St. Athanasius’ two treatises contra apollinarem

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VI

The Soul of Christ

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-5 Dec. 1983
VI.1 Introduction

The question concerning the place of the soul of Christ in Athanasius' Christology has been the most controversial and intriguing topic in Athanasian studies since the closing years of the nineteenth century. Originally it was raised for the first time (1) by F.C. Baur of Tübingen in the middle of the nineteenth century, and soon afterwards gained a definite place in the emerging manuals of Dogmengeschichte. It was however at the closing years of that century that, owing to the efforts of Hoss and Stüiken (2), the question became a momentous issue in the history of Patristic Christology.

The thesis, propounded first by Baur and then by his successors, was that Athanasius' habit of designating the humanity of Christ by the terms flesh and body, coupled with the fact that he scarcely mentioned the soul explicitly, meant that the latter had had no place in the Athanasian doctrine of the Incarnation of the Logos. This thesis was intertwined with a new theory concerning the interpretation of Patristic Christology as a whole, which distinguished between two rival types of Patristic Christology, the Alexandrian and the Antiochene. These Christologies were respectively associated with two Christological models or schematisations, one based on the terms Logos and flesh (or body) and another on the terms Logos and man. The former was monistic in tendency and the latter dualistic.

It was in such a context that, as it was shown in the first part of this thesis, the traditional Athanasian authorship of APO1 and APO2 was questioned, since it stood in direct contradiction to the new perspectives of Patristic Christology in the history of
Dogma. The suitability of this Christological schematisation and particularly of its application to the Athanasian doctrine of Christ will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter of this thesis, where the work of the 20th century critics will be critically surveyed. In this chapter two tasks are set as targets: firstly the review of the particular debate concerning the place of a human soul in Athanasius' Christology as it developed in the twentieth century right up to the present time, together with the evaluation of this debate on the basis of the generally accepted Athanasian texts; and secondly, the outlines of the doctrine of the soul of Christ in both APO1 and APO2, as well as their comparison with each other, and of both with the Athanasian view. The aim will be to determine how far this question has important bearings upon the question of the Athanasian paternity of the two APO.

The twentieth century critics

Baur's critical thesis, which denies the presence of a human soul in the Christology of Athanasius, was defended at the close of the 19th century by Hoss and Stülken. Voisin criticised it valiantly and successfully at the turn of the century on the basis of an examination of the semantics of the anthropological terms of Athanasius' Christology. Voisin's critique was completed by Weigl's extensive study of Athanasius' Christology, which also defended, as was shown above, the Athanasian paternity of the two APO which provide conclusive evidence. The reservations of such eminent Protestant scholars as Adolph Harnack and Hans Lietzmann about the Baurian hypothesis, and also the impressive work of Voisin and Weigl
in favour of the traditional interpretation of Athanasius' Christology, made it seem that the Baurian hypothesis about a latent Apollinarianism in Athanasius' mind had been decisively shaken, if not completely defeated, by the middle of the first half of the 20th century.

It was not until 1942 that the whole question concerning Athanasius' Christology was reopened by an essay of the Roman Catholic Patristic scholar M. Richard, which has remained ever since in the centre of the discussion on Athanasius' Christology. Richard's essay, entitled *Saint Athanase et la psychologie du Christ selon les Ariens*, provided a new impetus for further investigations, and as a result an impressive series of essays on the question of the soul of Christ in Athanasius' doctrine saw the light of day. It is this second phase, as it may be called, of the debate over the Christology of Athanasius that this chapter is designed to explore and then attempt to recapitulate the present state of the debate, making at the same time some fresh suggestions.

VI.2 M. Richard's Essay

Richard began his argument by saying that the defenders of the integrity of Christ's humanity in Athanasius' thought should at least be prepared to concede to the fact that before AD 362 there is not even the slightest mention of the soul of Christ in the authentic works of the holy doctor. This, he says, is an embarrassing fact which needs proper investigation. He then points to Voisin's way of circumventing this obstacle, which is based on two arguments: firstly on the fact that the terms flesh and body were not used by Athanasius in an exclusive or restrictive sense, and secondly on the
fact that the question concerning the soul of Christ had not been raised at that time, i.e. in the context of the Arian debate. It is this last argument that Richard sets out to contest in his essay and to interpret the silence of Athanasius on the soul of Christ as his agreement with the Arians and the Apollinarians. He does this by claiming that at least once, the question concerning the soul of Christ had been most explicitly put to Athanasius, as the case of CAR3 indicates, and he failed to respond. If in other cases, says Richard, Athanasius' silence could be explicated in favour of the traditional thesis, the case of CAR3 could not be the same. Richard regards this case as crucial for the whole debate and therefore embarks upon a minute analysis of it. He divides his work into three main sections which deal with (i) the Arian Christological text of CAR3, 26, (ii) the Athanasian Christology and (iii) the Athanasian refutation of the Arian Christological position.

In the first section of his essay Richard organizes an Arian text, which he claims to be cited in CAR3, 26, into four main theses. This anonymous text, which he sees as deriving from the pen of a great doctor of the Arian sect, and which Bardy failed to include in his collection of the Arian collarcionist literary fragments, is, he says, of great value particularly because of its isolation. Then, he proceeds to a detailed analysis of this fragment. He identifies seventeen N.T. texts in it, which are divided into four groups and are used to prove four main Arian Christological theses.

(II) He is not true Power of the Father by nature, because He was frightened and troubled (John 12:27-28, Matth.26:30, John 13:21).

(III) He is not true Wisdom of the Father by nature, which is proper to Him (Luke 2:52, Matth.16:13, John 11:18, Marc 6:38).

(IV) Finally He could not be the proper Logos of the Father (Matth. 27:46, John 12:28, John 17:5, Matth.26:41, and Marc 13:32).

On the question whether this text is a literary fragment deriving from a definite Arian text, Richard does not offer any clear argument. On the one hand, he points out Athanasius' disrespect for the Arian texts, demonstrated in his careless and general manner of citation, and on the other hand he asserts that clearly the Bishop of Alexandria could not have composed this text from memory, especially the seventeen biblical citations which support the four main theses. Therefore Richard brings forward the conjecture that this text certainly produces a resumé, or perhaps schematizes with sufficient fidelity the argumentation of an Arian book which might well have been the Συνταγμάτων of Asterius, the only Arian work explicitly cited in CAR3,2 and CAR3,66, or another ancient writing of the Arian sect.

Having thus organized the Arian fragment of CAR3,26 Richard puts forward the argument of his essay. He claims that the reasonings of the Arians evidently presuppose as a preliminary condition the fact that the Logos had taken the place of the soul in Christ. This, he says, should not surprise us, for it is a thesis well attested in Arian Christology. But it is CAR3,26 which actually demands such a precision, says Richard. The first thesis attributes to the Logos the most human psychological sentiments and limitations.
The second thesis affirms that He was afraid. The third that He grew up in wisdom and grace, that He was truly ignorant of what His disciples would give as a response to His question at Caesarea Philippi, or where Lazarus would be laid at his burial. The fourth thesis pointed out that He prayed not to enter into temptation and to be given power to overcome the feebleness of the flesh.

It is true, says Richard, that the Arians entertained a high doctrine of the Logos. They placed Him above all the other creatures attributing to Him an essential role in the creation of the world, recognizing in Him a power and a knowledge which, though not the power and knowledge of God Himself, were nevertheless very considerable. Athanasius' reproach of Asterius for having compared the power of the Logos with that of a caterpillar was but a simple nicety. The sophist simply wanted to prove that the expression "power of God" was equivocal and did not necessarily signify the personal power of the divinity. In order to comprehend the Christological system of the Arians, Richard goes on to assert, one should not forget that in their eyes the Incarnation was totally a test imposed by God on the Logos for justifying the privileges which He had originally received. For the Arians the Logos, in taking up human flesh from the Virgin, came to be in the humble condition of a simple human soul, which had, as it were, to start from zero in order to conquer the knowledge and the virtue. It was on account of entering into such a condition that the Logos was ignorant even of His own substance. Richard admits that the poverty of our information concerning the Arian doctrine does not permit a decision as to whether the Arians attributed such a humiliation to the Logos in the sense...
of an alteration of His nature, or in the sense of a provisional limitation of His power imposed on Him as a consequence of His entry into a body, but the crucial point of the attribution of such a humiliation to the Logos remains. The Arian text of CAR3,26 is particularly relevant here, because it invokes biblical arguments which are attributed of the Logos, although they are directly concerned with the psychological feebleness of Christ. Richard remarks that the fourth-century critics of the Arians, including Saint Athanasius himself, wrongly accused the Arians of attributing such feeblenesses to the flesh, and to prove this he cites a text from Severus of Antioch, according to which, in the Arian doctrine of the Incarnation of the Logos, the divinity did not submit to the passions of the flesh, but only to those passions which naturally belong to the human soul. This, says Richard, clearly means that the Logos occupied the place of the soul in the man Jesus in the Arian Christology. Judged by modern theologians, says Richard, this system is naturally criticised as presenting a Christ who is neither God nor man but a 'unique monster'. The judgment, however, passed by Athanasius was different. He had no difficulty in accepting the Arian view that a divine spirit could become human by uniting with human flesh or taking up a human body. Like all fourth-century theologians Athanasius, says Richard, was influenced by Neoplatonic philosophical thought which saw the spiritual soul of man as a sort of angel-spirit enslaved inside a body. This outlook was modified in the Middle-ages by the appropriation of Aristotle's view of the soul as a substantial form of the body, a sort of spirit adapted to the body, which is specifically different from the angelic nature, and
therefore this outlook no longer applies to modern thinking which is fundamentally indebted to the legacy of the Middle Ages. It is in this light, says Richard, that one should understand why Athanasius' replies to the Arian theses presented in CAR3,26 are based on the accusation that the Arian Christ is simply a man like the Christ of Paul of Samosata and the Jews. Richard claims that Athanasius does not criticise the Arians on the level of anthropology. He never accuses them of having arrived at a partial being, but of regarding the Logos as an ordinary man. The reference to Paul of Samosata already appears in the beginning of CAR3,26 and reappears in CAR3,51, while the reference to the Jews is extensively discussed in CAR3,27 and 28. Athanasius knew well that the Arians believed in the pre-existence of the Logos and that they attributed to Him a superior dignity in comparison with the angels, but he was also aware that they admitted to His Incarnation and becoming man. His disagreement with them was not that the Logos did not become a man, but that, in becoming man, He had been so totally conformed to the figure of an ordinary man that He had lost all His celestial prerogatives.

It is with the purpose of clarifying this point further that Richard embarks upon a full examination of Athanasius' Christology as it is presented in CAR3 in the second section of his essay. Before looking into the details of this examination, a few critical comments on what has already been said may be made.

Three main criticisms can be advanced against Richard's presentation of the Arian-Athanasian debate in CAR3,26ff.

(i) With regard to the Arian denial of the soul of Christ and its replacement by the Logos, it must be said that there is
absolutely no clear Arian textual evidence. Not one of the Arian Fragments included in Bardy's collection witnesses to this point. The thesis is supported by comments made by anti-Arian writers from the late-4th century onwards, but it has never been clearly established. Also there seems to be a logical lacuna in the relationship between such a view and the general Lucianic background to Arianism which on the whole favours a Jewish prophetic model for Christology. In the present case, the allegedly Arian text cited in CAR3,26 does not state explicitly that the Logos took the place of the soul in the humanity of Christ. This is simply inferred by Richard, but it is obvious that it does not have to be so. The attribution of the psychological passions of Christ to the Logos could equally be explained in the same way as the fleshly passions. The fact that Athanasius does not contest with the Arians about the soul of Christ could more naturally be attributed to the fact that the Arians did not bring the soul, or the replacement of the soul by the Logos, into their argumentation. The contest, as the text of CAR3 indicates, was about the propriety or impropriety of attributing the weaknesses of the incarnate Logos mentioned in the Gospels to the Godhood of the Logos, and thereby drawing out the implications of this for His divine status and His relation to the Father. It could be that a deeper implication of the Arian habit of arguing for the secondary, adoptive, or relative character of the divinity of the Logos from the 'psychological' weaknesses which He exhibited at His incarnation, was indeed a sort of replacement of the soul by the Logos, but the obvious and crucial principle in this way of thinking was the fact that the becoming of the Logos was attributed
to His Godhood and not to His manhood as Athanasius insisted. It is this basic principle that emerges from the debate as Athanasius' main concern. By attacking this, rather than its implications, he was defending the general perspectives of the Incarnation, and particularly the relation between theology and economy. This is the way in which the Cappadocians understood the teaching of Athanasius, and it is in this light that we would have to say that, even if Richard is right in pointing out that Athanasius 'failed', as it were, to attribute the psychological passions of Christ to His soul, the evident fact that he attributed them to the flesh and not to the Logos or His Godhood, at least implicitly, but certainly logically, called for an understanding of the term flesh in a holistic way, which would include not only the crude somatic experiences, but also the psychosomatic and psychic ones, and all that belongs to the human nature and experience. Athanasius did say this explicitly in his well-known statement in CAR3, 30 and later on in EPI and ANT. Indeed the Church in her ecumenical standards combatted the Apollinarian denial of a soul in Christ by employing Athanasius' formula based on a flesh which was said to be not reasonless, or soulless, or mindless or imperfect. The Synodical Epistle of AD 382, which gives us the official 'minutes' of the Second Ecumenical Council of Constantinople, states among other things that, καὶ τῶν τῆς ἐνανθρωπίας ἡ ἀτελές τῆς σαρκός οἰκονομίαν παραδεχόμενον (Mansi, Concilia, iii, 584/5). Even as late as the VIth ecumenical Council of Constantinople in 680/1, the Ηρώς of the Council speaks of the νοσοῦσα δύναμιν τοῦ Κυρίου σώματος (ibid. xi, 633), and even
subordinates the notions of will and energy to it.

(ii) It is a gross and inaccurate simplification to say that there are two views on the soul, the Neoplatonic patristic and the Aristotelian scholastic. Origen already knew how intricate the subject was and, at least once in the De Principiis, pointed out that the matter was not settled by the Apostles, or by their successors in the Church. The same was applicable at the time of Athanasiius and throughout the Patristic era. There is no explicit official, or ecclesiastical view on the soul in any of the ecumenical documents of the faith. Not only the semantic content of the term, but also the manner of its employment in theological, Christological and anthropological Patristic discourse present a wide-ranging variety of application which defies such rigid definition as suggested by Richard. This is true not only of theologians, but also of philosophers. In any case, there is little, if any, explicit evidence in the writings of the Fathers that they based their dogmatics on philosophical assumptions. Even though they did use philosophical notions and arguments for apologetic and polemical purposes, their foundation was rooted in the biblical data (both linguistically and conceptually) and especially on the epitome of the Apostolic tradition, the Rule of Faith. It is most improbable that Athanasius would have shared with the Arians the view of the soul which Richard has mentioned, namely that it was a sort of spirit imprisoned in the body. This is made crystal clear in the Athanasian perception of salvation which rests on the idea of the reconstitution of the whole man in his physical condition including the soul and the body. This holistic understanding of man's salvat-
ion, coupled with the well-known Athanasian emphasis on the resurrection of the body as the *sine qua non* of soteriology, render Richard's claim very dubious. Athanasius never says that Christ took up only a part of human nature. He rather affirms that all that belongs to human nature was taken up by the Logos, because all of it was in need of salvation. Even the 'crudest', or more restrictive, term in Athanasius' anthropology and Christology, the term body, witnesses to this holistic outlook, if one takes into account the intense debate among Athanasian scholars as to whether the body of Christ signifies a single body or a mystical body which comprises the bodies of all men and indeed the whole human race. In view of all this Richard's insinuation about a mere body in Athanasius' picture of Christ appears to be remote and obsolete.

(iii) Even though Richard asserts that Athanasius did not use an anthropological argument against the Arians, he fails to see the plain fact that the contest was not so much about the human state of the Logos, as about His eternal divine status irrespectively of the Incarnation, i.e. about His Godhood and His relation to God the Father. However, a closer look at the text of *CAR3* shows that he did in fact employ a form of anthropological argumentation in as much as he distinguished between what is proper to the Logos as man and what is proper to Him as God, i.e. in as much as he distinguished between the economy and the theology of the Logos. Athanasius' most distinct doctrine is that the properties of the flesh (i.e., humanity), whether somatic, psychosomatic, or psychic, should in no way be attributed to the Godhood of the Logos but to the flesh, although he conceded to the
biblical principle of referring every human property or experience to the Logos Himself on account of the fact that the humanity was His own and not somebody else's. Athanasius also saw a close interconnection and interaction between the Godhead of the Logos and His marhood, and even spoke of the deification of the latter, i.e. its appropriation of certain divine properties such as incorruptibility, immortality, perfection, sanctity and glory. Yet, he never spoke of a parallel appropriation of human properties by the Logos's Godhead. Had he held the Christological view which Richard suggests, the weaknesses of the Logos as man should clearly be related, in one way or another, to the Godhood of the Logos. But could Richard supply any evidence on this? It seems clear to us that the notion of the communicatio idiomatum in Athanasius' discourse exhibits only a manward direction, because the doctrine of the immutability of the Godhead is explicitly stated and definitively defended by him. The Letter to Epictetus, which was ecumenically received and appraised in Rome as well as in Antioch, makes this absolutely clear and indisputable.
The second section of Richard's essay deals with the Christology of Athanasius. It is built around the four Arian thesis of CAR3,26 preceded by a short introduction. In this introduction Richard prepares the way for his subsequent argument. He begins by saying that against the Arian position which held that the Logos became man in the full sense of the word, an Orthodox apologist would have to show (i) that the Christ who was said to be man was equally said in the Gospels to be God and immutable, and (ii) that the άνθρώπινα of the Saviour could not be invoked against His divinity and immutability. Richard claims that Athanasius did in fact dedicate CAH1 and CAR2 as well as CAR3,1–26 to a defence of the Godhood and immutability of the Logos. And then he remarks that, in view of this, one would have expected Athanasius to use the rest of CAR3 in defence of the doctrine of the Incarnation. This is in fact, he says, what Athanasius did. He set out to reply to the four Arian theses having first presented the general principles of his own Christology in CAR3,29–35. These principles centre upon the following hermeneutical theses: (a) the thesis that in scripture there is a double declaration on the subject of the Saviour, one referring to His eternal Godhood and another to the economy of the Incarnation, which corresponds to a distinction between two times, one anterior and another alterior to the Incarnation. Richard illustrates this thesis by quoting Athanasian texts from CAR3,29, 30, 43, and 55. He then points to Severus' use of the same thesis in support of his monophysitic Christology against John the Grammarian, in order to suggest that Athanasius' Christology was similarly monophysitic in its direction. As he says, at the basis of Athanasius' Christological
system there was one only opposition between the being of the Logos (l'être du Verbe, sa nature divine, sa divinité) and His becoming man (son devenir homme, sa condition humaine, son humanité).

In other words, Athanasius distinguished two conditions of the Logos rather than two natures, and therefore his thought approached the Arian position. The only difference was, that whereas for him the divine immutability of the Saviour was retained, even during His becoming man, for the Arians the Logos's privileges anterior to the Incarnation were momentarily lost, when He became man. This last point naturally leads to the second hermeneutical thesis of Athanasius' Christology, which deals with the meaning of the Incarnation.

(b) This is the thesis that the Logos became man and did not enter into a man (ἀνθρώπος δὲ γέγονε καὶ οὐκ εἰς ἀνθρώπον ἦλθε CAR3, 30).

Richard points to a text in CAR3, 30 which repudiates the prophetic model in Christology, as the reason behind Athanasius' thesis. But he calls this a "chimerical apprehension", because he claims, that what we have here is in effect a Logos-flesh Christological schema set forward against a Logos-man one. This, he says, should be maintained in spite of Athanasius' clarification in CAR3, 30 that the term flesh denotes in the traditions of scripture τὸν ἀνθρώπον.

The use of this clarification by Voisin against Baur's thesis produced only an exaggerated argument, because Athanasius' statement was not absolute. Athanasius' intention was to stress the fact that the Logos really became man but was not changed into flesh (CAR3, 47 and EPI, 8). Richard agrees with Stürlen's view that in the statement "He became man" the "became" refers to the Logos. The Arians had in fact accepted this view, but clarified it further
by saying that the Logos became man by taking up a human body without a human soul. The question is whether Athanasius also shared this understanding. A negative answer would be given, only if it could be proved positively, that beyond the assumption of the flesh or the body Athanasius also admitted the assumption of a human soul. But this, says Richard, cannot be shown. Voisin's claim that, since flesh is synonymous for Athanasius to the terms ἄνθρωπος and τὸ ἄνθρωπον, the statement concerning the assumption of the flesh could also be interpreted as the assumption of humanity, again, says Richard, cannot be shown positively. Besides, ἄνθρωπος is not exactly synonymous with σῶμα or σώμα in either Athanasius or Apollinaris because it refers to the human condition of the Logos.

(c) The third hermeneutical thesis refers to the relationship between the Logos and the assumed flesh. This relationship, says Richard, is understood by Athanasius in two ways, firstly as the Logos being in the body (Λόγος ἐν σώματι) and secondly as the body being of the Logos, or belonging to Him (τὸν Λόγον τὸ σῶμα). These expressions says Richard appear constantly and are often used alternatively, as for instance in the typical statement of CARR3, 31, καὶ σωματικῶς, ὡς φησὶν ὁ ἀνκόστολος, κατώρθυσεν ἡ θεότης ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἵνα τῷ φάναι, θεὸς ἢν, τὸν ἑστὶ σῶμα. Further, Richard points to two images illustrating the Athanasian conception of the Incarnation. These are, the image of the Logos putting on the flesh (ἐνδοθεοκεσαί, ἐνδόθεοκεσαί, περιμβάλλεοκεσαί, φορεῖν) and the image of the Logos dwelling the flesh, as if it were a house (οἶχος ἐν ὧ ἡ θεότης κατώρθυσεν). These 'Antiochene' images, as they are often qualified, says Richard, are but images, and should not be pressed to ultimate
limits. Their real intention is to defend the statement that the properties (τά ίδια) of the flesh are justly attributed of the Logos, as CAR3, 31-33 clearly indicate. But in CAR3, 31-33, where Athanasius defends this statement over against the Arian teaching, he avoids speaking of psychological properties, and restricts his examples to physical feeblenesses. As a result he never speaks, as Basil did, of πάθη σαρκός εὐμυστου, as opposed to πάθη ψυχῆς σώματι κεχρημένης (Epist. 261, 3). It is in CAR3, 34, says Richard, that Athanasius arrives as it were at the knot of the problem, that is, the reconciliation of the impassibility of the Logos and His appropriation of the weaknesses of the flesh (τῶ ἀπαθεῖς τῆς τοῦ Λόγου φύσεως καὶ τὰς ὑπὰ σάρκας λεγομένας ἀσθενεῖας αὐτοῦ). But the solution he provides is based on the well-known text of I. Pet. 4:1, Χριστὸς οὖν παθόντος ἀπέρ ἡμῶν σαρκί. Although this time the list of the ἀνθρώπινα is extended and comprises the psychological weaknesses as well as the bodily ones, and as such provides Athanasius with a good instance for passing over to the examination of the Arian theses, he fails to respond to the occasion and includes the weaknesses of the soul of Christ in the πάθη τῆς σαρκός. The only distinction he makes is that which refers to the properties of the flesh and to the properties of the Godhead. The former are attributed of the Logos because the flesh is His. By pointing to a double meaning in the term ἵδιος, Richard speaks of two senses of propriety, one which refers to nature and another which simply means possession and implies close association. The former applies to the phrase τὰ πάθη τὰ ίδια τῆς σαρκός, and the latter to the phrase ἡ σάρξ ἱδια τοῦ Λόγου. But this, says Richard, exposes an ambiguity which Athanasius was
unable to overcome. Thus, on the one hand he never fails to add to his statements of attribution of the passions to the Logos the correctives, σαρκικὰς, ἀνθρωπίνως, μὲς ἀνθρωπος, ὅδ' τὴν σάρκα..etc, but on the other hand he does speak of this attribution on the basis of the flesh participating in the divine acts of the Logos, or at times of the Logos acting divinely through the instrument of His own body (ἡ δοξάνου τοῦ ὀλίου σώματος θεικῶς πράττοντα CAR3,35 or καὶ ὀργανῶν αὐτῆς τῆς κοφίας πρὸς τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὸ σῶμα CAR3,53 ). It is clear that by pointing to this ambiguity, Richard wants to imply that Athanasius' distinction between the passions of the flesh and the impassible Logos is watered down and comes close to the Arian position. The suggestion is that this ambiguity would have been avoided, had Athanasius referred the psychological passions to the soul of Christ.

(d) The last hermeneutical thesis of Athanasius Christology is presented under the rubric, the Logos as the unique subject of the divine and human actions of Christ. The question that has to be asked here as a consequence of the former three theses, says Richard, is whether the appropriation of the passions of the assumed flesh by the Logos is such that it allows the Logos to be the subject of these passions, just as He is the subject of the divine activities. Athanasius' answer is affirmative, he says, and is clearly expressed in the beginning of CAR3,35: ἐξάντον γὰρ τὸ ὀλίου γινόμενοι καὶ ἀμφότερα ἐξ'ἐννοι πράττομενα βλέποντες καὶ νοοῦντες. This text, Richard points out, shows Athanasius' strong sense of the unity of Christ. It is exactly the same sense as that which a modern theologian would attach to the unity of Christ, i.e. the sense of the
hypostatic union of the Logos with the assumed human nature. But Athanasius would express it in terms of the flesh being appropriated by the Logos, and not in terms of union of natures. The reason for this difference is to be seen in the fact that for Athanasius the Incarnation involved only the assumption of flesh and not of an entire human nature. This is why the passions of Christ were all attributed to the flesh and could not be divided between those belonging to a σῶμα and those belonging to a ψυχή, as Basil wrote to the faithful of Sozopolis. Athanasius, says Richard, does not know of such a distinction and therefore condemns the Arians "en bloc" in a way which is not justifiable!

Richard is right about the four hermeneutical theses of Athanasius' doctrine of the Incarnation, but he does not interpret their implications correctly, not only because he examines them in isolation from each other, and from the actual context within which they emerge, but also because he deliberately sets them into a monistic incarnational scheme (that of the Logos-flesh), which he dialectically contrasts to a rival incarnational scheme which is dualistic (that of the Logos-man), though this latter scheme, in his own admission, does not belong to the context of the Arius-Athanasius debate because neither of them actually adhered to it! Though the Incarnation is inevitably brought into the discussion, the heart of this discussion is not the nature of the Incarnation but, as Athanasius puts it, εἰ θεὸς ἦν ἄληθινός ἐκ τού θεοῦ, πῶς ἦδυντο ἄνθρωπος γενέσθαι; (CAR3, 27), namely, whether God the Logos could in fact become man, if He was truly God. The Arians clearly believed that God cannot become man because becoming involves change and God does not change. Thus they pointed to the human experiences of the Saviour in order
to deny the eternity and Godhood of the Logos (ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, ἀλλ' ἐτελεῖσθαι ὁ ἦν εἶχε σῶμα, ἀρνοῦται τὴν ἀποστητὴν καὶ θεότητα τοῦ Λόγου, ibid. 27). Athanasius insisted that the becoming did not involve a change of the Logos' Godhood, that the human experiences of the Saviour were connected with His humanity (which is designated as the flesh, or the form of the servant), and that what pertained to His humanity was referred to Him, because the humanity was His, or He Himself was present in it. The presence of the Logos in the flesh, or the human form which He assumed at the Incarnation, is not expounded by Athanasius in terms of His divine ousia but His divine parousia, i.e., His person. This is why Athanasius saw the Arian threat as ultimately denying God's incarnate presence. (as he says in CAR3, 28, ἀλλ' ἀρνείσθως τέλεουν, καθά καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν εἰρήκαμεν, τὴν τοῦ σωτῆρος ἐνορκοῦν παρουσίαν).

As regards Richard's presentation of Athanasius' four theses, the following criticisms could be made. His attempt to interpret the distinction between two sets of biblical declarations on the Saviour, or two conditions, or times in the doctrine of the Logos, in a monophysitic direction, is dubious, if not utterly unjustifiable. The unity of the Saviour is not one of nature, which results from a combination of Godhood and manhood, but of Person. Athanasius makes the Person of the Logos the basis of the union of the Godhead and the manhood, which are otherwise clearly differentiated. Only a deliberate fusion of the Person of the Logos and His Godhead would provide the basis for the kind of Christology which Richard envisages. Whereas this fusion could possibly be attributed to the Arians, it could never be applied to Athanasius' position,
which presupposed a unity of Godhead and a distinction of Father and Son within this Godhead. But more importantly, Athanasius distinguished between the divine and the human natures in Christ, even though he affirmed most clearly their union in the Person of the Son, as well as their interaction and intercommunion (in a manward direction). The following texts would suffice to show how wrong Richard's monophysitic insinuations are. In CAR2,70 Athanasius states that, διό τούτῳ τοιαύτῃ γέγονεν ἡ συναφή, ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν τῆς θεότητος συνάψι τῶν φύσεων ἄνθρωπον καὶ βεβαία γέννηται ἡ σωτηρία καὶ θεοποίησις αὐτοῦ. In CAR3,41 he states, οὕτως ἐὰν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα λέγηται πέρι τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἐν τῷ Θεῷ καὶ τοῖς φυλακαῖς τοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, πάντως καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν λεγομένων ἐνορμάτες καὶ ὡς ἄλλοτρια ταῦτα ἐκεῖνοι τυχόντες ὑπό τῆς θεότητος τοῦ λόγου ταῦτα λογισμωθεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι αὐτοῦ. The same can be inferred from the following text from CAR3,43 where Athanasius argues with the Arians about the true sense of the ignorance or growth of Christ; οὐδὲ τούτῳ ἐλάττωμα τοῦ λόγου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως, ἢ τοῖς ἐστίν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ τοῖς ἐκεῖνοι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως καὶ θεοποιομένοις. In CAR3,53 Athanasius insists that, οὐχ ἦν ζωὴ ψεύδης τοῦ λόγου τάς τις λόγους ἦν.

Such texts demonstrate beyond doubt that Athanasius' Christology could not be construed in a monophysitic fashion. The acknowledgment by Richard that for Athanasius the Logos did not loose His divine prerogatives in becoming man, certainly demands a distinction between the Godhead and the manhood, i.e. between two natures in Christ. This distinction is so plainly asserted in the above quoted statements that Richard's and Stülken's understanding of
áνερποκότης in a functional, as opposed to a substantial, way is ill-founded.

With regard to the second hermeneutical thesis of Athanasius, it seems that Richard failed to see that the Holy Doctor, in affirming that the Logos became man and did not enter into a man, was in fact saying that the Person of the Saviour was not a particular man but the Logos become man. The thesis refers to person and not to nature. And yet, Richard transposes it to a distinction between Logos-flesh and Logos-man, i.e., monophysitism or dyophysitism. In classical patristic thought the right Christological model belongs to neither of these dialectically opposed schemes, because it rests on one divine Person in two natures. Though Athanasius does not state this model in the explicit formula of the Council of Chalcedon, his emphasis on the Person of the Logos and his distinction between the Godhood and the manhood of the Incarnate Logos surely imply this model of duality in unity. This is in fact the way in which Athanasius' Christology was understood by the Fathers who after him stated the orthodox Christological doctrine more explicitly.

The real problem, however, with Richard's presentation of the second thesis of Athanasius is his claim that this thesis was in fact accepted by the Arians! If that was the case, then, why did Athanasius put it forward as an argument against the Arian position? Surely the Arians must have argued in a way which, rightly or wrongly, sounded to Athanasius' ears as a doctrine of the Jews and the Samosatean! This was probably connected with their doctrine of Christ's Sonship, which for the Arians
was a Sonship by adoption and not by nature as the Orthodox insisted. As Athanasius states it in the beginning of CAR3, 26: τά ἀνθρώπινα κάλιν τοῦ ζωτήρος ἀκοδοντες καὶ βλέποντες ἐν τοῖς εὐαγγελίοις ἐκελάθοντο τέλεον κατὰ τὸν ἐμοσσοε ὑπὲς πατρικῆς θεότητος τοῦ Υίου καὶ τολμηρ ἢ γλώσσῃ θραυσυνίδενοι λέγοντι, πῶς σὺντα τὸ Υίος ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς εἶναι φύσει καὶ ὠμοιος αὐτῷ κατ’οὐσίαν καὶ λέγων, "ἐδοθη μοι (τῷ Υίῳ) πᾶσα ἐξουσία", καὶ "ὁ Πατήρ ὁ διδόκει τῷ Υίῳ..." Richard claims that the only difference between the Arians and Athanasius was that they believed in a change in the Logos from a pre-Incarnate condition to a post-Incarnate one, whereas Athanasius maintained the two conditions simultaneously. CAR3, 26 indicates that the crux of the dispute, at least as far as the Arian 'text' and Athanasius' understanding of it go, was ὁ πατρικὴ θεότης τοῦ Υίου, or, whether the Son was ὁ ὀμοιος καὶ φύσει καὶ ἀληθινὴ τοῦ Πατρὸς or ὁ σοφία καὶ φύσει ἀληθινὴ καὶ λοία τοῦ Πατρὸς, or ὁ λόγος ὁ ὅποιος τοῦ Πατρός. The debate was not about the nature of the Incarnation, but about the true Godhead of the Logos, or Son, or Wisdom of God, who became Incarnate. There is absolutely no evidence whatsoever in CAR3 of Richard's alleged doctrine of the Incarnation, which involves the replacement of the soul by the preexistent Logos, and which he claims to have been explicit in Arius and implicit in Athanasius! This is read into the debate on the assumption that it was explicitly Arian and implicitly Athanasian. It is the actual theological nature of the debate, at least as Athanasius conceived it and stated it in CAR3, which militates against Richard's arbitrary impositions.

The intention of Athanasius' third thesis was again the distinc-
tion between the Godhood of the Logos and the flesh which He assumed at His Incarnation, so that every 'monophysitic' confusion of divine and human properties might be outlawed. The Arians, as Athanasius understands them and cites them, argue for the creaturehood of the Logos from the human creaturely properties which are attributed of Him in the Scriptures in His Incarnate state. These properties, whether somatic, or psychosomatic, or psychic — in fact such qualifications are not explicitly mentioned in the text, but are imposed by Richard — are not referred to the Logos because of an alleged monophysitic Christological model. There is no explicit evidence for that. They are simply employed in order to prove that a divine Logos could never have condescended to enter such a state, and by implication to affirm the creaturehood of the Logos. Nor, again, is it evident, as Richard claims, that it is the psychological weaknesses of the Saviour which the Arians refer to the Logos, on the grounds that He had taken the place of the soul in Christ, which constitute the basis of the Arian argumentation. There is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that the debate was based on any particular incarnational model. As it is stated in the text, it was a general debate concerning the implications of the Incarnation for theology. The Arians referred to all the weaknesses attributed to the Incarnate Logos as evidence against His true Godhood. By contrast, Athanasius attributed all these weaknesses to the Logos's manhood and distinguished clearly between the theology and the economy of the Incarnation. In view of the actual textual data, we are compelled to say that it was not Athanasius who failed to respond to an Arian 'psychological
argument', as Richard alleges, but rather, that it is Richard who has failed to see that Athanasius' attribution of all the weaknesses of Christ, including the so-called psychological ones, to the flesh, implies Basil's phrase of πάθη σαρκὸς ἐγκυμονεῖν. It must be equally said that there is no ambiguity in Athanasius' application of the adjective ἵλους. Athanasius unambiguously states that the passions are ἵλου of the flesh, and that they are also ἵλος of the Logos only in the sense that the flesh is ἵλος of the Logos. In other words, there are two senses of attribution here, one which is direct and refers to the relation between attributes and substance, and another which is indirect and refers to the relation between the attributes of a substance and the particular subject which possesses that substance. The ambiguity seems to be in Richard's argumentation, in as much as he fails to see the two senses of Athanasian attribution. His failure seems to be caused on the one hand by his unwarranted introduction into the Arian-Athanasian debate on attribution of two nuances of the term ἵλος and, on the other hand, by his refusal to see that what he calls participation of the flesh in the divine acts of the Logos is a sort of communicatio idiomatum which has a manward direction and does not involve any blurring in the impassible Godhead of the Logos. This is precisely the force of the language of "indwelling in the body", or of "using the body as an instrument": the fact that, in the Saviour, one does not see only human creaturely weaknesses, due to the flesh, but also powerful acts, which are communicated through the flesh but ultimately spring out of the Godhead. As our investigation of CAR3 on the suffering and death of Christ has shown, Athanasius combats the
Arian arguments in support of a creaturely Christ by balancing Christ's human weaknesses with His miraculous and saving powers. The acts of weakness and the acts of power suggest two natures in the Saviour, the human and the divine. This is sufficient to refute the Arian confusion and it is obvious that no explicit mention of the soul is required of Athanasius, since no explicit Arian argument is built upon it.

Athanasius' last thesis is another way of stating the second and the third theses together. Athanasius' ἄμφοτερα ἐξ ἑνὸς πρατ-τόμενα is a dynamic way of affirming two natures in one person. Richard, however, who seems to operate with a static understanding of nature and with an unjustifiable bias concerning Athanasius' alleged 'monophysitism', fails to see this completely. His ultimate failure seems to be the lack of a proper distinction between the personal subjective language demanded by the masculine ὁ ἐῶς, and the impersonal objective language denoted by the neuter ἄμφοτερα. In effect, Athanasius is saying that there is one personal subject but two objective realities in the Saviour. The Subject is the divine Logos and the two objective realities, the Godhead and the manhood which are united in the Logos. Athanasius' Arian opponents did not use any such distinction between a divine subject and a divine reality, because they had a monistic doctrine of God which prevented them from seen the Incarnation in its true significance. As Athanasius put it in the beginning of his Trilogy against the Arians, in CARL, 8, ἡς γὰρ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ περὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς ὁ τῶν Υἱῶν ἀρνομένους; ἡς δὲ οὖν, ἀντιχριστὸς ἀγνόησας τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς τοῦ Υἱοῦ γνησίαν καὶ ἀληθινὴν γέννησιν, πλανηθησάται καὶ περὶ τῆς
It will be shown in the seventh part of this thesis that Athanasius clearly distinguished between the Logos' οὐσία and the Logos' παρουσία. He related the former to theology and the latter, to the economy. Here the following citation from CAR2, 11-12 may suffice: "τῇ δὲ οἰκονομίᾳ, κατ' εὐδοξίαν τοῦ λατρείας, ἐκκόψη ὁ ίμας ἀνθρώπου καὶ συνισταται... έκει γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται γενόμενος ἀνθρώπου, οὐδὲν οἰκεστρεῖ λέγειν, καθάπερ προειρήται, εἶτε ἐγένετο, εἶτε πεπλασται, εἶτε ἐκτισται, εἶτε τεπλασται, εἶτε δοῦλος, εἶτε νιὸς παιδίσκης, εἶτε νιὸς ἀνθρώπου, εἶτε κατεστάθη, εἶτε ἐπεδήμησεν, εἰτε νυμφός, εἶτε ἀδελφος, εἶτε ἀδελφος. Πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τὰ λεξεῖδα τῆς ἀνθρώπων συστάσεως έδια τυγχάνει ὑντα, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ λόγου ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπου αὐτῶν γεγενησθαι σημαίνει... οὐ δει τὰς τοιαῦτας λέξεις εἰς τὴν θεότητα αὐτῶν ἐπιρμάνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖναν διὰ τὰ καὶ πῶς ταῦτα γέγραπται, καὶ πάντως ἀπαντήσει τοῖς ἐγγράφοις ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη οἰκονομία, ἦν ὁ ίμας ἀνεδεξαμένη. It seems that in his uncritical readiness to apply a monistic incarnational model to Athanasius' Christology, Richard failed to perceive the fine distinctions propounded by Athanasius in his CAR1-3 and therefore ended up minimizing the critical nature of the Arian-Athanasian debate and the radical difference in their approach to Christology and theology.

In the third part of his essay Richard deals with Athanasius' treatment of the four Arian theses. He explains that Athanasius does not exactly follow the order of the Arian text, and that his plan is more logical than that of his heretical opponents, and then he proceeds with the detailed examination and evaluation of Athanas-
The first thesis refers to gifts which the Son received from the Father. The argument of the Arians is that, if He received, He did not have, and therefore He did not share in the Father’s Godhead. Athanasius’ reply is purely theological and has no reference to the Incarnation. Having first balanced the statements about the Son receiving gifts from the Father with the statement of John 16:15, according to which all that the Father has the Son has, Athanasius claims that the former statements were said with the intention to forewarn us against the dangers of Sabellianism, or as he puts it, “to show that He is not the Father, but the Father’s Logos and eternal Son, who, because of His essential likeness to the Father, has eternally what He has from Him” (CAR3,36).

In CAR3,37 Athanasius suddenly passes to the discussion of the third thesis, i.e. to a discussion of “those things which are humanly said of the Saviour” and which imply ignorance in Christ. His reply is summed up in the statement, ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῇ θεότητι οὐχ ἔστιν ἄγνοια, τῆς δὲ σαρκὸς ἰδιον ἔστι τὸ ἄγνωσίν. In CAR3,38 he restates the same point as follows: ὅτι τῆς μὲν σαρκὸς ἐστὶ τὸ ἄγνωσίν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ λόγος, ἃς λόγος ἔστι, τὰ πάντα καὶ πρὶν γενέσεως γινώσκει. In other words, the Logos qua Logos is not ignorant; rather the Logos qua man is said to be ignorant, or is said to have been ignorant ἀνθρωπίνως, or to have been ignorant in the flesh. But this, says Richard, does not imply a real ignorance. “He upheld our ignorance so that He might grant to us the knowledge of the Father” (CAR3,38). Richard finds this way of arguing very subtle, because in effect it admits to an ignorance which in the last analysis is
not real. Richard draws the same conclusion with respect to the rest of CAR3,38 which deals with the ἔξουσία and the ὁδὸν which the Son received from the Father. Athanasius again says that the Logos received these humanly and explains this by saying that it was the flesh which really received them. The Logos is said to have appropriated these gifts because the flesh was His. As for the reason for this appropriation, CAR3,38 puts it like this: "so that when the Lord receives the gifts to Himself, the grace might be secured; for if a man received the grace, then the grace could be lost, as the case of Adam, who received it and lost it, demonstrates. Thus, οὐτὸς αὐτὸς ἴδιον ὁ σῶμα τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἣν ἀναφέρετος ἔχει χάριν γεννηται καὶ βεβαια φυλαξῆς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις". In CAR3,39-40 Athanasius supports this doctrine with the following three arguments: (i) if the Logos had received the gift as Logos, the benefit would have meant nothing to men (CAR3,39); (ii) if the Logos was improved by the Incarnation then the entire economy would have been beneficial to Him but not to us (ibid.); (iii) The Gospels clearly demonstrate that He received as man what He already had as God. These arguments which restore the value of the human things of Christ, i.e. the gifts which He received as man from God, also apply to the ignorance or the needs of Christ. Thus at the beginning of CAR3,39 he says: ἀνθρώπου ἵπταν τὸ λαβεῖν, τὸ χρήσειν, τὸ ἀγνοεῖν. In CAR3,40 he says that the same ἀνθρωπίνως ἐπυνθάνετο...and the same ἀνθρωπίνως ἐλαβεν εἰρηται. In CAR3,41 he says that the same one performed the works of the Father and the same one exhibited τῇ πάθῃ τῆς σαρκὸς... οἶνον ἐπυνθάνετο καὶ ἠγείρε τὸν Ἀδὰμον. Athanasius stresses the fact that these miracles were in fact performed by the Logos
through the body.

Richard criticizes this Athanasian method of argumentation on the grounds that it does not seriously consider the concrete point of view of the Arian polemic. Though he does not name this point of view, he probably means the fact that the gifts of authority and glory, the ignorance and the need to know, are psychological attributes and are applied to the Logos because He Himself constitutes for the Arians the psychological aspect of Christ. This is obvious from Richard's comment that, in a strict sense, the flesh, or the body, cannot be the ideal receptacle of the gifts of glory and power, or the basis of ignorance and conjecture. Indeed, says Richard, Athanasius escapes from the real force of the Arian argument only by means of a *gros malentendu*, i.e. by insisting on speaking only in terms of the flesh of Christ!

Three critical points can be raised here against Richard's evaluation of Athanasius' doctrine. (1) Athanasius' insistence on the language of the flesh would be a *gros malentendu* only if "flesh" was ἄψυχος. But no positive evidence can be provided in support of this supposition. On the contrary phrases synonymous with the flesh as the following, τα ἄθρωπα του άνωτήρως (CAR3, 35), τα ἄθρωπα λεγώμενα του άνωτήρως (CAR3, 37), τα ἄθρωπαι (CAR3, 38), ἄθρωπαι διὰ το σῶμα (ibid.) ἄθρωπον ἔστιν το λαβεῖν (CAR3, 39), ἀναθρωπίως (CAR3, 40) ἄθρωπον ἔστιν ζωή (CAR3, 41), την ἄθρωπότητα (CAR3, 39), ἄθρωποι (CAR3, 40) ἄθρωπον ἔστιν ζωή (CAR3, 41), την ἄθρωπότητα (CAR3, 39), ταῦτα την ἄθρωπότητα αὐτοῦ (ibid.), της ἄθρωπης φύσεως ζωῆν το αγνοεῖν (CAR3, 43), ταῦτα την ἄθρωπότητα αὐτοῦ (ibid.), της ἄθρωπης φύσεως ζωῆν το αγνοεῖν (CAR3, 43), strongly, if not conclusively, indicate that "flesh"
is not used restrictively but holistically, kata synekdochen.

(2) Not once is Richard's alleged Arian point of view mentioned in the text! And yet he prefers to charge Athanasius with deliberate evasiveness, if not utter failure, to meet his opponents' challenge, instead of seeking to understand from Athanasius' texts Athanasius' understanding of the debate.

(3) If for a moment one was to suppose, following Richard's suggestions, that Athanasius' response did evade the alleged argument of the Arians based on the Logos occupying the psychological aspect of Christ's being, because again supposedly he shared with the Arians the same Logos-flesh incarnational model, then, Athanasius' insistence on the argument that the ignorance and the conjectures must be applied to the flesh, or the authority and the glory must be given to the flesh, or τὰ πάντα ὁμώς ὑπεμείνεν καὶ τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἡμῶν ἐβάσταξεν, should be characterized as a deliberate docetic deception, if not a sheer mockery of grace! One could not escape from such a conclusion, in view of Richard's comment about the unreality of an ignorant or graced flesh.

If, however, Athanasius' arguments are to be taken seriously, then a different picture emerges. It is basically what Athanasius states epigrammatically in CAR3, 38: οὔδέ ἐπειδὴ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος πέπαυται τοῦ εἶναι θεός, οὔδέ ἐπειδὴ θεός ἦστι φεύγει τὸ ἀνθρώπινον... ἀλλὰ αὐτὸς ἱσοποιεῖται τὴν ὀδὸν καὶ λέγει ἑξονοίαν εἰληφέναι ὃς ἄνθρωπος, ἴνα δὲ ἔχει ὃς θεός. It is on the basis of such a unity in duality in Christ that Athanasius charges the Arians with a double error in CAR3, 39 in a statement which he puts in the mouth of his opponents as if it summed up their intention:
Richard applies the same logic to his exposition and evaluation of Athanasius' reply to the second thesis of the Arians advanced in CAR3, 54–58, but this time his criticism becomes even more explicit. This thesis emphasized the sentiments of trouble and fear which Christ experienced, in order to prove that the Logos was not by nature the power of God. The argument was based on the citation of three Gospel verses, John 12:27–28, Matth. 26:39, John 12:21. The psychological character of the argument, says Richard, is apparent, even though the human soul of Christ is not mentioned. In his reply, Athanasius makes no reference to the soul at all. Yet Voisin, Weigl and those who upheld the traditionalist view concerning Athanasius' doctrine of the soul of Christ, argued that Athanasius' treatment of such verses as the above indicates the assumption of a complete human nature by the Logos. This is particularly said to be apparent in CAR3, 55 where these words of trouble and fear (of soul) are said of Christ ἀνθρωπίνως. In CAR3, 56 they are said to be proper to Christ's humanity (ἀνθρωπότης), and in CAR3, 57 Christ is said to have pronounced them not as the divine Logos but as man (ὡς ἀνθρωπος). For Richard, however, these texts do not have the value which has been attached to them. Inasmuch as one is prepared to hear the Holy Doctor confess that the Logos "became a man," says Richard, inevitably one should be prepared to hear Athanasius speak of the "humanity" of Christ and qualify certain acts of His as "human," or by the adverb "humanly."
But, says Richard, everything depends on what precisely Athanasius meant by the statement "the Logos became man", especially in view of his emphasis on the Logos' Godhood. It is this meaning that Richard attempts to explicate at this point and makes the following remarks. In broad outline, Athanasius' interpretation conforms to his general schema. The Logos, as Logos, was not troubled, did not experience fear, and did not become anxious. It was "on account of His flesh", "as man", that He pronounced such words, or said such and such. In the course of his exposition, says Richard, Athanasius cites and explains two primary texts invoked by the Arians, but all too curiously, replaces the third text by the first text of the 4th thesis ("My God, my God, why has Thou forsaken me"). This, says Richard, reveals a tendency in Athanasius to minimize the arguments of his adversaries from the psychological infirmities of Christ and assimilate them with those based on purely corporeal weaknesses. This, he says, is the kind of displacement in the argument, which was observed earlier, but here it takes a very acute expression, inasmuch as Athanasius interposes such an insistence on the tears of Christ which does not aim at the Arian thesis at all! This appears in the beginning of CAR3, 54, while in the following paragraphs Athanasius sweeps aside the precise objective of the Arian thesis. He no longer refers to the question about Christ's trouble, but only to the tears, the hunger, the sweat and the corporeal sufferings. In the beginning of CAR3, 56 the conclusion is reached: ἔδει δὲ ἄχοδοντας (οἱ Ἀρετανοὶ) τὸ ἐξελάμψεν καὶ τὰ ὀμοια... ταῦτα τοῦ σώματος ίδια λέγειν. Having
thus dealt with Christ's trouble of soul, Athanasius turns to the fourth thesis referring to Christ having been forsaken by the Father, if only to assert, once more, that this could not be literally true. Richard points to M. G. Jouassard's examination of this case in 1925 and to his conclusion about the clarity of Athanasius' position — namely, that as Logos Christ was united with the Father, but as man was abandoned by Him. But he claims that Jouassard had forced Athanasius' understanding beyond its real intention, because (for Richard) Athanasius could not have said that the Incarnate Logos could, as man, be abandoned by the Father. Indeed, as Richard points out, Jouassard adduced evidence in support of this interpretation from the Expositio in Psalmos and from INC&CAR, which is dubious, and gave no text from CAR. Athanasius, says Richard, does say that Christ was troubled and ignorant as man; but he never says that He was abandoned as man. He simply wrote that He said, "My God, my God." In this verse Athanasius did not envisage anything else beyond a mere statement of words, in accordance with his general principle: ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀνθρώπος γέγονεν ὁ Κύριος καὶ Δόξα άνθρώπου γίνεται καὶ λέγεται τάτα, ἵνα καὶ τάτα τὰ πάθημα τῆς σαρκὸς κοσμίωσας αὐτὸς ἔλευθεραν αὐτῶν ταύτην κατασκευάζη (CAR3, 56).

The text, says Richard, invites us to believe that it was necessary for the Lord to pronounce this saying humanly, i.e., by the organs of His flesh; in order to deliver humanity from the feeling of the abandonment by God in death, or rather the feeling of the fear of death. Nowhere, claims Richard, does Athanasius admit the revelation of any personal sentiment from the part of the Logos at the death of Christ. The reference to the miracles which follow the
death of Christ, excludes such a hypothesis. So then Richard concludes that he is forced to admit not only that Athanasius fails to deal with the difficulty pointed out by the Arians, but that he aggravates it further! And to substantiate this more decisively, he turns to an analysis of two further problems discussed in CAR3,57 and connected with Christ's cowardice (δειλία) and death.

Christ's cowardice is based on the second text of the second Arian thesis, i.e. on "the Cup" in Gethsemane, when Christ asked that it might pass. Athanasius' answer is clear and swift. It is not the Logos that is afraid of death, but the Logos as man who says so, διὸ τὴν δειλίαν σάρκα. As Richard observes, Athanasius' explanation of the cowardice of Christ admits only of an extrinsic physiological possibility of δειλία in the flesh of the Saviour, and does not enter into any deeper psychological level. It is simply a supposed cowardice, a prétendue crainte, a νομικομένη δειλία, as the following text shows: περὶ δὲ τοῦ λέγειν αὐτὸν, "εἰ δυνατὸν παρελθῆσαι τὸ ποτήριον", μεθετεθῆσαν ταῦτα εἰρηκῷς ἑκτίμα τῷ πέτρῳ, λέγων, "οὐ φομένετε-τελ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἄνθρωπων". Εἰς τὸ νομικομένη δειλία τὴν ἡμῶν δειλίαν ἀφηρέτο, καὶ πεποιθεὶς μηκέτι φοβεῖσθαι τοῦ ἄνθρωπου τὸν θάνατον (CAR3,57). Thus, Richard says, that, by qualifying Christ's cowardice as prétendue, Athanasius admits that he was prepared to accept a sensation of cowardice at the moment of Christ's agony in the garden of olives, but with the proviso that this cowardice could only be understood in a physiological (and not a psychological) sense (un sentiment physiologique de crainte).
Having thus dealt with the problem of Christ's cowardice, Richard turns to the problem of Christ's death, which is also discussed in CAR3, 57. He starts by observing, that whereas in his previous arguments Athanasius insisted on the tears of Christ, in order to defend the view that Christ's trouble was a strictly physiological emotion (une émotion strictement physiologique), here he attaches himself to the letter of the text invoked by the Arians, and more particularly on the expression "my soul", leaning on the ambiguity of the word "soul" in the Bible. This is why he cites John 10:18 and Ps. 15:10. It is certain, says Richard, that in the first text "soul" means simply "life". But the bishop of Alexandria, he adds, goes even further. Seeing, with good reason, that this saying is an announcement of the death of Christ, he paraphrases it as follows: ὁ Κύριος ἐξ ἐξουσίας εἶχεν ὡς ἑδύα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος χωρισθηναί. Richard not only insists that the term body is employed here in a strict sense, but also that the separation of the Lord from the body is Athanasius' translation of the words ἔξουσιάν ἐξω θείναι τὴν ψυχήν μου, which belongs to the Gospel text cited by the Arians. This bold transposition, says Richard, does not permit us to say with Voisin that six lines above, in the phrase τὸ ταράτ-τεσθαι τῆς σωμάτως Ἰη, our Doctor shows that the term flesh is used kata synekdochen to designate the humanity of the Saviour. In all spiritualistic philosophies death is understood as the separation of the body from the soul. But here, Saint Athanasius speaks of the death of Christ as a separation of the Logos from His body, or attributes to the Logos the function of the soul! Stühlen, says Richard, has added to the value of this argument by backing it up with a similar exposition of EPI, 5-6, which again presents the death
of Christ as a separation of the Logos from the body.

Richard claims that without doubt the doctrine of the Logos abandoning His body at the instance of the death of Christ was maintained at that time in Alexandria, since the dogma of the integrity of the human side of Christ had not yet been officially recognized. But at the moment it is nothing more than a relic of an epoch which was not yet conscious of this dogma. Richard asserts that he has no doubt that this applies to the case under examination, and he insists that the entire response of Athanasius to the 2nd Arian thesis proves that he could not maintain a human psychology in Christ. Athanasius' Christological system was of the type of the Logos-flesh in the strictest sense! His interpretation of Ps. 15:10 confirms this conclusion beyond all doubt. The theologians who profess the assumption of a complete human nature by the Logos have used Ps. 15:10 to demonstrate that the body of Christ did not undergo corruption at the tomb and especially to prove against the Arians and ultimately the Apollinarists that the Logos truly assumed a human soul. This is what Didymus did (PG, 39:1233BC) and also Theodoret (P.G. 80,964). On the contrary, says Richard, Athanasius was only interested in the incorruptibility of the body of the Saviour. He had no comment to make about John 12:27 and especially about the statement "Thou shall not abandon my soul in Hades". He rather saw this in terms of the natural separation of the Logos from the body (CAR3,54 and 56, and EPI 5-6). With these remarks Richard concludes that his thesis concerning the absence of the soul of Christ in the thought of Athanasius has been proved conclusively. The examination of Athanasius' reply to the remaining Arian theses will simply add a counter-test.
The points of criticism which have already been made in connection with Richard's evaluation of Athanasius' discussion of previous Arian theses can also be applied here. It is not only Athanasius who does not mention the soul of Christ explicitly, but also his Arian opponents. The alleged notion of the Logos taking the place of the soul in Arian Christology is nowhere made explicit, and nowhere used as the basis of an argument against the Logos' Godhood. Further, it is nowhere stated explicitly that the Arians distinguish two sets of weaknesses in Christ, one somatic and another psychological, nor that they apply the former to the flesh and the latter to the Logos. Again, no such distinctions seem to apply in the case of Athanasius. Athanasius' holistic language does not admit of Richard's qualification of it as merely physiological (as opposed to psychological) and therefore partial. Richard deliberately plays down the rich anthropological terminology in Athanasius' Christological vocabulary, and focuses exclusively on the flesh and the body, giving them a very restrictive semantic content, not because he finds any explicit justification of this in Athanasius' text, but because he insists on imposing on Athanasius' doctrine quite arbitrarily the straight-jacket of his alleged strict Logos-flesh incarnational model. More importantly, Richard's interpretation of Athanasius' replies to the Arian positions not only amounts to a blunt and cavalier form of docetism, which is most untypical of Athanasius, and which, if it ever existed, totally escaped the notice of his contemporaries, but in the last analysis minimizes the gravity of Athanasius' dispute with the Arians by restricting it to a mere difference in words of attribution! More seriously still,
the Arian–Athanasian debate, as Richard explains it, is no longer seen as being primarily a serious clash over the doctrine of God and particularly the Trinity, but as a minor dispute between a sort of strict Arian kenoticism (our term) and an ambivalent or equivocal kenoticism propounded by Athanasius.

Apart from these general points of criticism the following more particular points are necessary in this case:

(1) First of all, there is no transposition in CAR3.54 from the "psychological troubles" of Christ to His bodily tears, as Richard alleges. It is not clear that Athanasius is debating what Richard has called for his convenience, the second Arian thesis. What is clear here is that the Arian thesis which Athanasius combats refers both to Christ's weeping and being troubled in His soul, and that Athanasius' response to it in exactly the same terms distinguishes clearly between the flesh and the Godhood of the Incarnate Logos in order to combat the real intention of the Arian argument as he understood it. Here is the text which states the Arian thesis:

Clearly, it is the Arians who say that Christ wept and said that His soul was troubled, and not only Athanasius! Athanasius, in his reply, affirms this, and even re-defines it by adding the cry of dereliction and the prayer in Gethsemane about the Cup. Here are his words:

This being the case,
Athanasius does not lead his argument straight to the "Flesh of Christ", as Richard claims. He first challenges the Arian Θεομάχοι on theological grounds and then turns to the implications of his theological argumentation for the Incarnation. It is only then that the flesh of Christ appears. Athanasius' argument can be summarized as follows:

(i) Only a mere man (ψυλός ἄνθρωπος) can be afraid of death, i.e., be troubled in his soul. The Logos Incarnate is not a mere man but God Incarnate. There is nothing that He can be afraid of as God.

(ii) There is clear evidence in the scriptures that, rather, He encourages others not to be afraid and be troubled. i) Matthew 10:28; 2) Gen. 26:24; 3) Joshua 1:10; 4) He Himself comes to death in order to destroy it, 5) the porters of Hades saw Him and crouched with fear (Job 38:17); 6) He spoke before-hand of the Jews' plot against Him, but He did not run away (Mark 8:31); 7) when He was sought by the Jews, He said "I am" (John 18:5); finally, He Himself said that He could avoid death, if He wanted to, "I have authority to lay my soul and I have authority to take it up again" (John 10:18), and "Nobody can take it from me" (John 10:18).

(iii) On these considerations Athanasius accuses his opponents not only of being Θεομάχοι, but also Χριστομάχοι as the Jews, because they apply the statements "He wept and was troubled in His soul" to Christ as God, if only to deny His Godhood. In fact, οὖν ἦν ἡμεῖς φῶσει τοῦ Λόγου ταῦτα ἦν Λόγος ἦν, says Athanasius.

(iv) The last statement naturally poses the question of the Incarnation. Statements like those mentioned in the Arian argument are said of the Logos because ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ παρχόν συνεχέστερον ἦν ὁ Λόγος.
They were not said of Him before the flesh, but when the Logos became flesh, and became man, and therefore these things were said of Him humanly. Obviously, as far as Athanasius' understanding goes, his debate with the Arians was about the Godhood of the Logos and not about the nature of the Incarnation, as Richard claims. This is why, having said that the weeping and the trouble of soul were said of the Logos on account of His Incarnation and Inhomination, Athanasius immediately turns to further evidences for the Logos' true Godhood. He writes thus: "Never mind about these things having been written of Him; because of Him also it is written that He raised Lazarus, and made the water into wine, and made the man born blind to see, and said "I and the Father are one". And so Athanasius re-casts the whole net of his argument against the Arian claims: εἴπερ οὖν ἐκ τῶν ἄνθρω- πίνων προφασίζονται ταπεινά νοεῖν περὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ, μᾶλλον ὅσα ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν ὄλον ἐκ γῆς καὶ ἐς οὐρανοῦ νομίζοντο, οἷα τί μὴ καὶ ἐκ τῶν θεῖων ἔργα ἐπιγνώσκουσι τὸν ἐν τῷ ηατρί Λόγον, καὶ λοιπῶν ἄρνονται τὴν ἱσταν ἀσέβειαν; . . . εἰ τοίνυν ἐκλαυσαν καὶ ἐπαράξηθαν οὐχ ἢν ὁ Λόγος ἢ Λόγος ἢστιν ὁ κλαίων καὶ τραυσμόμενος, ἀλλὰ τῆς σαρκὸς ἢν ἱσταν τούτῳ. Particularly interesting here is the phrase ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν ὄλον ἐκ γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ νομίζοντο, which implies a monophysitic Christology, in as much as it resembles Apollinaris' ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος ὁ Χριστός. It shows that Athanasius was aware of the deeper implications of the Arian Christology, but refused to argue anthropologically, for he found it more straightforward and ecclesiastical to base his argument on the Apostolic kerygma and the biblical data. He did not transpose the argument from a psychological level to a somatic one, as Richard contended. Rather, he
stressed again and again that the Arians deliberately emphasized one set of Christological statements from the Gospels, which really referred to the Incarnate economy of the Logos, in order to deny His paternal and true Godhead. Hence, he set out to counterbalance the Arian statements with numerous other statements from the Gospels which pointed to Christ's divine power and Godhead.

(2) With regard to the abandonment of Christ by God on the Cross, and particularly Jouassard's view, according to which Athanasius understood it as referring to Christ as man, it seems that Richard was wrong. He was certainly wrong in claiming that Athanasius' reply was based on the idea that the cry of dereliction was a mere statement of words and did not have any deeper implications. The Athanasi-an text itself, which Richard cites in his essay, does not say ὦς παρὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγεται τάῦτα, but ὦς παρὰ ἄνθρωπον γίνεται καὶ λέγεται τάῦτα. On the strength of this statement alone and especially of the phrase ὦς παρὰ ἄνθρωπον, Jouassard's interpretation seems to be correct. The corroborative evidence deduced from INC&CAR should not be too lightly dismissed, since scholars still argue that this remarkable treatise is a genuine work of the great Alexandrian. However, the strongest criticism against Richard's presentation of the abandonment of Christ on the Cross in Athanasius' mind, is his failure to grasp and mention what seems to have been the fundamental argument of Athanasius which covers nearly three quarters of his exposition. It is the argument from the indisputable Godhead of the Logos. Athanasius insists that Christ could not have been abandoned by the Father, for as Son, He is ὦ ἄνωτέρω ὦν ἄξι. This is why "the porters of Hades, crouched with fear, abandoned Hades", or why
the graves were opened and many bodies of saints were raised and seen by their own people, or why “death like a dragon ran away from the Lord”, or why “demons were troubled and sea was calmed with fear”, or why “the heavens were torn and all the powers were shaken”. The very fact that He speaks to the Father and says “why has Thou forsaken me?”, says Athanasius, indicates that He is still with Him (as God)! And in any case, the fact that the sea trembled at His sight, that the veil of the Temple was torn, and the sun hid its face, and the rocks were broken and the graves opened and those present at His death, who previously rejected Him, now confessed that He was truly the Son of God, leave no doubt whatsoever that the abandonment did not refer to Him as God. This extensive argument from another set of Biblical evidences for the Godhood of the Incarnate Son is totally ignored by Richard, even though it constitutes Athanasius' most important reply to Arian Biblical exegesis! One wonders whether, in dismissing this basically theological argument, and demanding from Athanasius "a personal sentiment from the part of the Logos on the occasion of the death of Christ and the cry of dereliction", Richard expects of Athanasius to adopt either an Arian, or a Nestorian position? Only these two positions would accept in Christ a creaturely person who is troubled and abandoned at the Cross. Athanasius was neither Arian, nor Nestorian, and therefore insisted that the human weaknesses of Christ were not connected with His person but with His body, His flesh, His humanity, His form of the servant. What naturally and logically can be extracted from Athanasius' doctrine is not an Apollinarian confusion of Godhood and manhood but the doctrine of the hypostatic union and the anhypostasia of Christ's
humanity when viewed in itself. This is the real import of the two central Athanasian dogmas, that "the Logos became man and did not enter into a man" (anti-Jewish), and that "in becoming man the Logos was not a mere man, but the Logos as man" (anti-Arian). It is in this sense that the emphasis in Athanasius' Christology is placed on the Person of the Logos. And therefore the orthodox alternative to a Jewish (or 'Nestorian') as well as Arian creaturely person in Christ, is not Apollinarianism, but Athanasianism.

(3) As regards Athanasius' νομιζόμενη δειλία, Richard seems to have completely misunderstood its intention. First of all it is not primarily used by Athanasius, because he applies it to the Arians. It is ἡ νομιζόμενη (ὑπὸ τῶν Χριστομάχων), and therefore it should not be translated as pretendue crainte, but as "their so-called cowardice". Secondly, Athanasius uses it positively by saying that it was the source of courage! Here is the crucial text: 'Ἰδεῖν γοῦν πρᾶγμα παράδοξον ἀληθῶς ὡς μετὰ δειλίαν λαλεῖν νομίζομαι οἱ Χριστομάχοι, οὗτος τῇ νομιζόμενη (ὑπ’ αὐτῶν) δειλίᾳ θαρραλέους καὶ ἀφόρους τοῦς ἀνθρώπους κατεσχέσασεν. In effect, Athanasius is not saying that the fear was unreal, but that it was of such a kind that it resulted in courage and fearlessness. As he explains in the preceding sentences, this was possible because the fear or cowardice of the flesh was combined with the Logos's divine will. "Ὅτελε γάρ ὁ παρθενότο, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἦν ἐλενχὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ἢν τὸ θέλειν ἐπὶ τοῦτο γάρ ἦθεν τῆς δὲ σαρκὸς ἢν τὸ δειλίαν ὥσι καὶ ἢς ἀνθρώπος ἔλεγεν τὴν τοιαύτην φωνήν. Καὶ ἀμφότερα πάλιν παρὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐλέγετο, ὥς ἔδειξαι, ὅτι θεὸς ἦν θελων μὲν αὐτός, γενόμενος δὲ ἀνθρώπος εἶχε δειλιώσαν τὴν σάρκα, δι’ ἦν συνεκέρασε τὸ εαυτοῦ θέλημα τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ
Athanasius argues that the whole context includes not only the ἐσένελα, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο πάλιν ἄφαντος, ἑαραλέον τὸν ἀνθρώπον πάλιν πρὸς τὸν θάνατον κατασχενάσῃ (CAR3, 57). In other words, Athanasius argues that the whole context includes not only the ἐσένελα, owed to the weakness of the flesh, but also τὸ θέλειν, or τὸ θέλημα, which is of the Godhood of the Logos. Viewed from this total Christological perspective the ἐσένελα, which is thought to be negative by the Arians, is in fact positive in a soteriological sense. Both Apostles and Martyrs understood it in this way, and as Athanasius puts it: ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἄγιων μαρτύρων καρτερικωτάτης προθέσεως καὶ ἄνορείας δεικνύται ὡς οὐκ ἦν ἡ θέστης ἡ ἐσένελα, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἡμῶν δείλαιν ἦν ἅφερομένος ὁ ζωτήρ (CAR3, 57). In the light of this exposition, it must be said that Richard's notion of a sentiment physiologique de crainte becomes as one-sided and pretentious as the νομιζόμενη δείλα τῶν ἀσαμάχων καὶ ἀριστομάχων Ἠρεμίαν! (4) The case of the death of Christ and of the place of the Logos in it is, on the whole, treated by Athanasius as the case of cowardice or fear of death. Therefore the same criticism advanced in the preceding paragraph against Richard's exposition can also be applied here. Since the case of death has been discussed in an extensive way in the general examination of Athanasius' doctrine of death, two main comments will be made here, one which refers to the general context of Athanasius' discussion of the death of Christ, and another which refers to the particular topic of the separation of the Logos from the body at Christ's death; and this will be done with the intention of exposing a double mistake in Richard's exposition. Firstly his mistake of misunderstanding the theological context of the Arian-Athanasian debate within which the particular topic of the death of Christ emerges, and secondly his mistake of seeing
the separation of the Logos from the body at the death of Christ as parallel to the separation of the soul from the body at the death of a man.

The main point of Athanasius' argument about the death of Christ in his discussion with the Arians, as CAR3, 57 and 58 reveal, is not concerned with the physiology of death, but with the question whether the death of Christ should be understood in human or in divine terms. The Arians make no distinction between what pertains to the Logos as man and what pertains to Him as God, and so point to the death of Christ as evidence for His lack of true Godhood. Athanasius insists against them that the death of Christ is to be understood ἀνθρωπινῶς, and points to that aspect of it which pertains to the humanity, and that aspect of it which pertains to the Godhood. To be troubled unto death, and actually to die, is to be understood ἀνθρωπινῶς; but to have authority (ἐξουσία) and power (ἐξουσία) over death so as to be able to lay down the soul and take it up again, is to be understood Θείως. In other words, Christ's death does not embarrass the Godhood of the Logos at all. On the contrary, if one sees all its aspects, i.e. both the trouble and the fear, as well as the authority and the power, one is bound to confess that Christ's death is the death of His humanity which is undertaken in order to be overcome by the Logos's divine power, since He is the Christ and humanity is His! Alas, Richard has understood nothing of this clear and profound Athanasian argument, which fully exposes the deliberate silence of the Arians about the distinction between the Logos' Godhood and the flesh which He assumed at the Incarnation with the purpose to deny the paternal Godhood of the Logos.
A careful analysis of the full text from CAR3,57 which speaks of the separation of the Logos from the body in the context of the death of Christ will provide the best basis for evaluating Richard's and Stüken's claims. Here is the full text arranged in a way that its distinctions and juxtapositions are brought out more clearly and their import is not carelessly overlooked:

(a) Πάλιν τε λέγων ἀνθρωπινως ἢ ψυχῆ μου τετάρακται,

(b) Τό μὲν γὰρ ταράττεσθαι τῆς σαρκὸς ἵδιον ἦν

(c) "Ἀνθρωπος γὰρ οὐ κατὶ ἵδιον ἐξουσίαν ἐξουσίαν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη φύσεως καὶ μὴ θέλων ἀποθνῄσκει,

(d) "Εκπεφε γὰρ, φθαρτὴν οὕσαν τὴν οάρχα, μηκέτι κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς φύσιν μένειν θυντήν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν ἐνδοσάμενον αὐτὴν λόγον ἄφθαρτον διαμένειν. ἄθανασίας.

The following important points of doctrine emerge from this text: In (a) apart from the obvious distinction between the Logos as man and the Logos as God, denoted by the terms ἀνθρωπίνως, and Θεῖκος, we also have a further distinction between the human soul of the Logos and the person of the Logos to whom the soul belongs.
This is denoted by the contrasted statements, a) "humanly His soul is troubled", and b) "divinely He (i.e. His person) has authority to deliver His soul (to captivity in Hades) and to take it up again". To put it in other words, inasmuch as the contrast is between the ταραχή of the human soul and the ἐξουσία of the person, whose soul this is, over its delivery unto death, the distinction is suggested between the human soul and the divine person of the Logos. Three implications follow from (a). Firstly, that the language of the soul is not excluded from the humanity of Christ in Athanasius' Christology; secondly, that the soul of Christ does not belong to any particular human person, but to the person of the divine Logos; and thirdly, that the death of Christ can be understood on the basis of a person-soul model as a delivery of the soul (to captivity in Hades) by the divine person of the Logos, but without any strings of ultimate necessity been attached to it, because this person, being divine, has authority to reclaim the soul (from its captivity). What is absolutely crucial here is the fact that the person of Christ is the person of the divine Logos, and the soul, the human soul which was assumed with the flesh at the Incarnation. The last point is made clear in the second contrast, which immediately follows the first in the text under examination.

The contrast made in (β) is meant to be a parallel case to that presented in (α) as well as a clarification of it. Here the ταραχή is attributed of the "flesh", which logically implies that semantically, the "flesh" is not incompatible with the term "soul" and most probably the former includes the latter. Here again the ἐξουσία of the person of the Logos is attributed of the power of
the Logos which presumably refers to His Godhood. The little phrase οὐχέτι τοῦτο ἵνα τὸν ἄνθρωπον indicates a contrast between the human persons and the person of the incarnate Logos. It suggests that the persons of men exist only in their souls (their nature), whereas the person of the incarnate Logos does not only exist in His soul but also in His Godhood. It is because of this, that He has the kind of authority over His soul in the context of death which other ordinary men do not have. This sort of personal divine-human contrast is further brought out in (γ). In (γ) it is said that a man (i.e., a human person) has no authority over its own death which occurs by natural necessity. In view of the preceding (α) and (β), this is saying in effect that a human person existing in its soul alone, cannot control the delivery of the soul to death (captivity in Hades) nor its emancipation from it, because such a person does not have the kind of divine resources which might enable it to exercise controlling authority over the soul's death.

The case of a human person's lack of controlling authority in death is contrasted in (γ) to the divine person of the incarnate Logos who possesses such an authority. Here it is said that this person who, being divine, is immortal, is in possession of mortal flesh and therefore can experience human death. But in this case death does not take place by necessity, but by the authority of this person. This means that this person can be separated from His body, because of death but, inasmuch as He has divine resources at His disposal, He is capable of overcoming death, i.e., taking up the body once again. In retrospect this means that by virtue of the same contrast, a human person is not separated from the body at his
death by his own authority, but by a necessity of nature, and therefore such a person lacks the possibility of being reunited with its body again. It is crucial to observe here that the contrast in (γ) is between any human person and the divine person of the inhominated Logos, and that it is drawn out in terms of their relation to the body in death. It is not a contrast between a human soul and the Logos, and therefore Richard's and Stixten's deduction is unjustifiable.

Death in (γ) is spoken of in terms of a person-body model and not in terms of a person-soul model, as in (α) and (β). Though the element of "person" serves as a link between the two models, the question as to their precise interrelationship requires a clearer answer. It seems that such an answer is provided in the reference to David's statement about the death of Christ, where the two models are combined. It is about this person of the incarnate Logos (πρὸς τοῦτον), says Athanasius, that David wrote that His soul will not be abandoned in Hades and His body will not see corruption in the grave. In other words, the separation of the Person of the Logos from His body in death is to be understood as the separation of His soul from His body, which implies His human death. Ultimately though, since this person has the divine resources to be in control over both body and soul in death, death can be overcome.

With these analytic clarifications in mind we may now restate what Athanasius is stating against the Arians with regard to the topic of Christ's death.

Christ's fear unto death is not an embarrassment to His Godhood, because it relates to His human soul, i.e., to His flesh, His humanity. Scripture witnesses to the authority of Christ as a divine Person
over death, understood as His ability to deliver His soul to death (to captivity in Hades) and to reclaim it again. (John 10:18). The authority of His person rests on the power of His Godhead. By contrast, no human person possesses such an authority. When a human person dies, then his separation from his body occurs by virtue of a natural necessity. This person has no resources (in his soul) to reclaim it and be reunited with it. But the Lord, being a divine person, has divine resources, which enable Him to reclaim His body when He is separated from it by death. This is because, as David says, this person is in control of His death. He is in control of the soul departed to Hades, and of the body which is deposited in the grave. So then, the whole event of the death of Christ, in all its aspects, and particularly its final outcome, namely, the abolition of the necessity of human death, far from constituting evidence against His Godhood, is in fact an indisputable proof that He is the true Son and Logos of God, one with the Father in His Godhead, who in taking up manhood in union with Himself and becoming man has achieved through His divine resources to overcome man's ultimate enemy, corruption and death, the dissolution of the body and the imprisonment of the soul in Hades.

This seems to be the natural exposition of Athanasius' argument against the Arians in CAR3, 57. Richard's alleged suppositions of a replacement of the human soul by the Logos in Christ, and of a strict application of a Logos-flesh incarnational model from the part of Athanasius, not only find no explicit mention in CAR1-3, but make a real travesty of the Athanasian text. It is above all in the last statement (ὁ) which is permeated by typical Athanasian
soteriological overtones, in CAR3,57, that the fundamental perspective of Athanasius' doctrine is revealed. The flesh (i.e. human nature) is mortal, and when it dies, it remains hopelessly in the state of death. It can only be delivered from death and mortality if it is taken up by the incorruptible Logos. This is precisely what the Incarnation and the whole Incarnate economy, whereby He became like us and imitated us, is all about. It is about the transmission of His immortality to our humanity.

In the third part of section three of his essay Richard deals with Athanasius' reply (CAR3,51-53) to the third thesis of the Arians which concentrated on the notion of wisdom in Christ and claimed that it should be distinguished from the wisdom in God. The Arian claim was based on two arguments, the argument from Christ's growth in wisdom deriving from Luke 2:52, and the argument from Christ's ignorance deriving from Matt. 16:13, John 11:34 and Mark 6:38. Athanasius discussed the second argument in connection with the first Arian thesis, and therefore this section is entirely devoted to the discussion of the growth or progress of Christ.

Before the presentation of his views, Richard refers to the examination and evaluation of Athanasius' discussion of this topic by R.P. Schwalm in 1904. He summarizes Schwalm's findings by means of two citations from his essay, one from the beginning of the essay and another from its conclusion. The first one states the following: "It is neither a mere man who progresses in Jesus, nor the Logos as Logos; it is a man united with the Logos, whose progress becomes the instrument of the progressive manifestations of the Godhead". For Richard the claim of a man united with the Logos in Athanasius'
Christology is absolutely unthinkable. "Nothing," he says, "could push further away the sentiments of Saint Athanasius, than this notion." The second citation from Schwalm reads as follows: "We believe then, that we have been able to conclude here, that the thought of Athanasius is inclined with all its force to the explicit idea of an interior growth in the human wisdom of Jesus. It appears that Athanasius holds back from explaining this in proper terms, because of some sort of prudent theological restraint. The notion of the person, which is immediately related to the whole debate, is not adequately clarified. It is the opposite weight which arrests here a marching thought." Richard's remark here is that the notion of the person has nothing to do with this discussion. If there is a notion which seems to be at the centre of the discussion here, it is that of human nature.

Richard does not deal with Schwalm's argument. He simply says, that, "in spite of his immensely good will, this wise theologian could not find in the texts of Saint Athanasius even the slightest explicit affirmation of an interior growth in the human wisdom of Christ." It is this last point that he sets out to demonstrate by an examination of the relevant chapters of CAR3.

The primary aim of Athanasius in CAR3, 51, says he, is evidently the demonstration of the fact that the Logos as Logos did not progress. But the actual expressions in the text of our Doctor absolutely exclude the thought that Christ had himself progressed as man. So Richard cites a long extract from CAR3, 51 and puts the emphasis on the text, εἰ δὲ θεὸς ἐστὶν οὐδὲν φοροῦν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἀληθῶς... ἐκαὶ εἰχὲ προκοπῆν ὃ ἐστὶ θεῷ ὑπάρχων; 'in order to show
that in Athanasius' mind Christ is not a man united with the Logos, as Schwalm claimed, but the Logos clothed with flesh! Richard's basic contention here is that Athanasius' statements exclude from a Christ who is nothing but God clothed with flesh, the notion of progress at His becoming man. Whether Athanasius thinks of the Logos before or after His Incarnation, says Richard, he always thinks and speaks of the Logos as Logos, and not of the Logos as man. His main point, as he opens CAR3,52, is that progress is a matter connected with men, and not with the Logos. It is because of His condescension to take up human flesh that the Logos is said to have progressed. In fact, the progress primarily referred to the body, but secondarily, also referred to the revelation of the Godhood, which was coordinated with the former. Here again Richard cites another long extract from CAR3,52, which is centred on the statement: τοῦ οὐματὸς ἀρα ὡστίν ἢ προχώρητος αὐτοῦ γὰρ προχώρητος, προέχομεν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ φανερωσίς τής θεότητος τοῖς ὀρθῶν δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ θεότης ἀπεκυάλυτο, τοσοῦτον πλῆθος ἡ χάρις ἡμᾶς ὁμοίως ἡ καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάσιν ἀνθρώπως.

Richard contends that the body is understood here in a strict sense, whereas the grace is defined only extrinsically by its effect on the spectators, or literally, "on the eyes of the spectators"! He also points out that Saint Luke's qualification of the progress as being κατὰ ὡεόν is dropped by Athanasius, so that he may concentrate all the attention to the growth of the body, and emphasize its role as an organ for the grace of the divine manifestation.

Finally Richard examines two more texts from CAR3,52 and CAR3,53 which deal with the precise notion of "growth in wisdom" of Luke 2:52, which was of primary importance for the Arians. In the first text
Luke's προέξοκτεν σοφία is interpreted as προέξοκτεν ἐν σοφίᾳ, and in the second text it is turned into προέξοκτεν ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ. This is done with the intention to argue that οὐχ ἢ σοφία ἢ σοφία ἐστίν, αὐτὴ καθ' ἑσυχίν προέξοκτεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ προέξοκτεν. Richard observes that not only a psychological interpretation of this text is avoided, but also such statements as τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ προέξοκτεν ὑπεραναβαλόμενον κατ' ἄλλην τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν καὶ θεοποιοῦμενον καὶ ἄργανον αὐτῆς πρὸς τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς θεότητος καὶ τὴν ἐκλαμψιν αὐτῆς γίνομενον καὶ φανερώμενον πᾶσι refer to nothing else but the body of Christ in a strict sense, which is said to be elevated above its natural condition and be deified.

Richard's methodology in this case is not different from that of the previous cases. His criticism, therefore, does not come as a surprise. It seems to be conditioned by his general presuppositions concerning Athanasius' Christology. His dismissal of Schwalm's investigation is quite superficial. Schwalm, unlike Richard, has clearly understood and expounded the debate between Athanasius and the Arians, and has set it in its proper context, namely, the general direction of Alexandrian thinking as exemplified in its two main concerns, the safeguarding of the unity of the Logos become flesh and the rejection of the Samosatean heresy which saw Christ as a common man like one of the prophets of Israel who differed from them only in degree. Richard's main contention against Schwalm's exposition of the Athanasian exegesis was that his claim for the notion of a growth in wisdom of Christ as man could not be substantiated from the text of CAR3, 51-53. In this text Athanasius knew only of two notions of growth, one which referred to the body and another which
was correlated to it and referred to the manifestation of the Godhood of the Logos. Athanasius, Richard argued, could assert that Christ was said to have grown in wisdom as man, but not that He actually did so. A careful re-examination of CAR3, 51-53 will serve as the best way of arbitration between Richard's and Schwalm's expositions.

CAR3, 51 explicitly indicates that, in the first instance, Athanasius understood his disagreement with the Arians over the meaning of the growth of Christ in Luke 2:52 to have direct reference to the theological aspect of Christology and particularly the doctrine of the Incarnation. The crucial question raised by that disagreement was whether Christ was God incarnate, or a creature; whether He was the Logos clothed with flesh, or become flesh, or descended on the earth, or whether He was a mere man. The latter view was expressly identified as the Samosatean and Athanasius challenged his Arian adversaries by saying that they agreed with it ὠνήματι, though not τῷ ὠνήματι. Obviously, he was not concerned with the precise relationship between the Samosatean and the Arian Christologies, but with their common rejection of the true Godhood of Christ. In both cases Athanasius saw Christ being reduced to a mere man, a creature, inasmuch as the progress was attributed to Him. Over against this psilanthropic creaturely Christ, Athanasius defended the traditional doctrine of the Church which was based on the Incarnation of the very Logos and Son of God. It was the true Godhead of the Logos that, in the first instance, excluded the kind of interpretation of the Lukan verse, which Samosateans and Arians alike had advanced. Athanasius devotes the entire chapter to a defence of this theological Logocentric first premise of the Church's Christology. "If Christ is God the Logos,
then what sort of progress can He undergo who is equal with God? If He is a Son who is always in the Father, where does His progress go? What is there beyond the Father which can be the basis of His progress? What is there beyond His being Logos, Wisdom, Son and Power of God that He may progress towards? Above all, how can He who grants perfection to others, progress in perfection? or how can He who gives grace to others and through Whom grace is given, progress in grace?" The conclusion to this argument is given in the opening sentences of CAR3, 52. The reference to the growth of Christ should not be understood in terms of the Logos or Son of God as such, for, if that was the case, His Godhood would be denied and He would have to be understood in a creaturely, philanthropic way, which is heretical.

Having thus defended the theological Logocentric aspect of Christology, Athanasius turns next to the human aspect of the doctrine of Christ in order to develop an orthodox understanding of the Lukan statement. Here his argument is distinctly incarnational and soteriological. Men, he says, are bound to progress towards God, but they have failed to do so. The Son of God, who is not bound to such a progress, humbled Himself for the sake of men, so that in His own humility (lit. ἐν τῷ ἐκείνου ταξεῖν ἡμῖν) they might find the ability to progress. This progress required of men, says Athanasius, is their detachment from the sensible things and attachment to the Logos. As for the humbleness of the Logos, it refers to the assumption of the human flesh. With these clarifications in mind Athanasius states that it is not the Logos as Logos who progresses but the Logos Incarnate who leads men to progress. In other words, it is humanly (ἀνθρωπισμός) that He is said to progress, because progress belongs to human beings.
and He has become one. Here we may pause and ask what precisely Athanasius means by the phrases ἐν τῷ ἐκείνου ταπείνῳ and ἀνθρωπίνως εὑρηται τὸ προκόπτειν. What else, but that the Logos Incarnate progressed in His humanity, as man? This is confirmed not only by the drift of the argument but also by a parallel case from CAR1,41 where the expression τὸ ταπείνον is also employed and is clearly synonymous with the ἀνθρωπότης τοῦ Λόγου (as distinct from His divine οὐσία), as well as with τὸ ἀνθρωπίνον. Καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον γὰρ ὁ ἅπερψεσθαι, οὔ τινι οὐδὲν τοῦ Λόγου γνωσμένην σημαίνει· ἦν γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐστὶν ἐν θεῷ ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος ἐστὶν ἢ ψωσις. Ὡς πρὶν γοῦν εἰρηται ταῦτα, εἰ μή ὅτε γέγονεν ὁ δόγος, ἦνα γέννησαν φανερόν, οὔ τὸ ἔταπείνωσο, καὶ τὸ, ὁ ἅπερψεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου λέγεται· οὔ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ταπείνον, τοῦτον καὶ τὸ ψωθήναι ἦν εἰ. Further along, Athanasius speaks of τὸ ταπείνον τῆς σαρκὸς and in CAR1,43 he speaks of τὸ ταπείνον ἡμῶν οἶμα which he equates with the οὐσίαν μορφή and the δούλωσθείσαν σάρκα τῆς ἁμαρτία. Such texts indicate beyond all doubt that Athanasius is not thinking in strict partial anthropological terms, as Richard claims, but in comprehensive holistic or synekdochic terms, always to emphasize the divinity and the humanity of the one Christ. This especially appears in CAR2,10 where Athanasius states, that, the Apostle ἐσθύσε περὶ τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ μνημονεύει, πανταχοῦ τῆς ἀσφαλείας γινόμενος, δι' ἐνα μᾶλλον τὸ ταπείνον ὑποφέρα, ἵν' ἐσθύεις αὐτὸν τὴν ψυχώσῃ καὶ τὴν πατρικὴν μεγαλειότητα γινώσκωμεν, and he does this whenever τῆς ἕνανθρωπόσεως αὐτοῦ διὰ τῆς ἀρχιερωσύνης μνημονεύει.

In view of all this, we may agree with Schwalm that the growth of Christ is said of Him as man, or because of His humanity.
This is further explained in the remaining text of CAR3,52 where Athanasius analyses the Lukan statement once more. The Evangelist, he says, very perceptively and accurately associated the growth with the stature (ἡλικία). It is obvious that the stature refers to the body and not to the Logos, and therefore we may be certain that the growth refers to the human body. But, Athanasius adds, in the growth of the body, or contemporaneously with it, there are other senses of growth. First of all there is the growth of the Godhood to those who saw. But then, there is also the corresponding growth of the grace which grew as from a man to all men (αὐτοῦ γὰρ τοῦ σώματος προέκυκτον ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ φανέρωσις τῆς θεότητος τοῖς ὀρώσιν· ὥστε ἡ θεότης ἀπεκαλύπτετο, τοσοῦτος πλείον ἡ χάρις τῆς ἡβαπήν τὸς ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις). It seems crystal clear, especially in view of the phrase ὡς ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, that alongside the physical growth of the body of Christ there was also, in Athanasius' mind, a human growth of Christ in grace, which had had both, an intrinsic and an extrinsic sense, and which was governed by the gradual revelation (or operation) of the Godhead. In terms of the Lukan text, the physical growth refers to προέκυκτεν ἡλικία, whilst the human growth in grace, both, intrinsic and extrinsic, refer to the προέκυκτεν καὶ χάριτι παρὰ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώποις. As for the growth of the revelation of the Godhead, Athanasius points to the child Jesus speaking to the priests in the temple, to Peter's confession at Caesarea Philippi, and to the general confession that He was the Son of God. So far, so good. But there was one more element in the Lukan statement, the προέκυκτεν σοφία. What did Athanasius understand by this?
Athanasius devotes the last sentences of CAR3, 52 and the entire CAR3, 53 to answering this question. The old and the new Jews (the Arians), he says, willingly shut their eyes so as to be unable to see, that the phrase "grew in wisdom" does not mean that Wisdom itself grew, but rather, that the human (element) grew in Wisdom. (ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄνθρωπινον μᾶλλον ἐν αὐτῇ (τῇ σοφίᾳ) προέχοπτεν). Whatever this human (element) might be, it could not be just a human body as Richard tends to believe. Perhaps the clue to the right understanding of this term is the following statement which is as puzzling as it is profound! That Jesus grew in wisdom and grace, says Athanasius, perhaps means, if we are to speak the truth, that ἀνήκε ἐν ἑαυτῷ προέχοπτεν! If this is not going to be a logical puzzle or a hybrid statement, then it should mean that He (as man) grew in Himself (as God), and in turn, that His humanity grew in His Godhood. The personal and the reflexive pronouns ἀνήκε and ἑαυτός certainly indicate one and the same person, and Schwalm is right in pointing this out, in spite of what Richard says; but it remains clear, that there is a play here with two significations applied to the same person: that of man, and that of God, behind which there are two realities the human and the divine. This again seems to be the import of the citation from Prov. 9, which closes CAR3, 52. "Wisdom built a house for itself, and made the house grow in it". This statement would be unintelligible if the term house was used only in a strict and crude sense and not in a metaphorical and spiritual way.

This kind of personal paradox is not unique in Athanasius. It appears in a number of places in the Contra Arianos and also in ING&CAR. Here are some examples. CAR1, 42, ὃς ἄνθρωπος λέγεται λαμβάνειν
όπερ εἶχεν ἃς ἠς θεός, ἵνα εἰς ἡμᾶς φθάσῃ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ὀδηγεῖσα χάρις. Ἰβίδ.43, καὶ ὁ ἡμᾶς ἡ χάρις ὁδόται, ὁτά τὸ γενέσθαι ὃς ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπων τὸν χορηγοῦντα τὴν χάριν κύριον. Ἰβίδ.45, ἀὐτὸς οὖν γὰρ ὁ ἦν τοῦ θεοῦ Υἱὸς, ἀὐτὸς γέγονεν καὶ Υἱὸς ἀνθρώπωνος καὶ ὃς μὲν λόγος, τὰ παρὰ τοῦ πατρός ὁδόσοι πάντα γὰρ ἂ ποιεῖ καὶ ὁλόωσιν ὁ πατήρ, ὁ δὲ ἀυτῶς ποιεῖ τε καὶ παρέχει τὸς τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀὐτὸς ἀνθρώπινος λέγεται τὰ παρὰ τοῦ βῆλος ἀδερφοί...ιβίδ. 46, Ἔγώ λόγος ὁ ὁ τοῦ πατρός, ἀὐτὸς ἐμαντύκ ἀνθρώπῳ γενομένῳ, ἐξωθήκε τοῦ Πνεύμα, καὶ ἐμαντύκ ἄνθρωπων γενομένων ἐν τούτῳ ἁγίασα, ἵνα λοιπὸν ἐν ἑμοὶ ἀληθεία ὁ πατήρ...οἱ πάντες ἁγιασθήσονται. Ἰβίδ. 48, καὶ ἀὐτὸς ἐστὶν οἰδίδες καὶ λαμβάνων, οἴδιδες μὲν ὡς θεοῦ λόγους, λαμβάνον δὲ ὡς ἀνθρώπους. CAR3, 58, ἀὐτὸς ἕναντίον τὴν ὅσιν καὶ λέγει ἐξουσίαν εἰληφέραν, ὡς ἀνθρώπους, ἢν ἄλλον ἃς ὧς θεός. Ἰβίδ. 40, ἄεὶ εἶχον λόγος ὁ δὲ, ταῦτα καὶ γενομένων ἀνθρώπως, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἁπλάστιν, ἀνθρώπινος εἰληφέραν λέγει, ἵνα ἀυτὸν οἱ ἀνθρώπους εἰκονοῦσιν ἐξωθί. INC&CAR , 2, ἐγείρεται μὲν κατὰ σάρκα ὃς ἁνθρώπους, καὶ λαμβάνει ψωφίν ὡς ἁνθρώπους, καὶ ἀὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ ἐγείρων τὸν ὅσιν αὐτοῦ ναὸν, ὡς θεός, καὶ οἰδίδες ψωφίν τῇ ιδίᾳ σάρκει. INC&CAR,9, ἀὐτὸς γὰρ αὐτὸ (τὸ ἑνεδίωμα) ἀναβινθίστα ἐκείμενον, ὡς θεός, καὶ ἀὐτὸς αὐτὸ κατὰ ἱερά ἐκείμενο ὡς ἁνθρώπους. ἤκ αὐτοῦ οὖν εἰς αὐτὸν καθήλη, ἐκ τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν ἁνθρώποτητα... αὐτοῦ. Especially INC&CAR ,11, Ἐπεὶ οὖν πρῶτερον πλοῦσιν ὁμοιώσατο τοῦ πατρὸς ὡς ὁ θεός, καὶ τυπεσάτο τὸν πατέρα ὁμοίως γέγονεν, τοπεσάτο ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἡμοιώθη ἡμῖν κατακάνατα χωρίς ἀμαρτίας, καὶ διὰ τούτου ὡς ἀνθρώπους λαμβάνει ψωφίν, ὁ ἐχθρὸς ψωφίν, αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐστὶν ἢ ψωφί, λαμβάνει δὲ ὁ ἡμῖς, καὶ ὃς ἀνθρώπους προέκυψεν σοφία καὶ ἡμιστὶ ἢ ἀμοιβή τοῦ θεοῦ ὀνομασι καὶ σοφία, καὶ ὃς ἀνθρώπους ἀγαπάται ὁ ἀγίος, καὶ μὴ κρέαν ἐχθρὸς ἀγαμομοῦν. Ἰβίδ. 13, ἴνα χαρίσται αὐτοῖς τὸν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπους τὰ πάντα, ὡς θεός, ὡς αὐτός ὃς ἀνθρώπους ἔλαβεν. ἀὐτός ἐσθι εἰς εἰς τοὺς αὐτὸς χαρίσται ψωφί, καὶ αὐτός ἐσθι τὸν ἀγίος, καὶ αὐτός ἐσθι τὸν ψοί.
The above doctrine is fully clarified in CAR3, 53. Here Athanasius asks, what is the progress, but the deification and grace given by the divine Wisdom Itself to men whereby their sin and corruption are extinguished on account of the likeness and homogeneity of the flesh of the Logos (κατά τὴν ὁμοιότητα καὶ συγγένειαν τῆς σαρκὸς τοῦ Λόγου)? As the body grew in stature, so did the revelation of the Godhead which was given in it, and it was shown that God was in the body. The growth in stature, which is His, on account of the flesh, does not minimize His paternal light, i.e. His true Sonship. It rather shows that the Logos became man by putting on true flesh (ἀληθεῖν ὑπάρχψα). So as He died in the flesh and was hungry and tired, etc., so He grew in the flesh. The Logos was not outside when the growth occurred, since the flesh which grew was in Him and was His. The soteriological reason for this growth was that the growth of men might remain unfallen, because of the Logos who was conjoined to it. The growth was the Logos', Athanasius insists, inasmuch as the flesh was not the Wisdom, but became the body of Wisdom. "It was the humanity" (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον), then, "which grew in the Wisdom of God, rising slowly above the human nature, and becoming deified and the instrument of God's Wisdom for the divine operation and illumination of all." Finally Athanasius adds that the Lukan text does not say that the Logos progressed. It refers the progress to Jesus which is the name by which the Logos was called in becoming man. This means that the progress belongs to the human nature (ὡς εἶναι τὴς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως τὴν προσοπήν).

The above analyses demonstrate that Christ did not progress as a mere man, i.e. as a creature, and therefore the progress is no embarrassment to His Godhead. He did progress as man, but in Himself
as God (αὐτὸς ἐν ἐαυτῷ). This means that His humanity progressed by virtue of, or by the operation of, the Godhead. It also means that, in the last analysis, the grace of revelation, the abolition of sin and corruption, must be understood in terms of a coordination of human growth and divine energy operating intrinsically and extrinsically in Christ, the Incarnate Logos of God. Grace is externally communicated to all men, because it has been first internally appropriated by Christ Himself as man. Schwalm's conclusion seems, therefore, very apt. "Il semble ici que l' adversaire d' Arien, oblige d' un côté à revendiquer pour Jésus l' humaine perfectibilité, se garde parallèlement du péril samosatien. Jésus se perfectionne dans sa raison, déclare-t-il; mais non point comme la vulgaire des hommes ou l' élit des inspirés. De quelle façon alors? Athanase ne le précise guère: il oscille, dirait-on, entre l' idée d' une sagesse congénitale, progressivement manifestée; - elle s' opposerait bien à la thèse d' Antioche; - et l' idée d' une sagesse intérieurement accrue, - elle semble ressortir du texte évangélique". (19)

The fourth and final part in the third section of Richard's essay offers a discussion and evaluation of Athanasius' reply to the fourth Arian thesis. According to this thesis, the Logos who became Incarnate in Christ was not the proper Logos of God the Father. As evidence for this, the Arians referred to Christ's abandonment on the Cross, to His prayers, and to His ignorance of the day of judgment. As the themes of Christ's abandonment and prayer were discussed in CAR3, 56 in connection with the second Arian thesis, Richard now turns to the examination of Athanasius' treatment of the ignorance of Christ which is developed in CAR3, 42-50.
First of all, Richard notes the wide interest on this subject on the part of Patristic scholars since the time of Petau and makes particular mention of the works of E. Schulte, J. Maric, and R.L. Lebreton. From the last he cites a statement of conclusion, which serves as an introduction to his own understanding. Lebreton says: "Thus Athanasius intends to establish that the divine Logos is never ignorant; compared to this capital affirmation, the rest is for him of little importance, and he proposes various interpretations of the Gospel text. The ignorance, excluded from the divinity of Christ and attributed to His humanity, is presented sometimes as an appearance and sometimes as a reality". Richard agrees that the principal objective of the Bishop of Alexandria was to set aside from the Logos every suspicion of ignorance, but he wonders whether this is stressed to the point of presenting the human ignorance of Christ sometimes as real and sometimes as unreal. For him, Athanasius' position on Christ's human ignorance is much more coherent and consistent than Lebreton has admitted. It is a functional ignorance attributed to Christ because of the Incarnation, but it has no real ground in his humanity since the Logos assumed only mere human flesh. This is the view that Richard attempts to demonstrate by an analysis of the relevant text from CAR3. Here is a brief review of it.

Athanasius' exposition, says Richard, is quite naturally divided into three stages which deal with different aspects of the problem. The first, which is also the longest (CAR3, 42-46), is devoted to the demonstration of the absolute knowledge of the Logos, notably in what concerns the time of the Day of Judgment. Here in his attempt to establish this point Athanasius resorts to a priori argum-
ents opposing the orthodox conception of the Logos to that of the Arians, and more concretely, invokes the Gospel texts which demonstrate the absolute character of His knowledge, before as well as after the Incarnation. At the same time, however, he also attempts to interpret the difficult verse of Mark 13:32, which the Arians had made the basis of their argument. His interpretation conforms to his habitual way of thinking. Ignorance belongs to men (to the flesh, to humanity). The Logos Incarnate has taken up an ignorant flesh. Therefore it is in a human fashion (ἀνθρωπίνως) that He pronounces the words of Mark 13:23. Indeed, Athanasius repeatedly affirms that the Saviour was ignorant in a fleshly or human fashion (CAR3, 43: ὃς ὢς ἄνθρωπος ἁγγος, or ἁγγος σαρκικῶς; or CAR3, 45: οὐκ οἶδε γάρ σαρκι; or, CAR3, 46: ὃς ἄνθρωπος οὐκ οἶδεν). However, Richard asks as he had done in previous cases, whether such statements of Athanasius are in effect admissions of a real ignorance or a de facto ignorance ("une ignorance réelle ou d' une ignorance de droit"). Was Christ truly ignorant, or did He say that He was, because He spoke as man? Richard claims that in CAR3, 42-46 this aspect of the problem is not resolved, but he believes that the second case seems to be more applicable on account of certain details. However, what remains unresolved in the first stage of Athanasius' argumentation finds an explicit solution in the second and third stages.

In the second stage of Athanasius' argumentation, CAR3, 47, Richard detects an embarrassment on the part of Athanasius with regard to the ignorance of Christ. He finds him working his way towards the proposal that this ignorance was not real. This is eventually the proposal that Athanasius makes in the third stage of his argumentation developed in CAR3, 48-49.
In the beginning of CAR3,48 Athanasius argues that Christ made the statement recorded in Mark 13:32 "for our own good". Alluding to the context in the Gospel, he sees the Saviour speaking divinely, in the first instance, as He reveals to His Apostles for the benefit of all men the signs of the time of judgment. But then, when He comes to the precise date of the Judgment, again for our own benefit, He declines from saying divinely, "I know", and chooses to speak humanly for a moment! Naturally, He could have explained to His audience that He did not wish them to know the date of the Judgment, but that would have led His Apostles to interrogate Him and be at pains for getting His response. At the time, however, just before His ascension, when He spoke again to His disciples about the Last Day, the Lord chose to speak divinely, as He warned them that it was not their affair to know the times and seasons (Acts 1:7f). The reason for this choice was the fact of the resurrection, whereby His flesh had been totally deified and was not permitted any more to speak carnally.

This way of arguing, says Richard, indicates that Christ's ignorance was a mere appearance. Indeed Richard claims that even Athanasius himself understood that, otherwise he would not have written, for the sake of preventing a possible objection of his adversaries, that "in saying 'I do not know', Christ did not lie" (καὶ οὐὰ τὸ φήσαμεν τὸ τοῦτο ἐφημέρως, ἀνθρωπίνως γὰρ εἶπεν, ὥς ἀνθρωπός "οὐκ οἶδα")!

In CAR3,49 Athanasius, says Richard, expounds the advantages for humanity of the reserve of the Saviour, concerning the disclosure of the date of the judgment. If one day, he says, the demons were to turn into angels, or even the Anti-Christ himself, and propose revelations concerning the date of the Judgment, Christians would be able
to identify the fraud straight away. Also, Athanasius adds, if it is a benefit for man not to know the time of his death, it would certainly be a greater advantage to him if he remained ignorant of the date of the Last Judgment and therefore never came to despise the intermediary times.

Finally, Richard says, Athanasius produces one more argument in CAR 3, 50, if only to convince his readers about the unreality of Christ’s ignorance. In Richard’s judgment, this argument is probably added in order to compensate for the statements which Athanasius had already made in the earlier chapters. Here, Athanasius returns to the theme of the ignorance of Christ deduced by the Arians from the questions asked by the Saviour in the Gospels. Athanasius’ approach is to set these questions in parallel relationship to the questions which are attributed to God in the book of Genesis and particularly to the questions recorded in Genesis 3:9 and 4:9. The point that he wants to make is that the Arians, like the Manichaeans, would accuse God of being ignorant! Here, says Richard, Athanasius demonstrates that Christ’s ignorance was not real. It was simply “ignorance by right” (ignorance de droit), i.e. by the right He had to speak as man on account of His flesh. The Saviour always knew in an absolute way, but He appeared to be ignorant only for our benefit. This understanding, says Richard, was already in the mind of Athanasius from the beginning of his argumentation, as the following text demonstrates:

"οὔτε οἷς εἰσιν, οὔτε τὴν περὶ τοῦ πάντων τέλους ἔραν οὐκέ μέν ἄγος γνώσκει, οὐκ ἐν ἀνθρώπω μέν ἄγος, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἀνθρώπω ἄγος, ἀλλ’ τούτω τῷ ἀγνωστῷ γάρ ἢδον τῷ ἀγνωστῷ. Αὐτοὶ μὲν ἦν τοὺς τῆς φυλακότορος του ὀνομαστικώς τοῖς ἑρμήνευσιν, τοῖς οἷς ἅπερον, ἵνα ἐδείξῃ ὅτι ἐν ἀγνώσει ἐγένετο, οὗν ὁδὸν, ἵνα ἐβαθμισθῇ τῷ ἀγάλματι τοῦ Θεοῦ."
This passage alone says Richard would suffice for an exposition of Athanasius’ understanding of Christ’s ignorance. Here we are invited to see that when Christ said: “I do not know”, He did not utter this statement out of a necessity of nature, but by the choice of the Logos dictated by His love for men. As Athanasius explicitly says a little further on in CAR3, 44, “He said, not even the Son, by reason of his human function” (ἀπέρ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης αὐτοῦ λειτουργίας). No reason of necessity of (human) nature is given here, says Richard, because on no occasion does Athanasius state that the Logos was bound to His human nature in asserting His ignorance. So, Richard concludes, under such conditions it is not a good method to attribute a contradiction to our Doctor (as for instance Lebreton does) “alors que tous ses textes s’expliquent dans l’hypothèse d’une ignorance de droit du Sauveur en tant qu’homme”.

By way of evaluation we may first clarify the difference between Lebreton and Richard and then turn to Athanasius’ text for confirmation. There are two scales, as it were, to Lebreton’s view, as it appears from his statement which Richard has cited. First there is the Godhood of Christ, the divine Logos and Son of God, where Athanasius, quite unequivocally, sees no ignorance. But in the second place there is the manhood, the Incarnation, the Incarnate state of the Logos, where Athanasius develops the theme of ignorance. Here, however, Lebreton detects an ambiguity in Athanasius’ exposition arising from the fact
that on the one hand Christ is said to have been ignorant fleshly and humanly, and on the other hand to have been only deliberately (and by implication, not really) ignorant, because that was to the advantage of His fellow men. In other words, Athanasius' exposition of Mark 13:32 was equivocal. Richard agrees with the case of the Godhood, but not with the case of the manhood. For him there is no ambiguity in Athanasius' interpretation. When Athanasius says that Christ was ignorant fleshly and humanly, he does not mean, according to Richard, that He was ignorant because of His human nature. The terms fleshly and humanly refer only to the human condition of the Incarnate Logos and not to His human nature. In the last analysis, Christ was not ignorant for Athanasius, because the statement of ignorance was made by the Logos as something which was right for us, or beneficial to us men, but not as something natural to Him. In other words, it was a pretended functional ignorance which was confessed by the Incarnate Logos as man for our profit. The implication of this conclusion is that at His Incarnation the Logos did not assume complete humanity, but only a mere body, or mere flesh, without a soul which could be ignorant. Is Richard right in his exposition of the human ignorance of Christ? Is Lebreton wrong in detecting an ambiguity in Athanasius' exposition? Or, is Athanasius' exposition different from what Richard and Lebreton have made it to be? Obviously the best way to answering these questions is to re-examine Athanasius' texts and make Athanasius himself the arbiter. The question is, what precisely Athanasius understood by the ignorance of Christ recorded in Mark 13:32 and particularly with respect to His humanity.

The first statements of Athanasius in CAR3, 42 show that he
understands the reference of his Arian adversaries to Mark 13:32 as a pretext (πρὸφασις) for their heresy. This heresy is of a theologic-
al nature and represents an attack upon God, so much so, that Athanas-
ius does not hesitate to take the Arians for γιγανταὶ θεσμοκοῡντας. As he says, they judge the Lord of heaven and earth, through whom all things were made, about a day and an hour! They accuse the Logos, who knows all things, of not knowing a particular day. Or they say that the Son, who knows the Father, is ignorant about a day. For Athanasius, how-
ever, the Logos, who is the Creator of all things, including times and seasons, night and day, cannot be ignorant of anything. Indeed the very cohesion of the reading (ὁ εἰρμός τοῦ ἀναγνώσματος) shows that the Son of God knows both, the hour and the day, in spite of the ignorance into which the Arians themselves have fallen. This "cohesion of the reading" is probably the collation of Mark 13:32 with other eschatolo-
gical sayings or teachings of Christ in the Gospels, as for instance the eschatological discourse of Matthew 24:1ff to which Athanasius allu-
des, and by means of which Athanasius can claim that He who speaks of all the events preceding a day, cannot but know the day which follows after them (ὁ τά πρὸ τῆς ἡμέρας λέγων, οἶδε πάντως καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν, ἡπὶς μετὰ τά προειρημένα φανῆσαι).

It is a similar point that Athanasius tries to establish in the remaining part of CAR3,42, employing a number of logical arguments which are not necessary to be repeated in any detail here. The final sentence of the chapter clearly reveals his thesis:οὐτω λέγων ὁ κύριος τά πρὸ τῆς ἡμέρας καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας, οἶδε ἄκριβῶς, καὶ οὐκ ἄγνως, πότε ἡ ὥρα καὶ ἡ ἡμέρα ἑνίσταται. The clear implication of this thesis is that Mark 13:32 could not be used as evidence against the true Godhead.
of the Logos without violating its wider biblical and logical context. Whether Athanasius is right or wrong on the purely exegetical level, his point is clear. Christ's ignorance could not be related to His Godhood. This, of course, raises the question about the sense in which the Markan reference to Christ's ignorance should be understood. It is to this that Athanasius turns in CAR 3.43.

Athanasius' response in the opening sentence of CAR 3.43 suggests a variety of nuances in his understanding. (a) Christ knew, but did not speak openly to His disciples at that time (οὐχ εἰσε τὸν εὐαγγελίον τῶν τοῦτο τοῖς μαθηταῖς). (b) He knew, but remained silent about certain things (καὶ σειωπήκεν αὐτός). (c) As Son of God He knew, but on account of the flesh He said as man that the Son did not know (ὁ δὲ τὴν οὐδὲν ως άνθρωπος). Put in other words, the ignorance of the Markan text is for Athanasius (a) a halt at the revelation, plus (b) a deliberate silence, plus (c) a human phenomenon. (a) and (b) refer to the Son of God and (c), to the Son of man. Far from suggesting a contradiction, these three nuances indicate the coordination of divine and human aspects to the question which are coordinated in and through one and the same person. It is clear then that the Markan ignorance is understood by Athanasius in two ways, one positive and another negative, the first referring to Christ's Godhood and the second to His manhood. This is explicitly stated by Athanasius himself in stating: οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ τούτο ἐλάττωμα τοῦ Λόγου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἢς ἐστιν ἰδιόν καὶ τὸ ἁγνοεῖν.

But Athanasius goes on to state and restate the same point by referring on the one hand to the Lord's knowledge as God, and on the other hand to the ignorance which belongs to His humanity. Particularly
telling are the following expressions which relate to the ignorance of the humanity of the Logos:

(1) othp pro tov genesthai anerwpos elge tauta, all'ote o logos saph egevento.

(2) pantata osa meto to genesthai anerwpos anerwpulos legai, to
ta to anerwpotothi dikaiow anatithenai.

(3) peri thn tov pantwn telous aeran, wces men logos, ginwshkei, wc
de anerwpos agnoet, anerwpou yar idion to agnoein kai malista tauta.

(4) epieidh gar genouen anerwpos, othp epainoxhnetai dida thn sarka
thn agnousian elkein, othp apdo, Ika seleexi, oti

(5) elados wc oseis, agnoei sarxhwe.

(6) othp elrheken yout, othp o Yidos tov oseous odin, Ika mhe k theo-
ti ths agnousia fainetai, all' aplwos, othp o Yidos, Ika tov eis anerwpwv
geanomous Yioth h agnousia.

In these statements the ignorance of Christ recorded in Mark 13
is attributed to the Logos-become-man, humanly, fleshly, and on account
of the ignorant flesh, and finally to the Logos-become-Son from the side
of men. This amounts to one statement, that Christ is ignorant as man
because of His humanity.

So far it is clear that there is no ambiguity in Athanasius with
regard to Christ knowing and not knowing because the knowing refers
to the Godhood and the not knowing to the manhood, and certainly there
is no indication that Athanasius does not mean what he says, or that
he says what he says in a docetic fashion (as Richard claimed). This
is further clarified in CAR3, 44.

The opening sentences of CAR3, 44 and particularly the contrast
made in them between the angels who do not know and the Spirit who,
like the Logos from whom He receives, indicate that Athanasius'
primary concern is theological, presumably because of the Arian contention that the Logos as Logos is ignorant. Here Athanasius asserts that it is not the Logos as Logos who says, I do not know, because His statement is made with reference to (περὶ and not ἐκεῖνος) for the sake of, as Richard misquotes it) His human operation (περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης αὐτοῦ λειτουργίας ἔλεγεν). It would be totally absurd to take in this context the human operation of the Son as having merely extrinsic reference and therefore relegate its intrinsic human ground to a divine act of the Logos which pretends or appears to be human. This is, of course, Richard’s suggestion but Athanasius’ statement which follows immediately confirms our view that Richard’s suggestion is absurd. καὶ τοῦτο τεκμηρίζει, ὅτι ἀνθρωπίνως εἰρηκώς, οὐδὲ δὴ Υἱὸς οἶδαν, δεικνύοντας ὅμως θείως ἐκεῖνον τὰ πάντα εἰδότα. ὃν γὰρ λέγει Υἱὸν τὴν ἡμέρα μὴ εἰδοναὶ, τοῦτον εἰδοναὶ λέγει τὸν Πατέρα. Athanasius' juxtaposition of the divine and human activities of Christ presented in this statement would lose all its force and significance, if Richard’s suggestion was applicable.

The rest of CAR3,44 is a long-drawn argument from different aspects of the Son’s relation to the Father, in defence of the Son’s Godhood and in opposition to the rashness (προπέτεια) of the Arian madness which opposes it!

In CAR3,45 Athanasius returns to the double aspect of Christ’s ignorance and restates it using all the terms available in his vocabulary for describing the humanity of Christ. All Christ-lovers and Christ-bearers know, he says, that οὐκ ὁς ἄγνωστος ὁ λόγος, ὃς λόγος ἔστιν, ἐλεγεν, οὐκ οἶδα, οἶδε γὰρ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνθρωπίνον δεικνύς, ὃτι τῶν ἀνθρώπων έστιν ἐστὶ τὸ ἄγνωστα, καὶ ὃτι οὖσα άγνωστον ἐνεδόσατο, ἐν ὑμῖν, σαρκικῶς ἐλεγεν, οὐκ οἶδα. Then he supports this
statement by means of two arguments which emphasize that the ignorance connected with the Last Day is proper to men and not to the Logos. The first argument is based on the Lord’s sayings recorded in Matth. 24:42 and 24:44. On the basis of these sayings, says Athanasius, the Markan statement sounds like this: ὅτι ὑμᾶς γὰρ (extrinsic aspect) καὶ γενόμενος ὡς ὑμεῖς (intrinsic aspect), εἶδον, οὐδὲ ὁ Υἱός, and therefore, one should conclude, ὅτι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι οὗτος καὶ αὐτός (extrinsic aspect), τὴν ὁμοίαν αὐτῶν ἔχων σάρκα καὶ ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος (intrinsic aspect) ἔλεγεν, οὐδὲ ὁ Υἱός οἶδεν· οὐκ οἶδε γὰρ σαρκὶ καὶ ἐπερ ὡς λόγος γενώσχων.

The second argument is based on the ignorance of the Day of Judgment at the time of Noah. Matth. 24:39 says that men were ignorant of that day, but Gen. 7:1 and 7:4 say that the Lord knew. The conclusion is that He who knew the last day of the deluge surely should also know the day of His parousia! Here again Athanasius is not saying that the Logos Incarnate knows, but the Logos as Logos, as God.

CAR3,46 continues the defence of the same thesis by means of a similar argument based on the case of the Virgins. The argument is particularly focused on Matth. 25:13. It is observed that, in this case, the Lord did not say, I do not know; but He said, You do not know. Previously, however, in Matth. 24:36, He had said, nobody knew, not even the Son! Obviously, says Athanasius, the Lord made the second statement when the disciples asked about the end, and He wanted to impress on them that it is ἔδωκαν ἀνθρώπων τὸ ἀγνοεῖν the last times, it was the necessity to be categorical on this that made Him say that even the Son does not have such knowledge. He spoke, ὃς ἀνθρώπος, σαρκὶ καὶ ἐπερ τὸ σῶμα, even though as the Logos of God, as the Coming
One, or as the Judge, or as the Bridegroom, He knew the day of His coming.

After these biblically based clarifications, Athanasius links the human ignorance of Christ with all the other human weaknesses which are attributed to Him in CAR3 and at the same time he contrasts these with their opposites which are attributed to His Godhood. Becoming man among men (ἀνθρωπος γενόμενος μετά ἀνθρώπων or μετά τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἀνθρωπος) He can be ignorant, just as He can be hungry, and thirsty, and experience suffering, and conjecture about Lazarus, and question Peter at Caesarea Philippi. But divinely (ὁ υἱός), i.e. which being Logos and Wisdom in the Father, He knows and there is nothing of which He is ignorant, just as He goes to raise Lazarus and knows whence to recall Lazarus’ soul; and He knows too that what the Father revealed to Peter about the Son, was revealed through the Son (as Luke 10:12 says), i.e. through Himself, and He knows beforehand what Peter will say, and indeed knows all things, and above all knows the Father, beyond which no greater, or more perfect knowledge can be acquired. These statements leave no doubt as to the clarity of Athanasius’ mind concerning the ignorance of Christ mentioned in Mark 13. The ignorance is attributed to Christ as man and is ultimately located in His manhood. In contrast with that, however, ignorance is denied to Christ as God, because of His Godhood. If Athanasius did not distinguish clearly the Godhood from the manhood, then the double attribution of ignorance and knowledge to the same person would have been contradictory (Lebreton’s view), or one of the two attributions would have been unreal (Richard’s view). The above statements leave no room for such hypotheses.

With CAR3, 46 closes what Richard has called the first stage of
Athanasius' argumentation, where in Richard's view again, Athanasius' statements about the fleshly or human ignorance of Christ simply indicate an ignorance de droit, but not an ignorance réelle. Our analysis has shown that in Athanasius' argument Christ's humanity is not docetic, but real. The emphasis is certainly placed on the divine side and the absolute character of the divine knowledge of the Logos, and this is demonstrated biblically on the basis of traditional ecclesiastical hermeneutics. But the ignorance is not denied, because it is attributed to the humanity of the Logos.

As we pass from CAR3,46 to CAR3,47 we do not notice any significant change in the style of the argumentation and certainly no embarrassment with the notion of Christ's ignorance as Richard suggests. What we do find in this chapter is a further and more rigorous probing into the biblical context of Christ's knowledge and ignorance with the view to establishing, on the one hand, the indisputable divine knowledge of the Son of God (or Logos), and on the other hand, His human ignorance as man, which — and this seems to be the point of emphasis — have definite soteriological overtones. There are two biblical cases which Athanasius examines in this chapter, one connected with Paul and particularly his statement in 2 Cor. 12:2, according to which "he knows", but he says that "he does not"; and another, connected with Elisha, and particularly his experience of Elijah's ascension, about which he was equivocal by keeping silence, which he faced by the probings of the sons of the prophets (4 Kings 2), so that eventually he might lead them to believe in it. In both cases, says Athanasius, silence was chosen to serve a good purpose and did not necessarily imply any ignorance. This is the case also with our Lord's statement of
ignorance in Mark 13, says Athanasius in the beginning of CAR3,48. Though He knew, He said that He did not, because He sought our gain (τὴν ἕμων ἐματαλλομένης λυσιτελεός). In other words, though the Lord said that He was ignorant, He did not really mean it. As in the cases of Paul and Elisha, so here the ignorance is simply a refusal to reveal, or a deliberate decision to keep silence. Obviously Athanasius explains here the Markan ignorance from the point of view of the Godhood of Christ. It is the notion of the divine ignorance which is denied or explained away here. This is crucial for understanding precisely what Athanasius' argument is all about. But, alas! this is where Richard has failed (and it seems that Lebreton too did not escape the same fate), because it is to the notion of the human ignorance of Christ that he has attached the argument of CAR3,47. That Athanasius is thinking from the point of view of the Godhood is clearly shown in the phrase οὐκ ἔθελεν θεῖας εἰπεῖν ὅτι οἶδα, which is reminiscent of the phrases in the opening sentence of CAR3,43 οὐκ εἶπεν φανερῶς τότε ὦρ ἐσειώπηκεν οὗτος, which in turn were connected with Christ's Godhood. There is no embarrassment with the ignorance of Christ as such here. What there is, is an attempt, as in the beginning of CAR3,43, to make some sense of the ignorance from the divine point of view. From this point of view the ignorance is not real, but understood as a refusal on the part of the Logos to grant the particular revelation concerning the time of the last day. In the very same chapter, however, again as in chapter 43, Athanasius emphasises the reality of this ignorance from the human point of view. It is σαρκικάς ὅτι τὴν ὑπόκα τὴν ἄγνοος that Christ says what He says, and means what He says.

The clarification that Athanasius has made in CAR3,47f is this. Where-
as previously he had 'crudely stated' that Christ knows as God but does not as man, now he is saying that, as God, Christ not only knows, but is also reluctant to reveal a particular point concerning the last things, and thus His divine reluctance allows Him to act as man and exhibit a real human ignorance. Apart from this Athanasius is also stressing the soteriological significance of the divine reluctance and the human ignorance of Christ on this particular point. As he puts it very plainly, ὅ γὰρ ἄν τοιῇ, τούτῳ πάντως ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὅτι ἡμᾶς ὁ Λόγος ὑπές ἐγένετο.

It is at this point that Athanasius adds what Richard has called the preventive statement against a possible Arian objection, namely, that "Christ did not lie". Now according to Richard the purpose of this statement was to save the integrity of the Logos, which would have been put to question by relegating His ignorance to a seeming act of the divine Logos which was not real. The text however does not warrant such an interpretation. It rather reveals quite plainly and straightforwardly what Athanasius has asserted all along, namely the divine knowledge and the human ignorance of the Logos. Καὶ οὐχ ἐξεύσατο τούτῳ ἐλημωζ, ἀνθρωπικώς γὰρ εἶπεν, ὅς ἀνθρωπος, οὐχ ὁλόα. What Athanasius wants to prevent here is the inference that, if the Logos knows as God and decides as God to say "I do not know" for the benefit of others, He is in fact telling a lie! No! says Athansius, that inference would be wrong, because it is in fact humanly, as man, that the Lord says I do not know(ἀνθρωπικώς γὰρ εἶπεν, op. cit.). What He decides divinely is not to tell a lie, but to withhold the revelation of His knowledge (οὐχ ἂνθληθε θεῖως εἰπεῖν ὅτι ὁλόα, op. cit.), and allow the ignorance of His humanity to come forward.

Obviously, Athanasius' argument is quite involved and complicated,
but this seems to be inevitable, given his understanding of the double aspect of the Incarnation. He is aware of the mystery involved, hence his reluctance to probe into the depths of it (revealed in his phrase ως γε νομιζω) and his prayer to the Lord for assistance (ευχαίρε ἐν θεωρομενης της ἀληθείας). But at no point does he suggest that the Logos as Logos, i.e. divinely, said that "He did not know". On the contrary Athanasius repeats to the extent of becoming tedious that the statement of ignorance belongs to Christ's humanity. This is particularly stressed in his examination of the relative eschatological statement of Acts 1:7-8 which is advanced in the closing sentences of CAR3,48. Whereas previously, says Athanasius, the Lord had said humanly(ἐνθρωπιως) that not even the Son knew, here He said divinely (θειως) that it was not good for them to know the times and the seasons which the Father had put under His own authority. In the first instance He spoke humanly because that option was open to Him. In the second instance, however, He had had no such option because His flesh had put off all deadness and had been deified through the resurrection (ουκετι ἐκρεμε σαρκιως αυτων ἀποκρινασθαι ἀνερχομενων εις τους ουρανους, ἀλλα λοιπων θειως διδαξατ). The obvious suggestion here is that whereas before the resurrection the divine will not to reveal something could be accommodated to the human ignorance and be expressed by it, after the resurrection such accommodation was impossible, because the humanity had reached perfection! So we may conclude that Richard's allegations about the denial of Christ's human ignorance in CAR3,48 are totally groundless. Are they also groundless in CAR3,49 and CAR3,50?

In CAR3,49 Athanasius repeats and clarifies the soteriological purpose of the Markan statement of ignorance which was introduced in
the previous chapter. He does this by coordinating its meaning with that of the parallel eschatological statement of Acts 1:7-8. In Acts, says Athanasius, what the Lord was really saying was this: "The Son, as Logos, knows, whereas it is not of you to know. For your sake then, I said, when I was sitting on the mountain, that neither the Son knows; it was for yours and everybody's advantage." The advantage, as Athanasius explains it, was to prevent the disciples from later deceivers (demons, or the Anti-Christ himself) and also to prevent themselves from despising the intermediary times. Athanasius finds a parallel here between the human ignorance of the day of one's death (τὸ ἐκάστου πέρας) and the human ignorance of the end of all (τὸ καθόλου τέλος).

In what appears to be a very profound eschatological statement, Athanasius says, that the individual's eschatology is in the universal eschatology, and the universal eschatology is perceived in the individual's eschatology (καὶ ἐν καθόλου τὸ ἐκάστου τέλος ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐκάστου τέλετ τῷ καθόλου συνάγεται). What Athanasius is trying to say here is that, in the light of the relative eschatological sayings of the Lord in Matth. 24:42 and Luke 12:40, his saying in Mark 13:32 and especially the human ignorance which is confessed in Him, has two aspects, one referring to the universal and another to the individual eschatology.

In this light then, he concludes that the Lord's saying reads like this: "It is You, who do not know, but I, the Lord, have knowledge of the time of my coming, though the Arians do not wait for me, who am the Logos of the Father!"

We may conclude then, that even in CAR3, 49, Athanasius is not saying that the Lord's human ignorance of the last day is unreal, as Richard has claimed, but that He being the Lord, knows, and besides, He also knows that human ignorance of that day is advantageous. It was
for the sake of that advantage that He accommodated His divine knowledge to His human ignorance at an appropriate time as it is recorded in the Gospel of Mark. He wanted to make an example of Himself as man, that we men might be content with our human predicament to our own advantage.

CAR3,50 does not add anything new to what Athanasius has already taught in the previous chapters. The references to the questions of God in Gen.3:9 and 4:9 are made on the occasion for restating the same doctrine. It is all epitomized in the following question of Athanasius: 

Τί άποκοι ἡ ξένον, δρώντες οὖν πεπέτωκατε, εἰ δ ὢν άλος, ἐν τότε (i.e. at the time of Gen.3:9..), δ αὐτός ὢς καὶ νῦν σάρκα περιβεβλημένος 

κυνάνεται τῶν μαθητῶν ὡς ἀνθρώπως; In other words, if the Son had in the stories of Genesis the right to ask questions as God which indicated a certain ignorance, how much more should this right be His now that He speaks as man?

In the light of our entire analysis of CAR3,42-50, Richard's docetic interpretation is exposed as an arbitrary imposition which is based only on hypothetical arguments from silence as well as on a rigid application of a semantically restricted incarnational model which is unwarranted by the text. Above all Richard's interpretation seems to contradict entirely the εἰρμός τοῦ Ἄθανασίανοῦ ἄναγνωσματος, (to use an Athanasian term). There is no docetism and no ambiguity in Athanasius' mind over the ignorance of Christ, because he clearly and repeatedly affirms that the Son, as Logos of God, is not ignorant and is only ignorant as man, or Son of man, or on account of His flesh, (or humanity, or human element, or human nature), when He chooses to do so for the benefit of His fellow men. If the human element in
Christ is unreal, or curtailed, then the whole argument of Athanasius falls to the ground, and the Arian claims appear to be more just. But this was not the case. Athanasius' realist outlook, which was so clearly and forcefully defended on the theological level, equally applies to the humanity of Christ. Gregory Nazianzenus understood it like that, as Photius informs us through Gregory the Great and Eulogius of Alexandria. Here is the precise statement quoted by the Benedictines in the Migne edition of CAR3: Καὶ τὸ ὅριον καὶ ὁ θεόλογος (Gregory Nazianzen) ἐτέρανος εἰπὼν ὡς εἶ καὶ τινὲς τῶν Πατέρων τὴν ἀγνοίαν ἑπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν Εορθὴν παρεδεχόμενος ἀνθρωπότητος, οὐχ ὡς δόγμα τούτο προηγεῖται, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀρειανῶν μανὴν ἀντιφερόμενοι, οὐ καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πάντα ἑπὶ τῆς θεότητας τοῦ Μονογενοῦς μετέφερον, ὡς ἐν κτίσμα τῶν ἄκτισθεν ὁ λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ παραστήσαντι οἰκονομικότερον ἐσοχήμασαν ἑπὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος ταῦτα ψέρειν, ἡ παραχωρεῖν ἑκείνους μεθέλχειν ταῦτα κατὰ τῆς θεότητος.
In the final part of his essay, the Conclusion, Richard sums up the result of his investigation and refutes the last objections to his position. Thus he claims that Athanasius did not recognize in Christ a genuine psychology, mainly because of his attachment to a strict application of the Logos-flesh Christological scheme. The fact that he failed to bring the soul of Christ into his argument against the Arians in CAR3 proves conclusively that this was the case. In fact, says Richard, Athanasius saw only two Christological alternatives; a heretical one, in which Christ is an ordinary man composed of spirit and flesh, and the orthodox view, in which Christ is the Logos united with human flesh. The idea that the Saviour could be a man like the other men, and who could possess a complete human nature, and be God and man at once, had not yet come. Though Athanasius was firmly attached to the traditional affirmation of the real becoming man of the Logos, he did not arrive at the logical consequence of his system. He never employed the language of the soul positively, and his anthropology remained attached to the Platonic tradition which from the contemporary point of view is inadequate. Athanasius' Christological thought is close to that of Apollinaris, with the only difference that his concern is not ontological, but soteriological and functional.

Richard can see two final obstacles to this conclusion and he sets out to remove them. Firstly there are two arguments of Voisin based on the teaching of INC, which imply that the human body of Christ should not be understood in a strict sense, but as including the notion of the soul. Secondly, there is the clear Athanasian statement in A.D. 362 that the flesh of Christ could not be soulless.
Voisin contended that in Athanasius, Christ's body includes the soul, because it is compared with the body of the world which, in the Platonic tradition, is ensouled (GENT, 287). Richard dismissed this argument, not only by claiming that an ensouled Platonic cosmology is nonexistent, but also by pointing out that in Athanasius it is not a cosmic soul but the Logos who makes the composite body of the world cohere as one whole. Voisin also contended that Athanasius' formula of the Logos indwelling in a man in INC, 17 and INC41-55 implies concrete and complete individual manhood. Thus the parallel formula of the Logos indwelling in a body should be understood as referring to an individual humanity. Richard objected that the context of INC, 41-45 suggests a general and not a single humanity. Athanasius did not say that the Logos dwelt in a man but in the man, i.e., the whole human race. His general point is the defence of the fitness of the Incarnation on the basis of the Logos' ability to manifest Himself through a part of the world (i.e., man), just as He is able to do the same through the entire world. In this case the talk about man is general. Voisin, says Richard, changed the l'homme into a tel homme. In fact, the phrase dans l'homme should be understood as en prenant un corps. It is in this light that INC, 17 should also be understood.

Having thus removed Voisin's obstacles, Richard turns to Athanasius' statement in ANT. Here he stresses the ambiguity of Athanasius' language. The purpose of the Synod was to settle the conditions for the peace in the Church. There were two parties who contended about the Incarnation, the Paulinians and the Apollinarians. The Paulinians took their inspiration from Eustathius and emphasized with particular fervour the soul of Christ which they made the basis of their anti-Arian arguments. Apollinaris on the other hand followed
Athanasius and the Alexandrian Logos–flesh tradition. Confronted with these two rival parties Athanasius showed remarkable flexibility. Against the Paulinians, he rejected the prophetic model from Christology. Against the Apollinarists he stressed that the body of Christ was not soulless, nor senseless, nor mindless. In the last analysis, however, this formula was ambiguous and could be used by Arians and Apollinarians alike. What perhaps saves Athanasius in this case is his strong emphasis on soteriology (i.e. the salvation of soul and body), which points to a complete humanity in Christ. Nevertheless, says Richard, as SER2, EPI, ADEL and MAX, indicate, Athanasius remained faithful to his Logos–flesh Christological scheme and therefore did not alter the grande faiblessse de la Christologie d'Alexandrie.

In responding to Richard's final conclusions and arguments, we must first of all say, in the light of our detailed analysis and evaluation of his investigation section by section, that his argument as far as CAR3 is concerned, cannot be sustained. We have shown that Athanasius' argumentation demands the integrity of the humanity of Christ which excludes the implicit supposition of his rejection of the soul of Christ. Besides, the soul of Christ, as we have shown, does appear in Athanasius' text, and does play a positive soteriological role, though it is not viewed independently from the Logos but, like the body or the flesh or the humanity or the human nature, is subjected to Him on account of the Incarnation. The few references to the soul of Christ in CAR3 in effect point to the clear statement of AN'T and EPI, which Richard deliberately plays down.

As regards Voisin's contentions, Richard was wrong to reject them without looking closely to the Athanasian texts. Firstly
with regard to the parallelism or analogy between the body of the world and the body of man, we must agree with Richard that the key to it is the composite nature of the two bodies rather than their being ensouled. This is certainly the case of GENT 28 which Richard discusses. But is this also the case in the De Incarnatione? It seems that the following important text from INC 43 totally escaped Richard's attention. Ἐν γὰρ ὁδὲ καὶ ὁ παρὰ τοῖς Ἐλλησι θανατισμενοὶ Πλάτων ἤγερεν ἄφθαρτον καὶ κτίσμα, καὶ πάντα τὰ πνεύματα ὑωρηθοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ ὄνομα ἁπάντως θύμων, ἡμίσθιας ἐπὶ τοὺς οἰκος ἀκάς τῆς ψυχῆς, βοηθείᾳ, καὶ πάντα τὰ πνεύματα ὑωρηθοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸν ἄφθαρτον λέγεται παρ' ἑνίν, ἐλευθεροφύλακτας τῆς ἀνθρώποντος, ἐκάθισεν ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ ταύτην καὶ ἀνερόπος ἐπεφάνη, ἵνα ἐναρμοσμένην αὐτήν περιοδή ὅταν τῆς κυβερνήσεως αὐτοῦ καὶ ἁγαθότητος: It seems that in the light of this passage, which, as Meijering has shown, is based on a combination of the texts 272e and 273d e, of Plato's Politicus, Voisin's contention is sustainable. Also, the same thought seems to be found in GENT 41 which alludes to the same passage from the Politicus. Though the term soul is not mentioned, the reference to the logoi of the nature of the world (κατὰ τοὺς ἄλας αὐτῆς τῆς γεννητῆς φύσεως λόγους βευτὴν ὄσιν καὶ διαλυμένην) excludes the idea of a crude cosmological corporeality and suggests an ensouled cosmic body.

Voisin does not develop these points, but it seems clear that he is right in seeing a comprehensive nuance in the term body because of the cosmological associations.

With regard to Voisin's second contention, Richard is right in pointing out that INC 41ff is a defence of the fitness of the Incarnation based on the argument that if the Logos is present and active in the whole world, then surely he can do the same in a part of it, i.e. in man. But Richard is wrong in claiming that the phrase in man
(= ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, and never, ἐν τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ as Richard seems to believe), only refers to the human genus and not to single humanity. A closer look at the text shows that although 'the whole' and 'the part' are designated by the term 'body', the part is also designated by the terms 'man', 'the human genus', 'humanity' and 'human body' (INC,41 Μέρος γάρ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄνθρωπων ἐστὶ γένος, INC 42, Μέρος γάρ ὡς προεῖπον τοῦ ὅλου καὶ ἡ ἄνθρωπότης ἐστιν, INC 42, Μέρος γάρ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ ἡ ἄνθρωπότης τυγχάνει, INC 43, Μέρος τοῦ ὅλου λαμβάνει ἑαυτῷ ὁργάνον τὸ ἄνθρωπινον σώμα). Now since the human body is explicitly said to be a single one (σώμα ἐν ἀνθρώπινον), it follows that its synonymous terms 'man', 'human genus' and 'humanity' should also be taken as referring to individual humanity. Besides, these terms are all regarded as the instrument (τὸ ὁργάνον) of the Logos' Incarnate operation. Would it not be absurd to say that the whole human genus became at the Incarnation the instrument of the Logos? This is what Richard seems to be suggesting! But the text of INC,17 indicates that this is quite impossible. (26)

Finally, as regards Richard's characterisation of the Athanasian Christological statement of ANT as ambiguous, we cannot but point to an ambiguity in Richard himself. How could he claim that soteriologically Athanasius believed in the salvation of body and soul in Christ (as it is explicitly stated in ΕΠΙ,7 ὅλου τοῦ ἄνθρωπου, ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἀληθῶς, ἡ σωτηρία γέγονεν ἐν ἀντί τῷ λόγῳ; or in ANT,7: τελείως καὶ διακλήρως τὸ ἄνθρωπινον γένος ἐλευθεροῦμεν αὐτῷ τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἐν αὐτῷ (τῷ λόγῳ) . . .οὐδὲ σώματος μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ σωτηρίᾳ γέγονεν) and at the same time assert that on the ontological level Athanasius was an Apollinarian? It seems that the contradiction is not in Athanasius, but in Richard's handling of the Athanasian terms and texts.
VI.3 A. Grillmeier's contribution

Richard's position was taken up and developed by the German Roman Catholic historian of dogma A. Grillmeier in 1951. In spite of the critical studies of Chrysostom Constantinides (1954-6), Ortiz de Urbina (1954) and Paul Galtier (1955), Grillmeier reissued his argument in 1964 and in 1975, apparently without discussing at all the criticisms of his opponents. In this chapter we shall attempt to summarize and evaluate Grillmeier's argument before we proceed to the examination of the contribution of his critics.

Grillmeier applied to Athanasius the straight-jacket of the Logos-flesh Christological framework without offering any proofs. He dismissed Voisin's analysis of the Christological terminology of Athanasius (1900) and the similar Utersuchungen of Edward Weigl (1914) by simply saying "that an analysis of words cannot be conclusive". Instead, he referred to Richard's essay as providing conclusive evidence for the adoption by Athanasius of a strict Logos-flesh Christological framework which gave no place to the human soul of Christ. Since, however, Richard's essay was only based on the examination of a limited amount of textual evidence, Grillmeier set out to complete the picture. He did this by means of a four-fold argument. First of all he examined the activity of the Logos in Christ's body (or humanity, as he says in the sub-title, even though he concentrates exclusively on the body), and established the point that the Logos indwelling the body is not only the personal agent, but also the physical principle which governs all its movements. Secondly, he turned to the meaning of the death of Christ in Athanasius, and having found that it was nothing but a separation of the Logos from the
body, confirmed his first point by asserting once more that the Logos (and not a soul) was the physical principle which governed the life of Christ's body. Thirdly, Grillmeier pointed to the well-known Athanasian notion of the body as the instrument of the Logos in order to consolidate his contention that the Logos was not only the theological, but also the physical factor in the life-movement of Christ's body. This three-fold argument would have proved his contention conclusively had it not been for ANT 7 and EPI 7 which suggested that Athanasius did after all affirm a soul in the body of Christ. So Grillmeier developed his fourth argument, which explained away the Athanasian statements of ANT 7 and EPI 7 in such a way that the general contention remained unaffected. In spite of expressing reservations, both about the particular arguments and about the general contention, his final conclusion was that of Richard. Athanasius' Christology was akin to that of Arius and Apollinaris, even though he did not explicitly deny the presence of the human soul in Christ's flesh.

What precisely were the arguments of Grillmeier? Was he justified in interpreting Athanasius' Christology in this way? It is to the examination of these questions that we may now turn.

The first argument dealing with the activity of the Logos in the body of Christ comprises three particular arguments, the argument from cosmology and anthropology; the argument from the notion of the sacrifice of Christ; and finally the argument e silentio which is identical with that of Richard. The first argument is based on the assumption that Athanasius' cosmology and anthropology were fundamentally influenced by Stoic thought and Stoic models. In cosmology Athanasius borrowed the concept of the world as a great body, but instead of the Stoic concept of an immanent soul (logos)
indwelling this great body, Athanasius introduced the transcendent Divine Logos (INC, 41 and GENT, 36). Thus Athanasius' cosmology was essentially that of the Stoics, with the only significant variation that his Logos was personal, Divine and transcendent, although He was at the same time the sole life-giving (and therefore, physical) principle of the entire cosmos. In anthropology, however, Athanasius retained, according to Grillmeier, the Stoic body-soul (logos) model, with the qualitative difference that the human soul was a spiritual and perfect copy of the Divine Logos within the earthly corporeal creation. Thus Grillmeier saw a clear parallelism or analogy between the activity of the Logos in the great body of the world and the activity of the soul in the human body (GENT, 30-4). The critical question arises in the context of the Incarnation. Does the Logos assume a body endowed with a soul, or does He simply take up a body and acts Himself as its enlivening principle just as He acts in the great body of the world? The apologetic passages of INC which establish the fitness of the indwelling of the Logos in a particular human body on the argument that He can indwell a part as He can indwell the whole, the frequent references to the Logos' enlivening and moving the body, and the absence of any reference whatsoever to a soul as the physical (let alone, the theological) principle of the life-movements of the body of Christ, are regarded by Grillmeier as plain indications that as in Cosmology the Logos has replaced the immanent Stoic soul, so in Christology the Logos has actually replaced the human soul, in a way that He alone is both the theological and the physical principle of all movements and activities.

The same point is established by Grillmeier on the basis of the notion of sacrifice in Christ. On the basis of CAR3, 57 and
particularly the text ὡς ἡν θελὼν μὲν αὐτὸς, γενόμενος δὲ ἄνθρωπος εἷς δειλίωσαι τὴν σάρκα, οὐ \( ^{e} \) ἰν συνεκρασε τὸ ἑαυτοῦ θέλημα τῇ ἄνθρωπιν ἀσθενεῖα (as well as INC,16:4, 25, MAX,3, EPI,6, DION,11 and INC&CAR,21). Grillmeier argues that the Logos is not only the personal agent acting in the event of sacrifice, but also the physical principle governing this act.

Finally Grillmeier turns to the obvious test of this contention, namely to the question whether Athanasius attributes the sufferings of Christ to the Logos or to a human physical or psychological factor. "If all the ἄνθρωπινα", he says, "are to be kept away from the Logos, a created subject (the underlining is mine) of the suffering must be found. Here we touch the problem of Athanasian Christology". Pointing to Richard's essay, Grillmeier claims that this question had been put to Athanasius by the Arians by means of four biblically-construed theses (CAR3,26), and at the same time Grillmeier explains what Athanasius had to do to meet the Arian challenge. "He had to find the subject of all suffering in the manhood of Christ, so as to put it as a protective shield before the inviolable Godhead". The Arian challenge was not merely corporeal. It was also psychological, since it was based on "sufferings of soul" (Grillmeier's inverted commas) (as opposed to purely bodily sufferings), because the Arians "had reduced the Logos to being a 'soul'." And Grillmeier adds: "We know well enough that they built up their attacks on the strict Logos-sarx framework"! There is no need to repeat here our criticisms which we advanced in discussing the similar points made by Richard. At this point Grillmeier is totally indebted to Richard's argumentation, which he repeats in a comprehensive manner. He recalls
the allegation that Athanasius weakened Christ's inner experiences, that he turned the agony of Gethsemane into a mere "feint", or the ignorance of the last Day of judgment into an ignorantis de jure, and that finally he turned the flesh into a subject (like a soul) of psychological experiences. Especially the Athanasian argument about the ignorance of Christ, says Grillmeier, betrays no awareness of a limited human consciousness in Christ. The obvious conclusion is that the Logos is, for Athanasius, not only the personal agent but also the sole physical principle of Christ's experiences.

As the argument from silence has already been discussed and shown to be nothing but an arbitrary and hypothetical imposition on Athanasius' real contention with the Arians, we may only comment here on the other two arguments, the cosmological and the sacrificial. Grillmeier has not proved that Athanasius was influenced by Stoic thought. He seems to have relied on this on Gaudel's observations. But Athanasius's philosophical allegiance, as far as that went, was Platonic rather than anything else. This has been impressively expounded by Meijering and nobody has contested it to this day. However, Athanasius was certainly aware of the Stoic system. He alludes to it in a number of places. But there is no evidence that he replaces the cosmic soul (logos) of the Stoics by the Divine Logos. The transcendent act of the Logos's providence upon the world never becomes an immanent one. Rather it is the inadequacy of the immanent life-principles of the world which demand the Logos's creative and transcendent intervention. In GENT 40 Athanasius clearly distinguishes the living and active Divine Logos of the God of all from the logos which is inherent in all creatures (τὸν τοῦ ζωοῦ
θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων ζωντα και ἐνεργή θεόν λόγον = τὸν λόγον τὸν ἐν ἐκάστῳ
τὸν γενομένων καὶ συμπεπληγμένον καὶ συμπεφυκότα ἡ καὶ σχερματικῶν τίνες εἰλθασίν καλεῖτιν), but he does not reject the second, nor does he say that it is in any sense replaced by the former. The distinction is made for the purpose of emphasizing the absolute character of the former and the relative character of the latter, and therefore the former as the ultimate ground of the latter.

The same point is made in GENT.41, where the created nature is said to be weak and inadequate from the point of view of its own inherent logos, and therefore becomes the object of the Divine Logos' care and providence. (ἡ γεννητὴ πέπειλος, διὸν κατὰ τούς ἔδοιον αὐτῆς λόγους βεστὶ ὥδι καὶ διαλυμένη... οὐκ ἠφηκέν αὐτὴν τῇ ἐαντίκη φύσει φέρεσσα καὶ χειμάζεσσα...). There is no suggestion here that the Creator Logos is a physical principle of the created things. What is suggested is that He is the creative Divine principle which is needed in order that the weakness inherent in the physical principle (the "logoi" of nature) may be overcome. In GENT.44 Athanasius says that the Logos as the ultimate creative principle of the world moves all things, visible (corporeal) and invisible (incorporeal), the body as well as the soul. The statement οὐκ ἠξωθὲν ἐαντοῦ καὶ τὰς ἀδράτους ὀυνάμεις φοιλές (a reference to spiritual creatures) and the statement τῇ ἐαντοῦ προνοίᾳ καὶ σώματα μὲν ἀφεὶς, ψυχὴ δὲ λογικὴ κινείται, καὶ τὸ λογικά τοιαῦτα καὶ τὸ ἕξει are particularly telling. They establish the Logos as the transcendent and creative principle of everything, including those created things which are themselves life-principles (in Grillmeier's terms, physical principles) of others. Had Athanasius replaced the created physical principles governing the life-movement of the creatures by the Logos, as
Grillmeier imagines, he would have had no argument against the Stoic pantheism which constituted the intellectual basis of pagan idolatry. Many of his arguments in GENT would have lost their force.

To the above evidences we could add many others, as for instance the clear text from Plato's *Politics* quoted in INC,41, which we discussed in connection with the final part of Richard's essay.

There is however a different kind of evidence which should also be mentioned here. Grillmeier gave the impression that only the human soul is a copy of the Logos of God. In fact Athanasius saw a logical *kata' elixíonο* embedded in all the creatures of the Logos. 'καὶ μὲν οὖν μονογενής καὶ ἀντω-σοφία τοῦ θεοῦ κτίζουσα καὶ ὑμιομυργός ἐστι τῶν πάντων.... ἦν δὲ μὴ μόνον ὑπάρχῃ τά γενόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ καλῶς ὑπάρχῃ, ἡμῶν κηιεῖσθαι τὴν διανοιγο δύολ αν τοις κτίσμασιν, ὥστε τόπον τινά καὶ φαντάσιαν εἰκόνος αὐτῆς ἐν πάσι τῇ κοινῇ καὶ ἑκάστῳ ἐνθείναι, ἦν καὶ σοφά τά γενόμενα, καὶ ἄξια τοῦ θεοῦ ἑργα διέκυναι (CAR2,78). Also ἄλλη μὲν γάρ (ἡ σοφία) κτίζουσα καὶ ὑμιομυργός ἐστιν, ὥστε τά τυπος ἐγκινήθησαν τοῖς ἐργοῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς εἰκόνος τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα. (CAR3,80). Finally πάντα μὲν ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ ὅρωμα γέγονε, ἄρας ὥστε ἐγκινήθησαν σοφά τοῖς ἐργοῖς, τὴν μὲν ὁσίαν ἡμῶν αὐτῆς τῷ πατρὶ, τῇ δὲ πρὸς τὰ γενητα συγκαταβάςει, ἡμῶν ἁρμοδόουσα τὸν κατ' ἐμοὶ τύπον τοῖς ἐργοῖς, ὥστε καὶ ώς ἐγι ἁματι πάντα τὸν κόσμον μὴ σταυρίζειν, ἀλλ' ὁμοοείν πρὸς δαντόν (CAR3,81). This distinction between God's very Wisdom (the Logos) and the type of God's Wisdom embedded in the creatures individually and collectively as a whole, suggests two life-principles, the Divine which is absolute and the creaturely, which is related to and based upon the former. The body of the world is in harmony (lit. "has the same mind") with itself, not only because of the Logos's Divine action, but also because of
the creaturely intelligibility which the Divine Logos has implanted in it and sustains it.

In the light of the above evidence Grillmeier's cosmological argument appears to be utterly arbitrary.

Similar considerations apply to his argument from the meaning of sacrifice. The text which he quotes from CAR3, 57 does not have a direct reference to the notion of sacrifice but, what is more important is that, as it stands, it shows two wills in Christ. His powerful will as God and His human weak will as man. 'Αμφότερα πάλιν παρά τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐλέγετο, ἦν δὲ λέγει ὅτι Θεὸς ἦν θέλων μὲν αὐτός (the Divine will), γενόμενος δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἔχε δειλώσαν τὴν σάρκα (the human will), ἵνα ὑπ' ἐνεχέρασα τῷ ἐαυτῷ θέλῃμα τῇ ἄνθρωπίνῃ ἀσθενείᾳ, ἦν καὶ τούτῳ πάλιν ἄφανίσας θαλάβελον τὸν ἄνθρωπον πάλιν κατασκευάσας. Undoubtedly the emphasis is here laid on the one person of the Logos become man as the only subject active in the Incarnation. But there are two frames of activity, the Divine and the human, both of which (ἀμφότερα) find a centre in Him and are coordinated by Him (ἐνεχέρασα). If the human frame of activity is curtailed in its most crucial nerve (the physical principle, as Grillmeier calls it), then the soteriological clause which comes at the end of the above statement becomes meaningless. The act of destroying human weakness is a mere show without any objective significance. But this would be against the very words of Athanasius which follow on in the same chapter and expose the logic of his understanding. 'Εσε γὰρ τοῦ ἔδωκαν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκατηργησαν, καὶ ἄνθρωπίνως πάντα τὰ ἄνθρωπον, οὕτω τῇ νομικο-μένῃ δειλίᾳ τὴν ἡμῶν δειλίαν ἀφρένιτο, καὶ πεποιήσας μηκέτι φοβοῦσθε τοὺς ἄνθρωπος τὸν ἔδωκαν. Only by a sort of mental juggling could Athanasius' words be changed into a nominal game.
Grillmeier's second argument from the death of Christ understood as a separation of the Logos from the body, is based on three Athanasian texts, CAR3,57, INC,22 and EPI,5f. The first and the third have already been discussed in the previous chapter and in connection with Richard's essay and a different view has been established — indeed in the case of CAR3,57 the alleged separation of the Logos from the body has been turned into a separation of the soul from the body. Therefore we may here simply examine the second proof text of Grillmeier. The text reads as follows: Ἐι μὲν οὖν πάλιν νοσήσαν τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἔπεισεν πάντων ἀιλιθείς ἀπ' ἀντοῦ ὁ ἄγος, ἀπρεπές μὲν ἦν τὸν τῶν ἀλλών τὰς νόσους θεραπεύοντα παροραίν τὸ ὅσιον ὀργανὸν ἐν νόσοις τηξικομενον. It is obvious that Athanasius is using here the Person-body anthropological model to talk about the death of Christ. His point of view, however, is not the ontological how of Christ's death, but the manner or the occasion in which this death occurred. The question which Athanasius attempts to answer here is why Christ did not die as a result of bodily sickness, but received death by being crucified by others. Given this context of the crucifixion and its logical and real corollary, the resurrection of the body, to which Athanasius actually draws attention ("ἐμελέ τῷ Κυρίῳ μάλιστα περὶ ἧς ἐμελέ ποιεῖν ἀναστάσεως τοῦ σώματος. Τούτῳ γὰρ ἦν κατὰ τοῦ θανάτου τρόπων ταύτην ἐπιδείξασθαι κάσιν...) it should not come as a surprise that he employs the person-body anthropological model as the most convenient. Had he set out to discuss the ontological meaning of Christ's death and what precisely that means from the standpoint of the Incarnation, the Person-body model would perhaps have been inadequate and we say perhaps, because everything depends on the meaning one
actually gives to the body. But as it stands, in a different context, this model seems to be not only adequate, but most appropriate. And yet, Grillmeier has totally ignored this context, and has in a wholly arbitrary way placed Athanasius’ text into an ontological framework demanded by his *Dogmengeschichte*. This kind of exegesis would be utterly unacceptable to N.T. exegetes. Paul’s statement in Colos.1:22, which speaks of reconciliation in the body of His (the Son of God’s) flesh, could never become the basis for arguing that Paul understood the death of Christ in terms of the body alone. The same could be said of Phil. 1:22–24 (which actually suggests a separation of person from flesh in death!) and of numerous other passages which make exclusive use of the term body and never refer to the soul. Grillmeier has produced no textual exegetical argument for his claim that the death of Christ is conceived by Athanasius as a separation of the Logos from the body. His only grounds are dogmengeschichtliche, exactly like those of his predecessors, Richard, Stüiken, Hoss and Baur.

Grillmeier’s third argument is based on Athanasius’ habit of speaking of the body as the instrument of the Logos. The central claim of the argument is that “the flesh (or the body) becomes an agent moved directly and physically by the Logos”. By implication this means that Athanasius does not envisage a human soul as the physical principle of the life-movement of the body of Christ, but instead, he makes the Logos Himself such a principle. Naturally, we want to question here the physical character of the movement of the body of Christ by the Logos. As we have shown earlier, Athanasius regards the Logos as the ultimate life-principle of all things includ-
ing the body assumed at the Incarnation. But the character of this is unmistakably creative and transcendent. There is no textual warrant that it is also physical (and therefore 'Stoic' pantheistic). The two texts which Grillmeier cites as evidence do not indicate that this is the case either. A closer analysis of the texts of Athanasius which employ the organon-body model reveals that there is a double purpose behind them. This is either the revelation of the truth of God or the completion of the vicarious sacrifice for men from the side of the Logos (cf. INC, 8, 9, 41, 42, 43, 44, and CAR3, 31). Only once, in INC, 45, does Athanasius say that the Logos uses the body as a human instrument ἐνα καὶ ἔσωσις τὸ σῶμα, but this ἐσωσία is not a natural (physical) act, but a supernatural one. In INC, 43 Athanasius says that the Logos τῷ σώματι ὑπάρχει χρώμενος οὐδὲνός τῶν τοῦ σώματος συμμετέχειν, which surely excludes any physical coordination of the Logos with the body. To appreciate the force of this statement of Athanasius and its implications for the doctrine of the Incarnation, we need perhaps to set in juxtaposition with the parallel statements of Apollinarius which indicate not only a συμμετοχή but also a kind of ἐσωσία of the Logos and the body. Lietzmann's collection of Apollinarian texts and fragments contains three such statements:

(a) From the Ἐρετὴ σαρκισμὸς:

ὡς ἠρμώτατο σώματι θεοῦ καὶ σωτήρι κόσμου καὶ σπέρματι ζωῆς αἰωνίου καὶ ὑπάρχειν ἑλων ἐνεργείαν... ἐλ γὰρ καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἔσχεν ἀλλὰ τὴν ζωὴν ἐκ θεοῦ καὶ τὴν οὐναμίαν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τὴν ἁρετὴν θελαν (Lietzmann, p. 205, 22-27)

(b) From the Συμπληρωματικὸς κατὰ Διονύσου πρὸς Ἡράκλειον:

θεὸς ἀναλαμβάνει ὑμνον καὶ θεὸς ἐστὶ καθὸ ἐνεργεῖ καὶ ἀνθρώπος κατὰ τὸ ὑμνόν, μένων δὲ θεὸς οὐ μεταβέβληται ὑμνον καὶ τὸ χινώνυ
μὲν πέφυκεν ἀποτελεῖν τὴν ἐνεργείαν· ἐὰν δὲ μὲν ἡ ἐνεργεία μὲν
καὶ ἡ οὐσία· μὲν ἡ οὕσια γέγονεν τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν ὄργανον
(Lietzmann, p. 253, 24– p. 254, 02)

From the 'Ἀνακεφαλαίωσις:

σάρξ δὲ θεοῦ, ζωῆς ὄργανον ἀρμοδίμενον τοῖς πάθεσι πρὸς τὰς θειὰς
βουλὰς, καὶ οὔτε λόγοι σοφικὲς οὔτε οὔτε πράξεις, καὶ τοῖς πάθεσιν
ὑποβαλλομένη κατὰ τὸ σαρκὶ προσήκον ἔχει κατὰ τῶν παθῶν διὰ τὸ θεοῦ
eῖναι σάρξ, ὡστε κατάρξαι τῆς ἀπαθείας, τοῖς οὐχ ὁμοίοις μὲν, ὁμοζώο-
οις δὲ αὐλοσιν (Lietzmann, p. 246, 2-7).

Athanasius not only condemned the homoousia of the flesh and
the Logos (cf. the case of EPI), but also knew from his dispute with
the Arians that the ὄργανον model implied τὸ ἐπερομένεις and τὸ ἐπε-
ροοῦμενον (DECR, 23. Cf. also, CAR1, 26, CAR2, 30, CAR2, 31 and CAR2, 71,
which plainly state that the Arians applied the ὄργανον concept to
the Son/Logos in order to differentiate Him physically from the
Father and claim that He was only a creature). In view of all the
above, Grillmeier’s argument loses all its force. In any case, he
himself acknowledges that “this (organon-body) formula is in itself
completely neutral”! and that “if, however, it is introduced into the
problematic of the frame-work under discussion (the Logos-sarx), it
is then deepened in a peculiar way”!

The final argument of Grillmeier can be described as a desperate
attempt for removing the main obstacle to his alleged physical connect-
ion between the Logos and the body in Athanasius’ Christology. This
is of course Athanasius’ explicit statement that οὐ σῶμα ἄγιον, οὐδὲ
ἀναλογητον, οὐδὲ ἀνοήτον εἶχεν ὁ Ἱωάννης... which has been traditionally
seen as Athanasius’ explicit condemnation of the Apollinarian error.
It is on the interpretation of this statement, says Grillmeier, that "the whole interpretation of the Athanasian picture of Christ could depend". So he sets out to interpret it, and... takes a position against the whole tradition of interpretation ancient and modern! He asserts that, in spite of the explicit mention of the soul, this statement does not in fact say what scholars have understood it to have said. It is a statement "very suited to the Apollinarians and was even accepted by them as an account of their teaching" (an allusion to Apollinaris' Letter to the African bishops exiled at Diocaesaria). Indeed, as R. Weijenborg argued — from whom, incidentally, Grillmeier seems to have taken his inspiration — it is a possible Apollinarian interpolation introduced into the text of the Tomus after Athanasius' death. In any case, "if it is genuine, it certainly tells strongly against Athanasius"!

The actual argument by means of which Grillmeier sets out to establish the startling interpretation is complex and obscure, not least, because of his curious hermeneutical 'scissors' of the 'theological factor' and the 'physical factor' by means of which he anatomizes the Athanasian text so as to be absolutely incongruent with the rest of ANT,7. This argument comprises the following three steps:

Firstly, he begins with the last sentence, οὐ σώματος μόνον ἄλλα καὶ ψυχῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ Λόγῳ σωτηρία γέγονεν, which constitutes the premise or the substantiation (Grillmeier's term) of the initial proposition (namely, ἑμολόγουν γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σῶμα ἐνυχών, οὐ δὲναρασάρητον, οὐ δὲναύσητον ἔχειν ὁ σωτήρ). The meaning of this sentence, says Grillmeier, is very obscure and no clear argument can be really established on it. In spite of the phrase ἐν αὐτῷ
τῷ Ἑγῷ, the fact remains that nothing is said in the sentence about the being of Christ as such. The body and the soul are not those of the Logos, but of humanity in general.

Secondly, Grillmeier turns to the second sentence of the statement under discussion (οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ Ἰὼν τε ἦν, τοῦ κυρίου δι' ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπου γενομένου, ἀνόητον εἶναι τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ) and again tries to interpret it in an Apollinarian way. Here he comes up with the startling conclusion that the οὐδὲ ἀνόητον does not refer to a "reason of a soul" in Christ, but to a "reason which is derived from the Logos qua Logos". To support this view Grillmeier desperately tries to find an Athanasian text which could support a parallel meaning, and he finds it in the following text from VITA, 74: δ Ἐγός τοῦ ὑπὸ σῶμα ἐκράτη ἄλλος ἀυτός ὢν, ἐπὶ σωτηρία καὶ εὐεργεσία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνεῖλησε σῶμα ἀνθρώπινον, ἣν, τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ γενέσει κοινωνήσας, ποιήσας τούς ἀνθρώπους κοινωνήσας θείας καὶ νοερᾶς φύσεως. "This text," says Grillmeier, is not primarily a description of the part played by the Logos and His effect on the individual human nature of Christ, but attention is focused rather on the significance of the Incarnation for manhood as a whole. Through the communication of the Logos the Incarnation brings about participation in the divine nature and reason. Salvation then is supernatural communication of divine grace and spirituality.

Finally, Grillmeier comes to the first sentence of the controversial Athanasian statement of ANT, 7. In the light of what he said previously and particularly "the Alexandrinism of the Logos-sarx Christology", Grillmeier infers that the ἀνόητος should not be translated as soulless but as lifeless. This is in fact, as he himself points out, the Apollinarian understanding of the statement, as one gathers
from Apollinaris' Letters to the exiled Alexandrian bishops at Dio-
caesarea. Grillmeier does not actually cite the Apollinarian text,
but he realise that his claim is far from obvious. He expresses
for a moment a hesitation in deciding whether the ἄψυχος should be
be taken in the traditional view or in the Apollinarian one. But
quickly settles for the second option, because, as he says, "the
object to be redeemed in the final sentence is not the humanity of
Christ as such, but man in general". To support this kind of general
soteriological character of Athanasius' statement, Grillmeier turns
to EPI 7 and cites an appropriate sentence which makes the same
point (ὁντως ἀληθείᾳ ἀνθρώπου γενομένου τοῦ ἡμῶν. He stops here!).
Thus, he concludes that at the very most the statement of ANT 7
about the body of Christ could only contain an affirmation of a soul as
a physical (biological?) factor, but not as a theological one (Nestor-
ian?). Athanasius never spoke with complete clarity at this point.

Three criticisms should be made against this three-fold argument.
Firstly, the last sentence does have a Christological reference.
This can be gathered from the two parallel statements of Eusebius
of Vercelli and Paulinus himself which are appended to the text of
the Tomus. Eusebius states that οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς σαμκάσεως
toῦ ἡμῶν ἐμῶν, ὡς τοῦ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς Υἱὸς, καὶ ἀνθρώπος γέγονεν, ἀναλαβὼν
κάτω ἄνευ ἀμαρτίας, οἷος ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπος συνέστηκε, κατὰ τὸ
tῆς ἐπιστολῆς ὕφος, ἐπιστολοῦμην. Paulinus' statement reads as follows:
oυτε γὰρ ἄψυχον, οὐτε ἄναλαμπτον οὐτε ἄνόητον οἷμα ἔχειν τὸ ἡμῶν, οὐτε
γαρ' οἷον τ' ἡμ, τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἀνθρώπου οἴ τημάς γενομένου, ἄνόητον
εἶναι αὐτοῦ τὸ οἷμα. If this statement was Apollinarian, how could
Paulinus, who, in Grillmeier's view, is a staunch Antiochene, have
adopted it so slavishly as his own confession? (33) But the clearest
confirmation of the Christological character of Athanasius' soteriological statement is given in EPI, 7, to which Grillmeier refers, but does not cite fully. Here we read such statements as: οὐ θέσει ταῦτα ἐγένετο, μὴ γένοιτο. ὡς τίνες πάλιν ὑπέλεβον ἀλήθειαν ἀνθρώπου γενομένου τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἡλύθη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου σωτηρία ἐγένετο. 
.. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ φαντασία ἢ σωτηρία ἡμῶν, οὐδὲ σώματος υἱόν, ἀλλ' ἡλύθη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἡ υἱότης καὶ σώματος ἁληθείας, ἢ σωτηρία γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ Λόγῳ. Ἀνθρώπινον ἄρα φύσιν τὸ ἐκ τῆς Μαρίας κατὰ τὰς θελας Γραφὰς, καὶ ἁληθείν ἦν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Κυρίου ἀληθείν ὡς ἦν ἐκεῖ ταῦτα τόν ἦν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ...

Secondly, the "reason" of the penultimate sentence of Athanasius' statement cannot be a "reason communicated by the Logos to men", because it is in fact connected with the body of the Lord and not His Godhood. In any case, how could He communicate such a reason or reasonable grace to the body if the body did not have any reasonable capacity in itself? The citation from the Vita Antonii is another example of unacceptable exegesis. Athanasius' stress on the communication of men with the divine and intelligent nature (τὴν εἰλαν καὶ νοερὰν φύσιν) is not made in contrast to the body of Christ but to the pagans who assimilate the Godhead with the unreasonable creatures (ὅ ἐν ἀλέγοις ἐξομοιοῦν τῷ Θεῷ). The passage from the Vita is very complex, as it also includes a debate about the pagan view of the preexistence of the human soul. It needs very careful analysis of the entire debate before one draws final conclusions. One thing however is clear, that the passage does not imply what Grillmeier wants it to do.

Finally we need to cite Apollinaris' statement from his Letter to the bishops of Diocesarea in order to see whether it is in fact
identical with that of Athanasius\(^1\) in ANT\(_7\). Apollinaris writes:

\[\text{εἰς} \ \text{ἀνθρώπων} \ \text{ἄγιον} \ \text{ἐπιδεδημηκέναι} \ \text{τὸν} \ \text{τοῦ} \ \text{Θεοῦ} \ \text{Λόγον} \ \text{ὅπερ} \ \text{ἐν} \ \text{προφήταις} \ \text{ἄλλα} \ \text{αὐτὸν} \ \text{τὸν} \ \text{Λόγον} \ \text{σάρκα} \ \text{γεγενήθης} \ \text{μὴ} \ \text{ἀνεξανεμοφότα} \ \text{νοῦν} \ \text{ἀνθρώπων}, \ \text{νοῦν} \ \text{τρεπόμενον} \ \text{kai} \ \text{αἰχμαλωτισμένον} \ \text{λογισμοῖς} \ \text{οὐκαροῖς}, \ \text{ἄλλα} \ \text{θείον} \ \text{ὅντα} \ \text{νοῦν} \ \text{ἐπτρεπτον} \ \text{oὐδάνουν} \ \text{ὁ} \ \text{kai} \ \text{οὐ} \ \text{σῶμα} \ \text{ἀψυχον} \ \text{oὐδὲ} \ \text{ἀναλατότον} \ \text{οὐδὲ} \ \text{ἀνόητον} \ \text{ἔχειν} \ \text{ὅ πως καὶ} \ \text{ὅ} \ \text{οὖν} \ \text{τοῦ} \ \text{Κυρίου} \ \text{ὁμᾶς} \ \text{ἀνθρώπων} \ \text{γεγενημένου} \ \text{ἀνόητον} \ \text{ἔíναι} \ \text{τὸ} \ \text{σῶμα} \ \text{αὐτοῦ}.\]

The differences between this statement and the statement of ANT\(_7\) are not only striking, but substantial. The soteriological premise of salvation of both soul and body in Christ is totally absent. Instead, we have the premise of a "heavenly mind" which is unheard of in Athanasius and which stands in contradiction to his explicit affirmation in SER\(_1,9\): oὐ γάρ ὥς ἐπέτρεψαν ἐντοπιογραφήθηντος παρὰ τὸν ἐπὶ ἀρχής καὶ ἐνθάνετο γεγενέναι ἀνθρώπων ἔλεγεν ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐν Χριστῷ κτισθέντα καὶ ἀνακαινισθέντα νοῦν συνεθήλευεν ἀναλατότεν. Apollinaris' statement does not have any reference to "reason" as Athanasius' has. It seems that Grillmeier took the Apollinarian ἀνόητον for the Athanasian ἄγιον, but this is wrong because Athanasius employed both terms in different sentences. Lastly, we ought to draw attention to one more significant difference between Athanasius' sense of ἁψυχον and the Apollinarian one. Athanasius qualifies the body of the Lord in a positive way, as ψυχικῶν and as capable to be offered as ἁντὶψυχον for others. Apollinaris does not supply such positive qualifications.\(^{35}\)

On the whole, Grillmeier's argumentation is based on a supposition that the crucial Christological statement of ANT\(_7\) was an interpolation, or at least had a deliberate Apollinarian ring to it. But this supposition is very dubious, especially if one takes into account
that the Tomus was sent from Alexandria to Antioch. It seems incredible that Paulinus would have given his signature to a phraseology which was deliberately Apollinarian and did not safeguard the integrity of Christ's humanity. It is also incredible that Athanasius would have consented to a dubious formula, and would have used it in a document which was clearly of great importance for the peace of the Church. But what really makes Grillmeier's interpretation totally unacceptable is the dubious character of his exegesis of the Athanasian texts. It is not the natural meaning of the text emerging from its particular context, but a forced meaning imposed on the text in the interests of the schematised Christology of the History of Dogma that guides Grillmeier's exposition. Finally we should stress the fact that Grillmeier's exposition is out of tune with the Church's tradition, which, as he himself acknowledges, "stands in direct proximity to the Tomus ad Antiochenos of 362 and always understands the ἄψυχος as meaning "without a soul".

We should now leave Grillmeier here and turn to his critics who established the opposite view with positive arguments based on Athanasius' texts.
VI.4 The Reply of I. Ortiz de Urbina

Urbina's essay, entitled "the human soul of Christ according to saint Athanasius", appeared as a formidable attack against the views of Richard and Grillmeier. It comprised six parts dealing successively with the following topics: 1) A brief account of the history of criticism, 2) The question of methodology, 3) Express affirmations of the human soul of Christ in Athanasius, 4) Implicit affirmations of the human soul of Christ, 5) the right understanding of the Logos-flesh schema, and 6) the difficult texts. In the conclusions which followed Urbina stated, that since the Tome to the Antiochene Athanasius' affirmation of the human soul of Christ became explicit and even emphatic. But even before that document appeared, this affirmation was implicit in Athanasius' arguments and disputes with the Arians. The few difficult texts which seem to deny this affirmation, and whose interpretation can be estimated differently, do not really offer a content which is truly in contrast with the clear doctrine presented elsewhere. Urbina's essay presented particular merits, not only because it applied a new methodology, but also because it dealt with the question in a comprehensive and tidy way. Our task in this chapter will be to summarize the content of each part of the essay and to offer a general evaluation assessing particularly its contribution to the history of criticism.

Urbina began with an outline of Hoss' claims of the Apollinarian logic of Athanasius' Christology. He then referred to Voisin's reply, which was built upon the theory of two stages in the development of Athanasius' Christological doctrine, distinguished by the
publication of the Tome to the Antiochenes in A.D. 362. According to this theory, before A.D. 362 Athanasius denoted the humanity of Christ by the terms flesh and body and did not explicitly refer to his human soul because the question had not been put to him. After AD 362, however, with the rise of the Apollinarian doctrine, Athanasius explicitly referred to the human soul of Christ first in the Tome to the Antiochenes and later in subsequent writings. The general use of the terms flesh and body, and the explicit mention of the soul of Christ when the question arose, leave no doubt about Athanasius' anti-Apollinarian stance. Voisin's argument carried considerable weight and was accepted by the majority of the Roman Catholic patristic scholars as well as by the eminent Protestant historians Harnack and Lietzmann. The situation began to swing back to the position of Hoss when Richard's formidable essay appeared. Richard argued that the question concerning the soul of Christ had in fact been put to Athanasius by the Arians before A.D. 362, as CAR3, 26ff clearly indicates. Athanasius' silence on this issue and his use of a strict Logos-flesh Christological scheme strongly suggest that he did not uphold the existence of a human soul in Christ at that stage. Richard, however, did accept that since A.D. 362, owing to the rise of Apollinarianism, Athanasius had to confess openly the soul of Christ. Yet his Logos-flesh Christological scheme remained the basis of his thought. It was this last point which Grillmeier took up and developed its implications and thus brought patristic opinion back to the position of Hoss, although it was presented in a slightly modified form. Grillmeier argued that the Logos was the only hegemonic principle in Christ and therefore
the mention of the soul in the second stage of Athanasius' development does not have any real theological significance. The soul of Christ was never made by Athanasius a theological factor. The death of Christ remained even at this stage as a separation of the Logos from the body. The soul which is mentioned in ANT and EPI is simply a physical factor.

Having thus summarized the history of criticism Urbina turns to the question of methodology. He contrasts the method of his predecessors with that of his own and makes the second the basis of his argumentation. The chronological method of Grillmeier, he says, is not fruitful. It begins with what is obscure and therefore susceptible to a variety of interpretations and then passes on to the clear texts, which are not adequately appreciated, because they become attenuated by the obscure texts. The right method, says Ortiz de Urbina, would be the reverse procedure. One should begin with the examination of the subject by discussing the texts which deal with it ex professo, and then move to the equivocal or dubious texts applying to them the exegetical principles which have been established in the first instance. The case of the Holy Spirit in Athanasius is a parallel one, because it presents first a stage of silence and then a stage of explicit doctrine. Urbina warns that failure to adopt this method inevitably leads to inexplicable problems. Such are the problem of explaining how Athanasius supposedly ignorant of the soul of Christ becomes suddenly explicit on it in 362, or the problem of explaining why the numerous and fanatical enemies of the Alexandrian teacher never accused him of being ignorant of a truth which was already nearly taught by Origen. So Urbina suggests that firstly
one should undertake an examination of the texts which contain explicit affirmations to the human soul of Christ. Then one should turn to the texts which contain implicit affirmations of the matter. Thirdly one should examine whether the preferential use of incarnational schemes like those of Logos-flesh and Logos-body stands in contradiction to the preceding affirmations or admits of a conciliatory interpretation. Finally difficult texts which seem to contradict an otherwise explainable case should be critically assessed.

Urbina cites five explicit affirmations of the human soul of Christ in Athanasius. The first one is the well known text of ANT,7 which contains the phrases οὐ σῶμα ἄνω ζωτήρ, οὐδὲ ἀναίσθητον, οὐδ' ἀνάθητον εἶχεν οὐτῷ or οὐδὲ γάρ οἶδὲ τι ἢν...ἀνάθητον εἶναι τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ σῶματος μόνον; ἀλλά καὶ ψυχῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ σωτηρία γέγονεν. These, he says, are not ambiguous formulae as Richard claimed. They clearly reveal that ἄνωθεν without soul and ἀνάθητος=without reason. The second text comes from EPI,7 where Athanasius again states in a soteriological context firstly, that ὁντως ἀληθείᾳ ἀνθρώπου γενομένου τοῦ ζωτήρος, ὅλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου σωτηρία ἐγένετο, and secondly, that οὐ φαντασίᾳ ἡ σωτηρία ἡμῶν οὐδὲ σῶματος μόνον, ἀλλ' ὁλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ψυχῆς καὶ σῶματος ἀληθῶς, ἡ σωτηρία γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ. He also refers to Athanasius' repudiation of the preexistence of the human soul of Christ before the birth of the flesh from the Virgin Mary, mentioned in EPI,8, and concludes that the nature which came from Mary was truly human and contained both a body and a soul, since both of them were saved in Christ. The third reference to the soul of Christ appears several years before the Tome to the Antiochenes in the Sixth Easter Letter written in 354 and preserved in Syriac. Here we read about Christ that
"He gave His soul (nephesh), so that we would preserve ours unharmed from the snares of the enemy". The fourth text comes from INC&CAR, 13, which Urbina regards as Athanasian, following the majority of the patristic scholars. In giving his exegesis of I Cor. 2:10, 11 Athanasius says: ὃσκερ οὖν τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας οὐ κεχώρισται, οὔτω καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλότριον. This human spirit, contrasted with the divine Spirit, is the human soul. It is of this that Athanasius writes in the previous chapter, καὶ ὅτε παρατίθεται τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ ἐς χείρας τοῦ πατρός, ὥς ἀνθρωπος ἑαυτόν παρατίθεται τῷ θεῷ ἵνα πάντας ἀνθρώπους παραθέται τῷ θεῷ, and thus clearly confesses the human soul of Christ and its soteriological significance. Finally, Urbina points to CAR3, 57 as the fifth explicit reference to Christ's soul in Athanasius. The actual text is the following: Ἡδὲ ὑπὲρ τὸ λέγων ἀνθρωπίνως, "Νῦν ἢ ψυχή μου τετάρακται", ἔλεγε καὶ θείως, "Ἕξουσίαν ἔχω θείναι τήν ψυχήν μου καί ἔξουσίαν ἔχω πάλιν λαβεῖν αὐτήν". Τό μὲν ταράττεσθαι τῆς σαρκὸς ἱδίον ἢν, τό δὲ ἔξουσίαν ἔχειν θείναι καὶ λαβεῖν, ὅτε βούλεται τήν ψυχήν, οὐκέστι τούτο ἱδίον ἀνθρώπων ἄλλα τῆς τοῦ λόγου δυνάμειας ἔστιν. Here, says Urbina, the soul which was troubled was human, therefore the trouble is proper to the assumed flesh and in no manner can make an impression on a spirit of divine nature.

In the fourth part of his essay Urbina lists numerous anti-Arian Athanasian texts which implicitly but clearly establish the presence of a human soul in Christ. These texts oppose the Arian objections to the Godhood of the Logos taken from the human humiliations of Christ. Athanasius accepts these humiliations and asserts in general
that He suffered them ἀνθρωπινῶς. Urbina admits that not all the humiliations involve the human reasonable soul as, for instance, the corporal passion, which can be explained with reference to a sensible but not a reasonable soul on the assumption that there is in Athanasius a trichotomous anthropology. Ignorance, on the other hand, considered as a positive defect in Christ, supposes implicitly an intelligence which is ignorant (capable of ignorance) and hence a soul which is truly reasonable and human. In as much as Athanasius accepted some ignorance in Christ as man, he must have implicitly accepted the existence of a reasonable soul in Christ. Three texts are cited here as evidence:

SER2, 9: Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν, ὡς γέγραπται, ἄνθρωπων δὲ ἐδών τὸ ἄγνοιαν, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ πεινᾶν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα (οὐ γὰρ γινώσκοιν ἐδών μὴ ἁκούσωσι καὶ μάθωσι), διὰ τούτο καὶ τὴν ἁγνόιαν τῶν ἄνθρωπων, ὡς ἄνθρωπος γεγονός, ἐπιδείκνυται: πρῶτον μὲν, ἵνα δειξη, ὅτι ἀληθῶς ἄνθρωπινον ἔχει σῶμα ἐπείτα δὲ, ἵνα καὶ, τὴν ἁγνόιαν τῶν ἄνθρωπων ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐχων, ἀπὸ πάντων λυτρωδιῶν καὶ καθαρίσας, τελειαν καὶ ἀγίαν παραστησθῇ τῷ Πατρί τὴν ἁγωνιώτητα.

CAR3, 4: ὦθουν καὶ ὅταν λέγηται πεινᾶν, καὶ διψᾶν, καὶ καμινεῖν, καὶ μὴ εἶδέναι, καὶ καθεῦθειν, καὶ κλαίειν, καὶ αἰτεῖν, καὶ φεῦγειν, καὶ γεννᾶσθαι, καὶ παραπεζοθαι τὸ ποτήριον, καὶ ἀπλῶς πάντα τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς, λειτείθ ἐν ἁκολούθως ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ Χριστῷ ὅψιν πεινάντος καὶ διψώντος υπέρ ἡμῶν σαρκὶ καὶ μὴ εἶδέναι λέγοντος καὶ καταπιθαμένων, καὶ κάμνοντος υπέρ ἡμῶν σαρκὶ καὶ πυγμένου πάλιν, καὶ γεννώμενον, καὶ ἀνεξάντος σαρκὶ καὶ φοβομένου καὶ καταπιθαμένου σαρκὶ καὶ λέγοντος, "ἐλ μνατὸν παρελθέτω ἀπ' ἐμοῦ τὸ ποτήριον τούτο", καὶ τυπτομένου, καὶ λαβόντος υπέρ ἡμῶν σαρκὶ καὶ ἀλώς πάντα τὰ τὰ τὰ υπέρ ἡμῶν σαρκὶ.
CAR3, 43 Τίνος δέ χάριν γινώσκων ἔλεγεν, ὡς οὐδὲ δ' ὡς οἶδεν, οὐδένα τῶν πιστῶν ἄγνοειν οἶμαι, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο οὐδέν ἦτον οἷα τὴν σάρκα ὡς ἀνθρώπους ἔλεγεν. οὐδὲ γάρ οὐδέ τοῦτο ἐλάττωμα τοῦ λόγου ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἢς ἔστιν ἰδιον καὶ τὸ ἄγνοετι... διὰ τοῦτο τὰ πάντα, ὥσα μετὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ἀνθρώπος, ἀνθρωπίνως λέγει, ταῦτα τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι δίκαιον ἀνατίθεναι... Ἀμέλει ἄγνων ἐν τῷ παθητικῷ περὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον αὐτοῦ... ὡς μὲν λόγος γινώσκει, ὡς δὲ ἀνθρώπος ἄγνοει' ἀνθρώπου γὰρ ἰδιον τὸ ἄγνοετι, καὶ μάλιστα ταῦτα.

Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἰδιον τοῦ ζωτῆρος. Ἐκείνῃ γὰρ γέγονεν ἀνθρώπος, οὐκ ἐπαισχύνεται διὰ τὴν σάρκα τὴν ἄγνοοσαν εἰ- πεῖν, οὐκ οἶδα, ἵνα δεῖξῃ, ὡς εἶδός ὡς θεός, ἄγνοει σαρκικῶς.

Urbina applies the same argument to the following cases which implicitly establish the presence of a human soul in Christ:

The case of the progress of Christ in wisdom discussed in CAR3, 53, and particularly the text οὐχ ἦ σοφὴ, ἦ σοφὴ ἐστίν, αὕτη καθ' ἑαυτῆν προεξοπλεθείς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ προεξοπλεθείς, ὄπερ- αναραϊνόν κατ' ὁλόγον τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν καὶ θεοποιούμενον, καὶ εργανόν αὕτης πρὸς τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς θεότητος καὶ τὴν ἐνεργείαν αὕτης γινώμενον καὶ φανόμενον πίσι.

The case of the sufferings of Christ which pertain to the psychological and moral order and which in CAR3, 54-5 are said to have occurred in Christ in a human manner (ἀνθρωπίνως), and particularly the statement in CAR3, 56 which argues that εἰ τοινῦν ἔξαλλος, καὶ ἐπαράξη, οὐχ ἂν ὁ λόγος, ἦ λόγος ἐστίν ὁ κλαῖων καὶ ταρασοῦμενος, ἀλλὰ τῆς σαρκοῦς ἰδιον ἂν τοῦτο- εἰ δὲ παρεκάλεσεν παρελθεῖν τῷ ποιή- ριον, οὐχ ἂν ἂν τῆς σωτηρίας ἄγνοον ὁ λόγος- εἰ δὲ τοῦτο τῷ πάθος... ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀνθρώπως γέγονεν ὁ Κύριος, καὶ ὡς παρὰ ἀνθρώπου ταύτα καὶ λέγεται ταύτα. The same must be said of the
following text from INC&CAR,21 which explicitly mentions two wills in Christ one human and another divine: καὶ ήταν λέγη, "Πάτερ, εἰ δυνατόν τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο παρελθέτω ἀκ' ἐμοῦ· πλὴν μή τὸ ἐμὸν θέλημα γένηται, ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶν", καὶ, "Τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα πρόθυμον, ἢ δὲ σάρξ ἀνθρώπη", οὕτω θελήματα ἑνταῦθα δείχνουι, τὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπινον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς σαρκός, τὸ δὲ θεῖόν, ὅπερ ἦσθι. In these texts says Urbina Athanasius attributes the moral disturbance, the fear and the consequent arguing against the passion, to the human element in Christ, to the "flesh", to the "human nature", which in the Tome to the Antiochenes will become "the soul".

The case of Jesus being a true man shown in the following texts: INC&CAR,8: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὁ λόγος καὶ Υἱὸς τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐνωθεὶς σαρκὶ, γέγονεν σάρξ, ἀνθρώπος τέλειος, ἵνα οἱ ἀνθρώποι ἐνωθέντες ζεύγματι γεννωνται ἐν πνεύμα. INC&CAR,11: ἐπεὶ οὖν πρῶτον πλοῦτος ἢν, τούτῳ στὶ θεὸς, θυσιν ἐκ πτωχῶς γέγονε, τούτῳ στὶν ἀνθρώπως, καὶ ἀμωβηθή ἡμῖν κατὰ πάντα χωρὶς ἀμαρτίας. MAX,2: ἢπαξ ἐπὶ συντελεῖς τῶν αἰῶνων εἰς ἀθέτησιν τῆς ἀμαρτίας αὐτοῦ ὁ λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ παρθένου προῆλθεν ἀνθρώπως καὶ ἀμοιβῆς ἰματέραι.

The case of Jesus being not simply a man, nor only a man, which is shown in the following texts: INC&CAR,22, τὸν μὴ μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεὸν τὸν αὐτὸν ἤντα. INC37: ἢδὲ σημαινόμενος ἐκ τῶν Γραφῶν ὑπὲρ πάντων πάσχειν, οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀνθρώπος, ἀλλὰ ἐν τῷ πάντων λέγεται, κάν ὁμοιός κατὰ τὴν φύσιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπόνημα. SER,4,19: ἡμᾶς μὴ ἐχεῖ τοῦ φανομένου νομίσῃ τις ἀνθρώπων ψεύτων εἶναι τῷ κόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πνεῦμα ἄχοῦν, γινώσκει οὖν εἶναι τὸν ἐν σώματι ἤντα. DION,8: ἔχειν τούτων τοιαύτα φανταχομένων, ἢρ' ἐπιθυμή τοῖς ἰματίας ἀξίως τοῦτος ἱσχύςαντο, μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἠδειγμα τὸν κρίσαν οἱ ἀπόστολοι καὶ μηδὲν πλέον; μὴ γένοιτο· οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ εἰς νοῦν ποτὲ λαβεῖν... οἱ τότε
The case of Christ being a man, which is shown in the following texts: INC,50 : καὶ τὸ γε θαυμαστὸν, ὅτι ὡς ἄνθρωπος εἰς τὸν θάνατον καταβάς. CAR2,70 : καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῃ (τῇ ἐληθευτῇ σαρκὶ) γέγονεν ἡμῶν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς καινῆς κτίσεως, κτισθεὶς ἄνθρωπος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν.

The case of distinguishing clearly between what pertains to the humanity and what to the divinity of Christ, which is presented in the following texts: SER2,8: δει δε λοιπὸν, ἐννυχάνοντα τῇ Γραφῇ δοξιμάζειν καὶ διαχρίνειν, πότε μὲν περὶ τῆς θεότητος τοῦ λόγου λέγει, πότε δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων αὐτοῦ, ἢν μὴ ἐπερα ἀνθρώπων νοσθήντες παραπαίωσον. DION,9 : καὶ ὁ τὰ ἄνθρωπινα τοῦ λόγου γράφων ὁδε καὶ τά περὶ τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς θεότητος ἐξηγούμενος συν ἀγνοεῖ τά ίδια τῆς ἐνσάρκωσις παρουσίας αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔχαστον ὡς ἐπιστήμων καὶ δέκιμος τραπεζίτις διαχρίνων κατ' ὅρθον τῆς εὐσεβείας βαδιστείται. CAR3,41 : ἐκάν τὰ ἄνθρωπινα λέγεται περὶ τοῦ ὑπερτήρου ἐν τῷ Εὐαγγελίῳ, πάλιν εἰς τῇ σφάλμα τῶν λεγομένων ἐνορθώσεις, καὶ ὡς ἀλλότρια θεοῦ τά τυχόντα τυγχάνει δόντα, μὴ τῇ θεότητι τοῦ λόγου ταύτα λογιζώμεθα, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἄνθρωπότητι αὐτοῦ. CAR2,60 : ἀλλος γὰρ ὁ λόγος τῶν πάντων καὶ πρὸ πάντων ὑπὲρτον κτίζεται ἀρχὴ τῶν δόθων εἰς ἔργα διὰ τὴν ἐνανθρώπησιν. CAR1,48: ὑπόκουν μένων ἀττρεπτοῖς... καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ ὁ οἶκος καὶ λαμβάνων, οἰκοῦς μὲν ὡς θεοῦ λόγος, λαμβάνων δὲ ὡς ἄνθρωπος (Cf. also CAR1,45 and 46).

Finally, Urbina concludes that these texts indicate that Christ for Athanasius is perfect man, and he points to the final sentences of INC,42 which indicate that if reason (νοῦς) is found in every man, it could not be lacking in a perfect man like the Lord.
Having established that Athanasius both explicitly and implicitly confessed the existence of a human soul in Christ, Urbina turns to an examination of the actual meaning of the Logos-flesh Christological scheme. Nobody, he says, would doubt that Athanasius preferred the terms "flesh" and "body" to speak of the humanity which the Logos assumed at His Incarnation. The critical question arises when one inquires into the precise meaning of this assumption. For him, however, it is clear that this meaning should not contradict the express testimonies to the existence of a soul and therefore of a perfect humanity in Christ. Thus, when Athanasius quotes the classic statement John 1:14, one should assume that he understands it as implying the assumption of complete humanity by the Logos.

Put otherwise, this means that the terms "flesh" and "body" should not be understood as excluding the soul, but rather as designating the whole humanity. Urbina gives three reasons for this: firstly, the fact that only this exegesis avoids the contradiction with the clear texts of Athanasius; secondly, the fact that Athanasius himself has explicitly defended this view; and thirdly, that statements based on the "flesh" or the "body" are frequently followed in the Athanasian text by other statements based on the term "man". The first reason is self-evident. The second one is clearly asserted in two places. ΕΡΙ,8 says: "ὅ λόγος σώματος γέγονεν", ἵσον πάλιν ἐστίν εἰπεῖν,

"ὅ λόγος ἀνθρώπων γέγονεν", κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον ἐν τῷ Ἰωάν, Ἡ ἐκ τοῦ ἁλόγων ἐστίν ἐπὶ πᾶσαν σάρκα" οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τῶν ἠλόγων ἐστίν ἡ ἐπαγγελία, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀνθρώπως ἐστίν, ἐν ἔκκει καὶ ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν ὁ Κύριος. ΤΗΣ ΓΡΑΦΗΣ ἦσος ἐχοῦσας λέγειν σάρκα τῶν ἄνθρωπον, ὡς ὀμη Ἰωάν τοῦ προφήτου φησίν ...
As for the third reason, Urbina refers to Voisin's clear argument, but also gives examples from CAR2,12,14,54, CAR3,29, ENCY,17, INC,16, CAR1,43 and 44, DECR,14 and CAR1,50. In addition to these, he supplies references from DION,10, CAR2,69, and DION,18 to argue that in Athanasius' texts it is explicitly affirmed that the flesh or the body of Christ are exactly like ours, and therefore men are συγγένεις with the Lord. The point that Urbina makes is that this συγγένεια is another way of saying that Christ is homoousios with men on account of the body, and therefore the body must be connected with complete humanity. Particularly important is for Urbina the following text from CAR2,61:

εἰ γὰρ καὶ μεθ’ ἡμᾶς καὶ δι’ ἡμᾶς γέγονεν ἀνθρωπος, καὶ ἀδελφὸς ἡμῶν διὰ τὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ σώματος ὑμιῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ πρωτότοκος λέγεται καὶ ἐστὶν ἡμῶν, ἑπειδὴ πάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπολύματων κατὰ τὴν παράβασιν τοῦ Ἀδάμ, πρῶτη τῶν ἄλλων ἑσθή καὶ ἠλευθερώθη ἢ ἐκείνου σάρξ, ὡς αὐτὸς τοῦ λόγου ὁμια γενομένη, καὶ λοιπὸν ἡμεῖς, ὡς οὐσωμοι τυγχάνοντες, καὶ ἐκεῖνο σωζόμεθα. All is well, says Urbina, if in this passage the salvation effected in the body of the Lord and hence in ours is understood in the sense of the complete human nature in keeping with the preceding affirmations of Athanasius. If, in turn, we wish to exclude, because of silence, the soul, it is not understandable how He could be called our brother who has not the same human soul as ours. Thus, he goes on to add: it is the same Athanasius who in CAR2,70 affirms. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ προσελάβετο τὸ γεννητὸν καὶ ἀνθρώπινον σῶμα, ἵνα, τούτῳ μὲς ὲμημοιρυγὸς ἀναχαϊνόσας, ἐν ἐαυτῷ θεοοικήσῃ, καὶ οὕτως εἰς βασιλεῖαν οὐρανῶν εἰσαγάγη πάντως ἡμᾶς καὶ ὅμοιότητα ἐκείνου, while a little further down he writes, ἄγαθὸς ἡμῖν ὁ ἄν (ὁ θεός), τούτῳ βεβουληται (τὸ θεμελιωθῆναι τὴν ζωὴν ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ Χιστῷ), γινώσκων τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀθενὴ φύσιν χρησισθεὶσαν τῆς παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ
Finally, Urbina closes this section by offering an explanation for Athanasius' insistence on using the Logos-flesh scheme in his Christology. The scheme was given to him by his predecessors. It had been initially used against the Docetists and the Gnostics. It seems that Athanasius continued to use it in that sense, as his statement in CAR2, 70 openly declares: ἀλλ' ἐλαβεν ἐκ ἀληθινῆς σάρχας, κἀν μαζίνη τὴν υδαλεωτινὸς ἡ γὰρ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἀληθινὸς λόγος, κἀν μαζίνην οἱ 'Αρετομανῆται.

In the final section of his essay Urbina deals with what he calls the difficult texts of Athanasius, namely, the texts which the critics have made the basis of their argument against the existence of a human soul in Athanasius' Christ. These come from CAR3, 57, INC, 22 and EPI, 5, and refer to the death of Christ as a separation of the Logos from the body. In view of the common understanding of death as a separation of soul from body, these texts are taken as indicative of the absence of a human soul in Christ and its replacement by the Logos. With regard to the first text, Urbina observes, that the term soul has in fact been positively used by Athanasius, even though it is not employed in that particular sentence where the death of Christ is spoken of as a separation of the Logos from the body. In view of this, and in view of the fact that Athanasius' adversaries did not admit the human soul in Christ, Urbina suggests that it would be better to suppose that Athanasius did not wish to put the term soul forward, in order that his reply would not lose force in face of the Arians. The second text, he says, affirms in its general idea, that the Logos wished to accept the death of men precisely to kill
it in His own body. If the death of men is the separation of the soul from the body, then it is possible to explain the separation of the Logos from the body in the human death of Christ in similar terms. This means that where Athanasius presents the Logos as He who lays down and takes up the body, the human soul can also be understood. Thus, the Logos together with the soul would have abandoned the body in death to take it up again in the resurrection. This interpretation, says Urbina, does not conflict with other explicit and clear texts which include the soul, nor does it agree with the erroneous idea that the dead body of Christ would have lost the bonds which it had during life with the Logos. The same considerations are applied by Urbina to the text from EPI, 5. Here too, as in the previous texts, the soul must be presupposed as existing in the background, for otherwise the Incarnation acquires a pantheistic sense, and what is worse, it ceases to exist during the interval between the death and the resurrection, and when it is restored it stands only for a partial atonement between God and man.

There is one more difficulty which Urbina discusses here and which is not based on one or two texts because it appears in Athanasius' discourses quite frequently. This is the notion of the body being used by the Logos as an instrument. This notion, as Urbina admits, is often said of the body as regards its vital principle, i.e., the soul. But this, says Urbina, could easily be combined with Athanasius' application of this notion to the Logos, because the Logos is the hegemonic principle of both the soul and the body. The same consideration applies to the Logos' descent to Hades. It is attributed to the Logos, not because He replaces the soul, but because He is the soul's hegemon.
Lastly, Urbina shows how Richard's argument from silence could be explained positively. The principal difficulty, he says, explained by Richard in his study, does not find leverage on a single text but on a fairly general attitude of Athanasius in his polemic against the Arians. Richard believes that at least in Car³, Athanasius could have met the arguments of his adversaries which referred to the psychology of Christ, by admitting the reality of a human soul in Christ and attributing all the psychological miseries to it. The fact that he failed to do so, that he remained absolutely silent about the soul, and that he preferred to use the particular terms of flesh and body to refer to the humanity of Christ, indicate that the human soul had no place in His Christology. For Urbina this conclusion is not necessary. The silence of Athanasius on the soul could have been intentional for two reasons. Firstly, because, given the fact that the Arians expressly denied it, it could have been inconvenient for him to insist on it and make it the key to his solution; and secondly, because the insistence on the human soul would have diverted the dispute to new ground. On the positive side, Athanasius must have thought, that it was sufficient to respond to the Arian objection by attributing the psychological miseries of Christ to His human element in general, which he could denote by the traditional synekdochic terms of flesh and body, and in this way he would not run the risk of side-stepping the stated and main point of the dispute. In any case, says Urbina, it is preferable to admit that we cannot well succeed in penetrating the reasons which induced Athanasius not to insist on the soul when he argued with the Arians, rather than draw from this relative silence conclusions and interpretations in distinct contrast with other
undoubted and explicit affirmations of Athanasius. Preferring the systematic to the a priori chronological method of investigation, it is clear that the nuances in the various texts of Athanasius which compose an organic complex, do not take anything away from the harmony of the thought. The Alexandrian doctor knew and admitted the reality of the human soul of Christ, the theological importance of which he had given prominence when he explained that the whole man and so also the soul had to be redeemed and therefore assumed by the Logos.

Urbina's essay is plausible impressive and generally acceptable. Both the methodology and the handling of the evidence provided by the texts are so much truer to Athanasius than those of Grillmeier. Urbina's understanding of the movement of Athanasius' thought is coherent with its subsequent history, whereas Grillmeier's is at odds both with respect to the Athanasian texts and to the consensus Patrum on Athanasius.
VI.5 Chrysostom Constantinides' Contribution

Chrysostom Constantinides was the first Eastern Orthodox scholar to deal with the European debate concerning the soul of Christ in Athanasius. Though Orthodox opinion had been expressed, no Orthodox theologian before him had attempted such a full-scale treatment of the topic. A careful study of his essay reveals a clear structure and an interesting methodology, which resembles that of Urbina and exhibits greater theological coherence. In the following paragraphs we shall attempt to summarize and assess Constantinides' argument and conclusions.

There are five general sections to Constantinides' work. The introductory section exposes the dogmatic character of the debate and summarizes the history of criticism in the West and of Orthodox opinion in the East. The second section raises the question of methodology, and establishes a double perspective, that of language and theology, which provides the structure of the essay. Here four main topics are treated: the biblical language of Athanasius; the theological perspective; the soteriological question; and the question concerning the death of Christ. In the final section Constantinides sums up his conclusions.

First of all Constantinides establishes the point that the question concerning the soul of Christ in Athanasius is a theological dogmatic question and therefore should not be treated merely historically. Hoss' approach was primarily theoretical. Voisin's reply was primarily philological and to some extent chronological, since it entailed the distinction of two stages in Athanasius'
linguistic development, one before and another after AD 362. Harnack and Lietzmann were impressed with Voisin's philological/chronological approach and endorsed his views in a general way. Richard used Voisin's method, but remained faithful to the theoretical position of Hoss. On the whole Grillmeier followed Richard with a few minor modifications. It was Urbina who broke with the theoretical perspective of Richard and Grillmeier, but without abandoning completely their chronological/literary distinctions.

On the Orthodox side Constantinides mentions two Orthodox theologians, Michael Constantinides and Metropolitan Germanos of Sardis. The former, writing a study on Athanasius in 1937, had clearly asserted the integrity of the humanity of Christ in Athanasius' doctrine.

The latter, writing an extensive essay on Athanasius' doctrine of the Logos in 1933-4, had argued that Athanasius' Christ was perfect God who became perfect man, one divine person in two natures. Germanos knew of the theory that certain Athanasian texts which employed the terms οὐκ όμοιος, οἶκος, νόμος, ὄργανον and ἔνοχα, implied that Christ did not have a human soul. But he rejected it on the grounds that Athanasius had been explicit on this matter in other texts. He did, however, admit that there was a certain contradiction (ἀντιφασις) in the Athanasian teaching at this point, but unlike the Western critics, Germanos did not attempt to explain it by means of theological, or chronological, distinctions. He simply asserted that Athanasius explicitly affirmed the human soul of Christ because of new and pressing questions.

Evaluating the work of the critics before him, Constantinides accuses them of having approached the subject under investigation almost exclusively from the horizontal chronological/philological
point of view, and of having ignored the vertical theological perspective. From the theological perspective the whole issue would have to be placed in the general context of the Christological teaching of the Church. In this particular case, it would raise two specific Christological questions. Firstly, whether it is possible to conceive of the flesh, which according to Scripture the Lord assumed at His Incarnation, as having been soulless, and secondly whether the death of Christ can be really understood apart from the separation of soul from body. It is from this perspective, says Constantinides, that Athanasius' position must be investigated and assessed.

Before turning to Athanasius, Constantinides briefly examines the biblical position on this double perspective. Scripture, he says, in presenting the Incarnation of the Son and Logos of God, prefers the statement "the Logos became flesh" (John 1:14) which suggests a Logos-flesh scheme, or employs parallel expressions which are based on the terms flesh and body (e.g. Rom. 1:3, Hebr. 2:14, John 19:38, Matth. 27:59, Rom. 7:4, Hebr. 10:10, I Pet. 2:24). On the topic of the Incarnation, Scripture avoids the term man, which later on came to be generally accepted in Christology. From such N.T. Christological statements as Phil. 2:8ff, the flesh, or the body, which were assumed at the Incarnation, could not have been soulless. If that was the case, the Incarnation would loose its distinctive property, and the saving death of Christ would become inconceivable.

It was this general biblical Christological perspective, says Constantinides, that Athanasius followed closely. He used biblical Incarnational language and emphasized very distinctly the soteriological intentions and implications of the Incarnation. Once this
is perceived, he says, then Athanasius could not be accused of having curtailed the humanity of the Incarnate Saviour. Irrespectively, therefore, of any chronological or linguistic factor, Athanasius' strong attachment to the biblical Christological perspective does not allow the supposition that he could have denied the presence of a human soul in Christ. On the one hand his habit of attributing life, will, thought, suffering, sorrow, etc, to the flesh, and on the other hand his clear perception of the natural οὐγγένεα between Christ as man and all other men, as well as his emphasis on the perfection of Christ's human nature, exclude the hypothesis of a soulless flesh. It is true, says Constantinides, that Athanasius, following the clear teaching of scripture, saw the Logos and Son of God as self-life (John 1:4, 5:26, 6:63 etc) and the source of life for all things (John 5:40, 6:33, 10:10, 28, 17:2, Acts 3:15, Rom. 6:23, I John 5:16, etc), and therefore the life-principle of the flesh which He assumed at His Incarnation. But in this last case the flesh could not have been soulless, not only because it would be lifeless and dead and therefore not human, but because the Logos, in becoming man, would be a mere man and not God who assumed perfect humanity in order to effect a perfect salvation. As in the biblical, so in the Athanasian perspective the notion of a "soulless flesh" is both theologically and logically groundless. Such a notion, says Constantinides, could only be defended on non-biblical grounds, as it happened in the case of the Arians and the Apollinarians. If Athanasius had agreed on this with the Arians, then logically he would have to give his support to the Arian scheme of a Logos-creature Christology. If on the other hand he had accepted the Apollinarian notion of a soulless flesh, then logically he would have to lend his support
to Apollinarian monophysitism and apthartococetism. Athanasius' unequivocal doctrine of the divine Logos who, in the tradition of Nicea, is the eternal Son of God, *homoousios* with the Father, and his strong emphasis on the true and saving death of Christ, would render such hypotheses completely inapplicable. It is above all the biblical theological mind of Athanasius which militates decisively against a curtailed humanity in Christ.

Having thus established Athanasius' biblical theological perspective on the humanity of the Saviour, and having argued on that basis that a negative answer should be given to the question of the soulless body, Constantinides turns to the Athanasian texts for confirmation. Here he concentrates on the exposition of two topics, that of soteriology and that of Christ's death, with the view to defending his contention that Athanasius was bound to have held the existence of a soul in Christ.

With regard to Athanasius' soteriology, he cites and underlines the following text from ANT, 7:

"Αλλά καὶ τὸ περὶ τῆς κατὰ σάρκα οἶκονομίας τοῦ ἕωστῆρος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ περὶ τοῦ τούτου ἐδόξουν φιλονικεῖν τινες πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐνεκρίναμεν καὶ τούτους κάθεινοι, καὶ ἄπερ ὁμολόγουν οὕτω συνετέλθοντο κάθεινοι, ὅτι οὐχ ἡς εἰς τοὺς προφήτας "ἐγένετο δὲ λόγος τοῦ Κυρίου", οὕτω καὶ εἰς ἄγιον ἀνθρώπων ἐνεδήμησαν ἐπὶ συντελεῖσ τῶν αἰώνων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο· καὶ ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων, ἔλαβε δούλου μορφήν, ἐκ τῆς Μαρίας τὸ κατὰ σάρκα γεγέννηται ἀνθρώπως ὁ ίημᾶς, καὶ οὕτω τελείως καὶ δὲ λοχλήρως τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος ἐνθεομυμένον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἡ σωκολοῦμεν οἷς τῶν νεκρῶν, εἰσάγεται εἰς τὴν μακριλαία τῶν οὐρανῶν. Ἐλομολόγουν γὰρ καὶ τούτο, ὅτι οʹ οʹ οʹ οʹ οʹ οʹ οʹ οʹ καὶ οʹ οʹ οʹ οʹ οʹ οʹ οʹ οʹ οʹ
This text, says Constantinides, reveals a number of Athanasian theological insights. First of all it shows that there is a distinction in his mind between the word flesh and the general meaning which this word represents in theology, and the word man which denotes the human genus in its concreteness. This is revealed in the phrase τὸ κατὰ σώμα γεγένηται ἄνθρωπος. The κατὰ σώμα refers to the nature which was assumed at the Incarnation and the ἄνθρωπος to the personal character of the economy. The two together state that in assuming humanity (human flesh) the Son and Logos of God became personally and truly very man and not a being under or above man. Secondly, the emphasis on the personal character of the Incarnation is completed with the emphasis on the total character of salvation of the human genus. "And thus, the human genus was perfectly and entirely freed in Him from sin". This verse, says Constantinides, shows a correlation (σωστοιχία) in Athanasius' thought between the perfect man, consisting of soul and body, whom the Lord put on at His Incarnation, and His perfect and complete emancipation from the dominion of sin. Finally, this text affirms that, if salvation embraces the soul as well as the body, then the body could not have been soulless, or senseless, or mindless, and also, that the salvation which took place, did not pertain to the body only but also to the soul. Such categorical affirmations leave no doubt at all about the existence of a human soul in Christ. But what remains absolutely crucial here is the
soteriological basis of these affirmations. This basis, says Constantinides, is typical of Athanasius' Christology and can be traced to texts subsequent or even previous to that already quoted. As a subsequent text he cites the following extract from EPI, where Athanasius writes against Docetists and Manichaens: Οὐ θέσει δὲ ταῦτα (= ή ἐνσώρωσις καὶ τὸ ταῦτα παρομοιριστοῦν παθητῶν τῆς σαρκός) ἐγένετο, μή γένοιτο! Μιὰ τινὲς πάλιν ὑπέλαβον, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπον γενομένου τοῦ Χωτῆρος, θ ὁ ν ὑ τ. ὁ δὲ ἅ ν ὑ ρό π ο ν α ὑ τ η ῥ ι-α ἐ γ ἐ ν ε τ ο. Εἰ γάρ θέσει ἦν τῷ ὑμιᾷ τὸ λόγος, κατ' ἐκεῖνους, τὸ δὲ θέσει λεγόμενον φαντασία ἐστὶ. δοξήσει εὐρίσκεται καὶ ἡ σωτηρία καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις τῶν ἀνθρώπων λεγομένη, κατὰ τὸν ἀδεσσότατον Μανιχαῖον. Ὁ ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ φαντασία ἡ σωτηρία ἡμῶν, οὐ δὲ οὐ ω μ α τ ος μ ὑ ν ὑ, ἀλ λ' ὁ λ ο ν ἄ ν ς ρ ω π ο ν, ψυ χ ης καὶ αἷς ὑ μα τος ἄ λ η θ δς καὶ σωτηρία γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ.

As for texts before A.D. 362, Constantinides supplies the following: INC&CAR, 12: καὶ οτε παρατηθεται τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ εἰς κείρας του Πατρός, ὡς ἀνθρώπως ἑαυτὸν παρατηθεται τῷ Θεῷ, ἵνα πάντας ἀνθρώ- 
πως παραθήτωσι τῷ Θεῷ. Αὐς, CAR, 61: πάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπολλυ- 
μένων κατά τὴν παράβασιν τοῦ Ἀδάμ, πρώτη τῶν ἄλλων ἐσώθη καὶ ἠλευ- 
θερώθη ἡ ἐκεῖνον σάρξ, ὡς αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον αὕμα γενομένη καὶ λοιπὸν ἁμεῖς ὡς ὑσσωμοί τυγχάνοντες, κατ' ἐμείναιναι ὑσσωμεθα. Οὐ, DION, 10: Καὶ ἀπερ ἐστὶ τά κλήματα ὅμοιοια τῆς ἀμέλους, καὶ εἰς αὐτής, οὕτω 
καὶ ἁμεῖς ὁμογενή τὰ σώματα ἑχοντες τῷ σώματι τοῦ κυρίου, εἰ τοῦ 
κληρώματος λαμβάνομεν, κακεῖρον πίσειν ἐχομεν εἰς τὴν ἀνάστασιν καὶ 
τὴν σωτηρίαν. Οὐ, INC, 22: καὶ ἀλλως δὲ οὐ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ θάνατον, 
ἀλλὰ τῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων θύει τελειώσαι ὃ ζωτήρ θέειν οὐκ ἠδίως θανάτῳ 
(οὐκ εἰς εἰς ὑρ, ἡμῖν) ἀπέτιθετο τῷ αὐμα, ἀλλὰ τῶν παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώ- 
pων ἐδέχετο, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι προσελθόντα τέλεον 
ἐξαφανίση.
Constantinides admits that in the last texts the soul is not mentioned, but he asserts that this omission does not imply exclusion. Athanasius' silence about the soul does not apply only to soteriological statements referring to the body, but also to similar ones referring to man. The explicit mention of the soul in A.D. 362 is a strong pointer to what was already implicit in his earlier statements. In view of the general mode of Athanasius' thinking, it is impossible to suppose that at any time he thought of a partial soteriology in Christ. Finally, it is in his doctrine of the death of Christ that this holistic soteriological standpoint becomes further clarified.

With regard to the death of Christ in Athanasius, Constantinides claims that two considerations seem to be dominant in his mind. The first concerns the principle which vivified the flesh assumed at the Incarnation. The second consideration concerns the way in which the death of Christ should be understood, so that the Incarnation may not suffer dissolution, and that the body may not suffer corruption in the grave while the Logos departs from it to preach to the spirits imprisoned in Hades. These two considerations are interrelated, and it is clear, says Constantinides, that no answer can be given to the second, without an answer being first given to the first. Now as regards the first, Athanasius is quite explicit that the primary life-giving power in the Logos Incarnate was this very Logos of God:

\[
\text{οὐν} \ 	ext{καὶ} \ \text{ἐν} \ \text{τῷ} \ \text{ἀνθρωπίνῳ} \ \text{σώματι} \ \text{깐}, \ \text{καὶ} \ \text{αὐτός} \ \text{αὐτὸ} \ \text{ζωοποιῶν}, \ \text{εἰκότως} \ \text{ζωοποιεῖ} \ \text{καὶ} \ \text{τά} \ \text{δύο} \ \text{καὶ} \ \text{ἐν} \ \text{τοῖς} \ \text{πᾶσι} \ \text{ἐγίνετο}, \ \text{καὶ} \ \text{ἐξω} \ \text{τῶν} \ \text{ὄλων} \ (= \ \text{ὄπεράνω} \ \text{ὀλων}) \ \text{ἡ} \ \text{(INC,17}).
\]

But this, says Constantinides, does not mean that the human soul as a life-giving principle is necessarily nullified, because, if that was the case, the statement of the Tome
which affirmed that the body was not ἄγυγχον would have been impossible. So, Athanasius' understanding of the Incarnation was such, that the flesh was vivified by a soul, and that both, flesh and soul, were vivified by the overarching power of the Logos, who had assumed the whole in personal union with Himself. This was quite a different view from that of the Arians, the Eunomians, and the Apollinarians, who explicitly denied the existence of a human soul in Christ. That being the case, Athanasius' view of the Lord's death appears in a simpler form.

Constantinides contends that in the death of Christ Athanasius understood the soul to have been separated from the body, whilst the Logos as Logos remained unaffected. The hypostatic union was unbroken and the Logos descended into Hades to preach to the spirits which had been imprisoned there. This view is explicitly presented in the famous Orations against Apollinaris, which, although they are regarded today as writings of an unknown author, yet, chronologically at least could not be far removed from Athanasius' time. As for the genuine works of Athanasius, even those before A.D. 362 speak of the soul and the body of the Lord in the event of death, but they do it always in the presence, as it were, and the willing operation of the Logos. This is clearly shown in CAR2, 57 which must have been written about A.D. 356. Constantinides admits that the phrase ἐπ’ ἐξουσίᾳ ἐίχεν, ὡς θεὸς, ἀπὸ τοῦ ὢματος κυριοθήναι could be taken as suggesting a separation of the Logos from the body at the death of Christ, but the context which turns round the term "soul" and particularly the notion of the authority of the Logos to lay down His soul in death, seem to him to be strong evidence against this interpretation. Additional evidence, he says is also provided by
the statement in INC&CAR,12 where Athanasius interpretes Luke 23:16 in a way which suggests the separation of the soul from the body. As for the usual objection, that Athanasius frequently refers to the death of Christ in terms of the body without any reference to the soul, Constantinides believes that such references were made for the purpose of emphasizing the resurrection of the body, as for instance the statement of INC,22 reveals: "Εμελε τῷ Κυρίῳ μάλιστα περὶ ἡς ἐμέλλε ποιεῖν ἀναστάσεως τοῦ σώματος. He also argues that Athanasius did not use the term body in a strict sense, and as an explicit example, he points to the following text from EPI,7, which, as he explains, implies that the body of the Lord being identical with that of ourselves possessed πνεῦμα before the death and the burial.

'Ανθρώπινον ἄρα φύει τό ἐκ τῆς Μαρίας κατὰ τὰς θέλας Γραφάς, καὶ ἀληθεύνῃ ἢν τό σῶμα τοῦ Κυρίου ἀληθεύνῃ δὲ ἢν ἐπεὶ ταῦτα ἢν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ ἀδελφῇ γὰρ ἠμῶν ἡ Μαρία, ἐπεὶ καὶ πάντες ἐκ τοῦ 'Αδάμ ἐσμέν. Καὶ τούτο οὐκ ἐν τίς ἀμφιβαλλοι μνησθεῖς δὲν ἔγραψεν ὁ Λουκᾶς. Μετὰ γὰρ τό ἀναστήναι ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, δοκοῦντων τινῶν μὴ ἐν τῷ ἐκ Μαρίας σώματι βλέπειν τόν Κύριον, ἀλλ'ἀντὶ τούτου πνεῦμα θεωρεῖν, ἐλεγεν, "Ἰδεῖτε τάς χειρας μου καὶ τοὺς πόδας μου, καὶ τοὺς τέφους τῶν ἠλων, ὅτι ἐγώ εἰμι αὐτός. Ψηλαφήσατε με καὶ ἰδεῖτε, ὅτι πνεῦμα σάρκα καὶ δοσεῖ αὐθεν αὐθος, καθὼς ἐμὲ θεωρεῖται ἑχοντα. Καὶ τούτο εἴπων, ἐπέδειξεν αὐθος τάς χειρας καὶ τοὺς πόδας. Ἐξ δὲν καὶ ἐλεγχεσθαι οὖν αὑτος τάς χειρας καὶ τοὺς πόδας. Ὅδε ἐντος καὶ ἐλεγχεσθαι οὖν αὑτος τάς χειρας καὶ τοὺς πόδας. Οὐ γὰρ εἶπο, καθὼς ἐμὲ ἐλεγχεσθαί σάρκα καὶ δοσεῖ αὐθεντα, ἀλλ' ἑχοντα. Ἔνα μὴ αὐτος ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτα τραπεζες νομισθα, ἀλλ' αὐτος ἑχων αὐτα καὶ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου καὶ μετὰ την ἀνάστασιν εἶναι πιστευθή.
Constantinides' essay reinforces that of Ortiz de Urbina. The conclusions are the same in both cases and so is most of the material evidence though Ortiz de Urbina's citations are richer and far more numerous. Constantinides' structure, on the other hand, is broader and more biblical and as a result it lacks the sharpness and specific value of Ortiz de Urbina's presentation. The two essays put together carry considerable weight and refute positively the alleged Apollinarianism of Athanasius' doctrine of Christ. But the last and, in our opinion the most decisive blow to the critical views of Richard and Grillmeier came from another French scholar of great patristic erudition.
VI.6 Paul Galtier's Reply

He must have been fairly old but he probably felt that he had to enter the debate, when in 1955 Paul Galtier, the distinguished Patristic scholar, produced his essay *Saint Athanase et l'âme humaine du Christ*. Galtier defended the traditional view using a somewhat new and certainly broader methodological perspective. In some ways he went beyond Ortiz de Urbina and Constantinides, because he set the question concerning the soul of Christ in the wider context of the question concerning Athanasius' understanding of the Incarnation and particularly the meaning of the humanity of Christ in general. But Galtier also made distinctive contributions on the level of textual and exegetical details connected with the question about the soul.

Galtier's essay is divided into three main sections which deal successively with the following topics: (i) the questions posed by the critics and the opinions advanced by them concerning the humanity of Christ in Athanasius' teaching; (ii) the primary question concerning the general or particular character of the humanity of Christ; and (iii) the particular question concerning the soul of Christ. The last section, which is the most substantial of the three, is further subdivided into two sub-sections which respectively deal with 1) the approval given to the Antiochenes by Athanasius in A.D. 362 and 2) the position of Athanasius before that explicit approval. The main points which Galtier establishes in these sections are as follows.

In his Introduction Galtier supplies a brief statement on the traditional perspective of Athanasian Christology and on Baur's objections to it. According to this perspective Athanasius' primary
concern was the defence of the Godhood of the Logos, although the fact of the Incarnation was also stressed. When the heretics argued that the Logos' nature was inferior to the Divine, because of what was said of Him in the Gospels, Athanasius insisted on the fact that the Logos had become man and therefore human attributions were ascribed to Him. This argument, says Galtier, was especially developed in CAR3, 29-35, where Athanasius spoke of two times which help clarify the biblical statements concerning the Saviour and actually classify them into two kinds. The first is the time which precedes the Incarnation and is connected with the Logos as Son, Effulgence and Wisdom of the Father, and the second begins with the Incarnation when the Logos became flesh. These are not successive times, but co-exist, as it were, because in becoming man the Logos did not cease to be what He always was. Athanasius explains that this did not imply that God the Son entered into a man, whom He made His voice as in the case of the O.T. Prophets, because that would amount to the view of Paul of Samosata, which had been condemned as heretical (CAR3, 29, 30). It rather meant that one should distinguish between the Godhood and the manhood of Christ, while maintaining that He is one and the same Person, God's very Son. This position of Athanasius, says Galtier, does not differ from that which later on Cyril came to defend. Its main emphasis is that whatever is contained in Christ's flesh belongs to the Son of God personally and not to a particular man. The title Son of God refers to His eternal birth, whilst the title Son of Man refers to His generation in time, the Incarnation. Both are true and refer to His Godhood and manhood respectively.
As regards the objections to this understanding of Athanasian Christology Galtier refers to the history of modern criticism which begins with Baur and follows with Hoss, Stücken, Richard and Grillmeier. These critics raised doubts about the integrity of the manhood of Christ in Athanasius' teaching on two grounds, Athanasius' silence about Christ's human soul and his employment of a strict Logos-body (flesh) Christological schema. These criticisms however, have not been readily accepted by all scholars, and Galtier simply recalls the opposition of von Harnack, Lietzmann and Ortiz de Urbina.

Then Galtier turns to another critical question raised by modern scholars on the general topic of the humanity of Christ in Athanasian teaching. This is the question whether Athanasius' attributed to the Incarnate Son of God an individual human nature. Many modern scholars came to believe that for Athanasius the Son of God in becoming man came to possess a general humanity, a sort of collective human nature. In other words, all men together and individually were assumed by the Logos when He took up flesh and became man. Athanasius, it is said, does not hesitate at all in stressing this aspect of the Incarnation, when, for instance, he says that "it is ourselves who were buried and raised again when Christ was baptized". Similarly he refers to Phil. 2:9-11 in order to claim that Christ's exaltation was ours, because His Church is His very Body. This means that the fact of the Incarnation must be understood in terms of the union of the Son of God with the entire human nature by virtue of which Christ was able to work out in Himself the death and vivification of all men. The following statement from CAR3, 34 is put forward by Galtier as being of particular relevance to the
point which is made here. Τοῦ Κυρίου σώματος ἀναλαβόντος καὶ ἀνθρώ-
ποι γενομένου ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄνθρωποι προσληφθέντες διὰ τῆς σαρκὸς θεο-
κοσμομεθα διὰ τοῦ Λόγου καὶ ἀπολαμβάνομεν τὴν αἰώνιον ἤμην. This
statement, says Galtier, illustrates the sort of 'Platonic realism'
which has been connected with the thought of certain Fathers of that
era, and which has suggested to scholars the idea of an assumption
of the entire human race by the Logos. This led to the so-called
'mystical' or 'physical' theory of redemption which was first ascribed
to Athanasius by von Harnack, but was opposed by Holl, Stülken and
Weigl. Harnack's view that there was a basic affinity in Athanasius'
understanding of the body of Christ with the mystical body of Christ
in Pauline thought, was however defended by a number of Roman Catholic
Patristic scholars. E. Meersch collected all the Athanasian texts
which witness to this view in his book Le Corps Mystique du Christ
(1936), without accepting, however, the idea of a hypostatic union
of the Logos with the entire human nature. As he stated it, Athanas-
ius believed in the Mystical Body of Christ which he perceived to
be a "unique reality in which Head and members were one". In speak-
ing of the flesh of Christ in Athanasius, Meersch said that it does
not only refer to the "physical body of Christ", but is also extended
to "all the faithful". The flesh of the Logos is theirs too! M.
Bouyer was more forceful. He spoke of "our collective union with
the Logos by means of the flesh of Jesus". His was not only a humani-
ty like ours, but our very own! M. Gross in his book La divinisation
des Chrétiens d'après les Peres grecs went to an extreme position.
He claimed that it was impossible to refute the thesis that in
Athanasius' mind Christ had assumed collective humanity. Obviously
says Galtier, this question has divided scholarly opinion, but the fact remains that it must be settled first, before any attempt is made to tackle the stricter question concerning the integrity of the humanity of Christ. With this consideration in mind Galtier moves to the second section of his essay which actually deals with the question whether Christ's body is for Athanasius of an individual or a collective character.

Galtier begins this section by stating very perceptively that in Athanasius' mind the assumption of the body by the Logos and His becoming man are treated as inseparable events. Their precise inter-relationship is explained before the Arian controversy in INC. The body is like our own, but He is one among us. He comes to dwell among men and deliver them from the power of death and corruption, but He does this through the one body (ἡ φθορά κατὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ομ-κέτι χώραν ἔχει διὰ τὸν ἐνοικήσαντα λόγον ἐν τούτοις ὁ δὲ τῶν ἐνός σώματος - notice, says Galtier that the ἐνός is an indefinite pronoun which corresponds to the τούτων). The emphasis on the one body is completed with the image of the inhabitants of a city and the Prince who comes to dwell among them by indwelling in one of their houses, which is applied to the Incarnate Christ. Christ is the Logos of God, King of the Universe, who comes to dwell among men by indwelling in a body like theirs (INC, 14). This alone, says Galtier, is sufficient for showing that Athanasius is far from accepting a "collective body". He constantly distinguishes between Christ's body and that of other men in general. On the one hand he says that it is not a body ἄλλοτρον τοῦ ἡμετέρου and on the other hand, that it is assumed from our own (ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετερῶν τὸ ὁμοιὸν λαβῶν, INC, 8). Here Galtier refers to a number of Athanasian texts from
INC, CAR and DION which clearly establish the view that body of Christ is an individual one like that of the people whom He came to save. However, Galtier goes on to point out that along side with the individuality of Christ’s body Athanasius’ statements indicate a strong sense of the unity of the human race. The individuality of the body of Christ not only prevent Him from being present in the great human family, but actually becomes the primary and real means for this being the case. Thus He is not only one of us, i.e. one of the representatives in this great family, but He is also the proper representative who wants to seek us by means of His union with us through the body. He wants to be not only our brother, but also our Head. This is why He became consubstantial or con-corporate with us in order to identify Himself with us, and we might become His flesh. As Athanasius puts it, we may become His προσηλθόμενος διά τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ. Athanasius clearly states, says Galtier, that the union of the Logos with the flesh, or the putting on of the body is connected with His union with us and is seen as the means of our receiving deification and eternal life (CAR3, 34: ὁς γὰρ ὁ Κόριος ἐνυπάρχως τὸ σῶμα γέγονε ἀνθρώπινος σῶτω καὶ ἡμεῖς οί ἀνθρώποι παρά τοῦ Λόγου τε θεοποιομένα προσηλθόμενος διά τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ λοιπὸν ζωὴν αἰώνιον χαρακτομόμεν. We are conjoined with the Logos as a result of His union with our flesh, and the Logos is united with us by virtue of His Incarnation. It is on this basis that Athanasius explains our exaltation in Christ according to Phil. 2:9–10. The grace of the exaltation is not given to the Logos qua Logos but to us: ὁδὸν ὁ λόγος ἡ λόγος ἐστὶν, ἐλαβε τὴν τοιαύτην χάριν, ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς. We owe it then to our congeniality ( συγγένεια ).
with His body: διά τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ συγγένειαν. Athanasius' interpretation is not merely personal. He himself calls it μάλα ἐκκλησιαστικὴν ὁσιὰν (CAR1,44). In the Person of Christ we have our own restoration, because the Church participates in the exaltation of His human nature, and also because the Logos has graced the human nature by means of the deification of His flesh (ἕθεσα πολὺ ἐνεδόσατο, καὶ πλέον ἐξαρίστατο τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων τούτο, CAR1,42). However, Galtier points out that we must distinguish between the objective aspect of the exaltation, which implies destination or anticipation, and the subjective, which implies participation. The latter is in fact the Body which men constitute when "they are regenerated by water and the Spirit" (CAR2,33,59). But its presupposition is to be found in the former. Thus, when the faithful enter the gates of heaven, the angels are not surprised, because they know that they are made concorparate with the Lord. The notion of incorporation into the body of Christ, i.e. the union of our flesh with His flesh and vice versa, is crucial for understanding how being mortal in Adam we are revivified in Christ, or how τῆς γεννήσεως ἡμῶν καὶ πᾶσι τῆς σαρκίκης ἀσθενείας μετατέθηκαν εἰς τὸν λόγον ἐγερθούμεθα ἀπὸ γῆς (CAR3,33). The following text which Galtier cites from CAR3,33 epitomizes Athanasius' position: "ὅπερ γὰρ ἐκ γῆς ὄντες πάντες ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ ἀποθνῄσκομεν, οὕτως ἀνωθεν ἐξ ὅστος καὶ ἰνεύματος ἀναγεννηθέντες, ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ πάντες ἐξωποιοῦμεθα, ὁδειτὶ ὡς γηνέης, ἀλλὰ λοιπὸν λογοθεσίας τῆς σαρκοῦ διὰ τὸν θεοῦ λόγον, ὡς δὲ ἡμῶς ἐγένετο σάρξ. This text, says Galtier does not favour the theory of a collective assumption of humanity by the Logos. Rather His humanity is individual, but as such became the means of the re-union and renewal of all men.
Having established the individual character of Christ's humanity in Athanasius' thought, Galtier turns to the second question concerning the integrity of this humanity. Is it a mere body or mere flesh, or does it include the human soul? The obvious place for finding an answer to this question, says Galtier, is the Tomus to the Antiochenes. But here he notes and outlines the objections of Richard and Grillmeier, which are based on the claim that the Christology of ANT,7 could be explained in an Apollinarian sense. Galtier does not accept this claim and supplies his reasons for this. Firstly he points out that Apollinaris' statement to the Alexandrian bishops exiled at Diocaesarea, which contains a similar formulation as ANT,7, does not rest on the same premise as the latter. Secondly and more importantly, Athanasius' statement was in fact sanctioned by Eusebius of Vercelli and Paulinus of Antioch, whereas Apollinaris' statement was rejected both at Antioch and in Rome. This is shown in Epiphanius' account of the debate between Paulinus and Vitalis, which sanctioned Athanasius' statement but condemned the Apollinarian premise that in Christ the Godhead replaced the mind; and also in Damasus' Letter Per Filium, which again exposed Vitalis' heresy in spite of its initial 'Athanasiain' cover up. In view of these, Galtier concludes that Athanasius did acknowledge the soul of Christ in A.D. 362. Did he also do so in the period preceding the composition of ANT? It is to this that Galtier turns next, and here he provides an extensive and elaborate argument.

This argument is divided into two parts dealing with the Athanasian teaching before and during the Arian controversy respectively. In both parts the primary question is connected with Athanasius' general conception of man and its bearing on Christology.
First of all, however, Galtier examines whether this particular question is historically justifiable. Richard and Grillmeier did assert that the investigation of the humanity of Christ and particularly the question about His soul was integral to and occupied a primary place in the Arian–Athanasian debate. But this assertion, says Galtier, has not been substantiated by means of textual evidence. Not once is the question of the soul mentioned in Athanasius's anti-Arian treatises. Voisin's observation that the crucial issue in the Arian–Athanasian debate was not Christ's psychology but the doctrine of the Divine Son and whether such a Son could in fact become a man and suffer, seems to be clearly justifiable and establish the real case. It seems right then to accept Voisin's view that in the Arian debate Athanasius spoke of the humanity of Christ in a general way and stressed the fact that the Divine Son had also become man and suffered as such for our salvation, because this doctrine was sufficient to counteract the Arian arguments. Stücker, says Galtier, accepted as incontestable the fact that Athanasius believed in the Son of God becoming man, but he argued that by 'man' Athanasius understood only the human element (die menschliche Seite) of the Saviour, because as he argued in CAR1,45, the exaltation of Christ as man did not refer to the Son but to His body. But this particular text, says Galtier, instead of altering the proper meaning given by Athanasius to the term "man" in effect excludes what is understood by Stücker's Logos–body (ό Λόγος became man) schema. The text states that Christ ἔλαμβανεν κατά τὸ ψυχεῖα τὸν ἄνθρωπον... ὡσας δὲ τὴν τὸ θεοποιεῖσθαι αὐτῷ (τὸ σῶμα), This does not mean that man is the body, but that the man in Christ has a body and therefore is identical with
or like the other men. The phrase τὸ σῶμα τὸ φύσιν ἔχον τοῦ δέχεσθαι τὴν χάριν in CAR1,45 suggests that there is more to this body than a crude sense. In fact it is the body of the man in Christ. Thus Stückken's attempt to restrict Athanasius' terminology is incorrect and so is Richard's similar attempt to do the same. But more importantly, what militates against Stückken's attempts to restrict the Athanasian language to a Logos-body schema, is the explicit statement of Athanasius in CAR3,30 that according to Scripture "flesh" signifies "man" and therefore the statement "He became flesh" must be also stated as "He became man". Athanasius, says Galtier made the same point in SER2,7 and on this basis also argued that the statement "He became flesh" should not be interpreted as "He was changed into flesh" (CAR2,47). So Galtier concludes that Athanasius' statement that the Logos became man in truth should be taken as implying the assumption of man in general. To understand this further one should turn to Athanasius' general understanding of man. This is in fact what Galtier sets out to do in this section, having first quoted Richard as admitting that "a complete study of Athanasius' Christology could not be separated from his philosophy on man".

Galtier finds Athanasius' philosophy on man in his early works GENT and INC. Here, he says, it is manifestly clear that Athanasius does not conceive of a body without a soul. How this composition is established in his eyes is not important for this instance. One can admit that Athanasius' understanding presents a "Platonizing" tendency, but the significant fact is that in his eyes man cannot be man without body and soul. In GENT,30-34 he argues that this man has an immortal soul by means of which he is distinguished from
the animals. It is in the soul and especially in its mind (νοῦς) that man can discern what is and what is not useful and regulate his conduct in general (*ibid.* 31). In its distinction from the body this soul is immortal and constitutes the life-principle of the body, so that when it departs from it the body dies (*ibid.* 33). This constitution of man, says Galtier, is of sovereign importance in Athanasius' apologetic against the Gentiles. It is designed to condemn the cult which they render to their idols. Those who are ἐμπνευόμενοι and λογικοὶ and endowed with a mind, should not worship the gods who are unable to move and are in fact ὄνυχοι (*ibid.* 13).

To honour God one needs to recognize his spirituality and to do this one in turn needs to recognize the existence of the soul.

It is this constitution of man, says Galtier, that Athanasius applies to Christ in *INC.* In *INC* Athanasius sets out to prove that the Logos in becoming man was able to die. And he proves this by asserting that He assumed a body not different from our own (οὐκ ἄλλοτρον τοῦ ἡμετέρου, *INCB*, and 15). If He simply wanted to manifest Himself in a body, says Athanasius, the Logos was able to use a superior nature, but He assumed our body (ἄλλα λαμβάνει τὸ ἡμετέρον), and that from a human Virgin (*ibid.*, 8), because it was our death that He wanted to destroy and our salvation that He wanted to effect. He assumed a body able to die (*INC*, 9 τὸ συνάμενον ἀποθανεῖν λαμβάνει δαντὶ οὖμα), so that He may perfect the sacrifice and at the same time prove Himself to be superior to death (ἐμαυτὸν καὶ θανάτον κρείττονα, *ibid.* ) and also manifest His Godhood by working through it. It would be difficult, says Galtier, to demonstrate more clearly that the body of Christ was in its origin of the same nature as our own. But the important implication of
this emphasis on the human integrity of the body of Christ is that it could be no different from the body which was described in GENT. In other words, it could not be any other body but a human one which was moved by a soul and died when the soul departed from it. When in INC,17 Athanasius contrasted the action of the Logos in the body with that of the soul, regarding the former as superior, he was in fact defending the existence of the soul in Christ but at the same time was defending the true character of the Incarnation of the Logos. The Logos could not be limited on account of the Incarnation by the life-movement of his body, i.e., by the movement of His soul. This is the precise force of the statement, οὐ δῆ τοι ὑποτος ἤν ὅ τοῦ ζεου (49) Λόγος ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. But saint Athanasius, says Galtier, goes even further. He shows that the Logos who became man in receiving a body did in fact converse as man among men and assumed the senses of all (ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐποιευσετο INC,15). Also, he shows that He underwent death as all men in order to pay their due to death(INC,20, 10, etc). and by preserving the body from corruption, He might make it the premise for the resurrection of all. If the body of the Saviour did not die as all other bodies then it was not the human death that He destroyed. The mortal human body which the Lord delivered to death and offered as a sacrifice for all is then a body like that which all men have. It is one of theirs and consequently, following Athanasius' philosophy, it cannot be deprived of its life, i.e., its soul which is identical with that of other human bodies. If that was so, then it would not differ from the idols which do not have a soul or life, and therefore become the object of Athanasius' reproaches. Besides, it would not have died the death of all men, or Christ's death would not have been a human death similar to the one which
all other men experience. But as Athanasius explains, it was our death that Christ experienced because our need was the cause of this death (Θεωρήτω γάρ ἡν χρεία). Thus, the Logos was given a body which was susceptible to dying (INC, 20) to offer a proper sacrifice for all. But on account of His presence in it, it became capable of overcoming death for all. Galtier refers to P. Camelot's remark that in one of the Athos Mss of INC it is said that τὸ ὅμα κατὰ τὴν τῶν ομοδέτων φύσιν ἀπέθανος, as further evidence that Christ's death was human. As for the teaching of INC, 21-22, where Athanasius suggests that the Logos laid down the body (ἀπέθανο τοῦτο ..., ἀποθεόθαι τὸ ὅμα ..., ἀποθεόμενος τὸ ὅμα ..., ἀπέθανο τὸ ὅμα ..., ἀποθέσθαι ἀπ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ ὁ λόγος), Galtier argues that this was said in order to explain that the death of Christ did not take place because of His own weakness, for He was Life, but because He allowed it for a moment for our sake. The essential point here, Galtier contends, is that for Athanasius the death of Christ is a human death which, in view of the teaching of GENT, cannot be understood but as a separation of body from soul which is allowed by the Incarnate Saviour. This being the case, Galtier concludes, we could allow Saint Athanasius to affirm the same doctrine against the Arians and finally make it explicit in A.D. 362 and subsequently against the Apollinarists. But there is one particular text in INC which has been interpreted as evidence against this view and which ought to be more carefully examined. This is INC, 17 where the activity of the soul in man is contrasted with the activity of the Logos in man. To this Galtier devotes the third section of this part of his essay.

In INC, 17 Athanasius emphasizes the fact that the Logos ἐχίνη, ἐξωποίησε, ἐκράτει, ἔγινας καὶ ἐκοινώνησεν the body which suggests
the thought that He performed all the functions of the soul in it! Galtier points out that this is clearly a case where Saint Hilary's exegetical principle seems to apply, namely *Verbis tantum inhaerentes causas ipse dictorum relinquunt* (*De Trinitate*, I, 32)! So Galtier seeks to lay bare the intention of the whole chapter before deciding on the meaning of its particular verbs. The intention is to show that all the works of the body prove the Divinity of the Logos, and that the Logos is not limited as the soul by being in the body. He is not circumscribed by the body, because He vivifies the body as well as all things. Consequently, the movement which is being questioned here is that which has the Logos as its first principle. Being the "Life", He is the principle of the life of the body and the world and there is no other principle above or beyond Him. On the contrary, man is not like the Logos, for his life is both limited to the body and does have the Divine Logos behind it as its ultimate principle. What Athanasius wants to emphasize here is the unique vivifying action of the Logos in general in contrast to any other. His intention is not to contest about the particular soul of the living beings, but rather it is to affirm that the Logos has come to dwell in the body of man which is alive and which He has made it such. As it appears from INC,18, says Galtier, Athanasius wants to stress that only this body among all the others is united with the Logos and has become properly His. And this is so much so that He is said to have operated through it and to have made His own all its vital activities. His intention is to emphasize that this intimate union of the Logos with the body does not restrain or minimize the general vivifying operation of the Logos in the life of the entire universe. He is certainly not trying either to make this body
different from all the rest by virtue of this union, nor to deprive it of its natural or inherent life principle (the soul) which is proper to it.

Thus Galtier reaches his conclusion. The philosophy of man professed by Athanasius excludes the supposition that the body which the Logos assumed at His Incarnation was any different from all other human bodies. The only difference was that it belonged to the Logos and not to a particular man. This was deliberately done in order that the Logos may appropriate to Himself whatever is ours, i.e. the life and death of men and overcome the problem which is ours by His power. It is in the light of this philosophy of man, says Galtier, that we must understand the passages from INC where Athanasius speaks of the advent the manifestation and the presence of the Logos in man (INC, 17, ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, οὐκ ἦν τούτῳ (τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ) ἦν, or INC, 41 ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ φαμέν αὐτόν ἐπιστηκόντα, and INC, 42, τὴν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ ἁγίου ἐπιστηκόν). His intention is not to explain the precise nature of the union of the Logos with the body, but only to dispel the prejudices of the pagans against the idea of the Incarnation of God. As an argument ad hominem he opposes to them the opinion of their philosophers according to which the Logos is present everywhere in the world. His thought is, that if they admit His presence in this great whole, why are they so obstinate in setting aside the idea that He is also able to be present in the man which is one part of the whole? (ibid, 41-42). This language, says Galtier, is directly connected with the advent and the presence of the Logos among men. If saint John says that He dwelt among us, Athanasius restates it by saying that the Logos came to dwell among men upon the earth (ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐπὶ γῆς INC, 46). There is no doubt that this statement is sufficient
for his present argumentation. And this he makes explicit in many places where he emphasizes that the Logos was manifested in a particular way, through a particular body which He made His own. Consequently his human actions were virtually the actions of God, and the man that Saint Athanasius has in mind here is the man that the Logos became in being united with a human body. Finally, Galtier points out that the expressions ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ or, ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ indicate the presence of a human soul in the body of this man. This, says Galtier, must have been quite plain to Athanasius' readers, for this point did not constitute their difficulty. Their difficulty was only the fact that God could become man, or inversely, that a man like us who lived their life and experienced their death would be different from them, and in fact would be the very Logos of God! This is why throughout the INC Athanasius attempts to show that the works made with this body, especially the death and the resurrection, were not the works of a man but of God Himself. The fact however that he did not explicitly mention the soul of Christ in no way implies that He did not have one. His general philosophy of man does not admit of such a supposition. On the contrary the coordination of the teaching of GENT with that of INC leads to the natural conclusion that the human soul was presupposed when Athanasius spoke of the body of Christ.

In the last section of this third part of his essay Galtier examines the same question in Athanasius' anti-Arian writings. There are three subsections to it dealing successively with the conception of man in the three CAR; why Athanasius did not oppose the alleged Arian denial of a soul in Christ; and finally, the implicit acknowledgment of a human soul in Christ implied in the Athanasian expost-
ion of Christ’s ignorance and progress. In the following paragraphs we shall try to review the points advanced in these sub-sections in a brief but comprehensive manner.

Athanasius’ exposition of the general plan of the Incarnation in CAR1-3, says Galtier, is centred on the Logos who, to reveal Himself to men, humbles Himself by taking up the form of the servant and even experiencing death. But Athanasius also states the freedom of the Logos even in death (ο ἄνωθεν ἀπαντήσας). He just allows His own body to experience death, since it is susceptible to it (CAR1,44). What is at stake here for the Logos who is immortal is His free offering of Himself to death as a sacrifice for all by permitting His own flesh to die (CAR1,41). This is why, says Athanasius in CAR2,14, the Father willed the Son to assume a human body, that He may offer it for us and deliver us from corruption. His death was the ransom for the sin of men whereby the reign of death over them came to an end (CAR1,45). This doctrine, says Galtier, and particularly the point that death takes place in the flesh and is to be understood as a saving sacrifice, is identical with the doctrine of INC. This means that the death of Christ is the same as that which men suffer. And that in turn indicates that the flesh or the body envisaged in this death are not deprived of a soul, for otherwise the victim would resemble those without life and soul to whom the pagans paid homage.

But there is more to this doctrine, says Galtier. That which was humbled and delivered unto death was also exalted. Both are said of that which was human in Christ (CAR1,41), i.e. of the body which was delivered to death. Athanasius specifically says that that
which was exalted in Christ was the individual man, the man who
in Christ was able to receive the grace and to grow and who was
clearly distinguished from the Logos (ἐλάμβανε κατά τὸ ἐν υἱοθετώ τὸν
ανθρώπων, CAR1, 45). This, says Galtier, manifestly excludes that
the man in Christ was animated by the Logos alone. On the contrary,
as it is on account of this same man alone and in Him that the other
men are said to have a sharing in His exaltation, it should be assum-
ed that He and they are of the same nature. This is in line, says
Galtier, with the general aspect of Christ's humanity which was
discussed in the first part of this essay. The humanity of Christ
is identical with that of other men and has become by virtue of the
indwelling Logos the basis for the salvation of all men. All men
therefore have recovered in this man their natural representative
and Head. If they have become capable of receiving again the grace
of deification and adoption it is because of His flesh which has
been first deified and sanctified by receiving first the chrism of
the Holy Spirit (CAR1, 50). What is said here, especially about
representation, i.e. that Christ represents all men and that all men
have in Him their representative, presupposes the fact that He is
like them and therefore He possesses a body and a soul which makes
it alive. Thus Galtier concludes that in his argumentation against
the Arians Athanasius kept the same perspectives on the Incarnation
as in his GENT-INC, with the same philosophy of man as its presupposi-
tion.

The entire question about the integrity of the humanity of
Christ in Athanasius' teaching would have been closed here, says
Galtier, had it not been for Richard's intervention. Richard
argued that the Arians did admit that the Son became man, i.e. that he behaved as man, and therefore Athanasius could not have criticized them on this point. But this language did not prevent the Arians from denying that the Son in becoming man assumed a human soul. Why then, if this is true of the Arians, is it not also true of Athanasius? Galtier finds an obvious answer in the fact that Athanasius' Christology was totally different from that of the Arians. Also, he points out that the Arian conception of man which must have been the presupposition to their denial of a soul in Christ is totally unknown. On the contrary Athanasius' explicit anthropology obliges us not to accept the notion of a soulless body. Again, Athanasius never affirmed that the human soul of Christ was put off. Besides, his understanding of the death of Christ as man coupled with his general understanding of man's death, obliges us to view Christ's death as a separation of His soul from His body. Galtier acknowledges that the Christological formulae employed by the Arians and Athanasius are the same because they are borrowed from Scripture. In other words, both affirm that Christ is the Logos who became flesh, i.e. man. Also, both Arians and Athanasius acknowledged that the Son of God in His Incarnation did not cease to be what He was before. So to understand the εὐγενής of Phil. 2:7 of the preexistent Son and His becoming flesh, both should not be allowed to deduce a change in the proper nature which they attributed to Him. What then was their disagreement, but the state of that nature which persisted in Christ even after the Incarnation? Is this not what Athanasius' argumentation clearly presupposes?

In fact, says Galtier, for the Arians the nature of the Son
was essentially inferior to that of the Father who alone was regarded as true God. Made or engendered, they said, to be the head of the creatures, the Son was proved to have with them the same equality of nature and condition, as Gregory of Nyssa put it (πρὸς τὸ σωγγε-μές καὶ ὁμόφυλον, *Adv. Eunom. V*). Or they numbered with the creatures Him by whom the creatures were made, as Athanasius expressed it (CAR3, 55). In view of this, says Galtier, we can understand that the Arians could easily imagine a composition of this Son of theirs with a body with the purpose of constructing a man whose soul would be replaced by the Logos. And thus we could also understand that in his incarnate state he would be attributed of all the human words and actions of Christ which make him appear inferior to the Father. For Athanasius however, says Galtier, the attribution and the composition are different notions. On the whole Athanasius does not speak of a union or composition of the Logos and the flesh. The word ἑωχνις which appears in CAR4, is not common to his vocabulary. The Incarnation essentially consists in the Logos' acquisition of a body or flesh which properly belongs to Him and He properly belongs to it, but this belonging does not affect the Divine nature. It is on this basis then that Athanasius establishes his responses to the objections of the Arians against the Logos' Divinity. The principle on which the solution to their objection rests is the custom of Scripture of making two types of statements concerning the Saviour, one referring to what is proper to the Son and another referring to the Logos become flesh. The texts which the Arians use must be interpreted according to these two types. Consequently on the subject of the facts or the words concerning Christ two questions must be posed. Firstly whether they refer to the
preexistent Logos or the Logos become man, and secondly whether they refer to what belongs to the Logos' Godhood or to the flesh which He assumed at His Incarnation. Galtier insists that between the Arians and Athanasius the main issue at stake is the Godhood of the Logos and therefore Athanasius' position is known in advance. Whenever a real inferiority in comparison with God is manifested in Christ the holy Father will ascribe it to the Logos become man, so that every objection from the part of the Arians will lose its plausibility. The alleged inferiority of the Logos will be explained with reference to His flesh. Thus when the Arians claim that He was created or made or constituted Athanasius will reply that these verbs apply to the human condition of the Logos and therefore τι τοιαῦτα οὖ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Λόγου σημαίνεται (CAR2,11).

As for the manner in which the animation of the flesh was conceived by Athanasius and the Arians Galtier believes that it did not enter their debate. In spite of Richard's claim for the contrary, Galtier sides with Voisin's clear estimates, i.e., "that Athanasius criticized and condemned the Christological system of the Arians in all the measure of its force." There is no indication in the texts of Athanasius, says Galtier, that the animation of the flesh by the Logos Himself was an issue in the Arian-Athanasian disputes. In Athanasius' eyes the Arians denied the Godhood of the Logos; hence his reproaches that they are like new Jews or like Paul of Samosata (CAR3,27, and 51).

It is on the basis of similar considerations that Galtier opposes Richard's argument from silence applied to the exposition of CAR3,26ff. If, he says, the questions of the Arians were in
fact connected with the activity proper to the flesh and particularly its governing principle, then the psychology of Christ should have been introduced into the debate. But this was not the point that occupied the attention of the Arians. Therefore Athanasius' preoccupation was entirely to show that the human actions and weaknesses ascribed by the Arians to the Logos could not be attributed to the Logos as such, but to the Logos as man, or better to His flesh and His humanity. This is his constant defence which in effect deprives his adversaries of their weapon. From the moment of His becoming man whatever was said of the Logos as man should be related to His humanity (δ Λόγος οδρε έγένετο, διρ τούτο καλ κάντα ζωα μετά το γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπος λέγει, ταῦτα τῇ ἄνθρωπωτιτι αλάνων ἀνατεθεναι CAR3, 43 ). These are not the properties of the Logos as such, but are proper to men (ο κρ τού Λόγου ζ Λόγος ἔστι ταῦτα τυγχάνει ἄντα, ἀλλα τῶν ἄνθρωπων ἔστι ζωα ταῦτα CAR3,41). In the miracles accomplished by Christ, says Galtier, there is that aspect which pertains to the Godhood and that which pertains to the manhood of Christ. To discern which is which, we need to look into the nature of the facts which are spoken (εἰς τὴν φθον τῶν λεγομένων ἐνορμώσεις) so that what is strange to the nature of God we might not ascribe to the Godhood of the Logos but to His manhood( ἵνα τῷ ἀλλότριῳ τού θεοῦ μὴ τῇ θεότητι τού Λόγου λογικῶσθε, ἀλλά τῇ ἄνθρωπωτιτι αὐτοῦ, CAR3,41). Galtier explains that this does not prevent the human properties of the Logos from actually belonging to Him. But they are His by reason of the flesh which is His. He appropriated all the virtues and all the infirmities of a nature but this did not mean that they became properties of His Divine nature. Here, says Galtier, Richard's observation that there are two senses of the term Ἰσων in
Athanasius is particularly applicable. But in fact Athanasius anticipates the doctrine of Saint Cyril of Alexandria which will be directed against Nestorius. Attributing to the Logos the birth the suffering and the death of His flesh is not attributing them to His Godhood. (Epist. IV). These two cases are parallel, says Galtier, and he concludes that for Athanasius in particular there is no necessity to produce an irreparable problem by attempting to explain the manner of the assumption of humanity by the Logos.

Finally Galtier turns to the third and final sub-section to his essay. Here he argues that the ignorance and the progress ascribed to Christ in the Gospels, particularly as they are interpreted by Athanasius, affirm by implication, rather than exclude the presence of a human soul in Christ. It is true, says Galtier, that Athanasius in his responses to the objections of the Arians never speaks of the human soul of Christ and never supposes its presence in His flesh. The explanation in particular of the ignorance and the progress of Christ contain such a condition. Neither the one nor the other could be found but in a soul and a human intellect. However, the proper intention of Athanasius is to show that the words of the Logos are not just His. It is uniquely because of His flesh and His humanity that He is said to be ignorant and to have progressed. But ignorance is one of the properties of man in general. So in becoming man the Logos was not ashamed, having a flesh that was ignorant, to say that He did not know (ἐπειδὴ γὰρ γέγονεν ἀνθρώπος ὦ ἐπαλεχόντος δὲ τὴν οὐρά τὴν ἄγνοιαν εἶπείν ὦ ὀξὸν οἴδα, CAR3,43). This is however one of the points which the Arians stressed in their quarrels with their adversaries. The circumstances are so numerous
and so diverse that it is difficult to determine the precise nature of the argument. It seems that Athanasius searches for the motives which made the Son of God subject His humanity to ignorance of certain things and particularly of the Last Day (CAR3,49-50). But the suppositions and the hypotheses which were made in connection with this ignorance (such as Richard's and Stülcken's alleged ignorance de droit) could not but be ultimately related to the humanity of Christ. Hence Athanasius' insistence that Christ spoke ἄρρητως; or that He spoke not as the Son of God, but the Son who was raised from among men (Ἄνω τοῦ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένου Υἱοῦ ἧ ἄγνωστος ἦν, CAR3,43). Such statements as the above, as well as the general ascription of Christ's ignorance to His humanity (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον), lead to no other conclusion, says Galtier, than the affirmation of a real ignorance in Christ which is implicitly connected with His soul.

The same argumentation is applied by Galtier to the question concerning Christ's progress in grace and wisdom, discussed in CAR3,51-58. In the Lukan statement the progress clearly refers to the body of Christ. Neither the grace nor the wisdom refer to the growth of the Logos as Logos but to the Logos as man. Galtier cites a long extract from CAR3,53 which demonstrates that there are two notions of progress in Athanasius' interpretation, one referring to the gradual revelation of the Godhood of the Logos and another to the growth of Christ's humanity (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον) or human nature (ἡ ἀνθρωπινή φύσις) in the Divine Wisdom, both of which were synchronized and coordinated. It is the flesh which becomes the house of the Divine Wisdom and grows in it. How, asks Galtier, could this house (in effect, the body) grow in Wisdom if it was uninhabited
by a soul? The implication is obvious; the growth in grace and wisdom are in fact implicitly related to a human soul.

In his final conclusion Galtier states without hesitation that Athanasius' position on the humanity of Christ was totally opposed to that of the Arians and the Apollinarians. For Athanasius in becoming man the Logos possessed a soul because He spoke, lived, and died as a man. Also He was ignorant and progressed as a man. Since for Athanasius the term man includes both body and soul as two fundamental aspects of the human constitution, Athanasius' affirmation that the Logos became truly man should imply nothing else but that Christ possessed a complete human nature including body and soul.

Generally speaking Galtier's argumentation is a restatement of the argumentation of Ortiz de Urbina and Constantinides. His case however presents particular points of strength because, as we have already observed, he set the question concerning the soul of Christ within the wider context of the character of Christ's humanity in general. On this particular point Galtier has made a distinctive contribution which, however, has not yet been taken seriously by those who write manuals of history of Dogma or those who rely on them. Typical for instance is the case of J.E.D. Kelly, who claims that "Athanasisus' language often suggests that he conceived of human nature after the manner of Platonic realism as a concrete idea or universal in which all individual men participate". He also adds that "Athanasisus' Platonism tended at times to lose touch with his Christianity". It seems that the Greek historian of Dogma J. Kalogerou has also borrowed such ideas from the Dogmengeschichte,
for in his recent essay on Athanasius’s Christology and Soteriology he claims that “In the Incarnation the Logos assumed a perfect and pure humanity in an individual manner, which however was identical with that original idea which existed at the time of Creation and on which God built the human race”. This “original idea of humanity which is individually assumed by the Logos and within which men find their true hypostasis” is none other than the “concrete universal” of Kelly’s alleged Athanasian Platonic realism. How could such ideas be reconciled with the Athanasian texts which focus upon the particular body of Christ and its human integrity demonstrated in its human functions and weaknesses? Galtier has shown that this could not be the case. There is however one point which seems to have escaped here even Galtier’s notice and which seems to us of cardinal importance in dealing with the humanity of Christ in its relation to us. This is the point that we encountered in our exposition of Athanasius’ doctrine of the death of Christ in INC. We saw there how Athanasius insists that the single human body of Christ becomes appropriate for effecting a universal salvation because of the Logos and His Godhood. As Athanasius puts it Ἰνα τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων Λόγου μεταλαβών, ἀντι πάντων ἰκανόν γένηται τῷ θανάτῳ. It is the Divine Person of the Logos that constitutes for Athanasius the basis of the universal effect of the Incarnate economy. It would be wrong, in our view, to turn from this basis to another one located in Christ’s humanity as such. That certainly would lead to some kind of Platonism conceived physically or even legally as in the case of Rashdall. On the objective side the basis can be none other than the Person of the Divine Logos and Son of
 Cod. On the subjective, i.e., the mystical body, as Galtier has called it following the lead of other scholars, the basis can be none other than the Spirit through whose action men are regenerated and incorporated into Christ. Ultimately however, both the objective and the subjective aspects of the Incarnation are to be traced in the Father, for as Athanasius insists, ἐν Θεῷ ἐφεμελήσεν ὁ Κύριος τὴν καθολικὴν ἑκκλησίαν (SER3,6) or ἐν τῷ Θεῷ γὰρ ἡ τελείωσις ἐστὶν (SER1,30) or ἡ δυσαμήνη χάρις καὶ ὁμοθέτω ἐν Θεῷ ὁδοιποιεῖ παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς δι' ὧν ἐν Ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι (ibid.). Ultimately Athanasius' understanding of the whole economy of the Incarnation with all its far-reaching and universal implications rests on the Holy Trinity, for as he argued with the Arians the creatures receive the grace of deification μόνον μετοχῇ τοῦ Λόγου οὐδ' τοῦ Πνεύματος παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς (CAR1,9, cf. also CAR1,34, CAR2,41, 42, etc.).

As regards Galtier's view that the anthropology of INC presupposes that of GENT, Galtier has had at least one potential critic. A. Louth argued in a short article in 1975, without any reference to Galtier or to the debate about the soul in Athanasius' Christ, that (54) the anthropology of GENT differs radically from that of INC. The former is distinctly Neoplatonic and abstract, whereas the latter is biblical and historical. The former makes a great deal of the human soul which is understood in a Plotinian sense, whereas the latter hardly mentions it. For Louth GENT is untypical of Athanasius and represents an early flirtation of his with Neoplatonism which however was soon afterwards abandoned in INC. If this is correct, then obviously Galtier's argument loses its importance. A closer look at the texts however shows that Louth is mistaken. First of all he did not examine the question of anthropology in
GENT in the light of the whole argument in GENT and INC, for these two works stand and fall together. Secondly he made considerable exegetical mistakes with the details of Athanasius' anthropological teaching. For instance, Athanasius does not say that man can actually be saved by means of contemplation. What he is saying is that the right understanding of man and the world leads to the contemplation of the Logos of God through whom all things were made and by whom the Father is ultimately revealed. There is no suggestion that here we are dealing with the contemplation of Platonic ideas or that the body and its senses should be degraded in any way. The language Athanasius uses certainly has Platonic connotations, but the actual content differs radically from the Platonic viewpoint. On the one hand the doctrine of Creation with the Divine and true Logos at its centre and on the other hand man's fall and inability to rise to God, which naturally leads to the argument of INC based on the intervention of the Divine Logos in the Incarnation, leave no room for the kind of anthropology which Louth suggests. Again the soul of GENT does not differ all that much from that of INC. Even in GENT Athanasius says that the soul is subject to the Divine Logos. How does this really differ from the ξατ'εἰκόνα of the soul in INC? Finally, it seems unlikely that in view of the overall unity of GENT and INC, such a change in anthropology and general outlook could be sustained. Louth's case is more phenomenological than real. Caltier's exposition seems far more realistic and closer to the textual data. Besides, it is decisively corroborated by Meijering's thesis on the over-all Platonism of Athanasius. Caltier's argument is formidable and impressive. It shows that Athanasius' Christology has a greater depth than scholars have admitted.
VI.7 Conclusions

In the above section we have critically reviewed the major contributions of modern scholars to the modern question concerning the soul of Christ in Athanasius' theology. We paid particular attention to the arguments of M. Richard and A. Grillmeier, whose views have been all too readily and uncritically accepted as conclusive by many contemporary Patristic scholars, and we have found them to be wanting arbitrary and also conflicting with actual texts and theological drift of Athanasius' argumentation. On the whole the allegation of the above scholars of a latent Apollinarianism in Athanasius' Christology was based on an argument *e silentio* and on the rigid application of the dogmengeschichtliche straight-jacket of the so-called Alexandrian Logos-flesh Christological framework to Athanasius' doctrine of Christ, which prevented them from taking seriously the actual intentions of Athanasius' doctrine arising from his encounters with particular heretical propositions.

Apart from our own critical examination of the views of Richard and Grillmeier, we have also reviewed the rather unknown contributions of such formidable Patristic scholars as I. Ortiz de Urbina, Chrysostom Constantinides and Paul Galtier, which seemed to have escaped the attention of contemporary scholarship, although they are well balanced presentations of the textual data of Athanasius. The strength of these positive contributions is primarily to be placed in their attachment to Athanasius' biblical theological perspectives and particularly to his soteriological starting-points.
In our opinion these scholars have shown that beyond all doubt Athanasius' concerns were not philosophical or scholastic but kerygmatic and biblical, and that he never allowed himself to be drawn out of a simple but fundamentally biblical and comprehensive perception of Christ into the logical intricacies and often logical muddles of his opponents.

On the particular issue of the human soul of Christ and its place in the humanity of Christ, these scholars have demonstrated that the explicit texts of Athanasius in ANT and EPI cannot be either minimized or explained away, but rather make explicit a truth which was always implicit in Athanasius' earlier statements. Athanasius did not use the terms "body" or "flesh" restrictedly but synecdochically to denote the real humanity of Christ, and never actually moved to an Apollinarian scholastic position. His texts give no reason for assuming that if the question of the soul of Christ was put to him for acknowledgement or discussion he would have refused to do so. What is crystal clear however, in the light of the above reviews, is that Athanasius would readily accept the presence of a soul in Christ provided that this implied a physical (objective) as opposed to a personal (subjective) factor. As he put it in his argumentation against the Arians, γάντα τά λεξεῖδια τῆς ἀνθρώπων σωστά- σεως ἵδια (τοῦ Λόγου) τυγχάνει ὄντα· καὶ τά τοιαῦτα οὐ τὴν ὁδὸν τοῦ Λόγου ἀλλὰ τό ἀνθρώπον αὐτόν γεγενήθησαί σημαίνει (CAR2,11).

To argue for the presence of a human soul in Christ in a personalist individualist sense, as many modern critics would have liked, would have lead to a Samosatean Christ of whom Athanasius thoroughly and decisively disapproved.
VI. 8 The Soul of Christ in APOl

The first reference to the soul in APOl occurs in chapter three, καὶ τὴν παθητὴν σῶμα, ὑστέρος τε καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχῆ καὶ ὕλον τοῦ καθόμας σῶματος ἀρμοσθέενα... ἀκτιστον λέγοντες. The soul is here listed together with the words bones, blood and body as a constitutive part of the human flesh. It is not absolutely clear, whether this usage goes back to the opponents of the author or to the author himself. The λέγοντες suggests the former, but it is possible to see the λέγοντες only as a reference to the παθητὴν σῶμα. In the light of the whole chapter it appears that the author prefers the term "human form" (ἀνθρωπίνη μορφή) to the term "flesh" which seems to be favoured by his opponents.

The second reference to the soul is found in APO1,5, and seems to be quite similar to the previous one. Χάρις γὰρ καὶ ὅστισιν ἐπιλεῖσθαι ἑποιήσω κύριος καὶ ψυχῆς λυπομένης καὶ ταραττομένης καὶ ἀδημονώσας. Here the soul is named together with flesh and blood and bones as constituting the created human nature (τὴν ποιηθέσαι τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος φύσιν), or God's creation (τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ποίησιν) or the human form (ἡ μορφὴ τῆς ἡμετέρας εἰκόνος - ἡ καθ' ἡμᾶς μορφή) or even the whole man (σύμμας ὁ ἀνθρωπος). Contrasting the two references, we see that the σῶμα of the former is equal with the φύσις of the latter and that the soul is related to the whole.

Thirdly, a group of references to the term soul occurs in chapter eight. In fact there are only two direct and five indirect references altogether (cf. the adjective ψυχικός).
The whole chapter constitutes a comparison of Adam with Christ. This comparison serves to clarify the Christological statement of the author, that ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἡμῶν γένεται ἄνθρωπος, which is expounded in the previous chapter. The question raised in chapter eight is, what kind of man did God become? The reply given is, that He did not become different from ἄνθρωπος (οὐχ ἄνθρωπος) and therefore was He called the second Adam. Yet the apostle, who spoke of Him as a second Adam, also distinguished between Him and the first Adam. He spoke of the former as πνευματικός and of the latter as ψυχικός. His distinction did not imply two different bodies, one endowed with spirit and another with soul. He rather meant, that the former was under the authority and nature of the Spirit, whereas the latter was under the authority and nature of the soul. The difference between the first and second Adams is, that the body of the former only remains in the power of his soul, while that of the latter participates in the Spirit. The contrast is not so much between soul and Spirit as between the authority of the soul and the authority of the Spirit, the authority of man per se and the authority of God in man.

The fourth reference is found in chapter twelve, where we read that the human form consists of flesh, blood and soul. The implication is the same as that of the previous references.

Chapter thirteen discusses the heretical notion, that in Christ there was a heavenly mind, instead of the inner man in us. The author charges his opponents with "arrogance of the soul". He is primarily concerned with his opponents' conception of the soul. He finds that the origin of this conception lies in
the distinction between the inner and the outer man. The inner man is identified with "the human mind", the outer man with "the human soul and body", or correspondingly "blood and flesh". The author argues that the inner man is the soul and the outer the body. This is clearly seen in man's death, when the inner is separated from the outer and the first goes to Hades and the second to the grave.

In chapter fourteen the separation of the soul from the body in death is applied by the author to Christ's death. The Lord's soul descends into Hades and liberates the souls of men which are held captive therein by death. It is the Lord Himself who subjected the souls of men to the captivity of death because of their sins and it is the same Lord who through His sinless human soul annuls His own decree. Thus through a man the liberation of the whole man is achieved.

In chapter fifteen the author argues against the 'Manichean' thesis of his opponents according to which sin is viewed as natural (φυσικὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀμαρτίαν λέγοντες). He asserts that the human nature as such is not sinful, because it was created by God. Yet the sinless nature that God created was led by the devil to transgress God's command and to discover the death of sin. It is this same nature which God the Logos raised up in Himself, unaffected by the deceit of the devil and the discovery of sin. If the devil found nothing of his properties in Christ, Christ equally left nothing of his own creation to the devil. He raised everything in Himself, in order to work out the salvation of the whole man, i.e. of the
rational soul and the body, and thus to present a perfect resurrection. As in the previous chapter, the author's anthropology exhibits a duality of an inner and an outer part, the soul and the body. He contrasts his doctrine here to that of the Arians and his present opponents. The Arians claim that the Saviour took up flesh only (σάρκα μόνην) and therefore ascribe His knowledge of His suffering to His divinity. The new heretics, like the Arians, speak of the 'containing shape' (τὸ περιέχον σχῆμα) and replace our inner man in Christ with a heavenly mind. Both fail to see that the passion, consisting of sorrow, agony, prayer and perplexity of spirit, demands a soul which has understanding (ψυχῆς νόσιν ἐκούσης) and feels the passion in this (νοητῶς ἐπαισθανομένης τοῦ πάθους). The crucial point in the author's doctrine here is, that reason and mind should not be contrasted with the soul as the heretics propose. They must be subsumed, as it were, under the soul. The only contrast acceptable to the author is that between soul and body, that results from the transgression of God's command and the discovery of sin. This contrast is overcome in the resurrection.

In chapter sixteen the author makes similar points. He exposes the theological inconsistency of his opponents' distinction between soul and mind in Christ (ι.ε. that ἀλλοτρία καθόλου ἢ ψυχὴ τοῦ Κυρίου ἐγεγόνει τῆς ὁδίας νοησεως). His doctrine states that the mind in Christ is not the Logos qua Logos, but rather the mind of His human soul (ψυχῆς ὁδίας νοησεως). Hence the passion of Christ is related to His soul's understanding. The deep ground to this doctrine is the doctrine of salvation. As the author puts it, He ransomed us by the blood of His flesh and won the victory for us by
the understanding of His soul (τῆς νοησίς τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ). As His blood is not common, but saving, so His understanding (νοησίς) is not encompassed by human weakness, but exhibits God's nature.

In chapter seventeen the author continues his soteriological doctrine and makes direct references to the soul of Christ. "Where the human soul was captured in death, there Christ showed the human soul to be His, that He, who is uncaptured, may present Himself in death as man and annul the captivity of death". "Where death ruled as king, i.e. in the form of the human soul, there the immortal one showed by His Presence immortality". "He exchanged as a ransom a body for a body and a soul for a soul, a perfect existence for the sake of the whole man".

In chapter eighteen the author develops a Scriptural argument in support of Christ's human soul. He does this by reference to John 19:30 and 10:15. To give up the spirit did not mean the departure of the divinity from Christ. It meant the departure of the soul. If it was the divinity then Christ's death must literally be understood as God's own death! This implies that death must be understood as the separation of the soul from the body, but also as the capture of the soul in Hades and the corruption of the body in the grave. In the following chapter the author restates the argument from death, as well as the soteriological argument. He argues that Christ would not have died if the Logos had not constituted in Himself the inner as well as the outer man, i.e. the soul and
the body. In his Soteriological argument the author speaks of the soul as "κατὰ φρόνησιν ἁμαρτίαν," which most likely represents phraseology of his opponents. He contrasts this with his own phrase "ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ ἐν φρονήσει ἁμαρτήματα." The term φρόνησις seems to be synonymous with νοήμα, which already appeared in chapter fifteen. Both are derived from the addressees.

In chapter twenty the author discusses the heretical Christological terms νοῦς ἐπουράνιος and σῶμα ἐμψύχον. He disqualifies both of them as counterfeit (πλαστοῖ). He says, speak of σῶμα ἐμψύχον only with reference to that, which is given the name of the soul concretely (ἐνυποστάτως). What is νοῦς ἐπουράνιος? Is it νοῦς Κυρίου? But that, according to Rom. 11:34 denotes the Lord's will, decision or activity with regard to something. Particularly interesting, indeed, intriguing, is the phrase ὅτι ὁ ἐνυποστάτως τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς φέρεται ὄνομα. Who is this ὁ? It seems to be the particular man, the 'particular person', the individual. The author does not have a word for it. The best way to describe it is by means of the term ἐνυποστάτως. Is this the beginning of the so-called neo-Nicene usage of the term ὑπόστασις? We think, that it is. It is interesting that the usage is demanded by new questions or the new heresies. Even more interesting is the fundamental difference between the author and his opponents. His terms are concrete and realistic, theirs abstract and merely intellectual.

Lastly in chapter twenty-one there are references to the heretical conception of the soul. As the author puts it, they sometimes see the soul as a 'mindless mind' (νοῦς παρίφρων), and sometimes
as an "enhypostatic sin" (धार्मिक द्वापर नाम दत्त) which seems to be equivalent to "natural sin" (cf. APOL,15), and sometimes as a "worker of sin" (δργάς τῆς δικτύας).

In the light of the above exposition we may sum up the author's and his opponents' conceptions of the soul of Christ as follows: He asserts that Christ's humanity or human form included both body and soul and that the soul was endowed with an intellect or mind. Thus in the death of Christ His body was placed in the grave and His soul descended into Hades, whilst the resurrection was the reunion of the body and the body which were never separated from the Logos Himself. For the author's adversaries Christ's humanity was simply an outward dress which consisted of mere flesh endowed with the breath of life (a soul). This humanity however had no intellect (or mind) because the Logos had taken this place in Christ. Had Christ had a human mind, not only He would have been a mere man in whom the Logos would have dwelt as in the prophets, but also He would have been a sinful being because the human mind is the seat of sin. The author's reply to this view is both biblical and theological. So he argues that the distinction in scripture between the "inner man" and the "outer man" correspond to the division between soul and body and not to soul and intellect. And he adds that if Christ had had no intellectual soul, then either the impassible Godhood would have died and suffered, or salvation (i.e. the resurrection) would have been incomplete. As for the alleged sinfulness of a Christ endowed with a human mind the author contends that sin is not based on creaturely existence but is a matter of wrong doing - something which Christ did not commit. On the whole the author of APOL does not explain what precisely
the soul is, but it is clear that Christ's soul is not independent of the Logos and does not belong to another man. It is not a subject per se because such a principle is the Logos.
VI.9 The Soul of Christ in APO2

Turning now to APO2, we find altogether thirty-four references to the term soul. The first four occur in the very first chapter. They indicate that the theme of the soul of Christ is central to the author’s debate with his addressees. He argues that the soul of Christ is as genuinely Johannine as the term "flesh", and one should never therefore see them as mutually exclusive. This is particularly true of the crucial Johannine statement John 1:14. Clear evidence is supplied in John 10:15. The author accuses his addressees of failure to perceive this and consequently of distortion of the true sense of John 1:14 so as to be opposed to soul. They, he says, propound a change undergone by the Logos which would involve a conversion or remaking of the flesh (σαρκός μετατομὴν), or an assimilation of the Logos to a soul (ψυχῆς ὁμοιωσιν). The same notion is expressed in chapter 3 in parallel terms, ἀντὶ καταμερίσας ἐς σαρκὸς ἐπίδειξιν ἡ ψυχῆς ὁμοιωσιν.

The author argues for Christ’s soul also by means of the exposition of the meaning of the Pauline "form of the servant" (Phil.2:6f). The form of the servant, he writes, should not be understood docetically, i.e. as only referring to the "organic situation" (δρωμενὴ κοσμίας) in the human constitution (σώματος) but also to the fullness of that constitution, i.e. both to the "organic" and to the "mental nature" (νοσοῦσαν καὶ νοσοῦσαν σώματος). This is particularly apparent in death, when man becomes deformed (ἀμορφος) and dissolves, because the soul which is of an indissoluble nature (ἀληθος φῶς) departs from the body. For the author of APO2 the Johannine term "soul" corresponds to the Pauline "form of the servant".
John sees the soul in the flesh. Paul sees the body in the form of the servant. But the author's addressees understand the Pauline form of the servant docetically, because they deprive it of a mindful nature (or "mental nature"). It appears that the terms "organic situation" and "mindful nature" are borrowed by the author from the vocabulary of his addressees. The difference is, that, whereas they employ them differentially in defence of their doctrine of a change (σταυρωθη) of the Logos at His Incarnation, he employs them relationally in defence of what he calls the "whole mystery of the economy of Christ" (τὸ πάντα τῆς οἰκονομίας μυστηρίου), the fact that Christ is both God and man.

In APO2,3 the author refers to the Arian conception of the soul in Christ. Arians, like his addressees, speak of a mere flesh (σῶμα μόνον), identify the soul with the inner man and replace it in Christ by the Logos, and apply the understanding of the passion and the resurrection to the Godhood of the Logos. The same comment is made in APO2,13.

In APO2,8 the author accuses his addressees of Marcionism and Manichaeanism because they give the soul, i.e. the "mental nature of man", to the master of evil and therefore speak of a ψυχή σαρκικῆ. The author refers to Matth. 10:28 and I Pet. 3:19 to show that the soul is distinct from the flesh.

In APO2,10 we find the interesting statement that the second Adam included within Him the first Adam in all his aspects: ψυχήν καὶ σῶμα καὶ ὄλον τὸν πρῶτον...

In APO,13–17 we find references to the soul in the context of Christ's passion, death and resurrection. In APO2,13 the author
argues that (1) the passion never applies to God (ὁ ἁμαρτωλός) apart from the body, which admits of suffering, that (2) the body never exhibits perplexity or sorrow apart from the soul, which is liable to feel sorrow and perplexity, and that (3) the soul never becomes anxious nor prays apart from understanding, which prays and becomes anxious. This clearly implies that in his conception Christ consists of God plus the body that suffers, the soul that becomes sorrowful, and the understanding that becomes perplexed and prays. In APO2,14 the author argues that the blood shed on the Cross confirmed the humanity of Christ's flesh and that the cry indicated the presence of His soul, which was separated from His body. The body died and was placed in the tomb and the soul went to Hades, but the Godhood remained united to both. The result was that the soul was not abandoned in Hades and the body did not see corruption according to Ps.15:10. That God was not separated from the soul is seen in John 10:18, where His active presence in the laying down of the soul is strongly suggested.

In APO2,15 the author sums up his doctrine of the Incarnation. He speaks about the soul of God (ψυχή Θεοῦ), in which the grip of death was undone and the resurrection from Hades was wrought and the souls were evangelized. He also speaks of the body of Christ, in which corruption was banished from the grave. Man was not separated from God in Christ and God did not abandon man. The mortification and departure of the spirit was not a departure of God from the body. It was rather a separation of the soul from the body. If God had been separated from the body, the latter would not have remained uncorrupted in the grave.
Also, had He not had a soul He would have accomplished the resurrection.

The same general conclusion reappears in the following chapter. Passion, death and resurrection of Christ apply to His flesh and soul and not to His Godhood. According to Is. 53:16 He delivered His soul to death for them (the people) and the same statement is found in 1 John 3:16.

Lastly, in 1 Pe 2:17 we find two more references to the biblical tradition with regard to the soul of Christ, i.e. the prophetic witness of Isaiah and the Gospel tradition of John. The important point here is that the soul of Christ is called spirit in the Gospel. It is the spirit which departed from Jesus at His death on the Cross and thus the mortification of the body was effected. So Christ took up our death in His own body and soul and thus destroyed it. Without His Body and His Soul He would not fully and perfectly have completed the economy of salvation.

For the author of 1 Pe 2, then, the humanity of Christ designated by the Johannine term "flesh" and the Pauline "form of the servant" includes the element called "soul". This is affirmed against his adversaries who argue that the Logos Himself was the soul of Christ by way of a certain "assimilation". The author's arguments are biblical as well as theological. On the biblical side he mentions various NT verses from the Gospel of St John the Gospel of Matthew and the First Epistle of Peter as well as the classic OT Christological verses Isaiah 53:16 and Ps.15:10. On the theological side, he stresses the argument from Christ's real human death which involved the descent of His soul
to Hades, the Soteriological argument which involves the complete constitution of man, body and soul, and finally the negative argument from the impassibility of the Logos which makes impossible the view of the assimilation of the Logos to a human soul in Christ. The curious reference to a "fleshly soul" as opposed to a "soul which is endowed with perception and thoughts" is the occasion for a debate on the nature of sin and its relation to the soul which is reminiscent, though not identical, of the parallel debate in APO.".

Two are the most critical points in the doctrine of Christ's soul in APO, firstly that this soul does not imply two persons in Christ and secondly that the soul together with the body refer to the natural and creaturely constitution of man as he was originally made by God. This means that Christ is the Logos become man in a true sense by assuming all that is man's original nature without a particular human person or sin.
VI.10 General Conclusions

First of all we must note the parallel and almost identical doctrine of the soul of Christ in APO1 and APO2. Similar terminology, similar theological perceptions, and similar biblical and theological arguments in defense of the presence of a soul in Christ's humanity have convinced us that here we have the same mind working on different presentations or possibilities of the same fundamental problem. But although one could easily see the close connections between respective doctrines of the soul of Christ in APO1 and APO2 and make a good case for identity of authorship, the real question is whether one could as easily proceed one stage further and argue for an Athanasian origin. Admittedly the explicit teaching on the soul of Christ in the two APO cannot be matched with anything quite as elaborate in the generally accepted works of Athanasius. But this means that our assessment of this matter should be determined on the basis of tests from theological consistency and terminological concordance. In other words we need to find out whether the explicit doctrine of APO1 and APO2 on the soul of Christ is theologically consistent with the Athanasian Christology and whether its particular terminology contradicts the Athanasian terminology concerning the humanity of Christ. Fortunately having thoroughly examined the modern debate on the human soul of Christ and having reached certain clear conclusions, we are now in a position to give answers to the above mentioned tests. We concluded earlier on that for Athanasius the employment of the body-soul language for designating the humanity of Christ is explicitly witnessed in his ANT and EPI and that it stands in continuity
and inner cohesion with the whole drift of his Christological theory based on the Apostolic kerygma and inspired by a fundamental double-edged Soteriological concern. The only condition that we have laid down for the acceptability and use of such language by Athanasius was that the soul would have an objective, as opposed to a subjective, ontological status, because it will have to be coordinated with the uncompromising Athanasian intuition that the only subject active in Christ is the Logos — albeit, the Logos as God and as man — but not as a mere or particular man.

Now in examining the doctrine of the soul of Christ in APO1 and APO2 we have found positive indications that such a condition is clearly upheld even in the cases where the "mind" "thoughts" and generally the "perception or consciousness" (νοησις or νοερα διαθνοςις) of Christ is concerned. In whatever case such notions are defended by the author of APO1 and APO2, it is made crystal clear that all of them are predicated of the Logos and not of a man. Christ's humanity with all its perfections, psychological as well as mental, remains for the authors of APO1 and APO2 an objective reality which finds its particular existence in the person of the Creator Logos who assumed it in union with Him-Self and, making it His own, used it for effecting a perfect salvation. In view of all this, and taking into account the fact that on the anthropological level Athanasius used unhesitatingly the dualistic model of body-soul to speak of man and the problem of his fall and his death we are inclined to conclude that the author of APO1 and APO2 could easily have been the great Alexandrian. Whether
this is true or not;... and one can never be absolutely certain—
it is clear that the doctrine of the soul of Christ defended
in the two APO is not inconsistent with Athanasius' perception
of Christ and therefore the critics who argued otherwise were
mistaken. This conclusion will become even more obvious in the
following section when Athanasius' total perception of Christ
is thoroughly investigated on the basis of his texts.
VII

The Christology

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pp. 642-833 VII.2 Athanasius' Christology restated from his texts

(ii) INC

(iii) CA\textsuperscript{q1}

(iv) CA\textsuperscript{r2}

(v) CA\textsuperscript{r3}

(vi) Other anti-Arian writings

pp. 800-806 (vii) ANT

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(ix) ADEL

(x) MAX

(xi) Conclusions

pp. 834-873 VII.3 The Christology of APO\textsuperscript{1}

pp. 874-898 VII.4 The Christology of APO\textsuperscript{2}

pp. 899-908 VII.5 Comparison of the Christologies of APO\textsuperscript{1} APO\textsuperscript{2} and Athanasius
In the previous two chapters we established that neither the doctrine of death, nor the question concerning the soul of Christ constitute unsurmountable problems to the Athanasian paternity of the two treatises under investigation. What remains to be done, is to investigate the precise relationship of the whole Christological doctrine of the Athanasian literature to the whole Christological doctrine of the two APO, with the view to determining whether they are incompatible or antithetical. If it can be shown that this is not the case, then it would be justifiable to conclude with the general claim that the theological argument against the Athanasian authorship of APO1 & 2 does not carry the decisive critical weight which has been attached to it by the scholars.

Following the pattern of procedure adopted in the previous two chapters, we shall deal first with the Christology of Athanasius, examining it both from the point of view of modern scholarship and also from the point of view of the original texts. Then, secondly, we shall examine the Christology of APO1 and APO2 separately and in comparison with each other, and finally we shall bring our investigation to a conclusion by comparing the total Christology of Athanasius, as we shall have restated it, with the total Christology of the two APO. For lack of space, we shall restrict our investigation to the fundamental aspects of Christology avoiding particular details.
VII.1 The Christology of Athanasius in modern scholarship

The modern dogmengeschichtliche theory of Christological frameworks, which is the crucial factor in the modern interpretations of Athanasian and generally Patristic Christology, goes back to F.C. Baur of Tübingen, who seems to have been the first to propound it on the basis of the Hegelian philosophy of history. Baur's views were not readily accepted. The monumental work Entwicklungs geschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi by Baur's pupil, J.A. Dorner, written in the middle of the nineteenth century, made use of it but did not follow its implications. In the case of Athanasius' Christology Dorner corrected it because he perceived that the Athanasian clue was not to be found in terminology but Soteriology. Dorner's account of Athanasian Christology is still very valuable and on the whole accurate, because it brings out the central intuitions of Athanasius' vision. He stresses the fundamental connection between Creation and Salvation which is concretely realized in the One Creator and Saviour Logos; the equally fundamental interconnection between Creator and Creation and particularly between Creator and man, which is recapitulated in the Creator's Inhomination; the unity of Person and the duality of Godhood and manhood in Christ; the dynamic saving aspect of the Incarnation; the natural integrity of Christ's manhood including the existence of a human soul, etc.

Baur's views were taken up again in the end of the nineteenth century by K. Hoss and A. Städiker. Hoss argued against the integrity of the manhood of Christ in Athanasian Christology and defended Baur's Logos-body model as the only one.
applicable to it. As might be expected, he sustained this claim by denying to Athanasian Christology the presence of a human soul and rejecting the Athanasian paternity of the two AP. The real stumbling-block in Athanasian Christology for Hoss was the emphasis on the Logos as the only subject active in Christ. It is not clear whether Hoss's own Christology was of a 'Nestorian' type, but his criticism of Athanasian Christology suggests it. What is clear, however, is that Hoss did not see the frequent and impressive Logos-anthropos Christological statements of the Athanasian texts. For Athanasius the incarnate Logos was not merely 'Logos qua Logos' but 'Logos as man', 'Logos become man', as Dorner had so carefully noted.

Stüken's Athanasiana gave the most complete formulation of the Baurian exposition based on a careful and thorough study of St. Athanasius' texts. Especially the dogmengeschichtliche section, which dealt with the manhood of Christ according to Athanasius, has been most influential in later developments. Stüken summarized the problem of Athanasian Christology as follows. He saw two elements in Athanasius' Soteriology, the Divine and the human. But he observed that the emphasis was placed on the former, whereas the latter was only discussed whenever it was seen in the service of the former. Taking CAR 3, 29ff and SER 2,7 (cf. CAR 4, 6; AFO 1, 10) as a starting point, Stüken referred to Athanasius' anti-Arian emphasis on the 'Scope of the Faith', or the 'Canon', or the 'Scope and character of the Holy Scriptures', and especially his insistence on the double Christological proclamation of the Scriptures. As he says, the biblical doctrine of Christ for Athanasius is centred on the eternal Son, Logos, effulgence and Wisdom of God.
who for our salvation assumed flesh from the Virgin Mary and became man. So, for Athanasius there is in Christ a duality involving the Son-Logos on the one hand and the Man on the other. But the question emerges whether the Man is \textit{Mensch des Logos}, or \textit{Logos als Mensch}. Stü llen argues that one has to differentiate strictly between \textit{der Logos ist Mensch geworden} and \textit{der Logos hat einen Menschen angenommen}. For Athanasius only the former is acceptable. Also, according to SER2, the biblical Christological statements should not be divided between those referring to the 'Logos \textit{qua Logos}' and those referring to the 'man in whom the Logos came to dwell', but to the 'Logos \textit{qua Logos}' and to the 'Logos as man' or the 'Logos become man' (inhomminated).

Stü llen is right in these observations, so far, but he proceeds to draw the wrong conclusions. He fails to appreciate the full implications of Athanasius' Christological categories of the \textit{Logos als Mensch}, and the \textit{menschgewordenen Logos}. Quoting the typical Athanasian statement \textit{σώμα και \ νοῦς}, he claims that the human side of Christ is only the \textit{σώμα}, and therefore Athanasian Christology belongs to the \textit{Logos-soma} (\textit{sarx}) type. Here he explicitly agrees with Baur that Athanasian Christology is the progenitor of the Apollinarian, in spite of the criticisms of Voigt, Schwane, Dorner, Atzberger, Sträter and Lauchert. He also refers to Harnack's view which on the whole supports the Baurian hypothesis with some minor alterations. His conclusion is, that since APO has been removed from the Athanasian works the Baurian hypothesis must be regarded to be nearer to the point. Nevertheless, he still wants to maintain reservations. He thinks that what is needed is
a thorough analysis of the contents of the undisputed works of Athanasius, unprejudiced by previous study of APC. In his final general conclusion to his investigation of Athanasian Christology Stülken makes the following remarks. Athanasius' Christology does not seem to have anything special about it. In some respects it goes back to Irenaeus and Hippolytus. He borrows from them elements which he presents as the foundation of all subsequent Christological interpretation. One of them is the insistence on the Logos as the subject (anti-Antiochene) to the predicates which Scripture applies to the Body of Christ (anti-Arian). Stülken finds it difficult to determine the theological merit of Athanasius' theology, because in his view it does not seem to be the result of serious reflection but rather of a simple statement of faith. As he puts it, with his God Athanasius has his redeemer, therefore with his redeemer he has his God. To assume next to Him a second 'I', to which he could attribute some of the biblical passages, was a thought which probably never occurred to him. He certainly, Stülken contends, never made comprehensible the unity which he stated and defended. He never got any further than community of predicates (Prädicatsgemeinschaft). He dared locate the essence of the work of salvation in the fact that the Logos has nominally suffered for us, died, etc. The real inner relation of the two natures with each other, which is indispensable for the process of salvation, is absent. Stülken's criticism goes further still. He claims that one can prove an abundance of contradictions (Fülle von Widersprüchen) with regard to particular points! Yet, Stülken acknowledges,
that in spite of all this, Athanasius has strongly and decisively advocated the unity of Christ. Where he could talk freely from the standpoint of his own consciousness of salvation, he saw his living God, whom he owed adoration, in the suffering man. Thus he moved into the middle position between Anthiochenes and Arians and paved the way for the neo-Alexandrianism of Cyril, not so much by his technical formulae (which were rather few) but by his simple and clear statements and thoughts. His starting-point was Soteriological. For this and for his attachment to the consciousness of the faith rather than that which in his time was culturally acceptable, but religiously indifferent, he must be given credit.

StüIken's conclusions are at least materially correct, but his evaluations of the conceptuality of the Athanasian Christological positions reflect his own Christological stance and that of his age much more than that of the great Alexandrian Father. Perhaps the most revealing of his critical evaluations is his claim that the presence of a second 'I' in Christology apart from that of the Logos did not at all occur to Athanasius. This certainly implies a 'Nestorian' stance. If this is in fact the case, as it seems to be with the Baurian position in general, it is no surprise that StüIken finds it difficult to determine the merit of Athanasian theology. It is probably because of this Christological stance of his that he does not ask why Athanasius insists so categorically on the 'inhominated Logos' as the distinctive category of orthodox Christology, and enquire into the ontological implications of the Athanasian
notion of the *communicatio idiomatum*. Is it theologically apparent or necessary that ontology can only be adequately conceived of by means of nouns and conceptually defined ideas? Or could it not be the case that created ontology, at least, is more appropriately apprehended by means of adjectives and verbs? Stülen certainly discovered the frontlines of Athanasius' theological vision, but he did not cross them, probably because he was too attached to those of his own day and age. It seems that his approach was phenomenological rather than essential.

Hoss' and Stülen's conclusions were opposed by two Roman Catholic Patristic scholars G. Voisin and E. Weigel, whose works deserve special attention. Voisin accepted with some reservations that AFO was not Athanasian. Yet, in spite of this, he argued that Athanasius did accept the integrity of the humanity of Christ including the existence of a human soul. Voisin argued against Hoss's contention that Athanasian Christology was in line with the Arian and the Apollinarian. He referred to Hoss's *Logos = soma (sarx)* Christological framework as resulting from a certain *école rationaliste*. This school, he wrote, saw two original Christological tendencies in the first period of Christianity, and sought to interpret subsequent Christological doctrine in their light. The first tendency was that of ebionism which operated with an adoptionist Christology, and which was revived in the third and fourth centuries by Paul of Samosata and the Antiochenes respectively. The second tendency was, what this *école* called a *pneumatic* Christology entailing a celestial spirit, the Logos, who was consubstantial with God the Father, and a human flesh. This human flesh was regarded
as a mere envelope by which the Divine Logos was clothed and was thereby manifested to man. Various authors, such as Ignatius and Tertullian, maintained against the Gnostics that this flesh was real and true and not imaginary or degraded. Origen attributed to this flesh a human soul endowed with freedom of will. The Cappadocians at the time of their struggle with Apollinaris established the integrity of the human nature of Christ and introduced the expression ὄνομα φύσεως. But this notion of the two natures in Christ was judged by this école rationaliste to have been foreign to the original faith. It was regarded to be an Origenistic way of explaining the Irenaean formula, "The Christ is for the faith both God and man". St. Athanasius departed from the Origenistic heritage and based his theology on Irenaeus. He reacted against the Greek speculative theology by introducing the Irenaean starting-point of God, the Redeemer of mankind, which was integral to the original tradition. In this sense Athanasius should be seen as a great reformer, who exercised a far-reaching influence on both Eastern and Western Christianity. The best exposition of this view of Athanasius was given by A. von Harnack in his Dogmengeschichte. Voisin went on to point out that this theory rested on four basic presuppositions. 1) Athanasius distinguished two elements in man, a soul and a body. On this basis Christ's becoming man was understood as a union between the Logos and a body. The soul was never mentioned. Hence, the Logos was thought to have occupied its place. 2) Athanasius expounded Soteriology in terms of the body. He repeatedly asserted that the body needs to be redeemed, while never mention-
ing the soul. iii) Athanasius attributed all the actions of Christ to the Logos and entirely ignored a human soul endowed with human will. iv) In his conflict with the Arians, Athanasius did not expound the precise union of the Logos with the assumed flesh. He was concerned with the relation of the Logos to the Father. In the Tomus to the Antiochenos, however, where he advanced his arguments against the Apollinarists, he combatted the όμοοούξα of the human flesh of Christ with the Logos and not the substitution of the human soul of Christ by the Godhood.

Having thus outlined the views of the Baurian school concerning the Christology of Athanasius Voisin produced an elaborate argument against them. Against Hoss' assumption, that Athanasius did not know of a human soul in Christ and that he was in this issue in line with Apollinaris, Voisin argued that there was no positive evidence in the Athanasian texts to this effect and therefore the assumption must be seen as totally gratuitous. For Voisin the condemnation in EPI 8 of Origen's idea of the Logos' union with a human soul before the assumption of the body is an explicit affirmation of the opposite, i.e. the contemporaneous assumption of soul and body. But Voisin's fundamental argument against Hoss' contentions is what he calls a careful exposition of Athanasius' Christology.

Voisin's account of the Christology of Athanasius can be summarized as follows: Athanasian Christology is centred on the Son and Logos of God who became man in order to save us. The entire life of the great Father is spent in defence of the Godhood of the Logos against the Arians. Absorbed
in this controversy, he appears to be neglecting the human side of the Saviour, but he rather takes it for granted as an established and indisputable datum in the ecclesiastical doctrine of Christ. The fundamental affirmation in Athanasius' Christology is that the Logos became man (ὅ λόγος ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν). On the whole Athanasius speaks of the Logos' ἐναθρώκησις, but he also employs, somewhat rarely, the terms ἐνομίστως and ἐνομίσκως. On the basis of this initial truth and of all the inherent developments which came into the open with the rise of Apollinarianism, Athanasius must be said to have always held the integrity of the human nature of Christ. The main obstacle to this view is, as far as the argument of the critics goes, the frequent occurrence of the statement 'the Logos assumed a body to Himself' (ο�性 ἐκατο ἐλαβεν ὁ λόγος), or 'He became man by putting on flesh' (γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος ἐνομίσκεν τὴν ἁμητέραν σάρκα). Yet Voisin removes this obstacle by investigating the Athanasian semantics of the terms σώμα and σάρξ, which are basic to this group of statements. He contends that both terms signify the human nature of the Saviour in its totality and integrity. In support of this he supplies four testimonies. Firstly, according to CAR3,30, Athanasius uses the term σάρξ as Scripture does to designate man in his entirety (τῆς Γραφῆς ἔθος ἐχούσης λέγειν σάρκα τὸν ἄνθρωπον). This is corroborated by EPI,8 and SER2,7, where Athanasius identifies the statement 'The Logos became flesh' with the statement 'The Logos became man'. Secondly, with regard to the term σώμα Athanasius' semantics are equally
holistic. He approves of the Stoic philosophers, who speak of
the world as a great body (οὐδήμα) composed of member bodies,
and he employs the same term to speak of man's entire creaturely
being, regarding it to be a member body within the general body
of the universe. In this sense, 'body' denotes created being,
whether that of the world or that of particular men which,
according to Athanasius, must be distinguished from the
divine Being of the logos, which is uncreated (GENT, 28; INC., 41f;
CAR2, 28, 69). Thus the term 'body', as used in the Athanasian
Christological statements, must be taken to denote the entire
human nature and not simply one of its constituent parts.
Thirdly, in a multitude of cases Athanasius designates the
human element in Christ with the terms οὐρά and ἀνθρωποτής
indifferently. He attributes the human actions of Christ to His
manhood, rather than to His Godhood (CAR1, 41; CAR2, 41, 43, 56).
This also applies to Christ's ignorance and growth. The phrase
τῆς οὐρᾶς τῆς ἀγνοοθεᾶ would in the context make no sense, if
οὐρά is not identical with the entire human nature. The most
interesting case in Athanasian texts with regard to this is the
exposition of Christ's query concerning the place of Lazarus'
burial. Here again, the real and complete manhood of Christ
comes to the fore (CAR3, 31, 32ff; DECR 14). Fourthly,
Athanasius employs the statement, 'the Logos dwelt in man'
(ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ) in various senses (INC., 17, 41, 42, 43, 45). The
expression 'in man' designates the particular manhood of Christ
in its singleness and entirety. The phrases ἐν ἀνθρώπωι and
ἐν ἁμαρτίᾳ carry similar connotations (INC., 46; CAR3, 22 and also
INC., 42; GENT, 3).
Apart from semantics Voisin enquires into the reasons which compelled Athanasius to employ the terms 'flesh' and 'body' so extensively in his doctrine of Christ. He first points to the Father's attachment to the tradition in the Church of following biblical conceptual and literary habits. Biblical language and idiom, he says, exhibit a deliberately 'crude' simplicity in its presentation of the mystery of the Incarnation and salvation in Christ, because of the pastoral and missionary concerns of the Apostles. The Incarnation was preached to the first believers in the simple form of an invisible and incorporeal God who becomes visible in a visible body. In this way the early Christian preachers were able to commend the Gospel of God's love and concern for man in the most intimate and immediate way. As Gregory of Nazianzus says to Cleodinius, the Apostles employed the most trivial sides of our human existence in order to point to the abasement of God in the incarnation and the extent to which He has gone in order to reveal His love to us and save us. It is Athanasius' attachment to the Apostolic and Patristic tradition which accounts for the simple, non-technical and at times 'crude' language of his Christology. Voisin also points out that the great Alexandrian Father's attachment to the language of 'flesh' and 'body' was owed to earlier Christological disputes. Athanasius' predecessors had to defend the real flesh of Christ against the menacing Gnostic heresies. The employment of the term flesh became a definite intention, designed to reject Gnostic 'spiritualism'. Therefore, Voisin argues, to regard it as Apollinaristic is to fail to grasp its intention and represents in effect an
epistemologically-deficient anachronistic argument. Athanasius employed the terms 'flesh' and 'body' in line with the earlier Patristic tradition to confess the real humanity of Christ and not to explain its constitution. The question of the constitution of Christ's humanity did not become acute before the later stages of Arianism and particularly the rise of the Apollinarian-Antiochene disputations, in the latter half of the fourth century. Origen had explicitly affirmed the existence of a human soul in Christ and had ascribed to it freedom of will. But the heterodox speculation on the soul of Christ, which Athanasius had to combat (i.e., the Arian rejection of the soul of Christ), was not of the kind which would require the development of Origen's line. Irenaeus, who explicitly attributed a human soul to Christ (Adv. Haer. I.v.1), nevertheless confined himself to the formulae, *Filius Homo factus est* and *assumpsit carnem*. The same applies to the Apostles' and the Nicene Creeds. Athanasius is fully committed to these traditional theological formulae and only engages in a rational defence and clarification of their content, whenever heresy appears to attack them. Consequently, Voisin argues that one can easily understand why Athanasius is contented with the presentation of the humanity of Christ in the traditional soteriological terms of the Bible, the Fathers and the Synodal standards. The frequent employment of these expressions indicates the manner in which Athanasius puts forward the doctrine of redemption. Two soteriological motives seem to be his central concern. Firstly, he sees the sojourn of the Logos in the flesh as the means
for the destruction of death and corruption, which have taken hold of it through sin (INC\textsuperscript{3}-7,\textsuperscript{8},\textsuperscript{44},\textsuperscript{CAR1},\textsuperscript{44},\textsuperscript{CAR2},\textsuperscript{14} etc.). Secondly, he argues that the Logos rendered Himself visible in a body in order to make men understand His Godhood and thereby lead them into the vision of the Father (INC\textsuperscript{14}-1\textsuperscript{6}, 42,\textsuperscript{46},\textsuperscript{54}, etc.). In the light of such concerns, it is understandable why Athanasius does not speak of the human soul of Christ. It is true that the Arian controversy provided him with the occasion to throw some light on this point of the faith. Yet one should not lose sight of the fact that the Christological doctrine on this point was clearly accessible. Further, Arius' error was primarily theological. It attacked the Godhood of Christ and therefore it is to this point that Athanasius directs his arguments. His concern lies with the Divine nature, and his emphasis falls on the Holy Trinity, rather than Christology in the narrower sense. In this, Athanasius is closely followed by the great Cappadocian Fathers, Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus. The Christological debate in the narrower sense is initiated by Apollinaris in his disputes with the Antiochene theologians.

On the basis of the considerations above, Voisin argues that Hoss' restrictive understanding of the word 'flesh' is unjustified. Particularly wrong is Hoss's view that the human soul is for Athanasius a divine element in an essentialist sense. According to Voisin the Athanasian notion of a 'divine' soul is adoptionist rather than essentialist. (CAR\textsuperscript{2},\textsuperscript{58},\textsuperscript{59ff}).
What is important, however, is that Athanasius regards the soul to be a constitutive element of the human nature (GENT, 13, 18, DECR, 9), and as such created (GENT, 2). In CAR he constantly contrasts the uncreated and eternal Logos with everything that has been created, and among the creatures he includes the angels (CAR, 14) and the human soul which is made in the image of God (CAR, 48). The Logos is the very Image of God, whereas man is a divine image only by reflexion (INC, 13). Speaking about idolatry, Athanasius remarks that it would be more fitting for God to manifest Himself by means of an animated and reasonable being than by soulless and immovable statues, the idols of paganism (GENT, 20). For Voisin it is clear that soul is a constitutive element of human nature and as such is included within the Athanasian comprehension of the anthropological term 'flesh'. This means that the Athanasian understanding of John 1:14 cannot be Apollinarian.

Voisin's presentation of Athanasian Christology over against Hoss's interpretation is further defended by means of a thorough exposition of Athanasian Soteriology and a close analysis of the Christologies of ANT and EPI.

As regards Soteriology Voisin argues against Hoss that it should not be restricted merely to the human body. He admits that Athanasius sees salvation as the destruction of death and corruption in terms of the body. For him death can only be destroyed on the level of the body because it is there that it occurs (INC, 44). So the Logos assumes the mortal body and renders it immortal (CAR, 22ff, EPI 6, CAR, 61, 69, 70). Yet redemption is not restrict-
ed to this. The problem of death arises from sin, which is committed not just by Adam but by all men (INC, 3, 4, 20). It is in fact 'the sin of the flesh', which human souls commit by abusing their freedom, that causes death. Now the redemption wrought by the incarnate Logos does not just involve the destruction of the consequences of sin, but of sin itself. The Logos became incarnate, principally to pay the debt which we owe to God, and deliver us from the ancient transgression (INC, 4, 20). By virtue of the Incarnation the soul is regenerated and recreated in God's image and thus man is wholly renewed (INC, 14; CAR2, 53, 65). Not just the body, Voisin argues, but the whole man is in need of redemption and therefore the redemption brought about by Christ is total. But then Athanasius holds that a mere man could not effect salvation because "a creature is not able to unite a creature to God for the same is also in need of someone else who would unite it to God". A part of creation cannot effect the salvation of creation, because it is itself in need of it (CAR2, 69). A creature could not create us, therefore a creature would even less be able to save us (ADEL, 8, MAX, 3). So for Athanasius there are two main principles which govern his Soteriology, first that only God can save, and secondly that salvation should involve the assumption of what needs to be saved. Since he explicitly admits on the one hand that the Logos has saved the whole man and on the other that He saved the body which He assumed, the 'body' should be identical with the 'whole man', if Athanasian Soteriology is at all consistent with Christology. Voisin remarks on Hess's
view, that the Athanasian statement on the salvation of 'the whole man', including the soul, is not quite intentional (indeed, 'improper'), that it is invented to justify his contention that only the body is saved. This, however, would render the holy Father's Soteriology nonsensical and untenable, as Dorner and Lauchert contended. Voisin admits that Athanasius' early use of 'soul' and 'image' in his doctrine of man reveals apparent obscurities and even contradictions, but he argues that the communicatio idiomatum which the holy Father establishes with such admirable precision cannot be understood unless one admits the completeness of the human nature of Christ. It is obvious, Voisin says, that there is a mystery here, but the defender of the mystery of the Holy Trinity does not hold with regard to the mysteries of the Faith the presuppositions which Hoss attributes to him.

Voisin's analysis of the Christology of ANT and EPI confirms him in his views. ANT, 7 clearly shows that Athanasius rejected both Antiochene (adoptionist) and Apollinarian (fragmented) Christologies. The formulae "the Saviour did not have a body without a soul, sense or intellect" and "the Logos has effected in Himself the salvation not only of the body but also of the soul" are not ambiguous. The Soteriological motive does not allow for the attachment of a different meaning to them. The body of the Saviour was not without a human soul, since the salvation of the soul as well as the body were actually wrought in Him. Hoss, however, reverses the argument by claiming that Athanasius had on that occasion accepted the ambiguous formulae of the Apollinarians. On the contrary, says Voisin,
it was the Apollinarians who made it their task to interpret the formulae proposed by Athanasius in a way that would well fit their theory. This, he argues, becomes obvious in Apollinaris' letter to the Egyptian bishops exiled to Diocesarea, in which he tries to prove that Christ is not without a mind because the Logos is the mind in him. For Voisin the Christological formulation of the Council of Alexandria in A.D. 362, though brief, is of sovereign importance. That a Council, where Westerners, Egyptians and Orientals had been assembled, would conclude with a decision of reunion on the basis not only of the Trinitarian Dogma but also on professing unanimously and without any hesitation faith in the complete humanity of Christ, is certainly of cardinal significance. This confession was accepted as a mark of Orthodoxy and cannot be overlooked. It is particularly important for Athanasius himself, because he gives us here something which was not so precisely said in his preceding works. He did not explicitly teach this point in his earlier writings, not because he rejected it, but because the question had not been put to him. His reasoning in the Council of 362 for the recognition of a human soul in Christ can, however, be detected in his earlier writings. In these writings he claimed that the Logos became man in order to save the whole man and that this salvation could not have been effected, save by means of the union between the Logos and that which He came to save. The veracity therefore of the humanity of Christ is, says Voisin, the logical and necessary conclusion to Athanasius' Soteriological presuppositions.
Voisin's study exhibits an impressive cogency, because it is based on a wider selection of evidence and because his procedure is strictly historical avoiding the pitfalls of anachronistic arguments. Even though his observations are not critical enough (e.g., he attempts no investigation of the intricate Athanasian statements concerning the human soul) and no attempt is made to penetrate the implications of the Athanasian Christological formulae, especially those affirming the Logos' becoming man, his account is a sustainable argument against Baur's and Hoss's hypothesis and a clear, comprehensive and well-balanced exposition of Athanasius' doctrine of Christ. Voisin has in fact supplied what Stülken has asked for, "an account of Athanasian Christology unbiased by previous study of APO". For this reason his work is particularly valuable for the investigation of APO, because it establishes that its Christology is in basic agreement with that of Athanasius.

Stülken's work on the Christology of Athanasius was far more detailed than that of Hoss, and as such a far more adequate defense of the Baurian hypothesis. Voisin's article, in spite of its basic merits, would not have sufficed to sustain the balance of opinion in Athanasian studies. Eduard Weigl of Munich moved into the debate to supply this balance in his Untersuchungen zur Christologie des heiligen Athanasius.

Weigl's book contains three sections: a) Alexandrian Christology from the Nicene Council until the death of Athanasius; b) the two Books Contra Apollinarem and c) other Christological writings (INC&CAR, SER4, C&R4). In the first
EPI supplies Voisin with additional testimonies for the tenability of his views. He underlines here the statements, "really and truly the salvation of the whole man took place when the Saviour became man," and "the salvation of the whole man, of soul and body, has been truly achieved in the Logos Himself" (chs. 7-8), and emphasizes the importance for Athanasius' Christology of the identification of the statement "the Logos became flesh" with "the Logos became man". These statements leave no doubt that Athanasius cannot be bracketed together with Arius and Apollinaris as regards the doctrine of Christ.

Voisin's conclusion can be summarized as follows. Athanasius' Christology is neither Arian nor Apollinarian. In his writings anterior to A.D. 362 he ordinarily designates the human side of the Saviour by the terms 'flesh' and 'body' without giving them a restrictive sense. He does this in conformity with the language of the Bible and the Church's anti-Gnostic theological tradition. He does not speak explicitly about the human soul of Christ, because it has not become a serious issue. Yet he establishes the principles on which the human soul of Christ must be accepted. Particularly crucial is the Soteriological principle that the whole man is assumed and saved in Christ. The human soul of Christ is expressly stated in ANT and in the writings posterior to the Council of Alexandria in A.D. 362. After his death the Fathers will take up Athanasius' Soteriological principles to refute Apollinarianism and to confess that Christ took up the entire human nature, body and soul, and effected a complete salvation.
section Weigl establishes the following points: Alexandrian Christology immediately before the Council of Nicea in A.D. 325 exhibited two tendencies, one which emphasized the unity of Godhood and manhood in Christ and spoke of a union effected truly οὐκ ὄμοιός and φυσικός, and another which stressed the duality of Godhood and manhood and spoke of a union taking place σχέτικός. By the middle of the fourth century these two tendencies move to extreme positions. Athanasius steers a middle course between them, emphasizing on the one hand the unity of Christ and repudiating on the other any confusion of Godhood and manhood. This becomes more emphatic in his later treatises, especially in ANT, CAR4, SER4, and reaches its height with ADEL, EPI, and APO1&2. It is this stage of the development which Cyril follows up later, especially in the period of the Nestorian crisis. On the left of Athanasius' position Weigl finds Apollinaris, who stresses the Godhood of Christ and forgets His manhood. On the right he sees the Antiochenes, who develop a doctrine of two sons, or at least advocate an excessive distinction between God and man. Athanasius proclaimed the one Son in Christ, who is only possible if the inarnation is a real and physical one. For him Christ is one, truly God and truly man. Weigl's account is a classic exposition of the traditional view of Athanasian Christology. Apart from the works which today are regarded genuine, it also employs CAR4 SER4 (the longer version) and APO1&2. The second section of his study deals with the questions of authorship and doctrine raised by the scholars about the two APO. He defends the
traditional Athanasian attribution in a study which has ever since remained the most thorough work on the subject. The third section establishes that the Christologies of INC&CAR, SER4 and CAR4 are Athanasian in spite of doubts concerning their authenticity. The work concludes with a brief but comprehensive summary which deserves special attention.

Weigl, like Voisin and the earlier scholars (Dorner, Lauchert, Sträter), sees Athanasius' Christology develop within a wider Christological dogmengeschichtliche context and particularly that of the Arian controversy. In his fight against Arius, who focuses attention on the human acts of Christ in order to deny His Godhood, Athanasius deals with the problem of the unity of Christ and the relation of Godhood and manhood several times. For him the Logos question becomes the Son question: Who is the Son or God in the personality of Christ? Is He God, or man, or both, or is there a different construction to be sought? This question, says Weigl, has in the light of Sabellian, Marcellian and Antiochene tendencies become a two-souls question. In the last analysis it represents the position of Paul of Samosata. The formula ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος on the one hand and εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτός on the other hold the Christological battleground. In this situation the problem of the unity of Christ acquires supreme importance. The identification of the Logos with the man in Christ, i.e. the confession of one person in the incarnate Logos, becomes crucial. The reason is not merely theological but also practical. It affects the Church's attitude to the worship, adoration and glorification of Christ.
Once the unity of the person of Christ has been accepted, the development of the *communicatio idiomatum* is naturally introduced. Its introduction is necessitated not only by the teaching of the Apollinarists, who exchange the predicates of Christ's Godhood and manhood in a substantial way, but also by the teaching of the Antiochenes, who arrive at their total disjunction.

According to Weigl, Athanasius began his combat against the two tendencies, the exaggerated separation and the short-sighted unification, in the sixties. Both must have been developed earlier, but they came to Alexandria in the sixties and especially in the last years of Athanasius' life. Athanasian Christology stood in the middle, equally far from a separation as from a confusion of Godhood and manhood. This was Athanasius' initial intuition which runs a definite course of development and which can be traced from SER4, CAR4 and ANT to the two APO. The former only provide a somewhat clumsy outline, the latter a fresh and thorough treatment. In his attempt to produce a summary of Athanasian Christology, Weigl singles out four central theses: (i) The Logos, who is God, has truly and naturally (*Δληθής καὶ φυσικός*) become man from the womb of the Virgin (*ἐκ μυτράς παρθένου*). This is contested by Arians, Antiochenes and partly by Apollinarians for different reasons. (ii) That Christ is truly and fully God and man is a 'necessity' of the *Heilsgeschichte* and especially of the fact that the salvation effected by Christ is complete. Both Arians and Apollinarians fail to perceive this 'necessity', and therefore
disqualify the humanity of Christ as soulless and unreasonable.

(iii) Christ is one (ὁ Ἰησοῦς), but exists in two elements, Godhood and manhood (θεότης,ἀνθρωπότης). He is Himself God and man. In him there is ἄλλο καὶ άλλο but not διὰ άλλος καὶ διὰ άλλος. Godhood and manhood are united in Christ without division and without confusion. They do not stand merely in a parallel relation (the Antiochene view), nor in a relation of substantial exchange of properties (the Apollinarian view), but in a relation of dependence or possession whereby the manhood has become the Logos' own property by a natural and indissoluble union.

(iv) The relation of Godhood and manhood in the Logos is a mystery which cannot be fathomed by human intellect. It is a relation of possession (Besitzverhältnis) or a relation of rule (Herrschaftsverhältnis) of the higher over the lower. The clear and indisputable fact in this relation is, that the only hegemonic principle governing the convergence of Godhood and manhood is the Logos. But Athanasius never comes round to saying that the Logos is a Divine Hypostasis which somehow bears impersonal humanity, as later orthodoxy came to affirm. He would rather stress that the relation of the Logos to manhood is a natural one, in line with his perception of the unity as a physical relation.

Finally Weigl stresses the strong religious interest which deeply moved Athanasius, and which led him to acknowledge that his words could not possibly reach the movement of his thoughts inside and that he could not bring to expression the beauty and glory of the body of Christ (MON, 1, EPI 12, APOI, 22). This
was the interest in salvation rooted in a real and full Saviour who as God and man was able to save completely. He could not find this either in an adoptionist-dualist or in a reductionist-monist view of Christ. His piety demanded a doctrine according to which Creator and creature were not kept apart and not confused (Seine Frömmigkeit verlangte nach einer Lehre worin Schöpfer und Geschöpf nicht auseinandergesperrt und nicht confundiert wurden). So he stressed the unity and the duality of Christ without discussing the philosophical implications of this position. In doing this he was following the tradition of Irenaeus, Origen, Hippolytus and of his immediate predecessors Peter I and Alexander. His fundamental contribution was his defence of Christology as prior to philosophy. By doing this he paved the way for the development of a philosophia Christiana.

Weigl's contribution is substantial. He reaffirms the traditional interpretation of Athanasian Christology and answers many queries of the critics. But he does not advance beyond traditional theses. His account is accurate from the point of view of facts, but he fails to penetrate into the inner thought of Athanasius' Christological formulae and their far-reaching implications. From the historico-critical point of view Weigl's account is marked by his insistence on an early date for the development of Apollinarianism and the fourth-century debates concerning the humanity of Christ. This is not in agreement with the majority view, but one should acknowledge that the evidence is ambiguous and that the chronological issue cannot but remain a matter of debate.
Since the publication of Weigl's book on the Christology of Athanasius no comprehensive studies on this topic have been undertaken to this day. Even the relatively recent book of Roldanus, *Le Christ et l'homme dans la théologie de saint Athanase d'Alexandrie* (Leiden, 1968) deals more with the anthropology than the Christology of Athanasius. There has been produced however, a series of essays on this topic, either in the context of the general manuals of the history of doctrine, or in the context of more particular monographs. It is not necessary to review all these works here, but some of them should be mentioned as representing the general opinion as it developed from the first to the second half of the twentieth century.

In 1922 H. Rashdall writing a series of articles in *The Modern Churchman* in reply to charges made against him by Bishop Gore produced an extensive discussion on the Christology of Athanasius. This discussion was reissued in 1930 by H.D.A. Major and F.L. Cross in the book *God and Man*, containing a selection of Rashdall's best essays. Rashdall defended unreservedly the 'Apollinarianism' of Athanasius and particularly the thesis that in the Athanasian picture of Christ a human soul and a human mind had absolutely no place. If Athanasius claimed that Christ was the Logos become man, that meant, Rashdall contended, that "the Logos simply acted a part", or that "the Body which the Logos assumed was actually by degrees converted into the Divine substance"! Rashdall's view was written in a journalistic fashion. Its more scientific presentation was provided by C.E. Raven in 1923. Raven found Rashdall's essay "a brief but convincing exposition of the Apollinarianism
of Athanasius and noted that the evidence was overwhelming. He also thought that almost every section in the Orations against the Arians could be quoted as evidence of the above interpretation.

G.L. Prestige, contributing an essay on Athanasius' theology in 1940, took a very different point of view. He found no problem at all with regard to the integrity of the humanity of Christ in Athanasius' thought. In A.D. 362, Athanasius explicitly affirmed that the body of Christ could not have been soulless, or senseless, or mindless. But this confession, Prestige wrote, was not a new element in Athanasius' Christology. Athanasius' argumentation always presupposed that the flesh assumed by the Logos was ensouled and endowed with reason and mind. This was the implication of the attribution of all the psychological and intellectual activities of the Incarnate Logos to the flesh. This could be further supported by the express statement of Athanasius that the term flesh was not to be understood in a restrictive sense but in the general and inclusive sense of man and manhood. The particular instance of Athanasius' discussion of the ignorance of Christ revealed to Prestige "two spheres of consciousness in Christ, what He did not know as man and what He most assuredly knew as God". Athanasius' emphasis was thus placed on the fact of the Incarnation and above all on the unity of the person of Christ, the Logos incarnate. Athanasius, said Prestige, had no intention to curtail the reality of either the Divine of the human activities of Christ. His intention was to attribute both to the Logos, for He was the sole subject active in the Incarnation.
A similar view, but with some interesting modifications (10) was defended in the same year by R. V. Sellers. Sellers discussed the Christology of Athanasius in the general context of the Christological debates of the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. Like the continental historians of dogma, he distinguished between two types of Christological theory, the Alexandrian and the Antiochene, noting at the same time their respective debt to Platonism and Aristotelianism and making those responsible for their main differences. However, unlike the continental tendency of seeing the two rival schools as irreconcilably antithetical, Sellers set out to demonstrate that basically the two sides were committed to the same fundamental Christological principles, but laid the emphasis on different aspects of Christology. The Alexandrians emphasized the unity of the Divine person of Christ, but without denying or confusing Christ's Godhood and manhood, whereas the Antiochenes emphasized the two natures of the Godhood and the manhood without denying the unity of the person of Christ. It was, for Sellers, a sad historical circumstance that these two traditions were unable to be reconciled to each other, in spite of the fact that both shared similar concerns and both ultimately adhered to the same theological principles.

Now as regards the interpretation of Athanasius' Christology in particular, Sellers found the right clue in the relationship between the Incarnation and Salvation. As there are two aspects to the Incarnation, so there are two corresponding aspects to Salvation. The first aspect refers to the Divine person of Christ, which
being Divine also became human. The second aspect refers to the assumption of humanity by the Divine Logos whereby He actually became man. There is no confusion between the Godhood and the manhood of the Logos in Athanasius' Christology, but there is nevertheless one person, that of the Divine Son and Logos of God who also became human without ceasing to be Divine. With regard to Athanasius' conception of the manhood of Christ, Sellers noted that "Athanasius lived at a time when what was meant by the term 'manhood' was still awaiting careful definition." Apollinaris had not yet been condemned. Athanasius' language, although it presented affinities with that of Apollinaris, was used by later orthodox authors who had explicitly condemned Apollinarianism. As for the Christological formula of ANT, Sellers did not think that this could be used as evidence that Athanasius explicitly affirmed the reality of Christ's human rational soul, because he accepted the possibility that this statement could have been of Antiochene provenance(!) rather than an Athanasian production. Nevertheless, he went on to argue that the soteriological argument of EPI, according to which the whole man must be saved in Christ, did in fact indicate that Athanasius regarded Christ as totus homo. Ultimately, the "real test" for Sellers as regards the question whether Athanasius accepted the individual character of the humanity of Christ was to be drawn from his exegesis of the scriptural passages which had direct bearing on the point at issue. These were the passages referring to Christ's agony and trouble and the rest of His human infirmities. The fact that Athanasius applied all these to Christ's manhood implicitly indicated that he actually accepted the individuality of Christ's humanity. But he never drew out the implications of this principle because
he made the Logos the primary force operating in the life of Jesus. Sellers finally concluded by saying that although Athanasius asserted that Christ was *totus homo*, his Christology could not be wholly satisfactory. "He was unable to posit a relationship between the Godhead and the manhood in the one person of Jesus Christ in which the manhood really possessed its own individuating characteristics. But this failing did not belong to Athanasius alone; it was common to all the Greek theologians. It is possible that one may see here a plea for Nestorianism, but Sellers' general outlook concerning the fundamental similarity of the Alexandrian and Antiochene approaches to Christology seems to be the best explanation for his conclusion. Sellers did not seem to have modified his views in 1953 when he touched on the same subject in a more general way by dealing with the Council of Chalcedon.

In 1958 J. N. D. Kelly's manual of *Early Christian Doctrines* gave a general account of Athanasian Christology. By that time the great debates on the soul of Christ in Athanasius involving Richard, Grillmeier, Ortiz de Urbina, Constantinides and Galtier had taken place and the historians of dogma were taking positions on the actual debate. Kelly accepted Baur's theory of the two rival Christological frameworks of Logos–flesh and Logos–man and the application of the former to Athanasius. On the particular question of the existence of a soul in Christ's humanity in Athanasius' thought, Kelly followed slavishly the views of Grillmeier. In his account he reproduced Grillmeier's argument from the alleged modified Stoicism of Athanasius, or the idea of the Logos as the sole hegemonic principle in Christ, or the death of Christ as a separation of the
Logos from the flesh and the descent of the Logos to hell, or the failure of Athanasius to ascribe the ignorance of Christ to His soul, or that ANT,7 may be regarded as evidence that Athanasius accepted the existence of a soul in Christ (without however any theological importance) and that it was also open to an Apollinarian interpretation. Kelly made no reference to any opposition to either Baur's theory of Christological frameworks, or to Grillmeier's denial of the existence of a soul in the Athanasian picture of Christ! But this should not come as a surprise, if one observes that even in the fifth edition of his work (1977) the names of Vöisin, Weigl, Ortiz de Urbina, Constantinides and Galtier are missing even from his bibliography. Kelly's conclusion is in a way inevitable. He states that Athanasius most probably did not modify his Christology in A.D. 362, but remained adherent to the Alexandrian Logos-flesh schema. He has upheld this view to the present day.

A similar position was defended in the continent by J. Liébaert (12) in 1965. Liébaert adopted Richard's view, that in his argumentation against the Arian Christology in CAR3,26ff Athanasius not only did not perceive the fundamental point of the Arian Christology, namely the replacement of the soul of Christ by the Logos, but deliberately avoided to address himself to the question concerning the psychology of the Saviour. For Liébaert that was a pointer to the fact that Athanasius shared the sentiments of the Arians with regard to the soul in Christ.

As regards the Athanasian Christological system in general, Liébaert applied to it the Logos-flesh schematisation following Baur, Hoss, Stülken, Richard and Grillmeier. He claimed that Richard
had demonstrated the insufficiency of Voisin's and Weigl's counter-arguments and that Ortiz de Urbina's and Galtier's viewpoints were not textually verifiable. Liébaert did acknowledge the presence of other expressions than that of flesh in Athanasius' Christological vocabulary, particularly those connected with the term "man", but he subordinated them to the schema of Logos-flesh in the same way as Richard and Grillmeier. Thus the term "the humanity of Christ" did not signify the integrity of Christ's human nature but the result of the combination of the Logos with the flesh. To prove this Liébaert pointed to CAR3,29 which declared Athanasius' Christological perspective. It was by taking flesh that the Logos was said to have become man. The double statements of Scripture concerning Christ really referred to either the Logos as Logos or to the Logos with the flesh. They did not refer to two natures, one Divine and another human. This was in line with Athanasius' exegetical principle which relied on two moments corresponding to two states of the Logos. Athanasius distinguished the Divine and the human aspects of the Saviour in a chronological perspective as two successive conditions. The problem for Athanasius was to show that the Logos in appropriating the second, did not abandon the first condition.

With regard to the problem posed to the Divine immutability of the Logos by His appropriation of the passions of His flesh (or "human passions", as they were also called), Athanasius, Liébaert argued, always returned to the same principles. These passions were always connected with the flesh or the body. They were attributed to the Logos "on account of the flesh", or "as to a man", or "in a human fashion". But this attribution was for Liébaert too simple, and its realism brought back the Arian Christology with the
only difference that Athanasius maintained the immutability of the Logos. The crucial fact here is that in Athanasius' Christ the subject of all the attributions is the Logos. This, Liébaert argued, was consistent with Athanasius' view that the Logos was the only animating principle in the world and especially in the flesh which He assumed (i.e., Grillmeier's allegation of a modified Stoicism in Athanasius).

Liébaert also noted Athanasius' adherence to biblical terminology and particularly to the statement John 1:14. The Logos became flesh was rendered by Athanasius as the Logos became man. But as he clearly explained, this becoming man of the Logos was not to be understood as "His entering into a man" (ἐνθρώπως γέγονεν, ἀλ' οὐχ εἰς ἐνθρώπων ἡλθε, CAR3, 30, or CAR3, 47 and EPI, 2), nor as involving a conversion of the Logos into a man, or flesh, but rather as assuming flesh and entering into it (EPI, 2). Thus, according to Liébaert, Athanasius gave us two Christological formulae, one referring to the new condition of the Logos (i.e., His becoming also a man) and another connected with the element which He assumed in order that this new condition might be constituted (i.e., the flesh, understood in a purely biblical sense). The Logos remained the only subject active in Christ. His flesh or humanity was simply an instrument.

In his conclusion Liébaert asserted that Athanasius constantly opposed the Logos-man schema, and even in 362, when the disciples of Eustathius tried to push forward the Sardican formula, he obliged them to accept a compromise and generally sought to deal with the problem in a political way which ultimately safeguarded the faith of the Symbol of Nicaea. Obviously Liébaert depended on Richard and Grillmeier, but he stated their point of view in a coherent
and systematic way. He did not discuss the opposition to this view. More seriously, however, his account was based on assertions arising from the general perspectives of the history of dogma rather than expositions of Athanasius' statements based on their proper dogmatic and textual "life situations".

The publication in 1968 of Roldanus' book which investigated Athanasius' anthropology in its conjunction with Christology rather endorsed the critical view of Athanasius' Christology as expounded by Liébaert and other like-minded scholars. There is no need to refer to any particular points here. It should be noted however, that Roldanus' contribution seems to have been the recovery of the strictly theocentric perspectives of Athanasius both in anthropology and in Christology. In the last analysis it is this theocentric soteriological perspective of Athanasius which does not allow him to examine the humanity of Christ as such. It could be argued that from the point of view of Roldanus' general thesis the debate concerning the precise character of Christ's humanity and particularly the existence of a human soul are irrelevant or unrealistic as far as Athanasian studies go. This seems to be the position that F.M. Young defended in 1971 when she examined the Alexandrian Christology in a general kind of way.

We must not close this chapter without looking more closely at the latest and perhaps the most interesting essay on Athanasius' Christology produced by C. Kannengiesser in 1973. This essay in some way breathes the fresh air of new insights into the whole topic of Athanasius' Christology. Kannengiesser set out to show that Athanasius made an original contribution and played a creative
role in this field. He distinguished three levels in this contribution: (a) an original concept of man (propounded in GENT and INC); (b) an original manner of interpreting the scriptures (developed in CAR1-3); and (c) an original attempt to organize all Christian doctrine concerning the Incarnation (CAR1-3, etc). On the last level Kannengiesser believed that Athanasius exerted a considerable influence on later theologians, particularly on Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose of Milan and Cyril of Alexandria.

On the basis of an extract from GENT,2 Kannengiesser outlined three fundamental elements in Athanasius' original anthropology and then tried to show how these were introduced into his Christology. These elements comprised the ideal mystical exstatic and contemplative Adam before the fall, the absence of a soul from this ideal Adam, and the location of the image of God in the mind of this Adam rather than in his soul. In other words original man was for Athanasius composed of νοῦς or τῷ και ἐικόνα and a σῶμα. This was a distinctly theological (mystical) anthropology which, when applied to Christology, produced a Christ who was the very ἐικών of God plus a human body. If man is man by becoming like the very Eicon of God, and if he has failed to become such because of the Fall, then the very Eicon of God comes to man assuming Itself the original functions of man's mind and thus restoring man to his original manhood. In Christ then the Eicon of God (the Logos) has become man. The body is His instrument, through which He shows that He is God. Thus when men see Him they encounter the basis of their original image! This means, as Kannengiesser puts it, that "Christ takes the place of that which was the Logos nonincarnate for Adam".
Athanasius' original contribution on the exegetical level is summed up by Kannengiesser in the phrase "dogmatic exegesis". Here the concern of faith, the spiritual life, is combined with the reading of the scriptures in an original way.

Finally on the level of the doctrine of the Incarnation Athanasius' contribution is not to be seen in any constancy of models as in the previous two cases, but in his imaginative response to the questions posed to him which made him change profoundly both his terminology and his approach to the problems connected with the Incarnation. Thus the Incarnation is presented differently in INC, in comparison with CAR1-3 and again differently in the 360ies. But in all these cases Christology remains central to his argument and thought even though the terminology changes considerably. In CAR1 Athanasius is dealing with a theological controversy but his approach is Christocentric. If in CAR1 the Divinity of the Son is defended, this is done from the perspective of the economy of salvation. If in CAR2 the missions of the Son are defended, again this is done with reference to Prov. 8:22 which is applied to the Incarnation. And the same can be said of all the rest of Athanasius' writings.

In his conclusion Kannengiesser raises the general question: who was the Christ of Athanasius? and puts alongside it the particular questions about the soul, the alleged Apollinarism, etc. These questions, he says, will be and must be discussed from the perspective of the original Christology of Athanasius. Above all it must be taken into careful consideration that "Athanasius restored Christology to what it must be in the first place, a source of renewal for the Christian concept of man. It is for this reason that he elaborated
a new idea of man and developed it in his Christology.

Kannengiesser's insights have most certainly a ring of truth to any one who is familiar with Athanasius' writings. But looked at from the particular questions raised by the Athanasian scholars they do not seem to be very helpful. In the first place, the claim that in Christ "the Divine Eicon has assumed the role of the human mind" (the Χριστός υπέρ τοῦ ζωον ) is not only a vague statement, but suggests that the Logos replaced the human mind in Christ. If this is so, and if, as Kannengiesser himself has said, "Athanasius' notions of anthropology do not change", should we not draw the inevitable conclusion that Athanasius was an Apollinarian after all? If this is not so, then what meaning would Kannengiesser give to the claim of ANT, 7 about the body of Christ not being ἀνθρωπον ?

The Christocentricism of Athanasius, which is compared by Kannengiesser to that of Barth, is obvious, but is it justifiable to state it in such an exclusive way without any reference to Athanasius' Trinitarianism? Perhaps with the only exception of INC one could argue on a textual basis that Athanasius' Christocentricism had a definite Trinitarian context. This was by no means true of only SERI-3 or of SYNO. In the very heart of the Contra Arianos we find one of Athanasius' best Trinitarian texts (CAR1, 17b-18) whilst the frequently recurring references to the Father and the Spirit keep cropping up all over the place and the Trinitarian baptismal formula appears on pivotal places in the text. Without a proper appreciation of Athanasius' Triadology where the person of the Son and Logos of God is clearly distinguished from the one ousia of the Godhead, the Incarnation is not understood properly. Although it
is not technically stated in the fashion of later dogmatic theology, Athanasius' Christology entails a distinction between person and nature, who Christ is and what He has. On the personal level He is the Son of God, the second person of the Trinity who also became man. On the natural level, He has Godhood and manhood. The language of the two natures is present everywhere, but it is not as distinctly employed as in later theologies because it is subordinated to the personal aspect of Christology and it is normally couched in simple biblical terminology.

Perhaps the greatest value of Kannengiesser's essay is in his recognition of Athanasius' flexibility concerning terminology and the approach to the problems relating to the Incarnation as well as in his suggestion that one should study the doctrine of Athanasius with an eye on the chronological and the dogmatic circumstances of the Athanasian literary compositions.

We may now try to summarize the result of our general review of the interpretation of Athanasius' Christology in modern scholarship. In spite of differences in the details, it seems that there are two kinds of approaches to Athanasius' Christology. The first one which we may call the critical approach, is represented by Baur, Hoss, Stütken, Richard, Grillmeier, Liébaert and Kelly. In the first place it rests on the theory of two rival Christological frameworks, those of Logos-flesh and Logos-man. Athanasius' doctrine of Christ belongs to the former and entails the assumption of human flesh (or body) by the Divine Logos. Negatively stated this Christology denies the view that the Logos assumed a particular man. Consequently, the Athanasian Christ is fully God, but not fully man. The primary critical question against this theory is connected with
Athanasius' statement that in assuming flesh the Divine Logos became man and acted as man. Does this not suggest a Logos-man framework? Stülden in particular argued for a negative reply to this question by subordinating the statement "The Logos became man" to the statement "The Logos assumed flesh". The basis of his argument was Athanasius' explicit denial of the Logos' entry into a man, or assumption of a man, at His becoming man. For Stülden at the very most Athanasius' Christology entails two conditions for the Logos, the Divine and the human, on account of which He is called God and man, but this in no way leads to the later doctrine of the two natures.

Two criticisms can be advanced here. Firstly we must note that the theory of two rival Christological frameworks seems appropriate for the Apollinarian (monist) and the Nestorian (dualist) types of Christology and leaves no room for a middle position like that which was reached at Chalcedon (unity in duality). Orthodox Christology emphasized the unity of the person of Christ and the duality of His Godhood and manhood. This doctrine was at first expressed in a variety of ways and no technical formula had been agreed. The biblical terms flesh and man were usually adopted as well as the language of physis which appeared both in the singular and the plural. It was after the formula of union signed between Cyril of Alexandria and John of Antioch, and especially at the Council of Chalcedon, that a more rigid and technical formula was established. Athanasius' language exhibits the flexible variety which applied to the Christologies of the fourth century. But his doctrine, as it was understood by the Cappadocians, Cyril and Chalcedon, did not belong either to the Apollinarian or to the Nestorian type.
Athanasius stressed the unity of the person of Christ and the duality of the Godhood and the manhood. The unity of the person was ascertained by the statement that the Logos Himself (i.e., personally) became a man, whereas the duality of the Godhood and the manhood was ascertained by the statement that the Logos assumed the form of the servant (or flesh, or body, or humanity, or human nature) without ceasing to be in the form of God (i.e., to be homoousios with the Father). Athanasius never used the verb "to become" with reference to the Godhood, nor the verb "to assume" (or "to take") with reference to the person of Christ. Therefore Stücken and his followers were wrong in believing that "to become man" was for Athanasius identical with "to assume flesh". As I have argued elsewhere, the verbs "to become" and "to assume" applied to the doctrine of the Incarnation by Saint Athanasius denote two different aspects of Christology, which should never be confused. These are the personal (subjective) and the natural (objective) aspects, which clearly give Athanasius' Christology a middle position between the Apollinarian and the Antiochene types and commend it as an anticipation of the Christology of Chalcedon.

The second approach to Athanasius' Christology which we may call the traditional, and which is represented by Voisin and Weigl, does ascribe a middle position to Athanasius' Christology as compared with the rival Christologies of Apollinaris and his Antiochene opponents Diodore and Theodore. But even this view fails to specify the two aspects of Athanasius' doctrine of Christ, the personal and the natural, which really find their roots in Athanasius' Triadology. Weigl comes very close to these two aspects when he differentiates between the Apollinarian habit of approaching Christology ὄντως ὁμοουςίως
and φυσικῶς and the Antiochene habit of approaching the same doctrine χριστιανῶς. But he never states explicitly that Athanasius' approach could be qualified by the adverb ἀρχαῖος. The particular merit of this traditional approach is the recognition that the key to Athanasius' Christology and generally to the Christology of the patristic era is not to be found in the terminology but in the conception of Christ as the Saviour.

In the light of the above investigation we may conclude that from the point of view of theology the genuine or dubious Athanasian character of the two APO can be either defended or rejected according to the position one takes in the interpretation of Athanasius' Christology. If one agrees with Voisin and Weigl the defence of the Athanasian paternity is quite feasible. If however one holds the modern critical view, the rejection of the Athanasian authorship is inevitable. This means that in our present study we cannot rest assured on either of them, without testing their conclusions against the evidence supplied by the original Athanasian materials.
VII.2 Athanasius' Christology restated

The contradictory interpretations of Athanasius' Christology in modern scholarship demand a fresh examination of the relevant Athanasian texts especially from the point of view of their particular doctrinal concerns and terminology. Athanasius' particular doctrinal concerns are in fact inextricably interconnected with the specific historical circumstances of his life. By and large he wrote and taught whenever he had to meet particular political, ecclesiastical and theological challenges. The combination of particular doctrinal concerns and historical circumstances suggest three main periods in Athanasius' literary activity and theological development. We may call them in turn (1) the catechetical-apologetic, (2) the theological-Trinitarian and (3) the Christological- Incarnational periods.

Material for Christology is found in all these stages, but it is coloured by the particular concerns which apply to each of them.

The first stage comprises a catechetical-apologetic Christology which is designed to enhance the Church's faith in Christ. It is developed in a Judaeo-Hellenic religious philosophical context and is therefore of a dialogical nature. The work which expounds it is the twin volume GENT and INC written before Athanasius' accession to the Patriarchal throne of Alexandria. In this stage Christology is developed on the basis of a Logos doctrine which is expounded in three contexts, those of Creation, the Fall and Redemption. The Logos of God is presented as the key to cosmology and anthropology. He is the Creator of the world and of man, who cares for both through His providence. The Logos' care for man acquires a special nuance through man's creation in the image of the Logos. Athanasius teaches that the assimilation of man to the Logos is the key to man's
destiny and therefore the hermeneutical principle of his Fall and
the real principle of his restoration and salvation. Thus he
argues that the Creator Logos is the only Saviour of man who can
rectify the disastrous consequences of the Fall, since the Fall
represents man's falling and moving away from the Logos' grace.
The method by means of which the Creator Logos becomes the Saviour
of man is summed up in the word Inhomination. The Inhomination of
the Logos is seen as a new relationship between the Creator Logos
and man, which has definite soteriological aims and implications.
Two aspects of this relationship are particularly emphasized and
explored, both of which represent different aspects of the Inhominat-
ion. They refer (a) to man's creaturely reconstitution by the abolit-
don of death and the establishment of the grace of the resurrection,
and (b) to man's theological reconstitution through the abolition
of his ignorance of God and the renewal of the grace of the image
of the Logos in him. This twofold aspect of man's salvation is
achieved through the Inhominated Logos and particularly through
His Life, Teaching, Death and Resurrection. By His Life and His teach-
ing He leads men to the Father. By His death He offers creaturehood
back to God its Creator and establishes the perfect sacrifice. By
His Resurrection He reconstitutes the human body and the entire
human creaturehood and is enthroned as the eschatological King
who saves men and introduces them into His eschatological Kingdom.
The Christology of this stage is thoroughly Logocentric and soterio-
logical and as such it bears witness to the three dimensions of
the work of Christ, the prophetic, the priestly and the royal.

In the second stage which begins with Athanasius' accession to
the venerable Patriarchal throne of Alexandria his Christology is
antirrhetical or antiheretical and is designed to defend the Church's faith in the Divine Sonship of Christ and its theological corollary, the Trinitarian understanding of God. It is developed as a counter-attack on the rising tide of Arianism and therefore it either refutes Arian theological propositions, individual or synodal, or defends the faith of Nicea against the Arian objections. This Christology, the pivot of which is the doctrine of the Eternal and Homousios Son of God, comprises the great bulk of Athanasius' literary output and includes the particular works DION, CARL-3, DECR, SERL-4 and SYMO.

It seems that the basic contention in this stage refers to God's relation with the world. The Arians argue that the Logos who mediates this relation could not be fully God, because He became man and as such received God's grace. In other words, the uncreated (God) is utterly transcendent and cannot be involved in a real relationship with the world. He is radically other than creation (ἀγέννητος) and as such cannot become Inhominated. Therefore the Inhominated Logos, in spite of His preexistence and highest status in comparison with creation, ultimately is but a creaturely being. Athanasius argues against this view on the one hand by differentiating between Divine generation and creation, and on the other hand by defending the personal involvement of the Logos (Son) in the Inhomination, as opposed to an essential involvement which would implicate His Godhead. Another way of stating this last point is by distinguishing the being of the Logos from His economy, His οὐσία from his ἐνορχός παρουσία. So through his doctrine of the Inhominated Son and Logos of God Athanasius defends God's presence and active involvement of God in the world and especially in the history of man without
that involvement having any detrimental effect on the Divine immutability and transcendence. In doing this Athanasius also defends his earlier doctrine of Creation and Providence and a corresponding doctrine of Redemption.

The third stage begins with the significant Synod of Alexandria in A.D. 362, which marks an important turning point in the decline of Arianism and the beginnings of the fourth and fifth century Christological incarnational debates. As in the previous stage so in this one Athanasius' Christology is antirhetical and develops in dialogue with two rival Christologies, one fusing the Godhood and the manhood of Christ into a natural synthesis of a human kind, and another distinguishing the Godhood from the manhood in a way that the uniqueness of Christ's person is lost. This stage comprises the shorter and later works of Athanasius, ANT, EPI ADEL and MAX. It is to the Christology of this stage that the Christology of the two APO approximates. The particular concern in the Christology of this stage is the humanity of Christ. Here again the primary issues between Athanasius and his opponents are connected with the relation of God to the world and particularly God's relation to man in Redemption. The manhood of Christ in particular requires clarification, whilst the Godhead is presupposed. How far could one go with the statement Christ is a true man, or Christ became a true man? Could He really be God and man at the same time? How should this duality be understood without embarrassing the unity of Christ's person? Athanasius leads his thought between two opposite doctrines, one which sees Christ's humanity merely as an external instrument which lacks perfection, and another which stresses the Godhood and the manhood in equal terms and surrenders the oneness of Christ to
the duality. Athanasius defends the oneness of Christ by making the Logos (Son) the only subject active in the Incarnation and the duality of Christ by attributing both Godhood and manhood to the Logos. Christ is one, the Logos and Son of God who is homousios with the Father, and who at the same time has become man for us and for our salvation. Christ's human creaturehood which is assumed from the Virgin Mary when the Logos becomes man is identical with human adamic creaturehood and therefore lacks nothing at all from man's original constitution. Athanasius sees a soteriological necessity behind that. The Logos saves the whole man because He took up all that is man's. Although these are briefly the positions of Athanasius' Christology, his basic statement which runs consistently throughout all his writings is that Christ is the Logos and Son of God who without ceasing to be who He is has also become man by assuming the entire human creaturehood to Himself in order to save man and restore him to his creation.

This doctrine will be further clarified by a brief but comprehensive review of the main Athanasian works taken in chronological order. Each review will contain a comprehensive statement on the Christological doctrine of a given treatise and concentrate especially on the Christological terminology phraseology and statements which relate to the Incarnation. We shall begin with GENT.

(i) GENT,1 reveals the subject-matter of the entire treatise and indicates its central concerns. Generally speaking the subject-matter is the knowledge of the worship of God and the truth of all things (ἡ περὶ θεοσεβείας καὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀληθείας γνώσεως), i.e. the doctrine of God and the truth of the world. This doctrine is self-evident from the events which take place daily. But it is especially
revealed in the doctrine of Christ which is contained in the scriptures and the interpretations of the Christian teachers. Yet the pagans not only fail to perceive this, but argue that the doctrine of Christ is base and irrational and moreover revile and scoff at it, particularly on account of the Cross. There is a great need then for a Christian reply to these scoffings and accusations, which would demonstrate the Godhood of Christ, the fact that He is the Saviour of all, and that the Cross is no harm to Him but has taken place for the healing of Creation. The Cross has led to the abolition of idolatry, the exorcism of the fancy of the demons, the establishment of the worship of Christ and the knowledge of the Father through Him. These events, says Athanasius, clearly show that He who went up to the Cross is the Logos of God and the Saviour of all. This last sentence clearly indicates that the concern of the treatise is to show that the Christian faith far from being base and irrational is in fact connected with the very Reason (Logos) of God, who like a sun has spread the light of His knowledge to the entire ecumene and has thus demonstrated that He is God and God's Reason (Logos).

Having thus described the subject matter (theology and cosmology) and concern of the treatise (Christ as the Logos of God and Saviour of the world), Athanasius briefly states its two-fold structure. The first part will deal with the ignorance of the unbelievers (ἡ τῶν ἀπλοτων ἀμαθεία), or the lies (τα ψεύδη), whilst the second part will show by contrast the knowledge and faith of Christ which is more invaluable than all else, namely the truth (την ἀληθείαν). In GENT, 29, the epilogue of the first part, and in GENT, 30, the introduction of the second part of the treatise, Athanasius repeats the headings of these two parts and also informs us that the second
part is further subdivided into two sections. The first part is called "the Error" (ἡ πλάνη) in contrast to the second part which is called "the way of the truth" (ἡ θεωρεῖα ὁδός). "The Error" is the pagan religion (εἰς ὁλοκλήρωσιν) which is full of atheism and was introduced for the loss of man's life. "The way of the truth" is "the Leader and Creator of all, the Logos of the Father, through whom the Father is known, or the knowledge of the true God is revealed. There are in fact two ways to the truth of the Logos, one through man himself and another through the world.

On the basis of the above information the contents of the treatise can be outlined as follows:

ch. 1 INTRODUCTION: The Subject-matter and central Concern of the treatise

chs. 2-29 PART ONE: THE ERROR OF PAGANISM

chs. 2-7a (a) The presuppositions of the error:
ch. 2 man's creation
ch. 3 man's fall
ch. 4 good and evil
ch. 5 sin
ch. 6f heretical views on evil
chs. 7-26 (b) The content of the error: idolatry
chs. 7,8 the invention of idolatry
chs. 9-11 the progress of idolatry
chs. 11-26 exposure of the deceit of the idols
chs. 27-29 (c) The logic of the error: Stoic pantheism

chs. 30-46 PART TWO: THE WAY OF THE TRUTH

chs. 30-34 (a) man as the way to God: the way inside
ch. 30 the rational and mindful soul
ch. 31 the mind
chs. 32,33 soul and body
ch. 34 purification and contemplation
chs. 35-39 (b) the world as the way to God: the way outside
ch. 35 anagogy from the phenomena to the works
chs. 36-38 the works
ch. 37 the argument from the world's design (negatively stated)
ch. 38 "" "" "" "" "" "" "" (positively "")
ch. 39 one creation, one Creator
chs. 40-46 (c) God's way to God: the Creator Logos
chs. 40,41 the Creator Logos of God as distinct from the Stoic logos and the human logos
ch. 42 the work of the Creator Logos through His powers
ch. 43 examples illustrating His work
ch. 44 the gesture and powers of the Creator Logos
ch. 45a the knowledge of the Logos leads to the knowledge of the Father
ch. 45b the Logos of God and the Jews (condemnation of idolatry)
chs. 46,47a the witness of the Jewish scriptures to the doctrine of Creation and Providence by the Logos
ch. 47b EPILOGUE: The faith in God and the faith in His Logos who is also God and Saviour of all, our Lord Jesus Christ.

The above outline clearly indicates that GENT is a treatise on the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Logos of God. There are two cardinal aspects of this doctrine: the transcendence and immanence of the Logos in His relation to the world and in the contexts of Creation and Providence, which respectively refer to His being in God and His powers or acts in man and the world. Its contents can be summed up in the statement: the Logos of God is the key to the doctrines of man, the world and God. Man is not man apart from the Logos, because he has been made in His image and likeness. Man's fall is primarily his fall from the Logos. Evil is the result of man's fall from the Logos upon his creaturely being. Idolatry is the result of fallen man's relation to the world. The world is no longer a theater of the works of the transcendent Logos, but becomes 'divine' in itself. Its creaturely rationality is confused with the powers of the Logos and as a result it is deified. Cosmological theism deteriorates into cosmological pantheism. God the transcendent Creator is confused with His Creation and thus the error of man finds its ultimate rational expression in Stoicism. The error in the three levels of anthropology, cosmology and theology is owed to man's rejection of and fall from the grace of the Creator Logos. This means that the
Logos of God is the only way of the truth. He is able to illuminate the heart of man, to grant him the right understanding of the world, and ultimately lead him to the knowledge of God the Father. The title Logos predominates in the Christology of GENT. There are 71 occurrences of this term in the text and we could also add another 48 implicit references. The other titles which are synonymous with it are as follows: Christ (22), God (14), Saviour (13), Lord (7), Son (2), Jesus (6), Wisdom (8), Eicon (8), self-Logos (2), self-Power (1), self-Light (1), self-Truth (1), self-Righteousness (1), self-Virtue (1), Character (1), Effulgence (1), Interpreter (1), Angel (1), Fruit (1), self-Sanctification (1), self-Life (1), Door (1), Shepherd (1), Way (1), King (1), Hegemon (1), Creator (1), Life-giver (1), Light (1), Providence (1), Leader (1), Archon (1), Constitution (1). An examination of these titles in their specific places in the text of GENT shows that the Logos is not only numerically but also logically preeminent. It is the title which refers to the personal identity of Christ. This becomes apparent in a number of pivotal statements in which Jesus Christ is explicitly identified with the Logos of God, or in statements where God is designated invariably as the Father of Christ or the Father of the Logos (e.g. GENT, 2 τοῦ ἱδίου λόγου, τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, or GENT, 23 τοῦ τοῦ πατρὸς λόγου τῶν κάντων σωτῆρα Χριστοῦ, or GENT, 40 τῆς ἱδίας χαρᾶς καὶ τῆς ἱδίας λόγῳ τῷ Κυρίῳ ἡμῶν καὶ σωτῆρι Χριστῷ, etc.). This identification of Christ with the Logos of God by Athanasius means that from the early ecclesiastical point of view in Christology one is primarily concerned with the Godhood of Christ, the fact that He is God, and God’s Logos. Christology then is not to be settled merely on the level of the manhood of Christ and its historical manifestation, but on the theologic-
al level. The question about Christ is a question about a Divine
person. This theological approach releases Christology from the
narrow confines of "the historical Jesus" and makes it the criterion
of history. Christ is not historical as if history is logically
prior to His existence (His Person, work, etc.). Rather, history is
Christological, in that Christ's existence is its existential criter-
ion. He is such because of who He ultimately is and what He has
done. He is the Creator of all who has also become the Saviour,
the Creator and Ruler of the Universe. The Logos doctrine opens
up this critical primacy of Christ over the world, man and history.
Its foundation is theological and its perspective soteriological,
not in an abstract but in an economic functional and historical sense

GENT identifies Christ, the crucified Saviour, with the Logos
of God the Creator and expounds the content of this statement in
the context of Creation, the Fall and Providence. INC follows the
reverse procedure. It identifies the Logos of GENT with Christ the
Saviour, crucified and risen, and explains this in the context of
Redemption and Salvation.

(ii) INC, l begins with an echo of the twofold structure of
GENT. It mentions the Error of the nations (idolatry and superstition)
and the Godhood of the Logos of the Father as well as the Logos'
creating and ruling power in the world. What now remains to be said,
says Athanasius, is the Logos' Inhomination ( ἐνανθρώπωσις ) and
His Divine manifestation to men ( ἢ θεοίς αὐτοῦ πρός ἡμᾶς ἐπιφάνεια ).
The central concern remains apologetic. As he states it, Athanasius
wants to provide a reply to the accusations of the Jews and the
scoffings of the Greeks, which are directed against Christ, the
object of Christian worship. The heart of this reply is still
the Godhood of the Logos (ἡ θεότης τοῦ λόγου) which is now going to be defended in the context of His becoming man because the Jews reject it as impossible, and also in the context of the Crucifixion because the Greeks revile it as base. Athanasius points out that the contents of GENT must be kept in mind if one is to understand the cause of the manifestation of such a paternal Logos in a human body. The point is that He has not put on a body according to the sequence of nature, but rather, being Himself bodyless in His own nature, and existing as Logos, yet on account of His Father's goodness and love for mankind, He appeared in a human body for our salvation.

That the primary object of INC is still the demonstration of the Godhood of Christ is again explicitly asserted by Athanasius himself in the closing chapters of the treatise. In INC, 56 he says that INC was written to provide an elementary teaching and exposition of the character of the faith in Christ and of His Divine manifestation to us. Here he also adds that INC was based on the God-inspired scriptures and on the teaching of Christian theologians who took the scriptures as their authorities because they witnessed to Christ's Godhood (μάρτυρες τῆς θεότητος τοῦ λόγου).

The particular subject-matter of INC is however the Inhominatio of the Logos or His Divine manifestation through a human body. The Logos is still the dominant Christological title. It occurs 147 times. The other Christological titles are as follows: Christ(87), Saviour(61), Lord(46), Life(26), Son(22), God(20), Jesus (10), Creator(6), King(5), Despot (6), Eicon(10), Power(9), Wisdom(6), Hegemon(5), Self-Life(2) Saint of Saints (2), etc.

The contents of INC can be outlined as follows:
The above structure clearly shows that the Logos of God remains the primary and decisive notion in Athanasius' Christology and that this is affirmed for apologetic purposes in view of Jewish and pagan objections. As we have already seen, even statistically the term Logos exhibits the highest frequency of occurrence in the text than any other Christological title. In INC however Athanasius speaks of the Logos in a new context of Salvation. The terms which he uses to denote this new context are as follows:
We could classify these terms into three groups, (a) those which link the Logos with man, (b) those which link the Logos with the body, and (c) those which simply refer to a function of the Logos. Thus we have:

(a) ἐνανθρώπησις

 että έν-ἀνθρώπω σωτηρίους ἐπιφάνεια
to έν-ἀνθρώπω εἶναι τὸν λόγον

η φιλανθρωπία

(b) ἐνσωμάτωσις

η ἐν σώματι διαγωγή καὶ περιπολήσις

η ἐν σώματι φανέρωσις

η ἐν σώματι σωτηρίους ἐπιφάνεια

η σωματικῆ ἐπιφάνεια

(c) ἐπιφάνεια

η παρουσία

η ἐπιστημή

η κάθοδος
Do these terms represent distinctive nuances of meaning? Do they refer to different aspects of the same event? or do they all refer to one basic event and therefore should be treated as strictly synonymous? To find the answers to these questions we need to look into the verbal expressions which are connected with them and the actual statements which the author advances in his treatise.

In the Introduction of INC we find the three terms characteristic of its Christology: The Logos in man (Inhominated), the Logos' manifestation to men, and the Logos' manifestation in a body. Only the last term is given further clarifications by means of two statements. The Logos put on a body not by condition (or reason) of His own nature (οὐ φύσεως ἄξολον ἐκα). In other words the body of Christ is not Divine but human. In His own nature the Logos is incorporeal (i.e. Divine); yet, on account of the salvation of men He appeared in a human (creaturely) body. The principle which governs Athanasius' thought here as well as in the rest of the treatise amounts to the identification of the Creator with the Saviour. If the Creator is the Logos of God, then the same Logos must be also the Saviour. This in turn means that Christ the Saviour cannot be anybody else but the Creator and Saviour Logos (ὁ ἂν ἁμφοτέρωσιν ἐπεμεικνύμενον δ' Πατήρ, ἐν αὐτῶ καὶ τὴν ἁμφοτέρωσιν σωτηρίαν εἰργάσατο, INC,1).

In the first part of INC the Logos' relation to creation in general and to man in particular is outlined. Over against the Epicurean, the Platonic and the Gnostic views of Creation it is stated that the world was created out of nothing by God the Father through His own Logos, who is none other than our Saviour Jesus Christ. With regard to men God granted them a particular mercy. Seeing that they
unable to remain in existence on account of the reason (logos) inherent in their own generation, He granted them something more (πάσον τι). He did not simply create them (ἐκτισε) as He did with the irrational animals, but fashioned them (ἐξοικονόμα) according to His own Logos, and gave them His power so that becoming like Him (λογικό) they might remain in blessedness and life. There is then in the context of creation a special relationship between God's Logos and mankind which is tied up with the notion of creation according to the Image of the Logos. In other words man cannot be understood simply on the level of Creation as a limited and contingent being who is totally other than God, but he should also be understood theologically, i.e., as a being related to God in a special way through the Divine Logos. This last point is said to be crucial for the understanding of the Inhomination of the Logos (INC 4), because the Saviour's manifestation to men is fundamentally related to their creation in Him and fall from Him. His descent (χέθοος) took place on account of men and their salvation. It was necessary that He should reach them and appear among them, if their salvation was to be achieved, because only the Creator could restore them from their inprisonment in natural corruption (ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν φθορὰν ἐχρυσαύητο, INC 7) and only the very Image of the Father could rekindle the grace of the Image which they had lost (τῇ τοῦ κατ' εἰκόνα χάριν ἀφαιρεθέντες ἠσών, ibid).

In the second part of INC where the solution to the fall is discussed, we encounter further Christological clarifications. The intervention of the Logos as the obvious solution, is again stressed. But here it is explained that the Logos' saving task is particularly related to the two aspects of man's fall. He has got to abolish man's
death and corruption and also restore His special eiconic grace to man. In expounding the method of this achievement of the Logos Athanasius gives us clear insights into his understanding of the event of the Logos' Incarnation. With regard to the first aspect of salvation Athanasius says that the incorporeal, incorruptible and immaterial Logos of God arrives at our own territory (παραγίνεται εἰς τὴν ἁμαρτείαν χώραν), which is (by implication) corporeal, corruptible and material, and manifests Himself in it. Thus in condescending to our corruption He takes up a body to Himself which was not different from our own (λαμβάνει ἱδρύμα σώμα καὶ τοῦτο σῶμα ἀλλότριον τοῦ ἁμαρτείαν). He took up the same body as ours because He wanted to offer it to death instead of all. Thus the dominical body (τὸ κυρίαρχον σῶμα) is like (ὁμοιοῦ) that of other men and thus the law of corruption which is destroyed in it has no longer any place against the ὅμοιοι ἀνθρώποι. What Athanasius is saying here is that if corruption and death are connected with the human body and this is the first requirement of salvation, the Logos took up such a body (τὸ ὑπόθεσαν ἱδρύμα ἱδρύμα λαμβάνει σῶμα) in order to use it as an instrument and substitute for working out the abolition of death and the establishment of the resurrection. As we have already shown in an earlier chapter, Athanasius' concern here is not the physiology of death but the problem of the event of death. If human death is simply stated as the death and corruption of the body, then the solution to it can only entail the death of the Logos' own body as a substitutionary offering for all. It seems that the notion of the body is here understood holistically as referring to human creaturehood. The term soul is certainly included in it because it is explicitly said that the body is offered as ἀντὶψυχον πάντων. This suggests
that it was ἐμψυχων and thus ἐν τῶν ὁμολῶν οῶμα, which the Logos assumed διὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν ὁμολῶν σωμάτων θυσίαν. Obviously the term body is employed here to safeguard the fact that the death of Christ was a human death. But the crucial point in this doctrine is the fact that this death is not the death of a particular man but of the Logos as man. Otherwise the substitutionary efficacy of this death with regard to all men would have been impossible. Thus in INC,10 Athanasius says that μὴ ἄλλον δεῖν ἢ αὐτῶν τόν Δόγον ἐνανθρωπήσατι... and further on he adds: "because death reigned from men to men its abolition came only through the Inhomination (διὰ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως) of God the Logos; for as the Apostle says, as death came through a man(Adam), likewise the resurrection came through a man (Christ)." In this sense the abolition of death is seen by Athanasius as the first cause of the Inhomination of the Logos.

It is obvious that Athanasius operates here with a simple anthropological model (i.e. person and body), which he also applies to Christology. There is absolutely no suggestion that Christ’s death is physiologically different from that of other men. Hence his humanity could not be any different from that of others. It is only his person which is different, because it is identical with that of the preexistent Logos of God, but even this has in a mysterious way become human without ceasing to be Divine. In view of this it would be unfair to try and impose on this simple model other models which exclude or include the notion of the soul.

The second cause of salvation is for Athanasius the restoration of man’s knowledge of God or of the eiconic grace of the Logos in man. Athanasius explains this aspect of man’s problem in relational terms, and stresses the fact that men became ἀλογωθέντες i.e. lost
the knowledge of and communion with the Logos and came to be under the control of demons. He also argues that no man and no angel could restore the grace of the Image, because none of them is the very Image (ἡ Εἰκὼν) but all are 'after the Image' (κατ' ἑλκόνα). In the Inhomination then, we have the Very Image of God arriving in our territory in order to recreate the man who was made in His Image, (ὢς ἑλκὼν ἐν τῷ Πατρός τὸν κατ' ἑλκόνα ἄνθρωπον ἀνακαίνισαι αὐνηθὲν). There are two other sentences which refer to this arrival of the very Image among men for the purpose of salvation. The first one is the statement:παρετέντευ ἐπὶ τοῦς ὑμετέρους τόπους ἵνα τὸν κατ’ αὐτὸν παροιμίαν ἄνθρωπον ἀνακαίνιση. The second one refers to τὴν ἀναγεννησίαν καὶ ἀνακτιζομένην ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ κατ’ ἑλκόνα. The crucial question here is whether the phrases τὸν κατ’ ἑλκόνα ἄνθρωπον, or τὸν κατ’ αὐτὸν παροιμίαν ἄνθρωπον, or τὴν ἀναγεννησίαν καὶ ἀνακτιζομένην ψυχὴν have an intrinsic as well as an extrinsic Christological reference; in other words we want to know whether the arrival of the Eicon Itself to our human territory restores the grace of the κατ’ ἑλκόνα intrinsically in Christ Himself as man and also extrinsically in us. The logic of Athanasius' soteriology as we saw it in his discussion of the abolition of death by Christ demands that this should be the case. And this in turn implies that Christ restored the grace of the Image in Himself i.e. in His own soul. But then, if this is the case, why does he not say explicitly that the Logos' Inhomination entails the assumption of a human soul — especially in view of the explicit statement of the assumption of a body in this occasion? There are three possible answers to this question. Firstly, there is the possibility that Athanasius did not envisage the assumption of a human soul by the Logos and therefore no intrinsic Christ-
ological reference to the restoration of the grace of the Image of God in man should be seen in his statements. Secondly, there is the possibility that Athanasius accepts a human soul in Christ but hesitates to speak of its assumption because the soul is also used \( \text{kata synecdochen} \) to denote a particular human person. The same consideration also applies to the term \( \text{man} \), which can be used both generally in the sense of human nature and particularly in the sense of a particular human person. Thirdly, there is the possibility that Athanasius understood the term body as including the soul in it and therefore he felt no particular need to stress the assumption of a soul by the Logos. Indeed, if soul must be subsumed under the term body then it would be rather misleading to speak of yet another assumption of a soul after the assumption of the body. This might well lead to the position of Origen which Athanasius disapproved. The first possibility seems to run against the whole drift of Athanasius' thinking. Its only justification would be an argument \( \text{e silentio} \) which however would be controverted by the explicit reference to Christ's body as \( \text{ἀνθρώπου} \) and generally by Athanasius' understanding of a human body as including a soul. The second and third possibilities are quite plausible and could be combined. But the second part of INC does not help us to decide what precisely the case was in Athanasius' mind. One thing is clear that the Inhomination involves the restoration of the grace of the Image of God in man. There is no doubt that this restoration has an extrinsic reference and applies to all men. Though it is not stated explicitly it is quite probable that this restoration also refers to Christ's own humanity.
In the third part of INC (chs.17-32) the doctrine of the Inhomin- 
ation is further clarified. INC,17 stresses the point that the Logos' 
presence in the body was not restricted by it (οὐ περὶκακλαμένος ἦν 
ἐν τῷ σώματι ). He was in the body and He was also everywhere in 
the world, and at the same time He was outside everything. He was 
outside everything and totally inside the Father with respect to His 
Divine being (κατ' οὐσίαν ); but He was inside the world and the body 
with respect to His powers (τοῖς δεινοῖς δυναμέσι). This clarificat-
ion is of crucial importance because it implies that the union of 
the Logos with the body was not οὐκ ὅποι or φυσική (as in the case 
of the Apollinarians), but personal and dynamic. Therefore the vivi-
fication of the body and of the creation in general by the Logos is 
not conceived by Athanasius as a ‘natural notion’, but as a‘supernat-
ural’ and ’creative ’ one. In defending this particular perspective 
Athanasius makes an interesting contrast between the Logos and the 
human soul, which helps us work out how he uses his terms. 

The Logos' relation to the body, he says, is not the same with 
the soul’s relation to the body. Then, in explaining how the soul 
is actually related to the body and especially how she acts through 
it, he switches the term soul for the term man2. This suggests that 
soul and man are synonymous terms and therefore the earlier contrast 
between the Logos and the soul could be restated as a contrast 
between the Logos and man. But then Athanasius goes on to produce 
yet another contrast which employs the term man quite differently. 
He says that the Logos is not in the man2, as a man is in the body 
(οὐ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἦν ὃ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος ἦν τῷ άνθρώπῳ). Two possibilit-
ies emerge here with regard to this last contrast. If this contrast 
is parallel with the initial one, then man and body must be taken
as synonymous. This would confirm our earlier observation that the term body is here used holistically and not in a restricted sense. If however we take the last contrast as synonymous with the second, then we would have the contrast \( \frac{\text{Logos}}{\text{man}} \neq \frac{\text{man}}{\text{body}} \) and since man = soul then \( \frac{\text{Logos}}{\text{soul}} = \frac{\text{soul}}{\text{body}} \). Whatever the case may be, this text excludes the possibility of the replacement of the soul by the Logos in Christ; on the contrary the suggestion is that the model Logos–body is not a strict one, nor is it rival to other models such as Logos–man or even Logos–soul. Athanasius sums up his doctrine of the Logos in the condition of the Inhomination thus:

- He was not bound up by the body.
- He rather upheld the body in a way that.
- He was in it while at the same time.
- He was in all things and.
- He was outside all things, and.
- He was at rest in the Father!

In short: He lived as man; He enlivened all things as Logos; and He was united with the Father as Son. Here we have Athanasius' Christological perspective, which affirms one Divine person in three contexts, in man, in the world and in God. As such Christ is the key to anthropology, cosmology and theology. Athanasius is so keen to defend the primacy of the Divine person of the Logos even in the context of man and the world that He is careful to point out that He did not suffer when the Virgin gave birth; He was not contaminated by being in the body, but rather sanctified it (obviously a Greek concern); and again He did not partake of anything by being in all things, but rather all things received from Him Life and sustenance. Such statements clearly are intended to defend the transcendent God-
hood of the Logos in the context of His personal and active involvement in the world and in man. It is because of this intention that Athanasius differentiates between the creaturely functions of the body which are applied to the Logos by virtue of His becoming man in truth, and the works (τὰ ἔργα) of the Logos through the body which demonstrated that He was Son of God. The former indicated that He was present bodily (σωματικῶς παρών) and the latter that He was still Divine.

Having clearly differentiated between the Divine Godhood of the Logos and His active presence in the world and in the body which He assumed at His Inhomination Athanasius turns to a discussion of the death and resurrection of Christ. His point is not to explain the 'mechanics' of these events, but to establish on the one hand that both of them really and truly took place and on the other hand that they were undertaken for all and therefore were imbued with universal consequences. The whole teaching can be summed up in the following statement: οὗ τὸν ἐαυτὸν ἑδυνατόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν ἐνεργῶν ἔλεε τελειωματικὸν θυσία (INC, 22). The language of the 'body' predominates in this section, because human death is primarily understood in bodily terms, but the Divine Person of the Logos remains the key to the entire doctrine. If Christ was not a Divine Person, neither death would have been destroyed, nor the death of His body would have had universal implications.

In the final part of INC (chs. 33-55), where Athanasius replies to the objections of Jews and Greeks, the Logos-man language re-emerges and Athanasius' Christology is further clarified. This section is particularly interesting and important because its Christological language seems to run against the modern theory of Christological
frameworks. The terminology connected with the Inhimation of the Logos and particularly His humanity is quite flexible. Although the term body does appear frequently, particularly where there is reference to Christ's death and resurrection, the term man is equally frequently employed in a manner which indicates that Athanasius' youthful productions are more interesting for their conceptions than for their precise formulae.

Athanasius firstly argues against the Jews. His main point seems to revolve around the double claim that according to the O.T. prophecies the Saviour is predicted to be a man as well as the Lord of all (ἐντὸν σῶν ἀνέρωπος φανήσεται... ἐν Κύριος τῶν πάντων ἐστι ὁ ἔρχομενος). Isaiah 53:3ff calls Him a man who suffers (ἀνέρωπος ἐν πληγῇ ὄν... etc), but Isaiah 53:8-10 speaks of His unknown generation and indicates that He is not a common man in spite of His suffering (μὴ τις αὐτῶν κοινῶν ἀνέρωπον ἐκ τοῦ πάθους ὑπολαβή), but He has a different nature from us (τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀνόμοιον τῆς φύσεως).

Thus Athanasius proceeds to show that in the Jewish scriptures the Saviour who is said that He is to suffer for all is not simply a "man" but "the Life of all" (Deuter. 28:66), even though He has the same nature as men (ὁ συμανισμένος ἐκ τῶν γραφῶν ὑπὲρ πάντων πάσχειν ὀχθ ἀπλῶς ἀνέρωπος, ἀλλὰ ΖΩΗ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ λέγεται κἀν ὃμοιος κατὰ τὴν φύσιν τοῖς ἀνέρωποις ἐτύγχανε). He is clearly distinguished from the saints of Israel not only by being called the Life of all, but also by having an unknown generation. There is nobody else in the Scriptures, says Athanasius, except the common Saviour of all, God the Logos, our Lord Jesus Christ, who proceeded from a Virgin and appeared on earth as man and has no genealogy with regard to the flesh. He is the one who came down from heaven and took up a body not from a man but from a Virgin and delivered it as ἀντιψυχοντο
death for the salvation of all. Prophecy, then, clearly points to the advent of God (ἡ προφητεία θεόν ἐπιλαμβάνειν σώματεῖν, INC, 38). Particularly Daniel 9:24-25 expressly declares Christ to be "the Holy One of the saints" and not simply a "man" (ὅπου γε καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς συμμαλλυεῖται, καὶ ὁ χρισμένος σῶν ἄνθρωπος ἄπλως, ἀλλ᾽ "ΑΓΙΟΣ 'ΑΓΙΟΝ εἶναι καταγγέλλεται, INC, 39). This is why with His advent King and Prophet and Sacrifice have ceased to exist in Judaism and the whole world is filled with the knowledge of God.

In his anti-Jewish Christian polemic Athanasius presents a Christ who is human in His suffering but God in His person and power. Man and God are both predicated of Him and there is absolutely no suggestion that either of these predicates is unreal or partial. The human attribution is more connected with the passion of Christ and is expressed in terms of the human body when the death and crucifixion of Christ are being discussed; but the Divine attribution is connected with the saving acts of Christ and particularly with the miracles such as the casting out of demons, the healing of the sick, the opening of the blind's eyes, the Virgin birth, the miracle at Cana, the walking on the sea, the feeding of the five thousands, the witness of Creation at Christ's death and above all the resurrection.

Against the Greeks Athanasius develops a very interesting argument (chs. 42-55), which reveals important aspects of his Christological perspectives. It appears that the Greek objection was not concerned so much with the Godhood of Christ as with the fact that the Godhood appeared in a human body (τί γὰρ ἄπολον, ἢ τί χλεύης παρ' ἑμῖν άξιον; ἢ πάντως ὡς τὸν λόγον ἐν αὐτῇ πεφανερωθαι λέγομεν;). In his reply Athanasius argues that the Greeks are bound to confess the same if they are to be friends of the truth; if, in other words,
they are to be consistent with their belief in a Divine Logos which governs the universe (ἐλ ὁμολογοῦσι λόγον ἐἶναι ἔσοῦ καὶ τοῦτον ἡγεμόνα τοῦ παντὸς. καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων αὐτὸν βασιλεύειν, ὡς ἐκ τῶν εἰργῶν τῆς προνοίας γενὸςκεσθαί αὐτὸν, ibid, 41). The argument runs as follows. If the Greeks (presumably the Stoics) believe that the whole world is a body within which there exists a Divine Logos who descends (ἐπιβεβηκε) on all and on each one of the existing things, then why should they not accept that He can also descend on man (τῇ ἄτομον εἰ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ φαμέν αὐτὸν ἐπιβεβηκέναι; INC, 41)? Why should He not be allowed to come to be in a human body, if He is allowed to be in the Body of the world? Surely, says Athanasius, if He can be in the whole, He can also be in the part. What is particularly interesting here is that the part into which the Divine Logos can enter and exist is designated by the terms "man", "human genus" and "human body" (ὁ ἀνθρώπος, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ὀμοιόμορφον). That in turn implies that the Logos—man and Logos—body models are synonymous in Athanasius. Man does not mean a particular man, but the human genus or nature, whereas body does not mean mere body, but the human genus which is (to use the expression of INC, 11) κατ' ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ ὀμοιώματος (πεπλομένον).

But Athanasius' argument does not end here. It becomes more interesting, but also more intricate, as he goes on to claim that the Logos's relation with the whole world and with a part of it is indeed parallel to the relation of a man with his whole human body and with a toe of his foot. Obviously in this instance the word man is used with reference to a particular human person, whereas the word human body is used as previously as synonymous with the human genus. The intention of this argument is quite clear. Athanasius
wants to defend the reasonableness of the Inhomination of the Divine Logos against the Greek philosophical objections. From what he says at this point (INC 42), it seems that the Greeks had objected to the manifestation of the Saviour in man as unbecoming (οὐχ εὐπρεπὴς νομιζόμεν ἡμᾶς λέγειν τὴν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ ζωτήρος ἐπιφάνειαν) on the grounds that the human genus was created out of nothing (ὅτι γενητὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων γέγονε τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος), whereas the Creator Logos had always been in existence! Athanasius' reply rests on the principle that whatever applies to the whole that also necessarily applies to the part (ὅποια γὰρ ἐν περὶ τοῦ ὄλου νοησιαν, τοιαύτα ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τοῦ μέρους αὐτοῦς ἐνθεμετοθεία, INC, 42). On this basis, the unbecomingness of the Logos' manifestation in the creaturely human genus implies the unbecomingness of the presence of the Logos in the world at large, since that too was created out of nothing! However, since the Greeks do not regard the presence of the Logos in the created world at large to be absurd, neither should they regard as absurd His presence in man (οὐδὲ ὁ ρα ὁ ὁ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ αὐτὸν εἶναι ἄτοπον). Here again Athanasius speaks of the part which is connected with the Logos' manifestation and Inhomination in terms of ἀνθρώπος, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον σῶμα, and ἡ ἀνθρωπότης.

Finally Athanasius produces one more analogical argument, this time likening the Logos to a human mind. If the mind which exists throughout the whole of man is denoted by a part, namely the τονῦν, and nobody says that the substance of the mind has been diminished on this account, likewise the Logos, who is in the whole without change, could also be revealed by means of a human instrument (ἀνθρωπίνῳ χερεται ὅργῳ) without any change occurring to His Godhood. This point shows that the Greeks must have thought that the Inhomination of the Logos or His union with a human body must have meant a change.
in His Godhood. Athanasius clearly denies that, by saying that He used the body as an instrument and did not partake of anything which belongs to the body, but rather He sanctified the body (Οὔτω καὶ τῷ σώματι ὄργανω χρώμενος, οὐδενός τῶν τοῦ σώματος μετέχειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἦγερε τὸ σῶμα, INC, 43). Elsewhere he says that He used only man as His instrument (ἀνθρώπω μόνω...κέχρηται), because He did not simply want to appear or show off His power, but to heal and teach men who had been suffering. He took up an appropriate human body and worked through it in order to save men. Here too Athanasius cites a text from Plato’s Politicus which presents the Creator beholding the world tossed by wintry storms and being in danger of sinking into the abyss of chaos and therefore taking His seat at the helm of its soul and succouring it and putting it straight in all its mistakes, and Athanasius makes this text an image of the Logos’ descent upon humanity when she had gone astray and His appearance as man with the purpose of saving her through His guidance and goodness as she was tossed about by wintry storms. Although he does not draw out the implications of this parallelism for the understanding of the Inhomination, one can infer with reasonable certainty that as the Platonic Creator sat on the helm of the soul of the world, so the Christian Creator sat on the helm of the soul of an human body in order to save humanity. The debate with the Greeks (the Stoics) leads Athanasius to employ the term body in a decisive way in his exposition of the Inhomination. But it seems clear that he does not understand this term in a restrictive sense. Not only he identifies it with man (in general) and the human genus, but also seems to include in it the soul. Here we have a clear anticipation of the later statement of Athanasius concerning the οὐχ ἄνυχον σῶμα.
of Christ (ANT, 7), which was stated when the restrictive use of the term body was introduced.

That Athanasius' choice of the term body as a primary term for his exposition of the doctrine of Christ was necessitated by his debate with the Greeks also appears in another Greek objection which he cites and discusses. Why, the Greeks ask, did the act of salvation have to be mediated through a body and not through a gesture (νεύμα) of the Logos as in the case of Creation? The gesture, says Athanasius is sufficient for the creation of non-existing beings. But in salvation God has to deal with existing beings. The problem is the death and corruption of the body which has been created. This is precisely why the Logos became man and used an human body as His instrument. Being Himself Life, He vivified it and made it the basis of the renewal of all. Even here Athanasius uses the language of the body alongside the language of man and therefore leaves no doubt as to a general use of his terms. Here are some typical phrases: γέγονε δὲ ἄνθρωπος, διὰ τούτο καὶ ἄνθρωπεὶς ὄργανον κέχρηται τῷ σώματι (INC, 44); οὐκόν ἀκολούθως ὁ τῶν θεοῦ λόγου σώμα ἄνελαβε, καὶ ἄνθρωπεὶς κέχρηται, ἵνα καὶ ἐκκοσμήσῃ τὸ σώμα καὶ ἐν', ὡσεὶ ἐν τῇ κτίσει ἀδικτὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐργῶν γνωρίζεται, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ἄνθρωπῳ ἐργάζεται καὶ δειλὴ ἐκατόν πανταχοῦ, μηδὲν ἐρημὸν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ θειότητος καὶ γνώσεως καταλημάτων (INC, 45); οὕτω γὰρ πανταχόθεν συγκλείομενος ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ πανταχοῦ, τούτεστιν, ἐν σαρανῇ, ἐν ἀποθανόντι, ἐπὶ γῆς ἀπόκτησε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ θειότητα βλέπων, οὐκ ἐτεῖ μὲν ἀκατάτηται περὶ θεοῦ, μόνον δὲ τοῦτον προσκυνεῖ (ibid. 45). The last text points to the primary purpose of the treatise, i.e. the demonstration of the Godhood of the Logos (ἡν τοῦ λόγου θειότητα), which is the particular subject-matter of chs. 46 to 54. Here Athanasius lists
the results of the Inhomination in order to demonstrate the Godhood of the Logos. As he does this he gives us a number of phrases which relate to the Inhomination and should be noted here. Firstly he speaks of Christ as God in men: γέγονεν δ' ἀληθινὸς τοῦ θεοῦ θεὸς λόγος ἐν ἀνθρώποις (INC, 56), τὰ θεοφάνεια τοῦ λόγου γέγονεν ἐν ἀνθρώποις (ibid) ἀρτί δὲ τοῦ σωτήρος ἐν ἀνθρώποις φανέντος, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ( λεῖς, Κρόνος Ἀπόλλων, κλπ) ἐγνωσθέναι ἄντες ἀνθρώπων θεοτόκε, μόνος δὲ θεός ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐγνώρισθε θεὸς ἀληθινὸς θεὸς λόγος (INC, 47). Secondly he says that He was not a mere man (μὴ τε ἄνθρωπος ἄλλως) but God as man on account of His death (οὗς ἀνθρώπος εἷς τὸν θεόν κατακλύζει, INC, 50) and very God on account of His super-human works (οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπον ἐστὶ αὐτοῦ τά ἔργα, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἄνθρωπον, INC, 48). This teaching is finally rounded up in the famous Athanasian statement: Διὰ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως τοῦ λόγου ἡ πάντων ἐγνώση πρόνοια, καὶ ὁ τάσις χρησίμος καὶ ὁμολογός αὐτὸς ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος. Αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐνηνθρώπησεν θεοὶ ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθήμεν (INC, 54).

The Christology of INC is clearly dominated by Athanasius's apologetic concerns. It does not provide either a full or a final Christological statement, but it is concerned with the cause of the bodily manifestation of the Divine Logos and Athanasius' own partial understanding of it (τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς σωματικῆς ἐπισκανείας αὐτοῦ, ὡς οἶον τε τὴν, ἐκ μέρους καὶ ὡς ἠδυνηθήμεν νοήσαι, INC, 20). Two Christological theses are primarily defended. The Divine person of Christ, which is none other than the Creator Logos of God who is the key to cosmology and anthropology, and the saving fact of His Inhominatio, which is expounded in terms of "body" and "man".

The crucial element in the Christology of INC is not the terminology but the doctrine of the Inhominatio and its far-reaching and universal soteriological implications, strongly defended against objectors.
There is no suggestion here that the Inhomination of the Logos entails a curtailed humanity. Rather, it seems that the humanity of the Inhominated Logos constitutes the presupposition to the whole teaching of INC. This teaching stresses that Christ is not a mere man, but God become man, or God in a human body, or God in the human genus, or even God in man. This event is defended as reasonable on the grounds that the heart of it is the Creator Logos, and it is also regarded as necessary, since without it neither the conditions (the offering of a universal sacrifice) nor the reality (the destruction of bodily death and the restoration of the image of God in the human soul) of man's salvation can be achieved. The inner logic of this soteriological necessity of the Inhomination implies the integrity of its two fundamental aspects, namely, the real involvement of the Logos and the assumption of complete humanity by Him. Such a teaching reappears and is further strengthened in the second phase of Athanasius' literary activity. This time he defends the Divine integrity of the inhominated Logos of God not against the pagan Greeks and the Jews, but against Christian heretics.
(iii) *Contra Arianos* I

The date of Athanasius' famous Orations against the Arians has been a matter of considerable debate among Athanasian scholars. The traditional view going back to Cellier and Montfaucon and upheld by Nerman, Robertson, Bardenheuer, Bardy, Stegmann, Ruech, Schmeelchler, Roldamus and others, assigns the composition of CAR1-3 to the period of Athanasius' third exile, i.e. A.D. 356-362. Cavallera and Bouyer have assigned them to the peaceful period of A.D. 347-350, when Athanasius was active at his See. Finally Loofs Stülden, Guérnerus, Weigt, Lietzmann and Gaudel have preferred the earlier date of A.D. 339-341. Professor Elias Moutsoulas' recent defence of the third view carries considerable weight and makes this view the most probable of the three. Whatever the case, it does not affect our purposes in the present investigation, since the contents of CAR1-3 are clearly stated and the precise historical context is not a "sine qua non" for their doctrinal exposition and assessment. We may simply note that the reference to Arius' death in CAR1,3 gives us A.D. 336 as a "terminus post quem", whilst the references to Arius' and Asterius' writings together with the references to Eusebius of Nicomedia (d.A.D. 342) indicate the first stage of the Arian controversy. The mild references to Constantius' support of the Arians also points to the 340s rather than the 350s. We assume then that CAR1-3 is an early work.

What is more significant for us, however, is the question concerning the unity of the three Orations. Such a unity can easily be established from internal criticism and especially from the detailed examination of the contents. CAR2,1 looks back to the contents of CAR1 in a general way. It refers to the προσειριμένους ἐλέγχους, which the Arians purposefully ignor, as they go on
inventing and putting forward new arguments. But in CAR2,18 the contents of the third part and the final section of the fourth part of CAR1 are explicitly mentioned (i.e. CAR1,22b-36, and CAR1,54-64). Again, the opening chapter of CAR3 recalls the contents of CAR2 and CAR1 (i.e. the exposition of Prov.8:22 of CAR2, 18b-24a,57-61a, and the expositions of Hebr.1:4ff,Rom.8:22 & Col. 1:15, and Hebr.3:2, which are dealt with in CAR1,54-64, CAR2,61b-64, and CAR2,6-11a respectively). Finally CAR3,59 echoes the themes of CAR1 and CAR2 and the preceding section of CAR3 as it identifies the new contention of the Arians (Sonship by will) with the "there was when the Son was not", or "the Son is out of nothing" or "the Son is a creature" of the preceding sections. The unity of the three Orations can also be seen from the fact that all three of them deal with the same Arian sources (Arius, Eusebius and Asterius) which belong to the first stage of the Arian controversy. The different sections must have been written successively over a period of time, most probably between 338 and 346.

Our purpose in this chapter is to examine the Christology of CAR1-3, particularly as far as it pertains to the human side of Christ. To do this we need to survey the contents of the texts laying particular emphasis on the terminology. We shall do this with each Oration separately and then summarize our investigation by means of a comprehensive statement.

The contents of CAR1 can be summarized as follows:

Chs 1-10 INTRODUCTION TO THE ARIAN HERESY
chs. 1-4 On heresy and truth and the Arian heresy
chs. 5,6 Extracts from Arius' Thalia
chs. 7-10 The Arian heresy contrasted to the Church's faith
Chs. 11-22a REPUTATION OF THE ARIAN DENIAL OF THE SON

Chs. 11-13 Refutation of the Arian contention: there was when the Son was not.

Chs. 14-17a Refutation of the Arian objection: if the Son is co-eternal with the Father, then He is a brother.

Chs. 17b-18 The eternal Son and the eternal Trinity

Chs. 19-22a The eternal Son and the eternal Wisdom, Logos and Eicon of God.

Chs. 22b-36 REPUTATION OF ARIAN LOGICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE SON

Chs. 22b-23 The three Arian questions and a general reply
(a) The Son and Creation
(b) The Son and the ungenerated (τὸ ἄγεννητον)
(c) The Son and generation

Chs. 24-26a Reply to question (a)
Chs. 26b-29 Reply to question (c)
Chs. 30-34 Reply to question (b)1
Chs. 35,35 Reply to question (b)2

Chs. 37-64 REPUTATION OF ARIAN BIBLICAL ARGUMENTS

Chs. 37-40a The three Arian biblical texts, Phil.2:9-10, Ps.44:8 and Hebr.1:9 as understood by Arians and Orthodox

Chs. 40b-45 The first text: The meaning of Christ's exaltation
Chs. 46-53 The second text: The meaning of Christ's anointing
Chs. 54-64 The third text: The meaning of Christ's being made greater than the angels.

The above structural analysis of the First Oration clearly demonstrates that the subject matter of the treatise is theological and refers to the Godhead of the Son. This is true not only in the first three parts of the treatise, which are obviously theological, but also in the last part, which deals with texts belonging to the Incarnate state of the Son. The contention here, as Athanasius summarizes it, is whether the Son is a man who became God (Arian position), or God who afterwards became man in order to deify men (the Athanasian position). If the former is the case, then the Son is God by grace, but if the latter, then He is God by nature, eternally existing with the Father, who became man in order to establish men's deification and sonship by grace in Himself.
That the treatise is concerned with theological rather than incarnational questions is also shown from the Christological titles which present the following frequency of occurrence:

Son(254), Logos(176), Lord(161), Wisdom(45), God(40), Eicon(38)
Christ(26), effulgence(16), Saviour(15), Power(10), Jesus(9),
Character(8), King(8), Truth(6), Creator(4), Despotes(2), Maker(2)
and light, life, species, offspring, glory(1).

Bearing this in mind we may now survey the contents of CAR1, with the purpose of gathering together Athanasius' statements relating to the Incarnation.

In the Introduction of CAR1 Athanasius speaks of the difference between heresy and truth and particularly between the Arian heresy and the ecclesiastical faith. (CAR1, 1-5). The critical point in the latter case is the denial of the Son of God by the Arians and the fact that He is counted among the creatures (CAR1, 5). Athanasius cites a number of extracts from Arius' Thalia which illustrate this point in some detail. Above all, these extracts reveal that Arius denied not only the eternal Son, but also the eternal Father, on the basis of a monistic doctrine of God (Θεός υμνός). Indeed, for him, Father (God), Son (Logos) and Holy Spirit were three distinct and alien beings (άνθρωπος) and only the former was truly eternal and divine. In criticising this view Athanasius not only recalls the doctrine of Nicea (CAR1, 7), but also argues against it on scriptural and dogmatic grounds. He contends that the scriptural language of the Arians is not sufficient to cover up their heresy, which, in any case, in denying the Godhood of the Logos, denies both the Trinity and the Incarnation, in a way which is not warranted in the patristic catechetical background. Particularly important
is his reference to the Incarnation which is connected with the phrase ἔνωσις παρουσίας. It reveals that for Athanasius the Incarnation is to be understood as "the presence of the eternal Son of God in the flesh", or "the incarnate (human) presence of the Son" as distinct from His discarnate (divine) presence. The emphasis is on the eternal Son, but in the condition of a new manifestation. But this is only an incidental comment. The main concern of Athanasius here is the Godhood of the Son and his primary terms are chosen accordingly. He speaks of "the naturally true and genuine Son of the Father", or "the only-begotten Wisdom of God", or "the true and only Logos of God" who is "God from God, blessed above all in the ages" (CAR1, 9, 10).

The second part of CAR1 (chs. 11-22a) continues the theological debate between Arian monotheism and Christian Trinitarianism and makes no reference at all to the Incarnation. This part represents a discussion and refutation of the central Arian claim "that there was (a time) when He (the Son) was not" (ἦν ποτὲ οὐκ οἶκ οὐ), which amounts to a denial of the eternity of the Son. Athanasius attempts to show that the teaching of the Scriptures opposes such a contention and openly suggests the eternal coexistence of the Father and the Son (John 1:1, Rev. 1:4, 8, Rom. 9:5, 1:20, I Cor. 1:24, etc.) (CAR1, 11). Scripture differentiates between the Logos (Son) and creation (Matth. 11:27, John 14:9) and declares that the former is eternal (Is. 40:26, Dan (Sus.) 42, Baruch 4:20, 22, Hebr. 1:3, Ps. 89:17, etc.) (CAR1, 12). The main argument is that time belongs to the creatures and not to the Logos. Christ as the Logos and Son of God is not subject to time. (CAR1, 13). To the logical argument of the Arians, that if the Son is coeternal with the Father, then Father and
Son must be brothers, Athanasius replies that the Son is a genuine Son of the Father born of His very being and as such He is co-eternal (CAR1,14). The Arians, says Athanasius, accept the title 'Son' but divest it of substantial reality because they fear the consequence of introducing division into the very being of God. Thus they accept a Son of God who is such only by participation. But they cannot point to anything which can constitute the term of this participation. Divine sonship by participation is normally connected with the reception of the Holy Spirit, but according to the Scriptures the Son does not receive but supplies the Spirit of adoption. For Athanasius the Son's participation (if one chooses to speak in such terms) is to be understood in terms of the Father's being (οὐσία), which means that the former is identical with the latter in all respects including being eternal (CAR1,15). This means that the Son is a perfect offspring of the Father's being without division or change (CAR1,16). If God creates through Him, then the Son belongs to God the Creator who cannot be such without Him (CAR1,17). Particularly interesting here is Athanasius' argument from the Trinity in support of the true Son of God. The core of this argument is, that if the Son is not eternal, then neither the Trinity would be such, and consequently the Trinity would be creaturely. But this obviously militates against the Church's doctrine, which sees "theology as being perfect and complete in the Trinity", and denies as heretical the view that "the doctrine of God was completed by additions". "The faith of the Christians", says Athanasius, "acknowledges the blessed Trinity as unalterable and perfect and ever what it was, neither adding to It what is more, nor imputing to It any loss (for both ideas are irreligious), and therefore it
dissociates it from all things generated, and it guards as indivisible and worships the unity of the Godhead Itself; and shuns the Arian blasphemies, and confesses and acknowledges that the Son was always; for He is eternal, as is the Father, of whom He is the eternal Logos° (CAR1,17-18). Finally Athanasius turns to the Scriptures and gathers together the statements which identify the Son with the Wisdom, the Logos and the Eicon of God and by these means he establishes once more His eternity. If God is source of Wisdom and Life according to Jer.2:13, 17:12, Baruch 3:12, and if the Son is Wisdom and Life, He must have existed always, otherwise God would have been at some point a barren source. If the source is eternal, then the Wisdom which came from it must also be eternal. This Wisdom (Ps.103:24, Prov.3:19) is the Logos of John 1:3 and this Logos is the Christ of I Cor. 8:6 through whom all things were made and therefore He is different from all(CAR1,19). Athanasius stresses the point that God was never without His offspring, because His being and fullness were never imperfect(CAR1,20) and attempts to demonstrate it by pointing to the fact that the Son is the eicon and the effulgence of the Father. His argument is that the characteristics of the Father also belong to His eicon, and among them He includes eternity, immortality, and being Almighty Light King God Lord Creator and Maker. The Arian objection that this argument demands that the Son is also a Father, provides Athanasius with the occasion for differentiating between the divine and the human senses of fatherhood and sonship. In God Father and Son are proper names which exist and subsist in a unique way, whereas in man they are common names referring to the common nature. Thus the divine Father exists and subsists always as Father, and consequently the
Son also exists and subsists always with Him (CARL, 21-22a).

In the third part of CARL (chs. 22b-36) Athanasius replies to three Arian logical arguments which were designed to prove that the Son was to be counted with the creatures and not with the Father. These arguments say Athanasius rest on the wrong presupposition that God is like man, and imply that the Arians think of God in human terms. Athanasius insists on the essential differentiation between God and man and adduces as counter argument the claim that God does not imitate creation but rather the opposite is the case (CARL, 22b-23). In examining the first Arian argument, which rests on the question "whether the existing created the non existing or the existing out of nothing" (ὁ ὄν τὸν μὴ ὄντα ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος πεποληκε, ἢ τὸν ὄντα ὄντα ὁμό ὄντον πεποληκε ὃ μὴ ὄντα), Athanasius replies that this question is about creation and not about God and therefore cannot be used to illustrate the relationship of the Son to the Father. The manner of the question is a sophistical one and its only purpose is obviously the denial of the eternity of the Son. That this is totally inapplicable to the Son, says Athanasius, one can gather by reflecting on such scriptural statements as John 1:1, Hebr. 1:3 and Rom. 9:5 (CARL, 24). Athanasius goes on to argue by means of raising counter questions which expose "the Arian blasphemy" against the Son, but eventually he states affirmatively that there is a sense in which "the existing Father did make the existing Son". This is none other than the event of the Incarnation, when the Logos became flesh (John 1:14), which, says Athanasius, does not mean that He was not Son of God before He became a man, as the Sabosatean contended, but it rather means that being Son of God He was also made Son of man for the completion of the ages (καὶ ὄντα ὄντον
Yeōn θεοῦ ἐκόλουθον ἐκλ συντελεῖς τῶν αἰώνων καὶ Υἱὸν ἀνθρώπου, εἰ μὴ ἔρα κατὰ τῶν Ἐσομοστέων μὴν εἶναι σωτὸν πρὶν ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι εὐποιεν, (22) CAR1,25). The above statement shows that as far as the Incarnation is concerned the difference between Arius and Athanasius is connected with the preexistence of the Son—a dogma which Athanasius finds plainly taught in the Scriptures, but which Arius denies. The reference to the Samosatean here is accurate, because the point of connection between him and Arius is the denial of the preexistence of the Son (i.e. the eternal Son) and not the mechanics, as it were, of the Incarnation of the Logos. But what is particularly interesting here, from the perspective of our investigation, is the way in which Athanasius understands the classic statement of the Incarnation supplied in John 1:14. The "becoming flesh" of the Logos is identified with "the becoming Son of Man of the preexistent Son of God". Athanasius' concern is not at all about the "how" of the Incarnation, but about its truth and integrity, as well as its eschatological character. Perhaps the most striking feature of the present Athanasian incarnational statement is the coordination of "being" and "becoming" in the Son. Such a coordination is stated as a "datum" or a presupposition, which does not need any explanation or justification.

Athenasius next deals with the third Arian argument which rests on the question "whether there is a son before he is born" (εἷς θεοῦ Υἱὸν πρὶν τέκεσθαι). The obvious negative answer to this question clearly implies the Arian contention that in a similar way God's Son could not have existed before He was born (οὗτω καὶ ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ Υἱὸς οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γεννηθή). In replying to this Athanas-
sius makes a number of points. First of all he differentiates radically between generation in God and generation in man. But then, he also argues that the paradigm of human generation can be employed positively in talking about generation in God. Human parents give birth to their children by nature and their offsprings are eicons of their being. Similarly God gives birth to the Son by nature and therefore His Son is a perfect eicon of His being (CAR1,26). Also, natural children (in man) do not come from outside, but from the very being of their parents and as such keep their relationship with each other (parent-child relationship) for ever. Why should we not see this as applying to the divine Father and the Divine Son who are such by nature? (CAR1,27). However, Athanasius insists that God's generation is not like man's, because they have totally different natures, and especially because the nature of the former, unlike that of the latter, is neither partitioned nor is it possible. Perhaps, says Athanasius, a parallelism could be found between the divine nature and the spiritual side of man, in as much as this side has a logos which is born of a mind without passion or partition (CAR1,28). But Athanasius maintains the difference between the divine and the creaturely natures, even in the face of Arian arguments based on God's inherent creative power which must have existed with Him always. For Athanasius God is as distinct from the world as the Father is distinct from the Creator, or the offspring from the creature, or God's being from His will. Thus Athanasius concludes that the Son is always and eternally a genuine offspring of the Father’s very being, whereas the creatures were all created by God's Logos (CAR1,29).
Finally Athanasius deals in this last section of the third part of CAR1 with the two sides of the second argument which are based on the questions concerning the ungenerated (τὸ ἄγεννητον) and free will (τὸ ἀνεξοδουλον). Here again the Arian intention is none other than the denial of the Son of God. So determined are they in this, that they use the Greek notion of "the ungenerated", which is unscriptural (ἄγαρας), even though they demand of the Orthodox to use scriptural terms only. However, Athanasius embarks on a full discussion of the various meanings of "the ungenerated" not only to expose the inconsistencies of the Arians and particularly of Asterius the sophist (CAR1, 30-32), but also to demonstrate that the term refers to God in His distinction from the creatures (like the term Pantocrator) and therefore should not be applied to God in his relation to the Son (CAR1, 33). God as Father is to be preferred from God as ungenerated, because the former establishes the relationship of Father and Son, whereas the latter only refers to a negative distinction between God and the world. Besides, the first is biblical and is rooted in the gift of grace, whereas the second was discovered by the Greeks. To support this last point Athanasius lists a number of biblical loci which refer to the Father Son relationship, John 14:10, 14:9, 10:30, Luk. 11:2, Matth. 6:9, and Matth. 28:19 (CAR1, 34). As regards the second part of the Arian argument which defends the Son's mutability on the ground that He is endowed with "free will" or "self-determination", Athanasius' reply is consistent with his earlier outlook. The Son, he says, is not endowed with a creaturely "free will", because He is not a creature. In the Church's view He is the eicon of the Father; He is in the Father always; He is equal with the Father; and above
all He is the genuine offspring of the Father's very being. This means that He is immutable and unchangeable (ἄτρεπτος καὶ ἀναλλολο-
ωτος ) and therefore divine (CARL, 35). In conclusion Athanasius emphasizes the point that the eikon of the immutable God must also be immutable and in justification of this he points to Hebr.13:8, 
Ps.101:26-28, Hebr.1:10-12, Deut. 4:39 and Mal. 3:6. These loci, says Athanasius, are said of the Father and the Son, even though the Son became also a man. The Son was not changed on account of the human nature which He took on when He became man, but remained immutable as the true offspring of the Father. The same must be said of the Son as God's Wisdom or Logos, and therefore, the Arian claim, that Logos Son and Wisdom denote a grace given to Christ, must be decisively rejected (CARL, 36). The passing comment of Athanasius on the Incarnation summed up in the text, ὃτι μάλιστα καὶ γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος δείκνυσι τὴν ταυτότητα καὶ τὸ ἄτρεπτον ἑαυτῷ τοῖς νομί-
ζουσι διὰ τὴν σάρκα ἠλλοιωθάται αὐτὸν καὶ ἔτερον τι γεγενήθησαί, shows that Athanasius' understanding of the coordination of "being" and "becoming" in the Incarnation is not of the kind which resolves the one into the other, but of the kind which retains the terms of the coordination without confusion or alteration. Also notable is the point that the Son's becoming man involves his assumption of human flesh which is probably used here in the synec-
dochic sense of humanity. However, we must point out that even in this third section of CARL, Athanasius' dispute with the Arians is fundamentally conducted on the theological level and does not enter into the sphere of the Incarnation at all. The dispute is theological and is directly connected with the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Son of God.
The theological perspective in the dispute between Athanasius and the Arians is retained in the last and longest part of CAR1 (chs.37-54), but here the Incarnation emerges as a major topic. Athanasius makes constant use of it in his attempt to counteract the Arian exegesis and prove that what is said of Christ as man should not become the basis for drawing conclusions concerning His Godhood. There are four sections to this part, the first one being an introduction to the following three, which turn around the exegesis of three Christological texts, Phil.2:9-10, Ps. 44:8 and Hebr.1:9. In the introductory section Athanasius supplies a succinct account of the Arian argument based on these texts. If the Son "was exalted", or "received grace", or "was anointed", then this implies that He exhibited an appropriate choice (προαιρεσις). In turn this implies that He was mutable in His nature (τρεπτός τὴν φύσιν), and as such, could not be God (CAR1,37). In his general reply Athanasius observes, that for the Arians He became Son and God and Logos by grace, i.e. as a reward for His works. But these works, says Athanasius, relate to His Incarnation, or to His progression as man. If that is not so, then we must conclude that He was improved by the flesh! And then we must ask what He was before His Incarnation. If He was not such and such before He became man, then He must be just a man and nothing else. But this, says Athanasius, is the Samosatean and Jewish position which denies the preexistence of Christ as Son and Logos of God. Over against this position Athanasius recalls the witnesses of Abraham (Gen.18:1ff), Moses (Exod.3:1ff), Daniel (Dan.7:10) and of the biblical statements in John 17:5, Ps.17:10 and 17:14 (CAR1,38). For the Arians, he says, Christ is a man who became God, but for the Orthodox He is God who
became man. The Arians point to Ps.18:1 to show that the term "god" can be used in a functional sense, but Athanasius points to John1:3, and Col.1:16-17,1:15 to show that this does not apply to the Son who is before all. Athanasius' central statement here is that enthronement and deification by grace can only take place through the true Son of God who is genuine offspring of the Father (CAR1,39). This perception of "the Son", through whom men become sons of God by adoption, is in fact derived from Christ Himself (τὰς περὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐννοίας χρωμένων ὡς δεδωκέν αὐτός ὁ Κύριος - most probably an allusion to the fourth Gospel)(CAR1,40a). These general points are further elaborated in the three succeeding sections of this last part of CAR1.

In the first section Athanasius discusses the exaltation of Christ which is mentioned in Phil.2. In his attempt to provide an orthodox exegesis, Athanasius cites the full passage of Phil.2:5-11, and goes on to claim that on such plain evidence the idea that Christ was promoted from a lover to a higher state must be rejected. This text, says Athanasius, demonstrates that the Son was God, and as such, He was highly exalted with the Father, but that He also became man, and as such, He was exalted by God. There is no suggestion anywhere that He was exalted as God, or that in His exaltation as man He was raised to a higher point than He was before when He was only God (CAR1,40b). Thus Athanasius insists that one should distinguish the Godhood from the manhood of Christ and understand His exaltation in terms of the latter. He was God who became man and as such He was exalted for us. This, says Athanasius, is the import of such biblical statements as Hebr.6:20,9:24, John17:19, Ps.23:7 and Ps.88:17-18. (CAR1,42). As regards the other phrase in Phil.2
which refers to "the name above every name" which the Son received, Athanasius argues that it should be again understood, like the "exaltation", as referring to the humanity of Christ. It was for us that He received this name when He became man (CAR1,43). In the same way one should understand the statements that "He humbled Himself to the point of death" (Phil.2:8), and that "He was exalted through the resurrection" (Phil.2:9). Eph.4:10 sums up the meaning of these texts when it says that "He who ascended is He who first descended". He descended as man (in becoming man) and ascended as God (for He did not cease to be God). The basic mistake of the Arian exegesis is that it relates the verbs "was exalted" and "received" to the being of the Logos. In fact they are connected with His body and the mystery of His Incarnation. In the last analysis one must say that the same one gives and receives the exaltation and the name above every name, because the same one is Son of God and has also become Son of man (CAR1,44-45).

A closer look at the terminology of this section helps us to identify the basic elements of Athanasius' understanding of the Incarnation. His argument that the exaltation of the Son refers to His Incarnation can be analysed in terms of two sets of statements and phrases, a subjective one based on the verb "to become" and on the Son as subject, and an objective one based on the verb "to assume" and the humanity of the Son as object. The first set includes the following statements and phrases:

(1) γέγονεν ἀνθρώπος, or γενόμενος ἀνθρώπος, or πρὶν γένηται ἀνθρώπος which appears 23 times in CAR1,38-45 (i.e. CAR1,38(5), CAR1,39(3), CAR1,40(3), CAR1,42(3), CAR1,43(3), CAR1,44(3), and CAR1,45(3)).
(3) ὁ ἄνθρωπος which appears 10 times (CARL.40(1), CARL.41(3),
CARL.42(2), CARL.43(1), CARL.44(1) and CARL.45(2)).

(3) ἄνθρωπος, appearing 5 times (CARL.41(1) and CARL.45(2))

(4) γένος, appearing 4 times (CARL.41(1), 44(2) and 45(1))

(5) ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οἴκων, CARL.44

(6) ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐξ οἴκων καὶ ἐν υἱῷ, CARL.44

From this point of view the Incarnation is an Inhomination = ἐνανθρώπωσις, a term which actually occurs in CARL.44.

The second set of statements and phrases includes the following:

(1) ἀνέλαβε τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μορφὴν, appearing 6 times (CARL.38(1),
CARL.40(2), 41(1), 42(1), and 43(1)

(2) ἡ οὐρά, or ὁ δαντοῦ οὐρᾶ, or σαρκα, (used objectively and not
in the same sense as in John 1:14; in other words, used in distinc-
tion from the Son as subject), appearing 5 times (CARL.38(2), 41(1),
42(1), and 44(1).

(3) κρύολησε τῆς σαρκός, CARL.41.

(4) ἐφορεῖ σάρκα, CARL.41

(5) ἐνυσίμμενος τὴν δουλεῖαν σάρκα, CARL.45

(6) λαβὼν σῶμα, CARL.42, CARL.43

(7) ἐναύσαστο σῶμα, CARL.42

(8) τὸ δαντοῦ σῶμα, CARL.42, CARL.44, CARL.45(5)

(9) ἐν σώματι (γενεσίως ἐν ἑνωτί), CARL.43(1), 44(2), 45(1)

(10) ὁ ἄνθρωπός, CARL.41

(11) τὸ ἄνθρωπον, CARL.41

(12) ὁ ἄνθρωπος, CARL.45

A careful glance at these data reveals that there are two
aspects to the Athanasian understanding of the Incarnation which
can be distinguished by means of the verbs "to become" and "to
assume" as well as the terms "man" and "flesh" on the one hand,
and the terms "form of the servant", "flesh", "body", "humanity", "human element" and "man" on the other, which are respectively connected with the two above mentioned verbs. It is to these verbs however that we need to look in order to see clearly these two aspects and differentiate the nuances of the terms which are common to them. The first aspect may be called intransitive and subjective and the second transitive and objective, but both of them must be kept together, if the complete Athanasian picture of the Incarnation is to be perceived. The Incarnation then has an intransitive aspect, which relates to the Son as human subject, and a transitive one, which is connected with the Son's humanity. Thus, the statement, that the exaltation of the Son refers to His Incarnation, can be stated in two ways, subjectively and objectively. In the first instance Athanasius will say ὃς ἄνθρωπος ὑψώθη and in the second instance, τῆς ἄνθρωπότητος ἐστὶν ἐκ ὑψωσεως, or τὸ ὑπερήψωσεν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄνθρωπινον λέγεται, or τὸ σῶμα τὸ ὑψωθέν, or κατὰ τὸ ὑψωθέν τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Indeed the two aspects could also be combined into one common statement, ὃς ἄνθρωπος ὑψώθηκεν λέγεται, and ὃς ἐκ ἐνανθρώπωσος ἐν ὑψωσεως ἄνθρωπος ἐστί τὸ ῥήμα. This is Athanasius' understanding of the Incarnation as it emerges in these chapters. But the crucial point here, which is indeed the presupposition or the key to this understanding, is Athanasius' doctrine of the preexistent Son, who is a divine subject endowed with all the objective truth and reality of God. It is this presupposition that constitutes the core of the Arian-Athanasian debate. The Arians not only fail to acknowledge the preexistent divine Son, but deliberately employ the statements
which refer to His Incarnation (in this instance the statements relating to His exaltation) in order to deny Him. This is decisively opposed by Athanasius, in a way which brings out both, the divine existence of the Son and the soteriological implications for us men of His Incarnation. The typical statement here is this: οὐκ ἔρα μεσθὸν ἔσχε τὸ λέγεσθαι Υἱὸς καὶ Θεός, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς νικοποιησεν ἡμᾶς τῷ Πατρὶ, καὶ ἐκκληθεὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἁνθρώπου, γενόμενος αὐτὸς ἀνθρώπος (CAR1.38). And further along, οὐκ ἔρα ἁνθρώπος ἐν, ὑστερον γέγονεν Θεός, ἀλλὰ Θεός ἐν, ὑστερον γέγονεν ἁνθρώπος, ἵνα ἡμᾶς ἐκκληθῆσαι (CAR1.39). The soteriological character of the Athanasian doctrine of the Son as the presupposition and key to the Incarnation is apparent not only in the above statements but also throughout this section of CAR1. In the same chapter as the last statement Athanasius expresses it most clearly, κἂς δὲ καὶ ἐκκληθῆσαι γένοιτ' ἐν ἑωρή ποταὶ τοῦ λόγου;...εἰ δὲ κάπτες θὸν νική τε καὶ θεοὶ ἐκκληθῆσαι, εἴτε ἐπὶ γῆς, εἴτε ἐν οὐρανοῖς, διὰ τὸν λόγον νικοποιηθῆσαι καὶ ἐκκληθῆσαι, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Υἱὸς ἔστιν ὁ λόγος. And in CAR1, 42, ὦς ἁνθρώπος λέγεται λαμβάνειν ὑπερ ἐξεκεῖν ἀεὶ ὦς θεός, ἵνα εἰς ἡμᾶς φθάσῃ καὶ η τοιαύτη δοθεῖσα χάρις. Finally in CAR1, 45 he puts it like this, αὐτὸς μὲν ὁ ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς λόγος αὐτὸς γέγονεν καὶ Υἱὸς ἁνθρώπου, καὶ ὁ μὲν λόγος τὰ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς οἶδον, ...ἀς τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἁνθρώπου αὐτὸς ἁνθρωπιῶς λέγεται τὰ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ δέχεσθαι, ἵνα τὸ μὴ ἐτέρων ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ σῶμα τὸ φύσιν ἐχον τοῦ δέχεται τὴν χάριν. These statements sufficiently show, that the key to Athanasius' doctrine of the Incarnation is the doctrine of the eternal Son, which in fact constitutes the core of his dispute with the Arians.
The same 'logic' pertains to the next section of this last part of CAR1 (i.e. chs. 46-53), which deals with the exegesis of the messianic verse Ps. 44:7-8 referring to the anointing of Christ. As in the case of the imitation of Christ, so here, Athanasius argues that the anointing of the Son is not related to Him 'as God' but to Him 'as man' and was undertaken for us men. In other words it is connected with the Son's Inhominination. (CAR1, 46b). There are two aspects to this anointing corresponding to two ways of talking about it, which may be called subjective and objective, and both of which are related to the Son's Inhominination. In the first instance the anointing is attributed to the Son 'as man', who is regarded as the proper subject of it, but standing along side with this, there is the statement that the anointing really refers to the 'human body' or 'flesh' or 'humanity of Christ'. Thus, Christ is anointed subjectively 'as man', and at the same time the anointing is objectively related to His humanity. The crucial point for Athanasius' perception here is that He who sanctifies with the Spirit (the Son of God) is Himself sanctified when He becomes man, so that all men may be sanctified in Him. This anointing or sanctification should in no way imply that the Son of God progressed in holiness, but that this progress was attributed to Him on account of His Inhomination (CAR1, 47). The soteriological emphasis here is particularly strong, and Athanasius repeatedly asserts that what the Son did to Himself as man He did it for us (CAR1, 48). Athanasius also insists that it is not a paradox, if He who gives the Spirit Himself receives it as man. Had He not done that, human beings would never have become participants of the Spirit (CAR1, 50).
Clearly then Ps. 44:8 does not imply that the nature of the Logos was imitable, but that men have received the imitable and unchangeable character of the righteousness of the Logos as an eicon and prototype. Adam was imitable, but Christ was imitable. In taking up imitable humanity (τρομη οδηγος) to himself, the Logos has rendered it imitable by keeping it free from sin. So, to receive and to keep the Spirit as man ultimately means, that humanity has been rendered imitable by grace, and not that the Logos had been imitable (CARL, 51). That the latter is not the case, says Athanasius, is clearly inferred from the fact that the Logos is like (ὁμοιος) the Father and the Father's very eicon. Besides, Ps. 10:7, 5:6, 86:2, Mal.1:2 (Rom. 9:13), and Is. 61:8 say for the Father what Ps. 44:8 says for the Son! (CARL, 52). However, the Arians are determined not to take heed of such arguments, because they operate with the preconception that the Logos is a creature, and use as their pretext such verses as Prov. 8:22, Hebr. 1:4, 3:1-2 and Acts 2:36. Athanasius not only insists that the Arians misinterpret these verses, but also points out that, like Jews, they fail to acknowledge the biblical prophecy "that God will dwell on earth" (Mal. 2:14), and, like Manicheans, reject the Gospel statement of John 1:14 and the Incarnate presence of the Logos (CARL, 53).

The following terms are employed by Athanasius in his exposition of what we called the 'subjective' and the 'objective' aspects of the anointing of the Incarnate Son.

The subjective aspect:

(1) ὁ λόγος ὁς ἄνθρωπος, CARL, 46(1), 47(2), 48(1), 50(4).

(2) ὁ λόγος γενόμενος (γέγονεν) ἄνθρωπος, CARL, 46(2), 47(2), 48(4).
50(1), 51(1), 53(1).

(3) αὐτὸς ἀνθρωπός, CARL, 46
(4) ὁ θιάς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, CARL, 50
(5) ὁ δεσποτὴς Ἄδεμ, CARL, 51
(6) ὁ ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενος Λόγος, CARL, 47
(7) ὁ Λόγος γένος αὐτῆς, CARL, 50, 53(3).
(8) ἡ παρουσία τοῦ Λόγου, CARL, 49, 53
(9) ἡ παρουσία τοῦ Λόγου, CARL, 53

The objective aspect:

(2) τὸ ἡμετέρον (ἢ ἀνθρωπόν ὥς θεντὸν ἢ τοῦ Κυρίου) σῶμα, CARL, 47(4),
(3) ἡ προσωπείας ἢ χριστιανης σῶμα, CARL, 47, 50(3), 51(4).
(3) ὁ ἀνθρωπός, CARL, 49
(4) ἡ ἀνθρωποποίησις, CARL, 50
(5) τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἄντος, CARL, 50
(6) ἡ μορφή τοῦ θεοῦ, CARL, 47, 50
(7) ἡ ἀνθρωπότης σωφρονίς, CARL, 50

The subjective aspect is obviously more frequent than the objective one, but as the text reveals, both must be kept together. Thus the anointing of Christ refers on the one hand to the Son as human subject (or to put it in Athanasian language, "the Son as man", or "the Son become man", or "the Son in a human way", or "the Son as Son of man", or "the Son become flesh" or "come to be in the flesh", or "the Son's incarnate or embodied presence"), and on the other hand, to the Son's humanity (or "the human body", or "the human flesh", or "the man", or "the humanity", or "the human aspect", or "the human nature", or "the form of the servant"). As in the case of the exaltation, so in the case of the anointing
the governing principle of Athanasius' Christological thought is Soteriology. The Saviour is the Son of God becoming man and securing in Himself as man and in His own humanity the grace which saves men. That He gives and receives to Himself as man and to His humanity is in fact given and received for the sake of all men. The following statements sum up Athanasius' doctrine: "Avtos avtoton agiakxi, eva hmeis en tē altheia agiastōmen. O de avtōn agiakxwn Kuriōs esto tov agiakxen. Pws on touto ginetai; pws de touto legeti η ὁμιλία, 'Ean h Logos on tov Patroσ, avtōs emantē anerwpos yenomenei elwmē to Pneuma kal emantēn anerwpon yenomenein en tov- tov agiakxi, eva loipōn en emoil altheia dunetai (o de Logos o sós alētheia esto) oι tāntes agiastōsin. (CAR1,46δ). And further on, amélelo woster pre tis enanérwphsewos Logos on en xorhígeti tois agiois ws iōiōn to Pneuma, oútwes kal anerwpos yenomeneos, agiakestic tois tāntes tō Pneumati...kal avtōs esto idios σal lamabānwn, idios méν ws theou Logos, lamabānwn de ws anerwpos. Oūk ērwa o Logos esto, H Logos esto, o theiosthuios, εικε γαρ πάντα καλ όσ' εχει, αλλ' oι anerwptoi εχονον, o ροχκén exkontes του lamabanein en autō kai di' autōn. Avtōn yar wun yenomenein anerwphlwnos ξρίσθαι, hmeis esmen oι en autē χρισμενον. (CAR1,48). In fact there is hardly any major statement of Athanasius on this issue of the anointing of Christ in this section which does not contain a soteriological qualification. Here we have the mystery of the Son of God becoming man for the sake of men without ceasing to be God and without failing to secure in Himself as man His grace to all humanity. As Athanasius puts it, tēs yar en autē sarkōs kratēs agiastēs, kai autōn legeomēnou di' autēn eliphēnai ws anerwpon, hmeis epakolouthousan exomien tēn tov Pneumatos kairin ek tov plērōmatos autōn lamabá- nontes (CAR1,50).
In the final section of CAI (i.e., chs. 54–64) Athanasius clarifies further the same Christological doctrine as he contrasts the Arian exegesis of Hebr. 1:4 (affirming the Son’s becoming better than...) to that of the Orthodox.

He begins by explaining that the key to the right exegesis of this verse (and other such like verses) is to discern the time, the person and the event which are connected with it (ἀναγκαῖον ἵστην καθ’ οὖν εἶπεν ὁ ἀπόστολος λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὸ πράγμα διότι ἐγραφεῖ πιστῶς ἐκλαμβάνειν, CAI, 54). He also explains that it was failure to apply this triple exegetical key to the Apostolic kerygma – a key which is in fact suggested by Acts 8:34 and Mat. 24:3 – that led to the heresy of Hymenaeus and Alexander who were mistaken about the event of the resurrection (I. Tim. 1:20), or the heresy of the Galatians who had an untimely love for the time of the circumcision, or the heresy of the Jews who thought that it was a Prophet and not a Divine Person that Is. 7:14 Deut. 18:15 and Is. 53:7 envisaged. Similarly, it is the same failure that governs the heretical exegesis of the Arians. (CAI, 54). On the contrary the application of the above exegetical key to the interpretation of Hebr. 1:4 shows, that the verse refers to the divine economy of the Saviour’s advent to us, and stresses the fundamental difference between the ministry of the Son and the ministry of His servants whether angels or prophets. Athanasius finds it particularly important that the term of the comparison between the Son and the angels and prophets is not μετὰ but κρατῶν, and contends that this rules out any ὁμογενεῖον and rather reveals a difference of natures. Certainly the γενόμενος κρατῶν does not mean that the Son is a creature, because it presupposes the γεννηθές Χῖς, ως,
according to John 1:3 and Ps. 103:24, must be distinguished from
the ἀγνωτον υἱόν (Job 1:2 and Gen. 21:5), with regard to nature.
Only the Valentinians and the Carpocratians, says Athanasius,
spoke of Christ and the angels as having the same nature (CAR1, 55
and 56). The Church, however, follows the plain teaching of the
scriptures, which distinguishes clearly between the Son who is
Creator and Lord and the sons who are creatures and servants
(Ps. 88:7 and 85:8). By pointing to biblical examples of compa-
rison, as for instance Joseph and his brothers or Rachel and Leia,
Athanasius clarifies his point, that in the case of things sharing
the same nature (ἴμοιη) the terms of the comparison are those of
more or less, whereas in the case of things dissimilar (ἑτεροοὐσία),
as in the case of the Son and His servants in Hebr. 1:4, the term
κρατῶν is more appropriate (CAR1, 57). The same distinction
between the Son and the creatures is emphasized in Hebr. 1:8 and
1:10-11, where it is clearly stated that the former is the Creator
who remains for ever, whereas the latter are created and come to
have existence out of nothing (CAR1, 58).

In discussing further the reasonable and correct under-
standing of Hebr. 1:4 Athanasius expounds the difference between
the Son and the angels in a dynamic sense. The angels' ministry
was only connected with the giving of the Law, but the Son's
ministry was connected with the New Testament (CAR1, 59-61). Finally,
before concluding that Hebr. 1:4 must be understood with
reference to the ministry and the saving economy of the Logos
when He became man (CAR1, 64), Athanasius points out that the
γένομαις, which applies to the Son in Hebr. 1:5, equally applies
to the Father in Ps. 30:3 and 9:10. In neither case does the verb
gammai imply a reference to ousia or to beginning of existence.
The statements are connected with the notion of divine ministry
or the help and salvation which the Son and the Father give to
men who are in need.

The Christological phraseology of this section is similar to
that of the previous sections. The most notable statements and
phrases are the following: CARL, 55 distinguishes τὸ ἄνθρωπινα
from the θεότης, while it insists that the same Divine subject, the
Son, γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος. CARL, 59 speaks of the ἐναρμόνια ἐπιστήμη τοῦ Λόγου, or τὴν παρ' αὐτῷ γενομένην οἴκονομικά, as the terms of
the comparison between Christ and the angels in Hebr. 2. Both expres-
sions seem to refer to the Logos as man subjectively and objective-
ly. CARL, 60 explains that the statement John 1:14 has "the flesh"as
the first term of reference: τὸ γενέσθαι τῇ σαρκὶ λογικόμεθα, but
it also has as a second term of reference the Logos—become-man: τοῦ
το κατὰ δεύτερον συμανόμενον ἐκλάβωμεν διὰ τὸ γενομένον αυτὸν ἄν-
θρωπον. This clarification is made with the purpose to explain
the parallel point that the γέγονεν ἔγγυος of Hebr. 7:22 presuppos-
es τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἐγγύη τὴν παρ' αὐτῷ γενομένην. The comprehen-
sive principle behind these two statements is that as John 1:14,
so Hebr. 7:22: ὥσ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ γεγενηθαν αἰώνιες, ἀλλ' ἐλθὲν τῇ ἄνθρωπος ὡς ἔδωκαν τὸ γεγενηθαν καὶ νῦν λογίζεται.
CARL, 62 indicates that the statement ὁ λόγος γέγονεν σάρξ is equal
to the statement ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, and explains that the
γέγονεν, like the verbs ἔποιήσεν and ἔκτισεν which are also appli-
ced to the Logos, should be taken as referring to His incarnate pre-
sence ( ἐλθὲν τῇ ἐναρμόνια αὐτοῦ παρουσίαν λαμβανόμενον) . CARL, 63
speaks of the γέγονεν in terms of τὴν ἐλθὲν ἄνθρωπος παρ' αὐτοῦ
That then is the Christology of CAH? The starting point is undoubtedly the eternal Logos-Son of God who is and remains God in His being. The content of Christology, however, includes the fact of His Incarnation, the becoming man of the eternal Son of God. In Athanasian terms, He who is God in His being, has also become man in His economy. The being and the becoming, which apply to the same subject, the Son, do not share the same object. The former refers to the being of the Godhead of the Son, and the latter, to the flesh of His economy. The term "flesh", often exchanged for other terms such as "body", "humanity", "form of the servant" and even "man according to nature", depending on the particular biblical context and the topic of the discussion, seems to have a comprehensive meaning referring to the objective side of humanity which is common to all particular men. This is never fully explained, just as the being of the Godhead of the Logos also remains inexplicable, because the central point of the Arian-Athanasian dispute is the identity of the Son-Logos of God both in Himself and in His Incarnation. Athanasius' doctrine is by and large a series of basic affirmations without any particular explanations. The most central of all these affirmations, around which all the others seem to revolve, is that Christ is the Incarnate Son and Logos of God and not a creature. The basis for such an affirmation is materially biblical and doctrinally soteriological. If Christ is not God incarnate, then, neither the biblical witness is correct, nor is the salvation of men an accomplished reality.
(iv) **Contra Arius II**

The divine and true Son of God continues to be the central theme of Athanasius' Christology in CAR2 as it was in CAR1, even though the term Logos surpasses in frequency the term Son. The fact is that both terms are synonymous and refer to the Divine Person of Christ. There are some 291 explicit references to the term Logos and 223 occurrences of the term Son in CAR2. The other Christological titles are: Lord(122), Wisdom (67), Christ(60), Logos(28), God(25), Saviour(23), Creator(18), King(18), Eicon(12), Effulgence(9), Power (6), Despote (4), Character (4), Self-Wisdom (3), Living Counsel(2), Light (2), and the following hapax-legomena: Inmate Energy, Life, Glory, Child of God, Hand of God, Only-Begotten, Supreme-king-of-all. A closer look at the contents of the treatise shows that although theology predominates, the Incarnation does appear and is discussed, though obliquely, at a number of points, which provide notable clarifications of Athanasius' understanding of Christ and His humanity. These points will be the main scope of this chapter, which, following the same method as in the previous chapters, will provide a brief review of the contents of CAR2.

The contents of CAR2 can be structured in the following way:

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The above general structural analysis of CAR2 shows that it continues the refutation of Arian biblical arguments which was undertaken in the final part of CAR1 (i.e. chs. 37-64). The five introductory chapters pave the way for the rest of the treatise.

CAR2.1 introduces the Arian claim that the Son is a creature based on Prov.8:22 and Hebr.3:2 and offers Athanasius’ first and general reply. The latter’s contention is that the Arians not only misunderstand these verses, but choose to ignore the fact that the statement John 1:1, which unequivocally states the Godhood and preexistence of the Logos, precedes the statements John 1:14, Acts 2:36, Prov. 8:22, Hebr. 1:4, Phil.2:7 and Hebr.3:1-2, all of which are said of the Logos in a human fashion, and not with reference to His Godhood, on account of His becoming Son of man (τά τοιαύτα γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχοντα τὴν αὐτὴν ἐχει δύναμιν καὶ διάνοιαν βλέποντα εἰς εὐθείαν, καὶ δεικνύοντα τὴν θεότητα τοῦ λόγου, καὶ τά ἀνθρωπικὰς λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτοῦ οἰκονομεῖνα αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν ανθρώπον).

CAR2.2 exposes the discrepancies which arise in the doctrine of creation from the Arian habit of alienating the Son Logos and Wisdom of God, through whom all things were made, from the divine being, and CAR2.3 outlines the epistemological principle on the basis of which the Arian exegesis is false. According to this principle, words as such do not enshrine meanings because they
do not precede but follow and are determined by realities (οὗ γὰρ
αἱ λέξεις τὴν φύσιν παραλαμβάνει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡ φύσις τὰς λέξεις
eἷς διὰ τὴν ἐξαναπαύσεις μεταβάλλει. Καὶ γὰρ οὐ πρῶτον τῶν οὐσιῶν αἱ
λέξεις, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ μέσω πρῶτον, καὶ δεύτερα τούτων αἱ λέξεις).
Thus, words like 'son', a 'thing made' and 'servant' can be used — and
Scripture provides many such instances, as, e.g., III Kings 1:19 and
1:26 — in different ways with different meanings, or even synonymous-
ly according to the natural context to which they are attached. On
this basis Athanasius argues that the Arian literalist argument
from biblical terms cannot be sustained. In CAR2.4 he shows that
the terms which the Arians employ for denying the Son could not
sustain an argument, either because their meaning is not determined
from their natural context, or because they could, as it seems most
likely, be applied to the Son-become-man and be connected with His
humanity (καὶ τοιούτῳ δυνάμει σωτῆρι τῷ γεγενηθαί αὐτὸν ἀνθρώπων πέρας
tὰς τοιαύτας λέξεις ἐκπροφέτευν ἐπὶ τὸ ἁνθρώπων αὐτοῦ). This last
argument is particularly interesting for our investigation because
it exposes once more Athanasius' unfaltering Christological perspec-
tives. The Incarnation does not imply any confusion between the
humanity and the divinity of the Son, and therefore, what is said of
His humanity, should not embarrass in any way His Godhood. But it is
the first epistemological argument which Athanasius pursues here.
Both in the second part of CAR2.4 and in CAR2.5 Athanasius shows
how Hebr. 3:2, Prov.8:22 and Ps. 115:6 and particularly the verbs
ἐξαναπάυει, ἐγένετο and ἐκπροφέτευσε could all understood in terms of
the verb ἐγένετο, as numerous instances in the Scriptures suggest
(e.g. Is.38:19–20, IV Kings 20:18, Gen.4:1 and 48:5, Job 1:2,
Ps. 103:24, etc). Hence, his contention that the Arian claims
could not be regarded as biblical.

Having thus argued that words cannot be understood apart from their proper context and especially the realities to which they refer, Athanasius embarks upon the application of this principle to the precise texts which are put forward by the Arians. He begins with the text Hebr.3:1f and focuses attention upon the phrase πιστόν ὄντα, which relates to Christ as a High-Priest and to the efficacy of his sacrifice. First of all, he explains that πιστός is used in a double sense in the scriptures. It is used theologically to denote God's trustworthiness (τὸ ἔξιστον), and also anthropologically to denote man's faithfulness towards God (τὸ πιστεύειν). On this basis, he says that Hebr.3:1f must be understood in the former sense, as revealing the immutability and unchangeableness of the Son in his human economy and incarnate presence. The precise statement of Athanasius is this: Ὑδὸς ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ Θεῷ, πιστός ἐστι καὶ αὐτὸς ὀφελῶν πιστεύειν, ἐν οἷς ἐν λέγῃ καὶ ποιῇ, αὐτός ἐπετέρων μένων, καὶ μὴ ἀλλοιωμένου ἐν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ οἰκονομίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐνορμῇ παρουσίᾳ. The crucial point emerging here is that one should maintain a distinction between who the Son is as God and who He is as man. Being God and becoming man are two coexisting and parallel conditions which do not embarrass each other, even if the former has a soteriological effect upon the latter. In the second instance and in dealing with the High-Priesthood of Christ, Athanasius explains that this refers to His Inhomination and to His sacrifice on the Cross and has nothing to do with His natural and divine birth from the Father. In other words, the Son is not said to have been made Apostle and High-Priest when He was born, but when He "became flesh", or "when He put on our flesh", or
"when he raised up the body from the dead as he offered himself for us". The Apostle did not write the Hebr. 3:1f to denote what pertains to the being of the Logos, or His natural birth from the Father, but what pertains to His descent among men and His high-priesthood which accompanied it. Athanasius clarifies this further by examining Aaron's priesthood and comparing it to Christ's. The principle that he defends is, that as Aaron did not become a man when he became a priest, so the Son or Logos of God did not become such when He was made our High-Priest. The significant difference between Aaron and the Son as High-Priests lies in the fact that, whereas the former, being man, became High-Priest by putting on an appropriate robe, the latter, being God, became High-Priest by putting on human flesh or a body which He took from Mary in order to effect a perfect sacrifice. (CAR2,7). As Aaron did not cease to be man when he put on the robe of high-priesthood, so the Son did not cease to be God when He put on the flesh and became High-Priest. To have become High-Priest follows His becoming man. In other words, the time when He is said to have been made High-Priest is the time of His Incarnation, and the person envisaged is not the Son as God but the Son as man. This is plainly revealed in Hebr. 2:14-18 which forms the natural context of Hebr. 3:1f (CAR2,8). Athanasius particularly stresses the phrase "He was made like the brethren" as the presupposition to His becoming High-Priest in order to conclude, that the High-Priesthood of the Son refers to His human economy: οὐχοῦν περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπον οἰκονομίας τοῦ λόγου γράφων ὁ Παῦλος ἔλεγεν, πιστῶν δύνα τῷ ποιήσαντί αὐτῶν καὶ οὐ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ λόγου (CAR2,9).
In CAR2,10 Athanasius defends the same points as he contrasts the trustworthiness of Christ - a sign of His true Godhood - to the falsehood of the gods of the Greeks, or to the limited and different trustworthiness of the Jewish leader Moses. He insists that Hebr.3:5 refers to the "corporeal presence of the Logos" as well as to His unchangeability in His human condition. Thus he says, that the Apostle, on the one hand mentions His Inhoration on account of His priesthood, and on the other hand hastens to mention His Godhood when he contrasts Him to Moses. Hebr.3:5 says that Moses was a servant whereas Christ was Son, and that the former was trustworth> in the house but not over the house as the latter was. The difference was, as Athanasius explains it, that whereas Moses was a man in the flesh who needed the flesh in order to exist, like all other men, Christ was the Lord in the flesh who preexisted and did not need the flesh but put it on in order to sanctify it. Moses was a servant in the form of the servant, but Christ was Son and Lord in the form of the servant (CAR2,10).

Finally in CAR2,11a Athanasius concludes his discussion on Hebr.3:1-2 by drawing the following conclusion. This verse does not refer to the birth of the Son from the Father, but to the economy of the good pleasure of the Father according to which the Son became man and as such He remained trustworthy and was said to be a High-Priest. It is to this economy that Prov.8:22, and particularly the statement about God's Wisdom (the Son), really refers to. It does not, therefore, make any difference, says Athanasius, whether one says "that the Son became or was made, or was built into, or was created, or was a servant, or son of a servant, or son of man,"
or bridegroom, or brother... etc., as long as one presupposes that He became man. All these words and statements then, pertaining to man's constitution, do not refer to the being of the Logos, when they are applied to Him, but to the fact that He became man: καὶ τὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τὰ λεξικόνα τῆς ἀνθρώπων συνόδευσε ὅταν τυγχάνει δύνα ὁ τότε τοιαύτα οὐ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Λόγου, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπων αὐτὸν γεγενήθησαν σημαίνει (CAR2, 11a).

A number of important points connected with Athanasius' understanding of the Incarnation emerge from this exegesis of Hebr. 3:1-2. Firstly it is clear that his primary aim is to establish that the subject of these verses, who is said to have been made "Jesus the Apostle and High-Priest of our confession", is not a creature but the Son of God, and that His being made such and such does not imply any change in His Godhood. Secondly and more importantly for our present investigation, it appears that, in asserting that the Son's Apostleship and High-Priesthood are connected with His Incarnation, Athanasius provides a number of statements which clarify this doctrine. As in the case of CAR1, 37-64, where he expounded his understanding of Phil. 2:9-10, Psa. 44:8 and Hebr. 1:9, so here Athanasius gives us two types of statements connected with the event of the Incarnation. On the one hand he speaks of it subjectively as a becoming flesh or man, and therefore Apostle and High-Priest, of the Son or Logos of God, without this involving any change in His divine being or Godhood, and on the other hand he speaks of it objectively as involving the assumption of human flesh, or human body, or the form of the servant, or flesh and blood, or human constitution... etc., by the same. These aspects are so intimately and indissolubly interconnected that they are not only asserted
together whenever they are mentioned, but also give rise to a number of abstract phrases which include them both. Accordingly, the phraseology of the incarnation contained in this section of CAR2 can be arranged as follows:

(a) the subjective aspect:
CAR2, 7: ὁ λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο; CAR2, 8, γέγονεν ἀνθρώπος ὁ Κύριος; ibid., σάρξ ἐγενέτο; ibid., γεγονότος ἀνθρώπου; ibid., τὸν Κύριον ὁ ἀνθρώπον; ibid., ὁ Πατήρ ἐποιήσαν ἀνθρώπον; ibid., κατὰ κάντα ἀμοιβαία αὐτὸν τὸς ἀδελφοῖς; CAR2, 9, γέγονεν ἀνθρώπος; ibid., ἀμοιβαία κατὰ κάντα τὸς ἀδελφοῖς; CAR2, 10, ἀνθρώπος γενόμενος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς; ibid., ἀδελφὸς ἡμῶν ἐχρηστάτως γενόμενος ἀνθρώπος; CAR2, 11a, ἐκκοιτήσας ἡ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπος καὶ συνέσταται; ibid., ἐγένετο, πεποιήθη, ἐκτίστη, καθελθήσας, δοῦλος, νοὸς καιδοκίμης, νός ἀνθρώπου, κατεστέθη, ἐπεδήμητρεν, νυμφὸς, ἀδελφόδος, ἀδελφός; ibid., ἀνθρώπον αὐτὸν γεγενήθησαί.

(b) the objective aspect:
CAR2, 7, τὴν ἡμετέραν σάρκα ἐνεδόσατο; ibid., ἤγειρε ἐκ νεκρῶν τὸ σῶμα; ibid., ἔλαβε τὴν ἀπὸ γῆς σάρκα, ἀναβὰν ἐσχισμὸς ἐμπέρα τοῦ σώματος; CAR2, 8, τὴν σάρκα λαβὼν ἐκαλύπτεστο τάοτη; ibid., ἐνδυσάμενος τὸ σῶμα τὸ γεννητὸν καὶ κτιστὸν; ibid., αἵματι καὶ σαρκίς μετέσχε; ibid., ἀπέρματος ἀβραδίων ἐπιλαμβάνεται; CAR2, 9, αἵματι καὶ σαρκίς μετέσχε παραπλησίως ἡμῶν; ibid., τὴν ὅμοιαν ἐνεδόσατο σάρκα; ibid., θεὸς ἐν σαρκὶ; ibid., ἀναήζει τὴν σάρκα; ibid., Κύριος ὁ ἐν τῇ μορφῇ τοῦ οὐλοῦ; ibid., ἔλαβε ὅμοιον ἡμῖν σῶμα.

(c) the subjective and the objective aspects: phraseology,
CAR2, 6, ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη οἰκονομία καὶ ἡ ἐνσαρκώς παρουσία (αὐτοῦ); ibid., ἡ ἐν ἀνθρώπου αὐτοῦ καθόδος καὶ ἀρχιερευσάνη; CAR2, 9, ἡ κατὰ ἀνθρώπου οἰκονομία τοῦ λόγου; CAR2, 10, ἡ σωματικὴ τοῦ λόγου παρουσία; ibid., ἡ ἐνανθρώπης αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀρχιερευσάνη; and finally,
CAR2,11a, ἡ οικουμένη ἡ κατ’ εὐδοκίαν τοῦ Πατρὸς.

(c) The subjective and the objective aspects: statements,

CAR2,7, ἀπεστάλη...ὅπως δὴ τὴν ἁμετέραν ἐνεπόδατο σάρκα; ibid., ἀρχιερεύς γέγονε, ὅτε... ἤγερεν ἐκ γεννήματος ἀνθρώπου τὸ σῶμα; CAR2,8, λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν καὶ θεός...καὶ αὐτὸς ἔλαβε τὴν ἀπὸ γῆς σάρκα...ἐνα ἔχων τὸ προσφέρειν ὑπάτος ὁ ἀρχιερεύς ὕπατον προσενεχθηκέν τῷ Πατρὶ... ibid., λόγος ὁν ὁμοουργός ὑστερον πεποίηται ἀρχιερεύς ἐννοούμενος σῶμα τὸ γεννητὸν καὶ ποιητὸν ὅπερ καὶ προσενεχθηκέν ὑπναίται ὑπὲρ ἠμῶν, διὸ καὶ λεγεῖται πεποίηθαι; CAR2,9, πεποίηται...καὶ ἀπόστολος γέγονεν... ὅτε παραπλησίως ἦμιν μετέσχε καὶ αὐτὸς αἰματος καὶ σαρκός; ibid., γέγονεν ἑλεήμων καὶ πιστὸς ἀρχιερεύς...ὅτε κατὰ πάντα τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς ὁμοιόθη, ὁμοιόθη δὲ τὸτε ὅτε γέγονεν ἀνθρώπος ἐννοούμενος τὴν ἁμετέραν σάρκα; ibid., τότε ἔσχεν ἀδελφούς, ὅτε τὴν ὀμολογοῦν ἠμῶν ἐνεπόδατο σάρκα ἦν καὶ προσφέρων αὐτὸς ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἀρχιερεύς ὁμολογοῦσθε καὶ γέγονεν ἑλεήμων καὶ πιστὸς...; CAR2,10, ὅ λογος τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐνεκεῖν τῆς σάρκος γέγονεν ἀνθρώπος, καὶ Κύριος ἦν ἐν τῇ μορφῇ τοῦ θανάτου ἦν; ibid., τὸ ἐποίηθαι...δεξίων... ὅτε πρὸς ἐλαβε ἐμοῦν ἠμῶν σῶμα, διὸ καὶ ἀδελφὸς ἦμιν ἐκχωμάτισθαι γενομένος ἀνθρώπος; CAR2,11, πάντα...τὰ λεξεῖδια τῆς ἀνθρώπων συντάσεως ἕδρα τυχάνει. ὅτα, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔ τὸν οὐσίαν τοῦ λόγου ἄλλα τὸ ἀνθρώπου αὐτοῦ γεγενήθη ται σημαίνει.

These texts clearly show the structure of Athanasius' Christology and particularly his understanding of the Incarnation. Christ is the eternal and true Son or Logos of God who in His person (i.e., subjectively) becomes man and as such is made and is called Apostle and High-Priest, not by changing His divine being or Godhood, but by means of an economy which is pleasing to the Father and which entails the assumption or putting on of flesh or body, or the form of the servant, i.e., the entire constitution of human
nature. In this Christology we have the same Subject but in a
double subjectivity, divine and human (i), because of the theology
(the divine being, or Godhood, or the natural birth from the Father)
and the economy of the Father’s good pleasure (the assumption or
putting on of flesh or body or all that men have, or the human
constitution objectively understood), both of which are His. The
error of the Arians is that they deliberately focus attention on
the economy in order to deny the theology of the Son and obscure
His double subjectivity. The remedy to this error is epitomized
in the following texts which are the pivots of St Athanasius’ teach-
ing:

**CAR2:6**, Υἱὸς ὁν τοῦ ἁληθινοῦ θεοῦ... αὐτὸς ἀτρεπτος μένων καὶ μὴ
ἀλλοτριωμένος ἐν τῇ ἀνθρωπινῇ οἰκονομίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐνσάρχῳ παρουσίᾳ.

**CAR2:7**, οὗ τὴν οὐσίαν ἥρα τοῦ Λόγου, οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκ Πατρός φυσικήν
γέννησιν σημαίνει θέλων ὁ Ἀδρόστολος εὔρεις, Πιστὸν ὑντα τῷ ποιή-
σαντι αὐτὸν...ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰς ἀνθρώπους αὐτοῦ κάθοδον καὶ ἀρχιερωσύ-
νην γενομένην.

**CAR2:8**, οὐκ ἀλλος γέγονεν τὴν σάρκα λαμβάνῃ ἀλλ’ ἐν ἐκάλυ-
πτετο ταύτῃ.

**CAR2:9**, περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν οἰκονομίαν τοῦ Λόγου γράφων
ὁ Παύλος ἔλεγε, Πιστὸν ὑντα τῷ ποιήσαντί αὐτὸν, καὶ οὐ περὶ τῆς
οὐσίας τοῦ Λόγου.

**CAR2:11a**, τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ γέννησι τοῦ Πατρός (ὁ Υἱὸς), τῇ δὲ οἰκονο-
μίᾳ καὶ ἐδόθην τοῦ Πατρός ἐκποίησιν ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἀνθρώπος καὶ συνίστα-
tαι.

It is within this same Christological perspective that Athana-
sius interpreters Acts 2:36 and particularly the phrase “whom God
made Lord and Christ”, which the Arians use as evidence for arguing
that the Son is a creature. (CAR2,11b-18a). His first comment in 
CAR2,11b is that the text under discussion does not say that God 
made Himself a Son or a Logos, but that He made the already existing 
Son and Logos, Lord and King. But in CAR2,12 he argues as previously, 
that Acts 2:36 does not refer to the Godhood (εἴς τὴν θεότητα), 
but to the human economy (ἡ ἄνθρωπον οἰκονομία) which the Son un-
derwent for us. The argument runs as follows. If the subject of 
Acts 2:36 is Jesus the crucified, then the verse does not refer to 
the being of the Logos (ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Λόγου), but to the humanity, or, 
literally, to the Logos in His humanity (κατὰ τὸ ἄνθρωπον ἀδρόν 
κατανόον). Indeed the statement that He was made Lord and Christ 
must be understood with reference to us, i.e. in the sense that 
God demonstrated His Son to us to have been really Lord and Christ 
as the ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τῆς ὑποδοτησιμότητας of Acts 2:22 suggests. The 
meaning then of Acts 2:36 is that "He was shown to be not simply a 
man, but God in a body and as such Lord and Christ". This is plain-
ly stated in John 5:18 where the query of the Jews against Christ 
is explained. In Acts 2:36, says Athanasius, we are not given the 
beginning of His being Lord and Christ, but the beginning of His 
manifestation of being such and such. In CAR2,13 Athanasius explains 
further that to argue for the opposite, is to fall into the Samo-
stan position which fails to understand the preexistent Lordship 
and Kingship of the Son which was revealed to Abraham, Moses, the 
people of Sodom and Gomorra (Gen.19:24) and to David(Ps.109:1, 44: 
7, 144:13). This preexistent status of the Son as Lord and King or 
Image and Logos of the Father, says Athanasius, excludes the view 
that Acts 2:36 refers to the being of the Son (ἡ οὐσία τοῦ 
Υιοῦ), and suggests that it refers to His Lordship over us which
was established among us when He became man and redeemed us all through the Cross and thus became Lord and King of all (τὴν εἰς ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦ κυριότητα γενομένην ὅτε γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῷ σταυρῷ πάντων λυτρωμένοις πάντων γέγονεν Κύριος καὶ Βασιλεὺς). Athanasius further argues, that as in Ps. 30:3 and Ps. 9:10 God is said to become defender and refuge for His own, without this implying that His being is a becoming (γεννητόν), likewise Acts 2:36 does not imply that the being of the Logos is a creature. The text in question refers to the subjection of all to the Logos after their fall (τὴν μετὰ τοῦ τῶν πάντων ὁποταγήν), or to the establishment of His dominion over all (τὴν εἰς πάντας γενομένην τοῦ κυρίου κυριότητα). Athanasius' argument in CAR2,14 continues to run along the same lines and gives rise to further refinements in his exegesis. It was we men, he says, who fell from His dominion through sin, and we men who obtained a beginning of His being our Lord (ἡμᾶς ἄρχὴν ἔχομεν τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὸν Κύριον ἡμῶν). In this light Acts 2:36 does not and could not refer to Himself acquiring the beginning of being Lord (οὐχ ἄρχῃν τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὸς ἔχει τότα).

In spite of the clarity of his position Athanasius does not let the matter rest with the above explanation alone, but moves to an explanation of the Incarnational setting of the text under dispute and thus provides us with a crystal clear picture of his Christology. The following text forming the core of Athanasius' teaching deserves to be fully quoted:

So then, God being good and Father of the Lord, having pity and desiring to be known by all, makes His own Son put on a human body and become man, and be called Jesus, that offering Himself for all in this body, He might deliver all from deceitful religion and corruption, and might Himself become Lord and King of all. It is of this
kind of becoming Lord and King that Peter speaks in saying, "He has made Him Lord" and "has sent Christ", which is equal to saying that the Father in making Him man (for to be made belongs to man) did not simply make Him man, but has made Him in order that He may be Lord of all men and sanctify all through anointing. Because, though the Logos of God, existing in the form of God, took the form of a servant, yet the assumption of the flesh did not make a servant of the Logos, who was by nature Lord. Rather, it was an emancipation of all humanity that took place through the Logos; as for the Logos, who is by nature Lord, in becoming man, He is made Lord of all and Christ, that is, that He may sanctify all with the Spirit.

(CAR2,14)

This text is extremely rich in nuances, but its central thought is, that it is through the Incarnation of His Son that God has provided the way for fallen men coming again under His dominion, or that the Son is made men's Lord and King. Thus, to say that the Son was made Lord and Christ, is equal to saying that the Son was made man. The subject of this statement is the Son of God, who as God, is always Lord and King, but who is said to have become what He was, because He also became man. The Incarnation which is the key notion here, is stated in two ways which imply two aspects, one objective and another subjective, denoting respectively, what is assumed by the Logos, and who the Logos becomes or is said to become in this event. The objective aspect is explained in terms of the putting on of a human body or flesh, or even the assumption of the form of the servant. The subjective aspect is presented as a becoming man, or being made a man. The purpose of the Incarnation is both to accomplish the sacrifice which delivers all people from their deceitful journey away from God and from the ensuing corruption, and to make the Son the Lord who would guide the people and sanctify them all with the Holy Spirit. As for the implications of the Incarna-
tion, firstly it is stressed that the Son's becoming man and consequent-ly Lord and Christ did not mean that he ceased to be God and Lord and Christ as before, but rather that He becomes in the flesh what He is always as God (ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄλτοτο καὶ τότε κατὰ σάρκα κεφαλὴ). Secondly it implies that the Son's becoming man and Lord and Christ has resulted in the liberation of all humanity (ἐλευθέρως πάσης τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος). Humanity here seems to have not only the intrinsic sense relating to the humanity of the Incarnate Son, but also the extrinsic sense relating to all human beings. Thus the Incarnation has a distinctive universalist soteriological implication in all its aspects.

In CAR2, 15 and 16 Athanasius pursues yet another line of argumentation, again connected with the interpretation of Acts 2:36, and again bearing upon the doctrine of the Incarnation. Peter, says Athanasius, addressed this statement to the Jews to counter their two misconceptions concerning Christ, namely, that Christ, who was to come, could not suffer (as John 12:34 reveals), and also, that he could not be the Logos coming to be in the flesh but a mere man (ψιλὸς ἀνθρωπος) like the kings of Israel. Citing Luke 24:26 and John 10:35-36 Athanasius exposes the Jewish error and goes on to cite Deut. 28:66, Ps.109:1, Ps.15:10 and other texts to show that, far from being a mere man from the line of David, Christ is Lord and God and the immortal giver of life. He was God in the body and also the Life and the Lord of death. Had He been a mere man, He could not have achieved the destruction of the stronghold of death. Thus Athanasius asserts that Christ is the Son of God who is Lord of all even though He appeared in the shape of a man.
Indeed it is in His becoming man (ἐν τῷ κοσμῆναι ἄνθρωπον) that He was shown to be Lord of the living and the dead, or, putting it otherwise, it is in man (ἐν ἄνθρωπῳ) that God has been pleased to show His dominion and attract everyone to Himself. The fact that this has been achieved shows that He could not be a mere man, because His followers would be man-worshipers (ἀνθρωπολάτραι). So, Athanasius goes on to say in CAR2,17, that Peter’s challenge to the Jews in Acts 2 was ultimately about the divine Son of God the eternal Lord and King through whom the Father is known. Though Acts 2:37 says that most Jews who heard this were actually converted and believed in Christ to be truly God’s Son and as such eternal Lord and King, the Arians, says Athanasius, are determined to remain Jews refusing to hear the clear voice of John 14:9 (“He who has seen me has seen the Father”), or to understand the ἐξο mégα of Acts 2:36 in the light of such verses as Gen.27:29 and 27:37. But more importantly, says Athanasius in CAR2,18a, the problem with the Arians is that they insist in seeing Acts 2:36 as referring to the being of the Logos inspite of Peter’s confession in Matth.16:16 that He was “the Christ the Son of the living God”. Had they paid more attention to Peter’s speech in Acts 2, the Arians would have noted that the Son is the Giver of the Spirit which clearly demonstrates His true Godhood. In that case, they would have understood, that the particular statement of Peter in 2:36 was said with reference to the Son’s humanity (ὅτι τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ).

Briefly stated Athanasius’ exegesis of Acts 2:36 is as follows: The statement “He was made Lord and Christ refers to the Logos become man (CAR2,11b). The verb “was made” of Acts 2:36 is parallel to the verb “He was proved to be” of John 5:18(CAR2,12). The Arian
understanding of Acts 2:36 is akin to the Samosatean and the Jewish which fail to understand the distinction between the Logos' divine being and His personal involvement with us through the Incarnation (CAR2,13). The key to this distinction is the soteriological perspective of biblical Christology according to which man's fall from the Logos calls for His becoming man and restoring as man His dominion and kingship over all men. It is on this account that God the Son is said to become what He always has been (CAR2,14). This was precisely Peter's intention in Acts 2 (CAR2,15). He knew that Christ was not a mere man (CAR2,16). The Arians retain the Jewish position in rejecting the Son (CAR2,17), but Peter and the Jews who believed his kerygma knew who the Logos was in His ousia and who and why He became as man (CAR2,18a). This exegesis is rooted in the same Christology as the exegesis of the previous Arian texts. Athanasius primary concern is the distinction between the economy and the theology of the Son and Logos of God, the latter being the necessary presupposition of the former. But then, he also ventures, almost unintentionally, to interpret the Incarnation in general terms, and thus he comes to emphasize the unity of subject and the duality of the appellations owing to the presence of the divine and human realities in Christ. This picture is almost complete and sufficient to refute any Arian exegesis, but Athanasius does not become weary from applying it to other biblical and logical arguments of the Arians. Thus he turns to the exegesis of Prov.8:22 which seems to have been the most important Arian locus biblius (for as he says in CAR2,18b the Arians τῷ ἐκ τῶν Παροιμίων ἤπειρ θεραπηκαί τῷ πανταχοῦ) to which he devotes the rest of the treatise.
Although he mentions Prov. 8:22 in the beginning of CAR2.18b, Athanasius does not immediately embark upon the exegesis of this verse. He does that, when he comes to chapter 44, and thenceforth he deals with it till the end of the treatise. The reason for this, as he tells us in the beginning of CAR2.44, is that he devotes chs. 18b-43 to a full discussion of the central Arian claim that the Logos or Son of God is a creature (ἐξήλθα), which forms a sort of prolegomenon for the exegesis of the ἔξωσεν of Prov. 8:22. As he says in CAR2.18b, his first concern is τὸ ἔξωσεν καθ’ ἑαυτό ἐξωσότα. This prolegomenon could be divided into three sections, as we have already indicated in our general structural outline of CAR2. Apart from one text at the very end of this section, no other reference to the Incarnation is contained in it but the exposition entirely revolves around the Godhood of the Son. Since this is not the strict concern of our investigation here, our survey will be brief and restricted to the main points in the argument.

The first section in this prolegomenon (chs. 18b-24a) deals with the Arian understanding of the unique creaturehood of the Son. CAR2.19 recalls a convenient statement from Arius' Exposition to Alexander of Alexandria, which states that the Son is a creature, but not as one of the creatures, or an offspring, but not as one of the offsprings. In his reply Athanasius argues that it is absurd to say that something is and is not a creature! Recalling the biblical story of the Hexaemeron he argues that all creatures were made in six days and have remained ever since what they were made. There is no middle creature in this account, continues Athanasius in CAR2.20. So, one has to decide whether the Logos is a Son of the Father or a creature. To say that He is a higher creature (i.e.
(ἀπερέχετε τῶν ἄλλων τῇ συγκρόσει) does not minimize the fact that He is a creature. This however, is unacceptable to Athanasius because it stands in direct contradiction to the teaching of the scriptures and particularly the verses I Esdr.4:36, John 14:6, Prov.8:30, John 5:17, 5:3, 9:4, and 10:37. In CAR2,21 Athanasius argues on the basis of John 5:17, that the Son, who works all things with the Father, could not be a creature. He also elaborates the principle, that no creature can be strictly a Creator. He insists, that this applies to all creatures including angels, in spite of what Valentinus Marcellinus and Vasilides taught, as well as to stars and men. None of the creatures can be a creative cause. All creatures were created by the Logos. Therefore, the Logos cannot be a creature. This argument is further drawn out in CAR2,22, where it is stressed not only that the Father creates through the Logos, but also that He is made known through the Logos alone. CAR2,23 provides an impressive array of biblical evidences in support of the divinity of the Logos. Ps. 2:7, Matth.3:17 and Matth.4:11 point to a sharp contrast between the Logos and the creatures. In view of the fact that only God is worshiped, according to Acts 10:26, Rev.22:9, Judg.13:16, the verses Ps. 96:7, Hebr.1:6, Is. 44:14, John 13:13, 20:28, Ps. 47:9, Ps. 23:10, and John 16:15, which actually state that the Son is worshiped, do imply that He is God. CAR2,24a actually draws out this conclusion, and adds, that according to John 16:15, the Son, who as Son has all that the Father has, cannot but share with Him not only the honor of receiving worship but of being God.

Having argued on biblical grounds that the Logos or Son
of God could not be a creature, Athanasius turns next to the notion of the Logos and Son as mediator in Creation and to the Arian understanding of it, which he finds erroneous, and attempts to refute. He begins in CAR2,24b with the Arian view which bases the necessity of a mediator-creator in God’s utter transcendence and purity. He recalls an Arian text which claims that creaturely nature cannot be touched as it were by the Father’s pure hand (τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς ἁρδαπος χειρός), and therefore the Father creates only one unique creature who can act as mediator in Creation. In CAR2,25 Athanasius cites Is.40:28 to argue that God does not need a mediator, as if He could become tired in the act of creating, and Matthew 10:29 and 6:25-30 serve to support the claim that creation is not regarded as a lowly work by God. CAR2,26 exposes the absurdity of the Arian notion of a mediator-creator by showing that it necessarily leads to endless mediators-creators. CAR2,27a sharply differentiates between a mediator-servant and a mediator-creator as it argues against the Arian claim that Moses as mediator of the Covenant was an eicon of the Logos as mediator of Creation. For Athanasius διακονησις is sharply distinct from διακονησις. Indeed, whereas there are many διακονοι, e.g. angels, prophets, apostles, Moses, Aaron, and seventy others, there is only one διακονος. In CAR2,27b and 28a Athanasius defends the non creaturely character of the Logos by showing that He is all-able and all-sufficient (ἐναντιον καὶ πληροφορης) in Himself for carrying out any functions, whereas no one of the creatures is such, because they are all interdependent upon one another and constitute together one world like one body. In CAR2,28b Athanasius recalls Is.1:11 and John 5:17 to argue against Asterius’ contention that the Logos learned the act of creating
from the Father, and therefore He could not have known it beforehand or could unlearn it afterwards! Continuing on this point in CAR2, 29 Athanasius asks, why God did not teach others to create but only the Logos, and wonders whether God was envious? Again he asks, whether God needed to teach anyone, and wonders, whether He was unable to create all by Himself? In any case why did He need a mediator, if, according to Ps. 113:11 and Rom. 9:19, He can do whatever He wills?

But it is in CAR2, 30 that Athanasius advances his strongest objection to the Arian contentions. If the Son was made by God in order that we men may be created, then the Son was made for us and not for men for Him! This means that He is our image, or that we are first and He is second in God's mind, or.. etc, etc. Such a blasphemy, says Athanasius, is quite contrary to the teaching of scripture. CAR2, 31 and 32 supply the evidence and the following points are stressed: that we were made for Him and through Him (Col. 1:16); that the Logos abides in the Father and that whatever the Father creates He creates it through the Logos (Gen. 1:13, 1:9, 1:11, 1:26, Ps. 32:9); that the Logos of God is not like that of men because He is the creative will of the Father (Gen. 1:3, 1:6, 1:11, 1:15); that whereas in the case of men there is question and answer, in the case of the Father and Son there is no such phenomenon, because the Father wills and the Logos performs (Ps. 103:24, Ps. 32:6, I Cor. 8:6 and Matth. 17:5); In CAR2, 32 Athanasius contends that the Arians fight the Godhead because they fight God's voice (Matth. 17:5, Prov. 8:25), and the voice of the saints (Hebr. 1:3, I Cor. 1:24, Ps. 35:10, 103:24, Jer. 1:4, John 1:4, 1:1, Luke 1:2 and Ps. 106:20). Finally, they fight this very voice of Creation which declares God and His divine providence (Soph. Sal. 13:5).
The third section of the prolegomenon to the exegesis of Prov. 8:22 (chs. 33–43) is a continuation of the biblical arguments against the notion of a creaturely Son or Logos but presented in a more intensive and rigorous manner. CAR2,33 turns to the N.T. Christological titles of Logos, Effulgence, Son, Character, Eicon and Wisdom and shows their theological import which exposes the Arian error. In CAR2,34 it is explained that the Arians use corporeal human arguments, if only to argue that the Son is a creature. But their teaching is a sort of tare, which is sown into the Catechism of the Church which speaks of God and His Son or Logos or Wisdom. The Arian mistake consists in that the Son of God is measured by a human son and the divine Logos by a human logos, as if the notion of sonship or that of logos are exclusively human! In CAR2,35 Athanasius insists that one should not think of God in a human way, but in a way which advances beyond human nature (μηκέτι ἄνθρωπιος ἀλλὰ ἄλλος ὑπὲρ τὴν ἄνθρωπων φύσιν), because God is not like man (ὁ θεὸς ὃς ὃς ἄνθρωπος ἐστι). This demands a sharp distinction between generation and logos in man and in God, the former being out of nothing and taking place in time, whilst the latter being eternal. In CAR2,36 Athanasius continues his discourse along the same lines. Here he claims that the Logos of God is incomprehensible to us, because God's nature is such. Similarly, it is inconceivable to ask where and how God is, or who is the Father, or how is the Son generated. Such things, says Athanasius, are ineffable for us and peculiar to God's nature (τάτα κράτα ἀρρητον καὶ φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ), and are only known to the Father and the Son. Even when we use the example of the human logos to
speak of the Logos of God, we only point to certain similarities without ever ignoring the differences.

CAR2,37 takes up another Arian problem connected with the N.T. Christological titles. On the basis of a text from Asterius, Athanasius shows that the Arians draw a sharp distinction between the Logos and the Son, or the Wisdom of God and the Son, regarding the former as the eternal Power and Wisdom of God and the latter as one, though of supreme status, among many created powers and wisdoms. In his reply in CAR2,38 Athanasius asks whether the Son exists at all?, and he wonders whether the notion of a Power and Wisdom in God does not actually imply the presence of two 'ungenerated things' in God - something which goes against the Arian theology, or does not suggest that God is a composite being? Such absurdity, says Athanasius in CAR2,39, finds no warrants in scripture. The only distinction that scripture makes at this point is that between the Logos of God (John 1:14 and 1:3) and the 'logoi of God' which are in fact His commandments (Jer.23:29, Ps.1:2, 23, and John 6:63). On the other hand scripture plainly declares that our Lord Jesus Christ is one with the Father as His only Son. It also declares one Logos through whom all things were made. The Arian position not only contradicts this plain teaching, but resembles the inventions of the Manichaeanists. In CAR2,40 Athanasius continues his argumentation by claiming that according to scripture and the Fathers God's Wisdom is His Son who is with the Father and through whom all things were created (Ps.103:24). He also shows, by citing two extracts from Asterius, the latter's inconsistency in speaking about Wisdom, since 'to the pagans he presents it as one and to the Christians as two.imitating the position of the Manichaeanists.' Consummating his
argument in CAR2.41 and 42 Athanasius underlines the Orthodox position which confesses against the Manichaeans one Father of Christ Creator of all things through His Logos, and against the Arians one Logos of God who is His Son being one with the Father. The Son could never be a creature because a) the Father creates through Him, b) reveals Himself through Him, and c) bestows the grace of Baptism through Him. Athanasius lays particular emphasis upon the three-fold argument from creation revelation and salvation. The Father creates through His Logos and seals and confirms the holy bath of Baptism through the Son, whilst Light and Effulgence always work together. This says Athanasius is confirmed by John 5:19, 14:23, 17:22, Rom.1:7, I Cor.1:3, and Eph.1:2. CAR2.43 draws out the general conclusion. Arians and Jews reject the Son but claim that they follow the scriptures. Both use biblical names, but their argument is useless because they do not believe rightly. This is why neither their prayer nor their ablutions and baptism are of any efficacy, because their words are deprived of right belief. This, says Athanasius, is the problem of all heresies, of the pagans, the Manichaeans, the Phrygians, the Samosateans and finally the Arians. They all err against the truth and not just in words. It is in saying this that Athanasius makes a passing reference to the heresies of the Manichaeans the Phrygians the Samosateans and the Arians which directly relates to the Incarnation. Referring presumably to the first two, Athanasius writes: ἔκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ πλέον τι τῆς ἀληθείας καταψεύδοντας, καὶ ἣ περὶ τὸ σῶμα σφάλμα ἡκουσάτω, λέγοντες μὴ ἐκ Μαρίας ἐσχηκέναι σάρκα τὸν Κύριον, ή ὅτι ὅλως ὁ γέγονεν θάνατος, οὐδὲ ὅλως ἀνέφωσς γέγονεν ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐφάνη, καὶ σοὶ ἦν ἀληθῶς, καὶ ἐδόξασε σῶμα ἑκεῖν, μὴ
And as regards the Samosateans and the Arians, he adds: οὗτοι δὲ εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν Παστέρα φανερῶς ἀδεβοῦσι. Τὴν γὰρ θεότητα αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν Υἱὸν δὲ ἐν εἰκόνι μαρτυρουμένην ἀκοῦοντες ἀπὸ τῶν Γραφῶν, βλασφημοῦσι, λέγοντες αὕτην εἶναι κτλόμα καὶ πανταχόο περὶ αὐτῆς τὸ, οὐκ ἦν, δὲ ἐν πῆρα βόρβορον, τὸ λεξείδιον τούτο περεφέροντο, καὶ ως ὃς τὸν Υἱὸν, τούτο προβάλλονται. In the first instance he condemns all kinds of docetic Christology which deny the integrity of the Incarnation, i.e. the integrity of the flesh which is derived from Mary, or the reality of the death, or the reality of the Son's becoming man. In the second instance Athanasius condemns the opposite error, i.e. the denial of the divine Son. Particularly interesting is the fact that he classifies the Arian and the Samosatean errors together, because it implies that the primary concern of his dispute with the Arians was not the nature of the Incarnation as such, but who the Incarnate One was, and that the Incarnation did or did not mean to Him and especially to His being. This is yet another clear indication that Athanasius' Christology is built around the biblical notion of the Son of God. What he goes on to say in the second part of CAR2 makes this plainly obvious.

The second part of CAR2, chs. 44-82, dealing with the exegesis of Prov. 8:22 also presents interesting features from the point of view of Christology and particularly that which relates to the Incarnation. As shown above, this part can be divided into several sections, the contents of which we shall briefly survey here placing the emphasis on the incarnational aspects.

The first section, chs. 44-47, analyse what Athanasius calls the hidden meaning of Prov. 8:22, which is none other than the
Incarnation. The clue to this meaning is to be found in Prov. 9:1 which refers to the house which Wisdom built for itself, and which is none other than the body which it assumed and became man in Christ. Prov. 8:22 is then a hidden way of stating John 1:14, which suggests that Wisdom is identical with the Logos, and the beginning of ways identical with the Incarnation. In view of this, CAR2, 45 opens with the typical Athanasian exegetical statement which we encountered earlier. Prov. 8:22 does not refer to the divine being of the Logos (i.e. of the Wisdom's) Godhood, nor to His eternal and genuine generation from the Father, but to His humanity and His economy towards us (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον καὶ τὴν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπων γέννησιν). The important point here is that the verb "created" (ἐξετικός) of Prov. 8:22 denotes something happening to an already existing person without involving His being, and as such it should be contrasted to what it means when it is said of creatures as in the case of Ps. 103:24, Rom. 8:22, Rev. 8:9, I Tim. 4:4, Soph. Sol. 9:2, Marc 10:6, and Deuter. 4:32. CAR2, 46 further strengthens the above teaching by quoting a good number of biblical texts (Ps. 101:19, 5:12, Eph. 2:15, 4:24 and Jer. 38:22), which imply that the word "created" alone does not necessarily mean creation out of nothing, but can be used to denote a saving act of God related to an already existing being. This is, it argues, the case of Prov. 8:22, which does not denote the being of a creature, but prophesies about the renewing salvation among men which is to take place in Christ for us. When then God's Wisdom or Logos is crying in Prov. 8:22 that God created Him beginning of ways, one's mind should immediately go to the humanity which was created around Him (τὸ παρὰ αὐτοῦ γενόμενον ἀνθρώπων).
Having thus linked the hidden meaning of Prov. 8:22 with the Incarnation, Athanasius goes on in I Am 2:47 to show the parallel meanings between this verse and a number of NT statements, all of which relate to the Incarnation or the saving work of the Incarnate Logos. Thus He points to Hebr. 10:5, which speaks of the Incarnation and its soteriological intentions for all men in terms of a body (αὕτη μοὶ κατηργάστο). Secondly he points to John 1:14, which he elucidates both (objectively) in terms of the Logos putting on of flesh and (subjectively) as His becoming man, pointing out at the same time that the Logos was not at all changed into flesh. Similarly Athanasius points to Gal. 3:13 ("was made sin for us") or to Is. 53:4 and I Pet. 2:24 to say that He took up sin curse and suffering without becoming these in His being. Notwithstanding these incarnational parallels to Prov. 8:22, says Athanasius, the Book of Proverbs plainly teaches that God’s Wisdom is the only-begotten Son of God through whom all creatures were created. Thus the ἔκτος of Prov. 8:22 could not refer to the oúdoa of the Wisdom or the Logos of God, but to the fact that the only-begotten Son was made the beginning of many ways. In effect what Athanasius is saying here, is that the being of the Wisdom or Son of God or Logos must be kept distinct from what He becomes (personally), because the one refers to the Godhood or theology and the other to the manhood or economy. This distinction is elaborated in terms of two other distinctions, one between generation and creation and another between "the only-begotten" and "the beginning of the ways". It is such distinctions and notions that Athanasius proceeds to elucidate in the following sections.
CAR2.48 tightens the argument by means of further reasonings. Firstly it is claimed, that if the offspring cannot be a creature, then the only begotten Wisdom could not be "beginning of ways" in its own being. This is particularly illustrated by means of two examples which analyse the relation of Reuben to his brothers, or the first part of a city to all the other parts. Secondly and more importantly however, it is argued, that God's Wisdom could not be a creature, because it preexists before all creatures. CAR2.48b establishes the point that all created things were created together and there was none that was made before the others. CAR2.49 adds that the invisible creatures also were made contemporaneously according to their own order. The argument is, that if the Wisdom or Logos of God was a creature, then He should have been created together with all the rest. The fact that He is first and before the others and the beginning of others, implies that He must be differentiated from all other creatures and never be considered their ἀρχή καὶ τὴν ὄνταν ἀτού. As such He is the likeness and the image of the only true God, being Himself one and only. It is to Him that verses like Ps.82:2, or 85:8, or 88:7, or Bar. 3:36 refer to. This, says Athanasius in CAR2.50, is confirmed by the actual phraseology of Prov.8:22, which states that God created Wisdom into a beginning of ways unto His works (εἰς ἔργα ἀτού). Thus Athanasius returns to the hidden proverbial meaning of Prov.8:22, and links it once again with the Incarnation, which he expounds in terms of both John 1:14 and Phil.2:7. It is in putting on flesh or taking up the form of the servant, that He, who is Son of God and has God as His Father, now calls God His Lord (ἡμικα τό κυριόν ἐσάεσατο, τότε τόν Πατέρα καλεῖ Κύριον). Both Matth. 11:25 and Ps.85:16
are used here to show that God is both His Father and His Lord, or that He is God's Son and His servant's son, because of who He is in His being and what He took up at His Incarnation. The Son-servant motif is further expounded in CAR2,51 and its soteriological aspects are brought to the open. It was when He became like us that He called the Father His Lord, and He did this, because of His love for us, i.e. that we may receive the Spirit of the Son and be enabled to call Him, who is our natural Lord, our Father by grace. Thus, as we do not cease to be servants in becoming sons by grace, so He does not cease to be Son of God in taking the form of the servant and saying "the Lord created me beginning of His ways".

Athanasius explicitly distinguishes here between the divine οὐσία, ὢν εἶναι, and τὸ ἄνθρωπον, or the οἶκονομία of the Logos, associating the former with "being" and the latter with "becoming," although He unites both in the person of the Logos. Even though he does not use the word person or natures, it is obvious, that what he is saying is identical with the later statement of Cyrillian and Chalcedonian Christology which is couched in such terms. This appears most clearly in the following text, which concludes an interesting contrast between Adam Noah and Moses on the one hand and Christ on the other, backed up with Is.49:3; ἐν ἀξία ἢν ὁ λόγος μετὰ τὰτα δὲ εἰς τὸ ἔργα πέρασεν καὶ τὴν τούτων οἰκονομίαν καὶ γὰρ πρὸν γενέσθαι τὸ ἔργα, ἢν μὲν ἂν θεὸς, οὕτω δὲ κρέας ἢν αὐτὸν καὶ κτίσθημα. "Οτε οὖ ἐκτεθή τῇ ἔργα, καὶ κρέας μετὰ τὰτα γένον τῆς εἰς θεὸν ἀνθρώπων σώης οἰκονομίας, τότε δὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος δεικτικοὶ δεικτικοὶ εἰς τὸ συνασταθήμα τασ ὀμοιοθήμα τοῦ ἔργος."

We might say that here Athanasius makes a plea for the two natures of the one Son of God become Incarnate stated in a non-technical
but traditional and biblical way. This is exactly what CAR2, 52
continues to discuss firstly by distinguishing "the being of the
Logos" from "His becoming", or "His being Logos" from "His being created
into a beginning of ways unto God's works", and secondly by explain-
ing His becoming in terms of the Incarnation as the basis for
salvation. Here again Athanasius produces a barrage of biblical
arguments which find their centre in the two crucial statements of
John 1:14 and Phil. 2:7. The basic incarnational phrases in this
chapter are the following:

- ἐπεννοοῦμενος τὴν ἡμέτέραν σάρκα καὶ σχῆματι σώματος ὡς
  ἀνθρωπος
- ἐπέλαμψε σωματικῶς τῇ ζωῆν
- ἦν λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ δύναμις βασιλείας κατηχομένων ἀνθρωπλοίως
  ἐκλάμψα τὴν βασιλείαν εαυτοῦ καὶ ἐν τῇ ζωῆν.

All of them show that σῶμα, σώμα, and ἀνθρωπος are used to denote
the Incarnation, but without embarrassing either the unity of the sub-
ject or Person, which is the Logos, or the duality of the Godhood
and the manhood, i.e. the theology and the economy, which are both
linked together through the one person.

The same line of argumentation is relentlessly pursued in CAR2,
53, where again the same Christology emerges, and the soteriological
motif finds some of its best expressions in the whole of the Athana-
sian literature. The Wisdom of Prov. 8:22 is again identified with
the Son or Logos of God who became Incarnate and was called Jesus
Christ. That the Son is God, is stated unequivocally and without
explanations as a revealed truth, whereas His becoming man is
always explained soteriologically. The ἔξωτος of Prov. 8:22 is said
to refer to the Logos' beneficence (σοφροσύνη), renewal (ἀνανέω), or Incarnation (ἐναναπόθεσις), or His economy in the works (ἡ σετε ἑρμα ὁμοοιομολογεῖται), and not to the beginning of the Logos' existence, nor to His divine being. As for the economy, it is stated in subjective and objective terms, separately and together. It is "the Incarnation of the Logos," "the economy made in the flesh," and "the genesis of the Logos after the flesh," which involves, on the one hand, "His taking up to Himself the renewal of the works of Creation," or "the taking up to Himself the form of the servant" (the objective aspect), and on the other hand, "His becoming man or flesh," or "His being built into the works or into us." The Incarnation, as "a becoming man" and at the same time as "an assuming or putting on flesh" by the divine and preexistent Logos, reappears in CAR2, 54, where Athanasius elaborates a point which he made in passing in the previous chapter. This is the point that the Logos' existence is revealed in scripture without any reference to a cause — He simply is (e.g. John 14:10, 10:30, 14:9, 8:12, 14:6) —, whereas His Incarnation is always explained with reference to our salvation as its cause (ὅταν ἀνθρώπος γίνεται τότε τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ὁμοοιομολογείται, ὥς ἦν ὁμοοιομολογεῖται ὑποτικὴ χρηστο:http). Here again the Incarnation is cast in the language of "becoming man" and "assuming or putting on flesh".

CAR2, 55 explains further the saving cause of the Incarnation of the Logos in terms of "His assuming and destroying death for us through resurrection," or in terms of "destroying the works of the devil." Hebr. 2:14-15, I Cor. 15:21, Rom. 8:3-4, John 3:17, 9:39, and Ephes. 2:14-15 become the basis for this explanation and provide
Athanasius with the terms of the Incarnation, i.e.: "the obtaining of the mortal body", "the partaking of flesh and blood", "the achievement of the resurrection through a man", "the sending of the Son in the likeness of flesh of sin" to judge sin in the flesh, "the sending of God's Son into the world that the latter might be saved", "the coming of the Son into the world for judgment", "the abolition of the enmity in the flesh", "the union of the two (enemies) into one new man". In all of this, Athanasius' main concern, as he himself states it, is to keep to the mind of the scriptures (τὴν οἰκονομίαν ἢν ἔχουσιν αἱ γραφαί), which is none other than the saving economy of the Saviour, the eternal Son of God. With this mind the Arian interpretation of Prov. 8:22 could never be sustained. As Athanasius puts it: Εἴ δὲ μὴ οἱ ἐδαυτὸν ἐλήλυθεν, ἀλλὰ οἱ ἡμᾶς, οὐ δὲ ἐδαυτὸν ἠρα, ἀλλὰ οἱ ἡμᾶς κτέσται. Εἴ δὲ οὐ δὲ ἐδαυτὸν κτίσται, ἀλλὰ οἱ ἡμᾶς, οὐκ ἔστιν ἠρα αὐτῶς κτίσμα, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἡμῶν ἐνορθαικονος σάρκα τάττα λέγετο. CAR256 states the same argument in a negative way. If He was created for Himself, then He was not created for us, and therefore neither were we created for Him, nor were we saved. Ephes. 2:10 however, states that we were created through Jesus Christ, which really means that we were created in Him and not He in us. Prov. 8:30, John 14:10, Prov. 8:25, and John 1:1 clearly state that He always existed. As for the statement that He who always existed was also created beginning of ways, there is no doubt that it refers to His becoming man for the cause of our salvation. What should He have said, asks Athanasius, when He became man? Should He have said that He was a man from the beginning? Should He not have said, what in fact He did, namely that He "was created" a man, since "to be created" belongs to man?
The following section, chs. 57–64, continues the exposition on the pre-existence of Wisdom before it was created beginning of ways by means of a detailed clarification of its being Son-Logos born of God. CAR2, 57 shows how in scripture the Son-Logos is said to be born or to be (Ps. 2:7, 44:2, John 1:1), whereas the creatures are said to be created (Gen. 1:1, Ps. 118:73) and to have a beginning (Gen. 1:1, Matt. 19:4, Ps. 101:26, 73:2, Gen. 2:3). This points to a distinction between the Logos as "offspring" of God (γεννημα) and the creatures as "things made" by Him (κοιμματα). CAR2, 58 argues that the Arians deliberately choose to ignore this biblical distinction and identify "the offspring" with "the thing made" on the alleged evidence of Deut. 32:6 and 32:18. For Athanasius however, these verses from Deuteronomy, when looked more closely, indicate a distinction between creation and generation, since the former refers to το κατα φυσιν των ανθρωπων and the latter to την του θεου γενομενην εις ανθρωπους μετα το κτισα εοτους φιλανθρωπαν. CAR2, 59 explains that God's φιλανθρωπα is the grace of adoptive sonship. God creates men, first, and then adopts them as sons (Is. 1:2, John 1:12-13, Is. 1:3, Gal. 4:6, Mal. 2:10), but this adoptive sonship is given to men through God's Son who supplies them with the Holy Spirit. This is exactly what the Incarnation of the Son was all about: ο Ανεγενετο υπ ου των ανθρωπων δεκτηθην θεοτητος (i.e. θεοτητος by grace) κοιμηθη. Men are sons of God by grace through the gift of the Spirit, but God's Son is Son by nature. For men God is first Creator and then Father, but for the Son the Father is proper to Him and He is proper to the Father (ουκουν το Πατηρ του Υιου ζωον εστι, και οτ το κτισα, αλλα το Υιος του Πατερος ζωον ζωον). In scripture then, the divine sonship of creatures is never
confused with the natural divine Sonship of the Son and Logos of God. Following on this, CAR2,60 maintains that a similar distinction applies to the teaching of the book of Proverbs. Prov.8:22 denotes the creaturely type, and Prov. 8:25 the divine type of Sonship. Since both of them are applied to the same subject, which is God's Wisdom, we must infer that one refers to the Godhood of the Wisdom-Logos and the other to the Innomination of the same: ὁ δὲ Άλλος ὁ Άνγος τῶν πάνων κατ ἐπὶ πάνων ἄνω, ἐπιθέτων κτίζεται ἄρχῃ τῶν ὄσων ἐλκ ἔργα διὰ τὴν ἐνανθρώπησιν. This, says Athanasius, is also the meaning of Col.1:18 which states that the Logos has become ἐν πᾶσιν πρωτεύον! What Athanasius is really saying here is that the distinction between the creatures and the Son, which implies the distinction between two kinds of divine sonships, is maintained even in the case of the Innomination of God's Wisdom and Logos. Thus in Christology we have one Son but two sonships, one Person but two realities, one divine and another creaturely. This is exactly what CAR2,61a elucidates and thus provides a number of important statements about the Incarnation. Stating it first from the human point of view Athanasius says, that God, who is first the Creator of men, becomes afterwards their Father through the Logos who comes to indwell with them (ὅ τιν ἐνοικοῦσαν αὐτοῖς Άγον). Stating it from the point of view of the Logos, it sounds like this: God, who is first the Father of the Logos, becomes afterwards His Maker and Creator, when He puts on the flesh and becomes man. In the first instance men receive the Spirit of the Son and become sons of God through the Son. In the second instance, the Logos of God puts on humanity and becomes God's creature. As men do not become by nature sons, so He does not become by nature creature.
Both events take place by grace, which means that the grace of men's divine adoption finds its corollary in the grace of the Logos' becoming man. It is to this latter event that the ἔκτειος of Prov. 8:22 refers to.

After these explanations concerning the divine Sonship of the Wisdom-Logos of God in His pre-incarnate and post-incarnate states, Athanasius swiftly turns to the relative theme of the designation of the Wisdom-Logos of God as κριτότοκος. This theme constitutes the subject-matter of the next section in this second part of CAR2 (i.e. chs. 61b–64). In CAR2,61b Athanasius states right away that the Wisdom-Logos of God was given the designation κριτότοκος as well as ἄσελφος ἡμῶν when He put on creaturehood (τὸ κτιστὸν) and became like us corporeally (ἡμῶν ὄμοιος κατὰ τὸ σῶμα). And then he goes on to explain that this actually has a reference to us—i.e. He is κριτότοκος ἡμῶν—and particularly to the resurrection of our flesh which finds its beginning in the resurrection of the Incarnate Logos by virtue of our being concorporate with Him (ἀλλά καὶ ἐν τούτῳ κριτότοκος λέγεται καὶ ἐστιν ἡμῶν, ἐκεῖθεν, πάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπολογισμόνων κατὰ τὴν παράβασιν τοῦ Ἄδωνι, κρίτη τῶν ἀλλων ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἡλευθερίαν ἔκκεινοῦ ὑπὸ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐν τῷ κύριῳ ὄμοια γενομένῃ, καὶ λοιπῶν ἡμεῖς, ὡς σύμμοι τυγχάνοντες, κατ' ἑκείνῳ σωζόμεθα). Obviously Athanasius is speaking here about the κριτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν of Col. 1:18, which refers to the Incarnate Logos, or the Logos as man, and emphasizes the point that He was so designated, not because He was the first to die but the first to rise from the dead. In Col.1:15 however, a different nuance of κριτότοκος is suggested by the phrase κριτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως. Does this suggest, that He was created before the other creatures,
and the Arians are right after all? Athanasius' reply is negative and based on the view that the Logos is so designated because He was laid as the foundation of all Creation, which constitutes the presupposition to His Incarnation, or His becoming πρωτότοκος among many brothers. The crucial point however, is that as πρωτότοκος He is differentiated from being Μονογενής, which refers to His being proper Son, Logos, Wisdom of the Father (John 1:14, I John 4:9, Ps. 118:89, John 1:1, I Cor. 1:24, Matth. 3:17, 17:5, 16:16). Athanasius insists that even though He is called both πρωτότοκος and μονογενής, He cannot in fact be so designated for the same reason. He must be given the one designation, because of His birth from the Father, and the other, because of His condescension towards men and Creation; ε’ μεν οὖν μονογενὴς ἐστίν, ὦσκερ οὖν καὶ ἐστιν, ἐγκαινιάζω τῷ πρωτότοκῳ, ε’ δὲ πρωτότοκος ἐστι, μὴ ἐστὶ μονογενὴς. οὐ δύναται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς μονογενὴς τε καὶ πρωτότοκος εἶναι, ε’ μὴ ἂρα ποικὴ ἅλλο καὶ ἅλλο, ἐνα μονογενὴς μὲν διὰ τὴν ἐκ Πατρὸς γέννησιν ὦσκερ εἶρηνται, πρωτότοκος δὲ διὰ τὴν εἰς τὴν κτίσιν συγκατάβασιν καὶ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν ἁδελφοκολάσιν. CAR2,63 sums up Athanasius' understanding of the designation πρωτότοκος applied to the Logos. Firstly, He is not πρωτότοκος because He is πρωτότοκος Θεοῦ, but because He is πρωτότοκος κάσης τῆς κτίσεως. This does not mean that He is one, or the first, among the creatures (i.e. πρωτότοκος τῶν κτισμάτων), but that He was laid as the foundation of all creation – for in Him all things were created and through Him all things will be renewed. Secondly, He is πρωτότοκος ἐν πολλοῖς ἁδελφοῖς (and not πρωτότοκος πάντων) in the sense that He put on the same flesh as that of ours, or that He is like us in the likeness of flesh. Finally, He is πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν
because He was the first to rise again and establish the principle of a universal resurrection. These three senses of ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς are connected with the verses Col.1:18, Col.1:15, and Rom.8:29 and denote the involvement of the Wisdom-Logos of God in Creation, Incarnation and Redemption. They are summed up together in a comprehensive statement which occurs at the end of CAR2,63: ὅτι πρωτότοκος μὲν ἐν πολλοῖς ἄδελφοις ἐκλήθη διὰ τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς συγγένειαν, πρωτότοκος δὲ ἐν τῷ νεκρῷ, διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ μετ᾿ αὐτὸν εἶναι τὴν τῶν νεκρῶν ἀνάστασιν, πρωτότοκος δὲ πάσης κτίσεως διὰ τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν τοῦ Πατρὸς ὑμῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ οὐ μόνον τὰ πάντα συνεστὶκεν, ἀλλὰ ἐν αὐτῇ ἡ κτίσις... ἐλευθερωθῆσαται. The different sense of the πρωτότοκος in Creation, Incarnation (or Adoption=νικοῖς) and Resurrection, are explained once more in CAR2,64, and all three of them taken together are said to constitute the content of the designations ἐν πᾶσιν πρωτεύουσαν of Col.1:18 and ἡ ἀρχὴ ὅδος of Prov.8:22. It is to the precise meaning of the latter that the next section, consisting of chs. 65-72a, is devoted to.

Having previously shown that the Ἐπτοματον of Prov. 8:22 does not mean that the Wisdom of God is a creature, Athanasius now moves to the second crucial phrase in the above verse, the ἡ ἁρχὴ ὅδος, if only to clarify his earlier claim, namely, that the whole verse refers to the Incarnation. In doing this he gives us further insights into His understanding of Christ and especially of Christ the Saviour. The ἡ ἁρχὴ ὅδος of Prov.8:22 is explained in terms of the inauguration by Christ of the ὅδος πρόοδος καὶ ζωον of Hebr.10:20, which is directly related to the "veil of His flesh", and is contrasted to the lost ὅδος ἢ διὰ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ. The biblical terms of Adam and Christ, as well as the synecdochic term "flesh", which is
here used to denote humanity, are used to specify the difference between the two ways, the first and the new. Strictly speaking the first way is the falling away from paradise into the death of the flesh, which the first man brought about through the transgression. The second way is the taking up of this same creaturely flesh (Incarnation) by the philanthropist God the Logos, so that He may vivify it through the blood of His body (Death) and thus inaugurate for men this new way (Resurrection). This means that whoever is in Christ, is a new creation, because with Christ the old creation has gone and a new creation has been established (2 Cor. 5:17). The crucial point here, as Athanasius explains, is that a new creation requires someone to be its first participant and inaugurator. Such one could not be a mere or only earthly man (ἀνθρώπος ψυλός καὶ μόνων χοίρος), such as we became through transgression — for it was through the unbelief of mere men that the first creation was lost —, but somebody else who would be able to renew creation and keep it in this new state. This recreator and sustainer of creation, continues Athanasius, could be nobody else save the Lord Himself the Creator. This is in fact what both John 14:6 and Col. 1:18 imply, when they refer to the Saviour as the Way or as the Head of the Church respectively. Two fundamental principles are stressed here: a) that salvation is re-creation of the flesh (i.e., the human being), because the fall is the loss of the first creation through the subjection of the flesh to death, and b) that the Saviour cannot be a mere man or an earthly (fallen) man — for such a man is the author of the fall — but the Creator Himself become man through the assumption of the first creation, its renewal through death and resurrection, and its presentation to men as the ground of their
salvation.

CAR2,66ff elaborate and refine these Christological Soteriological points and at the same time draw out their implications for the right exegesis of Prov.8:22. CAR2,66 begins by stating that, if the Logos (presumably the Wisdom) is said to be beginning of ways, or the way, or the Head, or the beginning, or the first born of the dead, on account of His taking up our flesh and giving Himself for us in death, then, the statement that "He was created beginning of ways" does not refer to His ὄσος but to His "embodied presence" (ἐνσώματος παρουσία). Following on this, it is further explained that salvation is basically re-creation of the human flesh (the human being) thwarted by death, which takes place through the Incarnation the vicarious Death and Resurrection of the Creator, whereby both immortality and the way to paradise are ensured for all men. These, says Athanasius, are the works of Prov.8:22 which Jn.5:36 says the Father gave His Son to do, and for which "He was created beginning of ways unto works of God." Thus the statement of Prov.8:22 is identical with the statement of John 5:36. CAR2,67 explains further that the time of both the ἐκτίσεων and ἔκδοξις in these two verses is the time of the Incarnation, and therefore in neither case could the reference be to the ὄσος of the Logos. What is envisaged here is the Logos' corporeal birth (ἡ σωματική γένεσις). Here also Athanasius repeats that the saving works accomplished by the Incarnate Logos really refer to His humanity which is designated by the term "flesh", or in this instance by the term "human genus" (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος). As he puts it, "in Him the human genus has been perfected and restored to what it was from the beginning and to a greater grace, since, being raised from
the dead, we no longer fear death, but being in Christ we shall
reign for ever in the heavens". The key to this event is the fact
of God the Logos taking up flesh and becoming man, because without
union with God, the creature, says Athanasius, cannot escape the
mortality of creaturehood and the sinner cannot find forgiveness.
But this is exactly what the Incarnation of God the Logos accomplished.
In replying, in CAR2,68, to the objection that God could
have annulled the curse, even if the Saviour was a creature, Athana-
si\us says that God, in any case, could have annulled the curse
even with a word and without His personal sojourn ( ἐπίστημόντος
ὁστού)! But He did not do this, because the issue here was not
about what God could do, but about what was efficacious (λειτουργία)
for man. To illustrate this principle, Athanasius recounts a number
of events from salvation history - such as the Ark of Noah, or the
exodus under Moses, or the works of the Judges - and finally comes
down to the work of the Incarnate Saviour. God, he says, does what
is expedient and what needs to be done for man. There is a "good
logic" in all His works (τὸ εὐλογον τῶν γενομένων) which is our
duty to look for.

The final sentences of CAR2,68 and both CAR2,69 and CAR2,70
expound once again the "good logic" of the Incarnate Saviour and
His gift of salvation, and demonstrate, perhaps more clearly than
any other Athanasian text, that Soteriology is the key to Christolo-

The exposition can be briefly summarized as follows: Adam
could have been forgiven by God after his transgression, but that
would have meant that the possibility of his further fall would
have remained inherent in him. In addition, God's grace would have
remained external and not interconnected with Adam's body. In turn,
men, being simply fleshly, would have been eternally exposed to the battle with sin. The same, says Athanasius, would have applied, if the Son was a creature, because man would have remained mortal and would not have been united with God. Besides, a part of creation could not have sufficed for the salvation of the whole, since it would be itself in need of the same. In view of this, the only realistic solution was the Son's advent, whereby He Himself became man by taking on the creaturely flesh. Also, since all were responsible to death, and He was other than all, He, having become man, brought forward His own body, so that all might die through Him, and all might become free from sin and the curse, and therefore remain in existence for ever, having first been clothed with immortality and incorruptibility. Evil and death, says Athanasius, were conquered in the Lord's flesh (humanity), and through kinship (συγγένεια) all men become emancipated and are united with Him becoming thus themselves victorious over the devil. If the Logos was a creature, argues Athanasius in Car2:70, He could not have conquered the devil, because a creature does not have that in which and through which it could be united with God and thus become free from all fear. But the Logos did conquer the devil, because He was the Creator. As such He also deified in Himself the creaturely human body, which He assumed, and in this way brought all people into the kingdom of heaven through His likeness. Man would not have been deified, had he been united with a creature, or had not the Son been true God. Also, man would not have been presented to God, if the Logos, who put on the body, was not by nature and truly God's own Logos. So Athanasius sums up the two cardinal saving truths of his Christology: a) As our liberation from sin and the
curse would not have been achieved if the flesh, which the Logos put on, was not human by nature, b) likewise, man would not have been deified, if He who became flesh, was not by nature the Father’s true and own Logos. So, in Christ we have a conjunction (συμφωνία) of the Godhood by nature with the man by nature, whereby salvation and deification are secured (διὰ τούτου τοιαύτη γέγονεν ἡ σωφρόνις, ἵνα τῷ κατά φύσιν τῆς Θεότητος συνάψῃ τὸν φύσει ἄνθρωπον καὶ βεβαιῇ γένεται ἡ σωφρόνις καὶ ἡ θεολογίας αὐτοῦ). In view of this, Athanasius condemns both the Valentinians who reject the true human flesh of Christ (ἀληθινή σῶμα ἀνθρωπινόν) and the Arianists who deny that the Logos is true God by nature. For him, both, the true flesh and the true Godhood of the Logos, are necessary, and therefore, the statement of Prov.8:22 constitutes no problem. The divine Logos was created the beginning of ways, or the way for us, not by changing His Godhood, but by taking up true human flesh.

It is crystal clear here that in Athanasius’ mind salvation is fundamentally linked with creation, and that both are interrelated through sharing a common subject, the Logos and Son of God. Particularly important in this is the emphasis on the Incarnation entailing the integrity of the human flesh and the personal involvement of the divine Logos. The term ὁ φύσει ἄνθρωπος which safeguards the integrity of the human flesh of Christ, as well as the statement about the σωφρόνις of the κατά φύσιν Θεότητα and the φύσει ἄνθρωπος, constitute obvious anticipations of the Cyril of Alexandria and Chalcedonian two natures Christological model, and as such are of cardinal importance for any attempt of conjecturing Athanasius’ position in the Apollinarian-Antiochene debate. The integrity of the flesh, confessed in the phrase ὁ φύσει ἄνθρωπος, stands in opposition to
Apollinaris, and the emphasis on the Creator Logos as the only subject in Christ, stands in opposition to Apollinaris' Antiochenes opponents. The last point is particularly stressed in CAR2,71 and 72 which draw this section of the treatise to a conclusion. The Logos who is at work in Christ is not a work, because He is not a creature, but the Creator. Prov.8:22 does not say "He created me as a work", but "He created me... unto works", i.e. "He made me man to work in the flesh". Just as a man who enters into a house cannot be regarded as part of the house, so He, says Athanasius, who is built into the works, is other than them with respect to nature. He is God's Hand, or Wisdom, or Logos, through whom all things were made (Is. 65:2, Ps. 101:26, 142:5, John 1:3), identical with Jesus Christ, through whom and in whom all things exist (1 Cor. 8:6, Col.1:17), blessed and worshiped as God together with the Father (Dan.3:34, Ps. 32:4, 103:24 and Hebr.4:12-15), the Son who frees all the prisoners (Rom. 8:21-22, and John 8:35-36).

The closing sentences of CAR2,72 introduce one more problem connected with the exegesis of Prov.8:22, which constitutes the subject-matter of the penultimate section of this treatise (i.e., chs. 72b-77a). The problem is the statement πρὸ τοῦ καλοῦς ἔθωμεν ἀλλ' ὑμᾶς of Prov. 8:23, which seems to refer to God's Wisdom before the Creation of the world and not to Its Incarnate presence. The question is whether it refers to the Godhood of Wisdom and whether, as the Arians allege, it suggests that it is creaturely. In CAR2,73 Athanasius points out that this statement, like that of the preceding verse, is said proverbially with reference to the fact that Wisdom was laid down from the beginning as the foundation of creation and also the foundation of our recreation and renewal.
As such it has nothing to do with the alleged creation of Wisdom, who is none other than God's Logos and Son. If one was to inquire first, as one really ought to do, says Athanasius, about the identity of Him in whom the creation and the salvation of the world was achieved, one would get the answer, that He was not a creature but God's own Son. The first question then is that concerning the Son (Matt. 16:16, and 4:6), because on this stands and falls our salvation. The Son, says Athanasius, is the truth and the main point of our faith (τοῦτο ἐστίν η ἀλήθεια καὶ τὸ κύριον τῆς πληρωσις ἡμῶν), without which the tyranny of the devil cannot come to an end. The Arians, continues Athanasius in CAR2.74, ought to have seen that Prov.8:23 does not say "that the Logos or Son was founded before the ages" (ἐκμελώσεν με Υιόν), but "that He was laid as the foundation" of those who were to be conjoined with Him.

I Cor. 3:11 acknowledges precisely this point in saying, that nobody can lay another foundation except the one which has been laid, i.e. Jesus Christ, and 1 Cor. 3:10 stresses that everyone should see but the building on this foundation is done. This building up, says Athanasius, is related to the Logos's becoming man, because it is necessary that He who is foundational should be such as those that are joined with Him (ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν ἑμελήτων τοιούτον εἶναι οἷς καὶ τὰ ἐγκαθιδρυμένα ἐστίν). Being only-begotten He also became man, and thus He has those who are like Him, because of the same flesh which He put on. So Athanasius explains that the foundation of Wisdom in Prov. 8:23 is said with respect to Its humanity (καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἑμελήτωτα) and not with respect to Its Godhood. It is this humanity, as distinct from the Godhood of the
Logos (Wisdom) that is meant, says he, when He is called the vine and we the branches. Similarly, it is the body which is derived from Mary that was laid as foundation, just as a stone is laid as foundation of a building having first been cut out of a mountain. Thus Athanasius concludes: "The statement, He has laid me as foundation is equal to saying, He being the Logos He has dressed up with an earthly body; for thus He is laid as a foundation for us, taking on Himself that is ours (τὸ ἡμῶν δυσθόμυσνος), so that we might attain unto a perfect man and remain immortal and incorruptible by being conjoined with Him and being concorporate with Him through the likeness of the flesh." 

CAR2,75 further explains that the πρὸ τοῦ αἵματος and the πρὸ τοῦ τῆς γῆς κοινωνία of Prov. 8:23, like the πρὸ τοῦ τά ὅρη δόρος-θήνα of Prov.8:25, are connected with the economy of the Logos according to the flesh. As Athanasius puts it, God, who knew that, having been made good, we would afterwards become bad, and who is Himself good and lover of men, prepared in His own Logos, through whom He created us, the economy of our salvation. Thus, after our fall, the Logos came to us and applied in us the Father's saving economy. This, says Athanasius, is the clear teaching of 2 Tim.1:8-10 and Eph. 1:3-5, the first one referring to the preordained grace given to us in Christ Jesus before the ages, and the second, to God's election of us through Jesus Christ before the foundation of the world. This election in Christ before the foundation of the world is explained in CAR2,76 in terms of our being prefigured (προτεκτομένος) in the Logos, and this in turn is explained in terms of the Logos being laid down as the one who would take
up the economy which is for our sakes. Then Eph. 1:10 says that "we were chosen having been predestined," it really implies the fact that the Son was laid as the foundation of our salvation before the age. Our election and predestination are not to be understood without Him who had the predisposition to be for us, and to take the choice of judgment which lay against on Himself, so that we might become sons in Him. The grace which comes to us now, says Athanasius, was already given to us before we were even made, because it was laid up in store for us in Christ (ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ ἦν ἀποκειμένη ἢ ἐς ἡμᾶς φθάνοννα χάρις). As Matth. 25:34 puts it, it was the kingdom which was prepared before the laying down of the world. This grace and this kingdom, however, have been revealed in time, when the Logos sojourned in our flesh and was created beginning of ways unto God's works. As a result of this, even when the present age comes to an end, we shall not be worn out, but shall be able to live afterwards, having the life and the spiritual blessing which was preordained for us in the Logos as our permanent possession. CAR2, 77, continuing on the same theme, clarifies the point that our eternal life was founded upon the Lord of the ages through whom the ages were made. This occurred out of the goodness of God who wanted to secure our existence. Thus not only our Creation but also our renewal were founded upon Christ, and in this sense Christ is the will and predisposition of God, which took place when the need arose, and the Lord sojourned with us, and went up to heaven in our stead that He might take us up into eternal life.

Finally in CAR2, 77b Athanasius embarks upon a final discussion of Prov. 8:22, which constitutes the last section of his treatise
Having shown that the Logos (Wisdom) is not a creature, because the statement of Prov. 8:22 does not refer to the Godhood of the Logos, but to the saving economy of His Inhominatio which He undertook for our sake, Athanasius now turns to another hidden meaning of the ἐκ τοῦ μου of the above verse, which is connected with Creation in general, rather than man and his salvation. God’s only-begotten and self-existing Wisdom, who, according to Ps. 103:24, is the creator of all things, is not only, says Athanasius, the basis of the existence of the creatures, but also the basis of their well being. The latter, he explains, has been secured by means of a type or an imagery of this Wisdom which has been engrafted into each one of the creatures, so that all may be wise and worthy works of God. As our logos is an eicon of the Son of God as Logos, so the wisdom which was made in us is an eicon of the Son of God as Wisdom. It is through this inherent type of God’s Wisdom, that the Father is known through the works, and it is this very type of Wisdom, that Wisdom Itself claims for Itself, when It says, “The Lord created me. . . into His works.” This says Athanasius, is the meaning of Rom. 1:19–20, and this is the hidden meaning of Prov. 8:22. CAR2,79 clarifies the distinction between the only-begotten and self-existing Wisdom of God (ἀυτοσοφία μονογενος), or Creative and true Wisdom (ἡ δημιουργός καὶ ἀληθὴς σοφία), from its type which is poured out into the world (ἡ τύχος ἐκ οὐκ ἔν ἱόσμω ἐκχυδεσθή σοφία καὶ ἐπὶ σοφήμα) — this latter being implied in the statements of I Cor. 1:21, Soph. Sal. 6:24, Prov. 14:16, 24:3, Eccl. 8:1, Soph. Seir. 1:9–10, Ps. 18:2. The clarification is made by means of the paradigm of a King’s son, who inscribes His name on the works of a city, which in turn is said to be parallel to
the condescension of God's Wisdom towards the creatures, whereby Its type is inserted in them. CAR2,80 continues the exposition of the same theme, showing from biblical evidences that the Lord often speaks of His type embedded in the works as if it was identical with Himself. But it also claims that one should not confuse the very self of the Self-Wisdom with the type of Its osly, which is embedded in the works, even if the former is called beginning of ways on account of the latter. It is then with respect to the created type of God's Wisdom that one should interpret the statement of Prov. 8:22, without this implying the rejection of the incarnational understanding of the above verse. Thus, CAR2,81 not only asserts that all created things were made with the cooperation of God and His Wisdom, and that Wisdom put into all of them her own "type", so as to make them one and harmonious body, and show forth through them by way of image and shadow both Itself and the Father, but also stresses the point that the same Wisdom revealed Itself more directly through the Incarnation, when It took up flesh and suffered death on a cross. As previously, so now this Wisdom remains unaltered in Its Godhood and reveals Itself in Its economy. CAR2,82 closes the treatise with the general conclusion that neither Prov.8:22, nor the other biblical verses put forward by the Arians, imply in any way that the Son of God is a creature.

The above exposition of the contents and arguments of CAR2 above that the eternal Son of God continues to be in this treatise, as in the previous one, the pivot of Athanasius' anti-Arian dogma. In his expositions of such Christological verses as Hebr.3:1f, Acts 2:36, and Prov.8:22 Athanasius repeats again and again that the
Incarnation, which was undertaken for men's sake and their salvation, in no way constitutes a contradiction to the doctrine of the eternal Son of God. In other words, the saving economy of the Son is not identical with the Son's theology. His becoming man, and as such, Apostle, High-Priest, Lord, King, Christ and even Beginning of ways unto God's works, does not contradict His being at the same time Son, Logos and Wisdom of God. This seeming paradox is in fact due to the coordination without confusion in the one Person of the Son of Godhood and manhood. Godhood is something which belongs to the Son as God. Manhood is the natural humanity (the human flesh) which the Son assumed to Himself at His becoming man. The biblical terms and statements which Athanasius employs in order to designate the manhood of Christ leave no doubt as to its wholeness and integrity. Its most crucial aspect however is the fact that this manhood does not belong to a human person, like Adam or one of us, but to the Son of God Himself. This is the essence, as it were, of Athanasius' Christology, because, as he explains, on this point stands and falls the reality and integrity of salvation. This Christology safeguards the two fundamental principles of Soteriology, namely, a) that the Saviour is God the Creator and b) that salvation entails the union of Creation (strictly speaking, of humanity) with God; but it also exposes the inner relationship between Salvation and Creation. It is in CAR2, and especially in the exposition of the theme of Christ as the Wisdom of God who is first-born of all Creation, more than any other Athanasian text, that the saving economy of the Incarnation of God's eternal Son finds its ultimate "raison d'ètre" in the eternal predestination
or predisposition of God. The primary truth here is that the
Creation and the Salvation of man and the entire cosmos have
been from all eternity rooted in or founded upon the eternal
Son, Logos and Wisdom of God. The Incarnation is but a revela-
tion and realisation in time and in the world of creaturely
existence and above all in man of the primary truth of all
creation. Athanasius' doctrine is deeply biblical, both in
terminology and conceptuality, and rests upon the principle
that in all its variety of expression Scripture enjoys an inner
unity owing to its bearing witness to God's revelation in
salvation history and not least to the creative revealing and
saving activities of the eternal Son of God.

These activities are consummated in the fact of the Incarnation
of the Son. If the Son as Creator is the only Saviour, and if
salvation is the union of human creaturehood with the Creator
Son, and if such a union has actually taken place in the Son's
Incarnation and Incarnation; then there can be no doubt about
the integrity of the latter. The humanity of the Saviour must
be completely identical with our own, but it should not belong
to any particular man, because it is the Son Himself who became
such a man by taking up this humanity without ceasing to be
God. This is the Athanasian perception of Christ supplied in
CAR2 which is given intensified expressions in the next stage
of Athanasius' debate with the Arians as this is revealed in
CAR3.
(v) Contra Arianos III

CAR3 continues the defence of the doctrine of the true Son of God against new Arian objections which are based on Gospel verses. This becomes apparent from the Christological titles and from the contents of the treatise. The term Son is the most frequent Christological title of CAR3, occurring some 261 times. Closely connected with it is the title Logos which occurs some 233 times. Then follow the titles, Lord (52), God(52), Christ(43), Wisdom(34), Saviour (31), Jesus(16), Despote(4); and the following hapax. legomena: Effulgence, Character, Eicon, Power, Offspring, Life, River, Eidos, Almighty, Form, Fullness, Only-begotten, Son of Man, Emmanuel, Creator, Living Counsel, Prudence, Truth, Light, Will. As for the contents of CAR3, they can be classified as follows:

chs. 1-25 PART I: THE SON'S UNITY WITH THE FATHER
- 1-4 A The Arian understanding of John 14:10
- 4b-5a The Orthodox understanding of John 14:10
- 5b-9 The One God of the OT and John 14:10
chs. 10-11 The unity of Father and Son is essential
chs. 12-14 The one grace of Father and Son and their unity
- 15-16 The Trinity between Judaism and Polytheism
- 17-25 The unity of the Father and the Son compared to our unity with the Father (John 17:11, 17:20-23); 18-21: The Patristic understanding of John 17:11; 22-25: The Patristic understanding of John 17:22

chs. 26-58 PART II: THE SON'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE FATHER

ch. 26 New Arian theses backed up with Gospel verses: (a) The Son is not like the Father in essence nor is He from the Father by nature, because "He received authority and everything from the Father" (Matt. 28:18, John 5:22, John 3:35, 36, Matth. 11:27, John 6:37) (b) He is not true and natural Power of the Father, because He was troubled and asked for the Cup of death to be removed (John 12:27, 28, Matth. 26:30, John 13:21) (c) He is not the Father's own and true Wisdom, because He grew up in wisdom and asked questions which implied ignorance (Lk 2:52, Matth. 16:13, John 11:18, Mk 6:38).
(d) He is not the genuine Logos of the Father, without whom the Father never existed and through whom He created everything, because 1) He cried on the Cross the cry of dereliction, 2) He asked the Father to glorify Him, 3) He prayed in times of temptation, and 4) He confessed that He was ignorant of the time of the end (Matt. 27:46, John 12:28, John 17:5, Matt. 26:41 and Mark 13:32).

Assessment of the above theses and general orthodox reply.

Methodological considerations: the scope and character of Scripture (i.e., the double kerygma concerning the Saviour) as the basis of exegesis.

Orthodox exegesis of Gospel verses connected with the theses (a) and (c): 35b-36, "He received..." (John 3:35, Matt. 11:27, John 5:30); 37-38a, "He asked questions..." (John 11:34, Matt. 16:13, Mk 6:38, Matt. 20:32); 38b-41 "He was given..." (Matt. 28:18, John 17:1, Matt. 11:27, 2 Pet. 1:17, 1 Pet. 3:22).

Orthodox exegesis of Gospel verses connected with the Arian thesis (d): "the Son's ignorance of the last day and hour" (Mk 13:32, Acts 1:7).

Orthodox exegesis of verses connected with the Arian thesis (c): "He grew up in wisdom and grace" (Lk 2:52)

Orthodox exegesis of verses connected with the Arian thesis (b): "He was troubled and prayed...in death" (John 12:27, Matt. 26:39, Mk. 15:34)

PART III: IS THE SON SON OF THE FATHER BY WILL?

The Arian claim and the scriptural evidence.

The Arian claim resembles the Valentinian position.

Scripture links will with creation and not with the Son.

Nature, necessity and will.

The Son as the living counsel of the Father.

The Son not by will, but not unwanted either. Nature, love and will.

The human relationship between fathers and sons.

Epilogue.

Though Athanasius' primary objective throughout CAR3 is the defence of the Godhood of the Son against the Arian objections, the doctrine of the Incarnation does appear in Part II and constitutes the context within which Athanasius' defence is conducted. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that the Arian objections take their rise from Gospel texts which apply to the Incarnate Son.
As in CAR1 and CAR2 so here, the Arians fail to distinguish between the theology and the incarnate economy of the Son and by and large employ the latter in order to deny the former. In his reply Athanasius follows his earlier arguments, but he also supplies new ones, which clarify further his Christology. A brief review of the contents of CAR3 paying special attention to the doctrine of Part II and its terminology will help us to specify the old and the new insights of Athanasius' Christological theory.

The first Part of CAR3 (chs. 1–25) contains few references to the Incarnation. The primary purpose of Athanasius here, is to distinguish the Father's unity with the Son from His unity with us, and thereby, defend the true Divine Sonship of the Son. CAR3,1 introduces the Arian claim that John 14:10 must be understood in the same sense as Acts 17:28, i.e. as implying that the Father is in the Son as He is in us. Athanasius exposes the error of this claim by arguing that the Arians think corporeally about incorporeal things, and insists that John 14:10 should be understood in the sense of John 10:30 and not of Acts 17:28. CAR3,2 gives another statement of the Arian claim by citing from Asterius’ writings, and CAR3,3 argues against it in the same way as CAR3,1 did. CAR3,4 expounds further the orthodox understanding of the unity of the Father and the Son in terms of nature and identity of Godhood, whereby what is said of the Father is also said of the Son except the name Father (e.g. John 1:1, Rev. 1:8, I Cor. 8:6, John 8:12, Lk 8:24, John 16:15, and 17:10). CAR3,5 repeats the same point but argues that John 14:10 should be taken together with John 10:30 as well as 10:38 and 14:9. The example of the King and His image leads Athanasius to assert in CAR3,6 that the Son is the eikon and form of
God and as such, He could not be associated with a part but with the entire Godhood. CAR3,6–9 argues that OT verses stressing the unity of God do not contradict the unity of the Father and the Son which is taught in the NT. Here Athanasius deals with such verses as Ex.3:1, Deut.33:39, Is.44:6, and more particularly with Deut.32:39 and 6:4, which the Arians put forward as clear proofs of their rejection of the Godhood of Christ. Athanasius argues that such verses are not said with reference to the Son of God but to the many and false gods of the pagans, and he points to such clear statements as John 14:6, I John 17:3, and 5:20 in order to affirm that the Logos–Son is a true offspring of the Father. CAR3,10–11 expound the Athanasian claim that the unity of the Father and the Son implies likeness of "ousia" and not just agreement. The angels agree and do what the Father says, but they are not sons. The same must be said of the Apostles the Prophets and the Patriarchs, or Paul and the Christians. But none of these is called Logos Wisdom or Eikon of the Father on account of their obedience to His will. If the unity of the Father and the Son did not imply likeness of being ("ousia"), then God's Fatherhood would only be a mere name devoid of substantial reality. CAR3,12–14 defend this substantial existential unity of the Father and the Son on the basis of the one grace which comes from both. CAR3,12 stresses the point that no one can ask grace from an angel, and argues that the OT Angel of the Lord mentioned in Gen.48:15f is the Son (also: Gen.32:26, 33:50, Num.21:24, Amos 2:9, Gen.28:15, 32:11, 31:1ff are cited). CAR3,13 defends the same point on the basis of Ps.109:1–2, 17:2–3, 2Cor.1:10, and Gen.28:3–4, and formulates the principle, that acor-
ding to the Patriarchal witness the power to bless and to save belongs to God and God's Logos alone. Again pointing to I Cor. 1:4 Athanasius asserts that the divine blessing, which is one, is from the Father and the Son, and as such, rests on their unity in being. CAR3,14 stresses the same points as it expounds the OT incident of the Burning Bush, and the biblical doctrine of Creation which is decisively connected with the Father as well as the Logos–Son.

CAR3,15-16 argue for the substantial unity of the Father and the Son from the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. CAR3,15 refers to previous biblical examples which oppose Judaism and polytheism (Marcionism and Manichaeanism) and vindicate the Trinity. It also claims that, whereas the Arian Trinity leads to atheism, the orthodox doctrine accepts one "kind of Godhood" (ἐν οἶδος Θεότητος) common to the Father the Son and the Spirit, and therefore confesses one Godhood in Trinity (τὴν μίαν ἐν Θεότητι Θεότητος εφοροῦμεν).

CAR3,16 argues that the Arian position leads to idolatry and therefore exceeds the problem of Judaism, and the chapter concludes with yet another reference to the one "kind of Godhood" which Jacob saw and knew that the Father and the Logos were one.

CAR3,17-25 is an argument against the Arian claim that the unity of the Father with the Son is like His unity with us. It is of exceptional ecclesiological interest because it provides the orthodox exegesis of the verses John 17:11 and 17:20-23. In CAR3,17 Athanasius accuses the Arians of acting like the devil in as much as they usurp with their claim the place of the true Son on account of the grace of Sonship which they received from Him. In CAR3,18 he asks why terms like Only-begotten, Logos, and Wisdom apply exclusively to the Son and not to the Christians, particular-
ly in view of the fact that the Son become man (ἐνθρωπίᾳ ὦ κόσμῳ ὦ γένους) and as such shares the same nature with all men, in order to argue that a distinction between HIs and them must be maintained. But it is to the Patristic exegesis of John 17:11 that Athanasius turns in order to refute the Arian contentions.

Both in CAR3,18b and CAR3,19 Athanasius argues that it is the custom of scripture to use examples from nature to teach lessons to men (he cites as examples Ps.48:13, Jer.5:8, Lk 13:32, Matth.10:16, Lk 6:36 and Matth. 5:48). This means that men are called to imitate nature and become like it in position and grace. In the same way men are called to become sons of God by imitating the true Son. This does not mean that they are changed in their nature, but rather, that they become divine τῇ θεικῇ, or τῇ χάριτι, or τῇ μαθησιᾷ, through the reception of the gift of the Spirit. In this way Athanasius goes on to say in CAR3,20, that the unity of the Father and the Son, which is a natural one, is presented to men as an example, so that they may also become one. This does not mean, however, that the unity of men becomes identical with the natural and prototypical unity of the Father and the Son. There is a unity of disposition (διάθεσις) and of Spirit (νεόνομος), or a unity of one mind, soul and heart (Acts 4:32), or even a unity based on the humility and meekness of Christ (Matth.11:29). This unity stands in a relationship of imitation to the natural unity of the Father and the Son. CAR3,21 notes that John 17:11 does not say, "that they may be one in Thee as I am one in Thee", because the divine and the human natures are different. Rather, in saying "that they may be one even as we are one", the Lord laid down the natural unity of the Father and the Son as the example for the unity of the Christ-
ians, which is really based on a common mind (φοναμιος). Besides, in John 17:20 he said "that they may be all one in us", which meant, "as in us", or literally, "by us both being in them"! This is explained in CAR3, 22, by means of an analysis of John 17:23, "I in them, and Thou in Me, that they may be perfected in One". "I in them", says Athanasius, means "I in them through the body", i.e., it denotes the Incarnation. "Thou in Me" presupposes the "Me as Thy Logos". And "that they may be perfected in one" means "that they may be perfected through the one body which in me. As for the statement "that they may be one as we are one" of John 17:22, there is no doubt, says Athanasius, that it denotes example and not identity. Obviously the crucial notion here is the body of Christ as the basis of the union of the Christians, which stands in a relationship of imitation to the natural union of the Father and the Son. This body, as Athanasius' statements in CAR3, 22 and 23 indicate, is on the one hand the human body assumed by the Son at His Incarnation through which men's salvation was perfected, and on the other hand, it is the (Bucharistic) body of Christ of which men partake and as a result become "one body and one Spirit" (Eph. 4:4), or "a perfect man" (Eph. 4:13). In other words, it is through the Incarnation, understood not only as an assumption but in the light of all its soteriological implications, that the unity of men, which reflects by imitation the unity of the Father and the Son, is understood. The most important point in this exposition of the Incarnation is the notion of the perfection of the body (ἡ τελειωματος αὑτοι), which implies both, the soteriological significance of the death and resurrection of Christ, as well as His union with us through the
Eucharist. The crucial text here is the following: "Εὐθύς ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ σὺ ἐν ἐμοί, ἦν ὡς τετελεσμένοι εἰς ἐν. Ἑνταῦθα λαμψὸν μετέ·


dέν τι καὶ τελειώτερον περὶ θμῶν ὁ Κύριος αἰτεῖ, ὁδηγὸν γὰρ, ὡς ἐν ἡμῖν γέγονεν ὁ λόγος, τό γὰρ ἡμέτερον ἐνεδόθη σωμα. Καὶ σὺ δὲ ἐν ἐμοί, Πάτερ, σοι γὰρ εἰμί λόγος, καὶ ἐπειδὴ σοῦ μὲν ἐν ἐμοί, ὅτι σοῦ λόγος εἰμί, ἐγὼ δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ διὰ σὲ τετελεσμένα ἐν ἐμοί τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ σωτηρία, ἐρωτῶ ἵνα καὶ αὐτοὶ γένωνται ἐν, κατὰ τὸ ἐν ἐμοὶ σῶμα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ τελείωσιν ἤνα καὶ αὐτοὶ γένωνται τελεσθείς, ἔχοντες πρὸς τοῦτο τὴν ἐνότητα, καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ ἐν

gενόμενον· ἦνα, ὡς ἐν πάντες φορεσθέντες παρ’ ἐμοῦ κάντες ὡς ἐν σῶμα καὶ ἐν πνεύμα, καὶ εἰς ἕνα τελειον καταντήσωσιν. Οὐ γὰρ πάντες, ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μεταλαμβάνοντες, ἐν γενόμενα σῶμα, τὸν ἑαυτὸν Κύριον ἔχοντες ἐν ἑαυτοῖς.

In the last sentences of CAR3 22 Athanasius repeats that the "as" (καθὼς) of the "as we are one" of John 17:22 does not imply any identity or equality of men with the Father and the Son, but an example (οὐ τανότητα οὐδὲ λοσότητα δείκνυσιν ὁ λέγων τῷ, καθὼς ὑπ' ὑπερήμα, ἀλλὰ παράδειγμα τοῦ λεγομένου κατὰ τὸ θεμορώμενον). In defence of this, CAR3 23 examines the parallel case of Matth. 12:40, i.e. the Jonah–Christ similarity due to the three days, and ultimately concludes, that in a similar way the unity of men is "as the unity of the Father and the Son" "in mind and in Spirit" (ἐν τῷ φρονήματι καὶ τῇ τοῦ Πνεύματος ουμομνή). Though such notions as eicon and example are central to Athanasius' argument, the emphasis is once again placed on the Incarnation, the body of Christ and Its perfection. CAR3 23 supplies the following crucial text:

"Καθὼς σὺ ἐν ἐμοὶ, καὶ ἐν σοὶ. ὡς ἐν σοί, οὗτοι τελειώθησιν σωμα, τότε γενόσκετε ὁ κόσμος, ὡς ὁ σὺ μὲ ἀπέστειλας εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν ἐμοὶ καὶ φορέσας τὸ τούτων σῶμα, οὗτος ἐν αὐτῷ ἐπετελειώθη, ἀλλ"
that the reception of the grace of the Spirit is the key to the Christian participation in the body of Christ and union with the Father, is fully emphasized in CAR3, 24, on the basis of 1 John 4:13 and 15. But here it is also said, that this points to the fundamental difference between the Son and the Christians, in so far as they, unlike the Son, are in need of the Spirit in order to
be united with the Father. By contrast, the Son is not in the Father through the Spirit, for He does not receive but gives the Spirit, and indeed the Spirit takes from Him. Thus the Arian contention is entirely false.

Finally CAR3:25 sums up once more Athanasius' understanding of John 17:21. The verse does not denote identity of Christians with Christ as far as their union with God is concerned. Rather, it constitutes a claim (ἀγαθός) on the part of the Son laid upon the Father, that He might grant His Spirit to the believers in order that they may be united with Him and through Him with the Father. The force of the "as" in the phrase "as we are one" indicates that Christ's claim is for an unshakable and permanent grace of the Spirit from the Father in the disciples, because only such grace will truly set forth the unshakable and permanent union of the Father and the Son. In other words, the Lord asks that His disciples might be given in the grace of the Spirit, what He has in common with the Father by nature. The chapter ends with the clarification that this unshakable and permanent grace is not irresistible, because it is such only to those who want it (ἡ χάρις ἀμετάκλητος διαμένει τοῖς θεολομένοις).
In spite of these few references to the Incarnation, the whole of this first section of CAR3 is preoccupied with the defence of the true Son of God. The same must be said of the following section, even though here Athanasius has a lot more to say about the Incarnation and the humanity of Christ in particular. In our extensive discussion of this section in an earlier chapter i.e. in presenting and controverting M. Richard's analysis of it, we showed how in every particular topic of this section Athanasius' concern was to defend the true Godhood of the Son, and to show that His Incarnation with all its implications in no way affected or diminished the Son's divine status and being. Since this section has been already extensively discussed we shall concentrate here on the bare essentials.

Our structural presentation of this section in the beginning of the present chapter has shown that CAR3, 26 outlines four general Arian theses backed up with a good number of Gospel verses, which question the orthodox understanding of the designations Son, Power, Wisdom, and Logos as titles of Christ. It is not clear whether these theses are to be strictly regarded as such, because in dealing with them Athanasius does not take them in any particular order and besides, he treats them all as one case - i.e. as a denial of the Godhood of the Son - and concentrates only on certain of their most important Gospel verses. That all of them are designed to establish one particular case clearly appears in CAR3, 27 where Athanasius assesses them in a general way. He characterizes them as "Jewish" questions because they focus upon the humanity of Christ in order to deny His true Godhood. The differ-
ence between the Jews and the Arians, he says, is only a matter of procedure. The Jews ask, how, being a man, does He also claim to be God? or, if He is Son of God, how could He be crucified? The Arians on the other hand ask, how can He, who is God become man? or, how can He, who is God's true offspring, have a body and be crucified? The conclusion is the same: both deny the Son's true Godhood. Thus in CAR3,28 Athanasius points out that what is at stake here is the Saviour's incarnate presence (ἐναρμονική παρουσία) which Jews and Arians deny, because of the humble words which the Gospels apply to Him on account of His becoming man for us (ὡς ἄνθρωπος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τοποθετεῖται φθέγγοντο ἡμᾶς). In fact, they ought to know, says Athanasius, that He is the true and natural Son of God, who is inseparable from the Father's eternity as He exists as the Father's eicon and effulgence. The Gospel verses which the Arians put forward are pure pretexts resembling the ones which they had earlier put forward. They can be exposed to be such, if one examines them in the light of the "scope of the Christian faith" (ὁ σωκός τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς τούς Χριστιανούς πίστεως).

CAR3,29-35a expounds the content of this "scope of the Christian faith" and puts it forward as the orthodox canon of biblical exegesis. Compared to other exegetical rules already mentioned by Athanasius in the earlier treatises (e.g. CAR1,34: dogmatic-Trinitarian - CAR1,54: hermeneutical - CAR2,3: epistemological), this rule is more credal or kerygmatic in content and represents a refined statement of Incarnational Christology. CAR3,29 calls it "the scope and character of holy Scripture" (ὁ σωκός καὶ χαρακτήρ τῆς ἁγίας Γραφῆς) and identifies it with the double declaration concerning the Saviour (ἡ διιλή περὶ τοῦ Χωτῆρος
In other words, the aim and characteristic purpose of Scripture is to proclaim Christ the Saviour as the one who has always been God, Son, Logos, Effulgence and Wisdom of the Father, and who afterwards became man for us having received flesh from the Virgin Mary the bearer of God. Athanasius bases this doctrine upon four groups of statements from holy Scripture: (1) John 1:1-3 and John 1:14, (2) Phil. 2:6 and Phil. 2:7-8, (3) Gen. 1:3, 6, 26 and John 3:17, and (4) Matth. 1:23. Here we have an eternal Divine Person designated by a number of names, who, though other than God, nevertheless exists together with Him, and who has also become man in time by taking to Himself human flesh from the Virgin Mary. This basic Christological perception which constitutes for Athanasius the heart of the proclamation of holy Scripture is explained in a profound way in CAR3, 30-35a.

CAR3, 30 explains the meaning of the statement "the Logos became flesh" (John 1:14). It means, says Athanasius, that He Himself became man, but not that He entered into a man (ἄνθρωπος ὤγον οὐχ οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἠθανασίου). He did not sojourn in a man as He did in the case of the O.T. saints, nor again did He just appear in man, for had He done so, the Jews would not have asked such questions as we find in Mark 4:41 and John 10:35. The case is, says Athanasius, that the Logos of God, through whom all things were made, endured to become also Son of man humbling Himself, taking the form of the servant, and even undergoing the Cross, which is a scandal to Jews but God's power and wisdom to Christians. Finally Athanasius explains that the term "flesh" in John 1:14 really means "man" or "manhood" (τὸ γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων),
because it is used in a biblical synecdochic sense as in Joel 2:28 and Dan.14:5. CAR3,3la clarifies the meaning of "became" in John 1:14 by distinguishing it from the parallel "became" which was said of the Logos in relation to the saints of the OT times (i.e. the ἐγένετο πρὸς τοὺς ἁγίους). To come to be related to someone (γένομαι πρὸς τινὰ) is not the same with to become myself (γένομαι). The former applies to the Logos' relation to the saints and the latter to the Logos' Incarnation. In the former case it was never said that when the saints became or suffered the Logos did so, but in the latter case the birth and sufferings of the flesh were directly attributed to the Logos (e.g. Hebr.9:26, Gal.4:4, I Pet.4:1). Thus, Athanasius concludes with the following typical Christological statement: "Being always God who sanctifies all people in whom He comes to be and beautifies all things according to the will of the Father, He later became man for us and the Godhead came to dwell in the flesh (man) bodily, as the Apostle explicitly states it in Col.2:9." In other words, being God, He obtained a body of His own and using this as an instrument He became man for us². The above statement clearly demonstrates how close Athanasius' Christological language is to the language of the N.T. The terms Son, Godhood, body, flesh, man, are all biblical terms. But the key to Athanasius' perception of Christ is to be found in the whole statement and particularly in the verbs, "to be", "to have" ("to take" or "to assume"), and "to become". It is by means of such verbs that the above terms are coordinated and it is in this coordination that Athanasius' Christology is distinguished from that of his opponents. Crucial in this respect
is the statement: ἐνδὲ ὑπὸν ἔσχε σῶμα καὶ τοῦτο χρώμενος γέγονεν ἀνθρώπος ὁμός.

In CARR3,31b Athanasius explains the implications of such a coordination of the Logos with human flesh. The weaknesses which are proper to the flesh of Christ, he says, are attributed of Him but at the same time the divine works which are proper to His Godhood are said to be carried out through His own body. This, however, does not imply any confusion between the Logos and the flesh. It rests on the fact that the flesh was His (οὗτος ἡ σῶμα) and therefore He upheld (ἐβάλετο) its weaknesses as His own; and that He was in the flesh (οὗτος ἐν αὐτῇ ἡμῶν) and therefore the flesh administered the works of His Godhood (ἡ σῶμα ἐκδόησε τοῖς τῆς Θεότητος ἔργοις). Thus 1 Peter 2:24 states that He bore our weaknesses in His own body, i.e., not as Logos. He was not affected by all this (οὗτος ἐβάλετο); rather, He was able through His suffering to redeem men from their sins and fulfill them with His righteousness. CARR3,32 clarifies this point yet further by dealing specifically with the sufferings of Christ (τὰ πάθη) and His divine works (τὰ ἔργα). The sufferings were connected with His flesh and the works with His Godhood, but both were His, because He was not a common man, but the true Son of God by nature who also became man without ceasing to be what He was. Far from implying confusion of Godhood and manhood, the coordination of the "sufferings" and the "works" point to a real incarnation which included the entirety of human flesh with its natural passions (ἐπεκε θέ τόν Κύριον, ἐνυδίσυστομον ἀνθρωπλήν σῶμα, ταύτην μετ’ τῶν ἐνόμων παθῶν αὐτῆς δηλην ἐνόψασθαι... ἵνα τὰ τοῦ σώματος πάθη ἢδα μόνον αὐτοῦ λέγηται, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἔπετο
κατα την θεότητα αυτής. The soteriological purpose of all this, which is hinted at in this chapter, is more fully explained in Can 33, 34. The appropriation of man’s sufferings by the Logos led to their abolition, whereas the performance of the divine works through the human flesh led to man’s deification. The key to Athanasius’ thought here is the Divine Person of the Logos as the sole subject in Christ. As Athanasius explains it, if the Logos had simply rested on a man, sin and corruption would not have been abolished. Many saints, he says, were cleansed from sin (e.g. Jeremiah or John the Baptist), and yet death reigned from Adam onwards over all men, whose nature remained mortal and corruptible. Now, however, that the Logos became man and appropriated to Himself the properties of the flesh, mortality and corruption no longer touch the body because the Logos was in it. The body or the flesh which the Logos assumed constitutes the basis of this soteriological perspective. As Athanasius puts it, when the flesh was born from Mary the Theotokos, He was said to have been born, so that we may no longer be of the earth, but conjoined with the Logos we may be brought to heaven with Him. And further on he says: that all the passions of the body are transferred on Him, so that we may partake of eternal life as His own. We no longer die in Adam according to the previous generation, because our generation and all fleshly weakness are transferred on the Logos. Indeed we are raised from the earth, because the curse has been removed. In short, being from the earth we die in Adam, but being reborn from above, from water and Spirit, we are revived in Christ. The flesh is no longer earthly, but has become property of the Logos.
(λογοθετικά) on account of the Logos who became flesh for us.

It is clear from the above that Athanasius is working with biblical Christological models which entail two primary terms of reference, the Logos or Son and the flesh or body. The main thrust of his teaching is soteriological, but its incarnational foundation remains fundamental. It is this incarnational foundation that becomes the key to the coordination of human sufferings and divine mighty works. But no confusion is involved between Godhood and manhood. CAR3,34 almost entirely deals with the defence of the distinction between the ἐπάθης τῆς τοῦ Ἁγίου φύσεως and τὰς ὀμα τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀσθενείας αὐτοῦ or τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ φύσει. I Pet. 4:1 is at the centre of this defence, which in the last analysis is a statement about the deification of the flesh and the meaning of eternal life.

CAR3,35a sums up the meaning of "the scope of the faith" by returning once more to the one Person of the Logos or Son of God as the basis of both the divine and the human declarations of the Scriptures concerning Christ. The same one acts divinely (Θείως) using His own body as an instrument, and the same one speaks and suffers humanly (ἄνθρωπως) because He put on flesh and became man. The orthodox Christological perspective consists in the distinction of the two acts, the divine and the human, and their union in one subject. As Athanasius puts it: ἐκάστου τὸ ζων γινόμενος καὶ ἄμφοτερα ἐξ ἑνὸς πραττόμενα, βλέποντες καὶ νοοῦντες, ὅρθος, πιστεύοντες καὶ οὐκ ἐν ποτὲ πλασθῆναι εἰς ᾧ ἐν ποτὲ ἢ ἐν ποτὲ πλασθῇ.

Over against this orthodox Christological duality of acts (natures) in unity of subject (person), Athanasius sets three
erroneous views: (1) that of the Manicheans, who emphasize τά ἀνθρώπινα in order to deny the reality of Christ's human body; (2) that of the Jews, who emphasize τά θεια τοῦ σώματος in order to deny the θεοονομία παρουσία τοῦ Λόγου; and (3) that of the Arians, who emphasize τά ἀνθρώπινα in order to debase the Logos (τακτικά περὶ τοῦ Λόγου φρονήσει) and conclude that He is a κτήμα. The orthodox σκοπός τῆς πίστεως is clearly in opposition to both the Manichean denial of the body and the Jewish/Arian denial of the Godhood. It is on this basis that Athanasius sets out to discuss the 'biblical arguments' of the Arians against the true Godhood of the Logos based on the human attributes of the Saviour. His main position is that what is humanly said of the Son in the Gospels does not constitute a denial of His Godhood because it refers to His flesh and to the fact that He became man. Theology cannot be confused with economy.

CAR3, 35b-41 examines the first group of Gospel verses used by the Arians as proof-texts in their argumentation. CAR3, 35b points out, that John 5:35, Matth.11:27 and John 5:30, which state that the Son received everything He has from the Father, do not imply that there was a time when He did not have what He received; rather, they state, especially when they are taken together with John 16:15 and 17:10, that what the Son has eternally, that He has from the Father. Following the same line of thought CAR3, 36 states that similarly Matth. 28:18, John 10:18 and Matth.11:27 and generally verses stating that the Son received from the Father, must be understood in an anti-Sabellian sense. The Son Himself, says Athanasius, made such statements in order to show that He is
not the Father, but the Father’s Logos, and that He eternally has what He has from the Father as His Son. To have received does not minimize the Son’s Godhood, but rather shows Him to be true Son of God. This is especially demonstrated in the fact that He received all things (καὶ ἐν πάσην ἐπισκέψιν), which suggests that He is different from all things. Indeed, says Athanasius, if the Son is alone inheritor of all (Hebr. 1:2), He alone must be Son of the Father in essence (νοτροφόλογον). Obviously, if He was one of all, He could not be inheritor of all. So then, to have received does not mean that He did not have, but that what He has He has it from the Father (as clearly stated in John 5:26), who, in contrast, does not have what He has from anybody: ὃ μὲν Κατόρ οὗ κατὰ τιμὸς, ὃ δὲ Υἱὸς κατὰ τοῦ Πατρός ἔχει. As an example of this Athanasius mentions the light and the effulgence, and concludes with the following statement which rounds up the distinction and the union of the Father and the Son: what the Father has given to the Son, He has in the Son, and what the Son has, the Father has. The Son’s Godhood is the Father’s Godhood, and thus the Father cares for all in the Son.

In CAR3.37 Athanasius turns to what is humanly said of the Saviour in the Gospels (καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λεγομένων περὶ τοῦ Κατόρος) and particularly to Christ’s questions: John 11:34, Matth. 16:13, Mark 6:38 and Matth. 2:32. Here he argues that to ask for something does not necessarily mean to ask on account of ignorance. John was aware that when the Lord asked about the loaves, He knew in fact their number. Hence he wrote in 6:6, that He asked for the purpose of testing Philip. In other words He asked
as one who knew. The same consideration applies to the case of Lazarus. He asked where Lazarus was buried (11:34), but He knew that He had died and where He had died (11:14). Thus Athanasius concludes that there is no ignorance in the Godhead, but that it is the property of the flesh to be ignorant (ἐν μέν τῇ ἐνθύμησις οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνωστόν, τὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς ὑπὸν ἐστὶν τὸ ἀγνωστὸν). The Arians may think that He was ignorant, but John was aware that He knew men's thoughts (2:25), and that He knew the Father in a way that the Father was in Him and He in the Father (14:10).

Continuing on the same theme CAR3, 38 emphasized the distinction between the ignorant flesh and the knowledgeable Logos. This led Athanasius to make a number of very important Christological statements: a) The Logos did not cease to be God in becoming man; b) He did not avoid the human element (τὸ ἀνθρώπωμα), because He was God; c) rather, being God, He assumed the flesh (προσελθοῦντα τῷ ὄντω), and being in the flesh He deified the flesh. It is in the light of such statements that one should understand how in the same flesh the same Logos conjectured about Lazarus and raised Him up from the dead. Above all one should understand the saving character and grace of this incarnational situation. It is because He was sent for us and the salvation of all, that He upheld our human ignorance and thus granted men the knowledge of the Father and of Himself, which is the supreme grace. It is to secure such a grace for us men, unlike Adam who received it and lost it, that made Him to receive it in Himself. But He received the grace as man (ὡς ἀνθρώπως), even though He was always in possession of it as God (ἦν δὲ τῷ ἐξεστὶ). So, when it is said that
He received authority and glory (Matth. 28:18 and John 17:1), this must be understood humanly on account of the body (ἀνθρώπων πε πνευματικον), or as referring to the flesh (ὑπὸ ἀνθρωπομορφου ἐκείνου). CAR3,39 restates this doctrine by pointing out that it was not the Logos as Logos who was in need of grace, or was ignorant, but the Logos become man. To assume the reverse is to divide the Logos from the Father, and to deprive humanity (τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα) — presumably the entire human race in which the single humanity of Christ has a crucial place — of the divine grace. Besides, this would imply that the Incarnation took place for the Logos and not for us, or that the Logos was improved by the body and not the body by Him. This "Jewish position" as Athanasius calls it, in fact militates directly against the Apostolic view which regards the sojourn of the Logos as taking place for the redemption of the human race (τὸ γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων) and the sanctification and deification of men. It was the human flesh which the Logos assumed that received these gifts, and it received them from the Father (Matth. 11:27, 28:18), through the Logos (John 1:3, 1 Cor. 8:6 and 2:8, John 15:5).

In line with the above CAR3,40 argues that when the Logos is said to have received authority (ἐξουσίαν) after the resurrection (Matth. 28:18), it does not imply that He did not have any authority previously. The fact that He loosened Abraham’s daughter from her bonds (Luke 13:16), or that He forgave the sins of men, or that He raised some from the dead, or restored the sight of the blind, clearly demonstrate that He was possessor of authority (ἐξουσίαν ἔχων). These cases refer to Him as God, whereas the previous case refers to Him as man. The truth is that He received
as man after His resurrection, what He already had as Logos, so that men may become partakers of divine nature and have authority over demons, and, being delivered from corruption, they may live in heaven eternally. In short, He received everything in the flesh, so that men may receive everything from it! This is the sense of 2 Pet. 1:17 and 1 Pet. 3:22.

Finally in CAR3,41 Athanasius consummates his argument by challenging the Arians to cease to debase the Godhead of the Logos stoning Him as it were, with their accusations like the Jews. He also challenges them to look to the nature of the Gospel sayings (εἰς τὴν φύσιν τῶν λεγομένων ἐνορθώτας) and thereby distinguish between the sayings which refer to the Godhead (τῇ ὑπάρχουσιν τοῦ Λόγου) and those referring to His humanity (τῇ ἀνθρωπότητα Αὐτοῦ). The passions belong to the flesh and the grace and the power to the Logos. The former indicate a true flesh (δανεύχος οὐρα) and the latter a true God (δανεσχως Θεός).

CAR3,42-50 discusses Christ's ignorance of the end time (Mk 13:32), which the Arians use to argue against the Godhead of the Logos. CAR3,42 argues theologically and logically. As the Lord and Creator of all, the Logos could not be ignorant, and this is clearly supported by Mark 13:7ff which actually suggests knowledge of the end. Also, if He knew what preceded the end, He must have also known the end itself. CAR3,43 develops an incarnational argument which is of particular interest for Athanasius' Christology. It is argued that the Logos did not speak openly about the end time "because of the flesh", or because "He spoke as man" (ὁδὲ τὴν σωκὼς ὡς ἀνθρωπος ἔλεγεν). To be ignorant was proper
to His human nature (τῆς ἀνθρωπινῆς φύσεως... οἷον καὶ τῷ ἄγνοεῖν), and could not be regarded as an impediment of the Logos (οἷς ἐξέταιμα τοῦ Άγου). The occasion of this saying is regarded by Athanasius as crucial. It was not the occasion of Creation, but that of the Incarnation. This means that He did not speak as the Creator Logos but as the Logos become man. Therefore what He says humanly should be attributed to His humanity (κἀ̇κα ὅσα μὲτὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ἀνθρωπος ἀνθρωπικὸς λέγει τἀυτά τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι δίκαιον ἀναπτεθανεῖ). This does not however imply that He whose humanity this is, is ignorant. John 17:1 suggests that He knew the time of the glorification of His humanity (τὸ ἀνθρώπικον αὐτοῦ) and that in turn suggests that He must have also known the time of the end. In any case Mark 13:32 did not attribute the ignorance to the Son of God but simply to the Son!

CAR3, 44 provides further arguments in support of the view that the Son of God the Father really knew of the end time and that He was ignorant of it only as man, or that this ignorance was connected only with His human function (οὕτως καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπινῆς αὐτοῦ λειτουργίας ἔλεγεν). Here is a brief listing of these arguments. If He knew the Father, He would have known the whole of Creation also. And if He knew the whole of Creation, He would have known its end. In any case the end is ordained by the Father through the Son, just as the beginning is so ordained. Again, if He is the Father's true eicon and the Father knows about the end, He must have the likeness of knowing the same. Again, if all things were made through Him and in Him, He must know the end of each and all of them together. Finally, if He knows the Father but not the end of the world, then the knowledge of the world must be
greater than the knowledge of the Father - which is absurd.

CAR3.45 argues further that it is men who are ignorant of the end time and not the Logos by examining such verses as Matt. 24:42, 24:44, 24:39. The last verse in particular, referring to the people in Noah's time, leads Athanasius to argue that, if the Logos knew and told Noah of the coming deluge seven days before it happened (according to Genesis 7:4), He surely must have also known the day of His parousia.

CAR3.46 continues the same line of thought by examining the case of the wise virgins (Matt. 25:13 and comparing it to Mark 13:32). The conclusion is that as the Logos is hungry and thirsty and suffering as man, so is He ignorant as man among men. But as God and as Logos and Wisdom in the Father, He knows everything and there is nothing of which He is ignorant. This is why the same one conjectures about Lazarus and He knows where Lazarus' soul lies in death, or the same one as the disciples about Himself at Cæsarea Philippi, and He is the one through whom Peter learns from the Father concerning His Sonship.

CAR3.47 examines 2 Cor. 12:2 and 4 Kings 2:12 and 15-18 to indicate that there is a type of ignorance which corresponds to "deliberate silence" rather than real ignorance. CAR3.48 suggests that quite possibly something similar happened in the case of Mark 13:32, and it proceeds to explain that this was deliberately done for the benefit of the disciples. Here Acts 1:7 is brought in and supplies the evidence concerning such a benefit resulting from the disciples' ignorance of the end time. Continuing on the same theme CAR3.49 claims that the same reason prompted the Lord in Mark 13:32 to state His ignorance. In this way He ensured that
the disciples would stretch forward to what lies ahead without
becoming deceived by any sort of anti-Christ who promises to
reveal the time of the end. This, says Athanasius in Car. 50, is
what the Lord taught the Apostles and what the Apostles taught
the Thessalonian Christians (2 Thessal. 2:2).

Finally Car. 50 recapitulates the teaching of this section
by providing one last argument. If God's questions put to man
in paradise through the Son (Gen. 3:9 and 4:9) do not necessarily
imply ignorance on the part of God (a premise upheld by Athanasius
against the Manichaeans), then one should make the same allowances
when the Son acts in a similar fashion in and through the flesh.

In all the above arguments advanced in this section Athana-
sius defends the true Godhead of the Logos against the Arian
objections based on His alleged ignorance, by attributing this
ignorance invariably to His "humanity", or His "flesh", or His
"human nature", or even His "human function", as distinct from
His Godhead. There is no hint here of any argument connected with
the human psychology of the Incarnate Logos, either from the Arian
or the Athanasian side. The debate is entirely related to the
ontological implications of the attribution of Gospel sayings
to the Son and Logos of God. The Arians make no distinction
between the sayings which refer to the Logos' Godhood and those
referring to His manhood, and therefore reject the truth of His
Godhood. Athanasius insists on a double attribution which implies
a clear distinction between theology and economy, Godhood and
manhood in the Incarnate Logos.

Broadly speaking the same seems to be the case in the
following section (chs. 51–53) – at least as Athanasius' own under-
standing is concerned - which deals with the growth of Christ in wisdom and grace (Luke 2:52). CAR3, 51 opens the discussion by raising the crucial question concerning the subject of Luke 2:52. Is He a common man (κοινός ἀνθρώπος) as the Samosites believed and as the Arians in effect (τῆς συνάντησε) thought, or is He God who bears flesh, as the truth suggests in John 1:14? In the former case the growth would refer to Him, but in the latter, it would refer to the flesh. The rest of CAR3, 51 argues that God does not grow and that the same must be asserted of Him who is God's Son, Logos, Wisdom, etc. CAR3, 52 first shows that growth in grace belongs to men and that this is achieved when they look to the Son who alone is in the Father, or when they depart from the sensible things and come to rest in the Logos. Secondly, it is pointed out that when growth in grace is applied to the Son (namely in the case of Luke 2:52), it should be understood in terms of His humble element (τὸ τολμητὸν αὑτοῦ) which He acquired when He assumed flesh and became man. It was not the Logos as Divine Logos who was said in the Gospel to have grown - for He is perfect from perfect and as such He leads others to growth and perfection - but the Logos as man. This is why the Evangelist associated "growth" with "stature", thus implying the body assumed by the Logos in becoming man. The fact is that as the body grew in stature, so did the manifestation of the Godhood in the eyes of the onlookers, and so did the grace as man before all men (αὐτοῦ γὰρ προσέκοπτως προέκοπτεν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ φανέρωσις τῆς θεότητος τοῖς ὄρφων, ὅσῳ δὲ ἡ θεότης ἀκεμιλακόπτετο, τοσοῦτοι Χλείον ἡ χάρις θεοκαλεῖται ὡς ἀνθρώπου καὶ καθ' ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους). The growth in wisdom does not refer to the growth of Wisdom in wisdom, but of humanity in Wisdom. Thus
one could certainly say that "He grew up in Himself" (Αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ προέκυψεν!), in the sense of Prov. 9:1 - Wisdom built a house for itself and the house grew up in it).

These points are further clarified in CAR3, 53. The "growth" which is spoken of in terms of "deification" is identified with a grace given to men as sin and corruption are abolished from their flesh (humanity) on account of its likeness and homogeneity with the flesh of the Incarnate Logos. The body grew space with the manifestation of the Logos, because it was His temple, and He was in it as God. Again, it was the flesh that grew up, and it grew up in Him, because it was His, and in order that human growth might remain unfallen (ἐπιστροφής) by virtue of its conjunction with the Logos. The growth should in no way be attributed to the Logos or Wisdom of God, but to the humanity (τὸ ἄνθρωπινον) which grew up in Wisdom, transcending little by little the limits of human nature, i.e. becoming deified, and thus serving as the instrument for the operation of the Godhood and the shining forth (ἐλαλήτης) of the Divine Wisdom. That this is so, is further demonstrated by the fact that the sacred text did not say that the Logos grew, but Jesus, therefore referring to the Logos become man.

The last section, dealing with biblical objections of the Arians to the true Godhood of the Logos-Son (CAR3, 54-58), focuses on the fact that Christ was troubled and prayed in the face of death (John 12:27, Matth. 26:39, Mark 15:34). As in the previous section, so here, Athanasius begins with the crucial question concerning the subject of the above attributions. Is He a mere man (ψυλὸς ἄνθρωπος), or the Logos of God in the flesh? As God...
He could not have been afraid of death, for as such He was Life that saved others from death and encouraged others not to be afraid (Matt. 10:28, Luke 12:4, Gen. 26:24, Josh. 1:6, Ps. 117(118)6, Job 38:17). Not only did He not flee from the Jews who sought to kill Him (John 18:5), but also He claimed to have had authority to lay down His soul and take it up again, and that nobody was able to take it from Him (John 10:18). But the verses which the Arians single out, says Athanasius in CAR3,55, do not refer to the (Divine) nature of the Logos, but to the possible flesh. The sayings embedded in them were humanly said and were written of the Logos become flesh or man. One should balance these with many other sayings which reveal His Divine power and Godhood: e.g. that He raised Lazarus, turned the water into wine, made the man born blind see, said "I and the Father are one", etc. etc.

Once again Athanasius locates the problem of the Arian objections in their deliberate practice of focusing attention on the human realities (τδ ἀνθρωπινον) of the Saviour in order to debase His Divine Sonship. As a result they regard Him merely as a man from the earth and not as a man from heaven. But Scripture equally witnesses to the Divine works (τδ θεια πραγματα) of the Saviour, and thus demonstrates the fact that He is both human and Divine. He is clearly impassible God having assumed possible flesh. Thus the statement "I and the Father are one", referring to the Saviour's true Godhood should not be misunderstood, and the sufferings of the body should never be attributed to the Creator. By choosing deliberately to state the opposite, the Arians are like the Jews, committing the same error with the latter as they attribute the works of the Creator to the devil and thus share in the same condemnation.
CAR3,55 clarifies these points as it draws out clear distinctions between what is written with reference to the one Godhood belonging to the substance of the Father (eg. John 10:30), and what is written with reference to the body. In other words, the distinction between the Son's θεότης and the same One's ἀνθρωπότης should never become obscure. As for the verses which the Arian single out in their argumentation, they refer to the Logos as man (δε παρα ἀνθρώπου γίνεται καὶ λέγεται τάτα). Neither the Father abandoned the Son in whom He is always, nor was the Logos as Logos afraid of death. The extraordinary natural phenomena occurring at the moment of Christ's death confirmed the fact that the Son was with the Father and that the onlookers who had earlier denied Him, now openly acknowledged that He was truly the Son of God.

CAR3,57 argues that the Logos as Divine Logos did in fact want the Cup of His Passion, because He actually came for It (Cf. Mark 8:35). As for the prayer about the possible removal of the Cup (Matt. 26:59), it was over to the flesh which He assumed, and was said by the Logos as man. There are two sayings about the Cup here, both said by the same Person (ἀμφότερα παρὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐλέγετο), because He was God who had taken up a coward flesh. In fact, as Athanasius explains, the Logos joined His Divine will to His human weakness in order to abolish the latter and enable man to become courageous and fearless through His seeming fear and lack of courage. In the light of the whole evidence provided by the Gospel narrative the Incarnate Logos demonstrated the weakness of the flesh and His Divine authority and abolished the former
through the latter for the sake of men.

CAR3.58 concludes Athanasius' reply to the allegedly biblical arguments of the Arians. Such arguments cannot be sustained because they make no human sense (ἀνθρώπουν αἴσθησιν). And they make no human sense because they imply ignorance of the nature of men of the things which are proper to them (ἀγνοοῦντες τὴν τῶν ἄνθρωπων φύσιν καὶ τὰ τούτων ζώα). The Logos' conduct in such a suffering flesh - namely, that He did not avenge but allowed the passion in order to abolish it in Himself for others - should be the object of wonder and adoration. Had the Arians perceived this, they would have kept the ecclesiastical scope of the faith as an anchor of certainty and they would not have fallen away from the truth. But they are unashamed and obstinate in their heresy and resemble the mythical hydra which produces more heads when an existing head is cut off.

The third and last part of CAR3 (chs. 59-67) constitutes a critical discussion of the Arian claim that the Logos is Son of God by God's will (βουλής καὶ θελής) and not by nature (φύσις). As this is a purely theological matter, it is no surprise that this section contains absolutely no reference to the Incarnation, and as such resembles the first part of this treatise. Since our intention in this exposition is not to develop the strictly theological aspects of Athanasius' Christology, we can supply here a very brief outline of the argumentation.

CAR3.59 presents the Arian claim and contrasts it to the biblical evidence: Ps. 44(45):1 (a good word brought forth from God's heart), John 1:1 (the Logos who was from the beginning),
Ps. 35(36):9 (the light of the light), Hebr. 1:3 (the effulgence of God's glory), Phil. 2:6 (he who is in the form of God), and Col. 1:15 (the sion of the invisible God). These verses, says Athanasius in CAR3,60, clearly present the being of the Logos (τὸ εἶναι τοῦ Ἀδόνου), but there is no biblical place which supports the claim that He is from will (τὸ ἐν θυμῷ αὐτῶν) or that He was made (τὸ ποιηθῆ ὁ αὐτῶν). The only supporters the Arians have in claiming that God's will precedes the generation of the Logos are Valentine, Ptolemy as well as Asterios.

CAR3,61 draws out the distinction between the Logos' being from God φύσεως and the creatures' being from God θυμού (1 Cor. 1:1, Eph. 1:5, Gen. 1:3, 11, 26). In fact, according to James 1:18 and I Thess. 5:18, God's θυμού is in His Logos, in whom He creates and regenerates. But this means that if the Father's will is in Christ, Christ could not be in the Father's will, because this will would have to be in another Logos! The truth is however, that God's will is in Him through whom and in whom all are created. Besides, if the Logos coexists with the Father eternally, θυμού cannot preexist His existence!

CAR3,62 deals with the Arian logical claim, that if the Logos is not from the Father by will then the opposite must be the case, i.e. He must be from Him by necessity (παρὰ γνώμην, or ἀνάγκη). Athanasius' rather fascinating reply is that what is by nature (τὸ φύσεως - in this case τὸ γένεμα) transcends both, what is by will (τὸ θυμοῦ - τὸ κτίσμα) and its logical opposite, viz. what is by necessity (τὸ κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην). In any case for Athanasius ἀνάγκη and παρὰ γνώμῆς a human creaturely antithesis is inapplicable to God. In support of this reply Athanasius also
refers to God's goodness and mercy which are from Him by nature but not by will nor by necessity.

CAR3,63 deals with what Athanasius calls a more daring question which emerges from the Arian syllogisms, namely: whether the Father willed to become Father, or whether He became such unwillingly, i.e. by necessity? Such questions are absurd and contrary to the truth of God, namely, that God is ὅ γενεσίς and the Logos is the living Counsel and Power of the Father through whom the Father created whatever He willed (Prov.8:14, 3:19, I Cor. 1:24, Is.9:6). CAR3,64 argues from biblical statements that all things were made by God's will except the Logos who is in fact the living will of the Father (Ps.72(73):23,24). CAR3,65 follows up the same thesis stressing the point that the Son is the living will of the Father and that it is impious to think with Valentinus and Simon Magus (Acts 8:20) that God's will is like a human ἔξουσία (habitude, acquisition?). If according to Hebr.1:3 the Son is the effulgence of the glory and the character of the hypostasis of the Father, and if the Father's ousia and hypostasis are not by will, then neither the Son will be by will, because He is the peculiar offspring of the Father's hypostasis. CAR3,66 returns to the Arian juncta-position of will and necessity and argues, that though the Son is not by will, nevertheless He is not undesirable either (οὐκ ἔχει δεέλητος τῷ Πατρί'). The Father does not have the Son παρὰ γνώσεως. Rather, the Father wants the Son and the Son wants the Father with the same will (δεέλητε), and there is one will (δεέλημα) from the Father in the Son which reveals that the one is in the other. That the Father wants the Son and vice versa indicates φύσις γενησίτης, ὁ δὲ ζωῆς ἐνότητα καὶ ὁμοίωσις.
It is parallel to the Father's love for the Son and the Son's love for the Father. Finally, CAR 3.67 sums up Athanasius' position by stating once more that the Son is not a creature of will (σέληνος δημοτοργμος) as Valentinus claims, but the Father's living will (βουλή ζωος), natural offspring (φύσις γέννημα) and effulgence of light (φωτός ομαδύμα). The problem with the Arians is their thinking about God in a human fashion (ἀνθρώπινα περί τῆς θεότητος διαλογίζονται). Thus they cannot hear the Truth constantly crying, If you cannot believe in Me because of the covering of the body (διὰ τῆς τοῦ σῶματος περιβολῆς) you might then believe in the works and thus realize that I am in the Father and the Father is in Me, and I and the Father are one, and he who has seen Me has seen the Father. Athanasius' last references to the Lord as being confessed by all to be God and God's Son indicate the concern of the whole treatise: the defence of the Godhood of Christ against the Arian Christomachians.

On the whole it is crystal clear that Athanasius' primary concern in this treatise is the defence of the Godhood of the Son and Logos of God. Yet this theological emphasis does not prevent him from producing important statements relating to his perception of the Incarnation and its soteriological significance. As we have seen, this is particularly the case in Part II of CAR 3 and especially in the crucial chapters 27-35a, where he expounds the δικλη περί τοῦ ζωήρος ἐπαγγέλσα of sacred Scripture as the scope of the ecclesiastical faith. Here we find the clear references to the Godhood and the manhood of Christ; the stress on the personal (subjective) aspect of the
Incarnation of the Logos, particularly obvious in the crucial statement ἐνθρότροφῳ γέγονεν καὶ οὐχ εἷς ἐνθρότροφῶν ἁλᾶς; the categorical affirmation that "flesh" means "man" or τὸ γένος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου and that the classic declaration of John 1:14 means that the Logos Himself became a man and did not come into a man as in the case of the saints; and finally that Christ is the subject of two sets of acts, the Divine and the human, which have their own properties (τοῦ Ἴουν). Christ is one person, God's eternal Son Logos and Wisdom who has also become man without ceasing to be God, because He did not abandon or change His Godhood in taking up manhood to Himself. Such a view generally stated and defended, opposes both the teaching of the Arians the Jews and Paul of Samosata who deny the Godhood of the Logos and also the view of the Valentinians and the other Gnostics who deny the integrity of the human economy. The last point, though clearly stated, is not fully expounded, because it does not seem to be central to Athanasius' debate with his opponents. CAR3 fights the Arians and not the Gnostics.
1. In his DECR, written in A.D. 350, Athanasius deals with the defence of the Godhood of the Son-Logos of God against the Arians and hardly touches on the Incarnation. The Incarnation is, however, mentioned in DECR, 14 as constituting the true meaning of Prov. 8:22, which the Arians fail to understand and wrongly employ in defence of their particular doctrine. For Athanasius this verse refers to the Son-become-man because the verb "to create" is proper to man (καὶ γὰρ καὶ κτίσεσθαι λέγεται, ἀλλ' ὅτε γέγονεν ἀνθρώπος ἀνθρώπου γὰρ ἔδει τοῦτο). Indeed three things are important for bringing out the right exegesis of this particular verse: the time (ὁ καίρος), the person (τὸ πρόσωπον) and the need (ἡ χρεία) envisaged in this statement. As regards the time, Athanasius says that it refers to the completion of the ages (συντέλεσα τῶν αἰῶνων), when He who is always Lord, became man, or He who is Son of God also became Son of man (τὸν μὲν καίρον τοῦ δόξου τοῦτον εἴρηκε καὶ γνώσεται, ὅτε ἐδὲ ὁν ὁ Κύριος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ συντελεῖσ τῶν αἰῶνων γέγονεν καὶ Υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου). The need envisaged in Prov. 8:22 is the destruction of our death. It is precisely for this reason, says Athanasius, that the Son of God took a body for Himself from the Virgin Mary in order to offer it to the Father as a sacrifice for all and thus "deliver all of us who through fear of death were throughout our life subject to servitude" (Hebr. 2:15). Thirdly and finally the person envisaged in the above verse is that of the Saviour and entails the assumption of the body as "the beginning of ways unto God's works". The designation "Son of God", says Athanasius, implies that He is eternally in the bosom of the Father, whereas the statement "the Lord created me" befits "the Son become man". Not only the verb "to create", but also other verbs, such as "to be hungry", legacy.
"to be thirsty", "to conjecture where Lazarus is laid", "to die and to rise again" can be applied to the Son-become-man. But in no way are such verbs related to the Godhood of the Son — which are totally undecidible (μὴ τῇ ἐσόντι λογίσθω — ἐνοοίσθων γὰρ ). Rather they must be measured against the flesh which He put on for us (ἐλλα τῇ σαρκὶ τοῦτο μετέρχεται, ἐν δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἐφόσον). They are proper (ἐστὶ) to the flesh which is of the Logos and of nobody else. As for the use of it all, Athanasius states that: the Logos became flesh in order to offer it (the flesh) for all and all may be deified by receiving His Spirit. This would not have occurred, had He not put on our creaturely body (τὸ κτιστὸν ἰμῶν σώμα). But since this occurred, we began to be men of God and men in Christ. Lastly Athanasius explains that just as we do not lose our own being (τὴν ἐσόναν σαρκὸν σώμαν) when we receive the Spirit, likewise the Lord is no less God in becoming man for us and putting on a body. Far from being diminished by putting on a body, He rather deifies it and renders it immortal.

The above points obviously summarize in a succinct way some of Athanasius' most important Christological perspectives. The Logos Son and Wisdom of God is He who became man in Christ. His becoming man does not embarrass His being God, because it does not refer to His Godhood (ὁσόν) but to the assumption of the human flesh or body. Indeed He is now a man because this flesh or this body are His and nobody else's. And all this has been brought about for the completion of the ages, "in order that all men may be delivered from death and corruption through the offering of this flesh to the Father on behalf of all." The suggestion here is that the Logos would not have become man, if the human flesh was not His own but somebody else's. These fundamental Christo—
logical points appear once more in a brief statement in DECUR, 31 where Athanasius writes: "And if He wants us to call Father His own Father, we shall not on account of this extend ourselves to the Son with respect to nature; rather, it is because the Logos put on our own body and came to be in us, that as a consequence of His being in us and of us God is called our Father; and this is the mind of the Apostle who says: God sent the Spirit of His Son into our hearts crying Abba Father".

2. In defending the sentences of his predecessor Dionysios of Alexandria against the Arians, Athanasius touches again on the subject of the Incarnation. The Epistle of Dionysios to Euphranor and Ammonius, which contains the alleged "Arian sentences" is said to have been written by way of condescension (κατ' οίκονομιὰν). It was in arguing against the Sabellians that Dionysios emphasized in this Epistle the Gospel sayings which refer to the human aspects of the Saviour (τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἐκ τῶν Εὐαγγελίων παραθέσαι) so that he might show his opponents that it was not the Father but the Son— who became man for us and therefore the Father is other than the Son (οὗ ὁ Πατὴρ ἄλλ' ὁ Χριστὸς ἔστιν ὁ γενόμενος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀνθρωπος). Athanasius argues that the same οἰκονομία is seen in the Apostolic preaching about Christ, and here he mentions Peter (DION, 7.1), who calls Christ "a man approved by God" (Acts 2:22), or "Jesus Christ the Nazarene" (Acts 4:10), and Paul (DION, 7.2f), who speaks of Christ as "Jesus from the seed of David" (Acts 13:22), or "a man" (Acts 17:30f) and Stephen (DION, 7.3), who calls Him "Son of man" (Acts 7:56). Even though the Apostles called Him "a man from Nazareth and a possible Christ", they were not Arians (DION, 7.4), because they did not mean to say that Christ was only a man.
(μόνον ἀνθρωπον... καὶ πλεον σῶδεν , DION, 8.1). The case was rather that, because the Jews regarded Him only as a mere man from the seed of David (τὸν χρυσὸν ψεύδον μόνον ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυίδ) and even deceived the Greeks by leading them to disbelieve that He was God or that the Logos became flesh, the blessed Apostles first explained to the Jews the human aspects of the Saviour (τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τοῦ σωτῆρος πρῶτον ἐξηγοῦντο ) so as to persuade them from the appearances and the signs that Christ had come, and secondly they led them to the faith concerning His Godhood (τὴν περὶ τῆς Θεότητος αὐτοῦ πλήθευ) by showing to them that the works which took place were not the works of man but of God (DION, 8.2). This is why Peter who called Christ "a possible man", also added that "He is the Leader of life" (Acts 3:15) and in the Gospel confessed Christ to be "the Son of God" (Matth. 16:16), whilst in his Epistle he called Him "bishop of our souls" (I. Pet. 1:3) and "Lord of himself and of the angels and the powers" (ibid. 3:22). And Paul, who called Christ "a man from the seed of David" (Rom 1:3), also wrote to the Hebrews that He was the "effulgence of the glory of the hypostasis of God" (Hebr. 1:3) and to the Philippians that "He was in the form of God and did not consider it a robbery to be equal with God" (Phil. 2:6). So Athanasius argues that such terms point to nothing else but the fact that in the body there was a Logos of God (ὅτι ἐν σώματι Λόγος ἦν Θεός) through whom all things came to be and who is undivided from the Father as the effulgence is from the light (DION, 8.4). Dionysios , says Athanasius, followed the Apostles and threw at the Sabellians τὰ ἄνθρωπινα καὶ εὐτελῶς περὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος εἰρημένα. to dissuade them from identifying the Son with the Father and eventually lead them to the Son's Godhood. Like the Apostles, he had every right to use τὰ ἄνθρωπινα δῆματα περὶ τοῦ Κυρίου because the Lord
actually became man (καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρωπὸς γέγονεν ὁ Κόριος), but he is to be admired (just as the Apostles are) for handling so admirably such an appropriate and timely teaching (διὰ τὴν οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὴν ἐν καιρῷ δίδασκαλίαν). In any case such words and examples as the ones he used, are derived from the Gospels which write such things "on account of the Saviour's incarnate presence" (διὰ τὴν τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἐνσαρκωμένην παρουσίαν καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ὅμοια γέγραπταν), DION, 9.2). But in the Gospels, says Athanasius, one first hears of "the Logos who is of God" (John 1:1) and then that "the Logos became flesh" (John 1:14). The Logos was in the beginning and the Virgin conceived and the Lord became man. Here, says Athanasius, we have "one who is being designated from two kinds of statements" (εἷς μὲν ἐστιν ὁ ἐξ ἀμφότερων σμαίνομενος) because the Logos became flesh. These two kinds of statements referring to His Godhood and to His becoming man (His Inhomination) have an appropriate interpretation (τὰ περὶ τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως εἰρημένα ρήματα καὶ κατάλληλον ἔχει τρός ἔκαστον τῶν λεγομένων τῆς ἐρμηνειαλοι). Thus, he who writes about the ἀνθρώπινα τοῦ Λόγου also knows τὰ περὶ τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ, and he who expounds what concerns His Godhood, does not ignore τὰ ἱδία τῆς ἐνσαρκώμεναι παρουσίας αὐτοῦ. Like a scientist or approved banker, he follows the path of piety discerning what is right. When he says that He cries, he knows that the Lord has become man and His crying belongs to His humanity (τὸ μὲν κλαίειν τοῦ ἀνθρωπινοῦ). But then he also knows that He raises Lazarus as God; or again, that though He can be hungry and thirsty bodily (σωματικῶς), He can also feed a crowd of five thousand men with five loaves of bread divinely (θετικῶς); or that, though a human body is laid in a tomb, the same is raised
up by the Logos as being a body of God (DION, 9.3&4). Likewise Dionysios, says Athanasius, in using what was humanly said of the Saviour, namely John 15:1, Hebr. 3:2, Prov. 8:22 and Hebr. 1:4, was not ignorant of John 14:10 or John 14:9, because he actually referred to them in his subsequent Epistles. Thus "next to the high and rich words concerning the Godhood", we have "the humble and poor words concerning the Incarnate presence" (ούτως δόντων δύσηλν καὶ πλούσιων τῶν περὶ τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ λόγων, εἰς καὶ αἴ περὶ τῆς ἐναρκτοῦν καραυσίας αὑτοῦ τακειναὶ καὶ πτωχαὶ λέξεις, DION, 10.1-2). This is the principle that guided Dionysios in his use of the paradigm of Christ as the vine and of the Father as the vine-dresser of John 15:1.

In his exegesis of the same paradigm for the purpose of bringing out the real teaching of his predecessor, Athanasius makes a number of crucial Christological statements. The difference between the vine and the vine-dresser shows that the Son is "alien to the Father in being" (ἄλλοτριος καὶ ὁδόσιαν τοῦ Πατρός), but this applies to the Son having the same genesis with us and being homoousios with us and congenial (συγγενῆς) with us who are His branches (John 15:5). It does not apply to the Son as the Logos of the Father and therefore as being other than us, and hence it should be connected with the Saviour's human presence (εἰς τὴν ἄνθρωπόν τῶν παροικίαν) and not with His Godhood (οὐκ ὄφελε τὸ δητόν εἰς τὴν θεότητα ἀναφέρεσθαι τοῦ λόγου). Particularly interesting here is the way Athanasius uses the term "body" to explain the homoousia and congeniality (συγγενεῖς) of the incarnate Logos with us. "We are the Lord's relatives (συγγενεῖς), he says, with respect to the body (κατὰ τὸ σῶμα), and therefore the Lord can call us His brethren (Ps. 21:23). That is
say: "As the branches are from the vine and homoousia with it, so are we who have bodies which are homogeneal with the body of the Lord (ἐνογενῆ τὰ αὐτά ἔχοντες τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Κυρίου). We receive from His fulness and have His body as a root (ῥίζαν) unto resurrection and salvation. The Father is the vine-dresser, in the sense that He made the vine through the Logos, and the vine is the humanity of the Saviour (τὸ ἀνθρωπόν τοῦ Χριστοῦ) through which the Father leads us into His kingdom (DION,10.3-5).

It is in this incarnational perspective that Athanasius also understands verses like Hebr. 3:2, 1:4, 2:2, Prov. 8:22 and John 1:17. They are all written in a human fashion (ἀνθρωπικά γεγραμμένα) and are all connected with the body which the Lord took from Mary the Virgin in order to offer it for us. Thus, when in using such texts, Dionysios said that the Son is one of us and not proper to the Father's being, he meant to stress His homoousia with us or His bodily congeniality (τὴν σωματικὴν συγγένειαν), in order to prove to the Sabellians that the Father was not the Son (DION,12.1-3). His intention, as his subsequent Epistles show, indicates that he was not ignorant of the fact that the Son is "the undivided Logos and Wisdom of the Father" (DION,14.2), or "that He has His being from the Father and not from Himself" (DION,15.1), and that "He is effulgence of eternal light" (DION,15:3), and that "He is homoousios with the Father" (DION,18.1-2, 19.2-3), etc. etc.

In the rest of the treatise Athanasius cites and discusses extracts from Dionysios' Epistles which illustrate his defence. In doing so he gives us a number of incarnational phrases and statements. In DION,20.2 he distinguishes τὸ σωματικὸν τοῦ Κυρίου from τὸ ἄνθρωπον τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ. In DION,21.2 he speaks
of the Father as the creator of the Son on account of the created flesh which the Logos assured (ὅτι τῇν σάρκα ἦν ἀνελαβεν γεννηθήν ὀντίν ὁ Λόγος). In DION, 26.1-2 he refers once again to Dionysios' stress on the ἄνθρωπων ἐλεημένα καί τοῦ Σωτῆρος which indicate that it was not the Father who became man. In DION, 26.3 he speaks of the sayings which alienate the Father from the Son because they refer to the flesh which is creaturely (γεννήθης ὁμοιός) and therefore alien to God with respect to nature; and of the ζῶα τῆς σαρκός which the Lord forebears to be attributed to Him in order to show that the body is His own and nobody else's. Finally in DION, 27.1-2, where Athanasius produces the conclusion to his treatise, we find the clear distinction between two sets of sayings in the Scriptures corresponding to two aspects of the reality of Christ: τά ἄνθρωπων τοῦ Σωτῆρος καί τά ὁμοία τά σώμα λειχέντα καί τά σημαίνοντα τήν θεότητα τοῦ Λόγου; or τά ἄνθρωπων καί τά τῆς θεότητος ἀμβλύοντα.

3. In his ENCY, written in A.D. 356 and expounding and refuting the Arian doctrine for the Bishops of Egypt and Libya, Athanasius does make a few statements on the Incarnation. In ENCY, 2 we find the typical Athanasian phrase "the human economy of the Lord" and the interesting statement that "the enemy (the devil) was not able to deceive the flesh which was put on by Him" (μὴ δυνατείς ἐκατησία τῆν ἐκ τοῦ φορομένην σάρκα), which clearly suggests that by "flesh" Athanasius means the entire human constitution including the mental and cognitional faculties. In ENCY, 4 we come across the other Athanasian phrase "the incarnate presence of the Logos" (ἡ ἐνσαρκίζων τοῦ Λόγου παρουσία), which, as Athanasius says, the Samosatean had rejected, and in ENCY, 9 we find the statement that the Sadducaesans and the Herodians who were deceived in their interpretation of the Scriptures could not
deceive "the Lord become man" because He was the Logos who became flesh and who knows the thoughts of men.

It is in ENC 17, however, and in the context of discussing the exegesis of Prov. 8:22, that Athanasius introduces again (as he did in DEC 14) the doctrine of the Incarnation. The ἡθος of Prov. 8:22, says Athanasius, should be put on the same level with the biblical Christological terms of ὁμοος, νηνος καιονοκος, ἄρνησιν καὶ πρήσιον, and the verbs κακοδικάσας, ἐδόθης, ἐτυ-πτηθεν, και πέννεν. The occasion or the reasonable cause for the application of these terms and verbs to the Lord was the fact that He became man and Son of man by taking the form of the servant which is the human flesh, for as John says "the Logos became flesh". This means, says Athanasius, that instead of becoming scandalized, one should clearly discern that "to be created", "to become", "to be fashioned", "to labour", "to suffer", "to die" and "to rise again", which are proper to a man (τὸν ὄσιν ἄνθρωπον), are applied to the Logos—become—man, whereas "the fact of having everything that the Father has", or "the eternal", or "the immutable", or "the like in all respects", or "the co-existence with the Father without any notion of before or after", or "the fact of being Himself the species (ἐός) of the Godhood", and "the fact of being Creator and not a creature" belong to the Lord as the Logos and Wisdom of the Father and are the result of His being like the Father with respect to being (κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν). The fault of Arianism lies in its inability to discern this distinction and in mingling the two aspects of Christ like water with wine. In doing this, Arianism has exceeded all the heresies concerning Christ, which Athanasius classifies into two types: those which are in error, with respect to the body and the Inhominatio
of the Lord (περὶ τὸ σωμάς καὶ τὴν ἐνανθρωπίνην τοῦ Κυρίου) by explaining it away in this or the other way, and those which deny altogether (as the Jews do) the advent of the Lord (μὴ λέγως ἐπιστεύειν τὸν Κύριον). Arianism alone fights against the very Godhood by saying that the Logos is no Logos and the Father is not always Father.

4. In his GONS, written in A.D. 356 there is only one statement which refers to the Incarnation and which is worthy of being cited here. It reads as follows: "The Son of God our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, becoming man for us, destroying death and liberating our genus from the slavery of corruption, granted us, together with all the rest, to have virginity as an image of the holiness of the angels." The profession of virginity, Athanasius goes on to say, is achieved only among the Christians, and demonstrates their real and true piety. The members of the virgins are in a special way Ἵστα τοῦ Χωτήρος. Though it is not explicitly stated, the thought of the Son of God becoming man and liberating our genus (τὸ γένος ἡμῶν) from the slavery of corruption suggests that Christ as man is generically identical with us.

5. In his FUGA, written around A.D. 357 in defence of his flight from his See, Athanasius gives us a few Christological statements which ought to be recorded in our present survey. It was not only the saints of the O.T. and the disciples (FUGA, 10&11) but the Lord Himself, argues Athanasius in FUGA, 12, that fled from His persecutors. The evidence is seen in such verses as Matth. 2:13, 12:14-15, John 11:53-54, 8:58-59 and Matth. 14:14-15, all of which presuppose the fact that "the Logos became man" and "put on flesh." But this in no way detracts from the other fact which reveals the Logos to be God on account of His miraculous
works. In FUGA, 13.5 Athanasius produces a Christological principle which should govern the right interpretation of the above verses and which demonstrates beyond all doubt that he understands the term "body" assumed by the Lord to be at least in certain cases identical (synecdochically) with "the common genus of men" (τὸ ποιόν γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων). This principle reads as follows: 

α γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἑωτῆρος ἀνθρωπίνως γέγραπται, τάτα τῷ κοινῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀναφέρεσθαι προσήκει: τὸ γὰρ ἦμῶν ἐκεῖνος ἐφόρεσεν σῶμα καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἐνεδείκνυτο. Finally in FUGA, 15 Athanasius speaks once more of "the passion of the body", or "the Lord's bodily suffering" on behalf of all, as he explains that the Lord determined the time of His actual passion and that He withdrew Himself from such a passion before His time had really come.

6. In his letters to Serapion on the Holy Spirit Athanasius also supplies a few Christological statements which throw light on his understanding of the Incarnation. In SER1, 6 he writes "that the Lord was baptized as man on account of the human flesh which He bore... and thus the Spirit descended on Him". Here "flesh" obviously refers to the whole humanity of Christ which is capable of receiving the Spirit. In SER1, 9 Athanasius explains that when the "incarnate presence" of the Logos is announced in Amos 3:14 (one of the key texts of the Pneumatomachians) and "a spirit is said to be created", one should think of no other spirit save "the creaturely spirit of man which is created and recreated by means of the Logos' Inhomination" (τὸ ἀνανεωμένον τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀναχαινωμένον πνεῦμα). The "new heart", the "new spirit" and the "fleshly heart" (as opposed to "the heart of stone" mentioned in Ezek. 36:26f were brought about when the Lord came and made all things new. "It was our spirit, says
Athanasius, which was renewed in Him (τὸ ἀκέραιον ἑστὶ, ἀνασκαλυπτόμενον). It was what the Lord created in the first instance which He recreated in His Incarnation (ὁ γὰρ πρῶτον ἐκλάσεν, τὸν πεπτωκός ἀνεύτως, γενόμενος αὐτός, ἐν τῷ κτισματί, ὃς ὁ Λόγος, οὗτος ἐγένετο). Furthermore, it was not another man but he who was originally created in the image of God, i.e., the mind, that was created and recreated through Christ and whom the Apostle advised us that we should take up (οὗ γάρ δὲ ἐτέρων ὑμιουργηθέντος, παρὰ τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατ' εἰκόνα γενόμενον ἀνθρώπον ἠλεγέν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐν Χριστῷ κτισθέντα καὶ ἀνακαλυπτόμενον νοῦν συνεβολέον ἀναλαβένυ). All these statements clearly show that the incarnate presence is not to be understood in a way which curtails the humanity of Christ. Indeed it is explicitly stated here that in Christ "the human spirit", or "the human mind", as indeed "the entire creaturehood of man" were intrinsically renewed, because all these were included in "the flesh which the Logos and Son of God took up". Finally, S&1,37 contains a reference to the Incarnation in a statement which speaks of the Logos sojourning in the holy Virgin Mary and the Spirit entering in with the Logos, so that the latter might in the power of the former fashion and adapt the body to Himself and thus offer through Himself the creation to the Father and reconcile all things in Himself.

In S&2,7 Athanasius makes a statement about "the character of the Christian faith" (ὦ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ πίστεως) which reminds us of "the scope and character of the holy Scripture", or "the double declaration of holy Scripture concerning the Saviour" which appear in CAR3,29. According to this, Christ is the Son of God or Logos of God or the Wisdom and Power of the Father who
became man for the completion of the ages on account of our salvation. When John said that the Logos, who was in the beginning, became flesh, he meant to say that He became man. Hence the Lord called Himself "a man" in John 8:40, and Paul called Him "a man Christ Jesus" (I Tim. 2:5). In fact, in becoming man and fulfilling all the human needs (οἴκονομίας τῆς ἀνθρώπινης) and conquering and abolishing the death which was against us, He now sits at the right hand of the Father, being in Him and the Father being also in Him, as it was and will be for ever. SER2,8 explains that "the character" of the Faith which has come down from the Apostles through the Fathers, demands the recognition of two sets of statements in the Scriptures: those referring to His Godhood (περὶ τῆς θεότητος τοῦ Λόγου) and those referring to His manhood (περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπινῶν αὐτοῦ). Athanasius cites here many examples to illustrate his point and concludes with the claim that the first set of statements should not be used in defiance of the other, or "vice versa", because Christ "being God was created a man" (Θεὸς ὢν ἐκτίθην ἀνθρωπος). In the light of the above SER2,9 discusses the true meaning of Christ's ignorance of the last day which is mentioned in Mark 13:32. It is argued here that this was said of the Lord ἀνθρωποκότης, or because He became man and ignorance is ὑπὸ ὄντος of men. Indeed the Lord showed in Himself as man (ὁς ἀνθρωπός) the ignorance of men in order to prove firstly that He had an human body in truth, and secondly, that carrying the ignorance of men in the body, He represented a perfect and holy humanity (τὴν ἀνθρωποκότητα) to the Father having redeemed it and purified it from everything. As in his discussion of the same theme in CAR3, so here Athanasius shows that he uses the terms "body" and "humanity"
in a holistic way, which suggests the completeness and integrity of the Incarnation.

In SER4,14 in his attempt to elucidate the meaning of Math. 12:31-33, Athanasius turns to "the economy, which was undertaken for our sake and which is declared throughout the entire Scripture and particularly by John 1:14 and Phil. 2:5-8". Two primary elements are to be seen in this "economy", the "Godhood" of the Logos and the "body" which reveal that the same Lord is God and man. In SER4,15 Athanasius outlines what may be called the three-fold problem of the heretics concerning the economy: a) there is the denial of the Godhood because of the σωματικά or ἀνθρώπων αὐτοῦ; b) there is the view that the body is unreal or the humanity is a mere φαντασία because of the Divine works; and finally c) there is the denial of the Incarnation and the attribution of the miraculous works of the Saviour to the devil. In SER4,17 Athanasius explains that the forgivable and unforgivable blasphemies of Math. 12:31-33 refer to Christ. The former refers to His manhood and the latter to His Godhood. SER4,19 clarifies the same point by speaking in terms of "the bodily nature" (τὸ σωματικὸν) and "the Godhead" (τὴν θεότητα) which are set in parallel position to the terms "flesh" and "spirit". Particularly interesting here is the way in which Athanasius employs the Eucharistic argument in support of his Christological perspective. He argues that as the body and blood are given in the Eucharist in a spiritual manner (ὡς τε κυνοματικῶς ἐν ἐκχώρησι ταύτῃ ἀνθρώπων αὐτοῦ...), so Christ is not to be understood merely as a man but as God who is in a body. In other words the mystery of the Eucharist is inseparable from the economy of the Incarnation. In SER4,20 it is pointed out that "Son of man" is τὸ κατὰ σάρκα καὶ ἀνθρώπων αὐτοῦ in which the Holy Spirit who is in the Logos came
to dwell, and a distinction is drawn between the death of the body and the miraculous works of the Godhood. Finally Sερ4,23 claims, in line with what was said in Sερ4,19, that the Inhomiτion should be understood in terms of the κατὰ σῶμα and κατὰ πνεῦμα, the former being the human and the latter the divine aspects of Christology.

7. The final work to be reviewed here is CAR5, which is still regarded as Athanasian, in spite of Prof. Tetz's contention to the contrary. The entire work has two main subject-matters: Christology (CAR5,1-8, 11-12, and 19b-22) and Pneumatology (CAR5, 9-10, and 13-19a). The Christological section contains very valuable material on the doctrine of the Incarnation.

In the first Christological section of this treatise (CAR5,1-8) Athanasius refutes the Arian handling of six NT Christological verses: (i) John 5:26, (ii) Mark 10:18, (iii) Matth. 27:46, (iv) Mark 13:32, (v) John 10:36 and (vi) Gal. 1:1. CAR5,1 supplies short responses to the Arian exegesis of verses (vi), (i), (v) and (iii). In connection with verse (vi) Athanasius contends that it is said with reference to the Lord's body even though the statement is attributed to His person (τὸ τοῦ σῶματος αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ αὐτοῦ πρόσωπον λέγεται). Verse (i) is said of the Lord κατὰ σῶμα ὡς ἀνθρωπός, or ἐν σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ἀνθρωπός. Verse (v) should be balanced with John 17:19, which states that the Lord sanctifies Himself for our sake. Verse (iii) is said ἐκ προσώπου ἡμετέρου, because the Lord took up the form of the servant (Phil.2:6-7 cf. Isaiah 53:4). It is said ὁχ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ...ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν... CAR5,1 also takes up the themes of Christ's exaltation and His acquisition of the name which is above every other name.
These themes, says Athanasius, must be understood with reference to the "temple of His body", or, as he goes on to assert, in CAR5,2, with reference to the "Lord's flesh". It is not the Most High who is highly exalted, but the flesh. Indeed it is the flesh which receives the name which is above every name, because the Logos became flesh. As an example of this Athanasius mentions Thomas' confession (John 20:28) in which he says that "both the Logos and the body are theologized" (τὸ συναμφότερον θεολογῶν), and I John 1:1 where again the "Logos of life" (Λόγος ζωῆς) refers to the συναμφότερον of the Logos and the flesh. Finally it is pointed out that John 7:39 should also be seen in the same light i.e. as referring to the glorification of Christ's flesh and not to Himself who is the Lord of glory.

CAR5,4 summarizes Athanasius Christological exegetical perspective by stating that "whenever Scripture says that the Son receives or is glorified, it says it with reference to His "humanity" (ἀνθρωπότης) and not to His Godhood (θεότης). John 14:28 (the Father is greater than I) is a typical example of the above. It is said ἐκεῖ ἀνθρωπος γέγονεν ο ο ὅ ος ὁ Λόγος καὶ ὁμοούσιος τῷ Πατρί αὐτῷ ἐκ τῆς Πατρικῆς οὐσίας. In a typical Athanasian fashion it is here explained that behind this Christological incarnational perspective there is the saving intention and activity of God. CAR5,4 develops this by expounding Rom.8:32 and Eph.5:25, whilst CAR5,5 constitutes one of the best soteriological statements of the entire Athanasian literature. Here Christology is viewed from its extensive vicarious and saving aspect as it is stressed that the Lord who is immortal did not come to save Himself but those who were put to death, and that He did not suffer for Himself but for us. In fact He took on Him
our human littleness and poverty that He might give us His richness. He took up passion, death, tears, burial, baptism, wound, education, lack of glory and descent, and gave us instead impassibility, immortality, joy, resurrection, sanctification, healing, peace, glory and ascent. Luke 23:43, which points to Christ delivering His spirit into the hands of His Father, is used here to sum up Athanasius' soteriological conclusion: He delivered His own spirit to the Father in order to παρατιθέναι πάντας ἄνθρωπος τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐαυτοῦ, who are μέλη αὐτοῦ, and make up ἐν σωμα, the Church (cf. Gal. 3:28, "we are one in Christ").

The theme of the Church as the body of Christ is picked up in CAR5,6 which cites Eph.2:10, 3:10-12, 1:4-5 and 2:15-16 to point out that the ἔκτισεν με of Prov. 8:22 refers to Christ's body, the Church (τὸ ἔκτισεν με... περὶ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας λέγει τῆς ἐν ἐαυτῷ κτισμένης). We have seen in other Athanasian texts how Prov. 8:22 is always related to the Incarnation and the body of Christ. The difference here is that "the body" is understood "extensively" in its saving connection with the Church.

In CAR5,7 Athanasius responds to verses (ii) and (iv) mentioned in CAR5,1, following the same pattern as before. Mark 10:18, he says, was said κατὰ τὴν σάρκα καὶ πρὸς τὸν νοῦν τοῦ προσελθόντος αὐτῷ who thought of the Lord as being ἄνθρωπον μόνον καὶ οὐ θεόν. Mark 13:32 was said ἄνθρωπισιν. Matth. 11:27 should balance its meaning and the same can be inferred from the fact that the Spirit of the Son knows and that the Son is the Creator of the ages and the times.

CAR5,8 summarizes once again Athanasius' Christological perspective in a series of statements of superb soteriological quality. Τά εὐσεβή δόματα refer to the Lord's πτωχεύω which He took on
that we may become rich. The Son of God became Son of man that the sons of men may become sons of God. He who was born from above, came to be born below in time from a Virgin the Theotokos Mary, so that those who were born below might be born from above. He has only a Mother on earth that we may have only a Father in heaven. He who is the Master, became a servant, because we were servants of God. He tasted death because of His fleshly Father (Adam). He is Son of God by nature; whereas we are sons of God by grace. He is Son of Adam "by economy" whereas we are sons of Adam by nature. God became His Father "by economy" because He became man. In short, the Logos and Son of God became flesh by being united with flesh, i.e., He became perfect man, so that men may become one spirit by being united with the Spirit. In a statement which has been much discussed Athanasius states the contrast between Christ and the Christians as follows: He is flesh-bearing God (ο Λόγος καὶ Χῖς ἐνθεκός σαρκώ γέγονεν σώρες, ἀνθρωπὸς τελείος, ἵνα οἱ ἀνθρωποί ἐνθεκόντες Πνεύματι γέννηται ἐν πνεύμα). In a statement which has been much discussed Athanasius states the contrast between Christ and the Christians as follows: He is flesh-bearing God (ο Λόγος καὶ Χῖς ἐνθεκός σαρκώ γέγονεν σώρες, ἀνθρωπὸς τελείος, ἵνα οἱ ἀνθρωποί ἐνθεκόντες Πνεύματι γέννηται ἐν πνεύμα). In a statement which has been much discussed Athanasius states the contrast between Christ and the Christians as follows: He is flesh-bearing God (ο Λόγος καὶ Χῖς ἐνθεκός σαρκώ γέγονεν σώρες, ἀνθρωπὸς τελείος, ἵνα οἱ ἀνθρωποί ἐνθεκόντες Πνεύματι γέννηται ἐν πνεύμα). In a statement which has been much discussed Athanasius states the contrast between Christ and the Christians as follows: He is flesh-bearing God (ο Λόγος καὶ Χῖς ἐνθεκός σαρκώ γέγονεν σώρες, ἀνθρωπὸς τελείος, ἵνα οἱ ἀνθρωποί ἐνθεκόντες Πνεύματι γέννηται ἐν πνεύμα). In a statement which has been much discussed Athanasius states the contrast between Christ and the Christians as follows: He is flesh-bearing God (ο Λόγος καὶ Χῖς ἐνθεκός σαρκώ γέγονεν σώρες, ἀνθρωπὸς τελείος, ἵνα οἱ ἀνθρωποί ἐνθεκόντες Πνεύματι γέννηται ἐν πνεύμα). In a statement which has been much discussed Athanasius states the contrast between Christ and the Christians as follows: He is flesh-bearing God (ο Λόγος καὶ Χῖς ἐνθεκός σαρκώ γέγονεν σώρες, ἀνθρωπὸς τελείος, ἵνα οἱ ἀνθρωποί ἐνθεκόντες Πνεύματι γέννηται ἐν πνεύμα). In a statement which has been much discussed Athanasius states the contrast between Christ and the Christians as follows: He is flesh-bearing God (ο Λόγος καὶ Χῖς ἐνθεκός σαρκώ γέγονεν σώρες, ἀνθρωπὸς τελείος, ἵνα οἱ ἀνθρωποί ἐνθεκόντες Πνεύματι γέννηται ἐν πνεύμα). In a statement which has been much discussed Athanasius states the contrast between Christ and the Christians as follows: He is flesh-bearing God (ο Λόγος καὶ Χῖς ἐνθεκός σαρκώ γέγονεν σώρες, ἀνθρωπὸς τελείος, ἵνα οἱ ἀνθρωποί ἐνθεκόντες Πνεύματι γέννηται ἐν πνεύμα). In a statement which has been much discussed Athanasius states the contrast between Christ and the Christians as follows: He is flesh-bearing God (ο Λόγος καὶ Χῖς ἐνθεκός σαρκώ γέγονεν σώρες, ἀνθρωπὸς τελείος, ἵνα οἱ ἀνθρωποί ἐνθεκόντες Πνεύματι γέννηται ἐν πνεύμα). In a statement which has been much discussed Athanasius states the contrast between Christ and the Christians as follows: He is flesh-bearing God (ο Λόγος καὶ Χῖς ἐνθεκός σαρκώ γέγονεν σώρες, ἀνθρωπὸς τελείος, ἵνα οἱ ἀνθρωποί ἐνθεκόντες Πνεύματι γέννηται ἐν πνεύμα). In a statement which has been much discussed Athanasius states the contrast between Christ and the Christians as follows: He is flesh-bearing God (ο Λόγος καὶ Χῖς ἐνθεκός σαρκώ γέγονεν σώρες, ἀνθρωπὸς τελείος, ἵνα οἱ ἀνθρωποί ἐνθεκόντες Πνεύματι γέννηται ἐν πνεύμα). In a statement which has been much discussed Athanasius states the contrast between Christ and the Christians as follows: He is flesh-bearing God (ο Λόγος καὶ Χῖς ἐνθεκός σαρκώ γέγονεν σώρες, ἀνθρωπὸς τελείος, ἵνα οἱ ἀνθρωποί ἐνθεκόντες Πνεύματι γέννηται ἐν πνεύμα). In a statement which has been much discussed Athanasius states the contrast between Christ and the Christians as follows: He is flesh-bearing God (ο Λόγος καὶ Χῖς ἐνθεκός σαρκώ γέγονεν σώρες, ἀνθρωπὸς τελείος, ἵνα οἱ ἀνθρωποί ἐνθεκόντες Πνεύματι γέννηται ἐν πνεύμα). In a statement which has been much discussed Athanasius states the contrast between Christ and the Christians as follows: He is flesh-bearing God (ο Λόγος καὶ Χῖς ἐνθεκός σαρκώ γέγονεν σώρες, ἀνθρωπὸς τελείος, ἵνα οἱ ἀνθρωποί ἐνθεκόντες Πνεύματι γέννηται ἐν πνεύμα). In a statement which has been much discussed Athanasius states the contrast between Christ and the Christians as follows: He is flesh-bearing God (ο Λόγος καὶ Χῖς ἐνθεκός σαρκώ γέγονεν σώρες, ἀνθρωπὸς τελείος, ἵνα οἱ ἀνθρωποί ἐνθεκόντες Πνεύματι γέννηται ἐν πνεύμα).
many and clear parallels in \textit{CAR} and \textit{SER}) naturally lead to the first Pneumatological section of the treatise (\textit{CAR}5,9-11). Scholars has regarded this section as an interpolation, but it is not entirely unrelated to the proceeding section. Its comparatively short length suggests further its spontaneous character. 

\textit{CAR}5,11-12 return to the Christological discussion of the treatise dealing once again with the right exegesis of verses (vi) and (i) mentioned in \textit{CAR}5,1. "The temple of His body" re-appears and is clearly distinguished from the Son of God (τὸ σῶμα οὗ λέγομεν Υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ). Here also we find the earlier clarification, namely, that ὁ ἀνθρωπός λαμβάνει ζωήν δι’ ἑμῶν (John 5:26) καὶ ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἀγιάζεται (John 17:19) καὶ ὁ ἀνθρωπός ὑφίσταται καὶ λαμβάνει τὸ ὄνομα (Phil.2:9). \textit{CAR}5,12 restates the general principle found in \textit{CAR}5,4 by stating that "whenever Scripture says that the Son receives it says it with reference to the body". This time, however, the statement is expanded by identifying the body with the Church. 

Rico Thomae \textit{I Cor.} 15:23 Athenæius calls the body the "first-fruits" (ἀπαρχή) of the Church, which is the "lump" (φύραμα) and includes "us". The Lord's body is the first-fruits of the resurrection, which is potentially (ὁνύμερο) ours and is given to us by the Lord who established it for us. Here too we find the earlier point about Christ's delivery of all men to God through the delivery of His own spirit into the hands of the Father, as well as various other points which bring out the soteriological motif of the Incarnation. The most notable of all is the reference to Prov. 8:25 which is interpreted ἐξ προσώπου τῆς Ἐκκλησίας ἣς κρότερον κτισθένα μετὰ ταῦτα γεννᾶται.

The transition from this Christological section to the long
Pneumatological section of the treatise (CAR5,13-19a) is rather abrupt, but the return thereafter to the Christological discussion (in CAR5,19b) is made more smoothly. It is stressed here that the Godhood of the Son is no more important than His passion and poverty, and that as no proper theology can be developed without the Son, so no theology can be attained to without the confession that the crucified and risen One is Lord and God. The knowledge of the Son incurs the knowledge of the Father (John 14:7-12), and both are connected with the Father’s works which are performed by the Son as His hand and the Spirit as His finger.

CAR5,20 offers Athanasius’ exegesis of I Cor. 15:24-28. The question is whether this verse suggests that the Son’s kingdom will really come to an end, and if so, whether this can be reconciled with Dan.3:33 and Luke 1:33 which suggest the exact opposite. The delivery of the kingdom to the Father at the end of time, says Athanasius, refers to the subjection of the world which is subjected to the Son’s flesh (καὶ τὸν κόσμον λέγει, τὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἀδύτου ὑποταγμένης...) The fact that in I Cor. 15:24ff it is our subjection to Christ which comes first and then follows the Son’s subjection to the Father, means that it is not He Himself who shall be ὑποταχόνς to the Father but He as our head. In other words, it is we men who shall be ὑποταχόντες to Him and through Him to the Father. "His enemies" mentioned in this verse, are in fact our enemies, which He came to conquer on our behalf when He came to be in our likeness (ἐν ὁμοιωματί ἡμῶν) and received the human throne of David, His Father after the flesh, in order to rebuild it and reestablish it. When all these enemies are subjected to Him and this throne of David is raised up again, then it will be us men who shall reign
in it. So I Cor. 15:24ff refers to the ἀνθρωπίνη βασιλέα which the incarnate Lord administers and which in the end will be delivered to the Father, so that God may be all in all. Far from suggesting any Marcellian point of view this Athanasian exegesis focuses on the centrality of the Incarnation and the supreme status of the incarnate economy at the present age. The difference between the present age and the future one is not that the flesh which is central now will be abandoned, but that whereas God now reigns as through a Saviour man, then He will reign as through His Logos (...ἐνα, ὅταν ἀνορθῶθη (ο ἀνθρώπινος θρόνος Δαυίδ), οἱ πάντες βασιλεύσωμεν, καὶ παραβόν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην βασιλεύσωμαι καταρθωμένην τῷ Πατρί, ἕνα ὅ θεός τα πάντα ἔν πᾶσι, βασιλεύσωμοι ὡς ἀντι, ὡς διὰ λόγου θεοῦ, μετά τὸ βασιλεύσαι αὐτόν δι' ἀντι, ὡς δι' ἀνθρώπου ζωτήρος).

CAR 5,21 explains the rather difficult Christological verses Acts 2:36 (He was made Lord and Christ), Matthew 26:39 (Let this Cup pass...), and Mark 14:38 (The spirit is willing but the flesh is weak). In relation to Acts 2:36 Athanasius repeats what he had stated in his CAR, namely that δι' ἀνθρωπότητος αὐτοῦ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ ἐν ἀνθρωπότητος αὐτοῦ. But he also adds a phrase which brings out the typical ecclesiological point of this treatise: the identification of the Body of Christ with the Church. Thus he writes about the humanity (or the body): ἦταν (ἀνθρωπότης αὐτοῦ) ἐστιν πᾶσα ἡ Ἐκκλησία, ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ κυρίεσθαι καὶ βασιλεύσαι μετά τὸ αὐτόν σταυρωθῆναι, καὶ κριμένη ἐν χειλεύσαι αὐτῷ σατρονούν, ἵνα συμβασιλεύσῃ αὐτῷ τῷ δι' αὐτῆς ἀντι αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀναλαμβάνοντι αὐτὴν διά τῆς σοφείας μορφῆς. This superb ecclesiological text confesses the Incarnation and the humanity of Christ both intensively and extensively, i.e. in terms of the single
humanity of Christ (the form of the servant which He took up) and the new humanity which is given to men through the former, namely, the Church. It is in this kind of holistic perspective that we must understand Athanasius' exegesis of Acts 2:36, which is summed up in the following statement: τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα αὐτοῦ ἐποίησεν ἡ θεότης αὐτοῦ. Κύριον· καὶ Χριστόν.

Equally far-reaching in importance is Athanasius' exegesis of the other two difficult Christological verses of Matthew 26:39 and Mark 14:38, which was in fact employed at the time of the Sixth Ecumenical Council of Constantinople in A.D. 680/1 in the debate over monothelitism. Both verses, says Athanasius, must be understood with reference to the two wills of Christ (ὁ θελήματα ένταθε δεξιόνυ), the human will of the flesh (τὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπινον...τῆς σαρκός) and the divine will of God (τὸ δὲ θείον... Θεοῦ). Behind them Athanasius sees the double truth that Christ was God and that He became in the likeness of men (ὅτι θεός ἦν ἐν δυναμώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος). As man παραίτεται τοῦ πάθους, but as God οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν κρατεῖσαι αὐτόν ὑπὸ τοῦ θανάτου, because He was ἀκολούθησιν ἔχοντι, καὶ ἐγειρόμενος καὶ πάλιν ἐζωτήν. The Son is the Power of God, says Athanasius, who, although He suffers on account of weakness because of the fleshly composition, and although He declines the passion as man, He does live through His own power. That Christ is both God and man is the obvious conclusion, which Athanasius presents against the Arians in the final chapter of his treatise. John 17:3 and I John 5:20 are mentioned as pointing to the fact that the Son is true God before He became man and after He became Mediator between God and men. The man Jesus Christ is united with the Father according to the spirit and with us according to the flesh and thus He mediates between God and men. Athanasius
illustrates these points of doctrine by citing various verses from the Scriptures and emphasizing that the Son of God is God who took the form of the servant and became in the likeness of men.

The above survey shows that in all his anti-Arian works Athanasius retains the same Christological perspectives even though points of particular significance do emerge. First and foremost he maintains the distinction between the Godhood and the manhood of Christ and then he expounds the Incarnation both subjectively and objectively. Subjectively it involves the Logos or Son of God's becoming "Son of man", or "man", i.e.: His "incarnate presence", or "human presence", whilst objectively it entails the assumption or putting on of "a body", or "flesh", or "the human things", or "the human element", or "our genus", or "the common genus of men", or even "the man who was originally created in the image of God", etc. Perhaps the most distinctive and valuable points emerging from this survey are the following: a) the reference to "the human spirit of Christ" which was recreated and renewed in Him, mentioned in Ser1,9; b) the inclusion in the Logos' Incarnation of "the man who was originally created in the image of God", namely the human mind; c) The formula ἐὰς ἐξ ἀμφότερων θημαλγόμενος in Dion9,3; d) the statement that there is a homousia and congeniality (οὐγγένετο) between the Son become man and us men, mentioned in Dion10 and 12; e) and finally the references to the "spirit of Christ in the delivery of which into the hands of the Father all the spirits of men are delivered", the fact that the Son became "perfect man", and that in Christ there were two wills, mentioned in Car5,5, Car5,7 and Car5,21.

We shall now turn to Athanasius later works which had to deal with more direct questions concerning the humanity of Christ.
The greater part of ANT is occupied with the discussion of the Trinitarian formula and particularly the relation of the two crucial Nicene terms οὐσία and ὑπόστασις. There is, however, material which touches upon the Christological dogma and especially upon the relation of the Godhood to the manhood of Christ. A brief review of the contents of ANT with emphasis on the Christological section will help to draw out the significance of this document for Christology in its Godward and manward aspects.

In the first chapter the author discusses the necessity and blessedness of Church unity and argues that it can be achieved on the basis of a common confession and piety. Chapter two further expounds the same theme, pointing out the state of urgency existing in the Church at the time. Chapter three lays down the essence of the common faith and the principle which governs the Church's choice of confessional terminology or formulae. The essence of the common faith is the Trinitarian confession of God without dividing or regarding as creaturely any of the terms in the Trinity. This confession is stated over against the monistic Arian conception of God and is said to be the unerring criterion of Orthodoxy. The governing principle in this Trinitarian confession is, most important, the conviction of the faith (τὸ φόρον) and not the terms or the formulae as such. Indeed, it is said that it is possible to use the orthodox formula and yet deny the faith. The far-reaching implications resulting from the application of this principle to ecclesiastical dogmatic theology cannot be exaggerated. ANT itself is a
primary proof of that. It is by employing this principle that Athanasius is able to turn this Synod into a means of reconciliation and renewal in the Church. As the following chapters reveal and as history testifies this Synod marks the turning point in the Arian crisis and in the Church's terminological clarification of the Nicene Trinitarian dogma which is consummated at Constantinople in A.D. 381.

Chapter four makes similar points and stresses the fact that the common faith is inextricably bound up with reconciliation and common mind (ἡμόνωσις). Chapter five begins with an identification of faith and piety and goes on to outline the dogmatic intention of two rival Trinitarian formulae. The first one is the formula of the τρεῖς ὑπόστασις. It was opposed by some because it was "unwritten", dubious and especially because of its Arian connotations. The Arians had employed it to teach that the Trinity consisted of three totally different hypostases which were divided and alien to each other with respect to being. As such it had led to the doctrine of three divine principles or three Gods. Those present at the Synod who upheld this formula denied all the charges of their opponents and explained that their intention was anti-Sabellian and was focused on a real Trinity as opposed to a nominal one. They in fact accepted one Divine οὐσία and employed the term ὑπόστασις to denote the Trinity. In chapter six the rival Trinitarian formula, which identified the terms οὐσία and ὑπόστασις and used them to denote the Godhead, is similarly explained. It was opposed because it was thought to imply a Sabellian Trinity. Those who upheld it
explained that it was intended to counteract Arianism which believed in three gods and three godhoods, and therefore to stress the unity of God. It was by no means Sabellian because the Trinity was accepted to be real and was confessed in the names of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. After this examination of the dogmatic intentions of the two Trinitarian formulae, Synod resolved to accept both as orthodox on the basis of the hermeneutical dogmatic principle which was outlined in chapter three.

Chapter seven introduces a similar dispute, but this time connected with the Christological formula and doctrine, and employs the same hermeneutical principle to resolve it. Chapter nine makes it clear that this dispute did not involve all the delegates present at the Synod. It was a much more restricted dispute and involved a minority which stayed on to resolve their differences after the majority had departed. Disputed was the doctrine of the Incarnation, or, as it is actually put in the text, "the economy of the Saviour which is in accordance with the flesh (τὸ περὶ τῆς κατὰ σάρκα οἰκονομίας τοῦ Σωτῆρος)".

It seems that two rival Christological positions were involved, each one resting on its own particular model for explaining the economy of the Incarnation. The one employed the prophetic model according to which the Logos indwelt a particular man. The other stressed that the Logos became man by assuming to Himself mere human flesh without soul, because He Himself acted as a human soul in Christ. By the prophetic model the former position intended to safeguard the integrity of the humanity of Christ and therefore the reality of the Incarnation against docetism. By the Logos + mere flesh model the latter position
intended to safeguard the real involvement of God in the Incarnation against Judaism or Samosateanism. Unlike the Trinitarian dispute which was resolved by accepting the two rival Trinitarian formulae as orthodox, this dispute is resolved by rejecting the two rival positions and positing an alternative to serve as a compromise position. Thus, it is stated that the advent of the Logos did not take place as in the case of the O.T. prophets. That is to say, the Logos did not come into a holy man. Rather, the Logos Himself became man. This should be understood in terms of Phil. 2:6f, which states that the Logos who is in the form of God has taken up the form of the servant, i.e. the form of man. In view of this the Logos Himself and not a particular man was born of the Virgin Mary according to the flesh, and His birth took place for us men and for our salvation. This Christological position also states that the Logos' body which He assumed at His Incarnation was not ἄρσεν ἄνθρωπος, or ἄνθρωπος. This is a soteriological necessity, because, as the text itself states, the Logos came to save not only the body but also the soul. The orthodox position accepts that the Logos is the Son of God who has also become son of man, or, He is the only-Begotten Son of God who has also become first-born among many brethren. It is wrong therefore to distinguish between the one who was before Abraham and another who came after him, or distinguish the one who raised Lazarus from the one who asked where he had been laid. It was the same one who acted as man and as God and He suffered in the flesh, as Peter said (I Pet. 4:1), but also He opened the graves and raised the
dead. This double action of one and the same agent, i.e., the action of the Logos of God in and through the human and the Divine natures is the key to the understanding of the Gospels. The chapter concludes with the comment that both parties involved in the dispute accepted this interpretation and the fact that there is no difference between an Incarnation (σάρξωσις) and an Inhomination (ἐναγρώπωσις). Chapter eight probably refers to the Christological dispute. It is a warning against the pursuit of such rivalries which are based on dubious terms and rigid semantics. It is also a challenge to peace and unity and mutual understanding so that the whole flock will come to be under the one Sovereign, the Lord Jesus Christ.

There are two more Christological sections in the concluding chapters of the Tomus, which deserve special attention. In chapter ten Eusebius, Bishop of Vercelli (or Vercellae), who had helped Athanasius to summon this Alexandrian Synod, outlines and signs a declaration of faith which includes significant Christological clauses. In line with Athanasius' compromise position developed in chapter seven, Eusebius asserts that the Incarnation should be understood in terms of the Son of God becoming man by assuming all that is human except sin, i.e., all that constituted the original man. The other Christological section is found in chapter eleven. It is Paulinus of Antioch's confession of faith which was probably added to the Tomus after its arrival at Antioch. Paulinus asserts that the Logos became flesh as John testifies. But this should not be taken as involving a change in the Logos qua Logos, or the Logos as God-Logos. The Logos rather became man for us from the Virgin Mary and the
Holy Spirit. Also, the Logos’ body, such as it was, could not have been without a soul, sense or mind. It is clear that both Eusebius’ and Paulinus’ statements are almost repetitions of that of St. Athanasius.

The Christology of ANT is the earliest Athanasian Christological statement dealing with the question of the humanity of Christ with a view to the Apollinarian Christological position. It is obvious that Athanasius does not ally himself with either Apollinarius or his opponents. If Apollinarius’ position could be described as a Logos-sarx Christology and that of his opponents as a Logos-anthropos one (a schematization employed in contemporary Dogmengeschichte), Athanasius’ position would not admit of either description. For him the primary question is not the how of the Incarnation, but the who and the what. This becomes apparent in his pivotal statement, Ὑς τὸν ἀληθινὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, γέγονε καὶ ὑς ἀνθρώπου. Here there is one subject but two verbs. The subject is the second person of the Trinity, the eternal Son and Logos of God. The verbs ’to be’ and ’to become’ qualify the same subject but imply two different realities. They denote the Godhood and the manhood of Christ without defining or confusing them. In this sense, being and becoming are not opposed to each other as in Greek philosophy, but are brought together in the one person of the one Logos and Son of God. This view rests on two crucial Biblical statements which are confessed together as the sum total of the Apostolic witness to Christ. Ἀδητὸς ὁ λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων, ἐλαβεν δούλου μορφήν (John 1:14 and Phil. 2:6f.).
Against the Apollinarist position Athanasius stresses the Σαλαβεν of Phil. 2:6f. and the integrity and completeness of the μορφή τοῦ δούλου. Against the anti-Apollinarists who stress the prophetic Jewish model in Christology, he emphasizes the ἐγένετο of John 1:14 and the fact that it was Αὐτὸς and not another who became flesh, i.e. man. The outcome of this double challenge is, that the one Saviour is God and man. The expressions Θεῖκος and ἀνθρωποποιών qualify the One Logos because He is in the form of God and also has assumed the form of the servant. For Athanasius then, Christ is not a particular man in whom the divine Logos came to dwell, but the Logos Himself, become man. This does not imply that His manhood is in any sense different from ours. He has assumed to Himself all that is man's and at the same time He has in His own person become man. This becoming man relates to His person, which is and remains divine. His assumption refers to the manhood which He takes up from us, i.e., from Mary.

It is perhaps true to say that there is in ANT a certain hesitation on the part of Athanasius to enter into the intricacies which the question concerning the precise character of the humanity of Christ poses. His Christological statement is general and the particular answers he gives to the particular Christological points represented by the two disputing parties are cautious. Athanasius' main and pressing concern is the unity and the reconciliation of the Nicenes with the Orientals who accept the homoiousion. How could he allow himself to get involved in a debate which would suggest a division among the Nicenes?
Athanasius begins his letter by recalling the Nicene Synod as the standard of orthodoxy, which is sufficient for the refutation of all heresies and the commendation of the true faith. He mentions the recent councils summoned in Gaul, Spain and Rome, which anathematized the Western Arians, Auxentius, Ursacius, Valens and Gaius, and acclaimed the Synod of Nicea as the standard of the Catholic Church. He then refers to those who attempt to raise doubts and questions which deviate from the Nicene standard. Such people, he says, poison their neighbours and subvert the simple, though they like to think that they believe correctly and love the statements of the Fathers. Without naming these people Athanasius goes on in chapter two to enumerate their questionable and indeed devious reasonings. His account is based on certain Memoranda (ὑμουνήματα) which Epictetus of Corinth had sent to him. These Memoranda had spoken of two rival groups in the Diocese of Corinth which held opposite views regarding the Incarnation.

According to Athanasius' account the first group believed that:

1. The body born of Mary was *homoousion* to the Godhood of the Logos.
2. The Logos was changed into flesh, and bones, and hair and a complete body, and therefore was altered in His own nature.
3. The Lord put on a body as a matter of convention and not according to nature.
4. The Logos who is *homoousios* with the Father was circumcised and therefore has become imperfect though He was perfect.
(5) What was nailed on the cross was not the body but the very creative being of Wisdom.
(6) The Logos fashioned a passible body from His own being and not from Mary.
(7) He who says that the Lord's body is from Mary introduces a quaternity into the Godhood instead of the Trinity.
(8) The body of the Logos is not younger than His Godhood but has been coeternal with it, because it was derived from the Being of Wisdom.
(9) The Lord who was derived from Mary was not Son of God according to being and nature. He was rather from the seed of David according to the flesh, the flesh of the holy Mary.

The second group believed that:

(1) The Christ who suffered in the flesh and was crucified was not Lord, or Saviour, or God, or Son of the Father.
(2) It was not the Logos Himself who became man by the assumption of the body from Mary, but He entered into a holy man, as in the case of the prophets.
(3) Christ was one, and the Logos of God, who before Mary and before the ages was Son of the Father, was another.
(4) The Son is one and the Logos of God is another.

In chapter three Athanasius argues that both views are heretical because ultimately they lead to impiety and heresy. They are both alien to the "apostolic faith", "the teaching of the Fathers" and the "faith of the Catholic Church".

Chapter four contains Athanasius' refutation of the first thesis of the first group, i.e. that the body of Christ was homoousion with the Godhood of the Logos. His argument is three-
fold, Scriptural, Patristic and Theological. This notion is not supported by any Biblical text. It has no Patristic foundation. It inevitably leads to idolatry, because it confuses God with corporeality. The Fathers of Nicea did not employ the homoeousia to describe the relation of the body of Christ to His Godhood, but the relation of the Son to the Father. On the contrary they spoke of the body as been derived from Mary in accordance with the Scriptures. Obviously, Athanasius' position rests on a clear distinction between the body of Christ and the Godhood of the Son. As he goes on to argue, the body is from the earth. If it was not, i.e., if it was homoeousia, as the first group of the Corinthian Christians contested, then the Father would be homoeousios to it and therefore the Father's Godhood would be equally creaturely like the Son's. But then, why contest the Arians, who actually ascribe transcendent Godhood to the Father and creaturely Godhood to the Son?

The second half of chapter four contains a brief refutation of the second thesis of the first group, i.e., "that the Logos was converted into flesh and bones and hair and sinews and an entire body." The refutation is based on two arguments, a theological one and a logical argument from inconsistency. According to the first the body was from the earth, whereas the Logos was from the Father. The second argument drew attention to the logical inconsistency between this thesis and the previous one. This thesis entailed a conversion of one 'thing' into another (the Logos into body), whereas the previous one retained two distinct entities (the Logos and the body) regarding them to be homoeousia. Next follows a brief statement of what may be called a Mariological argument against the first thesis.
According to it the thesis in question renders the biblical reference to Mary superfluous. Finally, chapter four concludes with a soteriological argument against both theses. Stated ontologically, the argument involves the claim that the advent of the Logos would have been unnecessary, because no necessity would have demanded that the Logos should put on what is homoeousion to Him, or that His nature should be converted into a body. Also, stated dynamically, the same soteriological argument claims that the Logos who redeemed the sins of others did not commit sin, so that, being Himself converted into a body He might be able to offer Himself as sacrifice for His own sins and thus redeem Himself.

In chapter five Athanasius elaborates the Mariological argument employing it in a positive manner, against the two theses of his Corinthian opponents. He does this by summarizing the biblical evidence: 1) The assumption of a human seed (acc. to Heb. 2:16), 2) the necessity of the Logos' becoming like His brethren in all respects (Heb. 2:17), 3) that Mary was implicated as a true subject, 4) the human identity of Mary witnessed to by Isaiah 7:14 and Luke 1:27 ('betrothed'), 5) the reference to 'the paps which were sucked', 'the swaddling clothes', 'the sacrifice of opening up the womb', 6) Gabriel's 'from you' instead of 'in you' (Luke 1:36?), 7) the circumcision on the eighth day, 8) the incident with Simeon, 9) the visit to the temple at the age of twelve and 10) the fact that Jesus became thirty years old. In conclusion S. Athanasius draws a clear ontological distinction between the Logos' Divine ousia and the body which He assumed at His Incarnation. The ousia is
immutable according to Mal.3:6 and Heb.13:8, but the incorporeal and impassible Logos was in the body which underwent changes, suffering and death during which He went and preached to the spirits imprisoned in hades.

In chapter six, Athanasius supplies further proof in defence of the true human and creaturely body of Christ and against any notion of conversion of the Logos into a body. He argues that the burial and the descent into hades contradict the idea of conversion and that the body was still human and natural after the resurrection according to Thomas' testimony. In the second half of this chapter, Athanasius speaks of the personal appropriation of the properties of the body by the Logos (ἐπισερτατείως τὰ τοῦ σῶματος ἔσυξ), including the sufferings, and develops the notion of communicatio idiomatum without mentioning the term. The Logos, he says, referred to Himself the sufferings of the body (εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνέφερεν τὰ πάθη τοῦ σῶματος) and exchanged our weaknesses with His powers by offering the former as a sacrifice. The soteriological tone of this section reaches its completion in chapter seven, where the soteriological argument is positively employed against the third heretical thesis of the first group of his Corinthian opponents. The aim is to vindicate the Logos' abode in the body, truly (ἀληθῶς) and not accidentally (θεός). The central affirmation here is that our salvation is not an imagination (φαντασία) nor is it incomplete, because the whole man, body and soul, was saved in the incarnate Logos (ὅλον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἀληθῶς, ἡ σωτηρία γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ). There follows a summary of the Mariological argument, asserting that the body,
being derived from Mary was truly human (διηνενόμον), because it was identical with our own (ταύτον). Mary is our sister, because, like all of us, she is derived from Adam as the Gospel genealogies testify. The chapter concludes with the claim that the body of Christ remains truly human even after the resurrection, as Luke 24:39-40 indicates.

In chapter eight, Athanasius expounds the orthodox meaning of John 1:14 as a means of arguing against the first two heretical theses. For him the Johannine ἐγένετο σῶρες should be understood in the same sense as the Pauline ἐγένετο κατάρα. He became a curse, in the sense, that He assumed the curse which was for us. So, to become flesh is primarily to assume flesh. But that again means that the Logos became man. Consequently, John 1:14 is identical with the statement, He assumed flesh and became man. Athanasius argues that this understanding refutes both the idea of the conversion of the Logos into flesh and the idea that the flesh existed before Mary together with a soul to which the Logos was eternally united. On the same grounds, Athanasius refutes the notion that the body of Christ was inherently immortal. This idea, he says, stands in direct contrast to Paul's affirmation, "that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures" (I Cor. 15:3). The chapter closes with the heretical objection to the Orthodox insistence on a truly human and creaturely body. They argue that this insistence implies a quaternity in God instead of the Trinity.

In chapter nine, Athanasius replies to this objection by reversing the heretical argument, vindicating the true Trinity to be perfect, undivided and not admitting of any
'additions'. Rather, the body received 'additions' (προσθήκη) by virtue of its union and communion with the Logos. It acquired immortality, became spiritual though it was psychical, entered the gates of heaven though it was derived from the earth.

In chapters ten and eleven Athanasius refutes the theses of the second group which may be proleptically defined as 'Nestorian'. According to this group "He who came forth from Mary was not Himself the Christ and Lord and God." "He was a man in whom the Logos of God came to dwell in the same manner as in the case of the prophets of the OT". Athanasius argues that this theory is contrary to the testimony of the Scriptures. Mt. 1:23, Rom. 9:5, John 20:28 and John 1:14 clearly indicate that He who was born from Mary was God, the Logos. He also argues that the suffering, death and resurrection of Christ as they are presented in the Scriptures point in the same direction. Without the Logos' real presence in the body, which is derived from Mary, incorruption and resurrection could never have been achieved.

As regards the prophetic model as the clue to Christology Athanasius argues that the statement John 1:14 was never made with reference to a prophet's birth and is confined to Christ alone. His emphasis falls on the uniqueness of Christ and therefore he can argue that: 1) only He was born of a Virgin, 2) only His death was for us and our salvation, 3) only in Him has the completion of the ages been accomplished, 4) only He has risen from the dead, 5) only He was called Emmanuel, and 6) only in Him and not in any of the prophets is the Logos said to have spoken, eaten, drunk, laboured, died, etc. Athanasius'
counter statement to this 'psilanthropic' Christology is made in chapter twelve which also includes the epilogue of EPI. It involves the same central affirmation which was advanced against the former group of heretical opinions that exhibited 'Apollinaristic' overtones: "In Christ it is the Logos Himself who assumed flesh and became man. Being in His own nature and essence God's Logos, He, nevertheless, became man according to the flesh from the seed of David and the flesh of Mary. He is the beloved Son of the Father (Matt. 3:17) through Whom all things were made and we men were redeemed".

The Christology of EPI is strikingly similar to that of ANT. This is partly owed to the fact that the rival heretical Christologies which are refuted in both documents are similar. In both cases there is a rivalry between a Logomonistic Christology which interprets the ἕγεστο of the Incarnation in such a way that either the flesh is confused with the Logos' Divine οὐσία or the Logos' οὐσία is converted into human flesh, and a dualistic Christology which explains the ἕγεστο of the Incarnation by means of Jewish Christological models. Against the former both ANT and EPI differentiate between the οὐσία of the Logos and the flesh or body which He assumed at His Incarnation. Against the latter they emphasize the fact that the logos, not in His Θεότης, but in His person is the only subject active in the Incarnation. These two counterpositions are asserted together and not separately. Consequently, the differentiation of the former does not result in a dualism nor the identification of the latter in monism. This is reinforced by the transitive
which applies to the differentiation and the intransitive ἐγένετο, that refers to the identification. In other words Christology for Athanasius involves the transitive statement, "The Logos assumed flesh" and also the intransitive "The Logos became man". These are complementary statements. They refer to two aspects of Athanasian Christological doctrine and presuppose an ontological differentiation between οὐσία and παρουσία which applies both to God (the differentiation between the Trinity and the Unity) and to man (the differentiation between the particular person and the generically common human nature).

With regard to οὐσία, Christ includes two distinct and unconfused elements, Godhood and manhood. With regard to παρουσία Christ is One, the Logos become man in Himself. Godhood and manhood are atoned in Christ because of His one παρουσία. The παρουσία, which we may call the Person of Christ, is dual, Divine and human, because it exists in both Godhood and manhood. Obviously, this Athanasian Christology is a duality of οὐσία, or υπόσια, in a unity of παρουσία, or Person. As such it represents a middle position between two rival Christologies, the monistic, which is centred on God's immanent act in the world, and the dualistic, which is centred on God's transcendence. For St. Athanasius the alternative to monism and therefore pantheism is not dualism which results in deism, but a duality in unity, a theism which combines transcendence and immanence. In the last analysis he arrives at this position because he operates with a dysemantic ontology (both in his Theology and anthropology) unlike his opponents who share a monosemantic ontology. St. Athanasius' duality in unity results from his faithful exposition of the Christological statements of the Scriptures in line with
the Apostolic tradition of the Church. It is existential rather than logical. On the contrary the monism and the dualism of his opponents seem to reflect the philosophical-logical points of view of the Greek idealist philosophical tradition, whether that of Aristotle or that of Plato. For St. Athanasius the existential perspectives of the Apostolic doctrine of Christ (the Apostolic kerygma) are the sine qua non of orthodox thinking both in theology and in anthropology and therefore also in cosmology.
ADEL begins with Athanasius' praise of Bishop Adelphius' orthodoxy maintained against the perversion of the heretics (the Arians), "who are determined to remain true Christomachians". These heretics, Athanasius goes on to say, "who had formerly denied the Godhood of the only-begotten Son of God while acknowledging His incarnate presence", have now come to "invent a new insult (κατηνή δοσφημίαν) against the Saviour". "They refuse to believe that He became man". So, they deny both His Godhood and His manhood. The account of the new heretical tenet is general, but what clearly emerges from this opening chapter of ADEL, is the dual emphasis of Athanasius' Christology, which consistently permeates all his writings. Christ is true God, the only-begotten Son of the Father, who has also become man by virtue of His incarnation (ὁ Θεός γέγονεν καὶ ἀνθρωπός).

In chapter two, Athanasius speaks of two problems emerging from the heretical denial of the Son's true becoming man, which find their antecedents in the heresies of Valentinus, Marcion and Manichaeus. The first is the problem of docetism (δοκητισμός), which denies the true manhood of Christ and the second the problem of dualism (διαλισμός), which denies the key text John 1:14.

Chapters three and four deal with the heretical accusation, that the affirmation of a creaturely humanity in Christ leads to idolatry because the worship of Christ would include the worship of His creaturely manhood. St. Athanasius replies that this accusation really applies to the pagans and the Arians and
not to the orthodox. For the latter the worship of Christ is the worship of God's Logos who became incarnate. The flesh is certainly creaturely (a part of the creatures), but it has become God's body. Christians do not worship the body as such dividing it from the Logos. Nor do they worship the Logos apart from the flesh. The Christian perspective in worship is set by the Gospel statement "the Logos became flesh". So, Christians worship the Logos in the flesh. On the contrary the new heresy demands by implication that the body of the Logos should be separated from Him in order that He may be properly worshipped. Obviously, this attitude presupposes a theological transcendent-alism, that strikes at the very centre of the Apostolic kerygma which is focused on the saving economy of the Logos' Incarnation.

St. Athanasius further explains his understanding of worship offered to Christ by employing the imagery of the temple. The body of Christ, he says, has become the Logos's creaturely temple (κτωστὸς ναός). It is not the temple as such that Christians worship, but God the Logos in His own temple. Only the Jews, he argues, would have been offended at this new temple of the Logos' body. In support of his view St. Athanasius recalls the Gospel incidents of the leper, the woman with the hemorrhage, the calming of the storm, the man born blind and the miraculous physical events which took place at the crucifixion when the body of Christ was nailed to the cross. He argues that in none of these was obedience to the Logos questioned because of His incarnation. Although He appeared to be man, He was in fact confessed to be and worshipped as God, the Creator of all. The flesh, far from
bringing dishonour to the Logos, has been glorified by Him. The Logos, far from being diminished in His Godhood, by the assumption of the flesh, has in fact become the liberator of all flesh and all creation. Indeed, God's sending of His Son to be born of a woman does not bring shame to Him, but rather reveals His glory and abundant grace. The Soteriological incarnational perspective of St. Athanasius dominates his argument. It becomes fully disclosed in the following pivotal affirmations: "The Logos became man that He may deify us in Himself. He was made from a woman and was born of a Virgin that He may take up to Himself our own birth which had been led astray, and therefore make us a holy race and communicants of the Divine nature, as the blessed Peter said. What the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God, having sent His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh" (Rom.8:3).

Similarly, Soteriological considerations govern the argument of chapter five. Here St. Athanasius argues that if the flesh was assumed for the liberation of all men, the universal resurrection from the dead and the redemption from sin, the heretical accusations amount to ignominiousness. Without the flesh, he says, the Logos could not have redeemed us from death and sin. So, to deny worship to the Logos because of His flesh is to deny salvation. The same applies to those who divide the Logos from His flesh. It is as if they wish to affirm that sin has not been redeemed and death has not been conquered. Quoting Acts 7:55,1:11 and John 17:24 as examples St. Athanasius asserts
that nowhere in Scripture is the flesh of Christ said to exist in itself, but is always undivided (διαοχρεπτος) from the Logos.

In chapter six St. Athanasius contends that the orthodox faith is based on "the Apostolic teaching and the Traditions of the Fathers and is confirmed by the Scriptures of the New and Old Testaments". He cites Ps.42:3, Is.7:14 and Matth.1:23 as confirmations of the Inhomination of the Logos, and I Pet.4:1, and Tit. 2:13f as confirmations of His self-offering for us after His assumption of the human flesh. It is immediately after this reference to the self-offering of the Logos for us, that St. Athanasius introduces what may be called the Eucharistic argument. He contends that the orthodox Eucharist is always offered in the name of Jesus Christ. Far from contesting the grace given to us through Him, the Eucharistic practice confesses the incarnate presence of the Saviour as the ransom for death and the salvation of all creation. The Eucharistic argument is briefly stated as a corollary to the Soteriological Christological one which predominates in ADEM. It is, however, on both arguments, that St. Athanasius bases his conclusion to chapter six. To reject the Orthodox practice of worshipping Christ in the flesh (he might have said 'in the Eucharist' !) would mean to revert to Judaism, and even to take the position of Judas and Caiaphas!

Chapter seven elaborates the notion that the worship of the Lord in the flesh was 'warranted' in the O.T., and especially in the practice of worshipping God in the Temple. The Lord in
the Flesh is related to the Lord in the Temple as reality is to shadow, or as truth is to type. The Flesh, therefore, should not be dishonoured, nor should it be divided from the Lord, lest the grace which is given in and through it is rejected! This is precisely, says St. Athanasius, where the Arian problem lies.

The Arians, "while approving of the old people on account of the honour done to the temple, they do not want to worship the Lord in the Flesh, which has become to Him as a temple". They fail to perceive that the Body of the Lord, truly all-holy and all-reverend, announced in the Gospel by the Archangel Gabriel and fashioned by the Holy Spirit, cannot be other than adorable (προσκυνητόν). In a rather emotional rhetorical passage, Athanasius refers to 'the outstretched hand of the Lord' which healed the woman suffering from fever (Luke 4:39), His human voice which He uttered when He raised Lazarus from the dead (John 11:43), and finally 'His outstretched hands upon the cross' by which He cast down the prince of the power of the air, the one who now works in the children of disobedience and made the path through the heavens open for us. The soteriological emphasis is apparent. Salvation is achieved by the incarnate Logos and not by the Logos qua Logos. Hence worship is offered to the Lord in the flesh.

In chapter eight St. Athanasius outlines and contrasts the Arian and the Orthodox approaches to body particularly in the context of theology. The Arian approach argues that, if the body is creaturely and the Logos has really been united with it, then the Logos must be a creature. And since they agree that
the Logos is the Creator of the world, they end with the Gnostic notion of a creaturely Creator. Or, the other way round, the Arian argument demands, that, if the Logos is not a creature, the body, which is created must be essentially distinguished from Him, because God and creaturehood are incompatible. The Orthodox reaction to the Arian approach is determined by the perspective of salvation and creation, i.e., by the fact that God's activity in creation and salvation bridges the gap of Divine transcendence and creaturely limitation. The perspective of Soteriology and Christology demands that Godhood and manhood are not incompatible, although they are essentially different. Two particular arguments help to clarify this Orthodox position in contrast to the Arian.

a) If the Logos is a creature, then there would be no need of His assumption of a creaturely body in order to save, because a creature cannot save a creature. What is presupposed here is St. Athanasius' view that salvation is no less existential than creation, and that since creation is entirely the work of God, so should salvation be. b) The Logos is the Creator of all existing creatures, hence He alone can save them. In other words if God the Logos can be with the creatures in creation, He can also be with them in salvation. The relation of the Creator to creation is neither pantheistic nor dualistic (or deistic). God is directly, though differentially, related to His creation. This truth is concretely revealed in the Incarnation, where the Logos is directly related to the human creaturehood (the body), but is differentiated from it with regard to His Godhood.

In conclusion, St. Athanasius claims that the accusations
which the Arians make against the Orthodox are in fact directed against themselves. It is the Arians who worship creation and not God the Creator, since, for them, worship is offered to Him who saves and they believe Him to be a creature. On the contrary the Orthodox worship the Creator, who Himself became man for the salvation of men. As far as the mode of the Logos's becoming man is concerned St. Athanasius asserts that He is not as an equal in an equal body (i.e., not as a creature in a creaturely form). He is rather the Lord (ὁ Λεωντις) who has assumed the form of the servant, or Creator and Maker who has entered creaturehood. And He has done all this, so that by means of this creaturehood He may liberate all things, lead the world (the people) into His Father's presence and bring peace to everything in heaven and earth. By way of conclusion St. Athanasius confesses two central aspects of his vision of Christ, His Godhood which He shares with the Father (τὴν παριστηνόν αὑτοῦ Θεότητα) and His presence in a concrete manhood (τὴν ἐν ζωομον αὑτοῦ παρουσίαν), as the real content of the Orthodox worship. The crucial or 'logically' prior notion in this vision is the Person of the Logos which is conveyed by the term παρουσία. Παρουσία is the category which joins together Godhood and manhood. It is not the result of their union (a tertium quid), but the presupposition of both. This prevents St. Athanasius' theology from becoming trapped in Arian ontological dialectics which waver between subordination of the Logos' παρουσία to His Godhood (understood as οὐκ οὐδείς in a Greek philosophical sense) and the Logos' παρουσία to His Body (probably understood in a Stoic sense).
The Christology of ADEL moves along the same lines as that of ANT and EPI. The primary category for understanding Christ is His Person, He Himself, His \( \pi \alpha \rho \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \alpha \). Christ's person is one, the Divine, which has also become human. This unity of person does not lead into a monistic ontology. The ontological integrity of Godhood and manhood is retained. But ontology is not conceptualized. It is rather subordinated to the mysterious subjective category of \( \pi \alpha \rho \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \alpha \). As such it may be said to lose its rigidity and acquire an adjectival status. It becomes, as it were, an adjective qualifying the person. The Son is said to be Divine or the Godhood is said to be the Godhood of the Son. Also, because of the Incarnation, the Son is said to be human, or the human flesh is said to be of the Son. On the contrary, the 'Arian' heretics opposed in ADEL make ontology the primary and indeed the only category for explaining Christology. This results in the dilemma of having to choose between a 'pantheistic' monism, or a 'deistic' dualism. In Christological terms this becomes a dilemma between a Christology which accepts a docetic manhood and a Christology which individuates Godhood and manhood in such a way that they can never become one. The Athanasian alternative to the unresolved logical opposition between monism and dualism is a personal unity in an ontological duality. The clue to the understanding of Christ, and therefore the understanding of God and man, is authentic subjectivity. The subjectivity of the Divine Son is for him the key to the orthodox understanding of theological and anthropological reality. Its affirmation
as distinct from Godhood implies a dysemantic understanding of ontology which is no longer equivalent to either Platonic or Aristotelian primary and secondary substance. St. Athanasius' Christology as much as his Triadology would be incoherent if not untenable had he not moved away from the ideological tensions of the old Hellenic philosophy. His statements are primarily theological, couched in the language of the Church's tradition. They signal the development of a new philosophy resting on categories inherent in the Christian revelation.

This is in fact the Christian philosophy developed by the great Cappadocian Fathers, particularly St. Gregory of Nyssa, who expressed St. Athanasius' doctrine in philosophical language.

From this philosophical point of view, St. Athanasius' Christology is revolutionary for the development of Christianity in history. But from the point of view of the old philosophy, it cannot but appear to be inconsistent and even irrational. This distinction is extremely important when one attempts to evaluate St. Athanasius' Christology and compare it to those of his opponents. In the academic setting it is a 'scientific' imperative to recognize the fundamental presuppositions which govern the various dogmatic evaluations. In the case of St. Athanasius these presuppositions are, as he claims, derived from the Church's tradition. Ultimately they rest on the Christian revelation of God which abides in the Church and creates the Christian history.
If in ADEL Athanasius condemns two Christological errors relating to the doctrine of the Incarnation, that of δόξης and that of διαφραγμάτος, in his letter to Maximus the Philosopher (who most likely should not be identified with Maximus the Cynic who duped St Gregory the Theologian; cf. Gregory's Oratio xxv), he condemns the latter error. In MAX 1 he asks whether the heretics mentioned in Maximus' communication are in fact Greeks or Judaizers who regard the Cross of Christ to be a scandal or foolishness. Whatever they may be, says Athanasius, they must learn that the Crucified Christ is the Lord of Glory, the Power and Wisdom of God, if they want to be Christians. The opening sentence of MAX 2 reveals that these people have doubts as to whether the Crucified Christ is God. And in the following sentences it is clear that they just cannot see how the body which washed the disciples feet and carried our sins upon the tree could be the body of God. But this is precisely what Athanasius affirms against them: οὗ γάρ ἰνθρώπου τινάς ἦν τὸ ἱλασμένον σῶμα, ἀλλὰ θεοῦ. This statement clearly suggests that Maximus' opponents believed the crucified Christ to be just a man. But then why should they regard this man to be the Christ? Their answer would be based on the assertion that the Logos came to be in this man as in the case of the prophets and holy men of Israel who were also called Christs. This view is actually made explicit by Athanasius; who writes: διὸ οὐδὲ καλὸν ἐκεῖνο αὐτῶν τὸλμημα τὸ λέγων, ὅτι εἶς ἀνθρωπόν τινα ἄγιον ἐγένετο ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ (τοῦτο γάρ ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἐγένετο τῶν προφητῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄγιων). Over against this view Athanasius supplies his own
Christological statement which sees the Logos of God Himself becoming man like us, a fact which He Himself acknowledges before the Jews (John 8:40). Here are his exact words: ἀλλ' ἀπαξ ἑπὶ συντελεῖα τῶν αἰῶνων εἰς ἀδέτησιν τῆς ἁμαρτίας αὐτός ὁ Λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου προῆλεν ἀνθρώπος καθ' ὡμοιώσιν ἑμετέρου, ὡς καὶ πρὸς Ἰουδαίους ἔφη: Τί ζητεῖτε με ἀποκτείναι ἀνθρώπον... The understanding of the Incarnation as the Logos assuming a human body and becoming Himself a man is as typical Athanasian doctrine as the soteriological (even eucharistic) argument that follows: "we do not partake of the body of some man, but receive the body of the Logos and thus become deified".

The positions of Maximus' opponents and of Athanasius himself on the doctrine of Christ are more clearly drawn out in MAX.3. For them Christ is a man who came into existence in a purely natural way (φύσεως ἄκολουθα), but for him this view renders the presence of Mary the Virgin superfluous. Besides, this view leads to the conclusion that it was a man who offered himself for us, or that our faith and hope is in a man. For Athanasius, however, it was the natural Logos of the Father, who, being true God and Wisdom of the Father, became "corporeally a man" (σωματικῶς ἀνθρώπος) for our salvation, in order that He may have the means of offering for us and saving us who through fear of death were throughout all our life subject to slavery. A man, Athanasius goes on to explain, could not offer himself for us, because every man is responsible to death not only because he is made from the earth but also because as a creature he is liable to change. It was the Logos who offered the body for us and so our faith is in
Him. His becoming man did not obscure the Glory which He has as the only-begotten of the Father. What He endured through the body, He magnified as God. He was hungry in the flesh, but He fed the hungry divinely. No one should be scandalized at His bodily weakness, because he should trust what He does as God. He may conjecture about Lazarus ἄνθρωπος, but He can raise Him up Θείκως. No one should deny the ζωὴ τοῦ σῶματος in case he also denies His advent (ἐπιστήμω) for us. And Athanasius concludes in his favourite way: "In not denying τὰ τοῦ σῶματος ζωὴ one rejects the φαντασία τοῦ Μανιχαέου, whilst in not hiding behind the bodily properties τὰ τῆς θεότητος one rejects the Samosatean who says that Christ is a man other (ἄλλος) than the Logos of God.

MAX makes it absolutely apparent that Athanasius is as determined to condemn docetism (most impressively revealed in his EPI) as he is determined to reject dualism. He emphasizes the body against the Gnostics and those who like them operate with an ontological dualism. And he stresses the Divine Logos as the only subject in the human Christ against the Jews and those who operate with a moral dualism.
(xi) Conclusions

We may now try to summarize the conclusions to our investigation of the Christology of Athanasius' works and attempt to evaluate the interpretations of this Christology in modern scholarship.

In GENT-INC we find the fundamental perspectives of Athanasius' doctrine which are kept throughout his long and turbulent literary career and are elaborated and expounded as he is forced to defend them against heretical objections and doctrines. These fundamental perspectives are: the Divine person of Christ which is none other than the Creator Logos God who is the key to cosmology and anthropology, and also the saving fact of the Incarnation or Inhominatio of the Logos, which is expounded in terms of "body" and "man".

Two fundamental verbs sum up the meaning of the Incarnation, the verb to assume and the verb to become, and are both used to stress the total event of Christ. Thus the most perfect statement of Athanasius' Christology is that Christ is the Logos of God who assumed a human body and became a man. As to the precise meaning of this statement Athanasius holds that it is a mystery which cannot be explained away, although a number of things can be confessed about it both negatively and positively. So he states that in becoming man He did not enter into a man, but He Himself (in person) became a man without changing His Godhood which was true and immutable. Again in stating the fact that He took a body or was in a body Athanasius does not mean just a mere body, because he exchanges this term with other terms such as, "man", "human genus", "humanity", "human
What he really seems to be saying is that Christ is all that a man is and has all that a man has, but He is not a mere man, not even like the Greek gods who are deified men, but the Inhominated God the Creator.

CAR1 clarifies considerably the initial intuitions of GENT-INC. Christ is the eternal Son of God who remains God in His being even in His becoming man. Thus His becoming man with all its implications does not refer to His Godhood but to His Incarnate presence and involves the flesh which He assumed. Here again it becomes obvious that "flesh" does not mean "mere flesh" but "humanity", "form of servant", even "man according to nature".

CAR2 stresses against the Arians the Divine Logos and Son of God as the key to Christology and that His Incarnation with all its human implications constitutes no contradiction to His Godhood. The Incarnate economy of the Son should never be confused with His theology, because Godhood and manhood in Christ are ἅλλο καὶ ἅλλο although He is the same person (δοῦνα). The biblical statements which Athanasius uses here to refer to Christ's humanity leave no doubt as to the latter's wholeness and integrity. But the crucial point of doctrine concerning this humanity is the fact that it does not belong to any human person but to the eternal Son of God Himself. The Christological exposition of CAR2 reaches its climax with the doctrine of the eternal predestination of God concerning the Incarnation of His Son and the salvation and perfection of man and the universe. On the whole the tone is theological but this theology is derived from the context of the Incarnation.

In CAR3 Athanasius continues with the defence of the Godhood of the Logos against the Arian objections which are based on what
is said of Him in His incarnate state. Athanasius insists on the double kerygma of the N.T. concerning the Saviour which refers to His Godhood and manhood. His argument is both anti-Samosatean and anti-Arian in the sense that it rejects on the one hand that the Incarnation means the coming of the Logos into a particular man and on the other hand that τὸ δίνθρωπον τοῦ Σωτῆρος can be attributed to His Godhood (especially the suffering the anxiety the ignorance, etc.). Although the Son is the one and only subject of the attribution of both the divine works and the human weaknesses of Christ, this in no way implies confusion of Godhood and manhood.

Similar views are defended in Athanasius' anti-Arian works DECR, DION, ENCY, CONS, FUGA, SER1, SER2, SER4 and CAR5. Above all these works defend the duality of the Godhod and the manhood of Christ. But they also witness equally clearly to the subjective (personal) aspect of Christ which involves the Logos/Son of God becoming Son of man, i.e. His "incarnate presence", or "human presence". The manhood of Christ is again designated by such terms as "body", "flesh", "human things", "human element", "the common genus of man", "the man who was originally created in the image of God", etc. The most significant statements in these works are: the formula in DION,9 that Christ is designated to be one from two (ἐὰν ἐξ ὁμογενῶν ἀνθρώπων); the emphasis in DION,10 on the congeniality and consubstantiality of the Inhominated Son of God with us; the reference to the human mind of Christ in SER1; and the references to the spirit of Christ and to Christ being perfect man in CAR5.

With ANT we enter into a new stage of Christological questions
which lead Athanasius to new clarifications concerning the humanity of Christ. ANT stresses the fact that the body of Christ is not a mere body deprived of "soul" "perception" or "mind", because the salvation of the whole man, body soul etc., was achieved in Christ. This far-reaching Christological-Soteriological statement which anticipates Gregory Nazianzen's famous Soteriological principle, τὸ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον... is even more clearly restated in EPI,7, where Athanasius is refuting heretical Christological errors deriving from Apollinarian circles. Here, as in the other so-called later treatises of ADEL and MAX, the Logos assuming flesh and becoming man still remains the heart of Athanasius' Christology, but the integrity of Christ's humanity becomes clearer than ever.

Our present investigation of Athanasius' Christological texts has convinced us that Voisin Weigl Prestige and Sellers stand closer in their interpretation to Athanasius' real doctrine, than Hoss Stüleken Grillmeier Liebaert and Kelly. The modern critical interpretation of Athanasius' doctrine of Christ based on the strict Baurian theory of Christological frameworks is in the first instance inadequate and in the last analysis erroneous. The difference between Athanasius and his heretical opponents on the doctrine of Christ is not so much a matter of technical terms but of perception and doctrine. The clue to the various Christological positions in the early Church lies with the verbs which present the event of the Incarnation (especially the verb "to become" and the verb "to assume") and most importantly with the subject and object of these verbs. For Athanasius the only subject involved in Christ is the Eternal Son of God who became man without ceasing to be God by assuming complete and true humanity.
That Christ is the Son of God is rooted in the perception that only God can be the Saviour. That the Son has assumed complete humanity is rooted in the perception that only what is united with the Saviour is saved. The two fundamental aspects of Athanasius' Christology are inextricably related to Athanasius' Soteriology. The perception of the Saviour is for Athanasius the way into the mystery of Christ.
VII.3 The Christology of AP01

There are at least two ways of expounding the Christology of AP01: first by proceeding analytically from chapter to chapter, and secondly by gathering up the doctrine in a systematic way. We shall here employ both ways, because each seems to have its particular merits.

Having stated in AP01,† that the subject-matter of his treatise is an urgent refutation of certain people’s erroneous Christology, which is cannily presented as “a most lucid understanding of Christ” (κατάληψιν εύχρηστότερην περί Χριστοῦ ὑποκρυνόμενοι), thus leading astray the unconfirmed or deceiving the confirmed believers, the author proceeds in AP01,2 to contrast his Christology to that of his opponents. His Christology, or the Christology of the Fathers as he calls it, is distinctly Nicene and emphasizes the following points: (i) Christ is the eternal Son of God, who is consubstantial (δυοούσιος) with the Father, true God of true God and perfect from perfect, and who descended to the human level for our salvation. (ii) The descent of the Son is to be understood in terms of His taking-up-flesh (σορκωθέντα) and becoming-man-among-men (ἐνανθρωπώμενον) and as involving suffering death and resurrection. (iii) The Incarnation, Inhomination, Passion, Death and Resurrection of the Inhominated Son of God do not involve any alteration or change of His Godhood. These three statements outline a Christology from the Person of the Son. They state who He is, what He does, who He becomes in what He does and what His becoming does not imply with respect to His being. It is clear that who He is and who He becomes are two conditions of existence which coexist without transmutation.
This coexistence of (divine) being and (human) becoming in the Person of God's Son seems to be the precise point where the author's opponents err. Their views are summarized by the author as follows: (i) The Incarnation of the Logos involves a certain change which is to be understood in terms of the flesh of Christ becoming "uncreated" and "heavenly", and even "consubstantial" with the Godhead. (ii) In the Incarnation the Logos of God took only flesh and not the "inward man", the "mind", and therefore Christ is a heavenly man because He has a "heavenly mind", the Son-Logos. (iii) Indeed, it is argued that the Logos could not have become a "perfect man" in the sense of assuming an human mind, alongside with an human flesh, first because perfect man, and especially human mind, implies sin, and secondly because two perfect things can never really become one. (iv) Thus as far as the Incarnation of the Logos is concerned, two fundamental details must be maintained, a) that the Logos assumed that which (humanly speaking) is mindless and b) that in Christ the Logos exhibits human flesh in a new condition so that it is human only by way of likeness.

In APO1,3 the author begins his criticism of the heretical notion of "the uncreated flesh" of Christ. He observes that such a notion confuses the Godhood of the Logos and the flesh which He assumed in becoming man to the extent that the former appears to be mutable and the economy of the suffering and resurrection of the latter seems to be unreal. Against these two grave consequences the author affirms the distinction between the uncreated Godhood of the Trinity and the created flesh of Christ, and emphasizes the fact that the latter was raised from the human side.
He also explains that the adjective "uncreated" (ἀκτιωτός) refers only to the Godhood or the being of the Logos (ἡ θεότης, ἡ ούσια τοῦ Δόγμα) while the adjective "passible" (παθητός) refers to the creaturely flesh which He assumed at the Incarnation. The Godhood and the flesh are two distinct realities in Christ even though they coexist by virtue of the Incarnation.

In ἈΡΩΠ1,4 in pursuing his argument further, and particularly in emphasizing the creatureliness of Christ's flesh, the author stresses the fact that the union (ἐνωσις) between the Logos and the flesh took place in the womb of Mary the Theotokos, or that the Logos sojourned in the womb and raised the human flesh from there. Thus he recalls the biblical witness to the Incarnation, according to which the historical act of the manifestation of the Logos is inseparable from the historical existence of Mary the Theotokos. Bethlehem, the swaddling clothes, the presentation of the Child to the temple, the circumcision and the growth in stature, which are mentioned in the Gospels, indicate the historical existence and human creatureliness of Christ's flesh. The union then of the Logos and the flesh, taking place in the womb of the Theotokos, does not imply the conversion of the flesh into an uncreated flesh or a flesh of a different kind. Besides, something uncreated is by nature uncreated and does not admit of any increase or decrease. The union or communion of something created with something uncreated (τὸ τῷ ἀκτιωτῷ κοινωνήσαν ἢ ἐνωθέν) implies appropriation of the former by the latter ("Ἰδιόν λέγεται"). In this sense, the Logos-flesh union (ἐνωσις) is a beneficence (ἐλευθερία) because it establishes an intimate relationship between weak humanity and God (ἐχει πρός τὸν Θεόν οἰκειότητα ἢ ἐν ὁσιοσίᾳ τυγχάνουσα ἄνθρωπότης). Thus for the author it is a soterio-
logical necessity that the creaturely existence taken up by Christ should not be converted into an uncreated existence. As he explains, if the body of Christ became uncreated because of its union with the Logos, then men have no communion with Christ (πρὸς τὸν Χριστόν ποινωνίαν) the beneficence of Christ is cancelled, and humanity, which still finds itself in weakness, falls into despair as grace is defaced. The premise behind this thought is the identity and unity of the flesh of the incarnate Logos with the human race. This is made explicit in the author’s affirmation of the relation between the Incarnation and the “first creation” (ἡ πρώτη πλάσις) or the “archetypal Adam” (ὁ ἀρχιτύπος Ἀδὰμ) from whom all men are derived according to the succession of the flesh (οὗ ἴμετες μέχρι σήμερον ἁπάγονοι τυγχάνομεν κατὰ τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς ὀμομοιᾶς) - an affirmation backed by such biblical phrases as "He made us partakers of Himself", and "He who sanctifies and those who are sanctified are all derived from one". Of crucial importance here is the author’s notion of grace, which is expounded primarily in terms of the Logos’ assumption of real creaturely humanity, that is to say, the Divine Logos’ becoming a single man among men and entering into generic solidarity with all humanity. The key incarnational terms of “flesh”, “body”, “humanity”, “human creaturehood” and “archetypal man” are employed as synonymous and seem to refer to single and complete humanity, which stands in generic solidarity with all human beings. Christ’s humanity then, is identical with our own both singly and generically. The only difference is, that Christ is God-become-man-from-man and not merely man-from-man. He sojourned in the womb of a human mother and acquired from her real humanity identical with our own.

In AP01,5 the author continues his discussion of the heretical
notion of the "uncreated flesh" of Ch-rist and in anti-Arian manner sharply distinguishes between the two conditions of the Son of God: His being "from God" or "in the form of God" (which refers to His uncreated Godhead) and His demonstration of "the flesh" or "the form of the servant" or "the form of the first-created Adam". In other words he distinguishes between the uncreated (divine) and the created (human) realities in Christ. To strengthen this further, he analyses the semantics of the term "uncreated" and on this basis produces a new argument. The adjective "uncreated", he says, signifies that which never existed (τὸ ἀνοθέσιον ὑποθέσιον), when it is used with reference to creaturely existence. Now, since the flesh of Christ is creaturely, its being qualified as "uncreated flesh" could only amount to a denial of its reality, i.e. a denial of the Incarnation. On the other hand the term "uncreated" can acquire a positive semantic content and signify real existence, when it is used differentially to denote God. In this case one can talk intelligibly of an uncreated existence (άνοθέσιον ὑποθέσιον) without being entangled in a contradiction of terms. Thus the author concludes that it is as impious to qualify possible creaturely existence as uncreated, as it is impious to qualify God's uncreated existence as possible. For the author the real issue that arises here concerns the precise character of the union of God's Logos with the created human nature (τὴν ποιηθείαν τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος φύσεως). As in APol,4 so here, he states that the created human nature of Christ (i.e. His flesh) became the Logos' own by virtue of the union (τῇ ἐνωσεὶ τοῦ Λόγου λογικὴ εἶναι), and explains that this differs from saying that it became co-eternal with the Logos or equal to God's nature by virtue of an identification
This becomes apparent, says the author, in the manifestation of flesh blood bones and a sorrowful troubled and anxious soul, all of which are alien to the nature of God, and yet became the Logos' own by nature (τῆς φύσεως). The author's distinction between two natures, the Divine and the human, as opposed to an identity of nature, is apparent here, but equally apparent is the coexistence of these two natures without confusion in the one person of God's Logos.

It is clear that the argument of the author is not from the natures to the Logos, but from the Logos to the natures. It is the Logos Himself and not His nature that takes up human birth and human creaturehood. He can do this, because human creaturehood is His very own creation, and He does it because He wants to overcome the subjection of this creation to sin corruption and death, and establish it in Himself giving it an image of newness.

Crucial here also for discerning the author's Christological standpoint is his insistence on the understanding of the Incarnation as the (personal) appropriation of human creaturehood by the Logos Himself as distinct from the Logos' Godhood. In the last analysis it is the Logos and not a man who is the focus of this humanity. This is stated simply and without any technical linguistic apparatus (terms like "flesh", "humanity", "human nature" are used spontaneously), but conceptually it points to the hypostatic and personal union of Cyrillian and Chalcedonian orthodoxy. Equally crucial is the soteriological motif of the Incarnation, on which the author lays particular stress. For him Soteriology is indissolubly and organically interconnected with Christology. The Incarnation takes place so that the problem of
human creaturehood may be solved. The problem occurs on the level of human existence, and it is on this level that the Logos descends through the Incarnation and deals with it. The following schematic presentation maps out the author's conception of the problem of human existence, its solution through the saving acts of the incarnate Logos and the plain upon which both problem and solution occur:

The problem: sin → curse → corruption → death
The solution: judgment → cancellation → redemption → destruction
The plain: on earth → on the tree → in the grave → in Hades

Particularly important here is the notion of the "place" or "topos" (τόπος) because it points to the integrity of human nature which is not by-passed by the Incarnation. The author's soteriological topology, as it were, implies that the incarnate Logos has in the life-movement of His own flesh hallowed every human "topos", i.e. the entire context of human nature extending from the cradle to the grave. The phrases "that He might work out the salvation of the whole man exhibiting in Himself the form of our own image" (ἔνα τοῦ σώματος ἄνθρωπον τὴν σωτηρίαν κατεργάσας, μορφὴν τῆς ἁμητέρας εἰκόνος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐπιλειχθῆσαν), and "vivifying us through our own form and inviting us to the likeness and imitation of a perfect image" (ὅτι τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς μορφῆς ἔως ποιῶν ἡμᾶς καὶ εἰς ἰμαῖς ὑπολογίζων καὶ μίμησιν τελεῖας εἰκόνος προσκαλοῦμεν), point to the characteristic key to the author's argument against his opponents, namely the personal appropriation of the fullness of human nature by the Divine Logos which excludes any confusion or change of Godhood. Every aspect of human existence has been assumed and healed, and this healing is presented in such realistic terms that it also includes the sanctification
of the cosmic context where the problem occurred. But the decisive presupposition to this healing is the person of the Logos who assumed human nature and made it personally His own.

Finally we must not leave this chapter without casting a final look at the terms which the author employs here to clarify the doctrine which he presented in the previous chapters. He employs the Pauline "form of servant" and the term "nature" to point to a holistic understanding of the Johannine term "flesh" which he also designates as "the archetypal creation of Adam". He includes in this human nature "flesh blood bones even soul" and asserts that it should never be confused with the Logos' Divine nature. The language of the two natures in Christ is apparent, but the actual formula is not present. Indeed the term "nature" is also used in different ways - as for instance in the statement, "the human nature belongs to the Logos by nature inasmuch as He became man?, where "nature is used twice but in two different senses - and therefore we should infer that it is not a strict technical term in the author's theological vocabulary. Most probably it is taken up because of the peculiar use of it by his opponents. For him what is of paramount importance is not the terminology but the thought. Above all else it is the thought of salvation, accomplished and demonstrated in the real and complete humanity of the incarnate Logos, or what the author calls "the perfect image of the new man created according to God in purity and righteousness of truth", that dominates the author's thinking and speaking.

APO1,6 furnishes one more argument against the heretical notion of the "uncreated flesh" of Christ. It is argued that if the human flesh assumed by the Logos "became uncreated" by means of
transmutation or conversion, it should also have become invisible and immortal. But this is contradicted both by the event of Christ's death and by the written testimonies of the Apostles according to which Christ was seen and even touched (I John 1:1).

The other theme that the author discusses in APOL 6 is the argument of his opponents from the worship of Christ in support of their notion of uncreated flesh. According to this argument if the flesh of Christ is creaturely, then the worship rendered to Him amounts to sheer idolatry. In response to this the author states that in the orthodox worship of Christ the creaturely body is not separated from the Divine Logos because it does not exist on its own but only in Him. Besides, worship is directed to the Divine Logos, and since the body has been united to Him and has become His very own, this too is appropriately worshipped as belonging to God. For the author this orthodox understanding of worship is clearly demonstrated in the post-resurrection incident in the garden, where the women saw the Risen Lord and worshipped Him taking hold of His feet (Matt. 28:9). As he puts it, "they took hold of human feet and worshipped God". The touching of the Lord's feet by the women demonstrates the real humanity of Christ, namely the body, which, as the author explains, "the Lord prepared for Himself from the Virgin not by way of operation (i.e. merely by His own Divine act) but by way of human natural birth" (ἐκερ ἐκατεροτελείως περιποιήσατο ἐκ Παρθένου. οὗ εὐεργετώς τόπῳ ἄλλα φυσική γεννήσει). The expression "natural birth" implies the integrity of the body assumed by the Logos, but it does not exclude the latter's involvement. This is explicitly suggested by the verb "prepared for Himself" (περιποιήσατο) and particularly by the following statement: "so that the body may be according to (human)
and at the same time also be undivided from the Godhood of the Logos according to nature" (καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκ τοῦ οὐ̄μα καὶ ἰδιαῖοτου ἡ πάλιν κατὰ φύσιν τῆς τοῦ λόγου θεότητος). It is obvious that the crucial expression of "natural birth" and the lavish use of the adverbial phrase "according to nature" are introduced by the author into the context of the Incarnation in order to nullify the heretical notion of "the uncreated flesh", and stress the Logos' real cooperation with human nature. This is particularly brought out in the way in which the author expounds the meaning of "the natural birth" by employing other notions emerging from the life of Christ. In all of them the Logos is the active subject, but there is also activity which is proper to the human nature, to which the Logos coordinates His own. The following schematic presentation of the author's exposition at this point will make this apparent:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Logos' activity:</th>
<th>Activity proper to the Logos' human nature:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) He prepares a body</td>
<td>from a Virgin by a natural birth</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2) The body is undivided from</td>
<td>the body is in accordance with human nature</td>
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<tr>
<td>the Logos' Godhood, and yet</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3) It is by the Logos' will and</td>
<td>the body dies in accordance with its own nature</td>
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<tr>
<td>authority that the death of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>His body is permitted, and the</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>body is delivered to death, but</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4) The Logos willingly submitted His</td>
<td>first having suffered according to its human nature for us</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>body to death that it may be raised by</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>God for us,</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) He sought to regain us and</td>
<td>the whole process of human birth and death.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>this is why He was really</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>involved in</td>
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The above scheme clearly shows the two basic perceptions of the author regarding the entire economy of the Incarnation: the
real involvement of the Logos and the natural operation of humanity. From this perspective the Incarnation is the result of an act of the Logos in and through human nature. Far from violating the "properties" of the human nature, the Logos' incarnational saving act fulfills these demands which had not been previously realized because of the violence of sin corruption and death imposed on the human nature from without. Thus the Incarnation brings out the real properties of the human nature, and demonstrates that its truth lies in its creaturehood, i.e. in its openness to its Creator. If Christ's nature had not been this very body of ours, says the author, then our salvation would not have been accomplished. This understanding of salvation stands in stark contrast to the notion of the "uncreated flesh" of the author's opponents, because it envisages an act of the Logos not superseding but fulfilling the nature of the first creation. As he puts it in the last sentence of this chapter, "the whole history of the Logos' birth and death must be seen as His attempt to seek and regain us human beings" (καὶ θανάτου ἡ πραγματεία εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν ζητησίαν καὶ ἀνάκτησιν θεωρεῖται).

The soteriological argument of APOL 6 is further elaborated in APOL 7 where the author exposes the problem of the heretical notion of "an heavenly body". If the Logos had brought His body from heaven, he argues, this would mean that He changed it from being invisible into visible, or from being something insusceptible of outrage into something susceptible of outrage, or from being impassible and immortal into something possible and mortal. But then what would be the difference between Christ and Adam? Was it not that which fell in Adam (τὸ σύμπτωμα τοῦ 'Αδὰμ)
which Christ raised into an incomparable height when He appeared "in the likeness of flesh of sin and condemned sin in the flesh" (Rom. 8:3)? Was it not on earth and in the flesh that the Logos came to be and demonstrate this flesh to be insusceptible to sin? Was it not Adam who made this flesh susceptible to sin by his transgression, though he had received it free from sin? Thus the author stresses that it is the flesh which Adam led to corruption and death through sin, that Christ raised up in a condition free of sin, in order to show that the Creator was not the cause of the sin, and to establish the flesh in Himself according to the archetypal design of its own nature, and finally in order to show that He is the demonstration of sinlessness. The notion of the "heavenly body" is quite out of place here (the author calls it "vain notion"), because it is crystal clear that what Christ raised to heaven, i.e. to incorruption and immortality, was the body which Adam brought into corruption and death through sin. Precisely for this reason - namely, to raise the earthly body to heaven - Christ came to manifest incorruption in the tomb and the abolition of death in Hades and thus declare the to all the good news of the resurrection.

The crucial point in the author's argumentation is that salvation involves the restoration of human nature to its sinlessness and therefore, to its emancipation from corruption and death. This is what God came to do in Christ, when man, who was originally made by God for incorruption and for being an image of God's immortality, was subjected to the mastery of death through the envy of the devil. He certainly did not look down on man's plight, but Himself became man, not by changing Himself into a form of man (ο ὁ τραπεῖς κ έλ ἀνθρώπου μορφήν), nor by overlooking the
existence of man (οὐδὲς παρόδων τὴν ἄνθρωπον ὑπαρξίν); rather, He who is by nature God is born a man so that He may be one in two respects, perfect in every way, and demonstrating a natural and most perfect birth (ἀλλ' ὃν φύσις θεὸς γεννᾶται ἄνθρωπος, ἐνα εἰς ἕκαστερα, τέλειος κατὰ πάντα, φυσικὴν καὶ ἀληθεστάτην τὴν γέννησιν ἐπιδεικνύμενος). This is why, says the author, He was given the Name which is above every name to reign over the heavens and to have authority to make judgment. Thus in defending the human integrity of Christ's body, the author of APOl has provided one of the best statements of his doctrine of Christ. Being God, He was born a man, and these two conditions (τα ἕκαστερα, i.e. His being God and His becoming man) make up One (ἐις) person who is perfect in all respects. The emphasis falls entirely on the unity of the person of Christ which however, never deteriorates into either a unity of nature (since τὰ ἕκαστερα never become ἐν), nor into a duality of persons (since the ἐις is not ἐν ἕκαστεροι, but rather τὰ ἕκαστερα are ἐις). There is undoubtedly a paradox here, which the author states quite bluntly without making any attempt to explain it away. It is the paradox of One who is God and is also born a man through a real human and natural birth without ceasing to be God in order that mankind may be saved.

The same Christological teaching is expounded in APOl,8 where the author begins by stressing the fact that the Creator Logos appeared to be a Son of man not by becoming another (man) but a second Adam. On the basis of 1 Cor 15 the author distinguishes the first Adam from the second calling the first "psychical" and the second "spiritual" (ψυχικὸς καὶ πνευματικὸς). He also explains that the adjectives "psychical" and "spiritual" do not
imply different bodies but different authorities (ἐξουσίας) and natures (φύσεως) in which they exist. The first body existed "in the authority and nature of the human soul", whereas the second body existed "in the authority and nature of the Spirit". The term "spiritual" obviously implies the Logos (for the Logos, as the author himself observes, is "spirit" according to John 4:24) and not a spiritual element in the human body. When it is applied to the human body of Christ, it means that the latter is governed by the Logos and not from a centre in itself. On the contrary the term "psychical" implies Adam's "psyche" as the personal centre of his human creaturely existence. The contrast then between a "psychical" and a "spiritual" Adam is the contrast between an Adam who is mere man and an Adam who is the Logos become man. Similarly the distinction between "two natures" or "two authorities", the "authority and nature of the soul" and the "authority and nature of the Spirit", implies that whereas in Adam humanity exists in itself, in Christ humanity exists in the Logos. This is further clarified by a reference to I Cor 2:15, where the spiritual man who examines all things is distinguished from the psychical man who does not accept the things of the Spirit. It is as if the humanity of the psychical man is like a circle with one focal point inherent to itself, the authority and life-movement of the soul, whereas the humanity of the spiritual man is like an ellipse which is not merely focused on its own soul, but has a transcendent focus beyond itself in God the Spirit. The former's governing principle is immanence, the latter's, immanence and transcendence. This is most clearly presented in the following statement of the author: "even though the body of both (the spiritual and the psychical men) is one, he who partakes of
the Spirit is to be understood as spiritual, whereas he who remains in the power of his soul alone is psychical. In this text the word "alone" (μόνη) is particularly significant. It implies that whereas the psychical man relies only on the hegemonic principle of his soul, by contrast the spiritual man (in this case, presumably, Christ) does not rely on the hegemonic principle of His soul, because He has subjected it to the hegemonic principle of the Spirit (Logos). Presumably the same must be the difference between the first and the second Adams. The former is a mere man, but the latter, the Logos become man.

Having thus expounded the meaning of Christ as the Logos become man and second Adam, the author turns next to the testimonies of the Gospel genealogies for further support. Adam is the only man of whom it is written that he existed in heaven. But Christ became Son of man on earth, and therefore He should be understood as Son of Adam. This is attested by Matthew, who records that He is Abraham's son and David's according to the flesh, and by Luke, who traces His genealogy back to Adam and to God. In view of the above, the author concludes that the body of Christ is not and could not be from heaven.

In APOL,9-13 the author discusses and refutes the third heretical thesis according to which the flesh of Christ is homoousios with the Godhood. This thesis is implicit in the heretical statement "we say that He who is born of Mary is homoousios with the Father". The author contradicts this seemingly Nicene confessional statement because it does not distinguish sufficiently the homoousion of the Logos with the Father from his becoming man. For him the former refers to the Logos' eternal relation to the Father, i.e., to His Godhood, while the latter refers to His
relation to us through the Virgin, i.e. to His manhood. Against the dubious statement of his opponents, the author states that the *homoousios* does not apply to the flesh but to the Logos, because the flesh is from human seed and not from God, whilst the Logos is from God. But the author's most decisive argument is based on his exposition of the very notion of the *homoousios*. He asserts that this notion implies both "identity of nature" (ιδιότητα φύσεως) and "peculiar perfection" (ιδίαν τελειότητα). The Father, the Logos (Son) and the Spirit are *homoousioi*, not just because they have an identical nature, but also because they represent mutually interrelated particular perfections. They are perfect related to perfect. The flesh, on the other hand, is not a particular perfection (because it does not have its own telos in itself), and therefore it cannot be *homoousios* with God. In any case, if it was such, the Trinity would no longer be Trinity but Quaternity.

In AP01,10 the author argues against the notion that the flesh of Christ has become *homoousios* with the Godhood, because of its union with the Logos. He contends that the flesh of Christ can never become *homoousios* to the Godhood, i.e. Divine by nature, because it is creaturely and what is not Divine by nature cannot become such by transmutation. To believe in a divinization of the creaturely nature by transmutation is to Arianize, because the Arians held such a notion concerning the Logos. The author restates here his own doctrine by saying that the central Christological statement John 1:14 cannot be reversed. The Logos became flesh and not the flesh Logos. As such, this statement indicates that the flesh is the Logos' and not a man's and also guards the reality of the flesh against
docetism. It does not imply transmutation but "an unconfused natural union"(δύναμις φυσική ἐνωσίς) of the Logos and the flesh. The author observes that the phrases "body of God," or "body of glory" emerging from Phil. 3:21, should be understood in a similar way. Christ's "body of glory" which is contrasted to our "body of humiliation" refers to the resurrection and to the age to come, and therefore it should not be taken to imply that the Logos did not assume a body of humiliation like ours. The same applies to the logion Matthew 25:31, so that one should not deny either the name of the body or the fact that Christ is called a man. Matthew 1:1 (Son of Abraham) and John 1:1 (God—Logos) bear witness to this.

Also, the confession of Christ as both God and man (lit. Logos—God and son of David), without confusion of Godhood and manhood, does not imply dualism, because the names are not confessed by division, but conjointly. According to the Scriptures, the Logos who is God (John 1:1) has become son of man. Hence Christ is one, the same God and man (ἐὰν ὁ Χριστός ἐστιν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐστιν Χριστός). The author contends that this duality of Christ is also attested in the Apostolic kerygma as for example in I Tim. 2:6 and II Cor. 11:31, or in II Tim. 2:8 and I Cor. 11:26.

In APO1,11 the author advances what may be called the argument from the Eucharistic memorial to Christ's death, based on I Cor. 11:26. He argues that the heretical notion of the flesh of Christ as homousios with the Godhood of the Logos renders the Eucharistic memorial to Christ's death absurd, because it denies the reality of Christ's flesh and the fact that Christ is called a man. Without the human reality in Christ there can be no real talk about His death unless, of course, one is pre-
pared to say that God died in His Godhood. That would also suggest that the whole Trinity died! But that is for the author the greatest heretical impiety. The author's alternative is to take seriously the Petrine statement "Christ died in the flesh" (Pet. 4:1) and to infer from this the reality of the human flesh of Christ. His orthodoxy maintains that Christ is according to the Scriptures both God and man not because of a division (οὐ διαρέσεως ζωῆς) but in order that His passion and death which took place and are proclaimed might refer to His flesh, while the Logos as Logos is immutable and unchangeable. The real pivot of the author's argument is the statement that Christ is both one who suffered and one who did not suffer (ἀὐτός ἐστιν δὲ παθὼν καὶ μὴ παθὼν). In His divine nature He is the impassible, immutable and unchangeable, but He suffered according to His flesh and tasted death of His own accord because He became a man, Christ, and gave Himself a ransom for us. In this way, He is truly the Mediator of God and man as I Tim. 2:5-6 and Gal. 3:20 clearly indicate.

In APO1, 12 the author clarifies his view by stressing the unity of Christ, against the doctrine of those who distinguish one and another in Christ (ἀλλος καὶ ἄλλος), the Son who suffered and the Logos who did not suffer, and therefore introduce a division of two persons. For him there is no other person in Christ save the Divine Logos, who became man and as such suffered and died. The author also explains that like His death his exaltation above the angels does not relate to Him as Logos of God and Creator of angels, but to the form of the servant (Phil. 2:7), which He made His own by a natural birth (ἡ μορφή τοῦ θελου, ἢν ἀὐτὸς ὁ Λόγος ἑαυτῷ ἑστηκεν) and raised to a greater
state than what it had in the protoplast. Though this "form of the servant" which the author invariably calls "flesh" became God's own by nature, it did not become homoousios or co-eternal with the Godhood of the Logos. Rather, it became His own by nature according to a union not liable to division, (ὅσα κατὰ φύσις γενομένη καὶ ἄδιαλέπτος κατὰ ἐκκοσμίαν) being derived from the seed of David, Abraham and Adam, from which all men are derived. The author further argues against the heretical claim of the consubstantiality of the flesh of Christ with the Godhood by analyzing the actual meaning of the homoousion. We have seen how he developed this argument in AP01, where he stated that the homoousion rests on the two notions of "identity of nature" (ταυτότητα φύσεως) and "peculiar perfection" (ὡς τελειότητα). Here he makes the same point but employs a new term, that of hypostasis, which he uses as synonymous to the term "peculiar perfection". His crucial statement is the following:

"That which is homoousion impassible and incapable of death, does not admit of union according to hypostasis with that which is homoousion, but of union according to nature; whereas according to hypostasis it exhibits its own perfection".

In other words, the union of two consubstantial realities (in this case the flesh and the Logos) is a union according to nature and not according to hypostasis. Therefore, if the flesh is consubstantial with the Logos, it could never be united with Him according to hypostasis.

It is obvious that the author argues against his opponents' claim that the flesh and the Logos are united according to hypostasis which he takes to mean a union exhibiting one peculiar
perfection. In his view the reverse seems to be the truth. To talk of union of two consubstantial entities is to presuppose two peculiar perfections (presumably also, two hypostaseis) and to proceed to a union of nature. Applied to the Trinity, this thinking would imply that the Father and the Logos as consubstantial exhibit in themselves two peculiar perfections or two hypostaseis, whilst they are united according to nature. Though hypostasis does not seem to be a term of the author's choice (since his term is obviously ἡδὲ τελευτής), it does however imply that the author could uphold the trinitarian formula of three hypostaseis. It also implies that he could uphold the notion of a hypostatic union of the Logos and the flesh in Christ, given the fact that the flesh is not homousios to the Godhood of the Logos, as he repeatedly asserts, but denotes the nature of the first created man which all men have in common. But neither the "three hypostaseis" nor the "hypostatic union" are put forward by the author. His choice of words is governed by his attachment to the biblical data and it is such that he subordinates to it the technical terminology of his opponents. The point of his dispute with them, as he is quick to point out, is not a technical one, but one centred on the right understanding of the fundamental Christological statement of John 1:14, "the Logos became flesh". For them this statement means that the Logos and the flesh are atoned in a way that they form a peculiar perfection (an hypostasis) which confuses the Godhood of the Logos and the creaturely nature of His flesh and results in a monistic view of God and man. For him however, the Logos did not become flesh so as to cease to be Logos. The becoming does not imply a tertium quid, the resultant of the Logos-flesh union. The Logos remains
in His becoming who He always is. His becoming refers to His assumption of the flesh in which He endures the passion and the death, going as far as the tomb and Hades in order to bring about the resurrection. This flesh belongs to the Logos in a peculiar (personal) sense (it is ἰόσα τοῦ Λόγου), because it has been indivisibly united to Him according to nature, and it is real human flesh, because it exhibits flesh and blood and soul. The becoming then of the Logos in John 1:14 does not suggest a surrender of either the integrity of the Divine Logos or of the flesh which became His own. To argue thus would mean to go back to the views of Marcion, who spoke of a body as a heavenly appari-tion and only similar to that of ours, or to the views of Mani-chaeus who spoke of a divine kind of body which had only a semblance to that of our own since in substance it was alien to the latter. The author's conclusion to this argument is supplied in the opening sentences of APO1.13. Christ, he says, is the Logos of the Father, homoousios with Him before all the ages, who in these last times has raised anew "the creation and constitution of Adam" from the holy and Theotokos Virgin making it His own by virtue of a union (τὴν τοῦ Ἀδὰμ πλάσμαν καὶ τοῖς κατὰ νήμαν ἀνεκτῆσαν ὁ διοικοποιόμενος καθ' έκκεισιν ). Thus He who is God existing before all ages has appeared as man and has become the Christ. So truly human has He become, that we are called members of His flesh and His bones (Eph.5:30).

The rest of APO1.13 and the following chapters APO1.14 to APO1.19 deal with the refutation of what appears to be the most important heretical Christological thesis: "the replacement of the inner man in Christ by a heavenly mind, the Logos". The author begins his refutation by pointing out that the name Christ should
not to be understood univocally but as signifying two realities, Godhood and manhood (ὅτι Χριστός μονοστόρουχος οὐ λέγεται, ἀλλ' ἐν εὐτυχώ ὕπό εὐτυχώ ὑπὸ ἑντὼ ἐντῶ ἑκατέρων τῶν πραγμάτων ἰδι- κυναι σημαία, θεότητος τε καὶ ἄνθρωπότητος). Therefore Christ is called God, man, and God-man, and yet He is One. The author insists on stressing that this truth of Christ cannot be con- ceived of or contemplated by means of human conceptualisation (οὐκ ἄνθρωπον λογισμόν). He alone is such by nature (ὁ κατὰ φύσιν μόνος ἄληθινός Χριστός), and there is no other Christ who might explain His image. Yet the author's opponents speak of "Christ" in a conventional way (καταχρηστικῶς) and base their doctrine on such notions. They operate with a distinction between "Christ" and "the heavenly mind", which came to be in Him. But this means, as the author points out, that they envisage two perfect things in Christ, which of course is explicit- ly disclaimed by them! By this distinction the author's oppo- nents intend to deny that there is in Christ an inner man as in ordinary men. By inner man they mean a mind and by outer man they mean body and soul together. They also distinguish between the heavenly mind (of the Logos) and the human mind of Christ. On the assumption of these distinctions and applying the logical syllogism that two perfect thing could no become one, they argue that it would be impossible to think of both, a heavenly mind and a human mind in Christ, if the latter's unity and perfection is to be retained. The author counteracts these thoughts by putting forward a dichotomic anthropology which distinguishes between the soul as the inner man and the body as the outer. That the soul is the inner man can be shown
from the fact that it is not seen and also from the fact that it cannot be put to death (Matth. 10:28). It can also be shown from the fact of the death of Christ, which consists in the arrival of the body at the tomb and the departure of the soul to Hades. It is in the division of the two places of the tomb and Hades that one can see a double manifestation of Christ, a material one which occurs in the tomb and an immaterial one which occurs in Hades. The former relates to His body and the latter to His soul.

In APO 14 the author continues his defence of the dichotomic anthropology by expounding further the meaning of Christ's death in particular and human death in general. At His death the Lord appeared to the souls in Hades as a man, because He was clothed with a human soul. Had He not had this soul, He would not have established the terms of the resurrection, because He would not have liberated the entire humanity in His own form (ἐξ ὑλοκλήρου τῶν ἀνθρωπῶν ἐν μορφῇ ὑπὸ ἐμαυτοῦ) from the trap of death. It is interesting to note here the author's conception of death as a separation of the two basic constituents of the human form, the body and the soul, and the corresponding conception of Christ's saving death. This separation was due to the Logos' judgement on man because of his sin.

And it was the same Logos who took upon Him the form of the man who was under condemnation in order that He might render it free from condemnation and sin. He was needed to cancel His own decree through Himself, in the human form which He made His very own. And this is precisely what He did, when He appeared in the form of man. Death could not prevail over the human soul of Christ, nor could corruption lead His body
to decay. Thus God's reconciliation with man became an event and the freedom of the whole human race came into light through a man (ἡ ἐλευθερία παντὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἀνθρώπου...), in the newness of the image of God's Son, Jesus Christ our Lord. It is on the basis of this soteriological exchange that the author argues against the trichotomic notion of man employed by his opponents. Could they indicate a third place of condemnation, which would imply that man was divided into three parts? If they could not do so, then in their view redemption was incomplete. But this would be entirely contrary to the events. According to these events, man was fully delivered from the condemnation of the tomb and Hades. This deliverance was the result of Christ's own vicarious act on our behalf and in and through His own human form, which was not lacking in anything, but was complete and most true (ἡ ἐλευθερία παντὸς ἡ ἡμᾶς ἐν τῇ ἡμῶν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς μορφῇ τελεῖοι καὶ ἐλθεσμένῃ).

The author rebukes his opponents indirectly by putting to them a number of penetrating soteriological questions, thereby implying that if they were right in their claims, then: God was not reconciled to mankind; or the Saviour's coming exhibited His inability to liberate the whole man (ὁμωμενα ἰδιώματα ἀνθρώπων); or He abhorred the mind which had once sinned; or He feared lest He became a partaker of sin by becoming perfect man. Such implications, He argues, inevitably lead to the doctrine of Manicheus, which regards sin as inhering in nature. It is with the view to exposing the hidden Manichaeanism of his opponents that the author embarks upon a thorough discussion of the doctrine of sin in APOI, 15.

The author's key term in APOI, 15 is that of "nature" (φύσις) and his basic affirmation is that sin is not and could not be
inherent in nature, because nature is God's creation. To maintain the opposite is to hold God responsible for sin. This is what in fact his opponents do, and this is why he calls them accusers of the Creator. For the author the sinlessness of God is reflected in the sinlessness of nature which He creates. Man, who was made by God for incorruption and growth into the image of God's eternity, was made with a sinless nature (φύσιν ἀναμφότερον) and a self-commanding will (Θελησμὸν ἀυτοκύλιον). But man died, because he chose transgression invented by the devil (τὴν παραβολήν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν). This choice was actualized in man's disobedience to the command of God and thus man became susceptible to the seed (ἐπιθυμίαν) sown by the enemy. This seed was sown into man's nature and grew on it, but as such it does not represent something natural in man (οὐ ψυχίν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐργα- σίαν). Indeed the devil is not and could not become creator of nature, as the Manicheans asserted, because there is only one Creator, the true God. The devil's work can only be a perversion of nature derived from transgression (φύσις παραβολήν ἡν ἐκ παραβολῆς) and not from nature as such. It is because of such transgression that death ruled over all men (Rom. 5:11-14), which the Son of God came to annul (I John 3:8). The author speaks of this saving advent of God's Son as the act of God the Logos whereby He raised again in Himself the sinless human nature (φύσιν ἂν ἐκολοσσὼν ὁ Θεός ἀναμφότερον) which He had created, in order to make it incapable of receiving the devil's perversion and invention of sin. It was the very nature which the devil had perverted by leading it into transgression of God's command. The saying "the ruler of the world is coming but he cannot find anything in me" (John 14:20) refers, according to the author, to
Christ's humanity and it means that the Logos did not surrender anything of His humanity to the devil. It is in this sense that Christ exhibited in Himself the perfect newness of humanity (τελεσάν τὴν καινότητα) and worked out in a perfect manner the salvation of the entire man, of the rational soul and the body, which He rejoined by His perfect resurrection (τελεσαν τὴν αυτηρίαν διὸν τοῦ ἄνθρωπον ψυχῆς λογίᾳ καὶ σώματος, ἵνα τελεσα ἡ ἡ ἀνάστασις).

It is through such closely argued doctrine that the author fights his opponents exposing their fallacy concerning the "heavenly mind" in Christ and the understanding of the Incarnation as the assumption of mere flesh by the Logos which He denounces as an Arian way of thought. In his concluding sentences he refers to the fact of the passion of Christ, namely, that He was sorrowful and anxious, and that He prayed and was troubled in spirit, in order to prove that such facts could not be understood with reference to a "mindless flesh" or an "immutable Godhood", but only with reference to a "soul endowed with a mental operation (ψυχῆς νόσοιν ἔχοντος) that could feel and sense them.

APOI.16 continues the discussion of the same theme of the "mindless soul" in Christ and argues that in that view the facts of the passion must refer to the Logos Himself and lead to a position which defies all piety and truth. For the author the real test is to be found in the Gospel accounts themselves. St John's Gospel does not merely say that Jesus was troubled in His spirit (11:33), but also that His soul had been troubled (12:27). This means says the author, that the Lord showed forth a "mental operation" in His own soul (ψυχῆς ἰδαν νόσοιν ἔχοντος) so that He could sympathize with our own, and He could also take up
our suffering without becoming possible in Himself. Soteriology is the author's basic criterion here. As he puts it, Christ redeemed us by the blood of His flesh and won the victory for us by the mental operation (τῷ νοῷ) of His human soul (reminiscent of John 16:33 and I Cor. 15:57). Another way of his putting it, is this: as His blood is saving and not common (οὗ κοινῶν διὰ σωτηρίουν), so the mental operation of His soul is powerful, exhibiting the nature of God and not the weakness of humanity. Thus the author declares in a statement which consummates his doctrine that: "Christ is perfect God and perfect man, not in the sense that His divine perfection was transformed into an human one, nor as if two perfections are expressed in isolation from each other (ὅσο τέλειοτάτως κατὰ διαφορέσσι ὁμολογομένων), nor again as if there is an advance in virtue and acquisition of righteousness, but because of "an unwanted or unfailing existence (καὶ ὀπικαρδεῖν ἀνελληπτικῶν). In other words the perfection of Christ is not in His manhood or Godhood separately considered but in their perfect union. This, according to the author, is clearly demonstrated in the saying: "Now is my soul troubled, and is in pain" (John 12:27). It was His soul that was troubled, he explains, but the time of trouble, the "now", was decided by His own will! Thus, what He exhibited in His passion was real existence and not a docetic forgery. Everything was done in nature and truth. It is clear that in this context the author's notion of "real existence" (what he calls, τὸ δὲν, as opposed to τὸ μὴ δὲν) refers to the particular existence of the Logos become man, and therefore it includes the Divine and human realities viewed however, from the standpoint of their unity in the person of the Logos.

In APOL 17 the author clarifies yet further the meaning of
the Incarnation and particularly its ontology by developing the theme of the sinlessness of the human nature of Christ. The key to this perception of the Incarnation is the fact that the Lord became man "by nature" (φύσι) and not by fiction (οὐ θεόστι) i.e. ontologically and really and just functionally. The phrase "by nature" refers to the actual constitution of the human nature whereas the phrase "by fiction" refers to an imaginary docetic humanity. The fact that the Lord took on creaturely nature proves that sin was neither created with nor imposed upon nature by God the Creator (cf. his statement οὕτω κατὰ φύσιν οὕτω κατὰ πρᾶξιν ἀνθρωποφρένει τὴν ἀμαρτίαν ἐν οὐ Δημιουργῷ). Sin is not the result of a natural process, but is accidentally introduced into nature like a seed sown into a field (ἐκσπορᾶ), because of human weakness. Now in Christ no such accident occurred because His humanity became God's by nature. In fact humanity in Christ became incapable of all the sinful things which had been operating in it from of old and therefore revealed an image of newness. This, says the author, is what Paul has in mind, when he teaches us to put off the old and put on the new man (Col. 3:9–10). Particularly important here is the fact that the distinction between the "old man" (Adam and all men) and the "new man" (Christ) is not a distinction of different human natures, but a distinction of a presence or absence of sin in the same nature. Alternatively, this is a distinction between manhood biased by sin, closed to God, and manhood unbiased by God, closed to sin! The wonder of Christ, as the author puts it, consists in the fact that the Lord became truly man in a human natural way without sin (καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ θαμαστὸν, ότι καὶ ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν ὁ Κύριος καὶ χωρὶς ἀμαρτίαν). It does not consist in the assumption of
a human nature which is different from our own as the author's opponents contend. Obviously, the author stresses the point that the sinlessness of the human nature of the incarnate Logos is owing to the Logos Himself and not to a man, or, as W. Bright put it, to the fact that "He who became incarnate was really God, a Divine Person", and not to the assumption of a different kind of nature. The author explicitly states that the Logos took up into natural union with Himself all these things which according to His will had been originally built into the constitution of the human nature (ὅσα μὲν αὐτός ουσίως θελήσας τὴν φύσιν εἶς ἰδιώτην ἐνεστηκαί). He enumerates as examples the birth from a woman, the growth in age, the numbering of years, the toil, the hunger, the thirst, the sleep, the sorrow, the death and the resurrection. Hence, he sees the incarnate Lord as entering through His own body the very place where man's body was corrupted, and through His own soul where man's soul had been detained captive to death. By doing this, i.e. by presenting Himself as man in death, the Logos who as God can not be detained by anything annulled the captivity of death, so that incorruption might arise in the place where corruption had been sown. And thus by this presence in the form of the human soul, the place where death had reigned became witness to the reality of incorruption. This was done that we may become partakers of His own incorruption through the hope of the resurrection of the dead, as Paul clearly asserts in Rom. 5:14, I Cor. 15:53f, Rom. 5:12 and Rom. 5:21.

Here again the "soteriological topology", which the author advanced in APOL 5, reappears as he contrasts the life activity of the old man to that of the new. The following juxta-position of the author's statements will serve to bring out the force of
his doctrine:

a) The old order of the old man: b) The new order of the Saviour:

where the human body was corrupted
where the human soul is held in custody
where corruption was sown
where death has reigned

there Jesus introduces His own body
there Christ presents His own soul
there incorruption arises
there the immortal one makes the demonstration of incorruption by His presence in the human soul.

c) Conclusion:

As by one man sin entered in to the world and through sin death

So through one man Jesus Christ grace is reigning through righteousness unto eternal life.

Two are the fundamental premises of this contrast: a) the common nature of the old man and the new Adam, i.e. the integrity of the humanity of Christ; and b) the fact of the God-man, i.e. the fact that the Logos has taken up to Himself human nature and has become without ceasing to be God. Without these two premises the where/there juxtapositions with their far-reaching soteriological and existential implications would have been impossible. The author’s final statement at the end of this chapter is precisely designed to enhance these soteriological premises over against the heretical notions which introduce disparity of natures and confusion of persons: "It was not possible for Him to offer as a ransom one thing in exchange for another. Rather, He offered body for body and soul for soul and a perfect existence on behalf of the whole man (τελεῖαν ὑπάρξιν ὑπὲρ ὅλου ἀνθρώπου). This is the exchange of Christ (τὸ ἀντίλλαμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ) which the Jews, the enemies of life, reviled on the Cross as they passed by shaking their heads (Matth. 27:39). For neither could Hades endure the visitation of unveiled Godhood. And this is what
both Prophets and Apostles attest.

In this Christology there is obviously an ontological duality of nature in unity of person. The nature is human. The person Divine-human. Salvation primarily refers to nature, but it is worked out in the true unity of nature to person, i.e. in the natural union of duality in unity.

APO1.18 continues with the soteriological theme indicating that the exchange of Christ was indeed an exchange of body and soul, i.e. of an entire human form and nature. He refers to the Johannine Gospel accounts of Christ's death (John 19:30, 10:11,15) and affirms that the blood and the water bear witness to the reality of His body, the body of God (τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ σῶμα), while the cry of the delivery of the spirit indicates His soul which is inside the body (τὸ ἐσώθεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου σώματος, τούτως τῇ ψυχῇ). As for the "departure of the spirit" (John 19:30), according to the author, it should not be understood as the separation of the Divinity from the body, but as the departure of the soul from the body (τῇ ἐκκαταρμονῇ οὐκ ἀν τις αὐτὸς ἀνακτώντως μετάστασιν ἄλλη ψυχῆς ἀποχώρησιν). Therefore, if death took place by separation of the Divinity, then, Christ's death is not our death but His! The author regards this to be absurd both in the light of Christ's descent into Hades and particularly in the light of His promise that He would lay down His soul for the sheep (John 10:11,15). The conclusion is that Christ took up our death as He had taken up our birth.

The short chapter APO1.19 explains once more the author's conception of the death of Christ. Christ's death is the separation of the inner from the outer man, i.e. the separation of the soul from the body which the Logos constituted in Himself
Thus the Logos was able to offer in Christ as an exchange a ransom for the whole human nature (τὸ κατὰ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ). Had He not constituted a sinless soul on Himself, He could not have abolished death, which had been incurred by the soul's self-conceived sin (τὸ κατὰ φρόνησιν διαφθοράς, οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἐν φρονήσει διαφθορ- αδόνης) as Ezekiel 18:4 states. Further more the author observes, that there is no reason why the Logos should not unite the entire human psycho-somatic constitution to Himself, since He did not initially condemn the human creaturehood itself (οὗ κατά- γνω τῆς πλάσεως τοῦ πλάσαντος) as sinful, but its acts (κατέγνω δὲ τῆς πράξεως τοῦ πλάσματος). The author's opponents however, seem to hold the view that the Logos could not have assumed an human soul because the soul had become sinful by nature. The author condemns this identification of nature with sin because it implies that sin is ultimately derived from God the Creator who made nature in the first instance. For him sin is not and could not be natural. It is the tragedy of the arbitrary act in the context of nature which requires the human act to annul it and overcome its arbitrariness. This is precisely what the Logos did in becoming man and assuming the entirety of human nature. In the author's epigrammatical phrase, "the Creator Logos annulled the act of sin and renewed creation (περικλείει τούτων τὴν πράξεος καὶ καταλύει τὴν πλάσμαν)."

In the last two chapters AP01 20 and AP01 21 the author discusses critically further contentions of his opponents. First of all he takes up their insistence that "it is they who call Him who was from Mary, God". He confronts them with two heretical understanding of this kind of claim, the Marcionite and the
Samosatean, if only to expose the equally heretical nature of their view. Marcion spoke of the sojourn of God with us but he conceived of it as having taken place intangibly (ἐστάντος), because for him God's nature does not admit of flesh. Paul of Samosata also calls the one who came from Mary, God, because he was foreordained to become such by the indwelling in him of an active logos and wisdom from God; in fact he is not true God because he derived his existence from Mary. Less generous than the Samosatean view is in the author's mind the view of his opponents, which admits of a "heavenly mind" indwelling an "ensouled body" (νοῦν ἐπουράνιον ἐν σώματι ἐμπνεούχῳ) and thus denies Christ's complete manhood which the Samosatean view accepts. Indeed this view admits neither of God nor of perfect manhood in Christ! As the author explains, "heavenly mind" is not equivalent to God because it signifies that which God's (νοῦς Κυρίου οὕτω Κύριος), i.e. God's will, counsel or act towards something (Κυρίου θελησθε, ἡ θελησθε πρὸς τι); whilst the phrase "ensouled body" does not imply perfect man, because it excludes a body on which the name of the soul is applied in a concrete manner (ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἐνυποκοστάως τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς φέρεται ὄνομα). Therefore the position of the author's opponents is totally unacceptable and militates against the tradition of the Church. According to this Church tradition it is God the Logos Himself, the one who is with God before the ages (John 1:1), who descended at the end of the ages and has been born Son of man from the holy Virgin and from the Holy Spirit as Matthew 1:25, Rom. 8:29 and John 17:3 testify, in order to suffer for us as man and redeem us from passion and death as God. However, the decisive test which the author applies to the Christological theory of his opponents is a soteriological
argument. He argues that their "hegemonic principle" which moves and leads their flesh (τὸ όντος καὶ ἔγγον τῆς σάρκος ἐν ἑαυτῷ) cannot work out the newness of salvation by means of an initiatio Christi, because there is no comparable reality in Christ which to imitate. Indeed according to them, Christ exhibits only newness of flesh (σαρκίς μόνης καινότητα). In addition, if it was possible to men to achieve by themselves the newness of the hegemonic principle which leads their flesh, then, why did Christ come at all? It is obvious, that Christ exhibited the newness of the entire human nature and not just of a part of it.

Continuing on the same theme in APOL 21 the author explains that to assert that Christ exhibited in Himself the newness of that which rules in man (man's hegemonic principle) is not to assert that the Logos came to sojourn in a man as in one of the prophets, because: 1) no prophet is said to be "God become man", 2) no prophet fulfilled the law, and 3) no prophet has been delivered from death which ruled even on those who did not sin like Adam. Therefore Christ as the delivered from death could not be a man inspired by the Logos of God (i.e. a prophet), but rather the Logos Himself become man. This is precisely the force of the statement John 8:36, "If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed". It ascertains the newness and the perfection by which the faithful are renewed by imitation and participation in the perfect newness of Christ (cf. Col. 3:10), i.e. the fact that here we have God the Logos Himself becoming man and not the man receiving the Logos as in the prophetic tradition. The author argues at this point that his opponents reject this
doctrine because they invent all sorts of notions in their imagination. They regard the term soul as signifying a "senseless mind" or "a concrete sinful existence" or "a worker of sin" and therefore they remove it from Christ. On the other hand, they sometimes regard the flesh of Christ to be "uncreated", sometimes "heavenly" and sometimes "homoousios with the Logos". The result is that by the denial of the soul and by the assertion of a non-human flesh of Christ, a perfect denial of the Incarnation and therefore of our salvation is incurred. This projection of imaginary conceptions on Christ is precisely what the other heretics had done. Arius conceptualized the idea of Sonship. Sabellius denied the Trinity because he maintained a Jewish point of view. Manichaeus disbelieved the Incarnation and therefore ended up with the notion of the two creators of man, the evil one and the good one. These new heretics now, says the author, in rejecting the notion of two Sons in Christ they reject His God-manhood. The norm against every heresy is for the author the Gospel tradition. The event of the Incarnation should be confessed as it is recorded in the Scriptures and the God who is worshipped to the glory of His philanthropy and to our hope in Christ Jesus.

We may now summarize and synthesize this Christological doctrine underlining the author's terminology.

The Introduction (APOI.1-3a) betrays the author's Nicene Christological standpoint. Christ is for him the Son of God, consubstantial with the Father, who for our salvation was incarnate and inhominated.

The first part of the treatise (APOI.3b-6) which refutes the heretical notion of the "uncreated flesh" stresses the following
points: 1) the flesh is creaturely and from the side of men and should be clearly distinct although not separated from the Godhead of the Logos. 2) This flesh should be understood in terms of κωινωνία and οἰκείωτης, or in the sense that the one becomes διόν of the other. 4) This union does not imply identity of nature (ταυτότης φύσως, as the author’s opponents seem to have held) but indicates that the creaturely nature of man became of the nature of God ἐκατά φύσιν (= ἄληθϊς, i.e. in a way appropriate to each nature). 5) If the human flesh was or became uncreated, then it was irrelevant to our salvation. Man’s salvation, ἡ σωτηρία σύμπαντος ἀνθρώπου is achieved in Christ because He exhibits in Himself the μορφή τῆς ἡμετέρας εἰκόνος which Christ vivifies and sets up as the τελεία εἰκὼν with which men are called to be assimilated.

The second part of the treatise (APO1,6b-8) deals with the heretical understanding of the body of Christ as heavenly. Here we gather the following main points of doctrine: 6) The body is co-worshipped with the Logos because He appropriated it to
Himself (περιποιήσατο δικτύ). 7) Against the heretical understanding of this περιποιήσας as having occurred ἐνεργείας τόπῳ the author emphasizes the φυσική γέννησις (or φυσική καὶ ἀληθεστάτη γέννησις of the body, and that the body was born and died κατὰ φύσιν and according to the will of the Logos, and also that it was ἀδιαστέρετον τῆς τοῦ Ἰάσων θεότητος. 8) The body could not be heavenly because it was visible and mortal, and as such identical with the σώματος τοῦ ὁμοίου. In other words, in taking up a body, the Logos did not change the ἀνθρωπίνην ὑπάρξιν (as the author’s opponents seem to have implied) but ὦς ἐν γεννήται ἀνθρωπός by means of a φυσικὴ καὶ ἀληθεστάτη γέννησις. Thus ἐς τὰ ἐκάτερα πέλευσα κατὰ πάντα. 9) Christ’s body was not different from Adam’s; the only difference was that whereas in Adam the human body was ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ καὶ φύσιν φύσις (hence, it was called ψυχικὸν and he was just ἀνθρωπός), in Christ the same human body was ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ καὶ φύσιν πνευματικος (hence, it was called πνευματικόν and he was ὦς καὶ ἀνθρωπός).

In the third part of the treatise (ἈΠΟλ.,9-13) which repudiates the heretical notion of the ὄμοούσιος σώματος, the author advances the following additional points: 10) The homoousion refers to the Logos and the Father, i.e. to θεότητα; but the flesh refers to the γέννησις ἐκ ἀρπάσας. Besides, the homoousion implies ταυτότητα φύσεως and presupposes ἴδιαν τελειότητα (ἈΠΟλ.,9), or ἴδιον κατὰ φύσιν rather than ἴδιον καὶ ἑπόκοιτον ἴδιον τελειότητα (ἈΠΟλ.,12). 11) Against the notion of the μετατομῆς of the flesh into being homoousios with the Godhood (which implies confusion) the author stresses the φυσικὴ καὶ ἀληθεστάτη γέννησις, and against the σῶμα ὦς ἐν or σῶμα δόξης he stresses the σῶμα τῆς ταυτότητος, without which the Eucharistic memorial is incomprehensible-
sible. (2) The heretical μεταποίησις implies that Christ is just God, but in fact εἶς ὁ Χριστός Θεός καὶ ἀνθρώπος ὁ αὐτός. This does not imply διαλέξεις as if one is ὁ κόσμος and another ὁ μὴ κόσμο, or as if there is ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος in Christ. (13) Finally Christ's exaltation refers to the μορφή τοῦ δόξου or ἡ πλάσις τοῦ ὄσι οὐ δόθη ὁ ὄρατος στοιχεῖον γεννήθη, and which became ὁ λόγος κατὰ φύσιν and ὁ ὄρατος τοῦ λόγου κατὰ ἐννοιαν.

In the fourth part of the treatise (APO1,13b-19), which refutes the heretical notion of the νοῦς ἐπουράνιος in Christ the author advances the following additional points of doctrine: (14) The name Christ is not employed μονοτρόπως as his opponents suggest. It is ἐν ὄνομα but implies ὁ ἐπίγραμμα, θεότης καὶ ἀνθρωπότης (APO1,13). Indeed Christ is τέλειος Θεός and τέλειος ἀνθρώπος not by some sort of μεταποίησις nor by some sort of division of ὁ ὄρατος τοῦ ὄσι κατὰ διαλέξεις ὁμολογούμενων but καθ' ἑκάστην ἀνελλυπή (APO1,16). This means that Christ is not = νοῦς ἐπουράνιος (ὁ ἔσω) + σῶμα/ψυχή (ὁ ἔξω), as the author's opponents suggest, but rather Christ= λόγος + σῶμα (ὁ ἔξω) + ψυχήνους (ὁ ἔσω). (15) ὁ ἔσω ἀνθρώπος and ὁ ἔσω ἀνθρώπος of St Paul correspond to the body and the soul respectively. The soul could not be the ἔσω ἀνθρώπος because it is invisible and does not die when it is separated from the body at death; at death the body is corrupted in the grave whilst the soul is enslaved in Hades (APO1,13,14, and APO1,19). (16) Christ did exhibit in Himself both body and soul, the latter also including a mind, i.e. τὴν καθ' ἑκάστην μορφήν τελεῖαν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, because He totally liberated us in His own form (ἐξ ὀλοκλήρου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν μορφῇ τῇ ἑαυτῷ); indeed the author speaks of the liberation of σώματα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου which includes the νοῦς.
Another way of putting it is by saying that He took up what He originally attached to the φύσις as its creator, in order to work out a perfect salvation. Christ's offering or ἀνεπιδεντος υπὲρ ὅλου ἀνθρώπου (AFO1,17). Christ was perfect man without sin, because perfect man does not imply sin as the author's opponents assert. Man is φύσις ἀναμάρτητος and θέλης αὐτεξουσιος. 'Ἀμαρτία is not φύσις but ἐκπορεύσα διαβόλου or παρατροπὴ φύσεως ἐκ παραβάςσεως. Christ took up ἀναμάρτητον φύσιν and made it ἀνεπιδεντὸν τῆς ἐπισκοπᾶς τοῦ ἐχθροῦ. Thus he showed τελεῖαν καινότητα and therefore τελεῖαν σωτηρίαν ὅλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος (AFO1,15). Another way of stating this is by saying that Christ was a man φύσις and not θεός, and since sin is not κατὰ φύσιν but κατὰ πράξειν Christ was without sin. The difference between the old and the new is not one of nature but refers to the difference between yielding and not yielding to sin (AFO1,17). Christ's soul did have ἄνθρωπον (AFO1,16), because He achieved a complete victory both through His αἷμα and through His νόησις. Also Christ's soul did have ἄνθρωπον φρόνησιν or τὸ κατὰ φρόνησιν ἀμαρτήσαν (AFO1,19) and thus was able to fight sin. He did not look down on the πλάσμα of His creature but renewed it in Himself by dismissing its πράξεις.

In the fifth and final part of AFO1 (chs. 20-22) a few more Christological statements are made. 19) Against his opponents' νοῦς ἐκουσάντος ἐν σώματι ἐμψύχῳ which he regards quite unacceptable, the author sets the traditional doctrine of Christ: God the Logos who for the completion of the ages came to be with us by being born from the holy Virgin and the Holy Spirit, and who
beign true God has also become first-born among many brethren.

20) Against his opponents’ refusal to accept τὸ φωνοῦν καὶ ἄγον τῶν σώματος in Christ, the author argues soteriologically that τὸ φωνοῦν καὶ ἄγον τῶν σώματος in us cannot work out its renewal (κατά τὴν παντίαν) apart from Christ. 21) Finally the author repudiates the prophetic Christological model on soteriological grounds: It fails to take seriously the κατά τὴν παντίαν which is required in order that believers may be renewed by imitation as well as participation.

Two fundamental Christological truths then are emphasized by the author of APoll, firstly that the humanity of Christ is real and complete and includes flesh and soul and all that belongs to man’s original constitution, and secondly that Christ is one person, the eternal Logos of God who has also become man and as such includes in Himself two "things", Godhood and manhood. As he puts it in a pivotal statement, He is σὺς τὸ ἐκτεινόμενον κατὰ πάντα.
VII.4 The Christology of APO2.

As in the case of APO1, so in the case of APO2 the analytical exposition will precede the synthetical.

The treatise begins with the crucial question, whether Christ is God, or man, or God-man, and proceeds to outline two opposing Christologies, one orthodox and the other heretical. The orthodox Christology is summed up in the confession, "Christ is One from two, God and man". The foundation of this confession is the Apostolic witness and particularly the Pauline Phil.2:6f and the Johannine John 1:14 (but he also cites John 10:15 and I John 3:16). In contrast to the orthodox, the heretical view affirms that Christ is God and expounds the unity of His Person in terms of His Godhood. According to this view, Christ can be called man only in the sense that His Godhood has been expressed in human terms, by means of a kind of "change" (τροπήν) a transmutation of the Logos into human flesh (εἰς σαρκός μετατομήν) or an "assimilation of the Logos to a soul" (Ψυχῆς ὀμοίωσιν). Obviously, both Christologies stress the unity of Christ, but the former conceives of it in terms of a union of Godhood and manhood, whereas the latter conceives of it only in terms of Godhood and relegates the manhood to a mere manifestation of the Godhood.

The author rejects his opponents Christological view as a distortion of the Apostolic witness to Christ, because it rests on the claim that the manifestation of the human form in Christ (ἡ μορφή τοῦ όσύλου) was made by the Logos docetically and not really. To substantiate his criticism, he embarks on a brief clarification of the Apostolic witness to Christ and particularly
of the Pauline and Johannine statements which he cited at the beginning of the chapter. The Pauline text Phil. 2:6f. reveals "who" Christ is and "what" He took on (πέπλησεν τὸν Ἑλάβεν). He is in "the form of God" and takes on "the form of the servant". "The form of God" signifies the fullness of the Godhood of the Logos (τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς τοῦ Λόγου Θεότητος), where "the form of the servant" is the fulness of "the human constitution" (ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σώστοις), which includes "the noetic nature" (ἡ νοερά φύσις) and "the organic condition" (ἡ ὀργανικὴ κατάστασις). The Johannine statements reveal the same doctrine. John 1:1 reveals who the Logos is, whereas John 1:14 reveals what He became. The Logos is God who has also become man by taking to himself flesh which includes a soul. John's "flesh" is homosemantic with Paul's "form of the servant", even though they represent two specific nuances. The former refers primarily to "the organic demonstration of the body" (ἡ ὀργανικὴ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιδεικνύσις) but without excluding the soul, and the latter refers primarily to "the noetic nature" (ἡ νοερὰ φύσις or νοερὰ σύστασις) of the human constitution (a sort of noetic component) without excluding the corporeal aspect of the human condition. The author argues that the Pauline and Johannine witnesses to Christ with their distinctive nuances should be kept together, so that the whole mystery of the economy (τὸ πᾶς τῆς οἰκονομίας μυστήριον) may be confessed.

By employing the language of "form" and "flesh" and by identifying them with the fullness of "the human constitution" (ἡ ἀνθρώπων σύστασις) as distinct from the particular human subjects (οἱ ἀνθρώποι) the author manages to maintain a unity of subject and a duality of species in Christ and therefore
anticipates the fifth century Patristic Christological formulations. The subject of his Christology is the Divine Logos who being God has also become man by virtue of His assumption of the human species to Himself. By contrast, the Christology of the author's opponents is focused on the Logos alone who became man by means of a transmutation of His Godhood into flesh and soul.

In ἈΠΟ2,2 the author defends the same doctrine by expounding first the semantics of the term Christ. His central intuition is that this term has no meaning apart from the flesh. It does not refer to the Logos as God, but to the Logos who assumed flesh and became man. This is clearly seen in the Scriptures where the name Christ is associated with passion and death (as e.g. Acts 26:23, I Cor. 5, 1 Tim. 2:5f), which implies that Christ is not only God but also a man. Indeed Scripture employs both names, God and man to denote "the real existence" of Christ (ἐκατέρων τῶν ὄνομάτων ποιεῖται τὴν προσώπων ἐν ἐπίσείξει ὑπόρεξως). So for the author, Christ is invisibly God and at the same time visibly man. He should not be understood in terms of "a division of persons or names" (οὐκ ἐν διαιρέσει προσώπων ἢ ὄνομάτων) but rather in terms of "a natural birth" and "an indissoluble"union" (ἀλλὰ φυσικὴ γεννήσει καὶ ἐκτύπῳ ἐνώσει). It is in this sense that Christ must be understood to be both passible and impassible.

Ower against the author's dysemantic understanding of the term Christ, his opponents hold a monosemantic view which envisages the Logos without flesh (ὅπως ἐν διαιρέσει προσώπων ἢ ὄνομάτων) but rather in terms of "a natural birth" and "an indissoluble"union" (ἀλλὰ φυσικὴ γεννήσει καὶ ἐκτύπῳ ἐνώσει). The author objects to it on the grounds that it leads to theopaschitism and to the impious theory
that in Christ it was not just the Logos, but the Father and the Spirit, i.e. the entire Trinity, who suffered and died. For the author the suffering of Christ refers to His manhood and involves only this. But since He is God, become man without ceasing to be God, He must be confessed to be in the same time impenetrable, immutable and unchangeable.

The exposition of the Incarnation is particularly explicit in this chapter. Christ is the Son of God become man. His becoming is understood in terms of His assumption to Himself from the Virgin's womb "the complete species of the human composition" (τὸ σώμα τῆς ἀνθρώπου συστάσεως ἐὼς ἐν ἑαυτῷ... λαβὼν). The term "species" (ἐὼς) is obviously synonymous to the Pauline "form" and the expression "in Himself" (ἐν ἑαυτῷ) is a clear but non-technical anticipation of the later Christological notion of the "unio hypostatica".

That "Christ" refers to the Logos with the flesh is further clarified in AFO2,3 by means of an exposition of the cognate term "chrismation" (χρυσός). The author argues that God does not need "chrismation", because He is the Chrismator. In Christ, God Himself chrismates and He Himself receives the Chrismation in His own body which admits of it (ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῷ τῆς χρύσεως σώματι ἰεχωμένου). The reference to the body is probably an allusion to Christ's baptism, but it may also refer to the virginal conception by the Theotokos. So, in conclusion, the author contrasts his semantics of the term "Christ" to those of his opponents. For him the Logos became Christ when He assumed the human flesh, but for them the Logos became Christ when He divided Himself into a manifestation of flesh or an assimilation of the soul (ἑαυτὸν καταμερίσας εἰς σαρκῶς ἐπιδεικνύς ἡ ψυχῆς ὑμοίωσιν).
The author's view is based on his realistic understanding of the Incarnation, which he restates here in the following precise formulation: "Remaining that He was, the Logos took on the form of the servant which was not devoid of real existence clearly manifested in the passion, the resurrection and the whole economy".

The rest of APO? is taken up by a discussion of the meaning of the statement, "God was born in Nazareth", which apparently had been put forward by the author's opponents. The meaning of this statement, as the author explains, had become dubious, because it had been employed in various heretical theologies, which denied either the Godhood or the manhood of Christ. Paul of Samosata had employed similar language to show that Christ had His beginning at Nazareth and not in preexistence, and that He had been called "God" not in a real sense as God the Father, but because the Father's active Word and Wisdom had been in Him. Marcion and Manichaeus again employed similar language to deny Christ's real manhood and to defend a peculiar divine flesh which only bore the semblance of the human because in fact it was the Godhood. Valentinus spoke similarly when he argued that the Triune God suffered in the flesh which was part of the Godhood. Finally Arian employed this language to deny the true Godhood of Christ, and Sabellius to reconstruct the doctrine of Paul of Samosata.

In view of all these positions the author sees the position of his opponents as falling between the two heretical tendencies, the denial of the Godhood or the manhood of Christ, in the sense that it reproduces both! By disbelieving "the union" (τὸ ἐνώμα) his opponents have provided the occasion for the
two errors, and by contradicting the “completeness” (την πληρότητα) they have excluded both errors, destroying altogether the doctrine of Christ. Yet, as the author concludes, the economy is truly accomplished, truth has been revealed and grace has been witnessed to.

In AP02,4 the author challenges his opponents to acknowledge openly their docetic Christological position, which they defend in contrast to a dualistic Christology, which in turn distinguishes sharply between two subjects in Christ (they speak of “one and another”: δό αὐτός καὶ δό αὐτός) and overstresses His particular manhood. In fact the author realised that his opponents’ anti-dualistic Christological polemic is the real cause of their docetism and therefore he enumerates the basic statements of this dualistic Christology which are cited and disputed by his opponents:

a) Christ is a man who is deified.

b) The statements “in the beginning was the Logos” (John 1:1) and “He took the form of the servant” (Phil. 2:7) signify either a man who was with God, or a man who was conjoined with God, or a man who died for the world, and was part of the world, or a man who was ruling over the angels, or a man who was being worshipped by Creation, or a man who was Lord, as the Apostle says “Sit at my right hand”, or a man who is coming to pass judgment.

These statements obviously emphasize the manhood of Christ in such a way that they make Him a particular man who is somehow conjoined with God. This becomes apparent most particularly in their identification of “the form of the servant” of Phil. 2:7 with a particular individual man. The author acknowledges that such statements reflect the Jewish approach to Christ which sees
Him as a mere man like all men, and which was followed by many heretics. But he disputes that his opponents' opinion really constitutes a proper reply to the Jewish dualistic Christology. His response to both, the heretics and his opponents, is a critical exposition of their Christological views in juxtaposition to those entertained by himself, which he designates by such phrases as "the logos of our faith", or "the term of the Gospel", or "the kerygma of the Apostles", or "the witness of the prophets", or in short "the correct understanding of the fulfilled economy".

In AP02,5 the author starts this critical exposition by recalling the controversial statement "God was born in Nazareth" already discussed in AP02,3, and thereby referring to two heretical Christologies: that of Paul of Samosata, who takes the above statement to imply a "beginning of existence" (τῆς θεότητος ως ἄρχῆς γενέσεως) for the Godhood; and that of Marcion and the Gnostics who deny the birth of the flesh (τὴς σαρκὸς τὴν γέννησιν ἀρνούμενον). In terms of the Gospel, both views are incorrect, because they separate God from man. The author here accuses his opponents of choosing the same statement in order to disclaim "a natural birth" (γέννησιν σαρκὸς φυσικὴν) of the flesh and at the same time maintain the "God was born from a Virgin" manifesting a flesh of His own in a docetic manner. For him God did not manifest a beginning of existence from Nazareth, but the preexistent Logos was seen to be a man, because He was born from Mary the Virgin and the Holy Spirit in Bethlehem of Judaea, from the seed of Abraham and Adam as it is written. Thus, God's (the Logos') appearance as man and His birth from a human seed, must be seen as His assumption from the Virgin of everything which He initially designed and created to make up the constitution of man with the
The author insists that the appearance and the birth of the Logos should not be understood as implying a transformation of the Godhood (ου της Θεότητος μεταβολήν), but as implying a renewal of the manhood (της άνθρωπότητος καινοποίησιν) in accordance with God’s will. If it was not the known manhood which God assumed from the Virgin, the nations could not be of the same body with Christ (ούσωσι) nor partakers of Him (συμμετέχωσι), as the Apostle testifies in Eph. 3:6. The truth is that in Christ man is truly man and that Christ is truly man and truly God. This is not to say that Christ is a particular man in relation to God (άνθρώπου πρός τόν Θεόν ζωτος), as the author’s opponents contend, but that the only-begotten God was pleased in “the fulness of His Godhood (ἐν τῷ πληρώματι τῆς Θεότητος αὐτοῦ) to raise in Himself “the archetypal creation of man” (τήν τοῦ ἀρχετύπου πλάσιν ἀνθρώπου) as a new creation from the womb of the Virgin, by means of a natural and indissoluble union (φυσικὴ γεννήσει καὶ ἀληθῶς ἐνόσει), that He might accomplish on behalf of men the saving work and bring about men’s salvation through suffering death and resurrection.

In AP02,6 the author discusses his opponents’ objection to the orthodox claim that the Logos assumed from the Virgin all that pertains to the human creaturely constitution. They particularly object to the Logos’ assumption of “human thoughts” (άνθρωπίνου λογίσμος) on the ground that these are sinful by nature. Such an assumption, they argue, would render Christ’s sinlessness null and void. In his reply the author first argues that “sinful thoughts” (ἀμαρτητικος λογίσμος) do not belong to the human nature
as it was created by God, but became man's through the Fall. In examining Adam's fall the author clearly distinguishes between that which precedes and that which follows after it as two stages. In the first stage Adam's thoughts were sinless, but in the second stage they became sinful because of his disobedience to God's command. Before his disobedience Adam's thoughts were free and he could not distinguish between good and evil. That did not mean that he was irrational in his nature, but that his thought was free from experiencing evil. In fact he knew only the good and his life was simple and consistent (ὡσπερ τις μονότροπος ὁν). Yet, when he refused to obey God, his thoughts became sinful (ἄμαρτητικὸ) and his life was enslaved to them. The author stresses that these "enslaving thoughts" were not created by God, but were rather "deceitfully sown into man's rational nature by the devil" (τοῦ διαβόλου ἐξ ἀπάτης ἐπισπεύδαντος τῇ λογικῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) at the moment when this rational nature was removed from God through disobedience. Thus man's departure from God provided the devil with the occasion for introducing a law of sin within man's nature and also the reign of death over it through the operation of sin. This is precisely why the Son of God came: He came to destroy the works of the devil.

The author's opponents agree that the destruction of the devil's works was the purpose behind the advent of Christ, but they see this being achieved through Christ's divine sinlessness. In this case however, divine sinlessness is useless, as the author explains, because the devil did not introduce sin into God but into "the rational and noetic nature of man" (ἐν τῇ λογικῇ καὶ νοοτρόπῳ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου), which came to be trapped into sin and death. The real solution to this problem is achieved when the Son of God
raises this nature of man in Himself and gives it a new beginning and a wonderful generation. In His saving interference the Son of God does not divide the original constitution of man (οδ την ἀρχήν σώσει καταμερίσσεαι) but rejects the rejection sown by the devil (την ἐπισκοπεῖν ἐθέτην ἐθέτησον). Thus it was in the nature which sinned (ἐν τῇ ἀμαρτησίᾳ φύσει, presumably the λογική νοερά φύσει) that sinlessness appeared, and as a result "sin was condemned in the flesh". Otherwise, says the author, sin would not have been condemned, because the Godhood would not have known it and the flesh would not have committed it. But when the Apostle said that where sin abounded, there the grace superabounded, he really had in mind human nature and not just a place. And again he had the same thing in mind when he wrote in Rom.5:12 that as through a man sin came into the world and through sin death, likewise through one man Jesus Christ the grace reigned through righteousness unto eternal life. In conclusion the author states that it is in the nature in which the entry of sin was made that righteousness was demonstrated and therefore the works of the devil were destroyed, and the nature of men was liberated from sin and God was glorified.

In APO2,7 the author expounds further the argument from Soteriology in defence of the completeness of the manhood of Christ. He does this by answering his opponents' objection, that if Christ is a man, then He is a part of the world and as part of the world He cannot save the whole. For the author this syllogism is mere sophistry and does not take seriously the witness of the Scriptures. The Scriptures, he says, declare that Christ saves the world by becoming man (Ps. 48:8, 86:5 and particularly Rom.5:20). He attaches particular importance to the phrase "overabundance of grace" in Rom.5:20, which he takes to refer to the fact that the
Logos became man even though He did not cease to be God. So Christ is God become man in order to save those who believe in His human form. The author finds this clearly attested in Rom. 10:9, which links salvation with the confession of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus from the dead. He argues that death and resurrection could not refer to God as such but to the manhood. But this means that salvation is effected by the Logos through His manhood. It is the Logos then who saves man as man and therefore the argument of the author's opponents cannot be sustained.

AP02:8 deals with the objection of the author's opponents to the complete humanity of Christ, based on their assumption that sin is transmitted within the human nature by way of inheritance. They argue that if the Logos assumed our nature then He must be sinful, like every man, since the habit and succession of sin are inherent to the human nature. The author recognizes that by "nature" his opponents mean here "the mental nature of man" (τὴν νοσορίαν φύσιν ἡπὶς νοσῆται ψυχῆ) i.e. the soul, and he acknowledges the denial of a soul existing in Christ as the real intention of his opponents' argument. He argues against them, that their premise of the inevitability of sin in the human soul (ἀφευρτον ταύτην τῆς ἀμαρτίας) is Marcionite and Manichaean, as he had stated in AP02:3, and that their notion of a "fleshly soul" (ψυχῆ σαρκικῆ) is unbiblical and unreasonable. On this latter point, the author claims that Mt 10:28 and I Pet. 3:19 suggest a differentiation between soul and flesh. He also points out that Gen. 8:21 ("the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth") does not really support his opponents' premise, because it does not refer to nature, but to that which is sown afterwards into it, and is perishable. Behind these objections the author sees his
opponents' intention to deny the fact that the Logos became truly man. So he quotes and briefly comments on a series of biblical testimonies, including Acts 2:30, Gal. 4:4, Luke 2:52 and Hebr. 2:14, to ascertain the true manhood of Christ.

In APO2.9 the author deals with two more objections raised by his opponents against the real humanity of Christ. They argue that if the Logos assumed real humanity (ἄνθρωπόν θαυματουργόν), that humanity should have been equal to a man and therefore Christ would be the conjunction of the Logos and the man. But this would render the biblical statement "The Lord of glory was crucified" absurd. The author's answer is based on another text: Acts 2:36 ("This Jesus whom you crucified, God has made Christ and Lord"). He argues that if Christ was only Divine as his opponents contend, then the above verse would justify the Arian claim, because the chrismation would not refer to the form of the servant which the Logos assumed, but to the Logos as Logos.

The second objection is yet another form of the argument from the sinfulness of the human nature, which came up in APO2.6 and APO2.8. The argument here is based on the sinlessness of Christ runs as follows: "If the nature which had sinned did not commit any sin, when it came to exist in God, then it must have been subject to necessity, and what is subject to necessity is biased". The author replies that the fallacy of this argument lies in the implication that the human nature sins inevitably. On the premise of the Christian doctrine of creation, such a suggestion constitutes a direct blasphemy against God. For the author the sinlessness of Christ's human nature (the form of the servant-- as he calls it here) was in accordance with itself and its own inherent power. It was by means of such a power that it destroyed the limitation of
necessity and the law of sin and took captive the tyrant of captivity (Ps. 67:19). The Logos did not fight the enemy with His Godhood, but with the form of the servant which the enemy had previously defeated. He terminated all temptation, because He had taken up everything which admitted of it, and in this way He effected the victory on man’s behalf. The devil on the other hand did not fight the Godhood in Christ, because he did not recognize it, and because he would not have dared to do so if had known it. His challenge to Christ, "If you are the Son of God...", was addressed to the man whom he had long before been able to seduce, and ever since had extended his evil operation to all men. In a dramatic passage, which describes the soul of Adam and the souls of those who had been justified in the law of nature been held captive in death and ceaselessly crying out to their Master, the author expounds God’s mercy to man in terms of the revelation of the mystery of Christ, through which God worked out a new salvation for the human race. In expounding this he stresses the dethronement of the enemy who through envy had originally deceived man, and the demonstration of an incalculable exaltation of man through his union and communion with the Most High in nature and truth.

In Apolyt. 10 the author goes on to explain what this union and communion in nature and truth precisely mean. They mean that the Logos who is God and creator of the first man, Himself became man in order to vivify man and destroy the unjust enemy. This becoming has taken place through the birth from a woman, by means of which the Logos has raised again in Himself the form of man from the first creation and showed forth a flesh without fleshly choices and human thoughts (σαρκικά θελήματα καί λογισμοί ἀνθρώπινοι),
i.e. an image of new creation. Christ's flesh did not have any "fleshly choices" because the decision was God's only (ἡ σέληνις ἑστηκός μόνης), and because the whole nature (the human one) belonged to the Logos. As such this nature exhibited the human form and the invisible flesh (i.e. the Johannine and the Pauline aspects of the human constitution), not by "a division of persons but by a real existence of Godhood and manhood (οὐχ ἐν διαίρεσιν προσώπων, ἀλλ' ἐν υπάρξει θεστηκός καὶ ἐνθρωπότητος). The author's emphasis on God's decision as the regulating factor of this manhood should not be understood to imply monothelitism, but rather should be interpreted in the light of Christ's—rejection of the rejection of the command of God which annuls the Adamic seed of disobedience. —a theme which the author discusses in Apoc. 6. This becomes clear in what he goes on to say. He says that the devil approaching Christ as a man did not find in Him anything of the old seed sown in man (i.e. any arbitrary choice of transgression) nor any advance of his present attempt (to sow in Christ this seed), and therefore he was utterly defeated. The devil was wandering who this Edomite was who came from the land of men with such force and strength (Is. 63:1), whereas the Lord was saying that "the Prince of this world is coming and He has nothing in me" (John 14:30). The "nothing" of the Lord's saying does not refer to His human existence (ὑπάρξεις ἐνθρώπου), which was complete and included soul and body, and the entire constitution of the first Adam, except that which the devil had introduced into the nature of the first man. So the author concludes that sin was destroyed in Christ in the sense that He did not yield to it, but this presupposes that He did not lack human existence. This, he says, is clearly attested in I Pet. 2:22.
In the author further clarifies the difference between his Christology and that of his opponents by stating and contrasting their respective Soteriologies. According to him salvation requires "an identity of existence" (τὰυτότητι ὑκάρισεως) between the Saviour and man and "a renewal of man's nature" (φύσεως καὶ νόημα). To prove this he refers to Hebr. 10:20 and John 14:6. But for his opponents salvation is not a matter of "renewal or new beginning" but of "likeness and imitation" (ἄλλα ἔργα, τῇ ὁμοιώσει καὶ τῇ μιμήσει σφέσσας καὶ οὕ τῇ ἀνακαινίσει καὶ τῇ ἀπαρχῇ). They argue that man cannot bring forth "righteousness" since he has been taken captive by sin and is no longer able to deliver himself from it. Therefore it is the "pure righteousness" of the Godhood, which does not admit of captivity, that is brought in Christ and it comes in the likeness of flesh and soul. The author objects to this Soteriology not only on the grounds that it implies the impossible notion of the justification of God, as if God had sinned(!), but also because such as it is, it is of no real benefit to men. In any case Scripture makes it plain that Christ is the "first-born among many brethren" (Rom. 8:29), the "first-fruits of those that slept" (I Cor. 15:20) and "the Head of the body of the Church" (Col. 1:18). Faith in Christ implies strength in weakness, impassibility in passibility, incorruptibility and immortality in corruptibility and mortality. If this were only a seeming faith (φανομένη κτίσεως) then it would be no faith at all. In fact, the opposite is the case. The faith is the great Mystery of Christ and the Church (Eph. 5:32). It was not the Godhood then that came to justify itself in Christ (!) which did not commit sin. Rather we must think here of what St Paul says in II Cor. 8:9, namely, that "He was rich and yet for our sakes He became poor," that through His poverty we might become
This means that Christ took up in Himself "the impoverished nature" (ἡν πτωχεύσασαν φύσιν) and put it forward in its own righteousness (ἐν ἑαυτῇ δικαιοσύνῃ) suffering for the sake of men, and appearing from their side, and being entirely God's. If He did not become "first-born among many brethren", He could not appear as "first-born from the death". The author also condemns his opponents' theopaschitic claim that in Christ "God suffered and rose again through the flesh". On the one hand he regards it as an Arian view, because it implies a "pretended God-Son", and on the other hand he finds it entirely unbiblical, because it contradicts the claim that the passion took place "in the flesh through God" (Cf. I Pet. 4:1). The curious phrase "through God" is probably brought in to counter-balance the phrase "through flesh" which appears in the statement of his opponents.

APO2,12 continues the author's anti-theopaschitic argument. It is argued that his opponents cannot uphold the confession of the homousia if they insist in applying the passion to the "undivided name of the Godhood", or applying the passion and the resurrection to "the undivided nature" "the ineffable Godhood" and "the immutable and unchangeable homousia". Again it is argued that if the passion is applied to a flesh which is derived from the Logos Himself through transmutation, then the suffering and the resurrection would apply not only to Christ but to the whole Trinity also - a doctrine identical with the error of Valentinus. Such a doctrine, says the author, contradicts "the promise of the prophets", "the genealogy of the Evangelists", "the testimony of the martyrs", "the presentation of Mary the Mother", "the growth in stature", "the fact that Christ ate and sympathized with us in every respect", "the attribution of a name to Him", and finally
such phrases and statements as "the Son of God became Son of Man" (Rom.1:3?), or "Himself a man, Christ Jesus who gave Himself a ransom for us" (I Tim.2:5-6), or "the Son of man must suffer many things and be killed and the third day rise again" (Matt.16:21).

For the author Christ is possible because He is a man, and also impassible, because He is also God. The problem with the doctrine of his opponents arises from their reluctance to accept Christ as both God and man for fear of surrendering His oneness. In so doing they are left with two options: either to follow Marcion and the Gnostics and interpret the economy of the passion the death and the resurrection docetically, or to follow Arius and his followers and call the Godhood of the Logos possible?

Discussing further the same theme AP02,13 stresses the author's claim that Christ is God and man and therefore both impassible and possible. The Law, the Prophets, the Gospels, and the Apostles do not speak of the birth of the Godhood of the Logos but prefer to preach the Son. When they speak of the Son from Mary, or trace Christ's genealogy to Joseph, they do it"with reference to the flesh"(τὸ κατὰ φύσιν) or"to the assumption of the form of the servant"(τῇ προσόληψις τῆς τοῦ δούλου φύσις). Their intention is to lead people to believe in His humanity as deriving from the side of men (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον αὐτοῦ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων), and to confess Him as the God-Logos of the God-Father. They also teach that Christ bore the suffering for the sake of men in the possible form which derived from men; He showed the impassibility in the possible body; and the immortality in that which is mortal, the incorruptibility in that which is buried, the victory in that which was tempted, the newness in that which was old. In Christ our old man was crucified, says the author, and this is the meaning
of grace. No suffering then is attributed to the Godhood without the body, and no trouble and sorrow without a soul, nor any anxiety or prayer without a mental power (δύναμις νοησεως). What happened in Christ was not a defeat of nature (μη φθοσεως ήττημανεια) but a demonstration of existence (ελλειποσεξει θαρσεως).

APO214 supplies a number of biblical testimonies in support of the real manhood of Christ, which is designated by the terms "flesh", "body", "man", "seed of David", "Son of Man", and in support of his contention that Christ's passibility refers to it. These include Deut. 18:18, 28:28, and 66, Is. 40:28, 53:3, 8:1, I Tim. 2:5f., Rom. 1:3, Matth. 17:12(?). These testimonies, says the author, should be taken together with those which bear witness to Christ's Godhood, such as Hebr. 4:2 or John 10:30 or Luke 10:22 so that Christ's flesh and blood with which the passion is connected, may be properly confessed to be the flesh of God made man.

The author defends this doctrine further by setting the Orthodox understanding of Christ's crucifixion and death over against that of his opponents. The Scriptures, he contends, never speak of "blood of God" apart from the flesh, nor of "God suffering and being raised through flesh"! At the crucifixion, says the author, the effusion of blood indicated the reality of Christ's flesh, and the cry of dereliction the reality of His soul. Without the soul and the flesh the death of Christ would be incomprehensible, because death occurs when these two are separated.

The cry of Christ on the Cross denoted the soul and not the separation of the Godhood (ου χωρισμον Θεοτητος δηλουσος). It rather showed the mortification of the body. The Godhood did not abandon the body in the grave nor was it separated from the soul in Hades. This is clearly evidenced in Ps. 15:10 ("Thou shall
not leave my soul in Hades") and in John 10:18 ("No one taketh my soul from Me; by I lay it down of my own accord").

This notion of death as the separation of the soul from the body is restated in APO2,15. Here the author argues that Christ's death did not involve a separation of Godhood from the flesh but a separation of soul from body. If the former was the case, then Christ's death must have been God's and not ours. Also Christ's body would have been corruptible in the grave, and His resurrection a mere likeness to ours. For the author the Godhood remained united with the manhood even in the state of death, when the latter was split into soul and body by the tomb and Hades. Thus Christ's death cannot be attributed to the Godhead any more than His glorification at the right hand of the Father (John 17:4, 12:28), or His exaltation above the angels (Hebr. 1:4f). All of them refer to the form of the servant, which the Logos raised up in Himself. Scripture makes plain who the Logos is and what He became. He is the very Image of the invisible God, who became the first-born of all creation (Col.1:15) by being born from the Virgin as her first-born Son (Matth.1:25). He is the Creator of all things who took upon Him suffering and death in order to destroy them and become the Liberator. As such He is the head of the Church, the first-born from the dead, preeminent in all things (Col.1:18).

In APO2,16 the author contradicts his opponents' contention that the Logos became a rational man by combining flesh with Himself. He claims that in becoming man the Logos reconstituted the "rational form of the servant in Himself" (λογικήν τῆν τοῦ οὐράνου μορφήν ουσινομένος) and thus He appeared on earth as a "rational man" (λογικός ἄνθρωπος), even though He remained what
He was, namely, God. And He was called "heavenly man" (ἐνυπόστασις ἄνθρωπος), not because His flesh was derived from heaven, but because He took it from the earth and carried it to heaven. It is in the same sense that the believers are also called "heavenly" (I Cor. 15:48) as they participate in sanctification.

But the greater part of this chapter is taken up by yet another discussion of the death of Christ. The phrase, "they crucified the Lord of glory" (I Cor. 15:48), had become the starting-point of the author's opponents for arguing that the death of Christ was really the death of the Logos. For the author, the phrase "they crucified the Lord" means two things: firstly, that they rejected Him, and secondly, that they nailed His body to the Cross. Suffering, death and resurrection relate to the body and not to the Logos. This is clearly presented in John 2:19 ("destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up"), which refers to Christ's body, and in Isaiah 53:12 or John 3:16 ("His soul was delivered unto death — He laid down His soul for us") which refer to His soul. The author contends that the problem arises from his opponents' Christology which entails "an indissoluble fusion" of "an anhypostatic flesh" (unreal flesh) and the Logos (συναγερόμενος δαντίς ὁ λόγος ἔδειξεν τόν ἀντικαλόν καὶ τέλειον ἄνθρωπον — σάρξα τῆν ἀνυψώστατον). He argues that their conception of Christ's death as the separation of the Logos from the body is unacceptable because it implies the following errors: (i) that the Jews prevailed against God by dissolving "the indissoluble fusion"; (ii) that the death of Christ is not our death because it is the death of the Logos; (iii) that the body of Christ was actually corrupted in the grave; (iv) that the passion actually relates to the Logos (as the Arians had claimed).
and not to the body which was simply wounded; (v) that the Logos as Logos was actually raised up and therefore our resurrection could not be perfect, because it was not our soul that was raised from Hades in Christ.

The author continues his refutation in AP02:17 with the development of the following arguments: 1) If the Logos had died and been raised, then He would be mutable and changeable; 2) if He descended into Hades uncovered (without a soul) then death would not have mistaken Him for a man; 3) if He was raised again, then why did He say that "He would raise it" (Matt. 27:63) and not that "He Himself would rise from Hades"? 4) Also, if the Logos Himself had been raised from Hades, then the victory over death would not have been His but of Him who raised Him; 5) If He died and was raised, then why did the prophets speak of His soul and why did He speak of laying down His own soul (John 10:15)? The soul could not have been just the life of the body because Christ Himself says elsewhere that the soul cannot be killed because it is a spirit (Matt. 10:28). 6) Finally, if Christ did not have a human spirit (or soul) but only human flesh, human death would not have been destroyed by Him, because human death entails the separation of the soul from the body.

This last argument provides the occasion for a concise but comprehensive exposition of Christ's death as understood by the author himself. The death of Christ, he says, is exactly like any other human death, i.e. the dissolution of the composite human nature into body and soul. But there is a difference in Christ's death, because His body and soul remained unchangeably united with the Logos (Ὁ εοῦ του Λόγου ἀμαθεύτως ἑκοντος πρός τε τὸ σῶμα πρός τε τὴν ψυχὴν) even after their separation was effected by death. It was owing to this union that death was
ultimately destroyed. The body remained incorruptible in the
gave, the soul unconquerable in Hades and both were reunited
by the Logos in the resurrection. In this way, says the author,
the Logos, having walked our path to death in that form which
is ours (τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς γενομένῃ ἐν σωμάτω μορφῇ τοῦ ἁμέτερου ἐκεί
διέγραψε θάνατον), loosened the grip of death on us both in
Hades and in the grave and thereby bestowed on us the grace of
the resurrection. To speak only of flesh means to fail to show
the condemnation of sin, nor the dissolution of death, nor the
immutability of the Logos. Finally to say that the Logos did
not die an' human death in our human form is to revert to Ariana-
ism deliberately ignoring the biblical testimony to the soul of
Christ and to the completed economy which entails the demonstra-
tion of every fulness and perfection (ἐν ἐξουδελεξεὶ πάσης πληρω-
σώς τε καὶ τελειώσως).

In AP02,18 the author outlines the contrast between the
Orthodox and various heretical Christologies. Among the heretical
ones he mentions: (i) those who reject Christ's Godhood, because
they stress the fact that He appeared and was visible; and (ii)
those who accept Christ to be God, but either deny the birth of
His flesh, or accepting His flesh deny the existence of His soul.
The latter ones develop their position by projection of an either-
or into their doctrine of Christ. They do this by raising two
fundamental questions: a) who is He that was born of Mary, God or
man? b) who is He that suffered, God or man? In answering these
questions they are faced with the dilemma of having to choose
between either Arianism, which holds that God is born and suffers,
or Judaism, where this can only be the case with man. According
to the author orthodox Christology, which is derived from Scri-
The author holds that Christ is both God and man. The very same person naturally and truly appears in both aspects, Godhood and manhood (το αὐτὸς θεός καὶ αὐτὸς φύσις τὸ ἀληθῆς). As God, He exists eternally as the Logos of the Father, is the Creator of the world, gives life, performs miracles, is immortal, incorruptible and unchangeable and rises from the dead. As man, He is born of a woman, grows in stature, feels as men do, participates in human infirmities, is nailed to the Cross, sheds His blood, His soul descends to Hades, is raised from the dead. He is believed to be God and the birth of the flesh is not denied. Indeed the name of the flesh includes the harmony of the entire human constitution without sin.

The final chapter repudiates all the Christological errors and particularly a) those who attribute the passion to the Godhood; b) those who disbelieve the Incarnation; c) those who say that the one is really two; and d) those who attempt to define the "how" and the "what" of the flesh.

The treatise concludes with the author's direct warning and challenge to his opponents. He warns them against the errors of previous heretics including Marcion, Manichaeus, Valentinus, Paul of Samosata, Photinus and Arius, and challenges not to pervert the Scriptures but to believe in what has been written and has happened, following Paul who says of Christ, that He was like us in all respects except sin, and Peter, who says, Since Christ suffered for us in the flesh, arm yourselves also with the same mind and do not speculate any further rejecting the truth.

We may now try to summarize the above exposition. Against an heretical monistic Christology which sees Christ in purely theological terms, the author of AP02 emphasizes the duality of Christ, the fact that Christ is God and man, passible and impassible.
and that this is a matter of real existence (ἐπὶ οὗτος ὕποδρξεως). However, in emphasizing the Divine and the human duality of Christ the author of Apo2 is careful to point out firstly, that he does not mean to suggest a "division of names or persons (ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἁπλῶς κρυπτάντων ἔνοχον), since he holds that the same person (ὁ άὐτός) is God and man, and secondly that this person is in fact the Logos of God who being God assumed from the womb of a Virgin the entire constitution (or kind) of man and became man. "The entire human constitution assumed by the Logos is also spoken off in terms of the "form of the servant", or "the flesh", or the "flesh and the soul" (soul = intellectual or mental constitution), or "humanity", or "the archetypal creation of man", etc., and the author insists on its human integrity and on the event of its "natural birth and indissoluble union), or even "communion in nature and truth" with the Logos. In stressing the reality and integrity of Christ's humanity the author also stresses: a) the assumption of "human thoughts" which, he argues, could not be sinful by nature for even in the case of men sin was only a matter of wrong doing; b) the fact that He did not cease to be God in becoming man; c) that it was not the Logos but the human form of the servant who was crucified and died and rose again; d) that at Christ's death it was not the Logos who was separated from His body but the soul from the body whilst the Logos remained united with both and ultimately rejoined them in the resurrection; e) that Christ's flesh is not from heaven but from the seed of David; f) that Christ is rational man, not because the Logos is united with flesh, but because the human form of the servant which the Logos assumed
was itself rational; and finally and most importantly g) that the Logos assumed body and soul and the entire human constitution in order to work out a complete salvation.

As he clearly states in his Epilogue, the author of AP02 is ultimately concerned with the rejection of two Christological errors, the error of division which sees two persons in Christ and subjects Christ to an ontological dualism, and the error of docetism which subjects the mystery of Christ to an ontological monism. His solution is that Christ is one person but both God and man, and both His manhood and His Godhood are true in name and existence.
VII.5 Comparisons of the Christologies of APO1 APO2 and ATHAN

The Christologies of APO1 and APO2 are unmistakably close in conceptuality and in language. The linguistic connections seen in such pivotal terms and phrases as φυσική γέννησις, δόξα αληθος (ἀληθος) ἐνυπνία, κοινωνία, ἰδιότητα, etc., and the crucial statements which describe Christ as εἷς τὰ ἑκάτερα, τέλειος κατὰ κάντα, or τέλειος Θεός καὶ τέλειος ἐνθρωπος ὁ αὐτὸς, leave no doubt that here we have the same mind at work. But how does this Christology compare to that of Athanasius? Would Athanasius have used such pivotal terms as the above? We feel confident in answering this question in the affirmative, because the fundamental intuitions of the union of the person of Christ and the integrity and completeness of His humanity, particularly demanded by Soteriological considerations, are the most distinctive Athanasian common places, as we have shown in our preceding exposition. The ‘novelty’ of the technical language advanced in the two treatises under discussion is to be explained with reference to the novelty of the particular heretical challenge which the addressees of APO1 and APO2 presented. But in the first instance this terminology is not as novel as it appears, and in the last analysis it is parallel or coordinated with the non-technical biblical terminology which is traditionally Athanasian. For instance in Athanasius' EPI, which actually deals with similar questions as the two APO, we find the language of κοινωνία and ἐνυπνία of the Logos and the body (EPI, 9). And we may recall here such phrases as εἷς εἰς ἡμωτέρων (DION, 9), or ἡμωτέρων εἰς ἐνός προτότομον (CAR3, 35), or αὐτός...πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο (CAR2, 62), which, though rare, are in fact valuable because of their unpretentious character. The references to Abraham, David, Adam
and Mary to indicate the true humanity of Christ are as true of AP01&2 as they are of EPI and so is the emphasis on the salvation of the whole man which is remarkably typical of both EPI and AP01.

... ἢνα τοῦ σώματος ἀνθρώπου μένου τοῦ ξωτήρος ὄλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου σωτηρία ἐγένετο (EPI, 7). ...(AP01, 5).

... ἢνα τελεῖαν τῆν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸ Λόγον (ibid.)

The Christological titles and terminology present the same patterns in AFO as in ATHAN with the only exception of the title "Christ" and the term "soul", of which the rate of occurrence in AP01 and AP02 is quite high owing, of course, to the particular issues discussed in these treatises. Perhaps a particularly significant similarity between the respective terminologies of AP01&2 and ATHAN is the term φῶς which has not escaped the attention of a contemporary scholar who examined the contents (24) of the two AFO. The following charter containing the rate of occurrence of the basic Christological titles and terms will demonstrate the point made above. The figures in the last two columns in this charter indicate respectively the number of the pages of the work concerned and the rate of occurrences of the titles and terms under investigation.
There is however, a particular feature of AP01 which clearly betrays its Athanasian origin and it is to this that we have chosen to pay our last attention. It is the use and understanding of the term *homoousios*.

The actual term appears 25 times in AP01 in the context of the author's refutation of the heretical claim that the flesh of Christ is or became *homoousios* with the Godhood of the Logos. We are fortunate in possessing a work of Athanasius which actually refutes the very same claim – his letter EPI – because this provides us with a good opportunity of applying a concrete theo-
logical and literary test to the question of the Athanasian paternity of APO1. If we could show that the two refutations betray the same mind and tongue at work, we believe that we would add a fairly decisive internal theological and literary witness to the Athanasian origin of the two APO. As we saw in the first part of this dissertation, the point concerning the homoousion did not escape the attention of the critics. No one however, attempted the obvious course of procedure, the comparison of the evidences provided by EPI and APO. The general assumption of the critics was that APO operated with the so-called neo-Nicene terminology and understanding of the homoousios which was claimed to be unheard of in Athanasius.

We may begin our investigation by examining the evidence of APO first and then turning to that of EPI for the purpose of a comparison. The first relevant statement of the author of APO occurs in APO1,2 and in the context of his exposition of the orthodox Christology. The Fathers, he says, called the Son homoousios with the Father, i.e. true God from true God and perfect from perfect. This is set against the heretical notion of a flesh which is homoousios with the Godhood of the Logos. But, as we have seen in the exposition of the Christology of APO, the author's actual attack on his opponents' view comes up in APO1,9-12, and it basically consists of the following argument. Two problems result from the heretical homoousion: the denial of the flesh and the blasphemy against the Godhood. The actual notion of the homoousion of the flesh with the Godhood is curious and nonsensical. It is curious because it does not comply with the
traditional application of the *homoousion* to the Son vis-à-vis the Father, but applies it to the flesh which is traditionally acknowledged to be from Mary and the seed of Abraham. It is also nonsensical because it defies the principle according to which τὸ ὁμοούσιον τὴν μὲν ταυτότητα τῆς φύσεως ἔχει, τὴν δὲ ἐδώραν τελειότητα ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἑπεξερχομένη, i.e. whatever is said to be *homoousios* that has identity of nature and exhibits a peculiar perfection in itself. As examples of this principle the author refers to the Son, who, in being confessed to be *homoousios* vis-à-vis the Father is confessed to be τέλειος πρὸς τέλειον, and also to the Spirit, since the Trinity, as he says, is *homoousios*. In view of the above, the author concludes that to apply the *homoousios* to the flesh in the way in which his opponents have done is to accept the perfection of the flesh vis-à-vis the perfection of the Logos (τὴν τελειότητα τῆς σαρκὸς πρὸς τῇ ποὺ Ἀδων τελειότητι).

A second challenge to this heretical notion of the *homoousios* flesh is provided in APO1,11 and 12 where the author argues against the contention that the flesh became (but was not initially) *homoousios* with the Logos' Godhood on account of the union. Here the author sees two implications: firstly that the flesh is denied and Christ is not acknowledged to be a man, and secondly Christ's death, being the death of His *homoousios* flesh, becomes the death of the Godhead of the Father and the Spirit. For the author, however, the flesh is ἔδωρα of the Logos' Godhood and not *homoousios* with it, lest it is also οὐναίδιος and thus the creatures are *homoousia* with the Godhood.

Finally the author restates his earlier principle concerning
the homoeousion in order to argue that the heretical notion of the homoeousios flesh leads to the notion of a divine Quaternity instead of a Trinity. Τὸ δύοοσίον καὶ ἐπαθὲς καὶ ἀνεπίδεκτον θανάτου κρός τὸ δύοοσίον ἐνωσὶν καὶ ὑπὸστασιν (a phrase presumably deriving from the author's opponents) οὐκ ἐπιδεχόμενον ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φόσιν' καὶ ὑπόστασιν δὲ τὴν ἱδίαν τελειότητα ἐνδεικνύειν. In other words, the homoeousios flesh means that the flesh exhibits a peculiar perfection in itself and as such is distinctive from the Logos' peculiar perfection. But then, this peculiar and perfect flesh turns the Trinity of the Father the Logos and the Spirit into a Quaternity. There are two main points in the author's understanding of the homoeousion here: a) that it implies identity of nature (ταυτότης φύσεως) and b) that it entails a distinction between τέλεια or ἱδία τελειότητας. Applied to the case of the Trinity this means that the Father the Son and the Holy Spirit are one undivided φόσις and three τέλεια or τελειότητας, or we might say that they are a τελειό τριάς. Now the crucial question before us is whether such an understanding is Athenian.

In his EPI Athanasius argues against the heretical claim which regards τὸ ἐκ Μαρίας οὖμα δύοοσίον τῆς τοῦ Λόγου θεότητος, or ὃ τι ἡ θεότης (presumably τοῦ Λόγου) αὐτή ἡ δύοοσίος τῷ Πατρὶ περιετειμήθη καὶ ἀτέλης γέγονεν ἐκ τελείου. The first replies come up in EPI,4. Firstly the Fathers said that the Logos and not the body was homoeousios with the Father, being ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός — an argument which, as we may recall, finds its exact parallel in APOL.

Secondly Athanasius argues that if the body is homoeousios with the Logos and the Logos is also homoeousios with the Father, then
the Father must be also homoousios with the body, and...God must be a creature. This argument is syllogistically and logically parallel to the argument in APOI according to which the homoousion of the flesh with the Logos would imply the death of the Father and the Spirit.

Thirdly Athanasius argues that his adversaries fight themselves by saying that the body is homoousios with the Logos while also admitting that the Logos was changed into a body! How could the body be at the same time homoousios with the Logos and and also identical with Him? The homoousion body with the Logos implies distinction between them and not identity. In Athanasius' own words, ὅμως εἰς τὸν Λόγον τῷ σώματι ἔτερον πρὸς ἐτερον. This argument finds its exact parallel in the main argument of APOI based on the principle that the homoousion implies distinction of τέλειον πρὸς τέλειον, οὐ λόγον τελειότητα πρὸς λόγον τελειότητα. The only difference here is one of terminology. EPI is simpler. APOI is more technical. Both however say the same thing.

Fourthly Athanasius argues that the heretical application of the homoousios to the body makes the mention of Mary redundant because in this case the body would be ἄδειον, and there would be no need for the advent of the Logos. This argument also finds its almost exact parallel in APOI, where the term οὐ καί-διον is used and where the flesh is said to be denied.

Fifthly Athanasius argues that if the Godhood put on what is homoousios to it, then it did this for its own sake, which really means that the Logos came to save Himself. This argument
does not appear in APOL in the context of the discussion of the heretical homoousion, but it is present in the wider context of the treatise and particularly in the context of the author's general soteriological argumentation.

Sixthly Athanasius argues in EPI, 8 that if the body is homoousion with the Logos then the Trinity does not remain a Trinity, as his opponents had contented, but becomes a Quaternity. The reason for this is that the homoousion implies distinction. As Athanasius puts it, the Fathers in saying that the Son is homoousios with the Father presuppose that He is not the Father but the Son vis-à-vis the Father (ὁ Υἱὸς κατὰ τοὺς Πατέρας διούσιος ὦν τῷ Πατρί, οὐχ ἔστιν αὐτός ὁ Πατήρ, ἀλλὰ Υἱὸς πρὸς Πατέρα λέγεται διούσιος). If this is the case, says Athanasius, then to say that the body is homoousion with the Logos is to say that the body is not the Logos, but other than the Logos (οὐτω τῷ διούσιον σῶμα τοῦ λόγου οὐχ ἔστιν αὐτός ὁ λόγος ἀλλ' ἕστερον πρὸς τὸν λόγον). But then, if the body is distinct from the Logos, the Trinity is turned to a Quaternity! This, Athanasius concludes, is not, of course, the true and truly perfect and undivided Trinity (ἡ ἀληθινὴ καὶ ὑπωτις τελεια καὶ ἀπαλαζετος Τριάς), which does not admit of additions, but the one who is invented by his adversaries. This entire argumentation is most strikingly paralleled in APOL although the terminology is slightly different — and we say "slightly different", because the τέλειον πρὸς τελείον and the ίδια τελειότης πρὸς ίδιαν τελειότητα of APOL are implicitly present in the ἀληθινὴ καὶ ὑπωτις τελεια καὶ ἀπαλαζετος Τριάς of EPI. But a wider casting of the net of
our investigation into the extensive teaching of the great Athanasius on the homoousion reveals that the terms τέλειος, τελειότης are really his, and are in fact connected with the Trinity and the homoousion. In CAR3,1 we read that πλήρης καὶ τέλειος ἐστὶν ὁ Πατήρ; in CAR1,18 that ἐν Τριάδοις ἡ θεολογία τελεία ἐστὶ; in CAR1,35 we are asked πῶς γὰρ οὖ τέλειος ὁ Ἰσος θεοῦ? CAR1,4 speaks of τὴν ἑαυτοῦ (τοῦ λόγου) τελειότητα; CAR2,33 refers to the Son as ἀπάγαμος τελείοιον and CAR2,35, to γέννημα τελείον; CAR2,66 speaks of τοῦ τελείου τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου and CAR3,52, of τοῦ λόγου... τὸ τελεῖον ἐκ τελείου τοῦ Πατρός. We also find the following expressions: SER1,33 τὴν τῆς ἀγίας Τριάδος τελειότητα; SER3,1 ὁ Υἱὸς διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα ἤδαιμον... ὑμοούσιος τοῦ Πατρός; SER1,28 and SER4,12 τελεῖαν Τριάδα; Finally SER2,9 puts side by side the ἐδαιμόνες and the ὑμοούσιον τοῦ Υἱοῦ πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα. The above evidences are convincing to us that the discussion of the homoousion in APOL has the stamp of Athanasius' mind and tongue. But there are perhaps two remaining possible objections, connected with the references in the argument of APOL to the τοιοτάτης φύσεως and to the καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἔκτοις which do not find obvious parallels in EPI. The question is whether Athanasius holds the unity of φύσις in God and the distinction of ὑπόστασις. With regard to φύσις we can point to the impressive exposition of the homoousion in Athanasius' SYNO. In SYNO,44,48,52, and 53 we find the explicit teaching that the homoousion implies to ὑμογενέσις and ὑμοφυέσις. In SYNO,52 he states that the Son's φύσις is ἀδιαφραστος τῆς τοῦ Πατρός and in CAR3,18 he actually states that the φύσις of the
Father and the Son is one.

As for the term ὑπόστασις, we must first of all point to the possibility that, as it stands in the text of AP01, it has a negative import and seems to be deriving from the author's opponents. But even if we were to assume that it is positively and deliberately employed by the author in the so-called neo-Nicene sense, we could argue that it is by no means impossible for Athanasius to have used it, inspite of the current assumptions on this point in contemporary scholarship. Athanasius' predecessor, Alexander, did use the term τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις and so did Peter II, his successor, and Damasus, his ally, and above all Cyril who followed Athanasius so slavishly. There is evidence that in 362 Athanasius did officially accept this terminology along side with the μέα ὑπόστασις. In SYM041 he said that the Logos was not ἄνωθεν ὑπόστατος and in SER118 that the Holy Spirit ὑπάρχει καὶ ὕφεστηκεν ἀληθῶς. Finally in his Festal Letter 36 (for the year A.D. 364) he did speak of the three hypostaseis of the holy Trinity: τὸν θεόν τοῖς μισθοῖς ἐν τῷ ὁμοούσιον ἡ ποιμανή ἡ μακάρια ἐπιφάνεια (We recognize therefore the three hypostaseis: God, the Son, the Holy Spirit, who form the perfection (τελειότης).

In view of all the above we are convinced that Athanasius, the defender of Nicaea and the homoeousion, has left his indelible theological-literary finger print upon AP01, and therefore we may safely conclude that this work, together with AP02 which is closely related to it, present no theological problems to their Athanasian paternity.
VIII. General Conclusions

We shall now try to bring together the results of various investigations and draw out our general conclusions.

In our review of the history of criticism in the first part of the dissertation, we found out that the question of the Athanasian authorship of APO1&2 was not at all a settled issue. The arguments against it had not been as convincing as claimed, and serious counter-arguments had been advanced. There had been no thorough investigation of the matter, and the whole issue had reached a stalemate position. The work of the critics, however, had provided the outline for a fresh and thorough examination of the entire issue. Such an examination would have to look into the external evidences, the internal allusions, the style, the doctrine of the death of Christ, the question concerning the soul of Christ - one of the most intricate and controversial issues in Athanasian studies, - and generally the Christological doctrine as a whole.

Under external witnesses we examined citations from and references to the two APO in ancient authors, the Ms tradition, and the ancient versions of our two treatises. We made some corrections and additions to the list of the testimonia provided by the various critics and we concluded that the witness to the Athanasian paternity of the two APO undoubtedly goes back to the fifth century and there are strong implicit references to it in Cyril of Alexandria and in early Apollinarian circles. The Ms tradition going back to the seventh or possibly sixth century and the 6th-8th century Syriac and Armenian versions add weight to it. There is absolutely no reason why such a
tradition should be questioned.

On the subject of internal evidence, we have found that the addressees of APOL and APO2 are not the same, although they belong to the same theological camp, which is, beyond doubt, Apollinarian. The notions opposed in both works are not the same either, but they share a common terminology methodology and concern. Both of them represent extreme Apollinarian points of view which seem to belong to the early history of the Apollinarian school, but none of them is to be identified with Apollinaris' Christological theory which is much more coherent, refined and carefully articulated. The views, however, behind APOL stand closer to Apollinaris' particular theory and terminology, and it is most probable that this treatise was sent to Apollinaris himself (who is not mentioned by name but is simply alluded to as "the beloved") in order to be communicated to his disciples who were taking such extremist points of view. Certainly APOL indicates that the author writes as a friend to a friend (both of them being Nicenes), who has a clear ecclesiastical and theological status of authority and therefore can use severe language of admonition and even repudiation. The examination in this section of the allusions to other heretics in both APO has led to the conviction that the same sources had been used and most probably the same author had been at work in both cases. This is particularly strengthened by the fact that such allusions exhibit striking literary connections, although they are freely presented. With a few notable exceptions, all these allusions can be traced to Athanasius' writings and therefore strongly suggest that he could easily have been the author of the two treatises.
The stylistic comments of the various critics were limited contradictory and at times quite confusing. Acknowledging that there is by no means a universally agreed understanding of style we have opted for a thorough examination of certain fundamental stylistic data, the vocabulary, the grammar, the phraseology and the patterns of discourse construction. We found that nearly 98 to 99% of the total text length in APO1 and APO2 is based on a common vocabulary which also appears in Athanasius. The 'neologisms' of the two APO compared to the total vocabulary of Athanasius are length-wise very small but they comply to a pattern which is common to most of Athanasius' literary compositions. We have shown by means of an initial examination that there is hardly any Athanasian composition which does not contain a certain amount of neologisms - a feature most probably owed to the fact that Athanasius wrote in answer to specific challenges and needs and not on account of scholastic interests. The grammar and the phraseology showed clearly that APO1 and APO2 must have derived from the same author and the analysis of the discourse construction of these treatises was shown to be parallel of such Athanasian controversial works as CAR1, CAR2, CAR3 and EPI.

Turning to the theological problems which the critics raised in connection with the Athanasian origin of the two APO, we examined and compared first of all the doctrine of death in Athanasius and the two APO. We found no real contradiction as some critics had claimed. Athanasius' doctrine of death was based on Soteriological concerns and not on a certain ontological/physiological conception of death. On this latter point, his language and terminology was quite flexible, and we found that he could use various 'monistic' and 'dualistic' models ("somatic", "psychic", "..."
or "psychic-somatic", etc.) in order to bring out the force of his conviction that the destroyer of universal death was God's Logos/Son, the Creator, and that the death which He destroyed in Himself was our death. Then the alleged typical Athanasian view of a separation of the Logos from the body in Christ's death appeared to be an unduly rigid and narrow imposition on Athanasian doctrine which cannot really find clear warrant in his texts and therefore cannot be used against the Athanasian paternity of APO1 and APO2. But perhaps the most startling revelation of our investigation on this issue was the discovery in APO1 itself of the presence of two models of the death of Christ, one based on the "monistic" Logos-body model (which some critics had exclusively associated with Athanasius) and another based on the "dualistic" Logos-body-soul model (which we also found in CAR3,54 and hinted at in SER1 and CAR5). The fact that Athanasius insisted on stressing that Christ died "as man" and that death was "our death" or a "human death," coupled with the fact that our death is expounded by Athanasius both in terms of body only and of body and soul, convinced us that the modern allegedly Athanasian restrictive view of Christ's death represented a scholarly misunderstanding not to say theological blunder. As such this view could not be used against the Athanasian paternity of the two APO, especially if one takes into consideration that APO1 includes such a view in its exposition.

The soul of Christ in Athanasius which has been the most vexed desideratum of modern Athanasian studies is a case similar to that of Christ's death. Our critical review of the fundamental essays of M. Richard and A. Grillmeier, together with the examination of the major contributions to the question of the soul of
Christ in Athanasius have again convinced us that such an issue is no obstacle to the Athanasian origin of the two APO. In the light of our investigation we reached the conclusion, that if Athanasius did not use the language of the soul in his anti-Arian compositions, mainly because he preferred to employ the more obvious biblical and traditionally orthodox terminology concerning the Incarnation, and probably because he wanted to stress the real (personal) involvement of the Logos/Son of God in the Incarnation which could perhaps have been obscured by the reference to the soul which carried personalistic connotations, and if in 362, when the question arose as a fundamental issue, he did place the soul in the body of Christ without compromising the crucial point of doctrine that in Christ we have the Logos/Son of God Himself become man and not a man or the Logos in man, there is no reason why we should accuse him of an implicit Apollinarian rejection of the soul of Christ. The explicit references to Christ's soul in ANT and EPI cannot be explained away, and the doctrine of the soul in APO1&2 draws out their real intention, because it does not compromise but rather enhances the Athanasian perception of Christ as the Logos/Son of God who Himself became true man for our salvation by assuming generically true humanity and without ceasing to be God, man's Creator and Saviour.

The lengthiest part of this dissertation has attempted to compare the total Christology of Athanasius particularly as far as it relates to the humanity of Christ with that of APO1&2. Since modern scholarship was shown to be divided on the interpretation of Athanasius' doctrine of Christ, we undertook a fresh
examination of this topic analysing the relevant Athanasian writings. Our conclusion turned out to be more on the side of Weigl Prestige and Sellers than on the side of Grillmeier Liebaert and Kelly. We found the modern theory of the Logos-flesh Alexandrian approach to Christ restrictive and inadequate because it fails to do justice to the real issues with which Athanasius was concerned and to bring out the two basic intuitions of Athanasius' perception of Christ: the fact that in Christ we have the Creator Logos/Son of God as the only subject (person), and the fact that in Christ the Logos/Son has become inhominated, i.e., perfect man and as such has established Himself as the basis of universal salvation. This is exactly the double perspective of the two treatises APO1 and APO2 which is defended against two mutually exclusive heretical Christological theories: one emphasizing the Logos, to the extent that the humanity of Christ is either curtailed, or completely denied, and another stressing both the Logos and the humanity, in a way that the unity of Christ is lost. The same task was undertaken in Athanasius' AVT, EPI, ADEL and MAX and, as we have shown, the same answer was provided. The only difference between the above Athanasian works and the two APO is connected with the particular arguments advanced by the heretical Christology which denies the integrity of the humanity of Christ and most importantly Christ's soul or mind. Allowing for adequate replies to the particular challenges of heresy the Christology of APO1&2 is undoubtedly coherent with that of Athanasius. It reveals not only the general double perspective of Athanasius' vision of Christ, as we have already noted, but draws out Athanasius' few and crucial statements concerning Christ's soul and mind.
found in such works as CAR3, EPI, SER1 and CAR5. We may then conclude that the arguments from Christology advanced by certain critics against the Athanasian paternity of the two APO cannot be sustained. This conclusion has been greatly strengthened by the unmistakable presence in APO1 of what we have called Athanasius' theological/literary finger-print: his understanding of the _homoousion_. We have shown that the employment of the _homoousion_ in APO1 finds its exact theological and literary correspondence in Athanasius' EPI and other writings.

If the external witnesses, the manuscript tradition and the internal evidences are unanimously in favour of Athanasian authorship, and if the style, the doctrine of death and the conception of the soul of Christ present no obstacles to it, and if finally and most importantly the total Christological perspective of the two APO is most certainly Athanasian, we cannot but demand from modern scholars to return to the traditional view. Such a return would mean the thorough and positive reappraisal of Athanasius' contribution to the Church's theological tradition and particularly to the Church's vision of Christ. The value for Christology of the two APO is extremely important, because they state vigorously the orthodox position and reveal its Soteriological foundations. The clear message of Athanasius' final words (the precise dating of which will remain obscure until more information is obtained about the chronology of the Apollinarian heresy) on the Incarnation is similar to that of his _juvenalia_, but it is now stated more precisely and maturely. As our Saviour, Christ is our Creator and Lord, but inasmuch as our salvation is concretely and historically realized in Him, He is
also a man like us having the same humanity as we have. There is no confusion between His Godhood and His manhood and there is no division to His name or person. He is εἷς τὰ ἑκάστα, τέλειος θεός καὶ τέλειος ἀνθρώπος ὁ οὗτος... ἵνα τελείω τὴν σωτηρίαν καταργάσῃ τὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σωματος.
Footnotes

Prologue:


Part I:


(4) MIGNE, Patrologia Greca, vol.xxv, Prolegomena, pp clivf.

(5) LOUIS SEBASTIEN LE MAIN DE TILLEMONT, Mémoires pour servir a l'histoire ecclésiastique des six premiers siècles, vol.8 Venice, 1732 (cf. pp. l-255 and especially 242-255 on "Le grant Saint Athanase").


(8) Medulae Theologiae Patrum, 1606.


(10) Cf. J. H. NEWMAN, Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical, 1874.

(11) Cf. p. 82


(13) op. cit. pp. 169-190.

(14) op. cit. vol. lxii (1889), pp. 79-114.


(16) H. STRÄTER, Die Erlösungslehre des hl. Athanasius, Dogmengeschichtliche Studien, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1894. (see especially pp. 75-91).


(18) K. HOSS, op. cit. Freiburg im Breisgau, 1899.


(20) See on this chapter V. 3 on the death of Christ in APOL following later on in this dissertation.


(22) Cf. op. cit. 242ff.


**Part IV: Stylistic Investigations**


(5) EMMANUEL KARPATHIOS, "Στις τον μέγαν Ἀθανάσιον ἀποδίδομενον δύο λόγοι κατά Ἐκκλησιαστικού", in *Γρηγόριος Παλαμάς*, vol. 9(1925), pp. 370-385, and 442-452.

**Part V: The Death of Christ**

(1) *Athanasiyan*, op. cit. ch. 42, pp. 138-140. Cf. also ch. 41 on the Agony and two wills in Christ.


In this article Lebourlier examined the question of the state of Christ in death in both APO1 and APO2 and in various works of Gregory of Nyssa with the view to making some contribution to the dating of Gregory's works. His first concern however was to refute Daniélou's view that Gregory had actually used the two APO. As regards APO1 and APO2 he found that the question of the state of Christ in death was discussed in both APO for different reasons and with different emphases. In the case of APO1 Lebourlier found that the author in his attempt to refute an Apollinarian Christological trichotomy asserted a dichotomy in Christ's humanity and defended it by expounding soteriologically Christ's death as a separation of the body from the soul and Christ's resurrect-
ion as the reunion of these two human elements. In the case of APO2 no Apollinarian is envisaged and the author's main concern is to defend the thesis that the Logos remained united with the body and the soul after the death of Christ. Lebourlier then went on to argue that the one author does not seem to have had knowledge of the other and to conclude that he agrees with those patrologists who do not attribute the two books to the same author, although he acknowledged that his comparative study of APO1 and APO2 is limited only to a particular question. Lebourlier also ventured two further comments regarding the authorship of APO1 and APO2. He rejected the view that the similarities in language and conceptuality should be explained with reference to a common source and favours the view that the author of APO2 who wrote under different circumstances and much later than the author of APO1 might have been a disciple of the latter. Just like many other critics Lebourlier was selective in his research into APO and thus failed to see the real connections between the two works particularly on the subject of the death of Christ. Trichotomy and dichotomy are not terms really used by the heretics opposed in APO1 and APO2. Besides APO2 does make a distinction between soul and understanding (mind) in as much as he speaks of a “fleshly soul”. But the most important point which Lebourlier fails to acknowledge is that both APO1 and APO2 understand the death of Christ over against the heretical views of their opponents in terms of a separation of soul from body.

(3) ALOIS GRILLMEIER, Mit Ihm und in Ihm, Herder, Freiburg, 1975, pp.142ff. (He follows Lebourlier slavishly without
making any original attempt to understand the doctrine of the two APO.

(4) On the biblical holistic and synecdochic use of the term "body" see οὐσία in Kittel's W. T. Wörterbuch, W. D. Stacey's The Pauline view of Man, London, 1956, and most importantly Robert H. Gundry, Sūma in biblical theology with emphasis on Pauline anthropology, Cambridge University Press, 1976. Finally we should mention François Altermath's Du corps psychique ou corps spirituel (interpretation de 1 Cor. 15:55-49 par les auteurs chrétiens des quatre premiers siècles), J. C. D. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tübingen 1977, which actually includes an interesting section on St Athanasius' use of body.


(6) Cf. INC, 8 ...καὶ τὴν φθοράν ἡμῶν συγκαταβάς καὶ τὴν τοῦ θανάτου κράτους ὑπὲρ ἑνεχώκας... Also INC, 7 ...κρατουμένων ἐν τῇ θανάτῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.


(8) Although Athanasius' argument is soteriologically based there is no evidence whatsoever that the Arians argued from a similar standpoint. The recent book by the American scholars Robert C. Gregg and Dennis E. Groh's Early Arianism a view of salvation, SCM Press, London, 1981, is a curious one and, in spite of its meticulous style, it fails to produce convincing evidence for a soteriologically based Arian Christology.


(11) A. GRIEMER, "Mit Ihm und in Ihm", op. cit.

Part VI: The Soul of Christ

(1) F. C. Baur, Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes, 1841.

(2) K. HESS, Studien über das Schrifttum und die Theologie des Athanasius auf Grund, Freiburg i. B., 1899, and A. STÜLCKEN Athanasiana, Literar- und dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchungen, Leipzig, 1899 (T. u. U. Neue Folge IV, 4).


(6) op. cit., pp. 7-13.

(7) CAR3, 30... τῆς Γραφῆς Ἐθος ἐχούσης λέγειν σάρκα τὸν ἄνθρωπον. .. σάρκα γάρ καὶ οὐτὸς (ὁ Διανι分子) καὶ Ἰωάν τὸ τῶν ἄνθρωπων γένους λέγουσιν. ANT, 7... ἀλλ' οὕτως δ ὁ λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο... καὶ οὕτω τελεῖσαι καὶ ὀλοκλήρως τὸ ἄνθρωπον γένους ἐλευθερούμενον ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξαιροῦμεν ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν εἰσάγαται εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν, EPI, 8... γάρ τὸ εἰσεῖν ὁ λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο, ἢ οὖν πάλιν ἐστίν εἰσεῖν, ὁ λόγος ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν.

(8) ORIGEN, De Principiis, Book 3, Pref. 5, §§ 1-4.

(9) ANT, 7... οὐδὲ σώματος μόνου ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ σωτηρία γέγονεν. EPI, 7... οὗ φαντασία ἡ σωτηρία ἡμῶν οὐδὲ σώματος μόνου ἀλλ' ἕνων τοῦ ἄνθρωπου, ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἀληθῶς ἡ σωτηρία γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ.

(11) Cf. EPI, 5...ος γάρ ὃς τινες ὑπενόησαν ἡ σοφία ἀληθινή τοῦ Ἁγίου τριάδος περὶ τῆς ὑπενόησιν ἀληθινῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀμαρτίας.


(13) op. cit. pp. 26-46.


(16) op. cit. pp. 38ff.


(18) op. cit. p. 28f.

(19) op. cit. p. 31.

(20) RICHARD, Saint Athanase. op. cit. 42ff.

(21) Cf. op. cit. p. 42.

(22) MIGUE, P. G. vol. xxvi, 415f.

(23) RICHARD, op. cit. pp. 46ff.

(24) VOISIN, op. cit. 23ff.


(30) E. P. MEIJERING, *op. cit*.

(31) Cf. GENT, 28, 40, etc.


(33) Cf. ANT. II oýte γάρ ἄψυχον ὢντε ἀναλόγητον ὢντε ἀνόητον σῶμα, εἶχεν δὲ κατὰ ὀ λόγον τὰ δικό της ψυχῆς ἀναρρίθμητον ὄντος ἐγενόμενον, ἀνόητον εἶναι αὐτοῦ τὸ σῶμα.


(35) Cf. EPI., 9... καὶ ψυχῆς ὀν (τὸ σῶμα) γεγονέν πνευματικὸν

(35a) See at the end of the ἐπικεφαλεία, χρωτυπορέω


(37) Here we shall cite all the texts to which Urbina refers in the original Greek text though he gives them in Italian.

(38) The Athens edition of Athanasius' works (*Apostolike Diakonia*)
accepts this work as genuine Athanasian and this is the view suggested by the remarkable essay of Rapisarda which we have already mentioned.


(40) MICHAEL CONSTANTINIDES, "Ὁ μέγας Αθανάσιος καὶ ἡ ἐποχὴ αὐτοῦ, Athens, 1937.

(41) GERMANOS OF SARDIS, "Ἡ προσ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ δίδασκαλία τοῦ μεγέλου Ἀθανάσιον, Ἐκκλησιολογικός θερας, 32 (1933) 564-568, 33 (1934) 88-113, 272-291, 393-406.


(44) M. BOUYER, op. cit.


(46) ANT, 10, 11.

(47) EPIPHANIUS, Ancoratus, 78, P.G. xliii, 164.

(48) Cf. P.L. xiii, 356B.

(49) G. D. DRAGAS, Athanasiana, op. cit. pp. 24-27.


(52) Cf. our discussion on the death of Christ in ING in ch. V.2(ii) of this dissertation.


(55) See below, Part VI note 35a.

PART VII: The Christology

(1) F. C. BAUR, Die christliche Lehre...op. cit.


(3) K. HOSS, Studien über das Schrifttum...op. cit.

(4) A. STÜCKEN, Athanasiana, op. cit.

(5) G. VOISIN, "La doctrine christologique..." op. cit.

(6) E. WEIGL, Untersuchungen...op. cit.

(7) Cf. Modern Churchman, 1922, pp. 6-28 and 196-213. Also, H. RASHDALL, God and Man, (edited by MAJOR and CROSS), Blackwell, Oxford, 1930, pp. 79ff

(8) C. RAVEN, Apollinarianism, Cambridge, 1923.

(9) G. L. PRESTIGE, Fathers and Heretics, London, 1940 (cf. the essay on Athanasius)


(11) Cf. Part VI of this dissertation on the debate of the soul of Christ in Athanasius.
(12) JACQUES LIEBAERT, Christologie, "Handbuch der Dogmen-
geschichte", vol.3, Herder, Freiburg i. Br., 1965 (French

(13) J. ROLDAWUS, Le Christ et l'homme dans la théologie d' 
Athanase d'Alexandrie, étude de la conjonction de sa 

(14) F. M. YOUNG, "A reconsideration of Alexandrian Christology", 

(15) C. KANNENGIESSER, "Athanasius of Alexandria and the Founda-
tion of traditional Christology", in Theological Studies, 


(17) The number in the brackets following the titles indicates 
rate of occurrence in GENT. The same pattern will be followed 
throughout the dissertation, unless otherwise specified.

(18) Cf. GENT, 31, 34, etc...

(19) Cf. EPI, 8 where Athanasius repudiates the preexistence of 
the soul of Christ without mentioning Origen...εἰκότως κατα-
γνώσοντας ταύταν πάντας οἱ νομίζοντες πρὸ τῆς Μαρίας εἶναι 
tην ἐξ αὐτῆς σόρον, καὶ πρὸ ταύτης τινά έσχηκέναι ψυχῆν 
ἀνθρωπίνην τὸν Δόγον, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ πρὸ τῆς ἐπιδήμους ἀεὶ 
γεγενηθήσας.


(21) ELIAS WOUTSOULAS, Τὸ πρόβλημα τῆς χρονολογήσεως τῶν τριών 
κατ' Ἀρείανων λόγων τοῦ μεγάλου Ἀθανασίου, Τεχνολογία, 
47 (1976), 543-557.
(22) For all the references of Athanasius to Paul of Samosata see ch. III. 3 of this dissertation.


(25) The term hypostasis and the actual phrase union according to hypostasis (ἐνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν) were extensively used by St Athanasius' great successor Cyril of Alexandria. Scholars have found it very difficult to trace the ancestry of the above Cyrillian Christological phrases. M. Richard who wrote extensively on the introduction of the term hypostasis to Christology and particularly the Incarnation (Cf. his essay "L'Introduction du mot "hypostase" dans la théologie de l' Incarnation", in Mélanges de science religieuse, vol. 2 (1945), pp. 5-32 and 243-270) has regarded Cyril's use of the term as a great mystery! And yet Richard did acknowledge that the use of hypostasis in the Incarnation and especially the construction hypostatic union did appear for the first time in APO1. But the only comment he could make here was this: "Ce texte (the text from APO1; i.e. with the phrase ἐνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν) n'est pas trop clair, pas trop bien daté et d'origine incertaine. Vouloir expliquer par lui l' emploi par Cyrille de cette expression, c'est prétendre expliquer un mystère par un autre mystère..." (cf. op. cit., p. 250). It would have made,
in our opinion, much better sense of the historical textual data to dispose with two startling but inexplicable mysteries and find here a clear allusion to the Athenasian origin of APOI. After all, it is very well attested by modern scholarship that Cyril was slavishly attached to the traditions of Athanasius and produced very little innovation of his own. Jean LEBOURLIER, who also discussed the text from APOI.62 which contains the word hypostasis, was prepared to acknowledge a connection between Cyril and APOI - albeit an indirect one(?). This is what he wrote at the conclusion of his discussion: "Tout au plus – et de là vient le principal intérêt de notre phrase – cet emploi des trois mots ἐκτικός, ὁδὸς ἐπεισόδιον dans une controverse christologique a pu servir de préparation à leur emploi en christologie" (Cf. "Union selon hypostase" ébauche de la formule dans le premier livre pseudo-Athanasien Contre Apollinaire", Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques, vol. 46 (1960), pp. 470-475).

Incidentally, Lebourlier did acknowledge the connection between the Athanasian explication of the homoousion in EPI and the parallel one advanced in APOI. But he considered the latter to be an imitation of the former. Had he searched a little deeper, he would have recognized the same mind and the same tongue being at work.


(35a) We have not discussed here Prof. M. F. Wiles' article "The nature of the Early Debate about Christ's human soul" in Journal of Ecclesiastical History 16 (1965) 139-151 because it does not engage in original research but simply assesses the view of Athanasius' Christology from the point of view of a soulless humanity.
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