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TWO ALTERNATIVE DESCRIPTIONS OF PERSON

By

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ABSTRACT

The main concern of this thesis is to explore the possibility of discovering an alternative approach to the understanding of personhood, an approach which is not dominated either by severe empiricism on the one hand or extreme dualism on the other, but one which finds a new way of unravelling the mystery of what it is to be a person.

Chapter One is an introduction to the thesis as a whole. Chapter Two is an exposition of the dualist position and particularly that of Professor H. D. Lewis. Chapter Three is offered as a possible way forward towards an alternative model of personhood. Chapter Four deals largely with the theological implications of the preceding two chapters, and Chapter Five is a brief conclusion of the discussion.

There has been a deliberate attempt throughout the thesis to aim at breadth and a broad based examination of the criteria of personhood and perhaps the thesis will stand or fall by its success or otherwise in doing this.

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CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

In 1950, Alan Turing published an article in the journal Mind entitled 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence'.⁽¹⁾ Turing, although still in his thirties, was already at the forefront of research into the electronic digital computer in Britain, but the publication of his paper gave him a unique position in the history of computer research worldwide. In his paper he laid the groundwork for studies of 'artificial intelligence'. Turing began his paper by addressing the question 'Can machines think?', which he recognised to be the central problem of research into artificial intelligence. However, such a question could so easily get bogged down in discussions of definition: What is a machine? It was for this reason that Turing replaced a normal discussion of the question with an example which he called the 'imitation game' and which has since come to be known as the 'Turing test'.

His imitation game is played initially by three people: a man, A, a woman, B, and an interrogator (of either sex), C. Each person has a role. The interrogator, who does not know the sex of either A or B, has the job of discovering A's sex; and B's job is to help the interrogator in whichever way she can. A's job, on the other hand, is to lead the interrogator down the wrong track. The three people are isolated in separate rooms, being able to communicate through an intermediary or some device like a teleprinter that does not give any clues, by tone of voice or handwriting, as to the sex of the interrogees. Turing goes on to say:

'We now ask the question, "What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game?" Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our original, 'Can machines think?''⁽²⁾

No machine yet in production could successfully communicate with an interrogator in such a test and remain unrecognised as a machine. But perhaps the day is not far hence when a computer with a highly sophisticated program may succeed. Turing anticipated that there would be various objections to the idea that machines, whether they be highly advanced computers or not, could possibly think. In fact he anticipated nine objections:⁽³⁾



(1) The theological objection. According to this view, thought is a function of a person's immortal soul. Following Aquinas this view argues that God has given a soul to each man and woman but not to animals or machines. On this view a negative answer would have to be the reply to the question 'Can machines think?'

(2) The 'heads in the sand' objection: If we ignore the idea that machines might be able to think, it will go away.

(3) The mathematical objection. A computer depends on a builder, and a program on a programmer. Each mathematical system and every program has elements within it that are unproven by the system. Therefore a computer, unable to move beyond the boundaries of its program, will not be able to answer some questions about itself which may be put.

(4) The argument from consciousness. A computer cannot feel emotion, cannot compose poetry or a concerto, and, what is more, even if it could it would not be able to know that it had done so.

(5) Arguments from various disabilities. A machine may be able to do some of the things you require but it can never be kind, resourceful, beautiful, friendly, have initiative, have a sense of humour, make mistakes, enjoy strawberries and cream, fall in love etc.

(6) Lady Lovelace's objection. Lady Lovelace commenting on Charles Babbage's 'Analytical Engine' in the nineteenth century said, 'The Analytical Engine has no pretensions to originate anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform'.

(7) Argument from the continuity in the nervous system. A machine is a discrete state system with output being directly proportional to input, whereas the nervous system is not. A small mistake in the information about the nervous impulses of the body and the brain can make a significant difference in the outgoing behaviour. A person watching a film of a car chase, filmed from the pursuing car, may flinch, lean over as the car goes around a corner, even hide his eyes, but a machine would not 'react' in these ways.

(8) The argument from informality of behaviour. There are no definite rules by which all people regulate their lives. If there were, they would be no better than machines (!)

(9) The argument from extra-sensory perception. If a machine were compared with a person having telepathic powers in the 'imitation game', the machine could only rely on statistical chance in ascertaining the number of cards the interrogator held in his hand, whereas the person with E.S.P. would succeed more often.

In his paper Turing answered each of these objections, though there is no space here to record and discuss these arguments. More important is that it should be recognised that the objections that he anticipated and the test that he invented strike at the heart of the debate concerning the existence of the human mind. The objections to the idea of thinking machines are all put from the sure recognition that human beings are able to think. No one seriously doubts that thought is a function of personal existence. However, there is a great divergence of opinion on what thinking actually consists of and equal diversity as to what it is that enables us to think. What categories should be used in a description of human thought? Is thought the function of a mysterious entity which is fundamentally imperceptible - the human mind? Or is the process of thinking objective, open to the empirical investigations of the scientist? If thinking can be reduced to a number of physiological components - the 'firing' of nervous impulses and the transmission of electrical impulses in the brain - then the creation of a machine that has the ability to think is theoretically possible, and perhaps it is only a matter of time until one is made. If, however, thought is the mysterious process of the mind or soul a machine will never be created that can think unless it can somehow be made with a mind as well.

Dualism in its broadest sense is based upon a philosophical outlook that requires some form of division between two realms. Fundamentally dualism postulates the existence of two different sorts of entity, one physical and the other mental. The physical realm is of course open to all the normal procedures of sense perception and experience, but the non-physical is open to none of these. In the narrower sense with which this thesis is concerned - the philosophy of mind - dualism postulates that a person is composed of two parts, the body and the soul. Of course, the body, being part of the physical realm, is available to observation and empirical investigation; however, the soul or mind is quite different. The mind is in a different category from the body and is primarily a subject and not an object. This means that minds are not even directly available to other minds but are essentially private to the individual. It is in

this second and particular sense that dualism is referred to in this thesis and it will be investigated in relation to the work of H. D. Lewis.

Empiricism, it would seem, covers a multitude of approaches. Broadly, it refers to an approach which accepts as primary the evidence of the five senses in personal experience. Here it will be used as a shorthand way of describing an approach to the description of a person which relies upon the empirical evidence of the various sciences, both physical and behavioural.

It should be recognised that these two approaches are operating with different criteria, a different method, and even a different world view. The approach that accepts the existence of the mind recognises that the subjective evidence of self-knowledge and reflection is vital in a complete description of a person. The other approach relies only on those things which are available to the senses. These two positions are broadly represented by the dualist and the empiricist.

Both approaches are in the end incompatible with the evidence given by the other and both fall short, in the eyes of the other, in providing an approach to the description of a person. This is why the arguments of both sides of the debate seem quite reasonable. Even the most careful investigator, having accepted the initial presuppositions, would agree that both approaches seem inherently rational. If it is accepted that each individual has a self-knowledge which is unlike the knowledge we have of other things, we are on the way to accepting the validity of some form of dualism, because already there are two types of knowledge implying two kinds of entity. If, on the other hand, we accept that only those things which are directly observable can be admissible as evidence, we are on the way to denying the existence of the mind and heading towards a full-blown empiricism. Many seem to be caught between the two arguments, ambivalent about each and recognising the merits of both. Douglas Hofstadter has expressed this ambivalent position well in his outstanding book Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid.⁽⁴⁾ In the same way that a print by M. C. Escher presents the observer with more than one perspective and frame of reference and produces an illusion that the impossible has been created, so the various arguments for and against the existence of the mind create an ambivalent situation for the hearer or reader of the arguments, because he is unable to accept both but is also unable to deny either. Escher is able to create the illusion of a staircase which ascends whilst going around the edge of a roof, with the top step

of the staircase joining the bottom, without creating a feeling of disbelief in the observer. The two main positions in the debate about the existence of the mind create a similar effect. One argument, like one perspective in an Escher print, can be followed clearly and yet so can the other - and both seem meaningful and reasonable.

Is there a solution to this problem? Will one or the other approach finally produce conclusive evidence that will render the other approach untenable? It would seem that the views of the empiricists have gained ascendancy, at least for the present, with the dualists being forced into more of a tight corner. But will the final death stroke ever be dealt? For some the Turing test promises to furnish the evidence that will deal such a stroke. Although the optimism of the early computer scientists has given way to more caution and fewer prophecies, there are signs that a computer, described as a thinking machine, may be possible. Already programs have been written and computers built that go some way to fulfilling this aim. In Gödel, Escher, Bach, Hofstadter describes programs and computers which seem to have remarkable capabilities. SHRDLU is the name of a program which, although restricted to a relatively small frame of reference, is able to 'converse' with the 'user' and may be one of the few that seem to have an embryonic intelligence. Others which are probably less intelligent but more famous are 'Parry' and 'Doctor'. Parry is programmed to simulate the belief system of a paranoid and Doctor is supposed to simulate the approach of a psychiatrist using non-directive therapy. Doctor had the effect of becoming a private counselling service for some who came into contact with it. Hofstadter records its creator Joseph Weizenbaum telling of the effect that Doctor's initial program had on some who encountered it:

ELIZA (the program from which Doctor was made) created the most remarkable illusion of having understood in the minds of many people who conversed with it ... They would often demand to be permitted to converse with the system in private, and would, after conversing with it for a time, insist, in spite of my explanations, that the machine really understood them. (5)

Hofstadter also records some of the conversations that Parry and the Doctor had when they encountered each other. The language is a little stilted because they are programmed to speak to human beings, not to other programs, but nevertheless the conversation gives some idea of how far computer science has progressed:

Parry: I don't understand your motives
Doctor: Why don't you understand my motives?
Parry: Shouldn't I be?
Doctor: Why do you say that just now?
Parry: That's just the way it is.
Doctor: Suppose that's just the way it were not?
Parry: So?
Doctor: I am not sure I understand you fully.
Parry: You harp on the same questions too much
Doctor: What does the similarity suggest to you?
Parry: I don't get you
Doctor: Do you wish that you did get I?
Parry: It's about time you showed some interest
in my feelings.
Doctor: Oh? I showed some interest in your feelings? (6)

Doctor and Parry clearly have many limitations and would not get very far in a Turing test, but perhaps they indicate that passing such a test is not impossible. Would a program and a computer able to achieve such a thing signal the end of dualism? Perhaps, but what if it too believed that it had a mind, what if it believed in God or believed that somehow God had given it the ability to think, what then? Perhaps the dualist and empiricist computers would have the same debates the scientists and philosophers have today. It does not seem certain that the evidence for the mind based on self-knowledge need necessarily disappear simply because a team of scientists may be able to create a thinking machine. Also, and more important, it should be recognised that simply making a machine that can be described as intelligent, or able to think, does not mean that what has been created is a mechanical 'person'. Unless a person is described in only terms of thought or intelligence this is impossible. In Chapter 3 it will be shown that many things are required for the development of personhood and unless these conditions are also fulfilled or rendered unnecessary no machine can ever be described as a person. If computer scientists dispute this point they should at least be aware of the fact that, by making thought or intelligence primary in a descriptions of personhood, they may be conceding ground to the dualists. It would seem that a position that allows a machine to be described as a person simply because it can think is not far from asserting that the basis of person existence is in the mind or soul.

It would appear that the two positions, however popular they may be relative to one another, are as philosophically strong as they ever were. It is possibly a mistake to conclude that if empiricism is not right, dualism must be, and vice versa. If they really are two different world views perhaps they should be accommodated rather than being brought into confrontation. Both approaches seem reasonable but neither, it would seem, can contain or discount the other. People do not easily live with paradox and ambiguity but until some other more acceptable approach is provided, perhaps the only way is to recognise the merits of both.

As well as their fundamental differences these two approaches do have similarities. They are similar in as much as they are both incomplete. In 1931 the mathematician Kurt Gödel published his critique of Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead's Principia Mathematica. The basis of the critique was that the Principia Mathematica was not a complete system of mathematical theory as it claimed, because it contained statements and pre-suppositions which had no proof within the framework that Russell and Whitehead had produced. But it was not only Principia Mathematica that Gödel's theorem affected, it had a transforming effect on the mathematics of the day and through that to the rest of science. Since Einstein the idea of things being relative to one another has been generally assimilated by society. But the relativising effect that Gödel's theorem had at the time was revolutionary. It would seem that even the most basic of presuppositions can now be challenged on this basis. Even the simple rules of arithmetic, as Hofstadter points out in Gödel, Escher, Bach seem incomplete:

There are certain types of people who, as soon as some undeniable fact is written down, find it amusing to show why that "fact" is false after all. I am such a person...

People enjoy inventing slogans which violate basic arithmetic but which illustrate "deeper" truths, such as 1 and 1 makes 1 (for lovers) or 1 plus 1 plus 1 equals 1 (the Trinity). You can easily pick holes in these slogans, showing why, for instance, using the plus sign is inappropriate in both cases. But such cases proliferate. Two raindrops running down a windowpane merge; does one plus one make one? A cloud breaks up into two clouds - more evidence for the same? It is not at all easy to draw a sharp line between cases where what is happening could be called "addition"

and where some other word is wanted. If you think about the question, you will probably come up with some criterion involving separation of the objects in space, and making sure that each one is clearly distinguishable from all the others. But then how could one count ideas? Or the number of gases comprising the atmosphere? Somewhere, if you look it up, you can probably find a statement such as "There are 17 languages in India and 462 dialects". There is something strange about precise statements like that, when the concepts "language" and "dialect" are themselves fuzzy. (7)

Nothing is more simple than one plus one - or so it would seem. One stream plus another stream may equal a river, but they do not equal two streams. Dualism and empiricism are incomplete, it would seem, in the same way that mathematical systems were shown to be by Gödel. In their general expression as philosophical systems, and in their particular expression in the description of personhood, they contain presuppositions and arguments that are not substantiated in terms of the referential framework they construct - they are incomplete. Perhaps one example from each will suffice.

A fundamental presupposition of dualism is that a full and complete description of the world and of a person requires the existence of two categories, two entities, one physical and one mental or spiritual - hence the title dualism. This presupposition is for most dualists dependent on experience, particularly self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is that understanding we gain of ourselves by recognising that we are subjects of experience first before all else and that we are individuals who are aware of their thoughts and activities and are able to describe themselves in the first person singular. This recognition led Descartes to doubt all else except the existence of his own mind - this is the crux. Having allowed self-knowledge to gain such an important position, Descartes' doubt seems well founded, so why dualism and not solipsism? The progression from the recognition of the existence of the mind to the recognition of the mind plus the physical world is unsubstantiated by the existence of the mind. The recognition of the existence of the mind is self-substantiating but does not substantiate the existence of the physical world. This is perhaps why so many dualists tend towards solipsism and an idealist epistemology. Empiricism is incomplete in a similar way. Empiricism depends for its coherence on the reasonableness of taking the evidence of the five senses in its construction of a

picture of reality. Physical evidence can be tried, tested and repeated to give reliable results which can be used to describe events in time and space. But whose experience of the world are we relying upon? Is there any evidence to suggest that one perception or experience of the world is definitive? Perhaps we should rely on common sense, but what is that? Perhaps we should rely on the experience and results of the scientists alone. But then what about the poets and painters - is not their experience of reality also valid? If we are to allow only physical evidence as admissible, how do we gather, collate and interpret the great diversity of human experience of the world? This problem is not met by an empirical construction of reality and therefore the epistemological basis upon which it relies is not substantiated or proven by the system itself.

The incompleteness of the epistemologies of the two approaches has been illuminated, but it may not be restricted to these areas, it may be that there are other areas where similar incompleteness can be shown. However, for the purposes of this introduction and this thesis the important thing is that they be recognised as incomplete. Also it should be recognised that very little can be done by way of argument or the producing of evidence to rectify this fundamental incompleteness. If we attempt to produce an answer to this problem we invariably draw a blank, become involved in an infinite regress or enmeshed in a circular argument.

This thesis is written in recognition of this problem and attempts a method of presentation that accounts for it. Two approaches will be presented here. One will be that of Professor H. D. Lewis, probably the most eminent dualist alive at the moment. The other will be an alternative approach of my own devising, which will be broadly empiricist and will seek to include what I take to be some of the important areas of influence for a consistent empiricist approach to the descriptions of personhood.

Both approaches will be simply presented with criticism being directed towards the internal coherence of the approach in question. As far as possible they will not be brought into confrontation but will be presented as alternatives, as counterpoises. A chapter on the theological implications of each approach will also be included. The concluding chapter will attempt to weigh the merits of the two approaches and offer further areas of study and research, particularly in theology, where a discussion of personhood like that found in this thesis might be applied. In this way it is hoped that the two stances presented in this thesis will not be seen so much as

opposites best expressed in a debate between two 'combatants' across a philosophical and theological divide, but as two possible and alternative models of personhood which have merits and weaknesses and are similarly deficient. This thesis is not written to set up an argument between antinomies; rather it is presented as an attempt at discovering the essential areas of debate and research within the investigation into personhood and the soul. In pursuit of that aim we turn now to a discussion of Professor Hywel D. Lewis' approach to personal existence.

NOTES

Chapter 1

1. Quoted in D. Hofstadter and D. Dennet, The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on the Soul (Penguin, 1982) p.53
2. D. Hofstadter and D. Dennet, Mind's I, p.54
3. Ibid, p.57
4. See particularly Introduction and Chapter 20.
5. D. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach:An Eternal Golden Braid (Penguin, 1982), p.600. Cf. J. Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason, (Penguin 1979), p.189.
6. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach, p.599
7. Ibid, p.56

CHAPTER 2

THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF H. D. LEWIS' APPROACH TO HUMAN EXISTENCE

The Flat-landers are creatures that live in two dimensions. If we were able to see them, we would notice that some formed regular two-dimensional figures such as triangles, squares, circles and ovals, whilst others were irregular in form. None of this sort of information about their shape would be available to the Flat-landers themselves however, because they can, and do, experience only those things which a two-dimensional world allows. Therefore, they are without sight. They can communicate - hear and talk - and also feel the presence of others. These along with many other activities, like movement from one place to another, are possible by their adaptation to the continual flow of tiny two-dimensional particles of which their world is made.

The Flat-landers continued for a long time in the belief that they had explored their world and discovered the fundamentals of their existence and understood all that there was to life. Then some of them began to ask why it was that they thought of themselves as individuals - why it was that they could distinguish themselves from one another and the rest of the world. Moreover, they wondered why it was that they did not, and it appeared, could not, overlap with each other or encroach upon each other's space. They reasoned that if theirs truly was a two-dimensional world there was nothing to stop them from sliding over each other and getting all mixed up into one big polygon. Some even tried it, thinking that in the past they had been mistaken, but found it impossible.

This issue became the main subject of debate in Flatland. Flatlanders of every age, from infants to the old, talked about the problem and it soon became the fundamental question of the Flat-landers' existence: Why am I an individual? And many explanations were given and many parties of opinion developed. They largely fell into two camps. One camp said that 'The Question' could only be explained if there was a third dimension which was not available to the senses but which gave each Flat-lander his identity and stopped him from encroaching on another's space. This camp called themselves the 'Dimensionalists'. The other camp said that 'The Question' could be explained simply by an understanding of the two dimensions of the world and the people in it. It was impossible, they contended, to take seriously anything that could not be experienced directly. Their language often included phrases such as 'physical laws', 'behaviour' and 'social conditioning' and they called themselves the 'Experientialists'.

These two camps continue to have many long and heated discussions and at times seem to get closer together in thought, but then at other times they seem further apart. The many parties, which represent different shades of opinion within each camp, also argue amongst themselves and are ever seeking to clarify their positions. The arguments continue.

It seems that the argument and division of opinion amongst the Flat-landers is similar to the state of the debate within the philosophy of mind, and especially that part of the debate which makes particular reference to the distinction between body and mind. Like the idea of the third dimension for some of the Flat-landers, the existence of a mind which is not dependent upon a body for its existence seems to provide a tenable working model of personal existence. And yet there are those who, like the Experientialist Flat-landers, will question anything which empirical evidence cannot establish as possible. H. D. Lewis as a participator in the debate stands firmly on the side of the dualists who, like the Dimensionalists in the illustration, believe that our experience of life, our understanding and recognition of ourselves as individuals, leads to the irrefutable conclusion that we are more than our empirical/physical existence. We have a mind which forms the essential and necessary part of our self, and as such is the seat of our consciousness and identity.

Lewis affirms that we know of the existence of our minds not obliquely but directly, simply by being ourselves. In fact he would go so far as to suggest that the very notion of looking for our 'selves' is wrong: we are primarily subjects of experience and not objects, all experience involves the self and if we pause to observe ourselves doing something the activity immediately changes. Our experience of life leads us to the conclusion that we are more than a mixed bag of sensation and activity. Rather we are bodies with minds and minds with bodies. It is from this position that Lewis attacks the empiricists who, like the Experientialists in the illustration, believe that other than those things which are available to the senses, nothing can reasonably be argued for or philosophically supported. As an empiricist philosopher of mind Gilbert Ryle has been particularly singled out by Lewis for attack. Lewis rightly recognises Ryle's stature and position as an empiricist thinker and the enormous influence of his work - especially his book The Concept of Mind. In many ways Lewis' approach to personal existence becomes clear as he argues and disputes with Ryle. He defends Descartes and traditional dualism from the attacks of Ryle, and in restating dualism adds little to the basic Cartesian model of body and soul, but adds much in the way of exposition, explanation and illumination of the

approach. Some, whilst agreeing with the assessment of Lewis thus far, would argue further that he has made the distinction between body and mind more flexible, their relationship being conceived of in more dynamic terms and thereby rendered more tenable and acceptable. In all of this Lewis has provided a valuable resource for both philosophers and interested lay persons.

This chapter will investigate the 'building blocks' of Lewis' approach and the evidence that he offers for the existence of the mind/self/soul. These building blocks will provide both an overview of Lewis' approach and an opportunity for criticism. The investigation and criticism is not intended to be exhaustive, but sufficient to provide enough material to establish Lewis' thesis as a possible model of personal existence.

'Elusive' appears to be an important word for Lewis and a key word in his description of selfhood. This is made clear not only in the discussions found in Lewis' works but also, and more particularly, in the titles of his works: The Elusive Mind, The Elusive Self and his forthcoming The Elusive Self and God.

It is quite clear that it is the mind/self/soul which is elusive, but what is it eluding? The answer is quite simply - empirical investigation. Lewis contends that the self is by its very nature elusive and therefore cannot be treated like anything else. It is not available to normal human sense perception and cannot be brought to the bar of our normal means of describing the world - the self cannot be described in words drawn from everyday experience. Like the lost bar of soap in the bath the mind seems continually to elude our grasp and defy capture. In holding to this view of the self Lewis seems to be very close to I. T. Ramsey in his celebrated paper 'The systematic elusiveness of Ψ '⁽¹⁾

It would seem that the 'self' suffers the same problems of description as does 'God'. Like 'God', the terms 'mind', 'self', 'soul' conjure up pictures which are not easily translated into words - pictures of a shadowy world beyond the range of normal perception. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why, like the classical statements about God, descriptions of the soul seem to require the use of the 'via negativa'. By describing the soul as immortal, for instance, or in other words not-mortal or not-life-with-an-end,⁽²⁾ statements about and discussions of the soul, by contrast with what is empirically known about the world, have been expressed in negative language. This necessarily involves a restructuring of epistemologies to

allow for such concepts. In The Elusive Self, (in the chapter of the same name), Lewis has described the problems of talking about the self as like walking through a minefield. ⁽³⁾ The difficulty exists because of the tendency to say too much on the one hand and say too little (which could amount to nothing at all) on the other. The philosophy of mind, Lewis would affirm, presents everyone with linguistic difficulties, but none more so than those who, like Lewis, wish to defend the dualist position.

For Lewis the self is irreducible; the states of mind and body have no influence over the essential nature of the self which simply 'is'. In response to a philosophical trend which began with philosophers like Hume, Locke and Berkeley and has been expressed latterly in the work of Ryle, Lewis contends that our thoughts are not identical with our minds. The mind has thoughts, but that does not mean that it is thoughts. By this he is affirming the existence of some-'thing' which thinks, but which is neither dependent upon the body nor its own thoughts for its existence. As far as the existence of the mind/self/soul is concerned, Lewis argues for its complete independence. But this does not mean that Lewis is intending to deny the importance of the body. In The Self and Immortality ⁽⁴⁾, Lewis devotes a chapter to the 'importance of the body' and states what he sees to be the great value and importance the body has for human existence. In his arguments Lewis seems very close to his philosophical progenitor Descartes. On the one hand he says how important the body and its states are for human existence and, on the other, he supports the idea of a non-physical substance which is wholly independent of its states and all other 'externals' such as those signals which are transmitted through the sense organs.

Descartes made it quite clear that he believed the mind was a 'thing' or a substance (res) which as such could exist alone. Lewis has been quick to pick this up. Following on from Descartes, Lewis suggests that although the mind is able to exist alone it normally exists in some form of relationship to the physical world. Descartes believed that the essential nature of a physical thing is found in the fact that it is extended, and that the essential nature of the mind is to be found in that it is able to think. Scott Dunbar in a recent article in Religious Studies ⁽⁵⁾ has said that Lewis attempts to soften this radical distinction of Descartes and that in The Self and Immortality he injects more flexibility into his approach and facilitates greater opportunities for the mind to have a relationship with the physical world. This, Dunbar suggests, Lewis achieves by moderating Descartes' approach to the mind's essential nature. Lewis does not describe the mind as a thinking thing but rather as 'a thing that has experience' ⁽⁶⁾.

Whether or not this is a fair assessment of what Lewis is doing, or trying to do, will soon be made clear.

The two substances involved in the mind-body relationship are so different that the relationship is not just particularly intimate but also entirely unique. Although different, the two substances have, in Lewis' view, a peculiarly close connection and involvement with each other. We know this ourselves by the way we experience the physical world, and most particularly in our sensations. These are communicated to us through the physical world and are received, understood and responded to in our minds.

The experience of the world through sense data made Descartes describe his apprehension of himself, his mind and his body together, as being mixed up:

Nature also teaches by these sensations of pain, hunger and thirst, etc., that I am not present in my body merely as a pilot is present in a ship; I am most tightly bound to it and as it were mixed up with it, so that I and it form a unit. Otherwise, when the body is hurt, I who am simply a conscious being, would not feel pain on that account, but would perceive the injury by a pure act of understanding, as the pilot perceives by sight any breakages there may be in the ship; and when the body needs food or drink, I should explicitly understand the fact, and not have confused sensations of hunger and thirst. (7)

If this is what Descartes really wants to say about how we experience the physical world then his assertion that the mind is a thing that thinks must include the idea of the mind as a thing that experiences. Also, by describing the mind as 'a thing that experiences', Lewis does not appear to be correcting Descartes, (8) and, contrary to what Dunbar contends, appears to be merely redefining Descartes' position and making it clearer to contemporary readers - admittedly by a different use of language. Descartes undoubtedly believes that the mind is a thing which is intimately bound to the body, at least in all that it experiences of the world, if not in its individual ratiocination.

Sensation appears to be vital in the understanding of the relationship between body and mind. The great quantity and variety of sense data which the mind receives must be communicated through the body in some

way and if this channel or connection can be illustrated and explained we will have gone some way towards understanding the peculiar dynamics of the mind-body relationship. Lewis notes that Descartes had a few problems (which were never really resolved) associated with smells and colours, which with the aid of the many scientific advances since Descartes' day should no longer present difficulties, but he does not focus on these particular and often difused sensations. Pain is both common and memorable and furthermore is a more important issue and can therefore be effectively used as a focus for an explanation of mind and body - and this Lewis attempts to do.

Whereas Descartes uses the illustration of a pilot in a ship, Lewis uses that of a taxi driver in his cab to make this point. Unlike a taxi and its driver our minds do not simply control our bodies from a distance in some mechanistic way, and equally our bodies are not foreign to us - we do not survey them for evidence of pain. Pain is not experienced as affecting anything other than our 'selves'. There is nothing closer to a person than his pain. It is impossible to separate a person from his pain, because in a very real sense the pain is his - he is in pain - nothing else. Although we experience pain 'in' one particular part of the body it is not simply the body which is in pain. In the experience of pain we normally associate ourselves with our bodies, Lewis would contend, and the pain we experience is usually most intimately associated with ourselves, although it may be focussed in one or more parts of the body.

It is clear that Lewis does not want to say that dualism requires a tenuous link between our bodies and minds; they are not connected by some spectral umbilical cord; our experience of pain indicates that they are much closer than that, but, having said this, Lewis is also careful to point out that the relationship between mind and body is not one where we can take the further step of reducing ourselves strictly to our perceptions and sensations; that would be a mistake. For Lewis the evidence of self-knowledge - the fact that I always know that I exist without the need for external evidence - goes contrary to the conclusion that 'I' am my perceptions. It is the same 'I' who has had all these successive experiences and in that sense we are 'bound' to our sensations, whether they be of pain or of pleasure. Thus the situation which persists in the relationship of mind and body has for Lewis no strict parallel. My thoughts, sensations, experiences are mind because 'I' have them. But my mind is none of these. In fact, (according to Lewis) our minds are no more dependant upon our

experiences than the external world is dependent upon our perceiving it.

To return to the example of pain; Lewis would assert that there can be no meaning attached to pain unless it is 'I' who experiences it. 'Floating pain' ⁽⁸⁾ is an incoherent concept. We may be in doubt or mistaken about the exact whereabouts and extent of our injuries but we can be in no doubt that it is we who are in pain. Also because sensation and pain are essentially private there is a way in which other persons are a 'radical mystery' ⁽⁹⁾ to us. We cannot have the same knowledge of someone else and their sensations as we have of ourselves. Although pain behaviour is one thing and being in pain another, we can ascribe to others an experience of pain, because there is nothing to suggest to us that others do not have the same awareness of themselves as we have. We should take the behaviour of others seriously, and should use it as a clue to what is actually being experienced by them. The body in this sense, Lewis would say, is a 'mirror' ⁽¹⁰⁾ of the soul. It may be imperfect in its reflection, even cracked, but nevertheless conveying in many ways what a person is actually experiencing and feeling at any one time. There is a sense, however, in which we remain a mystery; it is no good asking us to describe our thoughts by giving their physical correlates (except in a very metaphorical sense) because these descriptions do not exhaust our thoughts. We can only ask how long we have been thinking because, although the soul remains unchanged through time and its thoughts have no location in space, they are still 'in' time.

In his discussions, Lewis clearly believes that the soul is 'outside' of space but 'in' time, giving continuity, co-ordination and order to the objective realities of experience. In fact in a review of I. T. Ramsey's Freedom and Immortality, which first appeared in the Hibbert Journal ⁽¹¹⁾ and then again as a chapter in Lewis' Freedom and History, Lewis criticises Ramsey for his suggestion that the soul transcends both time and space. As he says:

Some misgiving is caused also by the description of a free decision as 'spatio-temporal and more'. That a choice is not just an occurrence in space is plain. But all our conduct is surely temporal. We may also be said in some senses to transcend time, in memory for instance and in anticipation of the future. (But there seems nothing here peculiar to important decisions or ethical choice)... we must beware of presenting this in terms that take us back again to the notion of a timeless self. ⁽¹²⁾

If Lewis believes the soul is not restricted to space but is conditioned by time, what view of space-time does this presuppose? And, more particularly, what particular view of time does Lewis hold which does not require some sort of change - if the soul is in time but does not change? Is there nothing analogous to physical growth in which the soul participates? Or is the soul a container which becomes fuller and fuller as we get older and gain more experience and information? All these along with other questions which arise will have to be considered later in the chapter.

Although Lewis does believe that some of the problems associated with Descartes' approach do need removing (though these may exist more from mistakes in the interpretation of Descartes rather than being philosophical errors) he is in fundamental agreement with the Cartesian approach to the relationship between body and mind. Descartes was not an occasionalist like some of his later followers, who believed that there was no real connection between mind and body, just some sort of psycho-physical parallelism. Occasionalists believe that the only reason that the activities of mind and body do concur is that they were initiated - 'wound up' - at the same time by God and continue in parallel under normal circumstances, until the end of physical life. Neither was Descartes an epiphenomenalist; he did not believe that the mind was bound to the physical changes of the body. If it were, it would only appear that we will things to happen with our minds, the truth being that things are done to our minds by the outside world. Descartes, and now latterly Lewis, holds rather an 'interactionist' view, because he believed that the material world affects the mind largely through the body, which we call our own, and the mind, in turn, affects the body and through that the rest of the world.

However, metaphorical descriptions which attempt to illuminate the relationship between the body and mind invariably break down. Metaphors like 'having' (a mind) and 'being related to' (my body) are, for Lewis, largely inappropriate except where they are used in a general sense. In trying to walk the tightrope between making the mind reducible to its experiences and making it so abstract and unrelated to the physical world that he begins to lay himself open to the dangers of solipsism, Lewis, like Descartes before him, seems able only to use negative metaphors - the soul is not like a taxi driver in his cab and it is not like a pilot in a ship.

Privacy of thought and private access to our own thoughts is another

building block in Lewis' approach. In Philosophy of Religion ⁽¹³⁾ and more particularly in The Elusive Mind ⁽¹⁴⁾ Lewis, mainly in opposition to Ryle, establishes the importance of private access to thoughts and thereby access (though not objective access) to our own mind. The self may elude empirical investigation but it is not a mystery. It is unobservable but remains knowable. The self is not known obliquely but directly. But the ²very notion of 'looking' for the self is mistaken; Hume's comment that whenever he looks for himself he always 'trips' ⁽¹⁵⁾ on some perception or other, is wide of the mark. We are mistaken if we undertake the enterprise of looking for our 'selves'. Introspection as such is only useful in discovering the way we feel or think about something, not in observing our minds. In The Self and Immortality, Lewis gives two examples of the difficulty of observing ourselves, to which I have briefly alluded at the beginning of the chapter:

... if we pause in the course of some activity, or of something we undergo, like a feeling of anger or fear, this affects the course of that activity itself and we do not therefore have a fair expression of it.

(If I were to try to observe myself writing now, I would either have to slow down and therefore disturb my 'flow' or end up writing gobbledegook).

...the Self as subject can never observe itself as an object for it is always essentially subject.

Looking for the self is not only impossible but may deflect someone away from the self's essential nature. This seeking and looking for the self may, therefore, result in further problems, not least the problem of continuous identity. The problem of continuous identity only arises because of the confusion which is caused by philosophers (and lay persons) looking for their 'selves', as if they were objects of perception like other things. If we recognised that we are our 'selves' at this moment none of these problems would arise. It seems fairly clear where Lewis is leading but it is probably worth letting him have the opportunity to speak for himself. If we ask him 'How do we know ourselves?' he replies:

The answer is that the self, far from being a mysterious reality behind the scenes is in fact what we know best. But we know it in a very special way in the very fact of being it and having the experience we do have, including the activities we ourselves initiate ⁽¹⁶⁾.

(We know ourselves simply by being ourselves - no more, no less) .

Lewis' approach to individual agency is again dictated by his dualism

and, again, is largely expressed in opposition to other approaches. In the same way that thought is fundamentally private, so too are those bases for activity which are revealed in motivation and intention. Intention belongs to the invisible and private realm of the mind which for Lewis is self-existent and self-explanatory. When this process of thought or intention is linked to the body then intention is made manifest. This is not meant to relegate the body to a less important position than that which it should hold. As we have seen, Lewis is at pains to stress the importance of the body - at least until we die. He says in The Elusive Self:

No one seriously denies that under the conditions which we know, there are persistent and vital physical conditions of all mental states and processes. Our bodies have the utmost importance, at least for all our present existence... (17)

But however important the body remains, the mind appears to be primary in all that would normally be considered to make up personal existence, including volitional activity. Involuntary nervous twitches and unintended spasms by definition could not be included in the category of volitional activity. Lewis notes one interesting parallel between intentions and perception: intention like perception requires 'meaning'. Sensory perception relies not simply on what the retina receives, but on the associations and resultant meaning which the mind constructs on the basis of the received data. Likewise, intention has its foundation in 'meaning', since intention implies that at the root of activity there is some meaning. This meaning need not, it is true, be rational or even founded on any objective physical fact, but still this meaning, which again is largely private, remains at the core of all volitional activity. Because meaning is essentially private and personal, the motivation and intention for any given activity may not be self-evident.

Lewis would say that although there are some subconscious effects which the mind has on the body which may result in someone's heart beating faster or in someone looking pale or flushed, the most important and normal way a body is changed is by willing or intending a change. The change in the body must in turn bring about a change in the world, so for a person to change his environment in some way he must first bring about a change in his body. As all agency and intention is inextricably bound to the existence of the mind (in relationship to the body) it is possible for Lewis to make sense of a number of philosophical problems, such as; freedom of choice and decision making aesthetic appreciation and artistic creation. However, although Lewis is undoubtedly interested in these areas (particularly freedom) he does not make an effort to discuss them.

Lewis states many of his arguments in opposition to Gilbert Ryle, who, consistent with his slogan of 'one world not two', rejects the approach of Cartesian dualism and its interpretation of human agency. In The Concept of Mind, Ryle says that the Cartesian approach to volition and human agency is dependent on two activities, one mental and one physical. For each volitional act, states Ryle, there appears to be some ghostly counterpart in the mind which shows the body what to do. Ryle seems to be saying that the body reacts much in the way that a student dancer copies the movements of the teacher whom he can see reflected in the mirror - if the teacher lifts his foot the student lifts his foot.

Lewis would contend that not only has Ryle misrepresented Descartes and other dualists like himself, he has also missed the point. He has 'pigeon-holed' mental and physical events into separate categories; and this is in no way justified. Like Descartes, Lewis believes that all volitional activity is one event - one activity - but with two (inseparable) component parts: like two cogs moving by their interlocking teeth, one cog being physical and corporeal, and the other mental and non-corporeal. The mental component which is non-observable and non-spatial is still temporal and is therefore linked to the temporal existence of the body (though not to its spatial extension). Lewis would say that the mind and body may be in two different categories or have two different natures but they combine in activity to produce a single event, not two.

To this criticism Lewis adds a final 'Parthian shot': Ryle seems unable to see the moral issue. Praise and blame, freedom and volition are all tied up in activity, and Ryle, in Lewis' view, has not properly accounted for them. This same point has been expressed in similar terms by J. R. Lucas in his paper 'The Soul' ⁽¹⁸⁾ and it remains one of the major criticisms of Ryle's approach to activity and volition.

In The Elusive Mind Lewis goes on to criticise Ryle's famous argument for 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. In that argument Ryle reverses the generally accepted approach to knowledge which he believes is based upon the 'Cartesian myth' and suggests that knowing how to do a particular activity is primary in human knowledge and agency. It comes before knowing that anything is the case; and he gives various examples of enterprises where knowing how seems to be primary: playing football, playing chess or exercising a natural wit. To this Lewis responds by saying that even knowing how to play football or playing chess has a mental component.

Any skilled activity, if it is volitional, must have a mental process which is appropriate to it. Lewis would argue that Ryle is too simplistic and too ready to impose his presuppositions on any other approach. Mental processes are not, as Ryle mistakenly thinks, isolable events which can be timed, but are processes which are constantly changing, flowing from consciousness to subconsciousness and back again.

Obviously Lewis sees Ryle as one if not the most important opponent to his position as a dualist. It seems that Lewis is almost always prepared to devote some space in his books to a defence of the dualist position from the arguments of Ryle - particularly those in The Concept of Mind, where he states his belief that Descartes was the founding father of the 'official doctrine' as Ryle calls it, which is the popular and misguided approach to personal existence and the basis of the dualism which is in common currency. Lewis, as we have seen, agrees and supports Descartes' approach in almost every way. It is therefore not surprising that there is a tendency in Lewis' work towards a confrontation with the Rylean view.

In The Concept of Mind, Ryle describes how he intends to deal with the 'Cartesian myth' :

I shall often speak of it with deliberate abusiveness as the 'dogma of the Ghost in the Machine'. I hope to prove that it is entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle. It is not merely an assemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is namely a category mistake. (19)

The idea of category mistake is at the very heart of Ryle's thesis.. The mistake was not obvious in Ryle's view, because it appeared to be a part of the normal vocabulary used to describe a person. The sort of mistake he is talking about is one like the one contained in the sentence: 'the house was painted in warm colours'. Only if this sentence is reduced to its components parts does the real conceptual problem become apparent; how can a colour be warm? True, it may evoke a feeling similar to that experienced when a person is warm, but that is not the same thing, the colour itself is not warm. Terms such as 'thinking', 'knowing' and 'believing', when used in sentences which involve an inference of two entities (body and soul) within a person, are category mistakes of the same order.

Ryle illustrates category mistakes superbly (as he does many other

points) by using a story. This is the now famous illustration of the visitor to Oxford who, after having seen all the ancient buildings and Colleges, asked if he could be shown the University. The mistake is found in the visitor not recognising that there was nothing else to see - no other category, no further entity - which could be seen and which could be called the University. Likewise with persons there is no unseen category, no unperceived substance which further describes and defines a person.

With the recognition of this category mistake Ryle was able to go on to explain his approach to covert and overt human activity. These Ryle described in terms of dispositions which constitute a liability or tendency to do or to fail to do certain things in particular circumstances. Because these dispositions are tied to circumstance and result in certain behaviour, it follows that such behaviour is predictable. This predictability gives us what Ryle calls an 'inference ticket', which may lead to law-like statements about behaviour. Ryle, as William Lyons points out in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Gilbert Ryle, appears to substitute behavioural dispositions for Cartesian mental activities and substance. (20)

In his attempt to turn the tables on Ryle, Lewis shows that category mistakes are as big a problem for Ryle's approach as for that of Descartes. Lewis points out that Ryle's insistence in The Concept of Mind on being shown a mental event, or evidence of a relationship between mind and body, is just such a mistake. Ryle appears to be expecting that mental realities should be investigated in the same way as physical realities and therefore be brought to the bar of empirical investigation. In Lewis' view, mind is not material, it is not even specially refined material, and it is a category mistake to treat it as though it were. The category mistake is best illustrated in the sort of language Ryle uses to describe the dualist position. He writes in his introduction to The Concept of Mind:

Some would prefer to say that every human being is both body and mind. His body and mind are ordinarily harnessed together, after death of the body his mind may continue to exist and function.

To this particular passage Lewis responds directly:

The term 'harnessed' as used is significant. It is hard to avoid some metaphor in describing the relation of mind and body. But it is revealing that, at the very outset, Professor Ryle should be using a metaphor which suggests very strongly that he is thinking of mental processes, as envisaged in the Cartesian position, as

closely analogous material ones or, as he later affirms to be the case, duplicates of them. (21)

In The Elusive Mind he again expresses this point and suggests that the mind and its relationship to the body is unique and not available to empirical investigation. In Lewis' view therefore it is a serious category mistake to expect it to behave as physical material, and this mistake is sufficiently large to put in jeopardy Ryle's whole thesis, and virtually to discount his criticism of Cartesian dualism.

As well as this Lewis is quick to castigate Ryle for his ridicule of Descartes. He contends that it is unjust to blame and ridicule Descartes for being misguided by the science available to him in placing the precise area of interaction between the mind and body in the pineal gland, between the two brain hemispheres. Also the criticism levelled by Ryle at Descartes' use of language and particularly his negative mechanistic language is again unjust because these were the only tools available to him at the time. Lewis concludes that if these sorts of problems are overlooked, as they should be, then Descartes' basic approach, including a fundamental distinction between mind and body, and self-knowledge, based upon an indisputable recognition of our own existence, are very convincing.

Lewis obviously does not value much of Ryle's work as he says:

...Professor Ryle declares that he intends to proceed with 'deliberate abusiveness', and I think that in this at least he undoubtedly succeeds. (21)

Furthermore, Lewis sharpens his attack on materialists like Ryle in The Elusive Self, where he questions why they bother constructing arguments at all, because these are undoubtedly intended to change our minds and modify our behaviour which in theory are predictable and are dictated by dispositions and tendencies:

Indeed it is hard to understand the zest and even pride with which some severe materialists press their case when this itself involves the repudiation of the force of argument as such to modify the cause of our thinking... Sooner or later we have a reductio ad absurdum of the desperate repudiation of what is so obvious a fact of experience. (23)

It seems that in Ryle and Lewis we have two irreconcilable positions based upon different presuppositions and epistemologies. They seem to act as if they were two explorers who come across a new creature as yet unknown to science. The creature walks, hears,

sees, talks and seems to answer the questions of the explorers intelligently. Although both are excited about their new find they both interpret what they have found in completely different ways. One suggests the creature is an as yet undiscovered breed of animal, which is extremely intelligent. The other sees no reason for describing it as anything but a person, perhaps even a lost branch of the human race.

It has been seen that Lewis finds little to commend in the views of empiricists like Ryle. This is to some extent also true of other approaches to personal existence in general which do not in some way enshrine traditional dualism. Minimal dualists like P. F. Strawson are not free from criticism. In his book Individuals, Strawson suggests that we can know other minds through observing someone's behaviour because, being fundamentally simple creatures, our thoughts are expressed in our bodily states. For Lewis this is obviously too close to Ryle's position which denies any distinct mental category and therefore argues for a behavioural understanding of human personality. Lewis responds to Strawson in much the same way as he does to Ryle, by arguing that we are essentially private in our thoughts and although we can make ourselves known through our bodies we do not have to and refrain from doing so if we so wish. Noting the trend of his own argument and the possibility of criticism, Lewis is quick to parry any suggestions that might accuse him of a tendency towards solipsism, by affirming the importance of the body for communication both received and given.

Before we move on to criticise Lewis' approach there are two important areas in Lewis' thesis which should be covered and even this will leave others (which, to be sure, are of less importance) such as 'dreaming' and 'history' undiscussed. These two areas are 'memory' and 'immortality'. For Lewis memory has a close connection with identity. Memory of past events seems to establish a continuity of identity. Memory of a past event or experience and reflection upon the present establish that it is the same subject of experience then as now: the person I remember having experiences in the past is the same person experiencing now - that is, me. Lewis goes on to suggest in both The Elusive Self and The Self and Immortality that memory is the most important criterion in establishing continuous identity. By re-creating the past by our remembrance of it we find that we are the same person then as now. Activities and events which are remembered always have 'us' placed in then or in relation to them. Even poorly remembered or previously unremembered events can be slotted into the overall picture of our past because our identities are already established. In the case of memory loss, or even total amnesia, however, identity may still be established, because, Lewis

points out, I am still myself now! Therefore, identity is heavily dependent upon memory for the establishment of continuity throughout our lives, but is not dependent upon it in the final and complete sense, because identity is both self-existent and self-explanatory.

So that we are clear what it is he is saying, Lewis unpacks his approach to memory. He suggests that there are two fundamental types of memory. The first is a memory of some fact: 'I remember the date of the Battle of Hastings.' The second involves a memory of myself in relation to the event 'I remember my breakfast.' The second of these two types of memory is the more important for the establishment of identity. As we have seen, continuity of identity for Lewis depends on the relationship of a person to his remembered experience and also the relationship of that experience to other events, both past and present.

The second area that should be covered is that of immortality. Lewis' approach to immortality originates in his approach to personal existence and is therefore less of a 'building block' and more of an application of his overall thesis. Lewis recognises the heavy dependence which his view has on his dualism when he says:

I do not think that any case for immortality can begin to get off the ground if we fail to make a case for dualism. (24)

At the beginning of The Self and Immortality, Lewis spells out what appears to be the one certainty of human existence - we will all die. But if the evidence for the existence of the soul is tenable and his arguments are acceptable, Lewis would argue that he has the answer for the continuation of the self beyond death. The self is not dependent upon the body for its existence and therefore could, in theory at any rate, continue after the dissolution of the body. His approach to persons, who comprise two distinct and disparate parts, leads Lewis to postulate a form of disembodied existence in a life after death of the body. Picking up on some of H. H. Price's ideas of disembodied existence, Lewis speculates that any non-physical future existence could continue with:

- (1) No continued existence in physical space, but continued existence in time.
- (2) Communication between disembodied souls by telepathy.
- (3) The possibility of existence in an 'image world' with an 'image body' created either by God or by each individual's mental perception of himself, which is projected and communicates to others telepathically.

- (4) Memory of past life which would provide reference material for new life, including the 'image world' and 'image body'.

Resurrection seems, for Lewis, both impossible and unnecessary; it is impossible because there is no way that the body can be reconstituted after its dissolution and decay; and unnecessary because persons are essentially mental substances and the body is not required in any definition of the self. Persons described in terms of the mind or soul means that the body can be removed without any ill effects being experienced by the self. Only if the body is in some way synonymous with, or important for, the description of a person is resurrection after death necessary.

Some of Lewis' critics have suggested that disembodied existence seems rather rarefied and unattractive and compares unfavourably with our present existence. Also they point out that the problems of solipsism seem very great in an existence which is totally dependent upon the mind. To these and other objections Lewis suggests that we cannot fully appreciate the opportunities and qualities which such an existence offers. However, the critics remain and most object, not simply to his views on future existence, but to his dualism. If Lewis is successful in his arguments for the existence of the mind/self/soul then his position on disembodied existence seems secure. If this is the case then it is important to move to a criticism of Lewis' approach to personal existence and an examination of whether his arguments hold up.

From the summary of Lewis' thesis a number of questions would seem to arise: Does Lewis' interpretation and development of the basic evidence of an individual's self-awareness exclude all others? Is Cartesian interactionism the best expression of dualism? Are his basic assumptions and arguments which form the foundation of his approach correct? Of these questions the last is probably the most important, because from it arise many (if not all) of the answers to the other questions. This chapter has so far attempted to provide an overview of Lewis' arguments for the existence of the soul and his application of the fundamental distinction between body and soul. But are there major weaknesses, and if there are, where are they to be found?

If Lewis were asked the question: What is the position of the soul in space and time? He would answer by saying that the soul or the mind is not in space but in time. That is, he would argue that our experience of ourselves leads us to the conclusion that our minds are temporal but logic leads us to conclude that they are not spatial. We experience a succession

of thoughts but are unable to place the mind in any place - the mind has no spatial properties at all. This, of course, is consistent with the idea that the soul is a non-physical substance which is nevertheless related to our bodies through their temporal interactions. If the body and soul are to interact at all it is clear that the idea of a temporal soul would help. This understanding of the relationship between body and soul is at the heart of Lewis' criticism of I. T. Ramsey who in his book Freedom and Immortality, argues for a mind which transcends both space and time. Lewis does not wish to return to the platonic notion of a timeless self because he believes that it is beset by philosophical problems. The problems would fall into two main areas. First, a timeless self would make the link between body and mind very tenuous. Arguments for the existence of the soul could not rely on any evidence other than some sort of shared individual apprehension, which might easily fall into conjecture and speculation. Also this would create an opportunity for the spectres of occasionalism and epiphenomenalism to raise their ugly heads, and for Lewis neither is acceptable. Secondly, and for Lewis probably more important, the idea of a timeless self seems to run contrary to the evidence of experience. Our thoughts do succeed one another, they can be timed, we can say what we thought a minute ago and what we think now. Our experience is successive and appears in some way to be tied to our bodily temporality. But this is not true of any special continuity. The mind, it would seem, cannot be placed anywhere in space - if it could, then it would be available to our senses and to science and would no longer remain an empirical mystery. But there is a serious problem here. If the mind is in time and not in space then two things must be true: time and space must be distinct and separable (not just in theory but in fact) and time as distinct from space must provide an acceptable environment for the soul.

Is it possible to separate space and time? On the face of it there seems no problem. We all know that within our everyday experience the 'time' that we work to, the time on our wrist-watches, has no direct relation to our position in space. However, it would seem that modern physics, based very much on a single model of the universe provided by Einstein, would deny the possibility of any separation of the two. The use of phrases like 'space-time' and 'spatio-temporal' have been drawn from the scientific world and themselves testify to the common understanding of the relationship between space and time. It is worth noting some of the background to this contention that space and time are inseparable.

Sir Isaac Newton produced a view of the universe which postulated that it was dominated, and in many ways determined, by the two constants of space and time. Space was three dimensional and provided the 'container' for all that occurred. The universal container though infinite was still a container or a 'receptacle' ⁽²⁵⁾ and as such was a constant and fixed. Time was also constant, it was the continual flow of change and motion within the universe which flowed at a fixed rate and as such could be measured. In some ways it was the numbering of before and after. This explanation of time gave rise to the common illustration of time being like a river constantly flowing through the present from the past into the future with all things carried along as vessels in its strong current. Having described the universe, Newton was then able to presentproof for his view of thermodynamics which seemed to be unalterable and always true. Newton was not alone in promulgating such an approach, but gave it its fullest and most systematic treatment and thereby provided an invaluable legacy for the modern era. It would be thoroughly consistent with this approach to separate space and time and on that basis H. D. Lewis would seem to have support for his view of a temporal but non-spatial soul.

If it were not for Albert Einstein, Lewis would have no problems. Einstein has given supreme expression to the relational view of space and time. His meditation upon four-dimensional geometry led him to reject the absolute and universal constants of time and space and caused him to postulate a universe which was thoroughly relative. Space and time are relative to one another and also to the position of the experiencer. In some senses Einstein has provided a scientific interpretation of Humean empiricism and epistemology. He, unlike many of his predecessors, developed the importance of the individual in his model of the universe. Einstein stands at the head of a tradition of thought which finds its earliest roots in Plato ⁽²⁶⁾, who influenced the Early Church Fathers to adopt a relational view of the universe. The view that was later reinterpreted in the work of Huygens and Leibnitz. ⁽²⁷⁾ Space and time are, according to Einstein, two of the fundamental components of the universe but as such are not constants but functions of one another. An illustration first told by Einstein which has since had almost as many versions as tellers will, I hope, suffice to explain what relative space and time means.

In this illustration there are three men. Two men are standing on top of a train, one near the front, one near the back. The third man is some

way off, standing on a hillside watching the train journey across the plain below. Suddenly the train is struck by two bolts of lightning. One strikes the first carriage on which one of the men is standing, the other strikes the train at the back - on the carriage on which the second man is standing. To both men on the train it seems that the lightning struck simultaneously. The man on the hillside, however, notices from his position that the lightning was not simultaneous but the lightning which struck the front of the train was marginally before the bolt that struck the back of the train. Also the concomitant thunder which would have appeared to the men on the train to be simultaneous with the lightning would reach the man on the hillside some time after he saw the lightning strike. The timing of these events would be relative to the positions of the observers, all the events could be timed but it would depend on where you were as to when the events would seem to have happened. Time is relative to space and vice versa. Also both are relative to the individual observer.

Even in our daily experience space and time are found to be inextricably linked together and relative to one another. If I look out of the window the visual images seem to have an observable position in space relative to myself. But these visual images also have a position in time. The images arrive at my retina at the speed of light which although very fast does take some time. That time is dictated by the distance between myself and the objects. Sensation other than sight also bears out this approach. If I close my eyes and measure the length of the table with my fingers the process takes time. Spatial dimensions are relative to temporal conditions. The distance between two points is conditioned as much by the time it takes to travel (even at the speed of light)⁽²⁸⁾ between them as it is by the measurement in metres - measurement of distance is itself temporally conditioned. This understanding of space-time lies at the heart of post-Einsteinian physics. It would seem impossible simply to separate space and time because the one cannot be described without the other. The only justification for a separation in our language is one of convenience and to facilitate further discussion, otherwise it would seem that the universe is a single complex space-time continuum.

Why does Lewis believe he can separate space and time into two separate entities? He never explains why, he simply assumes it is possible. It would seem that Lewis is dependent for his interpretation of the interaction between the body and soul on an outmoded Newtonian/Classical model of space and time. Lewis' whole approach is dependent upon the possibility

of doing this it must cause serious problems for Lewis' argument. If time cannot be separated from space in the way that Lewis requires, he will be forced either to reject the model of space-time which denies any separation of the two, or to rethink his interpretation of the body-soul dynamic. If he rejects Einsteinian physics he runs the risk of losing any credibility which he might have had. Could Lewis find a new way to express the body-soul interaction? Is it possible that Lewis could find a way out of this dilemma without rejecting Einsteinian physics? There seem only three possible solutions. First, Lewis could describe the soul in terms of space and time. But this would mean that it is available to normal investigation and not simply to philosophical speculation. Secondly, Lewis could postulate a different sort of time which was not tied to the temporality of the body and therefore relative to space, but a 'soul-time'. This is possible. Einstein would not say that his approach excluded all others in every circumstance. But there would be problems in explaining the exact relationship between soul-time and space-time since it would seem to complicate an approach which Lewis has said to be simple and straightforward and not complex. Thirdly, Lewis could jettison the whole approach of a temporal soul and assert with I. T. Ramsey that it transcends the normal conditions of space and time. Maybe a non-temporal soul would after all be palatable to Lewis - especially if he faced the possibility of losing all credibility. Lewis' failure to explain what he means by a 'temporal soul' may have resulted in the development of a fatal flaw in his approach.

There is another question which one might ask: Is Lewis over-simplistic in his approach to personal existence? Lewis seems to pride himself in the straightforwardness of his views, but is he neglecting things which he should consider in the formulation of his arguments? One area in which this seems to be true is that of memory. Memory, as Lewis recognises, is one of the fundamental mental faculties of a person, but has he ignored some notions of memory which we could justifiably have expected him to have considered? In The Elusive Self Lewis does try, apparently successfully, to meet the challenge of the sort of causal memory that Professor Richard Wolheim offers (29) But there is another sort of memory - another facet of the mental faculty we call memory to which Lewis has not addressed himself.

Scott Dunbar in his article 'The Concept of Self: Some Reflections on H.D. Lewis' 'The Self and Immortality' (30) which has been referred to previously, suggests that Lewis does not recognise the importance, or it would seem the existence, of any subconscious or unarticulated memory,

which Dunbar suggests has a real effect on our lives. This is shown in the way that subconscious memories or unrecognised perceptions affect our activity. Dunbar illustrates his argument by using a personal example from his own experience. He explains:

Several years ago I was given a water-colour, by a friend who is a painter. The picture, a still-life, has hung in my sitting room with other paintings, since I received it. About two years ago I decided to buy some new dishes for everyday use. I had in mind plates with a simple green border. Yet it seemed impossible to find the dishes I wanted. And I had almost reconciled myself to continue to live with the dishes I have been using for years. One day I happened to go into a local shop, and was immediately attracted by a particular plate on display. Happily, the plate was one of a set of dishes; I bought them, brought them home, and immediately put them to use. Some months later, I had a friend to dinner, and later in the evening he asked if he might look at my paintings. I began to look at the paintings with him, and discovered that the plate in the still-life was very similar, if not identical, to plates we had used at dinner. How are we to understand these occurrences? One might say that the similarity between the plate in the picture and the one I saw in the shop, and later bought, was a rare, but nonetheless simple, coincidence. Or one might say, as I would myself say, that one can and sometimes does unconsciously remember and recollect, and that this is an instance of it. (31)

Many people, it would seem, can testify to this sort of thing taking place where they are unconsciously influenced to do or think something. But is it the sort of thing that happens rarely or is it sufficiently frequent and important for us to draw conclusions from it? Those working in the mainstream of the behavioural sciences taking their lead from Freud, Jung and Erikson, would certainly contend that our present behaviour, habits and tendencies, have a very real foothold in the past and that, although often unrecognised, everyone is dependent upon the subconscious levels of the mind to a great extent. Freudian psychologists would say that the 'id' and 'superego' certainly affect us and that our behaviour is rooted in the memories and images built up in these various levels of our psyche from birth onwards. Although Dunbar's 'unconscious memory' may not be

directly associated with Freudian 'id' and 'superego', he still seems to be saying that we must not expect human beings to act and think in response to conscious memory and perception and to find their motivation for activity in the simple facts of their present existence. Lewis seems invariably to take the straightforward and simple approach to a number of things. Although this is often refreshing and stimulating it can at times lead to an over-simplistic view of the way things are. Lewis gives no attention to innate or subconscious tendencies and memories in personal existence. He does not seem to recognise that we are also both unconscious and sub-conscious beings and that we are more available to our subliminal levels of consciousness than we often recognise. Why this is true of Lewis is something of a mystery. Perhaps he fears the deterministic flavour of a lot of modern psychology or perhaps it is too close to some of the things that Ryle has said from which he appears still to be smarting. What is sure, however, is that by leaving this area almost entirely unconsidered, Lewis leaves little room in his arguments for a more developmental approach to human identity. Can we be sure that we are not continually redefining ourselves in terms of our past and present? Is it not possible that unconscious unarticulated memories and images build up layer by layer to mould the people we are? Individuation, the process whereby a person grows and develops to become what they are in the present, seems to provide a rather more dynamic approach to personal existence than Lewis' static categories of body and mind. Maybe perception or apprehension of one's own individuality does lead to some form of dualism. Perhaps Lewis is correct in suggesting that self-knowledge does lead to the recognition of some sort of 'mind', but has he provided the best model? Does his argument for a 'temporal mind' make sense in a post-Einsteinian era? It would seem that in his attempt to rescue dualism from the ravages of empiricism Lewis has become too closely associated with a theory of body and mind which is unable to cope with the modern interpretations of the physical and behavioural sciences. Lewis' idea of discovering our present identities and his basic evidence of self-knowledge and our recognition of ourselves as subjects of experience does seem justified. But the jump that he then makes to Cartesian dualism seems totally unjustified. In itself this might be defensible but not on grounds that it is a logical progression from one point to the next.

NOTES

Chapter 2

1. I. T. Ramsey, 'The Systematic Elusiveness of "I"' in his Christian Empiricism (Sheldon Press, 1974) .
2. See I. T. Ramsey, Freedom and Immortality (S.C.M., 1960) p.94 .
3. Thomas Nagel, who approaches this subject from a different direction from Lewis, has expressed similar thoughts in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, 1979): see especially chapter 'What is it like to be a bat' .
4. H. D. Lewis, The Self and Immortality (Macmillan, 1971); see particularly p.115.
5. S. Dunbar, 'The concept of self: Some reflections on H. D. Lewis' "The Self and Immortality"', Religious Studies, vol. 16, No. 1, 1980 .
6. H. D. Lewis, The Self and Immortality, p.20 .
7. R. Descartes, Descartes' Philosophical Writings, ed. by D. Anscombe and P. Geach (Nelson, 1954), p.117 .
8. See H. D. Lewis, The Self and Immortality, pp. 19 - 20.
9. H. D. Lewis, The Elusive Self (Macmillan, 1981), pp. 56 - 7.
10. H. D. Lewis, The Self and Immortality, p.137 .
11. Hibbert Journal, January 1961.
12. H. D. Lewis, Freedom and History (George, Allen and Unwin, 1962) p.305.
13. H. D. Lewis, Philosophy of Religion (Teach Yourself Books, University Press, 1965),chapter 24.
14. H. D. Lewis, The Elusive Mind, (Allen & Unwin, 1952), p.275.
15. D. Hume, An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature, 1760 (Langmans, Green & Co., 1938), bk. 1, pt. 4, sec. 6.
16. All quotations in this section from H. D. Lewis, The Self and Immortality, pp. 343 - 5.
17. H. D. Lewis, The Elusive Self, p.13.
18. J. R. Lucas, 'The soul', in Faith and Logic, ed. by B. Mitchell (Allen & Unwin, 1958).

Chapter 2 cont..

19. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Hutchinson's, University Library, 1949), p.15.
20. W. Lyons, Introduction to the Philosophy of Gilbert Ryle (1980).
21. H. D. Lewis, Philosophy of Religion, p.277. There is also an interesting parallel to the use of 'harnessed' as a metaphor of the connection between body and soul in Plato's Phaedrus 246 (The Library of Liberal Arts, 1956), p.28.
22. H. D. Lewis, Philosophy of Religion, p.276.
23. H. D. Lewis, The Elusive Self, p.18.
24. H. D. Lewis, Persons and Life After Death (Macmillan, 1978), p.131.
25. T. F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation (Oxford University Press, 1969), p.4.
26. See T. F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, pp. 4 ff.
27. Ibid., p.38.
28. Einstein discovered that light travelled at a constant speed. Therefore a beam of light from a moving object (however fast) would always travel at the same speed. This fact suggests that light is a constant. In fact, as it turns out, it is the only constant in the universe.
29. R. Wolheim, 'Memory: Experiential memory and personal identity', Perception and Identity, 1973.
30. S. Dunbar, 'The Concept of Self'.
31. Ibid., p.45.

CHAPTER 3

AN ALTERNATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PERSON

Section 1

The Octapoids resemble nothing which might be called human and yet they are intelligent creatures able to communicate, to plan for the future and reflect on the past. They also have a highly developed and sophisticated society and form intimate and long lasting relationships with one another. Nevertheless we and they are different and the main way in which we differ is in physical appearance and constitution. They look like rather benign dry-land octopuses (whence comes their name), with a great number of tentacles and a large bulbous body. They also have very peculiar flesh which on contact attaches itself to all sorts of things, including other octopoids. Having become stuck to something they are, for a short while, able to detach themselves quite easily from the things to which they have become attached, but if left too long the bond becomes firmer and the adhesion complete. Octapoids join themselves to all sorts of things. Often they become fond of particular places and their tentacles burrow deep into the ground and fix them to the spot - they call this 'putting down roots'. Others are more mobile and as an alternative to putting down roots become attached to small movable objects which they carry around with them. It is, however, with other Octapoids that they develop their strongest ties.

Having allowed a bond to develop an Octapoid need not remain stuck forever, but if they do separate themselves from something or someone it is not uncommon for their flesh to tear away leaving parts of their tentacles still attached.

As soon as they are born they start to stick to things. At first they form a union with their mother. This relationship is vital for the young Octapoids' security and health but soon the process of removing the tentacles one by one begins. As the child grows so the number of connections decreases until only one or two remain. Most of them make the step of initiating their gradual detachment successfully with only a little pain on either side. Others find it more difficult; some remain fully attached to their mothers throughout their lives, whilst others often leave large pieces of themselves behind or even take pieces away. It is said that you can sometimes see Octapoids carrying their mother's breast around with them, but these are shy creatures, rarely seen, who either disguise the fact or keep themselves from the public eye.

There are of course other important attachments that Octapoids must make if they are to grow into healthy normal adults, but many continue to believe that the one with their mother is the most important.

The process of attachment and detachment, making bonds and tearing away, is a slow and often painful affair, but there need be no ill effects. On the contrary, the Octapoids are able to replace their lost members very easily and in the process of forming bonds (both with other Octapoids and to some extent with places and things), disconnecting and regrowing severed parts, they grow in stature and physical maturity. In fact it might be said that this process is not only helpful but essential to their growth and development.

The problem is that the regrowth of their severed parts depends very much upon the Octapoids themselves. They can only replace parts as they remember them to have been. This creates complications. If the detached part is very large - like a whole tentacle - it is difficult for them to remember what it looked like before it became attached to something else. Because regrowth depends to a large extent upon memory this can create varying degrees of disability. Success in regrowth depends on how aware the Octapoid was of the precise nature of the union and on how fortunate they are in not losing a very large part of themselves. The most successful at this process grow to become the largest individuals. Some of these help the more severely disabled by encouraging them to recognise the way in which they form bonds and recall what their limbs would have looked like before their attachment was formed. In doing this the Octapoids are able to pull off their imperfect limbs and grow new ones. Unfortunately, the pain involved in this process deters many but there have been some remarkable results and some Octapoids who were once crippled find that they are again living and growing normally.

The illustration attempts to illuminate some parts of the process of psychological development by projecting some of the essential elements into a physical realm. The invented creatures exhibit in their physical attachment and detachment something which is important about the effect that personal relationships and our environment have upon our development and individuation. In the same way that it is in the formation, development, redefinition and loss of particular relationships which enable the Octapoids to grow, so it is in the forming, developing, redefining and losing of intellectual and emotional bonds that human beings grow as individuals. The illustration recognises that there are stages to psychological growth

and that this often means that one kind of relationship must either terminate or be replaced in order that others, which provide different things and sometimes less in the way of emotional nurturing and support, may be formed. The illustration also reveals the need to recognise that there is an equal importance in the redefinition and stage-like development of relationships as there is in the nurturing and security which a stable stage in a relationship may provide; there are opportunities for personal growth both in the fostering and in the redefinition of relationships.

Identity according to this view is not a static category, but is something which has its roots in our early life and experiences and is in a process of becoming.

This becoming is not merely a passive experience or for that matter a case of active initiation by another person, but is a complex of external effects and personal initiative. It is to be stressed that time is important in this process; we are indebted to our past and present for what we are now and will be in the future, and because development and individuation are so thoroughly related to the temporal process our identities develop and change. Time and change penetrate the deepest levels of our psyche.

Amongst the countless events, people and places which we have experienced in our lives there are some which are of particular importance. There are stages when dependency relationships, like that of the nursing couple or the adolescent and peer group, form the focus of our development. The mutual dependence, nurturing and fostering of these relationships is important but they do have a natural life and a limit beyond which their usefulness decreases. A stage is reached when the relationship requires development and redefinition; a suckling child must suffer the loss of the breast at some stage and the teenager the loss of an intimate group of peers. It is in these experiences that we are forced to face the need for a sense of autonomy, individual identity and independence. The bereavement experienced in the loss of a particular sort of relationship and its replacement by another can be traumatic, but can also offer new potential in our development.

In Evelyn Waugh's classic novel Brideshead Revisited there is an episode which illustrates this point. Charles Ryder, having invoked the wrath of Lady Marchmain is 'expelled' from Brideshead, maybe never to return again. With the doors of the house having been closed behind him, Ryder recalls how he felt:

I was unmoved: there was no part of me remotely touched by her distress. It was as I had often imagined being expelled from school. I almost expected to hear her say "I have already written to inform your unhappy father". But as I drove away and turned back in the car to take what promised to be my last view of the house, I felt that I was leaving part of myself behind, and there wherever I went afterwards I should feel the lack of it, and search for it hopelessly, as ghosts are said to do, frequenting the spots where they buried material treasures without which they cannot pay their way to the nether world. (1)

We have all experienced 'leaving part of ourselves behind' when we have suffered the loss of a relationship with a person or place. The approach offered in this chapter recognises the reality of that experience and builds upon the process of which these experiences are particular examples. Most of us perceive that certain particularly significant events can become life-changing periods in our lives; the contention in this chapter is that these intense experiences highlight a process which is common to us all.

It is clear that this approach is heavily dependent upon the behavioural sciences and more particularly on developmental psychology. However, it should be made clear that although references will be made to the approach of a number of major theories of developmental psychology no single understanding will be used exclusively. Also, although what is said in this chapter is in general based upon developmental psychology it is not intended that the particular approach to human existence and identity adopted here should stand or fall on any single theorist's understanding or interpretation, but rather the basic and general understanding that people are in a process of development and individuation. This is a widely shared view and it would take a major academic revolution to overthrow it. Therefore it is acknowledged that the thrust of the major models of human psychology provide much of the motive force to the arguments presented here. The method will not be to expand on these models but will be to draw out a line of argument, a strand of thought, which as it is drawn will be seen less as dependent on psychology and more on a particular philosophy of person. Therefore there will be no focus on psychological standpoints like those of behaviourism and psychoanalysis, or on mental illness, but, as the argument will draw upon psychology, some of the major models of psychological makeup and development which are consistent with this approach will be briefly introduced.

There are two fundamental models of human consciousness. Psychologists recognise that in accepting one they need not discount the other, because as models of individual consciousness they perform different roles, in fact, more often than not, they are held in parallel. The first model is basic to all modern psychology and is the Conscious-Subconscious-Unconscious model. What this model does is to divide the mind into three levels of operation. The boundaries between the levels are permeable and are characterised by their content and interaction. The conscious mind is described in terms of all the experiences of which we might say we are aware. A description of the subconscious mind would rest on those experiences of which we are not aware at this moment, but which could easily move into the conscious realm if motivated to do so. The unconscious mind contains instincts and drives, experiences and recollections which are deeply rooted in our past, and which do not often become available to our conscious mind in the normal course of events. Richard Lowe in his book The Growth of Personality has summarised these three levels very well when he says:

Taking you, the reader, as an example, your conscious mind consists of everything you are fully aware of at this moment; for example, this printed page. Your subconscious mind consists of those experiences which you are not aware of at this moment, but could become so if you wanted to ... Notice also that other people may, by drawing your attention to some current experience of which you are not fully aware, pull that experience into your conscious mind and make you fully aware of it. At this moment, for example, you are not fully aware of the taste in your mouth - but you are now Your unconscious mind contains all those experiences, impulses, drives and feelings of which you cannot become aware under ordinary circumstances(However) sometimes even in every day living our unconscious feelings may almost reach our conscious minds and indeed may distress or bewilder us when they do... Thus, when expecting unwelcome guests we might greet their arrival with "What, so soon?" instead of our intended "Ah, at last!" and on their departure blurt out "Ah, at last!" instead of "What, so soon?" (2)

The second model is one which divides the psyche into ego, superego and id. The ego is the name given to the awareness of self which we all have. In our use of 'I' and 'me' it is the ego to which we are usually referring. The superego is roughly parallel to what is commonly

described as our conscience and the id is the collection of instincts and drives which urge the self to immediate gratification. Again the distinction between the three parts is not open to a final definition because the boundaries are flexible and the three parts freely interact to create, control and initiate our response to the world. A simple example may serve to elucidate the interactions between the parts. If a person were hungry and saw a chocolate bar on a shop counter, the id, clamouring for fulfilment, would demand that the bar be taken and eaten. The superego would say 'No!', the chocolate bar is not 'ours', it is wrong to steal and as 'we' have no money 'we' will have to do without. The ego would be required to respond to this divergent counsel. The actual course of action often turns out to be some sort of compromise between the two conflicting forces - perhaps the person would find someone to lend him the money so that he could buy the chocolate bar.⁽³⁾ In a normal person the interactions between these three elements of our psyche would be in constant flux and would be well integrated into activity which was, as far as possible, pleasurable to the individual and acceptable to the prevailing social constraints.

Both of these models are very closely related and in many ways are parallel descriptions of individual psychological make-up. They both speak of a constant interchange of information from one level of our psyche to another, pointing towards a description of a person which is complex. Data is constantly flowing between the various parts and activity is not generated by a single mental intention but by many divergent, even contradictory, elements in our make-up. Another thing which both these models express very clearly is that consciousness, including activity and sensation, is only the tip of an iceberg. The largest tracts of our psyche are not constantly or consistently available to our conscious minds and very significant areas of our psychological apparatus lie beneath the surface of consciousness, uncharted and even unknown.

Another thing that the models presuppose is development. When a child is born he does not have a fully developed psychological framework, he is dictated to and his behaviour determined by the instincts and basic needs of survival. Only gradually does the framework begin to form and the child gain autonomy and identity. At first a child is totally dependent upon his mother, but gradually he learns independence and how to live without the particular security and physical sustenance which parents provide, and to provide for himself.

Until Erikson, psychological development was understood to continue

only to the end of childhood where many believe that it came to an almost complete halt. Freud was the main cause of this belief. His monumental contribution to psychology and psychiatry concentrated most of its attention on childhood. Most of the important stages were seen to take place in childhood and these became determinative for adult life. Erikson, who in his early years studied with Freud in Vienna, took the Freudian programme of personal development a stage further - into adult life. Through his social and biographical work Erikson came to realise that there were important stages which most people encountered after childhood. His strength was to accept much of the Freudian corpus but use it as a foundation for further investigation and explanation, not as a final and definitive statement. Erikson pictured life as a process of development from the cradle to the grave, with a major crisis about every decade or so. The phrase 'the eight stages of man' has been coined to describe his approach. They are summarised briefly below:

(i) Trust vs. Mistrust

The first stage covers the first year or so of an infant's life. It is broadly parallel to the Freudian 'oral stage' when the mouth is the focus of the child's experience. According to Freud the relationship between the mother and child at this stage is central and, for the child, is dominated by the positive and negative experiences of weaning. Erikson, whilst not denying that this phase of a child's life is in some ways characterised by the oral, broadens the concept to include more of a social definition. The dependency that the child experiences in this period of his life builds up an understanding of trust on the one hand and mistrust on the other.

A child will develop a trust in people and his world if his needs are met and if the things which make his life unpleasant are quickly removed. Love which is expressed in physical ways helps the child to develop a basic trust which will be carried into future life and will form part of the foundation of the child's personality. If the care is inconsistent or negligent the child will learn that the world is a place where he cannot expect his needs to be acted upon and catered for and somewhere where his wishes remain unfulfilled. This experience of unfulfilled expectation generates a mistrust of people and the environment which will similarly be carried into future life.

Although this stage is of vital importance in the development of personality the positive or negative experiences can be redressed in later stages. No one stage of development is entirely determinative.

(ii) Autonomy vs. shame and doubt

Between the ages of two and four, during the Freudian 'anal stage' a child will develop and begin to emerge as an autonomous person. The new-found abilities, both motor and mental, will form the basis of the child's sense of worth and identity, on the one hand, and, if he is continually corrected and punished for 'doing naughty things', a sense of self-doubt and shame

on the other.

After the pragmatic monism of the first stage the child begins to recognise the distinctions between himself and the rest of reality. The child becomes more autonomous and is prepared to experiment with his strength. It is at this stage that the child begins to learn the boundaries of his experience. He learns that some things can and others cannot be done without causing injury to oneself. His world is expanding all the time and at a very rapid rate. If his environment is characterised by over-protective parents the child will not discover the real boundaries and will learn to doubt his ability to do things. If guilt is created by excessive criticism of what the child does, this will be carried on into the next stage of the child's development.

(iii) Initiative vs. guilt

The next major phase of development is brief and takes place between the ages of four and five. In many ways this stage, which in classical Freudian psychoanalysis is called the 'genital stage', compounds and extends the experience of the previous stages without the addition of any new significant factors. The development of individual autonomy leads to the taking of greater and greater initiative during this stage. A recognition of the ability to control and dominate may develop. A child will take on projects and no longer simply depend on imitation for learning. In short he begins to manipulate his environment. However, if a child has grown up with a sense of shame and doubt and his experience is still dominated by criticism and punishment, he will soon develop guilt complexes and start to introject and believe he is personally responsible for many of the problems in the home and family.

(iv) Industry vs. inferiority

Stage four takes place during the early school age between the fifth and tenth year of the child's life. A child may at this stage develop a fascination for the way things work and are made. A boy or girl may recognise that they have competence in certain areas. He or she may want to become an athlete or a dancer. Children take interest in games; they are now able to follow and obey the rules and juggle with the ideas behind the game to find the best way to win. The world has again been extended to include many more places and people. School has provided a circle of friends with whom a child can learn and play and develop bonds which may continue into adult life.

If the child has developed with an excessive amount of guilt and shame the seeds of inferiority have been sown and this stage may become dominated by a continuing sense of guilt and a rapidly developing sense of failure and inferiority. But like all the other stages the negative effects of this stage can be neutralised later in life.

(v) Identity vs. role confusion (identity diffusion)

During the adolescent years between the ages of twelve and eighteen many psychological changes take place. There is a rapid maturation of the personality, and mental faculties are sharpened. It is at this stage that the first major recapitulation of a person's previous life takes place. Many of the factors and influences of a young person's previous life start to 'fall into place'. This is a stage of major integration and a discovery of identity. With the discovery of their role (both sexual and social) and the emancipation from parents, a young person begins to take responsibility for his own life. Philosophical, religious and social interests become topics for argument and concern, often taking an important part in the decisions that young people make, motivating them to do something like joining a political group or maybe protesting about certain moral and social issues.

If a person is unsuccessful in the process of integration then his or her identity may remain undefined. Unresolved problems and fears from past life may work against integration and may engender a sense of identity diffusion. The adolescent question 'Who am I?' remains finally unanswered and the identity diffusion creates a role confusion, so that normal relationships become difficult and a person may find himself becoming increasingly isolated.

The sort of identity which a young person recognises and develops is very much dependent upon their previous history, the relationships which they engage in and the quality of care they have received within those relationships. His or her social milieu will also dominate the young person's approach to the world. A treeless, concrete environment which is also characterised by aggression and violence will dictate what the young person will grow to think of the world. A society which is male-dominated and where women are second-class citizens will create an environment where young women will find it more difficult to attain a sense of integrity and identity which is valued by them and respected by others.

Again, it should be pointed out that Erikson is not proposing a fatalistic approach. Failure to gain a sense of identity at this stage does not

mean that a person is doomed to an existence of failure throughout life; other chances will present themselves.

(vi) Intimacy vs. isolation

Young adulthood is the next stage which contains no major physical changes but which is characterised by the relationships which are formed at this time. This is the period when a person develops close and intimate relationships, both sexual and social, with others of both sexes. The lessons of previous life are put into effect in the care and love that is generated for those around. Intimacy need not involve sexuality, although it often does and may be expressed in the close bonds developed in particular friendships. If a person fails to develop intimate relationships at this stage they become gradually more isolated and more self-absorbed - without anyone with whom they can share their life.

(vii) Generativity vs. self-absorption

This phase occurs from about thirty through middle age to about the age of sixty-five and retirement. According to Erikson this is the stage which is either dominated by a long period of generativity or by a period of growing self-absorption and individual stagnation. The generativity can be directed towards a number of areas including family, friends, career or personal interests. A person becomes concerned for people beyond the circle of family and may be motivated towards altruistic aims for society both local and at large. A person need not be a parent to engage in these generative enterprises but must be concerned primarily with people.

Self-absorption is the same process working in the opposite direction. A person becomes more and more disengaged from his or her family, friends, society and even environment. The major interests are with the self and with the cosseting and comfort of the individual. Personal needs maintain a primary place on the individual's agenda.

(viii) Integrity vs. despair

Finally there is *the* eighth stage, which covers the period from retirement to death. The major concerns and projects of a person's life are coming to completion and an end. This is the second major stage of recapitulation when there is time for reflection and recollection and for the enjoyment of enterprises completed. Integrity is the final result of a life viewed with satisfaction. At the other extreme is despair at a life of misdirected projects and missed opportunities. The final event is death.

Having briefly introduced developmental psychology, one might ask: Is there anything else that can be added or is the background to the alternative approach complete? Having sketched our psychological make-up and development as a process starting at birth, should we not ask whether we bring anything into the world with us at birth?

Mary Midgley believes that we are born with a nature - by which she means a collection of innate tendencies and instincts which we carry with us through life and pass on to our children. In her outstanding book Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature, she lucidly argues for the existence of a human nature and, whilst agreeing that we develop from birth, suggests that if we become overdependent upon society and relationships as a basis for our approach to human behaviour, we run the risk of giving up things which are important about human life, including human freedom. This in itself is interesting because the existence of a human nature has often been seen to be a challenge to the existence of human freedom. Midgley counters this argument and also suggests that many of our misconceptions about human nature arise from an unfair and uninformed comparison between us and the animal world. In her introduction she lays the foundation of her arguments. On the subject of freedom's relation to nature and society she says:

Man has his own nature, not that of any other species. He cannot, therefore, be degraded by comparison, if it is careful and honest, but it will bring out his peculiarities, it will show what is unique about him as well as what is not. Certainly he is more free than other species. But that extra freedom flows from something natural to him - his special kind of intelligence and the character traits that go with it. It is not, and does not have to be, unlimited. (In fact, unlimited freedom is an incoherent notion) . It is not something added by his own will after birth, or by some external force called culture. (4)

She goes on to suggest that we cannot be indeterminate at birth and that development and freedom cannot be based squarely on the influence that society has upon us:

If we were genuinely plastic and indeterminate at birth, there could be no reason why society should not stamp us into any shape that might suit it. (5)

She goes further to suggest that the philosophical basis of the belief that we develop from nothing to what we are as adults is misguided:

The dogma, in its sociological form, where it says that man is entirely the product of his society must, as I have suggested, destroy all the central arguments for freedom. In its Existentialist form, where it says that we create ourselves out of nothing, it does not make sense. ⁽⁶⁾

On the subject of the unfair and uninformed comparisons between us and other animals she says:

We are not just rather like animals; we are animals. Our difference from other species may be striking, but comparisons with them have always been, and must be, crucial to our view of ourselves.... The gap between man and other animals comes, I believe, in a slightly different place from the one where tradition puts it, as well as being rather narrower. ⁽⁷⁾

Having built her bridges and laid her route Midgley begins her main argument in earnest. With her superb turn of phrase and the forceful way in which she argues, she is most convincing. First, she points out that the questions we ask about man are not only vital to the task and will determine the sort of answers given but they themselves are also often determined by dogma and ideology. She contends that, if we are prepared to shift ground and look at the issue from a different angle, the idea of inherited instincts as a basis for behaviour is not so ridiculous. If we are prepared to drop the dogma that the only thing that can cause behaviour is that 'creative divinity' ⁽⁸⁾, 'society', then there is no reason why there should not be such a thing as innate tendencies. Having relied on a certain amount of academic inquisitiveness and having tempted us to come out into the fresh non-dogmatic air, she then proceeds to advance her argument. She asserts that if there is nothing at stake in 'society' itself and that if we are prepared to believe in more than a 'physical' connection to the rest of the animal kingdom and what's more, if we accept the main arguments of the evolutionary perspective, then we should be prepared to believe in inherited tendencies and instincts - in short, human nature.

To illustrate her point that we are closer to other animals than we think, for instance, she comments that we may have a more developed social structure than the apes but that they are similar to us in other ways. We may be more intelligent than elephants but our family structures do bear

a resemblance. The difference between us and other animals is not dependant upon us being superior beings but upon the different ways in which we have evolved. Midgley points out that we have evolved with a highly developed brain and it is that which gives us our similarity with the apes: but we have also developed with a prolonged infancy when the child is very dependent upon parents for both food and protection and it is that which makes our family structures similar to those of the elephant.

As we are so close to the animals - and in many more ways than we would at first recognise - we can be informed by the way in which instincts and inherited tendencies work in them. Midgley would contend that there are two kinds of instinct; 'open' and 'closed'. The closed sort of instinct is that which has been shown to exist in creatures that have been reared in isolation. Honey bees still perform their honey dance if reared alone and weaver birds who have been brought up in the same way are able to build their intricate and complicated nests. Open instincts are those which are exhibited in other birds, like ducks or chickens, who are programmed to follow their mother but have no clear picture of what mother will look like - therefore they will often follow other creatures which are not their mother, even people. Midgley says that there is evidence to suggest that the more intelligent the animal the fewer closed instincts and the more open instincts they have. These are less specific and have more gaps in their programming. Human beings would of course qualify for very few closed instincts.

There are a number of things which characterise us as a species, all of which could be subsumed under the general heading of behaviour, and behaviour is, in some measure, determined by how our instincts are related to one another and our environmental context. One of the most interesting things about human beings is their altruism. This has caused all sorts of problems for physicalists who see motives in terms of brain states; behaviourists who see them in terms of behaviour; and the sociobiologists following E. O. Wilson who in believing in the 'selfish gene' can only categorise behaviour in terms of how it 'pays' the individual. Altruism does not fit neatly into these categories and this remains a 'problem'. Also altruism is not confined to the world of man but seems to be associated with a number of species. Midgley suggests that it may be connected in some way with the rearing of young. If so, the rearing of human children - the most vulnerable and dependent young of all - would not only be a way in which altruism is focussed but may provide a reason for its existence. Whichever way it is seen, it cannot be denied that it exists, and the burden is upon those who do not believe that it has an instinctual basis to prove otherwise.⁽⁹⁾

It would seem that Midgley has given sound reasons for believing that inherited instincts do exist. We come into the world with something. The legacy that Locke left the world - the blank paper theory - can be torn up and thrown out. But this does not imply that we do not develop from birth, it simply means that we know where we develop from. Put into the language of classical psychology, we are born with an Id; but this is no surprise and in some ways it should be a relief for many developmental psychologists that Midgley, starting from a very different place, has come up with these conclusions. Many psychologists believe that we are born with a rudimentary Id and that this dictates our early response to the world. As Lowe has put it:

A baby is, psychologically speaking, almost pure Id. The moment he feels an instinctive urge he clamours for its instant gratification; and it is only his relative helplessness and physical ineffectiveness that stops him from acting on impulse. (10)

To round off this brief exposition of Mary Midgley's argument for the existence of human nature, we return to where we began - human freedom. For Midgley freedom does not consist in being in a state where nothing determines our actions, or by being omnipotent, but consists in being able to be oneself and doing what is in one to do. To stand alone is not the most important thing. We are social creatures and the fundamental unit of human existence is common to us all - the family.

Human beings have, relative to the rest of the animal kingdom, a long life. One of the most significant things about that long life is the length of time we spend dependent upon others for food and protection. In addition, we spend a long time dependent upon others for our education (in the broadest sense); we need others to define, explain and answer the questions that arise every day. All children want to 'know', all children ask 'Why?' and they rely very heavily upon adults, and especially their parents, for the information they need. Anthony Storr, a psychologist and philosopher, has examined this fact of human existence and has come up with some interesting conclusions about personal activity and an individual's interaction with his or her environment and society. In The Dynamics of Creation Storr examines creativity and creative interaction and concludes that its explanation is to be found in the dependency of childhood. It is not a mystery and is not, as many believe, the province of the soul.

Storr is indebted to the Freudian analysis of creativity, which Freud studied in the particular senses of scientific and artistic creative achievement. But as well as being indebted to Freud and also to others such as Desmond Morris and Arthur Koestler, he is concerned to redress the balance by challenging many of Freud's assumptions. Freud recognised a psychopathological basis for much that was considered creative. Individuals like Newton and Van Gogh seemed to bear out his contention that social and sexual deviation have given birth to many of the great creative enterprises of history. Whilst accepting that Freud may have a point, Storr seeks to investigate the basis of a more general creative activity in which we all participate and this, Storr asserts, has a very different foundation.

Storr carefully and systematically develops his argument; he becomes less dependent on Freud as the argument continues and by the end of the thesis he is developing his own original and speculative insights. Some way into his argument he utilises the work of Desmond Morris and through this seeks to find a connection between different sorts of creative activity, namely 'play' and 'art'. Storr finds a fundamental similarity in the way that each activity functions, particularly in its most primitive forms: amongst children, aboriginal tribes and other primates. The connection may at first seem rather simplistic but it is the basis of Storr's theses.

Both art and play involve and develop certain rules and rituals which function as a control or a principle of order in what might otherwise be left to chance or characterised by chaos.⁽¹¹⁾ There are other connections in that both may have physiological and social constituents, but the idea of order or control seems to be the most important factor in Storr's understanding of the dynamics of creativity. Both play and art by their very nature require that the participant has observed his environment and the apparent conflicts and contradictions inherent within it. If play is seen as the ritualising of such things as aggression or sexuality, then the participant must grapple and come to terms with his innate instincts and discover the boundaries of his interaction with others. If aggression gets 'out of hand' then the game rapidly disintegrates along with its concomitant pleasure and excitement. Also if a child is going to draw or paint one of his parents or his home, then he must first start to grapple with these things as objects, with spatial qualities, and then try to transfer the impressions onto paper. Both art and play can be seen to develop along fairly fixed lines amongst most normal people. As motor functions and brain

size increase so does the art or play, becoming ever more elaborate and also a closer representation (especially in the case of art) of the world around. Storr sums up his argument by saying:

At first sight, both activities seem to stand apart from the 'serious' business of life. Both are disinterested, and neither appear to be directly associated with the immediate satisfaction of biological needs, in the way that hunting or meeting clearly are. Both art and play are concerned with rule and ritual: and both tend, therefore, to impose a certain form upon what otherwise might remain chaotic... Moreover, both play and creativity can be looked upon as adaptive in the sense of providing additional input to stimulate and alert the nervous system ... (also) ... a good case could be made out for regarding play as adaptive in that it provided a setting in which aggressive and sexual impulses could be learned, tamed and ritualised in such a way that the individual could preserve his aggressive and sexual potential but, at the same time, modify his primitive drives in such a way that the social group was not disrupted.⁽¹²⁾

The idea of recognition, realisation, and the ordering of perceptions is a very important one. Storr uses a fascinating example to illustrate his point.

The example records the account of an anthropologist, Froberius, who asked some African pygmies to shoot an antelope for him. To his surprise, before the hunt the pygmies cleared a piece of ground of plants and weeds and drew the antelope, called upon the sun for help and then shot an arrow at the drawing of the antelope. This drawing, like the cave paintings of the palaeolithic period, served a purpose. It gave an opportunity for a dynamic apprehension of the quarry. Like students revising before examinations, the pygmies were attempting fully to grasp their object of interest. As Storr says:

The preparations described by Froberius are a kind of ritual, and might be dismissed as nothing but a useless exercise in sympathetic magic. In fact the ritual is one which enhances the appreciation of reality. The man who had observed the antelope sufficiently closely to be able

to make a life-like drawing of it was, in truth, better equipped to pursue and despatch it. (13)

In this sense Storr sees art or any creative enterprise as adaptive in that it enables the artist to recognise and come to terms with the reality of the world around him, and this must help the artist to survive and develop. All creative activity relies upon an interaction between the subject and his world and this interaction enables the subject further to apprehend reality. This contention, Storr believes, applies to all human beings whether they see themselves as particularly creative or not. The ability to apprehend, which we all exhibit, leads to the ability of abstraction and the conceptualisation of thought, which functions as a realisation and an 'internalisation' of objects and symbols both remembered and perceived.

When a child is newly born, most psychologists believe, it is unable to differentiate itself from the objects around. As a child gradually becomes aware of the difference between himself and his surroundings he also becomes aware of the boundaries of his own body and physical influence.⁽¹⁴⁾ Storr contends that development and growth initiates a recognition of the difference between subject and object and a giving up of the monist/egocentric world which characterises the early phases of life. The recognition of our relationship to objects and the relationships between objects, both persons and other things, gives us our sense of identity and part of our model of the world. Part of the process of grasping and differentiating between things is creative and is expressed in a number of different ways - for instance, in play and art. Objectification is involved in other activities as well. Memory helps us to objectify our past and even express it through some physical medium. Language, too, can have the effect of capturing thoughts and events and expressing them in an ordered and understandable way. We can find great satisfaction in the ordering of our world and in making sense of what at first seems difficult and obscure. This may be one of the reasons why human beings persist in creative activity.

The main origins of creativity are, as has already been pointed out, found in childhood. A child is born with a brain 23% per cent of its adult size; his body is small and helpless and its motor functions are very primitive. Development takes place at different rates for different parts of the body. This may mean that the brain is developed enough for the child to achieve some activity whilst his motor co-ordination and other

functions are not. This, coupled with a long period of dependency upon others, creates what Storr describes as a 'divine discontent'. This frustration or discontent with our own abilities and dependence is the motivation, the spur, towards the grasping and ordering of reality which the child and later the adult relies on in his interaction with the world. In short, frustration is the developmental basis of creativity.

The connection between frustration and creativity is made by the fact that frustration leads to the development of a world of imagination to which we aspire, created by us, where symbols and images define and delineate the world. The combination and accommodation of the two worlds, one 'internal', the other 'external' to one another is what converts frustration and confusion into order. Creativity is what enables the accommodation and the reordering of the two worlds - the other world of physical objects and the inner world of imagination and symbol - to take place. Human beings do not like and cannot easily live with inconsistency and confusion. We need order and recognition to enable us to make choices and act effectively in the world in which we find ourselves. It is for this reason that we have sought to 'capture' and 'realise' our world in our various creative enterprises.

Storr has introduced some of the developmental reasons for creativity and has shown that it is an important constituent in our activity and thought. He has not however given much in the way of an understanding of the mechanics of creativity. For this another writer will need to be consulted.

In his book The Act of Creation, Arthur Koestler seeks to give an explanation of creativity by unravelling the mechanisms involved in creative activity. The book remains definitive as an expression of the nature, existence and effect of creativity in a person's life. The breadth of the work is enormous and for this reason a full exposition will not be attempted. However, the basic presuppositions and major thrust of Koestler's thesis can and will be indicated.

For Koestler, creativity is evident when two 'frames of reference' or 'matrices' interact in a particular way. These 'matrices' or 'associative contexts' may be simply described as the 'rules' or 'codes of conduct' for any given activity. Mathematics has a number of rules based in logic which must be adhered to if the activity is to continue to be described as mathematics. Likewise any particular activity such as riding a bike, playing football or painting a picture has rules which need to be recognised for

the activity to be a success and for it to be recognised as that activity. These rules or matrices can be refined and developed and become identified as a 'skill'. Because a spider 'knows' the rules of the game of web-making it is, by instinct, able to produce a cobweb which can be recognised as such on any number of occasions; its web will always follow certain rules: the lateral threads will always be intersected by the radials at equal angles to the other intersections and the centre of the web will always be the centre of gravity. As well as these fixed rules which determine frames of reference or skills there are also ones which are more flexible and which may be adapted to the circumstances of the environment. A spider can have anything between three and twelve points of attachment which form the radial threads of its web, the number of attachments depending very much upon the conditions of the environment.

Creation occurs when one matrix (which may be expressed in a skill or in knowledge about one set of things) interacts and combines with another. Koestler uses many, many illustrations to illuminate this fact, highlighting creativity in a number of areas of human life. In different ways he describes the interaction and association of independent matrices in the different areas of life. Koestler describes how humour is dependent upon separate frames of reference 'colliding' to produce laughter as a response: the absent-minded don boiling his watch whilst he clutches an egg. In academic activities where a new intellectual synthesis is produced, Koestler prefers the idea of the matrices 'fusing': $E = Mc^2$. In an aesthetic experience the idea of 'confrontation' between two associative contexts is preferred: witness the illusion of depth, hue and perspective produced by the Impressionists applying 'blobs' of colour to the canvas.

Whatever the description in particular, in general, creativity is described (by Koestler) as the coming together of two independent, previously unintegrated, frames of reference in a given context. This he calls 'bisociation' or 'bisociative thinking'. An example of this was given to me recently; consider a family playing a 'word association game'. One evening before the son and daughter go to bed they play a short version of the game with their parents where one person starts with any word and is followed by the next person who gives a word which is associated with the first, and so on around the group. If you get 'stuck' or fail to explain the connection between the previous word and your own word (on being challenged) you are 'out'. One of the rounds goes something like this: Car, Rolls Royce, mini, skirt, hedge, clippers, sail, shop... At this point the small girl who

said 'shop' is challenged by her brother. The family decide after much discussion that the girl is not 'out' because although she knew that 'sail' was not the same as 'sale' they both sounded the same and could be interpreted either way. What has happened in fact is that either by chance or by design, the small girl has fused two different frames of reference.

To some extent this 'bisociation' of different frames of reference occurs amongst animals, particularly those of a higher intelligence. Koestler quotes from experiments conducted in the early part of this century and recorded by the psychologist who had conducted them - Wolfgang Kohler - in his The Mentality of Apes. The experiments were effected amongst chimpanzees and began as a test of intelligence. The chimp is given a stick to play with which it does until it becomes bored and looks for other entertainment. At this point a bunch of bananas is placed beyond the reach of the chimp - outside the bars of its enclosure. The chimp, in obvious distress, tries in vain to reach the bananas - until it casts its eye on the stick. Immediately it uses the implement to drag the bananas to within arms' reach and consume its deserved feast. On subsequent occasions the same chimp turned more quickly to the stick to draw the bananas closer, until finally, when presented with the same problem, the chimp immediately turned to the stick without attempting anything else.

The combination of the stick and the bananas out of reach was an example of bisociation, and, as an example, tells us something more about the mechanics of creativity. In many ways the chimps were ideally suited to this sort of task and as a problem it did not lie outside of their intellectual capacities. If you give a stick to a dog, as Koestler points out, a very different thing would happen. This fact leads Koestler to believe in an 'appropriateness', a 'ripeness' within all creative individuals, which leads to an understanding of creativity as less of a mysterious inspirational flash, and more as an appropriate response by an individual to a particular environment. This enables Koestler to separate chance creativity from creativity which results from a number of factors and variables gradually coming closer together; as in the case of a scientist working towards the discovery of a new theory or law. One of the best-known examples of this is that of Archimedes discovering that displacement is equal to the mass of an object - by getting into his bath. (Eureka! the solution). The solution did not, however, simply come from nothing or nowhere, it was the result of a specific problem given to him by his protector, Hiero of Syracuse: namely to discover the way in which he could be sure that the crown given to his ruler was really made of gold and not contaminated by some other metal.

Archimedes was able to recognise, assimilate and repeat his 'solution' because he was 'ripe' for it. This is the story of so many great achievements. If a person is not available who is ripe to discover something, if the environment does not exist where the solution to a problem is required, then there will be no discovery. It took many hundreds of years for the art of block printing discovered by the Chinese to bear fruit in the modern printing press. Equally it took many hundreds of years for Hero's toy steam engine to find a use and so play such an important role in the 'Industrial Revolution'. Therefore, as well as the combination of the two matrices, the circumstances must be right for the interaction to take place and thereby create something.

An excellent example of bisociation is to be found in Richard Bach's delightful story of a seagull and his quest for a greater understanding of flight: Jonathan Livingston Seagull. Consider the point in the story where Jonathan, having failed in an attempt to fly fast into a dive and pull out before hitting the sea, recovers consciousness floating on his back.

When he came to, it was well after dark, and he floated in the moonlight on the surface of the ocean. His wings were ragged bars of lead, but the weight of failure was even heavier on his back... He pushed wearily away from the dark water...

(Failure and a growing frustration with the apparent impossibility of the situation - but also a growing potential; a ripeness)

...There would be no more ties now to the force that had driven him to learn, there would be no more challenge and no more failure. And it was pretty, just to stop thinking, and fly through the dark, towards the lights above the beach. Dark! The hollow voice cracked in alarm. Seagulls never fly in the dark!... Get down! Seagulls never fly in the dark! If you were meant to fly in the dark, you'd have the eyes of an owl! You'd have charts for brains! You'd have a falcon's short wings!... Short wings. A falcon's short wings! That's the answer! What a fool I've been! All I need is a tiny little wing, all I need is to fold most of my wings and fly on just the tips alone! Short wings.

(Failure, and the recognition that he could never fly like a hawk gives Jonathan the much needed leap from one frame of reference to another. He has shown an example of bisociative thinking).

... he brought his forewings tightly into his body, left only the narrow swept daggers of his wingtips extended into the wind, and fell into a vertical dive... he eased out of the dive and shot above the waves, a grey cannonball under the moon. (15)

(Success, and the solution to a problem for which he had become ripe to solve)

There is a connection between Kostler's use of 'ripeness' and Storr's use of frustration and the 'divine discontent', both of which are recognised as the basis of creative activity. Creation itself is a matter of either the active seeking after or the chance interconnection of two different, even disparate frames of reference. In no way could it be described as a creatio ex nihilo as Koestler writes:

This creative act is not an act of creation in the sense of the Old Testament. It does not create something out of nothing: it uncovers, selects, reshuffles, combines, synthesises already existing facts ideas, faculties, skills. The more familiar the parts, the more striking the new whole. (16)

Koestler has provided an insight into the mechanics of creativity, he contends that it is involved in many parts of human life and may be recognised in many activities. How important is creativity though, does it only help us to describe human activity or can it be used further? Charles Hartshorne in the development of his 'process philosophy' has examined the nature of creativity very closely and has devoted much in the way of time and effort to show that creativity is fundamental to our whole existence. He believes that creativity is at the heart of any proper description of person. He also believes that creativity is at the heart of any proper explanation or interpretation of the universe. His philosophical stance does, in its overall expression, seem rather over-optimistic, asserting as it does that 'creative becoming' in the universe, which finds expression in such things as evolution, is heading towards an ultimate fulfilment. But for all the apparent weaknesses of his philosophy, which are, some would say, particularly evident when given a theological application, Hartshorne has provided many valuable insights into the extent and nature of creativity in human existence.

In Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, Hartshorne introduces his now fully developed approach to 'becoming' as a 'creative synthesis' within human experience and, by doing this, has shown that creativity is at the basis of epistemology. Although his overall philosophical approach is in

many ways dependent upon his epistemology one does not necessarily imply the other. His epistemology can remain intact as an approach to human experience and knowledge without requiring that any further philosophical or theological speculations be accepted. As far as creativity is concerned, Hartshorne believes that it is all pervasive within human experience:

To be is to create. According to this view, when we praise certain individuals as 'creative', we can properly mean only that what they create is important or extensive, while what others create is trivial or slight. But what they create cannot be zero, so long as the individuals exist. (17)

Here Hartshorne outlines his thesis - no static Aristotelian constants and categories of being for him - being is described in terms of becoming. Extending creativity to the point where we all become creative individuals is not difficult for Harshorne as he writes:

In every moment each of us accomplishes a remarkable creative act. What do we create? Our own experience at the moment. (18)

From this basis Hartshorne moves on to explain what he means and to describe how a person is able to synthesise many causal factors into a single experience of the world at any one moment. According to Hartshorne, there is no direct causal link between our perceptions and our experience. The sum of all sense data does not simply result in our experience; there is, it might be said an 'epistemological gap' between the collection of sense data and our experience of the world, upon which we base our understanding of ourselves and our environment. It is our creative capacity which makes our scattered and various perceptions into coherent experiences. There is nothing inherent in the physical world which leads to coherent and consistent experiences. Also there is no hint of solipsism in Hartshorne's philosophy, which would lead to a belief that even if the physical world did exist it would not affect our experience. For this reason Colin Gunton in an exposition and criticism of Hartshorne's ideas in his Becoming and Being (19) has dubbed Hartshorne's epistemology Idealist/Realist or Subjective/Objective - not because it falls between two stools but because it makes a serious attempt at synthesising the strengths of both approaches. As such Hartshorne has provided an epistemology which, although based upon the insights of Bergson, Pierce and particularly Whitehead, is unique.

Hartshorne contends that, because actual experiences cannot be simply reduced to their constituent causes - which would lead to a somewhat deterministic epistemology, we are to recognise the unity of experience which is the result of the free creation of the individual. The unity of any experience does include events remembered from the past and also data from the present, but the coming together - the making - is dependent upon the person, and no two people will create the same experience from the same data. The step from the jumble of memories and perceptions to a 'self created actuality'⁽²⁰⁾ is not a logical one but a free creation. There is with each experience a new creative synthesis of 'the many' to form a new 'one', which cannot be predicted using logic. Creative synthesis tied as it is to the idea of unity is an important element in Hartshorne's approach. Unity has a primary position over plurality in the monist philosophy, and the concept which lies behind this contention is creative synthesis. The continual movement within the universe away from the many parts to the whole, away from plurality towards unity, is expressed, for Hartshorne, in a person's experience. As individuals, we reflect what is existent throughout the universe and one of these things is the process of unfolding and becoming exemplified in the process of creative synthesis. The presence of creative synthesis is recognised in that there is an indeterminate element in all that we do and experience, which is in some way tied to the laws of the universe which, reflecting only statistical probability, lead us to the conclusion that the universe is itself, at least in principle, undetermined. Creative synthesis in becoming is well illustrated by J. Cobb in his Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition⁽²¹⁾ when he likens it to a reel of motion film. Each frame is an entity unique in itself with its own depth and variety, and yet it is not fully explained unless it be seen in the context of the preceding frames. Each frame is a becoming dependent upon the past, though paradoxically distinct as an entity in itself. The weakness of the illustration is that it does not show that each event, within its own span, itself becomes. Since a frame is static it cannot of course do this. However, it is helpful in that it illuminates the general idea of creative synthesis in becoming. Take, for instance, frames A, B and C: in the becoming of C neither A nor B is created or changed - they do not become. However, the relationship between C and B does become. The very fact that frame C has become has made B a predecessor of C, and C a successor of B. Therefore, the relationship of the event-in-becoming to former events does become; and, this being the case, a connection between events is found to exist in the creative synthesis of former events. In this sense creative synthesis is cumulative - it is built up as the process of becoming continues. There is no strict causal connection between events: a connection exists

between successors and predecessors in becoming which enables the past to have a real influence on the present, but no predetermined causal link between events. The present experiences flow from the wealth of possibilities which become 'past' as soon as they become and are perceived; actual occasions (i.e. events) only exist in the past and these provide the basis for a new becoming through a creative synthesis of these occasions in the present.

Hartshorne has made a case for extending the effect of creativity as an element in our personal make-up to a position where it is fundamental to our understanding of what it is to be a person. This emphasis is to be welcomed. Creativity is at the heart and root of all human activity and experience. If we are looking for 'ways in to' a description of human individual existence surely creativity, based as it is in our personal development from birth onwards, provides this. Creativity is perhaps the single most important factor in Hartshorne's philosophy so perhaps it comes as no surprise that he would interpret individual experience in terms of it. But the fact that creativity is so important to Hartshorne is not sufficient reason to be suspicious of his argument: whatever is thought of Hartshorne's overall philosophy his understanding of perception and experience seems very sound. To conclude this section Hartshorne's own words will be used in summary:

Let me restate the basic argument: the stimuli moulding an experience are many: the five or more senses are operating, memory is relating us, at least unconsciously, to thousands of incidents of the past, but all this multiplicity of influences is to produce a single unitary experience, yours or mine right now, let us say. The effect is one; the causes, however, are many, literally hundreds of thousands, billions even, considering the cells in our brains for example. This vast multitude of factors must flow together to produce a single new entity, the experience of the moment. The many stimuli are given, and certainly they tell us much about the response. But it is a logical impossibility that they should tell us all. An emergent synthesis is needed, to decide just how each item is to blend in a single complex sensory-emotional intellectual whole, the experience... To experience must be a free act, or nothing intelligible. (22)

The arguments in this chapter have not as yet been developed, they have merely been presented. Clearly there are connections between various sections but these also have not as yet been drawn out and interpreted. For what remains of this chapter an attempt will be made to synthesise, interpret and draw out possible conclusions from the arguments presented here.

Section Two

Even the most cursory of glances at the arguments leads to the recognition that there are two important concepts which form both the underlying structure and the overall thrust of this chapter; they are: personal development and individual creativity.⁽²³⁾ Both are important to a proper understanding of personhood; they both act to unify and clarify the many disparate elements involved in any description of person, and as far as this chapter is concerned, they also function as principles of synthesis and interpretation.

Personal development or the growth of personhood is clearly involved as a philosophical presupposition in the material referred to and used in this chapter. As a concept it has acted as a backdrop to many of the arguments and as such is vital to their understanding and interpretation. Individual creativity has become more evident as an important concept as the chapter has progressed. It has acted as the motive force, the general thrust, of the chapter. Development, as a conceptual framework, seems to have more to do with those factors which are involved in the construction of our personality and identity, having something of the 'feel' of succession or temporal progression about it. Creativity, on the other hand, seems more significant in the area of understanding what we mean when we say that we intend, act or think. As such creativity seems to be of less importance to temporal progression and the future span of life and is more concerned with the present as the nexus of creation.

At first sight it would appear that these statements about development and creativity are meaningful. However, such clear divisions between the concepts can be misleading and may only be helpful in as far as they give approximate indications of areas of involvement and provide a rough delineation of the province of each. In fact both concepts are important to each other and neither should be allowed to exclude the other or to gain a position of primacy in the description of personhood. Personal development and individual creativity function as two sides of the same coin, but the metaphor has to be modified since this coin is transparent; that is, in looking at one side you also gain a glimpse of the other and the connections between both. It would seem that the chapter would best proceed and achieve its aim by focussing first on one of these concepts and then on the other.

Personal development (The growth of personhood)

Erik Erikson has been important in showing that there are opportunities for personal development at all stages throughout life. In showing this he has provided an important elaboration of the Freudian psychological system. He has shown that it is not only childhood which is important for the way we live and interact in adult life, but the whole of life, which he divides into eight stages. Clearly, from the evidence that Erikson and others who have followed him present, it is correct to think of human beings as in a process of development. This process can be seen from two different perspectives; first, in how we see ourselves develop; secondly, how those around us see the process evolving. It is not enough to talk of the existence of an 'I' which is constantly present throughout life. Our interaction with the world develops as those things which initiate a response in our psychological make-up change and develop, though seen from a different angle both the individual and others recognise this change. Some elements of our personal make-up may remain unchanged throughout life, but this does not imply the existence of an 'elusive I'. Some elements will have negative and some positive effects on the way we relate to others, but even the persistently negative elements can be joined by other patterns of interaction which may not rid the people of these negative effects but may, which seems better, ameliorate or redirect them. What may have once caused a negative response may result in something quite different. In many cases virtues seem to be our vices turned on their head. For instance, if those things which may produce arrogance or pride in a person are conjoined with a clear perception of the individual's value of himself and others it may result in a constructive assessment of personal worth and also lead to real growth.

Mary Midgley has added a helpful corrective to what might be a tendency in developmental psychology and other branches of the behavioural sciences. By establishing the importance of innate and genetically inherited tendencies and instincts to the overall picture of personal make-up she has countered the tendency to see everything from a relativistic position. She does not challenge the overall structure, but seeks to provide a more accurate description of the general area from which personal development can work. She believes that it is a mistake to claim that human freedom is only possible if there are no inherited tendencies. There are many factors involved in our development but this does not mean that we play an entirely passive role. We have the capability of shaping our own future and doing those things which are in us to do. We are not simply at the mercy of the innate

tendencies which we possess or to the capricious elements and forces in our environment. This is not intended to sound overly optimistic. We can make wrong choices as well as right, we can even redirect right choices to create less opportunity for personal integration and more alienation from our fellow human beings and from our environment. If virtues are often vices turned on their head the reverse is also true.

The central and most important point which developmental psychology seems to make is to establish a temporal process in which we are all involved. Like a river our personalities move through a landscape of space and time. Early in life we take the shortest routes, cutting gorges and valleys into the mountains of information which confront us. Later we slow down, taking our time to choose the course that we want to take, full of the alluvial deposits which we have brought with us from the highlands of our youth. Personality and identity are not in stasis. If there are elements which are essential to us and remain unchanged throughout the span of life the evidence from the way we develop and respond to our world seems to go contrary to that conclusion.

In an attempt to clarify the various strands of thought about personal development which are present within this chapter, reference will be made to two important examples of areas in which personal development takes a significant part. These examples will not only throw light onto the subject of personal development but will also give an insight into the role of individual creativity in our development. The first example will be discussed under the broad heading of autonomy and recognition and the second under interaction and integration.

(i) Autonomy and recognition

Autonomy seems to be dependent upon two kinds of recognition. The first sort of recognition is that which is needed to grasp the difference between the world and yourself; that is, the ability to differentiate between what is external to you and what is essential to you. The second sort of recognition is that which leads to an understanding of one's ability to manipulate reality. The ability to structure, shape and influence the world around, animate and inanimate, human and non-human.

In some ways the two forms of recognition at the root of personal autonomy are amongst the earliest things learned in a person's life. The differentiation recognised by the child which occurs between mother and baby happens early on in a child's life and forms part of the basis of the autonomy

of perception and action and a growth away from the practical monism which characterises the first months of a child's life. In another sense, however, autonomy is learned over a longer period, both in specific phases, during adolescence for example, and day to day. The results of a child learning to place wooden blocks on top of one another is the same as a young adult learning to drive. Both activities are pushing back the boundaries of experience, both are providing new areas of reality over which the person has a new found control. Autonomy in this sense is cumulative, in that each new experience of autonomy leads to greater confidence in facing new situations. A person with a lack of confidence in his own abilities may well have a limited understanding of the distinction between himself and others or may even doubt his ability to affect the world around him. An illustration of a way in which many people find it difficult to attain independence and a sense of autonomy is seen when young people often find it impossible to make an effective physical and psychological break with their parents and family when they have to start a career or get married. A growing body of research is being devoted to the subject of children leaving the parental home. Daniel Goldman writing on the subject of the gradual disengagement from parents and family that all young people need to achieve has said:

Erikson points out that in each phase of the life cycle, a particular issue takes centre stage. In adolescence, that issue is leaving home, in the symbolic sense of finding an autonomous identity... Without leaving home in this inner sense, it is impossible to become 'mature' in the sense of Freud's disarmingly simple definition to have the capacity to work and to love. (24)

Autonomy and a sense of individual identity are very closely related. In many ways they appear to be the same thing seen from two different angles; autonomy from the point of view of the externally observed effects of an individual action; identity viewed from the angle of the individual's perception of his own activity. As well as bearing this close relationship to identity, autonomy appears to be important for an understanding of personal freedom. Any sense of freedom must surely stem first from a recognition that freedom of action is possible. In some ways personal freedom is the sign of autonomy and is one of the important ways in which autonomy can be asserted in an individual's activity. Such a recognition can only be learned from the person's own experience of the ability to act purposefully in the world.

Autonomy, identity and freedom do seem to bear a close relationship to one another. All require a recognition of individuality and an understanding of personal and purposeful action. All three also seem to bear a close relation to the area of personal activity to be outlined in the next section - integration and interaction. An understanding of autonomy and its related concepts are arrived at by a person's interaction with those people and things which make up his environment, and interaction of this sort is dependant upon a person's ability to integrate the various patterns of behaviour and interpretation learned from the past.

(ii) Interaction and integration

Our interaction with people and events and our understanding of the present is, as has already been noted, dependent upon our integration of the past. But this integration of our learned patterns of interpretation, behaviour and even perception is dependent upon something else. The patterns of referential systems stored within our memories as symbols of interpretation by which we are able to understand and order our experience of the moment. Our memory, working on different levels of consciousness, is all the time 'trying out' various systems of interpretation and behaviour relative to the situation which confronts us in the present. Like a child trying first one piece of the jigsaw then another, memory is sorting, shuffling and selecting the images and symbols from the past and aligning them with the present. In doing this it is providing opportunities for creative connections between what we have learned in the past and what we experience in the present. The actual application of these patterns need not necessarily be easy and can be more or less successful in producing an adequate response. Some situations are more simple than others, some are merely 'run of the mill', others present enormous complications. Our response to the question 'What is the time?' is less complicated than and different from a situation where we are confronted with the death of a friend. Our response to any situation depends upon our understanding of it and this in turn is dependent upon what we can remember and apply from what we have learned in the past. Memory in this sense is not simply described in terms of what can be consciously remembered, but is operating at all levels of consciousness. Integration is pictured as an almost infinitely flexible system, constantly monitoring, testing and checking sense data against patterns of behaviour and symbols of interpretation and thereby initiating a response. It would be wrong to describe this system as autonomous; it would be more adequate to describe it as being largely an integration of the unconscious and subconscious levels

and thereby related to all parts of the psyche, though perhaps not consciously recognised as being so. Some would disagree with this analysis, however; in some ways arguments about what initiates personal action is the watershed of the philosophy of mind.

Problems arise when there are obvious discontinuities between the past and the present or where there is little opportunity for adjusting previous patterns to 'fit' the present circumstances. Situations which have never been encountered before need first to be recognised as such. This is not easily achieved if no adequate understanding or response is available. If it is possible, the process of attempting a creative synthesis of a number of patterns with the present may achieve an understanding of the situation. For this to occur it would require the 'slowing down' of the process of pattern selection so that the various patterns can be aligned with one another and 'tried' as a possible response. This slowing down is required because normally the unconscious process of interpreting what the sense organs are receiving is being constantly matched almost simultaneously by the process of response (in fact describing them as two processes may be mistaken - however convenient it may happen to be). The process of slowing down is variously called reflection, ratiocination or even contemplation. The process will be enhanced if some patterns are provided from external sources - the parent will teach the child from his own store of remembered patterns of interpretation and response, or a friend will listen and advise and open up new possibilities in so doing. Each time a problem is resolved by the integration of personal and external sources another stage of development is completed. The process can be called 'education' or 'coming to terms with the realities of life', but it is still personal development. Each successive stage in development bestows an inheritance of new and more complex patterns of understanding and response to the future.

The process of integration and interaction is involved in every area of life and is occurring in innumerable ways all the time. It may however be less effective in particular parts of some people's lives, with the system displaying more in the way of atrophy than flexibility, old patterns being continually applied to situations to which they may not be fully suited. Like the characters in Mervyn Peake's description of the imaginary world of Gormenghast, a person may lose touch with the need for change and creativity. Gormenghast was a complete society inside the walls of an ancient castle, where past traditions so ruled the present that time seemed to stand still. In Titus Groan, the first in Peake's trilogy of Gormenghast, the Lord

aptly named Sepulchre would have his daily itinerary set by Sourdust, the librarian, who was the only person who knew all the traditions which dictated every moment of the Lord's day. Although maybe not to the same extent, some people do seem to have many of their life decisions dictated by patterns of behaviour which have remained unchanged and unchallenged for years. As well as relying on outmoded patterns, some people retain patterns which they value more highly than others, and which they therefore invest with more power. In many ways some value system is inevitable, often necessary, and for the most part presents few problems, but it can also, it would seem, lead to a paralysis in a person's response to situations and an experience of the classic 'double bind'. A double bind is a situation which prevents people from effectively interacting with circumstances which face them. If a person has a very powerful pattern of behaviour (which may manifest itself in a prohibitive command - 'thou shalt not') which allows for no discussion, then that person is ripe for a double bind situation. Examples of this multiply and can be shown to be particularly evident amongst conservative adherents of various religions. If a person has, for instance, a strong pattern of behaviour which prohibits displays, even feelings, of anger, that person will have to find ways of dealing with that pattern. If a person, believing this, does get angry, he or she will seek to sublimate it, redirect it to another area where it may be more socially acceptable, or become 'trapped' and therefore more susceptible to neurosis as the emotional paralysis advances. For a double bind to occur three things are needed: firstly, a highly valued command about personal behaviour; secondly, no meta-communication, that is, no dialogue about the command; and thirdly, no possibility of obeying the command given the situation (the command itself may be impossible to obey like 'do not doubt', or it may conflict with another equally important command held by the person).

The decision which confronted Sophie in William Styron's book Sophie's Choice, between the life of her son and her daughter as she arrived at the concentration camp is just such a situation. A German officer responsible for meeting the internees off the train and segregating them, gave her the choice of saving the life of one of her children. How could she possibly choose between the two? She was caught in a most vicious double bind.

This neurosis which may for some become a serious condition was first recognised as a condition of a double bind by Pavlov, whose experiments with dogs are well known. Pavlov first taught a dog to recognise a circle by rewarding it every time it distinguished the shape from all others.

Then he tested the dog to see whether it could distinguish a circle from an ellipse. If it could, he would lessen the distance between the two focal points of the ellipse so that eventually the ellipse was indistinguishable from a circle. At this stage the dog, not knowing how to obtain the reward for recognising the circle, would become confused, agitated and distressed. If the experiment was repeated several times the dog would become reluctant even to go into the room where the experiments were carried out. The dog, unable to obey the command to find the circle which its instinct for gratification required, exhibited the neurotic paralysis which is evident amongst people in a similar situation. In psychological terms drawn from Freud, a double bind might be described as occurring when the ego is not in a position of sufficient control over the superego and the id to halt the ensuing barter for supremacy which results in stalemate, with the id desiring satisfaction and the superego exactly counterbalancing the id's demands with a prohibitive command or veto.

The example of the double bind is one which seems to illustrate how the integration of learned patterns of behaviour can go wrong in their interaction with the present, but conversely it also serves to show that if integration is successful then it will work in the opposite direction from the double bind, that is - it will produce opportunities for individual growth and development. The double bind is an example of a process which has broken down. It shows how situations can be dictated by powerful patterns of behaviour. In this it displays, if in a negative fashion, how the integration of patterns from the past work in the present and as such may illustrate, if extrapolated in a positive direction, how the process is usefully employed in the development of the person. Erik Byrnes, in his small book The Games People Play, shows again that even the most negative patterns of behaviour which take the form of 'games' in which more than one individual plays a role can not only have negative but also positive effects, especially if the 'players' become aware of the game and turn it to positive effect. Therefore the game which Byrnes calls 'Kick Me', which is where a person provokes a response in the other players of aggression towards himself so that he can have the chance of saying 'Why does this always happen to me?', can have a positive side. The central players are those who for one reason or another are depressive and persistent failures or who deliberately set out to become martyrs to some cause. If the game is turned around and the person is helped to become able to face the realities of life so that they become better adapted and more successful, or if the game is played by someone who has become successful for other reasons, the typical statement 'Why does this always happen to me?' can be turned to positive effect. It can lead to serious, constructive reflection and the statement even transformed into 'What did I really do to *deserve this?*'

The integration of the past with the present has been shown to be vital to our interaction with our world and to a proper understanding of personal development. There are particular phases in life when the bringing to bear on the present of patterns of behaviour and interpretation is particularly important. The process is occurring all the while but there are stages when the importance of the process is exemplified in particular. The two periods referred to are adolescence and the retirement years of life, each a period of recapitulation and therefore important as learning years. They can both lead to a particularly important phase of personal development and an ability to successfully interact with matters of life. The form which the recapitulation takes in adolescence can help in the successful launching of an adult life characterised by generativity and stability. In later life it can lead to a deep reflection resulting in the wisdom often associated with those in old age.

There are of course many links of connection between the various issues discussed here and in the previous section 'Autonomy and recognition' but they all possess and share a further connection, the very one which unites them to individual creativity. The closer the investigation gets to the mechanisms of personal activity and thought the closer it gets to creativity. Viewed in a broad sense personal development seems to provide a principle of unity by which the overall process beginning at birth and ending at death can be interpreted. When viewed in a more particular sense, however, another concept is needed to explain the processes by which we can be said to act and think - such a concept is individual creativity.

Individual creativity

The basis of creativity as a developmental component in our personal make-up has been shown by Anthony Storr to be found in our infancy. The dependence of the child on others to understand reality, and his inability to control and co-ordinate his motor functions, are the experiences which act as a spur to creativity. Storr contends that this 'divine discontent' is present throughout life, there is always an insufficiency - a gap - between achievement and aspiration. This being so, there is a need for the individual to control and order his frustration by capturing reality in creative enterprise. It is as though creativity functions to 'tie down' reality into manageable areas.

Arthur Koestler has been effective in showing something of the mechanism involved in creative activity. He has shown that there is a need for a 'ripeness' within any given context, for creativity in the form of 'bisociation' or 'bisociative thinking' to take place. Bisociation is involved in

many areas and results in the unifying and synthesising of previously separate, even disparate, frames of reference. The coming together of different associative contexts in personal creativity occurs at almost every level of human experience and endeavour, according to Koestler, from the writing of a shopping list to the making of an epoch-changing discovery.

Harsthorne broadens the vision still further by suggesting that creative synthesis is not restricted to those activities which can be recognised as creative, and is certainly not restricted to a few individuals whom we describe as creative, for 'to be is to create'. Creativity is involved in our most basic of activities: even our experience of the world, mediated through our perceptual senses, must involve creativity and, therefore, creativity is at the heart of all human knowledge and forms the foundation of our epistemology.

If creativity is involved at all levels of human activity, some structure is needed to provide an insight into how it is at work. A framework is required that will distinguish the different sorts and levels of creativity and delineate them into manageable areas. Such an approach is possible using one of the basic psychological models of the divisions within a person's psyche - the conscious/subconscious/unconscious model. This is helpful in as far as it can be used to interpret any number of creative enterprises and can show how the various levels of our consciousness contribute in the many activities of everyday life. No single activity will be entirely restricted to a single level of consciousness, of course but, having made this qualification, it would seem justified to describe and categorise activities according to the level of consciousness at which they seem to be most evident and which accounts best for what is happening when the activity takes place.

(i) Conscious creativity

Conscious creativity is the area of creativity most often recognised by people when they describe someone as being 'creative'. This is because the products of conscious creativity are often directly observable in the form of some completed artistic or scientific venture. If such an understanding is used to limit the scope of creativity it is clearly unhelpful. However, the stress on an observable product is helpful to an extent, in that it provides a line of demarcation between conscious creativity and all others. Such creativity usually involves the conscious creative synthesis or bisociation of two (or more) individually recognised frames of reference. It may not be

described by the person involved in the activity in quite the same way, they may find difficulty in explaining any part of the process. Conscious creativity does not necessarily require a fully worked out nomenclature or a high level of articulation. But that which enables a painter to portray the landscape before him, transfer his vision of reality onto canvas, is the same mechanism which enables a dancer to translate an emotion into a recognisable pattern of body movements - it is conscious creative synthesis or bisociation. It would seem that the desire for excellence or even understanding of any creative venture that a person might undertake requires the conscious recognition of the referential systems involved in the enterprise. In other words, some level of reflection is required if a person wants to develop an ability or interest. This does not necessarily mean that if you want to improve you have to sit down and 'think' about it, although it might. Modern teaching and coaching methods certainly involve some degree of reflection of this sort. The most common way that an activity is raised to the level of consciousness, and is examined and improved, is by practice. A tennis player will practise ground strokes over and over again; an artist will attempt to draw one or two objects until some level of satisfaction is achieved; a dancer will do a few movements repeatedly until they are right; a scientist will carry out the same or similar experiments until the techniques have been refined to such a degree that they become useful and repeatable; and so on. Once the particular level of refinement or excellence has been achieved the activity can be allowed to move to the level of the subconscious so that it becomes almost automatic. Children are perhaps better at this particular form of learning and development, not because they are more creative, but because they are more flexible in approaching problems and have fewer powerful patterns of interpretation and behaviour conflicting and vying for attention.

Almost every important artistic venture or scientific discovery has involved a high level of conscious reflection. Leonardo da Vinci spent years in anatomical research until he was able to represent almost perfectly the human form in two dimensions. Einstein would spend hours devising 'mental experiments' (even as he travelled on the tram to work) imagining such things as that he was being carried on a beam of light and was able to see what was happening to the dimensions of space through which he travelled, until he had understood some of the most profound mysteries of the universe. Gutenberg, the father of modern printing, spent a considerable amount of time watching block printing and a large amount of his fortune testing various methods of lead block printing and pressing until he had devised an efficient, workable machine. The examples could of course be multiplied

many times. Sometimes creative products occur in a surprising way as a 'flash of inspiration' or a 'bolt out of the blue'. This is not due to any novel form of creativity, but is due to the fact that often the individually recognised frames of reference do not easily or simply bisociate or synthesise and, because of this, are allowed to move to the subconscious level where, free from the conscious restraints, the creation takes place: this Koestler calls a 'Eureka moment'.

(ii) Subconscious creativity

All creative activity which occurs at this level can be brought to the conscious with varying degrees of ease and regularity. Some activities lie for some just below the level of conscious awareness, others lie deeper. For one reason or another many of the processes and activities at this level of consciousness are not generally recognised as being creative. The reasons for this are many and range from the personal and environmental to the cultural. This lack of recognition may account for why the 'light bulb' or 'sudden flash' theory of creativity is still so popular. According to this view creativity is the mysterious possession of a few 'gifted' individuals and a fleeting occurrence to the rest. The theory has led to further theories as to the origin or source of such occurrences and they range from God being the main cause, to the abilities being passed on from parent to child through the generations. It is interesting that two of the most popular explanations of creativity are similar to the traditional theories about the origin of the soul: creationism and traducianism.

Of course, none of these theories are necessary if we realise that, below the threshold of conscious activity, we are continually involved in the combination of many different patterns of interpretation and behaviour and are continually responding to the world by sorting and selecting different frames of reference, which are unified and synthesised in the course of our normal experience.

Many important daily activities involve the subconscious level of creativity. Driving a car is a good example of an activity which, although requiring a high level of co-ordination and competence, is often carried out largely at a subconscious level. Often, many other activities are carried out whilst driving a car. It would seem that once a certain level of competence has been achieved by the conscious learning of all the procedures involved, a driver can carry out a conversation, listen to music, think about the menu for dinner, do almost anything. In fact it would seem that as long as

the feet, hands and eyes are free to monitor and interpret and respond, anything is possible! This is certainly the case when the complications are few, as on motorways, but is decreasingly true as the particular manoeuvres become more complicated.

(iii) Unconscious creativity

Unconscious creativity cannot normally be recognised except in unusual or extreme situations where a person's deepest levels of consciousness are temporarily or artificially exposed. Certain methods in psychiatry, such as hypnosis, are designed to facilitate this. Unconscious pattern selection would seem to account well for the effect that perinatal and postnatal experiences have on our interaction with our environment. However, the area that it seems to account for best is that of individual experience. The vast sum of all sense data cannot simply account for our experience. There is a need for some sort of conceptual framework, learned early in life (possibly using inherited abilities as a platform) and progressively developed throughout life. This conceptual framework enables us to make sense of the chaotic collection of sense data which is being continually received by the body. Two people, when asked to look at the same scene, will focus on different things and will notice things and order their experience in different ways. We seem able to focus our experience and ignore all other data at will, and concentrate on only one thing, as when someone is engaged in sewing or writing. At other times we seem able to remove many of the 'filters' from our perceptual senses and take in a vast vista with all its variety of colour, sound and smell. It is interesting to note that those who have been congenitally blind and receive their sight, recognise only patches and areas of shape and colour when they first begin to 'see'. The activity which produces our experience, though unconscious, seems to be as well described using words such as creativity and bisociation as does any other activity at any other level.

It has already been noted that all levels of consciousness are involved in all creative activities in as far as all levels of consciousness are involved in almost every occasion of life (with the possible exception of such things as deep sleep). It would seem that there is a constant interchange of information between the various levels and although the exact role of the countless firing neurons is still unknown, there would appear to be a physical basis for this process. (However, a discussion of the possible neurological basis of creativity is not possible given the space available). It would seem that the breadth of subjects that could be involved in a description of personhood is bewilderingly vast. This should not however deter us from the project. The arguments presented in this chapter clearly show that it is possible to discover principles by which the vast welter of information can be inter-

preted. The principles developed in this chapter are not the only ones. Others may exist and some might even be found to be more useful than personal development and individual creativity.

The approach offered here derives from a recognition that the reductionist techniques employed by such as H. D. Lewis need to be balanced by more holistic and inclusive ones; and that the discussion needs to be broadened and freed from the cul-de-sac of Cartesian constants. The polemic exhibited in the various arguments is a sign that this mode of dialogue has been explored to its limits and needs refreshing by material drawn from other areas, such as the ones cited here.

NOTES

Chapter 3

1. Evelyn Waugh, Brideshead Revisited (Penguin, 1983), p.195.
2. R. Lowe, The Growth of Personality from Infancy to Old Age, (Pelican, 1972), p.xii .
3. There is a parallel here with Transactional Analysis: according to this view we have a 'parent', and 'adult' and a 'child' inside each one of us. These three facets of our personality interact to create our response to our environment. The parent, adult, child seem broadly parallel to the superego, ego and id.
4. M. Midgley, Beast and Man (Harvester Press, 1978-9), p. xvii .
5. Ibid., p. xviii.
6. Ibid., p. xix.
7. Ibid, p.xiii.
8. Ibid, p.9 .
9. Cf. the responses to Midgley's 'Toward a new understanding of human nature: The limits of individualism' in How Humans Adapt: A biocultural Odyssey (Smithsonian Press, 1983), pp. 533 ff.
10. R. Lowe, The Growth of Personality, p. xiv.
11. Cf. J. Huizinga, Homo Ludens (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971) (Storr does not acknowledge any debt to Huizinga and yet at times he seems very close to adopting a similar approach to play in personal development as Huizinga does in Homo Ludens).
12. A. Storr, The Dynamics of Creation (Heinemann, 1972), p.137.
13. Ibid., p.140.
14. Cf. p. 42, (Erikson holds a similar position).
15. R. Bach, Jonathan Livingston Seagull (Pan 1973), pp. 21, 24 and 25.
16. A. Koestler, The Act of Creation (Pan, 1970), p.119.
17. C. Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (S.C.M. 1970), p.1.
18. Ibid., p. 2.
19. C. Gunton, Becoming and Being: The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth (Oxford University Press, 1978) p.57.

Chapter 3 cont...

20. C. Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis, p.3
21. J. Cobb, Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition (Lutterworth Press, 1966) p.15
22. C. Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis, p.5.
23. Recognising Mary Midgley's objections to individualism, it should be noted that 'individual' here does not imply "individualism" or any subtle form of solipsism. It is simply used to describe a single person's creativity.
24. D. Goldman, 'Leaving Home', Psychology Today (U.S.A.) August 1980.

CHAPTER 4

SOME THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

Section 1.

As a writer and thinker Lewis has two main areas of influence which affect his particular approach to personhood. Like a yachtsman who, once he is confident of his equipment, has two elements which overlap and influence him in the setting of his course - the wind and the sea - Lewis has two major areas of academic influence which set the parameters of his approach, that is, philosophy and theology. They are of course distinct but they also interact, creating a dynamic tension in Lewis' work. At times one may be more evident than the other, but, like the yachtsman who cannot ignore the sea currents and conditions because he is in an area of strong prevailing winds, neither can Lewis ignore one influence and concentrate wholly on the other. It is for this reason that an attempt will be made to discover something of Lewis' theological background and also something of the faith to which this theology attempts to give an expression. It has been seen that Lewis has a strong leaning towards Descartes and a rather idealist epistemology, but where does he stand theologically?

The investigation of Lewis' theology will be followed by an attempt to produce a theological framework which is applicable to the alternative approach to personhood. Both sections will follow the same structure: first the general and major theological presuppositions will be brought into high relief and secondly, the application of the particular theology to the particular philosophy of mind will be highlighted in one area of theological and philosophical reflection, namely life after death. This should result in a more complete picture of both approaches which, though sketched in fairly broad strokes and without much fine detail, should provide a more satisfactory understanding of the relative merits of the two approaches.

Lewis is a man of faith, he is both theist and Christian and his theological reflection bears witness to these facts. Often Lewis makes it clear in the course of an argument the ways in which he is influenced and orientated theologically, but it is not only brief personal testimonies which provide this insight. Some of his books, including Jesus in the Faith of Christians and Our Experience of God ⁽¹⁾, deal with this subject quite extensively and make both his faith and his theology very clear.

As well as giving a general theological insight, Lewis is at pains in much of his work, including the two publications mentioned above, to present the Christian religion and also religious belief in general as both reasonable and relevant to the contemporary world. As he writes in Jesus in the Faith of Christians⁽²⁾

An age committed to exclusively secular pursuits and those not always the most elevated, can hardly expect to be well appraised of things that have to be 'spiritually discerned'. What Simone Weil and others have reminded us about 'heeding and waiting on God' is immensely relevant, and this means more than being religiously attentive in a general way: it means also the continual response, in practice as in thought, of individuals in the ebb and flow of the illumination they have in their own religious experience and what they assimilate from the religious life of their community.

Similar passages occur in a number of Lewis' works - most with the same sense of urgency and many with a similar concern. However, he is not simply concerned to recognise the prevailing conditions of society and present religious faith as reasonable within that setting, he is also concerned to defend a more traditional approach to Christian theology and particularly traditional Christology from the arguments of more radical theologians like Wiles, Lampe and Mackey. It would seem that Lewis is seeking to argue for what he takes to be the simple and straightforward interpretation of both the New Testament and the ecclesiastical traditions handed down through the ages, and to render implausible any theology which relies overmuch on empiricism, a demythologising of the New Testament, or on a 'Christology from below' which begins with a description of Christ as man before anything else. Lewis vigorously defends his position against any doubts that may be cast on the reasonableness of describing Christ as both God and Man and systematically defends, with a large measure of success, the orthodox beliefs based on this understanding of Christology. At the close of one such defence Lewis affirms:

But in the meantime I must declare, if I may end on a personal note in this lecture, that when we encounter what seems to me increasingly implausible substitutes for what, in common sense, we would take to be the central and lasting themes of the New Testament, and of Christian experience and witness throughout the ages, when not only all miracle - and do we have to abandon miracles altogether? - but all reasonably reliable

knowledge and understanding of the historical Jesus, all firm expectation of a 'life beyond'^h and sanctified condition of ourselves in fellowship with God through the mediation of Jesus, however unlikely in our normal understanding of ourselves, when this and all thought of God as abidingly one with the individual Jesus we meet in the story is lost in the mists of ambiguous secular expectations - then, I can only say, in the words of a desolate woman of long ago, 'They have taken away my Lord and I know not where they have laid him'^h. It is comforting to think that it was in the depth of despair that she was personally addressed and assurance flooded in, overwhelming. May we not also, in the blackness of so much despair, hear the same voice addressing us by name today? (3)

Lewis stands on familiar and traditional ground in theological debate and he seems to achieve a large measure of success in doing so. He courageously speaks out for what he believes where many others in his position and of his stature in the academic world would not. He obviously believes what he writes and serves his reader well by being clear and by forging many links between theology and philosophy. He obviously believes that there are many links between the two but that philosophy is not there to provide proofs and clever arguments for the theologians. It is to be used, as far as Lewis is concerned, as a method of making explicit the nature and status of religious beliefs and therefore clarify the theological framework which is dependent upon such beliefs. Philosophy aids reflection and ratiocination because it lays out routes which are both clear and coherent and offer means of access to the various areas of theological research. It has been shown that Lewis holds to traditional interpretations of the Christian faith, but what is it that lies at the heart of these beliefs and what is it that most clearly defines the lines of connection between the theological expression of his faith and his philosophy? Simply put, it is religious experience. Religious experience gives both the structure and content of faith and allows both theology and philosophy to 'touch down' in the present.

Lewis begins with a recognition that a belief in the existence of a God is common to almost all the periods of the history of man in almost every society and social group. This fact in itself is remarkable, but more remarkable still is that many of the elements of belief are similar. What could account for such a phenomenon; where is the reason for this common belief to be found?

For Lewis the basis of such beliefs in the existence of a God is found in what are broadly described as numinous experiences. Rudolf Otto and his The Idea of The Holy is important for Lewis' understanding of this. The experience of wonder engendered by the 'mysterium tremendum et fascinans' is for Lewis at the heart of any recognition or experience of the existence of God. We are drawn by the captivating wonder of various experiences of the world - the sun rising over the sea, the vista from a mountain top - and yet what we apprehend to be the captivating force behind these experiences paradoxically holds us at a distance, even forcing us away by its magnitude and otherness. Like the experience of standing close to a fire, we are drawn to the fascination and warmth of the flames and yet those very flames which so captivate us also keep us at a distance - out of reach. The experience of the numinous gives us an insight into the mysterious ultimate reality which is beyond all that we normally know of the universe. This apprehension, like the sound of distant thunder, affords no direct observation and admits of no description, only wonder.

Therefore, there are two elements in our experience of God: wonder and paradox. The paradox of a non-self-existent and non-self-explanatory universe leads to wonder and wonder ultimately results in religion. But religious wonder must be distinguished from other forms, especially when so many things in the contemporary scene are described as 'wonderful'. There is, after all, the 'Wonderful World of Disney', so Lewis is more explicit;

The wonder which is basic to religion, and in which it begins, comes with the realisation, usually sharp and disrupting, that all existence as we know it stands in a relation of dependence to some absolute or unconditioned being of which we can know nothing directly beyond this intuition of its unconditioned nature as the source of all other reality. (4)

Religion starts with wonder: wonder is at the root of the numinous and the numinous at the heart of religion. The mystery of the apprehended other, which lies beyond the experience of wonder and beyond the normal bounds of the universe, leads to reverence and reverence leads to worship and worship is religion. Wonder can, it would seem, involve different contexts including aesthetic and moral contexts; there is a wonder in fine poetry and art, there is also a wonder in selfless acts of love and unexplained providential occurrences. But the most important wonder, the fascination which for Lewis lies close to the centre of religion and faith, is that which is engendered by the relational dependence of all things in the universe to each other and beyond to what may only be described as absolute unconditioned being.

The fact that the complex patterns of interaction and mutual dependence of the various biological and physical systems in the universe do not finally explain their own existence or the existence of the wider universe leads to mystery: a mystery which turns to wonder through the mediation of intuition and apprehension, and for Lewis this wonder and mystery point to only one thing: God.

The second fundamental element in our experience of God is paradox. The world exists and yet it is not self-existent - or at least it does not seem to be so. Beginning with this basic paradox Lewis goes on to extend the paradoxical nature of belief in God. God's existence and his creative relation to the world may be a mystery but it is not an absurdity. It is because of this that Lewis relies so heavily on the idea of paradox. Unless paradox is employed in our understanding of the existence of God and in our description of our belief then our language may quickly fall into incoherence and alternative explanations for the existence of the universe seem to become more palatable and, which is more important, more tenable. He wants to avoid an ambiguous description of our belief in God and a confused understanding of the possible existence of God but he does seem close to one of the characters in John Wisdom's well-known illustration of the state of the debate in philosophical discussions of the existence of God.⁽⁵⁾ The illustration begins with two men who come across an odd phenomenon: a patch of vegetation in a desert. The first man heralds this as a remarkable find and sets to work to discover the cause for such an occurrence. The other sees in it something else, he sees the evidence of an unknown being cultivating the desert - what they have before them is a garden. The two men disagree and argue but finally come to the compromise of setting a number of tests designed to discover who or what the gardener is. They watch the garden, but no one turns up. They set a guard around the perimeter but still no one is seen. Finally, they attach an alarm to the fence which is tuned to react to the smallest disturbance, but still there is no tangible evidence of the gardener. Much less than solving the problem it becomes worse, because the man who believes in a gardener now believes that he must be an invisible, imperceptible, even ultimate being, able to carry out his gardening without being discovered and yet leave the evidence of his handiwork for all to see. Lewis differs from this character in that he does not simply postulate the existence of God in the face of all the empirical evidence; he uses a type of language that moves towards a description of religious experience without conceding ground to empirical investigation: hence the use of paradox. For Lewis, to understand the experience of the apprehension of God requires paradox.

All things point to the existence of an ultimate being and yet he is unknown. God must be involved in all things and yet not as an observable fact. We do not know, we cannot in fact comprehend the infinite and yet we experience the infinite breaking into the present. Here he is close to other recent explorations into the existence and activity of God, particularly those in Finite and Infinite by Austin Farrer and The Openness of Being by Eric Mascall. Lewis seems to be giving expression to one of the deeper mysteries of the Christian faith as he says:

He (God) is involved in the being of everything besides himself, but not involved as terms are related in an inference but in a quite peculiar relation of dependence of all things upon Him. He is closer to all things than distinct finite things ever are to one another, and also remote beyond all conception. This we see, not as inference, but in one insight or leap of thought. (6)

It would seem that we come to the end of normal understanding and are presented with a mystery and paradox. All that seems possible is an affirmation of the mystery and uniqueness of the being we describe as God, but for Lewis religion finds its genesis in situations where we ask how we can go further than these initial 'radical antinomies'⁽⁷⁾ which force us to recognise the mystery of an unconditioned being. It provides opportunity for a 'why question'⁽⁸⁾ which is fundamental to all knowledge and especially important in taking a person beyond the initial apprehension of God. It is as though there were an epistemological vacuum which prompts the question 'why' and which in turn allows the vacuum to be filled by a recognition of what the existence of God must entail for the universe and for his own nature. The answer to the why question is found in a vision of God who is both ultimate and unconditioned, who is responsible for the existence and explanation of all that we know. Normal language and explanation ends here. Only explanations which involve such things as transcendence, beyondness, completeness and perfection are possible. It would seem that following on from the initial apprehension there is an evaluative process which is commensurate with the former insight and which fills in the picture of what God must be like. Lewis has arrived at the perfect, transcendent creator and sustainer of the world from his initial numinous experience. A creator who is thereby distinguished altogether from his creation by his own being and nature.

However, God is not simply inferred from the world: for Lewis, he is not like the unseen planet that can be inferred from the movement of the

others which can be seen. The explanation of the existence of the world is incomplete without him. We are unable to deduce the explanation of the universe from our normal experience. God is not a postulation worked out on the basis of the laws of logic. We are not able to arrive at an assertion of the existence of God after some logical progression, as was attempted by Thomas Aquinas with his five ways. God does not 'fit' into such a structure of logic; he is above and beyond it. The recognition of God's existence is explained by a single intuitive leap which itself seems to transcend the normal process of reflection.

Also for Lewis the experience of God is not a single unrepeatable event given to individuals or a generation, it occurs many times and takes place at every stage of human life and religious devotion. However, the many and various experiences do not remain unconnected and unsystematised for long. They are, according to Lewis, integrated with previous experiences and shared amongst the various recipients of the experiences. In Our Experience of God, Lewis contends that we retain symbols in our minds which are held in our memory as approximations and condensed patterns of experience. We use these to interpret our language of religious experience and also to understand all other subsequent experiences, both ours and others, and the particular effect that they may have had. This, Lewis argues, enables us to recognise in a religious context feelings of forgiveness, peace, joy etc. which may accompany any specifically religious experience and integrate them into the patterns of our previous experiences. In this way the system of symbols builds up as they are integrated with one another and in so doing link past and present experiences and form an experiential basis to our belief and practice. A framework is constructed into which we may place our future experience and further apprehensions of God. Given time and the interaction of a number of people these patterns will develop into a system of belief. For Lewis the community aspect seems vital to this process. As different groups interact and engage with one another in the pooling of shared or common experiences and as they join together in the worship and contemplation of the object of their experiences a tradition will develop which each generation will inherit from the past and pass on the fruits of its experience to the next. The community being continuous through time provides a living interface of religious experience in the present with its roots stretching back through history, gaining deeper meaning and significance as it taps the riches of the past. Individual experiences may have little coherence, being difficult to place and define, but when set in the overall tradition they find an explanation and a fuller meaning:

Lewis argues that during the history of a religious tradition there may occur particularly important phases of religious experience which may be interpreted by the community as significant disclosures or revelations of God. These will become definitive periods of disclosure and may reorientate the whole, or part of the traditional structure, investing it with new understanding, beliefs and insights. Such periods will throw up their own symbols of interpretation which will be assimilated into the communal and individual experience. These symbols are what Lewis describes as 'first order symbols'⁽⁹⁾. As they are integrated into the overall tradition they will provide a further and closer approximation to the person of God and may aid more meaningful expressions and descriptions of his nature and activity. For Lewis, Christianity has made a unique contribution to the general apprehension and understanding of God, which can be summed up in two words - grace and redemption. The two concepts that lie behind those words have given both motivation and orientation to the overall religious tradition of Christianity. The particular phases of disclosure which produce these definitive concepts are clearly important for Lewis' theological approach and although they are often described in a difficult and complex fashion it is also clear that he understands revelation to take place in the same way and for the same reasons posited by a more obviously traditional theology. As he says:

For religion, as I understand it, has always an element of revelation at the core of it: and in revelation the transcendent discloses and shapes itself for our illumination in a peculiar involvement of itself with a particular situation, a time and place at which the revelation happens not withstanding that it may not always be precisely specifiable.⁽¹⁰⁾

Although Lewis holds this view of revelation he does not want to exclude other religions from the experience of revelation and in fact suggests that adherents would do well to study other religions to discover their important contributions. Lewis admits that it is hard for him to delimit the areas of experience which are important for our experience of God. They are not particularly intrusive into the normal occasions of life and are not simply to be seen as generalisations of the process of personal experience. Isolating religious experience is as difficult, Lewis would contend, as delimiting and placing a particular experience of pain.⁽¹¹⁾ Specifically religious experiences seem to have a recognisable core in their ability to be formalised into symbols or approximations of God, but they have semi-permeable boundaries so that other experiences including moral and aesthetic ones, can have an effect on them. Emotion does have a part to play but Lewis is suspicious of too much of a focus on the emotions:

Emotion plays its part, but the core of religious experience, I submit, is essentially cognitive. (12)

There is little doubt that when Lewis uses 'cognitive' he is referring to the province of the mind. In fact all of what has been presented of Lewis' approach is best interpreted if it is remembered that he presupposes the existence of the mind as that which experiences, integrates and structures our religious experience. The belief in the existence of the soul has ramifications for one particular area of Lewis' theological speculation and reflection - his approach to life after death.

Like belief in God, a belief in a life after death is virtually universal, Lewis argues. In Persons and Life After Death he observes that the idea of immortality or eternal life is not something ^{which} is held only by Christians, but by adherents of almost all the world's religions. For Lewis this is to be expected because as the process of the gradual deepening of faith continues to take place and as experience of God progresses and builds up, particular beliefs, such as a belief in a life after death, are encouraged:

God is God, but the point of true religion is the discovery of our place in the life of God himself, and as the disclosure deepens and the essentially self-giving character of it reveals itself, as the bond tightens, we know that we are 'of God' and have no home but God. The inestimable worth that is placed on each... puts the question of the elimination of anyone out of the question. (13)

In Chapter Two some of the important arguments and speculations about a disembodied existence of the soul in an after-life which Lewis offers were outlined. (14) If these are combined with what Lewis believes about the mind in general and what he believes about the assurance of life after death that a Christian (or an adherent of any religion for that matter) has, it is no great surprise that he argues so strongly for the reasonableness of a life after death. For Lewis it would seem that belief in life after death is not only compatible with other beliefs in God and the soul but essential to them. Lewis believes that the body is not required for a final description of what a person is. He also believes that once our total dependence upon God for our existence is recognised the only possible argument for a future life is one that rests on the soul. The body, he correctly points out, is either burned or buried and both result in a rapid decay and dissolution into dust soon after we cease life. Only if something of our essential nature can survive death

can we be assured of life after death.

As a Christian, Lewis believes that it is important, if not vital, to hold and witness to the belief in everlasting life. Apart from anything else he believes this because for him it speaks to many people's deepest need. It also keeps faithful to the Christian tradition and gives substance to the universal recognition that there is a life after death. Added to this Lewis believes it also explains some of the growing evidence of physical research in which he, following others like H. H. Price and C. D. Broad, is very interested. However, he also recognises that in the final analysis belief in life after death is a tenet of faith. It is God who creates and God who sustains life and if there is to be any future life after this earthly existence it is with God that the answers are to be found. Here as in other places the underlying connections between Lewis' philosophy and theology surface and offer a glimpse of the consistent and continuous interchange between the two in his thought and work.

Section Two

There seems much to commend in H. D. Lewis' approach to theology. His defence of a traditional Christology is both clear and courageous and exhibits well his ability to get to the heart of the matter. Equally his consistent attempts to make the discussion and debate of religious issues relevant to the modern secular age are most laudable and reflect clearly both his sincere faith and his abilities as a Christian apologist. There are also many things in his approach to religious experience which are especially interesting and provoke only assent. The role of the symbols of interpretation interlinking past and present perceptions is very interesting. If it were extended and broadened along with Lewis' insights into the place of the community in religious experience and were applied to his overall approach to mind, it would open up many new areas of discussion in the debates within the philosophy of mind and the theology of man.

However, problems remain. His approach to both religious experience and to life after death exhibit weaknesses. As such they cannot be simply transferred and incorporated into a theological structure which is acceptable and applicable to the basic suppositions of the alternative approach to personhood offered in Chapter Three. There are alternatives to the way that Lewis views these areas which are equally tenable and at least as meaningful. Also the alternatives may prove to be more able to explain certain areas with which Lewis seems to have problems; for instance, the things that can be decided about the person and nature of God from religious experience, and the relationship between an apprehension of God and God's self-revelation. Clearly the experience of apprehension is involved in revelation but how far is revelation involved in apprehension? Where, if they exist, are the lines of demarcation between God's initiative in self-revelation and the general experience of God in the world?

Perhaps the best way of answering these questions is to decide what can be recognised to be the limits of the experience of God in the world which Lewis discusses in terms of the numinous. As well as these areas of discussion within religious experience Lewis' approach to life after death remains one of the most contentious areas of debate and seems to leave large problems unresolved. If the arguments in Chapter Three were successful in showing that more than a soul is required to describe what is essential to a person, then the idea of a disembodied existence in a life after death seems to fall into incoherence. An approach to existence in a life after death would need to include at least

everything which is necessary for a proper description of person in this life and that would seem to require those things which were expanded upon in the last chapter. In the final part of this section an attempt will be made to outline such an approach.

Lewis often uses 'apprehension' or 'insight' to describe the activity or process of recognising the presence of God within the world. He implies that the ability to apprehend is something which although possessed by all lies beyond the normal process of perception and recognition. It lies more in the realm of intuition than does normal perception. The object of the apprehension is God, but the insight itself is a recognition of the real status and nature of the world in which we live. Undoubtedly God, as a unique being, lies beyond the scope of our comprehension and cannot therefore be categorised according to the normal framework of language and meaning. He cannot be finally or fully described because all our methods and modes of description are drawn from a universe to which he has no contingent relation. Given this it is understandable for Lewis to suggest that a form of perceptual recognition other than that which we normally use to recognise, interpret and understand the universe is needed in the apprehension of God. Understandable - but is it possible? And if it is possible how do we apprehend God? If we have a soul unrelated to space, that, at least, may offer a start, but if not, what then? Lewis seems to rely on some mysterious property within a person's perceptual abilities, probably based upon an elusive mind, for his understanding of our experience of God, but is there an alternative? If there were an alternative it would need to remove the mystery from the perception and yet give some explanation of our experience of God.

There is no mystery attached to our side of any experience of God; if there were it would only be that which is attached to human perception in general. How then are we to understand the numinous and religious experience in general? The basis of the numinous is, as Lewis rightly points out, wonder, a wonder created by the confrontation between the person and the world. There is a gulf of non-understanding when we attempt to categorise our vision of the world with our normal referential framework. We may have interpretive symbols of beauty, power and majesty which we use to understand and categorise the normal events of our life, but when scenes such as mountains rising from out of the early morning mists, gilded with the first rays of the sun, are experienced these symbols dissolve and hardly help at all in an attempt to describe what we see, still less what we feel. Such a confrontation is of course the raw material of creativity and the basis of the struggle to capture and explain the reality of our world. But where is God? The

numinous we are told leads to an apprehension of God. But two people seeing the same event or viewing the same scene will come away with different experiences. One may have his belief in God enhanced, another may have his understanding of beauty enriched and refined, and these, except on the most mystical of interpretations, are clearly very different. It would seem that there is nothing inherent either in man or the universe that leads invariably to a recognition of the existence of God. However, if God is involved in actively disclosing himself then the experience can be explained. The confrontation between the world and our normal pattern of interpretation will often lead to various enterprises calculated to achieve a greater understanding of our world. The extension of understanding is basic to human life and it is almost unnecessary to say that this has resulted in many advances in science and art. On a personal level it contributes to a more complete and integrated approach to life. But it is also an opportunity for God to 'step in' because there is always a threshold beyond which our understanding has not reached up until now. The self-disclosure of God can fill the chasm that separates our limited understanding from our object of perception. In describing religious experience in this way the initiative remains with God. It also means that claimed experiences of God by 'primitive' peoples who 'see' God in a storm need not be simply put down to their lack of knowledge. Their experience may be genuine, God may well have disclosed himself at the very boundary of their understanding. The experience of God is given in every case using an unrefined medium, that is, a medium which exists primarily in the borderlands of our conceptual framework between the recognition and perception of an object and its final interpretation and categorisation. As with all other perception and understanding there is a broad margin where the structures and symbols are incomplete and unworked out. This margin is the realm both of personal creativity and religious experience.

It would seem that at times the natural desire to understand the world using our conceptual tools can work in a different direction from the recognition of God's involvement. If we are always content to find our own explanation and meaning there will be little room for any divine initiative. But if we recognise our inability finally to explain anything then God may disclose himself and reveal his involvement in the world. As earthly and timebound creatures we are unable to recognise anything of God and his creative activity in the world unless he chooses to disclose himself. Therefore our experience of God seems to be dependent upon a divine initiative and upon revelation not apprehension: religious experience first requires a disclosure before we can move to explanation.

Does this account of religious experience have any implications for what we can say about God? If we were to take seriously both our role and God's initiative in our religious experience then the answer to this question would be affirmative. We experience God not first as beyond, but as one who is involved, not first as transcendent but as one who is immanent. We are not simply granted a vision of God's being but an experience of his becoming within the world. The recognition of God beyond the bounds of our universe, as the ultimate, infinite, immortal and perfect creator of the world, comes after our experience of him in the present, participating with us in our world. The recognition of divine transcendence may be required for our full understanding of religious experience and a more complete description of the object of that experience, but that recognition comes after the experience itself, which by its very nature is both dynamic and grounded in the here and now. Wonder may be at the heart of religion but this does not imply that our first experience of God is of his transcendence. Wonder is simply a word around which we can cluster a number of experiences all of which have emotion at their core. Lewis' suspicion of emotion seems odd if it is important for an understanding of wonder, and his relegation of emotion as secondary to cognitive experience is even more odd. Emotion is surely involved in any numinous experience and as such forms a major building block in our understanding of God. Emotions including love, guilt, peace, fear and joy are media through which God can reveal himself and, as such, are not barriers but avenues of his self-disclosure. Lewis seems too ready to rarify our religious experience and too quick to move from wonder to transcendence. Whitehead, although probably guilty of having moved too close to a purely immanentist description of God seems correct in asserting that many theologians are too ready to make God a metaphysical exception:

God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles to save their collapse. He is their exemplification. (15)

Neither is our experience of God different from everything else, and although the object of that experience may on reflection turn out to be totally unique, the experience, to have any coherent content, must be grounded in what we know and can experience, namely our world. Therefore rather than taking the course of argument that starts with God's transcendence and moves to an explanation of his immanent involvement in the universe, the process should be the other way round. Clearly for an experience of God to take place there needs to be a God who initiates a disclosure but this does not mean that our experience is of divine transcendence, in fact because we are bounded by our physical and temporal world, this cannot be. It can only be an experience

of the divine immanence giving us an approximate impression of God's involvement and participation.

Therefore there is a close connection to be found between revelation and our experience of God, in fact it does not seem that religious experience would be possible at all if it were not for the fact that both a divine initiative and human perception were involved in a creative tension. This is not to say that each successive experience starts from scratch in conveying an impression of God's activity. The cumulative experience of divine disclosure builds up, in much the way that Lewis describes, and is used to interpret our experience of God in the present. This can have both positive and negative effects. Positively it can extend our conceptual framework and refine our approximate knowledge of the person and nature of God. But it can also serve to stultify our understanding by forcing previously discovered symbols of interpretation onto new situations which will not bear them.

The initial revelation of God as involved in his creation seems to be borne out in the doctrine of the incarnation. The view that sees God as participating in our experience of the world is highlighted in the horror of the trial and crucifixion of Jesus, and the hope which is generated by a belief in God is focussed most finely in the resurrection. But the whole life of Christ from birth to death also speaks most eloquently of God's concern to share in the life of man. The incarnation is the definitive revelation of God's involvement and unbounded love for his creation and it speaks of his grace and our freedom and hope. Although the incarnation indicates these things it also shows that revelation can never be final. The incarnation gives many answers but it seems to pose at least as many questions as well, and the questions that it throws up seem to be both essential and yet fundamentally unanswerable. Questions such as what is the nature of the relation between God and man in Jesus Christ are vital, and yet they remain in the realm of mystery.

In summary, the experience of God and theological reflection in general find their basis in the dynamic tension created between divine revelation and our perception of the world, immanence should be seen on that basis to be made of recognition prior to divine transcendence which can only be deduced from the evidence of God's revelation and our experience, and although successive experience fills out our picture of God the incarnation provides the fundamental component of both Christian faith and theology.

In starting with divine immanence in this way the approach offered here should not be too closely associated with the 'immanentist' approach to

theology found in process theology. Charles Hartshorne following Whitehead and himself being followed by such as Cobb and Pittenger⁽¹⁶⁾ is overly immanentist because they force a wedge between what he calls the concrete pole of God's existence (his immanence) and his primordial or abstract pole (his transcendence). Only the concrete pole of God's existence is seen to be actually involved within the world and because of this Hartshorne creates complications for himself and produces a fundamental weakness in process theology. Colin Gunton in Becoming and Being has shown quite effectively that this division within the divine being has resulted in what can only be described as an Arian Christology in the particular approach of Charles Hartshorne. However, there are things which can be used from the more convincing parts of process theology. In describing God's present activity in the world, process theologians such as Pittenger and Hartshorne, use creativity as an important component. Here also there appears to be an unfortunate and unnecessary tendency to raise the position of creativity to the level of metaphysical autonomy acting independent of God, but if this tendency is avoided then the basic idea of using an understanding of creativity as a way of describing divine activity seems helpful.

By using creativity in this way it is possible to draw on the investigation of personhood and personal creativity and use it as a theological tool in providing a roughly sketched picture of God's activity. In so doing it is of course recognised that it is only providing one possible approach or model of divine activity and even as a solitary model may only achieve a broad delineation of the ways in which God is acting and creating. Even allowing these qualifications it does seem to provide a useful insight.

In making creativity central to a description of divine involvement and activity it is possible to recognise ways in which God would combine the disparate elements of the past in a continuous creation of the present. God does not, on this view, so much sustain his creation as continually create it each moment. This would result in a different view of creation from the one which supposes that God has created the whole world in the past and is presently sustaining it. The dimensions of space and time could be seen as a framework which God structures for his own purposes. The raw material of God's activity would be seen to be the continual flow of matter, space and time from the past into the present. God combining, synthesising, selecting and structuring would be moulding the present according to his purposes. God seen in this way would be a participator in the suffering and struggle of the world and we could be seen in some sense as co-workers with him, seeking to respond to his will as we perceive it to be. The incarnation

would then be a natural extension of the continual divine involvement in creation. Although God is logically unrestricted by his creation, except where he chooses to limit himself, such descriptions as found in the traditional 'attributes of God' such as impassibility and immutability would be largely inappropriate if applied to this view of the divine activity and nature.

As T. F. Torrance has written in his Space, Time and Incarnation:

If God is merely impassible He has not made room for Himself in our agonied existence, and if He is merely immutable, He has neither place nor time for frail evanescent creatures in His unchanging existence. But the God who has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ as sharing our lot is the God who is really free to make Himself poor, that we through His poverty might be made rich, the God invariant in love but not impassible, constant in faithfulness but not immutable. (18)

Envisioned in this way God is pictured on the creative threshold of the universe or at the centre of each 'now' (in a universe where simultaneity of time now seems impossible with the advent of Einsteinian physics) of every time, structuring the dimensions of space and time and combining the various elements of the past in his continual creation through which he chooses to work and reveal himself. Therefore, religious experience involves a recognition of God's present activity and self-revelation, the process being initiated by God but the participation with him and response to his revelation being ours.

Another area in which there may be an alternative approach to that offered by H. D. Lewis is that of life after death. John Macquarrie and Jürgen Moltmann⁽¹⁹⁾ have expressed the importance of hope not only for a proper understanding of Christianity but also for normal human existence. There is a basic hopefulness attached to all human activity - we would do nothing unless we had some hope of achieving our end or completing the task. Hope seems to give motivation to human existence. If we lose hope we die or go mad. Hope not only motivates but orientates our lives, we have goals and aims which give meaning to our enterprises and endeavours. It is not surprising that human beings should have hopes that extend beyond the grave. Hope of life after death is neither a restricted or a new phenomenon. Even neolithic man showed signs from the way that he buried his dead that he believed in a future existence after death. The bodies were buried with tools and weapons for the next life and placed in a foetal position ready for 're-birth' in the life after death. But however widespread this belief is and however ancient, there remain the questions of how we are to understand a future existence and on what grounds we can expect a life after death. General hopefulness and specific aims have meaning in our present existence because we can see

and evaluate their results, but as soon as we die all such evidence dies with us. Lewis has tried to show that a belief and recognition of the existence of the soul may give at least some hope of life after death. But if a life after death is possible then, whatever its exact nature, it depends upon God, without whom even disembodied existence (unless the soul is indestructible) is impossible. Maurice Wiles⁽²⁰⁾ has noted this as has Lewis himself, but for Lewis the soul seems to present fewer problems. As Nicholas Lash has put it:

A soul in the hand is worth two in the eschaton.⁽²¹⁾

But if it is God that we are relying on for a life after death how it is achieved is of less importance than what is required for a real personal existence. Clearly everything that is required for personal existence in this present life is required, and if the alternative approach to personhood offered in the previous chapter is anything to go by then that means many things. It would seem that some form of 'recapitulation' is required, where our whole lives including all of our development, memories and relationships are summed up and focussed into a new life. If we are not to simply 'jump the tracks' at the end of our life and continue where we left off with whatever stage of senility or memory loss that we had in this life, some approach which includes the whole of our lives being used as the basis for a new one, must be attempted. Memories and bodies, development and relationships are all required if God is to create a new life which can be described as personal. According to this view God would continually draw to himself all the elements of our lives by creating each successive moment. God is drawing the elements of the past into the sphere of his activity not only as the basis of his continual creation but also as the basis of our redemption, achieved by bringing the record of our lives into the realm of his boundless purifying love. In doing this God could be said to be 'recording' or 'storing' each moment, each event, each action and memory for a future re-creation based upon the redeemed recapitulation of our lives. There is a complete picture of each of our lives with God and he is able to use this as the building blocks of a future existence after death, ensuring our identity and continuity. Being redemptive the recapitulation will free and extend our present existence and enable us to live in communion with God in the way that he chooses, which, if it is to be in some way continuous with this life, will include some sort of bodily existence. In the same way that the DNA double helix and our genetic coding are the basis for human life in this existence, the stored complete record of this life forms the basis of the next. This sort of approach seems to provide more than Lewis' rather sterile soul-world existence and is also compatible with the Christian doctrine of resurrection.

It would seem quite clear that both Lewis and the alternative approach to personhood can and do have implications for theological reflections. Some of these implications include the sort of language and the concepts which are used to describe and define religious experience and divine activity. Lewis' view of a temporal, although non-spatial, soul seems to give rise to an approach to religious experience which depends on the apprehension of God in his transcendent state of being and an insight into the dependence of the world upon him for both its existence and explanation. It is interesting that an understanding of individual experience can be so important for Lewis in so many different areas of philosophical and theological reflection. For Lewis it is our personal experience which leads to the recognition of the self or soul and equally it is individual experience that results in our belief in God and our understanding of him as the ultimate being and transcendent creator of the universe. His approach to personhood and the essentials of individual existence not only influence him in this general way but also in a particular sense, especially in his views and speculations about life after death.

The alternative approach is dependent upon a different set of pre-suppositions and the approach to personhood and experience produces very different results. Concepts such as creativity and synthesis are more easily applied to the activity of God because a conceptual framework has been provided that invests these concepts and ideas with meaning. Also, and probably more markedly, a view of human existence that relies on many things including a body and relationships with others for a proper description will affect the way that a life after death is envisaged.

It would seem that any view of personhood if properly applied will transform the other parts of theology in many different ways. A clear and coherent approach to personhood is vital to theology if it is to be meaningful and succeed in offering an understanding of the world and man in relation to God. As such the understanding of what it is to be human acts as a set of joints in the intricate lattice work of theology, forging, linking and holding together the different elements and strands of thought. Or, like a junction box in a household wiring system or an exchange in a telephone network, an approach to personhood is vital if the perceptions and insights of one part of theology are to illuminate, revive and transform others, and facilitate dialogue and interchange between the different areas in theology which might otherwise remain unconnected.

NOTES

Chapter 4

1. Lewis is due to publish The Elusive Self and God which will hopefully give an even clearer understanding of his faith and theology. However, no major change or reorientation is expected.
2. H. D. Lewis, Jesus in the Faith of Christians (Macmillan, 1981), pp. 4 - 5
3. Ibid., p.62
4. H. D. Lewis, Our Experience of God (Allen & Unwin, 1959), p.167
5. Cf. John Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (Basil Blackwell, 1950)
6. H. D. Lewis, Philosophy of Religion, p.146
7. H. D. Lewis, Jesus in the Faith of Christians, pp. 4 - 5
8. H. D. Lewis, Philosophy of Religion, p.142
9. H. D. Lewis, Our Experience of God, p.9
10. H. D. Lewis, Persons and Life After Death, p.157
11. H. D. Lewis, Jesus in the Faith of Christians, p.2
12. Ibid., p.3
13. H. D. Lewis, Persons and Life after Death, p.157
14. Cf. p.26f.
15. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (Cambridge University Press, 1929) p.321. Cf. also W. N. Pittenger, Process Thought and Christian Faith (Nisbett, 1968), p.26
16. See the bibliography for individual book titles
17. C. Gunton, Becoming and Being, pp. 220 ff.
18. T. F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, p.75
19. Cf. John Macquarrie, The Christian Hope (S.C.M., 1982) and J. Moltman, The Theology of Hope (S.C.M., 1965)
20. M. Wiles, "Remaking Christian Theology", Appendix to The Resurrection of the Body (S.C.M., 1974 - 5)
21. N. Lash, Theology on Dover Beach (Darton, Longman & Todd, 1979), p.165

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

This thesis has from the outset considered which criteria are admissible and appropriate to be used in a description and discussion of personhood. There have been two possible approaches presented, both of which use different criteria and different arguments and thereby arrive at a different model of personhood. It would seem that in some ways each approach is strongest where the other is weakest. Lewis' approach is strongest in its recognition of cognitive experience at the heart of our experience of selfhood. The alternative approach is strongest in that it accounts for personal development and creativity and takes seriously the findings of the 'sciences of man' - psychology and sociology. It is precisely in these areas that the other is weakest. Lewis takes too little account of personal development and seems to set little store by the behavioural sciences. The alternative approach on the other hand seems to fall short in providing an adequate explanation of the 'I' of experience. Is there any hope that these weaknesses may be overcome by either or both of the approaches?

Lewis has adopted a dualism that is both radical and reductionist: radical in that it postulates a fundamental divide between body and soul; reductionist in that it has a tendency to move towards a description of what is seen to be the essence of personhood, cutting away unnecessary and obscure areas and focussing more and more on what is taken to be necessary and essential. It is this tendency in the work of Lewis that results in the weakness of not recognising the importance of personal development or the contribution of psychology and sociology to any discussion of man. It would seem to be evident that for Lewis to redress this weakness he would not only have to accept it as such, which in itself is doubtful, but then attempt a major redirecting of his arguments which seem at the moment to move in one direction only, and turn them to become more inclusive. Whether this is possible or will ever take place is doubtful - it would require too much of a revolution in Lewis' work.

The alternative approach, however, is a different proposition altogether. It has an empiricist foundation and relies to a large degree on scientific method and statistical material which can be found in the behavioural sciences. But the tendency within the approach is far from reductionist, in fact it leads in the opposite direction. The alternative approach deliberately sets out to be inclusive and has a tendency towards holism. It is holistic in

as far as it postulates that the components of a person's life are not sufficient to explain his overall existence, there is something more: there is his interaction with others. It is both the components and their mutual interaction that explain personhood. Although the alternative approach does not fully account for the experience and personal recognition of selfhood, it seems to be on the right track. It may be that the holistic tendency will need to be enhanced and developed, but with the propensity towards inclusiveness as well established as it is within the approach this should present few problems. Again it may be that further insights need to be gleaned from other areas. One particular approach which begins from a broadly similar base and which makes a real attempt at resolving the problem of self-knowledge is that which Douglas Hofstadter advances in Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, and again in The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul ⁽¹⁾ with his co-writer/collator Daniel Dennet. There is not enough space to include a discussion of his arguments which are advanced in the two books (Gödel, Escher, Bach is itself over 700 pages in length!). But basically Hofstadter, moving from a complex philosophical base, advances the theory that reflection, recognition of the 'I' of experience and the human thought processes in general, depend upon a cyclical or helical development of sensory impulses and stored information in the brain. Self-awareness seems to be gained by the constant circulating flow of information. Each moment produces a new threshold of experience and perception. The threshold acts as a reflective and experiential platform which enables a monitoring of where the process has come from: this secondary form of reflection is in itself what might be described as a sub-angle of the overall process. At first the process would be very momentary, but as a child grows to adulthood the recognition of identity grows and the development of the process becomes more refined. Perhaps with some alterations and with further thought and research this sort of understanding could be investigated and even integrated into the alternative approach to personhood and found here, thereby strengthening its theoretical basis and giving a clearer account of selfhood. Of course the brief description of Hofstadter's approach is not sufficient fully to comment it. The direction of his thesis however may indicate that the sort of approach which is offered in this thesis as an alternative to Lewis' dualism may have many more possibilities for development and refinement. It is for this reason that more approval has been expressed for the alternative approach rather than for that of Lewis. It seems to offer a greater flexibility and more of a hope of resolving its major problems and weaknesses. As far as Lewis is concerned the findings of this thesis would commend him to a broadening of his approach. If this is impossible then he should at least come to terms with the problems his approach poses for a contemporary understanding of space and time, as was outlined in

the final part of the chapter on H. D. Lewis.⁽²⁾

In the previous chapter some of the theological implications of the two approaches were outlined. As a closing thought, perhaps one further area of theology as yet not mentioned should be broached, that of practical theology. It is evident that a throughgoing model of personal existence is important to both theology in general and to certain individual areas of theological concern. One of the most important of these particular areas is that of practical theology. It would seem that practical theology is in many ways the Cinderella of theology with neither enough attention or time being given to it by professional theologians. This is regrettable, because, surely, it is in praxis that theology is grounded and it is to the needs of the Church and the world that theology must first be directed. In some ways practical theology remains relatively uncharted ground in this country with but a trickle of literature devoted to it compared with the great maelstrom created by other areas. If a significant interest in practical theology is rekindled, it will be of prime importance that some account of personhood which is flexible enough to be applied to the many different areas with which practical theology is concerned and broad enough to account for insights of the behavioural sciences is introduced in the initial stages of study. Such an approach is indicated by the alternative offered in this thesis. Lewis' dualism as a model of personal existence would not offer much that was new and applicable to practical theology. Ending on a personal note, if I were to continue to study in this area of the theological and philosophical implications of personhood it would be with reference to some of the major themes of practical theology that I would address it.

NOTES

Chapter 5 (Conclusion)

1. D. Hofstadter and D. Dennet, The Mind's I, especially chapters 18, 22 - 4.
2. See p. 17 f.

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