ETHNO-NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

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ETHNO-NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

Jamshid Gaziyev

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Government and International Affairs
University of Durham
October 2008
ETHNO-NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

Jamshid Gaziyev

ABSTRACT

THE last years of the Soviet Union were the most challenging for the nations of Central Asia. These nations witnessed the dramatic collapse of the Soviet federal system and beheld with disbelief the tragic unfolding of inter-ethnic violence in the land of ‘eternal friendship of brotherly nations’. Their disbelief, though understandable, presents the two puzzles that this dissertation addresses: (1) “how can one explain the outbreak of unprecedented inter-ethnic clashes in the lands where gracious internationalism should have replaced chauvinist nationalism?” and (2) “what lessons can be learnt from Central Asia’s nation-formational processes and its recent experiences of ethnic violence lest mistakes be repeated in its present and future socio-political development?” These puzzles, and solutions to them, are not only significant and intriguing in the regional context of Central Asia. They correspond to a set of larger, meta-theoretical questions in Social Sciences: (1) how do ethnicity and nationhood originate and change? (2) why do certain ethno-national movements become politically salient and others do not? and (3) how do ethnic conflicts arise and develop?
This dissertation uniquely employs the institutionalist approach to explain the above puzzles and theoretical questions in the context of Central Asia. By exploring the nature and dynamics of nation-formation in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, this work concludes that territorial nationhood and ethnic nationality have become pervasively institutionalized social and political forms in Central Asia as a result of the Soviet nationalities policy. The analysis of inter-ethnic strife in Central Asia during the last years of the Soviet empire, with a special focus on the Osh conflict, confirms that ethnic conflicts and inter-ethnic relations in the region were, and will remain, crucially framed, constituted and reconciled by rigidly institutionalized definitions of ethnicity and nationality. Following these findings, the study recommends considering institutional reforms within the framework of the rule of law and constitutionalism for deliberations of mechanisms and measures aimed at building more peaceful and secure inter-ethnic relations in Central Asia. The dissertation therefore urges policy-makers and other stakeholders in the region to take fuller advantage of the benefits of such institutional reforms at the state-structural level with the view to controlling and counter-balancing the effects of institutionalized ethno-nationalism in Central Asia, and perhaps beyond.
DEDICATION

To my beloved mother, Urun Boltaeva,

for

Paradise lies under her feet.
DECLARATION

This thesis is the result of my own work. Material from the published or unpublished work of others which is used in the thesis is credited to the author in question in the text.

Jamshid Gaziyev
Vienna, October 2008
FEW individuals can bring a major research projects to fruition without the help of other people, and I am no exception. I am profoundly indebted to Professor Anoush Ehteshami for his unwavering enthusiasm for my project and possessing an uncanny ability to offer the right sort of advice at exactly the right time. He has been the best of all possible advisers. Dr. Peter Kneen helped in formulating the research project at its initial stages with thoughtful comments and suggestions. My former colleagues at the Department of Politics helped me with their wider experience and knowledge. I am also grateful to Sergei Negoda and Sergej Daut for their help and support during the writing up of the research.

The research and writing of this thesis benefited from the support from a number of institutions. For the duration of three years of the project, I was supported by the Doctoral Research Fellowship from the University of Durham. Toda Institute of Hawaii, USA awarded me with the Human Security and Global Governance fellowship. I was also assisted by the Open Society Institute’s Global Supplementary Grant for the initial stage of the research. My field trips to Central Asia were kindly supported by the junior award of the Gilbert Murray Trust, Oxford and travel award of the British and Foreign School Society in summer 2001, as well as by the research award of British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, junior award of the Gilbert Murray Trust, research award of the British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies, graduate award of the British
International Studies Association and travel grant of the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham in summer 2002. I am extremely humbled by their trust in my skills and research, and grateful to all of these organizations for their generous support. It goes without saying that none of them is responsible for the views expressed in my work.

Last, but not least, I have been fortunate to have my mother’s blessings and encouragement throughout this long journey for which, among many other things, I am ever thankful and forever in debt.
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<tr>
<td>ASSR</td>
<td>Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>Committee for State Security</td>
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<td>KPK</td>
<td>Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<td>KPQ</td>
<td>Communist Party of Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>KPSS</td>
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<td>KSSR</td>
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<td>MVD</td>
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<td>NEP</td>
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<td>RSFSR</td>
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<td>TsIK</td>
<td>Central Executive Committee</td>
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<td>TASSR</td>
<td>Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<td>TsK KPSS</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
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<td>UzSSR</td>
<td>Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

I have translated Russian words according to the US Library of Congress transliteration system, as shown below. The spelling of geographical names and places in Central Asia roughly corresponds to the Russified version used under Soviet rule, but has been modified to take into account newer versions that have recently become standard usage. All translations from foreign language sources into English are my own, unless otherwise indicated.

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CHAPTER I, INTRODUCTION
LOOKING back at the dramatic demise of the Soviet Union, two immediate questions were frequently posed: what caused the collapse of the Soviet state and what are those new independent nations replacing it? While the first question preoccupied the minds of researchers and scholars, the second worried Western policy-makers who were anxious to learn more about the new independent nations and build bridges with them. Copious literature was thus produced on the former Soviet Union states, as well as on Central Asia in particular. They sought to explore and explain the nature of Central Asian nations, predict their future development, and propose variety of ways to better understanding them.

In the process of that exploration, theoretical and methodological tensions and deficiencies increasingly pervaded the study of ethnicity and nationalism in Central Asia. Even though there was a growing output in the field of nationalism in the former Soviet Union and Central Asia, much of the literature was skewed and polarized between various positions and epistemologies. The predominant perspectives on nationality and ethnicity vacillated between primordialism and modernism. The primordialist perspective on Central Asia tends to define ethnicity and nationality as a historical determinant and substantial force with the efficacious potential for action. It emphasizes the deep roots, ancient origins, and emotive power of national attachments.
Admittedly, few and earlier works on the region featured the primordialist viewpoints. An example of a primordialist description could be seen in the following description of ethnic discords in the Soviet Central Asia: “The open expression of hostile attitude of non-Russians against Russians, the Armenians against the Azeris and the Meskhetian Turks against Uzbeks is a manifestation of a deep resentment imbedded in the ruptured ego of suppressed nationalities; vying with each other to ascertain their national identities and ensure for them tenets of real self-determination”. In this context, Minogue’s metaphor of a *sleeping beauty* is worth quoting to illustrate such primordialist position. Accordingly, nation is viewed as the Sleeping Beauty who is waiting for a magical kiss from nationalism, the Prince, for its awakening. When reading primordialist literature, it is frequent to come across with such vivid phrases as ‘centuries of old antagonisms’ between this and that nationality in the region, or that ethno-national disputes have always been a major feature of the Central Asian landscape. We could take an instance of Bill Keller’s report on ethnic turmoil in Soviet Azerbaijan: “The disturbances in the south are the worst outbreak of the centuries-old antagonism between the predominantly Islamic Azerbaijanis the mainly Christian Armenians since anti-Armenian riots two years ago in a Caspian Sea industrial city, Sumgait”.

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On the other hand, modernist perspectives on Central Asia reject primordialist claims that nations are ancient or immemorial, or that they are given. They stress the fluidity and malleability of ethnicity and nationhood. Modernists suggest “instead of thinking of identity as an accomplished fact, which the new cultural practices then represent, we should think, instead, of identity as a ‘production’, which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation”. Nationhood should be treated as neither given nor fixed, but as determined, consciously or unconsciously, by the group itself and as variable according to changing circumstances. Modernists/constructivists maintain that the fact that nations are ‘invented’ or ‘imagined’ does not make them ‘less real’ in the eyes of those who believe in them.

Thus, the modernist approach to Central Asia would, for example, look into the role of Soviet and post-Soviet authorities in controlling, harnessing and manipulating ethno-national categories in the region. Borrowing Suny’s analogy, modernists’ standpoint reflects the ‘Bride of Frankenstein’ view on the Central Asian ethno-nationhood. That view understands ethnicity and nationalism as ‘created’ and ‘imagined’ identities in the Central Asian communities. In the past, the modernist/constructivist school of thought had limited resonance in the Soviet

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and Central Asian studies, but has been gaining wider adherence in recent years. Proponents of this approach draw parallels from European social experience and stress the importance of modernization.

They emphasize the transformation of society into a new industrial society with the concomitant processes of political and economic centralization, standardization of education, and the effects of mass literacy and the mass media. But modernization scholars downplay a crucial aspect in explaining the invented nature of nations - state intervention. Changes in the society involving increased communication and population mobilization rarely happen without the intervention of a centralized state.

The assessment of nationhood makes it evident that the ‘macro’ explanations of a general theory of nationalism are not possible. In other words, there can be no ‘general’ or ‘overarching’ theory of nationhood. Most theories and perspectives seem to point to different facets of nationhood and vary in significance depending on the context. It is indeed the case that “grasping nationalism in its multiplicity of forms requires multiple theories”. Indeed, in order to better understand nationalism today, it is important to challenge the notion that all the important questions about nations and nationalism have been answered.

This study seeks to move beyond the impasse by side-stepping the question “what is the nation?” and focusing on the nations as a category of practice and institutionalized cultural and political form, following Rogers

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Brubaker’s institutionalist approach to nationhood. The dissertation will examine the institutional formation and development of nations in Central Asia and show how state institutions, both Soviet and post-Soviet, have played a crucial role in forming and sustaining ethno-nationalism in the region. For the first time, institutionalist perspective will directly be employed here to explore how ethnicity and nationhood as a political and cultural form became institutionalized in Central Asian states, and how nation works as a practical category and classificatory scheme in the region. It is not the intention of the author to constitute yet another theory of nationalism through institutionalist perspective, but rather provide an alternative framework to organize and explain nationalism in the historical, political and social contexts of Soviet and post-Soviet Central Asia. As an organizing framework, the institutionalist perspective of the study does not seek to replace but to include and go beyond existing studies and approaches in explaining how the dual legacy of institutionalized nationhood has continued to shape the national question in independent Central Asia.

The institutionalist model is hoped to make the need urgent for new directions in the research of post-Soviet nationalisms. The dissertation’s test of the institutionalist framework against the historical evidence of Central Asia will not only shed new light on nation-formation and nation-building in the region, but will also make an original contribution to the wider scholarly development of theoretically informed approaches to understand better the relation between

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nation-building processes and ethnic conflicts in general, and in Central Asia in particular.

The study will illustrate that the institutional condensation of nationality in the Soviet Union was by no means an empty form or the Soviet propaganda, brandishing the increased indigenization and ethno-nationalization in the soviet national republics. Institutionally-defined nationhood not only played a role in the disintegration of the Soviet state, but continues to shape and structure the national question in the newly-independent Central Asia. The Soviet Union organized Central Asian political space according to the Leninist ideology of nationhood, basing it on four central characteristics: common economic life, common language, common territory and common national character. It succeeded in embedding the sentiments of nationhood and ethnicity profoundly in the imaginations of Central Asian people.

Post-Soviet Central Asia is the heir to the Leninist ethno-national territorialization. Ethnicity and nationality remain important categories and processes in the regional political development, and are therefore critical for understanding Central Asian societies today. As the legacy of the institutionalized ethno-nationalism was bound to have a long-term affect on political and social development of the local societies, the study will analyze the effect of the institutionalized nationhood on Central Asia in terms of ethnic conflicts. The increased politicization of nationhood and ethno-political tensions in Central Asia were the consequences of the Soviet regime’s institutional crystallization and codification of nationhood as the main organizing principle of the society. The dissertation will also address the dramatic politicization of ethno-nationhood in
Central Asia during the last years of the Soviet Union and the first years of independence, as well as explore how the expanded political scene during perestroika not only allowed for greater political mobilization along national lines but also changed the dynamics of inter-ethnic interaction.

The topic of ethno-national dimension of the Soviet collapse has been discussed and debated at great length by scholars both inside and outside the former USSR. The unfolding violent upheavals were referred to as ethnic or nationalistic clashes. The above-mentioned primordialist account explained the conflicts as an echo of ancient hatreds and struggles, which were suppressed or controlled by the communist regime. Even Marxist modernist Hobsbawm claimed that the nationalist disintegration of the Soviet state was more a consequence of the collapse of the regime than a cause of it. But Hroch rejects such conventional view that the turmoil is “the result of the release of irrational forces that were long suppressed - ‘deep-frozen’ as it were - under communism, and are now in full revival after a lapse of fifty years, is evidently superficial”.

In their assessment of regionalism and ethnic conflict in the former Soviet Union, Hughs and Sasse

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contest the notion that the conflicts in the region can be primarily explained as resurgent ‘unfinished business’ from past nationalist or ethnic conflicts.\footnote{Hughes, J. and G. Sasse (2002). Comparing Regional and Ethnic Conflicts in Post-Soviet Transition States. \textit{Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict}. J. Hughes and G. Sasse. London, Frank Cass Publishers, p. 2}

The demise of the Soviet state released conflict potential, which was dispersed mostly along ethno-national lines. While Gellner denied the possibility of a ‘third way’ for cultural pluralism between the assimilatory and the nationalizing state,\footnote{Gellner, E. (1997). \textit{Nationalism}. London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson.} a significant body of literature illustrates that deeply divided societies can be stabilized by political mechanisms and strategies of regulation. In the survey of such solutions, O’Leary identified two major instruments: first, an institutional approach that focuses on constitutional and institutional design with a preference for consociational devices, federalism, or autonomy arrangements; and second, a ‘group-differentiated rights’ approach.\footnote{O’Leary, B. (2001). \textit{Nationalism and Ethnicity: Research Agendas on Theories of Their Sources and Their Regulation. Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences and Possible Solutions}. D. Chirot and M. Seligman. Washington D.C., American Psychological Association.} The analysis of Central Asian conflicts by this study will focus on the first approach, by exploring the institutional foundations of the nation-building process, which was inherited from the Soviet ethno-nationalized federal state. Such ‘institutionalized multinationality’ was the key contributing factor in the nationalization of politics and the ‘ethno-constitutional’ crisis during the disintegration of the USSR.\footnote{The thesis will therefore explore the dynamics of ethno-political clashes during and after the fall of the Soviet Central Asia, in particular in Osh oblast’ (region), south of Kyrgyzstan. It is argued here that the Soviet institutional legacy for regulating ethno-nationhood and how it was constructed and re-constructed.
during and after the demise of the Soviet state has been a crucial structural factor in the causation of conflicts in Central Asia. In that context, the study will also explore the role of institutional reforms at the state-structural level and within the framework of democratization and the rule of law in managing the institutionalized ethno-nationalism in the region.

The unprecedented inter-ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz majority and Uzbek minority groups in Osh were selected for a detailed analysis for a number of reasons. First, ethnic violence in Osh took place in the context of the increased political and ethno-national mobilization from 1986 till early 1990s in Central Asia. Secondly, the Osh conflict involved two national groups, Uzbek and Kyrgyz, whose ethno-cultural and territorial nation-formation falls under the detailed institutional survey of the thesis. Third, the scale of casualties and intensity of the Osh conflict, which shocked not only the local population but even central authorities in Moscow, was unsurpassed by other inter-ethnic riots in the region, bar the civil war in Tajikistan. And fourth, the analysis of the Osh conflict could inform our understanding of current inter-ethnic dynamics in the present-day south Kyrgyzstan.

It is important to acknowledge several recent studies carried out on ethnicity, territory and conflict resolution in Central Asia, especially those that benefited from extensive field research. Drawing on critical social theory in geography, Nick Megoran looks at the non-ethnic issue of the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan border dispute from 1999 to 2000 and examines why the border

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tension occurred and how it changed the Ferghana Valley as a result. Megoran emphasizes the importance of the interaction of domestic power struggles in both countries, and asserts that the border acted as both a material and discursive site, where elites struggled to gain or retain control of power and to imprint their own geopolitical visions of post-Soviet space on the Valley.

In an anthropological study of authority and space in Osh Uzbek community in the 1990s, Morgan Liu explores how the spatiality of everyday social life within Uzbek neighbourhoods (mahallas) in Osh, Kyrgyzstan produced tacit expectations of authority as being something spatially dispersed. Following their experience under the Soviet rule, Uzbeks in Osh expected a welfare-oriented role of the state in society and felt disappointed by the Kyrgyz state’s failure to provide for its population and to control the surge of unemployment, inflation and criminal activity. According to Liu, discrimination and disempowerment in the post-independent Kyrgyzstan prompted Uzbek men in Osh to interpret events and trends through a vision of an ideal authority and polity around images of the neighbouring Uzbekistan and its president, Islam Karimov, who was recognized as the idealized ‘Khan’, a benevolent despot capable of resolving their post-Soviet problems. They saw the post-Soviet development in terms of eventual economic and political liberalization, however, the actual path and pacing of reforms would be determined by the paternalistic state leader (like Karimov), who “would run the

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state with a personal moral burden of stewardship similar to that with which a father was supposed to run an Uzbek household”.22

Liu’s research provides a useful insight to how the understanding of authority by Uzbeks in Osh shaped their vision of idealized Uzbekistan and unpromising Kyrgyzstan in the first decade after independence. That period was characterized by the prevalence of comparatively better economic and social conditions in Uzbekistan than in other neighbouring countries. As the socio-economic and political situation in Uzbekistan deteriorated in the late 1990s, the Uzbek community in Kyrgyzstan changed their perception of their idealized neighbour. Uzbekistan’s actions to ‘secure’ the border with Kyrgyzstan through aggressive patrols and checkpoints, mining of borders and the introduction of a visa regime led to the disenchantment and unease across the border. In a predicament where they found themselves unable to connect politically to Uzbekistan, Osh Uzbeks realized the futility of expecting Uzbekistan to address their concerns and needs. In fact, a small survey conducted by Fumagalli with 136 Uzbeks from the south of Kyrgyzstan revealed that three quarters of respondents indicated that it was the duty if all the citizens of the republic and also of state institutions to look after the interests of non-titular groups.23 The findings of another survey done by Elebayeva, Omuraliev and Abazov suggested a widespread desire to be part of the new state and that most people accepted the

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22 Liu, M. (2002). Recognizing the Khan: Authority, Space and Political Imagination Among Uzbek Men in Post-Soviet Osh, Kyrgyzstan, Michigan, Ph.D, p. 4
reality of living in Kyrgyzstan with its advantages and disadvantages. According to Megoran’s research, the border crisis of 1999-2000 compelled Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan to “confront the reality of the division of two states for the first time”, and that it could force them to “seek to establish a future for themselves in Kyrgyzstan, of seeking participatory ‘voice’ rather than ‘exit’”.  

Morgan Liu rightly points to the importance of addressing “the actualities of how processes of change play out on the small scales of communities and individuals” when interpreting “the complex post-socialist transformations through a grand narrative of ‘transition’ toward democracy and the market”. However, it is difficult to accept that the actual processes of democratic ideas and institutional practices that take root, or fail to do so, in the post-Soviet Central Asian societies “occur in the sphere of not national politics but everyday life”. Indeed, Liu’s ethnographic work in small Osh mahallas does not exclude the possibility of those processes taking place in national politics, but only illustrates how they interact on a small, local level. In that context, one could not agree more with Megoran who points out that “Liu’s theories about the mahalla as a field of power that structures responses to the nation-state are compelling and important, but it would be a mistake to confuse one moment in a small neighbourhood of Osh...
for a more stable element of Uzbekness in southern Kyrgyzstan”\(^{28}\). In addition, Liu’s research does not attempt to propose a general theory of its own. Neither does it address how the political imagination and recognition of an ideal Khan has been politicized in the post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.

In a comparative study of ethnic minority mobilization in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,\(^{29}\) Mateo Fumagalli explores how the memory of the Osh conflict and Tajik civil war were framed by the leaders of Uzbek communities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and what impact they had on the course of Uzbek mobilization. Building on the contribution of frame analysis,\(^{30}\) he examines different frames adopted and articulated by the Uzbek elites to mobilize and demobilize the community and asserts that the more successful frames were less confrontational, and led the Uzbek groups towards a non-confrontational path with the authorities.

Fumagalli draws four broad conclusions from his study of frames in Central Asia.\(^{31}\) First, he holds that state actors and leaders created a self-reinforcing frame for the post-independence period to support the incumbent as the only purported means of maintaining inter-ethnic stability. That apparently resulted in the demobilization and exclusion of the Uzbek community from politics in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Second, he points to the significance of the

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common legacy of the Soviet nationality policies, which conditioned the framing of the Uzbek question along the Soviet experience and discourses on internationalism and inter-ethnic harmony. Third, it is argued that frames are ‘quintessentially relational’ that implies their concurrent utility to mobilize or demobilize the population. And fourth, the research adds to the previous studies looking into the ‘internal heterogeneity’ of the Uzbek community in both countries and “cautions against the assumption of internal cohesiveness of a community simply out of common ethnic bonds”.32

Most of Fumagalli’s findings can be corroborated by the evidence from other field studies, with the exception of the demobilizing idea of the Uzbek community in the post-independent Kyrgyzstan. According to that idea, Uzbek leaders in Kyrgyzstan used the memory of the Osh conflict not only to rally support for state authorities and legitimize their position as intermediaries, but also to warn against the risks of ethnic outbidding that could politicize Uzbek issues and destabilize inter-ethnic relations.33 The prevention of such inter-ethnic destabilization was therefore achieved by the demobilization of the Uzbek community through “convincing ordinary Uzbeks of the consequences of creating an ‘Uzbek question’ in the country”.34

While the first observation of the strategic framing of inter-ethnic issues rightly acknowledges the continuance of the approach adopted by the Soviet regime, the second conclusion of the demobilized Uzbek community in

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Kyrgyzstan is debatable for a number of reasons. First, there is a conceptual confusion with the proposed concept of a demobilizing idea, which Fumagalli defines as “a type of frame strategically developed by elites which leads the target community from mobilization to demobilization”. Given that he understands mobilization in terms of Nedelmann’s broad definition that refers to “the actors’ attempt to influence the existing distribution of power”, the demobilization of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan would imply the absence of attempts by Uzbeks to influence the distribution of power in the country. Such a proposition is contrary to the facts that point to numerous attempts by the leading figures of the Uzbek community to challenge the status quo. The demobilization of the group would also go against Fumagalli’s insistence on the ‘quintessentially relational’ nature of frames.

What Fumagalli might have meant to suggest could be that the radical mobilizing ideas of separatism and autonomy failed to resonate with the majority of the Uzbek community in Kyrgyzstan, who instead opted for less confrontational frames that were hoped to address their concerns and interests without aggravating inter-ethnic tensions. This leads us to the second point. Fumagalli’s frames-focused research provides an interesting insight to ethnic mobilization in the south Kyrgyzstan, but any understanding of political mobilization among ethno-national groups should also draw from an assessment of structural explanations, which either enable or constraint opportunities for mobilization.

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Frame theorist Gorenburg is correct to claim that: “To be successful, nationalist leaders had to frame their demands in language and imagery that could resonate with the population”. However, the success and development of political mobilization also depends on structural factors, including a critical role of the state, its policies and institutions, that would expand or constraint political opportunities. With that in mind, Tarrow famously pointed to the crucial political opportunity structure, which he defined as the “dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure”.

The structural factors (the legacy of Soviet ethno-federalism, the centrality of inter-ethnic stability in politics, official ban of ethnic political movements etc.) play an indirect background role in Fumagalli’s study, rather than taking centre stage. And finally, the research would also be strengthened by an assessment of how the cultural framing of the conflict memory affected the ethno-political mobilization of the ‘other’ side, the Kyrgyz or Tajik titular majority. Ethno-nationalism, as a rule, involves at least two groups and is often seen as a political contest between those groups.

This study’s geographic focus is intentionally confined to Kyrgyz and Uzbek nations for a number of reasons. First, even though the review of this kind could benefit from extending units of analysis to include other Central Asian nations (Kazakh, Tajik and Turkmen) that would however come at the detriment

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37 In fact, Fumagalli mentions the use of nationalist frames by Davron Sabirov, head of the ‘Society of Uzbeks’ during Kyrgyzstan’s 2000 parliamentary campaign, as well as the petition sent to the state authorities by the ‘Jalalabad Uzbek Cultural Centre’.
of the study’s focus and probably in contravention with the postulated space limitation. Second, Kyrgyz and Uzbek nations represent two historically prevailing kinds of social groups of the Central Asian society, namely nomadic and settled, respectively. Third, the relative homogeneity and historical commonality of Central Asia lends validity to the assessment of trends in regional ethno-national development through the prism of formational processes in the selected two countries of the region. And fourth, the two nations inhabit the strategic Ferghana Valley, the most volatile area in Central Asia due to complex borders, multi-ethnic composition, dense population and socio-economic hardships.

Bearing in mind research objectives outlined above, the crucial issue is identifying the most appropriate form of analysis. A balanced methodological approach is essential, which can incorporate the advantages of differing levels of analysis. A qualitative and comparative assessment of the nature of ethnicity and nationhood would be required, as well as a wider contextual understanding of their functioning in Central Asia. The thesis will address research questions by applying the original institutional approach, so far mostly utilized in West and East European studies, to the understanding of ethno-nationality in Central Asia. The innovative use of the analytical account allows viewing nationhood not as an ethno-demographic or ethno-cultural fact, but rather as a political claim. It enables us to see nation as a category used to change the world, transform people’s self-perception, mobilize loyalties and articulate demands. The institutional perspective is the optimal medium for this study, as it is well placed to explain the

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institutional crystallizations of nationhood in Central Asia and its effect on the political stability in the region.

The research relies mainly on the qualitative analysis of wide-ranging and inter-disciplinary sources. The study also draws from the primary sources of information, which as mainly newspapers, publications and electronic outlets in the original languages (Russian and Uzbek). Two short fieldtrips were carried out to Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek and Osh) and Uzbekistan (Tashkent) in August 2001 and September 2002, respectively. The brief duration of the stays in the locations allowed research visits to the local state and academic libraries, as well as academies of sciences and universities. In conducting the research, the author has been aware of any subjectivity stemming from his personal background, multi-lingual Uzbek (Russian, Tajik, and Uzbek) originally from Bukhara, Uzbekistan. However, every effort has been made to ensure academic objectivity to the extent possible.

The dissertation is structurally divided into six chapters, including this introductory section. The next, second, chapter provides an examination of the existing literature to determine the origins of the term ethnicity and identify the nature of ethnic group and ethnic identity. The third chapter considers major perspectives on nationhood and ethnicity and defines key questions around which the debate on ethno-nationalism revolves. It also provides a robust justification and description of the institutionalist perspectives on nationhood, which will serve as a framework for analysis for consequent discussion. The fourth chapter tests

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40 Funds were sought for a more extensive fieldwork, but the research funding was limited and no additional financial resources were made available to the researcher in that regard.
the institutional approach in the context of the national formation and development in pre-Soviet and Soviet Central Asia. It explores the main stages of identity-formation in the region before the Bolsheviks and addresses the institutional ethno-nationalization during the Soviet rule. The fifth chapter examines the dramatic politicization of ethno-nationhood in Central Asia during the fall of the Soviet Union and describes the consequences of the national mobilization on the inter-ethnic relations in the region. It analyzes the dynamics of ethno-political clashes in Central Asia and explores specifically the Osh ethnic conflict in the context of institutionalized ethno-nationalism. Consequently, the chapter assesses the role of institutional reforms in the context of democratization and legitimation in managing ethno-political conflicts. The final chapter includes the concluding remarks from the author and the scope for further research.
Map 1. Central Asian nation-states today

CHAPTER II, CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ETHNICITY
1.0 Introduction

In recent seasons especially, there have been dozens of academic safaris in the field trying to track the snowman of ‘ethnicity’, everyone sure now that it exists and is important, more important than people thought, but no one sure what it looks like, much less whether it is abominable or not. (Harold Isaacs)

SINCE Isaacs’ writing on ethnicity in the 1970s, a notable progress has been achieved in ‘tracking’ the concepts of ethnicity and nationalism, due to burgeoning research in the field. Academic interest in the field increased as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and consequent ethno-nationalist events. Despite this, the nature of ethnicity and nationalism remains complex and divisive. Various scholars and researchers approach ethnicity from different vantage points and are conditioned by the disciplinary frameworks within which they operate. The literature on ethnicity and nationalism still fails to yield either definitional precision or usable empirical referents for its study. The concepts are highly contested, and there is no agreement over their nature. No wonder than that the phenomena invite endless definitional arguments among contemporary intellectuals. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to outline the debate on the nature of ethnicity and related terms and to offer a more definitional precision of the concepts by presenting the plurality and commonality of views on the subject.

The chapter will thus discuss the origins and definition of the term ‘ethnicity’, explore how ethnic group and ethnic identity are defined, as well as

explain how ethnicity relates to other concepts such as ‘race’ and ‘nation’. The conceptualization of ethnicity will inform and feed the discussions in consequent chapters, which will explore how our understanding of the development of ethno-nationalism in Central Asia can contribute to better understanding of ethnic conflicts in the region. It will therefore serve as crucial building blocks in the bigger, scholarly structure.

2.0 Origins of ethnicity

The word ‘ethnicity’ is relatively new in the English vocabulary. It only entered the lexicon in the 1950s. Because the origins of the word are not English, etymological discussion of the roots of the term and the ways it emerged in vernacular English can shed some light on its current usage.

The origins of ethnicity are usually traced back to the Greek word ‘ethnos’. The term ethnos in the ancient times covered a variety of meanings, but in all of its usages it had a common denotation of a number of people who live together making up a clan or tribe sharing cultural attributes or biological characteristics of a group. A useful parallel can be drawn from the early Greek use of ethnos to the contemporary English usage of ‘tribe’ with strong aspects of “naturality, of non-legitimate social organization, of disorganization, and of animality”. The use of

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ethnos for non-structured, tribal and peripheral peoples in classical Greek seems to have been transmitted unaltered into Modern Greek.45

Another usage of ethnos was implied in reference to peoples that are distinguishable. Such usage was useful for the situations when there was a need to distinguish between own (our) people and alien (other) people. Greeks therefore called themselves genos Hellenon, which was used in juxtaposition to other, non-Greek people, ethnea. That denotation could indeed be the first seed of the consequent development in the discourse of us/other in social landscape. The seed grew into a solid tree of fallacious categorization of assumed non-ethnic as us and ethnic as others. Such understanding has undoubtedly had a tremendous effect on our perceptions in the field of ethnic studies: most, as a rule, apply the adjective ‘ethnic’ to refer to other people (minority groups and immigrants as a norm), which do not constitute a majority of the total population who, in turn, are classified as non-ethnic citizens, countrymen or nation. This, however, is challenged by increasing appreciation among well-informed scholars and practitioners of the fact that the term ethnic is equally pertinent to the categorization of groups who can be the majority or minority (us and other).

In English, the term ‘ethnic’ had meant ‘pagan’ and ‘non-Christian’ till the nineteenth century, but from the mid-nineteenth century it altered its meaning among intellectuals to denote a group of people with shared characteristics.46 It is worth noting that the term ethnus was not in circulation in the English lexicon because the term ‘race’ was widely used instead and ethnology was perceived as

the study of races.\textsuperscript{47} As a result, when race discourse was politically marginalized after the mid-twentieth century, the English language has not had a concrete noun to replace the term race and engross the meaning of ethnos. Nonetheless, attempts have been made to fill this gap. The noun ‘ethnicity’ was chained from the root of the adjective ‘ethnic’, the same way as the French ‘ethnicite’ was created from ‘ethnie’. Other scholars such as Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson tend to use original ethnie in their English literature.

The origins of the term ethnicity reveal the continuum in at least two connotations of ethnicity: as a characteristic of a group of people with shared cultural and/or biological attributes, and a phenomenon to distinguish between kin and other alien groups. The forthcoming section will now explore what ethnicity signifies in contemporary social science.

3.0 Conceptualizing ethnicity

It is a challenging task to define contemporary meanings of ethnicity. The literature on ethnicity shows how difficult it is to establish an agreed definition of the term, while the prospect for a consensus in the field is only emerging. For the purposes of this study however a working definition of ethnicity will be attempted to fathom. One way of approaching this task is by sifting theoretical advancements in the subject area for the relevance to our study. So the subsequent analysis of ethnicity should be treated as a working framework based on the summary of ideal types of ethnicity.

\textsuperscript{47} Tonkin, E. \textit{et al} (1989), \textit{History and Ethnicity}, Routledge, p. 14
In contemporary social sciences, ethnicity has acquired several meanings: 1) a field of study of classification of (ethnic) peoples and the relations and distinctions between such groups; 2) the essence of ethnic group or the quality of belonging to it (identity); and 3) characteristics of an ethnic group.48

So that a well-informed idea of ethnicity can be formed it is important to keep in mind two grand traditions of social sciences, positivism and post-positivism, which influence our thinking of ethnicity today. Positivism is a system of philosophy that suggests looking into social and natural phenomena through empirical and scientific knowledge. The term was originally coined by Auguste Comte, usually dubbed as father of sociology, who sought to re-organise social life based on reality that can be fathomed by scientific tools. Hence the only true knowledge is scientific knowledge. Positivist doctrine was traditionally dominant in social sciences before mid-twentieth century and therefore made a significant contribution to our understanding of ethnicity. Positivists concentrate on objective, i.e. scientifically defined, attributes of ethnicity. For instance, as culture is a crucial factor that shapes ethnicity, one then could define ethnicity in terms of an objective cultural structure of society that can be scientifically and objectively ‘measured’. This formulation, as Brown rightly suggests, encourages perceiving “ethnic consciousness [as] arising directly out of possession, by a group, of a particular and distinctive language or religion, or ‘racial’ phenotype”.49

Positivism also treats ethnicity as just one of many available cultural bases for social grouping. One of the positivist assumptions is that social groups that possess distinctive cultural traits, such as language, religion, customs and common

history, would generate corresponding group consciousness. The role of a social scientist therefore is to explore scientifically objective cultural traits and common history, which as a norm trigger the formation of that group’s consciousness. Another tendency of positivism is to regard society as an organic and homogenous entity made up of groups and collectivities rather than individuals.

The alternative doctrine, post- (anti-) positivism, on the other hand, debunks the idea of objective knowledge and universal truths. It is a human-focused approach that looks into subjective dimensions of social behaviour and entities, which are difficult to prove objectively or scientifically. In the post-positivist tradition, the focus of enquiry into ethnicity shifts to exploring subjective feelings and consciousness as key elements. Post-positivists would therefore maintain that the relation between subjective and objective aspects of ethnicity is unclear. The example of this position can be seen by the statement that there is “no simple deterministic relationship in which culture, on its own, caused ethnicity”.

Correspondingly, post-positivism suggests that ethnicity is perceived in terms of a “subjective sense of loyalty based on imagined origins and parentage rather than something to be measured by objectively visible present cultural criteria or historical facts”.

Although the debate over which doctrine is more pertinent to ethnicity studies is far from over, it is the position of this study that in exploring ethnicity we should learn from both ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ dimensions of ethnicity.

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The objective dimension incorporates cultural attributes and symbolic ethnic markers, such as language, territory and religion. The subjective of ethnicity includes group loyalty/identity and boundaries of that identity. If we take territory, for example, it is symbolically as well as actually central to maintaining ethnicity, although sometimes its role may be minimal.\textsuperscript{52} It is possible to say that ethnicity is a subjective phenomenon even though it is based on (or is perceived to be based on), refers to, and invokes objective cultural and historical markers.\textsuperscript{53} In the words of Jenkins, it is also a “world of personal identity collectively ratified and publicly expressed”.\textsuperscript{54} This means that ethnicity is not a homogenous notion and there is much diversity and variation within it. Ethnicity’s appeal and strength could vary between groups and their members over time and context.

It needs to be borne in mind that ethnicity is often conceived as social construction. For Fenton, ethnicity is not only a social construction of descent and culture with the consequent meanings and implications of classification systems built around them, but it is also the social mobilization of descent and culture.\textsuperscript{55} Social mobilization as a rule can, in turn, lead to group affiliation and community formation. Ethnicity clearly stands out as one of the most attractive choices for group affiliation. It may be added that by replicating family functions and transferring them from private to public landscape, ethnicity can successfully meet at least three crucial criteria in people’s choice-making for group affiliation: the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{52} Romanucci-Ross, L. and G. De Vos, Eds. (1995), Ethnic Identity: Creation, Conflict, and Accommodation, AltaMira Press, p.20
  \item \textsuperscript{55} Fenton, S. (2003). Ethnicity, Polity. p.3
\end{itemize}
search for emotional security, rational utilization of access to desired resources, and creating circumstances with no real choice in group affiliation.  

Ethnicity is not an exceptional social phenomenon. It is one of a few socially-constructed collective identifications in society. Ethnicity is also distinct, as it differs with its unique cultural reference and a sense of us and them. De Vos, for example, points out subjective application of the cultural reference by defining ethnicity in terms of “subjective symbolic or emblematic use of any aspect of culture, in order to differentiate themselves from other groups”. The differentiation nevertheless tends to apply to the other because ethnicity often implies the overlooking of internal differentiations. Tonkin’s cynicism is unmasked in his unapologetic description of ethnicity as a term that “half-heartedly aspires to describe phenomena that involve everybody, and that nevertheless has settled in the vocabulary as a marker of strangeness and unfamiliarity”.  

Viability of difference in ethnicity needs to be placed in the context of awareness of that difference. Eller, for instance, emphasizes the “consciousness of difference and the subjective salience of that difference” that plays a role in mobilization around conscious difference. It can thus be added that “if a group is

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not conscious of or organized in terms of its characteristics, then there is no ethnicity, no matter how distinct it may be”.

Apart from serving as a social organization of culture difference, ethnicity can also encompass a contact between the groups, which are ethnically differentiated. This denotation echoes ethnicity’s ancient application in the society when it was used to demarcate lines of kinship between groups.

The notion of otherness in ethnicity has often been applied as a potent social label. Labels, as we know, carry normative value and can be created or used for some purpose. Another quality of social labels is that they can be “made and unmade and remade”.

It is common that in relation to ethnicity reference is usually made to the past. Most definitions of ethnicity employ objective attributes and subjective feelings that are connected to the past. The relation between ethnicity and the past prompts four different but related connections: the cultural past, the past as history, the past as myth, and the past as resource for the present.

Although ethnicity is often seen as a social problem, usually studied for its role in wider social structure, it has increasingly been looked into as a political resource open for manipulation by ruling regimes with the purposes to strengthen power, enhance or undermine national security, legitimise authority, or promote national unity.

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A functioning account of ethnicity will lack in complexity if two dimensions of ethnicity—ethnic group and ethnic identity—are left unaddressed. In the words of Thomas Eriksen, “when we talk of ethnicity, we indicate that groups and identities have developed in mutual contact rather than in isolation”. If one sees ethnicity through these dimensions, then it is natural for him to define it as “the state of being ethnic, or belonging to an ethnic group”. Burgess adds more flesh to the lean description of ethnicity and defines it as:

the character, quality, or condition of ethnic group membership, based on an identity with and/or a consciousness of group belonging that is differentiated from others by symbolic markers (including cultural, biological, or territorial), and is rooted in bonds to a shared past and perceived ethnic interests.

Projection of ethnicity though identity and group membership suggests its categorization as a collective phenomenon, when perceived as an ethnic group, and as an individual phenomenon, when referring to an ethnic identity. The following sections will offer a more detailed exploration of the terms of ethnic group and ethnic identity.

As will be shown in this study, many attempts have been made to define ethnic group and the sheer multitude of definitions makes it difficult to offer an agreed basis of what the concept should signify. It has however become apparent that ethnicity is just one of a few ways or methods to categorize, mobilize, and organize social collectivity. People can affiliate themselves or organize themselves around other social attributes like religion, class, culture and ideology. What is so

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different about ethnicity, and what is an ethnic group? The forthcoming discussion will address these questions and assess qualities and attributes of ethnic group. Defining ethnic group is no easy task but it is crucial in providing a useful insight into how ethnicity functions and transcends social layers.

One of the first daring attempts to describe ethnic group was made by the sociologist Max Weber. His definition of ethnic groups was ground-breaking for the time. Weber describes ethnic groups as:

> those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists.\(^\text{69}\)

Following Weber, it can be argued that ethnic groups are formed on the subjective basis of ethnicity in terms of members’ belief in shared ancestry, which is usually ‘salad dressed’ by objective phonotypical or cultural similarities. The subjective aspect of ethnic group by and large plays a more crucial role than objective qualities, as group formation is a subjective experience undergone by group members themselves. So the initial conviction among scholars of the importance of exploring and verifying objective attributes or memories of origin and descent of ethnic groups has gradually evolved. A more convincing argument suggested that it is the consciousness or awareness of difference and shared cultural elements that make up the basis of ethnic group, rather than the objective quality of those elements. This view can be exemplified by de Vos’s approach of ethnic group as

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self-conscious unification or ‘self-perceived inclusion’ of those who hold in common a set of customs and traditions not shared by others with whom they are in contact.\textsuperscript{70}

Ethnic self-consciousness among group members prompts an awareness of differences with other groups. The differences are usually drawn along real or putative shared culture, which is seen to exist as “memory of the true, or ‘original’, condition of the group”.\textsuperscript{71} Difference is evident and crucial not only to members of the group but also to members of other groups. Greeley takes a cynical view of ethnic differences and claims that “if there are no differences supposedly rooted in common origin by which people can distinguish themselves from others, they will create such differences”.\textsuperscript{72}

Another intriguing issue that Max Weber raises is ethnicity’s role in group formation, especially formation of a political community. He sees ethnicity as ultimately a “political community, no matter how artificially organized that inspires the belief in common ethnicity”.\textsuperscript{73} Weber makes a further claim that the ‘artificial origin’ of the belief in common ethnicity follows the pattern of “rational association turning into personal relationships”.\textsuperscript{74} Ethnic groups can be seen as movements acting upon their culture or social situation and having goals. An

\textsuperscript{72} Quoted from Eller, J. (1999). From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, The University of Michigan Press, p. 15
ethnic group at rest, without an agenda, is almost a contradiction in terms. Ethnic group can thus be linked to consequences of political inspiration where a political community essentially invokes the belief in the ethnic of otherwise political group.

As a result of its ancestral character, ethnic group is often dubbed as a kinship collectivity but due to its subjective nature some call it a pseudo-kinship group. Brown claims that because it is a fictive or imagined kinship group that lacks real ties of common ancestry, ethnic group must “display and propagate the myths and symbols of kinship [and] ‘advertise’ its claim to be the real thing”. A number of scholars, namely Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson, emphasise the importance of myths, symbols and memories as primary elements of ethnically defined groups. Smith, for example, defines it as “a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of common culture, including an association with a homeland and some degree of solidarity, at least among the elites”.

It is interesting to note that the description seeks a compromise between objective attributes, namely common history and culture, and subjective qualities of ethnicity such as myths and memories. It seems that it is this combination that makes ethnic groups viable and potent in social structures. Common ancestry and historical memories play a crucial role in transmitting culture and forming identity. It is through customs, rituals and preconceptions that elements of common culture shape the content of culture, broadcast it, and formulate behavioural patterns. Popular myths, art, music and literature provide a bridge

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with the homeland. A sense of solidarity is manifested through political and
popular community institutions or organizations. And, as can be learnt from ethnic
tensions, the important aspect of ethnic consciousness is that it often arises and is
transformed in the context of power relations.\textsuperscript{78}

Although it identifies key components of ethnic group, Smith’s definition
overlooks its segmental nature and consciousness that underpins it. Schermerhorn,
in lieu, offers a solution to this by adding another key element to ethnic group, its
segmentality. He, therefore, defines an ethnic group as “a collectivity within a
larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared
historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as
the epitome of their peoplehood… A necessary accompaniment is some
consciousness of kind among members of the group”.\textsuperscript{79}

The segmental nature of ethnic group can be traced back to the original
usage of the term ‘ethnic’ in Ancient Greece when it symbolised the relation
between Greeks and other ethnic groups.

It is frequently assumed that ethnic group is usually a segment of a larger
society, and it is more often than not believed to be a minority within it.
Furthermore, in each society ethnic groups are in subordinate rather than dominant
positions.\textsuperscript{80} If ethnic group is a culturally distinct segment of the larger society,
then there is an interaction between such groups that implies a relational quality.\textsuperscript{81}

It is then undeniable that speaking of an ethnic group in total isolation is as absurd

\textsuperscript{77} Smith, A. (1999). \textit{Myths and Memories of the Nation}, Oxford University Press, p. 13
Revisited.” \textit{Studies in Comparative International Development} 32(2), p.51
as speaking of the sound from one hand clapping.\textsuperscript{82} So, members of an ethnic group are in contact with and therefore aware of non-members. It is no surprise that ethnic identities are perceived and often defined in relation to whatever they are not-identity of other groups. As a result of inter-group contact, ethnic groups tend to identify and institutionalize their unique and distinct ethnicity. Such relational quality, however, concurrently implies both similarity and difference.\textsuperscript{83}

Thus, depending on the dynamics in relations between groups, similarities or differences are emphasised and employed by group members.

Yinger, who seemingly accepts segmentality, introduces another interesting characteristic of ethnic groups, that of participation. According to him, ethnic members are expected to take part in shared activities in which “the common origin and culture are significant ingredients”.\textsuperscript{84} So ethnic membership involves not only a possession or a belief in possession of common origin and culture but also requires an action (participation) in shared activities, which in turn sustains the very belief in common ancestry.

Thus far, we have established that ethnic group is an interesting hybrid of putative beliefs and shared objective characteristics. Because it operates in a larger social ‘reservoir’, ethnic group has to interact with other groups, which prompts enhancing its pseudo kinship ties. The group then acts, or participates, in shared cultural activities that not only symbolize ethnic bondage but also sustain the

putative belief. Though, something may be missing here. Perhaps purposefulness of such groups? Cohen responds affirmatively by defining ethnic group as “an informal interest group whose members are distinct from members of other groups in that they share a measure of … ‘compulsory institutions’ like kinship and religion, and can communicate among themselves relatively easily”. So for Cohen, the emphasis is placed on the instrumental nature of ethnic group; where interest is part of ideological transformation of the cultural to political/economic ends. No eyebrows raised then when one of the reasons for ethnic group being an effective and appealing social organization is explained by its ability to “combine symbolic and instrumental purposes, and coalesce an interest with an affective tie”.

Fredrik Barth, in his ground-breaking *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, makes a crucial contribution to our understanding of the subjective dimension of ethnic groups by alerting our attention to the importance of social-psychological ethnic boundaries. These boundaries define lines of ethnic identity and membership, as well as involve questions of group inclusion and exclusion. Barth’s revelations instigated a shift in emphasis from objective traits of ethnic groups to boundaries and relations between them. Such change allowed conceiving ethnic groups as movements, rather than stagnant social entities, and suggested that while contents and membership of ethnic group change, its

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effective difference between ethnic groups then arguably is hidden in the nature and direction of the movement.

Ethnic boundaries can be of two kinds: internal, within the ethnic group, and external, outside the group. In the internal boundaries, self-inclusion in the group takes place, sympathy and loyalty is set towards co-members, and the process of self-identity overlaps. In the external borders, membership exclusion is outlined and demarcation lines are laid for outsiders. According to Mash, kinship, commensality and a common cult - most common and pervasive ethnic boundary markers- constitute a basic structure of ethnic group differentiation.

In a multi-ethnic society, the relationship between the internal and external boundaries has direct influence on the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations. In societies where different ethnic communities interact and compete, it is inevitable that the existence of internal boundaries can create external ethnic boundaries. This process, in turn, can produce the duality of self and other that has troubled societies since ancient times.

As was mentioned earlier, one way of approaching ethnicity is by addressing its manifestation on individual level as ethnic identity. On the individual level, socio-psychological process creates in a person a sense of belonging and identity, ethnic identity. Cohen thinks that ethnicity has come to be regarded as “a mode of action and of representation: it refers to a decision people make to depict themselves or others symbolically as the bearers of a certain

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cultural identity”. He further adds that in contrast to “the apparently monolithic or generalised character of ethnicity at the collective level”, ethnicity at a personal level undergoes continual reconstruction. It can then be argued that ethnicity is better understood when “experiential, subjective forces underlying ethnic identity and its maintenance” are taken into account because macro-cultural, or objective, forces alone make our understanding of ethnic persistence inadequate.

Besides, ethnic identity, in Guibernau’s view, provides a useful interpretation of “the self that establishes what and where the person is in both social and psychological terms”. Ethnic identity in an individual usually involves simultaneous, yet inter-independent, processes of self-identification and identification with a group.

While assessing ethnic identity, Isajiw suggests distinguishing its external and internal aspects. External aspects of ethnic identity refer to social and cultural observable behaviour such as speaking ethnic language, practising ethnic traditions, participating in ethnic personal networks, participating in ethnic institutional organizations, contributing to ethnic voluntary associations and being involved in ethnic functions. External aspects constitute etic elements of ethnic identity. The internal aspects of ethnic identity include images, ideas, attitudes and

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feelings. They constitute *emic* characteristics of ethnic identity. There are at least three types of internal aspects of ethnic identity: cognitive, moral and affective.\(^9\)\(^6\)

Cognitive element of ethnic identity includes self-images and images of one’s group, objective or subjective knowledge of the group’s past and heritage and awareness of the group’s values. Moral component deals with feelings of group obligations that symbolise the level of importance and commitment a member attaches to his ethnic group. And affective element involves feelings of attachment to the group.

It is important to remember that ethnic identities represent variables. Le Vine reiterates that investigations into variations in the intensity of ethnic identity reveal a “unique condition of identity: identities are usually multiple and layered”.\(^9\)\(^7\) If ethnic identity is a variable then it is difficult to assess it. Nonetheless, one way of going around this problem and conceptualizing ethnic identity is to view it as “existing on a continuum with (at one end) those individuals for whom ethnicity is the primary identifier, and at the other, those who emphasize other bases of identity”.\(^9\)\(^8\) Since ethnic identity is a variable, it is often conflated or confused with other social identities. In trying to define the individual dimension of ethnicity one should address differences between the ethnic and other closely related referents, such as race and nation.

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4.0 Ethnicity, race and nation

Ethnicity is often equated with terms that although closely related are not conceptual surrogates. The section will explore the relations between ethnicity and such related terms. Brian du Toit, for instance, in his *Ethnicity in Modern Africa*, explores several connotations of ethnicity. We shall discuss two most salient connotations, that of ‘race’ and ‘nation’, which are often conflated with ethnicity. Fenton suggests there is a commonality between the three terms by describing them as descent and culture communities and claiming that they share a single core with some important differences at the periphery. If there is presumably a single core then an attempt is made to outline commonalities and differences between the concepts.

The discourse of race remains a potent background for the study of ethnicity today, not least because race has been widely used as a concept capable of classifying people into social groups. Although there are similarities of the usage of race and ethnicity, especially in the North-American vernacular, it is generally accepted that race can not be a surrogate term for ethnicity.

The meaning of race has changed dramatically over time. In the sixteenth century, race in Europe earned a meaning of a group or a tribe of people regarded as of common stock and ancestry. At the time, its usage was very similar to ethnicity now, and they were used interchangeably. In the late eighteenth century,

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it obtained the meaning that sought to classify humans along greater subdivisions
of mankind. Cuvier and de Gobineau were among prominent proponents of such
human classification into subspecies.

By late nineteenth century, race culminated as a key concept in the quasi-
science of classifying the divisions of humankind into physically or phenotypically
defined racial groups. Even though contemporary usage of race is primarily
concerned with biological underpinnings, in the nineteenth century its meaning
encompassed wider social horizons and its biological component was only a part
of wider reference to terms like nation, culture, or tribe.\textsuperscript{102}

Race scientists had four key co-related propositions.\textsuperscript{103} Firstly, they argued
that it is possible to classify humankind into races as defined biologically by
physical and visible appearances. Secondly, such physical classification of humans
implied possible categorization and distinction of unphysical qualities and
characteristics according to physical races. Thirdly, racial inheritance, or genetic
make-up, meant physical and moral qualities were preserved through racial
descent. And finally, as a result of the previous two propositions, they argued that
races had hierarchical order with some races superior to others.

The above propositions are best exemplified through the scientific racism
suggested by its nineteenth century founder himself, Arthur de Gobineau. He
proposed division of the world into three races: white Caucasian, black Negroid
and yellow Mongoloid. His claim was that every race is endowed with certain
physical and unphysical qualities that are scientifically discernible. Thus, he

\textsuperscript{101} Banton, M. (2004). Theories of Race. \textit{Nationality and Nationalism}. A. Leoussi and S. Grosby,
\textsuperscript{103} Fenton, S. (2003). \textit{Ethnicity}, Polity, p.20
discerned, people of the white race had far superior intelligence, mentality and morality. This was allegedly evidenced in European dominant position in the world, where black people were on the least capable and ‘human’ end, making up most of the slave populace in the world. Such view may have been convincing in the past, but is now totally discredited on the grounds of its narrow-mindedness, scientific fallacy and self-fulfilling justification of the status-quo enjoyed by the privileged group in domestic society and in the wider world.

It is not surprising that the term race is now largely abandoned in scientific discourse of ethnicity with some exception in the North-American continent. The desertion was due to the delayed waking up to the sense of revulsion, shame and guilt after the events in Europe in 1930s and 1940s, caused by the then racial studies, eugenics, and generated racist doctrines, specifically utilized by the Nazis. No wonder why experts in the field dislike viewpoints, even academic in nature, that describe race in terms of propositions outlined above. Hence Smith’s broad definition of race as “aggregates whose members are objectively distinguished from others by certain gross hereditary phenotypical features”.

Although recent attempts have been made to use genetic technology to improve racial assessment, such moves are received with criticism by biologists and geneticists who assert that phenotypical variations in human groups notwithstanding, it is scientifically impossible to identify clear-cut races and develop a race-based human classification, and that genetic diversity is great within people of the same race as between races. This means, and many social scientists would agree, that race can be nothing more than a socially or
ideologically constructed ideal type with perceived, though fallacious, biological grounding by which people can be categorized.\textsuperscript{105} However, other experts would claim that even though biological evidence is contested, people’s subjective belief in or perception of the significance and viability of racial (physical) differences in society cannot be dismissed and therefore should be within academic realm of study. Le Vine, for instance, argues that race no longer serves any useful purpose as a larger referent of group identity, though it remains relevant for political analysis due to its historical role in structuring power relations.\textsuperscript{106} One example of such power relations was given by Cox, who notes that expansion of European colonialism and consequent increase in demand for labour created capitalist societies with the social structure and belief system that justified subordination of black people and their distinction from white populace.\textsuperscript{107}

Banton puts forward two factors to explain why people still entertain false racial ideas about members of other groups:

[I]t is claimed on the one hand that processes of racial group formation can be explained in the same terms as those used for explaining group phenomena in general. On the other hand it is maintained that that the only possible theories are those explaining why, in particular societies and at particular times, racism assumes a given form.\textsuperscript{108}

Smith makes a useful distinction between race and ethnicity based on the un-negotiability of the former: racial identity is “immutable, manifest, and \textit{normally}
unambiguous in multi-racial societies and contexts”. Contrary to this is the view that tends to conflate the two concepts and debunk the distinction by stating that race’s reliance on phenotypical difference is just one element in the repertoire of ethnic boundary markers. In support for conflation, van den Berghe claims ethnicity is a manifestation of an adaptive nepotism between kin with essentially genetic foundations, therefore race can be seen as “just a special marker of ethnicity, a visible folk test of likely common ancestry”.

Conflating two concepts has been challenged on the basis of its neglecting the qualitative distinctions. Banton, for example, suggests that race is a categorization of people based on physical characteristics describing the other, while ethnicity is a cultural group identification denoting us. So ethnicity and race differ in their application in the discourse of us vs. them with the former usually referring to self-identification based on cultural distinctions and the latter addressing external classification based on biological traits. In addition, ethnicity is a matter of voluntary subscription and race is an imposed categorization. Thus, the perception of ethnicity among ethnic people is a positive sensation, while race categorization is usually perceived by ascribed people more as a stigma label.

Tonkin makes an interesting point. While acknowledging the shared strong bias of race and ethnicity towards difference and otherness, he distinguishes between

universal possession of the racial qualities on the one hand, and exclusive or selective usage of ethnicity, on the other:

‘Race’ as a term did not, so to speak, discriminate. Within the discourse of race, everybody had one, everyone belonged to one. In actual use, however, not everybody belongs to an ‘ethnic group’, or has an ‘ethnicity’.  

As was mentioned above, race is heavily based on physiological characteristics. This point is reiterated by Kellas who also proposes that this makes race distinguishable from ethnicity because races are viewed in predominantly biological terms, with particular emphasis on phenotypical distinctions and presumed genetic distinctions. Rex goes further to offer a simple distinction that ethnic group is similar to race but without the biology.

There are commonalities between two concepts, mainly in their methodological and communitarian bases on attributes of kinship and ancestry and invocation of difference and otherness with other entities. However, race and ethnicity also differ. Race is based on biological assumptions of intrinsic physical qualities. Whereas ethnicity even though it may utilize phenotypical characteristics to emphasis internal cohesion or external difference does not rely on racial or physical characteristics for self sustenance. Race may even be employed as one of the boundary elements in ethnicity, but in the case of its unavailability ethnicity is abundant with other options at its disposal.

The term ‘nation’ is a close relative to ethnicity. Both are even attributed to the same discipline and are often used interchangeably. Even though the co-

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relation between the two concepts undoubtedly strong it deems crucial to be aware of similarities and differences between the two.

So what is nation? According to Smith, ideal type of nation can be defined as “a named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members”.116 We can see that the description underlines objective characteristics of nation such as a territory, language, religion, and common descent. Nations also involve subjective features like people’s awareness of its nationality and loyalty to it.117

Nations often invoke links to states, or are even conflated with nation-states. Although in certain circumstances a nation may mean a nation-state, one need to bear in mind that there are states made up of more than one nation and there are nations that are not states. The nature of the link between state and nation is explained by two conceptions: the first views nations as self-governing entities, and the second holds that state populace are, or result to form, a nation.118 The second conception prompts us to approach nation as an entity in the process of nation building. In many cases, however, nationhood is not only an achieved status but also a subjective state of mind, or imagination. This imagination, as Anderson explains, is not in the sense of falsehood but of psychological creativity.119 We can thus deduce that there is a reinforcing connection relation between objective national attributes and subjective national sense. Eller, for example, illustrates the relation by the description of nation evolving as “the product of the will-to-

nationhood that prevails, an (often personal) imagination that becomes nation’s imagination”. Such qualitative relationship is indeed a source of stability and instability: this very imagination can create rival groups claiming competing visions of nationhood with competing evidence to that effect.

After outlining what nation is about, it is tempting to concede that commonalities between ethnicity and nation are hard to miss. They equally represent descent and culture community. Both terms belong to the same family of phenomena, collective cultural identities. Nations and ethnic groups share the attributes of common myths and shared memories. The two types of collectivity are both conditioned by the past or memories of the past and their territorial legacy. And, ethnicity and nation similarly manifest objective and subjective dimensions.

Differences, however, should not be brushed aside. The most salient distinction is explained by nation’s essentially political nature. Ethnicity, in contrast, lacks political referent or only has a potential for politicization. Le Vine reiterates the difference and claims that nation refers to political community, whatever the nature of the communal bonds involved, while ethnic group “needs no political badge to validate itself”. Moreover, nations are perceived as ‘rational’ political organizations, which frequently take advantage of ethnic symbols for decorative rather than substantive purposes.

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Aspiration to the status of nationhood is another crucial difference. A nation must aspire to nationhood and/or be recognized as a nation. In international relations, nation also implies some degree of self-determination. The national attribute of self-determination in turn generates a single economy and common rights and duties, which ethnic groups as a norm would lack. However, sometimes it is not necessary for a nation to possess a sovereign statehood, but what can suffice is a vociferous aspiration for autonomy coupled with the physical occupation of its homeland or territory.124 In other words, for nation to be self-governing a homeland or territory is a required element, whereas for ethnic group’s sustainability only a symbolic connection to homeland is usually needed.

In addition, the quality of group organization and consciousness also demarcate ethnicity and nation. Nations are to be conscious of their nationhood, be highly organized and institutionalized. For Eller, a nation is ultimately a fully mobilized, organized or institutionalized ethnic group, if it acquires the characteristics and the consciousness of nationhood.125 Nationalism is an alternative way to nationhood. Smooha suggests seeing nationalism as political processes in the context of the claim of ethnic groups to self-determination.126 Therefore, when an ethnic group achieves self-determination and sovereignty within a certain state, it will in all probability become a nation.127 But what happens to those that fail in achieving self-determination? Kellas’s insight into how such ethnic groups are usually seen is helpful here. He claims that ethnic

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group is often employed to describe a quasi-national minority group within a
nation-state that has not achieved the status of a nation. This is in line with
ethnic group’s quality of segmentality, mentioned earlier.

Nationalism, as a movement or ideology, can be related to ethnicity in
three ways: first, as a revival or protection of a well-formed, ancient but ‘decayed’
ethnic group; second, as an attempt of a segment of society (usually elite) to
stimulate and organise unorganized group; and third, as a movement in search of
constituency that may actually ‘invent’ an ethnic group where none existed
before. But in cases where ethnic groups aspire to nationhood and consequently
achieve it, the process of nation-building can significantly change them vis-à-vis
their aims, aspirations, identity and even culture.

Nation and ethnicity differ also in their cultural attributes. Ethnic group
shares cultural elements like language, religion and customs, employed for self-
 inclusion and exclusion. Nation, on the other hand, develops a common public
culture, sometimes called as high culture. The change from various memory
traditions of ethnic groups to a codified, standardized national history is but one
illustration of the cultural distinction. It is no surprise then why the
vernacularization of the restricted high culture, its digestion and presentation to a

127 Eller, J. (1999). From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on
International Ethnic Conflict. The University of Michigan Press, p. 17
288
130 Eller, J. (1999). From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on
International Ethnic Conflict. The University of Michigan Press, p. 21
mass audience is one of the objectives of nationalism, when part of nation building or mobilization.\textsuperscript{132}

Besides, it is crucial for a nation to be, or seem to be, internally homogenous. As for a nation, it is ideologically crucial that it is, in the words of Eller, “internally undifferentiated as that it be sharply differentiated from other nations”.\textsuperscript{133} This ideological characteristic is nevertheless very similar to ethnic group’s insistent overlooking of internal differences, thus begging a question how this aspect distinguishes the two. The distinction is in what the entity does in regard with the difference and homogenization. Internal differences in ethnicity are simply overlooked and shared commonalities are emphasized to create the perception of oneness. Nations, on the other hand, undertake determined plan of action to flatten, popularize, politicize or assimilate such differences in language, culture and custom. Such process of homogenization in nation-building is continuous in nature, and most nations are still experiencing it.

Kellas makes the point that ethnic communities are different from nations because they are usually smaller than nations, more clearly based on common ancestry and more pervasive in human history.\textsuperscript{134}

It will not be a fallacious generalization to say that ethnicity is often viewed through the prism of nation formation; ethnic groups are regarded as a foundation or root for the nation to form and ethnic group is destined to become the nation in the end. Thus, to illustrate the point it is worth quoting Smith that “to

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say that the modern world is a ‘world of nations’ is to describe both reality and an aspiration’.  

5.0 Conclusion

As was shown above, the origins of the term ethnicity reveal the continuity of at least two connotations of ethnicity to present day. It is frequently referred to as a characteristic of a group of people with shared cultural and sometimes biological attributes, as well as a term to distinguish between kin and other alien groups. In short, ethnicity is the essence and characteristics of ethnic group and ethnic identity. And as such, it possesses two dimensions: the objective, which incorporates cultural attributes and symbolic ethnic markers, such as language, territory and religion; and the subjective dimension that includes group loyalty, identity, and boundaries of that identity, which are collectively ratified and publicly expressed. Ethnic boundaries serve to determine lines of ethnic identity and membership, as well as address questions of group inclusion and exclusion. Because of ethnic boundaries, ethnic groups are conceived as movements, rather than stagnant social entities.

Ethnicity is not only a social construction of descent and culture with the consequent classification systems built around them, but is also the social mobilization of descent and culture. Social mobilization depends on the level of self-consciousness in an ethnic group and awareness of difference with other groups. Social mobilization, in turn, leads to further group affiliation and community formation. The notion of otherness in ethnicity, however, is often used
as a potent social label, which carry normative value and can be made, un-made or re-made.

As was revealed in the chapter, ethnicity can be a political resource open for manipulation with the purposes to strengthen power, enhance or undermine national security, legitimise authority, or promote national unity. Ethnic group is ultimately a political community or political movement acting on its culture, social circumstances, and political goals. An ethnic group at rest and without an agenda is almost a contradiction in terms, a cultural community with stagnant present and uncertain future. A sense of solidarity in an ethnic community is manifested through popular, political institutions. As the history of ethnic tensions reveal, it is in the context of power relations that ethnic consciousness and mobilization often emerges and is transformed.

But how does then ethnicity relate to nationhood? Both concepts equally stand for descent and culture community, and belong to the same family of collective cultural identities. They share the attributes of common myths and shared memories, similarly manifest objective and subjective dimensions, and are both conditioned by the past or memories of the past and their territorial legacy. But they also differ. Nation’s nature is essentially political. Nation is a political community per se, whatever the nature of its communal ties. Ethnic group, on the other hand, is a collectivity of descent and culture, which does not need a political badge to validate itself but has a potential for politicization. Nations are often perceived as rational political organizations that frequently utilize ethnic symbols for decorative rather than substantive purposes.
Moreover, the quality of group organization and consciousness also distinguish ethnicity and nationhood. Nation, conscious of its nationhood, is highly organized and institutionalized. It is ultimately a fully mobilized, organised and institutionalized ethnic group, once it acquires the characteristics and the consciousness of nationhood.\footnote{Eller, J. (1999). From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, The University of Michigan Press, p.22} A path to full nationhood for an ethnic group lies through the political process of nationalism (or ethno-nationalism) and its claim to self-determination. Thus when an ethnic group achieves self-determination and sovereignty, it will become a nation; but failing that, it will remain a quasi-national minority group within a bigger nation-state. The next chapter will therefore present a range of perspectives seeking to explain when and how ethnicity and nationhood arose and developed in the world, and what role they played in the development of modern societies.
CHAPTER III, PERSPECTIVES ON ETHNO-NATIONALISM
1.0 Introduction

If the previous section conceptualized ethnicity by explaining what it stands for, how it functions and ways it is related to similar societal concepts, this chapter will show how ethnicity and nationhood manifest themselves in society. It will provide a systemic overview of the main theories of nationhood and ethnicity, focusing mostly on post-1950s literature, as well as locate the key questions around which the debate on ethnicity and nationhood revolves. In a field as vast as this, the chapter makes no attempt to be comprehensive: its aim is to pierce through main issues and present dominant lines of argument on ethno-nationalism in a systemic and comparative manner. The study is of interdisciplinary nature, which reflects the characteristic of the wider scholarly debate on ethnicity and nationalism.

Once the deficiencies and merits of the major perspectives and approaches are diagnosed, the chapter will propose an analytical framework that can be used in the study of the formation of nationhood in Central Asia. This framework, drawing from the institutionalist approach, will be applied in the consequent analysis of nation-building processes of Uzbek and Kyrgyz nations.

The chapter’s analysis of the main theoretical positions towards ethno-nationalism will start with the discussion of the perennialist approach, in line with the chronological order and general tendency in the field. After describing major tenets and two types of perennialism, our analysis will move to the different
versions of primordialism, namely the *organic*, *socio-biological* and *culturalist* perspectives. Then the discussion will flow to exploring the dominant modernist perspective, as well as description of its three competing branches, such as *economic*, *socio-cultural* and *political* modernisms. [A special attention will be devoted to the Marxist-Leninist theory, since it had notoriously influenced the thinking of the Soviet *apparatus*, thus warranting our interest]. Modernism will be followed by the assessment of the ethno-symbolist propositions on the professedly stronger links between ethnic groups and nations, than usually proclaimed. The chapter will then discuss the institutionalist approach as the most conducive to our understanding of how ethno-nationalism was formed in Central Asia.

It needs to be noted at the outset that the focus of the chapter is mainly on the Anglo-Saxon literature, because most of the studies on nationhood and ethnicity are carried out in the Anglo-Saxon world and crucial books and articles written elsewhere are usually re-printed in English. A student of ethno-nationalism who is working on the theoretical advances in the field has few alternatives but to focus almost exclusively on the Anglo-Saxon literature.

And finally, a caveat needs to be made on the classification of scholars in terms of their adherence to certain perspectives and approaches. Even though marking scholars in line with those is an arbitrary exercise and some authors may disagree with those tags, every attempt is made to apply tags that are generally accepted in the scholarship.
2.0 Perennialism

One could call perennialism as the earliest theory of ethno-nationalism. This school of thought was most popular among scholars during the nineteenth century till the end of the World War II, who believed that nations had always existed in any given period of human history. Its inception and consequent popularity was prompted by a conjecture of a number of notions. The idea of social evolution with emphasis on gradualism, stages of progress and cultural accumulation were among crucial ones.\textsuperscript{137} The ubiquitous conflation of race with nation provided necessary perennial character to the national group. The initial equation of race with nation turned out to be fallacious, especially after race discourse was discredited by the Nazi Germany’s horrible atrocities committed in pursuance of racist ideology.

In addition to the perennial nature, a perception of nations as \textit{natural} communities was blended in. However, later it was realised that naturalness of nations is not a necessary requisite for the perennialist school of thought because conceding the antiquity of national ties is possible without conceiving them as natural.\textsuperscript{138}

Contemporary scholars, usually historians, still hold perennialist view and perceive certain nations and ethnic groups, especially their own, as perennial collective actors. Levi, Llobera, and Hastings are among some of prominent perennialists.

The underlying proposition of perennialism is based on historical and empirical observation that propagates longevity of specific nations. Most perennialists do not identify a specific date of birth for nationalism. The essence that differentiates a nation from others remains intact despite all vicissitudes of history.\textsuperscript{139} Perennialists see modern nations as \textit{lineal descendents} of their medieval counterparts, and believe that nation and nationalism engender modernity.\textsuperscript{140} The \textit{sleeping beauty} metaphor by Minogue illustrates this viewpoint.\textsuperscript{141} According to it, nation, the Sleeping Beauty, awaits a magical kiss from nationalism, the Prince, for its awakening. So perennialism would have us believe that origins of nations and nationalism can be traced to periods much earlier than modern times, the Middle Ages for example.

For perennialists, nation is a politicized, seamless ethno-cultural community that stakes a claim to political recognition on its common ancestry, rootedness in place and time, and a historic homeland, as well as defined by certain qualities and the underlying principles of ancestral ties and authentic culture.\textsuperscript{142}

Smith in his writings identifies two types of perennialism: continuous and recurrent. Proponents of continuous perennialism advocate that certain, not all, nations have existed for centuries and their history is therefore traceable and continuous. They allow for the possibility that some nations, like the Egyptian and Greek, are immemorial while some other nations in Asia and Africa can be more recent.

\textsuperscript{139} Ozkirimli, U. (2000). \textit{Theories of Nationalism}, Palgrave, p.70
The perennialist claim of antiquity of nations is usually challenged on the grounds of the qualitative distinction of ethnicity in ancient and modern periods.\textsuperscript{143} Ethnicity in antiquity did not have the same meaning and play the same role as it does today. Besides, lack of conclusive evidence makes it difficult to clearly state when nations emerged. As Connor notes:

Nationalism is a mass phenomenon. The fact that members of the ruling elite or intelligentsia manifest national sentiment is not sufficient to establish that national consciousness has permeated the value systems of the masses.\textsuperscript{144}

Recurrent perennialism, on the other hand, maintains that nations appear and disappear, emerge and dissolve in different places and times, but \textit{nation-in-general} as a human association is perennial and ubiquitous.\textsuperscript{145} While acknowledging the importance of change, time and space, this view contends that nation has always existed in the world and existence or absence of certain nations is explained by distinctive historical context. The recurrence of the same type of collectivity or cultural group identity can be expressed in variety of ways, places and times.\textsuperscript{146} Hastings, for instance, tried to corroborate the continuity of national identity among elites of the English, Scots and Irish prior to the Reformation.\textsuperscript{147}

The danger with recurrent perennialist approach, as Smith notes, is that it can impose a retrospective nationalism on communities and groups whose identities and consciousness may have been local, regional, and religious, but

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barely national.\textsuperscript{148} Such retrospective imposition opens perennialism to a criticism of teleological bias.\textsuperscript{149} Even though the thesis of recurrent nationalism can be sustained by consistent definition and open-ended empirical investigation, Smith debunks the proposition that nations are recurrent phenomena in history and adds that “the nationalist ideologies and the vast majority of nations can be shown to be of much more recent vintage”.\textsuperscript{150}

Perennialism is also flawed by its equal conception of ethnic groups and nations in terms of collective associations. And finally, perennialist approach is reminiscent of self-fulfilling prophesy that could utilize the contemporary interpretation of the history. Perennialism seeks to explain the antiquity of ethnic groups and some nations. This is in stark contrast to the modernist view advocating their novelty, hence the debate over the age of ethnicity and nationhood raging between perennialism and modernism.

### 3.0 Primordialism

If perennialism considers the origins of nations and ethnic groups as antique, primordialism recognises them as organic givens and natural divisions of humanity. According to primordialists, nations are more or less fixed and permanent entities of the world. Primordialist school of thought primarily focuses on the questions of nature and strength of ethnicity and nationalism. They argue

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{148} Smith, A. (1999). \textit{Myths and Memories of the Nation}. Oxford University Press, p.5
\end{itemize}
that the nature of ethnic and national ties is traceable to the emotions and consciousness reminiscent of primordial attachments in kinship groups. The power of such social groups, as the theory goes, lies in their rootedness in kinship and genetic bases of human existence. They are said to exist in the first order of time and pervade subsequent processes and developments.  

The intellectual foundation of primordialism and naturalistic spirit of nationalism can be traced to Rousseau and German philosophers of Romanticism like Herder, Hegel and Fichte, who were reaction scholars to the rationalism of Enlightenment. The term ‘primordial’ was first used more recently by Shils in the description of relationships within family, in which the strength of the primordial attachments among family members is not explained by social interaction but by a certain ineffable significance attributed to the tie of blood.  

There are three varieties of primordialism: popular, socio-biological and cultural. Popular variety of primordialism, also known as organic nationalism, defines nations as akin to natural organisms and, therefore, subject to natural laws. National identities are seen as an organic part of human beings, and the nationality of persons is thus predetermined and fixed by nature. So nations can be forgotten and silent, but continue “to exist beneath the debris of history until the moment of their rebirth”.  

Political and nationalist activists are common proponents of organic nationalism. They gain support for their views from wider masses without

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150 Smith, A. (1999). Myths and Memories of the Nation, Oxford University Press, p. 6  
151 Smith, A. (1999). Myths and Memories of the Nation, Oxford University Press, p. 4  
difficulties because they substitute explanations about nation’s origins with the discourse and appeal of nationalism. The common claim of popular primordialists propagates nations as primordial entities that were “objectively identifiable through their distinctive way of life, their attachment to a territorial homeland, and their striving for political autonomy” 154.

Lieven points out that if the natural order of the world is a division of humanity, made up by culturally fixed groups, then the groups will tend to exclude others. 155 Such order will also create antagonistic relations between nations and ethnic groups. Popular primordialism makes no distinction between ethnic groups and nations, and it treats nationalism as an attribute of humanity in all ages. 156 It replaces the evidence of nation’s existence with the nationalist rhetoric in support for it. Organic nationalism also neglects such changes affecting nations as migration and colonization, and fails to explain the reasons for loss and rebirth of nations. 157 It also overlooks and blurs the differences between ethnicity and nationhood.

Socio-biological primordialists, on the other hand, stress social and biological intersection in ethnicity and nationhood. Van den Berghe, its leading exponent, tried to apply the findings of socio-biology in animal grouping and cooperation into the explanations of race and ethnic ties. Similar kin selection is responsible for human sociality as well: ethnic and racial sentiments are therefore

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153 Smith, A. (1999). Myths and Memories of the Nation, Oxford University Press, p. 4
157 Smith, A. (1999). Myths and Memories of the Nation, Oxford University Press, p. 4
extensions of kinship sentiments.\textsuperscript{158} Ethnic and race sentiments are therefore seen as an extended and attenuated form of kin selection.\textsuperscript{159}

Socio-biological primordialism suggests that ethnic groups can be traced to the underlying genetic reproductive drives of individuals and their use of strategies of nepotism and inclusive fitness to maximise their gene pools. As a result, we are told, myths of shared descent largely correspond to real biological ancestry.\textsuperscript{160} Socio-biological primordialism claims that human societies are dictated by three elements: kin selection, reciprocity and coercion.\textsuperscript{161} It also explains the persistence and strength of social cohesion in ethnic groups or nations by shared biological (genetic) heritage of group members.

However, most scientific research and studies prove those claims to be unfounded.\textsuperscript{162} It is scientifically difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate that the genetic pool of smaller social units as family and clan can be extended to larger groups as ethnies and nations.\textsuperscript{163} Socio-biological primordialism also generalizes from individual reproductive behaviour to that of political and collective action.\textsuperscript{164}

The third primordialism is the cultural one, often associated with Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz. There are three main postulates of cultural primordialism: primordial attachments are given and prior to all social experience

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\item \textsuperscript{158} Van den Berghe, P. (1987). The Ethnic Phenomenon, Praeger, p. 18
\item \textsuperscript{160} Smith, A. (2001). Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, Polity, p. 52
\item \textsuperscript{162} See Rex, J. and D. Mason, Eds. (1986). Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations, Cambridge University Press, p. 7
\item \textsuperscript{164} Smith, A. (2001). Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, Polity, p. 52
\end{itemize}
and interaction; primordial sentiments are ineffable, overpowering and coercive; and primordial identities are essentially a question of emotion and affect.\textsuperscript{165}

Geertz explains that the power of the primordial ties is attributed to such cultural givens of human existence as blood, kinship, language, custom, religion, and territory.\textsuperscript{166} Shils points to the attribution to the tie of blood as a source of ‘ineffable significance’ of primordial attachments.\textsuperscript{167}

Cultural primordialism builds on the anthropological conception of culture, which defines it as a total way of life with the reference to a unique historical group past. A sense of unique peoplehood is seen as a product of a distinct culture, which is a system of encoding distinct historical experience into a set of symbolic patterns.\textsuperscript{168} Primordial attachments persist alongside modern secular civil ties and thus impede and dissolve civil ties of the modern state.\textsuperscript{169}

The\textit{ givenness} and power of primordial ties rest on the beliefs of group members and their perceptions of the ties being ineffable and obligatory.\textsuperscript{170} Cultural primordialism focuses on “the webs of meaning spun by the individuals themselves”.\textsuperscript{171}

Cultural primordialism is often criticised for limiting its scope to the description of the problem and failing to seek ways of preventing the destructive

\textsuperscript{170} See Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures, Fontana, p. 259
\textsuperscript{171} Ozkirimli, U. (2000). Theories of Nationalism, Palgrave, p. 73
potential of primordial ties.\textsuperscript{172} Moreover, as proposed by Fredrik Barth, the more useful understanding of ethnicity as a social force would render from the study of the subjective sense of loyalty based on imagined origins and from the analysis of how and why ethnic boundaries are maintained and shifted.\textsuperscript{173} To understand ethnicity and nationhood one should go beyond studying the cultural substance of primordial ties and address the origins and essence of the subjective sense of group loyalty and analyse psycho-cultural nature of group boundaries. In other words, it is the ethnic boundary that defines ethnic group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses.

Overall, primordialism has made a crucial contribution to the study of ethnicity and nationhood through highlighting the subjective aspects of perceptions, self-ascription and beliefs that influence human action, as well as illustrating the use of primordial attachments in nationalist rhetoric and its powerful effect on a wider society. It has its shortcomings, however. It is often critiqued for its quasi-academic perspective that provides “intellectual charter for much ethnic chauvinism and nationalism”.\textsuperscript{174} Other criticisms are levelled against its three major themes: essentialism, ineffability, and mystification. The first points to the recent studies that show that the content and boundaries of ethnic identity are fluid, not fixed, and are continuously redefined and reconstructed via

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individual choice and according to changing conditions.\textsuperscript{175} Some primordial attachments are thus variable and constructed ‘after-the-fact’.\textsuperscript{176} The second challenges the primordialist claim that ethnic and national ties are underived and ineffable and argue that the mere knowledge of ethnic ties is not sufficient in predicting the dynamics of ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{177} The use of ethnic attachments for political and nationalist ends can transform their very meanings. And the final criticism puts forward that the mystification of primordial identities can lead to the erroneous de-socializing of the phenomenon, and that emotional ties should be viewed as born in social interaction, rather than implicit in the ethnic relationship itself.\textsuperscript{178}

4.0 Modernism

Modernism initially emerged as a reaction to primordialism and perennialism, and became fully formulated as an alternative perspective in the 1960s. Modernists considered perennialist assumptions about naturalism and immemorialism of nations as fallacies that were in part responsible for nationalist conflicts erupting in Europe and around the world.\textsuperscript{179} They see nations as wholly modern social constructs. The modernist model of nation-building drew many supporters at the

\textsuperscript{175} See Ozkirimli, U. (2000). \textit{Theories of Nationalism}, Palgrave, p. 75
time of destabilizing events of decolonization in Asia and Africa. Modernization theorists who dominated political science from 1960s to 1980s emphasized that increased communication would erase ethnic cleavages and result in the successful achievement of nation-building.

Modernism puts forward a number of propositions. Firstly, it supports a belief in the historical specificity as well as modernity of nations. Nationalism and nations are modern phenomena that emerged in the last two centuries, most likely after the French revolution. They are consequences of such modern processes as capitalism, industrialism, state bureaucratization, secularism and urbanization. According to Hobsbawm, “nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round”. Secondly, nations are explicated through the social and political processes that underlie modernity. Nations were the product of modernity. Thirdly, modernism admits the power and unpredictability of nationalism, and that the multifaceted nature of nation made it impossible to predict the eruption or dynamic of forces of nationalism.

The main tenets of modernism, imbued in its nation-building model, stress the political side of nations and make a number of contentions. Nations are territorial political communities, conjoined with modern states to form nation-

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states, which are main political actors in the international arena. They constitute the chief political bond and loyalty of their citizens, which override their allegiance to other ties. As nations are consciously and deliberately constructed by their elites and citizens through a range of processes and institutions, successful nations depend on the infrastructure of social communications and comprehensive institutionalization of values, roles and expectations. And finally, since only national loyalty and nationalist ideology can mobilize the masses to deal with the challenges and opportunities of modernization, nations are therefore the sole framework, means and beneficiary of social and political development.

Although the modernity of nations underpins the beliefs of all modernists, they stress different factors in their accounts of nationalism and emphasize one set of factors at the expense of others. This does not mean that they totally dismiss other factors in their theories, but that they put a greater emphasis on one set of factors when explaining nations. It is therefore reasonable to avoid treating modernism as a monolithic group and consider modernists in three rough categories in terms of the following key factors: economic, socio-cultural and political.

4.1 Economic modernism

Some of the early attempts to explain nationalism were causally linked to the rise of capitalism, and held that the emergence and spread of nations derived from the
social consequences of capitalism.\textsuperscript{186} This usually involved economic analysis that explained nationalist resurgences through the dynamics of the particular stage of capitalism.

In the late 1960s, when de-colonization was unfolding, Marxist thinkers realised that their fight against neo-imperialism and international capital should be fought along national frontlines.\textsuperscript{187} Tom Nairn and Michael Hechter are two prominent modernists who derive nationalism from the rational workings of the world economy and the economic interests of individuals.

Nairn, in his groundbreaking work, \textit{Break-up of Britain}, wanted to find the right explanatory framework within which nationalism can be assessed in materialist terms.\textsuperscript{188} The roots of nationalism, in his view, are to be sought beyond internal dynamics of societies, and are therefore “determined by certain features of the world political economy, in the era between the French and Industrial Revolutions and the present day”.\textsuperscript{189} The main characteristic of the capitalist development process since the eighteenth century was its uneven development, which created a vast gap between the core (developed) and periphery (under-developed) countries. Since mass mobilization was only possible in terms of national identity vis-à-vis the outside forces of domination, “the new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation card had to be written in a language they understood”.\textsuperscript{190} After nationalism emerged in the peripheral countries as a result of uneven development

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and became the new global force, the core countries grew equally affected by nationalism. Nationalisms can thus be ‘good’ and bound for progress, and ‘bad’, heading to regress.

Nairn’s theory was met with two key criticisms: firstly, nationalism originated in Europe before the emergence of colonial empires, and therefore European nationalism predates anti-colonial nationalisms,¹⁹¹ and secondly, locating the origins of nationalism in the periphery rather than in the core often constitutes a historical error.¹⁹²

Michael Hechter is another prominent modernist who stresses the importance of economic transformation in nation-formation and addresses inter-group relations at a micro-social level. In his Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, Hechter analysed the problems of ethnic conflict and assimilation that troubled American politics in 1960s and questioned the validity of dominant assimilationist perspective on resolving those problems. Assimilationism has roots in the diffusion model of development, which posits that industrialization and the consequent increased interaction of the periphery with the modernizing will bring commonality, and the institutions of the developing core will eventually diffuse into the periphery.¹⁹³ Therefore, in the long run, as regional wealth is equalised and political bases of ethnic differentiations cease, the core and the periphery will become culturally homogenous.¹⁹⁴

Hechter sees the diffusion thesis as ‘over-optimistic’ model of social change, and puts forward an alternative, internal colonial model. It claims that industrialization in most cases will not lead to national development and, as a result, the nature of the core’s relation to the periphery will be that of a political domination and economical exploitation. Hechter argues that the initial wave of modernization over the national state creates ‘advanced’ and ‘less advanced’ groups with the former trying to “stabilize and monopolize its advantages through policies aiming at the institutionalization of the existing stratification system”. The stratification system, dubbed as the ‘cultural division of labour’, pushes citizens to identify themselves with their groups and leads to the development of distinctive ethnic identification. Hechter maintained that modernization in the society and increased contact between ethnic groups within a state will not necessarily bring about ethnic unity, but may well instead lead to ethnic conflict.

Hechter’s critics, however, claimed that his model is reductionist because it describes ethnic sentiments and cultural cleavages through purely economic and spatial characteristics. It reduces ethnic conflict and nationalism to discontent caused by regional inequalities and economic exploitation. Moreover, it fails to explain why national revival has occurred in places where the impact of capitalism or industrialization has been minimal, or why no ethnic revival or nationalist

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movement has been absent in economically backward areas of capitalist societies.  

4.2 Socio-cultural modernism

The works of Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson illustrate how modernism explains national phenomena through socio-cultural transformations. Gellner explores nationalism through three stages of human social history (hunter-gatherer, the agro-literate and the industrial) and traces it to the modern world, when it became a sociological necessity. He explains the emergence of nations in industrial societies by analysing the relationship between power and culture. If in agro-literate societies culture merely emphasises structure and strengthens existing loyalties, in industrial societies “a high culture pervades the whole society, defines it, and needs to be sustained by the polity”. The transition from an agro-literate to an industrial society is marked by the replacement of ‘low’ by ‘high’ cultures. For Gellner, a nation is a high culture society, which is a cultivated, standardized, education-based, literate culture. That is why he calls them ‘garden’ cultures.

The main role of nationalism in the industrializing society is to impose the successful new high culture of the state on the population, employing the old low cultures. According to Gellner:

Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes

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pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one.  

Nationalism was successful because it was appropriate and well-equipped for the needs of the time, rather than as an ideology that could be accepted or rejected intellectually in competition with other ideologies.  

Gellner concludes that it is nationalism that “engenders nations, and not the other way around”. For him, nationalism is primarily a political principle that holds that “the political and national unit should be congruent” and a movement that conceives “the natural object of human loyalty to be a fairly large anonymous unit defined by shared language and culture”. In short, nationalism is a product of industrial social organization, and nations are functional for industrial society. And nationalism is strong because “it determines the norm for the legitimacy of political units in the modern world”.  

Nonetheless, Gellner’s critics point to three major weaknesses in his theory. Firstly, Gellner’s model is said to be too functionalist: it explains nationalism on the basis of historical consequences that follow it. Secondly, Gellner’s assumptions on the relationship between industrialization and nationalism are challenged on the basis that many nationalist movements ante-

dated industrialization, and, conversely, nationalism was not a concomitant of the process of industrialization in many other cases. And finally, Gellner’s theory cannot explain the emotional power of nationalism, or in Perry Anderson’s words: “where Weber was so bewitched by its spell that he was never able to theorize nationalism, Gellner had theorized nationalism without detecting the spell”.

Benedict Anderson is another influential figure in socio-cultural modernism. His ground-breaking *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* was a result of the search to explain why every revolution since World War II was defined in national terms and to understand transformations of consciousness that made present nations thinkable.

Anderson approaches nationality and nationalism as particular cultural artefacts. He suggests going beyond treating nationalism as an ideological construct and, instead, seeing it as akin to kinship, ethnicity or religion. For Anderson, the real challenge is not identifying the objective factors, political or cultural, that facilitate the development of nations, but illustrating why and how nationalism can generate such deep, subjective, attachments. He defines the nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”, and further qualifies that it is an imagined community

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because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”.\textsuperscript{215} The nation is imagined as limited because of its boundaries and as sovereign because of its freedom.

There is a need to clarify what Anderson mean by ‘imagining’ of the nation lest to give a misrepresented description of his perspective. ‘Imagining’ does not mean ‘falsity’. He criticizes Gellner’s reference to ‘invention’ as fabrication or falsity, rather than to creation, which is to say that nationalism is a ploy for deception.\textsuperscript{216} All types of communities are imagined, and communities should not therefore be judged by their falsity/genuineness, but by the way in which they are imagined.\textsuperscript{217} In other words, the nation is in the eye of the beholder, and the task of the social scientists should be to identify how the nation is visualized by its members.

Anderson also acknowledges the nation’s feature as a ‘deep, horizontal comradeship’, which is the reason why many people have been willing to sacrifice their lives for their nation.\textsuperscript{218} An imagined political community can, and must be, re-presented, if it is not to remain in the private realm of the individual’s psyche.\textsuperscript{219} Imagination means ‘creation’, and the ‘inventions of the imagination’ include national communities and their ways of representation in art and media.

\textsuperscript{214} Ozkirimli, U. (2000). Theories of Nationalism, Palgrave, pp. 143-144
\textsuperscript{216} Ozkirimli, U. (2000). Theories of Nationalism, Palgrave, pp. 145
Anderson locates the cultural origins of the modern nation historically at the junction of three developments: a change in the conception of time, the decline of religious communities and of dynastic realms.\textsuperscript{220} The process was facilitated by print capitalism that enabled rapidly growing numbers of people in Europe to think of themselves in profoundly new ways.\textsuperscript{221} As a result, print-languages laid the bases for national consciousness in three ways: first, by creating unified fields of exchange and communication; second, by providing a new fixity to language that helped to build the image of antiquity, key to the idea of the nation; and third, by creating languages-of-power of a kind different from the earlier administrative vernaculars.\textsuperscript{222}

Two major objections are usually raised in regard to Anderson’s account. The first holds that it is culturally reductionist, exaggerates the importance of cultural nationalism and underestimates the political dimension of nationalism in nineteenth century Europe.\textsuperscript{223} The second objection notes that Anderson’s thesis concerning the relationship between nationalism and religion does not work for all cases, and that religion is not always replaced by nationalism.\textsuperscript{224}

4.3 Political modernism

\textsuperscript{220} Ozkirimli, U. (2000). Theories of Nationalism, Palgrave, pp. 148
\textsuperscript{221} Ozkirimli, U. (2000). Theories of Nationalism, Palgrave, pp. 148
A third variant of modernism, political modernism, emphasizes the primacy of political factors in explaining nationalism. In the West, since the French Revolution nation-state has been the predominant and the only legitimate form of political organization and the main method of collective identity, which initially spread to the areas colonized by the European powers and later to the rest of the world due to the superior power of the West. This history has led many theorists\textsuperscript{225} to view the modern, bureaucratic state as the source and framework of modern nations and nationalism, and regard political and military forces and institutions as the keys to explaining their emergence.\textsuperscript{226} Among such prominent political modernist are Anthony Giddens and John Breuilly, who focus on the relationship of nationalism to such sources of power as war, elites, and the modern state.

John Breuilly in his *Nationalism and the State* proposes a new perspective on nationalism as a form of politics. As for him, “the only starting point for a general understanding of nationalism is to take its form of politics seriously”, through comparative historical survey.\textsuperscript{227} Breuilly adopts a two-pronged approach: he develops a typology of nationalism because each type of nationalism would require different method of analysis, and then he investigates each type of nationalism by the method of comparative history.\textsuperscript{228} Thus, he is able to compare and contrast various types of nationalism systematically.

\textsuperscript{225} Amongst them are Anthony Giddens, Charles Tilly, Eric Hobsbawm, James Mayall, John Breuilly, Michael Mann, Paul Brass and Rogers Brubaker.
\textsuperscript{228} Breuilly, J. (1993). *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester University Press, p.2
Breuilly defines nationalism as “political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments”. These nationalist arguments are built on three assertions: 1) there is a nation with an explicit and peculiar character; 2) the interests and values of the nation have priority over all other interests and values; and 3) the nation must be independent, or at least politically sovereign. Breuilly’s thesis is based on a simple, yet powerful logic – nationalism is above all about politics, and politics is about power. By continuation of that logic, Breuilly contends that “power, in the modern world, is principally about control of the state”, and therefore, the challenge is “to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state power”. A central task is to understand why nationalism has become central in achieving and using state power. And another related task is to examine the relation of nationalism to the process of modernization by focusing on the development of the modern state.

Breuilly perceives the development of nationalism closely bound up with the nature of political modernization in nineteenth-century Europe, and its settlement areas and imperial spread overseas. He therefore proposes that nationalism should be seen in this specific, political context, not as “an intellectual invention to be unmasked, nor as an irrational force erupting in history, much less as the solution propounded by nationalists themselves to a deep human need for identity.”

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In his analysis, Breuilly focuses on two aspects of nationalist movements. The first deals with the relationship between nationalist movement and the state to which it either opposes or controls. The second concerns the goals of nationalist movements, such as separation, reform, or unification.\footnote{Breuilly, J. (1993). \textit{Nationalism and the State}, Manchester University Press, p.9} He also identifies three different functions of nationalist ideas: coordination, mobilization and legitimacy. Coordination means that “nationalist ideas are used to promote the idea of common interests amongst a number of elites which otherwise have rather distinct interests in opposing the existing state”.\footnote{Breuilly, J. (1996). \textit{Approaches to Nationalism. Mapping the Nation}, G. Balakrishnan. London, Verso, pp. 166-7.} Mobilization is described as “the use of nationalist ideas to generate support for the political movement from broad groups hitherto excluded from the political process”.\footnote{Breuilly, J. (1996). \textit{Approaches to Nationalism. Mapping the Nation}, G. Balakrishnan. London, Verso, pp. 166-7.} Legitimacy is defined as “the use of nationalist ideas to justify the goals of the political movement both to the state it opposes and also to powerful external agents, such as foreign states and their public opinions”.\footnote{Breuilly, J. (1996). \textit{Approaches to Nationalism. Mapping the Nation}, G. Balakrishnan. London, Verso, pp. 166-7.} In part because it performs those functions, nationalism has spread across the world and remained a powerful force for the last two centuries.

Breuilly’s assessment of the role of political transformation on nationalism has inevitably drawn some opposition. For example, Smith warns against exaggerating the role of the modern state in the formation of nationalism and criticizes the confusion of state-building with the formation of national identity among culturally homogenous populations, as the establishment of state institutions do not guarantee that the population will identify with these
institutions and the national messages they propagate. While Conversi points to tautology in Breuilly’s claim that failures in state-building cause distinctive nationalist politics, which risks reifying the state into the ultimate arbiter of all social processes, and argues that that ethnic nationalism has often been reinforced by state intervention.

Anthony Giddens in his book, *the Nation-State and Violence*, concentrates on the rise of territorially bounded nation-state and its links with military power. Underlying his work is the perception of the nation-state formation as a product of the dislocated modern history, conditioned by industrial capitalism that led to massive changes in the society. Giddens’s primary concern is not nationalism, however, but its function in reinforcing the territorial cohesion and reflexive qualities of the nation-state. In this connection, Giddens states that:

> The nation-state, which exists in a complex of other nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence.

For Giddens, nationalist movements are “distinctive properties of modern states”, and a nation is defined as “a collectivity existing within a clearly demarcated territory, which is subject to a unitary administration, reflexively monitored both by the internal state apparatus and those of other states”. Calhoun points out that the key is not just the identification of state with nation, but the structural changes involved in the rise of the modern state, which made it possible to

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conceive of the nation as unitary.\textsuperscript{240} Previous political forms neither demarcated clear boundaries nor fostered internal integration and homogenization. That is why a nation “only exists when a state has a unified administrative reach over the territory over which its sovereignty is claimed”.\textsuperscript{241} Such usage of the term ‘nation’ implies that the relationship between nationalism and ethnicity is coincidental. In other words, it is the modern state that defines nationhood, and pre-existing ethnic relations are revised to coincide with its boundaries or to constitute the basis of counter-state movements for the formation of new states.\textsuperscript{242} Giddens associates cultural explanations of nationalism with accounts concentrating on pre-existing ethnic solidarities and differences.

The origins of early nationalist sentiments lay in the state’s mobilization of different classes and strata to fight against a common enemy. Nationalism was the ideology that could mobilize mass population, enabling the state to invoke a common identity for its subjects in opposition to the other, which was seen as intrinsically hostile and dangerous.\textsuperscript{243}

While nationalism is perceived by Giddens as primarily a political movement, he still acknowledges its psychological character. In this regard he points to the affiliation of individuals to a set of symbols and beliefs emphasising commonality among the members of a political order.\textsuperscript{244} He then qualifies his position by noting that any postulated need for identity is too vague and cannot

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\item \textsuperscript{240} Calhoun, C. (1999). Nationalism, Open University Press, p.68
\item \textsuperscript{244} Giddens, A. (1985). The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge, Polity Press, p.116
\end{itemize}
explain the connection with states. The emergence of the nation-state in most cases stimulates oppositional nationalisms, the origin of which, Giddens suggests, must be sought less in regional economic disparities than in “the disruption of traditional modes of behaviour that encourage historicity and the claim to administrative sovereignty”. For that reason, Giddens proposes that all nationalist movements are necessarily political, because nationalism is “inherently linked to the achievement of administrative autonomy of the modern form”.

There are two general criticisms of Giddens’ model of political transformation. The first concerns the problem of definitional reduction because the nation is subsumed within the state and has no independent conceptual role outside the link with the state. This can prevent independent analysis of the nation and nationalism. The second is his characterization of nationalism as a psychological phenomenon. This reduces nationalism’s importance and creates a gulf between the structure of the nation-state and the subjectivity of nationalism, which can only be bridged by subordinating the latter to the former.

5.0 Ethno-symbolism

Ethno-symbolism, driven by tireless efforts of such scholars as Anthony Smith, John Armstrong and John Hutchinson, has tried to prove that nationalism has stronger roots in pre-modern ethnicity than modernists would like to accept.

Ethno-symbolism attacks the modernist argument on its circular nature because modernism “presumes the modernity of a phenomenon which it then declares to be the product of modernisation, and hence to fit the modernist thesis of its modernity, both temporally and sociologically”. \(^{249}\) The modernists, on the other hand, downplay the term altogether and approach ethno-symbolism as a less radical version of primordialism. \(^{250}\) Smith brought the end to confusion by clearly acknowledging and defining the term a decade ago. \(^{251}\) Accordingly, the term ‘ethno-symbolist’ is used to denote scholars whose objective is to uncover the symbolic legacy of pre-modern ethnic identities for today’s nations. \(^{252}\)

Ethno-symbolists share a common reverence for the past of the nation. They believe the formation of nations should be examined in *la longue duree*, in other words, a “time dimension of many centuries”, because an understanding of ethnic precursors is essential for our proper assessment of the emergence of present nations. \(^{253}\) In other words, and as Hutchinson suggests, the formation of nations needs to be contextualised within the larger phenomenon of ethnicity that shaped them. \(^{254}\) Thus, ethno-symbolists claim that they reject the stark continuism of perennialists and give due credit to the transformations wrought by modernity, while rejecting modernists’ assertion arguing for the existence of greater

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continuity between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ eras. Ethno-symbolists are also critical of the modernist failure to grasp the recurring nature of ethno-symbolic ties and to ground their understanding of modern nations in the longue durée and in earlier ethnic myths, memories, symbols, and traditions.

So that one can unfold the underlying thesis of ethno-symbolism, an assessment of ethno-symbolist theory of Anthony Smith, most prominent ethno-symbolist, is deemed helpful. Smith acknowledges that nations cannot be seen as primordial or natural but, nonetheless, claims that they are rooted in relatively ancient histories and in perduring ethnic consciousness. He agrees that nationalism, as ideology and movement, dates only from the later eighteenth century, but notes that the ethnic origins of nations are much older.

For Smith, the foundation of the concept of nation and of particular nations is based on the thesis that:

> Myths, symbols, memories and values are ‘carried’ in and by forms and genres of artefacts and activities which change only very slowly, so ethnie, once formed tend to be exceptionally durable under ‘normal’ vicissitudes, and to persist over many generations, even centuries, forming ‘moulds’ within which all kinds of social and cultural processes can unfold and upon which all kinds of circumstances and pressures can exert and impact.

The origins of modern nationalism therefore lie in the successful bureaucratization of aristocratic ethnie, ethnic communities with their myths and symbols, which

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were able to transform themselves into genuine nations only in the West. Thus, what makes ethnic and then national identity is the power of collective memory.259

In the modern arena, ethnic communities are compelled to become political and “in order to survive, ethnie must take on some of the attributes of nationhood, and adopt a civic model”.261 On the other hand, nations, rooted in ethnicity, are long-term processes, continually re-enacted and re-constructed, and they require ethnic homelands, heroes, and golden ages if they are to survive.262

According to Smith, modern nations and nationalism have only extended and deepened the meanings and scope of older ethnic concepts and structures. Nationalism has universalized such structures and ideals, but modern ‘civic’ nations have not in practice really transcended ethnicity or ethnic sentiments.263

There are five main charges against ethno-symbolist perspective. The first holds that ethno-symbolist scholars are conceptually confused and their arguments indicate a state of ‘terminological chaos’.264 The second asserts that ethno-symbolists underestimate the differences between modern nations and ancient ethnic communities.265 Breuilly points to the difference between modern nationhood and ancient ethnic communities by stressing the lack of institutional

basis in pre-modern identities.\textsuperscript{266} The third claims that it is impossible to speak of nations and nationhood in pre-modern times.\textsuperscript{267} The fourth criticizes ethno-symbolism for its downplaying the fluidity and malleability of ethnic identities. Thus, Kedourie states that ethnic identity is not an inert or stable object, but has proved itself as highly fluid and susceptible to changes.\textsuperscript{268} And the final charge holds that ethno-symbolist analysis of the process of ethnic formation is misleading: Western nation-states’ success and endurance in forming national identities were based on the process of centralization and institutionalization, while ethnicity and cultural homogeneity were the products of these processes and not their determinants.\textsuperscript{269}

6.0 Institutionalism

As was described in previous sections, modernization theorists hold that economic and political development promotes integration of ethnic groups based on national identities, which override and displace primordial attachments. All modernists agree that the ‘inventing’ or ‘imagining’ of nations became possible due to the transformation of economic, political or social conditions. Primordialists, on the

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other hand, emphasize the deep roots, ancient origins, and emotive power of national attachments. Primordialists and some modernists treat nations as real, substantial collectivities. Such conventional ‘substantialist’ accounts of nationalism reify the nation and consider it as an enduring collectivity. Brubaker challenges the associated dominant ‘groupism’ - “a tendency to take bounded groups as fundamental units of analysis (and basic constituents of the social world)”. He laments that, despite decades of prevailing constructivist thought, the overwhelming majority of studies published in the field of ethnicity and nationalism continues to suffer from the groupist syndrome.

That groupist tendency should be placed, however, in the context of the actual world of identifications and distinctions, where “a belief in sharp and relatively fixed distinctions between groups and predictable harmonies and homogeneities within groups gives a person an easy and reliable map of a complex and changing world”. This ‘mental map’ has a number of ramifications in an insecure world: it provides a degree of predictability and allows different forms of treatment of group members and outsiders. As Yael Tamir puts it:

Nationhood promotes fraternity both among fellow members and across generations. It endows human action with meaning that endures over time, thus carrying a promise of immortality.

Suny, in his exploration of the tension between investigations by scholars of the historical formation of national identities and the actual practice of identity-constructing nationalists, points to the disjuncture between the modernist assumptions of nationalism and the belief of nationalists in real and essential nationhood, which is not easily resolved by an exposure of the processes by which national histories and group distinctions are constructed. The power of the national identity lies within the discourse of the nation that justifies both territorial possession and statehood to those with prior and exclusive claims, based on language, culture, and ethnicity. In that context, he notes that:

In a world of competitors for territory and political power, primordialism was a practical, even necessary, solution to the difficulty of establishing such prior or exclusive claims. Since prenational ethnic and religious communities do not map neatly with modern nations, and since nations themselves are inherently unstable categories, primordialism and essentialism do the hard work of reifying the nation. Identities might be fluid, but in the real world of politics the players act as if they are immutable, both for strategic reasons and emotional satisfaction.

In an increasingly globalized world, nationalists fear the loss or erosion of identity and try actively to intervene and save it. Nation and national identity are reified, made and re-made into something real. However, the quest for meaning, mental maps, or effective boundaries and collective commitments for social polities can only partially explain the power of nationhood and the primordialist discourse. Suny emphasizes the complex nature of identity and asserts that: “People may act rationally to realize their preferences, but those preferences are intimately tied to the identities that people have constructed or that have been constituted for

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them”. In line with the views of Gellner and Anderson, he cautions against reducing the construction of primordial identity to “a mistake, a self-deception, or false consciousness”, because national identity, more often than not, is conceived as “an act of subscription to a continuous community with a past and a future, a shared destiny”.

Nonetheless, if a nation sees itself as real, ancient, and continuous, then its claim to national sovereignty would be unique, uncontested, and not to be shared. We are often reminded that national identity construction has most powerfully been about a single, unitary identity, not a multiplicity of self-understandings, embedded in a long history and attached to a specific territory. The attempts to achieve an exclusivist and homogeneous nationhood in the context of ethnically pluralist and fluid world could, and have, lead to despicable acts of mass deportation, ethnic cleansing or even genocide. Perhaps, that is the reasoning behind Brubaker’s assertion that there are very few scholars who continue to subscribe to the primordialist view that that nations are primordial and immune to change. Indeed most scholars would now agree that the general assumptions of modernism are fundamentally correct. In the words of Ozkirimli, we are told that: “Almost everybody admits that nations are born at a particular period of history, notwithstanding disagreements on the precise date for their emergence or the

relative weight of pre-modern traditions and modern transformations in their formation”.

Constructivists/modernists, on the other hand, propose a more open alternative view of national construction. Suny describes that position in the following way: “If the lines between peoples are blurred and shifting, if many possible claimants to a particular piece of the world’s real estate are allowed, then we can conceive of political communities in the future that permit cohabitation with shared sovereignties in a ‘national’ space”. Along the same lines, Hall puts forward that “instead of thinking of identity as an accomplished fact, which the new cultural practices then represent, we should think, instead, of identity as a ‘production’, which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation”. Nationhood is therefore neither given nor fixed, but is determined, consciously or unconsciously, by the group itself and varies according to changing circumstances. And the fact that nations are ‘invented’ or ‘imagined’ does not make them ‘less real’ in the eyes of those who believe in them.

In analyzing nationhood, it is evident that we deal with heterogeneous objects of analysis, not with a single, unitary phenomenon. Hence Ozkirimli’s observation that the ‘macro’ explanations of a general theory of nationalism are not possible. In other words, there can be no ‘general’ or ‘overarching’ theory of nationhood. Most theories and perspectives seem to point to different facets of

nationhood and vary in significance depending on the context. It is indeed the case that "grasping nationalism in its multiplicity of forms requires multiple theories".  

Given that nationhood is one of the most important forces in international relations and we need to deal with it, Ozkirimli proposes two strategies to better understand it in the current world. The first is to address the issues neglected or ignored by the mainstream literature, while acknowledging the merits and gains of the past insights, which would help to formulate a series of 'partial theories', each illuminating a particular aspect of national phenomenon. The second strategy is to produce 'theoretically informed' comparative histories, which will also test the theories concerned against historical evidence. Guided by that sagacious proposition, it is reasonable to proceed with considering the institutionalist perspective on nationhood, which is rarely reflected in the mainstream literature on nationalism. Testing institutionalist framework against the historical evidence of Central Asia will not only shed new light on nation-formation and nation-building in the region, but could also contribute to the development of theoretically informed approaches to understand better the relation between the nation-building processes and ethnic conflicts in the region.

So how is nationhood conceived according to institutionalism? One should start answering that question with addressing crucial assumptions of institutionalism. Institutionalists emphasize the primacy of political institutions

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in national transformation. Lowndes provides a useful baseline definition of institutions based on the following three elements.\(^{289}\) The first holds that institution is a middle-level concept, devised by individuals but in turn constraining their action. Institutions are part of the broad social fabric, as well as the medium through which day-to-day decisions and actions are taken. Apart from shaping human action imposing constraints, institutions also provide opportunities. The second element posits that institutions involve formal rules, but also informal norms and customs. Unlike formal institutions, informal institutions are not consciously designed nor neatly specified, but are part of habitual action. In other words, institutions may be expressed in organizational form, but also relate to processes. And the final aspect suggests that institutions possess legitimacy beyond the preferences of individual actors and show stability over time. Institutions may gain their legitimacy either because of their relative stability over time, or because of their link with a sense of belonging.

Political institutions are not equated to political organizations. Institution is conceived more broadly to refer to a “stable, recurring pattern of behaviour”.\(^{290}\) In fact, March and Olsen assert that political institutions are political actors in their own right.\(^{291}\) But political institutions are not independent entities, existing out of space and time. They are ‘embedded’ in particular contexts.\(^{292}\)

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Institutions are understood as models or scripts for behaviour. In other words, they represent ‘the rules of the game’ and provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action. Institutions are not things, but processes.\textsuperscript{293} Institutions are therefore expected to continually evolve. Lowndes explains that rules are seen as producing variation and deviation as well as conformity and standardization, because “there are always areas of ambiguity in the interpretation and application of rules, and because rules are adapted by actors seeking to make sense of changing environments”.\textsuperscript{294}

As institutionalism is concerned with the informal conventions of political life and formal constitutions and organizational structures, institutionalists consider not only the impact of institutions on individuals, but also the interaction between institutions and individuals.\textsuperscript{295} In the words of Hall and Taylor, the individual is seen as “an entity deeply embedded in a world of institutions, composed of symbols, scripts and routines, which provide the filters for interpretation, of both the situation and oneself, out of which a course of action is constructed”.\textsuperscript{296} While the structure of governance – “the inclusion or exclusion of different actors and the selection of instruments” - is embedded in, and sustains, political values.\textsuperscript{297}

In stressing that political institutions influence actors’ behaviour by shaping their values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs, March and Olsen note

that seemingly neutral rules and structures actually embody values and power relations, and determine appropriate behaviour within given settings.\textsuperscript{298} Institutions simplify political life by ensuring that certain things are taken for granted in deciding other things. Thus, it is evident that institutions not only provide strategically-useful information, but they also affect the very identities, self-images and preferences of the actors.\textsuperscript{299}

Institutionalists emphasize the way in which institutions influence behaviour by providing the cognitive scripts, categories and models, which are indispensable for action.\textsuperscript{300} The relationship between the individual and the institution is built on a kind of ‘practical reasoning’, whereby the individual works with and reworks the available institutional templates to devise a course of action.\textsuperscript{301} It is also observed that in many cases institutions provide the very terms through which meanings are assigned in social life.\textsuperscript{302}

In a world where individuals or organizations seek to define and express their identity in socially appropriate ways, organizations embrace specific institutional forms or practices because the latter are widely valued within a broader cultural environment.\textsuperscript{303} According to Clemens and Cooks, institutionalism has become predominantly associated with the constitutive role of

culturally legitimate models of organization and action. Institutionalists therefore seek to identify the diverse ways in which institutions embody and shape societal values, which may in turn be contested and in flux.

That is why institutionalist arguments against the realist and substantialist approach to nations do not imply to dispute the reality of nationhood, but rather to re-conceptualize that reality, and to decouple the study of nationhood and nationness from the study of nations as substantial entities or collectivities. It is necessary to approach nationhood as a conceptual variable, and treat nation “not as substance but as institutionalised form; not as collectivity but as practical category; not as entity but as contingent event”. This way the possibility to understand the reality of nationhood and the real power of nationalism, “without invoking in our theories the very ‘political fiction’ of ‘the nation’, whose potency in practice we wish to explain”. And instead of the groupist discourse, scholars are urged to operate with more dynamic concepts of group formation. The reason being is that since group membership is not a fixed state but a variable, it should not be assumed that collective action stems from ascribed collective designation.

A question “what is a nation”, which often bogs down scholarly discussions on nationhood, loses its potency. Throughout his works, which have

have been crucial in exploring institutionalized definitions of nationhood and their political consequences, Brubaker stresses the urgency of asking other questions, such as: How is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalized within and among states? How does nation work as practical category, as classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame? What makes the use of that category by or against states more or less resonant or effective? What makes the nation-evoking, nation-invoking efforts of political entrepreneurs more or less likely to succeed?

Putting the questions this way, he suggests, displaces our everyday understanding of nations as collectivities and entities, and suggests that one should start instead by considering nation as a category or a term, and nationalism as a particular language, a political idiom, a way of using that category. For Brubaker, nationhood is not an ethno-demographic or ethno-cultural fact, but rather a political claim, a claim on people’s loyalty and their solidarity. Nationhood is not used to describe a world independent of the language used to describe it, but rather, to change the world, to change the way people see themselves, to mobilize loyalties, and articulate demands.

Nation is first and foremost a category of practice, not a category of analysis. And as a category of practice, nationhood can be instanced in diverse circumstances. In some contexts, when national community does not coincide with the territory or citizenry of the state, claims to nationhood can challenge the existing territorial and political order, by expressing the demand for a change in

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the political map. In other contexts, the category nation is used to create a sense of national unity for a given polity. It is this nation-building work that was undertaken by leaders of post-colonial states, who had achieved independence, but whose populations were deeply divided along regional, ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines. Even in circumstances like this, nationhood category can also be used in a different way. Rather than appealing to a unified national identity, it can assert ‘ownership’ of the polity on behalf of a core ethno-cultural nation, distinct from the citizenry of the state as a whole, and re-define the state as the state of and for that core nation.\(^\text{313}\)

However, the category ‘nation’ can also function in an inclusive way by mobilizing mutual solidarity among members of the whole nation, defined to include all citizens of the state. Brubaker notes that to invoke nationhood, in this sense, is “to attempt to transcend or at least relativise internal differences and distinctions”, as well as “to get people to think of themselves - to formulate their identities and their interests - as members of that nation”.\(^\text{314}\)

While acknowledging the value of debunking groupist discourse, Malesevic notes a pronounced weakness persisting in Brubaker’s position in that regard, namely that it is not completely clear how one can avoid it altogether when dealing with particular empirical material or when attempting to disseminate knowledge to a wider, non-academic audience.\(^\text{315}\) Even Brubaker himself is not impervious to slipping into groupist language when in the empirical work in his


Ethnicity without Borders, for example, references are made to certain ethnic groups or people. One could also query if groupist terms such as ‘society’ or ‘race’ should be put under the same treatment as are those of ‘ethnic group’ and ‘nation’. Malesevic, quite rightly, cautions that with such overemphasis on the conceptual exterior a problem may occur that one could easily mistake form for substance, and prompts that it is possible to remain a firm essentialist even within the full acceptance of constructivist language.\footnote{Malesevic, S. (2006). “Review of Ethnicity without Borders.” Nations and Nationalism \textbf{12}(4), p.700}


In speaking of nationness as event, Brubaker signals a double contrast: the first is between nation as entity and nationness as a variable property of groups, of relationships, and of relational settings; and the second contrast is between

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Bourdieu, P. (1990). In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology. Stanford, Stanford University Press, p.134
\end{thebibliography}
thinking of nationhood as something that _develops_, and as something that _happens_.\textsuperscript{321} Under the second contrast, developmentalist perspective is exemplified through the vast literature on nationalism that traces the long-term political, economic, and cultural changes, which led to the gradual emergence of nationness. In that sense, the works by Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Anthony Smith, which were discussed earlier, can be defined as developmentalist.

Brubaker claims that there is a lack of theoretically sophisticated eventful analyses of nationalism. Studies conducted by sociologists and political scientists have tended to abstract from events in their search for generalized structural or cultural explanations, while historians, taking for granted the significance of contingent events, have not been inclined to theorize them.\textsuperscript{322}

Brubaker’s confinement of the nation’s referents to form, practice and event is opposed by Smith, who notes that this leads to stripping nation of those attributes that give it so much of its potency and appeal.\textsuperscript{323} There is no reason however why a strong theoretical case cannot be made for an eventful approach to nationness. For example, Craig Calhoun also argued that identity should be understood as a “changeable product of collective action”, not as its stable underlying cause.\textsuperscript{324} Brubaker points out that the same thing could be said about


That urgency was brought to our attention after the end of Cold War, when most tragic events related to nationalism and demonization of the national other unfolded to the surprise of many experts. Brubaker laments that we know well \textit{that} this happened, but we know too little about \textit{how} it happened. This is where he suggests that we need an eventful perspective and must give serious theoretical attention to contingent events and to their trans-formative consequences.\footnote{Brubaker, R. (1996). \textit{Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe}, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 21} Through this method, it may be possible to understand the ‘processual dynamics’ of nationalism. Indeed, historical contingencies play a crucial part in the formation of nationalism, which is a protean phenomenon, capable of taking on multiple forms depending on the historical, political and social context over which it reigns.\footnote{Ozkirimli, U. (2000). \textit{Theories of Nationalism}, Palgrave, pp. 226-27}

In a context of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the national conflicts in the successor states, the temptation to adopt a nation-centred perspective was understandable. Yet Brubaker urges that the temptation should be resisted, because nationalism is not engendered by nations, but produced or induced by ‘political fields’ of particular kinds.\footnote{Brubaker, R. (1994). “Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical Category, Contingent Event.” \textit{Contention} \textbf{4}(1), p.6} As institutions are ‘embedded’ in particular contexts, the Soviet and post-Soviet nationalisms serve as useful examples to illustrate institutionalist approach.
In the survey of resurgent national movements in the post-Soviet Eastern Europe and Eurasia, Brubaker identifies four distinct kinds of nationalism that have flourished in the post-communist countries as a result of the re-organization of political space along national lines.\(^{329}\) The first is the ‘nationalizing’ nationalism of newly independent states. Nationalizing nationalisms involve claims made in the name of a core nation or titular nationality, which is defined in ethno-cultural terms and distinct from the citizenry as a whole.\(^{330}\) The core nation is perceived as the legitimate ‘owner’ of the state, which is understood as the state of and for the core nation. In spite of this, the core nation is conceived as being in a weak cultural, economic or demographic position within the state, which justifies the remedial programme of using state power to promote the interests of the core nation.

The second type is trans-border nationalism of external national homelands, which directly challenges nationalizing nationalism. Trans-border homeland nationalisms are oriented to ethno-national kin who are residents and citizens of other states. It asserts a state’s right and its obligation to monitor the condition, promote the welfare, support the activities and institutions, and protect the interests of their ethno-national kin in other states, especially when they are seen as threatened by the nationalizing polices and practices of the state in which they live.\(^{331}\) Nazi Germany and present-day Russia could be considered as examples of trans-border nationalism.

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Caught between two mutually antagonistic nationalisms are the national minorities, who have their own, the third type of nationalism. They too make claims on the grounds of their nationality, which makes them a national minority in turn. National minority involves a self-understanding in specifically national rather than merely ethnic terms, a “demand for state recognition of their distinct ethno-cultural nationality, and the assertion of certain collective, nationality-based cultural or political rights”.332 Nationalism of minority, like trans-border nationalism or nationalizing state, designates a political stance, rather than an ethno-demographic fact.

The fourth form of flourishing nationalism is a defensive, national-populist nationalism that aims to protect the national economy, language, culture against alleged threats from outside. Such threats are seen to stem from diverse sources but can include among others foreign capital, trans-national organizations, immigrants, and foreign cultural influences. This kind of nationalism often brands its political opponents as anti-national, and is critical of the various ills of the West and/or of modernity. That is because the social and economic dislocations resulting from liberal market reforms - unemployment, inflation, decline of social welfare, etc. - create fertile soil for using such national populist idioms as a legitimation strategy by governments or as a mobilization strategy by oppositions.333

Gellner and some other scholars believed that the Soviet Union had effectively contained and ‘frozen’ nationalism, so that the nationalisms that

emerged in 1991 were essentially the late nineteenth-century forms of nationalism, in which the ‘one nation one state’ principle predominated.\textsuperscript{334} The efforts of the Soviet Union in containing nationalism were applauded by Hobsbawm in the following way:

Hence, as we can now see in melancholy retrospect, it was the great achievement of the communist regimes in multinational countries to limit the disastrous effects of nationalism within them . . . The USSR’s potential for disruption, so long kept in check (except during World War II), is now patent. In fact, the ‘discrimination’ or even ‘oppression’ against which champions of various Soviet nationalities abroad used to protest, was far less than the consequences of the withdrawal of Soviet power.\textsuperscript{335}

In his assessment of post-Soviet national movements, Brubaker challenges the primordialist view and asserts that:

To see these as the struggles of nations, of real, solidary groups who somehow survived despite Soviet attempts to crush them, is to get things exactly backwards. This perspective suggests that nations and nationalism flourish today \textit{despite} the Soviet regime’s ruthlessly antinational policies.\textsuperscript{336}

Miroslav Hroch agrees that it cannot simply be assumed that the Soviet state was always effective in its nation-building and posits that: “The conventional view that current turmoil is the result of the release of irrational forces that were long suppressed - ‘deep-frozen’ as it were - under communism, and are now in full

revival after a lapse of fifty years, is evidently superficial. Such a conception is extravagent - closer to the world of fairy-tales than of historical processes”.

With that in mind, Brubaker puts forward the alternative view that nationhood and nationalism flourish today in the post-Soviet world largely because of the regime’s policies, and that those policies, although anti-nationalist, were anything but anti-national. He traces how the Soviet regime used the construct of nationality - as an attribute of both persons and places - to organize the administration of its ethnically heterogeneous territories. In fact, the policies and methods of the Soviet regime gradually institutionalized the territorial and ethnic republics.

Nationalist practices were formed and sustained by Soviet political institutions. Far from ruthlessly suppressing nationhood, the Soviet regime pervasively institutionalized it. The regime repressed national sentiments, but at the same time it advanced the institutionalization of territorial nationhood and ethnic nationality as fundamental social categories. In doing so, the Soviet state involuntarily created a political field conducive to nationalism. Drawing on institutionalism, Brubaker proposes that those national categories were by no means empty. Even though the Soviet regime consistently and effectively repressed all signs of overt political nationalism, the repression of nationalism was

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concurrent with the establishment and consolidation of nationhood and nationality as fundamental cognitive and social forms. \(^{341}\)

Brubaker focuses on two different modes in which nationhood and nationality were institutionalized in the Soviet Union: territorial and political on the one hand, ethno-cultural and personal on the other hand. \(^{342}\) On the one hand, the Soviet regime divided up the Soviet state into more than fifty national territories. Each territory was explicitly defined as the homeland of and for a particular ethno-national group, while the top-level national territories were determined as quasi-nation states, complete with their own territories, constitutions, legislatures, administration and cultural institutions. Slezkhine emphasizes that the Soviet Union was the world’s first state to institutionalize ethno-territorial federalism, which was more than just a tool for propaganda: “Uncompromisingly hostile to individual rights, they eagerly, deliberately and quite consistently promoted group rights that did not always coincide with those of the proletariat”. \(^{343}\)

On the other hand, the regime divided the citizenry into a set of comprehensive and mutually exclusive ethnic nationalities. Through this state classification system, ethnic nationality served both as a statistical category, and as an obligatory ascribed status. \(^{344}\) Thus, ethnic nationality was assigned by the state at birth on the basis of descent, which was registered in passports and recorded in

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almost all bureaucratic documentations and official transactions. Nationality was also used to manipulate access to higher education and to certain jobs. In a thorough and insightful historical assessment of the Soviet Union as an ‘affirmative action empire’ (1923-1939), Terry Martin argues that: “Russia’s new revolutionary government was the first of the old European multiethnic states to confront the rising tide of nationalism and respond by systematically promoting the national consciousness of its ethnic minorities and establishing for them many of the characteristic institutional forms of the nation-state”. 345

Even before perestroika, territorial nationhood and ethnic nationality were already pervasively institutionalized social and cultural forms in the Soviet Union. Highlighting the institutional constitution of both interests and actors, Brubaker holds that the Soviet institutions of territorial nationhood and personal nationality constituted “a pervasive system of social classification, and organizing principles of vision and division of the social world, a standardized scheme of social accounting, and interpretative grid of public and private identities, and when political space expanded under Gorbachev, a ready-made template for claims to sovereignty”. 346 And when reforms during perestroika enlarged political horizons in the Soviet state, nationalism fulfilled a number of functions: it constituted elementary forms of political understanding, political discourse, political interest, and political identity; provided a ready template for claims to sovereignty; and made certain political actions conceivable. 347 And although the Soviet Union itself

was not organized as a nation state, that national template for identity was outsourced to regional and ethnic identities and eventually served as fuel for its thoroughly nationalist disintegration.\textsuperscript{348}

Nationhood is often employed in the creation and maintenance of political legitimacy. Institutionalized nations endure because those institutional models become taken for granted through repeated use and interaction, or they in turn become legitimate through the endorsement of some authoritative or powerful individual or organization. However, Goshulak reminds that the tools used for creating a national identity are not always effective, because “the legitimacy process itself is conditioned by the struggles that take place both within and between the state and society. How the nation is conceived, therefore, is an object of struggle and accommodation”.\textsuperscript{349} It is worth noting further that political institutions are durable to the extent that these models are “reinforced through socialization or interaction or legitimation while alternative scripts remain unimaginable”.\textsuperscript{350}

Institutional definitions of nationhood in the Soviet Union therefore did not so much constrain action but constituted “basic categories of political understanding, central parameters of political rhetoric, specific types of political action conceivable, plausible, even compelling, transforming the collapse of a regime into the disintegration of a state”.\textsuperscript{351} In other words, they constitute the

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rules of the game and serve as models that provide substantive guides for practical action.

The institutional formation of nationhood and nationality in the Soviet Union were therefore by no means empty forms or legal fictions, as previously viewed by many Sovietologists. Institutionalized definitions of nationhood not only played a major role in the disintegration of the Soviet state, but continue to shape and structure the national questions in the successor states. Moreover, institutionally-defined nationalism continues to constitute elementary forms of political understanding and political action in the successor states, including those in Central Asia. Following Smith, one could see the result of the breakdown of the Soviet system as not a struggle of post-Soviet nations, but of institutionally constituted national elites. Suny makes an insightful observation that:

If the irony of Soviet nationality development was that an antinationalist state helped create nations within it, the irony of post-Soviet states is that their determined efforts at creating national histories and identities are resolutely carried on as if a real past can be recovered, as if a continuous, unbroken existence of a coherent nation has come down through time.

Thus, institutionalist answer to the question of “how should we think about nationhood and nationness?” would propose to focus on nation as a category of practice, nationhood as an institutionalized cultural and political form, and nationness as a contingent event or happening. Some would suggest that the

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task at hand is to think about nationalism without nations. In order to understand
the power of nationalism, one does not need to invoke nations, but nor should
nationhood, at the other extreme, be dismissed altogether. Brubaker suggests
decoupling categories of analysis from categories of practice, “retaining as
analytically indispensable the notions of nation as practical category, nationhood
as institutionalized form, and nationness as event, but leaving ‘the nation’ as
enduring community to nationalists”.

In order to better understand nationalism today, it is important to challenge
the notion that all the important questions about nations and nationalism have
been answered. Through institutionalist perspective, it is not intended to constitute
yet another theory of nationalism, but rather provide a framework for organizing
and explaining nationalism in the historical, political and social contexts of Soviet
and post-Soviet Central Asia. Institutionalist model is important because it points
to the need for new directions in the research of post-Soviet nationalisms. As an
organizing framework, institutionalist approach does not seek to replace but to
include and go beyond existing studies and approaches in explaining how the dual
legacy of institutionalized nationhood has continued to shape the national question
in the successor states, in particular those of Central Asia.

Europe. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 22
7.0 Conclusion

THIS chapter has shown how ethnicity and nationhood are manifested in society, and provided a systemic overview of the main theories of nationhood and ethnicity. It has analysed the key questions around which the debate on ethnicity and nationhood revolves. Thus, perennialist scholars approach modern nations as lineal descendents of their medieval counterparts, and for them it is nation and nationalism that engender modernity. The *sleeping beauty* metaphor catches the gist of the perennialist perspective. It describes nation as the Sleeping Beauty waiting for a magical kiss from nationalism, its Prince, for its awakening or re-awakening. Notwithstanding its appeal to broad masses and populist nationalists, perennialism is flawed for it signifies a self-fulfilling prophesy that takes advantage of the contemporary interpretation of the history. It also imposes a retrospective nationalism on groups whose identities and consciousness may have been not national, but local, regional, and religious. Such retrospective imposition is evidently laden with teleological bias.

If perennialism considers the origins of nations as antique, primordialism recognises them as organic givens, which are fixed and permanent entities of the world. Primordialists mainly focus on the nature and strength of ethnicity and nationalism, and argue that the nature of ethno-national ties is traceable to the emotions and consciousness similar to primordial attachments in kinship groups. But the three major themes of primordialism—essentialism, ineffability, and
mystification- are often charged as deficient. Thus, recent studies showing that the content and boundaries of ethno-national identity are fluid, not fixed, and are constantly re-defined and re-constructed have challenged the essentialist fallacy of primordialism. Moreover, the claim that ethno-national ties are ineffable is in contradiction to the facts, which indicate the frequent use of ethno-nationalism for political and nationalist ends that in turn can transform their very meanings. And the mystification of primordial identities can lead to their erroneous de-socialising and provide an ‘intellectual charter’ for the chauvinist ethno-nationalism.

Ethno-symbolists, on the other hand, try to uncover the symbolic legacy of pre-modern ethnic identities for modern nations, and they share a common reverence for the past of nation. They believe that the formation of nations needs to be contextualised within the larger phenomenon of ethnicity that purportedly shaped them. But ethno-symbolist framework is flawed on a number of accounts that include conceptual confusion, underestimation of the differences between modern nations and ancient ethnic groups, fallacy of referencing nations in pre-modern times and the downplaying of the fluidity of ethnic identities.

Modernism suggests a more reasonable way of looking at nations as wholly modern, social constructs of modernity. Nations are consequences of such modern processes as capitalism, industrialism, state bureaucratization, secularism and urbanization. Nations can therefore be explained through the social and political processes underlying modernity. Modernists astutely stress the political side of nations and contend that: nations are territorial political communities and main political actors in the international arena; they constitute the main political loyalty of their citizens that override their other allegiances; their success depends
on the infrastructure of social communications and comprehensive institutionalization of values, roles and expectations; and nations are the sole framework and beneficiary of social and political development.

Although the modernity of nations underpins the beliefs of all modernists, there is little else in common amongst them. They tend to emphasise different factors in their accounts of nationhood or prioritise one set of factors at the expense of others. But this is not a deficiency, but rather a reflection of social reality. As was shown, there can be no grand theory of nationalism, only partial theories concentrating on specific aspects. Various dimensions of modern social, cultural and political change serve to make both nationhood and ethnicity salient.

Ethnicity and nationhood are not just social problems but a political resource, which is often used in a variety of political strategies. Hence it is reasonable to heed institutionalist suggestion to focus on nationhood as a conceptual variable, and treat it not as substance but as institutionalized form, see it not as collectivity but as practical category, and study it not as entity but as contingent event. Because group membership is not a fixed state but a variable, one should not assume that collective action stems from ascribed collective designation. That is why institutionalist approach calls for an eventful perspective and theoretical attention to contingent events and to their transformative consequences. This is relevant to our understanding of nation-formation in Central Asia. Through the institutional perspective, it becomes possible to understand the processual dynamics of nationhood, and learn how nation works as practical category and classificatory scheme. Those are the questions that will be addressed in detail by
the next chapter, which will test the institutionalist perspective in the context of the discussion on the development of ethno-nationhood in Central Asia.
CHAPTER IV, ETHNICITY AND NATIONHOOD IN CENTRAL ASIA
1.0 Introduction

IF the previous chapter has shown the institutionalist perspective as the most suitable for understanding how ethnicity and nationhood has developed in the former Soviet Union, this section will employ the institutionalist framework in contextualizing and exploring the formation and development of ethnicity and nationhood in Central Asia. It will treat nation as a category of practice, institutionalized cultural and political form, and a contingent event.

The objective of this chapter is to present a new way of looking into the history, present and future of ethnicity and nationhood in Central Asia. This new perspective suggests that state institutions played a crucial role in forming and sustaining ethno-nationalism in the region, and that the legacy of such institutionalized ethno-nationalism will have a long-term affect on political and social development of the local societies. The chapter will therefore explain how the Soviet institutions ingrained the sentiments of nationhood and ethnicity deeply in the imaginations of Central Asian population, and why it has a direct relation to the current developments in ethno-nationalist politics in the region.

A note needs to be made on the choice of Uzbek and Kyrgyz nations for our comparative and systemic investigation. There are a number of reasons that justify the choice. Firstly, even though the review of this kind could benefit from extending units of analysis to include other nations, such as Kazakh, Tajik and Turkmen, that would however come at the detriment of the chapter’s focus and
space limitation. Secondly, Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities represent two kinds of groups present in the Central Asian society, nomadic and settled correspondingly. Thirdly, the relative homogeneity and historical commonality of the whole region renders the assessment of general trends in ethno-national development of Central Asia through the prism of formational processes in the selected two countries appropriate. Fourthly, both ethno-national groups inhabit the strategic Ferghana Valley, which is seen to be the most volatile area in Central Asia due to complex, disputed borders, multi-ethnic composition, dense population and socio-economic hardships. Thus the informed decision was made to concentrate on the cases of Kyrgyz and Uzbek nations in discussing the formation and development of nationhood and ethnicity in Central Asia.

The chapter therefore explores ethnicity in pre-Soviet Central Asia and explains further development of ethnicity and nationhood in Central Asia during the Soviet period. The forthcoming section will start by outlining the nature of Central Asian ethnicity prior to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

2.0 Ethnicity in pre-Soviet Central Asia

2.1 Central Asia before tsarist colonization

Up to the twelfth century, only a passing reference can be found to a group known as the Kyrgyz, and their origins remain the subject of controversy. Some of their
ancestors may have lived on the banks of the Upper Yenisei River in Siberia until the tenth century. Under pressure from various tribal confederations and threatened by the Mongol advances, they were gradually forced to emigrate southwards. They settled in the Tien Shan region but were unable to escape Mongol domination. During the thirteenth century the early Kyrgyz tribes found themselves in the territory of Chingiz Khan’s second son, Chaghatay.

In the fifteenth century, various Kyrgyz tribes seem to have created the first independent khanate with some degree of autonomy from the weakened Mongol overlords. The Soviet historians claim that it was during this period that the Kyrgyz developed a distinctive language and acquired a sense of nationhood. However, their social organization and political order remained centred around tribal and kinship ties, and did not resemble modern nations. Later in the seventeenth century, many Kyrgyz groups were forced to move again to the Ferghana Valley region, further south to what today is northern Tajikistan, or to eastern Turkestan, now part of China.

By eighteenth century, Kyrgyz society had developed around a flexible political-administrative structure, based on independent family and tribal associations and rooted in the nomadic way of life. In the middle of the eighteenth century, the Kyrgyz territories fell under the influence of the Chinese, who left their nomadic lifestyle largely untouched. However, by the end of that century first the southern and then the northern territories came under the Kokand Khanate’s control. By 1830 all of the Kyrgyz tribes were paying formal tribute to the khanate. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, many of the Kazakh tribes were also subordinated to Tashkent rule.
During the Kokand domination, Islam took a deeper hold within Kyrgyz tribes. That was especially the case in the south of the country. Yet one should note that even during this period many Kyrgyz, similar to other Central Asian nomadic groups, remained loyal to their traditional customs. Their new religion combined allegiance to Islam with strong faith in holy places, saints and evil spirits. In the north, the influence of Islam remained limited till the end of the nineteenth century when the Russian invaders helped strengthen the institutional basis of Islam.\footnote{Imart, G. (1986). “The Islamic Impact on Traditional Kirgiz Ethnicity.” Nationality Papers}

Though local leaders preserved most of their privileges under the new Kokand rulers, a perceived weakening of khanate’s power in the 1840s led to a series of rebellions. For example, in 1845 the Kyrgyz in Osh took advantage of the absence of the regular garrison and rebelled against the harsh tax policies of the Kokand Khanate. Further revolts took place in 1870, led by Kurmanjan-datka, the widow of a Kyrgyz aristocrat and a leader of various mountain tribes. The revolts, however, had little impact on Kokand, and it still retained a strong regional position. Moreover, the Khanate proved especially skilful in dividing and ruling, which kept the Kyrgyz fighting each other and unable to liberate from Kokand’s power grasp. This had been the case until Kokand’s position became, in turn, undermined by the growing Russian presence in Central Asia.

The formation of the Uzbek and Kazakh collectivity began in the fifteenth century when Abul Khayr (1412-68) tried to regroup his tribes of the Kipchak linguistic group. Those tribal groups then divided into Kazakhs, who left the confederation and continued their nomadic way of life in the steppes of today’s
Kazakhstan, and to Uzbeks, whose confederation of around 92 tribes migrated to
Transoxiana and carried out its conquest under the leadership of Sheybani Khan
(1451-1510). The origin of the collective term ‘Uzbek’ is however linked to
Dashti-Kipchak Uzbeks and most probably originates from the name of Uzbek-
khan (1312-1340), the ninth overlord of Djuchi House (Chenghiz-Khan’s elder
son). The Uzbek rulers used Persian and Chaghatay languages and borrowed
Timurids’ culture and state apparatus.

The following three identity layers contributed to the formation of the
Uzbek ethnicity: (1) Dashti-Kipchak nomadic Uzbeks, who mainly migrated to
Central Asia in early sixteenth century; (2) Local Turkic tribes and clans, which
joined the former, from the so-called Chaghatay and Oghuz Turkic tribes and
clans; and (3) Sarts, including the settled urban Turkic population, who abandoned
nomadism and lost their tribal affiliation, and turkified Tajiks. But it is
important to distinguish between the ethnicity of modern Uzbeks and that of the
Uzbek communities of the nineteenth century. At that time and prior to the
national delimitation of 1924, the Uzbeks had a distinct set of ethnic, social and
cultural characteristics, although by other characteristics they were close to other
Turkic people of the region and even gradually assimilating with them.

Until the end of nineteenth century, Uzbeks were perceived mainly as
direct descendents of the Dashti-Kipchak nomadic tribes, who migrated to Central
Asia in the early sixteenth century and settled there during the period of the
Sheybanid dynasty, and of local Turkic tribes that joined the above at a later date.
In the mid-fifteenth century, the word ‘Uzbek’ began to be associated with the

names of a new group of Turkic-Mongol dynastic leaders, whose dated back not to Uzbek-khan but to Sheybani-khan, Djuchi’s younger son. In the early sixteenth century, Uzbek tribes under the leadership of Sheybani conquered the central part of the region, and since then the Uzbek khans have reigned over the territory of Central Asia, gradually shifting from a nomadic to a sedentary way of life.

In the thirteenth century, Chenghiz-khan’s son, Chaghatay, conquered the region and governed it through the local aristocracy, who became to be known as Chaghataids. In the fourteenth century, Tamerlane of the Barlos tribe defeated the Chaghatay ulus and founded his own dynasty that survived until the arrival of nomadic Dashti-Kipchak Uzbeks in the region. In the same way as the subjects of the Uzbek-khan identified themselves as Uzbeks, the peoples of Transoxiana during and after the rule of Chaghatay ulus, irrespective of their tribal affiliation, began to be known as Chaghataids. Thus, the word ‘Chaghatay’ originally was used to refer to all the peoples of Mauverannahr during the Temurid dynasty and was distinct from the term ‘Uzbek’. As a consequence of the Temurids’ exile, the use of ‘Chaghatay’ largely decreased. Later, the boundaries between the two terms became blurred and merged eventually in the second half of the twentieth century.

Sarts represented the third group that is thought to contribute to the identity of contemporary Uzbeks. However, at the time of the term’s usage in the late nineteenth century, there was no consensus among scholars on Sarts’ identity and their ethno-genesis. The disagreements on that issue could be classified to

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360 The ancient name for Central Asia, akin to Transoxiana, that referred to the most of the region, except for the present-day Kazakhstan and Afghanistan.
three categories.\textsuperscript{362} The first drew on the ancient sources as well as indigenous self-ascription to acknowledge the reality of the Sart identity. The second held that the term did not relate to a distinct ethnic group but was used to refer to sedentary Uzbeks, and sometimes to Tajiks. Finally, the third view refused the validity of the term ‘Sart’ in relation to Central Asian peoples and asserted that there was no distinct community called ‘Sart’, as no special Sart language existed.

It is important to note that the debate over Sart identity took place at the sensitive time, when Russian orientalists and Turkestan Jadids (reformers) engaged in a political struggle over the status and future of the region. The Sart label usually referred to sedentary, non-tribalized peasants and tradesmen of Central Asia, whatever language they spoke. However, the term that defined a social, economic and cultural category, was accorded an ethnic classification by some Russian anthropologists in the late nineteenth century. For example, Andreev’s chronicles of Central Asia referred to Sarths as one of the four ethnic groups making up Khiva population, whose total number equalled to 100,000 and who were occupied in trade or in agriculture.\textsuperscript{363} Allworth points to a different conclusion and stresses the urban and sedentary character of the term Sart by asserting that it became prevalent at that time because, it suited the ethnic mixture of Central Asian urban areas and was also embraced by numerous settled communities, irrespective of origin or subgroup links.\textsuperscript{364}

Most Russian travellers to Central Asia in the nineteenth century had a limited and subjective perception of the political order in Central Asia. For example, privy councillor A. Levshin in his *Opisanie kirgiz-kazakhskikh ord i stepey* (Description of Kyrgyz-Kazakh horde and steppes) was puzzled by the question of how order could be possible within a nomadic Kazakh society, if none of its members seems to be committed to a public weal. He describes Kazakhs’ opportunistic attitude towards their own superiors in the following way:

They deal with their own chiefs in the same way and change their obedience according to the circumstances. If a chief who has secured homage and loyalty calls someone to account for an assault, the latter will leave the former and join someone else. If that one refuses to hide him, he will go to a third or fourth person. ... What kind of order can be found by a commander, if his subjects will submit only when circumstances afford it, if they will not be prepared to sacrifice themselves for the general public good, if they will only aim at satisfying their own predatory inclinations and if each of them wants to command, when there is the slightest opportunity to do so?

According to Levshin, if political order refers to a code of authority, which regulates the commitment of a superior in the legitimate use of power and the obedience of a follower, then if tribesmen only obey when circumstances afford it they would not share such a code of authority and participate in a common political order. However, Levshin and other fellow Russian observers did not fully take into consideration that mobility and flexibility were important to the survival of nomadic tribes.

Russian officials primarily perceived Kazakh, Kyrgyz and other nomadic political orders from the standpoint of a settled civilization, and through the perspective of a representative of the tsarist empire, which was constantly

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threatened by invasions of nomads from its borderlands.\textsuperscript{366} The tribal political order was therefore perceived as lack of order or total disorder in the nomadic steppe. Such view was held, erroneously, by scholars such as Becker in relation to the Turkmen as well.\textsuperscript{367} Geiss disagrees and asserts that the shifting of tribal loyalties does not exclude the existence of political order within these societies.\textsuperscript{368} The important point to keep in mind is that political order of tribal and non-tribal societies are of a different kind. What seems to be chaos and anarchy from the perspective of a centralized state power might turn out to be quite ordered patterns of tribal authority relations. Geiss notes that such conflated outsider perception of the political order in Central Asia was not limited only to tribal societies.\textsuperscript{369}

The main linguistic groups in Central Asia were Persian and Turkic. Persian groups were predominantly located in the oasis belt, valleys and mountains of the south-east and had a settled way of life with occupations in agriculture, trade and craft. The Turkic language groups were represented by nomads living in steppes of the north and the deserts of the south. However, after some time of assimilation some of those nomadic pastoralists became bi-lingual and acquired sedentary culture.\textsuperscript{370}

The Turkic languages of Central Asia consisted of three branches: the Karluk or East Turkic group; the Kipchak or central group (also known as Chaghatay); and the Oguz group. In addition to that, there were many local variations of those. The written scripts varied throughout the history of Central

\textsuperscript{368} Geiss, P. (2005). Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia, London, Routledge, p.2
\textsuperscript{370}
Asia. When the Arabs conquered Central Asia, they brought with them the Arabic script. The Chaghatay language was first promoted as a literary language by the Timurid dynasty at the end of the fourteenth century and became the language of the educated class in Central Asia. Chaghatay was written in the Arabic script. Over the years, Chaghatay grew removed from the common vernacular and was mostly used in official documents. The Persian language, on the other hand, was taught in all the religious schools and was an established state language.

Nonetheless, the use of both Persian and Chaghatay in local administrations meant that the majority of indigenous intellectuals were at least bilingual. The accounts by travellers to the region point to the apolitical role of local languages and described kishlaks (villages) where Uzbeks and Tajiks shared the social and religious functions between themselves.\(^{371}\)

In terms of socio-cultural institutions, Islam became the dominant force after the introduction by the Arabs in the seventh and eighth centuries. The religion of almost all Central Asians was Sunni Islam of the Hanafi School, which made the local populations conscious of belonging to the greater community of Muslims (\textit{Umma}). The Islamic identity was one of the strongest over-arching identities. On the other hand, because different tribes and groups converted to Islam at different periods, the intensity and practice of their religion varied from highly conservative groups, to Sufi brotherhoods, and to religious practices mixed with shamanist rites.


The nineteenth-century observer Eugene Schuyler noted that the native population saw the whole society as divided into two classes: settled and nomadic. In the local vernacular, the nomads were often called Kazakh, while the settled population was frequently referred to as Sart. Those groups should be seen as more economic and social entities, rather than ethnic, and much less national ones. In settled areas and especially in cities, there was a large functioning Muslim establishment, which included legal Islamic experts of various denominations, teachers attached to schools (maktab) or colleges (madrasa), mosque functionaries (imam, muezzin, etc), Sufi orders and dervishes. Amongst the nomadic groups, the religious establishment was represented primarily by a local spiritual leader (ishan), who had moral authority in the community and a close alliance with the local tribal leader. Islam in those nomad communities did not resemble the text-based urban orthodoxy but was more syncretic in nature, strongly influenced by customary law (adat) and traditional shamanistic practices.

In regard to the features of administration, the dynastic and military organization was conditioned by the Mongol legacy to which most ruling families, both nomadic and settled, traced their ancestry since the fourteenth century. Even though variation existed in the details of the social organization, one could point to the features common to Central Asia as a whole. The social structure

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resembled a pyramid, formed of hierarchically ranked levels of authority, bound together by chains of loyalty and responsibility and centred around the patriarchal family, who lived in a single tent in nomad communities, or in an enclosed courtyard in settled areas.\footnote{Akiner, S. (1998). Social and Political Reorganisation in Central Asia: Transition from Pre-Colonial to Post-Colonial Society. Post-Soviet Central Asia. T. Atabaki and J. O'Kane. London, Tauris, p. 4} Those cellular units were inter-connected horizontally and vertically to form larger pyramids, constituting parts of more complex groupings, which culminated ultimately in tribal confederations, headed by the supreme Khan.

A highly developed sense of genealogy reinforced the nomadic groups, which helped to maintain awareness of not only historical continuity, but also of the family as a defining feature of identity. The structural subdivision of nomad society could be classified as tribes and sub-tribes. The nomads of Central Asia most strongly identified with their genealogical linkages, either in the tribal confederation (zhuz) or in smaller groups (ru or taipa), rather than ascribing to any notion of nation.\footnote{See Olcott, M. B. (1987). The Kazakhs. Stanford, Hoover Institution Press.} The organization of the Kyrgyz communities, as well as other nomadic tribes in the region, was around kinship ties and every Kyrgyz was expected to be able to trace their ancestors back at least seven generations. Each family belonged to a larger clan group. And each of the clan was part of a wider tribal confederation. Even though the Kyrgyz were mostly nomadic peoples, each of these communities had a territorial base and was dominated by an aristocracy. Aristocratic class was defined largely in the terms of the size of cattle, which in turn determined levels of access to the most favourable pastures.
As many contemporary Kyrgyz observers like to point out, tribal life was characterized by a degree of debate and consultation, which was less possible in the settled oases to the west. The election of khans and resolution of conflicts through tribal discussion was arguably a reason for more ‘democratic’ nature of Kyrgyz politics during the 1990s. However, it is important to bear in mind that leadership remained, as a rule, with certain families. And most Kyrgyz were suspicious of strong authority figures, and for much of the year their individual villages (auls) were self-governed.

Each clan or tribal group had its own myths about legendary ancestors and great events of the past. One of these, the story of Manas, was later turned into a national epic by the Soviet scholars and re-instated as such by contemporary Kyrgyz nationalists. And although the epic stressed the unity of the Kyrgyz, most of their history was indisputably one of disunity and internal struggle. The history of the region showed that because regional and tribal groupings struggled for dominance rather than pooled sovereignty against greater external threat, the Kyrgyz tribes could not generate a meaningful resistance to the Mongol invasions from the north. Moreover, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a split took place between northern and southern tribal groups. This split continues to play a divisive role in Kyrgyz politics to this day. But despite the importance of blood ties and the impression of rigidity, the tribal boundaries were far from

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homogenous, fixed structures and constantly evolved and changed according to circumstances.\textsuperscript{379}

In settled communities, the key element of identity was based on the place of residence, rather than clan or tribal affiliation. However kinship networks also played an important part and should therefore not be dismissed. The structure of settled societies was based on regional administrative divisions that extended upwards from the village (kishlak) or urban quarter (mahalla) units through districts and provinces to the over-arching khanate formation.\textsuperscript{380}

There is no doubt that the political entities in Central Asia were built on loyalty to dynasties/clans and fidelity to Islam. The political formations were built on dynasties whose tribal legitimacy transformed into dynastic legitimacy, which was then reinforced by a religious legitimacy, able to maintain sway over very varied populations thanks to a stat apparatus that was inherited from the Persian tradition.\textsuperscript{381}

The local communities accepted the political framework of multi-cultural and generally bilingual khanates, in which the competition for power was based on dynasties, clans and tribes rather than their identities. Even if the rulers were Uzbek, the Persian language was the court language in Bukhara and Kokand and was also the main cultured language at the time. The idea of associating a territory with an ethnic group defined language was alien to the political ideas of the


Muslims in Central Asia.\(^{382}\) Even though the terms such as Uzbek, Kazakh, Tajik or Turkmen were definitely used then, they were not politically or socially laden identities and did not take into account the complex interplay of identities. Glenn maintains that the development of pre-revolutionary Central Asia gave it “a mutual historical experience; a common Arabic script; a common Turkic language base (bar the Tadzhiks); and the same religion, Sunni Islam (except in Easter Tadzhikistan), which bound them to the greater religious community (the *Umma*). This resulted in a cultural interfusion within the region to the extent that two literary languages, Chagatai and Farsi, were in operation throughout”\(^{383}\).

On the eve of the Tsarist conquest of the region, the principal territorial formations were the three Khanates of Central Asia,\(^ {384}\) the three Kazakh Hordes (*zhus*) of the northern tier, and the Turkmen tribes of the south-west.\(^ {385}\) Within those governance formations, there was no clear division along nomad or sedentary lines.\(^ {386}\) Even though the main power base of the khanates was in settled areas, they included high proportions of nomadic groups who were seen as an important military asset. In a similar fashion, the Kazakh and Turkmen tribes followed nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life, but they were linked with sedentary population who were crucial to their sustenance. The three khanates were ruled by Uzbek dynasties presiding over a multi-ethnic population, which would be difficult to identify with present-day ethnic groups with clear

\(^{384}\) The Kokand Khanate in the Fergana Valley, Emirate of Bukhara in the Zerafshan Oasis, and Khiva Khanate down-stream on the Amu Daria River jointly covered a territory corresponding to that of present-day Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and the northern parts of Turkmenistan. See Map.2, which illustrates the political division of Central Asia before Tsarist invasion.
distinctions and politicized characteristics. Vamberi, who visited the region in the mid-nineteenth century, wrote that Uzbek tribes dominated in the Kokand and Khiva Khanates and Bukhara Emirate, and were then united into 32 principal tribes.\footnote{See Ivanov, P. (1958). Ocherki po Istorii Srednei Azii. Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury, pp. 117-214} Kyrgyz tribes at the time were grouped in two confederations, Otuz Uul and Ich Kilik.

Spiritual, legislative, executive and supreme judicial powers in the Emirate of Bukhara were concentrated in the hands of the emir. The senior officers of government and religion were appointed by, and answerable directly and solely to, the emir. The state apparatus consisted of administrative-financial, judiciary and military ministries, which were headed by kushbegi, the right-hand man of the emir. Later, a putative Consultative Council was established, but its functions were little more than nominal. The consequence of such a highly personalized nature of authority was on-going rivalry and intrigue, and chronic instability in government circles.\footnote{Akiner, S. (1998). Social and Political Reorganisation in Central Asia: Transition from Pre-Colonial to Post-Colonial Society. Post-Soviet Central Asia. T. Atabaki and J. O'Kane. London, Tauris, p. 6}

In terms of administrative-territorial governance, there was considerable devolution of power in the khanates.\footnote{For more detailed assessment of the administration in three Central Asian khanates, see Buldakov, A., S. Shumov, et al., Eds. (2003). Istoria Srednei Azii. Moscow, Evroints-Russkaia Panorama, pp. 205-19; Uzbek Academy of Science, U. (1967). Istoria Uzbekskoi SSR, Volume} The largest sub-division was province (vilayat or beklik), headed by a Hakim or Bek, who was appointed by khan and enjoyed a high degree of autonomy within his own territory. The administrative apparatus in the province was self-contained and similar in structure to that of the central government. Hakim appointed administrative officials that were dependent
on his patronage and goodwill. Among the nomadic groups, there was a similar balance of subordination and autonomy, with clan and tribal leaders exercising absolute power within their own units, while accepting, at least nominally, the authority of the overall khan.  

The intellectual life of Central Asia began to decline in nineteenth century, and the accounts of foreign visitors indicate that poverty, corruption and religious hypocrisy were endemic. For example, Logofet, in his monograph *Country without Law* also describes the unjust and despotic nature of politics in the Emirate of Bukhara.  

Thus, the Emirate of Bukhara, as well as other khanates, was at the time described by travellers and explorers as a “land of poverty and persecution and slavery, of oppressive taxes, of public tortures and drawn-out executions, a place where curious non-Muslim visitors could be (and sometimes were) clapped into the emir’s siyah chah, his black hole, and eventually put to death”.

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Map 2. Central Asia before Tsarist conquest

2.2 Russian conquest of Central Asia

The shifting of Russia’s border from the northern Siberia to Central Asia was gradual. The time and the manner of the Russian conquest of Central Asia can be divided into two stages. In the first stage (1730-1848), Russia acquired the greater part of Kazakh lands, except for its southernmost segments. Peter the Great initiated the drive to conquer the Kazakh territory, which ended around 1825. This period of Russian conquest was prolonged and rather gradual in nature.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, various Kyrgyz delegations were sent to the Russian authorities in Siberia. Under the influence of the Kazakh Greater Horde’s decision to accept Russian suzerainty, Kyrgyz tribes sought the Russian protection against the Khanate of Kokand. As Kokand’s position declined, the northern Kyrgyz tribes sent numerous letters to the Siberian authorities appealing for help. During the 1850s and 1860s, a number of tribes declared their allegiance to the tsar. In 1862, some Kyrgyz soldiers fought alongside Russians to take the fort of Pishpek (Bishkek). By the time when the Kokand Khanate was finally destroyed in 1876, all of the Kyrgyz tribes had formally submitted to the Russian rule. Russian troops conquered Kokand city in the important Ferghana Valley as early as 1853. However, Russia at that time considered the region to be of only marginal economic or strategic value until it suffered the great defeat in the Crimean War (1854-1856).

In the second stage of the Russian conquest (1855-1884), the remaining parts of Kazakhstan (Semirechye and Syr Daria) and the rest of Central Asian

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See Map3 below, which illustrates the Russian invasion of Central Asia.
territories (present-day Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) were conquered or subjugated. Russia’s move into Central Asia was reportedly aimed to counter the British gains on the Indian subcontinent and to offset the dwindling of cotton imports to Russia’s textile industry from the United States, which was going through the civil war of 1861-1865. After that, Russia’s competition with Britain appeared to become much more urgent in the context of the Great Game, and Russia set out to capture as much of Central Asia as possible.

The second stage of the conquest was relatively brief and decisive. It consisted of several military campaigns between 1855 and 1884. In 1855, a military Russian convoy occupied Turkeston, Chimkent and other parts of Kazakhstan’s southern region. After winning the battle on the hills of Kattakurgan (near Samarkand) in 1868, the Russians fought with the emir of Bukhara and, consequently, annexed a substantial part of the Emirate’s territory, including Samarkand. But they let the rest of Bukharan Emirate’s territory to exist as a de facto Russian protectorate. In 1869, Russian troops from the Caucasus disembarked on the shores of Khiva and established the port of Krasnovodsk. They then took over the Turkmen coastline and reached the Iranian border. Several years later in 1873, the Russian army defeated the khan of Khiva and annexed much of his territory, leaving the rest as a Russian protectorate. By 1876, the Khanate of Kokand was also occupied, together with the Ferghana Valley.

Only the territory roughly the size of modern Turkmenistan remained briefly un-subjugated. But five years later in 1881, the desert region of present-day Turkmenistan because the last Central Asian area brought under the Russian control, after a fierce battle in January of that year at the ancient fortress of Geok-
tepe (near Ashgabat) ended with the massacre of the native population by the invading Russian army. At that point though, formal reaction from Britain compelled Russians to recognize the Iranian and Afghan borders, and Afghanistan was established as a buffer zone between the two great powers.

Following the siege of Geok-tepe, the Russian occupation faced local resistance in the form of endemic, yet unsuccessful rebellions. Serious revolts took place in 1885 in the Ferghana Valley, led by Dervish Khan Tore, and in 1891 in Namangan and Tashkent. Yet the most serious challenge to the Russian regime was the uprising organized by the Naqshbandi Sufi brotherhood and led by Ishan, who declared holy war and attacked the Russian garrison in Andijan.

Partly in response to the rebellions, the Kokand Khanate and a part of the Emirate of Bukhara were incorporated into the Turkestan general-governorate in 1886, which was established to govern those areas and was under the administrative control of tsarist Russia. Thus, the territorial re-structuring of Central Asia by St. Petersburg went through several stages and modifications that could be divided into the fall of Tashkent in 1865, the defeat of the Emirate of Bukhara in 1868 and of the Khanate of Khiva in 1873, the liquidation of the Khanate of Kokand in 1876, and the completion of the overall conquest with the fall of Merv in 1884.
Map 3. Tsarist conquest of Central Asia

2.3 Tsarist rule in Central Asia

The first formal administrative decision of the tsarist rule in Central Asia was established shortly after the tsarist decree of 1867, which created the Turkestan governorate-general to govern the conquered land and people. As a result, a new political structure appeared in the region. The governorate-general of Turkestan was administered by the Russian military governor, who resided in Tashkent and reported to the Russian ministry of defence. The governorate-general was divided into five oblast’ (region) and two protectorates. The regions included Syr Daria with the centre in Tashkent, Semirechie with the centre in Vernyi, Ferghana with the centre in Skobelev, Samarkand with the centre in Samarkand, and Zakaspie with the centre in Ashgabat. The protectorates consisted of the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva. Under the agreement of protectorate, Khiva and Bukhara were barred from having independent foreign affairs and were levied huge taxes. The tsarist military were available to the rulers for suppressing revolts.

That tsarist decree in fact established a two-tiered administrative arrangement, which was typical of other Russian colonies as well. It recognized a firm distinction between the cultural lives of the indigenous Muslim populations and the colonizing Russians. In the beginning, Russian overlords sought not to interfere with local customs. For example, the Russians initially proved satisfied with political and military dominance and interfered only to a limited extent in the affairs of the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. Communication and interaction between the native population and the Russian settlers was discouraged. Central Asians were
not encouraged to learn Russian, unless it was necessary for the purposes of minimal communication. In general, the Russians remained ignorant of, and indifferent to, the culture of the locals, and vice-versa.

In terms of the administrative structure, the Russian rule in Central Asia was marked by constant re-organization. For instance, the majority of the Kyrgyz territory in the first instance was allocated to the Semirechie oblast (region) within the Turkestan governorate-general. But in 1882 that oblast was transferred to the Steppe Administration, and then again it was brought back under Turkestan’s jurisdiction. During the same period, the south of the Kyrgyz lands was located within the Ferghana and Syr Daria regions, each of which was in turn divided into uezd (district). The governorate-general expanded from three provinces in 1886 (Syr Daria, Ferghana and Samarkand) to five in 1898, through the addition of Semirechie from present-day Kazakhstan and the Transcaspian province from the Turkmen side. At the end of the nineteenth century, Central Asia under tsarist control was divided into four entities: the governorate of the Steppes (the north-eastern Kazakhstan), the governorate of Turkestan (Tashkent, Samarkand, and the north and east of Tajikistan), which included the Transcaspian province (present-day Turkmenistan), and the protectorates of Khiva and Bukhara.  

Throughout most of the tsarist period, each region within Central Asia remained under the rule of the military governors. However, at the level of uezd there were parallel Russian and local authority structures, whereby Russian rulers relied on traditional elites to maintain order. This division had the advantage for

394 See Map.4, which illustrates the territorial division of Central Asia under tsarist control.
the Russians. Unpopular decisions were left to be executed by local leaders, who then had to bear the brunt of mass displeasure that, in turn, was favourable to the popularity of the Russian authorities.

Despite the initial hands-off policy in the early years of tsarist rule, it was inevitable that clashes and conflicts would emerge as the colonization of the region progressed. In particular, the ideas and projects brought from Russia about agriculture and land use were bound to provoke tensions. For instance, Russian settlers shared to impose private ownership of land and settled farming on nomadic groups, who had the opposite idea of the land as the property of all. Therefore, the land statutes of 1867 and 1891 made the practice of nomadism problematic, especially because Russian settlers were given land in locations, which often obstructed the ancient pattern of cattle herding.

From the 1860s onwards, the numbers of the Russian and Ukrainian settlers initially trickled and then flooded in a bigger scale into the northern territories of Central Asia. An estimated 3,500 families arrived by the early 1880s. Russians authorities even established Russkoe imperatorskoe politicheskoe agenstvo (Russian imperial political agency) in Khiva to protect the interests of Russian subjects. Thus, the initial policy of non-interference changed and tsarist overlords tried to achieve Russification of nomadic groups in Central Asia through the settlement of Russian citizens on those lands at the expense of the local tribes. To illustrate with figures the result of that policy, it is worth mentioning that only in Semirechie province Kazakh tribes lost 2.4 million of

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hectares, while Kyrgyz 4 million hectares to settlers.\textsuperscript{396} The appropriation of the best land by settlers for agricultural purposes meant fewer pastoral opportunities for the nomadic communities, which was one of the causes for the gradual transformation of some nomadic groups to sedentary way of life.

There was a strong opposition to the settlement policy. In 1898, during the Andijan rebellion the Kyrgyz fought the incursion of Russian colonial settlers into the best lands of the Ferghana Valley. At some point in the mid-1890s, the fear of the nomad resentment and the problems of poorly developed irrigation convinced the Russian authorities to curtail immigration. But after 1905, the Russian settlement resumed again on a much larger scale mainly because of the booming industry in the imperial Russia.

The form of inter-state structures that tsarist Russia envisaged for its relations with the peoples of Central Asia was an important element for the consequent nation-formational processes in the region. After Central Asia became part of the tsarist empire by the end of nineteenth century, the relations between Russia and Central Asia became similar to those between the metropolis and periphery like in other colonial empires. According to Suny, an empire is defined as “a large state made up of many peoples or nationalities, ruled by a central power that usually represents one people holding a privileged position in the political and social hierarchy of the empire”.\textsuperscript{397}

Map 4. Central Asia after tsarist conquest

In fact, Russia was built on the imperial expansion and chose to incorporate its Muslim populations by assimilation or cooptation, depending both on the strategic context and the cultural setting of the particular period. The relationship between tsarist Russia and Central Asia represented an inequitable arrangement and that of subordination and hierarchical treatment of the newly colonized groups. The occupation of Central Asia was implemented by Russians in a similar fashion to the British and French colonisation of the time. Settler colonies were set up in the Kazakh territories, an administrative and military occupation of Turkestan eliminated the traditional political authorities but left the local elite structures intact, and protectorates were established in other areas.

The Russian policy toward Central Asia from the conquest to the first revolution of 1905 may have been hesitant and confused, but there was one definite principle behind it: “Manage the population without interfering in its affairs; above all render the machinery of colonial domination progressively lighter and less costly”. Thus, Russians were conscious of the strength of Islam in Turkestan and let the native people to continue to be organized under Islamic and customary laws. Turkestan’s population was therefore not conditioned by forced Russification. The most notable Russian presence was evidenced in the industrial transformation of a cotton monoculture, which also led to the establishment of urban Russian settlements. But that should be seen in the context of the overall desirability among tsarist authorities for Russification to take hold in the Muslim populations of the empire. The report of the Ministry of Public

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Education in 1870 emphasizes the role of the Russian language in bringing people together (sblizhenie), which would be followed by fusion (sliianie) and a stronger Russification.\textsuperscript{401}

As an upshot of non-interference policy, however, the indigenous peoples of Central Asia were not considered citizens of the Russian imperial state. They were classified as aliens (inorodtsi). That is possibly the background to Suny’s general observation that empire is in contrast to nation, and the two are mutually exclusive and subversive of one another.\textsuperscript{402}

In the Kazakh lands and the southern part of Central Asia, Russia did not try to integrate the local people but simply control them. They were also exempt from military service. But the Russian authorities in the governorate of the Steppes attempted to break the traditional tribal system through the direct administration of the indigenous Kazakh groups. They also tried to destroy the prestige of the local authorities and break up the existing units through constant modifications and changing of the political map. A settlement policy had an effect too, leading to an increase of the Russian population from 20 percent in 1887 to 40 percent in 1911.\textsuperscript{403}

The policy of breaking up the existing system in the Kazakh lands was not successful though. The Reaction to that policy led to a more rapid reinforcement of Islam at the expense of customary nomadic law. In response to the worsening

colonial conditions, a series of uprisings took place that combined defences of land, nomadism and autonomy.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the introduction of the tsarist civil-military administration headed by governors-general and oblast’ and uezd commanders led to the establishment of patrimonial state structures in all parts of Central Asia. From that time on, tribemen were unable to secure their own political integration and had to rely on good relations with tsarist officials. Indigenous patrimonial state structures survived only within the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva, but as tsarist protectorates they were still obliged to cede various territories to Russia and were confined in their freedom of action.

A series of events toward the end of the nineteenth century convinced the Russian military and administrators that Central Asian provinces were too distant to be effectively governed with the two-tiered system. A number of scandals involving the Russian administration led to a government commission of inquiry, which found that flagrant abuses of authority were extensive. Carrere d’Encausse writes that in Turkestan “each local Russian leader tended to behave as a petty king whose power was not limited by any authority; this provoked frequent clashes with the Muslim populations”. A series of popular revolts

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broke out in 1889, which prompted another commission of inquiry that produced a report criticizing the Russian policy of non-interference in cultural affairs.\textsuperscript{407}

The political alliance between the local elite and Russian authorities also created a legitimacy problem. Faced with the choice between a tribal and an Islamic bias to governance, which either secured the support of tribal followers or that of sedentary subjects, the Bukharan emir increasingly based his authority on Islamic political heritage and relied on the support of the settled population.\textsuperscript{408}

Even though emir’s alliance with the Russian tsar boosted his military power and extended his influence over rebellious provinces in eastern Bukhara, it also discredited him as an Islamic ruler and damaged the legitimacy of his rule. Similarly, in the Khanate of Khiva, the political alliance with tsarist overlords undermined the fragile political relations between tribal and sedentary populations. It also caused a declining cooperation between two groups. In that context, it can be argued that patrimonial state structures in Central Asia under the tsarist regime were based on domination rather than authority, due to the lack of shared legal and political community structures.\textsuperscript{409} The normative political order therefore became more fragile during the period of tsarist rule in Central Asia.

In the first decades of the twentieth century, an intellectual battle took place within the Central Asian elite, between representatives of the modernist movement and regional conservatives. The conservative elites, Qadimists (qadim, old), were the dominant group but felt under threat from the new order. The most influential of the modernist group was ‘Jadid’, named from the Arabic \textit{usul jadid}.

\textsuperscript{408} Geiss, P. (2005). \textit{Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia}. London, Routledge, p. 239
\textsuperscript{409} Geiss, P. (2005). \textit{Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia}. London, Routledge, p. 239
(new method). It was a cultural movement aimed to educate Russia’s Muslim populations in the modern fashion and raise awareness of their common Muslim identity. Jadids argued in favour of incorporating some elements of Western and Russian values to address the issues of political and economic stagnation and to bring about the modernizing transformation of Central Asia.\(^{410}\) They tried to achieve that objective by setting up new schools and newspapers in order to propagate pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism among the Muslim populations in the Russian empire. Their pan-Islamist ideas conceived of uniting the Turkic peoples under the Russian dominion as one Muslim nation (\textit{millat}). Jadids sought to achieve recognition of a de-territorialized, religious and cultural entity compatible with the structures of the Russian empire and without reference to independence or a state.\(^{411}\) As they were not seeking political nationalist objectives, Jadid reformists could not be considered as a nationalist movement in the modern conception of the term.

Since the vast majority of Muslims in the Russian empire were Turkic, the expression of pan-Islamism was bound to have pan-Turkic elements. At the start of the twentieth century, pan-Turkic movements supported the Ottoman caliphate as the commander of all Muslims. That support explains why pan-Turkism was the linguistic face of pan-Islamism in Central Asia. The political parties of Central Asia, such as the international Jadid movement or regional Young Bukharan and Young Khivan movements, were therefore formed along pan-Islamic/pan-Turkic lines and reflected supra-ethnic and supra-national identities. However, the 1908 Young Turk revolution in Turkey triggered a split in the joint movements of pan-

\(^{410}\) For further reading on Jadids, see Khalid, A. (1998). \textit{The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform};
Islamism and pan-Turkism, after Turkish nationalists sought to establish a secular Turkish state and thus shifted pan-Turkism to a purely ethnic and racial direction, dismissing its previous Islamic dimension.

Even though the Russian authorities initially supported modernists, they grew to see the civil unrest, which erupted in Central Asia after the 1905 revolution, as rooted in the modernist movement most influenced by Russia. The initial support by Russian authorities inadvertently promoted political liberalism in Central Asia and boosted the interests of the Ottoman empire, one of Russia’s principal nemesis at the time. So tsarist officials came to perceive the Jadids of Central Asia as a threat to the maintenance of the Russian imperial administration. The long-standing Russian principle of non-interference was thus replaced by policies, which allied the Russian imperial power with the most conservative elements of the local power structures, Qadimists. In order to limit Jadid influence in the region, the Russian authorities collaborated with the emir of Bukhara, who resisted any religious reforms and relied on the body of introverted religious experts. By the end of the empire, the tsarist regime was growingly led by its own ignorance and fears into supporting those groups, who were least friendly to the continuation of Russian administration. Thus, Jadids in Bukhara and Khiva remained underground till they managed to take power in alliance with the Bolsheviks in the 1920s.

In addition to the political manoeuvring between Jadids and Qadimists, Russians also discreetly introduced even less successful policy of ethnic

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nationalism in Central Asia. Olivier Roy explains the reasoning of the Russian authorities in the following way:

It may appear strange to have a tsarist government supporting ethnic nationalism. The aim was not, of course, to encourage independence movements, but to defuse what Russia viewed as the most important threat, that of a synthesis between pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism, because it hung on an external threat, that of the Ottoman empire, whereas the development of an ethnic identity could only take place within the framework of the empire.\footnote{Roy, O. (2000). The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations, I.B.Tauris, p. 40}

In the context of the growing pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism, it is understandable that ethno-nationalization had only few supporters among a minority of the Muslim intellectuals and elite. They tried however to affirm national identity around ethnic lines through creating a modern written language on the basis of vernacular languages and replacing overarching identities, such as Turkicness, by ethnic ones like Kazakhness or Uzbekness.

The government bulletin \textit{Turkestan vilayatining gazeti} was initially produced in Tashkent both in Kazakh and Chaghatay languages for twelve years. The publications of bulletins in Chaghatay and Kazakh resulted in “reinforcing the newly created Turkestan unity while bolstering the nearly nonexistent Kazakh written language and literature, distinguishing it from the powerful Chaghatay literary heritage that in the past had dominated Kazakh, Tatar, Uzbek, and related writings”.\footnote{Allworth, E. (1967). The ‘Nationality’ Idea in Czarist Central Asia. Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union. E. Goldhagen. London, Pall Mall Press, p. 234} Chaghatay language was replaced by the colloquial languages of Central Asia in the early 1920s. In the early twentieth century, a tsarist decree was issued to ban the import of materials printed in the Arabic alphabet.
Even though ethno-nationalizing attempts were boosted by the tireless work of Russian scientists and orientalists that emphasized ethnic components within the Muslim groups in Central Asia, they did not result in significant ethno-nationalist transformation in the region. That was partly because the support of the Russian authorities was only a half-hearted and tactical move to counter-balance the greater threat of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. The efforts to ethno-nationalize regional and local identities during the tsarist rule were only disconcerted trials of a variety of tactics aimed to balance various threats and preserve the Russian colonial regime in the region. They were carried out in the institutionalized context of societal transformation leading to ethno-nationalization of the local populations. The fusion of Tsarist policies of non-interference in the traditional settled structures, ethno-nationalization of some nomads and Russification through settlements, was applied in Central Asia without intentions of establishing relevant institutions, which were deemed unnecessary since modernization of the region was not a tsarist priority.

In total, eleven men served as governors-general of Turkestan, starting with General Romanovskiy (1865-67) and ending with General Kuropatkin (1914-17). Governor-general had significant powers, including the right to appoint provincial governors and expel persons from Turkestan on the basis of their unfavourable political affiliation. Local people would even call governors-general iarim posho (half-king).

Central Asia under tsarist control experienced an economic development that benefited the Russian state and harmed the native population through the loss of land to settlers, growth of detrimental cotton monoculture, and dependence on
food imports and finished products from Russia. The indigenous people of the region were treated by the tsarist Russia as what today would be termed as ‘second-class citizens’ because of their official status as inorodtsi. Moreover, the new electoral law of 1907 issued before the elections of the third State Duma referred to Central Asian, as well as Polish and Caucasian, peoples as ‘politically immature’, thus ruling out any political representation at the Russian centre level.  

The fact that the local male population was not required to perform military service turned out to be an advantage when the First World War broke out. Local young men were not recalled to distant battlefields in Europe. Nonetheless, official reports pointed to the increasing alarm at the anti-government mood of certain sections of the population in the years before the outbreak of the war. Native farmers protested against land seizures or tax burdens, whilst new settlers were increasingly critical of the administration. The indirect rule of Central Asia granted limited autonomy and self-government to some territories, while the tsarist authority ruled through local elites. Lands inhabited by local people were appropriated, a system of taxes and levies was imposed and the practice of non-equivalent good exchanges was introduced. The demographic policy of the imperial Russia towards the region was one of cultural assimilation and social oppression.  

The difficulties caused by the war only increased resentment, especially as prices rose, shortages increased, and some Russian settlers were drafted into the army. Even though initially the indigenous population was excluded from military

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service, Russia became more desperate to boost its troop numbers and the Russian government issued a decree in 1916 instructing that large numbers of Central Asian men be drafted for labour behind the battle lines. The insulting nature of that decree and widespread rumours provoked a number of uprisings in Central Asia against tsarist authorities and Russian settlers. Many of them were also unhappy about getting recruited into a war in which one of the enemies was Turkey, the guardian of the holy places of Islam at that time. The revolt also reflected deep seated grievances that had built up over previous years as local farmers and nomads became impoverished by excessive demands and the Russian settlement policy.

In mid-July of 1916, some 10,000 people gathered in Osh city chanting “we will not fight” and “we will not give our sons”. By August of that year, the revolt had reached the northern areas. Russian authorities were taken by surprise and were baffled by serious casualties on their side. They were able to suppress the revolts by November, but with the staggering loss of life among the local population. They Kyrgyz were especially hard hit, because their attacks on the Russian settlers in the vicinity of the lake Issyq Kul were particularly violent, and the resulting repression was that much harsher. Russian forces burnt down Kyrgyz settlements and around a third of the Kyrgyz population fled across the border to the Uighur Sinkiang in eastern Turkestan. In addition to the 100,000 Kyrgyz deaths, the revolt had major economic consequences because rural labour forces were depleted by population loss and conscription. All these factors further

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added to the tense relations between the Russians and Kyrgyz, and also fed into the revolutionary fervour of 1917.

As Kuropatkin, the last governor-general of Turkestan, planned for the aftermath of the rebellion and looked forward to taking advantage of the vacated land by the fleeing Kyrgyz, tsarist Russia began to crumble at the centre. Although the attitude of the Russian provisional government led by Kerenskiy after the February 1917 revolution was ambiguous with respect to Central Asia, the change in the centre provided the native people with some liberties they had not enjoyed before.\(^\text{419}\) During that time, Central Asian populations could form their own organizations, freely publish newspapers, and make political demands. Thus, later in April 1917 the first congress of Turkestan Muslims was held in Tashkent that created the *Turkestan Musliman Merkezi Shurasi* (Central Council of Turkestanian Muslims) and elected Mustafa Chokay as its president.


Map 5. Tsarist Central Asia in 1917

3.0 Ethnicity and nationality in Soviet Central Asia

3.1 Marxist-Leninist perspective on nationhood

Before going to the discussion of the Bolshevik and Soviet policies in regard to nationhood in Central Asia, a brief assessment of the original Marxist and Leninist perspectives on ‘the national question’ could provide a useful background. Marxism rejected the perennialist idea of the nation as a natural category, proposing instead that the concept of nation was a historical construct. The traditional Marxist debate on nationalism approached the concept in terms of the struggle between imperialism and anti-imperialism. This dichotomy reflected the action of capitalist classes and native bourgeoisie pursuing their economic interest under the cover of an instrumental national ideology.

For Marxists, the term ‘nation’ was seen as anathema, because Marxism aspired to the creation of a new, universal, supra-national community. Nationhood represented a form of false consciousness that masked the class character of society, and therefore to focus on ethnicity or nationality would be to miss the real driving force behind political conflicts. The Communist Manifesto boldly stated that the ‘worker has no country’. The Marxist emphasis on the constructedness of the nation resembles broader assumptions underlying the constructivist perspective on nationhood of today, except for its narrow focus on capitalism as the key factor. Marxism holds that the development of capitalism brought with it the creation of modern nations. Modern nations are so dependent on capitalism that the end of capitalism would mean the beginning of the end of modern nations.
too. Considering nations as by-products of capitalism, Marxists ruled out any space for these categories in the new socialist world order. According to Marxism, the concept of nationhood had no value in itself. Class could only be the only legitimate organizing principle in the socialist state.

Lenin and the Russian Social Democrats largely concurred and supported the Marxist interpretation of the national question. They developed it further and modified in the context of the Bolshevik Revolution. The Social Democrats saw nationality as middle-class phenomenon opposite to the interests of the proletariat. They rejected federalism and preferred large centralized state. The worker’s allegiance must be to the higher community of proletarians rather than to that of the nation. The teachings of Lenin predicted that nations were destined to die, passing into history and replaced by a new form of socialist internationalism.

After the national question in the tsarist Russia gained prominence in the second decade of the twentieth century, both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks had to increase their attention to it and re-think their approach. Lenin claimed that capitalist mode of production, economic specialization, increased trade and improved communication led to the unification of national economy and the centralization of national state. Stalin, on the behest of Lenin, wrote that:

Modern nations are a product of a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism. The process of the abolition of feudalism and the development of capitalism was also the process of formation of people into nations.  

As Leninism considers all questions in their historical settings, it views ‘bourgeois nationalism’ under the given historical conditions. The national movement

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420 Stalin, J. V. (1921). “The Immediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question.” Pravda 29
emerges at the time when feudalism is disintegrating and capitalism is asserting itself, and coincides with the formation of nations. Accordingly, in the early period of capitalism, the national movement led by the bourgeoisie had as its objective the struggle against oppression by other nations and the creation of a national state. At the later stage, such nationalism existed in the colonial and semi-colonial countries.

The ruling classes of Europe established the imperialist system of colonial and semi-colonial oppression in many undeveloped countries, where bourgeois nationalism took hold.\textsuperscript{421} It is because European imperialism had conquered many regions before modern capitalist nations emerged, nations had to develop in those regions under the conditions of imperialist rule. According to Leninist, these ‘oppressed nationalities’ therefore acquired the characteristics of nationhood under the adverse conditions in which national economic and political development is distorted by the needs and strain of imperialism. Stalin vividly described national oppression as “the system of exploitation and robbery of oppressed peoples, the measures of forcible restriction of the rights of oppressed nationalities, resorted to by imperialist circles”.\textsuperscript{422}

Leninist theory of nationalism viewed nationhood in precise, scientific terms. Stalin defined nation as “a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture”.\textsuperscript{423} The existence of a nation was therefore objective, rather than subjective matter. The Bolshevik regime held that a nation must have four basic characteristics: common economic

life, common language, common territory and common national character. Even though Stalin defined the nation in historically contingent terms, the definition itself includes elements of a primordialist approach, which was a departure from the original constructivist position of the Social Democrats. That may have been the reason why, according to Suny, the consequent Soviet state practices devoted significant time and energy to connect specific peoples to specific territories, primordialize nationalities by employing anthropologists and historians in order to establish the original moment of ethno-genesis.\textsuperscript{424}

Lenin and Stalin opposed the idea that regionally dispersed people constituted a nation because they would not possess the four basic characteristics of a nation. Thus, they believed that the Jewish people, for example, could not act as a nation for that reason. In this regard, Stalin was unequivocal:

\begin{quote}
For, I repeat, what sort of nation, for instance, is a Jewish nation which consists of Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian, American and other Jews, the members of which do not understand each other (since they speak different languages), inhabit different parts of the globe, will never see each other, and will never act together, whether in time of peace or in time of war?\textsuperscript{425}
\end{quote}

According to Lenin, there were two tendencies in the national question under capitalism.\textsuperscript{426} The first is the awakening and growth of national movements, the struggle against national oppression and the creation of national states. The second is the establishment of economic and other ties between nations and the breakdown of national barriers. The aim of the Leninist solution of the national question

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{422} Stalin, J. V. (1975). Marxism and the National Colonial Question, Proletarian Publishers, p. 100
\item \textsuperscript{423} Stalin, J. V. (1953). Works: Vol.2. Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, p. 307
\item \textsuperscript{425} Stalin, J. V. (1953). Works: Vol.2. Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, pp. 312-313
\item \textsuperscript{426} Lenin, V. I. (1914). Collected Works: Vol.20, p. 27
\end{itemize}
is to bring about the international unity of the proletariat in the struggle for socialism. The indispensable condition for achieving that goal is the struggle for the complete equality of all nations. Lenin described the Marxist-Leninist program on the national question as follows:

As democrats we are irreconcilably hostile to any, however slight, oppression of any nationality and to any privileges for any nationalities. As democrats, we demand the right of nations to self-determination in the political sense of that term... We demand unconditional equality for all nations in the state and the unconditional protection of the rights of every national minority.\textsuperscript{427}

Lenin’s slogan of self-determination of nations was a pragmatic move, as he grew conscious of the potential of national liberation movements to become temporary allies in the revolutionary struggle.\textsuperscript{428} The tactical nature of Lenin’s self-determination ideas was evidence in the fact that the national question was formally understood as the problem of abolishing national oppression and national inequality, freeing the oppressed peoples of the colonial and dependent countries from the imperialist yoke, and establishing national equality and fraternal cooperation between peoples.\textsuperscript{429} Liberation from imperialist oppression was seen as not only a matter for the people of the country fighting for its liberation, but also in the interest of the whole international proletariat.

Having considered the above assessment of the Leninist approach to the nationality question, it is striking to realize that the state that emerged from the October Revolution adopted nationhood as a major organizing principle and

institutionalized ethnicity and nationality. Suny describes the consequences of the crucial change in policy in the following way:

Nationality was institutionalized into the Soviet system as a category of identity, a passport to privilege (or discrimination), and a claim to political power in national republics. Moreover, the idea of nationness fluctuated between a more contingent understanding of nationality as the product of historical development to a more primordial sense that nationality was deeply rooted in the culture, experience, mentality, even biology of individuals.  

Leninist theorists held contradictory views, for example assuming the possibility of having nations without nationalism, and they tried to introduce incompatible policies of promoting nationalism and communism, which made the Soviet solution of the national question contradictory and unsuccessful in the end. The following sections will illustrate how the institutionalizing policies of nationalities were established, implemented and became rooted in the Soviet Central Asia.

### 3.2 The Bolshevik regime in Central Asia

In Tashkent, the Bolshevik Revolution was replicated only a few days after the events had occurred in Petrograd. On 15 November 1917, the third Regional Congress of the Soviets proclaimed the authority of the new regime in Central Asia. This authority was to be administered by the local government, *Turkestanskii Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov* (Turkestan Council of People's Commissars, or Turksovnarkom). Local people did not participate in the

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revolution. The Bolsheviks were viewed the Russian and colonial power, and only
the Jadids of Bukhara and Khiva joined the Bolshevik camp, after the bitter
experience of persecuted under the previous regime. The tsarist stereotypes about
local populations persisted in the minds of the Bolshevik leadership, who tended
to see Muslims as culturally backward, politically immature for communist
membership and requiring big brother’s tutelage. For example, one party member
tried to explain the lack of Muslim representation in the Soviets by asserting that:
“It was not that the political leadership ignored the Muslims – it was simply that
they were culturally more backward than the rest of the population, and thus the
revolutionary groups had no influence over them”. The Bolsheviks continued to
speak the tsarist language juxtaposing ‘backward’ and ‘civilized’ nations,
‘peasant’ and ‘proletarian’ peoples, while Russians were held among the more
civilized and proletarian.

The Bolshevik leadership war aware of the risk that Central Asians could
become hostile to the new regime and promised liberation and self-determination
of all the occupied peoples of the former tsarist empire. That intention was
explicitly reflected in two proclamations of Turksovnarkom, issued on 2 and 20
November 1917, as well as in Lenin’s appeal to ‘all Muslim workers of Russian
and the East’ of 24 November 1917. For the first year, instructions from the centre
that native population should be recruited into the Party, government and the Red
Army were ignored at the local level. That can be explained by the ravaging civil
war at the time, which separated Turkestan from Russia and made insubordination

possible. But the priority for the Bolsheviks was to win over the local population to the revolution, and therefore they did not attack local Islamic and tribal institutions directly. Roy puts forward other crucial reasons for the initial hands-off approach of the Bolsheviks: “The repression of the national Muslim movements in the first quarter of 1918, and the resulting alliance between Muslims and the Whites; the revolt of the *basmachis*; the risk of Bolshevik power coming to be seen as colonialism; and finally the hope of being able to use Muslim go-betweens as a way of promoting political agitation in British India, Persia and Turkey – all those were instrumental factors in persuading Lenin to put a break on outright Bolshevisation”.  

Before the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin discounted the importance of nationalism and supported a policy of regional autonomy, where political-administrative institutions are not based on ethnic lines. After the revolution, however, as some of the nations gained independence from tsarist Russia and were opposed to an imperial centre, Lenin realized that the formation of a union state would require substantial concessions to national rights. He found himself between two poles: needing some national assimilation for state survival but unwilling to assuage the national crisis through substantive action for fear of destabilizing the union.

In the period between the October Revolution and 1924, the Bolsheviks treated the peoples of Central Asia as one Muslim Turkestanian nation. That is

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why Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR) was established on 30 April 1918, at the end of the fifth Regional Congress of the Soviets of Turkestan. That was in line with the instructions brought from Moscow by P. A. Kobozev who later became chairman of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK). The Bolsheviks initially seemed to have accepted the pre-revolutionary tribal definitions. The Kyrgyz were considered a distinctive tribal group within the Kazakh nomadic community (then known as Kyrgyz), which is why they referred to the Kyrgyz as ‘Kara-Kyrgyz’. The territory of the Kyrgyz populations was also included in the new TASSR.

After the initial years of the Bolshevik rule in Central Asia, Russians were undecided if Turkestan should become a monolithic politico-ethnic entity or whether it should be divided up into smaller segments. That dilemma transcended the administrative and political borders of Turkestan, because many Muslim leaders viewed the whole of Central Asia in its broadest sense as Turkestan, which included Kazakhstan, Bashqurtistan, and Tatarstan.437

At the fifth Regional Communist Party Congress, held in Tashkent in January 1920, local members of the Party scored the greatest political victory they would ever attain within the Communist Party framework. On 17 January 1920, the Congress adopted the following resolution:

In the interest of the international unity of workers and oppressed peoples, be it resolved that we shall oppose by means of communist agitation the strivings of Turkic nationals to divide themselves into various national groups such as Tatars, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Bashkirs, Uzbeks and others, and to establish small separate republics. Instead, with a view to forge the solidarity of all Turkic peoples who so far have not been included within the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic), it is proposed to unify them within a Turkic Soviet Republic,

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and wherever it is not possible to achieve this, it is proposed to unite different Turkic nationalities in accordance with their territorial proximity.  

The resolution had far-reaching implications for Central Asia. Even though close ties with Russia were not disputed, the Central Asian delegates envisioned a Turkic Soviet Republic of vast size and with the common Turkic/Muslim identity. Further to that resolution, the Ryskulov group made a number of other demands: 1) renaming of TASSR as the Turkic Republic; 2) replacing the Communist Party of Turkestan with the Communist Party of the Turkic Peoples; and 3) dissolving of the Turkkomissiia on the grounds that it had violated the autonomy of Turkestan. Even though such demands by local nationalists may in retrospect appear idealistic, they were the result of a majority vote of the Communist Party of Turkestan that reflected the ethnic composition of the area.

The communist authorities became increasingly aware that Muslim nationalism in Turkestan might challenge the socialist unity, as envisaged by the Leninist formula. Moscow leaders became fearful of the popular appeal of champions of pan-Turkic national unity and charismatic figures such as Sultan Galiev, Turar Ryskulov, Mustafa Chokai, and Enver Pasha. The Bolshevik authorities realized that, if they allowed supra-national sentiment to further develop in Turkestan, they might not be able to control and re-channel it into the preferred proletarian ideology. It was at the point of the growing pan-Turkic movement in Central Asia, the Communist Party and the Red Army intervened and resolved to break up the unification movements of pan-Turks.

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The Bolsheviks started to think of ways to prevent the formation of pan-Turkic sentiments by preventing the establishment of political or territorial entities and facilitating smaller national units. The Muslim Socialist Communist Party was dissolved in November 1918. On 8 March 1920, Moscow sent unambiguous instructions, according to which the Communist Party of Turkestan were to become a part of the Communist Party of Russia with the status of a regional branch. The instructions also stated that there could be no question of a Turkic republic. In regard to the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the commissariats of defence, foreign affairs, railroads, finances, and postal services had to fall under the jurisdiction of their federal counterparts.\footnote{Soucek, S. (2000). \textit{A History of Inner Asia}. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 220} The communist ethnographer Ian Rudzutak commented on the change in Moscow’s perspective in the following way: “I cannot agree with the decision to create a Turkic republic. This decision was reached under the influence of nationalists. In any event, a single Turkic people does not exist; there are Turkmen, Kazaks, Kyrgyz, and Uzbeks”.\footnote{Soucek, S. (2000). \textit{A History of Inner Asia}. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 220}

Such was the resolution of the political struggle for Turkestan. The Bolsheviks were able to first neutralize the insubordinate Russian elements who failed to treat politically acceptable natives as equals, and then to design the future of the former tsarist colony according to its Leninist ideas and wishes and against those of the local population. Some Russian functionaries at the local level and pan-Turks were upset by the dissolution of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. For example, Paskutskii, the Chairman of the Central Asian Economic Council, wanted all three Central Asian Republics to be joined into a
When Russians of pro-Turkestan bias argued that it was economically unsound to divide the large unit to a series of smaller republics, they would be silenced by the charge of Russian chauvinism and be reassured that economic plans would be coordinated.

After the Red Army won a military victory in Central Asia, the Bolsheviks faced an acute problem of establishing a stable political order and had to deal with the nationalist dilemma. They still believed that socialism demanded equality between nations, but also felt that the reunion of most, if not all, of the tsar’s dominions under the Soviet flag served the strategic interests of socialism. Those calculations by Russian Communists conditioned the formative years of the Soviet Union.

The Bolsheviks hoped that the new political order would be supported by the local populations in the region, and therefore decide to create a façade of equality and sovereignty of nations by establishing a federal Soviet Union based on the Marxist-Leninist dictum -‘national in form but socialist in content’. The directive was clear: nations were to be seen but not heard. The communist elite consequently used three strategies in order to reinforce the ‘national forms’ as well as to prevent their spilling over into ‘content’. Those strategies included language policy, the recruiting and purging of elites, as well as the re-distribution and gerrymandering of national groups.

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Slezkine points to a tension in the following summary of Lenin’s views of nations as present but disappearing entities: “Nations might not be helpful and they might not last, but they were here and they were real”. But, he adds that: “Insofar as national culture was a reality, it was about language and a few ‘domestic arrangements’: nationality was ‘form.’ ‘National form’ was acceptable because there was no such thing as national content”.

Further, as Connor’s analysis of theoretical and policy implications of the national in form and socialist in content formula in the communist states persuasively illustrates, the form became the father of content. In addition, in the ideological competition between nationalism and Marxism, as the demise of the Soviet Union vividly exemplifies, the former decisively won. In the words of Connor:

> “When communism and nationalism have been wedded in the popular mind, Communist movements have found broad acceptance. When communism and nationalism have been perceived as at odds, such movements have tended to be spurned”.

Fuelled by apprehension that proletarianism was not well developed in Central Asia, Lenin championed the principle of national self-determination. This was justified on the grounds that national self-promotion, if directed by the Bolsheviks, would accelerate the transition to socialism. Lenin believed that the elemental forces of nationalism could be harnessed to the goals of socialist revolution. The

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Marxist-Leninist rationale expected a small role for peasants and nomads in the new socialist society. And when Central Asia fell to the Soviet dominion as a spoil of war against the monarchist opposition, Lenin saw the creation of artificial national communities as a stage-skipping step toward revolutionary transformation in Central Asia.

In pursuit of that policy, Bolsheviks included what they perceived as culturally similar population groups in newly created administrative units and developed literary languages for each of those units. They promoted newly created, codified languages by introducing compulsory education on the basis of these languages. In addition, Bolsheviks established cultural institutions for the discovery and protection of primordial cultural traditions of the newly-formulated nations. Through such state institutions the Soviets tried to mainstream the socialist interpretation of these cultural and ethnic traditions. They also used nationality as an administrative principle in order to achieve socialist goals in the society.

It is important to address the continuity between tsarism and Bolshevism in three fundamental areas of policy: Islam, ethno-national grouping and rearrangement of administrative borders. A three-fold approach to Islam was pursued under both the tsarists and the Bolsheviks; repression, utilisation of ‘progressive’ mullahs, and the organization of the world of Islam through conservative and functionarized clergy.448 Islam was seen as a threat by both the tsarist and Soviet regime, hence the constant drive to repress it. As tsarist authorities supported the modernizing influence of Tatar Muslims in Central Asia,

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the Bolsheviks tried to promote red, Jadid mullahs between 1921 and 1927. Both regimes used the official religious groups to support and legitimate the ruling policy. In terms of the functionarized clergy, the tsars and the Soviets ruled out the idea of one single mufti for the whole Muslims population of the empire, and instead opted for multiple functional muftiyas in separate administrative divisions but with a supra-national constituency.

In regard to ethno-nationalization, the Bolsheviks were far advanced in their achievements, but they followed the lead of their tsarist counterparts. Even though tsarist did not succeed in the facilitation of nation-construction in Central Asia, they had tangible results in promoting Tatar ethnicity based on the belief that an ethnic entity was defined by its language. Having recognized a Tatar language and culture, the tsarist authorities created a Cyrillic alphabet for the Tatars who converted to Orthodox Christianity, thus bringing them closer to Tatar nationhood. But tsarist ethno-nationalizing policy of the Tatars was paradoxical: “Tatar was being promoted as a ‘national’ language and destroyed as a vehicular language; it was forbidden in Kazakhstan at the same time as it was being institutionalised in Tatarstan⁴⁴⁹”. That paradox is explicated by the constant pressure of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism, which applied equally to tsarists and Bolsheviks. The second method of ethno-nationalization was to encourage the division of Muslims into smaller, national groups and strengthen their respective identities. Tsarist Russia tried that with the tribal groups in Central Asia but had limited success. In fact, the Soviets continued to implement the tsarist invention of the ethnic census primarily defined by language. Roy points out that there was a similarity in the methodology

⁴⁴⁹ University Press, p. 584
employed by tsarism and Bolshevism to institutionalize nationhood: “The instrument of this ‘nationalities’ policy under both the tsars and the Soviets were ethnography and linguistics. Soviet ethnography in its empirical version was a direct inheritance from the Russian ethnography of the nineteenth century, as was Soviet linguistics”.  

The division of the existing territorial entities and the artificial creation, and re-alignment, of new political territorial entities were the two policies first exercised by tsarists and then continued by Soviets. As was mentioned previously, the tsarist administration made much use of administrative division in Central Asia for political ends. As will be described in consequent sections, the Soviet regime will perfect the policy in the national delimitation of Central Asia. Moreover, the nature of the administrative structure of tsarist Russia and the Bolshevik state was inherently colonial, with all its consequences. In that context, Suny describes the following hierarchical tendencies:

Instead of equality, two kinds of hierarchy developed in the USSR: an imperial relationship between the Soviet center and the non-Russian peoples, in which the increasingly territorialized nations remained subordinate to the dictates and requirements of Moscow’s all-Union goals; and what Jeremy Smith has called a ‘national hierarchisation’, in which certain nationalities, like the titular nationalities of the republics, were considered superior to others within the republic and in which Russians often held a special place of privilege no matter where they lived.

With regard to the prevailing form of political community, there was little variation in the new regime in comparison to pre-Soviet patrimonialism in Central Asia.

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Asia.\textsuperscript{452} If during tsarist era the political order in Central Asia was based on relations of subservience and political loyalty between the local beg and the supreme khan/emir or between the military commander and the tsar, then such relations continued to exist in the Soviet Union between first secretaries of the raion (district) and oblast´ (province) party committees, and between first secretaries of oblast´ committees and those of the republics’ central committees.

The Bolshevik regime encountered local resistance from what they called ‘Basmachi’ (bandit) movement. The movement leaders were seen however by much of the indigenous population as popular national heroes. Basmachi rebels enjoyed considerable popular support and virtually controlled the Ferghana Valley for a while. In late 1919, armed groups were able to take over Osh, Jalalabad and Naryn, but gradually they were pushed back due to internal squabbles and in part by the successful Bolshevik strategy of carrot and stick.

In the summer of 1919, Mikhail Frunze was sent to lead the Red Army in Central Asia. Together with the newly created Turkestan Commission, Frunze brought the fighting to an end and pledged that the Bolsheviks would accommodate traditional ways of life of the local peoples. Under such terms and promises, the Basmachi campaign gradually weakened and its leaders eventually gave themselves up or fled into exile.

3.3 Ethno-nationalization in Soviet Central Asia

3.3.1 Soviet nationalities policy

There were two elements to the Soviet nationalities policy. The first explains the Soviet emphasis on nationality as power politics and a strategy to secure Russia’s dominance in Central Asia. The second relates ethno-nationalization to modernization and societal transformation in the region. Following the logic of power-politics, the Bolshevik’s promotion of nationality as an organizing principle was a tactical concession to the local populations, which were intended as a “temporary solution only, as a transitional stage to a completely centralized and a supra-national world-wide Soviet state”. The concessions were formal rather than real, because the real power remained within the central Communist Party. However in the Central Asian context, the strategy of the divide and rule dictated the destruction of genuine national movements in the form of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism and their replacement with the newly-invented national identities.

Moreover, Connor identifies four international concerns that drove the Soviet nationalities policy. First, the national entities satisfied the national aspirations in the borderland of the Soviet Union. Second, it galvanized support

from the peoples of the colonial world by demonstrating the liberated status of the former tsarist colonies. Third, it was meant to appeal to the ethnic kinsmen of the borderland groups outside the Soviet state. Fourth, it served as international propaganda to prove the Soviet respect for national rights of self-determination, which was featuring heavily in the global politics at the time.

The Soviet nationalities policy was also connected to societal transformation triggered by the Bolshevik regime. Slezkine identifies three main factors that led to the adoption of transformational ethno-nationalization by Bolsheviks.\footnote{Slezkine, Y. (1994). “The USSR as a Communal Apartment; or, How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism.” 
\textit{Slavic Review} 53(2), p. 414ff} First, they believed that it was necessary to ‘preach’ in the local languages, and that language was a transparent medium, without any connection to a ‘national form’. Second, the promotion of national identities was considered necessary in order to overcome national mistrust among the non-Russian groups, hence Lenin’s emphasis on the ‘bad’ nationalism of Russian chauvinism. Third, the promotion of nationality was aimed to ‘catch-up’ economically, socially and culturally with the Russian nation.

In \textit{Affirmative Action Empire}, Terry Martin argues that the Bolsheviks considered the nation as a historically inevitable stage of the wider modernization process, and claims that Lenin and Stalin, being aware of the development of defensive minority nationalism, promoted national identities to the point of affirmative action in favour of the potential minority nationalists.\footnote{See Martin, T. (2001). \textit{The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939}. London, Cornell University Press.} Hirsch takes a step further and asserts that the Soviet nationalities policy was a modernization and development strategy aimed to modernize backward peoples and organize
them into nations in the context of a ‘unified state with a colonial type economy’. Such ‘state-sponsored evolutionism’ tried to develop ‘double assimilation’, national affiliation within a more fundamental allegiance to the Soviet Union. Moreover, Jeremy Smith maintains that the national framework became to be seen by the Bolsheviks as part of a solution in the short term, enabling them to consolidate their regime through the means of national loyalties, as well as in the long term by achieving modernization, improving local conditions in backward regions, and establish the grounds required for socialism.

The nationalities policy shortly after the October Revolution resulted in the reorganization of administrative borders. Shifting his initial course, Lenin set about dividing the Turkic peoples of Central Asia into smaller segments in an effort to prevent the development of a nationalist coalition antagonistic to socialism. That policy became to be known as natsional’noe razmezhevanie (national territorial delimitation). In October 1919, a special Turkestan Commission was established to explore the national delimitation of the region based on ‘the ethnographic and economic circumstances of the territory’.

In the 1920s, the goal of Soviet nationalities policies in Central Asia was to create separate national republics through natsional’noe razmezhevanie, based mainly on ethno-linguistic criteria. Central Asian people had justified fears that

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Moscow’s strategy was designed to split the Turkic peoples and to fragment the economy in an effort to divide and rule.\textsuperscript{461} Despite their objections, national delimitation was carried out, and Central Asia was divided into several Soviet socialist republics none of which had an independent existence as nation-states prior to the Soviet rule. Bhavna Dave asserts that the delimitation indeed “forged a sense of territorial nationhood by identifying distinct nationalities from a plethora of ethnic, sub-ethnic, clan and religious groupings”.\textsuperscript{462}

In implementing the policy of territorial delimitation, Soviet ethnographers had to deal with a number of problems. The ethno-linguistic situation in Central Asia was extremely confused and complex. The delimitation did not therefore uniformly contribute to ethno-national territorialization in Central Asia, which is why “the category ‘Uzbek’ underwent considerable expansion through the assimilation of numerous ethnic groups located on its territories, evolving into a new identity discontinuous from the ‘historical’ Uzbek identity.”\textsuperscript{463} For example, in some areas such as the present-day southern Uzbekistan and southern Tajikistan, Uzbeks and Tajiks had become so inter-mixed that it was difficult to distinguish between them.\textsuperscript{464} As was earlier described, there was no sense of ethnic or national identity in Central Asia at the time. Local population often did ascribe themselves in ethnic terms, not to mention nationally, because their identities were based on the tribal name, the name of their town (Bukhoroli, Samarqandli, etc.), or

the religion. The term ‘Sart’ was not an ethnic term and could refer to both Uzbeks and Tajiks. A distinct territorial identity was also weak. Given those crucial difficulties, the solutions that the Bolsheviks adopted were far-fetched and eventually created a whole new set of problems, which resurfaced later on during glasnost’ era. Since Sart was not an ethnic category and acquired a pejorative bourgeois connotation, it was banned from use. Thus, Sarts were no longer listed in the official 1926 population census, and the term was replaced by the all-encompassing term Uzbek on the grounds that there was little difference between Sart and Uzbek communities and languages.

It is difficult to pinpoint the specific authors of the national delimitation strategy, but it is clear that Stalin played a substantial role. In Central Asia, Faizulla Khozhaev and his allies could be singled out as major proponents of the delimitation. The 1920 proposal for a division of Turkestan might have provided the basic outline for it, but the proposal had to be augmented by Faizulla Khozhaev’s recommendations on ways of dealing with Bukhara and Khiva. Notably, there was a local opposition to Faizulla Khozhaev’s vision. Turar Ryskulov and his supporters called for larger multinational units and were strongly opposed to a partition in 1924.

Still in 1922, when the treaty on the formation of the Soviet Union was signed, no ethnic group in Central Asia had a national/republican status. So in the early 1920s, there was also considerable discussion of the administrative and territorial structures to be devised for the new state in the Kyrgyz land.

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465 The 1926 census asked “Of what narodnost (ethnic group) are you?”, whereas the previous tsarist census used the ‘native language’ of a person to determine ethnicity and asked “Of what natsional’nost (nationality) are you?”
Considerable debate took place as to whether the region of present-day Kyrgyzstan should be included in Turkestan, Kazakhstan or the Russian Federation (RSFSR). Stalin was in favour of the principle ‘autonomization’, the transformation of certain republics into autonomous republics of Russia, but Lenin rejected such ‘autonomization’ and favoured a federation of equal republics. During the national demarcation of 1924, subordination to Russia was the final decision and the area became the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast. Later in 1936, the republic acquired the formal title of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic (KSSR) within the Soviet Union.

Also in 1924, the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (UzSSR) was created with an autonomous Tajik republic within it. In 1929, Tajikistan achieved the status of a national republic, and became formally called the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (TSSR). In general, the territorial delimitation seemed to favour the dominant Uzbek majority over the Tajik minority. In the official interpretation, the ancestors of the modern Uzbek nation were all the sedentary peoples who used to inhabit the territory of the UzSSR. But the link to the nomadic Turkic-Mongolian tribes who came into Central Asia in the late 15th and early 16th centuries under the leadership of Sheibani Khan was often omitted. For example, the official *Istoriia UzSSR* (History of the UzSSR) states that:

> The Uzbek ethnic group (*narodnost*) is composed not of the fairly recently arrived nomadic ‘Uzbeks’ of the fifteenth century Kipchak Steppe, but of the ancient inhabitants of Soghdiana, Ferghana and Khorezm. From the earliest times they led a settled life and were occupied in cultivating the soil.\(^{468}\)

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The official line further added that Uzbeks descended not from the Turkic-Mongolian group, but from the same Aryan base as the Tajiks because both had inhabited the same land. Similarly, *Istoriia Tadzhikskogo naroda* (History of the Tajik People) writes that Uzbeks and Tajiks have the same ethno-genetic roots, and maintains that: “the history of these two peoples may be graphically compared to two great branches emerging from the trunk of a single tree”. But there were visible differences between the two groups, language being one of them. Such differences were acknowledged by the Soviet ethnographers, and one explanation read that “an insignificant percentage of elements from another, Mongoloid, race, to which Turks and Mongols belonged, was deposited onto the Europoid base of the Uzbek population”. Meanwhile Tajiks constituted that part of the earlier population which, “to a lesser degree was subject to assimilation with Turkic tribes and preserved its language”.

On founding the Soviet Central Asian republics, state structures were re-established in the region. Even though Europeans dominated the upper echelons of the state apparatus, native people who decided to become political allies of Bolsheviks could hold high positions in the Soviet government. On the other hand, local committees such as *sovet aksakalov* (soviets of elders) in mahallas and tribal villages were run by traditional elites, which was similar to the arrangement

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during the tsarist rule. Even the Kazakh nationalists of Alash Orda (Horde of Alash), who initially opposed the Bolsheviks and tried to form an independent Kazakh government, joined the Kazakh Communist Party.\footnote{Geiss, P. (2005). Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia. London, Routledge, p. 240} In the period of New Economic Policy (NEP), local elites regained political influence on a regional level.

As a result of the national territorial delimitation, the main losers were the idea of pan-Turkestan and Turkestan's politicians, while those who benefited were Bukhara and its Jadid leaders. Some scholars dubbed the Soviet delimitation policy in Central Asia as “parcelization of their ancient territory into artificial 'tribal republics'”\footnote{Carlisle, D. (1994). Soviet Uzbekistan: State and Nation in Historical Perspective. Central Asia in Historical Perspective. B. Manz. Oxford, Westview Press, p.115}. In his assessment of Moscow’s policies, Alexandre Bennigsen wrote that:

> There is little doubt that the wish to forestall the fashioning of a pan-Turkestan national consciousness around the hub of a common language – Chagatay - was central to the 1924 decision. One need only to recall that the Bolshevik leaders had to combat at the same period the ideas of Sultangaliev and his followers on the union of all Turks of Russia into a single republic, Turan.\footnote{475}

The Soviet centre may have indeed exaggerated the threat from pan-Turkic nationalism, since it did not constitute a political mass movement, but rather remained a political discourse of the Jadid intelligentsia or the native Communists. Central Asian peoples did not have a chance to have become attached to the Soviet Turkestan, and no strong patriotism had emerged in response to Moscow's fragmentation and reformation scheme. This was primarily because local loyalties had never been linked to formal political boundaries drawn

by tsarist officials or by their Communist successors. Collective identities flourished at local or tribal levels instead. For settled population, they were manifested in the *mahalla* (urban community) and *kishlak* (village), and were expressed in a powerful Islamic identification. Since the Bolshevik delimitation policy mounted no direct attack against Islam or local traditions, there was no widespread mass opposition as a result. Therefore, the shared religious ties uniting Central Asian peoples had limited political relevance in regard to the Soviet delimitation experiment, unless they were directly to be tested and challenged by inept Russian policies.

The relative ease with which the national territorial division was carried out indicated the longer-term difficulties that each republic would confront in internal integration and in creating a viable national cohesion. The grouping of diverse people with primarily local loyalties under one label resulted in circumscribing them within boundaries of a national republic of which they had little awareness. It drew together under one umbrella many people who shared ‘objective’ common traits, while ‘subjective’ consciousness was lacking. This national amalgamation process did not and could not automatically erase the tribal, historical, and regional cleavages that had divided native communities. Nor could it eradicate shared religious loyalties reaching across the new boundaries. Tribal and clan feuds, which were crucial in the defeat of the Basmachi movement, would continue hindering the future Communist and in fact post-communist nation-building in Central Asia. Thus, in her analysis of the 2004 parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, Dave points to the “salience of informal

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connections and networks, possibly mediated by clan and kinship factors, especially in the southern regions”. ⁴⁷⁶ It is also interesting to recollect the article from the local newspaper Pravda vostoka, which reports the 1937 celebrations of the achievements of the Soviet nationalities policy and cites Uzbekistan's Communist leader, Akmal Ikramov, who describes how in 1924 the Soviet regime was trying to simplify the ethnic terrain through national consolidation in the following words:

The Uzbek people up to the October socialist revolution were not yet fully developed and consolidated as a nation. The Uzbek toiling masses had not then recognized themselves as a single nationality. The Ferghana uzbeks usually were called kokandists, according to the name of the khanate; the Zarafshan, Kashka Darya, and Surkhan Darya peoples were not considered uzbeks (by the Uzbeks of that time). Khorezmians, for example, when travelling elsewhere were for some reason called Tajiks. And the Russian colonialists called all of them Sarts.⁴⁷⁷

It is notable that through the policy of national delineation the Soviets contributed to the process of ethno-national differentiation in Central Asia. New political and educational elites were trained, who rejected the idea of a unified Turkestan and were more interested in the separate political existence of their ethnic groups. The relative ease with which the national delimitation was accomplished could indicate that some of the ethnic preconditions had already existed before the Bolshevik revolution, and therefore Khazanov suggests that calling this policy as artificial ethnic engineering may be unwarranted.⁴⁷⁸

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In 1923, the twelfth Party Congress adopted the policy of korenizatsiia (indigenization), increasing the role of the national languages and seeking roots in the minority populations by recruiting national (indigenous) cadres to run national republics. Korenizatsiia was designed to bring about equality among nations by designating members of the titular nations for preferential treatment in their home republics. In the context of the confederal structure of the Soviet Union, it promoted consolidation around the nations whose members were given a privileged status, particularly in regions where a strong sense of national identity was lacking. On top of that, korenizatsiia policies encouraged not only a growing ‘sense of spatial identity’ among native population toward their home republics but also a ‘sense of exclusiveness’ regarding their proper place in the national homeland.\textsuperscript{479}

The deference to newly-formed Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz or Turkmen nations symbolized more a goal of the Bolsheviks than it was a Bolshevik response to local reality and native demands. Thus, it would be more accurate to characterize the korenizational process as the establishment of national units in order to encourage invented nations rather than to claim that it was only a reaction to simmering Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik, and Kyrgyz national consciousness.

The policies of korenizatsiia were expected to ensure that the national problem would become more intractable over time, even with such equalization. They also guaranteed that nationalists would use territoriality as the primary strategy in the attempt to establish their control over the destiny of the nation. There is no doubt that that nationhood in the Soviet context became the essential

\textsuperscript{479} Kaiser, R. (1994). The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR. Princeton, Princeton
equivalent of national territoriality. For that reason, Terry Martin refers to the Soviet Union of korenizatsiia period as an ‘affirmative action empire’, and argues that one of the unique features of the Soviet Union was its ability to draw upon the experiences of the Habsburg empire in dealing with the nationalities question: “Russia’s new revolutionary government was the first of the old European multiethnic states to confront the rising tide of nationalism and respond by systematically promoting the national consciousness of its ethnic minorities and establishing for them many of the characteristic institutional forms of the nation-state”.

In the 1930s, central authorities realized that nationalism was strengthening at the expense of internationalism as a result of their nationalities policy and the socio-economic development. Politically, the Stalin years were most notable for the pervasive atmosphere of purge and terror. From the early 1930s, Stalin sought to ensure central control over the republics and considerations of efficiency and loyalty took priority over previously asserted affirmative action. The intensity of external control of the state apparatus in Central Asia culminated during Stalin's purges of the 1930s. The purging of indigenous elites on spurious charges of ‘bourgeois nationalism’ was increasing throughout the decade, culminating in the Great Purge of 1937-38.

As it happened in other Soviet republics, Stalin ordered the purging of Central Asian national elites, including influential native communists. Some of the prominent victims of Stalin’s purges included the chairman of the Turkmen Supreme Soviet, Nederbai Aitakov; Kazakh historian, Turar Ryskulov; Uzbek

University Press, p.384
prime minister, Faizulla Khodzhayev; and the First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, Akmal Ikramov.\textsuperscript{481} A renewed purge of party ranks was launched in late 1933. Over the course of two years it reduced membership of the Kyrgyz party from 19,932 to 6,385.\textsuperscript{482} Many others disappeared into the camps and execution cellars, or had their lives ruined as a result of kinship or friendship with ‘enemies of the people’.

It is striking that as nationalist local elites were purged by the central authorities, the policy of mass-based korenizatsiia and the nationalization of the republics carried on. The authorities emphasized their best efforts to distinguish between the nationalistic elites, who should be treated as anti-communist deviants that must be eliminated, and the titular masses, whose national consolidation should be promoted further. Nonetheless, a shift in nationality policies was noticeable during the 1930s, which increasingly favoured Russians in the Soviet Union. And after 1938 and till 1953, the Russians were lauded as the ‘first among equals’, and this became the most prominent element in nationality policy of the Soviet state.

Apart from the contradiction between the promotion of indigenization and the Russification simultaneously, but Stalin’s anti-nationalist programs of the Great Terror became counter-productive for the overall Soviet Union’s efforts to solve the national question. Stalin’s divergence from Lenin’s original policy was decried both by socialist reformers and nationalist elites during the late 1980s. The


dissatisfaction with that policy direction served as a catalyst in the political mobilization of the masses in favour of political decentralization and ultimately national independence.483

In the post-war period, the notion of nations as identity communities within national homelands became mainstreamed. The nationality question facing the Soviet leaders in the last forty years of the Soviet Union’s existence was fundamentally different from that one which Lenin or Stalin had to deal with. During this period, the Soviet authorities and ethnographers wrote extensively about the next stage of national development, sblizhenie (drawing together) of nations. They also proclaimed that the national question had been resolved through international equalization. Although it was evident the national dialectic predicting the sovietization of the peoples through social modernization and international equalization did not realize. The process of national consolidation was described by Soviet ethnographers in terms of a national rastsvet (flowering) that accompanied socio-economic development. But according to the national dialectic, national consolidation was essentially complete and was being replaced by the internationalization of the masses.

The international sblizhenie of nations was said to be creating a unique Soviet people, whose primary loyalty lay with the socialist state, even though they also ascribed to their national communities. The synthesis resulting from this dialectical process was defined as the sliianie (merger) of nations. That meant an actual end to national communities leading to edinstvo (unity) of the populations into one Soviet citizenry. In many official Soviet writing on the nationality

question, there was a trend indicating that the consolidation of nations was finalized, nations were drawing closer together, and it was only a matter of time before they disappeared entirely.

The Soviet ethnography however did not always follow the widely accepted practice of a theory exploring and explaining the patterns of social facts. Quite the opposite, the grand Soviet ideology was supreme, while the ethno-national theory was expected to illustrate how the social reality supported the doctrine. Olivier Roy in explaining Soviet ethnography’s role in Central Asian nation-formation states that:

The ethnic group in question is not first defined by scientific analysis and then given administrative status. On the contrary, first it gets its status, and then it is up to the experts to find it a *post facto* scientific foundation.  

Soviet theoreticians adopted at least two approaches to lay a firm foundation for the constructed national groups, ethno-genesis and linguistics. New Central Asian communities were ‘imagined’ according to the Leninist theory of nationalism, further elaborated by Stalin. One of the postulates of Stalin’s theory, published in Marxism and the Question of Nationalities, states that the nation is a “historically developed and stable community of people that has emerged on the basis of the commonality of their language, territory, economic life and psychological make-ups as manifest in the community of culture … Absence of at least one of these traits is enough for a nation not to be a nation”.  

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As was mentioned, Stalin’s perspective on nationality and ethnicity had elements of primordialism. However, Soviet theoreticians also incorporated some modernist aspects to nationhood. They argued that ethnic communities undergo the fusion process together with the development of the means of production. It could be argued that Soviet ethnography was based on a stage-based theory, which incorporated both primordialist and modernist views. Soviet ethnographers claimed that ethnic communities are formed through stage process, which involved stages that are congruent with the socio-economical development in the country. This theory is similar in spirit to Rostow’s prominent model of state’s economic development, which outlines five stages that a country needs to pass to achieve a desired economic development and modernity.487

According to the Soviet theories, stages of nation-formation can be grouped into pre-Soviet and post-Soviet stages. The pre-Soviet stage progresses from *plemennoe* (tribal) to the capitalist nation. A traditional ethnic community has a tribal sense of identity with a self-sustaining subsistence form of production. The capitalist form of nationhood is created as a result of emerging capitalist socio-economical relations within the community and reinforced by the functional division of labour and the accumulation of capital in the society.

The Bolsheviks argued that the capitalistic mode of community is undermined by the exploitation of the working class by the more powerful bourgeois class. They believed that the post-revolutionary stages towards socialist modernity would take the form of a process of *rastsvet* (flourishing), *sblizhenie* (coming together) and *sliianie* (unity). Their approach to nationhood fluctuated

between a contingent modernist perception of it as the product of historical development to a primordial understanding that it was deeply rooted in the culture, ancestry and biology of people. Suny observes that Soviet theorists held the contradictory views that nationality was passed on, like genes, from one generation to another, and that national differences would eventually grow less distinct and the Soviet nations would meld into a single Soviet nation.\(^{488}\)

It is important to note that, following Lenin’s interpretation of Marxist concept of the Asian mode of production, the Central Asian peoples were supposed to evolve from tribal community straight to the socialist flourishing, thus skipping capitalistic model of nationhood. Central Asia was therefore crucial for Soviet ethnographers because it was a social experiment that was hoped to prove the Soviet model of modernization. It also concerned the possibility of transforming tribal communities to a unified Soviet nation through post-revolutionary stages and institutionalized structures.

The assessment of the Soviet Union’s nationalities policy should be placed in the context of the consequent discussion, which will explore two different modes in which nationhood and nationality were institutionalized in the Soviet Union: territorial and political on the one hand, ethno-cultural and personal on the other hand.

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3.3.2 Territorial and political institutionalization

The 1919 Party Programme incorporated Lenin’s ideas on national equality and the right to secede, while stressing proletarian unity. Even though Stalin was in favour of the principle ‘autonomization’, the transformation of certain republics into autonomous republics of Russia, Lenin wrote to the Politburo rejecting ‘autonomization’ and asserting that the RSFSR and other independent republics should federate as equals in a union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia.\(^{489}\) Thus, a ‘federal association of states’ was envisaged as ‘one of the transitional forms’ to ‘complete unity’.\(^{490}\)

The Soviet Union was therefore constructed as a federation of sovereign republics in order to provide the nations of the state with political and juridical equality. But that federation was a transitional form with two complementary and concomitant tendencies, the flourishing (ratsvet) of nations and the gradual coming together (sblizhenie) of nations, which would lead to the eventual merging (sliianie) of nations to the single Soviet proletariat. The Union Treaty of 1922 (also known as ‘federal compromise’) established the Soviet Union and inscribed the equality to the larger non-Russian nationalities together with cultural and administrative autonomy within the Soviet federation. The federal units of the state were constructed on the basis of ethnic communities, followed by the


delimitation of national territories, which took place at the time when national consciousness was still a vague perception in the region.

When the above-mentioned Union Treaty was signed, Central Asia resembled the tsarist administrative division, and no ethnic group in the region had a republican or national status. Bukhara and Khorezm (formerly Khiva) were independent People’s Soviet Republics, while Turkestan and Kazakhstan were part of the Russian federation (RSFSR). Later on, the Turkestan Republic and Bukharan and Khivan People’s Republics were transformed to the Turkmen and Uzbek Union Republics, whereas Tajikistan initially had the status of an autonomous republic within Uzbekistan before becoming a union republic in 1929. The Kazakhs and Kyrgyz were first the autonomous republic and autonomous oblast’ respectively within the Russian Union Republic, and after the last re-organization in 1936 they obtained the status of union republic.

National divisions in the Bolshevik Central Asia were reflected in the organization of the state apparatus. Even before the territorial delimitation of Central Asia, the Bolsheviks established a special ministry, the Narkomnats, in the central government to deal with the national question. In Turkestan, there was a parallel structure in the form of the Commissariat for Nationality Affairs (Turkomnats). The first Regional Congress of the Communist Party of Turkestan passed a resolution in June 1918 stating that Turkomnats were to mainstream the ideas of the Soviet regime among the local population, organizing the publication of communist literature in local languages, and recruiting native cadres to the
Party and Red Army. Shortly after the release of the Statute of the Commissariat for Nationality Affairs of the Turkestan Republic in February 1919, the Turkomnats was reshaped and had separate national divisions of Kazakhs, Tajiks, Turkmen and Uzbeks.

Those institutional and organizational changes in the early years of the Bolshevik regime were interpreted by the Soviets as part of the gradual implementation of the Leninist nationality policy aiming for national self-determination. But Arne Haugen points to the pragmatism behind the national reorganization of the Turkomnats directed at facilitating the propagation of Soviet ideas among the indigenous population, and maintains that: “If the native population of the region were to adopt the message of the Soviet power, it was crucial that they be approached by people perceived of as ‘their own’ both linguistically and culturally, and not, at least not exclusively, by outsiders and foreigners”. In June 1922, the Turkomnats was abolished, and its national divisions were incorporated into the Turkestan Central Executive Committee (TsK).

The federal principle, through the national delimitation, resulted in the creation of five titular nationalities in Central Asia with separate state structures within the Soviet Union. It was the most prominent element of the institutionalization of nationhood in the region. The Soviet officials drew the boundaries of the new administrative units as close as possible to the apparent boundaries of ethnic communities. Their objective was “to have ethnicity,


territory, and political administration correspond as clearly as the science of the
day allowed. But since ethnicity was an inherently fluid identity and lines between
groups were often blurred, officials and ethnographers had to make sometimes
arbitrary decisions about who belonged where”.

Smith contends that the territorialization and politicization of ethnic groups were essential ingredients in
the development of a national self-consciousness in the Soviet Union.

Stalin’s constant administrative re-organization after 1924 had a
significant impact on Central Asia. It created an embryonic national state structure
whose ranks were to be gradually filled by new national elite educated within the
Soviet framework. The territorial political institutionalization ensured that when
the Soviet Union dissolved there was a solid foundation for the newly independent
country to build upon.

As soviet socialist republics, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan eventually had all the external symbols of
statehood: a national flag, a national anthem, a head of national state, relevant
government ministers including that of foreign affairs, a national communist party,
a national language, and so forth. The autonomous soviet socialist republics
located within national republics had their own soviet, a cabinet of ministers with
limited powers and a national language, which was taught at primary and
secondary schools only.

The territorial institutionalization in Central Asia was only part of a
classificatory process, which Benedict Anderson defines as ‘official nationalism’
in a European colonial context. The creation of borders defining the colonial


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state’s realm of control and the representation and designation of the population used lead to the totalizing classificatory grid with the effect “to be able to say of anything that it was this, not that; it belonged here, not here”. The national delimitation policy in Central Asia created a similar classificatory grid, which contributed to the institutionalization of nationality and enabled the Soviets to classify local nations in line with the nationalities policy. Kaiser adds that the construction of national homelands, facilitated by the Soviet nationalities policy as federal structuring of the state, was particularly crucial for the nationalization of the masses.

There was also a strategic and political logic behind territorial nationalization. The first reason is explained by the pronounced determination to curb greater Russian nationalism as well as the less announced intention to curtail pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic movements. The Soviet administration was concerned of those popular supra-national movements to the same extent as the tsarist regime. So the Soviets reinforced the tsarist timid policy of differentiating and distinguishing ethnic groups and began to institutionalize some of them within nation-states. Roy also points to the strategic consideration of trans-border nature, which dictated that: “Nationalities were created as a function of the principle of the dual bridgehead, the idea being to favour ethnic groups which might serve as a

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bridgehead to enable the USSR to extend beyond its frontiers and, inversely, to break up those which might function as bridgeheads for another power”. 497

The classification and territorialization of nationalities contributed to the gradual re-definition of distinct ethnic groups to bring them closer to the larger titular nationalities. In that regard, Glenn asserts that: “Although in general terms the Soviet nationalities policy was intended to represent, in institutional form, the various nationalities and ethnic groups within the federation, there were cases where the Soviet census served officially to eliminate differences within a state’s population by incorporating them under the imprecise and rather erroneous category of the titular nationality. In Central Asia, the use of the census endeavoured to merge the three pre-revolutionary ethnic layers of the Uzbek population”. 498 In fact, throughout Soviet history boundaries were re-defined to conform to new and evolving understandings of nationhood, but “the basic principle of territorializing ethnicity and linking both to politics remained constant”. 499 The changes of national status or territory were usually announced by the promulgation of decrees from the relevant soviets; the practice which would persist in the post-Soviet Central Asia.

The national demarcation with its efforts to combine both ethnic principles and economic rationality and according to which a nationality was defined by a language and a territory led to well-documented anomalies and created the basis for future tensions. In particular, the division of the Ferghana Valley in the south of Kyrgyzstan left sizeable Uzbek communities, whose numbers would increase as

a result of administrative tinkering in 1936, stranded in the Kyrgyz part of the region. At the start of the Kyrgyz delimitation, the boundaries of the Kyrgyz SSR were disadvantageously drawn. Most of the fertile land of the Ferghana Valley was given to the settled and agriculturally oriented Uzbeks. That was not a problem in the early 1920s, because land was still available for grazing by nomadic groups wandering down from out of the high mountain passes. But by the time the extensive irrigation projects of the Ferghana Valley were developed due to the Soviet industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s, the land became scarce and no longer available to the Kyrgyz nomads for grazing.

Few Soviet ethnographers could acknowledge that the institutionalized ethno-nationalism was actually substituting the professed merging of Soviet nations. The reality on the ground pointed to national separatism becoming a more intractable problem, while the central authorities found themselves increasingly unable to deal with it. To the disappointment of Moscow the next stage of modernization became the indigenization of life in each national republic, instead of the internationalization, or sovietization, of the population.

Once national republics were created, the internal borders of the Soviet Union catalysed the establishment of political and geographic basis for nations. From then onwards, national communities defined that territory as their homelands, while some nationalists also claimed territory beyond the borders of their republics. National homelands projected an exclusive image of nationhood held by each nation that contributed to shaping international relations in the context of the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy. And because such nationalistic images of homeland are exclusive, members of other nations do not share the same mental
As a consequence of these overlapping claims to homeland, border conflicts were bound to emerge throughout the territory of the former USSR, as they did after perestroika.

3.3.3 Ethno-cultural and personal institutionalization

The second mode in which nationhood was institutionalized in the Soviet Union was ethno-cultural and personal. The Soviet regime divided the citizenry into a set of comprehensive and mutually exclusive ethnic nationalities. Through such state classification system, ethnic nationality served both as a statistical category, and as an obligatory ascribed status. After the consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia, language policy played a crucial role in the institutionalization of nationality. During the implementation of korenizatsiia policy, instruction in the national languages was rapidly introduced to primary and secondary schools, as well as to higher education. Many vernacular languages were given alphabets and literary forms. In the pick of indigenization, the Russian language even ceased to be a compulsory subject in the schools of the national republics.

The classification of languages was one of the key criteria to distinguish between different levels of national consciousness and nationality. According to the Soviet classification, languages had three statuses: unwritten language, written

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language and literary language. The classification of local languages was a matter of political decision: “A ‘nationality’ which had no written language would not be able to have territory, but since the decision to ‘write’ a language comes from the administration, this meant that the status of the language is basically political”.  

Between 1927 and 1930, Latin script replaced the Arabic one for the spoken languages of Central Asia. In 1934, a new version of the Latin script was introduced by the Soviet government. However, in 1940 the Soviet authorities were concerned about direct communication between the Turks of Turkey and the Turkic populations of Central Asia, and replaced the Latin script with the Cyrillic one.

In Central Asia, nationality became pervasive and institutionalized in personal lives of the local population. It was assigned by the Soviet state at birth on the basis of descent, which was registered in passports and recorded in almost all bureaucratic documentations and official transactions. Nationality was also used to manipulate access to higher education and to certain jobs. The notorious ‘fifth point’ in the Soviet internal passport listed the holder’s nationality on the basis of parentage. In the words of Slezkine: “Every Soviet citizen was born into a certain nationality, took it to day care and through high school, had it officially confirmed at the age of sixteen, and then carried it to the grave through thousands of application forms, certificates, questionnaires and reception desks. It made a

difference in school admissions and it could be crucial in employment, promotions and draft assignments”.

In an insightful historical assessment of the Soviet Union as an ‘affirmative action empire’ in 1923-1939, Terry Martin argues that: “Russia’s new revolutionary government was the first of the old European multiethnic states to confront the rising tide of nationalism and respond by systematically promoting the national consciousness of its ethnic minorities and establishing for them many of the characteristic institutional forms of the nation-state”.

Suny maintains that nationhood was “institutionalized into the Soviet system as a category of identity, a passport to privilege (or discrimination), and a claim to political power in national republics”. The intention initially was to solve the national question, overcome a history of uneven development, and curb Russian chauvinism. As was mentioned, the two important elements of that solution were the federation structure of the state and korenizatsiia policies, which played a key role in the nationalization of the elites and masses throughout the post-revolutionary period. Due to its ideological commitment to ensure the equality among its nations and to modernize the more ‘backward’ peoples, the Soviet Union actively engaged in affirmative action programs designed to advantage the indigenous populations in their own national territories. Indeed, in the formative years of the USSR affirmative action policies helped non-

Russians to “achieve native language education, to advance socially, and gradually to occupy positions of power in industry, education, culture, the party, and the state”. In addition to the programmes of affirmative action, the geographic and social mobilization of the masses during the interwar period increased greatly, and therefore contributed to the mass-based national consolidation in the state. At the same time, the modernization program that promoted rural to urban migration contributed to “the more rapid nationalization of the masses”.

Prior to the Soviet rule, Central Asia was home to groups and collectivities who ascribed to affiliations other than national: they were based on tribe, kinship, religion, territory, language, and extended family. After the Soviet nationalities policy and the institutionalization of national culture and cadres in the national areas enhanced a sense of fixed and bounded national homeland. Slezkine notes that “insofar as national culture was a reality, it was about language and a few ‘domestic arrangements’: nationality was ‘form’. The ‘national form’ was acceptable to the Soviets because they believed that there was no such thing as ‘national content’.

Even after Stalin shifted the direction away from the early Leninist policy of curbing Russian chauvinism and towards the promotion of Russian language and culture as part of Russification in the early 1930s, the Soviet regime continued to promote the ethno-nationalization of major nationalities in the larger republics. On the other hand, indigenous intellectuals in some republics defended and

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promoted their own culture and language in reaction to Russification. The efforts of historians and ethnographic work sponsored by the Soviet state had similar aims in Central Asia: to institutionalize the ‘national’ history, obliterate more multi-cultural characteristics, and establish national claims to territories. For example, the experiences of pre-Uzbek tribes were assimilated into an Uzbek national narrative. The cultural activists, foot soldiers of the nationalizing project, re-discovered ancient heroes, demanded preservation of national monuments, and organized further excavations in search of further confirmation of primordial claim to nationality. Thus, during the 1970s the movement to re-discover traditional Kyrgyz culture gathered momentum, driven by the national intelligentsia in the Kyrgyz republic. Such figures as Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aitmatov represented the modern, cosmopolitan Kyrgyz intellectual and a champion of national values while opposing ethnic chauvinism.

In terms of the Soviet cadre policy, the Kyrgyz republic, similar to other Central Asian republics, was governed by a succession of Soviet officials appointed by Moscow. The republic’s remoteness may have given its officials greater latitude in local action and encouraged them to be more protective of their people. After the Second World War, considerable effort went to increase the Kyrgyz membership of the Communist party. A decree issued by the Communist Party Central Committee in 1958 criticized staffing policy in Kyrgyzstan, stressed the failure of economic management by local personnel and condemned the ways in which traditional practices continued to dominate. The decree, among other things, attacked the failure to promote women, and the readiness of many officials to compromise with ‘private property tendencies’ and ‘survivals of the past in
everyday life’, which was a semi-coded reference to the continued strength of religious practices.\textsuperscript{511}

Under the leadership of Turdakun Usubaliev, first secretary of the Kyrgyz Communist Party from 1961-86, and indeed that of many of his regional contemporaries, there developed a multifaceted approach to public life. On the one hand, this involved extreme flattery. This was evident in public utterances about eternal friendship with the Russian brother and praise for the achievements of the Russian people. At the same time, Usubaliev made increasing economic demands on Moscow for greater investment within the republic, and tried gradually to increase the number of positions available to indigenous elites. The policy of expanding positions for the Kyrgyz was highly discriminatory, especially when pushed through in the south of the country where there were substantial Uzbek populations.\textsuperscript{512} Thus, Turdakun Usubaliev, had to balance his obligations to his native people and to Moscow rather precariously. He was criticized by his own people for being too pro-Russian, promoting Russian culture and language, and having a Russian perspective on his country’s heritage. But on the other hand, he was also criticized by Moscow for being too lenient and for permitting localism and backwardness.\textsuperscript{513} This might have been the reason for Moscow’s replacement of Usubaliev with Absamat Masaliev in November 1985.

The Uzbek republic was heavily populated by Slavic and other non-Central Asian immigrants, as a result of the retreat to the hinterlands during the Second

\textsuperscript{512} This perception of discrimination was to play a role in the bloody Osh clashes of 1990 in Kyrgyzstan.
Many stayed behind after the war, and still more joined them in the 1950s and 1960s, drawn by the occupational mobility provided by the expanding Soviet economy. During the 1940s and early 1950s, the Uzbek SSR was mostly administered by Russian-speaking settlers. But by the 1960s, the native population grew and the economic base expanded, which lead to a gradual shift of power to local political and economic elite. The local party leader Sharaf Rashidov, who served from 1961 to 1983, was crucial in the localizing national impetus. By the time of his death in 1983, the party apparatus was securely in the hands of native Uzbeks, who had become the real locus of power. During Rashidov’s tenure, the party organization in the Uzbek republic garnered the power to win friends and punish enemies primarily through its control over party staffing policy and organization.

Powerful national elites therefore emerged in the late Soviet period, as Khrushchev and particularly Brezhnev permitted national leaders to remain in power for many years (like Rashidov and Usubaliev). The highly centralized command system of the initial Stalin years loosened its grip on the national republics, and by the last decades of the Soviet state nationalities in Central Asia experienced an unprecedented degree of local autonomy.514

Even though the Soviet cadre policy symbolized a more overt reversion to clientelism, it also showed elements of change as well as continuity. Patronage networks would continue to be based on kinship and regional identities, yet at the same time the system allowed for the cooption of individuals from other ethnic groups. However, Usubaliev’s strategy was seen by the nationalistic Kyrgyz as
compromised, because it involved subservience towards Russia, which was likely to result in the emasculation the Kyrgyz language and the national culture. Nationalists also criticized that the republic’s party leadership showed little initiative in dealing with the growing socio-economic crisis, in part due to the rapid rise in the rural population. Yet during Brezhnev's time in office, the trends promoted by Usubaliev were strengthened, because Moscow appeared content to allow the creation of regional fiefdoms, so long as political loyalty was maintained and five year plan targets met. However some observers noted that with weak central control official policies and structures could be distorted through processes that Andropov and Gorbachev were to describe as corrupt.\textsuperscript{515}

In the Khrushchev-Brezhnev era, the \textit{nomenclatura} (Communist elite) system took firm roots in Central Asia. First secretaries had to show loyalty to the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (KPSS) and formally complied with instructions from Moscow. The General Secretary was in charge of their political status and carefully selected and manipulated his staff. But it was members of TsK KPSS and the Politburo who had the power to sack their General Secretary, as it happened to Khrushchev in 1964. Whereas first secretaries could be criticized from above, criticism of their administration by subordinates was prohibited.

In their own republics, however, local heads of the Communist Party were able to increase their political influence by forming patronage networks which ensured the loyalty of regional and local leaders of economic and administrative


elites. As oblast’ and republican appointments were decided in Moscow, any change of General Secretary of KPSS would be linked with changes in new first secretaries in the republics, who then built up new patronage networks by forming political alliances and changing administrative cadres.\textsuperscript{516}

High-level positions, however, were always appointed by the centre in Moscow. If Central Asia leaders should disrespect tacit rules governing these relations, they were quickly removed. On the other hand, first secretaries who became members of the Politburo of TsK KPSS were able to lobby for more state economic investment in their republics. In that way, Dinmukhammed Kunaiev took advantage of his close ties with Brezhnev to mobilize considerable economic means for Kazakhstan, as did Sharaf Rashidov and Turdiakun Usubaliev in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan respectively.\textsuperscript{517} Relations of ruling constitute the identities of rulers and ruled alike. It can be argued that the imposition of the Soviet practices of rule on a particular territory elicited a territorially grounded national identity among the ruled.\textsuperscript{518}

The Soviet policy towards Central Asia also helped preserve or even revive tribalism and parochialism, in spite of professed fight against them. During the purges of the 1920s and 1930s, for example, all of the local political and cultural elites were physically destroyed. The Soviets trained new political elites whose privileged positions in local state structures of power were connected not with the interests of their republics and peoples, but rather with their compliance


with Moscow's demands and their ability to implement policies dictated by the centre. Besides, the positions of the top-level regional leaders depended also on their personal reputation in Moscow and their allegiance to powerful figures in the central hierarchy. When the centre was pleased with and trusted regional leaders, they were allowed to run internal affairs in their republics and distribute high level jobs, a percentage of which were reserved for the non-Russian elites in Central Asia in order to secure their support for the Soviet regime.\textsuperscript{519}

3.4 The nationality question during perestroika

The rise in nationalist sentiments and the resurfacing of the national question in the last years of the Soviet Union was mostly explained in the context of Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost’. With the political openings offered by Gorbachev, the political movements that emerged in the Soviet state quickly became the vehicles of nationalist expression in non-Russian republics.\textsuperscript{520} The nationalist advocates claimed that the primordial nations, previously contained within the USSR, re-awakened after seventy years of dormancy to reclaim their dominant position in the ancestral homelands and equal status of nation-states in the world community. On the other hand, some Soviet observers continued to claim that the majority of people in the Soviet Union had successfully been de-nationalized and sovietized. Some other would add that the new post-perestroika

nationalism was the work of some manipulative leaders who tried to establish themselves politically. Gorbachev clearly shared the last view. He continued to believe, throughout his term as the president of the Soviet Union, that nationalistic sentiments were the trickery of his personal and the Soviet state’s enemies.

However, when the Soviet authorities witnessed the actual demise of the USSR, they had to recognize that ethno-nationalism had become an irreversible mass-based movement throughout most national republics. Moreover, as was described earlier Central Asian republics were not the primordial national organisms, which nationalists tried hard to prove. National communities in the region were institutionalized, modernized and popularized only during the twentieth century. The Soviet regime, with its institutions and policies, played an important part in the formation of nationhood and the development of national territoriality in the region.

Although the nationalities policy together with rapid socio-economic transformation helped Moscow manage the national question of the multi-national Soviet state, it in the first case constructed nationhood and played a crucial part in institutionalizing and consolidating nationhood in Central Asia. In the ensued competition between Soviet and nationalist ideologies, nationalism came out stronger and more attractive in comparison with the ideals of a common Soviet people and a socialist fatherland. As Central Asians became more socially and geographically mobilized, they tended to become more nationalistic and more inclined to exert pressure from below for greater socio-cultural, economic, and political control over their own nations.
The change toward greater politicization and ethno-nationalization in each national republic began to accelerate and reached greater proportions under Gorbachev’s USSR. But as was described earlier, the underlying direction towards greater indigenization of nationhood in the Soviet republics started in the formative years of the Soviet Union. The progressive weakening of the central Soviet state and the Communist Party opened the way for three distinct political patterns in the non-Russian republics. First, non-Communist nationalist leaders in Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, and Latvia took power with broad support of the population. Second, former Communists in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine quickly adapted their political agendas to fit the new period of nation-building and to varying degrees adopted programs of democratization and marketization. Third, old Communist elites in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan tried to hold on to power, foiled the aspirations of nationalists, and threw up a nationalism façade camouflaging a Soviet-style distribution of power.

As in other republics, changes began with the March 1989 elections for the USSR’s Congress of People’s Deputies. As a result, the Kyrgyz SSR received thirty-two seats on the basis of ethnicity and nine seats on the basis of population. Twelve additional seats were filled by public organizations. In the summer of 1989, new legislation on language and a new electoral law were passed in the republic’s parliament. The new parliament was initially to be a bicameral house, but later legislation changed it to a single body of 350 people’s deputies. A variety

of electoral principles were discussed, but the one finally chosen was a simple population formula rather than a consociational formula based on ethnicity.\textsuperscript{523} The first meeting of the new parliament was on April 10, 1990. The parliament elected Masaliev as the new chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Kyrgyzstan.

In 1989, new draft election laws were introduced and were adopted by the Uzbek Supreme Soviet in October of that year. A new language law establishing the Uzbek as the official language was passed. Both the republic and local elections were set for the same day, 18 February 1990. With the exception of the actual vote, the most important aspect of the elections was the nomination process.\textsuperscript{524} Individuals had the right to nominate from within recognized organizations or institutions. Some groups such as the so-called \textit{neformali} (informals) were excluded. Voters received three ballots, one for republic elections, one for oblast´ elections, and one for rayon elections. Each voter was required to mark off the names of the candidates he or she did not want, leaving not more than one name unmarked. The ballots were printed in the Russian and Uzbek language versions. In the general election, voter turnout was high, especially in the rural areas. A total of 9,385,740 people, or 93.5 per cent of eligible voters cast ballots.\textsuperscript{525} However, toward the conclusion of his remarks to a Central Committee Plenum held late in 1989, about three months before the


\textsuperscript{524} This is still the case in some Central Asian elections when the nomination process is more important than the actual vote since the outcomes could be determined in advance through its careful orchestration, which was recently evidenced in the succession of Saparmurat Niyazov by Gurbanguli Berdimukhamedov in Turkmenistan.

February 1990 elections, Islam Karimov accused the party leaders in Andijan oblast’ of manipulating public discontent for their own purposes.\textsuperscript{526}

Social mobilization along ethno-national lines can be evidenced in the open letter from a number of Uzbek intelligentsia coordinated by Mr. Zakirov from the Institute of nuclear physics of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences on “social injustice in relation to millions of Uzbek people in KSSR”.\textsuperscript{527} In the letter, the group laments the state-sponsored discrimination of Uzbek minority in Kyrgyz republic, blaming the artificial division of Turkestan to segments earlier in the century on the continual and future tensions in the region. The group saw the unified Turkestan statehood, albeit within the Soviet Union, as the ideal development.

Contrary to Soviet propaganda on the nationality question in the USSR, nationalism was not resolved through socialist means. Nationalist slogans were neither accurate in claiming that their respective national communities had previously been asleep, nor their fear-mongering was truthful in warning that nations are to disappear under the de-nationalization policies of Communists. One of the useful ways to look at perestroika years is through an understanding that the revolutionary changes should be viewed as a stage in a much longer process of ethno-national development in Central Asia. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union into independent, indigenous nation-states was the result of the longer process of indigenization, initiated by Bolsheviks. It was not a short-term response to the reforms initiated under Gorbachev.

\textsuperscript{527} Full letter can be found in Razakov, T. (1993). Oshskie Sobitiia: Na Materialah KGB. Bishkek, Renaissance.
Table 1. The Soviet Central Asian Republics of the USSR (prior to independence)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>Territory (thousand sq. km.)</th>
<th>Date of Formation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>16.538</td>
<td>2,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>4.291</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>5.112</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>3.534</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>19.906</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With the view to countering the growing movement for national rights, Gorbachev attempted to re-define the relationship between the central and the republic-level governments. He proposed a new version of the Union Treaty to combine self-sufficiency, independence, and sovereignty of the republics with an effective centre in Moscow. The new slogan announced: “A strong union means a strong centre and strong republics”, and Gorbachev in the press conference on 31 August 1990 expanded that the USSR should be held together by mutually advantageous economic relations in an all-union market and emphasised the importance of maintaining such key economic institutions as a single economic field.\(^{528}\)

The new draft of the Union Treaty was approved by the Supreme Soviet (the upper house) in December 1990 and was introduced in the Congress of People’s Deputies (the lower house) later that month. But many deputies were not satisfied with the provisions of the treaty. Gorbachev retreated from his reform

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agenda in response, swinging away from the political positions of the early perestroika supporters in favour of party conservatives. Facing this opposition to his proposed Union Treaty, Gorbachev attempted to undercut his opponents by calling for a popular referendum on the concept of the union. The referendum was held on 17 March 1991. The referendum question was: “Do you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of an individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?” Several republics, such as Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Moldova boycotted the referendum. Accordingly, voter turnout was 80 per cent; 76.4 per cent voted yes and 21.7 per cent voted no.

By the spring of 1991, observers began to speak openly not only of devolution but also of disintegration. In June 1991, Boris Yeltsin was elected president of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) by a strong majority, which greatly strengthened his hand in negotiations with Gorbachev. By mid-August 1991, Gorbachev had produced four versions of the Union Treaty, each one progressively giving greater powers to the republics.

Communist Party conservatives were well aware that a new Union Treaty, if adopted and implemented, would mean the end of the old Soviet Union. In a desperate last-minute effort to preserve the old structure, an eight-man committee of KPSS conservatives announced the creation of an ‘emergency committee’ and, while Gorbachev was in the Crimea on summer vacation, the committee declared that it had taken control of the government to save the country. In the ensuing
battle, Boris Yeltsin emerged as a courageous defender of democracy. Gorbachev returned from his vacation to resume his position as president of the USSR, and the coup collapsed.

On 8 December 1991, the leaders of the three republics, Leonid Kravchuk from Ukraine, Stanislav Shushkevich from Belarus, and Boris Yeltsin from Russia, gathered in the Belarus capital of Minsk to sign a resolution asserting that a new formation, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), would serve as successor to the USSR. The Minsk Declaration declared that the “Soviet Union henceforth ceases to exist”. The Minsk Declaration took the Central Asian leaders by complete surprise. The Declaration referred to a new political grouping which was exclusively Slavic. The Minsk Declaration was a challenge and opportunity for Central Asia.

In an interview to Nezavisimaia Gazeta in May 1992, Nazarbaev recalled the events leading up to the USSR’s dissolution. He noted that after the Minsk meeting there was a talk of a broader, Slavic-based political community, implying Central Asians should now also form a political community. In the interview, Nazarbaev recalled that: “We were very close to a dangerous confrontation between the two at that time. We had a draft on the establishment of an Asiatic confederation. … Then, at Saparmurad Niyazov’s invitation, we met in Ashgabat to discuss the situation”.

On 13 December 1991, the five Central Asian leaders met in Ashgabat. The outcome was to opt for continued participation in a political community that was geographically defined by the political space of the former USSR. The

resulting public announcement claimed that the Central Asian presidents were in fundamental agreement with the concept of the Commonwealth. The Central Asian leaders requested that they join the Commonwealth, but only on the condition that they are included as founding members. The three Slavic leaders agreed to this condition, and on 21 December 1991, the representatives of eleven of the former Soviet republics gathered in Alma-Ata to sign a new agreement to form a broader-based Commonwealth. The Alma-Ata Declaration was quickly acknowledged by the international community, and sealed the fate of the Soviet Union. Thus without a referendum, without a popular mandate, without parliamentary consent, the USSR ceased to exist. The Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev simply acknowledged the inevitable and resigned on 25 December 1991. Nations of Central Asia thus became independent.

Mikhail Gorbachev tried to abolish the cult of idolising the Politburo and General Secretary. His open disrespect for such rules of government became evident during the twenty-seventh congress of KPSS, when Gorbachev interrupted the session and demanded that delegates refrain from base flatteries and mindless subservience.\textsuperscript{531}

In relation to the rules of power, described earlier in the chapter, perestroika initiated a direct assault on patrimonialism. Gorbachev’s policies were in juxtaposition to the patrimonial practices of the past. He supported free mass media, invited criticism of political leaders, promoted the establishment of independent public associations and gave political opponents access to television and the press. These new practices were bound to erode the power base of the

Communist Party and to undermine central state structures. The most daring Gorbachev’s disrespect for the rules of Soviet patrimonial politics culminated in the removal of paragraph 6 of the Brezhnev constitution, which stressed the leading rule of KPSS, the liquidation of KPSS and the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union.

In the West, Gorbachev’s policies were seen in the context of promotion of civil society, initialization of the democratization process and overthrowing totalitarianism. In the view of Central Asian leaders, however, Gorbachev was seen as a weak leader who demolished the functioning state structures. That was one reason why some Central Asian leaders sympathised with ring-leaders of the August coup that made a failed attempt to restore the authority of the Communist Party.

To the disappointment of Western analysts, perestroika made little change to the patrimonial basis of politics and authority relations in Central Asia. All current presidents of Central Asian republics, except Tajik president Rakhmonov, were originally appointed as first secretaries by Gorbachev, whose initial intention was to renew the state apparatus in Central Asia. And, as Geiss points out, they used this mandate to strengthen their positions as supreme rulers, but did not share Gorbachev’s dislike of Soviet patrimonial practices and were less keen on western ideal of democratization, which arguably generated the decline of the Soviet state structures to a considerable extent.532

The Soviet ethnicity policies were doomed to fail mainly due to their inherent contradiction. They explained the formation of the initial ethnos in

primordialist terms as if those communities were natural. This view reminds of the Germanic primordialist concepts. Then, they suggested that as a result of the distinct Soviet way of development and modernization the nations will inevitably merge into a common Soviet community. The contradiction here is that the Soviet state had gone their own way – the statist way. It actually intervened in nation-building and imposed a controversial two-layered culture to the Central Asian peoples. In the end, once the central government got weaker the local high cultures prevailed.

The collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the most significant events of the twentieth century, which most Western Sovietologists spectacularly failed to predict. Many Sovietologists mistakenly believed that the nationality question was long resolved in the USSR, and that it became a homogenous nation-less entity. They were caught by surprise when they witnessed growing national movements during glasnost period and when separatist ambitions eventually tore the union apart. After the demise, however, some scholars claimed that the collapse was due to the economic slow-down. Other experts suggested perestroika policies created a political chaos and undermined the central government, and yet another view held that nationalism had a crucial affect on the event. It is evident that nationalism played a significant part in the collapse of the Soviet state. Even after the Soviet republics became independent, they still faced the institutional ethno-national legacy inherited from the USSR.

4.0 Conclusion

DRAWING from the institutionalist perspective of nationhood, the chapter contextualized and explained the formation and development of ethnicity and nationhood in Central Asia. It illustrated that nationhood is a modern phenomenon in Central Asia, which emerged in the region as a result of colonial geopolitical and institutional influences.

Treating the nations as a category of practice and institutionalized cultural and political form, the chapter presented a new way of looking into the past and present of nations in Central Asia. It revealed that state institutions, both Soviet and post-Soviet, have played a crucial role in forming and sustaining ethno-nationalism in the region. The Soviet institutions embedded the sentiments of nationhood and ethnicity profoundly in the imaginations of Central Asian people. The legacy of such institutionalized ethno-nationalism is bound to have a long-term affect on political and social development of the local societies.

Differing with the views by most Sovietologists, the chapter showed that the institutional condensations of nationality in the Soviet Union were by no means empty forms or legal fictions. Institutionally-defined nationhood not only played a major role in the disintegration of the Soviet state, but continues to shape and structure the national question in the newly-independent Central Asia. The
Soviet institutionalization of nationhood was based on two-tiered elements: territorial organization of politics and the social classification of people.

As was noted throughout the chapter, the intentions guiding the architects of Soviet nationality policies had the opposite consequences on the institutional definitions of nationhood. Those nationality policies were intended to achieve two aims. The first was to control, contain and channel the potentially disruptive political expressions of nationality by establishing national-territorial administrative structures and fostering, co-opting, and repressing national elites. And the second was to drain nationality of its content while legitimating it as a form, aiming to promote the long-term fading away of nationality as a vital component of social life. The Soviet regime actively institutionalized the existence of multiple nationalities as intrinsic elements of the state, as well as codified nationhood as fundamental social categories distinctive from statehood and citizenship. While the first aim of the Soviet nationality policies was achieved to a large extent, the second aim, far from being realized, reinforced the salience and significance of nationality as a central organizing principle in the society. Moreover, in Central Asia ethnicity was individually ascribed and publicly expressed as nationality. Ethnic diversity was perceived as national heterogeneity. Therefore, minority ethnic groups in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan understood and still understand themselves, as well as seen by others, as belonging to distinct nationalities.

The chapter leads to the suggestion that Soviet and post-Soviet national struggles should not be seen only as the struggles of nations, but also as the struggles of institutionally constituted national elites. The next chapter will show
how inter-ethnic struggles in Central Asia were and remain crucially framed, constituted and reconciled by institutionalized definitions of nationhood.
CHAPTER V, ETHNO-NATIONALISM AND CONFLICTS IN CENTRAL ASIA
1.0 Introduction

The previous chapter suggested that Soviet institutions embedded ethno-national sentiments deeply in the imaginations of Central Asian people, and that the legacy of institutionalized ethno-nationalism will have a long-term affect on political and social development in Central Asia. This chapter will continue this theme by looking specifically at the dramatic politicization of ethno-nationhood in Central Asia during the last years of the Soviet Union and the first years of independence. It will show how the expanded political scene during perestroika not only allowed for greater political mobilization along national lines but also changed the dynamics of inter-ethnic interaction. In the context of more political freedom and the reform-minded Moscow, local state apparatus in Central Asia was unable to control the potentially disruptive political expressions of nationality, which spilled to inter-ethnic conflicts.

The increased politicization of nationhood in Central Asia was a natural effect of seventy years of the Soviet regime’s institutional condensation and codification of nationhood as the main organizing principle of the society. Another consequence of highly institutionalized ethno-nationality in Central Asia is the potential for ethnic conflicts. The chapter will therefore explore the dynamics of inter-ethnic clashes during the last years of the Soviet Central Asia.

Its geographical focus will be on the Ferghana Valley, which is the most volatile, yet strategic, area in the region. Hence the analysis of unprecedented
inter-ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz majority and Uzbek minority groups in Osh, south of Kyrgyzstan. The choice for examining the Osh conflict is justified by a number of reasons. Firstly, inter-ethnic violence in Osh is a dramatic prototype of a dozen of other, smaller inter-ethnic clashes that took place from 1986 to early 1990s in Central Asia. Secondly, the Osh conflict involved two national groups, Uzbek and Kyrgyz, whose formation and development as institutionalized ethno-nationality was described in the previous chapter. Thirdly, the scale of casualties and intensity of the Osh conflict, which shocked not only the local population but even central bureaucrats in Moscow, was unsurpassed by other inter-ethnic riots in the region. And finally, the analysis of the Osh conflict is beneficial given the spectre of inter-ethnic tensions is present in today’s southern Kyrgyzstan.

Several recent studies on Soviet ethnic relation have confirmed that the Soviet Union was one of the unique governments to confront the rising tide of nationalism after the Revolution and respond by systematically promoting the national consciousness of its ethnic minorities and establishing for them many of the characteristics of the nation-state. Terry Martin provided a detailed account of the logic and content of the Soviet nationality policies from 1923 to 1939 that aimed to create national republics, elites, languages and other attributes of nationhood in a manner that the Soviet state could be appropriately labelled as the Affirmative Action Empire. On the basis of materials from the archives of the Central Asia Bureau, Arne Haugen considered the delimitation of national republics in Central Asia during the same period of time, by looking at the role of

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the central Soviet authorities as well as indigenous political actors in that process.534

Analysing *samizdat*, a key manifestation of Soviet dissent through censored publications, Zisserman-Brodsky presented a systematic and comparative study of ethnic politics in the Soviet Union, as formulated within dissident ethno-nationalist movements between 1964 and 1986.535 The study found that *samizdat* not only served as a free voice for the politically mobilized part of the nationalist intelligentsia, but also expressed the most popular ethnic claims and championed the most popular political objectives.536 Focusing on the continuous process of transition, Sengupta’s research looked into how the Uzbek nation-state has come to terms with its ‘modernity’ in the course of nation-forming transformations and shows that, while the political construction of cultural elements continued, the Uzbek state in transition could not ignore the possibilities inherent in the cultural elements.537 Olivier Roy provided a commanding historical account of the re-composition of traditional solidarity groups in Central Asia and the emergence of new nationalist elites from within the Soviet framework.538

A large number of studies have focused on the examination of how ethno-national identities evolved and how nation-states developed in the post-Soviet states. Bearing in mind that national identity is not fixed and subject to changes, one of the authoritative volumes on the subject explored how national identities

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were reformulated, revitalized and contested as symptoms of the perceived post-colonial status of the former Soviet states.\textsuperscript{539} The key issue of integration of national minorities was the focus of the comparative study of nation-building in two post-Soviet societies, according to which the governments of Kazakhstan and Latvia, rather than ‘de-emphasize’ ethnicity in their national-building process, adopted a ‘re-ethnification’ strategy.\textsuperscript{540}

Acknowledging the role of rational elite choices and structural factors, Sally Cummings addressed the question of how Central Asian states started from the initial common path after independence and diverged into different forms of authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{541} On a different note, Pauline Luong assessed divergences in the development of electoral systems and the political trajectories of transformation in three Central Asian states, through the examination of pacts and perceptions and in the framework of a bargaining game model.\textsuperscript{542}

Scholarship has also shown keen interest in exploring various cases and aspects of nationalist mobilization in the Soviet and post-Soviet era. In a path-breaking study of nationalist mobilization in the late Soviet period, Mark Beissinger looked at successes and failures of nationalist mobilization and argues that the disintegration of the Soviet Union could not have taken place without the effects of tidal influences of nationalism.\textsuperscript{543} He described nationalist movements

in Central Asia as a ‘mobilization failure’ but a ‘political issue success’, since the demands raised by the nationalist movements were consequently owned by the state and incorporated to its nationalizing policies.\footnote{Beissinger, M. (2002). Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State, Cambridge University Press, p. 203}

Bhavna Dave considered the case of Kazakhstan in explaining the absence of ethnic mobilization in the country and describing how the top-down coercive ethno-national strategy of the Kazakh government resulted in the prevention of overt conflict along ethno-national markers.\footnote{Dave, B. (2004). Management of Ethnic Relations in Kazakhstan: Stability without Success. The Legacy of the Soviet Union, W. Slater and A. Wilson, Palgrave Macmillan.} She focused on two key elements of the state intervention. According to the first, the granting of state language status to Kazakh not only established a new ethno-national hierarchy, but also eliminated sources of conflict with the Russian minority over language issues, and second held that the Kazakh state erected a ‘surrogate institutional infrastructure’ to co-opt ethno-national elite in a hierarchical nationality system.\footnote{Dave, B. (2004). Management of Ethnic Relations in Kazakhstan: Stability without Success. The Legacy of the Soviet Union, W. Slater and A. Wilson, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 83-96}

In regard to the liberal-democratic theory of transition, Jack Snyder’s \textit{From Voting to Violence} contributed to widespread apprehensions among practitioners and policy-makers in transitional politics that the move to democratic politics can create fertile conditions for nationalism and ethnic conflict, which not only raises the costs of the transition but may also re-direct political participation into anti-democratic path.\footnote{Snyder, J. (2000). From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, London, W.W. Norton & Company.} Reiterating the doubts of sustainability of democracy in multi-ethnic societies, Roeder criticized the promotion of power-sharing as aggravating
the ‘ethnicization’ of politics through polarization of preferences that ultimately undermines the consensus for democracy.\textsuperscript{548}

However, the above argument was challenged by Hughes and Sasse for its neglect of the fact that an institutional architecture was already in place, when the Soviet Union collapsed, and for its denial of the capacity of institutions to be an effective means of democratic conflict resolution.\textsuperscript{549} Their approach, tested by the examination of regions in conflict in the former Soviet Union, emphasized the crucial role of institutions both for the initiation of conflict and for how states may mitigate, manage or prevent conflict.\textsuperscript{550} A separate research by Easterly similarly concluded that institutional factors do interact with ethnic diversity, as they “affect whether ethnic conflict is destructive or is contained by the rules of the game”.\textsuperscript{551}

It is important from the outset to outline how this study approaches ethnic conflicts, as many confusing and conflicting interpretations often surround the term. In the analysis of the ethnic question, Stavenhagen argues that “ethnic conflict as such does not exist. What does exist is social, political and economic conflict between groups of people who identify each other in ethnic terms”.\textsuperscript{552} In a study of social conflicts in the post-Soviet countries, one of the editors makes a contentious conclusion that “the overwhelming majority of the case studies presented here do not support the notion that the conflicts we are witnessing in

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Central Europe and the NIS [newly independent states] are ethnically based or that ethnicity provided the key to the outbreak or resolution”. 553

While it is reasonable to believe that the “mere existence of ethnicity is certainly no precondition for conflicts”, 554 the assertion above demonstrates the problem of distinguishing ethnic conflicts from other kinds of conflict situations. In that context, Ryan points out that the term ethnic conflict “should not be taken to mean that the ethnic differences that separate the groups are the cause of the conflict, any more than the term inter-state conflict should be taken to imply that violence between sovereign states occurs because there are separate sovereign states”. 555 Henderson thinks that much of the confusion regarding the categorization of disputes as ethnically based or not can be avoided by use of “the more appropriate phrase, ‘inter-ethnic conflict’, rather than ‘ethnic conflict’, since the latter appears to suggest that the conflict itself derives from ethnicity instead of the actual issues of the dispute”. 556 Ethnicity is rarely the root cause of the ethnic conflict. It is often the crucial form of that conflict.

So what is an ethnic conflict? Various definitions for ethnic conflict have been put forward by experts in the field. To begin with, the word ‘conflict’ usually denotes relationships that involve a measure of overt hostility. Tishkov sees ethnic conflicts as “any forms of civic clash within or across state boundaries when at least one of the warring parties is mobilized and organized along ethnic lines or on

behalf of a certain ethnic group”\textsuperscript{557} According to Yamskov, an ethnic conflict represents “a dynamically changing socio-political situation caused by rejection of the existing status quo on a part of significant number of people representing one or more local ethnic groups”\textsuperscript{558}.

Our working definition of ethnic conflicts encompasses violent\textsuperscript{559} or non-violent disputes and tensions between two or more ethnic groups over significant political, economic, social, cultural or territorial issues. Anthony Smith defines an ethnic group as “a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of common culture, including an association with a homeland and some degree of solidarity, at least among the elites”\textsuperscript{560}. According to the assessments from chapter two, ethnic group is an interesting hybrid of putative beliefs and shared objective characteristics. Because it operates in a larger social ‘reservoir’, it has to interact with other groups, which enhances its kinship ties. Members of an ethnic group act, or participate, in shared cultural activities, which not only symbolize ethnic bondage but also sustain the putative belief. Ethnicity’s ability to “combine symbolic and instrumental purposes, and coalesce an interest with an affective tie”\textsuperscript{561} can be one of the reasons for its effective and appealing social organization.

Conflicts between ethnic groups often arise over cultural issues, scarce economic resources and political power. What makes a conflict ‘ethnic’ is the


\textsuperscript{559} For the purposes of this study, any conflicts that have resulted in the death of more than one person are considered to be violent conflicts.

\textsuperscript{560} Smith, A. (1999). \textit{Myths and Memories of the Nation}. Oxford University Press, p. 13
perception and general acceptance among the participants that they are engaged in ethnic conflict. Kolsto is correct to say that: “If the group accepts the story, then an act that originally was ethnically irrelevant is transformed into an ethnic issue. It would, in my view, not make sense not to classify a violent conflict as ethnic simply because the initial spark that ignited it was ‘unethnic’.” 562 He further adds: “The touchstone should not be any inherent quality in the act or the contested item itself but how it is perceived by the actors and the immediate surroundings”. 563

As was also discussed in chapter two, ethnicity can serve as a political resource open for manipulation to strengthen power, enhance or undermine national security, legitimize authority, or promote national unity. Ethnicity is not only a social construction of descent and culture, but is also the social mobilization of descent and culture. Ethnic mobilization pre-supposes the salience of ethnic identity. It is hard to disagree with Henderson, who argues that: “An ethnic group has to perceive the political significance of its ethnicity before it can be mobilized for political action. To analyze inter-ethnic conflict one must examine the conditions associated with the increased salience of ethnic identity”. 564

Given that institutionalized ethno-nationhood has a direct relation on inter-ethnic relations in Central Asia, the chapter will explore the benefits of

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institutional reforms at the state-structural level in order to harness and counter-balance institutionalized ethno-nationalism at the social level. It will propose considering institutional reforms within the framework of the rule of law and constitutionalism for that end, because the rule of law is intuitively and professedly more acceptable to the local population and regional governments. Central Asian leaders publicly praised the benefits of the rule of law and constitutionalism and called for its adherence. But the rule of law is not a problem-free concept, and that is why the chapter will untangle its complexity. It will also examine its links with similar political ideals, such as democracy and constitutionalism, and outline how institutional reforms within the rule of law evolved in Central Asia.
2.0 Nationalism and ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union

The topic of ethno-national dimension of the Soviet collapse has been discussed and debated at great length by scholars both inside and outside the former USSR. A staple theme of academic and journalistic discourse about post-Soviet Central Asia has been focused on the importance of ‘ethnicity’, with particular emphasis on the discussion of the Ferghana Valley region. The region is seen as a dangerous ‘powder keg’ of ethnic and territorial conflicts, which finds itself ‘in the midst of a host of crises’. Scholars of the post-communist region were compelled to ‘re-tool’ themselves, following the demise of the Soviet Union. One of the most prominent trends involved studying ethno-national politics in post-communist states, given the number of ethno-national conflicts in the region and


the problems of state-building and democratization in many new multi-ethnic states.\footnote{Kubicek, P. (2000). “Post-Communist Political Studies: Ten Years Later, Twenty Years Behind?” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 33, p. 302}

While there is no widely accepted theory of causes and results of ethnic conflict, various approaches and perspectives have been put forward to explain certain aspects of it. The discussion in chapter two addressed those that deal with how ethnic identities form and change over time. Other approaches focus on the sources of competition and conflict between ethnic groups.\footnote{Olzak, S. (1992). The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict. Stanford, Stanford University Press.} While some others are concerned with explaining why and how ethnic groups mobilize politically and enter into open conflict with other groups or governments.\footnote{Gurr, T. and B. Hariff (1994). Ethnic Conflicts in World Politics. Westview Press; Beissinger, M. (2002). Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. Cambridge University Press.}

primordialism has been mostly marginalized in the Western scholarship. However, it still resonates with some Russian and post-Soviet scholars.  

Instrumentalists assume that ethnic identity is invoked as a means to achieve material and political goals. They regard ethnicity cynically and as “a fraud perpetuated by persons with self-serving objectives to exploit mass publics in pursuit of their political or economic ambitions”. The effect of ethno-political mobilization is therefore to increase economic differences, as well as awareness of differences, between dominant groups and minorities, so that ‘political entrepreneurs’ can “capitalize on these differences to establish ethnically based political movements aimed at increasing the economic and political well-being of their group or region”.  

Modernization school of thought views ethnicity as imagined, constructed and dynamic reality. Following the chapter two analysis, ethnic groups are likely to be transitory, contingent and susceptible to manipulation. For modernizationists, ethnicity is malleable and its boundaries and content subject to change. Tishkov holds that “ethnicity is constructed and reconstructed by specific verbal and political actions that reflect contemporary conditions, including power relations among social groups, and the meanings that people give to these conditions”. Contemporary ethnic conflict has therefore no causal relation to the

so-called ‘ancient hatred’ between communities, but is linked to disputes over political, economic, cultural values and resources.\textsuperscript{579}

Drawing from the above three frameworks, academic studies of the causes of ethnic conflict develop explanations at three main levels of analysis: the systemic level, the domestic level, and the perceptual level.\textsuperscript{580} At the systemic level, the security concerns of ethnic groups as well as the nature of the security systems in which ethnic groups operate are addressed.\textsuperscript{581} Domestic level explanations focus on such factors as the effectiveness of states, the impact of ethno-nationalism on inter-ethnic relations, and the influence of democratization/transition on inter-ethnic relations. Perceptual types of explanations look at how the myths and narratives that ethnic groups have of themselves and of others influence inter-ethnic relations.

Having outlined the main perspectives on and explanations of the causes of ethnic conflict, our discussion should now move to the consideration of the eruption of nationalism and ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union.

The primordialist account, surveyed previously, explains the ethnic conflicts erupting from the fall of the Soviet Union as an echo of ancient hatreds and struggles, which were suppressed or controlled by the communist regime. Even Marxist modernist Hobsbawm claimed that the nationalist disintegration of the Soviet state was more a consequence of the collapse of the regime than a cause

of it.  

But Hroch rejects such conventional view that the turmoil is “the result of the release of irrational forces that were long suppressed - ‘deep-frozen’ as it were - under communism, and are now in full revival after a lapse of fifty years, is evidently superficial”. In their assessment of regionalism and ethnic conflict in the former Soviet Union, Hughes and Sasse contest the notion that the conflicts in the region can be primarily explained as resurgent ‘unfinished business’ from past nationalist or ethnic conflicts.

The demise of the Soviet state released conflict potential, which was dispersed mostly along ethno-national lines. While Gellner denied the possibility of a ‘third way’ for cultural pluralism between the assimilatory and the nationalizing state, a significant body of literature illustrates that deeply divided societies can be stabilized by political mechanisms and strategies of regulation. In the survey of such solutions, O’Leary identified two major instruments: first, an institutional approach that focuses on constitutional and institutional design with a preference for consociational devices, federalism, or autonomy arrangements; and second, a ‘group-differentiated rights’ approach. The analysis of Central Asian conflicts by this study will focus on the first approach, by exploring the institutional foundations of the nation-building process, which was inherited from the Soviet ethno-nationalized federal state. Such ‘institutionalized

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multinationality’ was the key contributing factor in the nationalization of politics and the ‘ethno-constitutional’ crisis during the disintegration of the USSR.\textsuperscript{587} There are many perspectives on the eruptions of ethno-political conflicts in the former Soviet Union, but Suny’s rough categorization of the dominant views on nationalism in the Soviet state into two colourful models, the ‘sleeping beauty’ and the ‘bride of Frankenstein’,\textsuperscript{588} provides a useful background to ethno-national mobilization in Central Asia. The sleeping beauty view incorporates approaches that explain growing nationalism as “eruptions of long-repressed primordial consciousesses, as expressions of denied desires liberated by the kiss of freedom”.\textsuperscript{589} This view encompasses mainly primordialist approaches that focus on the dynamics of ethnic mobilization, which originate from various social anthropological findings. Primordialists suggest that an ethnic group shares sentiments of solidarity towards that community based on a common culture and a belief in shared history and ancestry.\textsuperscript{590} It is argued that those common identities are conserved and passed on from generations to generations, and that they constitute the main building material for social groups.

The sleeping beauty approach is frequently criticized by other scholars of ethnicity and colonialism. Instrumentalists, for instance, have challenged primordialists’ assumptions of unchanging nature of culture, and instead stressed...
“the variable and context dependent nature of ethnic identity”.

It was also criticized by other influential scholars, who argued that nationalistic discourse became dominant among masses in the modern history mainly as a result of social and political developments after the French and American revolutions.

In the Central Asian context, the sleeping beauty view does not appear convincing. The identities that had long bonded the peoples of Central Asia were different from ethno-nationalistic feelings that sprang in the last decades of the Soviet Union. Before the Soviet Union, Central Asian peoples had sub-national or supra-national identities. At the supra-national level people identified themselves with shared, though weak, Muslim and Turkic cultures. At the sub-national level people had local, tribal and family identities that were strong but counteractive for national unification.

In contrast, the ‘bride of Frankenstein’ view incorporates approaches that perceive ethnic conflict as confrontation between ‘created’ and ‘imagined’ communities. This approach offers a distinct advantage of historicizing the problem of nation-formation and providing a comparative perspective on the histories of the Soviet peoples. According to it, Soviet policies not only constructed national ethnicities in Central Asia in line with the Leninist principles on the nationality question, but at the same time they managed and suppressed the same national sentiments, if they grew stronger and dangerous for the Soviet state. When relative freedom was briefly experienced in Central Asia during glasnost’, nationalism played a crucial role in the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the

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establishment of new nations along the earlier Soviet lines. Suny explained that in the absence of “powerful constituencies favouring Western-style capitalist democracy, a furious search for an ‘authentic’ national identity and politics occupied both state officials and the cultural intelligentsia”.

And the social mobilization intensified inter-ethnic competition for limited social resources, while urbanization and education led to “heightened national self-consciousness and increasing national separatism among the more socially mobilized members of each national community”.

The bride of Frankenstein model is made up of modernization/communication and statist branches. Communication theorists draw parallels from European social experience and stress the importance of modernization. Modernists are said to emphasize “the metamorphosis of society into a new form – the industrial society, with its concomitant processes of political and economic centralisation, standardisation of education, and the effects of mass literacy and the mass media.” In other words, it is argued that during this very process of modernization, supported by growing communication and enlightenment, nations are concomitantly developed.

Modernization approach lacks one crucial aspect in explaining the invented nature of nations, state intervention. Changes in the society involving increased communication and population mobilization rarely happen without the intervention of centralized state. It is a state that is legitimized in order to secure

national homogeneity by superimposing a ‘high culture’, This is Gellner’s label for the superimposing of a uniform language, standardized education and national symbols, over the local ‘low cultures’. Benedict Anderson’s ‘official nationalism’ fits neatly with the description of statist approach, where cultural homogeneity is imposed top-down by state actions.\textsuperscript{597} It should be noted, however, that supporters of statist approach acknowledge the essential role of the concepts of modernization and industrialization in the formation of nationhood.

The statist, or more specifically instutionalist, approach seems to explain more adequately the institutional formation of imagined communities in Central Asia by the Soviet state. The Soviet central government undertook to establish a local high culture for Central Asia peoples and simultaneously attempted to superimpose an even higher Soviet culture over the former. As a result of the contradictory experiment, the ‘bride of Frankenstein’ was created, which, many claim, eventually turned against its ‘creator’.

3.0 Ethnic conflicts in Central Asia

The re-organization of political space in Central Asia after perestroika had dramatic consequences. Millions of people became residents and citizens of new states, conceived as belonging to an ethnic nationality other than their own. In the whole territory of the former Soviet Union, some 25 million ethnic Russians were transformed from privileged national group, culturally and politically at home throughout the USSR, into minorities of insecure status, disputed membership, and uncertain identity in a host of non-Russian nation-states.

Focusing on the way in which the legacy of the dual Soviet institutional nationality has shaped the national question in the emerging successor states, Brubaker points to the crucial triadic nexus between incipient nation-state, national minority, and external national homeland replicating throughout post-Soviet Eurasia. The incipient nation-state is conditioned by ‘nationalizing nationalism’ that involves claims made in the name of titular nationality, which is in sharp distinction to the demands and expectations of the citizenry as a whole. The titular nationality sees itself as the legitimate ‘owner’ of the state, which is perceived as the state of and for that nationality. Due to the perception of its weakened culture, economy and demography, the state’s nationalizing policies are

often directed at promoting the language, cultural revival, economic welfare and political hegemony of the titular nation.

Nationalizing nationalism was omnipresent in Central Asia in the late Soviet period and after independence. Nationalizing policies were apparent in the privileged status attributed to the indigenous languages, the newly revised and re-formulated histories and the exclusion of representatives of non-titular groups from power. According to Smith et al, “Titular elites in Central Asia have engaged in nation-building not only as a response to pressure exerted ‘from below’ by the indigenous intelligentsias, but also as a means of fortifying the integrity of the titular nations themselves, which has been undermined to a certain extent by sub-ethnic ties and loyalties”.

The issue of state language was the first to become politicized in the region. Under the pressure from nationalists and in attempt to capture popular mood, the Central Asian republics designated the languages of the titular nationality as the state language in the newly-adopted constitutions. That act signalled to the majority and minority groups that the status of the core nationality is higher than that of other non-titular groups. Nationalizing states in the region also strived to discover, formulate and exploit ethno-symbolic resources at their disposal. As was proposed by ethno-symbolist scholars, discussed in chapter two, those resources are essential for the creation of a unified and distinct nation with a shared history and destiny.

In Kyrgyzstan, knowledge of Kyrgyz language became mandatory for presidential candidates and essential for government officials. Foreign Minister
Roza Otunbaeva ordered diplomatic negotiations to be translated into Kyrgyz, while Justice Minister Marat Kayipov proposed that the cabinet meetings are conducted in Kyrgyz rather than Russian.\textsuperscript{601} Due to the more democratic nature of politics in Kyrgyzstan and its heterogeneous demographic composition, nationalism played a key role in state-building and an ethno-national element was in every major sphere of state activity, from the adoption of the constitution and the formulation of foreign policy to the production of new national currency.\textsuperscript{602} The change in the official name of the country, from ‘Republic of Kyrgyzstan’ to ‘Kyrgyz Republic’ in 1990 echoed the popular nationalistic slogans like ‘Kyrgyzstan for Kyrgyz’.

Nationalizing Kyrgyz state chose the image of Manas, hero of the Kyrgyz epic poem, to revive and promote Kyrgyz culture. Manas served two concomitant purposes, denoting a popular symbol of Kyrgyz culture and representing Kyrgyz nationhood. At the same time, another aspect of history was revised and politicized. The Basmachi movements of the 1920s, who fought against the Bolshevik regime and who were detested by the Soviet regime, were rehabilitated and glorified as heroes of liberation movement.\textsuperscript{603}

Uzbek government also played a key role in implementation of language policies. The Council of Ministers appointed a supervising commission, assisted by a terminological committee and advised by the linguistics section of the Uzbek

Academy of Sciences. As a result of that policy, official organizations increasingly conduct their correspondence and clerical work in Uzbek, rather than in Russian. State-run institutions insisted that fluency in the state language was required for employment to lucrative posts and promotions. Much attention was paid to the promotion of Uzbek teaching. A special committee was set up to implement the teaching for adults, and a new law determining obligatory examinations in Uzbek was passed. In terms of the replacement of Russian and Soviet toponymes (place names) by indigenous ones, Uzbekistan has been the most vigorous, trying to eliminate non-titular languages and signifiers from public view to the extent possible. A great number of regions, cities, streets and squares have been renamed in order to recover the past and to graphically symbolize a change in the ownership of the land.

With a view to harmonizing national history and imparting a sense of common glorious past, Uzbek President led national campaign to project the medieval ruler Amir Temur (Tamerlane) as the founding father of the Uzbek nation. Amir Temur became Uzbekistan’s primary national and political icon, in glorification of which eleven monuments were erected in the country, an expensive museum dedicated to the Temurid dynasty was built in the capital and the year 1996 witnessed the commemoration of the 650th anniversary of Tamerlane’s birth.

The nationalizing policies of indigenization and positive discrimination in the post-Soviet period seemed to be a ‘remake’ of the Soviet ‘affirmative action’

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during korenizatsiia, which was thoroughly reviewed by chapter four. As was discussed, korenizatsiia aimed to increase political representation of the indigenous nations, which strengthened networks of patronage by well-placed titular nationals in Central Asia. The new nationalizing policies accelerated the process of concentration of power in the hands of titular elites, as most important positions in government, administration and business shifted to members of the titular nationality.

National minorities that reside within nationalizing states have their own nationalism. They designate their own political stance in specifically national terms, such as “a demand for state recognition of their distinct ethno-cultural nationality, and the assertion of certain collective, nationality-based cultural or political rights.”\(^\text{606}\) That quality of a national minority is a subjective result of its self-perception, which was channelled and shaped by the national structure of social classification, institutionalized by the Soviet Union. Due to the Soviet legacy, national minorities in Central Asia have grown to think of themselves as members of distinct nationalities, because the Soviet regime was key to the institutionalization of that self-ascription.

The elites of minority groups tend to represent their minority constituents as belonging to a nation different from the titular national group. According to Brubaker’s assessment, the self-definition of minorities as members of distinct nations and their consequent claims for public rights in that capacity reinforce ethno-nationalistic perceptions and practices of dominant elites.\(^\text{607}\) It can also


strengthen the tendency of the dominant majority to define their own nationhood in ethno-nationalistic, rather than civic-territorial terms and to rule their nation-state accordingly. That can also apply to the cases when national elites formally define their statehood and citizenship in liberal terms. The reason being is that in an ethnically heterogeneous state with institutionalized and distinct ethno-cultural nationalities, liberal and ethnically neutral definitions of statehood and citizenship may mask a substantively ethno-centric organization of public life.  \(^{608}\)

Kyrgyz government claimed to follow such nationalizing policies that would aim to revive the Kyrgyz culture, while taking into account the interests of all ethno-national groups. The official line held that the Kyrgyz nationality policies were shaped by the desire to ensure ethnic harmony and peace in Kyrgyzstan on the one hand, and by the need to respond to nationalistic demands, on the other. In a number of cases, Akaev prevented enactment of laws by the parliament that would hurt the interests of national minorities. In 1991, he vetoed the law sponsored by nationalist party Asaba and adopted by the Parliament, which would ensure that the land and natural resources in Kyrgyzstan become the property of the Kyrgyz. \(^{609}\) That measure was welcomed by national minorities, who saw private ownership of land crucial to their rural livelihoods. Kyrgyz government tried to appeal to national minorities by officially endorsing the policy of ‘Kyrgyzstan - our common home’.

In February 1996, Kyrgyzstan became the first and only Central Asian state to eliminate the infamous ‘fifth column’ in the Kyrgyz passports, which denoted a


passport-holder’s ethnic nationality and manifested the Soviet legacy of social classification according to institutionalized nationality. It was replaced with a ‘citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic’. However, the decision caused a backlash of protests from nationalist Kyrgyz, and the ‘fifth column’ was reinstated by an edict of Prime Minister Jumagulov.\textsuperscript{610} Akaev was also crucial in according Russian the status of ‘official language’, while retaining Kyrgyz as ‘state language’ in the 2003 constitution. The move was seen as a compromise that granted Kyrgyz superior status, while allowing Russian to be widely used in public life.\textsuperscript{611}

Given the government support for civil society organizations, there were around one thousand social organizations in 1997, including fifteen political movements/parties and more than twenty ethno-national organizations.\textsuperscript{612} In 1994, Akaev established the Assembly of Peoples of Kyrgyzstan to give voice to minority groups in the country. Since political parties based on ethno-nationality were banned in the country, the participation of national centres and organizations in the activities of Kyrgyzstan Assembly of Peoples was crucial in channelling their perspective and guiding the government on nationality issues. Gradually though, the Assembly lost its credibility and became a tool to promote government’s political agenda.

The measures directed at allaying concerns of other nationalities in the country did not necessarily brought rapid improvement in inter-ethnic relations or living conditions of minorities. Uzbek national minority, constituting around 16


per cent of the total population in Kyrgyzstan, traditionally backed Akaev’s government for the ability to prevent repetition of inter-ethnic violence and the accommodative discourse towards ethno-national minorities. They also appreciated cultural freedoms provided by the policy of ‘our common home’, government’s support for land ownership by minorities and more tolerant treatment of ethno-national minorities, compared to that in neighbouring states.613

Notwithstanding that appreciation, Uzbek groups continuously expressed their concerns to the government, demanding that Uzbek is accorded ‘official language’ status and complaining that Uzbeks lack political representation and face discrimination in the country. They were disconcerted that the amendment to 2003 constitution resulted in the disappearance of the clause enabling the free use of minority languages. Uzbek leaders wanted to change that omission, so that the community regained a right to use their language in formal circumstances.614 After the Tulip revolution, Uzbek protesters in Jalalabad voiced their discontent with the slow progress in implementing reforms by the administration of Bakiev and urged the government to allocate a quota of government posts to Uzbek community proportionate to their numbers.615

The demands of ethno-national minorities for collective public rights, language privileges or territorial autonomy, which have roots in the institutional legacy of the Soviet nationality policy, directly challenged the claims of the republic’s titular elites to unitary ownership of their national polities and

614 “Divisions Loom Over Ethnic Minority Languages.” Institute for War & Peace Reporting (February 12: 2007)
territories. The Kyrgyz nationalist elites perceive the political demands by national minorities as threatening and as fundamentally illegitimate. For example, in reaction to Russian becoming official language of Kyrgyzstan, several nationalist parties (Asaba, Uluu Birimdik, Ashar) joined in establishing a campaign for “protecting the state language from the expansion of Russian”.

The head of Uluu Birimdik blamed Russian expansion for the lack of progress in promoting the Kyrgyz language. He stated that: “But the fact that Russian has been made an official language reduces the sphere where the state language is used; it allows people to say they write and speak the official language, which prevents the state language from ever establishing itself”.

Furthermore, minorities’ political or cultural demands make them more vulnerable to charges of outright disloyalty by the nationalist majority. Although they are formally part of the citizenry of the national state, they may be excluded substantively from the actual membership of the nation-state. Attempts by minorities to seek greater rights often provoke angry reactions from Kyrgyz representatives. Former Kyrgyz parliamentarian, Kuvanychbek Idinov alluded to the possibility of voluntary migration for those minorities and proposed that “If people are dissatisfied with their life here, they can always move to another country. No one will stop them”.

Even within the community, there is a palpable sense that political protests by their co-ethnics run a risk of inciting inter-ethnic strife. Crisis Groups reports

that the memories of the Osh conflict “are still fresh in both Uzbek and Kyrgyz minds, and shape today’s Uzbek attitudes”. The anxiety of a repeated ethnic conflict has been a major factor in the reluctance to over-stress ethnic issues and divisions. Some Uzbek politicians constantly recall the Osh bloodshed in attempt to warn people off from public protests. Davron Sabirov, who represents Uzbek Osh community in the Kyrgyz parliament, reminded parliamentarians of the sensitivities involved in inter-ethnic relations and suggested that holding a demonstration was the wrong way of achieving things.

Various political actors have tried to attract Uzbek groups to their strategic alliances. At every election before 2005, the Uzbek vote was a key southern constituency for President Akaev. The Uzbek community in the south served as a crucial ally for the north in its struggle with the formerly dominant southern elite. Portraying itself as an inclusive and tolerant regime, the Akaev administration projected its opponents as narrow-minded Kyrgyz nationalists. Indeed, Uzbeks had concerns about prospects of a new regime being more nationalistic than the Akaev’s one, and many perceived Akaev as the best of bad options.

Naturally, opposition politicians have denied accusations by the government that they held views against minorities. Deputy Head of People’s

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Movement of Kyrgyzstan, Ishengul Boldjurova, said that: “Minorities support Akaev because they are used to him, and because twelve years of spin have had an effect”.

While Emil Aliev, Deputy Head of Arnamys Party accused the authorities of bribing ethnic groups to secure their votes by noting that: “In some regions which consist of large number of minorities, their votes may decide the outcome of the election. So the authorities use various techniques to get votes – such as promising to provide ethnic groups with newspapers in their own language. We do not have this opportunity”.

During mobilizations for the Tulip Revolution in 2005, opposition politicians managed to win over significant section of the Uzbek community by refusing allegations that they hid intentions to expel Uzbeks and insisting on the policy of Kyrgyzstan remaining their common homeland. Once the political protests expanded, prominent Osh journalist Saipov reported that: “Many Uzbeks have realized that the Akaev era is over, and that they might find better opportunities in the new world. They are placing great hopes in the new regime, including the creating of new workplaces, fair employment policies and an end to corruption…” and he added that: “Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the south are united by common problems – unemployment, corruption, and a shortage of water, land and food”.

Now the popularity pendulum was gradually swinging to Bakiev’s favour, as the Uzbek community looked for change. One Uzbek leader in

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Jalalabad commented: “Bakiev is the lesser of two evils; he has a Russian upbringing and is tolerant on inter-ethnic relations”\textsuperscript{627}

After the Tulip revolution, the new regime appointed an Uzbek, Anvar Artykov, as a governor of the Osh region. It was a symbolic gesture to boost confidence amongst southern Uzbeks and to reward Artykov for his leading role in organizing protests prior to the March revolution in southern Kyrgyzstan. President Bakiev dismissed Artykov later that year and replaced him with a Kyrgyz to boost alliance with the Kyrgyz elite in the south. After the regime change, the Bakiev administration was also accused by the Uzbek representatives, such as parliamentarian Kadyrjan Batyrov, for ignoring concerns of national minorities and using the Assembly of Peoples of Kyrgyzstan as a propaganda tool.\textsuperscript{628}

In Uzbekistan, while nationalizing nationalism has created a sense of grievance and discomfort amongst the country’s national minorities, it has not provided sufficient ground for political reaction from national minorities. As was mentioned before, for national minorities to succeed in political mobilization, their activists and leaders depend on material resources and political opportunity structure. Given Uzbekistan’s authoritarian form of governance and the prevailing repressive politics, the capacity of national minorities to organize collective action has been severely restricted. Some Kyrgyz nationalists have voiced their support for that kind of uncompromising stance in Kyrgyzstan as well. In the words of Asaba party head Nusupov: “Uzbekistan and the Baltic states put considerable


pressure on Russian and do not indulge it the way we do here”. Other reasons for the low level of political activity among national minorities in Uzbekistan may include “a dearth of leadership skills, organizational structures and experience in forming social movements”.

The third form of nationalism that emerged in the aftermath of the re-organization of political space along national lines in the former Soviet Union is ‘transborder nationalism’ or ‘external national homeland’. According to Brubaker, transborder nationalism assert state’s right and obligation to monitor the condition, promote the welfare, support the activities and institutions, and protect the interests of ‘their’ ethno-national kin in other states. Due to its centrifugal nature, external national homeland poses a direct challenge to nationalizing nationalism.

In the first decade of post-independence, transborder nationalism has been non-significant in Central Asia. Pointing to the disengagement by Russia in its co-ethnics abroad, Beissinger notes that “the Russian national homeland, consumed with its own weighty problems and interested in the advantages of stability, never played its expected, catalyzing role”.

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Kazakhstan was the only Central Asian state that partially embraced transborder nationalism, mainly in the form of repatriation, which was explained by the centrality of the demographic concerns to the Kazakh nationalizing state. Cummings’s research shows that an active diaspora policy was considered essential to reverse the ethno-national imbalance that was initially favouring the Russian group.\(^{634}\) As a result of the extensive repatriation, the ethno-national balance reversed and the Kazakhs became the national majority in the country.\(^{635}\)

In Kyrgyzstan, the government had no policy of external national homeland, but it tried to gather Kyrgyz co-ethnics from all parts of the world through the organization of the World Congress of the Kyrgyz. The first Congress took place in 1992. The second World Congress was held in 2003 and brought three hundred Kyrgyz diaspora from more than twenty countries. During the Congress there were official celebrations of the purported 2,200 years of Kyrgyz statehood and Kyrgyzstan’s twelve years of independence, as well as the honouring of the Kyrgyz victims of tsarist repression in 1916.\(^{636}\) The event was controversial because President Askar Akaev promised help to diaspora in the field of education, opening Kyrgyz-language schools in areas with Kyrgyz populations, and designating quotas of places in higher-educational institutions for ethnic Kyrgyz from abroad.\(^{637}\) The frequent references to ‘ancient statehood’ and ‘Manas legacy’ by the Kyrgyz President gave the event a more nationally-charged


\(^{636}\) *World Congress Of Kyrgyz Opens In Bishkek*. (September 28: 2003). *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst*

\(^{637}\) *Kyrgyz President Lays Out Country's Major Goals*. (September 3: 2002), *RFE/RL Newsline*
character. The Kyrgyz journalist Saipjanov warned that the celebration of the 
2,200th anniversary of Kyrgyz statehood could stir up tensions between the Kyrgyz 
majority and the country’s other ethnic groups, particularly the Uzbeks. In 2001, 
Akaev signed a decree with a view to simplifying citizenship and residence 
procedures for the repatriation of ethnic Kyrgyz to their historical homeland. 

In the analysis of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy towards Uzbeks abroad, 
Fumagalli correctly points to the absence of support by the kin state to its co-
ethnics across borders and puts forward three main factors to explain that. First, 
security concerns perceived as originating from across the borders compelled 
Uzbek leadership to prioritize consolidation of the state over strengthening ties 
with co-ethnics. Second, Uzbek government preferred bilateral inter-state 
relationship with Kyrgyzstan to exchanges with the Uzbek cultural organizations 
in Kyrgyzstan. And thirdly, Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan have enjoyed a limited degree 
of pluralism and more open political climate, which has made their initial interest 
in annexation with Uzbekistan unattractive.

Another important factor for Uzbekistan’s limited interest in promoting 
relation with co-ethnics abroad can be explained by the government’s worry of the 
reciprocation of transborder nationalism from other nations and concern of 
provoking nationalist demands from its own national minorities. However, 
Uzbekistan disinterest in its co-ethnics abroad does not nullify Kyrgyz fears of 
cultural encroachment by its bigger neighbour. That concern was witnessed in the 
thorny issue of broadcasting in Uzbek in the south of Kyrgyzstan, when the 
authorities in Kyrgyzstan were locked in a conflict with two broadcasters, Osh TV

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638 Kyrgyz President Lays Out Country's Major Goals, (September 3: 2002), RFE/RL Newsline
and Mezon TV, over the excess of their airtime in Uzbek beyond the permitted fifty per cent.\textsuperscript{640}

\subsection{3.1 Inter-Ethnic Riots}

In the \textit{End of the Soviet Empire}, d’Encausse provides an account of how nationalist forces destroyed the ‘Red Empire’ and points out that the first serious threat to the reforms introduced by Gorbachev were the December 1986 riots by Kazakhs in Alma-Ata, which she views as the most noteworthy mass demonstration since 1927.\textsuperscript{641} As will be shown later in this section, after Alma-Ata riots, Central Asia witnessed more than a dozen of incidents of violence linked to ethno-nationalism (see Table 2). Those tragic events represent inter-ethnic conflicts, and more specifically, riot-type ethnic conflicts. Inter-ethnic riots are generally localized, explosive, short-lived and extremely brutal. They often stem from accumulated anger against governments for neglecting certain grievances or for persistent discriminatory treatment and disrespect.\textsuperscript{642}

In the insightful study of ethnic riots,\textsuperscript{643} Horowitz notes that accumulated suspicion, anger and rumours of atrocities contribute to the explosive and deadly outbreak of violence during riots, which have long-term repercussions on inter-

\textsuperscript{642} Esman, M. (2004). \textit{An Introduction to Ethnic Conflict}, Cambridge, Polity, p. 70

The common determinant of conflicts in Central Asia was that they encompassed violent and non-violent disputes between two or more ethnic groups over significant political, economic, social, cultural or territorial issues. Most of the inter-ethnic riots in the region took place between two or more ethno-national groups in the typical ‘us’ against ‘them’ framework of ethnic conflict. Our discussion of the subjective application of ethnicity in chapter two noted its key element in terms of a subjective symbolic or emblematic use of any aspect of culture to differentiate one group from other groups. Awareness of ‘the other’ and the subjective salience of that difference contribute to mobilization around conscious difference.

Ethnic disputes in Central Asia were unfolding in the context of increasing political agitation due to perestroika, worsening economic situation and weakening state structures. Reznichenko describes the political environment of the time in the following way: “Once the political thaw set in, the nationalist tensions, which existed and were artificially hidden away for decades, rose up from the fragments of the totalitarian ice in their dramatic form”.\footnote{The Division of the Undividable: What Is Left? (July 12: 1990), Leninskiy Put’, p. 3} The effect of the perestroika era policies on the fine balance between ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan was profound. According to Melvin:
The rise of Kyrgyz and Uzbek nationalist sentiments brought about by the rise in nationalist politics throughout the USSR and the declarations of sovereignty in the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan greatly exacerbated tensions in the south. Fears among the southern Uzbeks that the Kyrgyz would have increased power within a sovereign Kyrgyz Republic formed an important part of the background to ethnic rioting in 1990 between the two groups in Noviy Uzgen and Osh.  

Ethnic tensions tend to mount during the times of transition, which is because “when it looks as though the shape of the polity is being settled once and for all, apprehensions are likely to grow”. In the analysis of ethnic conflicts in democratizing countries, Prazauskas argued that ethnic conflicts emerge when instances of inequality are perceived by ethnic elites as directly infringing on the rights and interests of entire community, and he outlined the most important of those: “the threatened or actual loss of groups status, the danger of assimilation, the loss of cultural integrity, the curtailment of the functions and sphere of utilization of the native language, the erosion of the ethnic territorial base due to an influx of migrants, and the lack of real self-government”. Those factors were also present in the Central Asian region and will be later discussed in more detail.  

In an interview with Berliner Zeitung, Uzbek President Karimov stressed the effect of the Soviet nationality policy on inter-ethnic tensions and noted that: “The background of the events in Ferghana also includes the decades of national suppression of the Central Asian peoples... In May 1989, the long-overdue explosion was then directed against the ‘foreign’ Meskhetian Turks, who had been

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deported to this region decades ago". The Secretary of TsK KPSS Girienko suggested that tensions in the inter-ethnic relations in Osh were unfolding before the events and were partly due to the attempts of the Kyrgyz titular nation to obtain privileged position in terms of culture and language, which were perceived by the Russian and Uzbek community as an infringement of their rights. In fact, the legacy of the Soviet institutionalized ethno-nationalism created conditions that fostered violence. As Beissinger’s observes: “By creating a hierarchy of groups in which smaller ethno-territorial units were embedded inside larger ones, by consolidating ethnicities around those units, and by encouraging limited access to the state by ethnic groups, Soviet ethno-federalism inadvertently created the conditions for the explosion of violence that accompanied its break-up”.

The economic weakening of the central government not only signalled its vulnerability to ethno-nationalist demands but also stimulated them through turning the relationship with Moscow less economically attractive and burdening peripheral populations, which further added to their grievances. Distribution of collective goods of the state along ethno-national lines and the perceived discrimination was an important reason for protest and contestation. Conflicts between ethnic groups arise over cultural issues, scarce economic resources and political power. Demands of a socio-economical or political nature, which may be pertinent to the larger population, become skewed towards the interests of ethnic groups in the competitive environment, thus creating tension between groups.

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649 In Uzbekistan an Islamic State Will Not Be Possible, (March 5:1991). Berliner Zeitung, p. 3
Competition for state resources becomes a matter concerning not just individuals and societies of shared interests but rather entire ethnic groups. As the series of events in Central Asia showed, even what starts as an innocent quarrel over fruits in a bazaar in Ferghana or youth brawl in a bar in Jalalabad can transform to an ethnically-based dispute on a larger scale. That may have been why some political observers in the region asserted that even the economic catastrophe and the crisis of ideology in the USSR were not as threatening as the deteriorating inter-ethnic strife.\(^{653}\)

When interviewed by Schmodt-Haeuer of *Die Zeit* on the causes of nationalist clashes between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks in 1989, Islam Karimov offered the following insight:

> [T]hey were the consequences of many unsolved socio-economic problems that accumulated over decades. In addition, there is the historical injustice that was done to entire peoples under Stalin, among them the Meskhetian Turks… For decades they lived side by side with Uzbeks and other peoples in our country. Then perestroika was initiated in the country… The leaders of the Meskhetian Turks, who live in the north Caucasus not only organized demonstrations, but also made their compatriots intolerant of the local population and thus triggered off an avalanche.\(^{654}\)

Prominent Kyrgyz writer, Chingiz Aitmatov, in numerous interviews referred to extreme poverty, unemployment and housing shortages as key reasons for the inter-ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan, and blamed the tragic events on extremist nationalist forces, which “have stirred up these passions and that we are now seeing is an extreme nationalism”.\(^{655}\)

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\(^{655}\) *Poverty Blamed for Disorder*. (June 11:1990). Regional Affairs *FBIS-SOV-90-113*, p. 118
Osh Communist Committee, unresolved socio-economic problems resulted in the Osh mass riots that severed the “centuries-old friendship between peoples”.

There were official warnings about the danger of political and socio-economic issues taking ethno-national forms. For example, the declaration by Soviet of Nationalities on the land use disputes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan stated that “the absence of settlement of land use disputes in the border-zone Batkenskii District and Vorukh and Oktiabrskii in Isfarinskii District sometimes leads to direct clashes. A most acute conflict situation that required the introduction of a state of emergency developed here in July 1989”, and it further resolved “To appeal to the presidents of the republic of Kyrgyzstan and the Tajik SSR to return to constructive dialogue, urgently consider the disputed land use questions, and enact mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of Article 78 of the USSR Constitution, with the aim of removing the tension in relations between the Kyrgyz and Tajik populations in the border-zone raions”.

The Osh Office of the Kyrgyz KGB was aware of the increased inter-ethnic tensions in the region after the Ferghana riots in 1989.

Apart from the common context of the volatile political situation and socio-economic crisis, the regional conflicts were conditioned by incapacity of the local state structures to respond to increasing tensions. Pravda correspondent Razgulieaev noted that the Kyrgyz authorities’ yielding to the unsanctioned acquisition of land by the Bishkek protesters in May 1989 served as an open invitation for other Kyrgyz groups to grab land for housing at the expense of other

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groups and at a risk of escalating inter-ethnic relations.\textsuperscript{659} He writes: “In the following year [1990], conflict erupted in two spots at once, in Frunze and in Osh. They [authorities] yielded again, and again at the cost to the interests of other groups. However, this time the obvious injustice sparked a bloody flame”.\textsuperscript{660} When the authority within the Soviet regime shifted, Beissinger notes that “competition over defining the physical, human, and cultural boundaries of the state intensified, and the signals sent by local authority frequently gave the impression of support for the aims of those contesting the nation”.\textsuperscript{661}

It is interesting to mention how the events were perceived by the leading figures, observers and experts in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The perception and general acceptance among the participants that they are engaged in ethnic conflict is useful in determining if the conflict is inter-ethnic. In that regard, Kolsto’s observation is rather fitting: “The touchstone should not be any inherent quality in the act or the contested item itself but how it is \textit{perceived} by the actors and the immediate surroundings”.\textsuperscript{662}

In an interview with Sovetskaia Kirgizia, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Kulov pointed to the importance of the rising inter-ethnic tensions in the region by saying that “I also consider the overall complex situation in the country to be a factor. The events in Transcaucasus, and now also the pogroms in Dushanbe, have been received with alarm by millions of people and have given

\textsuperscript{659} \textit{In the State of Emergency.} (June 21: 1990). \textit{Leninskiy Put’}, p. 3
\textsuperscript{660} \textit{In the State of Emergency.} (June 21: 1990). \textit{Leninskiy Put’}, p. 3
rise to uncertainty and concern”.

At the meeting with journalists after the mass unrest in Parkent on 3 March 1990, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party Khamidov noted the similarities between the events in Parkent and Buka and inter-ethnic riots in Ferghana.

During the Osh riots, the Central Committee of KPK, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers of KSSR made a joint appeal to two ethno-national groups, ‘Kyrgyz and Uzbeks – blood brothers in language, culture and religion’, asking them to “display restraint, good sense, and humanity” and “Extend a hand to one another. Restore peace to your common home”.

The first act of the newly-elected President Akaev was to acknowledge the ethnic issue as a major concern. He said at a meeting with representatives of national and cultural associations that there was no way of resolving the socio-economic crisis in Kyrgyzstan without settling the ethnic conflicts and reaching national accord.

It is notable that the Office of Public Procurator of the USSR set up a special investigation team focusing on crimes committed during the Osh ethnic riots. When queried on the purpose of setting up the special investigation team on the federal level rather than locally or nationally, the head of the investigation team Frolov replied: “The group was created taking into account the fact that the conflict in the oblast was inter-ethnic in nature, which reflects on the functioning

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666 Kirghiz President Reiterates Union Membership, (February 15:1991). Regional Affairs FBIS-SOV-91-036, p. 107
of local law-enforcing organs. The scale of committed atrocities demanded the involvement of significant forces to investigate them.  

The participants in riots and protests often saw their participation in terms of securing the interests of their groups in opposition to those of other groups. The rumours about flats and plots of land allocation to refugees from Azerbaijan prompted the unsanctioned January meetings in the capital of Kyrgyzstan in 1990. The participants in the meeting warned that a mass relocation of refugee families would exacerbate the housing problem in Bishkek. Similarly, during the riots in Bukinskiy rayon in Tashkent oblast, more than one thousand young Uzbeks demanded the immediate eviction of Meskhetian Turks living in the Karabak settlement.

The policy of openness and restructuring in the Central Asian context took an anti-Central Asian overtone in the beginning of perestroika in 1986. The Soviet leadership was disappointed with the volatile situation there and with the regional political elites. Moscow was concerned with inability of the regional leadership in Central Asia to fight effectively against growing nationalism. In the final years of the Soviet Union, inter-ethnic strife in Central Asia brought the region to the notice of the outside world. This was not characteristic of the region because Central Asia had previously enjoyed peaceful inter-ethnic relations. The rising inter-ethnic tensions were in contradiction to the claims of the Soviet authorities that the nationality question in the USSR was resolved once and for all.

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The events in Alma-Ata in 17 and 18 December 1986 had significant repercussions and were arguably a starting date for the glasnost’ mobilization cycle. Even though the riots did not constitute an ethnic violence, they represented the first unauthorized political manifestations in the region, arguably unleashing the consequent waves of unrest in Central Asia. During the events, up to ten thousand participants took to the streets in response to the removal of the Communist Party leader of Kazakhstan, Dinmukhamed Kunaev, and the appointment of a Russian in his place. Alma-Ata protests were spontaneously organized by a group of students from the Kazakh State University but lacked proper movement organization.

Image 1. Alma-Ata riots in December 1986

Thousands were arrested and hundreds were sentenced to prison, fined, or fired from work. About 3,000 students were expelled from universities and other educational institutions. Extensive repressions accompanied and followed the riots, which could explain why there was no repetition of protest mobilization till June 1989, when local Kazakhs in Novyi Uzen carried out pogroms against local Meskhetian Turks. According to Beissinger, the Alma-Ata events did not evoke any iterative attempts to challenge the Soviet state and that there was no evidence that “the student organizers of these protests were inspired to take to the streets by liberalizing change within Soviet institutions, but rather by outrage in response to a contemptible personnel decision by Moscow. They pressed reactive rather than proactive demands”.  

From late 1987, attempts by the central leadership to introduce ethnic Russians into the political elite circles and administrative apparatus of the Central Asian republics were curtailed and later practically abandoned. For instance, in July 1989 Gennady Kolbin, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party (KPQ), was recalled from Kazakhstan because his name had notoriously been linked to the Alma-Ata events of December 1986.

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Central Asian public opinion was acutely against what it considered as colonialist policy of the centre. As vertical social structures with widespread patronage and clientage were characteristic of Central Asian society, economic and other benefits were distributed not only in accordance with a person's general standing in the society, but also depending on his position in these vertical structures. If the power of a patron diminishes in the system, his clients also find themselves in a disadvantaged position.

The growing discontent with existing conditions affected all strata in Central Asian societies by 1988. This was the context in which general discontent was channelled through nationalistic streams. National groups and movements
began to emerge in the Central Asian republics, where intelligentsia and educated urban groups articulated political goals and actions. Of all these nationalist movements, the largest was the Movement for Preserving the Natural, Material and Spiritual Wealth in Uzbekistan, aka ‘Birlik’ (Unity). Birlik was formed in November 1988 by eighteen Uzbek intellectuals. As any other anti-colonial nationalist movement, its original demands included the end of cultural imperialism and colonial exploitation in Uzbekistan. It also called for the sovereignty of the Uzbek SSR.

However, one needs to bear in mind that the formation of mass national movements in Central Asia took place under more difficult conditions than those in other regions of the Soviet Union. The national intelligentsia in the region was rather a new phenomenon, and even though its members demonstrated anti-colonial feelings they were a generation created by the Soviet regime. Khazanov makes an astute observation that the national intelligentsia in Central Asia lacked a clear vision of the political future for their republics.\textsuperscript{675} Therefore, the Central Asian intelligentsia tended to incline towards ethno-nationalism because they regarded the dominance of their own ethnic group in the titular republic as the best safeguard of their own positions in the society. Moreover, the national intelligentsia was not as numerous in Central Asia as those in other parts of the Soviet Union. They also featured ties to some extent to the old political elite and official power structure. This was evident by the fact that most of members of nationalist movements were involved in culture, education, and other humanitarian professions, which were always under the strict control of KPSS.
It is not surprising therefore that during perestroika most of the leaders of
the opposition nationalist movements and groups in Central Asia were moderate
in their political demands, avoided anti-Communist slogans, and showed
willingness to collaborate with local authorities. The common criticism that was
made by them referred more often to personalities of the criticized subject than at
the Soviet institutions. Thus, participants of a protest rally booed the leader of the
opposition ‘Erk’ (will) party, Muhammad Salih, when he took a moderate position
toward the unpopular government while trying to ease the atmosphere during the
rally at the university campus in Tashkent on 17 January 1992, a day after a
student demonstration had been brutally dispersed by police.\textsuperscript{576} It is notable that
even influential and highly respected figures of the Central Asian cultural elite
such as the Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aitmatov and the Kazakh poet Olzhas
Suleimenov preferred to maintain good relations with the government and never
openly sided with the opposition.

However, some social movements such as the Committee in Defence of
the Aral Sea stridently opposed environmental mismanagement of the
government. But public dissatisfaction with the state of affairs propelled the social
movements to openly challenge government authorities. The party and the
government fought back by narrowing the range of permitted discussion and
debate. Birlik was thus criticized by the Uzbek Communist Party and the
government for being manipulated by “those who would divide the country and

stir up ethnic antagonisms”.\textsuperscript{677} One government-sponsored social organization attacked the leaders of Birlik, claiming that:

“[Birlik leaders] have appointed themselves representatives of the people and try to discredit everything positive that is done in Uzbekistan. They appeal to the people to nominate the leaders of Birlik to the post of Peoples’ Deputy. Their actions cannot be described as anything other than the lust for power”\textsuperscript{678}.

The reasons mentioned above explain why the opposition in Central Asia was not influential enough to lead broad national movements with clear social and political goals. The weak opposition from the local intelligentsia was one of the factors that caused local dissatisfaction to become expressed through more sporadic, loosely organized mass protests. The underclass and the rural population, who had been worst hit by transitional hardship, were particularly prone to the extreme forms of ethnic nationalism and they were most likely to subscribe to the more radical political slogans like “Uzbekistan for Uzbeks”, “Russians out of Tajikistan”, or “Priority to the indigenous people in Kazakhstan”. Inter-ethnic relations in Central Asia deteriorated during perestroika, and two riots took place in Ashgabat and Nebit-Dag, both in Turkmenistan, on 1 and 9 May 1989.

Inter-communal tumult in Ashgabat was followed by the Uzbek pogroms against the Meskhetian Turks in the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan. In June of 1989 clashes between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks broke out after a disagreement in a market between an Uzbek vendor and a Meskhetian buyer. The incident sparked widespread inter-communal violence that spread to several cities.

in the Ferghana Valley. Several thousand troops were dispatched to quell the violence, which lasted over the course of a week. Around 100 people were killed and 600-800 wounded as a result. Hundreds of homes and government buildings were burned. The victims were mainly Meskhetians and the perpetrators were reportedly Uzbek by nationality. In order to prevent further troubles, Moscow later evacuated 17,000 Meskhetians.

Nearly a year later, on 20 February 1990, a rally of more than a thousand of young Uzbeks in Bukinski raion in Tashkent oblast’ demanded eviction of Meskhetian Turks living in the Karabak settlement.679 After series of assaults on Turks, Uzbek leadership decided to evacuate them to the ‘Ten Years of October’ sanatorium in the neighbouring raion. Blood was also shed in Buka and Parkent of Uzbekistan, when on 3 March 1990 clashes occurred between the local population and representatives of law enforcement after the resettlement of the Meskhetian Turks to the area. The small unit of the militiamen were not able to disperse the agitated crowd. The rioters moved towards the town, where they held troops as hostages in the local office of Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and set the building in fire.680 Some 44 internal troopers and officers were injured as a result.

Concerned with the similarities between Buka, Parkent and Ferghana inter-ethnic events, the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Uzbek SSR formed a commission to investigate the circumstances and consequences of the mass unrest that occurred in Parkent and Buka.681 On those events, Khamidov from the

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commission noted that “there are forces whipping up inter-ethnic conflicts and, unfortunately, the organisers of the pogroms in Ferghana oblast’ have still not been found, although dozens of people involved have now been sentenced”.

Novyi Uzen and Mangyshlak in Kazakhstan also witnessed inter-ethnic strife from 17 to 20 June 1989. The following year saw an unrest in the neighbouring Dushanbe, Tajikistan (11-14 February 1990), as well as a pogrom in Andijan (2 May 1990) and clashes in Namangan (2 December 1990), both in Uzbekistan. But the most ferocious inter-communal conflict was between the Kyrgyz majority and the Uzbek minority groups in the Osh oblast’, in the south of the Kyrgyzstan and adjacent to the Uzbek border, in the summer of 1990. The intensity and extent of the inter-ethnic violence in Central Asia shocked the Soviet officials and observers.

For a long time, the central and regional authorities blamed incidents of civil unrest on various subversive forces. Thus, the central government often pointed to extremists, Islamic fundamentalists, enemies of perestroika, corrupt local political officials, and the mafia. At the same time, regional officials chose to blame informal opposition movements, like Birlik in Uzbekistan, or Kirghizia in Kyrgyzstan. The opposition in Central Asia, on the other hand, argued that the violence was the result of outside provocation and claimed the involvement of local and central authorities, as well as the Committee for State Security (KGB). With that in mind, Muhammad Salih, an opposition leader in Uzbekistan, remarking on the pogroms in Ferghana, stated that:

“[T]he violence that occurred was instigated. Which organ instigated it - the KGB, the Central Committee [of the Uzbek Communist Party], or the centre - we

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cannot say with certainty, but it is very clear that all of the actions were planned in advance”.683

In order to remain in power, the political elites of Central Asia did not hesitate to resort to violence, and sometimes even to instigate it. For example, there is some reason to believe that the unrest in Dushanbe in February 1990 was provoked by the local elite who knew how strong the dissatisfaction was and feared losing power in the upcoming election to the supreme soviet of the republic.684 Even though the Dushanbe unrest was a mass nationalistic expression, directed against the Slavic and russified population, there was however a concomitant demand for the resignation of local leadership. The leaders of Dushanbe initially promised to comply, but it turned out to have been a tactical manoeuvre to save time before the order was restored with the help of the regular Army troops. Consequent elections in Dushanbe took place under a state of emergency, and the Communist elite claimed the victory in the end.

In response to the tensed nationalistic environment, government officials tended to react by issuing formal decrees. Thus, in February 1990 the Supreme Soviet Presidium of Uzbek SSR issued an order setting out penalties for fomenting public disorder. The order referred to “prevocational rumours which were inciting the public to panic”, and set a fine of 200 to 500 roubles or two months of hard labour for anyone circulating material calling for pogroms or the use of violence, threatening the public order, or spreading panic among the

The tragedies of earlier violence in other republics of the Soviet Union and the fear of growing chauvinistic feelings formed a backdrop to the inter-ethnic tensions in Central Asia. Even as officials were locked in conflicts with the centre, they were aware of a background of mounting social and inter-ethnic strife.

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Table 2. Inter-ethnic strife in Central Asia, 1989-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1988</td>
<td>Anti-Uzbek unrest in Charzhou, Turkmenistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 1989</td>
<td>Protests against Russians in Tashkent, Uzbekistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 May 1989</td>
<td>Pogroms of Armenians in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 May 1989</td>
<td>Anti-Armenian riots in Nebit-Dag, Turkmenistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 June 1989</td>
<td>Pogroms of Meskhetian Turks in the Ferghana Valley, Uzbekistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 June 1989</td>
<td>Anti-Caucasians riots in Novyi Uzen and Mangyshlak, Kazakhstan</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1989</td>
<td>Anti-Kyrgyz riots in Isfara region, Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 January 1990</td>
<td>Anti-Azerbaijani protests in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 February 1990</td>
<td>Protests in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 February 1990</td>
<td>Anti-Armenian riots in Dushanbe, Tajikistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 February 1990</td>
<td>Anti-Meskhetian riots in Bukinskiy district of Tashkent region, Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 March 1990</td>
<td>Protests in Buka and Parkent, Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 May 1990</td>
<td>Unrest in Andijan, Uzbekistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 June 1990</td>
<td>The Osh conflict, Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 December 1990</td>
<td>Riots in Namangan, Uzbekistan</td>
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### 3.2 The Osh Conflict

Having discussed the nature of ethnic conflicts in Central Asia and the dynamics of the series of inter-ethnic riots in the region, the forthcoming section will consider at the Osh conflict in the context of two opposing forces, the Kyrgyz nationalizing state and the Uzbek national minority. The legacy of Soviet ethno-federalism, the centrality of ethno-nationalism in politics, the increased political mobilization and the more open political environment provided necessary structural opportunities for the Kyrgyz titular nationality to legitimize its nationalizing policies and strengthen its cultural privileges and political power. Other communities, including Uzbeks, felt compelled to push for their own political demands and agendas, lest they lose in the inter-ethnic competition over scarce public goods and resources.

The fear of losing a privileged status enjoyed during the Soviet period also contributed to the urgency of the Uzbek national minority to act. National minorities become key to the state- and nation-building issue. Kyrgyzstan faced two urgent challenges. On the one hand, the Kyrgyz state was involved in the simultaneous processes of nation-building and consolidation of the new central authority, and on the other, it was confronted by the growing assertiveness and political mobilization of the Uzbek national minority. Thus, the demands of the Uzbek community for collective public rights, language privileges or territorial autonomy, directly challenged the claims of the Kyrgyz titular elites to unitary ownership of their national polities and territories. The Kyrgyz community
perceived the political demands by Uzbeks as threatening and fundamentally illegitimate.

In January 1990, the Soviet press was alarmed at telltale signs of social and political tensions in Bishkek (then Frunze), the capital of Kyrgyzstan. Radio Liberty noted that tensions had a significant element of ethnic friction.\(^{686}\) These predicaments reflected the situation on the ground, which was characterized by the increase of popular mass gatherings, a hallmark of Kyrgyz society since then.

In January and February 1990, three demonstrations were held on the main square of Bishkek. On 25 January, Kyrgyz students and ‘extremist-minded persons’ gathered in the square amid concerns with rumours of a thousand Azerbaijani refugees arriving in Kyrgyzstan for settlement and sought to receive some clarifications from authorities if the refugees would be provided with accommodation from the Bishkek housing stock.\(^{687}\) The demands and petitions made during other demonstrations were similar. At the rally of 10 February 1990, demonstrators demanded that migration into the republic should be regulated and called for rapid solutions to housing shortage.\(^{688}\) A year before that, residents of Bishkek took matters of desperate housing shortages into their own hands by squatting on vacant plots of land outside the city and building homes.

In Jalalabad, the Uzbek community presented a petition to local authorities demanding autonomy for the Osh region. Frustration and the feeling among Uzbeks of being mistreated was a factor in their nationalistic claims for autonomous Uzbek entity in Osh. A local informal group called ‘Adolat’ (justice)

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\(^{687}\) Kirghiz Leaders Meet with Crowd at Rally. (January 28:1990). \textit{Sovetskaia Kirgizia}.
was instrumental in organizing Uzbek people in the region. Adolat was established in late 1989 with the objective of preserving the Uzbek culture, language and traditions in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan. In early 1990, as a result of Adolat’s advocacy, the building that hosted the local history museum was returned to Uzbeks as a mosque. This decision by local authorities was negatively perceived by local Kyrgyz youth and intelligentsia.\(^{689}\) As its popularity increased among Uzbeks, Adolat activists wanted to achieve the declaration of Uzbek as a state language and announce Osh region as an autonomous Uzbek republic.\(^{690}\) These demands further contributed to the worsening relations between Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities.

Kyrgyz community in the south of the country, especially those that abandoned their villages and migrated to cities, were worst affected by serious economic and social hardships. Feeding into the growing frustration among Kyrgyz, a political movement ‘Ashar’ emerged in July 1989. It quickly gained popularity among Kyrgyz population. The radical group under the umbrella of Narodno-Demokraticeskii Front Kirgizii (Kyrgyz democratic movement) stated as its main objective the allocation of land for housing for homeless Kyrgyz people.\(^{691}\) Ashar’s success on a republican level prompted the creation of a similar organization in Osh oblast’ under the name ‘Osh Aimagi’. Osh Aimagi was founded in April 1990. Its proclaimed objective was to help Kyrgyz in obtaining land for building private houses. By 20 April Osh Aimagi collected five thousand


applications from homeless Kyrgyz for land allotments.\textsuperscript{692} One of the pre-election promises by the head of Osh Aimagi, K. Bektemirov, was to pressure local authorities to designate land from the territory of the Lenin kolhoz (collective farm) for construction of private houses for Kyrgyz workers. Even though this promise was greeted enthusiastically by young Kyrgyz who had migrated from villages to Osh city, Uzbek dwellers of the kolhoz were very anxious about this prospect.\textsuperscript{693} The competition for land was to have wider ramifications for inter-communal relations.

The situation on the ground pointed to the fact that growing nationalism combined with popular anger over severe social problems could produce a volatile mix that was reminiscent of the situation in Alma-Ata immediately prior to Jeltoqsan riots of December 1986.\textsuperscript{694} Correspondent of Sobesednik, Natalya Airapetova, described Osh as ‘the capital of unemployment’ and warned the authorities that the problems in Osh were similar to those evident in Uzbekistan’s part of Ferghana Valley prior to the disturbances between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks in June 1989.\textsuperscript{695} Moreover, Osh oblast’ was made up by multi-national population of 1.3 million people that included Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Russians and many other smaller ethnic groups.

The confidential report from the Kyrgyz KGB transmitted to the republican authorities indicated that heightened inter-ethnic sentiments were more

evident in the south of the country. On 9 May 1990, at the KGB headquarters in Frunze, a high-level meeting involving top Communist Party officials was held to discuss the situation in Osh oblast. On that meeting, second secretary of the Central Committee of the KPK, N. Chepelev, pledged to undertake necessary actions for alleviating inter-ethnic tensions. Yet official statements ranged from foolhardy optimism to deluded wishful thinking. Thus, sources from the MVD reported on the possibility of destabilization as a result of the problems of a social and economic order, migration of the population, unemployment among young people and reforms of the law on state language, and stressed its efforts to convince concerned people that the Kyrgyz people “have never tried to inflame inter-ethnic strife”, which was seen from its long history.

Responding to the article from Komsomol’skaia Pravda, An Echo of Baku, which compared volatile situations in Dushanbe and Bishkek, Feliks Kulov, the first deputy minister of internal affairs, said in unequivocal terms that: “I state in all responsibility that a criminal explosion of that [Dushanbe riots] kind will not take place in the republic. There are no grounds for that”. But oddly, he did not rule out ‘group hooliganism’ at night clubs and rock-concerts. Kyrgyz leadership thought that anti-Russian strife was more probable to take place than riots between Kyrgyz and Uzbek people. Thus, in an interview with Sovetskaia Kirgizia on Bishkek rallies, Kulov refuted a possibility of inter-ethnic tensions in Kyrgyzstan by noting that protesters’ demands were directed at curtailing migration to

Kyrgyzstan and that “even this appeal did not amount to an infringement of the interests of the Russian-speaking nationalities residing in Kirghizia”. 699

From 17 May 1990, local authorities fell under intense pressure by mass meetings organized by the leaders of Osh Aimagi. On 27 May, during the big mass protest at the state school no.38 local authorities agreed to provide 30 hectares of irrigated land for the purposes of Osh Aimagi. On the following day, a counter mass protest by the local Uzbek community forced authorities to abandon the decision and put forward an alternative option for the consideration of both groups. The alternative plan offered to the Kyrgyz group 600 hectares of land in a different location, in the collective farms of Kenesh and Kalinin. 700 Osh Aimagi leaders however refused to accept the new deal and proclaimed an ultimatum to the authorities with a deadline of 4 June 1990. Furious at the intransigence of the Kyrgyz counterparts, Uzbek activists of Adolat urged to boycott the Kyrgyz group. As a result, some Uzbek bread-makers stopped selling bread to Kyrgyz in the city and Uzbek flat-owners expelled 1,500 Kyrgyz tenants from their rented flats. Local KGB sources reported that that action had only added more Kyrgyz supporters to the ranks of Osh Aimagi. 701

By the summer of 1990, ethnic confrontation gained its momentum in the Osh oblast’ with only a trigger needed to spark off the conflict. The June decision by local Soviet officials in the city of Osh resolved to relocate the communal land of the Lenin kolkhoz, which ethnic Uzbeks had been farming for years, in order to


give it to the Kyrgyz protesters. That decision was not the most favourable for the
prevention of the inter-communal unrest. Squatting incidents by Kyrgyz of the
Uzbek land in the collective farm was similar in serving as a triggering
mechanism for a fully blown ethnic conflict.

The unrests started on 4 June 1990 in the city of Osh and later spread to
the whole Osh oblast’ and Kyrgyzstan, affecting Osh, Uzgen, Bishkek and
Jalalabad cities. The first reports of the riots suggested that it was a spontaneous
outburst of ethnic conflict. Later official reports, however, stressed the pre-
meditated character of many attacks and the fact that preparation of much of the
violence had been made well in advance. The chronology of the Osh conflict starts
from the dispute between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks over the allocation of the farmland
for housing lots on a suburban Uzbek-run Lenin kolkhoz in Osh oblast’. From 30
May, activists from Osh Aimagi organized daily protests on the fields of the
kolkhoz. On 4 June, a counter rally was held in the kolkhoz with the purpose of
discussing rival claims made by the Kyrgyz group, who had illegally occupied the
field for dividing it up for housing lots. Protesters heard the position of the Uzbek
group, Adolat, which wanted to maintain the status quo over land possession.702
Supporters of Osh Aimagi also gathered in the field, which already had 1,500
Uzbek and 10,000 Kyrgyz protesters.703 By the evening of that day, more Uzbek
supporters were coming from the adjacent cities in Uzbekistan such as Namangan,
Ferghana and Andijan.

701 Head of KGB Osh Office Mameev, A. (June 26:1990). Confidential Letter to first secretary of
Oshskie Sobitiia: Na Materialah KGB. Bishkek, Renaissance.
702 Ethnic Violence in Kirghizia (1990). Keesing’s Record of World Events, p 37541
The Lenin kolkhoz dispute was reminiscent of Bishkek squatting incidents, but with a key difference being that the land in the suburbs of Bishkek belonged to no one, while the land in the Lenin kolkhoz was within the working and living habitat of the local Uzbek community. The ethnic element created serious consequences, especially as the dispute over land was set against tensed social and ethnical background.

Attempts by Apas Dzhumagulov, chairman of Kyrgyz Council of Ministers, to calm the crowd failed. A militia squad of 900 officers was dispatched to separate two ethnic groups. Futile efforts of militia men to disperse people by firing blank ammunitions, and later live bullets, did not resolve the situation. Rioters, instead of dispersing, went into the city centre vandalising and setting fire to cars, houses and shops. Local KGB officers reported at the time that the arrival of a group of young Kyrgyz with Salpiev, the representative of the movement ‘Kirghizia’, from Bishkek to Osh was another destabilizing factor in the charged atmosphere. Even though their official purpose was to get acquainted with the situation in Osh, some ‘Kirghizia’ activists were reported to have engaged in heating up the flames of violence and provocations. It was also noted that representatives of Uzbek movement Birlik were engaged in similar activities. The events took an ugly turn when several houses, both Uzbek and Kyrgyz, were identified with markings to indicate the nationality of residents.

As the clashes between the two groups escalated, a state of emergency, including a curfew, was declared in Osh.\footnote{Carlson, C. (January 4:1991). Political Stagnation Gives Way to Democratic Impulses, \textit{RFE/RL Report on the USSR}. P. 32} The centre of Osh city eventually became quiet when troops blocked roads into the city to prevent opposing groups from entering.\footnote{The USSR this Week, (June 15:1990). \textit{RFE/RL Report on the USSR}, p. 31} However, the violence spilled beyond Osh city into the surrounding countryside. The first day of violence in Osh city left 11 people dead and 210 injured.\footnote{Ethnic Violence in Kirghizia, (1990). \textit{Keesing's Record of World Events}. p 37541} With the arrival of additional troops of the Army on 6 June, the situation improved and violence subsided.\footnote{Razakov, T. (1993). \textit{Oshskie Sobitia: Na Materialah KGB}. Bishkek, Renaissance. p.51} But the city was totally isolated. Rumours spread fast, and those reaching adjacent villages prompted many Kyrgyz villagers to travel en masse to support their people in the Osh city. Fortunately, most of them were prevented from entering the city by the military, which was crucial in cordonning off Osh city and warding off agitated young Kyrgyz and Uzbek people from adjacent areas to aggravate the situation further.\footnote{Razakov, T. (1993). \textit{Oshskie Sobitia: Na Materialah KGB}. Bishkek, Renaissance. p.52}

On 5 June, riots spread to another city in Osh oblast’, Uzgen, which witnessed the most horrific incidents of inter-communal violence. Even before the riots regular fights between Kyrgyz and Uzbek youngsters took place in Uzgen. Those youngsters under intoxication often scuffled, especially during official holidays. But on that day massive clashes between local Uzbek people and the Kyrgyz youth from outside Uzgen unfolded in the town market and central bus station. This was unusual in its scale and violence. It is notable that the first week
of the Osh conflict claimed 116 lives, with 468 people wounded and 500 cases of arson.\textsuperscript{710}

**Image 3. Riots in Osh city, June 1990**

After the effective crowd dispersal by local militia, rioters went to town centre causing further disturbances. At the same time gangs of Kyrgyz men from nearby villages flooded into town and subjected Uzbek population to pogrom, which resulted in murders, rapes, mutilations and three-quarters of the town burnt down.\textsuperscript{711} It was also reported that some Kyrgyz inhabitants from Osh city arrived in Uzgen to warn their fellows and spread the rumours about unrests.\textsuperscript{712}

\textsuperscript{710} Kirghiz Residents Begin Day of Mourning. (February 12:1990). *Regional Affairs FBIS-SOV-90-112*, p. 112

\textsuperscript{711} Continuing Violence in Kirghizia (1990). *Keesing’s Record of World Events*, p. 37618.

As Uzgen’s population was predominantly Uzbek, local authorities decided to evacuate immigrant Kyrgyz people to their villages or make-shift camps outside the town with the view to creating crucial space between two communities. But this move only brought partial results, because fleeing Kyrgyz rioters still took part in other fights and destroyed property on their way. By afternoon of 5 June, Uzgen was engrossed in turf fighting between local Uzbek community and Kyrgyz groups form surrounding villages. By the end of the day, one could see Uzgen blazing in flames (see the photo below) and hear bullets flying over heads. Ever more people, crazed with violence, took part in the inter-communal rioting. It was only on 6 June that the dispatch of an Army contingent to Uzgen stabilized the situation in Uzgen. However incidents of inter-ethnic violence continued. Thus, on 14 June, the chairman of Kyrgyz KGB, Asankulov, reported cases of marauding and self-willed reprisals. Protests against local officials continued, and thus on 12 June several rallies were held outside Party and local government buildings with such posters as “death to Asanov” and “all Uzgen militia under trial”.

Uzgen riots caused more than 200 fatalities and were the most violent in Osh oblast’. The Committee for protection of rights of Uzbek residents of Uzgen reported that 247 people died, 265 people disappeared and 165 people got

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wounded as a result of riots in Uzgen. More than 300 houses were torched down and dozens of cars got burned.

Image 4. Uzgen in flames

After violence in Uzgen subsided, two thousand Kyrgyz people displaced from Uzgen and 140 Uzbek families of refugees in Uzgen were angry with the slow pace of their return to homes. This situation caused frequent skirmishes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, when the latter tried to visit their homes and inspect

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their property amid hostile receptions by the Uzbek community.\textsuperscript{720} Persistent tensions delayed local authorities’ decision for relocating back the displaced Kyrgyz families. A member of the Committee for protection of rights of Uzbek residents in Uzgen warned the authorities that the Committee members would not be able to control the reaction of Uzbek residents to a hasty relocation of Kyrgyz back to the city, and that such relocation would then be treated as ‘an act of provocation’ aimed at escalation of inter-communal relations.\textsuperscript{721} The Committee also pointed out that if local authorities were to actively work on the return of Kyrgyz residents to Uzgen, then Uzbek residents reserved the right to make an appeal to the Uzbek president with the request for a consideration of their mass migration to Uzbekistan.\textsuperscript{722}

Both communities were very upset by the violence and, more specifically, with the inadequate handling of the situation by the government. For example, on a meeting between local people and government officials, a Kyrgyz woman pointed to A. Dzhumagulov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan, that: “If you are not able to bring order and to look honestly to the eyes of your people, then vacate your posts. Perhaps, there is someone from the Kyrgyz who will be better than you”.\textsuperscript{723} In response to growing criticisms, the office of public prosecutor set up an investigative team of 106 officers from its office, MVD and


KGB to probe criminal acts committed during riots in Uzgen.\textsuperscript{724} As a result, 74 people were under investigation for heinous crimes by 28 August 1990.\textsuperscript{725}

Meanwhile, Uzbek residents in Jalalabad region were alarmed at rumours of imminent attacks by Kyrgyz and were preparing for self-defence. As Uzbeks of Jalalabad were seeking support from their co-nationals in Andijan, the situation was further complicated by the arrival of Kyrgyz refugees in Jalalabad from Uzbekistan. Thus, on 10 June 1,200 Kyrgyz refugees from Andijan gathered in the neighbourhood of Suzak raion of Jalalabad. But on the following day, after authorities convinced them that no danger is waiting upon their return in Uzbekistan, most refugees were orderly returned to their abodes.\textsuperscript{726}

The initial silence of the official media outlets on the conflict was notable. It created an information vacuum. Little news on the situation in Osh was reaching the capital, Bishkek. Information that was available to most Bishkek residents had been usually received through telephone conversations with their relatives and friends in Osh oblast’.\textsuperscript{727} Because telephone lines remained open in the otherwise blockaded Osh city, news of the violence still could spread to the capital. As this was the only means of information, it is not surprising that rumours were the lords of the land. Such a vacuum had ramifications on people’s actions. For example, on 8 June in the village of Kizil-Dzhar, around 200 people gathered with the aim to


visit places of mass disturbances in Osh city. They also laid siege to the border post outside the village and put forward demands to release credible information on riots in Osh and Uzgen cities and to provide weapons for protection of Kyrgyz people in trouble zones.\(^{728}\)

The unrest also spread to Bishkek on June 6, mainly in the form of sporadic beatings of Uzbeks taking place in the city market. A large group of students marched to the headquarters of the KPK in the centre of the city. In the violent confrontation, personal injuries were minimized by the crowd control, so the violent crowd eventually was transformed into a mass meeting. *Radio Moscow* reported that unsanctioned meetings were held by large group of students, who demanded their final exams should be stopped so that they could participate in riots.\(^{729}\) On the following day, a state of emergency was proclaimed in Bishkek for preventive purposes.

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Map 6. The Ferghana Valley

Incidents of assault and battery of people of Kyrgyz nationality were reported in several towns in neighbouring Uzbekistan. This caused the fleeing of Kyrgyz refugees from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan. On June 7, the head of MVD of the USSR, Vadim Bakatin, confirmed that ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan had spread to neighbouring Uzbekistan and warned the Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities of the USSR that “local clashes may develop into a conflict between the two republics”. This concern was heightened when thousands of people armed with sticks, stones and other self-made weapons had gathered at the border of the two republics between Osh and Andijan. The situation between two countries was stabilized when the army troops were dispatched to patrol the temporarily closed borders and a state of emergency was declared by president Islam Karimov in the areas of Uzbekistan that border Osh oblast’.

The blockade of the Pamir highway in response to Osh riots threatened fuel reserves in Tajikistan. Many drivers that forward freight to the Soviet Pamir, autonomous part of Tajikistan, were subject to attacks by Kyrgyz rioters. According to Alexander Vasiliyev, the Tajik deputy minister of motor transport, stones were thrown at the passing trucks along the Kyrgyz stretch of the road, and “in some cases groups of assailants have stopped trucks, dragging out the drivers, and beaten them up.”

As the violence intensified, the character of the dispute changed as well. It became a political confrontation. In this regard, Komsomol’skaia pravda reported

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731 The USSR this Week, (June 15:1990). RFE/RL Report on the USSR, p. 32
that Uzbeks demanded more regional autonomy, while Kyrgyz residents called for equal treatment with the Uzbek majority in the city.\textsuperscript{733} Another newspaper, \textit{Krasnaia zvezda}, pointed out that the violence was caused by extremists who demanded autonomy for Osh oblast’, the annexation by Uzbekistan of areas where Uzbeks constituted majority and the sacking of local leaders.\textsuperscript{734} In the Uzbek neighbourhoods of Osh, leaflets addressing the Supreme Council of Kyrgyz SSR were seen to be circulated with a number of demands that included, among other things, a total renewal of the local office of MVD personnel, democratic elections of local parliamentarians, judges and other authorities according to national representation, resignation of the whole of Osh city and regional committees of the Communist Party, and bringing to justice of Osh Aimagi activists for their role in riots.\textsuperscript{735}

In the open letter from a number of intellectuals from Uzbekistan, state-sponsored discrimination of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan was condemned as systematic. The letter linked the discrimination with the causes of the Osh conflict. The authors of the letter also pointed to the pre-mediated character of the violence in the Osh city and Bishkek, which they argue was evidenced by the coordinated recalling of Kyrgyz students from Tashkent and a number of rumours within Kyrgyz community prior to violence.\textsuperscript{736}

In the early July, a delegation of five persons from the Uzbek community of Uzgen, equipped with documentation, video materials and photos of the riots,

\textsuperscript{733} The USSR this Week, (June 15:1990). \textit{RFE/RL Report on the USSR}, p. 31
visited Moscow with the aim of drawing central authorities’ attention to the tragic events. Members of delegation met with Eugene Primakov, from the Presidential Council, editors of Pravda and Izvestia, as well as with the president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov. The results of their trip were shared with the members of the Committee for protection of Uzbeks and aksakals (elderly chiefs). A peaceful demonstration was held later on 16 July with most Uzgen residents participating in it.

The violence continued till late August, with sporadic eruptions occurring in cities and villages throughout Kyrgyzstan. It only ended in October and the state of emergency was lifted on 21 November 1990. The scale of killings and destruction was immense. Official figures cite deaths of 120 Kyrgyz, 50 Uzbeks and one Russian. More realistically, as Komsomol’skaia pravda suggested at the time by July 1990 around 800 people may have died in the conflict in Kyrgyzstan. However, most unofficial sources claim more than 1000 people were killed as a result of the Osh conflict.

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Table 3. Timeline of the Osh conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 February 1990</td>
<td>Series of protests start in Bishkek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 June 1990</td>
<td>Inter-ethnic violence erupts in Osh city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 June 1990</td>
<td>Riots spread to other cities in the Osh oblast’ (region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 June 1990</td>
<td>State of emergency declared in Osh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 June 1990</td>
<td>Unrest spreads to Bishkek, Kyrgyz capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 June 1990</td>
<td>State of emergency declared in Bishkek.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 June 1990</td>
<td>Violence threatens neighbouring cities in Uzbekistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 June 1990</td>
<td>State of emergency declared in Uzbek cities adjacent to Osh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1990</td>
<td>Violence subsides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 November 1990</td>
<td>State of emergency is lifted in Kyrgyzstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1990</td>
<td>Hostilities end. Official figures for casualties 120 Kyrgyz, 50 Uzbeks, and 1 Russian. Actual numbers deemed much higher.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Osh conflict has barely been analyzed, with the exception of the authoritative anthropological work by Valery Tishkov. He used data from the ten rulings of the Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Republic and Osh City Court on criminal cases in the aftermath of the Osh conflict. Forty-eight perpetrators of violence were tried, and forty-six were found guilty. Tishkov observes that important psychological determinants, the social environment and the communal

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culture could have contributed to the precipitating the forces of violence and producing fear, aggressive distortions, dehumanization and paranoia.\textsuperscript{743}

The local sociological analysis of the Osh conflict would approach the ethnic conflict in terms of social groupings, social stratifications and labour functional divisions. Correlations between social disparities and ethnic structures are crucial, as the juxtaposition of those two factors can indicate their relation to inter-ethnic tensions. Through the sociological analysis of the Osh conflict, socio-economic parameters are carefully examined so that the conflict can be optimally explained.

The view that the Osh conflict was a result of socio-economic problems was widely adopted, especially in the official circles in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz parliamentary commission charged with the investigation into the conflict confirmed that socio-economic problems caused the tragic Osh events.\textsuperscript{744} As was mentioned before, Kyrgyzstan was facing dire social and economic hardships at the time of the conflict. Osh oblast’ was the lowest in the republican rankings of Kyrgyzstan in terms of living conditions. Lack of housing, unemployment and deteriorating social welfare were the most vivid elements that contributed to the hardships.

In the last year of the Soviet Union, the housing shortage became acute in Kyrgyzstan, and particularly so in Osh oblast’. In the cities the majority of housing premises was built and leased by the state. It was a well-recited policy of the Soviet state that all Soviet people were entitled to free housing. However, as a

result of the economic decline, state-run house constructions dwindled and the state could not provide housing to the expectant houseless citizenry, not to mention the new-arrivals. According to the official statistics, before the Osh conflict as many as 40,000 people were registered as waiting for state flats in Osh oblast’ alone. The considerable percentage of those waiting for flats in Osh were Kyrgyz, as they abandoned their traditional countryside residences for cities due to better employment opportunities there.

In terms of labour market, Osh oblast’ had the highest rate of unemployment in the Kyrgyz republic. While the Soviet ideology proclaiming jobs for all Soviet people, the reality of being jobless was agonising for citizens of Kyrgyzstan, especially young people. To make matter worse, there was no reasonable social protection available to the unemployed. This dire situation shed light into some of the reasons why the most active perpetrators of violence during the Osh conflict were the unemployed youngsters. Another contributing factor for their active participation in the riots could have been the absence of daytime commitment, which could have otherwise prevented them from rioting.

Economic hardships can only tell part of the story. As Aynur Elebayeva suggests the Osh conflict’s principal cause was not simply dire living conditions of the Osh people but it also included “de facto inequality of the principal nationality groups in the region in different spheres of social life”. Socio-economic hardships on their own could not cause and sustain ethnic strife. The Osh riots were therefore exacerbated by the acute segregation between Kyrgyz and

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Uzbek ethnic groups. The segregation along occupational and residential lines creates a fertile ground for deep divisions and perceptions in which ‘us’ is set against the ‘others’.

The majority of Kyrgyz citizens of Osh oblast’ were engaged in agriculture, while the predominant bulk of Uzbeks were occupied in trade and retail business. Thus in Osh oblast’, Uzbeks constituted 71.4 per cent of the workforce in trade and retailing, 74.7 per cent in public food chains, and 79 per cent in taxi services. Trade and its agents in multi-ethnic societies tend to constitute a special area of interest in sociological analyses. In this regard, Tishkov, for instance, notes that “there is a tendency to control the trade and market activities by members of a certain group, usually a minority”. It was frequently noted that the big disproportion between two ethnic communities in the employment in these noticeable public spheres could have created in the minds of the Kyrgyz population, especially young villagers, a bitter feeling of the wounded pride and a sense of deprivation in their own land. Moreover, the trading occupation provides better living standards than farming. Uzbek ethnic traders were mainly in control of markets where Kyrgyz farmers sought to distribute their harvests. The negative perception of traders from different nationality was not unique to Kyrgyzstan. A number of pogroms on the markets and businesses run by ethnic minorities took place in other Central Asian cities, most notably on Armenian businesses in Ashgabat and the Meskhetian Turks in Ferghana.

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The Uzbek community in Osh, on the other hand, felt disenchanted by the Soviet recruitment policy in the republic that favoured applicants of the Kyrgyz and Russian nationality for positions in government administration. According to the official figures, the Osh oblast’ executive committee consisted of 85.7 per cent Kyrgyz, 9.5 per cent Russians and only 4.7 per cent Uzbeks. This is so even though Uzbek constituted up to 26 per cent of the total regional population. Similar inequalities were recorded in the trade unions and law enforcement organizations. The persistent discrimination and consequent under-representation in the Kyrgyz administration generated among some segments of the Uzbek population the idea of creating an autonomous Uzbek territorial unit in Osh oblast’. This view naturally caused sharp protests among the Kyrgyz groups who felt their country was in threat.

In spite of the negative perception of the representatives of trade occupation, there was a tendency to downplay the role of a competitive labour division in the society as a major cause for the ethnic conflict. In many cases, it is argued, occupational division is based on mutually beneficial and accepted roles, and it is more often the case that political motivations are hidden behind violent actions.

In accordance with the census data, only 15.4 per cent of the Kyrgyz population in Osh oblast’, who constituted nearly 60 per cent of the total Osh

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population, were city-dwellers. Uzbeks, on the other hand, represented the majority in the administrative centres of the Osh oblast. As the economy declined, there was a sharp increase in migration of Kyrgyz youth into cities. Upon arrival, they encountered a very tight housing market, with most desirable jobs slots in the trade sector filled by predominantly urban Uzbeks. In this context, it was predictable that newly arrived Kyrgyz felt as left-out and perceived the urban Uzbeks as a threat to their space and status.

The inability and reluctance of local authorities to engage in a dialogue with masses was another exacerbating factor of the Osh conflict. Notably, some claimed that the mere fact that informal political movements Osh Aimagi and Adolat were able to emerge from obscurity and organize mass protests and function as outlets for these grievances signalled the inability and/or disinterest of the Soviet authorities to address the consequences of the social and ethnic stratification. The government administration of Kyrgyzstan retained the conservative set of mind, which did not and could not adequately react to the changes and challenges brought by perestroika reforms. As a result of its failure in addressing inter-ethnic strife, the conservative government of Masaliev was forced to resign.

The activities of loosely organized groups and ‘trade mafia’ were also acknowledged in the official reports as an important factor in the Osh riots. At the times of heightened feelings of national self-awareness, local groups like Kyrgyz Osh Aimagi and Uzbek Adolat were very successful in playing on the socio-

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economic injustices. According to Elebayeva, both organizations were skilful in shaping a ‘profile of the enemy’ by “manipulating public opinion, which in the final analysis was congealed by the introduction into the mass consciousness of the two opposing populations of the idea of national exclusivity”.753 One should also bear in mind that the perpetrators of the Osh violence did not have a rigid internal hierarchy or leadership, determined by any official status. Local bosses could have been indirect participants or witnesses of the riots, but nevertheless they had given the initial blessings and instructions, and secured the sense of permission among the activists and rank-and-file perpetrators.754

In the context of the nearly total information vacuum, a rather effective rumour or myth of mass murders in the cities of Osh and Uzgen was spread widely by word of mouth to other parts of Kyrgyzstan. This unfortunately widened the scale of ethnic violence. State-controlled media was paralysed and could not react adequately to mushrooming rumours throughout the Osh conflict.

Prior to the outbreak of the inter-ethnic strife, there was an invisible balance in the Osh oblast’ between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. The Kyrgyz majority dwelled in countryside and worked in agriculture, while the Uzbek minority lived in cities and engaged in trade and public services. This balance was shattered due to hard-hitting economic reforms and free-speech perestroika changes. Young Kyrgyz started moving to cities as a result of hardships in villages. Then they realized that most profitable jobs and decent housing in cities were in the hands of the Uzbek minority population. Uzbeks, on the other hand, felt threatened by the

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sudden Kyrgyz inflow into their traditional neighbourhoods. The perception among Uzbeks of being excluded from the decision-making power as a result of the biased recruitment by government was further aggravated by concessions made by the local authorities towards Kyrgyz squatters.

It should be noted however that government-endorsed surveys in Kyrgyzstan into the causes of the Osh conflict indicated a clear divergence in line with the ethnicity of respondents. While the Kyrgyz respondents emphasized socio-economic reasons of the conflict, the Uzbek responders pointed out discrimination in the employment for government sectors and unsatisfactory performance of government authorities.

Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan, as any other ethnic minorities of Central Asia, thinks of themselves as members of distinct nationalities because the Soviet regime through its institutions and structures taught them to think of themselves this way. The national elites of Uzbek minority group in Kyrgyzstan represent their constituents as belonging to a different, Uzbek nation from members of the titular Kyrgyz national group. The Uzbek demands for collective public rights, language privileges or territorial autonomy, which stem from the institutional legacy of the Soviet nationality policy, are seen as directly challenging the claims of the Kyrgyz elites to unitary ownership of their national polities and territories. It is no surprise that Kyrgyz state elites perceive such demands by the Uzbek community as threatening and as fundamentally illegitimate. Furthermore, the political and cultural demands of Uzbeks have made them vulnerable to charges of outright disloyalty. Although Uzbeks are formally part of the citizenry of the
national state, they are excluded substantively from the actual membership of the nation-state.

Following the institutionalist perspective, formulated by Brubaker, it is possible to suggest that the self-definition of Uzbek minorities as members of a distinct nation and their consequent claims for public rights in that capacity strengthened ethno-nationalistic perceptions and practices of Kyrgyz elites. It also reinforced the tendency of the Kyrgyz majority to define their own nationhood in ethno-nationalistic rather than civic-territorial terms and to rule their nation-state accordingly.

Ethnic riots in the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan and in the Ferghana Valley of Uzbekistan during the summer of 1990 discredited party leadership and created general fears among the population of party retaliation and a new wave of authoritarianism. Numerous official inquiries into the cause of the riots pointed to mismanagement by the official party elite. At the republic’s Central Committee plenum in August 1990, Askar Akaev cited press accounts criticizing the party leadership for the problems that caused the riots, and he questioned why nothing had been done to rectify the situation.

While the political elite in the republic refused to enter into constructive dialogue with the opposition, it tried to play along with nationalism by placing the Kyrgyz in a privileged position in the republic. The explosive situation that had developed in the Osh oblast was not a secret to anyone, but there were no measures taken to alleviate the situation. Thus, the congress of KPK, which took

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place during the inter-communal fighting in Osh and during a state of emergency in the capital of the republic, tried to place the blame for the bloody events in the Osh oblast’ on the ‘Kirghizia’ opposition movement and re-elected almost all of the old leaders headed by first secretary Masaliev. In July 1990, at the time when Kirghizia was being persecuted, news emerged from Kyrgyzstan that the ruling powers and the KGB were secretly supporting such extremist organizations as Osh Aimagy and Adolat.\textsuperscript{757}

Continuing struggles with the central authorities in Moscow and political conflict in the Kyrgyz SSR led to the scheduling of an extraordinary session of the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet. Members of an opposition group Kirghizia staged a public demonstration on the steps of the Supreme Soviet building on the eve of the extraordinary session in October 1990 with demands for sovereignty and the establishment of presidential rule.

The Osh events disturbed the situation in Kyrgyzstan, and put Masaliev's position in jeopardy. His readiness to preserve the compromised leaders and to incite tribal sentiments turned out to be extreme even for the less conservative members of the local elite.\textsuperscript{758} On that session, the parliament voted to introduce presidential rule in the republic, and the parliament surprised many by rejecting the candidacy of Masaliev for president. On 27 October 1990, Askar Akaev, then president of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, emerged as the first president of Kyrgyzstan after the fourth round of voting.


In its turn, the Soviet centre clearly expressed to the political elites in Central Asia its support and again demonstrated readiness to close its eyes on their old and new errors, as long as they controlled the situation in their republics.

The party organization continued to fight for power but by the winter of 1990 it had lost support in Moscow as well. In April 1991, a party plenum re-organized the party, replacing virtually the entire leadership. Given that the political machine was dominated by party officials, the choice of Akaev, who entered party work very late, as the first president of Kyrgyzstan was perceived exceptional.

Throughout 1992, the Jogorku Kenesha, the new Kyrgyz parliament, debated different versions of the new constitution. Debates concerned relations between executive and legislature, language policies, and privatization, particularly land privatization. There were a number of draft constitutions. The version preferred by Akaev proposed a presidential system with strong executive powers. Akaev’s opponents pushed for another version of the constitution, which favoured a strong legislature. Akaev’s argument, similar to that of other Central Asian presidents, was that parliamentary supremacy would spell disaster for the country. He claimed that this could lead to a struggle for power in parliament between country's clans and tribes, and warned that “as a result, the southerners would win because they are in the arithmetic majority. The northerners could not accept that, since the capital is in the north”.  

The parliament became the staging ground for political opposition to Akaev’s reform agenda. Parties, groups and organizations that were not
democratic per se took advantage of these legislative opportunities. For instance, Aman Amanbaev, first secretary of KPK and a supporter of the August 1991 coup, re-emerged from obscurity to be elected a Mejlis deputy by vocally opposing Akaev’s program of land reform.760

Such opposition parties such as ‘Erkin Kyrgyzstan’ and ‘Asaba’ freely exploited public dissatisfaction over economic breakdown, the role of the Kyrgyz language, and the distribution of land and accommodation. Asaba’s position stated that the Kyrgyz language law was implemented too slowly and that land distribution should only apply to ethnic Kyrgyz. Other nationalist parties had narrow nationalistic objectives. Thus, the movement ‘Free Uighuristan’ called for the establishment of a separate Turkic-speaking Uighur nation-state in the east of China, formerly the territory of east Turkestan.

Kyrgyzstan’s difficulties over nationality are also linked to the ethnic specialization of the population, which has its origins in the Soviet nationality policies. The Russian-speaking communities tend to be represented in the technical and skilled spheres of the economy. The nationalities from the Caucasus and other Turkic-speaking non-Kyrgyz ethnic groups tend to be involved in service and trade industries. The native Kyrgyz population are normally occupied in agriculture and animal husbandry. Since these economic sectors were affected differently by the economic dislocations produced by the collapse of the Soviet economy and liberalization, the standard of living of different nationality groups diverged widely. Those occupied in the service sectors benefited most, while those

groups occupied in the primary agricultural sector faced the greatest hardship. Kyrgyz intellectuals and observers were inclined to attribute inter-ethnic conflict in the republic to those economic differences.

It is notable that all regional, ethno-national, and economic fractures in the society were reflected in the composition of the parliament. In order to counter the political opposition Akaev, in asserting that the communist-era parliament was the reason for Kyrgyzstan’s inability to push forward in solving socio-economic problems, departed from his original course and embarked upon a new ‘Asian development path’. Akaev’s lurch toward authoritarianism can be traced to a meeting between the heads of state of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan that took place in Almaty (formerly Alma-ata) in July 1994. Convinced by Uzbek president to agree upon an Asian development path, Akaev abandoned his efforts to reach national consensus democratically. Under threat that Akaev and his associates would be accused of corruption and malfeasance in the autumn parliamentary session, Akaev decided to strike pre-emptively at his political opponents and engineered a quiet revolution in which he disbanded the parliament, forced the resignation of the government, cowed the judiciary, shut down the opposition press, set up a new electoral commission, and announced new parliamentary elections.761

Reflecting on the stability of the political order, Geiss notes that enduring, political order could emerge from the successful inter-penetration of communal and political action orientations in Central Asia.762 If it is not successful, then political regimes in the long term will face a legitimacy problem and that of
diminishing political obedience. It is common knowledge that patrimonialism as a
form of political community has remained influential in independent Central Asia.
This could be a partial explanation as to why parliamentary democracy has not
spread in the region. Thus if communal commitment structures are crucial for the
establishment of enduring political order, the extent of future Central Asian
communal commitment structures may set the limits for democratic reforms.

4.0 Ethno-nationalism in independent Central Asia

After the decline of the Soviet Union, most of Central Asian political elites faced
a new reality which forced to find a new base for the political order of their new
republics. National independence therefore compelled local elites to find a new
binding interpretation of collective identity, which could strengthen political
community structures and establish new normative political order.\textsuperscript{763}

The Soviet Union’s demise inevitably led to the decline of Soviet
patriotism and to obliteration of communism as all-inclusive worldview. Realizing
nationhood’s prevalence in international relations and under pressure from the
public concerned about the official endorsement of titular nations’ culture and
history, local leaders were bound to accept nationality as the dominant nucleus of
political discourse in post-independent Central Asia. It is therefore argued that
ethno-nationalism of state and society in post-Soviet Central Asia was not purely

Press, p.99
an opportunistic move of former communist leaders to find a new political ideology for their rule, but took place in response to growing public will for a more appropriate, institutional acknowledgement of the nations’ cultural and historical heritage. The establishment of political community based on ethnic identity or ethno-nationalism was to trigger serious problems in all Central Asian republics.

The collapse of the USSR and the transition to independence therefore propelled Central Asia to a course of further nation-building. It was a course that was particularly beneficial to the entrenched party elite in Central Asia. In this way, Central Asia’s communist party officials with new, nationalistic hats came to be the engineers of the transition to national independence. Many political leaders in Central Asia shifted their stance on key national issues. They quickly became champions of titular languages as official government languages. For example, Karimov, who spoke in broken Uzbek before independence, took intensive training in the native tongue. He and other leaders quickly learned to make speeches in their native languages rather than Russian to avoid looking as a totally russified agent. They also skilfully took over the cultural and national concerns of nationalistic groups like ‘Jeltoqsan’ (December) or the ‘Azat’ (free) movement in Kazakhstan, ‘Agzy-Birlik’ (concord) in Turkmenistan, the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, and ‘Birlik’ (unity) in Uzbekistan at the end of the 1980s, which already promoted ethno-nationalization of their republics before their formal

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declarations of independence.\textsuperscript{764} Moreover, local leaders re-positioned themselves as champions of the historical and cultural legacies of Central Asia as well.

The new-old policy of ethno-nationalism aimed at integrating communal commitment and regional political direction to a pre-interpreted, ethno-political community of Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Turkmen and Uzbeks. This community was seen as the main social underlying layer of the independent states in Central Asia. If Central Asian leaders before condemned the nationalist opposition as politically naive, foreign-inspired, and counter-productive to the interests of the society, now they changed their tack and tried to attract the most capable members of the opposition by offering them key government jobs. The sentiments of the opposition movements ironically contributed to strengthening of the new nation-states of Central Asia.\textsuperscript{765}

Central Asia has always been an ethnically and linguistically diverse region, and political unity occurred only for relatively short periods. There were over 20 bloody inter-ethnic conflicts in the 19th century within the Khanate of Kokand and even more in the Khanate of Khiva.\textsuperscript{766}

Ethnic consciousness in Central Asia still has a hierarchical character. A local person considers himself to belong to a given ethnic group vis-à-vis other groups, but in internal ethnic relations his parochial, kin-based tribal and clan affiliations still play an important role. Parochial divisions are particularly

conspicuous in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, while in other Central Asian republics one can more often notice pure forms of tribalism.\textsuperscript{767}

With the collapse of the USSR and achieving national independence, Central Asian leaders grew more in favour of a return to the Latin script. The governments of both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan announced official reforms to complete a return to the Latin script.

Although president Karimov of Uzbekistan was a staunch supporter of Moscow’s authority, he quickly changed his tune after the collapse of the USSR. After independence, Karimov spearheaded various attempts to find a new normative base for the republic. He championed the national values he had once scorned during the Soviet years. He was trained in Russian and spent most of his professional life working in that language. But as independence approached he changed quickly, and his broken speeches in Uzbek in 1990 were soon replaced by a fluent command of the native tongue.

Days after Karimov gained legal authority over all court cases in Uzbekistan, he issued a decree on 25 December 1991, which pardoned most of those convicted in the notorious ‘cotton scandal’ that was seen as a symbol of foreign intervention. In the new nationalist atmosphere, Karimov proudly exonerated those whom he had plainly condemned a few years before.

Initially, Karimov’s concentration of power under the notion of stronger presidential leadership provoked charges of dictatorship. For example, Shukrulla Mirsaidov, a vice-president of Uzbekistan in 1990-1991, resigned as deputy of parliament in August 1992, writing in a letter to his constituents that an

authoritarian regime was being established in Uzbekistan with the connivance of the parliament. And later on 8 September 1992, he resigned as vice-president in criticism of the emerging dictatorship.

It was evident that the legislature caved in to Karimov’s power, and thus in July 1992 the parliament issued a decree authorizing the president to withdraw the immunity of a member of parliament who is charged with anti-constitutional actions aimed at undermining the state structure. The Karakalpak autonomous republic was brought under the direct supervision of the Uzbekistan government, and the chairmen of Karakalpak’s Supreme Soviet and its Council of Ministers were forced to resign. And the new constitution of Uzbekistan was adopted by the parliament in December 1992.

There were visible opposition movements in the early days of post-independent Uzbekistan. Two of them, namely Birlik and Erk, were prominent. Birlik gained its support by spearheading protest efforts and drawing attention to pressing social problems. Birlik’s leaders defined the organization’s main goals as achieving economic and political sovereignty, as well as restoring the cultural values of Uzbek people. Birlik started as only a small group of intellectuals but quickly discovered broad popular support. Established in early 1990, the movement was allowed by the government to officially register in November 1991 but did not succeed in getting on the ballot. Erk won formal status on 11 September 1991.

In the formative years since independence, the nationality question assumed an entirely new character. Karimov’s policy since independence was to
encourage the popular support for the celebration of national identity. The decree on citizenship in Uzbekistan was adopted in July 1992, which granted citizenship to all persons living in the territory regardless of national origin, social status, race, sex, education, language, or political view. But it has excluded dual citizenship.

The use of the Uzbek language is another example of the narrowing nationality focus of the government. The government’s emphasis on the Uzbek language was designed to impose a single linguistic convention in the country in a short time. Thus, in September 1992 the general director of the Uzbek National Information Agency announced that his agency would soon produce information only in Uzbek.\(^{769}\)

In Uzbekistan, it was not a straightforward task to invent an interpretation of national history and identity without excluding many sections of the former multi-ethnic population, which were merged to a single Uzbek nationality as a result of the Soviet engineering. This complication was not only linked to settled and nomadic ways of life among the pre-Soviet population, but also emerged from the conflicting political heritage of three inimical patrimonial states and opposed tribal groups.

Such prominent historical figures as Uzbek-khan (1313–41) of the Golden Horde, whom modern Uzbeks owe their titular name, or Sheibani-Khan (1500-10), who in 1500 occupied the river oases of Transoxiana with the Uzbek tribal confederacy were not resuscitated from national amnesia by Uzbek leaders. It was


Amir Timur, or Temurlane (1409-47), and the Temurids who were destined to become the new national heroes of independent Uzbekistan.

The choice for Temurlane as the founder and father of modern Uzbekistan was primarily a political calculation. Born near Samarkand, holding the title of an emir and sultan and designating Samarkand as his capital, Temur's historical heritage was thought to be appealing to Uzbeks of both tribal and Sart backgrounds. Uzbek leaders could claim that Uzbeks have always been settled farmers and urban dwellers. On top of that, Temur was a Turk by descent and a leader of the Barlos tribal confederacy. This fact is meant to show affinity to the Sheibanid and Kipchak Uzbeks, who had recognised Chingizid claims of political supremacy. The widespread promotion of Temurlane as a strong national hero did not convince all Uzbeks and, in contrast, many Uzbeks regarded this government campaign as Karimov’s plot to strengthen the influence of his clan from Samarkand, where he was born, as opposed to other regional clans. In addition to the Temurlane campaign, the Uzbek government tried to revive the historical heritage of Jadids and interpret the Jadid sources as authoritative texts for its secular state structures and for its emphasis of Sufi traditions in the re-interpretation of Uzbekistan’s Islamic heritage.
Map 7. Uzbekistan today

During its first year of independence, Kyrgyzstan immediately encountered some of the classic problems of a small and dependent country entering the world scene. The country also suffered a series of natural calamities during 1992. Exceptionally heavy rains and mud slides caused serious economic problems. A major earthquake left as many as 65,000 inhabitants in the areas of Jalalabad and Osh without shelter and disrupted water and power systems. In late April 1992, hail and late frost killed a large portion of the early plantings. Under these difficult circumstances, Kyrgyzstan held to an ambitious policy of Western-oriented reform.

In Kyrgyzstan, ethno-nationalism of the republic faced complex problems. Since Kyrgyz only represent around 60 per cent of the republic's population, revived nationalism does seem to be most appropriate means to secure the political integration of all communities in Kyrgyzstan. That is why previous Kyrgyz president Askar Akayev often presented himself as the president of all citizens of Kyrgyzstan and a defender of the interests of national minorities. This notwithstanding, Akaev had to appeal to the Kyrgyz majority and supported the revival of the Kyrgyz national heritage. For that purpose, the government supported numerous researches and books about the Kyrgyz epic Manas and widely promoted Manas as national hero of Kyrgyzstan.

Beside the problem of regionalism, Kyrgyzstan has also to deal with a serious rift between northern and southern Kyrgyz. This north-south divide has survived the Soviet period and is endangering the political integrity of the republic now. Before the Soviet colonization these two parts were separated, and nomadic tribes maintained different political orientations. While the northern
Kyrgyz territories had closer contact with neighbouring Kazakhs from the southern edges of the steppe, the Kyrgyz of the south were influenced by the Khanate of Kokand, which was key to the Islamization of the southern Kyrgyz tribes. Both communities were autonomous and had limited communication with each other.\footnote{Geiss, P. (2005). \textit{Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia}. London, Routledge, p. 251}

Clan and tribal membership has retained great importance in Kyrgyzstan, even though the former first secretary of the KPK, Usubaliev, insisted that tribalism no longer existed in his republic and that official appointments on the basis of tribe or clan had no place anymore.\footnote{Tabyshaliev, S. (June 26:1988). Interview with Usubaliev. \textit{Sovetskaia Kirgizia}. Bishkek.} In fact, Khazanov notes that in the 1930-1950s the majority of leading positions were occupied by southern Kyrgyz from the Kipchak tribe, and then the balance of power began to change in favour of the northern Sary-Bagys tribe.\footnote{Khazanov, A. M. (1994). \textit{Underdevelopment and Ethnic Relations in Central Asia}. \textit{Central Asia in Historical Perspective}. B. Manz. Oxford, Westview Press, p.148} When in October 1990 Askar Akaev became the President of Kyrgyzstan, his election was linked to a struggle not only between reformists and conservatives, but also to rivalry between northern and southern Kyrgyz. The rivalry was so intense and the period so sensitive that in the view of some Soviet observers it put the republic on the brink of a civil war.\footnote{Rotar, I. (October 28:1992). \textit{Volnenia v Dzhelal-Abade}. \textit{Nezavisimaia Gazeta}. Moscow.} From the south himself, president Akaev used to meet the strongest opposition in the northern regions of Kyrgyzstan. In the countryside, many Kyrgyz are still able to trace their ancestors back at least seven generations, an ability that has survived since the tribal organization of Kyrgyz in the seventh century.
Map 8. Kyrgyzstan today

5.0 Reforming political institutions and state structures

The initial optimism after the end of the Cold War was quickly replaced by frantic attempts to re-conceptualize approaches to ethnic conflicts, which engulfed a number of countries in the post-Soviet landscape. Scholars and policy-makers were in frantic search for ultimate peace-providing element that would substitute the disappeared bipolar system, which was arguably peace-maintaining instrument during the Cold War. This search was often linked to the importance of the state systems and institutions that were hoped to ensure peace within state borders and beyond them. Many slogans were made that one should not look further than such liberal concepts as democracy and the rule of law. While democracy remains a topical and divisive issue, especially in the developing and post-colonial countries, the rule of law is less disputed by governments and more often quoted as a desired component of governance. Central Asian leaders have been no exception in praising the benefits of the rule of law and publicly stating adherence to it.

The rule of law is often perceived as a straightforward and problem-free concept. However, the rule of law is a very complex and essentially contested concept, and demands a closer look. The following discussion therefore aims to explore what the rule of law stands for and analyze its relationship with other political ideals, such as democracy and constitutionalism. It will also outline how the rule of law and related political and legal reforms have evolved in Central Asia, and how and what it may contribute to the future conflict resolution in the
social institutional framework. Such discussion is useful for transitional societies, such as those of Central Asia, because their aspiration to the rule of law can be hindered without proper understanding of the nature of the concept. The meaning of the rule of law differs from writer to writer but most frequently it is quoted in connection to or in conjunction with the terms of democracy and constitutionalism. So the discussion will start with look into the relationship between the rule of law and each of those terms in more detail.

The concepts of democracy and the rule of law date back to the Ancient Greek times. Initially, the rule of law was known as isonomia, which meant “equality of laws to all manner of persons”. Hayek suggests that isonomy, being contrasted to the arbitrary rule of tyrants, was older than the concept of democratia, which appeared to be one of the consequences of the former. The term isonomy was still in use after democracy had been in force, “at first in its justification and later in order to disguise the character [disregard to the equality of law] it assumed”. At some point in the seventeenth century the concept of isonomy became known as the rule of law, especially in England. However, since the times of the Greek democracy it was clearly understood that both concepts of the rule of law and democracy, although related, were not the exactly same.

Moreover, the controversy and debate over the very form of democracy that has been evident since the ancient times led to different perceptions of the relationship between the rule of law and democracy. The perception of the rule of law, as a norm, differs from those who favour the direct, or participatory, model of democracy to those who advocate for the representative, or liberal, democracy.

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Liberal democracy is widely understood as “a system of rule embracing elected ‘officers’ who undertake to ‘represent the interests and/or views of citizens within the framework of ‘the rule of law’’.” As it can be seen, some liberal democrats perceive the rule of law as the very modus operandi of democracy. Hayek, a constitutional democrat himself, went on further to argue that the rule of law is an essential feature of constitutional democracy, without which democracy would invalidate itself and become ‘doctrinaire’. He claims that:

There has often been much more cultural and spiritual freedom under an autocratic rule than under some democracies - and it is at least conceivable that under the government of a very homogeneous and doctrinaire majority democratic government might be as oppressive as the worst dictatorship.

Underlying this is the idea that the coercive political power of the majority and government can be constructively constrained only if certain general rules and principles, such as the rule of law, are respected and observed. David Held points to Hayek’s support for Locke’s dictum – “Wherever Law ends Tyranny begins”, meaning that “the law, properly constituted, binds governments to guarantee ‘life, liberty, and estate’… [thus] the legislative scope of governments is, and must be, restrained by the rule of law.” What is implied here is that the role of the rule of law is further developed to the function as a guarantor of freedom in democracy and a safeguard against the ‘oppressive’ and arbitrary majoritarian model of democracy.

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The direct or participatory model of democracy is rooted in the Athenian democracy. In those days, democracy meant direct participation of citizens in the affairs of the state, and the private life of an individual could only be fulfilled within the public life of the citizen. Thereafter, diverging views on the role of the rule of law in direct democracy emerged. On the one hand, it was argued that the rule of law is necessary to harmonize public life. Pericles in his historical funeral speech re-stated adherence to the rule of law, by stating that:

> When it is a question of settling private disputes, everyone is equal before the law…. We are free and tolerant in our private lives; but in public affairs we keep to the law. This is because it commands our deep respect.  

Held expands further by stressing that “if the law is properly created within the framework of the common life, it legitimately commands obedience” and suggests that the notion of the rule of law was incorporated into the polity of the Athenian democracy. In other words, the rule of law was concerned with the observance of procedures for making policy decisions rather than the decision themselves. On the other hand, some critics of the direct democracy condemn this artificial adherence to the rule of law on the grounds of the dominance of the sovereign ruler’s will over laws. Hayek notes that it is in the Athenian democracy that we can see “the first clashes between the unfettered will of the ‘sovereign’ people and the tradition of the rule of law; and it was chiefly because the assembly often refused to be bound by the law”. Aristotle in his *Politics* also denounced this

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type of government in which “the people govern and not the law” and “everything is determined by majority vote and not by law” \(^{784}\).

As it can be seen the conception of the rule of law in direct democracy extends from considering it useless and superfluous to granting it a minimal role of mediator in public affairs. The emphasis of advocates for this form of democracy is generally placed on achieving the widest direct involvement of the people and on eliminating obstacles and constraints to participation. Hence, the comprehension of the rule of law in direct democracy depends on perceiving it as a facilitator or limiter of the popular will and participation.

It is evident that the conception of the rule of law is different from democracy, and that this distinction dates back to the Ancient Greek period. This understanding of the difference is useful for transitional democracies. In their attempts to achieve an appropriate form of democracy, transitional societies could first strive for strengthening of the rule of law, as it is not totally dependent on the former. In addition, those societies that believe that the Western type of democracy is alien to their culture or that it is not the right time to endeavour meeting those high standards, can still operate in the framework of the rule of law, and by doing so they may have made forward steps towards democratic achievements.

Although democracy and the rule of law are not identical ideals, they are related. This relationship has been a focus of scholarly debate since the times of Athenian democracy. Scholars’ position on the relationship between the rule of law and democracy depends on their views on and approaches to either of popular

models of democracy - direct or indirect. Since it is not our task to justify a choice for either model, suffice it to say that they both share such common ideals as equality and freedom. And whatever model of democracy is adopted as preferable, the rule of law is either a pre-condition or condition (or indeed both) to democracy. For liberal democracies, the rule of law is often perceived as a working framework, cornerstone ideal and a guarantor of freedom. For participatory democracies, the rule of law is regarded essential to harmonise public life and to prevent arbitrariness of political power. As Hayek notes, “democratic control may prevent power from becoming arbitrary, but it does not do so by its mere existence”. 785

It is however useful to note that democracy is not an objective indicator for the existence of the rule of law, because the rule of law has not exclusively existed in democratic societies. In England, for example, it is well established that the rule of law pre-dated the emergence of democratic procedures. Having said that, it is necessary to mention that the sphere, or regime, where the rule of law is in place should not be confused with its flawed or distorted content.

Constitutionalism is another notion which is closely associated with the rule of law. Like the rule of law, constitutionalism is a concept in-process and has gradually evolved from its ancient prototype to its modern conception. 786 In order to fathom the relations of constitutionalism to the rule of law one need to determine contemporary understanding of constitutionalism first. The term of constitutionalism is normally used in two senses: narrow and broad. As pointed

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786 For more information, see McIlwain, C. (1947). Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern, Cornell University Press.
out by Sir Kenneth Wheare in his *Modern Constitutions*, constitutionalism in narrow sense simply implies the definition of a constitution as “the rules which establish and regulate or govern the government”.\textsuperscript{787} This collection of legal rules constitutes the system within which government is to operate. Following this logic, constitutionalism concerns itself with creating a meta-legal framework for government organization and gives lip service to its content and implementation. Such conception has been criticized for its nominal nature. For example, Eric Barendt points out that:

> Adherence to constitutionalism means that the constitution must necessarily check absolute power; otherwise it does not deserve recognition as a proper, liberal constitution. There is little or no point to a constitution unless its structure and contents reflect the purposes of adopting one in place of despotic government.\textsuperscript{788}

Constitutionalism is more frequently perceived in broader terms, which involves more concern with and attention to government action. According to Walton Hamilton, “constitutionalism is the name given to the trust which men repose in the power of words engrossed on parchment to keep a government in order”.\textsuperscript{789} In other words, raison-d’être of constitutionalism rests on promoting the constitution as the fundamental law (written or unwritten) in attempts to regulate government’s actions. Since governments tend to wield significant power, the principle of constitutionalism is based on “this idea of restraining the government in its


exercise of power [and] therefore, is to be set in contradistinction to arbitrary power”.  

Some of the components of constitutionalism, usefully described by Barnett, suggest that the exercise of power should be limited by law, powers within a state should be separated and independent, and that the government should be held accountable for its actions. It is evident that some elements of the doctrine of constitutionalism when conceived in broader terms resemble those of the rule of law. There is little doubt that the rule of law and constitutionalism both have similar aims and objectives in society. Charles McIlwain notes that constitutionalism is linked to the rule of law and claims that “true constitutionalism, from medieval times to our own, has never meant government enfeebled by divisions within itself; it has meant government limited by law”.  

Carl Friedrich, on the other hand, widens the scope of constitutionalism and defines constitutionalism as “both the practice of politics according to ‘rules of the game’, which insure effective restraints upon governmental and other political action, and the theory - explanatory and justificatory - of this practice”. The term constitutionalism, when used in its broader conception, is often employed as a synonym of the rule of law. Therefore one should beware of blurring the distinction between the two. In spite of similarities, the rule of law is a fundamental principle of the just and free society, whereas constitutionalism has gradually turned to a discipline that prescribes methods of managing and

regulating state business. Put it slightly differently, the rule of law encompasses principles of a free society and provides for the framework where free society is able to operate. Constitutionalism, on the other hand, is one of the means of realizing the rule of law through detailed description of the modus operandi. This argument is eloquently expressed by constitutional theorist Charles McIlwain:

Constitutionalism is more a method than a principle. It is the method of law as contrasted with force or with will. If this law perpetuated some abuses, it has also preserved all our liberties. 794

It is possible to infer from the above-said that constitutionalism shares some features of the rule of law and complements it but it falls short in terms of both scope and objective to be fully equated with it.

Terms that are closely associated with the rule of law, democracy and constitutionalism, have so far been discussed. A more topical contest on the rule of law however stems from the debate over the content and principles of the rule of law. One can group the views on this issue into formal and substantive conception of the rule of law. 795 Formal conceptions of the rule of law cover procedural principles of law-creating and law-implementing processes. In the view of Esteban, “they do not seek to judge the actual content of the law provided that the formal precepts of the Rule of Law are respected”. 796 What one can infer from this is that the formal conception of the rule of law may have first arisen from the understanding of the rule of law as supremacy of law.

In his *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution*, Albert Dicey, one of the authoritative advocates of the supremacy of the rule of law, puts forward three ‘distinct though kindred’ features of the rule of law of the formal conception. According to him, the first element of the rule of law states that:

[N]o man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established before the ordinary courts of the land. In this sense the rule of law contrasted with every system of government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary or discretionary powers of constraint.

It is evident that Dicey distinguishes between law-bound government and arbitrary government, implying that the rule of law restrains arbitrariness of the government and holds citizens responsible only if they broke distinct law. The second element postulates the idea of ‘equal subjection’ of all people to law. This is similar to the ancient notion of isonomy, mentioned earlier. Most people would expect that the law does not discriminate against people on any grounds and should apply equally to ordinary citizens and officials. The third component of the Dicey’s supremacy of law is of common-law nature and mainly involves British Constitution. According to it, in Britain, for example, “the law of the constitution, the rules which in foreign countries naturally form part of a constitutional code, are not the source but the consequence of the rights of individuals, as defined and enforced by the courts.” This element underlies belief that fundamental individual rights

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“had to be put beyond the reach of governments which might seek to curtail them to facilitate broader social and economic goals.” 800

Even though Dicey’s approach to the rule of law is impressive, it has been met with criticism, namely that the notion that a person can only be punished for a breach of law sounds like a plain tautology. Even though it may sound that way, this principle deserves due appreciation as it paved the way for due process and fair trial, which are enjoyed in a free society. Dicey’s equal subjection doctrine was criticized by Jennings as untrue reality that does not provide evidence that officials have the same rights and duties as ordinary citizens. This argument seems to be only partially true because even though officials abide by specific government acts and provisions, they are not exempt from the ordinary laws of the land. This point was highlighted by Dicey some time ago, when he noted that “though a soldier or a clergymen incurs from his position legal liabilities from which other men are exempt, he does not (speaking generally) escape thereby from the duties of an ordinary citizen”. 801 Another substantive criticism relates to the claim that Dicey’s concept is formal and empty.

Joseph Raz in his *The Rule of Law and Its Virtue* lent significant support to the formal conception of the rule of law. 802 He points out two main fallacies in the treatment of the rule of law. The first relates to the assumption of its supreme importance, while the second concerns the ‘perversion’ of the doctrine of the rule of law. By perversion Raz means the definition of the doctrine in broad terms, and thus turning it to a mere slogan to be associated with other unrelated, loose

political ideals; the process that he believes has already seized the fate of democracy.\textsuperscript{803} Raz holds that such perversion can only be obliterated if the rule of law is defined formally or literally - the rule of the law.

Following Raz’s frame of mind, the rule of law should be understood in Aristotelian phrase “government by law and not by men”. Accordingly, all government action must have foundation in, and authorized by, law. The law should be general, open and relatively stable. However, granted that every legal system should consist of both general, open and stable laws (popular conception of law) and specific executive or judiciary rules (legal orders), the rule of law requires that “the making of particular laws should be guided by open and relatively stable general rules”.\textsuperscript{804}

Raz’s formal conception of the rule of law has two main aspects. The first says that people should be ruled by the law and obey it. The second holds that law must be capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects. Therefore, a state which can satisfy these two criteria would be a state under the rule of law. Expanding on the issue, Maria Esteban states that the rule of law is conceived as a ‘negative value’ and its role is “to minimise the danger created by the law itself, the danger of arbitrary power”.\textsuperscript{805}

The formal conception of the rule of law involves principles that make law capable of being obeyed and guiding the behaviour of its subjects. Raz classifies

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eight principles in two groups. The first is concerned with conformity of the law to standards designed to enable it effectively to guide human action. The second group ensures that the legal enforcement system should not deprive the law of its ability to guide through distorted enforcement as well as be able to supervise conformity to the rule of law. The principles of the first group hold that: 1) all laws should be prospective, open and clear; 2) laws should be relatively stable; and 3) the making of particular laws should be guided by open, stable, clear and general rules. The second group states that: 1) the independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed; 2) the principles of natural justice (due process and fair trial) must be observed; 3) the courts should have powers over the implementation of the other principles to ensure conformity to the rule of law; 4) the courts should be easily accessible; and 5) the discretion of the crime preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law.

The formal conception of the rule of law by Raz resembles Ronald Dworkin’s rule book conception. The rule book conception argues that so far as is possible, “the power of the state should never be exercised against individual citizens except in accordance with rules explicitly set out in a public rule book available to all”. Dworkin’s rule book reinstates Raz’s principles of stable, open and general laws that are tasked to prevent arbitrariness of the government.

The above principles of the formal conception of rule of law have been widely endorsed by legal and political thinkers. They are supported on the grounds that they promote universality, predictability and avoidance of arbitrariness. Esteban observes that the discourse on the formal conception of the rule of law

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tends to focus on “the specification of certain formal or procedural characteristics
which commands and rules may have or lack, but which are thought to be
desirable on various grounds connected with liberty and justice”.

The Formal conception of the rule of law is argued to have a major flaw -
that it ignores substantive inequalities in power and disregard the unjust and
undemocratic regimes. For example, Raz claims that:

A non-democratic legal system, based on the denial of human rights, on
extensive poverty, on racial segregation, sexual inequalities and religious
prosecution may, in principle, conform with the requirements of the Rule of Law
better than any of the legal systems of the more enlightened western
democracies.

Thus, the rule of law in its formal conception implies a government of law rather
than of men, which is bound by predictable, prospective, open and clear rules of
the rule of law. It may happen so that countries that follow the rule of law may not
necessarily be democratic. Raz takes this further by claiming that a non-
democratic legal system “may, in principle, conform to the requirements of the
rule of law better than any of the legal systems of the more enlightened western
democracies”.

A substantive conception while admitting the importance of the formal
conception’s approach to rule of law seeks to develop the notion further.
Substantive conceptions hold that there are certain fundamental rights (legal
principles), which are based on the rule of law and are protected by it. Thus, the

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rule of law not only involves formal principles but also ensures that laws comply with certain substantive rights. In these terms, the rule of law means the rule of good law. Esteban makes her views clear by noting that “the Rule of Law should look to the content of particular laws in order to determine whether they comply with the Rule of Law”. However, what is bound to hinder Esteban’s expectations is the fact that there is little consensus on what the good law is. The substantive conception of the rule of law has a different name in Dworkin’s terminology. He defines it as the ‘rights conception’. The rights conception calls for a recognition of fundamental rights. On the purpose of the rights conception, Dworkin states that “it insists that these moral and political rights be recognised in positive law so that they may be enforced upon the demand of individual citizens through courts or other judicial institutions of the familiar type, so far as this is practicable”. He continues, by noting that:

The Rule of Law on this conception is the ideal of rule by an accurate public conception of individual rights. It does not distinguish, as the rule book conception does, between the Rule of Law and substantive justice; on the contrary it requires, as part of the ideal of law, that the rules in the book capture and enforce moral rights.

Reflecting on the rights conception by Dworkin, Esteban notes that “there is no difference between the Rule of Law and the particular theory of law and adjudication embodied in the rights-based approach to law”. As was discussed, it is often not fully understood what is implied if a political order is not based on

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the rule of law. In democracies, competition between various political parties is possible, because both citizens and politicians respect the rule of law which regulates political competition. Political power is linked to the attainment of majorities in constitutional assemblies, which decide on new laws executed by the government and its administrative staff and interpreted in the last resort by independent courts. Due to the rule of law, authority relations are de-personalized and stable, despite changes of political elites. The monopoly on physical coercion and taxation are secured by citizens’ and officials’ commitment to the law. On the other hand, political orders which form state structures but which are not based on ‘legal authority’ operate on a quite different basis. This form of political community relies on relations of piety and loyalty between rulers and ruled. The loyalty of administrative staff to the rulers is the constitutive principle of such a political order, which through this means tries to strengthen or secure its monopoly on taxation and the use of physical force. In this framework, authority relations are personalised and often unstable. Changes in the leadership can have direct effect on the political order.

Since patrimonial politics depends on loyalty to the ruling leader, democratic elections have destabilizing effects on the polity. As it is the case in Central Asia, whenever the supreme political position is vacant, various groups and regional leaders compete for political influence. The successful politician will re-arrange the balance of power by forming political alliances and distributing important administrative positions to other influential leaders. He will also seek to deprive potential rivals of their influence. If several strong eligible candidates are

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up for election, people tend to vote according to the candidate’s regional or tribal origin than for his programme, because they believe that their candidate will promote their region’s interest if elected.

In Central Asia, ruling presidents are more often re-elected for their promises to serve as guarantors of peace and stability in their republics. Incumbent presidents are also better able to mobilize their electorate through their patronage networks during presidential campaigns, via their privileged access to mass media or by means of active interference to rival’s election campaign. Bearing in mind the under-development of political institutionalization, it is not surprising that Central Asian presidents have tried to minimize the political risks of elections in several ways.\(^{815}\)

The first method involved their calling for referenda to extend their term of office. In this way, for example, Niyazov’s term in Turkmenistan was prolonged for six years in January 1994 by a 99.99 per cent vote. Uzbek president Karimov was confirmed in office for another five years in March 1995 by a 99.6 per cent vote, and in January 2002 his term was extended to seven years by another referendum. Nazarbaev won a 95.4 per cent vote in April 1995, which extended his term of office until 2000. This method was justified on the grounds that the constitutions of the republics limited presidency to two terms. Thus, in Kyrgyzstan, where no referendum was held, this problem arose when Akayev decided to run for a third term in 2000. However, well-briefed constitutional lawyers revealed that Akayev's first term (1991-1995) should not be counted because the election had taken place before the Kyrgyz constitution was drafted.
and enforced. One could also mention that till now only the former Turkmen president Niyazov formally demonstrated his commitment to patrimonialism by becoming the first president in the former Soviet Union to be installed for an unlimited period from December 1999.

The second refers to incumbent presidents’ influencing elections through manipulation of the registration process of presidential candidates and parties. Elections in 1999 and 2000 symbolised a move to this method with ample evidence on how opposition candidates were prevented from registering as candidates. The obvious rationale behind these procedures was to prevent the emergence of any political group, which may be inclined to oppose or criticize the government and the president.

The third solution concerned their efforts not to grant any significant powers to the parliament and to reduce existing powers in favour of strengthening the president’s position. This has been the case in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Some Kazakh political observers have argued that Nazarbaev dissolved the parliament in March 1995, ruled by decree, extended his term of office by referendum and enacted a new constitution for a strong presidential regime in order to eliminate Middle and Small Zhus (horde) opposition to his rule as representative of the Great Zhus. On a similar note, Kyrgyz president Akaev marginalized the parliament by organizing referenda on amendments to the constitution in October 1994 and February 1996, which effectively abolished Kyrgyz parliamentarism and granted the president powers to appoint and dismiss ministers without parliament’s approval.

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The criticism of Central Asian governments is normally levelled at human rights abuses, but it is often meant and understood in broader terms. In some respects, this criticism may be read as a disapproval of the entire system of governance. Government leaders repeatedly emphasize their commitment to democracy and market economics, but these rhetorical statements most often do not represent intent. In this regard, some critics feel that the words of the distinguished scholar of democracy V. Key may be closer to the truth: “The superimposition over a people habituated to tyranny of a leadership imbued with democratic ideals probably would not create a viable democratic order.”

However, there is more convergence of views between Western governments and those of Central Asia on the advantages of aiming for good governance. Good government conventionally prescribes pragmatism rather than ideology, urges the rule of law and public accountability rather than personalized and arbitrary rule. It also strives to transparency and openness rather than secrecy and insider politics. Conventional approaches to good governance emphasize the procedures and institutions of the government, bound by the rule of law. The institutions of good governance are usually understood to include representative government limited by the constitution, and separate functions carried out by independent legislative, judicial, and executive branches. The procedures of good government stress the rule of law and an independent judiciary.

The rule of law means that all components of society, including the public bureaucracy, operate under the same legal constraints and with the same legal

rights to enable peaceful and predictable political and economic participation. The law of secured transactions provides a framework for stable expectations in the marketplace. The rule of law requires that the legal system exist not only on paper but also in practice. Thus written laws must also be implemented, enforced, understood, accepted, and used. This necessitates a clear legal framework, mechanisms for the enforceability of agreements, transparency in dispute resolution, and the possibility of recourse against arbitrary acts.

The political order in Central Asia is based on an efficient state apparatus, which seeks the political integration of the population and secures its external security. It is also obvious and the regional leadership is aware that Central Asian governments will risk instability, if they are not able to solve some of the most urgent social and economic of their national republics. Improved economic performance alone does not secure political order. The carrot-and-stick approach in this context may enable opportunistic political order, but is less efficient in terms of the normative commitments of people.

If to take Uzbekistan as an example, the problem of political order is equally acute. In the pre-Soviet era a great part of the former Sart population of Uzbekistan was committed to sharia laws. This commitment did not disappear among today’s Uzbek population. Even during the Soviet period, Islamic cultural traditions continued to be covertly transmitted, and mullahs had an important position by performing religious ceremonies. When Karimov increasingly began to oppose ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ after the outbreak of civil war in Tajikistan,

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he was partly reacting to a perceived threat to the secularization of his country and partly trying to consolidate his power base.

According to Geiss, a functioning political order will be difficult to establish in Central Asia if there is little legal consciousness or if there are competing legal traditions regarding the notion of justice.\(^{820}\) As was discussed in previous chapters, legal conceptions in pre-tsarist Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, were based on tribal customary law, which regulated social relations between tribesmen. These legal traditions were influential and were allowed to exist in a limited and modified way within tsarist local administration. At that time, numerous compilations of customary law were collected and published to spread knowledge about it among tsarist officials. In contrast, the Soviet administration deliberately abandoned these legal traditions, combated them and tried to replace them by socialist laws and practices. Although this struggle seems to have not been fully successful at local level, it deprived state politics from its embedment in a legal culture, which could be shared by great parts of the population.\(^{821}\)

An evolutionary development of customary law towards the legal integration of authority relations and the constraint of state authority, such as took place in Anglo-American countries, is not probable in Central Asia because customary law no longer has any political significance in the region.\(^{822}\) In

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addition, its pre-tsarist state of development does not allow any basis for conflict regulation within contemporary Kazakh, Kyrgyz or Turkmen societies.\textsuperscript{823}

In sharp contrast, during the Soviet period patrimonial authority relations were re-established, as was described in detail in previous sections. They secured the political integration of regions in the republics and guaranteed the maintenance of the social infrastructure and the allocation of resources without being embedded in a legal culture shared by the people.\textsuperscript{824} In contemporary Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, for instance, these state-society relations are still intact. The state has strong control over strategic economic sectors and can effectively use its revenues to implement central policies. Unlike Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan that have opened their economies to international markets and privatized strategic branches of their economy, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have retained strong, hegemonic state structures. This factor has led to greater competition between regional leaders and central government, and has also decreased the state’s ability to provide the population with basic social infrastructure.\textsuperscript{825}

As most observers would agree the state’s withdrawal from economic and social responsibilities in Kazakhstan, backed by some financial and legal reforms, increased the protection of property and the rule of law in economic matters. This helped to recover the Kazakh economy and increased income for private services. In the current Central Asian situation, only state structures have an ability to spread a legal culture in areas which have been deprived of their legal traditions. This culture is an important precondition for the attainment of some kind of


political freedom and the rule of law. On the other hand, one should beware that sustaining the strong state structures do not automatically guarantee the successful establishment of enduring political order, but may often cause worse human rights records. In balance, there are good reasons to assume that client-patron relations will remain a constitutive element of Central Asian politics, even if some kind of legal culture evolves concomitantly.

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6.0 Conclusion

THIS chapter examined the consequences of the dramatic politicization of ethno-nationhood in Central Asia during the last years of the Soviet Union and the first years of independence. The increased politicization of ethnical nationhood in Central Asia was a natural effect of seventy years of the Soviet regime’s institutional crystallizations and codification of nationhood as the main organizing principle of the society.

The chapter showed that the expanded political scene and more political freedom during perestroika allowed for greater political mobilization, which followed national lines. The new political environment also changed the scene of inter-ethnic relations, which shifted from one of the ‘eternal friendship’ to sporadic hostilities. As the reform-minded Moscow was not able or willing to intervene politically, the local elite in Central Asia not only was unable to control the disruptive political expressions but also took advantage of the national sentiments and ethno-national platform for gaining fast declining political legitimacy.

The relevance and applicability of the triadic nexus between three distinct and mutually antagonistic nationalisms - nationalizing state, national minorities, and external national homelands – was examined in the context of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Having analyzed the cases of the two states, the study modified the triadic nexus framework by emphasizing the duality of nexus between two
opposing nationalisms - the core nation and national minority. It was shown that both states were nationalizing states and developed national policies in the name of titular nationality. Both the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks saw themselves as legitimate owners of their state. After perceived long repressions by the Soviet regime, the state’s nationalizing policies were directed at promoting the language, reviving national culture, boosting economic welfare and boosting political hegemony of the titular nation.

At the same time, transborder nationalism was hardly present in the region, with the exception of repatriation policies of Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan tried to sporadically involve the diaspora in its nationalizing policies through the World Congress of the Kyrgyz, but it was opposed by the elected parliamentarians. Uzbekistan disinterest in supporting its co-ethnic abroad was largely based on security concerns originating from the other side of its borders, contentment with its homogenous demography and unwillingness to change the status quo in regard to its treatment of national minorities.

National minorities residing in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan also designated their political space in specifically national terms. National minorities in Central Asia perceived themselves as members of distinct nationalities, which had been channelled and shaped by the national structure of social classification, institutionalized by the Soviet Union. Such self-definition and the consequent claims for public rights in that capacity strengthened nationalistic perceptions and practices of the titular nation. It also pushed the dominant majority to define their own nationhood more in ethno-nationalistic than in civic or territorial terms. The nationalizing Kyrgyz and Uzbek states employed different approaches toward
their national minorities. Kyrgyz nationalities policies tried to achieve two aims: first, to ensure harmonious inter-ethnic relations in the country; and second, to respond to nationalistic demands to the extent possible. The Uzbek government aimed for the total consolidation of power and territory and provided minimum opportunities for political mobilization of its national minorities. Its authoritarian style of governance and repressive approach to civil society significantly reduced the capacity of national minorities to organize politically.

The opposing ethno-nationalisms of the nationalizing states and national minorities resulted in the series of inter-ethnic clashes. One of the bloodiest conflicts was between two ethno-national groups, Kyrgyz majority and Uzbek minority, in Osh oblast’, south of Kyrgyzstan. The Osh conflict lasted several months, from June 1990 to November 1990, and the scale of casualties and destruction was immense. Official figures quoted the number of up to 200 people dead, but unofficial sources claimed that more than 1000 people were killed in violence. The analysis of the Osh conflict provides fascinating revelations. Even though one of the most quoted causes for the Osh conflict were said to be socio-economic in nature, the chapter showed that socio-economic hardships were one of a number of other contributing factors that added ‘kerosene to fire’.

The most crucial element in the Osh conflict was in fact the rigid institutionalized distinction between ethno-national groups in Kyrgyzstan, which was a result of the Soviet ethno-national experiment in Central Asia. The Osh conflict was an ethnic conflict between an ethno-national minority and a dominant majority struggling for power and resources in the context of volatile and expanding political environment. In this situation, the ethno-national majority
controls access to the power and resources of the state while the minorities, normally without resorting to an open confrontation with the dominant national group, question the state structure as a whole. But in the Osh case, the Uzbek minority as well as the Kyrgyz majority did react violently at the decreasing resources and increasing opportunities because the state and its institutions were unable to suggest alternative mechanisms for regulating and resolving these contradictions.

With the benefit of hindsight, what should have been done different to prevent the Osh conflict? And, what lessons can we draw from the Osh conflict? The chapter argued that, bearing in mind that institutionalized ethno-nationhood has had a crucial factor in Central Asia’s socio-political development in general, and inter-ethnic relations in particular, it is reasonable to explore institutional and structural solutions, as well as other available tools. The chapter therefore explained the benefits of institutional reforms at the state-structural level so that to harness and counter-balance institutionalized ethno-nationalism at the social level. It proposed considering institutional reforms within the framework of democratization and the rule of law to move towards a more peaceful, predictable, and resolvable inter-ethnic relations. Mechanisms of democratization and the rule of law can contribute to the institutionalization of preventative mechanisms, which could serve as a counter-balance and discharging element of the destructive effects that ethno-nationalism is bound to manifest in the social and political development of Central Asia.
CHAPTER VI, CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study has explored nation-formation in Central Asia and its effect on inter-ethnic relations in the region by employing institutional perspective on ethno-nationhood. It has disassociated itself from the mainstream approaches to Central Asia’s questions of ethnicity and nationality, which tend to pose such questions as: “are these nations modern or ancient?”, “how are ethnic groups in Central Asia defined and characterized?” and “are ethnic and ethno-political conflicts caused by ancient hatreds or modern circumstances?”

The discussions of nationalism in Central Asia have usually been dominated by two perspectives. The first, primordialist view, treats nationalist mobilizations and conflicts as eruptions of long-repressed ancient hatreds and identities, as well as expressions of nationalistic desires denied by the Soviet regime and liberated by the political opportunity after the fall of the regime. It tends to fuse primordial identities and contemporary nationalities, and claims that a nation is a community based on a common culture and descent, that its shared identity is conserved and passed on from generations to generations. The proponents of primordialism therefore trace the origins of Central Asian nations to the emergence of proto-ethnic groups in the region during ancient times. They either neglect or downplay profound national developments that took place throughout the modern period. Accordingly, the origins of the Uzbek nation would arguably date back to the Dashti-Kipchak nomadic tribes, which migrated to the region in the early sixteenth century under the leadership of Sheibani-khan. Such
primordialist views were mostly dominant in the Soviet scholarship during the Cold War and still re-surface in the native and Russian scholarship in Central Asia.

The primordialist perspective fails to fully match the historical reality of the nation-formation process in Central Asia. There are clear differences between collective identities of Central Asian people several centuries ago and ethno-national sentiments of the present. In ancient Central Asia people ascribed themselves to a different set of sub-societal and supra-societal identities than those of today. At the supra-societal level, the Islamic heritage and a fusion of Turkic and Persian cultures were dominant factors. At the sub-societal level, Central Asian population identified themselves with strong local, tribal and family sentiments. Furthermore, as the thesis illustrated characteristics of ancient ethnic tribes differ from social, cultural and political characteristics of the modern ethno-nationalities in Central Asia.

The second, modernist view approaches nationhood as wholly modern, social constructs of modernity and stresses the ‘imagined’ nature of communities. Nations are therefore not ancient or immemorial, they are historically specific. Modernism points to the dramatic transformation of a traditional society to a new industrial society, with associated characteristic processes of political and economic centralization, standardization of education, and increased communication. Modernist perspective offers a more advantageous position to address the question of nation-formation and provide a comparative perspective on the histories of Central Asian people. It treats nations as territorial political communities, conjoined with modern states, which constitute the main political
loyalty of their citizens that override their allegiance to other ties. As nations are consciously and deliberately ‘constructed’ by their elite and citizenry through a range of political processes and institutions, a successful nation depends on the infrastructure of social communications and comprehensive institutionalization of values, roles and identities.

However, traditional modernists tend to reify the nation, treat it as an enduring collectivity and neglect state intervention, a crucial aspect in the processes of nation-formation. And in contrast to the expectations of modernization and Marxist theory, industrialization and urbanization in either its capitalist or socialist variant did not lead to an end to national differences and conflicts, but in fact nationality was preserved in the Soviet Union and the power and cohesion of nations and their elites were enhanced.  

The dissertation therefore employed the institutionalist approach to ethnicity and nationhood, which subscribes to the fundamental modernist assumptions. Institutionalist perspective accepts the reality of nationhood and proposes to re-conceptualize that reality and decouple ethno-national study from the study of nations as substantial collectivities. Because group membership is not a fixed but a variable state, one cannot assume that collective action stems from ascribed collective designation. Testing the institutionalist approach for the first time in the context of Central Asia’s nation-construction, the dissertation considers nationhood as a conceptual variable and treats nation not as substance but as institutionalized political form and practical category. As the study confirmed, institutionalist perspective is one of the most optimal frameworks to
understand ethno-national developments in Central Asia and grasp the reality of nationhood and the power of nationalism, without invoking teleological postulates. It is important to add that the application of the institutionalist approach in Central Asia is not meant to constitute yet another theory of nationalism, but rather, serve as a framework for organizing and explaining nationalism in the post-Soviet context. Institutionalist model is important in that it points out the need for new directions in the research of post-Soviet nationalisms. And as an organizing framework, the institutionalist perspective does not seek to replace as much as include and go beyond existing studies and approaches.

Thus, drawing from institutionalist framework the dissertation examined the development of ethno-nationhood in Central Asia. It approached Central Asian nations in general and the Kyrgyz and Uzbek nations in particular, as an institutionalized cultural and political form, as well as a political claim and a category of practice. The dissertation outlined that our understanding of and studies on Central Asian nations should move beyond viewing them as a purely ethno-demographic or ethno-cultural fact, and instead approach Central Asian nationhood as a political claim and a social category, used to transform the reality, change people’s self-consciousness, express demands and mobilize identities. This is important because social mobilization depends on the level of self-consciousness in ethno-national group and awareness of difference with other communities. These are intricately connected political processes: nationhood generates political claims that transform self-consciousness and awareness of otherness, which contributes to increased social mobilization. Mobilization in turn

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leads to further group affiliation and community formation along ethno-national lines. In this context, state institutions not only provide structures necessary to these nation-forming processes, but also allow nationhood to be utilized as a political resource. As a political resource, and as has been the case with Central Asia, nationhood is open for manipulation, with such diverse purposes as to strengthen power, enhance national security, legitimise authority or promote national unity.

During the Soviet and post-Soviet period, state institutions in Central Asia have played a crucial role in forming, transforming and sustaining ethno-nationhood. Contrary to the prevalent view by Sovietologists, the research has shown that the institutional crystallizations of nationality during the Soviet Union were far from being empty forms or legal fictions. Its institutionalization has had a profound effect on the ethno-national development of the region. The Soviet institutionalization of ethno-nationhood followed the two-tiered path of territorial organization of politics and the social classification of people.

The Soviet nationalities policy in Central Asia aimed mainly to achieve two things. Firstly, they purported to control, contain and channel the potentially disruptive for the Soviet system political expressions of nationality through the establishment of national-territorial administrative structures, as well as through promotion, co-option, and repression of national elites. And, secondly, the Soviet leadership wanted to drain nationality of its content while legitimating it as a form, with the view to promote the long-term fading away of nationality as a vital component of social life in Central Asia. The Soviet regime actively

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institutionalized the existence of multiple nationalities as intrinsic elements of the state, and codified nationhood as fundamental social category distinctive from statehood and citizenship.

The Soviet nationalities policy, however, had the opposite from intended consequences on nation-formation in Central Asia. While the first aim of the Soviet nationality policies was achieved to a large extent, the second aim, far from being realised, reinforced the salience and significance of nationality as a central organising principle in the Central Asian societies. Moreover, in Central Asia, ethnicity became individually ascribed and publicly expressed as nationality. Ethnic diversity was perceived as national heterogeneity. Therefore, minority ethnic groups in Central Asia perceive themselves and are perceived by others as belonging to distinct nationalities. Thus, the Soviet institutions successfully embedded ethno-national sentiments deep into the imaginations of Central Asian people.

The study also described how the expanded political scene and more political opportunities during *perestroika* led to the drastic politicization of nationhood. For the first time, the emerging political space allowed for a greater political mobilization, which usually took the national form. The new political environment also influenced inter-ethnic relations. These relations shifted from one of the ‘eternal friendship’ to aggressive competition, and even to open hostilities. When tensions culminated to violence, the reform-minded Moscow was weak and reluctant to intervene politically. The Central Asia elite not only were unable to control the disruptive political expressions but it also took advantage of the national sentiments and ethno-national platform in order to retain
rapidly declining political legitimacy. The tense environment and politicized ethno-nationalism inevitably spilled to violence and inter-ethnic riots in Central Asia, as was the case throughout the territories of the Soviet Union. Thus, previously peaceful inter-communal relations were replaced by violent confrontation and ethnic conflict.

The dissertation offers the original analysis of a number of inter-ethnic disturbances in Central Asia that took place during the last years of the Soviet Union. It also examined in detail the Osh conflict in Kyrgyzstan, the most vicious conflict between the ethno-national groups of the Kyrgyz majority and Uzbek minority in Osh oblast’. The Osh conflict occurred in June 1990 and lasted several months. The scale of casualties and destruction was enormous in Central Asian terms. Official figures put the number of casualties up to 200 people, but unofficial sources claimed, more probably, that more than 1,000 people were killed during violence.

The study revealed a number of interesting findings as a result of the analysis of the Osh conflict. Even though one of the most acknowledged causes of the Osh conflict were said to be socio-economic degradation, the dissertation showed that the socio-economic decline in Kyrgyzstan was one of a number of secondary factors, which only served to aggravate inter-ethnic competition before the eruption of riots, as well as for official purposes to present with a simplified causation of the conflict. The most crucial element in the Osh conflict was, in fact, the rigid institutionalized interaction and inter-relation between the two ethno-national groups in Kyrgyzstan, which was a result of the Soviet institutionalization of ethnicity and nationality in Central Asia. The Uzbek ethnic minority in
Kyrgyzstan perceived themselves as members of distinct nationalities because the Soviet regime taught them to think accordingly of themselves.

The Osh conflict took place in the context of volatile and expanding political environment, where an ethno-national minority and a dominant majority were engaged in the struggle for power and limited resources. The Kyrgyz majority controlled access to state power and resources. While the Uzbek minority, normally avoiding an open confrontation with the dominant national group, questioned the state structure and institutions due to the widespread government discrimination of the Uzbek community in Kyrgyzstan. In Osh oblast’, both ethno-national groups resorted to an open confrontation when faced with the decreasing resources and increasing opportunities. The state institutions of Kyrgyzstan were unable to adapt and propose alternative mechanisms for regulating and resolving these antagonisms.

The national elites of Uzbek community represented their constituents as belonging to a different nation from members of the titular Kyrgyz nationality. The demands of the Uzbek groups for collective public rights, language privileges and territorial autonomy in Osh, which have roots in the institutional legacy of the Soviet nationality policy, directly challenged the claims of the Kyrgyz elites to unitary ownership of their national polities and territories. It was only expected that Kyrgyz state elites perceive such demands by Uzbek ethnic minorities as threatening and as fundamentally illegitimate. In this context, the political or cultural demands of the Uzbek community made them vulnerable to charges of outright disloyalty to the statehood and citizenry of Kyrgyzstan. Although Uzbek
are formally part of the citizenry of the national state, they feel excluded substantively from the actual membership of the nation-state.

From the examination of inter-ethnic riots in Central Asia it can be noted that the self-definition of minorities as members of distinct nations and their consequent claims for public rights in that capacity can reinforce ethno-nationalistic perceptions and indeed practices of the elites of the dominant nationality. It can also reinforce the tendency of the dominant majority to define their own nationhood in ethno-nationalistic rather than civic-territorial terms and to rule their nation-state accordingly, as the Osh case attested.

Given that the institutionalized ethno-nationhood has been a pervasive factor in Central Asia’s socio-political development in general and inter-ethnic relations in particular, the study prompts to look for institutionalist solutions to the national question in Central Asia. With that in mind, some of the institutional changes at the state-structural level and within the framework of democratization and the rule of law have been shown to have the potential to harness and regulate the effects of institutionalized ethno-nationalism at the social level. It recommends considering such institutional reforms as part of wider deliberations into promoting more peaceful and secure inter-ethnic relations in Central Asia. Institutional mechanisms of the rule of law and constitutionalism can thus contribute to the institutionalization of confidence-building and structural preventative measures. These institutionalized measures could balance and regulate sometimes destructive effects of ethno-nationalism on the social and political development of Central Asia.
The dissertation’s findings in regard to Central Asia’s nation-formation and its effect on inter-ethnic relations confirm that inter-ethnic struggles and antagonisms in Central Asia were, and remain, crucially framed, constituted and reconciled by institutionalized definitions of ethnicity and nationhood. Accordingly, institutionalized nationhood not only played a major role in the disintegration of the Soviet state, but continues to shape and structure the national development of the newly-independent Central Asian states.

In the first decade of post-independence, little was known about the nature and role of sub-national and regional identities, loyalties and patronage networks. That gap has been gradually filled by the researchers and experts in the field. In the study of the electoral systems in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Pauline Luong argues that following independence those states continued to witness the influence of regional political identities on the establishment of the new electoral systems, and pointed to the shared Soviet legacy and the “persistence of old formulas for making political decisions and resolving political conflict effectively re-encoded pre-existing conceptions of power and power relations onto new institutional forms”.

Regional divisions tend to correlate with clan affiliations in the region. A study by Kathleen Collins suggests that the third face of culture, clan identity (other two being ethno-nationality and religion), has also been crucial in structuring conflict for control of economic resources in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan before, during, and after the Soviet Union. She points to the mitigating influence of informal clan institutions on regional conflicts: “By
informally providing access to goods, resources, and jobs, the clan has provided a social safety net that enables its members to survive the transition. Without undermining the latter, clan networks have mitigated both economic deprivation and identity politics. There is indeed a symbiotic relationship between clan, region and ethnicity, and we are often reminded that clan systems in the region are “vast patronage networks that are related to ethnic and geographic factors.” What invites further investigation, however, is the role of those clan institutions in the series of inter-ethnic riots in Central Asia, discussed by this study, and the relations of clan networks, being ‘intra-ethnic and intra-religious groups’, with the other, more conflict-prone faces of culture, ethno-nationalism and religion.

Today, there is a potential for a repetition of inter-ethnic riots in the region. In its *Calming the Ferghana Valley* report, the Centre for Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relation warns that while the memory of the Osh conflict makes all parties aware of the dangers of inter-communal conflict, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz continue to mistrust each other. After the inter-ethnic riots, the Ferghana Valley witnessed other incidents of insecurity and conflict: Tashkent bombings in 1999, Batken incursions of 1999 and 2000, Aksy protests in 2002, Tulip Revolution and Andijan uprising, both in 2005.

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Various policy-oriented reports have described the area as continuing to be volatile and explosive with multiple sources of insecurity. Given the potential for conflict, a number of organizations and projects have focused on various aspects of conflict in the region: early warning networks, civil society initiatives, media and education projects, mediation networks, social justice and local development programmes. The Bishkek-based Foundation of Tolerance International reported that during the 2005 political protests in Kyrgyzstan, inter-ethnic relations were tense and ethnic minorities felt vulnerable. For a decade, Crisis Group has worked to prevent conflict worldwide and has continuously drawn the attention of the international community on the conflict situation in Central Asia, in particular in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

The special issue of the *Central Asian Survey* discussed different aspects of the ‘discourse of danger’ in Central Asia, exploring the possible motives, rationales, and consequences in the projection of the region as a risky and dangerous place. Bichsel’s research showed how that discourse has been translated into conflict mitigation measures in the Ferghana Valley that stress the need for conciliatory conflict mitigation, while local communities prioritize

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rehabilitation of infrastructure. From an ethnographic perspective, Reeves criticizes the discipline of konfliktologiiia for its tendency to “essentialize ethnic identities and to assume ethnic difference to be necessarily antagonistic, to see territorial ambiguity as inherently dangerous.” She argues that the very ambiguity of borders is seen by affected villagers as a peace-fostering factor that ensures a shared use of area and control-free movement, which is threatened by the much resented demarcation and delimitation of the borders.

In a critique of alarmist discussions of the danger of ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan, Megoran develops an approach to researching ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic conflict’ through the use of focus groups. That approach leads him to conclude that Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in southern Kyrgyzstan expressed similar views about the closures of international boundaries, framed in terms of ethnicity but understood through ‘Uzbekness’ or ‘Kyrgyzness’, which is based on “the performance of endogenous kinship practices and Muslim/Soviet notions of class morality, nuanced by geography”.

Nonetheless, Crisis Group warns in its recent reports that the new regime in Kyrgyzstan faces threats from at least three sources (the street, the disenfranchized political elite and dissension within government ranks), and that the old regime in Uzbekistan remains a serious risk to itself and the entire

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region.\textsuperscript{843} One should not be complacent because the political situation in Central Asia remains volatile and unstable, as the latest violence during the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan and the Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan has shown. The legacy of institutionalized ethno-nationalism is likely to continue having a long-term effect on Central Asia’s security and prosperity, and it is therefore vital that regional and international stakeholders address the development of institutionalized nationhood and its relation to inter-ethnic relations. It is also crucial that more funding and research is directed towards taking fuller advantage of institutional reforms and mechanisms, such as the rule of law and constitutionalism in the subject areas beyond their commonplace utilization, such as nationalism and conflict studies.

One cannot and should not be complacent given that the political situation in Central Asia has been deteriorating and universally acknowledged as far from stable, especially in the context of such events as the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan and the Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan, both took place in the spring of 2005. And because the legacy of institutionalized ethno-nationalism will continue to have a long-term effect on Central Asia’s security and prosperity, it is vital that regional and international stakeholders invest more time and attention for the considerations of the institutionalist dimension of nationhood and its relation to inter-ethnic relations. It is also crucial that more funding, research and political will is directed towards taking fuller advantage of institutional reforms and mechanisms, such as the rule of law and constitutionalism in the subject areas beyond their commonplace utilization, such as nationalism and conflict studies.

This dissertation, like any other study, opens up more lines of inquiry than it has been able to pursue. Naturally, there is scope for further research. The first area could be a further examination of the applicability of institutional perspective on a cross-regional comparative level. Through conducting an analysis of nation-formation and ethnic conflicts within the same time period but in a different regional setting, for example countries in Caucasus, the study will enable us to test the applicability of the above conclusions, as well as wider validity of the institutionalist methodological framework. The second area for further research is a more in-depth and wide-range examination of current developments of the institutionalized nationhood in all five Central Asian countries, focusing on more recent and crucial developments, such as the above-mentioned Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. This will provide us with the understanding of any changes in the institutionalization of nationality after more than a decade of independence and their relation to inter-ethnic relations in the region. And the final area could specifically examine policy issues, lessons learnt and best practices in applying institutional reforms in the context of democratization, or lack thereof, with a view to proposing optimal ways to manage inter-ethnic relations in pluralist societies.

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