ORDINARY EXPLANATIONS AS DISCOURSE:

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

By

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I declare that the work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted for any other degree.

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Abstract

Extending recent advances in attribution theory, this thesis aims to develop and apply an analytic framework within which the social constitution of explanations might be better accommodated. To this end, Part I draws on three theoretical trends: generative social psychology; critical theory; and Foucauldian discourse analysis. Respectively, these provide: the rationale for the critique of and the alternatives to orthodox social psychology, critical reflection on the social field, and the means to locate and analyze ordinary explanations. It is shown how: conventional cognitivist analyses tend to ignore the social contingency of explanations; intergroup theory cannot adequately deal with the influence of role; script theory does not address explanations' mediation of power. By contrast, the present thesis analyzes explanations in the context of numerous intertwined factors, including role, intergroup and power relations, and institutional, representational and material influences.

In this, 'role', constituted in a network of discourses and practices, is the principal conceptual tool. Packaged with a repertoire of explanations, cognitions, identities and functions, role interacts with situational factors to shape explanations. It is suggested that, through their mediation of power, explanations serve to reproduce the explainer's role and related roles and structures.

Part II applies this approach to the explanation of rape. Detailed analysis of gender stereotypes, rape myths, the professional, polemical and lay explanation of rape produced three ideal types: the dimensional, typological and schismatic. These served to tie particular explanatory forms to their corresponding frameworks of discourse/practice and to role. The function of such rape explanations was further explored with respect to 'traditional' and 'anti-sexist' male roles, and to the role of policeman. In the latter case, it was shown that explanations tended to distance rape from 'normal' sexuality, thereby recursively conditioning the police role and its legal, organizational and cultural delineants.
INTRODUCTION

1. Preamble.

As this thesis began to take shape it became apparent that there would not be a conventional introduction - a delineation of research field, an outline of the problems that bedevil it and an overview of the proposed solutions. This was partly because the areas concerned are too broad; an introduction in each chapter will serve this purpose. Further, Chapter 5, in addition to expounding the methods adopted, makes explicit certain connections between preceding chapters that it would be premature to outline at this early stage, prior to the critiques contained in those chapters. Indeed, the interwovenness of these chapters has somewhat hampered attempts at a neat exposition - the tendency towards restatement (but hopefully not redundancy) and the almost interminable cross-referencing through the text amply attests to this. Had I been more courageous, or rather more talented, I would have made positive use of this problem and written in the 'French Style' (for want of a better expression). In this, a bald statement of the thesis (with little or no effort to explain terminology or method) is followed by an examination of that thesis from a variety of vantage points; despite the initial agonies of incomprehension and given sufficient time and stamina, things eventually 'fall
into place'. Instead, I will remain faithful to my Anglo-Saxon heritage and share the blame for the turgidity and stuffiness of this text with it.

It had originally been my intention to go into some detail over the doing and writing of a PhD, but, over and above the self-indulgence of such an exercise (though it is important to reflect on some of the material antecedents of postgraduate research), space militated against an in-depth consideration. I will restrict my remarks to the following: In writing a PhD one is placed under a variety of constraints from the intellectual to the financial that lead to a series of interlocking choices through which one must fumble and compromise. This state of affairs is particularly acute for a thesis in which a number of disparate perspectives are brought to bear on social psychological phenomena. This very disparateness can lead to the charge of dilettantism. I am not especially concerned to rebut this (though I suppose I could call it eclecticism), other than, perhaps immodestly, point to the fact that some of the more influential thinkers have been accused of, and openly lauded, their dilettantism. Thus Feyerabend notes that "Bohr, Einstein...regarded themselves as dilettantes and often said so" (1978). Similarly Mannheim (1936) points to a tradition of synthesists who in drawing on a range of theories produce partial rather than absolute solutions. That is all I claim here: formally, this
Tenuousness is embodied in the research strategy of constructing an ideal-type analysis of rape explanations.

More slighting is the charge that my research is an example of opportunism: I have jumped onto, and within social psychology maybe given an additional nudge to, the New Wave French Bandwagon. Once again this charge is not unfounded, though I think I have approached the latter critically. Anyway, opportunism is inevitable given that even the most orthodox research can be construed as conservatively opportunistic. Importantly, both my dilettantism and my opportunism have been guided by explicit political and generative interests (see below; Ch. 5).

This brings me on to the next compromise, that between (intellectual/inclinational) honesty and expedience. If I had followed my hunches more fully this thesis might well have been about the relation between Hegelianism, Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis, masculinity and Eastern religions. Such pretensions would have set me even further beyond the bounds of social psychological orthodoxy. The point is that I have had to limit my interests for the sake of 'manageability': this again marks the essentially provisional nature of this work.

In sum then, it is important to be mindful of the background factors that condition research. Of course,
their existence does not undermine the validity or usefulness of a theory. However, such factors can serve to impart a 'truth' or power to a given theory. In this sense it is important to trace out the uses to which such power/truth can be turned. As I argue, many theories have, at present, conservative implications; I hope that this thesis' contribution is emancipatory.

2. Genesis and History.

In the next few pages I will briefly describe the development of this thesis. Though I dare say an element of autobiographical backslapping has crept in, my main aim is to show how this work is still animated by the specific concerns of generative social psychology (Gergen,1978, 1982), Foucauldian 'discourse theory' (Foucault,1979a; Poster,1984; Henriques et al,1984), Critical theory (Held,1980; Geuss,1982). Needless to say this summary can barely do full justice to the confusion, dead-ends and misguided enthusiasms I have led myself into, nor to the uninformed rubbish that I have produced and continue to produce.

A naive interest in attribution theory, and particularly actor/observer differences (cf Ch.1), and some elementary reading in theories of ideology suggested to me that a connection could be forged between the two which placed explanations in a more social context than I had at that point encountered. Fortunately my initial research
proposal was pre-empted by the work of Furnham (cf Ch.4). An interest in generative social psychology led to a survey of what might have been generative methodologies in which alternative behaviours and theories of behaviours are articulated. Gergen(1982) has outlined four heuristics which he supposes will spearhead the generative thrust: the articulation of minority response, extension of theory to the borders of absurdity, the production of antithetical theses, and the production of alternative metaphors. I attempted to concretize these suggestions into specific methods that illustrated, and thereby gave substance to, the alternatives generated by theory (this was as much a pragmatic/propaganda as an analytic strategy). Of the various methodologies I considered, those concerned with evoking alternative responses and extending behavioural repertoires suffered the typical problem facing quasi-therapies, namely that of follow-up (Gergen, personal communication). Eventually, I settled for a version of the articulation of minority response. Balking at the condescension implicit in this strategy, I decided to adopt a minority response against which to contrast mainstream response. The response I looked at was the explanation of rape. A pilot study was carried out in which the explanations of 'orthodox' subjects were to have been compared with radical feminist and socialist or libertarian feminist explanations. Unfortunately, one of the main subject groups refused to co-operate (because I was a man and therefore suspect). In abandoning this
project I had, however, garnered the materials for the thesis as it now stands (or falls): the role of ideology on explanations; the role of groups (in the pilot study one of the hypotheses was that the radical feminist group, partly driven by intergroup processes would go beyond system blame to man/rapist blame. In a sense they fulfilled this expectation more profoundly than I imagined); the importance of roles in the shaping of explanations.

Gergen (1982) proposed that a number of paradigms could be subsumed under 'generative social psychology'. These included ethogenics and critical theory. The latter appealed to me particularly because of its explicit political and sociological sensibilities. This led to an analysis of ideology from a critical theoretical perspective (cf Ch. 4); and likewise a critique of cognitive social psychology that entailed the production of antithetical theses (cf Ch. 2) and which placed cognitive processes in the context of wider social phenomena such as immediate situation, normative expectations and the economic infrastructure. My reading of Foucault's later works (1979a, 1981; cf Ch. 1) suggested that explanations could be treated in the same way as discourses, embedded in practical/discursive networks which gave them practical substance. Also, it dawned on me that Foucault's work could be placed under the rubric of critical theory, a view subsequently supported by various
commentators (cf Ch.4). This coincided with the interest in the explanation of rape which, under the appropriate circumstances (in the right discursive/practical matrix), represented an exercises of power par excellence (cf Ch.7). It was now a question of tracing out that matrix in some detail, in exploring the uses to which such explanations and power could be put. This entailed placing these explanations in a tangible context, specifically explanations produced by policemen. Of major concern would be the ways in which conventional rape explanations, as modes of sexism, serviced the masculine role (or that of policeman) and, thereby, police and patriarchal/capitalist institutions (cf Ch.8). Correspondingly, to undercut any potentially suffocating decline into functionalism (a charge that has been levelled at Foucault's work), it was necessary to set this against the struggle over the definition and explanation of rape that is being systematically waged by feminists and spontaneously by some victims and their relatives (cf Chs.6,7). Hollway's (1982) use of Giddens' (1976,1979) theory of structuration, in showing how (discursive) practices serve to re/constitute the individual subject, seemed to me to be a promising means of linking explanations (discursive practice) to the actor (role - despite Giddens' aversion to it) and structure. The pay-off, from the opposite direction as it were, would be, given the dialectical relations of these elements, an analysis of the way that psychological factors were shaped in a discrete social
context. In effect, this was a means of concretely questioning the (implicitly) assumed causal priority of cognitive processes.

This, then, is the (too neatly) reconstituted history of this thesis. It has culminated in an analysis of ordinary explanations that, in its sensitivity to context, aims to access the social bases of the form, process and content of explanations and, in particular, the use of explanations in the mediation of power.


This thesis falls into two parts. Part I is comprised of critiques of several areas within social psychology and their relation to lay explanations. The aim is to derive an alternative theoretical framework within which to analyze explanations. Part II is concerned with a case study of the lay explanation of rape, particularly those of policemen. It is an attempt to put the findings of Part I into practice. Thus rape explanations are considered from a socio-historical perspective with particular emphasis on the way they these mediate power. As a result it is possible to see how social psychological accounts of such explanations that do not consider this implication can serve to support it.

Chapter 1 examines traditional attribution theory. Via a critique of Kelley's Covariation model enters into the
social embeddedness and practical potency of explanations. Through a consideration of praxis, explanations are conceived as a part of a practical/discursive matrix. In addition I consider the emerging use of script theory in the lay explanation research. I suggest that, for this to be useful, it has to be related to the role position of actors where that role encompasses the social and ideological functions of scripts/explanations. Finally, I consider the underlying role of control and power in social psychological accounts of explanation.

Chapter 2 is a critique of cognitive social psychological approaches to explanations. It is argued that these approaches do not take into proper account socio-historical conditions as they relate to cognitive processes themselves (eg theory perseverance). Chapter 3 takes up the theme of the relation of explanations to role. This is developed in the light of recent advances in intergroup theory. The main purpose is to moderate the latter's reliance on the pivotal status of cognitive factors. Recasting intergroup processes in terms of role, a 'group member' is conceived as a particular type of role in its own specific milieu. Chapter 4 explores some of the debates surrounding the theoretical status of ideology and rationality. In typical critical theoretical fashion, I opt for a history-laden version of these concepts in which their ascription to behaviour is heavily contingent upon (perceptions of) historical conditions and
domination.

Chapter 5 is meant to bridge Parts I and II. It brings together some of the links between chapters 1 - 4, and presents an outline of the approach used in Part II. As regards the latter, given the breadth (perhaps spread would be a more appropriate term) of the thesis, our project is consigned to the more speculative end of research. This is accommodated by theoretically structuring Part II around the Weberian notion of the ideal type. There are three ideal types developed in Part II; they link role (policeman, man), environment (patriarchy, police institution, group antagonism, ideology, etc) and the explanation of rape.

Part II is a detailed study of the explanation of rape. In a sense this entails a reversal of the usual procedure employed in the study of lay explanations. Conventionally, the explanation is the dependent variable - the result that the researcher captures, measures and characterizes. Here, however, I effectively take the explanation as a starting point and trace out its 'correlates' in their complex interrelations - thus the distinction between independent and dependent variable blurs. Chapter 6 looks into the material and discursive bases of rape and rape explanations at the broadest level. That is, the perceptions and interactions of men and women are considered from a general feminist perspective. On the
basis of the study of the abnormal psychology literature, rape mythology, legal definitions and perceptions of rape, and interviews with men. Chapter 7 develops and applied three ideal types of rape explanation. The dimensional is related to feminist-sympathetic consciousness and is evidenced in feminist writings and 'anti-sexist' men's talk; it is concerned to establish the continuity between rape and normality. The typological, by comparison, aims to set out and deploy the criteria by which to distinguish rape from normality. While the latter passes no comment on continuity, the schismatic type is geared towards its denial. The shift from typological to schismatic is a very subtle and context-bound phenomenon - it is considered in interview and clinical material. It is argued that the dimensional, in this context, has generative/critical status. In Chapter 8 these types are explored in relation to policemen's explanation of rape; they are viewed in light of the complexly defined demands of that role. Finally, policemen's explanations are analyzed from the standpoint of their supposed cognitive constituents. In the conclusion, the findings of Parts I and II are summarized and several of the practical ramifications for masculinity, gender relations and the police treatment of rape victims are followed through. Finally, the perceived weaknesses of the thesis are outlined (e.g. the neglect of memory), and some implications for future research are reviewed.
PART I

CHAPTER ONE

ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND LAY EXPLANATIONS.

Introduction.
In this chapter I hope to analyze the limitations of Attribution Theory. This critique will address itself both to the major early formulation, namely that of Kelley, and to some of the more recent models, in particular those making use of the concept of cognitive scripts. My central aim is to show how these approaches fundamentally ignore the element of power that explanations incorporate and the relation of this to behaviour. In the process of this analysis, it will be suggested that explanations (and accounts generally) are more closely related to behaviour than is usually allowed for. The purpose of giving explanations this material edge is to better understand their role as mediators of power.

We will carry out this analysis in the following way: Firstly we will examine Kelley's ANOVA model showing that its apparent exclusive concern with process in fact covertly relies on content-laden consensus information. Thus it emerges that attribution and lay explanations generally, which involve the internal/external dichotomy
of causal locus, make an implicit appeal to concrete social knowledge. It is suggested that, rather than seeing explanations as simple statements of the causes of (or reasons behind) events, they should be considered as types of acts, dynamically interacting with the explainer, the object of the explanation, and their social environment. In other words, explanations can be conceived as glosses on perceived points of intervention (i.e., in apprehending an event one also apprehends one's power relation to it - how one might influence, control, ignore, avoid, etc., that event - and identifies the elements one must engage in order to achieve those things. An explanation is a gloss insofar as it, more or less explicitly, addresses those elements or points of intervention). This is illustrated in a brief consideration of that range of explanations we call social psychological theories of Attribution and Lay Explanation. This is further explored with respect to the cause-reason debate. It is suggested that many explanations specify their point of intervention only implicitly. To discover what this might be, it is necessary to analyze explanations in a matrix of other connected explanations (both proximal and distal), more or less related lay theories, behaviours, roles and power. Following this, the links between explanation and practice are considered with particular reference to the Marxian concept of Praxis and the Foucauldian couplet of discourse/practice. Thus explanations are seen as complex expressions of complex
webs of discourses and practices. In discussing this, we will remark on the recent applications of schema theory to the study of lay explanations suggesting that schemas (or discourses or myths) are not universal but can be attached to particular roles and ideological interests.

1. A Critique of Kelley's Covariation Model.

Attribution Theory (AT) has its roots in Heider's 1958 seminal text, The Psychology of Interpersonal Behaviour. Of the three models that sprang from that work (Jones and Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967, 72a, 72b, 73; Weiner et al, 1972) we shall be primarily concerned with Kelley's ANOVA theory and the various theoretical and empirical outcrops that it has engendered.

Following Lalljee (1981) we can characterize AT by: (i) its focus on the causal concerns of lay explanations; (ii) its internal/external dichotomy through which attributions are made either to the individual actor (or some aspect thereof) or to the environment or situation (or to some aspect thereof). Numerous authors (eg Buss, 1978; Kruglanski, 1975, 9; Locke and Pendleton, 1982; Winer and Kelley, 1982; McClure, 1984) have noted that causality is not the sole generative motor of events that subjects appeal to. Firstly, causality is not a unitary concept in that it can be conceptualized in a number of ways (Bunge, 1959). Moreover a cause can be decomposed along at least two dimensions: the temporal, every cause is also an
effect (Brickman et al., 1975); and a dimension concerned with the causal weight that is attached to a potential cause (in Gergen and Gergen's (1982) terms a distinction needs to be drawn between the enabling and empowering force of a cause or causal locus). In addition there is the uncertain causal status of reasons (see below).

The internal/external dichotomy can also be criticized for its relative crudeness. Firstly, there is accumulating evidence that actors do not always deploy it in a clear-cut way, preferring to use a combination of internal and external factors (e.g., Furnham, Jaspers & Fincham, 1983; Monson, 1983; Antaki, 1985). This latter point fits in with the multi-dimensional notion of cause. More important however are intrusive conceptual problems with this dichotomy. These problems have been derived from the idea of 'susceptibility'. In essence, susceptibility refers to the receptivity of the actor to external factors. (As a tantalizing aside, it can be mentioned that this analysis can be linked to the Gibsonian (Gibson, 1979) concept of affordance, though such associations will not be developed here.) Now, if people are aware of susceptibilities, they will be sensitive to the orderliness of social behavior. This leads us on to an analysis of explanations in terms of scripts (e.g., Eiser, 1983; Lalljee and Abelson, 1983; Turnbull, in press) within which the internal/external dichotomy is shown to be unsound (see below).
I now wish to explore the problematic status of internal/external dichotomy with respect to Kelley's covariational parameters. It will be shown that distinctiveness and consistency are not content-free parameters but covertly connected to the consensus information specific to the behaviour that is being explained.

Distinctiveness is the degree to which a given behaviour is stimulus/circumstance bound. When Jim compliments Mike's essay, the question distinctiveness asks is: does Jim compliment all essays or only Mike's? If the latter, then Jim's response is distinctive to Mike's essay and therefore it is something in Mike's essay that prompted Jim's response. In other words an external attribution is made. Now, if we deploy the notion of susceptibility, for Jim to compliment Mike's essay, he must first be susceptible to it (the essay must 'afford' Jim something - pleasure, intellectual stimulation, or whatever). Logically, on this evidence alone, we can no longer assign causal primacy either to the actor (Jim) or the stimulus (Mike's essay). Causality seems to reverberate between the two. What, we must ask, gives distinctiveness its explanatory power? It is suggested that it is the consensus information implicit in distinctiveness. If distinctiveness can logically reflect on either stimulus or actor, it becomes necessary to look at the nature of
the stimulus (the essay). Thus we are forced out of the decontextualized, content-empty realm of Kelleyan Attribution. If the essay can be said to be 'good', then Jim's distinctive, favourable response to it can be said to be a response to the stimulus; if it is 'bad', Jim's response reflects on his oddness. However, the terms 'bad' and 'good' are in fact shorthand for consensus information. Thus a 'good' essay is one to which most people respond favourably; conversely when Jim responds favourably to Mike's 'bad' essay he is acting against the consensus. Of course, things are not as simple as we have presented them. As Intergroup and Conflict Theorists (eg Marx and Engels, 1967; Tajfel, 1981) point out, society is fractured into numerous groups of varying ascendancies. When we speak of 'people generally' we are referring in this case to academics of a particular and hegemonic persuasion. (Malcolm Bradbury's novel 'The History Man' contains a neat illustration of the relative nature of 'good' and 'bad' essays.) In empirical studies where distinctiveness information has been shown to be used by subjects (though by no means spontaneously), we might speculate that subjects have compensated for the 'paleness' of the subject-matter by assigning a consensus-value to the situation, the circumstance and the response. The internal-external problematic is thus resolved in explanations of this type through an implicit reference to consensus information which covertly infuses distinctiveness with a social content.
There is a parallel process at work in the consistency parameter. When an actor acts in the same way over time and modality, the consistency parameter directs that we should infer that the observed behaviour is a manifestation of a trait appropriate to that behaviour. That is, we make an internal attribution. Let us take another example: S consistently behaves in an unfriendly manner across time and in different ways (verbally, physically, etc). Under these, admittedly simplistic, circumstances we infer that S is an unfriendly person. In addition to the fact that the ANOVA formulation tends to ignore antecedents in S's biography, it seems to assume that behaviour occurs in a vacuum or only in time. But behaviour is necessarily context-related: consistent behaviour does not occur simply over time, it must occur from situation to situation. Consistency as an attribution parameter is an abstraction from various instances of the target behaviour occurring in specific situations. Moreover these situations must differ sufficiently from each other to warrant a judgement of consistency: the more disparate the situations in which the target behaviour occurs, the more importance that must be attached to consistency information. Let us assume that in each of these situations there is an element which the actor responds to (ie is susceptible to) and which in some way triggers his/her unfriendly behaviour. It will be apparent that we have re-cast consistency in terms of
distinctiveness - our actor is responding distinctively to a particular element in the environment. The counter-argument, that there is no such common stimulus across disparate situations, is in fact a statement of consensus information: most people do not perceive that stimulus and therefore fail to respond consistently across those disparate situations. The target actor's 'active susceptibility' is judged eccentric and draws an internal attribution because 'most others' do not exhibit the same susceptibility. Once again we find the operation of a covert normative consensus giving substance this time to consistency information. Here the internal/external problematic is resolved in the internal direction because of the implicit anti-consensual nature of the target actor's behaviour.

The importance of normative consensus, in this context, lies in the fact that, despite its underpinning role within distinctiveness and consistency, it is itself open to the same critique. As an attributional parameter it cannot logically distinguish between internal and external causal loci. If an individual deviates from the popular behavioural norm, this does not automatically guarantee an internal attribution. Firstly, the population from which the actor is drawn can also be judged in terms of its deviance from what the observer considers to be 'normal' behavior. Thus attribution to a deviant population such as Nazi Germany, might invoke an internal
attribution for that population's apprehension of a Jewish conspiracy. This is where the Intergroup work on attribution (eg Hewstone and Jaspers, 1982a; Ch 3) has the advantage in that it takes this into account by pluralizing attributional vantage points. Conversely, the individual who conforms to the consensual response pattern to a given stimulus does so because of internal factors such as the need for the positive social identity (eg Turner, 1982), that his/her in-group satisfies (however, cf Ch.3). In orthodox individual attribution research, when an actor deviates from the consensus the internal attribution that they are supposed to receive is set against an absolute consensus. If the consensus is broken up, if the target actor is seen to be a member of a group, then any attributional judgement must take into account the consensus that pertains within that group (its baserate properties). Subsequently, that consensus is judged against a broader consensus or normality, one which is most likely to be drawn from, or is acceptable to, the observer's in-group. In all this, there is necessarily recourse to concrete background knowledge. This cannot be escaped however supposedly 'pure' the materials of attribution research might claim to be (cf Shultz and Schleifer, 1983).

The question now becomes: what influences the form of an attribution if it is not consensus, consistency, or distinctiveness (or any combination of these) per se?
Phrasing this slightly differently: what sort of content as regards consensus, consistency and distinctiveness will effect attributions?

I will begin with a provisional outline of the conception of attribution and lay explanation that will be employed in this thesis. Essentially, explanations are conceived as glosses on perceived points of intervention in which they, explicitly or implicitly demarcate what needs to be done to what in order to solve a problem or answer a question (this is irrespective of whether actual intervention is carried out or not; passivity is considered an authentic outcome of an explanation, as is contradictory behaviour). When an internal attribution is made, the individual is the point of intervention. This is the case for AT and psychology generally (especially in their more cognitivistic guises) when considered as explanatory edifices. Good examples of this are the debiasing techniques for individual limitations in statistical processing that have been developed by various researchers (eg Anderson,1982; cf Ch.2). If explanations are glosses on points of intervention, they both announce and entail the exercise of power. As a result explanations must be considered in terms of their power-constitution. For the moment it will suffice to say that such power is multi-faceted and multi-directional. Explanations exert power not only over the object of explanation but also over the explainer him/herself and his/her social
surroundings; that is, explanations are repercussive. The resemblance between this reformulation of explanations and the Foucauldian notion of discourse is not accidental.

This reconception of explanations can be applied to social psychological theories themselves. In particular, I will consider a number of the models of the attributer/explainer currently available in the light of their implicit internal interventionism.


Models within AT are used, as in most sciences (Harre, 1972), to generate hypotheses, in this case as regards what sort of information is required and how it is used in the construction of explanations. These models are primarily concerned with process. Originally Heider (1958) provided us with 'man as naive psychologist' (in those days there were only men, nowadays there are mostly men). Kelley (eg 1967) has generalized this to 'man the lay or intuitive scientist'. However his scientist was limited to (covariational) inference; the attributer as scientist has now been modernized to take into account hypothesis-testing procedures (eg Snyder and Gangestad, 1979; Lalljee et al, 1984). In addition to the lay scientist, we have the amateur scientist (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983) into whom has diffused the ethic of science via the medium of social representations. In related fields we have the attributer as historian
(Fischoff, 1976, 81); as lawyer (Hamilton, 1980; Fincham and Jaspers, 1980; Lloyd-Bostock, 1983); as actor (Harré, 1981a, b); as interpreter (Shotter, 1981).

It hardly needs spelling out that these models are all drawn from the professional middle-classes. As far as I am aware there are no alternative models derived from the skilled manual or unskilled classes: we do not find models of the attributer as plumber or housewife. (This 'bias' is bound to any psychology that does not ground cognition in the routine of historically concrete behaviour). Indeed we have a parallel here with the middle-class preoccupation that Israel (1979) has detected in cognitive dissonance research. But in this case these models reflect, at the level of theory, the social division of manual and mental labour. In the same way that this division belies the essential practical (or rather praxical) nature of theory, so too these models of the attributer neglect the fact that an explanation embodies both practical and theoretical components.

Less personalized than the preceding models are those of the attributer as a limited information processor (eg Ross, 1977; Nisbett and Ross, 1980); as a defensive egoist (eg Shaver, 1970; Lerner and Miller, 1978). Ostensibly less individualistic than these latter models are those that cast the attributer as group member or seeker of positive social identity (eg Hewstone and Jaspers, 1982,
Various points can be made about this variety of models. Firstly, things are more complicated: several of these models overlap and some attempt to address different types of explanation. However, this fragmentation seems to me to indicate the rehabilitation of content over process. At the concrete level, this is evident in the way that models derived from actual explanations are a combination of these formal models. The precise configuration of models would be specified by the type (content) of explanation that is studied and the context in which it is produced. At a more abstract level, content re-establishes itself through the fact that these models have a tendency to merge into one another. Thus lawyers are renowned for their histrionic expertise: their arguments and explanations are shaped by the requirements of their particular audience, namely judge, jury and the Legal establishment (Toner, 1982). Scientists are also defensive egoists and opportunists (Lemaine, 1984). It would seem that, rather than start off from a model from which are derived, more or less explicitly, ideal explanation types, deviation from which is labelled 'bias', it is preferable to study explanations in vivo, deriving a model or an ideal-type from these. Naturally, in vivo refers to the broad social and historical context of these explanations and thus necessitates some degree of social analysis. This the project undertaken in the
second part of this thesis. Under such a theoretical regime, a policeman's 'unreasonable' explanation for a rape event does not indicate that he is a bad intuitive scientist or a poor lawyer, but that he is a 'good' policeman.

Another related set of points deals with the fact that these individualistic models filter out the social components in the structure of explanations. As Hollway (1982) notes, an interest in content necessarily feeds off and into the social: as a result the distinction commonly drawn between individual and society, and internal and external, becomes problematic. These models presuppose a neat division; they are by and large directed at internal processes reified as cognitive structures. We do not deny that there are internal structures but insist that these must be properly examined; their existence needs to be traced beyond the cognitive and biological to the social and historical (Chs.2 and 3).

The internalist impetus of these models persists despite the avowed intentions of researchers who overtly endorse an external style of attribution. This is neatly brought out by Billig (1982) who shows how Nisbett, a major proponent of both cognitive bias and the generically superior accuracy of external attributions, is caught in a contradiction, simultaneously exhorting us to external attributions while himself, as a professional observer,
indulging in extreme internal attribution. As noted above, this reflects the fact that, for psychology, the individual constitutes the point of intervention, and this intervention very often takes the form of a technology. Debiasing techniques are just such a technology; dressed up as training, they are a means towards correcting a faulty mechanism that is safely and securely locked up within the individual (cf Shotter, 1975). For writers such as Shotter (Gauld and Shotter, 1976; Harre and Secord, 1972; Harré, 1979; Buss, 1978, 1979a), it is the reason and agency of actors that social psychological theory must account for and which lay explainers regularly if not predominantly appeal to in their explanations. However, as it will be contended in the next section, even these approaches resort to a similar form of individualism.


The debate regarding the attribution of causes and reasons, prompted by Buss (1978) and developed by Buss(1979a,; Kruglanski, 1979; Locke and Pendleton, 1982; McClure, 1984) has addressed the relative merits and importance of cause- versus reason-explanations and the possible relationship between the two. Here I will deal only with McClure's contribution as a way of highlighting the persisting individualistic conception of the attributer in this 'alternative' mode of research.

McClure provides some telling criticisms of the recent
cause-reason controversy, but his central concern is to
divest these terms of their presuppositional baggage by
defining them operationally. Thus:

"Reasons express a motive or rationale for an
action and can be operationally defined as the
(type of) response, if one is given, to such
questions as 'Why are (or were, will) you (or
they) performing this action?'

"Causes comprise a mechanical explanation of a
behaviour and can operationally be defined as
the (type of) response, if one is given, to
such questions as 'What is (or was/will) making
you (or they) do this?' in reference to an act
or behaviour."

(McClure, 1984, p131-132)

The immediate point to make is that any such
categorization of an explanation must be drawn up in
vivo, with specific reference to the implications that it
has for the behaviour of the explainer. If, for the
moment, we follow Heider, Kelley, Wortman (1976), Forsyth
(1980) and Bains (1983) in assuming that prediction and
control are the overriding motives behind the production
of explanation (this will be heavily qualified in the
following sections), we must judge the type of explanation
in terms of its implications for control/prediction (ie
the implicit point of intervention). It is these
implications that must be taken into account when
categorizing an explanation. That is, the classification
of an explanation into a cause- or reason- explanation
should depend on how that explanation is used. Let us
suppose that reason explanations make direct reference to
the rationale of the actor and thus locate the point of
intervention in the actor, then they also specify the
nature of that intervention, namely communication of some sort, persuasion or whatever. In other words, reason explanations point towards an intersubjective form of intervention. In contrast, cause explanations refer to a mechanical mode of intervention. This is the case whatever the actual form the explanation takes, whether it is in response to 'what' or a 'why' question of the type suggested by McClure.

Such a 'use-definition' (Wittgenstein, 1958) of cause- and reason-explanations has the partial advantage of, at least, giving explanations a function, of potentially placing them in a properly social context rather than isolating them in some a priori haven. However, to re-emphasize, as our analysis stands it is still only a qualified improvement: what is gained in functionality is lost in clarity. Clarity will only be established in concrete analyses of explanations appropriately contextualized. Moreover such a contextualization must make use of a de-individualized notion of control.

Our, albeit superficial, discussion of the relation of control to the point of intervention contained by an explanation, has largely ignored the multi-faceted nature of these control needs. 'Control' does not simply concern the object of the explanation but also other 'objects' that surround the actor. In particular, actors are interested in controlling their social world; that is,
moving through it as favourably as possible. They control themselves. Also, we must be sensitive to subtleties in these modes of control. For a start, very often in the literature on the control functions of explanations (and this includes intergroup research), the type of control (need) that is handled is a very active, directed form, both individualistic and masculine. There are many cases where control/prediction may be achieved more 'passively' or collectively. Helplessness or dependency in women in certain social and practical spheres (men have their own versions of these, in areas of expression or emotionality, cf Seidler, 1985), reflected in women's denigration of their own performance (eg Deaux, 1976), invites control/predictive competence to be experienced vicariously through the explanations and actions of men. This point, itself a reflection of gender bias/blindness in much social psychological research, will be developed throughout the thesis in particular with reference to the propensity towards intergroup processes that the genders manifest (Chs 3, 6).

Further, it is important to counter the accent on individual control needs, whether that be individually or collectively attained, in order to analyze the ways that explanations, or more precisely the discourses of which they are a part, exert control over the individual or collective explainer. Within science, this can be seen in the way that a paradigm (Kuhn, 1970) constrains what a
scientist is both able to do and think. Thus some discourses yield explanations that direct intersubjective intervention (e.g. the Liberal emphasis on education per se as a mode of social change), while others project mechanical intervention (e.g. the vulgar Marxist focus on the economic base as the prime mover of history and thus the primary point of intervention).

To restate our case: any cause (as defined by McClure) located either internally or externally, can in the appropriate context be re-interpreted as a reason. This can be illustrated with reference to the Just World Hypothesis (Lerner, 1970) in which accidents, which should entail external causal factors only, are transmuted, for the purposes of explanation and equanimity, to structural reasons; that is, accidental events are perceived as teleologically driven, shaped by a reason. Conversely, given the always already presence of history, i.e. the preceding social conditions of any behaviour (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Althusser, 1971) any reason can be traced back to its causal antecedents. We cannot simply assume that when people talk of reasons or causes they are not in fact referring back to prior or parallel causes and reasons. The meanings that attach to their explanations should be judged according to their locations within a discursive network and the control/prediction that such a network permits. In other words, we can understand an explanation in terms of the discourses which have yielded
it through their action on the actor.

Another example: Furnham, 1982b, has outlined explanations for unemployment that refer either to the prevailing economic conditions or to the willful indolence of the unemployed; the former is a cause explanation, the latter a reason explanation. The latter can easily be rephrased as a cause explanation: willful indolence readily translates into the state or trait (which, as McClure points out, is somewhere between a cause and a reason) of laziness, which in turn can take on full causal status by being interpreted as a genetic/genotypic substrate that is behaviourally/phenotypically manifested as unemployment or scrounging. More interesting is the way that a cause can incorporate a reason. In Marxist analysis of capitalist crisis, unemployment is the outcome of a downward economic spiral triggered by over-accumulation (Armstrong et al, 1984), over-capacity (Mandel, 1978) induced by a boom, or some complex mixture of factors (Sutcliffe, 1983), which cut profits, which leads to lay-offs. This explanation is set in purely mechanistic terms; as Marx (1970) insisted, there is no recourse to the reasons of capitalists in this framework. However, this discourse can be infused with others which make reference to the reasons of individual capitalists (or corporations or the bourgeoisie). Thus unemployment can be traced to reasons of capitalists - say the 'over-caution of investors' or 'greed - multinationals can procure bigger profits from production in the Third
This example should demonstrate that there is a parallel between reason and cause explanations; each contains the kernel of the other. Reasons, as productions of a consciousness are also distal productions of the social conditions that shaped that consciousness (e.g., Hollway, 1982; Henriques et al., 1984; Foucault, 1979; Giddens, 1976, 1979; Poster, 1978). Likewise causes are mediated by reasons. The question: "How are we to determine on which side of the cause/reason divide a particular explanation has fallen?" in a sense becomes meaningless. What is important is how this explanation, whatever its outward appearance, is used. As mentioned above, this is a complex function of its location within a discursive/practical matrix and its immanent point of intervention. The immanent point of intervention is that which is directly, that is, logically, implied by an explanation and is usually directed at the object of explanation. However, as we have pointed out, there are other points of intervention which might or might not bear a relation to that object. An explanation can be wielded in a variety of ways and aimed at a variety of objects. This is a point that has come more and more to the fore in research on attribution and lay explanations, though it remains underdeveloped. In particular, the relation between explanation and behaviour remains largely unexplored. We will treat this in a relatively novel way
by considering the relation between consciousness and practical social activity accessed through the concept of Praxis.


One of the main problems with the concept of Praxis is its slipperiness. Different authors will use it to mean different things (cf Bernstein, 1983). The clearest definition I have come across is Jounousek's (1972):

"The concept of Praxis in Marxism refers to the activity of man which aims at transforming the world as well as aiding his own self-development. Man is not a passive product of external influences, but instead participates, through his own practical activity, in changing the conditions of his existence. It is through these conditions that his personality is formed. The transformed environment does not lose its determining influence on Man. Thus, practical transformation of the world includes shaping as well as changing the human mind and consciousness."

(Jounousek, p279, 1972)

The relation between consciousness and practice can be considered at various levels. At the political level, the recent fragmentation of political resistance into numerous 'pressure groups' has resulted in a mood of resignation toward the decoupling of political theory and practice, the latter always being subject to material exigency which theory cannot foresee. Thus theory may pinpoint a particular point of intervention and yet be unable to approach it in practice. The simple point being made here is that, at this level, an explanation need not have any direct implications for behaviour where that behaviour is constrained by circumstance. However, where that theory
turns into a means of precluding intervention, then theory (or explanation) has had a behavioural effect by virtue of ensuring an absence of behaviour, or passivity. Here, theory can take on an ideological role. We shall examine this in considerable detail in Chapter 4.

In this section, the relation between theory and practice, and particularly explanation and behaviour, is of a more philosophical nature. Specifically, we are concerned with the ways in which theory and practice are fused, in the sense that every theory is embedded within and partially incorporates a matrix of practice and vice versa. What I will therefore do is firstly outline a recent examination of the relation between explanation and behaviour, then criticize it through the concept of praxis, in the process of which I will elaborate on the latter.

**Figure One**

*Two Models of Attribution*

*Kelley and Michela (1980)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antecedents</th>
<th>Attributions</th>
<th>Consequences</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Perceived Beliefs</td>
<td>causes Behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>Attributional theories</td>
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</table>

*Eiser (1983)*

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/           /
/ Attributional theories
\       \
Antecedents- - - - Consequences
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Eiser (1983) has analyzed the relation between explanation and behaviour, echoing Kelley and Michela's (1980) concern with the lack of investigation into the role of explanations in the production of behaviour (as well as affect and expectancy). However, Eiser also goes on to make the point that given that in the real world "behaviour can produce cognitive changes that are as much antecedents as consequences of attributions" then "The distinction between 'information, belief and motivation' on the one hand and 'behavior, affect and expectancy' on the other becomes harder and harder to draw....In short, the division that Kelley and Michela (1980) propose between attribution research and attributional research has become less and less helpful and less and less defensible" (p167) (see Figure 1). Thus "a more broadly attributional approach which looks specifically at the interaction between social cognition and behaviour" (p169) is essential. Of course I agree with Eiser's suggestion but would like to differentiate between Eiser's development of the Kelley and Michela schema and the notion of 'point of intervention'. In merging 'behaviour, affect and expectancy' with 'information, belief and motivation' it seems that Eiser has turned Kelley and Michela's model from a linear to circular model. We propose a web of interactions; in this we are making explicit what is implicit in Eiser's treatment. More fundamentally, we observe that attribution is more closely aligned with behaviour than even Eiser recognizes.
Various authors have argued that the distinction between theory and practice is a false one. For example, Feyerabend maintains that:

"What is called 'reason' and 'practice' are therefore two different types of practice the difference being that the one clearly exhibits some simple and easily producible formal aspects thus making us forget the complex and hardly understood properties that guarantee the simplicity and producibility, while the other drowns the formal aspects under a great variety of accidental properties."

(Feyerabend, 1978, p26)

Similarly, Poster (1984) in reviewing Foucault's later work remarks that he has brought theory and practice ever closer by coining the couplets discourse/practice and power/knowledge (see below).

According to Marx in the Theses on Feuerbach the human condition is characterized by the fact that people engage in sensuous human activity incorporating both theory or consciousness and practice, i.e., Praxis. In Bernstein's (1971), as with Janousek's, exposition we are presented with a view of consciousness as something intrinsically practical, having been infused with and shaped by the social activity of agents responding to objective conditions which have themselves been partially determined by the activity of agents. Immediately, the importance of history comes to the fore; as Janousek stresses, historically concrete study is vital. (This is what Part II addresses.) So, for Bernstein consciousness is not something other than sensuous human activity or
praxis: it is an aspect or moment of praxis itself and at the same time embodies within it practical elements. When Eiser points out that explanations do not simply yield behaviour, etc but also attitudes, etc, he does not address this property. This is because Eiser seems to hold to an individualist version of the attributer as cognitive processor: information impinges on a cognitive mechanism which processes it to yield an explanation which, in turn, might or might not effect behaviour. In contrast, the notion of praxis implies that this mechanism is, within broad limits, not absolute and ahistorical, but constituted through human action and objective forces acting upon humans. Eiser's talk of the "interaction between social cognition and behaviour" does not seem to include the potential of these two elements to constitute one another. That is, the objective circumstances which constrain behaviour also serve to shape, through social activity, the form and function of cognition. Moreover the specificity of those circumstances needs to be considered.

Janousek examined the possible influence of the conditions of production and exchange; we will look at the possible effect of commodification (Ch.2.3.c). Whereas explanations are seen by social psychology as individual or personal solutions, for praxis they are also practico-social solutions. This is exemplified by Gidden's idea (1979) of the recursive effects of action: behaviour and explanations can work back on the agent (as well as others) to consolidate his/her identity/role and thereby
the institutions and social structures in which these are embedded and which are constituted by them. In other words, explanations are a form of rehearsal with profound effects for the explainer and the system of which s/he is a part.

However, as we have said, they have wider ramifications. Not only will they affect the explainer, they will also influence other more or less proximal agents; they can also shape the identities of others. A stereotype does not simply construct the image of the other, it can also serve to shape the self-perception and ultimately the constitution of the other. The likelihood of this happening is proportional to the power invested in that explanation, or rather the complex array of institutions and discourses that are the conditions of emergence for that explanation. Foucault (1982) has outlined how this power can only be historically and concretely traced. We will illustrate this in the latter half of this thesis with respect to the power of rape mythologies. This concrete analysis must trace the multiplicity of connections that tie an explanation to the world, ranging from the cognitive (e.g., processes of categorization) to the historical (Chs. 6, 7, 8).

5. Discourses and Explanations.

My attempt to characterize both explanations and the study of explanations has leaned on a number of factors. Firstly there is the notion of 'points of intervention'
that an explanation is supposed to embody whether explicitly or implicitly. In attempting to unravel these, it is necessary to locate the explanation in a discursive/practical matrix.

Now, at last, we can turn to a consideration of discourse/practice. Discourse Theory (loosely called) has been developed since the early seventies by Michel Foucault in his historical studies of knowledges (particularly those human sciences concerned with discipline and sexuality), and their deployment in the construction of people as objects (sets of characteristics). These knowledges have been developed by and applied through a variety of agencies including the police, prisons, social work, hospitals (eg Foucault, 1979a,1981; Donzelot,1979).

Drawing on Henries et al (1988), we can provide the following description of discourse: Discourses are what people say and are thus content-oriented, though also sensitive to the interplay between content and process. Discourses are conceived as systematic and regulated, governed by rules of combination and difference with other discourses. Thus traditionally there is little crossover between science and literature; or a discourse on the fundamental irrationality of women is regulated, systematized and grounded by drawing on quasi-scientific discourses such as psychoanalysis and sexology (cf Ch.7),
and distinguishing itself from feminist discourses. These rules demarcate what is sayable therefore. Moreover discourses are not simply comprised of ideas: they emerge in and through processes of production which are material (say, in the way that men physically treat women) and discursive (say, in the reproduction of sexist ideas through macho talk, pornography, advertising). Every discourse is thus part of a complex; it is locked into an intricate web of practices and discourses. Discourses gain their currency by claiming to embody truth: one way of attaining this status is through the exercise of power (eg the institutional power of the expert; or of academic fashion - the rise of discourse theory must also be placed in the context of critical reflection, especially given its somewhat pessimistic political implications).

The similarities between our notion of the points of intervention and the practical aspects of discourses should be clear. For example, discourse theory excels at conceptualizing the multiplicity of points of intervention through placing a discourse (or explanation) in a complex web of discourses and practices. Distal points of intervention take various forms: from the expressive (self-presentational) interventions that an explanation allows to strategic points of intervention of which the explainer is not necessarily consciously aware (though s/he might have a practical consciousness of it,
Giddens, 1979). To illustrate: masculinity, linked as it is to rationality has an expressive edge which is itself practical - not only does it serve to express masculine status, it also practically consolidates the supposed irrationality or 'otherness' of women by undermining/denigrating the common activities of women (eg through sex discrimination at work). The historical dynamic that propels this process is so embedded in consciousness that only recently has it been recognized by its practitioners; at the same time, without this constant repetition of masculinity, there is a possibility that this dynamic would dissipate. Certain explanations are part of that repetition, and hence are involved in the oppression of women, and the disabling of men. Discourse theory, by its complex concern with multiplicity and detail, seems particularly suited to pinpointing this broader social role of explanations.

Using such an approach is not possible to abstract in the same way that a cognitivist analysis would do. Rather, we have to look at the minutiae of each explanation, tracing it historically, in its discursive and practical manifestations, unravelling the threads that it draws upon and which constitute it and its prowess. In this way we can compose a historical and social, as well as a cognitive and personal, picture of the function and constitution of explanations. Moreover, we can consider the ways that these factors shape one another.
Explanations are thus not seen as the property of the individual, but of a given system which has interactively constituted that individual.

6. **Explanations, Discourses and Scripts.**

If explanations are seen to be complex expressions of complex webs of discourses and practices, how are we to usefully enter into this complexity? I want to answer this question by looking at a recent development within AT, namely the application of script theory (Schank and Abelson, 1977), and its relation to the (weak) functionalist analysis of explanation suggested by Jaspars, Hewstone and Fincham (1983) and Hewstone (1983). By doing this I hope to show that the theoretical indeterminacy of what script is applicable to what events is solved by assessing the functionality of that script for the role in which the explainer is situated.

The introduction of Schank and Abelson's (1977) script theory into the study of how and why people construct explanations needs to be distinguished from the causal schemas originally outlined by Kelley (1971) (e.g. multiple sufficient causes) and further developed in his 1983 paper. While there are some similarities, Kelley's specific interest in causal inference processes places him at some distance from the more content-oriented formulations of Schank and Abelson and those who have followed them. Here I will not be dealing with Kelley's
work. Suffice it to say that, while cognitive structures sensitive to the causal configuration of events may be discernible, they will most likely be tightly bound to particular contents, circumstances and explanatory roles. Furthermore, where these structures or processes generalize across scripts (or conditions), they must still be historically located (eg the ascendancy of the notion of linear causality has to be considered against dialectical causality). In sum: the greater generality of Abelsonian scripts (they are not limited to causal structures) means that any criticism we apply to them will generalize to Kelleyian schemas.

The particular applications of script theory to AT that I am interested in are those of Eiser(1983), Lalljee and Abelson(1983) and Turnbull(in press).

1. Eiser(1983) has questioned whether attribution is as widespread as AT would have us believe. That is whether people really infer or diagnose causes or antecedents from a given event or behaviour. People don't often answer questions such as 'what kind of person would produce this kind of behaviour?' ; rather people find it easier to make forward-looking inferences of the form: 'how would someone like this behave?'. In doing this, they use causal schemata (Schank and Abelson,1977) which Eiser conceives as knowledge of the way that one event follows on from another, of a sequence or script of events. These schemata
are applied in an automatic fashion; the stop and think format of AT is only resorted to when something odd or novel happens.

2. Lalljee and Abelson (1983) outline a similar theory. They make the point that AT has little to say as regards what needs to be explained. They propose that it is deviation from a script that prompts explanation. They describe two broad ways in which this might proceed. There are constructive processes in which the to-be-explained behaviour is hooked up to plans, or goals, to actions. This effectively locates the target behaviour/event in a new schema. Alternatively, there are contrastive explanations which compare the actual behaviour to what would be considered normal under the circumstances. Clearly, in both these cases recourse to context and content is vital.

3. Another clear statement of the automatic and reflective use of scripts has come from Turnbull (in press). Like Eiser he notes the similarity between the automatic application of scripts and categorization, and conceives of the reflective application of scripts as a process of question-and-answer. Real-world knowledge forms the background against which events appear puzzling. In producing an explanation, the individual resolves that puzzle. The constructive and contrastive processes resolve puzzles therefore. As should be clear by now, all three models are highly concerned with the content of schemata.
In Antaki and Fielding's (1981) overview of the psychology of ordinary explanations, they presented a 2 x 3 typological schema (2 types of psychological or conceptual approaches; 3 types of explanation). As we can see from Table 1, Script theory is placed in the Descriptive-Representational category of their typology. 'Descriptive' denotes research that is primarily aimed at those explanations that deal with the meaning of events (as opposed to explanations attempting to ascertain the causes of an event, or the moral status of agents involved in the generation of that event); 'representational' refers to the theoretical concern with content, and the personal, interpersonal and cultural use of explanations (as opposed to information processing).

Table One
Research into Lay Explanations.

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<tr>
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<td>Representational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Descriptive</td>
<td>Script Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Agency</td>
<td>Ethogenics</td>
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</table>

However we would dispute this characterization. Indeed, we can detect a contradiction at work in the coupling of a mode of analysis (eg representational) and a type of explanation (eg descriptive). If the representational mode is concerned with the use of explanations and accepts that
such use demarcates their meaning (whether they are descriptive, moral, or causal), then to couple a representational analysis with a descriptive explanation presupposes the meaning of the explanation. Because an explanation does not overtly express morality, this does not mean that it does not contain implicit moral judgements. An explanation is a text and its interpretation is manifold. In the case of scripts, these are presupposed to be descriptive whereas it is the use to which they are put which will determine their explanatory form or type.

Also, it is important to bear in mind that there are a variety of schemas available. Some schemas might be exclusively used in a descriptive fashion, to answer the question: "What is going on here?", but implicit in them are assumptions regarding (the reasons behind) why people behave as they do within the script being applied, and judgements of the normative status of the characters and plot within that script. (On a different level of analysis, the possibility that affective and cognitive systems operate separately, that is, that affective responses (is it good?) might precede cognitive responses (what is happening?) suggests that the 'what is going on?' aspect of the application of a script might in fact be conditioned by the 'is it good?' element. Zajonc, 1980; Zajonc, Pietromuano, & Bargh, 1982). In sum, then, depending on what scripts are deployed and the
fashion in which they are used, they can implicate or project different points and types of intervention which necessarily incorporate a normative and causal/agential dimension (this will become more apparent in our example below). So unlike Antaki and Fielding we do not classify scripts as descriptive at outset.

In what follows, I will relate this brief outline of script theory to the attributional functionalism that has been proposed by Hewstone (1983). Hewstone has interpreted attributions in terms of their function for the subject. Drawing on Forsyth (1980), he outlines three primary functions of attribution: a) The need for control over the physical and social world, or predictability; b) Self-esteem; c) self-presentation where explanations are designed to gain public approval. His weak functionalist model suggests that any analysis of attributions has to be conducted in light of these functions. This is in fact what Antaki and Fielding have classified as the Representational method of research into ordinary explanations. However, there are a number of problems with Forsyth's account of the functions of lay explanations. Most fundamental is the fact that his account stops short of a comprehensively social account of their function (though he does briefly mention social functions he does not elaborate, at least in this paper, on what these might be). In particular, he fails to see how explanations serve to sustain and reinforce related
discourses and practices, which themselves work back on the 'functionality' of that explanation. At a concrete level this might refer to the way that sexist explanations go towards sustaining a sexist hegemony which undergirds particular control, self-esteem and self-presentational needs. At a more abstract level, such explanations serve to consolidate the way that causality is itself perceived, especially as it relates to judgements of responsibility.

It is also important to lay the separation of self-esteem and self-presentational needs open to question. If we assume that the self is a social construction (Hollway, 1982; Mead, 1932), it follows that these two functions are more intertwined than this distinction allows for. Thus any generation of self-esteem is necessarily derived in the process of some form of self-presentation, whether an audience is physically present or not (i.e. we are part actor, part audience). This issue is raised in the related debate around the status of self-serving attribution biases (Miller and Ross, 1975; Miller, 1978; Bradley, 1978, 1979. See Ch. 2).

What I want to do now is link up these four papers (Eiser, Lalljee and Abelson, Turnbull, and Hewstone) in order to distil a collective model which I will go on to criticize. Most events are explained by a simple, automatic categorization process which places them in their appropriate context or schema. Where stop-and-think
forms of explanation do occur, they are essentially concerned with resolving the uncertainty surrounding an unexpected or odd event, that is, deviation from the script or background knowledge then in operation. The expected script and thus the content and type of explanation given are derived in part from the context in which the event/behaviour occurred and in part from the context in which the explanation has to be given (this is where Hewstone's weak functionalism comes into play) which takes into account the self-esteem, self-presentational and control needs of the individual.

Here, I've constructed a composite model out of the common and compatible elements of the four separate models. Admittedly this has been done at the risk of vulgarizing the individual papers, but in this way, a view of an emerging 'paradigm' or approach can be derived and analyzed. This I will now do.

1. There seems to be an assumption that the adoption of the appropriate script, whether at the automatic or reflective level, is unproblematic. That is, that the array of events, the context, will specify which script is available. I would, in contrast, suggest that things are not so simple, or if they are they are so for a reason. People are more complex than these theories allow; for any given sequence of events they will have repertoire of scripts available to them. The question is:
what makes certain scripts more available than others? Provisionally, I wish to propose that it is roles (in the structural sense, Heiss, 1981) in which explainers are placed and the functions that these roles fulfil that determines which schemas are available. Thus there is an affinity between role and script. (It should be noted that the same problem of 'selection' applies to the choice of role. As we comment below, schemas will influence the way that roles are 'chosen'.)

Of course, roles are not simply structural, they are also interactively modelled, and are often full of contradictions. Moreover, I haven't analysed how a person adopts a role: in other words, the relation between entering a role and perceiving the script of which that role is a part. In passing, I will merely suggest that this might be thought of in at least two ways: 'Structurally', in which there is a meta-role which conducts the movement from one role to another and one script to another (this could be something akin to the rules of interpersonal interaction); alternatively, this might be conceived of as a norm of role-contiguity or role-set consistency. Secondly, we could simply consider role-adoption in 'biographical' terms, in the sense that role and the world-out-there, which the en-roled actor deals with, are in constant interaction the dynamic of which propels the individual from role to role, from script to script. We must not forget, however, that this
is not necessarily a process of willful drifting, but entails external factors that shape individuals into their roles.

This whole problem has much in common with the debates in literary criticism concerning the way that a reader and text interact. Does the reader impose his/her meaning on the text, or does the text somehow 'contain' meaning which the reader then taps into (Culler, 1983; Eagleton, 1984)? Indeed, the same problem crops up again and again, in that not only can the actor and social situation/script be considered reader and text respectively, but so too can the explainer and the explanation, and the attribution theorist (psychologist) and AT (psychology). I will not attempt such an outright textual deconstruction either of AT or explanations, scripts or discourses. My interest is more in the way that these various factors mediate power which goes to shape the cognitive and social functioning of individuals.

2. The fact that there are differing scripts also suggests that there can be conflict between scripts. While this is recognized by the authors mentioned, there is no consideration of the resolution of these contradictions through the exercise of power. Conceptually, scripts seem to presuppose a director who orchestrates the deployment of scripts through somehow inducing a mutually presupposed background of belief. There is no guarantee of this.
Especially for more controversial events and scripts. Often scripts are imposed. Discourse theory, by being fundamentally focused on the relationship of power to knowledge can incorporate conflict, resistance and resolution in the use of scripts/discourses.

3. So, whether an event is seen as puzzling depends on the script that serves to initially categorize it. Many events that are NOT seen as problematic can, on the application of a different script become in need of close inspection and explanation. An example: Witness this exchange from Susan Brownmiller's classic 1975 text on rape, Against Our Will. Visiting her local precinct (police station), Brownmiller found that of the 35 rape complaints only 2 arrests had been made.

"Not a very impressive record," I offered. "Don't worry about it." the sargeant assured me. "You know what these complaints represent?" "What do they represent?" I asked. "Prostitutes who didn't get their money," he said firmly closing the book.

(Brownmiller, 1975, p365)

The point Brownmiller wants to make is that many complainants are dismissed out of hand. Now the application of the 'peeved prostitute' script serves to dismiss the complaint, categorizes it away. Application of the 'women are oppressed' or 'policemen are sexist bastards' script would require a different sort of explanation for the arrest statistic.

4. Discourses, like scripts, emerge historically and some
carry greater weight than others. However, they are not rational in the sense of being readily or wholly accessible to the individual who deploys them in the way that say the ethogenic approach would suggest (cf Billig, 1977). They encorporate a multitude of assumptions, beliefs, practices, etc which are open to challenge/resistance and to which the individual is ordinarily blind. In other words subjects and, indeed researchers, provide only a limited interpretation: what is required is a critical hermeneutic method which places those interpretations in the context of a history and political theory (Habermas, 1971; Thompson, 1981; McClure, 1984). To put this another way, explanations have functions not only for individuals, they also serve functions for larger structures which encompass the individual and of which the individual is not necessarily aware. Such structures include groups, institutions and ideologies.

Brownmiller's example can serve to illustrate. The Sargeant's statement in both style and content asserts the essential rationality or expertise of the police institution. Simultaneously it reproduces and consolidates a set of discourses in which the 'peeved prostitute' myth is embedded. The Sargeant's explanation is effectively an external attribution as regards the causes for so few arrests (ie it has nothing to do with the police themselves, but is a result of objective facts, namely
peeved prostitutes). However, simultaneously, there is an attribution to women generally. The 'peeved prostitute' explanation is a version of the Potiphar's wife episode (Genesis, ch35). In this Joseph is falsely accused of rape by Potiphar's randy and peeved wife, because he wouldn't in fact lie with her. As a result he gets thrown into gaol where he is duly protected by God. This story has two facets. On the one hand it comments on the relation of power between the Egyptian Potiphar's wife and Joseph the Israelite - between oppressor and oppressed peoples. On the other hand, it evokes the relation of power between the sexes. In the latter case, it is the woman who has the power (in this case enhanced by her racial status) to discredit a man by crying rape. The ideological aspect of this story lies in its use to ground the suggestion that most women have a tendency to cry rape, indeed to lie in general. Hence we find statements such as Judge Sutcliffe's famous: "It is well known that women in particular, and small boys, are liable to be untruthful and invent stories" (quoted in Patullo, 1983). Thus women are predisposed to lying; however this is modulated by other factors such as the respectability of the alleged victim. If she's black, poor, on welfare, divorced etc then she is what Clark and Lewis have called (1977) an 'open territory victim', that is, she is up for grabs. This is expressed in the police's flat dismissal/disbelief (at least ideal typically) of/in the claims of an alleged victim falling into this category. This links up with
another set of discourses centred on the relative closeness of women to nature (cf Ortner, 1974) and the general patriarchal and capitalist (and Marxist too) view of nature as something that is there primarily for 'man's' use. In terms of group functions, at the risk of seeming too conspiratorial, the sergeant's explanation also serves a form of out-group denigration, i.e. the belittling of women. (This will be treated in considerably more detail in Chs. 6, 7, 8.)

At this point it is worth considering some of the most important theoretical connections between scripts and discourses. Scripts refer to social situations. However, these scripts necessarily have an historical pedigree. The obviousness of some of the rape myths is now being heavily challenged by feminists. The meaning of these situations as embodied in the myths/scripts is being thoroughly overhauled by a set of discourses that assert the rights of women.

The same applies to less openly controversial scripts such as Schank and Abelson's famous Restaurant script. In contrast to the view that it simply outlines the sequence of meaningful events (about going into a restaurant, finding a table, ordering a meal, paying and leaving, including the intermediate steps and some of the possible detractions), we can point out that in so doing it obfuscates the relations that exist between the customers
and the waiters, chefs, etc., the economic and social standing of the various workers within the restaurant, etc. Scripts are able to do this because the semantic and semiotic muscle they flex have long historical precedents. It is this historical (and institutional) embeddedness that discourse theory can tap; by reworking scripts as discourses, we can analyse the way that they have arisen, and the range of historical antecedents that have endowed them with their 'obviousness', that is, their POWER.

As suggested above, a fruitful way of entering the discursive complex into which scripts are integrated, is through the role in which the explainer is situated. The role is fully considered in Chapter 3, but for immediate purposes we can note that because it straddles both individual and social system, it can serve both the individual and social structure. For the individual, it generates expectations, behaviours, etc, but also, it structures needs and desires. In terms of the self, this approach presupposes a non-unitary conception of the self in which identity is recursively conditioned and substantiated in action and interaction, including, of course, explanation (Hollway, 1982; Henriques et al, 1984). The flipside to this is that roles, being constituted by social demands and traditions (both formal and informal - roles and institutions have underbellies too), also serve to re/produce the social structures and discourse/practices in which they are embedded. (To
reiterate: this is not meant in a global functionalist sense: such re/production may be dynamic in that it can entail social and cognitive change). Thus explanations also play a part in the re/production of the social, and this property of explanations is best apprehended through the analysis of role. Such an approach has an advantage over intergroup theory approaches to explanation as it places these processes in the context of wider social dynamics (cf Chs. 3, 6).

Our focus is thus upon the relation between the explanation and the role which effectively makes that explanation possible. The role embodies connected discourses and practices, and in so doing sets out the range of explanations that are available to the explainer. These guises incorporate cognitive processes, intergroup processes, and personal and social pay-offs. It is the first of these that the next chapter considers.

6. Power and Control.

At various points we have discussed the role of power in explanation. In this section I will be clarifying our use of that concept in relation to a number of phenomena. This will entail a brief consideration of several authors' views of power.

Nisbet (1966), in his survey of sociological traditions, distinguishes two approaches to the analysis
of power and authority. On the one hand there is the emphasis on the need for social cohesion, wrought through an authority which is pluralistic and decentralized - usually located in such institutions as the family. This traditional or conservative view can be marked off against the radical or centralist view which focuses on political power, on the rational use of power by the state. However as we shall point out below, these two can no longer be so easily separated. There have been a variety of critiques of the latter conception, first and foremost by the anarchists (Bakunin, Proudhon, Malatesta, etc) and more recently those influenced by anarchism as it briefly manifested itself in the upheavals in France in May 1968 (Cohn-Bendit, 1968; Poster, 1984; Lash, 1984). At the recent academic forefront of this critique is Foucault (eg 1979b, 1982). This work has been fundamentally interested in the way that the state and the multitude of disciplines attached to it have exercised their respective power to constitute important areas of the social field, from the large-scale (e.g., distribution of population) to the individual level (e.g., the experience of sexuality). In these manoeuvres, the integrity of truth-power was established; in this, truth serves as a source of power, but at the same time power grounds that truth. These links and operations can be gross (as in the plans for the panopticon) or subtle (as in the medical demarcation of appropriate sexuality). However, as Donzelot (1979) shows and Poster (1984) draws out, these modes of power -
microphysics of power as they are sometimes called - also move beyond the disciplines of the social sciences and their related applications (in clinics, prisons, welfare, etc) and impregnate (through both coercive and persuasive means) the social body or civil society. A recent example we might point to is the infiltration of the panopticon idea into general policing, or what has been called community policing, in which members of a community are encouraged to be alert to crime (ie spy on one another). Orwell's '1984' describes just this sort of phenomenon; and Aronson(1983) documents its operation at the height of the Stalinist era in the USSR.

For Foucault there is an integration of power and knowledge: this knowledge, by virtue of its acclaimed truth derives a potential power. It should be said that this a similar conception is present around in social psychology under the guise of 'expert power' (French and Raven,1959). What Foucault has done is specify in considerable historical detail the constitution, grounding, and the operation of this type of power. As regard the last of these, he has highlighted the use of technologies such as measurement techniques, tests, treatments, methods of observation and so forth which have gone towards shaping and defining (forming and formulating) the individual subject/object. But they can do this only insofar as they are considered legitimate. (Prior to this, for particularly novel conceptions, there
seems to be a period of coercion or high-intensity propaganda directed at the target groups. For example, the imposition of the nuclear family on the urban working classes. (Donzelot, 1979.) As with French and Raven's formulation, the degree of expertise will define the power of the expert (though of course this will in part also depend on other factors such as the legitimacy of the discourse itself - a novel discourse, such as psycholanalysis or discourse theory might be initially rejected irrespective of the expertise of its practitioners) so that some self-styled experts will face resistance. Nevertheless, the point I wish to make is that this expertise disseminates through society. People make claims to certain expertises, shift the grounds of argument and debate to establish their own terrain/field of knowledge and thus assert power. In other words, we all make claims to expertise - especially when that is grounded in our personal experience, eg on the limited subject of ourselves. However, some claimants are more adamant than others, especially those who are already placed in a position of power, or have relatively high status (eg policemen, men, the educated and famous, etc). So, there is a circularity, in which power and knowledge constitute and are constituted by each other. To unravel the precise nature of this constitution it is necessary to indulge in close historical and contextual analysis.

By using the term 'expert' instead of the retaining the
notion of knowledge (savoir), we are not thereby individualizing our analysis of power relations. As the preceding discussion should have made clear, expertise is itself thoroughly embedded in historical and social processes. As such, we consider this analysis as part of the three-dimensional view of power put forward by Lukes (1974, with modifications - Giddens, 1979). In this, power can manifest itself not only in open fashion, but also covertly, through the very formulation of a conflict which very often lies at the (relative) power-holder's discretion. This would require a concept of ideology to access latent conflict. The problem with this, as Lukes points out, is that if there is latent conflict between super- and sub-ordinate (or expert and object/client) which neither party is willing to identify, how do we as observers substantiate that conflict? This is a problem we touch upon in our discussion of critical theory, for part of critical theory's function to pinpoint the ways in which conflict has been denied, rendered latent. For Lukes, part of the way of accessing the conflict is through a democratic interaction with the oppressed group. One problem is that there is no reason to assume that the group is coherent (eg the working class has many conservative factions, as indeed there are amongst women).

Ng (1980) has reviewed a number of formulations of power. Till now we have considered only the negative aspects of power which, in its alliance with truth or ideology, has
served to oppress certain groups and individuals generally (where oppression refers in part to the shaping of individuals into particular 'roles' which oppress through constraint). However, Ng makes the point that power also has a positive component - lack of control can be highly damaging. Heider's (1958) notion of power as the 'power to' (as opposed to the 'power over') or the capacity to do things ('can') can be seen as evoking the need for control, prediction and competence.

At several points in this thesis we touch upon the issue of control and control needs. As we have mentioned, control as a prime motivator in attribution has remained relatively untheorized. Questions such as: what needs to be controlled? how have control needs arisen? and when do they need to be fulfilled? are left to wallow in the murky unspecificities of the social psychological version of society.

Typically, explicit research on control has centred on the individual. In the locus of control literature (eg Rotter, 1966; Furby, 1979) control is conceived as the degree to which an individual perceives personal control over the outcome of his/her behaviour, and is related to future responses (eg learning, achievement motivation). As Furby notes, the internal locus of control, in line with American individualism, is held up as the norm.
In the learned helplessness literature (e.g., Seligman, 1975; Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale, 1978; Peterson and Seligman, 1984) the perceived lack of control has been attributionally reformulated as high internal attribution for failure to stable and global characteristics (e.g., low IQ). It is hypothesized that this attributional pattern is involved in depression. The debate continues to rage over whether this formulation's application to depression is valid; I will not be entering into the fray. Of more immediate relevance is the fact that locus of control and learned helplessness do not seem to map easily onto one another (Peterson, Sushinsky, and Diemack, 1978; Miller and Seligman, 1982). For a start, locus of control confounds internality with control and externality with lack of control. In contrast, learned helplessness accesses those instances where internality underlies lack of control. Moreover, locus of control does not encompass the dimensions of global/specific and stable/unstable. Despite these differences the main point remains intact: lack of control, wherever located, is a bad thing.

Within these fields of research we get no sense of too much control being a bad thing. For this we must turn to the analysis of power. Ng (1980) complains that the derogation of power as a corrupting influence has ignored the fact that a little power can be a good thing, permitting people the opportunity to exercise legitimate
control over various aspects of their everyday lives. So, we have two opposing emphases that set up two norms: too much power/control is a bad thing; too little power/control is a bad thing. We can represent this simply in the following diagram:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of Power/Control</th>
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<tr>
<td>Too little ---------------Just enough-------------Too Much</td>
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The normative content of this simple dimension concerns 'health' and with health the focus of attention is the individual. Individuals with too little control become 'depressed'; those with too much become 'corrupted'. The observation I wish to make is that control/power needs vary within individuals, across groups, within and across circumstances, indeed, with history. What are 'appropriate' control needs should not be judged against some criterion of individual health. For example, individuals with high control needs can be expected to respond more unfavourably to a given level of failure than individuals with lesser needs. Thus, where little competence is ascribed to the self, failure and lack of control does not necessarily induce distress. It is no wonder that women will seek out games of chance (Deaux and Ferris, 1975) whereas men are more interested in games and skill given their respective stereotypical self-images. At the broadest level, men are ascribed a greater general competence than are women (cf Ch.6); they have a higher
status, and their control needs are greater (which are fulfilled through a number of mechanisms, Wortman, 1976; Bains, 1983).

It would seem then that the difficulty lies in the fact that competence or 'can' is variable. What one 'can' do will determine, within basic limits, what one's control needs are and vice versa. Moreover that competence is conditioned by numerous other factors such as those very micro-powers we outlined above. In that those micro-powers tend to delimit a role (by setting up norms) they also set up the competence, control needs and expectations that attach to that role. That is, these powers also effect the objective constitution and subjective experience of competence and the desire for control (and power). The role of expert can afford particularly extreme expectations for control/competence. In fact, what from within a role is perceived as 'power to', can from without appear as 'power over'.

The circularity we have abstracted runs as follows: control/competence embodied in the role of (relative) expert is partly responsible for competence needs in other roles through a process of 'policing' or 'micropowers'. These roles act back to consolidate expert roles and other roles, and so on across the social field. Much of this policing takes the form of what social psychology calls interpersonal interaction. Only in the historical
specificity of given events (rape), roles (men, women, policemen) and explanation can the flux of power and truth, competence and certainty be treated with appropriate sophistication.
CHAPTER TWO

LAY EXPLANATIONS AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES

Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter is to develop a theme we touched upon in the preceding chapter, namely the way cognitive processes function in the construction of explanations. I will deal with several such processes, though a comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this thesis. Moreover, categorization will not be treated here, but will considered in the next chapter in the context of intergroup behaviour.

Firstly, I will briefly overview the relation between attribution theory (AT) and cognitive psychology and selectively review the literature on three cognitive phenomena as they have applied to AT. This will be followed by a discursive critique of cognitive psychology showing that its biologistic momentum is misguided, or at least can be counter-balanced by explanations of behaviour that are couched in sociological and even economistic terms. As an exercise in what Wexler (1981, 1983) has called positive critique, I will analyze the three aforementioned attributional phenomena - the fundamental attribution error, the neglect of consensus and base rate information by subjects and the perseverance of theories
in the light of disconfirming evidence, recasting them as primarily social phenomena.

1. Cognitive Psychology and Attribution Theory

To start: I will give an elementary outline of cognitive social psychology in the form of a set of assumptions (Eiser, 1980, p8). 1. "the individual is an active processor of information"; 2. "the interpretation of a stimulus depends both on the attributes of the stimulus and on the perceiver's prior expectations and standards of comparison"; 3. "the individual tries to organize his experience; such organization typically involves selection and simplification"; 4. "the function of such organization is to provide a guide for action and a basis for prediction". As Eiser states, these assumptions apply to both social and non-social information processing and behaviour (though to what degree this application is similar for social and non-social information, and whether indeed there can be such a thing as the latter, is open to question. MacArthur, 1982; Tajfel, 1981). For cognitive psychology social behaviour is the product of some form of individual decision: "The way a person reacts to any social stimulus or situation depends on how he interprets and categorizes the information contained in that stimulus or situation, on his prior expectations and standards of comparison... on what he feels is expected of him, and on the consequences he expects to occur as a result of his action." (Eiser, 1980, p8).
A more specific account of the relationship between AT and cognitive psychology is presented by Antaki and Fielding (1981). They distinguish between the cognitive or information processing approaches from the representational tradition of research. The former is concerned with how ordinary explanations or attributions are constructed. "Research in this tradition is aimed at describing powerful models of the ways that people select, combine and integrate social information in arriving at a judgement" (Antaki & Fielding, 1981, p28). Antaki and Fielding see the work of Newton (e.g. 1976; in the footsteps of Michotte, 1960) as exemplifying the application of information-processing analysis to descriptive explanations. The information-processing approach to agency explanations is split into the less and more social use of information. AT lies at the more social end of information use in agency explanations. According to Antaki and Fielding AT allows us to uncover some of the 'biases' or limits of human information processing in the field of explanations. Moreover, while it certainly has its deficiencies (e.g. over-emphasising cause explanations or ignoring the influence of interaction on explanation).

"AT (is) primarily a theory to do with one sort of ordinary explanation (agency) which would benefit from a prior sort of explanation (descriptive explanation)" (p45). For explanations of morality, information processing accounts originally grounded in some analysis
of motivations (e.g. Walster's 1966 defensive attribution theory, or Lerner's 1970 Just World Hypothesis) "have been increasingly influenced by the mainstream social psychology tradition of reductive models of cognitive capacities" (p53). This will usually take the form of an analysis of how moral and non-moral information is integrated to produce a judgement (Hamilton, 1978, 80; Fincham and Jaspers, 1980; but also Lloyd-Bostock, 1983).

My intention is to now show how specific phenomena that appear in lay explanation, when analysed through the information processing approach, are misconstrued in a number of ways. Most importantly, too great an accent is placed on the individual organism. The main focus of my critical attention will be, in Antaki and Fielding's scheme of things, cognitive agency explanations.

Typically this research throws up the question of rationality; that is, whether people's cognitive processes are biased or rational. As Eiser (1980) notes, the answer to this turns on the meaning of 'rational'. At the level of examining the the processes involved in producing behaviour, the notion of 'rational' or 'irrational' simply does not apply. The cognitive psychologist's task is to unmask the mechanisms through which a decision is arrived at. Only with reference to some norm does a process become 'rational' or 'biased'. One of the most frequently applied norms is a mathematical or logical one.
(Kruglanski and Ajzen, 1983). However, we should note immediately that the bias as here treated, is internal and individual, something which a cognitive approach presupposes. Thus the term 'rational' cannot be dropped for the purposes of theoretical analysis; that analysis is, as I hope to show, value- (and history-) laden (e.g. Sampson, 1981), i.e., it embodies a norm which, by virtue of its hegemony, it renders invisible.

To reiterate: a full discussion of the range of biases and heuristics is beyond our scope. Instead, three examples of these will be considered in some detail. The Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE), the neglect of consensus/baserate information, and Theory Perseverance (TP) have been chosen because, in addition to their centrality in the literature, they are particularly relevant to the analysis of men's explanations of rape, serving to underpin the sexist treatment of rape victims and women generally. In this section I will review the literature on these phenomena. This will be followed by an analysis of the general shortcomings of cognitive approaches. Finally, I will speculatively reinterpret these phenomena in the light of the critical points developed in the preceding section.

a. The Fundamental Attribution Error. The original findings of Actor(A)/Observer(O) differences were formalized by Jones and Nisbett (1972) in the following
way: As reliably attribute their behaviour externally, that is, to situational factors; Os attribute the same behaviour relatively internally, to some facet of the A. There was a two-fold explanation of this: on the one hand As and Os have differing perspectives on the same fragment of behaviour. In other words they have different (perceptual) information available, so that for the O, the A's behaviour appears more salient. On the other hand, As and Os will process the same piece of information differently, according to, say, their relative knowledge of A's biography. Ross (1977), drawing on Heider's (1958) idea of the actor swamping the field, has institutionalized this into the FAE, which describes the fundamental and pervasive tendency of Os to attribute more internally than is warranted.

To say that this phenomenon and the paradigm to which it has given rise have been under attack in recent years would be an understatement. Various authors have disputed whether the FAE can be sustained by the available empirical evidence (Monson and Snyder, 1977; Monson, 1983; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1983). Others have pointed out that whether an A/O difference surfaces depends on the nature and content of the attributional task (eg Miller and Rorer, 1982; Bradley, 1979; Deaux, 1976; Taylor and Koivumaki, 1976). The role of expectations is particularly important in mediating the relation of A and O attributions. Expectations referring to one's own
behaviour (and this includes self-presentational aspects) will effect explanations: it is more important to appear rational, modest, flush with one's self-stereotype or in-group, than to consistently attribute internally as an O (though there does seem to be a norm for this too, Jellison and Green, 1981). On the other hand, expectations concerning the other will also condition explanations (eg Jones and Davis, 1965; Hansen and Stomer, 1978; Deaux and Ferris, 1977; Hewstone and Jaspars, 1982a, etc). Others have attacked FAE on the grounds that it is value laden (eg Harvey, Town, & Yarkin, 1981; Billig, 1982; Gergen, 1982), or that it conflates descriptive and evaluative aspects of explanation (Van der Pligt, 1981). Harre (1981a) and Shotter (1981) have both noted that as a paradigm it sorely lacks any treatment of the interactional nature of many A/O encounters - for Harre the A/Os competetively establish themselves as worthy people; for Shotter, they hermeneutically uncover what is going on. Further, FAE being mostly laboratory-bound and experiment-fixated, has failed to take into account the variety of explanations available to A/Os (Gergen, 1982; Ch.1). Farr & Anderson (1983) have also pointed out that the FAE paradigm has operated exclusively in the visual modality and that the O and A, in taking over from Heider's purely relational terms 'perceiver' and 'other' respectively, have effectively vulgarized the latter.

To some degree these problems have been tackled by the
intergroup attribution paradigm (eg Taylor and Jaggi, 1974; Pettigrew, 1979; Hewstone and Jaspers, 1982b, 1983, etc). Here, there is a sensitivity to the social embeddedness of the A/O paradigm; various motivational and social factors which serve to 'relativize' the position of A and O, by placing them in the context of opposing groups, are taken into account.

Despite the shortcomings of the FAE paradigm, there does seem to be one robust effect which emerges: the influence of salience. My aim is to show how salience (itself a subcategory of the availability heuristic, Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974) might be rendered suspect when seen limited to individual functioning. This will involve close inspection of the concept of availability, in order to rework this 'heuristic' as a socially grounded phenomenon.

Ross and Anderson (1982) and Nisbett and Ross (1980) note how the FAE can be explained in terms of the availability heuristic. For the O, the A is more available by virtue of his/her "perceptual proximity" to her/his action. "The A is dynamic and interesting while the situations are more commonly static and pallid" (Nisbett and Ross, 1980, p122-123). (When this is reversed, then attributions are likewise reversed, MacArthur and Post, 1977.) Before going on to recount the ways that availability might operate within FAE, it is worth noting
that it can accommodate many if not all the criticisms levelled above. The point that expectations are involved in AT can be rephrased in terms of the increased availability of certain types of behaviour-attribution couplings which have been prompted by the situation of the O (say, as an in-group member, or as 'ordinary person'). It would seem that availability can explain practically anything to do with explanation. This is part of its strength, as well as its weakness in the sense that, as it stands, it cannot map out the specificity and historicity of the couplings that constitute any given instance of availability: too often they are reduced to the 'biological individual' inevitably characterized by a gross and unexplored need to 'control' and 'predict'.

There seem to be, roughly in accordance with Jones and Nisbett's (1972) original formulation, at least two ways in which salience and availability function within the A/O paradigm: perceptually, and informationally (not that the two are always readily distinguishable). Taylor, 1982, suggests that availability operates in three ways in social psychology: through salience, retrieval, and the use of schemas - for the sake of convenience however, we have collapsed these into two.

(i) Perceptual Salience. (cf McArthur, 1982, for a review). Usually, this means that the perceptual salience of the A prompts the O to take him/her to be the prime
generator of his/her behaviour. Salience can be manipulated through the physical centrality of the A (Storms, 1974); or the relative 'differentness' of the A with respect to other As. Taylor and Fiske (1975) showed how the visual prominence of the A served to induce an internal attribution. Taylor, Fiske, Close, Anderson and Ruderman (unpublished manuscript, cited in Nisbett and Ross, 1980) showed how race or sex uniqueness had a similar effect. Similarly, the colour of a shirt which increases the salience of the target A, will also increase the internal attributions made to her/him. As Taylor (1982) points out, it is difficult to see what relevance other than perceptual the colour of a shirt would have for an O. As mentioned before McArthur and Post (1977) found that a brightly lit or moving A led to increased attribution to him/her, while a salient environment facilitated external attribution.

(ii) Informational Availability. This can be mediated in a number of ways: Ross and Sicoly (1979) showed that agents have differential retrieval, being better able to recall their own behaviour as opposed to others' (though this was modulated to some extent by the nature of those behaviours). Alternatively, if the different types and amounts of information that one has regarding self and others is balanced, then FAE seems to be abated (Eisen, 1979). Similarly Brickman et al (1975), and Rusbult and Medlin (1982) have shown that longer causal chains (i.e
more information) tend to moderate the internal attributions of Os. It would seem then that attributions are conditioned according to whether certain types of information are available which is itself conditioned by the situation in which the O and A find themselves. Informational availability can be fostered by altering that situation, without necessarily explicitly changing the amounts of information available to the O/A. Thus getting the O to empathise with the A has the effect of making available to him/her information that would otherwise remain untapped — after all, every experimental O has been a real-life A (e.g. Regan and Totten, 1975; Gauld and Sigall, 1977; however see also, Taylor, Etcoff & Lanter, 1979). We might also speculate over the action of empathy in the functioning of in-group attributional favouritism. Most important of all, it would seem that some types of information are more available than others by virtue of their vividness and concreteness.

b. The Neglect of Consensus and Baserate Information.
Kelleyian consensus information refers to the degree to which an A's behaviour conforms to other As' behaviour given the same stimulus and situation. If there is high consensus then it assumed that the situation is the cause. As ever, this parameter suffers from a variety of ailments. In addition to the criticisms we made in Chapter 1 in which we relativized the status of the consensual population, we can also point to the fact that a minority
can define the 'proper' (ie consensual) response if it is in a position to exert minority influence (cf Moscovici, 1976; Ng, 1980; Mugny, 1984). Thus in determining the relevance of consensus information we need to uncover the source of its power - whether it be located in the in-group, or a powerful minority, or in the mists of history as with some masculine norms of response.

However, more directly of interest to attribution theorists is the fact that it has been shown that consensus information is consistently underused (eg McArthur, 1972, 1976; Garland, Hardy & Stevenson, 1975; Nisbett and Borgida, 1975; Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall & Reed, 1976; Orvis, Cunningham and Kelley, 1975). Nisbett and Borgida (1975) have suggested that the main reason that this information is not used is that it lacks concreteness and vividness - it is too diffuse for common cognitive mastication. Some of these findings have been criticized because the random (ie normal) nature of the sample from which the consensus information was drawn had not been made clear to subjects (Wells & Harvey, 1977; Borgida, 1978; Wells and Harvey, 1978). However, even where this was made apparent to subjects, consensus information remained underused relative to the other informational parameters of distinctiveness and consistency. Other factors that might be involved in this underutilization are: size of consensus sample size (Kassin, 1979; however Hamill, Wilson and Nisbett, 1980, have found subjects to
be insensitive to sample size); successive versus simultaneous presentation of information (Feldman et al., 1976; Kassin, 1981); the order in which information is presented - the later that consensus is given to subjects, ie the closer it is to the point of judgement, the more likely it is to be used (Ruble and Feldman, 1976); whether consensus information is causally related to the target behaviour (Ajzen, 1977); if consensus is generated by reference to one's own behaviour then it is more likely to be used (Hansen and Lowe, 1976; Hansen and Donoghue, 1977); also the consensual potency of one's own behaviour is illustrated by the false consensus effect, Ross, Greene and House, 1977). Kassin (1979) distinguishes between two types of consensus information, normative and sample-based or explicit; it is the latter that has been most often (under)used in ANOVA studies. From this it can follow that sample-based consensual behaviour which is atypical or extreme, leads subjects to assume that that information is drawn from a deviant or unrepresentative sample. Thus consensus information is judged against normative expectations of what constitutes appropriate behaviour for 'reasonable people'. It would seem then that when consensus information is used, it must reflect a norm. However, as pointed out in Chapter 1, in many cases a clear norm does not emerge, as for example with Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) representativeness experiments. More recently, Borgida and Brekke (1981) have suggested that whether consensus is used or not is not a
simple function of its vividness or of the operation of the representativeness heuristic (in which subjects access the overt similarity between the actor (item) and an available background group (category), and use this rather than the actual baserates to guide their judgements). Rather, they suggest that where the baserate and individuating data are equally relevant, they can be combined and prioritized. We find parallels to this in the intergroup literature (cf Ch.3).

The main point I wish to draw out here is that the Representativeness Heuristic can be said to lie at the heart of the under-use of consensus information. To reiterate the representativeness heuristic: if an item A is similar to category B, then it is thought to be representative of B and this is insensitive to baserates, sample size, laws of chance and validity etc (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). The key notion here is 'similarity' which can include a variety of ways by which an individual item is seen as representative of a sample. I would further suggest that it is partly similarity that renders an object vivid. If similarity is one of the factors involved in categorization, and categorization is a process whereby an item is more unequivocably defined, then this definition will serve to make an item more vivid. (However, as Billig (1985) has pointed out, we must not forget processes of particularization in which an item is defined by virtue of its uniqueness.) In effect then, an
item derives its vividness partly from its similarity to well-defined and well-known categories. When individuating data becomes weak, that is, where the individual item lacks vividness, then recourse to the experimental baserate information (or consensus) becomes necessary. Given that the Representativeness Heuristic (RH) is a basic process in the neglect of consensus information, our main objection will revolve around its essentially individualistic perspective.

c. Theory Perseverance. Theory Perseverance (TP) refers to the way that people "persist in their initial assessments (or explanations) to an unwarranted degree" (Nisbett and Ross, 1980, p.176). TP has recently been studied through the use of the debriefing paradigm in which the subjects' initial assessment is wholly discredited through the introduction of new information. Ross, Lepper and Hubbard (1975) found that subjects' initial beliefs about their own and others' ability to distinguish between authentic and inauthentic suicide notes persevered even after a thorough debriefing. The debriefing consisted of the revelation that the feedback they had been receiving about their performance was in fact random (ie unrelated to their actual performance). This finding has been extended in a number of ways. Anderson, Lepper and Ross (1980) found that even where the initial evidence was itself highly dubious, as in the relation between firefighters and the preference for risk as measured by a
paper and pencil test, the beliefs that derived from that information persisted after debriefing. The overall evidence suggested that subjects were formulating causal scenarios or explanations from which they refused to shift after debriefing. Ross, Lepper and Lau (cited in Nisbett and Ross, 1980), replicated these findings outside a laboratory setting. They found that students continued to ascribe their performance to ability even after they had been debriefed that their performance depended solely on the type of lecture they had received prior to attempting the task. Anderson (1982, 1983) has studied the way that this 'bias' might be counteracted. He found that the more concrete the data, the more severe the perseverance. That is, subjects found it easier to generate causal theories or scenarios from individuating data than from abstract information. Attempting to attenuate subjects' perseverance, Anderson found that counter-explanations (producing alternative explanations) and inoculation (telling subjects about their tendency towards perseverance) both led to a decrease in perseverance, the former by effecting theory revision, the latter by effecting theory formation. These findings offer support for the theory that causal scenarios have a tendency to persist.

However, as Nisbett and Ross (1980) note, persistence is aided by the ability of subjects to interpret potentially disconfirming evidence so that it effectively contributes
to their initial theory. For example, Snyder and Cantor (1979; Snyder and Gangestad, 1981) showed that subjects are particularly prone to preferentially soliciting confirming data.

Incidentally, another way of viewing these phenomena is through the notion of 'anchoring' (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) which describes the failure of subjects to make necessary adjustments to initial judgements. However, I will not further develop the connections between anchoring and theory perserverance.

My intention is to speculatively show how TP can be reconceived as a social 'bias' that has some of its roots in the 'objective conditions of capitalism'. This is not to suggest that it is not present in other societies, merely to point out that its bases in social praxis will differ across the spectrum of societies (see below). Nisbett and Ross' (1980) accent on "higher epistemic goals" such as "the importance of beliefs and belief-systems" or on "the real-world constraints on time" (p191), is displaced in favour of an analysis in terms of social conservatism and an impetus towards social and self-objectification.


a. Preamble. Before I embark on a detailed critique of this tradition, I would first like to outline some of the
reasons for my initial reservations concerning the cognitivist approach. The second part of this thesis is specifically concerned with men's, particularly policemen's, explanation of rape. Even a superficial look at the way that rape myths are deployed and explanations constructed will show that availability, representativeness and anchoring heuristics are all applicable. However, because these 'heuristics' and 'biases' are located within the individual, that is, are seen to be an outcome of faulty cognitive functioning, the social 'biases' in the sense of inequalities in power, etc are bypassed. Rather than grounding these 'biases' in concrete situations, entailing particular discourses and practices, rather than seeing them as instances of the rules of combination and difference that apply to relevant discourses and practices, we are presented with a series of universal processes. The result is that the site of corrective intervention becomes the individual. The gross bigotry that we witness in many explanations of rape is due to the biological limitations of our cognitive capacities; one corollary of this is the conservative view that there can be no change, that such socially reprehensible behaviour is inevitable (Billig, 1985). Certainly, I am not arguing that the individual need not change; rather, I am arguing against the exclusive technological focus on the individual (as exemplified by inoculation and counter-explanation procedures). What is required is a complex, dialectical intervention that, in
the case of men's explanation of rape, would need to take into account the historical and biographical investments that have been made in, for example, sexual inequality, and extreme control of self and (low-status) other.

b. Epistemic Processes and Society. The debate regarding the rationality of heuristics rages. As we remarked above, any such judgement entails the setting up of a norm. Typically, these have been statistical or logical ones. In contrast, Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) have suggested that any such norms must be set against internal norms of epistemic functioning. What I will now do is show that this debate is still locked within the individualistic frame of reference outlined above. From this will lead a discussion of the general shortcomings of a cognitive social psychology.

Nisbett and Ross (1980), while allowing for the possibility of normative demands on inference processes, temper this by insisting that the cognitive is primary. Thus, it would be

"...a mistake to whitewash our subjects' behaviour, or to presume that it can be understood wholly in terms of such worthy higher order goals. People's confirmation biases and their approach to recall and generation of data is too well documented to justify such tolerance."

(Kruglanski and Ajzen suggest that in addition to
logical/statistical normative models, there are two further criteria of validity used in human inference research: direct observation and the experimenter's perspective. Kruglanski and Ajzen also summarize the current state of the field in the following way: (1) There is a range of biases that are fundamentally different - this research field and the processes it addresses are thus both essentially pluralistic; (2) Biases are motivational or cognitive; (3) There exist reliable criteria for inferential validity. In contrast, these authors offer the following alternative characterization: (1) The inference process is unitary; (2) Biases need not result in error; (3) There are no secure criteria of validity. They prefer to characterize knowledge by: (1) its contents; and (2) the confidence with which it is held.

For Kruglanski and Ajzen: (1) The epistemic (knowledge producing) process is initiated by an epistemic purpose (interests). Cognitions (hypotheses) arise in the stream of consciousness; (2) Validation of these cognitions involved deductive knowledge and the production of 'if-then' linkages. Thus an hypothesis will be accepted if it is deducible from the accepted evidence; (3) However subjects may generate alternative, equally viable, hypotheses from the same data-base that are inconsistent with the original hypothesis; (4) It is possible to generate an infinity of 'if-then' linkages. When we stop
generating we effectively 'freeze' the inference process. Conversely, we 'unfreeze' when generating a new hypothesis. The capacity to generate linkages is dependent upon various factors both internal and situational. In Kruglanski and Ajzen's view people are subjectively logical. Biases are preferences for one inference over alternatives; errors are subjectively defined as the kind of experience that is induced by an inconsistency between a given hypothesis, inference or conclusion and a firmly held belief. Presumably what is considered inconsistent is likewise subjective.

So, for Nisbett and Ross, the subject is objectively biased, or more colloquially, wrong. For Kruglanski and Ajzen the subject simply cannot be wrong. This can only be sustained by establishing that there are no objective or secure criteria of validity, which they manage by adopting a 'Popperian non-justificationist metaphysic'. Accordingly, any model of empirical reality, even direct observation, is a conceptual construction whose degree of actual correspondence with objective reality is in principle inestimable. It follows that normative models, direct experience and even the experimenter's perspective cannot provide us with infallible criteria with which we might go about our inferring. Nisbett and Ross see biases, errors, and heuristics as the imperfections of the human cognitive processor, as systematic hiccups in the our inferential machinery. This machinery is, moreover,
located within us, largely independent of the surrounding world: it is natural, universal and ahistorical. Indeed, Nisbett and Ross relate these cognitive limitations to rats. In the same way that rats are genetically primed to perceive and respond to reinforcement contingencies and thus to persevere, so we too are primed.

Kruglanski and Ajzen's infinite variety of 'if-then' linkages suggests that the way individuals freeze and unfreeze the epistemic process comes down to idiosyncracy. Bias is a matter of personal taste. The individualism has not abated; it is still something within the individual that determines the precise content of the epistemic process. What conditions the individual's taste is but peremptorily addressed. Whereas Nisbett and Ross' individualism is mechanistic, Kruglanski and Ajzen's is subjective. In both cases the influence of the social world is minimized. For the former, the social world seems to be comprised of technocrats, of social psychologists who can tinker with the subject; all else barely affects process. In the latter references abound to the social environment but it is an exotic social psychological world comprised of 'situational factors' and the 'press of time' and the 'need to reach decisions quickly', or find 'effective control' and 'physical safety'. Society under this sort of social psychological scrutiny is a mush: there is no specificity or systematicity about it; the focus is exclusively on
proximal situational factors - long-term material and ideological factors are neatly sidestepped. It is by virtue of this neglect of the specific and systematic that attention comes to devolve on the individual. To confront the systematicity and specificity mediated by groups, discourses, ideology, social and material practices and so forth would force us to consider alternatives to the mechanistic and the subjective.

c. Critical Adventures. Wexler (1981, 1983) has identified three critical modes in which social psychology may be apprehended. Firstly there are internal, conventional critiques. These range from the methodological and theoretical to the metatheoretical such as Gergen's (1973) classic re-appraisal of the social psychology as history. Very often the reforms that such critiques generate are geared towards re-emphasising the social aspect of social psychology. Usually this takes the form of procedural diversification and innovation and an accentuation of the normative composition of social behaviour; almost invariably this stops short of a full-bodied investigation of the relation of behaviour to socio-economic (and power/knowledge) structures. In contrast, Wexler suggests that what is necessary is a knowledge critique which traces changes in social psychological theory back to changes in Western capitalist societies. In particular, attention must be paid to the way that social psychology has ideologically distorted social phenomena through individualistic and
naturalistic categories of analysis. In addition, Wexler suggests a social critique which analyzes the ways in which social psychology has served to support the capitalist system in its militaristic, bureaucratic and individualistic guises. Complementing this 'negative' critique is a 'positive' one (or what Wexler also calls a critical social psychology) which tries to situate social psychological phenomena in the context of the prevailing social system. Specifically, this would entail a 'socialpsychologic' of capitalism in which the key Marxist concepts of alienation, commodification and the exploitation of human labour would be used to "describe general interactional processes which provide a matrix for understanding social psychology that is omitted in prevailing paradigms" (Wexler, 1983, p79). To put this another way, many of the phenomena which social psychology addresses may indeed be genuine, not simply artefacts of the methodological and theoretical parameters of social psychological practice. However, social psychology, (and particularly, that virulent strain, cognitive social psychology) acts to deflect attention away from the possible (capitalist) social construction of that behaviour.

In what follows I will subject the attributional heuristics described above to the types of critiques outlined by Wexler, though I will be deviating substantially from his social and sociological premisses.
(though to give him his dues, he does see these as being open to revision). I will not be attempting a detailed sociology of social psychology (Buss, 1975).

d. Internal Critique. Writers engaged in this sort of critique have been dismayed by the regression into the 'rigorous methodology' of a cognitive psychology at the expense of a socially amenable social psychology. Thus Taylor's (1976) original hopes for a fruitful marriage between social and cognitive psychologies are both realized and dashed in a one-sided affair, with cognitive psychology the dominant partner (Taylor, 1981). As she notes, temptation to generalize cognitive phenomena has to be resisted: "We need to do a better job of binding our phenomena and defining the contextual factors that influence the powerfulness of the phenomenon in a given domain" (p204).

Another source of internal concern is the fraught relationship between cognition and affect. Social cognition theorists such as Ross, Nisbett and Borgida have been prone to relegating the affective factors behind cognitive ones in the operation of biases. However, others have suggested that it is motivational factors that are responsible for a variety of 'cognitive biases'. Thus Bradley (1978, 1979) suggests that it is self-presentational needs that underlie many of these biases. More fundamentally, Zajonc (1980; Zajonc, Pietromono & Baugh, 1982) has suggested
that there is profound dissociation between cognitive and affective systems, to the extent that, contrary to mainstream belief, affect may precede cognition. Tetlock and Levi (1982) have suggested that within attribution theory, attempts to distinguish methodologically between cognitive and affective processes have resolutely failed for a variety of reasons such as the fact that in manipulating motives one is also altering informational input which might lead to covert changes in cognition (and vice versa).

Following Wexler, we could criticize these critiques for never venturing too far from the individual as the generative locus of social behaviour. Thus for Taylor, constraining the generalization of cognitive processes may simply make room for the introduction of other cognitive processes. The limited relevance of salience phenomena means the greater relevance of anchoring phenomena for a given circumstance. Taylor's critique may be read as a warning against overzealousness in the cognitivist specialist not against cognitivist specialization per se. Moreover, it is proximal social factors that prime or trigger cognitive processes; we get no sense of the way that these and long-term factors may function to actually shape cognitive processes.

e. Knowledge Critique. The above leads us on to a detailed consideration of the various metatheoretical
analyses of social and cognitive psychologies. Throughout this chapter we have stressed the individualistic nature of much social psychology and have touched upon the way it universalizes the phenomena it uncovers. This comes in a long line of just such critiques. Thus Pepitone (1981) identifies these imperatives as deriving from the methodologies of a psychology conceived as a natural, empirical science with its emphasis on reduction to (neuro-) physiological substrate and universalism. (Harré and Secord, 1972; Harré, 1979; Gauld and Shotter, 1976; Shotter, 1975 make similar points). In contrast to this, for Pepitone there are three interdependent and contributing contexts to social behaviour which need to be studied: biology, physical ecology, and socioculture. Without such an approach, the intra-psychic focus of current psychology cannot deal with environmental influences as anything other than stimuli or cognitive representations; it cannot account for the social conditions under which they become operative on and in individuals. Sampson (1981) in a parallel analysis isolates two processes at work in cognitive psychology - subjectivist and individualist reductionisms which grant "primacy to the structures and processes of the knowing subject...(and) to the thinking and reasoning of the individual knower..." respectively (p730). He contrasts this with the notion of ideology whose study likewise addresses the ideas and thoughts of people, "the forms and content of their consciousness" (p731) but in doing so
produces a "very different treatment" focusing on the materialist roots of these phenomena.

"To consider ideology is to consider matters beyond the merely subjective and the merely individualistic; it is to ground thinking and reasoning in ongoing practices, tasks and activities of human collectivities."

(Sampson, 1981, p731)

Further to understand cognition requires an analysis in terms of both subject and object (see Ch.4). Certainly this has been realized by various workers in the field who, according to Sampson, admit that "Insofar as cognition is part if a larger whole that affects its character, to study the part extirpated from its context is entirely to misunderstand the nature of that part" (p733). However, few go beyond this threshold as that would require "a radical break not only with existing tradition in psychology but also with psychology's relation to society" (p733). Sampson then goes on to instance the way that technical interests (Habermas, 1971) in controlling the objectified processes of nature serve to condition the way that reality is apprehended. This is embodied in the methods and theories of cognitive psychology which, as in the case of judgemental heuristics, serve to demarcate what is 'biased' in cognitive processing and social behaviour.

Gergen (1982) has traced this tendency historically to basic metatheoretical assumptions in psychology, in particular, psychological science's project of constructing "general laws of principles governing the
relationship among classes of observable phenomena" which should be "consistent with empirical fact" (p7). These and other logical empiricist assumption have, according to Gergen, captured and reinforced the following aspects of Western intellectual thought: a. Dualism and the 'mind as mirror' in which "ideally psychological processes provide a veridical representation of the empirical world"; b. "the centrality of cognitive processing such as abstraction and logic; c. "Affect as interference" (p115). Gergen indeed illustrates these with reference to AT's absorption of the cognitivist ethic. For Gergen, then, this metatheory forecloses the possibilities for research and understanding and, importantly, any challenge to prevailing normative assumptions concerning psychological functioning. This is mediated through the reliance on the experiment.

This cluster of knowledge critiques can for my purposes be reduced still further to a common focus on the way that psychology is intent on uncovering a core biology - that is, a human nature that is by definition universal. What I will now suggest is that the discipline of psychology does not simply formulate that nature, it also, through a variety of agencies, contributes to a formation of that nature. 'Nature' is here rendered a social and historical construct.

The above analysis has traced cognitive and social
psychologies out in the context of a variety of other discourses (eg outmoded mechanistic models of the individual; empiricist metatheory; social ideologies of individualism) and practices (eg technical interests, experimental methodology, etc). However, in contrast to discourse theory proper, there has not been an analysis of the way that these cognitivist approaches serve to reinforce and sometimes alter what people 'are' (within broad and perhaps unverifiable biological limits) and how they come to experience themselves and others.

The work of Foucault and others on madness, sexuality and discipline has shown how various theoretical conceptions (Knowledges or Savoirs), concretized as therapies, regimens, means of measurement, modes of testing and so forth have served to constitute people both as subjects and objects (though this dichotomy is itself open to question, cf Ch.1). For example, Heath(1982) sets out how the 'science' of sexology (which has the same sort of biologicist interest as cognitive psychology) and even its more radical cousins (epitomized by Reich and Cooper) have acted to 'fix' sexuality, to lay out the various parameters and norms around which people become modelled, and through which people come to experience themselves and others (cf Ch.7). Clearly, this process is more 'positive' than Gergen's enlightenment effects. In the same way, cognitive psychology, with its funnelled vision of the individual, limits the potential of individual and
collective self-definition and action, tying it to a conception of the bourgeois individual that is historically situated. A counter conception might entail the fusion of subject and object (cf. Held, 1980), or a notion of the collective subject such as is entailed by Guattari's (1984) concept of 'subjectless action'.

In effect cognitive psychology does not objectively apprehend real phenomena; it countenances and consolidates particular phenomena. One implication of this is an extreme relativism in which social behaviour and psychological substrates are historically and culturally specific, whose potential pliability is held in check by the operation of such disciplines as cognitive psychology as well as more practical factors such as work and family experiences. Arguments against this sort of relativism also come from within the radical camp (see Ch. 4 for a discussion of this relating to ideology). Geras (1983) reasserts human nature in the service of the socialist project. While many Marxists and socialists have felt themselves impelled to resist the notion of a human nature, Geras suggests that it has always been at the heart of Marx's thought, especially where it concerned physical (food, shelter, etc) and psychological (variety in one's activities) needs. Unfortunately, when Geras applauds human nature he does so only so long as it serves the socialist cause. There are plenty of alternative uses to which it can be put. Moreover he seems to presuppose
that we can directly apprehend this biological substrate (references to objective methods abound). Cognitive processes, biological phenomena, are not directly accessed, but investigated under particular experimental conditions. The value of these processes is not simply biological, that is to say, individual, but also social. How such processes mediate and are shaped by social factors which vary across time and place is what is at issue here: they cannot be reduced to their 'survival value' which is what Geras' view would seem to suggest.

To summarize: (a) Cognitive psychology by virtue of its discursive and practical history is liable to hypostatise unreasonably its finding as actual ahistorical processes located in the mechanism of the individual. (b) If such processes do exist, the way in which they are apprehended very much depends on the methodologies and theories through which they are approached. As these methods are themselves controversial, permanently open to revision, then a modicum of modesty is required when presenting findings. Such statements should always be heavily hedged with historical, cultural and political provisos. Naturally this is something that any naturalism is loathed to do (Feyerabend, 1976, 1978). (c) A way of relativizing these findings would be to analyse their roots in particular theories and methodologies which are themselves subjected to critique. This we have done in a very superficial way. Alternatively, we can show the
limitations of various cognitive processes by specifying the circumstances in which they fail to operate. In doing this, we can also reconceptualize such cognitive processes as a cognitivist shorthand for rules of combination and difference for specific (categories of) everyday discourses and practices.

In the next section, I will be criticizing representativeness and availability heuristics in order to re-think them as specific rules of combination/difference for particular types of information, and speculatively deriving theory perseverance from a highly partial view of social structure.

3. Three Cognitive Heuristics.

In this section, I will be considering availability, representativeness and theory perseverance heuristics not as actual cognitive processes, but as implicit rules for the combination of certain types of information within certain types of situation. As mentioned above this is in order to rework them as content-specific processes which have arisen in specific historical and social milieux.

a. Availability (Salience). As pointed out above, Taylor has specified three modes of operation of the Availability Heuristic (AH): through salience, through memory, and through cognitive structures such as schemas. Firstly, I will abstract a minimal definition of AH in
order to demonstrate how its operation is often tautological. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) suggest that it is the ease of illustrating a given category that determines the perceived frequency or likelihood of that category manifesting itself. So, categories that are readily accessed are seen as being more pervasive than is actually the case. Thus, the high salience of an object results in the observer perceiving that object as more 'active' or instrumental in the situation, and hence to a heightened internal attribution to it. Alternatively, ease of retrieval (eg Ross and Sicoly, 1979) and ease of assimilation to pre-existing cognitive structures (such as those of stereotypes, eg Hamilton and Rose, 1980) can also mediate AH. However, on reflection it becomes apparent that the equation between ease of access and perceived pervasiveness of the relevant category must be carefully specified. For instance, the salience of the holocaust for some individuals prompts a heightened estimation of similar events (cf Aronson, 1983); for others it might lead to a downplaying (Billig, 1978). These two contradictory examples, can be accommodated when the AH is rendered as a relation between the ease of apprehension and a pre-existing cognitive structure (schema). Thus mention of the holocaust accesses different schemas for different individuals, and even for the same individual. Clearly situational factors operate in determining which schemas are accessed in any given instance (see below; Ch.1). In other words, a highly salient item may render
the category to which it belongs less pervasive. This is clearly the case with rape, in which an incident judged as a rape can come to support such myths as the 'impossibility of rape' (see Ch. 8). Relatedly, the ease of apprehension, whether mediated by salience, retrieval or cognitive structure, is necessarily relative in the sense that what is easily apprehended is drawn from a context and that context can be extended almost indefinitely and interpreted in a multitude of ways. My suggestion is that the experimental set-up in which much of this research has taken place has limited that context so that AH has been affirmed. In the following I will be concentrating on salience phenomena insofar as these seem to be least likely to be 'contaminated' by social factors.

Taylor and Fiske (1978) and Macarthur (1982) have reviewed the literature on the effect of salience on social psychological phenomena such as impression formation and AT. For Taylor and Fiske:

"...attention within the social environment is selective. It is drawn to particular features of the environment either as a function of the perceiver's own disposition and temporary need states... As a result of differential attention to particular features, information about those features is more available to the perceiver... when the perceiver is asked to make a judgement about a particular stimulus, one accesses recall to see what kind of information is available. The more instances of a particular behaviour one can find, the more confident one is that the behaviour reflects an attribute of the stimulus. Accordingly, persons, when they are seen as salient, are seen as more causally prominent, more extreme, and possibly more representative of the class of which they are a
member... These processes seem to occur substantially without awareness, and as such, they differ qualitatively from the intentional, conscious, controlled kind of search...." (Taylor and Fiske, 1978, p281-3)

Taylor, Crocker, Fiske, Sprinzer & Winkler (1979) have gone on to provide support for the generalizeability of salience effects, showing, for example, that low levels of attention better serve salience effects, so that distraction tasks fail to hamper them.

It should be apparent from the above statements that high salience directs an internal attribution (and this applies to both individual and environment). The sorts of factors that will effect the salience of an item are brightness, movement, unit formation, contrast, novelty, etc. - all of them relational. The problem with this is that there will always be something different about the object which is internally attributed. Salience can become a catch-all. Moreover, the relational character of these parameters leads to two further difficulties. The first concerns directionality ('brighter than' versus 'darker than'; 'more dynamic' versus 'more stationary'). For example, a single still individual in a scene of panic is more liable to be salient than the surrounding turmoil. This example can be re-worked in terms of novelty of course; but then what counts as novel is dependent on the perceiver and his/her biography or role). The second concerns degree (to what degree must an item differ from its surround to become salient?). Both these problems can
be seen to derive from the fact that salience is conceived in a purely synchronic sense - something is salient only for a particular setting which the individual perceives at a given moment. There is no temporal dimension to salience in the sense that what is salient in the current situation is partly conditioned by what has been salient in preceding ones.

Placing these problems in the context of the Taylor and Fiske schema:

Salience----->Availability------>Internal Attribution,
we can see that they apply to the first linkage. However, biologically, even 'non-salient' information or 'salient-along-a-different-dimension' information is useful to have at one's disposal. (This point parallels Billig's, 1985, rehabilitation of particularization over categorization.) If we assume that such information is assimilated, salience becomes determined only in retrospect, unless the perceiver has in some way been primed.

If we examine the second linkage in the above chain, we find that what a salient feature makes available is not simply that feature, but that feature in a causally primal role. In other words, one of the categories made available by salience is that of internal attribution. However, there is no reason to believe that salience should not access the category of external attribution for the
Salient item. Women, in the company of men, may stereotypically be seen as passive; when a woman is rendered salient by being the only one in a group of men it follows, from her stereotypical constitution, that her salience should not necessarily induce an internal attribution to her.

In contrast to Taylor and Fiske's schema, we could reverse the direction and suggest that what is made available depends on what attributional structures (schemas) are available at the time. This of course, is something that Taylor and Fiske themselves do when they talk of salience being determined by the perceiver's own disposition or temporary need states. However, they fail to explicitly and concretely relate this to the dynamics of social life. Schemas must themselves be rendered available, and this occurs through the interaction in preceding situations. This can be illustrated by the fact that one attributional schema, the overt expression of which attribution experiments dealing in salience phenomena strongly suppress, is that concerned with the experimental arrangements themselves. Individuals are placed into the role of 'subject' (Silverman, 1977) in which they are required to make responses (usually in a particular direction). Subjects are thus sensitized to what is expected. Seeing someone in a bright shirt does have relevance for subjects for they will be sensitive to the fact that the experimenter has purposefully
constructed an informational array that includes someone in a bright shirt. That bright shirt is salient because subjects have a context-bound reason to see it as salient. (Thus the attribution effect can be mediated either through retrieval or encoding).

In introducing the term 'sensitizing' I have implicitly reintroduced the idea of salience. Subjects must have found the experimenter and the experimental situation salient. But then, repeating the above argument, we can rebuff with the point that they must have had reason to do so. Effectively, we are suggesting that the diachronic context must be taken into account when assessing what is salient, how it came to be so, and what the effects of it will be.

Where Taylor and Fiske separate 'salience as determined by characteristics of the array' from 'salience as determined by cognitive set', we fuse the two in the temporal and spatial (and social - at discursive and practical levels) movement of the individual. In doing this, we necessarily imply that salience and availability effects are not set, that is, do not result in particular types of response (e.g. internal attributions) but are content-laden and need to be studied in their specificity. The abstraction of the 'what grabs you' (McArthur, 1982) effect in terms of high-order concepts such as schemas, brightness, unit formation, etc
constrains our ability to analyze behaviour as it is historically situated.

Availability and salience effects — where they are authentic — must be seen not as broad cognitive effects that generalize across stimuli, circumstances and persons, but as discrete, specific events limited and demarcated by their content and context. Illusory correlations (Chapman and Chapman, 1967, 1969) are not general phenomena then, but relate to particular configurations of information, role and circumstance. 'Illusory correlations' is Cognitivese for the rule that delineates the interaction of these elements. To say that the effects tapped by the relevant experiments are primarily a property of cognition is to detract from their embeddedness in the social world. For this reason, 'heuristics' and 'biases' should be seen as referring to specific social, as opposed to general psychological, constructions. Where heuristics do appear to be in general use, rather than succumb and attribute them to cognitive capacity, we will try to show that they have emerged out of broad social processes. This is what will be attempted on the section on theory perseverance below.

The problem with a mode of analysis that deals with the diachronic motion of salience, role and circumstance is that it can swiftly degenerate into the study of biography, of the individual's rolling hermeneutic circle
(see Ch.1). This approach is of course important (eg Hollway, 1982, 1984). However, our interest in the way that saliences in the environment "call up" roles which in turn shape saliences and so on, focuses on the way that these interact to sustain one another recursively, to produce particular packages of role/environment/behaviour.

b. Representativeness Heuristic. The RH manifests itself in various guises (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972, 1973; Tversky and Kahneman, 1971, 1974). Tversky and Kahneman (1982) suggest that it is used when:

1. M is a class and X a variable defined in M (value and distribution);
2. M is a class and X an instance of that class (instance and category);
3. M is a class and X a subset of that class (population and sample);
4. When M is causal system and X a possible consequence (cause and effect).

The perceived representativeness X shows regarding M will under certain conditions deviate from statistical norms. This occurs when:

1. the evidence is fallible (as when X represents a small sample and is therefore less representative of the population than a large sample - regression to the mean);
2. when the target event is highly specific (as in the evaluation of composite events - see below).

The arguments against this theory include the following:

It is too individualistic, subjects are kept in isolation. Many decisions are taken collectively and this might
undermine (though it might also compound) deviation from statistical norms. Secondly, decisions are not made for the sake of accuracy alone but for assisting smooth passage through the social and material world, comprised as it is of long- and short-term demands. Thus under the appropriate conditions (which include those embodied in the experimental situation) we find that even the pallidity of statistical information can be overcome by subjects. Kassin (1979) found that subjects were sensitive to sample size when assessing consensus information; Bar-Hillel (1982) likewise showed that subjects were capable of responding to sample size, though not always correctly. Kruglanski, Friedland and Farkash (1984) found that subjects were able to use statistical information when they were assured of its appropriateness. Quattrone and Jones (1980) have shown that application of the law of small numbers, in which subjects generalize unduly from small samples, tended to be conditioned by intergroup factors: outgroup members exhibiting out-of-role behaviours did not lead to generalizations regarding that group - their 'deviant' behaviour could be explained through external attributions. Thirdly, because of the interactional nature of social life, the perceived representativeness of an item can come to be realized in actuality. Skrynek and Snyder (1982) found that a perceiver's gender stereotyped beliefs about another actually fashioned the behaviour of that other, bringing it in line with the stereotype. As regards rape, a general
climate that dismisses rape, serves to actually effect the number of rapes that are reported and, importantly, are subjectively experienced by victims (see Chs. 7 and 8).

At any rate, RH highlights the way that similarity between item and class makes it appear that the item is actually a member of that class. The converse of this is that people are insensitive to statistical data. We can recast this in terms of salience or availability. The ease of apprehension of concrete, vivid examples heightens their representativeness to the exclusion of baserates and so forth. Baserates are not salient enough to compete.

Here, the arguments levelled against availability in the preceding section come into play. As the above examples should have made clear, when subjects are cast into appropriate roles, then they have no difficulty in making use of statistical information. The problem lies in the fact that the roles in which subjects are situated are not made specific. Cognitive psychology is bent on dealing with a generalized subject. This is encapsulated in the notion of 'statistical intuition'. Intuition suggests an individualized perception of the world, and yet any such perception is conducted through an array of roles and discourses.

On the broadest level, the question is this: what is it that makes people take on RH unreflexively? Is it that
they do so because they are simply used to using it (i.e., are these processes cognitively driven)? Or is it because of other more socially and historically embedded factors? The corollary is this: when would individuals become critical of their use of RH? The central point I will make is that RH serves to simplify the range or course of actions as it relates to the vignette, item, class, materials presented in the experiment. That is, RH acts to aid a subject to situate her/himself with respect to the items in the task: in doing so it maps out the options for practice. Tversky and Kahneman's (1982) account of the evaluation of compound events will illustrate. If subjects are asked to rate the likelihood that a woman who is engaged in radical politics being a feminist, a bank-teller, and a feminist bank-teller, in descending order of probability they will rank them as follows: feminist, feminist bank-teller, and bank-teller. This clearly contravenes the elementary statistical principle of the conjunction rule, i.e., that increased specification can only reduce probability. For the population of activists it is equally or less likely to find a feminist bank-teller than a bank-teller.

However, what the order feminist, feminist-bankteller and bankteller sets up is an 'hierarchy' of responses and power relations. Whether the subject is sympathetic to radical politics or not, s/he can order her/his responses to the three groups in the above order of friendliness or
distate or avoidance, etc. By placing the accent on behaviour or practice, as opposed to cognition, we can ask under what conditions will such behaviour and cognition vary. We suggest that differences in power might affect sensitivity to RH. If the judge is in a position of somewhat greater power, e.g., as an adult over children, then RH is less valuable; the judge will have the space to reflect, or rather to deploy the conjunction rule. Similarly, where there are potentially more behavioural options open, e.g., as within a group, then again it is conceivable that judges will be more leisurely - i.e., reflect on what the task is 'actually' about i.e., statistical judgement as opposed to personal/role position and power. Under such circumstances, and when subjects are obliged by experimenters to reflect, we would expect them to readily acknowledge their mistakes. In sum: the contingency of cognitive heuristics such as RH can thus be seen as complexly located within the web of social relations and practices.

c. Theory Perseverance. Here we will be drawing on Wexler (1983) to speculate on the possible social bases of Theory Perseverance (TP). This will entail outlining what Wexler sees as one of social psychology's main functions, namely that of containment. It should be mentioned at
outset that though we focus on TP under capitalism, we do not mean to deny its presence in other cultures or a common causal root in cognitive processes: we are simply examining those possible social roots that are peculiar to capitalism.

Popular methods of containment are those processes that occlude identifiable sources of personal conflict and suffering. Such processes usually come under the rubric of ideology (cf Ch.4). Wexler particularly highlights the way in which these various ideological methods deny social contradictions (the central one being that between the collective nature of production and the private ownership of the means of production) by inducing people to avoid facing what they believe they cannot change. Specific modes of containment that Marxists and others point to are religion, patriotism, sexism, ethnocentrism. All these obscure class relations, all these divert energy away from the processes through which the proletariat would become 'for itself'. At this point it should be made clear that we consider such an analysis simplistic in the light of recent developments in social theory (Foucault, Giddens, Frankfurt School). Nevertheless, we are in agreement with Poster (1984) when he states that it is legitimate to resort to orthodox Marxist analytic categories when we feel this is in keeping with the critical spirit.

For Wexler there are three core processes which permeate
social behaviour: Commodification, Exploitation, and Alienation. Social psychology as the study of social behaviour directs attention away from these and the broader processes which underlie them. By cloaking social behaviour in an ahistorical, asocial mist, it blocks from view the potential control we have over these social psychological and structural processes.

In re-analysing TP, I will concentrate only on the role of commodification. Because of the nature of the capitalist mode of production, especially the way in which it is managed, with the worker having control neither over what is produced nor how it is produced, the product of labour appears to the worker to be stamped with an objective character. It is something outside the worker. In fact, according to Marx, the product is, in essence, social in character. The worker has control over it, not the other way round. It is produced by virtue of the relation between workers. In consequence, what is actually a social relation begins to appear as a relation between things. Relations between objects are no longer seen to be the result of human decision, but dependent on the objects' own intrinsic character which is beyond human reach.

Powerlessness at the point of production means that people treat themselves and each other as objects.

"The orientation of energies towards the production of profitably exchangeable objects"
or commodities penetrates the social organization and the social perceptions of the producers themselves.... The social character of production may be so far obscured that the sense of human agency is reversed: the products, things are understood as a source, rather than an effect, of human actions."

(Wexler, 1983, p85)

This process lies at the heart of much social interaction. We treat each other and ourselves as things; we see ourselves as static; we lose sight of our own social dynamism.

However, before going on to speculate on the relation of commodification to TP, we must hedge this analysis with a number of provisos. We do not maintain that these three processes are the only factors that effect social behaviour. To maintain this, we would have to convincingly show that the labour process retains an exclusive centrality in social life. In Marx's day that was less in doubt than it is today (Poster, 1978). As we noted above, Wexler does see Marxist analysis as providing only an initial starting point from which to launch a critical social psychology. We can show the limited importance of the labour process by placing it in the context of other activities.

Harre (1979) divides the social world into two domains: the instrumental and the expressive. In the former, behaviour is geared toward production of the means of life; the latter is characterised by the search for honour and the avoidance of contempt in the process of social
interaction. Gorz (1982) has produced what might be seen as an orthogonal dimension. He splits the world into the sphere of Necessity and the sphere of Autonomy. In the former, action, both instrumental and expressive, is directed toward the efficient production and distribution of material goods. In the latter, production is carried out at one's own pace, however inefficient that might be. The image of producer as artisan is evoked here. Similarly, autonomous expression is not conditioned by material, role-rigidified needs but by the idiosyncratic needs of individuals.

We can combine these two schemas to produce a 2 x 2 typology. The labour process would only enter into one of the quadrants. Whether it determines the character of the other three has been a point of contention for many years. My own feeling is that 'it depends'; in the period of early capitalism, it most probably did. Despite the decline of the productive sphere, and the rise of new technology and consumption (eg Marcuse, 1965), the legacy of that period hangs over us both in the nature of much existing production and through cultural transmission.

What then is the relation of all this to social behaviour and in particular cognitive processes? Broadly, commodification and the objectification to which it leads can be seen as one major element underlying these processes. As we have already hinted, other factors also
play a part though we shall not be dealing with them directly.

The main characteristics of TP are: (1) Vivid, concrete data such as case histories, yield the most resistant theories. (2) Causal theories result in greater perseverance. (3) Most of the studies of TP present subject matter which refers to people. That is, subjects are asked to form judgements either about themselves or some other (eg Firemen, patients, suicides).

I will start with a catechism: 1. (Q) "Why are causal explanations so potent?" ; (A) "Because they afford control and predictability". 2. (Q) "But how realistic is this control or predictability since so few people can ever be bothered to test their theories in practice?" ; (A) "The point is that people are not in fact exerting actual control; they cognitively control (that is stereotype) the behaviour of others. In achieving this, subjects are also standardizing (or stereotyping) the relation between themselves and the object of the explanation. To put this another way, they are standardizing their own behaviour, the control they actually exert then is over themselves".

Current research into TP conceives of the change in causal theories (on the presentation of new data or discrediting information) as simply a change in the theory
per se. According to our reasoning, this counter-information would necessitate a change in the standardized self-image that has been thrown up by the causal explanation.

Why should it be so difficult to change the self image? The answer to this lies in the objectification of the self. The self is experienced as an object. (An example of this is provided by Reynauld, 1981, who argues that men's masculine sense of self comes to be objectified in the penis). It is experienced as having an objective character that is beyond social relations and volition. Impingement, in this case in the form of discrediting information, will have minimal effect unless it confronts the individual with a sense of his/her own volition. TP is, therefore, the outward expression of the perseverance of the self as object.

When does TP break down? Anderson (1982) has found that obliging the subject to consider competing theories allays TP. In terms of the present theory of self-objectification, this works because, in forcing the subject to create alternative theories to explain the same data, the subject is confronted with choice; s/he is alerted to her/his own volition. They are jogged out of self-objectification.

Tetlock (1983) has found that when subjects are informed
that their judgements will be presented to others, they sift data more carefully and manifest less TP. (It would appear that it is all right to appear an automaton in front of an Experimenter but not one's peers. The image of the Experimenter as confessor comes fleetingly to mind.) Under these circumstances subjects are once again made aware of choice. By being told that their judgements will be presented to others, Ss are alerted to other points of view and the possibility of contradictory theories. Thus there is less scope for self-objectification by virtue of the subjects being confronted with their own powers of choice, their agency.

There are two main limitations that can be imposed on this interpretation. Firstly, as noted above, it is too partial. Many other factors are kept out of the reckoning. This can be seen in the fact that we have located objectification in the capitalist mode of production; it is quite conceivable that parallel processes occur for other modes of production. Generalizing this point, we can add that TP occurs in other cultures. However, while it may have a common cognitive root across societies, this does not mean that within each distinctive society peculiar social mechanisms have not arisen which serve to reassert TP. That is, flying in the face of parsimony, we might suggest that there are a variety of (supplementary) causes for the same cognitive phenomenon (TP) across different social systems. It is important to explore these
in order to show how TP contributes to and is affected by social as well as individual factors. Another problem with our account of TP is that it is too abstract. The process of self-objectification has to be specified for different social groups. As Deschamps (1982) has pointed out, different classes, by virtue of their status, are able to objectify (stereotype) themselves to different degrees. This cross-cuts in complicated ways with sex and race, and also with the type and circumstances of behaviour.

To conclude: In this chapter we have prepared the ground for showing how the cognitive heuristics of lay explanation can be reconceived as rules of combination and difference between discourse/practices embodied in roles, circumstances, and information. Where the use of heuristics appears to be widespread, we do not have to attribute this to their basis in a cognitive infrastructure, but can look for antecedents in the specific form of social life. In attempting such a gross reconceptualization of these processes, the main aim has been to get beyond the individualistic and internalistic onus that cognitive social psychology has been guilty of, and to escape the technicalities with which it immobilizes the possibility of social change. Concrete illustrations of this type of analysis will be presented in Chapter 8 in which the deployment of rape myths, having been considered in terms of the complex relations between
the police role (encorporating masculine, intergroup and institutional components) and information (type of victim, rape, etc), are reinterpreted in terms of the three heuristics we have tackled in this chapter.
CHAPTER THREE

LAY EXPLANATIONS, GROUPS AND ROLES

Introduction

In this chapter I will be exploring the relationship of role and group to explanations, and hence the relationship between role and group. While some recent work has addressed the influence of group-membership on lay explanation (see below), little research has examined the effects of the role of the explainer. Where antecedents related to roles have been considered they have usually taken the form of beliefs (e.g., related to sex, Deaux, 1976; or party political membership, Furnham, 1981; or expertise (Cantor and Brown, 1981). In the case of the first two, it is not difficult to translate these antecedents into role theory terms. However, as should become apparent below, role and intergroup theory have many points of collision. As a preliminary example we can consider the role of gender in explanation. On the one hand, gender denotes a role, in the structural sense of norms demarcating what behaviours and functions are permissible. On the other, it denotes group-membership, in that institutional and cultural forces serve to distil at cognitive and social levels groups based on gender. The interaction between these two moments will partly determine how an event is apprehended and explained; the
explanation that results may bolster either role or group identity or both. In-group favouritism typically involves preferential evaluation of in-group members along comparison dimensions important to the in-group. In contrast, a group is partly comprised of social norms (and by 'social' I have in mind the complex, fragmented world of Foucault, not a functionalist system in the mould of a Parsons or an Althusser) which may run counter to the means of in-group social elevation. Thus a norm of self-denigration or modesty in women would hinder the expression of in-group favouritism/out-group denigration (see below, and Ch.6). Conversely, because of the contradictory nature of many role norms, some of them may be flouted or exploited to enhance group-related social identity. What this all boils down to is that the relations of group-identity and role-identity may contradict as well as support one another. The relation between the two has to be specified in detail for each given instance.

However, at a higher level of abstraction, we can see that role has theoretical priority over group insofar as 'the group member' can be said to comprise a role. We can consider intergroup behaviour as reflecting normative demands on the individual. This is hinted at by the fact that some roles incorporate, formally or informally, an intergroup dimension which can be vital to their functioning (eg the policeman role, Ch.8). Here we part
company with Turner's (1982) cognitive reformulation of the group. This follows from our contention that the cognitive process should be conceived as a specific and complex rule that applies to particular configurations of role, circumstance and information (Ch.2).

This chapter will be organized in the following way: Firstly we will consider various versions of role theory, and then relate this to explanations. Secondly, we will examine intergroup theory, and analyse its influence on the study of lay explanation. In these sections I will examine not only the personal but also the social functions of roles and groups. That is, I will set out the way that explanations, which serve to mediate role and group identities, also mediate the part these roles and groups play in the wider social system. Further, both expressive and instrumental aspects of role and group-related behaviour will be considered. Finally, there will be a section detailing how these two approaches may be profitably merged.

1. Role Theory and Explanation

a. Role Theory. Heiss (1981) has noted that role theory has traditionally fallen into two camps, the structural and the interactional. In the former, the concept of role is based on a social position that designates a commonly recognized set of persons (Biddle and Thomas, 1966; Biddle, 1979). The terms physician, teacher, athlete, etc
are social positions which when occupied exhibit a characteristic role, that is, people will behave in ways appropriate to that social position. What is permissible within a role is determined by a variety of norms and expectations. For Goffman (1959) when one takes up such a demarcated role one is stepping into a ready-made self. However, interactionist models suggest that roles are created in the process of social interaction (J.H.Turner, 1978; Cicourel, 1973). This view sees the notion of 'norm' as open to criticism insofar as norms are constantly being reconstructed and verified in the process of interaction which, it follows, must be the site of role constitution. Thus, the difference between the two approaches is the difference between (structuralist) role-taking and (interactionist) role-making. However, as Heiss points out these differences can to some degree be settled when the two perspectives are seen as complementary. Concepts such as role-distance (Goffman, 1961a) and style (Goffman, 1959) capture this complementarity in pinpointing the space within structural roles to innovate at the instrumental level (eg the surgeon jokes in order to ease tension and thereby to ensure that the operation proceeds as smoothly as possible) and the expressive level (the sort of jokes a surgeon and his/her subordinates are permitted).

Various authors have drawn the distinction between instrumental and expressive goals (eg Parsons and Shils, 1951; Habermas, 1972; J.H.Turner, 1978; R.H.Turner
1979/80). As we saw in Chapter 2, Harré (1979) suggests that we must distinguish "between those aspects of social activity that are directed to material and biological ends" (p19) ie instrumental behaviour, and "expressive aspects of behaviour" (p19) which is directed towards such ends as the presentation of the self as rational and worthy of respect. Harre goes on to admit that it is not always easy to distinguish between these two domains. These are elements that are incorporated into every role, though it could be argued that structural conceptions of the role focus on the instrumental component, while interactionist are more interested in the expressive.

Roles, and particularly structural roles, tend to be conceived in more or less functional terms. Here functional refers to an integrated model of the social system in which the interaction of the parts function toward some end. This functioning might be either conflictual or consensual. Though some Marxist social theory picks out the conflict between proletariat and bourgeoisie as the driving force of recent history, that conflict is still functional for development towards socialism. The functionality of a role depends on the level of analysis. Deviant communities may be 'dysfunctional' for an orthodox functionalist analysis, but functional for a conflict model. For example, the conflict between soccer supporters is dysfunctional at the level of social control; however, it is (or was until
recently) functional at the level of the football subculture in that it is this conflict and partisanship that goes towards the economic stability of football clubs (Taylor, 1971). Even those fans who go to matches 'looking for a fight' have to pay to get in. Marginalized roles also serve another function: they set the limits of propriety beyond which lie the realms of 'otherness'. The 'nutter' role (Marsh, Rosser and Harré, 1978) demarcates the bounds of acceptable fan activity for the fans themselves. Related to this delimiting function, some negatively sanctioned roles are the necessary complements of certain 'stabilizing' roles such as the police and social/welfare workers. The role of the police 'needs' the role of 'criminals'; the role of social worker needs the poor and downtrodden. Structurally, both police and welfare workers serve to reproduce the conditions in which their counter-roles arise. Moreover, construction of counter-roles can develop into a (almost) conscious policy of distortion as with the use of crime figures or the policing of predominantly black areas (Kettle and Hodges, 1982).

It should be apparent from the above discussion that the quality of the functionality of roles is determined by the model of the social system adopted. In the second part of this thesis in which I deal with men's explanation of rape, the general role of 'man', and the more situated role of policeman, are placed within a system conceived in
the conflictual terms of a socialist and feminist analysis. This is done deliberately in order to stress the discursive and practical constituents of roles. This will necessarily entail historical and sociological detailing if we are to properly understand the conflicts and unities contained within the considered roles. In a sense, this approach contradicts the Foucauldian project which studiously avoids any totalization, that is, which by focussing on the local specificities of a given phenomenon, refuses to link these up into a wider (is total) theoretical system. The reason for this is to avoid constructing an intellectual edifice which carries authority by virtue of its weight, complexity, etc. And yet, as Poster (1984) argues, this latter can amount to intellectual dishonesty because one's metatheoretical premises are never confronted; moreover the covert operation of these can have just as devastating an effect in exerting power over the reader as the most explicit theoretical models.

So far we have discussed roles in terms of their functions for the social system. At the level of personal functions, role can be intimately tied to the concept of the self. The role-related activities, both expressive and instrumental, that one engages in will shape the self. Thus, as we saw in Ch.2, the type of instrumental work that one engages in will effect the way in which we treat ourselves as objects and agents. We will now consider
this relation in more detail.

Hollway (1982) has suggested that there are essentially two psychological versions of the self: the self as a transcendental subject, as the real kernel onto which roles are latched. We see this reflected in such notions as role strain or role-self congruity (Biddle, 1979). Less orthodoxy, we get the same sort of analysis from certain radical thinkers. From Adorno (1973) we have: "the concept of the role sanctions the bad, perverted depersonalization of today:...the hardships of the division of labour hypostatized as virtues in the concept of the role...the liberated ego would no longer be condemned to play roles..." (p278). "Roles are the bloodsuckers of the will to live. They express the will to lived experience, yet at the same time they reify it. They also offer consolation to the impoverishment of life by supplying a surrogate, neurotic gratification. We have to break free of roles by restoring them to the realm of play" (Vaneigem, 1983, p99). "...peasants do not play roles as urban characters do. (This) is simply because the space between what is unknown about a person and what is generally known - and this is the space for all performance - is too small" (Berger, 1979, p11). In all of these quotes there is presupposed a 'real' or 'genuine' self somehow hovering behind the the facade of a role. Hollway suggests that this is even the case for the ostensibly more fragmented versions of the self as developed by, for example Harre
(Harre and Secord, 1972; Harre, 1979). Residing behind the multiplicity of selves is a homunculus, an inner core self that rationally pursues honour. In contrast, Hollway posits a non-unitary self that draws on the structuralist psycholanalysys of Lacan which incorporates the factor of irrationality. However, while acknowledging the partially determining function of early life, she sees the self as also being recursively constructed in social interaction. Thus there are both diachronic (the biography of the self) and synchronic (the immediate situation in which the self is re/produced) dimensions that need to be taken into account when examining the constitution of the self.

So, in contradistinction to an 'essential' view of the self, there is a notion of the self as an empty vessel into which are poured the contents of the role. This is partly exemplified by the approach of Foucault (1979a, 1981) who, in dissecting the various ways in which discourse/practices inscribe upon the body of the individual certain (often normalizing) characteristics, assumes that the body is empty (Lash, 1984). Here the body refers to the fact that the individual is an object which interacts with society and is shaped by it. However, as Poster (1984) and Weeks (1981) have pointed out, the problem with this is that Foucault has difficulty accounting for subjectivity and therefore resistance. That is, people do not always readily accommodate every regime of disciplinarity (in which discipline is dispensed both as
a means of control, and of shaping the individual); they resist and they have reasons for resisting, which suggests that they have a core self that takes exception. Their subjectivities, grounded in prior traditions and modes of existence (both folk and disciplinary), do not automatically yield to new disciplinary conditions but must be coaxed or bludgeoned into them. Foucault has specialized in a range of particularly pungent norms and expectations, those that have derived from the Human Sciences, which, embued with the status of truth and concretized as specific methods of treatment, observation, measurement, have diffused into commonsense shaping the way that people behave and expect themselves to behave.

Another comparison between Foucault and role theory can be found in Hirst and Woolley (1982) who contrast Foucault's treatment of the regimens of total institutions to that of Goffman.

"We have seen that Goffman considers that total institutions break down individual identity and reduce the person to an anonymous member of an enclosed collectivity. For Foucault, on the contrary, disciplinarity involves a definite form of 'individuation'. Individuals are actually constituted as such through isolation in discipline, surveillance separates and distinguishes those subjected to it, and the regime of government seeks to constitute forms of individuality, to confer attributes, power and capacities.'"  
(Hirst and Woolley, 1981, p189-90)

In other words, power is productive, it does not merely confine. And yet, as various studies have shown, resistance does exist as does pain (Goffman, 1961b;
Rosenhan, 1973). The question of how potent rules/regimes are in shaping the self revolves around the plasticity (or malleability) of that self, which is at once an historical and a biological question and only answerable in specific instances.

The conflict between the view that 'there are only roles' and the view 'that behind these roles is a real self' can also be considered as a version of the conflict between the object and the subject. In the former the individual is treated much as an object, filled and emptied with roles as situations arise; in the latter, these roles are masks hiding a pervasive subjectivity. Hollway has attempted to get beyond this dichotomy by rendering problematic the social-individual and subject-object divides. For her, situations and roles shape the self which, in turn, goes to shape those roles and situations.

I will not attempt to resolve these two positions (in the way that say Giddens (1979) does by displacing roles and introducing practice as the 'point of articulation' between actors and structure). Rather, I will reverberate between them. This is because I see subject and object, self and role, individual and society, as dialectically linked. They constitute one another in a complex web of discourses and practices. When I analyse the role of 'policeman' I take into account both the construction of
that role (as an object) in terms of norms, expectations, discourses and practices but also the way that that role (as a subject) invites certain motives, emotions, perceptions and investments. However, I will not be considering the way that a role effects individual subjects, rather I will focus on the general subjectivity that comes ready-packaged with the role. As mentioned briefly above, my main concern is to detail the relation between a particular role and a particular category of explanations; how the role shapes or constitutes individual selves, other than in a broad, idealypical sense, is beyond the scope of this project. In addition, I will consider the way that such a role can serve to constitute other roles, specifically that of the rape victim and the alleged rapist (and also of the general roles of 'man' and 'woman'). This it achieves through the overt power invested in it both institutionally (eg in that the police have a virtual monopoly on the legitimate physical coercion of adults) and discursively (eg in that the police role has attached to it the potent 'capacity' to delimit truth and rationality). And, of course, as we remarked above, the policeman role (and masculinity) is itself constituted by other roles against which it defines itself.

Thus we must provide a theoretical account of the way that explanations serve roles, and vice versa. In Chapter 2 we showed how cognitive processes were 'called up' and
conditioned by the role and circumstances in which the explainer found her/himself. Roles also 'call up' up other processes, including needs concerning control, self-presentation, self-esteem, and so forth. Additionally, we argued that roles serve social functions the characterization of which depends on the model of the social system that is adopted. Thus one model will pinpoint certain social functions of a role, which the role-holder, adhering to another model, will not be aware of. This is another way of saying that a necessary part of examining role-related explanations is a concern with the ideological function of those explanations (cf Ch. 4).

b. Roles and Explanations. In this section I will present a brief overview of the way that roles might effect explanations. In doing this I will start with general roles and move onto progressively more specialized ones.

At the most general level we have the subject deposited in the role of 'ordinary person' or agent. This is what Harré(1981a) impresses upon us in his re-formulation of Actor-Observer differences. Subjects are intent on establishing their good honour, their rationality, their agency - in sum, they are intent on projecting themselves as good and worthy people. This will deeply effect explanations. Part of the problem with this theory is that actors belong to groups and
occupy roles which condition the form their behaviours might take. Any behaviour, by virtue of the fact that it can be traced back to its social antecedents, can be interpreted as a form of mimicking, a flattery of others and hence an embodiment of the desire to draw honour. Subjects in the role of 'agent' are also interested in attaining some control over their environment and others, however illusory this might ultimately be (Wortman, 1976; Bains, 1983). But as Bains notes, control needs are culturally mediated. Bond (1983) likewise stresses the cultural differences in requirements for control. Thus he suggests that the United States is peculiar in its norms for consistency (self-control) and internal attribution. It would seem then that the configuration for the general role of 'person' varies across cultures. However, it also varies within cultures, playing a covertly oppressive role where 'person' is epitomized by a particular role (or group) such as white middle-class male (Deschamps, 1982; but cf. Tajfel, 1984). Explanations that do not somehow reflect this role (e.g., through the use of highly personal references in the explanation of social phenomena) will be seen as reflecting a sub-person.

More specific, institutional roles can influence and be mediated by more specific, as well as general, styles and types of explanation. This relation need not be an overt element in the role, but may have arisen surreptitiously. Thus illusory correlations (Chapman and
Chapman, 1969) between homosexuality and popular invalid signs of homosexuality have been found in the evaluations of psychodiagnosticians. Another version of this is the 'sticky labels' that psychiatric professionals attach to mental patients and their actions (Rosenhan, 1973). In this case the relation between the role and the explanation is two-tiered. On the one hand, the role influences the explanation through, say, its accent on expertise. However, it should be mentioned that Chapman and Chapman found that illusory correlations were more prevalent amongst laypersons (ie undergraduates). This perhaps suggests that while the ethic of the diagnostician has diffused into the 'general' population, it is lacking the corollary of a professional pride in being 'accurate'. Against this, some institutional roles do not undercut 'popular prejudice' but magnify it. Thus Burt (1978) found that policemen have a more negative evaluation of rape victims closer to that of rapist than to that of the general public, which in turn is closer to the police than to rape counsellors. The second tier in the above relation accesses the way that the explanation serves to support the role. At the crudest level, the illusory correlations that psychodiagnosticians indulge in serve to convince them and others of the need for psychodiagnosticians.

Cantor and Brown (1981) have provided an interesting account of the relation between explanation and roles. Pointing out that subjects have different roles in
relation to the explanations they give and the phenomena they explain, they suggest that people may be situated in explanatory roles. Explainers will differ with respect to the degree of involvement and the degree of expertise that they can claim regarding any explanation or phenomenon. Involvement will be partly determined by the nature of the event or incident, and partly by the social and personal investments of the individual. Expertise will likewise vary according to what information is publicly available, special to the situation, and special to the role. These various factors combine in numerous ways to shape the type of explanation that a person gives. The precise configuration emerges only by investigating explanations in situ.

Unfortunately, the notions of involvement and expertise are directed solely at the role-holder and do not address the functions of roles in a wider sense. This includes an interactive mode in which the expertise that accrues to one particular role can serve to sustain, elevate or undermine the expertise of another. Moreover, the explainer/role-holder is not only expert and involved in the event being explained. S/he is also 'expert in' and 'involved in' much wider social processes. To illustrate using one of Cantor and Brown's own examples, the explanatory roles of 'Estate Agent' and 'House Buyer' are also instrumental in the continuation of certain property (the private ownership of housing) and class (what income
groups can afford housing?) relations; also they may be involved in reinforcing the nature of housing as dwelling places for particular groupings of individuals (eg the nuclear family). So that while the explanations that these two roles generate in evaluating a property may differ greatly, in another way they are in league, sustaining a particular view of housing and, indeed, bargaining. Moreover, we are given no indication of how group factors will influence such explanatory roles. In brief, roles have to be placed in a social context (practical, discursive and ideological) if we are to comprehensively characterize explanations.

Finally, we must consider the way explanations relate to personal roles (Biddle, 1979) - roles which individuals have constructed for themselves. We should be careful here and take heed of Tajfel's (1981) warnings against a purely interpersonal form of interaction, one which would presumably involve personal roles. Personal roles can perhaps best be conceived as roles in which the general and institutional elements are minimized. Alternatively, we can highlight their novelty or their biographical eccentricity. However, this apart, personal roles are deeply cross-cut by broader relations. Hollway (1982) has shown that, even what had appeared to be highly idiosyncratic and spontaneous actions within close relationships (in radical couples), such as the desire for intercourse without contraception, in fact reflected very
general role requirements, in this case expressing an element of the 'feminine' role concerning the need for the man to show commitment to the relationship (the 'have-hold' discourse in Hollway's terms). Orvis, Butler and Kelley (1976) have looked at attributional conflict in young couples. Again in such intimate conditions, typical gender-role related unities emerge. The female partner's high external attributions to herself are a roundabout indication of the 'feminine' role's limited agency. Conversely, the male partner's attributions generally indicate the greater control capacity that the 'masculine' role affords (see Ch.6). We shall not be examining the relationship between personal roles and explanations. Our interest is in more general and institutional roles.

2. Intergroup Theory and Explanation

In this section, I will first outline the basic tenets of intergroup theory and review the relevant experimental evidence that has accumulated around it. As with role theory, I will examine both the expressive and practical, and the individual and social functions that groups have. Secondly I will criticise these theoretical formulations, especially in regard to their general neglect of the role of content in the construction of group identity and the production of typically intergroup behaviours and strategies. In the light of these reservations, the relationship between group-membership and explanations
will then be considered, especially as it relates to the deployment of stereotypes. Finally, the relationship between intergroup behaviour to power will be considered as a prelude to a more detailed discussion of the interaction of roles, groups, power and explanations.

**a. Intergroup Theory.** Stemming out of his early work on categorization (Tajfel, 1981 for an overview), Tajfel et al (1971; Billig and Tajfel, 1973) showed that on the basis of categorization alone (even when this was conducted on a completely arbitrary basis) subjects belonging to a group would exhibit gross in-group favouritism. This is manifested as maximum differentiation in which the out-group was maximally deprived of rewards, even where this resulted in a relative loss in the in-group's profit. However, Turner (1975) went on to show that it could not be categorization alone that was responsible for the minimum group results. By introducing the possibility of rewarding the self, where the choice of rewarding either self, out-group or in-group preceded the choice of rewarding between in-group and out-group, then the out-group discrimination effect diminished significantly. (Although, more recently Taylor and Doria, 1981, found that group-serving biases can be preferred to self-serving ones.) Turner interpreted his findings as showing that self/other competition can be contrasted to in-group/out-group competition, and that the two processes are independent. He suggested that in addition to
categorization, social identity also played a part in intergroup behaviour. He has since developed these notions (Turner, 1982, 1984) in a cognitivist direction, attempting to formulate a cognitive definition of the social group. According to this social identity theory, individuals define themselves in terms of distinct social categories, learning the stereotypic norms of that category and the behaviours that are criterial attributes for category membership. Actors assign norms to themselves in the same way that they assign stereotypic traits to others; in other words, there is involved in group identification a process of self-stereotyping. As category membership becomes more salient, behaviour becomes more normative and conformist. Under these circumstances social identity is positively enhanced.

To this end the following processes should come into play: (1) Individuals will tend to evaluate distinctive (in-)category characteristics positively; (2) Conflict with out-groups will be manifested for the purposes of distinguishing the in-group from outgroups; (3) Within the in-group, individuals will move (and claim to be) closer to the group norm and thereby assert that they are superior to other group members.

Within the confines of its own framework, one of the most problematic aspects of this theory is "the spontaneous emergence or formation of self-defining social
categorizations...we can speculate that variables such as similarity, proximity, common fate etc contribute to perceptual unit formation, but research is necessary to specify precisely the determining conditions" (Turner, 1984, p535). Turner cites two experiments in which it was found that even where identification and group formation were based on similarity for disliked characteristics, intergroup discrimination still appeared (in contrast, disliked, non-categorized individuals seemed to exhibit a form of self-hate), and that failure and defeat actually enhanced group cohesiveness. Thus for Turner, this social identity perspective "reinstates the group as a psychological reality" (p535). "The group is a social reality and a psychological process and there is constant reciprocal determination between these two sides of the phenomenon at play in group behaviour" (p536). However, though Turner is quite right to stress this reciprocity, he does not see the "psychological process" as being socially mediated. Indeed "Identifications are cognitive structures but they are also social products" (p536). It is the type of identification, not identification itself, on which the social operates. A critique of this will be presented below.

What emerges from this brief survey of the literature on intergroup processes is that they are largely driven by the search for a positive social identity and
categorization. In functional terms, intergroup theory has been largely geared towards analysing the expressive and personal functions of group processes. However, before developing this theme further, it is worth pointing out that not all workers in the field agree with such a formulation. Some, for example Deschamps(1984) and Doise(1978) place their theoretical emphases squarely on categorization and category differentiation. Elsewhere, Linville and Jones(1980), Linville(1982) subordinate affect (such as that which might be mediated through positive social identity) to cognition, particularly the perception of complexity. Accordingly, the greater the perceived complexity of the other or the self, then the less extreme the affect associated with the target; conversely, the greater the simplicity, the greater the extremity of affect. In a similar vein, Wilder(1978) has shown that individuation of the outgroup attenuates intergroup discrimination. A similar accent crops up in Hamilton's theory of stereotyping (1979) in which cognitive attribution (in cahoots with salience and illusory correlation biases) result in the stereotyped conception of others. And yet, Turner's results suggest that these categorization effects cannot alone account for intergroup behaviour (nor, for that matter, stereotyping). Similarly, van Knippenberg and Wilkes(1979) reanalyzed Doise and Sinclair's(1973) data on the effect of status, interaction, and the competitive/consensual nature of comparison dimensions on categorization and group
differentiation. They found that the different items summed by Doise and Sinclair conflated social identity and categorization processes. The positive value of social identity was evidenced in the fact that the greatest differentiation occurred for those items important for the ingroup (e.g., differentiation was most dramatic on consensual items on which relative status was agreed upon by apprentices and collegiens). With respect to the categorization-loaded theories of stereotyping, the role of motivation seems likewise instrumental. Greenberg and Rosenfeld (1979) showed that even for dimensions uncorrelated with a stereotype (e.g., Blacks and E.S.P.), ethnocentrism appeared with whites positively evaluating E.S.P. in whites. Thus a characteristic usually excluded from a stereotyped category, not initially salient, or illusorily correlated, becomes all these things in the interests of the bigot. Moreover, such purely cognitive approaches are limited to the cognitive functions of supposedly categorization-based intergroup behaviour and stereotyping. They do not, and indeed cannot, theorize the social formation of stereotypes that Tajfel (1981) suggests is integral to the very notion of the stereotype (cf. Huici, 1984). We will be further criticizing the reliance on categorization processes below.

Given that there is an explicit and pivotal role for positive social identity, in what ways does it manifest itself? There are various aspects of intergroup behaviour
in which it operates. First, positive social identity as evidenced in those studies addressing the tension between intergroup and interpersonal differentiation. Brown and Turner (1981) suggest that when group-identity is de-emphasized, self-favouritism emerges. And yet, as Codol (1975, 1984) has suggested, even where the in-group is kept very much in mind, individual differentiation can occur. For Codol the individual is caught in a dilemma between the desire to epitomize the group norm and the simultaneous desire to avoid being deindividuated, that is, the desire to remain a discrete and novel individual. This is resolved in the 'superior conformity of the self' by which individuals claim that they are closer to the norm than are other members of the in-group. Thus at one and the same moment, they establish their similarity and their difference. As ever, perceptions of similarity within the group are modulated by other factors such as the presence of an outgroup (Wilder, 1984) or whether the group norm is unanimous (Allen and Wilder, 1977). Fraser and Foster (1984) go further, reporting that not only is there pro-norm deviance, but also anti-norm deviance. In other words, individuation within the group can be conducted through counter-normative behaviour. Studies of minority influence indeed suggest that this is perfectly feasible. At this point, as we begin to discuss groups within groups, we might also begin to wonder how much of the original conception of the group is left. What this discussion does reveal is that the conception of the
group in primarily cognitivist terms relies on a gross simplification of the dimensions and strategies subjects have available to them in using the group as a means to enhancing their positive social identity. If, as Wilder (1984) suggests, groups can differentiate the in-group from out-groups by actually highlighting the real contradictions and factions within the in-group, the implication is that subjects have a far more dynamic view of the in-group identity; that is, one that is open to negotiation and change.

All this naturally brings us back to intergroup processes and their parameters. Various debates have raged as regards the nature of differentiation and discrimination. Brewer (1979) suggested that it was in-group bias rather than out-group denigration that characterised intergroup discrimination. However, Locksley, Ortiz and Hepburn (1980) found that information about in-group and out-group rewards had an equal and opposite effect on the rewards subjects awarded to out-group and in-group members. Clearly this contradicts Brewer's contention. As Billig (1976) warns us, such minimalist analyses must be contextualized, placed in relation to ideological, political and economic variables. Similarly, Tajfel (1984) emphasizes the conditioning of intergroup processes by myth. Inevitably, then, the models that come out of such an approach will be hemmed in with 'it depends'. In contrast, it might be more appropriate to start from the
'it depends' end of things, exploiting rather than resigning ourselves to the contingent nature of these processes. (For example, we could start off with a speculative typology of concrete intergroup struggles through history.)

When actors do distinguish their in-group from out-groups (and in doing so engender conflict), they do so in fairly complicated ways. For a start, what can count as a plausible out-group will depend on a variety of factors, most important of which is perhaps the relative position of the groups on a valued hierarchy. Brown (1984) notes how similarity of status is insufficient to provoke much differentiation between groups when the hierarchy is stable and perceived as such. Van Knippenberg (1984) notes, however, that groups use complex presentational ploys to support or undermine the legitimacy of the status quo. So when subjects give descriptions of the in-group or out-group, they are often loose enough to allow strategic negotiation, especially where the outcomes or characteristics being described are not the ones that characterize the in-group's identity. This suggests that a flexibility in presentation and personal identity affords room to 'hype' both the self and the group (van Knippenberg and van Oers, 1984). Similarly, Mummenday and Schneiber (1984) have shown how out-groups may be positively judged on what for the in-group constitute second-class comparison dimensions. Here we can briefly
illustrate the contingent and content-laden nature of intergroup processes: Where Brown (1984) warns that too much similarity might exacerbate intergroup differentiation, van Knippenberg (1984) suggests that intergroup behaviours do not just involve antagonism—cooperation is also a feature of intergroup life. Putting these two observations together, we might ask: when does similarity lubricate social cooperation? Following on from this and the minimal cognitivist definition of a group, we can set up the following situation: where two members (or sub-groupings) of the same group encounter one another, unaware that they have both identified with the same group, to what degree will similarity hamper their acknowledging their membership of the same group? to what degree will it facilitate it? to what degree will it lead to cooperation or conflict? This cannot be answered in the abstract; one of the main reasons being that the use of similarity in the process of comparison/cooperation will depend on the way that similarity is integrated into the in-group identity. In other words, social identities contain norms regarding the way that as a group-member one should treat others, both in- and out-group members.

Another area within intergroup theory concerns conflict. Tajfel and Turner (1978) have provided the most extensive theory of intergroup behaviour. This has been refined by Taylor and McKirnan (1984). In Tajfel and Turner's scheme, a status hierarchy will remain secure: if
individual mobility is possible; where comparisons can be
shifted onto new or alternative dimensions; where the
in-group characteristics become more positively evaluated;
and where comparison groups can be changed. Conflict
arises where the hierarchy is seen as both unstable and
illegitimate, and especially where the possibility for
individual mobility is precluded. Tajfel and Turner go on
to state that such subjective conflict does not have
priority over objective (economic, social, historical)
conflicts. Taylor and McKirnan raise the objection that
Tajfel and Turner's model is historically too vague. They
suggest an amendment in which the historical
underpinning of intergroup conflict are more explicitly
integrated into the model. They envisage five stages in
the generation of intergroup conflict. Firstly, there must
be clearly stratified intergroup relations. Second, an
individualistic social ideology must have arisen
historically. Third, social mobility is attempted,
individuals try to penetrate advantaged groups. Fourthly,
those who have been repulsed realize that the possibility
for their own status enhancement lies in elevating the
status of the disadvantaged group as a whole. Finally,
competitive intergroup relations and collective action
should be viable. These authors assure us that causal
attribution and social comparison processes will play a
pivotal role in the operation of such a model.

How such collective action might be orchestrated is
suggested by the research on minority influence (Moscovici, 1976; Ng, 1980; Mugny, 1984; Mugny et al., 1984).

According to Moscovici, a minority's style of presentation, the consistency especially, will exert an influence over the majority easing its views in the direction of the minority's. For minority and majority we could read low and high status group respectively. However, both Ng and Mugny stress that the earlier work failed to take into account social factors involved in minority influence. Charismatic power, which Ng argues subsumes minority influence, is socially contingent, appropriate at some points in history, laughable at others. If a minority is not to be wholly marginalized, if it is not to be seen as a purveyor of deviance as opposed to innovation, there have to be alternative modes of presentation. Flexibility is vital in order to avoid being dismissed as deviant. Such flexibility also permits cross-category identification in that, at the very least, the minority shares the common feature of 'being reasonable'. In terms of high and low status groups, we might consider such an arrangement as hegemonic insofar as it is the ruling groups that will dictate what counts as reasonable (eg to be politically reasonable in most Western democratic countries means being willing to follow the parliamentary road). Finally, Ng points out that the effort that is put into making an attempt to raise the status of the in-group is liable to be influenced by perceptions of how far the top of that
b. Groups and Explanations. Before I launch into a full-scale critique of the above theories of intergroup behaviour, I will first locate them in relation to attribution theory and lay explanations. I have already given some examples of the way that groups and explanations have been connected (in the construction of outgroups and stereotypes, and in processes of group conflict). In this section I will consider in more detail the literature on the interrelation between explanation and group processes.

Early work by Taylor and Jaggi (1974) and Mann and Taylor (1974) showed how attributions were affected by ethnic group and class membership. Thus for positively evaluated behaviours in Muslims and Hindus, in-group members were attributed internally, out-group members externally. This pattern was reversed for negatively evaluated behaviours. In the case of English- and French-speaking Canadians who were either middle- or working-class, a more complex set of results emerged. French-speakers tended to judge others according to ethnicity, whereas English-speakers were more influenced by class, though in a counter-in-group fashion (that is, middle-class English-speakers attributed favourably to working-class English speakers). Mann and Taylor explain these results by pointing out that the French, being a
minority, need to bolster the group and thus their self-identity. The English-speaker results possibly arose because the English-speaking middle-class community tends to be large and undefined. Stephan (1977) showed that in/out group conflict could be mitigated by what we might call a 'supranorm' of high internal attribution for positively evaluated behaviours. So, while intergroup theory would predict that positive behaviours are externally attributed for out-group members, the above supranorm should counteract this effect. This Stephan illustrated by analysing the attributional evaluations of whites, blacks and Chicanos in which he found that the whites were more prone to internal attributions.

While Hewstone and Jaspars (1984) are right to criticize this study for not being social enough (it lacks interaction, group identity could have been more prominent, etc), it at least taps into norms that cut across intergroup processes. Indeed, as we will argue below, intergroup processes, rather than being at core a biological mixture of categorization processes and a drive for positive social identity, might themselves reflect a 'norm' to behave in the group-biased way the literature documents. Pettigrew (1979), Hewstone and Jaspars (1982a, 1983, 1984), Hewstone, Jaspars and Lalljee (1982) have refined and elaborated the theoretical interdigitation of attribution theory and intergroup behaviour, introducing such factors as social
representations (Moscovici, 1980, 1973; Herzlich, 1973), the role of interaction, and explanations of socially relevant behaviours and events. In general terms, this work showed that there was a complex, indeed dialectical, interweaving of social representations, attributions and social identity, with social representations (of the out- and in-groups) deployed in order to sustain positive social identity. However, intergroup processes themselves were not conceived as the result of social representations—that is, intergroup behaviour could reflect expectations embodied in the social representation of the schoolboy or adolescent. Put another way, the schoolboy is a group-member par-excellence because that is the way the role of the schoolboy is constructed. Social representations, as well as more covert processes, have a hand in the construction of that role. Below we generalize this point to men as a whole.

Hewstone and Jaspars (1982b) have also looked at what happens when discussion is allowed and when the in- and out-groups meet. In a study of unemployed black and white youths, they found evidence of risky shift which exacerbated intergroup discrimination. Thus white youths tended to attribute even more internally to black youths for unemployment, whereas the blacks explained this condition through system-blame. When the groups met, polarization took place. However, even amongst whites there was considerable system-blame as they too had
encountered discrimination and lack of opportunity. This study also found that in accordance with social identity theory, the lower status group (blacks) elevated its social standing by positively situating itself on the valued dimensions of religion and music. Overall it was blacks who perceived intergroup differences. The whites were more 'egalitarian'.

As a final instance of the relation of intergroup theory to attribution, Deschamps (1983) sees attributions as a function of category membership, both symbolic and real. For him, attribution is the process whereby social representations are put into operation. These social representations are governed by certain cognitive laws, amongst which categorization is uppermost. We can see that there are similarities between the Deschamps and Hewstone et al formulations though the latter are more rigorously social in their stress on social identity.

The above treatment of the intergroup theory literature has attempted to do fair service to the variety of initiatives in the field. However, there have been omissions, most glaring of which is the work relating groups to language use, as in the deployment of evaluatively loaded language in intergroup differentiation and discrimination (eg Giles and Johnson, 1982). This aspect aside, what seems to emerge from this survey are the pivotal roles of categorization and positive social
identity. While there are constant reminders throughout these writings of the importance of social factors, again and again we are left with the impression of cognitive (categorization) and motivational (positive identity) factors pushing from behind, as the dual generative cores of stereotyping, intergroup conflict or superior conformity of the self. In other words, despite claims to the contrary, this paradigm is infused with the individualism that we detected in cognitive approaches to attribution theory.

To substantiate this charge we can look at the conception of intergroup conflict which sees it as essentially a means of furthering or maintaining positive social identity. According to these theories recourse to intergroup conflict is likely when individual exit from a low status group is blocked. In such a theory no room is left for self-sacrifice or 'humanity'. It cannot account for certain intellectuals' and aristocrats' (eg Prince Kropotkin, Woodcock, 1971) identification with and allegiance to oppressed groups, individuals who would otherwise be members of high status groups. In other words, this is a theory of self-interest which in spite its social trappings ignores that most social of parameters, morality. As such, it is dangerously ahistorical. We have seen that intergroup conflict has payoffs for the groups involved, and more essentially, according to the terms of social
identity theory, for the positive social identity of individuals, and we have seen how these processes are reflected in the use of stereotypes in order to oppress some out-group (e.g., blacks, women). Yet, as various authors in a different context have remarked (e.g., in the case of masculine sexuality, Metcalf and Humphries, 1985), there are also negative pay-offs in the form of self-stereotyping that comes with intergroup discrimination. Why then does the balance between pay-offs stand as it does? We can best approach this question by altering its form—what function does intergroup conflict serve for broader, historical processes? The sometime self-stereotyping of men into what Hoch (1978) has called the 'White Hero' (ascetic, puritanical, etc.) has served not only to differentiate them from women, but also to justify and mediate the rapid generation of capital. (However, cf. Kelvin, 1984, for a critique of Weber's, 1932, Protestant work ethic which this stereotype partly embodies). More mundanely, intergroup processes can serve the requirements of a third party. The imperialist dictum 'divide and rule' captures just such a function: foment conflict and when troubles are at their bloodiest, step in and take advantage. The following quote suggests how conscious such manipulation can be. H.S. Truman was never a fervent supporter of either communism or the USSR:

"When the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, he was quoted as saying: "If we see that Germany is winning we should help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and that way we will let them kill as many as possible, although I don't want to see Hitler
victorious under any circumstances. Truman modified this view later and accepted the Soviet Union as an ally."

(Gosnell, 1980, p238)

Even more mundanely, and ironically, we might suggest that the experimenter in the intergroup experiment takes on Truman's role—exacerbating division for his/her personal gain (as well as for the gain of 'science' of course), and simultaneously denying his/her role in the conflict that appears by cloaking him/herself in the veil of 'scientific method'.

These latter points are neatly paralleled by those in Henriques' (1984) critique of the minimal intergroup experiments. He notes that the errors, that is, the gratuitous discrimination against the outgroup in fact reflects "The comparison... between the scientist's objective perception that there is 'no real difference' between group members and the subjects' subjective perception that there are significant differences between the groups." Moreover "the scientist's viewpoint, completely untheorized in the methodology of the experiment, produces the correct observations from which the subjects' are considered incorrect divergences" (p76).

Henriques thinks it "not unreasonable to suppose that subjects, if they continue to cooperate with the rules of the experiment at all, were left no option but to make 'gratuitous' discriminations. Positive and negative evaluations were required by the methodology. The power of the experimenter to make the rules governing the subjects'
behaviour resides partly in more general authority relations... (and) in the unrecognized power of formulating a procedure which limits the possibilities of response" (p77). Both the lack of meaningful criteria and the requirement to make judgements on individuals even when the provided criterion was a group one show how subjects were constrained. In other words, the apparent lack of content in terms of group identity is a chimera borne of experimental procedures and theoretical constructs. There might well have been perfectly valid reasons for subjects discriminating as they did - reasons derived from the experimental situation in which they found themselves. The experiment was the experimental psychologist's version of fomenting discord.

Billig (1985) has produced a detailed critique of the priority accorded to categorization in the social processing of prejudice. He is especially concerned with the way that categorization, as a cognitive process, serves to render simplification and distortion, and thus stereotyping, inevitable. As he points out, there is an opposing process, that of particularization in which a stimulus is distinguished from a general category and from other stimuli. Billig also criticized the underlying biologism of an approach which sees the perceptual as the substrate of all higher processes, including the social; he noted that we should distinguish the peculiarly human in these processes, particularly the role of language,
which can both simplify and enrich. However, Billig is wary of a simple one-to-one correspondence between categorization and prejudice, and particularization and tolerance. Rather, he opts for a form of analysis that examines the rhetorical aspects in the use of categories (attitudes and arguments included). It requires that we directly address the fluidities of thought and the ambiguities of language. Such a project is of necessity social and requires, in the context of intergroup behaviour, an analysis of the way in which the content of a particular category constrains fluidities and ambiguities to the point where it comes to generate intergroup behaviour.

In this respect, Williams (1984) has pointed to the way that intergroup behaviour is conditioned by gender. She notes that social identification theory does not take fully into account affiliation and attachment processes which might undermine the potency of intergroup discrimination. She highlights the fact that men tend to engage in these social identification processes more so than do women, and that women are more involved in communal processes such as helping other groups. This latter involves a form of agency somewhat different from that typical in the masculine role; this will effect the sort of group identity and processes that women might develop (cf. Ch. 6.) For Williams, then, the social identity posited by social identity theory is "an analogue
of the type of personal identity encouraged in males" - that is, "an agentic identity" (p313). Overall, this theoretical sex-bias suggests "that the relationship between identity and intergroup behavior is more complex than that proposed by the original formulation of social identification theory" (p314). Extending William's observation a little further, this complexity cannot be confined merely to the role of gender identity, but must be extended to class, race and age related identities. Indeed the intricate relationship between identity and group processes needs to be specifically mapped out for each given instance. Moreover, we must not forget that many identities are hegemonic and that their influence on intergroup behaviour is likely to reflect broader social processes. This can be briefly illustrated by considering the 'plausibility' that a given comparison dimension is endowed with. There are certain overarching criteria as to what dimensions and thresholds can be used for 'proper comparison'. These cannot be said to derive simply from the in-group. There is a supra-norm of rationality that must be met in making any comparison (it would be 'irrational' for athletes to compare themselves to paraplegics on the dimension of physical prowess.) The factor of rationality (perhaps mediated through similarity - see above) is dealt with in the next chapter.

In this section I have considered the mechanism and function of intergroup behaviour and found that mechanism
has been unduly foregrounded. Categorization and positive social identity are the twin engines of intergroup behaviour which are located deep in the interior of the individual. In consequence, function, however socially phrased, always returns to the personal. I hope to have shown both that mechanism cannot fully explain the function and form of intergroup relations, and that these core processes are themselves shaped by the content of the categories and identities which are supposed merely to pass through them. In the following section I will detail this interaction by describing some of the ways that roles and groups play off one another in the production of social behaviour and the fulfilment of certain functions. It should be noted at outset that the links I will detail are abstractions: in concrete examples it is far more difficult to disentangle group from role in order to place them in an order of priority. History tends to complicate these connections to the point where it is not realistically possible to unravel the two.

3. Roles and Groups

a. Groups, Roles and the Individual. In this section I will be looking at the effect of role and group identification on the individual. In our discussion on roles, we intimated that 'role' could be interpreted as shorthand for the range of discourse/practices that serve to shape the identity and subjectivity of the individual. In the case of intergroup identity, the reverse seems to
hold insofar as the drive for social identity shapes the type of identity. Thus Turner (1982) suggests that the self-concept is a relatively enduring, multi-faceted system carried about in the head from one situation to the next. Overall coherence and organization lead to a sense of unity and consistency. Yet the parts are highly differentiated. At any moment the part or combination of parts that is conjured up constitutes the self-image. In the case of intergroup processes, this implies a differentiation between social and personal identities, that is a dimension of identity with interpersonal at one end and intergroup at the other (Tajfel, 1981; but also Stephenson, 1981). The self-concept is a social construction derived from interaction with and reflection in others (Mead, 1932). Tajfel has noted that a purely interpersonal identity is an absurdity — there is no way of avoiding at least some group categorization of the other and the self. In contrast, Hollway (1982, 1984) locates this process outside the individual in the types and range of discourse/practices brought to bear on interpersonal interaction.

With respect to the consistency between the various disparate self-images, rather than individualize it as a given of social cognition (Festinger, 1957; Billig, 1982), we will externalize it as a norm in the way that R.H. Turner (J.H. Turner, 1978) has in his notion of 'the folk norm of consistency' — a social norm to present a
consistent self to others. As Billig points out, this norm may be in the process of being superceded by norms of ambivalence or 'trimming'. (Though, here too, there are ambiguities in that the underpinning motive of 'trimming', namely survival, is itself consistent. When one trims, one can trim consistently.)

We can now return to Turner's (1982,1984) ideas concerning the way that an individual ever comes to locate him/herself within a group, that is, choose a group membership and thereby construct a positive social identity. It should be apparent from the above discussion that this can best be viewed through the role-positioning of individuals, including those aspects of the roles that incorporate or facilitate the workings of intergroup differentiation and discrimination. In other words, role-derived identity 'precedes' group-oriented identity. This is not to pose a contradiction between personal and social identity, in the sense of reversing the priority of social over personal identity set up Tajfel(1981); we have already stated that roles are not personal but inherently social in their construction and function. Our reformulation serves to narrow the scope of intergroup behaviour, but also to broaden it by entrenching it in a more socially concrete context.

To round this section off: in terms of individual function, roles serve to shape and fill identity in its
unity and multiplicity. This occurs through both the interactional and structural aspect of role and, for each individual, must ultimately be traced biographically. Role is here used to encompass such forms of discursive/practical imposition as measurement, discipline, medicalization and so forth. These may be seen as (partly coercive) socializing processes that squeeze individuals into particular social positions - to use Heath's term, which 'fix' individuals. The constitution of roles and their incumbent identities will determine whether the intergroup processes, described by Tajfel and Turner, are a behavioural option. However, this is highly simplified. In the real world things are more complicated; not only will roles lead or not lead to group identifications, groups will also serve as the basis for certain roles. Ultimately, the relationship between role and group cannot be outrightly formalized in the somewhat elementary way attempted here. Rather it must be teased out of history in the process of close and detailed study for a particular group/role configuration. This is precisely what is attempted in Chapter 8 when I analyze the interaction between role and group amongst policemen as it reflects and effects the relations between women, rape victims, rapists and men.

b. Groups Yielding Roles. The most blatant way in which groups induce roles is through the differentiation within groups to produce 'leader' and functionaries. Bales and
Slater (1956), Bales (1958) distinguish between task and socio-emotional leader. The former is intent on improving the group's relation to the environment and especially in the fulfilment of its assigned task; the latter is geared towards keeping the group intact, smoothing out difference and so forth. Of course such groups are task-oriented and interactional whereas the Turnerian group is cognitively generated. Nevertheless, this is in itself instructive in that it suggests that Turner's conception implicitly characterizes the group-member as somewhat naive. Most individuals have been members of interactional groups - the family, in the classroom, with friends, workmates, etc - and are aware of how leaders and functionaries arise or are imposed; they are well-acquainted with the strategies people use in maintaining and changing their positions within a group and how this effects the constitution of the group. It seems unlikely that individuals will identify themselves with a group and not have some inkling of their position within it. Where individuals do perceive the ingroup as homogeneous it is usually for the purposes of differentiation; however, even differentiation may be mediated through reference to in-group roles (which, we must note, cut across groups). Thus actors may claim that their group is socially nicer, that is, it contains better socio-emotional 'leaders'; or more efficient, that is, contains more proficient task leaders. Thus we might argue that intergroup differentiation can take place in such a way as to promote within-group role-differentiation.
Alternative supra-group comparison dimensions might refer to style or decorum (Goffman, 1959) in which groups are compared according to the slickness with which they pull off their identities convincingly.

Role differentiation might also occur via superior conformity of the self (Codol, 1975). Subjects who attempt to resolve the fraternalist and egoist moments of group membership (Billig, 1976) by achieving greater conformity to the group norm, may have their efforts recognized.

On a more obviously sociological plane, group-identities can also serve as the content of particular roles as and when 'required' by particular circumstances or groups. The sociological role of 'scapegoat' comes most readily to mind here. Jews (Billig, 1978; Aronson, 1983), blacks, Vietnamese, etc have all been forced into this unsavoury role. Groups can also construct a role for themselves when it affords certain advantages. Thus the Confederation of British Industry (the Bosses' 'Union') is a group comprised of disparate and competing elements which has forged a role for itself as economic advisors to the government. The same might be said of all powerful pressure groups which claim to have a monopoly of expertise in a given area. Indeed, we might suggest that when a group begins to monopolize a given social function it is on its way to fashioning a social role. Thus in Marxist theory, when that group known as the proletariat
becomes 'for itself' it comes to realize its true historic role.

c. Roles Yielding Groups. The discussion immediately above suggests a terminology largely ignored in writings on groups. I have in mind the Marxist distinction between something which is 'in itself' and something which is 'for itself' (cf Billig, 1976). Classically, this is applied to the working class - a disorganized mass which is 'in itself' a group but otherwise unaware of its destiny (or 'truth'). In time, under appropriate historical conditions, the proletariat becomes aware of its strength and its mission and overthrows capitalism, that is, it becomes 'for itself'. Something of this is captured in Taylor and McKirnan's (1984) five-stage model of intergroup conflict. And yet, as mentioned above intergroup theory reduces the 'for itself' to a 'for him/herself' in the form of positive social identity. It cannot encompass the social (and economic and political etc) furthering of the whole group as a process in its own right. Moreover, this 'for her/himself' occupies centrestage; there is no room for a 'for the other'.

Within this framework we can see how roles act as a basis for the constitution of groups operating both instrumentally and expressively. An illustration of this process is provided by the formation of professional's
representative bodies such as the British Medical Association, which in banding the various role-players (doctors) together can increase the political and social muscle of both the group and the role. Indeed, its power may be so great that it can come to have monopoly over the definition of the role of 'doctor'; that is, determine what count as the relevant comparison dimensions. In this case, this monopoly has recently come under severe attack from alternative medicine.

The transformation from role into group also proceeds at a broader social level. The distillation of a group out of a number of roles can often entail the suppression of certain other roles which would not fit in with the emergent group identity. Hirst and Woolley(1982) for example outline (and criticize) the feminist view that the witch-hunts of the 16th and 17th centuries were in fact a suppression of common women's medical practices by men (ie the esteem of the woman healer was usurped by male doctors who organized themselves into group in order to achieve this). Irrespective of whether this is accurate or not, we can admit that it is a possibility which reflects a potential group-role relation.

The gravitation of roles into groups can be prompted by other social factors such as theoretical or technological innovation. Increasing technologization of medical research has meant that a variety of expertises (roles)
are required for any given project (Lemaire, 1984). Also, developments in theory which spans several disciplines, can serve to polarize individuals within a given role or expertise, while causing them to form alliances with other experts. Thus we find that the new French social theory has created divisions within several disciplines (Literary criticism, philosophy, sociology, history, psychology) whilst facilitating cross- or multi-disciplinary research groups. Finally, Stephenson (1981) has perceived both intergroup and interpersonal elements active in negotiation and bargaining. However, we can make the following counter observation: around the negotiation table there is a common role in operation, namely that of 'negotiator' or leader. This can serve as the role-identity that leads to a (more or less tenuous) group identification of negotiators. In other words, there is here a form of cross-category membership, a factor which Mugny (1984) has singled out as important in minority influence. In this case such influence takes the form of negotiation. So, here we can see a role mediating or directing conflict through serving as an intermediary social identity.

This analysis of the relation between roles and groups has not attempted to be exhaustive. For example, I have not even tried to systematically set out the types of dimensions and norms or discourse/practices which might serve to generate roles out of groups and vice versa. In
my opinion this can only be done by studying concrete examples (see Chs 6, 7, 8). To sum up: role is our main conceptual tool. This is because, in the view developed here, it theoretically 'precedes' intergroup behaviour by delimiting the type and range of intergroup behaviours that are permissible. Additionally, it has the advantage of being more socially inclined, shaped as it is by a network of discourse/practices, and not reducible to internal factors. And of course it can incorporate power as exerted not only over others, but also over the self.
CHAPTER FOUR

IDEOLOGY AND RATIONALITY

Introduction

The relationship between ideology, rationality, discourse/practice, power and social psychology is a multifarious one. Not only does it refer to the object of social psychology, in our case attributions and lay explanations, it also concerns the ideological or rational status of social psychology itself, which is after all a form of explanation in its own right. We have touched upon such issues before in our discussion of cognitivist analyses of social behaviour. In this chapter, we shall reiterate some of the points made above and provide a more detailed account of this relation. Necessarily this will include a consideration of the concept of ideology. In outline then, this chapter will address the following topics: 1. The treatment of ideology by social psychology; including the study of ideology in attributions and ordinary explanations; 2. A discussion of the relation between ideology and discourse/practice in the context of critical theory; 3. These concepts will then be considered in relation to rationality, irrationality and the problems of relativism; 4. Finally, various arguments developed in the preceding sections will be drawn together and related to explanations.
The position that eventually emerges is that it is unreasonable to invest too heavily in an absolute 'rationality'. Rather we adopt an 'historical objectivity' which serves as a (temporary) basis from which to analyze discourse/practices. This position also provides the (contingent) justification for attaching the perjorative 'ideology' to those discourse/practices that have worked to block critical reflection, say through an oppressive shaping of individuals. As such when we deploy the term ideology to various discourse/practices on rape and sexuality, it is from our adopted position - socialist, feminist and libertarian.

Social psychology's adopted approach to ideology has in the main been descriptive. This means, following Geuss (1981), that "ideology in the purely descriptive sense (implies that)... every human group has an ideology - the agent of any group will have psychological dispositions, use some concepts and have some beliefs" (p5). This meaning of ideology incorporates diversity in that not all members of society are expected to hold the same ideology or set of beliefs. Moreover, this sense is 'non-evaluative' or 'non-judgemental'. Pluralism is of the essence.

Brown (1973), in overviewing social psychology's use and
investigation of the concept of ideology, quotes the Webster's dictionary definition: "A systematic scheme or co-ordinated body of ideas or concepts, especially about human life or culture" (Brown, 1973, p9). For Brown, the descriptive sense is always uppermost. Attitudes and beliefs must be explained with reference to wider ideological content. This is affected by 'deeper' structures - economic at one pole, genetic at the other. Since ideologies relate to the content of systems of thought, a primary psychological interest has been in their acquisition, maintenance and structure, and in the behavioural processes that are their effects. These interests stand in "contrast to the more specific interests of philosophers, historians and sociologists" (Brown, 1973, p14). And yet, in what way are the concerns of other disciplines more specific? The fact is that they very often focus on the political implications of ideologies - their role in domination. As such they will eschew relativism by arguing that some ideologies are more oppressive than are others; in other words, they will take sides. The same can be said for the psychological form which these ideologies take. That is, social psychologists should not be averse to linking their study of ideologies to those ideologies' social 'function'.

However, in social psychology, in 1973 at least, ideology refers primarily to the matrix of attitudes and beliefs, and involves both proximal (groups, roles) and distal
(economic, historical) conditions, though the latter are not social psychology's immediate field of concern. Also pressing are the influences of genetic factors. Thus as Brown summarizes: "A complete theory of ideology must take account of intra-personal, specific situation and socio-cultural factors" (p178). Predictably, our adherence to discourse theory means that we cannot regard this neat separation of factors as unproblematic. The intra-personal derives from and contributes to the social and 'external' factors. Furthermore, there needs to be a greater specification of the nature of the social field in order to evaluate both the 'social function' of an ideology and the relative status of internal versus socio-cultural or economic factors. This must include an analysis of the ideological standing of social psychology itself, given that it makes up part of the socio-cultural factor.

Another problem with Brown's exposition is that it tends to assume that ideologies are systematic, that is, internally consistent. However, Billig(1982,1984), has noted that this forensic ideology in which a tightly knit, consistent network of beliefs operates, is not the sole mode of ideological practice. The use of ambiguity and contradiction, of balance-as-counterweight, contributes to what is classically ideological (ie denying, bypassing, swamping objective contradictions, Marx and Engels,1968). What is more, as we briefly
mentioned in Chapter 2, what counts as consistency is open to choice, though a choice that is mediated by social norms. Ideology cannot be classified according to its degree of internal consistency unless we specify its and our own criteria of consistency (see below); additionally we have to establish the superiority of one criterion over the other.

More ideologically blatant than Brown's treatment is Eysenck's (Eysenck and Wilson, 1978). Billig (1982) concludes that Eysenck's analysis is "a double-headed criticism against the revolutionary left and against existing society whose strand of egalitarianism impedes the march towards Kant's anywhere" (p126). In this respect we can point to Eysenck's automatic espousal of statism (his examples of political groups only include those that presuppose the necessity of the state) and his consignment of both right and left wings to the far reaches of toughmindedness. Statism per se is not itself considered a form of toughmindedness (inflexible when it comes to considering other forms of social organization). This blindspot is exposed by the lack of an entry in the far-tendermindedness/radical quadrant of his schema. Evidently libertarian communists (eg Clarke et al, 1980; Guerin, 1970; Ward, 1973) or critical theory (see below) do not figure in his scheme of things.

Elster (1982) has produced a more sophisticated theory of
the psychological basis of ideology. From the outset he breaks with the descriptive predilections of social psychology: for Elster ideology is a wrong belief. The mechanisms by which this wrong belief is acquired and sustained are fourfold: wishful thinking, adaptive preference, preference change by framing and inferential error. Drawing on mainstream cognitive psychology, Elster suggests that these are due to defective information processing. However, Elster is also a Marxist; these shortcomings have to be historically located. Ideology is thus the culmination of class position and cognitive defects which means that Marxism, methodological individualism and causal explanation can provide an adequate theory of socially grounded beliefs/ideologies. The criticism I wish to level at Elster's formulation refers to his acceptance of methodological individualism. This assumes that the experimental techniques of cognitive psychology adequately access the relevant processes. In Chapter 2 we argued that they do not: such processes must be placed in context of social interaction, intergroup behaviour and role situation. To put it another way, the power relations that Marxism analyzes on the sociological level also permeate the cognitive psychology laboratory and experiment, and shape the types of processes that are reported. These contextual factors do not simply converge with cognitive factors to produce ideology, as Elster seems to suggest. Rather they are complexly interdependent and mutually influencing; their interactions should be
studied in their historical specificity.

Billig(1984) provides a subtler framework for analyzing the social psychological bases of political ideology. Billig distinguishes between forensic and non-forensic ideologies. The former involves "the belief that complex world events have relatively simple explanations. The classic example is the conspiracy theory..." and "the need to preserve the logical coherence of the explanatory framework..."(p461). "These two feature follow on from the oppositional nature of forensic ideology..." which permits "determined action against a defined group"(p461). The contrast between forensic and non-forensic ideologies is mirrored in Sampson's(1978) distinction between paradigms I and II, entailing masculine and feminine styles of discourse respectively. The former is considered more rational, rigid, and distanced; the latter more intuitive, malleable and involved.

In keeping with our interest in the function of explanations, I want to briefly consider the relation of forensic and non-forensic ideologies to the production of power/knowledge (truth) and their potential to oppress. (To reiterate: Power/knowledge refers to the use of knowledge, particularly that which embodies expertise, to mediate power in the shaping of individuals.) In Chapter 1 we noted that explanations were placed in a framework of discourse/practices, acting as glosses on the point of
intervention specified by the relevant frameworks. We can see a parallel of this in Billig's account of the way that forensic ideologies afford determined action against a defined group. Similarly, non-forensic ideologies, by obscuring contradiction through a variety of linguistic contortions, serve to facilitate a more diffuse form of action (e.g., general reliance on the status quo). From these observations we can distil the following theme: power/knowledge (and the directed action or oppression that follows from it) is best served when contradiction is not overtly present. The following questions may now be posed: (1) When is power/knowledge so secure that overt contradiction does not matter? (E.g., when the differential status of the ideologue and follower is so great, that the follower will assume the correctness of the ideologue irrespective of his/her inconsistencies. The charismatic leader might be an example of this.) Phrasing this a different way: when does the power of a given discourse (and all its trappings) become so great, that its logical form has no bearing on its perceived validity? A corollary question is: When is power/knowledge itself so taken for granted, so built into a system, that directed action needs no overt legitimation and appears self-evidently rational? (Under such circumstances, a supporter of the status quo can assume that its momentum will assure its longevity); (2) Conversely, when is consistency (whatever the type) so tightly bound to a given role that it must be maintained at all costs lest that role lose its rationale
or its power. Explanatory roles are heavily invested with rationality and consistency: when they begin to issue contradictory statements or judgements, their status as explanatory roles becomes open to doubt and their power diminishes. Here, forensic ideology is probably only implicitly oppositional. (3) If we momentarily follow Kruglanksi and Ajzen (1983), we can suggest that logical consistency is a subjective criterion of validity. Of course, in Chapter 2 we rejected this, arguing that such criteria were necessarily socially embedded. Nevertheless, we can speculate that there are other criteria of validity (truth) such as the aesthetic, narrative or normative. In the West the logical seems paramount, but it may be that other criteria are operating. For example, Spender (1980), suggests that an exclusively logical criterion reflects the patriarchal monopoly of 'proper thought'; in contrast, alternative means of assessing the coherence of statements might proceed multidimensionally. If this is viable, then the distinction between forensic and non-forensic becomes problematic: the non-forensic ideologies may in fact be internally consistent along dimensions alternative to the logical. (4) When can power/knowledge and action be generated despite an awareness and admission of contradiction? Here we move away from the Enlightenment version of the rational individual to consider the irrational in behaviour. Habit, phobias, and compulsions can all lead to directed action despite the knowledge that these are riddled with
contradiction. More rationally, where can contradiction be positively used? (eg in Adorno's Negative. Dialectics coherence seems to thrive on contradiction.)

Leaving the social psychological study of ideology per se, we can consider research which looked at the effects of ideology on attributions and ordinary explanations. There have only been a few studies explicitly relating ideology to explanatory form and content, though others have implicitly incorporated an element of ideology, say in the shape of beliefs, expectations or gender norms. These can be illustrated by the Just World Hypothesis (Lerner and Miller,1978), expectations of gender-related competence (Deaux,1976; Ch.6); norms of internal attribution (Jellison and Green,1981). All these factors can be re-interpreted as the ideological antecedents of explanations. Thus the Just World Hypothesis is ideological in that it obscures contradiction and injustice in the apportionment of good fortune by falsely equating fortune and dessert. Expectations and sex likewise reflect ideologies regarding the status of women, consolidating the discourses that regard women as generally incompetent and ideally excluded from certain labour markets. Jellison and Green's findings suggest how an ideology, in this case the causal primacy of the individual, is sustained through a process of normalization whereby to deviate is to draw reprimand, itself a practice that presupposes and manifests that same
Our immediate interest however is in that research which has directly addressed the role of ideology in explanations. Furnham (1982a) showed that employed and Conservative subjects were more likely to blame unemployment on the unemployed than were unemployed persons. Similarly, he (Furnham, 1982b) found that, with respect to poverty, Conservatives deployed internal attributions, while Socialists were more likely to blame social conditions. Furnham and Henderson (1983) found a parallel pattern of explanations for delinquency - Conservatives focusing on the failure of moral and social education (the assumption being that subjects are intrinsically bad and kept in check only by the operation of the relevant social institutions); Labour voters, on the other hand, homed in on those failings in the system that generated discontent, anomie and so forth. There is something profoundly obvious about these findings. In part this is because they lack a sense of history: we do not receive any impression of how it is that the links between Conservatism and explanation arose, nor do we get any impression of the deep conservatism of the traditional Labour voter. In regard to delinquency it is worth taking note of Foucault's analysis of the penal system (1979a; Poster, 1984) in which crime, originally equated with the working classes and their discontent, came gradually, through the operation of the penitentiary and the various
disciplines that sprung up around it, to be located in the psychological make-up of the individual lawbreaker, exemplified in his/her recidivism. Foucault has the advantage over Furnham in outlining some of the ways that the conservative formulation of the criminal arose, how it was constructed in a given context. Thus, whereas Furnham and Henderson's analyses effectively end with the correlation between ideology and explanation, for Foucault and those who have followed him, that explanation and the discourse (or ideology) in which it is located is intimately related to a whole set of practices that buoy or undermine that correlation. So, while Conservative and Socialist doctrines conceive of two opposing core subjects (bad and good respectively) they both nevertheless presuppose core subjects - ahistorical, universal linchpins to the relevant explanations. We must, however, analyse how such conceptions arose and the functions that they serve. It is therefore necessary not simply to document the differences between discourses, but also to investigate their similarities. Once we do this, we begin to see that there is considerably more slippage between ideologies (or discourses) and their related explanations. We begin to take into account the fact that explanations have a rhetorical and practical function which sustain not only the ideology but its matrix of practices. With respect to Furnham and Henderson's findings we could point out that delinquency also occurs amongst Conservatives, say in the form of tax avoidance and fiddling, especially
in small businesses (Armstrong et al., 1984). Conceivably, this would be explained by Conservatives not in terms of delinquency, but through an external attribution to factors such as 'cut-throat economic conditions' and the like.

Gergen and Gergen (1982) have provided another view on the relation between ideology and explanation. In their analysis of the form and function of explanations of human conduct, Gergen and Gergen suggest that the "forms of explanation may also serve as grounding supports for broad social institutions. Differing political, religious, and economic bodies, for example, may be fortified by particular forms of explanation and hold an ideological stake in their continuance" (p147). However, there need not be a simple correspondence between ideology and explanatory form. Individuals have a considerable repertoire of explanatory forms at their disposal and will deploy these as and when the situation arises. For example, the Gergens suggest that Republicanism is best allied with empowered and person-centred explanations, which is to say that the target behaviour has been caused by internal factors which have "full determinative force" (p130). Further they add that as this "assumes a uniformity of nature, i.e. that all people are moved to action by the same internal mechanisms and that such operate in relative autonomy from environmental input, then a form of governance might be favoured in which the
state is properly viewed as a product of the multiplicity of individual agreement"(p147). However, we can readily point to disparities in this. Adherence to the "uniformity in nature" does not prevent Republicans from asserting the profound 'otherness' of communists and the transgression of community autonomy for the purposes of economic gain or ideological monopoly (eg the American way of life).

Moreover, internal attribution can be suspended as, say, in the case of wayward Republican presidents. The point is that expedience will temper the use of explanations in the service of ideology because that ideology is interwoven with political and social practices that are inevitably ambivalent and ambiguous. The same argument can be extended to any ideology-explanation equation, such as those uncovered by Furnham and his colleagues.

One tradition we have not as yet considered in detail is that dealing in social representations (Moscovici,1973,1981; Herzlich,1973; Moscovici and Hewstone,1983).

"By social representations we mean a set of concepts, statements and explanations originating in daily life in the course of inter-individual communications. They are the equivalent in our society of the myths and belief systems of traditional societies, they might even be said to be the contemporary version of common-sense."

(Moscovici,1981,p181.)

Herzlich has related social representations to the way people attempt to explain illness and health, in particular the way that they use social representations
of, for example, country and town as generative sites of health and illness. Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) have attempted to conceptualize explanations around the model of the explainer as an amateur scientist who has at his/her disposal various scientific social representations with which to transform and restructure initial experiences so that they are rendered familiar (eg figuration, personification, categorization - these serve to anchor and objectify otherwise alien experiences). Social representations, some deriving from science, others more traditional (Moscovici and Hewstone point to the often oppositional nature of these two sources) are "generated in daily life in the course of inter-individual communication". Here we can begin to distinguish our approach from Moscivici's. We are not told whether in the process of such communication power is exercised. This contrasts with ideology which many writers assume arises out of conflict, or is immanently conflictual (and this applies to discourses too, despite Foucault's sometime claims to the contrary). It should also be noted that Moscovici (1972) is well aware of the role of both power and ideology as it pervades groups and social psychology itself. However, his recent writings seem to have subordinated ideology to social representations, and with that, the social to the individual or cognitive functions. We argue that the two cannot be so separated. Social representations, in the form of categories and labels, are derived in an interactional process that is profoundly
infused with power; they reflect discourse/practices that are geared, increasingly so, towards control and the shaping of individuals. "Inter-individual interaction" obfuscates what in feminist and humanist socialism is now a commonplace: "the personal is political". Further, these individuals must be properly theorized. In stating that the categorization, etc processes that underlie social representations are a means to a cognitive security, we must be sensitive to the fact that such a strategy can itself be oppressive, limiting and ideological (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983; Ch.6). We must counterpoint the stress on control and stability against an emphasis on de-anchoring and de-objectifying which we can argue are an important means to changing what is an undesirable apprehension of the world (ideological insofar as it mediates domination). For our purposes then, social representations miss those vital, concrete aspects of social interaction which work through roles, and the relative power invested in them, to shape the self and others, both through anchoring and de-anchoring, etc, and thereby to affect the social world. That is, social representations do not simply effect the apprehension of the social world, but also its constitution. A more appropriate way of analysing these interactions is through the examination of specific discourses, and the interplay of these with other practices/discourses and power/knowledges including counter-normative ones.
2. Ideology and Discourse.

This section is concerned with the notion of ideology and its relation to the couplets of discourse/practice and power/knowledge. Our discussion as regards the Marxist treatments of ideology will deal primarily with the formulations by Marx and Engels (1968), Althusser (1971) and the critical theorists, largely by-passing the works of Mannheim (1935), Gramsci (1971), and Lukacs (1971). In this we follow Abercrombie et al's (1980) advice, who have with various others denied the utility of long drawn-out theoretical discussions of the concept of ideology. For them, in their specific concern with the dominant ideology thesis, what is needed is direct empirical research into the actual distribution, coherence, and modes of transmission of ideology. Our discussion is aimed at how best to go about this with regard to explanations.

a. Traditional Marxism. Larrain (1981) sums up Marx's position thus: "In short Marx is putting forward the priority of being over consciousness" (p39). Material life is the historical product of people's practice, though this practice is not merely subjective. Reality and this practice entail contradictions which result from humanity's subjection to, as opposed to control over, material conditions and which can only be solved when the appropriate conditions exist or are in the process of formation. As Larrain points out, from this we deduce that
"men cannot solve in consciousness what they cannot solve in practice". Solutions to contradictions which have no basis in practice are illusory: "ideology is therefore a solution in mind to contradictions that cannot be solved in practice...it is the necessary projection in consciousness of man's practical inability" (p56).

Ideology's origin in restricted practices must be historically located - these practices and ideologies are generated by particular classes. "Thus the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, ie the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time the ruling intellectual force" (Marx and Engels, 1968, p64). The result is that ideology "serves as a condition for the functioning and reproduction of a system of class domination" (Larrain, 1981, p47). The primary form that this takes is a denial of class difference and contradiction.

There are many counter-conceptions (cf Plamenatz, 1970) but given our interest in the relation between ideology and power, as it finds expression in the shaping or fixing properties of discourse/practices, our treatment will adhere to those analyses arising out of the Marxist tradition. Developments since Marx's original statements have taken on a number of guises (Larrain, 1981; CCSI, 1977; Thompson, 1984). Two important strands are cultural and orthodox Marxism, both comprehensively rejected by Barnett and Silverman (1979):
"Orthodox Marxism searches for a correct line, basing itself on a materialism that foregrounds base and relegates superstructure to a secondary place... cultural marxism searches for ideological structures at the level of symbolic meaning as such. This too separates thought and action in a way congenial to the reproduction of capitalism. Both orthodox Marxism and cultural Marxism in advanced capitalist societies have lost the sense of a social whole that animates Marxist praxis."
(Barnett and Silverman, 1979, p73)

We will add that this sense need not be a totality, but an appreciation of the complexity and interwovenness of factors, an appreciation which effectively dissolves the base-superstructure metaphor (see below).

b. Althusserian Formulations. The structuralist analysis of ideology, exemplified by Althusser (1971) and developed by, for example, Therborn (1980), has, as pointed out by Thompson (1984), recently receded. I will not therefore go into great depth regarding this approach.

For Althusser, ideology is a system of representations. This has nothing to do with consciousness: it is as structures that these function. It is through the system that representations come to have meaning. As ideological structure cannot be reduced to the way it is lived, it can be studied as an objective phenomenon. Ideology is social cement; dominant ideologies always prevail over dominated ones. There is an explicit contrast between science and ideology: science is correct; ideology is not. Ideologies are external, based on the structure of human thought - they exist across history. Ideology 'substantiates'
individuals through its propagation via ideological state apparatuses.

Various criticisms have been aimed at this model. Larrain (1981), Henriques et al (1984), Clarke et al (1980) all argue that the division of intellectual effort into science and ideology is highly spurious - especially in the context of the work of sociologists and philosophers of science (Barnes, 1981; Kuhn, 1970; Feyerabend, 1976, 1978; Henderson, 1981; Fee, 1983). Others have pointed to the necessary role of the subject in resistance (Seidler, 1980; Poster, 1984) and the need to avoid Althusser's reduction of the social field to a functionalist whole. As Thompson (1984) has pointed out, the connection between ideology and domination needs to be kept intact. Althusser's notion of interpellation, through which subjects are 'called forth' in the service of the whole must be re-worked to accommodate the fact that this calling forth is full of contradictions and resistances. So, ideology is both oppressive and positive, in the sense of shaping and reinforcing the social constitution of subjects and their perceptions, which at one and the same time limits the potentialities of those individuals and yet provides a subjectively valued stability of sorts. We will look at this in more detail in our analysis of how one set of ideologies (rape myths) serve to limit, stabilize and oppress both the self and others.
c. Critical Theory and Ideology. The critical theory of Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Habermas is engaged in counteracting ideology (though Marcuse, 1964, argues that even critical theory cannot evade an 'ideological character' under prevailing historical circumstances). For critical theory, ideology can be said (if we mix our terms) to be that set of discourses/practices and significations that counteract critical reflection for the sake of particular interests. To quote Held (1980): critical theory's "...social enquiry (is) a critical analysis insofar as it discloses the extent to which existence is a 'means' or a 'block' to free self-realization" (p235). This blockage is most thoroughly achieved through the presentation of the relevant discourses as absolutes, facts, universals; usually these discourses are aimed at the defence of the status quo. Hence the successive onslaughts that these writers have launched at positivism and its privileging of the perceptible. For Adorno (1973) negative dialectics (his version of critical theory) entails first and foremost a sense of non-identity, a sense of something beyond what is immediately available. Thus the identification between a concept and its object, as if a concept could directly access and wholly encapsulate its object, is the primal form ideology. In his introduction, Aranowitz points out that for Horkheimer (1972): "...the task of critical theory...is to penetrate the world of things, to show the underlying relations between people" (pxiii). In what
follows I shall be following Marcuse's reading of Hegel(1955) in explicating some of the main concerns of critical theory. (This is not to impose a uniformity on the practitioners of critical theory - there are fundamental differences between them, cf Thomas,1979.)

In transcending appearance as it might be manifested in the concept, fact, theory, etc, critical theories attempt to grasp the essence of the object of that concept, fact etc. This can be done either through immanent criticism which would lay bare the internal contradictions of that concept, contradictions which the concept itself is partly designed to deny. In the case of social psychology, we can say that its apparent scientific status and autonomy is open to various counts of immanent critique. For, as we have suggested, its various attempts to signify its independence belies its embeddedness in a complex of interests (Sampson,1981; Wexler,1983). Similarly, its assertions of scientificity insofar as it claims to study a 'pure' object (individual) covers up the fact that it partly creates that object (for example, through the role of the 'experimental subject', Silverman,1977).

In attempting such a critique we need to address the multiplicity of relations in which our target phenomenon is engaged. Only in this way can we begin to tease out an effective essence (with all the contradictions that are contained therein). In Adorno's terms (1973), given the
inevitable frailty of the relation between the (critical) concept and its object, the decline into randomness can be countered by: "the consistency of (thought's) performance, the density of its texture (that) helps thought hit its mark" (p35).

Against immanent critique, we have utopian critique which contrasts the conceptual appearance of an object in a theory, fact etc with its potentiality, its 'truth' in the Hegelian sense. We could say that utopian criticism focuses on the poverty of expectation and imagination that appearance engenders. That is, against the 'what is' of the concept, etc utopian critique contrasts a 'what is good' and a 'what could be'. However, the utopian counterpoint is not absolute, it is historically conditioned (though Habermas' ideal speech situation ends up being absolute or transcendent). One problem is that any such utopian derivation is liable to suffer from vanity (Adorno, 1967) in that the author makes claims to knowing what is possible and good. Examples of utopian derivations are implicit in Marx's analysis of alienation which hinges on a conception of the fulfilled worker as an artisan (Israel, 1971), and Marcuse's multidimensional person (1965).

The critical analysis of essence, object and appearance (ideology) is by its nature open to revision. This lies at the heart of critical theory which must be reflexive and
self-referential. In Geuss' words: "...critical theories are always in part about themselves"(p55). To be affirmed, a critical theory must be reflectively acceptable, where that reflection acknowledges the tentativeness of any theory. In producing critical theories the aim is to have them feed into the consciousness and practice of the theories' target groups (the oppressed). There they: 1. dissolve self-generated objectivity and objective illusions; 2. make the subject aware of its genesis or origin; 3. serve to bring into consciousness the unconscious determinants of action or consciousness. Whether such revelations (in Habermas' case(1971), this procedure is explicitly modelled on the psycholanalytic encounter) actually have any effect on changing the oppressed group is however open to question (cf Hollway,1982, for a discussion of the acceptance/resistance to such critical insights by feminist stalwarts who again and again find themselves at emotional loggerheads with the rationally obvious). Unlike those writers (Henriques et al,1984) who have dismissed this essentially Enlightenment and rationalist view of the individual, I would like to leave the question open. In the same way that Foucault is happy to allow for the possibility of a classical confrontation between proletariat and bourgeoisie under appropriate historical conditions (Gillan and Lemert,1982), I do not preclude the possibility of 'spontaneous change' in which the rationalist in us emerges, and where emotion and
motivation squares with intellect and reflexivity.

I will not engage in a critique of Habermas' views which according to Poster (1984) constitute a "Kantian step backwards for critical theory" (p32) as, with Poster and Geuss, I want to stress the relativism of Critical Theory, and emphasize the status of critical theories as "extraordinarily fragile historical entities" (Geuss, 1981, p63). Simultaneously, in deliberate contradiction, critical theory is historically objective: it announces its objectivity while firmly embedding itself in history, thereby admitting its partiality. By virtue of its reflexivity and its commitment to resist oppression, it becomes 'non-ideological'.

d. Foucault, Discourse and Ideology. Various writers have characterized Foucault's work as a contribution to critical theory (Poster, 1984; Smart, 1982). Jay (1984) has remarked that Foucault has himself recognized a "striking parallel between his own analysis of the disciplinary carceral society of modernity and Adorno's administered world" (p22). But as Lemert and Gillan (1982) have suggested there are profound differences in that, unlike the critical theoretical critique of the visible world of power relations, Foucault is concerned with the power contained within knowledge and vice versa, that is, with power's positivity, its capacity to shape and fix individuals. My specific interest in this section is to
locate Foucault's work in the critical theoretical project of uncovering those modes by which critical reflection is immobilized.

Foucault is deeply involved in critique; rather than "the provision of programmes, prophesies or policies" (Smart, 1982, p135). His work "is a challenge directed to what is" (Foucault, quoted in Smart, 1982, p136). Yet Foucault attempts to avoid the impulse to totalization present in many of the critical theorists, that is, the tendency to provide an overall account of the 'state of the world'. This temptation to totalize is something that even Adorno succumbed to (Jay, 1984) insofar as his anti-system ended up a system. Instead Foucault "proposes a multiplicity of forces in the social formation, a multiplicity which is dispersed, discontinuous and unsynchronized" (Poster, 1984, p88).

Another difference between critical theory and Foucault is in their respective perceptions of ideology. Foucault (1979c) seems to have severe reservations regarding the usefulness of 'ideology' (cf Poster, 1984). He perceives three difficulties: that ideology "is in virtual opposition to something like the truth" (Foucault, 1979c, p36); that "it refers to something like a subject"; and that it "is in a secondary position in relation to something which must function as the infrastructure or the economic or material determinant of
It should be clear that Foucault is here working against a Marxist version of ideology. For critical theory, as for Foucault, the contrast between science and ideology does not hold; as we pointed out above, the objectivity that critical theory yields is an historically contingent one. We might also call it, a rhetorical one, intent on furthering the emancipation of oppressed groups. As Urry (1981) points out, there need not be any simple dichotomy between true (science) and false (ideology) consciousness or between concealment and non-concealment. Here concealment refers to the fact that propositions embedded within a discursive structure and its related practice "involve the concealment of the causes, nature or consequences of that practice, or indeed some related practice" (Urry, 1981, p. 60). Left like this, everything becomes ideological. However, as Urry goes on to point out, there are "degrees of concealment" through which we can:

"...conceive of discursive change and development, the understanding of which seems essential to comprehending conflict and struggle, of both classes and of other important social forces in civil society. To argue that there are ideological effects of certain practices does not mean that one is committed to a true/false or science/ideology dichotomy."

(Urry, 1981, p. 62.)

In effect, we can point to the way that certain discourse/practices play a greater ideological role than do others by serving particular groups or concealing particular causes or consequences. Yet this analysis must be carried out from within the terrain of a
counter-discourse. To characterize a discourse as ideological because of its "inappropriate isolation of practices", its "conflation of practices" or its "eternalization of practices" (Urry, 1981, p61) necessarily means that that discourse has been appropriated through a set of concepts that are wrapped in their own discursive framework, in this case, Urry's brand of Marxism. At this level, discourse theory is itself a discourse - an interpretative schema which as Poster (1984) notes "can be judged on the basis of how one perceives the needs of the present situation" (p91). Those needs are perceived as both historical and objective which implies that what is appropriate now may become inappropriate in the future. The limits of our own reflexivity (both individual and collective), is what is responsible for our sometime claims to objectivity; indeed, if we were perfectly reflexive we would never actually do anything (here, we might speculate on a 'bodily objectivity', where the necessities of the body ground our activities - however, even at this basic level history intervenes).

In sum, while I sympathize with Foucault's criticisms of traditional Marxist views of ideology, I do not see 'ideology' as incompatible with a use of the concepts of discourse/practice and power/knowledge. The two approaches can be used in tandem, the precise configuration being dependent on the perceived nature of the subject-matter under examination. Thus in our case study of rape
explanations, I will use the term 'rape myth' rather than rape discourse because the former, carrying distinct ideological implications, points directly to the falsity and power of these ideas (Chs. 7, 8).

3. Rationality and Relativism.

In what follows I wish to consider the relation between ideology and the rationality/relativism debate. Limitations of space and expertise mean that I will not attempt to come to grips with this extensive field, but rather consider a number papers (Hollis and Lukes, 1982) in order to show how the bounded relativism, or historical objectivity, which we have espoused above finds parallels in this field. Furthermore, as much of the latter is concerned with both lay and (social) scientific explanation, it tackles questions relevant to our own project, namely the rational/ideological status of explanations. On the whole I will try to draw out the similarities rather than pinpoint the differences between the various perspectives presented. This aim also applies to the relation between the philosophical analyses outlined here and the more overtly political ones reviewed above.

Hacking (1982) suggests that the truth of a proposition is dependent on the style of reasoning; and that there are different styles of reasoning, there being no absolute rules as such. This allows Hacking to dub himself an
'anarcho-rationalist': Thus, in consigning a proposition to the realm of 'truth' one needs to place it in the context of its associated mode of reasoning. In doing this we can limit the generality of that truth. Indeed, we can go a step further, and assess the rules of logic that make up a mode of reasoning as propositions in their own right. The degree to which these rules are open to critical reflexivity, whether they absolutize or eternalize themselves, whether they are capable of revealing the unthought implicit in them, whether they are capable of acknowledging their own historical and theoretical backdrop, can serve as contingent parameters with which to judge the ideological index of a style of reasoning (Feyerabend, 1976).

Sperber (1982) records that traditionally where there is inconsistency between beliefs, this is assumed to be indicative of irrationality. Against this he suggests that such beliefs should be given 'semi-propositional' status—that is, they are intrinsically tentative. However, contradiction is not absolute. It can be denied for example where two contradictory beliefs lie in different cognitive domains (Gouldner, 1970; Nichols and Armstrong, 1976, illustrate this operating in workers against their own interests). Thus, as we have mentioned several times, consistency is subjectively anchored but drawn from wider trends (cf Billig, 1982). However, the notion of 'semi-propositional' holds promise in that it
captures the tentativeness of much thought. Indeed, if we continue to follow Adorno in his insistence on non-identity, then non-ideological thought needs a semi-propositional edge.

Taylor (1982) argues that rationality entails an articulation and theoretical understanding which yields a more comprehensive grasp of things. This works, in part, through a process of disengagement. Theory and articulation are cross-culturally viable when related to human-beingness in the form of the requirements for survival, technological control and a modicum of pleasure. Science as theory is superior to other modes of apprehension (especially non-theoretical ones) insofar as it furnishes a greater technical understanding, innovation and control. In other words, science is superior in the physical realm (and to some extent in the social). However, as Taylor readily recognizes, this is not the sole realm in which we move. There are ecological and social balances to be struck, and, for these, science cannot be the objective arbiter. As Taylor puts it "Perhaps critics are right to hold that we have been estranged from our world in a technological civilization... But if it were (true) It would just mean that we now had two transcultural judgements of superiority, only unfortunately they fall on different sides" (p103-4). When Taylor talks of disengagement and attunement, he refers to the degree to which individuals
cognitively 'merge' with the social and physical realms. Moderns are better at disengaging from the physical realm (to the extent that it can actually be separated from the cultural) than are primitives. And yet, as our above analysis has suggested, the moderns are necessarily historically attuned - our capacity to disengage is itself historically attuned to the context which has given rise to it. This is brought into relief when we consider the truth or meaning of scientific findings as a function of their use, of the interests that direct scientific research (eg Feyerabend, 1976). Whilst this is certainly the case for the positive social sciences in their creation of 'truth' and appropriate techniques (eg Donzelot, 1979), so too this applies to the physical sciences in their production of relevant knowledge and technology. In contrast to Taylor, I would suggest that attunement and disengagement are dialectically intertwined; disengagement entails attunement and vice versa. For example, drug-induced attunement can require the drug-taker to theorize the notion of a 'man of knowledge' which effectively explains the reasons and aims for attunement (Castaneda, 1970). Without the interplay of these two modes, at however rudimentary a level, there could be neither justification nor deviation.

Barnes and Bloor (1982) focus on the credibility enjoyed by beliefs, asking the question: On what is credibility based? The source of this credibility must be sought out
irrespective of whether the investigator subscribes to the relevant belief or not. For these authors, rationality is subjective - a judgement of plausibility - taken from within the given position or discourse. The counter-argument is that the rationality of any such position, that is, its internal cogency, can always be offset when it is located against the appropriate background of practices and conditions. Thus while Barnes and Bloor are happy to state that their radical relativist analysis "accepts that none of the justifications for (its) preferences can be formulated in absolute or context-independent terms" (p27), drawing on Urry(1981), we note that there are degrees of concealment and that some positions actively conceal more of their contexts of emergence than do others. That is, some positions and discourses can be counted as relatively irrational or ideological.

Barnes, in a commentary on Kuhn (1982), in the concept of finitism presents us with a further twist to his relativism. Finitism's "core assertion is that proper usage (of terms, theories, etc) is developed step by step, in processes involving a succession of on the spot judgements. Every instance of use...of a concept must in the last analysis be accounted for separately, by reference to specific, local, contingent determinants...consequently it denies that truth or falsity are inherent properties of statements"(p30-1). For
Barnes, "Theories (have) no predetermined set of applications, no given scope or domain; and hence, from the outside it is pointless to label (them) 'true' or 'false' " (p33). But who is ever on the outside? Predetermination infuses scientific practice and its truths: this is the investment of power that is reflected in the rules of combination and difference with other concepts, theories or discourses. Thus theories, etc play a more actively constitutive role than finitism allows, acting to formulate their object. Science as a movement, undercuts this fixing or reification in fits and starts, in the form of paradigm shifts. The truth or falsity of a concept, theory, etc can be partially gauged by the degree to which that theory, etc is aware of its own partiality and positivity.

In this respect, we can refer to Feyerabend(1978) for whom "all rules have their limits and there is no comprehensive rationality"(p32). Feyerabend arrives at "the idea of a guide (idea/reason) who is part of the activity guided and (is) changed by it..."(p33). For activity we can read a 'testing against reality'. In effect, Feyerabend's "interactionist view of reason and practice" is a form of reflexivity, one which is in part automatic - "For there is no tradition, no matter how hardheaded its scholars and how hardlimbed its warriors that will remain unaffected by what occurs around it"(p27). It is a form of "Protagorean relativism (which)
is reasonable because it pays attention to the pluralism of tradition and values. And it is civilized for it does not assume that (it) is the navel of the world" (p28). We might add that Feyerabend's animus against rationalism is directed at its self-sacralization. Feyerabend suggests that an appropriate reflexivity would best be instituted through structural changes in the way that research is conducted. This would entail giving all cosmologies and traditions equal status and a forum in which to engage in open, as opposed to guided, debate. In a sense, this is what Foucault has attempted to do by undermining the monopoly of truth (and thus power) of the human sciences—that is, he has helped to clear a space for such a debate, though the game is still heavily weighted in the orthodoxy's favour.

This view seems to me to strike a cord with Lukes' (1982) perspectivism, in which it is held that "some areas of social enquiry are inherently perspectival". By perspective, Lukes means "a more or less closely related set of beliefs, attitudes and assumptions that specify how social reality is to be understood" (p301). Here, Lukes vaguely suggests that it is only for some fields of social enquiry that perspectivism holds, but does not specify these. However, arching over these various perspectives are rules which insist that "data itself must be as distortion-free as possible - free both of the observer's influence and, more generally, of the distorting effects
of power, generating both deception...and self-deception" (p305). To this end "the data must be as systematically gathered as possible. And the interpreter must be as reflexive as possible, maximally aware of his (?) interpretative situation, without supposing that he can escape it" (p305, question mark added). Once again the relation between reflexivity and rationality that we have propounded emerges.

Despite its similarity to an extended list, I will briefly summarize the above section. The above papers addressed the classical epistemological question: What are the criteria for judging a theory or proposition to be true? The approaches to this question seemed to settle out into two related types. The first emphasized the the style of reasoning. Hacking suggested that the truth of a proposition has to be set against the style of reasoning in which it is embedded. Other authors set out to investigate what and how styles of reasoning effect 'truth'. Sperber suggests that contradictory statements are not necessarily false, but semi-propositional; Lukes focuses on the way that some rules of data collection minimize distortion; Taylor argues that disengagement is the necessary antecedent of scientific enquiry. The second type of analysis considers the conditions that bear on the emergence of theories and on the perception of their truth. Barnes and Bloor, Barnes and Feyerabend address the local and historical circumstances that endow theories
with truth. Feyerabend goes on to consider the circumstances that have led to the hegemony of one particular mode of reasoning, namely rationalism. One of the broad ways of 'optimizing' the truth that we have suggested is through critical reflection. Of the authors discussed above, certainly Lukes, Sperber and Feyerabend make more or less explicit references to this, while the rest are not openly hostile to it.

Overall then, these authors, in attempting to ground theory, have encountered similar problems to those which have dogged Marxist and other analyses of ideology. Though positions differ substantially. I have extracted a set of themes that address the ways in which ideology and the dangers of relativism and rationalism can be minimized, though not altogether eradicated, through a contextually sensitive critical reflection. We can add that this should take place at both individual and social levels. It is important to note here that much of the argument has been couched in highly individualist terms, placing the onus on the reflexivity of the individual (person, theorist, theory etc). Activity, whether it be individual theorizing or social interaction, involves some form of collectivity (eg a multiplicity of internal audiences and perspectives). One condition for a social form of reflexivity is, as we reasoned above, an open structure for debate. This entails the minimization of power, in the form of the monopolization of the 'truth' by a given
perspective (or cosmology, discourse/practice, theory, etc) which would guide debate. In indicating this, we necessarily propose a sociological and political analysis of the various discourses, cosmologies, etc in order to uncover the institutional and corporate interests that animate (and are animated by) them. As Poster insists (1984) we need an analysis of the texts (the theories etc themselves) and of the social (the historical, social, political context).

In short, we are suggesting that non-ideological thought's relation to relativism and rationalism involves a complex oscillation between the two. What is ideological is always context-bound: the lack of reflexivity in rationalism can at certain historical conjunctures turn out to be non-ideological in that it can counter (however contingently) oppression and domination. Conversely, reflexivity (however critical) may end up being ideological at those points where it takes on a self-contained dynamism of its own, that is, locks itself in a critical loop from which it cannot escape: it turns into a habit which effectively precludes (political) action. (Occasionally, the critical theorists were themselves accused of being other-worldly snobs). The fruitful, critical interplay between rationality and relativism is neatly captured by Adorno(1973): each should be used to undermine the other. "Dialectics is as strictly opposed to (relativism) as to absolutism, but it does not
take the middle ground between the two; it opposes them through the extremes themselves, convicts them of the untruths of their own ideas" (p35).

4. Ideology, Rationality and Ordinary Explanations.
In the following paragraphs I will bring this lofty, abstract discussion back down to earth. The observations we have made will here be related to the investigation of ordinary explanations, especially those concerning rape. As indicated in previous chapters, explanations need to be considered in terms of the interests they realize, the functions they fulfil, their practical role in domination and constitution (that is, the means by which they can shape both the self and others). These effects can be achieved in part through the blocking of critical reflection in the explainer, in the subjects to which that explanation is addressed, and to the object of that explanation. Our analysis of explanations must therefore consider what it is about the explanation itself, about the explainer, about the context in which the explanation is given, about the object and audience of that explanation, that impart to it its ideological muscle.

These then are roughly the means by which we may map out an explanation's ideological form and function. As regards form, Billig's(1984) analysis of forensic and non-forensic ideological forms is a good starting point (see above).
This needs to be supplemented with an analysis of the ways that the content of a discourse conditions its form, especially as that form is expressed in explanation. As Billig has pointed out, authoritarian discourses are more likely to take on forensic shape than are liberal or libertarian ones. However, this is not to say that authoritarians are not capable of packaging their views non-forensically. The point is that both these forms are directed towards the denial of contradiction: the forensic through an airtight structure; the non-forensic through a fleetness of tongue. As we argued above, it is necessary to place the need to ward off contradiction in context. If lack of contradictoriness is a (popular, Western) measure of plausibility, and if this plausibility indexes truth, which in turn mediates (but also reflects) power, we can argue that the need to (more or less scrupulously) deny contradiction is partly dependent on the power that the explainer perceives him/herself as having. Thus contradictions can be indulged in those situations in which the explainer is relatively secure in his/her position of superior power. To put this another way: what would be the purpose of critical reflection where rewards are guaranteed? (For example: a policeman might claim that he wouldn't have minded raping an attractive rape victim too. Though this contradicts his role as a police officer, in the presence of other policemen or persons of lower status, this does not matter. More grievously, some policemen will rape and
sexually intimidate women, who are, almost by definition, of lower status.) When the explainer is more vulnerable, then contradictions are perhaps more rigorously guarded against.

This above example should convey an impression of the way that context, and in this case specifically the power relation to the audience, will influence the ideological form of a statement or explanation. But as should also be apparent, the context complexly interacts with the role of the explainer. Some roles make demands on the discursive practice of the explainer that others do not.

In the case of the policeman role, it is expected that the holder will be strictly rational, non-contradictory, forensic. In part this derives from the profound stereotyped masculinity that infuses this role - as we suggested above, masculinity seems to have a particular affinity with forensic thought. Further, and more mundanely, forensic thought is part of police practice - simple, coherent explanations are sought because they are the stuff that convictions are made of. Yet under certain circumstances, policemen will forego the possibility of a conviction for the sake of masculine prejudice (cf Ch.8). Here we can see how contradictions within the role manifest themselves in practice.

While contradictions surface and are dealt with by individuals and groups (denied, dismissed or concealed),
that this is at all an option reflects the cultural weight that such contradictions often enjoy. That is, despite the inherent contradiction of many explanations, they appear to be self-evident truths, obviously rational. In considering the truth of a statement or explanation, which to the observer reeks of contradiction, it is important to look at how the constant reiteration of that statement through the media, family, roles and groups, has served to consolidate its apparent rationality. That is, the frequency and vehemence with which something is stated may suffice to blur the incoherence of that statement, to blind individuals to its irrationality. Conversely, we must be aware that the given explanation we are examining contributes to that process and is itself a moment in that generalized rehearsal. In other words, we need to be sensitive to how that explanation mediates and reinforces those wider structures. The policeman's statement we cited above, not only manages to deny a contradiction, it also recycles a set of myths about masculine prowess and feminine passivity, keeping them alive and potent. Moreover, the denial of contradiction as a process is itself rehearsed, implicitly (re-)savoured and (re-)dignified.

So, we can access the ideological status of explanations by coming to grips with the contradictions they incorporate. However, this must always be set in the context of their role in domination and oppression. We
have noted above that power, truth and contradiction are closely associated. The precise relation of these must be dissected if we are to achieve a worthwhile understanding of the ideological in the explanatory. The way that truth, asserted in part through the denial of contradiction, serves to block critical reflection and thus mediate power, and the way that power comes to ground truth, that is, the profound interpenetration of truth and power, can really only be examined in specific, historically traced instances. The second part of this thesis attempts just such a project. The contradictions we perceive and the domination that we recount regarding the explanation of rape are derived from and accessed through a socialist, feminist and libertarian set of discourses.
CHAPTER FIVE

BRIDGING THEORY AND PRACTICE

Introduction

The title of this chapter has a dual implication. On the one hand, it refers to our intention to put the theory developed in the first part of the thesis into practice, to apply it to men's and policemen's explanation of rape. On the other hand, it evokes our attempt to get beyond the antecedent (theory) - explanation - behaviour (practice) configuration by showing how explanation fits into the integral relation between theory (discourse) and practice. Thus, in the first place it is necessary to draw Chapters 1 to 4 together and show how they apply to men's and policemen's explanations of rape. In the second, we must outline the methodological tack we take in locating rape explanations in their practical/discursive matrices.

A familiarity with recent literary criticism might suggest that parts of the foregoing sections can be roughly subsumed under what are loosely called structuralism or post-structuralism, defined as approaches in which "languages and structures, rather than the authorial self or consciousness, become the major source of explanation" (Culler, 1983, p21). And yet, following
Culler, such labelling serves to confuse rather than clarify, especially in the light of the multiplicity of techniques and concepts that fall under this rubric. As we remarked in the Introduction, my method is eclectic; but this eclecticism is not arbitrary, it is guided by political/generative interests. For in this respect, I am quite happy to heed Eagleton's (1983) exhortation to deploy "any method or theory which will contribute to the strategic goal of human emancipation, the production of 'better people', through the socialist transformation of society..." (p211). To this we might also add that our own brand of socialism incorporates libertarian, feminist and ecological concerns. It might be objected that Eagleton is referring to the analysis of literary texts. But then, it is possible to consider human social behaviour as a text too (e.g. Ricoeur, 1971). Both are, after all, products of the same factors - of consciousness, practices, discourses, language and so forth. Ordinary explanations are texts. But they are not simply texts. We must also bear in mind Poster's (1984) point that it is necessary to steer a course between the textual and the social (and this applies for texts too). Explanations also serve particular social functions that shape experience.

This chapter effectively begins with a restatement of our aims as they relate to our specific subject matter (rape explanations). The core of this chapter addresses the notion of the 'ideal type'. The second part of this thesis
is concerned with the construction of a set of ideal types of men's and policeman's rape explanations. An explanation is conceived as the product and recursive producer of a whole set of relations between discourse/practices that can be worked into a variety of guises - role, group, etc. What will emerge is a complex of factors that can be framed around discourse (rape myths, legal and clinical formulations, etc), and practice (self-change, arrests, etc). At the centre of this complex, we place explanations. As a prelude to this some of the connections between the first four chapter that have been hinted at in Part I will be detailed. Finally, I will outline the organization of Part II.

1. A Restatement of Aims

In the Introduction, we characterized this thesis as a contribution to what Gergen(1982,1978) has called generative social psychology. To reiterate: the main purpose of this perspective is to undermine common or orthodox conceptions of social behaviour. Of the various generative approaches that he has identified, we opted for critical theory. In part this is because of its explicit political and historical allegiances, and its self-conscious reflexivity. Within that tradition, we have drawn upon a recent development, namely, Foucault's discourse analysis (cf Ch.4; Dreyfus and Rabinow,1982; Poster,1984; Smart,1982). Though Foucault's method has primarily been directed at the analysis of historical
material (ideas, documents, institutional and would-be institutional practices, etc). I concur with Henriques et al.'s (1984) view that this approach is well-suited to the study of social behaviour. This method, directly sensitive to the multiplicity of moments that go up to make the historical event or conjecture (Lemert and Gillan, 1982), allows us to tap the multiplicity that constitutes the construction, performance, and outcomes of an explanation.

Foucault's historical method involves settling on a point in the past at which events appear to us to be thoroughly alien, or irrational (e.g., the elaborate, horrific execution of the regicide, Damiens). He then traces the processes whereby what had once been commonsensical has been transmuted into something incomprehensible. The point of this is that it teases apart the means by which the self-evident rationality of our current perspectives (which condemn the past as irrational or barbaric), has itself been historically constituted. We do something similar in our analysis of explanatory types: we embed them in their practical and discursive matrices — in doing this we can map out the sources of their 'commonsensibleness', their relation to practices, and their power.

Of course we do more than this; we also look at the means by which explanations, as parts of discourse/practices, have their own formulative and formative ramifications. In this, we aim to unpack the
ways in which explanations affect both others and ourselves. An explanation thus represents a moment of expressive and instrumental activity, that exerts power (in Foucault's microsocial sense) which (re-)shapes the explainer, the explained and the audience of that explanation. That power is enhanced where the explanation, or the explainer, embodies relatively more truth or rationality. An implication of this is that we could be placed within Hewstone's (1983) project of analyzing explanations in the context of a weak functionalism. However, our view of the social field sees the Western world as shot through with contradiction, expressed in the antagonism between classes, races, sexes, ages, etc. The social cogency that we perceive is one that has to be constantly re-asserted and re-instated in the midst of conflict. This tug and pull of social life is partly mediated by explanations that aspire to truth and rationality.

By limiting myself to men's and policemen's explanation of rape, I can study these relations in close detail. That is, I can better illustrate the configuration or packaging of rape explanations, the practices they reflect and project and the power relations they mediate. The specific study particularly of policemen's explanation of rape has a polemical and practical goal too: the analysis of the variety of power relations that influence the construction and deployment of these explanations is also
a means to undermining those power relations, showing how explanations serve to mediate them. In other words, explanations implicate a point of intervention in the social world; to contradict an explanation is to challenge its sources by disrupting the oppressive loops of power-role-explanation. As regards the study of rape, I do not agree with some feminists who see this as the exclusive domain of female researchers. Men can play a part too, especially in uncovering the way that rape serves men and also oppresses them (though this is by no stretch of the imagination comparable to what women endure), denies them their potentialities and the control over other spheres of their lives. As such, the study of men's explanation of rape is not only about the application of the various analytic tools outlined in Chapters 1 to 4 and below, it is also an attempt to explicate the means by which explanations in their various aspects come to serve as blockages (or reinforcers thereof) to critical reflection on a number of phenomena, including rape, masculine and feminine roles, statuses, sexuality, class and race relations, and the status of the self in groups, roles and institutions. It is in this sense that this thesis falls into the mainstream of critical theory.

2. What Happened to the Dependent and Independent Variables?
Kelley's attribution model seemed to take off when
operationalized by McArthur (1972) five years after it was originally proposed (Kelley, 1967). Part of the attraction of McArthur's operationalization was its evident convenience, its more or less simple method of question and answer in which information was provided, a question asked and an answer recorded. Much of the research that followed stuck to this methodology. Variations on this theme were often directed at the type and range of information provided (ANOVA parameter information, perceptual information, further information about the target of the explanation, the personal relevance of the information). More recently, methods have evolved which attempt to go beyond the rigidification resulting from the experimenter's monopoly of information (eg Wimer and Kelley, 1982; Schmidt, 1972; Lalljee, Lamb, Furnham and Jaspars, 1984; Wong and Weiner, 1981).

Other techniques have been geared to uncovering those factors involved in altering the subjects' relation to a given informational array. This would often involve placing subjects in particular types of role - and this is something that was rarely explicitly recognized in the experiment itself. These roles varied in type from the very general ones such as that of 'ordinary citizen' intent on establishing a 'Just World', to those relating to the membership of groups both artificially and organically produced. An additional social factor has been that of interaction (or the threat of it).
All these approaches have effectively placed the explanation in the position of the dependent variable that is supposed to be affected by changes in the independent variables, namely information, role, group membership, interaction and so forth. Now, this assumes a linear causality in which the array of independent variables shape the explanation that is eventually produced (or more often than not, chosen). The most sophisticated version of this type of procedure, that is, those experiments which have harnessed the greatest number of independent variables, have probably been those conducted by Hewstone and his colleagues (See Ch.3) in which group membership, socially relevant information and interaction were all included. One of the problems with this is that the experimental setting is never fully analyzed. To what degree does it differ from the natural settings in which these groups operate? How is that setting affected by the history of the groups both in relation to each other and to internal role differentiations? Hollway (1982, 1984) provided another sophisticated account of the way that antecedent factors effect explanations and accounts. Her analysis dealt with the ways that such explanations, mediated and negotiated by highly articulate and theoretically adept individuals, effected gender identity. However, unlike Hewstone, etc, she does not place explanations at the end of a causal chain, but in the middle. That is, she re-works that chain into a complex
web. Whereas for Hewstone, what is 'measured' is the explanation (and how it mirrors or resists positive social identity), we would suggest that there is in fact a circularity operating beyond the reach of ordinary experimental methods. In this, explanations recursively work back to shape and frame those 'antecedents'. There is a dynamic loop in which it is difficult to say which came first, the 'antecedent', the explanation, or the behaviour. Phrasing this differently: if we assume that the explanation is more or less predetermined, how has it reconstructed those 'antecedents' (or more accurately, correlates) in order to 'ground' itself? These circularities, however, vary in the degree to which they are locked, that is, the degree to which an explanation wholly determines the use of 'antecedents', or 'antecedents' wholly determine the generation of an explanation (this is, of course, a false separation of explanation and antecedents). There are cases in which the explanations are so set, that it would seem that they somehow condition the way that information is used. This, it will be suggested, is what seems to sometimes happen with policemen's explanation of rape. Of course, the reasons why that explanation has become set are to be found in 'antecedent' factors such as the police role. The advantage of this conceptualization is that by placing the explanation in this position of 'independence' we can study its (recursive) practical role.
Thus, for us, the notion of independent variable is not very useful. Indeed, it is downright ideological in this context as it obstructs critical reflection on the ways that these variables interact. To sustain the distinction between dependent and independent variables it is necessary to assert the primacy of the subject insofar as it is on and through the subject that the independent factors work. Yet according to this argument, these factors not only partially constitute the subject (through discourse/practices) they are also constituted by the subject, in part through the medium of explanations. An alternative way of viewing these interactive processes, is in terms of a package. The explanation is one element in the whole which includes a variety of other factors such as those mentioned above; no a priori causal status is attached to any of them. The package itself has then to be considered in a wider context, in terms of its functions for broader social processes and traditions.

To abstract and dissect this package, we can focus on the explanation as a point of entry and trace it backward and forward till the traces meet in a circularity. In doing this, we must be aware that these packages are diachronically constituted and open to change, they are not automatically self-sustaining. Nevertheless, this is how I will treat them in order to illustrate the complexity of factors involved in the construction and operation of an explanation. Thus the atomism of
dependence-independence gives way to the holism of a dynamically constituted package. We conceive of this package as an ideal type that sets out the constellation of factors, forms and functions for a given configuration of explanation, context and role. Before going on to consider how we will apply this to the explanation of rape, I will first detail what precisely is meant by ideal type and outline its advantages and pitfalls.

3. The Ideal Type.
In this section I describe Weber's (1949) formulation of the ideal type, discuss some of its inherent problems, and outline how it will be applied in the study of rape explanations.

Weber does not hold with the project of natural scientific law-building in the social sciences. Such a presuppositionless procedure would not allow us to discover what is meaningful in the social world. The causes of social events (and here we include social psychological phenomena) are too many for such a simple mode of investigation to be of any use. For Weber, scientific truth is what is valid to those who seek truth. This of course has been echoed in the Kuhnian uproar of the 60s and 70s. Weber's alternative mode of analysis centres around the construction and deployment of an ideal type. As will become apparent, this is neither an hypothesis nor a description:
"An ideal type is formed by a one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytic construct...In its conceptual purity this mental construct...cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality."

(Weber, 1949, p.90)

"The goal of the ideal typical is always to make explicit not the class or average character but rather the unique individual character of individual phenomena."

(Weber, 1949, p.101)

"Only through ideal typical construction do the viewpoints with which we are concerned in individual cases become explicit. Their peculiar character is brought about by the confrontation of empirical reality with the ideal type."

(Weber, 1949, p.110)

Rogers (1969) points out that Weber's discussion of the ideal type is at best vague, and he attempts to unpack Weber's concept. At the core of it is still the notion of a one-sided emphasis that is neither description nor hypothesis nor average; it does not describe a concrete course of action, but an 'objectively possible one'. It contains, with the logical requirements of the relevant frame of reference, all the necessary properties for a complex act or complex of action. For Weber, Rogers notes, the ideal type is rational in structure - affectively determined elements of behaviour are treated as deviations. However, this entails problems, insofar as the relevant frame of reference might require behaviour which is 'irrational' when considered from an alternative frame of reference. That is, the process of accentuation renders rational what might otherwise be judged irrational.
Another problem is the ideal type's capacity to become normative and static, re-conceiving what are essentially dynamic and changeable phenomena in fixed terms. This problem is one that we have fully acknowledged in our study of ideal typed rape explanations. Indeed, only recently police forces on both sides of the Atlantic have become more sensitive to the needs of rape victims and have made moves to accommodate these (Guardian 11/1/84; O'Reilly, 1984).

Parkin (1982) also points to a number of difficulties with the concept of the ideal type. Weber's interest in analysing the individual case by contrasting it with the ideal type might not so much access the individual case's 'eccentricity' as the "sloppiness of the original construct" (p.30). Moreover, the moral loading of ideal types serves to relativize them: how are we to decide between them? Which are applicable and which are not? Further, once we have decided to apply an ideal type, its value as derived from its comparison against data is meaningless, as what counts as relevant data is determined by the ideal type itself. Finally, the ideal type seems to contradict Weber's main thrust, the getting of understanding (Verstehen), by directing attention away from individual actions and their perception.

We have mentioned at various points that our overall approach draws on Weber's concept of the ideal type. But
unlike Weber, we are not directly interested in Verstehen, but rather in the role. As regards Parkin's point that the ideal type distorts data, we can counter with the observation that this is the case for all methods. In our case, by deploying the notion of an ideal type, we acknowledge the tentativeness of our construction. In this sense, through outrightly limiting the scope of its truth, an ideal type becomes more reflexive. In terms of what is accentuated or stressed in the construction of an ideal type, our previous discussion of critical theory and feminism indicates that we will be particularly probing about the ways that ideal typical rape explanations are related to ideology and gender power relations. Certainly, from the outset we place ourselves in a given set of discourses regarding on the one hand the function of explanations, and on the other, the ways in which explanations have been studied in the past; in consequence, we admit to the partiality of our study.

Essentially, our ideal type will accentuate those factors that can be accessed by Foucauldian, feminist and critical theories of the social field. It must consist of a package that incorporates psychological, discursive/practical, sociological and historical analytic elements interconnecting in a network whose point of entry is the ordinary explanation (of rape). The ideal type that emerges might not ever occur in a pure state - after all there are differences between individual policemen.
locales, public moods, and so forth. In fact, as some of the instances described below will show, our ideal type does seem to appear, sometimes in a grotesquely caricatured form (eg. The 1982 BBC 'fly-on-the wall' documentary on the Police treatment of an alleged rape victim).

In addition to the latent reflexivity entailed by the ideal type, it also accommodates the holistic view of explanation that we are aiming for. It allows us to take an explanation as a case study and explore its various facets in such a way as to place the social psychological in a considerably wider context, to diffuse the primacy that is accorded it within social psychology. This is done by showing how these more global factors, rather than being simple adjuncts to the social psychological ones, also contribute to their constitution. Further, we effectively reverse the normal analytic procedure: we take the explanation as the starting point and trace out its multiple facets; this is in contrast to treating the explanation as the end point, as the dependent variable.

4. Connections in Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4.

In this section I hope to bring out the connections between the critiques presented in the preceding four chapters. In particular, my intention is to show how the various orthodox concepts such as schema, internal/external attributions, group and role, theory
perseverance, consensus information, the fundamental attribution error, ideology can be considered elements in a more global analysis when appropriately linked to discourse/practice.

In Chapter 1 we considered the ways that explanations were functionally and cognitively deployed. In doing this we suggested that explanations were not only functional for individuals, but also for systems, in particular, discourse/practices. Similarly, we rendered problematic the automaticity with which events could be absorbed by schemas, arguing that a purely cognitive approach could not explain this evident ease. Chapter 2 addressed more flagrantly cognitive analyses of attribution, criticizing their neglect of social factors, including the possible bases of cognitive 'biases' in infrastructural processes, and the normative demands placed on individuals to 'misuse' information. It was further suggested that 'cognitive biases' could be re-thought as rules, specified in the configuration of role, information and circumstances, of the combination and difference between the relevant discourse/practices. Chapter 3 considered the notion of role in more detail, complexly relating it to groups, and individual, social, expressive and instrumental functions. The main point was that the role could be conceived as a complex embodiment of discourse/practices that serve to shape the individual who enters into it. In other words, the role is the node at
which a number of discourse/practices intersect and it incorporates both behaviour- and identity-shaping rules, expressive and material functions and official and unofficial facets. Chapter 4 took up the issues of ideology and rationality as they relate to explanations. The overall conclusion was that the ascription of the term 'ideological', in addition to rhetorical and political functions, accesses particular modes of thought that are especially adept at barring critical reflection, and which serve to sustain or promote domination. As we pointed out, this process of blocking is in part a property of discourse (ideas, theories, etc) themselves, but also a property of the way they are packaged through groups, roles, institutions and so forth, which impart to those theories the sheen of absolute truth.

It should be clear from the above summary that 'role' is a pivotal concept in our analysis, one that is complexly defined, multifaceted, and invested with power. We use 'role' because it seems to us to be particularly sensitive to the ways in which the social positioning of an actor can both render an event meaningful (or worthy of explanation); moreover 'role', by straddling the individual and the social, allows us to see how that meaning or explanation is incorporated into wider social structures and processes, recursively supporting or undermining them.
In relating 'role' to explanations, there are various levels of analysis that need to be taken into account. Firstly, it is necessary to consider the interaction between the content and function of an explanation with the subject. The subjective feelings, motives, cognitions, etc. that are demarcated and inscribed by the role must be shown to reflect in the explanations it voices. However, roles can be coloured by biographical tones: I will not be dealing with these subtleties. Rather, I will concentrate on the grosser, functionally oriented aspects of role: this is why, as mentioned above, I limit myself to the construction of an ideal type.

Secondly, it is important to know the range of discourse/practices (or schemas and behaviours) that are available to a specified role. To the extent that we consider roles to be shorthand for the rules within which the role-holder must operate, then those rules will exclude some behaviours/thoughts and include others. For example, Hain (1979) suggests that the police role is geared towards achieving successful prosecution per se. Schemas that are directed towards finding the truth (the job of the courts) are not paramount, indeed are relevant only insofar as they lead to successful prosecutions.

Returning to Henriques et al's (1984) point that discourses have rules of combination and difference, roles are the loci of those rules, the point at which we find the play of inclusion and exclusion of schemas, etc. But that is not all: we must also be aware that specific or
situational roles are not isolated discursive nodes - they are in constant interaction with other discourse/practices which occasionally make inroads into them, or else have drained into them in the past and now constitute a more or less secret underbelly. Thus the policeman role is in many respects the epitome of the patriarchal masculine role (cf Ch.8).

Once we establish the types of schema that accompany a role, we need to go on to analyze the way that these schemas interact with 'cognitive processes', themselves partly determined by the specifications of the role. The cognitive processes we have chosen to consider are the neglect of consensus information, theory perseverance, and the 'fundamental' attribution error. These occur in both general and specific forms in that they might be derived from general-role constituting processes (eg to be a proper person one must tend towards the fundamental attribution error) or from more specific role requirements (the police role is intent on identifying culprits and not detailing the influence of social history on biography). A finer grain of analysis would show how a particular role could apply these 'cognitive processes' selectively. In many cases these 'cognitive processes' would be involved in ideological blocking. By attaching them to roles, we recognize both their historical specificity and their mediation of ideology. Consequently we open up the possibility of criticizing and
counteracting their action in a holistic, non-technological way.

Our analysis of role must also move onto the institutional plane. For example, the police force is still a predominantly male institution. This has allowed particular sub(terranean)-roles to manifest themselves as the underbelly of the formal police role. An example of this is the social identity of the police role that is mediated through group behaviour. The status and power effects, the need for positive social identity, the way that these are in turn influenced by the content of the formal role, must all be addressed. Further, this underbelly may itself be derived from other roles: in the example of the policeman role, the role of 'real man' is particularly relevant, as many aspects of the latter - pragmatism, rationality, objectivity, toughness, etc, have long been absorbed as aspects of the former. In our account, very often it will become difficult to differentiate role from discourse or schema. This is because, in this particular case, the policeman role often asserts its rationality by distinguishing itself discursively from the irrationality that is supposedly embodied in the alleged rape victim or archetypal (beast-fiend) rapist. That is, the role-parameter of 'male rationality' is expressed through the use of discourse/practices (schemas, explanations, etc) that propound the irrationality of the other.
A necessary adjunct to this is an, albeit brief, consideration of the way that the relations between men and women, and the recursive construction of these relations through the media, sexuality, family, work and so forth have constituted these roles. This will be part of the project whereby we effectively re-assemble the roles of 'man' and 'policeman' in order to ascertain the range of sources from which they draw their power and credibility.

Finally, we will consider the effect of explanations on roles - this will include both the role in which the explainer is situated and the roles into which object and audience are deposited by virtue of that explanation. Inevitably we assess the ideological standing of the given explanation, that is, its ability to project an image of role integrity, occlude the role's internal contradictions and promote its capacity to dominate. This requires that we place ourselves, critically, within our own particular political discourse. From this vantage point, we recount the ideological circularity of role, practice, process, power and explanation.

5. Organization of Chapter 6, 7, and 8.
Chapter 6 sets up the analytic background to Chapter 7. This will entail an exposition (from a largely feminist perspective) of the current positioning of men and women
at both material and representational levels. It will also involve an analysis of sex-role stereotyping and its partial basis in the relative positions of men and women. As a necessary corollary, there is an account of the role of power/truth of these stereotypes and the way that it is imparted through the media, social interaction and various disciplines such as sexology. All in all we do not, in this chapter, progress much beyond feminist generalities.

Chapter 7 is concerned with the explanation of rape. This is tackled by setting up three ideal types of explanation and exploring how they relate to feminism, rape mythological, professional (clinical, legal) discourses and men's talk (interviews). The most important aspect of the investigation is the exploration of the relation between these to practice and power. That is, our ideal types attempt to encompass the the way that the form and content of rape explanations are related to their functions at both personal and social levels. In keeping with our general approach, these connections are traced via role ('traditional' and 'anti-sexist' man in the most general sense). It is at this point that we proceed beyond a simple feminist analysis; that is, we explore a more extensive portion of the range of men's explanations of rape.

These types are discussed in the context of the more
concretely demarcated role of policeman in Chapter 8. The multiple delimiting factors ('cop culture', law, organization) of the police role are shown to have different, sometimes contradictory, effects on the explanations made by policemen and their use of our ideal types. A number of explanations and comments made by police officers are examined in the light of the tension that such influences set up. Finally, policemen's rape explanations are considered from the perspective of their cognitive heuristical composition.

In my concluding chapter, I will reflect on the limitations of our approach in more detail. Also I will be explicating the practical implications of my work, commenting particularly on the moves within the police to reform their traditional means of dealing with rape. Finally, I will be pointing to various alternative research strategies which were mentioned but not developed in the text, and suggesting some avenues for future research.
PART II

CHAPTER SIX

WOMEN AND MEN

Introduction

This chapter has the central aim of setting up the background for Chapter 7. There, we argue that certain types of rape explanations trace rape back to 'normal' gender relations, while others attempt to deny such continuity. Here, we describe the sociological relation between men and women as it is perceived from both feminist and traditional perspectives. Of course the two cannot be cleanly separated insofar as the traditional view is apprehended from a feminist standpoint, i.e., feminism addresses both gender relations and their representation. We do not make any strong claims about who holds either traditional or feminist feminist views (certainly, as we shall see in Ch.7, feminist-sympathetic ideas circulate amongst some men, in both critical and ideological forms). Simply, we map out the respective constitution of these stances: as such, we do not, at this stage, progress beyond feminist generalities.

The first section of this chapter will briefly consider the sociological literature on the positioning of men and
women. This will then be linked up with a more detailed social psychological analysis of gender or sex-role stereotypes and the mechanisms by which they are reproduced. This will naturally include an account of the components that go to make up the stereotype, particularly those that are instrumental in the explanation of rape. Finally, the stereotypical portrayal of sexuality, as it is recursively produced in the course of social life, will be considered.

1. The Sociological Relation of the Sexes.

In this section I will be briefly review the literature on the sociological relation of the sexes. Limitations of space mean that I will not attempt an extensive overview. Rather I will concentrate on those accounts that derive from feminist and socialist positions. This stems from the conviction that these approaches are more generative, that is to say, potentially emancipatory, as well as analytically superior.

In attempting to come to grips with the relative position of men and women in society, much feminist socialist theory has arrived at a dualistic conception of the social role of women. This is distinct from the radical feminist wing of research which conceives of women's social position as a function of the operation of patriarchy (eg Firestone, 1972). As Barratt (1980) has pointed out, the latter theories of patriarchy give "not only analytic
independence to male domination, but analytic primacy" (p11). Barratt goes on to deal with the various problems such a formulation poses. Most important is the fact that it is reductionist - patriarchy takes on a universal, transhistorical character so that analysis cannot distinguish between differences and changes across time and societies. At the opposite analytic pole, coming out of Engel's original statement (1968), are those approaches which attempt to account for women's differential status, and also their sexuality and identity, in terms of their economic position, their reliance on (and more recently their increased independence of) the male's wage. However, this analysis is equally reductionist in that women's oppression is conceived as primarily servicing the interests of capitalism and its reproduction. Barratt remarks that this type of analysis is particularly susceptible to the pitfalls functionalism: there is much historical evidence to suggest that capitalism reproduces itself in ways other than through the nuclear family which is supposed to mediate the oppression of women (eg Donzelot, 1979).

Barratt suggests that it is not fruitful to:

"try and resolve questions such as the independence or otherwise of women's oppression from the capitalist mode of production, or the degree to which women's oppression is to be seen as ideological, (to pose) them as strictly theoretical issues to which a correct formulation can provide an answer. It is, however, unlikely that such a formulation will materialize, since the questions themselves are historical rather than exclusively theoretical."
Such a project would require a recombination of patriarchy and capitalism, an undercutting of patriarchy's theoretical autonomy, derived in the study of historical (including the present) cases in their specificity and continuity. Our study of rape explanations is a contribution to that project, locating the oppression of women through the use of explanations in the configuration of patriarchal needs to assert control and masculinity, and the links that this has forged with the way that the police institution functions within contemporary society.

The above discussion has been provided in order to better ground our observations as regards representations of men and women and the relation of these to rape explanations. In what follows I will roughly sketch the economic standing of women in order to show how 'extradiscursive' (ie material) factors might interact with the discursive as represented by gender stereotypes (and the agencies which support and disseminate them). In doing this, I make no strong deterministic claims as to which factors determine which. This can only be done, and then with extreme difficulty, for specific historical instances. Further, I make no attempt at a feminist-socialist analysis of the origins of the sexual division of labour (cf Leibowitz, 1983).

Economically, women have been confined to a relatively
narrow range of occupations. With the expansion of production and trade in the boom era after the second world war (Armstrong et al., 1984; Nicholson, 1984), more and more women began to work outside the home. However, the jobs they did were somewhat 'specialized'. As Oakley (1981) puts it:

"More than half the women employed in Britain work in three service industries: the distributive trades (shops, mail order, warehouses) - 17 percent; 'professional and scientific' (secretaries, typists, teachers and nurses) - 23 percent; 'miscellaneous services' (laundries, catering . . .) - 12 percent. Of the quarter who work in manufacturing industries, a half are in four sectors: food and drink, clothing and footwear, textiles and electrical engineering." (Oakley, 1981, p151)

Such correlations are not found in men's employment patterns. This exclusivity cannot be explained by reference to 'the needs of capitalism', for it clearly reflects the domestic role that has traditionally been woman's. It is necessary then to bring in the influence of patriarchal structures - that is, those discourses and practises that have shaped the respective qualities of men and women, assigning woman to the position of 'home-maker'. Following Barratt (1980), we must stress the historical embeddedness of these discourses/practices and their relation to fluctuation within the labour markets. The prime example of a partial reversal is that found in war where women's labour was extended into heavy industry (as it still is in the war economy of the USSR - Barratt Brown, 1984). However, after the first world war legislation was passed supposedy to protect women
(femininity), but actually to protect men's jobs. The overall effect was of course the reinstatement and retrenchment of traditional roles - the primacy of the mother-housewife role was re-asserted.

The above shows, albeit in an elementary fashion, the close and always complex relation between ideology (roughly packaged in the mother-housewife role) and the economic positioning of women. In looking at the construction and constitution of rape explanations, we will find that the mother-housewife role is still deeply ingrained in our culture, even if it is under attack (though in recent times traditional gender roles seem to have re-asserted themselves, Ehrenreich, 1983). Our aim must be to set out the various roles (or images) into which women are cast, to analyze their constitutive and contradictory elements, and to comprehend the way that these roles serve as a foil for masculinity. In de Beauvoir's (1972) terms, we must understand the 'otherness' of femininity.

2. Images of Women and Men: Surface Stereotypes.

In this section I will outline the range of stereotypes of men and women currently in circulation paying particular attention to those aspects relevant to rape explanations. A detailed consideration of the problems that have dogged the study of gender stereotypes is beyond the scope of this chapter (cf Deaux, 1984, 1985;
Smith, 1985). Suffice it to say that gender stereotypes are neither unitary nor global. As Smith (1985) points out, many masculine/feminine inventories are "operationally insensitive to the possibility of national and regional variation in sex stereotypes, as evidenced by the fact the criteria against which individual masculinity and femininity are assessed are fixed and invariant, being loosely based on the sex stereotypes of American students" (p105). (A similar point is made by Huici, 1984, when she criticizes Deaux's 1976 model of expectation-related attribution - see below.) Citing Williams et al (1977), Smith nevertheless goes on to point out that there does seem to be "...a great deal of general consensus about the characteristics and behaviours that are seen to be typical of men and women in Western societies..." (p105). In her review of the field, Deaux (1985) has remarked that "Information about role occupancy can influence the ascription of stereotypic traits, with people identified in positions of higher influence being accorded more instrumentality, irrespective of their sex" (p67). What this suggests is that the perception and use of gender stereotypes is mediated by the grain of social perception as it is effected by more specific information. And indeed, this is what we find in attribution to rape victims in which some women are judged 'open territory' (Clark and Lewis, 1977) while others are intrinsically blameless (white, middle-class, very young).
The specificity of some stereotypes suggests that it might be more fruitful to consider stereotypes in terms of a pool of traits that cohere in particular configurations around a core or general stereotypic formulation. This configuration will accord with the amount and type of information that is available to the subject, and the subject's own social positioning (which would take into account Smith's concern with localized stereotypes). Of course, information can be garnered through the process of interaction - though whether this counters or is merely assimilated to the stereotype will depend on the positioning (preferences) of the subject and the nature of the circumstances. In making this point, I acknowledge Smith's criticism that much of the research into gender stereotypes has tended to dichotomize traits - conceiving the masculine and feminine components as essentially oppositional; it obscures the diversity that exists within genders. Moreover, often there is no consideration of the evaluative connotations of the various traits. However, the main argument is that a stereotype is evoked, in much the same way as a schema is called forth, by the combination of the role in which the subject is situated, the informational array that is presented to that subject (the overt characteristics of the target person or persons), and the circumstances. The role in which the subject is placed is partially correlated with the pool of traits that can be attached to the other. In other words, that pool is not fixed; as an individual
moves from one role to another, there are changes in what traits can be attached to the target (and that includes the self). The pool is also changeable in that it can absorb innovations in ideas about people. Thus a trait such as 'holism' (the ability to take an holistic view of situations) may enter into a pool (regarding the make-up of women) while others may become obsolescent (eg the hubris or valour of men). These innovations, it is suggested, will be linked to discursive developments in the human sciences, which are practically diffused through the practices of experts (see below for examples of this regarding sexuality). Also stereotypes are not necessarily internally consistent, especially when they are general ones. Thus the stereotype of 'woman' can be recast in terms of a dimension with the 'mother' image at one end, and the 'prostitute' representation at the other. In our analysis of these stereotypes, we will follow Huici(1984) in stressing that we must be sensitive to their personal and social functions, and their role in the domination of stereotyped groups. In this respect it is interesting to note the way that much research has shied away from openly facing this question: for example in Deaux's(1984) analysis of a decade's research on gender, in her attempt to reform the study of gender so that it takes into account interaction and change, the accent is almost wholly on choice; there is no mention of the use of power in the construction of those choices. More importantly, the pervasive reticence regarding political judgement has
blinded much social psychology to what gender stereotypes really represent. To access this core an assessment of the power relations between men and women is necessary: this would require a theory of history and social structure. In contrast, social psychology seems to have attempted to derive the latter from the study of stereotypes. As we shall see below, this blindness is compounded by a failure to adequately relate stereotypes to behaviour, and, as with scripts and explanations, to consider their status as praxis or discourse/practice.

So, what are the traits typically assigned to men and women? As Deaux's (1985) review indicates, this question can be approached from a variety of angles - from asking people, to watching them behave, to the analysis of the cultural representations of women and men. As we have already briefly noted, asking people has a variety of drawbacks. But there is also a conceptual and practical problem that concerns the ability of people to directly access those traits. In Giddens's (1979) terms, discursive consciousness (that consciousness which reflects and commentates on behaviour, society, the sexes, etc) is not complete. There is also a practical consciousness that directs day-to-day behaviour, including the apprehension and treatment of men and women, that is not necessarily directly open to formulation (this contrasts with Harre's second order accounting). An example to clarify: many feminists would claim that women generally are regularly
treated as objects, as something not quite human (which would make sense given the predominant definition of human as male — Hubbard and Lowe, 1983; de Beauvoir, 1972; Spender, 1980). In deriving stereotypes from a population, it is unlikely that we will find respondents voicing such traits as 'women are objects, sub-human', unless those respondents are women commenting on men's views. That is, the practical stereotypes held by men could be accessed by questionnaires if it is women, the 'targets' of the stereotyping, who are asked. To explore these facets with the traditional or even with 'anti-sexist' men would probably require some considerable soul-searching. The alternative to these is the examination of men's social behaviour and of those representations that encompass and elaborate such stereotypes (though this will impoverish the variety of men's views).

In the following I will give a brief account of the types and range of stereotypic traits ascribed to men and women, as they have been derived from questionnaire studies.

The early studies of Rosenkrantz et al (1968) and Broverman et al (1972) found that positively valued masculine traits clustered around competence; for women their core trait was warmth-expressiveness. On the whole, masculine traits were considered more desirable. These sex-role stereotypes, including both positive and negative components, were incorporated into the
self-image. Williams et al (1977) found that for the United States, England and Ireland there was cross-national similarity in the ascription of items from an adjective checklist to women and men. Again, the masculine stereotype was conspicuously more in need of autonomy, exhibition, aggression and dominance while the feminine stereotype differed was characterized by greater deference, debasement, succourance and nurturance.

Table 1.
Summary of Smith's (1985) Gender Stereotypes

1. Masculine traits - desirable for both sexes:
   Logical; Adventurous; Decisive; Sense of humour; Independent; Self-confident; Objective; Willing to take a stand; Conventional.

2. Masculine traits - desirable for men, neutral for women:
   Willing to take a risk; Achievement-oriented; Ambitious; Strong; Daring; Competitive; Leadership; Forward.

3. Masculine traits - desirable for men, undesirable for women:
   Masculine; Dominant; Hides emotions; Assertive; Tough; Outgoing.

4. Feminine traits - desirable for both sexes:
   Neat; Gentle; Well-groomed; Soft-spoken; Sensitive; Tender; Warm; Understanding; Appreciative; Affectionate; Tactful; Helpful; Creative; Conscientious; Cooperative; Dignified; Egalitarian.

5. Feminine traits - desirable for women, neutral for men:
   Expressive; Home-oriented.

6. Feminine Traits - desirable for women, undesirable for men:
   Feminine; Emotional; Passive; Shy; Dependent.

7. Non-stereotyped traits desirable for both sexes:
   Reliable; Intelligent; Contented; Friendly; Healthy; Competent; Self-sufficient; Interesting; Cheerful; Dependable; Enthusiastic; Adaptable; Sincere; Practical; Likeable; Wordly; Smiling; Attractive; Self-reliant; Kind.

8. Non-stereotyped traits desirable for women, undesirable for men:
   Flatterable.
Smith (1985) provides us with perhaps the most comprehensive study of sex-stereotype constitution to date which avoids many of the methodological deficiencies of its predecessors. To a sample of students and normals, men and women, he sent a list of 120 personality descriptive adjectives which the respondents were asked to evaluate in terms of desirability and femininity/masculinity. Items were then cross-tabulated for desirability and sex-stereotypicalness. The results that are presented in Table 1 and are a modified version of the tables presented in Smith (1985, p108-9). As he notes, his study is lacking insofar it is "based entirely on disposition or character..." (p107-110). Behaviours, interests and emotions will also have to be included eventually. However, he provides us with a basis from which to consider the deeper and broader relations of men and women.

3. Images of Women and Men: Embedded Stereotypes.
   a. Women as Objects. The above listing presents the components of the surface stereotypes. In addition to the absences that Smith notes, we can point to the fact that sexuality is more or less by-passed in this study (see below). Nevertheless, given the scope of this analysis, the various factors can be clustered around the personality factors of "communality, expressivity, nurturance and affiliation" for femininity, and "agency, instrumentality, dominance and control" for masculinity
(Smith, 1985, p137). However, as we remarked above, these factors contain other elements that are clearly present in interpersonal conduct and general social behaviour, but not readily verbalized (at least by the holder). Instrumentality and control suggest that what is being controlled is an object – there can be no (human) negotiation in such a process, it is not interaction between agents. This is not brought out explicitly by the concepts of control or self-assertion, etc. That is, the way that such control is exercised on others, especially those of lower status, and in particular women, belies women's enforced role as the object of masculine agency.

Various authors have commented at length on this. Oakley (1981) put it well: "Women are human beings. But a society organized around gender division does not yield a concept of normal or ideal personality applied equitably to both genders" (p62). Oakley pinpoints the following four covert components of the feminine stereotype: passivity, instability, materiality and maternalism. It should be apparent that these components cannot be based on an approach that views stereotypes as simply attitudes or stereotyping as a cognitive bias. Rather, it grounds stereotypes in the personality of women as it is lived and into which they are socialized. As such Oakley is providing the kernel to the stereotypic traits we listed above. In the following paragraphs I will briefly consider in more detail Oakley's observations.
Passivity comes in many guises. Berger's (1972) encapsulates the representation of this passivity in art when he states: "...men act and women appear" (p47). In art a "man's presence is dependent upon the promise of power which he embodies... (it) suggests what he is capable of doing to you or for you" (p45-6). By contrast, "...a woman's presence defines what can and cannot be done to her. Her presence is manifest in her gestures, voice, opinions, expressions, clothes, chosen surroundings, taste..." (p46). "Women are depicted in quite a different way from men...because the 'ideal' spectator is always assumed to be male and the image of the woman is designed to flatter him" (p64). Thus this agency extends beyond the frame; it is men who actively look at paintings. This relationship of male agency and female passivity is expressed in innumerable media. As we might expect this relationship also pervades literature: Culler (1983) has reviewed the way that novels both tend to ignore women characters as subjects and address only a male reader. In pornography we have what is perhaps the apotheosis of this representational trend (Heath, 1982; Dworkin, 1981; Griffin, 1981). A milder, that is to say less blatant and more insinuating, projection of female passivity (and availability) comes through advertising. Root (1984) quotes from a woman's description of her feelings about advertisements: "..."a man comes into a tunnel and looks me up and down. All the ads are like his gang - telling
him I am a cunt-thing, a leg-thing, a breast-thing and that I am waiting for him"..." (p56). This quote illustrates what a simple analysis of sex-role stereotypes cannot easily access in the stereotype-holder - a practical consciousness. Goffman(1976) likewise detects women's relative passivity (object-ness) in the ritualization of feminine subordination in gender advertisements. Various devices he has identified as signifying women's subordination are: recumbent postures; the elevation of the male partner in couples; and the bashful knee bend. However, it would be wrong to assume that all depictions are this way directed. In her introduction to Strang's(1984) photographic collection of furnishings, architectural features, implements (from cocktail sticks to nutcrackers) whose design draws on the feminine form, Johnson comments that there is some ambiguity as to how to characterize some of these representations. In some cases they are outrightly demeaning; sometimes there is a hint that they may be carrying deeper or more favourable connotations, as for example when "she...supports the scales of justice and holds the torch of liberty" (p9). Counter-images are also present in certain cinematic genres such as the film noir thrillers "which feature stunningly sensual stars who use their attractiveness to trap and remorselessly manipulate luckless men" (Root,1984,p17) - who are sexually active and proud of it.
One point that is rarely developed, even by the above more enlightened studies, is the relation between passivity and the notion that women are closer to nature, while men more appropriately embody culture (Ortner, 1976; also see Sanday, 1981b, for a critique of this position). Obviously, the concepts of 'nature' and 'culture' are complicated in the extreme; however, the aspect relevant to the present discussion is that concerning the passivity of nature - its status as something on which culture works, which is shaped and moulded by civilization. In the West, particularly with the rise of capitalism and the acceleration in the exploitation of resources, the ecological disregard for the earth reflects a reduction of nature to the status of object, something which cannot answer back (e.g., Gorz, 1980). It is no wonder that feminism is beginning to forge links with ecological perspectives (e.g., Caldecott and Leland, 1983); in both cases there is an urgent need to resist a monopolistic agency and to rehabilitate a form of passivity suited to mutuality. This, then, is the problem: to assert the agency of women but not end up mimicking the grosser agency of masculinity.

The above discussion of agency/passivity could not have been conducted solely on the basis of the gender stereotype studies we cited above. What was needed was a background discourse, namely feminism, through which to draw out the profounder implications of the stereotypical
images which these studies present.

b. Instability and Irrationality. The second element in Oakley's account (1981) of the feminine personality is instability. According to prevailing ideology, this instability is something that is inherent in woman's nature. Just as in the case of passivity, so instability is instanced in the churnings of the popular media. In novels (Heath, 1982); in the cinema - we can note the recent spate of nasties (The Shining, Don't Answer the Phone, Dressed to Kill, etc) portraying women as the targets of madmen and simultaneously reducing them to hysterical, incompetent fools. It is rare to find this sort of role meted out to male actors.

Emotional instability manages to colour a whole range of feminine activities and behaviours: women's supposed irrationality, their lack of objectivity, their predilection for gossiping as opposed to 'serious' talk, the feminine dwelling on emotions and the personal rather than on 'important' abstract or practical matters, their reknowned practical incompetence (see below) and so forth. All these can be associated with the central factor of emotional instability, or more generally, irrationality.

Here I will look at the relation of irrationality to women in more detail. Women's irrationality is a special sort: there is a "tendency of women to specialize in
mental illness" (Oakley, 1981, p. 77). After surveying the
literature on sex differences in mental illness, Oakley
sums up thus:

"Women's energies in our kind of society appear
to be devoted to 'doing good and feeling bad'.
Masculine culture delegates them to the care not
only of humanity's lowest needs (the 'lavatorial' function of housework, the cleaning
of small children, etc) but its 'highest
necessities' - the intense, emotionally
concerted cooperation and creativity necessary
for human life and growth...it is the very
sensitivity of women to other people's needs
that is likely to produce the appearance and
consequences of mental instability - women's
instability stabilizes the world."
(Oakley, 1981, p. 81)

Thus again we find the kernel at the core of the feminine
stereotype - one which reflects the oppression of women
in the way that the stereotype itself, operating at the
level of images and ideas, can only weakly do. However, we
can elaborate on Oakley's analysis to show how women's
instability not only derives from their everyday
activities, but is channelled and fixed through a number
of discourses and disciplines (eg Foucault, 1981;
Heath, 1982) such as psychoanalysis and sexology. Thus
Foucault talks of the 'hysterization' of women's bodies by
psychoanalysis - a shaping of their sexuality and of their
reaction against the restrictive sexual mores of the
Victorian era so that it came to be expressed through
hysteria. For men, hypochondria was provided. Heath(1982)
goes on to show that supplanting these in modern times are
the complaints of frigidity in women and impotence in
men: these derive from sexology. We can, in accord with
this approach, hypothesize that the condition of
'depressive psychoses' and 'psychoneuroses' in which women far outstrip men, are not 'natural' expressions, but mediated ones, shaped by a variety of discourse/practices. Indeed, we can suggest that this shaping is a means of underlining the stereotypic irrationality of women: women's typical depressions and breakdowns are the most readily accessible channels through which women can express their disaffection. (This is not to detract from the genuine pain that women and other mental patients experience - Sedgewick, 1981). In contrast to this extreme pole, there are milder and more pervasive forms of feminine irrationality such as those instanced in the everyday activities of women - eg housework. McMillan (1982) rightly points out that rationality is context bound (cf Ch.4) and goes on to highlight the rational in housewifery. However, also at stake is the form of rationality we are dealing with. As mentioned below, the type of masculine agency that has hitherto been credited with rationality is aimed at the production of what Griffin (1982) sees as a near pathological certainty ("His Certainty" as she puts it). Whereas some feminists have attempted to broaden the rational to ecological and personal political spheres, McMillan seems to want to relocate it in housework. (This is not to deny that housework is rational.) Also important is the fact that rationality is not the
core criterion by which feminine and masculine activities are judged. It is in a sense the gloss on status; it is a means to justifying and excusing the differential status of masculine and feminine activities. In other words, rationality is an assertion of truth, and through that an exercise of power - it mirrors the operation of Foucault's power/knowledge couplet. When it is said that women are irrational, that they gossip, that they are too emotional, what is actually being said is that they have no right to power because they lack the means to access truth. And when they do make inroads into this truth/power, again and again they are repulsed (eg the status of an occupation that women begin to infiltrate plummets - Nicholson, 1984).

Of equal relevance is the fact that whatever the rationality or status that attaches to these feminine activities, many of them are still chores - are boring, unRewarding (except extrinsically), and exhausting. To disclaim their rationality is in effect to claim a right to something more pleasurable, to encroach on men's freedoms. McMillan misses the rhetorical in the analytical.

In sum, women's stereotypic irrationality manifests itself in various ways. Though it has some kernel of truth, it is also a fabrication, reflecting rationality's mediation of power through its exclusive claims to truth. The positive feminine traits of warmth, succourance and so forth are the acceptable face of irrationality and
emotional instability for, vitally, they make no claims on truth and power. One of the reasons that madness, exudes such negativity is because it laughs in the face of rationality's self-importance (Foucault, 1967). Some feminists have adopted these very tactics, and in doing so have attempted to reclaim rationality from masculinity.

In the following paragraphs I will show how the irrationality of women is specifically mediated by concrete social discourse/practices as embodied in the institutions of science and the law. This is because I wish to avoid the tendency to reduce stereotypes to the level of individual expression. By relating them to institutionally fashioned practices, we can investigate how they are deployed and to what effect, and explore their embeddedness in a complex, concrete matrix of discourse/practices.

As a discourse/practice we find that science works on various levels to maintain its facade of disinterested rationality: this is at the expense of women. At the grossest level there is the scientific community's general exclusion of women through such devices as not providing adequate childcare services (Messing, 1983). Also there is the channelling of schoolgirls' interests away from the 'hard' sciences for middle class girls, and from academic achievement per se for working class girls (Sharpe, 1976). Fee (1983) has
pointed to the way that the liberal ideology of science sets up a series of dichotomies (e.g., man-as-rational/nature; or objective/subjective) reflecting the former traits in its own constitution, even in the ordering of disciplines from the hardness of physics to the softness of the social sciences (we need not draw out the full connotations of 'hardness'). This decontextualized version of rationality is paralleled in the sciences' claims to neutrality. As Fee (1983) details, the type of questions posed, the sources of funding, the political and economic as well as the human and philosophical interests all serve to sully the much vaunted value-freedom of the sciences. Messing's (1983) example of medical research on women which takes no account of women's actual needs well illustrates this. The relation between science and society is supposed to be one-way - the above comments suggest that it is not. Nevertheless, science certainly strives to maintain its apparent independence and keep its distance. This can be seen in the relation between the scientific expert and the public. As Fee remarks "the voice of scientific authority is like the male voice-over in a commercial, a disembodied knowledge that cannot be questioned, whose author is inaccessible" (p19). Put another way:

"If a man can protect his position in an argument as the point of view of rationality and define the woman's position as the emotional one, then we know that she has already lost the struggle to be heard; he has already won. In terms of the politics of science, this power relationship is reproduced on a social scale: the scientific experts are in the male role,
while the vast majority of citizens is given the female role."

(Fe, 1983, p18)

Orthodox scientificity is supposed to rationally generate certainty. As we have mentioned at various points, this can be seen as a largely masculine concern (though of course women are prone to it too. Also I should re-iterate that certainty is distinguished from historical or contextual objectivity.) This is built into the methodology of the sciences - for example, the application of impersonal, nomothetic, and decontextual procedures (Sampson, 1978) insures that the disruption of the smooth production of certainty is minimized: subjects cannot answer back. Yet, as Henderson (1983) puts it: "Uncertainty is valuable because it keeps us awake and aware, whereas certainty and exactitude allows us to hard-programme our responses to the environment, become rigid, or fall asleep mentally" (p207), and, tellingly in the current political climate, she comments: "Cartesian science's search for certainty, equilibrium, predictability and control is a good definition of death" (p206).

However, we should not simplistically equate science with its patriarchal trappings: it has also been conditioned by its servicing relation to Capital and the West. Further, given its, albeit limited, self-critical procedures, it has also served to undermine traditional views of men and women, as well as furnishing the occasional analytic tool that can counteract the excesses of patriarchy and
capitalism. That is, science should not be reduced to its institutional and ideological forms: it is partially autonomous.

If science represents the utmost embodiment of rationality, then not far behind is the law. Here too women are 'excluded' at various levels. Recruitment of women into the law is lower than for such professions as medicine and journalism. Unsurprisingly, women are concentrated on the lower rungs of the profession. In 1982, there were 10 women circuit judges out of a total of 339... A typical profile of all those High Court judges appointed between 1980 and 1982 is of a 55 year-old white male, educated at one of the top schools and Oxbridge, and an experienced barrister and QC" (Patullo, 1983, p6). Once women have found tenancies they are usually 'guided' into specialized areas such as family law which has low status within the profession. But also, discrimination infuses legal procedure: "the qualities of a good barrister tend to be associated with male arrogance, pomposity and 'erudition'..." (Patullo, 1983, p7; also cf Toner, 1982). Women are expected to model themselves on this archetype. Similarly, traditional rituals in court can render women invisible, or undermine their professionalism.

On the other side of the fence, the law also denigrates women defendants. Thus Iris Mills, one of the defendants in the 1979 Anarchist's trial remarks: "..."The general
impression you get is that everyone involved thinks that women must be victims - you're either led astray or you're sick. If you're not that, you must be evil."..." (Patullo, 1983, p9). As Patullo puts it, for the law, "Men commit crimes for rational reasons, women because they are mentally imbalanced" (p9). This is all in addition to the fact that women's crimes tend to reflect their social position (shoplifting, social security fraud, etc) which themselves carry low status and exude an air of pettiness and pathology.

But even as victims women are seen as culpable, or else the crime is itself belittled (eg domestic violence - see Ch.7). This is especially the case in those instances in which the woman does not fit in with the classical image of feminine virtue. Under these circumstances, it is often the ('deviant') woman who is put on trial. It is no great shock that the prosecution strategy in rape trials is based on establishing the victim(s)'s deviance from this norm. Even women as witnesses are open to the same sort of attack. That this is an appropriate strategy simply reflects the fact that the law itself regularly practices this form of sexist denigration. This is encapsulated with sweeping certainty in Judge Sutcliffe's proclamation at the Old Bailey in 1976: "It is well known that women in particular and small boys are liable to be untruthful and invent stories" (Patullo, 1983, p18). Thus women are intrinsically unreliable and irrational (cf Ch.7).
We have seen how irrationality is associated with women in a number of ways, mediated through a number of channels. In outlining some of these associations, my intention has been to show how, when explaining rape, these will play a major part in undermining the reliability of the alleged victim's testimony. Moreover, this irrationality comes to pervade the women's role in the rape incident itself. As we shall see in the next chapter, this is expressed by rape myths in which the woman is represented as (irrationally) putting herself in potentially dangerous situations; or as (irrationally) leading the man on and then denying him his due. In the next section I will consider another partial measure of rationality - women's and men's views of their own and each other's competence, a competence which is itself a partial measure of rationality.

c. Judgements of Competence. The literature on the perception and judgement of men and women's respective competences is extensive and I do not intend to review it thoroughly. What I will try and show is that the differential competences assigned to men and women reflect, in part, the undercurrents of rationality, agency and certainty described in the preceding sections. As Huici(1984) notes there are links between the justifications for women's low status and economic exclusion, and judgements of competence in which there is
an "attribution to women of a lack of traits associated with the competence dimensions (independence, competetiveness, ambition, logic)...." (p587). Instead, women are linked with needs "related to the warmth and expressiveness dimensions". Rather than equate men and women's stereotypic traits with judgements of competence, I wish to suggest that the derogatory attributions that we find are regularly made to (competent) women represents a broad form of intergroup (inter-gender - though women self-derogate) differentiation that implicitly involves the assertion of women's irrationality and objectness.

Deaux and Emswiller(1974) found that men attributed to ability more for male success on both feminine and masculine-typed tasks, which suggested that men were popularly conceived as generally more skillful or competent than women. Deaux and Farris(1977) produced similar results for self-attribution, with men evaluating their own performance more favourably and claiming greater ability for that performance. By comparison, women were more likely to resort to luck explanation even for successful performance on female-typed tasks (cf Battistich et al,1982). Deaux,White and Farris(1975) observed natural counterparts to these laboratory findings when they recorded that, at fair grounds, women preferred games of chance while men were inclined to games of skill. Similar game preferences were replicated for games presented in laboratory settings. Moreover, this array of
results has been mirrored in non-student subjects in their occupational roles (Reno, 1981). These results were interpreted as indicating that women invoked luck more often than did men and that chance success was a more potent experience for women than for men. Conversely, Nicholls (1975) found that women attributed failure more to their own inability than do men. Feldman-Summers and Kiesler (1974) showed that the derogation of women's performance could be mediated by a re-evaluation of the task itself. Thus men perceived a female physician as having an easier job than did her male colleagues. However, this was not the case for women observers who judged the female physician's job as harder. Indeed, on this score, Rosenfeld and Stephan (1978) have found that the more ego-involved women are in their assigned tasks, the more acclaim they seek. Moreover, where attributional modesty in women does appear (ie denigration of own performance) this might be for self-presentational effect (Berg et al, 1981). Other factors will also influence the appearance of these attributional phenomena, such as the salience of group membership, or authoritarianism (Dovidio et al, 1982), and the colour of the actor (Yarkim et al, 1982). Finally, Lochel (1983) found that these sex-differences in attribution were present in four year-olds. In fact, she goes on to liken this reliance on luck to learned helplessness (cf Ch.1).

Certainly the above findings are mixed: sometimes women
self-derogue, sometimes they do not. As ever, we can point out that the experiments are not necessarily commensurate, that is, there are a number of factors at work which are not uniformly dealt with across the various studies. This includes the specificity of the tasks; the subject sample; the salience of self-presentational openings; the salience of individual achievement motivation. Despite this variability of variables, when placed in an historical and social context of the sort I have outlined in this chapter, the results can be broadly said to demonstrate that men tend to attribute to ability for their own successful performance, and women tend to attribute to luck for their own similar performances.

I will now consider this broad finding in the light of the way that various researchers have attempted to explain it. My first observation is that attribution to luck for success is equated with self-derogation. In contrast we could invert this relation and see attribution to ability for success as a form of self-aggrandisement. The point being made here is that attribution to luck is negative only where the norm is ability attribution. And ability attribution is particularly prevalent in competitive societies in which success is directly associated with the performer as pure individual, rather than with his/her context, training, and collective nature. Intrinsic to this set-up is the differential distribution of rewards. As such, though this research
appears to be accessing and debunking the operation of sexism, in fact it does so only by accepting patriarchal terms of reference as to what constitutes appropriate performance and evaluation. A similar criticism is made by Furby (1979) of the locus of control research which downgraded external locus of control attributions made by workers. Her point was that the workers were not being unrealistic; rather, they were honestly reflecting on their own social condition. This research bias of individualism (internal locus of control) is precisely mirrored in the above gender-attribution research.

Where women do seem to self-denigrate is in their ability attributions for failed performance. However, whether this is qualitatively the same as ability attributions for success is open to question, insofar as what women are attributing to themselves for failure might be a lack of ability. To say 'I am bad at this' is not equivalent to saying that 'I am good at this' in that the latter suggests the presence of a skill, whereas the former can suggest the absence of it (as opposed to the possession of an incompetence). Taking this together with the trend for women to attribute to luck for success, we can propose that women see themselves and are seen by others as comprised of absences. (To re-emphasize this is derived from the broadest reading of the above mentioned results and is not seen as the sole process present). Where men are competent, or more accurately, adaptable, they have a
repetoire of skills at their disposal, including the skill to innovate, which they can apply to any task, whatever its gender-type. Women, on the other hand, recognize no such repertoire: what they have is a void - something that is continually in need of definition (and this applies quintessentially to their sexuality, Heath, 1982).

As we pointed out above, women are constituted in the gaze of men (Berger, 1972); or as Spender (1980) put it: men are the namers; women are the named. Once more we have come round to the notion of women's otherness. Also, we have glimpsed the way that while at the same time reflecting this, the attributions we have considered can also be seen as an attempt to constitute both men and women, to define them against each other. Thus we see the recursive functioning of these attributions as they practically work to formulate and thereby form women and men.

d. Otherness and Evil. So far we have seen how women, over and above their stereotypical representation, play the object to the masculine subject, nature to culture, subjectivity to objectivity and the 'other' (deviant) to the norm. In all these instances, power is operative: the subject apprehends the object; culture subdues nature; subjectivity must be wiped off the face of objectivity; the deviant must be brought back into line. At core, these oppositions express a relation of subordination and domination. This need not be the case - various authors have attempted to break these dichotomies. The Frankfurt
School, Deleuze and Guattari, Hollway, have tried to reconcile the subject and the object; Foucault, Firestone, Sampson, Fee have tried to integrate the subjective and the objective, art and science. Unfortunately, this is not the place for utopian meanderings. Suffice it to say that part of the project of undermining these relations must be to realize the true potential of women's otherness.

Otherness: de Beauvoir describes it thus:

"...she is simply what man decrees; thus she is called 'the sex' by which is meant that she appears essentially to the male as a sexual being....She is defined and differentiated with reference to the man and not he with reference to her; she is incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute - she is the Other"  

(de Beauvoir, 1972, p15-16)

As de Beauvoir states, this otherness is fundamentally concerned with the sexuality of women (though of course it is also related to irrationality, incompetence and objectness). The facet of women's sexuality we will be dealing with here is particularly relevant to rape mythology. Of the various images of feminine sexuality that are portrayed, the two which are most alien to men are those concerned with female reproduction and extreme female sexual prowess or capacity. While the former might well engender apprehension in men (Chesler, 1978; Stockland and Johnson, 1979 - for varieties of womb envy; Bradbury, 1985), it does not directly feed into rape mythology, though it might well do circuitously. In
contrast, the conceptions of female sexual insatiability certainly do—though it should be remembered that this image is reserved for particular types of women, usually beautiful, distant, alluring and novel. In other words, this image does not readily generalize to women with whom a man has been intimate, and especially not to his wife if he is married (Hite, 1982, though we must be wary of the representativeness of her sample, cf Ch. 7). Because of the supposed potential insatiability of the feminine sexual appetite, women can become threatening, that is, evil. Rape and the explanations that support it in some cases can be interpreted as engaging this evil in battle (a version of what Brownmiller, 1975, has called the 'heroic rape'). But it does more than that, it also serves to constitute that evil, to impress an identity on women. In turn, men's own view of themselves is consolidated (see below). There is a self-sustaining circularity here. This is demonstrated when men (and women) excuse rape with such comments as: "That'll teach the bitch".

This is by no means the whole story. For evil is perceived in many aspects of women's behaviour and condition. Hite (1982) has noted how many men are disgruntled by the fact that their wives who take a portion of their pay will often not provide sex. They feel they are being ripped off. They see their wives' 'frigidity' as a ploy. Amongst the untold numbers of rape within marriage (Hall, 1985), some will be a form of
punishment for this evil. No doubt some will be rationalized through the myth of rape as seduction: "What she needs is a good fuck". In both cases women's recalcitrant sexuality is recast in terms of its evilness, with the implication that it must be harnessed to the good, namely men's needs.

So, evil can become a covert element in the perception of women. We witness this in other cultures (Hoch-Smith and Spring, 1980; Sanday, 1981b) in which women's movement is circumscribed lest through their sexuality, they pollute men's society; and we can identify it in the long and distinguished lineage that runs through such figures as Eve, Pandora, Delilah, and Dietrich in the Blue Angel (Root, 1984). In sum, if the irrational and the uncertain contain elements of threat and fear, they are also to be seen as infused with evil, especially where the norm centres on the rational and the certain. Women by being placed in the position of 'other' will always contain a thread of evil which will be used to bind and subjugate them.

e. Sexuality. In the following discussion my purpose is to connect the deep stereotypic characteristics we have outlined above to the sexuality of women and men. But before this I will briefly describe the stereotypical ascription of sexual traits to men and women. For example, Oakley(1972) has explicated the respective sexual
stereotypes thus: men are naturally more sexually arousable and have a greater sexual appetite than women. (This is in spite of the stereotype of the 'evil' salacious woman we commented on above; generally speaking, men are supposed to be the more sexually inclined.) Further, men take the active part in initiating sexual interaction: the woman must be chatted up, aroused, conquered. These are the two main components of stereotypical sexuality and can be readily accommodated by the surface and deep stereotypes provided above. That is the man is still the agent, the independent, assertive partner, while the woman is the emotional, affiliative target whose emotion and affiliation have to be engaged, nurtured and, more blatantly, manipulated. Oakley supplies us with a variety of data to show that these general sexualities are not biological givens. I do not intend to enter into the numerous arguments for the biological or cultural determination of sexuality, at least not in the traditional way. Rather, I will show how these images are projected.

Certainly these stereotypic images have come to inhabit much of the media (Root, 1984); these deeper stereotypes can only be properly accessed by social analysis. For Covenay et al (1984), normal masculine sexuality is comprised of the following components: Power (eg taking the initiative - though many men don't like this,
especially given the possibility of rejection, Hite, 1982; aggression; penis orientation; sex – emotion separation; the objectification of women; fetishism (of clothing, parts of women's bodies, etc); uncontrollability – the belief that masculine sexuality is uncontrollable and that without release men will physically and psychologically suffer (it is interesting that amongst some Chinese men who have been influenced by a misconceived Taoism, the opposite view holds, that ejaculation is actually detrimental to health, Lieh-Mak and Ng, 1981). In sum, there is a compulsive masculine sexuality that is reflected in the quantitative approach that many men have towards sex. This is instanced in the masculine identification of sex with intercourse per se, and the relegation of foreplay and other forms of sexual activity. As Hite (1982) puts it "sex should be un-defined to become something with infinite variety" (p. 477) – the identical point is made by Heath and Foucault. All these elements combine to justify a masculine sexual behaviour that is geared towards reconstituting the general masculine identity, and shaping by constraint the feminine identity.

These representations are disseminated through a variety of discourse/practices and media. Through film and advertising (Root, 1984; Dyer, 1985); through pornography (Dworkin, 1981; Muye, 1985); through the novel (Heath, 1982). Likewise various knowledges have yielded data that 'fixes' sexuality into its orthodox configurations. Of these,
sexology (more so than psychoanalysis - at least in the Anglo-Saxon world, Heath, 1982) has been particularly potent, especially given its rapid dissemination through such 'enlightened' magazines as Forum (Covenay et al., 1984). Thus for Havelock Ellis (Jackson, 1984a), sex involved an element of aggression; this was embodied in the chase. The woman's diffidence must be overcome, and she recognizes this. In other words, the pursued woman, 'aware of the biological necessity for sex, in fact wants to be caught. As such, any conflict that occurs between hunter-male and prey-female is only apparent: women have an investment in their own submissiveness then - pain and love are intimately connected. Here we have a partial legitimation of prevailing sexual practice and, potentially, for rape. Even for the later sexologists, the liberalization of sex did not guarantee equality: whether as 'servicer' or 'serviced' the woman, according to Jackson (1984b), was the subservient partner. In the former, she aroused the man; in the latter, her 'passivity' facilitated his necessary sexual release. This is the view that has been popularized by magazines such as Forum (Covenay et al., 1984). However, there is running parallel with this a genuine concern for the woman's position, and certainly this work laid some of the ground for the more radical conceptions of sexuality.

More broadly, it should be remembered that sexuality has been conditioned by a multiplicity of factors. Weeks (1980)
decomposes these into: family and kinship systems; economic and social factors; the forms of social regulation (e.g., Church, peer groups); the political moment (the juridico-legal and legislative systems); and cultures of resistance (folk-knowledges, counter-movements). The rise of the welfare state in Britain, the state support of birth control, abortion and divorce reforms, the liberalization of censorship, the post-war consumer boom, and a host of other factors have influenced the (re-)formation and formulation of sexuality. The rise of 'permissiveness' in the sixties — one which largely worked in men's favour — at one level has receded on the tide of a moral revival, and at another has been superceded by more radical and thoroughgoing demands. When we analyze rape explanations, our ideal type will be concerned with the conservative end of this polarization.

Until now, I have touched only implicitly upon the stability of the various components of sexuality and sexual stereotypes. It is possible to discern in the vigour of the sexological discourses and the vehemence of the current moralist backlash a profound unease about the secure standing of traditional gender roles. On the one hand this applies to masculine sexuality (Tolson, 1977; Reynaud, 1981; Metcalf, 1985; Ryan, 1985). On the other it applies to the insecurity experienced by many middle class women regarding their social standing as wives with responsible husbands (Ehrenreich, 1983). Some authors
(Metcalf, Ryan) believe that masculine insecurity has at least some of its roots in socialization processes, especially in the tenuous disidentification from the mother and the identification with the father, and stress that this universal condition of masculine uncertainty has recently been exacerbated by feminist attacks on the integrity of the male identity. Others (Tolson) focus on the class differences in masculinity, and pinpoint the way that masculine identity, in its essentials of independence, self-reliance, agency and so forth, is consistently and continuously undermined by social conditions. In the case of working class men, the onslaught takes the form of the humiliation and alienation of the work process; this is diffused through the collective nature of work groups in which traditional masculine virtues can be reinforced. For middle class men, their particular brand of masculinity incorporates an element of morality and duty centred around the cultural capital that their schooling has provided them with. This is undermined by the futility they often perceive in their work and with which they cope either through a decline into cynicism or a use of professional fronts or business personalities. All in all then, we could say that masculine identity is not the bulwark it appears to be; rather its constant striving for certainty, rationality, and power reflects its manifold instability.

As an example of this masculine insecurity we can mention
the feelings that men often experience in intimate relationships, that is, "the fear of being dominated, controlled, swallowed up or suffocated. Underlying these fears, which on the surface appear to be concerned with autonomy and freedom, is a more basic fear about the disintegration or loss of their sense of maleness. Behind this appears to be the wish to surrender to the woman, to be like her, to be in union with her" (Ryan, 1985, p. 22). So men differentiate themselves in order to pursue their masculine identity. In addition to the few examples we have mentioned above, we can speculate that this need is an underlying moment in all, but particularly the more virulent, strains of intergroup behaviour that men manifest: a group mediated social identity, replete with its sense of certainty and control, will serve as a welcome supplement to the more tenuous individually mediated masculine identity. At a more abstract level, this instability is countered through the opposition of rationality and emotionality, subject and object and so on. And this is conducted recursively in everyday life: eg in the way that many men will cut off emotionally in a "tendency to denigrate or discount passionate or romantic attractions as unreal or undesirable" (Hite, 1982, p. 139); or in the way that 'enlightened' reflexive men will, when talking about themselves, automatically change register and couch their discourse in abstract academic terms (Hollway, 1982). However, the practical workings of this stereotype are now being recognized; and as some of Hite's
respondents show, there is a 'broadening' of masculinity which part-encompasses the feminine.

The frailty of masculinity is something which the simple study of stereotypes and their use could not reveal. In order to look at the way that men construct and deploy their explanations of rape it has been necessary to outline the deeper elements of these stereotypes, elements which are grounded in the historically specific conditions of women and men. These affect not only the construction of rape explanations (eg what discourses and information are held to be relevant), but also the 'motivations' that lie behind them. However, there is no simple relation between such a masculinity and rape explanation. Inevitably other factors intrude - factors that relate to biographical (eg friends, experiences with women and men, education, etc), local (eg work role, institutional requirements) and general (eg prevailing public mood) conditions. We will encounter some of the biographical factors when we consider the types of rape explanations presented in interviews (cf Ch.7); local and general factors will be more closely examined in Chapter 8 on policemen's explanations of rape.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE EXPLANATION OF RAPE

Introduction.

This chapter will overview the literature on rape and rape explanations. My main aim is to analyse the form which rape explanations take in order to show how they incorporate the sexist, and indeed anti-sexist, discourse/practices considered in Chapter 6. While I will lean heavily on feminist analysis, this is done reflexively, treating it as an ideal type in its own right. To reiterate: this is part of the generative strategy of adopting a minority response with which to critically apprehend the norm.

An analysis of explanations and comments given by men in various research literatures and in interviews will be presented. These will be framed in terms of ideal types with which I will attempt to access the interests (or practices) that lie behind the explanations given. The three ideal types presented are derived partly from the analysis of interview material, from feminist and legal formulations of rape, and from the abnormal behaviour literature. We start with an account of the ideal types, as opposed to an analysis of the interviews,
as a means of setting out from the start our main concern: the interpenetration of explanation, practice and power. While the interview material might appear merely illustrative, we emphasize that it has also played a formulative part in the construction of the ideal types. These are the dimensional, the typological and the schismatic types and, in the context of rape explanations, are related to feminist/anti-sexist, clinical/legal and machismo/defensive functions respectively. Thus the form of the rape explanation or discourse comes to be tied to a practice. In this chapter, practices will only be considered in broad terms - the dimensional is aligned with an 'anti-sexist' practical orientation which entails both self and social change; the schismatic involves the denial of continuity so that conventional (sexist, oppressive, etc) practice may continue. In the next chapter these practices are pinned down to the more specific role of policeman. Needless to say, our equation of form and function is simplistic; nevertheless it allows us to view the ways that explanations serve to rehearse the individual's positioning within a discursive/practical matrix. In this specific context, the dimensional is considered to carry generative weight.

This chapter will take the following form: First there will be a discussion of dimensional and typological types of explanation that draws on debates within the personality and abnormal psychology literature. These two
ideal types will be elaborated and their relevance to the explanation of rape drawn out in the following section. In addition, the schismatic ideal type will be considered, especially as it relates to the law. After this, there will be a detailed consideration of ways that these ideal types are represented in feminism, in clinical theory and in everyday discourse. Finally, there will be an analysis of their use in rape explanations as presented in the attribution and related literature, and in interviews. (This analysis will be extended to the account of a specific rape presented in "The Glasgow Rape Case". cf Appendix.)

1. Dimensional and Typological Explanations.

This section outlines our two basic ideal types. In framing them as we do, we are attempting to bring out what we consider to be their primary quality: the embodiment of both discourse (explanation, attitudes, beliefs, etc) and practice (behaviour). In this respect, the term ideal type 'explanation' is a misnomer for clearly it encompasses practices too. This is why, below, we link, perhaps in a reductive manner, discursive posture (form of explanation, content, myths, etc) to practice (research, broad social change, efficient differentiation between categories).

Dimensional explanations underline the continuity between what on the surface appear to be disparate or discrete conditions. Typological explanations are concerned with
the criteria that demarcate conditions. For the purpose of exposition, we can suggest that in clinical and personality psychology, the dimensional approach tends to be research oriented. More so than the typological, it is aimed at the production of theoretical verities and the discovery of causal mechanism. Here, I have particularly in mind the dimensional work of Eysenck (see below). By contrast, the typological is relatively more practical; it is interested in identifying and treating mentally ill types with the least fuss. Of course there is overlap. The latter's accent on categories is meant to reflect substantive differences in aetiology, in the causal mechanism underlying the types. The former's focus on the continuity between various conditions (their placement on a dimension) suggests that treatment is more personalized.

Kendall (1975), summarizing the pros and cons of these two approaches, suggests that the dimensional allows an easier mobility along the spectrum of conditions and minimizes the distorted perception of what, in the typological scheme of things, would be borderline cases. Despite these advantages, Kendall remarks that ultimately dimensional data is reduced to categories because these allow description and conceptualization, and, by implication, a readily practical means of treatment. (His view is complicated by the fact that he considers dimensional analysis appropriate for neuroses, and typological for psychoses.)
The differences between these two approaches lie at the centre of the controversy over the usefulness of the Eysencks' Psychoticism scale (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1976). The criticism that the scale fails to distinguish between ill and normal subjects (Block, 1977; Bishop, 1977) is not really rebutted by Eysenck and Eysenck's (1977) argument that it is a measure of predisposition. Such an argument does not tackle the practical problem of identifying psychotics (e.g., many art students scored higher on the P scale than did schizophrenics). For our purposes, we can simplistically treat this debate as hingeing on the conflicting practical meanings of 'predisposition'. For Eysenck the theoretician, predisposition refers to the potential for developing psychosis; whether that potential is realized is immaterial — other factors are bound to intervene. For Bishop the clinician, diagnosis (the derivation of an aetiology from a set of symptoms) is what is sought from and found lacking in the P scale. It is the typological approach that seems to hold in the traditional view of rape and rapists.

It should be apparent that the distinction between dimensional and typological is partially echoed by that of particularization and categorization (Billig, 1985). However, there are differences in emphasis. Where particularization acknowledges the individual, its complexity and cross-category membership, dimensional
explanation explicitly assumes a similarity between apparently different individuals insofar as they possess, in varying degrees, the same core processes or mechanisms, or can be located on a common dimension - i.e. it assumes quantitative difference. This is only implicit in particularization. Moreover, the practical use of dimensional explanations has been to counter typological approaches. Though, as with the equation between particularization and tolerance, dimensionality and a better use of information is not guaranteed. As regard typological explanations, while there is a tendency towards the same exaggeration that is present in categorization, this is not intrinsic to it insofar as, on the view developed here, the main purpose is to specify and deploy the criteria of difference. Further, there is no necessary denial of an underlying continuity - it is bracketted for the practical purpose of identifying and treating 'abnormals'. In sum, dimensional and typological discourses are allied to given practices, of generally theoretical and generally practical bent respectively. However, this is so only for the given discourses I have been considering; it is possible that these discursive forms and practices will dissociate for different discourses and under different circumstances. However, it is argued that the equations as here outlined by and large hold for rape explanations.

Finally, a moment of reflection reveals that in
distinguishing between dimensional and typological modes, I have myself engaged in a typological explanation. I acknowledge that there are gradations or combinations of these (cf Foulds and Bedford, 1975). However, by treating them as ideal types I defer to, what in Chapter 5, I called their latent reflexivity, and thereby admit their partiality.

2. Rape, Mythology, Explanations.

In this section I will consider the way that the dimensional and typological types of explanation apply to the explanation of rape. I will also introduce a third ideal type, the schismatic. The next paragraphs will act as a prelude to the more detailed investigation of the interaction and use of these types in the following sections.

The definition of rape, while potentially clearcut, blurs in the face of the complexity of concrete events and the variety of both theoretical and practical perspectives. I will not, therefore, attempt an outright definition of rape but outline some of the ways that the term 'rape' has been deployed. Thus we can access the dividends that applying or withholding the term 'rape' to a rape event (an event which is potentially open to the term 'rape'), afford. Such a procedure assumes the power/knowledge couplet: the use of the term 'rape' is, openly or surreptitiously, simultaneously the use of or the struggle
for power. Inevitably, its use is subtly altered by specific circumstances and concerns. And so, the accent can be placed on: the presence of coercion (Clark and Lewis, 1977); the presence of force (Medea and Thompson, 1974); the presence of extreme violence (Brownmiller, 1975); the absence of consent or the negligence of the rapist as to whether consent was forthcoming (Toner, 1982); as exemplary masculine sexuality (Dworkin, 1976); the 'looseness' of the alleged victim (Clark and Lewis, 1977), and so on.

However, as we noted in the introduction to this chapter, the various accents can be distilled into two types of emphasis, the dimensional (D) and the typological (T). While I treat these separately here, this is for analytical purposes; in actuality they have a tendency to merge (see below). Applied to rape, D explanations focus on the connection between the deviant behaviour (rape, rapist) and the normal; its aim is to explicate the broad and general conditions of emergence of the deviant; to use the deviant as an illustration of the potential in the normal; to stress the continuity between deviant and normal. In contrast, T explanations accentuate the difference between the normal and the deviant; they attempt to establish or deploy the criteria of that difference, criteria which may be embodied in the defining characteristics of the deviant category or else in the local/proximal circumstances that 'resulted' in the rape.
On the whole D analyses have come from the feminist camp. The stress on the continuity between rape and normal masculine sexual functioning has several implications. Firstly, it implies that the prevailing form of masculine sexuality is what is at the root of rape: in the Gergens's (1982) terminology, it provides the enabling conditions, in Kelleyian terms, it is a necessary causal factor. Thus it is this that must be fundamentally changed. Here, I deal with the socialist feminist version of this analysis, which ties masculinity to specific historical conditions, rather than the radical feminist which has a tendency to set up a biological typology between men and women. A corollary of the D view is that T explanations tend to obfuscate the 'real' mechanism behind rape, or at least obscure rape's general conditions of emergence. As such, D explanations can (and feminist explanations often do) consider T explanations as ideological in the sense of sustaining, through detraction, the 'basic' conditions that have produced rape. Below, I will present studies which support the feminist position. In doing this I adopt the minority feminist position and use it to re-appropriate T explanations.

Now, it might be argued that the dimensional form is not confined to feminist explanations. The relation between rape and normality can be explicitly recognized in the
form of biological necessity, which effectively excuses rape by seeing it as a more or less natural phenomenon. In other words, rape is a legitimate technique of seduction. But what seems to be actually happening here is a redefinition of rape: while harassment-type rapes are acceptable, extremely violent ones are not. It is the latter that constitute 'real' rapes. Thus this apparent dimensionality in fact serves as a typological criterion to demarcate the boundary between legitimate and criminal uses of force in seduction. Also, the dimensional can refer to the irrationality of women - seeing rape as an outcome of women's failings (see below).

As I have remarked, T explanations focus on the difference between categories. The likely motives are twofold. The first is practical: to specify the novel conditions which have resulted in rape. Archetypally, this is the terrain of criminal law and I will deal with this below. However, often running in parallel with this is the possible desire to deny any connection between the deviant and the normal. The T explanation, in the case of psychiatry, can be interpreted as concerned with isolating and treating those novel factors that have resulted in deviance. It has a practical purpose, and one of the criticisms it can level at D approaches is that they fail to provide workable criteria for such isolation: they are impracticable (though one practical implication of the D analysis is to impose a curfew either on men or on women). Of course, the
rebuff to this hinges on what is workable, and that is a complex historical question. The tension between D and T is present in the feminist literature (cf Box-Grainger, 1982). The explication of the continuities between normal and deviant is necessary to long-term eradication of the sexual harassment of women and sexual inequality generally; the identification of individual differences between rapists and non-rapists is necessary for the immediate protection of women. Both long and short term requirements need to be met. Nevertheless, because it has been relatively neglected, it is the D that is stressed, occasionally to the detriment of the T. T explanations being seen as ideological under the appropriate circumstances.

I will distinguish between the T explanation with its concerns with differentiation and its neutrality as to the continuity between rapists and normals, and schismatic explanation which serves to 'clearly' detract from or deny such continuities, and thus to 'protect' normal masculinity and male prerogatives. It is this schismatic aspect of T explanations that, we suggest, is abhorred in feminist critiques.

The problem now revolves around the degree to which T explanations are indeed schismatic(S). As will become apparent this is a difficult problem to resolve, primarily because many factors need to be taken into consideration.
Placing an outwardly T explanation in its historical context will often reveal that it is indeed schismatic. However, the problem is then simply transferred to a different plain; that is, the historical characterization becomes the point of contention: a feminist history might end up seeing all T explanations as essentially S, as asserting patriarchal ascendency. This might or might not be happening: applying a variety of perspectives might dilute the polemic, but it will do greater justice to the complex of payoffs that a given T explanation feeds into. It is worth re-emphasizing the problematic status of the more 'dubious' T explanations: often, whether T can be judged schismatic will depend on our reading of the contextual factors. The more evidence that accumulates in support of a pervasive sexism in the explainer, the more likely that some of some of his T explanations will have a schismatic edge.

A case in point is the legal determination of guilt in rape trials. The law's concern with determining the conditions of actus reas (whether the act actually occurred) and ('guilty mind') mens rea (Seago, 1981) can be considered an example of the typological process. Its aim is to identify and remove the criminal element from society: it aims to be practical, efficient and fair. It does not focus on social change or general social conditions but on local/proximal factors. This is not surprising given that the law is supposed to embody and
reflect the common(sensical) constructs of right and wrong. This concern with practicalities moulds the legal definition of rape as enunciated in the Sexual Offences Amendment Act, 1976. A man commits rape if (1) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who at the time does not consent to it and (2) at the time knows that she does not consent to intercourse or is reckless as to whether she consents. As Toner (1982) notes, this helped clarify the criteria by which to determine whether rape had taken place: the jury must take regard of whether the defendant had reasonable grounds for his belief that consent had been forthcoming. As ever, those grounds will be conditioned by the prevailing social mood: if there is a pervasive sympathy for the defendant then reasonableness will be projected into the grounds. But, as regard the law itself, its deeply patriarchal roots and its continuing masculine bias (cf Ch. 6) can turn a typological practice into a schismatic one. This can be manifested in either particular or general forms.

At the particular level, we have a range of statements issued by judges which are little more than the repetition of rape myths. For example, characterizing the rape victim as negligent can typologically place her as a vital factor in the extraordinary circumstances that led to the rape. Thus Judge Richards' statement, '"I am not saying that a girl hitching home late at night should not be protected by the law, but she was guilty of a great deal
of contributory negligence" '(p.21,Patullo,1983), by explaining the rape in terms of the woman's negligence, can potentially imply that she provoked the attack. This typological criterion might thus deflect attention from the possible dimensional factor that it is generally men who define the nature of an intersexual encounter. That is, in feminist theory, it is men who are considered as empowered to attribute 'availability' to women, and therefore to place the woman in a position where she becomes 'negligent'. Thus the typological becomes a schismatic statement. Another example involves the protection given alleged victims as regards evidence on their prior (good or bad) character. While offered in general, because it has been left to the judge's discretion, it has often been withheld - some two-thirds of applications for such character evidence to be given have been allowed (Adler, cited in Toner,1982). The general victimization of women is reflected in the requirement for corroboration in rape cases. The requirement for corroboration takes three forms in all (Murphy and Barnard,1984). Firstly, there is the statutory requirement of corroboration in which conviction cannot be obtained without it (eg speeding, procuring women and girls for purposes of prostitution). In the second class, corroboration is required because the evidence is 'regarded at common law as being inherently suspicious or dangerous' (p105,Murphy and Barnard,1984). Included here is the sworn evidence of children, the evidence of
accomplices and the evidence of sexual misconduct). Corroboration is required as a matter of practice, not law, and the "bench may convict on uncorroborated evidence, but must first warn themselves of the danger of so doing" (p105). The final class is where the danger of convicting on uncorroborated evidence is assumed and does not need to be stated explicitly. Toner(1982) notes that the "danger of convicting a man on uncorroborated evidence is apparent in all trials, yet in one of its extraordinary inconsistencies the law sees it only when the testimony is made by rape complainants, children, accomplices or witnesses in treason trials. In rape trials the reason given to juries is that it has been the experience of the courts over hundreds of years that women make unfounded rape accusations for totally malicious reasons and innocent men must be protected..."(p148). Later she adds: "Looking for corroboration is hardly offensive, but as the Criminal Law Revision Committee remarked in its working paper, it might be offensive for a rape victim to hear a judge directing a jury that it would be dangerous to convict on her evidence without it...many judges do labour the point about female malice and sexual neurosis which can only cast a slur on the complainant's evidence, corroborated or otherwise..."(p149-150). Thus the typological aim of duly distinguishing the genuine rapist as reflected in the reasonable requirement of corroboration becomes schismatic through a general denigration of the alleged victim's testimony. Of course,
this need not be the case.

As we mentioned, S and T modes are often difficult to tell apart - not surprisingly given that the former is a version of the latter. To reiterate, that the S is operating is often only apparent once the context of the explanation, both proximal and historical, is brought into the reckoning. This we shall see in some of the interviews. As regards some of the radical men's explanations, we encounter a tension between the D and T forms: the dual concerns with continuity on the one hand, and the need to fairly identify and remove rapists on the other, occasionally leads to confusion.

In the next section I will consider the D explanation of rape in more detail, showing how historical, anthropological and cultural research has provided support for such explanations.

3. Rape Explanations, Ideal Types and Payoffs.

The three ideal types outlined in the preceding sections have been equated with particular practices: D - the aim of connecting rape to masculinity; the T - purporting to explicate those features that differentiate rape from non-rape; and the S - an ideological version of T that aims to sever the links between rape and normality. As remarked above, these equations are not absolute, and there is much slippage. However, being ideal types this
does not matter too much: their usefulness lies in the new insights into explanation and its intertwinement with discourse/practice that they give. Nevertheless, throughout, occasional reference to the partiality of our three types will be made.

a. Dimensional Explanations and Feminism.

In this section I will go through feminist explanations of rape and consider the ways they have used various research strategies to support the dimensional view. Part of the ground for this has been laid out in Chapter 6. The broad representations and processes outlined there will be shown to underlie the more specific phenomena of rape and rape explanation. Further, the feminist analysis of rape differs from others in that it is also involved in the analysis of rape explanation; it is through these explanations, drawing on rape myths, that the necessary conditions for rape are partly reproduced, that rape is repeatedly marginalized. The variety of feminist analytical strategies can be grouped into two interlocking kinds. The first considers the evidence which positively charts the dimensionality of masculinity-rape (historical, anthropological, statistical); this continuity is placed in the context of the payoffs men derive from rape and the threat of rape. The second scrutinizes the processes by which that continuity is denied (through legal procedure, clinical categories, rape mythology). The latter will be dealt with in the section on T and S explanations.
i. History and Rape. This section is intended to illustrate how D explanations draw on historical material. For feminism, as represented by Brownmiller, the focus is on the way that rape relates to the oppression of women. Rape is at once a reflection and an instance of the power relations that exist between women and men. Brownmiller summarizes her view thus:

"From the earliest times, when men of one tribe freely raped women of another to secure wives, the laws of marriage and the laws of rape have been philosophically entwined...The criminal act he viewed with horror and punished as rape was not sexual assault per se, but an act of unlawful possession, a trespass against his tribal right to control vaginal access to all women who belonged to him and his kin...Although these legal origins have been buried in a morass of forgotten history, as the laws of rape continued to evolve, they never shook free of their initial concept - that the violation was first and foremost a violation of male rights of possession, based on male requirements of virginity, chastity and consent to private access as the female bargain in the marriage contract (the underpinnings, as he enforced them, of man's economic estate)."

(Brownmiller, 1975, p422-423)

However, Illich(1983), in line with his distinction between the reign of vernacular gender (in which there is an "eminently local and timebound duality that sets off men and women under circumstances and conditions that prevent them saying, doing, desiring and perceiving the same thing", p20) and the rule of economic sex (in which the rise of 'open' competition between the sexes has resulted in the relative devaluation of women), remarks that the "the social history of rape has yet to be written, in part because modern, sexist rape under
assumptions of general conditions of scarcity still has not been distinguished from age-old forms of physical violence against women" (p31). The implication is that, with the transition from vernacular gender to economic sex, in addition to the 'age-old injuries', modern rape constitutes a further "sexist insult" (p30). Presumably, in Brownmiller's terms, where previously rape had been a process of theft of men's property (cf Bashar, 1983), modern rape is also a direct attack on women: whereas before the position was clearly mapped out through vernacular gender boundaries, now these are enforced partially through the means of rape and violence. Hence women's increasing fear of rape, as Illich has it.

In the above analysis we have attempts to link the perception and practice of rape to broader historical trends. Rather than seeing rape as a marginal phenomenon, as a manifestation of given individuals' madness, the connections of rape are traced by Brownmiller to the proprietary rights of men, and by Illich to the rise of economic sex. Illich - both are characterizations of 'normality'.

Historical examples of schismatic explanations have been analyzed by Clarke (1983). She considered the discourses that converged on the rape of Mary Ashford by Abraham Thornton. The controversy that ensued entailed three positions: "the libertine view which excused violence in
seduction, the chivalrous view which urged women to submit to male protection, and the view of Mary Ashford as a working class heroine" (p16). In the first case, there is basically a conflation of surrender (to violence) and consent. But, further, "if violence was an acceptable technique of seduction (it) was always women's responsibility to defend themselves against men's allegedly uncontrollable passions. A victim's failure stained her, rather than her attacker, with dishonour" (p19). Indeed, it was "Her chastity, not her refusal or acceptance of a certain act, (that) determined a woman's consent". And Chastity "in fact meant that she behaved as the exclusive property of one man rather than common property to all men" (p19). When she was a bad character, then whatever the form of rape, acquittal was highly probable. The second approach, urging women to seek male protection effectively conjured "the threat of crime to control women's behaviour" (p21). Here, it was necessary to marginalize Thornton, to represent him as a "wild, inhuman, diabolical creature" (p21). As Clark notes, this is a process still in use today (cf Hollway, 1981 below). Nevertheless the fault is still hers: for she was imprudent and impudent enough to place herself in a position of danger, that is, to spurn masculine chivalry. Finally, the view of Mary as a victim of class exploitation (inappropriately, given that Thornton, despite being represented as well-to-do, was in fact a bricklayer) still managed to emphasize the
affront that her male relatives felt.

Again we have the analysis of a particular incident and the surrounding events which, by placing both the rape and explanations in the context of gender power relations, serves to uncover the links between explanations and the traditional interests of men. The feminist oriented histories we have here considered attempt to show the roots of contemporary rape and its mythologization. An historical continuity is emphasized (though Illich alerts us to the changes wrought by modernity), one that highlights the continuing, deep-set power relations between men and women and the effects of this on the contemporary production of rape. This is in contrast with pseudo-historical views (because they are in fact biologistic) that cast rape as the result of masculine sexual frailty or intrinsic feminine maliciousness, or else see rape as a more or less accidental occurrence in the form of the historically random appearance of the fiend-rapist.

II. Rape and Anthropology. In this brief section I will consider only one anthropological survey of rape, that conducted by Sanday (1981).

Sanday analyzed data on the cross-cultural incidence of rape and related this to the structural characteristics of those societies. She found the outstanding feature of
rape-free societies was that women were perceived as having high-status: usually they represented a source of spiritual power. Moreover, there was little leadership in the sense of an exclusive possession of power; rather, decision-making was through common consent. These societies' sexual relations were hinged on complementarity. Against this, rape-prone societies (that is, societies in which rape was commonly practiced on enemy women, in ceremonies, or used as a threat by which to control women) were most highly correlated with the existence of interpersonal and intergroup aggression and violence. Under these circumstances, Sanday argues, aggression and violence are measures of male status. If the sexual act is one expression of a self which is essentially aggression-oriented, then it is only to be expected that sexual relations are liable to be violent, or contain an undercurrent of aggression. In other words, rape will be endemic in such societies. Once again, a feminist-oriented analysis by grounding rape in particular structural factors has evoked the continuity between rape and what is within the culture considered normal.

iii. Contemporary Evidence for Men's Payoffs. Perhaps the most influential accounts of the payoffs for men that rape generates have been Brownmiller's (1975) and Griffin's (1971). For these authors, rape and the threat of rape has been a way of containing the autonomy of women.
That this is a structural effect means that most men benefit insofar as women are forced to seek men's protection (at least so long as they do not organize themselves). Thus masculine power is reinforced and the masculine stereotype and identity goes largely unchallenged (however, things do seem to be changing). Evidence that women are indeed intimidated by the threat of rape comes from Riger and Gordon (1981) who tested this thesis for Chicago, Philadelphia and San Francisco and found that those women with the fewest resources to cope with victimization (i.e., the elderly, ethnic minorities, the poor) are the ones who are most fearful and least mobile. These conditions led to two broad strategies - isolation and 'street savvy' such as the wearing of sensible shoes, taking care where to sit on public transport and so on. Riger and Gordon note that it was the relatively educated women who took up savvy techniques. Hall (1985) found almost identical results for inner London. However, as Hall noted, this fear extended into the home. It goes without saying that the fear was greatest amongst women who had previously been raped. This fear can be rephrased in terms of a socialization process through which women take on the role of legitimate victim: in the case of rape, this is often transmuted into the responsible victim (Weis and Weis, 1975).

This type of evidence traces the continuity in terms of the payoffs for men and the general denigration of women.
Another type of argument attempts to establish the continuity between the natures of the rapist and the normal. An example of this can be found in Dworkin’s writings in which rape is represented as the primary model of heterosexual sex in that it expresses the traditional property relations at the heart of marriage. As we have seen, rape was originally and explicitly conceived as a crime against property (cf. Bashar, 1983), but for Dworkin it also inheres in the

"polar definitions of men and women. Rape is congruent with these definitions... Remember, rape is not committed by psychopaths or deviants from our social norms - rape is committed by exemplars of our social norms...Men are defined as aggressive, dominant, powerful. Women are defined as passive, submissive, powerless. Given these gender definitions, it is the very nature of men to aggress sexually against women."

(Dworkin, 1976, p45-46)

Dworkin goes on to further localize the nature of men in aggressive phallocentrism. And so rape is an act of power; as Dworkin puts it: "male eroticism is welded to power" (1976, p43). This power manifests itself schizophrenically: on the one hand through chivalry - the power to protect women; and rape on the other. Ostensibly at least, these two faces are directed at different women: chivalry is reserved for women of high property or moral value (the young, the old, etc - hence the outrage when the old or young or rich are sexually assaulted); rape is what 'cheap' or 'loose' women ask for.

This continuity is further detailed at the microsociological level by some feminists who attempt to
discern the seeds of rape in everyday masculine behaviour. (The opposite strategy, which will be considered below, is to explicate the normality of rapists). Hite's (1982) analysis of her respondents' answers is telling in this respect. At the outset, it is worth approaching Hite's results (and indeed our own interview data) with some circumspection. The type of men willing to engage in an interview or in answering a detailed personal questionnaire are liable to differ in some way from those who refused; we are bound to be dealing with a skewed sample. Nevertheless, the array of ideas offered by her respondents at least provides a pointer to the broader spectrum. Be that as it may, Hite (1982) summarizes thus: "Most men do not rape out of 'lust', but because of feelings of anger, lack of self-esteem and a desire to assert masculinity or male dominance and put a woman 'back in her place'..." (p769). As we noted in the previous chapter, it seems that the lack of self-esteem and the desire to assert masculinity has become particularly acute in recent times. We noted that the present depression has eroded many men's perceived economic security. As many of Hite's respondents admit, their anger at women has an economic basis in their perception of marriage as basically a financial contract. In addition to the anger that stemmed from women's perceived clingingness and weakness, much of men's anger derived from the fact that they saw their wives as economically exploiting them, depriving them of their rightful sex in a relationship
that was based on the exchange of money for sex. In other words, men saw themselves as being short-changed by their wives; the contradiction in this was that men's rancour persisted irrespective of their wives', or lovers', economic independence. So, sexual violence can be derived from men's (illusory) perceptions of their own exploitation at the hands of their wives. But, more mundanely, as Schechter (1982) points out, much violence against women (and this includes rape and the threat of it) is effectively an attempt to bring about a state of affairs desired by the man, whether this relates to domestic work, possessiveness, sexual jealousy, or allocation of family resources.

The links between rape and the material conditions and power expectations of masculinity are liable to be apparent in those groups which have a particularly high investment in their masculinity. In adolescent groups, rape might be used as a mode of initiation (Hite, 1982; Groth, 1979); similarly in older groups with a high machismo count (eg the army, police - Hall, 1985; Brownmiller, 1975).

Clearly feminists are aware of the complexity of influences that have affected the incidence of rape. In addition to material changes there have been cultural ones. Both Medea and Thompson (1974) and Smart (1976) point to partial changes in the sexual mores which instead of
'liberating' women have taken them out of the protection of the family and simultaneously rendered their apparent sexual freedom, when interpreted along traditional lines, as signifying availability. Nevertheless, a constant lurking beneath these changes is the power imbalance between men and women which, if anything, according to Illich(1983) continues to grow with the erosion of women's prior domain.

The seeds of rape are also encountered in other areas such as the relatively common sexual harassment of women (Sedley and Benn,1982), and in the media depiction of women and gender relations (cf Ch.6). As we shall see with specific reference to rape myths, the broad denigration of women in sexist discourse/practice can be said to find its true fruition in the practice and mythologization of rape, a fruition which simultaneously attempts to dissociate rape from normality.

Perhaps more potent is the perception of the normal in the deviant, the uncovering of ordinary masculinity in the rapist. Much of the effort that has gone into establishing such a connection has taken the form of dispelling rape myths. These will be dealt with in the section on S and T type explanations. Here I will illustrate the type of evidence mustered in the reconnection of the rapist to the normal.
(1). The rapist is not a stranger: as Box-Grainger(1981) puts it in her review of studies of the incidence of rape, "...the stereotype of the stranger rapist, the attacker who is distinct from the 'normal' lives and 'normal' men that most of us know is a half-truth..."(no page number). For example, in Amir's(1972) study, some 42.3% of the rapists were not known to the victim. However, when this is taken in tandem with the probable fact that women who have been raped by acquaintances, relatives or friends are less likely to report it because they suspect a hostile reaction from the police, or else are immobilized by guilt or fear of reprisal, then we can speculate that rapes by known men are somewhat higher than the statistics show. As regard police response, we can take into account Clark and Lewis'(1977) finding that if the alleged rapist was an acquaintance of the victim only 23.8% of reports were classified Founded (that is, merited further investigation). This dropped to 20% if the offender was known. If the offender was unknown, 51.6% were considered Founded.

(2). Many rapes are not the explosive events that are commonly portrayed in the media. Thus Amir's finding that 58% of single, 82% of pair and 90% of group rapes were planned suggests that rape is not the simple result of some spontaneous sexual urge, but involves something considerably more normal, namely the use of 'rational faculties'.
(3). The popular view of rape as an openly and extremely violent event renders it far more clear-cut than is actually the case. By emphasising the presence of violence, such discourse serves to project rape as something thoroughly alien to normal sexual intercourse (though, as we noted in Ch.6, some discourses have attempted to legitimate force as a necessary ingredient in heterosexual sex). However, as various researchers have pointed out, the evidence does not bear this view out. Thus in Amir's sample of 646 rapes, "...in a large number of cases (67%), 'only' temptation and verbal coercion were used to initially subdue the victim; in 55% no physical force was used at all...in 50% of the cases when force was used, the victim was 'only' manhandled..." (p336, inverted commas added). A corollary of this emphasis is that the woman must struggle if the rape is to be genuine. Again, Amir found that "Over 50% of the victims failed to resist their attackers in any way." (p337). Bart(1980) has looked at the presence of victim struggle and related it to the occurrence of penetration. She found that those cases where struggle ensued and rape was curtailed involved a victim who was intent on not being raped; where victims refrained from struggle, their main priority was survival. Thus the presence of violence or overt resistance by the victim should not be singled out as the criterion for rape. Once it is admitted that other, less spectacular means can be used to induce passivity in a woman (and
this, of course, includes fraud), then rape is not so easily marginalized.

(4). Other instances where the continuity between deviant and normal is recognized have been drawn from the psychiatric profession and the prison service. I will deal with the former when I consider T explanations. Suffice it here to illustrate the profile of the rapist that has surfaced in a number of disciplines. Amir(1971) has shown that there is little that can be considered abnormal in most rapists: the profile of the common rapist that he sketches falls somewhere between the thief and the violent offender. Sentencing policy in the UK and US rarely treats rapists as psychopaths. Benn et al(1983) note that the Rape Counselling and Research Project found that many rapists had 'normal scores' for aggression towards women. This is in line with Melamuth's(1981) review which showed that exposure to aggressive-erotic films led to arousal in both rapists and 'normals'. Benn et al note that "Prison governors are often quoted as saying that rapists form the most 'normal' section of the prison community" (p9) and they go on to quote from the Royal College of Psychiatrists' submission to the Advisory Group on the law of rape in 1975: "The most common type of rapist is not mentally abnormal. He will be young, sexually unsatisfied and inexperienced" (p9). This, of course, emphasizes the sexual nature of rape as opposed to its power aspects (see below). Nevertheless, it does assert the partial normality
of the rapist.

(5). A further means by which the dimensionality of rapist/normal is founded rests on the notion of victim-precipitated rape and the arguments feminists have levelled against this. Amir's report dubbed 19% of the sample of rapes 'victim-precipitated'. Victim precipitation describes those rape situations in which the victim actually, or so it is deemed, agreed to sexual relations but retracted before the act-proper, or else did not react strongly enough when the suggestion was made by the alleged offender. "The term also applies to cases in risky situations marred with sexuality, especially when she uses what would be interpreted indecency in language and gestures, or constitutes what would be taken as an invitation to sexual relations" (Amir, 1972, p266). Amir tried to characterize what the differences were between victim-precipitated and non-victim-precipitated rape. For Amir, the former seemed to involve more alcohol consumption, closer relationships between victim and offender, and a victim with a bad reputation. In the cause of victimology - the study of crime from the victim's perspective, Nelson and Amir (1975), followed up this analysis with research into hitchhiking rapes as examples of victim-precipitated rapes. In this scheme of things, hitchhiking signifies availability. Clark and Lewis (1977) in their chapter "Victimology: The Art of Victim Blaming" criticize Amir's analysis because, though
he is happy to promote the notion of victim-precipitation, he never adequately defines it for us; it is largely a circular characterization. In the present context, the important point is that Amir does not fully acknowledge that the degree to which behaviour is precipitating depends on the man/offender's interpretation of it. That is, the reasonableness of whether a man is right to believe a woman is consenting or not needs to be explicitly examined (cf Toner, 1982). This should take due consideration of gender power relations.

Amir's typological view that some women are liable to precipitate rape by virtue of their 'provocative' behaviour is thus reconceived by Clark and Lewis in terms of the continuity of women's experience of having the definition and characterization of their behaviour set largely outside their control; i.e., the meanings of their behaviour, etc. is primarily determined by men (see below).

These, then, are some of the main ways through which the dimensionality of rape has been construed. Till now I have perhaps given the impression that D explanations have been generated by women. However, while this may have been so originally, they have certainly diffused into a proportion of the male population, especially those men familiar with feminist discourses and/or actively engaged in its anti-sexist projects. Further, these discourses have also entered less committed talk and, as we shall see in our
analysis of men's views on rape, the simple regurgitation of rape myths often implied by feminist work seems to have been replaced by a subtler rhetoric. Before that, however, I will look at the T and S explanation of rape.

b. Typological and Schismatic Explanations.

In preceding sections we have seen how T explanations can very often shade into the S. In this section I will be looking at how these pervade a number of disciplines. We will be seeking the schismatic lurking in the typological. In doing this we are appropriating T discourses from a feminist perspective: we consider a discourse which employs T explanations to become S when it tends to deny D. However, it should be borne in mind that our initial terms of reference still hold; namely, T does have a specific function, to practicably identify and remove offenders, and this is something that D is not very good at doing. Nevertheless, as the S is contextually engendered (see above), we can feel justified in calling T explanations S which by virtue of their dimensional silence serve, within the prevailing social context, to marginalize rape. As we shall see, not all T-oriented discourses ignore D.

i. Clinical Typologies. T explanations were originally expounded in terms of their use in the clinical analysis of mental illness. With regard to rapists, T explanations focus on the dysfunctional sexualities or the relative
lack of control of the offenders (e.g., Gebhard et al., 1966). In this vein Levine and Koenig point to "...the role of sexual repression and the fact that these men have little or no understanding of their own sexuality or that of their victims... Perhaps the key ingredient is the extremely flimsy barrier between fantasy and reality that these men have, and it is this that separates them from equally repressed, hostile and ignorant men who do not rape" (p2). So the difference is based on the differential access to reality between rapists and 'normals'. However, anticipating a future discussion, we can argue that this difference between reality and fantasy is suspect: a 'reality' can often be created or asserted by the man by virtue of the power invested in his masculinity. Levine and Koenig's attempt to psychiatrize rapists rest on an over-idealized view of masculine sexuality, one that is only in minor and marginal ways related to power. In Chapter 6 we suggested a far closer relation between these two. Still, Levine and Koenig are attempting to outline the differentness of rapists. Yet in failing to acknowledge the continuity they tend to reinforce the schism between rapists and normals. Groth (1979) provides a more sensitive analysis which categorizes rapists into three types: rapists motivated by anger; by power; and by sadism in which power and violence have been eroticized. Common to the first two, which make up the vast majority of his sample of 170 (Anger rapes-40%; Power rapes-55%; Sadistic rapes-5%), is the fact that sex is a means to
other ends, not an end in itself. And anger and power, as we mentioned above are salient in the make-up of masculinity, particularly under prevailing conditions. This is something that Groth draws out explicitly; the roots of these rapes can be found in the social order rather than reduced to personality traits per se. For Groth then there is no extreme separation of the T and the D. In the field as a whole however, it would seem that confusion (or, in more respectful terms, controversy) reigns. As Toner(1982) comments, there are a variety of disparate assessments: "While one psychiatrist will say that few rapists are mentally ill but all have some personality defect, another will say that certainly all men who commit rape do not suffer from personality disorders" (p145).

ii. Psychological Typologies. An uneasy balance between the dimensional and the typological is also found in the research on rape proclivity. Melamuth(1981) has reviewed the literature on rape proclivity. Most striking amongst his various findings was that 35% of a 'normal' population of male students said that they would rape if guaranteed non-detection. Clearly, this research takes rapists as a version of the 'normal' male and not a species apart, and in so doing blurs the distinction. Still, much energy has been expended in attempting to develop reliable methods by which to distinguish rapists and men with high and low proclivities to rape. The two major findings are that
rapists show a greater acceptance of rape myths, and a higher sexual arousal to rape depiction (Melamuth, Hein, and Feshbach, 1980). This finding was replicated amongst men who reported a tendency to commit rape (Melamuth, Haber, and Feshbach, 1980), which added fuel to the suggestion that sexual response to violent pornography might serve as an index of rape proclivity. However, as other studies have shown, there is a two-way interaction between the perceiver and depictions of violent sex. White (1979) found that such depictions increased the likelihood of violence in the perceiver; Donnerstein (1980) found that this aggression was more likely to be directed at a woman (the victim in the depiction) than a man. Malamuth and Check (1981) found that such depictions also facilitated acceptance of rape myths. In a sense then, pornography engenders or primes the proclivity to rape. Feningstein's (1979) finding, that men who have just engaged in aggression show a preference for viewing violence, completes the cycle. Men want to see violent sex which prompts them to behave violently which triggers a desire to see violent sex. The problem with this is that it is feedback loop without purpose - there is an obsession for (sexual) violence and depiction of (sexual) violence which is self-contained. In line with our previous attempts to ground the psychological in a more social context, we can suggest that the tenuousness of masculinity, the recursive need to shore it up is what underlies this dynamic.
The main criticism I shall direct at this research is that it is too individualistic. In addition to the social embeddedness of masculinity, it misses out on the collective or group processes that are involved in the generation or reinforcement of rape proclivity. Even in the case of watching or reading violent pornography, very often this is not done alone, but with peers (Root, 1984) - pornography is a pivot in many groups, a means through which women are generally degraded to the benefit of the group's masculine social identity. Further, Melamuth (1981) does not have a genuine sense of the historical. While he documents the recent increase of violence in pornography and gender advertising, he does not comment on the possible reasons for this. We would suggest that this increase is tapping and feeding a masculine audience whose identity is, through a number of factors becoming less stable (see Ch.6).

As regards the relation of this research to T and D explanations, then it does certainly incorporate both. Our criticisms have been directed at the quality of the dimensionality which this research partly addresses. It is not appropriately contextualized in history; indeed, it tends towards a biologistic dimensionality in which proclivity to rape is placed on a biological continuum, reflecting the same basic biological structures as opposed to common social conditions. Thus, this
research parallels the radical feminist analysis of rape, as reflecting biological givens, which we rejected in section 2 above. Even so, this is a timely reminder that the D form can be used for varying ends, and is not exclusively tied to socialist feminist analysis of rape. Still, it should also be remarked that it is partly by virtue of the injection of typological interest that the dimensional becomes dissociated from the polemical practical end.

iii. Rape Myths and Everyday Discourse. The transition of a T to an S explanation is particularly evident in the deployment of rape myths. These effectively present themselves as typological, as embodying the criteria by which to judge whether a rape has occurred, whether an alleged rapist is an actual rapist; in fact their primary function is to deny the continuity between rape and normality. Here we shall consider rape myths at length, as they appear in the media, the legal process, in the supposed talk and behaviour of men. This will serve as an introduction to our analysis of men's explanation of rape.

Rape myths have been considered by various authors (eg Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1974; Benn et al, 1983). Brownmiller's index proves instructive: the rape victim is: a beautiful victim; a masochist; a liar; vengeful and so on. The rapist is: a black man; a lover; biologically
driven; heroic. Rape myths apply to the victim, the rapist and the act itself. Brownmiller sets out those that apply to the victim:

"ALL WOMEN WANT TO BE RAPED"
"NO WOMAN CAN BE RAPED AGAINST HER WILL"
"SHE WAS ASKING FOR IT"
"IF YOU'RE GOING TO BE RAPED, YOU MIGHT AS WELL RELAX AND ENJOY IT"

(Brownmiller, 1975, p346)

Benn et al (1983) add to this list: "'All women should be pure' --women over 60, girls under 16, accredited virgins and indisputably faithful wives are 'pure'. A woman who has sex outside marriage is impure...the more sexual freedom she has enjoyed in the past, the less culpable her attacker." (p6). Overlapping with both the myths that 'All women want to be raped' and 'she was asking for it', is the myth that "...'No' really means 'Yes' -- women often say 'no' when they mean 'yes'. If they lead a man on and say 'no', they probably don't mean it...their protestations need not be taken too seriously." (Benn et al, 1983, p6). In contrast to Brownmiller's account of the 'relax and enjoy it' myth, Benn et al stress the myth that 'Dishonour is a fate worse than death'. "Faced with the prospect of rape, a woman has a duty to defend her honour, even at risk to her life" (p7). These contradictions well illustrate the double-bind in which women are placed. The 'enjoy it' myth is "predicated in two propositions: (a) the inevitability of male triumph and (b) 'All woman want to be raped'..." (Brownmiller, 1975, p347). As such it is a myth derived from the perspective of the rapist. The
'dishonour' myth is grounded in perspective of the injured party, namely the male 'owner'. If a woman resists she is liable to appear foolish, unreasonable, contributing to her attack, untrue to her true sexuality; if she does not, she sullies her honour and those of her relatives, and further there is creeping conviction that, in fact, she desired the rape: in accusing someone of rape, she is merely indulging her feminine spitefulness. Either way, a woman cannot win.

Running parallel with these are the myths concerning the rapist (which necessarily reflect on the 'normal' male). As we suggested in Chapter 6, a recurring theme of masculine sexuality is that it is a biological given, which, in arousing circumstances, generates sexual energy that surges towards a threshold beyond which there is no holding back. Progress towards and beyond this threshold is very often mediated by the appropriate behaviour of a woman. Her 'come ons' nudge the man closer and closer to that threshold. Once reached, there is no going back; the man loses control. In the case of rape, the victim has precipitated her own violation. The problem with such a formulation is that, when coupled to the "'No' means 'Yes'" myth, it becomes self-fulfilling. Thus, a man who monopolizes the meanings of a woman's behaviour, (ie knows better than she does that she wants sex) and is aroused through that 'true' understanding of her responses, effectively edges himself towards that mythical sexual
threshold. Accordingly, a struggling woman 'wants it', is 'teasing', is covertly arousing him to the point where he cannot help himself. Simply, this is a means of offloading responsibility onto the woman. The opposite side of this mythic coin is constituted by those discourses that see the rapist as an extreme deviant, who, through some genetic defect (or else through dealings with bad women - see below), manifests the characteristics of what must inevitably be described as a monster — something inhuman, something that is fully cut off from the mainstream of men.

What I will now do is go through three myths ('No means Yes'; 'All women really want to be raped'; 'Real rapists are fiend-beasts') in somewhat more detail to show how they are constructed, how they relate to the stereotypical traits we treated in Chapter 6, and how they are promulgated through media and social scientific portrayal. It should be mentioned that there is no easy division between the first two of these myths (though the first stresses women's supposed inability to access their actual feelings, while the second emphasizes their wantonness). In both cases 'irrationality' and 'closeness to nature' or 'objectness' have a role in the grounding of these myths (eg how can an object reflect? has this wanton object no self-control?). But this also works the other way: what is rational/cultural is not exclusively gauged by levels of 'non-naturalness'; it is also alloyed to the capacity
to resist and constrain the dangerous sexuality of women (eg their ability to swamp men - cf Ch.6). In this respect, we can note that the 'civilized' middle classes have claimed to be better at controlling this dangerous sexuality than the disreputable 'barbarian' working classes (Donzelot, 1979; Weeks, 1981).

(1). Irrationality, Wantonness, Sexuality. The myths that will be recounted in this section are essentially attempts to explain away rape incidents by placing the burden of the responsibility on the alleged victim; they are typological. Particularly amenable in this respect is her supposed inherent characteristic of irrationality. As we have mentioned, irrationality can take on the form of evil: this is usually manifested in women's propensity to lie spitefully - for the woman to make the whole thing up. To 'cry rape' is an act of spiteful vengeance. While this might occur in a small minority of cases, the 'cry rape' myth deserves neither the weight that is habitually attached to it nor the light in which it is often presented (see above).

Foucault (1967), formulates the classical apprehension of madness, as a circularity. The truth of madness is constituted in the language of delirium which is contrasted with rational language/discourse outside it. The analytic discourse of the observer-doctor embodies reason and thus acts as the standard of reason. Delirium
falls outside this sphere in its use of language, in its discursive form and content. The circularity consists in the incommensurate relationship between the two forms and the power of the one (the rational) over the other. The rational dictates what is true (good, desirable), and, because of its power, can demean the irrational, deny it voice. This circularity is present in the power relation between masculine and feminine/feminist discourses. Thus rape can be dismissed by reference to women's putative irrationality. When it is claimed that women who say 'No' really mean 'Yes', this can often be taken to mean that they don't know their own minds; indeed that the rapist and his masculine cohorts know these minds better. Another example of this monopoly of rationality is found in sexual harassment (Sedley and Benn, 1982). There, the meaning of harassment is almost exclusively male-defined. The woman who cannot take such treatment (lewd jokes about women, sexually loaded physical contact, pornographic posters, etc) with a giggle, lacks a sense of humour, is irrationally, unreasonably touchy.

"Women who say 'no' do not always mean no. It is not just a question of saying no, it is a question of how she says it, how she shows and makes it clear. If she doesn't want it she has only to keep her legs shut" (Judge Wild, Cambridge County Court, 1982, in Pattullo, 1983, p20-21). So, there are certain reasonable ways in which a woman might project this 'No'; the implication is that there is a
definitive 'No'. But this is simply not the case - even this definitive 'No' slides about on a male-defined scale. For some victims, 'No' is embodied in their very constitution - eg children, old people, the indisputably reputable. For others, such as prostitutes, however they might aspire to this 'No', it will rarely be granted them.

This is because some victims are seen as 'Open Territory' - that is, fair game. In part, this might be because they have inadvertently put themselves at risk. However, as we noted previously, this too is a sign of irrationality. For within this discourse, the actions of these women have fallen outside the bounds of common sense. "It is the height of impudence for any girl to hitchhike at night. That is plain, it isn't really worth stating. She is in the true sense asking for it" as retired High Court Judge, Melford Stevenson would put it (Pattullo, 1983, p21). However, this impudence is not intrinsic to the women concerned; often women resort to such means of transport because they cannot afford the alternatives. Hall (1985) found that 50% of her sample who had accepted rides had done so because they could not afford public transport. This point brings out the class (and race), as well as the sexual, blindness of 'reputable' men.

At issue here is the status of verbal and behavioural consent. As we remark elsewhere, it is men who seek out consent, read it into situations where, from the woman's
perspective, none exists. Often this seeking is a form of harassment which continues until a recognizable consent is secured. This latter point sheds light on the problematic nature of consent. Consent as a criterion, under conditions of harassment, can become schismatic insofar as it effectively uses the utterance of consent as the sole marker of legitimacy, as opposed to acknowledging the complex of (dimensional) factors involved in the generation of consent. So the T comes to mediate masculine power through an over-rigorous reading of the concept of consent. However, as we have mentioned, such a strategy has the practical payoff of serving to identify rapists. Ultimately, there must be a notion of individual consent, but it must be duly sensitive to the more subtle (dimensional insofar as they shade into normal gender relation techniques) means by which it comes to be obtained.

The following extract illustrates the S deployment of consent to suggest the culpability of the woman: "For the second time since her abduction twelve days previously, she held the life of her brutal captor in her hands. She glared at the man who'd raped and sodomized her repeatedly and knew genuine hatred. She also found herself unable to pull the trigger" (p35, Detective Files, Nov, 1982). The title of this 'article' is: "The Case of the Irresistible Rape-slayer. (Women who survived came back for more!)". Unsurprisingly, this sensationalized account of a 'true
story' (whether it is actually true or not does not matter: it is the representations of rape that it projects that interests us) reeks of the rape myths that women want to be raped and that they are subject to a profound irrationality. The irrationality of not slaying the rape-slayer and freeing herself is due to the fact that she is actually enjoying her ordeal. Here, rational consent is seen to be corrupted by the wanton, masochistic urges of the victim's make-up. Naturally, there is no consideration of the mundane possibility that she might lack experience and confidence in the use of a gun; that if she missed or merely wounded her captor, he would punish her; or that she might have background knowledge of the police's hostility to rape victims. Rather, it is implied that lack of resistance is tantamount to consent, if not craving.

(2). Rape-Fiend. As we have briefly remarked, the rapist comes in two popular forms: either he is generally mad (a beast, fiend) and in need of psychiatric treatment or confinement; or else he has momentarily lost control, overshooting his sexual threshold. We have shown above how the latter is often a means of forcing women to shoulder the blame for rape. By comparison the former formulation is a mode of marginalizing the rapist, of setting him up as an absolute other. This is one of the favourite stereotypes of the press. "The Beast of Broadmoor gets Life" (Sun,4/10/75, quoted in Smart and Smart,1978) and
"There is no earthly way to cite the total number of beautiful young girls slain by the malevolent entity who'd launched his sadistical rampage" (p22, Detective Files, November, 1982) are just two examples of the rapist as beast/fiend. Smart and Smart (1978) have noted that this type of representation is stressed in the press when the rape is a stereotypical one in which the victim is helpless and virtuous, and in which an extreme amount of violence is used. In more complicated cases, it is the nature of the victim that comes to the fore. In achieving this, various devices are deployed, such as a preference for Judges' comments as opposed to experts' testimony. As we have seen, Judges are as prone to conventional (sexist) imagery as laypersons. As we have seen experts would present a very different picture (cf Amir (1971) Rapist profile above).

Typological analyses however can become schismatic, ie depositing rapists in an exclusive category serves to marginalize them; the act of rape comes to be seen as extreme, abnormal - it becomes detached from its social bases. This is clear in press reportage with its gross individualizing of rape events and its concerns with the minutiae of the event, as opposed to the social context in which it took place (Smart and Smart, 1978). However, though this sleight of hand is common, it is a measure of last resort. For the reputation of the man behind the rapist must be salvaged at all but the most expensive
costs, expensive in the sense that it is only the more grotesque rapes that lead to rapist-blame. Thus Hollway(1981) noted that, in the reporting of the Yorkshire Ripper trial, it was intimated that it was excusable to murder prostitutes insofar as these women, by their sexual deviance, constituted a gross provocation to Sutcliffe. Further, it was attempted to shift blame onto his wife: to this end the image of the hen-pecked husband was evoked. We suggested in Chapter 6 that madness and irrationality are the prerogatives of women; it is part of their nature. Men must be driven forcibly into this state. Intoxicants other than women will have the same effect; thus the madness of the irresistible rape-slayer, Morin, was externally induced for "He was snorting coke and gulping bennies and obviously on the run" (p35, Det. Files, 1982). And so the contradiction plays itself out: the madman/fiend versus the woman-driven rapist. Whatever the upshot of this contest, the aim to set the rapist apart is never lost sight of. Thus, the finger points to his abnormality or his personal misfortune, but never to the potentiality for rape that is intrinsic to masculinity.

To sum this section up: We have seen how rape myths can be used to sever the relation between rape and normal gender functioning. However, this does not map easily onto our S, T and D types. In particular, the D type is used to link the putative irrationality or emotionality of women
to their role as partly guilty victims. Rape thus becomes partially naturalized. The feminist and this 'masculine' D perspective differ in terms of their normative bent. While the feminist locates the seeds of rape in the social constitution of gender relation, the 'masculine' identifies them in the nature of woman (for 'led on' rapes). The latter can thus have a typological function: it serves to demarcate the 'led on' from the 'extreme violence' rapes. The former are not 'real' rapes; that is, their seriousness is attenuated, the continuum of feminine irrationality seems only rarely to be extended all the way to the explosive rape scenario. We will see more example of this in the interview material below. In contrast, the feminist D perceives both types of rape as situated on the same continuum of power relations; it is more dimensional in this sense.

4. Lay Explanations of Rape.

In the following pages I will overview the social psychological research that has been conducted into rape explanations. I have divided this into two related types: that concerned with the factors that influence attribution in rape, and that which has assessed rape myth acceptance. In the context of the present concern with D, T and S ideal types, the problem with the former research is that by focusing its efforts almost exclusively on jury judgements, it has neglected the type of broad, generative explanation represented by dimensional explanation. In the
case of the latter, it has not directly considered the role of explanation in the reproduction of rape discourse/practices. These will be followed by a consideration of men's views on rape as represented in a series of interviews, and by an analysis of a book on a given rape case. Both of these illustrate that the complexity of explanatory strategies and their link with practices is somewhat greater than the ideal-typological schema developed here allows for. Even so, such a schema affords us a number of important insights, especially as regards the relation of explanation to practice.

a. Rape Explanation Research. The majority of this work has been directed at the relation between explanation and the use of various categories of information such as the attractiveness of the victim, or her similarity to the observer. The informational variables are further considered in terms of their relevance to the observer. Jones and Aronson (1973) attempted to locate the explanation of rape within Lerner's (1970) Just World Hypothesis framework. This predicted that, in order to ensure that people deserved what they got (ie that Fate is just), the more respectable (eg married or a virgin) the victim, the greater the need to attribute internally, (in this case a momentary lapse in behaviour). Moreover, they found that the defendant was given a longer sentence for raping a married (respectable) woman as opposed to a divorcee. However, Fulero and Delara (1974) provided an
alternative interpretation in which Jones and Aronson's results were seen as reflecting defensive attribution strategy (Shaver, 1970). On this theory, attributions are made on the basis of the positive or negative implications for the attributer. Accordingly, Fulero and Delara found that if there was similarity between the victim and the observer, then there was less internal attribution to the victim. Jones and Aronson's subjects were not, then, responding to respectability per se, but to perceived similarity. Sex differences currently represent one of the greater dissimilarities (male observer/offender - female observer/victim). Calhoun, Selby and their various co-workers have investigated the effect of sex difference on rape explanations. Calhoun, Selby and Weng (1976) found that male observers attributed more to victims than did female observers. Moreover, this effect was greatest when it was known that the victim had been raped previously, and where there was a relatively low frequency of rapes in the locality. Likewise, this informational configuration produced the highest victim blame scores in female observers. Selby et al (1977) have reported more evidence in support of this difference, placing female and male attributions in the context of their social perception of rape incidents in general. They found that men were more generally likely to blame the victim. Their results were interpreted as being congruent with defensive attribution theory, and actor/observer difference analysis (Jones and Nisbett, 1972). In line with the latter, Deitz
et al (1982) found that empathy with the victim tended to lead to a reduction in victim-attribution (cf Ch. 2). Other variables that have been shown to influence victim-blame are: the attractiveness of the victim (Calhoun et al, 1978); the (British) male observer's traditional versus liberal view of gender roles (Howells et al, 1984); the observer's attitude to societal norms, locus of control and perceptions of potential victimization (Alexander, 1980). In this last study of nurses' explanations and evaluations, it was found that, whereas attributions to the victims of beatings were made on the basis of actions (which permits leeway for external attributions), for rape, attributions were made to the victim's character, (ie stable and internal). In this study, the degree of victim blame was, relative to other studies, very low. Nevertheless, all these findings suggest that rape events are judged according to the perceived merit of the victim. As Sealy and Wain (1980) have shown, jurors' decisions in a rape trial appear to be unconnected with the defendant; it is the victim who is assessed. The opposite was the case when the crime under consideration was theft. It would seem, then, that for rape the victim's character is peculiarly salient. Luginbuhl and Mullin (1981) found that the respectability of the victim led to a general decrease in attribution to her, suggesting that similarity was not necessarily a major contributory factor to attribution.
If we consider these studies together, we can see an increasing awareness on the part of researchers of the ideological influences on the explanation of rape. What were originally conceived as generally guided explanations (general in the sense that the Just World Hypothesis and Defensive Attribution are supposed to be broad, pervasive phenomena), have come to be regarded as specific explanations with a particular ideological content that relates to a given disposition in the observer. An example of this increased sensitivity is found in Smith et al (1982) who explained the differences in rape attributions between German and American men and women in terms of the sexual polarization that is occurring in America, but which is less extensive in Germany. (Their results were: ordered in decreasing likelihood of attribution to the victim: US men, German men and women, US women). Theoretical accounts that refer to global processes such as Defensive Attribution presuppose that the blame that subjects seek to avoid is legitimate. Rarely do they bring into the open the historical and cultural conditions that have led to or constrain that legitimacy. Through their lack of social and group analysis, they implicitly posit a universal morality: this must be challenged - for it is one of the prime modes of ideology. This becomes all the more imperious for issues/explanations as contentious as rape. Smith et al's findings hint at how the social field may be split up (and this is a continuing process). In looking at
the attribution of rape, it is imperative to specify the ideological and discursive/practical divisions that parcel out blameworthiness, and relate these to the subject populations being studied.

But perhaps, as we noted in the beginning of this section, the most important factor is that the studies have emphasized the T explanatory form by using the jury experimental procedure. If rape explanation are more directly and openly accessed then we are more likely to get an indication of whether D explanations are part of the respondents' repertoire. Krulewitz and Payne's (1978), and Howells et al's (1984) more extreme findings that liberal or profeminist men were more likely to blame the rapist or social conditions than their conservative counterparts suggests that sex-role attitudes might act as pointers to the types of explanations subjects are willing to use. However, if these are to be expressed there must be opportunity within the questionnaires for such a link-up. For example, in Howells et al's study, of the 9 items rated, none explicitly referred to the social conditions of emergence of rape; ie typological explanations were assumed to be the only ones relevant to rape explanation, though the authors themselves are clearly aware of wider implications of rape, as their use of the 'attitudes to women scale' indicates. The same point applies to the Krulewitz and Payne study: none of the rape attribution scales directly addressed dimensional
factors, though they were partially accessed through the attitude measures.

In the next section I will look at the influence of various factors on these attitude measures, in particular those concerning rape myth acceptance.

b. Rape Myth Acceptance. In all the above studies, rape myth acceptance, however contingent it might be, must figure as an intervening variable in rape explanations. This is because, in making an attribution to the victim or offender, the explainer must assess the victim or offender according to some criterion of responsible or normal behaviour. Such popular criteria are implicitly set out in the various rape myths we have considered in Chapter 7. As we saw with Alexander (1980), nurses' attitudes towards societal rules and norms were important in the evaluation of rape victims. The two main studies from this perspective have been by Feild (1978) and Burt (1980). Feild found that a number of background factors played an important role in the evaluation of rape. Sex, race and marital status were the most important amongst these. As we have already noted, men tended to have a more positive view of rape than women. Rape crisis counsellors were the most hostile to rape in Feild's study. Police officers and rapists did not differ on four out of the eight rape dimensions that Feild used. Burt (1980) has made a more detailed study of the grounding factors of rape myth
acceptance such as personality, life experiences and attitudes. Her main aim was to assess whether rape myth acceptance could be predicted from attitudes as expressed in sex-role stereotyping, adversarial sexual beliefs, sexual conservatism and acceptance of interpersonal violence. What she found, and this is in line with Sanday's (1981a) observations (cf Ch.7), was that the more traditional the general sexual views of her subjects, the greater the rape myth acceptance. By comparison her younger, better educated subjects showed less of these attitudinal characteristics. Moreover, the attitudinal configurations Burt has uncovered are not related to concrete social contexts (eg roles) nor to the way that attitude and role functioning serve to re-constitute one another.

As we commented in the introduction, these two approaches, explanation-oriented and attitude-oriented respectively, in a way presuppose one another. Explanations require some background attitudes, and those background attitudes will often find expression in rape explanations. However, even combining these two approaches (as Howells et al, 1984, attempt to do) does not meet our requirements for an appropriately contextualized analysis of rape explanation. The problem stems from the fact that both these approaches are highly individualist. By this I mean that the antecedent factors to rape myth acceptance and rape explanations are mostly sited in the individual.
This of course ignores such influences as the demands of roles and group membership, and the relevance of such explanation and acceptance to the power and identity of those subjects. As regards the latter, the use of rape myths needs to be seen as a mediator of power against/over women and 'counter-roles' (such as the rape-fiend), but also as a recursive support of the ideologies, group processes, roles, etc. that mediate this power.

In this chapter we have not dealt directly with these latter aspects, except at one stage removed, at the level of motive as encapsulated in our three ideal types. To summarize this section: these studies on rape attribution and rape attitudes have addressed the discursive element of rape explanation, but have failed to realistically attach it to practice. By focussing on the 'motives', or the practical facets of the discourses, we can better embed these attitudes and explanations in their appropriate matrices. I will not be attempting this for the studies cited as the use of vignettes and scales has overly constrained subjects' responses. Rather, I will be using interview material that I have gathered in which subjects were given considerable room to expand on what they considered to constitute rape, as well as to provide detailed background and biographical information.

c. Interviews. These interviews were conducted with the
aim of illustrating the interaction of S, T and D ideal types of explanation in men’s expressed views of rape. Further, given that I have characterized these types as incorporating particular ranges of practice (i.e., S implies a sexist practice; T reflects a practical identification and removal of culprits; D designates a practice geared towards broad social change), then these interviews can also serve to indicate the types of specific practice that interviewees are involved in and to show how they are supported or otherwise by their statements on rape, men and women. These interviews are not meant to be representative of the population at large; and the validity of my interpretations is certainly open to revision given this early and tentative stage. Nevertheless, they can be viewed as broadly illustrative of the way that explanations are integrated into the matrix of of discourse/practices relating to the biography (or portion thereof) of the respondents. In fact, as mentioned previously, I am particularly interested in that aspect of the biography that draws on the general role of 'man'. Here, how individuals characterize themselves as men will be shown to vary dramatically, but it will also become apparent that their manly role does, by and large, square with their explanations of rape.

There were twelve men in all participating in 10 interviews, of which one involved a group of three. The men were either acquaintances or friends of acquaintances.
The reason for this was that, given the relatively intimate nature of the subject matter to be discussed, it was felt that individuals were more likely to 'open up' with someone they knew or knew of. Even so, in one of the interviews it was clear that the subject was not really willing to talk, or even to speculate. The men were drawn from a variety of walks of life, and an attempt was made to access a range of views. Interviews took anything from 30 minutes to three hours.

Table One sets out length, date and place of the interviews. The interviews were semi-structured or focussed (as broadly defined by Kidder, 1981). Questions were not pre-worded, and their open/closedness and in/directness (Cannell and Kahn, 1968) were left up to the interviewer's discretion. Inevitably this means that the comparability of the interviews is problematic, but it allows us to access the peculiarities and subtleties of the individual respondents in a more sensitive manner. In keeping with the focussed procedure, a set of topic areas was decided on beforehand. These were usually covered in the following sequence, (though there was some overlap, particularly in the latter topic areas):

1. Personal details: (Age, occupations past and present, hobbies, class identification, education, political and religious affiliation, etc).

2. Perceptions of and relations with men: (Friends; where they meet; activities; what dis/like
about male company; what types of men are there?).

3. Perceptions of and relations with women: (Types of women; what dis/like about women, whether having sexual relationship with them or not; how talk to/treat women; how mix with men friends; financial arrangements).

4. Views on and explanations of rape: (Definition of rape; who commits it; who suffers it; when, where, how does it happen; where place responsibility generally and in given instances; how stop it, etc).

This, then, was the checklist to be covered: in the the finer detail of the interviews, it was attempted to follow up the the interviewee's own predilections.

We can reiterate that these interviews were not intended to be representative but illustrative, exploring the ways that our ideal types are packaged and juggled in the process of explanation and comment. The interviews were recorded, partly transcribed and analyzed in terms of their S, T and D content, and the degree to which perceptions of and relations to women and men were consistent with such content. The alignment of types with 'radical' or traditional masculinity that became apparent was not meant to reflect rigorous categories: the final analysis emerged from an overall impression of the interviewee's position. As ever, this is open to revision.

The complexity and subtlety of the interviewees'
responses tended to undermine the somewhat coarser picture presented in the feminist literature. For example, the use of rape myths was relatively restrained. Few of the men spontaneously applied them, and those who did, did so circumspectly or else, in the process of interview, qualified them. In addition the interviews revealed rather more self-reflection and even a 'lack of confidence' in men than they are usually given credit for. However, this might have been due to the quirks of our sample which, on the whole, had a relatively high level of education (4 graduates; two of the 'bikers' had over 5 O-levels), and was undoubtedly politically leftward leaning. Below, I will first go through two sets of interviews with the (perhaps over-provocatively named) 'bikers' and the 'radicals', summarizing and illustrating their explanatory stance on rape and the ways that this fits in with more general views and reported practices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HL</td>
<td>3/3/86</td>
<td>2hr</td>
<td>Psychology Dept, Durham.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>4/3/86</td>
<td>1.5hr</td>
<td>Interviewee's home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TM</td>
<td>7/3/86</td>
<td>2hr</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>NS</td>
<td>9/3/86</td>
<td>2.5hr</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF</td>
<td>13/3/86</td>
<td>2.5hr</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BI</td>
<td>13/3/86</td>
<td>3hr</td>
<td>Interviewer's home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>16/3/86</td>
<td>30mins</td>
<td>Mutual acquaintance's home</td>
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<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>JG</td>
<td>20/3/86</td>
<td>3hr</td>
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<td>HT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SX</td>
<td>21/3/86</td>
<td>2hr</td>
<td>Interviewee's workplace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>21/3/86</td>
<td>1.5hr</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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</tbody>
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The rest of the interviews will be briefly considered in
the light of these two 'polar' positions. Phrases in quotation marks are verbatim statements from the interviews. Initials and place names have been changed.

(1a) HL (24, a photoprinter, from and resident in Thurley, County Durham). His main interest is motrobikes and membership of the local bike club. Most of his friends share this same interest. Educated up to O-level standard, and having gained his City and Guild's as a plater, he has variously worked as plater, a civil servant, and a caretaker. Politically he is leftwing though disillusioned with both the Labour Party and his local union.

HL's overriding priority is motorcycling and much of his time, effort and money goes towards this pursuit; for him "it's a way of life". Bikes and bikers come first, before women; it is clear that he thoroughly enjoys and seeks the company of his fellow bikers. When asked whether there was anything he disliked about his group of close biking friends (which he numbered at about 50), he could think of nothing. However, within the group, because of girlfriends and marriage, members were "dropping off like flies". Women were largely seen as a dampener on the activities of the group, whether in the pub or, though less so, when out camping: in the presence of women, the men were less "straight" - they had to constrain their behaviour. HL stated that he preferred it when women were not present.
In untrammelled male company, talk mostly revolved around bikes, mickey-taking and women. The objectifying talk about women (eg "Look at the arse on that") was, according to HL simply talk. On the whole, HL and his friends would only approach women who were likely to fit in with the group, that is, who were sympathetic to the biking way of life. For HL this was vitally important; any girlfriend had to fit in with the group; if she did not, sooner or later she would be ejected. Further, any girlfriend of HL's had to meet certain criteria of good looks, criteria which were public, those of the group, rather than personal ones, ("I wouldn't be seen dead walking around Durham with a dog" - Dog: an ugly woman).

His current girlfriend, who had recently had a baby, certainly fitted in with his crowd, but he felt uncomfortable with her because of the threat of being tied down ("She's still very good to me, even though I won't admit it. She won't take money off us"). When it came to personal problems, HL would always rather seek support from his male friends (though he jokingly suggested that this was because he got the answers he wanted to hear from them). In contrast, he felt suffocated by some of the women he had been involved with. As far as he could see, no-one could be happily married. As regards domesticity, he loathed it: four or five night a week he still had his tea round at his mother's.
On the topic of rape, his immediate response was to derogate reports that it was a regular occurrence in the biking fraternity. In most instances, the women were likely to be part of it ("What's a lass doing there in the first place"). His definition of rape involved "Somebody who puts a gun to somebody's head and says drop your knickers...that's rape, but apart from that I don't think half of it's rape"). He emphasized the physical difficulty of raping a woman, of "getting her wet enough". In addition, a lot of women "ask for it" by the way they act and dress ("getting lads to buy her drinks all night"). In response to the question of whether women 'cry rape', he estimated that perhaps 30% were false allegations, mostly because the woman did not want to be labelled a "slag", especially if she'd been drunk. In this context, HL stressed that whether a man was negligent as to the woman's consent was immaterial; the presence of a physical threat was the defining characteristic - after all, he noted, it "doesn't take much struggle to stop a rape". When asked whether anything justified hitting a woman, he responded that nothing did. Later, he argued that women were "dirty sods" and implied that their liking for sex might lead them to saying 'No' and meaning 'Yes'. In his own experience, he found that ignoring the 'No' did not result in any subsequent complaints. Men who raped were either "psychos" or had lost sexual control. Finally, as regards the feminist view of rape as an expression of gender power relations, he was thoroughly dismissive: rape
involved a loss of sexual control. Dominance was not very important because "you get dominant lasses".

For HL, women were less important than the group. This might have been a response to his current circumstances and the perceived threat to his independence. Nevertheless, he continually stressed the importance of the pleasure and camaraderie that he derived from his biking life and that any constraint on that was unacceptable. He did not seem to see the woman's adaptation to his group as being an imposition on the woman. A sense of helplessness came through in his talk on rape. Women led men on until they lost control and this was the woman's fault. There was no D element (in our sense) to his view of rape. Rape was typologically characterized either by the 'loss of control' motif or by extreme physical threat. The continued emphasis on the loss of control, plus the overt denial of the link between rape and normal gender relations suggest that his typology was very likely schismatic. Perhaps the best insight into this comes from his characterization of women as dirty sods ("lads do all the talking about it(sex), girls want it"), partly asking for it, partly deserving it; that is, women are often the responsible party. Here D is used to suggest that 'led on' rapes had their source in the wantonness of women, but simultaneously, these were not considered real rapes. As we noted above, the D has here been deployed typologically, to identify rapes as those
entailing gross violence.

(1b). The interview with BU, JG and HT was conducted at HL's home as they were all friends of his. He was present at the interview though did not contribute. BU (25, a motor mechanic, 6 O-levels), JG (23, a motorcycle mechanic, 2 O-levels), and HT (23, a driver-handyman, 7 O-levels) were long-time residents of Thurley, and like HL fanatic bikers. Their interests were very similar to HL's and they likewise stressed the importance of the group to them as individuals. However, their views on women differed markedly. BU didn't want his lovers to look like 'slags', (his current girlfriend did look like a slag, but did not behave like one, ie was unloyal). To his mind, women should be loyal, there if needed, and should not make demands on you. He did not think that he could change for a woman. By comparison, HT felt that he could change substantially for the right woman who must be intelligent, evidenced in her capacity "to know when to shut up". This desired girlfriend must also be reliable. JG felt that he could not really change for a woman, although it was possible. A discussion ensued in which BU suggested that a man could be changed by a woman who would "wear you down over a period". Fortunately, if "you look out for it, you could change back again".

As with HL, it was important that any girlfriend fit in with the group. HT couldn't stand women's "...all you ever
talk about is bikes’ routine...”. But preferable to the presence of acceptable women, was their absence. They all agreed with BU’s point that they would “never be able to talk like this” (to me) in front of women, in part because of the fear that the women would “blow it up out of all proportion”.

In a parallel vein to HL, their sexual sights were aimed at the strictly attainable: women with a similar taste for jeans, etc. But all felt themselves to lack any technique in attracting women. Women who were particularly disliked were slags who “get their tits out”. According to BU, this was all right as long it was someone else’s lass. The others were in sympathy. Of men, trendy, handsome and poser (effeminately dressed especially) types were reviled. In a conversation about posers, they emphasized their own basic, practically-oriented dress. This led to a vitriolic diatribe against homosexual and particularly bisexual men (who “betray our sex”), which BU saw as a reflection of decadent social decline (he later likened the incidence of rape to a similar decadent taste for the unusual). As regards the emotionality of men and women, views diverged. BU thought that the prevailing balance between women’s greater emotional expressivity and men’s emotional reticence was “about right”. JG and HT thought that it would be a good thing if men expressed their emotions more openly.
As regards rape, there was uniform condemnation of it; they saw it as "taking something forcibly off of somebody who doesn't want to give it...generally it involves sex"—JG. Castration was not good enough for rapists: BU thought that the punishment of rapists should reflect the fact that their victims were scarred for life. There was speculation as to whether tattooing 'Rapist' across the forehead of the convict or mutilation were suitably extreme, matching the permanence of rape trauma. BU found that even harassment of women upset him, especially when he thought that it might happen to his girlfriend, or when he thought of its obverse, of "an old woman grabbing your knickers". He also went on to note that lots of men get raped too, and that was probably worse for them than for women. JG thought that men and women rape victims suffered about the same.

On the whole, rapists were viewed as unbalanced ("though that's no excuse"—BU). JG, however, stressed that "you don't know commits rape", anyone might be a rapist. This was not so much a D comment, as a statement of the view that there were few outwards signs of imbalance. When asked whether they themselves could commit rape, all three thought not. BU suggested that physical rejection allied to the perceived right to have sex led to frustration and the actions of going out and taking it (ie rape). For HT, rapists were not simply sexually frustrated, they must also be sadistic. JG noted that frustration could be
relieved by going to a prostitute, therefore the violence of rape must be the attraction. All agreed that however aroused a man was, that this was no excuse to commit rape. On the issue of women's culpability, they estimated between 10 and 30% were false rapes. On the whole, they thoroughly condemned rape, including that occurring in marriage. (HT: "There's no automatic right to sex in marriage").

To stop rape, the tattooing and mutilation ideas resurfaced: but the deterrent effect was felt to be minimal as rape was supposed to be largely a spontaneous affair. All felt that any woman could get raped, though JG remarked that some women lead men on and deserve it. Yet for BU, even where it is "cockteasers" who are raped, "it's the bloke's fault" - "they don't deserve it, but they bring it on themselves". He then went on to explicitly distinguish between "leading men on rapes" and opportunist rapes. HT thought that teasers were asking for it, especially if they "picked the wrong bloke". BU felt that women should not be constrained by fear of rape.

Now, clearly this interview is not wholly compatible with the others; nevertheless it does show how 'secure' male company can shape explanations. In this case, initial statements often became progressively liberalized in the course of discussion between the interviewees (in which I
tried to participate as little as possible). Certainly, in comparison to HL's statements, the views expressed here were somewhat less traditional (though, of course, this may be because HL is more traditional). Still, certain underlying threads can be extracted. While they made the same points about the groups as HL, with regard to women, the emphasis was more on their independence from women, despite their demands, than on the due exacted by women that HL complained about. However, women were still subservient to the group: they would not be allowed to unduly disrupt it. Rape was divided into two types: the 'led on and lost control' rape was ambivalently regarded - while the man was blamed, the woman's culpability as enticer was also pointed out. It was never mooted that the man might be pressurizing the woman, or interpreting signals for his own ends. Nevertheless, as a type of rape it was condemned, albeit problematically. My own feeling was that it was regarded as inferior (less serious than) to the fiend-beast rape. It was the fiend-beast rape that was borne in mind when the various punishments were being described or when it was deemed impossible that they themselves might rape. On the whole the typological explanations made no attempt to deny continuity, except when it came to confronting the possibility that they themselves might become rapists. As we shall see below, those interviewees who held to a feminist-dimensional view of rape certainly admitted to their own potential to rape. Thus, despite the apparent concern with the practicalities
of catching rapists there is also likely to be a schimatic edge to the typological. The disgust at rape, and the, perhaps too ready, identification with the victim (as manifested in the discussion regarding male rape) as opposed to the offender suggests a more schismatic leaning. This will come into relief below where the 'bikers' are compared to the 'radicals'.

(2A). FC (28, a self-employed builder, ex-graduate, originally from Middlesborough but currently living in Evefield, Co. Durham) had been involved in anti-sexist men's groups for several years and was politically active (an anarcho-syndicalist). A libertarian or socialist feminist analysis seemed integrated into his general perceptions of himself, his relationships and gender. However, he was sometimes annoyed by what he saw as women's occasional lack of confidence, though he contrasted this with men's lack of sensitivity. As a result he felt he couldn't be as open with men; they were often too pushy for his liking. As regards rape, he was fully aware of the feminist-D view of rape as the extreme version of normal/patriarchal gender relations. Correspondingly, he explicitly recognized the potential in himself to rape. Even so, in the course of the interview the D came to confuse the T. Thus, on being asked to state what differentiated rapists from other men, he answered that it was only that "..rapists had actually done it". When pressed, he elaborated that it depended on "how
alienated they were from women" though all men were "just very tuned in to female vulnerability". Thus, for FC, rape was a social problem with the patriarchal ground rules and masculine socialization setting up the conditions for rape. Dealing with rapists was, then, almost secondary. Certainly they had to be taken out of circulation and treated, but the important thing was social change. The ambivalence again appeared as regards the possibility that some women might 'cry rape'. FC primarily saw this as an ideological ploy, though later he stressed that women had to be interrogated to ensure that the man was guilty. Subsequently he remarked that 'cry rape' events, in the face of the numbers of unreported rapes were "by the by". Again, the individual case, that would require T explanations was downplayed for the purposes of emphasizing the D continuity of rape. It was apparent that the interviewee felt uncomfortable when confronted with the typological 'practicalities', possibly because he had not fully articulated them.

(2b). In contrast, GF (37, currently a Research Associate and simultaneously engaged in completing his doctorate. Originally from Kinrow, now resident in Evefield) clearly summarized these two moments. Like FC he is politically sophisticated, though, partly because of this, he finds his political activity limited. To the domain of sexual politics, he has likewise devoted much thought. Though generally enjoying male company, he finds its frequent
competitiveness abhorrent. However, he was unwilling to divide men and women cleanly along gender lines. He had perceived the same qualities in men and women and saw any differentiation as largely the result of social imposition ("the same things are there, but because of different frameworks, these are articulated differently..."). In discussing his relations with women, he noted that he had previously divided these into the purely sexual (ie the emotionally uninvolved) and their opposite: this division he was no longer willing to uphold. But even when he had adhered to this schema, his sometime use of emotional blackmail to persuade women to sleep with him, had made him feel very guilty. On the issue of rape, he could thus draw out two types: the 'emotional blackmail' and the rapist-fiend types. He considered the latter to be primarily elements in the process of rationalizing and marginalizing rape. Like FC, he stressed the continuity between rape and normal sexuality, and admitted a potential to rape in all men, including himself. However, unlike FC, the differentiation of rapists did not come down to circumstance or opportunity; rather, "there must be a difference...but it is the potential that is important, in rapists that potential is developed over a period of time". GF emphasized that if one starts off categorizing rapists and non-rapists, one ends up blurring the continuity. Granted that around the individual rape act parameters have to be drawn in order to "decide what you're going to do with them (rapists)...But at a basic...
level...the potential is there in all men".

So, in terms of our ideal types, GF articulated all D, T and S (when the continuity is blurred) types. The aims of his relations with women, in particular his practical attempts to ensure that these are not alienated or superficial, are reflected in his comments on his own potential to rape. This we found, in a less explicit form, in FC's talk. We can now contrast the 'bikers's' views with those of the 'radicals'. What is immediately striking is that the 'radicals' are willing to admit to and combat what they see as their own potential to rape, whereas for the 'bikers', where rape potential is admitted (HL), it is downplayed, or else they do not acknowledge such potential in their psychological make-up. Here we see how the D explanation has a different practical implication from the T/S; by placing the self in a position of partial responsibility (in the reproduction of necessary gender relations, etc), D suggests that the individual must act in such a way that women are not objectified, etc; indeed, that they are given the space to act autonomously. Both FC and GF remarked on this. By contrast, the 'bikers' insisted that women had to fit in with their lifestyle in which, it appeared, they had relatively low status. Any counter-demands on the part of women were interpreted as unreasonable or even oppressive. Conversely, male company was seen as unproblematic: no links were drawn between the objectifying talk about women ("look at the arse on that"
- JG) and the underlying conditions of rape. Of course, while both FC and GF avoided and sometimes challenged situations which generated such talk, this does not mean that they themselves had ceased to think in such terms. It might be the case that they were minimizing the opportunity for themselves to fall into the old traps; alternatively, they could simply have been rehetorically voicing their idealized selves. HL, JG, BU and HT's preference for the absence of women (and their censoriousness) at group gatherings suggests that such talk was positively valued, whether that be so because they genuinely enjoyed viewing women in such a way, or because it served as a medium with which to bind the group. The division between 'bikers' and 'radicals' was further illustrated by their respective views on what should be done to rapists. For the 'radicals' this was essentially a side-issue: social change was the only true remedy, failing that, humane treatment. For the 'bikers', it seemed that extreme punishment was the preferred option. In the former, self-change was a precursor to social change; in the latter, it did not feature at all.

As we noted above, this division is artificial and the polarity of views is, in part, an outcome of the ideal types with which we have analysed the interviews. Even so, there do seem to be substantive differences between the two 'groupings'; all the other interviews fall somewhere in between. Also, by way of reiteration, we can note that
the 'bikers' held views that were considerably more complicated than might have been attributed to them on the basis of feminist portrayals of men.

(3a). NS (32, managing director of a garage, lived all his life in Myburn, Co. Durham), while lacking the 'theoretical expertise' of GF and FC, has come to similar conclusions. Thus, the most important criterion as to whether a rape has been committed is whether a woman has said 'No' which has then been ignored. However ambiguous, whatever her state, that 'No' had to be respected. He further differentiated between extreme violence and 'led on' rapes, and considered that punishment should reflect the differing degrees of severity, with rapists of the latter type perhaps "doing a form of community service", while violent rapists should "get psychiatric treatment". Certainly, he felt that rapists were either "suffering from mental illness" or perhaps "trying to get back at their mothers" or else "were afraid of rejection". Thus there was a distinction to be made for extreme forms of rape; there was something generally wrong with those sorts of men. However, there was an ambiguity concerning the "lesser type of rapist": the lenient punishment he suggested implies that such men were perhaps not so much at fault; and yet, NS himself, in keeping with his view that women's integrity had to be respected, felt he could not rape. It would seem that a partial connecting thread between rapists and 'normals' had been traced by NS, but
that he had not extended it to the normal as personified by himself. That is, the D. element was not fully developed.

(3b). TM (37, a musician and music teacher, resident in Forrestley, Co. Durham), like FC and GF, adopts a dimensional view: "Most men could do it...It's within me to do it...", but is less explicit as regards the theoretical basis of rape in patriarchal gender relations. The violent rapist will not just be suffering from sexual frustration, but also from "insecurity, dominance...he will have something against women". Unlike the more materialist emphases of GF and FC, TM pinpointed "the sex industry" as a major component in the production of rape, engendering sexual frustration especially in "the not very good looking guy whose bombarded by titillating stuff". It is a "change of consciousness" that is required to fight rape. This perspective was echoed again in another context: as a trainee teacher he had been warned not to be alone in a classroom with some of the older girls lest he be accused of rape. When asked why schoolgirls should resort to this, he replied that it might be to make an overbearing teacher suffer. In other words, he saw this as an individual incident and not as an instance of a generalized, gender power struggle. So, while TM was certainly aware of the continuity, it was not clearly formulated: D was present but was not correlated in any consistent way with the T as in GF's case, or confused as
(3c). ND (36, co-ordinator on an MSC scheme, originally from Yorkshire, resident in Co. Durham for 6 years) provided an interview which was somewhat more problematic. His evident familiarity and ostensible sympathy with feminism was undercut by his unease in dealing with feminist ideas and by the occasional slip ("...but most women like to keep the home tidy...(referring to himself)chauvinist pig (laughter)..."). The qualifying afterthought was reminiscent of the balance-as-counterweight (Billig, 1982) tactic and appeared in several places. At other points it seemed that his familiarity with feminism had more dubious ends ("There is especially today, a sort of protection for yourself about what your view is about women and what she should do, because there is so much about it in the press and TV"). As regards rape, statements that incorporated versions of rape myths came to be toned down in retrospect by a more feministic analysis. Thus sexual frustration was considered a major component in rape only to be downplayed when he remembered that many "rapists have normal sexual relations". On the whole, he found it difficult to characterize rapists, though he eventually settled on their "disturbed mind". In the case of explicitly "led on" rapists, he believed that women could provoke men by the way they dressed ("It is very provocative (laughing) when you see a girl with very beautiful legs and low cut
blouse and she's sitting there in the pub"), but then partially retracted by adding "But I don't know what rapists' minds are like, some might go for ones that are nuns (laughter)...". So, despite the feminist sentiments, these were not extended to rape. At one stage it seemed as if the dimensional was indeed present when he stated, in response to a question as to how to stop rape, that "Each individual should be made more aware of what rape was about". As it turned out, the 'individuals' referred to women who should be educated about safety and how to avoid rape. In a parallel sense, in dealing with rapists the emphasis was on the variety of rapists - on their individual problems. Thus, though humanely dealt with ("get them to do a useful job...therapies"), the problem was set in typological terms; D, as an explication of continuity, was absent.

(3d). SX (30, community artist, previously in the Army for 3.5 years, born and currently living in Wyburn) expressed views as regards women that were openly schismatic. Women were divided into those who were interested in casual, quick-turnover sex, and those who were not. In the army, though he had indulged in uninvolved sex, he was generally more inclined to long-term relations. Even so, the quantitative view persisted: thus, when talking about being on leave with his fiance who would not have sex until after marriage, given that he was getting sex fairly regularly in the
army, this meant that "you were missing out on your batting average". In his view, women were to be respected: even in casual sex there had to be mutual agreement. As regards men, he got on with most types though he disliked arrogant and ignorant ones. In the army, which he throroughly enjoyed, he found the group was self regulating, dealing with members who got out of hand itself. The camaraderie and the feedback he still sought, presently from a local football team of which he was a member. It was this need for feedback that meant that he could not rape: reciprocation was vital to him now. For SX, rapes involved extreme brutality; the rapist must "get a kick out of violence" for it could not be simply sexual - there was always prostitutes or masturbation. 'Led on' rapes were of another order: in these a man had reached the "point of no return" at which it is "probably the hardest thing in the world to say OK...switch off...". However, this was not the fault of the woman; the most important element was the type of man. The 'type of man' is also important as a protector of women. When asked who could get raped, SX felt that it was mostly women who did not have a husband or a boyfriend who could take revenge on the rapist. Thus, in a sense, it was men who determined how women were to be treated, but not in a sociological sense reflecting power relations; rather, as individuals who were more or less good. In terms of our own analysis, the D emerged as a continuum of sexual tolerance, which, it was implied, was biologically determined. Those men
with low tolerance were more prone to rape. The typological was asserted through men's biologically differing capacities to resist sex. Here, D serves to excuse men as a whole (whereas for the 'radicals' men had to take more responsibility), serving as a spectrum of reasonableness. The types who transgress happen to be different by virtue of an unusual sexual biology; their unreasonableness is a hiccup in a system otherwise all right.

(3e). BI (43, a painter and printmaker, originally from Hartlepool, now living in Vinemoor, Co. Durham) is clearly deeply involved in his art, and the majority of his activities contribute to and are guided by it. His interests are wide including philosophy, the occult, politics, art, mysticism and so on. Partly because of this, what he cannot abide in either men or women is narrow-mindedness. His view of men and women is on of complementarity - the one completes the other ("woman is the other half of oneself...that's what I've been looking for, the other half of myself all my life...it's like a poetic woman...you never really find her"). As a result he feels himself to be vulnerable; though he acknowledges that his artistic way of life is liable to suffocate his partners. Outside the personal domain, he believes that socially women are equal, if not, in fact, in a superior position (he cites the examples of Thatcher and the high numbers of women who hold exhibitions and run galleries as
indicative of this trend). Nevertheless, he is for the women's movement, though he resents being got at by women, especially over his use of words (e.g., Man for Humanity). Further, he finds that women's groups tend to be cliquish and too middle class. Women who dress in masculine fashion he finds unattractive: for BI, it is a pose, dishonest. In BI's eyes, androgyny is the ideal (the figures in his paintings reflect this). When it comes to rape, he defines it as physical violation, the cause of which is pornography and the quasi-pornography of advertising. These heighten the sexual urge and, with the additional stress of urban confinement, lead to rape. This socially inclined analysis is tempered with a more biological perspective: "in nature, the male takes the female violently in a sense...is that what is coming out? the animalness in man in this confined situation...because of advertising...tantalizing dress of women?". He noted that any women could get raped, and speculated that rapists were men who were "absolutely lonely", though this varied. The act of rape had to involve threat of serious violence simply because of the physical difficulty of subduing a woman. In "led on" rapes, BI was adamant that "once she says 'No' then that's it", though later he accepted the suggestion that sometimes 'No' means 'yes', though it was possible to tell such cases apart; personally he relied on intuition. He felt that he could not rape.

The larger part of the interview was taken up with BI's
general view of people and the world; as regards the broader relations between women and men, it was the spiritual perspective that prevailed. The complementarity of the sexes tended to blur the power relations that exist between them. Thus rape is primarily sexual for AH; the social ingredient feeds into the natural, unproblematically differential sexual urges of women and men, as opposed to those urges being socially constituted at outset. This emphasis was reflected in his disagreements with feminism which he sees as, through its oppositional stance, deflecting from the essential mutuality of the sexes. His view of rape is conditioned by and feeds into this position. Rape is a violation of the mutuality of the sexes and therefore must be categorized outside normal functioning. Here, the notion of complementarity is descriptive (his talk of his own needs to be complemented suggested this); as such it serves as a typological criterion.

(3f). Finally, CD (43, unemployed - forced to stay at home and tend his disabled wife, born and resident in Myburn) provided by far and away the shortest interview. It was clear that of all the interviewees he had devoted least thought to rape. As with all of the other topics covered, he was not willing (or able) to expand on rape. (In answer to many of the questions he would say that he hadn't really thought about it, and did not seem willing to speculate - this may have been that he did not trust
me, or else, that the questions I was putting to him were too general). Rape, he thought, was "interfering with somebody" and agreed that it might involve violence. Rapists were perverts or "oversexed"; probably they had lost control of their sexual urges. He suggested that women could avoid rape by "carrying sprays". As regards the provocativeness of women's dress, he replied that "it depend's how you take it". To lower the incidence of rape he suggested stiffer sentences or hospitalization of rapists, but otherwise "there was nothing you could really do".

Because of the lack of background material, it was very difficult to place these comments in any meaningful context. Certainly, however, some of his statements indicated a T view of rape. I will not, therefore, elaborate on this interview. It will suffice that I sound the following warning: because of the likely atypicality of our sample as a whole, it may be that CD was in fact the more representative, insofar as he displayed a pervasive indifference to rape, and a general lack of reflection. This of course suggests another problem with the interviews. Namely, that the process of interview forces people to think about issues that they would otherwise ignore. However, it was clear that some of the interviewees, especially in the light of recent media reports on rape, had considered rape spontaneously. Nevertheless, it is likely that the interviews obliged
subjects to think about rape and its related issues in more depth.

To sum this section up: the D, T and S explanatory ideal types were illustrated with respect to men's actual comments on and explanations of rape. Contrary to feminist-inspired expectations, a good deal of complexity and subtlety was uncovered; the ideal types were present though often in contorted forms. But more important than their facile evocation, were their possible links with the interviewee's reported practice. The links between dimensional and self-change, and schismatic/typological and self-stability became particularly apparent. In addition, these seemed to feed into the sorts of personal-political involvement that the men sought/found themselves involved in. Thus the dimensional was present in the reported practice of personal-political attempts to alter the way one perceived and interacted with women and men. The schismatic, by comparison, tended to subordinate women, to reassert traditional views of and practices within gender relations. The types of practices that were spoken of varied from the verbal objectification and stereotyping of women and their marginalization from the primary male group to chivalry. In all, the most important outcome of the analysis of the interview material was the illustration of the intertwinment of discourse (explanation) and practice(treatment of men and women), with their latter incorporating power exercised over women,
men and the self. Of course, we must remember that these are reported practices; they would need to be substantiated against first-hand observations or the perceptions of the men's women friends, acquaintances, etc. The intertwinement of explanation and practice as it relates not only to gender but also to class is further developed in our analysis of the book "The Glasgow Rape Case" (cf Appendix).

5. Conclusion.

In this chapter, we have developed three explanatory ideal types. Primarily, these have been explored in their relations to practices: to the feminist polemical strategies, to legal-juridical and lay practical, retributive and 'safety' concerns, and to the masculine protective/assertive function. Naturally, these relations involve power/knowledge; they are assertions of the truth and of power, and here this aspect has been dealt with in a relatively abstract way. In the following chapter, the use of T and S types in particular, will be situated in a more concrete context, that of policework and its varying demands. Finally, it has also become clear in the course of this chapter that the ideal types that we have set up are not tied in any simple way to the practices we have considered. There is a good deal more complexity than our ideal types can accommodate; nevertheless, and this is their original purpose, they serve to illustrate the way that explanation is part of a discourse/practical matrix,
of how it 'incorporates' practice and power (cf Ch.1) at levels variously distanced from its surface or immediate implications.
CHAPTER EIGHT

POLICEMEN'S EXPLANATION OF RAPE

Introduction.
In the previous chapter our concern was to outline and illustrate three ideal types of rape explanation which addressed various relations of discourse (explanation) to practice (behaviour). Thus we found that D explanation, in both feminist discourse and men's interviews, linked rape to wider social trends and implied an anti-sexist practice. Conversely, S explanations tended to point to discriminatory behaviour. These links, however, were only broadly drawn; both the role and the practice of the explainer was detailed only in the most general terms (eg as anti-sexist man or traditionally masculine man). In this chapter these connections are more finely explicated for a particular subgroup of men - policemen. This allows us to study the explanation of rape in a far more concrete social context which accesses a better delineated role and practice. The reasons for choosing the police are fivefold. Firstly, as a group they are in a position to help women, and yet they are often said to mis-use that power. Secondly, an extreme masculine element is incorporated into the police role which can be related to the discussions in Chapter 6.
regarding the effect of masculinity on the apprehension and control of women. However, because of this extremity and the ways that it is partially waylaid by institutional strictures, any parallels between policemen and other men must be duly circumscribed. Thirdly, in the police we have a potentially good example of the way that group processes might mediate masculinity. Fourthly, we can examine slippage from T to S explanations as it is conditioned by the police role. Finally, we can study the use of various 'cognitive biases' in a concrete, organizational environment and examine the ways in which these might interact with the social and institutional.

The format of the chapter runs as follows: First I will consider the complex constitution of the police role, taking in the organizational, practical and personal elements that contribute to its construction. It will be suggested that explanation (not just of rape) has a marked role to play in the recursive conditioning of the police role. Secondly, the relation between policemen and women, both within and outside the force will be considered as an illustration of the operation of intergroup processes at work. Thirdly, a number of police explanations, culled from the literature will be analyzed in the context of the role and the discourse/practices associated with it. It should be mentioned that there are not many such statements, and those that have been used are not, strictly speaking, explanations, but comments which
implicate a particular explanatory structure. Part of the reason for this dearth is that the explanations, being integral to role-related behaviour, are not the sort that need to be openly expressed (i.e., they are incorporated in scripts). They are most likely to be voiced when the discourses (or scripts) of which they are a part, are challenged; for example when policemen are confronted with alleged rape victims or academic investigators (see below). Finally, an analysis of these explanations in terms of the three cognitive heuristics considered in Chapter 2 will be compared with our own account. This will illustrate our contention that they can be reconceived as rules of combination for relevant discourse/practices.

1. The Police Role.

a. Preamble. Our analysis of the police role will not substantially differ from those expositions of the core characteristics of police work (e.g., Reiner, 1985), though we shall be emphasizing the 'machismo' element in such work. However, in line with the more recent sensitivity to multiple influences, from organizational, legal and police cultural factors, we shall take into account the complex of conditions. That is:

"A more complete equation in the analysis of police work requires a sociology that is structurally and historically contextualized at each level. The use of police discretion...cannot be simply explicated in terms of stereotypes, reflected imagery and the pressures of the police working day, but must be located within the legal form which provides the discretion parameters,
and historically according to the specificity of police-civil society relations." (Brogden, 1982, p221)

The rules by which police work is conducted do not simply derive from the unofficial culture of the police ('cop culture'). Indeed,

"The culture of the police - the values, norms, perspectives and craft rules - which inform their conduct is, of course, neither monolithic, universal nor unchanging. there are difference in outlook within police forces, according to such individual variables as personality, generation or career trajectory, and structural variations according to rank, assignment and specialization. The organizational styles and cultures of police forces may vary between different places and periods. Informal rules are not clear-cut and articulated, but embedded in specific practices and nuanced according to particular concrete situations and the interactional processes of each encounter. Nonetheless, certain commonalities of the police outlook can be discerned..." (Reiner, 1985, p86)

So, in spite of the variety of influences on the police role, there do seem to be a set of core characteristics that are centred on police culture.

However, McBarnet (1979) complains that much research into the police has been of so interactionist a bent that structural factors, such as legal constraints, have been left relatively uninvestigated. As she puts it: "...if abstract rules are redefined and used according to practical purposes, then practical purposes, the 'needs' of crime control, may be redefined according to the demands of formal rules..." (1979, p27). In other words, formal law does shape police behaviour, sanctioning the space in which police discretion comes into its own. But,
at the same time, within these rules, there is "sufficient elasticity to assimilate departures from idealized values of due process of legality..." (Reiner, 1985, p85-6). Thus the "legal rules may well be used presentationally, rather than being operational rules or inhibitors" (p86).

Another broad and amorphous influence on the police role is that of the police organization, which of course is intimately tied to legal parameters. Jones (1980) notes how the divergence between beat ideology (ie the notion that foot patrols are the mainstay of desirable policing) and organizational requirements (eg the demand for increased efficiency) has led to a devaluation of beat policing, which being comprised of prevention and community relations is not amenable to the types of quantification entailed in measures of efficiency (in the way that law enforcement/convictions are).

Still, the high degree of discretion permitted ordinary constables is inevitable since the nature of the work means that little supervision is possible. Indeed, in some cases, supervision is withdrawn so that illegal methods (eg force or verbalising) can be applied (Holdaway, 1983). Further, the autonomy of the lower ranks is positively asserted through a number of means, not least of which is their possession of "the organizational power to ensure that they retain a very considerable measure of discretion" (Holdaway, 1983, p4): this organizational power
often takes the form of secrecy whereby facts are kept from senior officers. Conversely, as Reiner points out, whether the directives of the police hierarchy are ever implemented depends, ultimately, on the front line police officers. Naturally, this raises all sorts of problems for the mechanisms of accountability.

In sum, there are clearly institutional and legal constraints on police behaviour, but these are mediated by police culture whose relative autonomy is assured through the high degrees of discretion inherent in the job. Henceforth, it will be mainly the cultural aspects I will be commenting on, though organizational influences will be alluded to: the rules and discourse/practices that pervade this culture will be related to the dealings with and explanations of rape cases.

b. Police Culture. The police force's function as an institution is difficult to pin down in anything other than the broadest terms. As Smith and Gray (1983) put it:

"The Metropolitan Police is a very large and inevitably bureaucratic organization in which there tends to be more emphasis on form than on content, more concern with following procedure than achieving an end result. When talking to senior officers it is very difficult to get a clear statement of objectives or priorities except in the most general terms. Yet...there must be a set of objectives implicit in the pattern of policing. In the absence of a continuing attempt, within the organization, to define objectives explicitly, the vacuum has been filled by the preoccupations, perceptions and prejudices that develop amongst groups of constables and sergeants in response to the people and problems they have to deal with."
So, as we indicated above, the role of the police institution in demarcating street-level behaviour is, outside the most general influences, minimal.

"The objectives and norms that informally develop tend to be those of the group... (and) there is considerable pressure to... adopt or appear to adopt (these). Many of these norms are similar to those that develop in any male-dominated group especially where the need for loyalty and solidarity is paramount. One of the effects of the group psychology is that certain themes tend to be emphasized in conversation... male dominance (...the denigration of women); the glamour... of violence, and racial prejudice."

However, we must be sensitive to the way that the demands of the institution serve to apportion the 'need for loyalty and solidarity'. This need occurs both with respect to divisions within the force and between the force and the outside world.

Within the force, there are various specialist units (eg CID). In particular "there is a continuing tension in the relation between uniform and CID" (Smith and Gray, 1983, p179) which is expressed by uniformed officers' view that "the CID are incompetent, do too little, drink too much and nevertheless consider themselves superior to uniform officers" (p179). Such friction will also occur amongst smaller groupings and at more local levels within the force - usually this rivalry will be expressed in the form of a mutual lack of trust. However, this in-fighting is likely to dissolve in the face of the main structural
division - that between public and police.

The police tend to divide society into the police and the rest (ie the public). As one officer put it: "Don't forget, we're a tribe, a minority" (Evans, 1974, p77). The public are further divided (as we shall clearly see with respect to rape) between the bad and the respectable. Cross cutting this are the categories of sex, race and class. Also, there are categories of dangerous others: namely those who can potentially undermine the autonomy (or expertise) of the police - challengers (eg lawyers, doctors); disarmers (eg women, children); do-gooders (NCCL); politicians (cf Holdaway, 1983; Reiner, 1985). As we shall see below, there are also categories within the 'bad' population which have different implications for police culture.

The police-public dichotomy is enhanced at the structural or organizational level. Brogden(1982) has detailed the way that, by appealing to the specialist nature of the police organization, the police can detach themselves from what they see as undesirable degrees of accountability. Specifically, the chief constable, in bargaining with local police authorities, deploys a managerialist ideology of police professionalism which asserts his expertise at the expense of the influence of local elites - that is, efficiency can only be maintained if the chief constable is given full freedom from outside meddling. This
autonomy, based on the defining goal of crime-fighting diffuses down to the police at all levels. As Brogden notes, the most potent source of control in police work, other than the social audiences to which the police play, are the police officers themselves.

The nature of police work, in serving to undergird the separateness of the police, facilitates solidarity and loyalty. A major component here is facing danger. Indeed, as in the case of racism, this danger can be exaggerated as a means of, at least verbally, asserting that separateness (through stressing the police's differential masculinity). We shall have more to say about the emphasis placed on the danger of 'real police work' below. The impression of separateness is furthered by the deep interpenetration of professional and private life. Reiner(1979) quoting Soloman writes: "From the available evidence, the police display this sort of work/non-work in an extreme form" (p163). That is, police work pervades the lives of police officers. As one officer remarked: "You're always noticing things. It's been bred into you, a reflex action...it's a sect, it's like a religion the police force" (Reiner,1979,p163-4). In addition to the overspill of suspiciousness and surveillance, the discipline imposes restrictions that result in a similar carryover: "My private life is governed by the police force. I mean I can't go out and get bloody drunk and start shouting and screaming in a
Another factor that will doubtless also serve to consolidate this separate group identity is the fact that many police officers are drawn from the same communities and in some cases from the same families (Evans, 1974).

Till this point we have considered how the police might be constituted as a separate group - we have only hinted at what the actual content of its group identity might be. From the above discussion it is apparent that one such component is loyalty. By loyalty, we mean something more than what is found in the intergroup behaviour research (eg maximum differentiation strategies). This might include actively covering up for members in one's group (eg helping out fellow officers by adding to their arrest figures, Smith and Gray, 1983). Moreover, backing up even occurs for those colleagues who are in the wrong, have committed illegal acts. Rather than resort to official force discipline "which was something that attacked the in-group from the outside and which the group could not control in any way once it built up momentum" (Smith and Gray, 1983, p72), control from inside the group was preferable as it was "not only less damaging to the officer concerned, but also less threatening to the group as a whole" (p72). And we might add that the acceptance of these internal, informal group disciplinary mechanisms serve to consolidate that group identity insofar as its uniformity of loyalty is maintained.
In other words, police officers actively, self-consciously see themselves as loyal to their group. This is something which is poorly theorized in intergroup theory - the degree to which a sense of loyalty characterizes the social identity (and inhibits exit). Rephrasing this in terms of the suggestion in Chapter 3 (ie that 'group member' should be reconceived as an aspect of a role), we can here see that the delimitation of the police role requires a hefty group-identification component. This becomes particularly acute in those collective forms of police work in which a high degree of consistency is desirable (ie it would not do if in the process of an arrest or investigation one officer had different ideas from his/her colleagues). Consistency is desirable because it is a partial measure of (forensic) truth; dissent would dilute that truth. Truth is important in police functioning because it partly underlies power, but also it legitimates actions (eg the use of coercion, the development of an investigation in a particular direction, etc) necessary to fulfilling the demands of the police role. Here then, truth is mediated by group processes; consistency, borne of intergroup activity, serves the practical aspects of the police role. In framing the relation between role and group in this way, I have avoided individualizing group processes, ie reducing them to the needs of decontextual individuals for positive and secure social identities. It is certainly possible
that these social identity 'needs' may come to dominate the other aspects of the role - but they are likely to be contained by the parameters of proper institutional functioning. Thus, as long as intergroup behaviour sustains the force, then it is fine; in cases where it embarrasses the force, it must be re-cast or purged.

We can now detail the content of the police role more finely. Reiner(1985) summarizes one major bloc in the core of that role as 'Mission-Action-Cynicism-Pessimism'. The police have a sense of mission - of danger from all sides threatening to destroy a valued way of life. This danger looms large in the form of criminals and it is against these that action is directed. Action is thus conceived by policemen, and certainly portrayed in the media, as largely law enforcement (the tracking down, arrest and successful prosecution of worthy criminal opponents with all the excitement and violence that that might entail). This picture pervades the self-image that many police hold: it is a main ingredient in the stories that officers tell (Smith and Gray,1983; Holdaway,1983), and it is facilitated by such technological introductions as the use of radios and panda cars which can enliven what would otherwise have been routine matters (Holdaway,1983). This image is in stark contrast with the mundane activity that is day-to-day policing: the image is sustained through story-telling, exaggeration, the expressed desire for violence, jokes. But this desire for action, or its
generalized counterpart, law enforcement, is, as we noted above, a partial outcome of managerial demands for efficiency which can only be quantified in terms of arrests, stops, etc. The police themselves refer to these as 'figures' (Smith and Gray, 1983; Jones, 1980). However, it is also because much police work is considered boring by the police themselves. As Reiner (1985) notes, out of his three types of police-public interaction, order maintenance (in which conflict is resolved without recourse to police powers) constitutes the bulk of police work (as opposed to 'service' - consensual- work, and 'law enforcement, in which police legal powers are used). Order maintenance work lacks the sparkle of law enforcement, and is, indeed, denigrated by the police themselves, often labelled 'rubbish' (i.e. "a matter which the police are required to deal with but which will not result in any arrest or an arrest of a kind that is not valued", Smith and Gray, 1983, p62). However, as we shall see below, the fact that the police decide in such cases not to use their legal powers, suggests that they are applying criteria which render some cases 'rubbish' or 'mere' order maintenance cases. If we talk in terms of audiences, we can imagine that in cases where there are conflicting audiences, as in some sexual offence cases, then being 'fair' becomes problematic (cf below; Hanmer and Saunders, 1984).

However, it should be remembered that not all police
officers conform to this pattern. Some do stress danger and excitement — Reiner (1985) dubs them the 'New Centurions'. Others however, take on a peace-keeping role (the 'Bobby' — Reiner, 1985); still others are designated 'uniform carriers' (lazy, cynical, pessimistic); a fourth group are the 'professionals', who are ambitious and career conscious, doing their work with an eye to promotion. This latter point suggests that boredom is not the sole key to the action view of policing. Clearly, for boredom to manifest itself, a contrasting condition to the prevailing, boring one must be held in mind. As such boredom is not simply a physical condition, it is an evaluation. One element that will play a part in such an evaluative process will be (extreme) masculinity and its attendant predilections. Thus the traditional ideal of the village bobby chatting to local residents, though patriarchal in a different sense, encapsulates a more sedate social identity, one in which machismo is ostensibly downplayed.

Before going on to consider the masculine component in the police role, I will list a number of other factors that contribute: suspicion, solidarity/isolation, pragmatism, and more contentiously, authoritarianism, conservatism and racism (cf Reiner, 1985; Cohan and Gorman, 1982; Waddington, 1982; Cochrane and Butler, 1980).

Various authors have commented on the presence of a
machismo element in the police role. Niedhoffer(1969), remarking on the police 'personality traits', points to aggression and authoritarianism which we can, following Ch.6's emphasis on the masculine desire for control, associate with masculinity. More positively, Adlam notes, for the police themselves, these characteristics are positively valued. Masculinity means high independence, assertiveness, confidence and adaptability. Despite the (few) self-criticisms and doubts they have, the police generally hold a positive self image and have high levels of self-esteeim. These aspects are flordily illustrated by the traditional masculine passtimes which the typical policeman should desire: "Beer, sport and women - preferably all at once" (Adlam,1981,p157).

The various elements of an extreme masculinity can be briefly expanded on thus: Masculinity's search for certainty can be expressed in a number of ways: the repeated claim to impartiality (Adlam,1981); an extreme cynicism and aggressiveness which denies the truth of others statements to the point of actually constructing confessions or statements for suspects (Holdaway,1983; Hain,1979). Hain suggests that the police are preponderantly concerned with gathering incriminatory evidence; they assume suspects to be guilty (hence they are denoted 'prisoners' as opposed to detainees,etc - Holdaway,1983). Balance is something the defence counsel provides. This orientation will mean that suspects are
liable to be disbelieved, especially if they fall into the appropriate social category (eg Black, 1980) or exhibit particular types of behaviours such as disrespect or antagonistic demeanour (Moyer, 1981; Smith and Visher, 1981). Other factors that will intervene in the perception of suspects include the presence of bystanders, the desires of the victim, and the seriousness of the crime (eg Smith and Visher, 1981).

Thus we see how certain elements of the police role both reproduce and reflect the extreme masculinity of the police. This complexly intermingles with the group processes that we considered above. As with the presence of authoritarianism and racism, the police's 'machismo count' may be simply a magnified instance of traits in the general social body. Nevertheless, the magnification and the process that lead to it seem to be significant. As Feild (1978) (also cf Feldman-Summers and Palmer, 1980) has shown, as regard rape myth acceptance, the police fall closer to rapists than do laymen.

Up to this point I have only considered the broader expressions of machismo in police work, as it has been instituted both organizationally and informally (though it should, by now, be apparent, that there is no ready distinction between the two). In the next section, I will more closely consider the manifestations of machismo in sexism.
c. Sexism in the Police Role. We have briefly mentioned the way that the group serves to partly mediate masculinity. Where these processes are most likely to be evident is in the more or less overt expression of sexism. As Smith and Gray (1983) note, sexism is rife in the force: this form of denigrating women can be interpreted in group terms (cf Huici, 1984; and for possible feminist versions, Giles and Williams, 1977). Such processes serve to recursively condition both role and group. With regard to the Metropolitan force, Smith and Gray (1983) state that: "From our observational work we would say that women face substantial prejudice within the force" (p163). This occurs at all levels. At the institutional level "the force discriminates against female applicants" (p163) and, once it has accepted them, it seems to hamper their promotion prospects. At a more informal level, "the majority of the men but only a quarter of the women (believe) that the women are given an easy ride" (p165) within the force. For those officers who thought that policewomen face greater difficulties than men (54% of men, 68% of women) 31% of the men thought that it was because of physical inferiority, while 48% of women thought that this was due to prejudice. This suggests that there is considerable strain within the police force. This is continued informally through the 'cult of masculinity': much of policemen's talk turns on sex and women - including the "denigration of women in canteen talk
(which) is also a devaluing of qualities within women that are actually required in much police work" (p91). So policewomen's nurturant qualities are themselves open to attack. But this attack/denigration is often directed through an aggrandisement of masculine sexuality - the man triumphing over the woman. This verbal assault has three facets: "the treatment of women as a thing, the humiliation of a woman and sexual assault on her" (p91). This sort of talk certainly goes on in the presence of woman and comes under the compass of sexual harrassment as defined by Sedley and Benn(1982). As a conversational tactic, it not only invokes the image of a woman as an object, it also constitutes her as such through what is effectively verbal terrorism. Indeed, Smith and Gray note that many women police officers accommodate to the attitudes of their male colleagues, simply suppressing reactions to the grossest types of prejudiced criticism. Given the importance of "not losing face", which policemen almost obsessively pursue, such passivity can only contribute to the stereotyped image that the men have of the women. The power relation as constructed around agency and masculinity thus comes to reinforce itself. This sexual harrassment is recognized by many policewomen, but though they may allude to it when interviewed, they are reluctant to admit that it occurs outright (Jones, personal communication). Some policewomen have attempted to overcome this by a process of 'masculinization' through which they accept the norms of the policemen and then try
to go one better. Paradoxically, these women never achieve the same status as the men, because, from the perspective of the latter, they have given up their femininity ("you can't be both professional and feminine", Jones, personal communication). The other type of policewoman, who attempt to deploy their femininity are, because of it, unsuited to policework. Furthermore, there is no intergroup defence that women can resort to in that, since the Sex Discrimination Act, women have been spread across shifts and reliefs in small numbers which undermines any possibility of group formation (Jones, personal communication).

Below I will focus on the way that police treat women outside the force - that is, how certain women, and in some cases, women generally, constitute the out-group. Given the way that women are objectified, it is sometimes difficult to imagine them as comprising an authentic out-group against which plausible comparisons can be made. Suffice it to say that there is profound denigration of women, especially in the case of sexual offences, and that this act of denigration, itself an act of differentiation, is what (re-)constitutes the in-group identity of masculinity. That is, it is not simply the differentiation along valued dimensions such as agency, toughness, etc that establishes positive social identity, it is the process of and engagement in differentiation (itself a form of agency) that practically (materially)
mediates masculinity. Indeed, within the limits of caricature, the more virulent this denigration, the greater the masculine pay-off. This phenomenon stems from the fact that the police social identity is bound up with being a good group member. To restate this: whereas in the Turnerian group, group membership processes are the means by which differentiation and heightened positive social identity are achieved, for the archetypally masculine police group, group membership processes are also part of the content of that social identity. Conscious differentiation and denigration or aggrandisement are fully part of that social identity. This, we have suggested, is partly true of all such masculine groups (cf Ch. 3).

However, if these are the sorts of processes we would expect from a 'macho' group, we find the police, especially for some women victims, suspects or witnesses, as acting somewhat warily. Holdaway (1983) refers to women as being disarmers; through their perceived frailty they can throw the police off balance, especially as regards their usual means of questioning. Furthermore, there is a degree of fear that some women will allege sexual assault against police officers. So, not all talk and practice serve to denigrate women; some is defensive. As Smith and Gray (1983) point out: it cannot be simply assumed that the talk that police indulge in expresses itself in behaviour in an unproblematic way. However, as
regard rape and sexual offences, there is some evidence that practice does partially reflect talk, though it is complexly linked to police work which is itself a complex combination of police role requirements (eg bringing 'credible' prosecutions) and masculine preference.

A facet to which we have so far paid scant attention is the superior conformity of the self (Codol, 1975). This, in this context, would embody the individualistic moment of masculinity. The competition between individuals to out-do one another is a means by which the group identity is rehearsed while simultaneously supporting a hierarchy. The form that this takes, and not just amongst the police, is the on-going attempt to disrupt others' and save one(s own face (done through mickey-taking, practical jokes, etc). Of course, such fun and games also have other functions, not least of which, as various authors have noted, is the release of tension.

2. Police and Women Victims.

At several points already we have encountered police prejudice against women. We have also noted that women suspects can be both derogated and perceived as a threat. In this section I want to outline how women victims may be constituted as an outgroup.

Hanmer and Saunders (1984) have looked at the pattern of violence against women in an inner city area (Leeds),
using interviews and regular group meetings to access women's experiences of harassment and violence. The portion of their results that directly interests us here concerns women's dealings with the police. In their sample of 129 women, for those women who experienced property crimes a minimum of 48% and a maximum of 73% reported it to the police. For violent crimes (attacks etc) only 13% reported to the police. Women based their (in-)action on the expectations they had of the police's response, often derived from personal experience of hostile or indifferent police reaction. Hanmer and Saunders also point out that this reluctance to report is not simply a function of police response, it is also a partial outcome of the guilt that many women feel for the attack. We can also note that foreknowledge of the police's attitude is liable to exacerbate those feelings, especially given the police's lauded impartiality.

In Hanmer and Saunders' sample, of the 21 minor crimes (indecent exposure, obscene or threatening phone calls, assault, breach of the peace, insulting or threatening behaviour), the police answered all but one call. "The most common outcome was that after the police had listened to the women's account...she heard nothing more...One conclusion we draw from these experiences is that women are much more likely than police to perceive violence to themselves as serious..." (p57). Of those women that reported crimes of violence to the police, some
40% (10/25) were satisfied with the police's response. The three main complaints were: not responding swiftly enough to calls, not being informed of the eventual outcome of the complaint and investigation, and the lack of seriousness with which the complaint was treated. This led to the conclusion "that the police do not interfere in any serious way with male violence to women" (p59). Hanmer and Saunders go on to point out that "this is true even if police action (or lack of it) only reflects accurately what they know would happen if those cases went to court; that is, nothing or next to nothing. The police are not necessarily being hostile in not enforcing the criminal law in relation to abused women" (p61). This lack of accessible response by the police feeds into a cycle of women's oppression and debilitation. Even where there is a response, it happens in "some obscure way, divorced from the active participation of women in curtailing the violence of particular men. This encourages dependence on a male protection system which has the effect of reinforcing a state of dependent helplessness" (p67). From this it would appear that, even at a structural level, policing contributes, by virtue of its opaqueness as well as by its overt hostility/indifference, to the 'passification' of women.

The not uncommon lack of police interest in sexual crimes against women, however, need not reflect a pervasive prejudice, but by the more general attitudes of the
police. Certainly, it can be assimilated to the distinctions officers frequently draw between: a 'good arrest' (ie an arrest "which demonstrated skill, determination and physical strength", Smith and Gray, 1983, p61); a 'good result' (in which "the emphasis is on building a good case against someone in connection with a reported crime rather than catching someone in the act", p61); a 'good villain' (who "is a successful criminal and who is, therefore, sometimes a worthy antagonist; arresting a 'good villain' is counted a much greater success than arresting an incompetent or occasional law-breaker, even if the offence committed is fairly serious", p61-2), and 'rubbish' (which "is a matter that the police are required to deal with but which will not result in any arrest or in an arrest of a kind that is not valued", p62). These categories can be mapped directly onto the police's attitudes towards violence against women. In particular, most instances of rape or sexual assault are not likely to be carried out by a 'good villain': 'casual' assaults by drunken men or men in groups are too occasional to warrant the title of 'good villain'. Those 'sexual' assailants and rapists who do receive the accolade of 'good villain' are few, especially in view of the popular conception of rape as an explosive event (cf Ch.7). If rapists per se are not generally considered 'good villains', then rape and sexual assault might tend to be considered 'rubbish'. Domestic disputes "are the clearest example of what PCs call 'rubbish'..."
and often these will involve wife beating of some sort. Of course, the law on rape (in Britain and most states in the US) does not recognize rape in marriage and so the police are constrained in intervening. Nevertheless, even where there is risk of physical injury, the police are often unconcerned, seeing these disputes as essentially outside their jurisdiction (Smith and Gray, 1983; Ludman, 1980). 'Rubbish' also applies to minor sexual offences (as outlined above) and the response of the police to these seem to testify to this evaluation. The same is often true for rape offences - though this will depend on the 'seriousness' of the rape particularly as it is gauged against the perceived nature of the victim and the degree of coercion used.

All these terms - 'good result', 'good arrest', etc - reflect the competitiveness within the force, as well as the institutional pressure to perform up to (and beyond) scratch (ie to make figures). This latter is instrumental in the police's self-image as professionals, equipped with the specific skills and know-how to cope with the 'real' police work of law enforcement. The criteria for professionalism are largely worked out within the force, as we saw above: there is only a relatively minor input from outside, and very little from the women victims of minor sexual offences (though, as we have commented, the more extreme the offence, the more likely an investigation - cf Rose and Randall, 1982). However, seriousness is
intertwined with a whole range of other conditions. These can be seen to centre on two points: the credibility of the woman (and it is at this point that the sexism comes into play), and the 'prosecutability' (Rose and Randall, 1982) of the case (i.e., the likelihood that further investigation of allegations will yield a credible prosecution). The problem is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine precisely what contributes peculiarly to credibility and what to prosecutability. This is because what counts as credible to the police carries similar weight in court, and credibility in court is the measure of prosecutability. Still, extra-legal factors do play a part in the assessment of a rape event and in the following, while always admitting the importance of the prosecutability, I will mostly be concerned with those indices of credibility that reflect the masculine component of the police role. Thus we might expect and indeed find (e.g., Rose and Randall, 1982) that women victims who do not exemplify the virtuous aspects of the traditional feminine stereotype, namely, an unblemished past, innocence and chastity, will be viewed with suspicion, disbelief, and derogation rather than a forlorn sympathy which accepts the theoretical credibility of the case but, say, because of the woman's status, is constrained by its low prosecutability. That is, despite the bias imposed by the courts, this does not preclude a more enlightened treatment of victims by a force less intent on making figures.
However, as we have mentioned, the view of the courts is resoundingly echoed in the talk and overt attitude of police officers.

There are also the procedures that the police force recommends to itself in its dealings with rape victims especially. As Toner(1982) points out, the ultimate decision to prosecute rests with the D.P.P.; for the decision to prosecute to be reached there needs to be some corroboration. However, "finding enough corroborating evidence to convince the court does (present problems)" (Toner,1982,p167), especially where the issue is consent. In the process of gathering such evidence and constructing a 'strong' case, the alleged rape victim must be thoroughly questioned. However, it is at such points that the gaining of prosecutability seems to shade into the cynical (macho) undermining of credibility. Here, I am thinking of the advice given in the Police Review to investigating officers in their dealings with alleged rape victims:

"If a woman walks into a police station and complains of rape with no signs of violence she must be closely interrogated. Allow her to make a statement to a policewoman and then drive a horse and cart through it. It is always advisable if there is any doubt about the truthfulness of her allegations to call her an outright liar. It is very difficult for a person to put on genuine indignation who has been called a liar to her face."

(p15, quoted in Benn et al,1983)

So, in addition to the more or less formal pressures of court requirements at one extreme, and the leanings of
'cop culture' at the other, there are in the middle advice on the proper handling of rape investigations. It is these latter that are currently being changed by the introduction of more sympathetic procedures for questioning, examining, etc, alleged rape victims. There is no guarantee however that these reforms will diffuse either into 'cop culture' or into the legal process.

Returning to the operation of 'cop culture', the measure of credibility (eg virtuousness) is highly flexible: indeed, it is determined by men (and that naturally includes policemen) themselves. Thus Smith and Gray(1983) report an incident in which a police officer (CID) who after interviewing "two teenage girls (the younger one aged 14) who alleged that they had been sexually attacked...came back saying that they played the man along and that he found the girls very 'tasty' himself" (p92). Policemen indulging in this sort of talk imply not only that the victims enjoy or deserve these experiences, "but also that they would have liked to commit the offence themselves" (p92). Given this, who counts as virtuous and who as open territory is partly determined by the police themselves and their perceptions of the status of women as they differ along class, race, subculture, age, etc, lines. Further, who counts as a doubtful or legitimate victim varies from period to period.

The next paragraphs will be concerned with the ways
that the police discretion manifests itself in the reproduction of rape and the open-territory victim. In this we shall follow Clark and Lewis' (1977) characterization of the open territory victim and profile of the rapist-fiend. The relevant data from this study runs as follows: It was conducted in Toronto in 1970, 116 rapes were reported by 117 complainants with 129 alleged offenders. Of these 36.2% were considered Founded; 63.8% were classified as Unfounded and investigations were terminated. Unfounded cases were, as it turned out, not based primarily on the evaluation of whether or not the victim had been raped - other reasons also played a part. Extra-evidential factors that influenced the police's judgement were: (1) The unsuitability of the victim (eg she was separated or was on welfare); (2) lack of 'corroborative evidence' acceptable in the courtroom (eg whether there were other witnesses, or material evidence - Clark and Lewis maintain that these are immaterial to whether a rape had been committed. In this respect, consider the police reaction to a murder or an instance of grievous bodily harm); (3) The victim decided to halt the investigation - that is, she became a 'hostile witness' (eg as a result of pressure from relatives, the fear of publicity and court procedure, or the police's own antics); (4) In some cases, despite independent evidence (eg bruising), the incident went unclassified; (5) In other cases the police just seemed prejudicially unwilling to investigate plausible complaints.
The sort of factors that prejudiced police judgements of rape were: (1) Alcohol (In only 20% of the cases in which alcohol was present in the victim were the claims judged Founded. In 100% of the cases in which the victim was drunk at the time of reporting Unfounded judgements were passed); (2) Where other sex acts were present (acts of humiliation as Amir(1972) calls them), 60.9% were classified Founded; (3) Where weapons were present 71.4% were classified Founded; (4) 62.5% and 61.1% were classified Founded for cases which involved physical violence and verbal threat respectively. Of course, this factor occludes the fact that rape can be conducted using subtler means (cf Chapter 7); (5) The closer the victim-offender relationship, the less likely a classification of Founded - strangers:51.6%; acquaintances:23.8%; known:20%; (6) Except for cases of rape in the victim's residence (63.2% Founded), attacks outside and in the offender's residence were mostly considered Unfounded. Here, the implication is that women who are physically 'exposed' - exceptionally so in the offender's residence - are effectively advertising their availability; (7) Also important were the following characteristics of the victim: a. Separated/divorced and common-law wives were the most discriminated against yielding judgements of 37.5% and 22.2% Founded respectively; b. Occupational status also played a large part with professional women complainants being accorded a
100% Founded judgements, students 50%, housewives 28.6%, and women who were unemployed, idle or on welfare, and prostitutes a meagre 4.5%; c. Age. The highest Founded category were those women in the age range 'Over-40' (62.5%). The lowest were for women in ranges 14-19 years (30.6%) and 30-34 years (16.7%). However, it should be noted that these latter women were drawn from the same socio-economic group and had similar (low) marital status. Relating these three variable to one another: high Unfounded judgements were made for young women not living at home, independent with no occupational skills. The most 'credible' victims were children from solid middle class backgrounds. Another factor was mental state of the victim: the more contra-normal it was (drunk, on drugs, mentally retarded) the greater the likelihood of the police passing an Unfounded judgement. Also, the time of first report was important: the longer the victim left it, (if the person she first reported the rape to was not the first she encountered), the more this militated against a Founded judgement.

While Clark and Lewis do describe the types of rapist, they do not analyze in much detail the effect of police perceptions of the rapist on their judgements. Where, for example the victim's claims point to links with a fiend type rapist (such as the Yorkshire Ripper) who has been operating for some while and who is currently being sought, then investigations are more likely to be
galvanized; the police will tend to take such allegations more seriously. This comes across vividly in an incident outlined by Hanmer and Saunders (1984). A woman on reporting an indecent exposure found the police were indifferent, simply not bothered. "..."They took a statement and followed it up two months later with a visit from the vice squad. They wanted a better description. They asked if he had a beard"..." (p59). The implication was that the original indecent exposure incident became relevant and was followed up only when Peter Sutcliffe (The Yorkshire Ripper) had been arrested. This woman was justifiably indignant because her experiences were not treated with concern; interest was only forthcoming when it was thought by the police that it might be associated with a major crime.

This last point suggests that, in examining the explanations of police for a given rape event, it is necessary not only to take into account long term factors as embodied in the role of policeman and the situational (and informational) factors such as the type of victim, the situation etc, but also intermediate factors, such as the investigation of similar cases within the area, or recent public sensitivity to rape.

To summarize this section: We have outlined some of the factors that have contributed to the generally poor treatment of women victims of sexual offences. These have
included: the demands of juridical credibility or prosecutability; the common, semi-formal advice for the questioning of such victims; the obligations of cop culture and its facet of machismo in particular. This complex of influences, lastly, must incorporate individual differences between officers (see preceding section on the different 'types' of policeman). Out of this jumble emerges a core or ideal typical role (perhaps 'orientation' would be a better term) which predisposes officers toward particular types of behaviour toward particular types of women. So far we have not directly considered the relation of this orientation to the types of rape explanation examined in Chapter 7. This will be done in the following section. The shading of T and S types is what will emerge, an intertwinement driven by the dual and sometimes conflicting demands of 'figures' on the one hand, and machismo on the other. This oscillation reflects a tension in the application of partially dissonant discourse/practices. As we remarked in Chapter 1, our interest is in the automatic, initial (socially if not subjectively problematic) application of a discourse (script). As such, I will not be dealing with explanations per se (of the reflective form) but with examples of discourse application.

3. Policemen's Explanation of Rape.

In the above section we have surveyed the variety of factors which influence the ways that policemen will treat
female victims, the circumstances under which they will believe them, and their willingness to follow up complaints. We have seen that it is the police who hold the balance of power: they are the ones who decide (or, perhaps more accurately, are impelled to decide) what is and what is not worthy of credulity. The aim was to present this process within an appropriately social frame of reference. Our discussion has so far confined itself to the antecedents (role, group, masculinity, institutional demands) and outcomes (behaviours, the treatment of women, the willingness or otherwise to investigate). In terms of Kelley and Michela's (1980) and Eiser's (1984) theories, we have not directly dealt with the explanations that interpose themselves between antecedents and outcomes. And yet, this is exactly what we have achieved in a roundabout way. Instead of looking at explanations per se, we have detailed the circumstances under which rape myths are applied. That application is what constitutes (ideal typical) explanation here. For rape myths are nothing more than rather rigid and power-ridden scripts, that is, discourse/practices, the deployment of which comprises explanation of the automatic type (Ch.1).

However, this needs to be fleshed out in somewhat more detail. We have seen the complexity of factors that bear on police behaviour; we can suggest that, for rape explanation, these come to be distilled in the rape myths that are utilized by the police. These, as we saw in
Chapter 7, perform the dual schismatic and typological functions. On the one hand they serve to differentiate credible rape events (this is a 'practical' process which attempts to bring cases to court that have a good chance of conviction); on the other, simultaneously, they reassert traditional gender representations and power relations, partially through a denial of the links between the rape event and 'normal' sexuality. Thus rape myths partly reflect the 'practicalities' of legal procedure but also whatever sex-bias pervades both the law and legal establishment (cf Edwards, 1981; Ch.7) and the traditions of 'cop culture'; at the same time as contributing to the job of policing, rape myths assert male hegemony.

When we look at policemen's rape explanations what we are searching for are the sorts of parameters used in characterizing an event and the implications that these have for the victims, the police themselves (recursive conditioning) and for those broader structures such as the legal-juridical and general gender relations. Clearly, then, these myths are closely tied to the 'role' of policeman. If the role can be interpreted as the point of intersection of legal, organizational, group, masculine and 'cop cultural' discourse/practices, then a part of this package are the rape myths in both their T and S form. These are summoned according to the informational array (diachronically considered, cf Ch.2). To illustrate this process we have gathered a number of rape
explanations from the literature on the police or rape (or both). Clearly there are not enough to inspire unconditional confidence in our overall analysis. Nevertheless, when they are interpreted in the context of the basic delineants of the police role, and appropriately located within that matrix, then our analysis can, given these limits, be considered viable.

In Chapter 2 we noted that role disposition (discursive/practical positioning) and information condition one another. Thus, what counts as information is partly determined by the role; what aspects of the role are stressed in the process of explanation are influenced by the array of information that is available. And so on. The various configurations into which components of the above categories combine will determine and reflect the type of explanation that is given (and also, concurrently, the degree of power that is exercised over both women and the self).

In sum, we can compose a set of ideal types - combinations of role and information that equate with the use of a given rape myth and the generation of a concomitant explanation. High masculinity, extreme group identification and differentiation, overt sexism combines with information that denotes 'open-territory-ness' (eg victim inebriation; the rape occurred in the offender's residence; the offender was known to the victim; there was
an 'uncommonly' long lapse between the time of the rape incident and the time of first reporting; the victim is working class, black, young, unemployed, etc) to summon a myth (from the role's repertoire) that is appropriate to the information and the 'demands' of that role. In cases where the information suggests an 'innocent' victim, other myths are brought into play (the monster-fiend myth).

In the following pages I will consider some statements and reported statements made by the police in order to illustrate how they fit into this general scheme. I have attempted to look at explanations or accounts given spontaneously, rather than those reflecting the advice given to officers for the interrogation of alleged victims (see above). That is, I wish to look at those explanations/comments in which the exhortations to 'drive a horse and cart' through a women's testimony are not in the forefront of the policeman's mind.

a. In this section I will consider the view sometimes expressed by police officers that there is no such thing as rape.

"In 1972, I was invited to address a seminar for police lieutenants training for promotion to captain at New York Police Academy. I spoke about rape and was met with a chortle of hoots and laughter from the assembled 30 men: "Honey, you don't believe there is such a thing as rape do you?" a lieutenant called out. "Don't you?" "Noooo" came the near unanimous response."

(Brownmiller, 1975, p409)

The first thing to note here is that things are liable to
have changed since this exchange (cf O'Reilly.1985). Nevertheless, as recent reports (eg Hall,1985) show, these attitudes do persist. A blanket dismissal of rape is doubtless an unlikely event, and we can expect that this response was as much a reflection of the group taking the opportunity to cohere against a member of an outgroup (a feminist woman), or else an example of pushing to see how far they could go before Brownmiller would respond (cf Smith and Gray,1983: police constables would test one of the researchers by showing him grotesque photographs of murder victims). However, the answer does suggest that their stock of explanations includes those which imply that many rapes have been manufactured by the alleged victims; alternatively, they might consider that many rapes are 'neutralized' by the supposed fact that the woman actually wanted to be raped, ended up enjoying it, or that simply 'things got a bit out of hand'. Thus, we might interpret this outburst as a summing up, in a gross nutshell, the generalized devaluation of the crime of rape. Now, while skepticism is encouraged by the courts, they still recognize the offence of rape: the above exchange reflects not practical evaluations of prosecutability, but the operation of the machismo perspective as it pervades cop culture.

b. At a more concrete level, we can see the particular underpinnings of the blanket dismissal (which, as we suggested above, was likely to be rhetorical). Thus we
have the following account:

"...some PCs take every opportunity to give detailed accounts of reported rape cases. Sometimes there is reason or an occasion for telling these stories. For example, as they drove past a particular nightclub, a PC started to tell DJS (one of the researchers) a long story about the rape of a barmaid there. He told it without gloating and his account was entirely sympathetic to the victim....This contrasted with an account of the same incident given by another PC in the same relief, later the same day. This time there was no particular occasion for telling the story....He ended by saying that the woman was not really upset and strongly implied that she thoroughly enjoyed the whole experience."

(Smith and Gray, 1983, p92)

Here, we have operating in the latter instance a case of the 'all women want to be raped' much flavoured with its 'lie back and enjoy it' counterpart. The fact that the first constable stressed the victim's trauma while the second denies it, suggests that the second believes that rape is not so bad an experience after all. That is, that it can be assimilated by the victim without undue bother. Once more the implication is that rape or interpersonal violence in gender relations is the norm, or is in some way natural. As we saw in Chapter 7, this has a dimensional aspect insofar as it suggests that rape is on a continuum with normal sexual encounters. Of course, it lacks a critical edge and actually serves a typological function: to define rape as that event in which extreme violence is perpetrated in the process. In practical terms it means that less extreme or less stereotypical rape cases can be dropped; or rather, it can serve to facilitate or rationalize the procedure of deliberately
and systematically undermining the victim's allegations.

c. Associated with the above example, are those cases which are perceived as largely the women's doing; that is, a woman has led a man on to the point of no return where he loses control and 'things get out of hand'.

"Victim: I rang the police and they showed up very casually about ten minutes later. They sauntered in and one of them produced a flick knife when I asked him to untie me. They started saying things like, "Well, I don't think you've been raped. This was obviously someone you met last night. It got too heavy and you decided to call the police this morning." They kept suggesting it was a casual affair gone wrong. They said, "If everything you say happened had happened you would be completely hysterical now. You would have thrown yourself out of the window to get away." They obviously didn't believe me."

(Toner, 1982, p154)

As Toner notes this ties in with both the 'cry rape' myth and the male sexual uncontrollability discourse. In fact, it reverberates between the two. In the latter instance, the implication is that the woman can only say no if she does so in good time. In the above case, even the fact that the woman was tied up did not hinder the police officers from questioning the genuineness of her 'No'. On the subject of the validity of the 'No', a detective Inspector from the Northamptonshire Police force puts it thus:

"I've got no time for the bloke who attacks a girl he doesn't know and rapes her....But I have some sympathy for the boy who is allowed to go so far and is told to stop at the last minute because I think the fault can lie with the girl. One wonders how forceful they were in saying no, whether they really meant it if they did say no."

(Toner, 1982, p155)
The reverberation between 'cry rape' (the false allegation) and the genuine rape (where the victim's 'No' has been illegitimately ignored) makes the distinction between the two problematic. Nevertheless, this is itself indicative of the pressure placed on the woman to fulfil men's criteria of a forceful 'No'. As we suggested in Chapter 7, these are constantly shifting across different men, states of inebriation, types of victim. But also, we saw how some men felt that any 'No' had to be respected. The police reflect the masculine bias in this respect by tying the 'helplessness' of the man (his automatonism in the face of his sexual urges) to the credibility of the 'No'. Here we have the typological shading into the schismatic. The T criterion (a man has intercourse without the woman's consent) is softened by the parameters of the masculine condition and the irrationality of women's response. The dual aspects of the mythological sexual loss of control and the (more or less standard) ambiguity of women's responses (which need to be 'sorted out' by the man) shift responsibility onto the woman. Rape thus becomes diluted (as indeed it must do given that grey areas do exist), but it is a dilution which can end up 'blaming the victim'. The schismatic inheres in the fact that the ambiguity is viewed as a natural property of women, and that the uncontrollability of men is brought about by the antics of the woman, rather than seeing these as read into or generated by patriarchal gender relations. Thus the dimensional connections with broader historical
and social trends are severed; the causal locus comes to be individualized in the particular woman, or naturalized in women in general. It is men who become the victims.

This, of course, all relates to the problems of prosecutability. The discourses outlined above also prevail amongst the judiciary (cf Toner, 1982; Patullo, 1983; Chs. 6&7), and as such might simply reflect the police's attempts to accommodate to the courts. And yet, the manner with which such discourses are enacted (the reported casualness of the police) suggests that these discourses might be fully integrated into 'cop culture'. I.e the police are responding to such cases as men with traditional views and investments, not simply as realistic officers.

d. The blame that is attached to the victim is not always so problematic as made out above. Some victims are presumed to ask for it:

"The police implied that I asked for it because I was wearing shorts in a red light district."
(Hall, 1985, p112)

So the types of clothes worn, and the places a woman ventures into signal to men that she is available. However, as we remarked in Chapter 7, these signals are largely male-determined. The typological aspect, which quite accurately notes that dressing in a certain way, going into certain situations, leads men to assume that a woman is sexually available (irrespective of whether she
is or not) becomes schismatic when that woman is seen as being solely responsible for the signals she emits; that is, where she become the primary, not to say solitary, cause. Where women deny such responsibility then they might be accused of simple stupidity, of essentially not knowing, what to men are, the obvious rules. The typological specifies the sorts of situations in which rape might occur, but it slides into the schismatic when it renders those rules absolute. Transgressing them, under such a routine, provides the causal impetus (the contributory negligence) that results in rape, not the rules themselves. The dimensional would counter that the rules set up the conditions of emergence for rape events; the schismatic detracts from these. These rules are, probably, by and large recognized by most people as being commonsensical, and legal expectation and juries are liable to follow this. As a result we would expect the police to again reflect this and temper investigation to suit legal reality. However, rough, unsympathetic approaches adopted by the police are not the only ones available (see above). It would seem that the repetition of these realities, and the relish with which this is sometimes carried out, suggests that prosecutability serves as a veil for the rehearsal of masculinity.

This becomes clearer in the police’s responses to attacks on prostitutes (Benn, 1985) where the sense of urgency is even less. Indeed, the police will occasionally equate
rape with a prostitute's false allegation (cf Ch.1). This view spills over so that other women's rapes are devalued by the suggestion that the victim is a prostitute. For example:

"The police called me a prostitute and they upset me so much that I withdrew the allegation...." 
(Hall, 1985, p112)

The devaluation of prostitutes to the point at which it is not possible for them to say 'No' convincingly, appears to come most glaringly to light in the pronouncements of the senior officer on the Yorkshire Ripper case (Burn, 1984, p236).

"West Yorkshire's Acting Chief Constable said. "He (the Ripper) has made it clear that he hates prostitutes. Many people do. We as a police force will continue to arrest prostitutes. But the Ripper is now killing innocent girls"...." 
(Root, 1984, p115)

And so there are innocent and guilty rape victims that the police differentiate between. However, this is not just the police. Others, relatives of the 'innocent' victims, also attempted during the Yorkshire Ripper investigations, to appeal to this distinction in order to shame those supposedly shielding Peter Sutcliffe into exposing him (Burn, 1984, p277-278). The contrast between the completely innocent victim and the implicitly culpable prostitute is echoed in the contrast between the beast-fiend and the righteous avenger representations of Sutcliffe (cf Hollway, 1982). These two contrasts remained closely tied to one another: Prostitute-Avenger; Innocent-Beast. Such equations would have facilitated the assumption that someone must have consciously known and
shielded the Ripper (because of his beastliness). Burn (1984) suggests that this was not the case. Further, these two typological discourses, by remaining separate become schismatic: their discreteness convicts them of their ideological function. For there to have been cross-over between these two versions there would have had to have been some acknowledgement of the dimensionality of rape. The prostitute-beast alignment would undermine the putative blameworthiness of the prostitute; the innocent-avenger link would reflect the potential anger of men towards any woman, or at least help conceptualize the possibility of a man just wanting to kill a woman (as Sutcliffe himself at one point described his state, Hollway, 1982).

The practical implications of the equations set out above is that perhaps too much energy was expended in looking for someone who fitted into these slots (though things were considerably more complex, crucially complicated by an information overload). Still, we can make the point that seeking someone who is quintessentially diabolical fits in more neatly with the notion of 'real' police work than would a search for someone who is more 'ordinary'. The tracking down of a fiend would fall easily into this exalted category, whereas the hard, relatively menial work that actually goes into tracing a murderer or rapist who is otherwise 'normal' would be perhaps less valued, less romantically action-oriented.
e. Here I will discuss the way that rape explanations are conditioned by the relation of victims to their attackers. In the Clark and Lewis (1977) study, we found that the relation between offender and victim was influential in determining whether a rape was considered founded or not. This was echoed in Rose and Randall's (1982) findings that police investigators used this relation as one index in their assessment of whether consent had been withheld or not (this assessment contributed to their overall perceptions of the legitimacy of a rape as represented in the Offence Incidence reports).

The following extract suggests one of the possible reasons underlying this parameter:

"She was taken to a local hospital for examination where the police were telephoned. She was then taken to the station and questioned for approximately six hours and medically examined further. She said the police told the women who had taken her to the hospital that there was proof of rape, but her uncle denied it. The police told the woman that there was no proof and that she should let the matter drop for the family's sake. The woman lived with her aunt and uncle and the outcome was that the aunt threw her out."

(Hanmer and Saunders, 1984, p51)

Again, we must stress that not all police "explanations" or behaviour are as extreme as this in Hanmer and Saunders's sample. Nevertheless, here we have an example of a close relation between victim and alleged offender; moreover, we have the family involved which edges this event into the terrain of domestic disputes, and thus,
potentially 'rubbish'. However, it does reflect the perceived sanctity of the longstanding relationship, whether that be for family, spouses or lovers. The 'No' of the woman under such circumstances often becomes subordinate to the length of the relationship: it is the relationship that must remain intact. Of course what this means is that it is the woman who suffers. The typological function of more or less discounting such events as bona fide rapes becomes schismatic because it effectively denies that men in longstanding relationships are logically, if not technically, capable of rape.

Finally, there are cases where the police disbelieve an alleged victim because she has delayed in reporting the rape.

"Police did not believe my story because I did not report it till the following day, were very discouraging about my pursuing it to court, and warned me of how unpleasant it would be. Felt very resentful they were not more helpful."

(Hall, 1985, p115)

"DETECTIVE SERGEANT (MALE), PETERBOROUGH: A girl who report rape eight or twelve hours after it happened can be taken with a pinch of salt."

(Toner, 1982, p159)

This attitude suggests that rape should lead to an instaneous outrage/trauma/shock that will result in an immediate complaint. Now such an assumption might reflect an ignorance of the rape trauma syndrome (cf Hopkins and Thompson, 1984) but it also hints at a denial of the social stigma that attaches to rape. Victims are not only outraged at the attack, but also confronted with the
potential of social disapproval and the possibility of police hostility. In other words, the police end up unduly narrowing the range of factors that can legitimate a victim's response to rape, ignoring those threatening contextual factors that to her are all too apparent. Rape is a crime and should be reported as soon as possible. Any delay hampers investigation and must be indicative of ambivalence on the part of the alleged victim. That ambivalence reflects on the event itself, not on the after-effects. Again, this attitude can be seen from a practical standpoint that shapes itself to the demands of the courts; but it need not take so brutal a form.

The typological aspect is thus rendered schismatic: the criterion of delay, by effectively individualizing the delay, serves to decouple rape and normality. Thus, unreported rapes are not 'really' rapes. However, there is another point to be made here. The ambivalence might also be traced back to the event itself: that is, women might realize only belatedly that they have been raped (as opposed to balking at reporting it). This, according to writers such as Brownmiller(1975), is because women are confused by such encounters; if consent has been subtly forced, then only in retrospect does it become apparent that force of some sort was deployed. Yet, it is likely that the police will ascribe such confused cases, more or less openly and generally, to the lack of rationality on the part of the victim. This can be seen as the source of
ambiguity in the sexual encounter. In other words, the traditional dimensional view of feminine reserve that needs to be coaxed is projected into the rape event. Women must be persuaded and this is a necessarily intricate and ambiguous process (i.e., it is men who persist; in most cases it is men who define). On this view, some women will misread what are seen as being nothing more than natural techniques of seduction. Only in clearcut cases where the woman's decision has been violated is rape admitted. If ambiguity is intrinsic to sexual encounters, then a woman's complaint of rape might, if it occurred under conditions of such ambiguity, be considered unreasonably forced, in other words, contrived. The typological criterion that specifies that a rapist must ignore the victim's denial of consent or else be negligent as to whether it was given, becomes partially schismatic because it rejects those cases where ambiguity embodies the continuity between rape and 'normality'. Once more, the practicalities of producing a believable prosecution contribute to the above. But, given that policemen do adhere to the traditional masculine view of gender relations, and further, if it is agreed that this is likely to be exacerbated by the nature of police work and its particularly strong group component, then we can argue that the above discourses relate to the personal/role related practices of policemen. That is, they might themselves exploit this ambiguity; they are unlikely to readily concede that it is an aspect and
condition of rape.

In this section I have considered the way that policemen's explanations of and comments on rape incorporate rape myths and S and T forms. Further, these have been related to the functional demands of policing, to prosecutability on the one hand, and 'cop culture' on the other. Of course, the limited scope of the material constrains the representativeness of our analysis. Still, it has served an illustrative role, demonstrating the way that our ideal types are shaped by the concrete exigencies of functioning within an organization. In this respect, the preceding section acts as a qualification of our analyses in Chapter 7, suggesting how the ideal types, that were previously related to the general role of more or less traditional or radical man, are mediated by the complex and contradictory demands of other (work) roles (in the above case, policeman). To put it another way, the police institutional and cultural limits placed on discourse/practice serve to refine, in the sense of more tightly demarcating, the discourse/practices of the general role of man. In the following section policemen's explanations of rape will be investigated from a different slant; the cognitive processes that are believed to mediate explanation are reinterpreted as expressions of the rules of combination and difference of the discourse/practices that we have treated above.

In this section I will consider the workings of cognitive processes as they relate to the application of rape discourse/practices. Following the thread of Chapter 2, my aim is to demonstrate that, in the configurations of role, information, myth (explanation) and cognitive processes, those processes (and 'biases') are conditioned by the content they are supposed to deal with. This emerges in the contrast of rape explanations given by police and those produced by their critics, in the production of S/T and D explanations respectively. In the stead of cognitive processes, we will have rules of combination and difference that demarcate the configuration of discourses/practices, rules which are historically and socially conditioned. We can introduce these latter aspects because, in apprehending the 'cognitive processes' of the Internal Attribution Bias, Theory Perseverance, and the Neglect of Baserate Information through our three explanatory ideal types with their historico-practical dimension, we place them in a concrete, praxical context.

a. The Internal Attribution Bias (Salience). In Chapter 2, we argued that salience is a circular concept, self-fulfilling unless grounded in 'biology', ie made functional to some biological need or disposition in the organism. We maintained that this cannot hold for more social phenomena such as the objects of explanation.
Arguing that explanation is an inherently social activity, what counts as salient—what 'swamps the field'—is subject to a variety of factors few of them directly relevant to 'biology'. As regards rape explanations, women of a 'disreputable' type can swamp a field comprised of a rape event far more comprehensively than can other types. This is of course mediated by the type of rape discourse to which the observer adheres. However, we should also be wary of too simple a division between person and field. An example to clarify: women who present themselves to police claiming that they have been raped and who are also evidently drunk will, as our survey of the literature indicates, most likely have their allegations treated with extreme suspicion. The explanation in operation here (ie the script/myth that is being applied) will be a combination of: alcohol-induced seduction is legitimate; the woman wanted it (and therefore allowed herself to get drunk) but changed her mind at the last minute (ie 'No' means 'Yes'). Whether it was part of the seduction process or not, the fact that she was drunk automatically renders her open-territory. In the simplistic and inadequate terms of attribution theory, she is the one who is attributed to; there is an internal attribution to the extent that her allegation is not accepted—the incident was her fault. At the same time, by virtue of her being drunk, that woman has defined her field as one of 'legitimate seduction' or 'an example of feminine irrationality/wantonness'.
The woman in this example swamps the field by virtue of defining it. Simultaneously, the field, inferable from her condition, defines her. There is backward and forth movement between field and target that is akin to a hermetic loop of mutual definition (and difference), a hermeneutic circle in other words. This is a package that ultimately centres on victim-blame. However, this can only occur against another field or backdrop of ideological or discursive assumptions concerning the relationship between men and women, and the status of rape. By contrast, it could be held that drinking and socializing were not simple processes of social interaction, but loci for the exercise of power. Given that prevailing historical and social conditions put this power largely at the 'disposal' of men, it would potentially follow that a woman's drunken state reflected the degree of social pressure placed on the woman by the alleged rapist (or by other men). This social pressure manoeuvres women into conditions of debilitation in which they find themselves open-territory (See above). So, against an alternative set of assumptions (and practices), against an absence of the relevant rape mythology, the woman no longer takes on the salient role as the prime instigator (and hence the point of intervention - which largely entails warning against the free movement of women, cf Ch.7). Rather, the field as a whole does, a field which stretches to incorporate wider socio-historical factors. By way of contrast, a different
type of victim, the archetypally respectable woman, would activate a different field whose most salient feature would be the rapist-fiend. Again, the same process of reverberation takes place to produce a standardized account of the probable sequence of events. Similarly, this can be disrupted through the input of alternative discourses.

In this discussion of salience, we have considered its relation to causal primacy, and the determination of that by the field, the figure and the discourses to which the observer adheres. However, we have not directly tackled how this is affected by and affects practice. That is, we must now examine how salience relates to our S, T and D ideal types. What is salient is apprehended as causally primary and therefore open to response (control, avoidance, manipulation, etc). And yet this response seems to be conceived wholly in terms of the individual: it is the individual's response that marks the salience of the target object. It is not the social or collective response that comes into the picture. What relevance has salience as biologically conceived to phenomena that are overwhelmingly social? Very little, we have argued. The individualized salience that Taylor and Fiske have demonstrated is a primed one, evoked by experimental conditions. This can be evidenced with regard to rape: the salience of the victim or the rapist-fiend is such only because of the practical/discursive constitution of
the police, their interest in maintaining the individual-centred status quo at the expense of the marginalized 'few' (that is, they are interested in intervening at the level of the individual). And here we can bring in our T explanatory type. The T explanation aims at differentiating the individual rape event/rapist/victim and, as such, is presupposed by an individualistic conception of salience-driven attribution - one which focusses on the 'manageable' (the prosecutable, credible and so forth). This is, of course, what the police and the law are constrained to do: their interest is in identifying and removing culprits (whether they be rapists or false victims). In other words, the role delineants of the policeman serve to mediate and are mediated by the processes of salience as they bear on attribution. For a given informational array, salience is shaped by the configuration of discourse/practices pertinent to the police role at that time, and it is expressed through typological explanation. When the option for a more genuinely collective form of action is present, as that implied in socialist-feminist analyses of rape, then it is the background factors that become 'salient', a potential canvas of intervention. This is incorporated in the dimensional explanation insofar as it is directed at social change. The notion of an individualistic, biology-centre salience process largely precludes the use of this type of dimensional explanation.
b. Theory Perseverance (TP). In Chapter 2's discussion of TP, we saw that the most resistant hypotheses are those that have the most plausible causal constitution. When an alternative theory is presented which has a similar or superior causal potency, and which can better accommodate the available evidence, then it will be accepted over the original theory. TP is thus conceived as a bias of conservatism that hinges on the perception of causality.

However, causality can be subsumed under 'plausibility'. Many explanations can persevere if their plausibility remains intact. Such plausibility can be grounded in a number of sources (e.g., faith, teleology - cf. Bunge, 1959). Dialectical explanations are particularly relevant in the present context: according to these an interaction between two elements, which are seen to lie in opposition to one another, produces an outcome. This type of dialectical explanation is reflected in the way some men perceive affairs as they exist between men and women, what Burt (1980) has called adversarial sexual beliefs.

Under these circumstances, the dialectical form is effectively dimensional insofar as it traces rape to the adversarial relations perceived between men and women generally. But, this also serves, as we have argued at several points, a typological function. As Burt (1980) found, those subjects who hold adversarial sexual beliefs
also tend to consider rape myths to be accurate; that is, adversarial sexual beliefs partially underlie the latter, and excuse the 'minor' (e.g., led on) form of rape. They tend to assert that only the more extreme, violent rape events constitute genuine rapes. Here, we see how plausibility is nurtured by the typological-schismatic practice of marginalizing rape. To put it another way, plausibility is conditioned by the discursive/practical matrix in which the explaining individual is immersed—it is not simply a question of the formal causal coherence of an explanation or theory. The investments in a particular framework of discourse and practice ensure that some types of theories or explanations, irrespective of their causal status, are liable to persevere.

However, there is also another question to be answered. Perseverance is itself a practice and must be accommodated by the discursive/practical framework. It should not be viewed as a negative outcome of a cognitive tendency, but as a positive component within a given discursive/practical matrix. Its positive status is especially likely where it has been integrated into a matrix by virtue of the explainer's power. For example, in the case of police officers explaining rape, they can bolster their sexist impressions by essentially regulating the number of disconfirming instances, dismissing all but the most stereotypical rape complaints. The self-fulfilling nature of such explanations has been taken
into account in that research which has looked at the propensity of subjects to seek out confirmatory evidence (cf Ch.2). However, in the example of the police, this takes on a more fervent form - unsurprisingly, given their investment in traditional modes of masculine behaviour and the demands placed on them by organizational and juridical factors. Further, it is worth emphasizing that the police do not exercise a simply cognitive power in the form of cognitively screening information; it is material too - women's claims/complaints are actively discounted, women are denigrated and humiliated. It is also not cognitive in the sense of being located in the individual; rather, such behaviour is an element of the policeman role.

The positive value of perseverance is that it feeds into and draws upon masculinity as present in the police role. Perseverance is not simply a form of bigotry, it is a means of rehearsing a theory or explanation, and that process of rehearsal (or resistance) is also an exercise of power, a reassertion of the privileged access to certainty ('eg through the capacity to determine what can and cannot count as disconfirming evidence). The findings of TP under experimental conditions may be a reflection of this positivity. Amongst policemen, it is likely to prove profound in the light of their tightly-knit, supportive group environment. But also, it is aided by the typological-schismatic orientation of 'cop culture' and
the police role, an orientation which is likely to be geared toward protecting its own hegemony (ie by the reproduction of rape myths and the denial of the dimensional).

c. Consensus and Baserate Information. Just as TP relies on plausibility, so too the use of baserate information will depend on its perceived plausibility. Various researchers have looked at what conditions the uptake of baserate information. It emerges that the (causal) relevance of such information is particularly instrumental (cf Ch.2). We, however, would repeat the argument of the above section that what constitutes a relevant sample depends on the subject of that sample. Our review of the literature regarding policemen's perceptions of rape victims, suggests that for some victims, no sample in which counter-stereotyped behaviours occur could dispel certain stereotypes which are strongly held. In other words, sample-based consensus information which does not accord with a given stereotypic image will be dismissed. This is, of course, what Ajzen(1977) is accessing when he refers to causal relevance. And Borgida et al(1981) have commented on how stereotypes may themselves be reconceptualized as a short-hand for consensus information; under these circumstances, consensus information is certainly used.

However, it must be recalled that baserate information
relevant to a given event is not necessarily, or even usually, unitary. That is, different types of consensus or baserate information apply, and sometimes these will conflict. In our discussion of the Yorkshire Ripper case, we saw two baserates or stereotypes projected onto the rape event (Innocent-Beast; Prostitute-Avenger): the initial Prostitute-Avenger being superceded by the Innocent-Beast configuration. The fact that information comes to be shaped to fit the stereotyped image reflects the discursive/practical positioning of the explainer. In the above example, it was always unlikely that the intervening categories of Prostitute-Beast and Innocent-Avenger would be construed. This was because the discursive/practical weight (or 'integratedness') of the former stereotyped configurations, which readily lend themselves to typological explanation, precluded the latter, more genuinely dimensional, pairs.

That the stereotype (illusory baserate) of the rapist-fiend survives the actual baserate information about rapists as the most 'normal' of inmates, is relevant here. Clearly, this might arise because policemen are not aware of the latter characterization of rapists; however, there might be other factors at work. Possibly, the 'normal' rapist might simply find no place in the traditional view of rape held by policemen. This, as we have seen in Chapter 7, is managed by nudging these 'led on' rapes out of the category of 'real' rapes. What would
then be a baserate that accesses the dimensionality of rape is rendered more or less irrelevant by an implicit redefinition of rape. Such a redefinition occurs in the 'unofficial' macho milieu of policing: it is a means of asserting orthodox discourse/practices. It will tend to fly in the face of the legal definition of rape which allows 'normality' to enter into the picture (certainly it does not openly exclude it). Of course, this process also applies to evaluation of rape victims (respectable versus open-territory).

As in the case of TP, the continued use of illusory baserates reflects and is an exercise of power: the production of counter-baserates - that is, the use of feminist-dimensional explanatory types - represent a struggle for power. The advantage at the disposal of the masculinized role is that, partly because of its tendency towards caricature, it will serve as a robust exemplar of the very baserates/stereotypes it propounds.

In this section I have started off from the opposite end of the spectrum to cognitive social psychology. I have not analyzed behaviour through a near-exclusive concentration on the de-contextual operation of given (postulated) cognitive processes. Instead, I have looked at behaviour in a highly textured environment, superimposing three 'cognitive' processes on it to demonstrate their intrinsic contingency. That is, I hope to have shown that they play
only an intermingled part in explanation. What is striking about this process of explanatory production is its complexity. It is a complexity that deserves the holistic treatment I have attempted in this thesis rather than the atomistic approach of experimental social psychology. In looking into the interaction of the various 'cognitive processes', we find that they are not unitary, discrete. Indeed, we can draw altogether alternative lines of demarcation through this matrix. Thus, rather than isolate an internal attribution bias, theory perseverance and neglect of consensus information, we could pick another factor that cuts across all three, eg plausibility. This could be a wide ranging rule of combination: the cognitive 'biases' we have looked are localized examples. This rule is socially mediated and socially 'functional'. Here we come close to Kruglanski and Ajzen's(1983) epistemic theory. But whereas they are typically vague about the nature of the social environment in which agents operate, we have tried to be as explicit as possible. In doing this, we are also in a position to formalize the activity of plausibility, in the sense of seeing it as the subjective element in the configuration of role, group, institution, discourse/practice and information.

To conclude this chapter: We have examined how our three ideal types enter into the rape explanations of policemen, and how they are variously integrated, or otherwise, into the discursive/practical framework of policework. We have
studied the complex of pressures that shape the explanatory orientation of policemen (their repertoire of scripts, myths, etc) and have attempted to demonstrate that these serve to trigger, shape and rehearse various cognitive processes. There is no easy way to summarize these combinations (and hence the usefulness of the ideal type): a fuller summary will be presented in the concluding chapter. Suffice it to say that, while we cannot do full justice to the array of factors that impinge on policemen’s explanations of rape, we have at least explored some of the (more important) ways that such a diversity relates to and incorporates a power at once structural (organizational, role-linked) and personal (masculine).
This concluding chapter will be organized in the following way: First there will be a summary of the main points of the thesis. This will be followed by an account of some of the practical ramifications of the work presented here, especially as regards the newly instituted police procedures for dealing with rape victims. Finally, I will consider some of the substantive weaknesses of the thesis and outline some implications for future research.

1. Summary and Overall Conclusions.

The central and basic point of this thesis is that social psychology has failed to do explanations the justice they deserve. That is, explanations are treated as if they are free-floating, disengaged from any concrete context of use. Where that use has been considered, its historical and situational specificity has hardly been taken into account. Rather, a vague 'need to control' is placed at the motivational centre of the generation and use of explanations; the social constitution of that need is not properly analysed. I have argued that to better comprehend the variety of needs and the spectrum of uses, it is necessary to situate explanations in the relevant discursive/practical matrix. This was the main thrust of Chapter 1.
In doing this it was necessary to outline the relation of explanation to cognitive processes, especially those that are conventionally seen as underlying explanation. It is important, in turn, to link these to the discursive/practical matrices in which explanations are embedded. This was also partly motivated by the desire to moderate the social psychological emphasis on cognition with its implications, invested with the truth/power of science, that such explanations and behaviours were inevitable. To undermine this fatalism, two types of critique were utilized. Firstly I tried to show the disparate ways in which the relevant cognitive processes were 'mediated' by social processes; that is, I tried to reassert the importance of contextual factors in explanation, in particular, the relation of cognition to practice and power. Instead of positing an underlying cognitive process to account for these various instances, I opted for a packaging approach which connected a given cognitive process with a given explanations that is 'impelled' by a specific social context. As such, an explanation, rather than being 'pushed from behind or within' by internal cognitive processes, is 'drawn towards' the 'external demands' of a given social situation. Naturally, this contrast is a false one, for each must entail the other. The second strategy was to speculate on the origins of cognitive processes, and suggest that they might be partially rooted in the social
infrastructure (say in the contradiction between the means and relations of production), not simply in the biological constitution of the individual.

Figure 1.

Simplified Model of Role

(Identity)
Personal

(a) / (b)
Practical ---- ROLE ---- Expressive

(d) / (c)
Institutional
(Behaviour)

(a) Self-related behaviour; (b) Group Processes; (c) Role Differentiation; (d) Institution-related behaviour.

Chapter 3 looked in more detail at what form the 'external demands' we mentioned above might take. This settled into an examination of the 'point of articulation' at which those processes acted: that point was conceived in terms of the role. In Chapter 3 I effectively focused on the point at which the discursive/practical matrix worked on the individual, that is, through the role. The role was conceived as incorporating both practical and expressive, personal and social moments. This conception was developed against the more popular backdrop of research into group-related explanation research. Regarding the latter it was maintained that the role
theoretically preceded the group, though in their actual interactions, role and group were complexly interdependent. Figure 1 diagrammatically summarizes our conception of the role.

Thus the role embodies and accesses the social identity of the individual, the behaviour of the individual in relation to both self and context, and the practical and expressive components of those behaviours. It goes without saying that such a diagram is a gross oversimplification, abstracting and isolating elements which are tightly entwined. Thus, for example, the institutional can lay the foundations of an identity, while that identity can mediate the day-to-day functioning of the institution. (In this relation the role of a practically grounded memory is pivotal - see below).

So, a role is multi-facetted: it contains elements that are derived from other matrices which impinge on both the general individual and the particular institution. Putting this a different way: the individual and institution interact with other individuals and institutions which partially remould the (target) role. The role is not static therefore, though we treat it as such in our case study. (Even so we do admit its malleability in noting that the police are attempting to reform their treatment of the victims of sexual offences by injecting "tact and sensitivity" p27, Report of H.M. Chief Inspector of
Constabulary, 1984). In placing individuals and institutions in wider contexts, we also took into account their broader function; to characterize such a function it was necessary to characterize the nature of the broader social structures. To this end, I adopted an essentially Marxist (Frankfurt School) view that also involved feminist social analysis (Chs. 4, 6).

The analysis of social structure must consider its relation to power and oppression. Consequently it is important to locate the role of ideology in this analysis. There are various problems with the concept, not least of which is the plethora of definitions, but I have continued to use it because of its theoretical links with oppression, power and resistance. In Chapter 4 I considered how explanations and their respective matrices could be related to ideology and power and argued that roles and explanations could be labelled ideological where it could be demonstrated (and this was always a historically contingent demonstration) that they played some part in the obstruction of critical (self-) reflection and promoted oppression of some sort. In the same chapter I explored some of the ways that explanations could be ideological tools in the hands of both lay persons (e.g., Republicans, role-holders) and experts (e.g., social psychologists/text book writers); these tools, it was suggested were complexly conditioned by the role situation of the explainer. It was also suggested that
particular roles have particular ideological functions, obfuscating criticism in both others (target roles) and in the home role (through a process of recursive conditioning). Power, a necessary component in such an analysis, had been more fully considered at the end of Chapter 1.

Chapter 5 drew various connections between the preceding chapters and elaborated on the methodology, for want of a better term, that was deployed in the second part of the thesis. By virtue of its holism, our preferred theoretical framework was bound to have a speculative moment in the sense that it is more theory- than data-driven. It was proposed that the ideal type could, at once, admit the speculative aspect of the theory (the one-sided extension of some characteristics over others, eg feminist over Marxist) and ensure that this speculation was grounded in data and theory that were credible (police, feminist and academic statistics of rape; interviews; socialist-feminist theories of rape and gender relations). The construction of an ideal type assumed that explanations were tools with a dual cutting edge: on the one hand servicing institutional role-demands, on the other supporting identity needs. In the terms of Figure 1, EXPLANATION could be substituted for ROLE. The former edge could readily encompass the social and ideological functions of explanations, while the latter could deal with the group, identity and
cognitive aspects of explanations. To re-iterate, this division is by no means as clear-cut as it is here presented. The precise configuration of the interaction between these will depend on the specific example chosen.

The foregoing discussions should have hinted at the broader significance of our approach. The analytic and empirical contextualization that has characterized this thesis can be applied to most, if not all, forms of social behaviour. Within what has been a multidisciplinary framework, we have attempted to counter the individualism of much social psychology by specifying the concrete environment in which behaviour is manifested and stressing its influence on both the form and content of psychological processes. In effect, we have been engaged in examining the interaction between psychological mechanism and function. Whereas social psychology has specialized in mechanism to the detriment of function, we have rehabilitated function in its explicit, social guises. By detailing the personal and social functions of explanations (expressive, practical, role, institutional, historical), we have been better able to understand the complexity and contingency of this interaction. Given that our approach generalizes across social behaviours, it follows that many areas within social psychology would be enhanced by adopting a broader based view such as that which has been developed here. Over and above the areas that have already been addressed (intergroup theory, role
theory, attribution theory, stereotyping, etc), the following might also benefit: those disciplines with a heavy cognitive bent such as person perception, equity theory, social influence, and even those with an ostensibly greater social and multidisciplinary orientation such as personal relationships research and ethogenics.

We now come to Part II, the case study of men's and policemen's explanation of rape. Because of the importance of background factors, Chapters 6 and 7 were given over to detailing the broad, non-institutional discursive/practical matrix which ground these explanations. Chapter 6 examined the material and ideological relation between men and women. Most important, we tried to show how stereotypes thus far accessed through questionnaires studies missed more fundamental, embedded representations which are integral to the practical relation between the genders. These we tried to bring out by applying a feminist analysis of gender relations. In doing this we did no more than set out the range of practices and discourses that are, on a feminist reading, likely to be associated with the 'traditional male'. As such, we did not go beyond feminist generalities. It was in Chapter 7, in our analyses of men's rape explanations, that we saw how these generalities mapped onto men's actual explanations. In that chapter we developed three ideal types of rape
explanation: the dimensional with its stress on the continuity between rape and normality, and its practice geared toward fundamental social and self change; the typological with its emphasis on the criteria of differentiation of rape from non-rape and its practical orientation towards the identification of rape in specific cases; and the schismatic a form of typological which further attempts to deny the dimensional, and thereby stands to preserve male power. The dimensional was related to feminist and anti-sexist explanations and drew on the critical analysis presented in Chapter 6 to support that continuity. The typological was evidenced in in legal, clinical, psychological and lay explanations. Whether the typological could be classed schismatic was always difficult to judge. Context was all-important; the more information as regards the general practices of the explainer, the more secure our assessment of the schismatic index of a typological explanation was likely to be. We attempted to illustrate, as opposed to survey, the use of these types and their relation to other discourse/practices in a small number of interviews. Contrary to expectations based on the feminist focus on rape myths, schismatic explanations relatively rarely resorted to the open use of rape myths. More subtle means, such balance-as-counterpoint, were deployed. However, it also became apparent that our distinction between the ideal types was more problematic than envisaged.
Figure 2.

Simplified Model of Policeman Role

Masculinity

(Unofficial) (b)

(a) Dismiss or ignore women's rape claims; (b) Group Behaviour (Denigration of women); (c) Loyalty to the force; differentiation from other roles; (d) Attributions to the the alleged rapist.

Maximize Arrests

This then is the general backdrop against which the more specialized deployment of rape explanations by policemen is considered. In Chapter 8 I tried to place these ideal types in the more concrete context of the policeman role. Figure 2 represents a highly simplified version of our findings. In embedding the police role in the framework outlined in Fig.2 we emphasize the masculine component of personal and social identity and reduce the institution-driven behaviour to the maximization of arrests. However, as we saw, this latter is affected by other factors such as the prosecutability of individual cases. In turn This is conditioned by the precedents of the juridical system. The merging of official legal procedure and informal cultural tradition suggest that our division between official and unofficial is somewhat artificial. This merging is an outcome of the fact that it
is the frontline officers who ultimately mediate and shape organizational directives. We might thus expect to find and in Chapter 8 we provided some evidence in support of a tendency toward schismatic explanation that is grounded in the traditional masculinity of 'cop culture' and juridical practice, but simultaneously constrained by the requirements of law enforcement (even if that is itself conditioned by judgements of 'good arrest', 'rubbish', etc), and shielded by notions of prosecutability (credibility in the courts). Thus we tie explanation of rape to a complex of influences each of which implicates its own set of discourses and, importantly, practices. Finally, we introduced cognitive factors into our analysis, attempting to show how they both were 'engendered' by and mediated the intersection of social practices and discourses connected with the policeman role.

2. Practical Implications.

There are a considerable number of more or less directly implied practical projects that can be derived from this thesis. At the more ramatic end these might include the overthrow of patriarchal and capitalist social structure to the thorough overhaul of the social psychological and university establishment. At a more manageable level we can look at two practical implications regarding the use of explanations.
Firstly, at the broad level, there are those implications that apply to the current polarization within the gendered social field. In particular, we can examine the consolidation and extension of the orthodox masculine role and the way that explanations (discourses, representations, etc) have mediated this. As an anecdotal example, it is possible to detect this polarization in the cinematic reawakening of the macho, individualist hero. The pessimism of the mid-70s which spawned such films as the Parallax View and Executive Action (in which organizations overwhelmed the efforts of individuals), is replaced by films, perhaps buoyed up by the optimism of Reaganism, like Turk 182 and Rambo which re-assert the primacy of the macho individual who takes on the establishment against overwhelming odds and wins. The main point is that this polarization is proceeding on a variety of levels, both practical and discursive (eg enterprise schemes and the rhetoric of self-reliance respectively). The production of counter explanations may or may not have an effect on this process. It will depend on the circumstances whether such explanations diffuse this polarization or exacerbate it. That such explanations may take effect can be seen in the possible influence of feminist thought on the police treatment of rape victims.

Regarding the latter, in Britain there seem to be changes in the treatment of rape victims by the police (Guardian, 1/11/84), with policewomen assigned to the task of calming
and taking seriously the claims of these alleged victims. In America, both men and women police officers are being trained to deal with rape victims (O'Reilly, 1984). However, suspicions arise when, in O'Reilly's account, we are faced with an extraordinary exchange between him and a policewoman who has broken down after attempting to comfort a victim. In this, O'Reilly quite savagely demands that the policewoman pull herself together and recognize his expertise in the field. This suggested that, if we looked beyond O'Reilly's optimism, we might regard the entrenchment and necessity of masculinity in policing as not so easily overcome. There are two ways in which it might retain its foothold. Firstly, there can be specialization across police officers, with some assigned to rape-related duties and others having little or nothing to do with it, treating it as an unworthy, low status duty. Secondly, and more insidiously, there may be specialization within police officers. Thus, the appropriate interpersonal skills reserved for dealing with victims are produced at a fairly superficial level (almost as another aspect of the professionalization of the police - putting the women at her ease yields more cogent information); there is still relatively little respect for the women herself. And anyway, tact does not preclude the tactful dismissal of a women's allegations. A difficulty which such officers might face is possibly reflected in a study of the rape attitudes of police surgeons (Geis, Wright and Geis, 1984).
This found that the majority were torn between role-loyalties to the police and medicine respectively, with many succumbing to the police role and all its biases. So, there is every possibility that this specialization within police officers might be swamped by the demands of the more powerful role/specialism.

If the above argument holds, it follows that the masculinity syndrome of policemen must first be tackled before the treatment of rape victims becomes genuinely improved. This is because part of such a treatment must entail the admission that orthodox masculinity generally provides the necessary conditions for rape. Working against this is the tendency to portray rapists as fiends and deviants, a species outside the bounds of normal masculinity. In order to undermine this, it is also necessary to erode the individualism that attaches to both lawful blame (guilt) and to masculinity - that is, to see both in the complex social context. Yet to do this would be tantamount to changing the very function of the police to something quite revolutionary. However, this pessimistic view should not detract from the few gains that have been made by women. Our analysis suggests that, under the right conditions, continued pressure (through the reproduction of alternative explanations) may lead to a more pervasive liberalization of the police treatment of alleged rape victims.
3. Shortcomings and Avenues.

In this section I will consider three broad problems with this thesis that I see as being particularly important, especially insofar as they point to avenues for future research.

It is clear that my work falls into the hermeneutic tradition within psychology (Taylor, 1973). As such it is open to the problems that face all interpretive disciplines - namely, that of validation. To what extent, then, is our interpretation of policemen's explanations of rape more plausible than others? This problem has been considered in some detail by Hirsch (1967, 1976) as it applies to literary criticism. Given that human behavior can be considered a text (Ricoeur, 1971), and notwithstanding our previous reservations (Ch. 5), for present purposes, we can consider our interpretation in the light of Hirsch's principles of validation.

For Hirsch, the production and evaluation of interpretations is necessarily probabilistic. The initial interpretation is something of a guess and there are no systematic rules for making good guesses. However, he seems to miss the point that there are nevertheless historical rules, which for given times and places, carry more weight than do others. Thus in Paris, the Derridean mode of analysis may currently be the preferred one. In our case, our interpretations have derived from a
generative intent that turns on feminist and socialist perceptions of the world (hermeneutic circles).

Hirsch (1976) feels that one criterion for the validation of an interpretation that is immune from these local fads, is that an interpretation should be true (or coherent with) the author's intention. Thus, "...in ethical terms, the original meaning is the 'best meaning'..." (p92). This is something that ethogenics also incorporates. In the Marsh et al. (1978) study this getting at the actor's intention is conducted through negotiation. While the interpretations are theoretically always open to revision, intended meaning is more often than not a constituent. In contrast, I would suggest that the meaning of a text/action can be accessed through its use and effects (which might or might not include intention). In doing this we must therefore demarcate the constraints that are imposed on the use and effects; this requires historical and social analysis. Thus, the meaning of an action/text is historically variable. In the case of policemen's explanations of rape, their meaning can be appropriated with particular reference to the effects that they have on women, men, the police themselves and so on. Such an 'external' criterion depends on the validation of the historical and social analysis which embraces those actions/texts. The corollary to this is that an interpretation also has a use. Hirsch's privileging of the author has an individualizing effect; its ethical
stance serves to present Hirsch as a gentleman (whatever Hirsch's intentions in this respect). In short, the conflict over interpretations is often a conflict over cosmologies.

But we are also presented with other types of criteria. The accumulation of favourable evidence is, because of the nature of the hermeneutic circle, inadequate. Rather, Hirsch (1967) suggests a number of statistically modelled parameters: All relevant evidence should be considered; the relevance is conditioned by the degree to which it can be assimilated to the class which embodies the interpretation. Evidence which helps narrow a class will have particular relevance when we come to interpret a possible representative of that class. Thus, in noting that 'macho' men tend to denigrate women, the additional evidence that policemen are especially 'macho' will serve to further support our interpretation of their rape explanations as generally derogatory of women. Other criteria are: the greater the number of instances that fall into that class, and the higher the frequency of the relevant traits amongst members of that class, then the greater the reliability of that class and hence interpretation. In all, I think that I have managed to sketch the context and practices that attach to the policeman's rape explanation in sufficient detail to warrant the interpretation that is placed on them.
As regard our ideal type of policemen's rape explanations, it suffers from an exclusive dependence on secondary sources, however reliable they might be. It would certainly be valuable to directly witness and more precisely analyze the distribution of these explanatory forms within the police institution. So, future research might take on a more empirical cast. This would also have to incorporate action (in the sense of Lewinian action research, Chein, Cook and Harding, 1948). The problem here is that we would be dealing with an event that occurs relatively rarely but whose discursive/practical manifestation (endemic sexism, etc) is a regular feature of police life. While we can trace out the links between masculinity and rape explanations (and the treatment of rape victims), to make such links seem credible and, vitally, alterable, to police officers seems a difficult task, especially in the light of the subtle and institutionally viable explanatory devices they use in severing those links. However, this pessimism might be modified by a sensitivity to the problems experienced by police officers themselves; for example, the stress of policing violent areas or the alienation of an extreme masculinity. With respect to this latter point, I have painted too functional a picture: a study of individual police officers, as opposed to the construction of an ideal type, would doubtless reveal problems that would otherwise go untapped (cf Ch. 8 for the various types of policeman).
A second problem is that we have to more convincingly substantiate our feminist analysis of masculinity for which we derived our embedded stereotypes. This is not helped by the variety of feminisms available, with all their different accents and dynamics. This aside, the embedded stereotype of masculinity as one in which, historically mediated, the desire to control is uppermost, has to be fleshed out in a more comprehensive way than I've done so here. The way that this motivation impregnates, (or fails to impregnate) the various aspects of the masculine self and its behavioural repertoire needs to be traced out. For example, my assertion that these control needs are fulfilled in the greater tendency of men to engage in intergroup processes (thereby controlling both self and other images) needs to be investigated in somewhat more detail. To this end we might look at how the generation of control/certainty through the formulation of the Other can drift apart from the 'actual nature' of the Other (a global example of this might be the ecological disasters we now face); we might examine how the inherent limits of the Other come to constrain the processes of control/certainty. In a sense this is what is happening with the resistance that women/feminists put up in defining themselves - they are setting the limits of themselves as Other. A different research strategy would be to recount alternative modes of control and interaction from the anthropological literature (eg of Pygmies,
Barclay, 1982; the Bushmen, Van der Post, 1964. As regards the latter, we can point out that, though perhaps over-idealistcally portrayed as perfectly attuned to their environment, they are loathed to engage in what are considered to be conventional intergroup processes), or else seek them out in contemporary Western societies.

Nevertheless, the problem that remains is still one of interpretation rather than falsification or proof. The, apparently empirical, counterclaim that women also form groups whose operation is as, if not more, extreme than male groups, can be explained in terms of masculine hegemony. But this explanation means that masculinity and control/certainty needs take on the form of a mutually defining couple. This is indicative of the fact that we are presenting an alternative interpretative framework (though it is duly relativized by our use of interview material); a framework that is meant to have both polemical and generative impact. Under these circumstances, another channel for research would be the elaboration and clarification of this alternative feminist schema in its application to various social psychological phenomena. I think this would be a fruitful enterprise, especially given the often assumed 'control needs' that lie at the affective heart of many of the processes social psychology attempts to understand.

Two corollary problems: Firstly, Potter et al (1984) have
pointed out that with regard to feminist novels there is a construction of feminine experience that, despite its differences with other forms of the novel, still manages to homogenize, albeit radically, female experience. They suggest that the full range of feminine (and masculine) experience (perception and interaction with self and others) needs to be explored. This criticism can certainly be applied to my work. I have indulged in such homogenization, though I have softened it by framing it as an ideal type and through the use of interviews. But more importantly, this criticism is too stringent. In setting up a universally applicable dichotomy, we can access broad historical processes, especially mediated through the family and work, that provide the (historically bound) 'baserate' of masculine and feminine differences. Over and above this, there are undoubtedly more refined differences and similarities. An exploration of the range of these and of their interaction (perhaps mutual shaping) with the baserates is another research area that could be developed. Secondly, in looking at masculinity's links with control, we have reworked the issue of aggression, situating it in the context of long-term historical processes, interpreting it as a latent aspect of masculinity, rather than a physiological or psychological phenomenon. As a means to more securely grounding this approach, it could be used examine the assumptions of orthodox aggression research and the possible ideological function of that research.
The final set of shortcomings I will tackle include issues surrounding memory, scripts, textual analysis and the relation of these to discursive/practical matrices. Schank (1982), extending Schank and Abelson's (1977) script theory, has argued that scripts play a major part in the organization of episodic memory and that memory plays a reciprocal part in understanding. In the same way that our critique of Schank and Abelson focused on their neglect of power, we can point to a similar void in Schank's formulations. The simple point is that what can be remembered is influenced by power as mediated through the role in which the remembering individual is situated. Further, the repertoire that is available to a role is accessed via memory. Thus power and memory are intrinsically linked. It is no wonder that the struggle for power also entails a struggle over historical memory: feminists attempt to recover women's history, Orwell's fictional and Kundera's Czech states rewrite history moment to moment, and social psychology textbooks attempt to convey a coherent history (cf Ch.4). At the individual level, we can suggest that two types of memory operate based on practical and discursive forms of consciousness (Giddens, 1979). At both levels, through these possibly distinct (cerebellar and cerebral?) modes of memory, power comes to be mediated. This can be described in Foucauldian terms. Power, in the form of microtechnologies (eg surveillance, measurement, the
semiotics of institutional layout, etc), inscribe the individual, shaping him/her accordingly. That inscription is likely to be stored in these two types of memory. We might naively propose that practical consciousness, being less open to critical reflection, plays the major part in this process.

Running parallel with this, and dealing directly with the problems of interpretation at both personal and academic levels can be a view of scripts, roles and situations that can accommodate recent developments in literary criticism (cf Ch.1; Potter et al,1984). For these may all be treated as texts; their meanings are always negotiable - never singularly determined by the text or the reader. The power/role of the actor/observer can determine how s/he will interpret the situation in which s/he finds him/herself - that is, s/he effectively deciphers the text/situation. Yet s/he is also constrained by the text. Similarly, the individual agent can be viewed as a text which the psychologist/investigator interprets. In both cases, the meaning of the text reverberates between the psychologist/agent/reader and the subject(or experiment)/situation/text. The use of various techniques from literary criticism in the analysis of these interactions, especially as they relate to the wider social/representational field, seems worth pursuing.

To end: This chapter has pointed to a number of possible
research programmes that lead off in various directions. At the heart of each are the dual concerns of this thesis: to adequately embed the individual in his/her context - indeed to blur the divide between them; and, thereby, to do justice to the potentiality of both.
The "Glasgow Rape Case" by Harper and MacWhinnie (1983) will be used as a case study illustration of the deployment of rape myths, and their links with S, T and D explanatory types.

This book is about two things: the rape and assault on Carol X, and Scottish legal history. The accounts of the incident (both within and outside the court), and Carol's physical and emotional trauma are woven, within the narrative, into accounts of the workings of the Scottish legal system and the dramas surrounding its partial breakdown in the course of this case. Essentially, this is a piece of journalism the main ingredient of which, the personalization of events, runs throughout the text. Nevertheless, there are marked differences between this book and the usual press reports. The social backdrop to the rape is sketched, and the broader implications, especially regarding the law, are outlined. Moreover, and perhaps most strikingly, both the rapists, Carol X and those involved with her and the case are presented in an ostensibly sympathetic light.
Given this detailing, which should at least partially undermine the use of myths and stereotypes, it is important to see how these have been re-instated. That this book was going to incorporate them was always likely given the backgrounds of the authors (solicitor and crime journalist respectively). A hint of this comes in the last page but two when the Potiphar's wife myth is cited as a warning against too cavalier a condemnation of the alleged rapist. The warning of course rightly serves a typological function, but its overstatement, or rather the uncritical adherence to it, suggests a tendency toward the schismatic.

In this analysis we will concentrate on the rape myth of the Rape-Fiend - that we considered above. After a precis of the book, I will show the ways that the fiend is constructed. It should be reiterated that these discursive elements exist in tension with the sympathy that is extensive throughout the book. While the sympathy is quite explicit; the myth hangs back, buried amongst sections and themes. In attempting to work this out into the open, the problem of validity comes to the fore. Given the arguments presented in this and the preceding chapter, and also various comments regarding the interpretation of texts, it should be clear that my validity claims are not absolute, but historically and contextually bound.

(1). Precis. Carol X came from a poor working class background. At 18 she was raped by a boyfriend and
got pregnant. She left work to have the baby. At 21 she was married. Her husband was in and out of prison and she left him; during this time she had two more children. Three years later she met Billy and, for a year, was happy with him.

Barrowfield is a rough district in Glasgow's East-end. Crowding, unemployment and poverty bred violence. Gangs were again commonplace in the '80s. On 31st October, 1981, Carol, instead of making Billy's dinner, goes to her friend's (Babs) house to chat and drink. Billy arrives and takes her back home. Babs later turns up at Billy's home because she doesn't want to stay with her boyfriend who is getting violent. Billy accompanies Babs back to the bus-stop. Meantime Carol slips out, frightened that Billy will beat her. She meets Babs at the bus-stop and they go for a drink. Billy, finding Carol gone, goes out and gets roaring drunk. Later, leaving the pub for her mother's, Carol decides to return to Billy's. No buses are running, so she walks. On her way, she is attacked.

Gordon Sweeny(14) and John Thompson(15), after going to a disco with Joe Sweeny and Steven Cameron (both 17), are hanging around. They have been drinking. They follow Carol after realizing she is probably tipsy. She is either, knocked out and dragged, or led towards a hut in a scrap metal yard. There the two youths have intercourse with her. Gordon goes off and gets Joe and Steven. Joe Sweeny after having intercourse with her, slashes her with a knife. As he comes out of the hut he cries, "I've ripped the lassie!".

Carol wakes up and eventually crawls to a neighbour's. From there she is rushed to hospital and treated. The police have meanwhile chased Joe and stopped Gordon and John, but not for any particular reason. Later, information received names them as the attackers and they are arrested.

Over the following days, Carol is devastated. She cannot sleep or get the rape out of her mind. She feels useless and attempts suicide. Billy saves her. At the Procurator Fiscal's office, she is subjected to a barrage of abuse as a taster of what to expect in court. Her ex-husband contacts her and she decides to go with him to Newcastle. Only days before the trial she cannot be traced. Eventually she is found and returns to Billy. She attempts suicide a second time.

On the trial day, the trial is postponed till the following week. The second time, she breaks down in the court cafeteria. She is taken to a psychiatrist. She miscarries at the hospital. An Advocate Depute (a part-time officer at the Public Prosecutor's office) reviews the psychiatric reports on Carol and decides to abandon the case for the time being. In the last months of
1981, a different Advocate Depute decides to drop the case altogether. The four defendants are told; Carol is not.

McWhinnie, crime reporter on the Daily Record, is contacted about these events. The contact considers this state of affairs to be a 'bloody scandal'. The argument runs thus: to prove rape it must be shown that penetration took place and consent was withheld. But Carol is too disturbed to testify. However, had she died of her injuries, a murder trial would have gone ahead. Why then has the assault not been tried? McWhinnie contacts the local MP; later he informs the MP that confessions were given by the defendants and that Cameron had turned Queen's evidence. A Parliamentary storm brews up. This is exacerbated when Nicholas Fairburn, representing the Public Prosecutor's office, insults the House by prematurely suggesting to the press that the prosecution had insufficient evidence to proceed. He eventually resigns.

Meanwhile, Carol is being hunted down by the press. The locals are overtly hostile to the reporters. She finally decides on a private prosecution after being looked after by men of the Scottish Daily Express. She meets Ross Harper who agrees to organize a private prosecution. A team is assembled and a presentation is constructed. All services are provided free. The application to prosecute privately is made on 16/3/82. Finally it is accepted and the trial is scheduled for 28/5/82.

Billy and Carol get married on 11/2/82. But after weeks of being cooped up with Billy, who has left his job to look after her, the marriage begins to founder. Carol leaves and stays with her aunt. McWhinnie eventually tracks her down. She has no intention of pulling out now.

The trial begins. The defences take the following forms. Joseph Sweeny is blamed for the assault by Gordon Sweeny and John Thompson. Joseph Sweeny blames John Thompson for it. Evidence is presented. Carol is nervous when she gives her evidence. In the cross-examination, the fact that rape ever occurred is questioned. The defence suggests that, given that she was unconscious, she cannot be sure of having been raped. They put it that, being drunk, she voluntarily went with the two boys. It emerges that Joe Sweeny may have been beaten by the police. Cameron eventually admits that Carol was frightened throughout the event. The doctor who examined her at the hospital cannot confirm that she had a wound at the back of her head through being knocked unconscious. The implication here was that she went voluntarily. More evidence is given and analyzed. The verdicts are that Joe Sweeny is guilty on counts of rape and assault, while Gordon Sweeny and John Thompson are guilty of indecent assault.

Carol tries to get back to normal. After a holiday, a
false pregnancy and rows with Billy, she settles with him and is doing better.

(2). Rape-Fiends. As we have already noted, in contrast to typical press coverage of rapist-fiends, details of the background of the boys are given. The appalling conditions of Barrowfield are stressed, but at the same time the four youths are distanced from them. On page 15, the following quote is given: "..."We do a lot of bad things but we don't attack lassies - even in Barrowfield"..." (This boy was a member of a rival gang). The outline of social and economic factors of Barrowfield is not directly used to explain the rise of the gangs; rather, sympathy is reserved for the law-abiding population. The gang members are essentially seen as thugs, especially in their relation to the police. Thus we are presented with an account of the gangs uniting to attack the police which the authors see as "amazing" (p19). A more genuinely sympathetic treatment might have considered the attack in terms of the internal cohesion of the gang, or the negative sense of occasion in response to boredom (Robins and Cohen, 1978); or it might have attempted to bring together the accounts of masculinity, hard drinking and economic hardship in a more meaningful way (Patrick, 1973). The accent on masculinity, hard drinking, and economic hardship are never brought together in any meaningful way.

So the contrasts that are initially established are between the gangs and law-abiding citizens. The fact that the social conditions are shared is simply
used to differentiate gangs and citizens; it is implied that there is something intrinsically deviant about the gang members. It is a means by which to more strongly assert typological criteria. It is easily achieved, as we saw above, by neglecting the history of Glasgow gangs and working class masculinity. The gangs represent the irrational. With the groundwork for the extraordinariness of the attack laid, more powerful symbols can be brought into play.

And these come in the form of the legal system. Where the group of defendants fell into dissolution, wracked my mutual recrimination, the Scottish legal system, itself under close scrutiny after its various misjudgements, pulled together. Throughout the text, its coherence and adaptability, as well as its compassion, is emphasized. The charge that the private prosecution that was eventually brought simply served to deflect attention from the internal failings of the public system is mentioned only fleetingly. What seems to be occurring is a contrast between two different strategies for survival: the defendants' was individualistic and internecine; the legal system's cooperative and rational. Of course, this is not surprising given the respective interests of the two groups; nevertheless, the contrast exists and under prevailing conditions serves to denigrate the former. On a different level, this class contrast is reflected in the statements and court evidence given by the defendants.
Inevitably, the boys are made fools of; in the case of Joe Sweeny, he ends up adhering to an implausible conspiracy between the police, the witnesses and the other defendants. The often mentioned brilliance of the counsel and the judges forms a luminous backdrop to the dimness of the defendants.

Thus we have a series of contrasts: between the defendants and the legal system, lawful locals, and members of other gangs. Each contrast, while overtly typological, serves to schismatically distance the defendants and their actions from 'normality'. This is the point being made here. We are not denying that these actions are out of the ordinary, but their connections to everyday practices, sexuality, attitudes, etc, should not be severed as they seem to have been here.

Also, the representations of both the intrinsic rapist-fiend and the temporary (lid-flipped) rapist are present here. In the defence submissions, Joe Sweeny's actions are presented as a "Moment of madness" (p242). The consumption of alcohol and the defence's depiction of Carol's behaviour as provocative likewise fit in with the conception of the triggered rapist. This is in comparison to the apparently intrinsically irrational character of the boys that the above contrasts signify. On closer reading, we can see that these two types of rapist can be demarcated in a way which relates to differing interests.
The inherent, long-term irrationality which culminates in rape is primarily equated with a class and a subculture (working-class gangs). The momentary, loss-of-control rapist is largely equated with a masculinity that has been mismanaged by the victim. This division is not absolute, there is crossover. Still, it serves to evoke the 'interests' or practices that bind these myths and discourses. It points to their schismatic function to obscure the continuity between rape and 'normality', here characterized by the practice/discourses in which the authors themselves are engaged (or else aspire to). That is, normality is itself open to multiple interpretations, and can be cast in class and sub-cultural terms, as opposed to simply individualist ones (eg in the way that the rapist is normally marginalized through the attribution of individual, internally driven deviance). So, as a further complication to our analysis, the use of schismatic explanations not only serves a uniform masculinity, but also a narrower masculinity that is allied to a class, ie middle-class, professional.
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