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THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM:
THE OHIO EVIDENCE

Abstract of Thesis:
The cleavage in voter loyalties that was to sustain the Second Party System in Ohio was created in the thirty years before 1830. Its origins are to be found in the national disputes of the 1790s, which by 1802 had become involved with the issue of Ohio statehood. These early divisions were more deep-rooted than commonly assumed, dictating political behaviour for over a decade and providing political experiences that became controlling influences on later developments. However, the more immediate origin of the divisions established by the 1830s was the many-sided crisis of 1819-22, which made men look to politics for the solution of their problems, break with older loyalties and create new ones. In Ohio the demands for a non-slave-holding President and positive federal economic legislation melded into what became the National Republican and Whig parties, though a minority of Ohioans - for reasons peculiar to particular localities and particular ethnocultural groups - insisted on supporting Andrew Jackson in 1824 and subsequent years. The contest between these two groupings drew unprecedented numbers of new voters to the polls in 1828, most of whom committed themselves to Jackson, thus establishing the balanced distribution of party strength that was to persist for decades. Jackson's advantage in 1828 came from neither superior party organization nor the "rise of democracy," but from the opportunity to harness social resentments of long standing which had previously disrupted rather than reinforced party ties. Jackson's partisans could also call upon old-party loyalties that dated back to the War of 1812, and so created a party that bore some resemblance to the Jeffersonian Democrats, even if the crisis of the early 1820s had forged a nationalist opposition party far more powerful electorally in Ohio than the Federalists had ever been.
THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM:
THE OHIO EVIDENCE

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by

Donald John Ratcliffe

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Department of History, University of Durham
1985
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DECLARATIONS

Some portions of this thesis, notably parts of chapters 6 and 7, appeared in a dissertation entitled "Political Divisions in Ohio in the Years of Jacksonian Democracy," which was submitted successfully in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Philosophy in the History of the British Empire and Commonwealth and the United States of America, at the University of Oxford in 1966.

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The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent, and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
The following abbreviations are used throughout the footnotes and bibliography of this work:

**HPSO** = Bulletin of the HPSO (subsequently CHSB, and latterly Queen City Heritage).

**BTP** = Benjamin Tappan Papers, OHS or LC, as indicated.

**CHP** = Charles Hammond Papers, OHS.

**CHS** = Cincinnati Historical Society (formerly HPSO).

**CHSB** = Cincinnati Historical Society Bulletin.

**EAB** = Ethan Allen Brown Papers, OHS.

**EOPL** = Microfilm edition of the Papers of Thirteen Early Ohio Political Leaders (OHS).

**EWP** = Elisha Whittlesey Papers, WRHS.

**HPSO** = Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio (subsequently CHS), Cincinnati.

**LC** = Library of Congress (Manuscript Division, unless otherwise stated).

**LFP** = Larwill Family Papers, OHS.

**MTWP** = Micajah T. Williams Papers, OHS.

**OAHP** = Ohio Archaeological and Historical Publications.*

**OAHQ** = Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly.*

**OAHS** = Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society.

**OAHSP** = Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society Publications.*

**OAHSQ** = Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society Quarterly.*

**OH** = Ohio History.*

**OHQ** = Ohio Historical Quarterly.*

**OHS** = Ohio Historical Society (formerly OAHS), Columbus.

**OLGRC** = Ohio Local Government Record Center.

**QPHPSO** = Quarterly Publications of the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio.

**TEFP** = Thomas Ewing Family Papers, OHS or LC, as indicated.

**TWP** = Thomas Worthington papers, OHS or LC as indicated.

**VFM** = Vertical File Material, at the library indicated.

**WRHS** = Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland.

* The journal of the OAHS and OHS has been known by various titles at different periods; in every reference the title on the volume actually used has been cited.
The river Cuyahoga, Tuscarawas Branch, the Indian boundary line, the Ohio River with the rivers and smaller streams running into the Ohio from the North East, as far as the Indian boundary, with the subsidiary line, and those equal to actual survey, except the Ohio from the lake to the Little Miami, and the Virginia reservation, these, with the Indian land Districts, are taken from the latest Map, corrected by the latest observations.

January 1804

Scale of 20 miles to an inch

Ohio in 1804.
Preface

This work began, too many years ago, as an attempt to understand what Jacksonian politics were really all about. The assumption was that the arguments between Schlesinger and his critics, between ethnoculturalists and those who took socioeconomic conflict seriously, between pragmatists who stressed the force of political mechanisms (like Richard P. McCormick) and those who detected ideological differences among the parties, could best be explained by a close attention to the interactions between politicians and grass-roots within the bounds of one state. Given the condition of state studies, I looked towards the states of the older West, and soon decided that Ohio had exactly the right blend of importance on the national Jacksonian scene, good sources available in microform as well as in print, and a degree of confusion surrounding the interpretation of its political behaviour.

At an early stage - influenced no doubt by the inspiration and encouragement of Professor Charles Sellers at the University of California, Berkeley - I decided that a major force at work in the political behaviour of the 1830s and 1840s was that of pre-established party loyalties. Thus I increasingly found myself looking back towards the 1820s, when, it then seemed to me, those loyalties were first established, and so I immediately had to confront the McCormick-style interpretation of the 1824 Presidential election presented by Harry R. Stevens in his book of 1955. My alternative interpretation was first presented in a short thesis offered for the Oxford postgraduate degree of Bachelor of Philosophy in 1966, and was subsequently


At the same time I was developing my ideas and research on the implications of my work for understanding the 1830s and 1840s, encouraged largely by the response to a paper on Ohio politics, 1824–1854, presented to the annual conference of the British Association for American Studies at Cambridge in 1968. In 1971–72 I was enabled by a Research Fellowship awarded by the American Council of Learned Societies to pursue my investigation into the whole Jackson period, concentrating especially on the years after 1828. The understanding I came to marked a refinement of the ideas already present in the Oxford B. Phil. thesis and the Cambridge paper, and their broad outline is indicated in an article I wrote when my earlier piece in *The Journal of American History* came under attack from a historian whose general approach to Jacksonian politics in Ohio seemed (and seems) to me absolutely untenable.

However, little of that appears here. For towards the end of my A.C.L.S. Fellowship in 1972, I suddenly realised that, just as the 1820s might be the key to the 1830s, so the 1800s and 1810s might be the key to the 1820s. My first approaches to the confusing political history of Ohio before 1820 resulted in an article published in *Ohio History* in 1976,


which was awarded the Ohio Bicentennial Article Prize. My progress, always laboured, then faltered beneath distractions, notably that of editorship, though a year as Visiting Associate Professor at Ohio State University, 1980-81, assisted my work considerably. The present work at last explains how political experiences in the thirty years before 1828 established the patterns of political support that were to determine the main lines of political conflict in Ohio for the next century, though it is still not the final word: for during 1984, as Samuel Foster Haven Fellow I found much new material at the American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Massachusetts, while a travel grant from the British Academy enabled me to plug a few holes and spot a few more hares to course.

Two conventions adopted in this work ought to be explained from the start. Firstly, I have tried to explain the interaction between national and state politics, especially in the 1820s, but, in doing so, I constantly run the risk of confusing the reader as to whether certain terms common to both state and nation are being used at any particular moment to refer to Ohio or the United States. I have therefore adopted the convention of using capital initial letters in terms like "North" or "Secretary of State" when they refer to the nation or the federal government, and stuck to lower-case letters when talking of regions of Ohio or officers and organs of the state government. Secondly, I have endeavoured to convey a sense of how contemporaries felt about the political conflicts they witnessed or participated in. I have therefore quoted extensively from their writings, both public and private, and have used their original spelling and punctuation. Because their writing was not always conventional in such matters —


6. One old hare has resulted in an unpublished paper, "Antimasonry and Partisanship, 1824-1840," which emphasizes the importance of the structure of loyalties established by 1828 in determining the fortunes of political Antimasonry. This is partly based on a local study, which has been summarized in Ratcliffe, "Antimasonry in Lake County, Ohio, 1827-1834," Lake County Historical Quarterly (Mentor, O.), XXII (1980), 1-6.
especially as I have as often as possible used the private writings of men of lower class and often meagre education - I have found that to use the term "[sic]" is to obtrude on the reader's eye, and so I have avoided it. Readers must believe that the quotations are what was written, not the result of the typists' idiosyncrasies.

A work as long in the making as this has been must inevitably generate a huge debt of gratitude. I must acknowledge the initial inspiration of Charles Sellers, as must so many works of the last twenty years on the Jacksonian period; that inspiration and encouragement has been sustained by the interest shown at different times by many American historians, both in this country and in the United States. The staff of the Ohio Historical Society has never failed to be helpful in spite of seeing my face too much for long periods, if at widely scattered intervals; and none more consistently over the years than Conrad Weitzel, Stephen Gutgesell and Frank Levstik. I have also benefited considerably from the cooperation and assistance of the staffs of the Library of Congress, of the Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, the Cincinnati Historical Society, the Geauga and Lake county historical societies, the Dawes Memorial Library at Marietta College, and at the local government records depositories at Bowling Green State University, Wright State University, Dayton, and Ohio University, Athens. An hospitable and stimulating home for research has been provided for me at Ohio State University by many colleagues, notably Ken Andrien, Michael Les Benedict, Merton Dillon, Gary Reichard, Marvin Zahnister, and especially Robert Bremner, Harry Coles and Austin Kerr. While first in Columbus, I also had the privilege of talking with the most distinguished of an older generation of Ohio historians - Randolph C. Downes, Eugene H. Roseboom and Francis P. Weisenburger - the men who first set the history of the state on a scholarly basis.

This work would never have been possible had it not been for the generosity of the American Council of Learned Societies in giving me a
generous Research Fellowship for fifteen months in 1971-72. Again, in 1980-81 Ohio State University's generosity in employing me - on an exchange of posts with Harry L. Coles - took me to the scene of my research for another year, while the American Antiquarian Society (and ultimately the Exxon Corporation) gave me a Fellowship which enabled me, in 1984, to use a depository remarkably rich in early Ohio newspapers. I am also grateful to other bodies for financing academic trips to the United States - notably the British Association for American Studies in 1975 and the British Academy in 1984.

I have even more obligations in Durham. The University's Staff Travel and Research Funds have consistently supported my research, while the University Library has procured materials on inter-library loan. A succession of secretaries typed this work with considerable skill and remarkable patience - notably Margaret Hutchinson, Joan Grant and Wendy Duery. Among my colleagues I am particularly grateful to W.R. Ward for his patience, interest and comments on earlier versions of this text, and to Howell John Harris for both his criticism of my text and the stimulus of his daily conversation. Finally I must record what I owe to my wife - who has always questioned whether it was really all worthwhile - and my children, who have managed to interrupt the writing of even this last sentence.
1. INTRODUCTION: The Second Party System in Ohio

By the eve of the Presidential election, Democrats all over the United States were aghast. Never had they witnessed such a hulabaloo, such junketings, such a concerted effort by irresponsible partisans to distract the people from the true issues, the fundamental principles, that were at stake in 1840. In Ohio the excitement was at its height, if only because the champion of the Whig opposition was a 'favourite son,' the military hero who had saved the state from the British and Tecumseh's Indians during the War of 1812. When William Henry Harrison himself spoke at a great Whig rally in Dayton during September, reports claimed that 100,000 people turned up to hear him - or at least to participate in the revelry so welcome in the depression-worn Ohio of 1840. One Democratic newspaper in northern Ohio summed up the Whig campaign as a merry round of "Log-Cabin revelries - bacchanalian songs - hard cider powows - the exhibition of Skunk skins, coon skins - and other fandangoes, with the sounding of horns and trumpets - drums and fifes...."¹

Not surprisingly, Harrison won. Quite apart from the hulabaloo, the Democrats' depression gave the Whigs a winning issue. Yet the really significant thing about Harrison's victory in Ohio is not that he carried the state by a larger margin than any other Presidential candidate between Monroe and Lincoln, but that the results were so similar to those of the elections immediately before and after. The returns of the 1840 election reflect those of four years earlier - of an election held before the onset of Panic and depression heightened the urgency of the party debate. Indeed, statistics suggest that 78.85 per cent of the variation in the Democratic

vote from county to county in 1840 was just a reflection of the variation in the vote among the counties in 1836. The only reasonable explanation of this phenomenon is that most voters, confronted by the excitement, the distractions and, yes, the issues of the Log Cabin campaign, in the end decided in favour of the political party they had long been inclined towards and had even created an emotional commitment to in previous years.

In the last twenty years historians and political scientists have become increasingly impressed by just such persistence in voter alignments throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and have explained it as resulting from the consistent attachment of voters to one or other of the main political parties. It appears that, as Joel Silbey has summarized, parties stand

for certain things in the voters' minds, general positions about the nature of the society, its direction, and what government should and should not do. In a political world of great complexity and confusion, parties are the major instruments ordering events and articulating particular individual and group desires. They establish for the average citizen "a point of reference" for political guidance. Parties thus become aggregations of persons sharing certain attitudes, assumptions and commitments, evoked by the party label and to which they continually react.

So powerful become these identifications that they develop a life of their own, continuing to influence an individual's behaviour long after changing social, economic or political circumstances would seem to make the rival party more consonant with the individual's self-interest and outlook on most public matters. Thus, however individuals may change sides, voters in the mass persist, in most stubborn fashion, in maintaining traditional voting patterns. For whatever psychological and socio-psychological reasons, "social and political cleavages rooted in the mists of history" continue to determine "the voting habits of affected individuals long after the immediate

---

2. Based on the coefficient of determination calculated by squaring the appropriate coefficient of correlation on Table 1:1. For the sources of voting figures used in this study, see the Appendices below.
events associated with the cleavages' formation have disappeared."^3

Certainly Ohio politics have been marked by an extraordinary persistence of voter loyalty over several generations. The political scientist Thomas A. Flinn has demonstrated that the electoral patterns of the 1830s persisted for over a century - until the major realignment of 1936; and such continuity amidst rapid social and economic change can be explained only in terms of the influence that family and community attitudes exercised on each new generation of voters. In the 1860s and after, the Republican party of Lincoln attracted loyalty in many parts of Ohio as powerfully as a church or even the nation itself. Looking back on his childhood in the 1860s, Brand Whitlock remembered that "One became, in Urbana and in Ohio for many years, a Republican just as the Eskimo dons his clothes. ... it was not a matter of intellectual choice, it was a process of biological selection." Yet the Democratic party survived, and did so essentially among those people who had become Democrats in the decades before the civil war.^4 After observing the Presidential election of 1876, the Cincinnati writer Edward D. Mansfield remarked of Ohio, "Anyone can see, by examining the votes of 1828, how little the strength of parties has changed since. The truth is that politics, like religion, descend from father to son, with little variation." Similarly, a local historian writing during World War Two could point out that the balance between the main parties in Guernsey County was still roughly what it had been in 1836, and wonder how much of "this constancy in the ratio of party strengths is due to political heredity." And he could recall that "an old gentleman of this county," when asked "a few years ago" whether he was a Democrat or a Republican, would reply only, "My grandfather voted for

---


William Henry Harrison.\textsuperscript{5} Whatever the social and psychological forces which explain this extraordinary persistence, there can be little doubt that this stability in voter loyalties dominated Ohio politics in the thirty years before the civil war. Table 1:1 reveals how far the distribution of a party's vote (by counties) in each Presidential election during the Age of Jackson reflected its distribution four years earlier or later. When Ronald P. Formisano applied this test to successive Presidential elections in Michigan between 1840 and 1852, he discovered a positive correlation of between 0.622 and 0.858, which he suggested indicated "the high stability" of party loyalty in those years.\textsuperscript{6} Table 1:1 suggests that party regularity was even higher among Ohio voters than among the traditional Michigan foe.

One consequence of this settled pattern of vote distribution was that many counties and electoral districts always elected the candidate of one particular party. Thus one political observer of the Ohio senate in 1852 could describe the politics of particular members by simply mentioning which district they represented: the senator for Fayette, Clinton and Greene counties in southwestern Ohio was "a Whig, of course, coming from that district," while as for the senator for Ashland and Richland, "Coming from that District, I need not say he is a Democrat."\textsuperscript{7} The same was true of Congressional districts: for example, in each federal House of Representatives between 1833 and 1843, seven representatives came from safe Democratic seats (with two aberrations in thirty-five elections), seven from safe opposition seats (with one aberration - by one vote), and the other five from marginal seats. As a result, each party's Congressional delegation from Ohio tended to represent particular regions and communities, with their

\textsuperscript{5} Edward D. Mansfield, Personal Memories, Social, Political and Literary, 1803-1845 (Cincinnati, 1879), 235; William G. Wolffe, Stories of Guernsey County, Ohio (Cambridge, O., 1943), 115-16.


\textsuperscript{7} "Erie," Pencilings in the Senate of Ohio in 1852 (Columbus, 1852), 7, 10.
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distinctive social, cultural and economic characteristics, and party policy was often determined disproportionately by people from those constituencies.

The persistence of voters in steadfastly supporting the Democrats or their current opponents was not peculiar to Ohio. The distinctive feature of the 'Second American Party System' was the relatively even and vigorous two-party contest in every state in the Union (except South Carolina), for the only time in American history. This national party conflict was of mighty significance since it inhibited intra-sectional unity between 1834 and 1852, and provided bonds between Northern and Southern politicians which enabled them to suppress contentious issues or patch up compromises that they could then sell to their partisan supporters back home. Even after the collapse of the Whig party in the South, the North remained divided; and the success of its Democratic allies, especially in the Northern cities, Pennsylvania and the southern parts of the Old Northwest, helped the South to secure its interests at Washington right down to the Republican triumph of 1860. Indeed, ever since 1790 the Northern states had been unable to maintain a sectional unity comparable with the solid front so frequently presented by the South on key issues; and the partisan divisions of the North were therefore crucial in making it possible for North and South to coexist within the Union in spite of growing sectional antagonisms.

What was it, then, which caused Northerners to divide among themselves and then maintain partisan divisions so stubbornly? Why could artificial, extra-constitutional, voluntary organizations attract such popular loyalty? Why, in modern jargon, did 'mass political parties' become 'emotionally significant reference groups' for an extraordinarily high proportion of white adult males? What forces determined which side of the party divide a voter was likely to find himself? What role did the guidance of political

leaders, or the agitation of ideological issues, or material interests, or cultural perceptions, or social tensions which had nothing to do with politics, play in the formation of mass party loyalties?

Most historians who have tried to answer these questions for the Jacksonian period have observed the two parties in action, at the very peak of the system between 1837 and 1852. Many of them, especially those under the spell of 'Progressive' historiography, have emphasized the socioeconomic differences in the parties' support; in the case of Ohio, the differences pointed to are those between the more isolated, "butter-nut," upland (and so Democratic) areas and the more commercialized river-valley (and Whig) districts. This socioeconomic interpretation at least tries to relate popular voting behaviour to the debates and arguments which filled legislative journals, newspapers and handbills during those years, but in the process these historians have found far too many constituencies to which their generalizations cannot apply. But this does not mean that their interpretation is necessarily wrong-headed, merely that they have failed to recognise that the alignments they are studying largely reflect a traditional voting pattern established long before issues concerning banking problems and the cause of improvement had become central to partisan controversy.

If they wish to discover the impact of contemporary political issues on voting behaviour, they ought rather to follow V.O. Key's example and look at the changes taking place in the distribution of the vote, thus isolating the impact of current political controversy from the inherited pattern of

voting behaviour. 10

Other students of Jacksonian political alignments have emphasized the 'ethnocultural' basis of popular voting behaviour. In the case of Ohio they have pointed to the 'ethnocultural regionalism' which divided settlers from New England (and, for some historians, the more evangelical or "pietist" settlers), who were preponderantly Whig, from those who came from Pennsylvania and the South and joined foreign immigrants in voting for the Democratic party. Indeed, Thomas A. Flinn has argued that political alignments in Ohio for a hundred years down to 1936 were based on traditions and habits that ultimately derived from the diverse regional backgrounds of Ohio's early settlers and their descendants. 11 However, almost none of these historians has systematically analysed the ethnocultural character of the various counties between 1824 and 1848, they have relied on the flimsiest of partial evidence, and not compared their material with detailed voting returns for those years. The main exception, Stephen Fox, has concentrated on the period 1848-50, and even his evidence is surprisingly unimpressive, especially for the state as a whole. Moreover, historians of this persuasion often forget that the signs they detect of an ethnocultural division among the electorate do not necessarily prove that the community was racked by such tensions at the time of the elections they are studying; the returns may simply reflect the tensions which existed long before at the time when most people's party loyalties were established. In detecting ethnocultural


(or other) differences between the parties, a historian may be describing the political cleavage among the voters, but he cannot explain it unless he carefully works out at what time, and in what circumstances, such differences came to influence voting behaviour. 

The present work is designed to explain how the basic voting pattern of the nineteenth century in Ohio came to be established in the first place. It hopes to make clear the many and varied influences which helped to form the great blocs of Democratic and anti-Democratic opinion, and may therefore be seen as an attempt to provide some of the information that Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan have said is sorely needed to explain "the processes through which political alternatives get set for different local electorates." 

It is offered in the belief, not only that an understanding of the traditional pattern of voter loyalties is necessary for a proper appreciation of Jacksonian politics, but also that it may draw attention to the critical importance of the first thirty years of the nineteenth century in determining the character of partisan conflict in the Northern states in the decades that followed.

Clearly the starting point must be to decide when the basic pattern of voter cleavage was first established. In recent years most historians have seen the 1830s as the period when mass parties, marked by voter loyalty, first appeared in American politics. Indeed, that assumption has become so deeply rooted that historians writing biographies, or studies of political culture, or even general political histories, have commonly repeated it as an unshakeable truth, while the research design of some monographs and dissertations is determined by the presumption that nothing of significance happened in the "pre-party" decade of the 1820s. The benign influence of

James Monroe and the antipartyism of John Quincy Adams are presumed to have led to a collapse of partisanship at both state and national levels, and the "vast majority of citizen" supposedly "lost interest in politics." Washington is seen as isolated from the voters, and politics, it is assumed, was a game for the privileged few. Even the campaign to elect the charismatic military hero Andrew Jackson is seen as nothing more than "Caudillo" politics, and the coalition of "various juntos, factions, and out-groups" behind the General is held to be something less than the organization of a political party. Even when researchers have detected signs that earlier developments may have influenced the emergence of parties in the 1830s, they have not followed up those hints, secure in the knowledge that "parties" in the true sense did not exist in the 1820s.  

Yet, in the case of Ohio, the hints are deafening. Some historians insist that a partisan cleavage can exist only if the key organs of party organization, in particular properly-convened nominating conventions, are called regularly each year: in Ohio, the first fully representative state conventions met in December 1827 and January 1828 and continued to meet biennially until the state constitution was changed in 1851, while county corresponding committees and nominating conventions were of even longer standing. Other historians prefer to define parties in terms of blocs of supporters, as does this work; and table 1.1 amply demonstrates that the pattern of party loyalties evident in the late 1830s and 1840s dates back to 1828 at least. Chart 1.1 (see next page) confirms the significance of 1828 as the beginning of the Second Party System in Ohio: displaying the proportion of the vote received by candidates for the governorship between 1803 and 1859, it demonstrates that the gap between the winner and the runner-up fluctuated wildly down to 1826, and then remained remarkably


15. These criteria are emphasized, for example, in Paul Bergeron, Antebellum Politics in Tennessee (Lexington, Ky., 1982), where such institutions did not appear until the 1840s. Ibid., 44, 58, 87.
CHART 1.1: Proportion of the Popular Vote Received by Candidates for the Ohio Governorship, 1803-1854.

CHART 1.2: Voter Turnout in Statewide Elections, 1803-1848.
steady for the next twenty years. Even when the Free-Soilers began to attract votes away from the Whig party in the early 1850s, the margin between the main parties never became as great as had been common before 1828.

Chart 1:2 is even more impressive, for it reveals the level of voter turnout in statewide elections between 1803 and 1848, under the first state constitution. For the first twenty years, gubernatorial elections held in October at the same time as Congressional and county elections attracted twice as many voters as turned out in the Presidential election in November. Then from 1828 onwards much higher levels of turnout are reached than previously, with the Presidential election now drawing out far more voters than the governor's race - except, interestingly, in the Log Cabin elections of 1840. The pull of the Presidential election is also revealed by the zig-zag pattern in the gubernatorial chart after 1826 - up in Presidential years and down (except in 1838) in off-years. But most dramatic is the change apparent in the 1820s when turnout increased drastically - and by so much in Presidential elections that it totally transformed the pattern of behaviour revealed in the chart.

Another indication of the formative nature of the 1820s is provided by the discussions in Ohio of the reapportionment of Congressional districts in 1832. Politicians knew perfectly well at that time which way each county voted, and could predict the party balance in any particular grouping of counties. The initial proposal for districting was considered too favourable to the Jacksonian Democrats, since it gave them fourteen out of nineteen districts, whereas the version finally approved gave them eleven, of which two were marginal. The 1832 elections showed that the predictions had been correct in fifteen districts; and in the other four, one seat was decided by one vote, while in two others the dominant party put up two

candidates and so let the opposition candidate win on a plurality. And in the Congressional elections of 1834 to 1840 inclusive, eleven continued to vote as they had in 1832, while three of the four aberrant counties of 1832 reverted to form and for the rest of the decade voted the way previously predicted. The reapportioners of 1832 were just as capable of predicting the effect of different district schemes as their successors ten years later - though not so grossly eager to use a partisan majority to gerrymander as the Democrats of 1842.

Ohio was not alone in seeing political parties form at an unfashionably early date. As Richard P. McCormick's influential comparative studies of the various states have shown, two-party competition was established by 1828 in a large area of the middle section of the United States - excluding New England and much of the South, but including states as significant as the two most populous, New York and Pennsylvania, as well as Maryland, Kentucky and Indiana. Moreover, Ohio stands out as an important member - and useful example - of these politically divided states. Although admitted to the Union only in 1803, Ohio was settled so rapidly that already by 1820 she was, for federal purposes, the fourth most populous state in the nation, and by 1840 she had ousted Virginia from third place. Indeed, from 1803 until 1842 Ohio counted for more in elections for the Presidency and the House of Representatives than the rest of the Old Northwest put together. Furthermore, the national political division was remarkably even in Ohio from the start. No Presidential candidate between 1828 and 1848 carried Ohio with more than 52.25 per cent of the popular vote, except for William Henry Harrison in the Whig landslide of 1840 - and even he won less than 55 per cent of the popular vote. If not yet deserving its later sobriquet of the "barometer" state, Ohio was still sufficiently marginal - and powerful - in the 1820s and '30s for national politicians to watch it anxiously.


There are other reasons, too, for regarding Ohio as a useful example. In the early nineteenth century it attracted all the main strands of Westward migration, other than those associated with the expansion of Negro slavery and the plantation system. New Englanders formed settlements in southern and central Ohio at an early date, and then created their own peculiar section, especially after 1815, on the Western Reserve in northeastern Ohio. Their persisting distinctiveness provides a fine opportunity to study Yankee rural society in competition with, and in a context created by, both foreign immigrants and the many other American groups who were settling other parts of the state. Southerners had been flocking into the Ohio country even before statehood, including many who wished to escape the curse of the South's 'peculiar institution' and others who wanted just cheap, fertile land. In many ways Ohio in its early days was an extension of the older frontier of west Virginia and Kentucky, while Pennsylvanian frontiersmen, most prominently the Scotch-Irish, had been among the first to cross the Ohio River. Yet, though undoubtedly a new country, a would-be "melting pot" of different regional and ethnocultural traditions, and part of Turner's New West, the Buckeye State rapidly matured socially and economically and often seemed, in many of its political characteristics, closely akin to the great states of New York and Pennsylvania. Leading Ohio politicians certainly felt, in the 1820s as previously, that ordinary Ohioans' responses to national affairs were entirely in keeping with responses in other parts of the country, while their growing involvement in Presidential politics was typical of what was happening in other states.

But if the 1820s saw ordinary voters becoming interested in Presidential politics and participating in elections as never before, what was it in national politics that aroused their interest? In recent times historians have emphasized that voter interest was aroused, after the apathy of the 1820s, only by the crusades and crises of the 1830s, most notably, in the North, by Antimasonry. Ronald P. Formisano has argued impressively that in Massachusetts it was the popular social movements of 1830-35 that
generated third-parties like the Antimasons and Workingmen and made possible the creation of genuinely popular major parties reflecting the new impulses symbolized by religious revivals and industrial factories. Similarly, in Cumberland County, North Carolina, as Harry L. Watson has shown, institutionalized, mass party conflict emerged when the Bank War allowed politicians to relate national politics to tensions over the cause of economic improvement that had increasingly divided the local community in recent years. Yet both authors reveal that the pattern of partisan divisions that emerged in their respective constituencies owed something to earlier cleavages in the "pre-party" period before the 1830s; and it could be argued - as did Richard P. McCormick - that the emergence of stable two-party conflict in New England and North Carolina was delayed until the mid-1830s not by popular apathy, but by unanimous sectional support for a favourite-son candidate for the Presidency.\(^{19}\) Ohio differed only in that it lacked such unanimity in the 1820s, and hence its experience provides a fine opportunity to examine the sources of political conflict and uncover the roots of partisan attachment in the peculiar world of that much neglected decade.

Clearly the Presidential election of 1828 represents the critical moment when a majority of voters first formed commitments to what became the Democratic and National Republican-Whig parties; and that "critical election"\(^{20}\) saw the drawing together of the various political impulses that marked Ohio politics for many years. Yet the process of forming two blocs of opinion did not begin at that time, for chart 1.2 reveals that the first great leap in voter turnout in Presidential elections in Ohio came four years earlier. Moreover, table 1.1 indicates that there was some continuity in voting behaviour between 1824 and 1828; indeed, it seems that the degree of support Jackson won in 1828 in most counties was primarily determined


by the amount of support he had inherited from 1824. 21 Such evidence forces us to look back at the much neglected Presidential election of that year, especially since chart 1.2 reveals a growing popular involvement in state politics in the years preceding that election. Indeed, this study will argue that the party loyalties which underlay the party system of the 1830s and '40s were first formed for many people in the unusual situation which developed in the wake of the moral, economic and political crisis of 1819-21.

Yet it would be a mistake to assume that that crisis completely transformed the character of American politics, and that the Jacksonian period saw the emergence of new political methods and new modes of political behaviour. Contrary to common assumptions, the political techniques and institutions associated with the Second Party System had long been known in Ohio, and such changes as there were were less significant than historians have sometimes claimed. Admittedly, there was a change from an older way of doing things, from an older political culture that was (in Formisano's words) "implicitly aristocratic, overtly elitist, deferential, relatively stable, consensual, and devoid of political parties," to a newer political world that was "professedly democratic, self-consciously egalitarian, expansive, pluralist, and organized into political parties." 22 But this process was well under way in many places already by the late eighteenth century, if not in Massachusetts; and in Ohio political behaviour and political culture were already becoming remarkably 'modern' and 'democratic' even while Thomas Jefferson was President. If that simple truth is not recognised, it is too easy to explain the developments of the 1820s in terms

21. The coefficient of determination suggests that 57% of the variations in the Jackson vote from county to county in 1828 might be explained by the variations in the vote inherited from 1824. Table 1.1 could not be projected farther into the past, since no full listing of returns by counties exists for earlier elections. See Appendix 3.

of the 'rise' of a 'democracy' which had risen long before; and a key feature of this work must therefore be a careful examination of political processes in Ohio in the preceding quarter of a century.

But even if politics were 'democratic' long before the Age of Jackson, surely they were not marked by mass political parties of the kind that come to dominate American politics in the 1820s and '30s? Many writers of the mid-nineteenth century describe how the institutions of party organization, notably the nominating convention, came into use in Ohio in the 1820s, and their view has been repeated by historians whose research has been limited to the years after 1820. Yet the mid-century writers were almost all men who had entered Ohio after 1815 and had no experience of earlier politics; they were comparing Jacksonian 'innovations' with the political process as it operated in Ohio during the Era of Good Feelings. Admittedly, charts 1:1 and 1:2 reveal that before 1816, at the state level, parties did not effectively organize and structure voting behaviour in the way in which they clearly did in the later period, but that does not necessarily mean that political parties did not exist, only that they were not quite the same in character, style and operation as they were to be subsequently. A key argument in this work is that earlier experiences of party conflict had created attitudes and modes of behaviour that were to dictate or at least limit the way things developed in the 1820s.

In particular, the politicians of the Jacksonian era constantly used the terms "Republican" and "Federalist" to define political standpoints and allegiances; and these terms - like the even more common "Democrat" - were inherited from the first years of the century. Moreover, both parties tried to attach the titles "Democrat" and "Republican" to themselves; in 1840 William Henry Harrison was frequently described in Ohio as the "Democratic Republican" candidate. The competition to appropriate these

labels - and hang "Federalist" round the necks of the other party - suggests that there already existed within Ohio a powerful set of images attached to these simple categories; that these names were capable of attracting loyalty and arousing deep antagonism; that the names actually referred to something which had had serious meaning in the past; and that, of the two, the name "Republican" possessed a popular appeal that "Federalist" clearly lacked. This clearly suggests that an earlier experience of party politics, in which political parties operated as 'emotionally significant reference groups' for the voters, may have already existed at some period before the 1820s, and Jacksonian parties may have developed as they did because they were modelled on much older parties. Any real understanding of the origins of the Second Party System in Ohio must therefore be based on a proper appreciation of an earlier experience of parties dating back to the very birth of the Buckeye State.
No-one doubts that political parties existed in American politics in the years of Thomas Jefferson's supremacy. The bitter fight between Federalists and Democratic Republicans that began in the early 1790s continued to mark important elections for twenty years or so in many states, and the two political parties, especially the Jeffersonian Republicans, began to develop novel and effective party organizations. But in what sense were these formations "parties"? Were they parties like those established by the early 1840s?

A number of distinguished historians and political scientists, led by William Nesbit Chambers, have seen the national parties of the years after 1795 as distinctly modern in comparison with the factional alignments typical of the eighteenth century, while David Hackett Fischer has argued that between 1805 and 1812 these parties continued to develop in organizational sophistication and campaigning techniques until they behaved remarkably like the parties of thirty years later. Out of the many works emphasizing the innovatory character of these early parties has developed the concept of a "First Party System" comparable with the later systems of party conflict which have marked American politics since the Age of Jackson.

Other historians, however, have been sceptical about the existence of this "First Party System," believing the concept involves reading modern mass parties too far back into the past. They concede that great crises, like the national crisis of 1798-1800, prompted partisan contest in important elections, but they do not see such partisan activity as "the same as institutionalized party behavior." For Ronald P. Formisano, to qualify as a modern political party, a political formation has to have a life and goals of its own, must strive to perpetuate itself, and must exist in the public mind as a social organization apart from its momentary leaders. Its supporters have to maintain their commitment to the party over a period of time, its candidates to run as the openly identified choice of a party, and its members, in office and out, to think of themselves as properly members of a party with legitimate claims of its own. As Formisano has again suggested, the prevalence of anti-party thinking in these years, the widespread presumption that parties were a social and political evil, suggests that men did not pride themselves on loyalty to a party and did not identify themselves as party members.2

By these criteria the parties of the Jeffersonian era have to be seen as a transitional, "preparty" form of political organization. Many of their inventions in organization and campaigning technique were of great significance for the future, and they certainly learned, in some states, how to bring out a large vote concentrated on a single party candidate or slate of candidates. Yet at the same time, it is claimed,

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the politics of the period were also marked by many of the features of the old-style elite politics typical of the eighteenth century: restrictions on the right to vote, *viva voce* voting with individual choices publicly recorded in a poll-book, habits of deference, general apathy broken by moments of popular excitement, and control of the government by well-heeled country gentlemen and merchants. Furthermore, the parties of the Jeffersonian period never developed the regularity, the persistence that came to mark the mass parties established in the Jacksonian period; they never developed the ability to survive as institutions long after the issues which gave them meaning had passed away. The "quest for unanimity" and the end of partisanship during the Era of Good Feelings are taken as the most convincing evidence that the Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans were not truly modern 'mass' parties.3

Traditionally Ohio has been seen as a prime example of a state so lightly touched by the "First Party System" that it did not share even the seaboard states' limited experience of organized partisanship in the years before 1815. Yet a closer look suggests that Ohio politics were more deeply marked by the conflict between Federalist and Democratic Republican than has been assumed, while many aspects of political life in Ohio were more 'modern' - more 'Jacksonian,' if you will - than in many of the seaboard states. Certainly antipartyism was a powerful force in Ohio politics, but on many occasions the resort to antiparty rhetoric was a tribute to the power, not the weakness, of party cries and party organization. There is, indeed, evidence that voters were developing party loyalties that had the power to persist through changing circumstances, and it is by no means clear that the "First Party System," such as it was in Ohio, entirely collapsed during the Era of Good Feelings.

2. THE BIRTH OF MASS PARTIES, 1800-1804

The obstacles to political action in early Ohio were immense. According to the Census of 1800, the Northwest Territory, incorporating the future states of Ohio and Michigan, had a non-Indian population of 45,365, of whom about 9,200 were adult white males. The 3,206 people in Wayne County (or the Detroit region) were separated from the other white inhabitants by the lands still held by the Indians east of the Cuyahoga River and north of the Greenville Treaty line - roughly the northwestern quarter of modern Ohio. South of the line, as map 2.1 shows, the scanty population was clustered in four main areas: one, in Hamilton County in the southwestern corner, included the former frontier post and small commercial centre of Cincinnati and the settlements in the Miami Purchase, owned by John Cleves Symmes; a second, Ross County, lay in the Scioto Valley, with its main focus at the small town of Chillicothe in the Virginia Military District; the third, Washington County, at the mouth of the River Muskingum, centred on Marietta and the settlements made since 1783 by the Ohio Company of Associates; and the fourth, Jefferson County, spread along the Ohio River near Steubenville in what was essentially an overflow of pioneers from western Virginia and Pennsylvania dating back to the mid-1780s. Further scattered settlements were strung out along the Ohio River, providing staging-posts between the principal centres of population. The northeastern corner, representing the eastern part of the Western Reserve, newly organized in 1800 as Trumbull County, was also beginning to be settled, though its population of 1,303 souls was widely

1. United States Census, Second Census of the United States (Washington, 1801). One contemporary claimed that at least one family in twelve was missed by the census takers: William Goforth to the President, 5 Jan. 1802, in Clarence E. Carter, ed., The Territorial Papers of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1934), III, 199. For the technique used to calculate the number of adult white males, see below, Appendix 1. Some of the material in this and the next chapter has been presented in a somewhat different form in my "The Experience of Revolution and the Beginnings of Party Politics in Ohio, 1776-1816," Ohio History, LXXXV (1976), 186-230.
Source:
Lloyd, Falconer and
Thorne, The Agriculture
of Ohio, p. 37.

MAP 2.2: County Boundaries, 1799 - 1800

Source:
Aronies, Evolution of
Ohio County
Boundaries, p. 19.
MAP 2.3 : CHIEF OHIO LAND DIVISIONS

CHIEF OHIO LAND DIVISIONS, THE GEOGRAPHER'S LINE, AND
THE EARLIEST SETTLEMENTS

Based upon the map in E. H. Roseboom and F. P. Weisenburger, History of Ohio

Source: B. W. Bond,
Foundations of Ohio,
p. 276.

MAP 2.4 : COUNTY BOUNDARIES, 1801

Source: Downs,
Evolution of Ohio
County Boundaries,
p. 22.

Ohio County Boundary Lines in 1801.
scattered in "a dense forest remote from any settlement, experiencing all the trials, privations, difficulties and embarrassments incident to their isolated situation." 2 Concerned with securing the most basic essentials of life, still conscious of possible danger from the Indians, labouring to build cabins, hunt the wild animals that roamed the woods, clear trees and produce a crop, most Ohio pioneers could scarcely think of travelling through thick unknown forests or boating on dangerous rivers, to communicate with like-minded people in distant settlements.

Frontier conditions may have encouraged popular participation in the affairs of each local community, but, in matters concerning other communities and relationships with county, Territorial and national authorities, most pioneers found it appropriate to defer to the guidance of the few men of wealth, connection and education among them. Thus traditional elite politics were compatible with the independence of frontier life and the urge to form communities; and these were not the circumstances in which mass parties might be expected to appear. 3 Yet already some Ohioans were becoming involved, emotionally at least, in the Presidential contest between Jefferson and President Adams, and within two years the future of Ohio was caught up in the conflict between Federalist and Democratic Republican. Already the foundations of the Territorial political system were being undermined, and a revolution was about to take place which gave Ohio a thoroughly democratic system of government. Moreover, this collapse of the Territorial ancien régime opened the way to the development of party action in politics which bore some of the hallmarks of a modern mass party system.


The Colonial Ancien Régime

In the years before statehood, the future Ohio had imposed on it from outside a governmental system that was designed to restrict popular control. Before 1798, during the first decade of white settlement, the Northwest Territory was governed by the system of colonial rule laid down by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. Power lay in the hands of the governor appointed by the federal government — in fact, in the hands of the upright but autocratic old soldier Arthur St. Clair (born in Scotland in 1734), whose reputation as a distinguished Revolutionary War officer had been somewhat impaired by his crushing defeat at the hands of the Ohio Indians in 1791. The governor was assisted by a Secretary and three Territorial judges also appointed by the federal government. The governor and judges together formed a legislature which represented the nation as a whole rather than the settlers it governed. People in Ohio could reasonably complain that they were taxed without "the free consent of the people or their legal representatives," while in 1797 some Cincinnatians claimed that migration to the Northwest Territory had deprived them of rights they had enjoyed in the East as citizens and ratifiers of the United States Constitution.

Even when the second stage of Territorial government was finally reached in 1798, the introduction of a locally elected representative assembly did not significantly increase popular control of the government. The self-same governor possessed full power to convene, prorogue and dissolve the Assembly and to veto its legislation as he thought fit; and

4. Jacob Burnet, Notes on the Early Settlement of the North-Western Territory (Cincinnati, 1847), 38, 374-81; William H. Smith, The St. Clair Papers: The Life and Public Services of Arthur St. Clair (Cincinnati, 1832), passim (hereafter St. Clair Papers).

5. Centinel of the Northwestern Territory, 1793-95, quoted in Beverley T. Bond, Jr., The Foundations of Ohio (Columbus, 1941), 431-33; Randolph C. Downes, Frontier Ohio, 1788-1803 (Columbus, 1935), 142,
he retained a real independence of the Assembly, since his salary was paid by the federal government which had appointed him. The need to throw off the arbitrary rule of an executive unaccountable to the people of Ohio was made clear when St. Clair vetoed many of the laws passed by the first Territorial legislature in 1799 and 1800. Many Ohioans saw statehood as the solution, even though the reduction of federal control would mean extra financial burdens; but this was a small price to pay for the blessings of a legislative power responsive to the wishes of local people.

If the Territorial Assembly reflected local opinion, it was still scarcely a means for the expression of the popular will. The Ordinance laid down a franchise which was more limited than in any of the states, being restricted to adult males who owned fifty acres freehold, or town lots of equivalent value; freeholders whose titles were in doubt — and there were many, notably in the Miami (or Symmes) Purchase in southwestern Ohio — were not allowed to vote. Moreover, there was only one polling place in each county, at a time when (down to 1800) the whole area of the future state was divided into only six counties, as map 2.2 illustrates. In 1800 at the first election in Trumbull County, which had about 397 adult white males scattered across the whole area of the Western Reserve east of the Cuyahoga, the sole polling-place was located at Warren in the southeast corner; this virtually ensured that "only a portion of the electors" would attend, while "none were present from Cleveland." Under such a system the county seats, where polling took place, enjoyed undue influence, while most people were effectively unrepresented — perhaps as many as four-fifths of them, as a petition from Jefferson County claimed

7. Charles Whittlesey, Early History of Cleveland, Ohio (Cleveland, 1867), 359, 360.
Most significantly, the "manner of conducting the election was after the English mode. That is, the sheriff of the county assembled the electors by proclamation, he presided at the election, and received the votes of the electors orally or viva voce." Moreover, each candidate (or his proxy) had to be present at the poll. This system exposed voters to the scrutiny of those who could bestow or withhold favour, and gave especially great influence to the large proprietors, particularly in those regions of the state where from the start the land was in private rather than government hands. For example, the Western Reserve had been sold by the original owner, the state of Connecticut, to the Connecticut Land Company, which had then distributed the land among its share-holders. Representatives of these proprietors -- and often the proprietors themselves -- became key political figures in the early years of settlement, because of their influence with their workmen, their tenants, and those who bought lands from them on credit. Hence there could be little surprise when in 1800 the election for the Reserve's representative in the Territorial Assembly resulted in 38 out of 42 votes cast going to General Edward Paine, one of the more influential proprietors.¹⁰ No wonder that the people, according to the former Territorial politician Jacob Burnet,

    in almost every instance, selected the strongest and best men, in their respective counties. Party influence was scarcely felt; and it may be said with confidence, that no Legislature has been chosen, under the State Government, which contained a larger proportion of aged, intelligent men, than were found in that body.¹⁰

Throughout his governorship, Arthur St. Clair worried about the influence that the great landowners possessed, and he blamed the opposition


10. Burnet, North-Western Territory, 289.
to his rule upon them. Certainly his chief opponents were wealthy land speculators like John Cleves Symmes of the Miami Purchase, or Nathaniel Massie, a great proprietor in the Virginia Military District, who, one pioneer claimed, had bought up land warrants from Wayne's soldiers and begun to locate and sell the land even before the ink had dried on the Greenville Treaty of 1795. St. Clair not only frequently opposed measures desired by such speculative interests, but also occasionally defended the interests of the underprivileged and minority groups against those who had already established their social and economic predominance. It was partly as a means of reducing the political influence of his opponents that St. Clair advocated the secret ballot in 1800; he believed that "tenants and persons under pecuniary liabilities, could not vote openly, according to their own judgment, without encountering the hazard of persecution," and thus the "great land holders" had it in their power "to influence the whole elections in the country."

In fact, however, this relatively closed system of politics served St. Clair's political interests fairly well. His unrestricted powers of appointment gave him control of the sheriffs, who supervised elections and made the returns. He usually worked closely with important vested interests, as when in 1800 he accepted nominations made by the Connecticut Land Company for the leading civil offices on the Western Reserve. He could also use his monopoly of official patronage to attract the support of men of local influence, including the socially dominant elite in the


12. Address of Governor St. Clair to the Territorial Legislature, in St. Clair Papers, II, 505-06; Burnet, North-Western Territory, 323.

towns where elections were held. In eastern Ohio in the Seven Ranges — the region south of the Western Reserve and close to the Ohio River — St. Clair enjoyed the support of influential town proprietors, and as late as 1802 the electoral success of his supporters there was predicted on the grounds that his "pets are chiefly in office," which "will give them a greater weight."\(^{14}\) Similarly, in the "town and neighbourhood" of Cincinnati, which as seat of the Territorial government had been a "den of Aristocracy," the "officers of the colonial government were the monied men" and discriminated against their political opponents.\(^ {15}\) By such means St. Clair had secured reasonably pliant legislatures, even if they did object to his more extreme assertions of gubernatorial prerogative, and the "intercourse" between them, according to Burnet, was "generally ... harmonious and agreeable."\(^ {16}\)

This somewhat authoritarian and elitist structure of politics effectively inhibited the development of party politics in the Territory during the 1790s. Admittedly, many settlers showed great interest in the disputes between Federalist supporters of George Washington's administration and the growing "Republican" opposition, as they began to impinge on public awareness. The arguments in Congress in 1790-93 over Alexander Hamilton's various measures to solve the financial problems inherited from the Revolution did not attract much interest in the Territory, though St. Clair himself was sufficiently involved to want to resign his governorship and seek a seat in Congress. Signs of a more


widespread partisanship became apparent after 1793, as men became aroused by the triumph of republican and anticlerical forces in France, the outbreak of war in Europe, British insolence on the high seas ... and then the Washington administration's backing-down and conciliation of the old imperialist and antirepublican enemy through the Jay treaty of 1794. 17

Equally arousing was the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania in 1794, for many in Jefferson County were closely connected with the rebels, while the old Revolutionary officers downriver in Washington County, Ohio, rallied round the Washington administration in its determination to enforce obedience to national authority. Such events merely confirmed the belief of Federalists like St. Clair and Burnet that too many settlers of the West were not only antifederalist in outlook, but, if allowed self-determination, likely to secede from the United States. Such doubts were further heightened by evidence that European powers, notably Spain, were still trying to seduce Westerners from their allegiance, though popular sentiment seems to have been firmly nationalist northwest of the Ohio River. 18 The war crisis with France in 1798-99 further rallied support behind the government of the day, with St. Clair even defending the Alien and Sedition Acts in the Cincinnati press, apparently to good effect, but these and other controversial measures - including the build-up of armed forces and the imposition of direct taxes - also aroused much opposition. As a consequence, many residents of the future Ohio keenly observed the passionately contested Presidential election of 1800, even though the Territory had no voice in the outcome. The Chillicothe newspaper, for


example, proudly identified itself with the Republican party (or the "Democrats," as friend and foe already commonly called them), and damned both the extreme "Anglo-Federalists," linked with Hamilton and excessive friendship with Britain, and the "Simple Federalists," loyal but deluded Americans who preferred the re-election of John Adams to the elevation of the sound Republican Thomas Jefferson. 19

Moreover, the demand for early statehood came essentially from those people who were becoming caught up in a Democratic Republican partisan commitment. Federalists who disapproved of St. Clair did not see statehood as the answer; Republicans did, at least in part because the Territorial regime seemed an intolerable expression of Federalism's belief in strong centralized controls. St. Clair himself noted in December 1799 that his Chillicothe opponents were motivated not only by local ambition but also by partisan considerations, "for almost all of them are democrats." 20 On the Western Reserve, it was firm "democrats" who were publicly agitating for statehood by 1800. As Benjamin Tappan in a July Fourth oration of 1801 put it, the extortionate practices of the Territorial governor, demanding fees for almost everything he did, were but typical of the way that "forms of civil policy" had been corrupted in the 1790s, and the liberties won in the Revolution put in jeopardy. 21 In this way Republicans in the Territory used memories of the nation's struggle against Britain colonialism to rouse opposition against the current regime, linked the Alien and Sedition Acts


21. Benjamin Tappan, "Oration, 4th July 1801, Delivered at Hudson," BTP, LC. See also Ratcliffe, "Benjamin Tappan," 136-37, though note 54 on p. 137 errs in not recognising that the speech mentioned there was probably given in 1800, as Paine was elected in that fall.
of 1793 with British "tyranny" before 1776, and used a political rhetoric based on Revolutionary imagery to identify their party with Ohioans' urge for self-government.

Yet this growing division of sentiment along party lines did not become the main determinant of politics in the Territory as it did in the seaboard states. Even while the state of Kentucky was overwhelmed by political "madness" in its opposition to the "High Federalist" measures of the national government - an opposition resulting in the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-99 - even then Governor St. Clair, ever concerned by challenges to the powers that be, felt in 1798 that "Every thing in the political hemisphere is as right on our side of the river as I could wish it." The elections of 1798 and 1800 to the Territorial legislature were fought without regard to party considerations, even while "the States were rent, and almost torn asunder, by party strife." According to Jacob Burnet, "this calmness and unanimity, was ascribable, principally, to the fact, that the people of the Territory had no voice in electing the officers of the General Government, and the Government had but little patronage to distribute among them." Furthermore, as in the seaboard colonies earlier, the effective centre of power and patronage within the Territory was beyond the reach of electoral politics. Politicians who wished to secure office for themselves and their friends, or other advantages like a new county or county seat, had to win St. Clair's favour and approval, regardless of their party sympathies; and if disappointed, they were unlikely to succeed through organized opposition unless they could influence the President to appoint a more amenable man - or somehow change the rules of the game.

If St. Clair's command of Territorial politics seduced men whose first instincts were Jeffersonian to accommodate to the governor's Federalist

22. St. Clair, quoted in W.H. Smith, "A Familiar Talk About Monarchists and Jacobins," 194; Burnet, North-Western Territory, 239, 314, 342 n. Alfred B. Sears, Thomas Worthington: Father of Ohio Statehood (Columbus, 1958), 48-52, and Dorothy B. Goebel, William Henry Harrison: A Political Biography (Indianapolis, 1926), 42-43, are mistaken in seeing national party divisions in the first Territorial Assembly; a complimentary address to President Adams was approved in 1799 with only five dissenting voices.
regime, the development of a clear party division was inhibited also by the sectional nature of Territorial politics after 1799. The Ordinance had envisaged the division of the Territory into areas of a size appropriate for new states; and the most eastern state was to be defined by a western boundary like that of modern Ohio — a line drawn north from the mouth of the Great Miami. St. Clair's plan was to change the boundaries and create smaller states which would have to wait longer before they attained a population sufficient to justify statehood. There also a reasonable expectation that the most eastern state - the state of Erie? - would be dominated by the settlers from New England on the Western Reserve and especially in the Ohio Company lands, who were considered Federalist in sympathy. The first, quite viable, version of this scheme was defeated in 1800 when Congress established the Indiana Territory and confirmed the present boundary; as a result, Cincinnati found itself in the southwestern corner of the old Territory and accordingly ceased to be the seat of government - which was transferred to the Scioto, to Chillicothe, headquarters of St. Clair's Republican opponents. Thereafter St. Clair produced a revised plan which would once more divide the reduced Territory along the line of the Scioto, thus reducing Chillicothe's importance. Like its predecessor, this project appealed powerfully to both Cincinnati and Marietta, which would probably become capitals of the new territories; and this log-roll - as a combination of disparate interests to form a voting majority was already being called - was powerful enough in the Territorial Assembly to pass a Division Act in December 1801 requesting Congress to modify the boundaries proposed in the Ordinance. So powerful were considerations of local interest that Republicans felt compelled to cooperate with Federalists in the region of Cincinnati and Marietta, while in the interior even the Federalists of Lancaster felt obliged to support the Chillicothe interest.23

23. Philemon Beecher to Worthington, New Lancaster, 14 Jan. 1802, TVP. For the paragraph as a whole, see St. Clair Papers, II, 480-561, and Downes, Frontier Ohio, 136-239.
Yet the triumph of St. Clair's scheme depended upon his ability to maintain control of Territorial politics. His arbitrary behaviour, however, had undermined his standing even among local Federalists: in 1801 it was Federalists, dismayed by his pettiness and inconsistencies — and by his demands for unjustified fees in order to keep himself in drink — who opposed his reappointment rather than the Chillicothe Republicans, who feared "exchanging an old and feeble tyrant for one more active and wicked." Moreover, as the statehood movement in 1802 mounted an increasingly powerful challenge, many of St. Clair's former friends began to see virtue in ending the "colonial system"; and by the close of the second session of the second Territorial Assembly — which had passed the division act — a majority of its members were thought to have come to favour early statehood.

In the nature of the colonial system, St. Clair's political dominance depended on the balance of power, not in the Territory, but in the nation's capital. However, St. Clair's influence with the federal government had never been all-powerful. In 1798, for example, a young Virginian of distinguished family, who had served with distinction as one of Anthony Wayne's officers, used his political contacts in the nation's capital to secure appointment as Secretary of the Northwest Territory, and in 1799 defeated St. Clair's son in the Assembly's election of its first Territorial delegate in Congress. This was William Henry Harrison, now resident in Cincinnati, who had married one of Symmes' daughters (without the father's approval) and was supported by St. Clair's opponents. The Adams government then appointed as Harrison's replacement as Secretary Charles Willing Byrd, a Virginian, a Republican and an enemy of St. Clair's. Meanwhile in 1800 Harrison persuaded a Federalist Congress to create the Indiana Territory, against St. Clair's advice, and


25. Tiffin to Worthington, Chillicothe, 1 Feb. 1802; Massie to Worthington, Chillicothe, 18 Jan., 8, 19 Feb. 1802; David Vance to Worthington, Union Mills, 20 Mar. 1802, TWP.
within a week Harrison was himself appointed governor of the new Territory. Even if those who succeeded him as Territorial delegate, William McMillan of Cincinnati and Paul Fearing of Marietta, were more sympathetic to St. Clair's schemes, he was unable to prevent most Federalists in Congress from accepting the argument that the Northwest Ordinance's description of future state boundaries was a compact with settlers, for they joined with the Republicans to vote down the Territory's request to be divided at the Scioto.

St. Clair's fatal weakness, however, lay not in his failure to convince his party allies at Washington, but to the fact that since March 1801 both Presidency and Congress had been in the hands of the Jeffersonian Republicans. Since their margin in the last Presidential election had been narrow, all Republicans could see the advantage of securing three more Republican votes in the Electoral College, as well as two more seats in the Senate. Moreover, early statehood might save the President the embarrassment of dismissing St. Clair, as Ohio Republicans were demanding. St. Clair himself saw the need to prevent this equation between statehood and Republicanism, and he had consciously striven to draw many an "open, honest, avowed democrat" into his division schemes. In the crisis of late 1801—early 1802 he argued that the supporters of division should send agents to Washington whose "political principles" were in tune with the majority. Though this was not done, the Territorial delegate argued persistently that the boundary issue was not "a party political question." However, the Chillicothe agents in Washington countered that argument and influenced the "Democratic members very strongly in their cause." As a result, they were "able to carry


27. Sears, Worthington, 55-56, 77; Massie, 78, 188.

any thing" through Congress, and so secured the Ohio Enabling Act of 1802, which authorized the calling of a Constitutional Convention and subsequent application for admission as a state of the Union. And Congress tried to ensure that the elections to the Convention would result favourably by specifically excluding Wayne County - i.e., the Detroit area - from this process and so considerably reducing the potential Federalist vote.

Thus Ohio's promotion to statehood was finally determined by the outcome of a national party struggle. The Republican majority in Congress had authorized the future of the Territory to be put to the voters of Ohio, and there was little doubt what their verdict would be. For the old ways of controlling elections no longer worked: the rules of the political game were changing, as the social and political foundations of the Territorial ancien régime began to crumble.

**Ohio's Democratic Revolution**

Many historians have assumed that Ohio's achievement of statehood in 1802-03 was a triumph of the few over the many. It has often been seen as the work of self-interested gentry centred on Chillicothe - of men like the wealthy Virginians Nathaniel Massie and, most notably, Thomas Worthington, who (like Massie) was in the process of amassing large profits and an extensive estate through surveying and land speculation. After all, did not the "Chillicothe Junto" use its influence in Washington to secure statehood, and did not its friends monopolize office in the years that followed? Did they not buy support of notables elsewhere in the Territory by promises of patronage, and so secured the support of a deferential electorate? Certainly it has sometimes been assumed that the majority of Ohioans were really opposed to statehood in 1802 - which presumably explains why statehood had to be

29. Fearing's letters, Jan.-May 1832, ibid., II, 559,583-84, and Julia P. Cutler, ed., Life and Times of Ephraim Cutler, Prepared from his Journals and Correspondence (Cincinnati, 1890), 61-65.
imposed from outside, in defiance of established representative procedures, and why the Constitutional Convention of 1802 refused to submit its handiwork to a popular referendum.\textsuperscript{1} Plausible as this argument seems at first sight, it in fact misses the point: for, in the last resort, statehood was achieved by a popular uprising - which was first made possible by, and then itself furthered, the democratic revolution which Ohio was undergoing.

For one thing, even during the Territorial period the social and economic power - and therefore political influence - of the large proprietors was being weakened, though not destroyed. After all, the basic objective of the proprietors in the long run was to sell their lands as prices rose; and those who wished to promote towns had to make generous concessions which encouraged - indeed, required - the creation of alternative sources of political power and the participation of other, smaller men interested in boosting the town. Furthermore, the large proprietors and land speculators were often forced to sell more quickly and cheaply than they wished because of the pressure of frontiersmen and squatters who settled where they willed. The large speculators also had to sell on terms comparable with those offered by the federal government after 1796, while the passage of William Henry Harrison's Land Act of 1800 made the acquisition of "Congress lands" even easier. As Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick have written, though "Much has been made of large engrossments of land by speculators in the Northwest Territory, yet before the admission of Ohio in 1803, ... it was apparent to all that the day of the great land magnate was at an end."\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1} Of earlier historians, see esp. Burnet, Notes on North-Western Territory, 350, 353; St. Clair Papers, II, 549-50, 560, 572; and William E. Gilmore, Life of Edward Tiffin, First Governor of Ohio (Chillicothe, 1897), 35, 51, 62, 77-78. Downes, Frontier Ohio, 216-25, accepts the popularity of statehood, but insists on the importance of federal patronage in securing the success of the party.

This development was not, however, unacceptable to those who dominated the Territory's political life. The Territorial legislature itself contributed to the process, for it facilitated the break-up of large estates by passing a law for the partition of real estate held jointly (for example, by speculative partnerships and companies), and it taxed unimproved lands owned by non-residents in order to encourage wealthy Eastern landowners to sell them to actual settlers. Furthermore, the political leaders of the Territory shared the ideological commitments generated by the Revolution and accepted the rightfulness of popular participation in the political process. In the Ross County election of 1800, it was generally agreed on all sides that the representative must serve the interests of his constituents, and be accountable to them. From the start the Territorial legislature published its proceedings, and the votes on particular measures, at the request of any member, were recorded; the Assembly even published addresses to the people on important questions. The practice of "instructing" - sometimes regarded as a Jacksonian innovation - was accepted, for the Assembly repeatedly sent instructions to the Territorial delegate in Congress, while on occasion members accepted their constituents' dictates. On the question of where the Assembly should meet in 1801, John Smith, a member from Cincinnati, "informed several members of the house, that if he had voted according to his sentiments, he would have given his vote for Chillicothe; but his constituents had instructed him to vote as he had done." According to Jacob Burnet, himself a member, this respect for public opinion ensured that the Territorial Assembly would never allow the introduction of slavery in any shape or form, in view of the "universal" hostility of the people.

3. Chillicothe Freeman's Chronicle, 5, 12, 19, 26 Sept. 1800.
5. Cincinnati Western Spy, 4 Feb. 1801; Burnet, North-Western Territory, 306, 332-33.
These highly "republican" and "democratic" sentiments resulted in significant political reforms. In 1802 the Territorial Assembly reformed the system of local government by allowing the people to elect (and by ballot) most of the township officers, though not the justices of the peace, who ran the county government. It also drastically extended the practical opportunity to vote by increasing not only the number of counties from six to ten, but also the number of polling places in each county so that voters no longer had to travel to the county seat. Finally, the Assembly petitioned Congress to amend the Ordinance so as to allow adult male tax-payers to vote in Territorial elections, just as they were already allowed to do in local elections. The rightfulness of popular participation in politics was acknowledged even by those who profited from a more restricted electoral system: St. Clair himself in the end accepted all these measures and was not averse to considering, occasionally, the suggestions made by public meetings.

Of these measures, the increase in the number of polling places was of most immediate consequence. In Hamilton County, for example, which then covered most of the Miami Valley, voters no longer had to travel to Cincinnati, since there were now eight voting places distributed throughout the region. This enfranchisement of backcountry voters would effectively threaten Cincinnati's political dominance in the county, for the settlers of interior townships had little interest in supporting Cincinnati's pretensions; and in the county's elections for the third Assembly, a ticket was elected devoted to immediate statehood for the Territory with its present boundaries, even if that meant a state capital on the Scioto. Though the triumph of the statehood forces meant that the third Assembly

would never meet, there was a reasonable expectation that the political
complexion of the lower house would in any case have been quite different
from that of earlier sessions.\(^8\)

Even as the Territorial \textit{ancien régime} was being undermined and the way
opened to a larger measure of \textit{populaire} control, the statehood movement itself
began to broaden the political forum. In view of St. Clair's command and the
appeal of his plans for division, leading Republicans had to look beyond the
established sources of power in the Territory. They appealed to the public
at large, including those excluded from voting in Assembly elections, and
used extra-legal expressions of public opinion to put pressure on key decision-
makers. In 1797 a Committee of Correspondence operating from Cincinnati
agitated for the taking of an unofficial census of the Territory, with
statehood their stated aim, and so forced St. Clair to advance the Territory
to the representative stage. In 1800-01 Republicans in various parts of the
Territory arranged public meetings which passed resolutions instructing their
representatives in the Assembly to support statehood. When the Assembly
instead passed the Division Act, the Chillicothe leaders launched a great
petition campaign requesting Congress not to approve the redrawing of the
Territory's boundaries.\(^9\) To their gratification - and the shock of their
opponents - they discovered in most counties a great popular demand for early
statehood. As a consequence, as more than one politician observed, local
notables with an eye to future elections changed their attitude so that, had
even the second Territorial Assembly - which passed the Division Act - been
reconvened, "a large Majority in the Present House of Representatives would be
in favour of statehood.\(^10\) Congress, too, was impressed by the evidence of

\(^8\) \textit{Western Spy}, 21 Aug., 20 Oct. 1802; \textit{St. Clair Papers}, II, 531, 560;
\textit{Downes, Frontier Ohio}, 207, 210-12, 244. See Map 2.5.

\(^9\) \textit{Downes, Frontier Ohio}, 182-85, 205-16; \textit{St. Clair Papers}, II, 524-25,
549-50; \textit{Fatcliffe, "Benjamin Tappan,"} 137.

\(^{10}\) \textit{Massie to Worthington, Chillicothe, 19 Feb. 1802, and David Vance to}
\textit{Worthington, Union Mills, 19 Feb. 1802}, TWP.
popular feeling, as it rejected division and passed the Enabling Act; and the leaders of the statehood cause found themselves pushed into achieving their aim more quickly than ever expected, and on terms many Ohioans thought imprudent. 11

The Enabling Act was certainly not quite what the statehood leaders had hoped for. It placed conditions, mainly financial, on Ohio's admission such as no other state had suffered. In particular, Congress insisted that United States lands in the new state were to remain untaxed until five years after the sale, which would considerably reduce the value and "injure the sales" of lands in private hands, in particular the lands of proprietors in the Virginia Military District. Thus, as was pointed out at the time, "the Great landholders" among the Chillicothe leaders suffered financially from the terms upon which statehood was secured? 12 Furthermore, the Enabling Act was a political gamble, since by it Congress was interfering in the internal affairs of the Territory, over which it had had no legal control since the beginning of the representative stage. This, they suspected, would be resented by the people, who clearly prized self-government above all. Even some leading Republicans argued that the Enabling Act should be ignored, the Territorial Assembly persuaded to call a convention, and - after slight delay - the new state apply for admission without being penalized by the heavy conditions imposed by Congress. 13


However, the statehood men were driven on by apprehensions that St. Clair's influence might yet manipulate a division of the territory which could delay statehood or even produce a state of "Erie" east of the Scioto, which might be Federalist in politics. The Enabling Act offered a means of outflanking the Governor and preventing further meetings of the Territorial Legislature, with its unrepresentative Council. Accordingly, the Republican Charles W. Byrd (who as Secretary of the Territory was acting governor in St. Clair's temporary absence) refused to reconvene the second Assembly, and the majority in the Constitutional Convention refused to risk referring the Constitution to the people, since that would delay its submission to Congress until after the meeting of the third Assembly. In any case, by that time their overwhelming triumph in the elections to the Convention gave them every reason to feel confident that the electorate would not object to what they had wrought.

By the time of those elections in October 1802, the statehood movement had gained added strength from the support of local notables, attracted by the prospect of political advancement and office. This had not been true previously, because President Jefferson was remarkably reluctant to dismiss federal officeholders in the Territory and St. Clair's powers of patronage remained immense. He proved well capable of attracting leading Republicans, especially in eastern Ohio where George Tod, Samuel Huntington, Jr., and Return Jonathan Meigs (both Sr. and Jr.) as late as January 1802 still angled for office - and especially the Governorship in the proposed Erie Territory.


But when St. Clair's scheme was destroyed and the Enabling Act passed, the boot was on the other foot, especially as it was generally understood that Worthington had the President's confidence when it came to federal appointments in the new state. Indeed, he was said to have returned from Washington with blank commissions in his pocket that he could fill out as he wished. Certainly Tod, Huntington and Meigs came running, rapidly donning the clothes of statehood men to reinforce their Republican credentials. Yet not all who applied were satisfied, the President did not begin to clear out Federalists from existing federal offices in Ohio until late 1803, and there is no evidence that promises of patronage significantly affected the results of the decisive election of October 1802.

The triumph of the statehood movement at that time was a direct consequence of its popularity. Its advocates resorted once more to traditional Revolutionary rhetoric, emphasizing the virtues of self-government and the evils of aristocracy; as Burnet later conceded, "Impressions were made on the popular mind, that a plan had been formed to perpetuate the colonial system, with a view of continuing the influence of a few individuals, in the councils of the general government, and in the management of the affairs of the Territory." Reports soon came in that this vigorous campaign was having its effect - that, as in Belmont County, "There is a great reformation wrought in the minds of some of the people." Members of the St. Clair party, though armed with strong arguments against submitting to Congress's interference, recognized the popularity of statehood and shifted to its support - on proper

16. R.J. Meigs Jr. to Worthington, Marietta, 1 June 1802, and C.W. Eyrd to Worthington, Cincinnati, 4 Dec. 1802, TWP.


conditions. In effect, they were recognizing a shift in the balance of power, resulting mainly from Congress's decision to authorize the election of the Convention on the more liberal franchise proposed by the Territorial Assembly but not yet officially adopted. Candidates in general approached this broader electorate as though it could not be trusted merely to follow its natural leaders; and the electorate itself, both in the election of October 1802 and in the first state elections in 1803, behaved at the polls in a far from deferential way.

Ross County was the closest thing in Ohio to a transplant of Virginia's political traditions, which are commonly regarded as a classic example of popular deference and elite control. At the county's heart lay the Virginian-settled town of Chillicothe, which was growing from the twenty cabins of 1796 to the prosperous settlement of 1807, when it was to have "14 stores, 6 hotels, ... a Presbyterian and a Methodist church, both brick buildings, ... and 202 dwelling-houses." In the area immediately surrounding, "the land is generally good, and on the streams extremely fertile," though the country "south and southeast of an imaginary line running west and northwest from Chillicothe, is considerably diversified with hills." At this period proximity to Chillicothe was not, however, considered a particular advantage as it did not provide a particularly good market, and settlements were beginning at some distance from the town, especially on the west side of the River Scioto in the Virginia Military District. The settlers here were

19. John Armstrong to Tiffin, Columbia, 13 Feb. 1802, Edward Tiffin Papers, OHS; Francis Dunlavy to Worthington, 12 Aug. 1803, Rice Papers; Burnet, North-Western Territory.


22. James Flint, Letters from America, ... 1813-20 (Edinburgh, 1822), 122, speaking of 1804 or 1806.
sometimes described as scruffy and unkempt, immoral and irreligious; they included many Virginians, though most came from Kentucky.  

The prospect that Chillicothe would become capital of the new state made the statehood cause irresistible in Ross, and ensured the popularity of men like Thomas Worthington and his close friend and brother-in-law Edward Tiffin, who was highly regarded as a doctor, lawyer and Methodist preacher. Yet both men had many local rivals who all competed for seats in the Convention. Elias Langham had been associated with St. Clair's schemes - and his drinking bouts - but early in 1802 became "a great advocate for State government": according to one rival, "a new election, which is approaching, has made him a convert." The young, ambitious lawyer Michael Baldwin also enjoyed an independent position in local politics, based on his command of an "electioneering gang," his "bloodhounds," a band of rowdies who were of great influence in tavern and grogshop circles in Chillicothe, though Baldwin was careful in 1802 also to ingratiate himself with Worthington. He reported in April how the various candidates "have begun to break ground in the electioneering field. — has begun to preach, which is generally a symptom of an election, not being far off." By October Chillicothe was reported as "glutted with hand-bills and long tavern harangues." In this prolonged campaign, efforts were made to ensure that the voters knew how the

24. For Tiffin, see Howe, Historical Collections, 489-91, and especially Gilmore, Edward Tiffin.
25. Edward Tiffin to Worthington, 1 Feb. 1802, TWP, and in St. Clair Papers, II, 572. For Langham, see also St. Clair Papers, II, 495.
26. Baldwin to Worthington, Chillicothe, 2 Apr. 1802, Rice Papers. See also Howe, Historical Collections, centennial edn., II, 517-18; Sears, Worthington, 59-69, 86-87.
27. Duncan McArthur, reported in Massie to Worthington, Lexington, 1 Oct. 1802, Rice Papers.
candidates stood on leading issues: each of them was called upon to answer in the local newspaper precise questions relating to statehood, slavery and the Republican party, and most candidates obliged — including all the successful ones. The only two respondents who openly favoured the introduction of slavery found themselves denounced as "negro feds," and received only 50 and 8½ votes respectively, compared with the 621 received by the least popular of the successful candidates. As Jonathan Hills Thornton has written of Jacksonian Alabama, when candidates have to explain their views to the voters, deference is dead and elections belong to the electorate. 28

Jefferson County, on the eastern border of the state south of the Western Reserve, was a very different place. The more heavily populated area along the Ohio River was settled mainly by people of modest means from Virginia, Maryland and southeastern Pennsylvania, many of them squatters who, in some cases, had moved in as early as the 1780s, in defiance of federal authority. However, under the Ordinance squatters were disfranchised, and elections were generally dominated by the governor's party, which was strongly supported by officeholders and town proprietors; and local Republicans believed that success at the polls depended on President Jefferson carrying out a "small revolution" among the officeholders — and certainly a change of sheriff. Even without such assistance, however, the Republicans or statehood men elected three of the county's five delegates to the 1802 Convention, and two of their Federalist opponents succeeded only by asserting their conversion to statehood and their support for a "Republican" constitution. Afterwards the leading statehood politician in Jefferson County, James Pritchard, described how Bezaleel Wells, the wealthy local proprietor who has often been considered a prime example of the "old style," elitist Federalist, won election to the Convention:

Bazaleel Wells changed sides and made profession in a hand bill he put out that if he was elected he would endeavour to procure a Constitution similar to that of Pennsylvania/. . . he out runs me 15 voices/. . . his Private interest is Great having a great Number indebted to him for Lands sold to them in small Quantities and for Town Lots/. . . he has always before this been a Great Stickler for a Territorial Government and an alteration for States bounds in the Territory & c. that I am not without hopes if he sees the Republican Party the strongest he will fall into all their views to acquire Popularity at home, but will be from Principle and interest I think a strong advocate for a Federal Governor as he has long basked in the sunshine of Power - ... The adverse Party to me ... Represented me as a friend to slavery/. . . their Peace Came out at a late time and I had not an opportunity publicly to Repel the assertion/. . . I believe with the Ignorant and uninformed it did me some injury ....

Such flexibility allowed the Federalists to carry the county in January 1803, leading Pritchard to emphasize the continuing influence of the proprietors in elections. In the township he himself commanded, the Republicans were irresistible; but the party had also to win votes in townships dominated by some Federalist notable- "& all he could do." In fact, the Republicans successfully did so in the June Congressional election, when the level of turnout increased significantly over the January figure, and in October when the "Republican ticket... prevailed in Jefferson." Clearly, if social and economic influence remained important in elections, even old-style politicians - like Bezaleel Wells - were facing up to the need to orient their words and deeds less to each other and more toward the voter.

29. Pritchard to Worthington, Jefferson County, 23 Mar., 23 Oct. 1802, TWP. See also Heald, Bezaleel Wells, Founder of Canton and Steubenville, Ohio, 36-37, 43-45. Both this latter work and especially Elkins and McKitrick, "A Meaning for Turner's Frontier, I: Democracy in the Old Northwest," 350-51, give a misleading impression by emphasizing Wells' position in Stark County to the neglect of Jefferson County, and by ignoring his political career; Fischer's account, in Revolution of American Conservatism, 409, is just wrong.

This was made especially clear in Adams County, which lay on the Ohio River between Cincinnati and the mouth of the Scioto. Here "the land is generally uneven and hilly, and embraces a variety of soils, from the best to the poorest"; according to Henry Howe forty years later, "Many of the first settlers were from Virginia, Kentucky and Ireland." Since many of them were tenants and debtors, the county was generally assumed to be in the pocket of Nathaniel Massie, founder of the would-be county seat, Manchester, "an active, intelligent man, and by far the most wealthy in the County." Yet when petitions were organized early in 1802 to protest against St. Clair's schemes, the Adams County petitions advocated statehood against the advice of Massie, who at that time preferred caution. The people, indeed, were considered unanimous in their zeal for statehood and eagerness to "shake off the iron fetters of the tory party in this territory." The statehood candidates won election to the Convention with ease, yet their political success undoubtedly depended on satisfying their constituents' wishes: for in January 1803 two of the three delegates to the convention, both significant landowners and friends of Massie, failed to secure election to the first state assembly in January 1803 because some of their votes on the constitution had given dissatisfaction. Apparently one of them, who lost by seven votes, and indeed, a colleague in Ross County who was also defeated, had "lost much credit by their negro vote," in favour of extending civil rights to blacks.

That established leaders could not automatically presume popular support was demonstrated again, more broadly, later in 1803. The First General


33. Scioto Gazette, 15 Jan. 1803; Duncan McArthur to Worthington, Chillicothe, 17 Jan. 1803, TWP.
Assembly had completed the distribution of state offices, and the so-called Chillicothe Junto and friends had emerged well plumèd, though not so disproportionately as is sometimes assumed. In many places, but notably in Hamilton and even Ross counties, severe criticisms were voiced of the appointments, especially where members had gained office contrary to the spirit of the new constitution. The result was a drastic turnover in the fall elections, with only three members who had served in the House in March being re-elected. 34 Only one of these elected from Ross County was acceptable to Worthington and Tiffin. 35 The new members in the House declared earlier appointments "unconstitutional and therefore void," and appeared "to have a wish to invert the whole order of things." Only the "men of business" in the Senate, where only half the seats had been up for re-election, kept things within bounds until party control could be re-established. 36

In this political environment, wealth and broad acres were not sufficient in themselves to secure political success. In Hamilton County, for example, John Cleves Symmes had found it difficult to find support in his own Purchase even in Territorial days, and as early as 1796 was faced by denunciations by public meetings as "the greatest land-jobber on the face of the earth." On the Western Reserve the proprietors retained considerable influence, including those linked with the Territorial establishment, but only men friendly to statehood and Republicanism were elected or came close to election in 1802. 37 Lee Soltow's study of landownership in Ohio in 1810 reveals that the delegates to the Convention owned, on average, ten times as

34. William T. Utter, "Ohio Politics and Politicians, 1802-1805" (Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1929), 31, 39, 41-42. Those who received appointive offices, including minor judgeships, did not form a tight group dominating state political activity: four of them had sat in both the Convention and the first Assembly, three had sat in the Convention but not the Assembly, and four were members of the first legislature who had not been members of the Convention.

35. Tiffin to Worthington, Chillicothe, 2 Nov. 1803, TWP.

36. Tiffin, 9 Jan. 1803 \_1804/1, Hassie, 1 Feb. 1804, McArthur, 2 Jan. 1804, all to Worthington from Chillicothe, TWP.

Source: Downes, *Evolution, Ohio, 244.

MAP 2.6: COUNTY BOUNDARIES, 1803.

Source: Ullet, Frontier, 25.

OHIO COUNTIES, 1803
TABLE 2.1

TURNOUT IN THREE COUNTIES, 1798-1803
as percentage of adult white males

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections for:</th>
<th>Hamilton</th>
<th>Trumbull</th>
<th>Ross</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Assembly:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1798 (first assembly)</td>
<td>c.19.05</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1799 (special election)</td>
<td>c.22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800 (second assembly)</td>
<td>c.16.85 (± 7.83)</td>
<td>10.58</td>
<td>17.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1802 (third assembly)</td>
<td>35.03 (± 7.19)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Convention, 1802:</td>
<td>52.14 (± 4.30)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>64.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor, January 1803</td>
<td>37.32</td>
<td>52.92</td>
<td>46.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressman, June 1803</td>
<td>54.33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: see Appendices

many acres as property owners in general. This reflects the considerably
greater wealth of six delegates (three of them Federalist) who owned more
than 5,000 acres each, and they were balanced by at least two delegates who
owned much less than the median for the state's landowners. As Soltow
acknowledges - with some surprise - "There was a strange mixture in the
sizes of holdings of the various delegates." An analysis of the Assemblies
of 1803 and 1804 would probably reveal a similarly varied and changing
pattern. Certainly electoral success was no longer the preserve exclusively
of the wealthy and those favoured by the establishment.

This change was associated with - and no doubt partly resulted from -
the dramatic increase in the numbers of men voting in these years. As Table 2.1
demonstrates, in the three counties for which relevant evidence survives, the

38. Lee Soltow, "Inequality Amidst Abundance: Land Ownership in Early
Nineteenth Century Ohio," Ohio History, LXXXVIII (1979), 141. Like
Soltow', I have assessed the landed property of individual delegates
from Gerald M. Petty, Ohio 1810 Tax Duplicate, Arranged in a State­
Wide Alphabetical List of Names of Taxpayers (Columbus, 1976).
turnout in the election for the 1802 Convention was two or three times higher than in the 1800 elections for the Territorial Assembly — and five times higher on the Western Reserve! The full run of returns for Hamilton County is most suggestive, for the elections for the third Territorial Assembly and for the Convention were held at the same time, but on different franchises: apparently half the increase was due to the provision of extra polling places, while the remainder was a consequence of broadening the franchise specially for the Convention elections. The attainment of turnouts over 50 and 60 per cent of adult white males marks, moreover, a permanent change in voter behaviour in Ohio, for the level of turnout never generally dropped back to the levels of Territorial days. In the state elections of 1803, over 35 per cent of the state's electorate probably voted for governor in January while in the Congressional election in summer almost 50 per cent went to the polls. In two townships in Washington County, over 80 per cent of adult white males turned out to vote for Congressman. And in the years that followed, over the state as a whole, between 35 and 40 per cent of the electorate usually voted in contested elections for the relatively unimportant office of governor.

Such levels of popular participation were possible because the state constitution devised by the Convention of 1802 consolidated the principles upon which Ohio's "internal revolution" had been based. There were to be no property or wealth requirements for office-holding, while the franchise was extended to all adult white males, resident within the state for one year, who had either paid or been charged with a state or county tax, or been compelled to labour on the roads. As a school text-book later explained, "as nearly every man is liable to labor on the roads, very few are denied the right to vote." Certainly in later years Ohio was commonly regarded as

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39. For estimates of the adult white male population and for the sources of voting figures, see the Appendices. The township figures come from the Abstract of Votes, October 1803, and the Enumeration of 1803, Washington County Court House, Marietta.
possessing, under this constitution, "an unrestricted and universal elective franchise."\textsuperscript{40} Furthermore, this electorate was given the right to elect the governor and the state senate every two years, and the House every year. After the admission of the state, the legislature gave to the people at large the election of Presidential electors, while it also secured for the people "the right of choosing all our officers by Townships."\textsuperscript{41} The number of counties now increased rapidly, and county commissioners were given the authority to create new townships -- thus bringing polling stations closer to the voter.

The real centre of power in the new state was to be the General Assembly, for the memory of St. Clair ensured that the constitution "put to sleep, forever, the Governor's negative upon the acts of the Legislature."\textsuperscript{42} However, the public accountability of the Assembly was ensured by a constitutional provision for the publication of its journals, and for the recording of the "yeas" and the "nays" on any vote at the request of any two members of either house. The Assembly had the power to appoint many of the governmental officials in the counties, but the constitution gave to the people the election of "all town and township officers" and the captains and subalterns in the militia, while the legislature of 1804 provided for the popular election of county commissioners. Perhaps as significant as anything, the constitution decreed that "All elections shall be by ballot", and provided that the sheriff in each county, who traditionally exercised great influence, should himself be popularly elected.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{40} Andrew W. Young, First Lessons in Civil Government, Including A Comprehensive View of the Government of the State of Ohio (Cleveland, 1846), 35; B. Drake and E.D. Mansfield, Cincinnati in 1826 (Cincinnati, 1827), 20.

\textsuperscript{41} Samuel Huntington to Elijah Wadsworth, Chillicothe, 23 Mar. 1803, in "Huntington Correspondence," 84.

\textsuperscript{42} Statement of Joseph Darlington, May 1830, reprinted in John Kilbourn, A Geography of Ohio, Designed for Common Schools (Columbus, 1830), 72.

\textsuperscript{43} The Constitution of 1802 has been widely reprinted, but most usefully alongside other relevant documents in D.J. Ryan, ed., "From Charter to Constitution," OHSP, V. (1897), 1-164. For the 1804 legislature, see Ratcliffe, "Benjamin Tappan," 139-40.
Thus from Ohio's first emergence as a state and a participant in national politics, the technical barriers to popular rule which persisted in some older states were destroyed. From the start the constitutional environment in Ohio approximated that which Richard McCormick has suggested made possible the new party system of the 1830s: Ohio chose its presidential Electors by a popular, general-ticket election, its Congressmen by districts (once it had more than one Congressman!), and had a multiplicity of locally elected officials. Printed ballots were used, voting districts were small, and all elections from the start were consolidated on one day in October - except for the township elections in April and the Presidential elections usually held in November. In Ohio at least, "the rules under which the political game was to be played" scarcely changed at all between 1803 and 1850, and were throughout conducive to the creation of mass parties.44

The Coming of Party Action

In the end, the campaign for statehood had become caught up in the great national contest between Federalist and Jeffersonian Republican. Not merely had the future of Ohio become a pawn in the struggle for partisan advantage, but many Ohioans had become deeply interested in the argument and identified themselves with one side or another. Admittedly, much antiparty feeling persisted: as one Virginian told Worthington in 1802, "I was in great hopes a forbearance of retort and a single view to the good of the community at large would have governed all parties, but so it is that both sides unite in all cases to oppose.... party spirit has the same effects it ever had and I am confident the consequences must be ruin to the happiness of America." In condemning "party," he bore witness that "party runs high among our legislators"; indeed, on looking back, Jacob Burnet thought "the spirit displayed in the political strife" of 1802 to be directly comparable

with that of the 1840s. As a consequence, political action in Ohio increasingly came to be structured by partisan identity and organization, as had already happened in the seaboard states.

The Republicans in particular, as they strove to mobilize support and co-ordinate action, began to draw upon the experience and example of party colleagues in the states. As early as 1797 a Committee of Correspondence, made up exclusively of good Republicans, was established in Cincinnati to organize opposition to the Territorial regime. The petition and electioneering campaigns which aroused popular interest in statehood after 1800 were organized by similar committees of correspondence and vigilance committees at the various county seats, while even on the Western Reserve Republican activists organized public meetings and encouraged "taking the stump," though the term was not used at the time. Such efforts intensified in 1802, and Republicans even called county conventions to nominate candidates, at least in most of those counties where the Federalists seemed strong. These conventions, made up of delegates elected in the townships, were among the first in the nation, with only Pennsylvania for certain adopting this device before Ohio.

The Federalists, too, showed every willingness to canvass for support and organize for victory. As early as 1800, St. Clair's supporters "visited every family in Cincinnati and its vicinity, except two; and ... found them well-disposed." In 1802, recognizing the critical nature of the elections to the Constitutional Convention, the Federalists appealed, even unscrupulously, for popular support, and showed themselves willing to modify their political

1. Abraham Shepherd to Worthington, Shepherdstown, 14 Feb., 8 Mar. 1802, TWP; Burnet, North-Western Territory, 341 n.

stance in their search for votes. Moreover, they worked to form a "general system" for co-ordination and made "extraordinary exertions" which the Republicans used as justification for their own organized efforts. And in Washington County they called two delegate conventions, the first of which met before any Republican convention in the Territory had even been called. 3

Yet the parties were not so well organized, nor their authority sufficiently accepted, for the 1802 election to be described simply in party terms. Even in those counties where delegate conventions met, official party nominations did not deter other members of the party from running, and in every county there were many privately nominated candidates. On the Western Reserve, at least three Republicans ran for the two vacancies, without any sense of contradicting the best interests of the party. In Fairfield County there were ten candidates for the two places open, and they all received very different numbers of votes. 4 Yet in almost every case it seems clear that the party identity of the candidates was widely known; and leading politicians quickly worked out the partisan implication of the election results. As Worthington told the President, "the Republican ticket has succeeded beyond my most sanguine expectations. 26 decided Republicans have been elected, 7 Federalists and 2 doubtful ...." 5

Proceedings in the Convention demonstrated the accuracy of Worthington's analysis. According to Ephraim Cutler, "Party divisions, as respects


4. Ratcliffe, "Benjamin Tappan," 137-38; Mary Lou Conlin, Simon Perkins of the Western Reserve (Cleveland, 1963), 53. For Fairfield, see Jacob Beck to Charles E. Rice, Lancaster, 7 Nov. 1894, Rice Papers, OHS.

Federalists and Democrats, were not prominent," and Samuel Huntington, on the Republican side, reported that "those politics but seldom were brought up in debates and never disturbed the calm discussion of any question." On more than half the recorded ballots the Federalists voted with the majority, agreeing to deprive the governor of his veto power and put the franchise on a tax-paying rather than property-owning basis. Yet the Federalists still tended to vote together as a bloc, with most of them voting together in 36 of the 45 roll calls that were recorded five or six of them on 23 occasions, and all seven together on 13 occasions. The Republicans, by contrast, tended to divide, which on occasions gave the Federalists great influence, as when they persuaded the Assembly to adopt a judiciary system quite different from that proposed by the Republican leadership. Partisan identities and attitudes were certainly present in the Convention, at no time more so than when all the Federalists voted to refer the constitution to the people for their approval, and all 28 Republicans voted against. As Huntington remarked after the Convention, "though it might not be expected that general politics would have found their way across the Allegany, yet the line that divides parties in the States is as distinctly drawn here as there."6

Conscious that the elections of 1803 would decide the future political character of the state, the Republican members of the Convention met towards its close to agree on a single candidate for Governor. They recognised that party unity was at a premium in this first statewide election, since voters in the various districts would have to take on trust the political soundness of a nominee personally unknown in their locality. The agreed candidate, Edward Tiffin, was given a clear run by Republicans, and won handsomely.7


7. For the caucus, see Western Herald, 23 Aug. 1806; Chillicothe Supporter, 26 Jan. 1809; Sears, Worthington, 108 n. For the results, see Appendix II.
Tiffin himself doubted whether the party's advantage would be carried over into the Assembly elections: "there will be more federalists in the Legislature than we supposed owing to the great division existing in the several Counties on Local questions such as dividing Counties, fixing Seats of Justice, &c." In fact, however, the results showed a considerable Republican victory in every county (except Jefferson), giving the party easy control of the first legislature. In March, towards the close of the Assembly, the caucus met again to choose the official candidate in the statewide election for the state's sole Congressman; but though Jeremiah Morrow was chosen, the session broke up amid confusion and some doubt whether he was the accepted candidate. Other Republicans came forward as candidates, but the 'Chillicothe Junto' threw their support behind Morrow, warning that "a division of republican interest" would result in "the election of a federalist." Morrow won, with 49.25 per cent of the vote, compared with 24.9 per cent for the Federalists' nominee.

The Federalists did, in fact, contest all these early statewide elections. They did not develop a means of statewide coordination, and found it difficult to agree on a single candidate - perhaps preferring to support whichever candidate might best strengthen their local ticket. In January 1803 they may in one county have boycotted the election of Governor, but elsewhere, as in Fairfield County, "The federalists united all their force behind a single candidate - if to little avail." In the fall elections of 1803 they staged something of a recovery in the Assembly elections, a success that in Fairfield was ascribed to their retention of federal offices, the influence of which they exerted "to a man ... against the republicans."

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3. Tiffin to Worthington, Chillicothe, 7, 24 Jan. 1803, TWP.


10. Tiffin to Worthington, Chillicothe, 14, 18 Jan. 1803, TWP.

11. Vyllys Silliman, to Worthington, Wachatomaha (near Zanesville), 2 Nov. 1803, and Samuel Carpenter to Worthington, Lancaster, 7 Nov. 1803, TWP.
However, this success probably owed as much to popular dissatisfaction with the dominant Republicans, who were accused of having gained all the best offices for themselves; in many counties, as in Ross, there was a falling-off in the Republican vote, though the beneficiaries were dissident Republicans as much as Federalists. Exploitation of differences among the Republicans, together with criticism of party tyranny, were now clearly the Federalists' favoured tactics.

In the Assembly of 1803-04, the Federalist minority gained the support of many dissident Republicans and so gained effective control of the House. As David Abbot, a Republican from the Western Reserve, said, nearly half the Republicans objected to "a party who are for forcing everything down our throats by the lump; if we object, they say 'you ought to unite'." However, close cooperation with Federalists was difficult when many of them bitterly opposed Jefferson's government and all its works, including even a measure as popular in Ohio as the Louisiana Purchase. When resolutions commending the Purchase came before the House, Federalists and some dissidents protested - with unintended "salutary effect":

it has fixed on those who signed it / the protest / such a mark as to enable not only the majority of the present legislature but the constituents of those persons to distinguish between professional and practical republicans. It has in fact had the effect of arranging the majority decidedly and almost uniformly against anything which originates with any member of the minority.

Several dissidents still supported the Federalists, but now "a fear of their truly republican constituents ... keeps them in some bounds."

In these circumstances arrangements had to be made for Ohio's first Presidential election. The Electors, leading Republicans agreed, must not


13. David Abbot to Worthington, Chillicothe, 17 Jan. 1804, TWP

14. Silliman to Worthington, Chillicothe, 29 Dec. 1803, and Massie to Worthington, Chillicothe, 1 Feb. 1804, TWP.
be chosen by the legislature, "as it will be made use of by our enemies, as an evidence of an encroachment on the privileges of the people." The Federalists wanted a popular election "in districts" in the hope that through "great exertions" they might win one of Ohio's three Electors; however, the Republican majority agreed on a general-ticket system which would minimize Federalist chances. The party caucus named three Electoral candidates "unequivocally" committed to vote for Jefferson, and a corresponding committee made great efforts to produce united support in the election, even though one Elector moved to Indiana. In state politics, Republicans worked to ensure that the "next election will bring about a different order of things." In Fairfield County the Republicans determined to "fall upon some plan or other to inform each other and unite the republican interest closer than it has been heretofore in this County." In Ross "every Republican" was urged to "come prepared with the 'Ticket' he means to support; if not, carefully to examine such as may be handed to him, previous to his putting it in the box." The result was a crushing defeat for Federalist candidates and a new legislature "composed of almost entirely new Members." In two strictly two-way contests, Morrow was triumphantly re-elected Congressman over the dissident Republican supported by the Federalists, and in November the Jeffersonian Electors were chosen by a seven-to-one margin. Never again did Federalists play as conspicuous a role as they had in the 1803-04 Assembly, the next two assemblies were harmonious and united, and so powerful was party feeling among the majority that the Assembly even considered changing

15. Silliman to Worthington, Wachatomaha, 2 Nov. 1803; Samuel Carpenter to Worthington, Lancaster, 7 Nov. 1803; Tiffin to Worthington, Chillicothe, 26 Dec. 1803, 13 Jan. 1804; Massie to Worthington, Chillicothe, 1 Feb. 1804, TWP.


17. Tiffin to Worthington, Chillicothe, 17, 20 Feb. 1804; Massie to Worthington, Chillicothe, 1 Feb. 1804, Carpenter to Worthington, Lancaster, 7 Nov. 1803, TWP; Scioto Gazette, 8 Oct. 1804.
the names of the Counties of Ross, Adams and Hamilton! It was, as even Tiffin acknowledged, "republicanism ... run mad." \(^{18}\)

The gradual extension of partisanship can be seen most clearly in the two counties most involved in St. Clair's sectional log-roll -- Hamilton and Washington. In 1800 Hamilton County occupied the western quarter of the future state, south of the Greenville Treaty line, but the bulk of the 14,000 population lived at the southern end in what is now the metropolitan area of Cincinnati. The city at that time contained only 750 inhabitants, though it was to grow in the next decade to 2,320, of whom under 500 were adult white males. The population of 1810 had come from every state of the Union, but mainly from the states north of Virginia, as well as from Ireland, England, Germany and Scotland. In character, its people were considered by its leading polymath, Dr. Daniel Drake, to be typical of "the other middle, and eastern states." The inhabitants he described as generally laborious. By far the greatest number are mechanics. The rest are chiefly merchants, professional men, and teachers. Wealth is distributed more after the manner of the northern, than southern states; and few or none are so independent, as to live without engaging in some kind of business. \(^{19}\)

Until the creation of the Indiana Territory in 1800, Cincinnati had been capital of the Northwest Territory -- and was to become so again, briefly, in December 1801. Not surprisingly, although the earliest demands for statehood had arisen in Cincinnati in 1795 and shown real force in 1797, St. Clair was able to persuade leading Republicans in the city to support his proposed boundary revision, which might yet make Cincinnati a state capital, and in the fall of 1800 his "friends" won five of the county's seven seats in the

18. Tiffin to Worthington, Chillicothe, 11 Nov., 24 Dec. 1804, TWP. See also McArthur to Worthington, 21 Dec. 1804, 10 Jan. 1806, TWP; and for the election results, Scioto Gazette, 12, 19 Nov. 1804.

19. Daniel Drake, Notices Concerning Cincinnati (Cincinnati, 1810), reprinted in QPHPSO, III (1903), 30-31. See also Howe, Historical Collections, centennial ed., I, 754.
second Territorial Assembly. From now on St. Clair had a clear hold on the majority of the voters in the city and its vicinity, though politicians doubted whether his influence extended far beyond its bounds. Ominously, in 1800 two of the legislative seats were won by the Republicans Francis Dunlavy and Jeremiah Morrow, who lived in the upper part of the county—near Lebanon (in what was soon to be Warren County), and opposed the Cincinnati scheme. 20

Even within the city there was a handful of citizens "of common decency" who hoped that "the genuine spirit of republicanism" would "totally annihilate the pernicious seeds of aristocracy." Such "Real republicans," led by David Ziegler, prayed in 1800 for President Adams' early retirement, though local elections were divorced from national party considerations and the local newspaper printed little news of the Presidential election. Even so, the few partisans in the city publicly celebrated Jefferson's inauguration in March 1801, and those in other settlements insisted on holding their own "wildly Republican" July Fourth celebrations. 21 Soon these committed Republicans became convinced that the Territorial system was an embodiment of anti-republican ideals, and decided that they preferred early statehood to a division of the Territory advantageous to the city. Finding allies in the townships in the north of the county, they organized petitions to Congress against the Division law passed by the Assembly in December 1801—and secured a great number of signatories "from their zeal in the cause and the unusual degree of Party spirit that prevails in that County at present on this subject." 22 In March Republican Corresponding Societies began to be


organized in the outlying townships, with a view to working with the Cincinnati Society in carrying through to completion Congress's scheme for securing statehood. These societies were regarded as "a good means of collecting the sense of the people," and ensuring that the Republican minority in the city co-ordinated its efforts with its allies farther north in the county. In August seventeen Republican Societies sent delegates to a county convention which nominated a slate of candidates for both the Constitutional Convention and the third Territorial legislature. 23

The efforts of the Republican Societies to control the election stimulated an outburst of antiparty rhetoric from their opponents. In a major speech in Cincinnati, St. Clair complained that the "design" of the Republican Societies "is to keep people that are not Republicans out of the convention." As an article in the Cincinnati newspaper (almost certainly by St. Clair) complained, the meetings of the Republican Societies were restricted exclusively to members: "The rules ... are that persons wishing to become members should be proposed by members, and admitted or rejected by a vote, constituting themselves, as it were, a court of Inquisition."

These self-appointed judges of political purity then raised "odious distinctions among the citizens, and set them at variance with each other." Their nominees were not "the wisest, the ablest, and the best informed men"; they did not, in many cases, have "a real interest in the property of this particular part of the country," which contained more than one-third of the population of the proposed state. Furthermore, St. Clair asserted, the Republican Societies were probably the agents of Ross County, the leaders of which constantly imposed on Hamilton, to its very considerable detriment. In particular, voters should hesitate before accepting the severe terms of the Enabling Act, or falling for covert schemes to introduce slavery into

23. Robert McClure to Worthington, Bighill, 4 Mar. 1802, TWP; Western Spy, 1 May, 3, 10 July, 21 Aug. 1802.
These appeals were clearly well-judged to sway a significant body of opinion. Certainly one supporter of the St. Clair party in Dayton -- another centre of Federalism -- accepted the truth of these charges, and later made it clear that, though "induced ... to rank among the Federalists," he "never supported either men or measures because they were of this or that party & indeed I have always been averse to every man who is warm or violent of any party, believing that party measures are destructive of the general good." The Federalists pressed home their advantages, and in June a leading Republican reported that "the parties are at it pell-mell in Cincinnati, but that the printers there do not give the Republicans a fair chance; print everything for Aristocrats, and only now and then a piece for Democrats." On the eve of the election Massie even feared that, with "the parties in that county ... exerting themselves to the utmost, ... the dividing party are gaining ground." Many rival nominations were made, both by township meetings and by anonymous individuals: one meeting, in Mad River township, more or less confirmed the Republican nomination, but the others all named more or less the same rival set of candidates. One particularly powerful attempt was made in Cincinnati to break the Republican ticket, by calling a "respectable" meeting to make a rival nomination. The attempt failed, however, for the meeting voted to include eight of those named on the Republican ticket, out of fifteen. In any case, the mutterings about the sinister purpose of the Societies were silenced when its nominees began

24. St. Clair's speech, in St. Clair Papers, II, 587-90; Western Spy, 28 Aug. 1802. See also ibid., 2, 3 Oct. 1802; Burnet, North-Western Territory, 501.


to answer publicly questions concerning statehood, slavery, the suffrage, and popular control of officeholders; and party leaders confidently asserted that the ticket "will be supported by a very large majority of Republicans."27

The election scarcely revealed a general respect for party nominations. Ninety-nine men ran for the ten seats in the Convention, and 116 for Hamilton's seven seats in the third Territorial Assembly. However, only 26 of the former and 27 of the latter gained more than 50 votes; those with fewer votes, the local newspaper generously supposed, "could not have been generally considered as candidates." The official Republican candidates for the Convention gained between 1,635 and 791 votes, while those for the Assembly gained between 948 and 484. Clearly there was little ticket voting, yet the Republican nomination was obviously the decisive advantage a candidate could have, since even those who gained three or four non-Republican nominations for the Convention received only between 964 and 458 votes. This meant, however, that the Republicans failed to win two of the ten Convention seats, since their weakest candidates were overtaken by the strongest Federalist, John Reilly, and the popular Cincinnati Republican, John Smith. Smith was "a successful merchant, an adroit politician, a sagacious legislator, and an able divine," and stood high in public regard, but he had alienated the Republican Societies by his earlier flirtations with St. Clair's log-roll (even voting for the Division Act of December 1801) and by his initial criticism of the Enabling Act, though he recanted before the election. But despite their disappointment at Smith's election, the Republicans could reasonably regard the election as a great triumph, since their nominees had won 15 of the 17 representative positions at stake.28


28. Western Spy, 20 Oct. 1802. For Smith, see ibid., 22 Oct., 31 Dec. 1800, 4 Feb. 1801; C.W. Byrd to Massie, Cincinnati, 20 June 1802, in Massie, Massie, 210-11; St. Clair Papers, II, 548, 572; Burnet, North-Western Territory, 342 n.; the quotation is from B.F. Morris, The Life of Thomas Morris (Cincinnati, 1856), 20.
In spite of their defeat, the St. Clair party made "active efforts" to win the first state elections in January 1803, and, in particular, took "great pains to influence the people of Hamilton against" Tiffin's candidature for Governor. The Federalists called a public meeting which fixed on John Paul, an elderly and conservative Cincinnati Republican who had sat in the Constitutional Convention, as a proper gubernatorial candidate; the Republican Society was then invited to concur in this most appropriate nomination. This offer was tempting since for many months it had been clear that local opinion felt that the first governor should come from the most populous county in the state. However, aware of the need to ensure statewide success, "the support of the Republican interest in Hamilton County" had been offered in May 1802 to Nathaniel Massie, "the only Person (out of the County of Hamilton) who will be able to command their votes." After the deliberations at the close of the Constitutional Convention, the Hamilton County Republicans transferred their support to Tiffin, and the local Federalists' "compromise" candidate, John Paul, was "unanimously rejected by the Republican Societies." 29 The Federalists put forward a ticket still including some sound Republican names, but the Republican Societies called a delegate convention which chose Tiffin as their gubernatorial candidate, and worked more efficiently than before in every town of size to co-ordinate the support of candidates. Once again large numbers ran for each post - 22 of them for Governor alone - and once again there was considerable ticket-splitting. Yet the official Republican candidates swept the board, winning all the representative positions, while Tiffin secured 1,387 votes compared to the 241 won by his nearest rival, the official Federalist candidate. 30


30. Western Spy, 8 Dec. 1802, 5, 12, 19 Jan. 1803; Scioto Gazette, 8, 15 Jan. 1803.
The Congressional election in June saw similar tensions and a similar outcome. Cincinnati Republicans pressed hard for the highly regarded William Goforth to be the party's candidate, for he had worked hard locally for statehood and had suffered for it in his profession as a physician, since local "monied men" had turned against him. However, Worthington and the Chillicothe Republicans emphasized the need for the whole party to support the caucus nomination of Jeremiah Morrow and frustrate Federalist scheming. The Federalists once more tried to exploit local feeling by nominating William McMillan, the earlier Republican defender of Cincinnati's ambitions, who was now described as an "independent American," without "the least tincture of the baleful and pernicious mania of democracy"; and the Federalists even looked for support among conservative Republicans in Ross County. In the event McMillan won 169 of the 252 votes cast in Cincinnati, while Goforth ran as well as Morrow both there and in the neighbouring river settlement of Columbia; but in the rest of the old Hamilton County Morrow won 449 out of 537 votes, to McMillan's 84 and Goforth's 3. In the countryside at large, and especially up the Little Miami Valley in Morrow's own township (now Warren County), the official Republican candidate was unstoppable.

However, the strong undercurrent of antiparty feeling persisted. In Greene County, newly created out of Hamilton, the voters rejected party direction in the first election of sheriff: "Greater unanimity was never seen. The words Federal or Republican were never heard throughout the day - they all acted like true independent Americans." Similar sentiment operated against the ticket nominated in delegate convention by the Republican Societies.

31. Western Spy, 11, 18 May 1803; Worthington to Goforth, 25 May 1803, reprinted in American Pioneer, II (1843), 89. For Goforth, see Goforth to Worthington, 29 Aug. 1803, Rice Papers, and C.W. Syrd to Worthington, 28 Dec. 1803, TWP.

32. Western Spy, 25 May, 22, 29 June 1803; Jacob Burnet et al. to Massie, Cincinnati, 9 May 1803, in Massie, Massie, 227-28.
of "the old county of Hamilton" for the fall 1803 elections, which Republicans regarded as especially important because the next legislature must determine how Ohio would choose its Presidential Electors. Newspaper correspondents attacked "electioneering or log rolling partisan[s/]" who had secured plum offices for themselves in the first General Assembly, and the Federalists, besides "spreading the most abominable falsehoods," placed "some popular republicans on their ticket," including those Assemblymen who had returned from Chillicothe without offices. The Republicans managed to elect only one Senator contrary to Federalist wishes, and "old Hamilton ... progressed backwards" by electing two "federal" Senators. Yet even in this antiparty triumph, strict ticket voting was to be found on both sides, notably in Cincinnati itself.

Local Republicans were undaunted by defeat. In May 1804 the Cincinnati Republican Corresponding Society tried to persuade party colleagues in other parts of the state "to form similar Societies in your neighborhood. Or by some means procure the sense of the people that we may be united on the day of the Presidential Election throughout the State." Typically, they claimed the right to name one of Ohio's three Electors, promising to support the two named elsewhere. At home they faced an energetic Federalist party, which at a Cincinnati public meeting nominated a ticket once more including dissident Republicans. The Republican Societies insisted that strict loyalty to the party ticket would overwhelm intrigue by the Federalists, who "to a man turn out at elections"; for while "Cincinnati appears to keep to its own compliment of federalists, two to one, ... in every other part of the county the republicans on an average carry five to one." And so it turned out:

33. Western Spy, 15 June, 7, 23 Sept., 12, 19 Oct. 1803; Samuel Huntington to Worthington, Chillicothe, 3/30?/ Oct. 1803, TWP.
34. Daniel Symmes et al. to Worthington, Cincinnati, 31 May 1804, Rice Papers.
"Both parties tried their strength," and the "republican ticket ... obtained universally, except in the instance of sheriff, ... an immense majority."  
Not yet satisfied, the Republican leaders proposed "a new plan of organization" before the November Presidential election," and urged their supporters to "draw together more closely than ever the ties of your affiliation." The result was a shattering victory, in which the Republican Electoral candidates won 97.09 per cent of a much reduced turnout.35

The triumph of partisanship was even more complete in Washington County, which in 1800 stretched from the Ohio River north to the southern border of the Western Reserve. Almost all the population lived near Marietta, though settlements had been made also up the Muskingum and along the Ohio River, where there were some "excellent farms." Marietta, the oldest town in Ohio, was the original settlement made in 1783 by the intrepid pioneers of the Ohio Company, and the southern part of the county consisted basically of the lands granted to the company. As a result the population was largely from New England, though the unfortunate French settlers lured by the Scioto Company were to be found further down river at Gallipolis and beyond. Marietta was incorporated in 1800, and by 1802 contained more than two hundred houses, some of them two or three stories high and "somewhat elegantly built" in brick. Its enterprising inhabitants had even begun to export local produce directly to the West Indies in sea-going ships built on the Muskingum - the first of them named the St. Clair.36

The original settlers of Marietta and neighbouring townships were led by former Revolutionary officers, whose loyalty to Washington's administration

35. Western Spy, 26 Sept., 17 Oct., 7 Nov. 1804. The turnout in October was 39.83%, in November 28.37%.
had been firmly expressed in the 1790s; in Territorial politics they were inevitably associated with St. Clair's plans to divide the Territory, as was John McIntyre, son-in-law of Ebenezer Zane (of Zane's Trace) and the leading man of Zanesville, then a village of one store and one tavern, some fifty miles up the River Muskingum from Marietta. However, when the citizens of Marietta met in January 1801 to protest against statehood, an address was approved "by a large majority" which included comments on national affairs that Republican participants in the meeting found offensive; in disclaiming responsibility for those parts of the report, Return Jonathan Meigs, Sr., blamed their inclusion on "the spirit of the times roused by the event of the late election." Though a county delegate convention including at least one Republican unanimously resolved against statehood in June 1801, by the end of the year local Republicans began to speak more favourably of statehood, even though hopes for a favourable division of the Territory still survived. The first Marietta newspaper, founded in December, "boldly raised the Democratic-Republican standard," though Meigs and his son continued to play both sides before the Enabling Act made them out-and-out converts to statehood.

The broader Republican success in defeating division and securing the Enabling Act roused Marietta Federalists against this local challenge. The

37. William H. Smith, "A Familiar Talk about Monarchists and Jacobins," OAHQ, II (1888), 187, 193; St. Clair Papers, I, 186-87, 203-05. For McIntyre and Zanesville, see also Howe, Historical Collections, centennial edn., II, 328-30.

38. R. J. Meigs / Sr. / to Massie and to Worthington, 15 Jan. 1801, in Massie, Massie, 166-68, and St. Clair Papers, II, 527-28, respectively; a draft of the report may be found undated in the Caleb Emerson Family Papers, WRHS (microfilm edn., roll 3, "Miscellaneous Papers"). Meigs Sr.'s Republican sympathies had been demonstrated in December 1799, when he was one of the few members of the Territorial Assembly to vote against a complimentary address to President Adams.

younger Meigs reported in May 1802 that "Federalism has raged here this spring with intolerant fury." In August a Federalist county convention, composed of "delegates" from six counties, nominated a ticket made up of three prominent New England settlers and John McIntyre. Some outlying townships refused to "elect members to the county convention," and a Republican ticket was named, though not by a rival convention. In Athens township there were "hot times about slavery and Republicanism," for the Federalists insisted that leading Republicans wished to introduce slavery. Republicans in Athens denounced "the Federal villainy; the party is weak here, but d-----d saucy." Throughout the county as a whole, the Federalist ticket won "by about two to one." The first election under the new state constitution was equally partisan. According to the younger Meigs,

The Federalists here have grown (if possible) more bitter than ever. They fulminate their anathemas against the administration with unprecedented malice. Such was their obstinacy that (knowing they could not carry a Federalist Governor) they would not vote for governor at all, but threw blank tickets.

However, the returns show that the Federalists did not abstain from voting for Assemblymen and county offices. Even so, they were thoroughly defeated, which indicates how much of their earlier strength derived from the local appeal of their attempts to make Marietta a state capital. Moreover, in spite of their continuing efforts, they were soundly scrubbed again in the fall elections of 1803 and 1804. On the latter occasion, the "republican ticket... universally succeeded.

40. Meigs, Jr., to Worthington, Marietta, 18 May 1802, TWP
41. Cutler, Ephraim Cutler, 65-67; Scioto Gazette, 4 Sept. 1802
42. Meigs, Jr., to Worthington, Marietta, 31 Jan. 1803, TWP. For the strength of partisan feeling in Marietta in 1803, see also E.D. Mansfield, Personal Memories, Social, Political and Literary, 1803-43 (Cincinnati, 1879), 5.
Table 2:2  Distribution of Votes by Township, Washington County, October 1803

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>STATE SENATOR (Two-year term)</th>
<th>STATE SENATOR (One-year term)</th>
<th>STATE REPRESENTATIVES (Three to be elected)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Backus (R)</td>
<td>Gilman (F)</td>
<td>Buel (R)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adams</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kugger</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newtown</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salem</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>Gallipolis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Waterford</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marietta</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>103</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ames</td>
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<td>Belpre</td>
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<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuskarawa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middletown</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hockhocking</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newport</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandview</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
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468 263 | 449 267 | 495 494 | 489 297 | 288 298
Republican majority in Marietta, two to one." The Federalists now found themselves dismissed from office, as a Republican President and state Assembly appointed their own party colleagues to civil and military office in Washington County. No wonder that Aaron Burr could soon find in Marietta disillusioned men willing to listen to his mysterious intrigues.

The township election returns for the fall elections of 1803 and 1804 in Washington County demonstrate how completely partisan considerations had come to dominate electoral behaviour. The returns for 1803, when over 63 per cent of adult white males voted, reveal an extraordinarily high level of ticket voting, as Table 2.2 reveals, although it is true that 131 votes were wasted because about 66 voters were confused as to which senatorial candidate was standing for the one-year and which the two-year term. Moreover, these voter preferences showed some consistency from election to election: a similar distribution of party votes among the townships appeared in the Congressional race of June 1803, the fall elections of 1803, and the elections a year later.

Most fascinating, however, was Adams township, which had been created in 1797 out of the more northerly part of Marietta township, and in 1800 lay entirely within the bounds of the present Washington County. It had been early settled by New Englanders who had moved up the Muskingum River and established farms along the river valley. For some reason, the clerk had the bright idea of drawing up the tally sheet and poll book for elections in a slightly different form from that laid down by law: instead of showing merely who had voted and how many votes each candidate had received, he recorded how each individual had voted!

44. Ratcliffe, "Experience of Revolution," 501, n.54 and 55.
CHART 2.1: Correlation of Republican Percentages, by Township, in Washington County, June 1863, October 1863, and October 1864.

- Republican Percentage, October 1863
- Republican Percentage, June 1863
- Republican Percentage, October 1864
The returns for three elections in 1804 and 1805 demonstrate that only fourteen out of 143 ballots cast failed to vote a strict party ticket, and most of those fourteen did not split their tickets but simply failed to vote for one or two candidates on the ticket. However, these unique returns also reveal that, while elections might be perceived as contests between parties, many voters had not yet established a fixed allegiance to one party. Of the 34 different voters who voted in the two fall elections, 12 men voted Republican who otherwise (or subsequently) voted Federalist, while 5 of the remaining 22 crossed over in the April 1804 elections for county commissioners. Even so, half of the 34 voted consistently for the same party, 14 for the Federalists and 3 for the Republicans.

It was, of course, too soon to presume that such preferences for a particular party had become loyalties that could persist over many years. But what is undeniable is the high level of ticket voting which was to be found in many places besides Washington County and Adams township. This was apparent even in the elections of October 1803, when Republican discipline partially collapsed and returned the troublesome House of 1803-04. In Cincinnati in that election, when antiparty cries enabled the Federalists to win, the Federalist candidates gained 123, 123, 122, 122, 120, 119, 119 and 117 votes, respectively; the Republicans gained 51, 52, 53, 57, 57, 58 and 62 - while the two men named on both tickets received 174 and 178, or the sum of the two parties' votes! The brief returns extant for counties as different as Jefferson and Montgomery - at opposite ends of the state - suggest a similar high degree of ticket voting elsewhere in 1803. A year later the voting for the state and federal legislatures in Hamilton County as

46. Pollbooks and Tally Sheets, Adams Township, Washington County, Apr. 1804, Oct. 1804, Oct. 1805, Washington County Court House, Marietta. Unfortunately the returns for 1803, which would be the most useful, do not appear to be extant.
a whole saw the Republican candidates securing 540, 533, 525, 522 and 516, compared to the Federalists' 183, 184, 199, 205 and 208 votes, respectively, though ticket voting did not carry over to all the minor county offices. The following month the three Republican candidates for Presidential Elector received 503, 501 and 500 votes, respectively. Obviously such results were brought about partly because parties nominated slates of candidates and distributed tickets (both printed and handwritten) before and during polling; but the returns confirm that the voters accepted such party guidance and perceived politics essentially in partisan terms.

The Choice of Sides

If party identifications had been established for a significant number of Ohioans by 1804, their reasons for preferring one party to another are not entirely clear. The extant township returns for the 1803 and 1804 elections in Washington County do at least establish some patterns of behaviour. Federalism found its main support there among the settlements made by the early New England settlers on the Ohio Company lands which lay more or less in the western two-thirds of the modern county. The banner township, almost uniformly Federalist, was Belpre, which in 1802 contained "not more than a dozen houses; but the settlements formed in the environs increase rapidly." By 1804 it was regarded as "a rich handsome place," made up of farms stretching several miles along the Ohio River and soon to be "much admired" for their "good management and excellent culture."1 These, plus the townships

47. Western Spy, 19 Oct. 1803, 17 Oct., 7 Nov. 1804. See also James Pritchard to Worthington, Jefferson County, 31 Oct. 1803, TWP; and Abstract of Votes, Montgomery County, Oct. 1803, Wright State University, Dayton.

1. François A. Michaux, Travels... 1802, 95; Jessup N. Couch, Diary, 1804-05, (VFM 1672, OHS), entry for 12 Oct. 1804; [Jervis Cutler], A Topographical Description of the State of Ohio, Indiana Territory, and Louisiana [Boston, 1812], 22-23.
that were to become Athens County, again carved out of Ohio Company lands, were basically the townships that had attended the Federalist conventions of 1801 and 1802.

By contrast, Marietta was at least 60 per cent Republican. Though it was still "principally inhabited by New Englanders" and impressed with its "neat and handsome style of building," it was already becoming a river town, attracting a more variegated population; in October 1804 one young newcomer from New England "found the manners of the people much vitiated; much gambling here [privately?]". Within the modern county, Republicans preponderated also in the eastern townships where the land did not belong to the Ohio Company and the majority of settlers came from Pennsylvania and Virginia. Otherwise, the Republican townships were those lying at a distance and soon to become counties in their own right: their greatest predominance was in the township far north up the Tuscarawas valley, settled mainly by Virginians and Pennsylvanians (probably including some Pennsylvania 'Dutch'), closely followed by the French settlement of Gallipolis. The Virginian and Pennsylvanian settlements up the Muskingum Valley near Zanesville gave smaller majorities to the Republicans, thanks to the presence of New Englanders, who in 1805 were also to found Putnam (later Springfield) across the river from Zanesville.

2. Fortescue Cuming, Sketches of A Tour To The Western Country... Commenced... in... 1807 and Concluded in 1809 (Pittsburg, 1810), 106; Jessup N. Couch, Diary, 1804-1805, entry for 12 Oct. 1804. The cleavage within the county is made obvious in [Alfred Mathews et al.], History of Washington County, Ohio (Cleveland: H.Z. Williams & Bro., 1881); compare 499, 556-60, 684-87, 608-13, 711-15, 580-86, 634-40, 622-29, with 565-72, 593-99, 685-89, 655-60, 700-02.

3. The township of Tuskarawa was based on the town of Coshocton, for which see William E. Hunt, Historical Collections of Coshocton County (Ohio), ... 1764-1876 (Cincinnati, 1876), 23-48. For Gallipolis township, see Michaux, Travels... 1802, 98-102. For Zanesville township, see J.F. Everhart, History of Muskingum County (Columbus, 1882), passim.
Such evidence suggests that partisan differences among the voters may have had an ethnocultural basis. Certainly the division in Washington County reflected the cleavage most travellers observed between the "ignorant, lazy and poor... rough and savage... Back settlers" of Virginia, and the orderly settlers from New England, "the Region of Industry, Economy and Steady Habits." Yet even more striking is the restricted appeal Federalism had for most people who settled Ohio. Besides the New Englanders associated with the Ohio Company's settlement, Federalism's support was limited to the numerous small urban centres where men of wealth, education and good connection were to be found. The ease with which the epithet "aristocracy" was attached to the party suggests its success in attracting officeholders, professional men, merchants, lawyers, and those who had established their reputations during the Revolution.

However, it must not be presumed that the Federalists formed an old-fashioned elite, incapable of appealing for popular support or insensitive to the new democratic climate. Admittedly, their views were not always popular; from their voting in the constitutional Convention, it is clear that, had they the majority, the constitution would have had fewer limitations on official salaries, poll taxes would have been possible, tax-paying blacks would have had the right to vote, and adult white males who laboured on the roads would not have had the right to vote, if they did not also pay taxes. But, on other issues, the Federalists were more populistic than the Virginia party. For example, the leading Republicans wanted a judicial system modelled on that of Virginia, with the sole court of appeal sitting at the state capital; instead, according to Cutler, the Federalists pressed for "a mode of

4. Thaddeus M. Harris, The Journal of a Tour into the Territory Northwest of the Allegheny Mountains (Boston, 1805), 58-59. See also Michaux, Travels... 1802.
administering justice that would bring it as near every man's door as was practicable; to the poor man equally with the rich." In the end, the more radical Republicans joined with the Federalists to establish this more "convenient and inexpensive" system, which provided for the supreme court to meet in each county annually, and was modelled on the supposedly radical example of Pennsylvania. In general, the Federalists worked hard to give the constitution, in Cutler's words, "a very strong democratic tendency" and establish a "perfect... republican system, giving as complete individual freedom as was possible." If the Federalists lost out in Ohio, it is not because they were incapable of playing politics or were out of tune with the wishes of the people.

Their great electoral weakness was simply that most of the settlers pouring into Ohio came from areas and groups already developing attachments to the Jeffersonian cause. Indeed, most national politicians were already convinced by 1802 that Ohio was almost certainly going to be Republican, if only because it was an extension of the older frontiers of western Pennsylvania, west Virginia and Kentucky. Most of the Pennsylvanian emigrants in eastern Ohio, many of them of Scotch Irish background, had sympathized with, if not participated in, the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 against Hamilton's excise tax, though the revolt had also sparked off the Federalist commitment of some better educated west Virginians and Pennsylvanians like Bezaleel Wells and the young Charles Hammond. The pioneers from Virginia and Kentucky who were moving into southern Ohio, especially the Virginia Military District, were in many ways of similar Antifederalist outlook and naturally identified with the


Jeffersonians, as certainly did such well-born Virginians as William Henry Harrison. Indeed, the Republican leadership was often referred to as the "Virginia party" and Virginian connections did provide a bond between some politicians in Hamilton County and the Chillicothe group. Yet this supposedly aristocratic "junto" did not dominate the party or impose its own views - which were in any case divided - for there were other powerful sources of Republican support.

In Hamilton County, in particular, the Republican party was quite radically democratic - and highly partisan - in its outlook. In Cincinnati, political radicals had supported the French Revolution even during the extremism of the Terror, and in 1794 had toasted "The Sans Culottes of France and the cause of Liberty triumphant." Such views were most clearly expressed in the campaign for the 1802 Convention, when Republican spokesmen and candidates - in the county as well as the city - made it clear they favoured a large degree of popular control of the future state government, with many elective offices, frequent elections, and a broader suffrage. One newspaper correspondent, signing himself "A FARMER," even advocated extending the franchise "to every free male inhabitant within the state." Indeed, these Democrats made it clear that their determined hostility to slavery was based on a sympathy for "The enslaved sons of Africa - may the time [come] when every son and daughter of Adam shall enjoy the sweets of freedom." Republicans in rural New Market township even advocated "a constitution that will set the natural rights of the meanest African and the most abject beggar, on an equal footing with those citizens of the greatest wealth and prosperity." Not surprisingly, the representatives from Hamilton County provided much support for the great effort made in the Convention - almost successfully - to give civil and political rights to black

residents, while it was the same county's delegation that broke party lines to join the Federalist minority in giving the new state a more accessible and cheaper judiciary system than that "which had like to have been established." 8

In Cincinnati, as in Tom Paine's Philadelphia and Aaron Burr's New York, the support for such radicalism probably came from artisans and educated young men trying to establish a career. Outside the city there was clearly a social resentment against officeholders and lawyers which Republican politicians tried to exploit. Even in the Territorial election of 1800, newspaper correspondents had complained that lawyers and judges sitting in the legislature had refused to pass laws regulating their own fees, and they advocated the re-election of only those "good republicans" who had supported frugal government. Not surprisingly, one candidate who received "an almost unanimous vote from the gentlemen in Cincinnati, ... was kept out by the Rabble in the country." In 1802 some Republicans urged the voters to elect only fellow farmers who laboured alongside them, in place of officeholders who lived on the labour of the people. Such social resentments were, of course, exploited just as effectively by the Federalists - as in 1803 - once the Republicans had become the officeholders. 9 Similar sentiments could be found elsewhere in the state, especially among settlers in eastern Ohio - often Scotch Irish from across the river - who were heavily tinctured by "the democracy of Pennsylvania."

The importation of party consciousness and rivalries from the East was most obvious on the Western Reserve, commonly called New Connecticut. In Connecticut itself, party divisions had become deeply marked in the 1790s, as dissidents of many kinds had combated the 'Standing Order'

8. Western Spy, 24, 10 July, 21 Aug., 18 Sept., 2 Oct., 1 Dec. 1802. See also Cutler, Ephraim Cutler, 71-73.

which governed the state. The Connecticut Land Company, though directed by men from both camps, was disproportionately connected with the Republican opposition — notably with men like Pierpont Edwards and Gideon Granger, later Jefferson's Postmaster-General. Certainly the young men who went west to settle in New Connecticut were far more Republican in outlook than most of those who stayed at home. As one Connecticut Republican remarked, "most people of much enterprise move away." Some found their opportunities restricted at home because of their Republican associations. For example, Elijah Wadsworth was a very respectable man and an unshaken Republican - he was an Inhabitant of Litchfield, the stronghold of Aristocracy in Connecticut, and was induced to leave that state from the political and religious intolerance affected and supported by his Townsmen the Wolcotts, Tracy[?], Long John and Co. (whose strong and persevering efforts left him little room to hope for better times).

Samuel Huntington, Jr., another active Republican, also found the "atmosphere of Connecticut is infectious" and decided to "get out of it as soon as I can"; like many others, he saw opportunities in the West acting as an agent for Western Reserve landholders. Some who stayed behind believed these emigrants had "removed away from all the tumults and broils into a new Country where... very little party spirit arises," but then themselves constantly pld them with news of party fights (often literally) in their old homes. 10 The young Benjamin Tappan was almost excessively caught up in the Presidential election of 1800:

needing to borrow a scythe, he walked twelve miles through the forests of the Western Reserve to borrow one from a neighbour, finding his way by the marks blazed on trees by surveyors, and discovered there "a package of letters and newspapers forwarded for me."

After a late dinner I set out to return after I had travelled five or six miles, thinking I would have time enough, I sat down on a log and began reading my letters and papers. The letters were from my friends in New England... the papers were several numbers of the [Philadelphia] Aurora. I soon became interested in the contest going on between Jefferson & Adams for the Presidency & "took no note of time." The sun had set ere I was aware of it. I thought of laying down and sleeping on the ground but about where I was I had killed a large rattlesnake on my way up & I was suspicious some of his relatives might avenge his death if I put myself in their way.

After wandering in the woods in the dark, "I took my road in the bed of the creek" which ran past his clearing, "& after a very labourious march or rather wade at twelve o clock I reached my fence & was at home."11

The source of Republicanism for many of these young men lay in their attraction to the freethinking and anticlerical ideas of the Enlightenment. Tappan himself reacted against the Calvinism of his distant relation, Jonathan Edwards, and the evangelical piety of his mother. An ardent defender of the French revolution, Tappan "had taken his stand on the democratic side" in Connecticut as early as December 1793, at the age of twenty. He bitterly opposed the close connection of the "Standing Order" with the established Congregational Church, and supported the dissenting sects in defeating plans to give the proceeds of Connecticut's Western lands to the Congregational church.12 After qualifying as a lawyer in

11. Benjamin Tappan, MS. notes on Howe's Historical Collections of Ohio, BTP, OHS.
Gideon Granger's law office, Tappan went west to the Western Reserve to look after the family's property there, but his fellow student, Calvin Pease, who was soon to join him in Ohio and become a rival in the local Republican party, kept him informed of events back home:

As for New Hartford - O Religion O Hipocracy O Tyranny O Priestcraft how art thou exalted & magnified in this place! thou ridest triumphant on the necks and consciences of the People & thy kingdom shall endure so long as Ignorance lends it friendly aid to support thee.

As for Pease himself,

I remain still in the nursery of saints altho I have long since been given over to hardness of heart & the buffetting of Satan which god grant may continue to be my happy portion.

He told how the Democrats, on July Fourth, had organized a party celebration to be held in the local church, only to find:

Saint Peters vicegerent [Timothy Dwight, the so-called Pope of Connecticut?] with his usual insolence forbid their entering the meeting house & refused the key but his little holiness found that vox populi was superior to vox dei. 13

Such attitudes were surprisingly common among the early settlers of the Western Reserve, which was a westward extension of chiefly the dissident sections of Connecticut society: as the most perceptive of the Reserve's nineteenth-century historians remarked, of "the early settled townships, ... not a fifth had a germ of the church of the parent states... Deism, Unitarianism, in at least two forms, Universalism and Universal Restoration, were largely prevalent" - and settlers from Massachusetts he thought even more heterodox than those from Connecticut. Tappan himself

publicly voiced his scepticism, notably in his highly partisan July Fourth oration of 1801, which the renowned missionary Joseph Badger found "interlaced with many grossly illiberal remarks about Christians and Christianity. Preached here the next Sunday." 14

The prevalence of Republican attachments among the settlers of the Western Reserve was critical for the future of Ohio. In 1800 the rumour that "the settlement on the Reserve is to be a Democratic one" almost prevented the Federalist Congress from recognizing the title of the Connecticut Land Company, for, if true, it put paid to any hopes of gerrymandering a Federalist state east of the Scioto River. 15 Federalist fears were soothed, and St. Clair tried to find allies on the Reserve for his plan to divide the state; but those whom he seduced, notably George Tod and Samuel Huntington, chose in the end to put party connection above possible local advantage. In doing so they gained office and preferment for themselves, but their decision was sustained by the political character of those settling the Western Reserve. Much the same was true even of those New Englanders who settled in the Ohio Company lands farther south after 1799: as a correspondent from Marietta told Jefferson in 1801, "these days there is not an Emigrant from Connecticut within this county, but what is really a friend to your honor and a true Republican." This development perhaps explains the younger Meigs' confidence in the eventual but "gradual" triumph of Republicanism in that presumed stronghold of Federalism. 16


The easy Republican predominance within Ohio was probably due to something more than this selective process of migration. Such favour for Jeffersonianism seems to have been common among all agricultural areas outside New England, especially those which were uncommercialized or expanding rapidly. In the critical years when previously uninvolved voters were everywhere being drawn into politics, short-term issues were making the Republicans much the more attractive party. "High Federalist" extremism in national affairs between 1798 and 1800 had identified the party with illiberal and militaristic measures and, more disastrously, with high direct taxation. Such policies turned most farming communities outside New England toward the Republicans, who in 1801 and 1802 had reversed these policies and established a government devoted to economy. In Cincinnati Republicans formally celebrated the "death of the Alien, Sedition, Stamp, and Excise laws." At Chillicothe the paper containing the hated acts was publicly burned, and orators condemned Federalist policy for maintaining "a standing army, navy, and a host of sycophants, dependents and drones." All present cheered "the present economical administration."

Thus the Republican party had not only rescued the people of Ohio from colonial status and given them all the advantages of statehood; it had also established the sort of federal government that most Americans beyond the direct reach of Atlantic commerce and British hegemony prized above all. In view of the popular demand for full self-government under the United States Constitution and the popular preference for weak, cheap government, there could be no surprise that when most Ohio voters took their stand in 1802 and 1803, they opted for the Jeffersonian Republican side of the party divide.

18. Western Spy, 3 July 1802 and Scioto Gazette, 3 July 1802
3. A PECULIAR PARTY SYSTEM, 1805-1815

At first sight, Ohio is the last state to fit the model of a "first party system." The gubernatorial elections of the years 1805-15 certainly do not fit any simple measure of two-party conflict: all candidates after 1803 were Republicans, their motivation apparently personal ambition, and it is difficult to make much sense of - or see much consistency in - the voting returns. Indeed, all studies focusing on Ohio politics at the state level are almost universally impressed by the personal quality of Ohio politics, the importance of wealth, personal connection, patronage, and the deferential - or apathetic - character of the electorate. As a consequence, Richard McCormick has described Ohio politics before 1824 as following "the Tennessee model of factionalism and personalism." In this, he considers Ohio typical of the "new states" formed after 1800 - "nominally Republican in allegiance, but in actuality... most accurately... described not as one-party states but as 'no-party' states."¹

Yet a closer look at the behaviour of politicians, and especially their operation at the county level, makes it clear that party considerations were far from dead. Rather, political life was dominated by the imbalance in the structure of party loyalties, by the overwhelming predominance of the Republicans, which gave Ohio the characteristics of what has been called "a modified one-party system." The lack of close competition made it difficult to maintain party unity and discipline, schisms and factions became rife, and considerable resentment was expressed against the dominant party. Yet its dominance survived, not least because the minority party maintained its opposition, and did so at a time when events in America and

¹ McCormick, Second American Party System, 257. For standard accounts of Ohio politics in these years, see Utter, Frontier State, 32-87, 93-95, 113-19, and Sears, Thomas Worthington, 115-98; and, for a typical recent approach, see J.P. Brown, "Samuel Huntington: A Connecticut Aristocrat on the Ohio Frontier," OH, LXXXIX (1980), 420-38.
especially in Europe made it seem that the survival of the Republic depended on keeping the government in the hands of those whom the people had learned, in the crisis of 1798-1802, they could trust. Though by no means displaying the organizational discipline and voter commitment of the Second Party System, these years provided important formative partisan experiences which throw valuable perspectives on - and may have helped determine the character of - the later mass parties.

The Sapping of Republican Unity

After 1804, faced by the overwhelming predominance of the Republican party, Ohio Federalists recognized that they were likely to lose in any straightforward confrontation between the parties in a statewide election; as one of their few newspapers claimed in 1809, "the federalists of Ohio not being ignorant that their opponents outnumber them, I think I may say five to one, never have made any general effort against their enemy." As a consequence they faced defeat and exclusion from local as well as state and federal office, and many of them withdrew from active politics in 1804, expressing deep disillusionment at the prospects of the country. Others recognised political reality, and at some suitable moment announced their conversion to Republicanism - and were duly rewarded with public office by the dominant party.

In these circumstances "party spirit" could not long endure "at its meridian height" of 1802 and 1803. According to the firm Republican John Sloane in 1806, "there has for the last two years been no party who dared to make head against the republicans." As a result, the General


2. Cutler, Ephraim Cutler, 84, 114; Rowena Buell, ed., The Memoirs of Rufus Putnam (Boston and New York, 1903), 125; Heald, Wells, 45; Mrs. Charles P. Noyes, A Family History in Letters and Documents (St. Paul, 1919), I, 272.

Assembly of that year had "one of the most agreeable sessions ever experienced in this or any other State as there was not the least appearance of anything like party during the whole time." The dissident Republican and Federalist leaders who had caused such strife and difficulty in 1803-04 now "find themselves in quite a different situation from what they were the first [regular] session as their influence does not extend much beyond their own votes especially on political questions or those that have a bearing that way." In the next session the emergency created by the Burr conspiracy ensured that, at the beginning of the session, "Great unanimity prevails in our Legislature, parties are lost in the consideration of our common safety." In 1804 and 1806 Morrow's re-election as the state's solitary Congressman was not formally opposed by the Federalists, while Tiffin's re-election as Governor in 1805 was almost entirely uncontested. Voter turnout accordingly declined somewhat, with only one in four adult white males voting in 1805 though over 30 per cent voted in the two Congressional races.

Yet, during these years when party competition declined, Republicans in many counties developed and maintained techniques for coordinating their efforts in elections. Most notably, they used county conventions more widely than is commonly assumed, these being the normal method of nomination not only in the Cincinnati region but also in many parts of eastern Ohio. As the young Lewis Cass, himself a recent convert to Republicanism, reminded Worthington in 1807, "in our part of the country the election business is generally managed by Committees from the several Townships chosen to meet for that purpose." Whereas conventions in the Cincinnati area usually represented the Republican Societies, in eastern Ohio these

"committees" or conventions were in fact made up of popularly elected delegates. A typical convention was called in Jefferson County in August 1806: a party meeting in Steubenville resolved that Republican voters be invited to meet in their respective townships, choose for each township three delegates to attend a general meeting, and instruct them whom to support for the nomination. At the same time a committee was formed to discuss with delegates from neighbouring Columbiana County the nomination of a candidate for the state senator which the two counties shared for the time being. This technique was commonly resorted to in order to mitigate rivalries between neighbouring counties that were linked together for an assembly seat. Admittedly the convention system was not universal: in many counties, like Ross, nominations were usually made informally by various party gatherings and by interested individuals through newspaper announcements, but even in Ross efforts were made to introduce a more formalized convention system.

But at the state level even the rudimentary techniques used in 1803 and 1804 to coordinate Republican support behind a single candidate now broke down. In 1806, for example, the Republican members of the Assembly did not meet and so gave no guidance as to who should be the party's candidate for Congressman in the fall elections. The problem was partly the recurrent, though not perpetual, lack of influential party leadership within the Assembly, partly a reluctance among the incumbent state officers to make clear their own continuing willingness to serve. In 1807 Worthington's unwillingness to announce his candidacy for governor


7. Timothy Buell to Worthington, Marietta, 22 Feb. 1806, TWP; Massie, Massie, 233.
prevented a caucus nomination, and the result was a highly confused contest marked by personal and regional rivalries. In 1808 once more the caucus failed to name a candidate, and two Democratic Republicans ran who both initially had said they would not run if the other did. Similarily no nomination was made for Congress, while the accounts of what had been decided about Presidential Electors were so varied that the most extraordinary confusion and intrigue resulted. In these circumstances much depended on personal correspondence to discover whom party members in other parts of the state were intending to back; and newspapers often carried news of convention decisions in other counties which might help local Republicans choose whom to support. The situation operated strongly to the advantage of incumbents; as Philemon Beecher, Morrow's sole challenger for Congress in 1808, explained, "The state composing but one district it is impossible to be personally acquainted in every neighbourhood therefore a candidate must in a [--?] greater degree be under obligations to friends to make known his pretentions in the several sections or Counties within the State."  

The nominations made by Republican county conventions were initially accepted by the voters, but even their authority declined as the Federalist threat receded. In Jefferson County, for example, the 1806 delegate nomination was challenged by local Republicans who feared an attempt to move the county seat from Steubenville; the dissidents succeeded in electing the representatives to the General Assembly, apparently with the help of the Federalist minority. Local rivalries of this kind undermined party loyalty in several parts of the state, but most notably on the Western Reserve. There the system of distributing the land had resulted in the Reserve's


relatively few settlers being widely scattered in innumerable isolated settlements. Yet the region was still organized as but a single county, and settlers with official business had to travel long distances to the county seat at Warren, and it was generally recognized that control of the county's offices could give significant advantages to particular sections of the Reserve. In the first state elections of January 1803, the Reserve was divided sectionally: "in the Southern District (which contains two thirds of the Electors) a Ticket had been formed calculated to deprive our [northern] District of any share of representation in the Assembly & of County officers." The north responded by naming a ticket which shared the offices more equitably, and this ticket "prevailed even in the southern district, in ours it was almost unanimous." Apparently the leading northern politician had misled some southerners as to the date of the election so that "every voter in that part of the Reserve included in the... [future] county of Portage" remained at home, "all deceived by the false statement of Huntington."11 This tension was to be largely solved by the creation of Geauga County in 1806, including all the future Lake Shore counties of the Reserve.

By this time there was "a terrible conflict... respecting the division" of Trumbull County as a whole. Many expected not a simple north/south division, but the creation of four or five counties, with the area at "the East End" divided into perhaps three counties.12 This resulted in a "great ferment" in the southern part over the ambitions of Youngstown to become a county seat, to the detriment of Warren; and the conflict was compounded by the tensions between the Scotch Irish from Pennsylvania and Ireland who were settling Youngstown, and the New Englanders at Warren, and indeed Canfield,
who opposed a division. According to Tappan,

a small party in Youngstown wanting to raise the value of
their property began last year [1804] & drew a plan for
dividing the county, one seat of justice was to be in
Youngstown & others were to be in places where they could
obtain the most votes... this year they have altered
their county lines to increase their partizans, another
party at Warren drew another plan & both have been very
diligent in circulating their petitions.

The Youngstown party managed to elect the state representatives in the
1805 fall elections, but, in the face of intense lobbying by their
opponents, failed to get their bill through the General Assembly.¹³

The following August a county meeting at Warren made a nomination
which included Tappan for Senator, but he was subsequently dropped from
the ticket by the connivance of his personal rivals among the Republicans
acting in conjunction with the Canfield Federalists. The Youngstown
party responded by altering their scheme of division in a way which made
the Tappan family property in Ravenna township a likely site for a
county seat. With Tappan's support, the Youngstown party succeeded in
1806. Ironically, the plan of division which finally passed the
legislature in 1808 secured a county seat for Ravenna but did not make
Youngstown capital of the much reduced Trumbull county.¹⁴ For many years
thereafter struggles over the location of county seats continued to
prevent elections on the Reserve from being fought according to party
lines - until at last Youngstown became a county seat in 1876!

This conflict of local interest bore some social, even class overtones.

From the very nature of the way in which Connecticut had disposed of its
Reserve, much of its land was owned by non-residents living in Connecticut.

¹³. Tappan to Jonathan Sloan, Canfield, 28 Nov. 1805, BTP, OHS; Conlin,
Simon Perkins, 55-56.

¹⁴. Tappan to Nancy Tappan, Canfield, 6 Oct., 9 Nov. 1806, and Sloan
to Tappan, Chillicothe, 25 Jan. 1808, BTP, LC.
The new state continued the policy of encouraging the break-up and sale of such estates, in particular by making them liable to taxation regardless of their state of improvement, and by compulsory partial confiscation if taxes were not paid. As one non-resident complained, "The Law of your State making sixty percent penalty on failure of payment of taxes is... a severe forfeiture - but... it is better than taking the whole property of the Non-residents." In addition, the exemption of "the United States Land Sold - from taxes &c - " penalized those who owned lands on the Western Reserve, even if some school lands were acquired from the federal government as compensation. The consequence was that in 1804-05 the Reserve paid one-fourth of the state's land tax, with members of the Company, both resident and non-resident, paying three-quarters of the Reserve's share. Not unnaturally, the "company interest" exercised whatever political influence it could muster and tried, as it had successfully in Territorial days, to gain some easing of its tax burden. 15

Those who bought land from the Reserve's great proprietors, often on credit, far from being deferential as St. Clair had feared in 1800, showed themselves hostile to the company interest. After the first regular assembly in 1804, one representative "circulated a tale" that Trumbull's state senator "had been opposed to taxing non-residents" - even though in fact he "drew up and advocated the bill" which laid the land tax on them. The senator, Benjamin Tappan, represented a proprietorial interest which included non-residents, and the "falsehood," he later recalled, "had the effect to prevent my election [in fall 1804], or indeed to prevent my being taken up as a candidate again." 16 During the election of 1805 Simon Perkins,

15. Henry Champion to Huntington, Colchester [Conn.], 15 July 1803, "Huntington Correspondence," 86. See also Ratcliffe, "Benjamin Tappan," 140; Tappan to Sloane, Canfield, 25 Nov. 1805, BTP, OHS. For the company's influence before 1803, see "Huntington Correspondence," 65-67, 77.

16. Ratcliffe, "Benjamin Tappan," 140. This story is partly confirmed by Elijah Backus to Tappan, Marietta, 24 Aug. 1804, BTP, LC.
the most important of the proprietorial agents and himself a major land-
owner, complained that "We have a singular kind of Republicanism in this
County, i.e. that no man whose property is above mediocrity (and if so much
it is very dangerous) is safe to be trusted." Tappan himself complained
that the men elected at that time paid little tax and so, while they might
deserve to be in the legislature for other reasons, still "they cannot
represent the property of the county." He insisted the legislature should
consider the "good" of "this company interest" which had opened up the
Reserve to settlement and still paid "more money into the state treasury
than any other equal number of men." While this argument could not prevent
the division of the county demanded by numerous petitioners, it did help
to secure a change in the tax law so that non-residents did not have to pay
their taxes separately in every township in which they had lands. 17

At the state level, however, it was regional rather than social
tensions that were disruptive. Cincinnati continued to resent Chillicothe's
claim to political preeminence; Marietta regarded itself as an alternative
centre of power. The "upper end of the State," above Marietta, felt that
it was neglected in the distribution of office and patronage. Indeed, the
most general source of resistance to party dictation came from those who
believed that Republican predominance had served merely to put power in
the hands of the so-called "Chillicothe Junto," led by Governor Tiffin and
United States Senator Worthington. These two men were conscious that they
had many rivals eager to win office for themselves, and they blamed the
trouble in the Assembly of 1803-04 on such unrequited ambitions. In
December 1804 they feared a log-roll uniting Hamilton and Trumbull in an
attempt to win the major offices for the great men of those counties, with
the help of dissidents from Ross. Accordingly they paid great attention
to Trumbull County and its leading men, making the influential lawyer and

17. Perkins to Benjamin Gorham, 3 Sept. 1805, in Conlin, Simon Perkins, 57;
Tappan to John Sloane, Canfield, 28 Nov. 1805, BTP, OHS. For the change
in the tax law, see Tiffin to Worthington, 2, 29 Jan. 1806, TWP.
unscrupulous office-seeker Samuel Huntington Chief Justice of the state supreme court and pressing his claims to be governor of the new Michigan Territory. In general, they seem to have seen great virtue in promoting rival Republican leaders to the state supreme court, or securing them federal office outside Ohio! However, many Republicans remained dissatisfied, and, in their reluctance to accept the lead of those who controlled the Republican party, were willing to co-operate with Federalists in their search for political office. As in New York and Pennsylvania, these men soon became identified as "Teitium Quids," as a third force in politics.

Some of these tensions came to a head in the Congressional election of 1806. Many felt that the southwestern counties had too great a say in national politics, with one of the two Senators and the sole Congressman; hence Morrow should stand down in favour of a candidate from "the upper part of the state." However, the Republican legislators could not agree on which was best of the three possible candidates from the eastern counties, which sufficiently "capable & firm in politics," and no caucus decision was made. In these circumstances most leading Republicans favoured the re-election of the incumbent. One eastern candidate, James Pritchard, a former Speaker of the House who was reportedly called "a Quid in his own County" of Jefferson, decided to run anyway, and tried - unsuccessfully - to attract Worthington's support. Morrow was generally regarded as the regular Republican candidate, and was nominated by county delegate conventions in those counties where they met. He carried the state with 74 per cent of the vote, while Pritchard failed to carry even the eastern counties, including his own Jefferson County, where he was denounced for

18. Tiffin to Worthington, Chillicothe, 5 Dec. 1804, TWP. See also the letters of Tiffin, Morrow and Worthington to Huntington, Dec. 1804 - Feb. 1805, "Huntington Correspondence," 94-95, 98-99, 100-01.

assisting Federalism. His only support, which he had been promised from the start, came from three counties he carried in the middle part of the state - Ross, Franklin and Highland. 20

Franklin and Highland had been created in 1803 and 1805 out of the northern and western parts of the old Ross County, and they were still linked electorally with their parent county. Far from being firmly under the control of the "Chillicothe Junto," so beloved by historians of early Ohio, these counties offered a persistent and worrying - and successful - local opposition to Tiffin and Worthington, who owed their preeminence to their prestige within the statewide party rather than to their command of the county in which the General Assembly met. Admittedly, Tiffin carried the county with negligible opposition in the gubernatorial races of 1803 and 1805, and Worthington won by handsome margins in 1807 and 1808; yet they could not transfer their personal popularity to control of other local offices. From statehood onwards they were opposed by Elias Langham, long Worthington's personal enemy, and by the quixotic, rabble-rousing, "infamous young" Chillicothe lawyer, Michael Baldwin, who was Speaker of the House in 1803 and subsequently United States District Attorney. In the first Congressional election both these dissident Republicans ran against Morrow, and Langham gained more votes in Ross than the official Republican candidate whom Worthington backed so strongly and openly. Langham was elected to the Ohio House in the 1803 fall elections, though the rest of Baldwin's ticket apparently failed. 21 Elected Speaker of the House, Langham was partly responsible for the success of the opposition to the regulars during that session, together with the influence Baldwin exercised "out-of-doors" in Chillicothe. They failed by only two votes to get the Assembly to elect Langham major-general of the district's militia instead of Nathaniel

20. Marietta Ohio Gazette, 18 Sept. 1806. For other delegate nominations, see Steubenville Western Herald, 30 Aug., 13, 20 Sept. 1806; Scioto Gazette, 13 Nov. 1806. See also Huntington to Worthington, Cleveland, 15 Feb. 1806, TWP.

21. Scioto Gazette, 25 June 1803; W. Silliman to Worthington, Wachotomaha, 2 Nov. 1803, TWP.
Massie. "Massie got but one vote in Ross, Mr. Evans, the only good man Ross has amongst them"; and for his pains "Evans has drawn upon himself the vengeance of the Junto." The fact that Tiffin called their opponents the "Junto" reveals how historians have exaggerated the control that Worthington and Massie exercised locally. 22

Tiffin hoped that the next election would destroy their opponents' political careers - but in vain. Though Langham's second bid for Congress failed to unseat Morrow, he once more carried Ross County. Baldwin was far the most popular of the candidates for representative, and he was elected Speaker of the House, though he found less opportunity for mischief in this session. The elections of 1805 were scarcely more satisfactory to the regular state leadership, for Tiffin told Worthington he "would blush for Ross County['s] representation" and its behaviour in the Assembly; Langham was almost expelled for drunkenness! In 1806 more or less the same delegation was reelected, with the addition of Massie, who by now had become friends with Baldwin; and in January 1807 almost all of them opposed Tiffin's election to the United States Senate. Throughout opposition was strong also in Franklin and Highland; indeed, in Highland in 1806 there was apparently considerable ticket voting for the successful candidates, including Pritchard for Congress: they nearly all received 105 or 106 votes, compared with between 73 and 66 for their regular opponents, except for the one who received the combined vote of 174. 23

It is difficult to discern the social sources of the popular support that the opposition discovered in these counties. As early as 1800 dissatisfaction had been expressed against the "pack of land speculators" who

22. Tiffin to Worthington, Chillicothe, 2 Nov. 1803, 9 Jan. 1803 [1804], 13, 19 Jan., 20 Feb. 1804, TWP.

dominated the Virginia Military District; perhaps a resentment akin to that visible on the Western Reserve in these years sustained in central Ohio an opposition that denounced "aristocracy." Certainly James Pritchard's Congressional campaign of 1806 appealed to such discontents, for his supporters denounced Morrow as the "disgraceful" representative of "federalists, land jobbers and speculators," mainly because of his vote on the Yazoo question in Congress. More obvious was the distaste for political monopoly: Morrow was condemned for treating the Congressional seat as though "that appointment [were] his exclusive inheritance"; he should be taught that "no such degree of entailed aristocracy exists in the state of Ohio." 24 This was a natural argument for those jealous of leading officeholders; as Tiffin told Worthington towards the end of the year, Ohio was "fruitful in producing Men who is self-accomplished for every public station" and think "themselves equal and perhaps superior to either of us." 25

The various schisms within the Republican majority, especially in and around Chillicothe, encouraged the Quids and Federalists to challenge the regular leadership directly. Their opportunity came as Worthington's four-year term in the United States Senate approached its end, for Tiffin had long expressed an interest in replacing him. As officials at Chillicothe became aware of Burr's military preparations on the upper Ohio early in December 1806, Tiffin's "anxiety & exertions" to apprehend those involved were "increased" by his awareness that he, and the government, "had many enemies who were waiting to rejoice at my miscarriage, but were happily disappointed." Instead the opposition, as the election approached in January, criticized the governor for being too aloof, but he responded by having forty-five circulars printed and circulated among the members, asking for support and reminding members to consider "the welfare of your constituents." Even so, "the intrigues caucuses etc. were carried to a

25. Tiffin to Worthington, Chillicothe, 18 Dec. 1806, TWP.
length which beggars all description - after trying what could be done for five or six different persons, the opposition were finally obliged to settle down on [Philemon] Beecher" - the noted Federalist parliamentary leader. Tiffin, however, had gained considerable popularity by his prompt measures to suppress the Burr Conspiracy, and was duly elected with 25 votes to Beecher's 12, with 6 votes scattering. As an incidental bonus, the Ohio Herald, since 1805 the Chillicothe opposition newspaper, "made such violent efforts to destroy the reputation of the Bourbons (as they call them) before the senatorial election - that a violent discharge of filth has proved fatal." The Assembly gave the public printing to the regular Republican Scioto Gazette, and "The Oracle of Billingsgate (the Ohio Herald) is no more."26

After the election the opposition maintained its fire against the regular leadership. In particular, the Lancaster press, presumably under Beecher's influence, and the Cincinnati Western Spy, never a strictly Republican paper, carried attacks on Tiffin for his "hasty and thoughtless conduct" in suppressing the Burr conspiracy; he had no right "to keep the country in constant terror with a military force." As Tiffin complained, the opposition to the government dared "openly to bring the measures into contempt & ridicule - and to attack in the most virulent manner those who are entitled to the highest encomiums."27 When the General Assembly asked John Smith to resign from the United States Senate because of his suspected complicity in the conspiracy, Smith was quickly defended by his supporters in Cincinnati. The radical Republicans in the city, led by Daniel Symmes and Matthew Nimmo, who had "got many of the active Republicans in & about Cincinnati attached to him," held a meeting to put pressure on Smith, whom they had never trusted; but they were attacked by Smith's supporters, a


27. Western Spy, 6, 19 Jan. 1807; Tiffin to Worthington, Chillicothe, 25 Jan. 1807, TWP.
"banditti" armed with "staves, bludgeons and dirks." As Tifin said, "At Cincinnati all is confusion and worse than confusion... relative to John Smith & the state of parties there - horrid business indeed."  

Thus the political conflict in Ohio by 1807 was not simply a struggle between Republican and Federalist nor yet a chaos of constantly shifting personal and local factions, though it bore features of both. At its heart was a conflict between those who valued strict Republican partisanship and what the party stood for, and those who objected to party control and party loyalty and, for whatever purpose, emphasized the virtues of independence. On the one hand, some men insisted on the virtues of party discipline and unity as a means of keeping the Federalists out of power. Devoted to "the principles of a Washington [!], the administration of a Jefferson, the genuine principles of Democracy, the rights of the people," such men usually referred to themselves as "Democrats." Like the Steubenville Western Herald, they insisted that the United States was a true "democracy," and that only Democrats were committed to maintaining the government on its true basis. The disloyalty of Federalists to this democratic government was proved, they said, by the abuse Ohio Federalists had poured on the officers of the state "for having repelled... with a pure and unsullied patriotism, the aggressions of a vile set of conspirators, ...a Federal league" led by Burr. Such attempts to overthrow or undermine the government could be prevented only by careful attention to the will of the people, and Democrats justified their nominating procedures on the grounds that they provided a means to "procure the sense of the people."  

Moreover, conventions and caucuses made up of elected representatives gave a candidate all the recommendation he needed; a party nomination obviated therefore all need for personal canvassing, whereas an office-seeker like Pritchard who came forward "on

28. Cincinnati Liberty Hall, 20 Jan., 2 Mar. 1807; Scioto Gazette, 5 Feb. 1807; Tiffin to Worthington, Chillicothe, 5 Feb. 1807, TWP.  

29. Western Herald, 2, 9 May, 4, 19 July 1807; Daniel Symmes et al. to Worthington, Cincinnati, 31 May 1804, Rice Papers.
his own bottom" had to indulge in "the wretched practice of self-trumpeting."\textsuperscript{30} Party nominations gave the state patriots like Tiffin and Worthington, who certainly owed their position to the trust of Republicans across the state rather than to any local advantage.

Against such justifications of the Republican party were pitted all those who found party dictation incompatible with republican liberty. Antipartyism was indeed widespread, and even a good Jeffersonian newspaper like the Cincinnati Liberty Hall could assert in 1804 that its Democratic editor "dares to judge for himself; and ... will never become the dupe of any party." But many went further and insisted that partisanship was inherently wrong because it gave power to the few - and so to whatever interests they represented - which amounted to "aristocracy." The Chillicothe Ohio Herald, which came to denounce Ohio's Bourbons most bitterly, had initially expressed the desire "to heal the breaches in social intercourse" resulting from partisan invective, while investigating "the pretensions of men offering themselves for public stations"; the editor insisted on respecting the opinions of those of different political persuasion.\textsuperscript{31} In Cincinnati during the controversy over John Smith's role in the Burr conspiracy, leaders of the Republican Society were denounced as men who had "for too long presided over our councils, and deprived us of the privilege of thinking for ourselves." And in Steubenville, later in 1807, a supporter of a dissident Republican ticket denounced the right of any caucus or convention to dictate to the people and deprive them of the right of suffrage by telling them whom to vote for.\textsuperscript{32} While it is not clear which social or cultural groups preferred independence to partisanship, such arguments certainly facilitated co-operation between Federalists and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{30} Worthington to Massie, 16 Feb. 1806, TWP. See also Western Herald, 23 Aug. 1806.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Liberty Hall, quoted in Hooper, Ohio Journalism, 26; Ohio Herald, 10 Aug. 1805.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Western Spy, 9 Feb. 1807; Western Herald, 10 Oct. 1807.
\end{itemize}
dissident Republicans and ensured that the Republican supremacy would be less than complete.

The Survival of the Federalist Threat

Despite the divisions within the Republican party and the undisciplined nature of state politics, the old party imperatives still operated. Those in Cincinnati who had sprung most readily and vocally to John Smith's defence early in 1807 were primarily Federalists; and when Smith finally resigned as United States Senator, he blamed the bitterness of the attack on him entirely on party considerations.¹ Slightly earlier, Tiffin's success in the election for the other Senatorial seat was due partly to the opposition's selection of a Federalist as their candidate, which made it harder for Republicans to vote against Tiffin; as Lewis Cass wrote, "a more improper selection could not have been made."² It was the survival of a Federalism still willing to oppose actively which made many Republicans conscious of the need to hold together to prevent defeat; and this feeling was heightened in the course of 1807 and 1808 by the signs of a Federalist revival at a time of severe national crisis.

Even in the gubernatorial election of 1807, too glibly dismissed as "the epitome of personal and local rivalry,"³ party feeling was evident, despite the lack of party coordination and firm leadership. Tiffin, the retiring governor, had hoped to persuade Worthington to run as his successor, but the latter's reluctance persuaded Tiffin and his friends to prevent a caucus nomination during the Assembly's session in the hope he would change his mind. Instead, United States Marshall Michael Baldwin and his Deputy, William Creighton, Jr., made "a federal mongrel selection" of two juries and used them as the basis of a public meeting in Chillicothe.

¹. William T. Utter, "Ohio Politics and Politicians, 1802-1815," (Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1929), 51.
². Lewis Cass to Worthington, Chillicothe, 4 Jan. 1807, TWP.
This meeting was addressed by leading Federalists from Cincinnati, and then nominated for governor Nathaniel Massie (Creighton's father-in-law), who for some time had not been on close political terms with the regular state leadership. According to Tiffin, the members of the Assembly had not been told of the meeting and "not a friend to any but Massie suffered to be present." When the result was made known, "several of the members were highly disgusted" and pressed for a single regular candidate to be agreed upon to oppose Massie.4

The problem was that Return J. Meigs, Jr., of Marietta, had for some time made clear his intention of running, and it was generally presumed that he would inevitably carry the counties in Marietta's range of influence - Washington, Gallia, Athens and Muskingum. Unfortunately, leading Republicans did not trust Meigs, whom they regarded as opportunistic and unreliable, and they resented his ambitions for high office in Ohio so soon after securing for him a federal judgeship in the new Louisiana Territory. They hoped to persuade him to withdraw in favour of Worthington, especially as "by securing Meigs, we can have the Marietta press."5 However, when Meigs refused, Worthington's claims continued to be pressed, especially by the regular Chillicothe paper, the Scioto Gazette, although the man himself refused to confirm or deny his candidature. In the circumstances regular party newspapers like the Cincinnati Liberty Hall and the Steubenville Western Herald came out for Meigs, and he received nominations from apparently every delegate convention that met - for example, in Hamilton and Jefferson Counties, at opposite ends of the state. The Cincinnati Republican Society stressed the need for Republicans to unite in resistance to subversives and Burrites, and approved Meigs because "His politics have ever been republican, and strictly uniform."6

4. Tiffin to Worthington, Chillicothe, 25 Jan., 5 Feb. 1807, TWP.
5. Ibid.
6. Western Herald, 12, 26 Sept. 1807. See also Elias Glover to E.A. Brown, 29 May, 17 Aug. 1807, EABP, OHS; and Lewis Cass to Worthington, Wakatomaka, 14 Aug. 1807, TWP.
regular John Sloane reported from Columbiana County that "Quidism has already raised her stand[ard]" locally, and asserted that if Meigs were not elected, "it will fall out ill for democracy."  

As partisan Republicans outside the Scioto Valley rallied to Meigs, so Federalists turned to Massie. Some, especially in Chillicothe, had preferred other candidates initially, but soon important Federalist groups, like those in Zanesville, rallied to his support. Faced by two rivals he did not entirely trust, Worthington withdrew and - perhaps surprisingly - threw his support to the "mongrel" candidate, who was, after all, a long-time personal friend and patron and the candidate of the Scioto Valley. Massie carried nine counties, all in the Virginia Military District or upper Miami Valley, while Meigs won most strongly in counties with a tradition of Republican regularity.  

The one exception was Jefferson County, where James Pritchard led a powerful resistance to the delegate convention's nominations, with Massie as the dissidents' candidate for governor. After a bitter struggle, the voters of Jefferson failed to elect the whole of the regular ticket - apparently for the first time; early reports said Massie had defeated Meigs, 430-389, but the result reported to the General Assembly gave it to Meigs, 430-457. This reflected the confusion surrounding the election, for the Assembly threw out nearly half the votes cast in the state (in a turnout of over 35 per cent), but without overturning Meigs' statewide victory. Then, at Worthington's prompting, Massie successfully contested the result on the grounds that Meigs' office in Louisiana had prevented his meeting the residence requirement; but Massie refused to take the office himself, and left the government in the hands of Thomas Kirker, who, as Speaker of the Senate,

7. Sloane to Tappan, Columbiana County, 4 Sept. 1807, BTP, LC.
9. Western Herald, 12, 26 Sept., 3, 10, 17 Oct. 1807. See also Appendix II herein; and, for the election returns and final result, see Ohio General Assembly, Senate Journal, 1807-08, pp. 7, 8, 16-17.
had been acting governor ever since Tiffin's departure for Washington.

Amid the confusion there were obvious signs of increased activity among Federalists, most conspicuously in Cincinnati, Zanesville and Marietta; in the last city, "an association of federal gentlemen" established a party newspaper in September 1807—which, under its young editor James B. Gardiner, quickly gained a reputation for "violence and personal vituperation" until a more sober editor was appointed in 1808. 10 The Federalists even seem to have made some gains in the 1807 county elections: the Ohio House elected then contained "ten decided feds" out of a total of twenty-eight members, which with "two or three quids" put them close to a majority. In the Senate, only half elected in 1807, there were three "feds" and three Quids out of sixteen members. Thus there was "a firm & decided majority of republicans in the legislature, but as the members were mostly new it was sometime before they could properly understand each other and this produced the election of Beecher" as speaker of the House. 11 This nice party balance resulted in Massie's successful challenge to Meigs' election as governor, Meigs' subsequent election to the United States Senate as a consolation, and—most alarming to many Republicans—the election of an old Federalist, Levin Belt, as President Judge of one of the state's three Common Pleas circuits. 12

Federalist vigour became even more obvious the following year. As in the Eastern states, the opposition to the Jeffersonians grew in confidence and assertiveness, as it began to glimpse the possibility of a revival in its electoral fortunes. New opposition newspapers appeared in Dayton and Chillicothe, the latter an avowedly Federalist state newspaper, with a system of agents covering the whole of Ohio. First published in October 1808, The Supporter announced from the start its devotion to


11. Sloane to Benjamin Tappan, Chillicothe, 25 Jan. 1808, BTP, LC.

Washington's principles and its determination "to break through [the] state of apathy and venality" which had crippled Federalism in Ohio:

Such has been the prevalence of party, such its bitter acrimonious effects, and such the powerful influence attached to the present administration of the general government of the United States, that many, in these NEW REGIONS, whose political opinions are in opposition, have been deterred from stemming the torrent; while others, more luke-warm, have, in hopes of patronage being extended to them, become strenuous advocates and servile adulators.

That the current could be stemmed was demonstrated by the recent Federalist gains of 16 out of 36 seats at stake in the Congressional elections in Rhode Island, New Hampshire, New York and North Carolina. 13

The vitality of the Federalists in 1808 was undeniably a result of the Embargo that Congress had imposed on all foreign trade during the war crisis with Britain, in December 1807. The Republican press in Ohio rallied to the support of the administration, assuring the seaboard states of Ohio's eagerness to support sailors' rights against foreign oppression, and it called on Federalists to rally round the national administration in this time of national emergency. However, the Embargo produced widespread economic suffering, and a shift in public opinion against the ruling party: and Republican politicians were soon bemoaning that present-day Americans, unlike their fathers, were unwilling to undergo the material deprivations necessary in order to preserve the country's independence of foreign tyrants, preferring to listen instead to the blandishments of those who were mere tools of Britain. 14 Most obvious was the example of Marietta, which since 1801 had developed an important ship-building industry, producing ships even for the Mediterranean trade; under this stimulus, the city had grown until it was almost as large, in 1806, as Cincinnati. According to distinguished local Republican and historian, Samuel P. Hildreth, the restrictions on overseas commerce after 1807 ended ship-

13. Chillicothe Supporter, 6, 27 Oct. 1806. The Dayton paper was The Dayton Repertory.
14. Silliman to Worthington, 29 July 1808, TWP.
building, rope walks, and hemp growing. "Town property, as well as farms, sunk in value; a stop was put to improvements in building and Marietta... retrograded as fast as it had ever advanced." The Marietta Republican newspaper argued that the choice was "embargo, or submitting to vassalage," and called for local prejudices to be given up by all who were "True Americans at bottom"; but in October Washington County for the first time elected a Federalist delegation to the state General Assembly.

The awareness that political fortunes were at last running their way encouraged Ohio Federalists to think of statewide success. By the summer of 1808 it was clear that Beecher was going to run as "the federal Candidate for congress." The Federalists were "in great hopes of success," and the Republicans correspondingly apprehensive. As one representative said,

> When we look at the rappid strides of federalism in the different parts of the Union (in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania for instance) I think we will see in the approaching election as much to interest us as any that has preceeded it. Beecher no doubt will attempt to pass for a moderate republican or as they call it in New York will be one of the american ticket.... [But] as soon will the Ethiopian change his colour as that Philemon will be brought to respect the rights of the people.

Sloane feared that "in the Middle part of the state he will get many more votes than he merits," but trusted that Republicans would remain firm behind Morrow not merely in the western part but also "in the upper part of the State," where "Great exertions will be made by the feds and Quids."

Beecher, Sloane reported, was to run "in company with Little Sammy for governor birds of a feather & c." Samuel Huntington was nominally a Republican but he had long been regarded as an ambitious office-seeker, eager for public status commensurate with his wealth. In the course of the year Tiffin and Worthington tried to buy his loyalty with first a Land

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17. Sloane to Worthington, Canton, 7 July, 6 Aug. 1808, TWP, and to Tappan, 11 July 1808, BTP, LC.
Office and then a promise of support for the United States Senate, and they endeavoured to divide him from Beecher. However, Huntington was in communication with Worthington's enemies in Ross County as well as the Cincinnati Federalists, and he was nominated in Trumbull County by a meeting dominated by Feds and Quids. It was generally acknowledged later that the Federalists voted for Huntington, and his election was so gratifying to them that he was publicly hailed as a "federal republican."

Huntington's success was undeniably the result of a division among his opponents. The legislature of 1808 had made no caucus nomination, but when Worthington announced his candidacy, some regulars felt "obliged" to support him: "there is no other chance, if we divide Huntington is elected and federalism will triumph." However, the acting governor, Thomas Kirker, also decided to run, presumably encouraged by those Republicans who were upset by the way Worthington had opposed Meigs in the previous year's election. For Kirker was nominated by party conventions, and ran most successfully, in many of the counties which had backed Meigs as the regular candidate in 1807 - especially counties on the western margin of the state and those in the area of the Ohio Company and the upper Muskingum Valley. However, Worthington ran best not only in Ross but also in the regular Republican counties of eastern Ohio. At any rate, both were regarded as on the same side, opposed to Huntington: in Columbiana County Worthington and Morrow were seen as the ticket opposed to Huntington and Beecher, while in some townships in Hamilton County the votes for Huntington or Kirker were


20. Sloane to Tappan, Canton, 11 July 1808, BTP, LC.
related to ticket-voting for the county offices and, to a lesser extent, for Congressman. 21

Yet, despite "the apparent Change in the Politicks of this State" marked by Huntington's victory, the overwhelming majority of Ohioans remained loyal to the national administration. Huntington himself, even while flirting with Feds and their Quiddish allies, numbered himself "among those who approve the measures, (particularly the late measures) of the General Government." 22 His first message as governor expressed firm support for Jefferson's administration and its foreign policy. Tiffin, delighted, "had an extract published in the National Intelligencer" to counteract claims that Huntington was a Federalist - a slander which the message "effectively wiped away." When he resigned for personal reasons, Tiffin felt able to ask Huntington to appoint Worthington as his interim replacement. Rejecting his former opponent, Huntington appointed instead an able young lawyer from Cleveland, Stanley Griswold, but at least he knew Griswold was a firm supporter of the administration's foreign policy; and the appointment of a sound Republican was generally appreciated in Washington. 23

The 1808 Presidential election had in any case confirmed that there was no political mileage in any other course. Early in the year factional disagreements - the desire of each side to gain credit from the election - had prevented "a nomination of electors... whilst the representatives of the people were together." However, the members agreed to correspond, and the Cincinnati corresponding society confirmed which of the Hamilton County candidates it preferred and agreed to support those chosen elsewhere,


even when "not altogether satisfied... for the sake of unanimity." Even so, Huntington tried to organize a Madisonian ticket made up of his own supporters; some dissident Republicans and Quids favoured Clinton's claims to the Presidency over Madison; and Gideon Granger, from within the Cabinet, exerted his influence against Madison among the politicians of the Western Reserve. Efforts were made to persuade a fourth Republican candidate to come forward in the eastern part of the state, so as to divide the regular Republican vote for one of the three Electors, but no Republican of standing in the end proved willing. In addition, various Federalist Electoral tickets were proposed, without mentioning the ultimate candidate's name, and in the end the ticket named by the Federalists of Washington County was generally accepted by that party. In Columbiana and Jefferson the Federalists said nothing publicly but apparently "their friends in the several settlements had their instructions, the republicans not expecting any opposition were careless and the consequence was that in this county [Columbiana] only fifteen votes of a majority was given for the Republican ticket[.]. in Jefferson the votes will be nearly equal." 

Yet the statewide result was never in doubt. Huntington himself had always known that "it is the general wish, with very few exceptions to have Mr. Madison for our next President" in order to continue Jefferson's policies, and the Quids who opposed Madison and tried to exploit the confusion over Electoral candidates soon came to the same conclusion: "Mr. Pritchard himself was first in favour of Monroe and secondly for Clinton but now he finds what the public sentiment is he is very noisy for Madison." 

24. Worthington to Huntington, Chillicothe, 29 July 1808, "Huntington Correspondence," 121-22; Sloane to Tappan, Canton, 1 Oct. 1808, BTP, LC.


The low turnout in the election (about 13 per cent) showed there was little popular doubt as to the result, and the Madisonian Electors all received more or less the same vote - more than three-quarters of all the votes cast. Though the Federalists tried to put a bright face on the result, there could be no doubt that when national issues were at stake, especially those involving the great international confrontation between Georgian Britain and Napoleonic France, Ohio Republicans overlooked their differences and closed ranks against Federalism.

The Limits of Partisanship

In the years after 1808, the split within the Republican party became ever more serious. As the members gathered in Chillicothe for the legislative session commencing in December 1809, the opposition Supporter commented that as soon as Federalists stopped contesting elections, the Republicans began falling out among themselves - in Ohio as in Pennsylvania. So it was that Chillicothe came to be "infested by judge-killers, republicans, democrats, real republicans, true democrats, genuine, do. &c. &c."¹ This factionalism among the preponderant party became the leading feature of state politics, and, in effect, Ohio experienced something akin what Richard P. McCormick has termed a "dual party system" - for a different cleavage now operated at the state level from that operating in national politics.² Yet this situation was unacceptable to the more radical and partisan "Democratic" wing of the party, which endeavoured to ensure that

27. Chillicothe Supporter, 17 Nov. 1808. Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans in Power, 198-99, detects considerable scattering of votes in the Ohio Presidential election: the results were 3,641, 3,331 and 3,307 to 1,174, 1,057 and 1,031, respectively.


its own views and supporters held sway within the Republican party and hence the state. Such an attempt to tighten party discipline and commit its followers to a controversial policy had raised, by 1810 and '11, popular awareness of the dangers of party; and the result demonstrated that most Ohio voters of the time were willing to follow party only within acceptable limits.

Factionalism among Republicans reached this pitch because, on top of all the local and personal rivalries, cultural tensions and social grievances that beset the party, passions were heightened by the raising of fundamental issues concerning the role and power of the judiciary in a republican society. In Ohio as in many other states, much popular hostility endured against lawyers and a legal system which seemed designed to boost professional fees rather than secure justice and individual rights. The popular demand for cheap justice in civil cases had been voiced in Territorial days and had been met by repeated extensions of the power of justices of the peace to hear cases for the recovery of debts in their local courts, where decisions would be quick and expenses low. Initially their power had been restricted to debts below ten dollars; the level had been gradually raised during the 1790s; and the state legislature met popular demands by further raising the level to fifty dollars in 1804. But the justices' decisions were often amateurish and certainly arbitrary, being made without a jury, while the United States Constitution, ever conscious of the need to safeguard property, had forbidden trials without jury in cases involving debts greater than twenty dollars. Accordingly, in 1806 an Ohio state judge, Calvin Pease, declared the fifty-dollar law unconstitutional and, in so doing, made a claim to the right of judicial review identical to John Marshall's innovative claim in the famous Marbury v Madison decision in the United States Supreme Court in 1803. 3

3. For this issue nationally, see Richard E. Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young Republic (New York, 1971); and locally, William T. Utter, "Judicial Review in Early Ohio," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XIV (1927), 3-24, and "Ohio and the English Common Law," ibid., XVI (1929), 321-33. For the origins of the issue in Ohio, see Burnet, North Western Territory, 311; Smith, St. Clair Papers, I, 191, II, 506; Downes, Frontier Ohio, 155-62.
Such a claim offended many of the more extreme Republicans who preferred to refer to themselves as "Democrats" and to their constituency as "the Democracy." Believing in the political supremacy of the people, they thought the people's representatives the supreme power in the state and the only possible interpreters of a constitution established through popular sovereignty. Hence Democrats were unwilling to accept that laws passed by the people's legislature could be declared unconstitutional by "the Judiciary, [that] dictatorial court of infallibility, whose decision is paramount to [the] voice of the great mass of the people and their constituent sages." 4

Not all Republicans agreed, however. A number of them believed that Pease's nullifying of "a favorite law of many" was erroneous as a decision, but legitimate as an exercise of judicial power; others thought him fully justified. The House of Representatives in 1807 divided evenly on the question of whether the judiciary had absolute discretion in declaring laws unconstitutional. 5 The gubernatorial election of that year had some bearing on the dispute, since the Quid candidate, Nathaniel Massie, had been one of the first to protest against unconstitutional legislation, and at least one strict Democrat - John Sloane, who had already gone on record against the right of judges to set "aside the laws" - believed Meigs, the regulars' candidate, must be elected, for otherwise "it will fall out ill for democracy as the majesty of the people is about to be dethroned and prostrated at the feet of our Judges." 6

Then, about the time of this election, the state supreme court itself nullified the fifty-dollar law and so brought forth a newspaper controversy and a stream of popular protests from the "upper and middle" parts of the state. In the Assembly that followed (1807-08), "the question relative to the unwarrantable conduct of the Judges was one that was more warmly

4. Ephraim Quinby to Worthington, 24 Dec. 1808, TWP.
6. Sloane to Tappan, 4 Sept. 1807, BTP, LC; Chillicothe Supporter, 18 Aug. 1809. For Massie, see Utter, "Judicial Review," 6, n.8.
contested than any that has ever come before the legislature." Now the two houses disagreed. The controversy most certainly affected the gubernatorial election of 1808, since Huntington was himself the chief of the offending judges, while Worthington had apparently rendered himself "extremely obnoxious to our Judges by attempting to set bounds to their ambition." In Trumbull County Huntington's support came not only from Federalists but from the "high Court party... and their sycophantic gentry," who were determined "to prevent the impeachment of the Judges." And in some county elections - for example, in Ross - there was "a very great political struggle this fall: 'Law or no Law,' 'Lawyer or no lawyer'." 8

This dispute soon overwhelmed the older cleavage between the regulars and those less impressed by party discipline and more willing to co-operate with Federalists. Indeed, some prominent politicians distinctly changed sides, perhaps because of pressure from their constituents. James Pritchard, for example, whose county had been shocked by the state supreme court's decision given in Steubenville in 1807, now supported the Democrats; the Marietta Ohio Gazette, known as "a violent democratic organ," by 1809 was attacking the "judge-murderers." 9 In Ross County the editor of the Scioto Gazette, who in 1807 had supported Massie as governor, in 1809 opposed his election to the Assembly because he was "an ardent advocate of the rights of the Judiciary"; on the other hand, Duncan McArthur, a wealthy and popular legislator who had consistently supported the regular cause, turned against Worthington and Tiffin, both still firm Decocrats, and joined their opponents. 10 The broader pattern is complex and confusing, though it seems clear that most lawyers supported the court faction, and poor debtors the

7. Sloane to Tappan, 25 Jan. 1808, BTP, LC.
radicals. More striking are the ethnocultural preferences discernible in the strife: New England constituencies tended to be conservative, even where most solidly Republican, as did the French of Gallipolis by 1810; while the eastern counties, where there was "much of the Democracy of Pennsylvania," a state experiencing similar contests, provided much support for the "Judge Killers." In Montgomery County the more radical candidates tended to do well - though not in 1810 - in the German townships, usually the most united in elections, and the more conservative found most support in the traditionally Federalist townships.

By the session of 1808-09, the Democratic faction had a majority which it used to impeach the erring judges, but the impeachment failed to gain the necessary two-thirds vote in the senate by the narrowest of margins. However, they did elect one of their number, Thomas Morris, to the seat vacated by Huntington on the supreme court - where the other judges ostracized him, partly because he had been accused of rape - and further flaunted the supremacy of the legislature by extending the justices' jurisdiction to debts up to seventy dollars! Amidst public controversy, they sustained their position in the fall elections of 1809, but still lacked the two-thirds majority needed in the senate for a successful impeachment. The frustrated Democratic leaders therefore decided to interpret the state constitution as meaning that, since all officers appointed in 1803 had been appointed for seven years, any vacancy in their post had been filled, not for seven years, but for the balance of the original term. As one of them said, ". . . in a short time it would be seven

11. J. Bureau to Huntington, Gallipolis, 31 Mar. 1810, Huntington Papers, OHS; Simon Perkins, 20 Feb. 1809, quoted in Conlin, Perkins, 58. For rising tension between New Englanders and Pennsylvanians at this time, see ibid., 56, 57-59.

12. Abstracts of Votes, Montgomery County, 1808-12, Wright State University. Analysis of townships from [Jervis Cutler], Topographical Description (1812); Henry Howe, Historical Collections of Ohio (1907 ed.), 299, 301; Embry Howson, "The German Element in Ohio" (typescript, OHS).
years, since the constitution went into operation and certainly all civil officers ought to go out of office every seven years, and so have the field entirely cleared off for new aspirants to office." The advantage of this application of the republican principle of "rotation in office" was that a simple majority of the legislature, declaring the true meaning of the constitution, could dismiss the offending Judges and appoint new ones who had a proper sense of their own subservience to the will of the people. "Thus," as one observer later wrote, "by a mere resolution, the general assembly, swept off out of office, every civil officer in the state!"\textsuperscript{13}

This so-called "Sweeping Resolution" of January 1810 gave the Democratic faction its opportunity to establish a firm hold on the state machine. They had to elect not only new supreme court judges, a new secretary of state, state auditor and state treasurer, but also new President Judges for the three Common Pleas circuits into which the state was then divided and new Associate Judges for all twenty-six counties. This opportunity was of considerable political importance not merely because of the patronage it offered and the local influence of judges, but because the peripatetic nature of the supreme court and President Judges' work made them an important means of political coordination across the state, especially among lawyers, who were becoming increasingly numerous among active politicians.\textsuperscript{14} For a time, in the Assembly, it appeared that the conservatives might break down the unity of their opponents and gain a decisive voice in the election of the new officers, but in the end the Democrats "nearly saved all." Incumbents they trusted were re-elected, and the opportunity was taken to get rid of Federalists like Levin Belt of Chillicothe, President Judge of the central district's circuit. There was much rejoicing at these victories, for, as the rising Democratic leader

\textsuperscript{13} Caleb Atwater, \textit{History of Ohio, Natural and Civil} (Cincinnati, 1838), 182-85.

\textsuperscript{14} See, for example, Benjamin Ruggles to Peter Hitchcock, 27 July 1810, Rice Papers; Ruggles to friend in Lebanon, St. Clairsville, 9 Sept. 1810, in Lebanon \textit{Western Star}, 29 Sept. 1810.
John Hamm proclaimed privately, "Our friends deserve immortal gratitude for their renovated exertions in the common cause on which we are embarked. Thanks to a good destiny! The Democracy of Ohio is yet triumphant - the insidiousness of quiddism and the wickedness of federalism to the contrary notwithstanding!"\textsuperscript{15}

The Resolution, however, had consequences which roused public awareness and turned people against the "sweepers." In theory the term of office of all justices of the peace had expired, and the Assembly had to make "provision for electing, as soon as possible, by the people, all the justices of the peace, in all the townships in Ohio." As for the county Courts of Common Pleas,

Many of the counties had not been organized one half seven years, and the judges, in not a few instances, had not served two years. In some such cases, both sets of judges attempted to act officially. The whole state was thrown into utter confusion for a time, but finally, one and all became convinced that the "sweeping resolution" was all wrong.\textsuperscript{16}

In Greene County, even a year later, one associate judge who had been swept off the bench insisted on exercising his office. The new judges ordered the sheriff to remove him, but the sheriff refused to recognise the court order. The coroner was then ordered to imprison the sheriff and remove the offending judge by force - whereupon the new judge, the young John McLean, the future long-serving United States Supreme Court Justice, resigned, with the consequence that, "then there not being a constitutional court," all business had to be held over to the next term.\textsuperscript{17} Under such circumstances the new judges, even as they strove to "weigh down all opposition," recognised that "Every exertion will be used to produce a change in the sentiment of representations next session."\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15} John Hamm to E.A. Brown, Chillicothe, 11 Feb. 1810, EABP, OHS.

\textsuperscript{16} Atwater, History, 185-86. See also John W. Campbell, Biographical Sketches, With Other Literary Remains (Columbus, 1838), 70-71.

\textsuperscript{17} David Griffin to Samuel Williams, 22 June 1811, Records of the Tammany Society of Ohio, OHS.

\textsuperscript{18} John Thompson to Joseph H. Larwill, Chillicothe, 5 June 1810, Papers of the Larwill Family, 1800-1908 (Western Historical Manuscript Collections, University of Missouri; microfilm at OHS).
In an effort to sustain their political position, the Democratic leadership introduced a means of providing stronger, centralized control. In March 1810 a Tammany Society was founded in Chillicothe, on the pattern of the New York and Philadelphia societies, with a dispensation from the latter; even in Ohio, every man, when processing, was to "wear a buck's tail in his hat." The object was to provide a close bond of fraternity and co-operation for "citizens of known attachment to the political rights of human nature, and the liberties of this country"; those principles were presumed to be akin to those of the French Revolution, the secularizing impulse of which was expressed in the adoption of a non-Christian calendar, with years dated from the "year of discovery," i.e., 1492. Great care was taken in admitting members: as all branches were constantly advised, "better have twenty members Good as fifty bad." With membership restricted to sound Democrats, the Society's real object, according to one opponent, was "to make nominations and control elections. The elements of their doings were secrecy and concert; and to insure the fidelity of members, the obligations of an oath were imposed."20

Quickly in 1810 St. Tammany flexed its political muscles. At Chillicothe it became the engine of the regulars, with the Scioto Gazette its mouthpiece, and it enthusiastically took up the gubernatorial claims of Worthington, who had apparently been nominated by a legislative caucus. The "Tammany Gazette most vehemently attacked" lawyers in general and in particular judges who wished to make themselves kings (!), and it vilified Return Jonathan Meigs, who had been prevailed upon to become the candidate


20. Campbell, Biographical Sketches, 71.
of "the ex-judge party." In reply, the opposition press accused Worthington of being the "Idol of Tammany," bitterly attacked that secret and conspiring society, and warned of the dangers of unrestrained legislative supremacy. Meigs was portrayed not as a friend of the Judges nor an opponent of the seventy-dollar law, but as a Republican willing to resist the dictation of Worthington and Tiffin and their conspiring friends. 21

The division within Republican ranks led to great confusion in most counties, since traditional nominating processes completely lost their authority. In many counties no convention or party meeting was called. In others, the factions struggled to control the county convention, with the disappointed faction rejecting the nomination and making an alternative one. In Warren County the official Republican meeting nominated Meigs and a Quid ticket; the minority, "not feeling themselves bound by the nomination [which was stated as a condition at the time]," held a second meeting which unanimously decided to support Worthington - who won, with the support of the local newspaper edited by John McLean. 22 In Ross County at least, so definite was the Tammany and anti-Tammany alignment in 1810 - and again in 1812 - that even the minor county officers were classified on that basis, and the returns show considerable ticket voting. 23 However, such signs of fixed 'state parties' being identifiable among the voters are rare, and ticket voting the exception rather than the rule. If partisan behaviour was visible anywhere, it was among the Federalists of Ohio.

Since their frustrations of 1808, Ohio Federalists had ceased to operate as an opposition, preferring to allow their opponents to divide. At times they claimed to "have no interest in the present rupture between the two parties styling themselves Republicans." 24 But in 1810 their

22. Lebanon Western Star, 29 Sept. 1810.
24. Chillicothe Supporter, 29 June 1811.
Ohio Counties, 1806


Source: Utter, Frontier State, 29.
editors urged them to intervene, for fundamental principles were at stake:

The federalists, lawyers and all, believe that the courts possess the power of declaring legislative acts unconstitutional. They consider that without this power in the judiciary, a written constitution is of no real or essential value. - Hence they cling to this principle as to the vital stream of life.

Since Worthington's supporters were opposed to judicial review - and, moreover, made "the destruction of federalism... the whole burden of their song" - they must be opposed; indeed, the Democratic radicals were making the same mistake as in 1808, when they had placed "the controversy upon such grounds as left [the Federalists] no alternative but to oppose them."

Admittedly, Meigs was no Federalist and his views on policy were not clear, but at least he was opposed to those "ambitious disorganizing demagogues" who appealed to established prejudices in order to maintain party distinctions and their own power:

O that the people were wise! and would look to the conduct, not the professions of men. Then the words federalists, lawyers, republicans, &c. would lose their magic charms, and truth would prevail over error.25

Federalist support could well have been decisive in 1810, as two years earlier, in electing the more conservative, less partisan of the Republican candidates.

Complicating political cleavages in these years was the growth of a marked tension between eastern and western Ohio. Initially such tensions had resulted from the contest for political leadership between Chillicothe and Cincinnati, but by 1810 the "middle" and "western" districts were often referred to together, in contrast to the "upper counties", i.e. the counties of eastern Ohio higher up the River, which believed they had not had their fair share of the great offices and consequently of government favour. In elections to the United States Senate, the residence of a candidate was becoming a prime, though not yet governing, consideration, with some attempt to maintain a balance between eastern and western Ohio.

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Such tensions affected the 1810 gubernatorial election, for although the anti-judicial party found much support among the small settlers - and debtors - of the eastern counties, Worthington did not run as well as expected there; as Benjamin Tappan later explained, Worthington had many friends in the county, but they had not voted for him in 1810 for "motives of policy" concerned with regional advantage. On the other hand, Meigs had run surprisingly well in parts of western Ohio - for an eastern man.

The east's sense of grievance had also resulted in the legislature's voting, in 1810, to remove the seat of government to Zanesville, at least until a permanent capital could be found nearer the centre of the state. Rumour had it that some members from other parts of the state had voted in favour in return for support in the elections to offices vacated by the Sweeping Resolution. Anyway, the consequence was a shift in the central focus of state politics from Ross to Muskingum County, and its political leaders. Zanesville, set in the foothills of the Alleghenies, lies at the point where Zane's Trace, the old pioneer trail from Wheeling to Maysville, crossed the River Muskingum, some fifty miles up from the Ohio. The county, settled mainly by Pennsylvanians with some Virginians and a few Germans, was predominantly Republican, although there were many Federalists in Zanesville itself and across the Muskingum River in the New England-settled town of Putnam (more properly, until 1815, named Springfield). Though the voting strength of the Republicans came from the rural areas, the local party was dominated by a small group of well-situated professional gentlemen in the city.

Most important was Isaac Van Horne, Receiver of the Public Moneys in the United States Land Office, and, connected with him, a number of young lawyers, including Wyllys Silliman, his Recorder, formerly editor of the

26. Tappan to Worthington, Steubenville, 22 Nov. 1811, TWP.
27. Jeremiah Morrow to Worthington, 8 Oct. 1810, TWP.
29. J.F. Everhart, History of Muskingum County, Ohio (Columbus, 1882); Norris F. Schneider, Y-Bridge City (Cleveland, 1950).
Marietta press; Samuel Herrick, who in 1810 became United States District Attorney; and Silliman's brother-in-law, Lewis Cass. In 1809 they had been joined by Dr. John Hamm, a former pupil of Benjamin Rush in Philadelphia, who attained political prominence in his one year's residence in Chillicothe, where he had introduced St. Tammany. Within a further year Hamm had married Van Horn's daughter and established a political influence which was constantly directed towards tightening party organization and pursuing Democratic policies. In November 1809 they established a party newspaper, the Muskingum Messenger, and, in July 1810, the second Tammany wigwam in the state. Initially they found it difficult to control their own county, where Federalist influence assisted conservative candidates, but behind the scenes they became an important partisan influence on the Ohio General Assembly when it first met in Zanesville in December 1810.

Too often in the past new representatives had been misled in the early days of a session by "prettended Republicans." Now the Zanesville Tammany Society operated as a means of influencing legislators elected in 1810 in those counties where the Sweeping Resolution had not been an issue, and Tiffin was re-elected Speaker of the House. However, when "a caucus was held in the court house... for the purpose of Nominating a [United States] senator," it "ended in a farce," since the 'Court party' wished to nominate Huntington, the retiring governor, while "the Anti-Judicial party" had determined that "politically [Huntington] shall die." The "late governor and his party exerted themselves with uncommon ardur," but their opponents took up Worthington - without his consent - and elected him, in spite of claims that the eastern counties should have the Senatorship on this occasion. 31 Although a majority of the House probably favoured a repeal of

30. Everhart, 141; Schneider, 176, 187, 69, 70, 176, 187; A Brief Sketch of the Life and Public Services of Samuel Herrick (Zanesville, 1849), 5-8, 20, 23.

the Sweeping Resolution, "in the Senate, it is safe enough"; and the 'Court party' found it "impossible to subvert the present order of things." 32

In the course of the session Tammany influence spread, as representatives who showed themselves good Democrats were admitted to it. Apparently, "during the session of the legislature, no less than seventeen members of both houses joined this nefarious association in one night." 33 These members then introduced the "council fire" to their own counties, and at least six more "wigwams" were established in the early months of 1811. These societies influenced nominations, issued circulars, used runners, employed heelers at the polls, maintained a system of 'espionage', and conducted an extensive correspondence - all designed to ensure Democratic success. 34 In addition, the Tammany leaders at Zanesville, on behalf of a state caucus, wrote to supporters 'of this state as now administered,' to propose the establishment of a state newspaper to inculcate "a union of sentiment among Republicans throughout the State" and "Give a tone to other republican papers." 35 No wonder that when Jacksonian Democrats began to tighten their party organization in 1833-34 and intensify its coherence, those opposed looked back to 1810 and 1811 when St. Tammany had done exactly the same thing. 36

Tammany itself now became the central issue. By March 1811 Tammany communications were referring to "the storm of calumny and persecution which hovers over our wigwams." Attempts to organize a society at Xenia faced

32. C.A. Norton to Worthington, Zanesville, 14 Dec. 1810, TWP; W.W. Irvin to E.A. Brown, Lancaster, 4 Feb. 1811, EABP.
33. Chillicothe Independent Republican, 21 Feb. 1811.
34. Samuel W. Williams, "The Tammany Society of Ohio," OSAHP, XXII (1913), 355, 363. See also Hamm to Samuel Williams, Zanesville, 13 July 1811, Tammany Society Records.
36. E.g., Columbus Sentinel, 9 May 1833; Campbell, Biographical Sketches, 151-52.
"strong and formidable... opposition," and "the enemies of Columbia" even threatened to "tar and feather all of us at our next meeting." At Chillicothe leading Federalist members of the Methodist church secured the expulsion of Methodists who had joined the Tammany society, and Edward Tiffin, who had long served as a local preacher, was suspended from all ministerial functions - on charges of idolatry, of worshipping an Indian saint! Those expelled were soon reinstated by the Quarterly Conference, if only because "a large majority of [Methodists] are firm democratic republicans" and the church had to recognise it had "nothing to do with the political opinions of its members." However, the incident demonstrated how Tammany, with its secrecy, rationalism and pseudo-Indian ritual, aroused all the fears and resentments that Freemasonry was to arouse twenty years later.

The "persecuting storms" that raged against "Tammanical secrets" were given urgency by the society's attempts to control political processes. After all, its members were trying to control those elected by voters loyal to a national party to gain factional advantage on a local issue. Not unnaturally, the "wigwams" were denounced as "secret, midnight, aristocratic political institutions," the party managers condemned as "aristocrats" endeavouring to control the votes of the people; and 'Independent Republicans' proclaimed the virtue of allowing the people a free choice without "the few Dictating to the many" - a doctrine which naturally encouraged Federalist support. This controversy over the rightfulness of party organization tended to replace the judicial question as the leading issue of the 1811 elections. As the Chillicothe conservative William Creighton reported in June:

37. Jacob Smith, quoted in Williams, "Tammany Society in Ohio," 365-66; David Griffin to Samuel Williams, Xenia, 22 June 1811, Records of Tammany Society.


the middle and western part of the State is in an uproar in opposition to the Tammany Society. The establishment of this institution has produced more warmth and division than anything that has occurred since the organization of the State Government. The fears of the people have been justly excited against this Infernal institution.... The Tammany scenes that were acted last winter have been laid open to the people and justly exposed. Many good men that have been drawn into the institution are abandoning it.... The only names of distinction now used are "Tammany & Anti Tammany."  

The Democrats responded by warning that "the opposition to the Tammany Society originates from a concealed plan to pull down the leading Democratic Republicans, and with their seventy dollar law to rescind the resolution, and give judges the unlimited right to set aside law." But, in spite of their firm defence of "the new order of things," the signs were that popular feeling on balance was against them. 41

The alignment on these strictly state issues was not sufficiently clear for politicians to be able to predict the political balance in the new Assembly. Initially it was "believed there is a small, but firm majority of Democrats in both houses, determined upon supporting the present state of things in this state" - a view apparently confirmed when Huntington, now a representative, was defeated in his bid to become Speaker of the House. 42 However, "in early part of the Session..., the watchword was beware of Ta -y -m, and the members from [Ross] County & Ci[nici]nnati took a lead in the hue & cry." Huntington himself was "unusually bitter against every thing that looks like Tammany." With support from the members from the New England-settled counties, the opposition leaders turned against the Sweeping Resolution, embarrassed the Democrats in the House, whose floor leaders were weak in debating ability, and brought impeachments against one of those considered "a Resolution Judge." 43

40. William Creighton, Jr., to George Tod, 2 June 1811, in "Huntington Correspondence," 157-58.

41. Scioto Gazette, 10 July 1811.

42. John Hamm to Worthington, Zanesville, 2 Dec. 1811, TWP.

Threatening not to participate in any elections that came up under the terms of the Resolution, but agreeing to treat as valid all appointments already made under it, they pushed through the House - "by a considerable majority" - the repeal of the law establishing that all offices were commissioned for a full seven years. They then put considerable pressure on the large Democratic majority in the Senate to approve this virtual repeal of the Sweeping Resolution. One of their leaders - former Governor Thomas Kirker - "felt bound to vote contrary to his Judgement to satisfy public opinion." Others, eager to win one of the extra seats in Congress that the state was about to be given, "voted on the strong side in stid of the more right side." In this way votes were found in the Senate to rescind the commissioning law. In effect, tight control had collapsed before public opinion, and many Republicans had shown they would co operate with Federalists rather than accept Tammany leadership.

According to Isaac Van Horne, "the Feds" considered the repeal "as a great triumph, and although it was urged that many good Republicans voted for this measure, it was apparent that this Majority was by sympathy of feeling &c. to be kept together, for all important measures." Thus it was thought that the decision to elect Congressmen in future by districts rather than on a general ticket was "carried by the same influence," while in the elections to judgeships and state offices at the end of the session, "none were to be elected but disciples of the new school." Though the attempt to elect Federalists as judges for Muskingum County failed, "throughout the counties were Judges were elected, the result has been near an equal division as to parties." Similar considerations may have helped establish the permanent seat of government near Franklinton, at what was to be called Columbus. Duncan McArthur thought "the exertions of the Tammany society,

44. C.A. Norton, 8 Jan. 1812, John Sloane, 24 Jan. 1812, Jacob Smith, 9 Jan. 1812, W. Silliman, 12 Jan. 1812, all to Worthington from Zanesville, TWP.

45. Van Horne to Worthington, Zanesville, 11 Mar. 1812, TWP.
here [in Zanesville], to prevent the repeal of the commissioning law will be a means of removing the seat of government from this place," while the "exertions" in the Assembly of Colonel James Dunlop, the leading Chillicothe Tammanyite, would prevent it returning there. Since those "who are insulted at the conduct of the Colo. and [of the] Tammany men chiefly reside to the west," their triumph guaranteed a state capital on the Scioto, but not at Chillicothe. 46

To Democrats in Zanesville, like Van Horne and Hamm, the triumph of "the opposition to the best interests of the people" was disastrous; according to Hamm, "a more unprincipled, selfish, and wicked faction never existed in the legislative councils of Ohio." 47 In describing that opposition as Federalist, they were in effect writing many Republicans out of the party, since they insisted that support of the national administration was not the sole criterion of true Republicanism; instead, Democratic Republicans should be committed to the proposition that the people must rule, and through their legislative representatives determine how the people should be governed. When, however, such doctrines were rejected by the people, the Democrats faced a paradox, since they firmly believed true patriotism required the citizen to do what was right rather than what was popular; yet they also believed that the voice of the people was the voice of God. When the people determined in favour of the right of judges to declare statute law invalid, the Democrats were left without a recourse - since they could scarcely appeal the decision to the courts! Though they may have hoped that the people could be persuaded to see things aright, they were by this time more concerned with the international crisis and the need for the government to take decisive action against Britain's insufferable conduct. As Wyllys Silliman said, "Important as these Subjects [of state politics] are to the people of this State, they are lost when

47. Hamm to Worthington, Zanesville, 14 Dec. 1811, TWP.
contrasted with the great and important objects which engross the attention of the national government."  

And yet the factional struggle did not, as often supposed, come to an end once the outbreak of war made party unity seem all important. In the Presidential election of that year each faction insisted on nominating its own ticket, and the main Electoral contest was between two tickets both pledged to Madison! In the next legislative session, John Hamm was "anxious to concentrate the Democratic strength on behalf of one candidate" for the United States Senate; he expected that "the strength of parties will, probably, be tried between Mr. Morrow and Mr. Cass!" - and, indeed, Morrow succeeded. Again, when the next Senate vacancy arose in 1814, the Zanesville leaders tried to organize a Tammany candidature, and were willing to sacrifice eastern Ohio's claim to the Senate seat in favour of a politically sound Tammany candidate from Cincinnati, though unsuccessfully. At the local level intra-party conflict had not died either; in Coshocton County, for one, the local elections of 1814 were fought between Tammany and the opponents of "the Great Council Fire," with each faction offering a "genuine republican ticket" named by a delegate convention! Nor had the two sides given up their views on the constitutional issue, though the Democrats no longer attempted to defend the principle of the Sweeping Resolution. Hostility to judicial review persisted for many years, and the dispute over the state judiciary was not really ended until the reconstitution of the judiciary in 1816, when both "Democrats" and conservatives - including Calvin Pease, the original offender of 1806 -

48. Silliman to Worthington, Zanesville, 12 Jan. 1812, TWP.


were elected as supreme courts judges and as President Judges of the Common Pleas circuits. 51

A factional struggle so intense that it could persist even during the crisis of war threatened to undermine Ohio's Republicanism on national questions. Indeed, for some time leading radical Republicans had feared that the state conflict might force the "Independent Republicans" and Federalists into each other's arms and even create a new majority party. In 1812 Isaac Van Horne feared that opposition to the Sweeping Resolution "will eventually give the Federalists an ascendancy in the Election of Members to Congress. My principle ground of hope, however, is that in the selection of Candidates, they and the Quids may split." In order to promote this end the Democrats introduced a loyal address to the President, which, however, failed to divide their opponents since even supposed Federalists decided to vote for it. 52 The Federalists and Quids clearly recognized that the overwhelming majority of Ohioans remained loyal to the national Republican administration, and that nothing could destroy that allegiance on national issues. In the presidential election the movement to elect Clinton in place of Madison came, in Ohio, from individual Republicans wanting a more strenuous prosecution of the war as well as from Federalists, and in the end the Federalists dropped their own ticket in favour of the "republican" ticket for Clinton. The voters, however, remained loyal to the official Republican candidate, and the real contest was between the two Madison tickets; the voters, while for the most part rejecting Tammany candidates for other offices, overwhelmingly preferred their Electoral ticket, named in Zanesville, for the loyalty of the regulars.

51. Besides Pease, the new judges included George Tod, who had also declared state laws unconstitutional and been the target of impeachment proceedings. Democrats included John McLean and Benjamin Tappan. Zanesville Express, 22, 29 Feb. 1816.

52. Van Horne to Worthington, Zanesville, 4 Jan., 11 Mar. 1812, and Hamm to Worthington, Zanesville, 2 Dec. 1811, TWP.
to the national administration could not be impugned.\footnote{53} In the first legislature of wartime, there was some disagreement over the wording of resolutions approving the course of the general government, with passages critical of the New England Federalists being "warmly opposed by all the members of dark & suspicious politicks." But in spite of "quiddish intrigues" by those unwilling to alienate Federalist support, resolutions warmly approving the government's war policy were passed with solid Republican support; and throughout the war Ohio Republicans co-operated to promote a vigorous prosecution of a conflict which invaded the state's own borders.\footnote{54} As executive action became more important, Republicans accepted the re-election of the reasonably efficient Meigs as governor, in spite of some conservative objections to his "milk-and-water politicks" and some hostility from western Ohio; while in 1814 even the Tammany men in Cincinnati publicized their desire "to harmonize the Republicans of the state generally" over the coming gubernatorial election by supporting the most widely acceptable man - who turned out to be Thomas Worthington, "Idol of Tammany" but also father of Ohio statehood.\footnote{55} However much Ohio Republicans had divided over matters of political organization and judicial power, they still agreed on national questions and regarded themselves as supporters of the same political party.

\footnote{53}{William W. Irvin to Tappan, Cincinnati, 28 Sept. 1812, BTP, LC; Worthington Western Intelligencer, 14 Oct. 1812; Franklinton Freeman's Chronicle, 24 Oct. 1812; Chillicothe Supporter, 6 June, 17 Oct., 14 Nov. 1812}

\footnote{54}{Hamm to Worthington, Chillicothe, 13 Dec. 1812, TWP; Hamm to E.A. Brown, EABP; Zanesville Express, 6 Jan. 1813; Senate Journal, 1812-13, 114-17. There were, of course, disagreements among Republicans about means, and some discontent over military and administrative shortcomings, but the basic rightfulness of the war was accepted.}

\footnote{55}{Duncan McArthur to Worthington, Fruit Hill, 23 March 1812, TWP; Daniel Symmes et al., "Circular," Cincinnati, 11 Aug. 1814, political broadside, OHS. See also W.W. Irwin to Tappan, Cincinnati, 28 Sept. 1812, BTP, LC; Chillicothe Supporter, 24 Oct. 1812.}
The Crisis of National Survival

Throughout the first decade or so of Ohio statehood, local and national considerations cut across each other. State issues divided Republicans, threatening the creation of a new majority party made up of Federalists and conservative Republicans; and the historian Richard E. Ellis has argued that this cleavage was more fundamental than that between Federalist and Republican.¹ Yet, throughout, Ohioans were more concerned about national affairs - and especially about preserving the integrity of the Republic amid the titanic struggle between Napoleonic France and Georgian Britain. Newspapers carried mainly news of European affairs; private correspondence among politicians was full of anxiety about international menaces and the responses of the United States. Consistently Federalists feared where the administration was taking the country, as it approached diplomatic problems with an inept mixture of belligerence and pusillanimity. Republicans, on their side, worried that public spirit was no longer willing to make the patriotic sacrifices necessary to preserve national integrity. And when war was declared in June 1812, the immediate consequence was a sharpening of party divisions in some places and the culmination of the First Party System in Ohio.

Ohio Republicans were enthusiastic for war, despite the peril it would threaten on their Indian-occupied northwestern frontier. The radicals, in particular, pressed for war to end "our present degraded condition," and a Marietta Republican reported that "In Ohio, the public mind (not being cankered with mercantile cupidity) is prepared for war."² When United States Senator Thomas Worthington voted against the declaration of war - as his fellow Senator would have too, had he been present - Ohio Republicans were shocked, and only Worthington's subsequent firm support of the vigorous

². Hamm to Brown, Zanesville, 7 June 1811, EABP; Levi Barber to Worthington, Marietta, 5 Mar. 1812, TWP.
prosecution of a war he considered imprudent restored his political standing. And Republicans in general expected Federalists to rally round in the same way, now that war was declared; and, indeed, many of them, especially in the Chillicothe and Cincinnati regions, did so, though remaining critical of the ineptitude of both government and commanders.

Elsewhere, however, Federalists of New England origin were markedly less enthusiastic, considering the war unnecessary and mistrusting the purposes of the Republicans. This heightening of Federalist passion is obvious in private correspondence: even the young Thomas Ewing and his fellow Federalist students at Ohio University in Athens were "inflamed" against "the infatuated conduct of the present administration," though also willing to serve their turn in the militia - or pay for a substitute. Ewing and his friends hunted for material to "give the Dems... a side swipe," loving to quote Fingal:

From dunghills deep of sable hue
Our dirt-bred patriots spring to view.

These passions continued even after the war, sustained partly by news of Napoleon's return from Elba, and one friend from Athens hoped that Ewing, now Philemon Beecher's law student, would "make the Democrats of Lancaster tremble under the powerful exhortations of your tongue."4

Such feelings prompted the establishment of at least two more Federalist prints after 1812 - at Zanesville, and St. Clairsville in Belmont County - both of which contained more editorial comment on politics than had been customary. In 1815 a further paper followed at Canton, John Saxton's Ohio Repository, and an abortive attempt was made to

3. Sears, Worthington, 169-78, which underestimates the popularity of the war. See also J.F. Cady's useful "Western Opinion and the War of 1812," OAH, XXXIII (1924), 427-76.

set up a Federalist press at the new state capital. As the young Elisha Whittlesey, who had already seen active service at the front as a Brigade-Major, privately put it in 1813,

It is of primary importance, that, the little scurrilous Democratic papers with which this State is cursed, should not longer remain uncontradicted. They have poisoned the principles of the young and uninformed. Federalists have been languid in their exertions; and overcome by the clamour of the populace.5

Whittlesey sought subscriptions for the St. Clairsville Ohio Federalist, edited by the talented lawyer Charles Hammond, whose command of the language of argument and abuse made him a cruel enemy and formidable critic of the administration and its policies; for him, the war was senseless, the administration futile, and the Republicans (or rather "Democrats") self-seeking, unscrupulous, unprincipled demagogues.6

Such attitudes disappointed Republicans who felt that all Americans should rally round their government in this hour of national peril. Van Horne, for example, was surprised that in Congress the Federalists maintained their opposition: "I had not expected that as a party, they would longer appologize for, and justify the demands of the British ministry." Rather, he wanted "Union of all Americans against the common enemy - They who are not for are against us."7 Such sentiments, expressed by the most partisan of Democrats, reveal that many of them accepted the value of party institutions as a means of ensuring that the will of the people was expressed, that the friends of the people, the "democracy," were elected, but did not accept the legitimacy of opposition to the people's government. They found it difficult to distinguish between the system of government as constituted and the current administration of the government; hence their presumption that Federalists must wish to overthrow the 'system' and reestablish monarchy, to introduce the alien and

5. Whittlesey to Hammond, 30 Aug. 1813, EWP, WRHS.
7. Van Horne to Worthington, Zanesville, 9 Dec. 1812, TWP; Muskingum Messenger, 6 July 1814.
corrupt forms of the Britain Federalists adulated.  

The Federalists did not agree that they should cease opposition for the duration. Even the moderate Chillicothe Supporter, by no means opposed to the war, pronounced that

Political parties will not, and ought not to cease. They are often carried to excess, but they are not without their use, and, we believe, are in a degree necessarily essential to the very existence of freedom.

Charles Hammond later said that he began the Ohio Federalist because he objected to the Democratic doctrine that criticism must not be allowed in time of war; so "by the exercise of my rights I practically demonstrated their existence." Hammond, in fact, was particularly effective in defending political liberty in the face of self-righteous Democratic doubts about the legitimacy of opposition. He was especially severe on the editor of the Muskingum Messenger, whom he shrewdly depicted as belonging to that class of politicians who identify their party with the country, and who consider every measure directed against the party as a species of high treason. He looks upon the agents employed or appointed to administer the government, as the government itself, and hence he interprets every attempt to expose the imbecility and wretchedness of the administration, as an attack upon the [system of] government.

Such analyses were significant contributions to the development of the concept of a loyal opposition, and helped to ensure the ultimate acceptance of the legitimacy of political parties.

But what are we to make then of the antiparty rhetoric which continued to fill the columns of Federalist newspapers in these years? Undeniably it represented a genuine anxiety about the political health of a Republic whose people placed incompetent men in power and then supported them through

8. E.g., Muskingum Messenger, 15 June, 6 July 1814.
9. Chillicothe Supporter, 4 July 1812.
10. Ohio Federalist, 2 July 1818, 29 June 1814.
thick and thin. This they blamed on politicians who curried popular favour, pandered to popular prejudices, and presented everything in partisan terms. What the Republic needed was firm leaders, willing to do their duty, even when unpopular, and to present political affairs in their true light. As it was, party machinery served merely to keep power within a few restricted hands. Even popularly chosen conventions were often devices merely to ratify a ticket already secretly chosen by the party managers. By these means power fell into the hands of a few fortunate men, and this new "aristocracy" was then kept in power by the blind support of their followers. Those who would not accept party dictation, even Revolutionary heroes, were damned as traitors and the country denied their services, while the power of government was misused to suppress dissidence and "to oppress the refractory minority people." Thus Federalist antipartyism was itself both a reaction to the effectiveness of the opposing party, and an assertion of the values - like liberty of opinion, access to public office and political opportunity - that made political parties possible. 12

Federalist antipartyism was not therefore inherently opposed to party action, as long as the leaders of the party were concerned primarily with the public welfare, and as long as the party nomination was only a recommendation and not a limitation, in practice, on the electorate's freedom of choice. And the Federalists were willing to act as a party, to adopt all Republican techniques except the nominating convention, wherever the situation offered some chance of success. Sadly, such opportunities were few, and in most counties the Federalists' only hope was to find allies among the ranks of the local Republican majority. Thus their antiparty rhetoric, with its attacks on party dictation and contempt for the new "aristocracy" of party managers, served well to appeal to discontented Republicans who were tempted towards an independent course.

The wisdom of this course is particularly well illustrated by the experience of Muskingum County during the war years. Here the leaders of Tammany had survived the disasters of the 1811-12 General Assembly, which, meeting in Zanesville, had repaid their meddling by trying to undermine their control of the county. But Federalism remained a force locally, and in 1812 Van Horne's friends were outmanoeuvred by Federalists in the election of directors of the new Bank of Muskingum by stockholders resident in the county (about 1,800 people voted). The declaration of war, however, was popular, and local Democratic leaders cashed in by forming themselves into the Silk Stocking Company of volunteers, named after a famous troop of that name in the Revolutionary War; but when called to the front after Hull's surrender, they refused on the grounds that their services were needed at home to win the election for the administration! In the fall two sound Tammany men were elected state representatives, and Van Horne could with justice congratulate himself on gaining "an increasing majority annually, against a host of Fedl. Tavern keepers store keepers &c. &c. whose intrigues and exertions... are not exceeded in any other County in the state."

The popularity of the war in Muskingum placed the Federalist minority in a delicate situation. When they established a party press, the Zanesville Express, in December 1812, specifically to scrutinize the conduct of this just but unnecessary war, it carefully adopted a moderate tone and pursued a nominally non-partisan course, aiming to attract the support of those "professedly opposed to us in politics" who were willing to rise "above those narrow prejudices of party, which enchain many political zealots."

The reward for restraint came when Republican dissidents opposed the regular

13. Arius Nye to Horace Nye, Springfield (i.e. Putnam), 8 Sept. 1812, VFM 634, OHS.
15. Van Horne to Worthington, 9 Dec. 1812, TWP.
nomination in 1813, for the Express could act as spokesman for an amalgamationist movement that threatened the regulars' control of the county. The Express insisted that the delegate convention was called only to rubber-stamp a ticket already named privately by "the Muskingum junto, alias the trio aristocrats of this county," for the party machinery, it claimed, was merely a device for preserving "the unnatural influence of family influence and arrangement." Voters should feel free to disobey the convention's nomination, for "all Tammany principles and delegated tickets," all attempts to discipline voters, were "a direct attack" on the privilege of voting. Despite all the canvassing efforts of the Democrats, the "Opposition Ticket" was elected over the "Delegate Ticket" by a good margin. 16

But party feelings bristled beneath the surface, as when men came to blows in Zanesville at the celebration over Perry's victory on Lake Erie. The Muskingum Messenger launched a partisan crusade designed to expose the Federalism of the Express, so hypocritically cloaked by pseudo-Republican language. At the same time the Express came under pressure from hard-line Federalists, who wished it to take a more openly partisan line and reveal more frankly the iniquities and incompetence of the party in power. The disasters of the war by the fall had persuaded them to run their own "Federal Republican" ticket, which they duly named "in caucus." The only consequence, however, was to enable the regular Republicans to keep a hold on dissenting movements within their ranks, and line up the voters behind the delegate ticket. In an election which saw a high degree of ticket-voting, the Democratic ticket carried by a four-to-one margin. 17 Once more the Federalists had learned that there was no future in competing in their own right.

Muskingum's experience was not untypical; in Guernsey County too, an

attempt to invigorate the local Federalist organization merely served, in 1814, to unite a Republican party suffering from serious internal divisions. In general, the centres of Federalism in central and eastern Ohio, like Granville in Licking County, or Coshocton, were swamped by the firm, if far from united, Republicanism of the countryside. On the Western Reserve there was "'a goodly number' of Federalists... who are anxious to support a well edited paper in this State," and believed that "the Federalists in this State must take their stand." But they put up no effective resistance in elections, for opinion on the Reserve strongly supported the war, and rumours of lukewarmness were sufficient to defeat at least one candidate for Congress. There were, however, some exceptional local situations in eastern Ohio which made a Federalist bid for power seem almost a duty - most obviously, in Belmont, Jefferson and Harrison counties where there were sizeable settlements of Quakers.

Traditionally Federalist when not apathetic, the Quakers had been willing to support Republican attempts to preserve peace. Once war broke out and the General Assembly refused to allow Quakers exemption from military duty, they opposed the war, refused to serve, and became Federalists "as a matter of course." William Dean Howells' father, as a child, lived in the Quaker settlement at Mount Pleasant in Jefferson County; naturally he "fell in with this spirit, and... was of course called a Tory and British by older ones who thus amused themselves at my childish earnestness."

19. Henry Bushnell, *The History of Granville, Licking County* (Columbus, 1889), 37, 97; for Coshocton, see William Craig to James Pritchard, Zanesville, 8 Sept. 1812, BTP, LC.
21. John Sloane to Worthington, 6 Aug. 1808, TWP. For these communities, see H.E. Smith, "The Quakers, Their Migration to the Upper Ohio, Their Customs and Discipline," *DAHSP*, XXXVII (1928), 35-85.
MAP 1.2: CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS 1817 - 1827

a) County Boundaries, 1812.

Source: Downes, Evolution of Ohio County Boundaries, p. 45.

Ohio County Boundary Lines in 1812.

b) County Boundaries, 1816

W. B. the Fourth district.


OHIO COUNTIES, 1816

Quakers refused to perform military service, and were liable to heavy fines as a consequence. Even at the news of New Orleans, "The Quakers kept dark and dumb, and were abused for it, of course." During the war Quaker votes in Jefferson and Belmont Counties elected Federalist representatives to the Assembly, where they protested vigorously against the war. After the war, in 1815, the Belmont Federalists, still embittered, once more offered a full county ticket, headed by the incumbent state senator Charles Hammond; once more the ticket swept the Quaker townships but was defeated on a strict party vote by thirty votes overall. As late as 1816, the Federalists in Jefferson were considered unusually heated, while in Belmont they were still "as a party" running their own candidates for the legislature - and winning.

The strength of feeling among the Quakers encouraged Federalist ambitions to win a Congressional seat in eastern Ohio. The newly created fourth district included these Quaker areas, and gave hope to Federalist minorities in Steubenville, Coshocton, Putnam and Zanesville. Accordingly, they nominated the wealthy and distinguished Bezaleel Wells of Steubenville, long a popular Federalist candidate, frequently proposed for governor, to face the official Republican nominee, James Caldwell of Zanesville. Yet this district was divided by a sectional conflict over the routing of the National Road: the northern area wished the road to strike the Ohio River opposite Steubenville, which felt itself discriminated against in the selection of post roads; the southern portion, from St. Clairsville to Zanesville, preferred Wheeling. Republican candidates from Steubenville offered to run, but desisted in the face of the Federalist challenge. Wells

22. William Cooper Howells, Recollections of Life in Ohio, 1813-1840, (Cincinnati, 1895), 17, 33-34. See also Conlin, Perkins, 77; Zanesville Express, 6 Jan. 1813; Ohio General Assembly, Senate Journal, 1812-1813, 187-190.

23. Senate Journal, 1813-14, 340-44.

received much support from Federalists interested in the southern route, as well as in the north; the Republicans, even in the Steubenville region, supported the official candidate, and standing united, carried the day in both 1812 and 1814. This willingness to ignore local interest and accept the official party nomination offers strong proof of the force of the national party division in eastern Ohio at this time. Partly as a result of it, the National Road was built to Wheeling, and Steubenville Republicans soon found they had made "a great sacrifice at the altar of party."  

The Republicans successfully, for the most part, resisted this Federalist challenge by reinvigorating their party machine. Throughout eastern Ohio south of the Reserve delegate conventions were regularly summoned, and their nominations well supported wherever and whenever the Federalist threat seemed serious. Indeed, in the fourth Congressional district a district nominating convention was called in 1812 to settle the claims of Steubenville and Zanesville to have the nomination - even though historians have usually said that nominating conventions for Congressional elections were unknown in Ohio before 1828. In 1814 no convention was called as the incumbent Caldwell was willing to run again, but in 1816 a further district convention was called to decide on his successor. To ensure justice and secure the popular will, seats and votes in the convention were allotted according to size of population in each county. In the heat of close partisan contest, the most advanced organizational techniques were adopted by the Jeffersonian Republicans.  

The development of a party conflict akin to that of the Second Party System was most marked in Washington County. The success of the Federalist


ticket in 1808 seems to have been a result of popular disillusionment with a Republican party that deliberately brought economic distress to Marietta and its environs; and in the years that followed the Republicans locally - as nationally - lost their coordination and electoral drive. Certainly party nominating procedures appear to have lapsed, perhaps because of the local popularity of Meigs and the cause of the judiciary. Certainly in 1810 one Federalist claimed that "the veriest tools of a party, are jostled into office, in the hurry of election," by the Democrats; thus he justified offering a list of Federalist candidates to "the independent Electors" of the county, not as "a mere electioneering manœuvre, calculated to mislead and confound; but as a fair and honest mode of proceeding, that the people on the day of election, may not be taken by surprise." 27 In these years the Federalists had some success in electing some Federalists to the General Assembly; and even in 1811, when the candidates ran as party men and the returns reveal a high level of ticket voting, the distinguished old Federalist William Rufus Putnam narrowly carried the county, only to be defeated in neighbouring Athens County which shared the state senatorship for which he was running. 28

By 1812 passions ran deeper. The Federalists of Marietta were especially bitter against the war, complaining privately that "our national misfortunes result from that cursed Gallicmania, which perverted the mind of Mr Jefferson &... his humble successor," as well as from "the imbecility of our Government" and its incompetent measures. 29 Initially they had the advantage of controlling the county's only newspaper - Caleb Emerson's Western Spectator - which persistently maintained that the local authorities resorted to the draft to fulfill their military obligations only in order to

27. "A Friend To Merit," reprinted in Chillicothe Supporter, 4 Aug. 1810. See also Hildreth, Genealogical... Sketches, 191, 192, 194.
ensure that as many Federalists as Republicans went off to the frontier to fight; otherwise, it claimed, the departure of Republican volunteers would have jeopardized the party's success in the county elections. As for the conscripted Federalists, they were rumoured to be badly treated by their officers but, as suspected "Tories," never risked in battle - at least according to local tradition. 30

Determined to overthrow the Republicans where possible, the Washington County Federalists were willing to adopt Republican techniques. Admittedly they did not use delegate conventions, but preferred to nominate their candidates in private meetings. However, Caleb Emerson could chastise his fellow Federalists for their "want of system," and urge them to emulate "the decided and invariable System of the Democrats"; they should act with greater discipline and outdo their opponents in loyalty to the official ticket. 31 Most notably, the Federalists introduced the Washington Benevolent Society, a Federalist counterpart to St. Tammany. Devoted ostensibly to promoting humanitarian welfare, this organization was openly described by its members as an attempt to promote the Federalist cause, at least by encouraging cooperation if not by actually electioneering. The Society "for the County of Washington and State of Ohio" was founded in August 1813 in Marietta, and immediately began to encourage the foundation of other branches. By May 1814 there were six branch societies in Washington County, one of them boasting 387 members in 1816, and a further branch in the New England settlement of Putnam in Muskingum County. Not inappropriately, the Zanesville Democratic newspaper commented that, "As these benevolent societies are unquestionably instituted with the very benevolent

30. History of Washington County, Ohio, 133-34. See also Marietta Western Spectator, 12 May 1813; Nahum Ward to Caleb Emerson, 11 Apr. 1814, Caleb Emerson Family Papers, WRHS.

intention of combining to overthrow our present government and administra-
tion, the anti-Tammanyites in and about Zanesville will have an
opportunity of showing their consistency by joining this secret society."32

A reinvigorated Federalism prompted greater Republican efforts in
Washington County. In April 1813 an editor was brought in from Boston to
establish a party press, devoted to support of a "just and necessary" war
proclaiming from its masthead, "United We Stand, Divided We Fall."33
Delegate conventions were once more organized to make party nominations and,
in cases where representative offices were shared with Athens County,
careful arrangements were made to balance the ticket between the two
counties. No independent Republican intervened to prevent a straight race
against the Federalist nominees, in a series of strict party elections
which continued through the war years. Turnout increased markedly, with
over 72 per cent voting in 1812 and over 61 per cent in 1814, in spite of
the absence of soldiers at the front. In these regular elections the
Republicans were uniformly successful, though in a special election for
state senator in December 1814 the Federalist candidate won by a good
margin (54%) in a light poll.34

Partisan hostilities continued even into the 1815 elections, and
consistently prevented the two parties from combining to celebrate July
Fourth. If hostilities did not become so blatant as in Zanesville - where
drunken Republicans fired a cannon loaded with rocks at the Federalist
celebration across the river in Putnam35 - in Marietta feelings still ran

32. Muskingum Messenger, 11 Mar. 1814. The records of the society can be
found in the Emerson Family Papers; the account in Fischer, Revolution
of American Conservatism, 119, is inaccurate.

33. Marietta American Friend, 24 Apr. 1813; Fischer, ibid., 409, wrongly
describes the editor, David Everett, as a Federalist.

34. Chillicothe Fredonian, 28 Oct. 1812; American Friend, 30 Oct. 1813,
24 Sept. 1814, 15 Sept. 1815; Zanesville Express, 5 Jan. 1815; Marietta
Register, 30 Oct., 13 Nov. 1863.

Table 3:1  Election Returns by Township, Washington County, October 1814

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOVERNOR</th>
<th>CONGRESSMAN</th>
<th>STATE REPRESENTATIVES (2)</th>
<th>SHERIFF</th>
<th>CORONER</th>
<th>COUNTY COMMISSIONER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Worthington Creighton Belt</td>
<td>Sharp (R) Gregory (R) Barker (F) Bingham (F)</td>
<td>Hill (R) Clark (F)</td>
<td>Cook (R) M'Farland (F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worthington</td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td>Belt (F)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belpre</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deerfield</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No return</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fearing</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandview</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>63</td>
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<td>112</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>55</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>Wooster</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>Wesley</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>627</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athens County:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>277</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
high. One local Federalist reported how on the great day the members of the Washington Benevolent Society marched to the large meeting house where they heard an oration by William R. Putnam, and sang several hymns and psalms. "The society then formed, the banners were all placed and we marched to a bower built by Nature where we partook of an 'extreme' dinner - the cloth being removed 30 or 40 toasts were drank with the best of wine... decency and decorum prevailed 130 members present." Then "the young Gentlemen & Ladies of nobility of Town & Country" proceeded to Campus Martius where "we partook of an excellent dish of Tea prepared by the Ladies own hands and served by two Negroes employed for that purpose." During these festivities the young Federalists saw something rather different:

the ruffscuffs of the earth collected together and stalking through the streets one after another in couples and their piper jogging along before....This was a composition of Ignorance, rascality, indolence and poverty, 3 thirds of them were in their shirt sleeves 2 thirds barefooted one third bareass-d perhaps you will ask who these were - I will answer the Democrats of the County of Washington --36

The objectivity of this account is obviously doubtful, but it speaks volumes for the social and party prejudices of one young Federalist.

In the elections of 1813-1815, and perhaps earlier ones, candidates were clearly labelled as party men, and the voters tended to vote strict party tickets. Table 3.1 presents the returns for 1814, when Federalists refused to oppose Worthington for Governor because of his vote against the declaration of war. Many similar examples of ticket voting could be presented from other counties, for example Muskingum in the same year, but, according to some historians, ticket voting is not in itself proof of the existence of party. What they require is evidence of persisting loyalty among the voters over a number of years. The evidence of individual voter behaviour from Adams township reveals a complex situation, with relatively few voters turning out in all three of the elections for which township

36. Luther D. Barker to Ewing, Union [Washington County], 26 July 1815, EFP.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>1813</th>
<th>1814</th>
<th>1815</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grandview</td>
<td>96.97</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roxbury</td>
<td>80.56</td>
<td>73.68</td>
<td>83.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newport</td>
<td>75.</td>
<td>80.85</td>
<td>75.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wesley</td>
<td>75.</td>
<td>78.95</td>
<td>75.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warren</td>
<td>75.76</td>
<td>75.86</td>
<td>72.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deerfield</td>
<td>78.57</td>
<td>No return</td>
<td>68.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marietta</td>
<td>74.51</td>
<td>68.67</td>
<td>70.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterford</td>
<td>44.74</td>
<td>54.63</td>
<td>62.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adams</td>
<td>50.</td>
<td>50.</td>
<td>60.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fearing</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>50.</td>
<td>52.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>50.</td>
<td>38.98</td>
<td>53.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salem</td>
<td>40.</td>
<td>56.25</td>
<td>40.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wooster</td>
<td>40.</td>
<td>40.91</td>
<td>43.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belpre</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

57.88  58.51  57.7

**CHART 3.1:** Correlation of Republican Percentages of Township

*Votes, Washington County, 1813 - 1815.*

\[\text{Republican Percentage, October 1814.}\]

\[\text{Republican Percentage, October 1815.}\]
records of this period survive: however, virtually two-thirds of those who voted in 1811 and 1814 voted the same way, as did 55.88 per cent of those who voted in both 1814 and 1815, when there was a marked swing to the Republicans. The aggregate data from all the townships in 1813, 1814 and 1815 is rather more impressive, with Table 3.2 and the scatter diagram suggesting a high degree of consistency and persistence in voter loyalties in the mass. While the rapid growth in population - and changes in township boundaries - make it unreasonable to expect much correlation with the distribution of party strength ten years earlier, in fact the two parties found their strength in much the same areas as they had in 1804, in the earlier period of undoubted two-party confrontation. Certain, it would be unreasonable to deny the existence of a 'First Party System' in Washington County, Ohio, in these years.

Such striking examples of two-party conflict were, of course, far from typical. In many, if not most, counties the Republican supremacy was uncontested, factionalism ripe, nominations often made by private announcements or by separate townships, and ticket voting unknown. Tensions between townships or counties often dictated the character of an election. Some measure of the prevalence of this situation is provided by the Congressional elections of the war years, in which national party divisions might be expected to be most relevant, as in the Steubenville-Zanesville (i.e., fourth) district. In 1812, the large sixth district in northern Ohio saw a struggle for influence in Washington between the Yankee Western Reserve and six counties south of the Reserve which were being settled by Pennsylvania Germans and Scotch Irish. In the equally large fifth


38. Warren Trump of Fame, 6 Jan. 1812, See Map 3.2.
district, stretching from Lancaster and Newark across to the Indiana border south of the Greenville line, there were innumerable candidates, and the main contest in some parts of the district was between a different set of men from those attracting votes elsewhere. The election in the second district, a northward extension of the original Adams County, was essentially personal, as far as can be discerned. In the third district, the partisanship of Washington County was made pointless by the huge popularity in the Scioto Valley of Duncan McArthur, one of the few officers to have emerged with credit from Hull's debacle at Detroit, who was now elected unanimously. Only in the Cincinnati (or first) district was a successful effort made to concentrate Republican votes on a single candidate, though not by a district convention akin to that used in the fourth district; elsewhere, there seems to have been neither the sense of party unity nor the organizational will sufficient to overcome the physical obstacles to co-ordination. 40

Yet the 1814 elections showed the impulse to partisanship in some counties, even outside the Zanesville-Steubenville district. Admittedly, the young John McLean's overwhelming success in the Cincinnati district in 1812 resulted in his unopposed re-election two years later, and personal and regional tensions predominated in three of the six districts. But in the district stretching from the Scioto Valley to Marietta, the 1814 election was essentially a conflict between two Chillicothe candidates, the firm if conservative Republican William Creighton and the old Federalist Levin Belt. And though at least five candidates ran in the Dayton and Lancaster district, the election was widely perceived as essentially between the incumbent Republican, James Kilbourn of Worthington, and the Federalist


42. Marietta Register, 13 Nov. 1863. See Table 3.2.
Philemon Beecher; and in Miami and Montgomery counties these two headed party tickets which were voted for with considerable regularity. 43

Even more significant is the fact that all the successful candidates ran as Republicans, and then secured easy re-election after they had demonstrated in Congress their firm support of the war and the measures necessary for its vigorous prosecution. 44 Political success in most of Ohio required firm commitment to the national administration, and ambitious and talented Federalists like Charles Hammond knew that, as long as they maintained their attachment to the opposition, they were "without any chance" of attaining the positions to which they aspired. Even men who prided themselves on their independence, who refused to accept party dictation and espoused antiparty doctrines, would hasten to describe themselves as Republicans when challenged. Thus Thomas D. Webb, editor of the first newspaper on the Western Reserve, the Warren Trump of Fame, refused in his prospectus in 1812 to state his political creed, though he assured "the public, that he is no monarchist, no aristocrat", and he opened his paper to "decent communications of any political faith." When criticized for his vagueness, he explained that he did not want to be branded "a party man" - but added that he had opposed Jay's Treaty and John Adams' measures, had supported Mr. Jefferson's administration and now was strongly in favour of Mr. Madison's War! 45

For all the factional divisions within the Republican party, for all the difference of principles underlying the schism over the judiciary and over party dictation, the fact remains that the national party distinction between Federalist and Republican was what mattered most, what had real

43. Dayton Ohio Republican, 24 Oct. 1814. See Map 3.2 (fifth district).
45. Hammond to Worthington, Belmont, 7 Feb. 1812, CHP; Trump of Fame, 9 June 1812.
emotional significance for politicians and voters. While some social, cultural and ethnic tensions underlay these identifications, they gained their saliency from the sense that the whole future of the Republic was at stake in this "stupendous age of revolutions."\(^{46}\) The common linking of Republicanism with France and Federalism with Britain made the party conflict seem but a continuation of the struggle taking place in Europe; the rival party was suspected of wishing to introduce the political and social forms of its European 'ally' - be they jacobinical or monarchical - into the United States. Most Republicans had no great liking for Napoleon, but they saw him as fighting against British usurpations which, as it happened, threatened American integrity and independence. The Federalists themselves believed that "a war with England is not so much to be deprecated as an Alliance (its necessary consequence) with France," for France had shown an insatiable appetite for gobbling up friendly republics.\(^ {47}\) With the fate of the world in balance and the outcome of an age of revolutions to be decided, both parties felt they could not allow the fate of the Republic to be left in the hands of those whose purposes, they feared, were unAmerican.

Such ideological polarity was exaggerated, and it neglected the common commitment of both parties to the Constitution, to the republic, to federalism and representative democracy, but the emotional overloading can be understood in the context of a new republic struggling for survival in a world of warring giants. Ideological commitment on this scale, it has widely been observed, made the so-called 'First Party System' rather different from the later party system. Yet that is not the real point: the important thing was that a web of emotion and common experience had created, for many people, a sense of allegiance to a particular partisan identity; and political passion had burned those loyalties so deep that they were never ever quite to be forgotten.

46. Muskingum Messenger.

4. GOOD FEELINGS AND PARTISANSHIP, 1815-1820

No period is so misunderstood, and its significance for American party history so underestimated, as the laughably misnamed "Era of Good Feelings." There can be no doubt that, for a short time after 1815, political passions abated, formal organized opposition to the Republican party disappeared, and a national consensus seemed to exist on the leading issues of the day. Yet the decline in the force of the old party division does not necessarily show the weakness of the old party loyalties nor the overriding power of antipartyism, since the decline was due not merely to Good Feelings but also to powerful new sources of internal disagreement at the local level which ripped at the unity of both parties. Moreover, in spite of these forces, the old party division never completely disappeared, for it remained a significant, if far from general, organizing principle of political behaviour in Ohio, even into the 1820s. The old loyalties were, in fact, not overridden entirely until after a crisis hit state and nation in 1818-19 which destroyed Good Feelings, provoked severe sectional controversy, and, in the end, created a new political cleavage of mighty significance for the future.

The Decline of Party Feeling

The real patriot, I think, has now cause to be thankful that the day is approaching when the zeal, the heat, the passion, prejudice & blind infatuation of party, mean, pitiful and degrading party, is subsiding and the door opening for considering the substantial interests of the Country.

So wrote John C. Wright in the summer of 1817, after a trip to the Eastern states. Wright, a diminutive man with a large head and protruding features, was by no means prepossessing in appearance. When serving as a Congressman in the late 1820s he visited a menagerie in Washington, where he overheard his fellow Congressman Davy Crockett saying, "Why, that monkey looks just like our friend, Judge Wright, from Ohio." Crockett, embarrassed by the
discourtesy, begged pardon of Wright: "An apology is certainly due somewhere, but for the life of me, I cannot tell whether it is to you or the monkey." Despite such stories, frequently told by Wright against himself, Wright was never underestimated by his contemporaries: "He had very little dignity of manners but excellent sense, united to a keen sense of humor, and a power of sarcasm" that made him a highly effective debater and controversialist. A New Engander who was later seen as "an old fashioned gentleman," he was to gain considerable distinction, in Congress, on the Ohio Supreme Court, as a Cincinnati editor, and not least as one of Harrison's "conscience-keepers" (along with Jacob Burnet) in the 1840 Log Cabin campaign.

In 1817 he was a successful Republican lawyer in Steubenville, where he lived close by his brother-in-law, Benjamin Tappan. He had always been a less committed partisan than Tappan, and as editor of a newspaper in western New York a decade earlier he had argued for a softening of party asperities. He got on well with Federalists, notably Charles Hammond, and cooperated with them during his several attempts to win a seat in Congress. His 1817 trip had shown him undeniable proof that at last "the bitterness of party is dying away": in New York, DeWitt Clinton's election "seems to have hushed up the animosities of party"; in Connecticut, "Party seem even there to be breaking down"; and, in New England as a whole, men seemed to have forgotten that "President Monro was elected by a party," and the Federalists there perhaps were the "most attentive" to him on his tour of goodwill.¹

In Ohio, the most striking sign of the new atmosphere was a fresh willingness to hold non-partisan July Fourth celebrations. Such joint celebrations had been known during the war in parts of western and central Ohio, but by 1816 Federalists and Republicans were coming together to celebrate national independence even in party-torn eastern Ohio. In Ohio as in New England, men of both parties could now listen to the same orators,

1. John C. Wright to Hammond, Steubenville, 24 July 1817, CHP, OHS. For Wright, see A.G.W. Carter, The Old Court House: Reminiscences and Anecdotes of the Courts and Bar of Cincinnati (Cincinnati, 1880); Howe, Historical Collections, centennial edn., II, 696-98.
without fear of hearing unacceptable versions of history and current affairs, while in Steubenville even the extreme partisan Benjamin Tappan could toast "An union of parties on American principles." And when President Monroe visited the state in August 1817, he was again received with enthusiasm by both Federalists and Republicans. 2

This decline in the sense of party difference, in Ohio and elsewhere, derived, above all, from the change in the international situation. Party feeling had derived its passion from a suspicion of the other party's loyalty to an independent American federal republic at a time of world war; such fears were obviously unreasonable once the Napoleonic struggle had been finally settled at Waterloo and the United States allowed to escape the entanglements consequent upon the struggle in Europe. On occasions, the old partisan attitudes could still raise their head, however, as in the clash with Britain over Arbuthnot and Ambrister and with Spain over the ratification of the Florida treaty. 3 Differences over domestic policy likewise declined, as the national Republican party came to adopt policies directed at rectifying the internal weaknesses revealed by the war. Federalists approved Madison's proposals of December 1815 - a stronger navy, the encouragement of commerce, the re-establishment of a national currency, and measures to improve the country's capacity to defend itself - as welcome departures from the traditional Republican emphasis on cheap, weak government. The Zanesville Express rejoiced

to find our national government falling upon a system of measures which remind us of former times, and are calculated to ensure our national happiness and prosperity. We never did oppose the Administration further than we candidly believed they departed from sound policy dictated by wisdom and sanctioned by long experience. 4

2. Western Herald, 12 July 1816; Muskingum Messenger, 3 Sept. 1817; Schneider, Y-Bridge City, 90-91.
3. Edward Paine, Jr., to Peter Hitchcock, Chardon, 12 Jan., 5 Feb. 1819; Isaac Mills to Hitchcock, New Haven, Conn., 22 Feb. 1819, PHFP, WHS.
It was, of course, not surprising that leading Federalists were eager to see party spirit lose its force. After all, as an apparently permanent minority they were doomed to exclusion from office; hence a frequent refrain in Federalist criticism of party spirit was that it prevented the people from electing the best men, if they happened to be Federalists. Hammond frankly argued through the columns of the Ohio Federalist that, since party conflict injured the country by depriving it of the services of many virtuous and talented men, the Federalists should drop their name and separate organization. He even suggested that party conflict prevented the election of the best men in the majority party, since parties tended to choose their most popular rather than their best men as their candidates. Hence he welcomed the approach of a time "when the only questions concerning a candidate shall be, is he honest? Is he capable? Is he faithful to the constitution?" And privately he hoped that the dropping of party names, marked by his giving up the Ohio Federalist in 1818, would "encrease the chances of future usefulness" for himself.

Many Republicans were equally grateful to give up a party contest they had found distasteful. As Richard Hofstadter has argued, many people had continued to be uneasy about parties, believing that there was something immoral and unpatriotic about them; many firm Republicans, even, believed that partisanship should and would decline now that the party of the country, the party of the people, was firmly established in power. These doubts about the virtues of continuing partisanship were particularly strong in Ohio among conservative Republicans who had defended the judiciary and opposed St. Tammany in state politics; after all, their success had depended upon undermining the power of those who insisted on the priority of partisan

5. Ohio Federalist, 12 Sept. 1816, 2 July 1818.
6. Ibid., 7 Nov. 1816; Hammond to Worthington, Washington, 18 May 1818, CHP.
loyalty, and upon attracting the support of Federalists. The ending of the old party conflict would reduce the embarrassments of joining with opponents they agreed with on many issues, and would reduce their dependence on men whose excessive ideological commitment they could not approve.

The diminution of party conflict came most slowly—and in the end most impressively—in eastern Ohio. In most other parts of Ohio party differences had been muted during the War, and the glorious news of New Orleans and Ghent (in that order) brought men quickly together to celebrate the Republic's apparent triumph. In central and western Ohio the danger that Philemon Beecher might at last gain election to Congress was not fearful enough to force Republicans to unite against him, and the result was that in 1816 at last a Federalist was elected to represent Ohio in the councils of the nation—though Beecher gained only 21 per cent of the vote and a plurality of only 37 over the nearest of his nine rivals. By contrast, in those counties marked by an unusually strong or active Federalist party, formal party conflict continued into 1815 and 1816, with newspapers on both sides arguing matters of high principle and slanging each other in a "filthy" fashion. James Wilson, brought in from William Duane's Philadelphia Aurora to edit the Steubenville Western Herald, spearheaded an attempt to destroy Federalism in eastern Ohio by frontal assault. In particular, Wilson attacked the Ohio Federalist, which even the Cincinnati Liberty Hall thought "stands alone ... as the only Boston stamp paper in the western country" in 1815. The sole consequence, however, was to force its editor, Charles Hammond, to reply with probing philosophical and historical analyses of "Democratic" ideology, including even sharp critiques of the public statements of Ohio's new military hero, William Henry Harrison, and "the Tammany squad at Cincinnati." Yet even in eastern Ohio, by the time of the elections of 1816, partisan passions had begun to decline in the same way.


9. Western Herald, 20 July 1815; Ohio Federalist, 5 Sept. 1816. The argument may be followed in these papers, the Zanesville Express and Muskingum Messenger, 1815-16, passim.
as elsewhere.

The initiative in bringing party conflict to an end in eastern Ohio was taken undoubtedly by the Federalists. In December 1815 the Zanesville Express rejoiced at President Madison's annual message, which, it said, showed "our national government falling upon a system of measures which remind us of former times." By January the paper was claiming that the message, with its blend of federal measures and republican principles, was the first that all parties could agree upon. By August both the Express and the Ohio Federalist agreed that, in view of the Republicans' "adoption of good old Washington principles," there was no need to oppose them as long as they nominated "honourable and capable men." The Express thought it "high time for the Federalists to give up an opposition which only serves to heighten the asperities of party spirit, and exhibit the thinness of their ranks." 10 Accordingly, they made no move to oppose James Monroe's election to the Presidency in 1816, and simply sat out the election. The Republicans, by contrast, held a "Grand Caucus" at the state capitol in January which named a slate of Electoral candidates whom, it was presumed, would vote for the candidate named by the Congressional Caucus. Though there were grumblings about party dictation, even the Muskingum Messenger, in urging Republicans on the eve of election to go to the polls, had to concede that "we hear of no opposition in this state to the ticket recommended at the meeting at Chillicothe." 11

The contagion of Good Feelings was not immediately caught in the Belmont county elections in 1816. Although Hammond earnestly desired "that the Federalists of this county should offer no candidates at this election," he was "dragged into" running for the state House of Representatives. This

made him "the only man in the state nominated for an elective office by the federalists, as a party." The Republicans had in any case arranged to make a Delegate nomination, but in the event they were unable to prevent Hammond's election. By the following year a newspaper correspondent claimed it was "generally agreed that there is no good reason for any longer keeping alive the party distinctions which have agitated this county so much," and suggested a nomination "upon which I think parties may fairly unite." Belmont accordingly sent two Republicans and two Federalists, including Hammond, to the General Assembly in both 1817 and 1818. After 1816 no Republican county convention met except in 1818 to ratify the Zanesville nomination for Congress, and in 1818 Hammond decided it was time to discontinue his newspaper. Now, for a time, county politics were to be marked by personal and local interests which combined in such confusing and shifting ways as to make prediction by contemporaries, and clear explanation by historians, almost impossible.

In Washington County, too, the Federalists made the first gesture of reconciliation. In 1816 the Washington Benevolent Society invited all admirers of the great man to join its July Fourth celebration, without distinction of party: thus "the spirit of party shall give place to the indulgence of social affections." The Republican party, however, preferred to hold a separate July Fourth celebration, and later made formal nominations for the fall elections. The Federalists refrained from nominating candidates, and, indeed, helped to secure the election of a Republican Congressman from


14. Muskingum Messenger, 30 Sept. 1818; Hammond to Wright, 15 Oct. 1820, 1 July 1821, CHP; Ruggles to — , 9 Sept. 1819, Rice Papers.

15. Zanesville Express, 27 June 1816; Luther D. Barker to Ewing, Union / Washington County/, 18 July 1816, TEFP.
In 1817 as in 1816, sound Republicans were elected in the county "without opposition," and, as public interest declined, so turnouts dropped from well above 50 to below 40 per cent in both years. The political unification was finally symbolized in 1818 by a bipartisan dinner in Marietta in honour of the incumbent Congressman - at which men toasted "More patriotism, and less party spirit." 17

In other parts of eastern Ohio, Democrats were much less impressed by the virtues of Good Feelings. In Steubenville writers in the Western Herald objected that the threatened "union of two parties" could result in "principles of all kinds being amalgamated in what Dr. Johnson calls 'a porridge of politics'." The editor, James Wilson, insisted that there was no evidence that the Federalists had sincerely given up their principles, and so Republicans should beware. 18 The Zanesville Democrats were of much the same opinion: they pointed to - and themselves provoked - examples of recalcitrance on the part of Federalists, and insisted that the Republican party should remain intact and preserve its traditional nominating procedures for focussing party support. However, other Republicans in Muskingum County disagreed, especially those who had formed themselves into a secret charitable organization called the Round Ring Society. In February 1816 the members voted unanimously to offer to amalgamate with the Washington Benevolent Society, since "really, there appears nothing lately so discordant in our respective Creeds .... In fact, we approximate so near in religion, morality and even politics, that I can see no good reason that we should any longer be kept asunder." But despite this attempt "to bury party spirit with the Spade of Oblivion," the regulars insisted on calling delegate conventions in both

17. "Old Marietta Newspapers," Marietta Register, 20, 27 Nov. 1863; American Friend, 22 May 1818.
18. Western Herald, 20, 27 June 1818, and as reprinted in Muskingum Messenger, 10 June 1818.
1816 and 1817. On both occasions the Delegate nomination was opposed by a rival "independent republican" ticket; on both occasions the regular nomination was only partly successful. By 1818 the regulars had dropped the "Delegate plan" because of the opposition it had aroused, but still hoped the county's Republicans would soon see "the necessity of early seeking a rallying point" in order to prevent Federalists from sneaking into office. 19

Faced by this opposition to "the old fashioned successful way of electing delegates to form a county ticket," the Zanesville Democrats had to work out their theories and publicize them. Like the Bucktails in New York, they now found it necessary to develop a justification for maintaining party organization and party discipline amid Good Feelings. As a consequence, they were nicknamed the "Legitimates" because of their insistence that their system of party government was the only right and proper one. For them, primary purpose of party organization was to prevent the Federalists from "smuggling" a man into elective office where he could do much damage to Republican principles. Without discipline among party members, Republicans suffered indignities like the election of Beecher to Congress in 1816: "No delegates were chosen to fix upon a candidate - no consultation of the people in one part of the district with those in other parts"; the names of ten candidates put before the people by one means or another, seven of them Republicans; and the result, as the Muskingum Messenger bemoaned, "A federalist is chosen in a district in which three fourths of the people are republicans!" Indeed, for the Messenger, it was a major weakness of the Ohio Constitution that a candidate could

be elected by a mere plurality: in elections like those of 1816 for Congress, "if a majority of the **whole number of votes** given, were necessary to constitute a choice, (as in the case in most of the States) no choice would be made, except in one or two congressional districts, in which the sentiments of the people have been expressed at delegate meetings." 20

But what if there were no Federalist candidate, or even opposition? There was still the possibility that an unpopular candidate might be elected, and small selfish interests could even improve their own chances by deliberately multiplying the number of candidates. But this perversion of the electoral process could not happen if there was "**previous consultation** among the electors," which allowed all views to be considered so that "the men best qualified" may be named. Small meetings "in conclave" or "**in private caucus**" were not suitable for this purpose, since they were "rank aristocracy - rank dictation to the people." Delegate conventions were far superior because they held their appointment from the people and acted in public; according to the **Messenger** in 1817, the "**Delegation Plan**... is the best and **only** method of ascertaining the wishes of the people," which was why usually "their constituents ... have discernment enough to support the nomination." In particular, such conventions could check "the aspiring and ambitious demagogue" and choose a more obscure, unassuming character: after all, those "living at a distance from town" had as much right to be a candidate as any resident of the county seat. If any change were to be made to the Delegate system, it should be in the

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direction of more accurate proportional representation according to population; if there were any faults, they arose from "the inattention of the people." But, whatever the weaknesses, no better method had been found of preventing the "evils which ensue from the distraction of public sentiment at elections," or of accomplishing "the great object of voting (an expression of the public will of the majority)." 21

Nothing if not consistent, the Legitimates tried to provide proper party guidance for the Republican voters of their own Congressional District. Party loyalty had helped them to elect their own man, James Caldwell, in 1812 and 1814, and Zanesville's reward was President Madison's decision to build the National Road to Wheeling rather than to Pittsburgh and Steubenville – though some said the decision owed less to Caldwell's representations than to Henry Clay's susceptibility to the charms of a young lady whom he visited in Wheeling when travelling between Kentucky and Washington, D.C. 22 Republicans in the northern part of the district were infuriated, and a Delegate meeting in Jefferson County nominated John C. Wright of Steubenville to replace Caldwell, who was retiring as Congressman. However, as Wright was told by his ally, the Federalist Hammond, "Among the Legitimates of Zanesville (your masters) Herrick stands in the line of succession." Samuel Herrick was duly nominated by the district Delegate convention, even though no Federalist candidate was running on this occasion. The Republicans of the northern counties had attended the convention but refused to acquiesce in the nomination - despite "the legitimate denunciation against those who


In the subsequent newspaper battle, the conflicting claims of party regularity and local interest were argued, with the Steubenville Western Herald embarrassed to explain why it rejected the nomination of a Delegate convention on this occasion. In the end, the Legitimate candidate won, but on a purely sectional vote: he won nearly nine-tenths of the votes in the counties on the future route of the National Road, but fewer than twenty per cent in the previously loyal Republican counties in the northern part of the district. The Legitimates had won - as they were to do again in 1818 - but for what they considered the wrong reason.

This deliberate attempt to maintain the old Republican party in the face of Good Feelings extended beyond Muskingum to at least the counties served by the influential Muskingum Messenger. In Coshocton and Tuscarawas Counties, conventions met in each of the three years, 1817-19, and in Guernsey County in 1817 and 1819. In 1818, according to the Messenger, "The Delegate Plan is this year practised in Belmont, Franklin, Washington, and several other counties in this state; and, we believe, very generally, in the state of Pennsylvania." In Licking County too, "a delegate meeting" named a ticket which succeeded in electing five of its six nominees. Indeed, there was a strong incentive to call some sort of nominating meeting in the counties of central Ohio in 1818 in order to effect agreement on a Republican candidate to oppose the re-election of Philemon Beecher to Congress in the fifth district. Republican meetings in Licking, Delaware, Franklin and Champaign all named Joseph Vance, who was expected to be elected "by a great majority" - if "the delusive song of _____-partyism"

23. Hammond to Wright, Belmont, 2 Aug. 1816, CHP; Ohio Federalist, 19 Sept. 1819. See also Western Herald, 13, 20 Sept. 1816; Express, 29 Aug. 1816.

24. Muskingum Messenger, 24 Oct. 1816. Of the three northern counties, Jefferson gave 20.78% and Harrison 10.33%; full returns for Coshocton are not available, but the first three townships to report were "nearly unanimous for Mr. Wright."
has not lulled the democrats asleep." However, the intervention of another
Republican, the former Congressman James Kilbourn, and the loyalty of
Fairfield County to its favourite son, secured Beecher's re-election by a
small majority. 25

Evidently, Delegate nominations did not carry the same force as formerly.
Even in parts of eastern Ohio, party was collapsing; one young lawyer - a
future federal judge, Humphrey Howe Leavitt - who in 1816 settled in Harrison
County, an offshoot of Jefferson, later recalled that in those years "there
were literally no parties, and consequently no political turmoil or strife."
In most of the state, old party considerations by 1818 had long
ceased to affect elections. The balance is perhaps indicated by James
Wilson's analysis of the state's political press in June 1818: out of twenty-
seven newspapers in the state, only six "avow and support democratic principles";
one was the Ohio Monitor at the state capital, the other five were all in
eastern Ohio south of the Reserve. "Leaving a balance of 21, many of which
are 'anything or nothing,' some singing Lullaby, and others up for sale! -
What a falling off." 27 The spirit of the times was encapsulated in 1819
by the editors of a new Cleveland newspaper, founded in 1819, for they
refused to make the usual profession of political faith generally considered
de rigueur for new papers. Not that the editors were less attached than
others to the present national government or to the principles of "the equal
rights of man, the supremacy of the people, an attachment to our common
country, and a cordial friendship for our republican institutions." But "an
acknowledgement of their correctness is only echoing the general voice of
the American people. All parties make the same profession, all subscribe

1817, 19 Aug., 2, 23, 30 Sept. 1818; Western Herald, 19 Sept. 1817, 4
Sept. 1819.

26. Autobiography of the Hon. Humphrey Howe Leavitt, Written For His Family
(New York, 1893).

to the same fundamental principles of civil liberty; and a minute detail of the maxims by which we shall be governed, in conducting the HERALD, would be wasting the time of the reader."  

The following year the same paper could report that "the old divisions of parties are but little known in this quarter": for, as Ephraim Cutler later wrote of the 1819-20 General Assembly, "the party heat had become much cooler than what had prevailed since 1803, and no party measures were agitated."  

Aristocracy, Banks and Protest

The decline of traditional party feeling, apparently inexorable even in the face of "legitimist" resistance, was not merely the result of the disappearance of the old partisan issues. For the decade after 1810 saw also the emergence of new issues which divided the Republican majority along new lines, and the Federalists too. Indeed, many elements among the Republicans, especially those wishing to protest against growing abuses and social evils, found themselves joining hands with Federalist spokesmen in condemning the powers that be; and even a radical Republican like James Wilson could conclude that his old enemy Charles Hammond, "Although still calling himself a federalist, ... was a better Democrat than many of those who howled Democracy the loudest."

The most powerful argument the Federalists had developed in their attacks on the predominant Republican party in earlier years was that it represented a new "aristocracy." Party managers, they claimed, used their influence to ensure that their friends gained "good snug fat offices," and behaved as though they had a prescriptive right, as legitimate as the claims of European monarchs, to control the process of nomination; "all that were not within the pale of their peculiar and favorite influence" stood no chance

28. Cleveland Herald, 19 Oct., 2 Nov. 1819, abstracted in Works Progress Administration in Ohio, Annals of Cleveland, 1818-1935: A Digest and Index of the Newspaper Record of Events and Opinions (Cleveland, 1937-38), II, 12,13

29. Ibid., 25 July 1820, in Annals, III, 63; note written by Cutler shortly before his death, in Cutler, Ephraim Cutler, 114.

1. Wilson to W.D. Gallagher, Steubenville, 1 Oct. 1840, CHP.
of securing office. The fact that nominations were made by popularly elected conventions made no difference, for the conventions merely ratified a ticket already secretly chosen by the party managers; from this point of view, conventions were no different from caucuses, which more obviously placed the power of nomination into the hands of the few, since in most cases Republican predominance made nomination tantamount to election.2

Ironically, it was such objections to party nominations which brought Federalists into line with the most radical Democrats of the day.

By 1816 a dispute had arisen within the more extreme wing of the Republican party. Some of the more doctrinaire Democrats began to share the feeling that the national party was losing sight of its original principles and becoming a machine to help the few monopolize office. This view was openly expressed by James Wilson, who, as editorial assistant to William Duane at the Philadelphia Aurora, had written the key editorial which had marked the emergence of the "Old School" faction among the Democrats of Pennsylvania. Thus while blasting at the Federalists in 1815-16, he also began to criticize the party's intention of nominating its next Presidential candidate by means of a Congressional caucus. Like Duane, Wilson believed that such a nomination was a usurpation of power by the few, since a proper and binding nomination could be made only by a set of delegates specifically chosen by the people for that task.3

Such a view caused deep misgivings among those Ohio Democrats who placed party regularity and party unity before all other considerations. Isaac Van Horne, leader of the Zanesville Legitimates, complained to Wilson's main patron in Steubenville, Benjamin Tappan, that Wilson was taking a course "calculated, ... not to consolidate & unite the Republicans, but to engender discord, and disunion." Since the United States was ever divided into only

3. Western Herald, 15 Sept. 1815.
two parties, "an attempt to divide the Republican party, if successful, must inevitably result in the raising the Federal party into power." Hence the highest obligation was to support the Congressional nomination, if one were made:

The mode of nominating a candidate by the Republicans in Congress I have thought, (if not the least exceptionable) the least inconvenient to them as a party; and I may add, the most likely to meet the public sentiment - for if we should adopt the mode of sending delegates from each state, for the express purpose, the inattention of some, and the intrigues of others, would be more likely to excite irritation & scism, and consequently less liable to meet the public opinion.4

In fact, the event justified Van Horne's faith, for fears that the intrigues at Washington would nominate William H. Crawford of Georgia, or someone equally unpalatable, were proved wrong. Those who were prepared to rebel against the nomination if James Monroe was not named could not object to the result, and Wilson had to approve the nomination while regretting the means. As the Zanesville Messenger said,

There are many republicans who have ever been opposed to congressional caucusses, from an idea that the interference of the legislative branch of government in the choice of President is improper, and an infringement of the rights of the people. But it should be remembered, that long before the congressional nomination, popular sentiment had emphatically designated Mr. Monroe as the next President; and it certainly cannot detract from the merit of this selection by the people, that it has been confirmed by their representatives.5

However, the fact remained that the Democratic critics of the Congressional caucus were taking ground akin to that of the Federalists. Admittedly, the Federalists were objecting to all nominations by extraconstitutional, partisan groups, and insisted that caucusses and conventions were essentially the same and equally objectionable. The "old school" Democrats were accepting the

4. Van Horne to Tappan, Zanesville, 16 Feb. 1816, BTP, LC.

5. Western Herald, 10 May 1816; Muskingum Messenger, 13 June 1816. See also ibid., 13 Mar., 17 Apr. 1816.
rightfulness of party nominations, as long as they were carried out in the open by properly elected delegates. But both challenged the established way of doing things and insisted that control of elections must be given back to the people. Both sides could agree with Hammond's prediction in 1816 that "the caucus business is now in its last stage. I do not believe our next President will be nominated by a caucus." 6

In other ways, too, Federalists acted as defenders of the people's interests against politicians who had held power too long. In 1817 Hammond, as "the leader of the opposition party in the state," challenged the election of two Congressmen on the grounds that they held federal office at the time of election, and almost secured the rejection of the Legitimate Samuel Herrick - with strong support from among Southern Republicans! 7 Hammond also campaigned against state legislators who appointed themselves to office, in violation of the state constitution: in 1818 he gained enough Republican support for the Ohio House to pass a resolution establishing his point; but when the Legislature, on a secret joint ballot, then elected two of its members to new circuits of the Common Pleas courts, he produced an address to the people about this "infamous intrigue." His appeal helped to stimulate considerable antagonism to the new President Judge of the Cincinnati circuit, and aroused considerable controversy in that distant city. 8

In other ways, too, Federalists acted as defenders of the people's interests against politicians who had held power too long. In 1816 both the Ohio Federalist and the Western Herald criticized the Ohio Assembly for

6. Ohio Federalist, 12 Dec. 1816. The opposition to the caucus nomination in Pennsylvania led by Duane is reported in ibid., 13 June, 31 Oct., 21 Nov., 1816. The debate over the proper grounds for objecting to caucus nominations may be followed in Zanesville Express, 11 Apr., 16 May, 27 June, 1816, and Western Herald, 31 May, 20 June, 5 July 1816.


8. Ohio Federalist, 5 Feb. 1818; Scioto Gazette, 12 Feb. 1819; Hammond to Wright, Belmont, 27 Feb. 1819, CHP.
raising its members' wages by $1 to $3 a day. This issue was soon overwhelmed by news that Congressmen had voted themselves $12 per day: "There is republicanism and economy for you!" cried the Federalist. Such agitation - not entirely approved of by all Federalists - coincided with the objections of a host of Democratic editors and politicians. Popular interest was aroused more by this measure than by the major legislative enactments of this Congress, or by the Presidential election. On the Western Reserve "there was much excitement," and appropriate songs passed around:

O, would you hear what roaring cheer
They had at Uncle Sam's Congress, O;
How they gabbled so gay as they doubled their pay,
And doubled the people's taxes, O.10

Regular politicians agreed the law must be repealed, but did not see this as a reason for voting against any incumbent Republican. However, many incumbents, like John McLean, recognized that a vote for the Compensation Act was an obstacle to election success or political influence in the immediate future, as candidates throughout Ohio were called upon for - and gave - pledges to repeal the law. Ohio was one of the states in which not one incumbent Congressman was re-elected.11

Underlying the political dissatisfactions expressed by many Republicans, there was undoubtedly a strain of social discontent. Federalists naturally sympathised with all who felt their interests were overlooked by the new party "aristocracy," and over the years had carefully exploited such antagonisms. In particular, there were strong tensions between outlying rural townships and the county seats, as well as class tensions within the small towns and cities of Ohio; and after 1810 Federalist politicians increasingly identified their interests with "the clod-hoppers of the country,


who consider more making their bread than of managing their fellow citizens." In 1813 Hammond successfully directed his electoral appeal in Belmont County to farmers and "producers" against "lawyers, doctors, merchants and idle young men." In Muskingum County in 1815 "Republican Farmers and Mechanics" refused to follow their party leaders, and held not only their own July Fourth celebration but even their own rival nominating convention. The reason was, they said, the "general complaint among the laboring part of the community, who are the source of government, that the nomination hitherto has been made by a designing few, in Zanesville and its vicinity"; instead, "the honest farmer and mechanic ... ought to rule the destinies of this country in future." The regular Republicans denounced this movement as playing the Federalist game, even if that party had no ticket in the field, but in the end this uprising of "the common people," backed by the Federalist press, succeeded in defeating the officeholding "aristocracy" which men believed dominated Muskingum. Similar tensions were displayed in the contests of 1816 and 1817 in the county.

Such social and political tensions within the Republican majority were seriously exacerbated by the "growing evil of bank incorporations." The rage for making new banks had begun in Ohio a couple of years after the chartering of the first bank in 1808, and it was further stimulated by the financial pressures created by the demise of the first Bank of the United States and the War of 1812. Leading Republicans were as prominent as Federalists among the directors of these banks, and there was little evidence of anti-bank sentiment in the Republican press, though rumbles were heard in the General Assembly among some Republican opponents of "monied

aristocracies." Indeed, when in 1814 a correspondent in a Federalist newspaper pointed to the spread of banks as one sign of the unhappy state of the country, the Muskingum Messenger contradicted him by arguing that the spread of manufactures and banks was in fact a sign of prosperity. When the legislature in February 1815 passed a law drafted by Hammond taxing banks and prohibiting unauthorized bank notes, a writer in the Chillicothe Fredonian attacked "the Charles Hammond law" as a Federalist measure as repressive as the Alien and Sedition Acts! Correspondents in the Steubenville Western Herald criticized this "foolish law against the banks," and when Hammond criticized banks founded by Quakers in Jefferson and Columbiana Counties, his opponents tried to arouse Quaker opposition in Belmont to Hammond's re-election: "I don't care a fig about thy politics ... but the bank must go on." There was, however, considerable difference of opinion within the Democratic Republican party, and hostility to the establishment of a new bank in Steubenville played some role in causing a breach among the Republicans of Jefferson County which resulted in rival Democratic tickets being presented at the polls in 1815. Hammond himself was friendly to the proposed new bank, since his main concern was the creation of a sufficient, sound and properly regulated banking system in place of the rash of unchartered and inadequately based institutions which plagued Ohio down to - and even after - the "Bonus Law" he drafted, and got passed by a Republican legislature, in 1816.

14. Timothy Flint, A Condensed Geography and History of the Western States, or the Mississippi Valley (2 vols., Cincinnati, 1828), II, 387-88; Zanesville Express, 6 Jan. 1813. See also Charles C. Huntington, A History of Banking and Currency in Ohio Before the Civil War (Columbus, 1915), 29-40, and, for the directors, History of Washington County, Ohio (Cleveland, 1881), 373; J.F. Everhart, History of Muskingum County, Ohio (Columbus, 1882), 218.


16. Western Herald, 22 Sept. 1815. See also ibid., 1 June-20 Oct. (esp. 22 Sept.) 1815, and Ohio Federalist, 5, 26 Oct. 1815.

17. Hammond to Wright, 19 Jan., 27 Dec. 1816, 7 Feb. 1817, CHP.
Those who wished to regulate banking were far from united. Some, like Hammond, wished to establish a proper system embracing all banks and providing a revenue for the state, and were accordingly quite willing to see the number of banks increase, in places where they were needed. Others, like Alfred Kelley, wished to refuse further charters - it was suspected, to spare existing banks from competition in a lucrative business - but faced the problem of suppressing the unchartered banks that appeared. The opponents of regulation were equally disunited. Some were "enemies of banking establishments of all kinds," and did not wish to see the state countenance them and to some extent underwrite them. Others wanted to see unlimited banking, and used the Democratic rhetoric of "equal rights" to justify their anti-monopoly attitude: "Why should one class of the community be debarred from privileges granted to others?" Bray Hammond has associated hostility to established banks in the Jackson period with the selfish ambitions of rival entrepreneurs; there is more evidence for that view in the debates of the 1810s than can be found twenty years later. 19

By 1817, however, public awareness of banks was becoming more acute. The early banks had been soundly run, and even maintained specie payments through the war, to within a month or two of the close of hostilities. But then the number of chartered banks more than doubled, to twenty-one by 1817, and strong inflationary pressures were felt. Much of the rapidly increasing bank capital was specious, since banks often made loans to their own directors to help them pay in their stock! Paper money began to flood some parts of the state, and the discount in Philadelphia on Ohio bank notes rose to 15 per cent for authorized banks and 25 per cent for unchartered banks. However, the resumption of specie payments in spring 1817 improved the credit

of the banks and forced them to be more conservative in their note issues. John C. Wright, returning from his Eastern trip in 1817, observed that though there was none of the destitution seen in the seaboard states, times were hard in Ohio, "for money is so scarce & the little circulating medium we have is such vile & worthless trash, that it seems almost impossible to transact any business in the Country." As a result, the Assembly was crowded with applications for banking charters, and "the majority in the house is very large in favor of chartering banking companies." As the British traveller James Flint was to say as he contemplated the great paper money rage and speculative fever of 1818 in the Northwestern states, an excessive number of banks was being imposed on the people because so many of the legislators were themselves directly interested in banking concerns.

Yet even before the crash, a popular reaction was setting in in counties flooded with shinplasters. In Muskingum, the formerly pro-bank Messenger had begun to open its columns to critics of the banks by the summer of 1817, but could not prevent the "independent republicans" from linking the abuses of banking monopolies with the political control of party regulars. Candidates were questioned about their views on banking and "exclusive privileges," and the issue may have helped the independent ticket to succeed in the election. In any case, by 1818 the Messenger had changed its tune and was insisting that the root of Ohio's problems lay in its banking system, and the swindling institutions that obscured "the difference between rags and money!" Such issues influenced elections in other parts of the state also: in Cincinnati, for example, one candidate in the Congressional elections of 1818 was bitterly attacked for operating an unchartered bank and so

20. J.C. Wright to Hammond, Steubenville, 24 July 1817, CHP. See also Huntington, Banking and Currency, 51, 53, 56.


contributing to the considerable over-issue of banknotes in the area. However, before the attack on local banks became too generalized, the Panic of 1819 had altered the situation, bringing the banks to their knees and creating a more obvious target for Ohio anti-bank sentiment.

But evidently even before the crash, as Hammond himself said in 1818, the leading issues of the day divided men in both parties. Republicans too recognized this, and saw that it was becoming difficult to be sure that men in power would indeed pursue policies which their constituents considered "republican." In the Congressional elections of 1818, one politician argued in favour of electing "a genuine republican, who will not be induced to support any party or measure unless it is grounded on principle":

It is too much the fashion of the present day to determine on a man's principles by his attachment to certain political parties - in this way every thing may pass for republicanism and principles be lost sight of entirely.... it must be obvious to every one that what is now called /the / republican party has got so great a majority that if every thing done by it is called republican measures let it partake of republican principles or not there is great danger of abuses by men in power.

This argument, hostile to partisan discipline, is all the more significant for coming from a Democrat, John Sloane, who had previously been firmly aligned with the more radical and partisan section of his party. It demonstrates how far the leading issues of the day - in this last case, the Second Bank of the United States - divided opinion along lines that did not match the alignments of the First Party System.

A Matter of State Pride

By 1818 the sense that something was amiss, that the Republican Party was in some way going astray, was not only pervasive, it was changing -

23. 'INDEPENDENCE,' "To the Electors of the Counties of Warren, Hamilton, Butler & Preble," 12 Oct. 1818, political broadside, OHS.
24. Ohio Federalist, 2 July 1818.
and sharpening - its focus. Evils at the local level were overshadowed by menaces from outside, and it became a commonplace that the majority in Congress could no longer be trusted to pursue genuine Republican policies or honour the original purposes of the Republic. This feeling came to a head in Ohio's war against the Second Bank of the United States, which saw Ohioans close their ranks in an unprecedented display of unity and, in the process, made old party divisions quite irrelevant.

From its first establishment in Ohio, Charles Hammond mistrusted the new national Bank. He feared that "all our best interests" were being placed "at the mercy of Stockjobbers and Brokers, mostly foreign agents, without morals or social feelings of any kind whatever which can induce them to assimilate with us."¹ Such attitudes were, however, by no means common at first among Republicans: during the War of 1812 Ohio's Congressmen had been divided in their attitudes towards the administration's attempts to re-establish a national Bank, and in the end most of them accepted the charter in 1816. Within Ohio at that time, as Burnet recalled, prejudice against the institution was "neither general nor strong."² Many believed the Bank would offer some solution to the financial difficulties experienced during and immediately after the War of 1812, and valuably supplement the state's banking facilities. Chillicothe and Cincinnati competed to have branches established in their midst, and both in the end succeeded; other centres, like Wooster in 1818, were less successful in their bids.³ However, the policy pursued by the Bank - and the United States Treasury - made even strong supporters change their minds. The Bank of the United States (or B.U.S.) encouraged a reckless overexpansion by the Cincinnati branch, which stimulated land speculation and excessive issues of paper money by the other,

¹ Hammond to Worthington, Belmont, 24 Mar. 1817, CHP.
² Jacob Burnet, Notes on the North-Western Territory, 406-08. See also William R. Barlow, "Ohio's Congressmen and the War of 1812," Ohio History, LXXII (1963), 186-90; Francis P. Weisenburger, The Life of John McLean (Columbus, 1937), 17-18; Muskingum Messenger, 17, 24 Apr. 1816.
³ Scioto Gazette, 28 Nov. 1816. See also Edward Paine, Jr., to Hitchcock, Chardon, 25 Mar. 1818; S.W. Phelps to Hitchcock, Painesville, 30 Mar. 1818, PHFP.
smaller banks in and around Cincinnati; and then the parent bank, irresponsibly and unfeelingly, in the summer of 1818 ordered the Cincinnati branch to curtail drastically. The result was the banking collapse of November 1818 in Cincinnati, followed by the Land Office's decision to accept only B.U.S. notes and specie in payment for land - which, in effect, stopped public land sales. Ohio's local banks in other parts of the state, finding their specie being drained, were forced to suspend specie payments and themselves call in loans. Not unnaturally, their necessities were blamed on the Bank of the United States; and local bankers and those hostile to all banks joined hands in attacking the main villain of the piece. 4

The one obvious way of preventing the Bank from gaining control of all financial operations in Ohio, virtually destroying the local banks, and subjecting the state to monetarist policies decided in Philadelphia, was to bring the B.U.S. branches in Ohio under a system of control that had been worked out with difficulty - and little enough success - for the private banks in the state. By imposing a tax on the branches, the state would not only secure a revenue, but treat all chartered banks equally - and, by destroying the branches' unfair advantages over the state banks, might induce their closure by the parent Bank. Thus the law passed in 1819 to tax the Bank was in no way a defiance of the federal government or its legislation. The Ohio General Assembly simply operated on the assumption that Congress could not deprive a state of its power to tax, and that equity demanded that no bank should be exempted from the taxation that its competitors had to bear. Nor did the United States Supreme Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland the following month affect the issue: if the Supreme Court had declared that states could not tax the Bank of the United States, clearly it had not had presented to it a case as compelling as

4. Huntington, Banking and Currency in Ohio, 55-69; Burnet, North-Western Territory, 408-11.
that of Ohio; and the sovereign state had a perfect right to pass a law, forcibly collect the tax, and then wait to be heard in its own right. This was not "nullification" or even resistance to the federal government: the Bank was not an agency of the federal government, nor was it under the government's control or responsible to it; it was a private commercial institution, a "Band of Brokers" to be treated as a "natural individual citizen," and the controversy one "between a non tax payer, and a publick officer who distrains property on the refusal to pay." 5

This standpoint effectively brought together state bankers fearful of the oppression of the Bank, anti-bankers hostile to paper money and privileged institutions, and those devoted to states rights and strict construction of the Constitution. From the beginning of serious discussion in December 1817, the Bank's friends were a minority in the General Assembly; and most of those were weeded out in the elections of 1818, which were virtually a plebiscite on the issue. The Western Herald reported that "those members of the last assembly who were suspected of being friendly to the U.S. bank, have been dismissed from the confidence of the people"; the whole delegation from Ross County, which had included directors of the Chillicothe branch bank like Duncan McArthur, had been defeated, while "the gentlemen elected to the legislature are known to be pointedly inimical to that institution." 6 Thomas Worthington concluded his governorship in December 1818 by advocating an expansion of banking facilities to meet the crisis, and opposing taxation of the B.U.S. branches; two months later he was defeated for the United States Senate by a nonentity, and consigned to the political wilderness for the next three years. His successor as governor

5. J.C. Wright to E.A. Brown, Steubenville, 6 Nov. 1819, CHP. This summary of Ohio's case is based on Governor Brown's messages, Hammond's letters, and Ohio newspaper editorials. See also, D.J. Ryan, "Nullification in Ohio," OHSP, II (1888), 413-22, and Ernest L. Bogart, "Taxation of the Second Bank of the United States by Ohio," American Historical Review, XVII (1912), 312-31.

was Ethan Allen Brown, another Tammany man but from Cincinnati and since 1810 a state Supreme Court judge; as governor, Brown consistently opposed any extension of bank and paper credit, and steadfastly supported the state's action in the forthcoming trial of strength with the national Bank. 7

The "Crowbar law" taxing the B.U.S. branches passed in February 1819 with only three dissident votes in the House. When state officials forcibly entered and seized money in the Chillicothe branch,

no paper in the state ... said anything in condemnation but the Cincinnati Inquisitor, and the Muskingum Messenger. The first has little influence, and the second is ... actuated by personal pique toward an individual, distinguished for his active agency in support of the officers of the state / probably Hammond /

The state's action was once more the issue in the elections of 1819, at least according to Niles' Weekly Register; and the result the election to the House of "a large majority of anti-Bankites." In Ross County the successful candidates had announced their views, even issuing a "Declaration of Independence against the United States Bank"; while in Muskingum the anti-Bank candidate for the state senate defeated the pro-Bank candidate by a 7:3 margin. 9

But it was in Cincinnati and its vicinity that the consequences of the Bank's behaviour were felt most critically. The fall elections of 1818 had seen the defeat of candidates too closely connected with banking, and only those hostile to the national Bank could hope to be elected. William Henry Harrison had a powerful position as military hero and well-connected local notable, but, as a director of the Cincinnati branch and an earlier opponent of

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7. Sears, Worthington, 208-09, 211. The nonentity was William A. Trimble, "a Nice young man but two much of a Boy" according to William Foulks to Hitchcock, Columbus, 31 Jan. 1819, PFW. For Brown, see John S. Still, "The Life of Ethan Allen Brown, Governor of Ohio " (Ph,D. thesis, Ohio State University, 1951).


9. J.C. Wright to Tappan, Steubenville, 3 Jan. 1820, BTP, LC; Chillicothe Supporter, 22 Sept. 1819; Niles Weekly Register, XVII (9, 30 Oct., 6 Nov. 1819), 87, 139, 147.
taxation, he had to take a firm anti-B.U.S. stance in order to win election in 1819 as Hamilton County's state senator. In the legislature he preached compromise, and argued against insisting on a right which the Supreme Court, however questionably, had found against. But then the "mammoth Bank ... required the poor Devils at Cincinnati to renew their notes and pay the reductions and discounts at Chillicothe," and when they demurred, put "the whole debts in suit." This news reached Columbus "opportunely to brace Harrison's resolution" just as he was about to question the state's course of action. In any case, with an election to the United States Senate coming up, keen observers felt "Gen. H. will hardly venture upon open hostility, so long as he is reaching for the senatorial tidbit."  

Throughout, prominent Federalists were openly aligned behind the state's radical stance - even though the National Bank was originally one of the touchstones of old party differences. From the start Charles Hammond objected to the excessive power that the Second Bank had over the state banks, and was an early advocate of taxing its branches. When the Supreme Court intervened in the controversy, Hammond confessed himself "too much a state sovereignty man at present" to accept the Court's current claims to review decisions of state supreme courts, and he became Ohio's most effective spokesman on the constitutional issue, even writing articles for his old enemy at the Steubenville Western Herald as well as for Niles' Weekly Register in Baltimore. He was consulted by Governor Brown, and wrote the "masterly and convincing" committee report on the Bank case which the Assembly adopted by overwhelming majorities in January 1821. Indeed, there was little discussion on the report and its

11. Hammond to Wright, Belmont, 27 Feb. 1819, CHP. See also Hammond to Worthington, Belmont, 24 Mar. 1817, and to Brown, St. Clairsville, 4 Nov. 1819, CHP; Ohio Federalist, 15 Jan. 1818.  
12. William Greene to Brown, Cincinnati, 27 Jan. 1821, EABP.
proposals, since there was no need "to effect a change in the public sentiment"; and even his proposal to withdraw the protection of Ohio's laws from the Bank of the United States passed by substantial majorities. Throughout this session, one member later recalled,

Mr. Hammond was industrious, and no proposition was presented that was not critically examined by him. His influence with the members was very considerable and it was dependent on his integrity and intelligence solely, as there existed no party organization at that time in the Legislature.\textsuperscript{13}

Most significantly, leaders of the Virginia states'-rights school wrote to Hammond expressing their approval of his constitutional arguments - not only Thomas Ritchie and John Taylor of Caroline, but also his venerable former bête noire, Thomas Jefferson.\textsuperscript{14}

Other Federalists took a similar standpoint. Congressman Philemon Beecher thought the tax imposed on the branches excessive, but wished to see it enforced in order to contest to the full the constitutional pretensions of the Bank men. The states, he thought, must provide a constitutional remedy "before the monster shall have bound the nation to the care of a monied aristocracy."\textsuperscript{15} Jacob Burnet was a director of the Cincinnati branch, but disapproved of the mother Bank's policy which he found publicly - and personally - disastrous. A distinguished lawyer as well as businessman and notorious Federalist, Burnet was appointed pro. tem. to the state supreme court by Governor Brown. The latter acknowledged that "The appointment may not be pleasing to some exclusive republicans, who may surmise that I am therefore becoming federalist," but, besides his legal talents, Burnet "professes to entertain similar views with my own in regard to 'the vital consequences to the nation ... of the subject of

\textsuperscript{13} Elisha Whittlesey to W.D. Gallagher, Canfield, 23 July 1840, CHP.

\textsuperscript{14} Thomas Ritchie to B. Ruggles, Richmond, Va., 23 Jan. 1821, Hammond to Brown, St. Clairsville, 23 Apr. 1821, Hammond to Wright, 17 Sept. 1821, CHP. See also Whittlesey to George Tod, Columbus, 16 Dec. 1821, for a copy of Jefferson's letter of Feb. 1821, reprinted in Tracts of the WRHS, XCV, 159-60.

\textsuperscript{15} Beecher to Brown, Washington, 1 Jan. 1819, EABP.
federal judicial supremacy'. In the Assembly the next winter, supporters of rival claimants tried "to engender the spirit of party" and "made a Tammany jib against Burnett," but still his appointment was confirmed by a Republican legislature impressed by the virtues of some Federalists.

By this time, however, the Bank issue had passed off the boil. Some newspapers began to show signs of regretting the state's extreme course, suggesting that Ohio had been guilty of an "ill founded state pride"; if not careful, Ohio would be guilty of the same disrespect for federal authority that some Southern States were displaying, and the state should accept whatever verdict the Supreme Court came to on the constitutional question. Some politicians, too, recognised that opposition to the national Bank was no recommendation for anyone seeking federal office or favour. In retrospect, the significance of the Bank War was that it operated as did other, contemporaneous crises, most notably the Missouri crisis: it created a sense of internal unity which helped to override - and almost destroy - the old party feelings. However, unlike those other crises, the great Bank War was to have little impact on the formation of political parties in subsequent years - even if memories of it were to be drastically revived in the 1830s by President Jackson.

The Persistence of the Old System

The Republican party, inside and outside Ohio, had fallen apart. The state was developing, in the midst of sectional crisis, a strong sense of

16. Brown to Hammond, Columbus, 1 Aug. 1821, EABP.
17. Allen Trimble to W.A. Trimble, Columbus, 5 Dec. 1821, Autobiography and Correspondence of Allen Trimble, Governor of Ohio (Old Northwest Genealogical Society, 1909), 122; Hammond to Wright, St. Clairsville, 29 Dec. 1821, CHP.
internal unity. Federalists were being elected to high office by predominantly Republican state legislatures. Much political activity, most elections, involved negligible partisan activity. All this is true; and yet it would be a serious mistake to assume that the First Party System had collapsed in Ohio. The memory of earlier partisanship persisted in all parts of the state, and men continued to use the "Federalist" and "Republican" labels. More to the point, in those parts of the state where the early party conflict had bitten deep, especially in southeastern Ohio, some politicians and voters tried to maintain the old pattern of conflict, and even in the 1820s elections could be fought along old party lines.

It is not surprising, perhaps, that voters in Washington County, that centre of Federalist partisanship, could still be aroused by the passions of the old party battle. Yet the process of amalgamation had proceeded here more rapidly than in many other eastern counties. In 1816 and 1818 Federalists had joined with Republicans in supporting Levi Barber's claims to the district Congressional seat. The architect Joseph Barker, a well-known Federalist - and builder of Aaron Burr's boats in 1806 - had been elected to the state House of Representatives in 1818, without much fuss.1 The truth was that men of all parties in Washington County had a common interest in securing a reform in the state land tax, since the existing system of assessment bore unfairly on the less well endowed hilly regions of southeastern Ohio, in comparison with rapidly developing agricultural areas like the lower Miami Valley. In 1819 an effective proponent of tax reform, the renowned Federalist Ephraim Cutler, was elected to the General Assembly in preference to fellow Federalist Joseph Barker, and immediately created a stir over the tax system, won a measure of support in the House

1. Marietta American Friend, 22 May 1818; "Old Marietta Newspapers," X, Marietta Register, 27 Nov. 1863.
for his proposed reform, and opposed canal schemes which would financially burden his constituents without benefitting them. At the same time the Missouri crisis created an even greater sense of local solidarity against the iniquitous policy of rival interests.

Yet in 1820 a properly convened county Delegate Meeting nominated a full ticket made up of good Republicans. Cutler and Barker, both up for election, were carefully excluded. The "Independent Electors of Marietta" then called a public meeting to investigate this proceeding - and duly confirmed the nominations. There followed in the columns of the only county newspaper a controversy as bitter as any the county had seen. Fierce attacks were made on the men accused of controlling the local Republican party and of dominating office; they were indicted as a corrupt, monopolizing aristocracy - in rhetorical terms of which any later Jacksonian would have been proud. Cutler and Barker were duly brought forward as opposition candidates, and gained some support from independent Republicans. They were not, however, publicly damned as Federalists by their "regular" opponents - no doubt because Federalist support was required in support of the leading Marietta Republican's race for Congress. The division among Republicans and the intervention of other privately nominated candidates prevented this from becoming a simple repeat of the more obviously two-party elections of 1813 and 1814, and the Delegate ticket failed to win outright majorities, though it elected five of its seven nominees. However, the result for the state House of Representatives was successfully challenged, and a special election called for December; Cutler withdrew in order to allow Barker a straight race against the previously successful Republican. The subsequent two-horse race produced a distribution of votes among the townships remarkably similar to that seen in the elections of 1813, '14 and '15 - and the Republican was

CHART 4.1: CORRELATION OF REPUBLICAN PERCENTAGES.

BY TOWNSHIP, IN WASHINGTON COUNTY, OCTOBER 1815 AND DECEMBER 1820.
returned with 61.59 per cent of the vote.³

The next year leading Marietta Republicans issued a circular warning that Federalists had not yet in any way renounced their political creed:

THE AMALGAMATION OF PARTIES has recently been the favorite theme of FEDERALISTS, who, availing themselves of the prevailing sentiments, favorable to political toleration, are insidiously gaining an ascendency in our councils, which may terminate in the total subversion of Republican institutions.⁴

Once more a Delegate convention met and named a slate; once more its nominees were attacked for abusing power, though on this occasion a rival "Independent Ticket" was named to concentrate the votes of the opposition. Once more the Delegate nomination won, and Cutler was defeated, by a vote which in two-thirds of the townships was similar to that of the previous December.⁵

The following year a Delegate convention was called by the Marietta Republicans, but for some reason it did not meet. Instead, a Republican meeting in Marietta named a ticket which excluded Federalists. Then, on the eve of the election, it was announced that Cutler was not a candidate - a "base falsehood" which twenty-three Federalists of Belpre claimed "outstrips all the electioneering tricks that can be met with in the annals of Jacobin perfidy." However, Cutler still won overwhelmingly, with Belpre providing - as it almost always had done - an almost unanimous vote for the two Federalist candidates.⁶ By now, however, the likely success of the proposed state canal scheme made tax reform an urgent need for Washington County and

³. American Friend, 4 Aug., 8, 15, 22, 29 Sept., 6, 13, 20 Oct., 15, 29 Dec. 1820. For the correlation of the votes of October 1815 and December 1820, see the scatter-diagram, Chart 4.1.


its neighbours, as Cutler had convincingly argued in the press before the election. In 1823, in spite of a rival, privately-made "republican nomination," he was promoted to the state senate, where he finally succeeded in securing the measures for which he had struggled so long in the face of partisan prejudice. 7

These political struggles were complicated by the fact that, in elections to the General Assembly, Washington County was linked with Morgan County. A "hilly and broken tract of country" containing "some flourishing and valuable settlements," 8 Morgan had been created in 1817 mainly from Washington, partly from Muskingum and Guernsey, and many of its inhabitants had participated in the party battles of earlier years. When in 1820 the regular Republicans of Washington offered to allow Morgan to name one of the candidates for the two House seats the counties shared, and to vote for that candidate in return for Morgan's support for the nominee of the Washington Delegates, the Morgan Republicans agreed. Thus, although it was later claimed that "Democratical and Federal controversies have never occurred in Morgan since she became a County," delegate conventions met each year from 1820 to 1823 and provided invaluable popular support for the Republican cause. 9

In 1821 a rival ticket was offered by Morgan politicians to the voters of Washington, but the regulars claimed that the voters "will readily perceive which is the Republican or real delegate party in this County and that that party is the Majority." 10 Ironically, in the race for the House, each county


10. William B. Young et al., statement for publication in the American Friend, McConnelsville, 15 Sept. 1821, Emerson Papers (OHS microfilm, roll 5: "fragments").
gave an overwhelming majority to the regular nominee of the other county, while marginally preferring its own "Independent" candidate; thus the regulars triumphed because Delegate nominations impressed voters at a distance much more than those who were more likely to know the nominees!

In 1822, however, this advantage was insufficient to beat Cutler, and by 1823 appreciation of his merits enabled him to defeat the Delegate nominee even in the overwhelmingly Republican county of Morgan. 11

Other counties in eastern Ohio also maintained, or revived, old party machinery in the early 1820s. Coshocton, Tuscarawas and Guernsey were linked together in some elections for the General Assembly, and co-ordinated their nominations through party meetings; when conflicting names were put forward in 1823, the Coshocton candidate withdrew so as to avoid "a division of the republican interest in this district." 12 Coshocton had a long tradition of delegate conventions, holding one, for example, in 1822 which elected its ticket; so, too, in Tuscarawas. Guernsey Republicans regularly held county meetings, which were not made up of regularly elected delegates, and at times Federalists insisted on their own right to attend, as they did also in Coshocton; in 1822 the Democratic Republicans of Guernsey asked - in vain - that their meeting "not be disturbed by those who are not entitled to the appellation of Democrats, as heretofore." 13 But then these counties were all dependent for their news on the most influential of eastern Ohio's newspapers, the Muskingum Messenger, mouthpiece of the Zanesville Legitimates.

The Legitimates, by their shift to an antibanking stance in 1818, had re-established their control of Muskingum County. In 1819 they summoned a county meeting which named a ticket to be supported by "CONSISTENT Democrats",

and secured the election of a leading Legitimate, Samuel Sullivan, by an overwhelming majority. The events of 1820 in Muskingum are obscure, but in 1821 there appears to have been a Delegate ticket, which elected at least one, if not more of its candidates. 14 In Congressional elections, the Legitimates still tried to control their district. In 1818 they had claimed - with justification - that the perennial Steubenville candidate John C. Wright was receiving support from Federalists all over the district, and so persuaded enough Republicans in the northern counties, especially Coshocton County, to desert Wright and support the Delegate nominee, the incumbent Samuel Herrick; Coshocton's volte-face gave Herrick his margin of victory in what the Messenger called "a triumph of democratic republicanism over a combination of Federalism, quidism, apostacy and personal spite." 15 In 1820 Herrick retired, and the Legitimates secured the nomination of another of their own number, David Chambers. His many opponents, both Federalist and Republican, held a caucus, with representatives from each county, to decide on a single candidate to oppose him; once more it was John C. Wright of Steubenville. Once more the election results reflected the difference of interest between the northern and southern counties, but again Coshocton supported the Legitimate candidate. In the event, Wright won by the narrowest margin, the result was disputed, and a new election ordered. Wright promptly refused to run again, and the Legitimates once more secured the seat for their nominee. 16 They also endeavoured to exercise influence in state affairs, securing Sullivan's election as state treasurer, and in 1821 making "a great effort to engender the spirit of party" among members of the legislature in order to


16. Hammond to Wright, St. Clairsville, 6 Aug., 15 Oct. 12, 14 Dec. 1820, 6 May, 30 Sept. 1821, CHP. See also Western Herald, 9 Sept., 11 Nov. 1820.
MAP 4.1: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION, 1820.

County boundaries of 1820.

Source: Utter, The Frontier State, p. 220

MAP 4.2: CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS, 1822-1832

County boundaries of 1825.


U.S. CENSUS 1820
- 230 RURAL POPULATION
- 2,500 URBAN POPULATION

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, 1820

ERECTED BUT UNORGANIZED COUNTIES
prevent Burnet's confirmation as Supreme Judge. Their failure on this latter occasion, Hamm's failure in 1822 to secure reappointment as United States Marshall, and the redistricting of Congressional seats in 1822—which divided them from the rest of eastern Ohio—showed, however, that success would not always attend those who prided themselves on being keepers of the Jeffersonian conscience.

Surprisingly, Belmont County provides a further example of how Good Feelings and amalgamation had failed to obliterate the loyalties and commitments of the old party system. After all, in the late 1810s, on every occasion when he had chosen to stand, Belmont voters had happily returned Charles Hammond to the General Assembly along with old Republicans, and had elected another prominent Federalist, the lawyer David Jennings, to the state senate in 1819 and 1821. Yet the old parties remained conscious of their traditional identities: the 1820 Congressional election was something of a party contest, most of the county supporting the Legitimate candidate, while Wright "got very few but federal votes"; and still in 1821 Republican leaders in Belmont could debate whether the Congressional candidate of the Zanesville Legitimates was of sound enough principles to justify party support in the county. In that same year the re-election of Jennings to the state senate was opposed by Republicans, and especially by the militia officers, "upon account of his vote in favour of excusing the Quakers from mustering"; but the sole effect was to "bring such a host of them to the polls, as to secure Jennings his election." More to the point, in 1822 Hammond ran for Congress in the newly created district of Belmont, Guernsey, Morgan and Monroe counties. At the time party feeling was being revived by arguments in the press over the virtues and vices of Thomas Jefferson, and a district

17. Whittlesey to Tappan, Columbus, 11 Dec. 1821, BTP, LC; Allen Trimble to W.A. Trimble, Columbus, 5 Dec. 1821, in Trimble Correspondence, 122.
18. Hammond to Wright, St. Clairsville, 15 Oct. 1820, 30 Sept. 1821, CHP.
convocation was called on Guernsey's initiative which unanimously named John Patterson as Republican candidate, who had beaten Hammond for the state senate in the strictly partisan Belmont election of 1815. Though Patterson had since that time co-operated with Hammond, he now attacked him for his Federalism; the day after the election Hammond conceded that "Democracy, Republicanism, whatever you may choose to call it, has made a violent and I suppose successful effort." It was perhaps this defeat that persuaded Hammond to leave eastern Ohio, where a Federalist past was such a liability, and make a fresh start the next year in Cincinnati.

After his defeat, professional colleagues, including Republicans, pressed Hammond to become a candidate for the vacancy on the Ohio Supreme Court occasioned by John McLean's appointment, in October 1822, as Commissioner of the General Land Office in Washington. Hammond was willing to accept appointment by the legislature, but refused to be hawked about or considered an active candidate:

I cannot be elected. The same feeling and sentiment that sent Patterson to Congress from the district prevails in the Legislature in at least the same extent, and will prevail to make Herrick judge rather than me.

Though the attempt to rouse old party feeling against Burnet's appointment had backfired in the previous session, Hammond was right: a second Federalist on the Supreme Court was more than the legislature could safely stomach.

Instead, the Assembly chose a sound Republican, Charles R. Sherman, whose sons were to become more widely known than any of them. Other major appointments that came up at this time, like the federal posts of Marshall and District Attorney, also attracted some strong Federalist candidates, but most state politicians, most of the Ohio delegation in Congress, and, crucially,


21. Hammond to Wright, Belmont, 15, 20 Dec. 1822, CHP.
the President of the United States, were careful to support none but sound
Republicans. 22

In fact, old party considerations were still strong, even in national
politics. The fact that the 1820 elections in Ohio resulted in the defeat
of the state's sole Federalist Congressman was duly noted, as was his election
for a different district in 1822. Similarly, the state's loyalty to the
Republican incumbent as President was presumed in 1820, for what was the
alternative? Admittedly, some Ohio politicians wished to see the free states
agree on a candidate to challenge Monroe, the Western Herald made "soft
insinuations" to that effect, and nearly a quarter of those who bothered to
vote in November preferred John Quincy Adams to Monroe. 23 Yet most voters
and politicians recognized that there was no point in opposing Monroe, and
the election aroused little interest. For, as Congressman John Sloane said,
the administration might be weak, inefficient and lacking influence in Congress,
but it understood "the management of electioneering" so well that "all popular
men are broken down in the northern states." It had encouraged Daniel
Tompkins' opposition to DeWitt Clinton in New York, and had secured an
effective control over "the operations" of the Republicans of New England,
too many of whom had "grown up under the care of Madison's and Monroe's
administration" and so were "too much the creatures of courtly power." In
this way Monroe is "able to ride in at another election without opposition,"
simply because of the inertia of the party's traditions, and the unpredictability
of trying to find an alternative - who might turn out to be even less
acceptable. Republican predominance made the incumbent's re-election
inevitable, in spite of - or perhaps because of - what the National
Intelligencer called "the strong influence of deep-seated local and political
predilections and prejudices." 24

22. For these appointments see CHP, BTP and esp. EABP, Jan. 1822-Jan. 1823.
23. Cleveland Herald, 2 May 1820; Harry R. Stevens, The Early Jackson Party
in Ohio (Durham, N.C., 1955), 34-35.
24. Sloane to Tappan, Washington, 29 Mar., 4 May 1820, BTP, LC; Washington,
D.C., National Intelligencer, quoted in Lebanon Western Star, 5 Mar. 1821.
Yet, if the presidential election of 1820 showed the persistence of Republican loyalties, it also revealed a degree of dissatisfaction that guaranteed a political crisis in 1824. Too many agreed that, if party control continued, in four years' time "thus comes in Mr. Secretary Crawford or such other secretary as may be able to manage the caucus best." When a Congressional caucus was called in April 1820

but 50 persons attended principally of those who were opposed to nomination/ . ./ this was probably the reason why others of different views did not attend/. / a vote passed unanimously that it was inexpedient to make any nomination and adjourned without day / . ./ there is not much doing here preparatory to the next election but more particularly to that of 4 years hence.29

In helping to determine who would succeed Monroe, Ohioans would have to find allies and make alignments without regard for the Republican party they had followed so long.

29. Sloane to Tappan, Washington, 29 Mar., 11 Apr., 1820, BTP, LC.
PART TWO: THE CRISIS OF PARTY FORMATION

In 1896 Josiah Morrow, describing the distinguished political career of Thomas Corwin, noticed a sharp dichotomy in the political history of the locality Corwin grew up in. Butler and Warren Counties, he observed, were formed by the same act of the General Assembly, settled by the same class of hardy pioneers, enjoyed the same geographical position and fertile soil and agricultural pursuits; for quarter of a century their inhabitants expressed the same political sentiments and gave majorities to the same national tickets. But by 1830 they had separated politically, and since then had never given majorities to the same national ticket: "Certain it is that in the days of General Jackson, Butler became decidedly Democratic and Warren decidedly anti-Democratic, and have so continued ever since." But why this had happened, Morrow simply could not say.¹

The same phenomenon might be noticed all over Ohio: by the end of 1820s, none of the party labels, none of the loyalties, none of the political friendships and enmities, that had existed before 1820 seemed to have any relevance to the current political behaviour of Ohioans. Benjamin Tappan no longer belonged to the same party as his former protégé James Wilson, who now found himself on the same side of the party fence as his earlier political antagonists, the Federalist Charles Hammond and a more recent foe, John Bailhache of the Scioto Gazette. Hammond had come to blows with Duncan McArthur during the 1813-14 legislature; they were now political friends. Former Tammany men had divided - even Isaac Van Horne and John Hamm now voted different ways - and Federalists could be found on both sides. Collections of political correspondence commonly attest this change, as old political friendships died and new ones took their place. In many counties the disappearance of old party newspapers and the emergence of new ones in the

¹ Josiah Morrow, Life and Speeches of Thomas Corwin, Orator, Lawyer and Statesman (Cincinnati, 1896), 28.
course of the decade likewise demonstrate that some sort of seismic change had taken place in Ohio politics.

This change first became apparent in the Presidential election campaign of 1824. As even the *Western Herald* said in 1823, "The question is not now whether this candidate or that candidate is a democrat or a federalist"; and for the first time in the state's history, Ohioans ignored the nomination of the Republican party's national leaders. But, as old Federalists rejoiced that "party, party, party names have not their usual charm," the arguments over alternative candidates in 1824 quickly bred, as James Wilson saw, a new party spirit—a party spirit which time showed was not to pass away, but to develop into the new two-party division of the late 1820s. The origins of these new parties may be found partly in the strains and pressures which had marked Ohio politics in the Era of Good Feelings, but primarily in the crisis which gripped state and nation in the early 1820s.

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In the years following 1819, Ohio was gripped by a multiple crisis which reached every Ohioan in one way or another. Most fundamental was the economic collapse that followed the Panic of 1819, as depression hit every walk of life in the early Twenties. Economic and financial difficulties not only turned men against the Bank of the United States, but also sharpened the tensions and social hostilities that had been visible within the state even before the Panic. At the same time the political world was troubled by the great national crisis sparked off by Missouri's application to join the United States as a slave state; and the consequence was a sharpening of popular awareness of the slavery issue which resulted in antislavery sentiment becoming an important influence on the formation of party loyalties during the 1820s. For the total impact of this multiple crisis was to undermine loyalty to the old Republican party, create huge interest in the future disposition of the federal government, and generate a number of popular concerns which, in complex and uneven ways, were to determine the character of the Second Party System.

The Missouri Crisis

Of all Ohio's residents, none was more aroused by the Missouri controversy than Captain James Riley. After all, he had himself suffered as a slave in North Africa, and had revealed his antislavery sentiments publicly in a best-seller recounting his adventures, hardships, and fortunate escape. In December 1819 he endeavoured to persuade Governor Brown to take action on the Missouri question:

1. James Riley, An Authentic Narrative of the Loss of the American Brig Commerce... (New York, 1816), which had gone through at least six editions by 1820. See D.J. Ratcliffe, "Captain James Riley And Anti-Slavery Sentiment in Ohio, 1819-1824," Ohio History, LXXXI (1972), 76-94, esp. 76-80.
In traversing much of the central part of this state and conversing with the most intelligent and thinking part of the community, it is with the utmost satisfaction I find in every quarter sentiments according with my own on the subject of the extension of slavery westward of the Mississippi River particularly in the new territory of Missouri. On this question there appears to be no difference of opinion among the means in their power the further extension of that crying Evil alike inhuman and disgraceful in a country like ours. Boasting (and justly too,) of the purity and excellence of our moral and Political institutions.

Yet when Missouri's application to join the Union as a slave state first came before Congress in the 1818-19 session, Ohio's representatives did not show the highest concern, or unity of view. The whole Ohio delegation, with one exception, voted in favour of the first proposal of the Tallmadge amendment - that no more slaves be introduced into Missouri. But on the second proposal - that all post-nati slaves in Missouri be freed on reaching the age of twenty-five - the delegation split down the middle, with Senators as well as Representatives disagreeing among themselves. Exactly the same cleavage appeared on the associated measure organizing Arkansas as a territory, with no limitation on slavery. This difference of view cannot be explained simply in terms of the differences between Ohioans from New England and those born in the Southern states, since only one of the delegation was a Southerner and two of the more antislavery Congressmen represented Southern-born constituents. The real distinction is rather the one more significant at the time, between eastern and western Ohio, for feeling over slavery was much stronger in the eastern part of the state.

In general, antislavery sentiment was more prevalent in Ohio at this


period than is commonly appreciated. In the Quaker-settled areas of eastern Ohio there was a committed abolition movement led by Charles Osborn and Benjamin Lundy, and supported by Charles Hammond. This movement, organized in 1816 as the Union Humane Society, openly denounced slavery, advocated gradual emancipation, agitated for the repeal of the Black Laws, and opposed schemes for colonizing free blacks abroad. Vigorous antislavery sentiments were also voiced by Presbyterians in some southern counties, as well as by some other congregations. Most Ohioans, however, had shown little concern over slavery since 1802, for it did not appear to involve them very closely. Yet whenever an opinion was expressed in a private letter or on some public occasion, that opinion was always adverse to the institution. In 1818 when a number of citizens in Harrison County petitioned the General Assembly to promote the gradual abolition of slavery and the colonization of the freedmen, the legislature promptly obliged by passing, with little debate, cursory resolutions calling on Ohio's Senators and Representatives in Congress "to use their best endeavors to procure the passage of a law which will effect the purposes aforesaid." No politician, in fact, wished to be branded as favouring the institution. When William Henry Harrison, running for Congress in 1816 in the Cincinnati district, was charged with, among other things, being "a friend to slavery" - as, indeed, his record as Governor of Indiana suggested - his supporters felt this accusation so potentially damaging that


they carefully refuted the charge before considering the others. Even more significant was the way in which proposals to revise the state constitution were resisted in 1817, 1818 and 1819 by those who feared the possible introduction of slavery into Ohio. Informed opinion in general believed that:

Such fears are groundless. The aversion to slavery is deeprooted and universal. If there should be some individuals who would wish to introduce a slave population among us, they are few in number, and the sentiments of the people are so decidedly hostile to it, that the bare suggestion of the idea would forever ruin their influence.

Despite such reassurances, the call for a state constitutional convention was defeated by popular referendum in 1819, apparently because of the persistence of the rumour.

However, this antislavery sentiment was offset by some countervailing attitudes. It was generally agreed that the existence of slavery in the Old South was none of Ohio's business, but a matter for the state concerned; and there was some feeling that "comity" required Ohio to assist her Southern neighbours to maintain their institutions. State judges believed a master must be able to send a slave to Ohio without losing his right to him, as long as he was not used as a slave in the state; and the state cooperated in returning runaways under the federal Fugitive Slave law, with newspapers throughout the state - even on the Western Reserve - showing few qualms about printing runaway notices. Indeed, it was a commonplace that Ohio benefited from the existence of slavery in (west) Virginia and Kentucky: long before Tocqueville, travellers had observed that settlement and economic progress

6. "To the Electors of the First Congressional District," Cincinnati, 1 Oct. 1816, political broadside, OHS.
were proceeding more rapidly north of the Ohio than on the slave shores of the great river, while Ohioans quietly appreciated that at least slavery prevented the migration of Negroes into their own state. The constitution of 1802 had established a pattern of discrimination against black people, while the Black Law of 1807 had been designed to discourage further black immigration. Such racial prejudice came to a head in 1819 when about three hundred slaves in Virginia belonging to an Englishman, Samuel Gist, were freed and settled in Brown County, in southwestern Ohio. There were voluble protests locally against the introduction of a "depraved and ignorant ... set of people"; and, though they received some charitable assistance from the Quakers, these black settlers were ostracized and even persecuted by their neighbours. In view of such common attitudes - largely shared even by James Riley - Ohio's representatives could feel free to vote in favour of continuing to confine in chains the slaves already in Missouri and allowing the movement of blacks into territories south of there.

However, the prospect of the expansion of slavery into the territories of the Louisiana Purchase roused public opinion as no-one had anticipated. The Cleveland Herald believed that no question agitated in Congress had "excited more interest and anxiety, in the minds of the people of the United States, we believe, ... since the formation of the Federal Constitution - in the ultimate result of which, depends our national character as acknowledging and guaranteeing universal, civil and religious freedom to all mankind." In Cincinnati a town meeting resolved that "the extension of a slave

9. Western Herald, 3 July 1819, 25 Mar. 1820; The History of Brown County, Ohio (Chicago, 1883), 591-92. See also O'Dell, "Early Antislavery Sentiment," 146-55, 223-24, 230-32. Frank U. Quillin, The Color Line in Ohio (New York, 1913), is unreliable, as is Moore, Missouri Controversy, 135, which misquotes the first item above from the Western Herald.

population in the U. States is fraught with the most fearful consequences to the permanency and durability of our republican institutions." Other meetings were held, notably in the eastern counties, which petitioned Congress and instructed Congressmen to prevent slavery from spreading across the Mississippi. The message for Congressmen was unmistakeable. Thomas Ewing wrote to his patron, Philemon Beecher, urging him to take a firmer antislavery line than he had in the previous session, when he had voted for the Arkansas bill: if he could conscientiously oppose the admission of Missouri, "an appropriate and spirited speech from you on that subject would do much for you with the people -- the question with regard to our own constitution aroused them, and no detail of the question will now pass them unheeded." 12

Active and responsible politicians saw great complexities and greater menaces in the situation. When the Ohio Assembly discussed resolutions to send to Congress, the two houses disagreed on how far the antislavery policy should be pressed: the state senate wished to see the 10,000 slaves already in Missouri emancipated, while the House wished merely to oppose "the further extension of slavery" - which one reporter interpreted as "tacitly allowing the territories now holding slaves to retain them." William Henry Harrison, who as a lame-duck Congressman in the previous session had been the sole Ohioan to vote consistently with the South, tried - unsuccessfully - to persuade the state senate to oppose the extension of slavery in so far as "the constitution and the treaties made under it will allow"; and was promptly criticized in the press - by Charles Hammond - for attempting to undermine the resolutions. In the end, the two houses agreed on a form of

12. Ewing to Beecher, Lancaster, 1 Jan. 1820, TEFP.
words which could be interpreted as signifying either position. 14

In fact, by January 1820 Northern Congressmen had dropped the second part of the Tallmadge amendment, and demanded only that no more slaves be introduced into Missouri. As Ohio's new Senator told the United States Senate, there was nothing in such a restriction that interfered with any property already in Missouri. 15 Ohio's representatives were saved, however, from having to vote in favour of Missouri's admission as a slave state on these terms, because the South refused to accept even this limitation. Instead, the Ohio delegation opposed Southern demands and the linking of the admission of Maine with that of Missouri, while in the Senate Benjamin Ruggles answered William Smith of South Carolina's remarkable speech declaring slavery a positive good. Even so, William A. Trimble, Ruggles' junior partner in the Senate, remained conscious of future state and national needs, and felt "some concession on our part will be necessary to re-establish harmony between the North and South"; and it was later claimed that all Ohio's representatives in Congress approved Clay's compromise, though instructions from their constituents prevented them all from voting for Missouri's admission as a slave state. 16 They all supported the Thomas amendment, prohibiting slavery north of 36° 30', and Trimble even tried to get the prohibition extended to all territories in the West. In marked contrast with the previous session, the Ohio delegation voted as a bloc to restrict slavery as far as possible. 17

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14. Goebel, Harrison, 228-33; Hammond to Wright, Steubenville, 2 Feb. 1820, CHP. These resolutions, and differing interpretations of them, are discussed in Ratcliffe, "James Riley," 84-85.


At home the delegation won praise for its faithfulness to its constituents' views— as Benjamin Tappan said, "not one dough faced traitor amongst them"— but many people were horrified at the South's triumph in extending slavery. William Greene, a young lawyer in Cincinnati and a New Englander by birth and upbringing, prophesied that "posterity will curse the day on which the proposed restriction on the admission of Missouri was rejected." Benjamin Lundy believed that the controversy, by revealing that slavery, far from dying of its own accord, was actually growing with menacing vigour, had stimulated awareness of the problem and made many people receptive to antislavery ideas; hence he was encouraged to begin publication in Mount Pleasant (Jefferson County) in 1821 of his newspaper, The Genius of Universal Emancipation. Some newspapers in eastern Ohio now began to refuse to print fugitive slave advertisements, and on the Western Reserve a Virginian who recaptured two runaway slaves was himself arrested and found guilty of kidnapping. At a July Fourth celebration in Medina on the Western Reserve in 1821 the toast "Freedom to the Africans" was loudly cheered, and in general there were many signs of an increase in antislavery sentiment, especially among New Englanders and Quakers. In particular, Congressional candidates were questioned to ensure that they were sound on the question. One especially outspoken correspondent in the Marietta Republican newspaper reminded his

18. Tappan's toast, in Western Herald, 6 July 1820; William Greene to Governor Brown, Columbus, 29 Mar. 1820, EABP; Dillon, Benjamin Lundy, 40-41.


readers how the Constitution had been "so daringly violated at the last
session, in relation of the great slave question," and argued that "If we
are once tied to the negro-holders of the South, ... we are no longer FREE."
Insisting that he echoed "the sentiments of thousands of Electors," he
demanded "a pledge from every candidate who would receive the public suffrage;
that however modified, however disguised, however coupled ... that slavery shall
be prohibited from extending its desolating and debasing current beyond the
limits of the old states... 'Carthago est delenda'."21

Yet among some Republicans there was a heightened sense of the need to
end the controversy and restore sectional harmony. Newspapers in Cincinnati,
Chillicothe and Zanesville refused to stop publishing fugitive advertisements:
they wished to restore good relations with the South, and to discourage
settlement by blacks - "nuisances to society, destroying our peace and quiet,
as is frequently the case in this part of the state."22 The same newspapers
also felt, like one Zanesville regular, that the Missouri question had
become "a political poney to ride into Congress on." John Bailhache, at
the Scioto Gazette, condemned "the attempts now making to excite the feelings
of the people, in the northern and middle States"; he not only suspected them
to be manoeuvres by a Federalist party that was trying to restore its fortunes,
but thought them also "misguided" at a time when the nation needed moderation.
As the Cleveland paper said, "No parties are so dangerous to the Union ... as
geographical ones."23 Yet such sentiments were largely ignored in 1820. The
Muskingum Messenger, presenting similar arguments, was branded by its local
rival as an advocate for slavery. At Steubenville James Wilson, whose columns
during the crisis had shown him fearful for the Union and the future of the


22. Muskingum Messenger, May/June 1820. See also Cincinnati Western Spy,
22 June 1820; Scioto Gazette, 9, 22 Nov. 1820.

23. Scioto Gazette, 14 Dec. 1820; Cleveland Herald, 21 Mar. 1820, in Annals,
III, 67-68.
Republican party, and hence not averse to compromise, was swept along by the embittered antislavery tide among his readers: his sentiments became more antislavery, he accused slaveowners of defying the Declaration of Independence, attacked moderate editors, applauded the defeat in other Northern states of the Congressional "DOUGH FACES," and called for efforts to prevent Missouri from being finally admitted at the next session. 24 In the Ohio elections, both Philemon Beecher and William Henry Harrison, running for Congress and Governor respectively, were criticized for being pro-slavery, and both failed; even in the 1822 Congressional elections Beecher still was being forced to defend his Arkansas vote, while Harrison ascribed his own defeat by a "Free Statesman" to the views he had expressed in the course of the Missouri crisis. 25 During the Congressional session of 1820-21, politicians in Columbus heard "from Washington ... of the doubts about Madame Missouri's virginity with satisfaction," and the Ohio delegation on the spot voted consistently against accepting its constitution and against the "conscience plaster" compromise which Clay fudged up for the final, "hypocritical" settlement of the issue in 1821. 26

The prolonged sectional crisis of 1819-21 in effect reinforced the lessons of Ohio's war with the Bank of the United States during the same years. For all their internal differences, Ohioans came together and stood four-square against outside violations of their dearest ideals and interests: they

26. Hammond to Wright, Columbus, 14 Dec. 1820, and Washington, 26 Feb. 1821, CHP; Sloane to Tappan, Washington, 13 Dec. 1820, BTP, LC. See also Moore, Missouri Controversy, 144, 145, 156, 158.
learned that the national government was no longer manned by those with whom they could identify themselves, as they had under Jefferson and during the War; and they found themselves in direct confrontation with a section that had always been their closest Republican ally and provider of national party leadership. Many Republicans now agreed with Charles Hammond not only on the Bank question but also in his more deeply felt views on the Missouri compromise:

I am in hopes the States where there are no slaves can in due season find men who do not boggle upon the point. This is, in my mind a great question, and fraught with important consequences. A new state of parties must grow out of it. Give me a Northern President, whether J.Q. Adams or D. Clinton or any body rather than that things should remain as they are.  

Others in Ohio, including the Western Herald, wished to see the free states agree on a candidate to challenge Monroe, but the election came upon them too quickly to organize a resistance to the Republican incumbent. Instead, men looked ahead to 1824 to the choice of a successor to Monroe; but by the time that election arrived, the memory of the Missouri crisis was being overwhelmed, for many Ohioans, by the strains, tensions and necessities created by the contemporaneous experience of economic crisis.

Economic Crisis and Social Tension

Visitors to Cincinnati were shocked by what they saw in 1820. The acute Scottish traveller James Flint had visited the city the previous May and noticed how on the river shore "the utmost bustle prevails, with drays carrying imported goods, salt, iron and timber, up to the town, and bringing down pork, flour, &c. to be put aboard of boats for New Orleans." In the town, the streets were full, and good houses being built.

Merchants' shops are numerous, and well frequented. The noise of wheel carriages in the streets, and of the carpenter, the blacksmith, and the cooper, make a busy din. Such an active scene I never expected to see among the back woods of America.

27. Hammond to Wright, Steubenville, 20 Feb. 1820, CHP.
But when he returned in June 1820, he found everything altered:

Building is in a great measure suspended, and the city which was lately overcrowded with people, has now a considerable number of empty houses. Rents are lowered, and the price of provisions considerably reduced. Many mechanics and labourers find it impossible to procure employment.¹

George Warren later recalled that "the spring of 1820 was a gloomy time":

All business was brought to a sudden stand .... The mechanics lately so blithe and cheerful had gone in different directions in search of work, at any price, to keep themselves and families from starving ...; few could get employment .... There was no money, and people even going to market resorted to barter .... Our merchants, being unable or unwilling to bring on fresh supplies of dry goods and groceries, these ran up to enormous prices; ... and we suffered considerably for want of our customary breakfast .... Country produce of all kinds was never so low before nor since; but the difficulty lay in getting money to pay even these low prices.²

All classes of the community suffered, with the greatest losses incurred by merchants, bankers and real-estate speculators. One newspaper correspondent winced at the pauperization of a whole class of people "who have hitherto been considered in easy circumstances"; and he urged the establishment of soup kitchens in every ward, since "many, very many" were "actually suffering" near-starvation.³

It was universally agreed that Cincinnati suffered worse than anywhere else - worse than Lexington, Louisville, St. Louis, or Pittsburgh.⁴ The reason was the extraordinary growth of the city in the inflationary conditions

1. James Flint, Letters from America, ... 1818-20 (Edinburgh, 1822), 149-50, 211.
3. Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette, 7 Jan. 1820.
following the War. Since 1814 brick buildings had replaced wooden ones in the principal streets, as commerce and manufacturing developed hand in hand; in three-and-half years, the population doubled, until in 1819 it was nearly 10,000. In that period, as the chemist William S. Merrill noted, almost everybody formed great designs and undertook great things with no other capital except great loans from the banks, so that when the banks afterwards found it necessary to call in their debts all found themselves building upon one another and none standing upon a firm foundation. Hence a scene of bankruptcy ensued unparallelled perhaps in the history of any trading town.5

Charles Hammond insisted that the paper-money system "never got foothold in Ohio out of the Miami country. It was a peculiar fungus of that locality, and was doubtless produced by the unnatural and hot-bed expansion of Cincinnati and its banks. An expansion so sturdily maintained, that it yielded to no contraction but that of unqualified explosion."6

Obviously the effects of the Crash were strongly felt throughout the Miami country, which formed Cincinnati's immediate hinterland. In Butler County the young lawyer John Woods reported how "our richest and ablest merchants are failing," while he was doing "considerable ... business" as attorney for the Bank of Hamilton in many suits for debt.7 Yet, as James Flint said,

The same changes have taken place in the other towns of the western country. Numbers of people have deserted them, and commenced farming in the woods. They will there have it in their power to raise produce for their families, but, with the present low markets, and the probability of a still greater reduction, they can have no inducement but necessity for cultivating a surplus product.8


8. James Flint, Letters from America, 211.
Indeed, commercial agriculture virtually came to a halt, in those few areas where it had developed—not surprisingly, since the root cause of the depression was the contraction of European markets in 1819 and the early 1820s, as their postwar demand for American food fell off. Prices were so low for farm produce it would not bear the cost of freighting, and the rapid falling off of immigration into the state not only slowed land sales but deprived farmers of their traditional market among new settlers. According to the Scioto Valley cattleman William Renick, "it was no uncommon sight to see stacks of wheat rotting down in the field"; several travellers through Ohio in 1820 reported that "in many cases, the farmers would not cut their wheat, but turned their cattle into it; and that in others, the tenants would hardly accept of the landlord's moiety of the produce which they had stipulated to give him for rent."9 One resident of Jefferson County recalled that, for two calamitous years, "Very few products of the soil would command money, even at the lowest price.... Although taxes were very low it was with the greatest difficulty that money could be obtained with which to pay."10

In these circumstances it was natural that economically embarrassed farmers and townsmen should turn to politics for some sort of relief. The main problem arose from the fact that the majority of farmers in Ohio had bought their lands on credit and still had not paid for them; in the crisis of the depression, they could not raise the money to maintain their payments, and so risked losing their lands and the improvements they had made. As


Jacob Burnet said, "it is not to be inferred that the people were destitute, or desperately poor; far from it - they were substantial farmers, surrounded with all the means of comfort and happiness - except *money.*" Where the creditor was a private individual, the debtor was at his mercy, and many settlers in the Miami Purchase and on the Western Reserve left their lands and moved further west, or would have if proprietors and their agents had not, in many cases, allowed them to defer payments. However, the largest number - "more than half of the men, north-west of the Ohio river," according to Burnet - had purchased their land from the United States government, which still owned the title; and "nine-tenths of those debtors would lose their lands and improvements, under the laws then in force, unless relief should be obtained from Congress." Since the rest of the community "felt a warm interest, operating in their favour," Ohioans were united in demanding relief from the federal government. 11 For at least two years complaints had been made about the Treasury's refusal to accept state banknotes in payment for land already purchased by settlers, and at last in August 1820 Secretary of the Treasury William H. Crawford agreed to accept the notes of the sounder state banks. 12 Then in 1821 Congress, with the support of the whole Ohio delegation, passed a bill enabling a purchaser to apply the payments he had already made to the immediate, outright acquisition of the appropriate proportion of the lands he had originally contracted for; alternatively, if he continued his payments, he would not be charged with accrued interest, and a liberal discount would be given for prompt settlement. Congress refused to distinguish between speculators


12. *Western Herald*, 19 Aug. 1820. For earlier complaints, see J.H. Larwill to Hitchcock, Wooster, Sept. 1818, and Joseph Richardson to Hitchcock, Columbus, 4 Jan. 1819, PHFP.
and actual settlers, as some Ohioans wished, but most Ohioans had been
saved from the consequences of the Panic. To prevent a recurrence, Congress
at last, in 1820, passed the reform of the land system long urged by
Jeremiah Morrow: it ended credit sales, but reduced the price of land still
further and made it possible to purchase it in smaller sections. 13

The willingness of the federal government to grant this undeniably
constitutional measure of relief helps to explain why the demand for relief
never generated the same measure of conflict within Ohio as it did in
similarly situated states like Kentucky and Tennessee. Distress and
embarrassment were great in all three, and perhaps greatest in Ohio; but
south of the river the land had never belonged to the federal government,
and the creditors who held the titles of land bought from them on credit
proved less generous in Kentucky and Tennessee than the federal government;
hence debtors in those states had to press for measures of relief, most
notably the issue of fiat paper money, such as were never necessary in Ohio.
In any case, ever since its inception as a state, Ohio had had an appraise-
ment law which forbade property to be sold in execution for debts, unless it
brought at auction two-thirds of the value appraised by a board of the debtor's
neighbours. Another law of 1811 allowed farmers to keep a few animals and
the produce of the animals free from all attachment, distresses or executions. 14

Furthermore, those in power were sympathetic to the debtors, and to any measures
that would help debtors to clear off the debt, which in the long run would
benefit "all the creditors"; as Governor Brown noted to himself, "efficient

Burnet, North-Western Territory, 452-53; Murray N. Rothbard, The Panic
The Federalist minority was helpful with this measure, especially Rufus
King: Ruggles to Hammond, Washington, 29 Dec. 1820, CHP.

14. T.H. Greer, "Economic and Social Effects of the Depression of 1819 in
the Old Northwest," Indiana Magazine of History, XLIV (1948), 238;
Huntington, Banking and Currency, 72; Rothbard, Panic of 1819, 40-41, 56.
See also D.B. Warden, A Statistical, Political And Historical Account of
the United States of North America (Edinburgh, 1819), 275.
The Assembly elected at the height of the reaction against the Bank of the United States had little hesitation in passing laws to hinder creditors from pursuing their claims to the ruin of debtors. In February 1820 a law was passed allowing the debtor to postpone settlement of his debts, and the next session adopted a revised version of this stay law, more or less as introduced by Hammond. Under this legislation a creditor could press for the repayment of his money at the time due only by accepting payment in goods appraised to be worth far more than their current market value. As south of the Ohio, the constitutionality of the law was challenged, but a state supreme court that had learned prudence a decade earlier, used its power of judicial review to rule in 1821 that this relief measure did not violate the sanctity of contracts.

However, much opposition to the law was evident, not only among lawyers, New Englanders, and those interested in attracting new investment into the state, but also among those who believed that the repeal of all laws governing debts would ensure that in future loans would be made only rarely, and then only to those whose ability and willingness to repay the creditor absolutely trusted. By January 1822 Henry Clay saw in the Ohio legislature "that reaction, in favor of the Creditor, which was to be anticipated against the system of policy which has prevailed for some time past in behalf of the debtor." Gradually, year by year, the stay laws were modified, and finally

15. Brown's endorsement on a letter from William Greene, Cincinnati, 22 Dec. 1820, EABP.
repealed in 1824, as businessmen and lawyers recognized that, essential as they were in 1820 and 1821, they were, if anything, prolonging "the dreadful state of things under which this State has so long laboured." 18

The great popular demand in Ohio was not so much for relief as for a reduction in government expenditures and especially in the salaries of office holders. This was not unreasonable in that the drastic fall in the general price level had given all those on fixed salaries a handsome increment in real terms, while making taxes more onerous. The Ohio Assembly stumbled over the question in the 1820-21 session because of the members' reluctance to lower their own wages, but the next Assembly, containing many new members, passed a bill reducing the remuneration not only of themselves, of Judges and state officers, but also of county and township officers. 19 One observer in Wayne County noted that a vote against "lowering the pay of members of the legislator ... will be a death blow" to any representative seeking re-election in the fall. 20 Newspaper correspondents argued for further reductions, especially at the county level, 21 and there was general horror when the 1823-24 Assembly, having reduced by one-third the recompense for compulsory work on the roads, raised the compensation of legislators "from the constitutional and ample amount of two dollars per day to the more liberal and gentlemanly sum of three dollars per day." There were many loud protests about the legislators' "unexpected act ... of increasing their own wages," and demands for "economy and public spirit ... over selfishness and cupidity," though some of the offenders thought the issue had less effect in the elections.


19. Hammond to Wright, 12 Dec. 1820, 29 Dec. 1821, CHP; Brown to C.G. Haines, Columbus, 1 Nov. 1821, EABP; Whittlesey to George Tod, Columbus, 16 Dec. 1821, "Huntington Correspondence," 160-61.


than they had anticipated. The concern about the wages of legislators, as opposed to other government officials and employees, suggests the strength of public disillusionment with politicians. They felt that most legislators had selfish purposes — how else to explain that so many banks had been chartered, for the benefit of favoured individuals at the expense of the people? They disapproved of "log-rolling," and were convinced that most sessions saw office-seekers conspiring together to secure plum jobs for each other. This was one disadvantage of having the legislature rather than the governor control patronage; it prevented the Assembly from getting on with public affairs rather than private business. Moreover, this suspicion, which had some justification where the state government was concerned, was unjustly transferred to Washington, to embrace the federal government as well: people believed this was the "Age of Corruption," however slender the evidence. The Cleveland Herald, in 1822, commented on the belief, widespread in its own locality, that power was being abused in the national legislature. "In regard to the profligacy and dissipation of some of our congressional members, while at Washington, we fear suspicions are but too well founded"; the editor had no factual evidence, but he spoke of the possible "prevalence of corruption and idleness." David Smith at the Columbus Ohio Monitor prided

22. Delaware Patron, 9 Sept. 1824; James Kookin to Trimble, Delaware, 27 Aug. 1824, Trimble Correspondence, 135.

23. William Doherty to Brown, Columbus, 12 Dec. 1824, EABP; Cleveland Herald, 12 Nov. 1824, in Annals, VII, 118.


25. Cleveland Herald, 15 Aug. 1822, in Annals, V, 225. For the argument that there was widespread corruption, see Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 1822-1832 (New York, 1981), ch.2; few of the scattered incidents and examples of actual corruption cited by Remini were reported in the Ohio press.
himself or his "unshaken stand against the corroding wiles of suspicious speculators; professional extortioners, ambitious aspirers"; he argued that the United States government had established an evil financial system which had caused much distress, because directed to the aggrandisement of overpaid legislators and government officials; "those full fed gentry hold our purse strings," and there was no sign of reformation. Moses Dawson, at the Cincinnati Advertiser, actually went so far as to distinguish between "Republicans" who supported the Monroe administration, and "Democrats" who wanted to reform the government and extend popular control. 26

Ironically, most of Ohio's Congressmen shared this attitude, and believed it necessary to cut down the government establishment. John Sloane, in 1820, was eager to "retrench the expenses of the government," but feared the opposition of an overpowerful executive branch and of entrenched interests. In Congress in 1821, when the "Radical" friends of Crawford attacked the military establishment, proposals soon followed for a 20 per cent reduction in the salaries of civil officials; John W. Campbell of Ohio moved that salaries of members of Congress should be included - which somewhat weakened the general sentiment for retrenchment! David Chambers, from the Zanesville district, in his re-election campaign in 1822, claimed that he was one of the group of Radicals endeavouring to reduce government expenditure; and he named the remainder of the Ohio delegation (except Sloane) as having worked and voted for a reduction in the members' wages. 27 The summit of this attitude among Ohio Congressmen was to come in 1825 when the whole delegation voted against the grant of lands and a pension to Lafayette, heroic to Americans


but, to some Ohioans, a sponger on American goodwill.

Behind the general suspicion of those in power lay, of course, the belief that politicians truly representative of the people would never have given bankers the privileges they secured during the previous decade. Thus the panic not only turned public opinion against bankers and financiers, but heightened prejudice against the professional classes, who often benefited from special privileges supported by the law they exploited so well. In particular, lawyers were suspect for they seemed increasingly to dominate legislatures and pass laws which created business for them—especially as they enjoyed the fees collected from the increased litigation consequent upon the crash. In 1819 James Wilson had blamed the failure of the proposal for a new constitutional convention not only on the slavery bugaboo, but on the general supposition that it was "a manoeuvre on the part of the lawyers to make a splendid judiciary." In Cuyahoga County in 1820, one newspaper correspondent opposed two prominent candidates on the grounds they were lawyers, and lawyers, by definition, did not understand the needs of the community; instead he proposed a substantial farmer, "that class who are the very vitals of the commonwealth." The farmer won handsomely. Paul Fearing found the popular mood in Ohio reminiscent of earlier contests in Pennsylvania, which, he remembered, had produced this parody of an election address:

Don't choose a lawyer for our representative:

For the lawyers are the greatest rogues alive—

Don't choose a learned man, they bother business vilely;

But choose such men as Me, Bendeger, and Smiley.


30. Cutler, Ephraim Cutler, 125.
Such attitudes, though not new, were more vociferously expressed after 1819. Other groups tried to link their standing to the farming community that made up the bulk of the state's population. In southwestern Ohio in 1824, when a newspaper correspondent blamed merchants for the hard times, another replied saying that merchants existed to serve the farmers and made little money: "If the mechanic, lawyer, legislator, or physician, impose upon the farmer ... let it not be charged to the merchant." 31

Ohio may have escaped a relief war akin to those further south, but the popular resentments sharpened by the depression ensured that many local elections would be embittered by conflicts between those in power and those willing to exploit resentments. On the Western Reserve, to take an extreme case, the large landed proprietors (or rather speculators) and their agents still retained considerable influence, though their power was being undermined by the increased sale of land to the great wave of Yankee settlement that had begun to sweep across northern Ohio since 1815. In Geauga County the dominant force was the Paine family, who had founded Painesville township, containing in the early 1820s the largest commercial centre on the Reserve, Painesville, then far in advance of Cleveland some twenty miles to the west. Captain Edward Paine, Jr. had opened up Chardon, the county seat, in 1811-12 and for at least the next decade "filled quite all the county offices." The Paines, a prolific family, had made many good connections through marriage and business with other local notables, "and with their collateral Paines and following ... they made up the Paine party, which sometimes controlled and for many years influenced the county and the Reserve." 32

By the early 1820s the Paines were facing challenges to their power, which they fought off by using the arts of "the locquacious, sycophantic and insinuating, bar-room politician" as well as their influence in Columbus and Washington. Many of the challenges came from their personal rivals among the elite, but by 1822 these rivals were angling for support by appealing to the growing popular hostility to lawyers and office-holders who supposedly ignored the interests of farmers. In 1822 the Paines established a newspaper, but soon alienated the editor, Eber D. Howe. Just before the local elections of 1824, Howe launched a scurrilous assault on the monopoly which the "royal family" enjoyed of "every office of honor or profit," and accused them unfairly of speculating with the county's funds. The outcome was a revolution at the polls and the defeat of the Paines' candidates for county office and the General Assembly.33

The example of Geauga is unusual only in that it is well documented, and perhaps because popular resentments had clear political success. In neighbouring Portage County, similarly, in 1822 "a large number of the electors ..., composed of the labouring classes of community, attending at the the Sept. Court in Ravenna, have agreed Unanimously, to support the following Ticket at the ensuing Election, in October" - which duly succeeded. It is most probable that those present were impeccably middle-class, if they had business at court, and their nominees on this "Farmers Ticket" seem substantial men, but included a saddler; some of the candidates already held office, having been elected in 1820, but none of them seem connected with the more dominant families - the Kents and the Harmons. Most interesting, however, was the appeal they made to the voters: "Let labouring Men those who 'hold or drive' some useful business represent soberly a labouring and industrious community - such will advocate retrenchment

South of Portage, in German-dominated Stark Country, a candidate at the 1822 elections, George Stidger, was attacked by his opponent, John Hoover, for being wealthy, a property speculator, and a bank director. Such attacks were commonly expressed in a style of rhetoric, class-based and extravagant in its abuse, that historians have often called "Jacksonian" as was certainly true of the local elections of 1822 in Ross County. In Muskingum County in that year the Legitimates contested the attempt of David Chambers — one of their former leaders and spokesmen, who had fallen out with them — to win re-election to Congress. For four months each side claimed its candidate was the more sincerely committed to the reduction of government expenditure; each appreciated the popularity of retrenchment at a time when "the pressure upon the mass of the cultivators of the soil, is too great to be borne with." Appeals were directed particularly at the farming community: lawyers were accused of milking honest farmers in these difficult times, and "towns-people" criticized for their "habit of claiming and monopolizing all the offices." Even the regular leaders of Muskingum politics could attempt to exploit popular resentment against those who grew rich through the complexities of the law and the advantages of office at the expense of the poor working-man. Chambers, however, carried the county against the Legitimate party bosses but lost the district — partly because reapportionment had "severed" him from his friends outside Muskingum, but also because of the internal cleavage in his own county.

34. "To The Independent Electors of Portage County," political broadside, OHS; History of Portage County, Ohio (Chicago, 1885), passim.

35. Heald, Bezaleel Wells, 126-27; Scioto Gazette, 18 Sept. 1822.

The most dramatic and best documented conflict came inevitably in Cincinnati, the epicentre of the economic earthquake. From the city in November 1818 William Henry Harrison's son-in-law reported that "This place & all the country round are almost in a state of mutiny and insurrection in consequence of the banks shutting up their vaults." Especially bitter were the mechanics' groups, which for some time had been developing a collective self-consciousness and now, by 1819, were facing unemployment. On July fourth more than eight hundred men, mostly mechanics, marched in a great civic parade and heard orators bitterly denouncing the banks. The city government fell into distrust, as rumours spread that the paper money it had itself issued was unsound and that city funds had been used to pay for work on private enterprises; then just before Christmas the chief suspect, the city treasurer — who happened also to be a local bank director — announced that the city treasury had been stolen from under his bed.\(^{37}\) As the economic situation deteriorated, so antagonism to banks became even more acute. Jacob Deterly, a local resident of German extraction, noted in his Diary:

17 June 1820 Banks going down. great confusion among 'th their paper, John H. Piatt's bank / is staggering, its last legs ~ Success to their downfall! The last scene of Banking is closing with disgrace ~ Down! down with the Banks that dont pay cash. Down with them! ~ damn all paulytry trash.

6 July 1820 Bank Mobs, Indication of hostilities against the banks of this place by a gang of "The Vulgar" assembling at several places in the town. ~ The mayor took out troops to quieten things down, an unpopular act.~

15 May 1821 ~ The rabble paraded in front of the Miami bank: / the Mob had a coffin which they pretended to bury callid "burying the Bank."\(^{38}\)

As the sacked cashier of the local B.U.S. branch said as the depression

\(^{37}\) John C. Short to William Short, 11 Nov. 1818, quoted in Harry R. Stevens, The Early Jackson Party in Ohio (Durham, N.C., 1955), 18; see also ibid., 17-23.

\(^{38}\) "Remarks" of Jacob Deterly, Diary from 1819 to 1848 (ms., Genealogical Society, Salt Lake City; typescript, OHS), I, 8, 9, 14.
struck home, "All things are changed, the rich have become poor, & the poor distrust; one universal state of embarrassment exists; tis want, & prosecution & suspicion & terror & dismay & bankruptcy & pauperism on all sides & on all hands..." 39

The turmoil quickly affected the location of political power in Cincinnati. In the years before 1820, the city had been dominated by an extraordinarily wealthy oligarchy, a closely knit business group involved in commerce, banking, manufacturing and landed pursuits, endogamous, dominating public office -- a group that even the anti-egalitarian Englishman Thomas Ashe admitted "would be respected in the first circles of Europe." In 1819 the thirteen members of Cincinnati's governing body owned property valued, on average, at $10,000 each, and only thirty-nine Cincinnatians all together owned more than that sum. 40 After the Crash, popular sentiment against bankers shook the mercantile elite's position, though William Henry Harrison, long a member of the elite, was able to win election to the state senate in 1819 - but only by expressing exaggerated anti-bank sentiments. But in the local elections for town and township officers the next April, more candidates appeared than ever before, including many from previously excluded groups; and the result, amid much confusion, was the ejection from office of many bankers and a greater turnover in the personnel of local government than at any previous town election. Samuel Watts Davies, a leading manufacturer and banker who had served as mayor since 1815, now lost the post and was not to regain it until 1825. 41 The city was now in


the hands of "radicals" who worked to reduce governmental expenditure, clear the city of indebtedness and taxes, and refused, in 1824, to take over the city waterworks from its near-bankrupt owner, Samuel Watts Davies. 42

At Columbus the Hamilton County delegation showed its bias against the old Cincinnati elite. On the whole it preferred the claims to preferment of the good Cincinnati Tammany man Ethan Allen Brown to those of Harrison. It supported Brown's re-election campaign as governor in 1820, even though Harrison was running; Harrison came a bad third in the state as a whole, winning not a single vote in Hamilton County. Then when United States Senator Trimble died in 1821, Harrison was again defeated by Brown; and Harrison blamed "the members from Hamilton for not bringing his name forward in time, and for not urging the claims of that name with all their energy." As a result, "the two parties" in the county became even more embittered. 43 In the 1821-22 session the most effective of Hamilton's representatives, Micajah T. Williams, raised the question of a proper endowment of Miami University, which claimed the lands of the township that Symmes, under his patent of 1794, was obliged to donate to maintain a college. In that investigation Williams had formally inquired into "the agency of Judge Symmes in the alienation of the original township from the people of the purchase" - which drew on him "the batteries of the hero of Tippecanoe." 44 Earlier the "reformers" had worked to prevent the Assembly from making the mayor of Cincinnati a state legislative appointment, but were prepared with a petition, in the event of failure, for the legislature


43. B.F. Powers to Brown, Cincinnati, 14 Feb. 1822, EABP; W.H. Harrison, Jr., to Clayton Webb, Cincinnati, 22 Jan. 1825, VFM 252, OHS.

44. M.T. Williams to Trimble, Cincinnati, 15 Aug. 1822, Trimble Correspondence, 192.
to continue the present mayor in office. 45

As the depression refused to clear from Cincinnati in 1822, so social
and political tensions became more extreme. In July 1822 a young store
clerk, Sol Smith, began a new newspaper, the Independent Press, which
launched itself bitterly against the "big bugs." By August 1822 the
Liberty Hall noticed "various indications at the present moment that the
laboring classes of the community are beginning to think for themselves,
and to reflect seriously on their own rights." While this meant little
more than that the Mechanical Association, embracing thirty-two trades,
endorsed candidates who were running anyway, it brought complaints from the
older groups. 46 By this time the banks of Cincinnati were no more, and
the B.U.S. branch bank had been closed. When some businessmen petitioned
the General Assembly for a new bank, a furious counter-petition was
circulated, signed by many discontented men who, ironically, were themselves
to become noted businessmen in the future: referring to "the evils which
/ the recent banks/ created and the influence they exercised in the
community," the petitioners pointed out that "The wounds inflicted by them
are not healed, nor is ... confidence restored among the people"; and they
trusted their representatives would not create a new bank or suffer "a
scion of any of the former establishments to come again into operation." 47
This internal conflict in Cincinnati, which was to have far-reaching
political consequences, was but the most dramatic example of the social
strains common in Ohio in the depression of the early 1820s.

Yet this fissure within Ohio society was not to lead immediately to
the party cleavage that emerged by the late 1820s. To a remarkable extent,
the social discontents of the age were unpolitical and unpolicitized.

45. William Phillips (clerk of the city council) to Williams, Cincinnati,
4 Jan. 1821, MTWP.

46. Independent Press, 3 Oct. 1822; Liberty Hall, 13 Aug. 1822; Wade,
Urban Frontier, 213, 216, 328.

47. Petition, Cincinnati, 19 Dec. 1822, MTWP.
William Renick later believed that the severe discontents of the early 1820s were less openly or vociferously expressed than similar discontents in the depression of the 1870s; he ascribed the difference to the fact that no active organized parties existed during the earlier depression. It is also possible that ordinary people found relief less through politics than through the religious revivals of the age; at least, William Dean Howells' father recollected that in the 1820s, away from the county seats, ordinary folk talked more of religion - and even of abstract theological issues - than they did of politics, at least until the appearance of Andrew Jackson as a Presidential candidate. however that may be, voting figures indicate a dramatically rising tide of popular interest in elections before 1824, but in elections for state and Congressional office rather than in purely local elections; for what seemed to interest this increasingly aware electorate were not so much the social tensions in their own communities as the broader problems affecting the state as a whole. Though in the end the social tensions would help divide Ohio into two parties, in the first instance the new national party division of the 1820s grew out of an acute sectional awareness that was the most salient consequence of the critical years since 1819.

The Jealousy of the East.

In the years following 1819, Ohioans began to see national politics as a contest between sectional interests. This was in part a reaction to the Missouri crisis, though in general they saw their enemy at this time as being not so much the South as the seaboard states; in part a reaction to the Bank War, though they increasingly saw the main banking states, New York and Pennsylvania, as belonging to the same sectional interest as Ohio. The

48. Renick, Memoirs; William Cooper Howells, Recollections of Life in Ohio, 1813-1840 (Cincinnati, 1895).
primary source of this sectional awareness was the general acceptance, in Ohio, of an economic programme designed to solve the economic problems of state, region and, naturally, nation, but regarded very differently in areas like the South which saw their economic fortunes as tied up with Europe. Ohio's programme was what Henry Clay later christened the "American System" — the combination of a high protective tariff with federally-financed internal improvements. Frustrated by the interests dominant at Washington in the early 1820s, Ohioans showed remarkable unity and commitment in endeavouring to achieve what they could; and in doing so, they began to perceive a basic division in national politics, operating most clearly in Congress. That perception was the main formative influence that shaped Ohio's political choices in the redefining Presidential election of 1824-25.

Intelligent Westerners had long appreciated the need for internal improvements. The original 'Compact' made at the time of the state's admission had included an undertaking by the federal government to build a great road from Washington to the capital of Ohio, and in 1806 Morrow and Worthington had formally proposed in Congress what soon became the Cumberland or National Road. From an early date, too, settlers in southern Ohio appreciated the need to improve the Ohio itself, their passageway to the Mississippi and outside markets; in 1804 Cincinnati merchants recognized that the Falls of the Ohio, downstream at Louisville, must be made negotiable — as even Aaron Burr recognized; hopes for financial support from Congress proved futile in the days of Jefferson and Madison. Within Ohio, little had been done: the "three per cent fund," Ohio's share of the proceeds of the public lands in the state, had from the start been divided up into small sums and spent on a large number of roads all over the state, so as to avoid regional jealousies; and the result, as Daniel


2. James Findlay to Worthington, Cincinnati, 9 Jan. 1804, TWP.
Drake said in 1815, was "to have not a single good road in the state." The "rich mud roads of Ohio," as Harriet Martineau was to call them, were the constant bane of all early travellers; roads which, as many Ohioans pointed out, were so bad that farmers could not convey their crops even twenty miles to a market centre, and so agricultural enterprise was discouraged.

After 1815 Ohioans increasingly acknowledged that the state's adverse balance of trade, its shortage of money and the slow rate of settlement in the interior could all be put right in a short time if the means of transportation were improved. Daniel Drake spelled out what good roads and in particular a canal could do for the Miami country: a canal from Cincinnati to the Great Miami and up to the Maumee would benefit the countryside for twenty-five miles on either side, "ensure for it a very dense population," and extend the city's hinterland even into the fur-trading empires of northern Ohio and Indiana. According to the later Cincinnati literatus W.D. Gallagher, in 1817 and 1818 the newspapers of the State, teemed with essays upon the subject, debating societies took it in hand, public speakers impressed the minds of the people with its importance, and every agent calculated to create a favourable public sentiment was employed.

The postwar governors, Worthington and Brown, used their official messages to explain the benefits that would follow not only from the transport-building, but also from the deliberate encouragement of American manufactures. On the former point, they emphasized the value of connecting the River Ohio with

3. Daniel Drake, Natural and Statistical View, Or Picture of Cincinnati And The Miami Country (Cincinnati, 1815), 220; Harriet Martineau, Retrospect of Western Travel (London, 1837), I, 137-38. For typical comments at this time, see Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette, 21 Jan. 1823; Drake and Mansfield, Cincinnati in 1826, 12-13; Timothy Flint, Condensed Geography and History (1828), 345.

Lake Erie, and so gain access to the great canal that New York was building and, beyond that, to the markets of New York and the East. On the latter point, industrialization would make the country less dependent on Britain, correct the adverse balance of trade, and create employment, as an internal market developed; and Ohio's farmers would create new wealth as they at last began to bring their fields into full production and sold their surplus crops in the new domestic market. Gone would be the days when "A tippler being asked the cause of his incessant use of ardent spirits, answered 'to get the cursed stuff out of the country'."^5

Obviously tariff protection could be enacted only by the federal government; and Ohioans were convinced that a poor, partly settled, under-developed state could not undertake internal improvements without federal aid. In 1816 Jeremiah Morrow made the first formal proposal in Congress for a general system of internal improvement, but initial hopes were dashed by Madison's veto of 1817 and Monroe's stated constitutional objections.^6 Indeed, it was by no means certain that appropriations would be made to continue the National Road beyond Wheeling, which was finally reached in 1818 — though there was some assurance in the act of 1816 admitting Indiana to the Union, which included a "two per cent" provision akin to the 'Ohio Compact' for continuing the road to Indianapolis. Congressman John W. Campbell blamed Congress's reluctance to continue the road on the "astonishing ... jealousy" with which "the Western interests are viewed by many."^7

Opinion in Ohio was indicated when some Congressional candidates in 1818 were publicly asked to state their attitudes to internal improvements.

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5. Painesville Telegraph, 17 July 1824. Worthington's and Brown's messages may be found in the appropriate Assembly journals, 1816-22.


and the encouragement of "domestic industry." In 1819 William Henry Harrison made a strong statement in favour of high tariffs as well as against banks in his campaign for the state senate; and in the Assembly he proposed resolutions urging Ohio's representatives to support measures for protecting home industry, and to apply the resulting extra funds to financing internal improvements rather than paying off the national debt. Harrison, it was presumed, was "industrious" in these matters to "ride into the Senate upon it." His resolutions passed the state Senate unanimously, but the House objected that it was scarcely necessary to advise Representatives who were recently elected and therefore duly aware of public opinion, while both Senators had openly avowed themselves advocates of both measures. The sly wit of James B. Gardiner set the resolutions to verse:

Resolved, by the Senate, that all the distress
Which our constituents so sorely oppress
Is caused by the want of a proper selection
Of means to give home manufacturers protection ....

... Resolved, To instruct our Trimble and Ruggles,
To aid by log-rolling, and speeches, and struggles,
And that Ross, Brush, and Beecher, and Herrick, and Sloan
Be requested to speak in their manliest tone,
And strive that these laudable things should obtain,
And thus we may all be elected again.

More positively, the Assembly invited Governor Brown to submit a report on possible canal schemes and then adopted his main proposal. It decided to authorize surveys of possible canal routes on condition that Congress agreed to sell to Ohio, out of the many millions of acres purchased by the federal government in 1818 from the Indians of northwestern Ohio, four million acres at one dollar an acre, on interest-free credit for ten years; Ohio would sell the land at a profit to pay for the canal and then canal dues would pay off the debt, while Congress would in this way sell

8. Western Herald, 10 Oct. 1818.
9. Rothbard, Panic of 1819, 166, 168; Hammond to Wright, Columbus, 12 Dec. 1820, CHP.
otherwise unsellable land and at the same time increase the desirability of its other land. 11

Senator William Trimble got a committee established to consider Ohio's proposal, and he was made a member. All the other members, however, agreed to turn down the proposal on the grounds that a state should never become the debtor of the federal government, though it did recommend withholding six ranges of townships from sale and locating a canal through them to connect Lake Erie with either the Scioto or the Great Miami. This more modest proposal was rejected by the Senate, even though it was usually more sympathetic to Western needs than the House, and all that Ohio received was a grant of one quarter section of land for the county seat in each of the new counties in the recent Indian purchase - provided that Ohio paid for them! At least Congress also agreed to reform the land system and authorize the location of the route of the National Road in Ohio. But this was a small consolation for the failure not only of the land grant, but also of the tariff increases proposed by Henry Baldwin of Pittsburgh, which had seemed reasonable in view of the shortfall in the federal government's revenue as a result of the Panic. 12

Ohio's representatives were quite clear why Congress was so hostile: as Trimble said, "Local interests and local jealousies have their effect here as well as at Columbus." The land grant failed, he added, because of "prejudices which appear to exist against the western country .... From the south and even from the east there was a strong jealousy of the rising prosperity of the north west." 13 The failure of the tariff resulted in


part from the Missouri crisis, which helped to turn "the whole slave representation" against the bill; this may explain why some protectionists like Baldwin decided to vote for the sectional compromise, presumably in hopes of saving his bill. John Sloane put equal blame on the commercial interest of New England, interested in vigorous transatlantic commerce, but pointed out that at least the Middle States were now beginning to identify themselves with the Northwest: "when any measure calculated to promote the interest of the middle and western States was proposed the east and south have uniformly voted against it." Governor Brown was infuriated by Congress's attitude: he presumed that the people of Ohio were expected to go on, as before, cheerfully to contribute to the defence of the seaboard, tho' our own frontier be neglected -- to the support of the navy, on which our Atlantic brethren doat (tho' God knows we have a heavy charge to convey our property to the Ocean, to be protected by a maritime force) and we should not murmur at assisting to build light houses and anchor buoys, tho' an appropriation for a light on Lake Erie be refused, &c. &c. &c. Ohio, we may boast, has deserved well of the U.S. -- they have done little for the special benefit of Ohio.

Ohioans increasingly felt, as the depression deepened, that the general government slighted the West. One widely copied article argued that if land sales were revenue, then the West was more highly taxed than the East, though federal money was spent almost totally in the East. The summit of sectional pettiness came when in 1821 when the Maryland legislature adopted resolutions proposing that part of the proceeds of the public lands in the West should be used to support schools in the older states. New Hampshire and Vermont agreed; Governor Brown proposed that the


15. Brown to W.A. Trimble, Cincinnati, 12 May 1820, EABP.

legislature prepare a remonstrance against the plan. Ohio's report, written by Alfred Kelley, argued strongly that the Western states suffered from having lands in their midst owned by other governments; while new states needed extra help in establishing educational institutions from scratch—which was why Congress had made its far from generous grant of school lands to the Western states. Eastern newspapers replied that federal resources should be distributed according to numbers and not need, and the issue was expected to raise "much excitement of sectional feeling." In the end, Congress postponed the question, many Eastern members privately acknowledging the justice of Ohio's case. 17

Yet still in 1821 and 1822 Congress refused to grant Ohio the things she felt she needed. Land grants, Henry Baldwin's tariff bill, internal improvement projects, all were stalled by the dominant sectional interests. The only real success came over the continuation of the military road from Detroit across the "Black Swamp" of northwestern Ohio, which had proved such an obstacle during the War: in 1823 Congress granted Ohio 57,000 acres of federal land on condition that the state built a road within four years to cover the forty-six miles from the Falls of the Maumee to the western boundary of the Western Reserve. 18 This measure of military necessity was, however, a very different matter from the National (or Cumberland) Road, so long promised to the Northwestern states. In 1822 President Monroe vetoed the erection of toll-gates on the Road to provide funds for repairing the existing sections east of the Ohio, and Congress proved unwilling to accept Monroe's proposal that funds be voted to pay directly for repairs. James Buchanan of Pennsylvania even proposed that Congress give


18. Zanesville Ohio Republican, 18 Jan. 1823; Niles' Weekly Register, XVII, (25 Dec. 1817), 287.XXVI (26 June 1823), 280. A year later the President had still not approved the location of this road: Q.F. Atkins to Whittlesey, Jefferson, 6 Feb. 1824, EWP.
up its responsibilities and cede the Road to the states (mainly Maryland) through which it ran. Congress at least agreed to the location of the Road across Ohio, though it showed no willingness to vote money for the actual building; indeed, in December 1822 the Speaker of the House, Philip Barbour of Virginia, appointed a House Committee on the Cumberland Road which was overwhelmingly hostile to the project, with not a single member from "the states principally interested" — Maryland and Ohio. Ohioans could conclude only that there was a real difference of opinion and interest between Eastern and Western states, and they wondered whether national measures could ever be devised which harmonized the interests of the different sections.

The disputes of these years, in fact, taught Ohioans that national politics had become, at bottom, a struggle for sectional advantage. Governor Brown in 1820 had appreciated the consequences of the selfish attitude of the forces dominant in Congress:

I regret, extremely, this disposition in the East and South, to impede our improvement: it tends to weaken the affection of the people N.W. of the River Ohio, whose strength is growing too mighty to be treated with contempt, as the next census will demonstrate.

John Sloane, too, believed that Congress had made it clear in 1820 that "we will not be able to do anything until the next census shall have given us our full share in the national government." They knew full well that the "Ohio fever" of the years following the War had swelled the state's population hugely, and the Census of 1820 did, indeed, demonstrate that


20. Greene to Brown, Cincinnati, 3 Apr. 1822, EABP.

Ohio contained one quarter of a million people more than ten years earlier — for a total of 581,434. Only four states were more populous, and one of those — North Carolina — counted far less for federal purposes because of the three-fifths rule. The apportionment of 1822 was to give Ohio fourteen Congressmen and sixteen Electoral votes — more even than Massachusetts, and fewer only than New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia. After recent experiences, Ohioans could see no reason why they should not use their newly promised political strength to override the selfishness of the seaboard states and themselves gain some satisfaction from Washington — at long last.

The Improvement Campaign

Congress's refusal in 1820 and subsequent years to give financial assistance to help Ohio build a canal between Lake Erie and the River Ohio left the state's would-be canal builders with only one recourse: as Senator Trimble said, "we must rely on our own resources." Unfortunately, in 1820 those resources were non-existent, since the state's revenue was paid in much depreciated bank notes: in 1821 the state had to authorize a loan of $20,000 in anticipation of the next year's revenue, but found it could not raise the loan in New York; and in order to pay the salary of the Supreme Court judges, the Governor had to borrow from the Western Reserve Bank, the only sound financial institution in the state. Furthermore, all proposals for a great canal across the state to connect the Ohio River and Lake Erie were embarrassed by local opposition from those who feared that the canal


2. Brown to C.G. Haines, Columbus, 1 Nov. 1821, EABP; Pease to Hitchcock, Hillsborough, 16 May 1821, PHFP.
would not benefit them, though they would have to help pay for it if the state alone built it. The friends of the canal had the scheme postponed in the Assembly of 1820–21, not because the majority of the members were opposed, but because it was felt, sensibly, that the undertaking must have a large majority in its favour and the full backing of public opinion in order to ensure that the work was not embarrassed once it had been begun - and to encourage outside investors.  

Even so, most prominent Ohioans felt it was worth pressing ahead, in spite of the popular demands for economy and low taxation. Hammond argued that government spending on public works, not retrenchment, offered the best way out of the depression. One Cincinnatian even argued that deficit spending, financed by borrowing "abroad," would bring money into the state, "and thereby tend to relieve instead of increase the pressure of the times"; the interest paid to outsiders "would be more than counterbalanced by the increased activity it would give the productive industry of the community." Newspaper editors and correspondents continued to argue the general benefits of canals, until most Ohio farmers could see the advantages of a canal at the foot of their fields; though too many publicists and politicians combined plans for ambitious public works with a Jeffersonian demand for small, cheap government. The canal lobby led by Brown developed close contacts with the New York canallers, including DeWitt Clinton himself, and received assurances that Ohio could raise in New York the capital needed for the canals, as long as the faith of the state were pledged and specific funds established for paying interest and capital. The project was 'developmental' and its profitability would not

3. Brown to C. G. Haines, Columbus, 7 Feb. 1821, and idem to Clinton, Columbus, 15 Feb. 1821, EABP.

4. Hammond, in Greer, "Panic of 1819," 236-37; David McClellan to Brown, Cincinnati, 13 Mar. 1820, EABP.

be regarded as certain by investors; returns had to be guaranteed from
tax revenues, not canal tolls. From the beginning almost, the canal lobby
had determined to keep the project in the hands of the state rather than
incorporate a private company for the purpose: not only would this give the
profits to the state, it would also satisfy the anti-monopoly feeling
strong in Ohio in the aftermath of the Panic. As State Auditor Ralph Osborn
said, a canal company would be "a monopoly in the hands of a few individuals
worse by far than a dozen Branch Banks within a State but the two connected
would be a gigantic aristocracy, the consequences of which no one can fore-
see or tell." On this basis, the Assembly took the first step in January
1822, and agreed to establish a Canal Commission to investigate the
practicability of the various routes proposed.

The most serious problem the Commission had to face was that of
overcoming the sectional tensions within the state, which made the choice
of route highly delicate. The creation of the Commission had met surprising
opposition from representatives from the Miami country, while James Wilson
in the House consistently opposed the project as of no interest to the
eastern margin of the state. The appointment of commissioners led to
arguments in the legislature, but in practice the main interests were all
given some representation. Micajah T. Williams and Alfred Kelley were
important as representatives of Cincinnati and the Western Reserve,
respectively, but the crucial figure in many ways was Benjamin Tappan -
a scientific improver who was intellectually committed to the canal
project, but also a firm old Democrat and, above all, a man whose interests
were identified intimately with Steubenville and eastern Ohio.
The canal lobby even accepted Worthington as the Scioto Valley representative

6. R. Osborn to Brown, Columbus, 31 Jan. 1823; Brown to Haines, Columbus,
20 Sept. 1820, EABP.
7. M.T. Williams to Brown, Columbus, 27 Jan. 1822, EABP.
on the Commission, though they regretted it when he became chairman for a year: a "bad selection, but necessary," Kelley thought, as the "only way to silence his opposition," Worthington was mistrusted as selfish and ambitious, and too eager to hand the business over to a private company. The canal lobby worked privately to prevent Worthington's further political advancement, even opposing his campaign for governor in 1822.8

Initially the commissioners believed that public opinion could be concentrated most easily on a central route, connecting Lake and River by the Scioto and Sandusky rivers. They gave careful attention to all other routes, and were able to rule out the short eastern route because the only practicable route would strike the Ohio in Pennsylvania. Then, in the summer of '22, came the awkward discovery: there was not enough water at the summit of the central route to carry the canal across the Sandusky plains. As Alfred Kelley reported in August 1822, "I much fear the difficulties which present themselves to the construction of a canal over the Sandusky and Scioto summit and west of the Scioto, will prevent a combination of interest sufficient to make one on any route." The commissioners persisted in trying to find ways round the problem because "it would be more easy to unite the various and opposite interests in the Legislature upon ... the middle route," but by September 1823 they had given it up.9 However, the "canal spirit" was strong enough to "stand the shock of want of water on Sandusky summit," though the people who lived on the Sandusky route were very dissatisfied and charged the commissioners with corruptly preferring routes that would benefit each others' property. In the end, the commissioners came up with an ingenious proposal:


9. Kelley to Brown, Medina, 13 Aug., 13 Dec. 1822, EABP; Williams to Trimble, Cincinnati, 15 Aug. 1822, Trimble Correspondence, 192; Brown to Whittlesey, 18 Mar., 31 July 1822, EWP; Williams to Worthington, Columbus, 19 Sept. 1823, TWP.
the canal was to run up the all-important Scioto Valley, cross Licking summit (itself not well supplied with water) into the Tuscarawas Valley and finally cross the old Indian portage into the Cuyahoga, though alternative routes across the Reserve were kept open; and to satisfy the Miami country, a short canal would be built from Cincinnati to Dayton which might be extended to the Maumee at some future date. This proposal interested a large number of counties and therefore representatives in carrying through the canal scheme, but it could never have been successful in the face of determined and united opposition from the counties that would not immediately benefit.

The most powerful opposition came from those eastern counties with poor agricultural land. Under the crude system of rating land for tax purposes used since 1803, taxes bore little relation to the real value of lands. Hence the wealthier southwestern counties were undertaxed and the hill counties of the southeast overtaxed: it was estimated that in 1815 Hamilton, Butler and Warren would have paid $17,915 and Athens, Gallia and Washington only $2,952 in taxes, if the land tax had been ad valorem; in fact, the former had paid only $5,735 compared with the latter's $8,397! Obviously the heavy expenditure involved in the canal scheme would be ruinous to these poorer counties, and there was much to be said for making those who were to benefit directly from the canals pay for them. Moreover, an ad valorem system would allow the state to benefit from the expected rise in property values along the line of the canal, and so expand its tax-base. The need for a just system was argued eloquently by old Ephraim Cutler of Washington County, and the matter taken up in 1823. However, he failed to get his bill through the Assembly of 1823-24, and it became obvious that tax reform would pass only with support from the canal lobby. Since the canallers were persuaded by now of the necessity of the ad valorem system, the two measures were bound together. Both

were finally to pass together, with Cutler having "the address to keep
the tax law in the lead." 11

A further measure that became packaged with the canal project was
school reform. In 1821 a permissive act had authorized the establishment
of school districts and the levying of local taxation for educational
purposes, but this was regarded as falling well short of the state's
constitutional obligation to foster education. Many people wanted a
mandatory act establishing a more systematic organization of school districts,
but were faced by strong resistance from some religious groups like the
Quakers, by poor settlers of Southern origin, and by those who said "let
every man school his own children." The canal lobby was naturally sympathetic
to proper educational provision, and those keen on schools could usually
appreciate the value of a canal system. Not surprisingly, therefore, both
measures prospered together; according to Caleb Atwater, the establishment
of a commission to look into a common school system was proposed in the
House within fifteen minutes of the resolution for a canal commission, "and
they passed into laws simultaneously" in 1822. Some disagreement arose over
the future of the school lands that had been given to the state by Congress
to maintain education: leasing the lands had proved unproductive and improvers
agreed that they should be sold, if legally possible, and turned into cash;
but should that money be used for the canals, and the school fund be financed
out of canal tolls? This issue forced a choice between schools and canals,
the canalers dropped their proposal, and both groups concentrated on
persuading the Assembly to ask Congress's permission to sell the school lands.
In the end, the alliance between the two improvements was maintained, and
probably served to bring to the canal project the support of some New
Englanders, some Presbyterians and city-dwellers who were not otherwise
particularly enthusiastic about the specific proposals made by the canal

Williams to Brown, Columbus, 14 Jan. 1825, EABP.
Even with these allies the canal project still had to be accepted by a legislature which, in the early 1820s, was economy-minded and conscious of the populace's suspicions of schemes dreamed up by politicians. Moreover, in twenty years of statehood, the Ohio legislature had never endowed a college, built a bridge, or made a decent road — let alone build two canals that would cost nearly one-tenth of the total taxable property in the state! Neither the Assembly of 1822-23 nor that of 1823-24 did much to further the project, though they kept the Commission in being and voted money for surveys; as Tappan said, "with such bodies we must have patience and not expect too much." The canal lobby recognized that the people must be agitated, must be made to "understand the real situation"; they saw the "spread of popular zeal" as "essential to the progress and success of the attempt to get the state to embark on the enterprise." After the frustrations of the 1823-24 session, the 'improvement men' laboured to focus the electorate's mind on the need for a prompt decision. According to Caleb Atwater, "Not less than seventy writers for our newspapers ... urged the necessity on the people":

During the next summer and autumn, the contest about the sale of the school lands, the school system, the canal, and an equitable mode of taxation, was warm and animated, but the friends of these measures, triumphed over all opposition at the polls in the October election of 1824. Large majorities were elected in both houses, friendly to


13. Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette, 25, 29 July, 8 Aug. 1823; Emelius O. Randall and Daniel J. Ryan, History of Ohio (New York, 1912), III, 347. The calculation is based on the 1826 valuation of property, under the new system.

14. Tappan to Williams, Steubenville, 11 Mar. 1823, MTWP.

15. Williams to Brown, Cincinnati, 21 Feb. 1822, EABP; Williams to Tappan, Cincinnati, 22 Feb. 1823, BTP, LC; and Williams to Trimble, Zanesville, April 1824, in Trimble Correspondence, 193.
these highly beneficial measures. These measures were carried through the general assembly and the greatest revolution, politically, was effected that our history offers to the reader.

Indeed, there were "many new faces," and "only ten old members in the house"; according to Cutler, "the unanimity which has prevailed has never had ... its parallel in our legislature." The tax reform passed the two houses by votes of 60-9 and 26-8, the school act by 46-24 and 28-8, and the canal project 58-13 and 34-2. 16

The size of these majorities owed much to events after the meeting of the Assembly - news of the financial success of New York's great canal, Governor Morrow's urging, and the careful granting of road appropriations to counties not benefitting from the canal scheme. Yet the fact remains that most legislators knew full well that a "fever" was "raging ... for canalling," and that they could vote for the scheme without fear of their constituents' wrath. 17 Public interest in the doings of the Assembly had been roused to its height by the compensation issue as well as by the improvement campaign; and the elections of 1824 had seen the largest statewide turnout in Ohio up to that date - 59 per cent of adult white males voted for governor, reflecting the contest for state representatives. Popular satisfaction in most counties with the work of the 1824-25 Assembly strongly suggests that the voters and politicians of Ohio had learned that positive government programmes offered them the only way of transforming their situation, ending their economic isolation, and at last climbing out of debt and depression.

Thus the great crisis of 1819-21, and the depression which persisted thereafter, proved a many-sided experience which deeply affected the

attitude of Ohioans to politics. The economic crisis had sharpened social
tensions in the state; distress had created a mass of discontents among
ordinary people; and prejudices against the wealthy, the learned, the
professional, and the mercantile had been confirmed. However, although
these discontents found explicit expression in local politics, especially in
1822, they were otherwise in most places, for the time being at least,
submerged beneath an unwonted sectional unity. The Missouri Crisis had
stimulated the general distaste for slavery and made Ohioans conscious of
their differences with the South, while the campaign for protective tariffs
and federally-financed internal improvements had revealed the hostility of
the dominant interests in most of the seaboard states. Clearly the federal
government must be placed in sound hands to correct the evils and weaknesses
demonstrated by the crisis; and this commitment to securing new national
policies and new leadership ensured that Ohioans would approach the forth­
coming Presidential election with unaccustomed interest. In doing so, as
time would tell, they were laying the seed-bed of two new national parties.
The Presidential election of 1824 was undeniably a contest of personalities, but those personalities gained widespread political support only because they were identified with the various sectional interests which had been competing since 1819 to control the federal government. By the beginning of 1823 leading Ohio politicians saw the forthcoming Presidential contest as between three main sectional candidates - William H. Crawford for the South, John Quincy Adams for the North, and Henry Clay for the West. In choosing among them, Ohioans were influenced by the lessons learned in the great crisis - in particular, by their general desire to reduce the political influence of the slave states and impose genuinely national policies that would promote the internal development of the United States. However, their agreement on these ends did not include agreement on the order of priorities, or on the best political instruments with which to achieve those ends; and these differences were to influence profoundly the development of parties in the 1820s. But, for most of the state's leaders in 1824, it was obvious which of the candidates was most likely to further Ohio's interests and well-being.

The Contest for the American System

The campaigns of the improvement party within Ohio heightened, rather than reduced, popular interest in securing favourable policies from the general government. Federal aid in any form for the canal project would lessen Ohio's tax burden and increase the chances of successful completion. Congress still had to vote money to extend the National Road across Ohio, even though the route had now been located. Other projects deserved support,
like Great Lake harbours and lighthouses and the improvement of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. In addition, American manufacturing needed a protective tariff, and those hoping to develop a woollen industry in Ohio appreciated that canals would increase British competition in the West if import duties on woollens were not raised. A system of measures to build up the "domestic" economy was more necessary than ever, but, as one Kentucky Congressman said, "nothing in that way may be hoped for until the power of the West be felt."

As expected, the reapportionment of 1822, following publication of the 1820 census, gave extra seats to the Western and Middle Atlantic states, at the expense of New England and the South. As a consequence, Ohio Congressmen could tell their opponents in the lame-duck Congress of 1822-23 that resistance was futile, for everyone knew that "Our increased representation will give a decided majority next year to the friends of manufactures" and internal improvements. This prospect explains why the older sections were so eager to win control of the Presidency, and why the Southeast in particular was becoming increasingly devoted to states' rights; as Hammond said, the census made Southern folk wince. The shift in the balance of power at Washington was felt first in the Congress which met in December 1823. The older sections made a considerable struggle to protect their interests, but in the end Senator Ruggles could report that "we have been very fortunate in succeeding in most of our western views." An appropriation of $75,000 to improve the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers was passed on the principle that these rivers were 'seas' and therefore as

2. J.C. Wright to Hammond, Steubenville, 20 Dec. 1820, CHP.


eligible for federal support as the Atlantic coast. On "the subject of more importance to the West than any other," the General Survey Act appropriated $30,000 to employ United States Army engineers ("now idle, but under pay") in surveying possible routes for internal improvements, while the bitterly opposed Tariff Act got the long expected protection to home manufactures that Ohioans had asked for, though not at the levels, certainly on woollens, that they would have liked. 5 And as far as Ohio itself was concerned, the session had not produced everything necessary: there was no special aid for the Ohio canals, and all moves for the extension of the National Road were defeated. 6

Ohio's political spokesmen were quite clear about the nature of the alignment in Congress. John C. Wright, elected in 1822 for the new Steubenville district, identified Ohio and the Northwestern states as part of "the great interest of the middle states": "I say middle for the north & east, strange as it may seem, appear to be espousing southern policy."

Such an analysis was confirmed by voting behaviour in Congress, which Ohio's representatives and newspapers made a point of reporting. On the General Survey Act, the opposition came from the South Atlantic states (excluding Maryland and Delaware), though there was some support from the western counties; they were joined by the New England states and by New York, which was building the Erie Canal out of its own resources and had no desire to contribute, through federal taxation, to building possible rivals. The


7. J.C. Wright to B. Tappan, Washington, 29 Mar. 1824, BTP, LC.
and the Middle Atlantic states (excluding New York) were almost unanimous in their support of internal improvements. The tariff bill produced an alignment that was somewhat more complex than this simple East/West division: the heart of the opposition remained the South Atlantic states, but they now found allies in the Southwestern states, while New England was evenly divided; support came virtually unanimously from the Northwest (plus Kentucky) and from Pennsylvania, joined now by the bulk of the New York delegation. Niles remarked on the similarities of this voting to that on the tariff in 1818; the main change was the falling off in support in New England and New York. This shrewd observer identified the opposition as coming from the tobacco, cotton and sugar states, alongside the three "Navigating and fishing states" of Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine, which feared a higher tariff might injure overseas commerce. In favour of protection were the "Manufacturing" states of Rhode Island and Connecticut, and the "Grain growing" states -- the Northwestern and Middle Atlantic states, together with Vermont, Kentucky and parts of Maryland and Tennessee. Such firm evidence fully justified newspapers like the Cleveland Herald in seeing "the farming interests of the Middle and Western States" as in contention with "the commercial monopoly of the East" and "the cotton growers of the South." 

As the Presidential election of 1824 approached, Ohioans saw each sectional interest putting forward its own candidate, and appreciated that the result could deeply influence their own welfare. John C. Wright prophesied that the Western states favourable to tariff and internal improvements

8 Niles' Weekly Register, XXV (21 Feb. 1824), 387, copying an unspecified Ohio paper; XXVI (17, 24 Apr., 1, 15 May 1824), 112, 113-14, 127, 137, 173. See also Clay to Hammond, 22 Feb. 1824, Clay Papers, III, 655.

9 Cleveland Herald, 22 Oct. 1824, in Annals, VII, 126.
can elect the President as certain as fate, if they keep united, and can carry an influence that will be felt throughout the next administration; but distract the Western whites and all hope is gone. / some different sections of the country unite a vote as soon the true men are holding office selecting Ohio building principles for the ten succeeding years. 0

This analysis was to prove remarkably acute, and certainly its interpretation of the coming contest was widely echoed; as the Cleveland Herald had said in 1822 of the coming Presidential election, "Every consideration is now subordinate to the great distinction between south, east, and the west."

Ohioans' undoubted awareness of their regional interests made them look askance at most candidates: "Opposition to the protection of the internal interests of the country is equally to be feared, whether it proceeds from the commercial men of the East or the cotton growers of the South." On this, Ohioans were united: as the new editor of the Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette, Charles Hammond, commented in 1824,

So far as we have been able to learn the sentiments of the editors of this state, we believe, however they may differ on other subjects, that they pretty generally agree in this one important point:-- that we ought to support that man for the Presidency, other things being equal, who will most effectually encourage domestic manufactures and internal improvements.

Or, more succinctly, in Ohio "internal improvements is made the test of the election." 12

If this test were to be applied, one candidate stood head and shoulders above the rest. Henry Clay not only lived in a neighbouring state which was aligned with Ohio on the leading sectional issues in Congress, but had "clearly manifested" his sentiments in favour of protective tariff and internal

10. J.C. Wright to Tappan, Washington, 29 Mar. 1824, BTP, LC.


12. Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette, 6 Jan., 10 Feb. 1824.
improvements in his speeches before Congress, and was to give the policy its most effective name -- the American System. In comparison, the other candidates had done little to further the interests of the West, and certainly had not put their political lives on the line as Clay had done. As a result, by 1823, almost all the state's Congressmen, leading politicians from all the old factions and parties, and many leading newspapers had made clear their preference for the Kentucky candidate. The only question was how best to advance his candidacy.

Rejection of the Good Old Party

Most Ohio Republicans had little theoretical objection to the nominating procedures traditionally used by their party in Presidential elections. Congressional caucuses were all very well, as long as they were genuinely representative and chose a nationally acceptable candidate. Unfortunately, the party was now deeply divided, and was unlikely to be united if the regular practice of choosing a member of the outgoing administration -- so far always the Secretary of State -- were once more adopted. As John C. Wright asked in 1822, "Must we have a Secretary to rule over us, or shall we be permitted to choose for ourselves?" The dominant voices in the party nationally had usually come from Virginia and New York, and by 1823 it was clear that leading Virginian politicians wanted the Virginia-born Crawford of Georgia as their candidate to continue the Virginia Dynasty, while the regular Republicans of New York -- the Bucktails led by Martin Van Buren --


1. Wright to Brown, Steubenville, 11 Apr. 1822, CHP.
were willing to go along with them for the sake of party unity. Ought Clay's supporters to submit his claims to a party caucus which was likely to be dominated by a hostile sectional interest? If they did, would they not be obliged to accept the successful candidate, almost certainly Crawford? Would they not be better off ignoring traditional party discipline, damning the caucus as an illegitimate and aristocratic device, and maintaining Clay's claims all the way to the ballot box—especially as there was no Federalist in the field? Admittedly, such a determination on the part of all the candidates would ensure that not one would have a majority in the Electoral College, but, if he were one of the top three, Clay's position as Speaker of the House would make him the almost certain victor in the House election that would settle the stalemate. 2

What made it certain that Ohio would ignore any attempt to impose a single Republican candidacy was the unpopularity there of the likely nominee, the Secretary of the Treasury. Subsequently politicians were to recall that, in the 1824 election, "A suspicion of attachment to or respect for Mr. Crawford, who was regarded as the southern candidate, was looked upon as a most heinous political sin." In December 1822 the Cleveland Herald explained its own opposition to Crawford as arising, not because he was "the Southern candidate," but because he held views on economic policy hostile to the interests of the grain-growing states. 3 Actually, Crawford's personal views were never publicly advertised, and his friends insisted that privately he favoured internal improvements and protective tariffs. 4 But that was not the point: as the


4. Ruggles to Worthington, Washington, March 1824, TWP.
This general attitude was properly reflected by Ohio's representatives in Congress. For some years they had been in the habit of consulting together, firstly over federal appointments and more recently, as the benefits of a united stand became more obvious, over legislative tactics and voting. In December 1823 the House delegation held a secret meeting in which, according to Congressman John Patterson, they revealed first "the wishes of their districts" and then of themselves: "14 members present 11 opposed to a caucus 3 in favour, so it was determined not to give countenance to a caucus." Together with others "who are opposed to King Caucus," they even tried to pass a Congressional resolution against the practice. When one was called, they met again: "Messrs. Vance, McArthur and Ross were disposed to attend / the caucus /, but concluded to conform to the wishes of a majority of their colleagues." However, United States Senator Benjamin Ruggles, who had not at first been in favour of a caucus, now felt that the old party machinery should not be ignored, and he determined to attend.

5. Scioto Gazette, 21 Oct. 1824. The "A.B. Plot" against Crawford, in which Calhoun's friends tried to stir up Western anti-bank feeling, seems to have had little impact in Ohio, where some saw Crawford's policy as having been helpful to the people as well as the banks: Ruggles to Hammond, Washington, 28 Apr. 1824, and Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 3, 7 May 1824, CHP.


7. John Patterson, 3 Feb. 1824, Whittlesey, 14 Feb. 1824, Wright, 26 Jan. 1824, all to Hammond from Washington, CHP. See also Ruggles to Worthington, Washington, 20 Jan. 1823, TWP.
Juggles was a New Englander, born in 1792 in moderate circumstances, who had studied law and then moved to Marietta in 1807. More skilled as a "consulting attorney ... in chambers" than as "an advocate ... in open court," he was elected by the "swelling" Democrats of 1812 to replace Dunn on the bench, moved to St. Clairsville, and was promoted to the United States Senate in 1815. He elected in 1821 and a close political friend of Martin Van Buren, Ruggles became deeply alarmed, as the "presidential campaign went on, by the "partisan warfare that has been kept up so long in favor of each of the candidates, and the ill-blood and bitterness of feeling which it has created." As he explained to Charles Hammond,

I know of no successful attempts at reconciliation or compromise, among the friends of the different candidates as yet. Each candidate seems to try his own bottom with the people in the first instance, and then measure strength in the last resort in the House of Representatives. I need not inform you that I sincerely deplore such a result. It is a hazardous game to conscience - the stake is too great ... bad shuffling foul play and downright corruption may be the consequence.

Hence Ruggles agreed with "many of the oldest and most substantial Republicans that an attempt ought to be made here in Washington in the old way to concentrate in some measure, if possible, public sentiment on this issue." Wanting "the republicans to act together," he thought "no mode ... appears less exceptionable than the old-fashioned and long-practised one." He was friendly to Clay's interests, but regretted that Clay was "not disposed to meet his brethren in caucus, and harmonize with the great republican family." 9

Ruggles not only attended the infamous caucus of February 1824, he

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9. Ruggles from Washington: to Hammond, 1 Jan. 1824, CHP; to Cutler, 8 Feb. 1824, in Cutler, Ephraim Cutler, 184-85; to Worthington, 5 Feb. 1824, TWP.
The guidance of the caucus was, however, almost uniformly ignored in Ohio. Its decision was damned when forty-seven of the fifty-two representatives who attended it voted against the General Survey bill, and thus against the cause of internal improvements. As Philemon Beecher gleefully told his protégé, "The Caucus folks begin to feel bad they begin to see that party, party, party names have not their usual charm." Ruggles himself was widely condemned for his participation in the caucus, and men in his own neighborhood began to whisper maliciously:

The Caucus expired in pains and in struggles, The birth was abortion, the Granny was Ruggles.

The situation that had arisen was exactly what one Clay Congressman had foreseen:

... this opposition to southern politicians is not the work of any political association of men who impose their notions on the people, but ... the spontaneous effusion of public sentiment. That


bring the case would it not be folly to give up
Mr. Clay & take Mr. Crawford who is identified with
the southern policy. In Ohio it will not do, men of
political standing will not hazard all by such a
course. The idea that a few, the very few, friends
Mr. Crawford has in the State can by beating up
for old fashioned democrats be able to carry him
against Mr. Adams in all the result of such tender
attachment to the man which will promote some of them
to recommend a game of this kind to the overthrow of
all who engage in it. 14

Not unnaturally, the three Republican leaders in Ohio who were most
friendly to Crawford refused to commit political suicide for him. Thomas
Worthington was a personal friend of Crawford, and had encouraged Ruggles
to support, if not engineer, the meeting of the caucus and its nomination.
Jeremiah Morrow, who had become widely respected during his sixteen years
of representing Ohio in Congress, had himself chaired the caucus which
ominated Monroe in 1816; he too was counted as a friend of Crawford in 1824.
But neither he nor Worthington saw any point in publicly campaigning for a
candidate who could not carry Ohio. 15 William Henry Harrison as well was
favourably inclined to Crawford, but felt that the people of Ohio could not
at this time be persuaded to vote for the Georgian. By policy Harrison
supported Clay and accepted nomination as one of the Senatorial electors on
the Clay ticket. 16 By October even Ruggles was claiming to be "using every
exertion in favor of the Clay ticket," since he was quite willing to acquiesce
in the people's preference. 17

Only in one part of Ohio were strenuous efforts made to promote the
claims of the caucus candidate. Most of the Zanesville Legitimates were
friendly to Crawford and determined to support the regular nominee of the

15. Ruggles to Worthington, Washington, 15 Feb. 1824, TWP; Sears, Worthington,
220, 221; Zanesville Express, 23 Mar. 1816; Scioto Gazette, 21 Oct. 1824.
17. Ruggles to Hammond, St. Clairsville, 9 Oct. 1824, CHP.
national party. Throughout 1822 and 1823 their mouthpiece, the Muskingum Messenger, rebuked the general tendency to discuss the question of Monroe's successor in sectional terms; what mattered, it argued, was not which section the next President came from, but that he should be a true confederate. In particular, the editor regretted seeing good Republicans "making their decision on northern and southern grounds," for this was "a distinction that should never be made by anyone who makes the least pretensions of friendship for his country or who wishes a continuance of its union." He far preferred that the contest take place "between the friends and enemies of roads, canals and domestic manufactures," but he hoped that the West, while pressing the claims of its favourite candidate, would accept the decision of the Congressional caucus. "This is the plain old republican path, and a deviation from it may be dangerous to the party and to the interests of the nation." If the official nominee be not accepted, "it will tend to dismember and weaken" the Republican party, and open a wide door for the admission of its opponents.18

However, the people of Muskingum County, as the Messenger itself acknowledged, were deeply interested in the fortunes of the American System. Protective tariffs would foster the industrial development of Zanesville which, with its glass works and potteries, with salt, coal and clay in the surrounding hills, was already being called "the Birmingham of Ohio" and the "Lowell of the West"; while the extension of the National Road across Ohio and through Muskingum would benefit the whole county, including its many grain farmers.19 As early as 1821 two leading Republican office-


holders in the Zanesville Land Office had made known their opposition to Crawford's claims. and David Chambers, former editor of the Messenger, had fallen out with his legitimate colleagues, probably over the policy to be adopted in view of the growing sectionalization of politics. Chambers apparently submitted and gained legitimate support for his election as Congressman in the special election of 1821, but he then came into conflict with Van Buren and Hamm over the control of county offices. The result was the embittered Congressional election in 1822, when "the greatest excitement prevailed that was ever known in our county on a like occasion," and the division in Muskingum allowed the election of the Federalist Philemon Beecher, the favourite of Fairfield County with which Muskingum was now linked. Behind this conflict among the Legitimates may well have lain Chambers' awareness of the impending struggle over the Presidency. At any rate, in January 1823 Chambers brought out a new newspaper, the Ohio Republican, which the following May declared for Henry Clay. If he succeeded, wrote Chambers, "we should equally avoid the risk of having our interest prostrated by the mercantile and shipping interests of the North, or the anti-manufacturing spirit of the cotton-growers in the South." The critical confrontation came on February 28, 1824, when the regulars called a meeting to endorse the caucus nomination. Samuel Herrick took the chair, but soon found that a large majority of those present disapproved of that nomination. He refused to put any question to the meeting, on the ground that, though the meeting had been called by Republicans, a number of Federalists were present. The opposition argued that it would be invidious


21. Hammond to Wright, St. Clairsville, 30 Sept. 1821, CHP; Messenger, 30 July - 12 Nov. 1822; 23 Oct. 1823. See Map 4.2.

"to forget them out; and their numbers could in no material manner affect the result of the meeting." In the end the regulars and their supporters, about thirty in number, retired from the meeting, leaving it in possession of over 330 opponents, who then passed resolutions condemning the caucus because it had represented the opinions of only a minority of Congressmen. The regulars held a separate meeting, approved the nomination of Crawford, justified attempts to secure party unity, called for party support throughout Ohio, and even appointed a ten-man committee of correspondence for the county. In the election, however, Clay won 1,102 of the 1,365 votes cast in Muskingum, and Crawford received none. Moreover, in the Congressional race of that year, John Hamm and the regulars once more used "unceasing exertions" to prevent Chambers' election, and once more Beecher was elected - but this time, as an incumbent who had proved his loyalty to Clay and the American System, Beecher received "a good support in Muskingum" from "democrats in the country and party men too." Clearly the Legitimate regulars had lost control on national questions, for loyalty to the party of 1800 was now less powerful than the sectionalist attitudes of their constituents.

The futility of Crawford's cause in Ohio left his friends with only one recourse. In October, with Van Buren's approval, Ruggles confidentially approached Charles Hammond, "the most prominent supporter of Mr. Clay in this State." Pointing out that Clay was now likely to come fourth in the Electoral College and so would be excluded from a House election, he suggested that the Clay electors vote for Crawford: Clay and Crawford were, after all, personally congenial and in many respects natural allies, while

23. Western Herald, 13, 30 Mar. 1824; Ohio Republican, as quoted in Niles' Weekly Register, XXVI (20 Mar. 1824), 39.

many men in both camps saw the other as their second choice. Hammond, however, considered that the unpopularity of Crawford in Ohio rendered such a course impossible:

I cannot assert that the Clay electors would not vote for Crawford were Mr. Clay withdrawn, but I am strongly of opinion that many of them would not. They look forward to future political importance and they would not have courage to do good, at the risk of their own personal standing.

In any case, Clay's opponents in Ohio and Indiana had asserted that the Clay electors would vote for Crawford, and the Clay men had repeatedly had to deny it. Even General Harrison, who might be expected to sympathise with such a coalition, had published a denial, as had Hammond himself and other Clay leaders. A coalition was thus out of the question, and the mere rumour of it a political liability. Indeed, in the end Clay himself was to explain the disappointing narrowness of his victory in Ohio partly in terms of the fear that a vote for him might turn out to be a vote for the one candidate who was absolutely unacceptable to the people of Ohio.

The whole election campaign of 1824 clearly demonstrated that the old Republican party was dead, destroyed by the sectional tensions of the early 1820s. As the Cincinnati Advertiser argued,

Thus we see that the old party landmarks are broken down, and others driven and distinctly marked. The friends of internal improvements and domestic manufactures are one party, and should unite upon one of the present candidates for president, as their rallying point . . . .

But could they, even in Ohio?

25. Ruggles to Hammond, St. Clairsville, 9 Oct. 1824, CHP.
27. Clay to Francis Brooke, 26 Nov. 1824, Clay Papers, III, 887. See also Supporter and Scioto Gazette, 18 Nov. 1824.
Henry Clay had every confidence in Ohio's vote in the Presidential election. Affable and dynamic, articulate and full of animal spirits, he was very much the political hero of the many Westerners who knew him. E.D. Mansfield thought Clay's extraordinary personal charm and popular touch should have earned him the title of "the GREAT COMMONER"; his "frankness, courage and gallantry" ensured that no other man "attracted so strongly so many personal followers."¹ His support in the Buckeye State ranged from the most prominent old Federalists - with Charles Hammond, "their head man," a hardworking Clay organizer and publicist who in 1824 became the new editor of the Cincinnati Gazette - to some of the oldest and most respected of the old Democratic newspapers. Most of the state's prominent politicians - especially those who had served in Washington - and most of the state's lawyers, many of whom had met him on business, were his ardent supporters.²

In his correspondence with politicians from other states, he emphasized the unanimity and steadfastness of his support in Ohio, which he claimed was at least as enthusiastic as Kentucky; as late as the eve of the election, he could predict an overwhelming victory.³

In the event, Clay carried the state, but with only 38.49 per cent of the vote. Andrew Jackson, who appeared late on the scene in Ohio and whose chances there Clay had always scorned, ran him close with 35 per cent, while John Quincy Adams secured the remaining quarter.⁴ This opposition to Clay's candidacy in 1824 reflected political forces that were to be central to the Second Party System in Ohio, its characteristics and its functioning. One,

¹ Mansfield, Personal Memories, 211, 215, 218. See also Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 27 July 1825, CHP.
² Delaware Patron, 7, 21 Oct. 1824, and in Ripley Castigator, 19 Oct. 1824; Scioto Gazette, 3 June, 9 Sept. 1824; Worthington to John McLean, 1 June 1826, John McLean Papers, LC.
⁴ Harry R. Stevens, The Early Jackson Party in Ohio, 167-68. See also Appendix III.
whatever it was in the state which sustained the Jacksonian opposition party, is the subject of the next chapter. The other, the tough, embittered, populistic campaign to give Adams the state's Electoral vote, expressed a tension—and, indeed, a quandary—which was to be the leading characteristic of the National Republican and then the Whig party. If in 1824 sectional identity was the prime political force, Clay the candidate of the West and Adams of the North, to which section did Ohio belong—West or North?

The trouble was that Clay lived in a slave state, owned slaves, and was generally considered responsible for the compromises which had allowed slavery to expand into the Louisiana Purchase. Joseph Richardson of Columbiana, Speaker of the Ohio House between 1822 and 1824, claimed that "as for H. Clay had the vote of Ohio been taken at the heels of the Missouri business he could not have recd. fifty votes." In October 1822 John Sloane told Clay "were it not the recollection of the Missouri question there would scarcely be a dissenting voice" in eastern Ohio to his election. In November John C. Wright suggested to Clay that Kentucky political leaders should send a public letter to their Ohio counterparts, "urging the claims of the west.... & mollifying, if possible your Missouri vote & slave residence." Later the same month Rufus King's son, now a lawyer in Chillicothe, told his father that "Ohio is decided at present for Mr. Clay.... If however the Missouri question should present itself, in the contest, Ohio probably would leave her favourite and support Mr. Adams."5

This opposition to Clay on antislavery grounds was unfortunately crippled by its lack of an appropriate Northern candidate. John Quincy Adams was considered hostile, or at least ambivalent, to Western interests, for through 1822 and '23 he made no statement on tariff or internal improvements.

According to the *Painesville Telegraph* in April 1824, "there is at present not a shadow of evidence before the American people, that Mr. Adams will lend a friendly voice to raise our country from its servile dependence on foreigners, to a state of independence and wealth, relying upon our own abundant resources." His supporters pointed out that in 1807 Adams, a United States Senator, had proposed a general system of internal improvements, but were embarrassed to discover he had voted against specific projects helpful to the West, including the National Road. "The truth is," said the *Cincinnati Gazette* in February, "Mr. Adams has no claims on the Western people for anything he has ever done to promote their interests or views of internal policy. On all occasions where he has had an opportunity, he has been directly against them." In May John McLean, since 1823 Postmaster-General, gained from Adams a written statement expressing his views on internal improvements, and asked if he could forward them to his brother William, who was on the Adams Electoral ticket in Ohio; Adams "had no objection, but wished him only not to suffer it to get into the newspapers"! In June Adams at last wrote to a resident of Washington County expressing his strongly favourable views - and the letter was widely reprinted, embarrassing Adams' cause in some seaboard states. But he remained evasive on the tariff, and Ohio newspapers picked up that in Virginia Adams was presented as a free-trader; indeed, the Richmond *Constitutional Whig* was quoted as asserting that "Upon all the great questions of policy which agitate the country, the Tariff, Roads and Canals, the feelings and interests of Massachusetts and Virginia, are one and indivisible." In any case, Adams was damned by association,

6 *Painesville Telegraph*, 8 Apr. 1824; *Cincinnati Gazette*, 10 Feb., 23, 30 Apr. 1824.


once the majority of members of Congress from New England had voted against the General Survey Act; and the balance of evidence seemed to support the confident eve-of-election assertion by a Clay paper that "It has been proved, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that Adams always has been, and now is, decidedly hostile to internal improvements, and the protection of national industry." 10

But if Adams could not satisfy Western feeling, what other Northern candidate was there? DeWitt Clinton of New York was recognised as the father of internal improvements and seemed ideal - except that his prospects of attracting national support were blighted by the overwhelming power of his Bucktail enemies in his own state. In December 1822 John C. Wright informed Clay that but "one obstacle remains" to Clay's nomination by the Ohio Assembly - "and that is the idea that Clinton will be a candidate." 11 State legislators were evidently afraid of committing themselves publicly to Clay and so laying themselves open to attack if a less obviously Southern 'American System' candidate came forward. Hence on December 10, 1822, the legislators refused to make the formal nomination which the Clay leaders wanted in order to boost his national campaign. As a Clay supporter wrote, "a number of chicken hearted individuals ... either wholly refrained from voting on the subject, or voted that it was inexpedient at this time to make any nomination, lest their popularity might be impaired, and that they might have a hole through which to crawl out, by the words at this time." 12 Ohio's Congressmen blamed this result on the fact that the caucus had met before letters from Washington had had time to arrive, informing Clinton's would-be friends that he could not be regarded as a serious candidate. From a national perspective, as Levi Barber said, "The idea of some in holding

12. Scioto Gazette, 14, 21 Dec. 1822. See also Williams to Brown, Columbus, 11 Dec. 1822, and Kelley to Brown, Columbus, 13 Dec. 1822, EABP.
back in expectation that Clinton will be brought forward, is most extraordinary.\textsuperscript{13} Although a second caucus of the whole legislature voted to nominate Clay on January 3, a large number of legislators who later became prominent Clay men voted to postpone the decision, and many publicly joined Clay’s opponents in boycotting the balloting for a nominee.\textsuperscript{14} Clearly many politicians agreed with Edward King, a Clay supporter, who wrote shortly after the nomination that "the country has not so soon recovered from the Missouri question"; he thought that a cry of "No Slavery" might yet "compel Ohio and the Western free States to abandon their choice and unite in this policy."\textsuperscript{15}

The nomination inevitably was damned by those wanting a Northern candidate. "Citizens of Ohio!" declared the \textit{Barrington Telegraph}, "have you forgot the course taken by this champion on the famous Missouri question? or are you about to resign your principles for the sake of local interest?"\textsuperscript{16} The Wayne County state representative, who had voted in favour of the nomination, was overheard to say that "he for his own part was not for slavery," but "he would not care if slavery was admitted in all or every state in the Union ... if the majority wished it"; and a local rival duly made a note of the statement for future political use.\textsuperscript{17} Significantly perhaps, the few attempts to discover in advance the Presidential allegiances of candidates for the state legislature in 1823 were made mainly in newspapers friendly to Adams.\textsuperscript{18} According to John Sloane, a shrewd observer, "this

\begin{enumerate}
\item E. King to R. King, Chillicothe, 23 Jan. 1823, in C.R. King, ed., \textit{Life and Correspondence of Rufus King}, VI, 497.
\item Quoted in \textit{Delaware Patron}, 22 Jan. 1823.
\item J.H. Larwill, memorandum, 12 July 1823, LFP, OHS.
\item E.g., \textit{Ohio Monitor}, 27 Sept. 1823.
\end{enumerate}
opposition to southern politicians is not the work of any political association of men who impose their notions on the people, but ... is the spontaneous effusion of public sentiment." In Ohio even Clay leaders, like Sloane himself, had to take note of it. 19

This anti-Southernism explained Clinton's continuing appeal to many Ohioans, despite the well-grounded doubts whether he would be a candidate. In August 1823 the old Republican James Heaton claimed that nine of the state's sixteen representatives in Congress would shift to Clinton if he became a candidate. In the General Assembly of 1823-24 there was still "much manoeuvring and some shuffling -- Clinton is still spoken of as a candidate, and many are or affect to be unwilling to commit themselves to any other candidate because they prefer him." 20 The Clinton men considered calling a further legislative caucus to nominate their man in place of Clay, but discovered from a private poll that Clay would beat Clinton 48-40, with Adams securing 6, and Jackson and Calhoun 4 votes each. Instead, the Clintonians called a public meeting in Columbus which four hundred people attended. The Clay men, however, had swamped the meeting, and would have nominated him, but "The friends of Clinton then as a last resort hurled the question of Slavery at us and denounced every man who would vote for it as a friend to slavery in Ohio &c. &c. &c. This produced great excitement" - and the meeting was adjourned. 21 It was in this situation that the famous Ohio Resolutions on slavery were brought forward in January 1824 and passed overwhelmingly: these resolutions proposed that the general government, with the consent of the slave-holding states, should pass a law providing


21. James A. Paxton to McArthur, Columbus, 10 Jan. 1824, Duncan McArthur Papers, LC; Columbus Gazette, 15 Jan. 1824; Scioto Gazette, 17 Jan. 1824; Hammond to Wright, Columbus, 7 Jan. 1824, CHP.
that all post-nati children of slaves should be freed at the age of twenty-one, on condition they agreed to be transported abroad; and the expense should be borne by all the states, "upon the principle that the evil of slavery is a national one." The resolutions were not the result of any pressure from the American Colonization Society, and it is not unreasonable to suggest that these resolutions came at this time because they offered to many Ohio politicians the opportunity to demonstrate to their constituents that they were sound on slavery, even if they did support a slaveholder for the Presidency.22

Henry Clay was certainly worried by the Clintonian challenge in January 1824. Both he and other Ohio politicians appreciated that Clinton would probably not carry his own state, and that it would be stupid for Ohio to throw away her vote on someone who could not possibly win nationally. As John C. Wright said, "you might as well extract sun beams from a cucumber as elevate him to the Presidency."23 Indeed, some of those who advocated Clinton acknowledged this, and privately confessed to using Clinton as a stalking-horse for a Western candidate. In Steubenville a public meeting was called which rumour later claimed was summoned at the prompting of New York Clintonians. Benjamin Tappan and Bezaleel Wells attended and discovered antislavery sentiment to be so strong that only Adams could displace Clinton; determined to prevent the nomination of a low-tariff man, these two locally influential politicians — and woollen manufacturers — fell in with the nomination of Clinton, hoping that if Clinton proved impossible, those present at or influenced by the meeting might in time be more inclined to accept a Southern 'American System' candidate.24 Despite much persistence in eastern Ohio, the Clintonian movement finally collapsed after the New York

24. Tappan to John Sloane, Columbus, 18 Jan. 1824, Benjamin Tappan Correspondence Miscellaneous Papers, New York Public Library (microfilm, OHS).
Senate, in March, voted in effect to keep that state's Electoral votes under the control of Clinton's Bucktail enemies. Clay was thereby "relieved from all collision with him in Ohio, where he wd. have given me trouble"; and Ohioans had to make up their minds whether they preferred a Western or a Northern candidate.

A significant number of Ohioans now decided that they must opt for a Western candidate, and Clay's eloquent and manly advocacy of the American System in Congress in 1824 made him their obvious choice. Most striking was the decision of James Wilson at the Steubenville Western Herald. Angry at the outcome of Missouri controversies, Wilson had for a long time advocated Adams, but had then begun to look for someone more committed to protection, which Jefferson County's sheep reapers and woollens manufacturers sorely needed. Through 1823 he bitterly attacked the nomination of Clay, "the champion of slavery, and of the United States' Bank," and he "conjured up 'all the horrors of slavery,' in terrorem against CLAY" in an effort "to prevent, if possible, the election of a dealer in slaves." In all this Wilson was supported by those in the region who would not vote for Clay as long as they could "find another candidate free from the political sin of slavery," by, above all, the Quakers, who "nauseate so greatly at slavery in Clay." This local feeling was so strong that by early 1824 some politicos plotted to run against the incumbent Congressman John C. Wright, a Clay supporter, against whom they "must cry Slavery or be silent." At this juncture Wilson suddenly announced that, to his regret, the Missouri question would not materially affect the election in Ohio; he accepted the primacy of

27. Western Herald, 12 Apr. 1823; Hammond to Wright, 11 Dec. 1823, 18 Feb., 19 Mar., 16 Apr. 1824, CHP.
economic issues, reflecting the skill and energy with which Clay was advancing the section's interests in Congress. Clay anticipated the position of such Chicanos exactly when he wrote of the Northwestern states, "They will vote for no man residing in a Slave state but me, and they vote for me because of other & chiefly local considerations outweighing the Slave objection."

Yet many Chicanos still insisted on supporting a Northern candidate, regardless of his economic views. The decline of Clinton energized the Adams men, who apparently by late February found themselves as numerous in the General Assembly as Clay's supporters. A caucus met, made up of those members "opposed to the slave holding policy," which named a "FREE ELECTORAL TICKET" composed of some distinguished names. They developed a reasonably strong central organization, which even arranged to send copies of the Columbus Ohio Monitor to Cleveland to counteract the Cleveland Herald's Clayism. They urged their supporters to "turn out, to a man," though their organization was, in general, weak at the local level. The only exceptions came in counties like Ross where a dissident faction of politicians latched on to the Adams campaign partly as a means of embarrassing dominant local leaders who backed Clay. Indeed, Adams men were drawn in many places towards appealing to popular grievances against men in positions of influence, and to criticize Clay for being a lawyer and receiving the support of so many lawyers.

31. Delaware Patron, 29 Apr. 1824; Hammond to Wright, Columbus, 7 Jan. 1824, CHP.
33. Cleveland Herald, 6 Mar. 1823, in Annals, VI, 42; Painesville Telegraph, 4 Sept., 30 Oct. 1824. See also the extant copies of the Chillicothe Times.
Most consistently, however, the Ohio press assaulted away at the slavery theme, with the Ohio Monitor, the Delaware Patriot and Harrison Telegraph particularly virulent. Even the restrained Western Reserve Chronicle used his opposition to the extension of slavery as a distinctive argument in favor of Adams. The most revealing was a handbill Clay and Slavery: that was issued on the eve of the election damning Clay as an immoral duellist and irresponsible, inconsistent politician unacceptable to "a moral and religious people"; it gave a long recital of Clay's role in the Missouri Compromise, which it insisted opened the way to the extension of slavery not only throughout the Louisiana Purchase but even into a free state like Ohio. If that happened, the state would soon be swamped by a rapidly growing "black population" and, within sixty years, "we may expect to be called to participate in similar scenes of horror with those that have formerly been experienced in St. Domingo and Guadeloupe, which may gracious Heaven avert!" John Quincy Adams was the only candidate "both in principle and practice opposed to the extension of involuntary servitude," which, together with his experience, record of consistency and "unblemished moral character," made him the ideal President for "a grateful people." 35

This appeal was especially strong among some distinctive groups scattered all over Ohio. The election results showed Adams' support to be more generally diffused than that of Jackson or Clay, and he won a large proportion of his statewide vote in counties where he ran second. 36 In southwestern Ohio, where he carried not a single county (except Greene), there were several small but determined antislavery centres which gave him some votes. In Brown County the Presbyterians were persistently antislavery.

34. Warren (Trumbull County) Western Reserve Chronicle, 23 July 1824.


Source:
Utter, John Frontier State, p. 334.

Table 6.1: 1824 Presidential Election: The Adams Vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>1824 Adams Percent</th>
<th>1824 Clay Percent</th>
<th>1824 Jackson Percent</th>
<th>1828 Adams Percent</th>
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<tr>
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<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>73.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huron</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashtabula</td>
<td>69.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trumbull</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seneca</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geauga</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Marion</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Meigs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Athens</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuyahoga</td>
<td>35.2</td>
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Source:
Ritchie, Eliza of Voters and the Vote, 1828, p. 266.

and the Ripley Castigator, which was friendly to Adams' cause, published the "Letters On American Slavery" written by the local Presbyterian pastor, John Rankin; these articles called for immediate abolition, and were later said to have converted William Lloyd Garrison, who reprinted them in The Liberator. It was in the township containing Ripley, and in a neighbouring one where Presbyterians were also strong, that Adams gained 140 out of his 164 votes in the county. 37 The old Scottish denomination of Seceders also had an uncompromising attitude to slavery, which may explain Adams' plurality in Greene County, where the Seceders were the largest denomination and formed a large proportion of the population. 38 Adams also ran well in those southwestern counties that contained Quaker communities, such as Clinton, Highland and Warren. Indeed, the critical difference between Warren and Butler counties which (to Josiah Morrow's mystification at the beginning of Part Two) prevented the former from becoming Jacksonian was probably the presence of a significant Quaker minority, which swung the balance of power. 39 In eastern Ohio, too, the Quakers supported the free-state candidate. When a Quaker was put on a Clay committee in Belmont County, he refused to serve, on the grounds that Clay's career was "too deeply marked with the sweat of the descendants of Africa. He has contributed, by his influence and eloquence, to fasten the yoke of bondage on ... millions of that unfortunate race that are yet unborn," and the Quaker, Nehemiah Wright, was simply not "willing to sacrifice principle at


38. Howe, Historical Collections (1847 edn.), 195-96. See also R.S. Dills, History of Greene County (Dayton, 1881), 265-67; M.A. Broadstone, History of Greene County, Ohio (Indianapolis, 1918), 1, 170. This is the best explanation I have found for the "Unexplained" entry on Table 6.1, reproduced on the previous page.

the shrine of WESTERN interest."

The "most active and persevering" support for Adams, according to a Clay editor, came from "emigrants from the New England states, who have not resided in the country long enough to divest themselves of sectional partialities." This was especially true of those communities which were islands in the midst of non-New Englanders - Granville, Worthington, Putnam - where the settlers retained a heightened sense of their own ethnocultural distinctiveness. Significantly, when an Adams meeting was held in Columbus in July 1824, the audience was "brought down in carriages and wagons from Worthington, a neighbouring settlement composed chiefly of N. England emigrants." In the Ohio Company lands of southeastern Ohio Adams also ran well, perhaps because in that area there was a clear rivalry between the Yankees and the settlers from Pennsylvania and Virginia. Yet it was not merely common New England origins which turned these settlers to Adams. Initially "the Yankee interest" in Ohio was considered to have "Clinton in view," and their persistent preference for a Northern candidate owed much to the shock they had received from the result of the Missouri crisis. In fact, what the Painesville Telegraph called "the Esprit de Corps of the 'Universal Yankee Nation'" was a recent development and the phrase itself coined since 1820. Moreover, the settlements on the Western Reserve, where New Englanders predominated but had a strong sense of their cultural differences with the Pennsylvanian and German settlers immediately to the

40 Western Post, in Ripley Castigator, 24 Aug. 1824.
41 Scioto Gazette, 21 Oct. 1824.
south of them, were far from united: there the tension between an inherited sense of Northernness and a newly developing sense of being Western produced a confused and agonizing situation.

So great was the confusion that, as late as January 1824, the state's Clay leaders could not find "proper persons in the Lake Country" to put on the Electoral ticket: "At present we cannot ascertain two in whom we can confide." The sources of the uncertainty are well illustrated by Geauga County, where, the local editor later recalled, "as the people ... were nearly all New England people, it could readily be perceived that they would naturally fall into line in [Mr Adams'] behalf." The editor, Eber D. Howe of the Painesville Telegraph, determined early in 1823 "to drive back the current that was rushing along in favor of Mr Adams": his editorials began to stress the need for the next President to understand the importance of promoting domestic industry, ... whether he be born in a slave-holding state or New-England. We should much rather see this made a rallying point than the "Missouri Question," as has been done by some of our neighboring prints. ... the popularity of Mr. CLAY, is in a progressive state in the northern parts of Ohio, where the most hostility was formerly manifested towards him. ... Many ... have abandoned their attachments to Mr. Adams, after more mature deliberation on the probable effects of his administration with regard to the interests of the western and other states not immediately connected with the shipping monopoly. Howe was bitterly attacked by leading local politicians - the "Paine party" - when he refused to change his editorial policy, but his arguments were effective enough to force them to shift to Clinton, whose nomination they arranged at Chardon in January 1824. "Never," claimed Captain Paine, "did there arise a political question in this County, in which the people were

45. Whittlesey to W.W. Griswold, 7 May 1825, EWP.
46. Hammond to Wright, Columbus, 7 Jan. 1824, CHP.
47. Howe, Autobiography, 32-33; Painesville Telegraph, 5 Mar., 30 Apr. 1823.
so perfectly agreed," even if "some of our little Editors have never ceased to bespatter us with Clay, until they have disgusted every body" - and lost patrons and customers. By April, however, the 'Paine party' recognised that, "As respects the question which at this time occupies the attention of the public more than any other, ... Mr. Clinton ... ought to stand foremost: As that is now out of the question, Mr. Adams comes next." The result of the dispute brought a surprise, for Clay ran much more strongly than had been anticipated; as in the county elections of 1824, the political leaders of Geauga found that the Telegraph could use issues to reach beyond them to the voters. For whereas the Adams men had expected three quarters of the vote in each Western Reserve county, in Geauga Clay ran remarkably well in the townships closest to the Lake and overall lost the county by only 98 votes in over 800.49

Such division of opinion on the Reserve created a great quandary for Elisha Whittlesey, Congressman for the four most easterly of the Reserve counties, including Geauga. In private letters he made it clear that he wished, above all, to promote internal improvements, especially on Lake Erie, and he circulated details of Congressional voting on the General Survey Act widely among his constituents, in a tacit effort to show that "the friends of Mr. Adams and Mr. Crawford are in direct hostility to their views and interests."50 But, as an Ashtabula County politician warned him,

prudent foresight will prevent a very warm espousal of the cause of either Mr. Clay or Mr. Adams - You know of what various political characters your district is composed. You would not for the finest Clay, wish to break with your good friends the Adams-ites, ... of whom there are many, perhaps a majority in this district.51


49. Telegraph, 30 Oct., 6, 13 Nov. 1824.


51. Q.F. Atkins to Whittlesey, Jefferson, 6 Feb. 1824, EWP. See also Eli T. Boughton to id., Canfield, 16 Jan. 1824, ibid.
## Table 6.2: 1824 Presidential Election

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<th>National Road Counties</th>
<th>Percent Clay</th>
<th>Percent Jackson</th>
<th>Percent Adams</th>
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<table>
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<th>Ohio Canal Counties</th>
<th>Percent Clay</th>
<th>Percent Germans</th>
<th>Percent Adams</th>
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<td>Coshocton</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>35.8</td>
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### Source:

## Map 6.2: 1824 Presidential Election

### Counties That Did Not Vote for Clay

- Under 25 percent of the vote to Clay
- 25-35 percent or less of the vote to Clay
- Over 35 percent of the vote to Clay

### Source:
Sure enough, his rivals endeavoured "to raise a prejudice" against Whittlesey, reporting that he was "in favor of slavery." Apparently while travelling from Columbus back to the Reserve, he and fellow lawyers had stayed at a tavern where the guests were invited to mark the register with their Presidential preference. Whittlesey at first refused, but, when pressed, "I wrote on the register 'The next President; may he look well to the interests of the West' ergo Mr. / Thomas D. / Webb / of Warren/ says I am in favor of Slavery." Whittlesey refused to state his personal preference publicly, answering "measures not men" and giving details of Congressional votes. He refused to "mingle in the Presidential contest," leaving the question "to the people unshackled, and when they have decided it in this district and I should be called to act I shall be governed by the voice of my constituents." This sensible approach to the problem, together with the excellence of his record in serving the district, helped Whittlesey secure the first of many re-elections.

Clay's ability to win votes in Adams' heartland demonstrates the power of the "Western interest" in Ohio. In fact, Clay won absolute majorities in three Western Reserve counties and a large plurality in a fourth, all of them counties which might yet have the great Ohio canal built across them. Similarly, in the belt of counties south of the Reserve - on the backbone of the state - where Jackson was strong, Clay won pluralities in the counties on the line of the canal. In fact, in every county on the canal route, and in every county on the proposed route of the National Road, Clay won an absolute majority, unless the county contained an ethnocultural group attracted to one of his rivals; and in those cases he usually won a

52. Whittlesey to Hammond, Washington, 14 Feb. 1824, CHP. See also Whittlesey to Giddings, Washington, 13 May 1824, Giddings Papers, which repeats the statement, but with the word "slavery" changed to "Mr. Clay."

53. Whittlesey to Giddings, Washington, 13 May 1824, and id., Canfield, 18 Sept. 1824, Giddings Papers.
plurality, and invariably at least 41 per cent of the vote. Ethnocultural factors may in turn have assisted Clay, for more than one contemporary observer gained the impression that in 1824 "the Kentucky and Virginia population, on the Scioto, the Muskingum, and the upper Miami, supported Clay." This may explain the enthusiasm for Clay in the backward and underpopulated hill counties of the southeast (outside the Ohio Company lands), though the area was already by the 1820s becoming recognized as the future mining region of the state and therefore interested in tariff protection for industry. The settlers of the scantily populated northwestern counties, which had been opened for settlement only since 1818, were more variegated in their origins, yet gave two-thirds of their votes for Clay; obviously they had much to gain from government assistance and especially the possible future extension of the Miami canal northwards. In fact, Clay was generally supported in most parts of the state, including most backcountry areas. Indeed, his supporters argued that his popular vote (38.49 per cent) gave a less valid indication of his popularity than the fact that he carried far

54. The evidence is presented in tabular form in Ratcliffe, "Voters and Issues in Party Formation," 854, 856, 858, 863. The one troublesome exception to this generalization is the one poorly endowed county on the Scioto route, Pike County, where Jackson gained 47.2% to Clay's 45.9%. It had been settled mainly by Virginians, though apparently Germans began to settle there in 1825. Howe, Historical Collections, 1847 edn., 412, Centennial edn., II, 420. Note also that still in October 1824 there was a chance that the canal might enter Lake Erie via the Black River, thus crossing Lorain and Medina Counties on the Reserve. Cleveland Herald, 29 Apr., 13 May 1825, in Annals, VIII, 166, 167. See Table 6.2.


56. The five northwestern counties cast only 584 votes, 413 of them for Clay. The leading salt-producing counties in 1826 were the southeastern counties of Muskingum, Morgan, Jackson, and Gallia, which voted 80.8, 61.8, 63.4, and 56.3 percent for Clay. By 1824 coal and iron were known to exist and were beginning to be worked in the region between the Scioto and Muskingum rivers. My reasons for rejecting an ethnocultural interpretation of all voting behaviour in this election, as opposed to that of particular self-conscious groups, are fully detailed in D.J. Ratcliffe, "Politics in Jacksonian Ohio: Reflections on the Ethnocultural Interpretation," OH, LXXXVIII (1979), esp. 15-25.
more counties by an overwhelming margin than did his two rivals between them; apparently many supporters in the interior counties were so convinced that his triumph was inevitable that they had not bothered to vote. 57

In some areas, however, Clay's American System possessed a less powerful appeal than in those counties most directly interested. The line of counties between Columbus and Sandusky had originally expected that the main Ohio canal would continue due north from the head of the Scioto River, crossing the Sandusky plains and descending the Sandusky River. When the canal commissioners announced in January 1824 that this route was impracticable, the inhabitants of these counties protested that they were being penalized for the benefit of selfish interests, pointing out that the Sandusky route was practicable if the same provision for water was made at the summit as was to be made on the favoured route. 58 "For the want of water," they proceeded to "kick up a dust," and maintained a campaign which persisted long after the canal act had been passed, but "had no effect beyond the district of country directly interested in the Sandusky route." 59

Their disillusionment with the politics of internal improvement served to weaken their objections to voting for the Northern candidate, and Adams gained his largest majorities in the state in these counties, though in most of the counties New Englanders were not dominant. In Delaware County, which lay on the Sandusky route, the town of Delaware, where most of the county's

57. Scioto Gazette, 18 Nov. 1824; Painesville Telegraph, 30 Oct. 1824; Cincinnati Gazette, 16 Nov. 1824. In seventeen of the twenty-four counties in which Clay won an absolute majority the level of turnout was below the average for the state.

58. Horton Howard to Brown, Delaware, 27 July 1824, EABP. See also M.T. Williams to Brown, Cleveland, 15 Oct. 1823, Columbus, 27 Dec. 1823, Kelley to Brown, Cleveland, 11 Mar. 1825, ibid.; and Sandusky Clarion, 1824, passim.

Yankees lived, gave Adams a lower proportion of its vote than the remainder of the county. Similarly, counties on the eastern margin of the state that manifested some hostility to the canal scheme showed some favour for Adams, and nearly all Adams' banner counties combined New England settlement with doubts about the state internal improvement programme. Some other elements, notably merchants connected with eastern import houses, were attracted to the side of the Eastern candidate, yet these sources of support were altogether negligible compared with the overwhelming success Adams could have achieved had he been able to satisfy Ohio's yearnings for a President who was both Northern in person and Western in outlook.

The National Republican Alliance

The refusal of the four leading Presidential candidates to withdraw ensured that none of them would have a majority in the Electoral College. As a result, the contest had to be settled by the lameduck Congress of 1824-25, voting by states and choosing from among the three most successful candidates. Since they could scarcely leave the country without a President after March 4, national politicians had to come to some understanding among themselves; and, as several commentators noted subsequently, whatever arrangement they came to, the combination of political interests that succeeded in the House election would find itself opposed by those who were not parties to it.¹

In these circumstances, the Ohio delegation in the House found itself critically placed. The candidate favoured by the state and, above all, by the members themselves had come in fourth and so was not eligible. Crawford

60. Delaware Patron, 4 Nov. 1824. For an analysis of the ethnic makeup of these counties, see Ratcliffe, "Reflections on the Ethnocultural Interpretation," 23, and "Voters and Issues," 856.

61. Scioto Gazette, 21 Oct. 1824; Stevens, Early Jackson Party, 115, 150.

1. Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 2 Feb. 1827, CHP.
many of them respected personally and wished not to shame, but they
recognised that he was impossible politically - and not merely because of
his severe illness. The delegation's main concern was to hold together,
act with the other Clay and Northwestern states, and try to secure a
President friendly to the Western interest, be it Adams or Jackson. The
delegation met in caucus, agreed to say nothing and not commit themselves
- especially as "we had several western measures on hand which would in no
way be injured, through the favourable expectations of the friends of the
different Presidential candidates." Indeed, one Adams man from New
Hampshire believed that "the election rests greatly with Ohio - If she
refuses to support Jackson, he is no longer able to succeed without the
support of states which, in that event, he cannot get." 3

Initially the delegation was divided. Philemon Beecher was "convinced
that Adams is best qualified, and that is enough for me." Others, like
John C. Wright, feared that Jackson might "trample the constitution under
his feet," and thought this "unyielding opposition" of some towards Jackson
"was sufficient to prevent the vote of Ohio being given to him in any event." 4
Moreover, if Adams were now elected by the Western interest, they could be
certain of "having Clay, by the aid of the northern states, at some future
period." But others, according to McArthur, "wish to have a Western President
now, in the person of Jackson, whom they do not much like." 5 They were
sustained in this view by reports from Ohio that, in an election between
Adams and Jackson, Jackson (as the Western candidate) would carry the state.
Certainly some of them were "afraid of the vote" Jackson had received, and
observers at home pointed out "the difficulty and danger too ... of Congress

2. Wright to Hammond, Washington, 22 Jan. 1825, CHP.
5. Quoted in Plumer to Plumer, 16 Dec. 1824, in Brown, Missouri Compromises, 123.
travelling out of the Record, as the lawyers say," and not choosing the
man with the highest Electoral vote. 6 But, as Whittlesey said, "the
members will generally consider themselves bound by the sentiments
expressed by their constituents": and Hammond insisted that the critical
thing in Ohio was not the size of Jackson's vote, but the opinion of the plurality who had voted for Clay and Western measures. 7

Some interpreted this situation to mean that Ohio -- and Kentucky and Missouri -- would vote as Clay directed. William Plumer, Jr., of New Hampshire, however, noted that "Clay's friends ... attach less importance to men than to measures -- Give us, they say, a man who is for internal improvement; & we do not care whether he is from the east or the west." John C. Wright wanted to know "their sentiments on internal improvements before I can cheerfully vote," and he and his friends strove to "know if either would go the whole, turnpike gates and all." 8 Clay, who had privately decided before the meeting of Congress to support Adams, repeatedly said his opinion was confirmed when he found the Ohio delegation developing "a decided preference" for Adams. 9 He himself went to see Adams and asked him "to satisfy him with regard to some principles of great public importance, but without any personal considerations for himself." Clay explained that he wanted his friends in the House to be "free ultimately to take that course which might be most conducive to the public interest." Obviously he heard what he wanted. 10 By January 22, John C. Wright was convinced that


7. Whittlesey to George Tod, Washington, 12 Dec. 1824, "Huntington Correspondence," 162-63; Hammond to Wright, 10 Jan. 1825, CHP.

8. Plumer to Plumer, 4 Jan. 1825, in Brown, Missouri Compromises, 129; Wright to Tappan, Washington, 18 Dec. 1824, BTP, LC; Wright to Hammond, 22 Jan. 1825, CHP.


"Southern views & politicks are more hostile to ours than eastern. While the east are commercial they are also manufacturing and are free...."

Jackson, he thought, had "a natural affinity" with "the cotton growing policy, which is in direct war with our own.... He is a western man to be sure in residence but not in feelings and policy he would be charged to the account of the west while in fact he belonged to the south." Did it not make more sense to unite upon Adams, "a man who agrees with us on the questions of internal improvement & domestic industry, elect him, make him feel he owes his elevation to us & throw our state in an influential attitude in relation to the new administration?"11

The New England interest had, in fact, already demonstrated invaluable support for the American System in the House of Representatives itself. In the debate on appropriating $150,000 to build the National Road from Wheeling to Zanesville, Daniel Webster spoke strongly in defence of Western interests and advocated the extension of the Road, as did other Adams men. The measure now at long last passed - by a majority of 25. The occasion, according to Plumer, "exhibited so many of Adams' friends in favor of this western measure, & most of the Atlantic friends of Jackson against it." Webster's remarks "were peculiarly gratifying to the Western Members; & were not without their effect in bringing them to vote for Adams." The incident was certainly remarked on in Ohio, where it was described as having "a great effect in attaching the people of this country to New England and the East."12 It provided the Ohio delegation with the perfect justification for voting for Adams. According to Duncan McArthur, the course of Jackson's friends in Congress "put it out of our power to support the pretentions of the

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11. Wright to Hammond, 22 Jan. 1825, CHP; Wright to Tappan, 12 Feb. 1825, BTP. LC.

General, without at the same time abandoning" the interests of Ohio, while "it was evident, that for the support of those measures, our only reliance was upon the friends of Mr. Adams, the identity of interest between the Northern and Western States, and the liberality of the Eastern members of Congress."  

Within a week, the Ohio delegation had caucussed and, apparently without consulting Clay, publicly announced that the state's vote would be given to Adams. Made together with an identical announcement by the Kentucky delegation, the announcement caused "a buzzing" since it was considered virtually to decide the outcome.  

In the election itself, two Congressman from southwestern Ohio voted for Jackson, two voted for Crawford from personal consideration, and the remaining ten for Adams; eight of the ten could certainly claim not to have contradicted the wishes of their constituents, since Clay had run ahead of Jackson in the popular vote in their districts. The President-elect promptly named Clay as Secretary of State, thus making him heir-apparent. As Plumer said, "The interests of Clay & Adams are, at any rate, identified - if Adams is run down, Clay falls with him - if Clay loses his ground in the West, Adams loses also all foothold in that country."  

The "union" of Adams and Clay, after the abuse of the election campaign, appeared to some observers "more extraordinary than the meeting of parallel lines."  

Two Clay papers in Ohio - both on the route of the National Road -


15. Plumer to Plumer, 16 Feb. 1825, in Brown, Missouri Compromises, 142. The ranking of the 1824 popular vote in each Congressional district is usefully tabulated in Weisenburger, Passing of the Frontier, 237.

expressed shock and disquiet at the Clay men's behaviour, but they were quickly answered by other Clay presses which pointed to the probable consequences for public policy. 17 Most signs were that the West was "satisfied" with the result; according to Clay, "In Ohio the approbation of it is enthusiastic." William Creighton, Jr., one of "the most discreet men in Ohio," urged Clay to accept the post of Secretary of State, on the assumption that "Mr. Adams will pursue a liberal policy, and embrace within its scope the great leading policy that you have been advocating." 18 Harrison in Washington approved Clay's acceptance because it ensured the West's influence in the Cabinet, while the Scioto Gazette praised Adams for calling "the great 'champion' of the domestic interest" to high office. 19 The Ohio press in general applauded the inaugural message, which committed the President to internal improvements. James Heaton said he would be satisfied if "Mr. A. performs 2/3 of what he hints at in his inaugural speech ... and if Clay is his right hand man the Republic is safe, and the West will be tolerably satisfied." According to Hammond, the inaugural showed "Mr. Adams is with us - He is sold to Mr. Clay, not Mr. Clay to him." 20 Many public signs suggested the popularity of the new administration.

When George Kremer of Pennsylvania accused Clay and Adams of "bargain and corruption," Kremer was burned in effigy in Waynesburgh, Stark County. 21 When Clay crossed Ohio in the summer - a journey marred by the death of a

17. Scioto Gazette, 3 Mar. 1825, replying to the Newark Advocate and St. Clairsville Gazette.
20. Heaton to John McLean, Near Middletown (Butler Co.), 19 Mar. 1825, Heaton Papers; Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 16 Mar. 1825, CHP.
twelve year-old daughter—she "scarcely passed a village in which I was not pressed to accept of some public manifestation of regard. The demonstrations which were made of public esteem and consideration, in the case of Genl. La Fayette, hardly exceeded those of which I was the object." Everywhere, outside Cincinnati, he found "not a mere acquiescence but a high degree of satisfaction in the events of the last Session." A toast "relating to those events," given at the ceremony commencing canal-building in Ohio on July 4, 1825, apparently aroused "more sensibility ... than was exhibited in reference to any other." In the same spirit, at a numerously attended public dinner in the Queen City, Clay could congratulate his audience on the success of "the cause of internal improvement," which "has finally maintained by repeated majorities in Congress, and has at last obtained the support of the President." Even so, the esteemed Ohio politician Joseph Vance could spell out to Clay the need for Adams' annual message "to notice some of the important interests of the western & southwestern parts of our country," since "their has been much complaint heretofore of willful neglect from that quarter." The message more than satisfied Ohio opinion, for the new President advocated a programme of federally financed improvements which far surpassed anything previously envisaged. Hammond was "much pleased" with the message: "the subjects recommended as proper for consideration in Congress are worthy of the Nation, and there is a statesman-like boldness in proposing them that pleases me." He subsequently reported that the message gave "very general satisfaction" among the politicians assembled in Columbus that winter: "we approve it, 'sky-light' and all." The programme was rounded out when the Secretary of the Treasury submitted a report to Congress.

22. Clay to James Brown, 4 Sept. 1825, and to J.Q. Adams, 21 July 1825; Toasts and Speech at Cincinnati Banquet; all in Clay Papers, IV, 617, 547, 529.

advocating a higher tariff, and one politically aware Ohioan applauded "the extraordinary ability with which he [Richard Rush] has defended the cause of domestic manufactures." In the opinion of some, the administration's advocacy of a national scheme made opposition impossible in Ohio.24

The new administration, in fact, combined the two characteristics that most Ohioans had been unable to find combined in any realistic candidate during the election campaign: a President who was Northern and a policy that was Western. Most Ohio politicians who had opted for Adams or Clay in the election therefore took the advice to "throw behind them the feuds of the late electioneering campaign and unite in support of the new administration."25 The signs are that few of their committed partisans turned against them, and none at all before late 1827. As Thomas Worthington remarked in June 1826, "The union of Mr. A & Mr. C. has united their adherents' interests? and although the union is a lukewarm one yet there is no other rallying point."26 In the Congressional elections of 1826, all those who had voted for Adams in the House election, and ran for re-election, were returned—which suggests that the voters approved their course; and on the Western Reserve Elisha Whittlesey, who had been so embarrassed in 1824 by the disputes between the Adams and Clay men in his district, was re-elected unanimously.27

Indeed, the political formation which backed Adams' re-election in 1828 and Clay's campaign in 1832, which in 1830 took the name National Republican and in the years after 1834 provided the backbone of the Ohio Whig party,

27. Scioto Gazette, 2 Nov. 1826.
may be traced back to the constituent elements first identified in 1824. Quakers were to be strongly identified with the National Republicans and Whigs, while New Englanders preponderantly favoured these parties; and these attachments can be explained best by the demand for a Northern President generated in the aftermath of the Missouri Crisis. The commitment of those most interested in positive federal economic programmes was also to be a persistent feature of the National Republican-Whig tradition, and its origins may be traced back to the triumph of the "internal improvement" cause in 1824–25. These two strands continued within the Whig party, forming the basis of the cleavage which in other states came to be described as "Cotton versus Conscience" -- the argument over how far Northern Whigs could stretch their antislavery consciences in an effort to conciliate Southern Whigs whose cooperation was needed in order to secure the national party's economic programme. This tension, which in 1848 was to result in the Free Soil secession on the Western Reserve, may be traced right back to its first expression in the dispute between Clay men and Adams men in Ohio in 1824. Yet for nearly a quarter of a century these two elements, these two poles of interest, feeling and ideals, were to cooperate and give allegiance to a common partisan identity - for how else could they resist the irresponsible opposition that had appeared, even in Ohio, behind the banner of Andrew Jackson?
7. THE EMERGENCE OF THE JACKSONIAN OPPOSITION

The cleavage which had appeared in American national politics by 1825 was essentially the product of the heightened sectional feeling of the early 1820s. All Ohioans perceived the cleavage in sectional terms, and were virtually united in the policies they demanded of the federal government. Yet in the long run the most important feature of the decade was to be the rise of an opposition party devoted to the Presidential claims of Andrew Jackson, a party that was to win so much support in Ohio that it defeated Adams and Clay in 1828 and won control of the state legislature in 1829. Out of sectional unity emerged a party division, in Ohio as in Kentucky and the Middle Atlantic states; and this party division first took shape in the Presidential election of 1824.

The Mystery of Jacksonism

The sizeable support that Jackson received in 1824 - only 766 votes fewer than Clay - in no way contradicted Ohio's sectional unity. Throughout the campaign Jackson was presented to the voters as a firm supporter of the American System, and no rival newspaper doubted his commitment to Western policies. In the summer of 1824, the state Jackson committee issued An Address To The People of Ohio which insisted that the two candidates "entertain the same sentiments, as to a national policy, and ... advocate the same system of measures." As proof of Jackson's position stood his votes in Congress on internal improvements and his several statements on the need to promote manufactures to secure national independence. For

1. An Address to the People of Ohio, On the Important Subject of the Next Presidency; By the committee appointed for that purpose, at a convention of delegates ... Columbus, 14 July 1824 (Cincinnati, 1824), pamphlet, LC. See also Homer C. Hockett, Western Influences on Political Parties to 1825 (Columbus, 1917), 136-37.
a time the closest observers of the 1824 tariff debates in Congress believed the tariff would fail because both "codfish and Hickory's men were against us," and thought the outcome depended on Senator Jackson; in the end, his need to conciliate Pennsylvania persuaded him and his advisor John H. Eaton to vote for it and so ensure its narrow passage through the Senate. 2 Yet it was stupid for the friends of the American System to divide in 1824, for their division gave Adams his best hope for success in Ohio. As the Painesville Telegraph said, "It is well known that the General is supported on nearly the same principles with Mr. Clay; consequently, what the former gains the latter loses, and Mr. Adams partakes largely of the profits." 3 Yet the Clay men could never accept the Jacksonians' argument that they should unite on Jackson since he stood the better chance of national success. For one thing, they had invested much hard work and personal commitment long before Jackson came seriously on to the scene, for it was not until late in the day - in fact, not until February 1824 - that the General seemed a serious candidate. 4 But more important was a deep conviction that Jackson was unfitted to be President. Old Federalists like Hammond remembered how alarmed they were in 1815 by Jackson's arbitrary behaviour in Louisiana after the battle of New Orleans, when it seemed he was trying - like George III before him - "to render the military independent of, and superior to the civil power." 5

2. J.C. Wright to B. Tappan, Washington, 18 Apr. 1824, BTP, LC. See also Wright to Hammond, Washington, 4, 6, 21 Apr., Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 9 Apr., 3 May 1824, CHP.
3. Painesville Telegraph, 7 Aug. 1824
5. Ohio Federalist, 6 July 1815; Marietta American Friend, 13 Sept. 1816. See also Zanesville Express, 20 Apr. 1815; Heald, Bezaleel Wells, 127.
invasion of Spanish Florida in 1818, and his execution of two British subjects, were seen even by some good Republicans as over-stepping the mark, though they were reluctant to condemn anyone who had done "such gallant service": "Even American Souls must submit to the laws of Nations, however flushed with victory."\(^6\) His record of arbitrariness, continued in his term as Governor of Florida, 1821-22, was still held against him in 1824. As Hammond said of his performance in the United States Senate in that session, "Gen. Jackson appears to have made no speech. His talent lies in something else - he can swagger at the head of an army, bully or court martial, or denounce the civil authority with more ease."\(^7\)

Such sentiments were most loudly voiced by supporters of Clay who came from New England. Return Jonathan Meigs, in his last year as Postmaster-General, thought "There is more of the Dictator than of the Consul in his Character. This Nation is to be governed by moral, not physical Force." William Greene, a Cincinnati lawyer and one-time secretary to Ethan Allen Brown (and future lieutenant-governor of Rhode Island), said his "whole mind and soul revolt now against the very suggestion of Jackson," simply because the Constitution, the sole bulwark against despotism, was too precious to be put at the mercy of a man who had shown himself willing to violate it. "Better that N. Orleans had been lost than that the Constitution had been violated."\(^8\) In fact, Yankees remote from the Jackson fever believed that "Were all the other candidates to decline, some other prominent citizen would be selected by the American people to fill the Presidential chair, in preference to him." This refrain in the Cleveland Herald reflected Jackson's weakness on the Western Reserve:

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7. Hammond to Ruggles, Cincinnati, 9 May 1824, CHP.

"The general has so few supporters, in this quarter, for the Presidency; they would hardly amount to a corporal's guard, all told, in the county of Cuyahoga." Yet such sentiments were by no means restricted to New England settlers: they were uttered even by men who before election day were to turn to Jackson's support!

But if there was such hostility to Jackson's Presidential aspirations, particularly at the beginning of the contest, why did a party emerge on his behalf — especially when it had no alternative programme to put forward? After the 1824 election, Hammond described it as having been a contest over the American System, with Clinton, Clay and Calhoun on one side, Adams and Crawford on the other, and Jackson trying to straddle the issue. For Hammond, the disaster lay in the West's failure to agree on a single candidate, because "The people have been ... divided and arrayed against each other by the influence of certain partizan leaders," whose sole concern was "to raise themselves into notice." Instead of concentrating on what mattered, the American System, "They played upon another feeling, touched upon another sentiment, and aroused a spirit altogether foreign to the merits of the question and which should have been left entirely out of the contest." What was this sentiment, this feeling which operated to the advantage of Jackson, dividing the 'Western' vote?

Jackson's military glory, his appeal to the populace as a military hero, might well be the answer, as New Englanders feared. His victory at New Orleans had been celebrated in Ohio with bonfires and torchlight parades, and special religious services were held. In 1824 the state printer — or his apprentice — printed, quite without authority, at the head of the journal of the senate's proceedings for January 8th:


10. Cincinnati Gazette, 26 Nov. 1824.
"Anniversary of Jackson's Victory!" And in the course of the campaign, opponents often linked Jacksonism with the military enthusiasm of young men, noted the straw polls in favor of Jackson taken at militia musters in April and September, and laughed at the way "rival lawyers and politicians suddenly began to use their militia titles: "Gen. Patterson! Major Tappan!! Well this is a free land where every man is /free?/ to play the fool...." Yet the state printer did not support Jackson for President, while by no means all militia musters demonstrated the popularity of the General; just before the election, opponents could cite a number of straw polls in which militiamen gave preference to Clay, some of them from counties where Jackson won a plurality. And if Jackson's "popularity" was the secret of his success, why was he so unpopular in some areas, including areas not settled by Quakers or New Englanders?

A more satisfying answer might be found in the social tensions and local political turmoil in many counties during the early 1820s. The rhetoric of class antagonism, of the rightfulness of popular rule, of the claims of the "laboring classes" over the privileged, common at that time, bears close resemblances to Jacksonian rhetoric of the 1830s; and certainly prominent politicians noticed in 1822 how the public distaste for those involved in Washington intrigues was likely to redound to the political advantage of any private citizen unconnected with the administration or Congress, and thought of as something other than a politician. In time this public disillusionment and memory of the discontents of the depression would have its impact on Jackson's fortunes in Ohio, but not

12. Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 7 June 1824, CHP. See also Xenia Ohio Interior Gazette, 21 Sept. 1824.
in 1824 -- with one rather important localized exception, as we shall see.
The most immediate consequence of the local popular revolts of the early
1820s was the election of many new men to the General Assembly, but
those men overwhelmingly favoured Adams or Clay, while the division
between the three candidates cut through all types of politician, old
and new, Federalist, Republican and Democrat.

But what of anti-bankism, so prevalent in 1820? Did that not create
a body of 'Jacksonian' sentiment which provided a bedrock of support for
Jackson's candidacy in 1824? Richard T. Farrell suggests that if evidence
could be found of who participated in the anti-bank meetings of 1820 in
Cincinnati,

the meetings could be identified with the Jacksonians.
Perhaps the organizers became local leaders in the party,
and those who attended most likely gave the General their
votes. Both the proceedings and the resolutions that
were adopted seemed to forecast the subsequent Jacksonian
attack on the United States Bank in 1832.15

There is a generalized truth in the last remark, but the whole passage
reflects an all too common misunderstanding of the process of party
formation. By 1824 anti-bank feeling had triumphed, in that most banks
in Ohio had collapsed or gone out of business during the depression, and
banks were simply no longer a subject of political controversy. Those
who had expressed strong antibank sentiments during the crisis did not
uniformly become Jacksonians, nor was there any reason — or any attempt —
to identify Jackson as being particularly hostile to banks. Indeed,
some of those who were regarded as hostile to banks, and went out of
their way to stress their antibank sentiments, became leaders of the
anti-Jackson party — not least James Wilson, Charles Hammond, Alfred
Kelley, and even William Henry Harrison!16

An Economic and Political Study" (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana
University, 1967), 66.

(Bloomington, Ind., 1951), I, 592 n.
Such the same may be said of state issues as a whole. The early 1820s had been marked by the emergence of the 'canal lobby': many of those prominently involved became Adams and Clay men—except for Ethan Allen Brown, "father of the Ohio canals," Benjamin Trapp, chairman of the Canal Commission, and Micajah T. Williams, one of the two men who actually supervised the building as "acting commissioners"! Equally, those few associated with opposition to the canals divided between the two parties. On all the many other issues that were the staple of state politics in these years—taxation, education, the state penitentiary—voting in the General Assembly in no way predicted or reflected the emergent national party division, and was not to do so for many years.

Indeed, there are two most striking features of the 1824 Jackson campaign in Ohio. One was the late emergence of Jackson as a serious candidate. In January 1824 only four out of 102 state legislators favoured Jackson, while before that month not one Congressman had declared for him. His claims were not taken seriously until his sudden coup in Pennsylvania in February, when he secured that state's nomination and, in effect, took over Calhoun's strength. One consequence of this late appearance was that a number of politicians and publicists who joined him were on record as doubting his suitability for high civilian office; the other was that the basic nature of the contest was decided, and his intervention in Ohio brought no new issues into the campaign beyond his own personality. The other remarkable feature was the failure of his campaign to make an impact across the state as a whole, unlike the other two candidates'. Jackson's success was restricted to a relatively small number of counties, admittedly the most populous ones, which clearly were not satisfied by the choice between Clay and Adams.

The election returns make the point: Jackson did well in two sorts of constituencies. Firstly, he won absolute majorities in five southwestern counties, around and stretching up river from Cincinnati; he did so also in Campbell County, Kentucky, across the river, and in the populous counties of southeastern Indiana. As one moved away from Cincinnati towards the centre of Ohio, so there was a belt of counties which gave pluralities rather than absolute majorities—almost as though the degree of a constituency's enthusiasm depended on its proximity to Cincinnati. Up river in the eastern counties and across the backbone of the state lay a second group of counties, distinguished by Germans and Scotch Irish settlers from Pennsylvania. In these counties—and in others marked by German settlement, like Perry, Fairfield and Montgomery—Jackson gained absolute majorities, except in future canal counties, where he gained a plurality. Almost all the counties which failed to give an absolute majority to any candidate were either on the outer edges of Cincinnati's range of influence or else canal counties settled by a distinctive ethnic group. Perhaps even more significant, as maps 6.2 and 7.1 show, is that, with the exception of the anti-canal counties of the Sandusky route and the eastern margin of the state, Jackson did best mainly in those counties which found it most difficult to accept Clay as a possible President.

This Great Receptacle

Before the Panic, Cincinnati had stunned visitors. Standing splendidly on a curve of the broad, steep-sided river, the city sprang suddenly into the view of travellers who for miles had seen little from the river but heavily wooded banks, broken only by occasional clearings and settlements. In the very midst of wilderness, a city appeared which seemed a Boston or a Philadelphia in the making. In 1823 much the same remained true, with the city presenting "many of the comforts and ornaments of refined and
TABLE 7.1:

THE VOTE IN THE SOUTHWESTERN COUNTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>1824 Percent</th>
<th>1828 Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clermont</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adams</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butler</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warren</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preble</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darke</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greene</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highland</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ratcliffe, "Vote of 1824 in the Western States," 858, 863

TABLE 7.2:

THE VOTE IN COUNTIES WITH SIGNIFICANT GERMAN SETTLEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>1824 Percent</th>
<th>1828 Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fairfield</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perry</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayne</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuscarawas</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbiana</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stark</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richland</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knox</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pickaway</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


MAP 7.1:

THE ADAMS AND JACKSON VOTES

Adams gained absolute majority
Adams gained 35-50 percent of the vote
Jackson gained absolute majority
Jackson gained 35-50 percent of the vote
National Road
Ohio Canal
Germans
intelligent society," while "the neighboring hills and plains look green
with many products of industry and art — yet a few miles distant, may
be discovered all the crude and rustic scenery of the most recent
settlements." To the Italian traveller J.C. Beltrami in April 1823,
"It is our own Genoa in minature, and its environs are equally embellished
with beautiful villas.... Activity and industry are everywhere obvious."
Henry Clay approved Charles Hammond's decision to move there in 1823,
making a less extravagant estimate of "the Western Metropolis": "Society
is somewhat unsettled there at present, but it must ere long right itself,
and I think Cincinnati possesses natural advantages which must make it a
great City, which it is indeed now."^2

The disturbance in society was, of course, a reflection of the severe
depression which Cincinnati had suffered - of which, indeed, it had been
the very storm centre. Whereas the city's population had increased from
4,000 in 1813 to 10,283 in 1819, by 1824 it had grown to only 12,016 —
which still made it many times larger than the next largest city in Ohio,
Steubenville, which had a population of 2,479 in 1820.3 The pit of the
depression had been reached in 1821 and there were distinct signs of recovery
to impress travellers in 1823, but a new recession hit the city in 1824.
In May, according to the Cincinnati Gazette, taken over by Hammond the
previous month, workmen still found it impossible to obtain work, middle-
men, auctioneers and commission merchants found trading not worth the effort,
shippers operated at a loss, and farmers coming to town with their produce
received negligible prices. The process of liquidating old debts continued

1. Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette, 9 May 1823; Daniel Aaron,
"Cincinnati, 1818-1838: A Study of Attitudes in the Urban West (Ph.D.
dissertation, Harvard University, 1942), ix-x, xxviii.
2. J.C. Beltrami, A Pilgrimage in Europe and America... (London, 1828),
3. Benjamin Drake and E.D. Mansfield, Cincinnati in 1826 (Cincinnati,
1827), 58; Timothy Flint, Condensed Geography and History, II, 330.
to cast a pall over the city. Cincinnati's politicians, businessmen and newspaper editors agreed that the rebuilding of local industry depended on tariff protection, while the city needed better communications both with its hinterland in the Miami Valley and with the lower Mississippi — which meant a canal round the Falls of the Ohio at Louisville.

The natural Presidential candidate for Cincinnati was therefore Henry Clay, as some leading men saw from the start. But Clay suffered a liability in the eyes of most Cincinnatians which made it difficult to persuade them to vote for him. The policy of the Bank of the United States in its treatment of the city had been, according to its one-time local cashier, "experimental and erroneous at its commencement, unwise in the progress, and violent, not to say vindictive in its end." The manner in which the B.U.S. branch was withdrawn in 1821 was "as unjust as it was unnecessary, and as oppressive as the absence of judgment and policy could make it." According to one of the main sufferers, Jacob Burnet, Cincinnati and its vicinity "did not recover from the shock, for many years." The Bank had pursued its debtors rigorously, foreclosing their mortgages, hauling them through the law courts; if it delayed settlement, it was only to enable the debtor find the means of paying. The process of settling debts to the B.U.S. — which in Ohio as a whole still stood at $3,000,000 in December 1824 — took until 1833. As a consequence of


7. Burnet, North-Western Territory, 409; Niles' Weekly Register, XXVIII (2 Apr. 1825), 68; Berry, Western Prices, 414.
the transfer of real estate, the bank owned a large part of Cincinnati: hotels, coffee-houses, warehouses, stores, stables, iron foundries, residences, vacant lots. 8 By 1830 the B.U.S. was to own town lots valued at $503,080 by the tax assessors— or one-fifth of the total valuation of the township! 9 To help it prosecute its cases, the Bank appointed a distinguished lawyer in 1820, who duly gave up his Congressional seat so that he could concentrate on the business. Though he thought the Bank's policy unwisely harsh at times, though he found these professional duties "painful to himself" (but lucrative), this legal representative stimulated local agents into greater zeal in prosecuting cases and, at the session of the federal court in Columbus in 1822 alone, he obtained 211 judgments in cases emanating from the Cincinnati office. 10 In choosing to work for the Bank, Henry Clay damned his political career— at least in the Queen City and its environs.

Clay's involvement with the Bank of the United States did not go unnoticed elsewhere in Ohio. The Steubenville Western Herald's attack on Clay in 1823 charged him, amongst other things, with being "the champion of the Bank of the United States." Hammond and Wright were counsel for the state in the case Osborn v. Bank of the United States, which was finally argued before the United States Supreme Court and decided, adversely to the state, in March 1824. Wright was most unhappy:

"A few more such decisions and good bye to the State sovereignties."

Hammond had told Clay himself in 1822 of his hesitation in helping to make President "the advocate of doctrines so heterodox" about the powers of the national Bank, and he feared that this would be an obstacle for many Westerners. 11 Yet this consideration did not prevent Wright or

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Harwood, or even in the end the Steubenville editor James Wilson, from supporting Clay, and there is little evidence of hostility to the B.U.S. influencing the 1824 elections outside southwestern Ohio. Indeed, concern over the issue had been dying as early as 1821-22, when doubts about the correctness of the state's past course began to be expressed openly; some even argued that hostility to federal power was scarcely wise for a state wanting federal aid, a politician wanting federal office, or a publicist arguing for a broad construction of the Constitution in the case of internal improvements.\textsuperscript{12} Ohioans were mainly concerned about constructive steps to bring about economic recovery, and in Cincinnati even future Jacksonians could favour the renewal of banking facilities and, in 1823, the reopening of the B.U.S. branch.\textsuperscript{13}

In southwestern Ohio the Bank issue might die, but not popular resentment against Clay's personal role in causing bankruptcy, ruin and distress. In 1821 Clay was accused of being directly responsible for "the rash, impolitic and barbarous step of indiscriminately suing all the debtors to the Branch Bank," and a correspondent in the Cincinnati Gazette urged "the injured parties..., whenever in their power, to remunerate the author of this mischief with a coat of Tar and Feathers!" Even Clay's own organ in Cincinnati confessed in May 1824 that "Much prejudice has heretofore existed against Mr. Clay among the citizens of this place on the supposition that he advised the commencements of the suits against the debtors of the Branch Bank."\textsuperscript{14} Although Hammond claimed that this prejudice was declining, the Cincinnati National

\textsuperscript{12} Cleveland Herald, 8, 22 Jan., 5 Feb., 9 Apr. 1822, in Annals, V, 154-56; Whittlesey to Brown, Canfield, 25 Feb. 1822, EABP.

\textsuperscript{13} Cincinnati National Republican, cited in Cleveland Herald, 8 May 1823 (Annals, VI, 6) and in Berry, Western Prices, 414.

\textsuperscript{14} Cincinnati Gazette, June 1821, 14 May 1824. See also Clay Papers, III, 102-03.
Republican refused to let go of the issue through 1823 and '24, obviously seeing it as good campaign fodder. In these circumstances most local politicians looked for an 'American System' candidate other than Clay, though a few from the start felt Clay's effectiveness more than made up for his Bank connection. Early in 1822 anonymous letters, written by John McLean, appeared in the press, urging the claims of John C. Calhoun as an advocate of national measures and a non-sectional candidate. Moses Dawson at the Inquisitor and Cincinnati Advertiser preferred Jackson. And a group of ambitious young politicians, including Micajah T. Williams of the canal lobby and Elijah Hayward, editor of the National Republican from April 1823, looked to Clinton's claims, while seeking advice on his prospects from their friend in Washington, Ethan Allen Brown.

The popular mood in Cincinnati, the emotional and social context within which political decisions had to be taken, was fully revealed by the Congressional election of 1822, which the distinguished Democrat Charles Reemelin described in 1869 as "the foreshadowing of the Presidential election" in which critical choices were to be made. The leading candidate in 1822 was William Henry Harrison, military hero and heir to the position of his father-in-law, John Cleves Symmes, founder of the Miami Purchase. Harrison, "dignified and erect, yet friendly, amusing and hospitable... of middle height..., spare, with reddish hair and plain, clean features," lived and farmed in the western part of the county but had many friends and business associates of long standing in the city. He "had been for years the person to whom the people looked for oratorical efforts upon all public occasions; and he was every way


Since winning election to the state senate in 1819, however, Harrison's political career had been stymied by his unpopularity with many elements in Hamilton County. In 1822 he had come last in the gubernatorial election, with not one vote in his own county; in 1821 and 1822 he had failed in the race for the United States Senate, coming last on the latter occasion, and he blamed these indignities on Hamilton County's representatives in the Assembly. In 1822 he was determined to return to Congress from the Hamilton-Clermont district, and he took pains to accommodate to the popular mood by presenting himself as an old Jeffersonian, hostile to "a large public debt" and "a moneyed aristocracy," in favour of economy and reduced pay for legislators.

Since at least 1816, however, Harrison's pretensions had been opposed by a group of young city lawyers including David Wade, Daniel Roe -- and James Gazlay. "Fierce, intense,... impetuous and strong-willed," Gazlay had been helped by Symmes as a brother in the Tammany Society on his arrival from New York in 1813. He soon broke with Symmes and showed himself "an aspiring radical," taking on poor men's cases and developing connections with new entrepreneur and mechanic groups. Gazlay had been Harrison's opponent in the 1819 state senate election, but had been unable to match the General outside the city, where Harrison had many influential friends and contacts. Since then Gazlay had run badly in local elections, but by 1822 he was once more firmly in the public eye.

19. B.F. Powers to Brown, Cincinnati, 14 Feb. 18??, EABP; Williams to Trimble, 6 Sept. 1824, Trimble Correspondence, 193.
He had been found guilty of malpractice in a trial which attracted much interest: "the court house was thronged during the whole trial, and Mr. Gazlay acquitted by popular opinion of even suspicion of misconduct, almost by acclamation." A "persecuted man." Gazlay published a pamphlet attacking the President Judge, an old enemy and an intimate of the city elite, whose very appointment he argued was unconstitutional since the judge had himself been a member of the Assembly that elected him.

Gazlay came out for Congress and endeavoured to attract Thomas Morris's support in Clermont County; at least Morris, and indeed Williams, withdrew to allow a straight two-horse race.

With the support of the old Western Spy (the future National Republican) and Sol Silbey's Independent Press, Gazlay attacked the "big bugs," portraying Harrison as an aristocrat, friendly to banks and swindling the people out of their rights over the College Township. But Gazlay's main target was the Monroe administration and its supporters in Congress, whom he accused of corruption and extravagance; he promised, if elected, to work for investigations and retrenchment. Harrison he damned as an intimate of the administration, adept at gaining offices for his friends and relations. The General justified himself forcefully, defending his record on slavery and banking, but at least one voter turned against him because Gazlay was "an anti Banker." Harrison later told Monroe that "the people would listen to nothing" in opposition to the "Great Radical Reform," and Harrison carried only Clermont County, where he had campaigned, and western Hamilton, where he lived. Elsewhere Gazlay beat him, even in the eastern and central rural townships - and

22. Greene to Brown, Cincinnati, 29 Jan., 28 Feb., 3 Apr. 1822, EABP; Niles' Weekly Register, XXII (30 Mar. 1822), 69-70. See also Stevens, Early Jackson Party, 43-44.

23. Gazlay to Heaton, Cincinnati, 2 July 1822, James Heaton Papers, LC.
by a margin of two-to-one in Cincinnati township. Gazlay then went to Columbus to spread his ideas, but discovered, according to Dr. Daniel Drake, "His influence there ... is nothing. His schemes of reform are likely to circulate amongst the rabble of this great metropolis, and extend themselves no farther."  

Yet demands for "Radical" reform were heard even among Harrison's supporters. Moses Dawson, of the Inquirer and Cincinnati Advertiser, was committed to defending and advancing the interests of those who had saved the country in the War of 1812. He had therefore advanced Harrison's claims as a man devoted to the Republic, and in 1823 he wrote a ponderous biography, published in 1824, defending Harrison's "character as a Soldier and as a citizen," which had been "impugned ... by the faction which opposed him at the election." For much the same reason, he took up Jackson as his Presidential candidate early in 1823 - but also because he was independent of the present administration. Dawson insisted that a change in government was essential for the good of republicanism:

quote: pure and representative as ours may be, a long continuance of power in the same hands, endangers the liberties of the people; and while the people go on to elect their executive from the administration, they at least run the risk of perpetuating any system of corruption that may have crept in among them, and thus preclude the possibility of bringing about a reform of those abuses which must necessarily insinuate themselves into the government where the power rests too long in the hands of any party.

24. Cincinnati Independent Press, 3, 17 Oct. 1822; Harrison to Monroe, 16 June 1823, quoted in Goebel, Harrison, 236. See also ibid., 235-37; Stevens, Early Jackson Party, 44-47; and, for the "anti-banker," see Jacob Deterly, "Remarks," Diary from 1819 to 1848 (Genealogical Society, Salt Lake City) typescript copy, OHS.

25. Drake to Harrison, Cincinnati, 9 Jan. 1823, Harrison Papers, LC.

Subsequent issues showed that Dawson believed corruption did exist in Washington, and that party opposition was necessary as a watchdog on government; in the first months of 1824, Dawson's paper challenged Gazlay to publish the letters he sent back to his "sociable circle" in Cincinnati - "the Eggnog junta" of about twelve men -- supposedly "exposing ... the corruption which exists in Washington, not only among the heads of departments, but the national legislature itself."

After all, Gazlay "was elected purely to hunt and search out corruption, and peculation." In fact, Gazlay dare not publish such letters - if they existed - because, for all his efforts, he could find almost no corruption or extravagance in Washington. But, for Dawson, that merely proved how corrupting Washington was, and demonstrated the need for a national hero to cleanse the Augean stable.27

Gazlay's friends, however, were not to be persuaded so easily to join the Jacksonian cause. In May 1823 their mouthpiece, the National Republican, declared Jackson unfit for the Presidency because his talents were essentially those of a soldier.28 But whom to support instead? Adams was impossible, given the commitment of some of them, notably Williams, to the internal improvement cause. Clay they were unwilling to support, and they poured out a splurge of 'Jacksonian' rhetoric against Clay's supporters in Ohio, whom they associated with "The Caucus Junto," "wickedness and corruption ... faction and intrigue ... advocates of legislative usurpation ... the partisans of discord and confusion, who would sacrifice the clearest rights of the people to subserve their own views of private advantage." In replying, the Scioto Gazette quite accurately described Hayward of the National Republican as belonging to

27. Cincinnati Advertiser, 3, 17, 28, 31 Jan., 11, 18 Feb., 3, 6, 10 Mar. 1824. See also Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 18 Feb., 5 Mar. 1824, CHP.

28. Cincinnati National Republican, 13 May 1823.
"the numerous tribe of mongrel politicians, whose principal care, on every occasion, is 'to leave a door open for dodging towards the strongest side'." Clinton they saw as an attractive candidate, who was already gaining support in Cincinnati, notably from the Gazette, but Hayward, Williams and Greene still hesitated to commit themselves too openly. At last by September 1823 the National Republican's advocacy was becoming firmer, and Clinton announced as "decidedly the most popular candidate in Ohio," a man distant "from the cabals of intrigues of factional strife." Still troubled by doubts whether Clinton would run, they called a public meeting in December at which they organized a committee which represented many different elements of support, including some members of the old elite. They even began to plot how to establish a press at Columbus, and were suspected of angling for the state's public printing contract as a means of financing the paper.

Yet their plans were futile if Clinton was not to be candidate and could not carry New York. News came at the beginning of the year that Gazlay had come out "decidedly" for Jackson as President, having discovered in Washington "the hopelessness of Mr. Clinton being brought out."

Though organizational efforts for Clinton continued in the county, leading Clintonians by February were recognizing the futility of supporting him. Some Cincinnati newspapers now began to fly trial balloons for Calhoun as "the only man on whom the domestic party can easily unite," but events


30. National Republican, 19 Sept. 1823; Stevens, Early Jackson Party, 50-52, 75-76; Scioto Gazette, 8, 22 Feb., 3 Mar. 1823.


32. Cincinnati Advertiser, 10 Jan. 1824; Benefactor and Georgetown Advocate, 15 Mar. 1824; Greene, 7 Feb. 1824, and Benjamin Drake, 22 Feb. 1824, both to Brown from Cincinnati, EABP.
in Pennsylvania quickly frustrated that scheme. As Clinton's cause finally foundered in March, Cincinnati politicians had to make uncomfortable choices among the remaining candidates. Some "yankee lawyers" opted for Adams. Others decided that Jackson was the only 'American System' candidate that could carry Hamilton County. And yet others, regretfully, opted for Clay. Indeed, when the Clinton committee finally voted to disband on April 10, only three of the ten members present voted for Jackson, the rest preferring Clay.

Charles Hammond saw it as natural for the majority of Clinton supporters to turn to Clay, since he was by far the most effective advocate of the "domestic interest." Indeed, in December he had believed that even local Jacksonians "will ultimately go for Clay," and now in April he thought "Clay is certainly gaining here in Cincinnati, and thro the Miami Country." From the collapse of Clinton Clay had acquired some talented supporters, including a number who had supported Gazlay in 1822; and some felt it was "injudicious" to have nominated Harrison as a Clay elector, because he was locally so "unpopular" that his prominence inhibited further gains from among Gazlay's supporters.

In addition, Clay's supporters included a majority of the city's most politically prominent industrialists, businessmen, and former bank directors and investors, as well as a majority of those who had lost


34. Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 7 June 1824, CHP. Cincinnati Gazette, 16 Apr. 1824. In the end, out of 20 members, 9 went for Clay, 7 for Jackson, and one for Adams. Stevens, Early Jackson Party, 103-05.

35. Cincinnati Gazette, 16 Apr. 1824; Hammond to Wright, 7 Jan., 16 Apr. 1824, CHP.
most heavily through their indebtedness to the B.U.S.  

In fact, of all those in the city prominent enough for their political preferences to be identifiable, almost as many had declared for Clay by the time of the election as for Jackson - over 7 per cent of the total vote in each case. Unfortunately, these identifiable individuals represented 57 per cent of Clay's city vote, and only 15 per cent of the Jacksonian vote. What some politicians had suspected from the start was true: most ordinary men in Cincinnati could not be persuaded to vote for Clay; and Clay himself recognised that, whatever might happen elsewhere in Ohio, "The General has the best interest in Mr. Gazlay's district including Cincinnati."  

Of course, the minority of Clinton leaders who joined Jackson brought a welcome element of political experience, prestige and energy to the cause. Micajah Williams was the most effective of the county's Assemblymen, and of impeccable credentials as an internal improver. David Ward and Othniel Looker had long been influential, and had close connections with rural politicians; and Looker's son, with Sackett Reynolds, owned the National Republican, edited for them by Wade's law partner, Elijah Hayward. Hayward, a New Englander and former Federalist, had been in the corridor of the House of Commons in 1812 when the British Prime Minister Spenser Perceval was shot - and in Cincinnati he treated politics as if they were always charged with extremism. In rhetoric and argument, he was always intemperate; and his intemperance (in every  

36. H.R. Stevens, "Henry Clay, the Bank, and the West in 1824," American Historical Review, LX (1954), 843-48. This article rightly dismisses the Bank issue as a factor in the election for the state as a whole, but goes too far in denying its importance in the Cincinnati region; see Ratcliffe, "Voters and Issues in Party Formation," 859 n.35.  

37. Based on Stevens, Early Jackson Party, 148.  

sense) often made him convert hope into fact, and exaggerate to the point of blatant falsehood. He now directed abusive assaults on all the other candidates as corrupt aristocrats, and maintained an assault on corruption in Washington which was but a continuation of the old Gazlay campaign. 39 Not that it can be claimed that the Jackson party in Cincinnati represented a continuation of the local protest movement, since the final alignments established in April 1824 saw the two camps of 1822 divided within themselves among the Presidential candidates. Moreover, the reform element lost control of the city council in the April elections, while in the October Congressional elections Gazlay, despite carrying the city, was defeated by a member of the formerly dominant elite, James Findlay— who happened to be a fellow Jacksonian. 40 Yet there can be no doubt that the widespread popular resentment of privilege and government corruption which local politicians had cultivated in the past— and now continued to cultivate— provided fertile soil in 1824 for the cause of a candidate who was portrayed as a strong-minded patriot hero risen from the people and unconnected with politics.

Indeed, a groundswell of grass-roots sentiment for Jackson began to appear even before the realignment of spring 1824 was accomplished. As early as December 16, 1823, before any prominent Clintonian had deserted the ranks, the important meeting called to nominate Clinton had almost been disrupted by the Jacksonians whom the Advertiser had called on to attend: "A powerful excitement in favour of Jackson among some men and more boys, seemed to threaten a dissolution of the meeting"; and an attempt to replace Clinton's name by Jackson's was defeated 450-330,

39. Stevens, Early Jackson Party, 23. For Hayward, see F.P. Weisenburger, "The 'Atlas' of the Jacksonian Movement in Ohio," BHPSO, XIV (1956), 283-301, and biographical materials in Rice Papers, OHS.

40. Cincinnati Advertiser, 14 Apr. 1824; Cincinnati Gazette, 19 Oct. 1824; Stevens, Early Jackson Party, 111, 143-46.
with, it was claimed, friends of other candidates voting against Jackson.

Moreover, the growth of Jackson's popularity as his prospects of national support improved began to amaze observers, even before the politicians had completed their transformation into Jacksonians.

Strange! Wild! Infatuated! All for Jackson! His victory at New Orleans was not more unaccountable than his political success is becoming. Two-thirds here are said to be for Jackson. But, surely, in February last, his name was not mentioned in the Miami country.

As the Jacksonian campaign moved up a gear, so popular involvement grew. By May even Charles Hammond conceded "Jackson ... is strongest in the city." By June he acknowledged that "Jackson here is all the rage - He is making inroads upon Clay almost entirely"; and by October had to report that "During the days of militia training the Jackson fever rose almost to blood heat." The excitement was at its height on election day, as one resident of German background testified in his diary:

29th (October) Fri: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION came on to day - a contrivance was got up at the polls: a carpenter's bench was arranged in front of the window leaving a narrow passage to admit about two or three at a time. The crowding was so great that no one could get to the polls without being squeezed almost to death, which means prevented several hundred votes getting in. The bench was occupied by challengers of every party - The Jacksonites kept crowded close to the window to give their party a chance to get in, but the Clayites & Adamsites soon got up to "a thing or two" they "huzza for Jackson!" They were soon helped thro' the crowd and some modest Jacksonites who did not huzza were push'd back 'thus they injured their own party-

Even so, Jackson carried the city by a landslide (55.33%), despite the significant element of New Englanders (31 per cent of the population in 1825), as well as people connected with large import houses, who enabled


42. Henry Dana Ward to Cutler, Cincinnati, 14 Apr. 1824, in Cutler, Ephraim Cutler, 189-90.

43. Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 10 May, 7 June, 1 Oct. 1824, CHP.
The example of Cincinnati had unusual power, even if it was scarcely typical of the surrounding rural areas; even in Hamilton County, the city contained less than half the population. But it served as the market and the source of news for many counties in the Great and Little Miami valleys and along the River Ohio. In 1815 Daniel Drake had described Cincinnati's metropolitan area as covering eleven counties of southwestern Ohio, as well as three populous counties of southeastern Indiana and adjoining parts of Kentucky. All this area had shared in Cincinnati's financial and economic collapse. Throughout the tri-state area, with the exception of the counties on the National Road, the influence of political sentiment expressed and decisions taken in Cincinnati was strongly felt. In June Hammond thought the rage for Jackson was "confined to Hamilton and the adjoining borders of Clermont and Butler," but the months that followed saw the spread of Jacksonism through counties within a radius of sixty miles.

For the most part politicians in these counties were as slow in coming out for Jackson as they were in Cincinnati. The one exception was the establishment, in June 1823, of a Jackson paper in Adams County, fifty miles southeast of Cincinnati; the two young editors seem to have been connected with Moses Dawson. There were no further signs of commitment until March 1824, when a Jackson county meeting was held in Adams, and the Hamilton Intelligencer, in Butler County, came out for Jackson. In April township and militia meetings declared for Jackson.

44. Jacob Deterly, "Remarks," II, 1. For the returns, see Cincinnati Advertiser, 3 Nov. 1824, and, for the New Englanders, Harvey Hall, The Cincinnati Directory, for 1825, Containing the Names of its Citizens... / Cincinnati, 1825/.

45. Drake, Natural and Statistical View, 36-37, 57-60; Cincinnati Daily Gazette, 21 Sept. 1833, quoted in Berry, Western Prices, 388-89.

46. Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 7 June 1824, CHP.
and by late June influential county committees had been organized in Hamilton, Clermont and Butler. In some cases, politicians were undoubtedly following the public mood. Thomas Morris, long a leading figure in Clermont County had initially favoured Adams and been a candidate for nomination as an Elector... as beffited a man who was to become the first abolitionist in the United States Senate over a decade later. But Morris at this time was fighting to reestablish his political career, which he had always been keen to advance; for in 1823, after many years' political service, he had been defeated for re-election to the state senate because he had supported the principle of taxation to sustain a proper school system. With his eye to a future Congressional election, and, at least according to a later detractor, "finding Jackson was gaining ground in the Congressional District..., he wheeled about some time during the summer of 1824 and came out for Jackson!" Certainly one of Morris's sons joined the Clermont Jackson committee in May, and his nephew, Thomas L. Hamer, who had recently taken over Morris's newspaper in Brown County, The Benefactor and Georgetown Advocate, had come out for Jackson by early June.

In general, it seems clear that the support of influential men and newspapers made only a marginal difference to the size of Jackson's vote. In western Hamilton County, where the voters had stuck with Harrison through all his trials, a meeting was called in May to nominate Harrison's favoured candidate; the meeting rejected Clay and voted for Jackson, 40-9. In early June, Adams men had a similar disillusioning experience in a township in eastern Hamilton County. In Clermont the only newspaper


favoured Adams, but could not stop the Jackson landslide. In Montgomery County, both Dayton newspapers opposed Jackson, who still won a plurality of 45 per cent, in spite of the county's interest in the National Road. In Warren, the leading men—Morrow, Dunlavy, the old Quig John Bigger, Congressman Ross, Postmaster-General McLean, the young Tom Corwin—preferred Clay, Adams, Calhoun or even Crawford, while the Lebanon Western Star finally came out for Adams; Jackson took 47.9 per cent of the vote, in spite of a significant popular constituency for John Quincy Adams.

Clearly the Jackson cause was almost irresistible among Western farmers who wanted internal improvements but resented Clay; for them, recent experience had amply demonstrated the need for a Hero to reform a corrupt government that had made possible the oppression of the people.

My Dear Countryman

The Cincinnati leaders of the Jackson movement could work hard to win support and stimulate an extraordinarily high turnout in the south-western counties, but victory in the Presidential election would depend on finding substantial support elsewhere in the state. They were hampered at the state level by the fact that so few state legislators were Jacksonians, and the movement for Jackson took off only after the General Assembly had finished its session. So whereas Clay and Adams had been able to organize central committees and nominate Electoral tickets simply by holding caucuses or public meetings in Columbus during the sitting of the Assembly, the Jacksonians were compelled to take the unprecedented step of calling a state convention to meet at the capital in July. In the event, probably fewer than twenty people attended and only eight out of sixty-four counties were represented. Moreover, the Jacksonians experienced great

difficulty in drawing up an Electoral ticket: some Congressional districts named an Elector for themselves, some county committees refused to accept the man named for them, and some parts of the state where Jacksonism was weak had Electors named for them who had no local standing. "Who ever heard of these men before?" asked one Western Reserve newspaper. Although a state committee of correspondence was elected, the Ohio Jacksonians continued to depend for their organizing drive upon the Hamilton County committee. 1

The simple truth was that, down to the collapse of the Clintonian movement in March 1824, there had been no attempt to forge an Ohio Jackson party. Instead, there had been a number of newspapers which advocated his claims but without hopes of more than local success. Besides Moses Dawson in Cincinnati and the two young editors in Adams County, there were sympathetic newspapers in Perry, Columbiana and Wayne Counties. The only one of these three to represent a centre of real energy was the Wooster Spectator in Wayne County, which was associated with a group of lesser politicians who began to organize for Jackson as early as December 1823. 2

The Hamilton County committee, through Elijah Hayward, contacted this group in the summer of 1824, and received a subscription for twelve copies of each issue of the National Republican "until the great election is over." At the end of August Hayward was urging the Wooster Jacksonians to encourage the formation of committees in adjoining counties, and "to cause meetings of the friends of Jackson to be held, if not more than 10 or a dozen can be found in a county." A month later Hayward confessed that the Hamilton County committee was dependent on the Wooster Jacksonians "for exertions to aid our glorious cause, in all the counties north and east of your County."


2. Ibid., 66-67, 93-97.
He sent them 140 pamphlets and 120 handbills to be distributed in those counties, and especially in Tuscarawas and Stark Counties where "some considerable exertion" might yet "procure a respectable vote for the old Hero." Hayward was so badly informed about eastern Ohio that he sometimes sent packages of these expensive materials to violent opponents of Jackson, and he complained still in October that the Wooster committee did not keep him informed of the progress of the cause in their region. admitting, by the fall the campaign was being aided considerably by energetic Jacksonians in Steubenville, but they too did not know the names of leading Jacksonians in some potentially sympathetic counties nearby.

These politicians were often drawn to the Jackson cause by no higher motives than moved some of the Cincinnati politicians. The Wooster Jacksonians were mainly men who had lost out in recent factional struggles, and were bound together by a common hatred of their rivals, notably Congressman John Sloane. In Steubenville and Jefferson County, the collapse of the Clintonian cause found some politicians stranded, hesitating to follow their colleagues into the Clay or Adams camps. The most prominent was Benjamin Tappan, ardent for the American System, yet mistrustful of the Clay candidacy and even more of Clay's partisans in Steubenville. Moreover, he was probably concerned about his own political standing locally, for as chairman of the state's Canal Commission he was identified with a project unpopular in Jefferson County, and in 1823 had been defeated in various bids for high legal and judicial office. He was losing both popularity and reputation, partly because of a bitter controversy with his neighbour and brother-in-law John M. Goodenow; when the Western Herald published the news that Tappan had been found guilty of slandering Goodenow, Tappan fell


5. See LFP, 1818-28, passim.
out with the editor, his former protege James Wilson, who in April 1824
came out for Clay. Though it was sometime before Tappan entirely burned
his boats in the Clay camp, he was soon in correspondence with the Hamilton
County committee and identified with the Jackson cause. So too in
Pickaway County the noted improver Caleb Atwater, who was active in the
schools and canal cause and had run a newspaper for Clinton in Chillicothe,
shifted to the Jackson rather than the Clay camp in the spring of 1824,
but then his political correspondence was marked above all by a bitter
hostility to the Chillicothe politicians, and their allies, who led the
Clay campaign.

The Jackson cause undoubtedly gained from the adhesion of such
energetic, experienced and influential men. Caleb Atwater, most notably,
became a member of the state committee of correspondence, and toiled hard
finding supporters in other counties, preparing addresses, and writing
newspaper reports and articles which earned him the reputation of being
"the Circleville branch" of "the Jackson lying manufactory," Dawson
managing the Cincinnati branch. Yet the efforts of such men cannot in
themselves explain the size of the Jackson vote in their areas, for such
efforts succeeded only in particular sorts of constituencies; and similar
constituencies elsewhere in the state also produced large votes for Jackson,
even when the influence of local notables and local newspapers was used
against him—as, for example, in Harrison County. Indeed, the suspicion
arises that discontented politicians like those in Wooster moved to Jackson's
side because they saw that voters in the surrounding countryside were
unusually sympathetic to his candidacy. Atwater, for example, predicted

6. Hayward to Tappan, Cincinnati, 5 May 1824, and John Sloane to Tappan,
Wooster, 9 Aug. 1824, BT, LC; Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 7 June
1824. See also Ratcliffe, ed., "Autobiography of Benjamin Tappan,"
153-56, esp. 154, n. 96 and the references therein.

7. Atwater to Trimble, in Autobiography of Allen Trimble, 134, 175. See
also F.P. Weisenburger, "Caleb Atwater: Pioneer Politician and Historian,"
OHQ, LXVIII (1959), 18-37.

8. Scioto Gazette, 11 Nov. 1824.
correctly that his campaign would rouse support, not in all the surrounding counties, but in those lying east of Circleville. What sort of voter was it that responded so easily and spontaneously to the Jacksonian call?

In the first place, the Scotch Irishmen who had come into Ohio from Pennsylvania or direct from Northern Ireland almost uniformly supported Jackson. By contrast, those the Scotch Irish patriots have claimed as kinsmen who entered Ohio through Kentucky or Virginia (or even New England) usually preferred one of the other candidates, generally Clay; but then the Scotch Irish in old Virginia had been Federalist, while the Pennsylvania Scotch Irish had been impeccably Republican, from at least the Whiskey Rebellion onwards. Even the supposedly unanimous Jackson vote of the Irish in Cincinnati (where they formed 6.88 per cent of the adult male population) was essentially a Scotch Irish vote, for there can have been few Irish Catholics, as the Bishop of Cincinnati claimed that two-thirds of the two hundred Catholics in the city in 1825 were recent converts. Secondly, the Pennsylvania Dutch appear to have strongly preferred Jackson, wherever they lived in Ohio. Even Atwater's comparative success in securing 44.1 per cent of the vote for Jackson in the canal county of Pickaway (where Clay gained 50.3 per cent) owed much to the belt of German settlement in eastern Pickaway that spread over from Fairfield, Perry and northern Hocking counties - the very area in which he had anticipated success; and, indeed, his most distinctive contribution to the campaign was his circulation of an inflammatory address written in German. It is

12. Delaware Patron, 25 Nov. 1824. See also Table 7.2 and Map 7.1.
also striking how many of those who had brought out newspapers for Jackson or joined Jackson committees before March 1824 bore Scotch Irish or German names, or else lived in counties with significant German settlement. The main clustering of these communities was to be found in eastern Ohio, and here the enthusiasm for Jackson represented little more than a westward extension of the great, early and sustained wave of enthusiasm which swept across western Pennsylvania. What underlay it?

The Scotch Irish had moved into southwestern Pennsylvania in the 1770s, and had begun to cross the River Ohio as early as the 1780s. Jefferson County was the centre of their settlement, but they also penetrated northwards across Columbiana into the southeastern corner of the Western Reserve, mainly around Youngstown, southwards into Belmont and even eastern Washington County, and after 1800 westwards into Harrison County and even Coshocton and Guernsey. Although their communities remained distinctive, by the 1820s they seem to have been most conspicuous and predominant among the rural population of the then Harrison, Jefferson and Columbiana counties. William Cooper Howells, whose family had moved from a Quaker area to Steubenville and then back into rural Jefferson County in the early 1820s, remembered his Scotch Irish neighbours well, "a race of people with which that part of the country was nearly all settled":

It seems as if a touch of the Irish soil makes a man easy to the cares of the world, and takes from him all that character for providence that so marks the Scotchman .... They were light-hearted and jolly, though more prudent and thrifty than the pure stock of the Irish. They were of the Presbyterian faith in religion, very democratic in politics, and took kindly to whisky.


They were also prone to litigation, especially for slander, partly because it enlivened the monotony of rural life, partly because "the obstinacy of the Scotch in them, combined with Irish irritability, seemed to fit them for constant quarrels." Howells was particularly impressed by their adherence to their ancestral Presbyterian faith, though a good number had become Methodists. "The religious feeling pervaded the whole community intellectually," and there were constant public debates and private discussions about free will and predestination - which the strict Calvinists usually won.

The public mind was more largely employed with religious subjects than in later years.... Politics occupied the people much less, and they talked less about it than in after times. This, however, was before the great Jackson era, whose poison has so thoroughly permeated the practical politics of the country. 

Besides the Scotch Irish, there are indications of recent immigration into eastern Ohio direct from the British Isles - and of some prejudice against the immigrants. In Zanesville during the previous decade the Irish had self-consciously celebrated St. Patrick's Day and the heroes who had struggled for "equal rights, civil and religious," but, though firm Democrats, in local disputes they supported the Republican dissidents; the reason suggested in the press is that the regular Democrats had alienated recent immigrants by rejecting their votes, and opposing Irish politicians on the ground that they were unnaturalized. At the same time there were suggestions in the Western Herald that the Federalists were canvassing for Irish votes, and Wilson reminded his readers which party had passed the Alien laws and had wanted to extend the residence


period for naturalization to fourteen years. Evidently the Irish remained loyal, for Wilson then gloried in examples of Federalist abuse of "imported patriots" and claimed for himself the proud title of "bog·
trotter." 17 The issue of alien suffrage became a serious one in some places, since the state constitution did not make clear whether Ohio residents had to be United States citizens in order to vote, and in 1821 a state law regulating elections ordered judges at elections to satisfy themselves that each voter was a citizen. Observance of this law varied from township to township, but it could be used, as in Cincinnati, to deprive immigrants of the vote. In 1824 a Jefferson County representative, who later in the year became a Jacksonian, advocated in the House that aliens be allowed by law to vote, in order to make the practice uniform. In some townships in his own county, he reported, aliens always had been admitted to the polls, since the existing statute was considered unconstitutional. The bill failed, exciting "much interest" in Jefferson County. 18

Also from the British Isles came Scottish Highlanders to settle in this part of Ohio. These were men who had been recently dispossessed by the infamous Highland clearances carried out by "those Tyrants ... in that land of bondage." Now, in Columbiana County, in country reminiscent of Aberdeenshire, they found "a better way of living here if providence permit than any tennant at will in the Estate of Culoden especially more independent." However, in 1830 one Scottish settler reported that "there are a great many of the British that refuses to be naturalized, for this reason, that the constitution does not admit of the existance of a God," and the lack of


18. Cincinnati Advertiser, 10 Jan. 1824; Columbus Gazette, 26 Feb., 4 Mar. 1824; Western Herald, 13 Mar. 1824.
religious tests allows infidels "(of which, their are a great many in this country)" to gain power. Significantly, he added that "all the difference that I can understand, in this, that a man un-naturalized has no vote in any business of a public nature, such as electing a member of Congress, Governor or State, Justice of the Peace, &c." 19

The Scotch Irish, however, whether first- or second-generation immigrants, did vote - and, in 1824, decisively. With their sense that they were a people "following along at the hand of God the pathway leading to destiny," 20 they deeply resented the British oppression that had persuaded them to leave Ireland. Some of these Ulstermen had participated in the great Irish rebellion of 1798, in the course of which some 30,000 people had been killed, and a few - like Moses Dawson - had suffered imprisonment at British hands. When a Jackson, at America's darkest hour, defeated the invading British redcoats at the battle of New Orleans, he was widely hailed - as by the Ulsterman James Wilson - as "the immortal ... hero whom Americans are proud to call their countryman, whom the people of the west look upon as the instrument under Providence of their salvation." Wilson demanded a national monument to Jackson comparable to the one projected for George Washington, and defended him against Federalist criticisms of his arbitrary rule in Louisiana. 21 Jackson now became a folk-hero to the Scotch Irish, who would not hear any criticism of him.

In 1819 one Ulsterman in Columbiana County warned his Yankee Congressman to tread carefully over Jackson's invasion of Florida:

19. Charles Rose, 15 Oct. 1822, and H. Rose, 2 Feb. 1830, both to John Rose of Inverness, Immigrants' letters, from Scotch Settlement, near Wellsville, Columbiana County (photocopies, VFM 1903, OHS).


21. Western Herald, 1 Sept. 1815; also 4, 18 May, 27 July, 8, 22 Sept. 1815. For Dawson, see Stevens, Early Jackson Party, 3-5.
Let Jackson have done Right or Wrong He has preserved His Country from the inamy and it would not do well for any member from our Western Country to do any thing against him — the people ... Would he ready to Tare the Livers out of any Member that would take part against Jackson.

Feeling was less strong in other parts of the West than it was in this region of the upper Ohio valley which, on both sides of the river, had been peopled by the Scotch Irish.

From the start of the Presidential contest many Ulstermen felt that only Jackson would do. Minor politicians in Pittsburgh began a campaign which rapidly spread through the upper Ohio valley, transforming Pennsylvania politics, and even reaching into Scotch Irish areas of eastern Ohio where established politicians and newspaper editors preferred a Northern candidate. Joseph Richardson, the most prominent Columbiana politician, wanted a "candidate from the free states - as I have always believed that slavery will one day be the downfall of our Happy Government but aside of this reason I have always believed that General Jackson has claims that none of the others have." Unlike Clay, Jackson was at least not responsible for the Missouri compromise, and good Presbyterians had not been shocked by reports of his gambling on board Ohio steamboats.

Popular sentiment needed only the reassurance that he was a realistic candidate, and by June 1824 the Steubenville area was struck by "the Jackson fever." The weakness of political organization, however, meant voters were not as aroused as they could have been, and the level of turnout was disappointingly low in some of these counties. But at least in the election Jefferson, Columbiana and Harrison gave the General absolute majorities, and in surrounding areas of Scotch Irish settlement, even on the southeastern fringe of the Western Reserve, he ran well - except along

22. William Foulks to Hitchcock, Foulkstown, 16 Feb. 1819, PHFP.
23. Richardson to J.H. Larwill, New Lisbon, 23 Sept. 1824, LFP, OHS.
24. Ruggles to Hammond, St. Clairsville, 11 June 1824, CHP.
the National Road.  

From Cincinnati Moses Dawson reported after the election how "An Irishman being asked on Friday last how it happened that all the Irish voted for General Jackson, replied, 'By the powers, for the best reason in the world, because he beat the English at Orleans, my darling.'  

But, beyond that, lay the self-identification of Scotch Irishmen with Jackson. One of the minor Pittsburgh politicians who had begun the movement in western Pennsylvania saw him not only as "the son of my dear countryman" but also, as he told Jackson himself, as the man whom "my God, and your God, ... hath raised ... up for to be a Saviour and a deliverance for his people." This sense of kinship lay behind several stories, probably apocryphal, told about General William Lytle, one of Jackson's warmest supporters for the Presidency. An early pioneer of Ohio, Lytle had fought Indians in what is now Front St., Cincinnati, and had made a fortune out of surveying, land speculation, and a diverse range of business activities. By background, Lytle was a Scotch Irishman who had long known Jackson and identified himself with him. Like Jackson, he was light of build, small of person, with hollow cheeks and melancholy eyes. When the great man stayed at the Lytle mansion near Cincinnati, a ball was given in his honour. In the midst of the whirl and the gaiety, General Jackson was tapped on the shoulder by Mrs. Lytle, who, with wifely acerbity, inquired why he was "standing around" instead of entertaining his guests!

25. Cincinnati Advertiser, 13 Nov. 1824. Jackson's percentages in the three counties named were 56, 59.8 and 54.7, respectively; and in Trumbull (on the Reserve) 25.3, Coshocton 50.2 (also Germans), Guernsey 41.4, and Belmont (on the National Road) only 13.5.


The 'Pennsylvania Dutch' (or rather Deutsch) represented a much later stream of settlement into eastern Ohio than the Scotch Irish. Moving into the state after 1800 and in large numbers only after 1815, they settled in particular on the good wheat-growing uplands on the "backbone" of the state, where they sometimes took over farms first opened up by Scotch Irish pioneers. In 1809 Ephraim Cutler, travelling in Pennsylvania, had pointed out the differences between these two groups:

Yet, in spite of their differences, the Dutch voted for Jackson in 1824 with as much conviction as the Scotch Irish, in both Pennsylvania and Ohio. The evidence in this respect depends on aggregate voting data. These German Protestants were restrained in the expression of their Jacksonism, and their newspapers, though sympathetic to Jackson, were more even-handed in tone and content than most other Jacksonian newspapers. The Dutch provided few prominent political leaders, and those they did - like Philemon Beecher, or Bucher as he was earlier called - often favoured Clay. But all the counties of east central Ohio traditionally associated with German settlement - Wayne, Stark, Tuscarawas, and what became Holmes, "a broad belt of good farming land some fifty miles wide, ... which they occupied in predominant numbers" and where "they planted their distinctive

30. Lancaster Ohio Eagle, 1823-24; Somerset Perry Record, 1824.
language and institutions" — all gave Jackson at least one-third of their votes, even when on the canal route, and 59.2 per cent in the case of Wayne, where the Wooster committee operated. This area spread into Columbiana County (45.1%) in the west, Richland on the east (46.8%), and just possibly Knox (41.1%) to the southwest, while Coshocton (50.3%) contained much of what became Holmes County.

32 Perhaps the proportion of Germans in the population was greatest in Perry and Fairfield Counties farther south, which stand out as islands of Jacksonism, with Perry giving him two-thirds of its votes, and Fairfield 39.5 per cent in spite of its location on the canal. 33 The other distinctly German county was Montgomery, which was the only county on the route of the National Road to give Jackson a plurality (45%). 34 The same picture emerges from township data, where available. In Ross County, for example, Jackson received 321 out of 1876 votes (17.11%): one-fifth of them came in Scioto township, containing Chillicothe, where Tiffin had introduced seventy families of German redemptioners by 1818; his only township victory was in the township nearest Fairfield, on Zane's Trace; and, of the three townships where he did next best, one was also adjacent to this strongly German area, and the others were on the

32. W.F. Dunaway, "Pennsylvania as an Early Distributing Center of Population," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LV (1931), 161. For early Dutch settlement in these counties, see John Kilbourn, The Ohio Gazetteer... (Columbus, 1819), 53, and ibid. (Columbus, 1833), 447, 482; Henry Howe, Historical Collections of Ohio (Cincinnati, 1847), 35, 105, 255, 257, 428, 467, 483; the many various county histories; and Albert B. Faust, The German Element in the United States (New York, 1927), 1, 392, 405, 420–22, 429. A further indication may be found in the distribution of German translations of official documents in 1817 and 1832, though such evidence is far from reliable. See Ratcliffe, "Voters and Issues in Party Formation," 862, n.50.


34. Gallagher, "Ohio in 1838," 188; Howe, Historical Collections (1847), 374, 376; Faust, German Element, 1, 428–30. See also Table 7.2 above.
western edge of the county where a British traveller in the same year noticed significant German settlement. The coincidence between a surprising Jacksonian vote and German farmers is impressively close in many parts of Ohio.

But why did the Pennsylvania Dutch — and possibly the few more recent German immigrants, as in Chillicothe — prefer Jackson to other candidates? There can be no doubt that the Dutch retained "as a body, their national feelings, and formed a distinct class from their fellow citizens." A future British prime minister — Lord Derby — noticed in 1824 that in Pennsylvania, in all elections, "the German party seems to consider itself as an interest distinct from the rest of the community, and both shows and excites considerable jealousy." In 1815 a New England doctor had discovered many Germans in Perry and Fairfield Counties who spoke no English, and was surprised at the strength of their "prejudices ... against the New England people," and it is entirely possible that the Dutch resented the superior attitudes of Americans of English extraction, to which Cutler bore witness in 1809. In that case, they may well have regarded the victor of New Orleans as having defeated, indirectly, a dominant and unsympathetic ethnic group. Certainly in 1822 Philemon Beecher, running for Congress, had to reassure his constituents that, in his earlier term,


37. John Cotton, "From Rhode Island to Ohio in 1815," Journal of American History, XVI (1922), 251-52. Against this should be set the comment, made by a British traveller in Perry County in 1817, that "The most perfect cordiality prevails between the Americans of German and those of English extraction, in every part of the United States." Morris Birkbeck, Notes on a Journey in America (London, 1818), 56.
he had not been hostile to Jackson for his services in defence of the country.\textsuperscript{38} In that case, German motivations, so difficult to find direct evidence of, may well have been similar to those of the Pennsylvania Scotch-Irish, who had even stronger reasons for gratitude to the hero.

Undoubtedly ethnic predilections helped voters to choose their sides in the critical election of 1824. New Englanders tended to prefer Adams regardless of their earlier views of his political apostasy in 1806, and his vote was to some extent an expression of the new "esprit de corps of the Universal Yankee Nation," a new self-awareness apparent ever since the shock of the Missouri crisis.\textsuperscript{39} Tensions between Yankees and the ethnic groups from Pennsylvania may well explain the differences in voting behaviour between the Western Reserve and the block of counties to the south: as Elisha Whittlesey explained in 1825, "few or no persons from New England would settle" on the Congress lands because the settlers there "formed such a motley society," coming as they did "almost exclusively from Pennsylvania, Virginia and Maryland" as "natives of those states or Germans, Irish & Scotch or their descendants." Yankee politicians had often faced opposition in that area.\textsuperscript{40} Yet, in spite of such tensions and ethnic prejudices, the division of the Ohio electorate cannot be explained purely in ethnocultural terms. Too many members of those ethnic groups were attracted to Clay by his American System and its promised aid to internal improvements, while in the southwestern counties prejudices of a quite different kind turned the populace against Ohio's most obvious 'favourite son.'\textsuperscript{41} The Presidential election of 1824 had divided Ohio voters along

\textsuperscript{38} Ohio Eagle, 3 Oct. 1822.

\textsuperscript{39} Painesville Telegraph, 22 Oct. 1823; see also Shaw Livermore, Jr., \textit{The Twilight of Federalism, 1815-30} (Princeton, 1962), 95-97.

\textsuperscript{40} Whittlesey to W.W. Griswold, 7 May 1825, EWP. For opposition because "you are a yankee," see Wright to Brown, Steubenville, 31 Aug. 1818, EABP.

\textsuperscript{41} These points are argued and substantiated more fully in Ratcliffe, "Ethnocultural Interpretation," esp. 16-25.
complexly cross-cutting lines, but only time would tell whether the new alignments created in the peculiar circumstances of that campaign were going to persist.

The Persistence of Opposition

It may take two to make a fight, but only one need be the aggressor. The perpetuation of the division which had appeared in Ohio in 1824 was essentially the decision of the Jacksonians. They determined not to accept the result of the House election, insisted on maintaining a separate political identity, and endeavoured to extend into all sorts of other elections the essential criterion of party affiliation - support for or hostility to the new Adams administration. Throughout the late 1820s their efforts were sustained by the loyalty of the groups who had voted for Jackson in 1824, and this stubborn persistence ensured that the National Republican supremacy in Ohio would not go unchallenged.

Even before the House election, some Cincinnati politicians feared that the Ohio delegation would "follow in the train of John Q. Adams, and serve as whippers-in to his party." The National Republican spoke of the unscrupulousness of the "Clay party in Ohio, men who have pretended to be the champions of a liberal and enlightened policy for the protection of Domestic manufactures" and now were about to be led by "interest or ambition" to support "a man notoriously opposed to 'domestic measures'." They argued that Jackson's second place in Ohio created a moral obligation on the Ohio delegation, just as his first place did in the Electoral College; preference for Adams would be a defiance of the popular will, which clearly wanted a Westerner.¹ Inevitably the result was greeted with horror by the most committed Jacksonians; and even a man as intelligent as

¹ National Republican, 28 Dec. 1824; Cincinnati Advertiser, 29 Dec. 1824, 2 Feb. 1825.
Benjamin Tappan could accuse his offending Congressman brother-in-law of having been "sold by Mr. Clay."²

From Cincinnati Hammond reported that no "permanent dissatisfaction is to be apprehended" over the outcome of the election, for "all but the Jacksonians are well satisfied." However, even weeks later "the Bedlamites" continued to make "some noise." Hayward had greeted the result with the headline "The long agony is over - the Bourbons are restored." He immediately looked forward to a new President in four years' time, and hoped Adams would "go out of office, as his father did, ... without the privilege of appointing his successor." Gazlay issued an address to his constituents, reporting that some Clay men voted for Adams in full awareness that they were defying the popular will.³ The Jackson press continued to denounce the corrupt bargain that had enabled Clay once more to feather his nest, this time with high office. The Jacksonians' abuse, for one St. Clairsville lawyer, proved conclusively that "Not monkies alone throw their excrement for want of better weapons."⁴

In March Jackson stopped off for a week in Cincinnati on his way home from Congress. He attended every festivity (including a "splendid private party made by Gen. Lytle"), and "did every thing possible to affect popularity." A dinner was got up for him at the Cincinnati Hotel by the Jacksonians, but they also "very much needed the cash and the countenances of the Adams & Clay men." This created some difficulties over the official toasts, since the Jacksonians "wanted to indulge in rancorous abuse." As a compromise, both sides agreed to have no toasts to - or against - the new President and his cabinet. Hammond was furious

²  J.C. Wright to Tappan, Washington, 12 Feb. 1825, BTP, LC.
³  Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 2 Mar. (transcript), 20 Apr. 1825, CHP; National Republican, 18, 22 Feb. 1825; Niles' Weekly Register, XXVIII (28 May 1825), 207.
⁴  Thomas H. Genin to Hammond, St. Clairsville, 4 May 1825, CHP.
with his fellow supporters of the Administration for not refusing to attend: "It was manifest that all the devotions to Jackson were for party purposes to rally an opposition to the new administration and get Jackson up as the rallying point."  

Henry Clay recognized the depth of feeling against him in Cincinnati, but comforted himself that "there is as little sympathy between a large portion of the population and the residue of the people of Ohio, as there is between the people of distinct Countries." Yet there was a similar response elsewhere in southwestern Ohio. The Hamilton Intelligencer promised to remember which Congressmen had trampled on the people's wishes. A dinner was held in Lebanon, in July 1825, to celebrate the opening of the canals, which was attended by Clay, Harrison and Clinton; the retiring Congressman Thomas R. Ross, who had voted for Crawford in the House election, toasted "Gen. Andrew Jackson - The distinguished citizen and soldier; may the freemen of the United States never forget his past eminent services, the surest pledge of his future usefulness." In the eastern part of the state, the response was a little more muted, though his supporters were encouraged by the news that "Jackson is out a candidate for the next heats." Even in Marietta, where they had possessed a small but energetic organization, "The Friends of General Jackson, in this Section of Country" announced this news, and added that "he will be supported by them for that Office" - in April 1825!

The prospects for such an opposition in Ohio depended greatly on the political situation elsewhere in the country. There was great uncertainty

5. Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 2 Apr. 1825, CHP; Smith, Buckeye Titan, 103-05.
8. Wright to Hammond, Steubenville, 10 Apr. 1825, CHP; Marietta American Friend, 8 Apr. 1825.
as Adams' first Congress met, though rumours in Cincinnati claimed "an organized opposition will be got up to the Administration, but who is to lead is not distinctly understood." Whittlesey, in Washington, was quite certain that some great effort is maturing to revolutionize the country in order that certain aspiring men may rule who are in the background and must remain there unless they take the front rank by some great commotion. You must not be surprised if the disaffected of all parties unite with the Jacksonites to bring about this state of things and assume the name of the People's party.9

Already the Jackson men in Congress had tested their strength by putting up John W. Campbell of Ohio for Speaker against both the Crawfordite candidate and the Administration men's preference, John W. Taylor of New York, who won. However, the elements hostile to Adams came together to condemn his first Annual Message and the proposed American participation at the Panama Congress; indeed, according to one Ohioan, "everything was assailed" with "feeling & ill temper," and business much embarrassed by "the spirit of indiscriminate warfare waged by the opposition."10 Although few people in Ohio approved the substance of the Congressional opposition's attack on the new administration, yet its mere existence encouraged the Jacksonian opposition in Ohio to persist. Observing developments in Cincinnati during the session, Hammond wrote from Cincinnati that

the leading Jackson men here are greatly disposed to side with any kind and character of opposition - It is my opinion that very few of the busy and forward of that party can be expected to unite for the opposition in any event - Like Randolph's Fanatics / the Virginia Crawfordites/ they would sacrifice every thing, country and all, that their chief might see his more successful competitor prostrate.


By the summer of 1825, back home in Belmont County, Senator Ruggles believed that "Adams and Jackson are now considered the only candidates, that will be presented to the nation at the next Presidential election, and the people are dividing between these two men." The

Yet there remained an alternative scenario: the chimera of DeWitt Clinton continued to fascinate some leading Ohioans. He was deservedly seen as "the great champion of internal improvements" and invited to turn the first spade to mark the commencement of Ohio's great canal project on July Fourth, 1825 - though the stiffness of his manners disappointed many in contrast with Jackson's ease and affability during his recent visit to Cincinnati. Members of the canal lobby like Tappan preferred Clinton above all others, as, indeed, did Elisha Whittlesey. Micajah Williams maintained close contacts with leading New York Clintonians, discussing not only canals but Clinton's presidential prospects for 1828; and they regarded other Ohio Jacksonians like Hayward and Atwater as really preferring Clinton. Some feared that if Clinton ran as a third candidate, the result might be another House election for Adams to win; others wanted Clinton to replace Jackson as the opposition candidate, but feared that the South might not unite behind him. Several politicians on both sides believed that Adams ought to withdraw, and allow a straight contest between Jackson and Clinton, which they anticipated would be close. A leading Cincinnati Jacksonian thought "in that case the Jackson interest will divide, many who are the friends of internal improvements will be for Clinton and numbers will still be for Jackson from principal." But

11. Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 27 Mar. 1826 (see also 2 Feb. 1827), CHP; Ruggles to McLean, St. Clairsville, 4 July 1826, McLean Papers.


13. William Burke to McLean, Cincinnati, 17 July, 2 Nov. 1826, McLean Papers. See also Hammond to Wright, 31 Mar. 1826, and Hammond to Frank Johnston, 12 Apr. 1826, CHP; Atwater to Tappan, Circleville, 15 Aug. 1826, BTP, LC.
all such prognostications proved pointless when Clinton himself, in autumn 1827, came out for Jackson — and so wrote to Caleb Atwater. By the time of his death in February 1828, Clinton himself and his friends were "bold & actively engaged in the Jackson cause."¹⁴

Gradually time showed that Jackson was the only candidate the opposition could rally on, and the former Crawfordites in New York and Virginia reconciled themselves to supporting him. But the formidable coalition Jackson's supporters were building in the South and Middle Atlantic states was of little consolation to Ohio Jacksonians, except in so far as they hoped to gain federal offices when their Hero at last gained the Presidency. Otherwise, prospects in Ohio seemed slim. Ethan Allen Brown's term in the United States Senate came to a close in 1825, and he wished to be re-elected. He had been careful through the Presidential election to express no personal preferences among the candidates, though most of his political friends in Cincinnati had been Clintonians who, in many cases, moved on to Jackson. In January 1824 young Harrison had identified Brown and Gazlay as the two Ohio representatives who were not for Clay. Brown's reluctance to commit himself undermined his standing in the legislature, two-thirds of whose members had voted for Clay, though he was named as one of the commissioners of the newly established Canal Fund. In the Senatorial election Brown ran the weakest of the four candidates, and the victor was the one candidate who had come out clearly for Clay and had headed the Clay Electoral ticket — William Henry Harrison.¹⁵ This demonstration that

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¹⁵. W.H. Harrison Jr. to Harrison, Washington, 26 Jan. 1824, Harrison Papers; Hammond to Wright, Columbus, 10 Jan. 1825, CHP; Supporter and Scioto Gazette, 10 Feb. 1825. See also letters to Brown, Dec. 1824 -- Feb. 1825, EABP, which reveal both the continuing hostility to Harrison among the Hamilton County members and Harrison's personal efforts to secure his election by calling on every member of the legislature.
political forces antipathetic to Jacksonism controlled Ohio was confirmed when Congress discussed a constitutional amendment establishing a uniform district system for Presidential elections: the whole Ohio delegation voted against such a proposal except for the two Jacksonian Congressmen, both of whom had districts in southwestern Ohio.

In spite of this discouraging situation, Ohio Jacksonians tried to persuade their supporters to make a candidate's Presidential preferences a test in elections to the Assembly. The first moves came, inevitably, in Hamilton County, where Moses Dawson in the summer of 1825 urged the calling of a county delegate convention to form a ticket for the fall elections. His call was rejected at first by the ward meetings in the city, but in late September the various ward meetings, "after much opposition, and after a part of those present had retired," agreed to call a convention, though one could not at that stage be organized before the 1825 elections.

In fact, even in Hamilton County local elections continued to follow the old factional lines, with no regard for national attachments. When William Greene cast around for political support for a judicial appointment, he saw no inconsistency, as a Clay man, in asking Jacksonians to assist him and he knew "Gazlay will support me with all his strength." Over the state as a whole, Presidential politics had virtually no impact on the 1825 elections, and the 1825-26 Assembly dealt with "a mass of business ... but principally of a local nature" - except in one respect. Resolutions forwarded from the Tennessee legislature proposing a constitutional amendment

16. Niles' Weekly Register, XXX (1826), 95.

17. Reemelin, "Moses Dawson," V, Cincinnati Commercial, 18 Dec. 1869. Reemelin (and historians who have followed him) were, of course, incorrect in describing this as a proposal for "the first County Convention of Hamilton County."

18. Greene to Brown, Cincinnati, 6 Dec. 1825, EABP.
to change procedures in Presidential elections so as to avoid further House elections were regarded as Jacksonian — and defeated almost unanimously by the Ohio Assembly in January 1826.19

In 1826 the Jacksonians made serious attempts to extend Presidential politics into Congressional elections. These elections were directly relevant to the balance of power in Washington, and would determine the political character of the House that might have to decide the result of the 1828 Presidential contest. Candidates in most districts were asked to declare whom they would vote for in that contingency, a practice which the old Republican James Heaton claimed would inevitably "produce harsh electioneering."20 The Jacksonians put forward candidates in eleven of the fourteen districts, not bothering in three districts that had voted heavily for Adams or Clay in 1824, including the two Western Reserve districts. In two or three cases, however, the supposed Jacksonian candidates kept very quiet about their Jacksonism, so that doubt persisted about their political colours even if "the friends of General Jackson very generally voted" for them. In many cases the "Jacksonian candidate ... was run off the track at the quarter post," as Adams-Clay incumbents were re-elected; and in some districts the elections were clearly contests dominated by the local tensions and personal rivalries evident in those districts in 1822 and 1824.21

Local rivalries both helped and hindered the Jacksonians. In the central (eighth) district, strong tensions among Columbus, the Sandusky route counties, Licking, and the northeastern fringe, allowed the incumbent, William Wilson from Licking County, to win with just less than one-third

19. Reuben Wood to Whittlesey, Senate Chamber, 4 Feb. 1826, EWP; Hammond to Wright, Columbus, 8 Jan. 1826, CHP.


21. Scioto Gazette, 2 Nov. 1826. For a map of the districts, see Map 4.2.
of the votes. Wilson had voted for Crawford in the House election and was now claimed as a Jacksonian success. 22 Similarly, in the heavily Jacksonian fifth district containing southwestern river counties, each county put up its own candidate, three Administration and one Jacksonian; and perhaps the latter won (with 35.5 per cent of the vote) because he combined his own local support with an appeal to Jacksonians in other counties. 23 By contrast, in the second district containing just two counties, Butler had come to resent its traditional subordination to the "distinguished men" of Lebanon (in Warren County), most notably Jeremiah Morrow, and in 1824 it had overthrown the Warren incumbent, Thomas R. Ross, in favour of its own favourite son, John Woods. In 1826 Ross, well connected and personally popular, came out again, but this time "mounted upon Jackson"; for a time it appeared Warren might put up a second candidate, the Administration man Tom Corwin, but he withdrew. Fears that Ross might appeal to the Jacksonism of Butler County - which had given over two-thirds of its votes to Jackson in 1824 - proved groundless when the voters of Butler County (or 84.59 per cent of them) insisted on supporting their own man John Woods, even though he was an Adams-Clay supporter and a Jackson man from Butler was also in the field. 24

Partisan considerations mingled even more complexly with personal, local and factional rivalries in what had been Gazlay's district. The Jackson committee of 1824, revived in August and reorganized in September, threw its weight behind the incumbent, James Findlay, in his bid for

22. Scioto Gazette, 2 Nov. 1826; Columbus Ohio State Journal, 2 Nov. 1826.
re-election; and other candidates from Hamilton County withdrew, at least one because he wished to ensure the party unity of the Jacksonians. In Clermont County the equally long established politician Thomas Morris decided to run as a rival Jackson candidate, encouraged by dissidents in Cincinnati who had supported Gazlay two years earlier. Hammond reported that "The division between Findlay and Thos. Morris and their friends is so inveterate that reconciliation seems impossible," and the cleavage ensured that the "friends of the administration ... opened a canvass." They nominated David Morris, also from Clermont County, who was a firm Adams man, and no Administration candidate was put forward in Hamilton. Clermont divided evenly between its own two candidates, with a strong minority vote for Findlay in two townships. The Adams candidate ran surprisingly well in the city, and took over one-third of the votes in Hamilton County as a whole; but Findlay took most of the Jackson vote, except in the poor fourth ward of the city where Morris equalled him. In addition, "Gen. Harrison and many other influential supporters of the administration aided Findlay upon grounds of personal regards and family connection"; as Hammond said, "This is very fatal where a supposed minority the Adams men in the district are making exertions to exhibit their strength." This reassertion of local factional considerations was estimated as worth two hundred votes to Findlay, in which case it was markedly less important than the vigorous Jacksonian support of most of those who had preferred Gazlay in 1824 in explaining the 2,576 votes (or virtually 55 per cent) that Findlay won in Hamilton to clinch the election.


Most significant, though, were the Jacksonian campaigns in the eleventh and twelfth districts in eastern Ohio. The incumbent Congressmen here were the only ones who had clearly defied the overwhelming Jacksonism of their districts in voting for Adams in the House election. They were thus prime targets for the Jacksonians, who could hope to use the Presidential issue to prevent their re-election. As a result, the "electioneering campaign in the 11th and 12th districts exceeded for warmth any thing ever experienced in Ohio."27 In the eleventh, John C. Wright had felt in 1825 that he had made a sacrifice of himself by his vote in the House election, and he certainly had been much abused by the Jacksonians for it. By March 1826 he had decided to run again, but reported that the Jacksonians were "rallying," intent on his overthrow. Hammond sarcastically told him it was his own fault for promoting Clay "instead of asking who will the district prefer? - And when the District deserts you why you must comfort yourself with having been in Congress and performed a part there for the advantage" of the present administration. 28 The Jacksonians reduced their candidates to one - Wright's brother-in-law, John M. Goodenow, who was "Jackson up to the hub," with "Jackson snuff, Jackson punch, Jackson whiskey, etc., etc., etc."29 Confident of success, the Jacksonians savaged Wright more remorselessly than any other candidate, apparently, in the whole country. Wright defended himself with equal vigour and greater sustenance of fact and argument. Then an old rival of Wright's, Walter Beebe, an Adams man from Harrison County who had opposed him in 1824, decided to run; and probably reduced the Jacksonian vote even more than the Administration's by appealing to local feeling in Harrison, where he won 71.06 per cent of


28. Wright to Hammond, Washington, 5 Mar. 1826, and Hammond to Wright, 16 Mar / 1826 /, CHP.

the votes cast. With an absolute majority in his own county, Wright narrowly won a plurality in an even three-way contest. 30

In the Twelfth District, there was a more clear-cut two-way contest, which Niles considered "a fair struggle between the parties." John Sloane was also one of the Congressman "black-listed" by the Jacksonians, and his district was dominated by Germans and Scotch Irish. "Great efforts were made by the ... Jackson Kennel to oust Mr. Sloane: a Jackson press was established, and hundreds of Jacksonian papers were weekly distributed gratis, filled with the vilest calumnies against the administration and Mr. Sloane ...."31 Sloane was advised not to attack Jackson, on the grounds that it would make it difficult for Jacksonians to vote for him, but "a little experience" soon showed him and his advisers "that no Jackson man had the least intention of voting for me."32 The election saw turnout double and treble compared with the Presidential election of 1824, yet the Jacksonians carried Columbiana and Wayne, Sloane's own county, with large majorities almost identical to those of 1824 (58.63 and 59.38 per cent, respectively.) In Stark County, which was "comparatively calm," Sloane took 78 per cent of the vote; but then Stark did lie on the canal route and had given a majority to Clay in 1824. This break in Jacksonian predominance, added to his personal strength throughout the district, deriving from his impeccable Democratic record and ardent support of the American System, allowed Sloane to squeeze home by 98 votes, winning 50.73 per cent of the 6,736 cast. 33

30. St. Clairsville Gazette, 16 Sept., 7, 21 Oct. 1826; Scioto Gazette, 2 Nov. 1826. Reports that Beebe was a Jackson man were generally contradicted, e.g., Wooster Ohio Oracle, 3 Nov. 1826.

31. Scioto Gazette, 2 Nov. 1826.

32. Sloane to Hammond, Wooster, 20 Apr. 1827, CHP.

33. Ohio Repository, 19 Oct. 1826; Niles' Weekly Register, XXXI (11 Nov. 1826), 164.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess more closely how far voting in these apparently partisan elections followed the pattern of Presidential preferences expressed in 1824 or anticipated those of 1828—except in one instance. John Thompson, the incumbent Congressman for the sixth district centered on Chillicothe, had been regarded as an Adams man, but during the 1825-26 session he had emerged as a "MONGREL Jacksonian," especially over the Panama mission. The Administration men determined to oppose his reelection and they "finally decided" (presumably by private arrangement) to concentrate their votes on the old conservative Republican, William Creighton, Jr., who promised to "leave nothing undone ... to secure my election." He even engaged the help of friends in other districts who had influence in outlying portions of his own district. After much "heat & bustle," Creighton defeated Thompson, taking over 60 per cent of the vote in Ross County. The township returns for that county reveal that Thompson's vote in 1826 correlated less closely with the vote he had received in 1824 than with Jackson's vote in 1824, even though one-third more people voted in 1826 than in the Presidential election two years earlier. 34

However successful in introducing partisanship into Congressional elections, Jacksonian organizational efforts in 1826 made less advance in the state and local elections. Caleb Atwater, who still acted "as one of the committee of general correspondence for this state," believed that the Jacksonians should put up a candidate for governor to succeed Morrow; and he told his personal choice, Benjamin Tappan, that "It is an easy thing to unite in your favor those who voted for the Hero of Orleans." Tappan visited the Miami

34. Scioto Gazette, 2 Nov. 1826; Creighton to Ewing, Chillicothe, 9 Aug. 1826, and B.G. Leonard, to Ewing, Chillicothe, 25 Sept. 1826, TEP. The returns may be found in Chillicothe Times 4 Nov. 1824; Scioto Gazette, 21 Oct. 1824, 16 Oct. 1826, 5 Nov. 1828. The enclosed scatter diagrams (Charts 7.1 and 7.2) reveal the complexity of the returns, and suggest that Thompson's personal vote in some townships may have modified partisan influences.
a) Correlation
by township of
Thompson's vote
in 1826 with
Jackson's vote
in 1824.

b) Correlation
of Thompson's vote
in 1826 with
Thompson's vote
in 1824.
country where, it was suspected, support was promised him by Jacksonians, but little came of it and the Presidential question was not made an issue. 35

The overwhelming preference was for Allen Trimble, a prominent Clay man who, as Acting Governor in 1824 and subsequently as a United States Senator, had distinguished himself in the canal cause. Gazlay's Jacksonian Western Tiller at Cincinnati mentioned no other candidate for the office, and in the city Trimble won all but 50 out of about 2,275 votes. Equally Presidential loyalties were rarely agitated in the election of state representatives, though about forty men were elected who incidentally supported Jackson. 36

As a minority, the Jacksonians had little to gain from partisan action on legislative matters. As a counterweight to the Tennessee resolutions, the Assembly now produced its own proposals for amending the process for electing Presidents, which the Jacksonians fruitlessly tried to postpone. Otherwise, on "all general subjects" there was "much harmony" in the Assembly, and the Administration men decided it "the best policy to say nothing in the Legislature, upon the subject of national politics, adhering to the maxim that it is useless to attempt mending what is well." 37 The only opportunity the Jacksonians had to gain party advantage came in the election of a United States Senator. The incumbent, Benjamin Ruggles, was tainted by his advocacy of Crawford in 1824, but since then he had faithfully and effectively supported the Adams administration. Leading Adams-Clay men in Ohio, including Hammond and James Wilson, now advocated his re-election, and not merely because he was the most prominent eastern candidate. However,


37. Scioto Gazette, 1 Mar. 1827.
two other Administration men stood against him, arguing that a change was required according to the old principle of "rotation in office." Most newspapers emphasized that party spirit was not involved in this contest as far as the candidates were concerned, but many observers feared a deadlock which the Jacksonians might break; and several Congressmen urged their friends in the Assembly "that in your divisions concerning individuals you be careful not to let the Jacksonians have any grounds to claim the senator." They warned of "the egregious folly of ... giving to the Jackson folks power to plague us, if not defeat us certainly to elect of our candidates they please, & making the man elected feel that his success depended on them." 

The Jacksonians recognized the situation, and cast around for the best means of exploiting it. State Senator Joseph H. Larwill wrote to his friends and constituents in Wayne County for their advice, pointing out that Ruggles was earmarked as "the Administration Candidate." Leading Jacksonians at Columbus, he reported, had considered voting for one of the other candidates, neither of whom they had confidence in; alternatively, they could split their votes and "thereby prevent an Election for this Session with hopes that at the next election we can gain strength to be able to make a choice of a person in whom the Jacksonians will have more confidence." Which course was preferable? The replies were divided in opinion, but made it clear that Ruggles, though personally favoured in Wayne, was out of the question if "Mr. Hammond & others" were supporting him.

38. Wilson to McLean, Steubenville, 29 July 1826, McLean Papers; Ruggles to Hammond, St. Clairsville, 5 Nov., 24 Dec. 1826, and Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 30 Nov. 1826, CHP.

One constituent wanted "the Republicans ... to take up a Jackson Candidate" and try to elect him, confident that failure would probably only postpone the election to a better time. He had "conversed on the Subject ... with more than one hundred in about eight Days and the Publick Expression of one and all is to tricy for a Jacksonite ..., we would Rather have a Jacksonian at Cincinnati the / than_\ an Adams man in our country."\(^{40}\) The Jackson men at Columbus, however, decided to support the Administration dissidents, Silliman and Irwin, and managed to prevent a decision on the appointed day, when fifteen ballots failed to produce an absolute majority for anyone. At some point in the balloting — either on that day or when balloting resumed a week later — a heavily folded note was passed to Larwill, presumably in the chamber itself:

Messrs Larwill & McConnahay - 
Go Silliman on the first ballot, and continue for Silliman and keep him ahead of Irvin as long as possible, but in no event vote for Ruggles - If on the second or third ballot Irvin is higher than Silliman, then go for Irvin. The object is to elect Silliman or Irvin in preference to Ruggles.\(^{41}\)

The manoeuvre, however, failed, as Administration men turned to Ruggles and gave him a majority on the twentieth-ballot in the face of heavy Jacksonian support for Silliman. Representatives rejoiced that the election was not going to lie over to the next session, "as was the declared wish of some of the warm advocates of the 'Hero of' the Cottonbags, alias 'New Orleans'."\(^{42}\)

The situation was clear. Jacksonian politicians were determined to advance their champion's interests, and were sustained in their efforts by voters who had expressed their preference for him in 1824. But they

\(^{40}\) J.H. Larwill to Benjamin Jones, Columbus, 28 Dec. 1826; John Larwill to J.H. Larwill, Wooster, 10 Jan. 1827; William McFall to J.H. Larwill, / Wayne County, 16 Jan. 1827 /, LFP, OHS.

\(^{41}\) Unsigned, undated note, LFP, OHS.

\(^{42}\) Q.F. Atkins to Whittlesey, Columbus, 27 Jan. 1827, EWP. See also Supporter and Scioto Gazette, 4, 25 Jan., 1 Feb. 1827.
were confronted by the fact that the dominant forces in the state sustained by an overwhelming majority of the voters in a clear majority of the counties - were contented with the Adams Clay regime nationally, or at least, were not sufficiently discontented to drop their local and personal concerns in order to overthrow the Administration's supporters. Ohio seemed a bulwark of strength for the victors of 1824-25, who remained confident of the state's support in 1828. They could not know, early in 1827, that the opposition's agitation over the Presidential question would draw so many new voters to the polls in 1828 that the future balance of power between the two parties was uncertain.
The contest of 1824-25 did not finally determine the lines of cleavage along which the party system would 'freeze' in Ohio. Simpler, however, than half of the eligible voters had bothered to vote. Even if they then remained loyal to the formations that had emerged from that contest, they could always be submerged if a large number of previously apathetic voters came to the polls and made partisan choices significantly different from those of 1824. In effect, the Jacksonian campaign of 1827-28 achieved precisely that result: the widespread excitement over a simple two-way national contest which must produce an outright winner, the vigour of political organization and the extension of party propaganda, induced 131,052 adult, white males to vote (a turnout of 82.09 per cent), compared with the 49,821 of 1824. This two-and-one-half fold increase in turnout ensured that the original partisans of 1824-25 would be swamped, and that the pattern of support apparent in the earlier election would be modified by the somewhat different concerns influencing the new voters of 1828. And such a large proportion of the electorate had voted in 1828 that, if they adhered to the same side thereafter, it was most unlikely that even Ohio's rapid growth in population would make possible a shift in the pattern as dramatic as that of 1828.

The distribution of party support in the 1830s and '40s was therefore primarily a result of the overlaying of the mass of individual decisions of 1828 over those of 1824. The critical feature in 1828 was the overwhelming shift towards Jackson, which created a balanced party system for the next quarter century, if not longer; and it will be argued that this shift reflected, essentially, the overwhelming preference of the new voters for Jackson - which was itself the result of the circumstances Ohioans had experienced by the late 1820s. Yet, ironically, the rejection of the
Adams Clay administration did not involve a rejection of the policies for which that political combination stood, for Ohioans remained remarkably united in their identification of themselves as both Northern and Western.
Supporters of Adams and Clay knew before the beginning of 1828 that the Presidential contest would be hard, bitter work. The Jacksonians had maintained their opposition, were already developing an effective organization and agitating the Presidential question at every opportunity. In September 1827 Thomas Ewing had reported from Lancaster, with some exaggeration, "We have much noisy electioneering in this State, the Presidential question mingle itself in almost every canvass, however petty the office." After the fall elections, John McLean's brother Nathaniel warned him that "A crisis is arriving beyond any thing we have seen or heard before - every thing ere long will be governed by party." But the Adams-Clay men, though worried by the challenge, retained a basic confidence that Ohio would not desert an administration so closely identified with the outlook and interests of the state.

For one thing, Ohioans had acquired an influence in the inner sanctums of power as never before. Clay's promotion to Secretary of State satisfied the demand that the Western interest be at long last given a voice in the Cabinet, and leading Ohioans made it clear that they preferred to see Clay there rather than any man from their own state. John McLean, of Lebanon, was retained in the chief patronage office of Postmaster-General, just below Cabinet rank. The need for representatives in the new Latin American republics made it possible to give Ohio its first diplomatic post, even if the actual appointment - James Cooley of Urbana, as chargé d'affaires in Peru - was greeted with much surprise and no commendation. Yet the appointment

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of Cooley — Yale graduate, experienced state legislator, Clay Elector of 1824, and a likely candidate for the next Congress — was a perfectly respectable one, especially as more eminent candidates like Wright and Hammond had "peremptorily refused" it; and the Ohio delegation in Congress approved the appointment in advance. The promotion of Cooley did the Administration no harm in Ohio — even if it was to prove fatal for Cooley. As the Ohio State Journal reasonably claimed in December 1827, "Distinguished citizens of the west, have been appointed to high and responsible offices, and the west cannot complain, as she has under every former administration, that her claims have been disregarded." Moreover, the programme Adams had outlined in 1825 had resulted in some legislation very favourable to Ohio. When John C. Wright had returned to his Jacksonian district after the 1826 session, he was given a public dinner and formally welcomed by Bezaleel Wells, who expressed "much gratification that the measures of the administration generally, have been such as to meet our expectations and wishes — a liberal policy has been pursued toward the west, and an advantageous one for the nation."

Ohioans in general approved the readiness of Washington to promote internal improvement, and confidently anticipated that the West would obtain larger appropriations than ever in the past. In this situation, Benjamin Ruggles felt that "those great principles" Adams recommended and supported made it impossible for an Ohio Senator to oppose him — "I mean internal improvements and the encouragement of domestic manufactures." As Ewing told his brother in Indiana in September 1827, "The measures of the present administration

3. Wright to Hammond, Washington, 7 May 1826, CHP; Cincinnati Gazette, 25 Apr., 16 May 1826. Vance was supposed to have engineered the appointment in order to prevent Cooley's running against him for Congress in 1828. Cooley later died in Lima, February 1828. For an exaggerated view of the effects of this appointment, see Weisenburger, Passing of the Frontier, 232-33.


5. Steubenville Western Herald, 5 Aug. 1826, quoted in Niles' Weekly Register, XXXI (2 Sept. 1826), 9.
See also Q.F. Atkins to E. Whittlesey, Lower Sandusky, 29 Nov. 1826, EWP.
are so highly favourable to the Western interest that it would be perfect
madness in us to think of a change if it can be avoided."

The identification of the administration with the interests of the
Northwest was made even clearer by the enemies the administration made.
From the start its most outspoken critics were the men whom Ohioans had
identified in 1824 as their main sectional opponents -- the Radicals of the
South Atlantic states. Adams' first annual message was recognized in Ohio
as throwing down a gage to these enemies of federally-financed internal
improvements. With characteristic irony, Charles Hammond confessed that

Upon its first perusal I was filled with compassion
for the Virginia politicians, upon whom I apprehended it would
produce some dangerous paraxisms. I did not indeed expect they
would be quite so extravagant as to elect John Randolph, the
notorious eccentric and doctrinaire Old Republican, to the
Senate to preserve the Constitution and save the Republic.

From the start, politically aware Ohioans anticipated that Radicals like
Randolph would oppose federal assistance for internal improvements, even
for works as national in interest as the proposed Ohio and Potomac canal.
As one constituent wrote to Whittlesey,

That Virginia should oppose us is not to be wondered at, since
"the crown of her glory" or the Presidency has again departed
from her for a period of four years, neither am I surprized
that the lineal descendent of the once celebrated Pocahontas,
claiming to be as Randolph claimed to be, should be foisted into the scale
of opposition against internal improvements. ... Johny (doing
as his progenitors have done) will rather sail round the
dangerous capes of Virginia (at the risque of life and his
tobacco and cotton) than shorten or render more safe the passage
by any artificial works unknown to his ancestors.

And these most vocal opponents of internal improvements were also the most
vocal opponents of the new administration, and clearly not by accident.

6. Ruggles to Hammond, St. Clairsville, 3 June 1827, CHP; Ewing to George
Ewing, Lancaster, 25 Sept. 1827, TEFP.

7. Hammond to Clay, Columbus, 4 Jan. 1826, in Clay Papers, VI, 7, and id.
to Wright, Cincinnati, 14 Dec. 1825, CHP; Atkins to Whittlesey, 11 Jan.
1826, EWP.
By March 1827 Jackson was clearly seen as the candidate of the former Crawfordites, and the Adams-Clay men took great pleasure in demonstrating that the Jacksonian coalition was predominantly hostile to the American System. Even to their dismay, they learned that the Jackson men had elected the Speaker of the new House of Representatives in December 1827, they consol'de themselves with the thought that now much of responsibility is cast from the Administration to the Jackson party & that it stands them in hand to make known by their public acts their views relative to internal improvements and domestic manufactures — would to God, the Southrons would come out with all their forces against what we conceive to be the true policy of our government, that our northern & Western brethren might see in whom they have put their confidence, by giving in their adhesion to "Old Hickory" and Van Buren -

On their side, Jacksonians recognized that only extraordinary measures could help them to overcome their constant, major political liability in Ohio — that of being connected with interests that were neither Northern nor Western in interest and sentiment.

The Politics of Slavery

"The people of this State," claimed a leading Jacksonian politician in 1826, "are remarkable for their hatred of slavery," and certainly at that time denunciations of slavery by newspaper writers and Presbyterian clergymen continued to be almost as common as earlier in the decade. Such sentiments did not, of course, preclude political co-operation with Southerners, since virtually all Ohioans at this time acknowledged that slavery was a local problem beyond the jurisdiction of the federal government. But

8. Q.F. Atkins to Whittlesey, 31 Dec. 1827, EWP.

1. Caleb Atwater, "The General Character...of the People of Ohio, An Address Delivered in Columbus, Ohio, December 1826" (Columbus, 1827); Weisenburger, Passing of the Frontier, 363-65.
co-operation was very difficult when the Southerners in question openly made the defence and justification of slavery the central item of their political demands.

Anxiety about the security of slavery had been strong in the South Atlantic states ever since the Missouri crisis and had underlain the Crawfordites' abortive efforts to keep the federal government in friendly hands. The Adams administration was aware of the South's fears and made some attempt to reassure it. In the fall of 1825 the new Secretary of War, James Barbour, made a speech in Virginia which was apparently designed to "satisfy the People of the South that there is not the slightest foundation for the suspicion, which some have entertained, of a design, on the part of the General Government, to interfere with their peculiar property and rights." However, some leading Southerners refused to be reassured, and insisted on raising the issue in the debates of 1825-26 on the Panama Mission. While other opposition members opposed the President's proposal on broad political and constitutional grounds, the Virginia Senators denounced American involvement in the Panama Congress as an attempt to associate the United States with the Negro republics of the Caribbean and Central America. In harping so virulently on the race theme, Floyd and especially Randolph were apparently trying to persuade their fellow Southerners that the new Northern-dominated administration was not to be trusted on the slavery question; and, indeed, they did succeed in forcing some sort of defensive unity on the representatives of the South.

Many Northerners reacted strongly against this Southern attempt to assert that American foreign policy should be dictated by the interests of slavery. Peter Hitchcock could see Randolph's speech on his resolution:

3. Register of Debates in Congress, II (1825-26).
calling for information as to the number of blacks and creoles in the South American republics as not only lunatic, but a basic denial of the political ideals upon which the United States was founded.流行 sentiment in Ohio admired the new republics and felt that the United States should co-operate with them; philippics on slavery by the opponents of Pan-Americanism merely confirmed that opinion. Although two of the three Ohio Jacksonians in Congress voted against the Panama mission, there was no doubt that opinion, even in Jacksonian districts, favoured it; and the campaign against participation, if anything, recoiled on the heads of the opposition, at least in Ohio. As Hammond said, "the cloven foot of negro slavery and Southern dominancy is so manifest in the votes connected with Randolph's speeches, that some of our free state Jacksonians must open their eyes." The raising of the slavery issue made it very difficult for the Ohio Jacksonians to go along with their Southern colleagues in associating themselves with the former Crawfordites. Some Ohio papers sympathetic to Jackson were careful not to identify Randolph with Jacksonism - at least, not in 1826. In March Charles Hammond put his finger on their embarrassment, and spelled out the opportunity now offered to the Administration men:

The Jacksonian prints in Cincinnati are beginning to yelp upon the Panama mission but they are not well decided what to do - They are keen for opposition, but are not certain it will be safe to commit themselves to the coalesced powers of the Senate - The Southerns are to take the lead and in the battle all our favorite measures are to be denounced - Randolph's "Negro slavery" motion and speeches set some of the Jacksonians all agape - and I mean to ring it upon every change - "Negro slavery" shall be a head in the gazette for weeks to come - "I thank you Sir for teaching me this word."

4. Hitchcock to Whittlesey, Burton, 21 Mar. 1826, EWP.
5. W.H. Harrison Jr. to Findlay, 10 May 1826, Torrence to Findlay, 16 Feb., 9 Apr, 1826, in "Torrence Papers, II," QPHPSO, II (1907), 10-11; Campbell to McLean, 29 June 1826, Ruggles to McLean, 4 July 1826, McLean Papers; Wright to Tappan, 27 Feb. 1826, BTP, LC; Wright to Hammond, 31 Mar. 1826, CHP.
6. Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 27 Mar. 1826, CHP.
7. E.g., St. Clairsville Gazette, 6 May 1826.
8. Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 16 Mar. 1825, CHP.
Accordingly Hammond struck hard at the slavery question through the columns of his paper, pointing out that the South had clearly given up all intentions of abolishing slavery and resented every hint of outside interference in the matter. "Moreover," he wrote, the slave states were "engaged in efforts to array the two sections of the country in opposition to each other," and so "Slavery and the Presidential election have been connected together."

In such circumstances there was only one honourable policy for Northerners: they must vote for men who would stand up for Northern rights and were not prepared "to fall down and worship the slave-drivers of the South."\(^9\)

This type of appeal was much used in 1826 by Administration supporters. In a widely reprinted speech defending his consistent support of the Administration, John C. Wright emphasized that the opposition party was based essentially on the antagonistic sectional feelings of the South. "Will free Ohio," he asked, "consent to be chained to the car of a nabob, - give up her own rights for fear of offending, or touching the sacred slave question?"\(^10\) Even more suggestive was a series of anonymous articles appearing in a small country paper in Wayne County. Entitled "A clanish spirit the bane of Republics," these articles asserted that the welfare of the nation was being jeopardized by the "clannish spirit" of the South:

The harmony, which a free intercourse \(\overline{\text{offered by the Erie canal}}\) and the cultivation of liberal sentiments by the people of the east towards their brethren of the west so happily produced, has excited the jealousy and kindled the ire of the politicians of the south; and they now display the section banner, and declaim against the east and the west; sounding the tocsin of alarm, and proclaiming that an unhallowed league has been entered into for the purpose of depriving them of their negro slaves, and calling on all true southern men to rally in defence of slavery.

Finding that they no longer ruled, Southern politicians were trying to unite their people behind them with the cry of slavery, boasting, in

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10. Western Herald, 5 Aug. 1826; widely reprinted, e.g., in Scioto Gazette, 31 Aug. 1826, and Niles' Weekly Register, XXXI (1826), 10.
Randolph's words, that they could nail the North down because it would never present a united front against the South's demands. But, in their zeal, McDuffie and Randolph had given the game away, and revealed that they hoped to use the popularity of Jackson in some quarters in the North as a means of regaining national power. The anonymous author doubted whether the scheme would work, for the people of Ohio would never sacrifice their interests for the sake of a shadow. As a Congressman Wright asked, in an echo of Randolph's blunt assertions, can we believe that "free Ohio" will "consent to be distracted about men, divided, conquered, driven to the wall, kept there, and nailed down like base money?"

In this way Southern concern to protect its 'peculiar institution' made it possible for Administration supporters in Ohio to appeal for countervailing sectional unity on the part of free Ohioans. And the political value of emphasizing the need to forestall "Southern dominancy" appeared fully confirmed by the Administration victory in the Congressional elections of 1826. Yet thereafter, even though the Ohio Jacksonians became ever more closely identified with Southern politicians, the slavery issue ceased to be quite so central to the arguments of the Adams party. The press began to lay off moral denunciations of slavery as an iniquitous institution, and largely stopped blasting local Jacksonians as lackeys of slavery.

In doing so, the Adams men were to some extent suggesting that anti-slavery, while remaining strong in some quarters, was not to be relied on as a vote-winning cry among the Ohio voters as a whole. Indeed, there are signs that popular attitudes were becoming more ambivalent to slavery, if only because Ohioans objected to the large number of freed blacks entering the state after 1825. The desire to remove this unwanted race lay

12. Western Herald, 5 Aug. 1826.
behind the great and sudden expansion of colonization societies in these years. Yet even here the Adams men might have made some political capital, for the South began openly to treat colonization proposals as an unwarrantable interference in their right to control their own lesser breeds as they thought fit. It is perhaps significant that in 1828 the Adams men in Ohio should devote their July Fourth celebrations to the cause of colonization, while the Jacksonians, as a party, carefully steered clear of a policy unpalatable to their Southern colleagues.13

The main reason why the National Republicans reduced their emphasis on the slavery issue is more obvious. Since their opponents stood a good chance of winning in New York and an even better chance in Pennsylvania, the National Republicans needed some Southern support to achieve national victory; and in the early months of 1828 there appeared strong possibilities that North Carolina and Virginia, not to mention Kentucky, Maryland and Louisiana, might yet swing to the Administration.14 Hence it was wise to keep quiet about slavery. In January 1828 the claim of Marigny d'Auterive for compensation for the lost time of a slave impressed into the service of the United States at New Orleans raised the slavery issue once more in Congress. The House Committee of Claims said that such claims had never before been accepted; Livingston of Louisiana denounced this attitude as a breach of the federal compact, on the grounds that the committee was denying that the slaves were property.15 The Ohio delegation united in opposition to the passage of an amendment allowing the claim; and the news that the amendment had passed prompted one Ohioan to complain


15. Register of Debates in Congress, IV (1827-28), 899-1122, 1458-1486. This incident was brought to my attention by Dr. R.C. Downes.
bitterly that for the first time the United States Government had recognized Negroes as mere property, liable to requisition for national defence on the same terms as horses. Yet the Adams men made comparatively little use of the issue. Elisha Whittlesey, who had been at the centre of the controversy, reported from Washington that the intent of some Jacksonians from the Deep South, and especially Louisiana, had undoubtedly been to create an excitement at home in relation to Negro property; but the Adams men, in justice to their friends in Louisiana — as well as in the Upper South — felt unable to answer the agitators in the spirit they deserved.

Similarly in the General Ramirez case. Thirty-nine Africans who had been captured on a slaver on the high seas and brought to Savannah had, after eight years of legal wrangling, been declared the property of Spanish claimants, on condition that the owners removed the slaves from the United States. In order to prevent the slaves from being separated from the wives and children they had acquired in Georgia, a Georgian bought the Spanish claim, tried unsuccessfully to sell it to the Colonization Society, and then petitioned Congress to release him from the requirement to send the slaves overseas. This issue, Niles reported, "has produced much incidental discussion in the house of representatives, of slavery and the slave trade." Supporters of the measure claimed that the slaves would be better off in the United States than under "Spanish bondage"; opponents like Wright of Ohio argued that here was an attempt to import thirty-nine slaves into the United States, in defiance of the 1807 prohibition. Instead they wished the government to pay all the Georgian's expenses and then hand the slaves over to the Colonization Society. This proposal, in effect to free slaves with government money, was defeated and the Georgian's claim allowed —

16. Register of Debates, IV, 1048, 1121; Q.F. Atkins to Whittlesey, 15 Feb. 1828, EWP. In the end the claim was recommitted to the Committee of Claims, from where it failed to emerge.

17. Whittlesey to Hitchcock, 29 Jan. 1828, PHFP.
with the South being supported in the critical vote, according to Wright, "by the N.Y. and Penna Swiss corps with our dee faces," i.e., two of the three Jacksonian members from Ohio. In the House Wright insisted on the yeas and nays being called and named, on account of "the interest that would be felt in his section of the Union in a bill of this character." Yet the Administration's organs in Washington, Wright complained, "are so delicate on the subject of negroes that the debate is not even given"; and there was almost no editorial comment on the case in the Ohio press. 18

Here again national political considerations, as well as a statesmanlike desire to avoid driving the South to extremes, prevented the Administration party from making political capital out of the South's determination to ensure federal regard for the interests of slavery.

Yet, in spite of the claims of some historians, the issue did not entirely disappear in the 1828 campaign. The main charge against Jackson, repeatedly harped on in the press, was that he was a "military chieftain" - a serious charge in an age which was concerned with the preservation of a true republic, which recalled the lesson of Caesar in classical antiquity and remembered how Napoleon only recently had subverted the first French republic. Yet the example of Washington showed that a military President was not inevitably fatal to the well-being of the Republic; what was so menacing about Jackson was the kind of military chieftain he had shown himself to be - willing to resort to violent methods of dubious legality to solve problems, willing to disregard both the law of the republic and the orders of civilians that the Constitution had given authority over him.

The elemental passion and wilfulness of the man made thoughtful citizens

18. Wright to Hammond, Washington, 28 Apr. 1828, CHP. See also Niles' Weekly Register, XXXIII (19 Jan. 1828), 349, XXXIV (3 May 1828), 163; Register of Debates, IV (1827-8), 960-61, 2501-03.
unwilling to trust him with executive power; and this lack of self-restraint, of respect for the law, was considered by many to be typical mainly of one section of the country. For the vices which the Adams press portrayed Jackson as possessing were essentially those to which, traditionally, slave owners were considered particularly prone. Jackson was held to have displayed, in his public career between 1812 and 1822, an arrogant and despotic temper, arbitrary wilfulness, a vicious disregard for human life, and moral laxity—all characteristics supposedly fostered by living among, and owning, slaves. For the most part the connection between these personality traits and slavery was not explicitly stated, but occasionally it was: "General Jackson is a slaveholder of Tennessee," wrote a Troy editor in 1828, "and is thoroughly imbued with all the corrupt and tyrannical habits of a Southern nabob."  

Indeed, many people in Ohio detected a moral quality in Adams which they felt was lacking in Jackson, and this quality they regarded as Northern rather than Southern. Education, moral restraint, respect for the law, civilian experience made Adams seem saner and safer, much more their kind of President. This feeling existed most notably among the New England settlers in Ohio: the objections to electing a military chieftain like Jackson were expressed privately with most feeling by Ohioans of New England antecedents. In the election the areas of New England settlement proved even more solid for Adams than in 1824, with the Western Reserve, for example, giving him some 75 per cent of its votes. This evident self-identification of New Englanders with Adams against Jackson can best be explained by the sectional self-consciousness aroused in the 1820s by the agitation of the slavery issue; and it is perhaps significant that the


county which gave 91.6 per cent of its vote to Adams was settled by New
Englanders and was ministered to by a newspaper which, more bitterly than
any other newspaper in Ohio, attacked Jackson in 1828 as:

an ignorant and ferocious slave-dealer - the same General who ordered
the Six Million for ... A trafficker in human flesh, the seller of a fellow being for vile
lucre - an occupation revolting to human nature, and in direct opposition
to the precepts of our divine Master....
Slavery is, indeed, rendered a bitter draught under the galling yoke
of such avaricious individuals as Andrew Jackson and other Negro
traders.22

For some Ohioans at least, slavery remained an issue and created a prejudice
favourable to the candidate from New England.

The Internal Improvement Party

If the connection of Jacksonism with the defence of slavery revolted
the sensibilities of Ohioans as Northerners, the association of Jacksonism
with hostility to the American System was a menace to their interests as
Westerners. Even in 1826, at the same time as they branded Jacksonians as
tools of the slave South, the Administration writers in Ohio insisted that
the true issue was not slavery, but the special economic interests of the
South. The real reason why Southerners complained of the threat to slavery
posed by the federal government, said the Wooster Ohio Oracle, was that in
1824 the South had lost control not merely of the Presidency but also of
national policy towards the tariff and internal improvements. And the
real reason why the majority of Northerners opposed Jackson's election,
declared the Cincinnati Gazette in November, was not because he owned slaves,
though with "some conscientious persons this is no doubt sufficient ground
of opposition": the question for most Northerners is "not whether the
candidate be a slave-holder; but whether he is for the protection of slave
labour in preference to that of free labour." It was the economic issues

which really mattered to most Ohioans, and here the enemy could all too easily be identified as the Jacksonians of the South.\(^1\)

Internal improvements continued to be a primary concern for Ohioans. Their own canal project was progressing well, and opposition declined even in those areas which were not about to benefit from it. The first section of the Ohio and Erie Canal was opened between Cleveland and the new canal town of Akron in July 1827, and the Miami Canal between Cincinnati and Dayton in 1828. Loans were raised on acceptable terms, and the new system of assessing taxes roused remarkably little opposition. Yet Ohioans were aware of the financial burden the canals imposed, and still looked for federal aid and financial assistance. Even more, they required the general government to undertake and complete the projects which were accepted as national, and no national administration was acceptable which did not positively adopt that role. As James Heaton had remarked in March 1825, "Mr. Adams may render his administration tolerable to the West, by aiding the continuance of the Cumberland road, and the Navigation of the Western rivers."\(^2\)

Adams' promises and proposals in his first messages were soon translated into practical terms by Congress. Acts were passed in 1826 to improve Western rivers, notably the act providing federal aid for the Louisville canal - which had for so long been regarded as essential for improving Ohio's connections with the Mississippi. An appropriation was made for graduating the National Road and building bridges between Fairview and Zanesville, though money was not voted for paving until 1827. At the same time school lands were appropriated for fractional townships, and Ohio was authorized to sell her school lands and apply the proceeds to education. Further relief was provided for those still in debt for public lands, a measure said by

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1. Wooster Ohio Oracle, 1 Sept. 1826; Cincinnati Gazette, 3 Nov. 1826.
one Ohio Congressman to "give every thing that the people could ask."  

In the short session of 1826-27, rather fewer gains were made, but at least the Administration men in Ohio were given clear evidence identifying the South and the Jacksonians with opposition to the American System. For example, one country newspaper could point out that, in 1827, only 27 out of 106 Congressmen from states north of the Potomac and the Ohio had opposed the appropriation to enable the federal government continue its internal improvement surveys; those 27 were all Jacksonians, except for a few from New York and two others. In the nine states south of the line, only 24 out of 64 Congressmen supported the appropriation, and 17 of those 24 were friends of the Administration.\(^4\) Such evidence threatened to be disastrous to the Jacksonian cause in the Middle Atlantic and Northwestern states, for it destroyed Jackson's claims to be a champion of the "domestic interest." Jacksonians from these regions were therefore determined to make full use of their newly-won control of Congress in 1827-28; full of pitfalls as it was, it offered an opportunity to demonstrate their soundness on the American System. If a Jacksonian Congress could pass measures such as their opponents claimed the bulk of the Jackson party was opposed to, then the party's chances of winning states like Ohio and New York would be greatly enhanced. From Cincinnati Elijah Hayward urged his Congressman to do all he could: "the exertions of our friends at Washington this winter, can do much for this state. In fact, I have no doubt their particular attention to Ohio, can be made equal to 5,000 votes for Gen. Jackson."\(^5\) 

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3. Western Herald, 5 Aug. 1826, quoted in Niles' Weekly Register, XXXI (2 Sept. 1826), 9; St. Clairsville Gazette, 31 Dec. 1825, 4 Feb., 1 Apr., 13 May, 3 June 1826; Wooster Ohio Oracle, 11 May 1826.  
5. Elijah Hayward to James Findlay, Cincinnati, 20 Nov. 1827, "Torrence Papers." I, in OPHPSO, I (1906), 76.
In the event, much was done for Ohio. One act refunded monies forfeited by purchasers of public lands; this "most important bill for the interest of Ohio" was expected to "restore our citizens about $300,000." A generous federal subscription was voted to the stock of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which was expected to open a new means of communication between Ohio and the seaboard, and more money was appropriated for the extension of the National Road as far as Zanesville. Much more important, however, were the land grants made to Ohio: one of 31,360 acres to assist the building of a turnpike from Columbus to Sandusky, and a controversial double grant of 800,000 acres, worth about one million dollars, to help finance the state's canal programme.

These gains contrasted greatly with Ohio's failure to secure anything at all from Congress earlier in the decade; and the change in her situation could well be ascribed to the interest that national politicians displayed in securing her Electoral votes for their party. As Hayward had said when urging "particular attention" to the state's interests, "Ohio is now too important a member of the Union to be lost to the Jackson cause." This partisan aspect of the situation was bluntly emphasized by the leading South Carolina nullifier James A. Hamilton in a speech made after the election:

You know, gentlemen, that Ohio was considered as debatable ground; that it was the Flanders of a presidential question which was to be fought for within her own limits, by a profuse expenditure of the public money. This war cost the Union about three millions of dollars in land and money, if we include in our estimate the appropriation made for that maximum of absurdity and extravagance, the Ohio and Chesapeake canal. The contest between the parties in these donatives was, who should enjoy the eminent

8. Hayward to Findlay, 20 Nov. 1827, QPHPSO, I (1906), 76.
privilege with the money of the south, of bragging highest. 9

Yet the contest for partisan advantage is a far from adequate explanation of Ohio's gains. Congressmen of both parties from seacoast areas persistently opposed internal improvement measures regardless of partisan considerations; and these opponents included Jacksonian leaders like Hamilton's friend McDuffie and Van Buren's friend Silas Wright of New York, who seem not to have appreciated the urgency of buying votes in Ohio. Throughout the session the Jackson Congressmen from Ohio were unable to count upon the support of a united party, for many Southerners refused to support internal improvements; instead, Jacksonians from Ohio and states with similar interests had to co-operate with Administration men. The measures refunding forfeited monies and assisting the Chesapeake and Ohio canal were, in fact, official Administration measures, and on internal improvement measures the Ohio Jacksonians voted as part of the bipartisan "Internal Improvement" party made up predominantly of Administration members. In doing so, the Ohio Jacksonians were, in effect, confessing that their national party was not committed to the policies most Ohioans wanted; only by deserting their party could they preserve their position at home.

The Ohio delegation, in fact, acted as a bloc on most of these measures, and it gained so much for Ohio mainly because all the diverse internal improvement interests were co-operating in a log-roll. As one Ohio Congressman wrote after the end of the session:

it is probable that the undivided vote of the Ohio Delegation for the "Chesapeake and Ohio Canal," "the Delaware Breakwater," and for the liberal donations of land to the State of Alabama, (far exceeding in value those made to Ohio), to aid in opening a navigation in which the states of Tennessee and Alabama are deeply interested, more than any other cause, secured the grants to Ohio, which her delegation had long & anxiously waited for a favorable opportunity to press upon the consideration of Congress.10

9. Walterborough Dinner speech, in Niles' Weekly Register, XXXV (22 Nov. 1828), 204.

In other words, even though the "Western interest" derived much strength from the support of the Administration, the internal improvement issue was still regarded as an issue of local advantage rather than a partisan question.

 Doubtless the story of the Miami Canal is misleading: the story is not one of persistent partisan conflict, but of the Jacksonians seizing partisan advantage in a situation in which none initially existed. It is usually said that each party had its own land-grant proposal which it wished to gain the credit for passing. Each party supposedly jockeyed to have its own measure passed first, knowing that no state could expect to receive two land grants at the same time. When the Administration men, it is assumed through trickery, won the struggle for precedence in the House, the Senate Jacksonians countered by adding their own bill as an amendment to the successful bill; and, since neither party wished to alienate Ohio, the double grant passed all within one bill.  

In fact, the story is more complicated. Early in the session an Administration member from the Miami Valley proposed that Ohio be given a land grant to help her extend and complete the Miami Canal, as projected in 1825. This measure was supported by James Findlay, the Jackson Congressman from Cincinnati, who now, on this subject, made his only speech in eight years in Congress. This apparently bipartisan measure was referred to the House Committee on Roads and Canals. A little later the Ohio Jacksonian William Stanbery proposed that Congress should make a further land grant

11. Remini, Election of Andrew Jackson, 170-171; Weisenburger, Passing of the Frontier, 230. It is, of course, untrue to say that "there could not be two bills for two grants of land to one state"; in this session there were two acts for three grants of land to Ohio! Nor was the total grant extreme: both Indiana in 1827 and Alabama in 1828 received more land from Congress than Ohio did now. Register of Debates, IV, 2735, Appendix, x; Clay Papers, IV, 132 n.18.
to help the state pay off the debts she had already contracted for building the initial canals; and this suggestion was referred to the Public Land Committee. Stanbery was a freshman who had been elected in a by-election in 1827 on a minority vote, in opposition to two Administration candidates, the urgency with which he publicized his endeavors in the local Jackson press suggests he was eager to establish his claim for re-election in 1828. Indeed, Jackson editors in Ohio quickly picked up his initiative as proof of the party's friendliness to internal improvements, although the measure had been proposed, abortively, in previous sessions by Administration men. 12

John Woods, the mover of the Miami bill, told the Administration governor of Ohio that it was unlikely that this second, more general bill would be taken up. "Indeed", he added, "I am perhaps doing injustice to those who have brought it forward when I admit that I am suspicious that it was only intended as a political maneuver." However, like other Administration Congressmen from Ohio, he asserted his intention to "cordially support either bill if we can get it taken up." 13

The Miami bill was reported on January 18 and the general-grant bill on February 11; both were referred to the Committee of the Whole, which took them up in the reverse order without anyone objecting, and approved both. Just as there was no fixed procedure in committee as to the order in which bills should be taken up, so there was none in the House, where the Speaker had the bills from committee on the table in front of him in what was usually a chance order. The Jacksonian Speaker happened to take up the bipartisan Miami bill first, and it passed with the support of the


Internal Improvement party. The Speaker then took up the general bill; no one protested that the order in which the bills were considered was improper. The general bill received united support from the Ohio delegation, and Hamiltonian support from the other state delegations. But when it was put to the vote the bill failed, 72-75. Now, and only now, Stanbery leapt to his feet and, vitriolic and intemperately, described the defeat of his bill to partisan manoeuvring, sleight of hand, and even corruption on the part of the Clerk; his bill failed, Stanbery claimed, only because it was considered after the other had passed, though he did not explain why it should have been given priority. Yet the truth clearly is that his bill failed because it raised an awkward principle: several members from each party who favoured grants to promote the building of new internal improvements, especially when they would enhance the value of the public lands, had strong scruples about allowing the federal government, in Hamiltonian fashion, to help a state pay off debts already incurred. If that were done for Ohio, New York may well present its bill for the Erie Canal. Stanbery and his friends had simply picked the wrong measure upon which to win the gratitude of his Congressional district.

Stanbery's onslaught in Congress, however, had the effect of making the general bill a party issue in a way in which the Miami bill was not. According to John C. Wright, "The whole Jackson corps was rallied at night." Immediately the next day, in a much fuller House, a Jackson man from New York moved reconsideration, "to prevent one of our side from doing it," and he roundly denounced the Administration party (especially the Ohio members) for "manoeuvring & managing & insincerity, which I charge was repelled." The reconsideration carried overwhelmingly, but the bill again failed, this time by one vote (86-87). "It would have passed I have no doubt," said Wright, "but for this Jackson violence"—which presumably made it harder to rally the support of Administration members of the Internal Improvement party. Even so, the bill's defeat owed less to partisan
feeling than to the fact that most Southern Jacksonians continued to oppose it. The Ohio Jacksonians, however, saw this issue as a valuable partisan weapon: apparently James Findlay now claimed that the general bill was more important even than the Miami bill; while Stanbery saw Benton of Missouri and persuaded him to tack the general bill on to the Miami bill in the Senate. Significantly, he by-passed the two Ohio Senators and approached a renowned Jacksonian. Bound together, the two measures passed both Houses. 14

Thereafter the Jacksonians in Ohio claimed that the incident showed that only their party was genuinely interested in doing as much for the people of Ohio as possible. They contrasted the Miami bill, which they said favoured only special interests in western Ohio, with the general bill which favoured all the tax-payers of Ohio. They argued that the Ohio Administration members had got up the Miami bill to counter the general bill, "with a view to defeat its passage, or to neutralize its political effect"; and that they had tried to kill the general bill by underhand methods. Such arguments, patently fallacious, not to say deceitful, were bolstered by a widely quoted article from the Washington United States Telegraph. Though effectively countered by Administration men, notably Vinton, this argument proved an effective piece of propaganda which presumably misled contemporaries almost as successfully as it has done subsequent historians. 15

Yet the Jacksonians were still not out of the wood, simply because it was all too easy for the Administration men to point out the attitudes

14. This account draws heavily on reports by three Ohio Administration Congressmen: Wright to Hammond, Washington, 20 May 1828, CHP; Vinton, in Marietta Pilot, 30 Aug. 1828; Beecher, in Zanesville Ohio Republican, 16 Aug. 1828; which reconcile closely with the official record in Register of Debates, IV.

15. Cincinnati Advertiser, 7, 18 June, 12 July; Steubenville Republican Ledger, quoted in Marietta Pilot, 5, 26 July; St. Clairsville Gazette, 14 June, 23 Aug., 13 Sept. 1828. The Telegraph's account is contradicted by statements by Jacksonians in the official record.
and desires of the Southern Jacksonians. During the Congressional session, Jacksonians from the South Atlantic states had declared the National Road unconstitutional and had opposed the appropriation for completing the road as far as Zanesville and surveying the road further west. Ohio newspapers reported that the bill passed the House only because 87 out of 93 Administration supporters voted for it; the Jacksonians were divided, with a small majority of them (54-47) opposing the measure. Furthermore, the Senate ordered that no new surveys be carried out under the General Survey Act of 1824, by an amendment passed on the casting vote of a leading Jacksonian, Vice President Calhoun. Calhoun and his fellows hastened to explain to the West that their opposition to various internal improvement measures was to the specific proposals rather than to the policy in general, a disavowal which Ohio Jackson papers were quick to reprint. The party's Presidential candidate did not give even such assurances, always pointing enquirers to his votes of 1824 rather than commending specific projects of 1828; certainly he could not be considered to have committed himself publicly to new internal improvements as Adams had. Though the action of Congress had neutralized, to some extent, the claim that support for Jackson was incompatible with support for internal improvements, advocates of the American System were better advised to prefer Adams to Jackson on this score even more than on that of the protective tariff.

**Tariffs and Abominations**

By 1827 the tariff issue was coming to the forefront of American national politics, displacing internal improvements as the key element in

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the American System. The chief pressure came from all those interested in protecting the struggling woollen textile industry, but they were enthusiastically supported by farmers interested in a large home market for their surplus crops. The Administration men in Ohio were delighted by the growing commitment of most Northerners to the American System; their Jacksonian opponents were deeply embarrassed. On the one hand, political success in Ohio depended on appeasing its sectional interests; on the other, the attempt to create a national party required conciliation of Southerners hostile to all ideas of tariff protection. And as the South became more and more heated over the tariff, and more and more committed to Jackson, so the Jacksonians of Ohio were increasingly exposed to the charge of being ready to betray the state's economic demands.

On their side, the Administration men were determined to emphasize the issue. For Hammond, "the cause of domestic industry" was "the main object" for which the Ohio Adams party was fighting. Accordingly, he was furious when Adams, eager to conciliate the South, failed to make a positive recommendation of tariff protection to Congress in December 1827. He felt "disposed to ground my arms," since there could be no point in the Presidential contest "if defeat in the main object is to be the result." Three influential and well-tried Congressmen from districts where Jacksonism was strong were doomed to defeat because they had identified themselves with the present administration. But would "the public gain any thing by this? What can the cause of domestic industry gain by sacrificing its most useful advocates to sustain an administration ready to give it the go by upon calculations of expediency and policy, referring solely to the security of their own continuance in office"? Though Adams was unlikely actually to denounce the tariff, it seemed likely that the tariff would have to make its own way through Congress whoever was President. While this was too

1. Hammond to Wright, Columbus, 16 Dec. 1827, CHP.
and Richard Rush again produced a report calling for a higher tariff, Adams' omission undoubtedly weakened his supporters in Ohio. For the Jacksonians could now claim that Adams' "sentiments on the American System partake in the mystery of diplomacy" and no one could be confident the President was pledged to tariff principles. But they had gained only a small point, since their own candidate was to prove even more evasive; and Administration men could argue effectively that alignments in Congress showed most accurately the character of men and their policies.

The attitude of the Jackson party in Congress had been revealed to the world when a new tariff proposal, designed to provide much needed protection for the struggling woollen industry, came before the House of Representatives in 1827. Whatever the views of their constituents, they had to conciliate their Southern partners and weld the national party more closely. Hence the bill's progress was slowed by many difficulties. The trouble, according to John C. Wright, was that "there is a majority in the House that will vote for it on a direct vote - but there are a good many light troops that fly off on every side vote, who really wish to kill the bill and avoid the responsibility of a vote against it." Of the three Ohio Jacksonians, only the lame-duck John Thompson voted against the bill. But, after passage in the House, Senator Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina moved to lay the bill on the table at a time when only three days of the session remained; several Northern Jacksonians hastened to leave before the vote; the resulting tie then allowed the Jacksonian Vice-President, John C. Calhoun, to defeat it.

2. Cincinnati Advertiser, 9 Jan. 1828; Niles' Weekly Register, XXXIV (29 June 1828), 293.

3. Wright to Tappan, Washington, 4 Feb. 1827, BTP, LC; Scioto Gazette, 1 Mar. 1827; Remini, Election of Andrew Jackson, 145.
In Ohio the Jackson party was duly held responsible for the failure of the Woollens bill. Ohio newspapers pointed out that the Northern states gave 101 out of the 106 votes in favor of the bill; every one of the five Southern high-tariff men was an Adams man. Of the 26 Northern Congressmen who voted with the high-tariff Southerners, 21 were Jacksonians. To William Henry Harrison these events confirmed that "the cotton and tobacco growing" states were for keeping the tariff as low as possible, even though this was a "distractive policy (as far as the Provision raising states are concerned)"; and to "foster this interest the people of my native state / Virginia/ are for elevating Genl. Jackson (whom they so lately denounced as a military usurper) to the Presidency .... I can remain silent no longer," he wrote privately, "the ruin which stares me in the face by the success of their schemes has determined me to come forward & expose to the farmers of Ohio the vile acts" of the opposition.5 After the session, Hammond reported from Cincinnati that Jacksonism was "losing ground in this part of the state":

The mass of those who take a part in politics are not prepared to unite with those, who oppose the tariff and internal improvements - The busy bodies like Hayward & Dawson go the whole - "aut capri vulgus aut piger" - but those who are less excited give some thought to consistency and consequences.6

In Urbana, in November 1827, a number of Jacksonians who attended an Adams meeting were converted after a forceful speech by John H. James had linked the party division with attitudes towards the American System.7

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6. Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 7 Mar. 1827, CHP. See also Whittlesey to Giddings, Washington, 8 Feb. 1827, Giddings Papers.

In justification of their party, the Ohio Jacksonians criticized the Woollens bill as a selfish sectional measure favouring New England alone. There was, they insisted, a fundamental cleavage of interest over tariff, not merely between North and South, but also between East and West. They argued that the woollen manufacturers of New England, supported by the Administration, wanted to protect themselves against foreign textiles, thus raising prices for the consumer, but were averse to protection for the raw wool produced by the American farmer, who could not compete with cheap imported wool. Much better, the Western Jacksonians claimed, for the tariff to discriminate in favour of the Western farmer. The home market for the wool and flax he produced should be protected, while the market for the spirits he distilled from his surplus grain should be improved by taxing the molasses imported for use in the distilleries of New England. A truly national tariff would favour the West and the farmer rather than provide excessive protection for the Eastern woollens manufacturer. This argument, in effect, tried to revive the divisions of 1824 and denied the harmony of Northeastern and Northwestern interests upon which the Adams-Clay alliance was based.

Although, on the face of it, the Jacksonian case accepted the principle of protection, many Administration men believed that the Jacksonians were demanding the kind of tariff that could never pass Congress. "The efforts made, in the West, to misrepresent the woollen bill," wrote Hammond in March 1827, "show how many are ready to abandon their former professions of principle, in favour of the Hero." In the summer of 1827 the Cincinnati Jacksonians held meetings which resolved to support a tariff which, according to Hammond, was "such an one as no sensible man can support"; their aim, he said, was "to throw the blame of rejecting it on the North."

William Henry Harrison, speaking in Cincinnati, also condemned this attempt to divert attention to increased protection for articles other than woollen cloth; such a policy, he declared, would give "the death blow to every prospect of obtaining relief for the western farmer," and he accused Western leaders of indirectly opposing the woollens program "in order to elect a President of the United States." 10

There is little evidence in Ohio of grass-roots hostility to protecting woollen manufactures — other than the hostility generated by Jacksonian politicians conscious of the sentiments of their Southern allies. It had, after all, long been accepted that protection of American industry was in the interest of the Western farmer; and, in the case of wool, it was widely argued by protectionists that the grower would not find a home market for his raw wool if he did not extend generous protection to woollen manufacturers struggling in the face of foreign competition. Certainly in Ohio there seems to have been little cleavage between grower and manufacturer: indeed, the main wool-growing interest in the state was very closely connected with the only important woollen factories — at Steubenville in Jefferson County. 11

Particularly instructive is the case of neighbouring Belmont County. Here by the mid-20s more and more farmers were growing wool; by 1827 the county contained some 54,600 sheep. In June 1827 local leaders from both political parties joined in efforts to rouse public support throughout the county for measures to improve the condition of this woollen interest. Initially it was generally agreed that "the present depressed state of the woollen Manufacturers throughout the country" was responsible for "the want of an adequate demand for wool" and the low prices of foodstuffs; and the failure of the Woollens bill was generally regretted. The local Jackson

paper began by blaming the failure of that bill on the Administration party, but by July it had learned to question whether it had been a good bill in the first place. This new attitude soon disturbed the unity of the local protectionist movement. At a meeting at the county seat, protectionist resolutions were approved overwhelmingly, except for one which stated that the protection of woollen manufacturers would in itself increase the demand for, and raise the price, of raw wool and the articles of subsistence. The minority argued that protection of the finished product was insufficient because the manufacturer would always buy his raw material wherever it was cheapest. The Jacksonian editor agreed, righteously claiming that "We can never consent to protect one branch of industry and leave a more important branch unprotected." However, one suspects that the editor was exaggerating for political effect the degree of dissension at the meeting, since the minority had apparently abstained rather than vote against the offending resolution. 12

Jacksonian politicians and editors knew they were playing with fire. As Hammond said of the Jacksonian attack on the Woollens bill, "This is a ticklish subject in Ohio, and is touched only by those whose violence prostrates all discretion." 13 The Administration men recognised that their main task was to demonstrate that tariff schedules could be drawn up which would combine the provisions of the Woollen bill with heavy duties on imported raw wool and protection for the produce of the American farmer. Accordingly, they enthusiastically co-operated when the national leadership engineered an ostensibly non-partisan convention to draw up proposals for a new protective tariff; Administration politicians who gathered at Columbus in the summer of 1827 selected a delegation, including some Jacksonians, to


attend the convention at Harrisburgh, in the expectation that it would prove of decisive political advantage to them. Though some Jacksonians denounced the convention as a partisan manoeuvre, only in Cincinnati, the centre of the partisan commitment was the sending of delegates openly obstructed; in wool-growing eastern Ohio Jacksonians cooperated in their selection. And in the end, little fault could be found with the schedules which the Harrisburgh Convention proposed, reconciling as they did the interests of Western producer and Eastern manufacturer.

Just how embarrassing the situation was for the Ohio Jacksonians was revealed at Columbus during the winter political season. Governor Trimble, in a conscious attempt to throw his personal and official prestige behind the Administration party, raised the tariff issue in his annual message to the legislature. He argued strongly in favour of the constitutionality and expediency of tariff protection, and asserted that no-one concerned with the welfare of the Northwestern states could oppose a measure as beneficial as the Harrisburgh proposals. The Governor therefore suggested that the legislature help the tariff cause by passing suitable resolutions for the guidance of Ohio's representatives in Washington. Trimble's message was duly applauded by Adams men, but the "Heroites" were reported to "grumble much at the Governors message, which they say has cast a fire brand amongst them. What a delicately sensitive set of gentlemen." The cause of "this irritable sensitiveness" was readily apparent to those who drafted the address of the Adams State Convention at the end of December. The Jacksonians, they argued, no longer feel, as they once felt, towards the protection of our industry. If not entirely abandoned, it has become a secondary object of their attachment; an object which they are willing to


15. Hammond to Wright, Columbus, 16 Dec. 1827, CHP; Scioto Gazette, 20 Dec. 1827. The message was widely reprinted in local newspapers.
jeopardise to promote one, which is to them, in their present state of feeling, of paramount consideration. To put down the present executive and to make Gen. Jackson President, they are willing to hazard every thing. 16

For their part, the Adams men held foremost "the American System, as the foundation of the free institutions in this country, and hold to it," and they waited to see "whether, and how far, the Jacksonians will dare differ from us, at their meeting on the 8th of Jan., with regard to the interests and true policy of the West." 17 The Jacksonian state convention differed not at all from the Adams men's assertions, except in its reaffirmation of Jackson's personal soundness as a high tariff man. At the same time the convention denounced Trimble for the views he had officially expressed on national policy; yet, as one Adams editor asked, did not this amount to a confession that the Jacksonians were doubtful on the tariff question, since that was the only national issue Trimble had discussed? 18

The rack was given a further twist when the widely esteemed Jeremiah Morrow, who had chaired the previous month's Adams state convention, introduced in the state senate a set of resolutions supporting higher tariffs. Jackson men saw immediately that these would "bolster up the Govr. and the Administration," and one of their leaders, Thomas Morris, attacked the proposal "most vehemently." But "the Jackson party" said openly that they intended "not to be caught in the trap." 19 The legislature unanimously passed resolutions declaring that Congress had the constitutional power to "foster and protect domestic industry" and that, in the existing situation, "effectual protection" must be given to "the manufacture and production of woollen goods, wool, iron, hemp and spirits distilled from

17. Q.F. Atkins to Whittlesey, Irville, 31 Dec. 1827, EWP.
19. Joseph H. to John Larwill, Columbus, 17 Jan. 1828, LFP, OHS; Gustavus Swan to Ewing, Columbus, 5 Feb. 1828, TEFP, LC. See also Morrow to Ewing, Columbus, 11 Jan. 1828, ibid.
domestic materials." But then Morris proposed some additional resolutions which received the support of his party. The first, that "protection ought to be uniform throughout the United States," passed the Senate 21-14; Morris later claimed, though with little justification, that this single amendment changed "the whole aspect of the resolutions." The other three resolutions expressed states' rights views of the Constitution which were implicitly hostile to protective tariffs and were, indeed, remarkably similar to resolutions passed by the Southern states at that period. One was so extreme that it failed 7-29, but the other two were voted for along party lines and defeated 15-20. This futile gesture in the state senate, which can hardly have been expected to strengthen the party within Ohio, really demonstrates just how far Jacksonian politicians were drawn towards aligning themselves with their Southern colleagues.

However, the real decision on the tariff question and its role in Ohio politics was not to be made in Columbus. All the various forces and interests involved in the tariff question focussed on the Jacksonian-controlled Congress which met in December 1827. The Harrisburgh convention had given a considerable impetus to protectionist sentiment in the North, and had drawn up sensible and practical proposals for the consideration of Congress. Yet the South seemed as intransigent on the issue as ever, and would be the dominant section within the Jackson party. More than one Northern Congressman thought that in the circumstances no tariff bill would pass. But at least, added Creighton, "We shall ... make them shew their colours on all the great leading questions that divide the parties and enable the Country to Judge whether Genl. Jackson and his friends in Pennsylvania and elsewhere, are really in favor of protecting the industry of the Country."21


The Adams men could confidently expect either to gain a new tariff, or to ruin Northern Jacksonians.

From the start the Jacksonians tried to find some solution to the problem through party action. The party caucus agreed upon a Southerner for Speaker of the House, but only on condition that he select a Committee on Manufactures dominated by those in favour of raising the tariff. This committee then asked the House for the power to send for persons and papers, at that time an unusual if not unprecedented request; significantly, this "first move of the Jackson tariff committee ... united all the inveterate anti-tariff men, with those opposed on constitutional grounds as upon expediency, in its support." The party rallied behind the proposal, with two out of the three Ohio Jacksonians supporting the manoeuvre. According to the usually well-informed Elisha Whittlesey, the aim was to select witnesses carefully so that the handful of woollen manufacturers "who were content with the present rate of duty" would give the bulk of the testimony:

It was intended to procure such evidence as would defeat an increase of duty on Woollens, and then by laying an increased duty on rum and molasses it was expected that the eastern members would vote against an increase of duty on hemp, flax and iron. By this vote they expected to retain Pennsylvania, and obtain New York and Ohio.

This plan failed, however, mainly because of the pressure exerted by manufacturers and public meetings in New York, Delaware and Pennsylvania calling for the committee to propose a realistic tariff; apparently these meetings "had a wonderful effect" on the minds of Jackson leaders like Silas Wright, who by the end of January was said to be "rampant for the success of the bill." Even the one Ohio member of the committee, the Jacksonian William Stanbery, who "at one time had some relentings of conscience," was said now to have "casehardened himself" and to wish the tariff raised.


Although Northern Jacksonians now realized that they must at all costs secure a new tariff, their behaviour for the next two months suggests that they still trusted to party action. Early in February the committee reported to the House a bill which placed excessive duties on molasses, flax, hemp, iron and raw wool, but raised the duty on a few fine goods made of wool. The Jacksonians were still trying to maintain that New England's interest in a high tariff was quite divergent from that of the Middle Atlantic and Ohio Valley states. Stanbery himself insisted that Ohio had nothing to gain from increased protection to woollen manufactures, though the Ohio wool growers disagreed. But if—as Robert V. Remini has argued—the Northern Jacksonians now sincerely wished to pass a new tariff law, how could they expect to do so if New England could not support it? Can it be that they expected the South to support a tariff which protected agricultural produce, but did not increase the cost of the textiles which the South had to purchase? Otherwise, how can we explain that the Northern Jacksonians persistently voted with the South in refusing amendments to the bill, if they did not expect the South to continue supporting the party's bill? In that case, it was the determination of the Southern Jacksonians to turn against the party's bill which ruined the scheme, and forced the Northern Jacksonians to appeal to the Administration men. "They now see," wrote John C. Wright, "they have nothing to expect from the Jackson Southrons—that the bill the Southrons stuck to a letter and comma, which no administration man has been allowed to put a word into, is now to be blown up, without our aid." The Pennsylvanians, he added, are much alarmed by this development, and so, we might assume, were the Jacksonian Ohioans.

24. Cincinnati Advertiser, 20 Feb. 1828; Western Herald, 22 Mar. 1828. See also Weisenburger, Passing of the Frontier, 231-32.

The Administration men played their part by supporting the amended bill on the final votes in the House, even though they disliked its unrealistic bias against New England. Since it was now apparent that the bill must be a sectional rather than a party measure, the Jackson leaders in the Senate were forced to support an amendment increasing the protection on woollen manufacturers, thus making the bill acceptable to New England. The Northern Jacksonians in the House likewise had to accept this change in the character of the bill as the price of securing a higher tariff, and in the end the three Ohio Jacksonians, including Stanbery, voted in favour of the bill. They had secured the means of defending themselves at home and promoting the General's election - but at the price of national party unity. As Calhoun insisted to his most eminent Ohio supporter, events had shown "how much stronger the feeling on the Tariff on both sides is than on any other question, even the Presidential." 26

Though the Ohio Jacksonians had accommodated to sectional feeling, they had not strengthened confidence in Jackson's personal attitude. When the Governor of Indiana requested Jackson's views, the reply was evasively judicious and referred the governor to Jackson's statements and votes of 1824. 27 And whether the tariff passed or not, the fact remained, as the Cleveland Herald claimed in January 1828, that Jackson's "most zealous supporters are the declared enemies of internal improvements and domestic manufacture." In March the same editor could argue that:

The opposition to the present Administration in the southern states, is more an opposition of principle, or rather to measures than is generally supposed. Southern politicians cannot endure the idea that manufactures are to be encouraged and works of internal improvement prosecuted by

27. Jackson to Governor Ray, April 1828, widely reprinted in the Ohio press.
the general government. It is the American System, more
than John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay, that they are
determined to prostrate; and it is principally as a means
of accomplishing this object, that they advocate the
election of General Jackson.

It was, indeed, the easiest task in the world to link support for Jackson
with what one New England settler in Ohio described as "the Southern policy
of No Roads - No Canals - No Manufactories; but Cotton and Tobacco, the
Richmond party and General Jackson forever." 28

Even more embarrassing to the Ohio Jacksonians was the storm of virulent
protest which the Tariff of Abominations aroused in parts of the South in
the summer and fall of 1828. Every move in South Carolina and Georgia in
protest against the tariff was reported in Administration papers at great
length; and they emphasized that these "Southrons" were not merely declaring
the protective tariff to be unconstitutional, but threatening "a resort to
arms, or a secession from the Union." Such extremism, thought the
Zanesville Ohio Republican, makes Jackson's leading supporters "perhaps the
most desperate and dangerous faction that ever threatened the peace and
union of these free states." They are openly saying, agreed the
Painesville Telegraph, that if they do not win the election, the Union will
be dissolved. Does not that mean, added the Cleveland Herald, that they
expect Jackson to repeal the tariff?

It is but reasonable to infer, if the south succeed in
electing the Southern candidate to preside over the
councils of the nation, the system which they so much
oppose will be prostrated, and the farmer and the
manufacturer abandoned to their fate.

In the circumstances, asked the Ohio State Journal, "if no sectional object
was to be gained; would the south give him their interest?" 29

to Whittlesey, 15 Feb. 1828, EWP.

29. Cleveland Herald, 22 Feb., 20 June, 18, 25 July 1828; Zanesville Ohio
Republican, 16 Aug. 1828; Painesville Telegraph, 25 July, 1 Aug., 12
Sept. 1828; Columbus Ohio State Journal, 14, 21 Aug. 1828.
Given the behaviour of the South, every rational calculation of self-interest seemed to operate in favour of the Administration forces in Ohio. The Jacksonian press could argue that Jackson and his party favoured the American System — with sufficient plausibility to satisfy their committed supporters. But to those who wavered, the evidence was less convincing. As one voter from Scioto County confessed after the election, "My sectional prejudices were in favor of Genl. Jackson, but it seemed to me, that the policy of the South was opposed to the West, & therefore I voted in pursuance of that persuasion."30 And when "the most conclusive evidence" was brought forward that "the General was a negro trader," that Jackson had actually been a slave-trader, the whole force of sectional prejudice was mobilized against him.31

A Perfect Mystery

The evident embarrassment of Ohio Jacksonians, caught between the sectional interests of their constituents and those of their Southern colleagues, gave the Adams men every confidence. Inside, and outside Ohio, the view was expressed that Ohio was safe. When state elections in Kentucky, Indiana, Louisiana and Missouri favoured the Administration forces, it seemed that the Ohio Jacksonians had lost all grounds for hope. Even in the southwestern corner of the state, the Administration was thought to be making ground in 1828; even the most pessimistic of Adams men, in an alarming eve-of-election report, said that Cincinnati was swinging away from Jackson. As a Jacksonian broadside published in October conceded,

31. Hammond to Wright, Columbus, 30 July 1828, CHP; Painesville Telegraph, 29 Aug. 1828.
1. Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 10 Aug. 1828, CHP; Benjamin P. Smith to James Weir, Washington, 16 July 1828, VFM, OHS.
"Ohio has always been considered the sheet anchor of the Administration party."2

However that may be, Adams men everywhere looked with interest to the October state elections in Ohio. At first the returns dismayed some leading national politicians by the surprising growth in Jacksonian strength they revealed, but on balance they still agreed with Clay that "we shall get the State by a large majority."3 The Washington National Intelligencer published a series of special daily "Bulletins" giving the results from Ohio, which it believed to be the leading state still in dispute between the parties. The gubernatorial election showed, the editors claimed, that Ohio was as safe as Massachusetts and Connecticut, and they quoted Ohio papers hailing "the complete triumph of principle over feeling, of reason over passion." According to the Scioto Gazette Extra, Jacksonism in Ohio had been "for ever prostrated."4 This, indeed, was the general verdict in Ohio: Jacksonians had done extremely well in some regions of the state and had gained four Congressional seats, but in the statewide vote for governor they had failed to defeat Trimble, who had become a special target for their denunciations. Now that they had been warned, the Administration forces would make no mistake at the Presidential election; they would not slacken their efforts, even though they were convinced that "Ohio is safe!"5

2. William McLean to John McLean, Piqua, 4 June 1828, McLean Papers; James Wilson to Peter Hitchcock, Zanesville, 10 Oct. 1828, PHFP; CANDOR, "To the candid consideration of the People of Ohio," Oct. 1828, political broadside, OHS.


After this confidence, the results of the Presidential election were shattering. Even Jacksonians, dejected after the result of the state election, were surprised at the Presidential result. An unexpectedly large leap in the turnout over all the state operated to Jackson's advantage, and gave him a critical 2 per cent margin. This result seemed to defy everything that commonsense, in the situation of the time, had led thinking men to expect. "Ohio has committed a perfect act of suicide," commented the Cleveland lawyer John W. Allen, "it will equally astonish the foes as well as the friends of existing men & measures." Many Adams men found themselves speechless, unable to comment on what had happened. One of the James brothers said he was almost afraid to mention the subject of our past elections for I can scarcely speak of them and retain my equanimity. That Ohio should have discarded the man ... so closely connected with her dearest and best interests and given her suffrage to a Military chieftan whose governmental views ... are altogether veiled in doubt, is a course to me, totally incomprehensible. It is an infatuation passing all measure, and one which can only be accounted for by their blind and heedless devotion to Military glory.

This, indeed, was the usual line of explanation. The truth was, wrote E.D. Mansfield in his memoirs, that the Western states "were composed of exactly those people who are most susceptible to the idea of military glory. In fine, they were carried by the Battle of New Orleans." The Jackson men, contemporaries argued, had created such an excitement that people were made "politically mad"; they forgot their interests and succumbed to passion and fervour. Yet in the end this explanation was not very convincing, as the Ohio State Journal seems to have recognized in its comment on the election:

For an event as mortifying as it was unexpected, it would, perhaps, be impossible to account satisfactorily, otherwise than by attributing it to the momentary influence of one of those fits of political delirium, of which the history of the

7. J.W. Allen to Ewing, Cleveland, 14 Nov. 1828, TEFP, LC.
Table 8.1

BANNER COUNTIES FOR EACH PARTY, 1828

by Jackson's percentage of actual total vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leading Jackson Counties</th>
<th>Leading Adams-Clay Counties</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holmes 78.67 'Dutch'</td>
<td>Ashtabula 8.46 Western Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adams 78.06 Southwest</td>
<td>Geauga 13.98 Western Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butler 77.27 Southwest</td>
<td>Medina 16.61 Western Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darke 75.03</td>
<td>Cuyahoga 20.14 Western Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monroe 71.39</td>
<td>Lorain 20.45 Western Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown 69.87 Southwest</td>
<td>Wood 27.54 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairfield 69.74 'Dutch'</td>
<td>Portage 28.87 Western Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayne 68.86 'Dutch'</td>
<td>Huron 31.96 Western Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knox 68.47</td>
<td>Clark 33.69 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perry 67.15 'Dutch'</td>
<td>Meigs 34.58 Ohio Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clermont 66.94 Southwest</td>
<td>Logan 34.81 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pike 66.8</td>
<td>Delaware 35.22 -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
human race affords too many examples .... Where the Jackson voters came from is, in sober truth, a perfect mystery.⁹

And so it remains for anyone who studies the election returns for 1828 in detail. No historian has yet discovered an explanation of the voting pattern established in that election that stood up to close analysis - and this one is unlikely to do any better. No simple correlation works: Roger Sharp's study of the electoral pattern, as expressed in Presidential elections between 1836 and 1844, claims to find a real socioeconomic difference between the constituencies each party drew majority support from, but his generalization is vitiated by too many exceptions. Stephen Fox has argued that the constituencies were divided along ethnocultural lines, with antiparty evangelicals opposing partisan anti-evangelicals, but his methodology is suspect, his evidence scanty and often wrong, his correlations scarcely impressive.¹⁰ Other scholars, ranging from Frederick Jackson Turner through Edgar A. Holt, Harold E. Davis and Francis Weisenburger to William Dean Burnham, make some perceptive comments on the electoral pattern established in 1828, but not one provides a systematic analysis; and anyone who glances at the distribution of county majorities (map 8.1) or at the twelve leading counties on each side (table 8.1) can see the difficulties.¹¹

However, the practised eye acquainted with the 1824 returns immediately

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⁹. E.D. Mansfield, Personal Memories, 229; James Heaton to C.M. Heaton, Middletown, 3 Dec. 1828, Heaton papers, LC; Ohio State Journal, 13 Nov. 1828.


notices some familiar landmarks. Four (or even five) of the top eleven Jacksonian counties are located in the southwestern corner of the state near to Cincinnati, and another four contained large concentrations of Germans; while seven of the top nine Adams counties are found on the Western Reserve, and one in the Ohio Company lands. These points of resemblance are clear from a comparison of map 7.1 with map 8.1. This suggests that in some places the same considerations as had operated in 1824 remained powerful determinants of political choice again in 1828. But in that case we need to explain the changes in the pattern, and to identify the new influences on voting behaviour in 1828.

If in order to do so, we follow the fashion of British psephologists and measure "swing," as on map 8.2, we make some surprising discoveries. Only three counties gave Jackson a smaller percentage of their vote than they had in 1824, and they were the Pennsylvania Scotch Irish counties of Columbiana, Jefferson and Harrison. All the Adams counties of 1824 showed a "swing" towards Jackson, though in two quintessentially "Yankee" counties, Ashtabula and Washington, the swing was comparatively negligible. Only in two of these Adams counties of 1824 was the swing sufficient to move the county into the Jackson column - and these were the only two counties on the abortive Sandusky canal route in which there is no evidence of settlement by New Englanders, which confirms that state canal politics were no longer an influence on Presidential choices. The largest "swings" - of over 30 per cent - were, indeed, recorded in all the counties on that route, as well as in the group of counties on the fringe of the southeastern hilly area, stretching from Monroe on the eastern border to Ross in the west. Yet this is a misleading measure, because the concept of "swing" is useful only if the electorate remains the same size: when applied in

12. Marion (including Crawford, which was organized as a separate county in 1826) and Union Counties. For their settlers, see Kilbourn, Ohio Gazetteer (1833), 298, 450; Henry Howe, Historical Collections (1847), 457, and (1889), II, 714; B.J. Lossing, A Pictorial Description of Ohio... (New York, 1849), 94.
circumstances when the numbers voting are increasing drastically, it is misleading. For example, in this instance the measurement of "swings" in percentages obscures the simple fact that Jackson piled up a huge advantage in the southwestern counties where the extra voters were - almost incredibly - even more disposed to support him than the voters of 1824.

One way of disentagling the new impulses of 1828 from those influences carried over from the 1824 election is to assume that all those who voted in 1824 voted the same way again in 1828. Of course, some of them had died in the meantime, moved out of the state or to another county, or simply did not vote in 1828, but there is no way of calculating their numbers and we can only assume that their incidence was roughly the same in each party. The assumption of constancy reconciles with the figures - as, for example in Table 1.1. In no county (or township for which figures survive) did Adams receive fewer votes in 1828 than he and Clay had gained between them in 1824; in no county was the increase in Jackson's vote greater than the increase in the total vote. Political constancy could mean either that many voters were influenced by the same considerations as in 1824, or that they had contracted loyalties in the earlier election which influenced their behaviour. It is impossible to be sure, but it is perhaps significant that the Jackson vote in 1828 was lower in the German counties through which the canal passed than in those off the canal route, even though state canal politics no longer had any relevance to the Presidential election: had a significant minority of voters in the former counties, possibly including some Germans, developed a commitment to Clay as the American System candidate which transformed into votes for Adams in 1828?

Whatever the answer, it seems reasonable to assume that a major element in the electoral pattern of 1828 was made up of men voting the same way as in 1824. If we subtract the returns of 1824 from those of 1828, we are left with an index of how the extra voters of 1828 - the 'new vote' - were distributed around the state. Of course, this figure will indirectly
MAP 6.3: 1920: THE 'NEW VOTE.'

NEW VOTES FOR JACKSON:

- 8 out of 5.
- 9 out of 7.
- 55-66%.
- 50-55%.
- 33-50%.
- Fewer than 1 out of 3.

* Erected but unorganized counties

MAP 6.4: 1828: SURPRISING JACKSONIAN COUNTY VICTORIES.

- Counties in which Jackson gained fewer than 1/3 of the votes in 1824, and more than 1/3 in 1828.
- Counties almost in that category.
- "A" and "C" signify an absolute majority for Adams or Clay in 1824.

* Erected but unorganized counties
reflect also any of the original voters of 1824 who changed their mind in this election under the new impulses. Alternatively, we could construct an even more abstract (and therefore less deceptive) index which predicted how each county would have voted had the 'new vote' divided equally between the two candidates, and then measure how far the actual result varied from the predicted answer. Each method gives roughly the same answer, which is plotted on map 8.3.

On average, 60.6 per cent of the 'new vote' across Ohio preferred Jackson to Adams. The map reveals twenty-eight counties in which fewer than 55 per cent of them voted for Jackson: the greatest hostility was still to be found on the Western Reserve, especially in the most completely Yankee counties which saw over 80 per cent of the increase in the vote go to Adams; also hostile, on balance, was the 'new vote' in the Ohio Company counties along with the neighbouring counties farther down the River Ohio to Scioto County. Perhaps the most surprising thing is the even division of the 'new vote' in the block of counties in the Little Miami and Mad River valleys, which is mystifying; but in eastern Ohio the 'new vote' in some of the German counties, and certainly in the Pennsylvania Scotch Irish counties, was less enthusiastic for Jackson than might be expected. By contrast, others matched the southwestern counties in giving two out of every three 'new' votes to Jackson. Most striking are two blocks of interior counties which gave four out of five of their 'new' votes to the Hero: some were lightly-settled, isolated counties on the Indiana line north of Cincinnati; others included four central counties - Knox, Licking, Fairfield and Pickaway - which stand out even in the company of the neighbouring pro-Jackson counties on the fringe of the southeastern hills.

These results must have owed much to new settlers moving into Ohio, as the state once more began to grow rapidly as the depression receded after 1824. Unfortunately, there is little evidence to distinguish the new settlers, be they native or immigrant, from the older settlers. One
exception is Pike County, where apparently Germans of some sort moved in after 1825; they may have helped produce the marked preference for Jackson in the 'new vote' there. It is possible too that Virginians were already moving into the southeastern hill counties - as Ephraim Cutler reported of Morgan, northern Washington and Athens, and southern Perry and Hocking, in June 1831 - and perhaps producing 'new' votes for Jackson. Yet we cannot be certain, especially as the relatively pro-Adams counties of the Mad River valley were settled predominantly by Virginians. For the most part, though, it seems most newcomers tended to congregate in areas already settled by people of similar origin and background, and thus probably tended to reinforce existing majorities.

However, the decisive factor in Jackson's success was not so much his ability to pull out even huger majorities in the centres of strength established in 1824, but his success in places where he had run badly in that year. Most of the counties Jackson carried in 1828 were those in which he had won at least one-third of the vote in 1824, but he also won eleven others, revealed on map 8.4, seven of which had in that election given absolute majorities to Clay. On the whole, the 1828 results indicated that Adams could hold on to places he had himself won pluralities in previously, but not those to which Clay had appealed. This could reveal a popular sentiment that Clay had deserted the Western cause when he allied with Adams, though there is little reason for stressing this factor; it

13. Howe, Historical Collections (centennial edn.), 420.
15. Gersholm Flagg to Azariah Flagg, Springfield, 0., 12 Nov. 1816 and 8 Jan. 1817, Solon J. Buck, ed., "Pioneer Letters of Gersholm Flagg," Transactions of the Illinois State Historical Society, (1910), 143, 145; Kilbourn, Ohio Gazetteer, (1833 edn.), 281; Howe, Historical Collections (1847), 84; Lossing, Pictorial Description, 41, 48, 72; Smith, A Buckeye Titan, 144; Ohio Writers' Program of the Works Projects Administration, Springfield and Clark County, Ohio (Springfield, 1941), and Urbana and Champaign County, Ohio (Urbana, 1942).
could reveal that a Western candidate had powerful appeal, regardless of his views on policy. There is another possibility: many interior and hill counties that Clay carried in 1824 had had unusually low turnouts, which meant that the 'new vote' of 1828 was comparatively more numerous and did not have to be exceptionally pro-Jackson in order to shift the county into that camp.

Be that as it may, map 8.4 reveals that Jackson overthrew the established pattern most dramatically in the more isolated counties, while the counties the Adams-Clay coalition held on to included many of those fortunately situated in river valleys and on routes of transportation. If so, why? Can it be that the Jacksonians, recognising that the backcountry potentially held the balance of power, focussed their organizational efforts on stimulating an unwonted turnout there? Or did Jackson's candidacy have an appeal to undercurrents of popular feeling, especially among back-country farmers, which won him votes, regardless of the efforts of rival politicians? These possibilities must be explored in turn.
9. THE TRIUMPH OF THE POLITICIAN

Many historians have found a simple explanation for Jackson's success in so many Northern states in 1828. His leading supporters adapted to the new world of social mobility and egalitarian aspirations more efficiently than their established opponents; they saw that a huge, amorphous electorate potentially existed which could be mastered by politicians willing to appeal to it and organize it into a mass political party. Thus the Jacksonians triumphed because they adopted novel political techniques, openly appealing to the prejudices of the electorate and developing party machinery appropriate to the new social and constitutional climate. Guided by Martin Van Buren, they created a voter-oriented political formation which quite overwhelmed the old leader-oriented approach of their opponents, who could do little more in reply than resort to traditional antiparty rhetoric to condemn the new partisan techniques and values.¹

Unfortunately this view does not fit the facts as far as Ohio is concerned—if it does anywhere. It is a view usually advanced by historians who have done little research on politics before 1815, who simply presume that something new was happening by the 1820s. In fact, no political technique was used in 1828 which had not been used effectively on some previous occasion, even if it was now used more universally, more persistently and energetically. Moreover, earlier experience of democratic and partisan elections was not confined to the Jacksonians; the same techniques were

familiar to Adams-Clay men, who showed every willingness in practice to compete with the Jacksonians in the struggle for partisan success.

The Thirst for Office

Charles Hammond had no doubt why the Jacksonians throughout the United States could offer such a firm - and swelling - resistance to the Adams-Clay regime. By November 1826 he was privately convinced that "there is too little principle in the politics of the times - That a view to Self aggrandisement and Self interest is a too general source of opinion. There is not, in the community, that united feeling of attachment to men and measures, which is essential to hold politicians together." By the end of Congress's short session, he was convinced - as was Elisha Whittlesey - that personal ambition was undermining the political purity of republican government:

We have sticks to be converted into Presidents and Secretary, and Ministers so numerous, that few can be accommodated. The disappointed must cast about for new arrangements and enter into new combinations. The outs must always make war upon the ins, and that war must be vindictive and malignant as are all wars of a personal character.

Though Hammond's view was no doubt affected by his personal commitment to the cause of National Republicanism, he had in fact placed his finger on exactly the impulse that brought extra resources of political talent to the service of the Jackson party.¹

Hope for personal advancement had, of course, been in the minds of many politicians in 1824, and had persuaded Jacksonian leaders to oppose an Adams administration from which they expected little promotion. Elijah Hayward in Cincinnati was regarded, even by fellow Jacksonians, as unreliably self-seeking, while Caleb Atwater's political - and academic - correspondence

¹. Hammond to Clay, Cincinnati, 26 Nov. 1826, Clay Papers, V, 955, and to Wright, Cincinnati, 7 Mar. 1827, CHP. See also Whittlesey to Giddings, Washington, 4 Mar. 1827, Giddings Papers.
throughout his life could be almost lunatic in its concern for securing renown. Other politicians, however, contemplated opposition with more caution; even a former Clintonian who had supported Jackson in 1824 like Benjamin Tappan could hesitate in his commitment.\(^2\) What they wished to see - or most of them, not necessarily Tappan himself - was which would turn out to be "the strongest party." By March 1827 John Sloane could see, in his part of eastern Ohio, "no change except here and there where Jackson has a majority, a few demagogues falling in publickly for him who before were only secretly at work."\(^3\) For others, however, local popularity was less important than the prospect of national success, for their interest was in federal office as much as in winning local elections. The old Democrat John Hamm and some of his fellows in Muskingum County sat on the fence in the spring of 1827, though it was becoming clear which way they would jump.\(^4\) Much of the Jacksonian organizational effort in 1827, and even 1828, was designed to demonstrate their strength across the nation, in order to encourage the adhesion of those who were non-committal. As Hammond said, there was nothing to apprehend from Jacksonian control of Congress in the session beginning in December 1827 "but its bad effect upon the timid and wavering through the land."\(^5\)

In fact, the Ohio Jacksonians benefited hugely in 1827 and 1828 from the accession to their ranks of men of great political eminence and experience. For example, William W. Irwin had been a former justice of the

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2. William Burke to McLean, Cincinnati, 2 Nov. 1827, McLean Papers; Wright to Tappan, Washington, 28 Mar. 1826, BTP, LC; Hammond to Wright, Columbus, 31 Dec. 1827, CHP.

3. Sloane to Hammond, Cincinnati, 29 Oct. 1827, CHP. See also Judson Canfield to Whittlesey, Canfield, 21 Dec. 1827, EWP.

4. James Wilson to Hammond, 25 May 1827, CHP.

state supreme court, 1810-15, had run for Governor in 1822 and been selected Speaker of the Ohio House in 1825 and 1826. According to Thomas Ewing, he was "much respected by the members" of the Assembly - at least, until he deserted to the opposition in 1827. He became the Jacksonians' candidate for the Speakership in the Ohio House that December, and they earmarked him as their candidate in 1828 either for the governorship or for Congress. 6 Equally well-known was the Virginian Thomas Scott of the Ross County, who served as secretary of the 1802 constitutional convention and clerk of the state senate, 1804-09, had ruled the Ohio Tammany Society as its first Grand Sachem, run for Governor in 1812, and served on the state supreme court for many years. In 1824 he had supported Adams, on the grounds that he wanted a free-state President, but by the summer of 1827 he had joined the opposition, even attending "the secret meetings of the Jackson party" in Columbus, and was suspected of being the author of a handbill retailing the "bargain and corruption" charges. In the fall this "newly converted Jacksonian" ran for the General Assembly in Ross County; though unsuccessful, he undoubtedly brought a much-needed respectability and expertise to the Jackson party in that county. 7 Interestingly, relatively few of the politicians who changed sides had been, like Irwin, former supporters of Clay; most, like Scott, had supported Adams in 1824 in areas that were overwhelmingly committed to Clay - and presumably could expect little support or advancement from a local party that was dominated by their former opponents.

For advancement and patronage seems to have been what most of these turncoats sought. Irwin had been disappointed in his ambitions in the

6. Ewing to his wife, Columbus, 9 Dec. 1825, TEFP, LC. See also Titus Brockway to Whittlesey, Columbus, 9 Dec. 1827, EWP; Hammond to Wright, Oct. 29, 16 Dec. 1827, CHP; and Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1107, which, however, confuses Irwin with the Ohio judge of that name who was impeached in 1804.

7. John Bailhache to Clay, Chillicothe, 28 Aug. 1827, Clay Papers, VI, 971-72 (also 284); Lebanon Western Star, 20 Oct. 1827.
state legislature of 1826-27: he had been defeated in his bid to secure re-election as Speaker by the combined opposition of personal opponents on the Administration side, who did not wish to build him up for the United States Senate seat; and then had failed in the Senatorial election, mainly because members of his own party thought him less reliable than Ruggles. Wright thought Irwin "good for nothing," and prophesised that defeat would alienate both Irwin and Wyllys Silliman, the other unsuccessful Administration candidate, who was not "to be relied upon in stormy times."\(^8\) Sure enough, within a month both were ready to abandon the Administration, and "take with them their friends and join the standard of Gen. Jackson." Irwin finally satisfied his ambition to go to Washington by running as the Jackson candidate for Congress against Beecher in a district which was regarded as potentially safe Jacksonian territory.\(^9\) Disappointed ambition also explains Thomas Scott’s tergiversation, for, as a highly regarded lawyer, he had been seeking federal office since at least 1824. In 1826 his claims to a seat on the United States Supreme Court were pressed by state legislators and Congressmen from Ohio, and he appeared before the Court in an important case early in the year, according to Hammond, "pregnant with a pro-di-gi-ous speech..., the delivery of which is to make it evident to every man, woman and child, President Secretaries and all that he should be appointed." He won the case but missed the seat, and then made a blatant attempt to ingratiate himself with Clay, in the hope of a future judgeship. No doubt he decided better prospects were promised by a Jacksonian victory, though Scott was never

\(^8\) Wright to Hammond, Steubenville, 19 Nov. 1826, Washington, 25 Feb. 1827, CHP.

\(^9\) Whittlesey to Giddings, Washington, 4 Mar. 1827, Giddings Papers. See also Beecher to Ewing, 15 Dec. 1826, TEFP, LC.
to receive a reward commensurate with his ambition. 10

The Adams men had no doubt what motivated such "ELEVENTH HOUR MEN."

As a correspondent in the Marietta American Friend said, "Wm. W. Irvin, Thomas Scott, Ethan A. Brown and David Smith, did not get places to suit them on the Administration side - so they jumped over the fence." John C. Wright had earlier expressed his dismay that

those we thought staunch and activated by principle go off to the opposition for slight personal pique or resentment .... Who can we trust? Is the love of office drowning every good and noble feeling, & Jackson to be made the scape goat for attaining sinister ends?11

And such cynicism about their new opponents seems quite justified in many cases. For instance, the unscrupulous Marietta editor A.V.D. Joline considered setting up an Administration press in Newark in 1827, but decided instead to turn his Marietta and Washington County Pilot into a Jackson print.12 The most notorious example of such opportunism was provided by the irrepressible James B. Gardiner of the Xenia People's Press, who insisted on remaining absolutely neutral in the Presidential contest, even as a member of the 1827-28 General Assembly: according to the Adams newspaper in Marietta (where he was well remembered), "Gardiner was professedly a no-party man, or, in the popular phase, was on the fence till after the election of state Printer was decided." When a friend of the Administration was chosen for that lucrative job, Gardiner jumped off the fence and "turned, from a professed neutral, to a furious Jackson man - ranting and roaring about federalism, bargain! corruption! intrigue! - as though his own


character was 'pure as angels'."\(^{13}\)

The logic behind these changes of side was obvious. The Jackson party at this stage was supported by fewer men of respectability and political experience than its rival, and yet it sought men of prominence and prestige as its candidates: the chances of being nominated as a party candidate for elective office were correspondingly greater, and events were showing that the party label might be no disadvantage in many parts of Ohio. Similarly, the party was not well supported by members of the legal profession, yet if it won at either national or state level, it would have many interesting jobs to dispense in the judiciary and court systems - not to mention in land offices and customs houses, as well as in the postal service. As Caleb Atwater had gleefully remarked to Benjamin Tappan in 1823, "If the laborers in our political vineyard are few, our reward will be the richer."\(^{14}\) By the same logic, struggling newspaper proprietors could see a tactical shift of editorial policy as the one possible way of wresting valuable government printing contracts from rival newspaper offices. Even before, then, they could benefit from party printing jobs, as did the turncoat editor David Smith of the Ohio Monitor, who became for a time the Jackson printer at the state capital.\(^{15}\) Once it was clear that Jacksonism was a political force with real prospects of success, a change of sides could look like a shrewd move for anyone wishing to advance his career in public life; and young Jacksonians like Samuel Medary, John Brough, David Tod and Matthew Birchard can scarcely have had their enthusiasm dimmed by thought of the reward party success might bring - and in time did. Together with older men who felt their merits had been overlooked and hopes for further advancement

\(^{13}\) American Friend, 12 Mar., 27 Sept. 1828; see also Hammond to Wright, Columbus, 3 Dec. 1827, CHP.

\(^{14}\) Atwater to Tappan, Circleville, 24 Nov. 1823, BTP, LC.

\(^{15}\) Joseph H. to John Larwill, Columbus, 17 Jan. 1828, LFP.
frustrated under the current dispensation, they contributed important energy and political skills to the growing opposition party.

Of course, there was nothing new about this thirst for office, patronage and favour. Traditionally government office had been seen as a means of gaining not only honour and distinction, but also important supplements of income. Office was still given to well-connected people who had hit hard times, to the crippled and wounded, to those whose family commitments had increased because of accidents to relations: the family of a revered Jeffersonian Democrat was supported by a post in the Cincinnati Land Office; an old doctor in Washington County served as county treasurer, "a position which afforded him ease and a moderate income" in his last years; while in 1826 one quite well-known Cincinnatian could even request his political representatives in Washington to secure him "any office affording a small income," on the grounds that he was "out of business" and "found it extremely difficult to support my family comfortably." 16 On the whole, however, office holding was not particularly lucrative, and older men often advised younger colleagues that they would be better off pursuing their profession or trade than taking on some public function. Officeholders often complained that their duties involved greater expense than their remuneration justified, and some discovered that they were expected to pay out of their salary for "Deputy, Clerk hire, wood, stationery and every contingency about the office." 17 Yet, even so, an appointment like that of Postmaster in Cincinnati was not to be scorned at $2,000 per annum – which the incumbent said "gives me a bare maintenance" – and even Hammond


confessed, "I am poor enough to want such an office for myself. But I do not." Elijah Hayward conceded that he could not afford to turn down Jackson's offer of the post of Commissioner of the General Land Office in 1830, though he would prefer to remain on the state supreme court:

My duty to my family will compel me to accept - the salary being three thousand five hundred dollars per annum.... The compensation is the great inducement, for if I ever had any ambition, above the vulgar competition in society, it was to distinguish myself as an able, upright and impartial Judge, and had the salary been any thing more than a living, no earthly consideration would have induced me to leave it.

Few people could aspire to such offices, yet the rage for office inspired people throughout the nation. One compulsion was spotted by Tocqueville: the urge to find some mark of distinction in a nominally egalitarian society made up of a mass of undifferentiated individuals. In December 1826 a correspondent in the St. Clairsville Gazette commented on the current rage for titles and distinctions and honours, whether civil or military: even appointment as a justice of the peace was much sought after, since in many parts of Ohio the justice would be referred to forever after as "Esquire." Another compulsion arose from the feeling that a man of education, however limited, was above physical labour, certainly superior to farm work. From this arose the accusation commonly directed against a farmer's boy who took up the law: "He feels above farmer's work, he wants to wear broadcloth every day." Yet in this relatively simple society there were not enough professional opportunities or clerical jobs to satisfy all those who considered themselves educated but had no property or capital


to invest in land or commerce: even early Ohio was said to be overflowing with underemployed third-rate lawyers, while young men competed eagerly for such new clerical positions as appeared - like being clerk on an Ohio River steamboat. It was this "wretched ambitious poverty which pervades our country" - which he contrasted with "a willingness to labour" - that Hammond blamed in 1824 for the rage for office which marked national political life. Even a firm Adams man from New England, a surveyor who had hit hard times, could press Elisha Whittlesey for his interest "for some employment in the gift of the Genl. Governmt. that will enable me to support my family reputedly, without an occurrence to the plow alone as my last hope." The revival of party competition provided a possible opening for people of this condition, since party hack work might lead to office, even if only at the township and county level. Hence the insistence of Hayward and other politicians that thousands of men were waiting for clear signs as to which would be the stronger side, since personal prospects could depend on going with the winner.

The attraction of the opposition party was enhanced in Ohio by the fact that many offices had been held by the same person for many years. At the state level, Jeremiah McLene had been secretary of state since 1808, and Ralph Osborn state auditor since 1815. At the federal level, John Johnston had been Indian agent for all the region south of the Detroit River and Lake Erie since 1805, while Edward Tiffin had held his lucrative post as Surveyor-General of public lands in Ohio, Indiana and the Michigan Territory.


23. Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 19 Mar. 1824, CHP.

24. Q.F. Atkins to Whittlesey, Lower Sandusky, 29 Oct. 1826, EWP.

since 1814. Some postmasters, like Simon Perkins at Warren, had served virtually since statehood. And President Adams' policy was to retain existing federal office-holders, even though the Tenure of Office Act of 1820 made their appointment renewable every four years. Even when offices were vacated, Adams' appointments were unimaginative: when Isaac Van Horne resigned after many years as Receiver of the Public Moneys for the Zanesville land district, Adams appointed Bernard Van Horne as his successor. Such a policy obviously disillusioned those who aspired to such offices, and Adams' decision to reappoint William Doherty as United States Marshall for Ohio undoubtedly helped to alienate Nathaniel McLean of Columbus, who had tried to use brother John's influence to secure the post - and, after failing, "carried water on both shoulders" for a time before deserting to the opposition in 1828. Yet, in the circumstances, there was no way that Adams could satisfy all aspirants: his reappointment of the "eloquent advocate and... able lawyer" Joseph S. Benham, of Cincinnati as District Attorney for Ohio may have helped convert Benham from Jacksonism, but it left others disappointed.  

When Charles W. Byrd - the old Secretary of the Northwest Territory - died in August 1828, a scramble commenced for the post of federal District Judge for Ohio he had held since 1803. Thomas C. Flournoy, of Columbus, recommended the appointment of William Creighton, Jr., "a man of the finest legal attainments, and undoubtedly the most popular man in Ohio. To give him the office, (if he will accept it) would have the best possible effect upon the Presidential Election." A few days later Flournoy wrote again recommending the President to wait until after the election before making the appointment. This is the course Adams followed, making his preference of Creighton over the other candidates known only in

November—though the Senate, under Jacksonian influence, refused to confirm the nomination.27

Jacksonians consciously tried to attract disenchanted politicians to their side with hints of future advancement, not always with success. Edward King—son of Rufus King and son-in-law of Thomas Worthington—was linked with Irwin and Silliman as a potential turncoat, but he remained true to the cause—which, in any case, had brought him some tokens of recognition and advancement.28 The biggest fish the Jacksonians sought to land was William Henry Harrison, the only living American with a military reputation to rival Jackson's. Harrison's ambition was to be Adams' Vice-Presidential candidate in 1828, and he claimed that Adams men throughout the North, as well as in Virginia and Louisiana, believed that he could bring more strength to the ticket than any other man.29 However, he remained unpopular in some parts of Ohio, the state's Congressional delegation (except for Wright) failed to press his claims, and the state convention of December 1827 refused to make a nomination for the Vice Presidency. Harrison's associates told him—to his annoyance—that they wished to avoid an embarrassing argument, since Jeremiah Morrow, who chaired the convention, had equal claims. Harrison tried to repair the damage by engineering a nomination in Indiana or Virginia, but the nomination of Richard Rush in Pennsylvania—and the desire to attract votes in that state rather in an Ohio that was presumed safe—was acquiesced in by Administration men in Ohio and elsewhere.30

Jacksonians in Ohio suspected that

the Clay faction have trifled with General Harrison....Sound policy and Gratitude both pointed him out to his party for the Vice-Presidency. He is an abler man than Rush, and the West was entitled to the nomination; a powerful Jackson influence would have gone with him and 
out of Ohio he is more popular than Rush. But Mr. Clay's party will sacrifice everything to gain a State and preserve the influence of their Idol.31

Moses Dawson invited the furious Harrison to join a party which knew how to honour men who had performed great deeds, but Harrison ignored the blandishments, though pointing out that it was "the principles in which I have been educated" and not personal attachment that kept him loyal to the Administration.32 Matters became worse still when the President refused to appoint Harrison major-general in command of the United States Army, preferring instead General Macomb of New York, whose appointment "elicited universal reprobation" in Washington and the West. Joseph Vance, said his friends were mortified because they were sure that the appointment of Harrison or Winfield Scott would have helped in the Presidential election; Wright felt that the Administration party "would do well, if our excellent president would forebear appointments or take advice." At last, in May, the Ohio delegation overcame Adams' personal dislike of Harrison and secured his appointment as minister to Colombia; thus honour was satisfied, and the Administration gained some credit for promoting Ohio's most distinguished resident.33

The number of aspirants ensured that patronage would embarrass the Jacksonians too. At the time of their state convention in 1828, Edward King noted that the Jacksonians

32. Dawson to Harrison, 11 Apr. 1827, Harrison Papers, LC; Harrison to Johnston, Washington, 12 Jan., 2 Mar. 1828, John Johnston, Papers, OHS.
33. Wright to Hammond, Washington, 20, 28 Apr., 18, 21 May 1828; Vance to Hammond, Washington, 17 Apr. 1828, CHP. See also Cincinnati Advertiser, 17 Sept. 1828; and, for this whole paragraph, Goebel, Harrison, 247-55.
are quarrelling among themselves — some of the new converts require pap. They won't give it — Others have received it, which meets with the disapprobation of those who have borne the heat and burden of the day.34

Even when Jackson had taken control of the Presidency, the party could not meet all the demands on it. There were — especially in areas of Jacksonian strength — some office-holders of long standing who had supported Jackson, and they could not be removed; Jackson was, in any case, reluctant to make too many removals; and success in the scramble for office depended on the favour of the Ohio "gang" — including Hayward, Hamm, William McLean and Joseph H. Larwill — who descended on Washington in February and March 1829 to help Jackson in his "great work of reforming public abuses."35 The new administration was soon being denounced by the disappointed; and the Adams—Clay men felt confident that the Jackson party, in its triumph, would break up in fights over the distribution of patronage because it was made up of such a discordant mass of office-seekers who could never be satisfied.36

Even so, many got what they had so dearly wanted. Some Ohioans gained diplomatic posts, with John Hamm going to Chile and Ethan Allen Brown to Brazil, while Harrison was replaced in Colombia by a Kentuckian. The Land Office provided many jobs, Hayward going to Washington, William Lytle (and, on his death in 1831, Micajah Williams) replacing Tiffin as Surveyor General for the Northwest, and key posts in the Ohio land offices going to Thomas Scott and Joseph H. Larwill, among others. John McLean moved up to the Supreme Court, John W. Campbell gained the post of District Judge that had been earmarked for Creighton, and the chief federal legal offices in the

34. King to Clay, Columbus, 9 Jan. 1828, Clay Papers, VII, 25.
36. Cincinnati Advertiser, 12 Aug. 1829; Clay Papers, VII, 553, 554, 634.
state - Marshall and District Attorney - were given to active Jacksonians. Ohio newspapermen - notably Moses Dawson and James B. Gardiner - were to be named to federal posts by Jackson, but rejected by a Senate fearful of corrupting the press. New postmasters were appointed in several urban centers, including Joline at Marietta, while the printing of United States laws and the list of "dead letters" was given to "party papers, though completely insignificant in character in comparison with the business papers heretofore advertised in." Together with the changes made when the party gained control of state patronage after the elections of 1829, these appointments amounted to the greatest changeover in office-holding personnel since the "Sweeping Resolution" of 1810.

In the quest for spoils - and the satisfaction of the victors - what the Jacksonians had profited from was the principle of "rotation in office" that had been established at the Revolution, the belief that public office was the legitimate aspiration of every man of integrity and education sufficient to carry out its duties. During the period of one-party supremacy, the turnover of office holders had been relatively slow, and aspirants for both elective and appointive office could feel that their opportunities were excessively limited as long as incumbents continued to be almost automatically reappointed. Moreover, the mere growth of the state ensured that the number of aspirants increased faster than the number of the public offices. When an opposition party appeared with reasonable prospects of success, such legitimately ambitious men were naturally drawn to its side, if some commitment to the Administration did not override the inclination. In doing so, these aspirants, whether young or old, brought an invaluable infusion of energy, experience, influence and support to the

37. Lorain Gazette, 24 July 1829. See also Cincinnati Advertiser, 21 Mar., 1 Apr., 2, 9 May, 6 June, 8, 19 Aug. 1829; Cleveland Herald, 14 Jan. 1830, in Annals, XIII, 137.
new party, which encouraged its growth and extension at every level of Ohio society.

The Extension of Partisanship

At the beginning of 1827 the Jacksonians still lacked an effective political organization capable of competing in statewide elections. They still suffered from the weaknesses apparent in the 1824 campaign—only a slender foothold in the state legislature and at the state capital, only a handful of newspapers, no means of statewide coordination, and large areas they had not yet effectively penetrated. According to Elijah Hayward, in April 1827 only three counties were organized; and months later he was still trying to discover the names of potential organizers in counties as sympathetic to Jackson as Stark and Holmes.¹

The Hamilton County Central Committee of Correspondence, revived for the elections of 1826, took steps early in 1827 to transform the situation. Apparently as a result of suggestions sent from Washington, the Cincinnati Jacksonians established a select committee under Hayward, to rouse and coordinate party activity in other counties. As a result of this prompting from Cincinnati, ten county meetings met in Ohio in the spring of 1827, passed suitable resolutions and set up a party organization for the county; this generally consisted of a corresponding committee to communicate with other counties, and, in some cases, vigilance committees in the townships.²

Similar prodding was soon undertaken by other centres of activity, notably

1. Hayward to J.H. Larwill, Cincinnati, 2 Apr. 1827, LFP, and 23 June 1827, William C. Larwill Papers, OHS.

2. Circular of the Select Committee of Correspondence for Hamilton County, Cincinnati, 29 Mar. 1827, LFP; Scioto Gazette, 3, 10 Jan., 24 May 1827; Webster, "Democratic Party Organization in the Northwest," 15-18.
Wooster and Steubenville. The Wooster (Wayne County) leaders, notably the Larwills, encouraged pockets of Jacksonian support on the Western Reserve—in places like Ravenna, Youngstown, and the new canal village of Akron—as well as trying to stimulate support in Stark County, the most reluctantly Jacksonian of the German 'backbone' counties. Though Hayward said that the main purpose of organizing county meetings was to create an impression of popular support in Ohio for the sake of its effect in other states, notably Kentucky, where critical elections were due to be held in August 1827, the effect was to strengthen and coordinate known areas of support. 3

In such places the Jacksonians introduced the Presidential question into the local elections of 1827. John C. Wright observed that in Cincinnati "you are to contest your County elections upon the Jackson principle, and I suppose, of course, you will be beat." And, indeed, the election in Hamilton County "terminated in the choice of the whole Jackson ticket." 4 From Fairfield County Thomas Ewing commented in September that "We have much noisy electioneering in this State, the Presidential question mingles itself in almost every canvass, however petty the office." After the elections John McLean's brother William told him that "You hear it now said when a constable is to be elected is he an Adams or Jackson man." Yet, he added, "... it was not made a test in half the counties—where it was the result will shew the Jackson party generally triumphed." 5 Hammond at the Cincinnati Gazette observed that in only seven counties was "an avowed Jackson ticket ... openly supported"; only there was it true that "Administration and


opposition forms the line of division" in 1827, though he had "no doubt that an open Jackson ticket has been made whenever it was thought prudent to make it." In most counties there was a multiplicity of candidates, and it was "easy in such cases for a small minority of Jacksonians, by acting in concert and keeping silent, to elect their man." In some cases the Jacksonians supported, openly or otherwise, Adams candidates whom they thought pliable and potentially sympathetic. 6 Although in fifteen counties Adams men were returned even though the electorate was considered predominantly Jacksonian, the net result of the election was increased Jacksonian representation in the Assembly, coming primarily in counties either located in the southwestern corner of the state or settled by Germans and Scotch Irish. When the legislature met, its partisan makeup was quickly analysed as 41 for Jackson, 66 for the Administration, with only two members reported as "on the fence" - a term which Hezekiah Niles "met with for the first time" in this report from Columbus.7

The Jacksonians were eager to demonstrate - and exaggerate - their strength in the Assembly. In the election of Speakers, "the Jacksonians put forth their men ... and endeavored to play the old game. Crying Jackson to Jacksonians, and alleging other matter to others." They were well defeated in "a pretty fair political test," but then claimed that some Jackson members had voted according to personal friendship and locality, while no Administration men had voted for the Jackson candidates. It was, they argued, the Jacksonians who recognized that party labels were meaningless

6. Cincinnati Daily Gazette, 7 Oct. 1827. See also S. Fales to Trimble, Dayton, 16 Nov. 1827, in Trimble Correspondence, 164.

in the state legislature.\(^8\) Thereafter, the elections of Associate Judges and of some important state officers were conducted without regard to "party principles," and both the Secretary of State and the Keeper of the state Penitentiary were re-elected even though they had become Jacksonians.\(^9\) Their party fellows immediately claimed this as a political triumph, to the great annoyance of their opponents. One representative from the Western Reserve retorted, with some wishful thinking, that these appointments were "no more a test of politics than the election of President Bolivar - No one here [in Columbus] thought of it - If it were a test in this State 'whom do you support for President' Jackson could not have a Constable."\(^10\)

The real menace of the Jacksonian challenge was revealed by the creation of a state organization during these months. Steubenville Jacksonians, jealous of Cincinnati's assumption of leadership, demanded that an official state authority be created, and the Cincinnati Jacksonians agreed that a state convention should meet on the anniversary of the Battle of New Orleans. During the last months of 1827 at least thirty counties held conventions to appoint delegates, and on January 8th, 1828, 160 delegates representing 54 counties assembled in Columbus. There they adopted an Electoral ticket, drew up an address and established a committee of thirty-two to act as a committee of observation and vigilance throughout the state.\(^11\) Much of the real thrust behind this body, however, continued to come from the Hamilton County committee. For example, Ohio's representation at the great celebration in New Orleans on January 8th, 1828, was organized from

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10. Lucius V. Bierce to Whittlesey, Ravenna, 17 Feb. 1828, EWP.

11. The Proceedings and Address of the Ohio Jackson Convention, assembled at Columbus, on the Eighth of January, 1828 (Columbus, 1828). See also Webster, "Democratic Party Organization," 20-25.
Cincinnati; and when an Electoral candidate withdrew in October, his replacement was named not by the whole state committee but by that portion of it resident in Cincinnati.12

The Jacksonians were particularly eager to extend the circulation of the party's newspapers. In some counties they managed to establish new presses of their own from scratch, like the Ohio Sun, founded in 1828 in Clermont County by the young Sam Medary. In others, they benefited when editors changed sides, as did David Smith of the Columbus Ohio Monitor in the fall of 1827.13 In some instances, it was the offer of private financial assistance which persuaded editors of Jackson's overriding claims to the highest office. For example, Joseph Clingman, as editor of the Wooster Spectator in 1824-25, had not objected to Adams' elevation by the House election, but changed his tune when appointed editor of the new Wooster Republican Advocate in 1826; as a local rival said, the editor "never supported Jackson, until employed to do so."14 The turncoat Amos Holton's Chillicothe print was almost certainly kept afloat by the infusion of capital raised by the party - which may have come, as the Adams men claimed, from the notorious $50,000 fund wielded in Washington by Jackson's friend John Eaton, but more probably from a levy on wealthy local Jacksonians. By such means the party had acquired or established eighteen newspapers by the time of the final campaign, in addition to the half-dozen or so inherited from 1824.15

This extension of the Jacksonian propaganda machine was made even more


13. St. Clairsville Gazette, 12 July 1828; Columbus Ohio Monitor, 3 Nov. 1827.


effective by the free distribution of leading party newspapers in areas
normally deprived of the Word. Sometimes the papers were sent to known
sympathizers, and for this reason organizers like Hayward carefully collected
the names of possible contacts in unenlightened counties and townships.
Frequently the newspapers were sent to postmasters, especially those of
Jacksonian sympathies, for free distribution. Congressman James Findlay
was said to have sent bundles of the United States Telegraph under his
franking privilege to nearly every post office from the Lake to the Indiana
line; while large packets of the Cincinnati National Republican and
Cincinnati Advertiser were "sent weekly to the seats of justice of those
counties in which no 'combination' press has been set up, and distributed
gratis by the understrappers of the faction" - in Indiana as well as in Ohio.¹⁶
The Western Reserve, too, was bombarded with newspapers sent from Washington
under frank: according to the Cleveland Herald just before the election,
400 copies of the "Tell-lie-graph" were lying uncalled for in the Cleveland
post office.¹⁷ In Hamilton County a township meeting resolved that all the
Jackson papers taken in the county should be saved, collected, and then sent
up to the Western Reserve to satisfy the starving proto-Jacksonians of that
area. Finally, in spite of fears that a Jackson press would never be
commercially viable on the Reserve, attempts were made to set one up in
Ravenna or Cleveland; and at last, in July 1828, David McLain began
publication of the Independent Newsletter in Cleveland - where it did survive,
though in August 1830 the editor was to move his press to Warren, in the
Trumbull, the most Jacksonian of Western Reserve counties.¹⁸

These initiatives were part of a major Jacksonian effort in 1828 to stimulate
activity in the more laggardly counties. A young lawyer was sent from

¹⁶. Cincinnati Western Tiller, quoted in Scioto Gazette, 31 May 1827;
Cincinnati Gazette, 11 June 1828.
¹⁸. Darius Lyman to Whittlesey, Ravenna, 5 Jan. 1828, EWP; Cincinnati
Advertiser, 30 Apr., 6 Aug. 1828; Cleveland Herald, 11 Jan., 25 July,
1828; Ohio State Bulletin, 1 Sept. 1830.
Cincinnati to aid Robert Lucas (of Pike County) in the work of creating a party in the lower Scioto Valley; what they lacked in numbers was "made up in noise and bustle." 19 Even in the most inhospitable places, meetings were arranged, however small and unrepresentative, to counter the assumption that Ohio was safe Administration territory, and to persuade hidden Jacksonians in unpenetrated or uncanvassed areas to come out and vote. 20

In many counties township committees of vigilance were established to canvass Jacksonian voters. As Harry L. Watson has written, 21 such committees were important in linking the feelings and interests of local voters to questions of national importance. In some cases, however, the committees had other functions: occasionally one suspects they were designed to impress people in other parts of the state, for many of them were of quite unwieldy size; in Belmont County the vigilance committees for thirteen townships had over 2,050 members, while in Smith township every known Jackson man was placed on the vigilance committee. 22 Membership of the committees was not always a privilege, since the members were expected to make contributions to the party coffers to pay for incidental expenses, most notably the printing of tickets. In Franklin County the committees even endeavoured to arrange "a gratuitous circulation" of party newspapers "among the destitute." Finally, these committees were expected "to visit every Jacksonian voter... and solicit his attendance at the polls." They then had to attend the polls themselves and distribute tickets accurately naming the candidates nominated by the party. 23

In these circumstances, it became impossible in 1828 to isolate local politics from the great national question. Both sides recognised that the result of the October election could have a decisive effect on the Presidential contest, both inside Ohio and outside. A leading Jacksonian in northern Ohio urged a party leader in Wayne County to prevent a local dispute from injuring the party's unity:

for God sake dont suffer that division to opperate as to the State election there is to much at stake. The Senator in Congress must be looke[d] to .... It is not a local question but one in which the whole State & the whole Country have a great interest in & have not a right to expect a sacrifice of local mater.24

In many counties, for example like Muskingum, nominations for the General Assembly were at first made privately and informally, but gradually party organizations indicated their preferred candidate. The main exception to this rule was the Western Reserve, where the comparative unity of opinion made it ridiculous for Jacksonians to compete. In most counties, the choice of representatives was made, as in Franklin, "in a great measure, by party considerations"; and within two weeks of the state election, newspapers were printing detailed lists showing the party identity of each legislator and a majority of four in each house for the Administration.25 Similarly, the gubernatorial election for the first time became a partisan contest, since Governor Trimble had shown during the last Assembly where his loyalties lay and the Jacksonians had announced a candidate to depose him. In this first statewide partisan contest, turnout reached a new record level, with over 66 per cent of adult white males voting; and Trimble narrowly secured his re-election with 50.9 per cent of the 106,033 votes cast, out of which all but 112 went to the two party candidates.26 Trimble's victory was later

ascribed to the support of Jacksonians in northern Ohio, where party considerations had not yet entered state elections and Trimble had long been personally popular.27

The turnout in the 1828 gubernatorial election may well have reflected the much more critical elections for Congress held at the same time. As the St. Clairsville Gazette said, a good Jacksonian could scarcely vote for Jackson as President and for a Congressman who would oppose him.28 Charles Hammond had recognized that this logic almost certainly doomed three Congressmen who had capably supported the Administration but represented districts with large Pennsylvania-Dutch or Scotch Irish constituencies29: the knell for Wright and Sloane had been sounded in the eastern districts in 1826, and even Beecher's personal popularity in Fairfield and Perry was unlikely to withstand the growing Jacksonian assault. In fact, the Jacksonians won not only these three seats but two more - one in southwestern Ohio, the other on the eastern fringe - and held all their existing seats. Not only did this give them a majority of Ohio's seats in the House of Representatives, 8-6, but a rapid sum revealed that the majorities for the Jackson candidates over the state as a whole were greater than those for Administration men.30

In fact, although 25,071 more men later voted for President than had for Governor (62.41 per cent of them for Jackson), the votes for Congressmen correlate closely not only with those for Governor - except on the Western Reserve - but even more closely with those for President. While Jackson's charisma and the excitement of the Presidential contest drew extra voters to the poll, the most important feature of 1828 - the huge increase in the

27. Biographical Sketches; With Other Literary Remains of the Late John W. Campbell, Compiled by his Widow (Columbus, 1838), 7-8.
29. Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 16 Dec. 1827, CHP.
Jacksonian vote - was revealed earlier in October as a vote for the party and its candidates.

This triumph of Jacksonian partisanship was made even clearer in the years immediately following 1828. The General Assembly of 1828-29, elected at a time of "high party excitement," was thoroughly aware of its partisan complexion. At the start of the session, the Jacksonians apparently tried to draw the line of party and throw out the old officers, but they were defeated and the Adams men elected the Speakers. As the Painesville Geauga Gazette reported, "the lines are distinctly drawn at Columbus, and probably all important appointments made during the session will be made upon party grounds." Sure enough, in the election of a United States Senator to replace Harrison, appointed by Adams as minister to Colombia, the Jacksonians tried initially to filibuster by withdrawing and preventing a quorum. Finally they decided to attend, having "unanimously agreed to support as their candidate John W. Campbell" and to "adhere to him undeviatingly." The Adams men were at first divided as to their candidate, but, like the Jacksonians recognizing that the next Senator should come from western Ohio, they chose Jacob Burnet as their candidate - and elected him, 56-50. All the Jacksonians voted for Campbell, and only two Adams votes were thrown away on other candidates, though fourteen members abstained.

This was the first Senatorial election in Ohio fought strictly on national party lines. By the end of the session, however, most commentators acknowledged that party feeling had not dominated proceedings: "however much we may differ as to men, we are all nearly of the same opinion with regard to measures." As the Ohio State Journal said, quite accurately,


Those [questions] of a purely legislative character, appear to have been decided solely on their own merits, without any reference to the political predilections of the members with whom they had originated; and although it must be acknowledged that party motives influenced two or three of the elections, which have taken place during the session, yet nearly, if not quite as much feeling has been displayed, on similar occasions, when personal considerations alone were involved in the issue. 33

Outside the Assembly, however, the Jacksonians determined to take the party battle once more into the local elections. They produced a "blacklist" of Assemblymen from Jacksonian counties who had voted for Burnet as Senator, and refused to be appeased when a letter of Burnet's was widely published saying that he would not oppose the new President, his appointments or his measures, as long as Jackson supported the American System. 34 During the summer, at the session of the federal Court in Columbus, "a little knot of Jacksonians from different parts of the state" held a caucus which called on the various counties to hold conventions to nominate good Jacksonians for the General Assembly. Reinforced by circulars issued from Cincinnati, these partisans argued that the Adams-Clay men's opposition to the new administration could be thwarted only by maintaining or reviving the organization of the party in the fall elections. 35 As a consequence, the Jacksonians in many counties (though not all) nominated a party ticket and remobilized their political machine, while their opponents made only half-hearted efforts - with the predictable consequence that the Jacksonians at last, in 1829, won control of the Ohio General Assembly. "Ohio," said the Cleveland Herald, "unless her Legislature sets an example of moderation, will soon become as politically abandoned as New York is, and we point to her as

33. Ohio State Journal, 19 Feb. 1829. See also Painesville Geauga Gazette, 3 Mar. 1829; Columbus Ohio Monitor, 11 Feb. 1829. The Assembly journals confirm this general judgement.

34. Ohio Monitor, 7 Jan. 1829; Cincinnati Advertiser, 7 Jan. 1829; Burnet to Silliman, Washington, 30 Dec. 1828, VFM 289, OHS, which was widely reprinted.

an awful example of prostituted political honor and honesty."  

Yet the triumph of partisanship by this stage must not be exaggerated. Some counties which had seen partisan struggles the previous year now reverted to the more common pattern of multiple candidates, personal appeals and local interests. On the Western Reserve in particular, party lines were "scarcely drawn at all" and, as in Medina County, "a candidate trusted for his election far more to his personal popularity than to the allegiance of his party adherents."  

The Jacksonians failed to destroy all the "black-list" Assemblymen who had voted for Burnet, even in counties with overwhelming Jacksonian majorities, and many established representatives who were Adams-Clay men managed to retain their seats. In the operations of the 1829-30 Assembly, party considerations were not predominant: even elections to office did not commonly follow strict party lines, while resolutions approving Jackson's first annual message did not pass. Above all, issues internal to the state were still not perceived as relevant to the party conflict, nor did voting in the Assembly on such issues follow party lines. Even though attitudes to the Presidential contest had entered into all kinds of elections in Ohio by 1828, the day was still a decade distant when alignments on national and state questions would coincide precisely.

A Comparable Response

No-one can deny that the Jacksonians worked hard for their victory in Ohio in 1828. The Ohio State Journal thought that perhaps the main reason


37. [W.H. Perrin, J.H. Battle & W.A. Goodspeed], History of Medina County and Ohio (Chicago, 1881), 230-31. See also Cleveland Herald (Annals, XIV) and Lorain Gazette for 1831.

38. Ohio State Journal, 9, 16 Dec. 1829, 30 Jan. 1830; Ohio State Bulletin, 1, 15 Feb. 1830. These generalizations are based also on a study of the journals of both houses.
for Jackson's success lay in "the extraordinary exertions of his partizans." Another commentator believed that the Jacksonians had found their prospects for 1828 so bleak that only the most desperate measures stood a chance - and then discovered, to their amazement, that their desperate energy had secured victory. Yet it is a mistake to concentrate solely upon the partisan efforts of the Jacksonians, or to presume that they alone were responsible for the newly growing dominance of partisan modes and considerations in Ohio politics. As Richard P. McCormick pointed out, political techniques tend to be common to both parties at any particular stage in the history of the American party system. In 1827-28 the Administration forces may have lagged behind the Jacksonians, they may not have shown the same initiative, and they may have lacked the desperate energy of the Jacksonians; but, even so, they organized themselves efficiently enough to ensure that Jacksonian superiority in this respect was of no more than marginal advantage.

On the whole, the Adams-Clay men had a less formidable opponent to compete against than historians have assumed. For example, we are often told that by 1828 the Jacksonians had increased their press support in Ohio from five to twenty-three newspapers. Yet, according to contemporaries on both sides, there were seventy political newspapers in 1828, divided in a proportion of five to two in favour of Adams; while in 1830, when the Jacksonians achieved their predominance in state politics, still only twenty-three out of seventy-nine political papers supported Jackson. What was more, the Administration press included established papers with large readerships, like the Steubenville Western Herald; at the state capital,

3. E.g., Remini, Election of Jackson, 77. The source of the figure is the letter sent by the Cincinnati committee to the Washington United States Telegraph and then widely reprinted, e.g., Hamilton Advertiser, 25 May 1828, St. Clairsville Gazette, 2 Aug. 1828.
the Adams Ohio State Journal had six times the circulation of the Jacksonian Ohio Monitor.\(^4\) Only in a few instances did the Jacksonians control papers with large circulations like the Zanesville Muskingum Messenger and the Cincinnati National Republican.

Similarly, historians have tended to describe some supremely well organized constituency, notably Hamilton County, and assume it was typical not only of all Ohio's counties but of most of the United States!\(^5\) In part, they have exaggerated the thoroughness of Jacksonian party organization because they have taken the claims of Caleb Atwater seriously. Atwater constantly emphasized to Jackson and the Nashville committee how thoroughly he was organizing Ohio - just as he emphasized to Ohioans that he possessed the confidence of both Jackson and Clinton. But Atwater was, frankly, a liar, or at least a wishful thinker. Within Ohio his influence did not match that of the Cincinnati committee; on his home ground, in the Scioto Valley, he was commonly mocked, and he failed to get himself elected to office in Pickaway County, where he lived.\(^6\) His letters to Jackson and his advisers may suggest that he stood high in the councils of the party, but he was never entirely trusted and his general standing was destroyed when he was inculpated as the author of malicious letters designed to ruin John McLean.\(^7\) Both in Ohio and among the national party leaders he came to be regarded as a

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4. Ohio People's Press, quoted in Marietta Pilot, 14 June 1828; Columbus Ohio State Bulletin, 14 Apr., 28 July 1830; Cleveland Herald, 14 Jan. 1830.


7. On Atwater's unreliability, see Duff Green to Moses Dawson, 24 Sept. 1827, quoted in Charles Reemelin, "Reminiscences of Moses Dawson," The Cincinnati Commercial, 18 Dec. 1869. For the McLean incident, see F.P. Weisenburger, "Caleb Atwater, Pioneer Politician and Historian," OHQ, LXVIII (1959), 25-26, as well as the McLean and Jackson Papers, LC.
pathological liar. When a national leader wrote "If he [Atwater] is to be believed, he corresponds with every great man in the nation," he was describing not the range of Atwater's influence, but the extravagance of his imagination. 8 His unreliability was finally demonstrated when he apparently deserted the party early in 1828; one Adams man groaned that Atwater's desertion of Jackson was a valuable gain to the Jacksonians. 9 Atwater may subsequently have worked strenuously for Jackson's victory, but personal enmities made him work also for the Administration candidate for Governor. 10 This is the man whom one leading historian credits as responsible for building a popular following and creating a majority in Ohio -- and whose claims for the thoroughness of party organization have too often been believed. 11

But the most important reason for not exaggerating the importance of the contribution made by organization to the Jacksonian victory is simply that the Adams and Clay men themselves adopted a similar system of organization. Initially, it is true, they had strong reservations about the virtue of party action. They believed that they were loyal supporters of a sound and sensible Republican government, and that opposition to the existing government (outside the South) was unreasonable and unthinking, and could be explained only in terms of arrant self-seeking. Organized partisan opposition in these circumstances reflected a decline in morality and virtue among public men, and was therefore to be condemned as potentially


9. J. Sloane to B. Tappan, Washington, 16 Feb. 1828, BTP, LC. Atwater was even reported as having "retired from the political world in disgust" at one point in 1828. B.M. Atherton to Whittlesey, New Philadelphia, 10 Mar. 1828, EWP.

10. Atwater to Trimble, Sept. 1828, in Trimble Correspondence.

fatal to the survival of republican government. "I am really fearful," wrote Hammond,

the public concerns and the public functionaries of the Union will soon set upon the same footing as in New York and Pennsylvania—presenting a continual struggle not for principles, but for men, or rather for official distinction and emolument through men—Suppose Clay and Adams prostrated who can succeed without provoking an organized opposition of disappointed men?...
The scenes now acted may always be repeated and if so, how long will our Government last? How long will it be worth preserving?

Party action was likely to have such destructive effects because commitment to a party tended to warp people's judgement. "Party", said Hammond, "sees everything through the medium of its own preferences"; "party", agreed Wright, "can so pervert the common sense of intelligent men." The abuse and vilification which the Jacksonians poured on the Administration, the lies and half-truths, slanders and innuendoes which filled their propaganda, could be explained only in terms of the perverting effect of party.

But if party was perverse, the remedy was not to avoid party action; the remedy was to adopt organizational techniques similar to those of the opposition and so ensure that the enemies of good government did not win power. As early as November 1826 Wright had argued that an Adams victory in Ohio in 1828 "will only flow from vigilance and exertion .... To ensure this the friends of admn. must be organized." He advocated setting up a central committee that would then appoint district and county committees, which would in turn establish township committees. It was undoubtedly significant that Wright had just experienced the full force of Jackson partisanship in the Congressional election of 1826; and that he and his fellow sufferer, John Sloane, were to be the most vigorous organizers, both in ideas and execution, during the Presidential campaign. Little heed,

12. Hammond to Wright, 15, 18 Apr. 1827; Wright to Hammond, 20 Apr. 1828, CHP. See also the letters of James Heaton, esp. 23 June 1826, 14 Sept. 1828, Heaton Papers.
however, was taken at Columbus during the winter session of 1826-27, and in February Hammond could still complain that Administration men lacked the spirit and energy to organize. "There is a cold formality in the conduct of their advocates - While their opponents are full of the most active and ardent zeal." In April Wright tersely commented: "they are organised - we are not - we must be." 13

Steps to improve things were soon taken in Washington. In order to establish some "concert of action," three Congressmen were named to stay behind after the adjournment of Congress: Webster, J.S. Johnston of Louisiana, and Wright of Ohio. They arranged improvements in the Washington press, considered steps to raise money, and debated the calling of "a grand meeting of Wool growing delegates in west Penna to resolve stoutly" - which resulted in the Harrisburgh Convention of 1827. 14 Wright himself was responsible for drawing up, printing and circulating an impressive list of the leading friends of the Administration through whom communications might safely be carried on, including a large number of what the opposition called "Political Task Masters for Ohio." 15

The example of the nation's capital was soon followed in Columbus. In July 1827 the federal court drew together many lawyers and prominent politicians, not least Henry Clay and most of the Ohio Congressmen. In practice, however, little was achieved, beyond appointing a delegation to attend the Harrisburgh Convention. 16 Although some county meetings had been organized in the summer, 17

13. Wright to Hammond, 19 Nov. 1826, 3 Apr. 1827; Hammond to Wright, 2 Feb. 1827, CHP. See also Sloane to Hammond, 13 Feb. 1829, ibid., and St. Clairsville Gazette, 29 Nov. 1828.
15. St. Clairsville Gazette, 12 July 1827.
16. W.K. Bond to Whittlesey, Columbus, 22 July 1827, EWP.
the party still lacked thorough organization such as the Jacksonians were beginning to develop. The Adams men obviously felt that, as the established majority party in Ohio, they did not need to display the organizational vigour of their opponents. Only when Jacksonian gains in the fall elections of 1827 demonstrated their vulnerability did they begin to worry about the "want of organization" that Clay observed in Ohio. 18

On too many occasions, in those elections of 1827, the Adams party failed to concentrate its votes on a single candidate. In Hamilton County the friends of the Administration decided against offering a party ticket, on the grounds partly that members of the party would not easily submit to discipline. In many other counties, several Administration candidates stood for the same office, while a minority of Jacksonians concentrated on one candidate and gained the plurality. Thus the gains which the Jackson party made in elections to the General Assembly in 1827 could reasonably be ascribed as proceeding more from "petty strifes at home than from attachment to the chief or his adherents." 19

This failure to co-ordinate party efforts was venial in local elections, since many people in 1827 still doubted whether divisions on the Presidential question had any relevance to local politics. In Congressional elections the relevance was obvious, yet even here the Adams men had failed to overcome rival personal ambitions and concentrate their efforts. Two of the three Jacksonian victories of 1826, those of William Russell in Campbell's old district and of William Wilson in the Columbus district, were achieved on minority votes, with the Adams men dividing their votes among two or more candidates. Again in 1827, when a Congressman had to be elected to fill the vacancy created by Wilson's death, the successful Jackson man, William Stanbery, won with only

18. Clay to Webster, 8 Nov. 1827, Papers of Daniel Webster: Correspondence, II, 253.
43 percent of the vote. As Congressman Whittlesey warned, "If it had not been for the bickering among our friends, the administration candidates would have been elected in Russel's and Stansberry's district." 20

The lesson was quickly learned. As a meeting of Adams men in Columbus publicly acknowledged,

The friends of the "American System," and of the existing Administration, relying on the goodness of their cause, as well as on their superior numbers, have hitherto remained inactive; while their opponents have been engaged, for upwards of twelve months, in mustering and organizing their forces, and making up for their numerical deficiency, by the adoption of the most exact party discipline. It is owing to this circumstance, that they have been enabled, at the last election, to return some of their candidates to the Assembly, even in counties where a decided majority of the voters are friends of the Administration.

These Jacksonian advances, reported Hammond to Clay, "are not sufficient to indicate serious danger, but are of a character to impress upon us the necessity of activity. We have accordingly taken measures to discipline and organize our friends for action." 21

Galvanized into action, the Adams-Clay men knew what sort of organization was needed. The Scioto Gazette praised "the excellence" of the enemy's "system," and recommended its political friends to adopt it. The Ohio State Journal pointed out that the Jacksonians were "actively engaged in concentrating their strength, for the approaching campaign," according to a simple plan:

every county should hold a general meeting, and ... committees of vigilance should be appointed in each township, to stir up the lukewarm, and strengthen the wavering in the cause of General Jackson.... We must act in concert, or all will be lost. We see no better mode of uniting our strength, than what the Jackson party - fertile in plans - have pointed out to us. 22

Adams leaders in both Columbus and Cincinnati decided that the key step was

20. Whittlesey to Giddings, Canfield, 21 July 1828, Giddings Papers. See also Cleveland Herald, 31 Mar., 16 June 1826, in Annals, IX, 48, 49; Scioto Gazette, 2 Nov. 1826; Hammond to Clay, Cincinnati, 27 Sept. 1826, Clay Papers, V, 723; Zanesville Ohio Republican, 10 Nov. 1827.


to call a state convention for December 28th, made up of delegates elected by publicly advertised county meetings. This convention in due course unanimously agreed on an Electoral ticket, established a powerful central committee to oversee the campaign, and ordered 10,000 copies of its Address to be printed and distributed. Two years later the Ohio State Journal looked back to this moment as the beginning — for both sides — of "party organization" in the state. 23

The spirit of partisanship lying behind this establishment of a state political organization independent of the legislature had already manifested itself in the willingness of the Adams men to introduce national party lines into the local elections. It is just not true to say that they feared to do so, or to claim that such extension of party action resulted solely from Jacksonian initiative. In October 1827, in several counties where the Administration was strong, individual candidates for the legislature were opposed because they were Jacksonians — and opposed by a single, ear-marked Administration candidate. In Washington County, for example, the Jacksonians tried to run as a nonpartisan candidate for the Assembly a man who had been a Jackson Electoral candidate in 1824; the Adams men opposed him on partisan grounds, and the vote for that office (though not for state senator) turned on the Presidential question. 24 Similarly, in Ross County the Adams men accused one candidate for the Ohio House of having deserted to the Jackson camp, and asked every candidate to declare his partisan affiliations; then, over Jacksonian protests, they turned the election into a test of party strength, and so "completely foiled" the Jackson men. 25 Indeed, the


Administration men were even willing to introduce party considerations into township elections, when they believed that a demonstration of partisan strength might influence opinion elsewhere. The Xenia (Greene County) township clerk was named as a Jackson Electoral candidate by the state convention in January 1828; in April the local Adams men opposed his re-election as clerk to show their partisan hostility, and defeated him, 142-49.

This ability to turn local elections into partisan contests at least as effectively as the Jacksonians was most strikingly demonstrated in April in the Cincinnati municipal elections, held under the new democratic city charter of 1827. The Jacksonian leaders, buoyed by their great success in the 1827 fall elections, decided to present "an exclusive Jackson ticket" for the council, believing victory might be "productive of a happy effect abroad." Unfortunately, as they later confessed, "by a superabundant confidence in the disposable strength of our party, we have beaten ourselves - by drawing the cord too tight, we have fractured its threads and broken our hold." The Administration men organized vigorously, agreeing to make the election a "party test," except in the election of constables and fence-viewers; and they campaigned strenuously in a contest which ignored local issues, city policy, the personal fitness of candidates - everything except their party label. Even so, a minority of Jacksonians apparently refused to vote against the incumbent trustees (or councilmen), who they thought were pursuing sensible municipal policies. It was claimed some thirty or forty Jacksonians in each ward voted against their party; more certainly, the numbers voting fell, with the Jacksonian vote suffering much more than their opponents'. The Administration men carried four of the five wards, and immediately dismissed every Jacksonian who held office under the council.


Just as they had little compunction about adopting a "spoils system" when it suited them at the local level, so the Adams men wished to exploit their command of the machinery of national government. In particular, they looked toward the Post Office, which not only commanded more federal jobs than any other department, but provided a network of communication reaching every small town and many villages across state and nation. Since mail had to be collected from the post office by the recipient, a cooperative and energetic postmaster could greatly facilitate the distribution and circulation of political letters, Congressional documents, newspapers and pamphlets favourable to his own party; and he could provide the nucleus of party organization especially invaluable in areas where his party was weak. Adams men, however, did not monopolize the post offices, simply because many postmasters had been appointed long before the nation began to divide between Adams and Jackson, and the Postmaster-General took no steps to remove postmasters who actively worked against the Administration. As Postmaster-General, John McLean insisted to his friends in Ohio that executive officers who wielded great powers of patronage ought not to try to influence elections, though many strongly suspected that he was privately devoted to the interests of Calhoun, Jackson's Vice-Presidential running-mate. 28 By the summer of 1827, Administration politicians complained that McLean's policy went beyond neutrality: John Bailhache claimed that Post Office printing was given to rival, Jacksonian newspapers rather than to his Ohio State Journal, while Hammond reported from Cincinnati that

The Heroites derive a vast advantage from their control of the Post office in this City. Nothing would embarrass their movements in this State & Indiana so much as an

administration Post Master in Cincinnati.... My impression is he [Postmaster William Burke] is now a defaulter, and I should not be Surprised were McLean to remove him and Substitute another Jacksonian the present chief clerk.29

Already Ohio Adams men, including Hammond, Sloane, Beecher and the influential Joseph Vance, were secretly pressing for McLean's dismissal, but without success.30 By 1828 McLean was not merely defending Jacksonian postmasters, but occasionally appointing Jacksonians to post offices over the objections of local people. Incensed by his "treachery and duplicity," Clay repeated the request that Adams dismiss McLean, but the President considered such a step fraught with difficulties: McLean retained much political influence and had many friends, especially among supporters of the Administration in his old Congressional district in southwestern Ohio; and he never alienated those friends by openly siding with the opposition. Joseph Vance claimed later that Adams' refusal to take the advice of his senior Western friends was fatal: had McLean been dismissed eighteen months before, the result of the election, Vance thought, would have been entirely different.31

If so, greater partisan control of the Post Office would have been more important for blocking the distribution of Jacksonian propaganda than for facilitating the circulation of Administration materials, for the Adams men did almost everything that was necessary to spread their message far and wide. Certainly they recognised that somehow money had to be raised to finance their propaganda campaign. Some assistance may have been forthcoming from funds Daniel Webster managed to raise in New England, but, in general,


Adams men had to dip their hands into their own pockets. Delegates to the 1827 state convention voted to contribute to the cost of printing the proceedings and the Address of the convention, and prominent supporters were generally expected to subscribe to party publications, even those produced at a distance. In the early months of 1828 the national leadership decided to establish a newspaper at Washington capable of combatting "the abominable falsehoods" of the United States Telegraph in a way that the more dignified and semi-official Washington papers could not. To help sustain it, an Ohio Congressman wrote to an influential acquaintance on the Western Reserve for assistance:

"We the People", a singular title to be sure, will be a partisan paper and altho it may not be needed to combat the influence of the Telegraph with you, it is elsewhere, but this cannot be done without an adequate support is given. As the tax will be light (vastly more so, than what I am paying, having long since been put on the expenditures of a state of War) I hope you will furnish in your village six subscribers to whom ten Dollars will furnish more original matter than is published in any other paper. Our friends at Warren sent to me a list of 22 subscribers, and the money, for one years subscription. It is in vain for us to get along and accomplish any thing without incurring some expense. We must use means ....

Though this venture had only limited impact, the Adams men in Ohio were determined to exploit their superior press resources to carry their message to as many voters as possible. They extended their newspaper coverage of the state, creating new papers in the few areas where they lacked support - as, for example, in 1827 in centres of Jacksonism like Brown and Columbiana Counties. In Butler County the one well established and well patronized


33. Whittlesey to Peter Hitchcock, Washington, 2 Mar. 1828, PHFP. A postscript announced that the first number of We The People had appeared.

34. Scioto Gazette, 28 June, 12 July 1827.
print was run by the Jacksonian James B. Camron; in October 1827 it came out in an improved and larger form as The Western Telegraph and Hamilton Advertiser. In August 1828 the local Congressman, John Woods, eager to promote his own re-election and that of Adams, brought out a rival paper, nominally under the ownership of the printer Edward Schaeffer. This new paper, the Hamilton Intelligencer, found its hardcore clientele among Adams men who transferred their subscriptions to it from the Advertiser.  

Even more significant was the commencement of Adams papers in the German language. Edward Schaeffer had begun a German paper in Canton in 1826, the Westliche Beobachter und Stark und Wayne County Anzeiger; he then moved to Germantown, Montgomery County, and in 1827 began Die National Zeitung der Deutschen.  In another centre of Jacksonism, Fairfield County, the two editors who in 1826 had begun the pro-Adams Lancaster Gazette brought out the Lancaster Ohio Wochenschrift on behalf of the Administration in the spring of 1828.  

However, it was not enough merely to be supported by many more presses than the Jacksonians; as David Hackett Fischer has argued, what really matters may be how many of them were "high-toned," enthusiastic and vociferous in the cause.  The Jackson newspapers tended to stimulate popular interest by making outrageous statements, stretching the truth, slandering personalities, and hitting the Administration with any weapon their scurrilous minds could

35. Alta H. Heiser, Hamilton In The Making (Oxford, O., 1941), 284-86.  
38. Fischer, Revolution of American Conservatism, 130.
dream up. Most Administration presses, on the other hand, retained a sense of propriety and decency, a respect for the truth, and a reluctance to sling mud; they were, at least initially, reluctant to indulge in severe and cutting personal attacks on Jackson. Sloane and Hammond from the start believed that this course was fatal because it gave Jacksonian propaganda a great unchallenged opportunity to make converts among the populace. By the spring of 1827 they believed a frontal attack should be made on Jackson personally. Wrote Congressman Sloane:

To the cowardice of our friends touching every thing relating to Jackson ... in a great measure we may attribute the force he is now possessed of in Ohio. When the fever first commenced here [in Wayne county] a vigourous course would have prostrated it in a few months whereas by a pitiful conciliatory course it is now in this county all powerfull.... Jackson is their centre and if we succeed it must be by a grand effort against their strongest point. ... there is nothing to be expected from sustaining principles and measures unconnected with a demonstration of Jackson's deformity .... The Jackson faction tell them [the people] all is wrong in government they will if let alone believe it. We may labour in vain to soothe them by telling them all is well ..., it will avail nothing. The assailants must in their turn be assailed. It must be shown that they are unprincipled and that power is all that is sought for by them.... I am from this time forward for using the knife.

Sloane's attitude received support in Washington, and, as part of the general invigoration of the party's organization in March 1827, Hammond received positive encouragement to take up the attack. He was assured that any extra expense he went to in publishing "for the common good" would be reimbursed, and the cost of extra circulars attacking Jackson would be raised in Washington during the 1827-28 session; Webster and Clay even tried to supply Hammond with a new and better press. Hammond's particular contribution was his articles in his Cincinnati Gazette on Jackson's accidental adultery with Rachel Roberts. At first other papers hesitated before following this line of attack, but soon were reprinting articles of

39. Sloane to Hammond, Wooster, 20 Apr. 1827; also 4 Dec. 1826, 13 Jan. 1827, CHP.
this kind. By 1828 much of the Administration press was as enjoyably scurrilous as the Jacksonian, if never so grossly falsifying. Though some papers on each side tried to retain a dignified course, in the end the press on both sides was perversely partisan in its appeal to popular prejudice and descent to personalities.

The Administration men fully recognized that they had to appeal to the ill-informed, to the politically unaware, as well as to those who took an interest in public affairs. In March 1827 Congressman Sloane wrote to editor Hammond:

"I know [how] difficult it is to cause the feeling which exists among the better informed to be communicated to the ignorant who make zeal a substitute for everything - ... if we expect to give full effect to our efforts we must print some 100,000 tracts and circulate. The men we want to operate upon are not the readers of newspapers or if they are it is of such as singing of the Hero - It is the ignorant we must attend to and cause if possible the light to reach them and be received -

Sloane believed that the material about Jackson's adultery which Hammond was currently publishing in the Gazette was too good a weapon to waste.

"When you are through with the adultery matters," he told Hammond in April, "it may be well to publish it in a pamphlet form .... Publications in that form have a more imposing effect on the people than newspaper publications. They excite the attention of a neighbourhood and are passed from one person to another." Hammond was soon printing circulars and having them distributed, even in backwaters like Coshocton, Holmes and Tuscarawas Counties. Finally, Hammond decided to publish a special campaign journal in pamphlet form which would repeat the sordid details of Jackson's past, not only his years of adultery with Rachel but also his supposed Negro grandfather. "The intention," Hammond privately told Wright in November 1827, "is to send this work into the byways as well as the highways of the land, to circulate it

amongst those who are as yet uncommitted. You must give us some aid in your country for yourselves rather than for us." This publication was the notorious Truth's Advocate and Monthly Jackson Expositor, which was to achieve a nationwide circulation and create more bad blood among leading politicians than any other publication.  

The Administration men also circulated widely the notorious "Coffin Handbill," which in effect accused Jackson of having murdered some of his own soldiers. From Guernsey County Jacksonians reported that

The spurious Militia pamphlet and Coffin hand-bills, have been very industriously circulated there. Even pious Clergymen have been known to lend their aid in trying to produce effect, by circulating and reading the base imposition.

This handbill was even translated into German and circulated in the 'back-bone' counties, as were 2,000 copies of the German translation of the Address of the Administration state convention - the same number as the Jacksonians circulated of their Address. Eastern Ohio was flooded with broadsides, while in the Chillicothe district all sorts of news thought likely to influence the election were published "in handbills." As Hammond had told Henry Clay in November 1827, "If the press can effect any thing we are determined to do what we can in that way."  

The Adams-Clay men were almost as good at verbal communication with the voters. It is true that an older politician, like James Heaton in 1827, could deplore "the ranting taste of the nation, for the last 8 or 10 years."


42. St. Clairsville Gazette, 28 June, 13 Aug. 1828; Hammond to Wright, Columbus, 29 Dec. 1827, CHP; Webster, "Democratic Party Organization," 23-24. For a copy of the Coffin Handbill in German, which had been circulated in Wayne County, see Political Broadsides, OHS.  

He objected to seeing "a man rise (immaterial what may be his talent) at the end of a dinner table - in a waggon body - on a fence, or stump, and without text, or question legal or political, and let forth a volley of words 'hours long' . . . ." But the objection was mainly to the fact that these occasions were frequently nothing more than an exhibition of individual merit, or "egotism & vanity," with no important question, legal, political or religious, to be decided as a result of the speech. When large issues were at stake, like the future custody of the Republic, the Adams men showed little reluctance to make public speeches and hold public demonstrations. Large public dinners, with speeches and toasts, cannons and fireworks, were used perhaps even more by Administration men than by their opponents, between 1825 and 1828. Indeed, Henry Clay was often regarded as the man who had introduced this political practice into the United States from England, and he was certainly regarded as the great exponent of this form of public speaking. In 1828 he attended a great celebration in Cincinnati, and only his ill-health prevented him making similar appearances in central Ohio. Jacksonians in Ohio were certainly not superior in their use of such public occasions, nor did they hold celebrations, junketings and parades on the scale Professor Remini suggests as being typical. Even the 1828 celebration in Cincinnati of the anniversary of the battle of New Orleans was a tame affair, for the "Heroites could get up no oration - no dinner party - no ball" and managed only to fire off a six pounder which sounded like "the minute guns fired over the grave of a soldier."

44. James Heaton to McLean, Middletown, 19 Aug. 1827, Heaton Papers.
46. Benjamin Drake to John H. James, quoted in Smiths, Buckeye Titan, 390.
Moreover, the Administration men took to the stump as happily as their adversaries. Stump-speaking had been relatively unknown in Ohio in the early 1820s, when it was regarded as a peculiarity of states like Maryland and Kentucky, but was now quickly adopted. Joseph Vance, the incumbent Congressman for the extensive fourth District, chose "to speechify to the people in every county in his district," even though his election was safe. In the Scioto Valley his colleague, the conservative William Creighton, Jr., reported, on the eve of the Presidential election, that "I find stumping it, the best mode of managing our adversaries - I am now daily engaged in addressing the people." He too visited every part of his district. Indeed, the record suggests that in 1828 the Adams men were much more energetic than their opponents in this form of campaigning, though it may still have been fairly rare on the Western Reserve.47

Jacksonians responded by condemning the "electioneering" of their opponents. In eastern Ohio, they even objected to Congressmen up for re-election who travelled round like "pedling demagogues," making speeches and polluting the countryside with "coffin handbills" and other party propaganda.48 Most opposition complaints, however, were directed against the principle of office holders, whether elected or appointed, seeking to influence (or corrupt) the electoral process. Cabinet officers were accused of undertaking canvassing tours, while Clay had supposedly handed out handbills from his carriage window while travelling through Pennsylvania Dutch country; only illness prevented a similar corruption of central Ohio! Federal judges were seen as agents spreading Administration influence within their circuits - hence good reason for not kicking John McLean upstairs into the Supreme

48. St. Clairsville Gazette, 10 May, 14 June, 5 July 1828.
Court. Within Ohio some of the state judges were subsequently said to have "acted as a travelling electioneering committee" in 1828, reinforcing and even organizing local efforts to influence the electors' minds. \(^{49}\)

That Jacksonians should resort to such antipartisan rhetoric ought to come as no surprise, in spite of the claims of some recent historians. After all, Jackson's original appeal had been consciously directed in 1824 against "faction, discord and domestic divisions"; Jackson was the Hero above the pettiness of party appeals. Even in March 1827 the Jacksonians had justified their own organizational efforts on the grounds that the Administration was already taking partisan measures to secure its own re-election. \(^{50}\) Throughout the campaign Jacksonians mobilized traditional "country" ideology against officeholders who used official advantages to win support for the Administration, thus interfering in elections. Henry Clay was even criticized for travelling around making speeches on behalf of the Administration, while being paid as Secretary of State! And when the Adams men in Cincinnati sacked Jacksonian local office holders and seized their offices for their own followers, the local Jacksonians shrilly denounced such partisan unscrupulousness — while, on the other side, a former antiparty theoretician like Charles Hammond fully approved! \(^{51}\) Nor was Jacksonian criticism restricted to the exploitation of office for selfish purposes: the *St. Clairsville Gazette* condemned even the circulation of semi-official documents, "electioneering pamphlets," and the canvassing of voters. \(^{52}\) Antipartyism in its various forms was a common cultural

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50. See esp. "An Address To The People of Ohio" (Cincinnati, 1824), ...; and Circular of the Select Committee of Correspondence for Hamilton County, Cincinnati, 29 Mar. 1827, LFP.


attitude which each party expressed and appealed to as circumstances made appropriate.

After 1828, admittedly, it was the Adams-Clay men who insisted that, since the Presidential contest was decided, there was no point in maintaining party distinctions. Like Jacob Burnet, their newly elected United States Senator, they agreed to support the new President - at least for as long as he supported the American System as faithfully as his Ohio partisans had promised. Hence in 1829 they objected to the Jacksonian call for partisan nominations, which had not previously been common in local elections "except in seasons of unusual excitement," since they could not "perceive that much good is likely to result to the state from the introduction of party politics among our legislative deliberations." Like the Federalists before them, they insisted that the use of party nominating machinery in local elections was simply a device for manoeuvring aspiring office-seekers into the state legislature. However, if party lines were to be drawn, they were willing to "take the steps necessary for the prevention of the evils which may result from running more than the proper number of candidates in each county."53 When it became obvious that Jacksonian partisanship had triumphed in the election, the Adams-Clay men once more preached non-partisanship. The Cleveland Herald, for example, expressed the hope and belief that

the Legislature at its ensuing session, will have but little to do with politics or party names, notwithstanding the efforts which are making to keep up the division. We hope every member will go there with a fixed determination to give party prejudices to the winds for one session.

Indeed, it appears that "many of the friends of the late administration" long before the meeting of the Assembly "determined to permit their

political opponents to select the presiding officers of each House" - as they did - and even co-operated in the election of Elijah Hayward - of all people - to the state supreme court. This policy succeeded well in dividing the Jacksonians, who now found themselves disagreeing about the merits of their various aspirants.

The consequence was a debate within the Jacksonian party over the virtues of party action. The critical figure was Thomas L. Hamer of Brown County, an early and energetic Jacksonian, who was elected Speaker of the House unanimously in December 1829 and conducted his office with "impartiality and independence rather than a narrow partisan spirit." He appointed a majority of Jacksonians on only eight out of fifteen standing committees, and wholly disregarded political differences in appointing select committees on the many local questions before the House. Then in a party caucus called in January 1830 to decide on the party's candidates for state judgeships, he openly refused to support the choice of the majority if it fell on someone he considered professionally incompetent. He then carried the dispute into the columns of the Ohio State Bulletin, to which he wrote letters under the name 'Brutus,' arguing that the Jacksonians ought to elect good men of principle to important posts - and not violent partizans like, it was understood, Elijah Hayward. Indeed, he denounced the "whole-hog" men, who exaggerated party distinctions and made party services the sole test of merit, as "these leeches, - these vampires, - who are draining the life blood of the party." Brutus provoked many replies from other Jacksonians, who emphasized the partisan selfishness of their opponents and insisted that


55. History of Brown County, 344-45.
"The success of a party is founded in union .... It is the firm basis on which all effective party discipline is founded." Hayward's friends tried to read Hamer out of the party, though the voting for Supreme Judges showed that he was not the only Jacksonian to vote against the caucus nominees. Still two years later Hamer was justifying his conduct, insisting that state politics had nothing to do with Presidential preferences and that his adherence to the traditional standards of legislative behaviour was no contradiction of his loyalty to Jackson. Clearly, theoretical reservations about the virtues of party action were by no means limited to Adams-Clay men, and such reservations did not prevent vigorous participation in national elections.

Thus, in these critical years for the party system, both parties displayed considerable energy, adopted similar means for persuading voters, and condemned their rivals for excessive partisanship. There were not the sharp differences in their attitudes to partisan organization that some historians have seen. Yet, even so, there may have been some slight differences in the effectiveness of their organizations - differences sufficient to help explain why the increase in the number of men voting redounded so much to the advantage of the Jacksonians.

The Test of Organization

How can a historian test the effectiveness of party organization in a distant election? Is he not in danger of assuming that the party which won must, ipso facto, have been the better organized? Remember the words of Robert Kennedy, organizer of victory in 1960: "If you win, the reporters will always

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57. T.L. Hamer's address, Sept. 1832, in Georgetown Castigator, 2 Oct. 1832, which is useful for the whole of this paragraph and for explaining the conventions and modes of procedure in the General Assembly.
write about well-oiled machines and super-planning. If you lose, they will always write about hopeless incompetence."¹ One way might be to compare the organization of the parties in the areas in which the Jacksonians are commonly said to have made decisive innovations - namely, the use of district conventions to concentrate votes on a single Congressional candidate, and of township committees to bring out the vote in all kinds of elections.² Another way would be to consider how effectively the two parties brought out their vote, in so far as we can judge from the election returns. But, in the last resort, we may wonder whether organization, in itself, can explain the Jacksonian surge.

Ever since the districting of the state in 1812, Congressional elections had provided a difficult problem for Ohio's party organizers. Strong county feeling had made it difficult for politicians to agree on a single party candidate, and such elections had traditionally been marked by regional and personal animosities. District conventions provided a means of overcoming such rivalries and making clear who was the official nominee of the party. The Jacksonians were not the first to recognise the advantage of the device, which had been adopted by the Democratic Republicans as early as 1812. Moreover, they did not use the convention in every district, even in 1828; according to the Jackson press in St. Clairsville, only six of the fourteen Jacksonian candidates were nominated by conventions.³ And in one district the Jacksonians virtually failed to agree on a candidate.

The Twelfth Congressional district, lying in German and Scotch Irish country immediately south of the Western Reserve, had given Jackson over 56


percent of its vote in 1824. Here, in 1826, the Jacksonians had launched their bitter onslaught on the incumbent, John Sloane, but failed narrowly to oust him. A faction of Jackson men in Columbiana County ascribed the defeat to the failings of the candidate, General John Thompson, an Irishman who had many personal enemies and whose honesty in financial matters some suspected. As early as October 1827, these politicians pressed the claims of their own favourite, Dr. George McCook, who was widely known through his medical practice, well connected in the "Seceders" church, had few personal enemies - and, incidentally, fathered the "Fighting McCooks" of Civil War fame. Since McCook's friends recognized that their own county would remain divided between the two men, they had to find some means of showing that their candidate was the more likely to carry the district. As Stark county had no Jackson committee, they could appeal only to the Wayne County Jacksonians. Leaders in Wayne were, for a time, attracted to the idea of putting forward a candidate of their own to break the deadlock, but decided against. No convention was called, perhaps because neither Columbiana faction was willing to risk an adverse decision; and things continued "at heads and points" right up to the eve of the election. McCook's nomination as senatorial Elector by the state convention may have been intended to buy him off, but, in any case, he refused the honour. Only at the last moment did a group of Wayne politicians declare that "republicans" should unite behind Thompson as "the most prominent candidate"; only at the eleventh hour did McCook's friends begin to fall off from him and support Thompson. It was this last-minute sense of the need for party unity rather than the adoption of a sound organizational technique for choosing generally acceptable candidates that enabled Thompson, at long last, to beat

4. Letters to various Wayne County Jacksonians from Columbiana County: J.C. Willard, New Lisbon, 19 Oct. 1827; Christopher White and Benjamin Yates, Salem township, 28 Oct. 1827; Jackson committee, Fairfield township, 29 Oct. 1827; Fisher A. Blocksom, New Lisbon, 9 Nov. 1827; and John Larwill to Joseph H. Larwill, Wooster, 12 Dec. 1827, LFP, OHS.
If anything, the Administration record is better, at least in 1828. True, the Adams men did not use district conventions to the same extent as their opponents, but this was unnecessary in that a number of their candidates were incumbents who had voted for Adams in the House election and therefore had special claims on all party supporters; to oppose the nomination of such a person would amount to a vote against the legitimacy of the Adams-Clay administration. Even so, a "blacklist" Congressman like Elisha Whittlesey, who had been re-elected without opposition in 1826, took care to ensure that he would have united party support behind him in 1828; he offered, in the event of disagreements at home, to decline in favour of someone who would unite the party. He explained:

... personally I am willing to make any sacrifice, rather than to have it said, that in a district where, there are three in favor of the administration, to one against it, we have divided among ourselves, and given the opposition a chance to put up a candidate who would, in the event of running three, receive comparatively a respectable vote, and I am willing to make any sacrifice rather than to have a candidate elected by the support of the Opposition, and thereby to enable it to claim a partial victory.... To divide now, is as hazardous, as it would be for an army to mutiny in the presence of an enemy.

He therefore asked party leaders in each county to consult, and, in due course, he was nominated formally in each county. The Jacksonians then tried to persuade the Adams man who had been Whittlesey's strongest rival for the nomination to run against him in the election with their support, but the disappointed candidate refused to jeopardize this safe Administration seat.

5. Wm. F. Smur et al., "To the Republican Electors of the Twelfth Congressional District, favorable to the Election of General ANDREW JACKSON," Wayne County, October 1828 (political broadside, OHS); Whittlesey to Hitchcock, Canfield, 17 Oct. 1828, PHFP. See also J.M. Goodenow to R.T. Lytle, Steubenville, 10 Sept. 1828, Robert Todd Lytle papers, CHS.

The Adams party resorted to district conventions in two districts peculiarly marked by intense regional hostilities. In the fourteenth district, made up of the eastern section of the Western Reserve plus Richland County, the long-standing antagonism between Sandusky and Cleveland, which had been so embittered by the struggle over the canal route, made it difficult for the party to agree on a candidate. In 1824 each interest had put its leading man into the Congressional race, and thereby allowed the seat to be retained by the incumbent, Mordecai Bartley, who enjoyed the overwhelming support of Richland County, the one non-Yankee area in the district. Although Cleveland had complained that "Our interests have already suffered essentially for the want of a Representative acquainted with our wants and local situation," Bartley soon succeeded in gaining a federal appropriation for a light-house at the ambitious young Lake port. Accordingly, in 1826 he was supported as the Cleveland as well as the Richland candidate, and defeated with some ease his only opponent, Eleutheros Cooke, the perennial Sandusky candidate — and father of Jay Cooke. 7

By 1828 Bartley wished to retire and it was certain that Cleveland would insist on putting its own man in the field. The trouble was that its most prominent candidate was Reuben Wood, who, though nominally a supporter of the Administration, was "on the fence as to the Presidency in point of fact" and likely "if circumstances would permit" to become "a thorough going Heroite." As he would stand a good chance of winning, it might turn out that "the People would unwittingly elect a Jacksonian or a dough face." The only hope was for other Congressmen to persuade Bartley to run again, since he was the only sound Adams man who could unite the district. Bartley was duly

prevailed upon. Then, in order that "a unanimous support" might be "secured for a single individual," a district convention of delegates from each county was summoned to Norwalk (on Sandusky territory), and Bartley formally nominated. Wood still insisted on running, though an official Jackson candidate was also in the field; but party loyalty ensured that Wood, instead of sweeping Cuyahoga County, carried it only narrowly, even with the support of the local Jacksonians. Bartley carried the other counties by handsome majorities and so retained the seat. As one public advocate of the district convention had written, "Let the nomination of this general convention be considered the voice of the friends of the administration, and my life on it, the man of their nomination is elected." 9

Both parties were troubled by the severe sectional tensions in the Columbus district, which since its formation had been represented by a Congressman from Licking County. The other counties were resentful, but divided among themselves - especially between Franklin, so favoured as state capital, and the northwestern counties of Marion and Crawford, which had been disappointed over the canal route. These tensions, reinforced by personal ambition, prevented the Administration forces from uniting both in 1826 and in the special election of 1827, when Bill Stanbery was elected. Yet the Jacksonians were little better off, for in 1827 "more than half the Jackson men" in Franklin had ignored Stanbery's open party appeals and had preferred the local candidate who happened to be an Adams man. 10 In order to overcome difficulties of this kind, both parties called district conventions in 1828. On the Adams side, however, this proposition "met with opposition from

8. J.W. Allen to Whittlesey, Cleveland, 23 June 1828; Mordecai Bartley to Whittlesey, Mansfield, 29 July 1827 [1828], EWP.
Delaware and Marion Counties and like to have produced a scism but those Counties have upon our representation receded from their [counter-] suggestion and agreed to meet at Granville." But great care was still needed in the choice of a candidate, since if a candidate from the northern part of the district were chosen, Franklin county might "go for Stanbury or at least would produce such an appathy that the result would be the same."¹¹ The convention found a suitable compromise candidate, who was promised "the undivided support of the party by whose delegates he has been nominated."¹² The election became a straight party fight, and the Franklin County Jackson men reconciled themselves to voting for Stanbery, whose victory on this occasion owed nothing to a division among the Administration men.

This example confirms not merely the triumph of partisanship on both sides in 1828, but the fact that both sides were equally willing to use district conventions as a means of concentrating their strength. They were also equally willing to use township committees, which had, after all, been known even before 1815. In 1824 the Clay men had organized such committees, informing their members, as in Guernsey County, that

> All that is required of them is to urge the necessity of a general turnout to the polls, and an attendance there on their own part for the purpose of furnishing electors with genuine Clay tickets, and to prevent deception on the part of those who may attempt to palm spurious tickets upon the electors.¹³

Indeed, Hammond had urged Wright in 1824 to "impress upon all around you the necessity of printing and distributing tickets - especially in the counties where there is no paper, and where our friends are not very valiant." The

¹¹. R. Osborn to Ewing, Columbus, 13 May 1828, TEFP, LC.


¹³. Guernsey Times, quoted in Wolfe, Stories of Guernsey County, 111-12.
conservative William Creighton, Jr., ensured that "in the lower part of State all the Counties have been supplied with tickets, as well as a portion of the Country between the Miamis and Scioto"; and he urged his colleagues to "have active men engaged to distribute them" in advance of election day.\textsuperscript{14} How far this actually happened, it is impossible to say, but clearly organization and effort at the doorstep-level was not a new or untried technique for Administration men in 1828.

Thorough township organization for the Administration appeared at the township level in a few counties, notably Belmont, during the spring and summer of 1827. For the most part, however, it was created either at the county meetings held in the fall of that year in preparation for the state convention, or else at meetings in the following spring and early summer. In Cuyahoga County, for example, a county meeting in August 1828 chose township committees of vigilance, made up of 73 people all together, whose task it was to persuade Adams supporters to come to the polls.\textsuperscript{15} Examples might be multiplied, but we cannot know how far these township committees - on each side - existed merely on paper, and how far they took the message to the ordinary voter and persuaded him to vote. All we can do is try to assess how effectively each side managed to get out its vote.

This task was presumably relatively easy in areas where competition was close, since involvement was inevitably greater and each party's need for every vote more obvious. More difficult, however, were the areas of the state where popular sentiment overwhelmingly favoured one party or the other. All the minority could do was to circulate their campaign materials widely and persuade the isolated supporter that his vote, useless in local elections, might be crucial in the statewide contest. In this work,

\textsuperscript{14} Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 1 Oct. 1824, CHP; Creighton to Ewing, Chillicothe, 21 Oct. 1824, TEFP, LC.

Administration men "full of godly zeal in the cause," like the "useful partisan" Wilson McGowan of Coshocton, circulated handbills and pamphlets in the German counties of eastern Ohio with energy comparable to that shown by the Jacksonians on the Western Reserve. Indeed, according to one sympathetic source, it was believed by many that the Jacksonians' gubernatorial candidate in 1828 "might have been elected ... if his political friends in the northern part of the State had fully appreciated his strength in other parts of it." If so, the matter was clearly put right in the Presidential election, when the Jackson vote increased markedly on the Western Reserve.

The problem for the majority party in such one-sided areas was equally great, but perhaps easier to solve. The difficulty was that in local elections there was little inducement to vote, at least on partisan grounds, because party victory was certain. In statewide elections, however, it was essential that local unanimity be not allowed to create a false sense of confidence; the voters had to realize that they had to turn out in strength in order to offset the perversity of other areas of the state. In 1824 the Jacksonians had demonstrated that they were capable of organizing a phenomenally large turnout in the populous southwestern counties. In 1828 the Adams men knew that their hope of carrying the state depended on producing a comparably large turnout on the Western Reserve.

Throughout the campaign Administration leaders comforted themselves with the thought that the "Lion of the North, the Western Reserve," would probably carry the day; "there is only one fact that we can hope for to save the state,... a very general turn out in the right Counties within the Connecticut Reserve." The state elections in October, they believed,

16. Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 29 Oct. 1827, CHP. See also John to Joseph H. Larwill, Wooster, 16 Dec. 1827, LFP.

17. *Biographical Sketches; With Other Literary Remains of the Late John W. Campbell, Compiled by his Widow* (Columbus, 1838), 7-8.

underestimated their statewide strength because "The strong Administration Counties are so strong as to have not put forth half of their strength at the elections for County Officers." When James Wilson detected at the last moment that the tide was beginning to flow towards Jackson in southern Ohio, he wrote urgently to party organizers on the Reserve demanding that they bring out the full vote. His request, "Let not a yankee stay at home," was taken seriously by his colleagues on the spot. This, indeed, was the message which the local press and politicians had been preaching to their voters. In September John C. Wright reported that "generally through the Reserve ... there is but one side ... and they seem so warmed up as to leave room to hope they will turn out to the polls."20

After all their urgings and exertions, the Administration men were comparatively pleased with the 8,599 majority that the Reserve gave to Adams. Earlier in the year local politicians had been predicting a majority of over 10,000 and possibly up to 12,000 or even 15,000, but those estimates had assumed a smaller Jackson vote on the Reserve than was cast even in the gubernational election.21 Philemon Beecher thought that if the "right Counties" on the Reserve "give three thousand votes more than they did at the general Election," Adams would win Ohio; in fact, the Reserve as a whole gave 5,517 more votes than in October, more than 4,000 of them in counties that gave Adams over 70 per cent of their vote. These results were so satisfying that, in the few days before the final result for the whole state was known, the Cleveland Herald supposed, complacently, that "We might have 'shelled out' a few thousand more; but we turned out in our full

strength, our Administration friends down south might imagine we were frightened.\textsuperscript{22} Certainly the results were impressive from an area where local unanimity meant there was "no exciting principle": though in Cuyahoga County only 68 per cent of the eligibles voted, four of the Reserve's counties produced turnouts in the range 88.4-83.7 per cent, while three were in the 95.3-94.2 per cent range. These figures compare reasonably with those for the overwhelmingly strong Jackson counties, for in both cases the average turnout in each side's banner counties (as defined on table 8:1) was slightly less than the state average.

However, overall the turnout figures suggest that the Jackson organization was marginally the more successful in bringing out the vote. A comparison of the figures for each party's banner counties reveals a slight advantage to the Jacksonians: six of their banner counties exceeded the state average compared with three of Adams', while none slipped so low as Cuyahoga County. Similarly, of the twenty-eight counties with turnouts greater than the average for the state, twenty-one produced majorities for Jackson. On this evidence, there is some case for concluding that the Jacksonians were marginally better than the Administration men in bringing out the reluctant voter - and to this marginal difference might be ascribed Jackson's narrow majority in 1828. Certainly it is possible that so many of the new voters approved of the Jacksonians because only the Jacksonian message and only Jacksonian organizers had penetrated into the more remote localities where many of the new voters lived.

Yet while energetic organization might explain the degree of turnout in particular counties, it does not necessarily explain the balance of preference revealed by the election results. Plentiful propaganda, repeated

\textsuperscript{22} Beecher to Clay, Lancaster, 6 Nov. 1828, VFM, OHS, and Clay Papers, VII, 530; Cleveland Herald, 29 Aug., 30 Oct. 1828, in Annals, XI, 214, 231.
knocking at the door, enthusiastic canvassing, all by one party, will undoubtedly rouse the political awareness of the elector, but may merely ensure that he turns out to vote for the other party, by reminding him of what he dislikes and creating the fear that abstention may allow a vigorous but wrongheaded party to win. Thus Adams men claimed that Jacksonian propaganda simply disgusted the voters on the Western Reserve, while the St. Clairsville Gazette believed that the handbills circulated by the Administration forces in eastern Ohio, especially in German areas, were counterproductive. It is probably most accurate to say that the politicians on both sides were responsible for the extraordinary increase in voter participation, that the activity of both parties served to politicize the previous apathetic, without necessarily determining which way the new voter would decide to vote.

Indeed, once popular sentiment in a constituency was decided, party efforts by the minority were often of no avail. In some parts of the Western Reserve, Jacksonian efforts to create an organization were stymied by the lack of support, while, as a Jackson paper in Columbus remarked eighteen months after the election, "Many counties that gave heavy majorities for Jackson were without a paper friendly to his election." Most strikingly, in the second district, made up of Butler and Warren Counties in the Miami Valley just north of Cincinnati, the incumbent Congressman, John Woods, made strenuous efforts to bring home to the voters his services to them in Congress, most notably in securing lands for the extension of the Miami Canal. Besides founding a newspaper in Butler, his


own county, and securing local-government printing for it, in Warren
Woods had all the organization, activity and influence on his side.
According to one active supporter,

... there was the most measured diligence and exertions in
his favor by what was called the strong part of our county -
you may have seen that the Star paper has stopped at nothing
to support him - B.C. & A.H.D. [Benjamin Collett and Anthony
H. Dunlevy, two well-known old Republican politicians] with
all their force formerly his heaviest opponents - done every­
thing they could do for his success.

The effect of this active support and organizational effort was to make
"Woods himself ... most wonderfully deceived in his own popularity," and
right up to the election he believed "all was safe." In the event, he was
defeated "beyond all calculations, by about 50 per cent" - or 1,700 votes.25
This was scarcely surprising, given Jackson's established popularity,
especially in Woods' own county.

After the election, Adams men had little sense that they had lost Ohio,
and other states, because of a lack of effort or weaknesses of organization.
In general they congratulated themselves that they had fought hard, and had
received a vote "not...far short of our most sanguine expectations"; and
the Jacksonians acknowledged that their opponents had "disputed the ground
with us manfully, contending inch by inch."26 Not that the Adams men had
done nothing wrong: the most thoughtful of Adams leaders thought they had
made a serious mistake in allowing the Jacksonians to make the early
running. The Jackson men had undeniably been the first to recommence the
work of organization in 1826, they made great headway in reaching uncommitted
voters during 1827, and they took the lead in campaigning in the early
part of 1828 - at least in some parts of the state. In June 1828 an Adams

25. John Reeves to McLean, Lebanon, 17 Oct. 1828, McLean Papers. See also
Hamilton Western Telegraph, 31 Oct. 1828.
man in the Miami Valley said "both sides are exerting themselves, the Jacksonians are the most zealous." In July Whittlesey reported that "The opposition has done too much here [in Trumbull County] during the winter - and more than it would, if prompt, and judicious measures had been pursued." However, he added - with complete justification - "I am counteracting the movements with some success." Similarly, the Administration Congressman in the Chillicothe district - William Creighton - acknowledged that "We commenced here too late, the enemy stole a march on us and if we had not roused up about three weeks before the [October] election we should have been beaten." However effective the Administration's final efforts, they had let their opponents get their word in first. As one of Henry Clay's correspondents told him from Virginia, "the friends of the admrn was too slow & long taking their stand they let the combination be formed & the mind of the people made up is verry hard afterward to change."28

Thus the Jacksonians of Ohio had been able to confirm their hold on their supporters of 1824, and to spread a worrying interpretation of national politics among the previously unpoliticized. In doing so, they were able to link the national political contest to prejudices, fears and aspirations long established among common folk in Ohio; and it is these cultural attitudes, reinforced by recent experiences, which really explain why the appeals of energetic Jacksonian politicians met with such an enthusiastic response.

27. G.J. Houston to McLean, Dayton, 10 June 1828, McLean Papers; Whittlesey to Giddings, Canfield, 21 July 1828, Giddings Papers; Creighton to Hammond, Chillicothe, 26 Oct. 1828, CHP.

Traditionally historians have seen the election of 1828 as a turning-point in American politics - as the moment when Jeffersonian Democracy gave way to Jacksonian Democracy. Underlying this political sea-change supposedly lay significant social or at least cultural changes: power moved from the aristocracy to the people, as symbolized by the shift from caucus to convention nominations; democratic values triumphed over republican restraint, as politicians were obliged to acknowledge the will of the people; and a new breed of machine politicians arose from the ranks of the people to man the party machines which brought order to the new atomistic society. Yet in Ohio the Jeffersonian period had seen a democratic political system in operation which bore most of the features of the Jacksonian period, while it is difficult to see what fundamental social changes might have taken place by the 1820s. Historians exaggerate when they write of a "democratic revolution"; but they are not wholly wrong. "Democracy" was an issue in 1827-28 in Ohio, though not in the way usually presumed: it was a traditional cry, which the Jacksonians had an unrivalled opportunity to exploit because of the political circumstances they found themselves in; and it provided a means of appealing to discontents which had long been a feature of Ohio life.

The Will of the People

By the 1820s democracy, as a form of government under the Constitution, was not a matter of dispute in Ohio. The general presumption of politicians on both sides was that final decisions were to be made by the people, and

1. This point of view is well summarized in Heale, The Making of American Politics, 115-48, and applied to Ohio in Weisenburger, Passing of the Frontier.
that the right to vote should be widely extended among them. In fact, from the very beginnings of the state, the franchise had been virtually universal among adult white males, and the electorate had been allowed a direct say in the election of officers at every level. Since statehood, key officials like county commissioners and sheriffs had been elected, for terms of two or three years, by the people of the county they served. Admittedly, other county officials were appointed either by the legislature or the Associate Judges (themselves appointed by the legislature) or by the county commissioners. Such a procedure of indirect election was not undemocratic, though it did in some cases put the election in the hands of an assembly dominated by people from outside the county. This did not constitute a major grievance, since the legislature customarily chose local officials, especially Associate Judges, who were acceptable to the representatives of the county concerned. This respect for the wishes of local people continued until 1830, when the Jacksonians began to use these offices as spoils to reward their supporters, even in counties where the party was in a small minority. There was little evidence before then of a widespread popular demand for appointive local offices to be made elective.

However, as the structure of local government was tinkered with during the 1820s and new offices created, so almost automatically the right to select the officeholders was given to the local electorate. In the search for tighter control of government spending, the office of county auditor was created in 1820, and in 1822 his post was made elective. There was little dispute over this latter decision, though at least one representative who preferred to let the Associate Judges appoint auditors was later

criticized for his anti-republican stand. Subsequently the Assembly looked towards reducing the number of county officers as an economy measure, and decided to abolish county collectors and add their duties to those of the county treasurer. As part of this reform of 1827, county treasurers and, indeed, county assessors were made elective. These changes aroused little controversy and were generally approved; certainly there was no correlation between legislative votes on these issues and the new national party alignments. The amendment providing for popular election was introduced by a staunch Adams-Clay man of good Virginia family, "a complete and finished gentleman" whose father had been Hamilton's second in his fatal duel with Burr, Nathaniel G. Pendleton of Cincinnati. He declared roundly that:

he was opposed to all appointments by county commissioners, and county courts. No one would have the hardihood to deny the competency of the people, to make this choice. The auditor, and other officers of a similar character, are appointed by them, and why not submit the elections of county treasurer to the same legitimate mode.

The extension of local democratic control over county officers was simply not an issue in Ohio politics in 1827 or 1828.

Democratic values were perhaps less easily triumphant at the municipal level. In incorporated towns like Marietta and Chillicothe, the right to vote or hold office was often restricted, usually to freeholders and householders, sometimes by charters granted during Territorial days. Gradually such property qualifications were removed, though only slowly. The first general act for the incorporation of towns, passed in 1817, gave the suffrage in municipal elections to all adult white male inhabitants resident for

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twelve months; however, the act proved unpopular and was repealed in 1824, though not because of its suffrage provisions. Special charters continued to be granted with widely varying provisions, sometimes opening municipal offices to popular election (as, for example, in some acts of 1814 and 1815), sometimes maintaining property and tax-paying qualifications for voting and more commonly for office-holding, even in the 1820s and 30s. On the whole there was little controversy over the structure of municipal government except in odd instances like the dispute in Wooster in 1824, where candidates argued whether non-householders should vote in local elections; interestingly, on this occasion local Jacksonian leaders favoured the more restrictive franchise. Such differences, however, were never presented in terms of the new party alignments, and no partisan differences were expressed over, say, the extension of democratic control in the new Cincinnati charter of 1827.

It was because they were widely accepted, at all levels of society, and not because they were strikingly new, that democratic appeals were of such power in the late 1820s. From the start, supporters of Adams and Clay saw that the circumstances in which the Administration had come to power in 1825 gave a dangerous weapon to their opponents. "You must not be surprised," wrote Whittlesey in December 1825, "if the disaffected of all parties unite with the Jacksonites ... and assume the name of the People's party." Six months later Ruggles predicted that "one consideration ... will operate in favor of Jackson" in Ohio in 1828:

That is a fixed belief that justice was not done by the house of representatives in making the selection of President. First on the ground that he had the highest number of electoral votes, -

and second - that states which had given him a plurality over Mr. Adams voted against him. These points urged by his friends with considerable effect.\(^5\)

This claim that the Adams administration lacked true legitimacy, having been elected in defiance of the popular will, was one which its supporters struggled against mightily - and to some effect. But it was a charge that constantly embarrassed them and, almost certainly, on balance operated against them among Ohio voters.

The Jacksonians seized eagerly the opportunity presented them by the fuss over the House election. Though open charges of "bargain and corruption" disappeared from Ohio newspapers after a couple of months, they were indirectly kept before the public eye by the constitutional amendment proposed by the Tennessee legislature. The Cincinnati *National Republican* approved, insisting that Presidential elections must be placed "exclusively in the hands of the People," and "Executive patronage" restricted so as to "exclude members of Congress from any office within its gift." The Ohio Assembly, dominated by Adams-Clay men unwilling to grant respectability to Jacksonian complaints about the House election, showed "no disposition" to adopt the Tennessee proposal. But, according to Hammond, "some of our men shiver a little lest voting against it may hereafter be cast in their path when seeking to walk with the People.

Some justified their opposition on the grounds that the Constitution does not give state legislatures the right to propose amendments, but in the end the Assembly decided to replace the Tennessee proposal by one of its own. When a year later Georgia proposed an amendment similar to Tennessee's, the Ohio Assembly responded in the same way - by outdemocratizing the self-styled democrats.\(^6\) John C.

\(^5\) Whittlesey to Giddings, Washington, 24 Dec. 1825, Giddings Papers; Ruggles to John McLean, St. Clairsville, 4 July 1826, McLean Papers.

\(^6\) *National Republican*, 8 Nov. 1825; Hammond to Clay, Columbus, 4 Jan. 1826, in *Clay Papers*, V, 7; *Scioto Gazette*, 1 Mar. 1826, 1 Mar. 1827.
Wright had seen this as the way to make political capital out of Jacksonian proposals which he considered merely the "natural effusion of political tinkers warmed and excited by the Hickory fever." When the constitutional amendment was recommended in Congress by George McDuffie of South Carolina, Wright suggested to his friends that McDuffie's resolution be amended so that in future the Presidential election would be decided by a single nationwide electorate of all adult white males, the person having the highest number to be elected: "I think this would out Herod Herod, and turn the whole south against his measure, and who north of Mason & Dixon's line dare vote against such a proposition?" In the end Sloane offered this amendment, which proved very popular: "the slave folks threaten hard, & were evidently excited - the[y] insisted on a division as to the reference and we beat them all hollow." The popularity of a proposal so "very obnoxious to the south" ensured that Jacksonians would not seriously press their amendments to the Constitution, and gave Administration supporters the opportunity to turn the cry for democracy into a sectional weapon which, at least in Ohio, they used. 7

As 1826 wore on, the Jacksonians focussed their charges against the Ohio Congressmen who were on the "blacklist" for voting for Adams. The case against them was expressed most fully in a pamphlet entitled The Voice of the People, which was particularly directed against John C. Wright and John Sloane, who had defied the Jacksonism of their districts in voting for Adams. According to the anonymous author, the opposition "rests upon the basis, that the right of election, the right of instruction and the responsibility of public servants, have been disregarded, abandoned and set at nought, by

those who had the immediate agency in making Mr Adams president." He emphasized that Congressmen were little more than delegates, obliged to carry out the will of the people of their districts: "the representative is the agent of the people, responsible to them and bound to do their will at the sacrifice of his own." He foresaw the danger of "the dangerous doctrines of aristocracy and nobility insinuating themselves into our elections" if representatives were allowed to get away with their claim to know better than the people. Thus "Gen. Jackson is identified with the cause we espouse, the cause of all true republicans - vox populi vox dei - 'the supremacy of the people's will' - the right of instruction, and the obedience of the servant to the voice of his master." 8

Wright and Sloane replied on behalf of their colleagues and their party. They insisted - as their successors were to insist, at least in prospect, in 1968 - that in a House election, Congressmen were not obliged to vote for the candidate who came first in the Electoral College; otherwise, why did the Constitution refer the question to the House? In February 1825 the Representatives had performed their constitutional duty in acting as arbiters among the top three candidates; and, in doing so, they had used information not available to the voters, notably that Jackson was not reliable on internal improvements. Such arguments were, of course, out of tune with the Jacksonian argument that the only proper consideration was the popular will, as expressed at the polls. Revealingly, the "blacklist" Congressmen did not contradict that view; they simply denied that they had defied the will of the people or "the democratic republican principle." They pointed out again and again - quite accurately - that Jackson owed his lead in the Electoral College to the Electoral votes he won in states where he was not the most popular candidate - in states using a district system (like

8. THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE. A Review of the Principles and Conduct of Messrs. VANCE, SLOANE, WRIGHT & Co. ... on the Presidential Election ... (1826), pamphlet, OHS, 9, 21, 1, 23.
Maryland) and those where the legislature still chose the Electors (New York, Louisiana, Illinois). There was, indeed, every reason for thinking that Adams had won more of the popular vote than Jackson - even without deducting "those votes obtained by negroes," under the three-fifths rule. 9

Similarly, Ohio's Congressmen were willing to concede that, in such a situation, they should be guided by majority sentiment. Even an old Federalist as supposedly conservative as Elisha Whittlesey had publicly held himself bound to vote in a House election as his constituents wished - as he did. John Patterson, from the Belmont district, like many colleagues could point out in 1826 that he had no means of knowing whom the majority of his constituents - those who had voted for Clay - preferred between Jackson and Adams, though everyone knew Jackson had come last in his district. 10 Sloane and Wright, by contrast, represented districts which had given Jackson an absolute majority, but even they did not insist that the Representative should do as he thought fit. Rather, they pointed out that the Jacksonians never made it clear whether a Congressman should be guided by the majority sentiment in his own district, or in his state, or in the nation. They had looked to Ohio as a whole, as indeed they had promised to. Wright, for example, had publicly announced in 1824 his belief that in a House election a Representative "is bound to express the declared will of that state" for which he acts as agent; and if that will differed from his personal view, "he must yield his own preference, and vote in accordance with that of the people. I consider the representative ALWAYS BOUND BY THE WILL OF HIS CONSTITUENTS, when that will is expressed." 11 No Jacksonian had


11. Ohio Oracle, 4 Aug. 1826; Harrison Telegraph, quoted in The Voice of the People (1826), 5.
expressed his commitment to "the democratic republican principle" more strongly; and it was undoubtedly the excellence of Sloane's and Wright's record as Republican Congressmen that helped them to survive the Jacksonian onslaught in 1826.

The next variation on the theme of Jacksonian democratic outrage came in 1827 when the press revived the "corrupt bargain" charges. Now it was argued, on the basis of evidence reportedly from Jackson himself, that Clay's friends had been willing to vote for Jackson as President if Clay were then appointed Secretary of State; Clay, it seemed, had been willing to sell to the highest bidder, without any regard for principle. The Jacksonian newspapers in Ohio hammered at this theme throughout the summer of 1827, in their first great effort to broaden the basis of their support. Their opponents, however, pressed for evidence, and it soon appeared that Jackson's own witnesses - even James Buchanan - would not substantiate his version of events. If anyone had touted offers of high preferment in return for votes in the House, it had been the friends of Jackson, not Adams. Clay himself produced a most effective Address, revealing conclusively that he had made known his determination to vote for Adams before going to Washington in December 1824. The Address included letters from Ohio Congressmen insisting that they had made their decision independently of Clay - and had rejected Jackson for the best possible reasons. Administration men by the end of the year believed that the "bargain and corruption" charge had been fully disproved, and was backfiring on Jackson all over the Union.


13. E.g., Whittlesey to Hitchcock, Washington, 29 Jan. 1828, PHFP; Hammond to Wright, 14 Jan. 1828, CHP. See also An Address of Henry Clay to the Public Containing certain Testimony in refutation of the charges Against Him Touching On The Last Presidential Election (Washington, 1827), widely reprinted in part in Ohio newspapers, and in whole in Niles' Weekly Register.
John C. Wright, however, could not agree. True, no intelligent man could now believe the charge, but Jackson's advocates still repeated it - "and the people, willing to swallow, believe it. Their attachment to Jackson is not founded on reason, conviction or sober thought, but on a diseased state of feeling, a fever...." The "corrupt bargain" charge justified continued opposition, and was probably believed by most of those who had earlier contracted a commitment to Jackson. Beyond that, regardless of whether the detailed charge was believed, it established a tone, a line of rhetoric, a political appeal which was of incalculable power.

The Jacksonians tended to generalize their charges until the Presidential contest became "one between the people and the friends of absolute power." As the wealthy Jacksonian Robert Harper wrote in a private letter, "it is a fact not to be denied that the whole Aristocracy of the Country is now arrayed against the people." A Belmont County candidate for the General Assembly in 1827 saw the election as resting "between democracy and aristocracy," in that the cynical manipulation of power in 1825 had elevated, in defiance of the popular will, a man whose maxims would "destroy the right of the people to hold the delegate accountable," would jeopardize "equality of rights, the freedom of speech and the press, the unrestrained suffrage of the elector and his due influence as a check on the arm of the delegate." When Adams-Clay men objected that demagogic rhetoric of this kind was leading the people astray, they were quickly condemned for such "aristocratic" doctrines, which displayed "the utmost contempt for the great mass of the American people" and treated them as "a mere rabble incapable of judging in their own cause." The principle for which the Jacksonians were

14. Wright to Hammond, Steubenville, 15 Sept. 1827, CHP.

contending was whether "those who have resisted the will of the people, armed with the power, patronage and influence of the Executive, shall triumph over the offended majesty of the sovereign."\textsuperscript{16}

Such rhetoric was powerful, not because it appealed to new popular aspirations, but precisely because it was based on long established cultural attitudes. John McMahon, demagogic, Jacksonian and a would-be legislator, based his democratic rhetoric on the fear that an aristocratic reaction was threatening to overthrow the democracy that had been safely established for a quarter of a century: the danger was innovation, and neglect of the fathers' teaching that "power was only safe in the hands of the people." Similarly, Moses Dawson saw his "radical" campaign as conservative in purpose, as returning the government "to its original principles."\textsuperscript{17} It was exactly because it picked up the tone, the style of rhetoric that had been common in Ohio earlier that the Adams-Clay men found this rhetoric difficult to combat, and certainly contemporaries believed that the charges arising from the House election helped to explain the success of the Jacksonians in attracting popular votes in Ohio in 1828. Four years later the \textit{Ohio State Journal} argued that Jackson's earlier victory had resulted "partly out of gratitude for his military services, and partly from a feeling of indignation, artfully excited and kept alive, on account of a supposed disregard of the will of the majority in the selection of a former President." And decades later E.D. Mansfield recollected that after 1825 Jacksonism "took a popular hold on many people not inclined to it, by the plausible argument that Jackson having received the most votes ought, therefore, to have been elected by the house."\textsuperscript{18}

Understandably enough, after the Presidential election the Jacksonians were swept away by their own rhetoric, gratified at discovering how wise the

\textsuperscript{16} Cincinnati Advertiser, 19 Mar. 1828; St. Clairsville Gazette, 8 Sept. 1827.

\textsuperscript{17} St. Clairsville Gazette, 12 May, 4 Aug. 1827; Cincinnati Advertiser, 19 Mar. 1828.

ordinary people of Ohio were. As Clay said of Kentucky legislators in 1829, "They have been elected under an excitement; and ... the representatives of the people when so elected, are ahead of the people themselves in reference to that particular excitement." The Ohio Jacksonians, concerned to extend the issue of democratic rule into state politics, introduced in the General Assembly of 1828-29 a bill for the popular election of County Recorders. Such a measure, they insisted, was appropriate in a "democratical" government, and could be opposed only by those who believed "the people had not the honesty, integrity or judgment necessary to choose their officers." Then it was proposed that the proposal should be extended so as to cover a wide range of local officers, notably county surveyors and prosecuting attorneys; indeed, some Jacksonians favoured the inclusion of all officers, except those whose election was reserved to the General Assembly or some other tribunal by the state constitution. These proposals were then pressed, in the words of one opponent, with such feeling! such excitement! such warmth! and such sneering and personal allusions .... party feelings and party principles have been woven and intermixed with heat uncalled for, and zeal ill spent. Every circumstance that could arouse and create a similar spirit without, has been resorted to within this Chamber.

Indeed, he suggested, the extreme party rhetoric was designed to heighten the partisan consciousness and discipline of the more moderate Jacksonians in the Assembly - "to have an effect upon some who are within as upon others who are without these walls." In general, it is difficult not to agree that Jacksonians, swept along by their own rhetoric, were endeavouring to find - at long last - a state issue, to create for the 1829 elections a popular cause akin to that which had assisted them in the Presidential election.

Most National Republicans opposed the progress and extension of the bill, although they were not "really opposed to the election of this officer by the people." They objected to the waste of legislative time - and the people's money - in discussing the "most indifferent" of offices when there was no evidence that the present system - selection by Associate Judges - was choosing incompetent, dishonest or unpopular men, and no suggestion of grievance or of demand for change from the people. One Adams-Clay man, McNutt of Preble County, declared himself "as willing to trust to the people, as those who appeared to be such ardent lovers of the people." But he was not "on that account prepared to advocate a radical change in our system, for the purpose of propitiating their favor, when there was no real necessity for it. He did not believe the people themselves desired any such change; ... if they had petitioned, or asked for it, in any way whatever, he would freely and unhesitatingly grant it to them." The real object of the measure, Adams-Clay men agreed, was to "sweep off all the present incumbents of whatever name, distinction or merit" in order to gratify "disappointed applicants for office" among the Jacksonians; and pointed reference was made to the iniquitous Sweeping Resolution of 1810. Adams-Clay men determined to withstand such corruption and defend the people's interests, even though they knew they were "to be charged by and by with a disposition to withhold from the people, privileges which they are best qualified to exercise, when such was not the intention of those who opposed the bill."\(^{21}\)

If anything, the issue was a damp squib. There was no immediate popular outcry, not even in the Jacksonian press. The bill for the election of county recorders, which emerged from committee was hedged with amendments designed to ensure the election only of those professionally competent, and it was quickly clear in the debates that many leading Jacksonians, especially

the lawyers, believed that the courts should have the power of electing their own officers, like prosecuting attorneys. Some of the leading speeches in favour of removing the amendments and broadening the effect of the bill came from Adams-Clay men, notably from McNutt, who thought "the people should have the privilege of making choice of a tanner, a farmer, or a mechanic" for any office if they wanted him. The party division was reflected best in the House vote to delete from the bill all offices except county recorder, when the Adams-Clay men divided 27-7 in favour of the restriction, and the Jacksonians divided 22-9 in favour of extending popular election to a wide range of county offices. On the final votes to introduce the popular election of county recorders - not all at once, as in a sweeping resolution, but at the expiry of the term of the present incumbents - the two parties voted together in the House, except for nine or ten determined opponents, all of them Adams-Clay men. 22

This controversy, which was to raise its head again in subsequent sessions, suggests that the National Republican party of the years after 1828 contained a hardcore of people who doubted the wisdom of giving too much power to the people. Certainly this was true of the men of good family and education - including the young Salmon P. Chase - whom Alexis de Tocqueville met at Cincinnati soirées in the winter of 1832. 23 Such doubts are, however, common among defeated politicians after the electorate has rejected them, as they were to be among Democrats after the 1840 election. The surprising thing, perhaps, was the number of older politicians whose democratic faith was not shaken by the election of Jackson: the people had been misled by demagogues, but they would in time see things

22. Ohio State Journal, 21, 28, 31 Jan. 1829. The Senate had initially approved the full bill, with half the Adams-Clay men voting with the 15 Jacksonians to produce a 24-11 vote. After the House had dropped most of the offices, the Senate voted to accept the amendment on almost strict party lines, 17-14; 2 Adams-Clay men voted with 12 Jacksonians to keep the full bill. Ibid., 14 Jan., 19 Feb. 1829.

clearly and put matters to rights. Others recovered their faith, as Chase
had by 1833.24 But perhaps the point was made by a writer in Cincinnati's
new literary and intellectual journal of 1833, the Western Monthly Magazine.
Everyone accepted, he said, the indisputable doctrine that "The majority
must govern, and ought to govern." But the populace at large also believed
that "The people can do no wrong." Many privately believed this was
nonsense, and yet every aspirant for office - regardless of party - "must
not only acknowledge, but boldly declare and fiercely maintain it on all
proper and improper occasions, if he would hope to climb the ladder of
public favor."25

Thus it is difficult to argue that there was a fundamental cleavage in
Ohio politics between 'democrats' and 'aristocrats' in the late 1820s.
Almost all politicians accepted the rightfulness of democratic elections, and
many in both major parties believed that the representative should follow
the wishes of his constituents. Some upper-class men may have had doubts when
they saw that the people could voluntarily choose an Andrew Jackson as
President, but political expediency (if not conviction) ensured that they
would form only a minority of the Adams-Clay activists. As for the
Jacksonians, circumstances had enabled them to trumpet the demand for popular
rights, and had found their faith in the people amply rewarded. Their view
of events and their demagogic rhetoric encouraged them to apply their
populism to state affairs: the popular election of County Surveyors and even
of Prosecuting Attorneys was to pass in 1831 and 1833, respectively, largely
through Jacksonian partisanship, as was the general law of 1839 which
provided that future charters incorporating towns and cities would not impose

24. Allen Trimble to James Heaton, Columbus, 11 Nov. 1828, Heaton Papers;
J.W. Allen to Ewing, Cleveland, 14 Nov. 1828, TEFP. See also S.P.
Chase, The Statutes of Ohio And of The Northwestern Territory
(Cincinnati, 1833), I, 48.

property qualifications on municipal voting and officeholding. The commitment of the party after 1828 to the extension of direct universal adult, white, male voting for all offices underlines how far Jacksonians identified their cause with democracy and believed they owed their initial popular triumph to the will of the people.

The People's Party

Congressman Vance rose to repel the charges. Those, like himself, who had voted for Mr. Adams had not been sold by Mr. Clay nor had they ignored the voice of the people of Ohio. Vance declared that he personally would be the veriest miscreant on earth, if he could for one moment desert the interests of the people; for to them, and to them only, is he indebted for all the distinction, (humble as it may be), that he enjoys, as a member of this body. All my feelings and all my sympathies are with them. I know how to feel for them; for, as regards poverty, I came from the very lowest order of the people.

After stressing his humble origins on the edge of civilization and his lack of education, Vance then promised that, "promoted as he was by the People of Ohio, when an Imputation of Corruption was cast on them he would sustain their character at the hazard of his life."

Vance thus joined Trimble of Kentucky in replying to charges made in 1826 in the House of Representatives by George McDuffie of South Carolina.

According to one Tennessee Congressman,

McDuffie in reply said... Genl. Vance...had not changed his...grade in Society,...but...the great political Juggler, Poltroon and Puppy, the Secretary of State Clay, had set on his Minions...but if Mr Vance or Trimble thought themselves agrieved he would for once forget they were not Gentlemen and would attend to their Calls. The House was a perfect scene of confusion for half an hour, ... the Chairman crying out Order, Order, Order, hurly burly, helter skelter, negro states and yankies.1


1. John H. Marable to Jackson, 3 April 1826, in John S. Bassett, The Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, III, 299. Vance's speech is more accurately reported in Niles' Weekly Register, (1 July 1826), 316.
Vance apparently let it be known he would issue no challenge, but neither would he refuse one. And his choice of weapons would be rifles! As a former backwoodsman, a friend of the famed pioneer Simon Kenton, and leader of a company of sharpshooters in 1812, Vance was known — according to the county history — as "a dead shot with the rifle, and nothing more was said about fighting." ²

This incident — in which, according to Wright, Vance "did wonders" — usefully challenges some all too common presumptions. Here the representative of the common man faces the proud aristocrat of gentlemanly bearing — but their party affiliations are directly contrary to the standard stereotype. Administration politicians could present themselves as Men of the People at least as easily as Ohio Jacksonians; Vance had not exaggerated his humble origins. ³ Moreover, the most conspicuous aristocrats in the nation, priding themselves on their gentility and honour, were Southern planters like McDuffie and John Randolph — Jacksonian almost to a man. Indeed, the sectional arguments used by Adams-Clay men branded the South as undemocratic, and Adams editors asked — in the wake of the Vance incident — "Will the laboring men of Ohio join in a party whose prime agent denounces all labour as despicable, and all who perform it as tale bearers and slanderers unworthy of the privilege of voting?" As at the time of the 1829 Virginia constitutional convention, they could point out that in many Southern states the Jacksonians were the aristocrats, and the Adams-Clay men the advocates of popular rights. ⁴

Vance was not the only Adams-Clay man to have long held populistic

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² Howe, Historical Collections (1887), I, 382-83; Burnet, North Western Territory, 467; W.P.A., Ohio Writers' Program, Urbana and Champaign County, (Urbana, 0., 1942), 24, 26, 31. Some versions ascribe the story of the duel to the later debate over the extension of the National Road in 1827.

³ Wright to Hammond, Washington, 10 Apr. 1826, CHP. For a contemporary account of Vance's career, see Scioto Gazette, 26 Oct. 1826.

⁴ Wooster Ohio Oracle, 21 July 1826. See also Ohio State Journal, 29 Oct. 1829.
views of politics or to regard himself as a "man of the people" opposing the entrenched interests of the aristocracy. John Sloane, for example, had been a rabid "Democrat" during the Court and Tammany struggles of 1806-12, and in 1818 he had won his seat in Congress after campaigning as the people's candidate, promising to serve the interests of poor farmers disdained by the "aristocratic" incumbent. Thomas Ewing, already respected as a lawyer and a vigorous supporter of the Adams cause, came from a poor pioneer family in Athens County; as his father had been "quite unable to lend me any penurious aid," young Tom had spent four seasons (1809-11 and 1814) labouring in the Kanawha salines to earn enough money to put him through the new Ohio University at Athens. On the eastern part of the Western Reserve, where there was a marked local conflict between the original landowning interest and newer, smaller men, both sides proved equally hostile to Jackson, and some of those considered leaders of the dissident or "populistic" cause, like the young Joshua R. Giddings in Ashtabula or Eber D. Howe in Geauga, were active and dedicated Adams men. It is scarcely surprising to find "men of the people" well-entrenched in the ranks of the Administration party, for some politicians believed that unworthy men, who fell short of their precursors in every respect, had been finding seats in the General Assembly since 1820 or so; and most of these new men had become supporters of Adams or Clay during the 1824 campaign, though not exclusively so.


6. S.S. Osborne to S.C. Hickox, 10 July 1900, Paine Family File, Lake County Historical Society, Mentor, O. James B. Stewart, Joshua R. Giddings and the Tactics of Radical Politics (Cleveland, 1970), ch. 1, exaggerates considerably Giddings' political elitism. Even Giddings' patron, the Federalist Whittlesey, had displayed great sympathy with populistic causes and publicized this feature of his past in 1830 when appealing for the support of "Working Men." Whittlesey to Giddings, Canfield, 18 Sept. 1830, Giddings Papers.

If the active leaders of the Administration cause included men of relatively humble background, even if they had worked their way to positions of some social and political prominence, so too the Jacksonian leadership included many men of wealth and distinction. This was undoubtedly true of the original leaders of the party in 1824, especially in southwestern Ohio where the party owed much to large landowners like William Lytle and Othnial Looker, to members of the old Cincinnati merchant oligarchy like James Findlay, as well as to successful lawyers such as Ethan Allen Brown, John W. Campbell and Thomas Morris. In Jefferson County, in eastern Ohio, the party depended heavily on the skills and experience of Benjamin Tappan and John M. Goodenow, both successful lawyers and large property owners; in Wayne County the Larwills were prominent proprietors, merchants and speculators. The key man in the lower Scioto Valley, Robert Lucas, was a relatively wealthy landowner, surveyor and merchant, who had served as an officer in the War of 1812 and a state legislator from 1814 to 1822. In that year he was the third largest taxpayer in Pike County, and two years later built himself one of the finest houses in southern Ohio, set on a farm of 437 acres. Very much the local notable, he had been opposed in one election by an illiterate Pennsylvania Dutchman named Delawder, whom he beat easily. According to the local historian, Delawder explained his defeat by saying "he was making a pooty good race, when that tam big General Lucas came along riding on his horse and all the tam fools voted for him." 8

This was a not inappropriate style for a politician advocating the claims of the victor of New Orleans.

Similarly, many of those who turned to Jackson in 1827 and 1828 were frequently men of prominence and often of wealth. Thomas Scott of Ross

County had served as secretary of the 1802 constitutional convention and clerk of the state senate, 1804-09, had ruled the Ohio Tammany Society as its first Grand Sachem, run for Governor in 1812, and served on the state supreme court for a number of years. Already by the 1820s "he had a wide reputation for learning and legal ability, and was retained in many important cases, receiving large fees for his services." William W. Irwin, too, was a former justice of the state supreme court (1810-15), who had run for Governor in 1822 and had been elected Speaker of the Ohio House in 1825 and 1826. He was highly regarded by professional and social friends in Lancaster and, according to Ewing, "much respected by the members" of the Assembly - at least, until he deserted to the Jacksonians.

Similarly, when the Jacksonians looked around for party organizers in counties which had shown little enthusiasm for the cause, they did not seek out new social sources of political leadership. When Elijah Hayward tried to extend the party's organizational base early in 1827, his technique was to ask prominent Jacksonians in distant parts to name key people in neighbouring counties: Robert Lucas was requested to name "eight or ten of the most firm, active and influential Jacksonians" in each county, while the Larwill brothers in Wooster had to point out "some ten or fifteen real influential Jacksonians." These were the men most capable of organizing effective meetings, and everywhere, even on the Western Reserve, the Jacksonians found suitable men. In Geauga County the Jacksonian leaders who had emerged by 1832 included some men of wealth and distinction, often professional men like the distinguished homeopath Dr. Storm Rosa - and like William S. Tracy of Painesville, whom local Jacksonians supported as a

9. Howe, Historical Collections (1900), II, 517.
10. Ewing to his wife, Columbus, 9 Dec. 1825, and Jacob Claypool to Ewing, Lancaster, 9 Oct. 1826, TEFP, LC.
11. Hayward to Lucas, 1824, quoted in Parish, Robert Lucas, 86-87, and Hayward to Larwill, Cincinnati, 23 June 1827, LFP.
candidate for the legislature as "a scholar and a gentleman." In Ashtabula County they turned to Robert Harper, the youngest son of a New York Episcopalian family that had organized a land company to buy up land in Ashtabula, and then moved there in 1798, calling their settlement Harpersfield. A successful lawyer, Harper built Shandy Hall in Unionville as a home in 1815. Entering state politics as a Republican, Harper was thought by John C. Wright to be one of the most politically influential men in northern Ohio in 1822. He was named in 1824 as a Jackson Elector, but withdrew and declared for Adams. By 1827 he was in dispute with Eber D. Howe's Painesville Telegraph, which he sued for defamation: "Such expedients," retorted the Adams editor, "are frequently resorted to by those who ride about the country in their coaches, and live in a splendid routine of 'high life,' at the sole expense of their honest and labouring creditors." Harper was welcomed into the Jackson camp by Hayward, who commended him to the party in 1828 as "highly respectable and respected for his talents, character and standing in society." Though they used the rhetoric of populism, the Jacksonians recognised the importance of putting men like Harper and Lucas on their Electoral tickets and committees of correspondence, if they wished to be regarded as a serious and respectable political force.

Similarly, Jacksonians sometimes advanced the proposition that all citizens of reasonable natural intelligence were capable of conducting all government offices. Bill Stanbery was even reported as having said when he first became a Jacksonian, "we will show you that it does not require any great talents to serve as President of this republic":

Yet in their appointments to office in 1829-30 the Jacksonians gave office to men who were no more (nor less) "of the people" than those they displaced. Nothing


13. Charles B. Goddard to Ewing, Zanesville, 23 Jan. 1832, TEFP, LC.
in the Ohio evidence contradicts Aronson's view that Jackson's office-holders in general were of much the same social background and status as they had been since the "revolution of 1800." Indeed, some of those rewarded came from inveterate officeholding families, like that of James Findlay with its connections with the notorious "Family Party" of Pennsylvania, which simply gained a new lease of life as its members pestered Jackson to reward them for their political services. Such examples — buttressed by, say, that of Robert Harper, appointed customs-house examiner in Cleveland in 1830 — only served to justify John Sloane's earlier assertion that the Jacksonian leaders — at least in his locality — had done nothing to merit the confidence of the people: "Are they not for the most part 'the men of yesterday,' ambitious for power, but inimical to merit?"

Even if its leadership was well-heeled and respectable, the Ohio Jackson party may still have been a genuine people's party, deriving its thrust and energy from the spontaneous support of the populace, and deciding on its candidates, organizers and policies in "primary assemblies of the people"; certainly Jacksonians liked to point to their use of nominating conventions at all levels as proof that the party was the expression — and respecter — of the popular will. Unfortunately, in practice, Jacksonian organization was commonly imposed from above. This was perhaps inevitable when the process of organization moved from the centre outwards — from Washington to Cincinnati, and from there to other counties — and when so much emphasis had to be placed on finding Jacksonians


15. For the Findlays' outstanding cheek, see "Torrence Papers," QPHPSO, esp. I, 65-66, 70-72, 79-83, 86, II, 4-6, 8-10, III, 116-17; Cincinnati Gazette, 9 Jan. 1827; and Blair, "James Findlay," esp. 64.


17. Address to the People of Ohio, 13 Sept. 1824, LC, 3-4; Webster, "Democratic Party Organization."
of influence in unorganized counties. The pattern of party organization within a county is well documented in Belmont: here a Jackson meeting at the county seat in May 1827 appointed a general committee of correspondence of 15, later 22, men, which in turn appointed a five-man central committee whose duties included the appointment of township committees—which turned out to consist of only two people each. These township committees were required to organize township meetings which were in turn to appoint committees of vigilance to maintain "a regular friendly intercourse with their fellow-citizens." The real power still remained with the centrally-appointed two-man committees, for it was they which met in August 1828 to name the party's ticket for local offices in the fall election.18 Similar patterns of control from the county seat certainly existed in Columbiana and Monroe Counties, though it is difficult to know how typical this pattern was. It is scarcely too much to compare the Jacksonian pattern of organization in such counties to that David Hackett Fischer has seen as typical of the Federalists—a cellular structure organized from above, rather than a loose confederation of local groups sending delegates to central meetings.19

In fact, these early Jacksonians made much less use of nominating conventions at the county level than historians sometimes assume. Even in Hamilton County, where thorough organization had begun early, the county committee of correspondence itself appointed the delegates to meet and form the ticket for the 1827 fall elections.20 In 1828 in some counties

19. Webster, "Democratic Party Organization," 18-19, 20-21, 28; Fischer, Revolution of American Conservatism, esp. ch. 3. In Guernsey the township committees were said to be "selected by the citizens." St. Clairsville Gazette, 28 June 1828.
apparently no regard was given to the representation of townships in making nominations, and the Jacksonians showed relatively little concern for ensuring that their conventions were anything more than local caucuses. As a consequence, in some instances there were protests over the unrepresentative nature of the party's nominating process, as in Monroe County in 1828. Other counties, like Ross, did adopt more representative systems — as, indeed, Hamilton had by 1828 — but the fact remains that the Jackson party (at least before 1829) made much less use of county conventions made up of township delegates elected by the voters than the Jeffersonians Republicans had. 21

In comparison, the Adams-Clay men were, if anything, less authoritarian and elitist. Admittedly they too had to work through contacts among prominent men, and they were constantly trying to secure the names of known sympathisers who would circulate campaign materials for them. 22 But their model of local organization followed the more populist and decentralized approach of the Jeffersonian Republicans. Many of the township meetings and committees which were organized in 1827 on behalf of the Administration appear to have resulted from spontaneous local action rather than instructions from the county seat, while in Belmont County the Adams township committees had much more authority than their Jacksonian counterparts. Moreover, in some cases Adams men took great care to ensure that the nomination of candidates resulted from a properly representative process. In Belmont County, they used the delegate system for making nominations in both 1827 and 1828. In Muskingum County, a public meeting of Administration men in 1828 resolved that the central committee of vigilance should arrange for the township committees of vigilance to organize township meetings on August 23rd; these


22. E.g., Creighton to Ewing, Chillicothe, 9 Aug. 1826, TEFP, LC; Lucius V. Bierce to Whittlesey, Ravenna, 17 Feb. 1828, EWP.
meetings were to choose a specified number of delegates to meet in Zanesville to name the ticket for the fall elections. Such meetings were as well attended as the Jacksonians', and some of the Adamsite township committees - like the 152-man county committee of correspondence in Belmont County - were as ridiculously oversize.23

Similar differences may perhaps be seen in the calling of the two state conventions. Customarily underrepresented at Columbus, the Jacksonians found a state convention the obvious means for promoting statewide coordination. They were not, however, concerned as to how many delegates each county should send, nor how those delegates were appointed. In some counties the delegates were regularly appointed by a county convention or by a committee specifically authorized by the convention; in other counties, the committee of correspondence named the delegate, sometimes at a joint meeting with the township committees and such citizens as could attend.24 The Adams state convention, by contrast, was more obviously a fulfilment of the Jeffersonian trend towards making all nominations by delegate conventions. As one of the many Adams meetings held in the fall of 1827 resolved:

... the usual method of forming Electoral Tickets in this State, by the unauthorised nomination of a few individuals who might chance to meet together at the seat of government, is highly anti-republican, dictatorial, and altogether inconsistent with the spirit and genius of the government - and ... this evil can be effectually obviated only by the formation of a State Convention, to be composed of Delegates from the different counties, whose province it shall be to form an Electoral Ticket.

The call for the state convention asked for the delegates to be named by publicly advertised county meetings, and the Adams convention was certainly more representative than the Jackson convention eleven days later: in all, 213 delegates attended, and "Every organized county in the State was


represented ... except two." It can be scarcely a surprise that the Adams-Clay men adopted the system of delegate conventions so easily, since both the concept and practice of local conventions were well established among Republicans in Ohio and formed part of the common heritage of both the newly emergent parties. In fact, in many parts of the nation Adams men used nominating conventions in 1828, recognizing the political advantages of nominations which seemed to reflect popular preferences.

Similarly, both parties endeavoured to portray their candidates as "one of the people, a man of the people." In his bitter onslaught on John Sloane in the Congressional election of 1826, the Jacksonian John Thompson claimed he himself was no worse than "our honest horse, cattle, sheep and hog drovers," even if he was "poor, and not able to pay his debts at this time." His opponents replied that this speculator was in debt only because he held the property of "many poor and industrious men," who were likely to lose their farms when Thompson settled his affairs. The young Adams-Clay man Tom Corwin liked to tell later in life how he won his first election to Congress in 1830 because of the "nightshirt issue": he discovered that his Jacksonian opponent not only powdered his hair but habitually slept in a night shirt, and so was able to exploit popular disapproval of any man who considered himself too good to wear the same shirt as he wore in the daytime. Yet on the whole it was the Jacksonians who benefited from such appeals, for the political circumstances of the late 1820s allowed them to exploit this tactic the more convincingly.

25. Wilmington (Clinton County) Western Argus, 17 Nov. 1827; Ohio State Journal, 2 Jan. 1828.

26. See bound volume of the proceedings of Adams delegate conventions throughout the Northern and Middle states, Rare Book Room, LC. Cf. James S. Chase, Emergence of the Presidential Nominating Convention, 1789-1832 (Urbana, Ill, 1973).

27. Wooster Ohio Oracle, 29 Sept. 1826; Morrow, Corwin, 27.
Corruption, Prodigality and Aristocracy

The cry of "democracy" was not the key to the Jacksonian appeal in 1828. The demand that the people's will be respected was only one part of a rhetoric which included other demands more critical in the competition for votes; and some of those demands stressed rights and limitations on the will of the majority. The Jacksonians, like the Adams men, believed that the "best man" should be elected President; their criterion of judgement simply differed. They too believed that government should be conducted with integrity and moral purpose, and admired respect for the restraints of the Constitution. The difference in their rhetoric arose because they appealed to some crude popular assumptions about the sources of virtue and degeneracy in what had once been the American Garden of Eden.

Fundamental to the Jacksonian cause was the sense that something was going wrong with the United States. As early as 1825, Jacksonian politicians were asserting in private that the Republic was in peril because of the evil machinations of the Adams administration. From this self-justifying fear of conspiracy, traditional in all country parties, developed the obsession that the Administration was using all sorts of underhand and corrupt devices to prevent the Jacksonians from challenging it at the polls. Elijah Hayward, for one, was constantly telling his colleagues that the Executive was throwing masses of money into the campaign, and using its control of patronage and the administrative machine to move secret levers and win influential friends.¹ A sober Yankee like Robert Harper could write privately that

This is the most important election for the Government that has been since Mr. Jefferson[']s 1st & Is in reality of more importance that that ... the means now resorted to to retain power is worse [?] and more dangerous than then, the executive patronage is greater than then.... The patronage of this Government is immense and its whole power is in action and arayed against us and if it is not now controlled it never will be.

Jacksonians drank deeply of the old obsession that — as Duff Green's motto at the masthead of the United States Telegraph had it — "Power is always stealing from the many to the few."²

The Jacksonian publicists reinforced this attack on an overpowerful Executive by resorting to other traditional arguments of the country-party ideology, as used, for example, by the Jeffersonians in the 1790s. The Administration gained its power from its extensive patronage, which enabled it to bribe Congressmen with office, and special interests with lavish expenditures from which they alone might profit. Faced with this threat, Jacksonians believed there was a need for "reform," for a "restoration of civil and economical government." Moses Dawson at the Cincinnati Advertiser was particularly cogent in developing this argument. For him, "The great question is, not whether this or that man shall be elected to office, but whether a system of corruption and prodigality shall continue to prevail, or one of reform and economy." He defined the Jacksonian candidates in the state and local elections of 1828 as men "fully impressed with the necessity there is for a general system of reform and retrenchments in public expenditure" — though he did not explain what the consequences of such a policy would be for internal improvements. For Dawson, the "system of corruption and misrule ... had prevailed for many years" and predated Adams' administration, though it was the "palpable corruption" of Mr. Adams' election that made the system "manifest to the observation of the people." Thus the proper consequence of Jackson's victory was large-scale removals: "Gen. Jackson has been elected to sweep the Augean stable, ... the many-headed hydra of corruption has received its death-blow, so the outward limbs and flourishes of such corruption, should be lopped off and the excrescences cleaned away."³

Arguments and rhetoric of this kind were touched on, if less consistently, by most Jacksonian publicists, and critical to their case was evidence that the Adams administration was extravagant and wasteful. Chilton's Resolution in Congress sent Congressional committees on fishing expeditions to find bait for the voters. Extra offices had been created, especially in the Department of State, which had been handed out to friends of the Administration; many, it was claimed, had gone to Congressmen who had voted for Adams in 1825. Particular attention was paid to the apparently large sums paid out as salary and for outfit to overseas emissaries and ministers. William Henry Harrison, for example, was attacked for not leaving for Colombia immediately after his appointment as minister: his pay of $24 per day for just sitting at home was considered typical of "the favoritism, profligancy and extravagance of the present minority Administration."4 Writers in the Cincinnati Advertiser claimed that the Executive had spent half as much again as Monroe had in his last three years in office; that, by a failure to retrench, the government had failed to reduce the national debt by at least seven million dollars; that, in sum, "The great question is, not whether this or that man shall be elected to office, but whether a system of corruption and prodigality shall continue to prevail, or one of reform and economy."5

This line of attack was, of course, hopelessly exaggerated. Only a handful of Congressmen had been given office by Adams. The growth in the Department of State was a consequence of Latin American independence, and growing expenditure was a concomitant of the country's growth and Congress's adoption of the system of internal improvement Ohioans demanded. But one charge, however trivial, had some substance: official accounts revealed that the White House had been furnished with a billiards-table.

5. Cincinnati Advertiser, 8, 12, 19 Mar., 11 Oct. 1828.
True, it was revealed in time that the President had not used public funds for its purchase, but had bought it for his son out of his own pocket. But in Ohio billiards had long been illegal, and a symbol of aristocratic extravagance and lasciviousness. One moderate Jacksonian Congressman thought that "The table seems a small matter for reproach, but I can assert that there is scarcely an act he could have done which will prejudice him more." Elisha Whittlesey later claimed that "the billiards table charge in Mr. Adams' account" made not "thousands of Jacksonians," but "tens of thousands." 6

The impact of such charges resulted from a longstanding popular suspicion that Washington was a modern Babylon or Gomorrah. In 1824 a Jacksonian broadside had attacked the luxury and corruption of Washington life, and in 1826 James Buchanan had commented on the popular suspicion that Washington must be corrupt - and representatives sent there all too likely to succumb to its influences and to corruption by the Executive. 7 Moses Dawson saw Washington as "the nursery of voluptuous living," since men who had spent years in European courts occupied the leading government posts and "practiced at the White House the European manners which they had learned to like while abroad." For Dawson, "There was too much splendor at the White House, too many foreign commodities consumed." 8

Charles Reemelin, the distinguished Cincinnati Democrat of a later generation and Dawson's disciple and biographer, saw this statement as the key to the early Jacksonian mind. Reemelin took his political faith from


Jackson's vetoes of 1830-33 and his Farewell Address, and found it difficult to comprehend how, before 1830, Jacksonians in Ohio could enthusiastically support the American System. The answer, he thought, lay in "the alarm which had seized upon the public mind, viz. that American society was fast drifting into habits incompatible with republican virtue and destructive of liberty." Dawson "shared fully" this alarm, and insisted that the source of corruption lay in the importation of luxury goods from Europe. The consumption of imported silks, broadcloth and wines were "the proof of aristocracy"; homemade clothes, food and drink "the symbols of republicanism." Thus Jeffersonians like Dawson who traditionally believed in simple, cheap, inactive government could support protective tariffs, as "a sort of national sumptuary law against aristocratic modes of living."

In the same spirit the young Peter Kaufmann - like Reemelin, a German immigrant - could devote a July Fourth Address in 1830 to the need to end ostentation in dress by adopting a national uniform for all citizens (hence his peroration's appeal to the "Friends of Liberty, Equality and Uniformity"!). Men of such mind - and certainly Dawson - were "impelled to seek a remedy through the election to the Presidency of some man whose mode of living would, by its simple example, produce a reaction to the purer social life of the fathers of the Republic." 9

Adams, for all his stern rectitude, simple tastes and private moral prudery, could not qualify for this role. He was the prime example of a lifelong politician grown plump at the public crib. From his youth he had been favoured with public office, benefiting from his father's eminence - unlike Jackson, who was essentially a self-made man. Contrast, suggested the St. Clairsville Gazette, "the manner in which the orphan, friendless and almost destitute JACKSON raised himself by his own merit and exertions,

9. Ibid.; Oration, Peter Kaufmann Papers, OHS.
with the manner by which the aristocratic bantling of power and patronage
has been forced forward in the world, like an exotic plant by extrinsic
influence." Jacksonians acknowledged Adams had received a fine formal
education, but it was an education replete with foreign and aristocratic
influences: Franklin County Jacksonians, in 1827, congratulated themselves
that their Hero was "not raised in the lap of luxury and wealth" nor
secured his knowledge "from Voltaire, and Oriental legends." Furthermore,
added the Marietta Pilot, Jackson "never cost the nation a cent for his
education, although he has acquired a good one. Can the same be said of
John Q. Adams?" Both men had performed valuable services for their country,
but one abroad, the other at home - and in the field. As a Jacksonian Address
of 1824 had pointed out, while the Hero was saving the nation at the darkest
hour of the War of 1812, Adams - and Clay - "were enjoying the luxuries
of wealth and security, or, at a salary of nine thousand dollars a year,
mingling in the gay circles of pleasure, at London, Paris or Ghent." 10

Moreover, Jackson had never been an office-seeker or almost permanent
officeholder. Whereas "Mr Adams... was never known to resign or refuse a
fat office in his life," Jackson had resigned as Governor of Florida,
giving up $5,000 per annum, and refused under Monroe both the office of
Minister to Mexico, "with an outfit of $9,000 and a salary to the same
amount," and that of Secretary of War. In sum, he had "held and resigned
and ... refused to accept" more important offices than Adams had held.
True, "it is charged against him that he resigned every office he filled;
if this is a fault in the character of any one in a republican form of
government, we have yet to learn it." Far from being a "military chieftain"
ambitious for absolute power, Jackson had always preferred civilian militia
to professional troops and had several times voluntarily laid down his

10. St. Clairsville Gazette, 29 Sept. 1827; Ohio State Journal, 29 Nov.
1827; Marietta Pilot, 29 Oct. 1828; Address to The People of Ohio, 13
Sept. 1824, LC, 13.
sword. In short, as a toast at a New Lisbon celebration proclaimed, Jackson was "a pattern of republican simplicity, a second Cincinnatus...." 11

Such rhetoric emphasized that Jackson was firmly rooted in the American environment that Jeffersonian tradition had idealized — the world of the simple farmer, independent, resourceful, self-reliant, naturally wise and aware of his moral responsibilities. Jackson presses in Ohio reprinted Mordecai Noah's pen-portrait of The Tennessee Farmer — "Andrew Jackson, as he now is":

A straw hat covers those white locks bleached by the midnight dews in the tended field — a coat of plain homespun made on his own farm, is substituted for the uniform, gorget and golden epaulets — ... and when the "curfew tolls the knell of parting day," he repairs to his fire-side and is surrounded by his friends and neighbours, and the evening closes in rational and improving converse .... such a man who can follow the plough, or follow the enemy as occasion may require, who has plain practical sense and sound experience in affairs of government, who has honesty as his land mark, and decision as his guide, even such a man will the people take from his farm & make him President of the U. States. 12

Thus Jackson was wholesome, the embodiment of American virtue imbibed from Nature, and his election would restore the nation to its original moral purity.

From such a point of view, the election of Jackson was a panacea for whatever people might think wrong. As Administration supporters grieved, it was almost impossible to adduce arguments and facts which might challenge such simpleminded, but deep-rooted presumptions. If people disliked the growing 'Europeanization' of American life — luxury goods, class differences, commercialization — the Hero would restore former standards and the old-time moral vigour. "We are about to be redeemed as a nation," wrote a Jackson print established shortly after the election,

"from former extravagance, lethargy and inaction." 13 If it was growing "faction, discord and domestic divisions" people disliked, then the Hero would stand above party and prevent Ohio from becoming "the sport of intriguing demagogues" or "subject to the wickedness and distraction of an organized system of office brokerage, and aristocratic domination." If people disliked growing sectional strife, the Hero would stand above that too, representing the interests of all "the people". Already he had shown the ability to unite Northern and Southern "advocates of reform," despite their differences over the tariff; as Dawson said, men from both sections came together behind his banner "because they believe that he will renovate the government and restore it to its original purity and true republican principles." 14

This view fits closely with John William Ward's fine analysis of Jacksonian imagery and rhetoric, and with subsequent developments of his approach by Richard Hofstadter and Marvin Meyers. 15 But what must be added is that these appeals had particular significance for many Ohio voters, because they related to issues and resentments which had been surfacing in state and local politics for at least a decade. Not that the national party division was related to alignments in state politics to any significant extent; but incidents within the state, local grievances and controversies, created a body of sentiment which readily saw the point of Jacksonian propaganda.

In December 1826, that unreliable man but worthy scholar, Caleb Atwater, delivered a public lecture in Columbus on "The General Character, Present


and Future Prospects of The People of Ohio." In it this renowned Jacksonian emphasized the broad measure of consensus that existed among Ohioans, united in their devotion to notions of liberty, democratic opportunity, internal improvement and traditional morality: "whatever differences of opinion you happen to entertain as to men, let all parties unite in measures calculated to promote the prosperity, the happiness of the people...."

However, he singled out one area where consensus did not exist:

There is a most undue prejudice in low minds, against our higher seminaries of learning. Persons of a certain grade of character, suppose, or pretend to suppose that our colleges are intended merely for the sons of the rich, the great and the powerful, and that, by promoting the interest of the schools, they are laying the foundation for a future aristocracy among us.

This notion he dispelled, pointing out the importance of higher education for the welfare of a democratic society - and adding pointedly that "Were our colleges as well endowed as those at the eastward, poor men's sons would be educated in them, as well as the sons of wealthy citizens."

Yet the prejudice he referred to was strongly entrenched: even the Tammany Society of Cincinnati, in an address it had reprinted in 1819, had declared its preference for common schools, which would promote the popular understanding of republicanism, over colleges, which merely bred aristocracy. 16

In fact, Ohio had only four colleges by 1828. Two of them, Kenyon College at Gambier (Knox County) and Western Reserve College at Hudson (Portage County) were private institutions, chartered as recently as 1824 and 1826, and dominated by the Protestant Episcopal and the Presbyterian-cum-Congregational churches, respectively. The other two institutions were older in their origins, based on federal land grants, and at least partly under state control, with trustees appointed by the General Assembly. Ohio University, at Athens, was a Territorial foundation, reincorporated in 1804 and opening its doors in 1809. Its requests for state financial aid

16. Atwater, The General Character, Present and Future Prospects of The People of Ohio (Columbus, 1827), esp. 13-14, 19;
had received only limited help — in 1817 authority to hold a lottery to raise $20,000, and a grant of $1,000 by the improving legislature of 1825. Miami University, at Oxford, was the fruit of Symmes' disputed College Township, chartered in 1809 but not opened to students until 1824. Inadequate endowments continued to inhibit its development, and two years later it still had only three teachers — the President and two professors — besides its grammar-school staff. Like Athens, Oxford applied to the 1825-26 Assembly for financial aid but without success.17

One promising step had been taken in 1824, however, when the Assembly decided that half the proceeds of a new tax upon auctions should be set aside as a fund to be applied by future legislatures "for literary purposes." Some of Congress's land grants, too, most notably the Salt Springs reservations, had been earmarked for use by the state for "literary purposes." This phrase was generally understood to refer to the higher branches of humanistic education, yet the Assembly of 1826-27 decided to absorb these grants into a permanent school fund designed to benefit common schools exclusively. This measure was justified on the grounds that the state needed to plough all available resources into common schools, whereas colleges are "of no great utility, and only calculated for the rich and luxurious — to create invidious distinctions in society — dividing the people into PATRICIANS and PLEBIANS." Opponents of the proposal argued that the colleges attracted no greater proportion of rich people than the common schools, while a decent school system, effective representation in Congress, and "the professions of law, divinity and physic," all depended on proper provision for higher education. Moreover, they adopted their

17. Ohio State Journal, 21 Dec. 1826; Samuel Wheeler to Hitchcock, Columbus, 29 Jan. 1826, PHFP. Brief summaries of these institutions may be found in Howe, Historical Collections (1887), I, 144-46, 286, 354-55; and Edward A. Miller, The History of Educational Legislation in Ohio From 1803 To 1850 (New York, 1969), 87-93, originally published in OAHQ, XXVII (1918) and in Supplementary School Monographs, III (1920).
antagonists’ rhetoric by arguing that the inadequacy of higher education in Ohio forced many of its sons to go to Eastern colleges; this not only took some $30,000 out of the state annually, but exposed Ohio's youth to "vice and dissipation," to the effete and corrupt ways of the wicked and aristocratic East. Throughout the debate the vocal defenders of the colleges tended to be Adams men, while leading Jacksonians supported the anti-aristocratic cause; but the latter side of the argument drew on more than merely partisan support, and the measure depriving colleges of a promised endowment was carried by an overwhelmingly pro-Administration legislature. 18

In spite of this setback, the President of Miami University, Robert Hamilton Bishop, endeavoured to secure public money for the foundation of a chair in law at Oxford. He pointed out to Governor Trimble that there was no regular law school in the West, a lack which threatened the purity of republican institutions in Ohio, and he suggested that "a few intelligent and active men" in each county be enlisted to persuade a majority of the voters to petition the next General Assembly to finance the establishment of such a chair - $20,000 invested in public stock would suffice. Trimble, though sympathetic to Bishop's object, warned him not to adopt a plan "so liable to fail, and in its failure to raise a prejudice against an honorable profession, and a young and promising institution of learning":

Now sir, look at the operation of this plan. You select the most influential men in each county, a lawyer if you please and friendly to the project, a petition is started, some demagogue comes out a candidate for the legislature (a third rate lawyer ten to one) a friend to the people, and laying hold of the vulgar prejudices of the community against science and literature, cries out Aristocracy, Privileged Orders, tax the poor to educate the rich, etc. And should the candidate not be a petty-fogger, he has only to bawl out lustily against lawyers, and the plan of taxing the people to increase a class already too numerous, and my word for it, your petition would have a lean minority in the counties, and probably a more mortifying one in the legislature.

Trimble was convinced that the proposed petition would "raise a high degree of excitement against lawyers, and prevent many of the most talented and liberal among them (who may be candidates) from being elected to the legislature." In their place would succeed unworthy men pledged to oppose appropriations for the University - "and God knows there is no necessity for sending men under pledges to oppose your interest, for there have always been enough willing to let you alone, without previous obligation to do so, or even to refuse aid pledged to be given, as evidenced by the proceeding of the last legislature." Trimble recommended an appeal to private sources, especially lawyers, for funds to establish the chair, and advised that, "however unfortunate your appeals to the legislature have hitherto been," Bishop should continue to petition the legislature directly "without agitating this question in the community."19

This frank advice clearly demonstrated the persistence of popular attitudes which the cause of improvement had not modified and even threatened to provoke. In spite of the general popularity of the canal and school laws of 1825, some grumbles were heard about having to pay extra taxes, especially in the areas where these measures were valued least. Suspicion even of common-school education persisted in some of the most southerly counties, and in the 1825 Assembly elections two candidates in Adams County pledged, if elected, "to oppose the system of Education." As a consequence, the school law was implemented only slowly in many counties, and years later advocates of public education complained of the patchiness of the state's common-school system.20 Behind these attitudes lay a popular assumption that education conferred privilege or at least created social


differences, that intellectual habits of mind cut the educated off from the masses. Moreover, those who gained the social advantages that education brought were suspected of using their knowledge, their contacts, their greater involvement in politics, to enhance their advantages by securing some form of legal protection or privilege. Such suspicions underlay what Elisha Whittlesey in 1830 described as the "feverish excitement at this time against professional men."21

Such feelings found expression also in contemporary attitudes to the laws designed to ensure that only properly qualified doctors practised in Ohio. Since 1811 a series of laws had experimented with a variety of measures for testing the medical knowledge of would-be practitioners, and licensing them: unlicensed practitioners could not use the law to collect fees, and at times were liable to fines. By the 1820s the principle of legislative regulation was widely criticized, and, in the 1826-27 Assembly James B. Gardiner proposed the repeal of the critical sections of the present law. He emphasized that his aim was not to encourage quacks, for he believed that properly qualified doctors did not need the protection of legal penalties. Rather, he and others believed that the law was turning popular sympathy away from regular practitioners:

Its existence on our statute book had the effect to prejudice the people against the legalized part of the faculty, and mislead their sympathies in favour of men who are mere pretenders to science. The community did and would consider the law as made for the protection of the licensed physicians; and not to guard the people against dangerous impositions.

Besides objecting to such "exclusive privileges," the people thought that doctors "armed with a diploma" were often as great quacks as those "armed with steam and horse fleas" - and other crazy panaceas. However, the argument that ill people needed protection against "unskilled practitioners, ... empyrics ... and quacks" prevailed (19-12) in the Senate, with both parties divided but the Adams men distinctly more hostile to Gardiner's

21. Whittlesey to Giddings, Canfield, 14 Sept. 1830, Giddings Papers.
proposal. In 1833, however, the penal clauses were to be repealed, largely, it seems, as a result of the "botanic" lobby, an alternative approach to medicine which was frowned upon by many established doctors. But Albert G. Riddle was no doubt right to conclude, half a century later, that doctors could not maintain their privileges "against leveling tendencies under democratic institutions which, with us, so far as governmental forces are concerned, have decreed that scientific and intellectual height shall come down and repose quietly on the plain of ignorance."

Leaders of the canal programme well appreciated that they had to appease or at least avoid provoking, these popular prejudices against lawyers, doctors and merchants. When the tax system was reformed in 1825 as the price of financing the canals, new taxes were imposed not only on merchants' capital but also on the professional income of doctors and lawyers. Many doubted whether the latter tax was constitutional since the state constitution forbade capitation taxes, and the lawyers and doctors of Cincinnati resolved not to pay it until its constitutionality had been tested before the courts; to their consternation, it was upheld by the state supreme court in 1829. Consistently the improvers tried to avoid rousing prejudices which might undermine the canal programme by identifying it with the more favoured classes. Allen Trimble, as commissioner of the Canal Fund, hoped his colleagues would not openly "come out against" the resolutions of an anti-canal meeting in Trumbull County in March 1825 - "nor would it do for any of the Western men now in the City [of New York] for they are all Merchants, against whom demagoggs would cry out lustily,

23. [Riddle], Geauga and Lake Counties, 32. See also Buley, Old Northwest, 294-95, and ch. V passim.
and perhaps successfully.\textsuperscript{25}

The feeling that well-situated individuals were profiting from the people's fiscal burden inevitably made the various canal commissioners potential targets for popular suspicion. In May 1826 both Acting Commissioners, Alfred Kelley and Micajah T. Williams, appreciated that "the public are ready to take the alarm" and "the sovereign authority may next session throw us all over board." Particularly damaging were suggestions that canal commissioners chose routes which benefited their personal interests, or that Fund Commissioners used public money to extend the paper circulation of their own private banks.\textsuperscript{26} By 1827 Ethan Allen Brown believed that the canal scheme's few opponents had given up attacks on "the general policy" but would "with eagerness seize an opportunity to assail the Comrs." Throughout there were criticisms of the remuneration the Commissioners received, exceeding, as it did, that of legislators, and in 1828 the Assembly failed to vote the Fund Commissioners the compensation owing them.\textsuperscript{27} So friends of the canals decided to impose limits on the tax powers of county commissioners -- who levied three times as much tax as did the state -- in order to "dissipate... discontent ... and restore that equilibrium, and cheerfulness in society, which alone can secure a happy termination for those great and glorious works."\textsuperscript{28}

Popular suspicions of men in power guaranteed that the most popular proposal for government retrenchment was the reduction of state legislators' pay from the three dollars per day fixed on in 1824. In the fall elections

\textsuperscript{25} Trimble to Brown, Philadelphia, 24 Mar. 1825, EABP.

\textsuperscript{26} Kelley to Brown, Cleveland, 1, 15 May 1826, and Williams to Brown, Cincinnati, 28 May 1827 [?1826], EABP; "M.T.W." to Tappan, Cincinnati, [11 May 1826], BTP, OHS.

\textsuperscript{27} Brown to J. Rathbone Jr., Columbus, 4 Jan. 1827, and Buckingham to Brown, Putnam, 21 Jan. 1828, EABP; St. Clairsville Gazette, 25 Feb. 1826.

\textsuperscript{28} Ohio State Journal, in St. Clairsville Gazette, 3 Mar. 1827.
of 1825, a host of candidates came forward with what a Western Reserve editor called "whining addresses," pledging to secure a return to the two-dollar per diem. This change was usually justified on the grounds that "labor of every kind, both natural and mental, are comparatively low," though a Belmont County newspaper correspondent thought that Ohio legislators should be paid less because they had recently laid extra financial burdens on the people by the school and canal laws of 1825.29

Inevitably, those elected on this platform raised the issue in the next Assembly, 1825-26. One commentator hinted that "the subject has been introduced as a hobby-horse for the mover to ride into the Legislature next year"; another described it as "customary at the beginning of every session" for some representatives to make "quite a flourish to reduce their own wages, but with little disposition to do much on the subject."30 Embarrassed by the proposal, many members responded that the reduction in members' pay should be part of "a general system of retrenchment," reducing the salaries of all state, county and township officers, including judges. The original proponents insisted such a bill went far beyond popular demands and would never pass, and called on "the real friends of retrenchment" to oppose it. They were, however, outmanoeuvred: the general replaced the specific bill, and was then killed; the margin of defeat came from members who were evidently pleased to have made speeches and given votes, at some stage, in favour of some form of retrenchment. As the St. Clairsville Gazette said, "... a good deal of time was spent on the subject of the compensation, but if it was not decided in accordance with the wishes of a majority of the people, we have no doubt a large majority of the

29. Ravenna Western Courier, in Scioto Gazette, 15 Sept. 1825; St. Clairsville Gazette, 10 Sept. 1825.
members are now satisfied with the decision."  

The greatest "noise," however, was created by the House's decision to expel the mover of the reduction bill, James B. Gardiner. Gardiner was a thoroughly entertaining - and unscrupulous - character: a virulent young Federalist editor in Marietta in 1809, an editor and postmaster in Franklinton during the war and a tavern keeper in Columbus after it, he was widely regarded as a wit and a drunkard. After he had moved to Greene County about 1823, his acquaintances rejoiced in the story of how "J.B.G. got drunk in Xenia last night, and lost his hat down the privy."  

Running for the Assembly in 1825, he addressed a broadside to the voters promising, if elected, to introduce a bill reducing members' salaries to $2 per day; if the bill failed, he would pocket the three dollars per diem and deposit the extra dollar a day in the county treasury. His election was duly challenged, and the House decided that his pledge constituted open bribery of the voters, of a kind that had never occurred before in Ohio. Gardiner was expelled, with several fellow proponents of the salary reduction proving "most zealous for his exclusion." Inevitably, however, his expulsion was interpreted as a punishment for proposing the two-dollar bill; and he was re-elected, in the special election to fill the vacancy, "by an almost unanimous vote" in Greene County.  

This placed the House in a "dilemma": though legal experts as renowned as Charles Hammond defended Gardiner's right to his seat, the "heat" engendered by indignation at his behaviour ensured that the House would refuse him readmittance. Only the end of the

31. St. Clairsville Gazette, 18 Feb. 1826. See also legislative summary and reports, including votes, in Scioto Gazette, 10, 22, 29 Dec. 1825, 5 Jan. 1826.

32. Hammond to Wright, 27 May 1824, CHP. See also William T. Martin, History of Franklin County (Columbus, 1858), 60, 175, 283-84, 288-89.

session prevented the recurrence of "the days and tâmes of Wilkes and liberty." 34

The passions aroused by this cause célèbre ensured it would remain an issue in the 1826 fall elections. Gardiner was now elected to the state senate by the voters of Greene County and, it was claimed, many who had voted for his expulsion were left at home. 35 From the outset of the next session, there was no doubt that "the people expect from their representatives" a fair consideration of the "old hackneyed subject" of the members' pay, unconnected with the compensation of other officers. The protagonists of the "compensation bill" were now accused of being "demagogues, who wish to ride into office on that hobby" - possibly into Congress, for eight dollars a day - or "to break down a more respectable antagonist"; and their measure was opposed ostensibly for that reason. One opponent - an Adams man - proposed a referendum on the issue, but his amendment was defeated, 21-50, with "the two dollar men" voting against it. The bill itself quickly passed the House, 51-19, with many of those who voted for it openly wishing it might not pass. The Senate, however, indefinitely postponed the bill, 17-16, with Gardiner notably silent - because, it was said, he secretly wished it to fail and wanted the vote held before two absentees friendly to the bill could reach Columbus. One wit sent a local newspaper a blank sheet of paper entitled "James B. Gardiner's speech on the Compensation Bill"! Besides agitating the deregulation of medicine, Gardiner now pressed for an early adjournment "as the only kind of retrenchment likely to be entered into" - and the Assembly did adjourn before the end of January, after an unusually short session. In a debate on whether to hold a referendum on the question of revising the state constitution, Gardiner suggested that the

34. William K. Bond to Whittlesey, Columbus, 9 April [Jan.?] 1826, EWP. See also Hammond to Wright, Columbus, 8 Jan. 1826, CHP.

people should also be asked how much they thought legislators should be paid, but his proposal was turned down—significantly, on the grounds that such a proposition "would tend to inflame their feelings, or produce an improper bias in selecting members of the Convention."[36]

Those who had voted against the Compensation Bill now, in many cases, found themselves under attack. The controversy over the matter occupied the columns of the St. Clairsville Gazette for over three months, until the editor finally cried "Enough!" In the 1827 fall elections some candidates began to outbid the two-dollar men, offering to serve for as little as 62½ cents per day (!), though not always with success.[37] In the Assembly of 1827-28 the Bill was once more proposed by Gardiner, but the Senate refused him leave, 18-18, to introduce the measure. The Ohio State Journal hoped "the indefatigable mover" of the Bill would accept its quietus rather than "consume the time of the Legislature, disturb their harmony, and be fairly smothered by obliging friends, with the weight of amendments, for additional retrenchment in other departments of the Government."[38]

By that time, however, members and populace were more caught up in national concerns, and the Compensation Bill did not again rear its head.

Yet there can be little doubt that the Compensation issue had its connections with the growth of Jacksonism. Not that the issue of legislators' pay was a party issue, or agitated as such: leading spokesmen in the Assembly on each side of the question came from both Presidential camps, or finished up in both; outspoken Jacksonian editors like Robert H. Miller of the St. Clairsville Gazette made clear their sympathy with those who defended the three-dollar status quo, and many Jacksonians supported


Gardiner's expulsion for making a corrupting pledge to the voters. If anything, voting in the Assembly showed western (which still primarily meant southwestern) Ohio as most sympathetic to the two-dollar cause, except for Hamilton County, and identifiable firm Adams men who voted for the bill came from that section of the state. A further bloc of support appeared in some north-central counties, notably Richland and Knox, and less consistently in the German 'backbone' counties. In general, eastern Ohio (including some Jacksonians) was opposed, especially where settled by New Englanders. However, by late 1827 most identifiable Jacksonians from eastern Ohio were voting for the Bill, and the Senate vote in December showed a growing partisan alignment: the Jackson men were two-to-one in favour, and Adams men two-to-one against, the reduction of legislators' salaries.

This alignment tends to confirm the impression that at the local level candidates who identified themselves as Jacksonian were the more likely to advocate the two-dollar cause. In Belmont County it was the demagogic Jacksonian doctor John McMahon, he of the extravagant democratic rhetoric, who on and off for over three months attacked the local state representative for wanting to be paid more than "the farmer or the mechanic... during the winter season." Elsewhere it was Jacksonian candidates who offered to represent their counties for 68 or even 62½ cents per day.

In Montgomery County the Jackson party decided, in 1826 and 1827, that "they could not elect a thorough going Jackson man" and so supported the firm Adams man George B. Holt, first for Congress and then the Senate, as

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39. Based on debates, proceedings and votes recorded in Assembly Journals, the Scioto Gazette and Ohio State Journal (esp. 8 Dec. 1827).

"the least of two evils." According to the opponent he defeated in 1827, who had himself voted for the two-dollar law, "Mr. Holt rendered himself very popular among the Dutch in our County by the great noise he made whilst in the legislature, about reducing the wages of the members."41

A few men prominent in the two-dollar cause, though not Holt, soon became Jacksonians: Gardiner himself had brought his Xenia newspaper, the Ohio People's Press, out for Jackson by March 1828. Yet the point is, not so much that the Jacksonians exploited the two-dollar issue, as that it demonstrated a continuing suspicion of politicians, of men in positions of influence who might exploit power to line their own pockets; and that resentment among Ohio farmers operated strongly to the advantage of a Presidential candidate deemed somehow to stand above the sordidness of day-to-day politics.

Patterns of Social Tension

No simple cleavage in society underlay the Second Party System in Ohio; the complexity of the process of formation ensured that. The influences that had determined partisan attachments in 1824 were not only varied in themselves but somewhat different from those of 1828; while the various considerations influencing voters in the latter critical year often cut across each other, and produced different reactions among individuals of similar backgrounds, experience and interest. Yet some generalizations about the social composition of each party's support may be advanced, demonstrating a tendency among most members of a particular ethnic or socioeconomic group to prefer one candidate to the other. And the role that publicly agitated local issues expressing popular discontents had

41. S. Fales to Gov. Trimble, Dayton, 16 Nov. 1827, in Trimble Correspondence 164. See also Geo. B. Holt - "for J.Q.A." - to Hammond, Dayton, 19 Nov. 1827, CHP.
played in the years before the Presidential election ensured that there would be signs of a class division between the great parties of the future.

Such a claim will, of course, be dismissed by those who believe that ethnocultural 'political culture' was the main (if not only) influence on Jacksonian voting behaviour. And to some extent this is true: the Jackson party in Ohio undoubtedly had less appeal to New Englanders than to some other, perhaps more exotic, ethnic groups. In 1826 The Voice of the People had assured voters in eastern Ohio that Jackson was "a friend of aliens," while an 1828 meeting in Belmont County accused Adams of despising the Irish. As the campaign wore on, the question of whether unnaturalized citizens could vote revived once more, and once more John M. Goodenow pronounced that attempts to prevent them were contrary to the state constitution, whatever the state supreme court had said. However, aliens were encouraged to become citizens, and Jacksonian politicians provided naturalization forms for those who wanted them. Nonetheless, in many townships in eastern Ohio aliens were allowed to vote, illegally or not, and it was generally agreed that these foreigners "have uniformly voted the Jackson democratic party."

In this situation the Adams party, according to Charles Reemelin, took on a nativist character: "Most of the naturalized citizens were for Jackson, and this fact made the Adamsites look askance on them.... Their party consisted almost exclusively of natives, and it was natural for them to hold this to be the American cause." In this spirit Adams men in Cincinnati reminded immigrants that only naturalized citizens could vote, a restriction


2. Voice of the People, 24; St. Clairsville Gazette, 21 June 1828.

which produced cries of protest from Dawson's Cincinnati Advertiser, which constantly appealed to immigrants. However, such nativism was subdued, even in Cincinnati, since the fairly affluent German Protestants who had settled there recently (the "Zwanzigers") provided some support for Adams, while even the Scotch Irish, supposedly "the core ethnic group of the Democratic party," were far from united. In such circumstances the Administration men did what they could to undercut Jackson's appeal to certain ethnic groups. In particular, they searched for personal details about Jackson which might discredit him with his followers. As a Washington journalist told Hammond,

The great body of low Irish in the country are to be found among his partisans, for no other reason than because he is said to have been born of Irish parents.... To establish the fact that his parents were not Irish, would of itself lose him a great part of his present support - to carry it still further and prove that he is of mixed blood, would root out all affection for him in that class of our citizens, for the antipathy between the Irish and our race of blacks, is as strong as that between the Cat and the Cur.

However, the evidence they discovered proved Jackson's parents were "Irish people," probably first-generation immigrants, thus forcing them to concede the bulk of the 'ethnic' vote to Jackson.

However, even if these groups were solid in their support for the favoured party - which they were not - they could not, by themselves, have formed the basis for a party division. It is conventionally assumed that New Englanders represented about 25 per cent of the state's population in the late 1820s, and settlers from Pennsylvania about 28-30 per cent; unnaturalized foreigners made up only 0.62 per cent of the population in

6. Tobias Watkins to Hammond, Washington D.C., 14 July 1828, CHP. A main piece of evidence came from an aged resident of South Carolina who had known Jackson's parents: see Mary Cowsar's certified statement, 19 Aug. 1828, VFM 1867, OHS.
In such circumstances the Jacksonians had to find most of their support among groups of Anglo-Saxon origin. Thus even in Fairfield County, one of the most heavily German outside the 'backbone' counties, the Jacksonians had to balance their county ticket in 1828 most carefully so that the success of the party was not jeopardized by dissensions between German and English-speaking residents. But what ethnocultural factors divided the native population? Pennsylvanians not of Scotch Irish or 'Dutch' background were not particularly identified with one party, nor, in general, were Southerners, as the divisions in the Virginia Military District indicate. However, it is quite possible that the self-awareness of particular native ethnocultural groups was heightened wherever they rubbed shoulders with New Englanders. As a doctor from Rhode Island had remarked in 1815, "the prejudices of the Germans and Virginians against New England people are very strong"; and in some counties frequent contact may have turned some native groups, especially Southerners, against Adams, even though this was not the case in the state as a whole.

Such a possibility could explain the surge to Jackson in 1828 in Licking County, which in many respects was unlike other counties that Jackson ran well in. Licking had been settled by Southerners, mainly from Maryland and Virginia, and especially by Pennsylvanians, but it also contained a Welsh settlement and the renowned town of Granville. According to Henry Howe in the 1880s, "Granville is, perhaps, the most peculiar, unique village in the State. It was for a long period 'a chunk' of the old-time New


10. N.N. Hill, Jr., History of Licking County, Ohio (Newark, O., 1881), 212-15, 222-23, 227; Isaac Smucker, Centennial History of Licking County, Ohio (Newark, O., 1876), 41.
England set down in central Ohio." Settled in 1805 by two hundred people from Granville, Massachusetts, the town was still in 1839 inhabited "almost exclusively by sons of New-England," who consciously preserved the best values of the New England of "thirty years ago." It provided a point of reference for neighbouring settlers, and came into spasmodic conflict with the county seat, Newark - which, according to the legendary (and Swedenborgian) Johnny Appleseed, corresponded to his idea of Hell, only smaller.  

One dramatic moment in the conflict occurred in 1822 when the county's year-old and only newspaper, the Newark Advocate, refused to announce the candidacy for the Assembly of Granville's leading citizen. Seventy Granville subscribers marched in a mock funeral procession behind muffled drums and buried copies of the paper in a grave; all but two cancelled their subscriptions. 12 In 1824 Granville voted for Adams, while most people in the rest of the county agreed with the Advocate in supporting Clay as the internal-improvement candidate. But when Clay coalesced with Adams, their respective followers did not all join together as they apparently did in other parts of Ohio. The editor of the Advocate was one of only two Ohio Clay editors to denounce the "bargain" - for "the sole purpose," according to the Scioto Gazette, "of gratifying his inveterate animosity towards Mr ADAMS." 13 In 1826 Licking County supported overwhelmingly the incumbent Congressman from Newark, who had supported Clay in 1824 but voted for Crawford in the House election; and then, on his death in 1827, turned to another Newark man, William Stanbery. 14

11. Howe, Historical Collections (1888), II, 81; Mr. Gurley, quoted in "New England in the West," The Hesperian, II (1839), 415; Hill, Licking County, 239-40.


14. Ohio State Journal, 2 Nov. 1826; Zanesville Ohio Republican, 10 Nov. 1827. For Wilson, see Stevens, Early Jackson Party, 85, 176, 178; Scioto Gazette, 2 Nov. 1826; and Biographical Directory of the American Congress (1961),
Jersey, reached Congress, he immediately joined the Jacksonians, openly exulting, it was said, "at the idea that the yankees were to be driven to the wall." In this respect Stanbery may have reflected the attitudes of many of his neighbours, who in 1828 increased their vote for Jackson from the 11.7 per cent of 1824 to 63.7 per cent.15

Such antagonisms may, of course, have reflected religious differences as much as regional origins. Granville, for example, was dominated by its Congregational church, which in 1832 was to consist of 136 voters, only one of whom voted for Jackson; apart from the Welsh, the other settlers in Licking County were predominantly Methodist with some Baptists and some Scotch Irish Presbyterians.16 Stephen Fox has followed the lead of Lee Benson and Ronald P. Formisano in stressing religious factors as the source of differing political cultures; and certainly it is reasonable to look toward religious influences, for to some people religion was undoubtedly a greater obsession than politics. The decade was marked by repeated religious revivals, led especially by the Methodists, while the end of the decade saw in some counties the rapid emergence and expansion of the Campbellites, or Disciples of Christ. Great excitements were generated by zealots, such as followed the appearance of Joseph C. Dylks as a Christ-figure at a camp meeting in Salesville, Guernsey County, in August 1828, which produced controversy and even a "reign of terror" locally throughout the last months of the Presidential campaign.17 Timothy Flint believed that,

1834-35. Wilson, it must be conceded, was himself a New Englander, but consistently opposed Adams.


in Ohio, "Most people are desirous of being thought to belong to some religious denomination," while Caleb Atwater repeatedly claimed that "a greater proportion of our population belong to some church, than any other people in the Union" — especially in the "Scioto and Miami countries." 18

Yet religion only seldom intruded openly into political campaigns. One reason was, as Tocqueville was to find, that American ministers in general were anxious to avoid being thought politically-minded. Americans for the most part had no desire to connect religion with the state, and aberrations like the Sunday Mails campaign met with surprisingly little support and much criticism from almost all quarters. Furthermore, as Atwater repeatedly stressed, there was little antagonism among the various denominations, at least in the 1820s. The English traveller Simon Ferrall expressed surprise that there was nothing like sectarian animosity prevailing in Ohio, a happy state of affairs he ascribed mainly to the lack of both an established church and compulsory religious taxation. 19 But the ethnocultural case does not require public conflict between denominations; rather, it supposes that a man's religious beliefs would create a world-view that would influence his political choices. For Stephen Fox, religious outlook, above all, affected attitude to party organization, with the more "pietistic" objecting to Jacksonian partisanship; yet "antipartyism" was a common and recurrent ideological motif on all sides, and organization a feature of both parties. 20 Alternatively, for both him and Formisano, a basic cleavage existed among the sects according to their attitude to

18. Timothy Flint, A Condensed Geography and History of the Western States, or The Mississippi Valley (Cincinnati, 1828), 317-18; Atwater, The General Character, Present and Future Prospects of the People of Ohio (Columbus, 1827), 11, and History of Ohio (1837), 306.

19. Atwater, General Character, 7-8, and History of Ohio, 304-05, 325; Simon A. Ferrall, A Ramble of Six Thousand Miles Through the United States of America (London, 1832), 70-71.

government action on moral questions. On the one hand were the "pietists" or evangelicals who wished to impose their moral values, to establish or restore a true community regard for traditional Christian virtues and strict moral behaviour; they agreed with the clerical writer in an Ohio Presbyterian journal in 1830 that if moral questions, in which the link between religion and politics was "so intimate," were left "in the hands of ungodly statesmen," religious men "may well tremble for the result."21 Opposed to them were the "liturgicals" or "Arminians" or "non-Puritans" who feared the imposition of moral or religious codes by government - and saw the Jackson party as the more committed to the separation of Church and State. Yet the religious denomination which was most consistently anti-Jacksonian, namely the Quakers, in both Hicksite and orthodox forms, were not "pietist" in Formisano's sense: they retained their suspicion of government power and persecution, and through these years openly voiced their hostility even to the imposition of an educational system by the state.22 Admittedly the Presbyterians and Congregationalists of New England origin were at once consistent supporters of moral crusades and supporters of Adams, but the equally "pietist" Presbyterians of Scotch Irish origin favoured Jackson. There was some contemporary talk that Methodists all favoured the Administration, which was supposedly one reason why Adams kept John McLean, the best known Methodist in Ohio, within his cabinet. However, Jacksonian papers could quote examples of Methodist local preachers who openly supported Jackson, not least Thomas Scott of Chillicothe and William Burke, formerly a renowned circuit-rider and now postmaster at Cincinnati, and enough Methodists with Democratic attachments have been found elsewhere for the 'ethnoculturalists' to try to deny them their undeniable place as enthusiastic supporters.


of evangelical crusades. There is simply no evidence to suggest that the pietist/liturgical dichotomy was of any significance as an influence on voting behaviour in 1828 - nor any reason to believe it was relevant to a choice between the two Presidential candidates.

After all, it was by no means clear in 1828 that Jackson was a more ungodly statesman than Adams. The Scotch Irishman had been elected President of the foreign and home missionary societies in 1825, which gave the impression to some that the Presbyterian church had taken him "under its patronage." He was commonly seen as an upholder of traditional values, and it was a supporter of his - Dr. Ezra Stiles Ely - who in 1827 first advocated a "Christian party in politics." In Ohio some "good people" thought Adams "not very religious" that he has purchased a billiard table with public money" and retained a duellist like Clay in his cabinet, while William Burke reported that the purchase had upset "the moral and religious" part of the community. Adams' orthodoxy was further challenged by newspaper claims, on the eve of the election, that he was a Unitarian, even if he did hold a pew in a Presbyterian church. Adams, however, still retained the support of most Presbyterians and Congregationalists, because of his sectional identification and the distaste of most Northern evangelicals for slaveowners, even in 1828. This latter consideration - together with horror at a military man who had spent his time killing Indians - was certainly what dictated the political attitude of the Quakers.


24. Whittlesey to Tappan, Canfield, 9 Aug. 1825, BTP, LC. For Ely and his sermon, see Schlesinger, Age of Jackson, 137.

25. Campbell to Trimble, Washington, 10 Apr. 1826, in Trimble Correspondence, 145; Burke to McLean, Cincinnati, 17 July 1826, McLean Papers.

Religious differences were most likely to have had a political significance within New England communities. Many Yankee settlers bore with them to Ohio memories and experience of struggles concerning the privileges of the established Congregationalist churches of Connecticut and Massachusetts, and retained their fear that such a traditional "ecclesiasticism" might be reimposed in their Western communities. In the early years on the Western Reserve, according to its most interesting historian, "Deism, Unitarianism, in at least two forms, Universalism and Universal Restoration, were largely prevalent," though they rarely developed institutional forms and left few records: in his memorable words, "Men who do not believe in buried treasure seldom organize to not find it." To them were added sceptics and members of the newer sects that had developed in New England and, very recently, in Ohio. Such groups may well have viewed the commitment of the Plan of Union churches to Adams with some apprehension, but it is far from clear that they tended to become Jacksonian in undue proportion, at least in 1828. One Jackson man in Portage County described as "feds" the few Presbyterians in his town, which, he wrote, was "inhabited by Methodists Camel lite Bantists [Campbellite Baptists] Bantists nothinarians and Universalists." In 1828 the town, Streetsborough, had voted 33-16 in favour of Adams, admittedly a slightly lower proportion (67.35%) than that for the county as a whole (71.21%). Not until the emergence of Antimasonry as a political issue after 1828 did religious affiliations seriously influence voting behaviour on the Western Reserve - and that breach in the Adams ranks merely made it obvious that the Administration cause had appealed to New Englanders of all religious persuasions.

In the end, one wonders whether religion was really a major concern for most Ohio voters. Simon Ferrall thought in 1830 that


28. William Y. Ford to Elias Ford, [Streetsborough], 6 June 1830, VFM 367, OHS
The farmers of this state are by no means religious, in a doctrinal sense; on the contrary, they appear indifferent on matters of this nature. The girls sometimes go to church, which here, as in all Christian countries, is equivalent to the bazaars of Smyrna and Bagdad; and as the girls go, their "dads" must pay the parson.

Mrs. Trollope too - admittedly, by no means the most reliable observer - doubted the depth of religious commitment, even in "a country where religion is the tea-table talk": "I never saw, nor read of, any country where religion had so strong a hold upon the women, or a slighter hold upon the men." Collections of family letters suggest she may have been right: a sexual dichotomy of interest kept religion separated from politics. 29

For a significant section of the electorate religious commitment was probably not deep enough to affect better judgement; while in those cases where religious differences are detectable between the parties, they may be the incidental consequence of other differences: ethnic origin, regional location - or the sort of class self-awareness which made people regard the Presbyterians and Episcopalians as more upper-class, less "democratic" than the more popular Methodists and Baptists. 30

Certainly men spoke and wrote as though there were a class division in the parties' support in Ohio. Even before the House election, Indian agent John Johnston thought Adams was preferred to Jackson by "at least that part of the people who are the best judges of qualification, and who have the greatest stake in the issue of the contest." Allen Trimble, too, believed Adams' support lay among "the reflecting part of the people," but had "no doubt but Jackson would in an election, have a majority of votes" in Ohio. A month later, in January 1825, Hammond thought that, on the contrary, Adams would win an election in Ohio, but only because "a very large majority of


those who think, and who usually give a tone to public opinion, decidedly prefer Adams to Jackson."

Various indications suggest that there was some objective reality behind these observations. In April 1825 Cincinnati Jacksonians found that they could organize a dinner for Jackson only if they secured "the cash and the countenances of the Adams and Clay men." When Ohio's leading lawyers gathered at Columbus for the session of the federal Court in July 1827, so few Jacksonians were present that one Adams man thought "there could not be said... to be two parties" in the state capital during that period. Even the meeting of the General Assembly did not bring many more Jackson men to Columbus, because, as William McLean told his Postmaster-General brother after the 1827 elections, most members of the legislature for the last ten years had become Adams-Clay men. Shortly afterwards the twenty-two medical districts in Ohio met in a state convention: 18 or 19 of the 21 delegates favoured Adams, while the absent delegate had stayed at home to attend his local Administration convention. This was assumed to demonstrate accurately "the sentiments of a large and intelligent profession in Ohio." The personal observation of the Adams men in general tallied: as one of Hammond's correspondents privately reported from Meigs County, "I do not know of a man of any standing in society but what is friendly to the present Administration."

The Jacksonians certainly thought it was in their interest to proclaim loudly that the upper classes supported Adams. James Gazlay told

31. John Johnston to Brown, Upper Piqua, 15 Dec. 1824, EABP; Trimble to McArthur, Columbus, 22 Dec. 1824, McArthur Papers; Hammond to Wright, Columbus, 10 Jan. 1825, CHP.

32. Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 2 Apr. 1825, CHP; William Key Bond to Whittlesey, Columbus, 22 July 1827, EWP; W. McLean to John McLean, Columbus, 26 Oct. 1827, McLean Papers.


34. H. Bosworth to Hammond, Chester, Meigs Co., 19 Jan. 1828, CHP.
his constituents in 1825 that Congressmen who had voted for Adams not only believed that they could vote against the popular will with impunity, but reassured themselves "that the better sort of people were in favor of Mr. Adams." Such evidence gave justification to the Jacksonians' claim that they were resisting the encroachments of the aristocracy: as the young Samuel Medary's masthead at the Batavia (Clermont County) Ohio Sun proclaimed, the Jacksonians were "UNAWED BY THE INFLUENCE OF THE RICH, THE GREAT, OR THE NOBLE." The St. Clairsville Gazette insisted that the great men, especially officeholders, provided the backbone of the Administration party's organization, sarcastically implying that the floods of handbills in eastern Ohio were being distributed by "the Judges, Clerks and lawyers."

The editor of the Ohio State Journal was accused - with some justice - of believing that "Adams would get the vote of Ohio, from the circumstance that all the Judges and Generals, Lawyers and Doctors being in his favor"; this, said the Newark Advocate subsequently, demonstrated his "deplorable ignorance" of the "true character" of the American people. The Jackson press loved to ascribe aristocratic notions to their opponents, and accused them of a snobbish scorn for ordinary voters. The St. Clairsville Gazette insisted that, according to Administration spokesmen, "The supporters of Jackson are generally blackguards - drunkards; that they are the mere common people; the ignorant and the laboring class of the community; that there are no men of sense, character or standing amongst them."

One old Republican from Butler County recognised the political advantage the Jacksonians gained in the appeal to new voters from the clear identification of the educated classes with Adams. As he privately told his son-in-law and daughter,

40. Gazlay's Address, in Niles' Weekly Register, XXVIII (28 May 1825), 207; Ohio Sun, quoted in Howe, Historical Collections (1888), I, 414.

It is true that the most intelligent, orderly, moderate and learned part of [the] community, take the nation as a body, are in favor of the administration, but the restless Jealous and violent have succeeded in exciting that kind of Jealousy and discontent which is too often the forerunner of a revolution.\textsuperscript{42}

As a consequence, it has seemed reasonable to assume that the poorer, less educated classes on the whole - when no countervailing consideration operated - supported Jackson.

Unfortunately there is no statistical evidence available for this period which can confirm whether any sort of social division existed between the parties. Calculations by Stephen Fox for the 1832 election in Ohio suggest that there was only the weakest correlation at the county level between Merchants' capital and money at interest, or total taxable property, and favour for the Adams-Clay party; similarly, he found only a weak correlation (at the township level) between occupational status in town and country and voting behaviour in 1848, though his figures are not beyond criticism.\textsuperscript{43}

Yet calculations and analysis of this kind are not very helpful if we cannot distinguish between those voters who were drawn to a party because of their ethnocultural outlook, regardless of their social and economic status, and those whose party choices are shrouded in rather more mystery. If we try to make such distinction with the simplest county-level data for 1828, a most suggestive result emerges. The tax records for 1830 and the United States Census for that year together reveal the mean value of real estate per capita in each county, a value which reflected not so much the average or typical wealth among the voters but rather the degree to which the county was involved in the market economy.\textsuperscript{44} On this listing we find that, of the thirty most 'valuable'

\textsuperscript{42} James Heaton to Charles and Rebecca, Middletown, 14 Sept. 1828, Heaton Papers.


\textsuperscript{44} These values were calculated by adding the assessed value of land (including houses) and of town lots (including buildings), as equalized by the State Board of Equalization, and dividing by the number of inhabitants, in each county. Ohio General Assembly, Senate Journal, 1830-31, 26; Fifth Census (1830).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Value of Real Estate per capita, 1830</th>
<th>Adam's Vote, 1828</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lorain</td>
<td>$129.69</td>
<td>79.55</td>
<td>Western Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuyahoga</td>
<td>98.07</td>
<td>79.86</td>
<td>Western Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medina</td>
<td>95.35</td>
<td>83.39</td>
<td>Western Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huron</td>
<td>94.39</td>
<td>68.04</td>
<td>Western Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>92.77</td>
<td>35.33</td>
<td>Southwestern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ross</td>
<td>87.94</td>
<td>52.29</td>
<td>Some Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>85.42</td>
<td>55.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin</td>
<td>80.02</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portage</td>
<td>78.29</td>
<td>71.13</td>
<td>Western Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pickaway</td>
<td>77.77</td>
<td>42.58</td>
<td>Some Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licking</td>
<td>72.12</td>
<td>36.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scioto</td>
<td>72.08</td>
<td>59.57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Williams, Putnam, Paulding</td>
<td>70.96</td>
<td>60.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warren</td>
<td>68.28</td>
<td>50.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashtabula</td>
<td>67.85</td>
<td>91.54</td>
<td>Western Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pike</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Logan, Hardin</td>
<td>65.79</td>
<td>66.19</td>
<td>Some Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geauga</td>
<td>64.48</td>
<td>86.02</td>
<td>Western Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandusky</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>63.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery</td>
<td>60.17</td>
<td>49.35</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butler</td>
<td>59.28</td>
<td>22.73</td>
<td>Southwestern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>57.82</td>
<td>49.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>55.26</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>Scotch Irish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coshocton</td>
<td>55.18</td>
<td>35.76</td>
<td>Some Dutch and Scotch Irish</td>
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<td>Brown</td>
<td>54.65</td>
<td>30.13</td>
<td>Southwestern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairfield</td>
<td>54.28</td>
<td>30.26</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clermont</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>33.04</td>
<td>Southwestern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>58.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark</td>
<td>50.92</td>
<td>66.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>50.84</td>
<td>64.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 10.2

**THIRTY COUNTIES WITH LOW-VALUED REAL ESTATE, 1830**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jackson's Vote per capita, 1830</th>
<th>Jackson's Vote 1828</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hancock, Hardin</td>
<td>15.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monrocco</td>
<td>16.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monroe</td>
<td>19.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darke</td>
<td>21.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crawford</td>
<td>25.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence</td>
<td>26.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seneca</td>
<td>27.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbiana</td>
<td>28.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelby</td>
<td>28.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercer, Van Wert</td>
<td>28.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallia</td>
<td>29.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perry</td>
<td>29.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guernsey</td>
<td>29.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>29.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrison</td>
<td>29.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marion</td>
<td>30.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belmont</td>
<td>33.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hocking</td>
<td>33.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richland</td>
<td>34.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>35.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preble</td>
<td>37.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holmes</td>
<td>38.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayne</td>
<td>38.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adams</td>
<td>41.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayette</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meigs</td>
<td>43.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>43.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muskingum</td>
<td>43.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trumbull</td>
<td>44.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Some Scotch Irish
- Dutch
- Ohio Company
- Southwestern
- Western Reserve
counties, seventeen (or 56.7%) voted for Adams in 1828, while twenty
(66.7%) of the thirty least 'valuable' had voted for Jackson (see Tables
10.1 and 10.2). But if we extract from the list those counties which were
attracted to the side of Adams or Jackson in 1824 and 1828 as a result of
ethnocultural factors or because they shared in the deep hostility to Clay
generated in the southwestern counties, then a far more striking picture
appears. For of the twelve most 'valuable' counties among those that
remain, all but two had voted for Adams in 1828 - and one of the exceptions
was Licking County, which perhaps ought to have been excluded on account
of the unusual ethnocultural tension there. Of the twelve least
'valuable' that survive, only three had voted for Adams; and two of those
counties lay in the agriculturally backward area close to the Ohio River,
downstream from the Ohio Company lands, which was involved in the production
of coal and salt and was therefore more integrated into the commercial
system than were the areas of subsistence agriculture which also appeared
at the lower end of the list. 45 Admittedly, the 'new vote' in some
'valuable' counties - like Madison and Licking - strongly favoured Jackson,
but not one of the less 'valuable,' more isolated counties on the tax list
swung towards Adams - except for those on the Western Reserve and in the
Ohio Company lands.

This difference in political behaviour is especially interesting
because it coincides with a distinction which travel writers often made at
this period about the types of agricultural society in Ohio. It was frequently
observed that there were three stages in the settlement of the Northwestern
states, with a different kind of settler associated with each. First came
the hunters, backwoodsmen and squatters; these were disappearing in the
older parts of Ohio, but could still be found not only in newer areas but

45. For the mining area, see Sharp, Jacksonians Versus the Banks, 171-73,
and Ratcliffe, "Voters and Issues," 853. On both Table 10.1 and
Table 10.2, the items underlined are the twelve that make the short
list.
even in comparatively populous areas like southwestern Ohio. Then came the "second rate" farmers who cleared the land, built decent cabins, created a proper agricultural society; though owning their own land they usually could not afford to hire labour, found it difficult to market their crops, and made money mainly from the rise in land values. "The next occupier is a capitalist": according to James Flint in 1820, this "first-rate" farmer builds a larger barn than the former, and then a brick or a frame house.... He erects better fences, and enlarges the quantity of cultivated land; ... fattens cattle for the market, and perhaps erects a flour-mill, or a saw-mill, or a distillery. Farmers of this description are frequently partners in banks; members of the State assembly, or of Congress, or Justices of the Peace.

Flint found, "in the earliest settled parts of Ohio and Kentucky, the first and second rate farmers... most numerous, and ... mixed together." In more recently settled areas, "backwoodsmen and second rate settlers predominate." The situation cannot have been very different by 1828, though some areas - and many individuals - must have moved a little further on towards a more advanced stage; but, as Timothy Flint observed, most farms were still "moderately sized freeholds."

In other words, the more advanced, more 'valuable' counties contained a larger number of men similar to what William Kingdom called "the wealthy or 'strong handed' farmer," a self-made man of large property, producing for "the home and Atlantic city markets," a man of social consequence, of "plain business-like sense," who "understands his own interest, and that of his country." Men who appreciated the American System and the Adams administration? By contrast, those constituees dominated by "backwoodsmen and second rate settlers" were less developed and more isolated.

British travellers before the Panic of 1819 had considered these small

farmers to be contented but, because of their debts and limited resources, "in a condition which, if compelled by legislative acts, or by external force to endure, would be considered truly wretched." 47 Such external pressure had been exerted by the depression and, though largely relieved of their debts by 1828, such farmers were most likely to feel antagonistic to the more fortunately situated who at times seemed to thrive at their expense. And, as Simon Ferrall noted in 1830, compared with their British counterparts - small farmers who had to work in the fields themselves - they were far from deferential, "possessing infinitely more independence in their character and deportment." 48

Their sense of grievance is detectable only in minor irritations. As Caleb Atwater was to say in 1837, Ohio had traditionally been governed by the people of the towns, a fact that farmers distant from the towns resented. 49 In the depression of the early 1820s such rural hostility to the urban centres had been commonly agitated in local elections, as in Muskingum County in 1822; while in Ross in 1823 a ticket was carefully drawn up which was "intended to accommodate both town and country." 50 Resentment at having to travel long distances to transact business at the county seat led to many proposals for the division of counties, few of which had succeeded since 1820, except in the new country of northwestern Ohio. Similarly, county histories reveal complaints in outlying parts of townships about having to travel too far to vote at the store, private house, or school house that was fixed on as the polling station for the township.

47. William Kingdom, Jr., America and the British Colonies: An Abstract of All The Most Useful Information ... Collected from the Most Valuable and Recent Publications (London, 1820), 56-58.
49. Atwater, History of Ohio (1837), 347.
Though such demands could be simply satisfied by the county commissioners, who had the power to create new townships, there was often contention and much illwill generated by conflicting claims. These petty complaints help reveal the sense of resentment felt by isolated farmers, and may explain the impression – if accurate – given by some voting figures that more outlying, and newly created, townships were more likely to be Jacksonian than the township containing the county seat.

But what of lower-class elements in the rural area where "first-rate" farmers were socially dominant? Did they necessarily follow the lead of their superiors, or at least share their appreciation of the need to extend the opportunities of the market system? Throughout Ohio there were probably more tenant farmers than historians have usually imagined: in Geauga County in 1830, for example, about 30 per cent of farmers owned livestock but did not pay land tax, even though lands on the Western Reserve had no exemption from taxation.51 The great centre of tenantry lay in the Virginia Military District, and especially in the Scioto Valley, where share cropping was common, as many travellers from at least 1816 onwards commented.52 Little has been recorded concerning the political behaviour of tenant farmers, and it is not impossible that deference, or abstention, was common among them – or had been. Interestingly, after the 1828 Presidential election a Kentuckian told Henry Clay that the "tenantry in Ohio" had risen against the "Landlords" by voting for Jackson, whose election, they believed, would mean that "Col. Benton's plan would succeed and each get a quarter section of land."53 Sadly, there is little

51. Auditor of State, Tax Records – Geauga County, 1830 (State Archives, OHS).
evidence to sustain this interesting explanation. Tenantry was especially strong in Pickaway County, most noticeably on the west side of the Scioto, in the townships lying in the Virginia Military District; what voting returns survive reveal that Jackson generally won his votes on the east side of the river, where the soil was "cultivated by those who both plow and own the land." Much the same is true of Ross County, though Jackson did run well in three of the ten townships on the west side of the river. The situation was reversed in Franklin County, but here the social contrast was less clear since the east side of the Scioto fell within the United States Military District, where the land had been bought up by large speculators almost to the same extent as it had west of the river. In general, there seems little reason for linking the grievances of tenant farmers - or the prevalence of large landholdings by speculators and even non-residents - with the growth in Jacksonian support in 1828.

Also important in the more commercialized farming areas were the landless farm labourers who migrated with the seasonal demand for labour. At harvest time they moved northward through Ohio as the wheat crop ripened, and then turned to threshing and corn-picking operations in early winter - or moved into the cities, or went down South, in search of winter work. They apparently made up about one-quarter of the agricultural labour force (defined as including farmers as well as employees), and were reasonably well-treated though not well paid before 1830. Commonly allowed to vote, they were often expected to vote as their employers or the local community wished, though local farm hands usually enjoyed

54. Howe, Historical Collections (1847), 401-02; Columbus Ohio Statesman, 18 Oct. 1837 (no returns available for 1828).

55. Scioto Gazette, 5 Nov. 1828; Columbus Ohio Monitor, 22 Oct. 1828. For the character of the various land divisions, see William L. Hutchinson, "Bounty Lands of the American Revolution in Ohio" (Ph. D., University of Chicago, 1927).
greater political independence. It is impossible to know how these "hired hands and plow boys" voted, though the St. Clairsville Gazette reported from Belmont County in July 1828 that

Forty persons were employed one day last week in the Harvest field of Judge Alexander, on the Scotch Ridge. It was ascertained that they were ALL friendly to the election of Gen. Jackson.

Alexander, it should be noted, was himself a strong Jacksonian. Again, there is little evidence to sustain the view that the lower classes in the countryside rebelled against their superiors; rather, there seems to have been a tendency for people to respond as did the community round about, with which they shared a world-view dependent partly on the extent of local isolation or involvement in the market economy.

On the other hand, Adams men often ascribed much of the support the Jacksonians received to footloose and mobile members of the lower classes, men without a settled occupation or place of residence. Darius Lyman claimed that a Jackson meeting in Ravenna in January 1828 was attended by an audience "collected from among those who are 'going to and fro in the earth', from tavern to tavern, I might have said perhaps with as much propriety." Social historians have demonstrated that large numbers of poor people were extremely mobile, leaving little evidence of their behaviour beyond their replies to the census-takers. This is not the case, however, with the 'navvies' who were employed in building the canals and National Road. According to the Zanesville Adams paper, there were nearly 1,400 hands employed on these works in Muskingum County in 1828, "whose predilections, generally, are in favor of the 'Hero'."


58. Darius Lyman to Whittlesey, Ravenna, 5 Jan. 1828, EWP.
estimated that there were "at least five thousand votes given by canallers and turnpikers in this state, for the Jackson ticket, most of whom recently emigrated further in search of such employment, and when employment ceases will probably go off again." 59

Of course, these identifiable segments of lower-class support for Jackson did not necessarily support him because they were lower-class and foot-loose. For many of the migrant "canallers," the fact that they shared Irish origins with Jackson may well have been the key consideration. 60

The point is that Ohio society was sufficiently complex for politicians out of power to be able to appeal to all sorts of tensions and dissatisfactions which lay below the surface of sectional consensus. As Whittlesey said of Jackson's success,

Office seekers and the discontents of every party united on him. It is a remarkable fact, that so soon as a man became soured towards his neighbor, or towards his family, or towards his brethren in the church, he was sure to support General Jackson, the better to satisfy his revenge. 61

However that may be, of greater significance were the resentments and disagreements which had been evident in Ohio for at least twenty years, and had been sharpened by the experience of the Panic and depression. Politicians had been quick to exploit these popular attitudes in particular local contexts at various times in preceding years, but only in the late 1820s did political circumstances arise in which they could be appealed to across the state as a whole and tied in to an arousing Presidential contest. As a result, this mish-mash of prejudice, self-identity, grievance and resentment help to establish the partisan identification of a major section of the Ohio electorate.

60. Cleveland Herald, 22 July 1825, in Annals, VIII, 172.
61. Whittlese y to Clay, Canfield, 4 Sept. 1829, Clay MSS., LC, as quoted in Weisenburger, Passing of the Frontier, 236.
11. THE OLD PARTY SYSTEM REVIVED.

When Jacksonian politicians mouthed the word "Democracy," they were not always referring to the rights of the people, so dangerously marred by the aristocratic corruption of the Adams regime. At least as commonly they had in mind the old party of Thomas Jefferson, the first to become widely known in Ohio - and elsewhere - as the "Democratic Party." Historians who have made overcareful distinctions between the Jeffersonian Republicans and the Jacksonian Democrats have often been misled by these references to the old Democracy, misinterpreting, for example, some key statements of Martin Van Buren. For him, even in 1827, politics in many Northern states were "yet governed by old Party feelings." Concerned to secure "a speedy reunion of the Republican party," he believed that the best way to overthrow Adams and Clay was "by combining Genl. Jackson's personal popularity with the portion of old party feeling yet remaining."¹ Is this what happened in Ohio? Did "old party feeling" survive in 1828 which could be attracted into the Jacksonian coalition? Was therefore the new conflict, at least to some extent, merely the First Party System revived?

The Fear of Federalism

As they looked back on the contest of 1828, old Jacksonian Democrats in Ohio believed that their party had, in effect, become the old Jeffersonian party. The thoughtful Charles Reemelin, writing in the 1860s, recognised the complexity of political divisions forty years earlier, but appreciated the simplifying power of a two-party division: "The question soon stood in

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public opinion identical with that between Adams and Jefferson in 1800: and Jackson became a synonym with Jefferson, and the younger Adams with the elder." For Reemelin, this identification in the popular mind explained the election victory, for in 1828 "Jackson ... united upon himself finally the whole old Republican party and its valuable prestige among the young voters of the country." Such interpretations were common even in the immediate retrospect of the election, and became the staple of political addresses. One Geauga County Jacksonian had one of his rhetorical efforts in 1833 parodied by this brief historical sketch:

I belonged to the democratic party in 1800 when Jefferson was elected - we had a hard struggle in 1812 - in 1824 I supported Crawford but the republican party got divided, and we was defeated - the federalists beat us -. In 1828, and 1832 we were united and succeeded.

This was, of course, a very peculiar version of political history, indeed. John Quincy Adams had certainly not been the Federalist candidate in 1824 or 1828, as the many Republicans knew who had supported him without any sense of inconsistency. Jacksonians could make good their arguments only by describing as Federalists some of their more prominent opponents like Jeremiah Morrow - whose Republicanism as an opponent of St. Clair, as Ohio's sole Congressman for a decade, and more recently as Senator and Governor, was quite unimpeachable. Yet intelligent Jacksonian Democrats repeated and even came to believe such charges, even one with as much historical sense as Benjamin Tappan, soon to be elected first President of the Ohio Historical and Philosophical Society. As John Sloane remarked to Tappan in 1828 after one of the latter's Jacksonian addresses, it was all too easy to forget how difficult had been the choice of sides in 1824, and to presume in retrospect, misled by partisan commitment, that only fools and villains had joined the opposite party.  

2. Sloane to Tappan, Washington, 16 Feb. 1828, BTP, LC.
Painesville Telegraph recognised, that the process of party division had divided both the old parties, and each new party contained both Federalists and Republicans. Yet this basic truth did not mean that passions and loyalties associated with the old party conflict were now irrelevant, and were of no significance in the appeal for popular support. For, as Elisha Whittlesey was to tell Daniel Webster in 1833, with cruel pertinency, "Although the former division of parties does not exist in point of fact: you know how easy it is for a demagogue to blast the prospects of the finest man in the world, by crying out Federalist." 3

Leaders of the Adams-Clay party had well appreciated, right from the start, the disadvantage of being identified with Federalism in a state - and a nation - that was overwhelmingly Republican. The old doctrinaire Democrat James Wilson, of the Steubenville Western Herald, had declared in 1824 that, whatever new parties may emerge, the pillars of the old Republican party must not be prostrated, nor the men of yesterday allowed to return to power. The force of this consideration was acknowledged by Clay men in Ohio who charged that Adams, because of his parentage and early career, was really a Federalist. The Adams editors retorted - quite correctly - that the best known Federalists in the state all supported Clay. The Scioto Gazette pointed out that the Adams newspapers were all of recent origin, little influence and unknown political character; by contrast, "all the old established republican papers in the state, without a solitary exception - those which stood by, and adhered to,

the democratic party, in its hour of darkness and of peril - are unanimously in favour of Mr. CLAY. John Sloane, as a committed old Democrat, was certain that Clay was the Republican candidate in Ohio, and he pointed out to constituents in Wayne County that local Federalists, especially in Wooster, supported Adams. However, Sloane found no difficulty in voting for Adams in the House election, because he could not see that Jackson was preferable in this respect; after all, Jackson had preached no-party notions and tried to persuade Monroe to appoint Federalists to office in 1817. Inevitably, the new Adams administration was quickly accused by Ohio Jacksonians of being Federalist, only to receive a sharp rap across the knuckles from the Scioto Gazette. How dare anyone claim that Jackson had been the candidate of true Republicans in Ohio during the 1824 election campaign?

Not one of the old established republican journals supported his interests; no distinguished democrat was found in his ranks. The only paper, of more than three years' standing, which countenanced his pretensions, was of federal origin; and the main body of his adherents consisted of strangers, wholly unacquainted with the political history of the state, and of young men, who have become entitled to a vote, since the federalists, as a distinct body, have ceased to exist.

Clay men knew that, in moving on to support the Adams administration, they had in no way contradicted their Republicanism, as they could tell by looking around them. They could see, James Wilson said in

4. Western Herald, 10 Apr. 1824; Scioto Gazette, in Painesville Telegraph, 3 June 1824. See also Delaware Patron, 7, 21 Oct. 1824; Ripley Castigator, 19 Oct. 1824.

August 1827, that in Ohio "all the old republican newspapers are in favor of the administration - and so are, but with very few exceptions, the most prominent men of the old republican party."6

In fact, the Adams press could produce lists of prominent Jacksonians who could be "charged with the sin of old federalism." Even William Stanbery was politically suspect, having apparently opposed the War of 1812, while Elijah Hayward - who voiced Republican rhetoric even in private letters and swore devotion to "the real democratic party of the nation" - was a former Federalist who had tried, unsuccessfully, to gain the position of secretary at the Hartford Convention of 1814!7 As the Ohio State Journal said six weeks before the election,

The cries of none are long and loud about Republicanism and Democracy as these renegadoes from the Federal ranks .... Shame that a party with bellweathers like these, should set themselves up as [the] exclusive Republicans of the day .... If old party names are to be revived, the fact is damming and conclusive, that the Jackson is the real Federal party of this state.

Indeed, after the election the same paper claimed that the Jacksonians owed their party cohesion to "the esprit de corps which the federalists have successfully infused into the otherwise heterogeneous and discordant mass."8


In these circumstances Administration politicians at times felt compelled to fudge their own party's debt to Federalist support. When the Ohio State Journal pointed out that the surviving members of the convention that had formed Ohio's Republican constitution all supported Adams, it indignantly asked how "the mushroom politicians" dare accuse such men of being "federalists, aristocrats and tories"; yet the fact was that five of the twelve men he listed had been Federalists. Similarly, old Republicans in the Adams camp were embarrassed by the prominence of Charles Hammond, the most effective editor in Ohio, who could accurately be branded as "the head man" of Federalism in Ohio. Hammond himself noticed that some of the party's newspapers seemed reluctant to quote his paper or reprint articles from it: "most of our Editors think my federalism so far a good ground of objection to all I write, that they deem it good policy to have the appearance of avoiding connection with me" - and one or two even thought it good policy to make the occasional "lunge" at Hammond and Federalism. Others thought this "injudicious" and not in the best interests of the cause, as it kept alive old distinctions no longer relevant to the issue at hand. However, Hammond's Federalism continued a political liability: after the election he was turned down as the party's candidate for the United States Senate, since some Adams-Clay members dare not vote for him. Admittedly, Jacob Burnet was chosen instead, but not without similar strains; one Jacksonian member reported that "Some few of the Republican members that have strayed into the Administration ranks do say that they will not vote for Mr. Burnett as he is a known Federalist.

10. Ripley Castigator, 19 Oct. 1824; Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 15 Apr. 1827; Wright to Hammond, Steubenville, 3 Apr. 1827, 22 Nov. 1828, CHP.
We fear that the party spirit is so high that they will in the event of two or three ballottings give him their vote." In fact they chose him on the first ballot, a result which was said to have "quite gratified ... the Old Federalists."\(^{11}\)

On balance, circumstances made it easier for the Jacksonians to exploit the prejudice against Federalism. The prominence in the Adams camp of nationally known opponents of the War like Daniel Webster did "great injury", according to John McLean, to the President's cause.\(^{12}\) Adams, it could not be denied, had appointed Federalists to office, and high office at that - something President Monroe, for all his talk of Good Feelings, had never dared to do. The appointment of Rufus King, Federalist presidential candidate in 1816, as minister to the Court of St. James did not go unnoticed in Ohio. Ohio Jacksonians also took advantage of Thomas Jefferson's unstatesmanlike public statements of 1825 and '26, warning that the Adams men were Federalists in a new dress, mouthing Jeffersonian sentiments but intent on corrupting the form of government and "riding and ruling over the plundered plowman and beggared yeomanry."\(^{13}\) But, above all, Adams suffered the great disadvantage of his name, which allowed unscrupulous politicians to blur the distinction between father and son. Indeed, one Adams paper even ascribed the "blind infatuation and reverence" of Jackson in 1828 equally to "his military services" and to "a prejudice against the present incumbent on account of the political opinions of his father." The way the Jacksonians behaved in the year after the election suggested that they thought that old Republicanism had won them as many votes

\(^{11}\) Joseph H. Larwill to John Larwill, Columbus, 10 Dec. 1828, LFP.

\(^{12}\) Quoted in Brown, Webster, 4.

\(^{13}\) Cincinnati Advertiser, 10 Dec. 1825, Feb. 1828; Merrill D. Peterson, The Jeffersonian Image in the American Mind (New York, 1960), 18-20, 29. See also Shaw Livermore, Twilight of Federalism, 105-12.
as their appeal to the "popular will": they justified their extension of party conflict into local elections on the ground that this was the way of the good old party, while county conventions were the "established system of Republican nominations." Even their partisanship they credited to Jefferson's Democratic party. 14

Yet could anyone really take such arguments seriously? Could anyone be fooled by Jacksonian claims, when the party obviously owed much itself to old Federalists? The extent of this debt became obvious when Jackson's leading appointments were announced: for the first time since 1801, a President had given to Federalists "of the Boston stamp ... a large proportion of lucrative and highly responsible offices ... which they never otherwise could have obtained." James Heaton even reported from Butler County that local Jacksonian politicians were "cooling off" for several reasons, but "still more because his whole cabinet is of the class of old Federalists of the deep cast - ... I have known for more than 5 years that Jackson was a Federalist, by the original parties, but I thought he dare not select his whole important appointments from that old party, but he has done it." 15 In response, Adams-Clay men could pronounce that they were the true "REPUBLICANS," opposing the "JACKSONIANS," who were "people of all sorts of politics, office hunters, caucusites, and demagogues." At frequent intervals throughout the 1830s, the opposition to the Jacksonian Democrats were to call themselves "Democratic Republicans," recognising even

in 1840 the power that lay in that historic name.  

So had the association of Jackson's cause with the old Democratic party influenced voters in their choice of sides in 1828?  Surely the bugaboo of Federalism was not strongly perceived in Ohio?  As a weary Ohio State Journal remarked after the 1828 election "The federal party ... never was very strong in this State; and at one time was hardly known even to exist out of the limits of three or four counties."  

But, curiously, those three or four counties included some in which Jackson made his largest proportionate gains in 1828, in which he won majorities even though he had inherited almost no support from 1824.  There was only one Jacksonian Congressional victory in 1828 which could not have been predicted from the 1824 Presidential results, and that in a district which the party had not bothered to contest in 1826; but that district was one in which memories of Federalism and strict Republicanism were very recent.  Was there any connection between the relative vigour of the First Party System in this region and the extraordinary sudden appeal, in 1827-28, of Jackson's candidacy?

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A Tale of Three Counties

The veteran old Democratic Republican, Dr. John Hamm, rose to give the principal speech at the July Fourth dinner held by Jackson men in Zanesville in 1830.  For him the new political divisions were but a

16. Ohio Republican, 26 Dec. 1829; Western Herald, in Niles Weekly Register, XXXVII (7 Nov. 1829), 165; Chardon Spectator, 10 Jan. 1835; Gunderson, Log Cabin Campaign, passim.

continuation of the older conflict between Federalist and Republican, aristocracy and democracy. To prove his point he appealed to local experience:

Take, for instance, a retrospective glance, at the political condition of the state of Ohio, and particularly of Muskingum county, for twenty years back - and are not the same facts manifest, that while individuals of the Democratic Republican party have been momentarily deceived through false information, or have become passive spectators, the party have continued to maintain the same political principles, without looking to the "right hand or the left," and without having been jostled out of their rightful course by the insidious acts of intriguers, trimmers or timeservers?

Surprisingly perhaps, this was more than mere rhetoric: from the point of view of Hamm and his most constant associates, this was exactly what had happened.

Hamm, of course, was the man who had introduced St. Tammany to Ohio in 1809-10 in an effort to sustain Democratic principles of popular supremacy. Together with his father-in-law, Isaac Van Horne, he had worked to maintain Democratic control of the state in the years when their town, Zanesville, was the state capital. After serving in the War, these "Legitimates" had resisted the temptations of Good Feelings and struggled to keep the Republican party machine alive, at least locally. They had repeatedly been troubled by the secession of former political friends, most notably the former Legitimate leader and editor, David Chambers. He had challenged their right to name the county's Congressional candidate, and had thereby divided the Muskingum Republican vote; as a consequence, Hamm and the Legitimates found after the election of 1822 - and

1824 and 1826— that they were represented in Washington by the formidable old Federalist Philomen Beecher, from Lancaster. Their leadership had reached its nadir in 1824 when they placed loyalty to the old party of 1800 higher than the need to cater to the sectional attitudes of their constituents: their attempt to lead Muskingum's Republicans into the Crawford ranks was rejected, and the county overwhelmingly followed Chambers and his new newspaper, the Ohio Republican, into the camp of Henry Clay — and, in due course, of John Quincy Adams.

However, the Legitimates' position in local politics was far from destroyed. David Chambers ascribed his repeated failure to win election to Congress to "the unceasing exertions of a small faction in Zanesville headed by our late Marshal" — i.e., John Hamm. In 1825 and '26 Hamm and his friends got a number of their candidates elected in local elections, including the county's state representatives. By 1827, however, they were facing a bitter opposition, led by Chambers at the Ohio Republican. When a new Associate Judge pro. tem. had to be appointed for the county, Governor Trimble was horrified to discover that the man he had chosen was a "partisan" whose selection antagonised some local people: "I regret," wrote Trimble to a Yankee acquaintance in Putnam, "that so much unpleasantness exists in your county and I assure you I would not willingly furnish materials to excite or keep alive a warfare such as seems now to be raging in Muskingum."


3. Trimble to Hugh Safford, Hillsborough, 17 July 1827, in Trimble correspondence, 157; see also ibid., 153.
In the fall elections the Republican launched an onslaught on "the knot of office hunters who rule the Messenger office" referring to the old Democratic organ, the Muskingum Messenger. However, the Legitimates managed to elect "three of their principal candidates," including Hamm as state senator. His success was ascribed to "the untiring efforts of his friends, the proficiency ... of whom in the 'art of political lying' is so notorious," to the "disgraceful ... scenes of intoxication and vulgarity around his door previous to the election," but, above all, to "the division among his opposers." At least Chambers and his friends could console themselves that they had elected the sheriff and county treasurer, and they recognised that "it requires but the same unity of action which characterizes our opponents, to succeed in all cases, and complete the discomfiture of the knot of political knaves who have so long ruled in Muskingum county."4

This conflict was not, at the time, directly related to the national political contest. Chambers and the Republican party were firm supporters of the Administration and the American System, but the Legitimates had not yet finally committed themselves. In May 1827 James Wilson had visited Zanesville and discovered that the great men have not, all of them, taken sides; they appear to be desirous of waiting to see how the wind is going [to] blow elsewhere. I find gen. Van Horne is decidedly and warmly with us. Dr. Hamm doubtful but I rather think for Jackson. [Robert] Mitchell is violently for Jackson, and I am told [James] Hampson is so too.

Otherwise, Wilson could produce an impressive list of Administration supporters, including some noted old Democrats. 5 Though Hamm's personal success in the October election was immediately interpreted elsewhere as a success for Jacksonism, the Legitimate ticket as a whole was not an avowed Jackson ticket, and included at least one known Adams man. 6 Obviously, a firm stand on the Presidential question was likely to divide the Legitimates and threaten their local control.

Even so, after the 1827 election, Hamm and some of his political friends threw themselves openly behind Jackson's cause, though others of their number, like their former leader Van Horne, refused to co-operate. In November "the Republicans of Muskingum county" held a meeting, with two old Legitimates - Samuel Herrick and Ezekiel T. Cox - as presiding officers, to nominate Jackson for the Presidency. 7 When the editor of the Messenger - Samuel J. Cox - refused to support Jackson and insisted on printing articles on both sides of the Presidential question, he was "brought down from his editorial vehicle" and, in May 1828, forced to sell the paper to a sound Jacksonian, Thomas Anderson. 8 By July 1828 the Jackson

5. James Wilson to Hammond, Zanesville, 25 May 1827, CHP.


7. Ohio Republican, 10 Nov. 1827; A Brief Sketch of the Life And Public Services of Gen'1 Samuel Herrick (Zanesville, 1849), 20.

8. Marietta American Friend, 24 May 1828; St. Clairsville Gazette, 10 May 1828; Everhart, Muskingum County, 207.
committee in Cincinnati could report that "Muskingum county has undergone a complete political revolution, and from a powerful opponent, has become a supporter" of Jackson. Hamm and his men indeed "made a most arduous struggle" to win, or retain, the allegiance of the voters, in the face of energetic and thorough organization by their opponents: and, to their gratification, in the Presidential election these eleventh-hour Jacksonians succeeded in cutting the expected majority of several hundred for Adams to a mere thirty-three votes - a vital contribution to the statewide success of the Jackson ticket.

Hamm and Herrick were well rewarded by Jackson, who appointed them Minister to Chile and District Attorney for Ohio, respectively - and James Hampson superintendent of the National Road in Ohio. Yet it should be recognised that, in turning to Jackson, they had taken a political risk which jeopardized their local position; like Van Buren in New York, they had risked local support for the sake of national considerations. By supporting the Administration, they could have safeguarded themselves and perhaps, like Van Horne, have attained distinction on that side. By supporting the opposition, they had alienated some of their colleagues and given to their enemies an additional weapon of proven power - the American System.

In 1828 Muskingum County eagerly awaited the completion of the National Road as far as Zanesville and its continuation beyond, while its growing industries and tremendous mineral resources - which had already made Zanesville "The Lowell of the West," with a

11. J.H. Larwill to Amos Kendall, Tiffin, 28 May 1829, LFP; Cincinnati Advertiser, 21 Mar., 2 May 1829.
population of over 3,000, second in Ohio only to Cincinnati\textsuperscript{12} - led many of its inhabitants to look forward to the benefits of tariff protection. Hamm and his friends had shifted to support the Presidential candidate who won only 6.3 per cent of Muskingum's votes in 1824, and their choice was probably responsible for their defeat in the local elections of 1828. They were able to retrieve their position in 1829 only because their opponents could see no point in agitating national issues in a local election and so failed to bring out their vote; by contrast, the old machine did its stuff and, by what Hamm called "an early and complete organisation," gained a large majority for the Jackson ticket.\textsuperscript{13}

Though the evidence is far from decisive, it is tempting to argue that Hamm and his associates for all their liking of office and power, were fired by a devotion to the traditional Republican party and the pure political principles for which it stood; they had refused to amalgamate with Federalists, even when party differences had appeared meaningless in the Era of Good Feelings. When the reorganization of national parties in 1824-25 shattered their world, one fact must have been obvious: the Federalists of Putnam had supported Adams in 1824,\textsuperscript{14} while local supporters of Clay had shown

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{12} For Muskingum c. 1828, see Bernhard, Duke of Saxe-Weimar Eisenach, \textit{Travels Through North America, during the years 1825 and 1826} (Philadelphia, 1828), 153-55; John Kilbourn, \textit{Ohio Gazetteer} (11th ed., 1833), 332-35. See also Schneider, Y-Bridge City, 99.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Hamm to J.H. Larwill, Zanesville, 1 Nov. 1828, 15 Oct. 1829, W.C. Larwill Papers.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Edwin Putnam to Cutler, Putnam, 20 July 1824, in Cutler, ed., \textit{Ephraim Cutler}, 191.
\end{itemize}
that they were willing to tolerate and amalgamate with Muskingum's Federalists. In the circumstances they could not fail to make the same decision as Van Buren in New York: the opposition to Adams and Clay must be supported as the only possible means of defeating a blend of political forces which could not be trusted to adhere to the ancient Republican truths. This, at least, was the line of argument they used to attract support for Jackson in the last months before the election: according to the new editor of the Messenger, Clay had joined the Federal party in 1825; and Chambers at the Ohio Republican, found himself on the defensive and having to reassure his readers that, "As for Democracy," his newspaper had never "advocated any thing anti-republican."15 And at least Hamm and his friends had secured one great triumph for principle by their Jacksonism: in the Congressional election the old Federalist incumbent, Philemon Beecher, was defeated by a Jackson candidate - William W. Irvin - who may still have come from Lancaster rather than Zanesville, but had at least been a radical Democrat in the great ideological struggle of 1810-12.

Whatever their motivation, the fact remains that the leadership of the Jackson party in Muskingum came from the most doctrinaire of the old Legitimate Democrats, and maintained their traditions.

Perhaps this may be symbolized in the person of that most doctrinaire of future Democrats, a "doughface" of the 1850s in Ohio and a liberal spokesman in New York in the 1870s and later - "Sunset" Cox. Born in Zanesville in 1824 and christened Samuel Sullivan Cox, he was literally the 'Legitimate' offspring of Muskingum politics - the product of the union in 1822 between E.T. Cox, a former editor of the

Messenger, and the daughter of former state treasurer Samuel Sullivan, both of whom became Jacksonians in 1827. 16

In Belmont County, David Jennings came to be remembered for the wrong reason. Elected to Congress in 1824, this "legislator upon p-phi-philosophical principles" (as he called himself) suddenly deserted his wife and children, ran off with another woman, and created such a scandal that other Congressmen in Washington ostracized him and, backed by public opinion, finally forced his resignation! 17 He should also be remembered as the first former Federalist to represent Belmont in Congress, the visible sign that the old political mould had been broken. Before 1824, Belmont Republicans could not forget that the county had been a centre of Federalism: Charles Hammond had published his uncomfortably effective Ohio Federalist in St. Clairsville, while on three occasions between 1813 and 1816 a Federalist party opposed to the war against Britain had carried the county with the assistance of the Quakers in the western townships. Admittedly, party divisions had weakened subsequently and amalgamation ruled the day, yet the old party cries had still enough popular appeal for an anti-Federalist campaign to prevent Hammond's election to Congress in 1822. However, in 1824 Belmont politicians and voters, eager to see the National Road at last cross the Ohio at Wheeling and move on the ten miles to St. Clairsville, cooperated with Federalists, elected Jennings to


17. T.H. Genin to Hammond, St. Clairsville, 3 May, 13 Aug. 1825, CHP. Other letters of 1825 and '26 in CHP refer to the scandal; see also Clay Papers, IV, 794.
Congress, and gave Clay 879 of the 1,230 votes cast for President; Jackson was beaten into third place by Adams, who was the unanimous choice of at least one Quaker township. Given the county's strong antislavery tradition and immediate interest in the American System, supporters of the new administration could assume an easy predominance in the county.

By June 1826, however, Benjamin Ruggles could report that the people in Belmont were beginning to divide between Jackson and Adams, already considering them the only candidates for 1828; and he prophesied that Jackson would win as large a majority east of the Muskingum and south of the Reserve as Adams won on the Reserve.

The first open sign of Jacksonism in Belmont came in December 1826, when the local newspaper, a supporter of Clay in 1824, announced its intention to support Jackson in future, though it did not begin to blast the typical hectic party line until April 1827. By that time a call was going out for the friends of Jackson to meet in St. Clairsville during court week, and at the beginning of May, in what was claimed to be the largest political meeting ever held in the county, more than twenty local politicians accepted positions on Jackson committees. In the 1827 fall elections, the Adams men tried to prevent the election of Jackson men to the state legislature, so making Belmont one of the few counties where "the Presidential election, or Administration and opposition forms the line of division."

The Jacksonians ran surprisingly well, losing the senator by 1391 to the Administration's 1432, and electing the less obviously partisan

18. For Somerset township's vote, see St. Clairsville Gazette, 19 May 1827.

of their candidates as one of the two representatives. 20 By this time the local party was beginning to organize itself properly, beginning from September; in the course of the winter it began to organize at the township level, and built up a body of support which was almost able, in the fall of 1828, to carry the county for a relatively obscure Jacksonian Congressional candidate. With a charismatic Presidential candidate a majority was certain. 21

Yet at the time the local party emerged, in the spring of 1827, its leaders could not have been sure of winning such successes locally. At that time it was believed that "Adams was in the ascendant" in Belmont and his support was doing "pretty well." The Gazette apparently lost subscribers in the months after it shifted to Jackson 22. Yet no doubt there were good practical reasons for the shift to Jacksonism. The young editor of the Gazette, Robert H. Miller, had objected to the Clay men throwing their support to Adams in the House election of 1825, though he had followed a strictly neutral course since then. By the end of 1826, however, it was known that a rival paper, the National Historian, was to begin in St. Clairsville, which, while supposedly non-partisan, would be edited by the son of a well-known Quaker protagonist of President Adams. Since some loss of custom might be expected, perhaps a recourse to Jacksonism might provide a new potential readership and, if the party


22. T.H. Genin to Hammond, St. Clairsville, 20 Mar. 1827; Wright to Hammond, Steubenville, 5 May 1827, CHP. In the long run, the newspaper probably gained more subscribers than it lost: Gazette, 21 June 1827, 10 May, 11 Oct. 1828.
won nationally, justify an application for patronage - as, in fact, happened. Desire to be on the winning side nationally may also have influenced Thomas Shannon, who had been elected to complete Jennings' term as Congressman, though not to succeed him; Shannon "came home Jacksonian" from Washington in March 1827.

Thomas Shannon was associated locally with the "family connexion" of Ezer Ellis, long a force in Belmont politics. Apparently Ellis and his friends had been losing their grip locally: unfriendly associate judges had been appointed by the legislature, who in 1826 refused to re-appoint Ellis as clerk of the county court. In response Ellis ran successfully for the other critical local office, the "sheriffality," which he was soon accused of conducting so as to benefit his relations, especially the two young lawyers who were his sons-in-law. All the other lawyers in Belmont between 1824 and 1828 opposed Ellis and proved staunch Adams-Clay men; the two related to him became prominent Jacksonians, and provided the party with useful talent. One, William Kennon, was elected to Congress in 1828; the other, Wilson Shannon, son of Thomas Shannon, was to attain national notoriety in his long career as a Democratic politician - helping to bring on the Mexican War as Polk's minister to Mexico and the Civil War as Pierce's governor of Kansas. Ellis himself was re-elected sheriff on the Jackson ticket in 1828, 1830 and 1832. This office-seeking clique, a family connection


24 Wright to Hammond, 5 May 1827, CHP.

25 T.H. Genin to Hammond, St. Clairsville, 13 Aug. 1825, CHP; St. Clairsville Gazette, 10, 17 June, 1 July, 26 Aug., 23 Sept. 1826, 13 Sept. 1828. See also S. Colwell to Ewing, St. Clairsville, 21 Dec. 1824, TWFP.
which was accused of dominating the local Jackson party for its own purposes, was intimately connected in 1827 with the build-up of Jackson party in Belmont. 26

Yet one suspects that more fundamental drives and considerations also lay behind the shift to Jackson. The character of these forces is suggested by a curious political movement which appeared in Belmont county in 1825 and 1826. In August 1825 - before the rise of Jacksonism locally - a correspondent in the St. Clairsville paper complained that having too many candidates for local office tended to breed "jargon and discord"; in order to ensure that there were only as many candidates as offices, he recommended that the voters in each township should elect two delegates to meet in convention and draw up a county ticket for the fall elections. This proposal began two months of controversy, but had no effect on the fall elections of 1825. Then in February 1826 it was announced that "a large number of citizens of most, if not all the townships, have agreed to adopt the Delegate System in nominating candidates for important public places"; and a controversy ensued which filled the columns of the Gazette for nearly three months. Delegates were, indeed, named and the convention met, but only six out of fifteen townships were represented; and, despite claims of growing public support for the idea, only one of the candidates named by the delegates was elected - Ezer Ellis. 27

What lay behind the movement? Its protagonists claimed that the

26. Gazette, 9 Aug. 1828, 25 Sept. 1830. The county's lawyers in 1824 and 1828 are named on a list in LFP, and in Caldwell, Jefferson and Belmont Counties, 182-183, respectively. For Kennon, see ibid., 230-231; for Shannon, see Dictionary of American Biography, XII, 20-21. Ellis's third daughter married another prominent Democratic politician, George W. Manypenny, who edited the Gazette between 1829 and 1833 before gaining political advancement.

delegate system would break the grip on county offices of a clique in St. Clairsville who engineered the election of their friends by bringing forward a multitude of candidates; the new system would ensure that the successful candidate had the support of an absolute majority of the voters, and effective power would return to the farmers who, under the informal system of private nominations, never bothered to see that good candidates were brought forward. In reply it was said that the proposed system would give uncontrollable power to the designing few who controlled the convention - or caucus, as it was branded. Another appeal claimed that the system would end sectional and partisan differences within the county, reduce rancor and bickering, and end the disgusting sight of candidates electioneering for the themselves and trying to bribe voters with promises. On the contrary, said opponents of the scheme, it will revive and exaggerate differences and cleavages within the county; conventions have always been the engine of party. This, of course, was the point. Though the system of private and self-nominations had become the customary procedure in the county, delegate conventions were still regarded as the true Republican mode of nominating candidates - as in the days of organised party challenge during the War. Throughout the controversy the main opposition to the conventions was identified as coming from the six western townships and those who opposed their country during the war against Britain; after all, the Federalist minority always had denounced the use of party machinery in elections. Though the aim was never to exclude Federalists from the convention procedure, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the real object was to revive true Republicanism, to restore the happy days when things were done properly and only good patriotic men were entrusted with public office.28

28 Ibid., Aug.-Oct. 1825; Feb.-Sept., 28 Oct. 1826
One thing at least is clear: the controversy over the delegate system in 1825 and 1826 had nothing to do with support for, and opposition to, the national administration. The only hint at the time that it might have come from the correspondent who said in 1825 that whenever the caucus system was put down, an Adams was elected President; and that it had to be revived in order to produce a Jefferson. Otherwise, the controversy was conducted without reference to current national politics. Yet in the long run there was a connection between Jacksonism and the delegate movement. For the overwhelming majority of the delegates elected and of the candidates they named - but by no means all - became Jacksonians in the course of 1827. And the only townships to give majorities to the delegate candidates for the legislature were also the only townships to give majorities in 1826 to David Robb of Guernsey County, the only self-confessed Jacksonian in that election! By 1827-28 the Jackson paper was presenting its own version of recent local politics: the Republican party had remained intact and coherent ever since Madison's day; it had opposed the election of the Federalist Jennings to Congress in 1824, and had been responsible for the revival of the Delegate System in 1826. Only Adams men had opposed this genuinely Republican measure.

29. Ibid., 15 Oct. 1825. Webster, "Democratic Party Organization," 14-15, treats this convention as though it amounted to the organization of the Jackson party in Belmont County, not recognizing the traditional nature of the movement, and ignoring the evidence that the Jackson party had still not been organized in that county as late as April 1827. See St. Clairsville Gazette, 1826-27, and Elijah Hayward to J.H. Larwill, 2 Apr. 1827, LFP.

30. Gazette, 27 May, 1 July 1826; 5 May, 29 Sept. 1827. Robb ran in the election to fill Jennings' Congressional seat: ibid., 7, 28 Oct. 1826. These townships lay in the northern and eastern third of the county, where Scotch Irish settlers were most common.

Indeed, this theme of the continuity of old party divisions became the staple of Jacksonian propaganda in Belmont. In May 1827 one correspondent in the Gazette had claimed that old party distractions were dead, since many leading Republicans now supported the Administration. Not so, replied "CRAWFORD": it had long been Federalist strategy to assert that party was dead, and to find some cry which might deceive some Republicans into helping them regain power. This was exactly what had happened since 1824: "Federalism has again secured the reigns of government under the stolen garb of Internal Improvement and the Tariff!!" This newspaper exchange was said to have let the cat out of the bag and "put the Republicans of Belmont completely on their guard," for no one could deny that those who had opposed the War now supported the Adams administration.

For nearly a year little more was made of this line of argument in the Gazette; instead, the extravagance of the administration, Jackson's record on the American System, and the controversy over his personal qualities were the main topics of concern. But from May 1828 onwards the Gazette shifted its emphasis to the Old Republican theme and stuck to it with a relish which suggested that the editor felt he had struck a responsive chord. The Federalists had sneaked into power; hence "the necessity of democrats hanging together." And the crisis was supposedly intensified by the fact that many Republicans had betrayed their principles and joined with those who had formerly excoriated them. "It is, with us, one of the most astonishing incidents which has occurred during the present contest, that men claiming to be called Republicans, should be found in the ranks of those opposed to bearing arms, and such as endeavoured to paralyze the energies of the government in our late
What made these charges effective was the fact that they approximated to the truth, even if they were grossly unfair to those Republicans who had committed themselves to the party of the Henry Clay and the American System. Undeniably, the Quakers did support Adams. Undeniably, both the chairman and the secretary of the Adams central committee for Belmont County were former Federalists. Undeniably, no prominent Federalist in the county supported Jackson. And, from the other point of view, there was no doubt that the local politicians who supported Jackson were good Republicans, many of them prominent in the party battles of 1815 and 1816. Indeed, the real significance of Ezer Ellis was the fact that he had been a party leader in those years, occupying a position which in some respects compared with that of John Hamm in Muskingum County; as recently as at least 1821, he had been regarded as the local Republican manager and the arbiter of what constituted good Republican principles.

All the evidence, in fact, reconciles best with the belief that the growth of the Jackson party in Belmont took place on the bedrock of the old Republican party. It appears that a good number of politicians, many of whom had supported Clay in 1824, were alarmed at the consequences of their action when they discovered that their old enemies now seemed to have gained power. Nothing condemned the

32. Ibid., 2, 9, June 1827; 31 May, 28 June 1828; see also 17 May, 21 June, 9 Aug., 27 Sept., 8 Nov. 1828

33. Ibid., 5 May, 29 Sept., 10 Nov. 1827; 17, 31 May, 31 Aug., 6, 13 Sept., 11 Oct. 1828. See also Ohio Federalist, 6 Oct. 1815, 25 July 1816; Western Herald, 20 Oct. 1815, 20 Sept. 1816

34. Ohio Federalist, 2 Mar. 1814, 25 July 1816; Western Herald, 14 June 1816; Hammond to Wright, 30 Sept. 1821, CHP.
new administration so much as the fact that it was approved of by the former enemies of Republicanism in Belmont county. Accordingly, these Republicans rallied round the only possible opposition leader, trusting he would prove a new Jefferson, but knowing with certainty that he had stood firm in the hour of darkness when loyalty to the Republic had last been tested. They had reason to expect support from the Scotch Irish of northeastern Belmont, and they trusted that the cry of Federalism! would extend their support among uncommitted Republican voters. This prior and historic party loyalty, they believed, was what in the end enabled Jackson to win in Belmont in 1828. Even a prominent supporter of the administration, an amalgamationist who had edited the local paper from 1812 to December 1824, for part of that time in conjunction with Charles Hammond, could take it for granted in 1828 that in Belmont "the Jackson and old Democratic party" (to which he was "personally obnoxious") was one and the same thing. 35

No county had experienced a more bitter partisan conflict during the war years than Washington. Although sectional feeling and local interest had drawn the two parties together after 1815, the old antagonism could still rear its head, as it had in 1820 and 1821; a faithful and capable public servant like Ephraim Cutler could

35 Alexander Armstrong to Whittlesey, St. Clairsville, 10 Jan. 1828, EWP. Armstrong founded the Belmont Repository in December 1811, which he amalgamated with Hammond's Ohio Federalist in November 1814, and their journalistic co-operation continued even after the demise of the Ohio Federalist and Armstrong's commencement of the Belmont Journal in August 1818. By 1823 the Journal had finished, and in December Armstrong brought out a new paper, the Gazette, in conjunction with R.H. Miller, who bought him out a year later.
still be defeated in the 1820s because of his Federalist past. Indeed, as late as 1825 the ostensibly nonpartisan election for state senator and state representative saw Marietta township give Cutler and William Rufus Putnam 120 and 121 votes, respectively, to 48 and 49 for their opponents; in other words, there was an element of informed ticket voting for the two best-known old Federalists in the county against two undeniable old Republicans - in 1825! This apparent persistence of old party feeling was, however, unusual, for in 1824 most Republicans and Federalists in the county had come together in support of the "Free Electoral Ticket" dedicated to elect John Quincy Adams. The New Englander swept the county with 58.6 per cent of the vote, though Jackson, backed by an energetic local organization, also ran well in Marietta and in the eastern portion of the county settled from Pennsylvania. With the backing of Clay's supporters (11.4%), the Administration forces seemed certain to control the county thereafter; and, indeed, in 1826 the candidate backed by the leading Jacksonians suffered a crushing defeat at the polls. 37

Nevertheless, the opposition was mobilizing itself into an effective political force. In April 1826 A.V.D. Joline brought out a new paper, the Marietta and Washington County Pilot, which almost immediately began slanging the old established Republican paper, the American Friend, which now firmly supported the Administration. Joline had edited the short-lived Marietta Minerva in 1823-24, advocating the election of Clay; hence when he came out for Jackson

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36 Poll Book for Marietta township, October 1825, VFM 178, OHS.
in 1826, he was, with some justice, accused of being a "political weathercock," a "summerset" whose word was not to be trusted. On one occasion, to the delight of the Friend, the Pilot appeared with the letters of its title transposed, and so gained a nickname which stuck with it - the Lipot or "Lie-pot." Strengthened by the acquisition of this unsavoury weapon, the Jackson men determined to contest the elections to the General Assembly in 1827, and helped to produce the largest turnout up to that time in the county; however, the increase in the vote favoured the Administration rather than the Jacksonians, who still lost by a two-to-one margin. Thereafter both parties strengthened their organizations and launched impassioned appeals to the voters; but now the further increase in the turnout over the next year on balance favoured the Jacksonians, who in the Presidential election of 1828 cut the difference between the parties from thirty-two percentage points to twenty-two.

In the course of this successful year, 1827-28, the local Jackson paper began to harp on one theme, and intensified its emphasis as the election approached. The Administration, it claimed, was supported by all the old Federalists, who had seduced, by corrupt means, some old Republicans into joining them. Royal Prentiss, editor of the firmly Republican American Friend since 1813, was condemned in a letter signed by "MANY OLD REPUBLICANS of the Jefferson principles" for having deserted the cause and sold himself to


"a VILE, CORRUPT coalition." Another correspondent claimed that old Federalists dominated the Administration party's ticket for the 1828 elections, because they were unwilling to trust the "numerous Republicans they boast of having on their side" with any office; after twenty-four years in the wilderness, the Federalists in the county were once more basking in the sunshine, and could truly claim

Now is the dreary winter of our long discontent,
Made glorious summer by our John of Ghent.

Joline even reprinted parts of the Republican circular of August 1821 arguing against the dangers of amalgamation, and he warned that the menace was even greater now when three of the five signers of the declaration were supporting the forces of amalgamation. In the "Republican Convention Address" issued by the county's Jacksonians, it was claimed that the old Federalists had now gained control of the local offices and that "the people" must once more assert themselves. And in this fight to overthrow resurgent aristocracy and Federalism, added the vigilance committee, the Jacksonians must appeal "to those genuine Republicans, who, by a uniform course of political conduct," have defended popular rights in the past. 40

To this line of attack the Administration press had many effective replies. It could point out that many sound Republicans considered the Administration the fulfilment of the principles of Democratic Republicanism; it could point out that many leading Jacksonians had been Federalists, notably the notorious James B. Gardiner (now of Greene County), who had once edited a Federalist paper in Marietta. And some of the Jacksonians, like Joline, had pursued a course of such shiftiness as to make their Republicanism appear a charade. 41 Yet the


fact still remained that, at the local level, almost all the prominent Federalists supported the Administration, including outspoken opponents of the War like Caleb Emerson, while the Jacksonians could gain public declarations of allegiance from scores of men, often fairly obscure, who considered themselves loyal Republicans coming to the rescue of their country. As in Muskingum and Belmont, the Jackson party in Washington County could use precise local examples to support its claim to be the true heir of the old Democratic Republican party.

In these three counties, the survival of a strong old Republican and anti-Federalist tradition encouraged local Jacksonian journalists and politicians to describe the new party conflict in familiar terms of reference and to cast their opponents as the villains of old. Of course, one might suspect their sincerity, suspect that their ostensible desire to revive the party and principles of Jefferson was only a mask donned to conceal more cynical and opportunistic motives. Yet what is important is not the inner drives of the politician so much as his belief that the cry of Federalist! could influence the voters, that the force of old party loyalties might yet draw voters to support the Jackson party. The critical point to determine is whether the electorate in these counties responded in 1828 to the old Republican campaign of the politicians.

The only way of discovering clues to the popular response is to compare the distribution of votes within each county in 1828 with that in earlier elections fought along strict old-party lines. Unfortunately, in the case of Muskingum, township returns are available for most elections between 1813 and 1818 (and for 1823 and 1827), but not for

42 Pilot, 10 May, 14 June, 11 Oct. 1828. The only former Federalists in the local Jackson party who can be identified are Jacob Barker and Moses McFarland, and the former had joined in 1824.
the 1824 or 1828 Presidential elections. Fortunately, in the case of Belmont, there are good returns available both for the 1828 Presidential election and the strictly partisan contest of 1815. When we compare the two, in percentage terms, in columns 'A' and 'B' of Table 11.1, it is immediately obvious that there is some sort of rank-order correlation between them. But this is not very useful since the 1828 figures contained some 1200 or so voters whose minds had probably been made up since 1824, when the choice had certainly not been made according to old party allegiances. What we need to know is how the vote for or against Jackson increased between 1824 and 1828 - even though the township returns for Belmont are not available for 1824.

We must therefore, at the risk of circular thinking, use our knowledge of the factors which influenced votes in Ohio at large to reconstruct the township vote in Belmont for 1824. The National Road was a powerful interest for the whole county; we may assume it was strongest in the four townships through which the Road would probably run. The Quakers, we know, voted overwhelmingly for Adams. The Scotch Irish townships in northern and eastern Belmont presumably were most favourable to Jackson - at least they were the most sympathetic to the avowed Jacksonian candidate for Congress in


44 Western Herald, 20 Oct. 1815; St. Clairsville Gazette, 8 Nov. 1828. As always, difficulties arise because political boundaries changed between 1815 and 1828, thus complicating Table 11.1. In Belmont by 1828 three new townships had been carved out of the twelve of 1815. Somerset was undoubtedly formed out of Wayne, and the two are linked on the table. Flushing was created primarily from Kirkwood and secondarily from Union; a Quaker township, it gave 23.6% of its vote to Jackson in 1828. Smith was created from three townships lying close together in the table, and has been ranked with them; like them, it contained a significant Scotch Irish population. For the various townships, see Kilbourn, Ohio Gazetteer (1833), and Caldwell, Belmont and Jefferson Counties; see also, for Colerain, Historical Collections of Harrison County, 26, and, for Somerset, Kilbourn, Ohio Gazetteer (1819), 33
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'A' Republican vote, 1815</th>
<th>'B' Jackson vote, 1828</th>
<th>'C' Index of increase in Jackson vote, 1824-28</th>
<th>'D' Value of land per voter, 1828</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pultney</td>
<td>87.04</td>
<td>74.80</td>
<td>Scotch Irish (-5)</td>
<td>69.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith (formed from Pultney, York and Richland)</td>
<td>69.82</td>
<td>Scotch Irish (-5)</td>
<td>64.82</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>York</td>
<td>80.43</td>
<td>64.53</td>
<td>Scotch Irish (-5)</td>
<td>59.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeling</td>
<td>77.81</td>
<td>68.28</td>
<td>Scotch Irish (-5)</td>
<td>63.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>52.26</td>
<td>43.63</td>
<td>Quakers, not dominant (+10?)</td>
<td>58.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richland (St. Clairsville)</td>
<td>51.28</td>
<td>53.92</td>
<td>Scotch Irish (-5)</td>
<td>53.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pease</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>53.56</td>
<td>&quot;many Scotch&quot; (-5)</td>
<td>53.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mead</td>
<td>45.35</td>
<td>64.73</td>
<td>Scotch Irish (-5)</td>
<td>59.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkwood + Flushing</td>
<td>40.35</td>
<td>55.43(-)</td>
<td>National Road (+5)</td>
<td>60.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayne + Somerset</td>
<td>38.78</td>
<td>38.54</td>
<td>Quakers, &quot;large and influential&quot; (+12)</td>
<td>50.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goshen</td>
<td>34.04</td>
<td>30.26</td>
<td>Quakers, &quot;quite numerous&quot; but not majority (+9)</td>
<td>39.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colerain</td>
<td>32.05</td>
<td>50.60</td>
<td>Scotch Irish (-5)</td>
<td>45.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warren</td>
<td>31.08</td>
<td>26.57</td>
<td>Quakers (+12)</td>
<td>38.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Now, logically, Jackson's share of the increase in the vote between 1824 and 1828 would be proportionally greater than the vote he actually received in 1828 in townships on the Road or inhabited by Quakers; while the actual Jackson vote would exaggerate his recent gains in townships with a Scotch Irish population. Hence we must make some allowance for the loading of the 1828 figure caused by the prior commitments generated in 1824. On Table 11.1 this is done quite arbitrarily, by deducting 5 per cent in reportedly Scotch Irish townships and adding 5 per cent in Road townships; the greater cohesion of the Quakers means, let us say, between 5 and 12 per cent must be added in their townships, according to their reported predominance. The result of this piece of chicanery is that we are left, not with a meaningful numerical value, but with a rough index of how Jackson's share of the vote increased between 1824 and 1828. The cynical will not be surprised to learn that we have now engineered a remarkably close correlation between the strength of Republicanism in 1815 and the growth of Jackson's support in the late 1820s in Belmont County!

Fortunately, enough returns survive for Washington County for us not to have to create figures of our own. Table 11.2 ranks the townships according to the average proportion of their votes they had given to Republican candidates in the strictly partisan elections of 1813 and 1814. Column 'B' gives the proportion of the vote won by Jackson in 1824. Column 'C' reveals what proportion of


46. American Friend, 30 Oct. 1813, 22 Oct. 1814, 4 Nov. 1824, 17 Oct. 1827, 1 Nov. 1828, which may be supplemented by the Washington County Abstracts of Votes (County Court house, Marietta).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>'A' (Mean Republican Vote, 1813-14)</th>
<th>'B' (Jackson's Vote, 1824)</th>
<th>'C' (Jackson's Share of Value of land per acre, 1830)</th>
<th>'D' (Increase in Vote, 1824-28)</th>
<th>'E' (Increase in Vote, 1827-28)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grandview &amp; Ludlow</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>96.87%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>$1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newport &amp; Lawrence</td>
<td>77.93</td>
<td>41.86</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roxbury</td>
<td>77.12</td>
<td>52.17</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wesley</td>
<td>76.98</td>
<td>35.48</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warren</td>
<td>75.81</td>
<td>36.17</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marietta</td>
<td>71.59</td>
<td>39.04</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>3.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fearing</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>16.98</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adams</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterford</td>
<td>46.69</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salem &amp; Aurelius</td>
<td>48.13</td>
<td>22.03</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watertown (or Wooster)</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>24.24</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barlow</td>
<td><em>Strongly Federalist</em></td>
<td>20.59</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belpre &amp; Decatur</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the increase in the Presidential vote between 1824 and 1828 was won by Jackson. We can see from this table and from the accompanying scatter-diagram that there is some sort of rank-order correlation between old Republicanism and the growth of Jacksonism. But we can do better than this. The old Republican appeal was not utilised in Washington County until 1828, and it was in the year following the 1827 election that Jacksonism outdid its opponent in attracting new supporters. In column 'D' of table 11.2 Jackson's proportion of the increase in vote between the state election of 1827 and the Presidential election of 1828 is given. The correlation with earlier voting behaviour now appears even closer.\textsuperscript{47}

It seems, on the face of it, surprising that the old party allegiances of the relatively small number of voters of the war years should have had such an impact on the aggregate behaviour of the much larger electorate of 1828; presumably the older voters were buttressed by the transmission of their values to their children and by the tendency of like-minded people to congregate in the same neighbourhood. At least, in Belmont County Quakers were moving into Quaker townships and in Washington the New England influence continued for decades to dominate the Ohio Company townships.\textsuperscript{48} But it is, of course, possible

\textsuperscript{47} Again boundary changes complicate tabulation. Barlow township was created after 1814, probably out of Warren, Wooster or Wesley; for its Federalism before it became a separate electoral unit, see History of Washington County (1881), 134. Other new townships were created by subdivision of older ones, as indicated on the table. Deerfield township, which became part of Morgan County in 1817, is omitted.

\textsuperscript{48} Wayne Jordan, "The People of Ohio's First County," OSAHQ, XLIX (1940), 10-11, 22, 30; History of Washington County, 99, 580-81, 586; Howe, Historical Collections (1907), II, 350; Cutler, Ephraim Cutler, 210. In Washington there is just one undoubted example of demographic change. Salem and Aurelius townships lay outside the Ohio Company lands, but they had been settled before 1812 by New Englanders moving up Duck Creek; thereafter these early settlers were slowly swamped by newcomers of various different backgrounds, and by the late 1820s many Virginians too were settling in this most northerly part of the county. These new settlers were presumably less friendly to Federalism than the original ones - and, indeed, table 11.2 shows Salem (with Aurelius) township to deviate from the general pattern in exactly this direction; it behaves as though it were more prone to Republicanism than its wartime votes suggest.
that the correlation is accidental, that the two sets of results reflect some common factor, such as socioeconomic characteristics, which underlay political divisions both in 1815 and 1828. Perhaps, for example, there was a cleavage between richer and poorer parts of each county, between older valley-bottom communities and those newer settlers who were moving into more marginal areas. A quick check can be made on this possibility by using the valuation of land (including buildings) for each township in 1830. Table 11.1, column E, gives the value per qualified voter of 1828 in Belmont: Table 11.2, column C, gives the value per acre in Washington, where of course, United States lands would receive different treatment from Ohio Company lands, in that the former would not be subject to tax if purchased since 1825. The results show that there is not a significant correlation with Jacksonian voting.49

Alternatively, the persisting factor underlying political cleavages may have been ethnic and cultural, for in both Washington and Belmont Counties there were undoubtedly strong ethnocultural identities and tensions which were capable of dictating partisan divisions. Yet in Washington the tension between Yankees and non-Yankees appears to have operated in 1824 rather than in 1828. In 1824 the three Pennsylvania-settled townships (Grandview, Ludlow, Lawrence) gave virtually one hundred per cent of their votes to Jackson, but showed less uniformity in 1828 when Lawrence gave to Jackson only 66 and 25 per cent of the increase since 1824 and 1827, respectively. The remainder of the old township it had been carved out of, Newport, was settled by New Englanders: this constituency gave Jackson only

49. Auditor of State, Tax Records - Washington County, 1830 and - Belmont County, 1830 (State Archives, OHS). For qualified voters, see Appendix I.
19.4 per cent of its vote in 1824, but outdid Lawrence in the proportion it gave him of the increase in its vote between 1827 and 1828. In fact, the results show that Jackson's success in 1828 was quite considerable in some New England-settled townships - and what, other than the balance of inherited party loyalties, distinguished these townships from others ethnoculturally similar?

Similarly, in Belmont it could be argued that being Quaker made one Federalist in wartime and an Adams man in the 1820s, and dislike of Quaker attitudes turned one to the opposite party regardless of any supposed partisan continuities. However, table 11.1 suggests that the voting pattern for 1828 in Belmont correlated less closely with ethnocultural identity than it did with old party loyalties. In any case, one might well wonder what made the Quakers objectionable in the 1820s. It cannot have been their antislavery sympathies, for these were shared, if less keenly felt, by other people in the county, including Jacksonians. The only thing that the Quakers were criticized for was their unpopular course in the War and their reluctance to bear arms, and this was exactly what the Republican tradition in Belmont was all about. The tension was not so much ethnocultural as partisan; militant patriotism was the party issue, above all in these counties so deeply marked by memories of the old party system.

Patterns of Old-Party Loyalty

This tale of three counties was not, of course, typical of Ohio as a whole. No county experienced such a clear-cut first party conflict as Washington before 1816. Muskingum and Belmont retained
a tradition of doctrinaire Democratic and Jeffersonian partisanship that was quite unusual; significantly, these were the only two counties in Ohio where the Whig party was to produce a states-rights wing - led in Muskingum by Thomas Anderson, the new editor of the Messenger in 1828. Yet these counties are unusual only in their relative obsession with the old-party issue, with the cry of Republicanism in danger! Similar appeals were made elsewhere and perhaps influenced many individuals, though the counties in which such individuals were sufficiently numerous to determine political developments were perhaps few.

The counties adjacent to the 'three counties' are the most likely to have shared their anti-Federalist concern. Athens County, for example, was linked with Washington in elections to the state senate, and as recently as 1825 was responsible for defeating a Federalist candidate for the state senate who had secured a majority in the older county.1 Even more suggestive are the three 'satellite' counties sandwiched between Belmont, Muskingum and Washington. Morgan, Guernsey and Monroe have been created out of the three older counties between 1810 and 1817, and had therefore shared their earlier experiences; they still depended for their newspapers on their larger neighbours, although Guernsey acquired its own press as well in 1824; and these three counties were associated with their neighbours in the same electoral districts for some offices. Morgan, which shared its state representatives with Washington County between its creation in 1817 and 1823, regularly held a Republican convention,

1. Marietta Register, 22 Jan 1864.
the nominee of which could hope for good support in the larger county; the convention nomination was frequently, however, not supported across the board in Morgan. Guernsey County also had a vigorous Republican organization after 1815, though its leadership was challenged by other local Republicans; Guernsey had taken the initiative in calling a district convention to name an opponent for Hammond in the Congressional election of 1822.³ On the whole, however, it is impossible to assess how strong regular Republicanism was in these counties in the early 1820s, or how it might have affected the growth of Jacksonism in the later 1820s. All one can say is that they shared with their larger neighbours the peculiarity that, while Jackson had made little impact in 1824, in 1828 he made considerable gains and even achieved handsome majorities, as in Monroe. Even in Guernsey, where Jackson had gained 41.4 per cent of the vote in 1824, local Jacksonians were surprised at the size of the vote won by their relatively unknown candidate for Congress in 1828; and in the end this candidate's success in defeating the well-known incumbent Congressman was due to the support he received in Morgan and Monroe rather than in his own county of Belmont.⁴ So too the extraordinary rise of Jacksonism in Licking County may have been justified in old-party terms, since Granville had been a noted centre of Federalism around 1812 and Congressman William Wilson was an old Republican who preferred Crawford in 1824-25 and then moved on to Jackson.⁵

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3. Western Herald, 4 Sept. 1819; American Friend, 8 Sept. 1820; Muskingam Messenger, 23 July 1822; Wolffe, Guernsey County, 67. See also above cb.4, pp.


5. Bushnell, History of Granville, 97; Muskingum Messenger, 3 Oct. 1816; Scioto Gazette, 2 Nov. 1826.
Yet Republican revivalism did not play such a decisive role in creating Jacksonian success in other counties farther north in eastern Ohio. Anti-war sentiment had been strong among the Quakers or Harrison, Jefferson and Columbiana counties; and Republican party machinery had been maintained and Democratic principles defended long after the War in parts of eastern Ohio between the Western Reserve and the National Road. The charge of Federalism was thrown around in a German 'backbone' county like Wayne in 1826 and 1827 in local elections which bore little relationship to the new national contest, while in Jefferson County James Wilson thought it necessary to counter the local Jacksonians' Republican appeals by making "an occasional thrust" at former Federalists, including those like Hammond who were now on his own side. Perhaps in part because of this policy, Republican revivalism did not bring as much strength to the Jackson cause in 1827-28 in this area as it did in counties farther south.

The primary cause of the difference lay in the circumstances in which the Jackson party developed. In 1824 Jackson had had little appeal in counties on the National Road. In those immediately to the north, ethnocultural preferences had brought Jackson a large popular following in 1824 among the Scotch Irish and German settlers of these counties; hence in such counties the party was well-established on a basis of personal allegiance long before the period at which the old Republican appeal began to make political sense. Moreover, antislavery considerations had taken most local Federalists into the Adams camp in 1824 in older communities of New Englanders or Quakers, while farther north prominent Federalists had moved into the Jackson camp. Men who

6. "Eelectors of Wayne County," draft ms. in hand of Joseph H. Larwill, [1826], and [J.H. Larwill] to Mr. Clingan, "for publication" [July 1827], LFP; Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 15 Apr. 1827, CHP.
had been spokesmen for sound Republicanism for a decade - like Wilson himself, or James Patrick in Tuscarawas County - moved naturally into the Administration camp, while the rival editors who accused them of deserting the good old cause were often upstarts with somewhat shifty political credentials. Hence the equation of Jacksonism with pure Republicanism could never be supported with local evidence as convincingly as it could farther south in eastern Ohio.

In other parts of the state, Federalism had not persisted as a sufficient threat locally for the old Republican appeal to have the same force as in southeastern Ohio. Even so, there were countless individuals all over Ohio who had strong personal memories of the old party system, or who had derived them from friends and relations; these people still retained or valued a partisan self-identification which tempted them to interpret the new conflict in the old accustomed terms. The Western Reserve, for example, had never developed a Federalist tradition comparable with older New England settlements farther south like Belpre, Putnam or Granville; yet the Reserve was being settled in the late 1820s by emigrants from parts of New England where the First Party System had continued to rage until recently. For example, William Y. Ford moved from Waterbury, Connecticut, to Streetsborough, Portage County, shortly before the 1828 election campaign. He spent that summer in "New Connecticut" clearing the forest, building a home and opening up a farm. He reported the result of the Presidential election in Ohio to his relations back in Connecticut in very decided terms:

Whoraw for the Hero Andrew Jackson he has got this state by upwards 9000 majority ... tell all the democrats to whoraw for the good luck so far give my Respects to uncle Josiah tell him to whoraw for Ohio for we Jacksonites hope that federalism is a dieing.

7. Like the editors of the Steubenville Republican Ledger, founded in Sept. 1826,
Ford's view of the new party contest derived from his experiences of politics - and religious conflict - in Connecticut. He remained in close contact with his old state, where he still had some property and more debts; he even had newspapers sent him from Connecticut, because "the papers hear on the reserve they are generally Administration and you cant know nothing by them." The news he received from home suggested that the party fight of Jeffersonian days still continued in Waterbury, and that many Republicans there associated Jacksonism with their old party. Though Ford himself recognised that there were some "mungril dimocrats... that is half federal and half Dimocrat" in both Connecticut and Ohio, he had no doubts that the threat of Blue-light Federalism persisted:

I am glad to hear that federalism with Presbyterianism and all the other devilish things that they can contrive to build them up has got voted down and I hope will stay down forever down they are all faith that they gain there helish plans all in hopes they live to see that day but no Charity for nothing but themselves... I am glad to hear that the Senet after there District plan is not a going to be federal because I believe it was there plan to make it federal.8

Many others also who had one foot in Old Connecticut and one in New saw Jacksonian politics in terms of Republican versus Federalist. Zalmon Wildman was the leading proprietor of Sandusky in Huron County - a real-estate speculator and businessman. Much of the time he lived in Danbury, Connecticut, and after 1825 left his Ohio interests to his son Frederick. Politically Wildman had always been a Republican, and with his associates became distraught at the political confusions of the late 1820s. As one colleague wrote in 1828 from Woodbury, Connecticut, "One thing is certain - Federalism was never more active -

8. William Y. Ford to Samuel Ford, Streetsborough, 23 Nov. 1828, and id. to Elias Ford (of Waterbury, Conn.), Streetsborough, 26 Apr., 6 June 1830, VFM 367, OHS.
all their disappointments are now to be made up and olde [word illegible] that we believed had passed their grand climacteric have become [strong again]; Connecticut was faced once more by "the union of Church & State & Aristocracy." What was needed was for those Republicans who had supported Adams to be drawn away from the Federalists: "the Jackson organisation is the only one in Connecticut worth any thing and embodies many of the most valuable republicans in the State." Though it would be necessary at first to conceal that these pure Republicans were for Jackson, many old Democrats could be brought over to that interest in local elections, "thus bringing us back to the old political division instead of religious standards." Such views were influential among Wildman's associates and they inevitably had some influence in New Connecticut. In Sandusky, for example, Wildman's associates provided a hardcore of Jacksonian leaders in the Western Reserve county in which Jacksonism achieved its first successes in elections to the state legislature. In fact, those residents of the Western Reserve who began to vote Jacksonian in the early 1830s may well have been influenced by old-party consciousness; as Martin Van Buren wrote later, the old Republicans of New England had been led to favour John Quincy Adams through sectional partialities, but soon began to drift back to their old party.

Occasionally individuals impressed by their earlier experiences of old party conflict in the East acquired positions of considerable influence in Ohio politics. David Smith, born in 1785, grew up and was educated in New Hampshire. He came to Ohio after the War and


established, in 1816, a newspaper at Columbus entitled the Ohio Monitor and Patron of Industry. In 1824 he was regarded as leading spokesman of the Adams party in Ohio; in November 1827 he brought out his paper for Jackson, thus giving the opposition the press it needed at the state capital. 11 The Administration press inevitably claimed that Smith had changed sides because President Adams had not given him office, while the Jacksonians had preferred a subsidy and patronage. Others claimed he was fired by hostility to the editors of the Ohio State Journal, who had earlier, as editors of the Scioto Gazette, tried to obstruct the foundation of the Monitor, wrangled with him through the late 1810s, and finally sued him for libel and forced the temporary suspension of the Monitor in 1823. Smith's constant antagonism to Clay was ascribed to the fact that these journalistic rivals were strong Clay men. 12 But in Smith's controversy with Bailhache and Olmstead there was always a point of principle involved. After 1816 the Ohio Monitor constantly ranted on about the dangers of Federalism and the need to preserve the "democracy"; in June 1818 James Wilson praised Smith as "a gentleman ... of inflexible democratic principles," one of the few Ohio editors who still defended true Republicanism. Smith's controversy with the Scioto Gazette arose

11. Alfred E. Lee, History of Columbus (New York and Chicago, 1892), I, 897-98; Ohio Monitor, 3 Nov. 1827. Smith was suspected of having become Jacksonian as early as March 1827, but kept quiet probably so as not to jeopardize his re-election as state senator for Franklin County; even so, his defeat in 1827 was considered a defeat for Jacksonism, and his open declaration promptly followed. Hammond to Wright, Cincinnati, 7 Mar. 1827, CHP; Lebanon Western Star, 20 Oct. 1827.

12. Scioto Gazette, 12 Apr. 1827; Ohio State Journal, 27 Nov. 1828. For the earlier controversies, see Scioto Gazette, 19 Nov. 1819; Ohio Monitor, 2 Aug. 1822, 15 Feb. 1823; Cleveland Herald, 6 Mar. 1823, in Annals, VI, 42.
because he believed that this leading Republican paper was guilty of apostasy and amalgamation. When he resumed the paper in 1823, he declared that his editorial policy would be truly "republican" in every sense of the word; since he included hostility to slavery in his definition of republicanism, this naturally led him to support Adams. However, in the other senses of his definition, Adams' regime soon seemed to him unrepulican, especially in its expansion of national authority and appointment of Federalists to office. Thus to Smith, "turning from [Adams] was political CONSISTENCY," the inevitable step for an editor whose "determination to support the democratic principle" had been "undeviating" for twelve years.

The cry of Federalism! and the old Republican rhetoric was, for this Franklin County editor, no cloak donned for convenience, but a habit of thought acquired in his years of association in New Hampshire - in fact, at Dartmouth - with Levi Woodbury, Amos Kendall and a man who long remained Smith's friend, Isaac Hill.

In sum, it would appear that there were many individuals whose choice of party in the late 1820s was influenced by party ties established long before 1820. What made these traditional loyalties so important to such people was probably some recent experience of a local political conflict in which the historic division between Federalist and Republican had in some way been involved. These individuals were likely to be found in all parts of Ohio, but whole groups of such people, clustered within a constituency and capable of making themselves felt, were found only in eastern Ohio, south of

13. Western Herald, 20 June 1818; Ohio State Journal, 27 Nov. 1828
the German backbone. What had made the old party conflict especially deep-rooted here was the fact that the local Federalists had become involved in opposition to the War of 1812. In places like Ross County and Cincinnati where local Federalists had supported the war and condemned party colleagues in New England for treason, there was less reason for insisting that the Federalists must on all accounts be denied political power; hence in spite of the strength of the old Democratic party before 1815, there was little evidence subsequently of local Republican revivalism akin to that in Belmont and Washington Counties. In areas of eastern Ohio, however, where Federalism was associated with disloyalty and treason, the old Republicans preserved an emotional appeal which still seemed relevant, even in the late 1820s; and nothing was more appropriate than to take up as standard-bearer, in opposition to the amalgamationism of the second Adams, the military Hero who had saved the republic - and Republicanism - in its hour of greatest peril.

Déjà Vu?

Some historians have dismissed with contempt the very suggestion that the Second Party System represented a continuation of the First. Yet for many people, both politicians and voters, the conflicts of the Jackson era gained their significance primarily because they reflected the issues, the interests, the loyalties that had been at stake in that earlier period; and, to even more, the correspondence between the Jacksonian and Jeffersonian causes became even closer after the onset of the Bank War. The earlier party conflict had burned deeper, and established firmer loyalties, than historians have often allowed; it had created a way of interpreting the political
world, a language, a set of symbols, of reference points, that provided, even twenty years later, a common means of understanding political issues and determining election choices. However, the clear distinction between the one-party predominance in Jeffersonian Ohio, with its factionalism and indiscipline, and the even balance of the Second Party System makes it obvious that there was no simple thread of continuity, no mere reenactment of what had gone before. The problem is to decide exactly what the differences between the two systems were, and how they came about.

Richard Ellis has provocatively argued that the division between Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans did not reflect the basic tensions in American society as accurately as did the cleavage between conservative Republicans and "democratic" Republicans. Thus he suggests that the more conservative, less partisan and more nationalistic Republicans were bound, in the long run, to coalesce with their Federalist opponents in national politics, just as they had tacitly cooperated in Ohio during the struggles over the judiciary in 1808-12; while the Democrats of those years, with their commitment to the will, strict Jeffersonianism and partisan identity, naturally evolved into Jacksonian Democrats. ¹ This view has much to commend it, as long as it is recognised that differences over foreign policy and the issues arising from the French Revolution prevented Federalist and conservative Republican from cooperating politically, especially during the War of 1812; indeed, the War created a further test of political virtue, which made amalgamation with Federalists unacceptable in many quarters even during the Era of Good Feelings. These barriers to the national political realignment that Ellis argued was inevitable ensured that

the process of realignment was less straightforward than his thesis suggests.

If we examine the politicians prominent—or at least identifiable—at both periods, we find that the cleavage of 1808-12 among Republicans does predict the later choice between Jackson and the Adams-Clay combination, at least in many cases. All three men elected as state supreme court judges in the wake of the 1810 Sweeping Resolution—Ethan Allen Brown, Thomas Scott, and William W. Irwin—later became Jacksonians. Prominent activists on the anti-judicial side, like Benjamin Tappan and John Hamm, joined them, justifying their choice in terms of their longstanding commitment to the Democratic cause. Many identifiable members of St. Tammany seem to have become Jacksonians, too, though most of them were not still politically active in the late 1820s. By contrast, leaders of the judicial party were often to be found active in the Adams-Clay ranks—men like Duncan McArthur, William Creighton, Benjamin Ruggles and Calvin Pease. Similarly, the cleavage in any particular county between regular Republicans and amalgamationists often predicted later alignments—as did the distinction in Guernsey County between the Legitimate Democrat David Robb and the amalgamationist Beatty brothers. Yet, however impressive such piecemeal evidence, there remain many striking exceptions, like the active Jacksonians John W. Campbell and Caleb Atwater who continued in later years to criticize the earlier attack on the judiciary. Operating in the other direction are the earlier Democratic leaders, Thomas Worthington and Edward Tiffin, the latter of whom was to be dismissed by President Jackson in 1829 as Surveyor

2. Ratcliffe, ed., "Benjamin Tappan," 145-147, esp. n.78. There are lists of members in the Records of the Tammany Society of Ohio, OHS.

3. Campbell, Biographical Sketches; Atwater, History of Ohio, 182-86.
General for the Northwest — and, most striking of all, John Sloane, the Jacksonians' bète-noire of 1826 and 1828, who in 1807 and 1808 had led the onslaught on the judges' claim to the undemocratic power of judicial review. Yet Sloane himself, like many others, need have no sense of inconsistency, since the limits of judicial power were scarcely an issue in Ohio after 1822, and certainly not one that directly influenced the formation of new party lines in the 1820s.

However, Ellis's point is not so much that there was a continuity in personnel between the intra-party struggles of 1808-12 and the inter-party conflict of twenty years later, as that there were permanent tensions in early American society which created similar cleavages on each occasion. Again, there is a core of truth here, but once more it is only a partial truth and cannot explain the precise character of the cleavage underlying the Second Party System. The tension Ellis identifies between the conservative-minded and the democratic-minded scarcely applies to the 1820s, since Ohioans in both new parties accepted both the rightfulness of popular rule and the necessity to protect constitutional principles through judicial procedures; it is true, however, that most Jacksonians after 1828 showed more willingness to believe that the people could not err, while most of those who doubted that proposition appeared, in Ohio, among the ranks of their opponents. The tension Ellis detects between religious revivalists and their more conservative colleagues had even less impact on party lines, since, as far as we can tell, in many, though not all, communities religious men of both outlooks preferred John Quincy Adams to Andrew Jackson. The third tension, that between the agrarian-minded and the commercially-minded, has much more relevance to the new party cleavage, though it seems to have been the net result of different considerations operating in the 1824 and 1828
elections, rather than of explicit issues that set 'agrarian' against 'enterpriser.' Such social tensions certainly existed and persisted in American society, and Ellis is right to say that they were not adequately expressed through the party contests of the Jeffersonian era; indeed, social tensions tended to break down early party lines, to disrupt the old party system, especially when the Republican party seemed in many counties to have become the party of officeholders and county-seat politicians, concerned primarily with office, patronage and the chartering of local banks. The circumstances of the late 1820s allowed the Jacksonians, as men out of power, to exploit agrarian resentments, and the party came to express that viewpoint as had no party before - but only in those constituencies where there was not an overwhelming prejudice in favour of one of the principal candidacies.

The many exceptions and difficulties that can be found obstructing simple lines of continuity between the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian periods may be explained in only one way. Strict Democratic party men like Sloan and Ruggles, like James Wilson preeminently, were drawn into the Adams-Clay combination by their commitment to the American System in the 1824 campaign. Men associated with hostility to the Sweeping Resolution like John W. Campbell and Thomas Morris became Jacksonian because it seemed political suicide to do anything else in the southwestern counties in 1824. The religious-minded - at least those who were not of Pennsylvania Scotch Irish or Dutch origin - favoured Adams probably because of the saliency of the slavery issue in the early 1820s. The overwhelming prejudices for Adams on the Western Reserve, and for Jackson in some other areas of the state, both found their root in the ethnocultural sensitivities expressed in the campaign leading up to 1824. The attraction of the most
commercially-minded people - outside the southwestern, Dutch and Scotch Irish counties - to the side of the Adams administration was a direct consequence of Clay's standing in 1824 as the architect of, and preeminent spokesman for, the American System as the solution to Ohio's problems. It was the combination of this economic programme with Adams' attraction as the Northern candidate which established the Administration party of 1825-28 as the dominant political force in Ohio politics, thus giving the Jacksonians the opportunity to appeal both to the old agrarian grievances of those distant from power and to the anti-Federalist prejudices of those suspicious of the amalgamationism of the administration.

All in all, the example of Ohio suggests that historians have underestimated the impact of the multiple crisis of 1819-21 upon political alignments in the United States. The partisan divisions of the Jeffersonian era persisted with some force even in the apparently relaxed, consensual atmosphere of the Era of Good Feelings. Those patterns were then shattered by the Panic of 1819 and the Missouri crisis, which introduced severe sectional competition into national politics and aggravated social grievances which were stored up for the future. The slavery issue divided Southern states from Northern, the American System Easterners from Westerners - and each section pressed to elect its own favoured candidate to the Presidency. In the end, the need to solve the stalemate produced a coalition based on the union of Western and Northern interests. As the protective tariff replaced internal improvements as the central economic issue, so the Southeast and Southwest drew together to protect the many-sided interests of a now solid South; and they found sufficient support among ethnic minorities, old Republicans and the discontented in the far-from-solid North to win control in national politics. This contest between a solid South and a temporarily united New England, with the
Middle Atlantic and Northwestern states divided and holding the balance of power, marked the first stage of the Second Party System. During Jackson's Presidency the reassertion of old party loyalties evident earlier in Ohio as in New York was to break down the National Republican predominance in New England; while the events of the second term, especially the Bank War, were to split and polarize the South as never before; and that new cleavage of the 1830s was to transform the Second Party System into its classic form as an evenly balanced, nationwide competition between Whigs and Democrats.

In Ohio, the shocks of President Jackson's firm - and unpopular - policy stances were to heighten passions, extend national alignments even further into local politics, and invigorate a party contest that seemed, for a time in 1833, to be fading; but the critical point was that, though some men changed sides, most took their stand on the same side as they had chosen in the 1820s. Moreover, the sharpening of the issues contested by the parties, the breakdown of the bipartisan consensus on most state issues, and the polarization of partisan views on government policy at both national and state levels, followed the lines dictated by the particular blend of social, economic and ethnocultural groups that had made up each formation since 1828; and the policy stand that each party took was the inevitable consequence of the internal contest among its component parts, almost regardless of external political realities and the need to win floating votes. In a very real sense, the development of party politics in Ohio in the 1830s was but the working out of the political consequences of the complex ways in which national parties had been formed in the state during the previous decade.
1. The Size of the Electorate

Historians constantly give different figures for the level of turnout in Ohio elections before the Civil War. For example, the figures presented by Richard P. McCormick for the Presidential elections of 1824-44, and by Stephen Maizlish for Presidential and gubernatorial elections between 1840 and 1860, differ markedly not only from one another, but also from those used in this work and presented most graphically in Chart 1.1. Earlier publications of my own also contain turnout figures at variance with those given in this work. These discrepancies arise not so much from disagreement over the election returns — though that can be a problem, as Appendix II shows — as from the use of different methods of calculating the total number of adult white males in any particular year, which figure everyone agrees approximates closely to the eligible electorate.

In fact, there should be no difficulty on this point. Every ten years, beginning in 1800, the United States Census counted and analysed the population of Ohio and the counties that composed it. The three earliest censuses, 1800-20, divided white males into five age categories: under 10, 10-16, 16-26, 26-45 and over 45. It may be

reasonably assumed that one-half of those in the 16-26 age group were 21 or over. The subsequent censuses used a different system, lumping together males between 20 and 29; I have assumed that one-tenth of the men in this category were under 21. Obviously these figures provide reasonable assessments of the number of eligible voters in, say, 1820, 1830 or 1840, but what of the intervening years? Many historians - including the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research - have extrapolated the size of the electorate in non-census years by assuming that population growth was constant between censuses, which it clearly was not. This technique seems, in general, to exaggerate the size of the electorate; hence both McCormick and Maizlish find levels of turnout somewhat lower than those given in this work, though the latter's results are so different that they do not reconcile even with the United States Census.

We can, however, do much better. The first census in the Northwest Territory was taken during the fall of 1798 on the instructions of the Territorial governor, and in 1799 the Territorial Assembly passed an act requiring a census to be taken every two years, beginning in May 1800, though it is most difficult to find evidence of the results. However, the census of 1798 for Hamilton County is readily accessible, and is used as the basis for 1798 and 1799 county figures

3. United States Census, Return of the Whole Number of Persons Within the Several Districts of the United States... 1800 (Washington, D.C., 1801); Aggregate Amount of Persons Within the United States in the Year 1810 (ibid., 1811); Census for 1820 (ibid., 1821)


given on Table 2.1. More important, however, the state constitution of 1802 required an enumeration of adult white males to be taken every four years, beginning in 1803; and one regularly was taken and recorded in the Assembly journals, except in 1811 when it was first deferred and then presumably forgotten amid the distractions and disruptions of the War of 1812. Thus, as Table A.1 shows, we have firm county figures at frequent intervals from which we can estimate the potential electorate for each intervening year with far greater accuracy than is possible with the federal census alone.

Of course, problems still remain. Not every county always made a return: for example, in 1835 three counties were delinquent, though in this case the record was completed four years later. The most serious failing came in 1831, when twenty-seven counties did not make returns, though all but three of these gaps were very soon filled by the state newspaper. On occasions, the United States Census does not reconcile too happily with the state enumeration: for example, Madison County failed to report in 1819, yet the figure derived from the federal Census for 1820 seems far out of line with the trend of population growth in the county; accordingly, I have extrapolated a figure for Madison from the 1815 and 1823 state returns. In general, I have preferred the state enumeration to the federal census, extrapolating even figures for 1820 and 1840. I have done so partly for the sake of consistency, partly because the state enumeration was specifically designed to count adult white males at more frequent intervals. Moreover, as the state enumeration was used solely to determine the

6. Ohio General Assembly, Senate Journal, 1811-12, p.56. A few of the county returns for 1811 survive, as do some township returns for several of the enumerations.

7. Senate Journal, 1835-36, 547, and ibid., 1839-40, 164; ibid., 1831-32, 106-07, and Ohio State Journal, 2 June, 7 July 1832
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>State Census</th>
<th>Federal Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>c.9,106</td>
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<tr>
<td>1803</td>
<td>15,314</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1807</td>
<td>31,308</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1810</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>c.44,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1811</td>
<td>Not taken</td>
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<td>1815</td>
<td>64,814</td>
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<td>1819</td>
<td>98,780*</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>c.114,562</td>
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<tr>
<td>1823</td>
<td>124,624</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>1827</td>
<td>149,745</td>
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<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>c.187,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td>137,559**</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>235,225</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1839</td>
<td>291,132</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>c.337,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843</td>
<td>325,646</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>351,885</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>437,085</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* One county missing

** Three counties missing
representation of each county in the General Assembly, census takers had every incentive not to undercount - as the federal census notoriously did - and any exaggeration serves the useful purpose of preventing us from underestimating the size of the electorate.

The final, and inescapable, problem arises from the creation of new counties and changes in county boundaries. In assessing voter turnout at the county level, I have watched out for such changes, and I have avoided assuming a constant rate of growth between two enumerations if the county boundaries changed significantly during the intervening period. All study of county-level data in a rapidly growing state has to make sure continuity of the county name does not conceal drastic changes in the composition and character of the county.

2. Problems of Voter Turnout in Early Elections

Obviously the historian who wrote "it is difficult to assess voter turnout before 1810 because of the lack of reliable estimates of the size of population" was talking through his hat. However, he was not totally wrong, for difficulties do arise but mainly because of the doubts surrounding the results of early elections. For example, Randolph Downes detected a "tremendous increase" in voter turnout in Hamilton County at the time of statehood: "Over six times as many votes were cast... in the election of 1802 as were cast in the previous election of 1800", producing a turnout of 83 per cent. By contrast,


William T. Utter was impressed by the low level of public interest in elections in early Ohio. After the election for governor in January 1803, he wrote, "only 4,564 votes were found for Tiffin when the ballots were counted in the General Assembly, although the population of the State was in the neighbourhood of 50,000". Again, he joined earlier historians in pointing out that the gubernatorial election of 1807 brought only 17.94 per cent of the electorate to the polls. Unfortunately, the sources do not sustain any of these calculations, and severe reservations must be made about the reliability of the official returns that historians have traditionally used for early gubernatorial elections.

Returns for Territorial elections are difficult to find, but are available for Ross and Trumbull counties, and partially for Washington. The fullest run exists for Hamilton County, since there still survive the detailed lists naming all those who voted in the Hamilton County election for the Assembly in 1798 and 1799. The returns for 1800 and 1802 were reported in the Western Spy, but not in full, and they can easily mislead - as they did Downes. In 1800 the newspaper recorded only the number of votes cast for each of the seven successful candidates, together with the news that, though thirty-five names had been announced as candidates, the number that actually "takes a poll" was only twenty-four. The most we can know about Hamilton County in

3. Utter, Frontier State, 26, 42; see also A. Banning Norton, A History of Knox County, Ohio (Columbus, 1862), 21.

4. The Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research uses the official returns without qualification.

5. Scioto Gazette, 16 Oct. 1800, 16 Oct. 1802; Whittlesey, Early History of Cleveland, and [Riddle], Geauga and Lake Counties, 255. Votes for various townships in Washington are reported in Cutler Papers, Marietta College. The vote for the Convention in Fairfield County is recorded in Jacob Beck to C.E. Rice, Lancaster, 7 Nov. 1894, Rice Papers.

1800, therefore, is that 1,551 votes were cast for the seven successful candidates, plus somewhere between 2,737 and 17 votes for the seventeen also-rans. Since each voter had seven ballots and in most cases probably used all seven, the number of people voting was between at least 613 and 224 - which means a turnout somewhere between at least 24.69 and 9.02 per cent. Similarly, in 1802 we know only that the top twenty-five candidates received 20,225 votes, while another seventy-four candidates gained fewer than 50 votes each. Since ten representatives were to be elected, the lowest possible number of voters was 2,023 certainly, plus somewhere between 8 and 370 more. Thus the lowest possible turnout figure for 1802 was between 56.29 and 47.89 per cent. In other words, Downes' statistics were unsound and exaggerated, but, as Table 2.1 shows, the actual doubling, even quadrupling, of the vote in some counties well justifies his concept of a democratic revolution coincident with the coming of statehood. 7

Less can be said for Utter's belief that people were uninterested in early gubernatorial elections, though there is no doubt that turnout was low in the uncontested election of 1805. In 1803, however, the Chillicothe newspaper pointed out that the returns officially received came from only seven counties and the two missing counties raised the total to 5,373. 8 Moreover, it seems curious that the General Assembly should declare the number of votes received by just one candidate,

7. The figures calculated are, of course, minimums, since it is likely that many voters did not in fact cast all their votes. The sources of votes for the 1803 elections in Hamilton, Ross and Trumbull, as used on Table 2.1, are Western Spy, 19 Jan., 22 June, 6 July 1803; Scioto Gazette, 15, 22 Jan., 25 June, 2 July 1803. These calculations are much complicated by the creation of new counties: in the case of Hamilton in 1803 I have included Warren, Greene, Butler and Montgomery, but excluded Clermont, which was quite distinct as early as December 1800; in the case of Ross, I have excluded Fairfield on the same grounds as Clermont, but included Franklin, which was created in April 1803 substantially out of Ross.

8. Utter, Frontier State, 26; Scioto Gazette, 5 Mar. 1803.
when the election had been keenly contested in some parts of the state.

As the *Journal* records:

> the returns of election for governor... were opened in the presence of both houses,... from the counties of Clermont, Belmont, Adams, Jefferson, Hamilton, Ross and Trumbull, from which it appeared that Edward Tiffin, Esquire, had received 4,564 votes in the said counties: Whereupon the speaker of the senate declared Edward Tiffin, Esquire, to be duly elected governor of the state of Ohio.9

Could not this really mean that Tiffin had gained a *majority* of 4,564 votes? This possibility is strengthened by earlier press reports which showed Tiffin winning more than 4,564 votes (in fact, 4,614) in only six of the seven counties that reported to the legislature; his majority in those six counties was 4,112, which could mean he gained a majority of 452 votes (a reasonable figure) in the seventh county, Trumbull, where his opponents received only five votes.10 If that is so, we can reasonably calculate, on the basis of press reports, that in fact over 5,723 people voted for Governor in 1803.

Thus we have three possible turnout figures for Ohio's first gubernatorial election: the apparent official figure gives a turnout of 29.8 per cent, the *Scioto Gazette*’s revised version gives 35.08 per cent, and individual county results suggest that 40.97 per cent would be closer to the truth, even though in some areas Federalists attending the polls refused to vote for Governor. That the higher figure is not unreasonable is demonstrated by the special statewide election for Ohio's single Congressman in June 1803, when 7,518 legal votes were given - an indisputable turnout of at least 49.09 per cent.11

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11. *Scioto Gazette*, 16 July 1803; *Western Spy*, 3 Aug. 1803. This figure is lower than the 70% calculated in Ratcliffe, "Experience of Revolution", 195-96, because the census reveals a larger electorate than was assumed in that article. For the Federalist boycott in Washington County, see R.J. Meigs to Worthington, Marietta, 31 Jan. 1803, *T W P.*
Again, the gubernatorial election of 1807 really demonstrates that the official returns for early elections (including those already discussed) rarely reveal accurately the number of people who voted legally and in good faith. Votes were commonly disallowed for misspelling a candidate's name; township and county officers would sometimes fail to make the return on time or at all, or would make it in an improper form which would lead to disqualification by the General Assembly. In 1807 votes were given for Return J. Meigs, Return J. Meigs, Jr., Jonathan R. Meigs, Jr., Jonathan Return Meigs, Jonathan Return Mags Jr., Return Meggs, Return R. Meigs jun'r, Jonathan Meggs, Jonathan R. Meigs, J. Meigs jr., Jonathan Meigs, Jonathan J. Meigs, Judge Meigs, John Meigs, Mr. Meigs, J. Maggs, Return Israel Meigs, James Meigs, Johan Meigs, Nathaniel Massie, Nathaniel Massie esq., James Massie, Mr. Massie and Daniel Massie - to a total of 11,026. The General Assembly in due course determined that only the first three forms of Meigs' name were acceptable, and found faults in the way in which the votes of ten counties had been returned: consequently, "the entire vote case for Governor in the State, as officially published, was 5,616" - or about half those actually given!  

In December 1808 Governor Huntington requested the General Assembly to attend to "the complaints arising out of the operation of our election laws":

It is a well known fact, that the suffrages of whole townships and counties have been lost, not by the fault of the electors, who have fairly and honestly given in their votes, but by the mistakes or negligence of the judges and clerks of elections, or of the clerks and their assistants, who receive and judge of the returns.... If means could be devised to effect the object, it would seem reasonable, that no suffrages should be lost, nor any election set aside, except from fraud, corruption or want of qualification, and that if none of these appear, any want of form should not affect the election.

12. Senate Journal, 1807-08, 8, 22; Scioto Gazette, 29 Oct. 1807; A. Banning Norton, A History of Knox County, Ohio (Columbus, 1862), 21. See also Utter, Frontier State, 42.
As a result a new Act to Regulate Elections was passed in 1809 which not only made the procedures clearer, but also ordered "That no election be set aside for want of form in the poll-books, provided it contains the substance."\(^{13}\)

For this reason Table A.2 presents alternative turnout figures for the early statewide elections; besides the official returns, a second, higher figure is offered which takes into account votes known to have been recorded in good faith and then disallowed on a technicality. Obviously the discrepancies in statewide elections cease to be significant after 1809, though on occasions the official returns continued to omit some counties which presumably failed to report officially returns that had been recorded in local newspapers immediately after the election. Such failings became rarer as the Second Party System developed, though the official returns continued throughout to omit scattering votes for fringe candidates.

Particular warning should be given against using the statewide election results most conveniently tabulated in the volume of Ohio Election Statistics published annually or biennially since the 1880s by the Secretary of State's office. Errors existed in the table from the start (especially in regard to the candidates' party identifications), other typographical errors have crept in over the years, and they are all repeated in each new edition. In 1936 someone decided that the first three gubernatorial elections could not have been held in odd years as all the others under the first state constitution were held in even years; hence, in blissful ignorance, he or she changed the year of the first three elections, and this confusing mistake still appears in recent editions.\(^{14}\) Those volumes must therefore be used with great

\(^{13}\) Senate Journal, 1808-09, 59; Chase, ed., The Statutes of Ohio, I, 622-26.

\(^{14}\) Secretary of State of Ohio, Ohio Election Statistics, 1979 (n.p., n.d.).
TABLE A.2: VOTER TURNOUT IN STATEWIDE ELECTIONS, 1803-1828

as a percentage of adult white males

| Year | GOVERNOR  | | CONGRESSMAN  | | PRESIDENT  |
|------|-----------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
|      | Official  | Actual           | Official         | Actual           |
| 1803 | 29.8      | 41.01+           | 49.09            | --              |
| 1804 | --        | --               | 30.13            | 16.64 or 14.86+ |
| 1805 | 20.52     | 23.13+           | --               | --              |
| 1806 | --        | --               | 33.32+           | --              |
| 1807 | 17.94     | 35.22+           | --               | --              |
| 1808 | 45.49+    | 43.23+           | 13.46 or 12.61+  | --              |
|      | --        | --               | --               | --              |
| 1810 | 39.39+    | (48.05)          | --               | --              |
| 1812 | 37.41     | 37.96+           | --               | 20.3 or 19.4+  |
| 1814 | 36.26     | 39.57+           | --               | --              |
| 1816 | 41.93+    | --               | 5.33             | ?               |
| 1818 | 42.04+    | 45.03            | --               | --              |
| 1820 | 46.09     | --               | 8.85             | ?               |
| 1822 | 50.68+    | or 53.58         | --               | --              |
| 1824 | 58.99+    | 58.30            | 38.51 or 38.35+  | --              |
| 1826 | 60.32     | --               | --               | --              |
| 1828 | 66.38     | or 66.45         | --               | 82.13           |

\(a\) Uncontested; 3 counties missing
\(b\) 2 counties missing
\(c\) 4 counties missing
\(d\) Based on only 2 counties
\(e\) + Soldiers absent
caution, though for the Presidential elections of 1816 and 1820 they remain the only extant source. The Presidential votes reported seem accurate enough, as long as it is remembered that the figure recorded represents the vote received by the most popular Electoral candidate representing each Presidential nominee; it overlooks the fact that some voters split their tickets, and so exaggerates the number of votes cast. In the Presidential half of Table A.2, the first column is based on the official figure printed in Ohio Election Statistics (with obvious elementary errors corrected); the second column is based on an examination of the vote received by every Electoral candidate (where known), and a calculation of the minimum number of voters needed to produce that result. By this measure it appears that only a small minority ever split their tickets, and that minority became almost non-existent with the onset of the Second Party System.

3. The Sources for Local Voting Returns

For the years from 1836 on, official voting returns at county level for Presidential, Congressional and gubernatorial elections are available in Horace Greeley's The Tribune Almanac ... comprehending The Politicians' Register and the Whig Almanac (New York, 1838-68), while the Presidential vote for 1832 and the Congressional vote for 1834 is given by county in Benjamin Matthias, The Politicians' Register (Philadelphia, 1835). Presidential results by county are, however, most conveniently found in William Dean Burnham, Presidential Ballots, 1836-1892 (Baltimore, 1955). For the earlier period covered by the present work, unfortunately, it is necessary to gather county-level (not to mention township-level) returns from a range of sources, though a full compilation is now being made at

15. The returns for each Electoral candidate are given in Scioto Gazette, 19 Nov. 1804; Chillicothe Supporter, 17 Nov. 1808, and 14 Nov. 1812; Warren Trump of Fame, 2, 9 Dec. 1812; Columbus Gazette, 18 Nov. 1824; but have not been found for 1816 or 1820.
the American Antiquarian Society on the basis of returns collected independently by Philip Lampi and myself.

Though they should be used with care in the early years, the official returns for the state gubernatorial elections, from 1803 on, may be conveniently found tabulated by county in the General Assembly Journals, usually in both the senate and house journals in the December following the election, as well as in leading newspapers. There is no systematic tabulation by counties for any of the Presidential elections held between 1804 and 1820, inclusive, although the returns for individual counties may be found in scattered newspapers. The county returns for the 1824 Presidential election were widely reported in the press, with small variations, and a sensible set has been drawn up in Harry R. Stevens, *The Early Jackson Party in Ohio*, 167-68, which I have used in this work. For the 1828 Presidential election I have accepted the county returns in the Ohio State Journal, 6 Nov. 1828, *Cincinnati Advertiser*, 26 Nov. 1828, Painesville Telegraph, 15 Dec. 1828, and St. Clairsville Gazette, 8 Nov. 1828, which differ slightly from those reported in Cleveland Herald, 27 Nov. 1828, and Niles' Weekly Register, XXXIX (20 Nov. 1830), 212.

It is also possible to find some county-level tabulations for the statewide elections of Ohio's solitary Congressman, 1803-10. Most of the results for 1803 may be re-created from the Cincinnati Western Spy, 20 July and 3 Aug., supplemented by 22, 29 June, 6, 13 July, 1803; and, for 1804, from ibid., 17, 31 Oct., 7 Nov., and Scioto Gazette, 12 Nov., 1804. In 1806 and 1808, full tabulations appeared in Scioto Gazette, 13 Nov., supplemented by 23 Oct., 1806, and in Cincinnati Liberty Hall, 19 Nov. 1808, and the Chillicothe Supporter, 20, 27 Oct., 4 Nov. 1808. Returns from only three counties have been found for 1810, but enough to show it was not an uncontested election. With the districting of the state in 1812, attempts to create a consolidated list of county returns virtually ceased, and it becomes necessary to search for county and district returns
in the various local newspapers. However, the complete county returns of
1818 for all the Congressional districts are listed together in *Columbus

Newspapers give returns not only for the whole range of elections at
stake each October (as well as in Presidential November), but also some-
times give township returns as well. Potentially the richest source of
election returns, certainly at the township level, are to be found in
county records slowly being collected since 1975 in the eight local
government records depositories which form part of the Ohio Network of
American History Research Centers. These records are, however, most
patchy, and almost never contain results of Presidential elections.
Indeed, the disappearance of the official returns of early Presidential
elections from both the county clerks' records and the secretary of state's
office remains the most surprising mystery in the archival history of early
Ohio.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography lists sources used in preparation of this work; it does not include materials read on later periods of Ohio history, nor books and articles important for a general understanding of this period but not specifically cited in this work. The guide is arranged broadly into two sections, primary and secondary. The primary section is arranged by type of material; the secondary section is subdivided by topic as well as according to the character of the work referred to. The detailed arrangement of the sections is as follows:

I PRIMARY SOURCES

a) Official Records and Compilations (Unpublished; Published)
b) Newspapers (Guides and Compilations; Original Newspapers and Periodicals, by place)
c) Pamphlets and Broadsides
d) Manuscripts (Published Guides; Originals)
e) Published Correspondence (by principal)
f) Published Diaries and Memoirs (by principal)
g) Contemporary Travel Accounts, Descriptions and Directories (Guides and Compilations; Original Sources)
h) Near-Contemporary Histories

II SECONDARY MATERIALS

a) Political Science Perspectives
b) Politics and Government Outside Ohio
c) Politics and Government Within Ohio
d) Biographies (Dictionaries and Directories; Individual Lives, by principal)
e) Settlers and Ethnicity
f) Religion
g) Antislavery and Race
h) Social and Economic Background
j) Banking, Finance and Transportation
k) Local Histories (State and Region; Regions of Ohio; Counties, by county; Municipalities and Townships, by place)
I PRIMARY SOURCES

a) OFFICIAL RECORDS AND COMPILATIONS

(i) Unpublished Records

Abstracts of Votes, Pollbooks and Tallysheets, (listed under Clerk of
Courts or Board of Elections, and housed mainly at the Local
Government Records Depository specified in parenthesis), for the
following counties:
Darke, Logan, Mercer and Van Wert, Miami, Montgomery, Shelby (Wright
State University);
Ashtabula, Madison, Sandusky, Union, and scattered townships (OHS);
Trumbull (WRHS);
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(ii) Original Newspapers

(Dates in parentheses show that only scattered copies have been read, even where no other copies are known to be extant; other dates show that an almost complete run of newspapers have been read).

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