A Cognitive Approach to the Translation of Creative Metaphor in Othello and Macbeth from English into Arabic

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A Cognitive Approach to the Translation of Creative Metaphor in
Othello and Macbeth from English into Arabic

By

Lamis Ismail Omar

A Thesis Submitted to the School of Modern Languages and Cultures
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Durham University

July 2012
ABSTRACT

Despite the intriguing nature of metaphor and its acknowledged importance in the discipline of Translation Studies (TS), a relatively small number of studies have explored the translation of metaphor from the perspective of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, and very few of them adopted an experiential approach to the object of analysis. This research aims at exploring the translatability of creative metaphor in six Arabic translations of Shakespeare’s *Othello* and *Macbeth* based on a combined methodology that adopts the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and the descriptive approach to text analysis in TS.

The empirical study argues that metaphor translatability is an experiential process that is highly influenced by the diversity and richness of our conceptual system and the background knowledge shared by the metaphor producer and metaphor translator. Discussing metaphor translatability from the perspective of these factors involves dealing with different levels of variation in our metaphoric thinking including the cultural, contextual and pragmatic levels. The analyses and discussions of the empirical study mark a departure from text-linguistic approaches to the topic in that they deal with the Source Text’s and Target Text’s metaphoric content as physically embedded conceptual models rather than linguistic patterns with grammatically delineated features and structures.

The arguments of the study answer several questions with regard to researching the translation of metaphor from the perspective of Conceptual Theory, providing a detailed description of what exactly influences the process and product of translation, and underlining the functionality of the variation factor in appreciating the conceptual nature of metaphor. The results of the empirical research reveal that, although our metaphoric thinking has a universally shared metaphoric structure, not all our metaphors are translatable or translated in a single way, which refutes the supremacy of the notion of metaphor universality, putting emphasis on the factors of experientialism, exposure and intentionality.
DEDICATION

For my late father and first teacher, for my great mother and little angel, my son Abd al-Rahman, for their sincere blessings, unconditional love, unlimited patience and everlasting support.
STATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT

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To them all I shall remain much indebted for the rest of my life.

July 2012 Damascus
NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The transliteration of Arabic words in this dissertation is illustrated in the table below. The doubling of sounds known as ‘gemination’ is represented by doubling the relevant letter, as in ‘yurattil’. The assimilation (idghām) of the letter ‘l’ (lām) in the definite article ‘al-’ with what are known as ‘the sun letters’ (ḥurūf ẓamsiyya: t, th, ð, d, dh, r, z, s, sh, ẓ, n) and the indefinite inflectional noun ending (tanwīn) are not transliterated: e.g. ‘ʿushba’ and ‘al-shams’ instead of ‘ʿushbatun’ and ‘ash-shams’, respectively. The ‘tā’ marbūta’ (妥善) is transliterated as ‘-a’ in pre-pausal form as in ‘ḥaraka’ and ‘-at’ when the word is the first element in a genitive (idāfā) as in ‘ḥarakat al-tarjama’. The ‘nisba’ suffix is transliterated as ‘-ī’ in masculine words and ‘-īyya’ in feminine words as in ‘ʿArabī’ and ‘ʿArabiyya’.

The definite article is not capitalized when it appears in a proper noun, except at the beginning of a sentence. When preceded by a particle or preposition ending in a vowel, the vowel ‘a’ in the definite article is transliterated as follows: ‘fi ’l-kitāb’ (hamzat waṣl). Short vowels are represented as ‘a, i, u’, whereas long vowels are transcribed as ‘ā, ī, ū’. As for diphthongs, they are transliterated according to their common representation in the scholarly systems as ‘ay, aw’. Transliterated Arabic words are italicized.

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Topic

This dissertation will research the translation of metaphor from English into Arabic in the framework of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. In the present chapter I will discuss the importance of the topic in language, thought and the field of Translation Studies, and set the scene for the main assumptions and arguments which will be discussed in the coming chapters. The chapter is made up of three sections: the first section will provide an overview of the importance and omnipresence of metaphor in different fields of knowledge; the second section will focus on the thesis structure giving a brief account of the content of chapters; and the third section will deal with the research main questions and hypotheses.

As a concept, metaphor attracts a great deal of interest in diverse fields of knowledge due to the various arguments about its conceptual nature and widely recognized cognitive value. In order to understand the significance of metaphor, we need to question the purpose behind its use. It is conceptually and linguistically limiting to confine the use of metaphor to the ornamental and aesthetic aspect because, as will be elucidated in the next chapter, metaphor is associated with multiple functions that exceed its linguistic features and highlight its conceptual value and ubiquitous status in our language and thought. Whether in art, literature, science or cultural communication, metaphor has been discussed prolifically as an indispensable tool for reasoning, which makes it a valuable subject for academic research. Morgan highlighted the importance of identifying the purpose behind the use of metaphoric language before embarking on any critical analysis of its nature:

“The answer to the question of the purpose of metaphor is surely not a simple one. (…) its purpose is more than the enjoyment of puzzle solving. (…) The picture of
Metaphor has been associated with various functions in our cognitive system as it is used in the fields of arts, sciences, communication, so on and so forth. From an artistic perspective, metaphor has a central position in view of its conceptual role in reasoning and developing ideas. It has an expressive power which is used in visual art, literature, music and even the silence of the mimetic to express the inconceivable and describe the indescribable. The artistic value of metaphor lies at the heart of the romantic view which Hawkes very expressively described stating that “we live in a world of metaphors of the world, out of which we construct myths” (1972: 55). However, limiting our perspective of metaphor to its role in art and literature could be subject to criticism from other fields of knowledge, such as science and philosophy, the discipline of logic and ‘truth’. Hence, there is a compelling need to detect the presence of other values of metaphor. The latest cognitive research about metaphor highlighted its epistemological value as being “central to scientific thought” (Gentner and Jezierski in Ortony 1993: 447) and indispensable to all fields of knowledge as it “connects us with something real” (Hausman 1989: 19). In other words, metaphor is not limited to metaphysics since it has also been the subject of analytic investigation in other disciplines like philosophy, social science, anthropology and mathematics, as the following passage reveals:

“Eliminating metaphor would eliminate philosophy. Without a very large range of conceptual metaphors, philosophy could not get off the ground. The metaphoric character of philosophy is not unique to philosophic thought. It is true of all abstract human thought, especially science. (...) Conceptual metaphor is one of the greatest of our intellectual gifts.” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 129)

The fact that metaphor has a key conceptual role in the disciplines of science and art, alike, does not make it of less worth to ordinary people. Metaphor always has something to
say to every human being in view of its high communicative value (Ortony 1975: 53) in all languages and cultures. Metaphor can create an atmosphere of intimacy and friendliness between people and help “make people ‘at home’, and this, in a certain sense, is why it is so pervasively engaged in” (Cooper 1986: 140). On the other hand, metaphor enables us to speak about our shared experiences and transmit our attitudes about our lives as people of the same cultural background. It is a common and “ubiquitous (…) everyday phenomenon in the lives of ordinary men, women and perhaps especially, children” (Ortony in Ortony 1993a: 15). This is what makes metaphor play a pervasive role in our conceptual system. The prominence of metaphor in everyday communication, in general, makes it a vehicle for transmitting cultural trends as culture tends to be shaped and enhanced throughout the daily exchanges between the individuals of a certain community:

“If culture is reflection and pattern of thinking and understanding, and if thinking and understanding can be and are sometimes inevitably metaphorical, then culture and metaphor would also fall into a relation of mutual promotion or restraint, depending on how this relation is interpreted. That is, culture plays a role in shaping metaphor and, in return, metaphor plays a role in constituting culture.” (Yü 1998: 82)

Recently, ‘the translation of metaphor’ has gained a growing importance in the field of Translation Studies. Metaphor poses a challenge to translation in theory and practice for several reasons comprising the complexity of the semantic associations invoked by metaphoric language and its pragmatic force and cultural value. Also, since metaphor is thought to be culturally oriented, it can be immune to a translation which seeks “to create in the TT an experience parallel to the ST” (Obeidat 2001: 206). Consequently, metaphor has been discussed lately as a controversial issue which needs special attention and consideration from researchers, academics and professional translators alike. The questionable extra-linguistic nature of metaphor creates difficulties on different levels of communication between two languages. However, there is consensus that metaphor was never given the attention it merits in the field of translation until very recently when its conceptual value was
brought to the light by the scholars of the Cognitive School. This research will deal with metaphor from two perspectives: first, from the perspective of Cognitive Theory which perceives metaphor as a conceptual phenomenon rather than a linguistic device; second, from the perspective of TS where I will investigate the implications and factors involved in the translation of metaphor.

1.2 Research Outline

This thesis is made up of eight chapters. The first chapter introduces the topic, structure and main assumptions of the dissertation. Chapter Two will provide a literature review of metaphor in language and thought. The literature review will be based on a diachronic and synchronic analysis discussing the various theoretical approaches to metaphor in classical rhetoric, modern linguistics and contemporary Cognitive Theory. For the purpose of the diachronic analysis, the topic will be reviewed in three main sections, each of which will deal with the literature on metaphor over a certain period of time. The first section will discuss metaphor in the Classical Tradition from the perspectives of Plato and Aristotle. The second section will be devoted to the debates which discuss metaphor from the semantic perspective including the Comparison View, the Interaction View and the Pragmatic View. In the third section, I will provide the arguments of the Cognitive School on metaphor as a conceptual phenomenon which permeates our reasoning and is rooted in our physical system and daily experiences.

The Conceptual Theory of Metaphor is based on three main assumptions: first, that metaphor is embedded in our bodies and their constant interaction with our neural system and conceptual system, i.e. the brain; second, that the use of metaphor is omnipresent in our daily communication and not restricted to creative individuals or special uses of language; third,
that all metaphors are the result of the extension of or interaction between three key patterns of conceptual metaphor: ontological metaphors, image schemas and structural metaphors. As for the synchronic aspect of the literature review, whenever needed, the sections will be divided into subsections which survey the main trends that dominated the arguments on metaphor throughout the selected period of time. In reviewing the theoretical contributions to the debate on metaphor and its functions in language and thought, the arguments will be presented progressively in a way that enhances the development of the literature review towards the theoretical framework of the present research, namely the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor.

The third chapter will provide a literature review of metaphor in Translation Studies. The chapter is divided into two parts: in the first part I will deal with the concepts of ‘translation’, ‘meaning’, ‘equivalence’, and ‘translation shifts and loss’ in relevance to Translation Studies, and in the second part I will provide a review of the different approaches to the translation of metaphor. The previous concepts, to be discussed in the first part of the chapter, will be introduced from different angles covering the variation in the text-linguistic accounts of each of them. As for the second part of the chapter, it will focus on the diverse arguments on the translation of metaphor. The contributions will be classified in three sections according to the historical development in the arguments on metaphor translatability, on the one hand, and the main assumptions and trends which characterize their theoretical framework, on the other hand. The first section will deal with early contributions to metaphor translatability comprising the accounts of Nida (1964; 2001; 2003) and Mason (1982). The second section will discuss the prescriptive model of metaphor translation (Newmark 1980; 1982; 1985; 1988a; 1988b; 2004) versus van den Broeck’s descriptive model (1981). The third section will review post-cognitive approaches to the translation of metaphor from the perspective of two models: the anthropological model of Crofts (1988) and Torres (1989) and the

Chapter Four will introduce the methodological framework of the empirical research on the translation of creative metaphor in Shakespeare from English into Arabic. The research methods of this dissertation have three components: data identification, extraction and selection from the ST corpus, data identification and qualification in the TT corpus, and the contrastive analysis of data based on a combined qualitative and quantitative reading of the results. In Chapter Four, I will discuss the research methods in three sections. The first section will discuss the tools of the empirical research. The second section will deal with the methods of data identification and collection based on a cognitive linguistic approach in extracting ST data and a combined model of the cognitive approach and the descriptive approach in extracting TT data. The third section will introduce the methodology of the contrastive analysis which will be based on a quantitative and qualitative reading of the results.

Chapter Five will cover the first component of the empirical study dealing with the ST corpus that consists of two Shakespearean texts, i.e. *Othello* and *Macbeth*. The chapter is made up of four sections. The first section will provide a survey of the literature on metaphor in Shakespeare’s language and the stylistic features of his imagery. The second section will focus on a review of the translation of Shakespeare from English into Arabic. The third section will deal with an account of metaphor in the ST corpus within the framework of Cognitive Theory. This section will discuss the results of the first part of the empirical research reading the ST extracted data quantitatively and qualitatively by the three models of conceptual metaphor: ontological metaphors, image schemas and structural metaphors. The fourth section will center on a descriptive analysis of creative metaphor in *Othello* and
Macbeth. Creative metaphors in the two STs will be quantified and analysed according to the two models of extended creative metaphor and blended creative metaphor, where the patterns will be deconstructed into their basic conceptual metaphors.

Chapter Six will cover the second component of the empirical research dealing with the TT corpus from the perspectives of the cognitive approach and the descriptive approach on data mutation in Translation Studies. The chapter will research the translation of creative metaphor in Othello and Macbeth from English into Arabic in four sections: the first section will introduce the criteria of TT data qualification by loss in ST data; the second section will discuss the criteria of TT data qualification by the shifts that influenced the ST analysed material; the third section will discuss TT data qualification by metaphor types; and the fourth section will provide a quantified account of the results of the contrastive analysis in terms of data mutation in the conceptual metaphors and types of metaphor. The analysis of the translation of creative metaphor in the first ST, Othello, will be based on a corpus comprising Jabra’s edition of The Tragedies (1986), Badawi’s edition of Othello (2009) and Enani’s edition of Othello (2005). For the translation of creative metaphor in Macbeth, the TTs include Jabra’s edition of The Tragedies (1986), Badawi’s edition of Macbeth (2009) and Nyazi’s edition of Macbeth (2000). This brings the total of the corpus to eight texts: two for the ST empirical study and six for the TT investigation in the contrastive analysis.

Chapter Seven will cover the third component of the empirical research, i.e. the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the results of the contrastive study in terms of their implications for the translations individually and collectively. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section will provide a descriptive account of the results regarding their implication for the individual methods of the translators, dealing with the type of equivalence that prevailed in their translation of creative metaphor in the ST corpus. The second section will provide a descriptive analysis of the results in terms of their implications
for the three translations of each ST, with a focus on the specific factors that could have influenced the translation of metaphor on the level of the three TTs (triangulation method). The results will also be examined in terms of their implication for the cognitive value of the types of metaphor. The third section will introduce a model for the translation of metaphor in the light of the main findings and implications of the empirical study. The last chapter will provide the research summary and conclusions.

1.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses

This thesis deals with a number of questions and hypotheses that will be discussed in the light of the cognitive approach to metaphor in language and thought. As explained earlier, the translation of metaphor is a controversial topic that has given rise to a great deal of debate and linguistic research since the mid-seventies of last century. There are several questions that have to be considered in researching the translation of metaphor. The first question is whether the translation of metaphor poses a challenge for translators in a way that makes it a valuable subject of discussion and academic research? If the answer to this question is, ‘yes’, then, the second question is whether metaphor can be translated and to what degree, and, if so, what factors play a role in the translatability of metaphor? The third question is: what governs the effectiveness of translating metaphor, and what are the best criteria for studying the translation of metaphor according to the different levels of equivalence? Since the methods of this research are based on the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor, the fourth question is whether the cognitive approach provides a solid basis for researching the translation of metaphor and detecting the key factors and implications which determine the degree of metaphor translatability? As a point of departure for answering these questions, this research will be guided by the following arguments.
The first argument is that the translation of metaphor involves the two issues of processing ‘meaning’ and reproducing ‘meaning’. In view of the presence of multiple levels of meaning (see Chapter III, 3.1 on ‘Translation and Meaning’), the question is what kind of meaning do we have to consider when dealing with metaphor-related issues? My assumption is that researching the translation of metaphor from the cognitive point of view highlights the importance of considering three levels of meaning when processing the conceptual content of the metaphor in question: the semantic (basic semantic content), the contextual (contextual associations) and the pragmatic (the user’s intentional and attitudinal implications). In other words, the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor is not expected to yield a magical solution for the difficulties associated with translating metaphor; rather it will focus on the role of experimentation in appreciating the richness of metaphor and processing its cognitive content in one language, culture and text before trying to reproduce it into another. Consequently, Conceptual Metaphor Theory can help unveil the determining issues and factors that influence the process and result of translating metaphor.

The second argument is that there is no Cognitive Theory for translating metaphor. Instead, there is a cognitive approach to processing metaphor. In other words, what Cognitive Theory says on the translation of metaphor is exactly what it has to say on processing and conceptualizing conceptual metaphor: that the translation of metaphor is embedded in our physical system (body and neural system) and its interaction with our conceptual system (brain) and physical and cultural environment. Metaphor is a conceptual process with a complex cognitive value and its translation is governed by our conceptual and experiential heritage, on the one hand, and the volume of cognitive effort we need in order to deconstruct and reconstruct its underlying associations, on the other. In a word, experientialism, exposure and common ground knowledge are indispensable factors in processing and translating metaphor, regardless of the purpose behind the process of translation.
The third argument is that the translation of metaphor influences the conceptual system and experiences of both the processor, i.e. translator, and the receiver, which calls for objectivity and relativity in any analysis, study, or project dealing with the translation of metaphor. This stems from the belief that metaphor is a conceptual device for reasoning and creative thinking, based on accumulating and developing the kernel conceptual patterns that are embedded in our bodies and daily experiences. Consequently, our metaphors are not only inspired by our physical and experiential identities, but they also inspire our thought and, therefore, our behaviour, actions and ways of living. At the same time, metaphor is a depository of cultural traditions and sets of beliefs, which makes it necessary for the translation of metaphor to consider the influence of its attitudinal and expressive power on both the source culture and target culture involved.
In this chapter I will provide a literature review of metaphor theories in language and thought. The review will be divided into three parts which deal with metaphor in classical rhetoric, modern linguistics and contemporary Cognitive Theory. Due to the inter-disciplinary nature of the discussions on metaphor, this concept will be discussed first in a condensed analysis of the main contributions that dealt with it in the fields of linguistics and philosophy, paving the way for a review of the contributions which handled metaphor in Translation Studies in the next chapter. The arguments to be surveyed in the following sections will be based on a diachronic and synchronic analysis which traces the development of metaphor theory from different angles, providing a comprehensive understanding of the nature and significance of metaphor in relevant fields of knowledge. This approach to the review will highlight the similarities and differences between different contributions to metaphor theory, on the one hand, and lay the foundation for the major terms and arguments that will be discussed in the account on Cognitive Theory which provides the theoretical framework for this research, on the other hand.

For the purpose of the diachronic analysis, the contributions to the debate on metaphor will be discussed in three different eras. The first section will deal with metaphor from the perspective of the two main arguments that prevailed in the Classical Tradition: Aristotle’s Comparison View and Plato’s epistemological model. The second section will be devoted to the modern linguistic accounts that deal with metaphor from a semantic perspective comprising the modern Comparison View, the Interaction View and the Pragmatic View. The third section will centre on contributions that fall under the arguments of the Cognitive
School which views metaphor as a conceptual process rather than a rhetorical or linguistic device. Whenever necessary, sections will be divided into subsections according to the relevant trends and assumptions that prevailed over the selected period, hence the synchronic analysis of the literature review. Before starting with the literature review, I would like to deal with the concept of metaphor from the perspective of various arguments which defined metaphor in relation to its linguistic behaviour, extra-linguistic nature and the notions of ‘metaphor versus literal language’, and ‘metaphor versus other tropes’.

2.1 Defining Metaphor

In this section, I will survey various approaches to the definition of metaphor. As a preliminary attempt at understanding the nature of metaphor, one might be prompted to look the word up in the lexicon in order to uncover its immediate semantic associations. However, this is the point of departure in an open-ended journey of investigation about the notion of metaphor which has been the subject of extensive research in various fields of knowledge. The Dictionary of Philosophy defined metaphor as “a rhetorical figure transposing a term from its original concept to another and similar one” (Runes 1983: 195). Runes elaborated further on this definition claiming that “in its origin, all language was metaphoric” (ibid.) According to this view, metaphor is not only defined as a figure of speech used for a rhetorical purpose (cf. Trauth and Kazzazi 1996: 1008), but is also believed to involve a transformation in the semantic value of words, and this is perhaps why metaphor can be considered the origin and source of language. For example, in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, the concept of LOVE was, in one instance, associated with “a smoke made with the fume of sighs” (Weller 1.1.190). In an advanced stage, LOVE turned into a “bud” (2.2.121) which “may prove a beauteous flower” (2.2.122). This mutation in conceptualizing
the emotion of LOVE from ‘LOVE AS THE SMOKE OF SIGHS’ to ‘LOVE AS A BUDDING FLOWER’ highlights the evolving conceptual function of metaphor where the indirect semantic associations of love were shifted from being ‘a source of pain and suffering’ to ‘a source of beauty and hope’. In other words, the writer used two different metaphors to conceptualize LOVE, altering its semantic associations by context, and this is what makes metaphor exceed the purely linguistic role and become associated with a wide spectrum of extra-linguistic functions.

As the previous definition has revealed, there are two main features which indicate the extra-linguistic behaviour of metaphor. The first feature implies that metaphor marks a transformation in the semantic content of a lexical item by associating it with another lexical item on the grounds of similarity. The second highlights the prominent status of metaphor in our conceptual system by considering it the raison d’être behind all language. Accordingly, metaphor is not a mere stylistic device used for decorative and rhetorical purposes. Rather, it has a complex cognitive value whose understanding cannot be achieved by giving a simple definition to be taken at face value. Appreciating the rich conceptual nature of metaphor requires a formidable process of experimentation and research into its behaviour as a linguistic and conceptual phenomenon in its own right. Multiple descriptions of metaphor ranged from considering it an ornamental device that abounds in the literary genre, as in “the Classical theory” (Innes in Boys-Stones 2003: 12), to viewing it as a pervasive feature in everyday language and communication (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) and highlighting its cognitive value in the fields of science and knowledge (Garfield 1986).

To put it differently, metaphor moves along the continuum between two sets of extremes: the imaginative and the real, the aesthetic and the functional, the decorative and the creative, and so on. This variation in evaluating the uses of metaphor in different disciplines says something about its extra-linguistic nature which merits attentive research and careful
consideration from an empirical perspective. As a researcher in the field of Translation Studies, I have often encountered contexts where certain semantic associations lacked clarity. Whether that vagueness was caused by the complex structure of linguistic units, the indirectness of speakers’ utterances, or the lack of familiarity with the genre and/or cultural background, it has always triggered my curiosity for research into what appeared to be dressed up in a metaphor. Most often, metaphor has been thought to involve some sort of vagueness which, in one way or another, might have created a gap between the conceptual supremacy of metaphor, on one side, and the notions of factual truth and scientific objectivity, on another. The following passage deals with the equivocal nature of metaphor:

“Metaphors are black holes in the universe of language. We know that they are there; many prominent people have examined them; they have had enormous amounts of energy poured into them; and, sadly, no one yet knows very much about them.” (Fraser in Ortony 1993: 340-1)

Despite the general debate about the opacity of metaphor, its significance for communication does not stem from its ambiguity and indirect implications, as might be thought, but rather by its indispensability for the basic processes of reasoning. Metaphor is no longer a sheer stylistic device which involves intentional, rhetorical excursions and word play, but also an “extension in the semantic value of a linguistic form resulting from perceived resemblance” (Trask 2000: 211). Accordingly, metaphor is an intellectual process which influences the semantic associations of a lexical item by extending its senses; and, in principle, this process “involves a semantic transfer through a similarity in sense perceptions (...) giving rise to new meanings for old words, for example, a galaxy of beauties, skyscraper” (Malmkjær 1991: 282). In other words, the role metaphor plays in language is not confined to changing linguistic structures, giving rhetorical effects, or expanding semantic associations; it is also functional in generating new meanings, which highlights the connection between the two concepts of ‘metaphor’ and ‘meaning’. It is this quality of effecting semantic change that makes metaphor functional in generating meaning and in communication. To put it
differently, the significance of metaphor in language does not stem only from its opacity but also from its conceptual power which gives it a deep level of signification. Metaphor helps us both create meaning and understand the essence of meaning, as discussed in *The Meaning of Meaning* by Ogden and Richards (1930). It can also generate diverse semantic associations by various people in different places and situations. This is, perhaps, the reason why metaphor tends to permeate every field of knowledge and has prominence on all levels of communication. Subscribing to Eco and Paci’s view that “metaphor defies every encyclopedic entry” (1983: 217), Malmkjær remarked that:

“metaphor merits such an entry because, although sometimes seen as merely one among the different tropes (...) available to a language user, it may equally be seen as a fundamental principle of all language use.” (1991: 415)

Having given a preliminary definition of metaphor highlighting its extra-linguistic functions, I shall continue to delineate this notion by defining it in terms of ‘what it is not’, which might reveal certain hidden features about its nature and behaviour in language and thought. Defining metaphor in terms of ‘what it is not’ involves two levels of comparison: the first is based on comparing metaphoric language with literal language; the second is based on a comparison between metaphor and other forms of figurative language, i.e. other figures of speech which have the status of non-literal language such as simile, metonymy, irony, oxymoron, personification and idiomatic expressions (Cooper 1986: 8). In this context, it is worth mentioning that some linguists used metaphor to mean all “figures of speech” (Nida 1945: 206) which “involve highly specialized meaning” (ibid). However, before I argue for or against this perspective, I shall introduce the main arguments which deal with metaphor versus literal language, on the one hand, and other figures of speech, on the other.
2.1.1 The Metaphoric versus the Literal

Talking about what is metaphoric and what is not entails a discussion of what is meant by literal language as opposed to non-literal language. Traditionally, literal language and metaphoric language were thought to be two mutually exclusive categories where what was viewed as metaphorical used to be contrasted with what was considered literal. In the main, a lexical item is considered literal if its intended meaning is identical with one of its direct semantic associations, i.e. dictionary denotations. Conversely, a lexical item is viewed as metaphorical when its intended meaning goes beyond its direct dictionary denotations. For example, in the phrase ‘black mood’, we cannot interpret the word ‘black’ literally, because the word ‘mood’ is abstract and does not have physical dimensions or tangible features like shape or colour. This makes the expression ‘black mood’ stick out as a linguistic unit in its own right; in which case the word ‘black’ should not be taken literally to mean the colour ‘black’. In such an example, we have to reason about the ‘non-literal’ associations of the phrase, as a whole.

However, the distinction between metaphoric and literal language is not always clear-cut and straightforward. While one can come up with innumerable examples where the previous criterion can be used in judging the metaphoricity or literality of a lexical item, this might not be always the case. For instance, whereas we can apply the former logic in judging the metaphoricity of the phrase ‘silver spoon’ in a sentence like ‘he was born with a silver spoon in his mouth’ which, in this context, has the figurative meaning of ‘born to a rich family’, we cannot apply the same logic to the phrase ‘silver spoon’ in the following example, ‘can I see the silver spoon collection?’ where the word ‘silver’ stands for its direct colour associations rather than its indirect metaphorical reference to ‘financial status’. This argument implies that the literality or metaphoricity of a lexical item is both gradable and context-based. It also highlights the relativity of meaning as a notion which resists rigorous classification into
‘literal’ and ‘non-literal’. In other words, what is metaphoric is not always ‘non-literal’ and what sounds ‘literal’ does not lack “metaphoricity or non-literality” (Janssen and Redeker 1999: 120) by default; simply because literality and, therefore, metaphoricity vary by “culture, individuals, context, and task” (Gibbs 1994: 27). Consequently, it is quite limiting to define metaphor based on the literal/figurative dichotomy, which takes us to the thesis, introduced earlier and expressed repeatedly by different linguists that metaphor is “logically prior to literal talk” (Cooper 1986: 257), and that the “mythical view of literal meaning as being well specified and easily identifiable in thought and language is incorrect” (Gibbs 1994: 26). This belief has been further elaborated in the arguments of the Cognitive School that will be extensively introduced later in this chapter:

“it is misleading to think of concepts as a whole as being either all metaphorical or all non-metaphorical. Metaphoricity has to do with particular aspects of conceptual structure. Part of a concept’s structure can be understood metaphorically, using structure imported from another domain, while part may be understood directly, that is, without metaphor.” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 58)

This leads us to the second part of the equation which sees metaphor vis-à-vis other tropes. Although different names were given to various figures of speech, some linguists refer to any trope which involves figurative meaning as a ‘metaphor’. The reason figures of speech tend to be grouped by many under the notion of metaphor is that all of them involve references to indirect implications which are different from the basic semantic associations of the lexical unit. In the following account, I will provide an initial questioning of the claim that different tropes behave in very similar ways in general, which is why they are all thought to fall under the broad category of metaphor.

2.1.2 Metaphor versus Other Tropes

The second argument which deals with metaphor in terms of ‘what it is not’ involves comparing and contrasting it with other figures of speech. Traditionally, rhetoricians and
linguists tended to build their study of metaphor on a one-to-one comparison with its sister tropes, highlighting the commonalities and differences between what they described as ‘figures of speech’. The purpose behind the following comparative account is to define the type of ‘metaphor’ which will be dealt with in the present research and introduce the main categories which are associated with, or organized under the notion of ‘metaphor’. In broad terms, we can define metaphor as an ‘analogy’ which holds between two concepts; where the term ‘analogy’ stands for “any expression of similarity or resemblance” (Miller in Ortony 1993: 378). This definition of metaphor is typical of the Classical Theory and the modern Comparison View, which see the metaphoric association as a comparison between two terms considering metaphors as ”similes with the term of comparison left out” (Chiappe and Kennedy 2000: 371). Although metaphor does involve the semantic association of similarity by describing one concept in terms of another, this view was criticized for reducing metaphor to simile, overlooking its functional force:

“Metaphors are impoverished when they are reduced to similes, because similes move toward closing the relationships between meanings put together in metaphor.” (Hausman 1989: 17)

One of the techniques adopted by certain linguists to draw a distinction between metaphor and simile as two different tropes is the principle of ‘unidirectionality’ or ‘non-reversibility’ (Glucksberg and Keysar in Ortony 1993). This principle is based on the assumption that metaphor involves an implicit resemblance which does not allow for interaction between the two fields of the similarity, and that it qualifies a kind of ‘class-inclusion category’ where one domain yields part of its semantic properties to another but not vice versa. On the other hand, a simile involves an obvious comparison, which allows for interaction between the two explicit parts of the comparison, and, at the same time, it is reversible. For instance, in a sentence like, “the earth has bubbles as the water has” (Macbeth, 1.3.79) the two parts of the comparison, ‘the earth’ and the ‘water’, are explicit. However, in the following example,
“why do you dress me in borrowed robes” (*Macbeth*, 1.3.108-109), the comparison which holds between ‘titles’ and ‘robes’ is implicit because the domain of ‘titles’ is not stated directly and can only be detected from the context. In addition, the directness of the comparison in simile makes the semantic association that holds between its two parts one of correspondence, unlike the semantic association of class inclusion which exists in metaphors as in the example, “there’s daggers in men’s smiles” (*Macbeth*, 2.3.140). In this example we cannot say that the association between ‘daggers’ and ‘smiles’ is that of correspondence. Rather, it is a relation of inclusion in which ‘smiles are containers for daggers’.

The fact that the two domains of the comparison are present in similes but not necessarily so in metaphors and that the semantic association of simile is one of correspondence, rather than class inclusion, makes the former reversible and the latter not reversible. If we go back to the previous examples, the explicitness of the two parts of the simile enables us to reverse the analogy of ‘the earth is as the water’ into ‘the water is as the earth’, but we cannot do the same with the second example in which the other domain of the comparison, ‘title’ is implicit. We cannot either apply the same principle to the third example which characterizes the domain of ‘daggers’ as being included by the domain of ‘smiles’. Glucksberg and Keysar explained the principle of the ‘unidirectionality’ of metaphor as follows:

“We suggest that the principle governing the non-reversibility of metaphoric comparisons is that they are implicit class-inclusion assertions. They derive from the canonical metaphor form, S is P. As implicit class-inclusion statements, metaphoric comparisons simply obey the ordering constraint on such statements. They are not reversible.” (in Ortony 1993: 416)

The second category of figurative language I would like to discuss in relation to metaphor is metonymy. It is defined as the figurative use of an entity to refer to another entity which is either identical with the first entity or relevant to it. Based on the partial or total identicalness between the two components of metonymy, linguists divide it into two types. The first is ‘whole-for-whole’ metonymy which involves a reference to the entity as a whole. For
instance, when I say, ‘I enjoy reading Shakespeare’, the word ‘Shakespeare’ is a whole-for-whole metonymy referring to ‘the writings of Shakespeare’. The second kind of metonymy is ‘part-for-whole’ metonymy, also known as ‘synecdoche’, where we use one part of the entity to refer to the whole; like Macbeth’s request to Banquo’s murderers to mask, “the business from the common eye” (3.1.123-124). The phrase ‘common eye’ functions as a ‘part for whole’ metonymic reference to ‘the public’. Another example of synecdoche is the use of the Arabic idiom ‘stretched hands’, ‘yadān mabsūṭatān’, the Biblical expression ‘good eye’ (Matthew 6: 22) and the English phrase ‘all heart’, as metonymic references to the quality of being ‘generous’.

The previous description of metonymy highlights its referential function (Gibbs in Ortony 1993: 258) bringing it close to the semantic association of synonymy. Metonymy functions as a semantic variation for the described entity itself, as its “logical basis is one of association or contiguity” (Silk in Boys-Stones 2003: 132). However, like metaphor, metonymy is not limited to a linguistic or stylistic function; it also contributes to expanding the semantic associations of a concept by highlighting part of its features and toning down others to give an attitudinal effect. In other words, it is possible for metonymy, especially when involving a ‘part-for-whole’ association, to have more than a referential semantic content, where it conveys an attitude in which the “part we pick out determines which aspect of the whole we are focusing on” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 36). For example, Shakespeare’s repeated use of the word ‘flesh’ in King Lear is meant to express an opinion about the sinful nature of the ‘human body’. This extra-referential role of synecdoche is shown in several examples like, “but yet thou are my flesh, my blood, my daughter; or rather a disease that’s in my flesh” (Shakespeare 2005, 2.4.214-215), and “our flesh and blood, my lord, is grown so vile, that it doth hate what gets it” (ibid., 3.4.129-130). The following passage explains this extra-referential function of metonymy in Shakespeare’s play:
“It is the discovery of the metonymy, ‘the flesh’, (...) which gives the language of the latter part of the tragedy its characteristic mark of simplicity charged with power, for within the metonymic structure made possible by the use of this common term, Shakespeare is able to sweep the strings of feeling whilst seeming to make no gesture at all.” (Muir and Wells 1982: 38)

Another unique feature of metonymy is that it plays a key role in cultural and religious conceptualization, taking the form of ‘symbolism’. Metonymies create associations between our physical experiences and our conceptual system, and, subsequently, help us condense our experiences in rich conceptual references that develop into cultural symbols. Examples of this include the use of the ‘good shepherd’ as a symbol for ‘Jesus Christ’, and ‘olive branch’ as a symbol for ‘peace’. There is a general assumption that symbols “arise from metaphorical creations” (Hausman 1989: 16) as a result of the repeated use of metaphors and metonymies. This role of metonymy in creating symbols adds to its significance as a major trope and ranks it with metaphor in a binary system of “selection and combination, which are taken to be processes fundamental to all linguistic usage” (Silk in Boys-Stones 2003: 135). The habitual use of a metaphor or metonymy in a certain community makes it acquire an increasing prominence in a way it becomes associated with a fixed conceptual function in which the symbol turns into, “a literal fact” (Ralph 1978: 3) and starts to be “referred to locally in non-figurative language” (ibid.). For example, the ‘lamb’ is a symbolic reference to ‘Jesus Christ’ and the ‘dove’ is a symbol of the ‘Holy Spirit’. Some examples on the iconic function of symbols have other cultural associations than those of faith such as ‘elephants and donkeys’ for ‘Republicans and Democrats’, and ‘hawks and doves’ for ‘Conservatives and Liberals’, respectively, in the United States of America.

Another trope that falls under metaphoric language is personification which is defined as a metaphor that describes a certain concept in terms of features belonging to human beings. Conceptualization in terms of personifications can be done selectively. For example, Macbeth conceptualizes life as “a walking shadow, a poor player that struts and frets his hour upon the
stage” (5.5.24-25). In this example, ‘life’ is not personified in general terms as in saying ‘life is a man or an actor’. Instead, the domain of ‘life’ is associated with the adjectives ‘walking’ and ‘strutting and fretting’, to indicate its transitory status. The function of this personification is not limited to describing ‘life’ as a ‘human being’; rather it qualifies the target concept and gives an attitude about it, as in the case of metonymy.

In addition to metonymies, symbols and personifications, figurative language comprises tropes such as oxymoron which is a figure of speech that describes “conflicting, contradicting thought and feelings” (Obeidat 2001: 218). We can divide oxymoron into direct oxymora which comprise two contradictory concepts and indirect oxymora which consist of two concepts that are not the direct opposites of each other. Consider Gibbs’ example of “the silence whistles” (in Ortony 1993: 269) where the writer did not create the oxymoron by using the word ‘silence’ next to one of its antonyms such as ‘noise’ or ‘clamour’. Instead, he used one of the features of the word’s antonyms. In other words, ‘noise’, which is the antonym of ‘silence, is associated with unpleasant sounds such as shouting, snoring, screaming, roaring, whistling, etc. The indirect oxymoron was created by using one of these associations, ‘whistling, next to the first conflicting term ‘silence’.

The difference between metaphor and oxymoron lies in their semantic behaviour and communicative function. From the semantic point of view, metaphor invokes similarity or comparison between two terms for purposes like reasoning, defining, describing, commenting, and so on. That is why metaphor is a cornerstone in any process of communication as it is rooted in the functions of our conceptual system. Conversely, oxymoron creates associations between two semantically contradictory concepts and “since oxymora combine opposites, they seem to express contrasts, not comparisons, and it can be argued that, on the Comparison View, they should not be analysed in the same way as metaphors” (Miller in Ortony 1993: 392). By and large, metaphor is omnipresent on all levels
of language use in different situations and text types. By contrast, oxymoron has a distinctive use which abounds in the literary genre and highly rhetorical discourse, as it gives a strong rhetorical effect by employing semantic incongruity for emphasis and stylistic effects (see Panksepp 2004 on ‘affective stylistics’).

Figurative language is sometimes believed to comprise idiomatic expressions. Metaphors and idioms are usually considered two contrastive phenomena: “lexicalized and non-lexicalized metaphors” (Dickins 2005: 234), “live” (Samuel 2005: 191) and “dead metaphorical expressions” (ibid.), or “creative and non-creative metaphors” (Hausman 1989: 19). The adjectives ‘creative’, ‘live’ and ‘non-lexicalized’ are indicative of metaphorical items which are the result of conceptual processes that create an association between two different concepts. On the other hand, the adjectives ‘non-creative’, ‘dead’ and ‘lexicalized’ are associated with conventionalized linguistic units which behave as fixed lexemes semantically and syntactically in such a way that they become part and parcel of our linguistic heritage. Although there is a noticeable difference between metaphors and idioms, some linguists consider the two as similar tropes in that they both originate from figurative thinking and “constitute an area of great unpredictability for the translator” (Menacere 1992: 568). Metaphors and idioms share the quality of being contradictory with the principle of compositionality (Machery et al 2005) which is defined as some sort of correspondence between the individual elements of the expression, on the one hand, and its overall semantic and communicative implications, on the other hand. An example of this is “making the beast with two backs” (Othello, 1.1.116). This is “an idiom which was calqued by Shakespeare from French, appearing in the works of Rabelais (c. 1494-c. 1553)” (Manser 2009: 43), and it implies the meaning of ‘being involved in sexual intercourse’. The meaning of the idiom is not related to any of its components or the total of their individual semantic associations.
Another example of the lack of compositionality in metaphors and idioms is ‘to starve the beast’, which is a novel metaphor in American English referring to a fiscal strategy adopted by American conservatives. The strategy of ‘starving the beast’ involves using budget deficits by tax cuts in order to force future reductions in the size of the government (Bartlett 2007: 5). In this example, it is not possible to tell the meaning of the metaphor from its individual components. Despite the common feature of non-compositionality shared by ‘living metaphors’ and ‘dead metaphors’, a distinction between them has always been made in terms of looking at idioms as lexical units whose semantic meaning is accessed spontaneously due to their frequent use. Conversely, and unlike idioms, living metaphors do not tend to be processed directly, nor can they be accessed in the lexicon of a language, which is why “most figurative language scholars do not view idioms as being especially metaphorical” (Gibbs et al 1997: 142) because although they “might once have been metaphorical, but over time have lost their metaphoricity and now exist in our mental lexicons as frozen, lexical items” (ibid.).

Viewing idioms as dead uses of language which are “lexicalized” (Dickins 2002: 147) in dictionaries has occasionally been challenged by some linguists. Idioms could actually violate their canonical classification as dead metaphors when a language user brings them back to life with original semantic implications other than the traditional ones which they used to have. That is why some linguists went as far as considering an idiom or a dead metaphor, alternatively, “a tired one that might come to life, so to speak, after some sort of rest” (Guttenplan 2005: 183).

Another linguistic phenomenon which is occasionally discussed in connection with metaphor is irony. The association between metaphor and irony has often been discussed by the school of pragmatics which looks at both tropes from a communicative perspective, as will be discussed in the pragmatic account of metaphor (2.3.2). However, while some linguists associate metaphor with a mere descriptive function that could be fulfilled by
employing different tropes, others think that there is a similarity between the pragmatic function of metaphor and the attitudinal force of irony. In general, and as will be clarified in the upcoming sections, metaphor is used for reasoning, describing, clearing ambiguities, effecting intimacy, impressing, or criticizing. These functions make metaphor indispensable to the conceptual processes of the mind, i.e. thinking and expressing our attitudes. On the other hand, irony is a linguistic and stylistic tool which performs a single function, i.e. criticism. In other words, metaphor is a tool of thought and reasoning, whereas irony is only a tool of communication. That is why, if we are competent enough in processing and using metaphor, then we can be competent in processing irony but the opposite is not necessarily true:

“Thus, metaphor functions to describe, to explain something in a particularly apt, memorable, and new way. In contrast, irony functions to show the speaker’s evaluative attitude and, as a by-product, to show the kind of person the speaker is-one who can criticize indirectly, without emotional involvement. Although metaphor and irony may realize one another’s communicative functions peripherally, their primary functions diverge in the above respects.” (Winner and Gardner in Ortony 1993: 429)

For the purpose of my research, I would like to adopt the cognitive approach to metaphor as a ‘mother’ of all tropes. As the section on the Cognitive Theory of metaphor (2.4) will reveal, all figurative language has a high cognitive value in our conceptual system. It would be limiting to deal with one trope as a distinct category which is more valuable than other tropes. Conceptual Metaphor Theory views the different types of metaphoric language, discussed briefly in the previous account, as essential for the processes of thought and conceptualization, and, consequently, they all merit equal attention in any objective research on the notion of metaphor. This claim will be further discussed and researched in the chapters ahead. The following passage by Gibbs highlights the importance of dealing with all figurative language as indispensable for the conceptual processes of the mind:

“Figurative language researchers in the cognitive sciences have been especially guilty of ignoring tropes other than metaphor. This neglect stems partly from the
belief that only metaphors have real cognitive value, whereas oxymora and figures involving irony, metonymy, and hyperbole are just rhetorical devices that neither serve conceptual purposes nor are motivated by figurative processes of thought.” (Gibbs in Ortony 1993: 275)

Having opened this chapter with different approaches to defining metaphor, I would like to move to the literature review of this research. As mentioned earlier, the presentation of the review will follow a historical progress where the main contributions to the topic will be discussed according to the prominent tenets of the Classical Tradition, the modern semantic views, as well as the Cognitive Theory of metaphor, respectively. The arguments which will be tackled in the selected eras have been known for the special attention they paid to metaphoric language although they differ in their approaches to and perspectives about the nature and behaviour of metaphor in language and thought.

### 2.2 Metaphor in the Classical Tradition

This section will deal with the classical view of metaphor in English Rhetoric from the perspective of the two leading classical figures: Plato and Aristotle whose contributions embody two divergent trends that highlight the “ancient’ quarrel between philosophy and poetry” (Pappas 1995: 65). Plato adopted a rational philosophy in investigating metaphysical issues that are relevant to human existence, moral values and the canons of our physical reality, in general. In questioning the essence of such concepts, he was influenced by the philosophy of his teacher, Socrates, who was interested in the logical, neutral description of things rather than the subjective interpretation of how they looked to him. As a philosopher, Plato’s logic aimed at providing an objective understanding of the metaphysical phenomena of the world and a rational description of the essence of ‘truth’ away from the ‘irrationality’ of poetic language. This explains why his philosophy took the form of dialogues that involve interaction between different participants who expressed their thoughts in a series of
arguments and rational inquiry. In any discussion of the philosophical nature of metaphor, it is important to have an idea about the logic of Plato as the whole Platonic philosophy, which is devoted to questioning the concept of ‘truth’, is based on an extended metaphor.

In *The Republic*, Plato introduced the *Allegory of the Cave*, which is an imaginary dialogue between a group of people who are imprisoned in a cave and are unable to see the light, symbolizing truth. According to this allegory, enlightenment can take place only if the chained person can leave the cave and be directly exposed to the light; as if Plato wanted to say that truth cannot be described to us by others. It is something to be experienced by us, rather than dictated by other people. Plato based his *Allegory of the Cave* on a very important metaphor which continued to influence human thought and metaphoric thinking until the present time. The main message behind this metaphor was that the concept of ‘truth’ is not absolute and what might look like ‘truth’ is only an illusion or appearance which emulates the original truth. This assumption highlights Plato’s skeptical philosophy, which he inherited from Socrates. He was often criticized for his condemnation of *Mimesis*, art, as a false representation of reality, but his “reliance on image, metaphor, and myth either dooms his philosophical enterprise, or demands an explanation of why those tropes should not count as the kin of poetry” (Pappas 1995:214). I think that Plato’s philosophy was not meant to criticize metaphoric language in as much as it sought to reintroduce the concept of ‘truth’ in a new theory which was revisited in modern philosophies about metaphor, as the following passage explains:

“Heidegger argues that contemporary representational accounts of truth as correspondence are an outgrowth of a change in thinking spurred by Plato’s thought. This change (…) can be detected in an ambiguity in the cave allegory surrounding the notion of truth, an ambiguity between truth as a property of things, and truth as a property of our representations of things. For Heidegger the decision to focus on truth as a property of representational states has its root in the historical influence of Plato’s doctrine of the ideas.” (Wrathall 2004: 444)
The second approach to metaphor I would like to discuss in relation to the Classical Tradition is Aristotle's theory which has become the subject of many arguments about the importance of metaphor in language and thought. Aristotle is the father of Rhetoric, which is the counterpart of Dialectic and refers to “the faculty of observing (…) the available means of persuasion” (Roberts 2010: 8). Aristotle’s account of metaphor became known as the ‘Comparison View’ which was most often accused of being superficial and dealing with metaphor as a linguistic device with a mere aesthetic function. Nevertheless, there is more to Aristotle’s view than the aesthetics of metaphor. In Poetics, Aristotle provided his definition of ‘proportional metaphor’ describing it as “the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion” (Butcher 1998: 38). According to this definition, metaphor originates from transferring (Gr. metaphora) a concept from one semantic field to another; or taking a certain semantic feature from one concept and attributing it to another based on the grounds of proportional analogy, which implies that the similarity between the two components of metaphor is relative.

This definition of metaphor might look simple. However, considering Aristotle’s use of the words ‘transference’ and ‘analogy’, we notice that the principle of ‘similarity’ involved in producing a metaphor is not based on an apparent resemblance taken at face value. It rather implies what Brogan described as an “analogy in the sense of proportion” (2005: 119) which is, for philosophers like Heidegger, much “more fundamental ontologically than the analogy of attribution” (ibid). Aristotle’s account also involves looking at metaphor in terms of comparison by considering it a simile without the article of comparison, ‘like’. According to Aristotle, metaphor has the same function of similes which “are to be employed just as metaphors are employed, since they are really the same thing” (Butcher 1998: 145). This view assumes that metaphor involves a comparison between two domains based on a
similarity that holds between the two components of the comparison. Certain linguists considered this assumption about the similarity between metaphor and simile superficial, calling into question Aristotle’s account of focusing on the ornamental function of metaphor exclusively, as the following comment reveals:

“Aristotle was interested in the relationship of metaphor to language and the role of metaphor in communication. (...) He believed metaphors to be implicit comparisons, based on the principles of analogy, a view that translates into what, in modern terms, is generally called the comparison theory of metaphor. As to their use, he believed that it was primarily ornamental.” (Ortony in Ortony 1993a: 3)

Although Aristotle was believed by some to have focused on the aesthetic aspect of metaphor, his view underlies other considerations about its expressive power and functionality in reflecting truth and depicting realities. In fact, Aristotle viewed truth as a concept which lies in art and beauty, rather than the physical representation of objective reality, which, for him, does not exist. His appreciation of the extra-aesthetic role of metaphor in language is implied in a number of opinions he expressed in his works about the everyday use of metaphor and its ability to provide accurate descriptions of realities and create new resemblances that never existed before. According to Aristotle, the use of metaphor is not limited to literature or the world of art, as such; metaphors prevail in the daily communication of different people and on diverse levels. The fact that Aristotle observed this important function of metaphor in normal communication and referred to it clearly refutes the argument about his superficial interest in the ornamental side of metaphor. In Rhetoric, Aristotle made this position clear stating that:

“In the language of prose, besides the regular and proper terms for things, metaphorical terms only can be used with advantage. This we gather from the fact that these two classes of terms, the proper or regular and the metaphorical- these and no others-are used by everybody in conversation.” (Roberts 2010: 154)

This clear statement about the functionality of metaphor in communication eliminates any doubt about Aristotle’s appreciation of the cognitive role of metaphor. In addition, he has a long-term dedication to researching the notion of metaphor, which makes it unlikely for him
to have thought that metaphor serves nothing more than an ornamental function. For Aristotle, as long as there is some sort of harmony between its main components, metaphor has a descriptive power which yields clarity and accurate depiction more than it embellishes style (Roberts 2010: 154). The other aspect that Aristotle addressed in dealing with the extra-aesthetic functions of metaphor is its role in creative thinking which can be associated with its novel uses. This role stems from the ability of the human mind to generate new resemblances which were not observed before. It is this power of metaphor which made Aristotle describe it as “the mark of genius, for to make good metaphors implies an eye for resemblances” (Butcher 1998: 43). The following passage says more about this side of metaphor:

“How strange words simply puzzle us; ordinary words convey only what we know already; it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh. When the poet calls ‘old age a withered stalk’, he conveys a new idea, a new fact, to us by means of the general notion of bloom, which is common to both things.” (Roberts 2010: 173)

In brief, the Classical Theory of metaphor, usually referred to as the Comparison View, has a deeper significance for understanding the nature of metaphor than might be thought. The Classical Tradition offered contributions that drew attention to the importance of metaphor in our conceptualization about the world, and its seeds are rooted in any view about the indispensability of the use of metaphor in language and thought. That is why revisiting Plato’s dialectic and Aristotle’s rhetoric on the nature of metaphor is vital for any account which aims at reflecting the richness of metaphor, not only because they represent the earliest contributions to the topic, but also because their philosophies showed a particular appreciation of metaphoric language, whether by using it as Plato did, or by investigating its nature and behaviour, as Aristotle did.

Having given an account of metaphor theory in the Classical Tradition, I would like to move to a synchronic analysis of the topic in modern linguistics, dealing with metaphor from
a semantic perspective. In general, there are three major views that adopt a semantic analysis of metaphor in modern linguistics including: the Comparison View, the Interaction View and the Pragmatic View. These three views differ in their definition and classification of metaphoric language as a result of their variation in decoding meaning, as such. Yet, they have one feature in common as they all value metaphor as a communicative device which is worth a detailed study and research, as will be further explained in the following sections.

2.3 Metaphor in Modern Linguistics

In this section, I will deal with the different contributions to the debate on metaphor in modern linguistics. The section is made up of two subsections: the first will review the arguments which tackled metaphor from the perspective of the modern Comparison View and the Interaction View; and the second will present the arguments which discussed metaphor according to the Pragmatic View. The reason I will deal with the Comparison View and the Interaction View in a separate account is that both of them are based on processing metaphor according to the principle of ‘contiguity’, unlike the Pragmatic View which looks at metaphor in terms of the notion of ‘incongruity’. More about the two concepts of ‘contiguity’ and ‘incongruity’ in relation to metaphor processing will be provided in each of the relevant sections ahead. For a start, I would like to explain what is meant by the principle of contiguity in metaphor analysis. The term ‘contiguity’ stands for the semantic similarity that exists between two different concepts. In Routledge Dictionary of Language and Linguistics, ‘contiguity’ refers to a semantic “relation between two lexemes that belong to the same semantic, logical, cultural, or situational sphere” (Bussmann 1996: 247).

Linguists who adopted the contiguity principle in dealing with metaphor maintained that the processing of metaphor has to be grounded on a kind of proximity in the semantic
associations of its two main components. Conversely, linguists from the Pragmatic School criticized the contiguity principle as a literal approach to processing metaphor and replaced it with the principle of incongruity, where metaphor is viewed as a deviation from the original semantic associations of the lexical unit in question. In other words, the latter school called for pragmatic semantics which deals with metaphor in a communicative approach, where the meaning turns into a message implied in utterances, instead of being limited to the semantic content of lexical items.

Very often, early modern approaches to metaphor have been considered two sides of the same coin as they deal with metaphor in terms of the semantic associations it involves in producing meaning. However, a closer examination of each of them can reveal that they involve more differences than similarities, as will be clarified in the following account. In the coming subsection I will review the arguments which dealt with metaphor from a semantic perspective and according to the principle of contiguity, trying to highlight the points of similarity and difference between them. The contributions to be surveyed will be classified under the modern Comparison View or the Interaction View, both of which are grouped under ‘the Modern Semantic Approaches’.

2.3.1 The Modern Semantic Approaches

I will start my account of the modern semantic approaches to metaphor with the Comparison View and then I will discuss the argument of the Interaction View. The modern Comparison View is based on the assumption that metaphor involves analogy between two notions, highlighting the similarities that exist between the two sides of the comparison. This view goes back to Aristotle, but it was reintroduced in modern linguistics by people like Jonathan Cohen (see Cohen and Margalit 1970; Cohen in Ortony 1993) and others who maintained that metaphors should be processed in a semantic theory rather than a theory of language use (in
reference to pragmatics). According to the proponents of the Comparison View, processing a metaphor is not different from processing a literal statement as it depends on the correct interpretation of its semantic associations which are determined by the rules of language. In order to prove this claim, Cohen attempted to classify systematic violations of the semantic rules which organize metaphorical language. The ultimate claim behind this is that all we need to interpret metaphors is a set of linguistic rules that are performed mathematically, i.e. in a compositional way:

“(…) we cannot dispense with some kind of compositional approach to the semantics of natural language if we are to achieve any determinate progress- anything more than pious generalities- in this area of inquiry. An analytic-resolutive methodology (…) leads us naturally into a deeper understanding of richly structured wholes, and the meaning of a natural language sentence, whether literal or metaphorical, is certainly such a whole.” (Cohen in Ortony 1993: 69)

As explained in the account of metaphor in the Classical Tradition (Section 2.2), the Comparison View has often been criticized for its superficial and simplistic treatment of metaphor. Although Aristotle stressed the value of mastering metaphor as a means of effective communication, the classical Comparison View has always been accused of dealing with metaphor as “a ‘mere’ rhetorical ornament” (Musolff 2007: 24) as well as an inaccurate way of representing the truth of things. However, the fact that the Comparison View interpreted the nature of metaphor in terms of the semantic proximity, i.e. contiguity, between its components, and, according to the rules of processing any type of meaning in language, does by no means imply that this view paid no attention to the extra-linguistic features of metaphor. Like Aristotle, who regarded metaphor as more than a tool for embellishment, explaining its role in highlighting existing similarities or creating new ones, defenders of the modern Comparison View based their appreciation of the value of metaphor on its expressive power and precise representation. This precision in analogical reasoning and creating new associations, gave rise to what has become known as ‘theory-constitutive metaphors’, as explained in the following passage:
“(…) there are theoretically important aspects of similarity or analogy between the literal subjects of the metaphors and their secondary subjects. The function of such metaphors is to put us on the track of these respects of similarity or analogy; indeed, the metaphorical terms in such metaphors may best be understood as referring to features of the world delineated in terms of those—perhaps as yet undiscovered—similarities and analogies.” (Boyd in Ortony 1993: 489)

Having given a brief account of the Comparison View of metaphor, I would like to move to the second semantic approach to metaphor in modern linguistics, namely the Interaction View. This view was introduced by I. A. Richards in his investigation of the concept of meaning and the main factors which play a role in determining the semantic properties of lexical items. Richards’ approach to metaphor relies on a semiotic interpretation of the notion of meaning starting on the level of word as a ‘symbol’ of thought. In his analysis of the nature of meaning, Richards was influenced by de Saussure’s Theory of Structuralism (see Holdcroft 1991; and Ogden and Richards 1930) which studies the influence of language on thought. According to Ogden and Richards, the early semantic approaches to language failed to provide an adequate theory of meaning as they were not based on a scientific framework which deals with the complexities of the semantic content of words as symbols. Alternatively, “it is the investigation of the nature of the correspondence between word and fact (…) which is the proper and the highest problem of the science of meaning” (Ogden and Richards 1930: 2).

The semiotic approach to meaning adopted a relative perspective of reasoning about the nature of language and its relation to our conceptual system. According to the semiotic view, language is a system of arbitrary signs, i.e. words, which do not have innate significations that are born with them. They are rather meaningless lexical items that bear no communicative value when they exist on their own. This side of language is what de Saussure described as *langue*. Signs start to acquire their semantic value, referred to as the literal meaning of a word, as a result of their frequent use in real life situations. The use of signs in real life interaction is what the Semiotic School called *parole* (Bussmann 1996: 657).
The word-as-sign assumption is based on the claim that “Words, as everyone now knows, ‘mean’ nothing by themselves” (Ogden and Richards 1930: 9). This claim involves looking upon meaning from two perspectives: the first as being transitory; and the second as being contextual. For Richards, meaning is transitory as there is no everlasting or fixed association between a word and its recognized semantic associations. Additionally, meaning is influenced by various factors that comprise the social background, cultural background, textual properties and educational background, to name a few. All these factors shape the semiotic sphere of communication known as context. In other words, the meaning of signs is derived from the situational dimension of the context; hence the notion of ‘contextual meaning’. According to this assumption about the nature of meaning, Richards questioned any theory which is based on the superstition of literal meaning as an absolute meaning, so to speak:

“The contextual theory of signs (...) will be found to throw light on the primitive idea that Words and Things are related by some magic bond; for it is actually through their occurrence together with things, their linkage with them in a ‘context’ that symbols come to play that important part in our life which has rendered them not only a legitimate object of wonder but the source of all our power over the external world.” (Ogden and Richards 1930: 47)

Richards’ approach to meaning gave rise to the Interaction View of metaphor. The fact that meaning is contextually determined by a number of factors implies that there is an interaction between the sign, other signs and extra-linguistic factors. In order to explain how this interaction takes place, it is advisable to consider Richards’ definition of the concept of metaphor. According to Ogden and Richards, the best way to understand a metaphor and process its implications is by interpreting it in terms of borrowing (1930: 213). This entails that certain attributes are borrowed from a domain called the ‘vehicle’, and projected onto another domain called the ‘tenor’, the subject of the metaphor (see Richards 1936) or the “topic” (McGlone and Manfredi 2001: 1215). For example, in Iago’s warning to Othello that “jealousy…is the green-eyed monster” (Othello, 3.3. 165-166), the tenor is JEALOUSY, and
the vehicle is THE GREEN-EYED MONSTER. Shakespeare created the metaphor by borrowing from the vehicle, THE GREEN-EYED MONSTER, the features of being horrific and predatory and associating them with the tenor, JEALOUSY.

In his account of metaphor as a kind of interaction between a vehicle and a tenor, Richards shared with the Classical Tradition and the modern Comparison View the principle of contiguity. For him, the process of borrowing features form a concept and transferring them to another concept does not happen haphazardly. What is important in generating a metaphor is that “the members shall only possess the relevant feature in common, and that irrelevant or accidental features shall cancel one another” (Ogden and Richards 1930: 214). In other words, the borrowing has to take place on the grounds of shared resemblances, i.e. contiguity. This does not mean that one cannot come up with a new combination of resemblance because the creativity of the human mind is competent enough to process the most uncommon resemblances. Nevertheless, there has to be harmony between the two associated domains so that the metaphor appeals to our senses and reasoning faculties. In the previous example, both JEALOUSY and THE GREEN-EYED MONSTER share the quality of being destructive, and this enhanced the interaction between the two parts of the metaphor and made it prominent. The following comment highlights the importance of the principle of appropriateness between the vehicle and the tenor of the metaphor:

“Mixtures in metaphors (...) may work well enough when the ingredients that are mixed preserve their efficacy, but not when such a fusion is invited that the several parts cancel one another. That a metaphor is mixed is nothing against it; the mind is ambidextrous enough to handle the most extraordinary combinations if the inducement is sufficient. But the mixture must not be of the fire and water type (...)” (Richards 1929: 196)

Richards’ philosophy implies a clear recognition of the communicative power and value of metaphor considering it “all that is meant” (Richards 1924: 239). It is a philosophy which views metaphor as a manipulative interaction between signs in a way it brings meaning close to perfection since what “is needed for the wholeness of an experience is not always naturally
present, and metaphor supplies an excuse by which what is needed may be smuggled in” (Richards 1924: 240). This plainly reveals Aristotle’s influence on Richards’ account of metaphor. However, in his attempt to bridge the gap between the aesthetic use of metaphor and its scientific function, Richards might have managed to avoid the criticism of the Aristotelian account. In doing so, Richards explained that the ability of metaphor to break the boundaries of abstraction by its expressive force is not necessarily brought up by the power of imagination since metaphor is the result of logical conceptual patterns that explain abstract concepts in terms of concrete concepts and processes, as the following passage reveals:

“People who naturally employ metaphor (…) are said to have imagination. This may or may not be accompanied by imagination in the other senses. It should not be overlooked that metaphor and simile (…) have a great variety of functions in speech. A metaphor may be illustrative or diagrammatical, providing a concrete instance of a relation which would otherwise have to be stated in abstract terms. This is the most common scientific or prose use of metaphor.” (Richards 1924: 239)

The name of the ‘Interaction View’ given to Richards’ account of metaphor was introduced first by Max Black in his book Models and Metaphors (1962). Black maintained that the interaction model of metaphor cannot be explained in terms of substituting one term by another or comparing a concept with another. It rather hinges on the trade-off between the content of two domains, the ‘principal’ domain and the ‘subsidiary’ domain, to use Black’s words. Black represented the process of metaphoric interaction by adopting scientific mathematical models of the type, ‘X + Z = Y’. If we want to turn this model into a sample of metaphoric interaction, it renders the following equation ‘Primary Domain (PD) interacts with Subsidiary Domain (SD) yielding a New Domain (ND)’. For example, in Iago’s remark that “there are many events in the womb of time which will be delivered” (Othello, 1.3.369-370), the metaphoric association can be represented in the following way:

(TIME) ↔ (PREGNANT FEMALE) → WOMB OF TIME

The metaphor in this example is based on the interaction between the domain of ‘TIME’ and the domain of ‘PREGNANT FEMALE’ in that both deliver, but while a ‘Female’
delivers an ‘INFANT’, ‘TIME’ delivers ‘EVENTS’. The conceptual interaction between the two domains yields the new domain of the ‘WOMB OF TIME’. According to the sample model, the listener selects certain features from the primary domain in order to highlight them or reorganize them in relation to the features of the secondary domain. It is important to point out that the process of producing metaphorical statements is not straightforward as it involves taking certain features from a certain semantic field, so to speak, and projecting them onto a different semantic field, with the result of creating new analogical patterns. In other words, every metaphor involves reading beyond the lines, or in Black’s words, is the “tip of a submerged model” (in Ortony 1993: 30).

Although Black considered the Interaction View as a “development” (ibid., 27) of Richards’ philosophy (see Richards 1936), his treatment of metaphor differed from that of Richards in that the latter did not maintain that there is a difference between the behaviour of metaphor and that of simile (Richards 1924: 239). Black, on the other hand, criticized the Classical Comparison Theory which looked at metaphor in terms of correspondence (similarity) or comparison (deviation) because it regarded metaphor and simile as two faces of the same coin, viewing metaphor as an elliptical simile without the similarity particle. For Black, it is significant to point out the clear-cut distinction between the two phenomena because viewing metaphor as a comparison undermines its communicative function reducing it to a mere stylistic variation of simile, based on two assumptions. First, metaphor is an open comparison in which primary and secondary subjects are put in a juxtaposition allowing for similarities as well as dissimilarities to merge. This makes metaphor subject to unlimited interpretations, which could lead to a potential loss of its semantic content, unless processed carefully. Second, simile involves the function of highlighting an obvious or innate resemblance between the two domains of the comparison. The interaction account looked at metaphor as an attitudinal filter which functions selectively by infusing certain attributes
taken from two different domains to introduce a new meaning. That is why Black did not agree with the Comparison View, which, for him, reduces the filtering function of metaphor considerably.

For Black, our recognition of metaphor depends on two points: the first is our knowledge of what a metaphorical statement might involve; the second is our judgment that the metaphorical reading enjoys prominence over the literal reading. This choice of the metaphoric interpretation over the literal interpretation happens as result of an underlying incoherence which lies within the literal reading. However, it is quite possible to be the result of an ambiguity in the truth of the reading, its pointlessness, as well as lack of consistency with verbal and nonverbal contexts (Black’s model of the Star of David (in Ortony 1993: 31). The bidirectional relationship between the primary and subsidiary domains, introduced by the Interaction View, was questioned by some linguists who claimed that this view makes the analogy look as though it holds within one domain rather than two different domains (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 131). The fact that Black claimed there is a shift in the meaning of metaphor and that the shift tends to be associated with what the speaker has in mind about the utterance brings the Interaction View close to the pragmatic approach to metaphor. Pragmatics considers the meaning of metaphor to be speaker-related because the speaker expresses what he/she has in mind about the messages they want to convey, as will be discussed in the following subsection.

2.3.2 The Pragmatics of Metaphor

Pragmatics is the study of intended “speaker meaning” (Cooper 1986: 88) as it appears in a certain verbal and situational context which provides certain propositions that go beyond the limits of the direct semantic associations of utterances. As such, the pragmatic meaning of an utterance is a feature of language use moving from the direct sense of what is said to the
indirect sense, and from the literal meaning to an indirect, intended meaning. This definition of pragmatic meaning applies not only to non-figurative language, but also to metaphors which are considered “speakers intended meaning” (Searle 1993: 84) loaded with “some emotional or evaluative aspect” (Morgan 1993: 134). In its approach to the meaning of utterances, pragmatics has been trying to distance itself from semantics in that it looks at meaning as being contained within a ‘message’ which the utterance producer tries to convey throughout the process of communication, regardless of the immediate semantic associations of words. The motive behind this focus on the verbal function of utterances is closely related to the pragmatic interest in what utterances are intended to ‘do’, rather than what they simply ‘mean’ (on utterance meaning see Fraser in Ortony 1993: 331). For example, the function of utterances in any communication process varies from stating facts, to describing things, to the highly pragmatic function of criticizing or asking for an action to be carried out by the hearer. The following passage highlights the difference between the semantic approach and the pragmatic approach to meaning:

“The distinction between meaning and use is significant in that it seems to play an important role in communication and has traditionally been used to distinguish between two branches of the study of language: semantics and pragmatics. Given the role of the distinction between meaning and use in delineating semantics and pragmatics, to debate whether metaphor is a matter of meaning has been to debate whether it should be analyzed in terms of semantic or pragmatic model.” (Nogales 1999: 47)

The earlier semantic approaches to metaphor and the pragmatic approach are equally interested in the notion of meaning, as such. However, they are functionally different in their perspectives about processing metaphor. For example, the pragmatic school denies the feature of compositionality in analysing metaphorical language, based on the argument that metaphor involves contradiction between the ‘literal’ meaning of utterances and their ‘intended’ meaning. Accordingly, it is not possible to process this deviation from the original meaning of utterances by a mere compositional process. Defenders of the pragmatic approach
claim that metaphorical utterances are quite difficult to decipher directly by the hearer, and that, if interpreted directly, they will look “grammatically deviant, semantically anomalous, explicitly or implicitly self-contradictory, conceptually absurd, nonsensical, category mistakes, sortal deviations, pragmatically inappropriate, obviously false, or so obviously true that no one would have reason to utter them” (Stern 2000: 3-4). According to the Pragmatic View, the challenge in processing metaphors originates from the fact that they mark a shift from the immediate semantic associations of the utterance to an indirect meaning which is intended by the speaker and contradicts the semantic content of the original words if taken in isolation and at face value. Linguists from the Pragmatic School maintain that meaning can be literal, direct and contained by utterances, or it can be pragmatic, indirect and lie within the context of pragmatic hedges and propositions, as in the case of metaphor:

“(…) the generation of metaphorical interpretation must be understood in pragmatic, rather than semantic terms. The meanings of the constituent terms of a metaphorical interpretation are not altered or replaced. They constitute part of the input to a pragmatic rule which, using additional factors of context, speakers (and hearers) construct in given discourse situations. By attempting to analyze this process within a semantic, rather than a pragmatic framework, adherents of the semantic shift approach present a distorted view of metaphor.” (Lappin 1981:117)

Although the Pragmatic View was introduced in the spirit of departing from the semantic approaches to metaphor, some linguists considered it close to the traditional way of processing figurative meaning as it employs a similar mechanism in interpreting “literal and metaphorical language alike” (Rumelhart in Ortony 1993: 72). The reason behind this claim is that pragmatics applies the same criteria to processing any kind of semantic content depending on “the concrete circumstances of linguistic communication, that is context” (Bosch in Paprotté and Dirven 1985: 170). In the Pragmatic School, there are three views which can be dealt with in relation to processing metaphor: Grice's theory of ‘Conversational Implicatures’, the theory of ‘Indirect Speech Acts’ and ‘Relevance Theory’. Paul Grice (1989) holds that any communication process comprises three elements: the speaker, the
hearer and the message. Succeeding in the process of communication involves activating the role of these three constituents. This involves what speakers do when they produce utterances providing certain clues as to the real intention behind these utterances. On a different level, the message has to contain certain contextual hedges about the directness or indirectness of the utterance produced, and the hearer, in his/her turn, has to rely on both the speaker's clues and the contextual hedges to get the message and keep the communication going.

In other words, the accomplishment of any communication process depends on two factors: the situational context and the cooperation between the two interlocutors, i.e. the speaker and the hearer. Consequently, there is an assumption that speakers have to abide by four maxims: quantity, quality, relevance and manner (Grice’s conversational maxims). If the utterance producer abides by the four conversational maxims, the hearer can pick up the message and process its semantic content directly. However, if one of the maxims is broken, this means that the speaker is implying more than what is literally said. In this case, the hearer's role becomes more difficult because he/she will need to decode the contextual or situational indicators in the message and cooperate with the speaker before processing its content. This summarizes the second principle of Grice's theory, namely the cooperative principle (see Grice 1975). The Pragmatic School applied this assumption of processing meaning to metaphors highlighting the importance of bidirectional cooperation between the speaker and hearer in processing messages with metaphoric content. Accordingly, metaphor is perceived as a violation of the maxim of quality where the speaker is considered to be saying something he or she does not believe to be true, associating the Target Domain (TD) with an attribute that does not belong to it, as clarified in the following passage:

“Specifically, I assume that when the reader or hearer fails to (sensibly) interpret something which he or she has reason to believe was intended to be meaningful, there follows an attempt to render the violation of the conventions (probably those of being relevant and of being sincere) only apparent. The hearer would then assume that there is a detectable basis for comparison and would engage in processes that
might help find it. But, of course this general account applies equally well to obscure literal uses of language.” (Ortony in Ortony 1993b: 353)

The second pragmatic approach to the interpretation of metaphoric utterances is ‘Indirect Speech Acts’ theory. Introduced by Austin in *How to Do Things with Words* (1975), this theory argues that the semantic content of utterances is not confined to what sentences directly say or to the falsity or truth of utterance. There are speech acts, such as ordering and promising, which are neither false nor true and which are, consequently, immune to the interpretation of formal logic. To decipher the pragmatic function of these speech acts, Austin came up with the assumption that a speaker means what he says but he means something more as well, such as ridiculing, criticizing or praising. The speaker’s intended meaning departs from what is literally being said and exceeds it to the content of an indirect act which is implied somewhere in the verbal or situational context. Searle employed ‘Speech Acts Theory’ in interpreting metaphorical statements (see Searle in Ortony 1993), giving an account of speech acts in different situations with examples about the behaviour of literal utterances, metaphorical utterances, ironic utterances, dead metaphors as well as all other indirect acts in a communicative process. The following account provides a brief description of what takes place in processing the content of speech acts:

a. In literal utterances, a speaker says ‘S is P’ and means that ‘S is P’, in which case the sentence meaning and utterance meaning are identical;

b. in simple metaphorical utterances, a speaker says that ‘S is P’, but means metaphorically that ‘S is R’. In this case, the utterance intended meaning is processed by relying on the literal sentence meaning as well as the situation and context;

c. in open metaphorical utterances, a speaker says that ‘S is P’, but means metaphorically an indefinite range of meanings, S is R1, S is R2, etc. As in the simple case, we decipher the utterance meaning by processing the literal meaning and taking advantage of the situational and verbal context;
d. in ironic utterances, a speaker means the opposite of what he says. The utterance meaning is decoded by going through sentence meaning and then inferring its opposite;

e. in dead metaphors, the original sentence meaning is bypassed and the sentence acquires a new literal meaning which is not identical with the immediate semantic content of the metaphor components;

f. in an indirect speech act, a speaker means what is said, but he/she means something more as well. Thus, the utterance meaning covers the sentence meaning but goes beyond it (Searle in Ortony 1993: 110).

The two pragmatic accounts of Conversational Implicatures and Speech Acts Theory were criticized for dealing with metaphor based on the principles of incongruity and discontinuity between the literal sense of the utterance and its intended meaning, i.e. message. In Grice’s view of Conversational Implicatures, producing a metaphor involves a contradiction between the immediate semantic content of the utterance and its indirect pragmatic implications. According to Speech Acts Theory, processing a metaphoric utterance involves a wide range of possible interpretations that are not stated directly by the utterance producer, which implies that there is some sort of discontinuity between the literal meaning of the metaphor and its indirect implications. The following passage highlights the position of the opponents of the Pragmatic View of metaphor based on this argument:

“the Pragmatics Position claims that the meaning of a metaphor is arrived at by taking its (semantically ill-formed) literal meaning and applying it to pragmatic principles of conversation that yield the meaning of the metaphor as a result. The Pragmatics Position has all of the flaws of the Literal Meaning, Deviance, Paraphrase, and Fallback Positions.” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 125)

However, not all pragmatic accounts are based on processing meaning in terms of incongruity or discontinuity between the direct semantic content and indirect implications of utterances. Sperber and Wilson criticized Speech Acts Theory on the grounds that it involves dealing with a “vast range of data that (...) is of no special interest to pragmatics.” (1986:
243). Alternatively, they introduced their account of ‘propositional attitudes’ which laid the foundation for Relevance Theory. According to this theory, every utterance has various possible interpretations which are supported by a group of contextual and situational factors. In order to process the intended meaning of an utterance, we need to apply this series of multiple relevant interpretations and then select the optimal meaning defined as the meaning which is most relevant and appropriate to the contextual and verbal situation in question. The earliest account of metaphor within the framework of Relevance Theory is that of Sperber and Wilson who claimed that there is no difference between processing literal utterances and processing metaphoric ones as “hearers generally approach utterances without fixed expectations as to their literalness, looseness or metaphorical nature” (1985-1986: 170). Literal or otherwise, the interpretation of an utterance is based on the message the speaker wants to convey and the relevant proposition of its content, as clarified in the following excerpt:

“The search for optimal relevance leads the speaker to adopt, on different occasions, a propositional form more or less approximate to her thoughts. Metaphor and literal utterances do not involve distinct kinds of interpretation: there is a literal-metaphorical cline and what varies is the degree of similarity between the speaker's thought and the propositional form of the utterance.” (Goatly 1997: 141)

This claim marks a departure from the earlier pragmatic accounts of metaphor (Grice's account and Speech Acts Theory) which encountered criticism for incorporating the mistakes of the literal approach to processing meaning. For these accounts, processing metaphor starts on the level of their literal semantic content, where the content of metaphor is detected based on the presence of anomaly or discontinuity between what is said and what is meant; then different interpretations of the metaphor can be introduced and filtered as appropriate to the context, situation and intention of the utterance producer. Conversely, Relevance Theory dealt with metaphor based on the principles of contiguity and relevance thus providing a
better understanding of the nature of metaphorical language and a more objective processing of its content.

Before I move to the last section in the literature review dealing with Conceptual Metaphor Theory, I would like to summarize the main arguments which were discussed in this section. The section was divided into two subsections which introduced the contributions that dealt with metaphor in modern linguistics. In the first subsection I reviewed the two arguments of the modern Comparison View and the Interaction View both of which dealt with metaphor based on the contiguity principle although they differed in their approach to meaning. To illustrate, the modern Comparison View regarded meaning as being contained in the semantic attributes of the word and viewed metaphor as an extension of these semantic properties. On the other hand, the Interaction View dealt with words as signs which are void of semantic content when they stand on their own and which acquire their meaning from a semiotic space determined by the contextual, situational, cultural and individual uses of language. According to the Interaction View, metaphor is also interpreted within the framework of the semiotic approach to meaning where the content of a metaphor is processed based on the contextual interaction between its two parts: the vehicle and the tenor. In the second subsection I surveyed the main arguments that fall under the Pragmatic View including Grice's account of ‘Conversational Implicatures’, the theory of ‘Indirect Speech Acts’, and ‘Relevance Theory’. Early pragmatic accounts of metaphor were based on the notion of incongruity or discontinuity between what is said and what is meant as the meaning of a metaphor is thought to contradict or take us beyond the basic semantic associations of the utterance. Alternatively, Relevance Theory came to provide a more objective understanding of metaphor that rejects the incongruity principle and deals with metaphor from the perspective of contiguity and relevance.
2.4 Cognitive Metaphor Theory

In this section I will review the contributions which deal with metaphor from the perspective of Cognitive Metaphor Theory, also known as Conceptual Metaphor Theory. This theory does not consider metaphor as a linguistic device whose use abounds in the fields of rhetoric and literature exclusively. Rather, it views metaphor as a conceptual process which permeates our reasoning and prevails in all fields of knowledge. This philosophy is known as the Cognitive Theory of thought because it views metaphor as a basic tool for perception and thinking. The cognitive approach discards the ornamental function of metaphor viewing it as “a way of experiencing the facts” (Hawkes 1972: 39) and “a way of thinking and of living; an imaginative projection of the truth” (ibid.). Introduced by Lakoff and Johnson in *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) based on their cognitive approach to language, Conceptual Theory views meaning as a conceptual, physically experienced phenomenon which is the product of interaction between our reasoning system, i.e. the mind, and our physical system, i.e. the body. The Cognitive School drew a distinction between ‘conceptual metaphors’ and ‘metaphoric expressions’. Conceptual metaphors are basic metaphoric patterns by virtue of which we relate one domain or concept to a certain experience, whereas metaphorical expressions are linguistic embodiments of these conceptual patterns. Conceptual metaphors differ from each other by the kind of experience in terms of which we conceptualize the relevant concept, and each conceptual metaphor generates a wide variation of metaphoric expressions. Consider the concept of LOVE in the following excerpt by Shakespeare:

“love is a smoke made with the fume of sighs. Being purged, a fire sparkling in lovers' eyes. Being vexed, a sea nourished with lovers' tears. What is it else? A madness most discreet, a choking gall and a preserving sweet.” (*Romeo and Juliet*, 1.1.190-194)
All the previous expressions which describe LOVE as ‘a smoke’, ‘a fire sparkling in the eyes’, ‘a sea’, some sort of disorder or ‘madness’, etc. are embodiments of the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A NATURAL/PHYSICAL FORCE. The following passage explains how Cognitive Theory differentiates between conceptual metaphors and metaphoric expressions referred to as ‘fixed correspondences’:

“In conceptual metaphors, one domain of experience is used to understand another domain of experience. (...) The conceptual domain that we try to understand is called the target domain and the conceptual domain that we use for this purpose is the source domain. Understanding one domain in terms of another involves a set of fixed correspondences (...) between a source and a target domain. (...) To understand a conceptual metaphor is to master the set of mappings that applies to a given source-target pairing.” (Kövecses in Dirven and Pörings 2003: 12)

Lakoff and Johnson (1980; 1999) provided a historical review of the philosophical theories which dealt with the concept of metaphor starting with the pre-Socratic tradition, moving to Kant’s moral theory and ending with the accounts of modern and contemporary philosophy. Their analysis of the various philosophical accounts of metaphor led to the conclusion that the cognitive processes of the mind and the physical experiences of the body are functionally integrated thanks to the conceptual power of metaphor, hence their notion of ‘the embodiment of the mind’ in the processes of thought and conceptualization. According to Lakoff and Johnson, the human cognitive system is, in its entirety, built on countless philosophical assumptions and suppositions which we derive from our interest in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of the mind and ethics. However, none of these sources of knowledge, as it were, comes from an absolute universal reason. They are, instead, physically bounded and considered to be part of the bodily essence of human beings in a way that makes our cognitive system highly metaphorical and unconsciously controlled; hence their notion of ‘the cognitive unconscious’. This notion introduced a new definition of our reasoning faculty based on the following principles which, according to Western philosophy, marked a revolution in our understanding of how our intellect functions:
contrary to the tenets of the Western philosophical tradition, reason is embodied, which means that our brains do not work independently of our bodies, and in order to understand how our minds function we have to understand the nature of our physical system and bodily experiences;

our reasoning faculty is influenced by our earlier experiences but, at the same time, it is evolutionary as it keeps evolving in the light of existing and new experiences;

our reasoning is mostly but not entirely universal, and what makes us think universally is the common physical experiences which are shared by us, as individuals of the same universal system and as human beings who belong to the same species;

our reasoning is subconscious and metaphorical, rather than conscious and literal.

In explaining the function of the metaphorical processes of the mind, the proponents of Cognitive Theory introduced the notion of ‘physical grounding’ based on the supposition that our conceptual system is made up largely of metaphorical patterns which are grounded in our tangible experiences. For example, we conceptualize abstract concepts such as TRUTH and FREEDOM by associating them with concrete concepts such as seeing ‘TRUTH IN FACTS AND FIGURES’ and ‘FREEDOM IN BREAKING EXISTING FETTERS’. Cognitive scholars have referred to this process as ‘delineating concepts’. According to the process of metaphoric delineation, there are no concepts that stand on their own with a totally objective meaning, and the cognitive associations of concepts have a metaphorical nature that is acquired from the way we experience them physically and empirically throughout our constant interaction with the surrounding world. Therefore, even universal concepts and values like DEMOCRACY and EQUALITY, that are thought to be shared by all mankind, have an empirical content derived from our biological functions, on the one hand, and our cultural, situational and individual experiences, on the other. The following passage explains how metaphor plays a role in the physical grounding of concepts:
“Our most important abstract concepts, from love to causation to morality, are conceptualized via multiple complex metaphors. Such metaphors are an essential part of those concepts, and without them the concepts are skeletal and bereft of nearly all conceptual and inferential structure.” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 73)

The physical grounding of concepts is ordinarily universal but not utterly so; since the delineation of concepts tends to be influenced by our empirical exchanges, and, thus, the experiential delineation of concepts is not only metaphorical, but also relative and differs by the nature of the concept which is being conceptualized and by experience. For example, we have concepts that tend to be more physically bounded than others (LIGHT is more delineated than LIFE, and OBJECT is more delineated than IDEA). This means that non-physical or less delineated concepts such as FORTUNE, DEITY and IMMORTALITY need to be conceptualized in terms of physically-grounded or more delineated concepts that have clearer tangible boundaries, hence the metaphoric nature of our thinking. Examples of this comprise the following metaphorical mappings: DEITY HAS A HUMAN REPRESENTATION (BLOOD, HANDS and EYES) and FORTUNE HAS A SPACIAL ORIENTATION (UP/DOWN). The process of physical grounding could be defined as the metaphoric correlation that holds between an abstract concept (emotional, conceptual and cultural) and the physical experience in which that concept emerged or evolved. This is most likely to take place when we conceptualize nonphysical concepts in terms of physical ones, or when we understand what is less delineated in terms of what is more delineated, as explained in the following passage:

“metaphor pervades our normal conceptual system. Because so many of the concepts that are important to us are either abstract or not clearly delineated in our experience (emotions, ideas, time, etc.), we need to get a grasp on them by means of other concepts that we understand in clearer terms (spatial orientations, objects, etc.). This need leads to metaphorical definition in our conceptual system.” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 115)

Additionally, the cognitive approach to metaphor presumes that the metaphoric conceptualization of concepts is not an arbitrary process; hence the principle of the ‘aptness
of metaphor’. This means that in order for metaphorical entailments to be plausible, they should be based on the appropriateness between the more delineated concept, the Source Domain (SD), and the less delineated concept, the Target Domain (TD), otherwise metaphor will not fulfill its cognitive function as a conceptual process that helps our reasoning. The aptness of metaphor is considered a very essential principle for effective communication; and in order to produce apt metaphors, we have to be strongly experienced in using our conceptual metaphors because this helps us realize when a metaphor can be of a certain cognitive value to thought, where it is indispensable and where it is misleading. This requires having a strong sense of ‘embodied realism’ where we can employ our empirical experiences and physical understanding of our surroundings in cognizing about the universe.

2.4.1 The Integrated Theory of Primary Metaphor

Relevant to the previous arguments about the physical grounding of concepts and the metaphoric nature of our thinking, the Cognitive School introduced the notion of ‘neural reasoning’ which was adopted in what became known as the ‘integrated theory of primary metaphor’. According to traditional schools of thought, our intellect functions in isolation from our bodily experiences and neural system, and this was considered the main distinction between human beings and animals. Nonetheless, Cognitive Theory proponents maintain that, contrary to the claims of the classical ‘faculty psychology’, the human mind is influenced by the physical and neural processes that make our body function. This implies that there is no functional difference between the reasoning faculty of human beings and the conceptual system of animals as both tend to be subconsciously bounded by the neural processes and physical involvements of the body with the surrounding environment, i.e. our intellect functions based on the subconscious embodiment of our subjective experiences.
In *Philosophy of the Flesh* (1999), Lakoff and Johnson explained their account of neural reasoning and its relation to the embodied nature of the mind based on three models of neural modeling, clarifying how, in both our perception and reasoning, we make use of the same mechanisms employed by the neural system, i.e. the system responsible for coordinating the signals of the sensory organs and organizing their functions. The models chosen for the empirical study were taken from three different conceptual fields: concepts of spatial-relations, concepts of physical movement and concepts that represent actions or events. These models comprised Regier's model for learning spatial-relations (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 40), Bailey’s model for learning verbs of hand motion (ibid.) and Narayanan's model for motor schemas (ibid., 42).

Researching the three previous models led to the conclusion that the processing of the studied concepts was not subject to the mechanisms of a single system, conceptual or perceptual, and that both the conceptual and perceptual systems were used interchangeably and in a coordinated manner in order to delineate the cognitive content of these concepts. In other words, the conceptual system makes use of the function of the sensorimotor system, i.e. neural system, in producing conceptual patterns by creating metaphoric associations between the functions of the two systems. However, this raises the question of ‘what happened in our conceptual system during the stage that preceded our metaphorical thinking?’ To answer this question, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) introduced the notion of ‘primary metaphor’ based on the four theories below:

- Christopher Johnson's Theory of Conflation (ibid., 46): states that, during the early stage of childhood, our sensory and non-sensory (conceptual) experiences seem to be conflated, i.e. not distinguished from each other. In a more advanced stage, the functions of the perceptual system start to be separated from those of the conceptual system leaving in the latter cross-domain associations which function as patterns for our basic metaphorical
thinking. These patterns have been referred to as primary or conceptual metaphors. For example, the sensory experiences of feeling warm and tasting sweet milk which an infant goes through while being held lovingly and breastfed by his/her mother yield primary metaphoric mappings as a result of the repeated occurrence of this experience. Such mappings give rise to metaphoric expressions such as ‘a warm hug’ and ‘sweet dreams’ which stand for the primary metaphors of ‘AFFECTION IS WARMTH, ‘ENJOYING SLEEP IS TASTING SOMETHING SWEET’ and ‘DREAMS ARE EDIBLE OBJECTS THAT HAVE A TASTE’.

- Grady's Theory of Primary Metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 46): as explained in the Theory of Conflation, primary metaphors emerge subconsciously and automatically as a result of the regular interaction between the sensorimotor system and our conceptual system. Those early experiences tend to be shared by all human beings during the conflation phase, which gives primary metaphors a universal conceptual structure. Complex metaphors are the result of the variation in assembling and merging different primary metaphors as in the previous example of ‘sweet dreams’ which is the result of merging the two conceptual metaphors of ‘ENJOYING SLEEP IS TASTING SOMETHING SWEET’ and ‘DREAMS ARE EDIBLE OBJECTS WHICH HAVE A TASTE’. Grady’s theory is similar to Fauconnier and Turner’s account of Conceptual Blending which will be discussed below.

- Narayanan's Neural Theory of Metaphor (ibid.): assumes that the brain is made up of neural regions which are connected together in the form of a network and which work jointly in creating and developing our conceptual domains. Reasoning is a process of neural simulation of our physical actions where multiple neural regions tend to be co-activated and function in a collaborative way in producing metaphoric associations between our physical actions and experiences, on the one hand, and our conceptual
processes, on the other hand. The more recurrent the physical experience, the greater the simulation and, therefore, the activation of the relevant conceptual structure. (see Lakoff in Gibbs 2008: 17-38)

- Fauconnier and Turner’s Theory of Conceptual Blending (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 47) states that new metaphorical mappings can be created by blending our primary metaphors in new conceptual models.

As these four theories indicate, primary metaphors are thought to be embodied physically and acquired subconsciously as a result of the processes of neural reasoning, and the fact that our conceptual experiences are physically grounded implies that the majority of our conceptual metaphors are universal. According to the modern cognitive approach, primary metaphors are the result of the regular interaction between the body, the neural system, the conceptual system and the physical environment. This implies that primary metaphors are not only universal but also inevitable and conventional as human beings acquire and store them in their conceptual system throughout their repeated daily experiences. Lakoff and Johnson defined conceptual metaphors as cross-domain conceptual mappings which move from the Source Domain (the sensorimotor system) to the Target Domain (that of the subjective experience) in a way which preserves the inference of the Source Domain in reasoning about the Target Domain. The following passage provides a concise definition of primary metaphors:

“The integrated theory- the four parts together- has an overwhelming implication: We acquire a large system of primary metaphors automatically and unconsciously simply by functioning in the most ordinary ways in the everyday world from our earliest years. We have no choice in this. Because of the way neural connections are formed during the period of conflation, we all naturally think using hundreds of primary metaphors.” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 47)

Although the regularity of our primary metaphors makes them entrenched in our conceptual system, Lakoff and Johnson argued that their conventionality does not undermine their vital role in our reasoning processes for three reasons. First, it is possible to have a
variety of conventional metaphors which highlight different aspects of a single concept representing our reasoning about it in different situations. For instance, we can conceptualize ‘THE MIND AS A CONTAINER’, ‘THE MIND AS A PRISONER (PERSON)’ and ‘THE MIND AS AN OBJECT (OF TAINTING)’ in the following examples respectively, “full of scorpions is my mind” (Macbeth, 3.2.36), “have we eaten on the insane root that takes the reason prisoner” (Macbeth, 1.3.84-85) and “have I filed my mind” (Macbeth, 3.1.64).

This variation in the uses of our primary metaphors makes them substantial and not secondary, indispensable and not peripheral and cognitive components of our conceptual system rather than mere linguistic devices, hence Lakoff and Johnson’s notion of ‘metaphor pervasiveness’. The pervasiveness of metaphor implies that the use of metaphor as a conceptual device is not confined to poets or rhetoricians and that language abounds in metaphor in all its uses, whether in literature, science or the daily processes of communication. This is related to the fact that, in conceptualizing their experiences, language users tend to move from abstraction to physical embodiment. The feature of metaphor pervasiveness in our life triggers a question about the possibility of our thinking without metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson maintain that the pervasiveness of primary metaphors does not exclude the existence of ‘non-metaphorical’ concepts, i.e. literal ones. All basic sensorimotor concepts are literal, and even the concepts of our subjective experiences are literal, if not conceptualized metaphorically. For instance, when I say, ‘the wound is still bleeding and it hurts’, the verb ‘hurts’ is literally meant to convey the subjective experience of getting actually, rather than metaphorically, wounded. However, this does not mean that we can always think without metaphors. Metaphors are a result of the function of our brains when we try to make sense of the interaction between our physical system, sensorimotor system and the world around us, which is why we cannot separate our metaphorical thinking from our non-metaphorical thinking.
Second, conventional metaphors are not dead metaphors as they might be extended to new metaphoric mappings. To explain, in our metaphoric conceptualization, we usually highlight one aspect of a certain concept while others tend to be downplayed based on the relevant experience. There is a general assumption that downplayed aspects are not considered normal ways of reasoning about the concept in question. For instance, while we have metaphoric expressions like ‘the mind’s eye’, we do not usually talk about ‘the mind’s tongue or mouth’ since the similarity between the function of the vision organ, i.e. the eye, and that of the mind allows us to envisage the latter as seeing things by way of imagining them as in Shakespeare’s “dagger of the mind” (Macbeth, 2.1.38) meaning ‘a dagger which is imagined by the mind’. This claim is not absolute, however, since there are situations where we can extend the metaphorical pattern to unused parts of the SD, thus, coming up with a creative metaphor which involves envisaging the mind as having a similar function to the speech organ as in Shakespeare’s example of “infected minds to their deaf pillows will discharge their secrets” (ibid. 5.1.72-73). In this example, the conventional metaphor ‘THE MIND IS THE EYE WHICH SEES’ is extended to the creative metaphor ‘THE MIND IS THE MOUTH/TONGUE WHICH TELS SECRETS’. This argument implies that conventional metaphors are not inactive as they are used predominantly in our conceptual processes and can be extended to conceptualize our new experiences in novel metaphoric patterns, which makes them metaphors we live by.

2.4.2 Ontological Metaphors, Structural Metaphors and Image Schemas

Having dealt with the notion of primary metaphor and the main principles which underlie it, I would like to deal with the three models of primary metaphor as introduced by the proponents of the Cognitive School comprising: ontological metaphors, structural metaphors and orientational metaphors, later discussed under ‘image schemas’. Ontological metaphors
refer to metaphoric patterns that are used to reason about our concepts, experiences and activities in terms of concrete things such as objects, substances and containers. In ontological metaphors, we represent our concepts in terms of objects we can describe, substances we can quantify, and states we can delineate. An example of an ontological metaphor which is used to represent a concept in terms of an object is seeing the emotion of LOVE as a FETTER and A FRAGILE OBJECT in the two following Shakespearean excerpts “his soul is so enfetter'd to her love” (Othello, 2.3.345) and “this crack of your love shall grow stronger than it was before” (ibid. 2.3.325). An example of an ontological metaphor in which the concept is understood in terms of a substance is “But that our loves and comforts should increase, even as our days do grow” (ibid. 2.1.194-195) in which LOVE and COMFORT are conceptualized as SUBSTANCES that are measured in QUANTITY. An example of an ontological metaphor which represents a state in terms of a container is “put the Moor …into a jealousy” (ibid. 2.1.300-301) where JEALOUSY is conceptualized as A CONTAINER FOR THE OBJECT OF JEALOUSY. The following passage gives a brief definition of ontological metaphors:

“We use ontological metaphors to comprehend events, actions, activities, and states. Events and actions are conceptualized metaphorically as objects, activities as substances, states as containers.” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 30)

A structural metaphor refers to a metaphorical pattern which is used to represent a whole conceptual process or experience in terms of another experience or process. Conceptual processes which are delineated in structural metaphors comprise events (PARTY), actions (READING), activities and states (EXERCISING and SUFFERING). An example of a structural metaphor is conceptualizing the experience of ‘BEING SO MUCH IN LOVE’ in terms of going through a ‘DIAMETRICAL CHANGE’ in the following excerpt from Othello “whom love hath turn’d almost the wrong side out” (2.3.52). Another example of a structural metaphor is the following excerpt taken from Macbeth, “New honors come upon him, like
our strange garments, cleave not to their mould but with the aid of use” (*Macbeth*, 1.3.144-146). In this example, the experience of “ASSUMING POWER” or “GAINING AN HONOUR” is conceptualized in terms of the process of “WEARING A GARMENT”. In this regard, it is important to point out that a structural metaphor involves more than a single level of metaphoric representation as each structural metaphor tends to comprise one ontological metaphor or image schema at least (image schemas will be discussed below under orientational metaphors). To illustrate, the previous structural metaphors involve seeing ‘LOVE AS A PHYSICAL FORCE’ (image schema) that turns the OBJECT OF LOVE the wrong side out and ‘HONOUR AS A GARMENT’ (an ontological metaphor) that is put on.

An orientational metaphor is a metaphoric pattern in which a concept is represented as having a spatial orientation: up-down, front-back, on-off, etc. In conceptualizing orientational metaphors, we are influenced by the bounded nature of our bodies in terms of having physical borders which separate them from the surrounding environment and its components. Examples of orientational metaphors include correlating the POSITIVE value of things with an UP-ORIENTATION and the NEGATIVE value of things with a DOWN-ORIENTATION in the following metaphoric expression ‘the ups and downs of life’. However, this is not always the case as the cognitive content of our metaphors is determined not only physically but also empirically in the light of the experiential interaction between the individuals’ conceptual system, on one side, and their bodies and physical environment, on another, which is why not all orientational metaphors correlate UP with POSITIVE and DOWN with NEGATIVE.

In an example provided by Lakoff and Johnson, the concept of the UNKNOWN is correlated with an UP orientation and WHAT IS KNOWN with a DOWN orientation. This is justified considering the experiential basis of the ‘UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING’ metaphor as it is easier to examine something carefully if it were on the ground (DOWN)
than if it were somewhere else beyond our reach (UP) (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 14). An example of an orientational metaphor is Macbeth’s exclamation that “the greatest is behind” (1.3.117). Contrary to our prevailing experiences about the FUTURE as having an orientation which is AHEAD of us, this metaphor conceptualizes the FUTURE AS HAVING A BACK ORIENTATION, the meaning being ‘the greatest news which will come in the near future is behind or will follow the news which has just arrived’; hence the ‘back orientation of the future’. This proves the earlier claim that our primary metaphors are not always universal or conventional as they tend to be influenced by our cultural and individual experiences and by the verbal and situational contexts, as clarified in the following passage:

“(…) the meaning a metaphor will have for me will be partly culturally determined and partly tied to my past experiences. The cultural differences can be enormous because each of the concepts in the metaphor under discussion- ART, WORK, COLLABORATION, and LOVE- can vary widely from culture to culture (…). There will also be differences within a culture based on how individuals differ in their views of work and art. LOVE IS A COLLABORATIVE WORK OF ART will mean something very different to two fourteen-year-olds on their first date than to a mature artist couple.” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 142)

In an advanced stage, the term ‘orientational metaphors’ was replaced by the notion of ‘image schemata’ which provides a more comprehensive understanding of the schematic nature of our thinking. As indicated by Johnson (in Hampe and Grady 2005: 15) and Grady (in Hampe and Grady 2005: 35), the concept of ‘image schema’ was introduced by Johnson in the Body in the Mind (1987) and Lakoff in Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (1987). This term was used as a reference to the interaction between our conceptual system (the mind) and our spatially-oriented physical system (the body) and its movement “through space” (Hampe in Hampe and Grady 2005: 1). In their initial research on the three types of conceptual metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) dealt with orientational schemata (UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK); however, further research has revealed that there is a long list of image schemata that allows us to conceptualize in a diagrammatic, structured way including CONTAINER IMAGE SCHEMAS, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL SCHEMAS, FORCE
orientational metaphors started to be dealt with as a subcategory of ‘image schemas’, as the following passage explains:

“Thus orientational metaphors are schemata all but in name, and, (...) they were superseded by image schemata once this notion was developed. In Johnson’s mature writings, image-schematic mapping totally assimilates orientational metaphor.”  
(Spitzer 2004: 56)

The examples discussed in the previous account of the three types of primary metaphor are simple ones and serve only to illustrate what is meant by each type of conceptual metaphor. However, more elaborate examples will be discussed in the second part of the dissertation that will be devoted to the empirical study of the translation of metaphor in the light of Cognitive Metaphor Theory. At this stage, and from what was discussed in the two previous sub-sections, it is important to highlight a number of points: first, that metaphor is a vital conceptual process which embodies our physical realities and experiences in our language and thought; second, that the use of metaphor is a universal phenomenon shared by all human beings, but the cognitive content of our primary metaphors may differ empirically and experientially; third, that our metaphoric thinking is made up of complex metaphoric structures whose kernel units comprise ontological metaphors, structural metaphors and image schemas.

2.4.3 Contextual Approaches to Conceptual Metaphor

During the early phase of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, there was much focus on the principles of metaphor universality and conventionality based on the assumption that our conceptual system is dominated by primary metaphors which are inspired by our shared recurrent physical experiences. However, as this theory started to become more influential, an increasing interest in adopting a more pragmatic approach to conceptual metaphor emerged. In this account I will deal with two notions that were introduced as an alternative to the
claims of the universality and conventionality of conceptual metaphor. These notions are: the ‘Invariance Principle’ and the ‘Toolmakers Paradigm’, both of which emerged as a response to the notion of the ‘Conduit Metaphor’ which was adopted by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in their research about Conceptual Metaphor Theory. The Conduit Metaphor was introduced by Reddy (in Ortony 1993) as a conceptual frame for communication, perceived in terms of ‘transmitting’ or carrying something over. According to the model of the Conduit Metaphor, language is viewed as a carrier of ideas, feelings and attitudes which are packed in words and transmitted to the hearer/reader whose role is to open the message and read its content. Reddy based his analysis of the metaphor of ‘LANGUAGE AS A CARRIER’ on a variety of metaphoric expressions about communication taken from everyday English. The analysis of the examined expressions revealed that the communication process in English is highly dominated by the conceptual pattern of the Conduit Metaphor which sees ‘LANGUAGE AS A CARRIER’. The following passage provides a brief description of the Conduit Metaphor account:

“The speaker puts ideas (objects) into words (containers) and sends them (along a conduit) to a hearer who takes the idea/objects out of the word/containers.” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 10)

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) believed that Reddy’s model was an inspiration for Conceptual Metaphor Theory as it showed how our everyday language is dominated by metaphors we live by, and how those metaphors are conventionalized in our conceptual system by virtue of their frequent occurrence. However, they criticized Reddy’s analysis for being a very objectivist account of the requirements of the process of communication reducing it to a simplistic conceptual frame which “does not fit cases where context is required to determine whether the sentence has any meaning at all and (...) what meaning it has” (Lakoff and Johnson 1982: 12). Consequently, Lakoff and Johnson concluded that communicating via a Conduit Metaphor makes our message vulnerable to misinterpretation explaining that “when
a society lives by the CONDUIT metaphor on a large scale, misunderstanding, persecution, and much worse are the likely products” (Lakoff and Johnson 1982: 231).

Alternatively, Lakoff and Johnson introduced their notion of the Invariance Principle, which rules out the possibility of stretching a single conceptual metaphor to cover the entire spectrum of the cognitive content of a concept. The Invariance Principle is based on the assumption of “systemacity” (Bailey 2003: 65; 66) between the conceptual content of a metaphor and its context. For example, if we use a conceptual metaphor like ‘LOVE IS A JOURNEY’ in a certain context, it is possible to have a variation in the different representations of that metaphor in terms of conceptualizing ‘LOVE’ as being ongoing, advancing, obstructed, blocked, etc. However, this variation should not imply conceptual incongruity between the various representations as it should support, rather than contradict, the context. Lakoff summarized the Invariance Principle in the following passage:

“Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain.” (in Ortony 1993: 215)

In response to the need to contextualize his account of the Conduit Metaphor, Reddy proposed the Toolmakers Paradigm as an alternative. The Toolmakers Paradigm is a huge wheel-like compound which is divided into various sectors that stand for multiple environments. Different environments share certain common features but none is identical with the other. In order for individuals to survive in their own environments, they have to be aware of the native cognitive content of that environment, including its concepts, thoughts, feelings, perceptions and physical properties. However, if the inhabitants of different environments want to communicate with each other, the processing of the communication requires the parties involved to exert an effort making use of the conceptual tools that are available to them in their own sector. Reddy’s alternative to the Conduit Metaphor shifted the focus of the communication process from the message sender to the message receiver.
because “it may be that the fault in a communication failure does not lie with the speaker. Perhaps, somehow, the listener has erred” (Reddy in Ortony 1993: 168). Unlike the principle of the Conduit Metaphor, the Toolmakers Paradigm makes it plain that there is no conceptual content in books or libraries unless it is experienced and reconstructed carefully according to the needs of our conceptual system; and what is preserved in libraries is an opportunity for us to carry out this process of conceptual reconstruction and extract the cognitive content of the environment which we are interested in. According to Reddy, we do not preserve ideas by building libraries and recording voices. The only way to preserve culture is to train people to rebuild it and grow it in its native environment, as the word ‘culture’ suggests.

The need to contextualize the uses and functions of conceptual metaphor was not limited to the arguments about the notion of the Conduit Metaphor. There were other arguments that touched upon the pragmatic function of metaphor and emerged in response to the claim about the universality of our metaphoric thinking. Proponents of these arguments maintained that the belief in the universality of our metaphoric thinking should not exclude socio-cultural and socio-political approaches to metaphor. The reason behind this claim is that the cognitive role of metaphor is not restricted to conceptualization and reasoning processes; and that metaphor plays an equally important cognitive role in “creating realities” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 145; 156). In view of its conceptual role in creative cognition, metaphor can leave a positive or negative effect on our conceptual system. In other words, metaphor is thought to be capable of effecting a positive change in our attitudes or producing negative schemas because they “serve to organize and interpret experience” (Traugott in Paprotte and Dirven 1985: 49).

An example of the positive effect which metaphor leaves on our lives is its role in solving social problems, in what was described by Schön (in Ortony 1993) as ‘generative metaphor’. This feature makes metaphor enrich our conceptual system with “new perspectives of the world” (ibid., 138), thus enabling us to find solutions to problems by conceptualizing them in
terms of the ‘SEE-AS’ conceptual metaphor. Another account of the positive role of metaphor in our conceptual system is evident in the prolific use of metaphor in poetics, as poets and men of literature use metaphor to describe, criticize and introduce new images of the world around us. This poetic role of metaphor makes its use associated with a positive change which we can effect:

“Poets can appeal to the ordinary metaphors we live by in order to take us beyond them, to make us more insightful than we would be if we thought only in the standard ways. Because they lead us to new ways of conceiving of our world, poets are artists of the mind (…) poets are both imaginative and truthful.” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 210)

Nevertheless, the creativity of metaphor is not positive all the time as metaphors can be manipulated by political systems to exercise hegemony on cultures or cultural groups by creating ‘scenarios’ or ‘image schemas’ which are meant to privilege a certain cultural group while oppressing another, as discussed by Musolff (2004). This means that language users have a role to play in “the emergence of scenario-based argumentative traditions, irrespective of whether they ‘defend’ or ‘attack’ a scenario and its evaluative bias” (ibid., 143). In other words, if we take all the metaphors which are presented to us at face value and “without thought or consideration, we are furthering their use and perhaps lengthening the shadows of what they conceal” (Young 2001: 621). By way of dealing with the manipulative function of metaphors in creating biased realities, Musolff came up with the technique of ‘negotiating scenarios’ which works by presenting a detailed account of the politics of metaphor in its relevant socio-pragmatic field. Musolff introduced this technique based on his analysis of Hobbes’ account of the influence of metaphors in grounding realities, as explained in the following excerpt:

“What Hobbes does recommend is for speakers to signal unambiguously any metaphorical intrusion in the arguments they propose, e.g. by way of their formulation as ‘similitudes’, so that the grounds for the analogical conclusion to be drawn can be explicated and, if need be, criticized.” (2005: 111)
The argument about the need to contextualize our approach to conceptual metaphor is closely related to the role of metaphor in categorization. Dealing with metaphor in terms of its cognitive ability to categorize is functional for our understanding of our conceptual system and how it operates, as it reveals how our ideas and objects are understood, classified, related to each other and distinguished from each other. The human conceptual system relies on categorization in analysing the conceptual relations between concepts, on the one hand, and objects and experiences, on the other hand. In *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, Lakoff dwelled on the significance of categorization stressing that “understanding of how we categorize is central to any understanding of how we think and how we function, and therefore central to an understanding of what makes us human” (1987: 6).

The first to deal with the concept of categorization was Plato in the *Statesman Dialogue*, but this notion was elaborated by Aristotle in his *Categories*. According to Aristotle, language is made up of a hierarchal system of categories with one dominating category at the top of the hierarchy and sub-categories under each category. Aristotle introduced the ten categories of substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, situation, state, action and passion (Abraham 1975: 45), based on grouping concepts and entities according to distinct properties and common features shared by all members of every individual set. This implies that categories are clearly delineated and discretely distinguished from each other. For example, ‘MAN’ and ‘STONE’ are both substances as they refer to particulars; ‘NUMBER’ and ‘LENGTH’ are quantities; and ‘MARKET’ and ‘HOUSE’ are places. Accordingly, it is assumed that the attributes shared by the members of the category of ‘SUBSTANCES’ single them out from the two other categories of ‘QUANTITY’ and ‘PLACE’. A substance such as ‘STONE’ refers to a particular with clear semantic features which exclude this entity from the category of ‘PLACE’. However, we notice that ‘HOUSE’ which belongs to the category of ‘PLACE’ might also be classified under ‘SUBSTANCE’.
There is a general assumption among the proponents of the Cognitive School that the classical view of taxonomy followed an absolute system of classification which does not account for “category gradation” (MacLaury 1991: 61) and that “there is more than one way of appealing to classification” (Nogales 1999: 30-31). Lakoff indicated that Aristotle’s categories were criticized by Ludwig Wittgenstein for being too rigid and not allowing for overlapping across classes. According to Wittgenstein, there is a shortfall in the classical theory claim that meaning exists in an objective world. Alternatively, meaning is not limited to the objective presence of things in an isolated world. Rather, it belongs to a more realistic system of thought as it is possible for categories to overlap reflecting the experiential nature of our thinking. Wittgenstein provided the group of ‘GAMES’ as an example of a category whose individual members do not all share the same essential characteristics. For instance, a game like basketball involves competition where we have winners and losers, whereas joggling does not involve competition. Furthermore, if we apply the logic of Aristotle’s categories we can classify ‘GAMES’ under two groups: ‘ACTION’, in terms of being an activity, and ‘QUALITY’ in terms of being entertaining, boring, violent, harmful, motivating, etc.:

“The classical category has clear boundaries, which are defined by common properties. Wittgenstein pointed out that a category like game does not fit the classical mold, since there are no common properties shared by all games. Some games involve mere amusement (...). Some games involve luck, like board games where a throw of the dice determines each move. Others, like chess, involve skill. Still others, like gin rummy, involve both.” (Lakoff 1987: 16)

The other model of categorization that was criticized by the Cognitive School is the notion of the ‘Great Chain of Being’. This theory categorizes all things along a vertical scale starting with inanimate objects and ending with animate beings where ‘higher’ beings and entities exist at the top of the scale and ‘lower’ beings and entities at the bottom of the scale. The great chain scale has also primary categories and subcategories which fall under them. For example, the category of human-beings comprises subcategories such as intellect, senses and
Accordingly, the great chain metaphor is defined in terms of conceptual, physical and behavioural attributes which are arranged according to the following hierarchy, from the top downwards: human beings (higher-order attributes and behaviour), animals (instinctual attributes and behaviour), plants, complex objects (structural attributes and functional behaviour), natural things (natural physical attributes and behaviour). In *More than Cool Reason*, Lakoff and Turner criticized the great chain model based on the claim that it can be politically manipulated by the strong against the vulnerable where its classification functions as a device of segregation, hegemony and oppression, as manifested in the following passage:

“(…) a chain of dominance, it can become a chain of subjugation. It extends over centuries, linking the causes of anti-colonial Americans and antiroyalist French to those still bound by it- from Blacks to Women to Untouchables to aborigines to the environment, from whales and eagles to snails and species of lettuce, to the integrity of rivers.” (1989: 213)

As an alternative to the preceding models of categorization, Lakoff developed the cognitive model of gradable categories based on the notion of ‘basic human categorization’ which was also known as “the theory of prototypes” (Lakoff 1987: 39; Lakoff and Turner 1989: 166-213) and which was first introduced by Rosch in 1978 (see MacLaury 1991). According to Rosch, there are basic categories which are considered the point of departure in any process of categorization. However, the boundaries between those categories are fuzzy and not fixed as their features tend to overlap constantly as a result of the experiential interaction between our physical system, neural system and conceptual system. This makes our conceptual categories also subject to personal experiences, social factors and cultural considerations.

According to the Cognitive School, the notion of gradable categorization involves two models. The first is perceptual because it emerges directly from our physical experiences and “neural system” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 14). For example, when we hear the phrase
‘small gun’, the sensorimotor system is mobilized directly to examine the object, its dimensions, shape, etc. The second model of categorization is functional based on our conception of the object in question or how we use it for a certain purpose. If we apply this assumption to the previous example, we could come up with a description of the ‘gun’ as being ‘a dangerous device’. Therefore, both ‘small’ and ‘dangerous’ apply to an entity such as ‘gun’, although they are two different ways of categorizing this entity (perceptual and functional categorization). This method of categorization applies also to events and actions.

In other words, categorization is not a rigid process of classification, but rather a clustered form of conceptualization whereby a category is seen as a gestalt with multiple dimensions and interactive conceptual features. This argument shows that our categories are not static, as they are not restricted by the inherent properties of the object; instead, they are defined by their experiential properties.

The inseparability between our categorization and experiences suggests that our reasoning is not absolutely objective but, rather, contextualized by our subjective and individual involvement with the world around us. Every conceptual process we perform goes through what is known as ‘frame-based’ reasoning, which means reasoning by depending on conceptual frames, i.e. prototypes. These prototypes are the result of the interaction between our neural system and bodies, on the one hand, and the immediate physical environment, on the other. However, our prototype-based conceptual processes are hardly noticed by us as they tend to take place spontaneously and subconsciously. To prove that our concepts do not reflect objective external realities but emerge as a result of the interaction between our bodies, experiences and brains, Lakoff and Johnson discussed the three conceptual groups of: ‘COLOUR’, ‘BASIC-LEVEL’ concepts and ‘SPATIAL-RELATIONS’ concepts. Their empirical study showed that these concepts are created as a result of the interaction between the human biological system and the surrounding physical and conceptual system.
Consequently, they concluded that the only realism which human beings experience is an ‘embodied realism’. Our reasoning faculty acquires its concepts perceptually and conceptually in terms of our bodily orientations and physical interaction with already-existing conceptualized frames.

2.4.5 Creative Conceptual Metaphor

This section will deal with the creativity of Conceptual Metaphor which is an important aspect in the genre I will be dealing with in my empirical research. Creative metaphors used to be associated with the field of literature; however, their uses in other fields of knowledge have recently become much more acknowledged than any time before. The Cognitive School dealt with creative metaphors discussing their role in creating novel experiences or forging new scenarios, as discussed in the previous section. The interesting thing about the cognitive approach to metaphor is that, although it reduces all our metaphoric thinking to three basic metaphoric patterns, it does not deny the conceptual function of metaphor in changing our conceptual system positively or negatively. This implies recognizing the creativity of our metaphoric conceptual system. Creative metaphors have always received the appreciation of influential figures in thought, literature and language. Nonetheless, their conceptual power became much more prominent after the emergence of the cognitive revolution which switched the universal focus from the decorative function of metaphor to its conceptual and creative function. Creative metaphors are no longer the result of imaginative meditation and conceptual originality. Rather, they are the result of accumulating and constructing our basic conceptual patterns in different ways:

“There is a widespread notion among lay people and scholars alike that the ‘real’ source of metaphor is in literature and the arts. It is believed that it is the creative genius of the poet and the artist that creates the most authentic examples of metaphor. When we examine this notion from the point of view of cognitive linguistics, we will find that the idea is only partially true, and that everyday
language and the everyday conceptual system contribute a great deal to the working of the artistic genius.” (Kövecses 2002: 42)

The arguments of Cognitive Theory reveal that metaphor is not restricted to one language use, literature, for example. Creative or otherwise, metaphor is omnipresent in all the uses of language and on all levels, and this pervasiveness of metaphor depreciates the notion that creative metaphors are literary metaphors by and large. We cannot deny that the metaphors used in literature tend to be distinctive in their conceptual content and originality. However, they do not derive their uniqueness from being of a literary nature or being introduced by a creative artist. Aristotle believed that “the greatest thing by far is to have a command of metaphor” (Butcher 1998: 43), and that “this alone cannot be imparted by another; it is the mark of genius, for to make good metaphors implies an eye for resemblances” (ibid.). Conversely, Conceptual Theory scholars maintain that figurative creativity in literature is cognitive as creative writers “still use the same basic conceptual resources available to us all” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 26); otherwise, “we would not understand them” (ibid.).

Therefore, if metaphors of literature, and indeed all metaphors in our conceptual system, are embedded in our experiences, and if their creativity is not ascribed to sheer genius or restricted to the literary genre, what makes them special and how do they originate? The Cognitive School introduced a number of mechanisms to explain what takes place in generating creative metaphors. For example, in More Than Cool Reason (1989), Lakoff and Turner classified the metaphors that are used in literature into different categories: ‘ordinary metaphors’, ‘extended metaphors’, ‘merged metaphors’ and ‘unusual metaphors’. In ordinary metaphors, the writer makes use of primary metaphors without changing their conceptual pattern or adding to it, and these tend to be less powerful than merged, extended and unusual metaphors. An extended metaphor is the result of stretching one type of primary metaphor as in the example “Tempests themselves, high seas, and howling winds, the gutter’d rocks, and congregated sands, traitors ensteep’d to clog the guiltless keel” (Othello, 2.1.68-70) which is
an extended ontological metaphor of the conceptual pattern ‘AN ELEMENT OF NATURE IS A PERSON’.

Merged metaphors are the result of the skillful combining of two different primary metaphors at least, thus producing a new image. An example of a merged metaphor is “I think our country sinks beneath the yoke” (Macbeth, 4.3.39) which is made up of the following conceptual metaphors: two ontological metaphors ‘COUNTRY IS AN ANIMAL WITH A YOKE’ and “TYRANNY IS A YOKE”; a structural metaphor “SUFFERING IS SINKING”; and an orientational metaphor ‘SUFFERING HAS A DOWN ORIENTATION/BENEATH’.

Unusual metaphors are the result of changing the basic conceptual structure of a certain metaphoric pattern, making us think of a given experience in an unconventional way. An example of an unusual metaphor is “Fair is foul and foul is fair” (Macbeth 1.1.11), which involves a departure from our common structural and conceptual metaphoric patterns as it does not belong to any of the three categories of primary metaphor (ontological metaphors, structural metaphors and image schemas), nor is it in harmony with our conventional way of thinking (the concept is defined in terms of its antonym). Lakoff and Turner explained the three uses of metaphor in poetry in the following passage:

“The first is simply to verify them in automatic ways; this results in a lot of lame, feeble, and trite verse. The second is to deploy them masterfully, combining them, extending them, and crystallizing them in strong images, as we saw in the lengthy quotations from Shakespeare and Dylan Thomas. The third stance is to attempt to step outside the ordinary ways we think metaphorically and either to offer new modes of metaphorical thought or to make the use of our conventional basic metaphors less automatic by employing them in unusual ways, or otherwise to destabilize them and thus reveal their inadequacies for making sense of reality. The third stance is part of what characterizes the avant-garde in any age.” (1989: 51-52)

The name that was given to the process employed by creative writers in generating creative metaphors is ‘the Conceptual Theory of Blending’ or the ‘Conceptual Integration Theory’, which was developed by Fauconnier and Turner (2002). The word ‘blending’ refers
to the mechanism employed in developing creative metaphors from basic metaphor patterns
which “can be combined and elaborated in novel ways” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 26).
According to Cognitive Theory, blending is “available to all speakers and in all cultures”
(Kövecses 2005: 282) as a result of activating a wide range of cognitive processes and
experiences which comprise universal, cultural and individual components, but the individual
components happen to play a more significant role than the other cognitive components taken
from universal and cultural experiences. This explains why creative metaphors appear in the
individual uses of language before they lead to “a great deal of variation in the use of
figurative conceptualization.” (ibid., 259)

In Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation (2005), Kövecses dealt with metaphor
creativity as a universal and cultural phenomenon which involves the use of three basic
conceptual processes: metaphor, metonymy and blending. Kövecses devoted chapter eleven
of the book (ibid., 259-282) to metaphor and blending. However, he also introduced an
illustration of other cognitive processes which are behind divergences in generating original
metaphors. For him, creativity involves more techniques than just blending and such
techniques fall under the title of ‘cognitive preferences or styles’, as clarified in the following
paragraph:

“I have identified several cognitive preferences or styles in cognitive systems that are
capable of producing differential uses of metaphor, including conceptual integration
(blending), experiential focus, viewpoint preference, framing, prototype, metaphor
versus metonymy preference, elaboration, conventionalization, specificity, and
transparency. These various cognitive processes are universal, but their applications are
not. Cultures and subcultures may use them preferentially and to different degrees. The
metaphors that characterize groups and individuals are coherent with the cognitive
preferences and styles of these groups and individuals.” (ibid., 286)

It is important to notice that, although the cognitive approach to metaphor views creativity
as a by-product of extending, elaborating, questioning and combining ordinary conceptual
metaphors (Kövecsces et al 2009: 59), it can also serve a stylistic approach to creative
metaphors. Dealing with the stylistic element of a certain text is of extreme significance in
interpreting or deconstructing its metaphors and studying them from a critical perspective even in the field of translation which, by virtue of its communicative aspect, involves a level of interpretation. If we take the cognitive approach to conceptualization at face value, we might be tempted to think that it is not adequate for a study of the literary genre as it overlooks the creativity of writers when it reduces all our thought to universal conceptual patterns which are shared by all human beings.

In fact, Cognitive Theory does not contradict literary creativity, nor does it overlook the artistic genius of writers. In their cognitive approach to poetic metaphor, Lakoff and Turner clarified that “to study metaphor is to be confronted with hidden aspects of one’s own mind and one’s own culture” (1989: 213) and that “poets are artists of the mind” (ibid., 215), and in an advanced analysis of creative metaphors, Kövesces referred to the presence of a cognitive-stylistic link particularly when he introduced the techniques adopted by an “artistic genius” (2002: 42) in mapping creative metaphors under the title of “cognitive preferences and styles” (2005: 286). Even recent literary studies which adopted a cognitive approach to literature confirmed that Cognitive Theory is not mutually exclusive with stylistics and that it can be very illuminating in identifying and evaluating the components of literary style:

“If cognitive linguistics can produce an adequate theory of language, it can also serve as the basis for an adequate theory of literature. I therefore propose a theory of literature that is grounded in cognitive linguistic theory: namely, that literary texts are the products of cognizing minds and their interpretations the products of other cognizing minds in the context of the physical and socio-cultural worlds in which they have been created and are read.” (Freeman 2000: 253)

To sum up, this chapter focused on a historical review of the development of metaphor theory in the classical tradition, modern linguistics and Cognitive Theory. I started the literature review with a general definition of metaphoric language versus literal language and other figures of speech surveying the main categories which fall under the topic of metaphor. In the second section I provided an account of the classical approach to metaphor in Plato’s logic versus Aristotle’s rhetoric and what is known as the Comparison View of metaphor.
The third section dealt with the semantic approaches to metaphor in modern linguistics. The modern perspectives of metaphor were classified under the ‘semantic’ paradigm as they analysed the topic in terms of its relevance to ‘meaning’ and the semantic properties of language. My review of the semantic approaches to metaphor comprised the modern Comparison View, the Interaction View, and the Pragmatic View. In the fourth section, I introduced the main assumptions of the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor dealing with the notions of ‘conceptual metaphor’, ‘contextual approaches to conceptual metaphor and categorization’, as well as ‘creative conceptual metaphor’.
CHAPTER THREE
METAPHOR IN TRANSLATION STUDIES

This chapter will provide a survey of the literature on metaphor in the field of TS. The chapter consists of two parts: the first part will tackle the concepts of ‘translation’, ‘meaning’, ‘equivalence’, ‘shifts’ and ‘loss’; the second part will focus on a review of the different approaches to the translation of metaphor. The above notions will be discussed in the first part of the survey considering their debated value in the discipline and their relevance to the text analysis (Chapters VI and VII), and they will be dealt with from different perspectives in an objective and comprehensive understanding of the assumptions behind each definition. The second part of the chapter will be divided into three sections which trace the development of the contributions to the translation of metaphor historically and descriptively according to the main tendencies that dominate their theoretical framework. The first section will discuss early contributions to the translation of metaphor comprising the accounts of Nida (1964; 2001; 2003) and Mason (1982). The second section will deal with the prescriptive versus descriptive approach to metaphor translation comprising Newmark’s contribution (1980; 1982; 1985; 1988a; 1988b; 2004) and van den Broeck’s contribution (1981), respectively. The final section will focus on post-cognitive contributions to the translation of metaphor dealing with the anthropological model (Crofts 1988 and Torres 1989), the communicative model (Mandelblit 1995, Fung 1994 and al-Harrasi 2001) as well as Shuttleworth’s contribution to the translation of metaphor in the scientific genre (2011).

Before starting the survey of the literature on the translation of metaphor, and in order to reach a comprehensive understanding of the various objectives behind translation as a process, it is useful to delineate the concept of ‘translation’ from multiple perspectives. The
question to ask in this regard is ‘what to translate and why translate?’ In other words, do we translate the sense of ‘lexical’ items or the semantic content of ‘syntactic’ structures? Do we have to be committed to the transfer of ‘meaning’ as an independent component in a certain text, or should we be involved in conveying the communicative force of an utterance within discourse? The answers to these questions call for an analysis of their implications in the field of TS. The analysis is not limited to the object of translation, i.e. the Source Text (ST); rather it involves a wider investigation of other factors including the subject of translation, i.e. the topic, the product of translation (the Target Text TT), the means of translation and the target audience. All these issues reflect the nature of TS as an independent discipline which has its own theoretical foundations. The first section of this chapter will provide a general discussion of the main concepts and factors involved in approaching a text from the perspective of TS and, thus, lay the basis for introducing the main arguments which dealt with the translation of metaphor.

3.1 Translation and Meaning

In delineating the concept of translation, I will follow a cognitive approach trying to cover the various metaphors that underlie the meanings attached to this concept in the light of the different contributions to TS in its wider context. The aim behind conceptualizing translation from different perspectives is to provide an understanding of the motives behind the process of translation in a way that eliminates any ambiguities about its nature, “not because the word ‘translation’ is ambiguous in any simple sense but because it is over-determined where one determination has the consequence of precluding other determinations” (Benjamin 1989: 37). Furthermore, conceptualizing translation in terms of various metaphors means acquiring a comprehensive vision about its relativity and uncovering the main theoretical foundations
which play a role in choosing a certain approach rather than another, then drawing a comparison between the different approaches in terms of their implications for the translation of metaphor. It is the understanding of those implications which will help us reach a decision as to whether we need a separate theory for the translation of metaphor or not. This question will remain open as I move on in my survey of the topic in the present context, and any answer to be provided in the next chapter on framework and methodology will take into consideration the following metaphors of the concept of translation as relevant.

When we think of a possible definition of the word translation, there tends to be certain associations that influence our understanding of this term. The first association conjured up by ‘translation’ is that of ‘transfer’, which involves the image of ‘moving’ something from one place to another or conveying a message from one party to another, without necessarily affecting the ‘object of transfer’, be it a text, meaning, message, etc. Thinking of the process of translation in terms of transfer has always been a prominent tendency in conceptualizing this notion, whether on the theoretical or the empirical level. The ‘TRANSLATION AS TRANSFER’ metaphor acquires its significance from a number of considerations which cover the evaluation of the translated text as being good, bad, accurate, unfaithful, objective, transparent, creative, skillful, etc. However, this metaphor has lost its prominence as the concept of translation has been reconsidered and redefined in TS, where the translator is given much more flexibility in dealing with the translated text in a functional way.

TS scholars made use of different metaphors in defining translation in a way that fits the purposes and motives behind adopting a certain ‘theory of translation’. One of the modern approaches to translation looks at it in terms of ‘transformation’ as the translator can perform certain amendments to the content of the text in order to make it ‘understandable’ or, to use technical terms, ‘adapted’ to the needs of the target audience. ‘TRANSLATION AS TRANSFORMATION’ is “a form of adaptation, making the new metaphor fit the original
metaphor, and in a bad translation the results can be most procrustean” (Rabassa in Biguenet and Schulte 1989: 2). An example of the ‘TRANSLATION AS TRANSFORMATION’ approach is the ethno-linguistic model which adopts a cultural approach to the translated text and avoids the conventional, literalist approach, thus liberating the translator from the rigid limitations of words and form, as expressed by Nida in the following passage:

“A really successful translation, judged in terms of the response of the audience for which it is designed, must provide a challenge as well as information. This challenge must lie not merely in difficulty in decoding, but in newness of form- new ways of rendering old truths, new insights into traditional interpretations, and new words in fresh combinations.” (1964: 144)

Another way of approaching translation is to think of the concept in terms of the ‘TRANSLATION AS EVOLUTION’ metaphor. According to this structural metaphor, the translator is not only capable of introducing certain changes to the content of the Source Text for the purpose of adaptation, as the case with the ‘TRANSLATION AS TRANSFORMATION’ metaphor. Additionally, the translators will be licensed to project their own interpretations and attitudes onto the text in question, as appropriate. Viewing ‘TRANSLATION AS EVOLUTION’ is an original attitude which we are unlikely to find embedded in pre-cognitive approaches to the translation process. The following passage explains how the ‘TRANSLATION AS TRANSFER’ metaphor was replaced by a ‘TRANSLATION AS EVOLUTION’ metaphor in response to the influence of Cognitive Theory:

“In place of the metaphor of movement, therefore, I would suggest one of propagation, diffusion, extension, even evolution: a genetic metaphor. Evolution thus suggests some notion of progress: translation adds value to a source text, by adding readers of its ideas, adding further interpretations, and so on.” (Chesterman 2000: 8)

Each of the previous approaches to translation can be justified if we take into account the multiple factors which play a role in choosing a certain framework. However, any approach or decision that looks at the translation process from a single perspective will, most likely,
lead to sacrificing certain features that could be necessary for achieving the basic requirements of an adequate translation. These requirements comprise several considerations such as the accurate representation of the ST, paying attention to cross-cultural sensitivities and taking into account the pragmatic and communicative messages of the ST producer. Therefore, it is essential to have a relative understanding of the concept of translation as this could influence the decisions we make in an advanced stage when we recommend a certain technique or follow a certain procedure in translating a specific text. In other words, it is important for linguists and translators to be pluralistic in their understanding of translation as a concept, and to view translation as a delicate process that involves understanding ideas, interpreting meaning, expressing intentions and attitudes and communicating between cultures. The following passage highlights the significance of adopting a pluralistic approach in defining and conceptualizing the notion of ‘translation’:

“There can be therefore no simple answer to the question: what is translation? It is both a plurality of activities and has a plurality of significations. The word ‘translation’ names this plurality and hence the word itself can have no content other than this potentially conflictual plurality.” (Benjamin 1989: 35)

Now that I discussed the concept of translation from different angles, I would like to deal with the concept of meaning which is closely related to the discussion of any argument in Translation Studies. There is a general assumption that no translation process succeeds without understanding the main components of meaning in the ST before trying to reproduce them in the TT. Nida and Taber pointed out that it is important for translators “to be well grounded in the principles of transferring the meaning of a source text into a receptor language” (1969: 7). The principles involved in re-producing meaning appear on different levels which exceed textual properties comprising other factors that have a communicative, cultural, or stylistic value, which is why there is a compelling need to define “the total meaning or content of a discourse; the concepts and feelings which the author intends the reader to understand and perceive” (ibid., 205).
In fact, there is multiplicity and complexity in the semantic components of language, which leads to meaning-related problems during the translation process (for example, see the semiotic approach to ‘meaning’ Section 2.3.1 on ‘the Modern Semantic Approaches’). The intricate nature of meaning has always been a delicate issue in TS, and it became even more prominent after the rise of Pragmatic Theory, where meaning became associated with the pragmatic function of utterances as intended by the text producer. In that sense, ‘to mean’ became associated with ‘to communicate’, which requires paying attention to a combination of elements that play a role in shaping meaning within a certain context and according to a certain situation. In *Contexts in Translating*, Nida devoted a whole chapter (2001: 29-41) to the significance of contexts in giving clues to meaning, where translators are invited to analyse the discourse properties of the text and “know the meanings of words in particular texts, but not necessarily all the meanings that are listed in comprehensive dictionaries” (ibid., 10).

The other turning point in defining the concept of meaning was concomitant with the emergence of Cognitive Theory, which called for adopting a pluralistic approach in investigating the meanings of concepts. According to cognitive philosophy, language is “a metaphorical web” (Newmark in Paprotté and Dirven 1985: 298), shaped by a massive cognitive content which we acquire from the interaction between our physical reality and daily experiences, on one hand, and our metaphorical conceptual system, on another. In that sense, meaning has a multifaceted representation rooted in our universal physically-grounded conceptual system, cultural identity and individual experiences, which means that the semantic value of a lexical item is neither static nor absolute where words have a meaning which is inherent in them. As explained in the previous chapter, Cognitive Theory has greatly influenced our understanding of meaning and changed our traditional perception about the objectivity of the semantic content of concepts. Accordingly, it is not possible to separate...
between meaning as such and our subjective experiences, and this, in turn, has influenced our reasoning in all fields of knowledge including TS.

### 3.2 Equivalence, Shifts and Loss in TS

In this section, I will provide an overview of modern translation theories against the backdrop of the concepts of ‘equivalence’, ‘shifts’ and ‘loss’, respectively. Reviewing the main arguments about the nature and role of these three concepts in the field of translation is highly significant as they trace the development of TS “with its wealth of facets” (Koller 1995: 192) throughout the twentieth century and beyond from a prescriptive branch to a descriptive one. In addition, the discussion of these concepts is functional for the purpose of this research, as I will make use of them in the text analysis on the translation of metaphor in Chapters VI and VII.

The first concept I will deal with in this section is ‘equivalence’. The importance of this concept in reviewing the main contributions to TS stems from its debated value in comparing between the original text and its translation from the perspective of accuracy. In lexicology, equivalence is a mathematical term signifying a binary relation of correspondence between two sides of an equation. In the *Dictionary of Philosophy*, the word ‘equivalence’ is traced back to its Latin origin *aequivaleo* which means having “an equal power” (Runes 1983: 96) or an “identical value” (ibid.) based on “the same relation or force” (ibid.). Viewing translation as a relation of equivalence involves conceptualizing it in terms of a ‘TRANSLATION AS TRANSFER’ metaphor where equivalence involves a logical relation between two propositions based on the principle of ‘identicalness’. In other words, to translate implies to produce an equivalent TT by transferring the ST from one language to another in a way that preserves its semantic value and structure.
Since equivalence is associated with ‘accuracy’, the latter principle became the criterion against which to measure the efficiency of the translation process where the TT is judged as accurate or not in as much as it is equivalent to the ST. Nonetheless, this concept was subject to evolution throughout the development of Translation Studies where researchers started to become less satisfied with perceiving equivalence as a kind of “linguistic sameness” (Lefevere in Bassnett and Lefevere1990: 11). Consequently, equivalence started to viewed as a “relative” (Koller 1995: 201) concept which evolved from a fixed relation of ‘X equals Y’ into a variable relation with components that have a changeable value. Venuti highlighted the shift in the semantic association of equivalence from “‘accuracy,’ ‘adequacy,’ ‘correctness,’ ‘correspondence,’ ‘fidelity,’ or ‘identity’” (2000: 5) to “a variable notion of how the translation is connected to the foreign text” (ibid.). The fact that equivalence has increasingly acquired the status of a variable in TS makes it one of the fundamental concepts to be reviewed in the discipline:

“The equivalence supermeme is the big bugbear of translation theory, more argued about than any other single idea: a translation is, or must be, equivalent to the source, in some sense at least. This idea too is based on the path metaphor, in fact on the trope of ‘metaphor’ itself carrying across.” (Chesterman 2000: 9)

There are three types of equivalence that were discussed in TS including Formal Equivalence, Dynamic Equivalence and Functional Equivalence. Each type of equivalence focuses on a specific approach that reflects the main assumptions behind adopting it in a translation process. For example, Formal Equivalence was meant to emulate both the linguistic structure and semantic content of the ST. On the other hand, Dynamic Equivalence was introduced to reflect variation in the formal structure of the ST in order to preserve its content, and Functional Equivalence was proposed to introduce variation in both form and content in order to retain equivalence on a level that preserves the ST message. The following argument will provide further details about the three kinds of equivalence, the motives behind each of them and their implication for different theories of translation.
As the notion indicates, Formal Equivalence calls for reproducing the structural components and semantic properties of the ST as accurately as possible in the TT. This means that the TT components should have a similar structure and content to those of the ST whether on the level of words, idioms, phrases, sentences, etc. The rationale behind adopting this type of equivalence is to preserve the stylistic features and semantic content of the Source Text, which makes it ST-oriented. In that sense, Formal Equivalence is different from literal translation because the objective of reaching structural correspondence between the two texts should not be achieved at the expense of the semantic content. This is what was referred to as “an effective blend of matter and manner” (Nida 2003: 164). Formal Equivalence was also referred to as linguistic equivalence or form-for-form translation because it adopts a linguistic approach to translation by preserving “a relatively fixed range of linguistic features, levels and categories, as well as a potentially infinite series of cultural situations” (Catford 1965: 50). The following definition by Nida explains the type of correspondence sought in opting for Formal Equivalence:

“Formal equivalence focuses attention on the message itself, in both form and content. In such a translation one is concerned with such correspondences as poetry to poetry, sentence to sentence, and concept to concept (…) to determine standards of accuracy and correctness. The type of translation which most completely typifies this structural equivalence might be called a “gloss translation.” (2003: 159)

Unlike Formal Equivalence, which gives priority to the ST content and linguistic style, Dynamic Equivalence is TT-oriented in that it aims at producing an equivalent effect that responds to the needs of the TL and culture. In other words, Dynamic Equivalence focuses on translating the content of a message in a way that preserves its naturalness in the TL even if this were to lead to a change in the linguistic structure of the Source Text. According to Nida, Dynamic Equivalence is sometimes necessary in order to reflect the cultural content of the ST in a way which is understandable and automatically appreciated by the recipients of the TT. The point of focus in Dynamic Equivalence is the target culture, regardless of the linguistic
features of the ST; hence the word ‘dynamic’. Certain lexical items are culturally oriented in a way they lack their naturalness if transferred literally to another language. In this case, it is justifiable to look for a Dynamic Equivalent that makes such items accessible to the reader. An example of a Dynamic Equivalent is translating the word ‘heart’ into Arabic as ‘liver’, *kabd*, in the context of talking about the emotion of love (Nida and Taber 1969: 107). The following paragraph highlights the uses and importance of Dynamic Equivalence:

“A translation of dynamic equivalence aims at complete naturalness of expression, and tries to relate the receptor to modes of behaviour relevant within the context of his own culture; it does not insist that he understand the cultural patterns of the source-language context in order to comprehend the message.” (Nida 2003: 159)

Nida stressed the importance of adopting a balanced approach which does not follow a “rigid formal equivalence” (ibid., 191) or go for “the opposite extreme” (ibid.) of a loose Dynamic Equivalence. Yet, he has been thought to have a preference for the latter as it liberates the translator from the limitations imposed by the use of Formal Equivalence, which could “actually involve serious distortions” (ibid., 192) of the ST semantic content. Although the notion of Dynamic Equivalence is associated with its tendency to approach the translation from the perspective of the target culture, Nida’s account can be described as bicultural based on his assumption that the translation process is subject to the influence of cultural factors from the SL and TL at the same time. This was discussed in his ethnolinguistic model which dealt with factors that influence the translation process comprising “(1) ecology, (2) material culture, (3) social culture, (4) religious culture, and (5) linguistic culture” (1945: 196). These cultural factors influence the ST producer and, consequently, leave an effect on the ‘performance’ of the translator during the process of translation. In other words, the translation process becomes subject to the influence of two sets of culture: the ST culture and the TT culture:

“(…) more important than what takes place inside the translator’s brain is what takes place in the total cultural framework in which the communication occurs. Moreover, in an attempt to describe these inter-language and intercultural factors, we must
reckon with differences and intercultural factors, we must reckon with differences of
time (...) and differences of culture.” (Nida 2003: 147)

Nida’s account of the role of bicultural factors in producing Dynamic Equivalence was not appreciated by some TS linguists who looked at the notion from a single perspective. To put it differently, certain cultural approaches to translation looked at Dynamic Equivalence from the perspective of the target culture where they ended up associating it with some kind of domestication, adaptation, naturalization, cultural filtering, etc. On the other hand, other approaches maintained that Dynamic Equivalence is not necessarily sympathetic to the TT culture where the ST’s cultural content tends to be preserved in the TT. Accordingly, Dynamic Equivalence became associated with exoticization, foreignization, estrangement, etc. (Chesterman 2000: 108). However, and as explained in the previous paragraph on Nida’s anthropological approach, Dynamic Equivalence was meant to stress the importance of a double context which involves the role of two languages and two cultures interacting at the same time (Leonardi 2000: 1). This twofold approach to translation began to gain prominence in the second half of the twentieth century with TS scholars and translators paying attention to two contexts at play in approaching a certain text, which paved the way for yet another approach to equivalence that conceptualized translation from a communicative perspective. This kind of equivalence is usually referred to as functional or “communicative equivalence” (Schäffner 2004: 1255) defined as “a relationship between the target text and the source text in which TT and ST are of equal value in the respective communicative situations in their cultures.” (ibid.)

The importance of Functional Equivalence stems from its role in paving the way for a communicative theory of translation which addresses the evaluative and stylistic aspects of meaning that are intended to express an attitude. Communicative translation makes use of the ‘translation as recreation’ metaphor which is employed to a great extent by TS scholars who are interested in literary translation. Translating literary texts can be a very challenging task
due to their highly stylistic and expressive nature which exceeds the levels of unpredictability that tend to be found in linguistic expressions and cultural frames. Hence, the importance of a creative translation which gives the translator a degree of liberty similar to that given to the ST producer in creative writing, as explained in the following passage:

“The image of translation as an exciting journey is one that many great translators would doubtless share, and brings us back again to the importance of stressing the creative aspect of translation, rather than perceiving it as some kind of second-rate literary activity. For translation is about writing to cross boundaries and enter new territory, whilst the study of translation involves mapping the journeys texts undertake.” (Bassnett 1997: 11)

By and large, the issues that could be highlighted in the communicative approach to translation are challenging as they involve dealing with the pragmatic implications of utterances which are on a high level of indeterminacy for being in the possession of the text producer. Consequently, talking about Functional Equivalence in communicative translation started to become less frequent and was gradually replaced with the term ‘compensation’ in describing any translation procedure which aims at ‘making up’ for the loss of an aspect that has a communicative or evaluative value such as “metaphor” (Kwiecinski 2001: 134). Communicative translation is usually associated with the literary genre as literature is supposed to have a pragmatic force in terms of being not “written passively” (Berry 1978: 3). The translation of a literary text is supposed to reflect the stylistic features of that text as expressed by the ST writer. In that sense, the word ‘stylistic’ is thought to imply the notion of ‘expressive meaning’ as an “aspect of meaning which co-varies with characteristics of the speaker” (Kwiecinski 2001: 145). As most TS researchers deal with literary texts within the framework of a pragmatic approach, it is much more common to come across the notion of a ‘pragmatic theory of translation’ than a ‘literary theory of translation’.

It follows from the above discussion of the development of the concept of equivalence in TS that this concept “should not be approached as a search for sameness, since sameness cannot even exist between two TL versions of the same text, let alone between the SL and the
This implies that any translation process involves some sort of variation that, in a way or another, influences the ST components and content, which takes us to the discussion of the second concept to be reviewed in relation to TS, namely ‘shifts’. Recently, the concept of ‘shifts’ has acquired a prominent value in major contributions to the field as the occurrence of shifts in translated texts is considered an inevitable result of the inherent differences between any two languages. Such differences enhance the assumption that “the process of translation necessarily entails shifts both in textual and discoursal relationships.” (Blum-Kulka 2004: 291).

A ‘translation shift’ refers to a change in one of the ST components during the process of translation. Although Nida talked about the need for introducing certain “adjustment” (Nida 1964: 226) to the ST throughout the translation process, the term ‘translation shifts’ was traced back to Catford (1965) (see Cyrus 2009: 90; Hatim and Munday 2004: 142) who discussed two types of shifts occurring in a translated text: level shifts that deal with changes on the level of grammar and syntax; and category shifts that are related to alterations in the lexical categories and structural units of the ST (Catford 2004: 141). In an advanced stage, several contributions dealt with to the term ‘translation shifts’ where the interest in the concept of equivalence started to retract increasingly. In the main, there are two views that mark the development of the concept of shifts in TS: ST-oriented and TT-oriented, both of which will be discussed briefly in this account.

The ST-oriented approach seems to view a translation shift as an unsolicited alteration in one of the ST components due to unavoidable dissimilarities between the SL and TL on different levels (linguistic, semantic, textual, cultural, etc.). According to this view, a shift is described as “A VIOLATION OF THE TASK, it we can speak of changes, violations, deviations, etc., at all” (Fedorov 1974: 14). This indirectly implies that a shift is perceived as “an error or mistranslation” (Baker and Saldanha 2009: 270) which, due to intrinsic
inconsistencies between the two linguistic and cultural systems involved, the translator(s)
cannot help avoid. Contributions under this view were later described as “negative
formulations” (Baker and Saldanha 2009: 270) of the concept as they were thought to imply a
“negative kind of reasoning” (Toury 1995: 84) about introducing shifts to the ST. These
approaches are ST-oriented because they are mainly concerned with discussing the changes
that appear in the TT from the perspective of their influence on the ST’s properties as having
fixed decontextualized values. Such approaches comprise Nida’s (1964) account of the
techniques of additions, subtractions and alterations (Sections 2.3.1-2.3.2), Catford’s (1965)
discussion of level and category shifts (pp. 73-77) and Vinay and Darbelnet’s (1965)
treatment of transposition, modulation, and adaptation (Sections 2.2.1-2.2.4) in their account
of the seven translation procedures. For more about the development of the concept of shift in
TS, see Cyrus’s article “Old Concepts, New Ideas: Approaches to Translation Shifts” (2009).

The ST-oriented approach to translation shifts was criticized for looking at them as
“obligatory deviations (…) from linguistic acceptability” (Toury 1981: 24). Alternatively,
this approach was replaced by a TT-oriented approach which is concerned with describing
shifts that emerge in a TT, not from the perspective of the ST, but from the perspective of
their influence on the target culture and response to the contextualized interpretations of the
reader(s). According to this view, target texts are looked upon as “facts of the target system”
(Toury 1982: 26) rather than imperfect emulations of their source counterparts or mere
“deviations from the norms of acceptability in the target literary and/or linguistic systems”
(Toury 1981: 23). In a discussion of “Shifts of Cohesion and Coherence in Translation”,
Blum-Kulka dealt with two types of shifts of meaning, referred to as ‘coherence shifts’,
drawing a distinction between “text-focused shifts” (2004: 296) and “reader-focused shifts”
(ibid.) as explained in the following passage:

“In examining the final translation product, the question then is: can we distinguish
between shifts of coherence due to the necessary shift between audience types as
distinct from those shifts that are traceable to the process of translation per se? I would like to suggest that it is important to attempt to draw this distinction, so that we can have a better understanding of what translation can and can not do, or in other words, to better understand the true limits of translatability.” (Blum-Kulka 2004: 297)

Introducing reader-focused shifts implies an attempt to focus on translated texts as normal texts that function in their target culture regardless of their commitment to the accurate representation of the source texts. This view subscribes to Toury’s descriptive approach which calls for dealing with translation shifts in terms of their performance in the target culture rather than their adequacy in representing the properties of the ST, which means that contemporary approaches to translation shifts are marked with a focus on the product, rather than process of translation. These approaches which were described as “positive formulations” (Baker and Saldanha 2009: 270) of translational shifts are concerned with an unbiased description of target texts as though they were source texts in their own right. Thus, they replaced the traditional focus on the relationship between the ST and TT with a more objective focus on the function and interpretation of these shifts in the target language and culture (see van Leuven-Zwart 1990 in Thelen and Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk).

The third concept I would like to deal with in view of its debated value in TS is the concept of ‘loss’. A loss in translation is defined as the detection of a ST component which is not rendered or compensated for in the TT as it is usually “not accompanied by the introduction in place of the omitted element of another element not given in the original” (Fedorov 1974: 15). According to Bassnett, “Eugene Nida is a rich source of information about the problems of loss in translation, in particular about the difficulties encountered by the translator when faced with terms or concepts in the SL that do not exist in the TL.” (2002: 38). These difficulties are thought to emerge due to conceptual discontinuities between the SL and TL, examples of which include “the concept of Trinity or the social significance of
the parables in certain cultures” (Bassnett 2002: 39), and, consequently, they lead to cases of “untranslatability” (ibid.), i.e. loss in a certain ST value.

The above view of a translation loss seems to be associated with a negative attitude as it approaches the TT from the perspective of its accurate representation of the ST. Thus, a translation loss tends to be synonymous with intended or unintended “omissions” (Toury 1982: 30; 31) or rather “zero solutions” (ibid., 30) for reasons to do with a problem in processing a ST component and/or finding an equivalent for it in the TL. However, and as happened in the development of the notion of translation shifts, a more recent understanding of the concept of loss in the framework of Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS) (Toury 1982; 1995) seems to adopt a pragmatic attitude which does not consider a translation loss as “something missing” (Gandin 2009: 77) from the ST but as something which can be compensated for or “replaced in the TL context” (Bassnett 2002: 38). Instead of comparing between a TT version and its ST origin, this view focuses on describing the functionality of any translation phenomenon (shift or loss, for example) from the perspective of the target text and culture and examining its implications for the factors that motivate and influence the translation process. Proponents of this view believe that “what is really lost in translation is the deceptive pretension of creating equivalence between cultures” (Gandin 2009: 89).

Recent arguments about a translation loss started to be replaced or associated with a discussion of ‘gain in translation’. Although Bassnett lamented the focus on translation loss “whilst ignoring what can also be gained” (2002: 38) as a result of the translation process, her account was criticized as inadequate where of “the two pages of the section, only one sentence addresses the gains” (Nord in Buffagni et al 2011: 22). Dealing with a translated text from the perspective of the concept of gain used to be concomitant with approaches to literary translation which does not look at a translated text as “reproduction of a work but the creation of something new” (Fedorov 1974: 24). However, the notion gained even more
momentum with the prominence of DTS that dealt with all translation phenomena from the perspective of their implication for the TT rather than the perspective of a mere contrastive ST-TT relationship.

To summarize, and before moving to the third part of this chapter, the second and first sections provided an overview of the main theoretical terms and frameworks which were adopted by TS linguists in their contributions to the field as a scientific discipline. The discussed terms and concepts including the notions of translation, meaning, equivalence, shifts and loss were selected for several reasons. First, they played a key role in laying the foundation for TS as an independent discipline; second, they trace the development of TS from a theoretical branch into a descriptive one; third, they are indispensable for discussing the topic of this research and suitable for the text genre that will be dealt with in the empirical study.

3.3 The Translatability of Metaphor

Before surveying the different contributions to ‘the translation of metaphor’, it is advisable to reflect upon the importance of this topic in Translation Studies. Recently, metaphor has gained an increasing importance in the field of translation. As explained in the second chapter (Section 2.4 on the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor), the findings of Conceptual Metaphor Theory sparked an increasing interest in metaphor in all fields of knowledge, paving the way for ongoing research and detailed studies which dealt with the extra-linguistic functions of metaphor and the role of its conceptual power in our physically-embedded conventional and creative thinking. This was met by a mounting interest in the research efforts on metaphor as a topic which merits special attention in TS.
Back in 1976, Dagut wrote an article expressing his criticism of the gap between the importance of metaphor as a conceptual process, on one side, and the linguistic studies which dealt with its role in language use and investigated its implications for Translation Studies, on another. Dagut’s article which appeared in *Babel* under the title “Can Metaphor be Translated?” drew attention to the translatability of metaphor, triggering responses from different TS scholars who tried to reflect on the challenges that metaphor poses for translators during the translation process. The following passage highlights the importance of metaphor as an issue to be dealt with in TS:

“There is thus an almost grotesque disproportion between the importance and frequency of ‘metaphor’ in language use and the very minor role allotted to it in the translation theory (...) it is high time for translation theory to make a start on a thorough and systematic discussion of the translation implications of metaphor.”

(Dagut 1976: 21)

In their attempt to address the main inadequacies and gaps which are associated with researching the translation of metaphoric language, TS researchers tried to understand the nature of metaphor stressing the need to redefine it as a first step towards a deeper consideration of the implications of its translation. The “re-evaluation of metaphor” (Newmark 1980: 100) varied by the variation in the linguist’s approach to translation, as the arguments in the following account will reveal. In my review of the debates on the translation of metaphor, I will tackle the major contributions to the topic from a chronological as well as descriptive point of view, where I will divide this section into three subsections dealing with: ‘early contributions to translating metaphor, ‘prescriptive versus descriptive approaches’ and ‘post-cognitive contributions’. For a start, it is important to observe that metaphor translation, as a recent topic in TS, used to be associated with remarkable generalizations about the degree of its translatability. In other words, the translation of metaphor has often been discussed along a continuum of literality versus untranslatability.
Early arguments about metaphor translatability/untranslatability fell under the three perspectives of metaphor universality, cultural specificity and creativity. Metaphors which are culturally oriented used to be considered untranslatable, whereas metaphors with a universal or creative nature were usually considered susceptible to literal translation. The question here is what determines the universal, cultural, or creative components of a metaphor? Fung and Kiu maintained that “not only cultural experience but also the values and qualities attributed to objects and events and the metaphorical concepts (...) are most at variance between SL and TL culture, resulting in untranslatability” (1987: 100). The untranslatability of culturally-oriented metaphors was originally raised by Nida who dealt with the ethnolinguistic aspect of metaphor as a conventionalized figurative extension. The process of figurative extension was believed by Nida to happen as a result of extending a single component at least of the semantic content of a concept (physical feature or behavioural attribute) thus adding a specific value to its meaning in a way it becomes “almost always specific to a particular culture and language” (Nida and Taber 1969: 88) and not prone to be shared “by all societies or speech communities” (Nida 1964: 94). For Nida and Taber, the cultural components of metaphors become gradually inherent in their semantic content in a way they start to resist translation, which is why it is suggested to translate cultural metaphors into non-metaphors, i.e. adaptation, as explained in the following passage:

“It is this very aspect of figurative extension that makes metaphor subject to cultural ‘manipulation’ and extra-linguistic associations leading to an impasse in the process of translation where metaphors ‘must often be translated as non-metaphors’” (1969: 220)

An example of what Nida described as the role of figurative extension in the cultural conventionalization of a metaphor is the use of the word ‘unbonneted’ in Othello’s statement, “my demerits may speak unbonneted to as proud a fortune as this that I have reached” (Othello, 1.2.22-24). The use of the word ‘bonneted’ (with the cap on) was extended by Shakespeare figuratively to indicate the social status of ‘being honoured’ (Becket 1815: 181).
In this example, the figurative extension of the semantic content of the word ‘bonneted’ has, in time, become conventionalized and particular to the British culture and other cultures where wearing a cap is common. Accordingly, if we want to translate this culturally-oriented metaphor into Arabic, we notice that it will resist translation because Arabic did not make use of the same figurative extension of the word ‘bonnet’, in which case one could domesticate the metaphor by replacing ‘bonnet’ with something like ‘iqāl’ (a black round rope which men wear around their head as a mark of honour and manhood in the Arab culture; it is still worn at the present time by men in certain countries and communities in the Arab world). Conversely, metaphors can be literally translatable when they have universal attributions shared by all human beings, or when they are creative. For instance, Fung and Kiu maintained that “the least obstacle to translation is encountered when the metaphor in SL is structured from some more universal concept also found in TL” (1987: 91). An example of this is the translation of Romeo’s metaphor of seeing the ‘OBJECT OF LOVE’ as ‘THE SUN’, which is a universal concept with universally-shared attributions, as the following excerpt reveals:

“(…) it is not usually all that difficult to translate a metaphor into another language. (...) While native English speakers find it hard to imagine how, in general, the power and beauty of Shakespeare’s language can survive translation, we do not have the same difficulty with certain bits of that language, bits such as Romeo's description of Juliet. Whether she is ‘le Soleil, ‘il sole’, or ‘die Sonne’ makes little difference to the impact of the original metaphor.” (Guttenplan 2005: 129)

Also, creative metaphors are viewed as highly translatable due to their pragmatic force. There is a general assumption that the communicative and stylistic power of creative metaphors makes them lend themselves easily to translation. Newmark maintained that the translatability of creative metaphors lies in their expressive tone which is “easily translatable” (2004: 127) as such metaphors tend to have a rhetorical function in addition to their basic semantic values. According to Newmark, the tone of a metaphor carries attitudinal and stylistic attributes such as seriousness, humour, intensity, formality, factual style, social class,
and proverbial or idiomatic style (Newmark 2004: 128), and the stronger the tone, the more original the metaphor and the better and easier to retain it in the TT (ibid., 127).

Discussing the translation of metaphor in terms of its translatability or untranslatability was later considered an unhelpful generalization which dealt with the issue from a partial perspective. Dagut discarded these “two diametrically opposed views on the problem of translating metaphor” (1976: 25) as insufficient, shallow treatments which fall short of discussing the problem adequately. For a compromise in dealing with the translation of metaphor, he introduced a model for negotiating metaphor translatability along a continuum of interaction between text-level sensitivity and cultural specificity (Dagut 1987: 82-83). This proposal might prove helpful in appreciating the originality of the metaphoric content and, at the same time, investigating possible ‘solutions’ to its translatability, as explained in the following passage:

“A ‘theory’ of the translation of metaphor, then, consists of two main parts: (1) the establishment of the general principle that, in relation to any TL, every ST metaphor occupies a position on a gradient of translatability (ranging from completely untranslatable to literally translatable) determined by its cultural and lexical resonances and the extent to which these can be reproduced in the TL; and (2) a close investigation of these resonances and the possibility of reproducing them in every particular case.” (ibid., 82)

Dagut’s model of investigating the translatability of metaphor between the two poles of literality and untranslatability is a good introduction to a thorough analysis of the literature review about the translation of metaphor. Not only did Dagut trigger a challenging argument about the translatability of metaphor, but he also initiated a constructive contribution to the topic in his research about it in an advanced stage. After Dagut’s initiative, different approaches to the translation of metaphor started to range on the continuum of interaction which he introduced in his second article starting with the “simplistic” (Dagut 1976: 32; Dagut 1987: 78) accounts and ending with more functional approaches that deal with the issue from a descriptive or empirical point of view, as will be clarified in the coming sections.
3.3.1 Early Contributions to Metaphor Translation

In the following account, I will survey the early contributions to the translation of metaphor, dealing with Nida’s model of negotiating equivalence (1964; 2001; 2003) and Mason’s zero-theory for the translation of metaphor (1982). As explained before, Nida’s model is influenced by his ethnolinguistic approach which represents the main framework for his scholarly contributions to TS as a whole, and it is based on considering cultural metaphors untranslatable, generally speaking, and adapting their content to the target culture. The distinctive feature in Nida’s argument about the lack of equivalence between source culture metaphors and target culture metaphors is that it does not dismiss the possibility of translating metaphor out of hand, as it is based on negotiating a kind of equivalence which is in harmony with the cognitive content of the target culture. Nida’s model was criticized by Dagut for his “brief discussion of ‘metaphor’, and, ‘figurative meaning’” (1976: 21) in a “comprehensive 264-page work” (ibid.). However, this should not undermine the former’s contribution for its remarkable objectivity in approaching the topic from the perspective of Dynamic Equivalence.

In his discussion of the translatability of metaphor, Nida made a distinction between “active figurative extensions” (2003: 93) which take the form of live figurative metaphors, and inactive figurative extensions, i.e. idiomatic expressions, which behave like lexical, semantic units whose meaning cannot be explained by virtue of their lexical constituents (Nida 2003: 95; Nida and Taber 1969: 106-107). This differentiation between ‘living’ and ‘dead’ metaphors provided the foundation for most modern accounts of the definition, classification and translation methods of metaphorical language, in general. In discussing the translation methods of these two categories, Nida made use of the notion of Dynamic
Equivalence, suggesting three kinds of semantic adjustment, i.e. adaptations, for the translation of figurative meanings. For Nida, inactive figurative expressions tend to be translated in three different ways all of which are considered dynamic equivalents. The purpose behind opting for Dynamic Equivalence in the translation of idiomatic expressions is to produce a translation which is natural in the target culture, i.e. adapted to it. Accordingly, an adapted translation of idioms can be produced by rendering the idiom to a non-idiom or a different idiom that preserves the meaning of the ST idiom, and rendering a non-idiom to an idiom. According to Nida and Taber, the same translation methods apply to live figurative extensions, as explained in the following passage:

“As in the case of idioms, there are three situations in which figurative expressions (...) are involved in the transfer process: (a) shifts from figurative to nonfigurative usage… (b) shifts from one type of figurative expression, (c) nonfigurative expressions changed to figurative ones (…)” (1969: 107)

The other technique that was introduced by Nida for dealing with the translation of idioms is that of ‘borrowing’ or Formal Equivalence. The criterion for employing the method of borrowing in the translation of an idiom is the availability or unavailability of a TL idiomatic equivalent which preserves the communicative content of the SL idiom, in which case Nida argued that the translator might decide to keep the ST idiom intact and import it into the target culture without any changes in its structure or content. Nida proposed two techniques which could help the text recipients understand the ST’s message in case the translator opts for a formal equivalent: the first is to add a classifier in order to give a hint about the semantic content of the borrowed idiom; and the second is to add a marginal note “if the feature in question merits an explanation” (2003: 165).

Nida and Taber referred to the use of the first technique as ‘contextual conditioning’ defining it as “the placing in the context of information which is needed to make the meaning clear to a receptor.” (1969: 199) Take, for example, the translation of the Biblical metaphor ‘killing the fatted calf’. If we want to preserve the cultural connotations of the Biblical
reference while translating it from English into a language that does not share the same cultural experience, we might condition it contextually by adding a classifier which explicates the idiomatic implications of the metaphor. For example, we might say something like ‘to celebrate by killing the fatted calf’. The word ‘celebrate’ is introduced into the context to add a communicative value to the metaphor’s content. In the case of Arabic there is no need for adding a classifier when translating this expression as Arabic language users are familiar with its cognitive content and experiential background which is also mentioned in the Qur’an in a similar context. The following passage clarifies the uses of the techniques of borrowing and contextual conditioning:

“In many instances translators conclude that no equivalent exists in the receptor language and that the only practical solution is to borrow a word from the source language. The heavy communication load imposed by such borrowings can sometimes be reduced by the use of ‘classifiers’ (...) to make these meaningless foreign words somewhat more intelligible, and thus reduce their communication load.” (Nida 2003: 137)

Nida’s account of adopting Dynamic Equivalence in a TT-oriented approach and Formal Equivalence in a ST-oriented approach to translating cultural metaphors reflects the relativity of his contribution to the translation of metaphor. It is a relativity that does not fall under an absolute argument of translatability or untranslatability, which makes it fit for the description of a ‘model of negotiating equivalence’. Nida’s model was embraced by Beekman and Callow (1974) in their account of translating Biblical metaphor. They suggested translating Biblical metaphor by means of cultural substitution, descriptive modification, or borrowing, which are the same procedures introduced by Nida but given different technical terms. The model of negotiating equivalence was also adopted by Schäffner in her approach to translating culturally-oriented metaphors. In an article entitled “Metaphor and Translation: some implications of a cognitive approach”, Schäffner (2004) dealt with metaphor-related problems of translation from a bicultural perspective which aims at producing a compromized equivalence. In order to create correspondence between ST metaphors and TT metaphors, she
proposed reproducing the ST metaphor in a way which fits the cultural and linguistic implications of the TL. At the same time, the translator is required to show sensitivity to SL cultural property by making use of certain procedures like ‘footnoting’ and paraphrasing, as explained in the following passage:

“Cultural differences between the SL and the TL and between the source culture and the target culture have often been mentioned as problems for the translation of metaphors. For example, it has been argued that if a metaphor activates different associations in the two cultures, one should avoid a literal translation and opt either for a corresponding TL metaphor or for a paraphrase. If, however, the culture-specificity of the ST is to be stressed, then it would be better to reproduce the SL metaphor and add an explanation, either in a footnote or by means of annotations.” (Schäffner 2004: 1264)

The second argument which I would like to discuss under the early contributions to metaphor translation is Mason’s account of the translation of cultural metaphors. Mason (1982) called for adopting Dynamic Equivalence in translating the cultural content of a text, metaphoric or not. The difference between this approach and Nida’s approach is that Mason did not view metaphor as a distinct linguistic aspect which merits special treatment in translation. Rather, it is present in all language and its translation is subject to the same factors which influence the translation of any ST content. Mason’s contribution was based on viewing metaphor as a prevalent feature in all language uses without distinguishing between the metaphoric and non-metaphoric components of language. The only distinction one can make vis-à-vis the metaphoric nature of language is between the common uses and novel uses of metaphor. According to Mason, it is the second kind of metaphors, i.e. novel metaphors, that creates obstacles during the translation process. This implies that the obstacles which are associated with the translation of metaphor are not related to the complex nature of metaphor. Rather, they are related to the uses of metaphor and the translators’ familiarity with its empirical content and functions, as explained in the following excerpt:

“All language is metaphorical in its origin, and it is (...) the fact that metaphors are typically made of old words, words already in common use, that creates problems for the translator dealing with original metaphors, (...) which shows that the
problems involved in translating a metaphor are a function of the problems involved in translating in general, and not of the problems with metaphor.” (Mason 1982: 141)

Based on the previous argument of metaphor pervasiveness in all the uses of language, and the lack of association between the intrinsic features of metaphor, on the one hand, and its method of translation, on the other hand, Mason claimed the futility of investigating the translatability or untranslatability of metaphor as a special case. Accordingly, the translation of metaphor should not be dealt with as an independent topic in its own right but rather within the framework of Translation Studies, as a whole, hence the description of this approach as the ‘zero-theory of metaphor translation’. Mason provided an example of the use of novel metaphor as the main source of problem in the translation process. The example was Ker Wilson's translation of *Alice in Wonderland* where the character of the White Rabbit was qualified as a Kangaroo, which is closer to the Australian physical environment (Mason 1982: 147). For Mason, the translator’s adaptation of the metaphor was quite successful; however, this technique which was employed by the translator to deal with the ST metaphor applies also to the ST's cultural content as a whole regardless of its metaphoricity or non-metaphoricity. Mason concluded that translating metaphor should be considered from a functional perspective based on the cultural and contextual components of the text and regardless of the kind of metaphor one is dealing with:

> “Each occurrence of a metaphor for translation must therefore be treated in isolation; each of its components must be dealt with in the light of its cultural connotations before a translation of the whole can take place, and account must also be taken of the textual context in which the metaphor is used. There cannot be a theory of the translation of metaphor; there can only be a theory of translation, and that theory has to allow room for the notion of the purpose of translating each new text.” (1982: 149)

Despite being limited in scope, Mason’s account on metaphor translation marks a departure from earlier contributions in that it distances itself from the dogmatic branding of metaphor as translatable/untranslatable and describes the issue in a wider context of
functionality where every single metaphor is treated as an integrated part of a cultural and textual setting. The point in common between Nida’s model and Mason’s account is that both focused on the role of cultural factors in determining the degree of metaphor translatability. However, they differ in that Nida’s account provided a general description of the options available to translators in dealing with metaphoric language, whereas Mason maintained that the translation of metaphor should not be discussed as a special issue in the field of TS and that, throughout the process of translation, every metaphor should be treated as an individual case which has its own cultural and contextual dynamics that determine the degree and method of its translatability.

3.3.2 Prescriptive versus Descriptive Contributions

This section will deal with the prescriptive versus descriptive approach to metaphor translation. The main distinction between these two approaches lies in moving from a ST-oriented model which deals with the issue within the framework of a problem-solution reasoning to a TT-oriented model which deals with the factors involved in the process of translation and their implications for the product of translation, i.e. the TT. The discussion of the prescriptive approach as opposed to the descriptive approach to metaphor translatability will deal with the contributions of Newmark (1980; 1982; 1985; 1988a; 1988b; 2004) and van den Brock (1981), respectively, both of which tackled the issue from a pragmatic perspective where the main criterion for the translation process is to serve the contextual and communicative function of metaphor which is considered to have been “insufficiently taken into consideration” (van Besien and Pelsmaekers in Nekeman 1988: 140).

First, I would like to deal with the prescriptive approach to metaphor translation starting with Newmark’s model which can be described as a kind of ‘literal pragmatism’. Initially, I would like to discuss the three main features of Newmark’s model in terms of being
pragmatic, prescriptive and literal; as this would be helpful in clarifying the assumptions behind his main arguments. In broad terms, Newmark’s contribution is described as prescriptive because it is based on providing normative guidelines which dealt with the translation of metaphor in a case-by-case study. Second, it is viewed as pragmatic as he was mainly concerned with the attitudinal and pragmatic function of metaphor considering it “the most powerful pragmatic factor in translation” (Newmark 1988b: 135) and “language’s main resource for conveying strong feeling” (ibid.) and also because his prescriptions took into consideration the functionality of metaphor within a certain context (see Newmark 1988a: 113) or what he described as the “tone” (Newmark 2004: 129) of metaphor. Third, Newmark’s approach is literal as literal translation seems to be the dominating tendency in his prescribed solutions for the issues involved in translating metaphor.

In order to deal with Newmark’s prescriptive model, it is important to explain his approach to the notions of word, meaning and metaphor. Newmark adopted the semiotic definition of word as sign, meaning as the sense of the sign in a particular context and metaphor as the mode of communicating an attitude, classifying metaphors by their different functions. According to Newmark, a metaphor serves two main functions: cognitive and aesthetic (cf. Newmark 1988a: 104). On the one hand, metaphor acquires its cognitive function from its ability to add sense to the sign, i.e. make words mean. On the other hand, metaphor acquires its expressive function from its ability to communicate meaning, where meaning stands for the message or the pragmatic function of the utterance. Newmark observed that metaphors fall into six types according to their function comprising dead, cliché, stock, adapted, recent and original metaphors, which should be discussed “in relation to their contextual factors and translation procedures.” (ibid., 106)

‘Dead metaphors’ are metaphors which we use subconsciously without being aware of their metaphoricity and which have become part of the lexicon as a result of being overused.
Examples of dead metaphors include the universal concepts of TIME, SPACE and the HUMAN BODY and activities such as ‘to grow’ for ‘to increase’, ‘to drop’ for ‘to decrease’ (Newmark 1988a: 106) and ‘to see’ for ‘to understand’ (Newmark 2004: 128). For Newmark, dead metaphors resist literal translation sometimes but they can be translated in various ways, which is why they do not pose an obstacle for the translator. For example, the Arabic translation of ‘I see’ is ‘fahimt’ or ‘hasanan’ (literal for ‘I understand’ or ‘well’, respectively) and that of ‘field of knowledge’ is ‘haql’ or ‘maydān maʿrifā’, literally ‘field’ or ‘arena’ of knowledge.

‘Cliché metaphors’ are popular, fixed expressions which have metaphoric associations but are used only for providing information in replacement of “clear thought” (Newmark 1988a: 107). Newmark also referred to clichés as “overused collocations” (Newark 2004: 128). An example of cliché metaphors is “the jewel in the crown” (ibid.). He proposed two ways for dealing with these metaphors: (a) to retain the metaphor in authoritative statements; (b) to give the metaphor’s semantic content while deleting the image, referred to as ‘turning the metaphor to sense’. According to Newmark (1982), expressive or authoritative texts are writings that derive their importance from the high status of their authors socially, politically, academically, etc. Such writings comprise official documents, religious texts and political speeches. For instance, there are two ways of translating ‘the jewel in the crown’ into Arabic. In an authoritative text, we can translate it literally as ‘al-jawhara fi Ḱ-tāj’, whereas in a text with no strong pragmatic function, e.g. a text written by an anonymous author, we can simply give the meaning of the cliché translating it as ‘ahammu shay’, ‘the most important thing’. Incidentally, we notice that Newmark’s two proposed procedures for translating cliché metaphors do not comprise the option of adaptation that renders the previous cliché into Arabic as ‘wāsiṭat al-ʾuqd’, literal for ‘the middle jewel of the necklace’. This adaptation of the example is a cultural equivalent, i.e. Dynamic Equivalence.
‘Stock metaphors’ are synonymous with “established metaphors” (Newmark 1988a: 108), which describe everyday activities or situations in informal contexts. Newmark referred to stock metaphors also as standard metaphors and considered them to have an emotional appeal that does not disappear with overuse. The reason behind the emotional appeal of stock metaphors is that they play a role in interpersonal communication within a certain community. Examples of a stock metaphor include “to keep the pot boiling” (ibid.) and “bring home the bacon” (Newmark 2004: 128), both of which are expressive of a physical activity or process, as indicated by Newmark. Three strategies were proposed for translating standard metaphors: retaining the image, changing the image, or reducing the image to sense. Accordingly, there are three ways for translating ‘to keep the pot boiling’ into Arabic: (a) ‘yubqiʿ l-qidr taghli’ (preserving the image); (b) ‘yuzayyit al-ʿajalāt’, literal for ‘to oil the wheels’ (changing the image); (c) ‘yuḥḥīẓ al istimrāyyat al-ʿamr’, literal for ‘to keep the continuity of something’ (reducing the image to sense).

‘Adapted metaphors’ are discussed under stock metaphors as ‘adapted stock metaphors’. Although Newmark listed ‘adapted metaphors’ as a separate category, he did not clarify the difference between them and standard stock metaphors, except by stating that they are less conspicuous than other types of metaphor (Newmark 1988a: 111) and that they should be translated into an equivalent adapted metaphor (in authoritative texts) or reduced to sense (in regular texts). For instance, we can translate Newmark’s example of ‘carrying coals to Newcastle’ into Arabic in two ways: (a) ‘yaḥmil al-balal ʿila Najd’, ‘to carry dates to the land of Najd’ (a region in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia most famous for its production of dates); (b) ‘yaqūm biʿamal lā tāʾl miniḥ’, ‘to do something in vain’. Newmark did not clarify why he proposed the procedure of Dynamic Equivalence in dealing with adapted metaphors but not with the two previous categories.
‘Recent metaphors’ are neologisms with metaphorical associations which are attributed to a certain period or person (usually unknown) and which have become of common use recently. Recent metaphors are usually not considered part of the conventional language, which is why Newmark suggested translating them simply by reducing them to sense, i.e. giving their semantic content. An example of this is the translation of “head-hunting” (Newmark 1988a: 112) as ‘ta′yîn al-mudîrîn sirran’, ‘recruiting managers covertly’.

‘Original metaphors’ are new metaphors introduced by writers in expressive texts, i.e. texts with a highly expressive pragmatic function and a distinctive individual style such as literary texts (Newmark 1982). These metaphors tend to be associated with attitudinal and stylistic features which, according to Newmark, should be preserved throughout the translation process, as they imply a message which the ST writer wants to convey to the audience.

Newmark’s classification of the above types of metaphor is not clear-cut in view of the overlapping between different types such as dead and stock metaphors, or stock and cliché metaphors, as he himself observed (Newmark 1988a: 108). Another distinctive feature in Newmark’s method of classifying metaphor is adopting a subjective approach where he came up with statements like, “I personally dislike stock metaphors” (ibid.). Regarding the proposed translation procedures, they are based on his description of metaphor as consisting of three components: the word, the sense (semantic content) and the image, and they comprise seven procedures: (1) preserving the image; (2) changing the image; (3) reducing the image to its semantic content (reducing to sense); (4) turning the image into a simile; (5) explicating the image (explicating its meaning while preserving its metaphoric content); (6) adapting the image or generalizing it; (7) deleting the image (Newmark 2004: 128).

The main criterion in Newmark’s argument is that his distinction of metaphor types and their translation procedures is based on a pragmatic approach to meaning as being embedded
in the communicative function of utterances. Newmark’s contribution focused primarily on what he described as the “tone in metaphor” (2004: 128) which is thought to comprise several components that cover the various uses of the metaphor such as its prevalence over a given period of time, its rhetorical function (irony, humour, etc.) and the social position of the ST producer. Newmark’s translation procedures can be summed up in three basic guidelines: (1) preserving the image; (2) changing the image; (3) weakening or deleting the image. The choice of any procedure is subject to two criteria (1) the nature of the text in terms of being informative or authoritative; (2) the intention of the translator (Newmark 1988a: 113).

It is worth mentioning that Newmark was a proponent of adopting literal translation in authoritative texts; and liberal translation (changing, deleting, or weakening the image) in informative texts in which the focus should be on the semantic content of the text more than anything else, as he explained. Newmark argued for adopting a literal approach in “communicative and semantic translation” (1988a: 70), in general, not only in the translation of metaphor, as he considered literalism “a yardstick of translation” (1988b: 136). According to Newmark, there is a linear relation between the functionality of metaphor and literal translation. In other words, the stronger the pragmatic function of metaphor, the more literal the translation should be. For him, the argument for literality in translating metaphors is justified on the grounds of the need to adopt an objective approach to the translated text and preserve its stylistic features. He maintained that in dealing with authoritative texts the translator has to emphasize the attitude of the writer “as objectively as he can, rigorously suppressing his own moral feelings” (1982: 389). Newmark states his preference of literal translation clearly in the following passage:

“Thus excessive pragmatics tend to rob the target language text of its translation character. Literal translation is one way in which we may continue to preserve the genius or particular character of the foreign language despite this process of assimilation.” (1988b: 140)
Newmark’s approach to the translation of metaphor influenced TS linguists like Dickins (2002; 2005) who dealt with the issue from the perspective of translation between Arabic and English. The first contribution made by Dickins to the debate on the translation of metaphor was in his book *Thinking Arabic Translation* (2002), where he adopted a similar approach to Newmark’s contribution with the difference that he drew a distinction between ‘lexicalized’ metaphors and ‘non-lexicalized’ metaphors. According to Dickins, a ‘lexicalized metaphor’ is a lexical metaphoric unit which is associated with a fixed meaning in the lexicon as a result of its frequent use in a given context. An example of this is using the word ‘*asad*’ in Arabic, ‘lion’, as a metaphoric reference to a ‘brave man’. Conversely, a ‘non-lexicalized’ metaphor does not have a fixed semantic value in language and its semantic content varies by the context in which it appears (Dickins 2005: 231). An example of a non-lexicalized metaphor is ‘*huwa ka ’l-bahr*’, ‘he is like the sea’, where the semantic content of the word ‘sea’ varies according to the context. For instance, it is possible for the described person to be ‘as angry as the sea’, ‘as generous as the sea’, ‘as ambiguous as the sea’, ‘as charming and seductive as the sea’, etc. There are many more metaphors in which one can conceptualize a ‘MAN AS A SEA’, in terms of being ‘deep, ‘vast’, ‘unpredictable’, etc., and it is the context which determines the relevant semantic content of the metaphor.

For Dickins, the six categories of metaphor which were proposed by Newmark fall under these two groups where dead, stock and recent metaphors are considered lexicalized metaphors; and conventionalized and original metaphors are classified as non-lexicalized metaphors (Dickins 2002: 149). Conventionalized metaphors are defined as metaphors which are not found in a dictionary, i.e. not lexicalized, but which are based on an existing cultural notion or prevailing linguistic structure. One of Dickins’ examples of a conventionalized metaphor is the variation in the conceptual metaphor ‘ARGUMENT IS WAR’ in English.
The notion of ‘ARGUMENT IS WAR’ appears in the form of various conventionalized metaphors in English such as ‘he won the argument, and ‘he attacked his opponent strongly’.

Dickins’ approach to the translation of lexicalized and non-lexicalized metaphors is similar to Newmark’s approach where the metaphor is preserved, changed, reduced to its semantic content, or turned into a simile, depending on the intensity of its pragmatic function or tone, as Newmark called it. Dickins shared with Newmark the attitude that original metaphors should be preserved in the TT. However, he also maintained that the translatability of metaphor is influenced by the degree of similarity or difference between the cultural and linguistic properties of the SL and those of the TL, as discussed in the following passage:

“Metaphor can give rise to difficulties in translation between any two languages, but where the languages concerned are relatively different culturally and linguistically as English and Arabic, the difficulties are sometimes quite pronounced.” (Dickins 2002: 146)

Dickins argued that Arabic and English differ considerably in the intensity of their metaphors, which is why he proposed the notion of metaphor ‘downtoning’ in the translation of original metaphors. By downtoning a metaphor, he meant reducing its “emotional force” (ibid., 154) by replacing it with another original metaphor in the TL or using a simile. For Dickins, Arabic metaphors can be very strong for the English language reader and, therefore, “there is some need to tone down the metaphors of the Arabic ST in the English TT” (ibid., 158). The principle of metaphor downtoning is an important aspect in the translation of metaphor from Arabic into English as the latter tends to be less receptive to Arabic language metaphors. Conversely, Arabic is more receptive to metaphors from other languages and is considered a “flexible language and is not hostile to foreign imagery and concepts” (Menacere 1992: 569). An example of metaphor downtoning is the translation of ‘pregnant with’ as ‘heavy with’ in the following sentence, ‘the clouds are heavy with rain’ (see Dickins 2002: 95).
Generally speaking, there is a broad assumption that a creative metaphor must be translated literally if we are to preserve its attitudinal force, i.e. the communicative function behind its use. The interest in the pragmatic function of metaphor was prominent in the approaches adopted by certain TS linguists to the translation of metaphor in the literary genre. As discussed in Section 2.4.5 on ‘Creative Conceptual Metaphor’, literary metaphors have special features that are associated with the individual style of the writer. Proponents of the literal approach to translating creative metaphor in literature proposed that the translator has to pay attention to the stylistic factors which give the literary text its aesthetic function because “if the translator of a literary work has not done justice to the aesthetic claim, almost nothing else that he has done can possibly be worthy” (Alvarez 1993: 484). Accordingly, the criteria for translating creative metaphor does not need to address its naturalness in the TT in as much as it should reflect its originality which is considered “natural to the author” (Parks 1998: 2). This implies that there is no harm in translating a creative literary metaphor sensu stricto even if it “invites attention” (ibid., 12) with its unnaturalness; especially as the “demetaphorisation of (…) images channeled to the surface serves no apparent semantic, interpretive or stylistic devices” (Obeidat 2001: 221).

According to the three notions of equivalence introduced in Section 3.2, the literal approach to translating metaphor can be described as a kind of Formal Equivalence. Nonetheless, approaching the translation of metaphor from a pragmatic perspective is not limited to the literal approach or Formal Equivalence, as such. There are TS scholars who adopted the notion of Functional Equivalence in their pragmatic approach to metaphor translation dealing with metaphor under the heading of “message” (Vinay and Darbelnet 1995: 210-211) and considering communicative metaphors to be untranslatable “by literal methods” (ibid., 211). For instance, Fung and Kiu (1987) agreed on the importance of conveying the pragmatic function of metaphor in translation; however, they argued that this is
not necessarily achieved by adopting a formal equivalent. The pragmatic function of metaphor can be conveyed by ‘substituting the image’ which is a functional equivalent. According to this scenario, compensation, not correspondence, tends to be highlighted in the translation process as the main focus should be on the communicative force (Dobrzynska 1995: 603) of the metaphor, as explained in the following excerpt:

“The equivalence of image is weighed against the equivalence of response. The former may be given up for the sake of the latter when the translator resorts to substitution of image or straightforward statement in literal language. Even when the image is retained, the overall impact varies in accordance with the rendering of a partially resurrected image into a live image, a common image into an anomalous one and the more desirable cases of stock into stock and live into live image. Equivalence hangs in delicate balance and the translator utilizes his linguistic resources to compensate for a loss or to control the tone.” (Fung and Kiu 1987: 101)

In this context, one can notice the gap between the above pragmatic approach and Newmark’s pragmatic approach to the translation of metaphor. Both approaches focus on the message/tone of metaphor, both argue for preserving the pragmatic function of metaphor, and both pay special attention to the translation of creative metaphor. Nonetheless, Newmark’s approach adopted the model of Formal Equivalence, i.e. the literal approach to translating creative metaphor. On the other hand, Fung and Kiu proposed dealing with creative metaphor in a more relative way by adopting the model of compensation, i.e. Functional Equivalence. This does not imply that their framework of compensatory equivalence is less concerned with the principle of accuracy in preserving the communicative meaning of metaphor. Rather, it is based on viewing the issue from the perspective of the reader (TT-oriented) and his/her ability to process the metaphor and understand its communicative function, unlike Newmark’s ST-oriented approach which is concerned with the individual style of the writer and the pragmatic function of the ST. This takes us to the following account on the descriptive approach to metaphor translation.
The main contribution I would like to discuss under the descriptive approach to metaphor translation is van den Broeck’s model which marks a departure from the prescriptive approach in that it deals with the matter within an objective framework away from suggesting procedural solutions for the translation of different categories of metaphor. Proponents of the descriptive model believe that the early accounts of the translation of metaphor lacked objectivity in that they did not base their discussion of the issue on a descriptive analysis. Instead, they issued conclusive statements and prescribed narrow solutions which seem to impose “rules or norms on translational practice” (van den Broeck 1981: 86) and do not take into account the uses of metaphor within context.

For van den Broeck, if we are to theorize about metaphor translation, it is not important to define metaphor. What is important is to “distinguish between categories of metaphor, uses of metaphor, and functions of metaphor.” (ibid., 74) as the translation of metaphor is influenced by its function and mutual relations with other components of the translated text including context, genre, syntax, etc. Van den Broeck classified metaphors into three categories according to the degree of their being conventionalized in the source language. The first is the category of private metaphors which are creative metaphors that tend to be associated with the personal style of the writer. The second is conventional metaphors which are shared and exchanged on the wide level of a community. The third is lexicalized metaphors which are very widely and frequently used to the extent they start to lose their sense of metaphoricity and behave like lexical items, hence their description as ‘lexicalized’.

Before dealing with the translation of different metaphor categories, van den Broeck pointed out the importance of considering the uses and functions of metaphors within their contexts, observing that “the use of metaphor is closely related to its function, i.e., the communicative purposes it serves” (ibid., 76) and distinguishing between functionally relevant metaphors and irrelevant or randomly-used ones. According to their function,
metaphors are of two types: creative metaphors which have a communicative value and, therefore, tend to be preserved in the TT; and decorative metaphors which are of no communicative value in the ST and could be replaced by an appropriate equivalent in the TT.

According to van den Broeck, there are three modes which tend to be adopted in translating different types of metaphor: “sensu stricto, (...) substitution (...) and paraphrase” (1981: 77). However, adopting any of these modes does not hinge on a fixed law of translatability in as much as it invites the translators to make their choices based on the contextual requirements, situational factors and communicative function of metaphor (Monti 2006: 118), referred to as “the textual environment in which it appears” (van den Broeck 1981: 78). Van den Broeck drafted his approach under the notion of the ‘basic law of translatability’ which, contrary to what the name implies, is hardly a ‘law’ as it avoids stating a final determinacy regarding the issue of translating metaphor and alternatively recommends a descriptive analysis of the complex relations that govern the degree of metaphor translatability, as illustrated in the following excerpt:

“Translatability keeps an inverse proportion with the quantity of information manifested by the metaphor and the degree to which this information is structured in a text. The less the quantity of information conveyed by a metaphor and the less complex the structural relations into which it enters in a text, the more translatable this metaphor will be, and vice versa (Basic law).” (ibid., 83)

The basic law of translatability seems to focus on the cognitive and contextual content of metaphor more than anything else. Van Besien and Pelsmaekers described van den Broeck’s model as different from the “traditional approach” (in Nekeman 1988: 144) which tended “to produce normative statements about how metaphors ought to be translated” (ibid.). For them, the basic law of translatability is consistent with Toury’s original approach which called for introducing models that provide a descriptive analysis for the issues and factors involved in the translation of metaphor. On the other hand, Toury described the basic law of translatability as “more complex” (1997: 81) than the preceding approaches but not
The main distinction between the prescriptive approach and the descriptive approach to the translation of metaphor is that the former seems to focus primarily on the accurate representation of the ST content whereas the latter is devoted to a neutral description of the empirical factors involved in the translation of metaphor, such as the contextual, cultural and communicative content of the metaphor. Also, while the prescriptive approach views metaphor as a problem which can be qualified and dealt with in a dogmatic manner, the descriptive approach adopts a somehow relative framework which does not issue conclusive statements as to the translatability/untranslatability of metaphor, nor does it recommend case-by-case procedures for dealing with different categories of metaphor. Rather, it discusses the issue in a wider scope which describes the implications of the textual, contextual and communicative dynamics for the translation of metaphor. By and large, the linguist’s method for dealing with the translation of metaphor can be highly influenced by his/her theoretical approach to translation as a whole and the type of text he/she is dealing with.

3.3.3 Post-Cognitive Contributions

In this section I will deal with post-cognitive contributions to the translation of metaphor, highlighting the commonalities and differences between these contributions in terms of the general theoretical framework they adopt in addressing the issue and their conclusions and implications about it. Initially, I will start with the anthropological model which comprises the two contributions of Crofts (1988) and Torres (1989). Then, I will discuss the contributions which adopted a communicative cognitive model comprising the arguments of Mandelblit (1995), Fung (1994) and al-Harrasi (2001), concluding the section with a brief account of Shuttleworth’s 2011 contribution to the translatability of metaphor in the scientific
genre. All these contributions based their arguments on Cognitive Theory as a theoretical framework for describing the conceptual nature of metaphor while differing in their approach to its translation. To explain, the arguments which fall under the anthropological model tackled the translation of metaphor from a cultural perspective, whereas those classified under the communicative model dealt with the issue from a pragmatic and contextual perspective, as the following survey will reveal.

In an article entitled “Translating Metaphor”, Crofts echoed the view of the Cognitive School about the indispensability of metaphor as a mental process which dominates our reasoning and abstract thinking (1988: 47). For Crofts, the role of metaphor in our conceptual processes implies that it is ubiquitous in the Scripture “which often is quite abstract” (ibid.) and has a high cognitive value in describing and explaining things expressively with its “vividness and colour” (ibid., 48). Arguing that Biblical metaphor has a vital cognitive function, Crofts stressed the need to pay attention to metaphor in translating the Scripture. However, she maintained that the obstacles associated with the translation of metaphor are not limited to the implicitness of its semantic content or the complexity of the conceptual processes that underlie its use. Rather, they are closely related to the conceptual nature of the TL as languages differ in the degree of their metaphoricity and there are even languages in which the “speakers use metaphor rarely or never” (ibid., 49).

As a result of an empirical study of the language of an indigenous community she was dealing with throughout her anthropological research, Crofts claimed that she “found no metaphor” (ibid., 51) in “1000 pages of Munduruku (Brazil) texts” (ibid.). In the same article, Crofts introduced several solutions for dealing with the issue of translating metaphor and these are: (1) to translate the metaphor literally; (2) to give the recipient a clue that the expression is not meant literally but rather figuratively by turning the metaphor into a simile; (3) to explicate the metaphor seeking the help of a native speaker; (4) to turn the metaphor
into non-metaphor, if none of these solutions work; and (5) to substitute the SL metaphor with an equivalent “receptor language metaphor” (Crofts 1988: 53).

This argument shows that there is an apparent contradiction between the writer’s assumption about the non-metaphoricity of certain languages, on the one hand, and her reasoning about how to deal with the hypothetical problem of translating metaphor, on the other hand. First, Crofts’ account which is based on considering metaphor as “omnipresent (...) in some languages” (ibid., 47) is in conflict with the cognitive claim that metaphor is prevalent in our reasoning processes. Second, the five procedures proposed by the linguist to deal with the issue imply that the translator is dealing with a receptor language which makes use of metaphoricity in one way or another. For example, if we apply the first procedure and translate a metaphor literally into a language which lacks metaphoricity, then the TL metaphor will be meaningless for the TT recipients whose language does not make use of metaphorical thinking supposedly. Also, the fifth procedure of replacing the ST metaphor with a TT metaphor is not valid for application in a non-metaphorical language.

In other words, although Crofts’ account was based on the cognitive notion of considering metaphor as an indispensable conceptual process, it lacked the objectivity of the Cognitive School in that it restricted the use of metaphor to certain languages. The claim about the metaphoricity of some languages and the literality of others was deplored by certain thinkers who saw in that a kind of cultural hegemony and subjugation. It is a hegemony which fits Kerrigan’s description of an “ideological conspiracy” (in Desmet and Sawyer 2001: 37) as “a way for cultural haves to deplore the ignorance of cultural have-nots” (ibid.).

The second contribution I will discuss under the cognitive approach to metaphor translatability is Torres’ article “Metaphor and the Translation of Cultures” (1989). As an anthropologist, Torres provided an analysis of the indigenous people’s metaphorical conceptualization of the concept of TIME based on his personal experience of what he called
“evocative anthropology” (Torres 1989: 49). This term was introduced as a replacement for the “contemporary trends of interpretive anthropology” (ibid., 50) and defined as a way of expressing one’s gratitude to the indigenous community one interacts with by processing and promoting the concepts and metaphors used by its people “to shape and reshape their own physical, psychological, social, and cultural existence” (ibid., 49).

Unlike Crofts, Torres’ analysis of the linguistic heritage of the target community was not based on a subjective interpretation of the language and culture of that community. Rather, it was an attempt to understand and represent the “inter-subjective worlds of those born in this community” (ibid., 50), where the culture of a people reflects an inherited conceptual system which they embrace in their everyday communication and in expressing their cultural and individual attitudes on different levels. Both Crofts and Torres are anthropologists who looked at metaphor from a cognitive perspective. However, the argument of the former was based on denying the metaphoricality of the indigenous people’s language, while the latter called for having the “moral imperative to return something to the community” (ibid., 49) one interacts with by cognizing its metaphors and symbols and exporting them to the target culture.

Towards the end of the twentieth century, the need to adopt a cognitive approach to the translation of metaphor gained more prominence with contributions that dealt with the issue from a functional perspective. One such contribution is Mandelblit’s hypothesis which appeared in an article entitled “the Cognitive View of Metaphor and its Implications for Translation Theory” (1995). In this article, the writer dealt with metaphor as an obstacle which occurs while the translator is trying to process the metaphorical content of the SL and replace it with an appropriate TL metaphorical content. For Mandelblit, discussing the translatability of metaphor necessitates focusing on what happens during the translation process and not on the output of that process (ibid., 483), as the difficulty of translating a
metaphor is assessed by the time the translator needs to move from the SL metaphorical system to that of the TL.

Mandelblit provided a brief review of the literature on the traditional approach to metaphor as an ornamental device criticizing the lack of studies which dealt with the translation of metaphor from a cognitive perspective (1995: 485). He was also critical of the modern approaches to the translation of metaphor for their shared “polarization” (ibid.) of the issue which focused on the divide between original metaphors and dead metaphors. According to Mandelblit, there is no intrinsic difference between these two types of metaphor as they share the same components of tenor, vehicle and mapping and fall under the wider entry of conceptual metaphor. This implies that, throughout the translation process, what we should consider is the cognitive content and value of the translated metaphor rather than its taxonomy as a dead or original especially that dead metaphors can be extended and used as original ones, as explained in the following passage:

“Although the system of conventional conceptual metaphor is mostly unconscious and automatic, it is also ‘alive’, prone to extension (…) and conscious reasoning. Hence, it may also be accessible to conscious translation processing with relevance to the metaphoric content. This view contrasts with the traditional treatment of translation of ‘dead’ metaphors as direct, and solely at the lexical level.” (ibid., 486)

Mandelblit’s argument can be summed up in his hypothesis of “cognitive translation” (ibid., 491) which is based on the assumption that the quality and speed of metaphor translatability varies by the similarities and differences between the SL conceptual system and the TL conceptual system. Accordingly, metaphors were not considered untranslatable, but rather challenging as they “involve temporary functional fixedness” (ibid., 486). The writer viewed this ‘functional fixedness’ as the incessant variation in the cognitive content of the metaphor by its contextual and communicative function. In other words, Mandelblit argued that there is a relationship between the translatability of metaphor, on the one hand, and the degree of the translator’s familiarity with the cognitive content of that metaphor in
the ST and its possible equivalent in the TL, on the other hand. The model of ‘cognitive translation’ invited TS linguists and researchers to distance themselves from the rigid classification of metaphor into different types and, alternatively, examine the role of our experiences in processing and, therefore, translating our conceptual processes including metaphor, as clarified in the following paragraph:

“Further experiments are required to support and enhance the “Cognitive Translation” hypothesis. Specifically, a crucial component that has not been addressed in this paper is the level of entrenchment of the metaphorical mapping (i.e., how amenable it is to conscious activation and novel extensions in everyday language) as a factor in the conceptual translation process.” (Mandelblit 1995: 493)

Cognitive research about the translation of metaphor gained further prominence after the emergence of academic projects which based their analysis of the topic on a more advanced framework of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. An example of these projects is Fung’s doctoral research (1994) on the translation of poetic metaphor. Fung adopted a communicative and cultural approach to the topic embracing Lakoff and Johnson’s model of conceptual metaphor as a methodological foundation for her empirical study. In her academic research, the writer introduced two case studies which dealt with the concepts of ‘SICKNESS’ and ‘LOVE’ in translating poetic metaphor from English into Chinese. Fung’s research showed that the conceptual overlap in our experiences plays a major role in the degree of metaphor translatability especially in the case of our bodily experiences which tend to be “less mediated by culture” (Fung 1994: 191). However, it also revealed that the translatability of creative metaphor is not influenced by the presence of conceptual novelty in its cognitive content. Rather, it is influenced by the linguistic, conceptual, as well as cultural constraints of the TL (ibid., 290). The constraints that Fung talked about include the lack of semantic and linguistic correspondence between the SL conceptual system and the TL conceptual system, and the interference of the TL ethical system in the translation process (as in translating some metaphors of LOVE).
The other academic research that approached the translation of metaphor from a communicative approach to Conceptual Metaphor Theory is al-Harrasi’s doctoral thesis on translating metaphor in political discourse (2001). Al-Harrasi reviewed prior contributions to the translation of metaphor in a chronological order based on a distinction between pre-cognitive and post-cognitive arguments. For his empirical study, he selected data from the human conceptual system (universal concepts), the physical domain (ontological metaphor) and the intertextual domain where he provided a rich analysis of corpora in a well-developed cognitive model. The findings of this study served the cognitive assumption that the translation of metaphor “is not a neutral activity” (al-Harrasi 2001: 313) but, rather, a subjective one which “involves functional and ideological considerations” (ibid.). Al-Harrasi’s cognitive approach to the translation of metaphor adopted a TT orientation which considered the translation process “a purposeful activity” (ibid., 307) that gives the translator a certain level of liberty in reshaping the ST’s message away from its producer’s individual attitudes and subjective intentions (ibid., 313) and in a way which is consistent with the cultural and conceptual patterns of the TL.

The last contribution I would like to discuss with regard to metaphor translation in the cognitive framework is a recent article by Shuttleworth entitled “Translation Behaviour at the Frontiers of Scientific Knowledge” (2011). In this article, Shuttleworth dealt with the issue of metaphor translatability in “scientific texts” (ibid., 302) questioning whether the translation of metaphor can be challenging in this genre. His study was based on an “‘extended’ version of conceptual metaphor theory” (ibid., 303) which takes into account the most recent argument on metaphor universality versus variation (cf. Kövecses 2005), as “the notion of interlingual and intercultural variation is part of the lifeblood of translation studies.” (Shuttleworth 2011: 303). The empirical results of the study highlight the observation that, regardless of the “translator’s feelings as to what is most in line with existing TL
metaphorical patterns” (Shuttleworth 2011: 321), ST metaphoric patterns seem to have a dominant presence in the product of translation and that there is no “obvious manipulation or subversion of ST metaphors” (ibid.), which implies that metaphor does not pose a problem for the translation of scientific texts.

It is clear from the previous survey that recent contributions to the cognitive research on the translation of metaphor marked a departure from earlier ones in that they distanced themselves gradually from the prescriptive model with its problem-solutions schematic approach and moved to a descriptive model which adopts an experiential diagnosis of the factors that play a role in metaphor translatability. By and large, the majority of these contributions did not see metaphor as a problem, but as a fundamental conceptual process which should be researched empirically by dealing with the aspects which determine the methods of processing and reproducing a metaphor, on the one hand, and the implications of this for the conceptual systems involved, on the other hand.

To sum up, the literature review shows that the distinction between the various approaches to metaphor translation lies in the theoretical frameworks which influenced their analysis of the topic and their proposed methods for dealing with it. For example, Dagut, Nida and Mason were highly influenced by their cultural approach to translation, which explains their focus on the translation of the cultural content of metaphor and the notion of Dynamic Equivalence. On the other hand, van den Broeck, who is mainly interested in the translation of the literary genre, focused on the function and uses of metaphor in terms of being creative or decorative. His basic law of translatability embraced a descriptive model in which he analysed the contextual and situational factors that play a role in processing the communicative function of metaphor and reproducing it accordingly.

Other pragmatic approaches to the topic such as Newmark’s and Dickins’ contributions were quite prescriptive. These contributions dealt with the issue in the framework of a
‘problem-solutions’ scenario as they were influenced by their theoretical framework of Applied Linguistics. Even when Newmark and Dickins discussed the pragmatic function of metaphor focusing on its tone or attitudinal function, their procedural approach was less relative than other pragmatic approaches as they proposed a fixed case-by-case prescription for dealing with different types of metaphor. The variation in the different approaches to translating metaphor was also present across post-cognitive contributions, all of which defined metaphor from a cognitive perspective but differed in their selection, description and analysis of the data due to the difference in their theoretical orientation. The anthropological approach to the cognitive research on the translation of metaphor focused primarily on the role of cultural factors in the translatability of metaphor, whereas the communicative approach focused on the communicative function of metaphor and its ethical and ideological implications.

The literature review also revealed that there was overlapping across the different approaches. For example, the researchers who adopted a cultural approach were partially influenced by the role of context in the translation of metaphor, and those who dealt with the topic from a pragmatic perspective were sometimes influenced by the cultural or cognitive approach. Similarly, cognitive approaches to the topic were not purely inspired by the findings of Conceptual Theory as they were equally subject to the influence of other schools of thought, hence the variation in dealing with it from different angles. In other words, any theoretical approach to the translation of metaphor is not purely objective, but rather experiential as our conceptualization of the issue and dealing with it is bound to be influenced by a set of factors which underlie our conceptual and experiential background. In a word, the closer we want to be to an objective understanding of the issue, the more exposed we need to be to various contributions and perspectives in dealing with it, which highlights the importance of adopting a cognitive methodology in researching the topic empirically.
In this chapter, I will introduce the methods that were adopted in my empirical research on the translation of creative metaphor from English into Arabic. Initially, I will outline the main components of the research methodology before I proceed on discussing them individually. According to the methodology of this research, the empirical study fell into two parts. The first part dealt with an analysis of Shakespeare’s creative metaphors in *Othello* and *Macbeth*, i.e. the ST corpus, from the perspective of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. The ST analysis was conducted according to the three phases of data identification and extraction, data classification and data selection for the contrastive study. The second part of the empirical study focused on a comparative analysis of the translation of creative metaphor in *Othello* and *Macbeth* from English into Arabic in the works of four translators. The two parts of the empirical study complement each other as the first part set the scene for the main features of Shakespearean metaphor in cognitive research before analysing its translatability into Arabic from a contrastive point of view.

While the main pillar of empirical research is data interpretation and analysis, the theoretical framework of this research and the nature of its corpus required paying equal attention to the processes of data collection, data qualification and data selection. As the data collection process should not be based on arbitrary measures or inspired by the intuitions of researchers, regardless of their experience in the relevant field of knowledge (Pragglejaz Group 2007; Toury 1985), the first two sections of the methodology will be devoted to a clear description of the tools and methods of data identification and extraction from the corpus, followed by a discussion of the criteria that were adopted in the data analysis phase.
In other words, the empirical study of this research consists of three phases. The first phase is procedural as it is concerned with the mechanisms and measures of data collection. The second phase is descriptive as it provides a background quantitative and qualitative account of ST data in the light of Conceptual Metaphor Theory and a description of the ST data that were selected for the second part of the analysis. The third phase is analytical as it focuses on a descriptive and contrastive analysis of TT data vis-à-vis ST data in the framework of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Before I explain what exactly took place in each phase, I will provide a diagram which outlines the main steps that guided the different phases of the empirical study.

**Phase I Data Collection**
In the sections below, I will explain the tools and methods that were adopted in the three phases of the empirical study covering the processes of data collection, data qualification and selection and data analysis. In order to explain the procedures that were implemented in these three processes, it is important to identify the two following components: (a) the tools of the empirical research, i.e. the corpus (ST and TT) and external sources; (b) the methods of the empirical research, i.e. the procedures and criteria of data collection, description and analysis. I will start with a section on the tools of the data collection process where I will provide an account of the volume, nature and relevant specifications of the corpus material. In the last
two sections I will discuss the methods of data collection and the methods of data analysis, respectively.

4.1 The Tools of the Empirical Research

This section will identify the tools of the empirical study dealing with the corpus and external sources that were consulted during the data collection process. The corpus that was studied in the empirical research consists of eight texts: two of them (Shakespeare’s *Othello* and *Macbeth*) represent the ST corpus, and the other six represent the TT corpus which comprises the translations made by four different translators (three translations for each ST). The TTs that were examined in researching the translation of metaphor in *Othello* are Jabra (1986), Badawi (2009) and Enani (2005). The translations of *Macbeth* are those by Jabra (1986), Badawi (2009) and Nyazi (2000).

The choice of Shakespeare’s drama for the empirical part of my research is motivated by a number of reasons including Shakespeare’s prolific use of figurative language, and the fact that his plays, especially the tragedies, have been abundantly translated into Arabic in different phases throughout the development of the translation movement in the Arab world, which allows for a variation in the methods and approaches of the translations. As for my choice of the Arabic language translators, it is based on the critical recognition those translators have achieved for their translation of Shakespeare and their special interest in Shakespeare’s language and his use of metaphor in general. A survey of the nature of imagery in Shakespeare’s texts and the history of the Arabic translations of Shakespeare including the motivation behind my choice of the STs and TTs will be provided in the next chapter (Sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively). The following table lists the components of the ST and TT corpus:
Throughout the process of data identification and extraction, and for the purpose of accuracy and objectivity in collecting data, I referred to external references, whenever necessary. The complex, cognitive nature of metaphor coupled with the richness and density of Shakespeare’s metaphoric language, makes it difficult sometimes to judge the metaphoricity of a certain linguistic structure or identify the conceptual metaphoric pattern of a certain metaphor without the interference of our interpretive reading of the text. This explains the necessity for consulting reliable sources in the course of the data collection process, as it reduces the probability of error in data identification and extraction. In other words, extracting and collecting data of a metaphoric nature is not a mere statistical process. Rather, it is a conceptual process which sometimes calls for referring to external linguistic, literary and other corpora that help the researcher extract the conceptual structures of the metaphoric patterns based on the relevant contextual and functional factors, as explained in the following excerpt:

“Variability in intuitions and lack of precision about what counts as a metaphor, makes it quite difficult to compare different empirical analyses. More important, the lack of agreed criteria for metaphor identification complicates any evaluation of theoretical claims about the frequency of metaphor, its organization in discourse, and possible relations between metaphoric language and metaphoric thought.”

(Pragglejaz Group 2007: 2)
The following table lists the details of some external references which were consulted during the phase of data extraction and collection. Also, I referred to different annotated editions of the two STs in order to cover as much as possible of the interpretations and annotations of critics in contexts which need explication or which have an implied cultural, historical, or stylistic relevance. For the purpose of consistency, the line numbers of the examples to be discussed throughout the empirical study will all refer to a single edition which is Philip Weller’s electronic version of the plays.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Corpora</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Dictionary Of Phrase and Fable, 16th ed.</td>
<td>Brewer E. C., 2003</td>
<td>Over 1800 entries, provides the sources, etymologies, definitions and explanations of famous phrases, allusions and figures (idioms and proverbs) taken from folklore, historical and mythical sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metaphors Dictionary</td>
<td>Sommer, E. and D. Weiss (2001)</td>
<td>6500 Comparative phrases, 2500 images from 600 entries including 800 Shakespearean metaphors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metaphorically Speaking</td>
<td>Renton, N. E. (1990)</td>
<td>A Dictionary and Thesaurus of 3800 picturesque idiomatic expressions and metaphors arranged alphabetically by keyword</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4.2 The Methods of Data Collection

The process of data collection is based on the cognitive model where ST data were collected according to the three patterns of conceptual metaphor introduced in Chapter II (2.4.2). Over the past five years, the cognitive model of metaphor analysis was subject to an extensive discussion and development. Before Cognitive Theory, research about the metaphoric language of a given text, for example a Shakespearean text, used to be inspired by the researchers’ focus on finding a connection between the topic of the research, on the one hand, and the theme of the play as well as the individual style of the writer, on the other hand. Towards the end of the twentieth century, certain voices started to emerge calling for an impartial investigation of metaphor in Shakespeare irrespective of its contribution to the major theme of the play, and regardless of whether there is anything “distinctively Shakespearean” (Thompson 1990: 676) about the metaphors under consideration.

According to Thompson, researching metaphor in Shakespeare should be done by conducting a philosophical linguistic analysis of “short, decontextualized examples” (ibid., 673). Referring to his experience with Ann Thompson on metaphor analysis in *Shakespeare, Meaning, and Metaphor* (1987), Thompson realized that “the types of analysis developed within philosophy and linguistics” (1990: 673) give “a kind of access to the Shakespearean text which actually greatly clarifies (our) sense of what makes the writing so striking” (ibid.). He also drew a distinction between two strategies for dealing with metaphor in Shakespeare: the first is what he referred to as ‘macro-metaphoric’ analysis which is a classical critical
strategy concerned with detecting the presence of a central metaphor that prevails within a text and enriches its theme (metaphoric structure); and the second is ‘micro-metaphoric’ analysis which deals with every single metaphor within the text as a separate distinctive case that merits a special analysis regardless of the central topic of the play.

For Thompson, the macro-level analysis of metaphor cannot provide an objective study of Shakespearean metaphors or the metaphors of any text in general because it deals with the different metaphors of the examined text as being “under the control of, organized by, founded on, a metaphor” (1990: 675). Criticizing Ralph Berry for his macro-analysis of metaphor in *The Shakespearean Metaphor* (1978), Thompson argued for understanding the limitations of the macro-metaphoric approach as being too general and subjective (1990: 674), for two reasons: first, it does not reflect the depth and unity of the text as it does not deal with all the variety of metaphors which play a role in an unbiased understanding of the theme; second, it presents a partial picture of the theme making it subject to the critic’s personal interpretations, instead of reconstructing it from all its constituent parts. As an alternative to the macro-level of metaphor analysis in Shakespeare, Thompson introduced the notion of “micrometaphorics” (ibid., 672), arguing that it is possible and natural for different metaphors to “co-exist” (ibid., 674) within a certain text and that dealing with the diversity of metaphors rather than the hegemony of a single metaphor is indispensable for a comprehensive analysis of the studied text:

“A great deal of text must be marginalized if we are to have a core; the ‘single angle of incidence’ provides a view of the play which relegates a surprisingly large area of the object in hand to the status of its invisible back. By Comparison, the micrometaphoric approach allows one to rotate the object freely and to allow any feature of the ‘marvelous structure’ to catch the eye.” (ibid., 677)

In an advanced stage, some scholars emphasized the importance of Cognitive Theory in conducting an objective research about the functions of metaphor within a text and called for adopting the model of Conceptual Metaphor analysis in researching metaphor empirically.
One of the early cognitive approaches to the empirical study of metaphor within a text is Schmitt’s notion of “systematic metaphor analysis” (2005: 369), which was raised as a “qualitative research procedure” (ibid., 359). Systematic metaphor analysis is a technique which was proposed for conducting qualitative research by extracting the metaphoric patterns of a certain text and interpreting its content based on a methodical analysis of the conceptual behaviour and function of those metaphors. Schmitt proposed a methodology for data collection and analysis according to two phases which sum up what takes place during the empirical research process: deconstruction and reconstruction. These two phases comprise several steps: (a) identifying the target area, i.e. the conceptual field, for metaphor analysis (JEALOUSY, AUTHORITY, LOVE, etc.); (b) collecting patterns of linguistic metaphors which describe the selected topic (idioms, for example); (c) scanning academic literature for metaphorical conceptualizations about the topic in order to have an overview of cultural and pragmatic factors that play a role in the uses of the relevant metaphor in discourse; and (d) reconstructing the collected metaphors by grouping them under a certain concept which is a shared TD or SD for the collected metaphoric patterns (ibid., 373).

Another cognitive approach to data identification and extraction in an empirical research on metaphor within a text is the “Metaphor Identification Procedure” or MIP which was introduced by the Pragglejaz Group as a reliable method for identifying the metaphoric uses of words in discourse (2007: 1). In an article about the procedures of identifying the metaphors of a text for the purpose of academic research, the Pragglejaz scholars explained their method of extracting data of a metaphoric nature based on the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor. The MIP method adopted a bottom-to-top investigative approach in collecting metaphors; i.e. starting on the level of the linguistic structure then extracting its conceptual pattern as outlined by the Cognitive Linguistic School, which reduced metaphors to the basic model TARGET DOMAIN IS SOURCE DOMAIN (TD IS SD).
The article discussed factors that play a key role in selecting metaphoric data such as context, research purpose as well as personal intuitions, providing researchers in the field of metaphor analysis with feasible tools that allow them to apply the identification procedure in varied contexts of research and different interdisciplinary studies. Also, the Pragglejaz Group highlighted the potential difficulties and challenges that researchers face in their application of the cognitive approach to metaphor analysis, and the set of procedures (Metaphor Identification Procedures MIP) they introduced to identify and extract metaphoric patterns from a text emphasized the importance of objectivity and distancing oneself from intuitive interpretations, as clarified in the following passage:

“Identifying metaphorically used words in a large text may be something that all metaphor scholars have already intuitions about, but justifying those intuitions, and being consistent in how they are applied to individual words in contexts, is far trickier than many would imagine.” (Pragglejaz Group 2007: 36)

Trying to present a flexible and practical set of procedures, the Pragglejaz Group explained the three main aspects which need to be covered during the data collection process comprising: sources and tools, processing steps (selection and coding) and the analysis criteria. These aspects were covered in a form which was introduced by the group for reporting on the details of the MIP process including: text details, text recipients, lexical units decision, sources, coding decision, analysis details, additional analyses and the results of the analysis (ibid., 14). The form presented by the group is comprehensive in that it covers a great deal of what happens during the research process. The group’s strategy for data identification was based on a contextual criterion, which is a determining factor in extracting metaphor in the literary genre as literary texts do “not establish a contrast between a contextual meaning and a basic meaning for their lexical units” (ibid., 24). In 2010, the Pragglejaz Group amended their method of the MIP process trying to bring it close to a descriptive analysis that helps researchers avoid a possible loss of data which is very likely to
happen should one follow a top-to-bottom approach to data collection, as clarified in the following paragraph:

“When an inductive approach is followed, this does not mean that all we know about conceptual metaphors should be ignored, for that would be throwing out the baby with the bath water. What it does mean is that we need an explicit, systematic, and reliable tool for finding linguistic expressions that may be related to metaphor in conceptual structure, and that this tool should at least lead to the inclusion of the obvious cases which have been so successfully revealed by the deductive approach that is characteristic of the cognitive linguistic approach to metaphor.” (Steen et al 2010: 769)

The amended MIP method described metaphor as “a relational term” (ibid., 771) stressing the significance of contextual pointers in processing the conceptual content of the examined metaphor. Accordingly, the identification and explication of metaphor is governed by a number of factors and contexts such as the immediate linguistic context, the socio-linguistic context and the cultural context. The guiding reasoning behind contextualizing the conceptual content of a given metaphor is the assumption that what is metaphorical for a certain social group or text receiver might not be metaphorical for another or might involve a different metaphorical content. The academic group explained their amended technique stating that the “main additions and alterations to MIP involve the two following features:

1. The detailed explication of many aspects of the decision-making process regarding lexical units and the identification of metaphorically used lexical units;
2. the addition of new sections on other forms of metaphor (…), novel compounds, and signals for metaphor.” (ibid., 774)

In the first part of the empirical study on data extraction from the STs, I adopted the amended MIP approach to data identification and collection. To illustrate, I worked through each play from beginning to end, collecting metaphoric linguistic units, deconstructing them into their conceptual components of SD and TD, and then extracting their conceptual patterns according to the ‘TD IS SD’ structure, without losing the subtleties in their semantic content. For example, in extracting the conceptual metaphor from the following excerpt “good name
in man and woman (…) is the immediate jewel of their souls” (Othello, 3.3.155-156), the SD and TD categories were preserved as they appeared in the ST: ‘GOOD NAME IS THE JEWEL OF THE SOUL’. In this example, the resulting conceptual metaphor kept the sub-categories of the conceptual units intact while indicating the mother conceptual group of each category between two brackets, whenever needed, as in saying (REPUTATION IS A PRECIOUS OBJECT). The aim behind this is to distance the conceptual metaphors from interpretation because what I classify under ‘REPUTATION’ could be classified by another reader under ‘HONOUR’, for example, and the same applies to interpreting the SD ‘JEWEL OF THE SOUL’ as a ‘PRECIOUS OBJECT’. The following excerpt highlights the difficulty and subjectivity involved in extracting a text’s conceptual metaphoric patterns:

“Expressed by convention in the form A IS B, the precise formulation of a mapping is proposed by the researcher on the basis of his or her analysis of the data. It goes without saying that finding the right verbalization for a mapping is not always easy and inevitably involves an element of subjectivity. The way it is verbalized needs to encapsulate its metaphorical force and correspond to what the researcher judges to be the most appropriate level of generality on the basis of its likely range of applicability (…) depending on the mapping’s precise contextual motivation.” (Shuttleworth 2011: 308)

Another example about adopting a bottom-to-top approach in extracting metaphoric patterns is in mapping ontological metaphors where the sub-categorical domain was preserved and the main domain enclosed between two brackets. In the following example, “Yield up, O love, thy crown and hearted throne to tyrannous hate” (Othello, 3.3.448-449), the concept ‘LOVE’ was conceptualized in an ontological metaphor as a ‘PERSON’. However, for the purpose of accuracy in identifying metaphoric patterns, and taking into account the importance of variation in the conceptual content of metaphors, it is not enough to identify the metaphor as being an ontological metaphor of the type ‘EMOTION IS A PERSON’. More appropriately, especially for the purpose of this research, it is better for the metaphoric pattern to appear in the clearly delineated conceptual model: ‘LOVE IS A KING WEARING A CROWN (EMOTION IS A PERSON’ and ‘HATRED IS A TYRANT
(EMOTION IS A PERSON)’. The other value of preserving the exact concept in modelling the extracted conceptual metaphors is to help us identify the shifts in the contrastive part of the analysis. Metaphoric structures such as ‘MAN IS AN OBJECT’, ‘EMOTION IS A PERSON’, or ‘TIME IS AN ORIENTATION’ do not help in tracing the commonalities and differences between the conceptual patterns of the ST and those of the TT, nor in spotting the main trends that characterize the behaviour of metaphor in translation.

Throughout the process of data collection, I also listed the metaphors by their traditional types (metonymy, personification, simile, etc.) paying attention to other details about the linguistic features and contextual associations of these metaphors. For example, the table of the extracted data contained a column under the title ‘metaphor source/domain’ and another column that listed the traditional types of metaphor. In other words, complicated metaphoric structures were divided into smaller linguistic units that are described both cognitively ‘TD IS SD’, and by their rhetorical components indicating the occurrences of similes, personifications, metonymies, symbols, etc. in producing the metaphor.

Additionally, while extracting the conceptual patterns of the STs, I explicated the metaphoric structures that needed more than a conceptual representation in order to be understood within their contexts. In other words, the process of data collection and classification was conducted with the help of relevant sources which were referenced whenever necessary comprising Shakespeare’s glossary, specialized dictionaries, encyclopaedia entries on mythology, literature and the Renaissance, as well as the Bible and Biblical imagery, as pointed out previously (see Section 4.1 on ‘the Tools of the Empirical Research’).

Annotations on any contextual or other background information were listed in the column of ‘metaphor source’, as necessary, to account for the decisions that were taken in extracting the conceptual patterns and clarify the use of metaphor for the text user who might have no
clue about the actual context of the original metaphors. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the text user is the modern and contemporary English-Arabic translator who is seeking a close, accurate and sincere representation of Shakespeare’s metaphoric thought in Arabic.

The following model presents the sample table that was adopted in the preliminary process of data extraction and classification based on the amended MIP approach:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original text</th>
<th>Source/Context</th>
<th>Metaphor Type and Components</th>
<th>Target Domain</th>
<th>Source Domain</th>
<th>Conceptual Mapping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate context extended or divided into smaller units</td>
<td>Bible Mythology Historical or Geographic Reference Lexical Context Domain</td>
<td>Creative metaphor (blended or extended) Personification Simile Idiom Metonymy Hyperbole</td>
<td>TD</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>TD is SD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the process of data collection and classification under different types and contexts might be complicated, it is of considerable importance to ensure an objective modelling of the conceptual patterns, taking into account the latest research about conceptual metaphor as a contextual case and the functional approaches to the translation of metaphor. The main objective, in this regard, is to distance the metaphoric models from the interpretation of concepts as much as possible, and to identify any mutation in ST data as a result of the translation process. The descriptive part of the empirical study is based on a combined reading of the results quantitatively and qualitatively, making use of the factors of frequency and mutation in ST data.

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1 “Our variant of MIP is called MIPVU, with VU being the abbreviation of Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the university at which our work was carried out” (Steen et al 2010: 774)
4.3 The Methods of Data Analysis

The methods of data analysis are based on two models: first, the descriptive method of data analysis in TS as proposed by Toury in his research on the issues which influence the translation process in the literary genre; second, the contrastive model which is based on investigating the mutation in ST data by comparing them with TT data. I will first explain what is meant by the descriptive model, and then I will discuss the criteria which were adopted in the comparative model and how the two models were used in a combined quantitative and qualitative reading of the results.

Stressing the need to follow a descriptive approach in the empirical analysis of a translated text, and in order for TS to be a scientifically tested discipline, Toury assumed that the text analysis process should rely on an actual description of what actually happens during the translation process. This approach underlines the importance of moving from a theoretical speculation about the foundations of an adequate translation theory to a descriptive analysis which investigates translated texts “only with regard to the underlying (...) ‘functors’. Thus, even if surface representations take priority in terms of mere description, their explanation can be attempted only on the basis of their underlying functions, which have therefore to be extracted from the utterance.” (Toury in Hermans 1985: 21) The descriptive model of analysing translated texts can be seen as a selective model where the elements to be considered in researching a translation issue should be functional enough in making the text count as performative. The following paragraph highlights the importance of the descriptive approach for TS:

“What we need (...) is not isolated attempts reflecting excellent intuitions and supplying fine insights (which many of the existing studies certainly provide) but a systematic scientific branch, seen as an inherent component of an overall discipline of translation studies, based on clear assumptions and armed with a methodology and research techniques made as explicit as possible.” (ibid., 17)
The descriptive approach to text analysis in TS was later referred to as the TT-oriented approach since it deals with the TT as a point of departure in studying the theoretical issues of translation. In other words, the translator should approach the translated text as though it were a ST in its own culture because, once produced, it loses its relevance to the ST and starts to function in another linguistic and cultural system, i.e. that of the TL. To be accurate, Toury did not mean that the TT should be subject to a description which tests its translatability as a ST. He clarified that to see translations as “facts of the target system is by no means to claim that every fact of the target system is (a candidate for) a translation” (1985: 19). Rather, it implies that the TT should be analysed vis-à-vis its ability to function in the TL, which means that the TT-oriented approach gives prominence to the notion of Functional Equivalence. Therefore, the researcher has to be selective in identifying and analysing his/her data in light of their functionality in the TT:

“For the purposes of descriptive research, translations should therefore be regarded as functions which map target-language utterances, along with their position in the relevant target systems, on source-language utterances and their analogous position. The source utterances, at least up to a certain point in the study, may comprise not only actual linguistic utterances, but also hypothetical ones, reconstructed, as it were, on the basis of the target utterance.” (ibid., 20)

Throughout the process of data analysis I followed a hybrid methodology based on Toury’s descriptive model and the traditional comparative model where the text analysis results were read quantitatively and qualitatively by the rate of mutation (shifts and loss) influencing the ST selected data and based on a functional reading of the TT data. It is important to merge the statistical reading of the results with a qualitative analysis because while the quantitative analysis reveals general tendencies about metaphor use in relation to a certain domain and within a certain genre, the full potential of such an analysis can only be reached when combined with a qualitative approach, which helps us analyse the functional and stylistic implications of metaphor use within context, whether the analysis is done for the purpose of literary criticism, autobiographical deconstruction, or applied text linguistics.
The question here is how to represent the statistical results in qualitative research? The answer is in our approach to the notion of a ‘translational shift’ throughout our comparative analysis of ST data and TT data. The purpose, in this case, is to see whether the changes in the TT data reflect changes in the components of the original Shakespearean metaphors under translation, or rather the presence of different interpretations of the concepts in question. In other words, the analysis of the TT material should be conducted, not only in light of the mutation that influenced the ST material but also according to the two following guidelines:

- The identification of loss or shifts in ST data should be coupled with an investigation of the TT data in terms of their acceptability in the target culture and their effectiveness in dealing with a specific translation problem or performing a certain pragmatic function (Toury 1985: 21-22).

- The descriptive analysis of the TT material should be based on a comparison of the different TTs, in each case of mutation, i.e. triangulation of the results, as this can be helpful in detecting the main tendencies behind data mutation rather than adopting a subjective approach to analysing the translated text in terms of being accurate or not accurate. This was recommended by Toury in his descriptive approach which called for a comparison of “several translations into one language done by different translators, either in the same period or in different periods of time” (ibid., 24).

During the data analysis process, I referred to the following table which classifies the data by the type of mutation influencing ST data (Conceptual Metaphors and traditional types of metaphor). In other words, the table of data analysis listed the translation techniques that were adopted by the translators in dealing with the ST metaphors and conceptual patterns from English into Arabic from the perspective of the ST-oriented approach (contrastive analysis) and the TT-oriented approach, as clarified in below:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original ST Metaphor Type and Context</th>
<th>ST Conceptual Mappings</th>
<th>TT Equivalent and Conceptual Mappings by Shifts and Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exact wording and structure of the metaphor</td>
<td>Simile</td>
<td>TD IS SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personification</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metonymy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Symbol</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Idiomatic expressions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Biblical reference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mythological reference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stylistic feature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To sum up, the empirical research of this dissertation is made up of two parts: the procedural part and the descriptive and analytical part. As for the procedural part, it covers the two processes of data identification and extraction, and data quantification and qualification. On the other hand, the analytical part deals with the two processes of: data analysis in terms of the shifts and losses influencing ST data in each translated text; and data description and qualification in terms of the shifts and losses that influenced ST data across the three TTs, taking into consideration the cases of data mutation according to the TT-oriented approach. The motive behind the double approach to data analysis is to detect the functional factors which play a role in the translation of metaphor in an experiential and factual approach to the process of translation.
CHAPTER FIVE
A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO METAPHOR ANALYSIS IN
OTHELLO and MACBETH

This chapter presents the first part of the empirical research based on an experiential study of Shakespeare’s metaphor in relation to the main notions and assumptions of Cognitive Metaphor Theory. The chapter consists of four sections. The first section will provide a review of the literature on Shakespeare’s language, dealing with the stylistic features of his imagery and discussing the relevance of his texts to the topic of this research. The second section will review the history of translating Shakespeare into Arabic, concluding with an account of the choice of the particular translations (TTs) for the empirical study.

The third section will focus on an empirical study of metaphor in the ST corpus within the framework of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. This section will provide a synthesized reading of the empirical research results by quantifying and qualifying the data extracted from the ST according to the three patterns of conceptual metaphor: ontological metaphors, image schemas and structural metaphors, paving the way for ST data selection and description for the second part of the text analysis. The fourth section will deal with a descriptive account of ST data selection discussing the category of creative metaphor in Othello and Macbeth. The selected ST data will be quantified and described according to two types of creative metaphor in Conceptual Theory: extended creative metaphors and blended creative metaphors. Examples from both STs will tackle the creative processes of extending and merging kernel conceptual metaphors to produce a creative image.
5.1 The Metaphoric Language of Shakespeare

In this section, I will provide a review of the literature on Shakespeare’s language in general, followed by a discussion of the distinctive features of his imagery and its appropriateness for the topic of this research. Given the international recognition and status of the Bard, one might be surprised to read Tolstoy's comment on the “Shakespearian, pretentious, and unnatural language, in which (...) no living man ever has spoken or does speak” (1906: 39). For Tolstoy, not only is the Shakespearean language “inflated” (ibid., 40) and “empty” (ibid.), but also full of “unnatural expressions with which the speeches of all the characters in all Shakespeare's dramas overflow” (ibid.). If that was the case indeed, then one might wonder why “Shakespeare remains the most celebrated author in world literature” (Nordlund 2007: 4) until the present time? Regardless of the pros and cons which accompany Tolstoy's perspective and the critical responses it has triggered ever since it was expressed, evaluating the language of Shakespeare requires a study of its main characteristics and influence on the English language and culture, on the one hand, and other languages of the world, on the other hand.

One of the main features I would like to discuss in relation to Shakespeare’s language is universality, which is closely related to the arguments about the translatability of Shakespeare’s texts. The language of Shakespeare is considered universal as it deals with topics and concepts which are shared by all human-beings, regardless of the restrictions of time and place. The case for the universality of Shakespeare’s language goes back to the eighteenth century with Samuel Johnson's “Preface to Shakespeare” published first in his annotated edition of Shakespeare’s plays in 1765 (Johnson 2004). Johnson argued that Shakespeare’s “characters are praised as natural” (ibid., 6) and that he presents his different themes or personalities from the perspective of man as a “species” (ibid., 3) rather than that
of man as an “individual” (Johnson 2004: 3) or that of the English man. There is a wide assumption that the concept of MAN in Shakespeare’s works is not categorized in line with the values and conditions of a single cultural environment or individual traits at the expense of the human dominating nature. His characters are represented from the inside out in a multi-dimensional, rich simulation that reflects the human complexity; which is why they seem to speak for us and tell our stories in a way we start to identify with them.

Nevertheless, the fact that Shakespeare speaks a universal language shared by all members of the human species does not mean that this language is not representative of the English heritage and culture. Shakespeare the universal is also Shakespeare the Englishman. “His Greeks and Romans, his Britons and Italians, all became, in one sense, Elizabethan Englishmen, and, in another, what for lack of a better term we can only call ‘Universal Man’” (Goddard 1951: 4). By and large, Shakespeare’s language is in utter harmony with the cultural context it emerged in; namely, the Elizabethan era, and it is not divorced from the time or place of his contemporary men. There is no doubt that Shakespeare’s universality was inspired by the universal heritage of great sources of literature such as classical mythology (see Root 1903) and the Bible (see Marx 2000); yet, he dressed up his characters as Englishmen, located them on the Elizabethan stage, and let them speak Renaissance English which is by no means in conflict with the nature of their universality. Furthermore, Shakespeare’s prolific use of imagery is a distinctive Elizabethan quality shared by all Renaissance writers. Therefore, one can very confidently say that Shakespeare is universal in terms of being Elizabethan and Elizabethan in terms of being metaphoric, as explained in the following passage:

“Though Shakespeare is for all time, he is part and parcel of the Elizabethan drama. If his plays are Elizabethan in their defects and limitations, such as their trivial puns and word-play, their overcrowded imagery, (…) they are Elizabethan also in the qualities of their greatness, their variety of subject, their intense interest in the portrayal of character, the flexibility and audacity of their language, their noble and
opulent verse, the exquisite idealism of their romantic love, and their profound analysis of the sources of human tragedy.” (Neilson and Thorndike 1927: 34)

However, the discrepancy lies not only in Shakespeare’s language being either universal or Elizabethan, but also in his “expressive genius” (Rhodes 2004: 211) which is sometimes considered “not as a distinctively English achievement” (ibid.). In certain cases and under certain considerations, the Shakespearean language is not ranked as English for different reasons. First, it is said to be dominated by a “double voice” (ibid., 64) which slides “between the different stylistic registers marked by Latin and English” (ibid.) “mixing high and low, combining genres” (ibid.). In addition, despite being the subject of prolific academic scholarly research, the Shakespearean text is not always viewed as “a model of academic rectitude” (ibid., 210). There are arguments that Shakespeare’s language lacks the stylistic features of academic English as it appears in a colourful style rather than a “full academic dress” (ibid., 211). However, despite being described as the “language of the heart” (ibid., 226), Shakespeare’s language is commended for its influence on the mind and this could be related to its flexibility in switching between the literal and the metaphoric in a harmonious dualism:

“There is a fundamental philosophic problem in admitting ‘metaphoric’ save in relation to ‘literal’; but (…) Shakespeare has an exceptional sense of the dynamic relations between the two, hence of the impress of language upon the human mind. Everyone is familiar with the idea that a single word may express multiple possibilities. So indeed it may, but at the heart of this is Shakespeare’s sense of the ineradicable dualism of language, the reciprocity of metaphor and literal.” (Berry 1978: 5)

Talking about the literal/metaphoric duality takes me to the main subject of this section, namely, Shakespeare’s metaphoricity. Although metaphoric representation is one of the unique qualities of Shakespeare’s linguistic artistry, the metaphoric component of Shakespeare’s language has received little more than a modest attention from scholars and literary critics alike, with an inconsistent rise and fall in the number, scope and density of studies that dealt with the subject as extensively as it deserves. Although “the metaphorical
quality of Shakespeare’s language in the 17th and 18th centuries was either ignored or even depreciated” (Pietrzykowska 2003: 153), the first serious attempt to research Shakespeare’s metaphoric language came with Walter Whiter’s edition of Specimen of a Commentary on Shakespeare (1794) which is considered “notable for its anticipation of much that is regarded as modern in the criticism of Shakespeare’s language and imagery” (Bell 1967: 83). After Whiter’s study, research on Shakespeare’s imagery remained in a state of slumber until the modern interest in the topic was revived in the first half of the twentieth century with Spurgeon’s Shakespeare’s Imagery and what it Tells us (1935). Following Spurgeon’s research, there were a number of studies that proved to be less comprehensive in scope, and that marked the time when research on Shakespeare’s metaphoric language became noticeably steady and less exuberant than ever before. In this review, I will tackle the main works which dealt with Shakespeare’s figurative language starting with Spurgeon’s research until the present time.

First, I would like to refer to two contributions which reviewed the works on Shakespeare’s metaphoric language throughout the twentieth century: McDonald's Shakespeare and the Arts of Language (2001), and Pietrzykowska’s article “The Shakespearian Metaphor” (2003). Both works provided a critical analysis of modern studies on Shakespeare's metaphoric language acknowledging the contribution made by those studies to the subject and describing Spurgeon’s (1935) work as a “breakthrough” (Pietrzykowska 2003: 153) in the study of Shakespeare’s imagery. However, McDonald criticized the early studies of Shakespeare’s metaphoric language for dealing with the thematic function of metaphor regardless of its linguistic, contextual and cultural properties. For McDonald, the “isolation of a figure risks diminishing the play to a single dominant theme. It also obscures those counter-currents that create semantic and poetic multiplicity, qualities which more recent critics have seen as vital to Shakespeare’s work” (2001: 71). On the other hand,
Pietrzykowska was critical of the earlier studies on Shakespeare’s metaphoric language for failing to maintain a balance between the two parts of metaphor: the ‘vehicle’ and the ‘tenor’, which could eventually lead to isolating “the metaphor from its social and historical function” (2003: 157). In the following account, I will highlight these two critical aspects providing a historical analysis of the most prominent works which dealt with the issue at hand. My aim, in this regard, is to make use of what those studies have achieved while trying to point out what they could have missed, bearing in mind the utility of each study for the framework of my research.

Spurgeon initiated her work on Shakespeare’s imagery with an article entitled “Shakespeare’s Iterative Imagery” (1933) in which she introduced her research method that started by familiarizing herself with Shakespeare’s taste for pictorial thinking then collecting and classifying images succinctly, hoping to provide future database for further research on Shakespeare. Spurgeon suggested that there was a link between what she called an “undertone” (ibid., 258) or “undersong of imagery within the limits of a single play” (ibid., 259), and a group of thematic units which are intertwined together to express a single topic in that same play. In other words, every play is dominated by an atmospheric mood which is the result of a whole set of human emotions such as anger, despair, parental love, pride, greed and hatred in King Lear. These emotions intensify gradually in the form of images creating a wave of feelings which bring about a controlling ‘tone’. In that sense, the images generate ‘undertones’ because they function as a backdrop that underlies the play’s atmosphere and enriches its themes. For Spurgeon, conducting a statistically supported analytical study of imagery was a main factor in drawing certain conclusions about the authorship of certain Shakespearean texts. Believing that “a poet’s imagery reveals his own idiosyncrasies, not only the usages of his period” (1935: 43), Spurgeon summarized the method adopted in her
autobiographical study under the title of ‘iterative imagery’, as explained in the following excerpt:

“Iterative imagery (...) is a marked characteristic of Shakespeare’s art; indeed, it is, I think, his most individual way of expressing his imaginative vision. It is quite clear that it is his habit of mind to have before him, as he writes, some picture or symbol, which recurs again and again in the form of images throughout a play, and (...) that these leading motives (...) are born of the emotions of the theme, and shed considerable light on the way Shakespeare himself looked at it.” (Spurgeon 1933: 255)

Spurgeon further explained her term of iterative imagery in Shakespeare's Imagery and What it Tells us (1935: 213-215). This book is a main contribution to the function of imagery in Shakespeare and can be described as the largest database of imagery in Shakespeare’s works. It was the fruit of a long-term project which consumed years of hard work and research that helped the writer collect all the images she came across in the form of similes and metaphors (Spurgeon 1933: 256) and then classify them into patterns which fall under different themes. The following paragraph highlights the importance of Spurgeon’s work (1935):

“Modern study of imagery and metaphor took a variety of forms, from the discovery of patterns by Caroline Spurgeon and Wolfgang Clemen to the isolation of the image by the descendants of the New Critics, and so compelling was their work that at mid-century the study of figuration occupied the centre of the critical enterprise.” (McDonald 2001: 70)

Spurgeon’s classification of imagery in Shakespeare can be very useful for its comprehensiveness in covering every single image the writer could have come across, regardless of the arguments about the definition and classification of figurative language. For Spurgeon, the difference between the types of metaphor is a matter of form rather than content, which is her main point of focus. Consequently, studying the variation in these types becomes superfluous to conducting an empirical research which aimed to target statistical comprehensiveness rather than “analyse the various kinds of image; the sunken, the
decorative, the expansive and so on; or to dwell on the differences between metaphor, simile, personification, metonymy, synecdoche and the like.” (Spurgeon 1935: 8)

However, although Spurgeon’s research was mainly concerned with the content of Shakespeare’s imagery, it was criticized for dealing with the subject matter of the image, leaving out its object or ‘vehicle’. In that sense, her classification and analysis of the extracted images was considered limited (McDonald 2001: 72) as it does not address the interaction between the two parts of the metaphor. Critics of Spurgeon’s patterns assumed that if we take the metaphor as a fixed SD pattern rather than an interactive model, we will miss a great deal in researching the studied material. The Shakespearean way of drawing metaphors targets multiplicity which cannot be researched by focusing solely on the SD of the metaphor. In order to address the thematic diversity of metaphors, our classification should be based on interactive patterns of the kind (SD↔TD). The following excerpt highlights this argument against Spurgeon’s methodology:

“The main objection raised against her method was that she focused on the subject matter of images, on that from which the comparison is drawn thus abstracting one part of the comparison (the subject matter) from the underlying idea or the object matter, which led to reductiveness (…) Modern criticism tends to focus more on that with which the comparison is made and it is at that point that Spurgeon’s method went wrong.” (Pietrzykowska 2003: 156)

For example, if we follow Spurgeon’s methodology in classifying imagery, we will end up dealing with the two following patterns as separate metaphors: ‘THE WORLD IS A STAGE’ and ‘PEOPLE ARE ACTORS’, where the first will be classified under the TD of THE WORLD and the second under that of THE PEOPLE. However, a closer examination of these patterns could end up with the realization that the second pattern is an extension of the first where the two domains of the metaphoric model interact and produce new patterns that are conceptually linked to the content of the first pattern, as explained in the modelling below:
THE WORLD IS A STAGE
THE STAGE NEEDS ACTORS
PEOPLE ARE ACTORS ON THE STAGE OF THE WORLD
LIVING IS ACTING

The second major study which dealt with Shakespeare’s metaphoric language is Clemen’s book *The Development of Shakespeare’s Imagery* (1951), a revised publication of his *Shakespeare’s Bilder* which was published in German in (1936). In an historical review of the main studies that dealt with the topic, Clemen surveyed the pros and cons of Shakespeare’s imagery, which makes his work a solid reference for the critical history on Shakespeare’s metaphor. For Clemen, it was natural for the studies on Shakespeare’s imagery to have to develop slowly as people needed some time “to understand Shakespeare’s work in all its different aspects” (Clemen 1951: 10). Unlike Spurgeon, Clemen was interested in the role of metaphor in reflecting the dramatic unity of the text arguing that every image in a Shakespearean play “has reference to the whole of the play” (ibid., 3) and “appears as a cell in the organism of the play, linked with it in many ways” (ibid.).

Although Clemen was considered one of the main contributors to the modern criticism on Shakespeare’s drama (McDonald 2001: 70), as pointed out before, he was criticized for limiting his study to the dramatic function of metaphor as Berry did in his book *The Shakespearean Metaphor* (1978) which tried to show how the duality of metaphor and symbol functions to create a multiplicity of meanings under one controlling theme that organizes the whole structure of the play. Berry’s investigation of the role of metaphor as a frame for Shakespeare’s themes and thought did not reflect the variation in the content and function of metaphor as his objective was “to detect the extent to which a certain metaphoric idea informs and organizes the drama” (Thompson 1990: 674).
Generally speaking, all the studies which dealt with the thematic function of metaphor in creating an organic, coherent structure controlled by a leading tone were criticized for neglecting the individual features of Shakespeare’s metaphors and the variation in their semantic and functional signification within their immediate context, rather than the whole context of the play. Amongst the critics of those studies are Thompson (1990) and Thompson and Thompson (1987) who came up with the notions of ‘micrometaphoric’ and ‘macrometaphoric’ metaphor analysis (discussed previously in Chapter IV, 4.2). The notion of ‘macrometaphoric analysis’ focuses on dealing with each metaphor in relation to the dominating theme or topic of the Shakespearean text, regardless of the variation in its functional and stylistic properties. Conversely, ‘micrometaphorics analysis’ aims at investigating each metaphoric structure “word by word, or indeed morpheme by morpheme, phoneme by phoneme” (Thompson 1990: 672) separately, dealing with it as an independent entity in its own right free of any macro-level associations with the dominating metaphoric atmosphere of the play. Thompson believed that studying metaphor on a macro level is very limiting because it looks at metaphoric representation from a single angle as a declaration, rather than variation, of the playwright’s attitude towards the main theme (ibid., 677).

There is no doubt that analysing metaphor on a micro level marked a departure from the earlier studies on Shakespeare’s metaphoric language, however, it needed to be further qualified in the light of the conceptual leap brought by the experiential method of cognitive research which calls for deconstructing every metaphoric structure into its main components taking into account all the cognitive factors that played a role in its production and development. The seeds of this new trend in studying the metaphoric language of Shakespeare started to grow in recent academic research on the subject like Nordlund’s *Shakespeare and the Nature of Love: Literature, Culture, Evolution* (2007), which I will
dwell on in the last part of this section as it deals with the cognitive role of Shakespearean metaphor from the perspective of TS.

At this stage, I will review the stylistic features of Shakespeare’s metaphoric language trying to test its appropriateness for the topic and methodology of this dissertation. In order for a text to qualify for empirical research on metaphor, it has to have certain features which reflect the depth and variation in the types and functions of its metaphors. Shakespeare’s plays provide an excellent model for a profound, experiential analysis of metaphoric patterns and their conceptual role. In this account, I will provide a summary of the main stylistic features which make Shakespeare’s metaphoric language suitable for an empirical research on the translation of metaphor.

The first feature of Shakespeare’s metaphoric language is the richness and depth of its content. ‘Richness’ refers to the prevailing figurative language which characterizes his writings with its depth and diversity. There is hardly any disagreement about the fact that Shakespeare’s texts abound in figures of speech to the degree of being characterized by “metaphoric excess” (Rhodes 2004: 64) and the use of “densely figurative language” (ibid., 73). However, although metaphors are “everywhere in Shakespeare’s plays” (McDonald 2001: 52), and while their semantic multiplicity can create some confusion and perplexity for his readers and critics, Shakespeare’s metaphoric style does not lack organic harmony and “one can scarcely pick up one of Shakespeare’s plays without being struck by its pictorial and metaphoric density, consistency, and multiplicity.” (ibid., 75) The richness of metaphor in Shakespeare’s language should not be viewed as a shortfall in his artistic representation as it is so compelling that it turns his art into a close representation of real life.

The second feature of Shakespeare’s metaphoricity is its simplicity and, yet, highly developed conceptual status as his metaphors go through the phases of plain observation, metaphoric abstraction and symbol creation. To explain, Shakespeare’s metaphors are drawn
from very common fields of conceptualization such as “the natural world” (McDonald 2001: 77) and daily human experiences. Spurgeon’s study reveals that, by and large, Shakespeare’s imagery can be easily processed because “the great bulk of his metaphors and similes are drawn from the simplest everyday things seen and observed” (1935: 44). Shakespeare’s sources of figuration, taken from the daily activities of the people “especially in outdoor country life and the homely indoor routine” (ibid., 15), made his metaphors quite prominent and widely welcome by different audiences. However, the metaphoric language of Shakespeare is not restricted to the use of prominent images which strike us as common and pervasive in our conceptual system. Shakespeare also created original images which are painted artistically in a way that captures the attention of our faculty of perception; hence the role of his imagery “in the creation of metaphor” (McDonald 2001: 58) as only powerful images can creating metaphors, and the less expressive the image, the less likely it will turn into a metaphor.

Another indicator of the highly advanced status of Shakespeare’s metaphoric language is seen in his artistic talent for generating symbols. As explained in Chapter II (2.1.2 on ‘Metaphor versus Other Tropes’), symbols are the most advanced form of metaphoric articulation because they are strong metaphors which become deeply embedded in the culture in a way they start to correspond to literal facts. In order for a metaphor to develop into the highly refined status of symbolic signification, it is, by no means, sufficient to be “used so frequently and so multifariously” (ibid., 78); it has to captivate the genius of the human mind and establish a conceptual and functional value in the cultural heritage of the relevant language (see the discussion on the translation of metonymy and symbols in Section 7.2.1 on ‘the Cognitive Value of Metaphor Types’).

In addition to the richness of his images which are derived from prominent sources of figuration, Shakespeare’s metaphoric language is known for its highly detailed structure and
microscopic description of the smallest conceptual elements of the Source Domain and Target Domain. It is also unique for its accurate representation of the interaction between the two fields of the metaphor. Shakespeare’s complex metaphoric structures reveal “his interest in and knowledge of other crafts, especially of needlework, for the small details of which he seems to have had a peculiarly observant eye” (Spurgeon 1933: 279). Therefore, it is not surprising to describe him as an “incredibly sensitive and amazingly observant man” (ibid., 285). This profoundness and accuracy in capturing the minute qualities of objects makes Shakespeare’s characters very close to the human self and similar to the living man, as expressed in the following passage:

“So the central figure gradually emerges, not an outline sketch merely, but full of detail, a living, breathing, and intensely human being, with marked individuality and tastes.” (ibid., 286)

Although Shakespeare’s imagery is derived from common sources of figurative representation and is intricately fabricated in a detailed description of the smallest particles of the image, we cannot claim that all his metaphors are simple and easy for our minds to process. One of the main features of Shakespeare’s imagery is its complicated nature in form and content alike, which sometimes caused his metaphoric language to be described as “peculiar” (Hudson 1872: 97) and “incongruous” (ibid., 102). Along with simple metaphors like “Juliet is the sun” (Romeo and Juliet, 2.2.3), there are “groups of images, which, as it were, stand out in each particular play and immediately attract attention because they are peculiar either in subject, or quantity, or both” (Spurgeon 1935: 214). Those images tend to be based “upon the most subtle, delicate, and unobvious analogies” (Hudson 1872: 97), but they make many of Shakespeare's metaphors original giving way to what is described as “unconventional metaphors” (Ródenas 2006: 713). Shakespeare’s creativity can be so forceful sometimes that a number of critics have claimed him to be outstanding in his “freshness, opulence, and boldness of imagery” (ibid., 93). Creative metaphors in
Shakespeare are not of one type but rather varied ranging from simple personifications (Spurgeon 1935: 45) to extended metaphors of a much more complicated structure. Some critics consider Shakespeare’s extended images distinguished for the complex homogeneity and harmony between their properties:

“It (...) may be seen (...) how in a metaphor the intensity and fire of imagination, instead of placing the two parts side by side, melts them down into one homogeneous mass; which mass is both of them and neither of them at the same time; their respective properties being so interwoven and fused together, that those of each may be affirmed of the other.” (Hudson 1872: 95)

Having reviewed the stylistic features of Shakespeare’s metaphoricty highlighting its richness and variation which are important for conducting empirical research, I would like to explore the adequacy of his metaphorictic language from the perspective of Translation Studies. The main question to be raised at this point is whether Shakespeare’s metaphorictic language is a source of difficulty for translators, and what issues are involved in discussing the translatability of Shakespeare’s metaphors. In other words, and in reference to Nida’s notions of Formal Equivalence, Dynamic Equivalence and Functional Equivalence, the appropriateness of the Shakespearean text for my empirical study is judged in the light of the variation it shows vis-à-vis Nida’s triple model of equivalence, and, in one way or another, this is closely related to the argument of universality versus cultural specificity and variation. Shakespeare's literature has been broadly communicated across different languages and cultures, which is why it was often considered “remarkably stable cross-culturally and hence transmissible across space, time and language” (Thompson and Thompson in Jansohn et al 2010: 124). Thompson and Thompson argue that some conceptual processes, such as metaphor and metonymy, are very accurately and objectively delineated in Shakespeare’s works, which makes them universally shared and a potential “reason for Shakespeare’s continuing strength across temporal, nation-state and linguistic borders” (ibid., 2).
The argument for Shakespeare’s universality is indisputable in dealing with the stylistic features of his language; nevertheless, the academic interest in its value has recently declined considerably, and started to be replaced by a focus on his cultural and idiosyncratic complexity, not in an attempt to bury Shakespeare the universal, but in the spirit of introducing undiscovered aspects of Shakespeare the metaphorical. Nordlund’s rhetorical question “what can you say about Shakespeare that has never been said before?” (2007: 14) raises a dispute about the validity of studying Shakespeare from the perspective of universality. I would like to pose a similar question from the perspective of TS. If all Shakespeare’s metaphors were universally shared, what other than the literal option can we adopt in translating them? Shakespeare’s universality is not a compelling argument for the purpose of this research, otherwise his language would be literally translatable, which is not the case, and which is why his texts continue to be the subject of argument, translation, retranslation and revision, in the Arabic language at least.

Nowadays, approaching the works of world literature from the perspective of the controversial concept of universality has become outdated and inadequate as any such work is thought to be read and represented diversely in different languages and translations. Contemporary studies about the scope of world literature debated the value of the universality argument in dealing with great works of art which tend to be transmitted globally. Damrosch argued that “world literature itself is constituted very differently in different cultures” (2003: 26) and that although it “can often reach out beyond its own time and place, but conversely it can also provide a privileged mode of access into some of the deepest qualities of its culture of origin” (2009: 2). Similarly, contemporary Shakespearian scholars maintain that it is inappropriate to examine his language from a universal perspective, that his imagery “must be seen also as a cultural product” (McDonald 2001: 86) and that “we have much to learn about the cultural contexts of Shakespeare’s figurative vocabulary” (ibid., 88). In response to
this, “the academic mainstream has produced an equally single-minded inversion of Johnson’s Shakespeare: a writer who only deals in the ‘customs’ of his own particular place” (Nordlund 2007: 8) and has little to tell us about our “common humanity” (ibid.). From an experiential perspective, it is not detrimental for some disciplines to focus on one side of the equation (universality versus cultural specificity) at the expense of the other. For instance, biologists can concentrate on genetic factors and historians on the development of socio-linguistic structures across time. However, Nordlund maintains that “it is incoherent and overly reductive to do so without bearing the other half in mind” (ibid., 10).

I would say that it is insufficient for translators to focus on one aspect while neglecting the other, if they want their translations to be intelligible, sincere and accurate. Translators have to see all that is universal, all that is English, all that is Elizabethan and all that is Shakespearean in Shakespeare. Challenging as it may seem, this is certainly an ambitious project; however, it is not impossible to be implemented, especially if we follow an all-inclusive approach which takes into account the experiences of leading translators in processing Shakespeare’s language. Like any project of translation, this is a collaborative project which could be doomed to failure, unless taken selflessly and comprehensively in “a cumulative research tradition that gradually replaces inspired but flawed ideas with more dependable ones” (ibid., 14).

Adopting a cognitive approach to researching the translation of Shakespeare’s metaphors can be adequately objective as it takes into account cultural and stylistic patterns, not only biological ones (those of the universal human nature). Nordlund called for adopting a biological approach to Shakespeare’s metaphors and understanding his language within its cultural context, not only within the universal framework of human thought, concluding that “only…when we begin to weigh human sameness against historical and cultural difference, will we give a more accurate picture of Shakespearean love” (ibid., 5). In a word, processing
Shakespeare’s language should not be limited to either cultural specificity or universal commonality. It is, like any language, subject to evolution as it interacts with the verbal and contextual factors of the experiential environment and responds to the ontological realities that govern its uses and functions:

“While the degree of conceptual precision a culture affords a phenomenon clearly says something about the latter’s social significance, a period’s mental or emotional world cannot be extrapolated from a dictionary (...) because the same word means several different things in different contexts and so allows for conflicting interpretations.” (Nordlund 2007: 27)

Now that I have given an overview of the literature on the metaphoric language of Shakespeare, the stylistic features of his imagery and the appropriateness of the ST corpus to the topic and methods of this research, I will move to the second section in this chapter focusing on a historical review of the translation of Shakespeare from English into Arabic and explaining the motive behind my choice of the translated texts.

5.2 The Translation of Shakespeare into Arabic

Shakespeare is one of the most translated writers in world literature (see Baker and Saldanha 2009: 264). The translation of Shakespeare from English into Arabic goes back to the end of the nineteenth century when the Nahda movement prospered in Egypt, giving rise to a wide range of intellectual and cultural activities including literature, language and art. Nahda is the Arabic term for Renaissance, in reference to the cultural revival that flourished at the end of the nineteenth century in Egypt and some other Arab countries. This movement of cultural reform, which covered various aspects of life, is considered the Arab world’s counterpart of the European Enlightenment where intellectuals like “Mohamed Abdou in Egypt (...) encouraged translation” (Ennaji 2005:11), and scholars and intellectual institutions started to show an unswerving interest in the ‘transfer’ of all forms of knowledge and art from Europe
to the Arab world. To that end, leading thinkers encouraged different means of contact and communication with Europe such as cultural exchange, travel and translating the works of remarkable literary figures and scholars into Arabic. They wanted to acquaint their people with the cultural heritage of modern Europe and educate them about what was happening overseas when many Western countries had reached the peak of their enlightenment, which gave rise to “the translation movement (ḥarakat al-tarjama) of European works, mainly French and English” (Somekh 1991: 75).

Shakespeare was one of the main literary figures to be introduced to the Arab reader not only as “the first English dramatist to be presented on the Arab stage; he was also the only English playwright to be widely translated in the late nineteenth century” (al-Shetawi 1989: 119). The translation of Shakespeare from English into Arabic underwent a process of development starting with adaptation and ending with ‘accurate’ translation. The first attempts at translating Shakespeare into Arabic were “done for the stage” (Twaij 1973: 52). Early translations took the form of mere adaptations of the original texts that were appropriated “to the conventions of native drama and to the taste of the audience” (al-Shetawi 1989: 115). To bring the Shakespearean texts closer to the Arab audience, translators dealt with them flexibly introducing various changes to their main components and features including the plot, setting, characterization, etc., like Najib al-Haddad’s adaptation of Romeo and Juliet (1891) as “Shuḥādā’ al-Ghārām (Martyrs of Love) or Shaqā’ al-Muḥibbīn (Lovers’ Misery)” (ibid.).

Hamlet, Othello and Macbeth are said to be among Shakespeare’s plays that were mostly adapted to the tradition of the Arab theatre, with translations that omitted whole scenes from the play, altered the whole ending and used the local Egyptian dialect. An example of these is Ẓānyus ‘Abduh’s translation of Hamlet (1901), which is considered “the earliest surviving Arabic Hamlet” (Litvin 2011: 10) and described as a distorted version of the original play.
with a “faint resemblance of the source text” (al-Shetawi 1989: 116). In his translation of *Hamlet*, ʿAbduh made considerable alterations in the thematic content of the play turning it from a tragedy into a play with a happy ending. This increased the popularity of Shakespeare’s works in the Arab world at the time as he was represented, in a manner of speaking, by being “translated, staged and adapted to the local taste and colour of the area” (ibid., 124).

During the early phase of translating Shakespeare, the adapted translations were performed by national theatrical groups that produced the localized plays in the Egyptian spoken Arabic. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, professional theatre companies came from France, Italy and England to perform in Egypt responding to the invitation of the Egyptian Ministry of Education. The English Shakespeare Company was among those groups, giving performances of Shakespeare’s plays in two seasons in 1927 and 1928 (ibid., 117). As a result, and after becoming familiar with the original structure and theme of the adapted play, people started to criticize the adaptations considering them distortions of the original Shakespearean texts. This encouraged leading men of literature to produce reliable translations of the Bard keeping the structure, plot and characterization intact, while limiting their changes to the linguistic and cultural components of the plays. Examples of such changes include deleting certain scenes or rephrasing some sentences and expressions as these translations were produced in order for the plays to be performed on the Arab stage.

This technique was referred to as ‘Arabization’ and was mainly used by Khalīl Muṭrān in his translation of *Othello* as ʿUtayl published in 1912 (Hanna 2009: 157). Arabization, taʾrīb, is the name given to the translation movement which aimed at representing the translated work in Arabic by adapting it to the cultural and lexical components of the Arabic language while preserving its structural and thematic content (al-Shetawi 1989: 114). Muṭrān played a
leading role in introducing the notion of Arabization to the translation of Shakespeare’s texts since “such plays ought to be written, he says, to be understood and made use of” (Ghazoul 1998: 4). In his introduction to the translation of Othello, Muṭrān explained how he chose to ‘arabize’ the metaphorical language of Shakespeare in order to make it comprehensible to Arabic language readers (see Muṭrān 1993: 8-9).

For people like Ahmad Shawqī and Khalīl Muṭrān, who tried to give a close representation of Shakespeare in Arabic, the focus of their translations was on the thematic content of the translated text regardless of its lexical and cultural components, as they wanted to domesticate the ST and make it natural to the target audience. Therefore, they were tempted to make shifts that went as far as deleting sentences or paragraphs from the original text or introducing new ones into it in order to make it more appealing to Arab readers. The difference between adaptations and domestications, which appeared in the form of Arabization, is that the former dealt with the ST freely coming up with dramatic variations in its content, whereas the latter preserved the thematic content and structure of the ST while domesticating part of its linguistic components to naturalize the language spoken by its characters.

In the middle of the twentieth century, Shakespeare’s plays started to appear in different Arab countries in new translations sponsored by certain cultural and academic institutions such as the Cultural Committee of the Arab League, which under the chairmanship of Ṭāha Ḥusain then, initiated the 1950s “grand project of translating all of Shakespeare’s plays” (Enani 2006). It fell onto scholars like Jabra Ibrahim Jabra to produce the first authoritative translations of Shakespeare setting the foundation for translating the Bard in a close, academic representation of the original text. By and large, the translations which started to appear as of the second half of last century were considered “accurate and faithful to the original” (Twaij 1973: 54) to the extent they were sometimes considered “competent
scholarly achievements” (Zaki 1978: 301). These translations did not deal with the text liberally and were committed to translating it as closely as possible without any changes in its structure, plot, characterization, sequence of events, or linguistic content:

“In the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, the translation of Shakespeare’s plays into Arabic entered a third stage when the League of Arab Nations established the Cultural Committee, which was founded for the sole purpose of translating the masterpieces of world literature into Arabic and which announced that its first priority was to translate all of Shakespeare’s works into Arabic. Well qualified literary figures and translators in the Arab world were appointed to translate all of Shakespeare’s work.” (Tounsi 1989: 51)

Following the Arab League’s initiative to translate Shakespeare’s works, and by the time the translation of Shakespeare into Arabic had reached a mature phase with translators becoming more committed to the accurate representation of Shakespeare’s language, these translations started to be evaluated by different critics and scholars. This trend aimed at examining the translations of Shakespeare in order to assess their contribution and check how far they match the ST in both form and content based on the claim that very “little critical research on translating Shakespeare into Arabic has been done to improve the…Arabic versions of Shakespeare for Arab readers” (Alsaai 1997: 35). Consequently, the interest in Shakespeare no longer remained limited to the themes of his plays and the meanings beyond his words. Shakespeare’s language itself became the main criterion for testing the translator’s competence and skill in introducing the Bard’s art to the Arab world.

This gave rise to academic and literary critical studies which were meant to question the primary difficulties and “highlight all the major problems which confront translators” (ibid., 37) in translating Shakespeare into Arabic. These studies fall into two categories based on the point of departure in their critical account. The first category approached the translations of Shakespeare from a socio-cultural perspective giving priority to the TT and target audience over the ST and source culture. Conversely, the second category adopted a ST orientation taking into account the principles of accuracy and faithfulness to the original.
The first category hailed the adaptations of Shakespeare into Arabic despite their flexibility in dealing with the topic, structure and characterization of the play, which is why those who belonged to this category did not examine any of the aspects relating to the Bard’s linguistic heritage. Praising the “Arab recreations of Shakespeare” (Kanaan 1998: 219), such criticisms were interested in the adaptations for their role in introducing the art of theatre to the Arab public by borrowing the attractive themes of Shakespeare’s plays and expressing them in a simple language. Therefore, they viewed the early translations, i.e. adaptations, as genuine attempts to fit the translated work into the socio-cultural and political context of the audience (see Litvin 2011 on the Arabic appropriations of Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*), dealing with “macro-level cultural categories rather than micro-level linguistic structures” (Hanna 2006: 13). Socio-cultural critical accounts of the translation of Shakespeare into Arabic stood firmly for the case of adaptation vis-à-vis the principle of faithful translation, defending the former on the ground that Shakespeare’s language has its own cultural environment and linguistic specificities and is, therefore, untranslatable in a one-to-one correspondence:

“(…) the purist’s ideal of a good and faithful translation of Shakespeare’s text into a foreign language, not to mention the translation of Shakespearean themes into foreign cultures, is in reality an impossibility. English metrical niceties, word-plays, imagery, emphases, insinuations, skilful repartee, and the atmospheric use of colour in verse and prose may all evaporate in a straightforward Arab representation of Shakespeare. Consequently, deletions of whole scenes, speeches, or characters from the original text and the interpolation of novel characters, speeches, songs, and theatrical techniques in ‘foreign Shakespeare’ are within the nature of the enterprise.” (Kanaan 1998: 219)

The second category of studies that criticized the Arabic translations of Shakespeare was interested in Shakespeare’s linguistic and conceptual legacy, rather than its adaptation to Arabic. The scholars who adopted this perspective maintained that what made Shakespeare assume an authoritative place in his own culture as well as worldwide is not his themes, settings, characters, or plots, popular as they may be. Rather, it is the way he presented them and let them speak, move, act and impress even while they were still on the page. This gave
the ST prominence over the TT, observing the standards of faithfulness and accuracy as the main criteria in a successful translation of Shakespeare. Tracing the development of translating Shakespeare into Arabic back to its beginning, ST-oriented studies conducted an in-depth analysis of the complexities involved in translating cultural concepts and lexical items in Shakespeare. These include religious lexicon, objects of nature such as birds, plants, “precious stones and gems” (Zaki 1978: 74), as well as indirect language structures like jokes, idioms, “figures of speech” (Tounsi 1989: 95), “puns, proverbs, grammar and images” (Alsaai 1997: 30).

Both Zaki (1978) and Alsaai (1997) conducted a comprehensive analysis of the history of translating Shakespeare into Arabic referring to the main obstacles which faced the translators in every stage and coming up with a set of solutions to improve these translations and bring them to a higher level of intellectual and linguistic excellence. For them, “only a few of Shakespeare’s plays and poetical works that have been translated into Arabic are regarded as accurate renditions combining both sound scholarship and literary merit” (Zaki 1978: 300). Nonetheless, there were certain shortcomings in these translations partially “due to negligence” (ibid., 75), but mainly as a result of a number of factors. Such factors include the lack of “solid knowledge of English literature” (ibid., 27), the lack of acquaintance with “classical and European Renaissance literature and cultures” (ibid.) and “the translators’ unfamiliarity with basic tools of research needed both in translation generally and Shakespearean translation in particular” (ibid., 76). Therefore, the task of the translator was no longer limited to projecting the ST onto the TL in a one-to-one representation of lexical items and grammatical structures. Translation has become a much more ardent task that calls upon the translators to arm themselves with all the necessary tools of research “such as the various lexicon, glossaries, and the Variorum” (ibid., 28), as explained in the following passage:
“A Shakespearean grammar book is also necessary to shed light on some of the rather archaic sentence structures. It is also mandatory for a Shakespearean translator to acquire at least two different very well annotated copies of the work he is dealing with. Those well-known editions that have been revised by the famous Shakespearean scholars should be referred to whenever one is in doubt about an expression or an idiom.” (Zaki 1978: 28)

In selecting the TT corpus, I sought to choose translators who met three basic requirements in translating Shakespeare: (a) a scholarly interest in metaphoric language, in general, and the language of Shakespeare, in particular; (b) familiarity with the main sources and tools of research and referencing; and (c) wide critical acclaim for the translator’s contribution to translating Shakespeare into Arabic. My TTs comprise translations made by: Jabra Ibrahim Jabra, Mohamed Enani, Salah Nyazi and Muhammad Mustafa Badawi, all of whom had certain commonalities in their approach to translating Shakespeare while varying in their contribution to the translation of Shakespeare from English into Arabic. As for the points of commonality between the four translators, the following account will reveal their shared sense of responsibility towards the refinement and accuracy in translating Shakespeare, their reliance on different annotated editions of the works of Shakespeare and their recognition of the importance of metaphor in both understanding and representing Shakespeare’s language adequately.

The main contribution of Jabra lies in his being the first to take the initiative of translating Shakespeare into Arabic as accurately as possible, away from adaptation or Arabization and with “a tendency to emphasize the form as well as the content” (Ishratheh 2006: 20) of the play. With Jabra’s first translation of Hamlet (1960), the translation of Shakespeare witnessed “a new and unprecedented development” (Zaki 1978: 294) which initiated a long translation project that produced translated works such as “Jan Kott’s Shakespeare Our Contemporary (1979) and Janette Dillon’s Shakespeare and the Solitary Man (1986)” (Boullata 2001: 221). In his edition of The Tragedies (1986), Jabra provided a review of critical studies by Shakespearean scholars who dealt with each play from a historical and literary perspective.
For example, he quoted remarkable scholars, thinkers and critics on Shakespeare’s language including Coleridge (Jabra 1986: 80) in his introduction to the translation of Hamlet, Bradley (ibid., 386) in his introduction to the translation of Othello, Kenneth Muir’s study on Macbeth (ibid., 608), as well as Spurgeon’s Shakespeare’s Imagery and what it Tells us (ibid., 222).

Jabra incorporated even negative critical accounts of Shakespeare’s language like Tolstoy’s comments on the unnatural language of King Lear (ibid., 220). He made sure to acquaint himself with different critical studies of Shakespeare’s literature, and his decision to translate Shakespeare was self-motivated and inspired by his enduring love for Shakespeare’s language and style. In his introduction to the translation of The Sonnets, Jabra expressed his interest in the metaphors and images of Shakespeare (1983: 22) and their role in creating a special poetic atmosphere. He also expressed his deep appreciation and admiration of Shakespeare’s texts after he finished translating The Tragedies, as he himself explained in the following passage:

“It is fulfilling for me to see that, throughout this period and despite my preoccupation with life, writing, and art, I have not let go of a dream which never stopped to haunt me since the first days of my youth: to accomplish the translation of those plays which brought me much joy and enlightenment during my days as a student and afterwards, and which are part of the literary issues everywhere and in every language.” (1986: 607)

There is an apparent consensus among the critics of the translation of Shakespeare on the great contribution made by Jabra in producing professional Arabic translations of the Shakespearean text. Jabra is believed to have played a pioneering role in arousing the interest among translators, men of literature, critics, as well as academic and cultural institutions alike in the production of professional and responsible translations of Shakespeare into Arabic. His translation of Hamlet was described as “a genuine attempt to produce a faithful rendition of Shakespeare’s play” (Zaki 1978: 281). In his other translations, Jabra is also said to have

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2 The translation of Arabic passages, excerpts and examples is mine.
been able to “observe accuracy of text and show deep understanding of Shakespeare’s dramaturgy” (al-Shetawi 1989: 120). Some critics went as far as claiming that no other Arabic language translator has ever translated Shakespeare “with such deep understanding as Jabra showed or with his sensibility and subtle feeling for language” (Boullata 2001: 222).

For most researchers and critics, Jabra’s achievements did not stop at the limit of his accurate representation of the form and content of the text. He is also thought to have paid close attention to the “aesthetic function of the language” (Ishrateh 2006: 20) and described as showing “accomplished scholarship, accuracy of rendition and an elegant style” (Zaki 1978: 295). Ghazoul claims that Jabra’s translations of Shakespeare focused “on the organic images and how to render the details in relation to the core as creatively and as coherently as possible” (1998: 5). Jabra’s translations of Shakespeare were not utterly faultless and void of shortcomings; as they were criticized from time to time for being unintelligible and “marked by obscurity and vagueness making the process of drawing appropriate inferences hard” (Obeidat 2001: 216). But even Jabra’s faults or ‘misrepresentations’ of Shakespeare were thought to have occurred as a result of misinterpreting certain linguistic structures (Enani 2005) or omitting some oaths occasionally (Zaki 1978: 42). These shortcomings were considered mostly “minor” (ibid., 294) and “few slight flaws” (Twaij 1973: 115) until some recent studies discussed more specific faults in their criticism of Jabra’s translation, focusing on his literal translations of certain metaphoric components (Yūsif 2009) as a result of being very committed to the principle of accuracy:

“Having confined himself to a faithful translation, Jabra did not succeed in translating certain passages, mainly those of a metaphorical nature, into an equivalent clear Arabic. When a comparison between the Arabic text and the original is made, we come across passages which have been ambiguously translated.” (Alsaai 1997: 84)

The second translator I chose to deal with in the text analysis is Enani who, in his translations of Shakespeare, showed no less attention, dedication and professional skill than
Jabra. So far, and ever since the Arab League’s Cultural Committee took a decision to translate the works of Shakespeare, Enani saved no effort in dedicating himself to this significant cultural project guided, as he puts it, “by what the critics since Shakespeare’s day have had to say” (2006). Enani clarified how he made use of different editions of the play and various critical accounts of the translation of Shakespeare and how, in his introductions to the translated works, he explained his choices and method of translation (ibid.). Additionally, he has shown a great interest in the translation of metaphor with a special focus on idiomatic expressions, in general, and Shakespeare’s plays, in particular. However, unlike Jabra, Enani is said to have been much more flexible in translating metaphoric expressions, taking into account their appropriateness to the target culture and readers.

Enani dealt with the translation of figurative language under his account on idiomatic expressions (Enani 2004: 113-145) where he showed a particular interest in expressing the communicative function of the metaphor more than anything else. An example of this is his domestication of religiously grounded concepts, like oaths, to fit them in the contexts of Arab culture. Some critics claim that Enani’s attempts to domesticate certain concepts to the cultural environment of the reader did by no means compromise their semantic content or communicative effect; because even though he gave those expressions “an Islamic flavour, yet in Arabic they convey almost the same message which is supposed to be conveyed by the original” (Zaki 1978: 38). That is why Enani’s translation was commended for his success in preserving the semantic content as well as function of the metaphor, and he was considered by people like Alsaai to have given “one of the finest examples so far of how to translate Shakespeare into Arabic” (1997: 300). The following passage deals with Enani’s stylistic approach to translating Shakespeare, highlighting his role in producing an authentic representation of the style of Shakespeare:

“Enani, for his part, although also guilty of paraphrasing and interpolation, provides the reader with the most authentic and accurate translation of all the four, being
noted in particular for his elegant, poetic prose which at times aspires to match the verse of Shakespeare himself.” (alsaa'i 1997: 137)

The third translator I chose for researching the translation of Shakespeare’s metaphoric language from English into Arabic is Nyazi whose contribution to the field is considered more updated and critical than that of the two previous translators. Nyazi has so far translated *Macbeth* (2000) and recently *Hamlet* (2008) each of which appeared with a critical introduction explaining how the translation was a response to bizarre interpretations on part of some translators leading them to commit astonishing errors in their translation of Shakespeare into Arabic. Criticizing Jabra’s translation of *Macbeth*, Nyazi questioned whether the reason behind the shortfalls in this translation was related to the richness and complex metaphoric content of the play, and why Jabra neglected that conceptual richness which is a main factor in making Shakespeare’s language powerful, as expressed in the following passage:

“Critics agree that what makes the poetry of Shakespeare powerful and moving is his metaphors, metonymies, and similes, in the first degree. Consequently, any translation which does not pay attention to this aspect must be considered shallow just like a dry fruit which looks wonderful but lacks the essence. There is no doubt that the translator was well aware of this truth, but the question is: why did he neglect it?” (2000: 24)

Nyazi criticized the early critical accounts of Jabra’s translations of Shakespeare for lacking clear criteria in judging these translations (2008: 17-18). For him, the shortfalls in Jabra’s translations have to do with the lack of attention to the metaphoric component of the plays, the literal translation of concepts and terms and the wrong interpretations of and additions to the original text as a result of Jabra’s exaggerated attempts to interpret concepts and images. According to Nyazi, Jabra’s faults are not to be underestimated as he could have consulted the annotated sources of Shakespeare’s works (2006). In the introduction to his recent translation of *Hamlet* (2008), Nyazi attributed the shortcomings in Jabra’s translation to his neglect of some of the stylistic techniques of Shakespeare like turning words into
concepts by repeating a ‘word’ in different occasions and contexts in order to highlight the variation in its semantic content and functions. Nyazi saw that Jabra also strayed where he dealt with the conceptual content of words inconsistently turning the text into fragmented strips, instead of producing a coherent, meaningful painting whose images are interwoven in a harmonious manner. Jabra’s weaknesses included skipping some metaphors (Nyazi 2008: 21) and rendering a handful of concepts and words arbitrarily (ibid., 22) without checking specialized English language sources (ibid., 6).

The fourth translator who was selected for the contrastive analysis of the empirical study is Badawi, known for his great interest in Shakespeare’s literature and its translation into Arabic. In 1966, Badawi wrote “Shakespeare and the Arabs” which discussed the translation of Shakespeare into Arabic and its influence on the Arabic language and literature. He also wrote *Background to Shakespeare* (1981) in which he provided a critical account and socio-cultural background of some Shakespearean plays. Badawi translated several Shakespearean plays some of which appeared in several editions and was interested in Shakespeare’s sources, historical and socio-cultural background and the critical studies of Shakespeare for his belief that these factors play an indispensable role in processing and representing the language of Shakespeare.

In his second edition of the translation of *Macbeth* (2009), Badawi referred to earlier translations of Shakespeare such as those of Jabra and Nyazi acknowledging their contribution to the translation of Shakespeare into Arabic. At the same time, he drew a distinction between those translations and his own translation declaring that his main objective was to represent the text in a simple language which facilitates its production on the Arab stage (ibid., 7-8). He also stressed the importance of experiencing the translation of Shakespeare clarifying that it is not enough to produce a single translation of Shakespeare as his texts can lend themselves to various interpretations and readings. Moreover, Badawi
showed a special interest in Shakespeare’s imagery emphasizing its function as a main component of the content of the plays and its implication for the translation of those plays and for reflecting the linguistic and stylistic features of the writer (Badawi 2009: 32).

Before I move to the first part of the empirical study, it is important to point out that there is much more than a historic review in this account of translating Shakespeare from English into Arabic. My choice of Shakespeare’s Arabic language translators was made in the light of a number of points. Although the four translators share the qualifications, tools, high sense of commitment, as well as personal and professional interest in Shakespeare’s metaphoric language, the contributions made by every translator seem to be highlighting different aspects of Shakespeare’s language and following different methods in the translation of metaphor into Arabic. It is far from fair to say that the selected translators were the only ones who showed excellence and variation in translating Shakespeare into Arabic. There are other equally important scholars whose contributions cannot be covered within the scope of this research. Jabra, Enani, Nyazi and Badawi were chosen for the purpose of the contrastive analysis, not only for their contribution to translating Shakespeare on a high level of accuracy and distinction. I also think they have shown a variation in approaching and processing the metaphoric content of the STs.

Now that I have reviewed the literature on the metaphoric language of Shakespeare and the translation of Shakespeare into Arabic, I will present the results of the first part of the empirical research in the light of the methodological framework which was set up in the previous chapter based on the cognitive approach to metaphor analysis. The results of the empirical study will also be listed according to the traditional types of metaphor, i.e. simile, metonymy, personification and idioms. The statistical output of the empirical research will be accompanied by a descriptive reading of the results to pave the way for a functional selection of the ST data that will be examined in the second part of the empirical study, namely the
contrastive analysis of the translation of creative metaphor in *Othello* and *Macbeth* from English into Arabic.

### 5.3 ST Data Extraction and Description

This section will examine the results of the data extraction and collection process from three angles. First, the data will be described as individual concepts (SD concepts and TD concepts) in terms of their distribution and frequency in the conceptual metaphoric mappings. Second, ST data will be quantified and qualified as primary metaphoric patterns that fall under the three models of conceptual metaphor: ontological metaphors, structural metaphors and image schemas. Third, the extracted data will be represented in terms of the distribution of traditional metaphor types in the metaphoric content of the ST comprising the categories of simile, personification, metonymy and symbols. Examining the results of the data collection process from these three perspectives is important for selecting the ST data that will be dealt with in the contrastive analysis.

For a start, I am going to illustrate the trends that distinguished the output of the first part of the empirical study (the data extraction and collection process) to see whether these results position Shakespeare’s metaphor within the main findings of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. The process of data extraction from the two STs resulted in a total of 1057 metaphoric patterns from *Othello* and 1238 metaphoric patterns from *Macbeth*. The extracted metaphoric patterns were listed under the general conceptual structure ‘TARGET DOMAIN IS SOURCE DOMAIN’. Before I narrow down the description of this conceptual structure to the three models that were introduced as a result of the modern research on conceptual metaphor, I will provide a quick reading of the concepts which appeared under SD and those which appeared under TD. By default, the results show that abstract concepts appeared predominantly in TD
fields, as opposed to SD fields which revealed a prevalence of physical concepts and processes. In order to exemplify this major observation about the conceptual representation of ST data, it is useful to examine the two tables below that provide a sample of the statistical results of data collection by SD/TD concepts:

| A Statistical Representation of Metaphoric Concepts in *Othello* by SD and TD |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------|----------|
| CONCEPT          | SD      | TD       |
| OBJECT           | 53      | 6        |
| PERSON           | 46      | 8        |
| ANIMAL           | 41      | 2        |
| CONTAINER        | 17      | 0        |
| HUNTING          | 3       | 0        |
| JOURNEY          | 2       | 0        |
| DELIVERY         | 2       | 0        |
| DEITY            | 4       | 23       |
| RACE             | 0       | 63       |
| JEALOUSY         | 0       | 18       |
| LOVE             | 4       | 130      |
| ANGER            | 1       | 6        |
| SORROW           | 1       | 12       |
| DEATH            | 1       | 5        |
| LIFE             | 1       | 11       |
| TIME             | 1       | 5        |

| A Statistical Representation of Metaphoric Concepts in *Macbeth* by SD and TD |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------|----------|
| CONCEPT          | SD      | TD       |
| OBJECT           | 134     | 17       |
| PLANT            | 12      | 0        |
| CONTAINER        | 30      | 0        |

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If we examine the two tables above, we notice that while concrete concepts such as OBJECT, PERSON, ANIMAL, CONTAINER and PLANT have a dominant presence in SD fields, abstract concepts such as DEITY, JEALOUSY, LOVE, ANGER, SORROW, LIFE, TIME, FEAR and POWER appear predominantly in TD fields. This initial observation positions Shakespeare’s metaphorical language within the framework of Conceptual Metaphor Theory as a process of abstraction which helps us understand abstract concepts such as EMOTION, LIFE, DEATH and POWER in terms of concrete concepts and processes such as OBJECTS, ANIMALS, PLANTS, HUNTING, DELIVERING and PEOPLE. The second observation is that simple concrete concepts such as OBJECT, ANIMAL and PERSON have a leading presence compared with complex physical concepts such as the CONTAINER concept, which comes in second position, and concepts that indicate processes and activities such as JOURNEY, THINKING and HUNTING. The results suggest that the latter have a marginal presence in the extracted data.
This takes me to the second approach to reading the results where I will survey the output of the data collection process on the level of the conceptual metaphoric patterns. The results reveal that the extracted metaphoric mappings fall under the three conceptual models of ontological metaphors, structural metaphors and image schemas (containment image schemas, path image schemas, orientational metaphors, etc.), as will be further clarified. As concrete concepts like OBJECTS have the highest rate of representation compared with complex concrete concepts like the concept of CONTAINER, which involves an image schema, and the concept of DELIVERY, which involves a structural metaphor, the frequency of the three models of conceptual metaphor in ST data is as follows, in descending order:

   Ontological metaphors
   Image schemas
   Structural metaphors

The classification of the collected metaphoric patterns by the three categories of conceptual metaphor is by no means a useless process. However, if it is conducted only to prove what has been already proven about the nature of conceptual metaphor as being embodied in our bodies and experiences, then, it will undermine the validity of the empirical study for two reasons. First, it will interrupt the analysis of the research results creating a gap between the findings of the first part of the empirical study and their implications for the second part of the analysis. Second, it will defeat the purpose behind the statistical account of the results which is meant to guide the contrastive analysis rather than limit its scope. For that reason, I will introduce some decontextualized examples of the three models of conceptual metaphor in a sample table listing some metaphoric patterns that were extracted from each ST. However, more examples will be provided and contextualized in the descriptive and contrastive part of the empirical study:
### Examples of Conceptual Metaphors in *Othello*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ontological Metaphors</th>
<th>Image Schemas</th>
<th>Structural Metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEITY HAS HUMAN TRAITS</td>
<td>THOUGHT IS A CONTAINER</td>
<td>CREATIVE THINKING IS DELIVERY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATIVE IDEAS ARE NEWBORN BABIES</td>
<td>THE BODY IS A CONTAINER</td>
<td>DECEIVING IS HUNTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIFE IS A HEAVY OBJECT</td>
<td>SORROW IS A FLOOD (A NATURAL FORCE)</td>
<td>LIFE IS A JOURNEY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEALOUSY IS A MONSTER</td>
<td></td>
<td>LOVE IS WAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SORROW IS A HEAVY OBJECT</td>
<td>ERRING IS FALLING (A DOWN ORIENTATION)</td>
<td>SERVING SELF-INTEREST IS LINING ONE’S COAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUTY IS A UNIFORM (OBJECT)</td>
<td>MUSIC IS A PHYSICAL FORCE THAT MOVES EMOTIONS</td>
<td>GETTING MARRIED IS BOARDING A WARSHIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICTIMS ARE FOOD FOR VICTIMIZER</td>
<td>ESCAPE HAS A DISTANCE ORIENTATION</td>
<td>HEARING IS DEVOURING</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Examples of Conceptual Metaphors in *Macbeth*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ontological Metaphors</th>
<th>Image Schemas</th>
<th>Structural Metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TIME IS A PLANT</td>
<td>DEITY IS UP (ORIENTATION)</td>
<td>DEATH IS SLEEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME IS A RIVER</td>
<td>TIME IS A CONTAINER</td>
<td>DEATH IS DEPARTURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME IS A VALUABLE OBJECT</td>
<td>LOVE IS A DIAMETRICAL CHANGE</td>
<td>LIFE IS A JOURNEY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT</td>
<td>THE MIND IS A CONTAINER</td>
<td>LOVE IS A DIAMETRICAL CHANGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIFE IS A STAGE</td>
<td>TIME IS A RIVER (MOVING OBJECT)</td>
<td>ASSUMING POWER IS WEARING CLOTHES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIFE IS A BUILDING</td>
<td>SMILE IS A CONTAINER</td>
<td>THINKING IS BENDING THE BRAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEATH IS A PERSON</td>
<td>THE EAR IS A CONTAINER</td>
<td>RULING PEOPLE IS GROWING PLANTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLEEP IS FOOD</td>
<td>THE BOSOM IS A CONTAINER</td>
<td>REACHING AUTHORITY IS ASCENDING A LADDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOVE IS A SHARP INSTRUMENT (OBJECT)</td>
<td>THE MIND IS A CONTAINER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HORROR IS A PHYSICAL FORCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The third reading of the results of the data collection process will be done in the light of the classical metaphor types of simile, personification, metonymy and symbols. The reason I am listing the category of idiomatic expressions under metaphor types is that they seem to play a functional role in generating metaphor in Shakespeare, especially in *Othello*, as the descriptive analysis will reveal. The upcoming analysis will show that reading the results by metaphor types has a double value for the cognitive and contrastive part of the analysis. First, it will highlight the earlier findings about the conceptual nature of Shakespeare’s metaphor. Second, it will serve to compare the cognitive approach to ‘the translation of metaphor’ with earlier text linguistic approaches (Section 3.3 on ‘the translatability of metaphor’). The initial results support the previous claim that ontological metaphors have a domineering presence in Shakespeare’s conceptual metaphor, as proven by the forceful presence of personification compared with other types of metaphor. Apart from other kinds of ontological metaphor such as JEALOUSY IS A MONSTER, LIFE IS A PLANT, TIME IS A SOLID OBJECT, personifications have the highest statistical value among other metaphor types representing about 12.5% of the metaphoric tokens in *Othello*, and nearly 19.5% of the metaphoric tokens in *Macbeth*, as shown in the following table of the results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistical Results of <em>Othello’s</em> Empirical Study by Metaphor Types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistical Results of <em>Macbeth’s</em> Empirical Study by Metaphor Types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The previous argument shows that analysing ST data in terms of the statistical results of traditional metaphor types says something about Shakespeare’s metaphor as a process of abstraction in the first degree. Furthermore, this quantification of ST data has another
advantage in that it highlights the comprehensiveness and objectivity of Cognitive Theory in dealing with metaphor as a process of thought. Indeed, if we look at the wide gap between the total number of tokens (conceptual patterns), on the one hand, and the number of metaphors that fall under classical metaphor types, on the other hand, we realize that dealing with metaphor from a purely linguistic perspective remains partial and falls well short of being an objective way of investigating metaphor. One reason behind this observation is that extracting ST data by traditional metaphor types does not cover the representations of two kinds of conceptual metaphor, namely image schemas and structural metaphor. For example, metaphoric patterns such as LOVE IS A DIAMETRICAL CHANGE, ASSUMING POWER IS ASCENDING A LADDER, CREATIVE THINKING IS DELIVERING, CREATIVE THINKING IS HUNTING and THE MIND IS A CONTAINER do not fall under any of the simple categories of personification, simile, idiomatic expressions, or metonymy. Rather, they reflect the presence of complex conceptual processes that take place as a result of the interaction between two patterns of conceptual metaphor at least, as will be further clarified in the analysis below.

5.4 ST Data Selection and Description

This section will focus on the identification and description of the ST data that were examined in the second part of the empirical study. After concluding the first part of the empirical study with a quantified and qualified description of the initial results, I decided to select the category of creative metaphor as the subject of the contrastive analysis. This decision evolved gradually based on certain observations that were gathered during the first phase of the empirical research. As indicated earlier in Chapter IV on ‘Research Methodology’, the objective behind the empirical study is to test the translation of metaphor
in a voluminous corpus that guarantees a high rate of data frequency. This dynamic is significant for detecting the main trends and factors that influence the translation process, which is why I was initially inclined to select ST data by the highest rate of frequency across concepts as in discussing ‘the translation of the metaphors of ‘jealousy’ and ‘anger’ in *Othello* and the metaphors of ‘death’ and ‘time’ in *Macbeth*. Alternatively, I considered selecting ST data by the highest frequency in the type of metaphor as in researching ‘the translation of personification in *Othello* and metonymy in *Macbeth*’. However, after concluding the process of data extraction and classification, I became more inclined towards conducting a fleshed out contrastive analysis which targets the factor of variation in the selected ST data, as well. Frequency alone does not guarantee objective and reliable results, unless coupled with a functional diversification in the research methods and variation in the conceptual content and structural features of the selected data. Variation in the conceptual content of a single concept or the structural pattern of a given metaphor is not adequate, which is why I chose the category of creative metaphor for the contrastive analysis. Creative metaphor covers a wide spectrum of conceptual and structural features that are found in almost all metaphoric content. This variation in the cognitive properties and schematic structure of the selected data allows for a greater probability in detecting the different trends that characterize the translation of metaphor.

The category of creative metaphor is different from the traditional types of metaphor in that it has not acquired a fixed status in the lexicon where there is a consensus on its definition and conceptual description. A creative metaphor used to be associated with some sort of conceptual originality where the metaphor producer would come up with a ‘new’ conceptual pattern that fascinates the recipients with its originality. However, this reasoning about metaphor creativity changed gradually as the premises of the Cognitive School reduced all human reasoning to universal conceptual patterns which are embedded in our bodies and
their daily physical interaction with our conceptual system, i.e. the mind. Accordingly, creativity does not seem to be attributed to a conceptual genius that emerges unexpectedly. Rather, it is the logical result of accumulating, extending and blending our past conceptual and physical experiences with present ones.

Lakoff and Turner were the first to discuss creative metaphor in relation to Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Kövesces 2010: 665). In More than Cool Reason (1989), they explained how the creative writer, the poet for example, employs certain cognitive techniques to generate creative metaphors out of conventional conceptual patterns. As explained in Chapter II (2.4.5 on ‘Creative Conceptual Metaphor’), the techniques of generating creative metaphors comprise “elaboration, extension, questioning, and combining.” (Kövesces 2010: 666). This view of creative metaphor highlights its structural aspects, regardless of its conceptual nature because it does not deal with it as an independent category with distinctive conceptual features. Since the Cognitive School maintains that there is no such thing as creative conceptual metaphor, what could be discussed in this context is structural issues that play a role in shaping our creative metaphoric thinking. This implies that in processing the creative metaphors of a certain text, we will end up with the three models of conceptual metaphor: ontological metaphors, structural metaphors and image schemas.

Consequently, to deconstruct or reconstruct a creative metaphor, we have to look at it as an image with structural associations between its basic conceptual patterns. This involves dealing with the structural relationship that organizes the basic conceptual patterns into a creative metaphoric unit. It could be a relationship of addition, i.e. compounding, or a relationship of expansion, i.e. stretching a basic conceptual structure to new levels of variation. To put it differently, if we are to deconstruct a creative metaphor into its main components, we will end up having conceptual metaphoric structures of the model TD IS SD, where the SD is usually a physical entity, physical process, or image schema. In the following
account, I will test the validity of this assumption in the extracted data of the ST in order to qualify and quantify the selected data that will be examined in the comparison between the ST corpus and the TT corpus in the next part of the analysis.

It is also worth noting that that the latest cognitive account of metaphor in use stressed the role and importance of exploring the cultural and contextual factors in processing the conceptual content of creative metaphors. In explicating a creative metaphoric structure, there are indirect contextual factors which could have influenced the production of the examined metaphor and which should be spotted in processing that metaphor objectively. Such factors will be explicited and annotated whenever necessary throughout the empirical analysis. For the purpose of facilitation, and in order to quantify the selected category of creative metaphor in the STs, I will define a creative metaphor as an image, i.e. a picture, which consists of basic conceptual metaphoric patterns that interact empirically and contextually in producing an original, conceptually integrated pictorial representation.

5.4.1 Creative Metaphor in Othello and Macbeth

Having presented the results of the first phase of the empirical study and selected the category of creative metaphor for the contrastive analysis, I would like to provide a quantitative and qualitative account of the selected ST data in the light of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. The creative metaphors that were collected from Othello reached 248, and those collected from Macbeth reached 233, which were deconstructed into 721 conceptual metaphors for the former, and 788 conceptual metaphors for the latter. Most creative metaphors extracted from the ST corpus appeared as images with the structure of conceptual clusters or simple metaphoric extensions. It is hard to classify the results under one fixed pattern structurally or conceptually as the variation in the structure of the metaphors is not only syntagmatic (in metaphor types), but also paradigmatic (in conceptual metaphors) where
all three models of conceptual metaphor (ontological metaphors, structural metaphors and image schemas) interact in producing the images. In order to explain this, I will give examples from the selected ST data and deconstruct them into their main conceptual components, clarifying how the process of creativity took place and what conceptual patterns took part in creating the images. The discussion of the examples will take place gradually, moving from less complicated metaphoric structures to more complicated ones. In other words, the analysis will first deal with extended metaphors then it will tackle blended metaphors in view of the heterogeneity in their conceptual and linguistic components, which makes the conceptual process of their integration rather complex.

The first example of an extended creative metaphor is taken from Othello and it represents a paradigmatic expansion of an ontological conceptual pattern where inanimate things such as the elements of nature ‘SEA and EBB’ and abstract concepts such as ‘THOUGHTS’ and ‘EMOTION’, ‘REVENGE’ are conceptualized in terms of the categories of ‘HUMAN BEINGS’ and ‘BEASTS’. This image is based on conceptualizing a mixture of thoughts and emotions in terms of clearly defined physical concepts, in which case all the metaphoric patterns belong to the model of ontological metaphor. In this form of creative metaphor, the mind of the text receiver needs to expend less cognitive effort in processing the conceptual associations of the image as a whole as it is based on the conceptual and structural extension of a single pattern, namely ontological metaphor:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>An Extended Ontological Metaphor</th>
<th>Conceptual Metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Like to the Pontic Sea, whose icy current and compulsive course ne’er feels retiring ebb (...) Even so my bloody thoughts, with violent pace, shall ne’er look back, ne’er ebb to humble love,</td>
<td>THE SEA IS A PERSON WHO FEELS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE COURSE OF THE SEA IS A COMPULSIVE PERSON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE COURSE OF THE SEA IS A PERSON WHO FEELS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EBBS ARE RETIRING PERSONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THOUGHTS ARE MOVING PERSONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THOUGHTS ARE PERSONS WHO LOOK BACK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second example of an extended ontological metaphor is taken from *Macbeth*. The example shows how universal elements and phenomena such as ‘NIGHT’, ‘DAY’, ‘DARKNESS’, ‘LIGHT’ and ‘EARTH’ are conceptualized in terms of human physical properties, emotions and experiences such as ‘PREDOMINANCE’, ‘SHAME’, ‘FACE’, ‘LIVING’ and ‘KISSING’. According to this conceptually integrated picture, the earth has a face covered with darkness, the night is a predominant person, the day feels shame, something that is for human beings to experience, and the light kisses the face of the earth.

As in the previous example, the structure of the creative image is based on a paradigmatic extension where all the metaphoric patterns are derived from the conceptual structure of ontological metaphor: ‘THE TD IS A PHYSICAL SD’. The following table demonstrates a conceptual representation of the extended image by its main conceptual units, mainly ontological metaphors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>An Extended Ontological Metaphor</th>
<th>Conceptual Metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Is’t night’s predominance, or the day’s Shame, That darkness does the face of earth entomb, When living light should kiss it?” (Macbeth, 2.4.8-10)</td>
<td>THE NIGHT IS A PREDOMINANT PERSON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE DAY IS A SHAMEFUL PERSON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE EARTH IS A PERSON (WITH A FACE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE EARTH IS A PERSON WHO IS BURIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DARKNESS IS A PERSON (GRAVEDIGGER WHO BURES THE FACE OF THE EARTH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIGHT IS A LIVING PERSON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIGHT IS A PERSON WHO KISSES THE FACE OF THE EARTH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The third example of an extended creative metaphor represents a different kind of conceptual extension, namely the extension of an image schema. Examples of image schemas include CONTAINER images, SCALES, ORIENTATIONS, PATHS and FORCES. The example I would like to discuss about the extension of an image schema to a creative metaphor is a container image taken from *Othello*. In this image, Othello envisages ‘THOUGHT’ as a ‘CONTAINER FOR IDEAS’ and then the image is extended to conceptualize ‘HORRIBLE CONCEIT’ in terms of ‘A HIDDEN OBJECT’ which is ‘shut up’ in the container of the ‘BRAIN’. This container image schema has a very simple extended metaphoric structure, but its creativity is based on merging the ontological metaphor ‘HORRIBLE IDEAS ARE MONSTERS’ with the container schema ‘BRAIN IS A CLOSED PLACE’ which we shut our ideas in. The extended metaphor is explicated in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>An Extended Image Schema (Container)</th>
<th>Conceptual Metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“As if there were some monster in his thought Too hideous to be shown (…) As if thou then hadst shut up in thy brain Some horrible conceit.” <em>(Othello, 3.3.107-115)</em></td>
<td>THOUGHT IS A CONTAINER FOR IDEAS BAD IDEAS ARE MONSTERS HIDDEN INSIDE THOUGHT HORRIBLE CONCEITS ARE OBJECTS HIDDEN INSIDE THE CONTAINER OF THE BRAIN THE BRAIN IS A CONTAINER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extended image schemas can be much more complicated in their conceptual structure than the above example as the extension could occur both vertically and horizontally, as will be explained in the following excerpt taken from *Macbeth*. The extended metaphor that is developed in the example below is drawn on stretching the image schema in almost all the three directions of surface orientation, horizontal expansion, as well as vertical expansion. The first image schema in the example is based on conceptualizing ‘TIME’, ‘intermission’, in
terms of ‘DISTANCE’ (cut short). Macduff wants the encounter with his enemy, Macbeth, to take place soon by visualizing the concept of ‘TIME’ as a sort of ‘HORIZONTAL EXPANSION’ that is shortened. Then, he expands the schematic visualization of the encounter by picturing himself and Macbeth in a face-to-face orientation against one another (SURFACE ORIENTATION), and the last image schema of this extended metaphor is when Macduff perceives Macbeth to be oriented in a vertical position within the ‘LENGTH’ of his sword.

The three image schemas that occur in this example are conventional conceptual metaphors that we use in our daily language but being put together in a multi-orientational expansion gives a new image that depicts the situation very accurately. This example shows that the structure of a metaphor that is extended from an image schema is more complex than the structure of an image that is extended from an ontological metaphor. The reason behind this observation is that an ontological metaphor has one sort of expansion, vertical, that is, whereas an extended image schema can have a clustered expansion which goes as far as the orientational association happens to take it (UP, DOWN, BACK, FORTH, INSIDE, OUTSIDE, etc.). The example is deconstructed by its main orientational metaphors in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>An Extended Image Schema</th>
<th>Conceptual Metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“But, gentle heavens, Cut short all intermission. Front to front Bring thou this fiend of Scotland and myself; Within my sword’s length set him; if he ‘scape, Heaven forgive him too!” (Macbeth, 4.3.231-235)</td>
<td>TIME HAS A DISTANCE ORIENTATION CHALLENGING IS HAVING A FRONT TO FRONT ORIENTATION WITH THE OBJECT OF CHALLENGE CHALLENGING IS HAVING THE OBJECT OF CHALLENGE IN A VERTICAL ORIENTATION (WITHIN THE SWORD’S LENGTH) THE FIEND OF SCOTLAND IS A METONYMY FOR MACBETH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following example presents another case of a creative metaphor extended from an image schema based on the concept of ‘FORCE’. In this example, Macbeth conceptualizes the emotion of ‘FEAR’ as a ‘PHYSICAL FORCE’ which ‘UNFIXES THE HAIR’, ‘MAKES THE HEART KNOCK AT THE RIBS’, ‘SHAKES’ his state and ‘SMOTHERS’ his performance. Once can perceive the image while picturing ‘FEAR’ as a physical ‘FORCE’ that runs through the whole body in a series of physical shocks. Once we conceptualize the first conceptual pattern of ‘EMOTION AS FORCE’, it becomes easier to the mind to work through the remaining extended structures which are brought up by means of a cognitive association between the mother image schema and the resulting image schemas, as the table below reveals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>An Extended Image Schema (FORCE)</th>
<th>Conceptual Metaphoric Mappings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“why do I yield to that suggestion Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair and make my seated heart knock at my ribs, (...) My thought (...) shakes so my single state of man that function is smother’d in surmise” (Macbeth, 1.3.134-141)</td>
<td>HORROR IS A PHYSICAL FORCE WHICH UNFIXES THE HAIR THE HEART IS A SEATED PERSON WHO KNOCKS THOUGHT IS A PHYSICAL FORCE WHICH SHAKES THE BODY HORROR IS A PHYSICAL FORCE WHICH SMOTHERS FUNCTION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now that I have given some examples of creative metaphors that are the result of extending an ontological conceptual metaphor or an image schema, I am going to provide examples of creative metaphors that are extensions of the third model of conceptual metaphor, namely, structural metaphor. In a structural metaphor, one cognitive process or experience is understood in terms of another cognitive process or experience as in ‘ARGUMENT IS WAR’ and ‘LOVE IS A JOURNEY’. The first example of an extended structural metaphor is taken from Othello where Iago says “which thing to do if this poor trash of Venice, whom I trash for his quick hunting, stand the putting on I’ll have our
Michael Cassio on the hip, abuse him to the Moor in the rank garb” (2.1.302-306). In this image, the SD of ‘HUNTING’ is projected onto the two TDs of ‘CONTROLLING’ and ‘DECEIVING’.

This metaphor consists of three ontological metaphors and three structural metaphors that involve conceptualizing an experiential process in terms of another. Both the ‘OBJECT OF CONTROL’ and ‘THE OBJECT OF DECEPTION’ appear in the image of hunting but while the ‘OBJECT OF CONTROL’ (Roderigo) appears as ‘AN UNTRAINED HUNTING DOG’ (a trash) or ‘THE SUBJECT OF HUNTING’, the ‘OBJECT OF DECEPTION’ (Cassio) appears twice as ‘THE OBJECT OF HUNTING’ (clutched on the hip and abused in the rank garb). The two conceptual metaphors of ‘THE OBJECT OF CONTROL AS AN UNTRAINED HUNTING DOG/THE SUBJECT OF HUNTING’ and ‘THE OBJECT OF DECEPTION AS THE OBJECT OF HUNTING’ are ontological metaphors that involve mapping one physical concept onto another. On the other hand, the three conceptual patterns of ‘CONTROLLING IS TRASHING (RESTRAINING A DOG)’, ‘DECEIVING IS CATCHING THE OBJECT OF DECEPTION ON THE HIP (HUNTING)’ and ‘DECEIVING IS ABUSING THE OBJECT OF DECEPTION IN THE RANK GARB’ are structural metaphors that involve understanding a conceptual process in terms of a physical one. The following representation illustrates the components of this extended image:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>An Extended Structural Metaphor</th>
<th>Conceptual Metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Which thing to do if this poor trash of Venice, whom I trash for his quick hunting, stand the putting on I’ll have our Michael Cassio on the hip,</td>
<td>THE OBJECT OF CONTROL IS A TRASH (AN UNTRAINED HUNTING DOG/SUBJECT OF HUNTING) CONTROLLING IS TRASHING (RESTRAINING A DOG) THE OBJECT OF DECEPTION IS THE OBJECT OF HUNTING (CAUGHT ON THE HIP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 ‘A trash’ is “an untrained dog; a worthless hound” (Shakespeare 1886: 121).
4 ‘To trash’ means to “restrain” (ibid., 122).
abuse him to the Moor in the rank garb”

(Othello, 2.1.302-306)

| DECEIVING IS CATCHING THE OBJECT OF DECEPTION ON THE HIP (HUNTING) |
| THE OBJECT OF DECEPTION IS THE OBJECT OF HUNTING (ABUSED IN THE RANK GARB) |
| DECEIVING IS ABUSING THE OBJECT OF DECEPTION IN THE RANK GARB |

The second example of a structural metaphor is also taken from Othello, and it is an excerpt by Brabantio, Desdemona’s father, in which he conceptualizes ‘GRIEF’ (‘EMOTION’) as ‘ROBBERY’ (‘EXPERIENCE’ or ‘PROCESS’). For Brabantio, ‘SMILING’ involves ‘STEALING FROM THE THIEF’ and ‘GRIEVING’ involves ‘SELF-ROBBERY’. Consequently, both emotions of ‘SMILING’ and ‘GRIEVING’ are conceptualized as processes of theft. The difference is that while the first conceptual process, ‘SMILING’, involves ‘STEALING FROM THE THIEF’, the second, ‘GRIEVING’, involves ‘ROBBING ONESELF’. It is noticed that this structural image was based on an earlier extended ontological metaphor that conceptualized ‘THE OBJECT OF LOVE’ as ‘A PRECIOUS OBJECT’ and ‘THE LOVER OF THE OBJECT OF LOVE’ as ‘A THIEF’. In an advanced stage, Shakespeare developed the ontological metaphor into an extended structural metaphor as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>An Extended Structural Metaphor</th>
<th>Conceptual Metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“The robb’d that smiles steals something from the thief; He robs himself that spends a bootless grief” (Othello, 1.3.208-209)</td>
<td>SMILING IS STEALING FROM THE THIEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GRIEVING IS STEALING ONESELF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE OBJECT OF GRIEF IS AN OBJECT OF ROBBERY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 “To catch, or have, on the hip, means ‘to have at an entire advantage’. The phrase seems to have originated from hunting, because when the animal pursued is seized upon the hip, it is finally disabled from flight. Dr Johnson once thought the phrase was taken from the art of wrestling, but he corrected his opinion at a subsequent period, and in his Dictionary derives it from hunting.” (Shakespeare 1826 :17)
The following account will deal with two extended structural metaphors that are taken from *Macbeth*. In the first example, Shakespeare depicts the process of ‘FIGHTING’ in terms of the experience of ‘SWIMMING’, which is a structural metaphor based on understanding one experience or process in terms of another. According to this image, ‘ARMIES’ are visualized as ‘SWIMMERS’; ‘FIGHTING’ as ‘COMPETING IN SWIMMING’ and ‘LOSING GROUND’ as ‘CHOKING ONE’S SKILL’ in the waters of the ‘BATTLEFIELD’. The second example involves extending the image of ‘RULING AS PLANTING’. In this example, King Duncan imagines himself as a ‘FARMER’, the ‘PEOPLE’ as ‘PLANTS’ and ‘RULING PEOPLE’ as ‘GROWING PLANTS’, which involves caring for them as one cares for one’s own plants. In response to this, Banquo replies, by extending the same structural metaphor, that the “the harvest is yours” (1.4.33). This is a structural metaphor that conceptualizes the experience of ‘GAINING LOYALTY’ in terms of the process of ‘HARVESTING’. The following table illustrates the metaphoric mappings that were used in bringing about the extended structural metaphors discussed above:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>An Extended Structural Metaphor</th>
<th>Conceptual Metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Doubtful it stood; as two spent swimmers, that do cling together and choke their art” (Macbeth, 1.2.7-9)</td>
<td>FIGHTING IS SWIMMING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE BATTLEFIELD IS A SEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARMIES ARE SWIMMERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CLINGING TOGETHER IS CHOKING ONE’S SKILL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I have begun to plant thee, and will labour To make thee full of growing (...) There if I grow, The harvest is your own.”</td>
<td>THE KING IS A FARMER (PERSON)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE PEOPLE ARE PLANTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RULING IS PLANTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHOWING LOYALTY IS BECOMING FULLY GROWN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 “the simile is drawn from two persons swimming for a trial of their skill, and as they approach near the goal, they are supposed to cling together and strive to hinder each other in their progress; an operation inconsistent with their being tired and spent, but well agreeing with their being expert in their art (...) That is, drown each other by rendering their skill in swimming useless.” (Shakespeare 1873: 9)
Now that I have discussed how creative metaphors in Shakespeare can be extended from one of the three models of conceptual metaphor, I am going to deal with the second type of creative metaphor referred to previously as ‘blended creative metaphor’. A blended creative metaphor is a complicated metaphoric structure that comprises at least two heterogeneous conceptual metaphors. For example, a blended image can be a conglomerate of an ontological metaphor, structural metaphor and an image schema, where the variation in the content of the image takes place in the form of a variation in the distribution as well as volume of its kernel metaphoric patterns. Before I explain the process of conceptual blending by examples, it is worth noticing that the previous category of creative metaphor, i.e. extended images, did not comprise in all the cases one model of conceptual metaphor, i.e. a purely extended image schema or a purely extended structural metaphor. In most examples, the extended metaphoric structure comprised at least one ontological metaphor and an extended structural metaphor or image schema. This is normal if we are to take into account the pervasiveness of ontological metaphors compared with structural metaphors and image schemas. In a way, ontological metaphors are the point of departure for the two other patterns of conceptual metaphors. If we re-examine the previous examples, we notice that each case involved the presence of an ontological metaphor at least:

THE BRAIN IS A CONTAINER

THE OBJECT OF GRIEF IS AN OBJECT OF ROBBERY (PRECIOUS OBJECT)

THE ARMY IS A SWIMMER

THE KING IS A FARMER

PEOPLE ARE PLANTS
The main criterion, therefore, in judging whether an image is extended or blended is not only to examine its conceptual structure, but also to look at it as one conceptual whole and see whether it projects one image or several mini images which appear in the form of different cognitive processes. In the previous examples about extended creative metaphors, the collective metaphoric structure in each case triggers in our minds only one image which can be summed up in a single experiential field such as: ‘HUNTING’, ‘FIGHTING’, ‘HIDING’, ‘CONFRONTING’, ‘SWIMMING’ and ‘FARMING’. In the case of a blended metaphoric cluster, there are at least two images which are merged together in conceptualizing a certain conceptual process. For more clarification, I am going to provide examples from the two STs to show how the clustering of creative metaphors takes place on the level of different conceptual metaphors and different cognitive experiences.

The first example of a blended creative metaphor is taken from Othello, and it is a mixture of two images which comprise two structural metaphors and one image schema. The context of the excerpt is Iago’s talk to Roderigo about how he would not show his feelings of hatred to Othello, otherwise he would be exposing himself to danger. In the first part of the image, Iago conceptualizes ‘EXPOSING ONE’S FEELINGS’, i.e. EXPOSING ONESELF TO DANGER, as ‘WEARING ONE’S HEART ON ONE’S SLEEVE’ with the ‘HEART’ being visualized as ‘CLOTHING’. In the second part of the image, Iago conceptualizes his potential ‘ENEMIES’ or ‘HARMFUL PEOPLE’ as ‘DAWS’ that cause him pain and harm throughout the process of ‘PECKING AT HIS HEART’. This creative metaphor conceptualizes the cognitive experience of EXPOSING ONESELF TO DANGER as two different processes: WEARING THE HEART ON THE SLEEVE and HAVING THE DAWS PECK AT THE HEART. It might be interesting to notice that the first part of the image involves an implied image schema where the concept of the ‘HEART’ is moved from the ‘INSIDE’ of a ‘CONTAINER’, the body, to the outside surface of that container.
‘SLEEVE’. Therefore, the image is actually much more complicated than it seems as the
image schema is not indicated directly although it is there conceptually. The following table
provides a detailed analysis of the image by its constituent conceptual metaphors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A Blended Metaphor</th>
<th>Conceptual Metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“But I will wear my heart upon my sleeve” for daws to peck at”8”</td>
<td>THE HEART IS CLOTHING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Othello, 1.1.64-65)</td>
<td>EXPOSING ONE’S INNER FEELINGS IS WEARING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ONE’S HEART ON ONE’S SLEEVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HARMFUL PEOPLE ARE RAVENS (ANIMAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EXPOSED PEOPLE ARE FOOD FOR RAVENS (HARMFUL PEOPLE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HARMING OTHERS IS PECKING AT THEIR HEARTS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is interesting to notice that the above example has an idiomatic component that could be
viewed as having a fixed semantic content rather than as a conceptual part of the creative
image. I listed the example under the category of creative metaphors for two reasons. First,
this issue is related to the etymology of language as the expression has been traced back to
Shakespeare (a Shakespearean expression), which means that it was very likely to have been
considered creative at the time it was coined. Second, the first part of the expression ‘wear
my heart upon my sleeve’ did not appear on its own, as it does in modern day dictionaries.
Rather, the idiomatic component was presented as an indispensable part of an integrated
image where ‘wearing one’s heart on one’s sleeve’ involves the danger of having the ‘daws
peck at it’. More on the role of idiomatic expressions in conceptualizing creative metaphors
will be discussed in the second part of the analysis, i.e. the contrastive analysis on the
translation of creative metaphor in Shakespeare.

7 “wear one’s heart on one’s sleeve to allow one’s emotions, esp one’s love for sb, to be seen.” (OED 5th ed. 1995: 1349)
8 “The eye that mocks a father and scorns to obey a mother will be picked out by the ravens of the valley and eaten by the vultures.” (Ryken et al 1998: 352)
The second example of a blended metaphor comprises the three types of conceptual metaphor: ontological metaphor, structural metaphor and image schema. The example is taken from *Othello* where Iago conceptualizes the conceptual process of ‘CREATIVE THINKING’ in terms of two different physical experiences: ‘HUNTING’ and ‘DELIVERY’. In the same creative metaphor, the conceptual process of ‘CREATIVITY’ is also conceptualized as a physical ‘FORCE’ which ‘plucks out’ the brains altogether. Consequently, the image comprises three conceptual metaphors: two are structural metaphors (thinking of a process in terms of another process), and one is an image schema (thinking of a process in terms of the concept of ‘FORCE’). In the first part of the creative metaphor, ‘INVENTION’ is conceptualized as ‘BIRDLIME’, ‘BRAIN’ as ‘FRIEZE’ and ‘CREATIVITY’ as a ‘FORCE’. In the second part of the image, ‘CREATIVITY’ is conceptualized as ‘THE MUSE’, ‘CREATIVE THINKING’ as ‘LABOURING’ and ‘CREATIVE IDEAS’ as ‘NEW-BORNS’. If we visualize the whole image in our mind’s eye, we realize that it is actually made up of two mini-images or pictures that are merged by combining different conceptual metaphors and projecting two different processes, ‘HUNTING’ and ‘DELIVERY’, on a single experience ‘CREATIVE THINKING’. Here is the representation of the metaphoric patterns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A Blended Image</th>
<th>Conceptual Metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“my invention comes from my pate as birdlime does from frieze; It plucks out brains and all: but my Muse labors, and thus she is deliver'd.” <em>(Othello, 2.1.125-128)</em></td>
<td>CREATIVITY IS A PHYSICAL FORCE (PLUCKING OUT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CREATIVE THINKING IS BIRDLIME (THE STICKY MATERIAL OF HUNT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BRAIN IS FRIEZE (COVERING THE BODY OF THE OBJECT OF HUNT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CREATIVITY IS MUSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CREATIVE THINKING IS LABOURING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CREATIVE IDEAS ARE NEWBorns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The third example of a blended image is an excerpt from *Macbeth*. The example is a monologue in which Macbeth uses seven structural metaphors and nine ontological metaphors to describe the concept of ‘SLEEP’ in six different images. The mini images which are brought together in a creative conceptualization of the concept of ‘SLEEP’ appear in the following order: ‘MURDERING’, ‘KNITTING’, ‘DYING’, ‘BATHING’, ‘HEALING’ and ‘FEASTING’. Although the different parts of the metaphor appear in different images, they still represent one creative metaphorical structure as all the mini images (processes) are set to describe a single TD, namely ‘SLEEP’. On the one hand, we can imagine ‘SLEEP’ as an ‘INNOCENT PERSON’ who is doing the ‘KNITTING’ and who is ‘KILLED’ by Macbeth. On the other hand, and in the same image, we imagine another ‘PERSON’ who is ‘FEASTING ON SLEEP’, ‘USING SLEEP AS BALM’ and ‘HAVING SLEEP AS A BATH’ to wash away the fatigue of the day. Therefore, this cluster of structural and ontological metaphors introduces three active agents who are leading the experiential processes at the same time: a ‘MURDERER’, a ‘KNITTER’ and a representative of an ‘EVERYMAN’ who takes sleep as a ‘BATH’, ‘MEDICINE’ and ‘FOOD’. It is a highly creative image with a complicated conceptual structure and the complexity of this image could very well be a challenge for any translator although it consists of conventional conceptual metaphors all of which are drawn from our daily experiences. The following patterning provides a conceptual representation of the main metaphoric mappings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A Blended Image</th>
<th>Conceptual Metaphoric Mappings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Macbeth does murder sleep, the innocent sleep, sleep that knits up the ravell’d sleeve of care, the death of each day’s life, sore labour’s bath,”</td>
<td>INSOMNIA IS THE MURDER OF SLEEP (STRUCTURAL)  SLEEP IS THE OBJECT OF MURDER (PERSON/ONTOLOGICAL)  SLEEP IS AN INNOCENT VICTIM (PERSON/ONTOLOGICAL)  SLEEPING IS KNITTING UP THE RAVELLED SLEEVE OF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>balm of hurt minds,</td>
<td>CARE (STRUCTURAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>great nature’s second course,</td>
<td>SLEEP IS A KNITTER (PERSON/ONTOLOGICAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chief nourisher in life’s feast”</td>
<td>CARE IS CLOTHING (ONTOLOGICAL)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Macbeth, 2.2.33-37)

| SLEEP IS THE DEATH OF EACH DAY’S LIFE (STRUCTURAL) |
| DAY IS A PERSON WHO LIVES AND DIES (ONTOLOGICAL) |
| SLEEPING IS BATHING (STRUCTURAL) |
| LABOUR IS THE OBJECT OF BATHING (ONTOLOGICAL) |
| SLEEPING IS HEALING (STRUCTURAL) |
| SLEEP IS BALM (ONTOLOGICAL) |
| MIND IS THE OBJECT OF HEALING (ONTOLOGICAL) |
| SLEEPING IS HAVING THE MAIN COURSE IN LIFE’S FEAST (STRUCTURAL) |
| LIVING IS HAVING A FEAST (STRUCTURAL) |
| SLEEP IS A NOURISHER (ONTOLOGICAL) |

The next example of a blended metaphor is also taken from *Macbeth*, and it is an excerpt spoken by Macduff after finding out about Duncan’s murder. The image consists of three structural metaphors, five ontological metaphors and one image schema, dealing with the concept of ‘MURDER’ by merging the three experiences of ‘PRODUCING A MASTERPIECE’, ‘BREAKING INTO A TEMPLE’ and ‘STEALING THE LIFE OF THE KING’. There are two agents in producing this picture: ‘CONFUSION’ depicted as an ‘ARTIST’ who produces the whole scene of murder as a ‘MASTERPIECE’, and ‘MURDER’ depicted as a ‘CRIMINAL’ who ‘BREAKS INTO’ the ‘TEMPLE’ (THE BODY OF THE KING), ‘DESTROYS’ it, and then ‘STEALS’ the most ‘PRECIOUS OBJECT’ inside it, i.e. the ‘LIFE OF THE KING’. This very vivid image involves a striking conceptual
contradiction between the two domains of ‘PRODUCING A MASTERPIECE’ and ‘MURDERING’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A Blended Image</th>
<th>Conceptual Metaphoric Mappings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Confusion now hath made his masterpiece! most sacrilegious murder hath broke ope the Lord’s anointed temple, and stole thence the life o’ th’ building!” (Macbeth, 2.3.66-69)</td>
<td>MURDERING IS PRODUCING A MASTERPIECE (STRUCTURAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONFUSION IS AN ARTIST (ONTOLOGICAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MURDER IS A MASTERPIECE (A WORK OF ART/ONTOLOGICAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MURDERING IS BREAKING INTO A TEMPLE (STRUCTURAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MURDER IS A PHYSICAL FORCE (BREAKS OPEN/IMAGE SCHEMA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE KING’S BODY IS THE LORD’S ANOINTED TEMPLE (ONTOLOGICAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MURDERING IS STEALING (STRUCTURAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE KING’S BODY IS A BUILDING (ONTOLOGICAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIFE IS A PRECIOUS OBJECT (ONTOLOGICAL)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last blended metaphor I would like to discuss is Macbeth’s final soliloquy. The master image in this example provides a visual representation of the concept of ‘LIFE’ in two mini pictures which will be discussed individually as each evokes a different image in the reader’s mind. The first part of the image consists of three image schemas, three ontological metaphors and a structural metaphor. In this picture, we see three agents who control the overall structure of the ‘LIVING AS MOVING FORWARD’ image schema. ‘TOMORROW’ is moving forward slowly or ‘creeping’ towards its destination of ‘THE LAST SYLLABLE OF RECORDED TIME’ (MOVEMENT SCHEMA and DESTINATION SCHEMA), and, at the same time, ‘FOOLS’ are heading towards the destination of ‘DEATH’ (DESTINATION SCHEMA). In the same picture, we can also see a third agent who controls
the metaphoric content of another mini-image appearing as a structural metaphor. We see ‘YESTERDAY’ as a ‘PERSON’ who is holding the light up for ‘FOOLS’ to see their way to ‘DUSTY DEATH’. This metaphor is extended from the structural metaphor ‘LIFE IS A JOURNEY’ which requires someone, ‘YESTERDAY’, to light the way ahead of us so that we can continue the journey and reach our destination of ‘DEATH’ safely. The image is not simple, but it can be visualized it if we divide it into smaller experiential processes highlighting ‘WHO’ is doing ‘WHAT’.

The second part of the soliloquy projects a completely different picture controlled by the image of ‘LIVING AS ACTING’. In this picture, we have three main agents: the first is Macbeth who ‘BLOWS OUT’ the ‘CANDLE OF LIFE’, the second is ‘LIFE’ walking as a ‘SHADOW’ and the third is ‘LIFE’ moving as an ‘ACTOR’. This image comprises four structural metaphors: ‘TAKING ONE’S LIFE AS BLOWING OUT A CANDLE’ (agent is Macbeth), ‘LIVING AS WALKING’ (agent is life), ‘LIVING AS ACTING’ (agent is life) and ‘EXPERIENCING LIFE AS LISTENING TO A TALE’ (agent is the audience because the sentence is in the passive). Also, the image comprises six ontological metaphors and two image schemas. In the first image schema, the writer depicts life as a ‘brief candle’. As a metonymy for ‘SHORTLIVED’, ‘BRIEF’ involves conceptualizing ‘LIFETIME IN A DISTANCE ORIENTATION’. The second image schema is that of the ‘CONTAINER’ image where ‘LIFE’ is conceptualized as an ‘ACTOR’ who is a ‘FULL’ of ‘FURY AND SOUND’ (THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS SCHEMA). The following table provides a detailed representation of the conceptual metaphors involved in creating the two images of ‘LIFE AS MOVEMENT’ and ‘LIFE AS A PLAY’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A Blended Image</th>
<th>Conceptual Metaphoric Mappings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,</td>
<td>THE PASSING OF TIME IS MOVING FORWARD (PATH IMAGE SCHEMA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“Out, out, brief candle!
Life’s but a walking shadow,
a poor player
that struts and frets his hour upon
the stage and then is heard no more
it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
signifying nothing.”

(\textit{Macbeth, 5.5.23-28})

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
creeps in this petty pace from day to day & TOMORROW IS A MOVING OBJECT (ONTOLOGICAL) \\
to the last syllable of recorded time, & TIME IS A WRITTEN MATERIAL (ONTOLOGICAL) \\
and all our yesterdays have lighted fools & THE LAST SYLLABLE OF RECORDED TIME IS A \\
the way to dusty death.” & DESTINATION (IMAGE SCHEMA) \\
(\textit{Macbeth, 5.5.19-23}) & GIVING WISDOM IS LIGHTING THE WAY \\
& (STRUCTURAL) \\
& YESTERDAY IS A GUIDE WHO LIGHTS THE WAY FOR \\
& US (ONTOLOGICAL) \\
& DEATH IS A DESTINATION (AN IMAGE SCHEMA) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

The previous examples on extended and blended creative metaphors in \textit{Othello} and \textit{Macbeth} are in line with one of the main findings of Conceptual Metaphor Theory that conceptual creativity is not a pure process of inventing novel conceptual models. Rather, it is
a conceptual process of deconstructing and reconstructing already existing basic conceptual metaphors that are embedded in our physical experiences on all levels: bodily experiences (universal), cultural experiences and individual experiences. This finding has its implications for the translation of metaphor in that it highlights the translatability of metaphor as an experiential conceptual process subject to the same physically grounded processes that influence our thinking and conceptualization. This is what the second part of the empirical research will try to test in the next two chapters.

To sum up, this chapter covered the first and second phase of the empirical research. The chapter started with a general survey of the literature on Shakespeare’s language and imagery followed by a review of the translation of Shakespeare into Arabic (sections 5.1 and 5.2). The third section dealt with the extraction, quantification and qualification of ST data according to the cognitive approach to data identification and collection (phase I). The results of the empirical study were surveyed on the level of: (a) the SD and TD concepts that had a dominant presence in the statistical output; (b) the three models of conceptual metaphor (ontological metaphors, structural metaphors and image schemas); and (c) the traditional types of metaphor (personification, simile, metonymy and idioms). The fourth section discussed the selection criteria of the ST data that were examined in the contrastive analysis based on the factors of variation and mutation in their structural and conceptual components. The selected ST data, i.e. the creative metaphors that were extracted from the two plays, were quantified and analysed according to the two models of extended creative metaphors and blended creative metaphors.
CHAPTER SIX
A CONTRASTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSLATION OF CREATIVE METAPHOR IN OTHELLO and MACBETH

This chapter consists of four sections that discuss the phases, processes and results of the contrastive text analysis of the selected ST data vis-à-vis their equivalents in the TT corpus. As mentioned in the previous chapter on the processes of data collection, quantification and selection from the ST corpus, the contrastive analysis will adopt a cognitive approach to the translation of creative metaphor in Othello and Macbeth from English into Arabic. The chapter will start with a discussion of the criteria of TT data extraction and qualification in terms of the shifts and loss that influenced the ST data analysed. The first section will deal with TT data qualification by losses. The second section will discuss TT data qualification by shifts. The third section will tackle TT data qualification by classical metaphor types, and the fourth section will present the results of the contrastive study.

As mentioned in Chapter IV (4.1 on ‘the Tools of the Empirical Research’), for investigating the translation of creative metaphor in Othello, I dealt with the translations of Jabra (1986), Badawi (2009) and Enani (2005). For the translation of creative metaphor in Macbeth, I analysed the translations of Jabra (1986), Badawi (2009) and Nyazi (2000). This brings the total of the corpus which I dealt with in the empirical research to eight texts: two were the objects of the ST empirical study, and six provided the material for the TT contrastive analysis, which will be discussed in detail in the following sections.

The ST data that was selected for the contrastive analysis of the translation of creative metaphor in Shakespeare comprise 248 cases in Othello and 233 cases in Macbeth, which were deconstructed into 721 conceptual metaphors for the first and 788 conceptual metaphors for the second. It is important to observe the difference between the number of cases, i.e.
creative metaphors, on the one hand, and the total number of metaphoric patterns which are conceptual metaphors appearing in the form of ontological metaphors, structural metaphors and image schemas, on the other hand. My reference to the ST tokens as cases is related to their complex structure, as each case of creative metaphor consists of of a number of conceptual metaphors that are extended or merged in a new metaphoric model or image. As for the process of data extraction and qualification in the six TTs, it was conducted in the light of the contextualized ST data. In other words, the verbal context of the metaphor was preserved along with annotations about the extra-textual factors that could have played a role in producing its conceptual content such as historical issues, cultural issues, mythological references, Biblical references, idiomatic content and stylistic features.

The Arabic ‘equivalent’ of each selected case was inserted in the table along with its back translation and the conceptual metaphors that were involved in producing the translated cases according to the ‘TD IS SD’ model. Considering the problems associated with the technique of back translation⁹, it is worth noting that it was not used in the analysis as a tool for evaluating the accuracy of the TTs in representing the STs’ metaphoric content. Rather, it was used to identify the conceptual, cultural and communicative variations (mutation) across the SL and TL, on the one hand, and the different versions of translation, i.e. the TTs, on the other hand. The process of comparison between ST metaphoric patterns and TT metaphoric patterns involved the following (a) reference to any loss in ST data in the Arabic language equivalent; and (b) reference to any shift in ST data and extracting the equivalent TT conceptual metaphor(s) which emerged as a result of the shift. During the process of extracting TT data and comparing them with ST data, reference was also made to any losses

⁹ These problems comprise the lack of a fully accurate correspondence between the ST components and their TT counterparts (Brislin 1970) and the ambiguity or nonsensicality of certain TT components when translated back literally (Weller in Krawutschke 2008: 47).
or shifts in ST data by metaphor types, as the quantification of the results will show in an advanced stage.

The process of the contrastive analysis was conducted for each TT individually where the results were presented in six tables that embraced the previous model. Before I unfold the results of the contrastive research process, I would like to dwell on the standards that guided the analysis in terms of identifying losses and shifts in the translated texts throughout the process of contrasting ST data with TT data. The standards of identifying losses or shifts in ST data will be explained in the next two sections with examples from all TTs about the kind of mutation that influenced ST data and an explanation of how this mutation has influenced the conceptual content of the ST.

6.1 TT Data Qualification by Losses

In this section, I will provide examples of how the losses were identified in the TTs throughout the process of the contrastive analysis. The contrastive study has revealed that there were losses in some ST data because of certain translation procedures or processes that will be discussed below. What I mean by ‘loss’ is missing one conceptual metaphor at least from ST data, as a result of deleting part/all of the metaphor or as a result of opting for Formal Equivalence, Semantic Equivalence, or Functional Equivalence in translating the conceptual content of the metaphor. In the two cases of deletion and Functional Equivalence, there tends to be a loss in both the SD and TD of the conceptual metaphor most of the time. Conversely, when the loss appears as a result of opting for Semantic Equivalence, it is most likely to affect one part of the metaphoric mapping, SD or TD, although sometimes there could be a loss in both SD and TD. In opting for Formal Equivalence, both SD and TD tend to be preserved in the TT. Nonetheless, due to a misunderstanding of the SD’s actual
reference or a variation between English and Arabic in conceptualizing the reference, the translation could lead to a loss in both the metaphoric and semantic content of the metaphor leading to an equivalent with a zero cognitive value in the TL.

The first translation procedure to be discussed in relation to loss in ST data is deletion. As the name of the procedure indicates, deletion implies loss in both the SD and TD of the conceptual metaphor. In the course of the analysis, the deletion of a conceptual metaphor will be referred to as ‘Zero Equivalence’ since it involves a loss in the metaphoric as well as semantic content of the relevant metaphor and Semantic Equivalence is considered the minimum level of equivalence to be achieved in any process of translation. In fact, the contrastive analysis has revealed that deletion was the least prominent phenomenon to be detected as causing loss in ST data to the degree it was barely observed without a rigid scrutiny of the ST and TT going through them word by word. The first example of deletion is taken from Macbeth when the protagonist says “Wake Duncan with thy knocking” (2.2.71), a metaphor which involves the structural conceptual pattern ‘DEATH IS SLEEP’. If we examine Nyazi’s translation of the text (2000), we notice that the metaphor was taken out of the TT altogether, i.e. deleted with both its SD and TD. Moving to less clear examples of deletion, I would like to draw on samples taken from the translations of Othello. One such example is Jabra’s translation of Othello’s pronouncement “I took by the throat the circumcised dog” (5.2.355) as:

أمسكت بالكلب من عنقه وضربته (Jabra 1986)

Back translation: “I took the dog by the throat and hit him”

This metaphor is made up of two parts: the first is a metonymic reference to the ‘MOSLEM ENEMY’ as ‘CIRCUMCISED’, and the second is an ontological metaphor which depicts an ‘ENEMY AS A DOG/INFERIOR SPECIES’. The loss in the metaphor took place in its first part, i.e. the metonymic reference, which was deleted in the TT. Another example, also taken from Othello, is Badawi’s translation of “Trifles light as air are to the jealous
confirmations strong as proofs of holy writ” (3.3.322-324). This example comprises two conceptual metaphors: the first is an image schema which is drawn from conceptualizing ‘TRIVIAL THINGS’ in terms of a weight measure, ‘LIGHT AS AIR’, and the second is an ontological metaphor which is based on conceptualizing ‘CONFIRMATIONS’ as ‘PROOFS OF HOLY WRIT’. The loss in the metaphor took place in the first mapping which was deleted in the TT and appeared as follows:

الأشياء التافهة مثل هذا المنديل عند الرجل الغيران لها وقع الأدلة والإثباتات القوية كما لو كانت براهين مصدرها

Back translation: “Trivial things, like this handkerchief, are to the jealous man strong evidence and confirmations as if they were proofs of the sacred book”

A further example of loss in ST data as a result of deletion is Enani’s translation of Iago’s reference to Desdemona as someone who “could give out such a seeming, to seal her father’s eyes up close as oak” (Othello 3.3.209-210). This image consists of two conceptual metaphors: a structural metaphor that conceptualizes the process of ‘DECEPTION’ in terms of a practice taken from the field of ‘FALCONRY’, ‘DECEIVING IS SEALING UP THE EYES OF THE OBJECT OF DECEPTION’, and an ontological metaphor that conceptualizes ‘THE OBJECT OF DECEPTION AS AN OBJECT OF FALCONRY/HAWK’. The loss in the metaphor took place in the second part of the image where Enani deleted the reference to ‘HAWK’ in the TT coming up with the following translation:

"لقد تظاهرت فغممت عيني أبيها بالخداع المحكم"

Back translation: “She pretended sealing her father’s eyes up with full deception”

It is noticed in the last three examples of loss as a result of deletion that the TDs of ‘ENEMY’, ‘TRIVIAL THINGS’ and ‘OBJECT OF DECEPTION’ were all preserved in the TTs, which contradicts the earlier claim that a loss which is caused by deletion involves an

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10 This is an “allusion to the practice of sealing a hawk, or sewing up its eyelids, by running a fine thread through them, in order to make her tractable and endure the hood of which we have already spoken.” (Dyer 2004: 119)
omission of both SD and TD concepts. The answer to this is related to the structure of creative metaphors as images which are created by extending a conceptual metaphor or blending two types of conceptual metaphor together with the result of projecting more than a SD onto the same TD. In the previous example, which is an extended creative metaphor, one conceptual metaphor was deleted whereas the remaining part of the image was preserved, keeping with it the TD. Consequently, the loss in ST data as a result of deleting one part of the creative metaphor cannot be easily detected unless the metaphor in both ST and TT is deconstructed into its basic conceptual patterns with a one-to-one comparison between the conceptual metaphors of the ST image and those of the TT image.

Now that I discussed loss in ST data as a result of deletion, I am going to explain what is meant by loss as a result of Formal Equivalence. A Formal Equivalence of a metaphoric mapping is an equivalence that preserves both the TD and SD of the ST metaphor. Loss in the data as a result of Formal Equivalence takes place when at least one part of the conceptual metaphor is deeply embedded in the ST language and culture that transferring it to another language results in an equivocal structure which is void of any metaphoric or semantic content. In other words, a loss that influences a metaphor as a result of Formal Equivalence is another form of Zero Equivalence that infringes on the minimum level of equivalence, Semantic Equivalence, between ST data and TT data. The first example of this type of loss in ST data is Jabra’s translation of Montano’s invitation to “throw out our eyes for brave Othello, even till we make the main and the aerial blue an indistinct regard” (Othello, 2.1.38-39). In this example, the metaphor contains three parts: the first involves an image schema which conceptualizes the process of ‘STARING’ as ‘MAKING THE SKY AND OCEAN AN INDISTINCT REGARD’, the second is the metonymic reference to the ‘OCEAN’ as the ‘MAIN’, and the third is the metonymic reference to the ‘SKY’ as the ‘AERIAL BLUE’. The loss in ST data appeared in the Formal Equivalence of the metonymy ‘AERIAL BLUE’
which, if rendered literally, means almost nothing in the TL. The actual corresponding reference to this metonymy in Arabic is *al-*ufuq al-azraq, the blue horizon. Jabra rendered this example into Arabic as:

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إلى أن نعجز عن التمييز مشهداً بين البحر وأزرق الهواء
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Back translation: “until we fail to distinguish between the view of the sea and the blueness of the air”

Another example of loss in ST data as a result of Formal Equivalence is taken from Badawi’s translation of Iago’s exclamation “blest figs’ end (...) blest pudding” (*Othello*, 2.1.251-253), in response to Roderigo’s pronouncement that Desdemona is “full of most blessed condition” (ibid., 2.1.249-250). This metaphor, which is an extension of the ontological conceptual pattern ‘SEX IS FOOD’\(^\text{11}\), consists of two parts both of which imply the pragmatic functions of irony and euphemism. The first part involves the indirect reference to ‘FEMALE GENITALS AS FIG’S END’, and the second part involves the indirect reference to ‘FORNICATION AS PUDDING’\(^\text{12}\). The loss in the TT equivalent is two-fold: (a) a loss as a result of opting for Semantic Equivalence in the first part of the conceptual metaphor; (b) a loss as a result of adopting Formal Equivalence in the second part of the metaphor. In dealing with the ontological metaphor ‘SEX IS FOOD’, Badawi reduced the metaphor to sense (gave its meaning), translating ‘blest figs’ end’ as ‘nonsense’, which represents the minimum level of equivalence, i.e. the semantic content of the metaphor. The loss in this translation influenced both the SD (SEX) and the TD (FOOD). Also, Badawi’s translation seems to have loss not only in the metaphoric content but also in two functional

\(^{11}\) (Fernández 2008: 99; Kövesces 1990)

\(^{12}\) “Nothing in drinking the wine of grapes would prove chastity or its lack, but the three uses of ‘blessed’ (...) indicate Iago is contrasting the blessed wine that represents the blood of Christ in the Eucharist with the other wine that represents human BLOOD (semen). Desdemona, he says, has no blessed fig’s end (*fica:* fig and vulva- F); nor a blessed PUDDING (fornication). Her *most pregnant* position is not a *most blessed* condition: she is not virgin, not chaste (Luke 1:42: ‘Blessed art thou among women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb’)” (Rubinstein 1995 :305); “a vulgar expression, based on an obscene gesture” (Shakespeare 2002b: 319)
elements of the metaphor, i.e. euphemism and irony. As for the second conceptual metaphor ‘FORNICATION IS PUDDING’, Badawi opted for a Formal Equivalent transferring the word ‘pudding’ to ‘muhallabiyya’, the Arabic equivalent of the dairy-based dessert of rice pudding or custard pudding. In fact, this literal equivalent of the ST conceptual metaphor happens to be meaningless for the Arabic language reader at the metaphoric, semantic and functional levels of equivalence; hence the Zero Equivalence in opting for a literal translation of a metaphor which is deeply embedded in the ST language and culture such as the previous example. Badawi’s translation is as follows:

("كلام فارغ. سُخام(...) فاضلة مثل المهلبية") (2009)

Back translation: “nonsense! Bullshit! (...) Blessed as pudding!”

The third example of loss in the metaphoric content as a result of Formal Equivalence is taken from Macbeth. When Siward was told about the death of his son while fighting against Macbeth, he remarked, “Had I as many sons as I have hairs, I would not wish them to a fairer death. And so his knell is knoll’d” (5.8.50). My reference to the loss in the metaphorical content of this example involves the second part of the sentence: ‘HIS KNELL IS KNOLLED’ which is a metonymic reference to the ‘INESCAPABILITY OF DEATH’. It is like saying in Arabic ‘HIS HOUR HAS COME’ in reference to the hour of death being an inevitable destiny which one cannot avoid. In Nyazi’s translation, for example, the metonymy was preserved as it appeared in the ST, yielding a structure which can be described as meaningless in Arabic. The metonymy was dealt with in the TT as though it were a statement of a fact, announcing the death of Young Siward, whereas in the ST it says more than that as it expresses the helplessness of the bereaved father who can do nothing now that his son is actually killed and ‘his knell is knolled’. It is like saying ‘la hawla wa la quwwata ’illā billāh’, ‘God is the only source of power and might’, an expression that is said in reference to our helplessness in facing the acts of God. In an advanced stage, the analysis will show the high cognitive role of metonymy in conceptualizing and translating metaphor:
"لو كان لديّ أولاد بقدر ما لديّ من شعر لما تمنيت
لهم ميتة أفضل،
لهذا
فإن ناقوس نعيه يدقّ"

Back translation: “if I had as many sons as I had hair, I would not have wished them
to a better death, and so his knell is knolled”

Having dealt with the loss of data as a result of deletion or Formal Equivalence, I am
going to deal with cases of loss in ST data as a result of opting for Semantic Equivalence. In
this type of equivalence, the TD is preserved and the loss takes place in the SD which tends
to be replaced by a non-metaphoric reference. An example of this is Nyazi’s translation of
Duncan’s exclamation that “So well thy words become thee as thy wounds; they smack of
honor both” (Macbeth, 1.2.43-44). This example consists of three conceptual metaphors:
‘WORDS ARE CLOTHES (ONTOLOGICAL)’, ‘WOUNDS ARE CLOTHES
(ONTOLOGICAL)’ and ‘HONOUR IS AN APPETIZING FOOD (ONTOLOGICAL). The
loss in ST data influenced the third ontological metaphor, ‘HONOUR AS AN APPETIZING
FOOD’, which Nyazi reduced to sense in the following translation:

كلماتك تليق بك تماماً كجراحك في كليهما أثر للشرف

Back translation: “your words suit you as your wounds. They both have a trace of
honour”

In this example, it is noticed that the loss in the metaphoric content influenced the SD
‘APPETIZING FOOD’ which was replaced by an equivalent that implies no metaphoricity in
Arabic. Another example of the loss in data as a result of Semantic Equivalence is a sentence
taken from Lady Macbeth’s advice to her husband when she says “To beguile the time, look
like the time” (1.5.63-64). This is an extended image comprising two conceptual metaphors:
‘TIME IS THE OBJECT OF DECEPTION/A PERSON’ and ‘TIME IS A PERSON WITH
COUNTENANCE’. In the translations of both Nyazi and Badawi, there was loss in the
metaphoric content of the image where the TD concept ‘TIME’ was replaced by the
‘PEOPLE’ in Arabic, a concept which does not bear metaphoricity when projected onto the
SDs of being ‘THE OBJECT OF DECEPTION’ and ‘HAVING COUNTENANCE’.
Reducing the ontological metaphor to sense, Badawi and Nyazi opted for Semantic Equivalence coming up with the following Arabic versions of the ST:

(\textit{Badawi} 2009)

\begin{quote}
ولكن لا بد من التشبه بالناس لخداعهم
\end{quote}

Back translation: “but you have to look like people, if you are to deceive them”

(\textit{Nyazi} 2000)

\begin{quote}
وحتى تظلّل الناس، فابدُ لهم كما يبدون
\end{quote}

Back translation: “and to deceive people, look for them the way they look”

Another example of loss in the ST metaphoric content as a result of opting for Semantic Equivalence is Othello’s pronouncement that his “demerits may speak unbonneted\footnote{There is disagreement among Shakespeare scholars on the interpretation of the metaphor where most “copies read (…) to speak unbonneted, is to speak with the cap off” (Shakespeare 1821: 240). However, Becket sees that “The editors have puzzled themselves strangely. ‘Unbonneted’ signifies, in this place, neither the \textit{putting on} nor the \textit{putting off} of the bonnet. The meaning is ‘not being honoured: not having the usual mark of honour bestowed on me.’ We must read the passage as follows, and my merits, unbonneted though they are, though not distinguished by the General’s hat, may yet speak, & e.’ This hat or cap, and which in Venice is called \textit{Bonnet de General}, is worn by no other than the head of the army and the head of the state.”(1815: 181)} to as proud a fortune as this” (\textit{Othello}, 1.2.22-23). This is a blended image consisting of two ontological metaphors and one structural metaphor: first, ‘DEMERTS’ are conceptualized as a ‘PERSON WHO SPEAKS (ONTOLOGICAL METAPHOR); second, ‘SPEAKING OPENLY’ is conceptualized in terms of ‘SPEAKING WITH THE CAP OFF’ (a structural metaphor); third, ‘FORTUNE’ is personified as the ‘OBJECT OF SPEAKING’ (ontological metaphor). In Enani’s translation, all the conceptual metaphors are affected by the loss in the metaphoric content as a result of choosing a Semantic Equivalent in the TT. In the first and third metaphoric mappings which appeared as ontological metaphors, the loss affected only the SDs of ‘A PERSON WHO SPEAKS’ and ‘THE OBJECT OF SPEAKING’. However, in the second mapping which appeared as a structural metaphor ‘SPEAKING OPENLY IS SPEAKING UNBONNETED’, both parts of the mapping were subject to loss because the TD of this metaphor ‘SPEAKING UNBONNETED’ is the ‘SD’ for the previous conceptual metaphor ‘DEMERTS ARE A PERSON WHO SPEAKS UNBONNETED’. Although the
loss in the metaphoric content is gross in this example, the basic level of equivalence, i.e. Semantic Equivalence, is retained:

(Enani 2005)

Back translation: “my demerits qualify me for the great fortune I have reached”

In this account, I will exemplify the loss in the metaphoric content as a result of opting for Functional Equivalence. As indicated previously, the loss of metaphoric content as a result of embracing the Functional Equivalence option would most likely involve a loss in the two parts of the metaphor, namely the TD and the SD. Translations which are aimed at Functional Equivalence pay attention to several pragmatic options which the translator might have in mind. A translator might opt for a Functional Equivalent in case he/she is willing to domesticate the content of the metaphor bringing it closer to the cognitive system of the TT reader linguistically or culturally. Also, a Functional Equivalent might be adopted if the translator prefers to preserve the pragmatic function of metaphor, as in irony and euphemism, for communicative or stylistic reasons. In such cases, and in view of the variation across languages in their cognitive content and pragmatic functions, it can be tricky to preserve all the components of a metaphor in one translation, in which case a translator might choose a Functional Equivalent at the expense of a certain metaphoric component.

Ordinarily, Functional Equivalence does not involve loss in the minimum level of equivalence as it is a much more advanced option than Semantic Equivalence and, for a translator who opts for Functional Equivalence, it would be unlikely to miss the semantic level of correspondence. An example of loss in ST metaphoric data as a result of Functional Equivalence is Enani’s translation of the earlier example of “blest figs’ end (...) blest pudding” (Othello, 2.1.251-253). In Enani’s translation, there is loss in all the metaphoric content of this extended metaphor, which, as explained previously, consists of two conceptual metaphors: ‘FEMALE GENITALS ARE FIG’S END’ and ‘FORNICATION IS PUDDING’.
Enani deleted the two euphemistic references in both parts of the metaphor and replaced them with a Functional Equivalent which conveys the pragmatic function of irony:

"عيني على الروحانية!" (2005)

Back translation: “My eye on the spirituality!”

Another example of loss in ST data due to opting for a Functional Equivalent is Enani’s translation of Iago’s exclamation “God’s blood” (Othello, 1.1.4) into Arabic as ‘‘uqsim’’ (2005), literal for ‘I swear’. This example represents a blended metaphor consisting of two conceptual patterns: the first is a metonymy15 ‘GOD IS THE SON OF GOD’ and the second is an ontological metaphor ‘DEITY HAS HUMAN FEATURES/BLOOD’. Trying to avoid the cultural metonymic reference to the ‘SON OF GOD AS GOD’ and the conceptual ontological metaphor of the ‘SON OF GOD AS HAVING BLOOD’, Enani opted for a translation that preserved the pragmatic function of the metaphor, i.e. ‘the act of swearing’.

The last example I would like to discuss about the loss in the metaphoric content of ST data as a result of Functional Equivalence is Enani’s translation of Brabantio’s wisdom in Othello that “words are words; I never yet did hear that the bruised heart was pierced through the ear” (1.3.218-219). In this example, Enani opted for a Functional Equivalent for stylistic reasons. The example represents an extended structural metaphor consisting of three mappings. The first mapping is a tautology that conceptualizes the concept of ‘WORDS’ in terms of itself as ‘WORDS’ (‘WORDS’ is a concept which involves the ‘PROCESS/EXPERIENCE OF SPEAKING’). The second mapping is a structural metaphor and an image schema, at the same time, which conceptualises ‘SORROW/EMOTION’ as a ‘BRUISE IN THE HEART’ (involving ‘FORCE’ and the experience of ‘PHYSICAL

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14 This is a literal back translation of Enani’s equivalent which expresses the pragmatic function of irony in Arabic.

15 “The concept ‘God’ is a distinguishing attribute in the expression, and it overshadows the concept ‘son’. Therefore the whole of God metonymically stands for ‘Son of God’, and the Son is thus called ‘God’.” (Barcelona 2003: 15)
PAIN’). The third mapping is a structural metaphor which conceptualizes the process of ‘HEALING’ as ‘HEARING WORDS’, as manifested in the conceptual metaphoric patterns below:

WORDS ARE WORDS (Structural Metaphor/Tautology)

SORROW IS A BRUISE IN THE HEART (Image Schema and Structural Metaphor)

HEARING WORDS IS NOT A PHYSICAL FORCE (PEIRCING THE EAR/Structural Metaphor)

HEARING WORDS IS NOT A HEALING POWER (Structural Metaphor)

لكن الألفاظ تظلّ دائماً ألفاظاً لا أكثر؛ لم أسمع يوماً أن القلب المعتل يداوى باللفظ المسكر” (Enani 2005)

Back translation: “But utterances always remain utterances no more, I never heard that intoxicating words can heal a heart that is sore”

This example shows that Enani’s translation paid particular attention to the musicality of the wisdom, which is why he adopted a Functional Equivalent that influenced the metaphoric content of the ST while preserving its semantic content. The basic level of meaning was very well preserved and the musicality of the wisdom sounds natural to the ear of native Arabic speakers.

To sum up, this section dealt with the notion of loss in the translation of creative metaphor explaining the criteria that were adopted in identifying the kind of loss that influenced ST data. I clarified how the loss in the ST conceptual metaphors can be the result of deleting part of the ST metaphoric content. It can also be the result of opting for Formal Equivalence, Semantic Equivalence or Functional Equivalence. In the two cases of deletion and Functional Equivalence, the loss can influence the SD and TD of the conceptual metaphor, whereas the loss caused by opting for Semantic Equivalence influences one part only of the metaphoric mapping, SD or TD. Conversely, a Formal Equivalence preserves both the SD and TD but might sometimes damage the metaphoric as well as semantic content of ST data resulting in
an equivalent that has no cognitive value in the TL. In the next section, I will discuss the criteria adopted in identifying translation options that caused shifts in the metaphoric content of ST data.

6.2 TT Data Qualification by Shifts

In this section, I will deal with the second standard that was adopted in the qualification of TT data, discussing translation options that led to shifts in ST data. The notion of ‘shift’ refers to the mutation that influences the conceptual content of the metaphor due to changing the cognitive value of its TD or SD while preserving its metaphoricity. Accordingly, the detection of shifts in the metaphoric content of a ST involves no such output as Semantic Equivalence; because once the metaphoric content is compromised, the outcome is loss, rather than a shift. This is closely related to the metaphoric nature of ST data as replacing a metaphoric structure with a Semantic Equivalent (a non-metaphor) undermines the metaphoric component altogether. In other words, a shift in a metaphoric pattern leads to mutation in its conceptual content without affecting its metaphoricity, and this mutation either influences the degree of metaphoricity (downtoning/sharpening) or changes the conceptual field of the metaphor as a whole turning it into a completely new image.

I will refer to the type of shifts that influence the degree of metaphoricity as ‘intra-categorical shifts’ as they do not involve changing the main category of the altered concept. Rather, they involve moving to a subordinate category lower or higher up within the same conceptual field, and these comprise examples like shifting ‘WEED’ to ‘PLANT’, and ‘DOG’ to ‘CAT’. As for shifts which involve changing the whole conceptual field of the SD or TD, I will refer to them as ‘inter-categorical shifts’ as they implicate moving from a certain conceptual category to a different one such as shifting ‘ANIMAL’ to ‘DEVIL’ or
‘PLANT’ to ‘INSECT’. Generally speaking, a shift which involves moving within the boundaries of the same conceptual category influencing the degree of metaphoricity could be viewed as not functional or much less functional than ‘inter-categorical shifts’ which involve a change in the whole conceptual field of metaphoricity. Sometimes it is even possible not to notice the presence of an intra-categorical shift. However, throughout the empirical process of the contrastive analysis, and after dealing with more than one TT for each ST, I became more inclined to believe that even intra-categorical shifts can be functional and significant for processing the metaphorical component. Before I explain this by examples, I would like to point out that shifts vary in their degree of influencing the functionality of a metaphor, depending on the level of mutation in its conceptual content whether they are shifts within the same conceptual category or across a chain of different categories. I will start my contrastive analysis of the two types of shifts with the following example, from *Othello*. The example is made up of a structural metaphor, an image schema and an ontological metaphor, as the following table reveals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST Example</th>
<th>Conceptual metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“you’ll have your daughter covered with a Barbary horse” <em>(Othello, 1.1.110)</em></td>
<td>MAKING LOVE WITH THE OBJECT OF HATRED IS BEING COVERED WITH A BARBARY HORSE (structural metaphor and image schema/covering) THE OBJECT OF HATRED IS A BARBARY HORSE (ontological metaphor)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As an introductory example to what is meant by an intra-categorical shift, I will introduce the three translations of this metaphor and provide my contrastive analysis in the light of shifts made in each TT. This analysis will reveal that two of the TTs provide an intra-categorical shift in the first conceptual metaphor: ‘MAKING LOVE WITH THE OBJECT OF HATRED IS BEING COVERED WITH A BARBARY HORSE’. The shifts which
happen to have taken place in Jabra’s and Badawi’s translations will prove to have left no effect on the semantic content of the image. However, they have caused heterogeneity and interruption in its metaphoric content, thus influencing the functionality of the creative metaphor, as the following representation reveals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Back Translation</th>
<th>Conceptual metaphors</th>
<th>TT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| You will accept to have your daughter **topped** by a barbarian horse | **MAKING LOVE WITH THE OBJECT OF HATRED IS BEING TOPPED WITH A BARBARIAN HORSE** (a structural metaphor and a top-down image schema)  
**THE OBJECT OF HATRED IS A BARBARIAN HORSE** | **سترضى لابنتك أن يعلوها حصان بربري** (Jabra 1986) |
| And so, you will let your daughter **sleep with** a Moroccan studhorse, | **MAKING LOVE WITH THE OBJECT OF HATRED IS SLEEPING WITH A MOROCCAN STUDHORSE** (structural metaphor)  
**THE OBJECT OF HATRED IS A MOROCCAN STUDHORSE** | **وبذلك تدع ابنتك يضاجعها فحل مغربي** (Badawi 2009) |
| No sooner you will allow your daughter to **be covered** with an Arab charger | **MAKING LOVE WITH THE OBJECT OF HATRED IS BEING COVERED WITH AN ARAB CHARGER** (structural metaphor and image schema/covering)  
**THE OBJECT OF HATRED IS AN ARAB CHARGER** | **حتى تسمح لابنتك بأن يعضها فرس عربي** (Enani 2005) |

I would like to deal with the translation of one part of this metaphor and this is the first metaphoric mapping as it appears in the table of the conceptual analysis: ‘**MAKING LOVE**
WITH THE OBJECT OF HATRED IS BEING COVERED WITH A BARBARY HORSE’. This is a structural metaphor and image schema which conceptualizes the experience of ‘LOVE MAKING BETWEEN THE OBJECT OF LOVE, DESDEMONA, AND THE OBJECT OF HATRED, OTHELLO’ in terms of ‘BEING COVERED WITH A BARBARY HORSE’. If we compare the Arabic equivalent of this conceptual metaphor in the three translations, we notice that only one translation, i.e. Enani’s translation, preserved the SD of the metaphor ‘BEING COVERED WITH A BARBARY HORSE’. As for the two other translations, they dealt with the metaphor as follows:

MAKING LOVE WITH THE OBJECT OF HATRED IS BEING TOPPED WITH A BARBARIAN HORSE (a structural metaphor and top-down image schema)/ Jabra

MAKING LOVE WITH THE OBJECT OF HATRED IS SLEEPING WITH A MOROCCAN STUDHORSE (structural)/ Badawi

If we are to qualify the last two translations by the earlier rationale of shifts, we can say that both of them introduced ‘intra-categorical shifts’ in which the SD, which is a process, varied lexically but still fell under the conceptual category of ‘EXPERIENCE’ and referred to the same semantic field of ‘LOVE MAKING’ (the TD). The question now is whether this mutation in ST data amounts to the level of a ‘shift’. The answer lies in putting the example back in its immediate context to see whether the ‘change’ in the ‘SD’ has left an influence on the image as a whole. If we examine the ontological metaphor which is derived from the previous structural metaphor, it is interesting to notice that the first part of the ‘SD’, ‘BEING COVERED WITH’, is, in fact, functional for two reasons. First, it highlights the behavioural associations of the second part of the SD, ‘A BARBARY HORSE’; second, it reflects the attitudinal associations of ‘THE OBJECT OF HATRED’ as an ‘INFERIOR SPECIES’. This makes it fully integrated with the metaphoric structure of the whole image. Actually, there is a direct and organic relationship between the SD of ‘BEING COVERED WITH’ and the
ontological metaphor ‘THE OBJECT OF HATRED IS A BARBARY HORSE/INFERIOR SPECIES’. Consequently, the intra-categorical shifts in Jabra’s and Badawi’s translations do, in fact, influence the functionality of the metaphor as each of them causes interruption in the flow of the overall image, especially if we take into account the individual style of Shakespeare in coining harmonious creative metaphors, as discussed in Chapter V (5.1 on ‘the Metaphoric Language of Shakespeare’).

Dealing with Shakespearean metaphor calls for paying attention to his talent in finding behavioural and functional variations, not only across different cognitive categories in the ‘Chain of Being’, but also within the same cognitive category. Shakespeare is the writer of “the valued file” (Macbeth, 3.1.94) which does not list “hounds and greyhounds, mongrels, spaniels, curs, shoughs, water-rugs and demi-wolves (...) all by the name of dogs” (ibid., 3.1.92-94), but “distinguishes the swift, the slow, the subtle, the housekeeper, the hunter, every one according to the gift which bounteous nature hath in him closed” (ibid., 3.1.95-98). The classification of shifts in the translation of metaphor by ‘intra-categorical’ and ‘inter-categorical’ shifts highlights functional subtleties in the conceptualization and translation of metaphor. This might be the reason behind the tendency for ‘literacy’ in the translation of metaphor in authoritative texts where translators try to be as accurate as possible in order not to impinge on the functionality of the ST content (see Newmark’s account of the translation of creative metaphor in Section 3.3.2 ‘Prescriptive versus Descriptive Contributions’). More on this will be discussed in the body of the contrastive analysis.

The second example of an intra-categorical shift is also taken from Othello where the protagonist says, in reference to Desdemona, “O thou weed, who art so lovely fair and smell’st so sweet that the sense aches at thee” (4.2.67-69). In this example, I will deal only with the ontological metaphor of ‘THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS A WEED’. In fact, conceptualizing this metaphor varies by the number of times we are exposed to its context.
The first time I extracted the metaphoric structure of this metaphor, I mapped it as ‘THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS A PLANT’. In an advanced stage during the revision process, the mapping was changed into ‘THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS A FLOWER’, in view of the context that involves the description of the ‘WEED’ as ‘smelling so sweet’. However, throughout the process of the contrastive analysis I decided to change this ontological metaphor into ‘THE UNFAITHFUL OBJECT OF LOVE IS A WEED’.

The more we expose ourselves to the context, the closer we come to the realization that Shakespeare’s choice of ‘WEED’ instead of ‘PLANT’, ‘ROSE’, or ‘FLOWER’ was, in fact, functional. When Othello started to doubt the faithfulness of Desdemona, he began to see her as an undesirable plant, namely a ‘weed’. When he realized that he will lose his ‘OBJECT OF LOVE’ if he took away her life, he saw his beloved as a ‘rose’ on which occasion he said, “When I have pluck’d the rose, I cannot give it vital growth again” (5.2.13-14). Normally, there is not a single fixed conceptual metaphor for the ‘OBJECT OF LOVE’ because a metaphor is subject, not only to our universal embodied experiences, but also to our individual experiences and, consequently, our state of mind when we produce it, which explains the variation in the conceptual metaphors that delineate THE OBJECT OF LOVE in Othello. They vary by context as some of the extracted conceptual metaphors reveal:

THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS A PRECIOUS STONE
THE OBJECT OF LOVE AN APPETIZING FOOD
THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS A DEITY
THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS A PIECE OF ART
THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS A NEGOTIATOR
THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS A JOINT BETWEEN TWO BONES
THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS A PRIZE
THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS A HAGGARD HAWK
THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS AN OBJECT OF HUNTING
THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS A FOUNTAIN
THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS A WEED

228


THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS A ROSE

In *Othello*’s extracted data, the ‘OBJECT OF LOVE’ appeared sixty times showing variation in its metaphoric content by contextual and situational factors, which implies two observations. First, metaphor is not only a conceptual tool that we use to reason about things, but also a communicative tool that we use to express our attitudes (pragmatic function). Second, deconstructing a metaphor is not a linguistic process, but a cognitive process which is influenced by different empirical factors such as cognitive exposure, context and experiential involvement. Back to the earlier example of ‘THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS A WEED’, the translators introduced different translations which preserved the metaphoric content of the conceptual pattern but showed variation in the level of its metaphoricity viewing ‘THE OBJECT OF LOVE’ in three different ways as ‘A PLANT’, ‘A HERB and ‘A WILD PLANT’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Back Translation</th>
<th>TT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“O thou plant of wondrous beauty, and sweet fragrance that the senses ache while enjoying it”</td>
<td>“لا أيتها النبتة الرائعة الجمال، الزكية الفوح، التي يتلذذ الحس بها حتى الألم” (Jabra 1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“O thou herb of exceeding beauty and sweet smell that numbs the senses”</td>
<td>“إيتها العشبة البالغة الجمال تفوح رائحتك الزكية بحيث تخدر الحواس” (Badawi 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“O thou black wild plant! Why did you come to the world with that wonderful beauty and fragrance of yours whose sweet scent aches sensation!”</td>
<td>“يا نبتة برية سوداء! لماذا جئت لنذني بذلك الجمال الرائع وذلك الشذا الذي يفوح حتى يوجع الإحساس من طيبه” (Enani 2005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is noticed that the translations above move from the general to the particular with Enani’s closest equivalent of ‘wild plant’. In Arabic, a ‘weed’ is a ‘wild herb’, ‘*ushba barriyya*. Some ‘wild herbs’ can be ‘useful’ like the herbs that are used for medication, but
some others are ‘useless and harmful’, and these are herbs that grow in cultivated lands injuring ‘useful plants’, which is why they are ‘undesirable’ and are referred to in Arabic as ‘a’shāb ḍārra’, ‘harmful herbs’. This variation in the cognitive content of the Arabic equivalent of ‘weed’, ‘ushba barriyya’, could be the reason why Enani chose to qualify the phrase ‘wild plant’ with the adjective ‘black’, depicting the ‘UNFAITHFUL OBJECT OF LOVE’ as a ‘BLACK WILD PLANT’ which implies the negative attitudinal associations of the metaphoric concept ‘WEED’.

A third example about the occurrence of an intra-categorical shift in the translation of metaphor in Othello is Desdemona’s description of herself as “a moth of peace” (1.3.256). Before I deal with the contrastive analysis of the translation of this metaphor, I will contextualize the example deconstructing its conceptual content. Then, I will provide the Arabic equivalent in each translation conducting the explanatory analysis in the light of the occurrence of an intra-categorical shift, as I have done in the previous cases. Contextually, the metaphor was introduced by Desdemona when she expressed to the Senators’ Council her desire to accompany her beloved husband to the war, rather than stay on her own in Venice. Conceptually, the phrase represents an extended ontological metaphor consisting of two mappings: ‘AN OBJECT OF LOVE WHICH IS LEFT BEHIND IS A MoTH OF PEACE (ontological) and ‘PEACE IS A SOURCE OF LIGHT’ (ontological).

The context reveals that Desdemona’s description of herself as a ‘moth’ of peace is clearly not a very favourable one as it involves different levels of negative connotations: loneliness, uselessness and lacking aesthetic value, if we are to contrast ‘moths’ with ‘butterflies’. It is hard to notice the difference between a moth and a butterfly unless we contextualize their uses. In fact, if we translate the expression ‘moth of peace’ into Arabic as ‘butterfly of peace’, as in three TTs, then we might not be compromising the image as a

16 “Usually glossed ‘an idle, useless creature’; but ‘moth’ normally denotes ‘clothes-moth’ and its connotations are more destructive; cf. ‘moth to honour’ (…)” (Shakespeare 2006a: 230-1)
whole, but we will be shifting part of its conceptual content and missing part of its functional components, as discussed in the following analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Biological and Functional differences between moths and butterflies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Butterflies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fly during the day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attracted to flowers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult butterflies have a proboscis suited for obtaining liquid food, mostly nectar from flowers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we examine the three Arabic versions of the metaphor, we realize that what is marked as intra-categorical shifts in the contrastive analysis of the translated texts, and which might seem marginal and valueless at first glance, happens to be functional to the integrity and appropriateness of the image. This becomes clearer if we look at the metaphoric content of the image in terms of the basic conceptual metaphors of the three translations. As the following table reveals, the analysis of the conceptual structure of each TT shows that there is an intra-categorical move from ‘MOTH’ to ‘BUTTERFLY’, both of which belong to the same biological category but involve functional variations with different communicative associations. It is rather a shift which led to mutation in the conceptual content of the second conceptual pattern which Jabra’s and Enani’s translations changed from ‘PEACE IS THE SOURCE OF LIGHT’ to ‘PEACE IS THE OBJECT OF ATTRACTION FOR BUTTERFLIES’, whereas Badawi’s translation rendered it as ‘WAR IS A SOURCE OF LIGHT’. This analysis highlights the functionality of intra-categorical shifts in researching
the translation of metaphor and the centrality of experiential and cognitive exposure for the processes of conceptualizing and translating metaphor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Back Translation</th>
<th>Conceptual Metaphors</th>
<th>TT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If I am left alone, a butterfly of peace, and he goes to war, the rites for which I love him are bereft me</td>
<td>AN OBJECT OF LOVE THAT IS LEFT BEHIND IS A BUTTERFLY OF PEACE PEACE IS THE OBJECT OF ATTRACTION FOR BUTTERFLIES</td>
<td>&quot;إذا تركت وحدي فراشة سلم وهو للحرب قد يذهب، فاني أحرم الحقوق التي من أجلها أحبه&quot; (Jabra 1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I stay at home like the playful butterflies of peace, and let my husband go to war on his own, I will be denied the rituals of my love or the things for which I love the man</td>
<td>AN OBJECT OF LOVE THAT IS LEFT BEHIND IS A PLAYFUL BUTTERFLY OF PEACE PEACE IS THE OBJECT OF ATTRACTION FOR PLAYFUL BUTTERFLIES</td>
<td>&quot;إني أن أمكث في الدار مثل فراشات السلام اللاهية ولترك زوجي يذهب للحرب وحيداً فسوف أكون سليلت شعائر حبي أو ما أحببت الرجل بسحبه&quot; (Enani 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I do not accompany him, and am left behind a pointless liability in peace, like a butterfly that is far from the lights of war, then I will be denied the merits for which I have loved him</td>
<td>AN OBJECT OF LOVE THAT IS LEFT BEHIND IS A POINTLESS LIABILITY LIVING IN PEACE</td>
<td>&quot;إن أنا لم أصاحبه وتركتك هنا عطلة عالية في السلام مثل الفراشة بعيداً عن أضواء الحرب، حينئذ أسلب تلك المزايا التي من أجلها أحبه&quot; (Badawi 2009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table shows that the three TTs involved intra-categorical shifts from ‘MOTH OF PEACE’ to ‘BUTTERFLY OF PEACE’, ‘PLAYFUL BUTTERFLY OF PEACE’ and ‘A
BUTTERFLY THAT IS FAR FROM THE LIGHTS OF WAR’. Although the three intra-categorical shifts in the SD, ‘MOTH OF PEACE’, did not involve moving beyond the family of Lepidoptera, they implied a change in the conceptual content of the examined metaphor in view of the behavioural and biological difference between the category of butterflies and that of moths. The functional difference between these two categories exists also in Arabic which makes a distinction between ‘farasha’ and ‘uththa’. The latter is used metaphorically in Arabic to refer to ‘a useless, skinny woman’ as explained in the dictionary of Lisăn al-‘Arab in the following definition:

(Ibn Manzūr 2003) "عثث : العثة، والعثة : المرأة المحقرة الخاملة ، ضاوية كانت أو غير ضاوية (...)"

Back translation: “a moth: is a reference to a despised, sluggish woman, skinny or otherwise”

Having explained my criteria for qualifying the TT data in terms of intra-categorical shifts, I would like to move to the second type of shifts which I have detected during the process of extracting and qualifying TT data in comparison with ST data. It was noticed that there was a general trend among the translators not to embrace an inter-categorical shift unless the metaphor involves a referential issue. Referential issues occur in the following cases: (a) the concept has a double reference; (b) the contextual indicators do not fully support a single interpretation of the metaphoric concept; and (c) the translator needs to change a concept for pragmatic reasons related to expressing the communicative function of the relevant metaphor. This will be explained with examples that show how a referential issue can determine the translators’ choice of moving from one conceptual field to another.

The first example is taken from Macbeth, where, in response to the news about Duncan’s death, the protagonist declares that, “renown and grace is dead; the wine of life is drawn, and the mere lees is left this vault to brag of” (2.3.94-96). In this example, the translators differed in their interpretation of the reference of ‘vault’. While Jabra and Badawi processed ‘VAULT’ as a ‘METONYMY FOR THE GRAVE’, Nyazi interpreted the word as a ‘wine
cellar’ considering it a metonymic reference to the ‘KING’S BODY’. Before I provide the three versions of translation, it is important to point out that the context does not give priority to one interpretation at the expense of the other. Besides, according to a Norton edition of the play, both interpretations are possible\(^\text{17}\). If we take ‘VAULT’ to be a metonymic reference to the grave, we can deconstruct the extended image into the following six ontological metaphors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RENOWN IS A PERSON WHO DIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GRACE IS A PERSON WHO DIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE WINE OF LIFE IS A METONYMY FOR THE KING’S BLOOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DREGS IS A METONYMY FOR THE KING’S DEAD BODY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE VAULT IS A METONYMY FOR THE GRAVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE VAULT/ THE GRAVE IS A PERSON WHO BRAGS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, if we take ‘VAULT’ to mean a ‘WINE CELLAR’ as a metonymic reference to the ‘DEAD BODY OF THE KING, we will notice that there will be shifts in certain conceptual metaphors as explained in the following representation of the extended image:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RENOWN IS A PERSON WHO DIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GRACE IS A PERSON WHO DIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE WINE OF LIFE IS A METONYMY FOR THE KING’S BLOOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DREGS IS A METONYMY FOR THE LEFTOVER OF THE KING’S BLOOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE VAULT (WINE CELLAR) IS A METONYMY FOR THE KING’S DEAD BODY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE VAULT/ THE KING’S DEAD BODY IS A PERSON WHO BRAGS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 “(1) wine cellar, (2) earth, with its vault, the sky” (Shakespeare 2004: 31).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good repute and nobility have died, the wine of life, which gives it taste, is drawn, and nothing, but the dregs, is left for the vault of earth to brag of</th>
<th>&quot;لقد مات الصيت الطيب والنبل ونفذت خمر الحياة التي تجعل لها طعماً، فلم يبق منها سوى الحثالة يتباهى بها قبو الأرض&quot; (Badawi 2009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The vault of earth is a metonymy for the grave</td>
<td>&quot;الصيت والفضيلة ميتان؛ رحيق الحياة نفذ، ولم يبق إلا الثفل يتباهي به ع비ار الخمر (شبه رحيق الحياة هنا بالدم في الجسد. إن عبار Vault عنبار الخمر تعني أيضاً سقف السماء الذي يغطي العالم&quot; (Nyazi 2000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Fame and grace are dead; the nectar of life is drawn, and nothing left, but the dregs, for the cellar of wine to brag of (the writer depicted ‘the nectar of life’ as ‘blood in the body’. VAULT also means the ‘dome of the sky’ over the world.) | "الصيت والفضيلة ميتان؛ رحيق الحياة نفذ، ولم يبق إلا الثفل يتباهي به ع비ار الخمر (شبه رحيق الحياة هنا بالدم في الجسد. إن VAULT عنبار الخمر تعني أيضاً سقف السماء الذي يغطي العالم)" (Nyazi 2000) |
| The vault of earth is a metonymy for the grave | "الصيت والفضيلة ميتان؛ رحيق الحياة نفذ، ولم يبق إلا الثفل يتباهي به ع비ار الخمر (شبه رحيق الحياة هنا بالدم في الجسد. إن VAULT عنبار الخمر تعني أيضاً سقف السماء الذي يغطي العالم)" (Nyazi 2000) |

This table shows that the two translations of Jabra and Badawi interpreted the double-referenced domain of ‘VAULT’ as ‘VAULT OF EARTH’, by way of a metonymic reference to ‘THE GRAVE’, whereas Nyazi translated it as ‘WINE CELLAR’, a metonymic reference...
to ‘THE BODY OF KING’. As indicated in the previous footnote, the word ‘VAULT’ has more than a single reference, and Nyazi pointed this out in his translation, although he chose the latter reference of the word. A close examination of the context of the metaphor reveals that both references are possible. First, if we assume that ‘BLOOD’ is the ‘WINE OF LIFE’, then the ‘BODY WITHOUT BLOOD’ is ‘MERE DREGS’, and, therefore, ‘THE VAULT OF EARTH’, i.e. the grave, which will win ‘THE BLOODLESS BODY’, will eventually have won nothing but the ‘MERE DREGS’ to brag of. Second, assuming that ‘BLOOD’ is the ‘WINE OF LIFE’ and ‘BODY’ is ‘A WINE CELLAR’ where the ‘WINE OF LIFE’ is stored, a ‘BODY WHOSE BLOOD HAS DRIED OUT’ is like a ‘WINE CELLAR WHOSE WINE IS DRAWN’. Consequently, this slaughtered body, or ‘wine cellar’, as interpreted in the inter-categorical shift, will eventually have nothing but ‘THE LAST DROPS OF BLOOD’, i.e. THE DREGS’ to brag of.

There could be even another inter-categorical shift if we were to interpret ‘VAULT’ as the ‘DOME’, i.e. the ‘SKY’, although this interpretation is barely supported by the context. Assuming that the ‘KING’S BLOOD’ is the ‘WINE OF LIFE’ and ‘DREGS’ is a metonymic reference to the ‘PUBLIC’, then when the ‘WINE OF LIFE’ is drawn and the ‘THE KING’S BODY’ goes into the earth, the ‘VAULT’, the ‘DOME OF THE SKY’, will have nothing to brag of but the mere ‘DREGS’, i.e. the ‘PEOPLE’.

The previous inter-categorical shift from ‘VAULT AS GRAVE’ to ‘VAULT AS THE KING’S BODY’ has led to mutation in the cognitive content of three metaphors. However, it did not seem to influence the integrity of the image or its communicative force, not only because the semantic content of ‘VAULT’ allows for more than a single interpretation of the metonymic reference, but also because the continuity of the image is not interrupted or harmed by adopting one interpretation rather than the other. The example also highlights the role of metonymy in processing the conceptual content of a metaphor. The patterning of the
conceptual metaphors has revealed how metonymy interacts with the conceptual content of the whole image influencing different parts in it. More on the role of metonymy in conceptualizing and processing metaphor will be discussed in the descriptive part of the analysis (Section 7.2.1 on ‘The Cognitive Value of Metaphor Types’).

Other cases of inter-categorical shifts have nothing to with the multiple cross-categorical reference of the shifted concept’s conceptual domain, but are solely related to the equivocal nature of the examined concept which could be indicated as a ‘THING’, for example, coupled with the lack of a clear contextual cue in the text. An example of this is Macbeth’s rhetorical question whether “can such things be, and overcome us like a summer’s cloud?” (3.4.110). This image consists of two conceptual metaphors: an ontological metaphor which conceptualizes the concept of ‘THINGS’ as ‘A SUMMER CLOUD’ and a structural metaphor which conceptualizes the experience of ‘THE PASSING OF A SUMMER CLOUD’ as a metonymic reference to the concept of ‘NORMALITY’, as the following patterning shows:

THINGS ARE LIKE A SUMMER CLOUD
BEING OVERCOME BY A SUMMER CLOUD IS A METONYMY FOR NORMALITY

The general concept of ‘THINGS’ was not clearly delineated in this metaphor. However, the earlier dramatic context that preceded the metaphor indicates that ‘THINGS’ implies a reference to the ‘ABNORMAL THINGS’ which took place after the ghost of murdered Banquo had entered the dining room. In other words, although the TD of ‘ABNORMALITY’ was not stated directly in the verbal context, it was expressed indirectly in the dramatic context. Two of the Arabic translations read ‘THE PASSING OF A SUMMER CLOUD’ as a ‘SIGN OF NORMALITY’, whereas the third version of the metaphor, appearing in Nyazi’s translation, read the conceptual process of ‘THE PASSING OF A SUMMER CLOUD’ quite

18 “overcome: come over” (Shakespeare 2004: 47)
differently as ‘TRIGGERING MELANCHOLY’. Usually, the passing of a summer cloud happens to be unnoticeable\(^\text{19}\). In fact, the structural metaphor of ‘THE PASSING OF A SUMMER CLOUD AS A METONYMY FOR NORMALITY’ is cross-cultural in this sense and it is prevalent in classical and modern everyday Arabic in reference to the occurrence of a casual event. It is believed that summer clouds pass quickly as they are light and not heavy with rain like winter clouds that tend to pass slowly. If we want to understate the importance of a certain problem in Arabic, we can describe it as ‘a summer cloud’ which will soon disappear. The following table provides a conceptual analysis of the three TT versions of the metaphor:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Back translation</th>
<th>Conceptual metaphors</th>
<th>TT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Can such things be that pass by us like a summer cloud without amusing us?</td>
<td>THINGS ARE LIKE A SUMMER CLOUD</td>
<td>&quot;ايمكن أن توجدشيء كهذته تعبر بينا كسحابة صيف، دون أن ندهمنا؟&quot; (Jabra 1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can such things occur and pass by us like a summer cloud without triggering our wonder?</td>
<td>THINGS ARE LIKE A SUMMER CLOUD THE PASSING OF A SUMMER CLOUD OVER US IS A METONYMY FOR NORMALITY</td>
<td>&quot;ايمكن أن تظهر لنا هذه الأشياء وتمر بينا كسحابة صيف دون أن تثير عجينا؟&quot; (Badawi 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can such things be that bring us melancholy like a summer cloud?</td>
<td>THINGS ARE LIKE A SUMMER CLOUD THE PASSING OF A SUMMER CLOUD IS A METONYMY FOR MELANCHOLY</td>
<td>&quot;ايمكن أن توجدشيء كهذه تجلب الكآبة مثل سحابة صيف؟&quot; (Nyazi 2000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{19}\) Johnson commented that “The meaning is, can such wonders as these pass over us without wonder, as a casual summer cloud passes over us” (Shakespeare 1790: 373)
Although the TD of ‘THINGS’ was not stated directly in the verbal or situational context, I think that the inter-categorical shift occurred in Nyazi’s translation, rather than the two other translations. Certainly, we cannot make presumptions when dealing with the translation of metaphor, but we can make use of the collective experiential context in disentangling the subtleties of a metaphoric structure. ‘Experiential context’ is used here to mean a group of factors which include the immediate verbal context, the communicative situational context and the stylistic as well as thematic context of the metaphor in question. For instance, the situational context in this example, which appeared in the form of a rhetorical question, implies the communicative function of irony, which supports the interpretation of the ‘SUMMER-CLOUD PASSING’ image as a metonymy for ‘NORMALITY’ rather than ‘MELANCHOLY’. Taking into account that irony implies semantic contradiction between the situational context and the verbal context (see Chapter II, 2.1.2 on ‘Metaphor versus Other Tropes’), one is most likely to agree with the first interpretation viewing ‘THE PASSING OF A SUMMER CLOUD AS A METONYMY FOR NORMALITY’. This interpretation implies the presence of contradiction between the situational context, the appearance of the ghost of Banquo after being reported dead and the verbal context of the ‘summer cloud pulling over quickly and unnoticeably’. Conversely, Nyazi’s interpretation involves no such contradiction between the situational context and the metaphor of ‘summer cloud as a trigger for melancholy’. If anything, this interpretation does not support the cognitive or contextual content of the metaphor, as, unlike winter clouds, summer clouds tend to be associated with an emotional feeling of relief rather than melancholy, unless this experience is not shared cross-culturally.

The last example I would like to discuss in the context of dealing with inter-categorical shifts explains how an inter-categorical shift can occur, not only because of a multiple reference of one of the concepts involved in processing the metaphor, but also for contextual
and communicative reasons, i.e. a functional shift. The example is taken from an excerpt by Iago who, speaking of the emotion of love between Othello and Desdemona, claimed that “the food that to him now is as luscious as locusts, shall be to him shortly as acerb as the coloquintida” (Othello 1.3.347-349). First, Iago conceptualized ‘THE OBJECT OF LOVE’ in terms of being ‘AN APPETIZER’, ‘luscosious’, and, then, he built on this basic conceptual metaphor to complete his extended image. Conceptually, the image consists of four conceptual metaphors:

THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS AS LUSCIOUS AS LOCUSTS (AN APPETIZER)
THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS LIKE LOCUSTS
THE OBJECT OF LUST IS AS ACERB AS COLOQUINTIDA (A NON-APPETIZER)
THE OBJECT OF LUST IS LIKE COLOQUINTIDA

The conceptual metaphor exemplifying an inter-categorical shift that occurred for functional reasons is the part that involves describing the ‘OBJECT OF LOVE’ in terms of being “AS LUSCIOUS AS LOCUSTS”. This phrase is thought to be a reference to John the Baptist’s diet of ‘honey and locusts’ (Shakespeare 2006b: 237). Before I introduce the three translations of the metaphor and the analysis of their conceptual structure, it is appropriate to give a historical background about the main concept that will be investigated in this discussion, namely ‘LOCUST’. The word ‘LOCUST’ has more than one reference. Its immediate reference indicates the insect family of ‘grasshoppers’, which is edible in certain communities in different cultures. Its secondary reference is that of a tree which produces honey, i.e. the honey locust or the carob. Even in the context of John the Baptist’s diet the word ‘locust’ has a double interpretation: (a) some believe it refers to ‘honey and grasshoppers’, which John the Baptist dieted on when he was lost in the wilderness; (b)

20 “luscosious as locusts Cf. the description of John the Baptist’s desert sojourn in Matthew 3:4: ‘his meat was also locusts and wild honey’. Ridley cites Gerard’s Herball (1597): ‘The carob growtheth in Apulia and other countries eastward, where the cuds are so full of sweet juice that it is used to preserve ginger (…) Moreover both young and old feed thereon with pleasure. This is of some called St. John’s bread, and thought to be that which is translated locusts.’” (Shakespeare 2006b: 237)
others believe that he was a vegetarian and the reference is rather to the sweet beans of the carob tree that used to be referred to as ‘locusts’

In the TTs, this metaphor has three different equivalents, some of which are likely to have been adopted for functional reasons, as the analysis will reveal:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Back translation</th>
<th>Conceptual metaphors</th>
<th>TT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This food, which he relishes now as locusts, soon will taste as acerb as mugwort (most probably, the reference here is to John the Baptist who used to feed on ‘locusts and honey’)</td>
<td>THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS AS LUSCIOUS AS LOCUSTS (GRASSHOPPERS)</td>
<td>&quot;هذا الطعام الذي يستعذبه الآن كالجراد سيغدو له عما قريب مرًا كالعسل! (أغلبظن أن الإشارة هنا إلى يوحنا الذي كان يقتات على الجراد والعسل)&quot; (Jabra 1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The food that he finds now as luscious as honey and carob soon will taste in his mouth as acerb as mugwort</td>
<td>THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS AS LUSCIOUS AS HONEY AND CAROB (TREE)</td>
<td>&quot;إن الطعام الذي يجد الآن شهياً عذباً كالخربز والعمل سرعان ما يصبح مذاقه كالجراد والعسل&quot; (Badawi 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The food that he finds today as sweet as honey soon will taste as acerb as coloquintida</td>
<td>THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS AS SWEET AS HONEY</td>
<td>&quot;فالطعام الذي يجده اليوم حلواً كالشهد، سيجده غداً مرًا كالحنظل&quot; (Enani 2005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table shows that each translation introduced for the SD ‘LOCUSTS’ a different equivalent from the two other translations, with only one of them explaining the motive behind the choice of the equivalent, namely Jabra’s translation that ascribed the reference to John the Baptist’s diet of ‘honey’ and ‘locusts’, the ‘INSECT’. Whatever the actual reference of the metaphor is, there are at least two inter-categorical shifts in the three translations of this metaphor into Arabic. While Badawi’s translation made it clear that the reference is to the ‘CAROB TREE’, Enani’s translation equivocated the reference and introduced a shift by

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21 Kelhoffer (2005: 171-179) offers the first comprehensive study of John the Baptist’s diet of ‘locusts and wild honey’ in its socio-historical context and subsequent Christian interpretations.
way of a functional correspondence, ‘HONEY’, which is neither an ‘INSECT’ nor a ‘PLANT’. Enani’s equivalent seems to have more of a communicative function where the two sides of the comparison, ‘LUSCIOUS’ versus ‘ACERB’, can sit opposite each other while highlighting the conceptual difference between the ‘OBJECT OF LOVE’ and the ‘OBJECT OF LUST’.

If we are to examine the image as a whole, we might start to wonder why would Shakespeare create a contrast between one category, an ‘INSECT’ and a completely different category a ‘TREE’? In this regard, I would like to point out that the objective of this research is not to investigate the fallacy or truth of a certain reading or translation of a metaphor. Rather, it focuses on researching the factors that play a role in processing and translating metaphor and detecting the main trends that underlie the adoption of several approaches in different translations of the same metaphoric content. In the following section, I will discuss the criteria of TT data qualification by the loss and shifts that influenced classical metaphor types.

6.3 TT Data Qualification by Metaphor Type

Having discussed the criteria that were adopted in extracting TT data by the kind of mutation influencing the ST conceptual metaphors, I would like to discuss the influence of the translation process on the traditional types of metaphor. Throughout the process of TT data qualification, it was increasingly noticed that the issue of translating metaphor is far less related to the typology of metaphor than it is related to their conceptual content. The empirical analysis showed that preserving the type of metaphor did not always succeed in eliminating the conceptual issues which emerged throughout the processes of conceptualizing and translating metaphor, nor did shifting the conceptual content of a metaphor necessarily
affect its type. This account will progressively illustrate that the issue of translating metaphor is mainly a cognitive issue which is directly associated with the experiential processes that influence the conceptual faculty of the translator before, throughout and, perhaps, after the process of translation.

In most ST tokens which posed an issue for the conceptualization and translation of metaphor, the classical categories of metaphor types went through almost unnoticed and untouched. Similes were preserved in most cases including those that involved an ambiguity in their conceptual content. To a lesser degree, personifications were preserved even when ST data were subject to shifts in their metaphoric content. The only metaphor type which proved to have shown noticeable variation as a result of the translation process is metonymy, and this is believed to be closely related to its special cognitive nature and its interaction with the different conceptual components of the relevant metaphor, as will be discussed in the last part of the descriptive analysis. In the following account, I will list some examples whose translation involved ambiguity or variation in the conceptual content of the metaphor although the typological component was preserved throughout the process. The first example is Othello’s ironic response to Desdemona’s claim that she was ‘honest’ by saying, “Oh, ay, as summer flies in the shambles that quicken even with blowing” (Othello, 4.2.66-67). The following table provides the three TT versions of this example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;نعم، عفيفة مثل ذباب الصيف في المذابح تلقّحه حتى عصفة هواء&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;كعجة الذباب في شهر الصيف بالمجاز! يتأتي إلى الحياة قبل منشأ اليرقات!&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;أي والله، كما ذباب الصيف في المجازرة إذ ينشط فيما يحلو!&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, pure like summer flies in the shambles that quicken even with the blowing of the air</td>
<td>As pure as flies during summer time in the shambles! They come to life even before the larva phase</td>
<td>Yes, indeed, as summer flies in the shambles; they become active as they stop to fly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above table shows that although the three TTs preserved the typology of the metaphor, i.e. the simile, there was a variation in its conceptual content. The example represents an extended metaphor consisting of two conceptual patterns: an ontological metaphor and a structural metaphor. The variation across the translated texts occurred in the second conceptual pattern which is a structural metaphor that conceptualizes the ‘DISHONESTY OF THE OBJECT OF LOVE’ in terms of ‘the behaviour of summer flies in the shambles’ which ‘QUICKEN EVEN WITH BLOWING’. As the following conceptual representation of the metaphor will reveal, only the first equivalent, in Badawi’s translation, preserved the conceptual content of the metaphor, whereas the two other equivalents of Enani and Jabra, showed variation in their interpretation of the metaphor:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST Conceptual Metaphors</th>
<th>TT1 Conceptual Metaphors</th>
<th>TT2 Conceptual Metaphors</th>
<th>TT3 Conceptual Metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE DISHONEST OBJECT OF LOVE IS AS SUMMER FLIES IN THE SHAMBLES</td>
<td>THE DISHONEST OBJECT OF LOVE IS AS SUMMER FLIES IN THE SHAMBLES</td>
<td>THE DISHONEST OBJECT OF LOVE IS AS SUMMER FLIES IN THE SHAMBLES</td>
<td>THE DISHONEST OBJECT OF LOVE IS AS SUMMER FLIES IN THE SHAMBLES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The contrastive analysis has also shown that, like similes, personifications were marginally influenced by the translation process, even when the conceptual content of the metaphor was subject to mutation. Being ontological metaphors that conceptualize things in terms of the physical features of HUMAN BEINGS, personifications are expected to be more cross-culturally shared than other kinds of conceptual metaphor such as structural metaphors and image schemas. Consequently, they are expected to show less variation in their conceptual structure when subject to a process of translation. The following examples will discuss the conceptual behaviour of personifications throughout the translation process. The first example is taken from *Macbeth* where Duncan says, “the air nimbly and sweetly recommends itself unto our gentle senses” (1.6.1-3). In the following table, I will provide the three versions of the example with their back translations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;فالهواء هنا منعش وعذب ووقعه لطيف على الحواس&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;فالهواء يخفّ بسرعته وعذوبته للترحيب بحواسنا المرهفة&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;فالهواء يخفّ بسرعته وحلاوته يحبب نفسه إلى رهيف حواسنا&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The air here is fresh and sweet, and leaves a gentle effect on the senses</td>
<td>The air moves swiftly and freshly to welcome our gentle senses</td>
<td>The air, with its swiftness and sweetness, makes itself attractive to our gentle senses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that the three translation processes influenced the ST example differently. Whereas Badawi’s translation gives the semantic content of the metaphor, i.e. its meaning, leading to a loss in the metaphor type as a personification, Nyazi’s preserves the personification while changing the SD of the metaphor from ‘A PERSON WHO RECOMMENDS’ to ‘A PERSON WHO WELCOMES’. Jabra’s translation seems to give the closest representation of both the type of metaphor and its conceptual content. The following table provides a representation of the conceptual metaphors that are implied in the equivalent of each TT:
The third example which I would like to discuss in relation to the behaviour of the metaphor type throughout the process of translation is Macbeth’s personified image of SLEEP as a ‘PERSON’ who “knits up the ravelled sleave of care” (2.2.34). If we examine the three TT versions of the metaphor and the representations of the conceptual metaphors in the following table, we notice that both Badawi and Jabra preserved the personification and the conceptual content of the image of ‘SLEEP AS A KNITTER’. Nyazi, on the other hand, came up with a less technical image where he conceptualized ‘SLEEP’ as a ‘PERSON WHO DISINTANGLES THE TWISTED THREADS OF CARE’. Nyazi’s shift influenced the conceptual content of the metaphor while preserving its typology as a personification:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST Conceptual Metaphors</th>
<th>TT1 Conceptual Metaphors</th>
<th>TT2 Conceptual Metaphors</th>
<th>TT3 Conceptual Metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE AIR IS A PERSON WHO RECOMMENDS HIMSELF</td>
<td>A loss in the two conceptual metaphors (SEMANTIC EQUIVALENCE)</td>
<td>THE AIR IS A PERSON WHO WELCOMES SENSES ARE THE OBJECT OF RECOMMENDATION (PERSON)</td>
<td>THE AIR IS A PERSON WHO MAKES HIMSELF ATTRACTIVE SENSES ARE THE OBJECT OF ATTRACTING (PERSON)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;النوم البريء الذي يعيد نسج خيوط الهم المعقدة&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the innocent sleep, that reknits the entangled threads of care

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TT1 Conceptual Metaphors</th>
<th>TT2 Conceptual Metaphors</th>
<th>TT3 Conceptual Metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLEEP IS A KNITTER WHO REKNITS THE ENTANGLED THREADS OF CARE</td>
<td>SLEEP IS A PERSON WHO DISENTANGLES THE TANGLED THREADS OF CARE</td>
<td>SLEEP IS A PERSON WHO RE-KNITS THE RAGGED CLOTH OF CARE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TT1 Conceptual Metaphors</th>
<th>TT2 Conceptual Metaphors</th>
<th>TT3 Conceptual Metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;النوم الذي يفرز خيوط الهم المتشابكة عن بعضها البعض&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sleep that disentangles the entangled threads of care

Sleep that reknits the ravelled cloth of care
The previous discussion shows that, irrespective of the complex nature of the cognitive processes that take place inside the mind of the translator, these processes tend to be mainly dominated by the conceptual nature of the metaphoric content and that they have a minor influence on the classical types of metaphor. This goes contrary to the analysis of text-linguistic approaches to the translation of metaphor which discussed the issue from a purely linguistic perspective (Chapter III, 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 on ‘the Translatability of Metaphor’) neglecting other aspects which might have a much more important role to play in processing and translating metaphor. This claim will be further discussed in the descriptive analysis in the next chapter of the empirical study. Now I will move to the last section of this chapter providing the results of the contrastive study by the mutation that influenced ST data (conceptual metaphors and the traditional types of metaphor) as a result of the translation process.

6.4 TT Data Quantification: The Tables of the Results

Having discussed the criteria that were adopted in extracting and qualifying TT data for the descriptive analysis, I will provide a statistical account of the results. The results of the contrastive analysis will be read descriptively in terms of the main trends that were detected in each translation and across all translations. For an objective analysis of the statistical results, it is not enough to read the data in terms of the numbers of shifts and losses that appeared in the translations individually. It is equally important to read them functionally by investigating the variations that occurred in the TT data in the three translations altogether. As indicated in Chapter IV on ‘the Research Methods’, surveying the results of the
comparative analysis based on the triangulation of data provides a wider scope for analysing
the statistics functionally and empirically. The following tables of the statistical results will
give a quantified approximation of the rate of mutation that influenced the ST metaphoric
content in terms of the extracted conceptual metaphors as well as the traditional types of
metaphor, i.e. simile, personification, symbols and metonymy.

<p>| Statistical Results by the Number of Shifts and Losses in Conceptual Metaphors |
| (Othello) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translator</th>
<th>Tokens</th>
<th>Shifts</th>
<th>Losses</th>
<th>Total Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jabra</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badawi</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enani</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Statistical Results by the Number of Shifts and Losses in Conceptual Metaphors |
| (Macbeth) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translator</th>
<th>Total ST Data</th>
<th>Shifts</th>
<th>Losses</th>
<th>Total Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jabra</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyazi</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badawi</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Statistical Results by the Number of Shifts and Losses in the Traditional Types of Metaphor (Othello) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translator</th>
<th>Simile (35)</th>
<th>Personification (98)</th>
<th>Metonymy (43)</th>
<th>Symbol (6)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
To sum up, this chapter dealt with the second part of the empirical research, the contrastive analysis, providing an explanation of the main criteria and processes that were adopted in conducting the contrastive study. The content of the chapter was discussed in four sections. In the first section, I explained the criteria that were adopted in qualifying TT data from the perspective of the notion of ‘loss’ in ST data. The second section centred on the criteria that were followed in extracting and qualifying TT data by the shifts that influenced ST data. The third section discussed TT data qualification by the mutation influencing the classical categories of metaphor, and the fourth section provided the statistical results of the contrastive text analysis by the extent of mutation that occurred in the ST conceptual patterns and the traditional types of metaphor.
CHAPTER SEVEN
A DESCRIPTIVE READING OF THE RESULTS
OF THE CONTRASTIVE ANALYSIS

This chapter is devoted to the descriptive reading of the results of the contrastive study. The results of the first two phases of the empirical study, ST data extraction and selection and TT data qualification, were gathered according to the research methods introduced in Chapter IV. As pointed out earlier, the first part of the empirical study, dealing with the extraction of ST data, was carried out in the light of the cognitive approach, and the second part was carried out according to a combined methodology which comprised the cognitive model of Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Toury’s descriptive approach to TS (a TT-oriented approach). This chapter will cover the last phase of the empirical research where the statistical results will be examined and read qualitatively in three sections.

The first section will provide a descriptive reading of the results in terms of their implications for the individual methods of the four translators, i.e. vis-à-vis the type of equivalence that prevailed in each translation. The second section will deal with a descriptive reading of the results in terms of their implications across the three translations of each play where I will try to detect the presence of common tendencies that could have influenced the translation of metaphor in all translated texts. In other words, section two will discuss the results in the light of their implications for the cognitive value of metaphor types. The third section will focus on a summary of the main arguments of the descriptive discussion in a model for the translation of metaphor. The results that were presented in Chapter VI comprise: (a) data mutation in the six TTs by the shifts and losses that influenced ST conceptual metaphors; and (b) data mutation in the six TTs by the classical types of metaphor. Before I start the descriptive analysis of the results, and in order for these results to
be read in a functional way, I am going to re-present them as percentages of the total volume of the analysed material:

<p>| Percentage of Metaphor Types influenced by Shifts and Losses in ST Data (Othello) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translator</th>
<th>Simile (35)</th>
<th>Personification (98)</th>
<th>Metonymy (43)</th>
<th>Symbol (6)</th>
<th>Total (182)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jabra</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4.08%</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badawi</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enani</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>65.1%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Percentage of Metaphor Types influenced by Shifts and Losses in ST Data (Macbeth) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translator</th>
<th>Simile (35)</th>
<th>Personification (191)</th>
<th>Metonymy (79)</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Total (305)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jabra</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>29.11%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badawi</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyazi</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As this table shows, the total percentages of metaphor type data influenced by the translation process are not very high hitting a highest point of 32.1% in Badawi’s translation of Macbeth. In a preliminary reading of these results, we notice that the behaviour of metaphor types is quite consistent in the six TTs and across the four translators in terms of the rate of their mutation, with simile being the metaphor type least influenced by the translation process, as opposed to metonymy. The table shows that the mutation rate of similes ranged between nil to 2.8% in all data fields, and the mutation rate of personifications was a little higher than that of similes but did not reach a considerable level, with the highest being 30.3% in Badawi’s translation of Macbeth. Conversely, the mutation rate of metonymy
proved to be highly noticeable in all the results hitting the highest percentage of mutation among other types of metaphor.

We can also notice that symbols, which have a very low representation in comparison with other types of metaphor, came in second position after metonymies in their rate of mutation. Before I proceed on a functional reading of the results taking the analysis further towards the descriptive approach, it is important to represent the second half of the results in terms of the percentages of mutation that influenced the ST conceptual metaphors. The objective behind this is to see whether there is consistency in the statistical distribution of the results in the different translations and to combine the two tables of the results in one objective reading of the main issues and factors that influence the translation of metaphor and discuss their implications for the empirical study.

| Percentage of Shifts and Losses in the Conceptual Metaphors of Othello |
|-----------------------------|---------|--------|--------|----------|
| Translator                | Total   | Shifts | Losses | Total Changes |
| Jabra                     | 721     | 13.03% | 11.9%  | 24.9%     |
| Badawi                    | 721     | 19.1%  | 21.9%  | 41.05%    |
| Enani                     | 721     | 19.8%  | 25.3%  | 45.2%     |

| Percentage of Shifts and Losses in the Conceptual Metaphors of Macbeth |
|-----------------------------|---------|--------|--------|----------|
| Translator                | Total   | Shifts | Losses | Total Changes |
| Jabra                     | 788     | 9.3%   | 7.8%   | 17.2%     |
| Nyazi                     | 788     | 14.2%  | 20.6%  | 34.8%     |
| Badawi                    | 788     | 17.1%  | 18.4%  | 35.5%     |

Having submitted a percentage representation of the statistical output of the contrastive study, I will deal with a combined reading of the results in terms of their implications for the main trends that characterize the individual methods of the translators, on one hand, and the
general trends that were noticed across all TTs, on another hand. For the purpose of clarification, I will divide the descriptive analysis of the results into two parts: the first part will focus on reading the results by the individual style of each translator in dealing with the metaphoric content of the ST, and the second part will provide a descriptive reading of the results across the three translations of each ST. Both parts of the descriptive analysis will refer to the last two tables whenever needed and will be supported with appropriate examples from the contrastive analysis of the empirical research.

7.1 The Implications of the Results for Translators

In this part of the descriptive analysis, I will discuss the statistical results of the empirical research vis-à-vis the main trends that characterized the translators’ individual ways of dealing with metaphor. The results of the tables above highlight some very interesting implications about the translators’ tendencies in dealing with the metaphoric content of ST data. First, the results show that the translators who had their translations examined in the two STs were quite consistent in opting for changes in the types of metaphor. For example, the percentage of changes made by Jabra in the types of metaphor has totalled 15.9% in Othello and 13.7% in Macbeth, which are very close results. Similarly, Badawi’s tendency to change metaphor types has registered equally similar results in his two translations reaching a rate of 28.5% in his translation Othello and 32.1% in his translation of Macbeth. As for the two other translators, Enani and Nyazi, we cannot apply the same measure because the contrastive study dealt with the data of one TT only by each of them. However, we can analyse the data extracted from their translations from a different perspective, which is the subject of the second interesting point to be noticed in the previous statistical results.
If we classify the overall tendencies of the four translators in opting for changes in ST data, both by classical metaphor types and conceptual metaphors, we notice that the translator who opted for producing the least number of changes in the types of metaphor also made the least number of changes in conceptual metaphors. This description applies to Jabra who came at the lowest level of opting for changes in ST data in both metaphor types and conceptual metaphors. Likewise, the translator who effected the highest percentage of change in ST data by the types of metaphor also effected the highest percentage of change in ST data by conceptual metaphors. This applies to Enani who registered a rate of 31.8% for the changes he made in the types of metaphor in Othello, and a rate of 45.2% for his changes in the conceptual patterns of metaphor in the same ST. Similarly, Badawi who made the highest rate of changes in metaphor types in Macbeth 32.1% also reached the highest percentage of changes in the conceptual patterns of the same play 35.5%.

Throughout the contrastive analysis, I noticed that the translators were highly consistent in their approach to translating metaphor. Certainly, there were few occasions when the translators would go beyond the main tendency that characterized their way of dealing with the issue of metaphor. For example, it was observed that a translator who opted for Formal Equivalence most of the time, like Jabra, would occasionally come up with an equivalent which might not be in line with this tendency. However, and in the main, when a translator showed a preference for a certain type of equivalence, they were most likely to continue to opt for that particular preference on the wider level of ST data. As a result, I combined the earlier results of the statistical tables in one table that shows the main type of equivalence adopted by each translator in ascending order, as revealed in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translator</th>
<th>% of Changes in Metaphor Types</th>
<th>% of Changes in Conceptual Metaphors</th>
<th>Prevailing Type of Equivalence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Othello TTs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translator</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Semantic</td>
<td>Functional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabra</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>Formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badawi</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>41.05%</td>
<td>Semantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enani</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>Functional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Next to the statistical results, this table shows a general appraisal of the prevailing type of equivalence adopted in each TT, which will be supported with examples from the TT of each translator. The descriptive analysis will reveal how the translators were, generally, consistent and steady in the translation choices they made where they dealt with the issue of metaphor throughout the translation process not as an individual phenomenon in its own right, but as a vital part of an integrated conceptual content. In this regard, it is important to mention that all the translators tried their best to preserve the ST metaphoric content. If we go back to the second table about the percentages of loss in data, we notice that the highest registered rate of loss in ST metaphoric patterns did not exceed 25.3%. The next section will deal with the first part of the descriptive analysis providing an account of the main trends that were unique to each translator in dealing with the metaphoric content of the ST.

7.1.1 Formal Equivalence in Jabra

Now that I have given a general description of the translators’ key tendencies in dealing with the translation of metaphor, I will move to a more particularized analysis of the main trends which prevailed in the TT of each translator. I will start this account with Jabra’s translation of Othello, leaving the discussion of his version of Macbeth to the account on the translations.
of Badawi and Nyazi. As the statistics showed in the quantified description of the TT data, Jabra introduced the least number of changes to ST data. His tendency to preserve the ST metaphoric component against mutation comprised metaphor types and conceptual metaphors both of which he tried to keep as close as possible to those of the ST, even though the outcome could be seen to have influenced the ‘naturalness’ of the semantic content, the linguistic structure, or the overall flow of the image concerned.

In my contrastive analysis of the translation of metaphor in Jabra’s versions of *Othello* and *Macbeth*, I noticed that he adopted a strict approach towards preserving the metaphoric component of the ST, with translation choices that were highly reflective of his preference for the model of Formal Equivalence. With the exception of very few examples, Jabra tried his best to avoid any interpretations that were not supported by academic scholarly efforts, as his footnotes revealed. His tendency to opt for Formal Equivalence becomes more conspicuous if we contrast the examples taken from his translation with examples taken from the translations of Badawi and Enani, as the following table reveals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Enani</th>
<th>TT3 Badawi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“I will wear my heart upon my sleeve for daws to peck at”</td>
<td>“سأرتدي قلبي فوق ردني لينبش فيه كل غراب”</td>
<td>I would have carried my bare heart on my palm for birds to peck at</td>
<td>“حينئذ أغدو هدفا لنقرات الحمقى”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(Othello, 1.1.64-65)</em></td>
<td>I will wear my heart upon my sleeve for every daw to grub at</td>
<td></td>
<td>Then I will become a target for fools to peck at</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The robbed that smiles steals something from the thief; He robs himself that spends a bootless grief”</td>
<td>“المسلب إذا ابتسم يسرق من السارق شيئًا ويدلب نفسه من ينقح حزناً دون جدوى”</td>
<td>The robbed who smiles steals something from the thief. He robs himself who cries indeed steals</td>
<td>“الرجل الذي يسرق فيبتسم يسرق شيئًا من سارقه، أما الذي يحزن بلا طائل على ما فقد إما يسرق نفسه”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“أكون قد حملت قلبي فوق كفي عارياً كي نأكل الأطيار منه”</td>
<td></td>
<td>The man who smiles when robbed steals something from the thief.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"I will wear my heart upon my sleeve for daws to peck at" *(Othello, 1.1.64-65)*
If we examine this table and draw a comparison between the ST metaphoric content and each TT metaphoric content, we notice that Jabra was the only translator who opted for strict literality in preserving the images. In certain examples, the tendency for literality has influenced the naturalness of the Arabic equivalent. These examples include Jabra’s translation of “wear my heart upon my sleeves”, “spends a bootless grief” and “a usurped beard”, all of which sound unusual if rendered into Arabic literally. In the last example, we notice that, unlike the other translators, Jabra introduced what seems to be an unintentional inter-categorical shift from ‘FRIEZE’ as in the ‘bristle which covers the body of a bird’ to
‘FREEZE’ as in ‘FROST’. This resulted in a Zero Equivalence between the ST conceptual metaphor and the TT conceptual metaphor, which influenced the conceptual unity of the metaphor, as the following comparison between the ST conceptual representation and the TT conceptual representation shows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST Conceptual Metaphors</th>
<th>TT Conceptual Metaphors (Jabra )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“My invention comes from my pate as birdlime does from frieze it plucks out brains and all”</td>
<td>My invention comes from my pate as birdlime from frost; plucking out the head and feathers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATIVITY IS A PROCESS OF HUNTING (STRUCTURAL)</td>
<td>CREATIVITY IS A PROCESS OF HUNTING (STRUCTURAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INVENTION IS BIRDLIME (ONTOLOGICAL)</td>
<td>INVENTION IS BIRDLIME (ONTOLOGICAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATIVITY IS A PHYSICAL FORCE (IMAGE SCHEMA)</td>
<td>CREATIVITY IS A PHYSICAL FORCE (IMAGE SCHEMA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the remaining examples, however, Jabra’s treatment of the ST metaphoric components involved no unintended inter-categorical shift as he preserved every single conceptual metaphor which contributed to the metaphoric content, unlike the two other translators whose choices involved refining parts of the metaphoric component out of their tendency to achieve Semantic or Functional Equivalence. For example, in the first metaphor, a blended image consisting of two structural metaphors, only Jabra’s translation preserved the two structural metaphors, unlike Badawi and Enani who treated the first part of the image in two different ways. While the ST blended image went through loss in its first metaphoric component in the translation of Badawi, it was shifted to a metaphor that is common in the metaphoric heritage of Arabic language, in Enani’s translation, i.e. Functional Equivalence. For further
clarification, this needs to be discussed in a conceptual analysis of the creative image as a whole in the ST and each TT. In the following table, I will provide a general representation of the ST and TT conceptual metaphors on the level of the structural metaphors without going deep into the micro level of the metaphoric content, namely basic level ontological metaphors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST Mappings</th>
<th>TTI Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Enani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘EXPOSING ONE’S EMOTIONS IS WEARING ONE’S HEART ON ONE’S SLEEVE’</td>
<td>‘EXPOSING ONE’S EMOTIONS IS WEARING ONE’S HEART ON ONE’S SLEEVE’</td>
<td>EXPOSING ONE’S EMOTIONS IS BECOMING A TARGET FOR OTHERS</td>
<td>EXPOSING ONE’S EMOTIONS IS CARRYING ONE’S HEART IN ONE’S PALM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘EXPOSING ONE’S EMOTIONS IS HAVING ONE’S HEART PECKED AT BY RAVENS’</td>
<td>‘EXPOSING ONE’S EMOTIONS IS HAVING ONE’S HEART GRABBED AT BY RAVENS’</td>
<td>EXPOSING ONE’S EMOTIONS IS BECOMING A TARGET FOR THE PECKS OF FOOLS</td>
<td>EXPOSING ONE’S EMOTIONS IS HAVING ONE’S HEART EATEN UP BY RAVENS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before I analyse the three translations of this metaphor, I would like to draw attention to the first part of the metaphor, ‘wear my heart upon my sleeve’, which is lexicalized in modern day English as an idiomatic expression for ‘allowing one’s emotions to be known to others’. The fact that this part of the image evolved to the status of an idiomatic expression might pose an issue for processing and translating the whole image, as there is more than one way of looking at it. First, this part of the metaphor can be dealt with as a fixed lexical item that has a static semantic content in the lexicon, with the effect of influencing the second part of the image, as happened in Badawi’s translation. Second, the idiomatic component can be considered an integrated part of the whole image and translated accordingly, which is what
happened in Jabra’s and Enani’s translations. In fact, this example shows how the translation of metaphor is not only subject to the translator’s main tendency in approaching the conceptual content of the ST, but also to other factors including the etymology of language. Since the first component of the metaphor is traced back to Shakespeare and used by him as a part of an integrated image, I will analyse its translation as an extended creative metaphor that consists of two structural metaphors.

If we examine the previous analysis of the two structural metaphors that underlie the conceptual content of the creative image, we notice that Jabra’s translation yielded an almost precise equivalent of the ST image, contrary to the two other translations that introduced a shift in the first part of the image. For example, Badawi reduced the first structural metaphor to a semantic equivalent and explicated the second structural metaphor accordingly interpreting the SD of ‘DAWS’ as ‘FOOLS’ while preserving part of its properties by maintaining the presence of the verb ‘PECK AT’ which is about the only element that was preserved from the original metaphor. By contrast, Enani kept the second part of the image almost intact while trying to domesticate its first part by introducing something familiar to the Arabic language reader without influencing the degree of its metaphoricity.

For more clarification, Badawi’s semantic equivalent eliminated the metaphoric reference to the concept ‘HEART’, unlike Enani’s translation that preserved it while replacing ‘SLEEVE’ for ‘PLAM’. Enani’s translation introduced the ST image as follows: ‘If I reveal my emotions to others, I will be like someone who walks around carrying his heart in his palm for birds to come and eat it away’. In this translation, the structural metaphor was shifted from ‘WEARING ONE’S HEART ON ONE’S SLEEVE’ to ‘CARRYING ONE’S HEART ON ONE’S PALM’. The image of ‘carrying one’s heart on one’s palm’ is not uncommon in Arabic. A very similar image of ‘carrying one’s soul on one’s palm’ was introduced by the famous poet Ibrahîm Ṭūqân, and used by the poet ‘Abd al-Rahîm Maḥmûd.
(Taha 2005: 319) in two of the most celebrated poems in Arabic, as explained in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Back translation</th>
<th>Arabic poetry line</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t ask about his safety; His soul is on his palm</td>
<td>“لا تسل عن سلامته روحه فوق راحته” (ibid.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I will carry my soul on my palm, and throw it into the depths of death</td>
<td>“سأحمل روحي على راحتي، وألقي بها في مهاوي الردى” (ibid.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As for the other examples that appeared in the earlier table, only Jabra maintained all the metaphoric components of the ST metaphors, whereas Enani and Badawi gave their semantic content, as in the case of the conventional metaphor ‘SORROW HAS A FINANCIAL VALUE (SPENT)’ in ‘spends a bootless grief’. This metaphor was rendered into a semantic equivalent in Enani’s translation, ‘cries’, and Badawi’s translation, ‘grieves in vain’. The same applies to the ‘BEARD AS PROPERTY’ ontological metaphor in the example of the ‘usurped beard’. Both Enani and Badawi translated the metaphor as ‘a false beard’, i.e. a semantic equivalent. Conversely, Jabra preserved the conceptual content of the metaphor even though it might sound ‘strange’ to the Arab reader. More examples from Jabra’s translation of the second ST, Macbeth, will be discussed when I tackle the main trends that prevailed in the translations of Badawi and Nyazi. In the following account, I will discuss Enani’s translation of Othello, trying to detect the main tendencies that characterized his translation of creative metaphor.

7.1.2 Functional Equivalence in Enani

Going back to the tables of the statistical results, we notice that Enani introduced the highest rate of mutation to ST data in terms of the changes that influenced the types of metaphor 31.8% and those that influenced the conceptual metaphoric patterns 45.2%. 19.8% of this
mutation appeared in the form of shifts in the conceptual metaphors and the other 25.3% appeared in the form of loss in the metaphoric patterns. Throughout the contrastive analysis of Enani’s translation, it was noticed that the translator tended to carry out changes in ST data whenever he felt the need to opt for Functional Equivalence. As indicated previously, a functional equivalent is an equivalent which is produced for pragmatic reasons which comprise domesticating the conceptual content of the ST for stylistic, cultural, ideological, or communicative reasons that aim at preserving the ST message. Also, as explained in my account of the nature of shifts and losses that influence data of a metaphoric nature (Sections 6.1 and 6.2), Functional Equivalence might lead to a loss in the metaphoric content of ST data, but, at the same time, it provides a correspondence which does not influence the minimum level of equivalence, namely the semantic content. I will provide examples on how Enani’s tendency to adopt Functional Equivalence has influenced his method of translating metaphor.

Initially, I will not contrast Enani’s translation with those of Jabra and Badawi as I would like to approach his translation from the perspective of certain stylistic features that are not found in the two other translations. Nevertheless, the analysis will be further supported with other examples that will adopt a contrastive approach to the three translators of Othello, showing how Functional Equivalence was a main trend that characterized the translation of Enani, as opposed to the translation of Jabra, who opted for Formal Equivalence, and Badawi, who gave priority to the semantic content of metaphors. The first example is taken from the wisdom spoken by Brabantio in response to the Duke’s request to challenge his misfortune with a smile. The following table provides the ST, TT and a back translation of the TT into English. In this example, Enani paid special attention to the poetic element of rhyme which is one of the distinctive features of Shakespeare’s dramatic language. The analysis will show how the translator’s attempt to preserve the writer’s individual style has influenced certain
components of the extended image, leading to loss in certain parts of the metaphoric content and causing shifts in its other parts, depending on the stylistic requirements of rhyme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>Back translation</th>
<th>TT Enani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| “So let the Turk of Cyprus us beguile; We lose it not so long as we can smile. He bears the sentence well, that nothing bears But the free comfort which from thence he hears; But he bears both the sentence and the sorrow That, to pay grief, must of poor patience borrow; These sentences, to sugar or to gall, Being strong on both sides, are equivocal: But words are words I never did hear That the bruised heart was pierced through the ear” | Let the Turk, then, beguile us of Cyprus while we are preoccupied We will not lose it as long as we draw a smile on our lips; How easy it is for someone who did not suffer to be wise; It is a pure comfort that does not go beyond the limit of words; But he who bears the taste of wisdom and hard sorrow borrows from poor patience to pay the debt of grief; The words of wise people might be like sugar or gall; Powerful on both sides, they bring the sweet with the bitter; But utterances remain utterances no more; I never heard that the sick heart is treated with intoxicating words | ظليرض منا الأتراك إذن فإن فرس في غذا! لن نفقدها ما دمنا نرسم فوق الشفة اليسمة! ما أيسر أن يتحلى من لم يخبر آما بالحكمه فهي عزة صاحب لا يتعدى حذ الكلمة! أما من يتحمل طعم الحكمه والشجن الأثر فيستند دين الحزن بفرض من فقر الصبر قد تصبح أقوال الحكماء إذن كاحنظل أوكاسكر وستجمع من قوتنا في أن طعم الحلو مع الممر لكن الألفاظ تظل دوماً ألفاظاً لا أكثر لم أسمع يوماً أن القلب المعطل يدوى باللغة المعسكر.

( Othello, 1.3.210-219) |

We notice from this table that the translator’s priority was preserving the poetic style by giving the words of wisdom a rhythmical component corresponding to that of the ST. As a result, and throughout the process, ST data went through some changes in its conceptual...
content, although the translator seems to have tried his best not to influence their metaphoricity. To illustrate, Enani preserved the main metaphors that dominated the scene such as the extended ontological metaphor of ‘EMOTION (GRIEF/PATIENCE) AS A PERSON’ and the structural metaphor of ‘OCCUPYING AS STEALING A PRECIOUS OBJECT’. The change in the ST metaphoric content in Enani’s translation of this excerpt is of three kinds: loss in ST data, shifts in ST data and introducing new conceptual patterns to the ST metaphoric content. For example, in the TT version, we notice that there were some shifts in certain metaphors such as changing the TD concept of the structural metaphor ‘EQUIVOCALITY IS TASTING SWEET AND BITTER’ to ‘POWERFUL WISDOM IS TASTING SWEET AND BITTER’, which dropped the concept of ‘EQUIVOCALITY’ altogether from the TT.

Also, the image schema of ‘SORROW IS A PHYSICAL FORCE’ was shifted to the structural metaphor ‘SORROW IS A DISEASE’. In addition, throughout his attempt to come up with words that fulfil the musicality of the wisdom, the translator introduced new conceptual patterns to the metaphoric content of the ST such as the ontological metaphors: ‘WISDOM HAS A TASTE’, ‘SMILE IS THE OBJECT OF DRAWING’ and ‘WORDS ARE ALCOHOL (INTOXICATING)’. The following table presents a detailed analysis of the changes that influenced ST data as a result of the translator’s choice of Functional Equivalence:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST Conceptual Metaphors</th>
<th>Loss in ST Data</th>
<th>Shifts in ST Data</th>
<th>New Metaphors in TT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

264
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GEOGRAPHIC SPACE IS A PRECIOUS OBJECT</th>
<th>SENTENCE IS A HEAVY OBJECT</th>
<th>THE POWER OF WISDOM IS HAVING A SWEET AND BITTER TASTE</th>
<th>A SMILE IS THE OBJECT OF DRAWING WORDS HAVE AN ORIENTATIONAL VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GRIEF IS A CREDITOR</td>
<td>SORROW IS A HEAVY OBJECT</td>
<td>SORROW IS A DISEASE</td>
<td>WISDOM HAS A TASTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATIENCE IS A POOR PERSON</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>THE TASTE OF WISDOM IS A HEAVY OBJECT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATIENCE IS A CREDITOR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GRIEF HAS A TASTE WORDS ARE ALCOHOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIVOCALITY IS THE EXPERIENCE OF TASTING SWEETNESS AND BITTERNESS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SORROW IS A PHYSICAL FORCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now that I have given an example of how Enani’s preference for Functional Equivalence influenced his translation of metaphor, I will support the analysis with more examples that will be contrasted with the translations of the two other translators. The aim behind this is to highlight the different types of functionality that the translator was trying to achieve while translating the ST metaphoric content. As the following table will reveal, Enani seems to be the only translator who opted for Functional Equivalence when he introduced ‘the act of swearing’ influencing, not only the metaphoric content of the metaphor ‘God’s blood’, but also eliminating the whole reference to the TD of ‘DEITY’. Contrary to Jabra who preserved
the cultural metaphor of ‘DEITY HAS HUMAN FEATURES/BLOOD’ while deleting the metonymic reference to ‘THE SON OF GOD AS GOD’, and unlike Badawi who deleted the two metaphoric mappings and domesticated the metaphor to an exclamation that preserved the TD of ‘DEITY AS GOD’, Enani’s equivalent has no trace of the SD (‘HUMAN FEATURES/BLOOD’) or even the TD (‘DEITY/SON OF GOD/MESSIAH/GOD’). Yet, we cannot qualify his translation as a Zero Equivalent as it fulfils the pragmatic function of the metaphor even though it sacrifices its conceptual content:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Enani</th>
<th>TT3 Badawi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“God’s blood”</td>
<td>&quot;وجروح المسيح&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;أقسم!&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;يا إلهي!&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(Othello, 1.1.4)</em></td>
<td>By the wounds of Christ!</td>
<td>I swear!</td>
<td>Oh my God!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second example about Enani’s preference of Functional Equivalence in translating ST data was discussed previously under the topic of inter-categorical shifts (Chapter VI, 6.2) and it is taken from Iago’s statement, “The food that to him now is as luscious as locusts shall be to him shortly as acerb as the coloquintida” *(Othello, 1.3.347-349)*. If we examine the three TT versions of this metaphor in the following table, we notice that Jabra’s and Badawi’s translations of ‘as luscious as locusts’ were meant to preserve the ST reference to the TD ‘LOCUSTS’ regardless of the variation in their interpretation of the concept. Although Jabra translated ‘LOCUSTS’ as ‘GRASSHoppers’ and Badawi translated it as ‘CAROB’, none of these translations was marked as a shift in the TD because, as discussed before, the TD reference to ‘locusts’ is associated with two possible interpretations: ‘LOCUSTS AS GRASSHOPPERS’ and ‘LOCUSTS AS THE BEANS OF THE CAROB TREE’. In other words, both Jabra and Badawi introduced an equivalent which they believed to be an authentic representation of the actual reference of the TD ‘LOCUSTS’. On the other hand, Enani’s translation of the metaphor made a clear shift in the TD reference from ‘LOCUSTS’ to ‘HONEY’, which does not belong to any of the previous interpretations but fulfils the
There are two reasons why Enani’s inter-categorical shift from ‘LOCUSTS’ to ‘HONEY’ reflects his tendency to opt for Functional Equivalence. First, the resulting TT equivalent of ‘as sweet as honey’ is prevalent in Arabic and used in similar contexts. Second, although this equivalent does not represent the exact wording of the ST metaphor, it satisfies the rhetorical function of semantic juxtaposition, namely antithesis, in ‘sweet versus acerb’ and ‘honey versus coloquintida’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Enani</th>
<th>TT3 Badawi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The food that to him now is as luscious as locusts shall be to him shortly as acerb as the coloquintida” (Othello, 1.3.347-349)</td>
<td>&quot;هذا الطعام الذي يستعذبه الآن كالجراد سيغدو له عما قريب مرّا كالعلقم!&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;فالطعام الذي يجده اليوم حلوا كالجراد سيغدو له عما قريب مرّا كالعلقم!&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;إن الطعام الذي يجده الآن شهيا عندبا كالخرزوب والعسل سرعان ما يصبح منه في فمه مرّا كالعلقم&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;This food, which he relishes now as locusts, soon will taste as acerb as mugwort&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;The food that he finds today as sweet as honey soon will taste as acerb as coloquintida&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;The food that he finds now as luscious as honey and carob soon will taste in his mouth as acerb as mugwort&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third example, listed in the table below, involves the translation of the metonymic reference to ‘CUCKOLDRY’ as a ‘FORKED PLAGUE’. If we examine the three TT versions of this example, we notice that both Jabra and Badawi preserved the metonymic reference to ‘the forked plague’ partially by explicating its first part, ‘forked’, while keeping its second part, ‘plague’, intact. Conversely, Enani domesticated the reference of the ‘forked plague’ by replacing it with the cultural concept of ‘being a fetishist’, ‘dayyūth’ in Arabic. Enani’s translation involves a loss in the metaphoric content of the ‘forked plague’, not only because he replaced it with a direct reference to its semantic content, but also as there is a functional difference between the concept of ‘CUCKOLDRY’ and the concept of ‘FETISHISM’. As a metonymic reference, ‘CUCKOLDRY’ involves conceptualizing the
'THE OBJECT OF CUCKOLDRY AS AN OBJECT OF DECEPTION', unlike the latter concept, ‘FETISHISM, which does not involve the same semantic associations. The following table lists the ST example along with its TT equivalents and back translations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Enani</th>
<th>TT3 Badawi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Even then this <em>forked</em> plague is fated to us when we do quicken” <em>(Othello, 3.3.276-277)</em></td>
<td>“قد كتب علينا داء القرنين هذا حال دخولنا الحياة” We were destined to this <em>plague of horns</em> once we came to life.</td>
<td>“كأنما على الجبين ساعة الميلاد قد خطّ القدر بأن أكون ديوثاً” As though destiny wrote on my forehead the minute I was born that I be a fetishist!</td>
<td>“منذ الميلاد قدر لنا أن نجابه هذا الوباء ذا القرنين” Since our birth, we were destined to face this <em>plague of the two horns</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This discussion has revealed how the translation of metaphor tends to be influenced by the translator’s approach to the ST as a whole and how the translator sometimes deals with the metaphoric content of the ST as an integrated part of a conceptual whole. Regardless of Enani’s commitment to a true representation of Shakespeare’s metaphoric language, his translation seems to have been influenced by the empirical factors that played a role in shaping the theoretical framework of his thought. As the table of the results revealed, Enani’s translation introduced the highest rate of mutation to ST data (45.2%). Nonetheless, and as his translation choices were inspired by his preference for Functional Equivalence, it would be far from objective to claim that this high level of mutation reflects a misrepresentation or a distortion of the ST conceptual content. Rather, it reflects the translator’s TT-Oriented approach to the ST’s conceptual content as he seems to have been mainly concerned with the reader’s response and a close representation of the ST’s communicative function. In the coming account I will discuss the prevalence of Semantic Equivalence in the approaches of Badawi and Nyazi to the translation of creative metaphor in *Macbeth*.
7.1.3 Semantic Equivalence in Badawi and Nyazi

This section will deal with the distinctive trends that prevailed in the translations of Badawi and Nyazi of *Macbeth*. The reason I am going to tackle the approaches of Badawi and Nyazi in one account is not only related to the fact that they both worked on the same text within the scope of the empirical study, but also due to the similarity in the statistical results of their TTs and their method of translating metaphor. The results of TT data that were extracted from Nyazi’s translation of *Macbeth* reveal that the mutation rate in ST data reached 21.9%, for changes influencing the types of metaphor and 34.8% for changes influencing conceptual metaphors. On the other hand, the results of TT data extracted from Badawi’s translation of the same ST registered 28.5%, for changes in the types of metaphor and 35.5% for changes in conceptual metaphors.

This analysis will discuss Nyazi’s and Badawi’s shared preference for Semantic Equivalence, while highlighting the variation in their approaches to translating the ST metaphoric content. For example, Badawi showed a high tendency towards avoiding colour metaphors by turning them to sense, i.e. giving their semantic content, or replacing them with a functional equivalent, i.e. domesticating their content. Conversely, Nyazi showed more appreciation for the conceptual content of ST colour metaphors treating them as part of the Shakespearean style that should be represented accurately in the TT. On the other hand, Nyazi’s treatment of universal abstract concepts such as ‘TIME’, ‘NATURE’ and ‘ART’ showed that he had a clear tendency towards ‘concretization’, as opposed to ‘abstraction’. By ‘concretization’, I am referring to conceptual processes that involve turning ‘ABSTRACT’ concepts into ‘CONCRETE’ ones, for reasons to do with clarification or conceptual simplification.

The table shows that Badawi’s TT introduced a slightly higher rate of mutation than that of Nyazi (35.5% for Badawi and 34.8% for Nyazi). However, it is interesting to notice that
20.6% of the mutation rate in Nyazi’s TT went for loss in ST data and only 14.2% went for shifts, in comparison with 18.4% for loss and 17.1% for shifts in Badawi’s TT. This means that Nyazi’s translation introduced a higher rate of loss to ST data than that of Badawi, which could be related to the earlier claim that Nyazi’s main trend in translating metaphor was dominated by a tendency to concretize abstract concepts. This also supports a general description of Badawi’s translation of Macbeth as being more functionally oriented, compared with Jabra’s translation, that has the minimum rate of mutation, and Nyazi’s translation. Therefore, my characterization of Badawi’s translation of Macbeth as ‘functional’ is relevant to the two other TTs, but it is nothing like the level of functionality encountered in Enani’s translation of Othello that was discussed in the preceding account.

The previous observation about the indicators of the statistical results regarding the translators’ main tendencies in translating metaphor is a mere reflection that remains assumptious unless coupled with a concrete analysis of the main criteria adopted in reaching this evaluation. In the following analysis, I am going to highlight the contrastive features which can be observed in the three translations of Macbeth, providing examples of how far a translator’s distinctive approach to the ST can play a major role in his/her translation of its metaphoric content. For a start, both Badawi and Nyazi showed their appreciation of certain metaphors that are prominent for being Shakespearean images and of the unity of imagery in Shakespeare. For example, wherever the translators felt the need to explicate a certain metaphor and bring its deep implications to the attention of the reader, they did not hesitate to do so. This was clear in their treatment of metaphors derived from the fields of ‘THEATRE’ and ‘CLOTHING’. The following table will exemplify the attentiveness of Badawi and Nyazi in dealing with Shakespeare’s special imagery, in contrast with Jabra, whose close representation of ST data reflected his high sense of commitment to the exact wording of its conceptual content:
This example is an excerpt spoken by Angus when he brought Macbeth the good news of becoming the ‘Thane of Cawdor’. The ST image is made up of two conceptual metaphors: ‘SUPPORTING IS LINING CLOTHES’ and the ‘OBJECT OF SUPPORT IS CLOTHING’. In general, the image does not strike us as a metaphoric use of language especially as the metaphorical sense of the verb ‘to line’ has been lexicalized in the English Dictionary as ‘to give support to’. Referring to different editions of Shakespeare’s *Macbeth*, not all of them considered the line metaphorical, although some critics did consider the possibility of a latent metaphor in this line as in Brooke’s edition of the play where ‘line the rebel’ was annotated as “line reinforce (figurative use from lining clothes)” (Shakespeare 1990: 106).

The back translations of the TT equivalents introduced in the table above show that Badawi and Nyazi treated this example as a metaphor, and they might have had strong reasons to do so as the images of clothing have a noticeable presence in both *Othello* and *Macbeth*. The output of the pilot empirical study of the two plays (phase I on extracting ST conceptual metaphors) highlighted the presence of clothing metaphors in both texts where clothing images collected from *Othello* totalled eighteen and those collected from *Macbeth*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Nyazi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Whether he was combined with those of Norway, or did line the rebel with hidden help and vantage—I know not&quot; (Macbeth, 1.3.11-114)</td>
<td>هل انضم لرجال ملك النرويج، أم أنه أمد المتمرد في الخفاء بالعون والفرصة. (...) ليست أدري!</td>
<td>&quot;لا أدري إن كان تواطأ مع جيشه النرويجي، أو أمد ثياب المتمرد بتقديم العون وانتقاوة الفرصة له في الخفاء. &quot;</td>
<td>&quot;لا أدري إن كان تواطأ مع جيشه النرويج، أو أمد المتمرد بتقديم العون وانتقاوة الفرصة له في الخفاء. &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did he join the men of Norway, or reinforce the rebel with hidden support and opportunity? I do not know!</td>
<td>I do not know whether he conspired with the Norwegian armies, or lined the clothes of the rebel with support and hidden opportunity.</td>
<td>It does not matter whether he was involved with the Norwegian forces or lined the clothes of the rebel with free support and opportunity.</td>
<td>It does not matter whether he was involved with the Norwegian forces or lined the clothes of the rebel with free support and opportunity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
totalled twenty-six. For example, the verb ‘to line’ was used metaphorically in *Othello* when Iago says, “others there are who, trimm’d in forms and visages of duty, keep yet their hearts attending on themselves (...) and when they have lin’d their coats do themselves homage” (1.1.49-54). Going back to the use of ‘to line’ in *Macbeth*’s example, if we examine the context of the verb from the ST perspective, we might not detect the presence of metaphoricity in its conceptual content, and, consequently, we are most likely to drop the example from ST data. However, upon examining the two equivalents of the translations made by Badawi and Nyazi, one might have a retrospective thought about the conceptual content of the verb in terms of being of a metaphoric nature.

This argument highlights the need for adopting a TT-Oriented Approach to the experiential research on the translation of metaphor. Additionally, the argument shows how the translation of metaphor is an empirical process that is influenced by the degree of our exposure to the ST conceptual content. Various levels of cognitive exposure can influence the translator’s method of dealing with a given metaphor. The first is concerned with the translator’s exposure to the ST conceptual content as in the repetitive experiences of reading the text, or listening to and watching different performances of it. The second has to do with the exposure to the conceptual content of another text written by the same writer. The third involves the exposure to different editions and/or translations of the same text, which implies being under the influence of various interpretations. The fourth is concerned with the situational exposure to a similar context or experience in our daily life. In a word, the translation of metaphor is an empirical process that is influenced by our own experiences and our exposure to the experiences of others. The experientialism of metaphor influences its conceptualization and the processing of its cognitive content, and, therefore, applies to its translation as well.

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22 Cf. Toury (1981) on the descriptive approach to TS (discussed in Chapter IV, 4.3 on ‘the Methods of Data Analysis’)
Upon examining the three translations of ‘line the rebel’ in the table above, and assuming that the phrase has metaphorical associations, we notice that Jabra’s translation introduced a semantic equivalent: ‘to reinforce the rebel’. As for the two other versions of the metaphor, both preserved the image of ‘GIVING SUPPORT AS LINING CLOTHING’, although, in an attempt to explicate the metaphoric associations of the image, both translations ended up with a slight change in its conceptual content leading to loss in the second part of the metaphor. To clarify, the image consists of two conceptual metaphors: (a) a structural metaphor: ‘GIVING SUPPORT IS LINING THE OBJECT OF SUPPORT/PERSON’; and (b) an ontological metaphor: ‘THE OBJECT OF SUPPORT IS CLOTHING’. Badawi and Nyazi translated the metaphor in a way that conceptualizes ‘GIVING SUPPORT AS LINING THE CLOTHES OF THE OBJECT OF SUPPORT’, by way of explication. The shift in the conceptual structure of the image demetaphorized its second part where the ‘OBJECT OF LINING is no longer ‘THE OBJECT OF SUPPORT’, but rather ‘THE CLOTHES OF THE OBJECT OF SUPPORT’. The following table provides the ST and TT conceptual patterns of this metaphor:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Nyazi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GIVING SUPPORT IS LINING THE OBJECT OF SUPPORT</td>
<td>semantic equivalent (loss)</td>
<td>GIVING SUPPORT IS LINING THE CLOTHES OF THE OBJECT OF SUPPORT (loss in the second conceptual metaphor)</td>
<td>GIVING SUPPORT IS LINING THE CLOTHES OF THE OBJECT OF SUPPORT (loss in the second conceptual metaphor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE OBJECT OF SUPPORT IS CLOTHING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second example of Badawi’s and Nyazi’s tendency to explicate implicit metaphors in an attempt to highlight the functional unity of imagery in Shakespeare is taken from Macbeth’s response upon hearing the good news of becoming ‘Thane of Cawdor’. As
clarified in the following table, which provides the TT equivalents and conceptual metaphors, Jabra’s translation preserved the metonymic reference to the ‘IMPERIAL THEME’ intact, contrary to Badawi and Nyazi who introduced a new metonymic reference to explicate the metaphoric implications of the ‘IMPERIAL THEME’. Jabra’s translation is seen to be more reflective of the wording and metaphoric structure of the ST. In contrast, Badawi’s and Nyazi’s equivalents are more explicative of the original metaphor. Nyazi’s attentiveness to the functionality of this image is reflected not only in his explication of the metonymic association but also in annotating the TT with additional information about the importance of this metaphor for the unity of imagery in Shakespeare. This example highlights the translation of metaphor as a creative conceptual process which, does not only involve loss or shifts in ST metaphors, but might also lead to enriching them with additional metaphoric content, as a result of expanding ST metaphoric patterns or reconstructing them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Nyazi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Two truths are told, as happy prologues to the swelling act of the imperial theme!” (Macbeth, 1.3.128-129)</td>
<td>&quot;الحقيقةين أنها نانية توطنين مشترتين للفصل المتانني حول الموضوع الملكي&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;الدفايعان كن بأكتفا كانتين مبارة للفصل الأعظم من مسرحية الملك الجليل&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;الحقائقين صحتا، وكما مصحتا منها للفصل الرابع من مسرحية الملك الجليل&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two truths were told as bright prologues to the growing act of the imperial theme</td>
<td>Two prophecies came true as a happy prologue to the greatest act of the play of the ‘Reverend King’</td>
<td>Two truths proved to be true, and they are fitting prologues for the wonderful act in the ‘Reverend Play’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Back translation: “Most metaphors in Macbeth’s speech are taken from the theatre”

(23) معظم الاستعارات هنا في كلام مكبث مستقاة من المسرح (Nyazi 2000)
Having explained how Badawi and Nyazi adopted a similar approach in dealing with the ST metaphoric content, I will discuss the distinctive features that make their translations differ from each other. Although the general statistics bring the translations of Badawi and Nyazi to a very close representation, Badawi’s translation could be described as ‘functional’, compared with that of Nyazi. This functionality stems from his consistent attempts to contextualize the TT equivalents whenever he needed to change the conceptual content of ST metaphors. The contrastive analysis will show that Badawi’s trend to shift the conceptual content of a metaphor or give its semantic equivalent is part of a tendency to see concepts within context. Conversely, Nyazi seems to have adopted a purely interpretive approach to the conceptual content of ST metaphors with translation choices that can be described as utterly pioneering in taking the initiative to ‘concretize’ major metaphoric concepts. For example, in the translation of Duncan’s pronouncement that “there is no art to find the mind’s construction in the face” (Macbeth, 1.4.12), both Jabra and Badawi preserved the reference to the concept of ‘ART’ intact, whereas Nyazi shifted it to ‘SCIENCE’:

لا يوجد علم لمعرفة ما يدور في العقل من الوجه

Back Translation: “There is no science to know from the face what is going on in the mind”

Throughout his translation of Macbeth, Nyazi showed a very prominent inclination to materialize universal abstract concepts such as ‘TIME’ and ‘NATURE’, by shifting the former to concepts like ‘THE WORLD’, ‘THE PEOPLE’ and ‘LIFE’, and the latter to concepts like ‘LIFE’ and ‘HUMAN BEINGS’. Nyazi’s tendency to concretize abstract
metaphoric concepts was not limited to a few examples, but seems to have dominated ST data consistently that it would be difficult for this tendency to go unnoticed. For example, out of thirteen occurrences of ‘TIME’ as a SD in key images, Nyazi preserved the concept only once and concretized the remaining twelve occurrences; in contrast with Badawi who preserved the concept six times out of thirteen and Jabra who consistently preserved the concept as ‘al-zamān’, ‘al-zaman’, or ‘al-dahr’. The same applies to Nyazi’s treatment of the concept of ‘NATURE’ that was in most cases deleted or shifted to ‘HUMAN BEINGS’ or ‘LIFE’.

The assumption behind Nyazi’s tendency for concretizing certain concepts is his preference for interpretation and simplification. Nevertheless, this claim needs a deep empirical analysis of Nyazi’s TT, with examples that contrast his translation with the two other translations. In certain cases, Nyazi and Badawi shared the tendency to shift the conceptual content of abstract domains like ‘TIME’ and ‘NATURE’, where both translators opted for equivalents that contextualize the conceptual content of these concepts within the text. For example, in Lady Macbeth’s metaphor of ‘SLEEP’ as “the season of all natures” (3.4.140), both Nyazi and Badawi concretized the concept of ‘NATURE’ as ‘CREATURE’, contrary to Jabra who remained consistent in preserving it. The fact that the concept of ‘NATURE’ appeared in the plural form, as ‘NATURES’ gave strong reason to believe that its conceptual content has a more definite reference than that of the all-inclusive ‘NATURE’.

The following table provides the three translations of this example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Nyazi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“You lack the season of all natures, sleep” (Macbeth, 3.4.140)</td>
<td>“إِنكَ بِحَاجَةٍ إِلَى النَّومٍ، الْمَلِحُ طِبْعَةٍ”</td>
<td>“إنك بحاجة إلى النوم، الملح طبيعة”</td>
<td>“إِنكَ بِحَاجَةٍ إِلَى النَّومٍ، الْمَلِحُ الَّذِي يَحْفَظُ لِحُرُفِ الكُلِّ”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You need sleep, the salt of every nature</td>
<td>You need sleep, the salt that preserves all beings</td>
<td>You need sleep; it is the preserving element of all creatures</td>
<td>You need sleep, the salt that preserves all beings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are more examples about Badawi’s and Nyazi’s tendency to shift certain metaphoric domains out of their inclination to contextualize their conceptual content. The following example is taken from an excerpt by Lady Macbeth when she informs her husband that she put drugs in the drink of Duncan’s guards “that death and nature do contend about them, whether they live or die” (Macbeth, 2.2.6-7). Unlike Jabra, Badawi and Nyazi shifted the concept of ‘NATURE’ to ‘LIFE’, a shift which is thought to be grounded in Shakespeare’s reference to ‘death and nature’ as two opponents who are arguing about the status of the drunken men. The extended ontological metaphor of ‘DEATH AS A PERSON WHO ARGUES’ and ‘NATURE AS THE OPPONENT OF DEATH’ positions the two concepts of ‘NATURE’ and ‘DEATH’ in a contrastive conceptual association against each other. Experientially, the concept of ‘DEATH’ stands in a clear antonymic relationship with the concept of ‘LIFE’, more than it does with the concept of ‘NATURE’, which appropriates the shift made by Badawi and Nyazi from ‘NATURE’ to ‘LIFE’ within the framework of a contextual approach to processing the conceptual content of the metaphor. The following table presents the example along with its three TT equivalents and back translations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Nyazi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“I have drugg'd their possets, that death and nature do contend about them, whether they live or die” (Macbeth, 2.2.6-7)</td>
<td>أفنعد الأحياء هما أم الأموات &quot;أفي عداد الموت والطبيعة حولهما&quot;</td>
<td>That death and nature argue about them whether they are living or dead I have spiked their drink with drugs that they hang in the balance between life and death</td>
<td>&quot;لقد دسست شرابهما حتى أن الموت والحياة يتناقضان، هل بحيث أنها الآن معقلان بين الموت والحياة&quot; &quot;لقد سممت شرابهما حتى أن الموت والحياة يتناقضان، هل بحيث أنها الآن معقلان بين الموت والحياة&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This discussion highlights the translation of metaphor as a hermeneutic process which is influenced by the translator’s interpretation of the cognitive content of the metaphor’s two
conceptual domains (SD and TD) and the conceptual association that holds between them. Although the previous examples show that Badawi and Nyazi tended to shift the concept of ‘NATURE’ out of their tendency to contextualize its reference, this does not apply to all the cases in which this concept was similarly shifted to the concept of ‘LIFE’. In the following example, in which Macbeth conceptualized the concept of ‘SLEEP’ as “great nature’s second course” (Macbeth, 2.2.36), Nyazi and Badawi remained consistent in their shift of the TD from ‘NATURE’ to ‘LIFE’; whereas Jabra preserved the reference to the concept as it appeared in the ST. This example does not have the same strong contextual cues that were present in the earlier examples about the cognitive content of the TD albeit shifting the concept of ‘NATURE’ to ‘LIFE’ did not leave a big influence on the metaphoric content of the image. The ontological metaphor ‘NATURE IS A HOSTESS’ was preserved as such with a shift in its TD: ‘LIFE IS A HOSTESS’ (who serves the plate of ‘SLEEP’ as a main course on the banquet of life):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Nyazi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Macbeth does murder sleep (...) great nature’s second course; chief nourisher in life’s feast” (2.2.33-37)</td>
<td>“الطبق الذي تقدمه الطبيعة العظمى، المغذي الأكبر في وليمة الحياة” The plate which is served by great nature, the chief nourisher on the banquet of life</td>
<td>“الطبق النديي أسرها” The chief plate which is served by the whole world</td>
<td>“طبق الحياة العظيم الثاني” Life’s second great plate, main nourisher in the banquet of life</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The other metaphoric concept that was subject to prominent mutation in the translation of metaphor in Macbeth is the concept of ‘TIME’. However, unlike the case with the mutation influencing the concept of ‘NATURE’, there was little verbal and situational context to support the claim that the tendency in shifting the concept of ‘TIME’ was motivated by the
need to contextualize. Certain examples show that the shifts in the concept of ‘TIME’ were made out of a tendency to concretize its content rather than contextualize it. On the other hand, there are examples that reflect the translators’ tendency to adopt an interpretive approach to translating the metaphorlic concept of ‘TIME’. In the following example, taken from Lady Macbeth’s advice to her husband, both Nyazi and Badawi shifted the concept of ‘TIME’ to the ‘PEOPLE’, in contrast with Jabra who preserved ‘TIME’ as ‘al-zaman’ in the Arabic text. The concretization of the concept of ‘TIME’ has led to a complete loss in the metaphorlic associations of Lady Macbeth’s wisdom, as the following representation reveals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Nyazi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“To beguile the time, look like the time”</td>
<td>“لكيما تخادع الزمن، أجعل محاياك مثل الزمن”</td>
<td>One has to be like people, in order to deceive them</td>
<td>One has to be like people, in order to deceive them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Macbeth, 1.5.63-64)</td>
<td>To deceive the time, make your countenance look like the time</td>
<td>To deceive the people, look like they do</td>
<td>To deceive the people, look like they do</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The verbal and situational occasions of the above example do not support any assumptions about the presence of contextual considerations behind the translators’ shift of ‘TIME’ to ‘PEOPLE’. The fact that Shakespeare used the concept of ‘TIME’ in an abstraction (ontological metaphor), does not mean that he was necessarily referring to the ‘PEOPLE’. Instead, this line involves a metaphor whereby ‘TIME’ is conceptualized as a ‘PERSON’ who ‘HAS COUNTENANCE’ and who is ‘CHALLENGED’ and ‘DECEIVED’. Most likely, Badawi’s and Nyazi’s decision to demetaphorize the conceptual content of this example was taken on interpretive grounds. However, the TT data reveal that Nyazi’s interpretive approach to the translation of metaphorlic concepts was much more prominent than that of Badawi, not only because he exceeded Badawi in the number of times he shifted
the concept of ‘TIME’ (twelve out of thirteen), but also because he himself pointed out this tendency clearly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Nyazi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“If you can look into the seeds of time, and say which grain will grow and which will not” (<a href="#">Macbeth, 1.3.58-59</a>)</td>
<td>&quot;إن يكون بفضل لوقته في بذور الزمن تعرف أن بذورهما سينمو، وأبياه لا، حسنائي&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;If you can examine the seeds of time and know which grain will grow and which will not, talk to me&quot;</td>
<td>If you can tell the seeds of what will happen and which grain will grow and which will not, talk to me then</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| "Time, thou anticipatest my dread exploits" ([Macbeth, 4.1.144](#)) | "أبياه الزمن، إنك تستيق فعلي الرهيبة" | "Time, you anticipate my horrible deeds" | "أبياه التأخر لقد أفسدت خططك الرهيبة" |

In the first example, taken from Banquo’s remarks to the weird sisters, we have an extended image consisting of four conceptual metaphors: three ontological metaphors and one structural metaphor: ‘TIME IS A PLANT’, ‘EVENTS ARE SEEDS’, ‘EVENTS ARE GRAINS’ and ‘THE OCCURRENCE OF EVENTS IS THE GROWING OF SEEDS’. If we examine the three TT versions of the example, we notice that both Jabra and Badawi preserved the four conceptual metaphors in their translation. Conversely, Nyazi’s translation preserved only three metaphors and deleted the first ontological metaphor of ‘TIME AS A PLANT’ which is the basic conceptual structure that gives rise to the image as a whole. The second example has a simpler conceptual structure as an extended ontological metaphor whereby ‘TIME’ is depicted as ‘THE OBJECT OF SPEAKING’, in the first part of the metaphor, and ‘AN ANTICIPATOR’, in the second part of the metaphor. While Jabra and
Badawi kept the reference to the concept of ‘TIME’ as open as it appeared in the ST rendering it as ‘al-zaman’ and ‘al-dahr’, respectively. Nyazi came up with an intra-categorical shift in the concept of ‘TIME’, reducing it to ‘DELAY’ and annotating this choice as follows:

“it occurred in the text as TIME which, for Shakespeare, does not always mean ‘TIME’, but ‘THE PEOPLE’ or ‘THE WORLD’. Here, it was translated as ‘DELAY’, because, it seems, this is what was meant by it.” (Nyazi 2000: 129)

As indicated in the account on ‘inter-categorical’ and ‘intra-categorical’ shifts in Chapter VI (6.2 on ‘TT Data Qualification by Shifts’), the fact that the shift took place within the boundaries of the same conceptual field does not mean that it has left no functional influence on the content of the metaphor. Generally speaking, and even on a cross-cultural level, there is a wide difference between the concept of ‘TIME’ and the concept of ‘DELAY’. While the former tends to be associated with a universal dominating power that has conceptual intersections with other universal concepts such as ‘DEITY’, ‘LIFE’, ‘DEATH’, ‘NATURE’ and the ‘UNIVERSE’, all of which are beyond the control of ‘MAN’, the latter has a much more confined cognitive value that we acquire from our ‘ACTIONS’ in relation to the concept of ‘TIME’. Nyazi’s tendency to interpret the concept of ‘TIME’ was clearly indicated in his introduction to the translation of Macbeth in which he criticized Jabra’s consistent preservation of this concept in the Arabic text instead of following in the steps of editors and researchers who were claimed to have interpreted ‘TIME’ as ‘PEOPLE’ or the ‘WORLD’ (ibid., 19).

The previous analysis highlights the close relation between the translation of metaphor, on one hand, and the variation and richness in the cognitive value of concepts, on another. Concepts that have a high cognitive value in our conceptual system in terms of the abstractness and richness of their conceptual content tend to play a key role in the translation of metaphor. Such concepts lack a definite physical correspondence in our cognitive system
and have a rich cognitive content that we need to reason about metaphorically, which makes their processing much more complex than the processing of concepts with a clearly delineated conceptual structure and lower cognitive value. In this context, I would like to point out that it is not uncommon for the concept of ‘TIME’ to be conceptualized in Arabic metaphorically. Quite the contrary, ontological metaphors of ‘TIME’ are used in Arabic very widely and pervasively. The following table provides two examples about the metaphoric conceptualization of the concept of ‘TIME’ in Arabic:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Back Translation</th>
<th>Arabic Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How can I be a victim to misfortunes?</td>
<td>&quot;أم ثْلي تأخُذُ النّكَباتُ م نْه</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And how can I fear to encounter war!</td>
<td>وَيَجزَعُ م نْ مُلاقاﺓ  الح مام</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If time challenges me as a man,</td>
<td>ولو بَرَزَ الزّمانُ إليّ شَخصاً،</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>my sword will dye its mane with gore</td>
<td>لِلخَضّبُ شعرَ مَفر ق ه  حُسامي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Al-Mutanabbi 2012: 44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We blame our time, and we are to blame;</td>
<td>&quot;نعيب زماننا والعيبُ فينا</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And, for our time, we are the only shame</td>
<td>وما لزماننا عيبُ سوانا</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We falsely curse the guiltless time;</td>
<td>ولهجو ذا الزّمانُ بغير ذنبٍ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And if time speaks, it would curse us all the same</td>
<td>&quot;ولو نطق الزّمانُ لنا هجاناً&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Al-Shafii 2000: 131)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last account about the distinction between Nyazi and Badwi in their approaches to translating metaphor will deal with the translation of colour metaphors in Macbeth. For example, Shakespeare made use of the colours ‘WHITE’ and ‘GREEN’ in conceptualizing the emotion of ‘FEAR’, with the difference that the ‘WHITE FOR FEARFUL’ metonymy appeared gradable in different contexts in the play, as opposed to ‘GREEN’ that appeared only once as a metonymic reference to ‘COWARDICE’. The gradation in the ‘WHITE FOR FEARFUL’ metaphor was prominent in the use of ‘OBJECTS’ that are associated with
different degrees of the same colour such as ‘CREAM-FACED’, ‘LILY-LIVERED’, ‘WHEY-FACE’ and ‘LINEN-CHEEK’.

As for the TT equivalents of colour metaphors in Macbeth, Nyazi’s translation is characterized by hitting the highest rate of Formal Equivalence in dealing with them, compared with Badawi’s translation that is dominated by a general trend to domesticate colour metaphors or turn them to sense and Jabra’s translation that stroked a balance between the two. In the two following examples that conceptualize the emotion of ‘FEAR’ in terms of ‘LOOKING GREEN’ or ‘CARRYING A WHITE HEART’, we notice that Badawi and Jabra turned the colour metaphor to sense or domesticated its reference by rendering the colours ‘GREEN’ and ‘WHITE’ as ‘PALE’ in the TT. Nyazi, on the other hand, preserved the ST text metonymic reference to ‘LOOKING GREEN’ and ‘CARRYING A WHITE HEART’, as the following table reveals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>Jabra</th>
<th>Badawi</th>
<th>Nyazi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Was the hope drunk wherein you dress’d yourself? Hath it slept since? And wakes it now, to look so green and pale at what it did so freely?” (Macbeth, 1.7.36-38)</td>
<td>“ Helm كان الأمل الذي ارتديته ألمسته نفثة؟ وهل غرق في الليل بعد ذلك وهل استيقظ الآن، مخاطب اللون شاحباً لما قد فعل بملاء حريته؟”</td>
<td>“ هل كان الأمل مخموراً ذاك الذي أكتسبت به مرة؟ هل رقد منذن؟ وصحا الآن، مخصوصاً وشاحباً مما فعل بحرية؟”</td>
<td>“ هل كان الأمل مخموراً ذاك الذي أكتسته به مرة؟ هل رقد منذن؟ وصحا الآن، مخصوصاً وشاحباً مما فعل بحرية؟”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Was the hope you wore drunk and fell asleep to wake now from its drunkenness pale-faced, not daring to contemplate what it did so freely before?”</td>
<td>Was the hope you wore drunk and fell asleep to wake now from its drunkenness pale-faced, not daring to contemplate what it did so freely before?</td>
<td>Was the hope that you wore once drunk? Has it lied down ever since and wakes now, so green and pale at what it did so freely?</td>
<td>Was the hope that you wore once drunk? Has it lied down ever since and wakes now, so green and pale at what it did so freely?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the following examples, we notice that only Badawi was consistent in domesticating the ‘WHITE FOR FEARFUL’ metonymy into Arabic as ‘PALE FOR FEARFUL’. Conversely, Jabra tried to preserve the metonymic reference to ‘WHITE AS FEARFUL’ in most cases; although there were cases where the ‘OBJECTS OF COLOUR’ were not reflective of the ST metaphors accurately as in his equivalents of ‘MILK-FACE’ for ‘CREAM-FACE’ and ‘YOGURT’ for ‘WHEY’, which do not have the same grade of colour (intra-categorical shifts). In Nyazi’s translation, we notice that, like Jabra, the translator attempted to maintain a close representation of the ST colour metaphors most of the time. There is only one example of a Functional Equivalent in which Nyazi domesticated the colour metaphor ‘LILY-LIVERED’ by shifting it to the image schema ‘HEART-DISLOCATED’, thus conceptualizing the emotion of ‘FEAR’ in terms of the concepts of ‘FORCE’ and ‘ORIENTATION’. The following table lists these examples with back translations for each TT equivalent:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“The devil damn thee black, thou cream-faced loon!” (Macbeth, 5.3.11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jabra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;مسخطك الشيطان عبداً أسوداً يا ودأ حليبي الوجه!&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Badawi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;سُمْدُ الشيطان وجهك أبيها ودأ حليبي الوجه!&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nyazi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;مسخطك الشيطان لعيناً أسوداً أبيها وجهك أيها المبيضّ الوجه من الخوف!&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| "The devil damn thee black, thou cream-faced loon!"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jabra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The devil damn you a black slave, you milk-faced villain!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Badawi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The devil blacken your face, you villain!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nyazi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The devil damn you black cursed, with your face which is blanched with fear!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colour metaphor deleted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;CREAM-FACE&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| "Go prick thy face and over-red thy fear, thou lily-liver'd boy (…) Those linen cheeks of thine are counselors to fear. What soldiers, whey-face? (Macbeth, 5.3.14-17)" | "اذهب، وخز وجهك ليصعد فيه الدم فيغطي على خوفك أيها أباؤنا الصبي المخلوع (…) ان منظر خدّاك الشاحبين ليبعث الخوف في نفس الناس، أي جنود يا وجوهاً بلون القرن! "Go prick your face, and hide your fear with 'red', you lily-livered boy (…) those linen-colored cheeks of yours teach others terror (…) what soldiers, yogurt face!"  
  
| "اذهب، وخز وجهك ليصعد فيه الدم فيغطي على خوفك أيها أباؤنا الصبي المخلوع (…) ان منظر خدّاك الشاحبين ليبعث الخوف في نفس الناس، أي جنود يا وجوهاً بلون القرن! "Go prick your face, and hide your fear with 'red', you lily-livered boy (…) Those linen cheeks of thine are counselors to fear. What soldiers, whey-face? (Macbeth, 5.3.14-17)" | "اذهب، وخز وجهك ليصعد فيه الدم فيغطي على خوفك أيها أباؤنا الصبي المخلوع (…) ان منظر خدّاك الشاحبين ليبعث الخوف في نفس الناس، أي جنود يا وجوهاً بلون القرن! "Go prick your face, and hide your fear with 'red', you lily-livered boy (…) Those linen cheeks of thine are counselors to fear. What soldiers, whey-face? (Macbeth, 5.3.14-17)" |

The analysis has revealed that the translation of metaphor tends to be highly influenced by the translator’s approach to his/her text. For example, the analysis showed how Jabra’s preference for Formal Equivalence led to the lowest rate of mutation in ST data, but, at the same time, it was observed that his strictness in adopting Formal Equivalence caused some unintended loss or shifts in the conceptual content of metaphors. The analysis also revealed that Enani’s preference for Functional Equivalence, out of his concern with the communicative and stylistic functions of the ST content, led to the highest rate of mutation, i.e. loss and shifts, influencing ST data. In addition, the analysis highlighted the similarities and differences between Badawi’s and Nyazi’s approaches to the translation of ST metaphors. While both Badawi and Nyazi embraced translation choices that were highly dominated by their preference for Semantic Equivalence, the former had a clear tendency to contextualize and domesticate the metaphoric content of the ST, whereas the latter was motivated by a tendency to particularize and simplify the conceptual content of ST.
metaphors. To put it differently, no matter how committed a translator is to the accurate representation of a ST metaphoric content; there is no doubt that the result of the translation will be influenced by a main tendency that characterizes the cognitive orientation of that translator. By ‘cognitive orientation’, I mean the complicated set of experiential factors that impact the translator’s cognition and influence his/her conceptual reasoning.

The text analysis has also highlighted the translation of metaphor as a hermeneutic cognitive process that involves interpreting the conceptual content of the involved domains and the association that holds between them based on a series of empirical factors comprising language etymology, socio-cultural factors, the situational context of the metaphor, as well as its stylistic features. Additionally, the discussion underlined the translation of metaphor as a creative process (see 7.1.2 on ‘Functional Equivalence in Enani’) that should be examined in a TT-oriented descriptive analysis, i.e. dealing with the translated text as a point of departure for the empirical study. Furthermore, the statistical results and the descriptive contrastive analysis have shown that the mutation influencing a ST metaphoric content does not happen on the overall level of the image. Rather, it influences smaller components of the metaphoric content starting with the conceptual domains and metaphoric association that holds between them and ending with the patterns of conceptual metaphor.

Having analysed the main trends that characterized the translators’ different approaches to the translation of creative metaphor individually, I will move to the second part of the descriptive study dealing with the main trends that characterize the translation of metaphor across all the translations. In other words, I am going to survey data mutation across the three translations of each ST, examining the ‘type’ of data that was subject to the highest rate of mutation and discussing the implications of that for the translation of metaphor.
7.2 Reading the Results across the Translations

In this part of the descriptive study, I will read the results of the data analysis process in terms of the trends that characterize the translation of metaphor across the three translations of each ST. As discussed in the first section, the translation of metaphor is highly influenced by the translator’s general approach to the ST and his/her preference for a certain type of equivalence. However, this is not the only factor that plays a role in the process of translating metaphor. The translation of metaphor is subject to a wider scope of factors that play an equally important role to that of the translator. The factors that will be analysed in this section with regard to their impact on the translation of metaphor are related to the cognitive value of metaphor types, on the one hand, and their interaction with the conceptual content of metaphor, on the other hand. The types of metaphor that were extracted in the empirical study include simile, personification, metonymy and symbols. If we re-examine the results of the contrastive analysis in terms of the mutation in ST data by metaphor types, we notice that the translation of metaphor influenced the various types of metaphor differently. For example, in certain metaphor types, like simile, the rate of mutation was almost non-existent, while in other types of metaphor, like personification, the mutation rate was rather low, compared with metaphor types such as symbols and metonymies which showed the highest percentage of mutation among all other types of metaphor. This underscores the possible difference between the types of metaphor in terms of their cognitive value and interaction with the conceptual content of metaphor.

For a start, one of the main distinctions between similes and personifications, on one side, and metonymies and symbols, on another, is their conceptual metaphoric structure. While similes and personifications have their SD concepts and TD concepts stated clearly, metonymies and symbols tend to project a SD on an absent TD leaving the metaphoric
association to the text receiver, be it a translator or a reader, to process, based on shared cultural knowledge\textsuperscript{24}, experiences and situational or verbal context. This implies that, in the case of symbols and metonymies, additional cognitive processes need to take place in order to recognize the metaphoric reference to the TD and process its metaphoric association with the SD, which is why symbols and metonymies require an additional cognitive effort to conceptualize their higher cognitive value.

This part of the descriptive analysis will be conducted from two perspectives. First, I will discuss the results in terms of the mutation influencing each type of metaphor in order to see whether the factor of typology plays a role in the translation of metaphor. Second, I will detect the presence of prominent trends across the three translations of each ST (data triangulation), in order to see whether a shared mutation in a particular datum underlines the role of a certain factor in researching the translation of metaphor. Before I proceed on discussing the first part of this section, I will re-present the table of the results on data mutation by metaphor types once again in order to allow for a quick comparison of the figures, as that they were not discussed adequately in this context before:

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Translator} & \textbf{Simile} & \textbf{Personification} & \textbf{Metonymy} & \textbf{Symbol} & \textbf{Total} \\
\hline
Jabra & 0\% & 4.08\% & 57.1\% & 16.6\% & 15.9\% \\
\hline
Badawi & 2.8\% & 10.2\% & 85.7\% & 83.3\% & 28.5\% \\
\hline
Enani & 0\% & 25.2\% & 65.1\% & 83.3\% & 31.8\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Translator} & \textbf{Simile} & \textbf{Personification} & \textbf{Metonymy} & \textbf{Symbol} & \textbf{Total} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{24} The role of common ground knowledge in processing and understanding the conceptual content of metaphor was mainly discussed by Gibbs (see Leezenberg 2001: 253; Gibbs 1999: 100)
7.2.1 The Cognitive Value of Metaphor Types

In this account, I will analyse the research topic in terms of its relevance to the types of metaphor trying to see whether metaphor typology has any implications for the translation process and to detect what factors play a role in metaphor translatability and to what degree. So far, the text analysis has shown that, unless the type of metaphor has a high cognitive value, it seems to have a marginal influence on the output of the translation process. The cognitive value of metaphor is determined based on three criteria: (a) the explicitness of the three components of metaphor, i.e. the SD, TD and conceptual association between the two; (b) the translator’s familiarity with and exposure to the metaphor’s conceptual content; and (c) the richness and variation in the metaphor’s cognitive content. For example, abstract concepts are conceptually richer than concrete ones and cultural concepts are richer than universal ones. While the cognitive value of metaphor preserves an inverse relationship with the first two factors (the explicitness of the metaphor’s conceptual structure and the translator’s familiarity with its conceptual content), it preserves a direct relationship with the third factor (the richness of the metaphor’s cognitive content). To explain, the more explicit a metaphor’s conceptual structure and the more exposed it is to the translator, the less the cognitive value of the metaphor. Conversely, the richer the conceptual content of a metaphor, the higher cognitive value it has for the translator.

As explained in the preliminary account that introduced the initial arguments based on the statistical output of the empirical study, and as manifested in some examples that were
discussed previously, personifications and similes tend to have a lower cognitive value than other types of metaphor, due to their explicit conceptual structure. The clarity in the conceptual components of metaphor and the metaphoric association that exists between them reduces the effort and time needed to process its conceptual content, no matter how novel the metaphor happens to be. The earlier discussion of TT data qualification by metaphor type (Chapter VI, 6.3) showed that most mutation in ST similes and personifications tended to influence the conceptual content of metaphor, rather than its typology. This was discussed with examples highlighting the translation of metaphor as a cognitive process that is highly influenced by the clarity and/or richness of its conceptual components and pattern.

The analysis of ST data by the types of metaphor has an empirical value for two reasons. First, its results are in total harmony with the results of the contrastive analysis in terms of the mutation rate in ST data and its relation to the different trends that characterized the variation in the approaches of the translators. Second, the results highlight the issue of translating metaphor as a conceptual process, in the first degree, that is closely related to the cognitive content and value of metaphor. The fact that similes and personifications showed a lower percentage of mutation than other metaphor types does not mean that they should be given less attention during the translation process, as it is possible for an ambiguity in their metaphoric associations or a misreading of their conceptual content to influence the TT output. What this means, however, is that special attention should be given to the conceptual content of their metaphoric components and the association that holds between them, taking into account the set of cognitive factors that determine the nature of that metaphoric association such as contextual factors, cultural factors, stylistic factors, etc.

Although personifications and similes are more likely to preserve their conceptual structure when they go through a process of translation, it remains uncertain whether their conceptual content will be subject to mutation or not. The explicit presence of the SD and TD
of a metaphor implies that processing it can be much easier and faster than processing other types of metaphor that involve the absence of one conceptual domain. Nonetheless, this does not mean that such a metaphor will always have a definite conceptual content that the translator can simply process and reproduce into the TL. There can be cases where a conceptual domain involves a certain degree of ambiguity, double reference, inappropriateness for a metaphoric association to be created, etc. The role of the translator lies in processing the actual conceptual references of the two domains (SD and TD) and the metaphoric association that holds between them before the process of translation takes place. What the following analysis will display is that the conceptual processing of a given metaphor is subject to wider considerations than the mere explicitness of a SD and TD. Factors of a multi-dimensional cognitive nature play a determining role in processing and translating metaphor.

The following examples will emphasize the role of the conceptual association between the SD and TD in translating metaphor. The first example is taken from Macbeth’s soliloquy before he murders Duncan where the former says, “wicked dreams abuse the curtain’d sleep” (2.1.50-51). The analysis of this example will deal with the personification of the ‘curtained sleep’, which was preserved as a personification in the three translations, but with a variation in its conceptual content. If we examine the three versions of this metaphor, we notice that not all of them reflect the same conceptual implications. In this example, we notice that both SD and TD are stated clearly, which is the case in personifications in general: TD is ‘SLEEP’ and SD is ‘CURTAINED AS A PERSON’ (an ontological metaphor). However, although both domains of the metaphor are explicit, there is an argument about the exact reference of the SD ‘CURTAINED’ whether it is a reference to ‘A PERSON SLEEPING BEHIND A CURTAIN’ or ‘A PERSON CURTAINED WITH HIS EYELIDS’.
The metaphor of the ‘curtained sleep’ bears more than a single interpretation: the first visualizes the image as an ontological metaphor that conceptualizes ‘SLEEP AS A PERSON SLEEPING BEHIND A CURTAIN’, and the second views the image as a double ontological metaphor which involves depicting ‘SLEEP AS A PERSON’ and ‘EYELIDS AS CURTAINS’. Both readings preserve the conceptual structure of the personification as an ontological metaphor while changing part of its conceptual content. If we examine the metaphor equivalents in TT data, we observe that Jabra and Nyazi preserved the image of ‘SLEEP AS A PERSON SLEEPING BEHIND A CURTAIN, whereas Badawi’s translation opted for the second interpretation of the conceptual content: ‘SLEEP IS A PERSON’ and ‘EYELIDS ARE CURTAINS’. It is not easy to notice the difference between the two readings unless we deconstruct the image in each translation into its main conceptual metaphors, as the following table reveals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT 1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Nyazi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Now o’er the one half-world nature seems dead, and wicked dreams abuse the curtain’d sleep” (Macbeth, 2.1.50-51)</td>
<td>“في هذه الساعة تبدو الطبيعة في نصف العالم، ميتة، والأحلام الشريرة تخادع النوم المسجف”</td>
<td>“والآن في نصف الكورة الأرضية تبدو الطبيعة نصف الكرة الأرضية ميتة، والأحلام الشريرة تزعج النوم المسجف”</td>
<td>“والآن في نصف الكورة الأرضية تبدو الطبيعة نصف الكرة الأرضية ميتة، والأحلام الشريرة تزعج النوم المسجف”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Now nature in half the world seems lifeless, and wicked dreams deceive the curtained sleep</td>
<td>Now nature in half the world seems lifeless, and wicked dreams disturb the curtains of sleep</td>
<td>And now in that other half of the globe (where the night prevails) life seems lifeless, and wicked dreams deceive the curtained sleep</td>
<td>And now in that other half of the globe (where the night prevails) life seems lifeless, and wicked dreams deceive the curtained sleep</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 The metaphor of ‘EYELIDS AS CURTAINS’ is common in Shakespeare. In the Tempest, ‘curtains’ is annotated as “Fringed curtains; a beautiful metaphor, meaning the eyelids fringed with eyelashes, which shut out the light from the eye as curtains do from a room” (Shakespeare 1864: 86); and in King Henry IV, the excerpt “But rather drowsed and hung their eyelids down” (Shakespeare 2002a: 262) is annotated as “drowsed became drowsy, lost interest hung (…) down. The image is of the eyelids as curtains, as in Tem 1.2.409, where Prospero orders Miranda: ‘The fringed curtains of thine eye advance’.” (ibid)
The next example will also show how the presence of the two domains of the conceptual metaphor is not enough to guarantee its processing into another language without mutation. The example is taken from Iago’s remark to Othello that, “It is impossible you should see this, were they as prime as goats (…) and fools as gross as ignorance made drunk” (Othello, 3.3.402-405). The metaphor that I would like to discuss in relation to this example is the structural metaphor of ‘FOOLISHNESS AS BEING DRUNK WITH IGNORANCE’, which implies the ontological metaphor of conceptualizing ‘IGNORANCE AS AN ALCOHOLIC DRINK’ 26. The translations show that, although the references to the TD of ‘IGNORANCE’ and SD of ‘DRUNKENNESS’ were preserved in the TT equivalents, there was loss in the metaphoric content of the image of ‘BEING IGNORANT AS BECOMING DRUNK’ in all three of them. What is missing in the TT versions of the metaphor is the ‘CAUSAL’ metaphoric association between the two domains of ‘IGNORANCE’ and ‘DRUNKENNESS’ where the domain of ‘IGNORANCE’ is viewed as a cause for the domain of ‘DRUNKENNESS’, or as Shakespeare puts it, “fools as gross as ignorance made drunk”, which is the English for:

"بحماقة من أسكرَهُ الجهل"

Back translation: “fools as though their ignorance has made them drunk”

This argument shows that the translation of metaphor is not necessarily influenced by its structural properties or taxonomic features in terms of being a personification or a simile.

26 This is a religious metaphor. On the Gnostic Metaphor of ‘IGNORANCE AS DRUNKENNESS,’ see Jonas 1992.
Rather, it is a conceptual process that involves processing the conceptual reference of the metaphor domains and the conceptual association between them. In other words, the preservation of the two domains of a metaphor and the lexical and semantic pointers (like the simile particle) that bind its components under a given rhetorical structure does not essentially provide an objective representation of its conceptual content. In the three TT versions of this example, the main properties of the metaphor were preserved, but the phrase lost its metaphority due to a misrepresentation of the conceptual association between the SD and TD. The three translators rendered the causal relationship between ‘IGNORANCE’ and ‘DRUNKENNESS’ into an attributive one. So, instead of describing ‘fools’ as being ‘made drunk with’ their ignorance’, the SDs of TT equivalents were represented as being ‘drunk and ignorant’. The following table provides the ST example along with its three TT equivalents and back translations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Enani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“It is impossible you should see this were they as prime as goats (...) and fools as gross as ignorance made drunk” (Othello, 3.3.402-405)</td>
<td>“من المستحيل أن تجده عياناً حتى ولو كانوا في شهوة التيوس (...) ودعاء الحمقى حين يسكر ذوو الجيل”</td>
<td>“إنه ليستحيل أن نراهما هكذا حتى ولو كانت لهما شهوة الماعز (...) وغفلة الأغبياء المحمورين”</td>
<td>“فمحال أن تشهد ذلك حتى لو كانا في فق الماعز أو (...) حمق الجيل ونذوع من شرب كثيراً حتى غاب عن الوعي!”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>It is impossible to witness this, even if they were as lustful as goats (...) as impious as fools when the ignorant become drunk</td>
<td>It is impossible to see them like that, even if they were as lustful as goats (...) and as ignorant as drunk fools</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third example about the conceptual nature of mutation that influences metaphor types such as simile and personification throughout the translation process is an excerpt from
Macbeth describing Duncan’s stabbed body after his murder; when Macbeth says “his gashed stabs looked like a breach in nature for ruins wasteful entrance” (2.3.113-114). As is usually the case with similes, the two domains of the metaphor are present: SD is ‘BREACH IN NATURE’, TD is ‘STABS’ and the conceptual metaphor is ‘STABS ARE LIKE A BREACH IN NATURE’. If we examine the translation of this example, we notice that the three TTs preserved the simile although the SD was subject to shifts, as the following representation will show. The shift took place in conceptualizing the domain of ‘NATURE’ that is processed by the three translators differently. For example, Jabra translated ‘NATURE’ as ‘tabī‘a’, in reference to the ‘PHYSICAL NATURAL LANDSCAPE’, in contrast with Badawi and Nyazi who dealt with the concept of ‘NATURE’ in two different ways. While Badawi shifted the metaphor’s SD from ‘BREACH IN NATURE’ to ‘GAPS IN THE BUILDING OF LIFE’, Nyazi shifted the conceptual content of the SD to ‘FRACTURES IN LIFE’, trying to strike a balance between the reference in his SD equivalent to ‘LIFE’ and the immediate context of the metaphor by introducing the concept of ‘DEATH’ into the TT. The change in the conceptual content of the metaphor becomes clearer if we analyse the text by its conceptual patterns as this allows us to recognize the kind of mutation that took place and where it influenced the conceptual content of the ST metaphor:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT 1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Nyazi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“his gash’d stabs look’d like a breach in nature for ruin’s wasteful entrance” (Macbeth, 2.3.113-114)</td>
<td>“وطناته الفاغرة شبه بثغرة في الطبيعة ينفذ منها الخراب والدمار”</td>
<td>“وجروحه الجلاء مثل ثغرات في بنيان الحياة ينفذ منها الخراب والضياع”</td>
<td>“وبدت طعناته الشاحبة مثل صدوع في الحياة لتكون مدخلاً للموت”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>His gashed stabs are like a gap in nature for ruin and destruction to infiltrate</td>
<td>And his noble wounds are like gaps in the building of life for ruin and loss to infiltrate</td>
<td>And his pale stabs looked like fractures in life for the entrance of death</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The change in TT2 and TT3 versions of the example does not only involve processing the concept of ‘NATURE’ as ‘LIFE. It also involves explicating the metaphoric reference to ‘LIFE’ as a ‘BUILDING’ and a ‘SOLID OBJECT’. The ST metaphoric representation of ‘STABS’ as a ‘BREACH IN NATURE’ involves seeing the concept of ‘NATURE’ in terms of an ‘ENTITY’ with some sort of ‘PHYSICAL REPRESENTATION’. What Badawi and Nyazi did in their translation was to particularize and explicate the reference to the unknown ‘PHYSICAL ENTITY OF NATURE’. This example shows that what revolves in the minds of translators, when opting for a shift in a certain metaphor, is far from structural and taxonomic formalities and is closely related to the conceptual content of the metaphor’s two domains and the metaphoric association that holds between them. Throughout the process of translation, translators try: first, to process the conceptual content of the metaphor (the reference of the SD, TD and the metaphoric association between them), and second, to reproduce the ST metaphor accordingly.

Since the issue of translating metaphor is not a taxonomic issue, as the text analysis implies, why would other types of metaphor such as metonymy and symbol undergo a higher rate of mutation when subject to translation? The answer is to do with the rich cognitive value of these two types of metaphor. Although metonymies and symbols differ from similes and personifications in terms of being associated with a referential role in our cognitive system, their cognitive value is higher than other metaphors as their conceptual content carries more than a mere ‘reference’ to an absent TD. In terms of their conceptual structure, metonymies
and symbols have one thing in common: the absence of the TD. More often than not, the TD of a metonymy or symbol is implicit and left to the text receiver to recognize based on his/her familiarity with the syntagmatic associations involved in producing the conceptual content of the metonymic/symbolic reference. Therefore, the absence of such associations, for a translator, coupled with the lack of clear contextual indicators could compromise the cognitive processes needed for processing the actual conceptual value of the reference and consequently translating it. When Iago declares that Othello has boarded “a land carrack” (*Othello*, 1.2.50), as a metonymic reference to ‘Desdemona’, Cassio replies that he does not “understand” (ibid., 1.2.52). This metonymic reference does not only bear a stylistic and aesthetic value for the conceptual content of the play, but also has a functional value as it introduces the mindset of a main character in two words: Iago is a character who conceptualizes the ‘OBJECT OF LOVE’ as a ‘SHIP FULL OF TREASURES’ and as ‘THE OBJECT OF BOARDING’. This metonymic reference implies attitudinal associations that reveal a great deal about the motives of the character. The fact that Cassio does not understand the TD of the metonymy is related to his ignorance of the marriage of Othello and Desdemona. This highlights the role of Gibbs’ notion of common ground knowledge (Gibbs 1999: 100) in the conceptualization and, consequently, translation of metaphor.

Symbols and metonymies have a referential function whereby they refer to an absent TD; however, their conceptual power lies in their cognitive functionality and conceptual richness. They are cognitive signs that summarize the conceptual content of a whole experience on a personal level, at least. Lady Macbeth’s metonymies for the CROWN as the “golden round” (*Macbeth*, 1.5.28), “ornament of life” (ibid., 1.7.42) and “round and top of sovereignty” (ibid., 4.1.89-90) were not meant to be associated with a mere referential role or have an aesthetic value. These metonymies encapsulate her attitude and that of Macbeth, towards the sign of the ‘CROWN’. This is how they both see it and fight for it. The same thing applies to
metaphors such as “white heart” (*Macbeth*, 2.2.62), “lily-livered” (ibid., 5.3.15), “linen cheeks” (ibid., 5.3.16) and “whey-face” (ibid., 5.3.17) all of which sum up the cognitive value that certain ‘OBJECTS OF THE COLOUR WHITE’ have for the character of Macbeth, the theme of the play, the writer and perhaps the wider community of the audience. A metonymy or a symbol can even condense the attitude of a whole culture or tradition in one word or two, which makes their conceptual content richer than what the same words in another culture could say. Take for example “redeemed sin” (*Othello*, 2.3.344) which is a symbolic reference to the sacrifice of Jesus Christ. This symbol summarizes a whole set of beliefs that a whole culture lives by.

Like other types of metaphor, metonyms vary in the degree of their conceptual richness and the cognitive effort required by a translator to process them depending on his/her exposure to the cognitive experiences that underlie their conceptual content. Metonyms range from being self-explanatory such as “safer guides” (2.3.205) and “best judgement” (2.3.206) in *Othello*, and “merciful powers” (2.1.7) and “barefaced power” (3.1.118) in *Macbeth*, to metonyms that need disambiguation and an increased cognitive effort to be processed conceptually such as “God’s blood” (1.1.4) and “forked plague” (3.3.276) in *Othello*, and “death’s counterfeit” (2.3.76) and “bladed corn” (4.1.55) in *Macbeth*.

Symbols tend to be more prominent than metonyms on a cross-cultural level functioning like landmarks in the identity of the source language and culture. Therefore, when they are subject to mutation in the translation process, the decision of changing their conceptual content has much less to do with the richness of their cognitive content than it does with the cultural specificity of their associations. In other words, mutation in the conceptual content of a symbol is most likely attributed to the translator’s functional choice to domesticate the symbolic reference and bring it close to the conceptual system of the TT. However, the mutation that influences the conceptual content of a metonymy can happen, not only for
functional reasons, but also for cognitive reasons that have to do with the efforts required for processing the actual conceptual content of that metonymic reference. I will discuss this with examples in the following account.

Before I start the analysis of the examples, I would like to explain what is meant by ‘mutation in the metonymic conceptual content’. As metonymy involves having a SD in reference to an absent TD, mutation in its conceptual content involves one of three options. First, a shift in the conceptual content of metonymy can involve deleting the metonymic reference to the SD and explicating the reference to the TD, in which case we can say that the metonymy is turned to sense, i.e. replaced with a semantic equivalent. An example of this is translating ‘a lily-livered person’ as ‘a coward’. Second, it is possible to explicate the metonymic reference by merging the TD with the SD. Third, a metonymy can be subject to mutation by deleting the metonymic reference to both SD and TD and replacing the metonymy with a Functional Equivalent, i.e. domestication.

In this regard, I would like to point out that the examples will deal with cases in which ST data went through changes in the three TTs, focusing on two trends that marked the translators’ way of processing metonymies. First, if the metonymy has a rich cultural content, the translators are most likely to domesticate the reference of the TD. Second, if the metonymy is associated with other cognitive functions, stylistic for example, then the metonymic reference tends to be explicated or go unnoticed. Initially, I will deal with examples of metonymic references that have a rich cultural value in which case the three translations of the example introduced a Functional Equivalent, i.e. domestication. The first example is the use of the phrase “green minds” (Othello, 2.1.246) as a metonymy for “inexperienced people”\(^27\). In the three TTs, the metonymic reference to the ‘SD’ was not preserved. For instance, Jabra and Enani turned the metonymy to sense, i.e. replaced it with

\(^{27}\) Green is “unripe (…) inexperienced (…) minds, (…) in judgement” (Schmidt 1902:495); The word ‘green’ is lexicalized in OED 5th edition as “lacking experience” (1995: 521)
the TD reference of ‘easily-led souls’ or ‘easily-led fools’. On the other hand, Badawi replaced the metonymy with the functional equivalent “unripe minds”, the English for ‘uqūl  ghadda’, taken from the conceptual domain of ‘FRUITS’. The following table provides the TT equivalents and back translations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Enani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Besides, the knave (...) hath all those requisites in him that folly and green minds look after”</td>
<td>وفضلاً عن ذلك، فإن هذا الوعد وسيم، فتى، تتجمع فيه المتطلبات كلها التي تتوق إليها الألسن الغبيرة العابثة”</td>
<td>ويملك جميع الصفات التي تجري وراءها الألباب الغصنة السائحة المتطلبات كلها التي تتوق إليها الحفاء”</td>
<td>ويتنازل بجمالليا التي تجذب كل غريرة حفاء”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“He has all the requirements that easily-led souls long for”</td>
<td>He has all the qualities which unripe naïve foolish minds run after</td>
<td>He enjoys all the merits that attract easily-led fools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most probably, the reason behind avoiding the exact wording of the metonymic reference in Arabic is that a strict translation would give metonymic associations that contradict those implied in the ST example. In Arabic, a ‘green mind’ involves a positive metonymic value of having ‘an open mentality’, ‘fruitful ideas’ and ‘creative thinking’ where only people who are considered open-minded and innovative would be described as having ‘green minds’. Colour metonymies can have different cognitive values across cultures; and this is perhaps why metonymies such as “a heart so white” and “green and pale” in Macbeth were turned to sense (Semantic Equivalence) in the translations of Jabra and Badawi. The prevailing metonymic association of having a ‘white heart’ in the Arabic language is that of being innocent and pure, contrary to the implications of the metonymic reference that was intended by Lady Macbeth when she told her husband that she would “shame to wear a heart so white” (Macbeth, 2.2.61-62).
In the second example of “God’s blood” (1.1.4), also taken from Othello, there are two metaphoric associations that can be discussed: (a) the symbolic association of the ‘BLOOD OF GOD’, as a symbol for the sacrifice of Jesus Christ; and (b) the metonymic reference to ‘THE SON OF GOD’ as ‘GOD’ (Chapter VI, 6.1 on ‘TT Data Qualification by Losses). Both Badawi and Enani deleted the symbolic association, whereas Jabra shifted the symbol to its semantic equivalent of ‘CHRIST’S WOUNDS’. However, the metonymic association of ‘GOD FOR THE SON OF GOD’ went through mutation in all three equivalents. Jabra explicated the metonymic reference by replacing ‘GOD’ with its TD reference, i.e. ‘CHRIST’. Badawi domesticated the reference by deleting the symbol and keeping the concept of ‘GOD’ as a reference to ‘DEITY’ without any metonymic associations. Enani domesticated the metaphoric content completely by deleting both the symbolic and metonymic associations and replacing them with the functional equivalent ‘I swear’. It is worth mentioning that the highest percentage of loss in symbolic and metonymic references with cultural value was noticed in Enani’s and Badawi’s translations, in contrast with Jabra who seems to have tried his best to preserve the symbolic and metonymic values of concepts of faith such as ‘CHRIST’, ‘BAPTISM’, ‘REDEEMED SIN’, ‘CHRIST’S WOUNDS’, ‘GOD’S BLOOD’, ‘HEAVEN’. The following table provides the three TT versions of this example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Enani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“God’s blood”</td>
<td>&quot;وجروح المسيح!&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;يا إلهي!&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;أقسم!&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Othello, 1.1.4)</td>
<td>By the wounds of Christ!</td>
<td>Oh my God!</td>
<td>I swear!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third example about mutation in metonymies with cultural background is Iago’s exclamatory remark, “or else I am a Turk” (Othello, 2.1.114). The metonymic reference in this example involves the use of the word ‘TURK’. The verbal context, situational context and historical context imply that ‘TURK’ is a metonymy for ‘INFIDEL’: ‘TURK FOR
INFIDEL\(^{28}\). The translators dealt with this metonymy in three different ways. For example, Jabra deleted the metonymic reference to the SD ‘TURK’ and its implied TD ‘INFIDEL’ all together from the text, replacing the metonymic association with the functional equivalent, ‘by God!’ Enani, on the other hand, deleted the metonymic reference of the SD ‘TURK’ and explicated the implied metonymic reference of the TD ‘INFIDEL’. Badawi preserved the ST metonymic reference of ‘TURK’ but explicates a TD that has associations other than ‘INFIDELITY’: ‘TURK FOR ENEMY’. I believe that the argument for ‘TURK AS ENEMY’ is weaker than the argument for ‘TURK AS INFIDEL’, as the verbal context implies the function of swearing, where one expects the conceptual content to include references to faith:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Enani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“or else I am a Turk” (Othello, 2.1.114)</td>
<td>“إن لم يكُ هذا حقاً فأنا كافر!” (بالله بل وصحيح ما أقول)</td>
<td>“إنها الحقيقة وإلا اعتبروني واحداً من الترك الأعداء” (By God, what I say is true!)</td>
<td>“لا يمكن هذا الحقا فانا كافر!” (It is the truth; or else, consider me one of the Turkish enemy!)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the second set of examples about the behaviour of metonymy under translation, I will deal with the mutation that influences metonymies with no cultural content. The first example is taken from Othello, and it involves Shakespeare’s metonymic reference to ‘CUCKOLDRY’ as the “forked plague” (3.3.276). This metonymy was subject to different changes in the three TTs. Enani replaced the metonymy of the ‘FORKED PLAGUE’ with ‘BEING A FETISHIST’, which is a semantic variation of ‘CUCKOLDRY’. On the other hand, Jabra and Badawi explicaded the metonymic associations by deleing part of the SD, ‘FORKED’, explicating the ‘TD’ of ‘CUCKOLDRY’ as ‘HORNED’ and merging it with the

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\(^{28}\) The use of the word ‘Turk’ carries within its implications the cultural attitude of Renaissance people towards a Turk as being an “infidel” (Draper 1956: 523)
other part of the SD, ‘PLAGUE’, coming up with a new form of the metonymic reference: ‘THE PLAGUE OF HORNS’ OR ‘THE HORNED PLAGUE’. In this context, it is important to point out that the Arabic equivalent for the concept of ‘CUCKOLDRY’, namely ‘HAVING HORNS’, is cross-cultural as it exists in certain variations of Arabic such as the Syrian dialect and the Egyptian dialect. The following table provides the three TT versions of the example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Enani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Even then this forked plague is fated to us when we do quicken” (Othello, 3.3.276)</td>
<td>“لقد كتب علينا داء القرنون هذا حال دخولنا الحياة” We are destined to this plague of horns soon as we come to life</td>
<td>“منذ الميلاد قدر لنا أن نجابه هذا الوباء ذا القرنين” Since our birth, we are destined to face this plague of the two horns</td>
<td>“كأنما على الجبين ساعة الميلاد قد خظ القدر بأن أكون ديوثاً” As though destiny wrote on my forehead the minute I was born that I be a fetishist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second example about the translation of a metonymy with no cultural associations is Othello’s reference to ‘CRYING’ as the “MELTING MOOD” (Othello, 5.2.349). This metonymy, whose cognitive content seems to have an aesthetic value, went unnoticed in the three TTs, all of which turned the metonymy to sense by deleting its SD and replacing it with the TD of ‘CRYING’. In this example, we do not detect the presence of any cultural associations or rich cognitive content, as in the earlier examples; quite the contrary, this metonymy can very possibly be cross-cultural due to the lack of cognitive richness in its conceptual content. This example shows that not all mutation in ST data happens as a result of the high cognitive value of the metaphor or the lack of exposure on the part of the translator to its conceptual associations. There are cases when the mutation in the metaphoric content of a text happens for no clear motivations as happened in this example which is listed with its back translations in the three TTs below:
One important feature of metonymy is that its lexical components interact with each other in yielding its conceptual content to the extent that any partial change in the metonymic reference could compromise its cognitive value. For example, Macbeth’s metonymic reference to ‘BLOOD’ as “the colours of their trade” (2.3.115), appears in an organic conceptual unity that each part of the metonymic reference acquires its conceptual value from appearing next to the other parts. If we take out the reference to “their trade”, which is another metonymic reference to “MURDER”, or replace it with a different lexical item, this will influence the conceptual value of the metonymy. The other example about the relationship between the structural unity and conceptual unity of metonymy is Macbeth’s conceptualizing of the emotion of ‘FEAR’ as a physical force which, “doth unfix my hair” (1.3.135). In this example, we notice that every lexical item in the metonymic structure contributes to its entire cognitive value as the emotion of ‘FEAR’ is not restricted to the word ‘UNFIX’ on its own, nor is it implied in the use of the word ‘HAIR’ on its own. It is rather the conceptual sum of the two lexical items appearing together in a certain structure and specific context that helps us make associations and conceptualize the cognitive content of the metonymy.
The next example will discuss the subtlety of metonymic conceptual associations, showing how the cognitive content of metonymy could be damaged if subject to mutation in any of its components. The example is taken from Macbeth’s challenge to the weird sisters to unveil their prophecies for his future “though bladed corn be lodged” (4.1.55). This example involves using the SD ‘BLADED CORN’ as a metonymic reference to the absent TD ‘UNRIPE CORN’: ‘BLADED CORN IS METONYMY FOR UNRIPE CORN’. In this metonymy, there is a conceptual association between ‘BLADED’ and ‘CORN’. The word ‘BLADED’ is not associated with a mere aesthetic value that indicates the ‘SHAPE OF CORN’ in terms of looking like ‘BLADES’. It has a deeper cognitive association with the metonymic reference as well as the context, which makes it functional to the image as a whole.

For Macbeth, the impossibility for the wind to break an ‘unripe corn’29, that is as light as a blade of grass, intensifies the challenge of knowing about his future. This interpretation of the metonymic reference, inspired by the Bible30, fulfils the conceptual and contextual content of the excerpt as it expresses Macbeth’s burning desire to know the prophecies of the weird sisters at any price. If we examine the three translations of this metonymy, we notice that the shifts made by Jabra and Badawi from ‘BLADE OF CORN’ to ‘EAR OF CORN’ eliminate the previous cognitive associations of the ST metonymy; because once the corn grows from a blade to an ear of corn, it becomes heavy and easy to break. In Nyazi’s translation, however, the shift from ‘BLADED CORN’ to ‘GREEN EARS’ does not seem to harm the cognitive associations of the metonymy. In his translation, Nyazi preserved the conceptual value of the

29 “We are to recollect that ‘bladed’ corn is never ‘lodged,’ or layed; but corn which is heavy in the ear is often borne down by wind and rain. Shakespeare must have been aware that green corn, or corn in the blade, is not liable to be affected by violent weather.” (Shakespeare 1873 : 205)

30 “Hast thou not heard, how I have of old time made it, and have formed it long ago? And should I now bring it, that it should be destroyed, and laid on ruinous heaps, as cities defenced? Whose inhabitants have small power, and are afraid, and confounded: they are like the grass of the field, and green herb, or grass on ye house tops, or as corn blasted before it be grown.” (Geneva Bible, 2 Kings 19: 25-26)
metonymy by explicating the reference of ‘BLADED’ in a way that reflects its cognitive and contextual functionality. Instead of saying ‘niṣāl al-qamḥ’, the Arabic for ‘bladed corn’, he said, ‘al-sanābil al-khaḍrā’, the Arabic for ‘green ears’. The following table provides the exact wording of the three translations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Nyazi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“though bladed corn be lodged (...)” (Macbeth, 4.1.55)</td>
<td>&quot;حتى وإن تضرب حبة القمح في السنينة (...)&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;حتى ولو انكسرت سنابل القمح وانقصفت الأشجار (...)&quot;)&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;حتى لو أن السنابل الخضر خُربت ونزلت إلى الأرض (...)&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Even though corns are lodged in their ears</td>
<td>Even though the ears of corn are broken (...)</td>
<td>Even though green ears are lodged and born down to earth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having discussed certain cases of mutation in metonymy across the three translations of each ST, I would like to deal with the implications of translating symbols from English into Arabic. The examples about symbols in ST data are quite limited, but in view of their high cognitive value, it is important to deal with them in this context particularly as they share with metonymy two features. The first feature shared by metonymies and symbols is the richness of their conceptual content; and the second is the absence of the TD, both of which are factors that influence the result of the translation process. As the discussion of the example of “God’s blood” (Othello, 1.1.4) has revealed, symbols are more prominent than metonymies regarding the clarity of their cognitive content. Yet, they tend to be subject to a higher rate of mutation as they tend to be avoided completely or replaced with a functional equivalent. This tendency was clear in the translations of Badawi and Enani of metaphors with a symbolic value such as the writer’s references to ‘God’s blood’, ‘God’s wounds’, etc.

The first example that will be discussed in this context is taken from Othello where Iago says that the Moor is prepared to do anything for the sake of Desdemona even if it were to give away “all seals and symbols of baptism and redeemed sin” (2.3.344). The metaphor of
‘SIN AS ATONEMENT/HAVING A FINANCIAL VALUE’ comprises two symbolic values. The first is a cross-cultural value that implies a reference to the ‘Original Sin’ as a symbol of ‘the Story of the Fall’, i.e. the sin we inherited from Adam and Eve. The second is a partially shared cultural value that implies a reference to ‘the Sacrifice of Jesus Christ’ as a symbol of redeeming humanity from the ‘Original Sin’. This double symbolic reference appears in the form of a structural metaphor: ‘SIN AS ATONEMENT’. Discussing the mutation in the conceptual value of this dual symbolic reference involves examining the metaphorical structure that inspires its conceptual content.

If we examine the three translations of this symbol, we notice that it was processed in three different ways. Jabra’s translation of ‘redeemed sin’ as ‘al-khaṭṭa al-mustadā’ preserved the two symbolic values of the metaphor. This formal equivalence or ‘transfer’ of the metaphor seems rather natural, which could be attributed to a number of factors: first, the explicit cognitive content of the ST metaphor; second, the first symbolic value of the symbol is shared in English and Arabic; third, the second symbolic value of the symbol is shared partially by English and Arabic.

As for Badawi’s translation, there was a shift in the symbolic reference from the ‘redeemed sin’ to the ‘Original Sin’, which implies two arguments. First, Badawi shifted the focus from the structural metaphor ‘SIN AS ATONEMENT’ to the broader conceptual content of the structural metaphor ‘SIN AS A HEREDITARY RELATION’. Second, the translator eliminated the first symbolic reference to ‘the Sacrifice of Jesus Christ’ and preserved the second symbolic reference to ‘the Story of the Fall’. In other words, what the translator did was to preserve the symbolic reference that is shared completely in English and Arabic and eliminate the symbolic reference that is shared partially in the cultural systems of the two languages. In contrast with Jabra and Badawi, Enani’s translation introduced a

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31 (Genesis 48: 16) and (Matthew 20-28)
Semantic Equivalent eliminating the metaphor with its two symbolic values as if to imply that ‘SIN IS NOT A HEREDITARY RELATION’ and ‘SIN IS NOT ATONEMENT’. The following table provides the three versions of translation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Enani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>And then for her to win the Moor, were’t to renounce his baptism, all seals and symbols of baptism and redeemed sin (Othello, 2.3.342-344)</td>
<td>&quot;وإن ارادت استيلاء ابن المغرب المغربي فهو أسير غرامها بحيث يفكر بعموديته و بكل أخطام ورموز الخطيئة المفتدة (…)&quot;)&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;وإن أرادت استيلاء ابن المغرب المغربي فهو أسير غرامها بحيث إنها لو طلبت منه حتى أن يبذل دينه لا بد منه في محو الخطايا والtransactions من الخطيئة الأولى&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;وإن ارادت استيلاء ابن المغرب المغربي فهو أسير غرامها بحيث إنها لو طلبت منه حتى أن يبذل دينه لا بد منه في محو الخطايا والtransactions من الخطيئة الأولى&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And if she wanted to win the Moor, even if it were to blaspheme his baptism, and all the seals and symbols of the redeemed sin (…)</td>
<td>Besides, it is very easy for her to influence the Moor, who is hostage to her love, even if she asks him to forsake his Christian faith and renounce all the symbols of redemption from the Original Sin and guilt</td>
<td>And if she wants to win the Moor, nothing is easier for her, as he is ready to forsake all the values of his baptism and renounce all that is needed to erase his sins and guilt</td>
<td>And if she wants to win the Moor, nothing is easier for her, as he is ready to forsake all the values of his baptism and renounce all that is needed to erase his sins and guilt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While it is not possible to speculate about the cognitive processes that motivated the translators’ different methods of dealing with the rich symbolic content of the above metaphor, this does not mean that we cannot discuss the influence of their translations on the conceptual content of both the ST and TT. When it comes to the translation of highly rich and functional metaphoric content, the translation of metaphor can leave a major effect on the ST’s and TT’s conceptual content in that it can eliminate a whole cultural tradition from a certain conceptual system and/or introduce a new tradition into another system of thought. The other thing to notice in this example is that symbols tend to be domesticated or neutralized in translation, unless their cognitive value is partially or completely shared by the SL and TL.
In this context, it is important to point out that Jabra, as a Christian, must have had more exposure to the metaphor of ‘SIN AS ATONEMENT’ than the two other translators, which could have played a role in the way he translated the symbol into Arabic. Once again, I would like to clarify that the rationale behind this analysis is not to give assumptions about a translator’s motive behind processing a given metaphor in a certain way, but rather to investigate the factors that play a role in processing metaphors throughout the process of translation. There are cases; however, where we cannot base our analysis on the role of cognitive exposure in the translation of symbols such as the following example which introduces a cultural symbol that is shared in English and Arabic; yet its cognitive value was not preserved in any of the three translations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT1 Jabra</th>
<th>TT2 Badawi</th>
<th>TT3 Enani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“fire and brimstone”</td>
<td>“نار وكبريت!” Fire and sulphur!</td>
<td>“نار الجحيم!” Fire of hell!</td>
<td>“نار وحجر الكبريت!” Fire and sulphur!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(Othello, 4.1.234)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In old English, the reference to ‘fire and brimstone’ has a symbolic value in that it implies a Biblical reference to the ‘WRATH OF GOD’.*32* As a symbol of the ‘WRATH OF GOD’, ‘BRIMSTONE’ appears also in the Qur’ān, as ‘*hijāra mīn sijjīl*’, as the following table reveals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official English translation<em>33</em></th>
<th>Arabic verse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“When Our Decree issued, We turned (the cities) upside down, and rained down on them brimstones hard as baked clay, spread, layer on layer.” <em>(Qur. XI, 82)</em></td>
<td>&quot;فَأَمَرَنَا جَاءَ أَمًّا جَعَلْنَاهَا سَاقِفَةً وَأَمْطَرْنَاهَا جَعَّارَةً مِّنْ سَجْبِلٍ مُّضْنِوَّةً (هوَنَّةُ: 82)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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“And We turned (the cities) upside down, and rained down on them brimstones hard as baked clay.”
(Qur. XV, 73)

If we examine the TT equivalents of this symbol, we notice that Badawi’s translation deleted the symbolic reference to ‘BRIMSTONE’. Conversely, Jabra’s and Enani’s translations introduced the scientific variation of the symbolic reference transferring it as ‘kibrīt’, the Arabic for ‘sulphur’, which does not have any religious associations. In this context, it is important to point out that adopting the scientific sense of the word does not express its religious symbolic value. Nonetheless, even the religious equivalent of the symbol might not express the communicative function of Othello’s exclamation which has the pragmatic force of something like ‘yā ghaḍab Allāh!’ In the next section, I will present the main findings of the empirical study before moving to the last chapter on ‘Research Summary and Conclusions’.

7.3 Towards a Model of Translating Metaphor

The previous analysis has revealed that the translation of metaphor is a conceptual process which involves a role for all the cognitive processes that influence thought and conceptualization of meanings before and throughout the process of translation. Empirical factors such as the richness, explicitness and complexity of the conceptual content, contextual considerations, cognitive exposure and experiential involvement play a vital role in the translation of metaphor. The value of the cognitive approach to the translation of metaphor is two-fold. First, it helps us quantify the behaviour of metaphor when subject to a translation process on the level of the smallest conceptual units, projecting a magnified picture of the minute conceptual interaction between the different components, types and levels of the
metaphoric content. Second, it highlights what happens on the level of the conceptual processes that underlie the processing of metaphor throughout the translation process. Having dealt with translation of creative metaphor from English into Arabic from the perspective of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, I would like to summarize the main implications of the empirical study. These implications will answer the research assumptions about the nature of metaphor in the framework of Translation Studies and the factors that play a role in processing metaphor throughout the translation process, as will be discussed in the following arguments.

First, in dealing with the translation of creative metaphor in Shakespeare’s *Othello* and *Macbeth*, it was observed that the mutation influencing every ST datum, as a result of the translation process, did not take place on the level of the creative metaphor as a whole, i.e. the image. Rather, it influenced the smaller components of the image on the level of basic conceptual metaphors, their components (SD and TD) and the conceptual associations that exist within those conceptual patterns and between them. In other words, what influences the translation of metaphor, creative or not, is the interaction between conceptual metaphors and across their conceptual structure. The analysis has demonstrated how conceptual metaphors interact in knitting up the entire metaphoric content of an image in one whole and how the mutation in one unit could compromise the content of other units, i.e. conceptual metaphors. Throughout the translation of metaphor, translators try, first, to reason about the conceptual essence of the components of metaphor (SD, TD and the conceptual association between them) and, then, to reproduce the ST metaphor into the TL accordingly. This implies that the translation of metaphor tends to be dominated by two cognitive procedures: the deconstruction and reconstruction of the ST conceptual content.

Second, it is much more effective to look at the translation of metaphor as a process, rather than a problem. This process involves two phases that are highly dominated by our
cognitive reasoning: (a) processing meaning; and (b) translating meaning. What determines the answer to the ‘how question’, i.e. how to process and translate meaning, is our approaches to the binary system of ‘TRANSLATION’ and ‘MEANING’. The contrastive analysis has revealed that the translator’s processing of metaphor tends to be dominated by a major trend that reflects his/her approach to translation and meaning, in general, whether it is the semantic content, contextual associations, communicative function, or stylistic aspect of meaning. No matter how committed a translator is to a close representation of a ST metaphoric content, there is no doubt that the course and result of the translation process will continue to be influenced by a main tendency that reflects his/her cognitive orientation. A group of empirical factors tend to determine a translator’s approach to a ST metaphoric content, and these factors are grounded not only in the ST conceptual system. They are also embedded in the TT cognitive patterns that influence the translator’s conceptual framework.

Third, researching the translation of metaphor from the perspective of Cognitive Theory helps us move from the logic of evaluating the performance of the translator to detecting the empirical issues that influence his/her translation of metaphor and the factors that play a role in its processing. Consequently, we have to reconsider our understanding of the value of Cognitive Theory for TS. The underlying assumption here is that there is no Cognitive Theory for ‘translating metaphor’, in as much as there is a cognitive framework for an objective understanding of the nature of metaphor. What post-cognitive linguistics can contribute to the issue of translating metaphor does not exceed the contributions made by earlier text-linguistic approaches to translation including the contextual, pragmatic and semiotic approaches. However, the cognitive approach to researching the translation of metaphor can be helpful in understanding the experiential nature of metaphor as a conceptual phenomenon that influences and is influenced by the cognitive embodiment of our physical and conceptual experiences.
Fourth: It is more helpful to deal with the translation of metaphor in a ‘descriptive model’ rather than a doctrine. Translation is a process of cognition, perceptive reasoning and conceptualization, in the first degree. This is what makes us differ from machines, which, if fed with a novel metaphor, would yield an output of the type, ‘no entries were found’. The human mind will at least try to process the components of the metaphor, find conceptual associations, filter them and then reprocess the metaphor. This conclusion was drawn based on the following observations:

(a) When the two components of the conceptual mapping are explicit and their conceptual and contextual reference is clear, the chances of mutation in the ST metaphoric content decrease considerably.

(b) Concepts with a high cognitive value in terms of their ‘ABSTRACTNESS’ and the lack of definite physical entities that are associated with them play a key role in the translation of metaphor. It is because such concepts lack a definite physical representation in our conceptual system that they have a rich cognitive content which we need to reason about metaphorically. This makes their processing much more complicated than the processing of concepts with a clearly delineated and lower cognitive value.

(c) The translation of metaphor is closely related to the complexity of its conceptual structure as well as the richness of its cognitive content that comprises semantic associations, contextual associations, communicative associations and socio-cultural associations. The richer the cognitive content of the metaphor, and the more complex its conceptual structure, the more cognitive effort and time the translator will need for processing it.

Adopting a dogmatic approach to the translation of metaphor does not only reflect superficiality in dealing with the issue, but can also be counterproductive as it overlooks the main factors which play a key role in processing a metaphor before and during its translation, and which are cognitive in the first degree. The translation of metaphor is a cognitive matter
that is far less related to issues of typology or dogmatic classification and quantification of
the metaphoric content than it is related to cognition which covers the conceptual orientation
of the translator and the complex set of conceptual processes and experiences that influence
his/her mind before and throughout the translation process. This goes contrary to the text-
linguistic approaches to the translation of metaphor that deal with the issue in terms of a
problem-method-solution orientation, focusing on purely structural and typological
prescriptions and neglecting other aspects that might have a much more important role to play
in processing the ST metaphoric content.

**Fifth:** As processing a metaphor is influenced by the density of its cognitive content, the
factor of exposure plays an indispensable role in the translation of metaphor. The loss in the
translation of a metaphor is not always attributed to the lack of a lexical equivalent or cultural
equivalent, but it is also connected with the lack of the relevant cognitive experience. Also,
the translation of metaphor is not always influenced by the issue of conceptual or structural
complexity in as much as it is influenced by the metaphor’s cognitive subtleties. Sometimes
there is a shift or loss in the translation of a creative metaphor, not because it does not travel
well to the other culture or language but because of the lack of exposure to its nuances and
minute associations. The factor of exposure is not limited to experiential paradigms, but also
comprises exposure to the cognitive and conceptual content of the ST, the writer’s
background and the verbal and situational context. It even includes exposure to earlier
translations of the ST content. It is an empirical process that goes as far as the translators
widen their cognitive horizons by reading, researching, investigating and benefiting from
earlier research on a certain topic whose metaphoric content interests them. The
experientialism of metaphor applies not only to its processing and conceptualization but also
to its translation.
Sixth, the translation of metaphor is also a creative process that enriches the TT with additional metaphoric content to that of the ST, by extending the ST metaphors or reconstructing them. However, it is a double-edged weapon that has to be used responsibly in view of the interactive role between the metaphors we deconstruct and reconstruct, on the one hand, and our conceptual system, on the other hand. In other words, we are free in as much as we are responsible and do not cancel the other and faithful in as much as we are ethical. When it comes to the translation of highly rich and functional metaphoric content, the translation of metaphor can leave a great effect on the conceptual content of the ST as well as that of the TT in that it can introduce or undermine the use of a whole tradition in our conceptual system.

To summarize, this chapter focused on a descriptive reading of the results of the empirical research vis-à-vis the type of equivalence that was prominent in each TT and the cognitive value of metaphor types. The analysis was discussed in three sections. The first section provided an analysis of the mutation (shifts and loss) in TT data in terms of the trends that seem to have influenced the translators’ methods of translation individually. The second section dealt with the cognitive value and behaviour of the different types of metaphor by examining cases of data mutation across the three translations of each play. The chapter concluded with a third section which introduced a model for the translation of metaphor where the main observations and conclusions of the text analysis were combined in a descriptive reading of the challenges that translators face throughout the translation process and the factors that play a role in translating metaphor as a cognitive process.
CHAPTER EIGHT
RESEARCH SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation dealt with a cognitive approach to the translation of creative metaphor in *Othello* and *Macbeth* from English into Arabic. The answer to the issue of the translation of metaphor in the framework of conceptual metaphor entailed an extensive discussion and experimentation of the topic in the two disciplines of Cognitive Science and Translation Studies. The analyses and discussions conducted in the empirical study marked a departure from text-linguistic approaches to the translation of metaphor in that they dealt with the ST metaphoric content as physically embedded conceptual processes rather than linguistic patterns with grammatically delineated features and structure. The arguments and conclusions of the dissertation can be summarised under two headings: the implications that fall under the arguments of Conceptual Metaphor Theory and those that fall under the discussion of metaphor in Translation Studies.

With regard to the empirical study that focused on metaphor in the framework of Cognitive Metaphor Theory, the analysis of the ST corpus led to several conclusions. First, all ST data extracted from the ST corpus were deconstructed into the basic conceptual pattern TD IS SD, where SD concepts represented highly delineated concepts in terms of being physical objects, schemas or processes. Accordingly, ST data were classified under the three basic models of conceptual metaphor comprising ontological metaphors, image schemas and structural metaphors, which is in line with the findings of Conceptual Metaphor Theory about the embodiment of metaphor in our physical system and experiences and about its conceptual, rather than linguistic, nature as a cognitive process of the mind. Second, the ST empirical study has also shown that metaphor creativity is not related to a conceptual genius.
Rather, creative metaphors are inspired by our embodied conceptual thinking that makes use of the three patterns of conceptual metaphor, and they are the end result of basic conceptual processes that are employed by individuals to different degrees. These conceptual processes are based on observation, accumulating physically embodied experiences and intensifying (extending or blending) them in the form of images (extended or blended) that can be deconstructed into conceptual metaphors. Third, the first part of the empirical study was also helpful in qualifying and quantifying the conceptual structure and behaviour of creative metaphor paving the way for the contrastive empirical study that was based on a clear description of how and to what degree ST data were influenced by the process of translation.

As for the second part of the empirical research, the contrastive study answered several questions with regard to researching the translation of metaphor from the perspective of Conceptual Theory. While the first part of the empirical study focused on the universality of our physically grounded metaphoric thinking, the second empirical study highlighted the factors of variation and diversity in the metaphoric processes of our mind. These factors involve variation on the cultural level, contextual level and attitudinal level. The universality claim is significant for understanding the physically grounded conceptual nature of metaphor, but it is not adequate for answering the main issues related to metaphor translatability. The fact that not all our metaphors are translatable or translated in a single way refutes the supremacy of the notion of metaphor universality while not dismissing it out of hand.

The empirical research has revealed that the majority of ST data analysed in the contrastive study were not dramatically influenced by translation and that the mutation in ST data took place on the level of the smallest components of conceptual metaphor, i.e. SD/TD concepts and associations, leaving a minor effect on the higher conceptual structure of the image. The total mutation rate influencing ST data as a result of the translation process did not exceed 45.2% (in a highly functional translation), which implies that at least fifty five per
cent of our metaphoric thinking is translatable (by virtue of being universal). With regard to
the remaining forty-five per cent that were subject to mutation when translated into Arabic,
these involved different levels of variation both between and within the metaphoric content of
the SL and TL.

The results and discussions of the empirical study indicated that the translation of
metaphor is governed by three factors: the universality of metaphorical thought, the diversity
of metaphorical thought and the background knowledge shared by the metaphor producer,
metaphor translator as well as metaphor receiver (reader, audience, etc.). Discussing
metaphor translation from the perspective of these three factors involves dealing with
different levels of diversity and variation in our metaphoric thinking including the cultural
level, the contextual level and the pragmatic level, all of which subsume what was described
as the ‘cognitive richness and value’ of metaphoric concepts and associations. The higher the
level of variation in the cognitive content of concepts and metaphoric associations, the higher
the cognitive value of metaphor and the greater the possibility of variation in its processing
and translation.

Researching the translation of metaphor from the perspective of Conceptual Metaphor
Theory not only provides a detailed description of what exactly influences the process and
product of translation, but also underlines the functionality of the variation factor in
understanding the conceptual nature of metaphor. Additionally, dealing with the translation
of metaphor within the cognitive framework is a scientific and objective method as it
distances the researcher from the fallacy of evaluating translators’ performance based on the
notions of accuracy and precision putting emphasis on the factors of experientialism,
exposure and intentionality. Accordingly, instead of focusing on the quality of the product of
translation and the rigid prescriptions of how to translate or not translate a metaphor, one can
focus on what influenced the process of translation and what lies beyond it. This research has
shown that the translation of metaphor is not a problem but a conceptual phenomenon that is influenced by our physically delineated conceptual and experiential heritage and will continue to influence it infinitely.
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