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Evaluating the Role of Confucian Tradition in the Prospects and
Limits of Political Change in Four East Asian Societies

A Thesis

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

School of Government and International Affairs
Durham University

by
Hsin-Che Wu

March 2013

Abstract

Confucian society is one of the major cultural and social systems of East Asia. There have been long-standing scholarly debates about whether Confucian societies can produce or maintain a democratic regime; and in more recent years discussion of why there are several Confucian societies that can democratise yet some of them cannot. In order to contribute to these debates, this thesis conducts an analysis of China, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea to explore and explain the following issues by comparative strategy: why have some Confucian societies democratised yet some of them have not? What is the role of traditional legacies from the pre-democratic dynasties and how does this political culture shape contemporary Confucian societies and their capacity to produce and sustain democratic politics? What is the role of economic and social modernisation in contemporary Confucian societies in the development of democracy? What role is played by ruling parties and leader's attitudes and choices when they face claims for democracy from society? How do these three factors - legacies, modernisation and ruler's choices - shape successful and unsuccessful cases of democratic change in East Asia?

Evaluating these factors by comparative qualitative and quantitative strategy, this thesis concludes: the ruling parties and leaders strategies for democracy are quite different between successful and unsuccessful cases. In China and Singapore, the leadership can unite and deploy a pseudo-democracy to respond to democratic claims of society; yet in Taiwan and South Korea, non-democratic leaderships could not sustain their rule, and they even chose to cooperate with opponents for survival. Secondly, the traditional legacies that emerged from the pre-democratic imperial system are the elements to hinder development of democracy rather than Confucianism itself. In China and Singapore, these legacies are selectively chosen by leaders to serve their official ideologies, yet in Taiwan and South Korea, rulers could not sustain their ability to manipulate these legacies. Modernisation in China and Singapore is controlled officially so it serves and consolidates non-democratic rule; but in Taiwan and Singapore, the modernisation process was not totally controlled by non-democratic rulers and instead promoted democratisation in these societies.

Comparing these factors, the attitude and unity of rulers seems the influential factor for this debate. If non-democratic rulers can remain united in their strategy, traditional legacies for serving non-democratic rule will be strengthened, and the effects of modernisation for democracy will continue to be limited. However, because the

younger generation demonstrates positive attitudes to democratic values and against traditional legacies, this situation could still change in the long run.

*To my family, my lifetime partner and friends who
offered me valuable opinions during its creation.*

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Acknowledgement

The end of the doctoral study means a temporary end to my study.

In finishing the thesis, I would like to express my appreciation to my family, my supervisor, my girlfriend and several important friends who supported and helped me in this period.

I would like to thank my parents, who offered me solid backup during this period, which meant I did not need to worry about many things that other people would have been concerned about. Without this support, the thesis would not have been finished in time. I would also like to express my appreciation to my girlfriend, Shu-Ping Lo, who gave me motivation and mental support to finish this study.

Regarding my academic support, I would especially like to thank Dr David Kerr, who always gave me useful and important advice for the thesis. This enabled me to keep the thesis on an optimal track. He also helped me to solve some issues that arose in my daily life. To me, he is a wise and trusted supervisor and mentor. Without his help, I could not have finished this thesis.

I also would like to thank my two examiners, Dr Welch and Dr Wang, who carefully read my thesis and pointed me to inappropriate sections that I should remove while giving me the opportunity to improve my thesis.

In addition, I would like to express my appreciation to Dr Florence Wei-Fang Chen, Miss Yanzhuo Xu, Dr Chien-Jung Chiang and Dr Mei-Feng Hsin. Dr Chen and Dr Chiang always gave me useful and critical advice to help me review my ideas and improve them. Dr Hsin was my classmate from a pre-session course, and she always encouraged me to finish the thesis. I have known Yanzhuo since mid-2010. During this period, we overcame many difficulties and cooperated together in conferences and tutorials, as well as informally. She is always a good partner when I need help.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my family, my lifetime partner and friends who offered me valuable opinions during its creation.

Statement of Copyright

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Acknowledgement for Asian Barometer Survey

Wave 1:

Data analysed in this thesis were collected by the East Asia Barometer Project (2000-2004), which was co-directed by Profs. Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu and received major funding support from Taiwan's Ministry of Education, Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University. The Asian Barometer Project Office (www.asianbarometer.org) is solely responsible for the data distribution. The author appreciates the assistance in providing data by the institutes and individuals aforementioned. The views expressed herein are the author's own.

Wave 2:

Data analysed in this thesis were collected by the Asian Barometer Project (2005-2008), which was co-directed by Professors Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu and received major funding support from Taiwan's Ministry of Education, Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University. The Asian Barometer Project Office (www.asianbarometer.org) is solely responsible for the data distribution. The author appreciates the assistance in providing data by the institutes and individuals aforementioned. The views expressed herein are the author's own.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Topic of the Thesis

In 1947 Sir Winston Churchill noted “Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time”. Democracy is not a perfect political system, but it is increasingly an accepted one, practised by a majority of the world’s population. Democracy is derived from *demokratia*, which can be separated into two words: *demo* and *kratia*, indicating one meaning: rule by the people (Held, 1996, p. 1). However, in academic terms, the definition for democracy has been controversial. There is not a united theory of democracy (Sartori, 1987, p.3), but rather an accepted principle of "power rests with the people" as the true meaning of democracy (Lee, Teng-Hui, 1995, p.5). Nowadays, democracy has become a universal word to define systems of government, not only for democracies but also many authoritarian states. Most non-democracies, such as North Korea and Congo use ‘democratic’ in their state name. The trend also affects East Asian countries, and nowadays more than half of them have democratised or are undergoing a process of democratisation. This indicates that rulers around the world, including rulers from non-democratic regimes, all employ the idea of ‘rule by the people’ to legitimise their ruling status.

East Asia covers several cultures, and Confucian society is one of the major cultural and social systems, at one time covering a majority of the population in the region. Discussions and debates about whether a Confucian society can produce or maintain a democratic regime have continued for several decades. In more recent decades with the emergence of some successfully democratised societies in the region another debate has been conducted as to why some Confucian societies can democratise but some of them cannot. There is no the obvious conclusion in this debate because some Confucian societies have democratised, and continue to maintain a stable democratic regime for more than two decades; but other non-democratic rulers also sustain their rule in several Confucian societies, and there is no accepted evidence that their rule will be end in the short term.

When considering the historical context of the debate on democracy in Confucian

societies we find many opinions. In the beginning, Confucian scholars tried to argue that the classic Confucian political system actually made the people the basis of legitimacy in the political system. Yet in the imperial period, the ruler controlled all political power in practice and tradition. In this way it was conceptualised that the ruler represented the legitimacy of the political system. Several Confucian scholars sought to correct this mistake. In late Ming Dynasty, Huang, Zongxi (黃宗羲) developed the concept of 'People are the ultimate source of political authority' in his *Ming Yi Dai Fang Lu* (明夷待訪錄). The King was chosen by the people to deal with public affairs in the state, and ministers were selected to share these affairs. However, this situation was incorrectly changed from the Qin Empire (秦朝), so that the King established the basis of sovereignty, and the people became the King's property (Yu, 2000; see also Tu, 1998, p.121; F.K.Hsu, 2004a, p.248). In late Qing Empire, regardless of the faction of reform and constitutionalism, all leaders that supported revolution indicated that Huang's view was the source of their thinking, including Liang Qichao (梁啟超) and Sun Yat-Sen (Yu, 2000). Liang's teacher, Kang You-wei (康有為) used the Confucian thinking to criticise the feudal and autocratic empire and indicated that the leaders' right to rule had to be based on the people (Kang, You-wei, 2011). He combined strands of western thought and traditional Chinese thought to construct his framework for adopting a democratic system and institutions. But his attempts failed because his work was viewed as seeking to overthrow the whole existing political system and offended most Confucian scholars' interests (Tu, 1986, pp.13-14; Yu, 2000). Although political reform was eventually conducted, it also led to the collapse of the imperial system because the Confucian gentry stood against the Qing government (Gasster, 1980, pp.506-507) and undermined its authority.

After the end of the imperial period, the debates on political change for China tended to reject the idea that Confucianism was compatible to democracy. Most scholars and overseas students suggested abandoning Confucianism and introducing the Western thoughts to replace it; because history had shown that the rule of Confucianism could only weaken the country, so to totally abandon it was the only way to save the country (Fairbank K & Goldman, 2006, pp.266-268; Gasster, 1980). The famous May Fourth scholars, such as Hu Shih (胡適), Chen Duxiu (陳獨秀), Li Dazhao (李大釗) and Lu Xun (魯迅), and students from universities promoted the New Culture Movement argued that Confucianism was not suitable for a modern society, and it was only a part of Chinese culture. They argued that this movement is an 'Enlightenment' movement in China to get rid of old traditions and lifestyle, since these sources hindered the willingness of society to accept western and modern institutions. They argued that the thought of Confucius tried to promote the feudal era's political system, manner and

lifestyle, which were now outmoded. Science, democracy and new literatures were the essential measures to replace the old system (Fairbank K & Goldman, 2006, pp.266-268; Schwartz, 1983, pp.419-429). This is the first time Chinese modern scholars totally overthrew the ideas of Confucianism in a Confucian society. In contrast to scholars of the late Qing Empire, they pointed out Confucianism is not capable of giving China a path to democracy and modernity.

In recent decades, the debates on the relationship between Confucian society and democratic politics has revived and renewed divergent opinions. Lee Kwan Yew, the former Prime Minister of Singapore believed that Confucian culture in society is an important factor in Asian democracy, which can bring well-ordered democracy. It is because of this culture that Confucian societies should have a different kind of democracy (Zakaria, 1994; Bell, 2000). However, democracy in Lee's mind is not the democracy as understood in scholarly definitions. On the other hand, some scholars argued the characteristics of Confucianism promoted a culture that would hinder democracy. Huntington believed that the Confucian heritage is a clear obstacle for Confucian societies to practice democracy (Huntington, 1991, p. 300-307; 1996, p.237). Bell et al (1995, pp. 163-167), Bell (2000, pp.219-234) and Zakaria, (1997, pp.27-29) also discussed illiberal democracy or liberal autocracy in East Asia, arguing that because this region does not have the traditions of Western states, abuses of civil liberties and rights, rule of man rather than rule of law, are likely to prevail . As for the freedom, equality and pluralism in western values, the western traditions, are not the prior concern here. According to their argument, Confucian culture should take the major responsibility for hindering the development of democracy.

Nonetheless, another group of scholars emerged to argue that the above scholars may have made errors in their analysis. They indicate that scholars mentioned in the last section make use of the traditional legacies that emerged from the political system of pre-democratic dynasties in Confucian society, rather than Confucianism itself to discuss whether a Confucian society can produce or maintain democratic regimes (Tu, 1998, pp.222-223; Fukuyama, 1995a; 1995b; Yu, 2000; Tu, 1999; Sen, 1999, pp.14-15). Confucianism as a system of political thought does not support autocratic regimes, and rulers should understand that their right to rule should be based on the people's support. However, during the imperial dynasties, the dominant political class controlled the political agenda, and a number of legacies that are not compatible to democracy emerged in that period of time (Huang, 1981; 1987; 1993). As result, the people, who should be the source of legitimate rule, were not aware of their political status (Yu, 2000; Hsu, 1985; Mou, 2002). In order to correct this problem, the

important objective is to demonstrate how democracy can be the political system and Confucianism the spiritual essence so that they can co-exist within democratic Confucian societies (Bell, 2000, p.14; Chan, 1997, p.44-47; Tu, 2009, December 30). This also means clarifying the differences between Confucianism and 'Kong Jia Dian (孔家店)', which means a political system that uses Confucianism's name to practise the autocratic rule (Yu & Bei, 2012, March 22).

Kim Dae Jung (1994), the first democratic President of the Republic of Korea, also argued that Confucianism offers democratic traditions like the popular sovereignty of John Locke. He indicates that in the classic Confucian political system, people-orientation is the core of the system, and the ruler should practice government of benevolence to fulfil people's needs. Kim also suggests that rule of law and measures such as the imperial examination, which offered equal opportunity for people to be government officers, impeachment of officers who censored mistakes from emperors and officers, and freedom of speech were also important characteristics in Confucian society, that point to some democratic traditions. In his opinion, Confucian societies even had democratic values earlier than European society. Furthermore, that several Confucian societies have democratised also offers vivid evidence that Confucian societies also can produce democratic regimes under modern conditions. Thus, the claim that Confucian culture does not need democracy can be viewed as evasive words designed to support regime authoritarianism; that along with offers of good government and high living standards seeks to gain people's support for non-democratic rule (Ng, 1997, pp.21-22). The view that Confucian societies are not suitable for democracy is mostly given by authoritarian rulers rather than scholars, as Sen argues (Sen, 1999, p.15).

The above debates reflect the fact that the relationship of Confucian society towards democracy remains highly contested, with scholars and politicians upholding opposing views as to whether these two are compatible or antagonistic. It can be found that some scholars indicate that the major problem is the nature of Confucianism because it encourages several negative concepts which can hinder the development of democracy. For this reason a Confucian culture should be replaced by a democratic culture, otherwise, only an illiberal democracy can emerge. On the other hand, some scholars indicate that the major problem is not Confucianism itself, but the traditional legacies that emerged from the history of Confucian dynasties, and the rulers – the political dominators - should take the responsibility for this issue. Modernisation also took an important role in these debates: in the late Qing Dynasty, the debates arose within the modernisation process, and even as new ideas argued for

the need to replace the Confucian thinking during the May Fourth period. In the modern Confucian societies, the role of modernisation in shaping debates about the relationship between the past and the future is also vivid.

Scholars have also debated the conditions for producing and maintaining a democratic regime. Scholars agree that the regime needs not only that the political elites commit themselves to creating and maintaining a democratic regime in the beginning (Schedler, 2001; Pridham, 2000; Linz, 1990), but that a solid democratic political culture is essential to support democratic consolidation so it is important to develop people's democratic values (Gunther, Puhle & Nikiforos Diamandouros, 1995; Pridham, 2000; Inglehart, 1990, 1997; Shin, 1994). For these reasons, it is important to discuss both the rulers' attitudes to political change and the factors that would shape the emerging political culture, such as traditional legacies and modernisation factors in Confucian societies. From that basis it should be possible to compare the democratic and non-democratic cases in East Asia to assess under what conditions a Confucian society can have a democratic regime, and why some of them have democratised by the present but some of them failed to change so far. This thesis will study this topic by exploring the following points:

- a. Why have some societies within the Confucian East Asian state system achieved a democratic regime but some of them have not?
- b. How do the choices and objectives of different political elites interact with the claims for democracy in contemporary Confucian society?
- c. What role does the multiple traditions and uses of Confucianism play in this varied pattern of democratic change?
- d. What is the role of socio-economic modernisation to democracy: does it act as a facilitator to assist democratic change as some theories suggest, or does it act to help consolidate authoritarian rule in some cases?

1.2 Research Design

In order to research the topic, this thesis will be divided into two parts : the first part is theoretical examination that discusses what scholars have said about Confucianism in politics; about how Confucian ideas have been used by rulers to shape a political culture for their societies; and how social-economic modernisation has re-shaped political values. The second part is a case studies analysis that tests the changes to values in four East Asian societies to see how traditional legacies and modern politics interact. The theoretical part will be used to construct a framework for analysis and

confirm certain hypotheses and research questions; the case studies part will be used to evaluate the hypotheses and answer the research questions.

1.2.1 Theoretical Part

The theoretical part will be divided into two chapters: political culture, and modernisation.

In the political culture chapter, this thesis will discuss the essential conditions for producing a democratic regime and how traditional legacies survive in contemporary Confucian societies politically. It can be found that a transition to a democratic regime needs the major political players to agree to support such a change in the beginning, and also needs an emerging democratic political culture to support it. However, in this chapter, this thesis will demonstrate that in fact the traditional legacies still exist in contemporary Confucian societies and have some impact in politics. These legacies in the political aspect may help to consolidate the non-democratic ruler's system, control the public space and limit different voices from the people, and constrain individuals will to promote collective interests. If these legacies are promoted by political dominators in politics, then the democratic political culture will not easily be constructed, and in the meantime, the non-democratic rule will be facilitated by these legacies.

In the modernisation chapter, this thesis will point out the ambiguous effects of modernisation in Confucian societies. Modernisation theories have been taken to indicate that the traditional legacies will diminish under modernisation and the traditional society will totally change during the process of modernisation. An open and democratic-oriented society should emerge to replace the old one. However, the scholars suggest that in the East Asian countries, modernisation may not bring about the effect as the theories expect. Furthermore, this thesis will also briefly indicate that in Confucian societies, influences of modernisation changes upon democracy are variant. Modernisation in some Confucian societies may become the facilitator to maintain non-democratic rule, although modernisation might help some societies to democratise their regimes. Thus, the role of modernisation in Confucian societies and why it seems to push democratisation in some societies, yet also seems to facilitate sustaining non-democratic rule in others, is also an essential discussion.

To summarise the preceding sections, the theoretical part of the thesis establishes three essential determinants of political change in East Asia: the rulers' attitude to

democratic change, and the role of two major elements, traditional legacies and modernisation, which can shape change to the political culture and thus the public's perception of, and decision for, democracy.

1.2.2 Case Studies Part

The cases studies part will analyse the hypotheses of this theses and compare the differences between democratic and non-democratic regimes. Regarding the definition of Confucian society, Bell (1995, p.18-20) gives three characteristics by which society can be viewed as Confucian. Firstly, behaviour: the public's behaviour can be defined as Confucian in terms of values-orientation as based on the Confucian classics. Second, elite instrumentalisation: Confucianism is employed as an ideology by elites to facilitate their purposes. Third, values of the Confucianised society, so that people in Confucian society remain deeply influenced by a Confucian culture. Therefore, he indicates that China, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore (a Chinese majority society), Japan, Hong Kong and other Chinese majority societies can be viewed as Confucian societies (1995, p.20).

Though there are a number of Confucian societies in East Asia, when selecting the cases in this thesis, two important characteristics have been considered: the length of time that Confucianism has been established in the society; and the manner in which the current regime was established. China and Korea are the Confucian societies which have experienced Confucianism for hundreds (even thousands) of years. The societies of these two states will be used as two of the cases in this thesis. The majority races in Singapore and Taiwan are ethnic Chinese, most of whom were from mainland China and effected by Confucian culture. After the Second World War, an ethnic Chinese dominated government with Confucian value-orientated leaders were established on these places. Confucianism, especially family-centric values are vivid in these two societies; and they will also be chosen as typical of Confucian societies. Other choices might be Japan, which was also affected by Confucianism; but Japan's Confucianism is not similar to that of China and Korea. In Japan, the royal family may not be overthrown by the public or nobles; and it has its own traditions for arranging the relationship between emperors, nobles and the masses. Fukuyuma (1995, pp.26-27) suggests that Japanese Confucianism is suppressed because the emperor's status is not like Chinese or other Confucian societies' emperor. Meanwhile, family-centric values, the unit that may be applied against the state, may not be applied in Japanese society. Huntington (1996, p.45) also indicates that Japanese culture is a unique civilisation separated from Sinic civilisation, and this state has

fewer cultural connections with its neighbours (ibid. p.133).

According to these scholarly discussions, this thesis will choose China, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan as the cases to be considered. China and Singapore are non-democratic societies, and South Korea and Taiwan are democratic societies. In the case studies part, this thesis will investigate comparatively:

What is the ruler's attitude to democracy in democratic and non-democratic societies, and why do some non-democratic rulers chose to democratise their regime?

How do traditional legacies perform in these Confucian societies: do they continue to be used by non-democratic rulers for serving non-democratic government, and what happened in the new democratic states during the non-democratic period to ensure these legacies could not sustain non-democratic rule?

What is the role of modernisation in democratic and non-democratic societies?

The statistical analyses, which are based on data from the Asian Barometer Survey, will be operated to demonstrate people's support for traditional legacies, to test whether traditional legacies and modernisation help non-democratic rulers or not, to examine whether traditional legacies and modernisation would help or hinder to develop democratic values, and finally what is the strength of democratic values among people in these societies. Through these analyses, political science explanations as to why some Confucian societies can produce and maintain a democratic society yet some of them cannot will be demonstrated.

1.3 Hypotheses and Research Questions

Based on the examination of the topic introduced in the preceding section, there seem to be three major aspects to consider when evaluating the interaction of Confucian culture and democratic change in East Asia: the ruler's attitudes; the strength and use of traditional legacies; and the extent of social, economic and educational modernisation. In order to evaluate the relative role of these aspects this thesis uses the following three hypotheses, that produce five research questions:

H1: A democratic regime can be the political system in modern Confucian societies, yet rulers' attitudes to democratic values and changes are decisive in these ruler-dominated societies for practicing democracy.

Although there are fundamental differences between the classic Confucian political

system that is more people-oriented, and the imperial system that is more ruler-based, yet traditionally, these Confucian societies are ruler-dominated. Meanwhile, New Confucian scholars also indicate that the people are not aware of their right to take the dominant role in the political system. In the contemporary Confucian societies, democracy has become the consensus among Confucian societies, not only rulers in democratic Confucian societies but also non-democratic rulers all indicate that their regime is democratic. In the meantime, after the imperial period, there is a possibility for Confucian societies to implement democracy, and New Confucian scholars clearly suggest democracy should be the new political solution to replace the imperial political system and realise people-oriented politics as suggested in the classic Confucian political system. Thus, political leaders' attitude is decisive for democracy. So, if political leaders cannot tolerate or support establishing a democratic government, democracy cannot emerge. This hypothesis produces the following research questions:

Q1: How do rulers in contemporary Confucian societies respond to the trend of democracy? Why are some non-democratic rulers not able to sustain their rule by employing the traditional legacies? How do the nature of the regime, the nature of internal or international change (including the US role) affect the ability of rulers to control the political process and maintain their non-democratic rule?

As the scholarly discussions argue, the ruler is the politically dominant force that has controlled the political system for centuries in Confucian societies. Democracy became the common consensus in the beginning of the last century among most Confucian societies, thus the ruler's attitude to democracy is important for these societies to establish the democratic regime. This thesis will compare rulers' attitude to democracy through the cases studies to assess why rulers in some societies chose to democratise yet some of them sustain a false democracy. In the meantime, there are several important factors that may affect rulers' attitude to democracy: the nature of the regime, international and internal change are also important elements to affect the ability of rulers to control political life and manipulate modernisation factors.

H2: The traditional legacies that some scholars see as hindering the development of democracy emerged from the political system of the pre-democratic dynasties rather than the Confucian political system, yet now they are still existing in modern Confucian society. But the roles of this traditional value system in shaping democratic emergence are variant and uncertain. In non-democratic societies, legacies are selectively chosen to sustain non-democratic regime; and in democratic societies

might not serve to be the obstacle for democracy. This thesis will discuss these ideas further in the political culture chapter to demonstrate what the original meaning in Confucian classics is, and how these legacies gradually formed into a ruling system of thought, and how they exist in the politics of contemporary Confucian societies. This hypothesis would seek to explore following research questions.

Q2: What role do the traditional legacies play in this varied pattern of democratic change?

During the pre-democratic dynasties period, several legacies emerged and were selectively manipulated by rulers to support their power. This phenomenon could also happen in the contemporary Confucian societies. Political culture is a political attitude that is formed over a period of time and becomes a collective memory in people's mind, and people's political actions will be driven by these memories that are saved in their mind (Almond & Bingham Powell, Jr., 1978; Almond & Verba, 1989). Thus, there is a powerful incentive for non-democratic rulers to exploit these legacies politically. The people will recognise and accept these legacies and may be persuaded to accept non-democratic values and politics. On the other hand, how did these legacies operate in democratising societies? How could non-democratic rulers during non-democratic period not successfully control these legacies to keep their rule, or what changed so these legacies could not be used to prolong the non-democratic period? In the case studies part, this thesis will compare the differences between democratic and non-democratic societies in these ways.

Q3: Can rulers in non-democratic regimes use the traditional legacies to deepen support in people's mind for non-democratic values? Are they successful in hindering the development of democratic values in contemporary Confucian societies?

In order to assess whether the non-democratic rulers have an ability to manipulate these traditional legacies selectively, the thesis will use two waves of Asian Barometer Data to demonstrate the support rate of the people towards these legacies, and the trend change: do the traditional legacies that are promoted by rulers gain higher support from people over time? This part will be demonstrated in the case studies. Furthermore, the regression analysis is operated to analyse whether the independent variable would affect dependent variable (Wu & Tu, 2005, p.445). This thesis will operate this analysis to explore whether traditional legacies will negatively affect the development of democratic values and hinder the formation of democratic political culture in contemporary Confucian societies.

H3: Socio-economic modernisation is ambiguous in Confucian societies: it can be a tool to serve regime survival in non-democratic regime, yet it pushes democratisation in democratic regimes.

Modernisation theories suggest that the modernisation process can bring total changes for traditional society because the traditional social structure is dissolved, people's values are changed during the modernisation process and it is harder for rulers to control people's values. However, all Confucian societies have 'modernised', during the modernisation process of rapid economic growth, emergence of middle class and public education, and other elements that could happen from this process have occurred; yet not all of the Confucian societies have met the expectations of modernisation theories that the more open society and values mean possibilities for a democratic regime. This thesis will address the major modernisation factors in Chapter 3 to indicate that economic development, middle class, and education are the important factors to observe modernisation's role in Confucian societies; but also that the experiences in these societies reflect that there is an ambiguous condition of modernisation factors producing democratic politics. Thus, this thesis suspects that modernisation could help to consolidate the non-democratic regime in non-democratic societies, and in the contrast, it could also facilitate the democratisation as theories expect in democratic societies. This hypothesis would try to answer the following research question.

Q4: What is the role of socio-economic modernisation for advancing or hindering democracy? Can it diminish the traditional legacies? Can the ruler's control be used to limit the effects of modernisation or even turn modernisation to be the facilitator of their rule? How does modernisation work to help pushing democracy during the modernisation process and can political culture be controlled during this period?

With this question, the thesis will explore modernisation's role in Confucian societies in supporting change to political culture that favours democracy; or conversely modernisation could be the supporter to consolidate the non-democratic rule. This will be compared in the case studies. In the ruler-dominated Confucian societies, the ruler could use the achievements of modernisation to propagate and legitimate its rule. Since the ruler can control the modernisation agenda, so that under these situations, can modernisation still help to push democratisation, or it will turn to facilitate non-democratic rule? This thesis will discuss these issues in the case studies part, and also use regression models to test the role of modernisation in serving or not

non-democratic rule; and whether it can help to develop democratic values which can shape a democratic political culture.

1.4 Research Outline

This thesis will be presented in the following sections:

The Introduction, this chapter, introduces the topic of this thesis, and then describes the research design, to establish that in order to discuss the topic, this thesis will be organised in two parts: the theoretical part and the case studies part. After that, the hypotheses and research questions will be introduced.

The theoretical part includes Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. In Chapter 2, this thesis will firstly review the theories of political culture to demonstrate that the political culture is a long term accumulation of political socialisation, which will form individuals' political attitude, and this attitude will affect their political decisions. Then the thesis will turn to discussion of the specific nature of the Confucian political culture arguing that it cannot be absolutely demonstrated that these societies failed to produce democratic regimes. This thesis will argue that the imperial system of Confucian societies was a ruler-oriented regime which sustained hierarchical politics, harmony ideals, group-orientation and guanxi; these are named the traditional legacies. This imperial system established that the ruler should be the political dominator to control the political system and its culture. Finally, this thesis will indicate that the traditional legacies which emerged from imperial period can still exist in the politics of contemporary Confucian societies, and that some of them are manipulated by rulers to consolidate their rule, and some of them are the result of politics in society.

In Chapter 3, this thesis will review modernisation theories, and indicate that the modernisation theories involve total changes as traditional societies become modern ones. The social structure and people's value will also shift in this period. There are three major factors to be considered: economic development, middle class emergence and public education. These three factors are indicated by several modernisation theorists as the major elements that could help a traditional society begin to push for a democratic regime, yet these effects may not apply in some cases of Confucian societies. Thus, a brief argument as to how modernisation may benefit non-democratic rule in Confucian societies would be introduced in the end part of this chapter.

After theoretical part, a summary for this part will be given to conclude this part and open the discussions for the case studies.

At the beginning of the case studies part, Chapter 3, the methodology to be employed for the case studies will be demonstrated. After that, four Confucian societies, China, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, will be discussed in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.

In Chapter 5 on China, this thesis will firstly indicate that the CPC authority practices a democracy with Chinese characteristics, yet that democracy is dominated by the CPC rulers. In China it can be found that several traditional legacies are manipulated by the CPC authority to construct their official ideology, and at the same time the modernisation factors are controlled by this authority to serve their rule. This thesis will indicate the existing political values and the trend for traditional legacies to test whether the CPC's efforts are useful to sustain traditional values or not. Then this thesis will use multiple regressions to test: a) the relationship between traditional legacies and modernisation factors to understand whether modernisation can help to diminish traditional legacies, and b) to test the relationship between democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors to evaluate whether traditional legacies or modernisation factors will hinder or help to develop democratic values as a basis for a democratic political culture. Finally, this thesis will demonstrate the existing frequency of and trend for democratic values.

In Chapter 6, the Singapore style democracy which is constructed by the PAP authority will be introduced. Although this system can offer the people a regular election for checking the PAP government, yet overall the 'democracy' is dominated by the PAP authority. This thesis will then discuss how the PAP authority recruits the traditional legacies for serving their official ideology. At the same time, the achievements and policies of modernisation factors are used to support the PAP non-democratic rule. In the statistical analysis, this thesis will also follow the structure of Chapter 5: it firstly demonstrates the existing values and the trend for traditional legacies, and uses multiple regressions to test the relationship between traditional legacies and modernisation factors, the relationship between democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors to test whether traditional legacies would hinder the development of democratic values, and whether modernisation factors would help to diminish traditional legacies and facilitate the development of democratic values. Also the existing democratic values will be demonstrated.

Chapter 7 will discuss the case of Taiwan. In the first part of this chapter, this thesis

will demonstrate how the KMT authority, an alien regime from mainland China, needed to face the indigenous elites and people's resistance. This regime also needed to maintain an image of being democratic China and sought the US support, so that rulers had to tolerate some political opponents. Because the international situation changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War, the KMT rulers chose to liberalise politics and finally to democratise their regime to maintain the KMT's survival in Taiwan. In the second section of this chapter, this thesis will demonstrate that although the KMT rulers tried to choose several traditional legacies to consolidate their rule, yet they eventually gave them up because the internal and international pressure made their efforts in vain. This authority could not control the modernisation process so they could not firmly sustain their non-democratic rule, so these factors, as theories expect, facilitated the emergence of a democratic regime. In the statistical section, this thesis will also demonstrate: the values of traditional legacies, and then test the relationship between democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors. This thesis will try to assess which factors played the role of diminishing the obstacle of democratic values – the traditional legacies. Finally, the existing and trend of democratic values will be demonstrated.

Chapter 8 will focus on South Korea. The first part of this chapter will indicate that South Korea was originally a democratic country when it was established. Thus, it is difficult for non-democratic rulers in South Korea to legitimise their non-democratic regime. The military junta finally made political concessions to their opponents and the people who demanded democracy. In the second section, this thesis will indicate that traditional legacies might not serve the military junta as they expected, and the modernisation factors actually helped to push the process of democratisation. In the statistical section, this section will follow the structure of Chapter 7; firstly to demonstrate the existing values of traditional legacies; then to test the relationship between democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors to assess those factors that affect democratic values. After that, a regression will be operated to identify which elements can decrease the anti-democratic values factor of traditional legacies. Finally, the existing and trend of democratic values will be demonstrated.

After these case studies, a summary for these cases will address the research questions the cases were supposed to address; then it will summarise the conclusions reached in the cases studies chapters; then indicate how the questions and hypotheses advanced.

In Chapter 9, a conclusion of this thesis will be made by summarising the topic and conclusions for both theoretical and case studies parts. Then the hypotheses and

research questions will be answered. Finally, this thesis will point out the significance of the study for future research on East Asian democratic change.

Part 1: Theoretical Part

Chapter 2: Political Culture

Political culture was discussed by Alexis de Tocqueville in the following statement: 'laws serve more to maintain the democratic republic in the United States than physical causes, and mores more than laws' (de Tocqueville, 2010, p. 494). According to his definition, the word 'mores' refers 'not only to mores strictly speaking, which could be called habits of the heart, but to the different notions that men possess, to the diverse opinions that are current among them, and to the ensemble of ideas from which the habits of the mind are formed' (de Tocqueville, 2010b, p. 466). Several scholars have developed these concepts. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues argued for the importance of political culture when they observed voting behaviour in the US presidential elections, and they found that social characteristics determine a person's political preference (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944, p. 27). Therefore, the person's social background is important as it not only decides the individual's position in the social structure, but also affects what kind of political information this individual will receive.

From 1950s to 1960s, research on political culture become an important factor in the study of modern politics, and was subsequently to become one of the major topics in democratic research. Empirical research that sought to demonstrate the consequences of political culture was also applied in these studies. For instance, Putnam, in an attempt to explain the different patterns of development in northern and southern Italy, finds that civil tradition is an important factor to explain why northern Italy performed better than the southern region when facing challenges or opportunities (1993, pp.121-148). Inglehart (1990; 1997) focuses on industrialised states and indicates that the political culture in these societies shifts from material to post-material, and people do not only focus on economic development, but on more social affairs. The Asian Barometer (the survey that focuses on the East Asian region) and literature that focuses on Confucian political culture indicate that negative influences from traditional values would hinder the practice of democracy (Chang & Chu, 2002; Park & Shin, 2004; Nathan, 2007; Shin, 2007; Chang & Chu, 2007).

This chapter will firstly introduce the scholarly discussion of political culture, then focus on political culture in two sections. In the first section, this thesis will demonstrate scholarly discussions concerning political culture in Confucian societies and requirements for democratic regimes. This section will discuss: what are the basic

requirements for a society to support a democratic political system? A democratic political system cannot emerge or be maintained without a democratic political culture as the solid support of the people and the commitment of the elite to democratic values are essential factors. The commitment of elites is particularly important in the initial stage; the people's support and a democratic political culture are also important. Nonetheless, scholarly examinations, including empirical evidence, also indicate there are legacies that may hinder or distort democracy in Confucian societies.

The second section will then discuss the legacies that exist in Confucian society. This section should discuss the role of traditional legacies in the crucial transitional phase as modern politics emerges: which legacies discussed by scholars emerged from the imperial period and how did these traditional legacies continue to survive in Confucian societies and with what results? In particular, is it true that many of these legacies were incompatible with the emergence of democratic regimes in Confucian societies.

2.1 The Political Culture Approach and its Significance for Modern East Asian

Politics

In the wake of the behaviourism revolution in political science in the 1950s and 1960s, Almond and Verba started the study of political culture in a systematic method. According to their research, political culture should be defined as: 'When we speak of the political culture of society, we refer to the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population' (Almond & Verba, 1963, p.13). A more comprehensive concept of political culture was offered by Almond and Powell (1978, Chapter 2). They defined 'political culture' as a political attitude, belief and emotion in a period of time. This is formed by past experiences; so it is a long-term mental accumulation in terms of 'political socialisation' and is saved in the memories of the people in a nation and directs their political activities in the future. Therefore, it can be seen as a 'distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the member and the nation' (Almond & Verba, 1989, pp. 12-14). Almond & Verba also indicated that political culture affects the 'conduct of individuals in their political roles, the content of their political demands, and their responses to laws', and it also shapes 'the actions of individuals performing political

roles throughout the political system' (Almond & Powell, 1978, p. 25). The systematic framework for political culture that focuses on orientation can be observed to fall into three categories – cognitive, affective and evolutionary (Almond & Powell, 1978, pp. 25-26; Almond & Verba, 1989, pp.13-14), and these categories are involved in an individual's preferences. Lucian Pye offers similar points of definition for political culture:

Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. A political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the members of that system, and thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experiences.

Political culture is a recent term which seeks to make more explicit and systematic much of the understanding associated with such long-standing concepts as political ideology, national ethos and spirit, national political psychology, and the fundamental values of a people. (Lucian Pye, 1968)

Overall, these theorists indicate that political culture is a subjective orientation which is formed or accumulated by the political process (Pye, 1962, p.22; Pye & Verba, 1965, p.7). To summarise the theory in this stage of its development, the political culture approach analysed the political system by discussing the relationship between political structure and individuals' subjective attitude so that political culture is seen as a political attitude, belief and emotion for people with a community or nation in a period of time, and thus one way of explaining individuals political actions (Almond & Verba, 1963; Almond and Powell, 1978). Hu (1998a, p. 244) also follows this idea to indicate that an individual's activity with respect to politics depends on his or her own orientation.

The major contribution of Almond & Verba and Pye is that their concept of political culture 'offers itself as an ideal token of and catalyst for behaviourism since it fulfils the two central aims of the approach: it can be defined so as to be measured quantitatively, and it marks the ultimate expansion of the territory of political science' (Welch, 1993, p.4). It is also the first attempt to study the relationship between

political culture and democracy. However, the limitations of the pioneer operational research also led to several criticisms and points for further development.

2.1.1 Problems of Empirical Evidence and Methods

The criticism of early political culture approaches can be defined in terms of problems of evidence and problems of method. The first version of political culture research contains problems of case selection and cross-country culture comparison. On the basis of empirical evidence employed it was argued that the approach drew overwhelmingly on Anglo-Saxon democratic experiences rather than more diverse political systems and experiences, meaning that the case selection is biased towards the Western stable democracies. Almond and Verba's research in 1963 used a survey method in five countries (the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico) and there were approximately 1,000 participants in each case. The authors use the participant political culture, which likely exists in the US and the UK, to indicate that the more a country's political culture is based on the civic culture, the democratic system in that country is more stable (Almond & Verba, 1963). Even Almond himself agrees that the mixture of the US and especially the UK's political culture is 'near to the civic culture ideal'. So it is the civic culture, which the citizens understand as their ability to participate political affairs, that Almond and Verba are examining not democratic political culture as such (Rosemond, 2002, p.87-88).

However, the problem of the comparison is the choice of cases will lead to the bias. For instance, this selection of cases has set up an inevitable result because this method will highlight the particular nature of Anglo-Saxon democracy (Brown, 1987, p.176-179; Pateman, 1980; Moor, 1996, p.52-55). The situation leads to an implication that the democratic system should follow the US or the UK style political system, and ignores other democracies. So the concept still lacked analytical precision and often became 'a subjective, stereotypic description of a nation rather than an empirically measurable concept' (Dalton, 2000, p.914). Lane also indicates that the framework is designed for its purpose, an operational plan to measure political culture, but both the cases selection and the framework are too simple for a 'permanent solution' (1992, p.363).

Another problem for the method employed by Almond and Verba are the differences between respondents' values in different cases (1963). According to their notes to the survey, it can be found the variation in responses to survey questions may generate

bias, which will devalue the accuracy of the survey. Verba (1980, p.398) accepted that there were three challenges in operationalising the cross country survey for political culture: language, understandings for the individual country's culture and historical background. How to overcome the 'problem of equivalence' will be the issue for these survey methods (Almond & Verba, 1963, p.57). Rosemond (2002, p.90-91) summarises four problems in their methods. Firstly, respondents will disguise their opinions, and their understandings also may not comply with the meaning of the questions, which might cause the results of the survey to be distorted. Secondly, their research method may construct political orientations for respondents that may not be obvious before they accept to answer the questionnaire. Thirdly, the problem of functional equivalence, which indicates that although respondents will have the same answer for the same question, though they have the same answer actually they refer to a different meaning. Fourth, there is a bias in their samples, citing Kavanagh (1980) who argues that even in the UK's case, most of samples are from urban England.

More recently researchers have tried to explore the usefulness of political culture approaches to non-Western cases and correct the shortcomings mentioned above. Work such as that of Brown (2003) employed the political culture research in the case of Russia and indicated that although the political transformation in 1990s was not accompanied by the development of a significant democratic culture, yet it also seemed to prevent the country from going back to the personal dictatorship regime. Shi (2003); Chang & Chu (2002); Park & Shin (2004); Shin (1994; 2007); Chang & Chu (2007); Chang, Chu and Diamond (2012) also expanded research on political culture to East Asia countries. Their researches consider balancing samples from different background to avoid the errors. Nonetheless, problem of equivalence still will be an issue when researchers implement a cross-country survey.

2.1.2 Contents of Political Culture

Regarding the contents of political culture, there are problems making connections between the political system (macro) and individuals (micro) levels. Almond & Verba (1989, p.13) indicate 'the political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among members of the nation'. Almond & Verba particularly construct the civic culture by referencing the political system and individuals values. Especially when they introduce three types of political culture and the definition of civic culture in Chapter 1, they clearly indicate that 'the civic culture is a participant political culture in which the political culture and political

structure are congruent' (1989, p.30), and they also mention:

We would like to suggest that this relationship between the attitudes and motivations of the discrete individuals who make up political systems and the character and performance of political systems may be discovered systematically through the concepts of political culture that we have sketched out above. In other words, the connecting link between micro and macro politics is political culture. (1989, p.32)

They also indicate that political culture can maintain or change the political system- it will affect the individuals' attitude and behaviour, and then these attitudes and behaviours will shape the political system and help the system to be stable (1989, chapter 1; p.62-64).

Almond and Verba's research framework therefore tries to connect the relationship between individuals and political system, and argues that political culture is the intermediary for them. Nonetheless, they use only individuals' attitude to infer the collective culture and ignore social-economic factors and this will cause the problem of the 'individualistic fallacy' (Vallier, 1973, p.345). There is a gap between measuring individuals' psychological responses that forms a collective political culture and proving a connection to the political system.

Fuchs (2007, p.172-175) gives a wide-ranging scholarly discussion of this issue, calling it an aggregation problem. According to his paper, scholars, such as Scheuch, Pye, Kasse, Reisinger and Seligson, all indicate the false use of individuals' micro-level attitudes to transfer assumptions to a macro-level culture (p.173). He also notes that several scholars indicate 'individuals have beliefs, values and attitudes but they do not have values' (p.173, cited from Elkins and Simeon 1979, p.129), and that there is no theoretical rationale to link micro and macro levels (p.173, cited from Reisinger, 1995, p.339). Held (2006, p.167) also indicates that political culturalists research did not successfully explain the relationship between 'political orientation of social classes and, cutting across these, of men and women, which their own data revealed'. Held also noted that even in their data, political culture cannot offer a clear relationship from the variables they use to support the relationship between political system and individuals. Pateman (1971, 1980) and Dogan & Pelassy (1990) indicate that there should be a variable to connect political system and political culture providing an explanatory link between them, and they argue socialisation should be considered this explanatory variable.

Although the issue still exists, and the survey method also continued to be important for political culture research, Fuchs offers a solution for the issue. He indicates that although this issue has not been overcome, he offers a solution that 'the data of individual attitudes are collected through representative random samples. This aggregation implies that each individual receives an equal amount of weight in the whole data set', 'The distribution of the equally weighted attitudes of the citizens can also influence on the dependent variable of political culture' (Fuchs, 2007, p.173).

Recent researches in the political culture field do not only focus on the political system and individuals; and these studies do not consider it as a stable factor which is influenced by individuals. Both inputs and outputs to political culture have been diversified, giving regard to effects from the historical experiences, social-economic background and social contexts. For instance, in East Asia, Chang & Chu (2002) and Chu, Chang & Huang (2004) have focussed on interactions between traditional culture's effect and individuals' values in modernising societies. Wang, Zhengxu (2010a; 2010b) emphasises how social-economic development will gradually affect individuals' values to democracy. These researchers' studies also cover both democracies and non-democracies.

Meanwhile, there are also stable democracy and political culture issues. Almond and Verba (1963) indicate that according to their observation, there are two major paths to develop the civic culture. One is that culture will develop gradually without crisis or external pressure, and the second is that the new attitudes and values do not replace the old attitudes and values, but combine with them (1963, chap. 8). They also indicate that individuals' political beliefs and participation are major elements to maintain a stable democratic system, and they indicate in the US, the people are active participants and the UK's citizens are also active but they are more likely to have a subjective culture. However, these two countries can reach a balance to maintain the stable democracy. To them, a mixture of subjective and participant political culture like the US and the UK is the 'best sort of political culture for a stable democratic system' (Rosemond 2002, p.87). On the other hand, the factors in the other three countries may lead to instabilities in their democracy because their original non-favourable beliefs have not changed. The democracy will be stable when the political belief and participation can meet the democratic system, 'institutions are largely derived from a culture base' (Rosemond, 2002, p.91).

However, this conclusion faces challenges because the political belief and

participation may change, yet the people continue to support the existing regime even if the culture shifts. The arguments of Almond and Verba also cannot explain the role of changes in the stable environment, and what the relationship between change and stable environment is (see Girvin, 1989). Meanwhile, other factors also can contribute to stable democracy. Lijphart's 'Consociational Democracy' also indicates that 'consensual behaviour among political elites with appropriate institutional support could ensure the effective governance of societies that were divided on religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic line' (Rosemond, 2002, p.88 , see also Lijphart, 1999).

Some scholars try to use other approaches more comprehensive in theoretical explanation. Wildavsky (1987, pp. 4-5) used political preference to explain political culture, which means that preferences are endogenous rather than exogenous. He suggests that shared values and social relations indicate togetherness and, when people make choices, they also make cultural choices. The political culture shifts because, when cultural factors cannot be fulfilled in the existing society, people will evaluate their original choices from their original preferences, and then a positive or negative evaluation will appear. Therefore, people shape the culture during the 'decision making process'; they can strengthen, modify or reject the 'existing power relationship'.

Inglehart (1990; 1997) further expanded the range of case-studies and surveyed European, North American, Eastern Europe, South America and Asia countries. This research found that stable democratic countries held three cultural characteristics: a high level of interpersonal trust, a high level of life satisfaction, and a lack of support for revolution. This approach on seeks to more closely explore and explain the relationship between individual's personal characteristics of political culture and stable democracy. Inglehart's research also indicates that to create a democratic political culture will need a long time because the cultural shift between individuals and the political system may need one or more generations (see also Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

To sum up, it can be found that scholars' efforts are trying to locate and explain different explanations for culture shifts, yet most of them still conclude that political culture is continuous but also shifts slowly.

2.1.3 Summary

To sum up for this section, political culture research became operational from the time of Almond & Verba's introduction of the new research programme. Although their political culture approach faced criticism from different parts of academic society, yet their research still opened a broader field new concepts and methodologies in political science. The definition of political culture still has not reached a common academic consensus (see Gibbins, 1989, p.13), it can be agreed that political culture should be considered the individual's psychological attitudes (Lane, 1992, p.381). As such 'political culture donated an integrated constellation of ideas about not just government but about political life as a whole, from the meaning of social existence, to social priorities, to actual polices'. Lane further argues that political culture would connect political cultural values to political attitudes, then to individual political behaviour, social choices, political policies and institutions to form a cultural cycle (1992, p.381). Individuals' psychological attitudes have been considered to explore political culture, and the trend of this culture should be studied in the social context of a society (see also Dogan & Pelassy, 1990).

Confucian societies originally do not have a clear democratic tradition, but a bias towards the traditional legacies because of the historical background, socialisation process and the political system's effects. For Confucian societies, to adopt democratic values would be considered a revolutionary change for the existing system. In the rest of this chapter, this thesis will introduce arguments about the conditions that allow for the emergence or maintenance of democracy. It will then demonstrate how traditional legacies form historical experiences and how they may survive into modern society so that there can be a gap between the existing culture and the conditions for democracy. The next chapter will try to introduce modernisation as a factor for further discussing and explaining the change in Confucian societies and the possibility to practice democracy in these societies.

2.2 Requirements for Democratic Regimes and Academic Discussion of Political

Culture in Confucian Society

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they

are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, ...

(U.S. National Archives & Records Administration, 2011)

This description is now presented as a fundamental statement of democratic principles. To discuss how to make a democratic regime survive, this thesis would discuss how democracy can survive in the short term and in the long term. Although this claim does not have consensus in academic work (Schneider, 1995, p.219), it will be argued a democratic political culture is needed for maintaining the stable democratic regime in the long term.

A democratic regime may be viewed as a mechanism for dealing with the relationship between people and government (the leadership) (Held, 1995, pp.145-153; 1996, pp.262-267). The essential element of a democratic regime is that qualified people in the system need to be aware that they are the decision makers for their own benefit; everyone's opinion must be viewed as affecting the making of laws, policies and rules (Held, 1995, pp.145-153; 1996, pp.262-267). If the people always depend on their rulers, then they would remain at a child-like stage in terms of public policies (Dahl, 1989, chap. 7). The will of the people is the decisive factor for a democratic regime (Held, 1995, pp.145-153; 1996, pp.262-267; Dahl, 1989, chap. 7). Therefore, elites and people's decisions are decisive. In the beginning, the elites' decision would be particularly important; this involves a negative concept of democratic consolidation, but, to make democracy survive in the long run, then a positive concept which indicates how people should develop democratic values is important (Schedler, 2001; Pridham, 2000, p.20).¹

Historical experience indicates that parties or elites who stand against democracy are

¹ See, for example, Schedler who uses 'where we stand' and 'where we aim to reach' to evaluate democratic consolidation into positive and negative categories. The aim for positive category is to completing and deepening democracy. As for the negative category, it is to prevent eroding or collapsing of democracy. Pridham also divided democratic consolidation into two categories: negative and positive. Negative consolidation is to decrease power or impact from groups or individuals who do not support democratic regime and eliminate legacies of the transformation process. Positive consolidation '*refers to a long-term change*'. It is related to the attitude from the elite and people, both of them should develop democratic values. It is to creative a political culture to build up a 'system-support' environment.

a key element in the failure of democracy (Huntington, 1997, pp.57-58). Therefore, the negative conceptions focus on preventing collapse or erosion for a democratic regime; the most important is that major political actors should follow the rules of the democratic regime and argue that the democratic regime can exist in the short-term (Schedler, 2001; Pridham, 2000, p.20). The standard for this conception is various. Some scholars indicate that the consolidation in this definition should pass a turnover test. For example, the highest administrative position should be elected and party-changed in the election (Power & Gasiorowski, 1997, p.130-148), or the highest executive position and parliament members should be constituted by election. Two competitive parties should exist and the original government should step down at least once (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997, p.178). Some scholars focus on how people and the elite should follow the rules of a democratic regime. For instance, the two-turnover test from Huntington is to prove that political elite and people can follow the rules of democratic regime (Huntington, 1991, p.266-267). When the democratic regime faces challenges, rulers in the democratic regime can be changed rather than changing the democratic regime itself. Linz also indicates that consolidation refers to the fact that the major political elites, parties or organisations must understand that democracy cannot be replaced by any other procedure. No one can ban the decision makers from the democratic election. Democracy must be viewed as 'the only game in town' (1990, pp. 156-158).

The turnover test or party-change for the highest position of the state or parliament involves the establishment of a democratic regime. However, the establishment of a democratic regime and its institutions does not mean that people in the country would firmly support the democratic regime. As the last paragraph argued, it requires a guarantee from major political players to confirm that the democratic regime is the only form of governance in the country. Furthermore, the positive concepts related to the new political culture and political values, which can support the democratic regime, will be discussed. It is the long-term change of political attitude.

Democratic consolidation, which refers to the long-term survival of a democratic regime, needs a strong democratic political culture to support it (Gunther, Puhle & Diamandouros, 1995, pp.17-18; Pridham, 2000, p.20; Inglehart, 1990, 1997).² The

² Gunther, Puhle & Diamandouros argue that if people's attitude cannot firmly support democratic regime, then the regime is not consolidated. People need to be re-politically-socialised to establish democratic values. If this procedure cannot be completed, then people's attitude (mass attitude) can easily be changed due to '*political circumstances*'. Pridham also argues that democratic consolidation is much wider and deeper than the transition stage. Not only can it construct democratic institutions, but also people (mass) need to develop democratic values. See also Inglehart's research, which indicates the importance for developing democratic values to consolidate the democratic regime.

long-term political attitude change involves a change in the political culture (Inglehart, 1990; 1997). Therefore, to consider whether a democratic regime can reach consolidation, or move towards consolidation, people's attitude to the democratic regime is the major indicator that needs to be considered (Shin, 1994, pp.153-154). People's support for democracy can be considered in two categories: support for democracy as a principle and support for democracy in practice (Park, Chu and Chang, 2010, October, pp.1-2).

The satisfaction of the electorate with a democratic regime does not refer to support for a democratic regime in principle (Evans & Whitefield, 1995, pp.488-489). If the reason that people support the democratic regime is because the democratic regime can offer them a better life than before, rather than the fact that they really believe in democracy as the only solution for the political system, then the democratic regime may collapse when it faces economic or political challenges (Diamond, 1999, p.169). On the other hand, if people are loyal to the democratic regime, then the democratic regime can survive when facing challenges (Diamond, 1999, p.169). The first case can be viewed as instrumental legitimacy, and the second as intrinsic legitimacy. A country could be consolidated when the people confer intrinsic legitimacy, that is, the loyalty to democratic regime. If people confer only instrumental legitimacy, then the democratic regime may collapse when facing challenges.

Linz and Stepan conclude that the way to ensure the survival of a democratic regime can be divided into three aspects: behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional. In the first, no actors in the country would try to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state by violence. The second part indicates that the majority in the state would believe that democratic governance and laws are the '*appropriate*' solution for the country. The anti-democratic force is weak or 'isolated by pro-democratic forces'. The final one indicates that official or non-official forces would wish to obey the laws of a new democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996b, pp.5-6).

According to this research, how to make a democracy survive rests on how to make people support a democratic regime unconditionally. The most important thing is to develop a democratic political culture.

Dahl (1997) indicates that democratic consolidation needs a strong democratic culture to provide appropriate emotional support and cognition to support the democratic

Inglehart asks to bring people back in to maintain the long term stable democratic regime, especially see 1997, chapter 6

process. If a country's political system does not have a sound democratic political culture to support it, the democratic regime may be replaced by an authoritarian one, when the country faces crisis. In contrast, if the democratic regime performs well in the crisis, then people's confidence in democracy would be strengthened. He also indicates that the members in the system have to be convinced that democratic regime is the most suitable regime for the society, even in the face of deep economic crisis, or when dissatisfied with the incumbent leaders.

Inglehart suggests that culture is a common value of the attitude and knowledge system in society, and it can be transferred from one generation to the next. He uses life satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and support for revolutionary change as his variables for measuring culture. He indicates that interpersonal trust is the prerequisite condition to organise a group, while forming a group is the condition for whether democratic rules can be followed. Life satisfaction can represent a different culture in each country, rather than a short-term economic condition. Support for revolutionary change or gradual change involves people being willing to negotiate or vote to reach the object or not. Inglehart (1990) find culture does affect the stability and development of democracy. Furthermore, further cases prove the importance of political culture in the maintenance of a stable democratic regime (Inglehart, 1997). He indicates that the value change for individuals and society as a whole cannot be completed in a short time. Instead of that, it needs the long term to accumulate value change (Inglehart, 1990; 1997).

To summarise: for an emerging democratic regime, elites' attitudes are important in the initial stage, as this would help a non-democratic regime to transfer to a democratic one. However, a democratic political culture is necessary after the initial stage, and a strong democratic political culture is essential to maintain a democratic regime.

In this context it must be noted that the culture in East Asia is often considered incompatible with democratic values as discussed in the preceding sections. 'Culture is destiny', the argument suggested by Lee Kwan Yew, is used to indicate that the political culture derived from traditional values dominates the political development of a country (Zakaria, 1994), and that each country should find 'its own democracy' which is capable of withstanding its own challenges, but this 'Eastern democracy' is not necessarily the same as 'Western democracy'. Instead of creating an ambiguous space for culture and democracy, some scholars indicate that Confucianism is an obstacle for Confucian society to follow democratic values, and the way for these

countries to practise democracy is to reject the tradition of Confucian values; then democracy will be able to emerge. Huntington, an eminent western scholar, argued that Confucianism would create obstacles for Confucian societies to practise democracy because of the Confucian heritage that stresses 'authority, order, hierarchy, and the supremacy of the collectivity over the individual' (Huntington, 1996, p.237). He also argued that Confucian societies do not have a '*tradition of rights*' to act against the state, and those individual rights were offered by the state. Harmony and group orientation are encouraged. As for 'conflict of ideas, groups, and parties was viewed as dangerous and illegitimate' (Huntington, 1991, pp. 300-301). In Korea:

People did not think of themselves as citizens with rights to exercise and responsibilities to perform, but they tend to look up to the top for direction and for favours in order to survive ... negotiation and compromise are not recognised as a social norm, but as selling out. Confucian scholars never used the word compromise. They had to maintain their purity of conscience....

(Huntington, 1991, p.303)

Taiwan and South Korea practise democracy because these two states have only 'un-Confucian fashions'.³

These phenomena led to Confucian society's lacking the traditions necessary to oppose authority. On the other hand, a harmonious society, which discourages conflicts and diverse opinions, but supports coherence and maintenance of social order, limits the space of civil society and cannot tolerate the opposite party or group defying authority. Therefore, even though Confucian countries might begin the process of democratisation, the democracy that would be established would not be a liberal democracy, but a democracy with an illiberal political culture: the democracy will not demonstrate a western style democracy, but a democracy with authoritarian traditions (Ling & Shih, 1998, p.63).

This situation can be found in several of the literature sources. Bell et al. (1995, pp. 163-167) also indicate that there are three characteristics in East Asia's illiberal societies. First, there is a non-neutral and interventional-orientation of state

³ In Taiwan, he argued it was because KMT retreated to Taiwan, and KMT leaders could not 'uphold the posture of arrogance associated with traditional Confucian notions of authority'. As for South Korea, a vast educated middle class in urban areas, and Catholic and Christian groups helped to diminish the legacies (Huntington, 1991, pp. 302-304). This thesis does not agree with his explanation in Taiwan, and will discuss this in a case study.

institutions. This thesis has indicated that personal autonomy should be respected in a democratic regime, but in East Asia, rulers prefer to maintain a stable regime; therefore, intervention in people's life is necessary. The government tends to offer shared values and objectives; harmony, balance and consensus are strongly encouraged in order to have a well-ordered, developed and coherent society. Elections in these societies are not seen as an opportunity for party change, but as support for the current authority. Therefore, the 'Loyal Opposition' cannot appear. Second, the rationalistic and legalistic technocracy manages the developing state as a corporate enterprise. In East Asia, rational and law-abiding technical bureaucracies are used to manipulate law and state resources to fulfil the state's objectives. Therefore, laws become the facilitator for defending the state bureaucracies' mechanism to complete their goals, rather than protection for the people's rights of political participation and their basic human rights. Third, there is only the managed public space and civil society, rather than an open and a critical one. Civil society in East Asia lacks the kind of historical experience to oppose the state, which exists in western countries. Therefore, rulers in East Asia are used to manipulating society, and groups within it, and limit the society and civil space to the boundary set by rulers.

Bell (2000, pp.219-234) uses a discussion between Mr Demo and Lee Kwan-Yew to demonstrate that the core concern of 'democracy' is different between western and Confucian societies. Western states focus more on personal autonomy, equality, pluralism, and people's civil and political rights; but Confucian societies place the emphasis on how to establish a prosperous and well-ordered society to ensure that the people's needs can be fulfilled. This thesis could suggest that this idea is from the Minben thinking of Mencius, which stressed the ruler's responsibilities to take care of the people. Legacies from Confucian societies may also hinder the practice of democracy. O'Donnell (1993;⁴ 1996, pp.35-36), O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986, pp.21-23), Chu (1996, pp.74-75)⁵ and Schedler (1998, p.98)⁶ suggest that when discussing democratisation in the third wave democracies, the legacies from the authoritarian regime cannot be ignored. Particularism and clientism would work to consolidate the democratic regime and interest associations, central and local governments, and parties who served authoritarian leaders would try to maintain

⁴ He suggests that some new democracies lack horizontal accountability, especially in post-communist states and Latin American states; he calls these democracies 'delegative democracies'. He indicates that although the new democracies have democratised, in the non-urban areas, personalistic and sultanistic situations continue to exist, which erode the new democracies.

⁵ He indicates the after democratisation in Taiwan, several legacies from the KMT authoritarian period remained, such as the president's particular power, neutrality of military and security services, and money politics. These are the unfinished tasks of the new democracy.

⁶ He indicates that 'tutelary powers', 'reserved domains', and 'major discriminations' which would affect free election should be cancelled.

particular rights. This situation would also apply in Confucian societies, and will be demonstrated in this chapter.

Empirical evidence also suggests that Confucian traditions would be an obstacle. Yu-Tzung Chang (2000) analysed whether Confucian values would be an obstacle in Taiwan and found that, although the authoritarian values from Confucianism may bring negative effects to democratisation in Taiwan, modernisation, higher education and alternation of generations would retard this effect and develop democratic values. Chang and Chu see ‘emphasis of social classes (authoritarianism), emphasis of social harmony (avoiding conflicts), community first (pursuing aggregate interest), and anti-pluralism (preferring social cohesion)’ as the traditional values and found these would hinder the practice of democracy (2007, p.19). Park & Shin examined a number of political values to determine whether they would be obstacles to democracy in South Korea:

[S]ocial hierarchy (deference to authority), social harmony (aversion to conflict), group primacy (pursuit of collective welfare), and anti-pluralism (preference of social unity) as social values and the family-state (benevolent paternalistic rule), the moral state (the moralistic and perfectionist role of the state), and anti-adversarial politics (the concentration of governing powers).
(2004, pp.17-19)

They found that people who support these values would be more likely to support authoritarianism and be opposed to democracy (Park & Shin, 2004, pp.17-19). Chang, Chu, and Tsai (2005) follow Park and Shin (2004)’s indicators to analyse three Confucian societies (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) and also suggest that modernisation and a higher level of education would help to develop democratic consciousness in Confucian societies and ease the negative effect from Confucian values. Shin even suggests that ‘There is no doubt that Confucian values and regime experience are not only the most pervasive but also the most powerful influences on subjective democratisation among East Asians’ (2007, p.27).

To summarise the above discussion, some scholars find the existence of traditional legacies in Confucianism and that these may present a phenomenon in Confucian societies so that is cultural factor sustains an anti-democracy environment. Therefore in the next sections, this thesis will discuss the origin of traditional legacies and how they survived into modern Confucian societies.

2.3 Emergence of Legacies from the Imperial Political System

2.3.1 Debate of Legitimacy: Good or Evil Human Nature

Two important arguments were found in the classic Confucian political system: a moral meritocratic hierarchy of the political system, and that the people ultimately would serve as the basis for legitimacy of the political system. However, this changed in the imperial period. The change came about because of the debate about human nature between Mencius and Xun Zi.

Mencius paid more attention to human beings than Confucius did. Mencius indicated that the Mandate of Heaven refers to the virtue of humans. People should focus on moral training of the self. The process of being human should involve trying to explore and develop human nature, and maintaining the best aspects of human nature with morality. To achieve this process, human beings must restrain the physical senses of animalistic desire. Mencius focused his political legitimacy on the people. He argued that kings should practise benevolent governance, and the people would then follow them. Otherwise, kings would lose the Mandate of Heaven, which refers to the support of the people. Xun Zi (荀子) suggested concepts different from those of Mencius. Xun Zi suggested that, from his observation, human nature is evil. He argued that it was important for a ruler to act as a sage, to teach and lead the people to conceal their evil side and explore their good side; otherwise, the evil side of human nature would present itself.

Mencius argued that there is a good human nature, for the following reasons: firstly, human beings and animals are different from each other. Mencius said, 'That whereby man differs from the lower animals is but small' (Legge, 1861a, p.201) – meaning that human beings, like animals, have instincts and material desires. However, there are two opposing facets to the nature of human beings: one is driven by sensual desire to meet the animal instinct, which is not different from other animals. The other is a mind that cannot bear to see the sufferings of others (Legge, 1861a, pp.77-80). Because humans have the ability to act differently from animals, they should restrain the negative aspects of their nature, such as material desire, with virtue, to become completely human (Tu, 1993, p.4). Furthermore, because of the goodness of human nature, Mencius did not particularly focus on the rulers' responsibility for educating people toward virtue. To Mencius, Minben thought, which indicates that the

rulers' legitimacy is from the people, could aptly reflect the goodness of human nature.

In contrast to Mencius, Xun Zi observed from his experience that the nature of human beings is evil rather than good. Xun Zi argued that the nature of human beings is to favour material desires. If desire could not be constrained, then violence and disorder would be rife among the people (Tu, 1993, p.4). He argued that goodness shown is the result of education. Therefore, education towards virtue is needed to modify the people's behaviour from evil to good. Because of the evil of human nature, Xun Zi indicated that it is incorrect to see the legitimacy of power as belonging to the people. If politics depends on the people, the politics in the country would only reflect chaos, which is precisely why people need a sage with virtue to lead and teach them virtue. In this circumstance, Xun Zi argued that legitimacy should belong to the sage – the ruler who can practise the rule of virtue. Xun Zi's argument is sometimes perceived to be similar to that of the legalists (法家); it was accepted by the Emperor Wu in the Han Dynasty, and especially in the work of Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒) and his Tian Ren Gan Ying (天人感應) theory.

2.3.2 A Theoretical Framework for the Imperial Political System

During the Emperor Wu period, the empire had been united, and the economy began to develop. Dong considered that the state needed a unifying philosophy for the empire (Bell & Hahn, 2003, p.25), so he offered a revised theoretical framework from the Confucian political system.

Confucian scholars and other faction scholars before the Han Dynasty found that abnormal changes of the moon and stars are natural occurrences, rather than signs from heaven. Every phenomenon worked independently by its nature rather than by being affected by other elements. Dong Zhongshu's theory indicates that these changes should be viewed as heaven's performance, and these performances may be considered good or bad forces in relation to human beings. The connection between human beings and heaven, especially monarchy and heaven was strongly emphasised. Heaven would reveal some phenomenon in response to the monarch's behaviour, in order to express heaven's praise or criticism.

Dong used the text from *Shoo King*, 'Heaven sees as my people see; Heaven hears as my people hear' (Legge, 1861c, p.292) to point out that human behaviour, especially the behaviour of the monarch was connected to heaven. If the monarch acts in

accordance with heaven's will and Confucian teachings, then heaven would demonstrate a positive phenomenon in response to the monarch's good actions. On the other hand, if the monarch failed to follow heaven's urging, then disasters would appear to warn the monarch (Department of Philosophy, NTU, 2011; Tu, 1993, pp.22-23⁷). He also accepted Xun Zi's idea, which indicates that the monarch should use his power to teach people to be good (Department of Philosophy, NTU, 2011).

Dong's efforts fundamentally changed contemporary political thought from the classic Confucian political system, which urged rulers to emphasise the people's needs. Instead, Dong's theory asked the monarchy to follow heaven's will rather than the people's will (see Huang 1981, pp.46-47).⁸ Further, his theory facilitated Emperor Wu's wish to establish a suitable ideology, using the slogan 'promotion of Confucianism to the disparagement of all other schools'. The centralised ruling framework established by Dong and Emperor Wu included the following: 'Confucian self-restraint, mutual deference, humanistic sensitivity, kinship cohesion, and devotion to rituals which adopted a comprehensive code of behaviour for the bureaucrats', Minben from Mencius, and reliance on a strict law to 'discipline to governed remained intact' (Huang, 1997, p. 43).⁹ Furthermore, Soong and Ming's Confucian scholars did not only develop their method of self-development in ethics, but they also consolidated the emperor's ruling authority. They surrendered their positions as Confucian scholars to submit themselves to the emperor. They viewed the emperor and the centralised government and the empire as a facilitator to protect the welfare of the people, because the people were only a passive actor in the system (see Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp.96-97; Fairbank, 1978, p.22). Submission to emperors led to conditional and limited government that could not be correctly implemented.¹⁰

In this new framework, the imperial government was constrained in two ways: ceremonial procedure (禮) and personnel affairs (Huang, 1981, p.3).

Ceremonial Procedure (a mixture of Confucian rules, ancient traditions and ancestors' teachings), was a rule to restrain, but also to offer legitimacy to, the ruler (Bell & Hahm, 2003, p.7). Actors in the institution who disobeyed the rule would be punished,

⁷ Although Tu expresses the positive side to this revision by arguing it can make the monarch more careful about his actions, he also indicates that the *final arbiter of human worth* is heaven, in Tung's theory. It is not coherent with classic Confucian political design (p.22).

⁸ Hung indicates that the monarch should be reminded that this ceremonial procedure consolidates the monarchy's highest authority, and also proves that he still needs to follow heaven's orders and Confucian moral rules (pp.46-47).

⁹ This did not reflect Confucian ideas, but the ideas of legalists.

¹⁰ As this thesis argued, the emperors still had constraints, but they had the power to oppose these or ignore them if they wished.

even the rulers. In the modern view, Ceremonial Procedure is similar to a constitution in a modern country. Monarch, ministers and people should act according to ceremonial procedure, and the monarch and minister should be the model from which the people should learn (Huang, 1981, pp.3-4, pp.43-44). Confucian scholars administered the Ceremonial Procedure and asked the whole monarchy and the bureaucratic system to follow rules of procedure to manage the country (Huang, 1981, pp. 204-205).

Under the procedure, the monarch had the ruling legitimacy through complicated ceremonies. If any monarch offended ceremonial procedure within the scope of Confucian teachings and imperial traditions, then conflicts would appear that would jeopardise the empire. Moreover, the monarch was to make the final decisions for state affairs and act as the perfect model of virtue for people and ministers to follow. The role of ministers was to help emperors to rule the country, by offering suggestions on state affairs in the court or representing emperors in local governments. A monarch's order was essentially considered just and unchallengeable (Huang, 1981, p.3), yet ministers still had the power to challenge the monarch (Weber, 1968, p.128). A monarch needed ministers' assistance to maintain routine state affairs, as most of the information of the state was gained from ministers in the court and in local government. The importance of ministers offered them opportunities to limit the power of emperors. The emperor understood that the choices were from the *zòu zhé* (奏折); therefore, as an appropriate ruler, he should make a decision from these *zòu zhé*. Otherwise, it might be necessary to oppose the ministers in the court. Meanwhile, ministers would check the actions and decisions of the emperor. If ministers argued that the emperor's actions could not satisfy Ceremonial Procedure, ministers would stand against the emperor and challenge his decisions (Hu, 1997, p.356).

Personnel affairs refer to interactions between officers in the imperial court. Ministers, as well as central and local officers in the bureaucratic system, would need to cooperate; harmony between officers was the most important thing. If ministers and officers could not support a policy, then the policy would not succeed (Huang, 1981, p.50). The monarch also needed ministers and officers to manage the country. It was not possible for the monarch to cooperate with the people directly to control the country; ministers and officers who had their own responsibilities in state affairs would fulfil these roles. However, as the imperial court could not give orders to bureaucrats individually, a rough principle was essential, and issues and problems could be solved if bureaucrats at the central and local level could work and unite for a common purpose (Huang, 1981, pp.52-53). The monarch was the essential source of

unity for the bureaucrats, 'if the bureaucrats in the capital did not even see the emperor for months, it would be difficult for them to believe that he still had everything under his firm control' (Huang, 1981, p. 53). Bureaucrats were the leaders in their own areas of responsibility, and they were also like the head of a family. Their job was to maintain harmony to prove their administrative ability; any arguments from 'restless spirits of nature or of man' were not allowed (Weber, 1968, p.132; see also Huang, 1981, pp.57-59). Harmony was controlled by officers who would maintain the balance of the empire. The emperor and bureaucrats should also maintain a balance; if any one of them failed to operate appropriately, then the government would be involved in trouble (Huang, 1981, chap. 2). Ministers were generally divided into several factions. Emperors who could not resolve conflict, or manage these ministers, might also suffer a collapse of the empire.

2.3.3 Mechanisms for Controlling the Imperial system

'Rule by law' and 'rule by man' are the first mechanisms for a ruler to lead people. According to the historical contexts, most Chinese dynasties established a code to rule the country. All subjects in the empire should obey the code; a criminal judicial system was established to maintain the social order. This included the death penalty that should be confirmed by the ministers in the imperial court and signed by the emperor.

It seems that Confucian society also established a similar judicial system, yet the law was used to regulate people rather than to offer a fair legal system; it was designed to regulate everyone except the emperor and part of his family (see Huang, 1992, pp.23-30, where he clearly indicates that the emperor is the final judge on all matters). Meanwhile, the standard for the legal system was judged by morality as interpreted by the emperor or bureaucrats (Huang, 1981; 1992, pp.23, 30, 40-41). To bureaucrats, the legal system might demonstrate different results, depending on the emperor's decision. While the emperor might follow the state laws to deal with ministers who offended against the laws or against Confucian teachings, a minister might change the emperor's decision if he, the minister, were able to demonstrate his virtue, or actually presented an acceptable excuse (Huang, 1981, Chap. 2; 1992, p.23).

To the people, bureaucrats' 'moral standard' became the administrative and judicial measure in their area of jurisdiction (Huang, 1981; 1992; 1997). Confucian values that focused on family-centred and interpersonal relationships also diminished the

possibility of the rule of law when these values were put into practice (Huang, 1997, pp.58-59), and strengthened the conditions for the 'rule of man'. Confucian officers in their local areas judged disputes, conflicts and crimes that offended against 'Confucian teachings' or the law (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp.104-105; Fairbank, 1978, p.22). The purpose of these officers was to maintain harmony and social solidarity in their jurisdiction (Bell & Hahn, 2003, p.18; Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp.183-184), and bureaucrats should use their abilities to achieve that purpose.

Imperial examination (科舉) was the channel for the flow of talent. The recruitment of talented people was a primary topic of interest to Chinese emperors. The system assured an equal opportunity for commoners to raise their social status (Weber, 1968, p.116). Social mobility was assured under the system (Weber, 1968, pp.116-117). On the other hand, whether or not the imperial examination system is qualified as a democratic institution is ambiguous. From the time that this system was established, *Four Books and Five Classics* (四書五經) became the official texts for scholars to study in the sphere of Confucian culture. However, the criticisms of the system – arguing that the system is a tool for emperors to control their empire – address two points. Firstly, if anyone wanted to enter the bureaucratic system, the only way¹¹ was to study these texts to pass the examination; the system only accepted the Confucian texts on these terms. As a result, scholars were focused only on the texts and the people recruited were those with a good knowledge of traditional literature, rather than those with the ability to manage the country (Weber, 1968, p.125; Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp.100-101). Secondly, it was argued that the system benefited emperors so that they could manipulate society, because, through the system, the emperors could focus on the principles they needed to educate their people (Weber, 1968, pp.118-119) Furthermore, only a few powerful local families could easily pass the examination, because they had more educational resources (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp.93-95).

To summarise, from Han to Soong and Ming, Confucian scholars successfully revised Confucian teachings to serve the rulers. In the meantime, they also established a Confucian-based empire. This imperial political system did not look like the ideal type that was demonstrated in the previous period. Moral meritocratic leadership is not genuinely applied in this system. The monarch acted as a model of virtue, responsible for ruling the country.¹² Bureaucrats dominated the government and

¹¹ From the Qing Dynasty, imperial examination was not the only way; commoners could pay money to buy a title or become an officer.

¹² Weber (1968, p.132) also indicates that emperors in Confucian society were 'the high priests of literary arts' to guide bureaucrats.

'helped' the emperor to rule the country. The emperors' authority was the highest authority, and was constructed on the Ceremonial Procedure (Huang, 1981, pp.46-47). The monarch and bureaucrats needed to work together to follow the Ceremonial Procedure in the court and take pains to ensure that the empire could fulfil the requirement for people to reach the basic standard of Mencius' Minben rules. Otherwise, the populace would overthrow the inappropriate government.¹³ During this period, traditional legacies, such as hierarchical politics were consolidated, harmony, group-orientation, and *guanxi* (connections) appeared and strengthened.

2.4 Traditional Legacies and their persistence into the Modern Era

When discussing the imperial political system in the preceding section, we found that an empire based on a hierarchy system existed in several Confucian societies for thousands of years. This situation has created a hierarchical politics tradition, which would ask people to obey and follow rulers. Meanwhile, people were not aware of their actual political status as described in classic Confucian teaching.

In this system, harmony was important, not only between emperors and bureaucrats, but also among bureaucrats and the people. The last section had indicated that, in the court, bureaucrats needed to maintain a harmonious balance to avoid conflicts; the stability of the empire was the priority for them. As for bureaucrats and people in local authorities, bureaucrats would try to govern the area for which they were responsible through harmony and the exercise of personal judgment. It was also a demonstration of their personal ethics. Confucian gentry would support a harmonious local authority, because they would consider it as a manifestation of Confucianism (Weber, 1968, pp.148-150).

Although knowing how to manifest Confucianism and maintain a harmonious society were important, the way in which these issues were dealt with was based on personal rather than institutional considerations. In the meantime, there was no united and centralised authority to explain Confucianism;¹⁴ different Confucian scholars would form into factions (see Kim, 2002). Meanwhile, Confucian scholars who passed the imperial examination in the same year or from the same provinces would help each other in the court. Among the populace, personal relationships – as a core element of

¹³ People would overthrow an unsatisfactory government, but these revolutions would not destroy the government type itself. After the revolution, the new dynasty still constituted the same government type.

¹⁴ But Weber argued that government has the right to do so (1968, pp.152-153).

Confucianism – were also strongly encouraged. *Guanxi* was developed at the official level and in civil society.

Observations from the imperial period and empirical research show how hierarchical politics, harmony, *guanxi* and group-orientation are the Confucian values, or traditional values, that hinder democracy. This section will discuss these four traditional legacies in Confucian societies by following methods to demonstrate why and how they continue to exist, or even deepen in Confucian societies. Firstly, this section will discuss Confucian teachings (norms) in Confucian classics to clarify its conceptualisation, yet norms may not form the legacies. Second, this thesis will discuss the practical applications in the imperial period and modern Confucian society to demonstrate how these legacies were formed, promoted and deepened politically in modern Confucian societies.

2.4.1 Hierarchical politics

Hierarchical politics that favours rulers and weakens the populace is one of the traditional legacies in Confucian society, as has been demonstrated in the previous sections. This legacy has a long history, deeply rooted in people's mind. Classic Confucian texts offer a conceptualised framework for hierarchical politics with moral meritocratic leadership and *Minben*. Regarding the leadership, the leader must be well-educated (Legge, 1861b, p.208), must devote himself to the highest morality (Legge, 1861b, p.161), should take care of his own personal relationships first, and then he should take care of the people (Legge, 1861b, p.156; Tu, 1993, p.19). He must also remember that his duty is to satisfy the wishes of the people and their basic needs, rather than take care of his own interests (Legge, 1861a, p.176; Legge, 1861a, p. 359). Otherwise, people have the right to overthrow the ruler. In essence, this was also a hierarchy political system, which emphasised the ruler's responsibility rather than the people's rights.

Confucian teachings, in effect, reject the general population as decision makers for state affairs. In Confucian teaching, ruler and people are at different levels and have different responsibilities. As regards rulers, Confucius claimed that there are only a few people able to rule. Only the literati (君子) who are 'humane, wise, and brave', well-educated and have 'certain inborn qualities and a level of culture, education, and constant effort that are beyond the capability of the majority of the common people' are qualified to rule (Shuan, 2003, p.44). And it is said of the leader: 'He who exercises government by means of his virtue may be compared to the north polar star,

which keeps its place and all the stars turn towards it' (為政以德，譬如北辰，居其所而眾星共之) (Legge, 1861b, p.9). Mencius also argued:

Some labour with their minds, and some labour with their strength. Those who labour with their minds govern others; those who labour with their strength are governed by others. Those who are governed by others support them; those who govern others are supported by them, This is a principle universally recognised' (或勞心，或勞力。勞心者治人，勞力者治於人，治於人者食人，治人者食於人，天下之通義也) (Legge, 1861a, pp.125-126).

Therefore, it is clear that everyone should fulfil his/her duties on behalf of his/ her social ranking, the ruler should govern, and the people should support the rulers. Because most people were not educated, when a ruler implemented policies, they should simply follow: 'The people may be made to follow a path of action, but they may not be made to understand it' (民可使由之，不可使知之) (Legge, 1861b, p.75). Confucianism also indicates that the priority of a government is the relationship between rulers and ruled.

The imperial period is the developing and consolidating period for hierarchical politics. Confucian scholars who served the emperors constructed a despotic monarchy system. The emperor was the highest authority in the system (Weber, 1968, p.132), and Confucian bureaucrats were responsible for helping emperors and explaining Confucianism; they could add or revise the original meaning to serve the monarch if it was needed (Huang, 1981; Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp.96-97). Confucian scholars who served rulers used these Confucian teachings to create a Patriarchal – Patrimonial political system. At the state level, the emperor was at the centre in the empire, ministers surrounded the emperor. In the empire, the government was the centre and thousands of farming villages and families surrounded and followed the government's orders (Fairbank & Goldman, pp.96-97). In the villages or family, the elder or chief of the family was the centre, surrounded by family members (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp.101-107). The person higher in rank might have responsibility to take care of the one lower in rank, to earn their support and effort, while the lower should follow instructions from the higher ranked.

In order to control the system, there is also a recruiting and assessment system. Weber (1968, pp.107-169) views Confucianism as a religion similar to the Catholic Church. In his opinion, Confucian scholars formed a process to select the priests (Weber, 1968, pp.115-118; 1961, pp.422-425; see also Furth, 1983, pp.354-371). Confucian scholars

in the past learned Confucian teachings from childhood. Confucian scholars ran schools to train children by means of the Confucian texts. The students learned these texts, which were edited by the state's Confucian scholars, and passed the examination held by the imperial court and Confucian bureaucrats. During this period, candidates for the bureaucracy must follow the official Confucian textbooks and strictly obey the orders of the state. If they failed to follow these regulations, they might lose the qualification to take the exam and also might lose the titles which they had won in the previous examination.¹⁵ Although these candidates might pass the national stage imperial examination and became officers, it was not the end of supervision by the Confucian government. Yushi (the administrative supervision officer) would 'watch' and impeach officers in the court, dependent on whether they were qualified in the Confucian regulations (Weber, 1968, pp.132-133).

After the end of the imperial period in Confucian societies, the highest authority in the institution, the emperor, disappeared. This opening needed to be filled. In the meantime, Confucianism also lost its position as the only ideology in Confucian societies (Hsu, 1985; 2004a; 2004b; Yu, 1992; Tu, 1993; 2002a; Hahm, 2004). The political system in Confucian countries lost both the ruler and its core philosophy. Confucian texts and the history of Confucian societies indicate the ethos of hierarchical politics was very deep. Not only rulers, but also the people, were accustomed to accepting the concept, and hierarchical politics had been embedded in the minds of both people and rulers. Although the imperial political system collapsed in 1911, new hierarchical politics emerged to replace the imperial political system in Confucian societies by various types of non-democratic regimes. These new hierarchical non-democratic regimes continuously strengthened this legacy in Confucian societies. This thesis will focus on how these regimes were to and consolidate and even develop these legacies under modern political conditions.

China

The Communist Party of China (CPC) won the civil war by claiming to establish a democratic regime in China (see CPC leadership's speeches in Shantou University Press, 1999). However, regimes in China still maintained a series of hierarchy political systems from totalitarian regime,¹⁶ post totalitarian regime,¹⁷ to Party as a

¹⁵ Imperial examination was not simply a one-stage examination. It was divided into several stages: the township stage, provincial stage and national stage. The candidate who passed the national stage examination would have qualification to be an officer at the imperial court.

¹⁶ A totalitarian regime generally covers six elements in scholarly texts: a single ideology, only mass political parties, political police, strict control of mass media, a bureaucratic economy, and monopoly

Supervisor of the State.¹⁸

The CPC claimed to end KMT one-party rule in *Jiefang Daily* (解放日報, the official newspaper of CPC, a propaganda tool that was used to publicise CPC's policies and opinions) on 28th October 1941, stating that the key to the implementation of democratic politics at that time was to end one-party rule (Shantou University Press, 1999, p.304). Further, the CPC's purpose CPC in opposing KMT dictatorship was to establish a democratic government, rather than establishing a CPC one-party dictatorship (Shantou University Press, 1999, p.292). Mao Zedong also mentioned establishing an interim central government formed by representatives from KMT, CPC, CDL and Non-partisan people. This interim government would issue the democratic policy agenda, hold free elections for representatives of the National Assembly and form the formal democratic government (Mao, 1945). In order to carry out its promise, CPC assembled 'The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference' (CPPCC), with other parties, not long before they won the civil war. However, CPC's democracy is based on the Democratic Centralism government system that asks party institutions and party members to follow the party's leadership,

of military force (Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1965, pp.120-145). Linz & Stepan (1996b, p.40) also indicate that, in this type of regime, 'almost all pre-existing political, economic, and social pluralism' has been eliminated. It also 'has a unified, articulated, guiding, utopian ideology, has intensive and extensive mobilization, and has a leadership that rules, often charismatically, with undefined limits and great unpredictability and vulnerability for elites and non-elites alike'.

¹⁷ Post-totalitarianism, in the definition of Linz & Stepan (1996b, pp.42-51), is different in the following respects. For leaders, the post-totalitarian regime has some constraints in the beginning, and would tolerate criticism from civil society later. As for pluralism, the post-totalitarian regime has an important and complex play of institutional pluralism, and also normally has a significant degree of social pluralism; it is even possible that oppositional organisations would appear. But the original party still stands as the only legal part. The party is still restricted to the revolutionary style. However, the leadership in the post-totalitarian regime is more bureaucratic and state technocratic than charismatic; leaders are from the party organisations. Although the original ideology still exists, it has faced challenges from society and actual practice. Finally, mobilisation would not as intensive and extensive as in a totalitarian regime (see also Linz, 2000, pp.245-261). The bureaucrats and state technocrats would not consider mobilising the public unless the regime faces serious crisis. Yu-Shan Wu (2007) indicated that China from 1979 to the present is more like a Post-Totalitarian Capitalist Developmental State, which combines the characteristics of Post-Totalitarianism from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, with characteristics of a Capitalist Developmental State from East Asian states. The original ideology has lost its dominant status in politics, and become symbolic. Bureaucracy rather than charismatic leaders now dominate politics. The party itself becomes conservative rather than mobilised and revolutionary.

¹⁸ CPC decided to separate the party organisations from the state, which means party organisations will only be party organisations, and state institutions will only be state institutions. Zhao Ziyang's speech at the 13th National Congress in 1987 indicated that the key political reform is the separation of the party and government (Dang Zheng Fen Kai, 党政分开). His report clearly indicated that party's mission is to become the political leader – to formulate political principles and political direction, make important decisions and recommend staff for state institutions. The party's method of conducting state affairs is to lead the state in order to legitimise the party's views. He indicated that the objectives for state institutions and party organisations are different. Party organisation is responsible for mobilising the masses to put the party's policies and directions into practice. State institutions are responsible for carrying out and legitimising these policies.

and for the sake of the state.¹⁹ The core principle is that the state should be under the leadership of the Communist Party of China; statements of this principle can be found in the Constitution of PRC and speeches of the leadership (see NPC, 2004; Hu, 2007, p.2; Jiang, 2001; Wen, 2009).

Singapore

The leaders of Singapore have clearly indicated that Singapore does not seek a Western-style democracy, and instead, a hierarchy guided regime was established. This regime includes both democratic and authoritarian characteristics, and is called Hybrid Regime (Diamond, 2002, p.23).²⁰ Democracy for the Singapore government refers to democratic accountability, a long-term orientation, and social justice (Ng, 1997, pp.19-21; Kausikan, 1997, pp. 26-28). As former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong (吳作棟) argues:

This is why, in Singapore, government acts more like a trustee. As a custodian of the people's welfare, it exercises independent judgment on what is in the long-term economic interests of the people and acts on that basis. Government policy is not dictated by opinion polls or referenda. This has sometimes meant overriding populist pressures for 'easier' economic policies. Indeed, implementing the right policies has on occasion meant administering bitter medicine to overcome economic challenges. The trustee model of democracy that Singapore has subscribed to enabled it to pursue the tough policies necessary for economic development. Indeed, the concept of government as trustee went hand in hand with democratic accountability. Because the government has acted as an honest and competent trustee of the people, we have been returned to power in every general election since self-government in 1959. With a comfortable majority and a strong mandate, we have been able to take a long-term view in addressing our economic problems.

(Kausikan, 1997, pp. 27-28)

¹⁹ The principles of Democratic Centralism of the CPC can be found in Mao's speech (Mao, 1945, p.2) and People.com.cn (2011, November 6); Encyclopaedia of CPC History (2011).

²⁰ Larry Diamond (2002, pp.22-32) discusses hybrid regimes in terms of competitive authoritarian and electoral authoritarian types. Both of these types of regime have a controlled election, which limits the opponents' development, but the competitive authoritarian type would have a clear opponent in the parliament. Since Singapore has a constitution and fair elections (although the electoral system benefits the People's Action Party), some scholars may argue that Singapore is a democratic country. However, this 'democratic regime' may be an 'electoral authoritarian regime', which is a defective form of democracy, a pseudo-democracy –in Linz's definition, a 'democratic façade [that] covers authoritarian rules' (Linz, 2000, pp.33-34). Now it can be argued that Singapore 'was' an electoral authoritarian regime but after the general election in 2011, it may transform to a competitive authoritarian type.

The Singapore government's goal for the people is clear: the government should offer a good government to protect people, and gives individuals in the state opportunities to develop themselves, to raise children and to offer children a better life than their parents (Bell, 2000, p.186). Further, this government has the best ministers and civil servants to support them (Lee, KY, 2011, pp.664-665). People in Singapore may not agree with the government's decisions, but they will finally understand that the government's policies are correct (Bell, 2000, pp.229-230). Lee also indicates that the opponents are the people who are trying to break the existing Singapore society, which may lead Singapore to follow the incorrect way (Bell, 2000, pp.273-275).

Taiwan

Like the CPC, Chiang Kai-shek used Democratic Centralism to re-shape the KMT party system after 1949, and this party also led the state. Chiang Kai-shek used this system to manipulate not only the party but also every important aspect in the society (Tsang, 1999, p.5). At the central government level, the leaders in the party have four positions: state leader, party leader, government actual leader, and military and security section's actual leader (Chu, 1992). In the local area, KMT nominated faction leaders to be the KMT candidates, and used resources to win the election (Chu, 1996; Lin, 1999). After the collapse of the authoritarian period, this legacy is weakening among the people, but still exists in KMT and the bureaucratic system of the Taiwanese government. Taiwan in the democratic period is establishing stronger and more pluralistic civil society to confront the government. Notwithstanding the Taiwan-China relationship or food safety issues, various civil organisations or parties would oppose official decisions.

South Korea

Through non-democratic leadership, South Korea maintained the legacy by personal or military dictatorship²¹ for approximately 40 years. In South Korea, Syngman Rhee,

²¹ An authoritarian regime can be described in four categories: has broad economic and social pluralism, but without political pluralism; normally does not normally have an ideology; would govern by a well-established elite group, such as a military force; does not mobilise people, except on some special occasion (Linz & Stepan, 1996b, pp.44-45; Linz, 2000, pp.184-208, he uses Bureaucratic-Military Authoritarian Regime). This regime is one of the popular regimes for a country after a colonization period, monarchy period or even an end of a democratic regime. These phenomena can be found in Asia, Africa and Latin America; most countries turn to a military authoritarian after the last regime collapse. As for the military regime, this regime is one 'in which military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force. Thus in a military regime the armed forces may exercise political power either directly or indirectly by controlling

the first president of South Korea, started his personal dictatorship during his presidency with US military support and national security laws. Rhee lost power after the April Revolution in 1960. Park Chung-hee led the military coup in 1961 and established a military authoritarian regime. This regime was in power from the 1960s to the late 1980s and maintained its legitimacy by rapid economic development. South Korea, as has been mentioned in this chapter, started its process of democratisation from the late 1980s. Although the ruling class at that time faced protests from the people, democratisation was still effected by the ruler himself, to decrease the damage of the incumbent authority. In democratised South Korea, like Taiwan, people are establishing a strong civil society to demonstrate their preferences in public policy and oppose unpopular government measures. For instance, President Lee Myung-bak faced major protest riots in Seoul when he decided to open American beef imports to South Korea.

Preliminary Summary: Strong authority and weak civil society

In the beginning of this chapter, this thesis indicated that the political culture arises from the political socialisation process of the people, and it is also a part of the historical memory of a nation. When reviewing the historical and existing regimes, most of them were/are hierarchy. Therefore, it is not surprising that people tend to *look up to the top for direction and for favours* (Huntington, 1991, p.303).

It can be seen that hierarchical politics has existed in all Confucian societies for a long time, and this legacy cannot offer people the concepts of political equality and people sovereignty. The public are not aware that they have the power in the state that facilitates the ruler's control and forbids pluralistic opinions. Andreas Schedler (1998, pp.98-99) explains this problem further. He argues that in Western democratic countries, the development process is state building, then legal domestication of the state, and finally democratic domestication of the state. However, the sequence in most third wave democratic countries is contrary to that in the west. In these countries, state reform and judicial reform should be implemented to solve these problems. O'Donnell also suggests that the popularity of particularism and a strong but challengeable executive authority, which a lack of checks and balances, would lead to the following problems. He indicates that because of the formal and informal regulations that co-exist in a regime, it will form a 'delegative' democracy that lacks horizontal accountability (O'Donnell, 1993; 1996, pp.35-36; O'Donnell & Schmitter,

civilian leaders' (Hadenius & Teorell, 2007, p.146, the first sentence is from Nordlinger, 1977, p.2).

1986, pp.21-23). Yun-Han Chu (1996) also uses Taiwan as a case to argue the importance of removing legacies from past authoritarian regimes. In these circumstances, to ease this process, hierarchical politics is essential for democracy.

2.4.2 *Guanxi* (關係): Connections and Factions

Guanxi, interpersonal connections, is frequently used to discuss Confucian capitalism in Chinese society (see, for instance, Kao, 1993; Rozman, 2002; Crawford, 2000). Scholars use this cultural factor to analyse how *guanxi* (the connections) affects business activities in Confucian societies. Samuel Huntington (1997, p. 229) also suggested that rapid economic growth in Sinic civilisation is because of the cultural effects, especially the ‘bamboo network’.

Guanxi is given many similar definitions from different scholars (can see Tsui, Farh, & Xin, 2000, pp.225-227). These definitions indicate that *guanxi* represents interpersonal connections, or the social connections of individuals. This thesis will discuss how *guanxi* is a major cultural element, affecting democracy in Confucian society.

Regarding concept conceptualisation in classic Confucian teachings, Confucius said ‘The superior man is dignified, but does not wrangle. He is sociable, but not a partisan’ (Legge, 1861b, p.164). According to Confucian teachings, it can be found that Confucius agreed that the literati should maintain social connections but disagreed that they should form a specific party. However, Confucianism also demands the formation of the family-based society that supported the Confucian societies for thousands of years. *Guanxi* became an inevitable cultural element in Confucian societies.

In the imperial period, *guanxi* did not exist only in families, but also affected the political arena. Weber (1968, p.59-60, pp.117-118) and Huang (1981; 1997) argued that the bureaucratic system can be divided into several factions in different ways. Weber also suggests that, according to the locations of the Confucian teachings, this system was divided into three factions: a northern ‘conservative’ faction, a midland ‘progressive’ faction and a southern ‘radical’ faction. However, they would unite against anyone who asked to reform the system. Huang argued, on the other hand, that the emperor would tolerate these factions as long as they would not be a threat to his ruling status.

However, the tolerance of factions does not mean that the emperor would allow a 'party', an active and influential faction in politics, because this activity would be considered dangerous or could lead to the overthrow of the court. Although the Confucian imperial court was strong, centralised and bureaucratised, and it might not be possible to form a legitimised party at the court, yet there were still several cases of this happening in the imperial period (Kim, 2002, p.73). In China, there was party conflict in the Han, Tang, Song and Ming dynasties and one of the reasons that these dynasties collapsed was because of serious partisan conflict. Sang Jun Kim (2002, p.75) argues that in Choson (Korea) there were also hundreds of years of partisan conflict.

Kim (2002, pp.73-77) argues that Confucian parties emerged because of the arguments about Confucian teachings. He found that if the 'Confucian Moralpolitik became hegemonic', then the 'groups or individuals' would start to fight against each other to become the 'moral paragons' (Kim, 2002, p.73). Therefore, the conflicts between these parties were different from the western style. There was no tolerance, because each party wanted to be the orthodox one that held the power to explain Confucian teachings. In this circumstance, each party tried to 'brand [the] opposite one as evil' (Kim, 2002, p.74). Besides the conflict concerning orthodoxy, the parties might organise through *guanxi*. Huang (1981) also indicates that cronyism happened in these parties, because people in the party would be familiar with each other.

Huang (1981) and Kim (2002, p.74) both suggest that in this conflict, the ruler was an arbiter, who punished the loser and awarded the winner. Huang gives an example in the Ming Dynasty, describing the period when the part of the first minister, Zhang Juzheng, occupied important positions in the court, and his policies were followed by the empire; even the emperor would respect him. However, after he died, the situation was completely reversed. His familiar colleagues, and students and officers in his faction, lost their original positions. Guanxi (connections) brought together ministers from similar backgrounds, or who held similar opinions on Confucian teachings, to create parties that opposed each other. Some led to the collapse of the empire, especially in the Song and the Ming dynasties.

The following paragraphs will demonstrate how *guanxi* survives in modern societies and it can be found that most demonstrate this in political factions.

China

In China, political factions are not encouraged but are very much alive. DW News produced a series of reports on the political factions in the CPC in 2011. According to the report, these emerged from struggles during the KMT period. At that time, the CPC could not form a united central authority; therefore, factions emerged in different provinces, but they were eliminated when the CPC gathered in Yan-An (延安). As for the Mao dictatorship, Mao also eliminated Lin Biao's faction in the army. The major factions in the CPC now are: The Princeling (太子党)²², Tuanpai (团派), and Shanghai faction (上海帮) (DW News, 2011a, October, 24; 2011b, October, 24; 2011c, October, 24; 2011d, October, 24; 2011e, October, 24; See also Dotson, Zhuo and Taffer (2012), the report to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which also indicates that three major factions, Shanghai Clique, CCYL Faction and Princelings, control China's central government in turn). These three factions are based on the sources of individuals' bureaucratic career.

The Princeling group in China now is a strong faction in the CPC, which controls many resources. When Deng Xiaoping started economic reform in the 1980s, sons and daughters of CPC leaders become the main actors to take over the resources that were released from the state. These people have good political and commercial connections to accumulate personal wealth. With regard to the incumbent institution, the core of the CPC cannot absorb the ordinary civilian elite. Only those who already occupy an advantageous position to start their official career and also those who are constantly promoted by the party have a chance of reaching high office in the CPC. This privilege is belongs to only two categories: one is the student leaders who have entered the China Youth League (CYL) Central Committee and become Tuanpai, and the other is members of the Crown Prince Party. Tuanpai is now the incumbent ruling faction, because Hu Jintao is from this faction, as are approximately one third of central level officers (DW News, 2011c, October, 24). The Jiang faction is essentially a Shanghai faction, loyal to Jiang Zemin.

Singapore

In modern Confucian societies, *guanxi* is strongly forbidden by the Singapore leadership. However, because of the challenges of Singapore from its reluctant independence (Lee KY, 2011, p.3-9), Singapore leaders try to make Singapore a success; therefore it can be found these politicians from the founding state have a

²² This faction covers children of revolutionary elders; children of second and third generation leaders; children of incumbent leaders; children of parents in state enterprises and children of financial executives (DW News, 2011b, October, 24).

sense of mission to make Singapore a success. In this circumstance, this state only allows ‘the best elites in the People’s Action Party’ to serve in the civil service (Bell, 2000, pp.177-181; Lee KY, 2011, pp.664-995). The former Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew is considered to be a traditional Confucian ruler. In his construction of patriarchal politics in Singapore, leaders have a responsibility to take care of the people and act as a virtuous model (Neher, 1994, p.954). Singapore founders and their successors suggest that this state has elections in order to ask for the people’s trust, and when people choose the People’s Action Party and the leadership, it does mean that people trust, and are willing to give power to, the party to serve Singapore (Bell, 2000, pp.179-182; see especially p.182). The government, in return, is to offer a prosperous and just society for people to enjoy their life. Only the best and most incorrupt people can be chosen and survive in the Singapore government. It can be concluded that the government is a revised classic Confucian political system: the people do not overthrow the government through revolution, but by election. However, the strong guidance of the life of the populace interferes with election campaigning and could hinder opponents’ activities and the legal actions of those who criticise the government leaders, especially Lee himself. In consequence, this prevents Singapore from reaching the standard of a democratic regime.

Taiwan

KMT set up several methods to maintain the top down alliance between KMT and local factions. First, the faction’s leadership was limited in the local elections, and KMT also limited horizontal connections between factions (Chen, 1996, pp.176-177). Second, local factions were nominated in rotation, and new factions supported or sent new candidates to local authorities, in order to win the largest number of seats in the SNTV elections. KMT used a ‘flexible nomination policy’, which nominated a few candidates and gave some space for ‘local party friends’ (Chu, 1996, p.77; Lin, 1999, p.168). Third, KMT also assigned a responsibility zone to the nominees for ‘vote-cultivation’. This responsibility zone was based on each nominee’s social network, from which it would be easy for them to mobilise voters (Lin, 1999, pp.170-171). Finally, KMT asked their loyal party supporters to vote for the specific nominee. Most of these loyal party supporters (which can also be called ‘iron votes’) were the ‘mainlanders, veterans, military personnel, government employees and school teachers, which continued to receive benefits from the KMT or had strong linkage to the party’ (Lin, 1999, p.172). Meanwhile, vote buying, violence from local candidates, farmer’s and fisher’s associations²³ and local factions were also popular

²³ Local farmers’ associations and fishers’ associations are also controlled by KMT in the long term.

activities in local KMT factions (Chu, 1996, p.77). These pro-KMT votes still play important roles in Taiwanese elections. In the business arena, national commercial and industrial associations, and important entrepreneurs, were members of the Central Committee of KMT. After the democratisation period, the patron-client system still exists between the KMT and local factions, and could hinder the development of democracy. Even though the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidency for eight years, the relationship between local factions and KMT still cannot be dissolved.

South Korea

In South Korea, Hahm (2008, pp.132-133) also confirms that the relationships within local areas can be the sources of factions. Politicians can gain more votes from their home county. For instance, Roh Tae-woo in Gyeongsangbuk-do (경상북도), Kim Young-sam in Gyeongsangnam-do (경상남도), Kim Jong-pil in Chungcheong (충청도) and Kim Dae-jung in Jeolla (전라도) can win most support, and when these politicians unite, then the union can win the election. Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil united against Kim Dae-jung in 1992 and won the presidential election (Kuo, 2010, p.12). Shih Chung-Shan (2011, pp.133-134) also indicates that supporters of the parties of South Korea can be divided into West and East. The East area is the Saenuri Party base and the Democratic Party gains most votes in the West. Seoul and its surrounding area is the major region to compete for votes. The Saenuri Party was founded by Park Chung-hee and Roh Tae-woo succeeded, even though Roh or Kim Young-sam, and Kim Jong-pil are from the east of South Korea. Thus, it is not surprising that the Saenuri Party can win a majority in the East. Kim Young-sam led the Democratic Party, and his hometown is in the west, therefore his party can win more votes in the west. It can be seen that *guanxi* in South Korea is more like a geo-political structure,

To summarise, *guanxi* has existed in Confucian societies for more than a thousand years. It would be an obstacle to democracy if cronyism were widespread in the political arena. In China, political factions who rely on *guanxi* are well established in the Communist Party, and cronyism that would expel people from other factions can be found in Chinese society. A particularly striking recent example of factional conflict can be seen in the case of Bo Xilai (Guthrie, 2012, March 16). In Singapore, although *guanxi* is highly prohibited by government, nonetheless, the People's Action

These associations help the party controlling local resources and *guanxi*. The KMT nominated the leadership of these associations and helped them to maintain their positions.

Party is the largest faction in Singapore and dominates Singaporean politics. In democratic societies, the KMT also establishes closed *guanxi* with local factions and enterprises to facilitate the KMT's candidates in elections, and in South Korea, factions can be found in different locations. Therefore, *guanxi* is a negative factor that could hinder the development of democracy in non-democratic Confucian societies, but also distorts democracy in democratic Confucian societies.

2.4.3 Harmony and Group-orientation

Harmony and group-orientation are legacies from the imperial period, and now become useful tools for non-democratic rulers to control people. Non-democratic leaderships in Confucian societies built up an official ideology and educated people to follow them. Meanwhile, these leaders used nationalism to strengthen the legacy of group-orientation. Therefore, in order to maintain a stable society and state unity, a harmonious society is needed. Nonetheless, in democratic Confucian societies, harmony cannot be reached because of the open and pluralistic civil society that has developed.

In carrying on your government, why should you use killing at all? Let your evinced desires be for what is good, and the people will be good. The relation between superiors and inferiors is like that between the wind and the grass. The grass must bend, when the wind blows across it (子為政，焉用殺，子欲善而民善矣。君子之德，風也，小人之德，草也，草尚之風必偃)

(Legge, 1861b, pp.122-123; Legge, 1861a, p.114)

This description from Confucian classics demonstrate the core concept of harmony: when dealing with conflicts, violence is not the first option, virtue is the key to solving them. Harmony is an important value in Confucian teachings, which guides Confucian society to maintain a conflict-free relationship (Chen, 2002, p.4). According to Confucius, individuals cannot withdraw the society; therefore, it is important for individuals to maintain proper interpersonal relationships. Meanwhile, as this thesis has argued before, Confucius suggested an individual's actions should be appropriate to his position and encourages other individuals who stood in his/her position to fulfil his/her duty. If everyone can deal with their interpersonal relationships appropriately, then unnecessary conflicts and disorder in society can be prevented. Therefore, everyone should respect and fulfil the social duties of their own social status for a harmonious society. Chen (2002, pp.5-9) also indicated that the concept of harmony can be found in most Chinese philosophies; equilibrium is the

core of this concept. Harmony asks people to work together as wheels on two sides of the axis. In order to achieve this, people should practise self-restraint and self-discipline. Harmony also asks people to focus on their particular relationships, which would also help to decrease conflict in society. Harmony, a core value in Confucian teachings represents an ideal state in Chinese society (Chen, 2002, p.12).

As for group-orientation, it is taken from family-centred values. Confucianism argues that if a person can properly deal with his/her own human relationships, then it would be possible for he/she to reach the level of sage, and this idea can be found in Mencius' words: 'By the sage, the human relations are perfectly exhibited (聖人, 人倫之至也)' (Legge, 1861a, p.168). Furthermore, personal relationships should be established in the family unit, and then extended to others.

The core concept for this human relationship asks individuals to consider not only himself/herself but also related people surrounding him/her, and this is the way to become a sage. Therefore, the concept for group orientation is formed in Confucian societies. Bell (1995, pp.20-24) also indicates three characteristics about family-centred values in Confucian classics. Firstly, *family is the first and the most important school of virtue;*²⁴ particularly the female in Confucian society would be encouraged to hold this idea. Second, proper behaviour in the family is not only a daily ethical practice but also reflects *respect of politics*. Third, family obligations should be more important than any other obligations.

In the imperial period, the concept of harmony operated in the bureaucratic system in two areas. Firstly, an officer in his own jurisdiction should use his sense of morality to lead people to follow him in this. Law is the last resort for correct people's incorrect activities. Secondly, this phenomenon can also be seen in the local officer's report to the imperial court. In Chinese dynasties, the ruling class was not concerned about numeric data;²⁵ most of them were barely numerate. Officers also did not ask for the facts. In order to maintain the system of centralisation of authority in the Chinese empire, the solution was to establish a 'perfect method' and standardise it. Bureaucrats at all levels should follow this standard. If any bureaucrats faced difficulties in practice, then they were required to solve the difficulties by themselves. If the difficulties could not be solved – or the method of solution damaged the

²⁴ See also Shuan (2003, p.44), who argues that Confucianism asks people to learn to be a human by *moral and intellectual character* through interactions with other people *throughout his/her life in different relationships*.

²⁵ Weber (1968, p.125) indicated that there was no training of calculation in schools. The training only existed among merchants.

empire's reputation or interests – then the sacrifice of individuals for the state was necessary to protect the group (see also Huang, 1981, chap. 2; 1992, p.23; 1997, pp.58-59; Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp.104-105, pp.183-184). In this circumstance, bureaucrats would choose not to report the problem, and it would grow larger and larger. When the problem was too big to solve, it would ruin the foundations of the empire, and then a revolution would emerge. This problem was like a loop –when a dynasty was overthrown by civil revolution and a new dynasty was established – yet this problem of harmony would reoccur in the new one. As for group orientation, family-centred values would not disappear in Confucian societies.

Peace and order sanctioned dynastic rule. They were to be achieved by the central power of a dynasty which sat on top of its territorial bureaucratic administration and beneath this level maintained local control through the loyalty of the lineage structure and gentry leadership. Such loyalty was the product of Confucianism; China's traditional polity can be understood only in Confucian terms. (Fairbank, 1978, p.22)

Nowadays, harmony and group-orientation are emphasised for establishing coherent values in Confucian society by non-democratic leaderships. Harmonious society and group orientation have become significant values that are highly promoted by the non-democratic authorities of China and Singapore.

China

In China, the concept of harmonious society has entered into official documents in the past ten years. In order to maintain a stable society, decrease conflict or protests, and relieve internal pressure from the people, the policy of establishing a harmonious society has become one of the most important policies in China.

In order to fulfil this object, the CPC maintains a strong central government, manipulates the media and internet, and makes connections between party and state to create the idea that love of China refers to love of the party. As for political culture, the Central Guidance Commission for Building Spiritual Civilisation of the CPC (中央精神文明建设指导委员会, directly led by a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC) is responsible for educating people to follow CPC policies and official ideology to build up a harmonious society. 'Love China' education is promoted, CPC and China is 'one integrity with both sides', 'For the leadership, and in public opinion, the unity of the country is all-important' (House of Lords, 2010,

point 9).

In 1987, Zhao Ziyang mentioned that stability and unity are the prerequisites for establishing democratic politics. Socialism should have a high standard of democracy and in the legal system, and a completely stable social environment. In the initial stages, because of many factors that could lead to instability, it is particularly important to maintain stability and unity, although experience has demonstrated that this is not an easy task. He also mentioned that conflicting views among the people should be dealt with correctly (Zhao, 1987, p.1). The CPC asks that the party and people of all races should unite to overcome difficulties and march towards socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Hu Jintao has also delivered speeches to the CPC meetings that all place emphasis on harmonious society. He argues that building a socialist harmonious society is our party well-off society and creating a new situation in the socialist cause with Chinese characteristics reflects the fundamental interests and common aspirations of the broad mass of the people. To promote the history of the development process for socialist material civilisation, political civilisation and spiritual civilisation, a solid job of building a socialist harmonious society work needs to be done (Hu, 2005, February 19). Wen Jiabao also mentioned the idea of harmony in an annual government working report in 2010. To the CPC, increasing harmonious factors and reducing disharmonious factors as much as they can provides an important guarantee to achieve the long-term development goals of China (Xinhuanet, 2006, September 26). Harmonious culture would decrease the divisions and confrontation of values that arise from the unequal distribution of benefits among different groups. In the meantime, it would establish one cultural idea for the whole society to obey, and realise the collective identity in spirit of Chinese culture (Xie Xiaorong, 2007, September 30, article in CPC theories).

Chinese authority is desirous of a stable society, without conflict, to avoid potential challenges against CPC authority. Nationalism, which binds the CPC and China together, is encouraged to avoid people overthrowing the CPC's authority, because this attempt could lead to unstable situation to China. Instead of the resolution of conflict by the people themselves, the official announcement argues that the CPC and the state will deal with conflicts within society. Meanwhile, the people should also work to maintain a harmonious society and cease conflicts, and together support the interests of the state this concept can be seen in the speeches of the CPC leaders.

Singapore

Singapore is a newly-independent state that is composed of different ethnic groups. This country does not have a long history as a united Singaporean nation. Meanwhile, it has already been mentioned that Singapore became independent reluctantly, and the Singapore leadership need to make Singapore a success. Therefore, they set up a clear objective: the Singapore government should establish a prosperous society, but people should follow the government's directions to ensure that the best people should be in a position to organise the best policy for Singapore. This objective covers two important categories: patriotism and harmony.

The Singapore leaders endeavour to build the nation, and this has avoided ethnic conflict in Singapore since 1965 (Bell, 2000, p.254). Singapore's government teaches people to put national interests and community interests ahead of individual interests, and that nation and community should help an individual's development (see Tan, 2001, September 21, the descriptions of five values; National Heritage Board, Singapore, 2009). To Singapore's leadership, they indicate that 'Singaporeans have little doubt that a society with communitarian values where the interests of society take precedence over that of the individual suit them better than the individualism of America' (Bell, 2000, p.256).

Harmony is another important issue in Singapore, where leaders believe that, because of the effects of Confucian values, a duty-based society has naturally emerged. Compared with the western 'right-based society', this society has less selfishness and conflict, and more consensus and harmony (Ghai, 1998, pp.29-30). Singapore's leaders suggest that, if Singapore is not affected by western culture in the next decades, official values will teach people to consider the welfare of the group, such as family, community and the state, rather than the rights of the individual. To summarise, Lee highlights the accomplishment of Singapore and makes a brief conclusion that states: an impetus to Singapore's success is that most people put the interests of the community higher than the importance of personal interests, and this is the basic concept of Confucian ideology.

Taiwan

During the non-democratic period, the KMT authority at one time focused on group-orientation for nation building, yet harmony was not promoted politically. As an alien regime, the KMT government attempted to establish a base in Taiwan to

expel communists from mainland China; thus, the KMT's actions were part of a Chinese nation-building process rather than an ideological development (Lin, 1998, pp.131-134). For instance, the KMT authority controlled Taiwan by pragmatic measures – such as constraining local factions, establishing party-commercial ties, building a security service and strictly limiting public space – rather than by a systematic official ideology. Meanwhile, instead of establishing a solid official ideology, the KMT authority needed to use democracy as a slogan to enhance the authoritarian regime (Tsang, 1999, p.7).

However, after the democratisation period, neither a harmonious society nor Chinese nation-building success could be found. Because of the open public space and competition among parties, it is hard to reach consensus, in Taiwanese society, on whether the nation is Chinese or Taiwanese, although most Taiwanese call themselves Taiwanese.²⁶ In contrast with the authoritarian period, public groups in Taiwan may ask for re-union or oppose the communists, various public groups are developed for different public policies from the democratisation period, and this phenomenon reflects the fact that civil society in Taiwan is more pluralist and autonomous (Chang, 2000, pp.118-120).

This thesis uses two waves' data from the Asian Barometer Survey to demonstrate group orientation in Taiwan. Both waves use the following questions:

For the sake of the national community/society, the individual should be prepared to sacrifice

For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second

²⁶ See Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Taiwan <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/modules/tinyd2/content/TaiwanChineseID.htm>. The data shows that, up until June 2011, 54.6% people in Taiwan called themselves Taiwanese, 39.0% argue they are both Taiwanese and Chinese, and 4.1% indicate they are Chinese.

Table 3.1 Group-orientation and Taiwanese opinion

Family		
	Wave 1	Wave 2
Strongly agree	13.7	13.1
Somewhat agree	72.5	75.5
Somewhat disagree	13.1	10.6
Strongly disagree	0.7	0.8
Nation		
	Wave 1	Wave 2
Strongly agree	6.6	4.9
Somewhat agree	58.0	51.4
Somewhat disagree	32.4	40.0
Strongly disagree	2.9	3.7

Source : 1. 2001 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave One)
 2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave Two)

Table 3.1 demonstrates the results of the group orientation survey in Taiwan. The results suggest that group orientation in Taiwan is considered to be centred more on the family than on the state, unlike the situation that the non-democratic form of leadership in China or Singapore tend to establish. However, this legacy still exists in people's mind.

To summarise, this thesis may indicate that the concept of harmony does not broadly exist in Taiwanese society, and even group orientation is more a family-centred value, rather than the loyalty to the nation.

South Korea

Unlike in China and Singapore, where the leadership tried to establish a common ideology to diminish the opponent's voice, and unlike in China, Singapore and Taiwan that need to confront the issues of a multi-racial society, South Korea is more focused on establishing concepts for educating people to build up a Korean identity. Harmony is a kind of life-style, rather than a politically promoted element in modern society, as it exists in the Korean's life.

Harmony is viewed as an interpersonal courtesy (Zhang, 2011). Zhang indicates that it

is a tradition from Zhuxi's theory and was developed in Korea's Confucian society. This concept of harmony was also highly promoted by official scholars in the Choson Dynasty. Therefore harmony 'in personal relationships is a dominant force in a Korean's life' (K4E Editor, 2012). Kima & Park (2003) also indicate that 'harmony in the workplace' is one of the major contributors to rapid economic growth in South Korea.

With regard to group orientation, Korea has been affected by surrounding countries, such as China and Japan, for hundreds of years. From the Choson Dynasty, Korean was influenced by Chinese Confucian culture. Then the country faced Japanese colonial education from 1910 to 1945, and now it is influenced by western culture (Yim, 2002, pp.38-39). Therefore, the South Korea government introduces Korean national education to develop group orientation at the national level. It can be found that, during the last few decades, South Koreans have been used to making a stand in defence of their country's interests, whether in an anti-American movement during the Gwangju Democratisation Movement (Oh, 1999) or against Ractopamine American beef in 2008. Nonetheless, these movements might not be considered to be in opposition to democracy.

In summary, two legacies of Confucianism that were mentioned in this sub-section – harmony and group orientation – have their own original ethical functions in classic Confucian teachings. Yet when these concepts were operated in practice, the ethical functions disappeared and the only legacies that remained were those that constrain the rights of the individual, in order to achieve the collective interest. This result is not capable of supporting democratic political culture but facilitates non-democratic leaderships to control the state in non-democratic societies, yet these legacies might demonstrate a different effect in other democratic societies.

2.4.4 Section Summary

Four traditional legacies – hierarchical politics, *guanxi*, harmony, and group orientation – are introduced in this section. It can be found that these four legacies are substantially anti-democratic in character and also below the standards of classic Confucian teaching. Hierarchical politics would encourage people to allow political leaders to maintain dominant status and manipulate the political agenda. People in this situation cannot have broad access to different ways of thinking, in order to form a new political culture, and the political status quo cannot be changed. Thus, a democratic political culture cannot emerge. *Guanxi*, harmony, and group orientation

are obstacles to the consolidation of democratic culture. *Guanxi* encourages cronyism, harmony, and group-orientation advocates a single opinion and personal sacrifice for the collective interest in a society, which would allow non-democratic leaderships to control public opinion with ease. Meanwhile, non-democratic leadership would strongly support the concepts of harmony and group orientation in order to establish a coherent value in society and to avoid potential opponents. If political culture in Confucian societies tends to support these legacies, democratic political culture would not easily emerge or even consolidate. However, non-democratic leadership would strongly encourage these legacies because they are an original part of a political culture instilled in the minds of the people; it is not costly to deepen these legacies in the public's mind and they can also facilitate non-democratic rule.

2.5 Conclusions

The concept of political culture involves evaluating the relationship between collective long-term political experience and the preference of individuals. Regarding the emergence of a democratic regime in Confucian societies, the leaderships' attitude is important at the initial stage, and then the people's firm support of democracy would help to develop a strong democratic political culture. However, in Confucian societies, the traditional legacies that emerged from the imperial period continue to survive in different ways in Confucian societies. Hierarchical politics facilitates control of the political agenda and leads people to remain in disadvantageous situations in the political system. Thus, it is difficult for democratic political culture within Confucian societies to emerge. Three other legacies also encourage anti-democratic values that become obstacles to democracy. These traditional legacies have a long-term accumulation in the political culture of Confucian society, and have become a collective memory for rulers and the people.

Although traditional legacies are incapable of bringing about democracy, the potential for democratic regimes to emerge in non-democratic countries has been indicated in de Tocqueville's books. He argued that 'The mores and laws of the Americans are not the only ones that can be suitable for democratic peoples; but the Americans have shown that we must not despair of regulating democracy with the help of laws and mores' (Alexis de Tocqueville, 2010b, p.504). Meanwhile, at the beginning of this chapter, it was said that political culture could change when people consider that it is not compatible with the needs of the existing society. A democratic regime needs a strong democratic political culture to support it. Therefore, a value-shift in Confucian

society would become necessary. Modernisation, which could diminish traditional values and help to establish a democratic regime, will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 3: Modernisation

This thesis discussed political culture in Confucian societies, and the shift of political culture involved in changes to the existing society. People would seek a new political culture for accommodating to change. Yu-Shan Wu (1998, p.444) indicates that recent democratic theories can be divided into two categories. One of them is focused on prerequisites for change, and another is focused on the process of change. In Wu's opinion, the first one emphasises macro political-social factors. The other indicates that political change cannot be explained by economic, cultural or political conditions. Instead, political change should be regarded in terms of the interactions of actors and the sequence of events. Modernisation is one of the most powerful and influential of these democratic theories.

Modernisation is a concept that covers not only economic aspects but also covers political, social and mental aspects. Modernisation is acknowledged as an active process that makes a country or a society adjust itself to face challenges and adopt new conditions and values. This phenomenon began in Europe in the 17th to 18th century, followed by the North American countries in the mid-19th century and Asian countries in the 20th century. With the wave of modernisation, the countries that follow this wave begin a rapid development period. These experiences became the early empirical cases for scholars to develop the theoretical framework. Then the framework was amended to adapt to the conditions of other non-western countries.

Modernisation is considered to be a revolutionary, complex, systemic, global, lengthy, phased, homogenising, irreversible process, which covers 'industrialization, urbanization, social mobilization, differentiation, secularization, media expansion, increasing literacy, education, and expansion of political participation' (Huntington, 1968, p.32; 1971, pp.288-289). It can be argued that it leads to the erosion of traditionalism (see Inglehart, 1997, pp.73-74). Modernisation can also be seen as not only a change in the model of production or of institutions, but also a change in the behaviour of human beings. Regarding Confucian societies, these societies started processes of modernisation in different ways and at different times. However, modernisation in these societies demonstrates different phenomena.

The modernisation paradigm from scholars of modernisation indicates that social and economic development will bring about political openness and democratisation,

because these developments will bring the internal need for democratisation (Wu, 1998, p.443). Modernisation is a choice for Confucian societies to 'catch up' with the developed countries. In the meantime, the institutional and cultural change to modernisation will transform existing traditional thinking and institutions. Modernisation is more involved with the change of the traditional society to a modern society; when discussing the prerequisites of democratisation, modernisation and wealth are argued as important conditions (Huntington, 1984, p.199). Furthermore, the consequences of modernisation – economic development and the emergence of the middle class – are possible elements for helping to establish a democratic regime (see Lipset, 1959; 1960). Meanwhile, popularised education arising from modernisation is also an essential prerequisite for democracy. Lipset indicates that although there may not enough evidence to argue that higher levels of education would be an advantage for democracy, yet popularised education is essential for a country to practise a democratic regime (Glaeser, Ponzetto, & Shleifer, 2006). However, the effects of these factors for democracy may be controversial, because there are still some modern Confucian societies that do not perform as the theories would predict. However, there are theorists of culture shifts who argue that modernisation will create a positive environment for individuals to develop democratic values, and this will advance the democratisation in a society (Inglehart, 1990; 1997, Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2008). Generational differences will be an important factor for observing such changes.

This chapter will focus on how modernisation and its three consequences the middle class, economic growth, education, and age could help to reshape traditional legacies and help develop democracy. These issues will be discussed in the following sequence. Modernisation theories will be reviewed, to begin with. The theories indicate that modernisation is a total change that transforms society from a traditional to a modern one, and because of a series of changes, traditional political values will be diminished and replaced by open and democratic values. The rise of a middle class, economic development and education are three important factors of modernisation that could help to develop a democratic regime. However, this thesis would indicate that the middle class in East Asian societies may tend to support stability, and economic development would help to maintain a stable democratic regime. As for education, it also needs popularised education and a neutral education system to support it. Meanwhile, modernisation and its effects would help to break traditional norms and lead people to become more skilful and to seek democracy, but these will not directly bring democracy. Then this thesis will briefly discuss these three factors in modern Confucian society, to determine the differences between democratic and

non-democratic Confucian societies..

3.1 Modernisation Theories

Early modernisation is based on experiences from the 17th–19th centuries in Western Europe and North America. Scholars used these experiences to develop their theories to support the developing countries. A standard and process were designed to implement in these countries. What these scholars want to achieve is to replace the ‘traditional societies’ in developing countries by ‘modern societies’ that reflect the western experience.

3.1.1 Early Modernisation Theory

Modernisation theories arose from the 1950s. These theories were first suggested by an economist, Simon S. Kuznets, and his committee for research on development in developing countries. In the meantime, scholars, such as Talcott Parsons, Gabriel A. Almond, James S. Coleman, Seymour M. Lipset and Walt Rustow, also developed the theory in 1950s and 1960s. The theories they contributed created the foundation for modernisation theory. From the Hakone conference, which was held in Japan, a series of characteristics for modernisation emerged.²⁷ It is suggested that these characteristics are the essential conditions for a modern society. During this period, different scholars offered their own standards for modernisation. Modernisation theory was popular in the academic community for explaining development in developing countries, among scholars such as Lipset (1959, 1960),²⁸ Lerner (1958)

²⁷ The works of different authors reflect different opinions about the standards. Koschmann, J. Victor (2003, pp.231-232) indicates 9 points as following: ‘1. A comparatively high degree of urbanization; 2. Widespread literacy; 3. Comparatively high per capita income; 4. Extensive geographical and social mobility; 5. Relatively high degree of commercialization and industrialization within the economy; 6. An extensive and penetrative network of mass communication media; 7. Widespread participation and involvement by members of the society in modern social and economic processes; 8. A relatively highly organised bureaucratic form of government with widespread involvement by members of the society; 9. An increasingly rational and secular orientation of the individual to his environment based on the growth of scientific knowledge’. However, John W. Hall’s points (1965, p.19) were acknowledged and used in the conference: ‘1. A comparatively high concentration of population in cities and the increasingly urban-centeredness of the total society; 2. A relatively high degree of use of inanimate energy, the widespread circulation of commodities, and the growth of service facilities; 3. Extensive spatial interaction of members of a society and the widespread participation of such members in economic and political affairs; 4. Widespread literacy accompanied by the spread of secular, and increasingly scientific, orientation of the individual to his environment; 5. An extensive and penetrative network of mass communication; 6. The existence of large-scale social institutions such as government, business, industry and the increasingly bureaucratic organization of such institutions; 7. Increased unification of large bodies of population under one control (nations) and the growing interaction of such units (international relations)’.

²⁸ He uses average wealth, degree of industrialisation and urbanisation, and level of education as an

and Levy (1966). With regard to the views of Rostow (1960), Rustow & Ward (1964, pp.6-7),²⁹ Hall (1965), Levy (1966), and Lerner (1958)³⁰, modernisation can be discussed in relation to the following factors:

Economic factors: scholars focus on industrialisation and the capability of using non-manpower resources. They argued that the difference between traditional societies and modern societies is that traditional society refers to an agricultural society in which people used resources from nature. On the other hand, people in modern society not only focus on natural resources, but also use industrial products and develop non-agricultural industries.

Political factors: a highly secular, specialised, functional and differentiated type of government is needed. In this government, the decision-making process should be secular and rational, and should be according to the rule of law rather than traditional rules. People in this society have to participate, broadly and actively, in political affairs.

Social Structure: these scholars suggested a highly differentiated society. Each division in the society is highly specialised but also highly interdependent. Social mobility is high and the population is concentrated in cities. Role and position in society is based on individual ability and performance. A bureaucratic system generally exists, and is developed. In contrast with traditional societies, family functions in modern societies are limited and narrowed.

Cultural and Individual factors: modern societies are more focused on the values of

index and suggests that democratic countries have higher figures for these indices.

²⁹ They have eight important points. '1. A highly differentiated and functionally specific system of governmental organization; 2. A high degree of integration within this governmental structure; 3. The prevalence of rational and secular procedures for the making of political decisions; 4. The large volume, wide range, and high efficacy of its political and administrative decisions; 5. A widespread and effective sense of popular identification with the history, territory, and national identity of the state; 6. Widespread popular interest and involvement in the political system, though not necessarily in the decision-making aspects thereof; 7. The allocation of political roles by achievement rather than ascription; and 8. Judicial and regulatory techniques based upon a predominantly secular and impersonal system of law'.

³⁰ He uses Turkey and the Arab world as case studies to discuss modernisation in traditional societies. He indicates that modernisation is a trend, and traditional societies are changing. Mass media is the mobility multiplier, which means people do not need to travel by them but can understand different experiences (p.53), and people would respond to these experiences by seeing (p.54). Furthermore, modernisation is involved in a change of social institutions and people, urbanisation that changes people's attitudes (p.61), literacy that would encourage people's participation, and media participation that also would raise participation in all aspects of society (p.62). He also indicates three kinds of people: the traditional man, who would tend to refuse change; transitional man, who demonstrates various situations; and modern man, who participates in society, 'literate, urban and high empathisers' (pp.70-72).

rationalism, liberalism, efficiency and personal abilities. People will have more rational attitudes in confronting issues, and will have more motivation to participate in public affairs.

To conclude, modernisation involves a change in industrialisation, urbanisation, education, literacy rate, wealth, social modernisation (Huntington, 1997, p.76), and this modern society is 'characterised by rationalised authority, differentiated structure, mass participation, and a consequent capacity to accomplish a broad range of goals' (Huntington, 1971, p.288). Huntington (1971, pp.286-287) also indicates the differences between traditional and modern society. He cited Sutton's opinion that listed several differences between industrial society and agricultural society to argue the differences between the modern and the traditional. He also used Levy and Rustow's definition to argue that modernisation refers to a change to men. He argued 'traditional men are passive and acquiescent, who expect continuity in nature and society'. They do not believe in 'the capacity of man to change or control'. Modern society, in his opinion, includes not only institutional change, but also a behavioural change in human beings. However, early modernisation theories that were based on observation from western developed states led to the following criticisms.

The first criticism addresses the point that nearly every scholar focuses on the question of traditional society versus modern society, and then compares the differences. Levy may be the first scholar who offers a systematic analysis for these two types of society. Levy (1966) tried to compare differences between modern and traditional societies and listed 8 points. His points covered professional economic, political and educational institutions; highly professional but interdependent institutions; state power is centralised but not autocratic; universal ethics rather than control and decision-making by the family; well-developed markets and bureaucratic system. Family should be small and have fewer functions. In his two volumes *Modernisation and the Structure of Societies*, he suggests a theoretical division into the structure of relatively modernised societies and the structure of relatively non-modernised societies. Several important characteristics are mentioned in these books.

Modernised society uses non-biological sources and non-manpower tools; on the other hand, non-modernised society tends to use manpower and animal-based tools. Levy also uses the concepts of Specialisation of social units, self-sufficiency, ethics, the combination of centralisation and decentralisation, relationships, generalised media of exchange and markets to distinguish these two types of society. In relatively

modernised societies, social units are more functional, and have their own functions. They are less self-sufficient, and people must rely on each other. As for ethics, there will be a universalistic system of ethics rather than a particular relationship between people. Concerning centralisation and decentralisation, it will be easier to form a centralised government, but Levy refers to the United States and the USSR to argue that centralisation is an essential process of modernisation. However, the case of the US proves that centralisation does not necessarily lead to authoritarianism (p.56). On the other hand, democratisation would also arise in the process of modernisation. As to the relationship aspect, a modernised society places emphasis on rationality, universalism, functional specificity, and emotional neutrality or avoidance (p.62). There will be a clear relationship between people, everyone has his/her rights and responsibilities, and there will be less hierarchy in a modern society.

Regarding the media of exchange and markets, modern society has highly generalised media of exchange and highly developed markets (p.67), the information is open, and the market order is established. In a non-modernised society, specialisation is low, although it can offer some religious education and entertainment organisations, which have higher differentiation and specialisation in China and Japan. Merchants units are often a family enterprise. Non-modern society is highly self-sufficient. Family is the core unit to fulfil this, and it also offers socialization, training and education to individuals for his/her lifetime. Family is controlled by elders, and, within the family, individuals learn an adult role (pp.96-97). Furthermore, rulers would not try to centralise the government because the self-sufficient unit is family rather than the state (p. 96). Predominantly particularistic ethics are also strong; decisions are based on family considerations, which are the major determinant of all their decisions (97-98). It is similar to a kinship-dominated society. Therefore, in terms of relationships, non-modern society is based on tradition and particularism, on close and distant interpersonal relationships. People in this society would be responsible for others rather than themselves. There may be a comparatively isolated market and media channel.

However, it was too simplistic to divide and explain traditional and modern societies in these terms. Early modernisation theories divided modern and traditional societies into two end of a political spectrum. In these theories, traditional society was described as a backward and uncivilised society.

Secondly, early modernisation theories 'assumed that all societies approached modernity through the same recognizable stages' (Kerr, 2009). These theories indicate

a single development model that can be used in cross-cultural societies, races and sovereignties.

Rostow (1960, pp.4-16) indicates a sequence of modernisation: the traditional society (the society controlled by landlords and long-run fatalism; although there would be a central government, but the political centre is in the local authority); the preconditions for take-off (central government is established, new concepts, education and financial system exist; he argues that Britain is the state that is qualified to this stage); the take-off (traditional concepts that do not favour economic development diminish, production is raised because of new technologies, new industries expand rapidly, and 'the new class of entrepreneurs expands; and it directs the enlarging flows of investment in the private sector'); the drive to maturity (10%-20% national income used for investment, new technologies improve, 'a relatively narrow complex of industry and technology has extended its range into more refined and technologically often more complex processes', which led to new industries developing rapidly); and the age of high mass-consumption ('the leading sectors shift towards durable consumers' goods and services', social welfare appears in this state).

Most scholars of modernisation introduce the essential points of the experiences and characteristics of modernisation in western countries and try to extend this to other countries. This method ignores each country's specific characteristics and may lead to failure. Historical experiences in non-western countries have demonstrated the phenomena of failure. Tu (2000, p.261-264) suggested that modernisation reflects western enlightenment values. However, societies in East Asia, especially the Confucian states, develop their own East Asian type of modernisation.

Third, modernisation theory ascribed to a 'liberal universalism' that was subsequently challenged by the argument that non-western societies would find their own route to modernity (Kerr, 2009). Because the major theorists were from the western countries, therefore, the design of these theories and the empirical experiences are from the western development experiences. As a result, the assumptions of early modernisation theory were that 'liberal, democratic capitalism was synonymous with modernity' (Kerr, 2009). Theorists such as Lipset (1959, 1960, chap. 2) uses western countries as an example to indicate that for capitalist economic development, Protestant values of individual responsibility help democratic values to emerge. Fukuyama (1992, p.242-243) suggests that the successful democratic countries in Asia adopt a western style of development and liberal democracy concepts to diminish the influence of

their traditional legacies.³¹ Most scholars assume modern, western society is the model for traditional societies to follow. In the meantime, because of these assumptions, such theories have failed to consider the individual countries' conditions and traditions, in the process of changing from a traditional to a modern society. These consequences of early modernisation theories were criticised by scholars of dependency theories and world-systems theory. Theotonio Dos Santos indicates a dependent situation between developed states and developing states. He argues that the dependent is

a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development.

(1970, p. 231)

Dependent theory indicates that western societies are the metropolis and non-modernised societies are satellites, which are strictly controlled by the metropolis. The reason for the satellites' failure is the capture of control and resources capture by the west. Alejandro Portes (1976, pp.56-59) confirmed the theory and indicates that, although income in developing countries increased, the trend was with developed countries and the gap between developed and developing countries also increased.

Immanuel Wallerstein (1974; 1980; 1989) takes a historical approach to suggest a world system, instead of using states as his units. He uses the Core area, the Semi-Periphery area, the Periphery area, and External areas to explain his system. The Core area is the northwest Europe states, which had strong central government, a bureaucratic system, militia, homogenised population, diversification of economic activities that dominated international trade, and local bourgeoisie. The Semi-Periphery area in southern France and Germany, Spain, Portugal and Italy was exploited by the Core area, but also exploited the Periphery area. The states in the

³¹ He indicates two possible options. One is to continue to 'absorb western ideas of universal and reciprocal recognition leading to the further spread of formal liberal democracy. Another is to convince them that their success was due more to their own than to borrowed cultures. If economic growth in America and Europe falters relative to that in the Far East, if Western societies continue to experience the progressive breakdown of basic social institutions like the family, and if they themselves treat Asia with distrust or hostility, then a systematic illiberal and non-democratic alternative combining technocratic economic rationalism with paternalistic authoritarianism may gain ground in the Far East'.

Periphery area in Eastern Europe and Latin America lacked strong central government or were controlled by the Core states, and were exploited by the Core states. The External area is outside these previous areas, and each state maintains its own economic system. Wallerstein's world system is dynamic but consolidated; states could change their own membership in this system, and with the development of industries and as more regions, such as Africa and Asia in 19th century, move from the External area to the Periphery area, this affects the status of the original states in the system. Nonetheless, no matter what states move, the system would still exist, and the relationship between Core, the Semi-Periphery, the Periphery, and External Areas would also continue to operate.

In summary, these theorists reflect the fact that linear development is not always correct; there could be a dynamic development route for modernisation. Meanwhile, each country would have its own conditions that need to be addressed. Thus, the early modernisation development models, which were developed from the experiences of western states, cannot necessarily be used in non-western countries because the internal and external environment in each country could be different. To western states, modernisation for them is indigenous, but when theorists collect the experiences of western states and apply them to other states, to those states, modernisation is exogenous; in fact, those states may lack the conditions of western states, and these shortcomings in early theories have led to the criticisms. Dependent theorists and Wallerstein's observation also show that early modernisation theory would ignore the fact that developed states would consider their interests in advance, and this would result in developing countries being exploited by developed states.

3.1.2 Later Modernisation Theory

According to the modernisation theories in the last section, it might be puzzling for leaders in countries with a non-western culture to determine how to both modernise the country and preserve its culture. Leaders in non-western countries may accept the need to modernise, yet they may also be concerned how to maintain the characteristics and traditions of the original culture.

In order to resolve this, debates for non-western countries to adopt modernisation are discussed. Fukuyama (1992) points out that modernisation emphasises the need for change of economic and social structure. A democratic government is needed in an industrialised society. He suggests that modernisation needs modern technologies, which would lead to a change of economic structure. He indicates that the market

economy is the optimal economic system in the transition, and the development of a market economy will raise incomes. This will result to social and cultural change, which will change the traditional culture and encourage demand and pressure for political participation. When the tipping point of the need for democracy is crossed, society will move forward to a democratic system. In his opinion, a western path will still be fulfilled after all (see especially chap. 22).

Huntington (1996, pp.72-78), on the other hand, indicates that three possible routes will be applied when non-western countries face westernisation or modernisation. The first is refusal, such as China and Japan in the early 19th century and some Islamists; however, this route is not possible nowadays because of the interactions between countries. The second is to accept both westernisation and modernisation. In his opinion, the third one is to accept modernisation but reject westernisation. Huntington indicated that western countries have their own particular characteristics, such as religions, languages, cultural legacies, rule of law, diversity in society (western countries have not been, historically, united as a whole). Modernisation does not equal Westernisation. He also suggested a model that argues that modernisation would result in the strengthening of the economic, military and political aspects of society, and the crisis for sense of identity and alienation would also apply, due to the collapse of traditional society. However, when modernisation continues, the original culture will revive. Iran, Singapore, Taiwan and China are the examples for this.

Huntington's opinion explained the difference between westernisation and modernisation. The development route might be similar to the route experienced by western countries; nonetheless, it does not mean that non-western countries ought to accept the values of the west.

Apart from the arguments concerning westernisation and modernisation, scholars of modernisation also amended their theories in the following ways.

Tradition and modernity are no longer considered as concepts representing consistent homogeneous societies. Instead, both traditional and modern societies contain different elements. Modern theories no longer see tradition and modernity as positions that are polar opposites, but consider that they can coexist and complement each other. Traditional factors might have a role in promoting modernisation, and there may also be a continuous process to amend or complement the shortcomings in traditional society to satisfy modern requirements.

Modern theories do not insist on the linear development model; nor that the way in which western countries developed in the past should necessarily be adopted by non-western countries. Thus, theories do not only apply the theoretical models from western countries' experiences to analyse non-western countries' development process. Instead of a linear model, a diversity model is suggested, which places more emphasis on analysis of specific historical facts rather than a library-based theoretical framework. The theories also consider internal factors and external environment rather than limiting focus to the internal factors.

Furthermore, current modernisation theories do not focus narrowly on functional and evolution issues. They do not focus on how non-western countries upgrade themselves to reach a differentiated type society, nor their abilities to adopt the western experience of modernisation. These theories contain more phenomena from non-western countries for analysis.

It can be found that modernisation involves radical changes for a traditional society to transform to a modern one. These changes would lead traditional Confucian societies to be more secular, differential, diverse and open. Because of the increasing literacy and education level, and expansion of mass media, information cannot be blocked by the leadership, and people's values would change during the modernisation process. Political participation in modern societies would also change the existing political structure. These phenomena could help a democratic regime to emerge. This thesis will discuss three points further: middle class, economic growth and education. Lipset (1959, 1960, chap. 2) indicates that, in his case studies, the middle class and economic development arising from modernisation would help to bring about a democratic regime. Limitation of education fundamentally led to the continuance of traditional legacies because only a few people, who received a Confucian education, could participate in politics and government, which limited the possibility of new ideas and democracy. This thesis will discuss these three points in the next section.

3.2 Middle Class, Economic Development, Education and Democratic Regime:

Theoretical Considerations

3.2.1 Bourgeoisie (Middle class) and the Democratic regime

The last paragraph has mentioned that modernisation scholars, who argue that modernisation will assist a state to 'emerge' or 'maintain' a democratic regime, suggest that, because economic development will enlarge the wealth in the society, this will also increase the size of the bourgeoisie. The middle class emerges in modern society with industrialisation and economic development. This class is comparatively economically independent. It became the majority in the 19th century in the West, and started to ask for more political power from the ruling class. Workers and capitalists devote themselves to political reform to protect and gain their interests. Therefore, the middle class from them in the west can become the 'motivation' to establish a democratic government. Lipset (1959, pp.83-85; 1960, chap. 2) suggests that industrialisation in modern societies creates a substantial working class. This will change the original social structure and result in an increase in the middle class. This middle class are educated, with moderate political attitudes that can soften conflicts between sharp, radical groups or bridge the gap between the upper class and lower class. They also support moderate and democratic parties. Barrington Moore (1966, p.414) introduced three kinds of paths to modern society; one of them shows that the bourgeoisie plays an essential role in the emergence of a democratic regime. Richard Lowenthal (1983, pp.192-193) also indicates that, even in communist countries, when reform starts, ideology will not return to the original one, but, instead, the needs of economic and technology development and industrialisation will push the country towards modernisation. Therefore, communist countries will still transfer their regime to a liberal and democratic regime.

Huntington (1991, pp.66-67) also indicates that the educated middle class will enhance the development of democracy in some situations. He suggests that in the beginning, when the middle class are still few in society, they may support an authoritarian regime because they see they might lose their existing advantages. However, when economic development continues, the middle class will be more confident in supporting a democratic regime. In the meantime, this class will try to

enhance their prosperity by election in a democracy. Hsiao & Koo (1997) suggest that economic development in Taiwan and South Korea produced a sizeable middle class that became stronger and dissatisfied with the ruling status of the original authoritarian regime and started to demand more political freedom and participation. They were firmly against the authoritarian regime during the liberalisation period, and were led by the elite of the middle class to push for democratisation.

The middle class may hold an essential role, as a result of economic development, in developing democratic regimes in Western protestant states. However, Wu (1998, p.446-448) indicates that the middle class is absent in communist countries because, in communist countries, all tools belong to the state rather than private individuals. Thus, there is no actual middle class. The Soviet Union implemented several 'Five-Year Plans for the National Economy of the Soviet Union' to push the Soviet Union and East Europe towards modernisation, rather than the market economy, private property, and the western economic style.³² Therefore, Wu suggests that, according to the case of the Eastern European countries, modernisation theories may need to stop citing the middle class as the only motivation for democracy. As for western cases, Huntington (1968, p.88) indicated that if the traditional political system could accept the need for political participation of the middle class, then this class would support the system; otherwise, the middle class would oppose the traditional political system. Huntington also indicates that the middle class would be loyal to non-democratic regimes if these regimes could offer them political space and respond to their political demands (Huntington, 1968, pp.185-190).

Furthermore, the middle class may not always benefit from the development of democracy. In the Europe and Latin America, economic growth gradually balances the power of classes, thus the middle class and working class become newly self-organised political participants, yet middle class is not the solid supporter to democracy, on the other hand, the mutual working class is consistently most pro-democracy (Rueschemeyer et al, 1992). In East Asia, the attitude of the middle class is various. In China, the Chinese government and the CPC have declared the intention to establish a 'well-off society' (Zhang Dejiang, 2010, October 25, Wen Jiabao, 2010, March 8). The middle class in China would choose to maintain a stable government rather than overthrowing the existing government. Hsiao and Koo (1997, pp.312-334) also argue that the middle class took a firm stand against the authoritarian regime during the liberalisation process, especially the active

³² This thesis argues that the modernisation in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe may not necessarily satisfy the characteristics of modernisation. Communist countries focused on heavy industry to improve economic development, but ignored other aspects of modernisation.

participants from university and unions. However, in South Korea, the middle class became less firmly opposed to the authoritarian regime firm status during the democratisation process, because they sought a stable society, and were dissatisfied with the rising conflicts of democratic movements. The middle class in Hong Kong gained some political power in the UK colony period, which meant that the middle class did not need to face the pressure from the lower class and also gained advantages from the government. Therefore, the middle class in Hong Kong does not necessarily support democratisation because this class considers that democratisation will damage political stability and affect the stable economic development (Ng, 1998, p.13;³³ Ma, 2008, pp.160-164³⁴).

3.2.2 Economic Development and the Democratic Regime

It has been shown that, if a non-democratic regime does not maintain stable economic development, and even drops to economic recession, then it would be more likely to collapse (Haggard & Kaufman, 1995, pp.32-36).³⁵ However, whether economic development would help to bring about a democratic regime may not necessarily apply universally. The issue falls on whether economic development can give rise to a democratic regime, or maintain a democratic regime.

‘The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy’ (Lipset, 1959, p.75). Higher economic development will enhance the level of education, the literacy rate and the prevalence of mass media to assist in spreading democratic values. Economic development will also provide wealth to people and this will bring greater political tolerance and avoid political conflict. It is most important that economic development accompanies the rise in the level of education, changes attitudes to political affairs and produces a substantial bourgeoisie. This increasing bourgeoisie, with wealth, will hold important positions in the state to limit the government’s power and demonstrate moderate political characteristics (Lipset, 1959, pp.75-84).

Lipset (1960, p.45-76) considers European, English and Latin American states to explore relations between economic development and democracy. He took the concepts of stable democracy, unstable democracy, unstable autocracy and stable

³³ She indicates that people in the business sector would oppose democracy.

³⁴ He indicates that the situation has changed, yet the democratic movements are suppressed by the Chinese government.

³⁵ According to their data for 29 democratic transition cases, 22 of them demonstrate economic recession, and 7 of them maintained economic development, see Haggard & Kaufman (1995, p.34, GDP table).

autocracy, and then used average wealth, industrialisation, urbanisation and education level as indices for his analyses. He found higher wealth related to a higher standard of democracy, higher urbanisation also correlates with higher democracy, and a higher education level also brings higher chance of democracy. On the other hand, low economic development would bring broad dissatisfaction among the people, and democracy would be hard to establish because of political radicalism, and even if a democratic regime is established, it would easily be destroyed by political radicalism. In order to maintain social stability, dictatorship, military rule, authoritarian or one-party authoritarian regimes would appear. Therefore, economic development is essential to practise democracy. At that time, he argued that economic development is a condition of democracy.

Lipset (1959, 1960) is the first scholar who used empirical evidence to indicate that economic development and wealth in a state will help a democratic regime to emerge in that state, because economic development brings a higher literacy rate, a higher education level and mass media; wealth eases political conflict. He separated the countries into stable and unstable democratic and non-democratic regimes, then analysed by his economic index and found a strong connection between stable democracies and the degree of economic development. He also found that economic development will help to improve the educational level and popularised education, which broadens the people's views on political issues and enhances belief in democracy, leading individuals to support the implementation of democracy.

However, empirical evidence suggests that economic development may not necessarily result in a democratic regime. Research suggests that economic development may indeed have a positive relation with democracy; however, the relation is to maintain the democratic regime rather than to result in a democratic regime (Muller, 1995; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997; Przeworski, et al., 1996, p.40-42; Przeworski et al., 2000, Chapter 2). Chang, Chang, and Chu (2008, June) even indicate that economic development provides legitimacy to these authoritarian regimes, and also offers these regimes power to 'justify their limits on civil and political rights' (p.21).

Five thousand US dollars GNP per capita would be a threshold for an authoritarian regime to democratise to a democratic regime, according to Lipset, Seong, & Torres (1993, pp.158-165). Przeworski et al, (1996, pp.40-42) indicate that the threshold for establishing a democratic regime is between 1000 to 6000 USD; if people's income is fewer than 1000 USD, then the democracy is fragile, and if the income is over 6000

(6055) USD, than the democracy would continue indefinitely. The faster the economic growth, the more the possibility that the democratic regime will survive, and a poor democratic regime is weak when facing an economic crisis that may destroy it. Przeworski and Limongi (1997, p.165) again suggest that, when the average income is over 6050 USD, the democratic regime would survive. Huntington (1997, pp.55-56) argues that the threshold of 1000 USD relates to whether there will be a military coup in a state; when GDP rises to 2000-3000, the coup would not easily succeed. If GDP per capita is over 3000 USD, the coup would be unlikely to succeed.

Larry Diamond (2011, p.18, pp.21-22) examines the reasons for the collapse of new democracies after 2000 and finds that income is one of the main factors which led to the collapse. It is about maintaining democracy rather than the emergence of democracy. Chu, Chang, & Hu (2003, p.23) suggest that people's attachment to democracy from modernisation and political liberalisation may not mean the detachment from authoritarianism. Research from Chang & Chu (2002, p.28) and Chang & Chu (2007, pp.20-21) also indicates that modernisation and democratisation would encourage individuals in East Asia to learn new ways of living, in opposition to the traditional values, and this then changes individuals' value-orientation. These changes will come from individuals, and then develop to a macro level change. Therefore, modernisation would help to develop personal new experience and strengthen the knowledge about democracy, but not directly lead to democracy.

3.2.3 Education and the Democratic Regime

Increasing literacy and education are important results of modernisation that enable people to read and understand information by themselves, rather than through a third party's explanation. Education in a classic Confucian society is limited to a few people, and the fundamental result is that only a few people become leaders in government, and this would lead to the continuance of traditional legacies; few people are qualified to rule, and this would lead to top-down politics. Furthermore, as chapter 2 discussed, Confucianism became the state-serving knowledge and the subject for imperial examination; only those who studied Confucian classics could pass the exam and become an officer of state, further supporting the concepts of *guanxi* and harmony. Because these officers were from state-support Confucian

The rise of modern education is also important for Confucian societies to achieve democracy, because of two important changes it brings.

Firstly, it will provide education to more people and the content could be more neutral, which would avoid unnecessary or traditional information. School is the place to preserve knowledge and pass to the new generation (see Dewey, 1930). However, traditional Confucian societies only have schools for preserving and teaching Confucian classics, and regarding the Confucian classics, Confucius indicated that only a few people were qualified to receive education and the best of them could become civil servants (see Weber, 1968, pp.107-108; Weber, 1961, p.416; Hahm, 2004, p.99; Legge, 1861b, p.208). The Confucian classics also asked people to stay and fulfil the duties of their role; anyone not qualified to be amongst the educated should remain in his/her role and manage their own duty well. (In this regard, see Legge (1861b, p.77), which was also mentioned in Chapter 2: 'He who is not in any particular office has nothing to do with plans for the administration of its duties'). Education in modern society cannot be restricted to a few people. A mass and normal education system should be established in modern society. Schools should provide a simplified environment and:

By selecting the best for its exclusive use, it strives to reinforce the power of this best. As a society becomes more enlightened, it realises that it is responsible not to transmit and conserve the whole of its existing achievements, but only such as make for a better future society. The school is its chief agency for the accomplishment of this end. (Dewey, 1930, pp.23-24)

Secondly, based on a mass and more neutral school environment, modern education will make a person more skilful in considering and gathering information, rather than accepting it only from the official channel. Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2006) indicate two important correlations between democracy and education. Firstly, they suggest education will raise the possibility and ability for people to oppose a non-democratic regime. They find that when the education level rose in Europe during 17th-19th centuries, revolt and uprising also increased.³⁶ Secondly, they indicate that the size of the power for opposition to a non-democratic regime demonstrated a positive correlation with the rise in the education level,³⁷ such as the US revolution

³⁶ They indicate that 'Education also seems linked to the ability of democracies to defend themselves from dictatorial coups. Popular uprisings during the less educated periods were almost invariably followed by dictatorial takeovers. The educated supporters of democracy tried but failed to resist the dictators. As nations became more educated, they also became more successful at defending democracy' (Glaeser et al., 2006, p.30)

³⁷ They argue that: 'In less educated times and places, coups are generally small affairs including only small cadres of nobles or army officers. As education grows, effective uprisings (like the American Revolution) became larger. Eventually, large swaths of society were included in attempts to overthrow a regime. Even the Nazi takeover in Germany, which eventually led to a dictatorship, succeeded only

and even Nazi Germany. Shi (2004, p.3; p.4) and Chang & Chu (2007, p.9) also indicate that expansion of formal education would help to transform the original social structure and offer more possibility for political participation. Shi, Tianjian's empirical findings also indicated that education is statistically significant in China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, when exploring relationship between education and political participation, and the effect in China is higher than in Taiwan and Hong Kong (2004, p.62)

More empirical evidence also supports this idea. Chang & Chu (2007, p.15, p.29) demonstrate that in East Asian countries, only 25.44% people without formal education can speak about the concept of liberal democracy. The percentage rises to 36.31% when people receive primary education but do not complete it. However, when people complete primary education, percentages fluctuate between 49.11% and 59.96%. The highest percentage is for people who complete undergraduate education rather than postgraduate. However, percentages for people who attend university, whether they complete or not, are 5% slightly higher than people who only finish high school education. However, Nathan & Chen (2004, p.5 & p.25) indicates that years of education is highly correlated to both democratic and traditional values in China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Their empirical research suggests that people who have more years of formal education would be more likely to accept democratic values and reject traditional values. On the other hand, people who have fewer formal education years would give less support to democratic values and have more attachment to traditional values. Thus, it may be assumed that in some cases in this thesis, people with a higher education level could be more supportive of democracy.

3.2.4 Summary

To summarise the discussions in last two sections, it can be found that modernisation is a process that covers economic, political, cultural, and social aspects of society. The transformation process may not necessarily follow the western steps. Instead of that, the conditions in an individual country ought to be applied to the modernisation process. These addenda make modernisation theories more applicable to non-western countries. Modernisation of a country does not only change the mode of production, but also changes lifestyles, information channels and government type. Most important is the fact that the original ideas and values would also be changed, because people would find the original values cannot satisfy the new modern society, and this

after the Nazis had built a broad coalition, including students and other educated Germans' (Glaeser et al., 2006, p.31)

situation would lead to a shift in the existing political culture. Economic development and the emergence of the middle class would help people to be more skilful in seeking a democratic regime, but these factors are not guaranteed to regain legitimacy from the leadership. A neutral and popularised education system would also help the development of democracy because people will have more ability to oppose non-democratic leaders.

3.3 Modernisation and Democracy in Modern Confucian Societies: Empirical

Observations

This thesis has demonstrated three major elements in modernisation that can change traditional and closed society to an open and modern society. This section will briefly combine the theories and facts in four modern Confucian societies to examine the difference between democratic and non-democratic Confucian societies in order to discuss the reason why some societies can follow the prediction of modernisation theories to become democratic, but some of them can resist the results of modernisation.

According to modernisation theory in the first section of this chapter, a democratic country is very likely to be formed during the process of modernisation because, besides economic development, the rise of the middle class, popularisation of education with a neutral educational environment, openness of the media and information will train and provide skills and information for people to oppose a non-democratic regime. Furthermore, the condition of an individual country should be considered; western experiences may not be applicable in other countries.

However, the previous section points out that the effects of modernisation may not necessarily lead to democracy. Regarding economic growth, GNP threshold could apply in some states, but Singapore is an exception. Values will change during economic growth, which would transform traditional political culture, yet academic writings suggest that economic growth would help people to be more willing and skilful to ask for democracy, but it will not automatically result in democracy. The interactions between leadership and people are a key element for an emerging democracy. Emergence of middle class is also a result of modernisation and this class (modern, educated, autonomous and rational) would be a power to moderate conflicts

in society and oppose non-democratic regimes, to expand their space of political participation. Nonetheless, the middle class's attitudes are still ambiguous because they still consider their own interests. Huntington (1968, p.88, pp.185-190) also mentioned the key element for the middle class in choosing to support or oppose an existing non-democratic regime is whether this regime can include them or not. Meanwhile, if a traditional political system can include the middle class in its power structure, the pressure can be eased temporarily. As for education, a neutral environment and popular education should be provided in modern society to help people to be more thoughtful and have the ability to gain more information rather than receiving only official information. Yet whether a neutral environment can be established is a question for the section on education.

This section will discuss four societies in three factors: economic growth, middle class and education, to examine briefly the reason why some Confucian societies cannot democratise during the process of modernisation, but some of them do democratise. The non-democratic societies will be discussed first, and will then be followed by democratic societies. It can be found in non-democratic societies, economic growth would give two possible results: regime stability and democratisation. In non-democratic societies, a new interaction is created between leadership and people. Non-democratic leadership would claim essential conditions for the existing achievements of economic development, to ask people to continue to support and maintain these conditions. Thus, if a non-democratic government can satisfy people's needs, the people could choose to support it. China and Singapore governments are working to create an environment to diminish people's demands for democracy by claiming that the country is stable. As for the middle class, as Huntington argued, China and Singapore offer channels and benefits to buy off the middle class to decrease their political demands. The neutral educational environment does not exist in non-democratic societies; instead of that, education becomes official ideology propaganda to educate people from pupils to adults. On the other hand, in democratic societies, an official ideology was not established because non-democratic leaderships in Taiwan and South Korea focused more on nationalism and described their regime as a democratic one to both oppose a Communist regime and to gain support from the United States.

3.3.1 Economic Development and Democracy

China

Yu-Shan Wu (1998) uses modernisation theory and regime stability to analyse the correlation between economic development and democracy in China. He argues that modernisation theory refers to a long-term change in political culture that comes with economic development in a society. However, regime stability theories in China can combine with traditional ideas that asked only that the ruler should take care of the people's material life, to consolidate their rule (Wu, 1998, p.451). If the Communist party failed to satisfy people's expectations for material life, people would overthrow the authoritarian communist government and seek for democracy.

Therefore, the economic development would continuously offer legitimacy for the CPC authority to control China because the Chinese people would be satisfied with this condition. Wu's opinion is useful to explain China's situation because the people in China do not have many democratic experiences,³⁸ and traditional Minben thought also made most people convinced that the mission of the government is to take care of their life. This situation can also be found in the CPC's policies.

After approximately two decades of political movement and Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping declared 'Reform and Opening' policies in 1978 to start economic reform in Communist China. These policies, which are completely different from Mao's self-sufficiency policies, were suggested and implemented for China to recover and to re-establish stability after the Cultural Revolution. The methods were clear: economic development and building up a harmonious society. The CPC authority is still trying to maintain an acceptable speed for economic development, and is also convincing people in China that only the CPC has the ability to maintain existing economic achievements and social stability.

Singapore

Unlike China, which still struggles in degree of economic development, Singapore is one of the developed countries and has maintained a high economic growth rate in most years for last four decades (see CIA, 2012). However, high economic growth and economic development does not bring democratisation to Singapore because the Singapore leadership redefine the democracy in Singapore's style and indicate that economic growth is based on these conditions.

Singapore is a place without resources but it has a good location for commercial

³⁸ From 1912 until Yuan Shikai revived the monarchy, there was a short but unstable democratic regime and elections during that time.

activities. Therefore, the Singaporean leadership has designed strategies of economic development to promote economic growth in Singapore and gain success in the past four decades. Singaporean leaders decide the essential conditions for economic development and point to a clean, anti-corruption and a well-managed government to promote order and stability initially (Lee, KY, 1992, November 18). However, when economic development reaches a level that a group of professional and skilful managers and engineers has emerged, the leadership in government will need to take a step to open up more political space for them, because they are rational and well-educated (Lee, KY, 1991, July 2, pp.559-560). Because of cultural factors, Singapore needs to organise in a western way, rather than practising western-style democracy. The core problem in East Asia is that western democracy contains an important element: a common value that enables people with different ideas to cooperate. Therefore, the basic mission for government is to organise a good government to ensure that citizens can live in a prosperous, well-ordered and stable society, to have a well-organised social welfare system, education system, appropriate freedom (which can have individual freedom but cannot invade others' freedom), high moral standards, infrastructures and continuous economic growth rather than following the western way (Lee, KY, 1992, November 20).

Lee Kwan Yew indicates that without the US's pressure and support, Taiwan and South Korea cannot develop to be the western style modernisation mode: economic growth leads to democracy (Lee, KY, 1991, July 2, p.561).

Taiwan

Taiwan's economic growth was dominated by two factors: the government's strategy and US aid. Initially, the KMT authority controlled most resources and established state-owned companies to be the distributors of resources and rule makers (Tsang, 1999; Rigger, 1999). Thus, the KMT authority became the economic strategies maker to shape the economic development process (Chu, 1994, pp.115-121). Bureaucrats in the Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan are in charge of regulating economic development strategies. In order to oppose Communist China, the US also offered financial aid to helping Taiwan to become a stable anti-communist base (Wade, 2004, pp.83-84). Meanwhile, the market of Taiwan cannot be closed to the democratic camp.

Looking at the period from the 1950s to the 1980s, Taiwan's economic development can be divided into several stages; several important industries were developed, such

as high technology industries and petrochemical industries. These developing industries led to two new political participants: entrepreneurs of industries, and the newly middle class from technical and professional workers. In order to face this change, just like China and Singapore which opened more political space for new political participants, the KMT opened seats on KMT's standing committee for leaders of important state and private enterprises, federation of industries, general chambers of commerce and the National Association of Industry and Commerce. During the 1980s, influential commercial leaders could affect government's policies. The government economic bureaucrats' dominant status was weakening. Meanwhile, in order to respond to stronger political claims from opponents, the KMT and enterprises supported each other in elections, and this further results in KMT being unable to control the state strictly.

It can be found that, in Taiwan, because of the US factor, the new participants from the process of economic development, the mutual needs of KMT (funds for election) and newly developed enterprises (enterprises' profits), economic growth fundamentally weakened the KMT's power to control the state. Government cannot fully control strategies of economic development and independent enterprises (Wade, 1988; 2004), and these enterprises may support opponents, if the KMT cannot satisfy their interests. As for the emergence of the middle class, it will be discussed in the next section.

South Korea

Like Taiwan, South Korea was in the democratic camp during the cold war period. To be a close ally with the US, open economic policies are practised. However, unlike China, Singapore and Taiwan which have a strong party to lead and control economic development strategies over a long period, to establish a solid political-economic tie, in South Korea, the Park, Chun-Hee government was the government which could strictly control the economic agenda and built up the political-commercial coalition.

The rapid economic growth in South Korea emerged from Park's presidency. Like the KMT in Taiwan, he also established an institution that was responsible for strategies of economic development. Park's government was a resources distributor – it controlled resources and used them to cooperate with big family enterprises (Moon, 1994, pp.143-144; Robinson, 2007, p.132). Government itself did not control state-owned companies, as the KMT did.

During the 1970s to 1980s, the middle class also developed from the rapid economic growth, with two stages industrialisation. Meanwhile, leaders of large enterprises also claimed political power from the government, as in Taiwan. These two situations both affected the power of an authoritarian regime because the regime needed to face both political needs.

In summary, the differences between non-democratic and democratic Confucian societies lie in the ways in which the level of economic development is raised initially, in response to the argument of some scholars – that wealth is a condition for democracy. However, Singapore’s case indicates that if political leaders can offer explanations for economic growth, which convinces the people that economic growth in that country need not follow only the western way, but should consider conditions for Singapore, then people may not choose democracy. Another important factor also cannot be ignored: the influence of the US. It can be seen that Taiwan and South Korea were allies in the democratic camp in cold war period. Thus, these two societies needed US aid and cooperated with the West. Although a non-democratic regime and its economic bureaucrats dominated the strategies of economic development, yet the leaders in these two societies could not hold a hard line position in relation to the political agenda; they needed to cooperate with the developing commercial elite. When a non-democratic regime cannot reform before demands, like Singapore, this type of regime would face challenges from civil society.

3.3.2 Middle Class and Democracy

This thesis has discussed the theory that the emergence of the middle class would help to establish a democratic regime. However, if an existing non-democratic regime can adopt the middle class into the existing regime, then the middle class may choose to be loyal to the regime.

China

Report of the House of Lords suggests China as a GDP growth factory:

with an average economic growth rate of some 10% per year since 1978. China had lifted some 300 million people from poverty, created a successful middle class mainly in the coastal areas and been ‘incredibly successful’ in terms of wealth creation. (House of Lords, 2010)

The communist party is trying to institutionalise the channel for the process to hand over ruling power in the Central Politburo, to reduce internal pressure from the CPC. In the meantime, rapid economic development, ‘love China’ education,³⁹ which leads to nationalism and strict control of mass media and the internet, also decrease outside pressure. These measures may help the Communist China to lessen the need to democratise. This thesis will discuss this part further in the case chapters.

Lu, Xueyi and his team from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) published a research report on the contemporary Chinese social classes (Dangdai Zhongguo Shehui Jieceng Jiegou Yanjiu Baogao, 当代中国社会阶层结构研究报告) in January 2002. This report clearly indicates that private-owned enterprises have developed to become one of the most important social classes in China, with approximately four million people in 2000. Private enterprises in China can be divided into three types. The first are developed from individuals and family owned businesses, the second are privatised public enterprises, and the third are private technology enterprises. The report argues that the middle class in the second type has participated in politics, and others have formed political requirements, and these people are generally not interested in politics, but will express their needs on suitable occasions (Lu, 2002). In order to respond to the emergence of the middle class and their political demands, Jiang Zemin offers ‘Three Representatives’,⁴⁰ and declared that people in private technology companies, foreign-funded enterprises, people who are self-employed, and private entrepreneurs will be allowed to join the CPC (Jiang, 2001). These measures open political space for the middle class to become involved in the existing political system and also ease the pressure of claims for political participation.

Singapore

The previous section mentioned Lee’s argument to deal with the political demands of the emergent middle class. Lee indicates that a more open political environment that can satisfy these people is needed. Lee’s consideration is the same as what the CPC is doing and Huntington’s observation from western history (see Huntington, 1968). Meanwhile, this thesis has described the Singapore leadership’s argument as a series of conditions for achieving economic growth. It can be seen that they use

³⁹ This situation can be found in students’ textbooks. For instance, textbooks for junior high school students from the People’s Education Press, the biggest textbook provider, which belongs to the Ministry of Education, only describe the historical view constructed by the CPC.

⁴⁰ The contents of three representatives cover economic, cultural and political aspects. They are ‘Represents advanced social productive forces’; ‘Represents the progressive course of China’s advanced culture’; ‘Represents the fundamental interests of the majority’ (Jiang, Zemin, 2001).

father-to-children concepts to formulate their strategies for developing Singapore, and ‘it is important to emphasise, however, that the customary values that modified development in the Pacific Asia have been largely reinvented for the ideological purpose of channelling popular energy to collectively achievable economic targets’ (David Martin Jones, 1998, p.149).

The middle class in Singapore are a majority (Tamura, 2003, pp.186-187), but demands for democracy may be diminished in two ways, as mentioned above: offer political space and promote successful experiences in order to be able to request that the middle class do not change the existing political system. Rodan, (2008) also mentioned part of these ideas, but he analysed them in detail. The results indicate that the PAP and the Singapore state actually merge together by reshaping the party structure, passing strict laws, dominating developing strategies and offering reform before it is claimed by opponents. Thus, the PAP and Singapore can together respond effectively to pressures, accommodate political demands and claim these to be their policies for reform. Firstly, because of the successful experiences and government propaganda, the middle class may worry that change in Singapore could lead to an uncertain situation for Singapore’s future and their own interests (David Martin Jones, 1998; Tamura, 2003). Secondly, social welfare policies to middle class, such as public housing, can both increase support to the People’s Action Party and diminish opposing voices (Tamura, 2003, pp.191-192). In the meantime, the Singapore government also established a law that offers direct nomination seats for the middle class (Tamura, p.193).

Taiwan

Taiwan’s middle class emerged quickly with industrialisation and economic development during the 1960s to 1980s. Because Taiwan was an ally in the democratic camp during the cold war period, western style capitalism, in which people can earn their own fortune, was practised from the early stages of KMT rule. Thus, because of the accumulation of an individual’s fortune, individuals would have more ability to participate in politics (Li, Yu-Tan, 2006, p.104).

Tieh-Chih Chang (2011) indicates that the middle class were only approximately 20%–40% of the overall population in the mid-1980s, and most of them were educated. These people had both a strong concept of a Taiwanese nation and democratic values; they tended to support the opposition, which asked for democracy to rise against the KMT, tended to support the concept of a Chinese nation and was

the ally of commercial enterprises. The power of the opposition also increased sharply during the 1970s to 1980s; it finally formed an opposition party and won a large amount of seats in local and national level councils, and as county magistrates, to oppose the authoritarian regime.

However, both Chang (2011) and Lin (1998) indicate that the middle class' attitude to democracy is ambiguous because the middle class who serve in the civil service, military service, state-owned companies and companies, who are allies of, or have benefited from, the KMT, would tend to support the KMT's authoritarian regime. This phenomenon still exists in a democratised Taiwan: the middle class in the above services and companies would tend to support the KMT, and others may choose to support non-KMT parties in elections.

South Korea

Like Taiwan, South Korea was a state that practised liberal capitalism from the late 1940s. Industrialisation in South Korea was implemented rapidly in Park's, presidency. He announced his intention to establish a wealthy and self-reliant state, and he tried to establish South Korea as a company (Oh, 1999, p.55; Kihl, 2005, p.71). The middle class was also developed during this period (Oh, 1999).

Huntington (1991, pp.67-68) indicated that the middle class is the major element which organised movements and preserved democratic values to rise against authoritarian regimes in South Korea. Protestant ministers and Catholic Cardinals, professors from Korea University, opposition parties, 'students, workers, peasants, urban service industry employees' stood for 'down with the military authoritarian regime and up with a democratic government' (Kim, 2002, pp.95-96). In order to maintain regime stability, Park's successors, Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo also chose to cooperate with the middle class (Moon, 1994). Finally, efforts from the middle class drove democratisation in South Korea.

The middle class in South Korea is more satisfied with theoretical prediction, which indicates that the middle class would be a major actor to further the process of democratisation. Although Inglehart (1990; 1997) indicates that democracy will not come automatically (it needs interaction between leadership and people), the middle class in South Korea would be a successful case for seeking democracy.

To summarise this section, the middle class in four societies demonstrate different

attitudes to democracy. With regard to China and Singapore, non-democratic leaders, just as theoretical prediction, are opening more political space to absorb the middle class into the existing regime. In the meantime, leaders place emphasis on propagandising social stability to claim middle class support. As for democratic societies, it can be found that non-democratic leaders originally tended to cooperate with the leaders of enterprises to organise a political-commercial alliance. The educated middle class, who were not part of the existing regime at that time, chose to oppose non-democratic regimes in Taiwan and South Korea. In Taiwan, the indigenous middle class tended to support Tangwai, the opposition who supported Taiwanese nation building and made a claim for democracy. In South Korea, the middle class preserved democratic values and stood against the military authoritarian regime. Another point for observation is whether the type of regime is intrinsic. It can be found in Taiwan, the boundary of the middle class supporting KMT authority was clear: the indigenous middle class would oppose the KMT, but the non-indigenous middle class, whose ancestors retreated with the KMT to Taiwan, would support KMT authority. In South Korea, because this country was established and initial leadership was installed by the US, the ruling class of South Korea and the US would help mutually to maintain the status of the non-democratic leadership and the interests of the US in South Korea. However, since the middle class in South Korea favoured neither the non-democratic leadership nor the support they received from the US, this US-installed regime faced challenges from the middle class until the democratisation period.

3.3.3 Education and Democracy

Previous sections have mentioned that a neutral and popularised education system in modern society is necessary to promote democracy. However, although Confucian societies perform well to popularise education, yet education authorities in these societies, just like other Asian countries, are creating/created 'loyal and efficient citizens'. In particular, Confucian societies are processing/processed nation-building values, students are trained to obey and understand their duty for national development (see Jones, 1998, p.151), although four Confucian societies promoted nation-building education. However, the difference between democratic and non-democratic societies in education for democracy is that the democratic societies, Taiwan and South Korea, allies of the democratic camp and highly influenced by the US, also promoted anti-communism and some democratic values in the content of education provided. As for China and Singapore, both of them can only promote their official ideology to consolidate their non-democratic regimes.

China

Although modern education indicates that the school should offer a neutral environment for people, yet the Chinese government establishes a series on Patriotic Education from primary school onwards (Zhao, 1998; Wang, 2008). For instance, the BBC reported that ‘Chinese children are being told that the first lesson they must learn this school year is ‘love your country’ (Bristow, 2009, September 1). However, this ‘love China’ education is also highly involved in CPC’s ideology, which is anti-democratic, and this education is indistinguishable from the Chinese state and the Communist Party, because China is a party-led state (Zhao, 1998, p.290).

The CPC indicates that the correct route for developing an intellectual should be, fundamentally, under the guidance of Maoism and Marxism-Leninism. Intellectuals should be taught to love the country, be loyal to the people, and put motherland and the nation’s interests ahead of their own. Thus, it is very important for the CPC to stress patriotism and party ideology education in party ideology to prevent incoherent thought among young intellectuals. In particular, they would wish to avoid some of these intellectuals incorrectly suggesting that the idea of freedom and democracy from western capitalist countries would be suitable for replacing the socialists in China (Jiang, 1990, May 3). Jiang argues:

We should conduct education on Chinese modern and contemporary history and national conditions to pupils (even to the kids in kindergarten), middle school students and to the university students. The education should go from the easy to the difficult, and should be persistent.

(Wang, 2008, p.788.

Wang translated it from Jiang Zemin’s letter to the Minister of Education).

Jiang’s speech also becomes the official education policy, carried out by Ministry of Education and Central Guidance Commission for Building Spiritual Civilization of the CPC (mentioned in Chapter 2, directly led by member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC). The major contents of the guidelines for education describe how the party led the country to success (Zhao, 1998, p.293). Modern education in China becomes a party-propaganda facilitator to instil party ideology. For instance, in order to respond to conflicts between Hong Kong citizens and mainland citizens, members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) suggested that emphasis should be placed on Patriotic Education in Hong Kong for

the younger generation, and the People's Liberation Army in Hong Kong should be involved in this (see CPC's official news, China.huanqiu.com, 2012, March 6).

However, higher education could train people to be more thoughtful and more skilful in gaining information, rather than accepting only official texts. The report of the House of Lords indicates that '...there were groups of well-placed intellectuals in China thinking about democracy in the way it was understood in the West. 7,000 to 8,000 people had signed a "Charter 08" document calling on China to reform in terms of liberal, multi-party democracy' (House of Lords, 2010, key issues point 7). Higher education could help the Chinese to change their way of thinking, rather than following official slogans.

Singapore

In contrast to the CPC's direct control of party theory and propaganda in the state's education objectives, the Singapore government has employed National Education to promote positive narratives about the People's Action Party's successes. The objects of National Education of Singapore are:

by fostering a sense of identity, pride and self-respect as Singaporeans; by knowing the Singapore story - how Singapore succeeded against the odds to become a nation; by understanding Singapore's unique challenges, constraints and vulnerabilities, which make us different from other countries; and by instilling the core values of our way of life, and the will to prevail, that ensures our continued success and well-being. (Ministry of Education, Singapore, 2011)

It can be found that the original design still does not provide what Lee Kwan Yew and his colleagues argue for: Singapore is a multi-racial country, and in order to avoid racial conflict, the Singapore government tries to build up a Singaporean nation (Lee, KY, 2011). Thus, the government should take the responsibility to educate Singaporean pupils to build up a Singaporean nation and a suitable ideology that can help Singaporean society unite.

However, a Singaporean blogger indicates that the National Education (NE) is only the 'government propaganda', which suggests that the original purposes of NE cannot be fulfilled. Meanwhile, the contents of Singaporean's successful stories focus on the People's Action Party and founders of Singapore's policies and contributions (Guanyinmiao, 2011, May 13). Raymond & Sim (2007, pp.18-19) also indicate that

Singapore promotes an official ideology in education which emphasises shared values (officially published in 1991 by the Singapore government), national identity and cohesion, as against western individualism and promoting communitarianism. This official ideology is, in effect, suggested by Lee Kwan Yew and his colleagues, and they indicate that Singapore needs democracy with Singaporean needs rather than practicing the western democracy (see Zakaria, 1994; Bell, 2000, chap. 3 and 4; Lee KY, 2011).

Different from the conceptualised ideology for serving the ruling party in the education system, the education authorities in Taiwan and South Korea focused on anti-communism and some democratic education around the authoritarian period, because these two societies were supported by the democratic camp, and they were examples to set against the communists. After that period, education for democracy was introduced in the education system.

Taiwan

In order to face the challenges of the communist party, the KMT authority strongly promoted the Three Principles of the People in education. However, the proportions of these three doctrines were not the same. Because Taiwan was a Japanese colony until 1945, KMT took control of the island for just four years, until 1949. Yet, as the KMT had lost the civil war in mainland China, Taiwan was the last base for them to survive. The KMT soon promoted nationalism, part of the three principles to establish the concept of the Chinese nation in Taiwan (Lin, 1998, pp.131-134).

However, as an example of democratic country to oppose Communist China, the Three Principles of the People also contain the ideas of democracy (Lin, 1998, Tsang, 1999). Even famous scholars, such as Hsu, F.-K (1985, 2004b) and Hu Shih, published articles to promote democratic values. Thus, civil education, which contains nationalism and the Three Principles of the People, was part of compulsory education for students.

After democratisation, from the late 1990s, the Three Principles of the People education was abolished, and textbooks that contained Taiwanese nation-building, democratic values and civil rights were introduced to students.

South Korea

Like Taiwan, education in South Korea is highly focused on anti-Communist materials. Nationalism education was promoted in the late 1940s to 1970s. During this time, freedom of speech was not encouraged, but democracy was conceptualised as anti-communism and pro-Americanism (Kang, 2002, p.319 cites Kang, M. K, 1984). During this period, both nationalism and anti-personal dictatorship political movements emerged (Oh, 1999).

This democratic education faced challenges during the military authoritarian rule period in the 1970s. Park Chung-Hee's military government forbade political protests by students and teachers, and textbooks had been reviewed during this time (Kang, Soon-Won, 2002, pp.319-320). After Park's death, Kang indicates that more varied texts were introduced in the 1980s. Because the US was involved in helping suppressing the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, which was led by Chun Doo-Hwan, anti-American and anti-authoritarian concepts emerged on campus (Oh, John Kie-Chiang, 1999, pp.83-89). From 1993, civil education, which contains concepts of democracy and human rights, has been introduced in schools (Kang, 2002, pp.320-321, pp.324-325).

In summary, non-democratic and democratic Confucian societies all practice popularised education; nonetheless, contents of education are different. Again, the US factor played an important role in content of the education syllabus. Taiwan and South Korea were in the democratic camp in the cold war period. Thus, democracy is part of the contents of the textbooks for students, to develop democratic values.

3.4 Post-modernisation and Culture Shift Theories

The relationship between economic development and open political systems remains a subject of debate among scholars, some arguing that successful economic development can delay change and others arguing that it must ultimately promote it. Previous sections of this thesis argued that modernisation factors, such as economic development and popularised education, offer opportunities for people to increase their civic awareness, and the emergences could also become catalysts for democratisation (Huntington, 1991). The thesis also indicates that these factors might not help to democratise a regime. Thus, modernisation and several important indicators might not be solid factors to diminish traditional values and promote democratisation.

In order to fill the gap between modernisation processes and democracy, culture shift theorists use modernisation as an intermediary to indicate that modernisation would help people to fulfil their needs initially. After the modernisation period and as they enter the post-modernisation period, people will start to consider not only economic issues but also various other factors, especially human development issues, and they will be more confident in self-expression. In this period, democracy will become an important issue (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

The theory covers three major points: economic development, value change within the population; and change in the political system.

Considering the economic perspective, economic development offers the people social-economic resources and raises their ability to make choices freely. Inglehart uses Maslow's hierarchy of needs as the basis to develop the theory: he indicates that there is also a hierarchy for those things that people seek. Individuals will seek to meet their basic needs in the beginning, with materials for basic life standards. After this period, the objective will change to other non-material aspects (Inglehart, 1990, 1997). As this chapter indicated, modernisation will combine a systematic change to traditional society. In the early stages, people and the government would place more emphasis on survival issues (Inglehart, 1997, chap. 1). During this period, people will be more tolerant of the non-democratic government as they will be more focused on economic development, security, order and economic needs. If the government can achieve satisfactory economic growth and security, the people might not oppose the government. However, when people's quality of life and education, and the government's operational efficiency, improve with the process of modernisation, other effects of modernisation will gradually appear and civil society will also develop. During this time, the needs for civil rights and individual rights will increase (Inglehart, 1990, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

The political system also gradually changes during the modernisation process. As indicated earlier in this chapter, modernisation involves a complete change of traditional society. The government is organised so that its functions are highly differentiated, and political structures are highly integrated (Rustow & Ward, 1964). Thus, the original traditional political system will be modernised, and the modern system will focus more on political rights and civil rights. People will have more power and a wider range of choices in the new political system.

However, economic development and political system change cannot automatically offer a democratic society. Instead, these changes offer an environment for people to gradually change their values. Meanwhile, with regard to political culture, the people will develop values that emphasise freedom of expression and freedom of choice, and that would lead to a shift in the existing culture.

Inglehart uses two hypotheses, and traditional–rational and survival–self-expression factors, as variables to test the hypotheses. The two hypotheses are the scarcity hypothesis and the socialisation hypothesis (Inglehart, 1990, p.56; 1997, p.33). The scarcity hypothesis suggests that an individual’s needs have value priorities; as the needs hierarchy is based on its social-economic environment, the individual will consider what is most deficient, and will try to remedy the deficiency as a high priority. This hypothesis is based on Maslow’s needs hierarchy theory, which uses historical evidence to indicate that people will seek to fulfil physiological (material) needs, such as safety and food, and then non-physiological needs, such as ‘esteem, self-expression, and aesthetic satisfaction’ (Inglehart, 1997, p.33). As for the second hypothesis, it argues that an individual’s values are affected by early socialisation. When the value hierarchy is formed, it will develop resistance, and will not easily change even when a person faces a different social-economic environment. Both of these hypotheses indicate that economic development will bring a generation with more focus on economic issues, and the next generation might emphasise post-modernisation values. However, the individual’s values, or the culture of the society, are shaped over a long time, rather than a short time.

The theory separates modernisation into two stages. In the first, it is a competition between rational and traditional ideas. Industrialisation transforms a traditional and non-secular society into a modern and secular one. In this period, scientific development will reduce people’s dependency on nature, and religious effects decrease. Meanwhile, industrialisation makes individuals more disciplined to fit into the modern social structure, and people in this stage will be more likely to support the promotion of economic development. Thus, in this period, rational modernised society is not enough to support democracy.

In the second stage, the post-modernisation period, the society has accumulated an amount of wealth; thus, the people do not need to focus only on survival and economic issues. Furthermore, the professional class emerge strongly, the spread of education provide greater opportunities for self-expression, and the people will focus more on personal and political freedom (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Questions of

survival and self-expression were used to test the hypotheses and it was found that in low-income countries, the people will be more inclined to support survival values, yet in high-income countries, the people will place greater emphasis on self-expression (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

The theorists indicate that 'self-expression' is the most important element to explain a country's democratic standards (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, chap.11). The changes in social-economic development and the political system, from traditional to modernised, offer more power and political space to the people. Meanwhile, people would seek for more political rights, and the people will be more 'secular, tolerant, and trusting, and place more emphasis on self-expression, participation, and the quality of life' (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.46). Furthermore:

Self-expression values and rising emphasis on freedom of choice emerge as increasingly favourable existential conditions that allow the universal desire for autonomy to take priority. Rising emphasis on human choice has immensely important consequences, generating pressures for female empowerment, more responsive elites, effective civil and political liberties, and democratic institutions. (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.47)

Based on these ideas, the theory indicates that the people's needs for materials or economic development will become peripheral because the basic needs for life have been fulfilled, and people 'feel safe enough to trust others, and self-reliance, creativity, and initiative take high priority' (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.259). However, during the modernisation process, the environment will be changed, and the people will develop new values; thus, the need for democracy and civil rights will be more important than economic needs. Moreover, because the people do not need to focus on economic needs, they will be more active and be able to participate more in political and social activities. These new political needs from people, such as political rights and civil rights, will emerge as new demands to the existing political system, and force it to move toward a democratic system.

Generational Differences

The above discussion indicates that those who grow up in different social-economic conditions will differ from each other because they accept a different process of socialisation. Inglehart indicates that the post-materialists and materialists would act

differently because they live at different security levels (see Inglehart 1997, p.77, 215, 332-333). The older generation will give greater support to economic and survival values (and this cannot be changed easily), yet the younger generation will be more likely to support post-modernisation values, which are more attached to democracy. Because the elder generation will pass away, and will be replaced by the new generation, the generation shift will happen that leads to a culture shift in a society (Inglehart 1997, p.33-36; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2008). Thus, the younger generation could be more democratic than their elders, if the society is modernised and its economic development is successful.

Summary

In general, Inglehart offers a clear conclusion from his empirical research in 43 industrialised societies (1997, p.215, pp.330-331). He indicates that modernisation may not result in democratisation, but is 'conducive' to democracy because the economic development involved in the process of modernisation would bring cultural change. Modernisation breaks the traditional norms and restraints and brings secular-rational values to the society (see Inglehart, 1990, pp.430-432; Inglehart & Norris, 2003, pp.153-154). During economic development, the younger generation would be concerned about their rights more than their life requirements, and the people would 'tend to give an increasingly high priority to autonomy and self-expression' in the long term. This results in a higher cost in terms of suppression for the government. In short, economic development would tend to make people support democracy and 'more skilful at getting it' (Inglehart, 1997, p.215, 330; see also Inglehart, 1990, p.429; Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p.154). Economic growth would only bring more possibilities for democracy to survive, but it does not result in democracy automatically (Inglehart, 1997, p.215; see also Fukuyama, 1992, pp.xiv-xv). Democracy is a reflection of 'underlying social changes and specific historical events and leaders'; through the process, the authoritarian leaders give up power in response to the demands of the masses to regain legitimacy (Inglehart, 1997, p.179). Huntington also indicates that the leaders' actions would be more important than economic or social conditions (1991, p.108); although rapid economic growth would benefit democratisation, the political actors' interactions are the decisive element to democracy (Huntington, 1991, p.70-72).

To conclude, the theory indicates that:

Economic development is conducive to cultural changes that make democracy

increasingly probable.... Democracy ... depends on deep-rooted orientations among the people themselves. These orientations motivate them to press for freedom, effective civil and political rights, and genuinely responsive government – and to exert continual vigilance to ensure that the governing elites remain responsive to them.

(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.300)

Meanwhile, the generation factor needs to be analysed and considered together with the modernisation factors in case study chapters.

3.5 Traditional Legacies and Modernisation

This thesis has indicated four traditional legacies in Confucian societies: hierarchical politics, *guanxi*, harmony and group-orientation. All these legacies are conceptualised and developed from Confucian classics and the imperial period. In contrast, modernisation is a re-socialisation process that would diminish traditional legacies and traditions in traditional society and force it to change to a modern one. Regarding the modernisation theories, an industrial, secularised, professional, differential and popularised educational system will be established in a modern society. Meanwhile, openness for mass media and broad political participation will help to promote democracy.

However, western experiences are not the only example of modernisation; this chapter has indicated that an individual country's situation ought to be considered. This thesis indicates that there is also a space for non-democratic countries to argue that there are different developing routes for western and non-western societies. In Confucian societies, a bargain between traditional legacies and modernisation can be found in the following aspects, and non-democratic leaderships are using the space to establish their own examples of modernisation.

Firstly, modernisation can facilitate promoting tradition legacies for consolidating non-democratic regimes in these non-democratic Confucian societies. Non-democratic leaders emphasise the building of official ideology and successful stories to propagandise how non-democratic regimes can benefit people, especially non-democratic societies that enjoy social stability and rapid economic growth. A modern popularised education system becomes a tool to promote harmony and group-orientation. Collective interests should be considered ahead of individual's interests, and nationalism is the safety valve to ask for people's loyalty to an existing

regime. All of these are part of official ideology promoted by China and Singapore.

Second, hierarchical politics continues in non-democratic modern societies, but there will be limited openness in the political aspect. As the previous section indicates, in China and Singapore, governments propagandise how they led their countries to success. In China, the CPC has clearly indicated that modernisation is led and planned by the party; there is no other experienced and powerful authority that would be able to lead China since the liberation revolution of 1949. Only the CPC has ability to maintain social stability and continue to ensure the existing achievements of economic development. According to the past 30 years open and reform policies, only the CPC has the ability to lead this country and continue to move forward. Because the CPC is the only superpower in China, combining official ideology with popularised education for harmony and group-orientation, people will choose to support the CPC authority. Thus, in China, modernisation actually helps the CPC to consolidate their rule. As for Singapore, the leadership indicates that, according to Singapore's experience for gaining success, a strong top-down politics is needed to maintain order and stability at the start. Government propaganda and stories of success legitimise and strengthen the power of the leadership over the people.

However, both China and Singapore need to respond to the emergence of the middle class and the change in people's values during the process of modernisation. The educated middle class, increasing in numbers during the modernisation process, will not easily be convinced by official propaganda. Thus, non-democratic regimes need to open more political space for these new political participants.

Third, international effects and the nature of regime become major supports for democracy in democratic Confucian societies. The US was the major ally with Taiwan and South Korea against communist China and Korea, and it also influenced authority in Taiwan and South Korea to take a moderate position in relation to political opponents and promote democratic values. On the other hand, because the KMT is an outside regime for Taiwan, and South Korea was established by the US's aid (and the initial leadership was arranged by the US), people in these two societies would tend to stand on the opposite side to non-democratic regimes in Taiwan and South Korea. As this chapter indicates, indigenous elites and the middle class in Taiwan would support Tangwai for democracy and the Taiwanese nation; the middle class in South Korea would choose to oppose authoritarian leaders and their supporter, the US.

In summary, leaderships in China and Singapore control education and use it to

facilitate propagandising official ideology and the leadership's stories of success from rapid economic growth. On the other hand, they also try to buy off middle class by opening more political spaces. Tan and Wang (2007) also indicate a similar result in their empirical research. They found that in non-democratic East Asian societies, support for democracy is hard to increase because the government controls the 'public discourse'. However, the younger generation would have stronger democratic values, and modernisation helps values shift from traditional to democratic.

3.6 Conclusions

The content of this chapter focuses on modernisation in the following aspects. According to theoretical discussions, there is no doubt that modernisation would re-shape the political culture in a traditional society. Since early modernisation theories were based on experiences of western countries, they were criticised because these experiences may not apply in non-western countries. Nonetheless, later modernisation theories have adopted an approach involving more case studies. Whether they are early or late theories, modernisation should include not only industrialisation, rationalised or differentiated authority, professional structures and broad education, but also include mass participation, open information and the media. This process involves a total change to a traditional society, which would encourage people to give up traditional values and adopt new ones to satisfy the demands of the modern society.

Economic development, a new middle class, and neutral and popularised education are three characteristics that would help to develop a democratic country. However, the middle class may not be democrats in East Asian countries. In East Asian countries, the education is popularised but not neutral. As for whether economic development could lead to democracy or maintain democracy, the result has also been discussed in this chapter: economic development would help people to be more skilful in asking for democracy, but it would not directly lead to democracy. To establish a democratic regime needs interaction between political actors. Non-democratic leaders realise the importance of controlling the modernisation agenda and education contents are essential to protect their regime. They would control economic development to build up a loyal middle class and people who consider that their daily basic needs have been fulfilled. Official ideology (that could change in different stages) should be highly promoted and combined with traditional legacies to deepen their force in the minds of the populace. Further, connections of country and ruling party should be

established to make people believe that this country needs this ruling party; otherwise, the country would collapse.

Although economic development, the emergent middle class and public education might be not be consistently pro-democracy factors (and could be manipulated by rulers), yet these factors could help to create an environment for generational culture shift. The results of generational culture shift would be a more solid support in establishing democracy, since the younger generation, as culture shift theorists indicate, would be more attached to democratic values than the older generation. Thus, in the long term, democratic culture could emerge in the minds of the younger generation and lead to demands for democratic change.

Part 1 Conclusions

In the first chapter of this thesis, three hypotheses and four research questions are introduced to solve the question of whether or not a Confucian society can produce or maintain a democratic regime, and why, when facing the long-term disappearance of democracy, some Confucian societies succeeded but some of them failed. These hypotheses and research questions focus on three aspects. Firstly, whether Confucianism itself or traditional legacies should take major responsibility for hindering the development of democracy, and what is the ruler's attitude in the face of claims for democracy; secondly, what is the role of traditional legacies during the political change to democracy; and thirdly, what is the role of modernisation, and whether modernisation can help or hinder the development of democracy.

In the second chapter, this thesis indicates that political culture is a political attitude at a certain time, and this is shaped by a long-term accumulation of socialisation and collective memory in a nation. Moreover, it will influence people's political activities in the future. Regarding the emergence of a democratic regime, it can be viewed in two stages. In the short term, a democratic regime may need major players to support the political system to democratise a non-democratic regime. Nonetheless, a solid democratic political culture is needed to sustain a democratic regime in the long run. Reviewing the historical background, people in most Confucian societies did not have democratic experiences, and their long-term experience of politics was dominated by the political system of the Confucian imperial period over thousands of years. Thus, the political culture in these societies is still affected by four traditional legacies from the Confucian imperial period: hierarchical politics, *guanxi*, harmony, and group-orientation.

This thesis has demonstrated that these legacies have their definitions in Confucian classics, and emerged from the imperial period. After Confucianism withdrew from the political arena, these legacies continue to exist through non-democratic leaderships. Hierarchical politics enable non-democratic rulers to continue to control the political agenda without strong opposing opinions; *guanxi*, which could lead to cronyism; and harmony and group-orientation, which could help non-democratic rulers to construct official ideology, and facilitate nationalism, social stability, and the sacrifice of personal interest to further the collective interest, sustaining non-democratic regimes in Confucian societies.

Modernisation is presented as a revolutionary process to a traditional society that would change economic, political and social aspects of the society. It is involved in a value change and covers at least industrialisation, urbanisation, expansion of political participation, popularised education, secularisation and openness of mass media in a society. Originally, modernisation theories are based on experiences from western protestant countries, and scholars indicate that non-western countries should follow these routes. However, these concepts were revised later, so that the change to modernisation should include the situation and conditions of the individual country. According to modernisation theories, an open political environment should be created, and a democratic regime could be established.

Lipset indicates that economic growth, the emergence of a middle class and education are major factors that could help to establish a democratic regime. Nonetheless, according to scholarly arguments, economic growth would help a democratic regime to survive, but it may not necessarily lead to democracy. The middle class would consider their own interests; if a traditional regime can satisfy their political needs and interests, the middle class may choose to support the original regime. Education needs certain conditions; a popularised education with a neutral environment is essential. And the most important of all, modernisation would only make people more skilful in their claims for democracy; interactions between rulers and people, especially the actions of the ruler, would dominate whether modernisation led to democracy or not.

In modern Confucian societies, rulers' actions, the US factor and whether the regime is indigenous become three factors that can affect modernisation in these societies. In non-democratic societies, economic growth may not lead to democratisation as modernisation theories have indicated; it could result in regime stability, because intrinsic demands for democracy cannot be permitted by the rulers. Meanwhile, in order to ease the political requirements of the middle class, non-democratic rulers release more political space in order to gain support. Moreover, party-ideology and patriotic education are promoted by rulers to construct an official ideology to make people believe that the existing regime is the optimal choice for the current situation. In democratic regimes, Taiwan and South Korea faced challenges from indigenous elites because the KMT regime was an outsider and the leaders of South Korea was installed or supported by the US. In the meantime, as a member of the democratic camp, these two regimes could not maintain a hard-line position to the people. In terms of economic growth, it created a group of entrepreneurs who would share power with non-democratic rulers, and these rulers could only follow pro-western economic

policies. As for the middle class in modernisation, this class became a major power for demanding democracy in South Korea, and in Taiwan. Ideologically, the middle class stood to support opponents who asked to establish a democratic regime. The education system was not neutral, but in order to go against Communist China and Korea, Taiwan and South Korea practised nation-building, anti-communist education, and democratic values that were introduced because both of them were members of the democratic camp during the Cold War period.

As well as the discussions and findings above, the hypotheses mentioned in Chapter 1 are re-confirmed in these theoretical chapters.

At the beginning of each of the case studies, the ruler's attitude will be demonstrated to examine their argument of whether democracy should be practised or not, and whether they are affected by any international factors. In the second section, this thesis will discuss how traditional legacies and modernisation factors are/were treated for or against democracy; the regime type and the US factors will also be discussed. In the third section, this thesis will use the Asian Barometer Survey data to analyse the trend of people's support for traditional legacies and democratic values for discovering whether these factors are affected by measures from the second section. After that, regressions for analysing what kind of people would support or oppose traditional legacies and democratic values will be demonstrated. And finally a conclusion will be made. In the next part, this thesis expects to find that:

1. Leaderships in non-democratic Confucian societies create a pseudo democracy in response to people's claim for democracy. In democratic societies, leaderships could tolerate opponents who make a claim for democracy and democratic values cannot be forbidden, because it is also considered official propaganda.
2. Traditional legacies are selectively emphasised by non-democratic leaders to build up an official ideology and maintain social stability. However, in democratic societies, these legacies are diminishing.
3. Non-democratic rulers use modernisation as a tool to serve and protect the regime, and the purpose of modernisation also serves to protect their regime. In democratic regimes, the results of modernisation drive democratisation because non-democratic rulers did not have ability to continue to dominate the modernisation process.
4. Effect of regime nature, the US factor, and internal and international factors in Taiwan and South Korea's cases.
5. Political culture in non-democratic societies is dominated by measures taken by

rulers; the traditional legacies which are strongly promoted by leaderships will be high, whereas democratic values are low. On the other hand, in democratic societies, the overall trend for democratic values is increasing, and support for traditional legacies is diminishing.

Part 2: Case Studies

Chapter 4: Methodology and Research Methods for Cases Studies

‘Democratisation studies’, which focus on the global spread, pace, and process of democratisation, is one of the important topics in comparative politics (Landman, 2008, p.186). The research of this thesis falls within the scope of this discipline and focuses on why some Confucian societies can democratise while others cannot, and asks whether Confucianism or its legacies is the obstacle in scholarly texts. The present research indicates that, although Confucianism itself should not be labelled as being a major obstacle to democracy, traditional legacies, which were derived from Confucianism and which remain entrenched in people’s minds, work to shape a disadvantageous political culture for democracy. Although one might expect that modernisation would diminish these traditional legacies, non-democratic leaders have managed to use elements of modernisation to consolidate their rule.

4.1 Methodology

Methodology can be viewed as a recipe which describes the reason why this recipe should be used in this research (Clough & Nutbrown, 2007, p.23), and it is a principle which guides one to choose research methods (Burnham, Gilland, Grant & Layton-Henry, 2004, p.4). This thesis is the result of a democratisation study that belongs to comparative politics; thus, it necessitated a comparative methodology.

There are three strategies for researchers to compare countries: global selection, few countries selection, and single country study (Landman, 2008; Burnham, et al., 2004, pp.75-78).⁴¹ The chosen strategy should be based on how many suitable cases can be selected in the research (Burnham, et al., 2004, p.75). A large number comparison can be viewed as ‘variable-oriented’, focusing on ‘general dimensions of macro-social variation’ and analysing the relationship between variables with a global view for ‘stronger inferences and theory-building’ (Landman, 2008, pp.53-54, pp.63-64). Because of its extensive observation, however, large number comparison also faces disadvantages in data collection and statics technology. Case studies of Confucian societies are not suitable for this strategy, because the number of Confucian societies is limited and regional, rather than large in number and global. Furthermore, a single country study may not be accurately considered as a comparative study, and may also

⁴¹ They use large-n and small-n to represent large number and few countries

be criticised as ‘theoretical’ and ‘interpretative’ or ‘configurative-idiographic’ (Landman, 2008, p.86, citing Lijphart, 1971, p.691 and Eckstein, 1975, p.96). However, a single country study can contribute to the development of new classifications or types (Landman, 2008, pp.86-87). This strategy could not be applied to the present regional research, because the aim of the study is to determine whether Confucian culture is an obstacle to democracy and why in some cases democracy has succeeded, and in others failed.

Since this thesis adopted the few countries selection strategy, then an adequate design is needed to examine the three hypotheses and five research questions. In comparative research, two major designs are available: one is the ‘most similar’ system design, and another is the ‘most different’ systems design (Landman, 2008, p.70; Burnham, et al., 2004, pp.62-68).

The ‘most different’ systems design (MDSD) ‘compares countries that do not share any common features apart from the political outcome to be explained and one or two of the explanatory factors seen to be important for that outcome’ (Landman, 2008, p.70). It focuses on similar characteristics in countries with different backgrounds to explain a specific political outcome (Burnham, et al., 2004, p.63). This design is used on cross-regional studies (Landman, 2008, pp.72-75). The ‘most similar’ systems design (MSSD) ‘seeks to compare political systems that share a host of common features in an effort to neutralise some differences while highlighting others’ (Landman, 2008, p.70). This design is relevant when countries have similar backgrounds, yet several important factors differ and lead to different political outcomes (Landman, 2008, p.70; Burnham, et al., 2004, p.63). It is applied particularly to area studies (Landman, 2008, p.71). Countries in the same region with similar cultural and historical backgrounds may form a specific geographic area. The system selected is designed to control the similar and common characteristics and then identify different characteristics that could lead to different political outcomes (Landman, 2008, pp.70-71). The difference between these two designs is in the selection of cases.

Regarding these two designs, MSSD is the appropriate design for this research for two reasons. Firstly, Confucian societies are located in the same region and share similar cultural backgrounds, and therefore they fall within the definition of MSSD. Secondly, one of the purposes of this thesis is to answer why some Confucian societies democratised but some others failed to do so, and MSSD is also designed for accommodating these background factors and is useful for comparing differences in

explanatory factors.

According to the hypotheses, the explanatory factors that this thesis focuses on are the leaderships' choice of democracy (leaderships' choice) and political cultures, which are shaped by traditional legacies and modernisation. This thesis will compare these two factors to figure out why some Confucian societies can democratise, while others can sustain non-democratic rule.

In regard to the leaderships' attitude to democracy, a democracy needs both the ruler and the people's agreement in both the short-term and long-term (Huntington, 1997; Schedler, 2001; Pridham, 2000; Linz, 1990, pp.156-158). The elites' choice of democracy or non-democracy and interaction between the elites and people are key elements for the emergence of democracy (Inglehart, 1997, p.215, p.330; 1990, p.429; Huntington, 1991, pp.70-72). This thesis assumes that the leaderships' attitudes to democracy are different in democratic and non-democratic societies. In non-democratic cases, leaders create a pseudo-democracy to avoid the pressure of claiming democracy. However, in democratic societies, internal challenges, political facts and a clear communist enemy in the non-democratic period forced leaders to take pragmatic and efficient methods to respond to challenges; thus, leaders demonstrated tolerant attitudes towards opponents.

As for political culture, democratic regimes require a strong democratic political culture to support them (Gunther, Puhle, & Diamandouros, 1995; Pridham, 2000; Inglehart, 1990, 1997; Diamond, 1999). Traditional legacies, which were derived from Confucianism during the imperial period, exist in Confucian societies and are a threat to democracy. It would seem that modernisation could diminish these traditional legacies to re-shape a political culture that is more consistent with democracy. However, non-democratic and democratic Confucian societies demonstrate different phenomena that also result in different political outcomes. In non-democratic societies, traditional legacies are partly chosen by non-democratic rulers to build up the official ideology, and modernisation factors are used as facilitators to help them sustain their rule. In these cases, the leadership tries to strengthen traditional legacies and manipulate modernisation to create an anti-democracy and support a pseudo-democracy within the political culture in order to sustain their rule. However, in democratic societies, international factors and digressive control of power for political agendas has meant that leaders cannot manipulate modernisation, as has been done in non-democratic societies. This result helps to establish a more open political environment for democracy and decreases support for traditional legacies. Democratic

values are increasing in those societies that could construct a democratic political culture to support their democratic regime. Political culture is a long-term socialisation process and an accumulation of political thought among the people; therefore, individual attitudes to democracy must be considered (Shin, 1994). The Asian Barometer Survey Data will be applied to estimate political culture in this context.

Comparisons of these explanatory factors will lead to different political outcomes of political cultures in non-democratic and democratic Confucian societies. The reasons behind these variations will be discussed and advice for non-democratic countries will also be made.

4.2 Research Methods

Research methods are an intrinsic part of research that will lead to research findings (Clough & Nutbrown, 2007, p.28; Burnham, et al., 2004, p.1). Considering the requirements of this thesis, both qualitative and quantitative methods were used to examine hypotheses. The selected methods are documentary and archival analysis, and data from large-scale surveys for descriptive statistics, regressions and other statistical models.

4.2.1 Documentary and Archival Analysis

The resources for documentary and archival analysis can be divided into primary, second and tertiary sources. Primary sources are evidence of the event or the result of the event; secondary sources are the items that are related to the event or are produced just after the event; and tertiary sources are ‘materials written afterward to reconstruct the event’ (Burnham, et al., 2004, p.165, citing Lichtman & French, 1978, p.18). Researchers can use these sources to construct a theoretical framework and understand the concepts of the event. This research will use several documents and archives, which could be primary, secondary or tertiary sources, for analysis.

In order to understand the real picture of the Confucian political system, this thesis has used Confucian Classics to explain the actual framework of the fundamental system. In theoretical chapters, these classics also provide useful information to distinguish whether Confucianism or its legacies lead to a negative environment for

democracy. In case studies, Confucian Classics will also be used to demonstrate how non-democratic leaders try to use the name of Confucianism to practise non-democratic rule.

Official documents and records are the primary sources that directly provide the government's official decisions and thinking about a given event. Through these official documents and records, the construction of a pseudo-democracy, the promotion of official ideology and the leaderships' attitude and policies, the decision to strengthen traditional legacies, and the use of modernisation as a facilitator to consolidate rule, can all be found. Official documents also reflect why leaders of the pre-democratic period in democratic Confucian societies needed to take soft-line, pragmatic and efficient measures to face challenges, rather than taking a hard-line attitude to consolidate their rule. Official newspapers, publications or major newspapers, as secondary sources, also offer official attitudes or reflect facts around an event. While official documents only offer the official tone for an event, official publications may offer more discussions and opinions that reflect official thinking on decisions and policies.

In China, the sources of these documents, newspapers or publications are the Communist Party's website, and official newspapers and their related websites (especially sources from the People Daily or the Xinhuanet), which offer official documents, and a theoretical framework for official ideology and leaders' speeches. As for Singapore, the major materials are sourced from the Singapore government's website, Lee Kwan Yew's talks and his bibliography, and Nanyang Sin-Chew Lianhe Zaobao, one of the largest newspapers in Singapore. In Taiwan, major materials are from the Sun Yat-sen foundation website, the Chiang Kai-Shek foundation website, the Taiwanese government and major newspapers in the country. As for South Korea, materials are from the South Korean government's website.

Tertiary sources, written by scholars and people related to the events, are also used to discuss the case studies. Scholars have observed and discussed several pertinent topics in China, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, and some of them offered valuable information and opinions.

4.2.2 Large-scale survey for statistical analysis

A survey, in definition, tries to 'obtain accurate information about a population by obtaining a representative sample of that population and using the information from

the sample to make generalizations about the whole population' (Burnham, et al., 2004, p.81). Thus, a survey can reflect popular opinions on certain issues and demonstrate support of traditional legacies, modernisation or the existing political culture. The Asian Barometer Survey is the only cross-country large-scale survey that can offer standardised questionnaires for these four cases, China, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. Moreover, the survey can offer two waves survey data, which can help to analyse the trend of support for democracy, traditional legacies and existing political culture. Until now, no substantial survey has been able to offer comprehensive survey data like the Asian Barometer Survey for these countries. Thus, this thesis will use two waves data from the Asian Barometer Survey for statistical analysis, which will be demonstrated in two parts.

In this statistical section, there are three major variables: democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors. Regarding traditional legacies, in previous empirical studies, scholars' indicators of Confucian values or traditional values were similar to those of this thesis; the focus is on harmony, group-orientation, *guanxi* and the authoritarian concepts (Nathan, 2007, p.13-14;⁴² Shin, 2007, p. 27; Chang & Chu, 2007, p.17;⁴³ Park, & Shin, 2004, pp.17-19;⁴⁴ Nathan & Chen, 2004, pp.2-3; Chang & Chu, 2002, pp.20-29⁴⁵). Traditional legacies mentioned in this thesis are divided into four categories as Chapter Three indicates: hierarchical politics, harmony, group-orientation and *guanxi*. This thesis will use the Asian Barometer Survey to demonstrate support of traditional legacies and democratic values in four cases through two waves data. Based on the previous research and the analytical framework, traditional legacies relate to questions from two waves questionnaires (see Appendix 1).

Concerning modernisation factors, this thesis will use actual age, educational level (divided into three levels: lower education level, where people do not finish their high school education; high school education, where people do not go on to obtain any degree, and degree level, which people have at least a degree), subjective social class (divided into lower, middle and upper classes) and economic performance. The chosen questions and recoding information are demonstrated in Appendix 1.

⁴² His research indicates that the three Confucian societies, China, Taiwan and Hong Kong have the lowest percentage of people committed to democracy, followed by Korea and Japan, and then followed by the non-Confucian societies of Mongolia, Thailand and Philippines.

⁴³ They used four indexes as the traditional values.

⁴⁴ They used four indexes as social values and three indexes as political values to exam whether these values would be obstacles in South Korea and found that people who supported these values were more likely to support antiauthoritarianism and be against democracy.

⁴⁵ Their research indicates that Confucian values hinder the development of democracy; the more Confucian values a person has, the fewer demands for political rights he/she has in mind.

As for democratic values, the category is inclusive of democracy, political freedom and autonomy, equality, representation, majority rule and citizenship (Blaug & Schwarzmantel, 2006; Sartori, 1987; Held, 1995; Dahl, 1989). A discussion of democratic values should begin by addressing freedom and individual autonomy, where people have an equal right to choose without any intervention (Held, 1995, pp.145-153; Held, 1996, pp.299-304; Blaug & Schwarzmantel, 2006, p.4; Sartori, 1987, pp.301-305; Dahl, 1989, p.85). Some authors have insisted that, 'in the absence of a compelling showing to the contrary everyone should be assumed to be the best judge of his or her own good or interest' (Dahl, 1989, p.100; see also Sartori, 1987, pp.344-356, who argues that everyone should be equally treated before the law). In addition, people should be aware of their rights in public affairs (Held, 1995, pp.145-153; 1996, pp.299-304; Dahl, 1989, p.105), otherwise people would never outgrow their childhood in terms of public affairs (Dahl, 1989, p.105). And finally, as Held noted, since only qualified citizens would share political rights, democratic legitimacy would be established on the basis of the largest number of votes in the election (1996, p.337).

After deciding who can participate in a democratic regime, Dahl (1989, pp.108-114) suggests four essential elements for a democratic regime: effective participation in which citizens have equal opportunity to express their preference to final outcome (Dahl, 1989, p.109); voting equality at the decisive stage, where citizens should have equal opportunity to make collective decisions, to ensure that each person has only one vote; enlightened understanding, which argues that people should be given proper information to ensure they have full ability to decide; and control of the agenda, in which 'the demos must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how matters are to be placed on the agenda of matters that are to be decided by means of the democratic process' (Dahl, 1989, p.113). This, in essence, indicates the importance of vertical accountability. Aside from vertical accountability, horizontal accountability is also important because, if accountability does not exist, then the democratic regime will fail because of the expansion of executive power. Therefore, effective state institutions must exist to enhance horizontal accountability and limit executive power (O'Donnell, 1998, pp.113-114, pp.117-122; Huntington, 1997, pp.58-59).

Based on these concepts, scholars offered several conditions for a democratic regime. For instance, Schumpeter (2003, p.269) indicated that democracy is a mechanism to decide government officers, and election and competitiveness are two important factors for democracy. Furthermore, the ruler must govern the state democratically and free

election of executive and parliamentary positions should be constitutionally guaranteed. There should not be violations of individual and minority rights, nor should there be a lack of legislative function that would lead to failure of the rule of law. Otherwise, the regime should be considered to be a non-democratic regime (Linz & Stepan, 1998, pp.48-49; 1996, p.15). Linz also offers a clearer definition that requires an open, free and fair election for electing executive and legislative branch members; an equal right to vote for citizens; political and civil rights, such as the freedoms of assembly, of publishing or of speech. Moreover, the government power belongs to elected officers and should not be affected by military or religious power (Linz, 2000, p.34). Sorensen (2008, pp.26-27) also indicates that democracy refers to rule of the people, and three major dimensions should be considered in a democratic regime: competition, participation, and civil and political liberties. Held offers a broader definition: a constitution ensures that the government should be controlled by elected officers, mechanisms for fair and free election to elect or recall elected officers; equal rights to elect or be elected; substantial freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, and freedom of gathering information (1995, p.51). As for a globally accepted definition, member states of the United Nations (UN) declare democracy to be a 'universally recognised ideal', and that UN forces can protect human rights, civil liberties and political rights in 'meaningful democracies' (United Nations, 2011, October 27). The UN definition, in effect, summarises scholars' conditions for a democratic regime, 'democracy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives'" (United Nations, 2011, October 27). In general, political equality, popular sovereignty, rule of law, checks and balances, political liberty and political pluralism are essential concepts to form a democratic regime. This thesis adopts this UN definition of a democratic regime.

Based on these ideas, democratic values in this essay adopt Hu Fu's 'five dimensions of democratic value-orientation' that are used in the Asian Barometer Survey (Hu, 1998, pp.19-23; Chu, Chang, & Hu, 2003, p.37; Chang, Chu, & Tsai, 2005, pp.15-18). Hu uses four relationships of power: power from status, source of political power, range of rule (including protection of people's liberty and social liberty), and checks and balances, to develop five value-orientations: 1. Political equality, 2. Popular accountability, 3. Political liberty, 4. Political pluralism, and 5. Separation of power (horizontal accountability). This thesis adds 'rule of law' as the sixth dimension because, as Chapter 2 demonstrates, the 'rule of man' rather than the 'rule of law' is the key element that led to the acceptance of traditional legacies. The chosen questions for democratic values are noted in Appendix 1.

The condition on whether or not to choose these questions was made by requiring that the question exist in four cases and the two waves of data. However, the question for group orientation was not the same, because of the wording on the different questionnaires; therefore, group orientation will only be compared between countries rather than comparing between the two waves.

This thesis will use these variables to demonstrate the statistical findings through descriptive statistics and multi regression models.

4.2.3 Descriptive statistics

Descriptive statistics is a basic tool to describe data and also offers a powerful and direct way to measure, analyse and demonstrate data (Burnham, et al., 2004, p.114). The descriptive statistics in this thesis will serve the following purposes:

Percentage analysis: in each case, this thesis will demonstrate the support and reject percentages for four traditional legacies and six democratic values orientation. Recoded chosen questions (mentioned in Appendix 1) will be used for this demonstration. Through these percentage analyses, the general attitude for traditional legacies and democratic values will be illustrated.

Strength analysis: this thesis will also use recoded chosen questions (mentioned in Appendix 1) to demonstrate the strength of four traditional legacies and six democratic values orientation. This analysis will demonstrate how people are attached to traditional legacies and democratic values.

4.2.4 Multiple regression models

Four multiple regression models will be operated for responding to hypothesis 2 and 3.

Model 1: Satisfaction with democracy in China, Singapore, Taiwan or South Korea

The purpose of this model is to determine whether traditional legacies or modernisation factors would affect the people's attitude to the existing democracy in the four cases. In China and Singapore, this model would test whether traditional legacies and modernisation factors that are manipulated by the leaders would help to

consolidate their rule or not. As for Taiwan and South Korea, this model will examine the factors that support the existing democracy. The dependent variable is ‘On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in our country. Are you ...’. The original answer ‘Very Dissatisfied’ is recoded to ‘-2’, ‘Somewhat Dissatisfied’ to ‘-1’, ‘Somewhat Satisfied’ to ‘1’, ‘Very Satisfied’ to ‘2’, and others to ‘0’. The independent variables – traditional legacies and modernisation factors – are listed in Appendix 1. Age, gender and democratic variables, also in Appendix 1, are the control factors in this model.

Model 2: Relations between democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors

The purpose of this model is to determine whether traditional legacies or modernisation factors would hinder or help the development of democratic values in all societies. The dependent variable is democratic variables (Appendix 1). The independent variables are traditional legacies and modernisation factors. Age and gender are the social-economic background factors in this model.

Model 3: Whether modernisation factors can diminish traditional legacies in China and Singapore

The purpose of this model is to figure out whether modernisation factors can diminish traditional legacies in China and Singapore. The dependent variable is traditional legacies (anti-) (mentioned in Appendix 1); all legacies are combined and form the ‘traditional legacies dependent variable’, and, because of the recoding process, the variable is ‘anti-traditional-legacies-oriented’. The independent variable is modernisation factors. Age and gender are control variables.

Model 4: The factors that will affect traditional legacies in Taiwan and South Korea

Whether this model should be operated in Taiwan and South Korea is dependent on the result of Model 2 in Taiwan and South Korea. If traditional legacies are confirmed to hinder the development of democratic values, this model will be operated to test which factor would help to diminish traditional legacies. The dependent variable is traditional legacies (anti-) (mentioned in Appendix 1); all legacies are combined and form the ‘traditional legacies dependent variable’, and, because of the recoding process, the variable is ‘anti-traditional-legacies-oriented’. The independent variable is modernisation factors. Democratic variables, age and gender are control variables.

Chapter 5: China

China is the birthplace of Confucianism, and the first Confucian society to practise democracy during the 1910s and 1920s. Now China is the largest non-democratic country in the world. The Communist Party of China (CPC) authority proclaims itself as a democratic regime, but the CPC's version of democracy has its own characteristics for satisfying its own situation in response to external and internal pressure. The CPC authority now is a dynamic regime; it can adjust its official ideology to confront the changing environment, using both traditional legacies and modernisation factors as tools for consolidating rule.

This chapter will focus on three points. In the beginning, this chapter will discuss the leadership's attitude to democracy and how Chinese democracy is constructed. This thesis will demonstrate that Chinese democracy is based on an original ideology and adjustments to openness and reform. This thesis will then discuss how traditional legacies are adopted to construct its official ideology, and how modernisation factors are manipulated to benefit the rule of the CPC. Finally, statistical analysis will demonstrate quantitatively that the Chinese popularly support Chinese democracy. In the statistical section, this thesis will show that the values of traditional legacies encouraged by the CPC have increasing support, while support for democratic values is comparatively low. Meanwhile, interactions between traditional legacies and modernisation factors, and their relationship to democratic values, will also be analysed to determine the factors that could hinder the development of democracy in China.

5.1 Democracy with Chinese characteristics

A Report from the House of Lords, United Kingdom, notes:

China has never known democracy as the West understands it. The Communist Party, in power since 1949, continues to run China at all levels and remains the dominant force. The formation of alternative political movements or parties is forbidden. This is unlikely to change in the near future.

(House of Lords, 2010, Key Issues point 3).

This description indicates that in China, democracy is different from the form of democracy known universally. Similarly, the Chinese government claims that China has also adopted a democratic system, albeit a democracy with Chinese characteristics. In China, western democracy is at an impasse, and Wu Bangguo (吴邦国), the chairman of the National People's Congress, argued that the separation of powers, the multi-party system and bicameral Congress will never be established in China (Gao, 2009, March 11).

Chu, Chang, and Hu (2003, p.38) distinguish two types of 'democracy' in modern authoritarian regimes: the Desirability Argument and the Feasibility Argument. The first one is similar to Chinese democracy, socialist democracy or guided democracy, wherein the government creates a different definition of democracy and declares that this new democracy is better than the western one. The second Argument indicates that the country in question is not ready for western democracy, and that a high price would be paid if it adopted western democracy immediately. The CPC fits into the first model, and official documents have demonstrated that the CPC had prepared for its own form of democracy before it won the civil war.

This section will firstly indicate that in fact, the CPC originally supported a democracy similar to that of the West. However, party leaders changed their minds after taking power from the KMT. During the period of the Cultural Revolution, China turned to a totalitarian regime controlled by Mao Zedong. After that, the CPC began economic reform and gradually revised its ideology to construct a Chinese democracy.

5.1.1 Before the end of the Cultural Revolution

After military and KMT dictatorial rule from 1912 to 1949, the CPC won the civil war by claiming and establishing a democratic regime in China (see the CPC leadership's speeches in Shantou University Press, 1999; Pepper, 1986). However, regimes in China still maintained a series of top-down political systems from the totalitarian regime, post-totalitarian regime, and 'Party as a Supervisor of the State'.

The CPC's claim for establishing a democratic government was in response to the trend from the May Fourth movements; the historical evidence suggests that the CPC did not support one-party rule before the party gained state power. *Lishi de xiansheng*:

ban ge shiji qian de zhuangyan chengnuo (历史的先声—半个世纪前的庄严承诺),⁴⁶ the book celebrating the 50th anniversary of the battle of the democratic CPC that ended KMT dictatorship, was a collection of the official documents from the CPC leadership and the CPC official newspapers before 1949. In this book, nearly all of the CPC official documents claimed that democracy, even the American or British versions, were welcomed. Furthermore, the book collected records of the argument for political equality, freedom of assembly and speech, accountability and rule of law – the characteristics for a democratic regime. Most importantly, in the book the CPC claimed to end KMT one-party rule in 'Jiefang Daily' (解放日报, the official newspaper of the CPC propaganda, used to publicise the CPC's policies and opinions) on 28th October 1941. The newspaper article argued that the key to the implementation of democratic politics at the time was to end KMT one-party rule (Shantou University Press, 1999, p.304). If one-party rule was not resolved, then the affairs of state were bound to be in the hands of one party; therefore, intellectuals could not be involved in government, and good suggestions could not be implemented. Although KMT argued that there was a democratic government, the so-called democratic government existed only in name. Nonetheless, only after the end of one-party rule, and the separation of party and government had been put into practice, would intellectuals contribute their best to public life. As a result, people in different parties could learn and watch each other in order to seek the greatest progress in politics. The CPC also clearly asked to end one-party rule and carry out democratic politics; this implied that all parties would gather in the democratic regime and work towards democratic politics (Shantou University Press, 1999). Meanwhile, Liu, Shaoqi (刘少奇), the former president of China, indicated that 'It is a malicious rumour-mongering and slander to argue that the CPC moves against KMT's one party dictatorship only to establish instead the CPC's own one-party dictatorship. The purpose for the CPC to go against the KMT dictatorship is to establish a democratic government rather than establishing the CPC one-party dictatorship' (Shantou University Press, 1999, p.292).

The official position on a democratic coalition government can also be seen in Mao Zedong's speeches to the National Congress of the Communist Party of China, such as the speech he delivered named 'On Coalition Government on the 7th National Congress in 1945'. His speeches mentioned the establishment of an interim central government formed by the representatives from the KMT, the CPC, the CDL and non-partisan people. This interim government would issue a democratic policy agenda and hold free elections to elect the representatives to the National Assembly and

⁴⁶ The book has been banned by the CPC authority.

create the formal democratic government (Mao, 1945). In order to carry out its promise, the CPC assembled 'The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference' (CPPCC), with other parties, not long before they won the civil war. This conference delivered the first constitution in 1954, which kept several democratic values, such as the rule of law and the parliamentary system. Furthermore, this constitution did not mention one-party rule in China. From 1949 to 1957, the promise of a democratic coalition government was used in slogans and strategies to attract support from anti-KMT parties. This stage continued until 1957, when the CPC won the civil war; it established a coalition government and shared partial power with other parties, such as the CDL and the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang (民革, one of the founders was Sun, Yat-Sen's wife, Soong Ching-ling).

The newly born 'democracy' ended after the Anti-Rightist Movement in 1957 and the regime in China transformed from a 'democracy' to a totalitarian regime. Any party or leader who did not agree with the CPC's policy was outside the government and related institutions. From 1957 to the end of the Cultural Revolution, Mao started to eliminate his potential and actual political competitors to ensure his political status. During the Anti-Rightist Movement, Red Guards, most of whom were young students, became Mao's personal guards; they only followed Mao's orders, and were loyal to Mao himself. Mao, at that time, tried to establish himself as the only great leader (see Li Zhisui, 1994) and China raised a cult dedicated to Mao himself. Most of his comrades who were loyal, but did not follow his opinion, , such as Peng Dehuai (彭德怀), Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao (林彪)⁴⁷, were, sooner or later, killed in this movement. Thousands of scholars, teachers, CPC party leaders or anyone else, who, it was claimed, failed to follow Mao's ideas, were cited as anti-revolution or anti CPC (8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 1966; 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1968). Also in this period, a new constitution was established, which limited most civil rights and party organisations; the Cultural Revolution suggestions and the quotations from Chairman Mao became the only guide for the state. After the Cultural Revolution, the *Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of CPC* criticised Mao's errors and clearly indicated that the class struggle and revolutionary mobilisation of the people was not necessary. The party was urged to emphasise the construction of a democratic system and the security of the democratic system under the rule of the CPC (11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1981).

⁴⁷ Lin Biao was one of the most loyalty supporters of Mao; he even said, 'Chairman Mao is a genius, every sentence from him is the truth'.

5.1.2 Construction of Chinese Democracy

Mao constructed Chinese democracy in the 1940s (his suggestion of the New Democracy of China, can be found, for the first time, in his speech ‘New democracy’ (新民主主义论) in 1940). He understood that China is a rural state, and, like the successful revolutions in Chinese history that overthrew a previous dynasty, a successful revolutionary movement must be joined by people from rural areas. He combined the word democracy with the ‘bourgeois-democratic revolution’, arguing that class struggle is needed in China to fight against capitalists, and foreign powers are exploiters who seize power over members of the proletariat, such as farmers and labourers. Therefore, a bourgeois-democratic revolution in which farmers, workers or intellectuals could participate was needed to overthrow the feudal society manipulated by capitalists and landlords.

However, the situation changed after economic openness began, when the regime faced social, economic and political challenges following economic reform. Scholars argue that China now is more like a post-totalitarian state (Wu, 2007, pp.309-311; Lin & Hsu, 2004, pp.14-26; Nathan, 2003, pp.7-16).⁴⁸ During this period, the original socialist ideology has been gradually weakened, or even, some scholars indicate, has ‘died’ during the economic reform period (Bell, 2009, May 11). In order to re-construct the official ideology, traditional values – as constituted in Confucianism – were suggested to replace it (Thompson, 2001, pp.162-163; Bell, 2009, May 11; Huntington, 1996, p.106; Hahm 2004, pp. 99-100).

⁴⁸ Wu (2007) indicates that the CPC still guards people and the society and controls every important aspect to prevent any possibility that would endanger their regime. On the other hand, the CPC tries to transform China to follow the East Asian economic development model to seek a high-growth economic development for consolidating their ruling legitimacy. Lin and Hsu (2004, pp.14-26) also indicate that China now is a degenerative totalitarianism state, and argue that because of the rapid economic development, China now faces economic challenges, such as unequal distribution of wealth, a developmental gap between regions, and even problems from farmers and workers. The coalition of ruling elites and enterprises may provide a short-term stable environment. China now tries to promote a ‘limited political reform’ to increase government efficiency, and also tries to maintain rapid economic development to ease pressure for social, economic and political challenges. Meanwhile, China also tries to maintain a peaceful and friendly international environment. However, Lin and Hsu suspect that the CPC may still need to face regime transition eventually, because a degenerative totalitarianism may not be able to maintain rapid economic development. Nathan (2003, pp.7-16) also indicates that two important institutional changes happened in China. ‘Norm-Bound Succession Politics’, from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao, and ‘Meritocracy Modifies Factionalism’, which focuses more on a regularised process, rather than factions, now exist in China. In order to overcome the crisis of legitimacy, more input, such as the ‘three representatives’ and expansion of local elections theory was introduced. Economic growth, which leads to the rise in living standards, was also effective. Meanwhile, no substantial opponents and the chaotic conditions from former Soviet Union states also provide the CPC with sources to help convince people of the cost of reform.

The communist party learned from the lessons of the Cultural Revolution and started to abandon the original farmer-workers alliances route. Instead, leaders of the Communist party began to revise its ideology to expand its mass support. This party takes a pragmatic attitude to revision of its official ideology. In order to expand its mass base, the party announced that China now stood at the primary stage of socialism; thus, openness and economic development become important factors in raising general living standards (Wen, 2007). Because of economic development, the middle class and upper class emerged. In order to confront this situation, the CPC amended its original ideology, which now offers 'three representatives' to open political space for these newly emerged social classes. Most importantly, according to the argument of the Chinese government, China now is a democratic country that adapts to national conditions specific to China.

Three elements can now be identified in Chinese democracy: People's Democracy, Democratic Centralism and Minben (People-Orientation). The first two elements are from the original CPC thinking, and the third one, Minben, was suggested by Hu and Wen in the past decade. 'Three Representatives' expand the mass base of the CPC, and Minben asks CPC officials to take care of the needs of the population in a dynamic and flexible way. Through these methods, the CPC eases pressure from the people's claim for democracy and further consolidates its ruling base.

5.1.3 People's Democracy

According to the government's white book of 'The construction of Chinese democratic politics' (中国的民主政治建设), one of the important characteristics for Chinese democracy is a people's democracy under the CPC's leadership (Information Office of the State Council, The People's Republic of China, 2005, October 19). The Chinese people can enjoy democracy because of the CPC's efforts and the facts that a democratic system has been established by the CPC; nevertheless, the development of Chinese democracy still needs to be supervised by the CPC. Under the CPC's leadership, the society can be stable to ensure both social and economic development; China can maintain unity to fight for a better future.

Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao gave a speech at the Royal Society of Britain that mentioned several pertinent points: the goal for China is to achieve a society with full democracy, the rule of law, fairness and justice. In essence, the Chinese accept the concepts of democracy, and the rule of law, freedom, equality and human rights are the result of the struggles against feudal autocracy. However, these concepts would be

achieved in different ways by different states. His speech also mentioned that 'People's democracy is the soul of socialism. Without democracy, there is no socialism. Without freedom, there is no real democracy. Without guarantee of economic and political rights, there is no real freedom' (Wen, 2011, June 27). Hu also argued that the people's democracy means that the CPC is a party to serve people full-heartedly because, in China, the government's power is from the people (News.xinhuanet.com, 2007, October 19). However, a people's democracy does not mean that everyone can enjoy the democracy in this system. According to Mao's speech in 1949, he indicated that only some qualified people could enjoy this democracy (Cpc.people.com.cn, 1949, June 30). The Constitution of the PRC also notes 'The Chinese people must fight against those forces and elements, both at home and abroad, that are hostile to China's socialist system and try to undermine it' (NPC, 2004). Likewise:

Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship.

(National People's Congress (NPC) of the People's Republic of China, 2004).

The CPC controls the power for deciding who can participate in politics.

In order to introduce a people's democracy, the system of people's congresses was established (News.xinhuanet.com, 2007, October 19). This system confirms a non-professional congress system in China where congressional representatives are not committed full time. Professional congressional representatives for these positions in the national people's congress only gather once for several days each year to listen to the government's report and make important decisions. This situation results in easy control by the government that facilitates the consolidation of the CPC's ruling status. According to the Chinese Constitution:

Article 57-The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China is the highest organ of state power. Its permanent body is the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

Article 58-The National People's Congress and its Standing Committee exercise the legislative power of the State.

Article 61-The National People's Congress meets in session once a year and is

convened by its Standing Committee.

(NPC, 2004)

The National People's Congress only meets once a year and its representatives are not full-time professional members of the congress; most of them have other jobs. The institution that actually acts as a congress is the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, which acts on the NPC's behalf when the NPC is not in session. Most members of this committee are professional politicians from the CPC and its affiliated parties. Nevertheless, this system can actually support the CPC authority rather than checking the CPC government.

5.1.4 Democratic Centralism

From the Mao period, CPC leaders have indicated that democratic centralism should be the political principle, both in the CPC and in New China. According to the party constitution of the CPC, democratic centralism should be practised as follows:

Democratic centralism is a combination of centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralised guidance. It is the fundamental organisational principle of the Party and is also the mass line applied in the Party's political activities. The Party must fully expand intra-Party democracy, safeguard the democratic rights of its members, and give play to the initiative and creativity of Party organisations at all levels as well as its members. Correct centralism must be practised so as to ensure the solidarity, unity and concerted action in the whole Party and prompt and effective implementation of its decisions. The sense of organisation and discipline must be strengthened, and all members are equal before Party discipline. Oversight of leading Party organs and of Party members holding leading positions must be strengthened and the system of intra-Party oversight constantly improved. In its internal political activities, the Party conducts criticism and self-criticism in the correct way, waging ideological struggles over matters of principle, upholding truth and rectifying mistakes. Diligent efforts must be made to create a political situation in which there are both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness.

(CPC, 2007, General Program at Constitution of The Communist Party of China, see also People.com.cn, 2011, November 6; Encyclopaedia of CPC History, 2011 and article 10 of CPC constitution)

For the CPC, democracy does exist in China, yet this democracy must be under the

guidance of the CPC. The CPC is responsible for centralising and passing orders to state organisations that then follow these orders using a democratic method to make decisions (Ying, 2005). The CPC collects opinions, and then analyses these opinions and makes them into systematic policies. After that, the CPC publicises the policy to the people, and lets them examine whether this policy is suitable (see Cpc.people.com.cn, 1943, June 4). The CPC also only centralises correct ideas; people provide opinions, and leaders decide the correct ideas. However, democracy is essential because, without democracy, people cannot provide opinions, and there would be no correct opinion to centralise (Cpc.people.com.cn, 2012). Deng Xiaoping even argued that China's democracy is based on a 'democratic centralism system'. The CPC is responsible for guiding this democracy. In this system, 'personal interests must be subordinated to collective ones, the interests of the part to those of the whole, and immediate to long-term interests. In other words, limited interests must be subordinated to overall interests and minor interests to major ones' (Deng, 1979, March 30). However, what constitutes the collective interests is decided by the CPC.

5.1.5 Minben: People-Orientation

One of the representatives of the 'Three Representatives' theory is 'Represents the fundamental interests of the majority'; this part tasks the CPC with representing the people's interests. In the preceding paragraph, this thesis mentioned that the CPC leadership now promotes people's democracy, which indicates that the government's power is from the people. In order to promote this idea, during the Hu-Wen period, Hu and Wen emphasised that CPC officials should understand the CPC and the government should prioritise public welfare. According to Hu:

We must always place the people's interests before everything else, and make sure that the aim and outcome of all our work is to realise, uphold and expand the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people. We must exercise power for the people, identify ourselves with them and work for their interests. This will win us the most extensive, reliable, and solid popular support, which will serve as the source of strength for our work.

All Party members must put the people foremost in their minds, respect the people as masters of the house and their creativity, and treat them as teachers. We must ensure that in their growth, our political vision and governance capacity draw inspiration from the creative practices of the people. We should attach great importance to work relating to the people under new conditions and do the job

well. We must consult the people on policies, learn about their needs, and seek suggestions from them. We must listen to their views, truthfully reflect their wishes, help alleviate their hardships, and protect their economic, political, cultural, and social rights and interests in accordance with the law. The people will care about and feel close to the Party only when the Party feels the same toward them. (Hu, 2007b; 2011, July 1)

Wen also clearly mentioned ‘it is the people who feed you’ when he asked that the PLA implement the rescue mission during the Sichuan disaster earthquake period. The *Building of Political Democracy in China* (中国的民主政治建设), the white paper published by the Chinese government, also declared that the essence of Chinese democracy is that people are the real masters of their own country; it is the nature of socialist democracy in China. Under the CPC’s leadership, this characteristic can be ensured by four measures: the system of people’s congresses; abiding by the Constitution and Law; local self-government; and the principle that all people are equal before the law (Information Office of the State Council, The People’s Republic of China, 2005, October 19). Wen also noted that the government should insist on ‘Minben’, which can be found in Confucian teachings, to ensure a better life for the people under the leadership of the CPC government (Wen, Jiabao, 2009). This Minben reform and ideas are also mentioned in the report of the 17th National Congress of the CPC and in speeches to members of the CPC by Hu Jintao (Hu, 2006; 2007a, p.6).

However, Minben in classic Confucianism is not a democratic concept, as was mentioned in Chapter 2. Although Minben asks the ruler to view the people as the source of legitimacy of the regime, in the classic Confucian political system, most people are not allowed to participate in politics because only the qualified persons can rule; thus the ruler should fulfil his duty to take care of the needs of the populace. For CPC leaders, Minben offers them a democratic image for the people and for foreign countries, showing that the CPC leaders tend to stand on the side of the people and wish to practise democracy.

Regarding these three characteristics, the CPC constructs a CPC rule-based democracy. In this system, the fundamental principle is that the CPC agrees that governmental power is from the people, yet this political system must be under the control of the CPC. Considering the relationship between the government and the people, government leaders should become flexible in dealing with public requirements and public opinion. The welfare of the people should be paramount and

leaders should take care of people's basic needs. As for popular opinions, not every opinion needs to be regarded; only those selected should be considered. The populace can follow the existing mechanism, the People's Congress, to participate in politics, yet because of the limitations of this system, representatives of the People's Congress at the central and local level may only accept the CPC's decisions and policies. Thus, this Chinese democracy becomes the essential theoretical framework for facilitating the CPC's ruling status.

Figure 5.1 demonstrates popular opinions of Chinese Democracy. This thesis uses 'In your opinion how much of a democracy is China?' to examine the result. Figure 6.1 demonstrate how successfully the CPC convinces the Chinese to believe in this form of Chinese democracy. In this figure, 74% of Chinese people argue that the Chinese political system belongs to a democracy, 20% of 74% argue that this system is a full democracy. On the other hand, only 1% of people indicate that this is not a democracy.




Figure 5.1: Chinese opinions on Chinese democracy (Wave 2).

Source: 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).




Figure 5.2: Chinese opinions for satisfaction with Chinese democracy (Wave 1).

Source: 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

Note: 'Decline answer' and 'Can't Choose' have been eliminated from the data.




Figure 5.3: Chinese opinions for satisfaction with Chinese democracy (Wave 2).

Source: 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Note: 'Decline answer' and 'Can't choose' have been eliminated from the data.

This thesis uses the question 'On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in China. Are you ...?' to demonstrate Chinese opinion in relation to satisfaction with Chinese democracy. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate a high percentage of satisfaction with Chinese democracy in the past ten years: 88% of people offered a positive attitude to this democracy in Wave 1, and there was a 79% positive response to the democracy in Wave 2. This percentage of satisfaction

demonstrates that the Chinese nowadays are pleased with the ‘Democracy with Chinese characteristics’, which is actually a one-party dictatorship ‘democracy’.

5.1.6 Summary

This section introduced Chinese leaders’ attitude to democracy and the kind of democracy that now exists in China. After the Qing Empire collapsed, a series of social and political movements asked for democracy, and the CPC leadership at that time answered the call and committed themselves to practise democracy. Their slogan was to end KMT one-party rule and they finally won the civil war. However, the facts demonstrate that ‘democracy’ existed for less than ten years, and then China was ruled by Mao’s personal dictatorship regime. After the Cultural Revolution, the CPC leadership initiated openness and reform, and the Party became the supervisor to the state. The original official ideology was revised to expand its popular base. The democracy with Chinese characteristics was constructed of two original elements: people’s democracy and democratic centralism – and one new element, Minben, which is from Confucianism.

According to the ideas of people’s democracy, government power comes from the people, and who constitutes ‘the people’ is decided by the CPC. There is only a limited mechanism – the people’s congress system – for public participation in politics; democratic centralism asks the CPC to collect public opinion, but in the meantime, it also provides the CPC with the power to select and control opinion because the CPC is the highest judge of opinion. Minben requires the CPC officers to take the people to their heart and to take care of them, and also creates a ‘love-people’ and democratic image; yet it is a lever to end public dissatisfaction because people will feel the party stands with them. However, the overall principle is that the system is under the leadership of the CPC.

Empirical evidence from Asian Barometer demonstrates, in fact, that a very large majority of Chinese are satisfied with this democracy. Only a few respondents indicated that the democracy is a problematic one. In the next section, this thesis will demonstrate how the CPC uses traditional legacies to help to strengthen Chinese democracy in the public consciousness, and discusses whether modernisation in China would diminish or help to strengthen the influence of traditional legacies.

5.2 Traditional legacies and modernisation

In the preceding section, this thesis mentioned that the CPC constructs a CPC-dominant democracy. In this democracy, some Confucian ideas have been used to create a people-orientation image. In order to establish this Chinese form of democracy, the CPC also strongly emphasises people's spiritual civilization building (精神文明建设) – the mechanism for instilling official ideology. Three traditional legacies have been adopted, more or less, to serve this purpose. Regarding hierarchical politics, as mentioned in the last section, Democratic Centralism is the element for managing political issues therefore, a hierarchical politics under the leadership of the CPC is created, and most political organisations are bound into the CPC-created system. In order to prevent potential conflict between the people and the government, harmonious society becomes the core policy for the CPC authority to promote. It can be found that these policies with traditional legacies are also closely related to the Chinese democracy elements mentioned in the preceding section.

Guanxi in China is not promoted officially. Even the CPC authority indicates that it is a core problem that would lead to corruption, and corruption should be strictly forbidden. Hu indicates that in order to prevent erosion of legitimacy, anti-corruption will be a priority for CPC to prevent the party losing trust and support (Hu, 2011, July 1, p.6; 2011, June 29). Nonetheless, *guanxi* broadly exists in Chinese politics. The US congress report also indicates there are three major factions in China: Jiang Zemin and the 'Shanghai Clique', Hu Jintao and the 'CCYL Faction', and Xi Jinping and the 'Princelings' (Dotson, Zhuo, & Taffer, 2012). Although factions of the CPC dominate Chinese politics and they attack each other, these factions are not mentioned officially by the CPC authority, in order to create an appearance of unity (Guthrie, 2012, March 16; Wasserstrom, 2012).

5.2.1 Traditional legacies

Hierarchical politics

China encourages a strong hierarchical politics system that can be viewed as having three aspects: the relationship between state and party, the relationship between the CPC and other democratic parties, and the inner party.

Regarding the state-party relationship, the CPC decided to separate the party

organisations from the state, which means that party organisations will only be party organisations, and state institutions will only be state institutions. Zhao Ziyang's speech at the 13th National Congress in 1987 indicated that the government should only act as a supervisor of the state rather than become part of government organisations, and secretaries of the Party committees supervise government institutions. His report clearly indicated that the party's mission is to become the political leader that decides political principles and political direction makes the important decisions, and recommends staff for state institutions. At the central government level, the party leads state affairs by implementing the party's policies through the government. He indicates that the objectives for state institutions and party organisations are different. The party organisation is responsible for mobilising the public to put into practice the party's policies and directions. The state institution is responsible for carrying out and legitimising those policies (Zhao, 1987).

In the local authority, the local party leadership should follow the central party leadership, and also supervise local authorities to ensure that the policies of the central party and central government can be fulfilled in practice. In the state enterprises, the party also acts as a supervisor, and managers should take the actual responsibilities. Professional intellectuals should establish the state bureaucratic system, and the state enterprises should hire professional managers. The standard to select people is based on profession rather than seniority (Zhao, 1987, p.2). With these mechanisms, the CPC is responsible for policies guidance, and the government is responsible for implementing and promoting them. This can be found in the Chinese Constitution:

The basic task of the nation is to concentrate its effort on socialist modernisation along the road of Chinese-style socialism. **Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China** and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism...

Both the victory in China's New-Democratic Revolution and the successes in its socialist cause have been achieved by the Chinese people of all nationalities, **under the leadership of the Communist Party of China** and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.

In the long years of revolution and construction, there has been formed under the leadership of the Communist Party of China a broad patriotic united front which is composed of the democratic parties and people's organisations and which embraces all socialist working people, all builders of socialism, all patriots who support socialism, and all patriots who stand for the reunification of the

motherland. This united front will continue to be consolidated and developed.
(NPC, 2004)

Hu Jintao indicated that ‘Taking the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics means we will, **under the leadership of the CPC** and in light of China's basic conditions, take economic development as the central task ...(2007a, p.2), and Jiang Zemin (2001) also expressed the views of the CPC leadership in relation to the state. The Chinese constitution and leaders’ speeches confirm the status of the CPC as the actual supervisor of the state.

As for the relationship of the CPC with other democratic parties, China moved from a ‘one-big-several-small parties’ system to a ‘one-party dictatorship several-satellite parties’. The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference is used to maintain this system.

The common programme of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (中国人民政治协商会议共同纲领), established in 1949, was the first constitutional document for the PRC. The government, based on this programme, was organised by leaders from the Communist party and democratic parties that supported the CPC in the civil war. In the Political Consultative Conference, democratic parties were the actors and negotiators; nonetheless, these parties held nearly one-third of the seats in the government. During this period, a ‘one-big-several-small parties’ system was formed, in which every party had a right to be involved in state affairs. This ‘democratic coalition government’ ended after the 1954 Chinese Constitution was implemented. The system of people’s congresses replaced the Political Consultative system, which allowed effective participation for most parties. The democratic parties become the ‘satellite parties’ which are affiliated with the CPC (see Information Office of the State Council, The People's Republic of China, 2007, November 15. This official document clearly indicates that the CPC is the leadership and other democratic parties are participants of the political system. The CPC is the only party that can rule the state, and others participate in politics by the Chinese Constitution. These democratic parties can discuss policies at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference).

A multi-party cooperation and political consultation system exists under the leadership of the CPC, and the constitutions of eight democratic parties have an article of ‘under leadership of the CPC’; this is also, in practice, democratic centralism.

As for inner party organisations, the CPC constitution states:

Article 10 (1) Individual Party members are subordinate to the Party organisation, the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower Party organisations are subordinate to the higher Party organisations, and all the constituent organisations and members of the Party are subordinate to the National Congress and the Central Committee of the Party. (CPC, 2007)

The party adopts democratic centralism to guide the party, and obviously party members should obey the orders of the leadership. Party members can offer their opinions, yet as this thesis has discussed in the previous section, party leaders have the right to decide what is the correct view that should be adopted by the party.

Overall, in China, government leaders are from the CPC and only a few are from its affiliated parties.

Figure 5.4 demonstrates the political structure of Communist China: the ruling class is attached to the Communist Party, and a democracy with Chinese characteristics becomes the new theoretical framework to rule the country. In this model, most civil servants need to be CPC members; central and local government, and related institutions, even companies, are under the leadership of the CPC. Moreover, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) belongs to both the CPC and the state. Outside the CPC are the people, who should be led by the CPC.




Figure 5.4: Political structure of Communist China.

Recently Hu, Jintao made a speech for the 90th birthday of the CPC, in which he said that China would expand political participation for the people and the CPC's satellite parties. Several improvements are needed, regarding, for example, legal procedure, the efficiency of government, wider political participation, more 'democratic' elections, supervision, management and decision-making processes, but the fundamental principle – that the government must be ruled and led by CPC – is not changed (Hu, 2011, July 1, p.8). In order to prevent the erosion of legitimacy, anti-corruption will be the priority for the CPC, so that it will not lose the trust and support of the people (Hu, 2011, July 1, p.6; 2011, June 29).

Harmony and group-orientation

After the Cultural Revolution, a *Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of CPC* made clear that the CPC authority must build a spiritual socialist civilisation to reduce incorrect thoughts and strengthen nationalist education (11th Central Committee of the CPC, 1981).

Article 24 The State strengthens the building of a socialist society with an advanced culture and ideology by promoting education in high ideals, ethics, general knowledge, discipline and the legal system, and by promoting the formulation and observance of rules of conduct and common pledges by various sections of the people in urban and rural areas.

The State advocates the civic virtues of love of the motherland, of the people, of labour, of science and of socialism. It conducts education among the people in patriotism and collectivism, in internationalism and communism and in dialectical and historical materialism, to combat capitalist, feudal and other decadent ideas. (NPC, 2004)

Social stability and unity is one of the most important issues for the CPC authority. As Chapter 2 mentioned, from the 1980s, Zhao Ziyang has pointed out that the CPC authority should deal correctly with the contradictions among the people. The Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of CPC formally indicated that China should construct a socialist harmonious society. The Hu-Wen administration found that social conflicts are rising in Chinese society after openness and reform;

corruption, social injustice, employment issues, social security, income distribution, education, health care, housing, and problems of farmers and workers have all raised the level of opposition in society. Since openness and reform cannot be stopped, social dissension is increasing, and values are changing because of the material life. It is said that the CPC should act to build up a socialist harmonious society to deal with these issues (Hu, 2005, February 19; Xinhuanet, 2005, March 23; 2006, September 26; News.xinhuanet.com, 2006, October 16).

An official document from the Central committee of the CPC “*Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu goujian shehuizhuyi he hexie shehui ruogan zhongda wenti de jue ding*” (中共中央关于构建社会主义和谐社会若干重大问题的决定), asserts that people-orientation, scientific development, openness and reform, and a socialist legal system, would all correctly deal with reform and stability, under the CPC’s leadership (News.xinhuanet.com, 2006, October 16). In order to reach these objectives, CPC commits to building its political and social care system, but the most important of all is the need to construct a harmonious culture, and maintain social stability and unity. The party should take responsibility for ensuring that these objectives are achieved.

For a harmonious culture, both law and morality should rule the state. Therefore, the CPC should prioritise turning the thoughts of the people towards patriotism, collectivism and socialism. A common consensus should be built by these ideas. Meanwhile, the party should work to keep control of the internet and public opinion, deal correct with public feeling, and spread the propaganda of the party’s official ideology (News.xinhuanet.com, 2006, October 16).

Social stability and unity should be maintained through community organisations and government organisations. Community organisations should offer services and encourage residents to have friendly interactions. The party and government should actively find the conflict among people and create information collection channels. The party and government should follow the law and policies to deal with conflicts, and also prevent and properly treat conflicts, to maintain social stability (News.xinhuanet.com, 2006, October 16).

The Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the CPC further declared four strategies for modern socialist China: firstly, act under the guidance of Marxism, Mao’s thoughts, Deng’s theories, and ‘three representatives’ theories. Secondly, press for socialism with Chinese characteristics. Thirdly, patriotism is the

core of the national spirit, and fourthly, eight honours and eight disgraces⁴⁹ (Shanghai Academy of Social Science, 2007).

The official theorists of the CPC also mention the core concept of constructing a harmonious society – political ethics (Ku, 2008, April 1). A harmonious society should be established on a human-based principle, which emphasises decreasing the uncomfortable and negative atmosphere in society. However, the facts may not necessary conform to the party theory.

It can be seen that, through these official documents, in which democratic centralism and Minben are so deeply involved, the CPC authority follows its principles of Chinese democracy to construct the new core values. This authority has foreseen the potential conflicts among the people, and that their values would change during openness and reform. In order to prevent possible change and end conflict, the party emphasises, in its theories, morality and patriotism to manage the direction of value changes. Harmony and group-orientation are included in these concepts and combine with Confucian morality to avert potential changes in values. As Hu's 2008 speech mentioned: 'We need to learn all the cream of political civilization of the human society, but will never copy the mode of the Western political institutions ... We firmly uphold the idea that Chinese affairs must be handled by Chinese people in a Chinese way, and oppose any foreign forces to interfere in Chinese domestic affairs' (Hu, 2008, December 18). The CPC authority does not want to see people support non-official, or even western values, because this could cause instability for the CPC authority. For the CPC, the revival of traditional values would teach children harmony and compassion, and lead the Chinese to maintain a conservative political attitude in a high economic growth environment (Bell, 2009, May 11).

5.2.2 Modernisation

In a speech for the 90th birthday of the CPC, Hu Jintao argued that economic construction is the core for the development and prosperity of China (Hu, 2011, July 1, p.7). Economic development is now the priority issue for the Chinese government, because failure of economic development could lead to the collapse of the existing non-democratic regime (Huntington, 1991). For China, Deng Xiaoping has admitted

⁴⁹ They are: '1. Love the country; do it no harm. 2. Serve the people; do no disservice. 3. Follow science; discard ignorance. 4. Be diligent; not indolent. 5. Be united, help each other; make no gains at other's expense. 6. Be honest and trustworthy; do not spend ethics for profits. 7. Be disciplined and law-abiding; not chaotic and lawless. 8. Live plainly, struggle hard; do not wallow in luxuries and pleasures.'

this problem and decided to practise openness and reform. The first thing is to explain how a socialist country should adopt capitalism. China's official ideology is 'socialism', but in order to put into practice openness and reform, the market economy should be established in China. Thus, socialism has to be renamed 'socialism with Chinese characteristics'. Currently China is in the 'primary stage of socialism, and will remain so for a long time to come' (CPC, 2007; Information Office of the State Council, The People's Republic of China, 2011, October 28, p.7). Therefore, economic reform and the market economy are the methods for China to reach socialism (see Wen, Jiabao, 2007; Xinhuanet, 2011, November 6, and, in fact, it is a long-term Chinese official argument). The Chinese constitution further expounds the guidelines and how modernisation should be implemented in China:

....Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of Three Representatives, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship and the socialist road, persevere in reform and opening to the outside world, steadily improve socialist institutions, develop the socialist market economy, develop socialist democracy, improve the socialist legal system....., to turn China into a socialist country that is prosperous, powerful, democratic and culturally advanced. (NPC, 2004)

China's modernisation triumph can be traced to the Mao period. The Great Leap Forward, intended to surpass Great Britain and catch up with the United States, was the first attempt at modernisation by the CPC authority, which tried to mobilise the people to devote themselves to producing steel. The failure of this movement led to a serious famine, especially in rural areas, and millions of refugees starved to death. After this movement, and several other political movements, Mao's position as ruler was threatened by other party leaders. In order to consolidate Mao's ruling status, the Chinese Cultural Revolution was introduced.

Deng Xiaoping ended this revolution during late 1970. Open door policies and four modernisations,⁵⁰ which were first mentioned by Zhuo Enlai in 1963, were implemented to prevent the CPC's crisis of legitimacy. Deng argued: 'Development is the absolute principle' (发展才是硬道理) and formally ended the revolutionary years in China. The objective of the CPC authority was clarified: the government supports economic development and maintains high economic growth in China. However, the government must control these economic achievements, and people could not

⁵⁰ The four modernisations are Agriculture, Industry, National Defence, and Science and Technology modernisation.

challenge the government's authority. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* noted Deng's decision and the framework for CPC's modernisation. According to Deng's speech 'Insist on four fundamental principles', he argued that the prerequisites for Chinese modernisation are: 'keeping to the socialist road, upholding the people's democratic dictatorship, upholding leadership by the Communist Party and upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought' (see the Chinese Constitution). These four principles are also written into the preamble of the Chinese Constitution. Deng explained that the Chinese should to handle the country's affairs in the way that accords with Chinese characteristics and that would meet the particular conditions in China. Based on these prerequisites:

Domestically, the post-Mao Chinese state has arguably been based on an unwritten social contract between the party and the people, where (by) the people do not compete with the party for political power as long as the party looks after their economic fortunes.

(Taylor, 2008, pp.3-4, p.69, cited from Breslin, 2005, p.749),

Taylor also indicates that 'foreign policy that sustains an international environment supportive of economic growth and stability in China serves these objectives' (2008, p.4). This situation developed further in the post-Deng period. Tsang (2009, p. 878) indicates that a consultative Leninism political system now exists in China. This system, according to Tsang's argument, is a system to respond to quick growth in China. The Communist Party gained experience from the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and also learned how to deal with internal opponents. The current CPC authority, in Tsang's argument, is a regime that can change with internal environments and responds to the challenges to the regime. Order, stability and economic growth are the priorities for this authority; therefore, the ruling class will use any possible means to achieve these objectives. He also indicates that Mao's thought and amended Confucian values would be adopted to increase this authority's governing abilities and moral authority. The bottom line is clear: the CPC must hold the dominant position in the state; if the ruling class faces a crisis that they cannot control, then strict suppression would be the choice for them to protect their regime. In order to prevent the legitimacy crisis from failure of policies or economic growth, nationalism becomes the safety valve for this regime. This valve would be the channel to transfer their depression and anger to any other possible outside states rather than to the CPC authority inside China (Tsang, 2009, pp.879-890; see also Alagappa, 1995, pp.32-33, who suggests that the Chinese government tries to use nationalism and the rise of China to consolidate its ruling legitimacy). Bell (2008,

p.16) also indicates that the liberalised economic system with tight political control is a temporary, but necessary, method to maintain social order. Hu's speech in 2008 provided evidence for these opinions:

Without democracy, neither socialism nor socialist modernisation could be realised.... Don't sway back and forth, relax our efforts or get side tracked, but firmly push forward the reform and opening-up as well as adhere to socialism with Chinese characteristics. In that way, we will definitely achieve our grand blueprint and ambitious objectives.... The country that develops asserts itself, and to keep stability is an overriding task. We will achieve nothing without stability.

(Hu Jintao, 2008, December 18)

His speech confirmed the idea that modernisation in China should not affect stability or the CPC's ruling status.

Economic growth cannot really bring democratisation to China because the CPC position must be taken into account.⁵¹ Economic growth in China helped the party by creating a number of supporters who have become rich, and importantly, there are no effective opponents to compete with the CPC. Consequently, people are forced to consider that, if the CPC should collapse, then China may find itself in a chaotic situation, and even separated into several parts, and this situation could not be tolerated by the Chinese. This perceived threat convinced people that going against the party means going against the state, social stability and existing economic achievements (Dickson, 2003, pp.32-33). Thus, the situation brings not democratisation but regime stability – people will tend to support the CPC. Meanwhile, economic development also prevents a legitimacy crisis for the authoritarian regime. To summarise, high economic growth in China will lead to satisfaction with this regime. However, when the state suffers low economic growth, people will complain to the government rather than overthrow the regime.

Another modernisation factor, education, is also important to help the CPC to strengthen its rule, especially patriotic education. The CPC authority faced the first legitimacy crisis in 1989, and they suppressed the democratic movement. After that, although the legitimacy of the Chinese communist government depends on economic growth (Taylor, 2008, p.15; Hahm, 2004, p.100), the CPC authority and the people reached a balance. As Taylor and Tsang's analysis shows: this authority only allows

⁵¹ Dickson (2003, pp.32-33) points out that those who argue that China will transfer to a strong and wealthy state, or it will collapse, miss an essential point: who leads the democratisation?

economic development, and will not tolerate any political challenge which may lead to an unstable society and decrease economic growth, and then lead to a legitimacy crisis. Furthermore, this authority is trying to avert any possible challenge from the people. As has been argued in this chapter, the inculcation of 'love China' education and the CPC historical view, from elementary school onwards provides a safety valve.

The preceding section, which discussed traditional legacies, mentioned that one of the most important elements for constructing socialist harmonious society is strengthening patriotic education. The CPC emphasises patriotic education, especially educating people to 'love China', and the contents of this education, includes many of the CPC policies and principles (Huang, K.-Y, 2007). This education may set up a connection between 'love China' and love of the CPC government (under the leadership of the CPC), to facilitate the party's ruling status.

Nationalism is used as the safety valve to prevent low economic growth (Alagappa, 1995, pp.32-33). Nationalism covers three aspects. First, it connects China and the Communist Party as a whole. The Communist Party noticed that, in the late Qing dynasty, the choices of the populace were first, follow the Qing government's measures to save China; when the Qing government failed, people chose to overthrow the Qing government. A stable and united China is a priority, and, if the Chinese people want to keep this, the Communist Party must lead China. Currently, there is no other political group or party that can challenge the Communist Party. Second, education in terms of 'love China' and 'this state needs the leadership of the Communist party' is common. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Communist Party used an historical view of the party to teach the younger generation in China to become attached to this idea. Third, Chinese authority is used to argue that any conflict or political movements in China are the result of interference by foreign powers in Chinese internal affairs. For instance, the CPC authority took three measures to deal with conflicts in the Inner Mongolia autonomous region: 1. it sent troops, who were responsible for suppressing democratic movements on 4th June 1989, to suppress conflict (Chinesedaily, 2011, June 1); 2. China claimed that these conflicts were encouraged by foreign powers, although Spokesperson Jiang Yu did not mention which foreign powers were responsible (Ceng, 2011, June 1; News.Sina.com, 2011, May 31); 3. China minimised this conflict as a small, regional issue, saying that the CPC and government would deal with it appropriately.

As for the middle class, China has faced challenges from rapid economic growth, and one of the important challenges was how to deal with the growth of the middle class.

As the preceding section indicates, in the original CPC ideology, Mao indicated that the Chinese revolution was led by a farmer-workers alliance against capitalists, landlords and enterprises (11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1981; Mao, 1945). However, after openness and reform in the 1980s, this ideology could not meet the needs of the time and has since been revised. In order to expand the popular base, the Three Representatives theories, suggested by Jiang, Zemin, which allows the middle class to participate in politics, was soon written into the Constitution of the PRC and the Constitution of the CPC. For the middle class, Xueyi Lu (2002) indicated that most are from private or public enterprises (family or individual), and newly-developed technology companies. Most are the result of openness and reform policies; thus, they benefited from the CPC. Meanwhile, the CPC has also opened political spaces for the middle class for bribing them. Therefore, the middle class would hold a positive attitude to Chinese democracy to ensure their benefits would not disappear.

Table 5.1 demonstrates middle class support for Chinese democracy. In this table of the two waves data, the indicators for the satisfaction for Chinese democracy are extremely high, reaching 81.02% in Wave 1 and 87.21% in Wave 2. According to this result, it can be concluded that the middle class in China is loyal to the CPC authority. As Huntington argued, the attitude of the middle class is ambiguous (Huntington, 1968), and the middle class in China (like the middle class in other East Asian countries) are seeking economic development and social stability (Hsiao & Koo, 1997; Ma, 2008).

Table 5.1: Middle Class satisfaction with Chinese Democracy.

	Wave 1		Wave 2	
	N	%	N	%
Dissatisfaction	305	18.98%	319	12.79%
Satisfaction	1302	81.02%	2176	87.21%
Total	1607	100%	2495	100%

Source: 1. 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

5.2.3 Satisfaction with Chinese Democracy

In order to examine the sources for supporting Chinese democracy, this thesis uses ‘On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in

China. Are you ...?’ (from the two waves survey) as dependent variable⁵² in the model of satisfaction with Chinese democracy. Then gender (male and female) is set as control variables in this model. Four traditional legacies and four modernisation factors (education: high school level and degree level; subjective social status: middle and upper class; economic factor; age) and democratic values are set as independent variables in this model. Dummy variables are produced for nominal variables: gender (male and female), education level (divided into three levels), and subjective social class (divided into three levels).

Regarding the four traditional legacies, in Wave 1, all traditional legacies demonstrate positive beta to satisfaction with Chinese democracy, which means that people who hold the values of these legacies will be satisfied with Chinese democracy. However, none of these legacies show a significant result, which means that none has explanatory power to the dependent variable. In Wave 2, the situation has slightly changed. With the exception of *guanxi*, beta of the other three legacies is positive to Chinese democracy, which means people who have these values support Chinese democracy, and harmony and group-orientation have explanatory power to the dependent variable. Meanwhile, people who are against *guanxi* also support Chinese democracy. This result in Wave 2 is not surprising. As this thesis has mentioned, the CPC authority has highly promoted a socialist harmonious society that includes harmony and group-orientation, but is against *guanxi*. This result reflects the fact that the government’s political movement is effectively instilled in the public consciousness, and this policy successfully helped to consolidate their rule.

As for modernisation factors, in Wave 1, all modernisation factors have explanatory power to explain the dependent variable. Social class and people who feel that there has been good economic performance support Chinese democracy, but educated people are detached from the democracy. Regarding social class, the upper class is the solid supporter of this democracy, followed by the middle class. As for people who feel that there is good economic performance in China, they choose to support the government. In the second wave, education loses explanatory power to the dependent variable, and only people who have a degree are against the democracy. Results for social class and economic performance are the same as the results of Wave 1: these people continue to support Chinese democracy.

People with democratic values in the two waves, as expected, have a negative attitude

⁵² ‘Very satisfied’ recoded as 2, ‘fairly satisfied’ as 1, ‘no answer’ as 0 (a neutral answer). Then ‘not very satisfied’ was recoded as -1, and ‘not at all satisfied’ as -2.

to Chinese democracy, because they consider this democracy is a pseudo-democracy. Age in the two waves does not have explanatory power, and males tend to support this democracy in Wave 2.

Table 5.2: Satisfaction with Chinese democracy: multiple regression analysis.

CHINA				
Dependent Variable : Satisfaction with 'Chinese democracy'				
	multiple regression in Wave 1		multiple regression in Wave 2	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Gender (Female)				
Male	0.019	(0.031)	0.034	(0.022) *
Traditional legacies				
Anti-hierarchical politics	-0.014	(0.016)	-0.015	(0.011)
Anti-harmony	-0.015	(0.018)	-0.039	(0.012) **
Anti-group orientation	-0.023	(0.016)	-0.105	(0.010) ***
Anti- <i>guanxi</i>	-0.006	(0.018)	0.028	(0.011) *
Modernisation Factors				
Education (under high school)				
High school level	-0.063	(0.039) ***	0.006	(0.025)
Degree level	-0.047	(0.070) **	-0.026	(0.062)
Subjective social class (Lower)				
Middle class	0.040	(0.037) *	0.067	(0.028) ***
Upper class	0.056	(0.055) **	0.088	(0.037) ***
Economic factor	0.297	(0.004) ***	0.235	(0.004) ***
Age	0.003	(0.028)	0.016	(0.001)
Democratic values				
(Constant)	—	(0.076) *	—	(0.051)
<hr/>				
Adjusted R-square	0.172		0.125	
R-square	0.175		0.127	
<hr/>				
N	3183		5076	
<hr/>				

*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001

Source: 1. 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and

negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have democratic values.

5.2.4 Summary

This section has demonstrated how traditional legacies have facilitated the construction of official policies to consolidate the CPC's rule. The CPC constructs a top-down political system that is controlled by the CPC. Harmony and group-orientation are manipulated to construct a harmonious society in response to side effects from openness and reform. The core concepts are under the rule of the CPC and their official theories that enforce patriotic education; the party is responsible for dealing with social conflict. Modernisation in China should not go against the CPC's rule. Economic development helps the CPC to decrease its legitimacy failings and asks people to follow the CPC strictly, because, in China, the CPC is the only political power that can maintain existing economic achievements. Patriotic education is taught at every educational level in China, which helps China to set up a safety valve in case of a failure in economic performance. As for the middle class, this class has benefited from the CPC and has been offered political space; statistical data also prove that they choose to support the CPC authority. Finally, this thesis also found that the government's policy is effective, and people who have traditional values support Chinese democracy; modernisation factors (except education) also benefit the CPC's rule.

The next section will demonstrate popular support for traditional legacies and democratic values, clarify whether modernisation will end traditional legacies as modernisation theories argue, and will also examine the relationship between traditional legacies and modernisation factors.

5.3 Statistical Analysis

In the preceding sections, this thesis has demonstrated that the CPC authority constructed a Chinese democracy. The basic concepts for this democracy are that people can offer their public opinion, and participate in politics through the people's congress system, yet party leaders have the right to decide the correct opinion and the

Congress system serves as a rubber stamp to approve CPC's policies. Selected traditional legacies are adopted to be a part of official ideology. The CPC authority needs these legacies to convince people that their policies are positive. Modernisation factors, as this thesis demonstrated, are manipulated to support the CPC's rule.

This section will use the Asian Barometer Survey for the following purposes: to demonstrate popular support and strength for traditional legacies. The data will demonstrate that the people in China have values of traditional legacies that are promoted by the CPC, yet democratic values are very low. This thesis will explore whether modernisation can diminish the influence of traditional legacies or not in China. Then this thesis will analyse the relationship between democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors to discuss how traditional legacies and officially controlled modernisation factors affect democratic values among the population. Finally, this thesis will demonstrate popular support and strength for democratic values.

5.3.1 Percentage and strength analysis for traditional legacies

The percentage for values of traditional legacies in China is illustrated in Table 5.3. This thesis assesses the percentage, which is over 60%, as representing a solid attitude to this legacy. The data of Wave 1 demonstrates a polar result: 65.8% of people rejected hierarchical politics, and 64.4% of people refused *guanxi* in China. However, 71.2% of and 91.78% support harmony and group-orientation, respectively, as a result of the Communist Party's long-term propaganda. As to the data of Wave 2, hierarchical politics has demonstrated a reversal, in which supporters have surpassed the opponents. Harmony and group orientation still illustrate high percentages, which are 63.8% and 89.4%. People in China still maintain a 'reject' attitude to satisfaction with *guanxi*.

The trend for values of traditional legacies is increasing. Although the questions from questionnaires for the two waves are slightly different, the meanings of the two waves' questions are the same. Other questions from the questionnaire are the same; therefore, hierarchical politics, harmony and group-orientation are comparable. If this thesis only considers three comparable aspects, the percentage of support for traditional legacies increases by 2.77%. If this thesis considers all aspects, then the increase rate is 2.93%. Both of the two waves' general support to values of traditional legacies is over 65%, which illustrates a solid support to these values. Regarding the individual aspect, support of harmony and group-orientation demonstrate a slight decrease. On

the other hand, support for hierarchical politics decreases dramatically.

Table 5.3: Percentage for values of traditional legacies in China.

Wave1	hierarchical politics	harmony	group-orientation	guanxi	Total
Support	34.2% (1067)	71.2% (2149)	91.78% (5463)	35.6% (972)	65.11% (9651)
Reject	65.8% (2051)	28.8% (871)	8.22% (489)	64.4% (1761)	34.89% (5172)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Wave2	hierarchical politics	harmony	group-orientation	guanxi	Total
Support	52.3% (2493)	63.8% (2981)	89.4% (8060)	44.8% (1885)	68.04% (15419)
Reject	47.7% (2272)	36.2% (1691)	10.6% (953)	55.2% (2326)	31.96% (7242)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: 1. 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).
2. 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

These results also reflect the idea that the Chinese follow official propaganda; harmony and group-orientation are highly supported. However, the important message here is that harmony decreases significantly, which means that, although the government's policies can make people support the government, the support for these policies may decrease. The overall results demonstrate that most people still follow these legacies, and the last section has demonstrated that people who support these legacies also support the existing political system. If the trend is increasing, then the support to the existing regime will also increase.

The percentage analysis reflects the percentage of support or rejection for traditional legacies and democratic values. This section will demonstrate the strength of Chinese attachment to these values. This thesis recoded questions that were introduced in the methodology section as following, in order to examine the strength of traditional legacies: 'strongly disagree' as 2, 'somewhat disagree' as 1, 'no answer' as 0 (a neutral answer); recoded 'somewhat agree' as -1, and 'strongly agree' as -2. Descriptions of questions of anti-connection of the two waves are slightly different, although they refer to the value; this thesis will not compare them in this section.

Table 5.4 presents the results of the strength of these values. The major finding of Table 5.4, in terms of traditional legacies, is that the trend of strength is similar to the difference of percentage for traditional legacies. Anti-harmony and anti-group-orientation rise slightly, which refers to the decrease in strength of the support for harmony and group orientation. Results also show a strong attachment to group orientation, followed by harmony. As the last section argued, these concepts are strongly emphasised by the CPC authority. The reversal in the results for hierarchical politics would also facilitate the CPC's one-party dictatorship system and Chinese democracy. Generally speaking, these results demonstrate a positive strength for the CPC authority. The positive strength of anti-*guanxi* reflects Chinese dislike of the corruption and nepotism in China.

Table 5.4: Strength of traditional legacies in China.

CHINA	Wave1 Mean	Wave2 Mean	PDI
Traditional legacies			
Anti-hierarchical politics	0.32	-0.06	-0.38
Anti-harmony	-0.42	-0.26	0.16
Anti-group-orientation	-0.8547	-0.7988	0.0559
Anti- <i>guanxi</i>	0.26	0.11	-0.15

PDI: The percentage differential index in this table is Wave2-Wave1.

Note: 1. The range is -2 to 2: -2 means totally against the factor, 2 means totally support the factor, 0 means no preference.

2. Because of the different question of the Anti- *guanxi* aspect, to compare for this aspect may not meaningful.

Source: 1. 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

5.3.2 Traditional legacies and modernisation factors

In order to examine whether modernisation factors would diminish the influence of traditional legacies, which could facilitate non-democratic rule in China, 'anti-traditional legacies' is used as a dependent variable, and gender and age are control variables; three modernisation factors (education, subjective social class, and economic factor) and democratic values are set as independent variables into the

model.⁵³

The two waves' results are demonstrated in Table 5.5. Regarding modernisation factors in Wave 1, education and economic performance demonstrate positive beta to the dependent variable, which means that respondents choose to reject traditional legacies. However, only education has explanatory power for the dependent variable: people who receive education disagree with traditional legacies. On the other hand, subjective social class supports traditional legacies; the upper class in Wave 1 is significantly in support of traditional legacies. As for the result of Wave 2, only education shows positive beta to the dependent variable, and two other factors (beta of social class and economic performance) are negative. This result means that people who accept education oppose traditional legacies, but education loses explanatory power in Wave 2, that is, in Wave 2, levels of education do not have different support to the dependent variable. The middle class in Wave 2 becomes a supporter for traditional legacies, and people who feel that economic performance is good also support traditional legacies. These results show that modernisation factors in China do not help to diminish the influence of traditional legacies, but even facilitate their development.

Age is another factor against traditional legacies: results show that the younger generation is against traditional legacies in both waves, and this result reflects how, when people's lives improve, their values will also change gradually.

⁵³ Dummy variables: gender, education level (divided into three levels), subjective social class (divided into three levels).

Table 5.5: Anti-traditional legacies in China: Multiple regression analysis.

CHINA				
Dependent Variable : Anti-traditional legacies				
	multiple regression in Wave 1		multiple regression in Wave 2	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Gender (Female)				
Male	0.000	(0.074)	-0.022	(0.067)
Modernisation Factors				
Education (under high school)				
High school level	0.196	(0.090)***	0.034	(0.074) *
Degree level	0.185	(0.160)***	0.064	(0.183)***
Subjective social class (Lower)				
Middle class	-0.013	(0.088)	-0.051	(0.083) **
Upper class	-0.043	(0.131) *	-0.014	(0.110)
Economic factor	-0.032	(0.010)	-0.091	(0.011)***
Age	-0.105	(0.066)***	-0.086	(0.002)***
(Constant)	—	(0.163)***	—	(0.152)***
Adjusted R-square	0.084		0.024	
R-square	0.086		0.025	
N	3183		5076	

*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001

Source: 1. 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have democratic values.

5.3.3 Democratic Values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors

In order to explore relationships between democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors, this thesis set democratic values as the dependent variable, and set traditional legacies and modernisation factors as independent variables in the regression model. As for gender, it is set as control variables into the model. The results are illustrated in Table 5.6. Male for gender, high school level and degree level for education level and middle class and upper class for subjective social class are produced as dummy variables for this model.

Regarding traditional legacies, the results in the two waves are the same. In both waves, figures of beta are positive to the dependent variable for all legacies, and all of them also have explanatory power to explain the dependent variable. Thus, these results mean four traditional legacies are not favoured in the development of democratic values. If traditional legacies are developing, they would be an obstacle to the development of democratic values.

As for modernisation factors, in both waves, education factors all have power for the dependent variable, and the beta is positive. Thus, education would help to develop democratic values. Moreover, the data also illustrate that people who accept higher education would be more likely to adhere to democratic values. In contrast to people who feel that economic performance is good and would support traditional legacies, people who feel that economic performance is poor would support democratic values. Table 5.6 illustrates that, in both waves, people who feel that economic performance is poor would be likely to be more attached to democratic values, yet only Wave 1 data have the power to explain the dependent variable. Regarding subjective social class, the upper class (compared with the lower class) support democratic values more in Wave 1, but reject these values in Wave 2. Middle class attitudes demonstrate no significant difference from those of the lower class, and previous data show that the middle class are not attached to democratic values.

The younger generation are more attached to democratic values in both waves, and data in both Wave 1 and 2 have power to explain the dependent variable. Males also demonstrate the same results: males, compared with females, adhere more to democratic values.

Table 5.6: Democratic values in China: Multiple regression analysis.

CHINA				
Dependent variable : Democratic values				
	multiple regression in Wave 1		multiple regression in Wave 2	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Gender (Female)				
Male	0.051	(0.127) **	0.046	(0.103) ***
Traditional legacies				
Anti-hierarchical politics	0.133	(0.064) ***	0.190	(0.051) ***
Anti-harmony	0.156	(0.071) ***	0.228	(0.054) ***
Anti-group-orientation	0.092	(0.065) ***	0.117	(0.046) ***
Anti- <i>guanxi</i>	0.229	(0.071) ***	0.131	(0.051) ***
Modernisation factors				
Education (under high school)				
High school level	0.140	(0.159) ***	0.064	(0.115) ***
Degree level	0.203	(0.280) ***	0.103	(0.283) ***
Subjective social class (Lower)				
Middle class	0.016	(0.146)	0.020	(0.128)
Upper class	0.054	(0.216) **	-0.034	(0.170) *
Economic factor	-0.114	(0.028) ***	-0.008	(0.017)
Age	-0.065	(0.005) ***	-0.073	(0.004) ***
Democratic values (Constant)	—	— (0.307)	—	— (0.237) *
Adjusted R-square	0.258		0.201	
R-square	0.260		0.202	
N	3183		5076	

*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01, *** <.001

Source: 1. 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and

negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have democratic values.

5.3.4 Percentage and strength analysis for democratic values

Table 5.7: Percentage for six dimensions of democratic value in China.

CHINA Wave1	Political Equality	Popular Sovereignty	Political Liberty	Political Pluralism	Separation of Powers	Rule of Law	Total
Support	92.3% (2697)	34.3% (2916)	37.7% (1910)	24.3% (617)	50.4% (2335)	69.9% (1566)	46.5% (12041)
Reject	7.7% (225)	65.7% (5575)	62.3% (3159)	75.7% (1927)	49.6% (2294)	30.1% (673)	53.5% (13853)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
CHINA Wave2	Political Equality	Popular Sovereignty	Political Liberty	Political Pluralism	Separation of Powers	Rule of Law	Total
Support	94.5% (4012)	37.5% (4647)	33.8% (2658)	22.8% (829)	41.9% (2618)	58.7% (1755)	44.21% (16519)
Reject	5.5% (232)	62.5% (7731)	66.2% (5211)	77.2% (2800)	58.1% (3635)	41.3% (1234)	55.79% (20843)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: 1. 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).
2. 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2)

Table 5.7 demonstrates the percentage for democratic values in China. In this table, all questions from the questionnaire are the same, both in Wave 1 and Wave 2; therefore, six dimensions in this table are comparable. Dimensions that are over 60% are also marked in this table to demonstrate that respondents solidly support the dimension.

Findings of Wave 1 are: approximately 92.3% of Chinese people support the concept of political equality. Rule of law, which argues that the government's activities should obey the legal procedures, is another advantage in Wave 1, where 69.9% of people support the dimension. Nonetheless, 65.7%, 62.3% and even 75.3% of Chinese reject dimensions of popular sovereignty, political liberty and political pluralism – the core concepts of democratic values. A minimum advantage is illustrated on the dimension

of separation of powers, where the difference between supporter and opponents is only 0.8%. The total result rejects the democratic values, which indicates that only approximately 46.5% people would support values of democracy. In contrast, a small majority, 53.5%, reject these values.

As regards data of Wave 2, political equality is still highly supported by the Chinese, at 94.5%. Chinese also continue to demonstrate a solid expectation that government activities will follow legal procedures. Three core dimensions of democratic values are still firmly rejected: the percentages of rejections are 62.5%, 66.2% and 77.2%. As for the dimension of separation of powers, it demonstrates a reversed situation where the percentage of rejection has overtaken support by 16.2%. 55.79% reject democratic values as a whole in Wave 2, and only 44.21% people continue to support these values.

The difference between Wave 1 and Wave 2 is slight, except in the case of separation of powers. Chinese continue to support political equality: the percentage of support increased 2.2%, which means that this concept has been deeply rooted in the Chinese consciousness. As to core concepts, the percentage for rejection of popular sovereignty slightly decreases by 3.2%, but political liberty and political pluralism increase by 3.9% and 1.5%. These results indicate that Chinese still hold firm attitudes against democratic values. Support for the concept of separation of powers in China is decreasing, and the figure between Wave 1 and Wave 2 can be found decreasing by 8.5%. These values are not tolerated by the CPC authority, which argues for the establishment of a democratic institution with Chinese characteristics – a de facto one-party dictatorship.

In China, elections have existed for some time, and elections should make people feel they are equal in respect of politics. Although the political system in China is non-democratic, and elections are not equal (even officially-controlled), local elections have existed for decades, which encourages the concept of political equality, because people believe that they have the right to vote.⁵⁴

The CPC has also promoted the establishment of a socialist legal system. The CPC authority argues that rule of law is one of the measures they have taken to ensure that ‘people are the real masters of their own country’ (Xinhuanet, 2005a). However, the Chinese government argues that the ‘The Socialist System of Laws with Chinese

⁵⁴ Editorial of Apple Daily (2011, November 11) indicates that PRC has fair elections, but this only appears to be the case on the surface. Actually, any independent candidate would soon face political persecution.

Characteristics' has been constructed, yet the legal system cannot challenge the leadership status of the CPC.⁵⁵

Table 5.8: Strength of democratic values in China.

CHINA	Wave1 Mean	Wave2 Mean	PDI
Democratic values			
Political Equality	0.87	0.95	0.08
Popular Sovereignty	-0.2935	-0.22	0.0735
Political Liberty	-0.2034	-0.27	-0.0666
Political Pluralism	-0.4452	-0.4386	0.0066
Separation of Powers	0.0113	-0.11	-0.1213
Rule of Law	0.3	0.12	-0.18

PDI: The percentage differential index in this table is Wave2-Wave1.

Note: The range is -2 to 2: -2 means totally against the factor, 2 means totally support the factor, 0 means no preference.

Source: 1. 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Table 5.8 presents the strength of democratic values. The questions relating to democratic values (introduced in the methodology section) were recoded to examine the strength of traditional legacies, as follows: 'strongly disagree' as 2, 'somewhat disagree' as 1, 'no answer' as 0 (a neutral answer); recoded 'somewhat agree' as -1, and 'strongly agree' as 2. Three dimensions of Wave 1 and four dimensions of Wave 2 show negative strength, which means the Chinese stand on the opposite side of these concepts. Figures of political pluralism of Wave 1 and Wave 2 reflect the concept that the Chinese are least attached to; these figures show that more Chinese stand on a strong opposing side to the concept. Negative attitudes to popular sovereignty, political liberty, political pluralism, and separation of powers would facilitate the CPC authority, and these attitudes still increase in general. Political equality and rule of law, like the percentage analysis in the last section, demonstrate positive strength. However, rule of law has demonstrated a downward trend. As for political equality, the concept continues to exist in the public consciousness because elections have been held for decades, and officials are calling for more open and broad local general elections in the county and township stages of the People's Congresses.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ See Information Office of the State Council, The People's Republic of China. (2011, October 28: either Foreword or III. Features of the Socialist System of Laws with Chinese Characteristics confirm the ruling status of the CPC.

⁵⁶ See CNA (2011, October 22); the official media in Taiwan reports Chinese Official: the vote rate is

5.3.5 Discussion

Through these statistical demonstrations and models, three observations can be made:

Firstly, officially promoted traditional legacies are more highly supported than others, which proves that the CPC's policies that include traditional legacies are effective. The analyses of percentages have demonstrated that support for harmony and group-orientation is extremely high, and it has already been demonstrated in section 6.2 that these two legacies are strongly promoted by the CPC authority. In contrast, democratic values, especially the core concepts of democracy, are rejected by over 60% of people. This section has shown that if Chinese have higher values of traditional legacies, the democratic values will be low. Secondly, modernisation in China cannot diminish the influence of traditional legacies; some of them even strengthen with modernisation (except for education). Meanwhile, the younger generation is also the key to the decrease in traditional legacies. These phenomena reflect Inglehart's argument: the values will shift between generations (1990; 1997). Thirdly, the environment for democracy cannot be established because traditional legacies and some modernisation factors, such as economic performance and social class, operate against the building of democratic values. The younger generation and education may help to strengthen democratic values in China.

5.4 Conclusion

The one-party system, as in the revolutionary communist states, where it was developed indigenously, can have more solid legitimacy because both ideology and nationalism can facilitate the party's rule (Huntington, 1991, pp.47-48),⁵⁷ and the CPC authority could be the classic example of using both ideology and nationalism to facilitate their rule. In China, as this chapter demonstrated, rulers' attitudes to democracy are clear: build up a democracy with Chinese characteristics to both facilitate rule and end demands for democracy. The CPC authority creates an illusion that this country also has democracy, yet China cannot only follow in the steps of the Western countries: a democracy with Chinese characteristics is required.

over 90% in county and township stages of People's Congresses. China now is holding the latest general election for the county and township stages of the People's Congresses, and the latest election law would ensure three equalities: equality for everyone, regional equality, and ethnic equality. The general election will be finished in all provinces and municipalities no later than the end of 2012.

⁵⁷ Although Huntington used the case of ROC, Taiwan, this thesis does not agree. The KMT authority in Taiwan is not indigenously developed.

In order to consolidate this democracy, the CPC authority promoted a socialist harmonious society that includes harmony, for ending social conflict, and group-orientation, for encouraging nationalism. The party dominates politics in order to decide what ideas are right and wrong. Statistical analysis also proves that traditional legacies will hinder development of democratic values, and official promotion for selected traditional legacies is useful for the CPC.

Economic development becomes the facilitator for the CPC because rapid economic growth offers a good reason for the CPC to convince people that it is the only party with the ability to lead China. The middle class that emerged from economic development has accepted inducements from the CPC in many ways. Statistical evidence shows that these two factors facilitate the CPC's ruling status, and help to consolidate traditional legacies rather than diminish them, as modernisation theories would expect. However, education and the younger generation are key elements for diminishing the influence of traditional legacies, and these elements are key to developing democratic values and for creating a friendly environment for democracy.

Chapter 6: Singapore

Can Singapore survive after its independence? It is an unanswered question. Lee argues that ‘what is absolutely essential is to survive’ (Apcar, Arnold, & Mydans, 2007, August 29, p.1). After considering this question for more than 40 years:

In a joint-statement, Mr Lee and Mr Goh said the current prime minister and his team ‘should have a fresh clean slate’... The time has come for a younger generation to carry Singapore forward in a more difficult and complex situation... After a watershed general election, we have decided to leave the cabinet and have a completely younger team of ministers to connect to and engage with this young generation. ...The Patriarch's retirement is, unquestionably, a key moment in Singapore's political history. But the dynasty is secure. (Harvey, 2011, May 14)

The founding father of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, and his colleague and successor, Goh Chok Tong, resigned their positions in government after a competitive general election in 2011. The People Action's Party (PAP) lost seats in Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs) for the first time. The results of the election may reflect that the people of Singapore are not satisfied with Singapore's patriarchal politics, which had continued for more than forty-five years (The Associated Press, 2011, May 14; Holmes, 2011, May 16).

Singapore's founding leaders tried to make Singapore a success, and these politicians from the founding period have a high sense of mission. The ethos still exists in the Singapore government, which is used to guide what people should do and what they should not do, and what is good for people or what is bad. Singapore's success also attracts the attention of other Confucian societies to learn from them. Deng Xiaoping in China and Ma, Ying-Jeou in Taiwan expressed their desire to learn from the Singapore model. Ma especially wants to learn how the Singapore government managed the country and to transfer the experience to Taiwan.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Ms Chee Siok Chin, Central Executive Member of the Singapore Democratic Party sent a formal letter to Ma to respond to this issue. The letter indicated that the Singapore government maintains an authoritarian regime that uses official power against opponents and ignores human rights. Most countries that tend to use Singapore as a model to follow are non-democratic countries; she is surprised that the leader of a democratic country would wish to follow in the Singapore government's steps.

The reason for discussing the Singapore case in this thesis is not to discover how this country gains success to survive or its economic achievements. In this chapter, this thesis will use Singapore as a case to demonstrate how this country creates its own 'democracy', and how the government uses selected traditional legacies to form its shared values for union, nation building and to end conflicts. Meanwhile, modernisation factors in Singapore may not diminish the influence of traditional legacies as modernisation theories expect. Instead, modernisation factors are even used to strengthen traditional legacies and its 'democracy', and further hinder the possibility of putting democracy into practice.

The structure of this chapter will be as follows: first, there will be a discussion of the leadership's attitude to democracy. This thesis will indicate that Singapore leaders have a specific view of democracy, and this view is similar to the classic Confucian political system. Then this thesis will discuss how traditional legacies are used in the official ideology and how modernisation factors are manipulated to benefit the leadership. After that, statistical analysis will demonstrate how people in Singapore will support traditional legacies that are promoted by the government, interactions between traditional legacies and modernisation factors, and how traditional legacies and some modernisation factors are obstacles to democracy. Finally, in Singapore, democratic values are low, and cannot support a democratic political culture for democracy.

6.1 Trustee democracy

Singapore leaderships' attitude to democracy is different from the form of democracy in democratic countries. The core difference between them is the purpose for democracy. In democratic countries, individual autonomy in which everyone has the right to make choices without intervention is highly valued (Held, 1995, 1996; Sartori, 1987; Dahl, 1989); however, for the leaders of Singapore, their duty is to offer people in Singapore a prosperous life, organise long-term objectives for the country and maintain social justice. This idea is more similar to ideas in classic Confucianism that indicates that a ruler's responsibility is to ensure that the daily needs of the people can be fulfilled. Furthermore, Singapore leaders also believe in a meritocratic government similar to the classic Confucian government type. However, people do not have right to revolt; instead, regular elections become the tool for people to check the government. Former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong called this hybrid democracy

‘the trustee model of democracy’ (Kausikan, 1997, pp. 27-28). This section will first introduce the background to clarify the reason that Singapore leaders have adopted this type of democracy, how a meritocratic government operates, and discuss the relationship between people and government. Finally, a pie chart demonstrating the popular support for this democracy and a summary of this section will be made.

6.1.1 Background

Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles landed in Singapore on 28 January, 1819, which began the commercial port history of Singapore. From 1867 to 1942, Singapore became part of a Crown Colony; the British Empire established a legal system, naval base, commercial ports, colonial administration of the Straits Settlements, and infrastructures. From 1948, the Legislative Council of Singapore, which held a partially public vote, was established as a legislative authority of the Singapore government. The Legislative Assembly of Singapore was established in 1955; most seats were directly elected. After 1958, all seats were elected and a parliamentary self-government was established to replace the colonial government until Singapore was independent.

Stability of the state and how to survive after independence are two core issues for leaders of Singapore. Lee Kwan Yew more than once described his worries after he realised that separation between Malaysia and Singapore was unavoidable.⁵⁹ In his memoirs, he argues that Singapore is a man-made international transport and trade hub. This small island does not have any resources and is surrounded by millions of Muslims, but the major race in Singapore is Chinese. The surrounding environment was not friendly (Lee, KY, 2011, pp.11-48; Kuo, 1998, pp.29-30).

If Singapore became an independent state, this state would be like a person who has a heart without a body. Therefore, in Lee’s argument, Singapore needed to merge with Malaysia; it could not survive by itself. When the separation of Malaysia and Singapore occurred, in the view of Lee and his colleagues, Singapore would not be able to survive after suddenly becoming independent. In the meantime, foreign commentators also held a pessimistic view of the independence of Singapore (see Lee, KY, 2011, pp.3-9: Lee describes the challenges and negative comments from major

⁵⁹ Lee said ‘we have to be very different from our neighbours. That was the first shock we had. Because we thought by joining Malaysia, we’d go back to the old Singapore. We would have a hinterland, a common market, and can develop import substitution industries like other countries. Now, we’re off on our own with not the most sympathetic of neighbours. How do we live?’ to express his worry at that time (see Apar, Arnold, & Mydans, 2007, August, 29, p.1).

press and countries. Lee himself also felt upset during that time).

Singapore needed to prove that it had the ability to prevent the growth of the local communist party because its surrounding countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, had suffered negative experiences with communists. If Singapore failed to demonstrate its ability to control the development of communism internally, these surrounding countries would take any necessary step to interfere in Singaporean affairs (Kuo, 1998, p.30). Lee also indicates that Singapore did not have its own military force and police; the army in Singapore included the British Army and the Malaysian Force of Singapore. The British Army was planning to withdraw in 1971, and the Malaysian Force threatened security and was a factor in racial conflicts in Singapore. An important description reflects the Singapore leadership's view to the construction of a Singapore political system:

Our community lacks in-built reflexes – loyalty, patriotism, history or tradition.... [O]ur society and its education system was never designed to produce a people capable of cohesive action, identifying their collective interests and then acting in furtherance of them.... The reflexes of group thinking must be built to ensure the survival of the community, not the survival of the individual; this means a reorientation of emphasis and a reshuffling of values.... We must have qualities of leadership at the top, and qualities of cohesion on the ground.

(Bell, 2000, p.258)

In this situation, Lee and his colleagues had to ensure that Singapore could survive independence (Lee, KY, 1980, January 5, pp.150-152), and the objective in Lee's and his colleagues' mind for Singapore was clear: Singapore must be stronger than any other surrounding states, and the government had to be efficient (Lee, KY, 2011, p.58;⁶⁰ Kuo, 1998, p.31 cited Lee's speech in Strait Times, 1987.11.14). Therefore, the trustee democracy, which is a meritocratic government with elections, was created.

6.1.2 Meritocratic government

Purpose of government and selection of talent

The background of Singapore forced the founding leaders of Singapore to consider

⁶⁰ He said 'We had one simple guiding principle for survival, that Singapore had to be more rugged, better organised, and more efficient than others in the region'.

how to manage this state to success. Lee states that ‘I was convinced our people must never have an aid-dependent mentality’ (Lee, KY, 2011, p.52), to encourage people in Singapore to be confident and enthusiastic to work for Singapore’s future. In the meantime, the government should also demonstrate its ability to guide and lead the people to success. In these circumstances, the Singapore government was designed to establish a clean and efficient political institution for achieving the country’s survival and success. According to the speeches of Lee and his colleagues, because of their Chinese background, the Singapore leadership tend to establish a government where:

1. the government can meet the needs of the people
2. social order and justice under rule of law are maintained
3. people have individual freedom but cannot offend others’ freedom
4. there is economic growth and social progress
5. a good education system is maintained and improved
6. both ruler and people have a high moral standard
7. a good infrastructure is maintained with leisure, musical, cultural and art facilities, and the people have freedom of religion and have the ability to have a knowledgeable life

(translated from Lee, KY, 1992, November 20, p.570)

The government that can reach these goals would be considered a good government. Although democracy and protection of human rights are worthy values, they may not apply to developing countries at present. He also indicated that even western powers would sacrifice democracy or human rights for maintaining stable situations; for example, the US attitude to Iraq during the Persian Gulf War from 1990 to 1991. The US chose to keep Saddam Hussein in power, not only for Iraq, but also for the sake of regional stability. In the meantime, the original culture of the society should be considered; otherwise, the democracy may not really succeed and human rights might be not protected (Lee, KY, 1992, November 20, pp.569-575). This government type includes characteristics that will be further explained below.

Meritocratic government is committed to review the leaders’ morality and ability. Kishore Mahbubani, the Dean of Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, describes three standards for Singapore to choose their officers: meritocracy, practice and honesty (MPH) (Mahbubani, 2009, April 13). Lee also argues that the standard for Singapore to select officers is not based on race, skin colour or relationships but on his or her ability and formal educational background. After that, his or her abilities should be examined and evaluated in actual practice.

The moral character is the most important part of the evaluation, because the more intelligent a person is, the more dangerous the person could be for society (Bell, 2000, p.208). ‘Once we veer away from the meritocratic system, our standards will drop’ (Wong, 2011, September 6), Lee argues that in order to maintain Singapore to be a ‘great’ country, this system is necessary.

These standards ensure that officers in Singapore can satisfy two categories: moral leadership and anti-private relationship. Regarding moral leadership, ‘When a government leader’s personal conduct is correct, his government is effective without the issuing of orders. If his personal conduct is not correct, he may issue orders, but they will not be followed (其身正, 不令而行, 其身不正, 雖令不從)’ (Legge, 1861b, p.130). These words describe how leaders should discipline themselves and set themselves as an example for people to follow. Lee said ‘we decide what is right never mind what the people think – that’s another problem’ (Economist, 1986, November 22).

The PAP establishes a strict process to choose members of Singapore’s Parliament and cabinet ministers. A report called *Let the best people run for Congress*, from the Chinese official news agency, describes at least six procedures for PAP to select their members of Parliament (Ceng, 2007, March 9 in CPC’s theory). This report indicates that the candidate should be interviewed by the leader of a committee to select the parliamentary candidate, and then examined by the committee. The candidate who passes the examination will be able to work in the local party branches. After that, another interview and examination will be arranged by government members to decide whether this person should be a parliamentary candidate. Then ministers will examine the successful candidate; after that, other examination and debates will be arranged to understand which position is suitable. Government leaders will hold one more interview, related to actual policies, to make the final decision. This selection process is to ensure the best person will be chosen, even if that person is better than leaders of the PAP (Lee, KY, 1988, August 22; 1989, March 23). Lee’s memoir also indicates that only the best people in Singapore would have a chance to be an MP. They choose candidates from best universities and offer them opportunities to prove they are qualified to be MPs or even ministers (Lee, KY, 2011, pp.121-123, pp.157-171, pp.135-144, pp.663-665).

In order to ensure these talented people would have high moral standards and would not be corrupt, an anti-private relationship ethos is promoted. Chapter 2 has argued that Confucian classical writings indicate that leadership should be virtuous, and they

should only have social relationships rather than establish private relations. The Singapore government made a series of laws to prevent corruption. According to the information from the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), a wide-ranging regulation is established to restrict government officers from accepting benefits from other people (Government of Singapore, 2006). The achievement in Singapore is striking. The CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index) from Transparency International indicates that Singapore is the least corrupt country in the world (Transparency International, 2011).

Government-people relations and elections

The founding leaders viewed themselves in the role of a strict father in the family; the father serves the people in Singapore (Lee, KY, 1988, August 22). Lee himself is not in favour of universal suffrage. He said:

I am not intellectually convinced that one-man, one-vote is the best. We practise it because that is what the British bequeathed us and we haven't really found a need to challenge that...it may well be that a voting procedure giving two votes to persons between the ages of 35 and 60, married and with families ... A plural voting scheme may be a rough procedure to distinguish the competent from the foolish, or the public-spirited from the selfish, but it may still lead to good government with greater probability than a one-person, one-vote procedure.

(Bell, 2000, pp.187-190)

This idea can also be seen in Lee's speech in 1984 (1984, December 23, p.201), and in Zakaria (1994, p.119). Lee said 'And whether you have one-man, one-vote or some-men, one vote or other men, two votes, those are forms which should be worked out.' However, Singapore's trustee democracy still offers everyone a one-vote system, and in this trustee democracy, regular elections offer the chance for people to check the performance of these 'fathers'. The election is a trustee form of voting where people choose the PAP and the leadership. It means people trust and are willing to give power to the ministers, members of parliament of PAP, to serve Singapore. In return for this trust, the government would offer a prosperous and just society for the enjoyment of the people.

Because every citizen in Singapore has one vote, the Singapore leadership need to negotiate public policies with the public to gain their support. In order to put into practice long-term public policies, the PAP administration also tries to convince

people that what the government does them is for their own good. If the people cannot accept the policy, then the government should force them to, and the people would eventually understand (see Lee, KY, 1981, December 24, pp.171-177; 2011; Bell, 2000, p.185). Singapore leaders believe that, although some policies cannot gain full support from the people, the government should ensure that people will benefit from these policies, and people will then believe that this government takes care of their welfare. Through this process, the Singapore government can maintain long-term strategies for development rather than buying people off for short-term support.

In order to protect the existing political system, opponents are not welcomed because these opponents are considered to care only for their own short-term interests in politics, rather than looking to the long-term development of Singapore (Bell, 2000, chap. 3 & 4). Interference in election campaigns that may hinder opponents' activities, and taking legal action against opponents who criticise government leaders, still happens in Singapore. Leaders of PAP do not trust that opponents have the ability to ensure the long-term development of Singapore. Lee Kwan Yew said that if the PAP loses the power to rule, Singapore would lose its achievements and stability of development; thus, he claimed that the people should be aware and continue to support the PAP in elections.

Public opinion on Singapore's Trustee Democracy




Figure 6.1: Singaporean opinions on Singapore democracy.

Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

This thesis asks ‘In your opinion how much of a democracy is Singapore?’ to explore public opinion of Singapore democracy. Figure 6.1 illustrates the result of mass opinion of democracy in Singapore. This figure demonstrates that a solid majority, 91%, of people agree that Singapore is a democratic country, 71% of them argue there are minor problems in the system, 5% of them indicate that the system has major problems, yet 15% of them consider this system is perfect for democracy. Although criticisms from scholars indicate that Singapore is not a democracy (see Emmerson, 1995, pp.99-105, who indicates that Singapore is more like a dynastic political system; and Bell, 2000, pp.185-219, who describes that the way in which Singapore’s leaders perceive its political system, it is more like a patriarchy than a democracy), most people in Singapore take the opposite view. This phenomenon can also be considered in relation to recent elections. People may not be satisfied with the long-term rule of the People's Action Party; however, it does not necessarily mean that the Singapore people want to overthrow the existing political system.

6.1.3 Summary

The philosophy of democracy for Singapore leaders is clear: they need to ensure that Singapore survives, and this is the highest goal; any other ideas, such as democracy, human rights, or civil rights cannot be set against this goal. Until now, Singapore still works under this philosophy. This essay has explained how the political leaders of Singapore operate their government and how they view the populace, in order to reach the goal of survival. With regard to government leaders, a clean and meritocratic government is maintained to ensure the best ministers will always lead Singapore. Regular elections provide a way to check this government and also to nominate the government as the trustee to ensure the interests of the people are safeguarded. Meanwhile, government leaders have to convince the populace that the government's policies are for their own good – for the collective good – and if there is a conflict between the individual's rights and collective rights, individuals should yield.

It can be suggested that the government is a revised classic Confucian political system, although the government is not overthrown through revolution, but by election. Nevertheless, with the strong guidance of public life, especially by Lee himself, Singapore cannot reach the standard of a western style democratic regime. To Singapore, democracy is no doubt to be a mechanism for government type; the point being that one should 'focus on democracy as a mechanism of government rather than as a political theory of the legitimation of government' (Ng, 1997, p.20).⁶¹ Singapore leaders focus on a good government, which stresses 'democratic accountability (government as a trustee of the people), and social justice'; it would be a 'trustee model of democracy' (Ng, 1997, p.21).

The achievement now – that Singapore surpasses surrounding countries in economic performance and living standards – are creditable to Lee and his colleagues (Lee, KY, 2011, p.664). However, this situation may change in the future, because people may grow tired of this style of administration. Recent elections demonstrate that the PAP cannot win so many seats in Parliament and can only win a presidential election by a small majority.⁶² Moreover, the Singapore government

⁶¹ She discusses Kausikan's (1997, p.32) opinion: 'The real debate is not about the values of any particular geographic area, but about values per se: it is about which values, in what degree and in what proportion, are necessary for sustained development, the maintenance of social cohesion, and the avoidance of serious problems. This is now a matter of grave concern to many Westerners as well as to Asians'.

⁶² A report from the Elections Department of Singapore shows that a candidate who was supported by the PAP only won 7382 votes. Please see Republic of Singapore Government Gazette. (2011, August

also needs to take notice of the fact that the major salary earners and workers also demonstrate a negative attitude to this system. Social problems, the wealth gap between rich and poor and inflation could push people at this time to oppose the incumbent system (Leyl, 2011, May 6).

Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong noted, 'Many [Singaporeans] wish for the government to adopt a different style and approach Many desire to see more opposition voices in parliament to check the PAP government' ('Singapore opposition,' 2011). Although most Singaporeans may not really want to overthrow the PAP government, yet they have sent a message to the government: everyone has a vote in the election; therefore, the government may have to change their attitude, act as a father and treat people like their sons and daughters to rule this country.

6.2 Traditional legacies and modernisation factors

In the last section, the Singapore leadership's attitude to democracy has been introduced. The Singapore leadership indicate that democracy in Singapore should be democracy in the trustee model, and a meritocratic government should take responsibility to ensure that the interests of the people are served. And *guanxi*, which could lead to cronyism, is prohibited in this political system.

Because Singapore is a multi-racial society that has suffered racial conflicts, and the PAP has also faced challenges from the communists, before its independence, as 'fathers' of the people, leaders enforce a strict legal system and encourage shared values to ensure that the people of Singapore could unite under the rule of the government. Shared values contain parts of traditional legacies and are employed to construct Singapore's official ideology for national union. In the meantime, the legal system also provides judicial power against any person who could threaten national security.

Modernisation factors, mentioned in Chapter 3, also help to strengthen this ideology. Planned economic policies lead to rapid economic growth, which makes Singapore become an example for other countries to follow. Housing policies and the related community committees not only satisfy the middle classes' basic requirements, but also make families and committees become a publicity pipeline for government policies'. Education also serves for helping the government to promote the official

ideology. These measures lead to the selected traditional legacies being firmly embedded in the Singaporean's mind.

In this section, this thesis will demonstrate a good combination for traditional legacies and modernisation factors in Singapore, which can promote traditional legacies and separate the need for democracy from modernisation. Singapore's constitution will first be discussed, where the government's duty is just like that of a father when it comes to supervising moral standards. The government can punish people who do not follow the government's moral standards. After that, shared values, which contain traditional legacies of harmony and group-orientation, will be discussed. Family is the basic unit for the Singapore government to instil these values, because the family originally is the basic unit in Confucian society. As in other traditional societies, the family has responsibilities to educate and pass important values to the next generation. Regarding modernisation factors, this thesis will demonstrate the economic achievements of the Singapore government, and it will be explained that Singapore leaders are adamant that only under their rule will Singapore have the ability to compete with other states. Aside from high economic growth, the Singapore government also uses school education and control of the media to educate people about the existing political system. Meanwhile, Singapore's middle class was created by the Singapore government, and also receives advantages, and channels to participate in public affairs, such as housing policy and community committees. The middle class will tend to support the existing government.

6.2.1 Traditional legacies

As was mentioned in the previous section, the Singapore government tries to act as a father, and treat people as children, and this thought is also reflected in the Constitution. Article 14 in the Constitution of Republic of Singapore notes *Freedom of speech, assembly and association*, and the second section of the article is

(2) Parliament may by law impose —

- (a) on the rights conferred by clause (1)(a), such restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part thereof, friendly relations with other countries, public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or to provide against contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any offence.

(Singapore Attorney-General's Chambers, 2012)

This article clearly indicates the limitations of Singaporean democracy: expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore, public order or morality cannot be offended. Meanwhile, Article 9 of this constitution also authorises the Singapore government to enforce internal security law, which commenced before its independence, to arrest any person without formal judicial procedure, if that person is considered a threat to national security. This constitutional rule again ensures the Singapore government's status as father of the state, and hierarchical politics is implied in this rule.

Group-orientation and harmony are promoted for constructing Singaporean nationhood and ending racial conflicts through highlighting shared values.. The family is used as the unit for delivering government policies and preventing potential conflicts (Hill and Kwen, 1995). Lee Kwan Yew pointed out the ethnic pluralism:

To begin with we don't have the ingredients of a nation, the elementary factors, a homogenous population, common language, common culture and common destiny.

We are migrants from southern China, southern India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, before it was divided, Ceylon and the archipelago. So, the problem was, can we keep these peoples together?

(Apcar, Arnold, & Mydans, 2007, August 29, p.1)

In order to unite Singaporean society, 'We must have qualities of leadership at the top, and qualities of cohesion on the ground' (Bell, 2000, p.258). Singapore's policies to prevent conflicts between races and ensure the society can be united do not rely on a democratic system or individual rights; several non-democratic mechanisms are implemented to maintain social cohesion.⁶³

Five 'shared values' established by the Singapore government can be viewed as the fundamental elements of Singapore political values:

Nation before community and society above self: Putting the interests of society ahead of the individual.

Family as the basic unit of society: The family is identified as the most stable fundamental building block of the nation.

Community support and respect for the individual: Recognises that the

⁶³ Bell (2000, p.202-205) cites Lee's speeches to demonstrate Lee's wish to prevent racial conflicts from the 1950s to early 1960s through policies made to create a common national identity. See also Lee's bibliography (2011), where he describes how he prevented the severe racial gap in Singapore; and see also Lee's speech in Lee (1986, August 17, pp.223-226).

individual has rights, which should be respected and not lightly encroached upon. Encourages the community to support and have compassion for the disadvantaged individual who may have been left behind by the free market system.

Consensus, not conflict: Resolving issues through consensus and not conflict stresses the importance of compromise and national unity.

Racial and religious harmony: Recognises the need for different communities to live harmoniously with one another in order for all to prosper.

(Tan, 2001, September 21)

Inoguchi and Newman also mention a framework suggested by the Singapore leadership that includes the idea that individuals are not isolated, so everyone is a part of society; therefore, it is important to ‘strike a balance between civil liberties and social stability’ (1997, p.4). They also note that ‘[g]roup orientation is also associated with values such as self-effacement, self-discipline and personal sacrifice to the greater good, respect for family ties and the elderly, frugality, filial piety, hard work and teamwork are further elements of this matrix’.

In these official values, the Singapore government especially stresses the family-centred values. According to historical experience, family-centred values have been shown to protect individuals to survive wars or invasions. In the meantime, the family structure can help a family to raise and teach younger members by informal education (see Bell, 2000, p.236; Lee’s speech in Lee, KY, 1982, February 7, pp.407-408). The basic core of this framework is that an individual does not exist alone in the society, nation and state, but is a member of these units. In this situation, individuals should try to balance the interests of individuals and groups, even giving up individual rights for the group interest. Therefore, the sacrifice of the individual becomes possible when government leaders consider the country’s welfare and common good in Singapore. An early paragraph of this chapter demonstrated that the stability of Singapore is the priority of the Singaporean leadership. Therefore, they choose to establish a well-ordered society and sacrifice individual rights. In this society, limitation of individual’s rights is applied to reach the objective of collective good. Cohesion, harmony and group orientation, which facilitate the establishment of a well-ordered society, are strongly emphasised. As this chapter demonstrated, in order to build this political system, an uncorrupted elite leadership⁶⁴ train the people

⁶⁴ *Guanxi* is strictly prohibited in Singapore. Bell (2000, pp.207-209) and Lee’s speeches (1962, December 6, pp.435-445) have demonstrated what kind of elite is needed by the Singapore government. They would accept the elite from their selection procedure, rather than *guanxi*, to ensure the quality of the civil service. Uncorrupted leadership is always mentioned by Lee; this point can also be found in

to adopt shared values that are suggested by the Singapore government. Family-centred values would help the Singapore government to teach children about what is good or what is bad (especially the values) in the home. Because most of these values are from traditional culture, it would be more effective for family members to teach their younger generation than for schools or government to promote the values.

6.2.2 Modernisation factors

Section 7.1 has described several important characteristics of the Singapore political system. For the continued existence of Singapore, the country needs the best and most honest people to lead the country; a series of shared values needs to be adopted to maintain a united society, and these values are not the favoured practices of a democratic regime. Regarding modernisation factors, the Singapore government uses its achievements of high economic growth, education and policies that benefit the middle class to lessen demands for democracy and seek support of the existing political system.

Regarding economic growth, Lee and his colleagues believe 'More important is the economic prospect' (Apcar, Arnold, & Mydans, 2007, August 29, p.1). Lee argues that Singapore cannot fail; otherwise, it will go back to a small fishing village (Apcar, Arnold, & Mydans, 2007, August 29, p.2, p.7). For this reason, the Singapore government dominates Singapore's economic strategies (Quah, 1994, pp.23-24).

The Singapore government's strategy is to open its market to the world, and combine this with policies to attract foreign investments. The Singapore government is the director to guide and adjust the policies. Economic development can be divided into several stages (see Wong, 1990, pp.58-62; Quah, 1994, pp.6-14; Peebles & Wilson, 2002, pp.4-7).

During the 1970s, the industrialisation period and because of the separation between Singapore and Malaysia, the Singapore government used its natural harbours, decreased wages and encouraged foreign investors in order to develop its economy. Labour skills and technology were the major assets in modern industries, which included petrochemicals or electronics companies, at that time. The government could invest in these industries directly or in cooperation with foreign investors (see Lee, 2011, pp.49-70: he describes how he and his colleagues develop, and invest in, local

Lee's bibliography (Lee, KY, 2011, pp.157-171). He does not protect or help corrupt civil servants or leaders, because this is the essential point for the PAP government to win the people's support.

industries and assist foreign companies).

Later in the 1970s, the Singapore government offered the second industrialisation reform. This included increasing wages, increasing productivity, increasing investment in education and vocational training for increasing productivity, and expanding foreign investment incentives to attract high-technology industries. However, Singapore faced a recession from 1984 to 1986 (see Figure 6.1). Expanding the international financial centre and decreasing the costs of production became the strategies to resolve the recession. By the early 1990s, the Singapore government offered other strategic objectives.⁶⁵ Now this authority focuses on innovation-intensive industries. These strategies can be considered successful, according to achievements in economic growth. Recently the BBC reported that ‘At 14.7%, Singapore is the fastest growing Asian economy in 2010’ (‘Singapore economy,’ 2011). In figure 6.2, data from the Department of Statistics, Singapore, also demonstrates that it does in fact maintain high economic growth, and Singapore was awarded a high score by the World Competitiveness Yearbook from IMD (IMD, 2011).



Figure 6.2: Real Economic Growth of Singapore.

Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore

<http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/economy/hist/gdp1.html>

Drawing on the experience of successful economic development, Lee argued that what foreign investors need is ‘political continuity, to assure foreign investors that present and future governments will stay committed to reforms’ (Bell, 2000, p.228: he

⁶⁵ See Peebles and Wilson (2002, pp.6-7).

cites from the Straits Times (weekly edition), 28 February 1998, 14). The Singapore government offered this investment environment through its political system.

The administration works to construct Singapore as a modern commercial city to ensure its competitiveness, and, from the 1950s until the present, ‘the prosperity of Singapore, where people lead lives that even many Japanese would envy, is shared widely’ (Bell, 2000, p.231).

Economic development has been successful in Singapore and it is recognised as a guided and state-controlled process. Although economic development will slightly change public opinion, nonetheless, as this thesis has mentioned, the Singapore government enforces shared values to educate people. In the meantime, school education also instils these official values to prevent change.

Considering the educational aspect, as Chapter 3 and this chapter mentioned, the Singapore government uses education to encourage the people to serve Singapore’s official ideology: moral education strengthens social cohesion for uniting the state, helps construct the Singapore nation, and propagates successful stories and experiences of Singapore (Ministry of Education, Singapore, 2011; Guanyinmiao, 2011, May 13; Nichol & Sim, 2007; Tan Tai Weia, 1994).

For Singapore’s leaders, western values are not suitable to prevent incoherent and unstable conditions among the Singaporean people. Leaders favour traditional values, especially the values that originally existed in East Asia, to help to create national identity and maintain social coherence and stability (Tan Tai Weia, 1994, pp.64-65). Singapore commenced this moral education from its independence, and even now, the contents of education offer students moral standards to follow. Singapore leaders indicate that this education can not only unite Singapore, help people to avoid the shortcomings of western societies and develop personal moral standards, but can also help to establish a coherent society and help economic development (Tan Tai Weia, 1994; Nichol & Sim, 2007; Lee, 2011). National education and related educational programmes are responsible for promoting this moral education. The Singapore government released a clear message: this government welcomes foreigners, but these foreigners cannot challenge the values of Singapore. The government practises a strict method of control to forbid any information that is considered to have a negative effect on Singapore’s values.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ This can be seen in Lee, KY (2011); Emmerson (1995); Kuo (1998, p.297-304). These sources show that the Internal Security Law of Singapore, limitation of media reports, the proscription of normal

The government also publishes stories of success, and of the leaderships' attitudes and methods to manage the nation. For instance, Lee Kwan Yew himself has quotations from his experiences of managing Singapore, a bibliography and interviews to publicise the idea that Singapore's success is due to the existing political system and strict control. National education also serves to educate the younger generation on the success of Singapore: the meritocratic government relies on a series of well-organised policies and claims that Singapore needs to keep this government to ensure future success.

As for the middle class, as this thesis demonstrates, the Singapore government establishes an official ideology that is based on some of the traditional legacies. High economic growth also convinces people in Singapore that the existing political system is helpful for its development. Meanwhile, school education, as well as the media, propagates official ideology and stories of success. The government's work for economic development creates a middle class; Table 6.1 demonstrates that approximately 72.6% of Singaporeans consider themselves middle class. Therefore, how to gain support from the middle class is essential for the Singapore government.

Table 6.1: Subjective middle class in Singapore.

	N	Percentage
Middle Class	735	72.60%
Other Class	277	27.40%
Total	1012	100%

Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Chapter 3 mentioned that the attitude of the middle class to democracy is ambiguous, and the key element to influence the middle class is whether the government can create benefits for the middle class and offer channels for them to be involved in the political arena (Huntington, 1968).

The Singapore government, as a 'father', offers public housing; this can help to gain support (especially from the middle class) for the government's official ideology and consolidate the people. The government promoted housing policy from the 1960s. It controls the land and dominates the strategies to build public housing. In order to

clubs or associations from participation or involvement in politics, suing people or media who criticise government leaders, and interfering in industry, union movement and social life are the elements that the Singapore government uses to limit political participation by the populace.

ensure that the people can afford the cost, , the government offers lower prices and uses government funds to subsidise the loss. The government funds are based on the compulsory saving system, which asks everyone to submit a certain percentage of salary in his/her account to The Central Provident Fund. Nowadays, approximately 85% of Singaporeans live in public housing (Liu, 2012, p.2). This policy not only solves housing problems, but also affords the opportunity to gain support for Singapore's political system. Firstly, the policy promotes its official values, such as encouraging large families, reducing conflicts between races and minimising the gap between the rich and the poor (Liu, 2012, p.9). Along with the public housing, community centres, citizens' consultative committees (responsible for delivering the government's policies), residents' committees (responsible for government-people mutual communication) and town councils are new community organisations established to deal with community affairs and help the government to promote official ideology and policies. These organisations also cause the collapse of traditional organisations (Hill & Kwen, 1995; Ooi & Soh, 1993, pp.46-48; Wong & Yeh, 1985, pp.283-285). Meanwhile, since these community committees are guided by the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports, they can transfer residents' opinions to the government, and this offers mutual communication channels for the government and people. Furthermore, the middle class would stand to defend their property and present standard of living.

The fundamental aim of the present government from the inception of its public housing programme has been the creation of a nation whose people have homes they are proud to call their own. The underlying philosophy is that if one owns an asset in the country, one would stand to defend it.

(Hill & Kwen, 1995, p.120, citing Wong & Yeh, 1985, p.231)

Therefore, public housing policy in Singapore not only offers channels for the government to promote official policies, but also makes people more committed to the country.

Furthermore, the nominated member of parliament system also provides the middle class with various opportunities to participate in politics. The fourth schedule – appointment of nominated members of parliament in the Constitution of Singapore – notes:

- 3 (2) The persons to be nominated shall be persons who have rendered distinguished public service, or who have brought honour to the Republic, or

who have distinguished themselves in the field of arts and letters, culture, the sciences, business, industry, the professions, social or community service or the labour movement; and in making any nomination, the Special Select Committee shall have regard to the need for nominated Members to reflect as wide a range of independent and non-partisan views as possible.

(Singapore Attorney-General's Chambers, 2012)

These government measures successfully gain the support of the middle class. Table 6.2 demonstrates that 83.90% of the middle class support Singaporean democracy. This result indicates that the middle class in Singapore does not act as a power to promote democracy, but as a solid power to maintain the existing political system.

Table 6.2: Middle class Satisfaction with Singapore Democracy.

	N	Percentage
Satisfied	617	83.90%
Not Satisfied	118	16.10%
Total	735	100%

Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

This thesis asks ‘On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?', to explore the support of Singaporean democracy as a whole. Table 6.3 demonstrates the satisfaction rate. The result demonstrates that most people in Singapore have a positive attitude to this democracy.

Table 6.3: Satisfaction with Singaporean Democracy.

	N	Percentage
Not Satisfied	178	17.6
Satisfied	834	82.4
Total	1012	100

Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

This thesis uses ‘On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Singapore. Are you ...?’⁶⁷ as the dependent variable in the model to examine who is satisfied with Singapore democracy. As for independent variables, one control variables: gender (male and female), four tradition legacies, three

⁶⁷ This thesis recoded ‘very satisfied’ as 2, ‘fairly satisfied’ as 1, ‘no answer’ as 0 (a neutral answer); then recoded ‘not very satisfied’ as -1, and ‘not at all satisfied’ as -2.

modernisation factors (education, social class, economic factor and age) and democratic values are adopted in the regression model.⁶⁸

The results are illustrated in Table 6.4. Regarding traditional legacies and modernisation factors, although most legacies and factors do not demonstrate significant results for Singapore democracy, it can be found that people who hold traditional values (except *guanxi*) and all modernisation factors are favourable to Singapore democracy. This result reflects the analysis in the last two sections.

Overall, this model demonstrates that the Singapore government's strategy to seek support is successful. In this regression model, older people support Singaporean democracy more than younger people. Those who have a group-orientation significantly support this political system; the upper class (compared with the lower class), and people who indicate there is good economic performance in Singapore also support the existing system. Nonetheless, people who have democratic values oppose the system because it cannot be considered democratic.

The result again reflects that the Singapore government's work is successful. Group-orientation is the most important value in their official ideology, and people with this concept become core supporters of the existing system. The upper class may be people who enjoy the benefits of the existing political system because the policies of Singapore government are clear: the government encourages and offers good pay for skilled people to serve Singapore society (see Lee's speeches in Lee, 1980, January 5, pp.452-461). Therefore, this could explain why the upper class would be satisfied the Singaporean democracy. Economic growth is one of the major achievements for the existing political system, and people who see the benefits of good economic performance will tend to enjoy this achievement. On the other hand, younger people and people who have democratic values will stand against the existing system, and this result reflects the de facto situation in Singapore. During the last parliamentary election, democratic parties and the younger generation stood against the PAP government and demanded an end to its rule.

⁶⁸ Dummy variables for nominal variables: gender, age (divided into three levels), education level (divided into three levels), and subjective social class (divided into three levels)

Table 6.4: Satisfaction of Singaporean democracy: Multiple regression analysis.

SINGAPORE				
Dependent Variable : Satisfaction with 'Singaporean democracy'				
	multiple regression in		multiple regression in	
	Wave 1		Wave 2	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Gender (Female)				
Male	—	—	-0.024	(0.053)
Traditional legacies				
Anti-hierarchical politics	—	—	-0.037	(0.021)
Anti-harmony	—	—	-0.026	(0.023)
Anti-group orientation	—	—	-0.094	(0.018) **
Anti- <i>guanxi</i>	—	—	0.040	(0.022)
Modernisation Factors				
Education (under high school)				
High school level	—	—	0.054	(0.089)
Degree level	—	—	0.057	(0.109)
Subjective social class (Lower)				
Middle class	—	—	0.044	(0.079)
Upper class	—	—	0.071	(0.105) **
Economic performance	—	—	0.206	(0.008) ***
Age	—	—	0.071	(0.002) *
Democratic values				
(Constant)	—	—	-0.183	(0.005) ***
Adjusted R-square		—	0.112	
R-square		—	0.123	
N		—	1012	

*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001

Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2)

Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive beta of four traditional legacies means people who against these legacies and negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that

economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have democratic values.

6.2.3 Summary

To summarise, the Singapore leaders' attitude to democracy is clear. They tend to practise a trustee democracy, in which the government should act as a father and take care of the people's needs; in the meantime, the government should also instil correct values.. The government uses modernisation factors as the tool to promote the shared values that contain traditional legacies. People in Singapore will have become used to the official shared values, economic achievements, government measures that take care of their needs and the official propaganda in the education system that both promotes these values and shows that the existing Singaporean democracy is suitable for its people. Statistical evidence from the Asian Barometer demonstrates that most Singaporean people are satisfied with this political system. These results comply with the hypothesis 2 & 3 of this thesis. In the next section, this thesis will use descriptive statistics and regression models to examine attitudes to traditional legacies, democratic values, whether modernisation factors would diminish the influence of traditional legacies, and who would support democratic values, in order to test other hypotheses.

6.3 Statistical findings for Singapore

In the preceding sections, this thesis demonstrated the attitude of Singapore's leaders to democracy, and how the government uses traditional legacies and modernisation factors to facilitate their rule. For them, the government's purpose is to act as a father for taking care of people. Apart from *guanxi*, three other traditional legacies are encouraged by the government for constructing common values and nationhood. The Singapore government commits itself to building a modern country. However, the achievement of economic development is their best propaganda, education contents favour official ideology, and the middle class becomes a solid supporter of Singaporean democracy because of the government's policies. This section will use the Asian Barometer Survey data to serve the following purposes:

- to demonstrate support for traditional legacies and democratic values; the data will demonstrate that people in Singapore tend to have values of traditional legacies that are encouraged by the government

- to explore whether modernisation in Singapore can diminish the influence of traditional legacies
- to examine the relationship between democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors to discuss how traditional legacies and official controlled modernisation factors affect democratic values, using multiple regressions
- to demonstrate the democratic values of Singapore

6.3.1 Percentage and Strength for traditional legacies

The previous section demonstrated that the Singapore government promotes shared values (sometimes they also use the phrase ‘Asian Values’ instead), and these shared values cover traditional legacies, especially harmony and group-orientation (Tan Tai Weia, 1994; Emmerson, 1995, pp.95-99).

Table 6.5 demonstrates the percentage for traditional legacies in Singapore. In this table, the results satisfy the hypotheses of this thesis: people have high support to legacies that are promoted by the government. According to Table 7.5, we can find that a majority in Singapore approves harmony and group-orientation; the percentages for supporting these two concepts are 75.3% and 83.6%. A small majority, 51.6%, reject hierarchical politics. As for *guanxi*, 61.5% of Singaporeans reject the concept. Incorrupt politics has a broad consensus in Singapore. Overall, approximately two-thirds of people support traditional legacies; 66.09% of Singaporeans view these traditional legacies positively.

Table 6.5: Percentage for values of traditional legacies in Singapore.

Singapore

Wave1	hierarchical politics	harmony	group-orientation	guanxi	Total
Support	—	—	—	—	—
Reject	—	—	—	—	—
Total	—	—	—	—	—
Wave2	hierarchical politics	harmony	group-orientation	guanxi	Total
Support	48.4% (486)	75.3% (754)	83.6% (1662)	38.5% (366)	66.09% (3268)
Reject	51.6% (518)	24.6% (248)	16.4% (325)	61.5% (586)	33.91% (1677)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Note: Singapore joined the survey from Wave2.

Harmony and group orientation are two important elements highly promoted by the government from official ideology-shared values. It is not surprising that most people would support these concepts. As for hierarchical politics, the figure indicates that half of Singaporeans, 51.6%, reject the concept. This result shows that attitudes to patriarchy politics are ambiguous.⁶⁹ However, the ban on *guanxi* in Singapore is successful: three-fifths of respondents reject *guanxi*.

⁶⁹ Lee's policy is to choose the best people to serve Singapore, and try to convince Singaporeans that government's policies are good for the people. Lee said 'Singaporeans should unite for the existence of Singapore and better life. Communication, patience, explanations with people and force to implement government's policies when necessary are good for the government (see Lee, 1981, December 24, pp.167-177).

Table 6.6: Strength of traditional legacies in Singapore.

SINGAPORE	Wave1 Mean	Wave2 Mean	PDI
Traditional legacies			
Anti-hierarchical politics	—	0.1	—
Anti-harmony	—	-0.49	—
Anti-group orientation	—	-0.8444	—
Anti- <i>guanxi</i>	—	0.36	—

PDI: The percentage differential index in this table is Wave2-Wave1.

Note: 1. Singapore joined the survey from Wave 2.

2. The range is -2 to 2: -2 means totally against the factor, 2 means totally support the factor, 0 means no preference..

Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

The findings on the strength of traditional legacies in Singapore can more precisely reflect the opinion of Singaporeans for these values. With regard to the traditional legacies in Table 6.6, figures are similar to the percentage analysis: people choose to reject hierarchical politics and *guanxi*, but support harmony and group-orientation. These figures reconfirm that the shared values and Singaporean democracy are deeply internalised. Although there is an attitude opposed to hierarchical politics, it is not strong.

6.3.2 Traditional Legacies and Modernisation Factors

Table 6.7: Anti-traditional legacies in Singapore: Multiple regression analysis.

SINGAPORE				
Dependent Variable : Anti-traditional legacies				
	multiple regression in Wave 1		multiple regression in Wave 2	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Gender (Female)				
Male	—	—	-0.055	(0.172)
Modernisation Factors				
Education (under high school)				
High school level	—	—	0.071	(0.205)
Degree level	—	—	0.146	(0.285)***
Subjective social class (Lower)				
Middle class	—	—	-0.014	(0.293)
Upper class	—	—	0.020	(0.355)
Economic factor	—	—	-0.123	(0.026)***
Age	—	—	-0.046	(0.007)
(Constant)	—	—	—	(0.466) **
Adjusted R-square	—	—	0.026	—
R-square	—	—	0.032	—
N	—	—	1012	—

*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001

Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have democratic values.

In order to examine whether modernisation factors can diminish the influence of traditional legacies, which are a tool for the ruler, in Singapore, this thesis uses anti-traditional legacies as dependent variable, and then sets gender, age as control variable, modernisation factors as the independent variable, and democratic values into the model.⁷⁰

The results of the model are demonstrated in Table 6.7. Modernisation factors demonstrate different effects from traditional legacies. Education is the only factor that may diminish the influence of traditional legacies, but none has explanatory power in Singapore. Subjective social class and economic performance demonstrate a positive result for support for traditional legacies, and people who indicate good economic development are supportive of traditional legacies.

⁷⁰ Dummy variables: Gender, education level (divided into three levels), subjective social class (divided into three levels).

6.3.3 Democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors

Table 6.8: Democratic values in Singapore: Multiple regression analysis.

SINGAPORE				
Dependent variable: Democratic values				
	multiple regression in Wave 1		multiple regression in Wave 2	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Gender (Female)				
Male	—	—	0.117	(0.355)***
Traditional legacies				
Anti-hierarchical politics	—	—	0.090	(0.142)**
Anti-harmony	—	—	0.135	(0.153)***
Anti-group orientation	—	—	0.117	(0.123)***
Anti- <i>guanxi</i>	—	—	0.087	(0.148)**
Modernisation factors				
Education (under high school)				
High school level	—	—	0.113	(0.424)**
Degree level	—	—	0.248	(0.593)***
Subjective Social Class (Lower)				
Middle class	—	—	0.001	(0.606)
Upper class	—	—	0.102	(0.736)*
Economic factor	—	—	-0.195	(0.055)***
Age	—	—	-0.074	(0.014)*
Democratic values				
(Constant)	—	—	—	(0.973)
Adjusted R-square		—	0.179	
R-square		—	0.187	
N		—	1012	

*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001

Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have democratic values.

In order to examine relationships between democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors, this thesis set democratic values as the dependent variable, set other elements such as traditional legacies and modernisation factors as independent variables, and gender as control variables in the regression model. Table 6.8 illustrates the result of the regression.

Regarding the relationship between democratic values and traditional legacies, the result proves that people who have values of traditional legacies do not have democratic values. According to the result in Table 6.8, four traditional legacies, hierarchical politics, harmony, group-orientation and *guanxi*, demonstrate opposite results to those relating to democracy, and all of the results are significant. This means that, in Singapore, if a person supports any one of the traditional legacies, then they do not favour democratic values.

As for modernisation factors, people who believe that there is good economic development in Singapore do not favour democratic values. Subjective social class also demonstrates positive attitudes to democratic values. The results suggest that compared with the lower class, the upper class will have democratic values. Yet the result relating to the middle class is not significant in this model. Education is the most effective modernisation factor to help people in Singapore to develop democratic values. Results in Table 6.8 demonstrate that people who have middle or higher education have higher democratic values than people who only have lower education. The result for higher education is greater than for middle education, which means that graduates measure highest for democratic values. Younger people in Singapore will have higher democratic values than their elders, which could lead to substantial democratic political change in the long-run.

Male attitudes are ambiguous; males in Singapore have both values of traditional legacies and democratic values.

6.3.4 Percentage and Strength for democratic values

Table 6.9: Percentage for six dimensions of democratic value in Singapore.

Singapore							
Wave1	Political Equality	Popular Sovereignty	Political Liberty	Political Pluralism	Separation of Powers	Rule of Law	Total
Support	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Reject	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Singapore Wave2	Political Equality	Popular Sovereignty	Political Liberty	Political Pluralism	Separation of Powers	Rule of Law	Total
Support	72.4% (715)	33.0% (975)	29.1% (568)	48.9% (477)	50.5% (960)	47.4% (447)	42.63% (4142)
Reject	27.6% (273)	67.0% (1982)	70.9% (1384)	51.1% (499)	49.5% (941)	52.6% (496)	57.37% (5575)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Note: Singapore joined the survey from Wave 2.

Democratic values of Singaporeans are shown in Table 6.9. Findings in the table show that most Singaporeans, 72.4%, support political equality. Three rejections follow – to popular sovereignty, political liberty, and political pluralism. Percentages of rejection for the first two exceed two-thirds – 67.0% and 70.9%. As for political pluralism, a small majority rejects it. Rule of law is the most surprising dimension; 52.6% of Singaporeans disagree with it. Finally, more than half of the people support separation of powers. Overall, 57.37% people disapprove of democratic values.

Regarding their nation's history, Singaporeans do not have the environment or resources to know about democratic values. Although Singapore was colonised by the British Empire, the British colonial era did not help Singaporeans to establish democratic values. The legacy, in terms of politics, is the parliamentary system.⁷¹ A democratic regime needs a strong democratic political culture to support it (Gunther,

⁷¹ Lee argues that 'Why should I be against democracy? The British came here, never gave me democracy, except when they were about to leave. But I cannot run my system based on their rules. I have to amend it to fit my people's position,' then interviewers asked him, 'During your career, you have kept your distance from Western style democracy. Are you still convinced that an authoritarian system is the future for Asia?' (Der Spiegel, 2005).

Puhle & Diamandouros, 1995, pp.17-18; Pridham, 2000, p.20; Inglehart, 1990; 1997).⁷² The existing parliamentary system from the British colonial period may help Singapore to establish a modern state and election system, but this system does not guarantee that Singaporeans would develop democratic values automatically because an environment has been created to support the establishment of a democratic regime. (See Shin, 1994, p.154: he argues ‘democracy can still be created without the demand of masses, yet cannot be consolidated without their commitment’).

Table 6.10: Strength of democratic values in Singapore.

SINGAPORE		Wave1	Wave2	PDI
		Mean	Mean	
Democratic values				
	Political Equality	—	0.45	—
	Popular Sovereignty	—	-0.3528	—
	Political Liberty	—	-0.4131	—
	Political Pluralism	—	0.09	—
	Separation of Powers	—	0.1739	—
	Rule of Law	—	0.06	—

PDI: The percentage differential index in this table is Wave2-Wave1.

Note: 1. Singapore joined the survey from Wave 2.

2. The range is -2 to 2: -2 means totally against the factor, 2 means totally support the factor, 0 means no preference.

Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Percentage analysis demonstrates how many Singaporeans would support or reject democratic values, and strength analysis can illustrate to what extent Singaporeans support or reject democratic values. The findings on strength of democratic values are shown in Table 6.10.

The results of strength analysis are slightly different from the percentage analysis. Although the percentage analysis shows more than two-thirds of people support political equality, and are against popular sovereignty and political liberty, the strength analysis indicates that the strength of support for or rejection of these concepts is not

⁷² This point can be seen in Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros, who argue that if people’s attitude cannot solidly support a democratic regime, then the regime can be seen as not being consolidated. People need to be re-political-socialised to establish democratic values. If this procedure cannot be completed, then people’s attitude (mass attitude) can easily be changed due to ‘political circumstances’. Geoffrey Pridham also argues that democratic consolidation is much wider and deeper than the transition stage. Not only do democratic institutions need to be constructed, but also people (mass) need to develop democratic values.

strong. The strength of support for political pluralism and separation of powers is weak. Rule of law, rejected in the percentage analysis by Singaporeans, demonstrates a different phenomenon here: it is positive, yet the strength is weak. This result demonstrates that the people who support rule of law demonstrate a stronger attitude to this concept; therefore, the positive strength can overcome the negative one.

6.3.5 Discussion

Statistical results demonstrate the following findings: Firstly, people tend to stand with traditional legacies that are encouraged by the Singapore government. Harmony and group-orientation are extremely highly supported by people, and both of the percentages are over 75%. *Guanxi*, which is forbidden by government, lacks support by the people. The traditional legacies are supported by two-thirds of the overall population. Secondly, modernisation factors cannot effectively diminish the influence of traditional legacies; the result shows that economic development even helps to increase traditional values. Thirdly, statistical regression proves that traditional legacies are an obstacle to democratic values; nonetheless, economic performance in Singapore demonstrates a negative effect to democratic values. Although moral education takes place in Singapore, education will still be the key element to develop democratic values.

Through these results, it can be said that in Singapore, an environment that could support the establishment of a democratic regime is unlikely to emerge for now. This is because people are used to following the officially promoted values, and these values are opposed to democratic values. Therefore, a democratic culture for supporting a democratic regime is not possible. Modernisation would also encourage official values rather than decrease traditional legacies.

6.4 Conclusion

After the end of the monarchy period in all Confucian societies, the emergence of a democratic regime becomes the choice of political leaders. In Singapore, because of the crisis during its independent period, leaders chose to create a trustee democracy for the survival of the state. The government is committed to maintaining a meritocratic government that recruits the best people to serve in the public service. The goal of the government is to provide a prosperous and hopeful life for the populace. The government treats people as children, and people have the opportunity

to take part in a regular 'vote of confidence' to the government. However, the government will not tolerate opposition movements, and government leaders may consider those who tend to attack current achievements as opponents.

In order to construct a Singaporean nation, unite all races, and prevent public opinion from favouring western values, shared values are offered and encouraged by the government. These values contain harmony and group-orientation, part of the traditional legacies. In the meantime, the achievement of economic development becomes official propaganda, the education system helps to promote official values and the middle class is bought off by government.

Statistical results prove that people will follow in the ruler's steps to support legacies that are promoted by leaders in Singapore. Modernisation cannot successfully diminish the influence of traditional legacies in the public consciousness; economic development even helps to strengthen them. Statistical analysis results that show in favour of democratic values (which are key elements to create a pro-democracy environment) are very low.

These results satisfy the hypotheses, that pseudo-democracy, the encouragement of selected traditional legacies for official ideology and modernisation as the tool to serve pseudo-democracy and official ideology make a political culture that does not favour democracy. However, education will be the transforming factor, and the younger generation may also help to support democracy in Singapore.

Chapter 7: Taiwan

Taiwan has been democratised for more than 20 years. Data from Freedom House (Table 7.1) clearly finds that from 1972 to 1986, the overall status of political rights and civil liberties improved from 'Not Free' to 'Partly Free', and the scores remain on 5. The later years of the rule of Chiang Ching-Kuo (CCK) saw the liberalisation of politics (Lin, 1998, pp.47-48); this was followed by democratisation in Lee Teng-hui's presidency. The ratings of political rights and civil liberties then increased gradually. From 1996, there was a direct presidential election, and Taiwan, in Freedom House's record, became a free country. After that, the ratings of political rights and civil liberties dropped to 1 or 2.

This chapter will focus on three points, in order to respond to the hypothesis. First, the leadership's attitude to democracy will be discussed. It will be shown that the KMT authority, an outsider to Taiwan, originally tried to establish Taiwan as a base to expel communists and restore the ROC. Nonetheless, this authority faced international pressure (especially restrictions by the US that limited KMT's methods to fight against opponents), and confronted internal challenges by indigenous people. The KMT authority finally chose to democratise in order to protect their interests.

This thesis will discuss how traditional legacies served to shape the KMT administration and how modernisation factors were in favour of democracy. Although the KMT built up a democratic centralised top-down political system to control most organs of the state and society, it maintained *guanxi* with local factions for local elections and encouraged group-orientation for building up Chinese identity. Yet some of these political structures were dissolved during the democratisation period. Harmony, which was not encouraged officially, will not be discussed. As for modernisation factors for democracy, economic development weakened the ruling power of KMT, because this authority shared power with enterprise leaders. The middle class tended to support the opposition and political reform during the democratisation period. Although education for developing Chinese identity was emphasised, democratic education could not be avoided, because not only did the KMT need to maintain democratic China's image, but also the 'Three Principles of the People', KMT's official ideology, also includes democracy.

This thesis will demonstrate the trends for traditional legacies and democratic values in Taiwan. The relationship between democratic values, traditional legacies, and modernisation factors will be examined to analyse which factors would help or hinder the development of a democratic environment in Taiwan.

Table 7.1: Status for Political rights and Civil liberties ratings in Taiwan, 1972-2010.

Year covered	Political rights	Civil liberties ratings	Overall status	Year	Political rights	Civil liberties ratings	Overall status
1972	6	5	Not Free	1992	3	3	PF
1973	6	5	Not Free	1993	4	4	PF
1974	6	5	Not Free	1994	3	3	PF
1975	6	5	Not Free	1995	3	3	PF
1976	5	5	PF	1996	2	2	Free
1977	5	4	PF	1997	2	2	Free
1978	5	5	PF	1998	2	2	Free
1979	5	5	PF	1999	2	2	Free
1980	5	5	PF	2000	1	3	Free
1981.01-1982.08	5	5	PF	2001	1	2	Free
1982.08-1983.11	5	5	PF	2002	2	2	Free
1983.11-1984.11	5	5	PF	2003	2	2	Free
1984.11-1985.11	5	5	PF	2004	2	1	Free
1985.11-1986.11	5	5	PF	2005	1	1	Free
1986.11-1987.11	5	4	PF	2006	2	1	Free
1987.11-1988.11	5	3	PF	2007	2	1	Free
1988.11-1989.12	4	3	PF	2008	2	1	Free
1990	3	3	PF	2009	1	2	Free
1991	3	3	PF	2010	1	2	Free

Ratings process of Freedom House:

Political rights (1-7) / Civil liberties ratings (1-7)

Free 1 – 2.5; Partly Free (PF) 3 – 5.0; Not Free 5.5 – 7

Source: Freedom House.⁷³

⁷³ For this rating information, please see Freedom House (2005).

7.1 Party state to democracy

Before democratisation, the approach of the non-democratic leadership in Taiwan can be seen as falling into two stages: firstly, to restore the Republic of China to mainland China, and secondly, to choose to stay in Taiwan and soon face the challenges of democratisation.

Huntington indicates five possible routes that authoritarian leaders would choose when facing the challenges of democratisation:

1. imagine that they still control the state and refuse to admit there is any issue eroding their legitimacy;
2. increase repression to force opponents to obey the regime;
3. provoke foreign conflicts to restore legitimacy by nationalism;
4. establish some semblance of democratic legitimacy for the regime, such as an election;
5. choose to end the authoritarian regime and transfer to a democratic regime.

(1991, pp.55-57)

However, none of these routes guarantees that the original leaders of the authoritarian regime would stay in power. How to choose these steps is a puzzle for the leaders. The KMT authoritarian authority took the last four steps for maintaining its regime. In the first stage, the KMT authority asked people to be a part of the 'Restore Republic of China' plan to oppose communist China, in order to demonstrate the differences between communists, who have a totalitarian government, and the KMT authority, which is democratic. This authority used routes 2, 3, and 4 mentioned by Huntington above, to open local and then national elections, to pretend there were competitive elections and a multi-party system in Taiwan, and to enforce the Chinese nation-building in Taiwan. In the meantime, the clear enemy – communist China – and the unfavourable dramatic changes of the international environment offered the KMT government a chance to claim state union. In the second stage, the KMT authority gave up the mission to restore ROC in mainland China and included indigenous Taiwanese elites in the government. Finally, the KMT leaders chose to democratise the political system of their own accord to ensure that the government could continue to exist in Taiwan.

7.1.1 Restoring the Republic of China

The KMT authority first controlled Taiwan from October 1945. Before that, Taiwan was not under the ROC or the KMT's control. The KMT authority, to Taiwanese, is an external power rather than the native one. After losing the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan. Although, in early 1949, Chiang Kai-shek (CKS) had declared the resignation of his position of president, he was still the underground leader. Li Tsung-jen (李宗仁) became the acting President at that time. However, Li went to the United States for medical treatment and refused to return to the temporary capital city Taipei. CKS returned to power on March 1950 and clearly declared the purpose of his return. He indicated that the Republic of China would end with the fall of mainland China. Therefore, he argued that the mission for him and everyone in Taiwan would be to restore the Republic of China – democratic China – and save the people in mainland China from the Communist Party. The final goal for the people in Taiwan was to eliminate the Communist International. He also pointed out that the reasons for the failures in mainland China were not that the communist enemies were too strong, but because the people in KMT did not hold solid values to combat the Communist Party. Furthermore, the organisation of the KMT was too loose for communists to incite defection in the KMT (see Chiang's speeches 'The missions and purposes of reinstatement' Chiang, KS, 1950, March 13). These speeches clearly identify the early direction of the KMT authority: expel communists from mainland China and restore the Republic of China. During this period, the KMT authority consolidated its power in several ways.

Firstly, the KMT put into practice the Constitution of ROC, martial law and accepted US aid. The formal Constitution of ROC had been passed and implemented in 1947, and it holds legal evidence for KMT to claim the right to rule mainland China. In order to maintain a Chinese government in exile, the KMT authority insisted on holding to this constitution. CKS also said: 'I brought this constitution to Taiwan, and I will bring it back to the mainland in the future' (National Repository of Cultural Heritage, 2011). From 1948, in order to deal with the civil war with communists, *Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion* was established to suspend some articles in the constitution.⁷⁴ This temporary constitution offered legal justification to the CKS authority. In the meantime, martial law was

⁷⁴ The major articles in the temporary constitution were 1. Exempt the term limit for President and Vice President (from 1960); 2. Allow supplemental elections to fill the empty seats in the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan (the actual Parliament in Taiwan) (from 1966).

declared and enforced by the Taiwan Garrison Command (台灣警備總司令部) in Taiwan Province, in May 1949, for maintaining social order and suppress Taiwanese.⁷⁵ These martial laws limited freedom of assembly and association, and civil rights (Content of Martial Law and how to implement it can be found in Hsueh, Tseng, & Hsu, 2000, chaps 1 & 2). US aid was also another important resource for the KMT authority to control Taiwan. After the Korean War, the US moved to consolidate the joint defence relationship between the US and Taiwan (Stueck, 1995, p.53), which helped the CKS authority to maintain stability. In return, the KMT authority declared itself as a democratic government in the civil war, saying that the government should maintain its democratic China image, and took a soft approach to opponents.

Secondly, the KMT authority built up a clear enemy – the communists – to unite the Taiwanese, and reconstructed KMT to consolidate its regime by using democratic centralism to build the party state. Lin (1998, p.22) cites Huntington's opinion to show that the one-party authoritarian regime needs 'the existence of a clear enemy, and the strength of a one-party system depends upon the duration and intensity of the struggle to acquire power and/or to consolidate power after taking over the government' (see also Huntington 1970, p.14). Every year during CKS' presidency, the KMT government declared their objective or blueprint to recover mainland China from the communists (see Chao, 1996, pp.45-46); although the preparation year for this aim changed every year, it could not be questioned at that time. This intention to fight against the communists, offered the KMT administration a reason to demand aid from the US, since the US government, from the Korean War to the Nixon presidency, tried to prevent the communists' expansion in East Asia. Furthermore, consolidating power in Taiwan was successful in two respects: to those who came with CKS from mainland China, this goal offered them a hope of returning to their homeland; and the existence of an enemy could encourage the original people of Taiwan to support the regime, to prevent invasion from the Communist Party.

Thirdly, the KMT authority opened local elections to incorporate local factions and make them become a part of the KMT authority. Three local elections were held during the CKS period: elections for representatives of town, township and district, and the head of neighbourhood or village in 1946; elections for representatives and county governors and mayors of provincial cities in 1950; and elections for representatives of the provincial assembly in 1954. After reviewing the reason for failure in mainland China, the KMT authority decided to cooperate with the local

⁷⁵ As for Kinmen and Matsu, a previous Martial Law for the mainland had been declared and implemented in 1948.

factions to consolidate their strength in Taiwanese society (see Chao, 1996, pp.44-45; Lin, 1998, pp.161-162). The KMT authority used state resources and media to help the factions who stood with the KMT and boycotted persons or organisations that opposed the KMT (see Lin, 1998, p.162; Gobel, 2001, August p.5;⁷⁶ Chao, 1996, p.51;⁷⁷ Chu & Lin, 2001, p.115; Chu, 1999, p.152⁷⁸). The functions of local factions affiliated to the KMT were to be as clients between the KMT leadership, the local populace and elites; to help the KMT to deepen its local strength and mobilise local people to consolidate its ruling legitimacy; and also to decrease the opposition power from the root (see Lin, 1998, pp.177-185; Gobel, 2001, August pp.4-6; Chen, 1996, p.175, p.182; Chu & Lin, 2001, pp.115-117; Chu, 1999, pp.152-153).

According to Chen Ming-Tung's data (see Chen, 1996, p.178, Table 7.1), the average percentage for candidate nomination of the Provincial Assembly for local factions was 62.93%.⁷⁹ The average rate of election (candidate won the election) was 92.60%.⁸⁰ Lin's data for local factions and the KMT's share of seats in country magistrate/ city mayor elections (1990-1993) also demonstrates that the average percentage for KMT to nominate local factions as the candidate in these elections is 74.4% (see Lin, 1998, p.145, Table 6.3). The average seat share of magistrates/ mayors in KMT factions is 61.134% (This thesis uses the KMT local factions' share of seats/ total seats from Lin's table to calculate the average percentage; see Lin, 1998, p.145). These figures obviously show the close relationship between local factions and the KMT authority. Lin (1998, pp.187-194) further indicates that the KMT would make a check and balance between factions. At first, these factions were expected to remain at the local level, rather than the national level; the KMT authority would assign them to be the candidate in different elections. In the meantime, the amendments for election law also accelerated the replacement of faction elites.

Fourth, the KMT authority enforced the ideology that contained Chinese culture and the 'Three Principles of the People'. From the time that KMT won the civil war during 1927 to 1931, Dr Sun Yat-Sen's 'Three Principles of the People' became the central ideology for the KMT authority (Johnson, 1987, p.144). After CKS'

⁷⁶ He describes the aid clearly: the KMT uses trade money to help affiliated local faction candidates.

⁷⁷ He also suggests that the political trade off and payoff created a patron-client system, to ask for local elites; and factions' loyalty and cooperation.

⁷⁸ He argues that the KMT local officers 'provide the legal shield for illegal vote-buying' from local factions.

⁷⁹ Percentages were 75% in 1954, 60% in 1957, 63.79% in 1960, 64.86% in 1963, 63.33% in 1968, 50% in 1973, 60.87% in 1977, 71.05% in 1981, 68.33% in 1985, and 58.06% in 1989.

⁸⁰ The elected rates were extremely high: 90.91% in 1954, 93.94% in 1957, 100.00% in 1960, 87.50% in 1963, 94.74% in 1968, 96.67% in 1973, 92.86% in 1977, 92.59% in 1981, 90.24% in 1985%, 88.89% in 1989.

reinstatement, the principle becomes the doctrine for the authority to challenge the Soviet Union and expel the communists from mainland China. CKS argued that the failure in mainland China was because of culture and education. Regarding education, the government should focus on the idea of state, ideas of nationality and traditional moral spirits (Chiang, KS, 1951, September 3). The major failure of education was that the state education failed to teach the 'Three Principles of the People' well. Therefore, these principles should be learned by students, and the government should use it to 'wake fellow countrymen up', to unite people under the flag of the principles, and then to eliminate communists and reconstruct a new China with the principles (Chiang, KS, 1959, May).

The 'Three Principles of the People' covers three parts: nationalism (Principle of Mínzú), democracy (Principle of Mínguán), and social welfare (Principle of Míshēng, or people's livelihood). These principles, it is argued, combine Confucian values and western ideas and institutions (see Centre for Information & Communications, PCCU, 1983; Dr Sun, Yat-Sen Academic Research Website, 2011; Tsang, 1999, p.4⁸¹). Confucian values are the essential element in nationalism. Lin indicates that the 'Three Principles of the People' is not a coherent doctrine; some of the concepts are even from socialism (1998, pp.25-27). The part that the KMT authority focused on is nationalism, which could unite the mainlanders from China to support the government, but also build up Chinese nationality in Taiwan, especially since most of the ancestors of the Taiwanese were from mainland China.⁸² The infrastructure, built by the Japanese colonial government, and the administrative system, education system, military force and police service also facilitated the implementation of the Chinese nation-building policies of the KMT (Lin, 1998, pp.131-134). Nonetheless, Lin also argues that the Three Principles' doctrine limited the KMT authority towards becoming a 'totalitarian regime', because this authority needed to satisfy its 'democratic China' slogan (see also Tsang, 1999, p.7⁸³).

During the 1960s, the CKS authority started the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement in response to the Chinese Cultural Revolution by the Communist Party. The Chinese culture, according to CKS, was founded on Confucian values and the

⁸¹ Tsang indicates that Confucianism was rebuilt in Taiwan and became an ethos of KMT, but Confucianism may not really apply to the 'Three Principles of the People' However, he argues, CKS indicated that the purposes of the 'Three Principles' and of Confucianism are similar.

⁸² Huntington (1991, p.48) also indicated that nationalism can benefit the one-party system authoritarian regime, if the regime uses it as a 'product of indigenous political development'.

⁸³ He suggests that the emphasis on propriety in Confucianism and KMT's ideology of the 'Three Principles of the People', which included democracy, made the KMT authority protect the constitution of ROC, the evidence for Chinese orthodoxy, which offers this authority the legitimacy to oppose the communist party, but it also needed to tolerate a 'certain democratic process'.

‘Three Principles of the People’ (Chiang, KS, 1969, November 12a; 1969, November 12b). His speeches also indicate that the ROC, the state founded by Sun and that succeeded the traditional Chinese culture, is the orthodox version of China, and that he was the successor of Sun. In order to implement the policy, Confucian classics became part of the textbooks in schools and universities. However, Confucian classical texts ask the ruler to practise ‘benevolence and reverence’, which called for the KMT authority to practise a gentler authoritarianism (Tsang, 1999, p.7)

From official documents of CKS’ speeches and Sun’s doctrine, it is evident that the government promoted Chinese culture as a means to oppose the communists and created the connection to prove the government to be the successor of Chinese orthodoxy. Similarly, Confucian values are part of the culture to shape the doctrine of nationalism and to be the evidence that the government is part of Chinese orthodoxy; this helps the government to consolidate the idea of Chinese nationality in the populace. The KMT authority used this ideology to argue that, in order to restore the ROC’s ruling status in mainland China, it was necessary for the government to practise martial law and have a temporary constitution, which should ‘temporarily’ suspend democracy in Taiwan. Although this course of action offered an explanation for KMT’s authoritarian ruling status, it also eroded the legitimacy of the KMT authority in Taiwan (Rigger, 2004, p.286).

The central level of the KMT authority focused on practical matters rather than ideology (Hood, 1996, p.471). The CKS and the CCK authority learned from the failures of the mainland era. During their presidency, they first eliminated the various factions who did not follow their orders on the mainland and took full control of the military forces and security units. Then they used the communist enemy to establish the goal of expelling the communists from the mainland, of uniting the mainlanders who followed them to retreat in Taiwan (giving them hope of returning to the homeland) and asking the Taiwanese to obey the government (with martial law and the communist enemy just next to Taiwan, only the KMT could offer protection). In order to control Taiwanese society at its roots, KMT organisations involved in social sectors also opened local elections to establish a patron-client system and manipulate local elites and factions. Regarding ideology, Sun’s ‘Three Principles of the People’ is the central ideology for this regime, and the Confucian values relating to nationalism in the doctrine provided the element to prove that the government is the successor to Chinese orthodoxy, rather than Communist China. Meanwhile, asking the people to learn Confucian classics also helped the populace to consider themselves as a Chinese nation.

7.1.2 Republic of China on Taiwan

From the 1970s, the international environment and internal situation dramatically changed, which forced the KMT authority to consider a more pragmatic way to maintain their rule.

When discussing the international environment change from 1970 to the 1980s in Taiwan, one must consider the change in the relationship between the US and the People's Republic of China (PRC), which led to the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan and the PRC's reform(see Hu, 2005, pp.29-36; Nathan & Ho, 1993 pp.35-39; Lin, 1998, pp.272-276). After the Korean War, the KMT authority and the US government signed the Sino-American Mutual Defence Treaty, which formally ensured that the KMT authority would be under US protection, and, in exchange, the KMT authority should give up the islands off the coast of mainland China.⁸⁴ In the meantime, US aid also helped the KMT authority to maintain its ruling status in Taiwan. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, PRC under Deng Xiaoping's leadership started a series of economic reforms and open door policies. CCK considered that the ROC model in Taiwan should be a model for Communist China to follow. This change also encouraged him to adopt a less rigid policy towards his opponents. Nathan & Ho (1993, p.38) also argue that CCK needed to respond not only to Communist China's diplomatic offensive, but also needed to confront Deng Xiaoping's political reform in China. Rigger suggests that in order to continue to gain international support from the democratic camp, especially US support, it was essential for CCK to maintain the image of a democratic China (2004, p.288).

Internal challenges also grew in strength, which forced the KMT authority to take a softer approach to internal anti-government issues. The Kaohsiung Incident, in December 1979, was the notable issue during this period. Opponents tried to organise a large-scale outdoor gathering on International Human Rights Day without the government's permission.⁸⁵ Tangwai opponents underestimated KMT's bottom line because of past tolerance by the CCK government. According to the data from Liu (1984, pp.470-473) and Taylor (2000, pp.322-327), an agreement was reached by both government and Tangwai: flammable chemicals, torches or sticks were not allowed during the parade and the Garrison Command would only maintain order rather than stopping the speeches and parade. However after speeches about overthrowing the

⁸⁴ See AIT (2011). Please note the ARTICLE VI, the definition of territory for mutual defense.

⁸⁵ They applied for permission, but the request was rejected.

KMT authoritarian regime, leaders of Tangwai asked the officers of Garrison Command to withdraw, and the agreement was broken. Because several people brought torches and sticks, a violent conflict occurred between military police, officers of the Garrison Command and people who participated in the meeting. The KMT authority decided to suppress the conflict, and made a series of arrests. CCK declared that this incident was a judicial case and the government would punish the culprits, yet it would not affect the policies for political openness (see Liu, 1984, p.473; and Taylor, 2000, pp.323-327, who also argues that CCK decided to ban magazines and arrested leaders of the incident, because he was worried that the violence would affect his reform process). CCK agreed to open the media to report the trial, and the US government and congress ‘promptly urged the KMT government to restrain its repression after the Kaohsiung Incident’ (Kan, 2010, p.4).

In the later years of the CKS presidency, CCK succeeded to the actual ruling power of CKS, in his ruling period: he needed to consider how to face these international and internal challenges. Robert Dahl uses two dimensions – public contestation and right to participation in elections and office – to discuss what kind of path an authoritarian regime is able to choose during a democratisation period. The authoritarian leadership’s attitude to public opposition is related to liberalisation, and the attitude to the right to participation shows the extent of inclusiveness (Dahl, 1971, pp.5-6). When the authoritarian regime faces external or internal challenges, the leadership needs to estimate the situation to take the next step. Dahl (1971, pp.14-16) further indicates that the cost of toleration and the cost of suppression are two key elements for authoritarian leadership when considering what steps to take. Dahl expresses the relationship between the incumbent government and its opponents by three assumptions. He focuses on the possibility for the government to tolerate the opponents by these two costs. This thesis would use these costs to argue: If the suppression cost is larger than the toleration cost, then the opponents would be safe; on the other hand, if the toleration cost is high but the suppression cost is low, the opponents would suffer the suppression. Four possibilities could occur:

Table 7.2: Cost to opponents

		Tolerance Cost	
		Low	High
Suppression Cost	Low	1	2
	High	4	3

In situation 1, the authority would definitely suppress opponents because both costs

are low; it is easy to suppress the opponents; 2. is similar to the first axiom of Dahl (1971, p.15), but the government here would also consider suppressing the opponents; 3. is similar to Dahl's third axiom (Dahl, 1971, p.15); it is possible to form a competitive regime; and 4. is similar to the second axiom of Dahl (1971, p.15); the government would tolerate the opponents because the suppression cost is higher than the tolerance cost. Due to international changes, the KMT government was losing support from allies, but the government still needed to consider the attitude of the US towards the communists; thus, the suppression cost was rising. The rise of internal opposition led to an increase in the cost of tolerance; opponents actively participated in elections and won seats, and also publicly challenged the KMT government.

CCK became the Prime Minister in Executive Yuan from May 1972. Soon, because of CCK's heart disease, in July 1972, CCK gained actual control of the government (Taylor, 2000, pp.275-280). Because of the changes in the international environment and the challenges from the Taiwanese elites of Tangwai, CCK started the process of liberalisation to ease the pressure on the regime.

CCK found that the foundation of the KMT regime – the orthodoxy of China – might be at risk after the frustration of the negative international environment. He tried to re-consolidate the ruling legitimacy of the KMT authority by 'installing' the KMT authority from mainland China in Taiwan. CCK chose to take the following measures:

Firstly, in order to solidify the power in the government, he started to promote the younger generation in KMT against the elder leaders (Liu 1984, p.440); for example, he appointed Kwoh-Ting Li and Sun Yun-Suan as Minister of Finance and Minister of Economic Affairs. He also appointed Taiwanese, especially the younger members of the Taiwanese elite, rather than mainlanders (particularly mainlanders who occupied important positions in the KMT) to hold high office in the government (see Taylor 2000, pp.274-280; for example, Hsu Ching-Chung as Vice Prime Minister, Chang Feng-Hsu as minister, and Hsieh Tung-min as the first 'Taiwanese' Governor of Taiwan Province). CCK appointed these new bloods to consolidate his ruling status against the conservative factions in the KMT. More Taiwanese also were elected as members of the Central Standing Committee of the KMT (see Taylor, 2000, pp.285-290).

Second, CCK expanded the ruling legitimacy of the KMT administration in Taiwan. Although CCK declared that expelling the Communist Party from the mainland was the priority of the KMT authority, he implemented several policies for expansion in

Taiwan, such as the Ten Major Construction Projects in 1973 and changed the slogan from ‘expel Communists’ to ‘unite China by the Three Principles of the People’. Lin (1998, pp.287-289) argues that this change means that the KMT authority established the preconditions for giving up communism and implementing a democratic constitution, in order for the Communist Party to discuss the possibility of unification. The KMT authority also opened the supplemental election of National Representative Bodies from 1969 to start political reform for meeting the requirements of the Taiwanese for political rights and satisfying the concerns of the US government (see talks between Fredric Chien and Jay Taylor in Hsu, 2009). Lin also indicates that the expansion of the supplemental election of National Representative Bodies also offered more legitimacy and minimised negative effects for the KMT authority (1998, pp.283-285) .

Liberalisation in Taiwan had a decisive effect in CCK’s period. CCK had a positive and optimistic view of democratisation, and considered it to be popular in Taiwan (Hsu, 2009, p.110). CCK insisted on moderate policies to Tangwai magazines or activities. He continued to promote Taiwanese elites to be KMT cadres, ‘ignored’ several magazines and deployed limited military and police force when facing violent incidents, such as the Chungli incident. He also allowed the KMT and Tangwai to discuss democratic reform (Taylor, 2000, pp.320-325; Hsueh, Tseng, & Hsu, 2000, pp.435-440). CCK opened more seats for election of legislators and used economic and social welfare policies as the slogan to help KMT candidates win the election in 1980. He adopted the following measures: release of political prisoners and allowing gradual concessions to Tangwai leaders, holding fairer elections, decreasing the restrictions on speech and publishing, opening immigration restrictions, expelling radical officials who did not support the open policies,⁸⁶ and acquiescing in Tangwai’s political associations (Liu, 1984, pp.478-480; Taylor, 2000, chaps 23-24; Nathan & Ho, 1993, p.41). During this period, ‘The representative at AIT in Taipei, from 1982 to 1984, stressed U.S. support while prodding President Chiang to pursue his goal of democratizing Taiwan’ (Kan, 2010, p.4), to ensure that CCK’s reform was implemented.

CCK chose Lee Teng-hui (LTH) as his successor in 1984, although he faced challenges in the KMT and clearly announced that there was no possibility that his successor would be from Chiang’s family. Although CCK faced heavy challenges from the KMT against political reform, and stronger opponents from Tangwai asking

⁸⁶ Especially Wang Sheng (王昇) and Wang Shiling (汪希苓), and even his son Chiang, Hsiao-Wu (蔣孝武).

for political reform at this time, CCK decided to continue his reform (Taylor, 2000, chap. 24; see also Hsueh, Tseng, & Hsu, 2000, pp.435-437). He accepted the foundation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in September 1986.⁸⁷ He also formally announced the decision to abolish martial law and the prospect of offering legal routes for opponents to establish a new party, when he agreed to an interview with Katherine Graham from Washington Post (Hsueh, Tseng, & Hsu, 2000, pp.437-440). CCK made a hard decision at that time because, to some people, to abolish martial law meant to lose defensive power against Communist China. (Hsueh, Tseng, & Hsu, 2000, chap. 5 for details of the abolition martial law). The CCK authority abolished martial law from 15 July 1987 and allowed new parties from January 1, 1988 (Hsueh, Tseng, & Hsu, 2000, pp.442-445; this issue had been discussed on October 15, 1986). The KMT's policy was to unite mainland China and Taiwan under the conditions of political reform, freedom of speech and liberalisation of the economy, rather than to expel communists from mainland China.⁸⁸

LTH succeeded to CCK's position after the death of CCK, but Lee did not consolidate his power until 1990. From 1988 to 1990, Lee tried to overcome the conservative factions in KMT. After that, he ended the 'Period of mobilisation for the suppression of Communist rebellion', abolished the *Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion* in 1991 and then dominated the revision of the Constitution in 1991 and 1992, which legitimised the election of the new round of representatives of National Representative Bodies (National Assembly, Control Yuan and Legislative Yuan),⁸⁹ and finally passed the direct presidential election article in 1994. Democratisation primarily emerged in LTH's presidency.⁹⁰

LTH continues to work to construct a new theory so that the KMT can survive in

⁸⁷ Tsang (1999, p.13) indicates that CCK refused the elders' suggestions to forbid the creation of the new party, and this decision offered the best start for democratisation, Tsang then argues that CCK's decision to start the democratisation process is a record in Chinese history. However, there are many debates in Taiwan concerning the role of CCK: the reason why he decided to start the process is disputable. But his contribution to the beginning of liberalisation, which led to democratisation, cannot be ignored.

⁸⁸ Hsueh, Tseng, and Hsu (2000, p.439) indicate that CCK also asked the Communist authority to return to Chinese tradition and give up communism.

⁸⁹ Lin (1998, pp.303-366) analysed the strategies which LTH used to reach these goals.

⁹⁰ Liberalisation and democratisation are different. Linz and Stepan (1996b, p.3) argue that liberalisation is more open to political, economic and labour activities, and that tolerance is the most essential part of it. Democratisation is open to free elections to allow political organisations to have an equal right to compete for government positions. Przeworski (1988, p.61) also indicates that liberalisation is an institutional process of civil liberties, which would allow the right of associations and create some political organisations. It is an opening of political space, which would have an open process to deal with political issues, but the authoritarian regime is still not transformed. CCK adopted many measures for liberalisation, to tolerate the opposition party, but LTH opened the presidential, and fully parliamentary, elections in Taiwan.

Taiwan. He led Taiwan to democratise. This decision also meant that the KMT could enjoy the legacies of authoritarianism, such as party assets and party-owned enterprises that had been captured from the state, for gathering funding to win elections and maintain connections with local factions. These legacies were able to facilitate the KMT's dominant status in the new democratic regime. From now on, in the executive branch, it has had a reversal once, yet the legislative branch is still controlled by the KMT and its party allies. Nonetheless, as the Freedom House data (shown at the beginning of this chapter) makes clear, the political system in Taiwan has become a democratic one, although there may be several shortcomings.

This thesis uses the question 'In your opinion how much of a democracy is Taiwan?' to estimate mass opinion to democracy in Taiwan. The attitude of the Taiwanese to Taiwanese democracy is ambiguous. Figure 7.1 demonstrates that 87% of Taiwanese indicate that Taiwan is now a democratic state. However, the notable information from this figure is that 44% of Taiwanese argue that democracy in Taiwan has minor problems, and 37% people indicate that there are major problems in Taiwan's democracy. These results might suggest that people in Taiwan may have deeper democratic values; hence, people would have higher expectations for democracy in Taiwan.




Figure 7.1: Taiwanese opinions on Taiwan democracy.

Source: 2006, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

7.1.3 Summary

When CKS retreated to Taiwan after the civil war, what he planned to do was to expel

communists and restore his authority in mainland China. Thus, all policies and ideologies were intended to serve this purpose. In order to control Taiwan, the KMT authority controlled most organs of the state and organisations in society, and tried to establish the Chinese nation among the Taiwanese, yet these efforts still could not overcome the dramatic changes in the international environment. Meanwhile, because of US pressure and commitment to protect Taiwan, the KMT authority could not take severe methods to deal with opponents. CCK and his successor LTH chose the pragmatic route – political liberalisation and democratisation for protecting the KMT's interests and entrenching the KMT in Taiwan, yet these measures also weakened the controlling power of the KMT. However, these efforts eventually ended non-democratic rule and left authoritarian legacies for facilitating the continuation of the KMT.

7.2 Traditional legacies and modernisation factors

7.2.1 Traditional legacies

The preceding section has mentioned that although the KMT authority practised constitutional government and identified itself as 'democratic China', nonetheless, the *Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion* had affected basic political rights. For instance, the president had power to use emergency decrees without the permission of the legislative branch; the government had the power to use martial law to limit civil rights; and the president did not have restrictions on re-election. The mission for the government was to expel communists and restore power in mainland China. Chinese nation-building education was taught from elementary school onwards and propagated in all media in order to convince the people of Taiwan that the KMT authority was the orthodox version of Chinese government, and people in Taiwan (the only free men in China) should unite together to serve this purpose. The 'Three Principles of the People' was selected for use in nationalist education (see speeches from historical documents from Chungcheng Cultural and Educational Foundation, KMT). The US gave solid economic and diplomatic support to the KMT administration..

The KMT party state, as has been mentioned, used democratic centralism, learned from the communists, as their structure for KMT to control the state and social organs (Tsang, 1999, p.5; Rigger, 1999, p.64). The KMT rulers were the central command to

control and guide these organs and organisations. At the same time, the original KMT factions, which retreated with CKS from mainland China, were cleared from the military and security agencies, and party organisations manipulated or were involved in all social sectors, such as labour unions, youth groups, religious groups, professional associations, business associations, farmer and fishers' associations, women's associations, schools and mass media (Chu & Lin, 2001, p.114; see also Chu, 1994, pp.115-116; Rigger, 1999, p.70). During this period, a strong hierarchical politics was constructed, and people were asked to unite under the KMT authority's leadership to expel communists. The KMT also controlled most local factions and eliminated factions that did not obey it (Lin, 1998). The KMT and local factions maintained a patron-client relationship in politics (Chao, 1996; Lin, 1998, pp.161-162; Chen, 1996; Chu, 1999).

After 1949, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the PRC weakened from the period of Nikita Khrushchev. From 1963 to 1964, the nine criticisms (CPC, 1964), which were published in People's Daily and Red flag magazine, were against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and showed the public conflict between the Soviet Union and the CPC. From 1968 to 1969, a series of regional military conflicts occurred on the northeast border of PRC and the Soviet Union. The Nixon presidency decided to cooperate with PRC against the Soviet Union. In July 1971 President Nixon's National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, made a secret trip to the PRC and met Zhou Enlai (周恩來) to discuss formally normalising the relationship between the US and the PRC. In late February 1972, the US president Richard Nixon visited China,⁹¹ and then The Three Joint Communiqués followed in 1972, 1979 and 1982.

According to the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations in 1979, and the Joint Communiqué on United States Arms Sales to Taiwan in 1982, the KMT authority lost its main support regarding the orthodoxy of China, the promise to defend Taiwan, and the sources of military equipment:

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the

⁹¹ Hu (2005) indicates that Nixon argued that, in order to maintain the world peace, the US must change China's attitude.

Chinese themselves (see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume xvii, China, 1969–1972, Document 203, Joint Statement Following Discussions With Leaders of the People’s Republic of China <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d203>).

The United States of America recognises the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. (see Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America <http://www.china.org.cn/english/china-us/26243.htm>)

6. Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue. (see United States-China Joint Communiqué on United States Arms Sales to Taiwan <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/81782a.htm>)

These three communiqués clearly demonstrate that the US government had turned to support the PRC as representing the whole of China in the world. In the meantime, the security issue became the priority for the KMT.

In addition to losing the major alliance, the ROC was forced to withdraw from the United Nations in 1971, and lost nearly 40 alliances from 1970 to 1980. These former alliances also signed familiar communiqués with the PRC acknowledging that PRC is the ‘the sole legal Government of China’. As PRC gained ‘international recognition’, KMT’s wish to expel CPC from China and restore KMT’s ruling status in mainland China became unreasonable (Rigger, 2004, p.286). These international changes made the KMT authority lose its long-term official belief ,instilled in the minds of the

people, and also forced the KMT authority to change its slogans ‘expel communists from mainland China’ and the ‘orthodoxy of China’, to encourage the populace to support the government.

Although the KMT authority could still maintain a top-down political system, the effects of the loss were huge. From that time, as previously mentioned, the KMT authority could only choose to survive in Taiwan and needed to take a softer approach towards political opponents. Some of the local factions that felt they would not be treated fairly by the KMT chose to cut *guanxi* to the KMT and joined their opponents, and powerful factions asked for more resources from the KMT (Chu, 1999): the original top-down system was changing. Furthermore, political opponents did not favour the concept of Chinese nation building, but tended to want to establish a Taiwanese state. With the political liberalisation and democratisation process in Taiwan, the KMT party state and its ideas about the Chinese nation gradually dissolved. Instead, a democratic regime, with a Taiwan orientation was established.

Figure 7.2, data from Election Study Centre, National Chengchi University, Taiwan, demonstrates that the sense of Chinese identity decreased and Taiwanese identity increased from 1992, and sharply moved from 1996 to 2000. During this period, LTH offered the Neo-Taiwanese concept. Although Chen, Sui-Bien (CSB) tried to establish a Taiwanese identity from 2000 to 2008, the Taiwanese identity only increased gradually. From 2008 to June, 2011, during Ma Ying-jeou (MYJ)’s presidency, Taiwanese identity increases sharply again, although Ma’s government tends to support Chinese identity.




Figure 7.2: Percentage of Taiwanese identity/ Chinese identity.

Source: Election Study Centre, National Chengchi University, Taiwan.

<http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/modules/tinyd2/content/TaiwanChineseID.htm>

Note: 1. Green: Taiwanese; Purple: Both Taiwanese and Chinese;

Blue: Chinese; Black: No Response.

2. 1992-2000: LTH Presidency; 2000-2008: CBS Presidency;

after 2008: MYJ presidency.

After democratisation, the effects of traditional legacies decreased; hierarchical politics was weakened because there was no strong government that could control most of the social and political organisations in the state. Group-orientation in Taiwan remained ambiguous, because of the identity issues that arose, regarding nationality and state (Chinese or Taiwanese). *Guanxi* still existed in politics, yet local factions in the democratic period might not only serve the KMT; they might change their support to other parties to stand against KMT candidates in elections. In Taiwan, harmony is not promoted; diversity has taken a firm hold as a public idea, because of fundamental differences, the identity issues, and the development of democratic values.

7.2.2 Modernisation

Education

Initially, the KMT authority in Taiwan had popularised the education system. However, the KMT authority established a series of guidelines for schools to promote the expulsion of communists and Chinese nation-building education. CKS indicated that he felt the failure on the mainland was because of the failure of education. He asserted that if the government had emphasised the concept of state, nationalism, and traditional moral and spiritual values, then mainland China would have not been occupied by the communists (Chiang, KS, 1951, September 3). Therefore, in order to achieve the goal to expel the communists to restore the ROC, the government should adopt education to unite people to eliminate communists and establish a democratic new China based on the 'Three Principle of the People' (Chiang, KS, 1959, May). Therefore, CKS asked all levels of schools to open the subject of 'Three Principles of the People' to teach nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood.

In these circumstances, the ministry of education established 'Essentials of the Implementation of Nation-Building Education in the Period of Rebellion', 'Essentials of the Implementation of National-Restoring Education' and 'Essentials of the Implementation of Recovering the Mainland Education' as guidelines for action to expel communists and promote Chinese national-building education (Council for Cultural Affairs, ROC, 2011; Ministry of Education, ROC, 2012). The educational system in this period had a mission to educate people to be part of the recovery plan. In the meantime, democratic education was also provided because the KMT's official ideology, the 'Three Principle of the People', includes democracy. This was an essential subject for examinations and focused on nationalism, yet students would still learn democratic values.

Education changed during the process of the democratisation period. In order to give the ROC-KMT institution a new legitimacy, LTH created a 'ROC on Taiwan' concept in 1991, which argues that the ROC government now only governed Taiwan and its affiliated islands. This concept is included in the additional articles of the ROC constitution, which distinguishes the two areas – the Chinese mainland area and the free area.⁹² The democratisation process should be carried out in the free area. The

⁹² Lin (1998, p.350-352) indicates that this concept is to solve the conflict of unification and independence during the early 1990s, and the concept is a two-China concept, or even considers

ROC, with Taiwan's democratic experience, could help mainland China's democratisation and the liberalisation of the economy (see Lee's speech in Connell University, see Lee T.-H, 1996, June 10). LTH also used 'life community' to create a 'Neo-Taiwanese' concept, which indicates that no matter whether a person is a mainlander or Taiwanese, the people who fight for this land and love this land are the owner of the land (Lee T.-H, 1992, July 23). However, he also argued that reunification is the goal for cross-strait governments in his presidential inaugural addresses in 1996. Although he still mentioned that the government should follow the 'Three Principles of the People' and Confucianism, the attention had turned from Nationalism to Democracy (Principle of Minquan) (Lee T.-H, 1995; 1996, May 20). During this time, education for democratic values was broadly introduced in textbooks, and these values would become questions on university or senior high school entrance examinations.

CSB was elected as the president in 2000; as an anti-Chinese identity supporter, he tried to dissolve the Chinese orthodox education policies in favour of Taiwanese-based policies. This represents a total change from Chinese identity to Taiwanese identity. Taiwanese and other dialects in Taiwan became core courses in primary and middle schools, courses of the 'Three Principles of the People' were abolished, and replaced by civil education to develop democratic values. Most textbooks that served to build up Chinese identity were abolished, the DPP government effected gradual desinicisation in the education system, and even pan-KMT party legislators did not oppose it (Liu, 2005). However, Chen's successor, MYJ is a ROC nationalist;⁹³ thus, the education policies changed to favour Chinese traditional culture, but his government could not build up the Chinese identity by official policies as in the authoritarian period. Yet democratic education still exists.

Middle class

The attitude of the middle class towards democracy is ambiguous in Taiwan; some members would support the KMT's opponents, the Tangwai (黨外, outside KMT) elites, yet some of them tended to support the KMT authoritarian regime.

Taiwan an independent state. People would have rights to decide whether the state should unify with China or separate from China permanently. Nonetheless, this thesis does not totally agree with that. The additional article still notes that 'To meet the requisites of national unification, the following additional articles are added to the ROC Constitution in accordance with...'. Therefore, it may not be considered as an implicit recognition that Taiwan is an independent state at that time.

⁹³ Please see Wikileaks, 08TAIPEI1093. 'Ma was raised and educated in a wholly KMT environment, he is a "nationalist" who identifies with the Republic of China (ROC), not Taiwan...' (Wikileaks, 2011).

Elites of mainlanders have dominated the KMT authority, in the long term. Because of the 228 Incident, which eliminated most Taiwanese elites, and the mistrust of the indigenous people, elites of mainlanders who retreated with the CKS authority became the core elements of the government and the KMT-controlled national organisations (Wu, 1987).

From the 1950s, several opponents of Taiwanese elites from outside the KMT united against the KMT authoritarian regime in local elections. *Da Xue Za Zhi* (大學雜誌) was re-organised in 1971 by several Taiwanese and mainland elites to criticise the government's policies and ask for political reform. These elites also challenged the orthodoxy of the KMT authority (Liu, 1984, p.439). From the 1950s, candidates from Tangwai started to win positions in the local elections, such as county governors and mayors of provincial cities. They also won elections for representatives of the provincial assembly, and legislators' elections or elections for representatives of the National Assembly.⁹⁴

With the economic development in Taiwan, a middle class gradually developed, and became supporters of the Tangwai elites in elections, seeking political openness (Chang, 2011; Chu, 2011; Hsiao & Hsiao, 2010). Tangwai used the death of CKS to organise new magazines in 1975. The KMT authority eventually suppressed these, because some articles ask Taiwanese to stand up to overthrow the KMT's autocracy by armed rebellion and unite with mainland China. The chief editor and authors were arrested and accused of the crime of armed rebellion (Liu, 1984, pp.449-452). From 1977, candidates from Tangwai would win at least four seats in elections of county governors and mayors of provincial cities. They won more than 20 seats in the Province Assembly in 1977.⁹⁵ In the Chongli Incident, the KMT authority tried to cheat in the election of a Taoyuan county magistrate, but this was discovered and violent action resulted in 1977 (see Chen & Chang, 2001, p.VIII-IX).⁹⁶ This also seriously affected the KMT's image. From 1978 to 1979, the power of Tangwai continued to grow, and several magazines to promote democratic movements were

⁹⁴ People like Lee Wan-Ju, Guo Guoji Guo Yu-Hsin, Wu San-Lien, Lee Wan-Ju, and Li Yuen-Chan became Representatives of the Provincial Assembly from the 1950s. Wu San-lien was elected as Taipei City Mayor in 1951, Kao Yu-Shu was elected as Taipei City Mayor in 1964; Kang Ning-Hsiang became the councillor of Taipei City Council in 1969; Huang Shin-chieh was elected as the councillor of Taipei City Council in 1964 and won the supplemental Legislators election of in 1969; Huang Tien-Fu won the election for Representatives of National Assembly.

⁹⁵ See news from Taiwan Provincial Consultative Council (formerly: Taiwan Provincial Council) http://www.tpa.gov.tw/big5/News/News_view.asp?id=282&cid=2&urlID=3

⁹⁶ People in Chungli city protested against the KMT's vote-buying, and finally a candidate from Tangwai, Hsu Hsin-liang, won the election.

published (Chen & Chang, 2001, pp.581-740).⁹⁷ In the meantime, the KMT authority started to suppress these movements and arrested several leaders of Tangwai (Chen & Chang, 2001, chaps 5 & 6). For instance, the *Formosa Magazine* incident is the highest point of the suppression.⁹⁸ During this period, the middle class commenced a series of social movements to cooperate with KMT opponents, but they did not publicly move against KMT authority, and, although their political attitude was still conservative, they supported gradual political reform (Chang, 2000; Chu, 2011; Hsiao & Hsiao, 2010).

The power of Tangwai continued to increase, especially since their candidates won several seats from the first Supplemental Election of Legislative Yuan.⁹⁹ The social movements also started to rise in the meantime. During the mid-1980s, Tangwai had become the powerful political force to oppose the KMT authority (see Chou & Chen, 2000, especially chaps 3–5). A central election committee was formed by Tangwai, Research Association on Public Policy and the Editors' and Writers' Association were established in 1985, and some of these organisations helped to found the DPP (Nathan & Ho, 1993, p.41; Chou & Chen, 2000, chaps 4 & 5). A newly developed and indigenous middle class from the cities became its major supporters at that time. During this late CCK period, because of the start of political liberalisation, a liberal middle class and some from the lower class joined together to support political democratisation and the newly-established DPP (Hsiao & Hsiao, 2010; Lin, 1998).

However, other groups from the middle class, such as mainlanders, people who accepted benefits and cooperated with the KMT and 'state employees (civil servants, military personnel, and school teachers)' gave solid support to the KMT's authoritarian regime (Chu, 2011). Up to the present, these people are still the solid voters for the KMT in elections.

The middle class in Taiwan also acted as a promoter for political liberalisation and democratisation, although the middle class itself also showed the discrepancy between

⁹⁷ For instance, the *Formosa Magazine*, which planned to form a party without a name to push for total parliamentary election and elections for all local authorities. During that time, the legislative Yuan still included legislators from the mainland, representatives of the National Assembly also included members from the mainland; and the mayors of municipalities were appointed by the Executive Yuan.

⁹⁸ Major leaders of Tangwai, such as Huang Hsin-chieh, Shih Ming-teh, Lin Yi-hsiung, Yao Chia-wen, Chen Chu, Annette Lu, Chang Chun-hung, and Lin Hongxuan, were arrested and sentenced for the crime of armed rebellion by martial court. Fifteen lawyers stood to defend these leaders in the court; some of them become leaders in the DPP, such as Chiang Peng-Chien, You Ching, Hsieh, Chen, Chang, Su Tseng-Chang.

⁹⁹ Some members from the mainland died; therefore, several seats were allowed to be supplemented after the supplemental law passed.

the liberal and newly-created middle class, and the KMT-raised middle class. After the democratisation period, two major parties, KMT and DPP, both adjusted their strategies to claim support from the middle class in elections.

Economic development

The government dominates economic development in Taiwan,¹⁰⁰ and it creates a middle class, as has been discussed previously. This section will focus more on how the Taiwanese government dominated economic development during the 1950s to 1980s, and the authoritarian regime itself became the provider of a stable environment and the elites from the regime guided economic and industrial development. Economic and industrial policies were controlled by economic elites; their objective was to ensure economic success in the global market rather than the regime's stability. Their policies eventually created stronger enterprises that could influence the state's economic policies and even drive government policies (Chu, 1994, pp.125-128).¹⁰¹

At first, Liu Ming-Chuan, the first Taiwan governor, implemented several measures for modernisation, as part of the self-strengthening movement. The Japanese colonial government had already started to build infrastructure, such as commercial and military ports in Keelung and Kaohsiung, the railway from Keelung to Kaohsiung and several forest railways for the government to trade goods, such as sugar, minerals and crops from Taiwan to Japan or other Japanese trade partners (Wade, 2004, p.74). The Japanese had also established several trade companies, such as the Taiwan Sugar Company, Taiwan Power (Electricity) Company, Bank of Taiwan, Chunghwa Bank, Huanan Bank, Taiwan Commercial and Industrial bank, for these goods and commercial activities. After WWII, the Japanese colonial government left nearly all these institutions, companies and the infrastructure (Cumings, 1987, p.65),¹⁰² and they

¹⁰⁰ See Wade (2004); the author uses nearly two-thirds of the content of the book to explain how the government produced the environment for economic development and upgrade of industries. Riedel (1990) and Wade (1990) also explain the role of the government in the process of economic development and industrialization in terms of modernisation. MacIntyre (1994, p.7) also indicates that when discussing development in Taiwan and South Korea, 'state strength, and the nature of state involvement in the economy' should be emphasised. Chu (1994, pp.115-121) also described how the KMT authority used state enterprises to shape the development of industry from 1960s to the 1980s.

¹⁰¹ He points out that, after the late 1980s, the competition of elections gave enterprises opportunities to support and influence legislators and the government. Because of the sponsorship of candidates during elections, candidates would return favours when they came to power. Moreover, LTH's mainstream faction also established relationships with business elites, and these elites entered the Central Standing Committee at that time. This thesis argues that interactions between political liberalisation and modernisation, and political liberalisation and democratisation, offer the chance for the business sector to participate in politics; not withstanding that the candidates also need funds for elections.

¹⁰² The Japanese colonial government trained their Taiwanese replacements until 1946, and saw that

were taken over by the KMT authority. The Japanese colonial government also introduced the western education system, to train professional elites in medicine and agriculture.

The KMT authority took over all resources and institutions from the Japanese colonial government and started land reform, to redistribute the lands to farmers to raise agricultural productivity (Cumings, 1987, p.65; Haggard & Cheng, 1987, pp.114-115).¹⁰³

From the 1950s, US aid and military protection offered the KMT authority the opportunity to consider its economic policies, and both the US and the CKS government wanted a stable and developed non-communist base to oppose communist mainland China (Wade, 2004, pp.83-84). Therefore, the KMT authority sought to follow the US camp from the cold war onwards and insisted on cooperating with international society rather than closing its door. Taiwan's economic development can be divided into several eras. Import substitution is the first period. The KMT authority controlled all major resources to support and control economic development. The authority developed the original agricultural sector and started to develop light industry in this period, and the textile industry became the major industry for export (Wade, 2004, p.55; Wang, 1997, p.69).¹⁰⁴ Plastic and synthetic fibres were also supported by government (Wade, 2004, pp.76-81). Export expansion occurred in the second period, along with the growth of several important industries, such as fibres, plastics, electrical and electronic goods. These industries are labour-intensive industries, and Taiwan could offer highly-skilled and well-trained technicians because of its education system (Wade, 2004, pp.64-65). Small and medium-sized enterprises emerged because of these labour-intensive industries (Wang, 1997, p.70; Campos & Root, 1996, p.110).¹⁰⁵ Small and medium-sized enterprises offered the government space to adjust the economic development policies so that they were more flexible. During this time, the KMT authority decreased the size of the agricultural sector and increased the industrial sector to ensure beneficial job opportunities, salaries and

the Taiwanese bureaucrats who served the colonial government would remain in their positions.

¹⁰³ Because leaders of the KMT authority did not have lands or properties in Taiwan, there were no landlords or warlords to oppose the KMT authority. Nonetheless, the KMT authority could successfully carry out land reform that this authority failed to do in mainland China; Haggard and Cheng argue that the KMT authority learned a lesson from the failure in mainland China; the land reform would help the KMT to expand its influence in the countryside.

¹⁰⁴ The KMT government controlled the exchange rate for New Taiwan Dollars; it undervalued NTD in the market to encourage the export industries.

¹⁰⁵ Jose Edgardo Campos and Hilton L, Root, on the other hand, suggest that, because the mainlander elites did not trust the Taiwanese elites, the KMT authority adopted the favour-KMT policies, such as land reform and limiting a firm's size to ensure that local companies would not grow large enough to challenge the party and the state.

living standards (Wang, 1997, p.70). Heavy industry and high-technology industry came in the third stage. From the 1970s to the 1980s, Taiwan lost the comparative advantages of its cheap labour because the surrounding states, such as mainland China and South East Asian countries, could offer cheaper labour than Taiwan. The KMT authority constructed several heavy industries in the 'Ten Major Construction Projects' and also prepared to invest in non-energy industries because of the oil crisis (Wade, 2004, pp.96-99). The government encouraged and invested in computers, IT, semiconductors and related industries. The Science Park and Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) were established to help industry to develop. Even now, the Taiwanese government still offers tax-cuts and incentives to high-tech companies.

The government's guidance and influence play the most important and decisive role in modernisation in Taiwan, especially in economic development and industrial policies. However, internal and international changes forced the leadership to make political concessions, and then during the liberalisation and democratisation periods, the government could not control the agenda for these policies, because the relationship between the government and companies had changed (Wade, 1988, pp.154-160; 2004, pp.224-227, pp.253-254).¹⁰⁶ The strong controlling power of the central government was weakening, and, at the same time, the KMT authority needed to cooperate with the capitalists for financial support for elections. In return, the KMT needed to open seats in the KMT's central standing committee for officials from important state-owned and private enterprises, including the federation of industries, general chamber of commerce and the National Association of Industry and Commerce, as mentioned in Chapter 3. These measures led the KMT authority and these officials to organise a political alliance for upcoming elections that would benefit the KMT and the enterprises, but also decreased the influence of professional economic bureaucrats (Chu, 1989; 1994). On the other hand, as the last section indicated, the middle class that arose because of economic development would choose to seek political reform, even if this meant voting for the opposing party.

Therefore, in Taiwan's experience, the powerful authoritarian regime could control the direction and policies of economic development. However, because Taiwan was in the

¹⁰⁶ He indicates that a centralised and autonomous regime must exist, and the rational economic bureaucrats should find the points for the government to invest in or focus on. Wade (2004) describes these points in detail. In his theory, the strong and autonomous state, and rational economic bureaucrats who can consider and dominate economic policies are essential. However, after democratisation, these characteristics are disappearing, especially as the non-KMT parties would try to cut the link between the original bureaucrats and the KMT. Economic affairs also become a controversial issue in Legislative Yuan because of the side effect of cross-strait affairs. Economic affairs are not neutral for development, but involved in the disputes for or against China issues.

US camp, both international and internal pressure made the KMT choose a soft approach to opponents and seek help from the developing commercial companies for more competitive elections. But this method also helped to weaken the KMT's control, because it was necessary to take into account the opinions of these entrepreneurs. Although the KMT authority could not maintain its authoritarian regime, the new alliance is workable. During LTH's and MYJ's presidency, this commercial-political alliance, although there are different party leaders and different enterprises, still exists and helps the KMT authority to win elections.

Table 7.3: GDP and average income from 1951 to 2010 in Taiwan.

Year	GDP	A.Income	Year	GDP	A.Income	Year	GDP	A.Income
1951	158	154	1971	447	419	1991	9,016	8,473
1952	213	207	1972	525	491	1992	10,625	9,843
1953	181	175	1973	700	649	1993	11,079	10,244
1954	192	184	1974	927	848	1994	11,982	11,068
1955	220	210	1975	978	882	1995	12,918	11,882
1956	153	146	1976	1,151	1,036	1996	13,428	12,330
1957	173	164	1977	1,323	1,192	1997	13,810	12,652
1958	187	176	1978	1,599	1,453	1998	12,598	11,419
1959	142	133	1979	1,943	1,763	1999	13,585	12,279
1960	164	155	1980	2,385	2,150	2000	14,704	13,299
1961	162	153	1981	2,730	2,455	2001	13,147	11,821
1962	172	162	1982	2,703	2,444	2002	13,404	12,077
1963	189	178	1983	2,902	2,616	2003	13,773	12,549
1964	213	202	1984	3,219	2,947	2004	15,012	13,602
1965	229	216	1985	3,290	3,045	2005	16,051	14,412
1966	248	235	1986	4,007	3,765	2006	16,491	14,724
1967	279	263	1987	5,265	4,947	2007	17,154	15,192
1968	317	298	1988	6,146	5,948	2008	17,399	15,194
1969	354	332	1989	7,558	7,134	2009	16,353	14,271
1970	393	369	1990	8,124	7,628	2010	18,588	16,413

Note: 1. A. Income: Average Income.

2. Currency: USD.

Source: Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Taiwan, R.O.C.

Taiwan has been democratised for more than 20 years. This thesis would discover the role of traditional legacies, which are not encouraged by the present democratic regime, and modernisation factors, which were favoured in promoting democracy in

Taiwan. In order to discuss further what kind of people would be satisfied with democracy in Taiwan, this thesis uses ‘*On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Taiwan. Are you ...?*’ as the dependent variable,¹⁰⁷ and then gender (male and female), age are set as control variables in this model, Four traditional legacies and four modernisation factors (education: high school level and degree level; subjective social status: middle and upper class; economic performance; age) and democratic values are set as independent variables.¹⁰⁸

Regarding traditional legacies, people who hold the values of traditional legacies have an ambiguous attitude to democracy in Taiwan. In the two waves, only harmony in Wave 1 and hierarchical politics in Wave 2 demonstrate significant results to the dependent variable. In Wave 1, people who support harmony would support democracy in Taiwan, and in Wave 2, people who are against hierarchical politics would favour Taiwanese democracy. During the survey period, 2001 and 2006, Taiwan had just finished the first changeover of parties and the KMT hegemony was dissolving. In the meantime, the social movements and conflicts in terms of identity, mainland affairs, and pan-blue, pan-green political conflicts were rising. In this period, it is not surprising that people who were against hierarchical politics would support democracy, because during this time, people in Taiwan did not argue that there should be a democratic and diverse government, rather than a strong government. Nonetheless, people wanted the long-term serious political conflicts to cease.

As for modernisation factors, education demonstrates significant results to the dependent variable in both waves. Education in Taiwan now has become a system to develop democratic values, as has been argued in this section. Thus, educated people would not be satisfied with the existing democracy and hope the democracy can be improved. People who feel there is good economic development in Taiwan also support democracy, in both waves. This result could be considered as an instrumental support to democracy; because this democratic government can bring good economic performance, people would support it. As for social class, only the upper class in the second wave has explanatory power to explain the dependent variable.

The younger generation is more supportive of democracy than their elders, perhaps

¹⁰⁷ The answers to the question are recoded as follows: ‘very satisfied’ as 2, ‘fairly satisfied’ as 1, ‘no answer’ as 0 (a neutral answer); then recoded ‘not very satisfied’ as -1, and ‘not at all satisfied’ as -2. The recoded answer becomes the dependent variable in the model.

¹⁰⁸ Dummy variables are produced for nominal variables: gender (male and female), education level (divided into three levels), and subjective social class (divided into three levels).

because of the effect of education and also the younger generation, compared with their parents, live in the democratic period, so that their political experiences are also from the democratic period. As for males, they also support democracy in Taiwan more than females.

Table 7.4: Satisfaction with Taiwanese democracy: Multiple regression analysis.

TAIWAN				
Dependent variable : Satisfaction with 'Taiwanese democracy'				
	multiple regression in Wave 1		multiple regression in Wave 2	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Gender (Female)				
Male	0.086	(0.057) **	0.053	(0.053) *
Traditional legacies				
Anti-hierarchical politics	-0.050	(0.030)	0.065	(0.027) **
Anti-harmony	-0.069	(0.028) *	-0.013	(0.030)
Anti-group orientation	0.001	(0.020)	-0.030	(0.019)
Anti- <i>guanxi</i>	-0.054	(0.030)	0.007	(0.030)
Modernisation Factors				
Education (under high school)				
High school level	-0.140	(0.078) ***	-0.069	(0.071) *
Degree level	-0.125	(0.109) ***	-0.025	(0.096)
Subjective social class (Lower)				
Middle class	0.030	(0.063)	0.044	(0.079)
Upper class	0.031	(0.113)	0.071	(0.105) **
Economic factor	0.175	(0.009) ***	0.267	(0.008) ***
Age	-0.072	(0.002) *	-0.066	(0.002) *
Democratic values	-0.111	(0.007) ***	-0.161	(0.006) ***
(Constant)	—	(0.148) ***	—	(0.142) **
<hr/>				
Adjusted R-square	0.080		0.109	
R-square	0.088		0.116	
<hr/>				
N	1415		1587	

*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001

Source: 1. 2001 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic

factors means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have democratic values.

7.2.3 Summary

The KMT authority followed the enemy's example and also used democratic centralism to construct the top-down political system. Group-orientation, which is associated with nationalism, was also the core of its ideology to build up Chinese identity and to prove that the KMT authority was the orthodoxy of China, but this ideal was broken because of changes in the international environment. *Guanxi* was an essential part of this system because the patron-client relationship between KMT and local factions was one of the keys to ruling Taiwan (Lin, 1998). Nonetheless, hierarchical politics and group-orientation were dissolved during the democratisation process. However, *guanxi* is still an important resource for the KMT to win elections. Modernisation also helped to foster democracy. Economic development, which created a middle class, led opponents to gain more support to oppose the KMT. On the other hand, the KMT's supporters (enterprises) were also involved in sharing political power because the KMT needed them in order to win increasingly competitive elections. As for education, although the KMT effected patriotic education to establish Chinese identity, democratic education still existed. During the democratisation period, democratic education was strengthened, and education for Chinese identity disappeared.

7.3 Statistical findings

In the preceding sections, this thesis has shown Taiwanese leaders' attitudes to democracy and how traditional legacies were used to consolidate their rule, but were eventually deconstructed, and how modernisation factors served to help democratisation. In this section, this thesis will use basic statistical data and regression models to determine trends for democracy and traditional legacies, and examine which factors would help or hinder the development of democratic values.

This section will use statistical analyses from the Asian Barometer Survey for the following purposes. First, this thesis will demonstrate popular support and strength for traditional legacies and democratic values. The data will demonstrate the trend and

changes for traditional legacies and democratic values in Taiwan. Then the relationship between democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors will be analysed, to discuss which factor would hinder development of democratic values. Finally, this thesis will examine whether any factor can diminish the influence of traditional legacies that are not favoured in the development of democratic values.

7.3.1 Percentage and strength for traditional legacies and democratic values

The percentage of values of traditional legacies in Taiwan is shown in Table 7.5. The results of Wave 1 indicate that hierarchical politics and *guanxi* are strongly rejected by Taiwanese: the rejection percentages are 77.4% and 74.2%. Taiwanese also reject harmony, and the rejection rate is 57.0%. Group orientation is the only legacy approved by Taiwanese; however, as Chapter 2 indicates, this might be because the family-core value is the essential value in the Taiwanese mind.

The rejection rate in Wave 2 increases gradually. Hierarchical politics, harmony and *guanxi* are highly rejected by Taiwanese: the rejection rates are 72.1%, 70.5% and 82.3%. Group-orientation is still the only one that is approved by Taiwanese; the supportive percentage is 75.77%.

Although *guanxi* is not comparable because questions in the questionnaires are slightly different for the two waves, the trend in this table is clear: support for traditional legacies is decreasing. The rate of support for harmony reduces sharply, dropping from 43.0% to 29.5%, a 13.5% gap between Wave 1 and Wave 2. The support rate for group-orientation also decreases slightly, which reflects that the value is changing in public opinion. The rejection rate is increasing overall from 51.67% to 56.02%, and this result indicates that people in Taiwan are removing the influence of traditional legacies.

Table 7.5: Percentage for values of Traditional legacies in Taiwan.

Wave1	hierarchical politics	harmony	group-orientation	guanxi	Total
Support	22.6% (309)	43.0% (578)	75.77% (1989)	25.8% (341)	48.33% (3217)
Reject	77.4% (1059)	57.0% (765)	24.23% (636)	74.2% (979)	51.67% (3439)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Wave2	hierarchical politics	harmony	group-orientation	guanxi	Total
Support	27.9% (429)	29.5% (442)	72.83% (2166)	17.7% (266)	43.98% (3303)
Reject	72.1% (1111)	70.5% (1054)	27.17% (808)	82.3% (1235)	56.02% (4208)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: 1. 2001 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).
2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Table 7.6 illustrates the percentage for democratic values in Taiwan. All questions from the questionnaires are the same, for both Wave 1 and Wave 2 in this table, and the six dimensions in the table are comparable.

Findings in Wave 1 demonstrate a positive attitude to democratic values. Political equality, popular sovereignty and rule of law are highly supported by Taiwanese. Political liberty and separation of powers are slightly rejected and political pluralism is rejected by 60% of respondents.

As for Wave 2, political equality, popular sovereignty and rule of law continue to be supported solidly and support has even slightly increased. Political liberty and separation of powers change to support from rejection; the supporting rates increases 4.1% and 0.9%. As for political pluralism, it decreases 0.1% in Wave 2. The total rates for supporting democratic values in both waves exceed 60%, reaching 63.26% and 64.34%.

These findings suggest that democratic values held by Taiwanese do not only remain at the initial stage, but also, over time, reach most of the values. However, Taiwanese dislike the conflicts between the Pan-Blue Coalition and the Pan-Green Coalition,

which seriously hinder the state's affairs. Therefore, people would tend to reject political pluralism.

Table 7.6: Percentage for six dimensions of democratic value in Taiwan.

Taiwan Wave1	Political Equality	Popular Sovereignty	Political Liberty	Political Pluralism	Separation of Powers	Rule of Law	Total
Support	89.5% (1191)	71.6% (2786)	49.8% (1272)	39.7% (506)	49.8% (1178)	85.7% (1096)	63.26% (8029)
Reject	10.5% (139)	28.4% (1103)	50.2% (1283)	60.3% (768)	50.2% (1188)	14.3% (183)	36.74% (4664)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Taiwan Wave2	Political Equality	Popular Sovereignty	Political Liberty	Political Pluralism	Separation of Powers	Rule of Law	Total
Support	89.3% (1369)	71.8% (3247)	53.9% (1614)	39.6% (597)	50.7% (1448)	88.2% (1308)	64.34% (9583)
Reject	10.7% (164)	28.2% (1273)	46.1% (1380)	60.4% (911)	49.3% (1409)	11.8% (175)	35.66% (5312)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: 1. 2001 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Note: Dimensions that are over 60% are also marked in this table to demonstrate that respondents have solid support of the dimension.

Strength analysis would be more precise than percentage analysis because the questionnaire of ABS gives the respondents a range of answers for questions. The answers of selected questions are recoded as following: 'strongly disagree' as 2, 'somewhat disagree' as 1, 'no answer' as 0 (a neutral answer); recoded 'somewhat agree' as -1, and 'strongly agree' as -2. Questions of anti-connection in the two waves are slightly different, and it will not be compared in Table 8.7.

Results of Table 7.7 show the strength in four elements of Confucian values and six dimensions of democratic values. The result is similar to the percentage analysis. Regarding Confucian values, anti-hierarchical politics and anti-harmony are strong, and people still tend to support group orientation, which is explained in Table 8.7. The trend also rejects the traditional legacies in both waves.

Findings of democratic values show a strong tendency towards democratic values

from Taiwanese. The table demonstrates that there is no negative figure in PDI, which means democratic support in all dimensions is increasing or equal in the two waves. Political equality, the basic concept of democratic values, is particularly strong, which reflects that local and national elections, over a long period, have brought Taiwanese to believe that everyone should share equal political rights in the state. Rule of law is another strong concept for Taiwanese, which nearly reaches the rate of political equality. In contrast with the percentage analysis, strength of separation of powers in both waves is positive, which implies that people actually have a positive attitude to the concept in both waves. As for political liberty, although there is only a slight increase in this concept, yet the strength increases significantly. Political liberty maintains a moderate strength in both waves. Table 8.7, in general, shows Taiwanese have strong democratic values.

Table 7.7: Strength of traditional legacies and democratic values in Taiwan.

TAIWAN		Wave1 Mean	Wave2 Mean	PDI
Confucian values				
	Anti-hierarchical politics	0.6	0.47	-0.13
	Anti-harmony	0.15	0.42	0.27
	Anti-group orientation	-0.5569	-0.4925	0.0644
	<i>Anti-guanxi</i>	0.54	0.72	0.18
Democratic values				
	Political Equality	0.91	0.93	0.02
	Popular Sovereignty	0.461	0.4724	0.0114
	Political Liberty	-0.0191	0.0813	0.1004
	Political Pluralism	-0.23	-0.23	0
	Separation of Powers	0.0223	0.0309	0.0086
	Rule of Law	0.78	0.9	0.12

PDI: The percentage differential index in this table is Wave2-Wave1.

Note : 1. The range is -2 to 2. -2 means totally against the factor, 2 means totally support the factor, 0 means no preference.

2. Because of the different question of the Anti- *guanxi* aspect, to compare for this aspect may not meaningful.

Source: 1. 2001 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

7.3.2 Democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors

In order to examine relationships among democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors in Taiwan, democratic values is set as the dependent variable, the other elements such as traditional legacies, modernisation factors as independent variables, and gender as the control variable in the regression model. Table 7.8 demonstrates the results of the regression.

Regarding traditional legacies, all legacies have explanatory power to explain the dependent variable in both waves. Thus, all traditional legacies are unfavourable to democratic values in Taiwan. People who are against traditional legacies would support democratic values.

As for modernisation factors, education still has explanatory power in both waves, and people who accept higher education would be more likely to support democratic values. On the other hand, results for economic performance demonstrate that in both waves, people who judge that there is poor economic development would have democratic values.

The younger generation still supports democratic values more than their elders. As this thesis argued, the younger generation has accepted democratic education and live in a democratic period; they would likewise have deeper democratic values than older respondents.

Table 7.8: Democratic values in Taiwan: Multiple regression analysis.

TAIWAN				
Dependent variable : Democratic values				
	multiple regression in Wave 1		multiple regression in Wave 2	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Gender (Female)				
Male	0.046	(0.227)	0.086	(0.211)***
Traditional legacies				
Anti-hierarchical politics	0.103	(0.121)***	0.070	(0.108) **
Anti-harmony	0.079	(0.113) **	0.131	(0.118)***
Anti-group orientation	0.102	(0.079)***	0.134	(0.076)***
Anti- <i>guanxi</i>	0.135	(0.119)***	0.170	(0.120)***
Modernisation factors				
Education (under high school)				
High school level	0.107	(0.314) **	0.110	(0.284)***
Degree level	0.284	(0.426)***	0.306	(0.369)***
Subjective social class (Lower)				
Middle class	0.007	(0.253)	0.043	(0.317)
Upper class	0.015	(0.455)	0.025	(0.422)
Economic factor	-0.059	(0.034) *	-0.122	(0.031)***
Age	-0.122	(0.009)***	-0.106	(0.008)***
Democratic values (Constant)	—	— (0.592)***	—	— (0.261) **
Adjusted R-square	0.210		0.276	
R-square	0.216		0.281	
N	1415		1587	

*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001

Source: 1. 2001 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and

negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have democratic values.

7.3.3 Factors to diminish the influence of traditional legacies

The last model has proved that traditional legacies will be obstacles to the development of democratic values in Taiwan. In order to examine which factor could diminish the influence of traditional legacies in Taiwan, this thesis uses anti-traditional legacies as the dependent variable, and then sets modernisation factors as independent variables into the model.

The results of this model are illustrated in Table 7.9. The results show that the younger generation, education and democratic values do not favour traditional legacies, and these variables also have explanatory power for the dependent variable. This result reflects the gradual development of democratic values, and schools are the institutions for this purpose. Furthermore, the younger generation have just left school and live in a democratic period; thus, they would be unlikely to support traditional legacies.

Table 7.9: Anti-traditional legacies in Taiwan: Multiple Regression Analysis.

TAIWAN				
Dependent Variable : Anti-traditional legacies				
	multiple regression in Wave 1		multiple regression in Wave 2	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Gender (Female)				
Male	-0.065	(0.132) **	-0.063	(0.120) **
Modernisation Factors				
Education (under high school)				
High school level	0.083	(0.179) *	0.127	(0.160) ***
Degree level	0.160	(0.241) ***	0.193	(0.206) ***
Subjective social class (Lower)				
Middle class	0.030	(0.147)	-0.002	(0.181)
Upper class	0.014	(0.265)	0.009	(0.241)
Economic factor	0.026	(0.020)	-0.073	(0.018) **
Age	-0.266	(0.005) ***	-0.274	(0.004) ***
(Constant)	—	(0.336) ***	—	(0.318) ***
Adjusted R-square	0.129		0.143	
R-square	0.133		0.147	
N	1415		1587	

*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001

Source: 1. 2001 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have democratic values.

7.3.4 Summary

In this section, traditional legacies are hazards for democratic values. However, the data show that, in democratic Taiwan, popular support of traditional legacies is decreasing, and comparing the two waves, the trend for rejecting these legacies is clear. In contrast, democratic values are increasing in both waves, and the data show these values are still deepening. Thus, an environment for a democratic regime is consolidating in Taiwan.

Modernisation factors may not help to strengthen democracy. Education is the only modernisation factor that demonstrates a significant effect to diminish the influence of traditional legacies and helps to strengthen democratic values. Age is also a decisive factor. Results from Table 7.8 and 7.9 show that the younger generation will help to diminish the influence of traditional legacies and deepen democratic values. Most of the younger generation in Taiwan was born in the democratic period and also receive education for developing democratic values; thus it is not surprising that this generation will support democracy more than their elders.

7.4 Conclusion

Democratisation in Taiwan did not happen automatically. Just as Inglehart (1990; 1997) indicates, it needed interaction between rulers and people. In Taiwan, it was also dependent on the international situation and the US factor. For KMT rulers, they were defeated by the communists and retreated to Taiwan. Although they tried to construct Taiwan to become its anti-communist base, this regime was also dependent on the military and financial support from the US. At the same time, they needed to confront internal challenges from the indigenous elites.

Traditional legacies served to consolidate the power of the KMT in various ways.. Nonetheless, the nature of this regime and the international situation meant that the KMT authority could not sustain its non-democratic rule and dissolved the influence of traditional legacies for serving their non-democratic rule.

With regard to the nature of this regime, as an anti-communist base, it was necessary to maintain a democratic image of China, so democratic ideas and publications could not be banned. In order to establish itself firmly in Taiwan, this authority needed to

open local elections and cooperate with local factions. Promotion of the 'Three Principles of the People' also led the regime to spread democratic values in schools. As for the international situation, as an ally in the democratic camp in the cold war period, it was in need of assistance from the US. The regime needed, therefore, to pretend it was democratic, which meant that the cost of eliminating political opponents was high. Furthermore, modernisation in Taiwan also helped to dissolve its regime. Finally, change in the international environment destroyed the KMT's claim to Chinese orthodoxy and threatened the survival of the regime, so that it had to respond to support from the US and the Taiwanese. The cost to maintain the non-democratic regime increased dramatically and the KMT rulers chose to democratise for survival.

Statistical data demonstrates that support for the values of traditional legacies in Taiwan is decreasing, and democratic values are increasing. Regression models also prove that a decrease of traditional legacies will help to develop democratic values. Through this trend, democratic political culture, which is in favour of maintaining the democratic regime, is consolidating. Data also show that education and the younger generation are supporters of democratic values, which will also sustain the democratic regime.

In summary, in the case of Taiwan, the regime's nature, the US factor and modernisation helped to force the non-democratic rulers to end non-democratic rule for survival. After the democratisation period, how to strengthen democratic values became important, and education was the key for diminishing the influence of traditional legacies and strengthening democratic values.

Chapter 8: South Korea

Scholars would agree that South Korea was a Confucian society during the Choson Dynasty period (Oh, 1999, p.22; Lee, J.K., 2001). Even now, Confucianism still exists in daily life. However, South Korea maintains an active democratic regime and it was the first democratic regime of all Confucian societies after the Second World War. South Korea is the classic case for expectation of modernisation theories among Confucian societies. A military junta modernised the country and brought rapid economic development, yet a middle class emerged and strengthened with this process and finally formed a strong force to push for democratisation. During this period, democratic education encouraged students initially to oppose the non-democratic regime. The nature of the regime led to some traditional legacies becoming helpful to the expansion of democracy and this is also different from other Confucian societies.

In order to examine hypotheses, this chapter will focus on three points. South Korea was founded to be a democratic country, yet personal dictatorship and a military junta suspended democracy. However, non-democratic rulers could not gain legitimacy to rule, even if they performed well economically. Finally, the military junta chose to democratise and cooperated with opponents.

Traditional legacies are not absolute obstacles to the implementation of democracy in South Korea. Hierarchical politics, which existed in the non-democratic period, could not be continued because both personal dictatorship and the military junta did not offer a clear ideology to claim popular support. They could only suppress opponents; yet when the cost for suppression increased, this political system could not be sustained. *Guanxi*, which existed in the political and economic aspects of society, is not opposed to democracy; it may even be pro-democracy. Group-orientation, which facilitates nationalism, is also helpful against non-democratic regimes, because group-orientation made people in South Korea seek the country's common good for democracy and stand against the non-democratic regime's ally – the US. Harmony, which is not promoted in politics, but demonstrated its effects in the economic sphere, will not be discussed. As for modernisation factors, economic development led to the emergence of a middle class, which became the major opponent of the military junta. In the meantime, in order to seek support from the middle class, non-democratic rulers were forced to

change their relationship with their supporter – large enterprises. Education for developing democratic values was practised very early, which encourages students to stand against non-democratic rulers and develops democratic values.

In the statistical section, this thesis will demonstrate the trends for traditional legacies and democratic values in South Korea, and then show the relationship between democratic values, tradition legacies, and modernisation factors.

8.1 Korean democracy

South Korean politics is driven by political elites. The political agenda, such as modernisation and democratisation, was also dominated by rulers (Kihl, 2005, pp.49-50, pp.104-105). In contrast with the other three cases, South Korea was originally created as a democratic regime by the US military forces and several South Korean politicians; thus, non-democratic rulers could not gain legitimacy to rule. This democratic regime soon faced the Korean War and then transformed into a personal dictatorship for reasons of national security. Although popular protest ended the personal dictatorship regime, soon the military coup established a military authoritarian regime that lasted until the late 1980s. During this period, these authoritarian leaders would face the problems of legitimacy and pressure from the people. Although the leaders tried to rely on US support to maintain their rule, they still needed to take steps to open more political spaces, and finally chose to democratise by themselves to ensure that their advantages could be maintained. In this section, this thesis will demonstrate leaders' attitudes to democracy and why, finally, they chose to democratise.

8.1.1 Personal dictatorship - Syngman Rhee presidency

After three years of military occupation by the US from 1945 to 1948, under the guidance of the US military forces in Korea, the national assembly was elected and gathered to deliberate on the Korean constitution in the South Korean peninsula, because the Soviet Union rejected the UN's proposal for a national election in the north (Lee, 1975, p.19). The Republic of Korea was established under the supervision of the United Nations and the US. Syngman Rhee, an exiled politician who spent more than one third of his life in the US, was elected as the first president for this new republic. The purpose of the new republic was

[to] establish a democratic system of government eliminating evil social customs of all kinds, to afford equal opportunities to every person and to provide for the fullest development of the capacity of each individual in all the fields of political, economic, social and cultural life (Oh, 1999, pp.28-29).

The purpose for establishing South Korea was to create a democratic alliance in the democratic camp, with the US acting as its 'foster parent' (Lee, 1975, p.19; Oh, 1999). To South Koreans, this democratic regime was installed by the US, although the country might not satisfy the conditions for democracy; not only was the public control of the leaders weak, but also social-economic conditions, and cultural and historical backgrounds lacked experience of democracy (Lee, 1975, p.21).

Rhee was educated at several famous American universities, such as George Washington, Harvard, and Princeton, participated in independence movements, joined the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, and argued against Japanese occupation. It might be this background that led to his winning support from the US to be the leader of the new republic.¹⁰⁹ Rhee's government soon faced internal and external challenges. He lost the parliamentary election that the US had insisted be held, in 1950, he only won 22 of 210 seats in the National Assembly (Gupta, 1972, p.701), and his government lacked broad public support (Stueck, 1995, pp.27-28).¹¹⁰ Furthermore, there was a threat to unification in the form of Kim Il-sung, the leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), who also came into power at that time (Gupta, 1972, pp.701-702).¹¹¹

The Korean War, from 1950 to 1953, made the US turn to Japan for support. South Korea and Taiwan both prevented invasions from communists and the Soviet Union, and ensured that the western pacific defensive line would not be broken (Stueck, 1995, pp.52-55; Hong, 2000, pp.57-58).¹¹² They also made a stable environment for the authoritarian regime that existed in South Korea and Taiwan. These regimes were able to survive because of US aid and military protection. Leaders in South Korea and

¹⁰⁹ The leader of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was not Rhee. Rhee's competitor, Kim Gu, who was assassinated by Ahn Doo-hee, was more famous than he was at that time.

¹¹⁰ William Stueck describes how Rhee's government could not contain the internal situation and how his government lacked public support. But the US still supported him because of considerations of balance between North Korea and South Korea, and the prestige of the US.

¹¹¹ He indicates that North Korea not only refused to allow Rhee and his colleagues to join the meeting suggested by North Korea in June, 1950, but also rejected the interference of the UN for unification discussions. However, Stueck (1995) noted that North Korea sent three representatives to South Korea to discuss unification directly, but they were arrested.

¹¹² Hong, Yong-Pyo mentioned that the US could not give up South Korea because the US needed to maintain balance in the area, and to lose South Korea would damage the prestige of the US.

Taiwan had the opportunity to encourage ‘anti-Communist’ nationalism to support their legitimacy to rule.¹¹³

Rhee gained credit from the war to expand his power; because of the war, he regained popular support. In order to stay in power, he declared martial law temporarily in 1952, to force members of the National Assembly to amend the Constitution, changing the rule for electing the president to a direct popular vote. Therefore, he could continue to be elected as President. (Hong, 2000, p.85). In 1954, he suggested another revision of the Constitution to resolve the two-terms limitation. His draft of revision won 135 of 203 votes in the National Assembly, yet according to the constitution, the revision must have two-thirds support from members of the National Assembly, and his draft lacked one vote. Some members of the National Assembly argued that the threshold should adopt the rounding number 135; the Assembly eventually passed the draft without the opposition parties’ support. This revision meant that Rhee qualified for the 1956 presidential election. In the meantime, Rhee’s government also used government power to limit press reports and freedom of speech; other civil rights were also violated (Lee, 1975, p.21). Rhee employed secret institutions and national security law against his opponents. In 1960, Rhee used state power to ensure that he and his vice presidential candidate would be elected (Oh, 1999, pp.40-41; Robinson, 2007, p.125). This election rigging led to the 419 Student Uprising,¹¹⁴ which in turn led to the loss of internal support from his own party in parliament and from civil associations – and even the US government criticised him publicly. Finally, these pressures forced him to resign and he went into exile in the US (Lee, 1975; Oh, 1999; Robinson, 2007).

8.1.2 Military authoritarianism - Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan

After Rhee’s resignation, a short democratic government appeared, but it was soon replaced because of the military coup on 16 May 1961 (Robinson, 2007, pp.125-129). Soon Park and his military junta organised the Democratic Republican Party for the forthcoming elections and won the presidential and parliamentary elections. The strategies of Park’s military government were clear: clarify the facts of separation between South and North; seek unification; the government should dominate economic development, anti-corruption measures, and should form alliances with

¹¹³ See Huntington (1991, p.46). He argued that nationalism is also a popular force that can legitimise both democratic and authoritarian regimes.

¹¹⁴ There were other reasons, see Kim, C.I and Kim, K, S (1964); they argue that corruption in Rhee’s government was the greatest concern of people in the movement, followed by election riggings and economic depression.

western powers. He also encouraged party politics in the beginning as a semblance of democratic legitimacy. Just like the KMT authority in Taiwan, Park also built up a clear enemy (North Korea) to acquire and consolidate his regime's legitimacy; as Huntington argued: a clear enemy would help the authoritarian regime to acquire and consolidate power (Huntington, 1970, p.14).

During Park's presidency, economic development received a sharp boost, and Korea changed from an agricultural society to an industrial society. In essence, Park established a 'paternalistic Korean Inc', which transferred South Korea into a 'mobilised workplace' (Oh, 1999, p.55). Park wanted to establish Korea as a wealthy nation with a strong army, via a self-reliant and independent spirit of nation-building (Kihl, 2005, p.71).¹¹⁵ Democracy was not so important when he decided to carry out his plan for modernisation and rapid economic development.¹¹⁶ GDP in South Korea increased from 106 USD to 1745 USD in 1979. This successful economic performance, which is called 'Miracle on the Han', offered Park the confidence to establish a personal military dictatorship. He won the presidential election in 1971 by a very small margin of victory over the opponent candidate Kim Dae-Jung. When Richard Nixon declared that the US could decrease the numbers of United States Forces in Korea (Nixon, 1969; Oh, 1999, p.59; Robinson, 2007, pp.135-136),¹¹⁷ a National Emergency Decree was issued. Park argued that, because of changes in the international and internal environment, South Korea needed to be ruled under martial law, and the new constitution (Yushin constitution) was put into place. He dissolved the National Assembly, political movements and parties. A new institution, the National Conference for Unification, was established as the highest institution in the state to elect the president, and Park was the chairman of the conference. He also controlled the power of nomination for one third of new parliament members and the head of the Supreme Court. There was now no limitation for Park to rule the country (Oh, 1999, p.60; Robinson, 2007, p. 136).

Park was assassinated by his close subordinate, director of the KCIA, Kim Jaegyung, on 26 October 1979. His successor, Chun Doo-hwan, soon took power from 1979 to 1980 (Robinson, 2007, p.139, p.167; Oh, 1999, pp.73-80). During this period, the

¹¹⁵ He cites Park Chung Hee 'Kukka wa hyongmyong kwa na' (The Nation, Revolution and I) (In Korean) (Seoul: Hyangmunsa, 1963), p.292.

¹¹⁶ Park suppressed political movements and opponents during this time. He also established the Anti-Communist Law and strictly enforced National security law against any suspect, and controlled the media; see Robinson (2007, p.135).

¹¹⁷ Nixon said 'Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defence. (1969)'.

claim for democratisation was rising in South Korea. Gwangju is an education centre in South Korea, and had a stronger ethos of opposition to the military authoritarian regime than in other places (Oh, 1999, p.81; Kihl, 2005, p.77). Chun suppressed the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and arrested important democratic politicians, such as Kim Dae-Jong, Kim Jong Pil and Kim Young Sam. The US was found to hold a pro-Chun position, which led to both anti-authoritarianism and anti-American movements (Oh, 1999, pp.83-89).

Chun Doo-hwan continued Park's policy; he also focused on rapid economic performance and was actively bidding for the right to host the Olympic Games in 1988. He also tried to suppress the movements for democracy that arose by university students, the middle class, especially skilled workers, and Christian and Catholic churches (Huntington, 1991, pp.67-68; Oh, 1999, p.90; Kihl, 2005, p.73; Kim S, 2002, pp.95-96; Koo, 2002, pp.112-116).¹¹⁸

8.1.3 Democratisation

In the last chapter, this thesis used Huntington and Dahl's theories to discuss the possible route for Taiwan's democratisation. In South Korea's case, the military junta also considered how they should face the challenges developing from the middle class. For the military junta, the suppression cost increased because of the internal and international changes. Regarding the international changes, the coming event – the Olympic Games – limited strict action against the opposition: if the military government chose to suppress opponents, then it was very likely that South Korea would lose the right to host the games in Seoul. As for the internal situation, economic development had brought with it a new middle class, and as has been demonstrated, this middle class would stand to support democratisation rather than the military authoritarian government. Thus, a series of protests against the military government

¹¹⁸ Oh indicated that South Korea was a Confucian society, but major opponents, such as Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam were Christian. The spirit of Christians against the authoritarian regime replaced Confucian authoritarianism. He argued that Christians and Catholic churches started to oppose Park's government from 1974, and acted in an essential role in the late 1980s. Church organisations offered a platform for people who were anti-authoritarian to gather and share ideas. Also see Kihl (2005), who argues that labourers, radical students and progressive Christians joined the democratic movements. Kim Sunhyuk indicates that Protestant ministers and Catholic Cardinals, professors from Korea University, opposition parties, 'students, workers, peasants, urban service industry employees stood for "down with the military authoritarian regime and up with a democratic government"'. Hagen Koo also suggests that Christian associations had the international network to protect them from suppression, and they provided guidance for workers in 1970s-1980s. Labour movements in the 1980s also played an important role in democratisation, because the waged workers were the largest number in South Korea at that time. Their commitment to participation in the democratic movements led to the leader of authoritarian regime declaring the democratic plan earlier, to prevent large scale workers' protests in the streets.

began, which also increased the cost of tolerance. These situations forced the leaders in the military government to consider how to face these challenges.

Huntington (1991, pp.161-163) suggested that it is easier to end the non-democratic rule of a military authoritarian regime, because these rulers do not view themselves as holding long-term control of the state.¹¹⁹ These military rulers would tend to give power back to a civilian government or to negotiate with opponents to leave power. Huntington especially indicated two 'exit guarantees' that military rulers would ask. Firstly, the succeeding government will not punish, prosecute, or take revenge for, any action of the military junta during the period of military rule. Second, the military junta cannot be deprived of military institutions and autonomy. Military government in South Korea was composed of the military junta and secret agencies, most of whom did not have official ideologies like the non-democratic rulers in China, Taiwan and Singapore. These non-democratic rulers would consider how to transfer power peacefully, but were also concerned to ensure their safety and positions in the democratic era.

The military junta took three steps for democratisation. Firstly, they committed to political reform in 1987, to ease the pressure from opponents and civil society. Secondly, when their opponents could not unite to select one candidate, they declared that they would host a presidential election. Thirdly, after winning the presidential election, they chose to cooperate with several opponents to oppose the most influential one. These steps confirmed that the military leaders would not be prosecuted immediately, and the government gained legitimacy from democratic elections.

The protests were increasing in 1987. Students and the middle class expressed their desire to restore democracy, which led the military junta to start negotiations with opponents (Kihl, 2005, p.83). Chun nominated Roo Taw-woo as his successor in 1987, and Roo, the candidate of the ruling party, announced eight measures on 29 June 1987 in response to the protests for democracy. Several important points were covered: restoring direct presidential election (to reply to opponents); protect human rights and promote freedom of speech and the press; offer amnesty and restore Kim Dae Jung's civil rights; reform political parties; and offer social reform to establish a clean and

¹¹⁹ In South Korea, even Park, Chun-hee was in office approximately 16 years. Nonetheless, he also wanted to resign after his wife's death by an assassination, rather than to be the president for his lifetime. Kihl (2005, pp.87-88) noted that Kim, Young-sam's memoirs indicate that when Kim Youngs-sam met Park in 1975, Park himself had expressed his intention to resign, yet he needed to consider the possibility that other members of the military junta would take steps to replace him if his intention was observed.

honest society (Kihl, 2005, pp.83-84; Oh, 1999, pp.98-102). Chun accepted these, and, because of the Olympic Games, Chun's government could not use martial law against opponents. However, the Olympic Games, which raised South Korean's prestige, Chun's concession to opponents and Roo's declaration ended the pressure for democracy from the masses. A new constitution was put into practice and the presidential election took place. However, the opponents could not agree on a common candidate, because there were only five months (from June to December 1987) for opponents to organise their candidate.

This division among his opponents was an advantage for Roo and he won the presidential election. After that, he cooperated with Kim Young Sam and Kim Jong Pil and formed a majority ruling coalition to oppose Kim Dae Jung (Kihl, 2005, p.89). South Korea successfully democratised during this period. Kim Young Sam became the first 'genuinely civilian South Korean President in more than three decades' (Kim, S, 2002, p.98). Data from Freedom House also indicated that political rights and civil liberties ratings in South Korea rose from 4.4 to 2.3 in 1987, changed to 2.2 in 1993 and finally to 1.2 in 2004 (Freedom House, 2011). After Roo, there has been peaceful transfer of presidential power in South Korea four times, and the democratic regime in South Korea is stable. This thesis will examine both public opinions and popular commitment for democracy.

8.1.4 Public opinion to South Korean democracy

This thesis uses the question '*In your opinion how much of a democracy is South Korea?*' to understand mass opinion to democracy in South Korea. Figure 9.1 illustrates the response. The finding shows 95% of respondents indicate that South Korea is a democratic regime, but 56% suggest there are minor problems and 34% argue there are major problems in their democracy. This result is similar to Taiwan; people in a democratic state would consider democracy more deeply, and they would have a wider and higher expectation of democracy.




Figure 8.1: South Korean opinions on South Korea's democracy.

Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

People's normative support to democracy (support democracy in principle) is essential to a democratic regime (Diamond, 1999, p.169; Geoffrey & Whitefield, 1995, pp.488-489). A democratic regime needs public commitment to create a supportive environment to maintain it (Shin, 1994, pp.153-154). To examine commitment to democracy, this thesis uses 'Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion?', followed by three answers 'Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government', 'Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one', and 'For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime'. The results are shown in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1: Commitment to democracy.

	Democracy	Both	Authoritarian
Wave1	47.9% (518)	11.6% (125)	40.5% (438)
Wave2	49.4% (741)	17.4% (261)	33.2% (498)

Source: 1. 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Results from Table 8.1 demonstrate that, in South Korea, commitment to democracy increased slightly, yet the percentage for supporting democracy in principle is still not over 50%. The results show that people in South Korea still do not fully support the democratic regime. It appears that past authoritarian regimes that brought rapid economic development could still inspire their desire for an authoritarian regime, if

South Korea faced economic crisis. On the other hand, Table 8.2 shows that satisfaction with democracy in South Korea is decreasing. These results may not be a positive phenomenon for democracy in this country.

Table 8.2: Satisfaction with democracy in South Korea

	Wave 1		Wave 2	
	N	%	N	%
Satisfy	921	61.80%	583	52.10%
Not Satisfy	569	38.20%	536	47.90%
	1490	100%	1119	100%

Source: 1. 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1)
2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2)

8.1.5 Summary

South Korea was created as a democratic regime by the US and the UN. To the people in South Korea, a non-democratic government could be considered illegitimate by the populace. Thus, all non-democratic leaders faced protests in which at least a hundred thousand people participated. Although these rulers tried to unite people in a common goal – economic development – their measurements could not convince people that they had a legal right to rule. On the other hand, economic development also created a middle class who joined the opposition camp to seek political participation (Oh, 1999, pp.70-73). During the late 1980s, democracy had become the consensus between political elites and the masses in South Korea. Christian and Catholic groups, university students and the newly developed middle class produced high pressure on the military junta for democracy. This military government could not suppress them because of the coming Olympic Games; thus the compromise for democracy was achieved.

8.2 Traditional legacies and modernisation factors

8.2.1 Traditional legacies

Hierarchical politics

Hierarchical politics before democratisation can be found in Rhee's period and in the

military government period. During Rhee's era, as this chapter has introduced, he used national security and his reputation from the Korean War to limit civil rights and amended the constitution so that he could remove re-election limits. His disregard for the democratic constitution finally led him to resign, and resulted in a military coup within eight months of his resignation. During the military junta period, hierarchical politics was strikingly in evidence, yet it also brought economic achievements.

Most of the military junta did not have a firm official ideology or follow other international ideologies. Most of them had only unclear commitments to unite the country, make the country progress, remove the corrupt civil government, modernise the state, defend order or expel foreign influences. In the meantime, these regimes lacked 'ideological justification, ideas attractive to the intellectuals'. Therefore, in order to hide this secret of power (Linz uses *arcana imperii*), they would seek for some ideas to satisfy the requirements of the time (Linz, 2000, p.173). The military junta in South Korea also met this theoretical expectation. Park Chung-Hee himself indicated that

We have been waiting for the civilian government to bring back order to the country. The Prime Minister and the Ministers, however, are mired in corruption, leading the country to the verge of collapse. We shall rise up against the government to save the country. We can accomplish our goals without bloodshed. Let us join in this Revolutionary Army to save the country.

(Kim, Kim, & Vogel, 2011, p.50)

The military junta also declared their reason for uprising in the military coup:

(1) We believe that the fate of the nation and the people cannot be entrusted to the corrupt and incompetent regime and its politicians. (2) We believe that the time has come [for the armed forces] to give direction to our nation, which has gone dangerously astray.

(Kim, Kim, & Vogel, 2011, p.51)

And the reform objectives of this military junta were:

1. Oppose Communism and reorganise and strengthen anti-Communist readiness, which has been so far asserted only rhetorically;
2. Respect the United Nation Charter, faithfully carry out international obligations, and strengthen ties with the United States and other free-world allies;
3. Root out corruption and the accumulated evil in this nation and its society, instil moral principles and national

spirit among the people, and encourage a new and fresh outlook; 4. Speedily solve the misery of the masses, who are reduced to despair, and concentrate on the construction of an independent national economy; 5. Increase the national capacity to achieve national unification, the unanimous goal of all Korean people, and oppose Communism; 6. Transfer power to new [generations of] conscientious politicians as soon as our mission has been completed, and return to our original [military]duties.

(Kim, Kim & Vogel, 2011, pp.51-52)

Their purpose was to lead the country to achieve their objectives against communists, expel corruption, build up people's sense of nationalism, unification and give power to 'conscientious politicians'. Park finally resigned his military position, participated in presidential elections and became the president. Stability of the state and economic development became his major demands to gain popular support. The military junta took the following measures to consolidate its top-down rule. Firstly, it claimed that stability was the priority for the state. During Park's period, Park himself twice won presidential elections. He claimed that political stability is the priority for the state, and then economic growth can be achieved. Meanwhile, to achieve political stability, the government should have the ability to control the army; otherwise, the army could still overthrow the government (Hahn, 1975, p.99). Secondly, they isolated the opposition camp and limited sources of funding for opponents. Finally, the military government confirmed the abolition of the original democratic mechanism by the Yushin constitution and emergency decrees, and also formally arrested opponents, and suppressed opponents and protesters from the 1970s to the early 1980s.

However, the construction of the top-down political system was not popular. With regard to traditional Confucian values, in South Korea they would decrease the legitimacy of the Korean authoritarian regime because, in Confucian tradition, the scholar holds the highest rank among civilians, and soldiers should follow the scholars rather than rule them. Confucianism also encourages people to help each other to reach the goal of democratisation (Chang, 2003, pp.106-111).¹²⁰ Furthermore, groups from civil society – especially, students and professors, in combination with the Catholic Churches and the newly emerged middle class – began a series of protests against the top-down military political system; this thesis will discuss the factor of the

¹²⁰ He indicates that in order to challenge the US military presence in South Korea, and Park and Chun's regime, a democratic ideology – the three *min* principles (democratic, people-oriented and nationalistic) – was suggested by organised student groups, who worked together to create a theoretical framework for democratisation. Church organisations (Catholic and Christian) were also committed to democratic movements. Students and Churches members would also help each other against political persecution and arrest by the authoritarian regime.

middle class later. Thus, in South Korea, the solid top-down system could not be established, as in China, Singapore and even Taiwan. These military leaders took power from a democratic regime, and they only had objectives rather than the clear ideology of other Confucian societies. At the same time, these objectives also will create a number of opponents claiming democracy.

Group-orientation

In South Korea, group-orientation acts to serve the building of Korean nationalism because South Korea, in the long term, does not have its own national identity. Korea was occupied by imperial Japan from 1910 to 1945. During that period, the Japanese tried to educate people in its colonies to adopt Japanese identity. After the Japanese occupation period, the South Korean government started to build up the Korean nation's identity. The policies for serving this purpose include several methods: recover Korean traditional culture and remove Japanese colonial culture, anti-communist cultural policies (before democratisation) or organise a dialogue with North Korea for cultural exchange (after democratisation); encourage traditional culture, such as loyalty, patriotism, cooperation, and even an anti-western culture (if it serves anti-communism); nationalism and state-led development strategies in the authoritarian period (Yim, 2002; Kang, 2002, p.319). Although, at first, the military government's intention was to inspire nationalism and Korean identity, yet scholars indicate that the Korean group-orientation for nationalism and Korean identity actually facilitated democratisation, especially in anti-American movements.

For people in South Korea, the US has a unique position. Because of the US, South Korea was born to be a democratic country, and the US twice asked non-democratic rulers to stop the restoration of democracy in 1960s, yet was silent when the military junta suppressed the people. With the rising of national identity, people were not satisfied with the role of the US in tolerating the military government. The commander of United States Forces Korea (USFK) is the highest-ranking commander for both the US and Korean army, and Korea had to meet the costs of USFK. Thus, from the 1970s, anti-Americanism had commenced (Manyin, 2003, pp.8-9). People in South Korea consider this as unequal treatment compared with Japan and West Germany (Moon, 2003). However, in the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, Chun commanded Korean forces to Gwangju and suppressed the protesters, students and civilians. The USFK did not stop this massacre in the very beginning; thus, nationalism soon rose in the form of anti-Americanism, to protest how the US first divided Korea,, and then supported military governments in the long term (Oh, 1999,

pp.88-89; Manyin, 2003, pp. 8-9).¹²¹ After democratisation, this movement even strengthened, yet Moon (2003) indicates that nationalist movements in the democratic period would promote participation in public affairs; people could express their intention to the USFK and ask the government to consider their views. Meanwhile, although the Korean government still needed the military help of the US for defending North Korea, yet popular movements would increase the government's bargaining power with the US for better conditions.

Also during Chun's period, the Koreans demonstrated that group-orientation could seek good objectives: they could work together for the nation's common good, and individuals would find that collective political decisions – when democrats help each other and work together for democratic movements – are wiser and broader (Chang, 2003, p.121). Therefore, the military authoritarian regime could not fully alienate those seeking democracy and still be legitimised in the Korean Confucian society (Kihl, 2005, pp.73-74).

Guanxi

In South Korea, *guanxi* in politics is a geographical factor (Hahm, 2008). It clearly affects the votes for presidential elections (Kang, 2003; Manyin, 2003, p.4-5), and the relationship between government and enterprises, which will be discussed in the section on economic development.

Most South Korean leaders, such as Roh Tae-woo (Daegu), Chun Doo-hwan (Gyeongsangnam-do), Kim Young-sam (Gyeongsangnam-do), Park, Chung-Hee (Gyeongsangbuk-do) are from southeast Korea, but Kim Dae-Jung is from Jeollanam-do, in the southwest.

During the period of military rule, people in the west of South Korea, especially the southwest, felt that the government ignored this region, in the long term. The leader of the Democratic Party, Kim Dae-Jung was also from this region, and it became his base for democracy; thus, people in this period were more against military rule (Shih, 2011; Oh, 1999, pp.80-81). During the beginning of the Chun Doo-hwan period, Kim Dae Jung led and his followers in this region commenced the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, and then suffered military suppression. Kim himself, at that time, was also sentenced to death, because the military authority prosecuted him

¹²¹ His report to the US congress clearly indicates that the nationalists are one of the major anti-American groups, because they argue that the US offends their sovereignty.

with violations of Gwangju movement (Oh, 1999, p.83). Although the movement failed, the people of this region have continued to be firm supporters for pan-democratic parties.

In the East, the power-base belongs to the Saenuri Party (previously, the Grand National Party). This party is the successor of the Democratic Liberal Party, which was founded by Park Chung Hee, and now his daughter, Park Geun-hye, is the party head.

Empirical evidence also demonstrates the obvious vote difference between these two political groups. Figure 8.2 demonstrates the chart for presidential elections in 1997, 2002 and 2007. The results clearly indicate that in the west of South Korea, people support pan-democratic parties much more. Even in 2007, the Grand National Party won a clear victory in the election. Kim's hometown, in the southwest, still supported a pan-democratic candidate.




Figure 8.2: Presidential election of South Korea: Percentage of votes obtained (Green: Pan Democratic Parties, Blue: Pan Grand National Party).

Source: Wikipedia (2012).

Table 8.3 illustrates these results further. In Kim's hometown Jeolla, the support for pan-democratic parties is extremely high: over 90% in the first two elections and nearly 80% in the 2007 election. On the other hand, in the Gyeongsang region, support for Park's successor candidate is always higher than that for the pan-democratic parties' candidate. As for people in other regions, they may change their support to an opposition party.

Table 8.3: Presidential election of South Korea: Percentage of votes obtained

		1997		2002		2007	
		Pan Demo	Pan GNP	Pan Demo	Pan GNP	Pan Demo	Pan GNP
		Kim Dae-Jung	Lee Hoi-Chang	Roh Moo-hyun	Lee Hoi-Chang	Chung Dong-young	Lee Myung-bak
Sudogwon	Seoul	44.90%	40.90%	51.30%	44.96%	24.50%	53.20%
	Incheon	38.50%	36.40%	49.83%	44.57%	23.80%	49.20%
	Gyeonggi	39.30%	35.50%	50.65%	44.19%	23.60%	51.90%
Gangwon		23.80%	43.20%	41.51%	52.48%	18.90%	52.00%
Chungcheong	Daejeon	45.00%	29.20%	55.09%	39.82%	23.60%	36.30%
	Chungcheongbuk	37.40%	30.80%	50.42%	42.89%	23.80%	41.60%
	Chungcheongnam	48.30%	23.50%	52.16%	41.23%	21.10%	34.30%
Honam (Jeolla)	Gwangju	97.30%	1.30%	95.18%	3.58%	79.80%	8.60%
	Jeollabuk	92.30%	4.50%	91.59%	6.19%	81.60%	9.00%
	Jeollanam	94.60%	3.20%	93.39%	4.63%	78.70%	9.20%
Yeongnam (Gyeongsang)	Busan	15.30%	53.30%	29.86%	66.75%	13.50%	57.90%
	Ulsan	15.40%	51.40%	35.27%	52.88%	13.60%	54.00%
	Daegu	12.50%	72.70%	18.68%	77.75%	6.00%	69.40%
	Gyeongsangbuk	13.70%	61.90%	21.65%	73.47%	6.80%	72.60%
	Gyeongsangnam	11.00%	55.10%	27.08%	67.52%	12.40%	55.00%
Jeju		40.60%	36.60%	56.05%	39.63%	32.70%	38.70%

Source: Wikipedia (2012).

However, this phenomenon would not affect democracy in South Korea. David Kang (2003) indicates that, in South Korea, people will still consider their own interests, and in the democratic regime, political parties need to expand their popular vote to win the election. Although the regional vote may not change, the democratic mechanism will still work, due to the party's and the people's rational considerations in the democratic regime.

8.2.2 Modernisation factors

Economic development

Industrialisation in South Korea began in the Japanese colonial period, The Japanese colonial government introduced modern schools, a modern bureaucratic system, industries and infrastructures (Oh, 1999, p.23; Haggard, 1988, p.267), but most industries and resources were controlled by the Japanese (Haggard, 1988, p.267). During that time, the Korean economy changed to some degree from an agricultural economy to an industrial economy. The Japanese colonial government improved the

farming system, constructed infrastructures and developed light industries (Oh, 1999, p.23). In the beginning of the military rule period, South Korea's economy changed from an import-led economy to an export-led economy and entered the capitalists' world economy (Kihl, 2005, p.50).

From Park's presidency onwards, industrialisation and export expansion policies dominated South Korea's economic development (Seong, 1997, pp.53-54).¹²² Park's government maintained the dominant role in economic development and industrialism after the Japanese Occupation period; the government controlled resources and the power to redistribute the Japanese legacies and the US aid. Park's government formed a strong institution to guide economic development and maintain its authoritarian regime (Moon, 1994, pp.143-144). In contrast with the KMT authority, which had many large-scale state-owned enterprises with which it could control and dominate resources, Park's authority acted as a planner. Few large-scale enterprises (whether family based or established from the colonial period) became cooperative partners of Park's government (Robinson, 2007, p.132). Park's policies for economic development and the strong state formed a coalition for government and large enterprises to maintain a patron-client relationship. Because the military government dominated economic policies, and these large-scale enterprises also followed and benefited from this process, the government and enterprises could achieve a symbiotic structure. However, the condition here was that the government should have enough power and autonomy to dominate economic policies.

Nonetheless, the power to control would decrease during this process. Enterprises, especially the larger ones, would also expand their influence in the government, playing a major role in economic growth, and in supporting the political system (Moon, 1994, p.144). Meanwhile, the middle class also created pressure on the military government, which made leaders consider dissolving the links with these enterprises and making a deal with the workers. Thus, the coalition was gradually dissolved during the Chun and Roo era (Moon, 1994, p.146, p.160). Chun tried to cooperate with the middle class because of international and internal pressure. Roo in effect followed Chun's method to maintain a negative attitude towards large enterprises (Moon, 1994, pp.152-160). Tsai (2001) indicates that from 1987, the Roo government tried to downgrade the dominant status of the government as in relation to the economy. However, as a result, large-scale enterprises were able to affect

¹²² He suggests that, from 1961 to 1980, industrial policies can be divided into two periods; in the first, the government focused on export-oriented industries, and in the second period from 1973, heavy industries were introduced, but the government still focused on exports. After 1980, these policies continued.

government policies. Kim Young-sam adopted a hostile attitude towards these enterprises and strengthened the government's influence on them. Kim Dae-Jung reconstructed the government-enterprise relationship with new economic bureaucrats and finally ended the big family's effect on these enterprises and dissolved the symbiotic structure between government and enterprises.

The government acted in a leading role concerning economic development in South Korea and established a tie with business for a political-commercial alliance. However, with advances in economic development, the big enterprises would start to affect government policies, and the middle class urged democracy, which forced the rulers to consider their requirements. Finally, it became necessary for the government to break the tie with business and seek help from the middle class that had emerged with modernisation – even if they had to attack big business as a way of gaining support from the middle and lower classes (Moon, 1994, p.158). Because of this, economic development brought a positive effect to South Korea, not only creating an 'economic miracle' with industrialisation, and cutting the relationship between government and large enterprises, but also creating a middle class, which held a major role in democratisation and economic development.

Education

Chapter 3 mentioned that in South Korea, the concepts of democracy existed in education from the very beginning. Just as in Taiwan, since South Korea was an ally of the democratic camp and a model for opposition to a clear communist enemy (North Korea), democratic education could not be removed from the education system. With the expansion of the education system, students and teachers in schools also became major actors for democracy.

During the non-democratic period, there was support for democracy, recognised as pro-American and anti-communist, before the military rule of the 1970s (Kang, 2002, pp.319-320). Opponents from other parties, students and more than two hundred professors from the universities, and over 100,000 citizens came out to protest against Rhee's personal dictatorship in the 416 Movements in 1960 (Lee, 1975, p.24; Kim, S, 2003, p.82, Oh, 1999, p.41). From the 1970s, when Park's government took more strict measures for military rule, education for democracy was suspended. Instead, a group-orientation approach that promoted unity was introduced (Kang, 2002). However, the democratic values were still circulated in the universities by student and professorial organisations and they continued to demand democracy (Shin, Chang,

Lee, & Kim, 2007). During the 1980s, students and professors joined the protests for democracy; and in the late 1980s, democratic education was restored.

In order to promote democratic education, the South Korea Assembly also passed a law to establish the Korea Democracy Foundation to educate people about democratic values and to explore how South Korea could democratise (Korea Democracy Foundation, 2012). Through this officially-supported democratic education, democratic values could be developed and democratic culture could also become more deep-rooted in Korean society.

Middle class

This thesis has indicated that South Korea is a classic case for the argument of modernisation theories that economic development brings about a middle class, and that this middle class claims political space and finally overthrows the non-democratic government and establishes a democratic regime.

Korean civil society demonstrated their power to stand against the non-democratic regime in three periods: Rhee's personal dictatorship, Park's military authoritarianism and Chun's era (Kim S, 2003); and the middle class participated in the last two periods. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the middle class becomes the majority in South Korean society, because of the modernisation process and the transformation of industries (Oh, 1999, pp.66-73), and they became the major power against the authoritarian regime and made claims for democracy (Huntington, 1991, pp.67-68).¹²³ Particularly in the 1980s, the working class, church servants, managerial and professional persons, students and the well-off came out to protest military rule and call for democracy (Huntington, 1991; Oh, 1999; Kim, 2003). According to data from Shin, Chang, Lee and Kim (2007, pp.9-11), in the 1970s, each year there were 100,000 individuals who participated in political protests, especially when Park Chung-Hee declared the dissolution of the National Assembly and imposed strict military rule from 1973-75. As for the 1980s, especially from 1986-1988, over 2-6 million individuals participated in political protests. In South Korea, just as modernisation theory would predict, rapid economic development emerged that stimulated the middle class' interest in politics (Huntington, 1991, pp. 68-70). Nonetheless, the military junta itself was a small ruling group, and, just as Linz (2000) indicates, the military junta did not have an official ideology and ideas for attracting

¹²³ He also argued that 'the managerial and professional classes of Seoul were perhaps of greater moment than any other'.

broad support. Furthermore, the military junta was the group that abolished the democratic regime, so they could not have legitimacy to maintain military rule by expanding political participation for the middle class in order to end its protests. Eventually, the military junta in South Korea could not deal with the increasing demand for democracy from the middle class and they chose to introduce democratisation of their own accord, to ensure the retention of their privileges and their ruler's personal survival.

South Korea has been democratised more than 20 years. In order to examine the sources for supporting democracy in South Korea, this thesis uses '*On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Taiwan. Are you ...?*' as the dependent variable;¹²⁴ gender (male and female) and age are set as control variables; and then four traditional legacies and three modernisation factors (education: high school level and degree level; subjective social status: middle and upper class; and economic performance) and democratic values are used as independent variables in this model.¹²⁵ The results are illustrated in Table 8.4.

In democratised South Korea, people who have values of traditional legacies and modernisation factors demonstrate ambiguous results in support of democracy. In Wave 1, people who support hierarchical politics and *guanxi* are satisfied with democracy in South Korea; and in Wave 2, there are no legacies with explanatory power for the dependent variable. As for modernisation factors, in regards to education, comparison shows no difference between those with a lower level of education and those with high school and degree levels. Yet in Wave 1, people who received higher education are not satisfied with democracy. On the other hand, in Wave 2, educated people are satisfied with democracy. As for social class, the middle class is more satisfied with democracy than the other two classes in Wave 1; yet in Wave 2, there is no difference between classes. As table 8.4 demonstrates, support rates in all classes are evenly balanced. People who feel that there is good economic development significantly support democracy. This could be because people feel that democratic governments can maintain satisfactory economic development.

As for democratic values, just as in Taiwan, people who have democratic values will be dissatisfied; because they consider that the existing democracy does not reach their

¹²⁴ The answers of the question are recoded as follows: 'very satisfied' as 2, 'fairly satisfied' as 1, 'no answer' as 0 (a neutral answer); then, 'not very satisfied' as -1, and 'not at all satisfied' as -2. The recoded answer becomes the dependent variable in the model.

¹²⁵ Dummy variables are produced for nominal variables: gender (male and female), education level (divided into three levels), and subjective social class (divided into three levels).

standard of democracy.

Table 8.4: Satisfaction with democracy in South Korea : multiple regression analysis.

SOUTH KOREA				
Dependent Variable : Satisfaction with 'Korean democracy'				
	multiple regression in Wave 1		multiple regression in Wave 2	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Gender (Female)				
Male	-0.009	(0.052)	0.044	(0.061)
Traditional legacies				
Anti-hierarchical politics	-0.084	(0.021) **	-0.042	(0.028)
Anti-harmony	-0.030	(0.023)	0.000	(0.029)
Anti-group orientation	0.003	(0.015)	0.021	(0.020)
Anti- <i>guanxi</i>	-0.063	(0.022) *	0.038	(0.029)
Modernisation factors				
Education (under high school)				
High school level	-0.015	(0.090)	0.032	(0.096)
Degree level	-0.073	(0.107)	0.008	(0.118)
Subjective social class (Lower)				
Middle class	0.117	(0.053) ***	0.038	(0.081)
Upper class	0.022	(0.131)	0.030	(0.200)
Economic factor	0.147	(0.008) ***	0.159	(0.009) ***
Age	0.024	(0.002)	0.045	(0.003)
Democratic values				
(Constant)	—	(0.151)	—	(0.172)
<hr/>				
Adjusted R-square	0.097		0.023	
R-square	0.104		0.033	
<hr/>				
N	1500		1212	
<hr/>				

*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001

Source: 1. 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have democratic values.

8.2.3 Summary

In South Korea, people believe that the democratic regime would offer them a better life; thus, traditional legacies could not stop their wish to seek democracy (Kihl, 2005, p.61).¹²⁶ The non-democratic government in South Korea also tried to construct their regime by adopting some values of traditional legacies, yet these legacies did not serve non-democratic rulers as they expected. In contrast, modernisation factors have an active role foster democratisation in South Korea as the theories suggest. Economic development brought the middle class to force non-democratic rulers to dissolve the existing political-commercial alliance and make concessions towards democracy. Education is one of the most important factors that drove South Korea to democratise; education for developing democratic values made students become the most committed actors who stood against non-democratic rulers from the 1960s to the 1980s.

8.3 Statistical findings

In the previous sections, this thesis demonstrated South Korea leaders' attitude to democracy and roles of traditional legacies and modernisation factors for democracy. In this section, basic statistical data and regression models will be adopted to determine the trend for democracy and traditional legacies, and examine which factors would help or hinder the development of democratic values.

This section will use statistical analyses for the following purposes:

- to demonstrate support and the strength of support for traditional legacies and democratic values
- to demonstrate the trend and changes for traditional legacies and democratic

¹²⁶ He also uses instrumental and intrinsic legitimacy to explain why South Koreans asked for democracy.

values in South Korea

- to demonstrate the relationship between democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors, in order to discuss which factor is an obstacle for the development of democratic values
- to examine whether any factor can diminish the influence of traditional legacies that are not favoured in the development of democratic values

8.3.1 Percentage and Strength for traditional legacies and democratic values

Table 8.5 illustrates the results of the percentage of values of traditional legacies in South Korea. The results in both waves are similar: people strongly reject *guanxi* (connections): the rejection rate in Wave 1 is 73.7% and 75.6% in Wave 2.¹²⁷ Hierarchical politics, in both waves, is also rejected: the percentage of rejection in Wave 1 is 52.5% and rises to 59.3% in Wave 2. Support for harmony is the highest among the traditional legacies, but the percentage of support is decreasing from 71.4% to 62.0%. South Koreans also support group-orientation, but the rate decreases slightly from 62.4% to 61.7%. Overall, the support rates in both waves are greater than the rejection rate, but the gap is very small. In Wave 1, the gap is 7.96%, but it drops to 0.1% in Wave 2.

Kihl (2005, pp.45-47) lists several cultural mores and legacies in Korea, and harmony and group-orientation can be viewed as legacies of hierarchy in status, family-centred values, group norms and authoritarianism. According to the list, it is not surprising that South Korean would have higher support for harmony and group-orientation. It also reflects that Confucianism still affects South Koreans' daily life, but not in political aspects. Yun-Shik Chang (2003, p.121) also indicates that group orientation may not necessarily hinder democracy in South Korea; it may sometimes help the development of democracy, and this chapter has also demonstrated this point.

¹²⁷ As the questions for *guanxi* are slightly different in the two waves, they are not comparable.

Table 8.5: Percentage for values of traditional legacies in South Korea.

Wave1	hierarchical politics	harmony	group-orientation	guanxi	Total
Support	47.5% (712)	71.4% (1067)	62.4% (1867)	26.3% (394)	53.98% (4040)
Reject	52.5% (786)	28.6% (428)	37.6% (1127)	73.7% (1103)	46.02% (3444)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Wave2	hierarchical politics	harmony	group-orientation	guanxi	Total
Support	40.7% (483)	62.0% (726)	61.7% (1431)	24.4% (285)	50.05% (2925)
Reject	59.3% (703)	38.0% (445)	38.3% (890)	75.6% (881)	49.95% (2919)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: 1. 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Table 8.6 illustrates the percentage of support or rejection of democratic values. Questions in all dimensions are the same, so the six dimensions are comparable. Findings in Wave 1 demonstrate that support rates in all dimensions are greater than rejection rates. Rule of law, with a 77.2% support rate, is the highest in Wave 1, followed by political equality, political pluralism, separation of powers, political liberty, and popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty is the weakest of the six dimensions, at 2%. In Wave 2, political equality is ranked the highest, followed by rule of law, separation of powers, political pluralism, political liberty, and popular sovereignty.

Results in the two waves have various strengths of change. Except for political pluralism, trends in the other four dimensions are clear: there is an obvious increase. Regarding political equality, there is a 17.2% rate of increase in the dimension. Popular sovereignty and separation of powers also increase by more than 7%. Rule of law and political liberty increase slightly. Yet political pluralism, on the other hand, decreases by 4.2%. The slight decrease may be because of political scandals and conflicts during the interview period in September 2006.¹²⁸

¹²⁸ During that time, President Roh Moo-hyun's colleagues were involved in several scandals. Roh

Table 8.6: Percentage for six dimensions of democratic value in South Korea.

Wave1	Political Equality	Popular Sovereignty	Political Liberty	Political Pluralism	Separation of Powers	Rule of Law	Total
Support	72.2% (1083)	51.0% (2293)	56.4% (1692)	64.8% (971)	61.4% (1842)	77.2% (1156)	60.29% (9037)
Reject	27.8% (416)	49.0% (2204)	43.6% (1306)	35.2% (527)	38.6% (1157)	22.8% (341)	39.71% (5951)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
S. Korea Wave2	Political Equality	Popular Sovereignty	Political Liberty	Political Pluralism	Separation of Powers	Rule of Law	Total
Support	89.4% (1056)	58.4% (2025)	58.7% (1336)	60.6% (660)	69.3% (1151)	79.1% (906)	64.87% (7134)
Reject	10.6% (125)	41.6% (1440)	41.3% (942)	39.4% (430)	30.7% (687)	20.9% (239)	35.13% (3863)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: 1. 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

8.3.2 Strength for traditional legacies and democratic values

Table 8.7 demonstrates percentage analysis of the strength of South Koreans' attachment to traditional legacies and democratic values.

Regarding traditional legacies, the PDI shows that South Koreans are now more detached from traditional legacies (anti-*guanxi* is not comparable because the description of questions in the questionnaires of the two waves slightly different). As in the percentage analysis, results show that people in South Korea are highly against *guanxi* in both waves. Harmony and group-orientation are supported by more than 60% of South Koreans, yet the strength decreases sharply in harmony and slightly in group-orientation. Although the strength of anti-hierarchical politics doubles in Wave 2, the strength is still not significant.

As for democratic values, the strengths of these values are slightly different from the percentage analysis. Although political equality increases by more than 17%, the increase in the strength analysis is larger. Compared with Wave 1, strength in Wave 2

himself was impeached in 2004, and party conflicts continued.

increases by nearly a quarter. Strength of popular sovereignty is tripled in Wave 2, although there is only a 7.4% support increase in the percentage analysis. Although support for political liberty increases in the percentage analysis, the strength, on the other hand, decreases in this table. Strength for political pluralism is nearly halved in Wave 2. The trend of separation of powers is similar in both the strength and percentage analyses. Rule of law, which increases slightly in percentage, decreases a little in the table.

Table 8.7: Strength of traditional legacies and democratic values in South Korea.

SOUTH KOREA		Wave1	Wave2	PDI
		Mean	Mean	
Traditional legacies				
	Anti-hierarchical politics	0.11	0.22	0.11
	Anti-harmony	-0.53	-0.26	0.27
	Anti-group orientation	-0.2854	-0.269	0.0164
	Anti- <i>guanxi</i>	0.72	0.65	-0.07
Democratic values				
	Political Equality	0.5573	0.9711	0.4138
	Popular Sovereignty	0.0571	0.2189	0.1618
	Political Liberty	0.2204	0.2174	-0.003
	Political Pluralism	0.42	0.24	-0.18
	Separation of Powers	0.3614	0.4563	0.0949
	Rule of Law	0.79	0.76	-0.03

PDI: The percentage differential index in this table is Wave2-Wave1.

Note: 1. The range is -2 to 2: -2 means totally against the factor, 2 means totally support the factor, 0 means no preference.

2. Because of the different questions for the anti-*guanxi* aspect, the comparison for this may not meaningful.

Source: 1. 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

8.3.3 Democratic Values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors

In order to examine relationships between democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors, democratic values¹²⁹ is set as the dependent variable, and

¹²⁹ Questions of democratic values are recoded as following: 'strongly disagree' as 2, 'somewhat disagree' as 1, 'no answer' as 0 (a neutral answer); recoded 'somewhat agree' as -1, and 'strongly agree' as -2. The political equality question '*People with little or no education should have as much say in*

traditional legacies and modernisation factors are set as independent variables in the regression model. As for gender, it is set as control variables into the model. The results are demonstrated in Table 8.8. Male for gender, high school level and degree level for education level and middle class and upper class for subjective social class are produced as dummy variables for this model.

Regarding traditional legacies, Table 8.8 shows that all legacies in both waves are negative for democratic values. According to the results of Wave 1, all legacies demonstrate significant results to the dependent variable, which means that all legacies can be found to oppose democratic values effectively. Nonetheless, in Wave 2, hierarchical politics and harmony lose explanatory power, which means these two legacies may not stand effectively against democratic values.

Education, one of the modernisation factors, as this thesis has discussed, plays an essential role in the development of democratic values. Especially in Wave 2, those with higher education levels have stronger democratic values than those with lower levels of education. As to social class, supports for classes do not demonstrate a difference, and, according to Table 8.6, support for democratic values is high. People who see economic development as poor have stronger democratic values. Although these people do not benefit from economic development, they would still support democracy.

The younger generation, just as in other Confucian societies, have stronger democratic values than their elders. As this thesis has indicated, South Korea has promoted democratic education after democratisation; it is not surprising that younger people would have stronger democratic values because they have received a democratic education.

politics as highly-educated people.' is recoded as following, due to the design of questionnaire: 'strongly disagree' as -2, 'somewhat disagree' as -1, 'no answer' as 0 (a neutral answer); recoded 'somewhat agree' as 1, and 'strongly agree' as 2. After recoding, questions are added together as dependent variable.

Table 8.8: Democratic values in South Korea: Multiple regression analysis.

SOUTH KOREA				
Dependent Variable : Democratic Values				
	multiple regression in Wave 1		multiple regression in Wave 2	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Gender (Female)				
Male	0.009	(0.270)	0.054	(0.280) *
Traditional legacies				
Anti-hierarchical politics	0.094	(0.109) ***	0.006	(0.127)
Anti-harmony	0.063	(0.120) *	0.012	(0.135)
Anti-group orientation	0.225	(0.077) ***	0.245	(0.091) ***
Anti- <i>guanxi</i>	0.183	(0.115) ***	0.125	(0.131) ***
Modernisation factors				
Education (under high school)				
High school level	0.038	(0.470)	0.108	(0.442) **
Degree level	0.058	(0.560)	0.190	(0.539) ***
Subjective social class (Lower)				
Middle class	-0.010	(0.277)	0.024	(0.371)
Upper class	0.017	(0.683)	0.014	(0.923)
Economic factor	-0.055	(0.044) *	-0.111	(0.042) ***
Age	-0.070	(0.011) *	-0.088	(0.012) **
Democratic values				
(Constant)	—	(0.787) ***	—	(0.788) ***
Adjusted R-square		0.157	0.142	
R-square		0.163	0.150	
N		1500	1212	

*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001

Source: 1. 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and

negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have democratic values.

8.3.4 Factors to diminish the influence of traditional legacies

The last model has indicated that traditional legacies have negative influence for developing democratic values in South Korea. In order to examine which factor could diminish the influence of traditional legacies in South Korea, in this model, a collective ‘anti-traditional legacies’ is put as the dependent variable, and modernisation factors, gender, age and democratic values are independent variables in the model.¹³⁰ The results of this model are illustrated in Table 8.9.

Regarding modernisation factors, the results are different in Wave 1 and Wave 2. In Wave 1, the table shows that beta of education and all classes are positive, which mean that people stand on the anti-traditional legacies side, although compared with lower education and lower class, there is no significant difference. As for economic development, people who see economic development as poor would oppose traditional legacies. Regarding the results in Wave 2, compared with lower educated people, higher educated people are still against traditional legacies, especially those with a degree. As for social class and economic performance, both demonstrate support of traditional legacies, but economic factors do not have explanatory power to the dependent variable. However, the middle class support traditional legacies more than other classes.

¹³⁰ Dummy variables: gender, education level (divided into three levels), subjective social class (divided into three levels).

Table 8.9: Anti-traditional legacies in South Korea: Multiple regression analysis.

SOUTH KOREA				
Dependent Variable : Anti-traditional legacies				
	multiple regression in Wave 1		multiple regression in Wave 2	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Gender (Female)				
Male	-0.031	(0.179)	-0.178	(0.120) **
Modernisation Factors				
Education (under high school)				
High school level	0.068	(0.312)	0.110	(0.282) **
Degree level	0.085	(0.372) *	0.141	(0.344) **
Subjective social class (Lower)				
Middle class	0.019	(0.182)	-0.063	(0.237) *
Upper class	0.018	(0.452)	-0.039	(0.591)
Economic factor	-0.111	(0.029) ***	-0.050	(0.027)
Age	-0.203	(0.007) ***	-0.274	(0.004) ***
(Constant)	—	(0.517) **	—	(0.501) ***
Adjusted R-square		0.061	0.087	
R-square		0.066	0.081	
N		1500	1212	

*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001

Source: 1. 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1).

2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2).

Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have democratic values.

8.3.5 Summary

In democratic South Korea, people's support for democratic values in all orientations is higher than the rejection rate, and the trend still slightly increases from Wave 1 to Wave 2. The results show that people in South Korea have developed strong democratic values to support its democratic regime. However, the effects of traditional legacies do not significantly disappear from the public consciousness. Although this thesis has also indicated that traditional legacies may not hinder the democratisation process, statistical data show that except for harmony and hierarchical politics in Wave 2, other legacies could still be an obstacle for developing democratic values. Education may continue to deepen democratic values and will be a key element to diminish the influence of traditional legacies. The younger generation, as in Taiwan, acts as an essential element for democracy and the decrease in the values of traditional legacies.

8.4 Conclusion

South Korea is a unique case: this country was born as a model in the democratic camp to oppose the communists. Thus, non-democratic rulers could not legitimise their rule. They did not construct a consistent official ideology to consolidate their rule, and even they could not decide whether they should continue to maintain their non-democratic rule – like Park Chung-Hee, who once considered giving up military rule.

The major method they could use to claim support was through rapid economic development. This situation meant that the non-democratic regime in South Korea could not be sustained when the modernisation factors developed. As previous sections have demonstrated, economic development, the middle class and education were not favoured in consolidating non-democratic rule, but helped to strengthen the power of the opposition. Further, because the non-democratic regime in South Korea could not gain broad support from the people, traditional legacies also could not facilitate their rule. Group-orientation, used by non-democratic rulers to construct nationalism for national unity, also made people unite to oppose the non-democratic government and its ally, the US. *Guanxi* was another factor that helped opponents to unite their supporters in their own areas. These characteristics did not exist in other Confucian societies.

In democratic South Korea, democratic values in all orientations have gained support from more than half of the people. This demonstrates that the people in South Korea have internalised democratic values, and the regression analysis also indicates that, although traditional legacies may hinder development of democratic values, yet education, the younger generation and continuously developed democratic values will end the influence of these legacies and build up a democratic political culture in order to maintain the democratic regime.

Part 2 Conclusions

In Part 1, the theoretical part of this thesis, it was argued that the classic Confucian political system is a limited and conditional government design; although the ruler dominates the government, the ruler should still acknowledge that the legitimacy to rule is people-based. Nonetheless, the imperial political system revised the classic system to be ruler-based, and asked the people to follow the rulers for stability and continuity of the empire. After the imperial era, the New Confucian scholars clearly indicate that, in Confucian societies, a democratic regime is essential for solving problems. The status of the populace changed from the source of legitimacy to be merely the element to support the empire in the Confucian political system. Yet, the choice for democracy lies with the political leader – that is, in the ruler’s hand. Moreover, traditional legacies from the imperial period, which affect the political culture, continue to exist in modern Confucian societies. Modernisation is expected to dissolve these traditional legacies and facilitate openness in societies, awaking the wish of the people to stand against non-democratic regimes, and training people to be more skilful in seeking democracy. Yet the facts demonstrate that modernisation does not bring democracy to all Confucian societies; some of non-democratic ones even become more rigid during the modernisation process. According to these discussions in the theoretical part, there are three hypotheses to be addressed:

1. As the dominant force in the political sphere, the leadership’s attitude is decisive at the initial stage for an emerging democracy. The US factor, the nature of the regime, and internal and international factors also needed to be considered to explain the cases of Taiwan and South Korea.
2. In non-democratic societies, traditional legacies are selectively adopted to construct their official ideology for facilitating their rule. These selected traditional legacies would be strongly supported by the populace. In democratic societies, traditional legacies might not be an obstacle for democracy, and support for traditional legacies is decreasing.
3. Modernisation factors in non-democratic societies are deliberately used to serve to consolidate non-democratic regimes. However, in democratic societies, the previous non-democratic rulers did not have the ability to continue their power to dominate the modernisation process.

The case studies are expected to find the following results in response to the

hypotheses, as the conclusion to Part One indicated.

With regard to the ruler, case studies are expected to find that the rulers' attitude to democracy is decisive. There are two different attitudes for non-democratic rulers among the four Confucian societies that faced democracy. In China and Singapore, they create a pseudo-democracy, yet the rulers dominate this democracy. In Taiwan and South Korea, their background forced previous non-democratic rulers to pretend they were democratic; they had to be tolerant to opponents and made political concessions to gain foreign support and cease internal pressure.

As for traditional legacies, rulers in non-democratic societies selectively used these legacies to decorate their official ideology to make people believe these official ideas. In democratic societies, although some of these legacies existed or helped to facilitate the previous non-democratic leaders' rule, the rulers eventually gave up power of their own accord, or the effects of using traditional legacies did not help to consolidate their power as was expected.

Concerning modernisation factors, leaders in non-democratic societies deliberately took the modernisation process under their control and ensured that modernisation factors could serve their rule. Yet in democratic societies, the power of control was decreasing and dissolving during the modernisation process, and these modernisation factors eventually were in opposition to the non-democratic rulers.

Finally, cases studies are expected to find that in China and Singapore, measures taken by non-democratic rulers were successful, and that is the reason why they were able to continue in power: because these societies could not build up a political culture in favour of democracy, people in those societies were more attached to officially-promoted traditional legacies, and did not support democratic values. However, in democratic societies, democratic values are increasing, and traditional legacies are decreasing.

In order to testify to these expected results for the hypotheses, each case is divided into three sections in the case study chapters. In the first section, the ruler's attitude to democracy is considered, to demonstrate the differences between non-democratic and democratic Confucian societies. In the second section, traditional legacies and modernisation factors are discussed to demonstrate the dissimilar points between non-democratic and democratic societies. The third section is to demonstrate the trend of political culture through the relationships between traditional legacies,

modernisation factors and democratic values. The results of the case studies are summarised as following:

Ruler's Attitude to Democracy

In this section, the attitudes of the rulers in each case are demonstrated to discuss why some societies can begin a democratisation process and finally become democratised, yet some of them cannot.

Rulers in non-democratic societies are aware that democracy is a source to gain legitimacy for their regime. Thus, rulers in China and Singapore made a pseudo-democracy to respond to demands for democracy. They claim that East Asian societies are not suitable for the western style of democracy, which would erode their culture and lead to unstable societies. Thus, they create a democracy that contains a mechanism to respond to claims by the people: offer them a channel to express their opinions, yet the ruler will decide what is right and what is wrong. Rulers are just like a head of family, or the priest of the Church. They are responsible for taking care of the needs of the people, and for offering them a better life; the people are not allowed to threaten their leadership. These phenomena can be summarised as following:

In Chapter 5, the democracy with Chinese characteristics is conceptualised by the CPC as having three major elements: people's democracy, democratic centralism and Minben. Regarding people's democracy, it means that Chinese democracy should be practised under the leadership of the CPC, and not all of the people are citizens: some people who are hostile to socialism are the enemies for people to fight against. Meanwhile, the People's Congress system is the practical method for people to participate in politics, yet this system offers only limited space and a 'rubber stamp' to the CPC's decisions. As for democratic centralism, it encourages people to offer public opinions, yet there will be a leader, the CPC, to collect these views and decide which should be adopted. Collective interests take priority over the interests of individuals, and collective interests are identified by the CPC leadership. In order to create a democratic image, the CPC leaders introduced Minben, the concept from Confucianism, to be an element of Chinese democracy. The CPC rulers ask the government and party officers to consider the people's needs, yet Minben itself is a concept which encourages hierarchical politics. Minben urges the ruler to treat the people as their children; it also urges the people to follow rulers unless the rulers fail to meet their basic needs. This concept in China can combine with its bottom line of Chinese democracy under the leadership of the CPC. Thus, Minben for the CPC rulers

is a facilitator that both creates an appearance of democracy and consolidates CPC's rule.

Chapter 6 demonstrates that in order to ensure Singapore's survival, the Singapore leadership promote a trustee democracy that contains two characteristics: meritocratic government and elections to gain authorisation to act as trustee. The meritocratic government is to ensure the best people will always manage the government and serve the following purposes: fulfilling people's needs, maintaining social order and justice, promoting economic growth and social progress, maintaining a good education system, keeping moral standards for both ruler and ruled, and maintaining standards of living. In this system, the PAP authority is the unit to ensure that only the best and moral people will be government officers, and the PAP rulers treat people as their children. They use the legal system and official values to educate the populace to follow the government's guidance to achieve these goals. Meanwhile, it is the government officers' responsibility to convince people that what the government does to people is always for their own good. People have the right to vote regularly to check this government. If the public choose to allow this government to continue in power, the government will take the view that they have been authorised to maintain the existing political system and government –people relations.

On the other hand, in the other two democratic societies, rulers were forced to make a concession to opponents within the democratisation process. The US influence and nature of the regimes in Taiwan and South Korea meant that non-democratic rulers in these societies could not gain legitimacy nor did they have enough power to stand against opponents. When these non-democratic rulers considered that the tolerance and suppression costs were high, they started to choose to democratise the non-democratic regimes for their survival.

In Chapter 7, the 'Three Principles of the People', which contained elements of democracy, were adopted to restore the democratic ROC. Internal pressure forced the KMT ruler, CCK, to make concessions to opponents and start the process of political liberalisation; his successor, LTH, completed democratisation in Taiwan. Democratic China's image was important for the KMT to distinguish between communist China and the KMT's China. In order to restore this democratic ROC, the KMT authority controlled most social organs and local factions to establish Taiwan as the base for its plan for restoration. However, international environment changes led the KMT to lose the legal cause to restore a democratic China. The 'Three Principles of the People' was KMT's official ideology, and the authority promoted the principle of education,

especially the part concerning nationalism, to build up the sense of Chinese identity in Taiwan. Yet the 'Three Principles of the People' also urges the government to be democratic; thus this education also developed people's democratic values. Meanwhile, the KMT authority was an outsider to the Taiwanese. This regime came to Taiwan after WWII, and soon raised the 228 Incidents in which the KMT authority massacred most of the indigenous elites and created a strong mistrust between the KMT and indigenous people. Thus, the indigenous elites stood against the KMT regime through local elections and political movements from time to time, and the power of this opposition increased with time. These negative factors made the KMT rulers consider how to survive in Taiwan and eventually CCK implemented a gradual political liberalisation, because he found the KMT was not able to suppress its opponents. This was because the regime could not afford to lose support from the US. The tolerance cost was also too high, because the opposition was strong enough to challenge the KMT publicly. After CCK, his successor democratised the regime and ensured the KMT's special rights.

South Korea (Chapter 8) was established as a democratic regime to be the part of the democratic camp by the US and the UN. Thus, in spite of Syngman Rhee's personal dictatorship, the military government faced a legitimacy crisis and protests from the people. Syngman Rhee expanded his power after the Korean War, using national security as an excuse. Like the KMT in Taiwan, he used the existence of a clear enemy, North Korea, as his tool to establish national security law and build agencies against his political opponents. He also cheated in the presidential election in 1960, which directly resulted in his resignation. The military leadership raised a coup to recover state order, to be anti-communist, end corruption and develop the national economy. Although the military junta successfully developed the economy in South Korea, their actions also created a middle class who sought to expand their political power. The rising middle class and opponents who demanded democracy placed strong pressure on the military junta, which dramatically raised the tolerance cost. Furthermore, the forthcoming Olympic Games in 1988 were related to Korea's national prestige and limited the rulers' choice to suppress opponents. Eventually these rulers chose to democratise the regime, isolated their opponents and cooperated with some opposition parties to maintain their influence during the process of democratisation.

Traditional legacies and modernisation

In the second section of each case, the role of traditional legacies and modernisation

factors are demonstrated. Not all of these states had successfully practised democracy before, and the values of traditional legacies generally existed in the political culture of these societies. However, differences between democratic societies and non-democratic societies made Taiwan and South Korea democratised, yet China and Singapore maintain stable non-democratic regimes.

In the non-democratic societies, traditional legacies are selected to facilitate the regime and official ideology. Hierarchical politics is the demonstration of these non-democratic regimes; harmony and group-orientation are used to serve non-democratic rulers' official ideologies. *Guanxi* is not promoted officially in these two societies; factions in China may support or undermine its regime, whereas for Singapore, only those chosen by the PAP are permitted to be ministers or members of parliament.

In Chapter 5, the CPC authority created a CPC-dominated top-down political system. In this system, the CPC's highest rulers are the highest authority, and they have the right to guide the party and the state. As was mentioned in the last section, the CPC authority adopted democratic centralism and offered limited political rights, and the ruler was the decision maker deciding which public opinions are correct and which are wrong. All of the other party members, parties or army should follow these people. The whole structure of this political system was illustrated in Chapter 4. In order to consolidate the CPC rule and deal with problems resulting from openness and reform, the authority wanted to establish a socialist harmonious society. The fundamental concept for this society was that the state must be under the leadership of the CPC, and the objectives for include group-orientation, such as patriotic education and the maintenance of social unity, and harmony, which asks the party to take responsibility to cease social conflict and seek social stability.

In Chapter 6, the PAP rulers identify themselves as a father who should both guide the people to the correct way and require them to hold to moral standards. In this top-down system, the PAP authority provides the shared values for the people to follow. These values include two traditional legacies: group-orientation and harmony. Firstly, the shared values ask people to consider national and community interests above personal interests. Secondly, the government discourages conflicts yet encourages national unity, racial harmony and consensus. Family is the unit to promote these values; through the family, values can be transferred from elders to the younger generation.

On the other hand, in democratic regimes, traditional legacies might not serve to consolidate non-democratic rulers. Although non-democratic rulers in Taiwan and South Korea also tried to establish hierarchical politics, the internal pressure and international realities forced them to make political concessions to their opponents. *Guanxi* also existed in the non-democratic period, but it may not serve to consolidate the ruler's power. Group-orientation demonstrates ambiguous results in Taiwan and South Korea.

In Chapter 7, the KMT authority tried to establish a base for restoring the ROC. This authority also practised democratic centralism to control state organs and most social organisations. The KMT ruler was the commander to guide them, yet this power of control decreased gradually when the KMT authority faced internal and international challenges. *Guanxi* between the KMT central and local factions was the method for the KMT ruler to control most regions of Taiwan; nonetheless, this relationship was dissolved during the period of political liberalisation and democratisation. Local factions now choose their allies according to their own interests. As the alien regime, the KMT tried to build up the Chinese national identity among Taiwanese, but this effort could not totally replace the Taiwanese identity. Even now, identity becomes a political issue as Taiwanese demonstrate different perceptions of national identity.

In Chapter 8, the military junta could not gain legitimacy for their regime. Although military rulers tried to construct their top-down political system, this system was seriously challenged, and eventually led these rulers to yield to the political power of the populace. *Guanxi* in South Korea is demonstrated geographically. Most non-democratic rulers were from the east of South Korea, and they took especial care to develop that region. This resulted in the west region following a member of the opposition, Kim Dae-jung, to stand against the non-democratic rulers. Even now, the voting behaviour between the east and the west is clearly different. The west region tends to support Kim's democratic parties; and the eastern people offer more support to the previous non-democratic rulers' party. Non-democratic Korean rulers encouraged the building up of the Korean nation. However, this effort also made the people unite to make a demand for the good of the state – restore democracy in South Korea.

As for modernisation factors, they performed differently among non-democratic and democratic societies. In non-democratic societies, although economic development could help to promote democratisation, it could also be the source of regime stability. As was discussed in Chapter 3, because of traditional ideas, the people would be

satisfied with the regime if the ruler could meet their basic needs. In China and Singapore, rulers tried to make economic development become the source of their regime stability. Popularised education made people become more willing to stand against a non-democratic ruler, yet patriotic education was promoted at all education levels to change public opinion to support the regime. As for the middle class, they were accepted inducements to support the regime.

In Chapter 5, Deng Xiaoping allowed the openness and reform policies to prevent the CPC authority's collapse following the Cultural Revolution. The rapid economic development in the past two decades persuaded the CPC authority to claim that only this regime could maintain economic success, and the whole party was committed to reaching this goal. Meanwhile, the CPC also convinced the people that if they tried to overthrow the regime, they would overthrow existing achievements and stability. Thus, people would tend to support the regime, which confirms economic development as a strong element in support for the CPC. The CPC authority also firmly asked all education institutions to put into practice 'love China' and 'love party' education. This move was an attempt to change public opinion to support the CPC authority. In order to ensure that the newly developed middle class in China would not go against the authority, the CPC revised their official ideology to open political space for the middle class.

In Chapter 6, economic development also became the most effective official propaganda to persuade the people of Singapore to believe that this authority is the optimal choice to continue this achievement. In the meantime, the PAP authority also promoted moral education to prevent people from following the western values. Rulers of the PAP indicated that western values would be hazardous to Singapore's good traditional values; therefore, the government should guide people to avoid these incorrect values. The Singapore government also operated a public housing policy to create a communication channel and open political space for the middle class, which would make the PAP rulers be more dynamic in response to public opinion.

As for democratic societies, modernisation factors were more in accordance with the expectations of modernisation theories, which facilitated political opponents in seeking democracy.

In Chapter 7, economic development both led to the emergence of the middle class and weakened the KMT's power of control in the state. Although the KMT authority was the dominant force in the process of economic development and achieved

economic success, development of large state-owned and private enterprises led to the leaders of these enterprises becoming decision makers, sharing power with the KMT. The emergent middle class sought for political reform, and they also chose to cooperate with the indigenous opponents to stand against the KMT during the non-democratic period. Meanwhile, although the KMT continued to encourage Chinese nation building education, in order to sustain the image of a democratic China, a democratic education was also provided. These modernisation factors helped to limit the non-democratic rulers' power and increased the people's ability to seek democracy.

In Chapter 8, economic development led by the military junta in South Korea also created a middle class and forced the military junta to give up the political-commercial alliance with big family-based enterprises. These enterprises were firm allies of the military junta, yet the military rulers chose to keep distance from them from the mid-1980s when facing political challenges. The middle class that emerged as a result of economic development became opponents who claimed democracy from the military junta. Education for democracy also existed in South Korea for decades, which developed democratic values. Thus, these modernisation factors, as in Taiwan, also provided more power for opponents seeking democracy to stand against non-democratic rulers.

Statistical findings

The statistical findings further prove the following facts:

Regarding satisfaction with the existing regime, in non-democratic societies, the results show that the CPC and PAP's efforts on traditional legacies and modernisation factors are feasible. In China, people who support officially promoted legacies were satisfied with Chinese democracy. In the meantime, most social classes and people who note good economic development also support this democracy. In Singapore, the results are similar to China. However, these phenomena are different from results in Taiwan and South Korea. Most traditional legacies do not have significant explanatory power to affect people's satisfaction with the existing democracy. As for modernisation factors, people who feel that economic development is good are satisfied with the existing democracy, perhaps because they are satisfied that the democratic system promotes economic development; educated people would have more expectations of the existing democracy and are therefore not currently satisfied with democracy.

As for the percentage and strength analysis for traditional legacies among non-democratic and democratic societies, the results clearly reflect that the traditional legacies that are strongly promoted by the CPC or the PAP are highly supported by the populace. In the other two societies, they are not. The manipulation of these legacies – to strengthen elements that are obstacles to democracy – is successful. However, in democratic societies, the influence of these legacies is decreasing.

In the regression model for the relationship between traditional legacies and modernisation factors, in China and Singapore modernisation factors cannot diminish the influence of traditional legacies; if education is excepted, the other two factors even help to strengthen traditional legacies. Nonetheless, education is also not reliable because in the results shown from Wave 2, education is not always effective against traditional legacies. Thus, these results again respond to arguments in the case studies: the CPC and the PAP manipulate modernisation factors to facilitate their rule. However, education and the younger generation are two major elements that are diminishing the influence of traditional values in all Confucian societies. This reflects the fact that generational differences and education are feasible in these societies.

In the model for democratic values, in all cases, most traditional legacies are obstacles to democratic values: if traditional legacies continue to grow, democratic values cannot develop. As for modernisation factors, only education is a reliable factor to support the development of democratic values. Economic development in non-democratic societies hinders the development of democratic values. On the other hand, the younger generation in all societies support democratic values more than their elders do. The results also reflect that, although economic development might not foster the development of democracy, just as Inglehart indicated, there will be a value change between generations (1990; 1997).

In regards to the percentage and strength analysis for democratic values, it is not surprising that in non-democratic societies, democratic values are very low. That is because the forms of ‘democracy’ of the CPC and the PAP and the values of pseudo-democracy which come from traditional legacies, are not compatible with democracy. According to the above analysis, modernisation factors are not reliable; there is only one strong factor to stand against the effects of traditional legacies: the younger generation. Thus, the democratic political culture for the development of a democratic regime is not likely to form shortly in China and Singapore, unless the leaderships are willing to change their attitude and accept democracy. On the other

hand, democratic values in Taiwan and South Korea are high, and they are still developing.

Summary

To summarise the case studies, the hypotheses can be answered as following:

Rulers' attitude is decisive for democracy to emerge. Democracy will not be reached automatically, just as Huntington (1991, p.108), Inglehart (1990; 1997) and Schmitter (2010) indicated. To establish a democratic regime there must be interactions between the leaders and the people. The appearance of the prerequisites for democracy, such as social, economic or other factors, are not enough to create democracy. To reach democracy one still needs the activities of political leaders for democracy to be possible. In democratic Confucian societies, rulers were forced to accept the fact that they could not continue to maintain their regime, because of international conditions and the nature of their regime: in Taiwan, it is as an outsider, and in South Korea, it was intended to be a democratic regime. Thus they chose to democratise to maintain their legacies, and this was also the safest way, as Huntington (1991) argued. Their choices also promoted, or directly led to, democratisation in Taiwan and South Korea. On the other hand, rulers in non-democratic societies choose another way – to form a pseudo-democracy. They claim that, although they also believe in democracy, every country has its own characteristics, and they insist that the form of democracy should be compatible with their country's situation.

As for traditional legacies, in non-democratic regimes, rulers promote a clear and feasible official ideology that combines with traditional legacies to protect their regime and make this manipulation successful. In China, the idea of the socialist harmonious society, which includes most of the traditional legacies, was applied by the CPC authority to deal with problems arising from openness and reform policies. Meanwhile, this official ideology also demanded social unity and authority for the party to be the facilitator to end social conflict. In Singapore, the shared values also helped to propagate official ideology to serve the PAP authority's need to control. As for Taiwan and Singapore, the clear and feasible official ideology did not appear. In Taiwan, the KMT authority claimed they were the orthodox and democratic China; thus, the mission for the authority was to expel the communists and restore the ROC. Nonetheless, the official ideology that was established on this illusory purpose was not workable, and even the KMT leaders understood that. Although the KMT administration spent much time working for this purpose, they eventually abandoned

it. In South Korea, the military junta did not in fact construct an official ideology to combine traditional legacies and we can find that traditional legacies might not even be of service to that regime.

Concerning modernisation factors, in democratic societies, democratic values were introduced from the non-democratic period by education, which developed people's democratic values and provided the people with a greater ability to seek democracy. In non-democratic regimes, this democratic education did not exist. The regimes could educate people towards their particular form of democracy and its related values rather than western democracy and western democratic values. This effect also occurred in relation to economic development and middle class factors. In Taiwan and South Korea, although the non-democratic regimes created economic achievement, and gained a legitimacy bonus from economic development, the middle class would resist their rule because the middle class considered the KMT authority an alien regime, and the military junta in South Korea had forcibly occupied government seats. Meanwhile, these non-democratic rulers' concession to opponents would only increase the strengths of opponents. Nonetheless, in China and Singapore, governments could more easily convince the people that they were the only route to maintain economic success and social stability. They could also make a deal with the middle class. For instance, in China, the middle class gained the right to participate in politics and this right was offered by the CPC authority. The middle class would be appreciative of the CPC because, in the CPC's original ideology, no middle class would exist after the CPC's farmer-worker revolution in 1949. The new opening would be viewed as a creditable political reform by the CPC authority. In Singapore, the middle class is taken care of by the government's policy; thus, they may not choose to stand against the PAP government.

The US factor, the regime's nature and internal and international factors, are important to affect rulers' decisions. Although all non-democratic rulers tried to manipulate selected traditional legacies to consolidate their rule, in Taiwan and South Korea the international and internal environment changed dramatically, which meant that these non-democratic rulers could not put up an effective resistance. Eventually they chose to make political concessions to opponents, which led to the collapse of their top-down regime, and negated their attempts to use traditional legacies to serve their regime. The nature of the regime affected the outcome for non-democratic rulers in the management of modernisation factors. The non-democratic regime in Taiwan was an alien regime that came from mainland China and claimed to restore democratic China; South Korea was originally a democratic regime. Thus, it was hard for

non-democratic regimes in these Taiwan and South Korea to legitimise their rule. However, the CPC authority in China was a revolutionary regime, which gained power from the revolution, and the PAP authority in Singapore was elected to be the ruler. They originally had legitimacy to rule and therefore have total autonomy to manipulate modernisation factors to serve their own interests.

The statistical results demonstrate that the measures taken by the non-democratic leadership in China and Singapore were successful. Firstly, they could legitimise their rule by selected traditional legacies-based official ideology and achievements of modernisation. Secondly, the officially promoted legacies are strongly supported by the public, and, at the same time, support for democratic values is low. Thirdly, education and the younger generation can help to reinforce democratic values. The result also shows that if there is stronger support for traditional legacies, there would be less support for democratic values. Thus, building up a democratic political culture cannot be achieved in a short time. In democratic societies, democratic values are increasing, which means that democracy can still exist in a Confucian society. Nonetheless, in the long-run, education and generational differences will put pressure on the rulers of these societies to allow a broader political space.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

9.1 Restatement of the Topic

This thesis began with consideration of the unresolved debate as to whether Confucian societies can produce or maintain a democratic regime. Having a democratic regime has become the consensus position, accepted not only by countries that operate open political systems but also by states that do not. The rulers in these non-democratic states also argue that their countries are democratic, yet their democracy is one with their national characteristics rather than the model of Western democracy. The issue of whether a democratic regime can be established or maintained in a Confucian society has been discussed for more than a hundred years. In the early modern era, Confucian scholars accepted that their society needed to modernise and accepted the democratic system as the best political system,¹³¹ so they advocated the solution of combining the democratic regime with the Confucian society. Their view that only the people could be the source of just government was consistent with the Confucian classics and they sought to introduce several democratic institutions to correct the mistakes of the traditional system that made the rulers the basis of just government. This first attempt did not succeed because their formula not only offended most Confucian elites' interests but also contributed to the collapse of the imperial system. Thereafter, the influence of modernisation and westernisation led most famous scholars and political elites to abandon Confucian culture in support of democracy, notably in China and Korea. These scholars and elites argued that the Confucian cultures and political system weakened their countries and led their countries to fall behind the Western powers. Thus, the solution was to learn from the West, including understanding their democratic system and scientific way of thinking.

In more recent decades the debate on whether Confucian societies can have a democratic regime has become more pragmatic, focusing on the factors that lead some Confucian societies to produce a democratic regime and some of them to practice only

¹³¹ The democratic system they imagined might not perfectly satisfy the ideas of a democratic system that is practiced now. They indicated that the country should develop civil rights, modernise the national defence power, establish parliaments, and practise the parliamentary system (Ichiko, 1980; Gasster, 1980).

non-democratic politics even as their societies continue to modernise. Some scholars have argued that the Confucian culture will hinder democratic change because this culture is intrinsically anti-democratic. So these scholars indicate that if this culture persists in the Confucian society, it will be difficult for democracy to emerge, or it could develop a hybrid democracy combining liberal and illiberal elements. On the other hand, some scholars suggest that the scholars who argue that Confucianism should be the primary variable for explaining the failure of some societies to democratise do not correctly observe the actual causes for this. These scholars clearly indicate that the phenomena that some scholars suggest stand against democracy are not the real contents of Confucianism. Most of these phenomena are the legacies from the imperial period, and the imperial systems government does not reflect the actual Confucian political thought, but are revisions devised by some official intellectuals to serve the emperor and consolidate the foundation of the empire. They argue that the philosophy of the true Confucian system should be people-oriented, and that classic Confucian thought always argued that political legitimacy should be based on the people. Thus, a democratic regime should be practised in Confucian society in order to fulfil this mission, and Confucianism can also serve as a religion for people's spiritual needs. These scholars clearly that the core problem that emerged from the imperial system was with the role given to rulers rather than Confucianism. Some non-democratic rulers use the Confucian culture in an unjustified way, using evasive words about a national kind of democracy to be practised in Confucian societies due to cultural differences between West and East. However, these evasive words look false because there have been several successful cases of Confucian societies that now have democratic cultures and regimes. Therefore, Confucian societies can have a democratic regime, which is required to fulfil the people-oriented political philosophy of the true Confucian tradition.

Scholarly arguments about the emergence and maintenance of democratic regimes need to consider the level of support among political actors to operate a democratic regime and the depth of democratic political culture to sustain it. In line with these suggestions and the above debates, this thesis has discussed this topic by comparing the non-democratic and democratic Confucian societies in terms of the rulers' attitude to democracy, the role of traditional legacies in shaping democracy emergence, and the effect of modernisation. By evaluating these factors it has provided explanations as to the compatibility of Confucian cultures and democratic cultures; and why some of the Confucian societies succeeded in democratic change but some of them failed.

9.2 Summary of the Thesis

In order to analyse the topic, the main body of this thesis is divided into two parts: a theoretical part and case studies part.

The theoretical part contains two chapters. In Chapter 2, this thesis first discussed the role of political culture in Confucian societies. It argued political culture is the long-term accumulation of political attitudes and values. These are stored in the people's memory, and shape their political activities and decisions. Thus, it is essential for a society to develop a democratic political culture for democracy to emerge and be maintained. This thesis also demonstrated that a successful democratic regime needs a consensus for democracy among political elites, other major actors in society, and the people's support in the stage of democratic emergence. Thereafter there should be a strong commitment by the people and a democratic political culture to sustain a democratic regime. Then this thesis outlined the contemporary debates as to whether Confucianism is an obstacle to democratic change. It was established that it is traditional legacies and the way these are used that seem to be the obstacle for democracy. When these traditional legacies exist in the modern politics of Confucian societies they can be employed to restrict democratic change, when promoted officially or as a result of some political activities. If these legacies continue to operate in a Confucian society, then it will be harder for that society to develop a democratic political culture.

Chapter 3 focuses on the effect of modernisation. Modernisation theories have demonstrated that an open and democratic-oriented society can emerge from a traditional society. However, this situation may not operate evenly in Confucian societies. This thesis uses three major modernisation factors - economic development, the development of a middle class and educational levels - to indicate that the democratic system will not emerge automatically by modernisation alone and that it needs political interactions between the ruler and the people. Meanwhile, the effect of modernisation may be ambiguous in these societies since it can serve the non-democratic regime as well as helping to advance the democratisation process. This thesis also indicated briefly that in Confucian societies, modernisation factors may be operated by the non-democratic rulers to facilitate their rule or conversely these can help to dissolve the non-democratic regimes.

Having established this theoretical approach, the second part of the thesis present case

studies. In this part, all chapters are discussed in three sections: the rulers' attitude to democracy, the role of traditional legacies and modernisation factors, and the statistical findings from surveys of political values.

In Chapter 5, the attitude to democracy of the Communist Party of China is clear: what China needs is a 'unique democracy' rather than the Western style democracy. This unique democracy with Chinese characteristics has three major elements: People's democracy, Democratic centralism and Minben. People's democracy limits the range of political participation and offers the CPC power to control the qualifications to participate in politics. Democratic centralism provides the CPC rulers the final determination and explanatory power to policies, although the people can offer their voices. Minben helps the CPC rulers to create an image that the party always puts the people first. Yet the thesis shows that Minben, substantially, is a ruler-dominated political system, and combined with the previous two elements, ensures the CPC rulers are still the highest authority in the Chinese 'democratic system'. In order to consolidate their rule, the CPC rulers maintain a top-down political system to make the party the final judge and coordinator in conflicts, and they employ political values of harmony and group-orientation as tools to construct their official ideology and repress possible anti-party elements hazardous to their rule. Through a tight control of the modernisation process, the party claims the achievements of economic development to gain the people's support for economic growth and a stable environment. The middle class, which has been created from this growth, has been permitted a more open political space by the party to attract their support. At the same time the CPC has promoted patriotic education so that love China and love the party is also practised through pupils' education. In the statistical analysis, the results demonstrated that the CPC's effort to promote traditional legacies for official ideology has been successful, and the modernisation factors also operate as facilitators to non-democratic rule. As result, only education is the firm factor for the people to develop democratic values, but the existing democratic values support is low, and the trend for democratic values is toward the negative direction. So, democratic values may even be retreating from the Chinese people's minds.

In Chapter 6, the rulers in Singapore created a trustee model of democracy, which is similar to the classic Confucian political system. The PAP rulers act as a father figure to the society and treat their people as the sons and daughters. They control not only the political issues but also the people's daily life, needs and morality. These rulers clearly identify their status as an efficient, honest and strict father, and they promise to offer the best bureaucrats and environment to the people of Singapore. The people

have the right to re-authorise their trust in the PAP rulers to practice their policies. The PAP rulers indicate that this is the democracy that Singapore needs and can make Singapore succeed and survive. The Singapore government also maintains a top-down political system and promotes harmony and group-orientation in their official shared values. As for modernisation factors, it can be found the achievements of economic development are the best official propaganda for the government to claim the people's support protecting economic success and a stable environment for investments. The education system also helps the government to install the correct ideology and the successful stories of Singapore to consolidate the people's support for the existing political system. The middle class is nurtured and protected by the government, so it is difficult for them to stand against the government. The statistical findings also demonstrate that officially promoted legacies have highly support by the people, and only the education system is a firm factor that could help to develop democratic values. Yet overall democratic values in Singapore are low, which means the democratic political culture is still not constructed in Singapore.

In Chapter 7, it was argued the KMT authority in Taiwan was imported as an alien regime from the mainland of China. For this reason, this authority needed to surmount the indigenous challenges to their legitimate as Taiwan rulers. At the same time the KMT authority opposed communist politics and was eager to prove it was the legitimate and democratic government of China. For this reason the KMT could not take a strict attitude to the suppression of all opponents. In the 1980s the dramatic changes of international environment forced KMT to move closer to democratic politics to gain support their continuing rule. Chiang Ching Kuo started the process of political liberalisation, and his successor, Lee Teng Hui, implemented a process of democratisation making the KMT a Taiwan-based party and ensuring their power to rule. Although the KMT authority tried to construct a legitimating ideology by promoting several legacies, their efforts failed because they could not sustain a non-democratic government by themselves. They needed the cooperation of Taiwan's powerful entrepreneurs which diminished the KMT's power to dominate society. In education, although this authority installed a Chinese identity education to build up a new national concept in the Taiwanese mind, yet they also needed to provide democratic education in order to stay true to Sun Yat-sen's Three Peoples Principles. Development of a middle class also strengthened the indigenous opponents' power to challenge KMT monopoly; and the KMT found it difficult to claim credit from modernisation factors to consolidate their rule. The statistical findings demonstrated that the people's support in Taiwan for traditional legacies is decreasing gradually, and this trend and open education have helped Taiwanese to develop the democratic

values necessary for constructing a democratic political culture. Overall support for democratic values in Taiwan is increasing.

In Chapter 8, this thesis showed that the Republic of Korea was originally established as a democratic regime. As a result neither the personal dictatorships nor military governments of the post-war period could fully legitimise their non-democratic rule. The military junta eventually needed to negotiate with its opponents and made concessions to the people's claim for democracy. Because the military junta did not have a specific ideology, they also did not place much emphasis on traditional legacies to consolidate their rule. The military junta only tried to develop the people's patriotism for opposing the communists, yet there was no apparent linkage between this patriotism and the military junta. In time the people of South Korea considered they should overthrow the military junta for the state's long-term benefit and development. Modernisation factors also helped to democratise this country. Economic development was the major achievement for military junta, and for a time the political-commercial alliance helped to consolidate their rule. Ultimately, the military government conceded to democratic change because they needed to meet the working class's demands for democracy. The emergence and development of a middle class was a classic case of democracy promotion in Huntington's book. These middle class and educated people protested against non-democratic rule from 1960s to late 1980s. Their continuous protests formed a firm pressure for change on the military junta and forced them to consider concessions. The statistical findings indicate that although some traditional legacies are high, yet they are not really harmful to democracy as considered by scholarly explanations. Education is still the major element to develop people's democratic values, and some traditional legacies lost their effect to hinder the development of democratic values. The overall democratic values in South Korea are high, and numbers of people who have a specific democratic value are higher than those who do not in each case.

Through these brief summaries of chapters, the hypotheses and research questions will be evaluated in the next section.

9.3 Evaluating the Findings for Hypotheses and Research Questions

This thesis has developed three hypotheses and five research questions for responding to the topic, and through the analysis set out in the theoretical and cases studies parts, these hypotheses and research questions are evaluated in this section.

H1: A democratic regime can be the political system of modern Confucian societies, yet rulers' attitudes towards democratic values and changes are decisive for practicing democracy in these ruler-dominated societies.

Q1: How do rulers in contemporary Confucian societies respond to the trend of democracy? Why are some non-democratic rulers not able to sustain their rule by employing the traditional legacies? How do the nature of the regime, the nature of internal or international change (including the US role) affect the ability of rulers to control the political process and maintain their non-democratic rule?

Hypotheses 1 and research question 1 are discussed in Chapter 2 and the first section of Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, and the hypothesis has been proved in these discussions. According to these discussions, it can be found the rulers emerged from the traditional society as the political dominator and the people in Confucian societies were largely unaware of their political status as the source of legitimacy in the imperial system. The rulers continued to control the political agenda and this became decisive after the imperial system collapse. The four cases studies also demonstrated that in China and Singapore, the ruling party created a pseudo-democracy which was still ruler-dominated but responded to the trend of democracy by telling their people that this country's democracy is unique to their circumstance as required by culture or level of development. Conversely, the non-democratic rulers in Taiwan and South Korea provided some democratic education in their non-democratic period and eventually were forced to make political concessions to the opponents that emerged in the modernising societies. A combination of concessions by rulers and demands by the people finally led to these Confucian societies democratisation. This result also confirms that the interactions between the ruler and the people are highly significant for the emergence of a democratic regime (Inglehart, 1990; 1997).

Regarding the answer to Q1, rulers in all contemporary Confucian societies will claim they are democratic; yet they use quite different ways to define and practise democracy. In China and Singapore, two regimes were established by revolution and national elections. The rulers of these two systems have never had to face strong challenges to their rule because their people did not have much democratic experience and commitment to democratic values, so the ruling party created their own democratic models based on their own characteristics. However, Chapters 6 and 7 suggested that in fact these democratic models are not really democratic, but still ruler-dominated systems. Through national elections in China and Singapore the

people are given an opportunity to endorse the ruling party, their regime still cannot be termed a democracy as defined by the United Nations: a meaningful democracy is 'based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives'(2011, October 27). In Taiwan and South Korea, the non-democratic rulers needed to maintain a democratic image because they were members of the US-led democratic camp during the Cold War. In Taiwan, the KMT rulers claimed they were the only orthodox government of democratic China, and thus democratic values could not be forbidden by the government. In South Korea, non-democratic governments also could not totally forbid the spread of democratic values because this regime was originally founded as a democratic regime. Thus, the nature of their regime could not provide true legitimacy for these non-democratic rulers as Chapter 7 and 9 argued. In the non-democratic era, the KMT authority needed to compensate for its imposition as an alien regime, and faced challenges from indigenous elites and the people. This weakened their ability to dominate the whole system either politically or economically was argued in Chapter 7. The US relationship also limited the KMT's power to suppress its opponents, and changes to the international environment finally forced the ruling party to democratise the regime. In South Korea, non-democratic rulers continuously faced claims for democracy from society, both elites and ordinary people. The international environment also limited the power to suppress opponents. Therefore, it is clear that, although non-democratic rulers in Taiwan and South Korea tried to sustain their rule, problems in the nature of the regime, internal social pressures, and change of the international environment undermined their ability to sustain their regime. These problems might not happen in China and Singapore or at least take a long time to emerge.

H2: The traditional legacies that some scholars see as hindering the development of democracy emerged from the political system of the pre-democratic dynasties rather than the Confucian political system. These traditional legacies still exist in modern Confucian society; but the roles of this traditional value system in shaping democratic emergence are variant and uncertain. In non-democratic societies, legacies may be selectively chosen to sustain non-democratic regimes; but in democratic societies these legacies may still exist but not serve as an obstacle for democracy. This thesis discussed these ideas further in the political culture chapter to demonstrate the difference between the original meaning of the Confucian classics, the way these legacies gradually formed into a ruling system of thought, and how they exist in the politics of contemporary Confucian societies. This hypothesis would seek to explore the following research questions.

Q2: What role do the traditional legacies play in this varied pattern of democratic change?

Q3: Can rulers in non-democratic regimes use the traditional legacies to deepen support in people's minds for non-democratic values? Are they successful in hindering the development of democratic values in contemporary Confucian societies?

This hypotheses and research questions are discussed in Chapter 2 and the first part of the second section and statistical sections of Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. These discussions also confirmed the hypothesis. Chapter 2 indicated that these legacies developed under the imperial system rather than being adopted from the Confucian political philosophy. Chapter 2 also further introduced four legacies that still exist in the politics of modern Confucian societies, some of which are promoted by rulers, and some of which are the result of political activities. In Chapters 5 and 6, this thesis indicated that some of traditional legacies, especially harmony and group-orientation, are officially promoted by the CPC and the PAP authorities to construct their official ideology. In Taiwan and South Korea, non-democratic rulers only promoted group-orientation for the strengthening of the national identity as a Chinese nation (ROC) or Korean nation. Other legacies, such as the social value of guanxi, did not serve the regime as the ruling elite in Taiwan and ROK expected. They also abandoned their top-down political system because of the negotiated decision to democratise the regime.

Based on this result, Q2 and Q3 can be answered as follows. With regard to Q2, traditional legacies have been sustained in some Confucian societies as tools to be manipulated by non-democratic rulers, and if legacies are promoted in this way, these legacies can be used to damage democratic culture. Since these traditional legacies are part of an older political culture that persists in the people's memory, it is convenient for non-democratic rulers to use these legacies to serve their official ideology and facilitate their rule. In all case studies, it can be found these legacies are or were selectively chosen by non-democratic rulers to serve their rule. For instance, in China, the CPC authority employs aspects of these legacies to construct its socialist harmonious society, and the PAP authority in Singapore combines them in the official shared values. Thus, those legacies that can serve the official ideology will be highly emphasised by these rulers. Conversely, other legacies, such as guanxi, that do not serve official ideology, may not hinder the development of democracy. In China, the CPC authority discourages guanxi because conflicts between political factions reveal

that the CPC authority is not as united as claimed, and this affects their ability to control the state. Thus the Bo Xilai (薄熙来) case in Chongqing exposed that the party itself is not harmonious and not united; and this might lead the people to wonder how the party can be the coordinator to solve social conflicts if it cannot agree its own affairs. In Taiwan, although the KMT authority controlled local factions to consolidate their rule, yet some of these factions turned to support its opponents when the KMT authority could not satisfy their political needs or when they lost their dominant power over the state. In South Korea, guanxi also led the people in the Western part of South Korea to offer more support to the opponents of military governments.

As for Q3, traditional legacies that are officially promoted will influence people's political values and prove a hazard to the development of democratic values. The findings in the statistical sections of Chapters 5 and 6 clearly illustrated that the officially promoted legacies will have higher support than other legacies. Thus these legacies are increasing in influence in people's mind; and these legacies will hinder the development of democratic values based on the following findings in the case studies. As Q2 discussed, some legacies will serve non-democratic rulers' official ideology, so these legacies cannot also facilitate the development of democratic values. This is supported by the regression results for the relationship between democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors in Chapter 5 and 7, which demonstrate that the officially promoted legacies are obstacles to the development democratic values. Since the official ideology in China and Singapore is employed to consolidate non-democratic rule so those legacies that serve to construct the official ideology are a hazard to the development of democratic values. If these legacies continue to be influential the people will have limited opportunity to develop democratic values, and the democratic political culture will be harder to construct. However, whether these legacies will continue to serve and be manipulated by non-democratic rulers is uncertain in the future because there are two important observations that illustrated by the statistical sections: first, the younger generation do not have strong traditional legacies in mind and give more support to democratic values. Second, people who have democratic values would also help to diminish traditional legacies and help to develop a democratic political culture. Thus this part should be observed in the future.

H3: Socio-economic modernisation is ambiguous in Confucian societies: it can be a tool to serve regime survival in non-democratic regime, yet it advances democratisation in democratic regimes. This hypothesis leads to the final research question.

Q4: What is the role of socio-economic modernisation for advancing or hindering democracy? Can it diminish the influence of traditional legacies; or can the ruler's control of the political system be used to limit the effects of modernisation or even turn modernisation in to a facilitator of their rule? How does modernisation work to help advance democracy during the modernisation process and can political culture be controlled during this period?

This hypotheses and the research question are examined in Chapter 3 and the latter part of the second section and statistical sections of Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. According to this research, this thesis found the effects of modernisation for democracy in East Asian societies is uncertain. In China and Singapore, economic development and the emergence of a middle class can serve as sources of support for their regime, and the statistical sections also confirmed this assumption. In Chapters 5 and 6, the regression models that tested factor support for the Chinese or Singaporean political systems demonstrated that people who experience good economic development and or have middle class status are actually firm supporters of these systems. However, in Taiwan and South Korea, these modernisation factors actually served to dissolve and weaken non-democratic rule in the following ways. Economic development lead to the emergence of the middle class and weakened the non-democratic rulers' power to dominate the state; the education system which provided democratic education helped the people to develop their democratic values and to resist the non-democratic rule; and the emergence of a middle class strengthened the power of opponents challenge non-democratic rulers. The situation was totally different from China and Singapore. The reason for the difference can be answered in research question 4.

With regard to Q4 the role of modernisation in helping or hindering democratic change is ambiguous: it can help non-democratic rulers to consolidate their non-democratic rule, yet it could also push the democratisation process in some societies. The main factor which drives this different result is how the ruling party treats modernisation and the extent of their ability to control the modernisation process. In China and Singapore the rulers' ability to control modernisation and their ambition to manipulate modernisation factors is clear. With regard to their ability to control modernisation, these non-democratic rulers continue to exert strong control over the modernisation process and its contents. Unlike in Taiwan and South Korea, they do not need to face challenges of international interference, make political concessions to internal opponents or share political power with commercial leaders, which could weaken their dominant power in the country. They also treat

modernisation as their primary tool for consolidating their rule. They can use the achievements of modernisation to claim people's support for country's stability and unity. On the other hand, modernisation mechanisms are also employed to serve their rule and construct their official ideology. The regression model which tested satisfaction for Chinese or Singaporean democracy also proved that their measures in these areas are effective: most modernisation factors had lost their ability to advance democracy, and could even be turned to serve non-democratic rule. The exception was education which could be a factor to develop people's democratic values. As modernisation proceeds in Confucian societies, the younger generations' values are changing. The findings in the statistical sections indicate that younger generations have less support for traditional legacies and more support for democratic values. So whether non-democratic rulers' efforts to manipulate modernisation factors will continue to work in to the future will need long-term observations.

9.4 Significance of Study for Future Research on East Asian Democratic Change

This thesis has tried to contribute to the unsolved puzzle that has emerged in East Asia: whether Confucian societies can have a democratic regime? This puzzle focuses on whether Confucianism should be identified as the primary cultural explanation to hinder the development of democracy; and why some Confucian societies can democratise yet some of them cannot. This thesis can provide three points for future research on East Asian democratic change.

Culture is not Destiny

This thesis has indicated that the leaderships of several non-democratic regimes in East Asia have tried to argue that because their society is Confucian in its culture that Western-style democracy is not suitable, and that their country should practise their own particular democracy instead. However, this thesis has demonstrated two errors in this thinking. Firstly, the Confucian culture that they are discussing is not derived from the classic system of Confucian thought but from the legacies of imperial system. Chapter 2 and 3 demonstrated there are fundamental differences between the classic Confucian political system and the imperial system, and even with regards to traditional legacies, there are still important differences between the meanings of classic Confucianism, the practiced facts of the imperial system and the officially promoted concepts in modern non-democratic societies. Thus, it is not the culture itself that is the barrier to democratic change because the classic political system has

its own meanings and functions, some of which are democratic. In addition, it is not only the rulers in history but also non-democratic rulers in contemporary Confucian societies that have revised the original meanings to serve and promote their rule. These created legacies from history to contemporary Confucian societies actually only have the surface of Confucianism and the contents have been revised to serve the current rulers. As famous New Confucian masters like Yu, Yingshi and Tu, Wei-Ming argue, we need to carefully distinguish between the ruler-served ‘Confucian factors’ and the classic Confucianism (Yu, 2000; Yu & Bei, 2012, March 22; Tu, 1984; 1989; 2002a; 2009, December 30). The classic Confucianism system does not operate as a barrier to a democratic regime and the democratic regime ought to be practiced in a Confucian society. On the other hand, it is not surprising that the ruler-serving traditional legacies do not support democratic change because non-democratic rulers created these. Therefore, culture is not the real problem; it is ruler-made legacies that present obstacles to the practice of democracy in Confucian societies.

Modernisation is unreliable

Several scholars have argued that modernisation will not automatically produce democracy. Inglehart (1990; 1997) has argued that modernisation cannot create democratic regimes; it only can help the people to be more skilful in seeking democratic change. Interactions between the ruler and the people are the key to the emergence of democracy. Huntington (1991) also made similar points that argued against any presupposition that modernisation could create democracy, and that the rulers’ choices and the people’s actions are more important for creating democracy. Chapter Four also suggested that modernisation factors may not necessarily be the facilitator to create democracy, and in some conditions they could be used to provide support for non-democratic regimes. This thesis has proved that in Confucian societies, modernisation is unreliable. Although it helped some Confucian societies, such as Taiwan and South Korea to democratise, yet it could not resist the control of non-democratic rulers if these rulers have the power to dominate the process and contents of modernisation.

Rulers’ influence is important for the short-run

It is important to observe the ruler’s status when studying Confucian societies because, as this thesis argued, the ruler has been the dominant actor in the political system for more than two thousand years. Especially in the imperial period, the ruler could dominate the political agenda, and the people were not aware of their right to be the

source of legitimacy in politics. When the imperial system collapsed, the rulers still dominated choices as to whether they should move toward a democratic regime or not. In the meantime, many ruling elites still control the explanatory power of the traditional legacies and the contents and process of modernisation. If non-democratic rulers can sustain their rule, it is very difficult for that society to be democratic because the rulers have dominant power to control the people and shape the political culture in ways that favours their rule. In the cases of Taiwan and South Korea, the non-democratic rulers faced several challenges which dissolved their ability to sustain their rule: the nature of the regime that made it difficult for their non-democratic regime to achieve legitimacy; internal pressures for recognition of democracy claims became stronger during the modernisation process; the changes of international environment limited their ability to suppress opponents; they did not particularly establish an official ideology (South Korea) or the official ideology was damaged by themselves (Taiwan); and they lacked the ability to dominate modernisation contents and process because their power was weakened. Thus, to weaken non-democratic ruler's ability to control modernisation and to shape the people's values is the key to accelerate the speed of democratisation in Confucian societies. However, these factors did not significantly occur in non-democratic societies, so if rulers in these societies cannot sustain their existing promise, such as development and stability for the CPC or meritocratic government and a well-structured social welfare system in Singapore, their regime may not collapse soon. Otherwise, rulers' influence still acts as a crucial factor in the short-run. Meanwhile, a political crisis could also weaken or dissolve the non-democratic leadership and accelerate the process of democratisation.

Generational change and education may lead fundamental change in the long-run

Although non-democratic Confucian societies may not change toward democratic because of the rulers' decisions, yet the people may form an increasingly pressure to these rulers and even force them to at least liberalise the existing political regime.

Education and younger generation are two factors that can change support for democratic values gradually. This finding has also been found by several empirical researches in East Asia, such as Chang & Chu (2007), Chang, Chang & Chu (2002) and Tan & Wang (2007).

The rise of younger generations and the improvement in education may weaken these rulers' ability to sustain their rule because these younger people will be more attached

to democratic values and stand against traditional legacies. In 10 to 20 years these younger generations will be more powerful in society and they may have more open minds to reject non-democratic rule. Elsewhere, this thesis also found that people who have democratic values will challenge both non-democratic rule and traditional legacies, so that even if non-democratic regimes can be sustained for now, these regimes may also gradually liberalise to accept democratic values as the political culture changes in the future. Recent events in China and Singapore also reflect the fact that the younger generation and educated people have gradually formed an adverse opinion of CPC or PAP one-party rule. In China, officials seem to be becoming more tolerant of opposing voices. Improvements in technology also help news which is not favourable to the CPC spread quickly and widely; for instance, protests against corrupt officers forced a new generation of CPC leaders to focus on a new wave of anti-corruption movements. In Singapore, the younger generation wanted change and supported opposition party candidates, which forced the PAP Prime Minister to face these voices.

Generational differences resulting from the modernisation process will change people's values, yet the speed of this transformation may be slow, and a long-term observation may be needed in order to evaluate these effects. However, eventually public opinion will put pressure on non-democratic rulers in China and Singapore.

In summary, for future studies, the debate whether culture is the main factor in Confucian societies that hinders the development of democracy has been clarified. Furthermore, it has been possible to make some arguments that evaluate whether non-democratic rulers could be weakened by their choices or for any other reasons, suggesting that rulers' choices may be decisive as long as they command the modernisation process and reinforce controls over values. On the other hand, the younger generations' thoughts should be investigated more deeply to assess whether they would support democratic change or whether they favour more liberal politics but under the existing regime. In the non-democratic societies, rulers have agreed to follow the rule of democracy and installed their people-centred concepts of democratic regime, but nonetheless it needs to be observed in the long-term whether resistance to their rule will grow gradually and may eventually force these non-democratic regimes to embrace change.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Chosen Questions from Two waves' Questionnaires

Variables which are operated in statistical sections in each case study chapter are divided into traditional legacies, democratic values, modernisation, and social-economic background batteries.

1. *Traditional legacies battery*

Traditional legacies questions

Hierarchical politics

Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask.

Harmony

When one has a conflict with a neighbour, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person.

Group-orientation

For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second.

For the sake of the national community/society, the individual should be prepared to sacrifice his personal interest.

Guanxi

Wave One

When hiring someone, even if a stranger is more qualified, the opportunity should still be given to relatives and friends.

Wave Two

When dealing with others, securing one's immediate interests should be more important than developing a long-term relationship.

This thesis recoded these questions as following: 'strongly disagree' as 2, somewhat disagree as '1', no answer as '0', a neutral answer, recoded somewhat agree as '-1', and strongly agree as '-2'. Thus, the positive side of these legacies is against these legacies, and the negative side is to support them.

2. *Democratic values battery*

Democratic values questions

Political Equality

People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly-educated people.

Popular Sovereignty

You can generally trust the people who run our government to do what is right.

Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions.

If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything.

Political Liberty

The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society.

If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.

Political Pluralism

Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organise lots of groups.

Separation of Powers

When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch.

If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things.

Rule of Law

The most important thing for a political leader is to accomplish his goals even if he has to ignore the established procedure.

Questions of democratic values are recoded as following: 'strongly disagree' as 2, somewhat disagree as '1', no answer as '0', a neutral answer, recoded somewhat agree as '-1', and strongly agree as '-2', Political equality question 'People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly-educated people.' Is recoded as following due to the design of questionnaire: 'strongly disagree' as -2, somewhat disagree as '-1', no answer as '0', a neutral answer, recoded somewhat agree as '1', and strongly agree as '2. After recoding, questions are added together as dependent variable. Thus, the positive side of these values is to support these legacies, and the

negative side is against them. In the percentage and strength analysis, these six orientations are calculated separately. However, this thesis adds all recode questions to be a democratic values variable for all multiple regression models.

3. *Modernisation battery*

Economic development factor

Economic development factor

1. **How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today?
Is it ...**
 2. **How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our
country over the past five years? Is it ...**
 3. **What do you think will be the state of our country's economic condition five
years from now? Will it be ...**
 4. **As for your own family, how do you rate your economic situation today?
Is it ...**
 5. **How would you compare the current economic condition of your family
with what it was five years ago? Is it ...**
 6. **What do you think the economic situation of your family will be five years
from now? Will it be ...**
-

The original answer 'Very bad' or 'Much worse' are recoded to '-2', 'Bad' or 'A little worse' to '-1', 'Good' or 'A little better' to '1', 'Very good' or 'Much better' to '2', and others to '0'. And this thesis adds these entire recoded question together to be the 'economic development variable'. The positive side is people who hold positive attitude to economic development, and the negative side means people who indicate the bad economic development.

Education factor

What is your highest level of education?

Education factor recode		
Type	Original	New
No formal education	1	Low
Incomplete primary/elementary	2	
Complete primary/elementary	3	
Incomplete secondary/high school/ technical/vocational type	4	
Incomplete secondary/high school	6	
Complete secondary/high school/ technical/vocational type	5	High-school
Complete secondary/high school	7	
Some university/college-level, with diploma	8	
With University/College degree	9	Degree level
Post-graduate degree	10	

Subjective social class factor

People sometimes think of the social status of their families in terms of upper class, middle class or lower class. Where would you place your family on the following scale?

Subjective social class factor recode		
	Wave One	Wave Two
upper class	1	1,2,3
middle class	2,3,4	4,5,6,7
lower class	5	8,9,10

Age factor

Age factor question		
	Wave One	Wave Two
Age	SE3: Actual Age	SE3: Actual Age

4. *Social-economic background battery*

Social-economic battery questions

	Wave One	Wave Two
Gender	SE2: Male, Female	SE2: Male, Female

Appendix 2: Asian Barometer Survey

Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) is the largest standardised large-scale survey that covers most countries and regions of East Asia. It provides two waves data (Singapore has only Wave 2 data) for cross-country and cross-time comparison, which satisfied the requirements of this thesis. Seven sets of survey data for four countries are used, as following:

China: Two sets of survey data – from Wave 1 in 2002 and Wave 2 in late 2007 to early 2008.

Singapore: One set of survey data – from Wave 2 in 2006.

Taiwan: Two sets of survey data – from Wave 1 in 2001, and Wave 2 in 2006.

South Korea: Two sets of survey data – from Wave 1 in 2003, and Wave 2 in 2006.

The questionnaires are available at Asian Barometer Survey's website:
<http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/surveys/SurveyTopics.htm>

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