Capitalism, managerialism and the market: the problem of politics in the culture of bureaucratic individualism

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This thesis addresses a core problem of the human sciences: the relationship between communal and individual forms of life. In so doing it seeks to raise questions about the acceptance of liberal individualism. This is achieved by the development of certain themes in the work of the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, especially those present within his major work *After Virtue*. This thesis is not a critical study of MacIntyre, but instead attempts to extract, from the work of this major anti-liberal philosopher, elements that can be profitably developed by the human sciences and contribute to a renewal of a socialist politics which is more than one more version of liberal progressivism.

The introductory chapter outlines the nature of the problems posed for any kind of communalism in a liberal polity, the major themes from MacIntyre's work in the last three decades are outlined, in relationship to the question of liberal modernity.

This is followed in Chapter One by an outline of some cultural themes concerning concepts of self and community briefly touched on in MacIntyre's work.

Chapter Two looks at the impact of liberal culture on its major ideological competitor, Marxism, stressing MacIntyre's complex relationship with the Marxian tradition.

Chapters Three and Four examine some of the historical assumptions embodied within MacIntyre's *After Virtue*. Chapter Three looks at the impact of the capitalist market on our social and moral attitudes. The account of this process is shown to be closely related to the work of the historian Karl Polanyi.

Chapter Four looks at the historical relationship between liberalism and bureaucratic practices. In conclusion, Chapter Five examines MacIntyre's alternative to liberal individualism, and connects his narrative account of a human life with other recent developments, in thought and experience.
When we've worn ourselves out with our soft nihilism, the Russians would like to arrive with their hard nihilism. They feel humanly superior. Even the Russian dissidents, especially the right wing, take the high tone with us. They say "we haven't got justice or personal freedom but we do have warmth, humanity, brotherhood and our afflictions have given us some character. All you can offer us is supermarkets." Whereas the best defence that liberal democracy can make goes like this: "True, we're short on charisma and fraternal love, although you have it in debased forms, don't kid yourselves about that. What we do have in the West is a kind of rational citizens' courage which you don't understand in the least. At our best we can be patient, we keep our heads in crisis, we can be decent in a cold steady way. Don't underestimate us."

Do you buy this?
No.

Why don't you?
I don't think you can be managerial and noble at the same time.

Saul Bellow
The Dean's December

Submitted to the University of Durham in 1987
as a result of research conducted in the Department of Sociology
and Social Policy, University of Durham
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This thesis is all my own work and has not been offered in candidature for any other degree or diploma at this or any other university.

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Note: This thesis involves a good deal of quotation. When several quotations follow from the same page(s) of a text, they are sourced with a footnote at the end of the final quotation, to avoid needless repetition.
In the mid-1980s it might seem foolish to write a thesis that raises inherently speculative questions about the political and moral worth of our social order. In the economic and intellectual climate encouraged by the present British Government, such an activity is becoming almost extinct at the level of post-graduate work. It can go almost without saying that I believe such work to be important and worthwhile. But why write a thesis on such a large matter as the status of the epoch? No one is more aware than I am of the inadequacy of my treatment of so many large and intractable questions. But I felt compelled to write the thesis to uncover what lay behind a growing sense that something important to the socialist tradition was disappearing from it, and from modern society generally. The immediate motivation was a strong sense of recognition of my own half constructed thoughts, in the pages of Alasdair MacIntyre's *After Virtue*. In this it would appear that I have not been alone, for as MacIntyre points out in a reply to critics,

... I have had in the form of letters, even occasionally of telephone calls, a quite extraordinary response from members of those communities whom I identified as heirs of the tradition of the Virtues ... not only in the United States but also in Spain and in Italy, some intellectuals, some not at all so ... thus I have some assurance that what I articulated was not just something thought by me, but something thought and felt by large numbers of people who recognise themselves as unable to be heard saying what they really mean in modern societies. (1)

I owe a good many practical and intellectual debts to those who have
helped me try and say what I really mean. Most important of these is to my supervisor Huw Beynon, without whose unstinting kindness and friendship and clear sighted intelligence it would have been quite impossible to write this thesis. It was the late David Rosenberg who initially steered me towards Durham, his powerful, critical mind is much missed. The thesis owes much to long discussions, over several summers in Durham, with Terry Austrin, and to Eric John, because of a long conversation about MacIntyre one December at Spode House. Denys Turner of Bristol University has always been generous with his encouragement and time. I have learned from Scott Meikle and Hillel Ticktin about what the Marxist Socialist tradition could really be about, although I know how little they will like this thesis' content. Lastly, I must thank all the good friends I have made in Durham over the past few years, for it is profoundly true, that without the Aristotelian virtue of friendship nothing worthwhile can be achieved.

Durham

November 1986

Footnote

To the memory of my Father and Mother
INTRODUCTION

The astute journalist Neal Ascherson recently described the experience of re-reading an early Malcolm Bradbury novel Stepping Westward. The novel was written 25 years ago and describes a young writer going to a US university from Britain:

He reaches an utterly strange continent: here are universities with cement towers ... couples in ranch-style houses with patios, extractor fans and dental floss, paper cups, supermarkets ... Everyone is obsessed by sex and everyone wants to be masterless. So strange? It was then. Now it sounds like prosperous life in outer Richmond or outer Stirling - or the new suburbs of Bonn. The gap has closed. The United States no longer seems marvellously unfamiliar. It impresses a European by its wealth and space ... But not its newness; we have the gadgets too, sometimes better ones, and gawky adaptions of the lifestyle... The politics of the American cowboy Right which baffled Bradbury's hero, for whom "conservatism was a defunct intellectual fashion" have been the rhetoric of the British Government for the last seven years. (1)

What has been the response to this change, especially political change? It has been mixed. There have been adaptions to this apparent modernity, from the use of advertising agencies by the Labour party to the questioning of the role of public ownership in the definition of 'socialism'. Yet perhaps the strongest ideological reaction from the Left to Margaret Thatcher, has come from that most oft quoted expression of hers for a 'return to Victorian values'. Acres of print have been spent on it, Left conferences have been organised around the theme, to show either how bad Victorian values were or how complex the reality of them was compared with simple quotations from Sam Smiles. It seems almost as if the Left felt happiest in being able to cast
Thatcherism as part of the past so it could assert its own modernity, without confronting the actual social changes that Thatcherism, as modernity, was actually ushering in.

Nonetheless, the Left's reaction is not entirely misplaced for it highlights a real ambiguity and potential contradiction at the heart of New Right Conservatism. This is, in essence, the conflict between economic liberalism and the desire for a hierarchical and communally regulated social order, both of which feature, ideologically within the repertoire of various strands of the New Right.

Let us look at this in more detail. The great strength of the Right, in recent years, has been its possession and advocacy of an economic 'solution' to the all too visible failure of Keynesianism in the mid-1970s. Its solution has, of course, been sharp monetary control and deregulation of the economy. The intellectual case for these policies was made by a new generation of able publicists, academics and journalists. In Britain the central figures in this advocacy were Peter Jay, then economics editor of The Times and Samuel Brittan of The Financial Times. The case was adopted by the Conservative Party in opposition. The crucial figure here was, of course, Margaret Thatcher. But in the early years of her leadership Sir Keith Joseph's very public rethinking of past-Conservative positions had a big impact on the Right. In any case the Conservative Party was predisposed to be sympathetic to a free market case.
But this was not the only element in a reviving conservatism, there was also the demand for what was termed as 'a return to standards' in education, the family, public behaviour etc. In other words, there was a gesture towards forms of behaviour rooted in hierarchy and in some respects a pre-modern social order. Now clearly there is at least a potential conflict here. Michael Walzer has described the American neo-Conservative intellectual Irving Kristol as standing

with one foot firmly planted in the market, while with the other he salutes the fading values of an organic society. It is an awkward position. (2)

The fact that this conflict has been relatively well-managed by politicians like Thatcher and Reagan, should not be allowed to disguise or minimise the long run difficulties of this position. The Left in particular is rather too quick in passing over this difficulty, seeing the New Right as fairly homogenous in composition.

Even Andrew Gamble, who has contributed probably more than anyone to an understanding of the British Right, tends to see the matter as a difference of emphasis:

The neo-Conservatives have no difficulty in accepting the formula of the free economy and the strong state, he writes,

but the significance of the two terms is reversed. neo-Liberals put the objective, of a free economy first, the strong state is a means for achieving this. The state is not valued in itself. Just the opposite is true for neo-Conservatives. For them the objective is a strong state, a state which possesses authority but which is not afraid to use its power of coercion. (4)

This view has a certain plausibility, and as a tactical alliance, may work for some time, but in the long run the aspirations of these two
groups are quite different. One does not have to be too impressed by the neo-Liberal, hard Right, of the PCS, with its calls for the legalisation of incest and heroin and the abolition of the NHS, to see that a quite different agenda is in operation from that of the Monday Club and the Salisbury Review.

These differences have been there from the New Right's early stirrings in the late 1960s and early '70s. In 1973 Samuel Brittan published a book entitled Capitalism and the Permissive Society - dedicated to Nigel Lawson and Peter Jay. This book is in part, an appeal to the then youthful radicals, to give up their opposition to competitive capitalism on the grounds that it will further their desires more effectively than any Left-wing alternative. He claims that:

The values of competitive capitalism have a great deal in common with contemporary attitudes, and in particular with contemporary radical attitudes. Above all they share a similar stress on allowing people to do, to the maximum feasible extent, what they feel inclined to do rather than conform to the wishes of authority, custom or convention.

He goes on to make an almost classic statement about the nature of unalloyed consumer capitalism:

Under a competitive system, the businessman will make money by catering for whatever it is that people wish to do - by providing pop records, or nude shows, or candy floss. He will not make anything by providing what the establishment thinks is good for them. (5)

Brittan goes on to argue that the competitive market of capitalism can be equally useful for constraining the moral criticism of conservatives against, for example, the 'hedonistic young' as it can be against the critics from the Left, who wish to shape the activity of the economy for some 'higher national purpose'. Brittan identifies
what he calls 'permissiveness' quite clearly with the Liberal
tradition of 'personal liberty' and sees 'competitive capitalism' as
'the biggest single force' acting on its side. In this respect, as in
so many others, Brittan is modernising and popularising the ideas of
his mentor Von Hayek, who has always been anxious to distance himself
from the European Conservative tradition, in, for example, his famous
essay, 'Why I am not a Conservative'.

The neo-Conservative element within the New Right have not been
unaware of these emerging tendencies and potentialities that Brittan
enthusises about. The leading theorist of neo-Conservatism, Roger Scruton
has referred to the possible danger of consumer capitalism as a form
of 'pathology' of property (thereby protecting the sacredness of
ownership itself). He writes:

Property - now reduced to the status of "commodity" ie to
its fluid expendable form - no longer has a distinctly
human character. It is in a world of mere consumption that
people become prey to that "fetishism of commodities"
persuasively described in Capital. (8)

This, though, is Scruton in a rather abstract muse, but recently, the
Salisbury Review (which he edits), published an essay by the
Conservative sociologist Bryan Wilson, entitled The Demoralisation of
Society which seems to be sharply aimed at the very competitive
industrial order that is celebrated by neo-Liberalism. Wilson's topic
is the removal of explicitly moral criteria and reference from much
of the public realm. In other words a move from a society based upon
forms of social integration to one of system integration. He raises
the question of the quality of life and the political dangers of a
society which has moved from a situation with at least elements of a common morality to one without a public evaluative framework. He concludes that:

The economic order may survive - may survive better - without a public that responds primarily to shared diffuse moral sentiments, and which can be mobilised rationally for economic roles. Social control in the role may suffice to elicit adequate performance. But beyond the economic order there is a wide civil arena in which men also act, and social control there presents a less acceptable face. Yet if that civil space is peopled by those whose emotions are uneducated, who are fed on hedonism and cynicism and are untrammelled by inner restraints, shall we escape new forms of oppressive social control to contain the latent hostilities between people who do not trust the system and a system which cannot trust the people? (10)

Here we find many familiar conservative themes: a fear of the 'masses' of the uncultured or uneducated, those without self-discipline, the concern for culture for a way of life, for human relationships; yet along with these we find the suggestion that the modern capitalist economy might not just provide the context for all this, but might actually prefer or even promote this process. Such a conservative is in a very difficult position indeed, for is not he/she allied to the very forces that would destroy that which is to be defended!

What can a socialist learn from this division within the ranks of the New Right - a political lesson, no doubt, to exploit, for that is a necessary part of politics. But also, perhaps, something about the nature of reality, for if ideologies attempt to comprehend or articulate and present and organize 'reality', and are themselves contradictory, then perhaps the situation they face is itself, contradictory. For Samuel Brittan's intervention, referred to above,
into what was the height of the 'New Left' period in the early '70s, was itself a register of divisions internal to radical aspirations. In fact, Brittan was attempting to exploit a conflict in the culture and ideology of the Left and radicalism generally that emphasised freedom as self-actualisation and liberation from past constraint, which vied for dominance perhaps successfully, with the values of integration, solidarity and community.

We know from Gareth Stedman Jones' recent work that socialism itself was originally formulated at the beginning of the 19th century as an attempt to replace, with a total philosophic/moral and economic system, the older pre-industrial order fragmenting under the pressures of secularism and capitalist economic development.

Since socialism claimed to be a science of human nature, and to have solved the mystery of social harmony and universal happiness, it impinged directly upon the territory of pre-existing moral theory - par excellence the Christian Church ... therefore, I argue that utopian socialism was indeed a religious movement, but not in any meaningful sense a Christian one. It was a new humanist religion, whose gospel was the new science. (11)

Utopian socialism was to put the world back together again after capitalism's dismemberment of it. Later socialisms especially Marxian, may have broken with Utopianism in terms of historical and economic analysis, but the sociologist Peter Berger has plausibly argued, that modern socialism's power of attraction derives from its unique capacity to synthesize modernizing and counter-modernizing themes. (12)

By this he means that socialism is the bearer of key elements of the Enlightenment: history as progress, human perfectability, science as a
problem solver and a liberator from superstition. In addition, of course, socialism embodies a strong belief in the ability of human beings to order their lives and institutional arrangement on a rational basis.

However, unlike that other child of the Enlightenment, liberalism:

Socialism has also successfully incorporated the themes that have arisen in protest of the discontents of modernity, notably the theme of renewed community. (13)

In this move it can be claimed that socialism, unlike liberalism, tried to give positive content to the ideals of the French Revolution, liberty, equality, fraternity. Socialism made fraternity its distinctive hallmark of what its version of the 'modern' future would be.

It seems, then, that the position of socialists in modern complex capitalist market societies, possess some of the same ambiguous elements as that of the New Right: they both possess close ties both intellectual and organisational with elements of the liberal tradition but both are suspicious of and anxious to limit liberalism's movement. It would, I believe, be very difficult for any socialist to disagree with the substance of this following analysis of liberalism by Roger Scruton. Scruton sees that the fault with liberalism is that:

it reposes all politics and all morality in an idea of freedom, while providing no philosophy of human nature which will tell us what freedom is. It isolates man from history, from culture from all those unchosen aspects of himself which are in fact the pre-conditions of his subsequent autonomy. (14)

Thus exactly as socialists have always claimed, liberalism proclaims
only negative freedom, freedom from, not freedom to do something substantive; in accordance with one's nature as a human being. Yet are not Scruton's left critics like Anthony Arblaster right to argue that the effects, Scruton and his neo-Conservative colleagues have, is to help usher in and then bolster a Right wing Government's use of state power against the forces, (many of them traditionally minded), that oppose economic liberalisation. In this process they run the risk of having done nothing to challenge the liberal idea of freedom but rather (pace Brittan) merely strengthened its sphere of influence.

However, rather than just scoring ideological points, it would perhaps be useful if we gave some thought as to why there is such a peculiar yet manifest distance between an argument like Scruton's and its actual embodiment in office. In this context it becomes extremely important to recall that socialist activists and intellectuals have been no more successful, in incarnating their version of substantive community, in the actual practice of left-wing parties coming to power in the western world, in the post-war era. Indeed, is it not one of the chief complaints of neo-conservatives, that these socialist Governments have in effect been, liberal modernisers, rationalising out the pre-modern elements of the civic culture? Rather than presenting a threat to freedom (Worsthorne's phrase 'not too little freedom but too much'), they have in reality increased the realm of negative freedom, ie freedom from constraint in areas like censorship, marriage, fertility, sexuality etc (the Wilson government in Britain in the 1960s, the Whitlam government in Australia in the 1970s, the
Mitterand government in France and the Gonzales government in Spain in the 1980s) have all passed liberal reforming legislation in these areas. But nowhere in the West have socialists shown any signs, even within the most favourable of social and economic climates, of being able to step beyond the pale of the negative freedoms of the liberal tradition, to embody any notion of what the positive shared freedom of a socialist society would actually look like.

The reasons for this are many and complex, more traditional analysis in terms of state and class power and the manipulation of ideologies etc are not irrelevant. But I would like to suggest that the very symmetry and apparent impotence of certain kinds of Right wing and Left wing critique of western societies, suggests that the institutional and intellectual power of liberalism is very great indeed - so great that it seems to enter into the very terms of reference of those who seek to oppose it. It is to the investigation of the material roots and impact of the culture of liberalism, individualism and the negative tradition of freedom, that this thesis directs itself.

To understand our situation we need to understand the nature and roots of what I will rather loosely call our liberal culture - the full meaning of which will emerge in due course. This is done, in order to see if a break with this culture is both possible or desirable. Yet to suggest a break with liberalism is a familiar cry; too familiar. It can easily be another call to progress, 'to transcend the limits of the present', 'to be creative', 'to be new'. In other words, to risk
a break that will turn out, on closer inspection to be a repetition of liberalism itself in a guise that may be either of left or right. To understand liberalism is, in part, to understand ourselves in the West, whatever our formal ideological identity. It requires us, in some respects, to attempt to step outside the pale of our own assumptions; to reconstruct some of our own taken for granted ideas, implicitly comparing them with other ways of viewing the world that have held sway in the past. It is for this reason that it is most helpful to examine a writer, who in almost his entire career can be seen as attempting this kind of critique of modern liberal society. His name is Alasdair MacIntyre.17

It is vital to recognise MacIntyre's importance at the outset. For he is one of the very few philosophers in the Anglo-Saxon tradition who in this century has thought it important and indeed possible to use philosophy to investigate what might be called the classical problems of western thought: 'What is the good life?', 'How should we live?', 'Is the way we live now either just or good?' He asks such questions about the fundamental basis of our culture, by relating thought and belief to the social and political context in which they have their existence.

MacIntyre's scope is the tradition of western thought as we inherit it from the Greeks and Hebrews. In his refusal of disciplinary boundaries and in the capaciousness of his work, he can be seen as that most unusual animal, an Anglo-Saxon 'Grand theorist'. He draws freely from history, linguistics, sociology, anthropology as well as from
philosophy. But not only this, he also challenges the very form of these disciplines, which he rejects as arid, positivistic neutrality. Instead he writes a narrative, in which the division into stages, presupposes standards of achievement and failure, of order and disorder. It is what Hegel called philosophical history and what Collingwood took all successful historical writing to be. (18)

MacIntyre comes from the Left, with a Trotskyist-Marxist formation, deeply throughgoing in his social criticism and now sceptical and ambivalent about all existing political philosophies. But he is a most unusual post-Marxist, for he refuses to join in the familiar celebration of liberalism of most former Marxists, instead he attempts to retain the kernel of Marxism's criticisms of liberal society and culture, whilst being doubtful of the feasibility of its political programme(s). From such a position, he will provide us with valuable resources for an understanding and criticism of liberal culture. A criticism that casts light on the predicament of liberalism's critics and would be opponents, as well as on liberalism itself.

In this light, the thesis attempts to contribute to the ongoing and vitally urgent task, of internal discussion, self-clarification and reconstruction, that is taking place within the Left as a response to a widely recognised crisis. It attempts therefore, to recognise and absorb into the Left, work like MacIntyre's, that is both critical of the dominant liberal culture and the Left's response to it. Principally by illustrating how this liberal culture both shapes and limits some of the assumptions of its most devoted opponents.
In what follows in this chapter I will principally be concerned with an exposition of MacIntyre's work with special reference to *After Virtue*. This is to give the reader a sense of the overall structure, development and continuity of that work over nearly 30 years. Inevitably, this will mean some drastic simplification and foreshortening of argument, especially in the case of *After Virtue*, a book of over 150,000 words of closely reasoned analysis. This has meant that a degree of further exposition of particularly important points, will be necessary in the main body of the thesis.

The intention, then, is to explicate and develop, MacIntyre's work (principally *After Virtue*) and work either adjacent to his or referred to by him. (Philip Rieff's work falls into this latter category, whilst authors like Christopher Lasch and Richard Sennett clearly have similar preoccupations to MacIntyre. These works are referred to in Chapter One.) To a large degree MacIntyre's framework and understandings are assumed by the thesis. Some critical comments are made but they are largely of a secondary nature. Tensions and alternatives are highlighted from within his work, especially in the case of Marxism, which was raised as the central issue at one stage of his intellectual career.

The thesis then, is in no sense a critical appraisal of MacIntyre, its main purpose is to open up and develop his thoughts, reveal some of its presuppositions; in some cases extending these out with new material taken from within the broad tradition of historical
sociology. The basic aim is to apply his analysis in a manner that highlights the problems that capitalist modernity poses for anyone with socialist commitments; without in any sense claiming to resolve them. Secondly, it attempts to utilise elements of MacIntyre's presentation of a non-Liberal vision, in order to show some of our Liberal culture's shortcomings, and revealing some elements of this social order, that cannot be absorbed into the core assumptions of liberalism, and which may again guide our thinking about alternatives.

What is MacIntyre's contribution? His work is principally that of a philosopher, concerned especially with moral philosophy. But to say this gives no sense of the range and scope of his work. His principal aim is to use philosophy - but with history, sociology and anthropology used in aid - to illuminate some contemporary social and political problems. He has written on Marxism, general politics, psychoanalysis, theology, philosophy of social science, medical ethics and the history of ethics and this is not an exhaustive list. Almost all these elements come together in what must be regarded as his magnum opus, After Virtue.

This deeply influential book seems to be a summation of his career, for in it he addresses and reworks the central themes of his earlier work, especially A Short History of Ethics, Secularisation and Moral Change, and Against the Self Images of the Age. As he puts it in the preface to After Virtue his work emerged from a growing dissatisfaction with the concept of "moral philosophy" as an isolable area of enquiry.
He states that as in his earlier work:

a central theme ... was that we had to learn from history and anthropology of the variety of moral practices, beliefs and conceptual schemes. The notion that the moral philosopher can study the concepts of morality merely by reflecting Oxford arm-chair style, on what he or she and those around him and her say and do is barren.

However, just as he noted the variety of practices and beliefs:

it was as clear to others as it ought to have been to me that my historical and sociological accounts were and could not but be, informed by a distinctive evaluative standpoint. More particularly I seemed to be asserting that the nature of communities and moral judgements in distinctively modern communities was such that it was no longer possible to appeal to moral criteria in a way that had been possible in other times and places - and that this was a moral calamity. But to what could I be appealing, if my own analysis was correct? (31)

This is ultimately what almost all MacIntyre's work attempts to deal with, and it is in this process that he has elaborated his case against our liberal culture: a case that he has been putting together from the beginning of his work. So before addressing the mature work of After Virtue, I want to begin by examining some of his earlier work. This will help our understanding of the later work, partly because it possesses a relative simplicity compared to the rich complexity of After Virtue, but also, because it reveals what has been rejected on the way.

To do this I will concentrate on his important and path breaking essay 'Notes from the Moral Wilderness' that appeared in 1957-58. This essay displays a remarkable continuity of thought across a quarter of a century, when read in the light of After Virtue. It, like the later work, draws on the resources of the past for a critique of liberalism,
the classical world, Christianity and Marxism. MacIntyre has been at various stages a Christian (a Church of Scotland background), a Christian Marxist, a Marxist and now perhaps a rather disconsolate anti-modernist - but not a Conservative - with signs of some movement back to Christianity. At each stage, drawing on these traditions, still viewed, in some sense, as continuing to be indispensable.

Why is he an opponent of Liberalism? The answer is to be found in the position he staked out in the period of the early New Left. Here the experience of Stalinism was seen as having given a new lease of life to liberal ideology:

a position we are all tempted into is that of the moral critic of Stalinism. (33)

Here, he is, of course, writing for the journal New Reasoner and stands full square with this grouping - although, unlike most of them, he was himself a Trotskyist, for a third way between liberalism and Stalinism.

At once the uncertainties and difficulties of this position are made clear, as problems and doubts always are in MacIntyre's brave work:

Moreover I cannot even say with certainty from what standpoint I ask this question. And this, I suspect, is not merely a matter of my own private confusion. The various characters who walk through these pages, the Stalinist, the moral critic, the Revisionist and so on, if they succeed in being more than lay figures do so not just because they are present in the real world, but also because they represent moments in the consciousness of all of us, masks that we each wear or have worn at some time or other. (35)

Here for the first time, a typical MacIntyre form, the use of
characters that he changes and develops in his work, as a means of illustrating his argument. In *After Virtue* these characters are replaced by the manager, the therapist and the aesthete. They like the above, are representative figures but also elements of our own consciousness.

What is the weakness in this revived liberalism? It is principally in the appeal to moral principle (and what follows echoes through all MacIntyre's work):

> the fragility of their appeal to moral principle lies in the apparently arbitrary nature of that appeal. Whence come these standards by which Stalinism is judged and found wanting and why should they have authority over us? (36)

The moral (Liberal) critic seems to have won independence from the Stalinist bureaucracy, ie leaving the party, 'freed' the critic from an organisation that had, albeit for wicked purposes, institutionalised belief. The moral critic, MacIntyre argues, has exchanged this conscious dependence, for an unconscious one, of dependence on the prevailing Liberal culture of the west. This liberalism turns out to be the flip side of Stalinism. Stalinism identifies what is morally right with what will be the outcome of history. The individual, including his or her moral position, is pre-determined by history:

> The "ought" of principle is swallowed up in the "is" of history.

On the other hand the moral critic effectively removes himself from history becoming a "spectator". Principles are invoked as valid but
quite external to the actual course of historical events.

The "ought" of principle is completely external to the "is" of history. (37)

ie, to what is actually happening or what is likely to happen. This is described by him as the prevailing Liberal ethos:

For it is of the essence of the Liberal tradition that morality is taken as autonomous ... it is the doctrine that moral principles can have no non-moral basis. Our judgements on specific moral issues may be supported by the invocation of more general principles. But in the end our most general and ultimate principles, because they are that in terms of which all else is justified stand beyond rational justification. In particular, by any appeal to facts historical or otherwise. (38)

It follows that the hallmark of liberalism is the arbitrariness of moral judgement. For the moral critic condemns Stalinism on the basis that he or she chooses values to condemn it, ie the facts of Stalinism are confronted with a set of moral principles. From this it is possible to discern the likely social role of the radical critic in western society. It is expected that there will be protesting minorities on particular issues. Radical public protest, especially by intellectuals, can be viewed as the critic, exhibiting his or her self choosing a set of private values, embodying and reinforcing the arbitrary and abstract nature of western pluralism.

Is there an alternative to this arbitrariness which does not involve accepting Stalinism or something equally repellent? MacIntyre suggests at this stage that there is, and that it lies in a return to a more authentic Marxism. This naturally means rejecting the then widespread Stalinist versions of the theory, which meant seeing historical developments as the product of simple objective laws and a rigid
division between the material basis of society and its politics - cultural superstructure. Marxism, he argues, is not about the creation of a socialist material base, created by force or manipulation, upon which will arise, a socialist superstructure. The two, argued MacIntyre, will be created together or not at all, and in the process any version of a means-ends morality is rejected.

He states that:

the economic basis of a society is not its tools, but the people co-operating using these particular tools in the manner necessary to their use, and the superstructure consists of the social consciousness moulded by and the shape of this co-operation. To understand this is to repudiate the ends-means morality for there is no question of creating the economic base as a means to the socialist superstructure. Creating the basis, you create the superstructure. There are not two activities but one. (39)

MacIntyre then goes on to show us how Stalin's economistic version of Marxist theory in terms of conceptualising historical change in terms of positivistic laws led to a severing of Marx's economic theory from his concept of human nature, with disastrous consequences. He states bluntly:

Marx inherits from Hegel a conception of the 'human essence'. Although human life at any given moment is not a realisation of this essence, because human life is always limited in ways characteristic of the basis of a given form of society. (40)

He continues that capitalism, for Marx, creates the possibility of realising human potential in new ways but that this realisation must never be interpreted as an abstract law, standing over and above human beings and independent of human will.
It is this that points us towards MacIntyre's third way. It suggests a Marxist theory, which regarded history as providing a basis for standards, but without making the process automatic or devolving it from human choice and commitment. MacIntyre is involved here, as so often later, in trying to transcend the liberal distinction between human nature and morality. That is, in constructing a relation between what I am, what I can be, what I want to be and what I ought to be. (41)

MacIntyre is arguing for a Marxist naturalistic basis for morality. In his claim that morality expresses the most permanent and long run human desires, (42) we can see the embryo of his view developed in After Virtue that it is necessary to revive the role of the virtues as guides for 'untutored human nature', in enabling the realisation of a human telos. In 'Notes from the Moral Wilderness', it is even possible to discern the same structure of argument as found in After Virtue concerning morality and the pursuit of human purposes, the Greeks, the Bible, the Medieval world are all commended for keeping the connection (broken by liberalism) between the moral life and the pursuit of what men want, (43)

whether in notion of the pursuit of philosophy (Aristotle) or as God offering to meet your desires (the Bible), or God meeting your desires by fulfilling your nature (Thomist synthesis of Aristotle and the Bible).

It is Marxism, for MacIntyre at this point, that performs the feat of restoring this pattern of thought lost to liberalism but in Marx,
placed firmly in the secular context of human history and practice. Marxism is a bridging theory. For most of human history, long run desires cannot achieve fulfilment, humanity fails to understand its real, long term needs and desires. That is until the possibility of doing away with class society and the creation of real human community becomes possible.

This Marxist view suggests that morals are necessary to protect these long term desires, or the end of our natures, but in the present they seem to lose their point, and then morals become objectified and alien to us. With morality objectified or standing above us, so desires become wild and anarchic. At this stage of MacIntyre's thought, capitalism seems to both heighten this division but also to create the material conditions to resolve it. He suggests

capitalism provides a form of life in which men rediscover desire in a number of ways. They discover above all that what they want most is what they want in common with others; and more than that a shared human life is not just a means to the accomplishment of what they desire, but that certain ways of sharing human life are indeed what they most desire. (44)

MacIntyre finds in his Marx no trace of a means-ends morality characteristic of Stalinism, but the notion of a real but developing essential human nature. He interprets this to mean that human conduct is not merely to be judged by its effectiveness in bringing communism closer, but that in your behaviour now, you to some degree embody the human nature which communism will fully realise.

This is MacIntyre's third way and clearly it depends upon the reality
and plausibility of Marx's essentialist notion of human nature and Marxism as a general theory of this nature's development in history. Whatever MacIntyre's views now, this remains a possible resolution to the problem of Liberalism. Some of the reasons why few take such a view seriously and a very tentative outline of some recent work that tries to take Marx seriously is given in Chapter 2. Were it possible to update such a view of Marxism it would promise a most powerful challenge to Liberalism.

What, then, has been MacIntyre's response to his loss of confidence in a Marxist resolution to his dilemma? He has principally deepened and extended his critique of Liberalism, both philosophically and sociologically, and surveyed the philosophical and cultural resources of the past for an alternative to Marxism as a solution. Nonetheless he remains committed to the fundamental diagnosis of the New Reasoner piece. In the preface to After Virtue he quotes from the essay a critical remark about the then revisionist communist Leszek Kolakowski:

One cannot revive the moral content within Marxism by simply taking a Stalinist view of historical development and adding liberal morality to it. (45)

He reaffirms his view that leaving Stalinism, by turning to the Liberalism, which Marxism had originally emerged to criticise, is not good enough,

since I continued, and continue, to accept much of the substance of that criticism, this answer was not available to me. (46)

So is there a non-liberal alternative?
After Virtue is his answer. MacIntyre tells us that this work arose out of an attempt to write two books, one on the fate of morality in the modern world and another on the philosophy of social science. In the process he discovered that the arguments of one book required the arguments of the other.

After Virtue begins with a 'disquieting suggestion'. MacIntyre develops the now familiar view, present in all his work, that in modern liberal society, the moral basis has fragmented. It is not that we are confused over particular moral questions but rather we have lost the basis for understanding what a coherent moral argument is. This is because our moral vocabulary has lost the institutional framework and shared conceptual understanding, which originally provided it with meaning and persuasiveness. With moral vocabulary ripped from its context, we are left only with the fragments of the originally meaningful moral scheme. The fragments are used, or referred to in everyday life, so we continue to act as if there continued to exist, an overarching moral framework, within which to relate to one another. In practice we have a marked tendency to appeal to different bits of the fragments, hence our difficulty.

The cultural and intellectual response to this situation is the emergence of emotivistic ethics, in which arguments about values are considered to be nothing more than statements of individual preference, argument tends to become a species of rhetoric, which makes a person's feeling present to the world; so they can exhibit the
choosing of a position - as we see in the following definition the moral critic has resurfaced in a new guise.

Emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgements and specifically all moral judgements are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitudes or feeling, in so far as they are moral or evaluative in character ... factual judgements are true or false; and in the realm of fact there are rational criteria by means of which we may secure agreement ... But moral judgements, being expressions of attitude or feeling, are neither true nor false and agreement ... is not to be secured by any rational method for there are no rational criteria by means of which we may secure agreement ... It is to be secured if at all by producing certain non-rational effects on the emotions or attitudes of those who disagree with one. We use moral judgements not only to express our own feelings and attitudes but also precisely to produce such effects in others. (48)

It is crucial to grasp that MacIntyre is not claiming that this philosophical theory is very widely accepted, although its emergence in the late 19th century and early 20th century is not without significance. Indeed in his A Short History of Ethics, he pointed to several powerful critics of the view. But rather the point is that something very much like emotivism, is in fact, institutionalised and operational in a society like our own.

This is indeed central to the whole of MacIntyre's approach and provides the justification for his importance, for social theory, for he argues that moral philosophy, including emotivism:

... characteristically presupposes a sociology. For every moral philosophy offers explicitly or implicitly at least a partial conceptual analysis of the relationship of an agent to his or her reasons, motives, intentions and actions, and in so doing generally presupposes some claims that these concepts are embodied or at least can be in the real social world. (50)

The link between the theory and the practice can be seen to be
provided in this case by nothing less than Weberian sociology, which also places values beyond argument, and focuses on a discussion of means. Therefore neither emotivism nor Weberism sociology, are mere theory, but simultaneously an analysis of, and the embodiment of contemporary life.

The point can be made clearer, if we look at the difficult example of nuclear weapons. In a public arena without shared moral criteria, the debate over the possession and use of nuclear weapons has some peculiar features. There are, of course, many grounds for opposing nuclear weapons, some pragmatic and tactical, but others take a more 'moral' form. It is the latter form that concerns us here.

Many, although by no means all, people who oppose nuclear weapons on 'moral' grounds, do so because they are members of communities that MacIntyre describes as bearers for the traditions of the virtues. They tend to oppose the possession and use of nuclear weapons, on the grounds - which have a long pedigree - that the intention to kill vast numbers of people in a war, is immoral. Such an intention is a central part of current nuclear strategy, given the targeting of Soviet cities. Clearly such an objection could be rooted in the abstract moral principle of the 'moral critic', but groups within the opposition do also rest their claim in the existence of a shared human nature, which is not being realised by such an intention. This would be the position of certain kinds of humanist; certainly the Christian tradition of the 'just war' forbids the intention of killing civilians
for this reason, certain kinds of socialist and anarchist would have
similar grounds for opposition. This is the structure of the early
(Marxist) MacIntyre's argument as in, for example, the value to be
found in the bravery of the deaths of the 'good' communists,
displaying something of the potential of human nature whose
realisation is communism.51

How does the state respond to such claims? Its apologists do not
normally make a direct appeal to moral principle as would the liberal
critic. It is normally conceded that the use of nuclear weapons would
be a truly appalling thing, but that the missiles must remain
targetted. This is because bureaucratic organisations, on this view,
operate on an implicit means-ends morality. Such forms can have no
concept of the intention to do something as being evil. A modern
bureaucratic state's only relevant criteria is effectiveness. That
this particular threat to exercise nuclear weapons has proved to be
effective: 'there has been no war for 40 years in Europe'. The ends
are chosen, there can be no intrinsically evil means, only means that
would fail or whose use would jeopardise the ends. Means are not
internally related goods to ends, they are but a medium for attaining
what is wanted.

Emotivism is embodied then in bureaucratic forms, and in the process
the distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative forms of
behaviour becomes critically blurred. Bureaucratic organisations,
private or public, are involved in a competitive struggle for scarce
resources, to put at the service of predetermined ends. Managers have to use their resources towards achieving those ends as effectively as possible. About the ends, of course, no reasons can be given in the actual practice of managing. The Manager is one of MacIntyre's key characters in our moral drama and his theorist is Weber. For, as he puts it:

Weber's thought embodies just those dichotomies which emotivism embodies and obliterates just those distinctions to which emotivism has been blind. Questions of ends are questions of values, and on values reason is silent, conflict between rival values cannot be rationally settled. Instead one must simply choose between parties, classes, nations, causes and ideals. (52)

If the manager obliterates the manipulative/non-manipulative distinction at the level of the organisation, the therapist obliterates it at the personal level. The manager treats ends as given and is concerned principally with technique, now to transform the resources at his/her disposal into a final product, eg investment into profits. The therapist also has a set of predetermined ends, to which to apply technique. Mental illness, frustration, dissatisfaction etc are to be transformed to create 'healthy' ie self-directed, organised contented individuals. But neither manager or therapist can meaningfully argue about the moral content of ends.

If Weber is the theorist of the manager, then for MacIntyre, Erving Goffman gives us the therapeutic vision of society. The therapeutic self in Goffman is a spectral self that flits from role to role, being no more than a "peg" on which the clothes of the role are hung. (53)

But the 'I' has not disappeared in Goffman, rather it stands over and
against each of its roles. Its sense of 'freedom' seems to reside in its relative indifference to any particular role and an awareness of the ultimate contingency of each situation.

It is out of these two key figures that the culture of what MacIntyre terms 'Bureaucratic Individualism' is discernable: the manager grounded in organisational effectiveness, the therapist in the sovereignty of the individual as free self. In so far as both characterize moments in our lives, moral debate becomes histrionic, an assertion of ungrounded, unshared assumption; success in such roles takes the forms of conversion or manipulation rather than rational persuasion.

MacIntyre argues that this position emerges for both institutional and intellectual reasons. The fragmentation of a shared system of argumentation, (his pre-Enlightenment unity) occurs, for institutional reasons, because of the secularisation of the state, the fragmentation of religious and cultural organisation, (the Reformation and growth of Nation States), the emergence of new economic and social forces. But this change is also a change in what is accepted as a viable argument.

In philosophy, the response to the breakdown of shared understanding, was, in the hands of figures like Hume and Kant, to seek to ground ethics in the individual. Kant sought rational principles that any individual could accept, whilst Hume and many others in the 18th century sought to ground morals in human passion (see Chapter 3). But
for MacIntyre it is what their thought has in common, that is more important, ie the negative features of their argument. These features explain why the attempt to find in philosophy what had been lost in religion failed because

reason for him (Kant) as much as for Hume, discerns no essential motives and teleological features in the objective universe available for study by physics ... what is true of them is true also of Diderot, of Smith and of Kierkegaard. All reject any teleological view of human nature, any view of man having an essence which defines his true end. (55)

In other words they reject what the earlier MacIntyre had noticed as crucial to Marx, as a way of overcoming the alternatives of Liberalism and Stalinism.

More detail on the nature of the rejection of teleology is found in Chapters Three and Four of this thesis. But in essence, MacIntyre argues that without some teleological framework, in which the concept of the virtues is at home, we are forced in our culture, to ground morals in the individual. A position that may well lead to the adoption of a Nietzschean perspective: the assertion of our individual morals and desires through the power of the will. This is the dark side of emotivism, a self that has no criteria external to it, will impose itself on reality, perhaps by subtle manipulation, perhaps by rhetoric, but perhaps also by force!

If the cultural strength of emotivism is that moral conclusions cannot be derived from factual premises, it follows that only factual claims are open to communal or public verification. MacIntyre will not accept
After Virtue has a principle purpose in attempting to reconnect the two, via a return to a form of Aristotelianism.

Aristotle is important for MacIntyre for two reasons. The first is that his is a form of thought that has proved itself as capable of providing the intellectual basis of at least three different cultures, Ancient Greece, the Arab Islamic Empire and Medieval Europe. The second reason lies in the teleological nature of Aristotle's arguments. For an emotivist culture can only arise when in both theory and practice, the distinction between man as he happens to be and 'man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos'.56 is rejected. Aristotle derives concepts of purpose and intention from factual premises, and so doing heals this gap.

It is these issues of purpose and intention that are involved in MacIntyre's arguments concerning the social sciences. For the Fact-Value split only applies in this arena, if we are committed to producing universal laws of predictability, based upon certain versions of what natural scientists do. Doing this means stripping the social sciences of references to purposes and intentions. But if we reject such a view, as MacIntyre contends that we should, and view human action and indeed the whole of human life in a teleological framework, then it becomes less difficult to move from facts to morals and norms. MacIntyre's intention seems to be to construct the social sciences, as versions of practical reason, not seeking universal laws, but as producing value laden guide lines for human communities.
Aristotle then serves duty in filling the gap in MacIntyre's scheme that Marx's own teleology of human nature and history, once filled. But MacIntyre has clearly lost faith in essentialist metaphysics. For he rejects what he sees as Aristotle's 'metaphysical biology'. But paradoxically, as we see in Chapter Two, it is precisely in a revival in metaphysical realism that has allowed a regeneration of a version of Marxism premised upon Aristotle (cum Hegel's) metaphysics. Such a view would, in effect, fulfill the promise of the young MacIntyre.

A fuller account of MacIntyre's Aristotelianism, ie without metaphysics is put forward in Chapter Three and in the concluding chapter. The core of the arguments is that Aristotle avoids abstract moral imperatives bearing down on recalcitrant human nature - as in versions of the Kantian and more general Protestant tradition - by the employment of practical reason as embodied in the tradition of the virtues. The virtues being settled dispositions, acquired by practice, which enable us to behave in ways that allow us to flourish, in human practices and pursue the good life. Virtues are to be used in cooperative human activity, ie in practices, carried out according to standards of excellence characteristic of those practices; examples would include painting, sports, musicianship, farming. Missing, significantly, from MacIntyre's account of such practices are most forms of modern work organisation. While work was still tied to the household it could be seen as a vital part of a human practice sustaining various communal forms of life, but when

... work moves outside the household and is put to the service of impersonal capital, the realm of work tends to
become separated from everything but the service of biological survival and the reproduction of the labour force, on the one hand, and that of institutionalised acquisitiveness, on the other. Pleonexia, a vice in the Aristotelian scheme, is now the driving force of modern productive work. The means-end relationship embodied in such work - in a production line, for example - are necessarily external to the goods which those who work seek... (58)

Modern capitalism is a form of institutionalised life that can be destructive of the virtues, marginalising and relegating them, to small areas of human activity.

It is the concept of a practice that enables MacIntyre to keep Aristotle's teleology, without his so called metaphysical biology. Practices find their place in life shared with others, but the role of the virtues is not limited to distinct practices. MacIntyre argues that virtues sustain individuals and communities in very different situations and practices. Life is perceived as narrative, in which virtues enable subjects to fulfill both short run and long run intentions, with relative harmony and as such make for the 'unity of a single life'.

This unity of a single life is naturally connected with that of other lives, both now and in the past, via the complex tissue of responsibilities, roles and commitments that I share in. So the narrative order of my own life is part of a variety of communal narratives, and indeed, of moral traditions. It is in that context that MacIntyre attempts to answer the problem or question, what is the end of human life to be?
To ask "what is the goal for me?" is to ask how best I might live out that unity (of a life P.M.) and bring it to completion. (60)

It is to view the life of an individual and community as a narrative quest, a narrative quest that pursues the good. But what is the good? Briefly and inadequately - we pursue the problem in the final chapter - MacIntyre believes the good is to be found in the looking for it. We start to look for the good in the social and moral particularity that we inherit from the past, family, town, profession, nation, class etc. This means that pursuit of the good is always in part a communal enterprise, developing further, or even rebelling against what we inherit. Though clearly MacIntyre believes that a total rebellion, or repudiation of the past, is impossible and in so far as we think it is we suffer from painful liberal individualist delusions.

Ultimately, then, MacIntyre's teleological framework is a perspective on human life, and human community as story. This, then, is the strength and perhaps the weakness of the mature MacIntyre. The rejected Marxist naturalistic essentialism, is replaced by an Aristotle stripped of his naturalistic essentialism and replaced by notions of narrative unities. But, as MacIntyre argues, the culture of 'bureaucratic individualism' minimises practices with a narrative teleological structure guided by the pursuit of goods internal to practices. Compared with Marxist essentialism, such a structure must seem fragile indeed, but clearly narrative elements cannot be eliminated from human life, as they constitute a part of human consciousness, so MacIntyre places his hopes on our ability to build
upon these elements, in the formation of human communities.

Having given the reader a sense of the basic framework and orientation of MacIntyre's work, I now turn to examine the role and treatment of this work, within the thesis, in a little more detail. It is important to emphasise again the centrality of the sociological and historical dimension to MacIntyre's work. As he put it in his 1966 book on ethics:

> moral concepts change as social life changes. I deliberately do not write "because social life changes" for this might suggest that social life is one thing, morality another, and that there is merely an external contingent causal relationship between them. This is obviously false. Moral concepts are embodied in and are partially constitutive of forms of social life. (61)

In this and in all his substantive work, MacIntyre seems to be expressing the concept that Philip Abrams has called structuring which attempts to resolve the old sociological problem of agency. This problem is expressed by Abrams as:

> How do we, as active subjects, make a world of objects which then, as it were, become subjects making us their objects. It is the problem of individual and society, consciousness and being, action and structure. (62)

Just as MacIntyre refuses the false dichotomy between social life and moral concepts, so Abrams rejects the structure – action division within sociology. Interestingly, their resolution of the problem takes exactly the same form; MacIntyre sees moral concepts embodied in social life that changes over time, so Abrams argues that the way out from the agency dilemma is to insist on the need to conceive of that dilemma historically to insist on the ways in which and the extent to which the relationship of action and structure is to be understood as a matter of process in time. (63)
MacIntyre refuses to consign moral concepts to some interior area of the mind, where 'choice' takes place, rather he sees social transformation as involving transformation of that arena, being intrinsic to the transformation of other areas of social life. This is why moral philosophy presupposes a sociology and a history, it is as Abrams has remarked about Norbert Elias: 'a unified working-out of meaning-and-structure'.

This, then, is one major justification for the thesis for it attempts to make some small contribution to MacIntyre's project, by exploring the relationship between his 'philosophical history' and sociological and historical analysis. It uses historical materials to explicate in a more concrete form, the transformations that MacIntyre's work depends upon for its coherence. MacIntyre, himself, in response to criticisms by Marx Wartofsky, has called for this supplementation. Wartofsky's view is that After Virtue requires more adequate social history to achieve in MacIntyre's words an adequate exploration of why individualist theory flourished and to enable us to gain an adequate understanding of the kind of mistakes involved in coming to accept it. (65)

In accepting this and decrying the separation of the history of philosophy and social history, he states that:

it is a measure of the appositeness of Wartofsky's criticisms, that the project of which After Virtue is a first sketch will on my own view remain radically incomplete until its narrative history is written. (66)

This thesis is not such a history but does in some small measure
attempt to make good an absence MacIntyre concedes from After Virtue -
but upon which the work depends, namely some analysis of that
transforming process, he describes in terms of

the self comes to acquire the status of "the individual",
the individual becomes defined as that which is capable of
making contracts; anything in the self's environment
becomes potentially the property of some individual
... (67)

the transition either from feudalism to capitalism or from pre-modern
to modern society.

MacIntyre is committed to some version of this narrative being true
and as he says

the version that I judge to be thus vindicated is that of
Karl Polanyi's Great Transformation. (68)

MacIntyre claims that his preference is a methodological one,
principal that involves the way Polanyi weaves economic, social and
theoretical elements together in his narrative. But this is not to be
taken as the whole story, for MacIntyre's relationship to Polanyi's
work is much deeper than this. For both Polanyi and MacIntyre are
writing morally evaluative narratives, albeit in slightly different
idioms, of the rise of modern capitalist society as in some important
respects, a narrative of loss. Both of them are opposed to the denuded
means-ends morality of modern capitalism's economic framework and the
consequences this has for the rest of society. Moreover, the sources
and basic inspirations of their respective criticisms are the same.
The Austrian Polanyi was a Christian Socialist economist member of the
Austrian Socialist Party until fleeing the Nazi's in 1934. Like
MacIntyre, he was a Christian deeply impressed by Marx's analysis of
capitalism though not accepting all of his work. In the 1930s he, as MacIntyre did in the 1950s, wrote with sympathy on the convergent relationship between Christianity and Marxism, especially in opposition to Fascism.\(^6\) Also he, like MacIntyre, was greatly impressed by Aristotle's social and economic analysis, for essentially the same reasons ie that this analysis applies a normative overarching framework to questions of economic and social relationships.\(^7\) In examining Polanyi's assumptions we learn much about the implicit social analysis involved in the narrative of After Virtue.

The thesis reflects to some degree the form of MacIntyre's work. As it contains both analysis and evaluation, a part of Chapter One and Chapters Three, Four and Five involve a development of the sociological/historical nature of MacIntyre's work. Whilst Chapter Two and Chapter Six involve more philosophical and evaluative discussions. These examine the plausibility and coherence of solutions to our problems that MacIntyre has endorsed at various stages, principally Marxism and Aristotelian narrative teleology. In Chapter Six I emphasise the importance of MacIntyre's use of the concept of narrative.

In Chapter One I look at some questions connected with individualism. Although the main focus of the thesis is on what might be termed macro-sociological questions in MacIntyre's work, ie our focus on the market and the state nonetheless, his crucial formulation of our culture being that of 'bureaucratic individualism' means that
reference to the individualist side, cannot be entirely avoided. Chapter One, therefore, develops the sources MacIntyre uses to develop his character of the therapist - principally the work of Philip Rieff. It draws also from the work of cultural sociologists whose works relate to that of Rieff in its preoccupation and analysis eg Richard Sennett. It also refers briefly to the work of George Simmel, whose ideas are taken up in Chapter Three as a sociological complement to MacIntyre's framework. This work is contrasted with more traditional Marxist formulations which posit an optimistic transcendence of the individual/society dichotomy.

In Chapter Two this Marxist resolution of problems is examined by looking at some aspects of the fate of Marxism in the century since Marx's death. The chapter looks at the philosophical claims of Marxism to resolve the problem of modernity, by seeing how social and cultural pressures exert themselves on that philosophy. Emphasis is given to recent philosophical work that appears to reopen Marxism's great philosophical/practical claims, but in following MacIntyre we raise doubts about the reception of such theory in our current social and cultural context.

In Chapters Three and Four I turn to examine the underlying historical assumptions behind MacIntyre's account of the changes in our understanding of the moral order. This was done in Chapter Three by developing MacIntyre's account of the way the emergence of the market system is internally connected with the fragmentation of the moral
order. Here the connections between MacIntyre's and Polanyi's accounts are emphasized. In Chapter Four I utilise MacIntyre's analysis of managerialism and bureaucracy in modern capitalist societies. Bureaucratic power and authority is seen as exemplified in the modern state. This analysis is grounded through the use of one particular historical example, that of 19th century English Radicalism in Oldham.

The bureaucratic form is seen to be rooted in the conflicts of civil society and the nature of liberal ideology. The account shows how liberal politics are based around questions of exclusion and formulated in terms of individual rights, which are best 'managed' by bureaucratic control. The bureaucratic form can manipulate the historically constituted liberal self, by blurring the distinction between ends and means, by offering the hope of neutral technique, legitimized by the democratic acceptance of sovereign wills.

In the concluding chapter I look further at MacIntyre's notion of the narrative unity of a life, relating it briefly to some elements in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. I emphasize, following MacIntyre, the prevalence of narrative elements, and shared understandings, in human relationships and communities.

I conclude by illustrating the relationship between MacIntyre's preoccupations and the invocation by some, especially American radicals, of the Republican tradition of civic virtue; and the role played by tradition and communalism in the British miners recent
struggle against bureaucratic and managerial power. These are seen as illustrative examples of the survival - albeit precarious - of particular communal and traditional forms, in conflict with our market order.
NOTES


3. The still strong appeal of Thatcher and Reagan among their populist right constituency, in spite of carrying through policy that are likely to intensify their grievances, e.g., the encouragement of satellite and cable TV. Seems in part to be rooted in this group's rather poor grasp of wider sociological processes. See the excellent analysis of the aspirations and limitations of the American populist right by Christopher Lasch, 'Making America feel good about itself', New Statesman, 29th August 1986.


7. This can be found in F.A. Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1960, p.397-411. In case it should be thought that 'liberal' in this context is just another name for democrat, it should be noted that both Hayek and Brittan have their authoritarian side. For them the institutions of a market society are what counts not 'rule by majorities' and when the occasion demands it they will call for limitations on democratic control, see Samuel Brittan's 'The Economic Contradictions of Democracy', British Journal of Political Science, April, 1975, p.129-159.

8. Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1980, p.127. This is one of Scruton's many borrowing from Marxism, for he is quite aware of the similarities between conservative and radical critiques of modern society. A question that will be examined below.


12. Peter Berger, 'The Socialist Myth' in his Facing up to Modernity. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1979, p.90. Also of note is an essay by Ernst Nolte that stresses those elements of Marxism which form a critique of modernity, entitled, 'The Conservative Features of Marxism in his Marxism, Fascism, Cold War, Van Gorcum, Assen, Netherlands, 1982. On the other hand, the modernising 'promethean' element is crucial to Marx; for a recent emphasis on this element in his thought see Marshall Berman's All That's Solid Melts as Air, Verso, London, 1983.


14. Scruton, op.cit., p.120.


17. MacIntyre is not entirely alone. There are emerging within the Anglo-Saxon philosophic tradition, some very interesting criticisms of liberalism, from the point of view of a revived republican conception of the common good and a positive notion of active citizenship. Some good examples of this kind of work are Charles Taylor's 'What is Wrong with Negative Liberty' in A. Ryan (ed.), The Idea of Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979, also Charles Taylor's 'Philosophy and its History' and Quentin Skinner's 'The Idea of Negative Liberty: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives', both in R. Rorty, J.B. Schneewind and Q. Skinner (ed.) Philosophy in History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984.


20. After Virtue, op.cit.

21. MacIntyre's concept of the character of the therapist is drawn from Philip Rieff's work, After Virtue, p.29. The work he refers


28. Ibid.


32. I am grateful to Eric John, of Manchester University for this background information on MacIntyre.

33. 'Notes from the Moral Wilderness', New Reasoner, 7 Winter, 1958-9, p.90.

34. This was the dissident left wing journal, founded by ex-communist intellectuals, notably Edward Thompson and John Saville who jointly edited it. It emerged as a result of the crisis in the Communist movement as a result of the invasion of Hungary. See John Saville's 'The XXth Congress of the British Communist Party' in The Socialist Register 1976, edited by Ralph Miliband and John Saville, Merlin London, 1976, for the immediate background leading up to New Reasoner's creation.
35. Notes I, op.cit., p.90.
37. Ibid, p.91.
40. Ibid, p.100.
41. Ibid, p.100.
42. 'Notes from the Moral Wilderness II', New Reasoner, 8 Spring, 1959, p.90.
43. Ibid, p.91.
44. Ibid, p.95.
45. After Virtue, op.cit., p.vii, viii.
48. After Virtue, op.cit., p.11-12.
49. A Short History of Ethics, op.cit., p.63.
50. After Virtue, op.cit., p.22.
52. After Virtue, op.cit., p.24-25.
53. Ibid, p.31.
54. Ibid, p.33.
55. Ibid, p.52.
56. MacIntyre's formulation, ibid, p.52.
57. Ibid, p.152.
58. Ibid, p.211.

60. Ibid, p.203.


63. Ibid, p.xv.

64. Ibid, p.231.


Living on his surfaces, as he does, the therapeutic is an acutely sensitive man; it is only deep down that he has learned to be less vulnerable.

Philip Rieff
I

**Bureaucratic Individualism**: that is how MacIntyre describes our contemporary culture. Before defining exactly what he means by this, we will briefly rehearse the condition of its rise. The key move for MacIntyre is the rejection of functional teleology. As we have noted in the introduction, in the European context, this means a rejection of Aristotelian notions in philosophy and science as well as allied notions in theology. The central concept of the classical and medieval tradition on this reading, was one functional concept, the concept of man having an essential nature endowed with functions and purpose. Once such a vision is rejected then the way is left open for the kind of argument that claims no 'ought' can be derived from an 'is'. But MacIntyre notes that it is not just the medieval and classical world that was the home of such concepts of functional teleology:

> It is rooted in the forms of social life to which the theorists of the classical tradition give expression. For according to that tradition to be a man is to fill a set of roles each of which has its own point and purpose: member of a family, citizen, soldier, philosopher, servant of God. It is only when man is thought of as an individual prior to and apart from all roles that 'man' ceases to be a functional concept. (1)

However, the problem then arises for the autonomous self, freed from the constraints of natural or divine teleologies and the hierarchial demands of an encompassing social role, as to how it can give any substantive content to its own moral and thereby social claims. Attempts are made to fill this gap in the forms of 19th century utilitarianism and 20th century analytic philosophy. Both forms fail, according to MacIntyre, but are, nonetheless, important presences
within our culture. Utilitarianism fails because pleasures are incommensurable, we can formulate no real way of ordering them in terms of priority; no overall concept of happiness is available to base our decisions on. Thus

it follows that the notion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number is a notion without any clear content at all. It is indeed a pseudo-concept available for a variety of ideological uses. (2)

Analytic philosophy attempts to ground an appeal to moral rules on reasons which are objective. To be a rational agent, ie to be able to make appeal to such rules, you require a degree of freedom and well being. Therefore, to be a rational agent you must have a right to these goods. The problem with this is that rights are very historically specific concepts, they are not general rules, because they do not exist everywhere, so they cannot be the minimal characteristics of a rational agent, ie objective and suitable for anywhere, which means we cannot move from them to general and universal moral criteria. (3)

MacIntyre argues therefore, that both utilitarianism and analytic philosophy are really unsuccessful attempts to save the autonomous moral agent from the Enlightenment's failure to provide secular justification of moral utterances. These two newer attempts at justification apparently did not resolve the situation that

each moral agent now spoke unconstrained by the externalities of divine law, natural teleology or hierarchical authority but why should anyone else now listen to him? (4)

In this context we are left, if not actually in articulated theory,
then in practice, with emotivism. We all continue to talk and argue as though some attempt to provide universal and rational foundations for our utterances, had actually been successful. This leads to a very odd situation, for we all attempt to protect the independence and freedom of our selves, but living in our current situation we are inevitably involved in

modes of practice aesthetic or bureaucratic which involve us in manipulative relationships with others. (5)

So in order to avoid falling prey to manipulation ourselves, we are, in effect, forced to practise it on others as we seek to incarnate within social practice our beliefs and aspirations.

In this situation concepts derived from earlier attempts to provide rational foundations for our moral positions are still present within our culture. Two central concepts for understanding 'bureaucratic individualism' are 'rights' and 'utility'. Utility haunts the bureaucratic and managerial aspects of our culture, but as we see in Chapter Four, the claim to understand what would constitute such a basis for utility, such as prediction and shared concepts of 'effectiveness', are based on faulty premises. On the other hand, the concept of 'rights' is used to express and protect our belief in our autonomous action.

Rights as implied by expressions like 'natural rights' 'the rights of man' and now, in our own century 'human rights'. It is assumed that rights attach to human being because they are human. MacIntyre claims that:
there is no expression in any ancient or medieval language correctly translated by our expression in Hebrew, Greek, Latin or Arabic, classical or medieval, before about 1400, let alone in Old English, or in Japanese even as late as the mid-nineteenth century. (6)

MacIntyre, of course, realises that this does not prove that no such rights exist, merely that they were unknown. But naturally, such widespread absence across cultures should put us on our guard. But in essence MacIntyre rejects the existence of such rights because, he claims, all attempts to prove they exist have failed and in reality modern philosophers retreat to claiming them on the basis of supposed intuition. They may, of course, exist even if we cannot demonstrate their existence but as he dryly remarks, this argument could equally be used to defend claims about unicorns and witches! They are moral fictions just as the concept of utility is; both are supposed to provide us with the objective and impersonal moral criteria that we lack.

The terms of 'utility' and 'rights' are the terms on which the culture of 'bureaucratic individualism' fights out its political debates. Bureaucratic organisations make their claims within our culture in terms of utility; whilst individuals make their claims in terms of rights. If this pair of terms are fictions, then they are also quite incommensurate with one another, they are the forms of an unsettable conflicts. On this basis it is easy to see why protest and the feeling of indignation are prominent. MacIntyre points out that:

to protest was once to bear witness to something and only as a consequence of that allegiance to bear witness against something else. But protest is now almost entirely
that negative phenomenon which characteristically occurs as a reaction to the alleged invasion of someone's rights in the name of someone else's utility. (8)

This form of argument has recently been developed by the cultural historian Christopher Lasch who has made the point that the Black Civil Rights movement in the US in the 1950s and 1960s seemed to pursue its ends via an appeal to an earlier conception of democracy. He argues that:

It articulated the goals of blacks in a way that appealed to everybody. It attacked racism. Not just white racism, but racism. The black power movement, starting in the mid-60s, which seemed to be much more militant and attacked Martin Luther King ... actually redefined the goals of the black movement, black power, as an attack on white racism, as if racism was only a white phenomenon, in ways that made it much easier in the long run to redefine blacks in America as essentially another interest group claiming its share of the pie and not making larger claims at all. (9)

Lasch sees this in terms of the decline of a specific notion of a public realm and public language, which creates a pressure against presenting demands as anything other than a claim for the specific interests of quite specific groups of claimants or better still, victims. One consequence of the triumph of this form of competitive interest group liberalism has been a moral elevation of the victim and the increasing tendency to appeal to victimisation as the only recognisable standard of justice. If you can prove that you've been victimised, discriminated against, the longer the better, that becomes the basis of claims ... (it) ... has little reference to that of other groups or to the society as a whole ... (10)

In MacIntyre's terms the original civil rights movement would be part of an older civil and religious tradition in which claims could still be made to objective and agreed moral criteria, shared in the public
realm. Such traditional movements are prey to pressures to be instrumentalised along the rights/utility axis of interest group liberalism, because they exist on the margins of the dominant culture.

But what happens on the subjective side of the Macintyre bureaucratic individualist couplet; what happens to the self as the public realm declines to an arena of interest group assertion? If 'utility' is culturally borne by the actions of the manager character, then the stripped down self, deprived of its functional role, is under the tutelage of the therapist. But to what does the cultural power of the therapist adhere? What is it about the therapeutic attitude that makes it so distinctively modern?

II
COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL

As has often been remarked, from its origins in classical thought, the sociological theory that emerged in the 19th century was much concerned with the whole question of community. Robert Nisbet argues that:

the idea of community holds the same pivotal importance in the 19th century that the idea of contract had held in the Age of Reason ... In the 19th century, however, we find contract waning before the rediscovered symbolism of community. In many spheres of thought, the ties of community-real or imagined traditional or contrived - come to form the image of the good society. Community becomes the means of denoting legitimacy in associations as diverse as state, church, trade unions, revolutionary movement, profession and co-operative. (11)
Philip Rieff, whose work as we have noticed is MacIntyre’s source for his concept of the therapeutic, has emphasised the connection between community and the sense of well being and health that flowed from membership of communities. According to Rieff much philosophy can be seen as the ‘elaborated systems of symbolic integration’\textsuperscript{12} often in the modern era with the particular intention of integrating themselves as philosophers, as much as anyone else.

This community based view of well being, has deep roots in the classical tradition. It is perhaps most clearly seen in Aristotle’s definition of Man as a citizen an active definition, teleological in form, that saw that whether a man could fully express his humanity or not depended upon his membership of the political community. So for Aristotle, a citizen is

he who enjoys the right of sharing in the deliberative or judicial office

and that it followed from this that

a state, in its simplest terms, is a body of such persons adequate in number for achieving a self-sufficient existence. (13)

In this situation an individual’s continued well being, material, emotional and psychological, depended upon the continued existence of that community, defined by Aristotle as the City-State.

Nor are such views of merely antiquarian interest. They held until recently, a central place in virtually all social theory. Rieff like Nisbet argues for its centrality, whether in the Conservatism of Bonald, the Liberalism of De Tocqueville or the Revolutionary
Socialism of Marx. In Rieff's heavily Durkheimian analysis of community's therapeutic function, it is the Priest, philosopher or Magician who cures personal disorder via committing people to the symbol system of the community. These communal symbols are what Rieff calls 'commitment therapies'.

Behind Shaman and priest, philosopher and physician, stands the great community, as the ultimate corrective of personal disorder culture is the system of significances attached to behaviour by which a society explains itself to itself. A culture that is not thus self-expllicative must be undergoing, in the measure of the negative condition, a profound change. (14)

To say this is to raise the question and the problem of what happens when the community itself is in a state of disorder, or undergoing a profound change. Rieff, like MacIntyre, but in another idiom, is suggesting that these cultural changes are so great as to destroy the therapeutic power of the community, for .....

then, in the destruction of all idealisations upon which traditional and classical communities were based, in theory and in practice, is to be sought the origin of modernity. (15)

In order to explicate this analysis a little, we will briefly sketch elements of a theory, of the conditions that gave rise to a therapeutic culture. We have seen in MacIntyre's work how once the self was stripped of its functional teleology, which linked human-nature-as-it-is with human-nature-as-it-might-become, there was generated considerable confusion. The contradiction between an inherited ethical/religious system, to which many wanted to remain loyal, and the reality of 'human nature' seemed great. This tended to produce two responses: on the one hand the conservative tradition which viewed the moral demands of the community as rational moral law which
we had a duty to obey - Kant's response - on the other the Romantic view, from Rousseau down to D.H. Lawrence and beyond, which viewed moral regulation as a painful weight on the goodness of human nature. The latter tradition pushed for greater detachment of the individual from communal restraint, as it was now perceived.

However, this latter movement was only one of several processes at work that helped produce the modern self. Bryan Turner has helped bring some much needed conceptual clarity to these processes. He suggests three distinct elements, Individualism, Individuality and Individuation. Individualism he suggests, is best understood as the conception of individuals possessing particular individual rights with a strong emphasis on external relations between separate and formally equal individuals on the basis of some form of social contract. Individualism, in this form, is the principal source for the notion of rights, which MacIntyre saw as a crucial component of 'bureaucratic individualism'.

The concept of individuality is as Turner puts it:

a romantic theory of the interior and private nature of personal life. (17)

The nature and consequences of such a form are notoriously difficult to analyse. The powerful and formative impact of new forms of thought of German and English intellectuals at the turn of the 19th century are the key instances. As ever, its perhaps George Steiner who sees the social origins and consequences of the interior and intensely personal, when he notes:
It is the historicisation of the personal which is the commanding truth and legacy of the French Revolution...

Time had changed. The inner temporalities, the orderings of remembrance, momentariness, and, above all, of futurity by virtue of which we compose our grasp of self, had altered... the closely argued metamorphic relations between the Revolution and the new densities of personal time in Wordsworth's Prelude, are famous evidence. But there is scarcely a recorded life or body of experience in the 1790s, in the Napoleonic era, in the decades of explosive urbanisation, technological change, and social challenge that followed which do not bear witness to the irruption of the political into the private. (18)

Perhaps the most significant cultural change of the 20th century has been the diffusion of this once minority intellectual sensibility, amongst the bulk of the populations of the countries of the Western World. 19

Finally, the third process, Individuation, refers to the process whereby people are individuated by bureaucratic practices and disciplines. Almost all the apparatuses of the modern state and large scale private bureaucracies are involved in such processes, as taxation, educational certification, health and welfare regulation as well of course, as the practices of police surveillance. This is a major theme of the darker tradition of social analysis from Weber, through the Frankfurt School down to Foucault; a principal preoccupation being 'the death of the individual' in those processes. As Turner puts it:

The paradox of individuation is that, in making people different and separate, it also makes them more subject to control and regulation. Individuation is essentially registration, the precise determination of persons within a network of files, records, documents tabulations and portfolios. (20)

But as Turner also notes, although this process does mean the regulation of the individual, that its critics suggests, individuation
is also a necessary basis for meeting basic levels of human need with some degree of equality, through health and welfare agencies. It would seem to follow, therefore, that individualism is in some measure an ideology connected with civil and political rights, whilst the process of individuation is the necessary accompaniment of wider social rights. The irony is, that at least in the public domain, the rise of universalistic criteria of citizenship have the effect of eliminating the 'individual' and the particular upon which the sense of individuality flourishes.

Many of these processes, although still in embryo, were evident to 19th century social theorists. At the beginning of the century perhaps the most perceptive was Alex de Tocqueville. In the fast emerging secular liberal culture of his time, he delineated the sensibility at home within such societies. He saw clearly, that it was not powerful bonding sentiments but critical detachment, which most found more conducive to well-being. De Tocqueville's work especially Democracy in America, was an attempt to examine the relationship between the condition of the psyche and the social structure. He argued that in politically unequal societies, the social bond is firm and therefore the sense of communal purpose is high. But in conditions of equal citizenship, what would happen to public life once individualism had sapped its virtues. As he put it:

Individualism is a mature and calm feeling, which disposes each member of the community to sever himself from the mass of his fellows and to draw apart with his family and his friends, so that after he has thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves society, at large to itself. (21)
It seemed that within a deeply differentiated democratic culture, truly for the first time there arose the possibility of every person standing for themselves, each leading a truly private life and most importantly trained to understand rather than to love or hate their neighbours. A sense of reflective choice and detachment, that provides the context for making sense of E.M. Forster's famous remark concerning his desire, that if he had to choose between betraying a friend and betraying his country, he hoped he would be brave enough to betray his country.

A remarkable similar analysis, to De Tocqueville's, although couched in different terms, was produced rather later in the century by another theorist of modernity, George Simmel. We will meet Simmel later in our discussion of the market in Chapter Three, but we must briefly summarise his importance for understanding the modern self. In his most important work *The Philosophy of Money*, Simmel examines the growth of freedom and its relationship with the movement to a market based money economy. In a money economy individuals are able to participate in the social order without totally committing their whole personalities. They are sustained as material individuals by participating in an ever more complex set of impersonal exchanges. These exchanges, in turn, produce universal objective standards - ie prices - which provides general social knowledge of the rates at which commodities will be supplied. Although this increases the individual's reliance on the whole society, it does, however, reduce an individual's reliance upon particular persons. The growth of universal
standards results, along with the growth of the social division of labour, in greater substitutability between the providers of goods and services and so increases choice. These changes reduced the importance of ascriptive relations, increasing autonomy and self-direction.\textsuperscript{22}

These processes generate what Simmel describes as \textit{objective culture}, ie that embodied in production and exchange, which in effect means the reification of human activity. Human society may begin to take on the aspect of an objective and fateful natural process. Human intervention into this objective culture seems less and less effective. Yet at the same time Simmel notes tendencies corresponding to \textit{De Tocqueville's} predictions. For this process of reification also seems to allow the individual to create a sphere of free self development. This is due to the rather abstract quality of life, freed from direct concern with \textit{particular} people or things, which allows the development of a deeper and detached inner nature. As Simmel puts it:

\begin{quote}
If modern man can, under favourable circumstances, secure an island of subjectivity, a secret closed off sphere of privacy ... then this is due to the fact that money relieves us to an ever increasing extent of direct contact with things, while at the same time making it easier for us to dominate them and select from them what we require. (23)
\end{quote}

Pushed to its logical conclusion, Simmel feels that this process can only strengthen the ego as

\begin{quote}
all the material contents of life become increasingly objective and impersonal, so that the remainder that cannot be reified becomes all the more personal, all the more the indisputable property of the self.
\end{quote}

And as he adds concerning the mechanisation of culture, in this case the typewriter:
No matter how socialistic all such mechanical contrivances may be, the remaining private property of the intellectual self becomes all the more jealously guarded. (24)

The self, withdrawn and self-preoccupied, is possibly in danger of disappearing altogether, in societies with modern complex economies. This is a major theme for what might be termed the dark side of social theory. De Tocqueville, Simmel, Weber and the Frankfurt School and the inheritors of this tradition (which must include MacIntyre albeit in a distant sense), as well as Reiff, Lasch, Richard Sennett and others, insistently ask not just 'is this all that modernity amounts to?' but rather, 'can we bear it at all?'; can we learn to cope with such privacies?

Philip Rieff notes that the classical tradition in both its conservative and its radical forms was agreed, despite their differences, that the good life was the life of a good citizen. As he put it:

In short, security cured and security came through membership in an 'organic' community. This was the basis of conservative and radical political theory alike: community cures through the achievement by the individual of his collective identity. To cure a man, one need only return him to his community or construct a new one. (25)

It is within this context that Rieff notes the importance of Marxism for presenting the image of a new community. In some of Marx's writings we see elements that recall the analysis of the pessimistic tradition in social theory, as for example, in his attack on so called natural rights in On the Jewish Question Marx writes:

Thus none of the so called rights of man, goes beyond egoistic man, man as he is in civil society, namely an individual withdrawn behind his private interests and whims and separated from the community. Far from the rights of man conceiving of man as a species-being, species-life itself, society appears as a framework exterior to individuals a limitation of their original self-sufficiency. The only bond that holds them together is natural necessity, need and private interest, the conservation of their property and egoistic person. (26)

Here Marx is making the almost standard criticism of many social theorists, but Rieff is surely right in seeing Marx's importance, for he offers a way forward, a transcendence of this situation, not merely
rational appraisal of it. Rieff makes the point well:

Marxist diagnosis, without the Marxist ideal of a new community, would be not socialism but sociology. Marx's utopian vision of a communist identity, predicate of true individuality, combines both the radical and conservative tradition. Marxism is more than theory; at the same time it is a type of commitment therapy. (27)

I will return to the structure of Marx's solution to modernity later in the chapter and assess its viability in Chapter Two. But I now want to briefly outline another response to the problems of modernity, which takes us to the heart of the question of the therapeutic. This is what Rieff calls the analytic attitude.

III

THE ANALYTIC AND THE NARCISSISTIC

The analytic attitude seems to emerge as a response to, and an acceptance of the stripping away from the self of binding attachments and communal purposes. But it can differ profoundly from the romantic celebration of this process. It is frequently deeply anti-utopian, in that it accepts that there are no positive communities within which one could merge oneself. It is disbelieving that any such communities could be constructed. It is what Rieff christened in the late 1950s 'psychological man'.

The analytic, as a cultural type, involves first of all detachment, which itself, as Simmel noted, is both product of and support for certain characteristics of our individualistic culture. Secondly it
involves the construction of what Rieff calls 'negative communities'. Positive communities were those that offered salvation to the individual by subordinating them to some communal purposes either religious or political, which in turn transformed the individual. Negative communities are almost self-sustaining, capitalist market societies are our clearest model, they do not offer a type of collective salvation, and are not transformative but informative; understanding and not passion must be the basis of their attitude.

Several things follow from this view of advanced capitalist societies, as culturally negative. Without communal purposes actions tend to become increasingly based on rationalistic self interested forms of justification. Given this, controls (necessary to regulate the impersonal but potentially conflictual relations) must be established in ways other than that produced by transcendent transformations of the individual. In a liberal individualistic culture such controls over an individual life tend to be informational or psychotherapeutic, intended to rationalistically manage the problems of living as a detached individual in society. The clearest character type of this kind was the intellectual of the late 19th century and early 20th century. For Rieff this type is undoubtedly exemplified by Freud himself. The essence of Freud's theory is that in rational detachment, we will learn that particular style in which our individuality can flourish within the materially feasible opportunities that are compatible with our rationally arrived at sense of personal limitation.
It is, however, with the notion of the rational that problems appear. How is this concept to be arrived at, and coherently grounded in order to have power to curb desire, but without damaging spontaneity. George Steiner has pointed to the difficulties and peculiarities of analytic thought, in terms of the violence that it does to the object of analysis as a process of reducing or taking apart, without any certainty about what will be found. He argues for the great difference in the radicalism of analytic and Marxist thought. He writes:

We are ready to ask very large and inherently destructive questions. This is radicalism in a special sense. Not Hegelian Marxist radicalism with its implicit futurity, with its almost axiomatic presumption that we go to the root of a problem in order to solve it, and because we know that destruction, uprooting, is only a necessary risk before solution. No; our going to the root of things is more ambivalent. We would do so even when we are not confident that there is a solution. It may be, in fact, that the aspect of demolition, the apocalyptic strain, gently, tempt us. We are fascinated by 'last things', by the end of cultures, of ideologies, of art forms, of modes of sensibility. We are certainly since Nietzsche and Spengler 'terminalists'. Our view of history, says Levi-Strauss in a deep pun, is not anthropology but an entropology. (31)

These distinctions between two very different modes of thought are quite crucial. The dominance, for whatever external or contingent reason, of the analytic attitude, seems to underlie much of contemporary Marxism's difficulty. But so far we have been treating Rieff's account of the rise of the analytic and the therapeutic in abstract outline. Is there a more precise way of grounding the decline of 'positive communities', if this is indeed the case, in real processess?

Much of Richard Sennett's work, especially his path breaking The Fall
of Public Man is directly concerned with a process that seems analogous to the decline of 'positive community', Sennett begins from the work of Alex De Tocqueville, especially the analysis and predictions of Democracy in America. The influence of De Tocqueville and the assumptions at work in The Fall of Public Man were intimated in an earlier book with Jonathan Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of Class, in which Sennett argues that:

what needs to be understood is how the class structure in American is organised so that the tools of freedom become sources of indignity. (32)

Sennett and Cobb claim that because awareness that one's class position is flexible, this means that it is likely to be seen as an attribute of the self, rather than located in terms of family, or region. The claim that there exists equal opportunity within a context in which there is some real opportunity for upward mobility, has the effect they claim, when combined with the existence of real inequality, of turning the injuries of class inwards.

What this means is that class, at least in the modern American context, is no longer culturally perceived as an external objective reality, but instead has come to be understood as an emanation springing directly from the self, ie a subjective definition of success or failure. Sennett and Cobb compare this situation with the situation of craftsmen in the Italian Renaissance, when there was also competition between workers for success. But they point out that these craftsmen would have thought it ridiculous

to think of a dignified man being reflected in his ability to make a good piece of jewelry ... what he created would
establish his repute independent of his person, the jewelry or silver perhaps keeping his name alive after his death. (33)

However, today it seems as though this has been reversed, the interviews which Sennett and Cobb conducted with American workers, seem to indicate that ability and excellence are a measurement of the person's inner being.

The demonstration of worth now has become a demonstration about inner capacity in the man greater than his tangible works, about a virtue which permits him to transcend situation after situation, mastering each but attached and identified with none. (34)

As with Simmel, Sennett sees the increasing fluidity and objectivity of lives dominated by production and exchange, leading people to dive ever inwards to find meaning and definition. The key concepts here are authenticity and intimacy.

Paradoxically, being driven inward for meaning and definition, must within our culture, result in a drive outwards with subjectively derived utterance, to assert what one really is! Sennett applies Lionel Trilling's analysis of the cultural move from sincerity to authenticity, to the social order. These terms refer to the shift from the language of personal sincerity spoken before the 19th century to a language of individual authenticity spoken after it. Sincerity is used here to mean, 'the exposure in public of what is felt in private' and authenticity means 'the direct exposure to another of a person's own attempts to feel'. In this process the distinctions between public and private become blurred. It stops being possible to see that keeping strong and dangerous feelings from others, can be morally
expressive

Instead self-disclosure becomes a universal measure of believability and truth. (37)

The consequences of this are that:

the more a person concentrates on feeling genuinely rather than on the objective content of what is felt, the more subjectivity becomes an end in itself, the less expressive he can be. (38)

In essence Sennett seems to be arguing that this process equates 'feeling' with human development, ie to be a person is connected with strength of feeling, so the more you feel, the more real you are. This dehumanising process took shape in the 19th century, and Sennett finds evidence for it in the ways people become convinced that they themselves did not have real personality, but instead went in search of those public figures, politicians, artists, actors, conductors, who seemed to feel more intensely than they did, and hence seemed more real. As Sennett puts it:

Being expressive and having extraordinary talent - that was the formula on which personality entered the public realm. (39)

Artists and performers

... used shock tactics to make the moment of performing all-important, those who could arouse and shock the audience were perceived as powerful persons and therefore, as of superior status, rather than in the servant status of the 18th century performer. In this way as the performer came to rise above his audience he came to transcend his text. (40)

On this basis the common life or public life of society was eroded, as the fictions and rituals of public life, by which performers could distance themselves for the necessary impersonality of public life, failed to stand up to the new criteria of authenticity and intimacy.
By these standards public life must always be found wanting. Full of strangers it is hostile and forbidding. There arises then the urge amongst people to seek havens from impersonal contact, to create areas of warmth in a cold world. It is this, that Sennett terms Destructive Gemeinschaft. This means that the classical ideal of community and the life of the citizen are degraded, community becomes a weapon against society, whose great vice is now seen to be its impersonality. (42)

Such a culture is preoccupied by its own disposition and is localist in outlook. The prominant personality type is narcissistic. Here Sennett reveals the affinity between his account and Rieff's portrayal of the analytic attitude, when he argues that psychoanalysis in particular, was founded on the faith that in understanding the inner workings of the self sui generis without transcendental ideas of evil or of sin, people might free themselves from these horrors and be liberated to participate more fully and rationally in a life outside the boundaries of their own desires. Masses of people are concerned with their single life-histories and particular emotions as never before, this concern has proved to be a trap rather than a liberation. (44)

The impersonal quality of the world makes the search for community into a retreat into smaller groups, ever more narrowly defined and with greater emotional weight put upon these relationships. The most highly valued yet paradoxically least realised state according to Sennett, is intimacy, because the basis on which it is sought is destructive of real intimacy. Sennett puts forward three elements that explain the rise of the intimate, desiring self. The first of these is the emergence of the narcissistic pesonality; Sennett like Christopher Lasch, notes the move in psychoanalytic data, especially after the second world war, towards the emergence of more narcissistic
personality disorders, suggesting a profound shift within the balances of the social order. Sennett suggests that the reason for this shift is that:

Today's society has mobilised the forces of narcissism that are potential in all human beings by intensifying the culture of personality immanent in social relations to such a point that those relations now appear only as mirrors of self. (46)

The second element is the emergence of the protean self, a self with no fixed nature, capable of changing all the time.

This self-hood puts an immense premium on 'direct' experience with other people, it detests reserve or masks behind which other people are felt to lurk, because in being distant they seem to be inauthentic. (47)

Thirdly, this protean self interacts with others in peculiar ways in that it treats intimate interchanges as a market in self-revelations. You interact with others according to how much you tell them about yourself the more 'intimate' you become, the more confessions you have made. (48)

All this creates severe problems for any kind of public life and a coherent radical politics. Amongst such people, insecure in their innermost selves, they can only create community by fantasy and projection. The shared imagery becomes the real purpose of the community and deters rationally effective political action. Sennett concludes that:

It is no accident that western bourgeois radicals of the last decade could so easily arrive at a notion of changes in immediate personal relations as 'models' of what should happen to the whole society. (49)

Sennett thus condemns the 'intimate society' for essentially political reasons. A culture that fears the large scale will leave the real centres of global economic and military power untouched. Sennett fears
Christopher Lasch in his most recent work *The Minimal Self* has taken this argument further by looking at the effects of the profound uncertainties (cultural, economic, military) of life in the 1980s. In part this is a response to misunderstandings of earlier work on narcissism as being merely moralising about selfishness etc. In fact he argues, narcissism is, in reality, an attempt by the psyche to survive. He writes:

Narcissism signifies a loss of selfhood not self-assertion. It refers to a self-threatened with disintegration and by a sense of inner emptiness ... Everyday life has begun to pattern itself on the survival strategies forced on those exposed to extreme adversity, selective apathy emotional disengagement from others, renunciation of the past and the future, a determination to live one day at a time. (50)

Lasch accepts the notion of the protean self as mobile and reconstituted, but sees it as a response to a public environment out of control, leaving only the option of self management and personal adjustment, with the aid of the caring and therapeutic professions. Lasch is important for he argues against both conservative critics of modern hedonism and liberal apologists for such a culture. Lasch instead roots these cultural changes, as part of the process of change in advanced capitalism. It is this which gives Lasch's American based work its wider applicability. His is an analysis of the way advanced capitalism remakes a social order. New cultural forms of the organisation of work and new forms of consumption emerge from the
heart of the capitalist market economy. He argues that:

manipulative, therapeutic, pluralistic and 'non-judgemental' style of social discipline ... originated like so many other developments with the rise of a professional and managerial class in the early years of the 20th century and then spread from the industrial corporation, where it was first perfected into the political realm as a whole. (51)

These processes along with the rise of new professional groupings like social workers have introduced therapeutic management forms, into what was once the private sphere, substituting observation and measurement for moral judgement. In the workplace the gradual replacement of skilled work with machinery and a process of collusion with the education system that turns education into 'man power' selection, not to create skills but to classify workers. Workers are split into a small group of administrators, technicians, managers and a larger group of workers who carry out instructions. Added to this the massive invasion of life by advertising and consumerism, remoulding environments and cultural forms on the basis of profit maximisation which makes for the replacement of a reliable world of durable objects by a world of flickering images. (54)

This, in Lasch's view, is the context to which he adds in the 1980s the hazards of economic recession and nuclear war; such a culture seems to produce survivalism not in dramatic mountain retreats only, but in psychological preparedness for the worst. But this is merely the other side of narcissistic/protean/impulse self, generated by a society based on the dominance of market relations. Lasch, like Sennett, sees here a withdrawal from politics and public life, which in turn seems to become one more variety of consumerism as the techniques and models
of advertising invade this realm too.

It is always possible for the British reader to nestle in the cultural conservatism of British society, and say that all this is not the case in Britain. And, of course, this is largely true. But it is also true to say this of much of the US. What writers like Rieff, Lasch and Sennett argue, is that these are cultural tendencies deeply congruent with modern capitalism, thus becoming more and more generally applicable. Bernice Martin (whose work points to the way British culture has been changing over the past 30 years in ways described by Sennett and Lasch) is correct to argue:

Neither Mrs Whitehouse's middle England nor the mainstream working class can seriously recognise itself in the picture of the New Narcissism. (55)

However, she argues that:

In all the cases we examined - education, the welfare professions and the Churches - the expressive imperative made a great deal of headway against earlier structures based on formality, hierarchy and ritual ... spontaneity became the preferred mode, and it was ever more widely assumed that the natural objectives of these institutions was to enable ego to achieve self-realisation ... The basic premises of what has been called the New Narcissism ... became deeply etched into the cultural and political base of these professional activities. (56)

However, Martin's work goes on to confirm MacIntyre's understanding of the relationship between the therapeutic mode and bureaucratic utility. By the mid '70s, especially in the areas of public and private bureaucracies, she argues that 'the continued, if half concealed imperatives of utility and instrumentality' began to place limits and reimpose some elements of structure and control. Yet as both MacIntyre and Rieff argue it is precisely this formulation and
real division of the social order that prevents genuinely communal action. This corresponds to Rieff's negative communities, of isolated and increasingly protean selves, left to struggle in an environment of bureaucratic necessity.

Such a culture seems to be most inhospitable to a Marxism, which seeks to renew the classical community ideal, as the fulfilment of an objectively given essential human nature. Nonetheless Marxism has been the major oppositional force to capitalist society and culture in the past hundred years, described by Rieff as

the last great institutional example in Western history of a credal elite, a guiding cadre which would practise what it preached ... (58)

It is to the hopes and problems of Marxism that we now turn.

IV

MARX'S REAL COMMUNITY

We have noticed how Rieff saw Marx's importance as being in the uniting of conservative and radical views of community, by transposing it into a communist future. Marx's view of the communist future has been implicitly as well as explicitly criticised by much of the sociological tradition. For example, Alvin Gouldner shortly before his death, compared Marx's vision of socialism unfavourably with Durkheim. Gouldner saw Marx as a theorist of indefinite growth, who solved the classic problem of scarcity by simply producing more.
Gouldner argues that both Marx and Durkheim saw human desire as potentially infinite (always growing and developing), but that Marx's position is incompatible with the belief that production will solve the problem. He sees this as endemic to Marxism because of its refusal to look at the subjective side of demand and value.

For Marx it is the sheer amount of production, the sheer supply side of the equation alone, that will, without reference to the demand side, solve the problem of scarcity. (60)

Gouldner compares this view with Durkheim's conception of the way out of scarcity, he quotes Durkheim thus:

What is needed if social order is to reign ... is that the mass of men be content with their lot. But what is needed for them to be content, is not that they have more or less, but that they be convinced that they have no right to more. And for this it is absolutely essential that there be an authority whose superiority they acknowledge and which tells them what is right ... a moral power is required whose superiority they acknowledge and which tells them what is right ... a moral power is required whose superiority (man) recognises. (61)

Now clearly Marx did have a view of humanity having expanding wants. However, a case can be made that Marx was a part of a classical tradition, locating his vision of the future, within the terms of a shared public life. On this view communism is not as Gouldner seems to think a state beyond scarcity, because of the expansion of production, but rather because it is a qualitatively different social order, which is a realisation of humanity's common potential, rooted in their real essence. In the next chapter we will give a fuller account of Marxism as it has developed, and the problems underlying such an essentialist view. But I shall end this chapter with an outline of the way Marx's thought attempts to transcend the contradictions of the liberalism of
rights and utilities, and of Rieff's negative community.

To examine the structure of Marx's thought, it will be useful to borrow a schema that Carol Gould uses to reconstruct Marx's use of Hegel's dialectic as a logic of historical development. 62

The three historical stages are:
1) Pre capitalist formations.
2) Capitalism.
3) Communal Society.

The forms of social relations that correspond to these are:
1) Personal dependence.
2) Personal independence based on objective dependence.
3) Free social individuality.

These stages can be further characterised as
1) Internal relations that are concretely particular.
2) External relations that are abstractly universal.
3) Internal relations that are concretely universal.

With respect to the characteristic of equality, the three historical stages may be ordered in terms of
1) Relations of inequality.
2) Relations of formal equality.
3) Relations of concrete equality.
Finally, the social relations in the three stages may be characterised as

1) Community.
2) Individuality and external sociality.
3) Communal individuality.

This is clearly a heavily Hegelian view of Marxism as a theory. As we will see in the next chapter there are good grounds for believing the Hegelian heritage stays with Marx throughout most of his intellectual and political life. We should also recall Rieff's comment about Marxism that without some notion of the new community inscribed in its theory, it becomes mere sociology! This schema helps us explore the possible role of a positive community in Marx's thought.

It is clear that in the pre-capitalist stage the individual is integrated into the whole, and although the community is hierarchically divided, it is fairly stable and self-sufficient with land and agriculture forming the basis of material life. The relations of producer to production are immediate, as Gould puts it:

he or she produces in order to consume and consumes what he or she produces. Because of this immediate unity between labour and the natural conditions of production both the mode of production and the relations within which the individual stands appear as natural. (64)

Relations between individuals within this organic community can be seen as internal. This means that people relate to each other personally on the basis of their status and role. This means that the relations between people are determined by their place within the
social totality. These relationships have a nature like quality, which means that generally, they are not enforced by external authority but are heavily internalised. This means according to Gould that

\[
\text{individuality remains bound to particularity} \ldots
\]
\[
\text{Universality belongs only to the community and this universality is limited to the local, the regional, the traditional.} \ (65)
\]

The second historical stage, capitalism, involves the dissolution of the precapitalist community, both in terms of relations between people and the means of production, ie the emergence of landless propertyless workers. As is well known this requires that there exists a fund of capital to buy labour and a system of exchange relations. This second stage is apparently characterised by personal independence, but as we can see from the schema, this is an illusion in that dependence is not eliminated, but takes on an objective form. Marx suggests this independence is 'more correctly called indifference'. 66 Each individual produces out of their own self interest and simply views others as means of fulfilling their own aims. They know they must produce what others want, but this dependency is indifferent since it is an external and instrumental relation. Marx describes this process well in the Grundrisse chapter on money, in a mode that recalls us to Simmel's analysis of exchange relations

\[
\ldots \text{reciprocity interests him only in so far as it satisfies his interest to the exclusion of, without reference, to that of the other. That is the common interest which appears as the motive of the whole is recognised as a fact by both sides; but, as such, it is not the motive, but rather proceeds, as it were behind the back of these self-reflected particular interests, behind the back of one individual's interest in opposition to that of the other.} \ (67)
\]

Marx takes this as the basis of the social order under capitalism and
clearly if it is to work efficiently definite, although limited, ideological conditions of existence are going to be in place. These are likely to give the social order a particular moral texture. Indeed, if we compare the above quotation of Marx with a full quotation from MacIntyre (partly quoted earlier) we see this moral form in operation.

Each of us is taught to see himself and herself as an autonomous moral agent, but each of us also becomes engaged by modes of practice, aesthetic or bureaucratic, which involve us in manipulative relationships with others. Seeking to protect the autonomy that we have learned to prize, we aspire ourselves not to be manipulated by others; seeking to incarnate our own principles and standpoint in the world of practice, we find no way open to us to do so, except by directing towards other, those very manipulative modes of relationship which each of us aspires to resist in our own case. (68)

In view of what we know about MacIntyre, such parallels between his analysis and Marx are not surprising. However, it is the next move in the schema that separates Marx off from MacIntyre and most sociological analysis. For it is clear that the movement between stages are internally related. It is the relationship between pre-capitalist and capitalist society and their corresponding social typologies which allows us to think the stage of 'social individuality' and 'differential unity'. These expressions would be just intellectual slights of hand, unless they were grounded, by Marx, in real ontological categories at least possessing the potential of being realised historically.

Gould argues that this historical process is to be seen in Hegelian terms as a negation of the negation. She argues:
Hegel sees this movement as a spiral where the third stage has some of the form and content of the first, but also takes up into itself the developments of the second stage. Therefore the third stage only has a superficial and partial resemblance to the first stage or, to put it differently, repeats it at a higher level of development. (69).

However, Gould stresses that there is no pattern of logical necessity or laws of historical development but rather these changes are contingent, 'and that it follows from human choices and actions'. 70

The next chapter considers recent work that presents a Hegelian Marxism in a way that repudiates contingency, but here I am concerned merely to stress the social implications of Marx's conception of historical change. For Marx's theory of change, and the goal of communism, seems to create much embarrassment among socialists today. We can now see that in the third stage Marx expects a community of social individuality, with clear concrete freedom but maintaining the universality and differentiation that capitalism introduces.

Bearing in mind the cultural effects of capitalism in encouraging a particular form of self, and the practices of individualism individuality and individuation, what clues are there in Marx's work that might give content to the notion of social individuality in a future community?

Russell Keat shares Gould's interpretation of Marx. 71 He shows how the instrumental "sociality" (of capitalism), mediated through the exchange of commodities will be transformed in such a way that the "sociality" will become an intrinsic feature of production itself and of the motives and attitudes of those engaged in it. (72)
Keat then goes on to furnish us with a most interesting quotation from the Grundrisse, which gives us some idea of how Marx saw a socialist society.

The communal character of production would make the product into a communal general production from the outset. The exchange which originally takes place in production - which would not be an exchange of exchange-values but of activities, determined by communal needs and communal purposes - would from the outset include the participation of the individual in the communal world of products. On the basis of exchange value, labour is posited as general only through exchange. But on this foundation it would be posited as such before exchange, ie the exchange of products would in no way be the medium by which the participation of the individual is mediated. (73)

Keat does not find this depiction satisfactory, for it gives no clear content to the phrase 'the communal character of production'. Nonetheless this quotation gives important clues to Marx's assumptions about socialism. Clearly, exchange-value would not exist in full socialism, as Marx clearly locates the origins of abstract labour in this process - 'labour is posited as general only through exchange' - which would mean continued subordination to the division of labour by the working class.

Keat in his discussion suggests that Marx in the Grundrisse, is basing his account of socialism on the concept of 'species being', ie a concept of human essence present in his early writings. Keat writes:

what he means by 'communal needs and purposes' are those which every individual can come to have in common by virtue of their (recognition of their) being members of the human species. That is the 'mutual indifference' of egoistic individuals will be replaced by a situation in which each individual pursues the (universal) species interest, and thus no longer regards the interests of others as a potential limitation or obstacle upon their own. (74)
As we shall see in the next chapter, such a vision of the potential development of humanity seems very much to cut against the grain of much late 19th century and 20th century philosophy and political practice. We will examine a particularly strong presentation of what we can term the Hegelian Marx. But the question we address is inevitably a double one. Firstly, is Marx's conception true? Secondly, whether true or false, are the cultural, political and intellectual forces, even of the left capable of accepting such a view?
NOTES

4. Ibid, p.66.
5. Ibid, p.66.
8. Ibid, p.68.
9. Quoted from the transcript of 'The Culture of Narcissism' a Voices programme for Channel 4 TV (Brook Productions) taking part Christopher Lasch, Michael Ignatieff and Cornelius Castoriadis Broadcast 26th March 1986.
10. Ibid.
15. Ibid, p.69.
17. Ibid, p.11.

22. See Chapter 4 for textual references on these matters.


25. Philip Rieff, op.cit., p.70.


29. Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic, op.cit., p.73.

30. Currently I would suggest that the most persuasive advocate of such a negative community, in the social sciences, is Niklas Luhmann, Habermas's protagonist in many debates. Luhmann's entire systems theory seems to be a veritable hymn to modernity, defending it from conservatives and radicals alike. See his collection of essay, The Differentiation of Society, Columbia University Press, Columbia, 1982, see especially his powerful essay, 'The Future Cannot Begin', p.271-289. For the threat that Luhmann and the tendency he represents might pose of the complete technizising of human relations see Richard Wolin, 'Modernism versus Post Modernism' in Telos, No.62, Winter, 1984-85, p.27-29.


33. Ibid, p.245.

34. Ibid.


40. Ibid, p.205.


44. Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man*, op.cit., p.5.


48. Ibid, p.103.

49. Ibid, p.104.


51. Ibid, p.46.


57. Ibid, p.239.


60. Ibid, p.216.

61. Ibid.


63. Perhaps the single most important work in this context is Roman Rosdolsky's The Making of Marx's Capital, Pluto Press, London, 1977, where the Hegelian approach is seen as clearly present in the very heart of Capital. See the very well balanced discussion of the relation between Hegel and Marx in Allen Wood, Karl Marx, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981, especially chapters 13 and 14, p.189-218.

64. C. Gould, op.cit., p.10.


68. A. MacIntyre, op.cit., p.66.

70. Ibid, p.21.
71. Russell Keat, op.cit.
72. Ibid, p.144.
73. Quoted in ibid, p.144-5.
Chapter Two

Marxism: A Solution?

True genesis is not at the beginning but at the end, and it starts to begin only when society and existence become radical, ie grasp their roots. But the root of history is the working creating human being who reshapes and overhauls the given facts. Once he has grasped himself and established what is his, without expropriation and alienation, in real democracy, there arises in the world something which shines into the childhood of all and in which no-one has yet been: homeland.

Ernst Bloch

The Principle of Hope
Ernst Bloch writes a few pages earlier in this great utopian work, of the strange mixture of elements in Marxism:

... but Marxism, in all its analysis the coldest detective, takes the fairy tale seriously, takes the dream of a Golden Age practically. (2)

Given the rise of the analytic attitude and a therapeutic culture, can these two aspects of Marxism be retained or must they fall apart? Is not Bloch a sure sign of this; his work is surely not that of a practically minded, revolutionary socialist. It is in 20th century theology that Bloch has been principally taken up, not by radical social science.³ What is it about Marxism's situation and nature, that has, since Marx's death, split the 'fairy tale' from the 'analysis'. We can not hope to do justice to this vast question in a few pages. We can only try to highlight a few themes, in order to attempt a very provisional conclusion as to whether MacIntyre was correct to abandon Marx's resolution of the liberal dichotomy, via the conception of a teleology of the human essence. To do this we will examine some recent attempts to rehabilitate such a concept and the theory of history.

I

ADAP'TATION AND DEFEAT

To do this, we must briefly remind ourselves of the historical context that Marxism has had to exist within. There can be little doubt that the fate of the October Revolution in Russia, Stalin's rise and the millions of deaths that ensued, followed by the impact of the
Nazi Holocaust, have produced considerable scepticism about large scale societal transformation. The 'Butskellite' consensus of the 1950s was as much a response to this international dimension as to the new Welfare State. This scepticism has been confirmed by the western intelligentsia's 'discovery' of the horrors involved in the Chinese 'Cultural Revolution', Cambodia under Pol Pot and post-war Vietnam. But problems with Marxist practice and theory, and scepticism about it, is not of recent origin. Even before the first world war, there were problems of both a sociological and intellectual nature with orthodox Marxist positions. 'Orthodox' – in this context, inevitably means the Marxism of the Second International – carrying as it did the powerful imprimateur of Engels and then of his heir apparent, 'the Pope of Marxism', Karl Kautsky. The intellectual challenge will be dealt with below, but the two are not completely separate, the sociological context helped shape the theory.

Undisputed leader of the Second International was the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), the largest mass Marxist Party in the world. Its leaders faced a situation largely unforeseen by the version of Marxism they inherited. Most of its intellectuals expected a severe crisis of capitalism that would result in a new socialist society. Instead they face a situation in which on the one hand, an industrial capitalism was enjoying an unprecedented phase of growth and prosperity, and on the other a powerful state based on an aggressive aristocracy and well organised civil service bureaucracy. Salvadori is surely right when he refuses to blame Social Democratic evolutionist
theory for the integration of the working class into Germany society when he writes:

the real "motor force" of integration was actually the trade union movement. German Social Democracy was the first great workers' party that was compelled to deal, squarely and bluntly with a capitalist system whose rapid end its theory had led it to expect, which instead exploded outwards in an imperialism that rallied wide mass support. (4)

The German trade unions and more indirectly the SPD had to come to terms with the situation. As Barrington Moore has shown in his excellent study of the attitudes and conditions of the German working class, with its occupational divisions and geographical composition giving it a strong provincial outlook plus the economic room for manoeuvre and social attitudes of the workers, added up to a non-revolutionary working class. Moore concludes that:

the SPD leadership, its cautionary policies and occasional outbursts of rhetorical anger at the propertied classes, appears reasonably representative. For the pre-war years at any rate it is difficult to imagine just what else they might have done. A revolutionary policy would have lacked a popular basis and would have been easily crushed. (5)

This situation naturally imposed itself upon the leading Marxist theorists of the time, many of whom happened also to be leaders of the SPD. What seems to have happened is that Marxist theory was adapted to conform to the realities of the situation, as theorists like Kautsky saw them. Kolakowski has concisely summarised Kautsky's view as follows:

Let us improve capitalism for the time being; socialism is guaranteed by the law of history in any case. It does not matter that we can not prove separately the moral superiority of socialism: it simply so happens that what is necessary is also what appears desirable to me and to other persons of good sense. (6)
From one perspective it is clearly possible to argue a strong case against Kautsky’s views — even if we allow that it is somewhat caricatured. It seems both to lack Marx’s revolutionary urgency and to capitulate to evolutionary and positivistic forms of thought, fashionable at the time. Nonetheless Kautsky’s position is not without a degree of plausibility. Marx’s thought is a large and complex matter, it defies easy codification, we can recall Marx’s own rebuke to some over-enthusiastic disciples that he for one, was not a Marxist. Marx also stressed the progressive as well as the negative features of capitalism and frequently proclaimed confidence that capitalism would be overthrown. But the question of textual fidelity is less important than the point that Russell Jacoby has made, that Marxism as a critique of bourgeois society, had lost its bite, he claims that:

the distance between Marxism and bourgeois society narrowed, Marxists and their opponents shared the belief in science, progress and success. Revolution was not simply adjourned, rather the Marxists embraced the scientific and industrial rationality as their own. They saw themselves accelerating the advance of capitalism. (7)

By the eve of the first World War, Kautsky argued strongly against the idea that the war would lead to a socialist revolution. He described it as:

a sure method of anihilating capitalism, but also of rendering socialism impossible. (8)

Salvadori goes on to argue that by 1914, Kautsky’s central theoretical premise was that:

... democracy, understood as the "participation of the popular masses in state policy, in institutions, represented the necessary political reflection of the indispensable economic role of the proletariat in production, as an essential element of the modern capitalist system. (9)
Weber was able to say after visiting the SPD party congress in 1906. 'These gentlemen no longer frighten anyone.'

The process by which a revolutionary theory like Marxism was adapted into the tamed ideology of an electorally based reformist political party, is not too difficult to see. For in reality this process reflected a real tension within Marxist theory, resolvable in terms of Marx's own analysis, but not so easy for those working in everyday politics. We have noted that Marx was both positive and critical about capitalism; Marx denounced capitalism for its evil exploitation but also praised it for at last creating the conditions, especially material conditions, upon which a truly human society could be built. In terms of dialectical theory these two elements can be held in tension, each given their specific weight, but in the demands of everyday politics these subtleties are bound to be lost. As Jacoby emphasises:

> The history of Marxism is the history of the loss of the dialectical critique of bourgeois society. The irresistible temptation was to cast the dialectical movements of society into a one-way and upward path. Progress in capitalism was read as progress towards socialism. (11)

Nor is this process limited to the so-called reformist SPD. In Russia, the Marxists were fighting for support against revolutionary competitors, like the Populists and 'Socialist Revolutionaries' who looked to the peasants for revolution. This meant the Bolsheviks had strong reasons for emphasising capitalism as a bearer of progress — this view was most deeply held, witness the commitment of Lenin to technology and work organisation, as relatively neutral as in the case of Taylorism. (12)
Clearly Marxism as a social and cultural current within capitalist society, is subject to that society's pressure. Capitalism's likely impact upon Marxism is apparent if we remember Marx's comment on bourgeois culture:

The bourgeois viewpoint has never advanced beyond the antithesis between itself and the romantic viewpoint, and the latter will accompany it as its legitimate antithesis up to its blessed end. (13)

Marx was able to note this distinction and believe he had moved beyond it, ie transcending rationalistic individualism and organic naturalism in full communism. But if we recall Bloch's reference to 'the fairy tale' and the 'analysis' that w. in the everyday practices of capitalist societies these 'bourgeois' antitheses are fully at home within the heart of Marxism itself. Marxism can and has lent itself to both Romantic and bourgeois progressivist outlooks. Jacoby is not exaggerating when he writes:

Every chapter in the history of Marxism has been rent by this dialectic or inconsistency: the denunciation of capitalism vied with its affirmation. (14)

The Progressivist approach was thoroughly institutionalised but at the turn of the century, the romantic dimension of Marxism was harder to see. Nonetheless that perceptive social observer Georg Simmel, writing at this time, could see it along with its utilitarian side. Throughout his great work The Philosophy of Money, Simmel makes it clear that in his view, modern Socialism ie the SPD aims at the rationalisation of life, by extending all those elements in capitalism that already move towards the generation of law-like regularities and that foster detached calculation in life, but he notes:
At the same time, socialism has affinities with the hollow communistic instincts that ... still lie in remote corners of the soul. Socialism's dual motivations have diametrically opposed psychic roots. On the one hand, socialism in the final developmental product of the rationalistic money economy, and on the other it is the embodiment of the most basic instincts and emotions. (15)

Ironically it was one of Simmel's most brilliant pupils, Georg Lukacs who was to be one of the most powerful representatives of romantic Marxism. Lukacs took a romantically inspired Kulturkritik with him into Marxism. Indeed, it seems likely that he became a revolutionary Marxist, as a means of bringing about the 'dream of the whole man'.16 Walter Benjamin is clearly a similar case. The deep connection he felt with Jewish Messianism and the Neo-Romantic movements, makes one of the two Marxists (Ernst Bloch being the other) who emphasised the eschatological dimension of the tradition, in the 20th century.17

Nonetheless, these important intellectual movements had a very small impact on the large scale organisation of political parties and unions. The need to distinguish these bodies from apparently backward or 'restorationist' currents, meant that dialectics was pushed towards seeing science and capitalism on a one way journey towards socialism.

The events following the October Revolution, and their consequences for Marxism, East and West, are too well known to require more than sign posting. The failure of the 1917 Revolution to spread to the advanced capitalist world, especially the failure of the revolution in Germany, sealed the fate of Marxian socialism in Russia. Stalin and
Stalinism, with much prestige abroad, reduced Marxism in Russia to a state dogma, whilst at the same time literally killing or driving into exile, most creative Russian Marxists; Trotsky, Bukharin, Preobrazhensky, $^{18}$ are only some of the more famous figures. The rise of Fascism in the west accomplished a similar feat, as most working class and socialist organisations were destroyed in the 1930s and early 1940s. Followed by the combined effects of a post-war economic boom and the cold war based, in part, on quite legitimate fears of western workers about Stalinism: this in effect has removed revolutionary politics from the western agenda, for the moment. No wonder Perry Anderson, after noting all these factors can comment that

The hidden hallmark of western Marxism as a whole is thus that it is a product of defeat. (19)

In the ten years that have passed since Anderson produced this judgement, little has happened to alter it. Since 1976 the west has gone through the most severe recession since the 1930s. But this, unlike the '30s, has produced no move to Fascism, but neither has it produced a radical working class response. Rather there seems to have been a strengthening of right-wing ideologies, and the emergence of a crisis of Marxism (in spite of its Indian summer in the late '60s and early '70s) which may have been latent within the movement, from the days of the Second International in the West.

Anderson (described by Alex Callinicos, as the Plekhanov of the British left) has recently returned to his earlier analysis, in his short book In the Tracks of Historical Materialism. $^{20}$ In this, he
attempts to put a brave face on recent events, by noting such things as the substantial numbers of empirical Marxist studies written in the English speaking world, he claims that:

The traditional relationship between Britain and continental Europe appears for the moment to have been effectively reversed - Marxist culture in the UK for the moment proving more productive and original than of any mainland state. (21)

This, however, cannot hide two essential and related facts: Firstly, to reiterate, there has been no radicalisation of the western working class, indeed in Britain its commitment to the post-war social democratic settlement although not broken, looks precarious; Secondly, the current capitalist crisis seems to have produced no movement to the left or decline in support for capitalism amongst the intelligentsia (unlike the '30s) indeed the movement has been virtually all the other way, with, for example, Paul Q. Hirst moving from Marxism to right-wing social democracy and Paul Johnson from right-wing social democracy to Thatcherism.

Thus we have the briefest of historical sketches of Marxism's situation. The powerful optimism and confidence of Engels and the leaders of the Second International in the 19th century, seemed to many, after the short lived hope of 1917, to have been falsified. War, tyranny from left and right, the enormous power of the international capitalist economy, even as it falters, all have shaken the hopes of the Left. This has happened to a degree that for some radicals, the very idea of socialism has been put in question. I will end this section with two quotations from one of America's most perceptive
left-wing intellectuals, which lucidly captures this often unarticulated mood of many. The first expresses a pessimism about the fate of socialism as a concept, the second illustrates the sense of trappedness within the cage of modern capitalism. I quote them not because I agree with them, or because I have ready answers to them, but because they represent a form of thought within which no Marxism can survive:

Originally conceived as the necessary culmination of a competitive capitalism gradually shifting towards a monopoly phase, socialism has long since lost its meaning to the point of surviving only as a political myth. As such, it can still attract disparate factions whose unity can be manufactured only by allowing a multitude of their contradictory subjective interpretations to co-exist as underdeveloped projections into an otherwise vague and undefined mythological 'socialism'. The original notion of socialism as the centrally planned socio-economic organisation of society has been discredited by the experiences of advanced and even not-so-advanced industrial societies where central planning has proved itself even more wasteful and counterproductive than the competitive capitalism it was meant to displace and rationalise. (24)

The author soon follows up this obituary note, with an almost desperately gloomy commentary on the favourite panacea on the left, for economic centralism; 'self-management'.

To the limit, successfully functioning self-management enterprises tend to split workers into two separate roles: that of Taylorised functionaries subject to the inevitable logic of modern industrial discipline and division of labour, and that of owners only externally concerned with overall economic performance. As such, without what today is a practically impossible restructuring of science and technology, the self-management strategy leads to the re-invention of capitalism, with workers essentially reduced to the role of minor individual entrepreneurs. (25)
II

THE INTELLECTUAL 'CRISIS'

Even if we grant the priority of sociological factors in deciding the fate of Marxism, we cannot neglect the role of intellectuals and ideas. For we know that intellectuals, at least in the west, have been crucial to the development of the Marxist tradition.26 We should note, therefore, that long before political developments seemed to question Marxism, there was, by the end of the 19th century, a powerful weight of pessimism in European culture. As H. Stuart Hughes has shown, this pessimism took the form of a critique of the Enlightenment in general, and of Marxism in particular, focusing positively on concepts like the Freudian unconscious and Nietzsche's 'will to power'. As Stuart Hughes puts it:

psychological process had replaced external reality as the most pressing topic of investigation. It was no longer what actually existed that seemed most important: it was what men thought existed. And what they felt on the unconscious level had become rather more interesting than what they had consciously rationalised. (27)

Why this occurred is a large and complex question. It has been plausibly suggested by Stuart Hughes and others that it should be seen as part of the same process that produced various strands of Elite Theory as an alternative to Marxism. In other words part of those intellectual currents, strong in countries that still contained large hierarchically based landed classes, who feared both democracy and socialism.28 But underlying much of this seems to be a highly variegated resentment, hostility or mere irritation, with features of capitalist industrial society. This could take many forms, from Weber's
pessimistic but nationalistic liberalism to Lukács's romantic Leninism and even Sorel's social poetry. We have in Thomas Mann's novel The Magic Mountain a powerful evocation of this atmosphere, and in the character Zaphta, based on Lukács, an unforgettable portrait of a radical romantic rejecting capitalist modernity; a tyre that could move to either left or right. Naturally such rejection of capitalism frequently meant the rejection of a Marxism that seemed its mirror image, that of the Second International.

The intellectual atmosphere of pessimism did not dissipate after World War I but forms a crucial background for the formation of the next generation of Marxist intellectuals. With the relative decline of mass Marxist parties and the Stalinisation of the remainder, Marxism after 1945 was to be increasingly the property of intellectuals. As Perry Anderson notes the political experiences of these intellectuals did not encourage a more optimistic outlook: Adorno and Horkheimer politically formed by Fascism, Sartre and Althusser radicalised by the Spanish civil war, Della Volope and Colletti coming to Marxism in the late '40s and early '50s, respectively. All in a period of working class defeat or under the influence of Stalinised communist parties. 29 These figures all turned to the most abstract questions of culture or philosophy and method. Their influence on the more empirically minded Marxists of the past twenty years has been considerable, with most Marxist scholars acknowledging one or more theorist as their guide. 30 But more generally most Marxist researchers have in recent years, started out in the social sciences, which are both directly and
indirectly shaped by elements of the broader philosophical culture. What are the currents here that oppose the hope of what I term the 19th century Marx.

**Firstly, we should note Anderson's observation that virtually all the western Marxists he surveys resort to earlier philosophical authority within European thought (31)**

to supplement Marx's work - Engel's work being generally considered unusable. Lukacs and Marcuse turned to Hegel, Sartre to Kierkegaardian existentialism (even after his turn to Marxism), Della Volpe and Colletti to Kant and, in political theory, Rousseau, Althusser to Spinoza and the Freudianism of Lacan and finally Gramsci, who turned to Machiavelli.  

If this need to turn behind Marx was felt by this virtually complete range of western Marxist theorists, then it seems likely the same need would reassert itself with the younger and more numerous generation of Marxists schooled in the social sciences. They too had to locate themselves within specific traditions, that of Marx but also that of their own subjects and their theoretical and philosophical underpinning. This has proved to be a problem; these theoretical assumptions are, for reasons we will examine, often profoundly, although perhaps obliquely hostile to Marxism as a whole.

To illustrate why this is so, I intend to draw on a review essay by Richard Rorty - a review of a work by Saul Kripke whose importance
will emerge later - which is valuable for the clarity with which it delineates the assumptions of modern philosophy. Rorty's point is that since Kant, the majority of philosophers have operated with certain central Kantian assumptions. Basic among these is the belief of philosophers that they have gone beyond the so-called naive realism of Aristotle and common sense. The old view involved the correspondence theory of truth, i.e., that there is a correct way to describe things that corresponds to how they actually are. Philosophers believed this common sense view to be inaccurate; in reality what people did, e.g., natural or social scientist, was in some way, constitute the objects via concepts of intuition or whatever. So Rorty states:

This "condescending" view has been shared by people as far apart as Russell and Bergson, Whitehead and Husserl, James and Nietzsche, Carnap and Cassirer.

The basically Kantian view, is that we decide what will count as an 'object' by putting ideas together

we build a world, a world inside our minds, by tying concepts together so as to package sensations more conveniently.

Russell and Frege develop this further. For Russell names are really just

lists of the qualities which we have decided to use to identify occasions on which we shall use a name.

In other words, they are a kind of short hand. This is based on Frege's claim that meaning determines reference, a view which is uncontroversial if you believe that the Universe is undifferentiated and merely requires conceptual structuring.
But as Marxists and Neo-Thomists insist, such a view smacks of idealism. It leads fairly quickly to the pragmatist view that science and human inquiry generally makes truth rather than finds it - that we did not discover sub-atomic particles, but rather discovered that it was helpful to package the flux under such labels as "position".

Rorty's reference to neo-Thomists and Marxists is significant because at least until the second Vatican Council and the liberalisation of western European communist parties, referred to as Euro-Communism, both these philosophical positions had institutional bases in the Catholic Church and the Party, which explicitly - both in ideology and in institutional practice - stood outside the consensus of western liberalism. It seems likely that the survival of these positions in the 20th century, is connected with this institutional protection. Indeed it is probable that the shift in Marxism's base, from party to university, in the post war period is part indicator, part cause of its intellectual 'crisis'.

Rorty's inclusion of Marxists as critics of Kantianism is also significant. Because Marxism is clearly the heir to the immediate post-Kantian philosophy of early 19th century Germany and, most particularly, Hegelianism. This grouping of philosophers stands out remarkably from the bulk of Kantian influenced 19th century and 20th century philosophers, for as Merquior has recently noted:

the majority of post-Kantians had no qualms about reasserting speculative metaphysics.

Fichte, Schelling and, above all, Hegel sought to respond to the severe limitations on knowledge, which is capable of forming only
strictly empirically-based concepts. They believed that
to hold no adequate grasp of ultimate being (the famous 'thing-in-itself) can be rationally warranted, come as an intellectual attitude, "lacking the courage of truth, the belief in the power of spirit". (34)

- Hegel's words. Marx rejects Hegel's idealist metaphysics - to anticipate a little - but maintains the ambition of Hegel to grasp the real natures of things in order to understand their developmental tendencies. As we will see in more detail later, the most obvious point to be made, is that this view implies that things have necessary properties attaching to them as real objects, which give them their character, and that these properties are knowable by the human mind.

From the middle of the 19th century in Germany, significantly after the failure of the 1848 revolution, the whole speculative tradition of philosophy - Hegel being its towering representative - became more and more suspect. A whole phalanx of anti-Hegelians emerged. Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Wilhelm Windelbrand, Heinrich Rickert, Ferdinand Tönnies, George Simmel and Weber; out of this group emerged the philosophical basis of modern social science. As Jeffrey Bergner has shown, Kant was a fundamental influence on the founding of the social sciences.

For it was Kant's general understanding that scientific (theoretical) knowledge cannot provide a natural, unified view of the world which has general validity. Kant proclaims the independence of moral and aesthetic judgements from the canons of scientific knowledge ... and it is philosophies task to investigate and uncover them and their presuppositions. (35)

In this revival, that went a good deal further than the ranks of the official Neo-Kantians 36 we see not only a scepticism about history as unfolding progress (stable nation-states, powerful bureaucracy,
bureaucratical labour movements, etc) but also a growing doubt, about what Bergmen calls

the very possibility of an adequate comprehension of the whole ... (37)

Neo-Kantianism is quite sure that it is quite impossible to get at the essential nature of a thing, and was able to offer this as the central plank of its attack on philosophical history. Figures like Simmel, Weber and Tonnies all make use of history in their work in the social science, but they were all quite certain that they were not revealing in theory, the process that lies behind historical transformation. Rather they were abstracting from historical reality, classically in Weber's notion of ideal types but also in Tonnes own ideal type conceptions of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. There is no intrinsic meaning or purpose here, merely forms imposed upon history by the human mind.

Such a view is, as we have seen, the necessary correlative of a philosophical culture that denied any necessary connections between the names of things and the things themselves. In this context it is hardly surprising that Marxism, when it aspires to be more than a social scientific description of reality, ie when it claims both authoritative knowledge of what will change, and how to change, runs up against acknowledged, or unacknowledged, scepticism amongst even its supporters in the social sciences. Naturally many have been aware of this problem: how to claim certain knowledge, alongside social scientific respectability. In the immediate post-1968 environment Althusser seemed to perform this function admirably, with a clear
argument for re-interpretating Marx along more congenial lines. Writers like E.P. Thompson and Simon Clarke have pointed to the role of a concept like theoretical practice as perfect ideology for the academic seeking radical political respectability. 38

Althusser fitted perfectly with both political needs and academic prejudices. In the first place no one could have been stronger in his denunciations of the apparently Hegelian metaphysical baggage in much of Marx's work; hence the need for the radical epistemological break between the pre-scientific Marx and the Marx of real science, for in the mature Marx

There is no longer any original essence, only an ever pre-given, however far knowledge delves into its past. There is no longer any simple unity, only a structural complex unity ... If this is the case, it is clear that the 'womb' of the Hegelian dialectic has been proscribed and that its organic categories, in so far as they are specific and positively determined cannot survive it ... (39)

In the second place, as is clear in this quotation Althusser makes the move familiar to Neo-Kantians and positivists, of making a sharp divide - ultimately unbridgeable - between the real and the process by which we appropriate the real, for as Callinicos has put it:

what he wants to do is to distinguish between reality and the process by which we come to know reality. The thought-object is, if you like, the precondition of the latter process. It consists in the pre-existing concepts and theories which science sets about to transform in order to provide a more rigorous knowledge of the real. (40)

This provided the basis for Althusser's famous epistemological machinery of Generalities I, II and III. Generalities I being not empirical reality, but the body of concepts which were to be
transformed by Generality II, which was the body of concepts that constituted the theory or problematic which in turn produced the result of the so-called concrete-in-thought i.e. Generality III. All this must have seemed very sophisticated and up-to-date avoiding any of the dangers of a na"ive realism which as anybody with any philosophic sophistication knew was untenable. However, as is well known, the great emphasis on Althusserian theory as theory, led to an acute paralysis in intellectual work. The self-appointed guardians of this theory led much of the young left through agonised considerations as to whether this new pristine theory could have an authentic relationship with the extra-discursive reality. The upshot of all this was a journey within a few short years from high theory to a pragmatically orientated empiricism. It did not, of course, escape the attention of Marxist social scientists that the dominant Althusserian trend of the late '70s was ultimately going to take an idealist path out of Marxism. This seems to have generated an interest in realist philosophies of science, which are principally concerned with attempting to understand, the mode of operation of unobservable entities, that sustain the regularities of observable phenomena. In other words, it is concerned with fundamental or essential processes that underlie phenomena. Even a relatively cursory acquaintance with Marx's work would be enough to show the affinity of this approach with that of Marx. To take a most basic example - Marx's famous assertion in the Preface to a Critique of Political Economy:

It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. (45)
However, such work, itself, has suffered from the pressure of the prevailing philosophic climate, as, for example, we can see in the work of two authors who are sympathetic to Marxism, R. Keat and J. Urry's *Social Theory as Science*. To escape Kantian criticism of the possibility of 'ultimate explanations' they argue that realism is agnostic on the implication of this question see Gillian Rose's comments, note 36 above). In dealing with the difficult question of essentialism, they begin with a definition of it being the 'essential properties, of things' so that:

Scientific explanation requires the discovery of such essences and thus of correct definitions.

They ascribe these views to Aristotle and further add that this assumes a world that is objectively divided into "natural kinds" to which correct definitions must correspond.

This is, of course, precisely that view that Rorty has noted the philosophy consensus as being so opposed to. Unsurprisingly then, Keat and Urry argue that:

the realist is not committed to this theory of definition, to the view that explanations can be discovered by definitions, or to a belief in natural kinds. (46)

More recently Urry has expressed the fear that the realist view (he has clearly been influenced by Althusser) that:

may lead to viewing such societies as characterised by an "expressive totality", that all aspects or elements of it are merely the phenomenal form of the inner essence,
and Urry also indicates that he is anxious to be able to understand the process by which individuals' subjectivities are constituted.47

The latest and at present the most academically respectable versions of Marxism, are associated with the names of Gerry Cohen, Jon Elster and John Roemer and are even more hostile to essentialism. They are also deeply rooted in the tradition of analytic philosophy. They can be seen as part of wider process in academic Marxism and in the social sciences that is moving away from structure towards the question of agency,48 in this particular case, most strongly connected with the work of Jon Elster, on the question of collective 'class' action.49 However, it is fair to say that the foundation of this analytic Marxism was laid by Gerry Cohen in his book on Marx.50 This book, appearing in 1978, was greeted with almost audible relief in many parts of the intellectual left. It could be said that this is when Anglo-Marxism came into its own in terms of a theoretical rigour, equal to the continentals. In 1978 it was clear Althusserian Marxism was collapsing from within; in Britain many seemed to be deserting Marxism for more apparently radical French theorists like Foucault, Lacan and Derrida. Stuart Hall could write a year later, rather fearfully, of the 'Foucauldian deluges' about to be translated.51 Cohen's book seemed like the answer to a failing Marxism and Franco domination of radical culture. Written in the cool clarity of the English philosophic idiom; this in itself was a relief for those for whom Althusseriansim had become synonymous with pompous obfuscation, and intellectual and political arrogance. Cohen's book seemed to offer
a good defence of Marx to both older and younger generations of Marxists.\textsuperscript{52}

However true to its roots in the Anglo Saxon analytic tradition of philosophy, Cohen's reconstruction and defence of Marxism, systematically stripped the theory of those phrases and assumptions that might be thought to link it to the speculative metaphysical and essentialist tradition. Cohen begins his book significantly with the major section of the 1859 Preface to a Critique of Political Economy, it is this that he bases his conception of Marx's theory of history. Thus, in effect, Cohen is able to define Marxism in clear propositional form, partly by reducing it to two central points, easily derivable from the 1859 Preface. These points are:

1) that there is a tendency for the productive forces to expand; and

2) that there is a tendency for the productive forces to determine the production relations, so that whatever institutions and relations the expanding productive forces require, do in fact 'correspond' to them in reality.

Absent from the account is any notion of dialectics, nor is the account held to be dependent on the labour theory of value. Clearly this work is a strong form of technological determinism and is based, as Cohen makes explicit on a form of functionalist explanation.\textsuperscript{53} My concern, however, is not with the particular validity or coherence of this approach\textsuperscript{54} but rather with its revelation of underlying assumptions.
It would seem that Cohen's use of the 1859 Preface as the touchstone of orthodoxy reveals (in addition to whatever Stalinist connotations it may have), itself as a particularly crude form of Kantianism, with the sharp distinction between an abstractly presented method to be followed by application to its object. As the Hegelian Rose puts it:

... for all "method", by definition, imposes a schema on its object, by making the assumptions that it is external to its object and not defining it. (55)

This is why a Hegelian-Marxist like Scott Meikle is surely right in saying that:

Cohen has taken Marx's programmatic remarks and summaries of how he sees things, and reconstructs Marx on that basis alone. The only intelligent thing to do is to study the finished form, Capital; if done properly, that should show what the outline and summary really mean. To treat a finished form merely as a source of illustration of summary obiter dicta is a preposterous procedure. (56)

In addition to this procedure there is also the way Cohen presents Marx's theory in terms of what he calls:

those standards of clarity and rigour which distinguish 20th century analytical philosophy. (57)

It is, of course, a moot point as to whether the analytical tradition really is clearer and more rigorous than (the obviously implied point) 'those waffling unsystematic types on the continent' one can imagine responses from that quarter, about it being easy to be clear about banalities. However, name calling about style and exposition, only goes to mask rather deeper points, about what it means to use analytical procedures on Marx's work. For, as Sean Sayers has ably pointed out, Cohen's work is in fact analytical in a very traditional way:
like the philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries, Cohen relies on the method of analysis. He insists upon analysing the whole that he is considering into its component parts. He insists upon separating and isolating the different elements and aspects of the given concrete totality, and considering and defining these in isolation. The effect of this method is to produce a fragmented and atomised picture of reality. (58)

In addition these elements are understood as quite distinct entities, and what these entities are, in themselves, is not defined or changed by the context, or the set of relationships, within which they are placed. Sayers characterises these relations as external; in other words external to what constitutes the entities in themselves. It would seem that this approach underpins Cohen's anxiety to make sharp and clear distinctions between the different elements that make up the basis of the explanation, as in, say, his concern, derived it is true from the 1859 Preface, that the forces of production are to be sharply distinguished from the relations of production.\(^{59}\)

The economic structure (or 'real basis') is here said to be composed of production relations. Nothing else is said to participate in its composition. (60)

but

productive forces strongly determine the character of the economic structure, while forming no part of it. (61)

In other words Cohen seeks to discursively causal functional relationships between distinct entities.

Cohen has quite self-consciously turned his back on what we can call the dialectical tradition of explanation. No doubt he feels that the *Dia-Mat* tradition has so blackened the name of dialectics that professional seriousness demands establishing Marxism on analytical
principles. However, there is no doubt also that Marx was not an analytical philosopher, but an applier of dialectics, as he was able to write as late as 1873 in a post-face to *Capital*:

> The mystification which the dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general forms of motion in a comprehensive and conscious manner (62)

in the same place he applauds a reviewer's description of his approach and says, 'But what else is he depicting but the dialectical method?'

III

**DIALECTICAL METHOD OR ESSENTIALISM REVIVED?**

What is the 'dialectical method' that Cohen is rejecting, as are the others of his group such as Roemer and Elster. One obvious example of this being the stated methodological individualism of Elster's recent work. Following Sayers, we can immediately see that:

> For dialectics, concrete and particular things are always and essentially related, connected to and interacting with other things within a larger totality. This context of relations is internal and essential to the nature of things not external and accidental. (64)

However valuable Sayers' critique of Cohen is, in pointing out in considerable detail, the disconnected and atomistic quality that Cohen's reconstruction of Marxist theory has, compared with the internally related accounts of entity to be found in both Hegel and Marx. He never seems to take us to the heart of the question of Dialectics; the question of internal contradictions and the process of change. By briefly touching on these questions we will be able to see
more clearly the centrality of the problem of essentialism, and the way in which a variety of positions taken up on this matter illustrate the conditions for and against, a successfully reconstructed 19th century Marxism.

The whole question of Dialectics and contradiction has proved very difficult for Marxists, especially for those with philosophical training, to the degree that many have abandoned the ground of real contradictions entirely.\textsuperscript{65} The matter is most complex and cannot be adequately broached here, but the difficulties are not hard to see. The 1970s saw a lively debate in Marxist circles over the nature and viability of dialectics, sparked off by the work of Lucis Colletti. In the debate over Colletti's work it quite clearly emerges that the central aim of his work is to produce a positivistic Marxism based on Kant with a strong rejection of Hegel.\textsuperscript{66} Following from this he takes the view that dialectical contradictions must be logical contradiction because non-logical contradictions, ie those that might exist in reality, are impossible. He takes this position for reasons Peter Dews explains:

\begin{quote}
Established science ... pays no attention whatever to dialectics. Indeed, science as we know it, or in any sense we could understand could not exist at all if the principle of non-contradiction were flouted, since this principle merely expresses a condition of the continued existence of any object.
\end{quote}

Once more the villain of the piece is Hegel, for as Dews goes on:

\begin{quote}
... Colletti has made clear that Hegel's suspension of this principle was intended precisely to dissolve the reality of the finite and the material. (67)
\end{quote}

So Colletti, to defend what he sees as the program of science denies
the validity of real contradiction and so must fall back on logical contradictions, but these breach the rules of formal logic so must be rejected, and so he famously embraces the notion of unreal contradiction in an unreal capitalist reality! This need not detain us, but is his opponent Roy Edgley's position more persuasive? Edgley attempts to get round the non-contradiction rule in formal logic by more or less inventing a logic of his own:

if we are to make acceptable sense of the dialectic and its chief category, dialectical contradiction, we must shape a conception of logic different from that of formal logic ... Basically what we need to do, following Hegel but without the idealising, is to break down the dichotomy between logic and reality and thus between logical and real opposition, which generates the bourgeois critique of dialectic as logic. Logic must become ontologic. (68)

However, a powerful paper by Meikle has argued that Edgley has conceded too much to Colletti and left himself vulnerable over the matter of fusing ontology and logic. Edgley agrees with Colletti that dialectical contradictions must be logical contradictions, but Meikle suggests it is foolish to deny the power of formal logic, or the notion that Marx somehow did not believe in it, or sought to contradict it: 'one is stuck with formal logic and dialectics', he suggests. 69

Now, if formal logic implies, 'logical necessity', in its operation, and, as Meikle asserts, logical contradictions are not dialectical contradictions; it seems that dialectical contradictions must, for him, have the character of 'real oppositions', in other words they follow the line of 'natural necessity'. Dialectical contradictions are therefore real contradictions within reality. Meikle illustrates this
via the contradiction most extensively analysed by Marx namely the contradiction in the commodity between use-value and exchange-value.

The commodity is the unity of use-value and exchange-value, in precisely the same way that water is $\text{H}_2\text{O}$, that light is a stream of photons, or that gold is the element with the atomic number 79. All these statements are necessarily true. They state truths that are true of necessity, not in virtue of any logical or 'conceptual' connections, but in virtue of the essences or real natures of the entities in question. (70)

Meikle goes on to show how Marx analyses the development of the commodity form; however for our purposes it is crucial to point out how his starting point is possible. It is clear that the position is an elaboration of the 'notion of necessary truth' and based upon that 'given by its modern expositer S. Kripke'. (71)

We are now in a position to see the potential import of Kripke's work, as well as the motives for opposition to it. Basically, as Rorty has put it Kripke has shown

that Aristotle as well as Kant can be successfully updated. (72)

In the first place in regard to Marxism, it has legitimated Meikle's move back to Aristotle as a grounding for his reading of both Hegel and Marx, in terms of the realisation of potentialities present within real essences; once Aristotle's metaphysics no longer seemed completely anachronistic it was possible to build upon them again, but more on this later. We need first to think about the significance these moves in fairly archane levels of philosophy have in the wider context.
We are given some clues as to the potential significance of Kripke's work if we think of it in relation to competing approaches. We have noticed already the basic relationship of continuity between Kantian and Neo-Kantian philosophy and the project of Anglo-American analytic philosophy: Kant attempted to analyse how perceptual order was attained by human beings out of the profusions of impressions that are given to us in perception. It was achieved, he argued, by the imposition of a priori categories rooted in the subject, whilst in the post-Fregian analytic philosophy, the process of knowledge and perception is held to be structured by certain forms of linguistic prediction which are the fundamental guides to reference. Now the project of analytic linguistic philosophy parallels another, namely that of structuralism, because for Saussure and his followers, language was a complete system that structured our relationship with reality, access to which was only available through the structure of linguistic conventions.

No one has brought out more clearly the relationship between these two traditions of thought than Christopher Norris:

... there is a good deal in common between the structuralist and the logic-linguistic traditions. For Saussure as for Frege, "meaning determines reference" in the sense that there exists no self-sufficient act of naming outside the criteria which language provides for deciding how - or on what specific terms - such an act achieves its designated object. (73)

Once this connection is established, then potentially much flows from it, for it seems likely that the analytic tradition will in turn be susceptible to the same fate as structuralism, ie of a post-
structuralist deconstruction. Analytic philosophy attempts to cope with radical doubt by preserving some connection between meaning and logical necessity, but follow the Kantian tradition by ignoring the referential function of language, and using instead the structures of logic and semantics. This is why meaning precedes reference, to try and prevent a mass of variation. But to do this you have to be confident you have a way of distinguishing between necessary (or analytic) structures of meaning, that give accurate delineation, and those that do not. But this is a distinction that Norris claims can not hold, following Quine he says:

supposedly a priori truths are themselves so linked to the total structure of knowledge that they may at any time be subject to revision, the field as a whole being "undetermined by its boundary conditions". This is effectively to collapse the distinction between synthetic and analytic judgments. (74)

Norris in effect suggests that scepticism has a logic of its own, and shows this with some telling and for our purposes, highly relevant historical examples. Clearly Derrida did this with Saussure's structuralism by exploiting the arbitrary nature of the sign with its denial of a referential appeal to that which is signified. Derrida in effect deconstructs the notion of structure in Saussure's system, seeing it as a metaphor that had been passed off as a scientific concept, he overcomes it and realises what Derrida sees as the endless disseminating power of language\textsuperscript{75} ie the generation of new meaning. But perhaps an even more pertinent example for us occurs at the end of the 19th century with the Neo-Kantians, who attempting to stabilise knowledge in the face of Cartesian doubt, came up against Nietzsche. Nietzsche asked the question, why should we accept the Kantian a
priori structures of knowledge as the final limit, was this not, as Nietzsche saw it, one more attempt by reason – logocentrism – to repress the irrational and continue its centuries long domination.

It seems that Norris is suggesting that the apparently moderate moves made by the conventional thinkers of the modern age: From Kant to the Neo-Kantians, to Anglo-American linguistic philosophy, and structuralism have a radical instability about them, rooted in their common rejection of the directly referential function of language, this makes them prey to the radically sceptical and relativist moves of a Nietzsche and a Derrida.

Perhaps unsurprisingly Norris suggests an alternative, based on the work of someone who reasserts the referential function of language, Saul Kripke. Kripke crucially asserts, against all the conventional wisdom, the priority of reference over meaning. Naming is for Kripke a matter of 'rigid designation' that is of using such terms as can properly be used, to pick out the referent in question. As Norris notes:

the paradigm case is that of "fixing a reference" rather than (As Frege or Russell would argue) applying a set of descriptive attributes which enable one to verify the object referred to. (76)

The Frege-Russell position runs into many difficulties, exploitable by radical relativisers, as in the classic Fregian example, of who is Aristotle; many statements can be made of Aristotle that are also true of others and this leads to numerous ambiguities in trying to fix him in space and time. But Kripkean 'rigid designations' only use
description to fix on to a referent, which, even when new descriptions appear or old ones are proved false, still leave the referent intact. As Rorty puts it, it all boils down to:

we'll call that 'X' rather than saying we'll call something 'X' if it meets the following criteria... (77)

Clearly in natural science there are all sorts of technical redescription of entities, to use Norris's example, light can be for some purposes a particle for other a wave but as he states

There has to subsist a certain referential grounding without which no such refinement of theory could retain its grasp on the phenomena concerned. (78)

The implications of such a move are really quite enormous, indeed absolutely staggering for anyone educated within the dominant philosophic tradition. Rorty has been eloquent on the shock that his colleagues felt or perhaps more accurately he felt, given his role as chief deconstructor of the western philosophic tradition. He claims:

the whole idea of what it was to be an analytic philosopher, what it was to be sophisticated about the relation of thought to the world, began to totter. For a moment nobody could quite believe that a leading modal logician should seriously commend the Aristotelian way of looking at things. Perhaps it was merely affected Gothicising. (79)

But he was doing nothing of the kind. Rather he was showing it was possible to see things as possessing properties that were absolutely necessary to them, to be those things, and most explosive of all, that essentialism and necessity would no longer be attributes relative to concepts. What is the relationship between this kind of philosophical thought and Marxism? Clearly Kripkean essentialism does not automatically lead to Marxism or the dialectical method. However, it does suggest a greater confidence in gaining a real understanding of
things, natural and social, unmediated by a priori categories. Kripke type approaches, seem to shift the ground of argument to escape the depths of radical doubt, and away from a preoccupation with the methods of gaining knowledge. Such a move would be necessary to see any collective purpose in a human enterprise going beyond mutual tolerance and self-interest. It should therefore come as no surprise that it is by no means just Marxism and left social science that has made use of the revival of 'naive realism', some Christian Theologians have been quick to see its potential in reviving metaphysics. This as ide from reinforcing the view that at a deep theoretical level that there are connections between speculative theology and Marxism (almost all the early 19th century German post-Kantians, Fichte, Schiller and Hegel etc had theological backgrounds) it also, I believe, reinforces the argument that there is a connection between relativistic forms of thought and capitalism (see Chapters Three and Four).

IV
BACK TO ARISTOTLE?

We have seen therefore something of the social and intellectual context that Marxism finds itself in: fifty years of political defeat, a century of much intellectual opposition and erosion by a mainstream intellectual culture that is most inhospitable to it. But, nonetheless, we have noted that even at the height of a fashionable radical idealism - post-structuralism - some elements of an
intellectual shift have occurred, that are more propitious for what I have called the 19th century Marx. I now want to look at what I take to be the boldest attempt to build upon these moves, Scott Meikle's defence of Marxist essentialism.81

For Meikle, Marx's theory has three elements: his theory of history, his theory of value and his dialectical form of analysis and presentation, these together form a single unified theory. To understand his analysis we must see how these elements connect up together. As we have already touched upon the way Meikle builds upon Kripkean essentialism to understand Marx's dialectical approach, we will begin with this element of the theory.

As we have seen Meikle begins from the position that entities in the world both natural and social, are 'real referents', entities with real natures that are susceptible, with due care, to human understanding. Now from this Meikle makes his most fundamental move which is to argue that:

the most fundamental choice that has to be made in thought and method is between atomism and essentialism.

This applies in all philosophy and science, including of course the social sciences, it just can not be avoided because even those unaware of the explicit choice,

are nonetheless committed in their intellectual operations to one or other ... since every method is a variety of one or other of this exhaustive and mutually exclusive pair. (82)

The basic difference between these two approaches lies in their
respective ontologies,

between those on the one hand, who think that there are organic wholes with real natures and necessities (the essentialism and organists), and those ... who think there are no (knowable?) essences (the atomists, empiricists, anti-essentialists). (83)

Atomists work with simple ontologies, ie basic building blocks, complexities are reduced to simpler more basic elements, science consisting of understanding the combination and relationship of these simple elements. On the other hand essentialism,

admits into its ontology entities or organic wholes with identity, complexity, and form. These are not considered reducable but irreducable to their parts. There are levels of complexity among entities from atom to nebula and from human individual to society. (84)

From this fundamental opposition, flow according, to Meikle, quite distinct philosophies of science which affects all the categories of explanation such as for example, the concept of law. This means that for the atomists events are primary, normally based upon the regularity of events taking place (the Humean constant-conjunction of events); the basic problem of constructing laws on this basis is the necessity of placing exclusion clauses to explain why sometimes, something does not happen, hence the prominent role of statistics and probability theory in such accounts. But

for the essentialist a law is not epistemic but either a statement of the real ontological line of development of an entity, specifying some necessary change or changes which things of the kind typically undergo or else a statement of some piece of characteristic activity or ergon. (85)

Meikle claims that Marx's notion of law is of the essentialist kind, most centrally the law of value.
One central advantage of Meikle's approach is that it places Marx's in an explicable philosophical tradition. It makes no claim that Marx produced a theory that was absolutely new, on the contrary the conflict between essentialism and atomism goes back to Greek thought, i.e., the conflict between the atomists and Aristotle, that Marx analysed in his Doctoral Dissertation. In the medieval world essentialism was dominant, but atomism became dominant in the modern period with Descartes, Hume etc., with essentialism appearing again with Hegel and his followers including Marx. We note here that this history is important, for as we will see in later chapters that pick up and develop MacIntyre's work, the fact that the modern period was born out of an attack by atomism on essentialist forms of thought, does not augur well for the reception of Marxism in the modern world.

However by placing Marx in this essentialist line, Meikle is able to provide us with a relatively clear account of what Marx meant by Dialectics:

the dialectical method is the seeking out of laws of the movement of society considered as a process of natural history, and that the most important among these are laws of development, that is, of transition in the entity (human society) from one form to another. (86)

Marx comes by his categories in a study of principally Hegel and Aristotle, drawing on both and transforming both these essentialist thinkers' concepts in the process.

Although not so well known as Marx's connection with Hegel, Meikle is by no means the first to see Marx as at least related to
Aristotelianism in his essentialist categories, for example the philosophers Allen Wood, whose work is a valuable complement to Meikle's, has written that Marx in

both his dialectical method and his concept of humanity (is) based more or less openly on the Aristotelian notion that things have essences and that the task of science is to understand the properties and behaviour of things in terms of these essences. Marx's concept of alienation involves the further Aristotelian notion that a fulfilling life for men and women is one in which they exercise their distinctively human capacities. Marx's historical materialism employs teleological explanations apparently presupposing that such explanations are legitimate ... and applicable to social organisation. The dialectical method, by its intention to penetrate beneath the surface appearance of things and mirror their inner developmental structure, pretty clearly commits Marx to some form of scientific realism in opposition to most familiar forms of empiricism ... (87)

However, this comment is tucked away at the end of his book, in the respectable 'The Arguments of the Philosophers' series. No one to my knowledge has foregrounded Marx's Aristotelism-Hegelian essentialism in quite Meikle's way, ie to drive home its theoretical and implicitly political conclusions or challenged so openly the dominant anti-essentialist and anti-teleological consensus.

In examining how Marx comes to dialectics, Meikle is able to point to the degree of Aristotelianism there is in Hegel. He locates three key Aristotelian moves; firstly starting from the position that entities have real natures and essences, he excludes chance as the basis for phenomena, this is to be found in Hegel introduction to The Philosophy of History. The second Aristotelian move

is that he conceives the form of law in terms of the realisation of potentialities in a whole which has an essence in which those potentialities inhere. (88)
Whilst the third feature is that

history arise(s) from a whole with an essence which
undergoes transformation of form and has an end or telos.
The essence of history for Hegel is that "freedom of
spirit (which) is the very essence of man's nature" and
that the telos of world history is "the actualisation of
this freedom" which Hegel identified as "the final purpose
of the world". (89)

On Meikle's reading these basic Aristotelian categories are taken over
by Marx, even though the content 'spirit' etc, is changed. But for Marx
the most important advance Hegel makes on Aristotle is the contrast he
makes between natural change and historical change that is

the manner in which organic categories apply in the
history of human society and in organic nature. (90)

The difference for Hegel, lies in the differences in the natures of
the two processes. The organic one being simpler, at least in the
sense that its line of necessary development can be more easily
traced. But in the process of history, development is internally more
complex. This is because the relationship between its components can
hinder development in unforeseen ways which are not the product of
'extraneous accidents' (as in nature)

... this is an aspect of its nature as a dialectical
process the line of necessity in the development is not
immediate and frustratable only by external, material
accident. It is mediated: "The transition of its
potentiality into actuality is mediated through
consciousness and will". (91)

The crucial difference between the natural and the historical is that
in the first you have the development of an unchanging essence or
nature via, eg Biological evolution, ie random genetic mutation and
selective environmental pressure. Whereas in history we do not have
the development of the same nature, but quite new forms of nature so
there is, in effect, space for conflict in the essence of history which accounts for the apparent regressions in human development.

The historical process ... does not preserve a nature through successive generations; it develops a nature through successive forms. (92)

Stripped of Hegel's difficult language and his emphasis on spirit, Hegel argues that there are conflicts within the form or essence, as Meikle puts it:

The basis of the instability here, the contradiction, is between what exists and what is in the process of coming-to-be. (93)

There are many difficulties with Hegel's account, including his use of almost wilfully obscure language, and we have no need to pursue him further. The key to Meikle's account is what he believes Marx does with the form of the Hegelianism he inherits. Basically, his claim is the rather startling one that he, Marx, keeps the general theoretical structure but rejigs the whole system at the level of ontology, by making real natures the starting point. In other words for Marx, the real problem with Hegel's system, is that he ignores the real natures of the parts that make up the whole, so fails to examine their specific line of development, but instead, imposes an external system derived from a system of logic (this is his idealism), on the real pattern of development which had to be studied to be understood. This is what Marx is getting at in Critique of Hegel Doctrine of State when he says:

The crux of the matter is that Hegel everywhere makes the idea into the subject while the genuine real subject ... is turned into the predicate. (94)

This is what is meant by Marx putting Hegel on his feet, ie he bases
Hegel's categories on Aristotelian 'real natures' in which the real developments take place. Having thus traced Marx's relation with Hegel, Meikle now sets out to define what exactly Marx's essentialist materialism is. He does this by explaining what Marx means by the very Hegelian sounding expression that 'the universal as the real essence of the finite real'. This means:

a) that there are real natures or essences which are not "reducible" to "simples"; b) that coming to identify them and know them involves tracking down what is general, universal or essential in the phenomena or "finite real"; and c) that that has to begin with an investigation of the facts of the finite real itself in order to discover (it cannot be known a priori) what is truly the general within it, so that d) the finite real, the reality itself, can then finally be comprehended in the light of the general the universal or the essence, that the empirical investigation turned up. (95)

From this starting point Marx's clear objective must be to track down what the 'concrete universal' or essence of human society and history is. In The Critique of Hegel Doctrine of State he speaks of 'socialised man' but by the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts this has been identified as human labour:

which passes through a series of specific forms (which he comes to identify as organic social wholes in which a particular form of supply of human labour is predominant) each having specific laws or realisable potentially of development, and culminating in the attainment of socialism where the fullest potential of the essence is realised in a form of society adapted by man to himself. (96)

Clearly then, it follows that the Labour Theory of value, flows naturally from this conceptual framework, for if there are only social forms that have people's labour as their essence, the real content of value, whether in the money-form, price-form or capital-form, must be labour. On Meikle's terms only atomistic Marxists could want a
technical problem to solve, rather than the deeper question of the essence/appearance distinction, which underlies all debate over value.

Firstly it is important to draw out from this framework, what Meikle believes Marx regarded as the historical basis of communism. Given what we have written above, it is obviously rooted in the teleologically governed realisation of a real essence - a realisation that is, as in all essential development, potentially frustratable. In regard to communism, however, it consists of:

the identity between the twin teleologies of the historical process of the coming-to-be of human society itself and the realisation of man's nature in it. (97)

What this means is that, for Marx, history is the way human society develops through particular forms to realise its fullest potential, a teleological process leading towards communism, the content of which is largely unknowable. But in addition to this Marx also views man as a natural kind, ie a

species of mammalian order, whose essence is differentiated from others of that and other orders by the essential properties of being conscious and social (a highly Aristotelian view. P.M.). (98)

These two elements are only analytically distinct, because the individual is the social being, and

the realised human society is a society of realised humans (99)

The detailed use of Marx's applied philosophical categories is, of course, in Capital, and a full understanding of the content of Meikle's rescuing of the dialectical method can only come from seeing it in its full application; this takes up the greater part of his
book. Nonetheless I have presented enough of his groundwork to see what can be built from essentialist foundations, ie once an ontology and epistemology of real natures and real reference is accepted. But what can we today make of it, if not only Aristotle but Hegel and Marx can be successfully updated; is our reaction bound to be, 'this is all metaphysical madness'. The problem is basically that which Rorty locates with Kripke, - although perhaps less obvious than with Meikle-Kripke's philosophy of real reference is powerful, but as Rorty puts it:

the Russell-Kripke issue is probably a stand-off. One can play it either way, and develop a system from either starting point with equal completeness and elegance.

If this is true, then our choice will not be commanded by logic but by preference, and this strengthens a wider point of Rorty's when he says:

it is very doubtful indeed that the Kantian ideas which are taken for granted in our culture are going to be refuted by anything that philosophy professors do. (100)

A teleological Marxism of real natures will be judged not by standards of internal logic or rigour, but by the sense it makes to people of real histories and experience. 101

The question remains, however, after our move through Marxism's crisis and an attempted philosophic restatement of its traditional form, why does MacIntyre not seek his resolution of modernity here? Why does he seek in After Virtue, to restore teleological conceptions to our culture via the narrative features of human life 102 rather than through the development of real natures or essences? At one level the
answer is clear enough, he simply does not believe in Aristotle's naturalistic teleology or what he calls Aristotle's 'metaphysical biology'. He gives no argument as to why he does not accept it, so we can only speculate. It may well be, that he is simply unconvinced by realist and essentialist philosophic argument. But it is possible that he chooses a narrative, rather than a naturalistic version of Aristotelian teleology, for ultimately, political reasons.

It is, to a recent essay, by Cornelius Castoriadis that we must turn to furnish the grounds for this suspicion of political motives on MacIntyre's part. Castoriadis in his essay From Marx to Aristotle, from Aristotle to Us has, like Meikle, noted the importance of Aristotle as well as Hegel for Marx, but with very different conclusions. The basis of his argument is this: Marx's concepts and categories are at heart Aristotelian as, for example, in the case of the concept of labour

... in a formula of the purest Aristotelian casting, materialises "the faculties that originally lie sleeping in productive man" and only the through and through transformation of man into "producer" completely awakens the dormant faculties, actualizes the telos of man; (104)

This is basically Meikle's point; but he claims at the heart of Aristotle is a tension which is not resolved and reproduces itself in Marx's work.

Castoriadis argues that the question raised at the start of the Nichomachean Ethics as to whether the supreme human good is either nature (physis) or law (nomo) is not finally resolved by
Aristotle, in any of his work. Castoriadis argues that it is this ambiguity that ultimately haunts Marx's work also, as he puts it in relation to Marx:

"do the "equality" of human beings and the commensurability of their labours depend on the physics of man ("natural" or "social") or on nomos, the law, the social-historical institution of a particular society, capitalist society — in other words, is there a physis of history that requires that a particular nomos must be realised at a particular moment?" (105)

This, then, is the tension within Aristotle, for Castoriadis, physis and nomos, nature and law. This is the tension between man as a natural kind species and man as socially constituted being. As Castoriadis puts it:

"Every being is in as much as a being it actualises what it was to be (to ti en einai) in as much as it accomplishes its destination" (106)

But in human beings this is in some sense broken. But why? Because virtue is the telos of man, his "natural ends" but it is not "natural" in the sense that men arrive there "more often than not" and spontaneously. Almost all horses ... accomplish the end of a horse; almost no man really accomplishes virtue, and strictly no city accomplishes its telos. And of course, virtue has not this "power" to be accomplished in the case of man, because virtue ought to be created by paideia, that is to say, by the fundamental institutions of the city. (107)

This, then, is the problem, how can the physis and telos of man, ie the natural kind purpose of being human, be fulfilled, except by the nomos or law and institutions of the city. But since Aristotle knows most people do not become completely virtuous and most cities do not embody it, to socialise their inhabitants. How is this gap between the natural end and the social form to be overcome.
For Castoriadis, Aristotle's greatness lies in the fact that he does not simply collapse the one into the other. He does not produce a false resolution, as does Plato, who presupposes that virtue is already effectively created as the goal of total justice capable of realising itself in the form of an instance that institutes - whether "the legislation or the people". (109)

Here then, is the basis for Castoriadis's condemnation of the Aristotelian Marx, for he does collapse nomos into physis, the social into a natural kind teleology, as he puts it:

Does not Marx want to show that a certain physis of man and of history must lead them to their "goal" to their predetermined telos communism? Does he not try to find in the proletariat the legislation, which by its own proper historical nature as a universal class does not have particular interests and would therefore vindicate the human essence/nature of man, such as will be undoubtedly manifested when "labour will become the prime need of life?" (110)

Is this the real political problem that lies behind a move back to an essentialist teleology, Aristotelian or Marxist? Whether this is so, or not, it is likely to be a powerful consideration for theorists immersed in a liberal culture, and perhaps provide them with strong motives to resist a fully updated Aristotelian-Hegelian Marx.

MacIntyre has shown himself aware of this problem and the likely consequences these cultural resistances would have for Marxism. In 1968 in his book Marxism and Christianity he echoes the picture of Marxism's fate made earlier in the chapter when he states:

Marxism was overcome by and assimilated itself to the modes of thought of the very society of which it sought to be a critique. (111)

This happens he argues because implicitly, Marxism's chief
representatives shed those elements, that made it more than a set of private opinions, ie:

Marxism's Hegelian inheritance and with it the loss of that particular view of human nature upon which Marx's own moral critique had depended. (112)

This is the dissipation of a view of human nature and process, which as we have seen, had made theory an explicit political and moral view, that would guide social transformation.

MacIntyre argues that by the end of the 19th century, as is clear from the Bernstein controversy, most European Marxists accepted bourgeois moral formalism - Bernstein falling back on to Kantian moral imperatives and Kautsky, nothing other than one more version of utilitarianism ...

(113) In effect MacIntyre argues that the same privatisation process that has happened to religion in the 19th and 20th centuries has happened to Marxism. He writes:

secularisation has not resulted ... (in us) ... acquiring a new and more rational set of beliefs about the nature of man and the world. Rather, men have been deprived of any overall view and to this extent have been deprived of one possible source of understanding and of action ... the conditions which are inimical to religion seem to be inimical to Marxism too. (114)

In these conditions Marxism all too easily becomes a matter of personal intellectual conviction; If that is so, as MacIntyre is clearly painfully aware, it becomes trivial and in a sense not Marxism at all.

MacIntyre's resolution of liberalism, is to start where the culture
actually is. He, in Castoriadis's terms, is firmly in the camp of nomos. His narrative conception of human life and community, focus on the quest of defining the good life, as being the good life itself; there are no claims to any definitive end to history. Narratives are constructed from human lives, as they exist; purposes are the product of human interpretation, but with the need for such interpretation a permanent part of being human. Teleology reconnects morality with the realm of facts, but in a form that refuses an essentialist grounding. The 'moral critic' is placed back in history, the history of a particular life, with an inherited identity and into an inherited community - we explore some consequences of this in the final chapter.
NOTES


2. Ibid, p.1370.


9. Ibid.


11. Ibid, p.27.


14. R. Jacoby, op.cit., p.27.


17. The literature in English on this is now quite considerable, see Michael Lowy's 'Revolution against progress: Walter Benjamin's Romantic Anarchism', New Left Review, No.152, July/August 1985, and more generally by the same author, 'Jewish Messianism and Libertarian Utopia in Central Europe' in New German Critique, No.20, Spring/Summer 1980 also Richard Wolin, Walter Benjamin, an Aesthetic of Redemption, Columbia University Press: New York, 1982 is an important work on this topic.

18. A powerful account of what Stalinism did to its political opponents, inside Russia, and how they responded, is to be found in Ante Ciliga, The Russian Enigma, Ink Links: London, 1979.


30. Althusser is the classic example in Britain, with numerous pieces of Marxist sociology in Britain referring to his work. Gramsci is a slightly different case, theorist and politician, his influence has been more subtle especially on historical work by historians like E.P. Thompson and E. Genovese, with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, reflecting both influences.


32. This return behind Marx is also on index, as Anderson has also noted, of the continuing pessimistic pressure upon 20th century Marxist thought, for these 'borrowings' greatly affect the structure of the theory, "Gramsci's revolutionary temper was tersely expressed in the maxim, 'pessimism of the intellect, optimism for the will', ... The pervasive melancholy of the work of the Frankfurt School lacked any comparable note of active fortitude. Adorno and Horkheimer called in question the very idea of man's ultimate mastery of nature, as a realm of deliverance beyond capitalism. Marcuse evoked the utopian potentiality of the liberation of nature in man, only to deny it the more emphatically as the objective tendency in reality, and to conclude that the industrial working class was itself absorbed past recall within capitalism. The pessimism of Althusser and Sartre had another but no less grave horizon, the very structure of socialism itself. Althusser declared that even communism would remain opaque as a social order to the individuals living under it, deceiving them with the perpetual illusion of their liberty as subjects, Sartre rejected the very idea of a true dictatorship of the proletariat as an impossibility, and interpreted the bureaucratisation of socialist revolutions as the ineluctable product of a scarcity whose end remained inconceivable in this century." Perry Anderson, op.cit., p.89.


36. Gillian Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, Athlone: London, 1981. In chapter one of this powerful and difficult book, Rose lays bare the Neo-Kantian basis of both Weber and Durkheim and most of 20th century western Marxism. She says of Kant, 'The demarcation of legitimate theoretical and practical knowledge turns out to be the demarcation of new areas of ignorance ... In sum, the finite only is knowable, while the infinite transcends the realm of thought ... The unknowability of what Kant calls, among other names, the "unconditioned" or the "infinite", results in the unknowability of ourselves, both as subjects of experience "the transcendent unity of apperception", and as moral agents capable of freedom. Parri passu, the unknowability of ourselves means that the social, political and historical determinants of all knowledge and all action remain unknown and unknowable.' P.44. In its place Rose presents what she calls a speculative reading of Hegel, as opposed to reading his work as ordinary grammatical propositions. To read 'speculatively' in this sense 'means that the identity which is affirmed between subject and predicate is seen equally to affirm a lack of identity between subject and predicate' (p.48-9). The whole book should be taken as a critique of formalism, so there can be no question of a distinction between theory and method, nor can the subject be given a definition prior to working through the text and its consequent experience. Hence she seems to be suggesting a rooting of theory in a Hegelian re-education of consciousness, ie a phenomenology.

This difficult nomic work seems to be an attempt to avoid what Adorno termed Identity logic (Rose is author of a study of Adorno) in which the irreducible particularity of existence is reduced to its formal-rational component. Her work may open the way to a proper Hegelian/Marxian theory of consciousness that would take Marxism away from the structure/action question, which is, on her terms, another version of Kantian formalism.

37. J.T. Bergner, op.cit., p.64.


41. For anyone who wants to, Althusser's thought on these matters can be followed in E.P. Thompson's Poverty of Theory, op.cit., p.202-205. Paul Piccone's 'Structuralist Marxism,' Radical
America III, No.5, September 1969, p.25-30 is probably the best short critique of Althusser's conception of science, written from a more or less Hegelian Marxist viewpoint.

42. Especially the group around the journals Theoretical Practice and then later Economy and Society, the most famous members of this group are Paul Q. Hirst and Barry Hindess.

43. The fate of the British Althusserians can be traced through Paul Hirst and Barry Hindess's Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London 1975, to the same authors, Mode of Production and Social Formation: an autocritique of Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production: Macmillan: London, 1977, down to co-authored with the above by Anthony Cutler and Athar Hussain (old hands from Theoretical Practice) Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today, Two volumes, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977 and 1978. In the final works the authors de-construct most of the concepts of Althusserian Marxism, such as the mode of production, any version of the Labour Theory of Value, economic determination etc. The result of all this was the reduction of Marxism to 'a medium of political calculation' (P. Hirst, On Law and Ideology, Macmillan, London, 1979, p.3). The practical consequence of which seems to have been the foundation of the relatively short lived bi-annual journal Politics and Power, vols1-4 Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980-2. For a valuable survey of the varieties of Althusserian and Post-Althusserian work see Ellen Meiksins Wood: The Retreat from Class: a new true Socialism, Verso: London, 1986.

44. Perhaps the most influential work has been that of Roy Bhasker: A Realist Theory of Science, Harvester Sussex, 1978.


48. This point is elaborated in a realist critique of so called 'Game Theory Marxism', although sharing many of its anti-metaphysical premises, see Scott Lash and John Urry, 'The New Marxism of Collective Action: a Critical Analysis', Sociology, Vol.18, No.1, February, 1984.

49. See Jon Elster's Logic and Society, Wiley Chichester 1976, and his most important statement of this 'New Marxism', Making Sense of Marx, Cambridge University Press; Cambridge 1985 - this latter work appeared too late to be fully included in this analysis.


52. See, for example, Perry Anderson praise in *Arguments within English Marxism*, Verso: London, 1980 where it is said of Cohen's discussion of the whole Base/superstructure metaphor: 'It so happens, in fact, that we now possess a stringent and persuasive vindication of its role within Marxist theory, in Cohen's work whose intellectual force supersedes virtually all previous discussion.', p.72. Note that Cohen is being deployed against Thompson who in the process of his critique of Althusser in 'The Poverty of Theory' (op.cit.) was also making his break from orthodox Marxism although in a very different style and intention to Hindess and Hirst etc.


55. Gillian Rose, op.cit., p.45.


60. Cohen, op.cit., p.28.

61. Ibid, p.31.

62. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol.I, Penguin Books/New Left Review, London, 1976, p.103. It is good to be able to note that this is recognised now even by those who were once heavily influenced by Althusser. Richard Johnson for example, can now write that 'The attempt to drive a wedge between Hegel and the 'later' Marx is a distinct weakness of Althusserian interpretations and leads to some real travesties of 'reading' of the Marx texts themselves' in 'Reading for the best Marx' history-writing and historical abstraction' in *Making Histories: studies in history-writing and politics*; centre for contemporary cultural Studies ed. Richard Johnson, Gregor McLennan, Bill Schwartz, David Sutton, p.353, note.49.

63. J. Elster, 'Making Sense of Marx', op.cit.

64. Sayers, op.cit., p.5.


66. This is clearly brought out his book, *Marxism and Hegel*, NLB: London, 1973, and perhaps most pointedly in his interview with Perry Anderson for New Left Review, Lucio Colletti, 'A Political and Philosophical Interview in Gareth Stedman, Jones et al, *Western Marxism: a critical reader*, New Left Review Editions: London, 1977. Here he says, 'there are two main traditions in this respect: one that descends from Spinoza and Hegel and the other from Hume and Kant. These two lines of development are profoundly divergent. For any theory that takes science as the sole form of real knowledge - that is falsifiable, as Popper would say - there can be no question that the tradition of Hume-Kant must be given priority and preference over that of Spinoza-Hegel, p.325.


68. R. Edgley: 'Dialectic, the contradiction of Colletti', op.cit., p.49-50.

70. Ibid, p.22.

71. Ibid, p.24. Meikle is careful to point out that Marxist essentialism cannot be simply developed out of Kripke's position (p.26-9), his work on the necessary identity of things is rather a necessary but not sufficient condition for this kind of Marxism.

72. R. Rorty, 'Kripke versus Kant', op.cit.


74. Ibid, p.151.,

75. Christopher Norris's first book Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, Methuen: London, 1982 is an excellent guide to this complex and often bewildering topic.

76. C. Norris, Deconstructive Turn, op.cit., p.152.

77. Rorty, op.cit.

78. C. Norris, Deconstructive Turn, op.cit., p.154.


80. See, for example, a response to modern liberal protestant theology, Keith Ward, Holding Fast to God, SPCK: London, 1982.


82. 'Making Nonsense of Marx', op.cit. p.38.

83. Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx, op.cit., p.9.

84. 'Making Nonsense of Marx', op.cit., p.38.

85. Ibid, p.38-9 'Ergon' behaviour of a kind that expresses the essence of the kind of thing it is, see Glossary p.176, in Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx, op.cit, see also, on the question of what a law is p.171-4, ibid.

86. Ibid, p.40.
others who have noted Marx Aristotelian connection include the work of Richard W. Miller, 'Marx and Aristotle: a kind of consequentialism', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supp. vol. 7, 1981, and Alan Gilbert's, 'Marx's moral realism: eudaimonism and moral progress' in T. Ball and J. Farr (ed.) After Marx, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984. In addition on the question of the Labour Theory of Value in relation to essentialism see Diane Elson's 'The Value theory of Labour' in D. Elson (ed.) Value: the Representation of Labour in Capitalism, (C.S.E. Books London, 1979) especially p. 149 where she is using the Aristotelian concept of potentialia to explain Marx's theory. All these seem compatible with Scott Meikle's approach. Also see Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958, the entire book being an exploration of the tradition of thought concerning 'work, labour and activity' which she sees running from Aristotle to Marx. More recently R.N. Berk's Insight and Vision: the problem of Communism in Marx's Thought, J.M. Dent: London, 1983, his understanding of at least the derivation of Marx's thought, as opposed to its viability, is at one with Meikle: 'Marx's connecting capitalism and communism is really not much more than a peculiar and striking adaption of the Aristotelian categories of potentiality and actuality, and it is certainly not an accident that Marx's later theoretical writings (the Grundrisse as well as Capital) are replete with references to Aristotle, in revealing contrast to the earlier texts. Of course, Marx's immanentist 'Hegelianism' and his increasing reliance on and preoccupation with Aristotle are not in any sort of contradiction: Hegel himself ... (needs little) ... analysis for his Aristotelianism to be discovered ... But again neither Hegel nor Marx is a simple interpreter of Aristotle. Marx's project, and in this he more or less carries further and perhaps culminates the Hegelian philosophical enterprise, is an attempt at a gigantic synthesis of classical and modern thought...' p. 97-98. This seems to be the basis of Marx's unrepeatable brilliance, it could be said of him what he said of Cobbet, that he was 'the last man of the old world, and the first man of the new.'


88. Meikle, Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx, op. cit., p. 31.


90. Ibid, p. 33.


92. Ibid, p. 36.

93. Ibid, p. 36.
94. Quoted in ibid, p.42.
95. Ibid, p.44.
96. Ibid, p.47.
97. Ibid, p.57.
98. Ibid, p.58 on this point see Meikle note 137, p.58.
99. Ibid.
100. Rorty, 'Kripke versus Kant', op.cit., both Rorty quotations.
101. Important attempts at precisely this have been made by the Marxist political economist Hillel Ticktin working on the fate of the Russian Marxism and what the existence of the USSR as a bureaucratic tyranny means for teleology. See especially 'Towards a Political Economy of the USSR', Critique 1 and 'Class Structure and the Soviet Elite', Critique 9. Ticktin is now applying these same essentialist Marxist categories to modern capitalism in a series of important articles on finance capital, which he sees as both expanding and growing, but also as a declining form of the organism that is capitalism 'Finance Capital, the transitional epoch and Britain', Critique 16, 1984.
102. See our final chapter, plus introduction and After Virtue, op.cit., chapter 15.
103. After Virtue, op.cit., p.152.
110. Ibid, p.735.
112. Ibid, p.130.
114. Ibid, p.111.
Chapter Three

Markets and Morals: Triumph and Fragmentation

There are few ways in which a man can be more innocently employed than in getting money.

Dr Johnson

Where the market is allowed to follow its own autonomous tendencies, its participants do not look towards the person, of each other, but only towards the commodity; there are no obligations of brotherliness or reverence, and none of those spontaneous human relations that are sustained by personal unions.

Max Weber

... the attack on private property has been abandoned (by the Left) and the case for the market economy, as the only adequate basis for distribution is now widely acknowledged. The market is even incorporated by Alec Nove in his recipe for a "feasible socialism", although what he means by "socialism" is perhaps better described as Capitalism with a human face.

Roger Scruton writing in New Socialist, December 1985
We can now turn to examine the roots of our contemporary cultural and political situation. I shall attempt to make good the promise of the introduction, to explicate by supplementing and expanding, the account that is partly assumed and partly present in MacIntyre’s analysis in *After Virtue*. I am therefore going to attempt the complex task of illustrating, in inevitably sketched form, some of the connections and determinations involved, between the account of the economic and social 'Great Transformation', narrated principally, but not solely by Karl Polanyi, and the philosophic and cultural transformation, presented by MacIntyre - stressing the congruence of their approaches.

This will, first of all, involve us in paying some attention to the actual historical process of transformation, to see its scope and limitations. This will then be clarified by the use of certain 'representative' figures (not in the statistical sense) ie Edmund Burke and George Fitzhugh, who in the clarity and self-awareness of their lives and work, seem to incarnate some of the tensions and contradictions found in the particular social systems they inhabited. These figures help us think through, if only by example, the vexed question of the effects of social relations upon intellectual thought and culture. The underlying similarities of method and objectives between MacIntyre and Polanyi will be explored. Finally, these approaches will be supplemented by philosophical/sociological considerations concerning notions of the self and the individual, in relation to the actual workings of a market economy. Here I draw especially on the work of George Simmel.
I

HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATION?

It is vital to recall at the outset that MacIntyre's philosophical and sociological theory, presupposes a particular history. It is rooted in a sense of the development of a capitalist market order out of a feudal society. In this context this means being rooted in a sense of the possibilities of life being lived in very different ways; with purposes and meanings attached to practices and institutions that order life quite differently from the way we live now. For MacIntyre feudal society, whatever its distinctive features, shared enough in common with other non-capitalist, pre-industrial cultures (eg the classical world or the Arab Empire) to make the emergence of a capitalist market society, a quite qualitatively distinct type of social order. In other words, MacIntyre's entire account is based upon the idea that some version of this radical transition, or what following Polanyi, we might call 'The Great Transformation' thesis, has been vindicated.¹

Recently, however, the reality of this Great Transformation has been challenged, most notably in Alan MacFarlane's The Origins of English Individualism.² MacFarlane makes large claims for his work. He states that:

What is absolutely clear is that one of the major theories of economic anthropology is incorrect, namely the idea that we witness in England between the 16th century and 19th century the "Great Transformation" from a non-market peasant society where economics is "embedded" in social relations, to a modern market, capitalist, system where
economy and society have been split apart. This view is most clearly expressed in the work of Karl Polanyi. (3)

MacFarlane is quite clear about the sociological and cultural consequences of his work. He states:

Yet if the present thesis is correct, individualism in economic and social life is much older than this in England (post 1500). In fact, within the recorded period covered by our documents, it is not possible to find a time when an Englishman did not stand alone, symbolised and shaped by his ego-centred kinship system, he stood in the centre of his world. (4)

In certain respects it would not be unfair to say that MacFarlane's work could seem to be part of a sophisticated Liberal/Conservative move to eternalise the market, or at least push its origins so far back in history, that it can appear a relatively permanent feature of the social landscape. This view would see the market as an 'institution' compatible with a variety of political, cultural and religious arrangements, the origins and specific character of which would have to be looked for elsewhere. In effect, he defends Adam Smith as he says:

Adam Smith founded classical economics on the premise of the rational "economic" man believing he was describing a universal and long evident type ... According to Polanyi, such a man had only just emerged, stripped of his ritual, political and social needs. The implication of the present arguments, however, is that it was Smith who was right and Polanyi who was wrong, at least in relation to England. Homo economicus and the market society had been present in England for centuries before Smith wrote. (5)

But whatever Macfarlane's political intention others have not been slow to pick up the implications of his point. The popular Conservative journalist Ferdinand Mount, has used MacFarlane's book as an historical basis for saying that collective control is profoundly unEnglish. He states:
If MacFarlane is right - and the battle is still raging - the English were always individualists and never enmeshed in, or aspiring towards tribal collective ways of life. In that case, why should we not be allowed to cultivate our heritage? Is it not our destiny to be home-owning, self-employed capital acquiring, two-car nuclear families? (6)

It is clear, however, that MacFarlane's view, were it to be accepted, would dangerously undermine the necessarily totalistic element of MacIntyre's account, which is dependent upon connecting, albeit in a relatively loose manner, economic, political and cultural changes together. As MacIntyre puts it:

... my preference for Polanyi's type of narrative is that it avoids the methodological mistakes which all three (make, Marxist, Neo Marxist, Weberian) most notably the error of supposing that we can identify economic or social factors independently from ideological or theoretical factors in such a way as to produce causal explanations of a cogent kind. My thesis is not that we cannot distinguish economic or social items from ideological or theoretical items; there is indeed more than one way of marking such a distinction. But when we try to understand the narratives of historical change in terms of any one of these sets of distinctions, the causal explanations which they yield are generally implausible. It is only when we understand and categorise the social and economic phenomena in such a way as to recognise that agents' and participants' understanding of social and economic activity is integral to and partially constitutive of the characteristics of such activities that we provide characterisations which enable us to write rationally defensible explanatory narratives. Karl Polanyi's was just such a narration. (7)

It is open to question as to how fair this characterisation of Marxist explanation is, but it can leave us in no doubt as to the integral connectness of economic and social, cultural and theoretical phenomena in MacIntyre's thought. It follows therefore that the presence of widespread economically individualistic attitudes in 13th century England, would be very damaging to his conception of the transformation of social and moral thought and practice occurring at a
later stage. For MacIntyre's account is built around a notion of the triumph or at least predominance, both intellectually and materially, of versions of liberal individualism, which became established in the period from the 16th century to the 19th century. He is quite clear that his account depends on there being:

a sharp contrast between the self-aggrandising drive for power and money in the European communities of the 12th century and even 13th century and that drive in the 16th and 17th century, a contrast signalled by the different ways in which the relationship of the self to what it possesses is conceptualised. (9)

So how far, if at all, is MacFarlane correct in his claim that the forms of life that Polanyi and numerous other historians and social scientists, believed to have emerged in the 16th century, were in fact present from at least the 13th century? I shall attempt to show that his account is deeply flawed. To do so we must examine his account more closely.

The core of Macfarlane's argument is as follows: the claim that medieval England was a peasant society is wrong because truly peasant societies have very definite characteristics, the principal ones of which are missing from England in the period from 1250 to 1750. It follows from this that Macfarlane challenges the view that England was radically transformed between the 15th century and the 18th century, as it made a move from a medieval peasant society to an agrarian capitalist society, with a corresponding development of ideas of autonomy and individual political rights. He claims that as early as the 13th century, the basic marks of a capitalist economy can be seen to have been present within the country.
Macfarlane is attacking the view, widely accepted, that England came to differ from the rest of Europe because its capitalist transformation occurred between the 15th century and the 18th century. But rather he claims that this change lay in a much earlier development of capitalism in England in the 13th century, while the rest of Europe remaining largely peasant societies, for many more centuries. So, for Macfarlane the origins of English individualism are pushed right back, possibly, before we have adequate records and documents, to the early Anglo-Saxon Germanic settlements.

Macfarlane's thesis depends upon him making a key conceptual move, in order to challenge the claims of most medieval historians that England at the dawn of the 16th century was a peasant society. This involves him in constructing a model of 'peasant society', and arguing that certain key features of such a society are missing from England, in the three centuries leading up to 1500.10

So what is Macfarlane's definition of a peasant society? He has five criteria. The first two are taken from Daniel Thorner and are that 'half the population must be agricultural' and 'more than half the working population must be engaged in agriculture'.11 The next two criteria are:

that a peasantry can exist only where there is a state, in other words, a ruling hierarchy, an external political power sovereign over the particular community of 'peasants'. The second is that there are almost inevitably towns with markets the culture of which is quite different from that of the countryside. (12)

The final criteria is that:
the family farm is the basic unit of peasant ownership, production consumption and social life. The individual, the family and the farm, appears as an indivisible whole. (13)

From this Macfarlane proceeds to point out that there is a very rich literature on the peasantry from almost all over the world. He suggests that to put together a general picture from all these sources would 'produce an unsatisfactory rag bag', and instead he decides to concentrate on just one area for his model. This area is Eastern Europe. He does this because it has been subject to so much scholarly attention and also because it is just about the right distance from England, not part of the general area of Western Europe (the area that Macfarlane is trying to distinguish England from), but part of general European culture and permeated by Christianity. His final reason is that such important English medieval historians as E.A. Kosminsky, Sir Paul Vinogradoff and M.M. Postan, were themselves Eastern Europeans, and as such, he claims that:

It is clear from their writings that they were consciously comparing medieval England with traditional Russia. (15)

Hilton provides a compendious summary of what, for MacFarlane, a peasant society would really look like, allowing for the fact that MacFarlane astonishingly has almost nothing to say about the concentration of land ownership among landlords and the nobility:

the family, not the individual, owns the holding, the family on the holding is multi-generational; its emotions are identified with specific pieces of land; women had few, if any, rights; there is no wage labour; there is no social differentiation; there is hardly any production for the market; therefore there are virtually no markets; also, consequentially, there is no market for land. (16)

We can see now that the chief problem with MacFarlane's work lies in
his construction of a model of what a medieval non-capitalist peasantry should look like. In the first place this allows him to ignore or disguise the fact that many of his supposed opponents amongst medieval historians e.g. Rodney Hilton have a quite significantly different notion of what a peasant society is, which allows them to deal with much of what MacFarlane sees as hostile evidence in a different way.  

The second fundamental feature of his model is the family household, which is the basic unit of ownership, production and consumption. From this it follows that individual ownership cannot exist. White and Vann point out that many historians and anthropologists do not adopt this criterion. They note that:

> even anthropologists who stress that the peasant household is the main unit of production and consumption do not necessarily insist that it is always the primary unit of ownership. (18)

In part this emphasis seems to derive from the work of Shanin and as Keith Tribe - a noted critic of Shanin - has argued:

> MacFarlane's use of Shanin's work produces an extreme "peasantist" version of the Russian peasantry against which the alleged English peasantry are measured. (19)

This question of ownership is central. It allows MacFarlane to move to the question of a market in both land and labour, the existence of which is crucial to his claim that capitalism existed in England in the 13th century. It is, I believe, in this area that MacFarlane becomes most seriously unstuck - partly because of confusion over definition and partly because of the nature of the evidence on peasant society in Russia. To begin with on page 13 MacFarlane concedes that to distinguish tribal society from peasant ones, there normally has to exist markets and a state, with the clear implication that there is
peasant production for the market, yet on page 152 he points to the existence of markets in medieval England as providing positive evidence that England was a capitalist society and not a peasant one. However, as both Tribe and Hilton point out, markets existed in Russia in both medieval and modern (ie 19th century) times. Hilton states:

Peasants in medieval Russia produced for the market, bought and sold land (women as well as men), gave dowries to their daughters and redistributed their land through partible inheritance. (20)

He goes on to point out that there is no evidence that they lived in multi-generational rather than nuclear families. Hilton feels that the real difference between the Russian peasantry and those of the west lay in the fact there was a great deal of land available to be colonised in Russia, which made for the easy creation of new households. As for the significance of the existence of a land market in pre-Revolutionary Russia, Tribe makes the important point that:

... private and state serfs bought and sold land in early 19th century Russia and while the form of land transfer was nowhere as significant as that shown by Smith (in MacFarlane) this does not indicate that serfs were individualistic.

Tribe goes on to make the general point, certainly entirely compatible with MacIntyre's theoretical principles, that what MacFarlane neglects:

... is the simple principle that "individuality" is divergently constituted in law, economy, politics and so forth. (21)

We have noted that there is some confusion in MacFarlane's account of the role of markets in peasant societies and as a result, his views as to what constitutes capitalism are also confused. At various points he refers to the existence of markets (eg p.173-4, p.155) to the
existence of cash or money and the existence of wage labour and
servanthood (p.151-155) complex division of labour (p.78-9): all seen
as clear signs of the presence of a capitalist economy. There are many
problems with this: firstly if we take Marx as our theorist of
capitalism, then Marx never took the simple existence of commodity
production as definitive of capitalism; he recognised that probably for
all but the most primitive social formations some form of commodity
production would exist. It was rather the dominant form of surplus
extraction that, for Marx, was definitive of the nature of a
particular social formation.22 However, even if we leave aside
tries at theoretical coherent definitions, as White and Vann point
out no historian has ever imagined that an entirely 'natural economy'
existed in England in the 13th century.23 But as they argue 'markets',
'money', 'local exchange', 'production for market', 'hired labour' etc
can:

... individually and in various combinations ... be found
in unambiguously pre-capitalist societies. So can a
variety of family and kinship relations ... there were
nuclear families in Carolingian society and in many other
parts of the pre- or non-capitalists' world. (24)

However, there is a deeper problem with MacFarlane's work, which makes
him potentially far less damaging to MacIntyre than he otherwise might
be. This lies in his refusal (a refusal which he seems to make a
virtue of) to investigate the feeling, sentiments and mentalities of
the people he is writing about. As White and Vann put it, he:

fails to pierce the veil of legal texts to see how
villagers actually managed their lands and to identify the
sentiments or attitudes that such practices may
reflect. (25)

This makes him critically vulnerable to MacIntyre's point quoted above
concerning the difference between the drive for power and money in the 12th and 13th centuries and the 16th and 17th centuries. The point being that if it is the case that economic relations are in fact embedded in social or customary relations, whatever the apparent 'letter of the law' may say, then the whole force of MacFarlane's polemic against Polanyi and others who think like him is lost.

MacFarlane argues that what matters is who owned the land. He claims to be going deeper than mere 'statistical tendencies' of what was normally done with it, ie land - normally being passed on through the family. MacFarlane is surely wrong in taking this strategy, for it can only be misleading. For example, he relies a great deal on the official legal doctrines of the 13th century as presented in Bracton's On the Laws and Customs of England. It is highly unlikely that they were even known to any of the villages that MacFarlane is concerned with, and the idea that they shared Bracton's assumptions is based on no evidence. His refusal to examine the social and moral context of interpretation and his narrow concentration on the family, leads him to miss the fact that these so-called English individualists were, in fact, members of village communities who often acted together to restrict the way land might be used in particular cases, eg abuse of access to common land. If we also recall that all those peasants discussed by MacFarlane were either serfs or freeholders, both categories of which would have obligations, of various kinds, to their Lords, which may well have severely limited what they could do with their property. MacFarlane's neglect of customs and sentiments
prevents him from realising the problematic nature of the concept of property that he so freely uses. White and Vann point out:

... the tenements of villages were generally comprised party of various use-rights in communal resources such as pasture, wastes, forests and water. He (MacFarlane) seems not to see how difficult it would have been for 'rampant individualists' to have carried on the complex system of village agriculture and husbandry which many medieval social and economic historians have described. (27)

It is clear, therefore, that MacFarlane's account of an essentially individualistic capitalist culture in medieval England, designed to vitiate the notion of a Great Transformation, cannot be sustained.

II

THE SELF AND HISTORY

MacIntyre makes clear that his historical narrative concerning the transformation of conceptions of self and human nature is critically determined by a particular kind of social context. He points out that we tend to think of the Enlightenment as being French, ie 'the philosophes', but in reality they looked to England as an example of a just and 'modern' society, but England in turn was overshadowed culturally by the achievements of the German (Kant, Mozart) and Scottish Enlightenment (Hume, Smith, Ferguson).28

He points out that what the French lacked was a secularised Protestant background with an educated reading public, in effect although he does not greatly elaborate the point, MacIntyre seems to be laying emphasis
on what Jurgen Habermas has described as the existence of a 'Public Sphere'. This involved the disintegration of feudal authorities such as church, princes and nobility, which in the 18th century broke into private and public elements. The Church, of course, continues in existence although religion becomes increasingly a private matter, with the Church becoming one public and legal body amongst others. Whilst the emergence of public authority is marked by the separation of the private household expenses of a ruler from the public budget.

As the old feudal estates changed and the nobility's power shifted to bodies of public authority, merchants, traders and the professions via their corporations and territorial bodies, developed a sphere of society that stood apart from the state (see Chapter 4 for more detail) as a genuine sphere of private autonomy. MacIntyre places special emphasis on the existence of:

an educated class which linked the servants of government, the clergy and lay thinkers in a single reading public. (31)

This is the world of, in England, Dr Johnson and the coffee houses - linked with universities like Kant's Koenigsberg and Hume's Edinburgh.

This, then, briefly is the context in which a series of first rate theorists, by any standards, Hume, Kant, Smith, Diderot and later Kirkegaard attempted to produce for this connected reading public valid arguments which moved from conceptions as to what human nature is, to conclusions about the authority of moral rules. In effect, MacIntyre claims that they failed, but interestingly he sees this as
no intellectual failure, but rather as a failure inherent in the historical situation from which they emerged.

MacIntyre argues that these early modern philosophers inherited a moral schema from medieval Europe which contained both Classical and Christian elements, but that its basic structure is that which is found in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. Now this scheme is fundamentally teleological involving a fundamental contrast between:

\[ \text{man-as-he-happens-to-be} \quad \text{and} \quad \text{man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-essential-nature} \]

(the very clumsiness of the language here is an accurate indication of our conceptual unfamiliarity with such concepts as we have no precise terms for them). As he goes on to argue:

> Ethics is the science which is to enable men to understand how they make the transition from the former state to the latter. Ethics therefore on this view presupposes some account of potentiality and act, some account of the essence of man as a rational animal and above all some account of the human telos. The precepts which enjoin the various virtues and prohibit the vices which are their counterparts, instructs us how to move from potentiality to act, how to realise our true nature and to reach our true end. (33)

This framework, then, contains three central components, all three of which only make sense in relationship to one another: a concept of a basic or 'untutored' human nature, a set of rationally groundable ethics and a notion of 'human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realised its telos'. The ethical precepts are what allows you to pass from one state of human nature to the completed state, the final one being, of course, potentially present within the original. This meant that within medieval Europe and the classically influenced Islamic world,
moral claims had something of the quality of facts (for us). For to say what someone should do, was to say as a matter of fact what would lead them to their true end, as ordained by God and comprehended by reason.

However, with the Protestant Reformation alongside the rise of Jansenist influenced Catholic theology, and the scientific and philosophical rejections of Aristotelianism; the whole basis of this system was fragmented. The Protestants and Jansenists denied the power of human reason to understand man's true end, this being lost with the Fall (Aristotelianism was deeply suspect to the reformers, because of its association with the medieval Catholic Church, Luther regarded The Nicomachean Ethics as the worst book ever written). Emerging 17th century science was also hostile and here the crucial linking thinker between science and theology is Pascal. His role in developing the new science of probability meant that he carefully limited the role of reason in both theology and science.⁴¹ As MacIntyre puts it:

Reason is calculative, it can assess truths of fact and mathematical relations but nothing more. (35)

No question here of understanding essences or potentials and transitions. The options then become faith or scepticism or as in Pascal's case, a rather fraught mixture of both.

This process effectively eliminated the possibility of any concept of 'man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos'. What this left was an apparently unbridgeable gap between the two remaining elements in the moral scheme: on the one hand was a definite content of morality, which almost everyone in this period (atheists as well as theists)
believed was important; on the other, a certain notion of human nature in its basic unreformed state. This was a major problem because the form of these ethical demands were after all designed to develop and educate the notion of human nature as it naturally existed, they were clearly not of a form, or of kind, that could be derived from an appeal to the reality of human nature.

The injunctions of morality, thus understood, are likely to be ones that human nature, thus understood, has strong tendencies to disobey. Hence the 18th century moral philosophers engaged in what was an inevitably unsuccessful project; for they did indeed attempt to find a rational basis for their moral beliefs in a particular understanding of human nature, while inheriting a set of moral injunctions on one hand and a conception of human nature on the other which had been expressly designed to be discrepant with each other. (36)

The upshot of their efforts was that in their negative arguments with opponents they moved closer and closer to the view that no moral argument could move from factual premises to moral and evaluative conclusions (the consequences of which in another context are examined in Chapter Four). This is unsurprising since the intellectual material for such a move had been removed.

Now, if we continually bear in mind, that the picture I have all too briefly sketched is not an abstract intellectual history, but rather an element that partly presupposes and partly contributes to a change in social and political relations. But the question must be clearly posed as to why the fragmentation of this medieval moral frameworks is important for an analysis of the rise of a capitalist market culture. What is it that is implicit in this narrative that may cast new light on this process?
However, before directly answering this it is important to be absolutely clear about the status of such arguments. Thinkers, philosophers and philosophies in no sense caused the rise of capitalism, no spirit of the age is being invoked as a causal factor. In some measures philosophers may be indicators of changes in social relations, although given their role as theorists at this time, and normally dependent upon courts, patrons, universities and journals they are most directly affected by institutional changes, that would in turn have to be placed in a larger setting. But they are not just indicators of social change; they inherit forms of thought from the past, forms deeply implicated in prior social relations, in MacIntyre sense of helping to constitute those relations. These forms cannot be simply ignored, argument itself makes demands upon those who use it and live by it.

We should also note though that ideas and values have a reality in quite another sense, in that they are produced and reproduced not merely by word of mouth or words on the page but via what has been termed the 'emotional economy of the family'. Psychoanalysis - whether fully accepted or not - points out to us the importance of family structures as productive of personalities, identities and ideals. It is not insignificant then, that both Kant and Kierkegaard had Lutheran family backgrounds. David Hume, a Calvinist one, and John Locke a Puritan. The case of Locke is most instructive for our purposes. There is no doubt that he was perhaps the greatest of the British liberal empiricists and that his theory of rights was a part of the
underpinning of the capitalist market and liberal individualism, but it is important to avoid economic reductionism. In the case of Locke, C.B. Macpherson's analysis in his book *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* is a favourite target for this accusation. The distinguished Locke scholar John Dunn has been very critical of Macpherson, he has written:

> Living when he did and as he did, Locke was by necessity in part a bourgeois political theorist. But in so far as he was a Liberal, he was certainly not such because of his moral credulity in the market. Nor is there a shred of evidence that any of his major commitments - tolerance, rationality, individual rights and a modest degree of empiricism - had anything directly to do with the specific institution of capitalism at all ... what Locke trusted in was the Christian God and his own intelligence and when it came to the crunch and the two parted company what he proved to trust in more deeply was the God and not the intelligence. (39)

Yet we can also point out Dunn's further comments in another place on the motives for Locke's theory of property and Macpherson's argument:

> The boldest answer to this question, advanced most strongly by C.B. Macpherson is that Locke intended his theory as an exploration of the moral legitimacy of capitalist production. There is little case for taking this seriously as an assessment of Locke's intention in building his theory. But it is a more interesting question how far this suggestion may capture if in mildly anachronistic terms, Locke's sense of his own achievement in having constructed his theory. (40)

The fact that many of his contemporaries and later liberals of the 18th and 19th centuries understood Locke in the light of this achievement, makes Macpherson's point rather more than anachronistic. Once more we need to take full account of MacIntyre's argument concerning conceptual change:

> ... It was a matter of many different changes gradually acquiring a cumulative effect, so that the nature of those changes only became apparent retrospectively. Indeed, it
is only because the outcome was what it was that those changes have the nature we now ascribe to them. (41)

As we shall see more clearly the emergence of capitalism in all its complexity, both material and ideological, had more than a trace of Hegel's 'cunning of reason' or if you prefer, the unintended consequences of social action.

In what then lay the future importance of this fragmentation of a teleological moral framework? Here it is necessary to deepen and extend MacIntyre's narrative, to draw on the work of Albert Hirschman, in particular his book The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph. Hirschman's narrative is in effect one in which a whole intellectual and moral framework was fashioned in which reason, prudence and good sense all seemed to demand the construction of, or rather intellectual and moral support for, a social order based upon the pursuit of economic self-interest and individualism, rather than in buttressing values and institutions encouraging to communality, altruism and the pursuit of shared values and collective endeavours. In this process we will be able to grasp why it is implicit in MacIntyre's narrative that the capitalist market economy is perhaps the paradigm case of a system that favours external over internal goods. As we shall see this is precisely what the early advocates of the capitalist system (before its triumph) believed it would achieve. This will therefore enable us to highlight precisely what it is about the market mechanism that makes it so inappropriate for the achievement of, as Paul Piccone has put it, a
social individuality where ethics and politics are continuous with each other. (43)

What then is the substance of Hirschman's argument? His starting point is the emergence in the 16th century of a sense of crisis and disarray, the intellectual origins of which we have already referred to and will have little difficulty in recognising. As Hirschman states:

A feeling arose in the Renaissance and became a firm conviction during the 17th century that moralising philosophy and religious precept could no longer be trusted with restraining the destructive passions of men. New ways had to be found, which meant a detailed and candid dissection of human nature. (44)

Here we are on the familiar ground of the crisis of authority in late medieval and early modern Europe as the old institutional forms and intellectual defences of medieval Europe were forced to come to terms with the new social forces; powerful independent states supported by new economic power. But what possible response was there to this situation? Clearly the newly powerful rulers and states could themselves be appealed to to provide the necessary coercion and repression. However, such an appeal lacked a certain intellectual coherence, for given the pessimistic views of human nature that were increasingly dominant, appeals to monarchs or rulers to act always wisely with reason and justice seemed to be asking of them what seemed to be impossible for ordinary people.

A second option that seemed to be rather more promising, lay in the notion of harnessing the potentially destructive passions; using the state and society as a transformer, to use 'human nature' for the
greater good of all. This notion was clearly set out by Bernard Mandeville and followed later by Adam Smith. In Mandeville's *The Fable of the Bees* skilful politicians were to manipulate the human vice or passion of luxury for the good of society. As is well known Smith developed this notion in *The Wealth of Nations* celebrating the invisible hand, operating through individual self-interest. But as Hirschman points out, Smith made an absolutely crucial semantic move:

Smith was able to take a further giant step in the direction of making the proposition palatable and persuasive: he blunted the edge of Mandeville's shocking paradox by substituting for "passion" and "vice" such bland terms as "advantage" or "interest". (49)

We will examine this type of movement more closely in a moment. But we must note, a third option, really a subtle variant of the second, but of great importance for understanding the triumph of external over internal goods. This third option can be called following Hirschmann 'the principle of the countervailing passion'. Here it was suggested, assuming the awesome power of human passions, why not use a relatively innocuous passion as a means of limiting or restraining other more dangerous ones. But then the question arises what is to be thought relatively innocent and what potentially politically destructive.

The key to the problem lies in the way in which certain passions or vices become detached from others, all of which were traditionally condemned, and were connected with and disguised by a word like 'interest'. The passions that had all been lumped together for condemnation included ambition, lust for power, greed, sexual lust, avarice etc. Interestingly, Hirschmann notes that in the many tracts
on the passions that appeared in the 17th century:

no change whatsoever can be found in the assessment of
avarice as the "foulest of them all". (50)

This was the position it had achieved towards the end of the Middle
Ages. 51

It was ideologically necessary, in order for certain passions to
trip\ymph, for them to be redefined and in effect renamed, under the
rubric of the increasingly fashionable notion of 'interest'. In the
16th century the term 'interest' began to be used in common parlance
in a way that shifted its meaning away from its traditional legal
sense 52 to become a notion expressing concerns and aspirations by no
means limited to material aspects of a person's welfare. But it always
carried with it an element of reflection and calculation on how this
welfare was to be achieved. In particular this was the sense others
emphasised such as Machiavelli in regard to state craft, although he
does not use the term. 53

However, by the middle of the 17th century we can note the semantic
drift in the meaning of interest towards material and economic
aspects. In this respect it parallels the development of other words
about this time, like 'corruption', which Machiavelli had used to
describe a decline in the quality of government, but by the 18th
century this word, especially in Britain, had become so tied to
bribery that it drives out the other more inconclusive meaning. Much
the same thing happened with the word fortune, with its older use
again in Machiavelli (fortuna) covering most aspects of human
endeavour,\[^{54}\] but reduced gradually to the gaining of wealth in 'seek your fortune'. Here also the work of Benjamin Nelson is pertinent, obviously his well known work on changing attitudes to Usury parallels our narrative,\[^{55}\] but his lesser known essay on the changing conceptions of friendship highlights changing notions of self and its relationship with money, which in turn parallels changing notions of friendship between states in international law, in the period from the 16th century to the 18th century. This reveals a similar drift from wider to more narrow notions of interest. Nelson argues that Antonio's surety for Bassario in Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice* represented medieval ideals:

In the history of the ideal of Friendship, Shakespeare stands at the parting of the ways. The ancient and Renaissance ideals of friendship, as well as the medieval ideal of sworn brotherhood ... was ambivalent and inviduous friends and sworn brothers are supposed to share all goods, services and sentiments including hatred of one another's enemies. By Shakespeare's day the worldy-wise were already denying the usefulness of 'exaggerated' manifestations of friendship. (56)

Shakespeare seems to defend the friendship - surety motif in the play. Nelson argues that many Elizabethans shared Sir Walter Raleigh's views:

... suffer not thy self to be wounded for other men's faults, and scouraged for other men's offences, which is surety for another; for thereby millions of men have been beggared and destroyed paying the reckoning of other men's riot and the change of other men's folly and prodigality if thou smart, smart for thine own sins. (57)

In the sphere of international relations, Nelson argues that from the 16th century onwards there is a systematic movement away from the 'utopian' ideal of the medieval and classical world. In accordance with the emergence of generally universalistic concepts of relations,
which seem to parallel Kantian notions of personal morality, friendship between nations becomes more and more to be something defined negatively rather than positively, as Nelson puts it:

All nations not formally allies or enemies seem to be reckoned as friends. It is held to be natural, desirable and mutually profitable for all men and all nations to be friends. However, little more seems to be meant by this proposition than that nations and individuals alike, are obliged to do their best - not to make others hostile to themselves. (58)

To sum up then by the 18th century, one set of passions formally described as greed, avarice, etc were seen as capable of being used to restrain other passions such as ambition, power lust, and sexual lust. As Hirschman puts it:

... once money-making wore the label of "interest" and re-entered in this disguise the competition with the other passions, it was suddenly acclaimed and even given the task of holding back those passions that had long been thought to be much less reprehensible. (59)

Hirschman's explanation of this takes us right back to the core of MacIntyre's argument, for he suggests that:

the term "interests" actually carried - and therefore bestowed on money making - a positive and curative connotation deriving from its recent close association with the idea of a more enlightened way of conducting human affairs, private as well as public. (60)

For "interest" as a concept caused so much excitement because it seemed to provide a realistic basis upon which the social order could be founded, based upon the principles of 'predictability' and 'constancy' for as Sir James Stewart put it:

were miracles wrought every day, the laws of nature would no longer be laws; and were everyone to act for the public, and neglect himself, the statesman would be bewildered ... (61)

Clearly then the pursuit of economic self-interest could now be seen
as a valuable instrument of social coordination as well as leading to national material prosperity. But most crucially for MacIntyre's account the pursuit of economic interest with its 'predictability' and 'constancy' was a natural part of, and complement to, the new philosophies of the natural sciences and human nature, with, as we have noted above, their increasing emphasis on the Fact-Value split. We will see in the next chapter the way managerial power derived its value-neutrality and its claims to manipulative authority from the 17th and 18th century philosophies, so that MacIntyre can argue:

twentieth century social life turns out in key part to be the concrete and dramatic re-enactment of 18th century philosophy. (62)

But the other side of this triumph of 'bureaucratic individualism' is the expectation of a constant and predictable element in the newly individuated persons of this social order, tied to no imposed moral framework, but inherent within, and spontaneously springing from, human nature itself. It is with Adam Smith that this movement attains its apogee as 'interests' and 'passion' are seamlessly merged. In Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments he states:

For what purpose is all the toil and bustle of this world? What is the end of avarice and ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power, and pre-eminence? ... From whence ... arises the emulation which runs through all the different ranks of men and what are the advantages which we propose by that great purpose of human life which we call bettering our condition? To be observed to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy complacency and appreciation are all the advantages which we can propose to derive from it. It is the vanity, not the ease or the pleasure, which interests us. (63)

Here, as Hirschman notes, is the 'final reductionist step turning two into one'. 64 Here, economic interest is no longer separate from or
restraining other desires, but rather seen as a means for their achievement. Non-economic desires are still seen as very powerful but they smoothly fit into and reinforce the drive for economic interest.

We can make the move that Hirschman fails to. For we can see that Adam Smith is describing and responding to a society in which the pursuit of external goods has triumphed over internal ones, in which the fateful transition to a capitalist market economy, has been more or less accomplished.

The collapse of the passions and the interests together under the general rubric of interest is, of course, a move of great consequence. It is not only the basis of the famous 'invisible hand' in which persons 'private interests and passions' are the instrument for the betterment of society, but also the positivistic Marxist interpretation of class interest as well as the enormous literature in the social sciences on 'rational choice theory', 'economic theories of democracy' and methodological individualism in general. Most of these theories including some version of Marxism take rational calculable and predictable aspects of human nature for granted and like Smith assume they can be used for the purposes of explaining human behaviour or as a means towards social and political integration. Claus Offe makes the point from within Marxism cum systems theory:

The ownership of the means of production, market competition and the private use of capital are institutional means that serve to separate the problem of system integration from the process of will formation,
collective action and societal control. For an essential feature of markets is that they neutralise meaning as a criterion of production and distribution. (66)

It is this that reveals the deep connection between the triumph of bureaucratic managerialism and that of the market. For the market like the manager is premised on the fact and value split. Just as the capitalist market cannot operate without the manager (for very specific reasons see Chapter Four) neither can the manager, as a pervasive authority figure, exist without the social and cultural triumph of particular conceptions of self and self interest - over the older conception of both passions and virtues. It is in this context then, peculiarly important that Adam Smith is both the author of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* and *The Wealth of Nations*, for he along with his contemporary Scottish Enlightenment intellectuals, like Adam Ferguson and John Millar, mark the shift from a philosophical moral discourse to political economy and social science. A shift which is both partly constitutive of, and partly a register, of the so-called 'Great Transformation'.

We have therefore, in a manner that both strengthens and develops MacIntyre's position, unravelled a little of the specific intellectual process by which the market-dimension (implicit but underdeveloped in MacIntyre) of the culture of 'bureaucratic individualism', became triumphant. That is in short, how the intellectual and institutional fragmentation of the medieval synthesis created conditions which allowed key critical intellectuals to bestow upon emerging capitalist market relationships a benign aura; viewing them at the very least as
innocent, clean, gentle, passions and at the strongest – seeing in
them a new regulative principle of society that might preserve peace
and harmony. It is this view, unfamiliar though it is to most modern
political thought of both Right and Left, that reveals most clearly
the affinity between the market, and the criterialess self of
modernity. But more on this later.

III
THE MARKET AND THE VIRTUES

Karl Polanyi in virtually all his writings is at pains to oppose
ideas, popular with some economists and economic and historical
anthropologists, that wished to construct an overall unified economic
type which could cover all human societies past and present.
Polanyi's contention is that those who have attempted to uncover an
overall economic science, have in fact imposed concepts derived from
their understanding of market economies, on to non-market ones. In
this process, he maintains that they have done, precisely what we
noted in the work of Alan MacFarlane: seeing past societies as filled
with acquisitive individualists and thereby supporting the theory of
human nature held by Adam Smith and his followers, ie the idea of
some 'unquenchable propensity 'to truck and barter'.

Polanyi sets out his basic theoretical orientation both in The Great
Transformation and in a lengthy essay The Economy as Instituted
Here, he makes the very Weberian distinction between 'substantive' and 'formal' economies - a point, as we shall see, of considerable importance for his relationship with MacIntyre's work. Polanyi argues that:

the substantive meaning of economic derives from man's dependence for his living, upon nature and his fellows. It refers to the interchange with his natural and social environment, in so far as this results in supplying him with the means of material want - satisfaction.

In essence this definition is alike to what Marx means by the concept of 'use value'. Whilst

the formal meaning of economic derives from the logical character of the means - ends relationship as apparent in such words as "economical" or "economising". It refers to a definite situation of choice, namely that between the different uses of means induced by an insufficiency of those means. (68)

Clearly Polanyi's notion of formal economies, also owes a great deal to Weber's notion of 'rationalisation', and we shall have cause to return to an analysis of the formal notion of the market economy later. For the moment it is enough to note that Polanyi believes the formal definition is readily applicable to the capitalist industrial societies of the west, and that to apply its terms of reference to earlier pre-market societies can only cause grave distortion. Indeed, he goes so far as to argue that:

The two root meanings of economic, the substantive and the formal have nothing in common. The latter derives from logic, the former from fact. The formal meaning implies a set of rules referring to choice between the alternative uses of insufficient means. The substantive meaning implies neither choice nor insufficiency of means; man's livelihood may or may not involve the necessity of choice and, if choice there be, it need not be induced by the limiting effect of a "scarcity" of the means; indeed some the most important physical and social conditions of livelihood such as the availability of air and water or a loving mother's devotion to her infant are not as a rule, so limiting. (69)
Now it is clear from Polanyi's comments that what he terms the empirical or substantive economy must in some sense exist everywhere. The crucial difference between market and non or pre-market societies is that in these latter societies the economy is 'embedded' within the overall society, whilst in the former it is not. What does this embeddedness consist of? Principally Polanyi is referring to a wide range of non-economic institutions such as those of kinship, religion, political/state forms, that provide the context within which economic functions proper are performed. The consequence is that the goals or ends of economic activity are to a considerable degree shaped by these non-economic institutions and values, and it is almost never left simply to small groups or individuals to pursue their own material self-interest. This is a very important point, for it connects with the manner in which Adam Smith (as noted above) was able to make the move of subsuming a whole gamut of human desires and aspirations within the one moment of economic self-interest. But as must be obvious now, such a move requires very specific material and intellectual conditions, for it to be possible. And whatever followers of Smith may think of this kind of analysis, it has in its favour the fact that it is not based (unlike Smith) upon a static view of human nature. For Polanyi argues, in a whole variety of societies, tribal ones, small hunting or fishing communities, and even in great empires such as those societies at one time referred to as 'oriental despotisms':

Neither the process of production nor that of distribution is linked to specific economic interests attached to the possession of goods, but every single step in that process is geared to a number of social interests which eventually ensure that the required step be taken. (70)
How is this so? Are such views based on romantic notions of primativism and altruism? No. For, as Polanyi argues in the case of a tribal society it is unlikely that most of the time an individual's absolute interest in survival will be put in question, because the community keeps all of its members from starving, unless there is a disaster that threatens all of them. However, for this support to operate the maintenance of social ties is quite crucial:

Firstly because by disregarding the accepted code of honour, or generosity, the individual cuts himself off from the community ... second because in the long run, all social obligations are reciprocal, and their fulfilment serves also the individuals give-and-take interests best.

Polanyi goes on to suggest that the nature of these social relationships may be such that there is pressure on the individual to eliminate economic self-interest from his consciousness to the point of making him unable, in many cases (but by no means all), even to comprehend the implications of his own actions in terms of such an interest.

This, of course, raises the whole question of individuation (see Chapter One) and the processes that produces it, this will be touched on later. The crucial point is Polanyi's view that in non-market societies the human economy is enmeshed firmly in a variety of institutions both economic and non-economic, as he puts it:

religion and government may be as important for the structure and functioning of the economy as monetary institutions or the availability of tools and machines themselves that lighten the toil of labour. (71)

Crucially, therefore, an analysis of the changes of the role of the economy in society turns out to be:

no other than the study of the manner in which the economic process is instituted at different times and places. (72)
Clearly then at the abstract level, the corollary of this notion of non-market societies being enmeshed economies within other dominating frameworks, is that in market societies the economy with a capital 'E' is no longer so embedded. The market means that there is in some sense, a differentiation of economic activity into a separate institutional sphere, no longer regulated by norms that have their origin elsewhere. The individual economic agent is free then to pursue economic self-interest, without 'non-economic' hinderance.

One commentator on Polanyi, Joel Whitebrook, has argued that this concept of a disembeddedness of the economy requires modification. He states that:

While it is true that economic activity becomes disembedded in market society in so far as economic activity is not thoroughly merged with other activities and attains a realm of its own, nonetheless the economy, this independent realm as a whole, is itself embedded in an institutional and normative matrix without which it could not exist. The notion of the disembeddedness of the economy is therefore somewhat misleading. It would be less misleading to speak of the emancipation of economic activity ... what ought to be understood is that the denormatisation of economic activity does not preclude the existence of a new normative structure ... (73)

Although the main drift of this point is largely correct and unexceptionable, it is rather unfair to Polanyi. The reference to 'denormatisation' is critical and it is used by Whitebrook without citation or reference to Polanyi's works. Neither in The Great Transformation or in Polanyi's essays, is there an explicit or implicit argument claiming market societies possess no norms or that in some sense they have not generated a new normative structure. In fact, the very opposite view seems to be implied in the following:
For once the economic system is organised in separate institutions, based on specific motives and conferring a special status, society must be shaped in such a manner as to allow that system to function according to its own laws. (74)

However, having cleared Polanyi of the charge of naivety, it is important to add that the whole question of the relationship of the capitalist market to the strictly bourgeois realm of values and motivations is a complex one. Habermas, for example, has argued that capitalist societies have always been dependent on pre-capitalist (i.e. pre-market) norms and cultural traditions:

Motivational structures necessary for bourgeois society are only incompletely reflected in bourgeois ideologies. Capitalist societies were always dependent on cultural boundary conditions that they could not themselves reproduce; they fed parasitically on the remains of tradition.

He goes on to point out, many of the traits we have rather unthinkingly associated with capitalist modernity are themselves based upon the past:

The "Protestant ethic" with its emphasis on self-discipline, secularist vocational ethos, and renunciation of immediate gratification, is no less based upon tradition than its traditionalistic counterpart of uncoerced obedience, fatalism, and orientation to immediate gratification. These traditions cannot be renewed on the basis of bourgeois society alone. (75)

The reasons Habermas gives for these assertions are important and in the final chapter we will turn to discuss the nature and the importance of tradition as a necessary mode of being. For the moment it is enough to note the radically distinctive nature, of bourgeois capitalist societies from any other.
It is this point that seems to be fundamental for Polanyi and MacIntyre, and is ultimately the reason why MacIntyre grounds his analysis on Polanyi's work. Polanyi is at pains to stress the radical novelty of the market order of 19th century capitalism compared with any other society from virtually any period:

Whether we turn to ancient city-state, despotic empire, feudalism, thirteenth century urban life, sixteenth-century mercantile regime or eighteenth-century regulationism - invariably economic system is found to be merged in the social. Incentives spring from a large variety of sources, such as custom and tradition, public duty and private commitment, religious observance and political allegiance, judicial obligation and administrative regulation as established by prince, municipality or guild. (76)

It is worth noting that Polanyi does not deny that markets existed in many of these societies, rather his main contention is that isolated markets did not link up into an economy that made the rest of society, a kind of appendage to it.

I have noted above MacIntyre's stated dependence on Polanyi's historical account for *After Virtue*, an account he believes vindicated because it avoids common methodological errors, but yet treats the transformation as a total process. I have given reasons in the introduction for suspecting that MacIntyre's preference for Polanyi's account runs deeper than this. In essence this is because Polanyi's account carries a moral change, which emphasises the novelty and immorality of the transformation of human labour and the natural world into commodities. As is characteristic of Polanyi's analysis it is the similarities between pre-modern societies that is emphasised, in contrast to that of the modern, as in the last quotation. We can
compare this with the following from MacIntyre:

... the modern world in everything that makes it peculiarly modern is a society of strangers, that is, a society where the bonds of mutual utility and of appeals to rights have replaced older conceptions of friendship which pre-suppose an allegiance to the virtues ... (77)

Both MacIntyre and Polanyi are involved in locating what is specifically new within modern western societies. In Polanyi's case he does not for a moment deny the enormous variety of institutional and economic forms present within the very different types of society that he lists, but he does insist, that for all their differences there are some core elements of similarity, ie the embeddedness of the economic within the social. This is precisely the structure of argument employed by MacIntyre. In order to be able to locate and illustrate the unique aspects of the modern; MacIntyre must be able to extract, for purposes of comparison, elements of similarity from beneath the apparent diversity of moral concepts in pre-modern societies. His task is perhaps more difficult than Polanyi's, but they possess a unity of purpose nonetheless.

MacIntyre examines the role of the virtues in Homer, Aristotle, the New Testament and then for further comparison two more recent figures, Benjamin Franklin and Jane Austen. They would appear, at least at first, to have very different notions of the virtues, suggesting perhaps, that they differ as much amongst themselves as they do from our culture, especially when one considers the enormous variety of social and cultural contexts that they inhabited. It is quite explicable in cultural terms that Homer saw the warrior as the model
of human excellence and achievement, whilst Aristotle in the changed context of a fairly stable Athenian city-state, saw goodness and virtue embodied in the Athenian gentleman.

MacIntyre points out that in the case of Aristotle:

... certain virtues are only available to those of great riches and high social status, there are virtues which are unavailable to the poor man, even if he is a free man. And those virtues are on Aristotle's view ones central to human life; magnanimity - ... (78)

No greater contrast could be found than in the New Testament, for here are virtues that find no place in Aristotle's thought such as faith and hope, but there is also praise for something Aristotle would probably have seen as a vice, humility - the corresponding vice to his virtue of magnanimity, as he understood it. Aristotle's social priorities are reversed in the New Testament, as slaves seem to have more chance of achieving virtue than rich men.

Nor is the situation easier when we move to later figures like Jane Austen and Benjamin Franklin. For MacIntyre argues that in Austen we find an immediate contrast with Aristotle, for where he sees a virtue in 'agreeableness' she sees only the artificial simulation of a genuine virtue she calls 'amiability'. The difference lies in the latter's Christianity, as she attaches importance to the need for some real feeling to be involved. The case of Franklin is different again:

Franklin includes virtues which are new to our consideration such as cleanliness, silence and industry; he clearly considers the drive to acquire, itself a part of virtue, whereas for most ancient Greeks this is the vice of pleonexia. (79)
Franklin is a complicating case for MacIntyre, as we'll see below, because of his relation to, and proximity with the modern market order. He is, nonetheless, important because there are few clearer examples from his period of the systematic redefining and reordering of older conceptions of the virtues.  

The differences, therefore, are numerous, and there seems little common ground. However, so far we've looked at particular virtues and changed definitions, but what of the underlying structure of argument in the placing of virtues in their various social contexts. We will see that at this deeper level similarities emerge.

To elucidate the underlying structure of the placing of virtues, we can follow MacIntyre's definitions of his five cases. In Homer, a virtue is a quality which enables someone to do exactly what it is that their social role requires of them. So that:

the concept of what anyone filling such-and-such a role ought to do is prior to the concept of a virtue; the latter concept has application only via the former. (81)

In Aristotle, despite some virtues only being possible for certain kinds of people, his basic notion of human virtue follows his general understanding of metaphysics, virtue attaches to the nature of man's being as such. (Aristotle's metaphysics are briefly examined in relation to Marx in Chapter Two.) It is the telos of humanity as a natural kind species which decides what behaviour counts as a virtue. But in the New Testament, although its virtues are different from Aristotle's, nonetheless, as MacIntyre argues:
A virtue is, as with Aristotle a quality, the exercise of which leads to the achievement of the human telos. The good for man is, of course, a supernatural and not only a natural, but supernature redeems and completes nature. (82)

We can add to this, that for MacIntyre's argument there is another extremely important similarity between the Christian and Aristotelian conception of the virtues; that is that for both, the relationship between means and ends is an internal one, and not external. What is meant by this, is that the means by which the end is achieved are inseparably connected, so that the very process of movement and development, partly constitutes what it is to achieve the end itself. (I return to the question of internal and external goods in the final chapter.) It is, of course, precisely this internal relationship between means and ends, that Polanyi describes in his location of the role of the economy in pre-modern societies.

Naturally, it is this deep parallel between the role of virtues in Aristotle and in the New Testament, that allows Aquinas to make his famous synthesis between the two. But MacIntyre argues for a deeper parallel between these two and the type of outlook represented by Homer. For both Aristotle and the New Testament, the concept of 'good life for man' comes prior to any particular virtue or hierarchy of virtues, so in Homer the concept of a person's social role was prior to any notion of a virtue.

In regard to Austen, MacIntyre (echoing C.S. Lewis and Gilbert Ryle) is able to subsume her also within the Christian and Aristotelian
traditions, the latter she probably gained from reading Shaftesbury, he suggests. The case of Franklin is more complex but interesting. MacIntyre's account is too brief here and requires supplementing. Franklin, in his understanding of the virtues, shares Aristotle's teleology, but his reasons are utilitarian ones. For MacIntyre this means that his conception of means-ends relationships are external rather than internal, i.e. governed by utility:

The end to which the cultivation of the virtues ministers is happiness, but happiness understood as success, prosperity in Philadelphia and ultimately in Heaven. The virtues are to be useful and Franklin's account continuously stresses utility as a criterion in individual cases: "make no expense but to do good to others or yourself. Avoid trifling conversation". (84)

These are typical of Franklin's ideas of the virtues along with punctuality, industry, frugality plus many others, but always for utilitarian ends.

On the face of it, Franklin's utilitarianism may seem to pose problems for the argument so far developed. For utilitarianism features in After Virtue, and in much else of MacIntyre's work, as a paradigm viewpoint of modernity, which prioritizes the pursuit of external goods and is hence, ideally compatible with a rationalistic market order of society. For such a viewpoint the simulation of virtues would be quite sufficient to get what one wants e.g. a hard working reputation, for credit worthiness. But if this is true, how can it be that Franklin has a teleological vision of the virtues?

The answer to this lies in Franklin's location as a transitional
figure between two radically different cultures. His apparently pragmatic utilitarianism is in fact sustained by something far more fundamental, for as Weber puts it after noting the potential hypocrisy of Franklin's position:

The circumstances that he ascribes his recognition of the utility of virtue to a divine revelation which was intended to lead him in the path of righteousness, shows that something more than mere garnishing for purely egocentric motives is involved. (85)

In effect, Franklin illustrates well the point we drew from Habermas concerning the dependence of capitalist societies on cultural boundary conditions that cannot be renewed by themselves. Franklin's teleological view of the virtues is therefore sustained by a key element in the tradition which saw the virtues as a system of internal goods leading to determinate ends, to which behaviour was subordinated. As is well known later utilitarians such as Mill, were to remove this underpinning from their theory.

In summary, MacIntyre argues that we have three conceptions of the virtues here: Firstly, that a virtue is what enables an individual to carry out his/her role, this is the view present in Homer; secondly, a virtue is a human quality that allows an individual to move towards achieving a specific human telos, which can be supernatural or natural, the position of Aristotle, the New Testament authors, Aquinas and Jane Austen; thirdly, a virtue is a quality which has 'utility' in achieving earthly and heavenly success, held by Benjamin Franklin.

Is there, then, within these three forms, some core concept or shared
conception of the virtues? We can only attempt an adequate analysis of MacIntyre's conclusions in the final chapter. But there is enough here for us to notice that one aspect of the virtues has emerged with some clarity. It seems to be the case that for the concept of virtues to operate at all in a society:

... it always requires for its application the acceptance of some prior account of certain features of social and moral life, in terms of which it (virtue) has to be defined and explained. (86)

This means that in Homer virtue is secondary to and dependent upon a clear concept of social role. In Aristotle and related accounts, it depends on what the 'good life for man as the telos of human action' is defined as. In Franklin it is dependent upon some specified notion of utility. For each of these writers prior agreement on crucial aspects of social and moral life cannot be merely theoretical, it must have some material embodiment for their conceptions to have any purchase at all. The obvious examples are the role of the Polis in Aristotle's thought - perhaps we should say more accurately that the Polis makes Aristotle's thought possible - the role of the Church for New Testament writers.

This is the heart of the matter. The very diversity of these writers and the cultures they in part represent all, nevertheless, imply and demand some definite institutionalisation for their conception of the virtues to operate. Jane Austen requires a type of agrarian capitalism - a country house and a certain form of the institution of marriage, for her Christian Aristotelianism. This is the deep structure of similarity that unites these writers even in their diversity and most
importantly what distinguishes them most profoundly from modern liberal individualistic thought. It can make no assumption about social context, except to say no way of life must have institutional precedence over others.

The parallel and connection with Polanyi is clear: for just as the wide diversity of pre-market economic forms all require embedding within some wider set of social relations to avoid economics being a narrow means - ends relationship of self-interest; so with MacIntyre's account, for in order for virtue to be exercised, or even understood, there must be criteria embodied in some shared account of our own context. When that shared account collapses, then the moral self is as disembodied as economic relations are in the market place.

IV
THE RISE OF MARKET SOCIETIES

Both MacIntyre and Polanyi, from within their respective disciplines, stress both the novelty of, and the consequences that ensue, of basing the operation of society upon the needs and demands of the market. It is well known, of course, that petty commodity production for the market has been present in many societies and not least medieval Europe. However, Polanyi makes some useful distinctions between different types of market that will enable us to see more clearly the distinctiveness of capitalist market society. In the process of which, Polanyi makes it quite clear that smaller markets do not have a built
in propensity to become bigger and bigger until they engulf the whole of society. In this, as we shall see, he is at one with Marx.

However, the process by which small pockets of market relations are transformed into, or supplanted by, the capitalist market economy, is vital for our narrative. This is the process that Polanyi understands as the transformation of regulated markets into what he calls a self-regulating market, with all the flows from that. Clearly such a discussion touches on the complex matter of the transition from feudalism to capitalism; however, it is not identical to this vast question. We are here more concerned with the political and cultural consequences of the dominance of the axial principle of the market, rather than the dynamic relations of class conflict through which the dominance of one mode of production, is replaced by another. Hence we will keep reference to this debate to the necessary minimum.

Markets then have grown up in a variety of places and times. They are not therefore, in themselves, intrinsically part of only capitalist society. Why is this? Polanyi's answer is fairly straightforward:

Markets are not institutions functioning mainly within an economy, but without. They are meeting places of long distance trade. (87)

In pre-capitalist society long distance markets occur principally because of the geographical distribution of goods, the most famous of these are the age old spice routes that stretched across almost all of Asia, from China and India to Europe. The point that Polanyi is at pains to emphasise, is that neither the long distance markets based
around geographical specialisation or local markets dealing in goods that were heavy, bulky or perishable - largely the necessities of life - had any necessary tendency to expand or compete. As they were dealing with very different goods, either specialised for particular destinations, or local basics like food, which would face no out-of-area competition. There is, Polanyi argues, no particular reason in this context for competition to arise:

such trade need not imply competition, and if competition would tend to disorganise trade, there is no contradiction in eliminating it. (88)

In almost all of Polanyi's work he points to pre-modern cultures to illustrate the elaborate efforts people have gone to, to limit the space for the potentially disruptive elements of greed and self interest in trading relationship, eg the Kula ring with its principles of 'reciprocity and redistribution' as Polanyi terms them as they regulate their system of exchange round the archipelago:

a systematic and organised give-and-take of valuable objects transported over long distances is justly described as trade. Yet this complex whole is exclusively run on lines of reciprocity. (89)

Whatever the particular truth of the Kula ring, it seems likely that Polanyi's general point can be sustained, many cultures have as he suggests, gone to great lengths to surround the actual practice of trade with ceremonies and ritual.

The peace of the market was settled at the price of rituals and ceremonies which restricted its scope while ensuring its ability to function within given limits. (90)

If, then, in themselves neither local markets nor long distance market practices create pressure for a growing market, then what practice does? Here Polanyi introduces a contrast between the above two forms
and what he sees as the newer internal market. Here he seems to be referring to something like a national market that exists behind a particular state's boundaries. It is, of course, different from even a network of local markets because it introduces many exchanges from a multiple of sources for the same item, which inevitably come into competition with one another.

The contrast that Polanyi makes between different kinds of trading relation should be well taken. For they interestingly parallel Marx's own views of merchant capitalism, as by no means leading directly toarian and industrial capitalism. Polanyi and Marx are at one in seeing much of the trade of the late medieval period as being between towns (or as we shall see, a particular relation between town and country):

Right up to the time of the commercial revolution what may appear to us as national trade was not national, but municipal. The Hanse were not German merchants; they were a corporation of trading oligarchs, hailing from a number of North Sea and Baltic towns. (91)

The trading and merchant cities of the Mediterranean, such as Venice, amply bears this claim out as well. As the work of John Merrington has shown, Marx did not see the merchant capitalism evolving in towns as possessing a dynamic that led to the greater and greater commodification of feudal society. Merrington argues:

the "capital" and "markets" on which feudal urban growth was based were in no sense the linear ancestors of the capitalist world market. It is wrong to interpret the "freedom" of the medieval towns in a one-sided unilateral sense outside the feudal context which both determined the externality of this freedom of merchant capital and defined its limits. (92)
The basic point being made by Merrington is that the municipal based nature of merchant capitalism was in no sense opposed to the feudal system, but in reality a fundamental element within it. Merchant capital is, as Polanyi knew, based upon the difference in prices between markets and areas of production that are separated and are kept separated.

Its externality, vis a vis production, is the very condition of its existence, since it interposes itself as "middleman" between extremes which it does not control and between premises which it does not create. (93)

On this view feudalism is the first social order that actually creates a specific place for towns within the system of production, based on the overall system of the parcellisation of sovereignty, which allowed the 'free' enclosures of the towns to exist.

It follows, therefore, for both Marx and Polanyi that the characteristic attitude of those involved in markets of a local or a long distance kind, would be to encourage exclusiveness and monopolies, not extended market relations and free competition. As Merrington says:

The market was a restricted prize and the "capture" of it entailed the enforcement of a productive and trading monopoly against the countryside and against the encroachment of rival towns. (94)

There will be no pressure here necessarily flowing from the structure of economic relations pushing for social transformation. But then where does, what Polanyi calls the internal market or national unified market, come from? What are the forces at work that achieve it?
Marx is clear:

what new mode of production will replace the old, does not depend on commerce, but on the character of the old mode of production. (95)

In other words, on the outcome of the class struggle within the social relations of production of feudalism. This is not, of course, the immediate cause of the creation of internal markets, especially from the 18th century onwards. Polanyi turns directly to the intervention of the state for an explanation. In doing this, he is by no means wrong, although he may lack Marx's depth and analytic power, for it was indeed the state that was the main instrument in the creation of unified national markets. Why the state? The work of Perry Anderson seems to provide valuable answers.

The importance of the state, especially the absolutist ones, have always been seen as crucial for laying the foundations for modern capitalist societies, but their natures have always seemed difficult to grasp, on one hand 'progressive' in some aspects of behaviour, yet on the other, seeming to have a deeply 'reactionary' form to them. Anderson's powerful work cuts through the confusion and explains their class basis in a way that illuminates their promotion of unified national markets - the divergent path of England will be picked up shortly.

The core of Anderson's argument is as follows. The transformation of the dues of labour services, that peasants owed their lords, into rents threatened the crucial nexus of power in a feudal society. This nexus
was the unity of economics and politics achieved by parcelling sovereignty down to the local level, so that serfdom allowed economic exploitation by the lord through politico-legal means. The severence of these two elements, by the payment of rent, threatened the class power of the feudal lords:

The result was a displacement of politico-legal coercion upwards towards a centralised militarised summit - the absolutist state. Diluted at village level, it became concentrated at 'national' level. The result was a reinforced apparatus of royal power, whose permanent political function was the repression of the peasant and plebian masses at the foot of the social hierarchy. (98)

However, Anderson argues that the disappearance of serfdom does not mean the disappearance of feudal relations itself. While the surplus is no longer extracted via labour services or deliveries in kind, but rather by rent it does not follow that

private extra-economic coercion, personal dependence, and combination of the immediate producers with the instruments of production disappear. In fact:

so long as aristocratic vassal property blocked a free market in land and factual mobility of manpower - in other words as long as labour was not separated from the social conditions of its existence to become labour power - rural relations of production remained feudal. (99)

It would seem then that we have something of a paradox. On this definition, the absolutist states of Europe - some lasting right into the 19th century and in the case of Russia the 20th century - are feudal formations. How is it then, that they could find themselves sponsoring unified internal, ie competitive markets? The explanation of this lies partly in the novelty of these large scale state machines themselves. For although they in effect were the form that the class rule of the landed nobility took in this phase of development, this
inevitably meant that the state was capable of far reaching power in relation to particular groups within the nobility, and the urban capitalist class. As a system of state power in the final stage of feudalism, absolutist state structures reflected its paradoxical position, possession of land was still the heart of the system and land can only be adequately controlled by some physical presence; these states then were war machines of necessity, competing for material possessions amongst themselves. This inevitably meant an *grandizement* of the state, which not only meant military but also an economic strengthening of it.

Mercantilism was the economic theory of this situation. Just as war was a zero-sum game, based upon gaining or losing land, so trade was seen as a fixed quantity belonging to a nation to be taken and then held by force, ie economic protectionism. Hecksher, the historian of mercantilism claimed:

> The state was both the subject and the object of mercantilist economic policy. (100)

To strengthen its material base, the state broke down barriers to trade within the nation, with the aim of creating a unified domestic market. The state intervened into the economy to strengthen the commercial sectors, in order to strengthen itself, in its competition for power with other states. It is clear from this, however, that there is no notion of an economy separate from politics. As Anderson notes, it is:

> the indistinction of economy and polity in the transitional epoch which produced mercantilist theories. Disputes as to whether either of the two had "primacy"
over the other is an anachronism, because there was no such rigid separation of them in practice until the advent of laissez faire. (101)

Absolutism then protected the interests and privileges of the land owning aristocracy whilst at the same time being able to protect the relatively small urban mercantile and manufacturing classes. It could do this, as Anderson says, because:

neither (of the latter) rested in the mass production characteristic of machine industry proper, neither demanded a radical rupture with the feudal agrarian order, which still enclosed the vast majority of the population (the future wage labourers and consumer market of industrial capitalism). (102)

This, however, reveals the limits of these capitalist markets and the potential conflicts between such state forms and a future nascent industrial bourgeois. It also reveals the crucial importance of the so-called English route of an agrarian capitalism for the separation out of economy and society.

The above discussion is sufficient to vindicate the basic outline of Polanyi's summary of the role of the mercantile system:

In external politics, the setting up of sovereign power was the need of the day; accordingly, mercantilist statecraft involved the marshalling of the resources of the whole national territory to the purposes of power in foreign affairs. In internal politics, unification of the countries fragmented by feudal and municipal particularism was the necessary by-product of such an endeavour. Economically, the instrument of unification was capital ie private resources available in the form of money hoards and thus peculiarly suitable for the development of commerce. Finally, the administrative technique underlying the economic policy of the central government was supplied by the extension of the traditional municipal system to the larger territory of the state. (103)

The Absolutist states whilst fundamentally based upon the feudal
landowning class carried out what might be termed key elements of 'primitive capitalist accumulation' in the form of unified capitalist markets. At the same time within the shell of absolutism the ideological accumulation that we have noted above (Kant in Germany, Voltaire and Rousseau in France) were also being made. To fully come into their own both elements, material and ideological, would require the formalisation of bourgeois revolution from below (France) or above (Germany and Italy) for whilst the aristocracy still controlled land they had the power to inhibit, economic, political and ideological development. 104

It is quite clear therefore, that Polanyi was correct to draw his line between market and pre-market societies (in the widest cultural and political as well as economic sense) after mercantilism whether we turn to ancient city states ... or eighteenth century regulationism - invariably the economic system is found to be merged in the social. (105)

It is therefore unsurprising that the bulk of The Great Transformation is devoted to the process of capitalist development in England, with the nature of land ownership acting as a crucial variable.

For Polanyi the market economy means an economic system that is regulated by markets alone which means that production and distribution are dependent upon the pricing mechanism to act as a self regulating system.

Self-regulation implies that all production is for sale on the market and that all incomes derive from such sales. Accordingly, there are markets for all elements of industry, not only for goods (always including services)
but also for labour, land, and money, their prices being called respectively commodity prices, wages, rent and interest. (106)

Market and industrial capitalist triumphed first in England and so inevitably forced the pace of development in other European countries. My concern here is only partly with how this process happened. More important is the matter of what this process teaches us about its political and cultural consequences. For a market society to operate efficiently nothing must stop the formation of markets. Polanyi is clear that there must be markets for every element in industry, which naturally means there must be markets for land, labour and money. However, here is the rub

labour, land and money are obviously not commodities, the postulate that anything that is bought and sold must have been produced for sale is emphatically untrue in regard to them. (107)

If we take a commodity as something produced for sale then clearly none of these are in any direct sense commodities viewed from the moral vantage point Polanyi has in effect adopted, ie pre-market society. Labour is just human activity, part and parcel of human life anywhere, and certainly not something produced for the market and production. The same point applies to land which, as he, Polanyi, points out, is only another name for nature, certainly not produced by man; it is a pre-existing form, merely appropriated by the species. Finally, money is by definition not a commodity, it is 'a token of purchasing power', normally produced by the state or the banking system, but not for sale. Now these naturalistic points may seem banal or obvious, but they do help draw attention to the very artificial quality of the market as an institution, they are in effect fictions
upon which the market depends, but as we will see in the case of land and labour, these fictions have profound consequences.\textsuperscript{108} For:

\ldots they are being actually bought and sold on the market; their demand and supply are real magnitudes, and any measure or policies that would inhibit the formation of such markets would ipso facto endanger the self-regulation of the system. (109)

I have so far tended to emphasise land amongst the three factors, because it seems to offer us the key to the English transition to a market society. In essence, this is because the English landed classes converted themselves from feudal landowners into agrarian capitalists earlier than any other European ruling class; this fateful move explains the inner logic of those other changes in English society that led to an industrialised market society.

Already by the 14th century Anderson can speak of a 'monetarised feudalism', ie feudal dues transformed into money rents.\textsuperscript{110} In England Christopher Hill tells us that 'the Reformation threw monastic and chantry lands on the market' so that between the years 1558 to 1640 £2\textsuperscript{½} million of monastic and crown lands were sold. This meant that:

there was relatively cheap land to be bought by anyone who had capital to invest and social aspirations to satisfy.

Such a radical move to a market in land meant that by the 1630s one observer could complain:

the making of a parity between gentlemen and yeomen and those which before were labouring men; the begetting of pride and stubbornness in them, and by this means to become refractions to the government of the country. (111)

The consensus of historians on English agricultural development is well summarised by R.J. Holton:
By 1750 English landed society had already experienced a transition from peasant to capitalist agriculture ... For several centuries, but especially from the sixteenth century onwards, a number of elements of "improvement" are detectable. These included the enclosure of communal or hitherto waste land, the gradual dispossession of small peasant producers and the consolidation of holdings into larger units ... meanwhile technical improvements are evident in both arable crop rotation and animal husbandry. (112)

The heart of the so-called 'English system' was the successful tenant farmer, according to Roy Porter:

by 1790 about three quarters of England's soil was cultivated by tenants. (113)

It seems likely that this reflected an essentially commercial attitude towards land on the part of landowners, that tenants with their profit maximising incentive would produce the best return on land. For in the 18th century landowners were:

clear as to what was a good estate. It was one tenanted by large farmers holding over 200 acres or more, paying their rents regularly and keeping their holding in repair ... improvement in this period were all devices to this end - consolidation of holdings, enclosure, and the replacing of leases for life by leasers for a term of years. (114)

By the 18th century England had been lifted clear by the commercialisation of agriculture from the fear of famine that still afflicted most of Europe. The nobility formed a tight ring of privileged landowners to become from 1700 for the next two centuries what Porter describes as

easily the most confident powerful and resilient aristocracy in Europe. (115)

They became involved in a wider range of activities including the development of minerals such as coal and iron ore and in setting various forms of rural manufacturing along with the rural
infrastructure of roads and later canals. The nobility were also heavily involved in urban redevelopment, and in particular made large profits from the development of what were to be the most fashionable parts of London.\textsuperscript{116}

Although Britain was clearly ruled by a landowning class in the 18th century we have clear signs, most pertinent for our analysis, that we are dealing with an order quite distinct from that in the rest of Europe. Here there was no absolutely rigid divide either by law or hereditary principle between different kinds of people or different types of activity, eg between trade and land, or between commoner and noble, or even between clergy and laity. Thus to a degree that Porter can claim that:

what it took to be reckoned a gentleman was ... negotiable, for by long tradition, gentility in England was but ancient riches. (117)

Once a merchant or a tradesman had made some money, he seemed able to style himself a 'Gentleman'. Getting into the upper classes and even the nobility was rather more difficult, but by no means impossible. The sons of the less well-to-do gentry would marry the daughters of rich merchants, but getting a peerage meant owning a good deal of land and cultivating the well connected, so with patience one could come your way, or your heirs'. There seems little reason then for not endorsing the famous Barringtom Moore thesis as to why there was no violent Bourgeois Revolution in the 18th or 19th centuries in England:

Despite a good many expressions of contrary sentiment from their own members, it is fair to say that the most influential sector of the landed upper classes acted as a political advance guard for commercial and industrial capitalism. (118)
V
THE MARKET AND THE CRISIS OF PATERNALISM

We are now in a position to approach some of the complexities and paradoxes of this still landed and monarchic society, for purposes of illustrating our theme, as it gradually turned itself into the first market society. Important elements of this process have been caught by Harold Perkin, in ways congruent with our argument. He describes 18th century England as based upon 'property and paternalism' (or patronage). Whilst not necessarily endorsing his notion of a one class society, his emphasis on what we shall see as the contradictory conjuncture of property and paternalism is fruitful. Why? Because England, unlike most European countries, was a society in which feudal relations in the countryside had gone, but this meant that the English landed class held its land via the notion of 'absolute property'. Whereas medieval notions of property were

contingent, conditional, circumscribed and subject to the specific claims of God, the Church, the King the inferior tenants and the poor

by the 18th century the concept of property was absolute 'categorical, unconditional', argued from either natural rights (Locke, Blackstone, Adam Smith) or utility (Hume, Paley, Bentham) it was safe against all threats.

It followed naturally from this that the English landed classes were in an almost reverse situation to those on the continent. In Europe attempts were being made to follow through feudal theory that property
followed from status - hence the numerous examples of the creation of 'tables of rank' - with only certain people, because of who they were, able to do certain things eg, knights who used to perform military service, held certain offices. But in Britain, as we have seen, status clearly followed from property and wealth.

By the eighteenth century only a handful of English peers could claim continuity in the male line from a medieval feudal grant; all the rest owed their status to their property. (121)

The only legal privilege the English gentry possessed was an official coat of arms, which could be bought anyway.

From property of course flowed power, political and social power. The landed class had effective control of both houses of Parliament, which seemed to many to have become private clubs for the pursuit of gain and the convenience of their members. Numerous private land enclosure bills were passed and numerous 'place men' found very lucrative state positions. Thompson indeed, insists that the concept 'Old Corruption' was a serious piece of political analysis, because he feels political power in the 18th century should be seen not as a direct organ of any class or interest, but as a secondary political formation, a purchasing point from which other kinds of economic and social power were gained or enhanced. This power in its primary functions was costly, grossly inefficient, and it survived the century only because it did not seriously inhibit the actions of those with de facto economic or (local) political power. We should add that whatever inefficiency of operation, this system seems to have served well enough, because for most of the century the landed class became richer
and richer, with the nobility and the grandees in 1800 owning 20-25% of England's landed wealth compared with 15-20% in 1700. 

But it was the de facto economic and local political power that was at the heart of the second element of 'property and paternalism'. Paternalism was in effect property as social power, and through that the dominant class in England exercised its hegemony Every kind of property had its 'legitimate influence'. Whatever feelings the great landowners and smaller gentry may have engendered in the ordinary people, they were a central part of life, their houses were in effect local forms of the state:

its estate office the exchange for farm tenancies, mining and building leases, and a bank for small savings and investments ... its law-room; if the landowner was on the bench (many were) the first bulwark of law and order ... its dining-room the fulcrum of local politics. (124)

In addition to this was the deep and complex network of relations between clients and patrons, that we know as patronage - not all of which were as in Johnson's wonderful definition of a patron as

one who looks with unconcern on a man struggling for life in the water, and when he has reached the ground, encumbers him with help (125)

In a period before the introduction of the impersonal criteria of exams, tests, etc, almost all posts were in the personal gift of someone, with little distinction between public and private positions. Someone with wealth or power would be expected to provide positions for nearest relations as well as the wider family, one's tenants and villagers, political supporters and indeed anyone who had done you a service or seemed to show merit.
It is these complex elements that allow Perkin to say that although class was latent in the politics, industrial relations and religion of the old society, it was overlain by powerful bonds and loyalties which meant living under 'the great law of subordination'. Thompson would wish to amend this:

I find the notion of gentry - crowd reciprocity, of the 'paternalism-deference equilibrium' in which both parties to the equation were, in some degree, the prisoners of each other, more helpful than the notion of a 'one-class society' or of consensus he sees gentry-pleb relations as a 'field of force' tightly constrained but conflictual. Both historians are grappling with a complex situation, where power relations are bound together inextricably in their constraining and enabling forms, in a way that reminds one of Foucault's 'micro physics of power'. However, I think Thompson would have little difficulty accepting the point I wish to emphasise in Perkin, namely that

patronage was the middle term between feudal homage and capitalist cash nexus. For the truth is that given both the assumptions and the material bases of paternalism and patronage (they have clearly more than an etymological connection), the situation in the long term was chronically unstable, for at root they were based on land as capital - absolute property - but capital that was not going to remain solely in land.

Bauman makes the useful distinction between two forms of power relationship, 'control-through-space' and 'control through time'. The
basis for the difference between the two forms is symbolised by the prevalence of land property over fluid, mobile, space-independent capital which was to become dominant later. (129)

Landed capital is the fundamental condition for 'control-through-space' it can only work in so far as locality remained the seat of comprehensive obligations and equally comprehensive and also realistic, rights ... The web of place-tied obligations and rights could be, indeed, so complete that it might allow the owner of the land, the holder of power, not to be concerned with control of time. (130)

Porter tells us that even this land based paternalism in England was 'wearing thin', its veneer was 'corroded by the brutality with which great landowners emparked, enclosed, exploited the game laws, and rode roughshod over customary tenant and village rights' in pursuit of pleasure or greater profit.131 There was also a steady movement from the land from the middle of the century towards the new manufacturing districts of the Midlands and the North, not however, generally as a direct result of enclosure, but up to at least 1780 they seemed to offer better employment prospects.132 It seems likely that the political and social conflicts of the 1790s, inspired by French radicalism, were made possible both by the deterioration of paternalist relations in the countryside and by the concentration of workers and artisans in the Northern and Midlands towns. Here paternalist relations were weak in any case, as has often been noted there are similarities between Luddism or machine breaking and Agrarian protests like rick burning, perhaps responses to two faces of the same situation.
The process Polanyi commented upon, of turning nature into landed capital was completely in place throughout the 18th century, although its consequences are only clear with hindsight. However, it is only in the latter part of the century that the other crucial component, the turning of human activity into labour as a market commodity, was achieved as we shall see in a moment. Nonetheless, we have seen enough so far, to understand the paradoxical position and attitude of England's 'Old Society' to the market order they helped create. This is caught in a telling observation by MacIntyre:

... Burkeans, who, faithful to Burke's own allegiance tried to combine adherence in politics to a conception of tradition that would vindicate the oligarchial revolution of property of 1688 and adherence in economics to the doctrine and institutions of the free market. The theoretical incoherence of this mismatch did not deprive it of ideological usefulness. But the outcome has been that modern conservatives are for the most part engaged in conserving only older rather than later versions of liberal individualism. Their own core doctrine is as liberal and as individualist as that of self-avowed liberals. (133)

There is a great deal that can be unpacked from this quotation, in some respects it provides a summary of the argument of the past few pages. The emphasis on tradition is important, for it marks a way of viewing oneself, one's class and one's nation's history, in a way that denies fundamental ruptures in life, even as in this case, they had happened and were happening. It should perhaps be seen in the light of a probing remark by J.A.G. Pocock:

Nothing could be more misleading than to picture the vehement assertion of the antiquity of English law and liberties as an inert acceptance of 'traditional society'. It was rather traditionalist than traditional ... an assertion of conservatism; and conservation is a mode of action. (134)
The question of English 'traditionalism' is, of course, vast and too complex to really develop adequately here, but clearly the fact that in the 18th century the most advanced and successful European society could emphasize its continuity with its past is remarkable enough in itself. The assertion of the distinctiveness of England is present in both Radical and Conservative traditions with the concept of the Norman Yoke on one side, and 'Great English Oaks' slowly maturing and the slowly evolving common law, on the other. Clearly in Pocock's terms the powerful, innovative and successful landed class, towards the end of the 18th century, sought through an ideologue like Burke, to stabilise its dominance through 'tradition' as a mode of action, to in part 'repair', the consequences of its own success.

Burke is a most interesting figure, for he attempted to provide some intellectual coherence for a landed class, comfortable and prosperous though it was, half way between feudalism and the cash-nexus. Burke is widely known as the fierce opponent of the French Revolution, defender of rank, distrusting of reason, and as an icon of 20th century Conservative European thought. His traditionalism is perhaps best caught in his definition of society - from his Reflections on the Revolution in France - as

a partnership not only between those who are living but between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are to be born. (136)

However, the key issue from our point of view is that registered by MacIntyre, namely that Burke was also a staunch upholder and defender of the free market and capitalist property. He had long been
interested in political economy and communicated with Adam Smith, who is reputed to have said of him:

that he was the only man who without communication, thought on those topics exactly as he did. (137)

C.B. Macpherson has been at some pains to defend the intellectual coherence of Burke, on the basis that capitalist property rights had been ratified in the 1689 settlement, to which Burke was loyal, so that capitalist relations had become the 'traditional society' by his time. \(^{138}\) Such a view is highly questionable, not so much as a matter of intellectual coherence, but because Burke's commitment both to some paternalist relationships and to a free market political economy (he no doubt had a much firmer grip of this, than most contemporaries) reflects a real tension in social relations and most particularly the mode of domination. These two commitments are in some part mutually exclusive, for paternalism, as historians as different as Perkin and Thompson insist, has to be something more than a show to disguise profit making. It demands not just subordination to rank, but some degree of reciprocity or mutual obligation for this 'field of force', as Thompson puts it, to exist.

In the end Burke could only come down on that side of paternalism that demanded subordination:

the whole of agriculture is in a natural and just order; the beast is as an informing principle to the plough and cart; the labourer is as reason to the beast; and the farmer is as a thinking and presiding principle to the labourer. An attempt to break this chain of subordination in any part is equally absurd ... (139)

He also realised that this would demand great restraint upon or great
self restraint by, the worker or labourer, seeing the apparent injustice in the relationship:

They must labour to obtain what by labour can be obtained; and when they find as they commonly do, the success disproportioned to the endeavour, they must be taught their consolation in the final proportions of eternal justice. Of this consolation whoever deprived them deadens their industry, and strikes at the root of all acquisition and all conservation. (140)

He would not, however, take the final step which might make the paternalist hierarchy materially bearable, he would not allow interference with the labour market, he completely opposed the Speenhamland system.

The last five years of the 18th century saw very bad harvests and severe shortages and dislocation due to the French war, farm labourers wages in several regions dropped beneath subsistence. Price rises in the period outstripped wages, but Burke's response was a product of his belief in the sanctity of the market:

Patience, labour, sobriety, frugality and religion should be recommended to them: all the rest is downright fraud. (141)

A response strongly reminiscent in our own day for its implacable 'realism', of Enoch Powell on, say Third World aid. However, across the low wage counties of southern England JPs used a variety of measures such as subsidizing food or topping up low wages, the alternative was hardship and even starvation. It is, of course, a moot point concerning who is being most faithful to the 'traditional order' (Pace Macpherson), triumphant property from the 'Old Whig' Burke or the Tory Paternalist JPs of Speenhamland. But as the
historian of social policy, Derek Fraser has argued:

social policy is an expression of social philosophy and a generation which resorted so quickly to allowances in aid of wages was clearly one which did not regard poverty or poor relief as degrading. Poor relief did not have the social stigma of debasement it was later to acquire. (142)

Nonetheless, Burke's position confirms MacIntyre as to what notion of tradition Burke is defending, namely what we have termed the 'absolute rights of property'. The logic of this position for all its wrappings in rank, must pull it apart from the Tory paternalists with their real grasp of what 'control-through-space' would mean as a system of hegemony. It was significant that what became the Speenhamland system was really no more than a set of local initiatives, Parliament would do nothing. Pitt summed up the consensus in a debate on a Bill proposed to regulate wages in the dire and perhaps exceptional circumstances of the 1790s:

It was indeed the most absurd bigotry, in asserting the general principle to exclude the exception, but trade, industry and barter would always find their own level, and be impeded by regulations which violated their natural operation, and deranged their proper effect. (143)

This was the wave of the future, it revealed that most 'advanced' opinion in the landowning class, accepted the logic of free market economics, although paternalism died hard at the local level, amongst Tory traditionalists. This now was the era of the Combinations Acts, the steady deregulation of labour and the freeing of the labour market which culminated in the Poor Law of 1834. This was what Carlyle referred to in his study of Chartism as the 'abdication on the part of the governors'. Perkin has summarised well the ultimate consequences of the contradictory social position that Burke so powerfully
articulated:

Emancipation (from paternalism) was counterbalanced, and indeed provoked, by a rejection on the part of the higher ranks not of the whole relationship - for they insisted on paternal discipline and filial obedience, long after they were willing to pay the price for them - but of that part which alone justified it by the light and reason of the old society: paternal protection and responsibility.²⁴⁴

We can learn most about the ambiguities that the capitalist market generates, in the position of the Burkean conservative by contrasting it with the position of another conservative theorist, almost a contemporary but locked into a very different set of social relations: George Fitzhugh the defender of the slave based society of the American South in the early 19th century.²⁴⁵ Fitzhugh was probably the most sophisticated defender of slavery in the American South. Eugene Genovese has taken him as important because of this sophistication and self consciousness, and sees in him more than an apologist for slavery but rather the emergence of a spokesman, and a relatively coherent theorist, for an entire class and social order. The Marxist Genovese pays Fitzhugh and his society a powerful tribute:

... they did, nonetheless, stand for a world different from our own, that is worthy of our sympathetic attention. The questions they asked are still with us; the inhumanity they condemned must still be condemned; and the values for which they fought still have something to offer. (146)

He and his society are important for the argument in this thesis in that the southern slave state of America had a market economy, but they did not have what Polanyi or Gevonese would describe as a market society. All George Fitzhugh's work was designed to make sure it did not get one. No market society existed for reasons that must now be fairly clear, there were areas of life in which markets could not
form, principally there was no labour market. The relationship between master and slave is described by Genovese as 'organic', so although slave owners faced each other in the market place, labour existed in another realm.

The existence of exchange relations, external to labour did not necessarily undermine the organic relationship between master and slave within. From 1808 onwards there were no new slaves coming from Africa, because of the British and later European ban. This meant that the Americans had to raise their own slaves, which inevitably required certain minimum standards of treatment. Genovese argues that any understanding of the southern slaveholders must begin with an essential fact about their slaves; the slaves of the Old South constituted the only plantation slave class in the New World that successfully reproduced itself. (147)

This reveals more clearly than anything else could, the paternalist quality of the master, and the fairly good treatment of the slaves.

This material basis reveals a sustainable social order, at least in its internal relations. The plantation was the key institution, it was presided over by a resident planter who saw it as his home and the entire population of the plantation as a kind of extended family. Clearly the need to reproduce the absolutely crucial workforce provided a powerful motive for the paternalist ethos of the plantation to develop, but Genovese warns again any easy separation between economic interests and morals:
once extended over a generation or two, the appropriate standards of treatment became internalised and part of the accepted standard of decency for the ruling class. (148)

The American War of Independence freed the south from British interference and allowed the slave owners to become a regional power. Given the social relations of production, Genovese argues that it is quite plausible to see the slave owning class, taking its cultural model from the Old Virginian aristocracy, as on the way to becoming a landed aristocracy complete with an articulated set of anti-bourgeois values.149

George Fitzhugh was not in any sense typical of the South; no theorist is really typical since most people do not spend their time shaping their beliefs into a coherent logical form, but this is what he set out to do. He saw that the immanent logic of the plantation ideology led ultimately to a rejection of almost all bourgeois liberalism. He took the logical step of moving from the common belief amongst whites in the south, that negro slaves were often better off than many 'free' workers and peasants in the western world, to arguing that slavery was the best system for every society and that ultimately capitalism was incompatible with Christian morality. Property was no absolute right, for him, it exists for the public good.

Slave property, like all other carries with it the duty of public leadership and a sense of responsibility towards the propertyless. Society ultimately retains control of property; individual property owners are the trusted agents of society. (150)

Fitzhugh acknowledged sympathy for socialism's arguments in his critique of capitalism. Indeed he saw the rise of socialism in Europe
as a sign that capitalism there could not last. He accepted the need to overcome the alienation of capitalism but did not believe equality was possible and so was able to turn socialist arguments for the association of labour on their head.

The association of labour like all associations (he claimed) requires a head or ruler and that head or ruler will become a cheat and a tyrant unless his interests are identified with the interests of the labourer. (151)

Socialism was impossible he believed it could lead only to the re-establishment of slavery. He was bitterly opposed to capitalism and the free market, for basically moral reasons; capitalism produced greed and ultimately destroyed all finer feeling and all bonds of domestic affection. His model of the relation between master and slave was familial, because the master is used to treating the slave as part of his family, so his sense of family is massively extended further than it ever could be under capitalism.

Therefore Fitzhugh's view according to Genovese is that:

Capitalism's stands condemned as an enemy of the human race because it produces economic exploitation, degradation ... wherever capitalism has triumphed, the family has been undermined and all community has perished. (150)

It was above all the world market that carried the bourgeoisie to their position and it was the relentless external pressure of the forces of the market, that Fitzhugh saw threatening the south. He knew slavery could only flourish free of the corrupting influence of the world market. He pinned his hopes on the collapse of European capitalism. He was no doubt very foolish in his hope, but as Genovese says:

What else could he have thought? His wisdom led him to see what few others could. Slavery could not exist much longer
as a social system in contradistinction to and as an occasional or peripheral labour system, in a bourgeois world. (153)

Fitzhugh has never been taken up by modern Conservatism and we hardly need Genovese to tell us why, for the answer is clear from MacIntyre's account. Most modern Conservatives are committed to capitalist property relations and older forms of liberal individualism that help constitute those relations. The archaic George Fitzhugh standing outside those relations could articulate a genuine alternative, free of the one-sided obfuscations of an Edmund Burke. Fitzhugh's message for us is clear, and is, to quote Genovese one last time:

If you will the world to be thus, then you must will the social relations that alone can make it thus ... Fitzhugh's message came to one simple point that few if any conservatives still want to hear: To have a world without market place values you must have a world without a market-place at its centre. Go backward or go forward, but if you are in earnest, then go. (154)

VI

THE SOCIOLOGY OF MARKET RELATIONS

It is clear that Polanyi's 'Great Transformation' was completed by the late 18th century, Burke and the type of landed class that he in part represents, were firmly in place. Economy was separated from society, the formation of markets was now a sacramanct process, including the formation of Labour markets. This process had hollowed out the substance of Burkean paternalism; morals and markets were separate. Burke's rhetoric stood to sanctify 'old' capitalist property relations
as they followed into whatever profitable avenues were available. The market makes its own demands on the lives and minds of peoples, including theorists. We have seen that to defy its logic, you must step outside its foundations.

The propertied class were, as we've noted and despite their own separation of norms and markets, to continue to insist upon moralising the economic behaviour of their subordinates and employees for some time to come. For as Bauman has noted the campaign for the creation of a work ethic amongst early industrial workers seems to be an attempt 'to exempt the workers from the rule of market rationality', ie greatest gain for least cost:

rather than, as common interpretations would like us to believe, to train the crude, pre-industrial labour force in the art of life guided by commercial reason. (155)

Once again we see capitalism's dependence on what we have seen Habermas refer to as pre-capitalist 'boundary conditions', for its continuation. Bauman argues that these capitalists attempted to recreate the commitment to task performance which came to the craftsman naturally when he himself was in control of his time and work rhythm. (156)

These attempts are, of course, eroded by the workings of the market economy, as the 'rational' route to material well-being becomes quite clear to generations of workers.

The reasons for this process (chapter 1 is relevant here) are given by Simmel and Weber - the latter very much influenced by Simmel.157
Simmel's account in particular reveals him as the sociologist of the triumph of 'external' over 'internal' goods. His Philosophy of Money is preoccupied with the ever lengthening 'teleological' chain of connections that spin out from the money economy, for the achievement of any given end. Money and the market principle, as we saw with Adam Smith's fateful reduction of human aims and aspirations to an economic drive, the

absolute means which is elevated to the psychological significance of an absolute purpose.

This as he (Simmel) goes on to acutely observe, is because there is no reason to

fear (it) being dissolved into something relative, a prospect that makes it impossible for many substantial values to maintain the claim to be absolute. (158)

In other words, as he puts it later:

As a tangible item, money is the most ephemeral thing in the external-practical world, yet in its content it is the most stable, since it stands at the point of indifference and balance between all other phenomena in the world. (159)

This seems very much what MacIntyre means by a society that can only recognise external goods (internal ones being goods that cannot be understood independently of the end, purpose or good of the practice which they are part). External goods are those which can be most easily subsumed, in the manner of Adam Smith (see above), within economic interest. MacIntyre adds:

And in any society which recognised only external goods competitiveness would be the dominant and exclusive feature. (160)

This would be so for the reasons Weber gives when he states that:
Within the market community every act of exchange ... is not directed in isolation by the action of the individual partners in the transaction but the more rationally considered the more it is directed by the actions of all parties potentially interested in the exchange (a potentially almost infinite external series PM). The market community as such is the most impersonal relationship of practical life into which a human being can enter ... (161)

It is the centrepiece of Simmel's works to focus on the consequences for a society, of its being dominated by the impersonal nature of these exchange relationships and the connection between this and the subjective and objective aspects of contemporary human experience.

Simmel is certain that the dominance of the market principle makes for greater freedom for the individual in his or her relationship with others, but at the same time increases the subjection of people to the process of measurement and bureaucratic regulation. As Turner puts it in his paper on Simmel:

Money is thus consistent both with indiviudality and individuation. (162)

Simmel, in effect, tells the story of 'The Great Transformation' principally from the subjective side. The consequences of the presence or absence of money relations in European history at its most abstract, are put into three parts: the first stage is one in which:

... the feudal lord's rights are extended to the whole of the obligated person who had to forfeit his most fundamental possession or rather his being. This would have been the price at which the lord would have granted (for example) his female subjects the right to marry. The next stage is that he granted this right - which he can deny at any time - in exchange for a sum of money; the third stage is that the lord's veto as such is abolished and the subject is now free to marry if he or she pays the lord of the manor a fixed sum: bride-wealth, marriage money, bridal money etc.
He goes on to point out that money is obviously connected with personal liberation but not completely at the second stage because the lord can reject payment:

The relationship is completely depersonalised only when no factors other than money payment are involved in the decision. (163)

What then is the relationship between this process of depersonalisation and 'freedom'? To understand this, Simmel attempts to examine the specifics that continuing relations of dependence possess. 'The money economy' he argues

makes possible not only a solution (to dependence) but a specific kind of mutual dependence which, at the same time, affords for a maximum of liberty. (164)

In the first place this happens because a massive range of quite unknown obligations develop. For many reasons, including the diversified technical division of labour and the growth of banking and finance houses, which lend the funds of small and large savers and investors to anonymous others. Naturally these myriads of connections produce anonymous dependence.

For these people gain their significance for the individual concerned solely as representatives of those functions such as owners of capital and suppliers of working materials. What kind of people they are in other respects plays no role here. (165)

So money, when it achieves dominance, ie when a society is based on capital accumulation and commodity exchange (he can be criticised, and was by Weber, for not being specific enough about capitalism as a system), it makes possible, because of its flexibility and divisibility, a great range of economic relations, whilst at the same time removing the personal element from them by its objective and
completely indifferent character:

we are compensated for the great quantity of our dependencies by the indifference towards the respective persons and by our liberty to change them at will. (166)

Compared with all non-market societies with 'embedded' economies, we are extraordinarily independent of particular members of society because their relationship with us has been transformed into an objective quality, which can be effectively done by numerous others.

Simmel observes that:

this is the most favourable situation for bringing about inner independence, the feeling of individual self-sufficiency (167)

but this is by no means simply to be understood as an absence of relationships, because 'freedom' is not simply a state of inner being of an isolated subject, such a state exists rather when extensive relations to others exist (but) all genuinely individual elements have been removed from them so that influences are anonymous.

The cause as well as the effect of such objective dependencies, where the subject as such remains free rests upon the interchangeability of persons: the change of human subjects - voluntarily or effected by the structure of the relationships - discloses that indifference to subjective elements of dependence that characterises the experience of freedom. (168)

The narrative of the stripping away of the relations of personal dependence and authority, can as we have seen with George Fitzhugh, be viewed in a different light, which exposes the ambiguity of freedom. It can be seen as in MacIntyre's view, as having suffered a deprivation a stripping away of qualities that were once believed to belong to the self (169)
ie, notions of personal identity founded upon sets of personal relations with others. Simmel, politically and ideologically a liberal, was well aware of the dark side of this, although clearly committed to the process. He saw in the situation of the industrial worker the problem clearly illustrated: compared with a slave, who could not change his master under any circumstances, a worker has a formal freedom to do so. Viewed in one light then the worker is on the way to personal freedom despite his present poor state:

for here, as in other spheres, there is no necessary connection between liberty and increased well-being.

This is because

the freedom of the worker is matched by the freedom of the employer which did not exist in a society of bonded labour. The slave owner as well as the lord of the manor had a personal interest in keeping his slaves and his serfs in a good and efficient condition.

Freedom for the labourer is in effect paid for

by the emancipation of the employer that is by the loss of welfare that the bonded labourer enjoyed. (170)

This takes us close to the heart of liberal market freedom and reveals more clearly the relationship between a particular sense of self and a particular economy, for freedom to engage in a market order means a change

from one of stability and invariability to one of liability and interchangeability of person.

Therefore,

the relationship of individual persons to others simply duplicates the relationship that they have to objects as a result of money. (171)

This, then, shows us the dilemma facing both Burkean Conservatives and market socialists. For standing inside the pale of the market they
must follow its logic and its cultural consequences. What then, happens to them? A leading liberal theorist, Ronald Dworkin in a recent attack on the New Right, has provided some pointers. He argues that modern western politics is fundamentally about two issues:

How to improve production and how to distribute it more fairly. (172)

He points out that:

arguments about privatisation for example, are not about the metaphysics of exploitation or the validity of Marx's labour theory of value, but about whether public or private ownership is more efficient ... (my emphasis)

He further claims that behind the old left-right divide what we really have are two different and conflicting distributive theories, which both emerge from 19th century liberalism not Marxian socialism. The first of these theories is

an informal, statistic-based version of utilitarianism. The present government aims (successfully or not) at efficiency because it assumes government should make the community prosperous over all, for most people and in the long run.

The second theory is based on the notion that government should treat all individuals with equal concern. Rawls is its most sophisticated theorist:

serious economic inequalities are justifiable only if they work for the benefit of those at the bottom

and this may lead to less than the overall maximum prosperity. Naturally this position has nothing to do with what he calls the 'ancestral' left of Marxism and class consciousness, rather he calls it 'Fabian'. Naturally this requires a degree of benign state intervention to carry out the redistribution of non-functional inequality and therefore to assess the position and needs of the
individual.

Dworkin is an authentic voice of modernity, the two versions of liberalism he outlines fight it out under the rubric of individualism versus collectivism. The first version to which Burkean conservatives are prone to in practice, demands the classical bourgeois self of 'possessive individualism' ie the proprietor of his own person, the ability to enter contracts freely, contracts being the model of all human relationships. The second version of liberalism requires a self who owes something to the Lockean possessive individual tradition, but is also the ghostly inheritor of the moral philosophy and institutional changes, that began in the 18th century, an abstract but unique self as moral agent, on a par with all other such agents.

This second version, it might be called social democratic liberalism, inheriting such a notion of self, must inevitably separate any notion of right from any particular conception of the human good, each individual must develop as they supposedly abstractly choose. No one can claim a privileged conception of the human good. No government, state, or historical community's views can be binding on the whole society. All that can be demanded of the state in terms of values is its claim to protect freedom embodied in positive law.

Simmel in the course of his analysis of the multiple but anonymous dependencies generated by the proliferating possibilities of exchange in the market, examined this abstracting process at work. The
particularity of real personalities were removed:

such a personality is almost completely destroyed (by) ... a money economy. The delivery man, the money lender, the worker ... do not operate as personalities because they enter into a relationship only by virtue of a single activity ... The general tendency ... undoubtedly moves in the direction of making the individual more and more dependent upon the achievements of people, but less and less dependent upon the personalities that lie behind them.

were this tendency to continue he argues, it would

exhibit a profound affinity to socialism... for socialism is concerned primarily with transforming to an extreme degree every action of social importance into an objective function.

Interestingly he compares this with the role of the official whose position is objectively pre-formed so only limited aspects of his personality can emerge. So Simmel claims:

fully fledged state socialism would erect above the world of personalities a world of objective forms

so eventually it could be that the official

no longer individually differentiated simply passes through the function without being able or allowed to put their whole personality into these rigidly circumscribed individual demands. The personality as a mere holder of a function or position is just as irrelevant as that of a guest in a hotel room (173)

Simmel saw socialism as did the SPD as a rationalisation of capitalism, emerging from capitalism's own tendencies and ideologies.

This conception is that of abstract liberalism and has been well summed up by Brian Barry in his critique of Rawls:

The essence of liberalim as I am defining it here . the vision of society as made up of independent autonomous units who co-operate only when the terms of co-operation are such as to make it further the ends of each of the parties. Market relations are the paradigm of such co-operation. (174)
Such a view may be a realistic vision of modern society as nothing but a collection of strangers each pursuing his or her own interests with minimal constraint. (175)

Can such a view of society and its concomitant concept of self be sustained, or are there elements in the cultural boundary conditions that capitalism is dependent upon, which provide a potential space from which a contrary view of self and society can be generated?


5. Ibid, 199.

6. Ferdinand Mount, 'Goodbye to the Peasants', Spectator, 17th February, 1979, p.4, his emphasis.


8. It was the younger Alasdair MacIntyre who made the following point about Marxism: 'As Marx depicts it the relation between basis and superstructure is fundamentally not only not mechanical it is not even causal. What may be misleading is Marx's Hegelian vocabulary. Marx certainly talks of the basis 'determining' the superstructure and of a 'correspondence' between them. But the reader of Hegel's 'logic' will realise that what Marx envisages is something to be understood in terms of the way in which the nature of the concept of a given class, for example, may determine the concept of the membership of that class ... the economic basis of a society is not its tools, but the people co-operating using these particular tools in the manner necessary for their use, and the superstructure consists of the social consciousness moulded by and the shape of this co-operation'. Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Notes from the Moral Wilderness I in New Reasoner 7, Winter 1958-9, p.98 (emphasis added). There may be doubts about the use of this Hegelian philosophy of internal relations in Marxism but it does raise questions about the legitimacy of his rather sweeping criticisms of Marxists formulations as positivistic causal explanations. Indeed, it seems likely that his present formulations are an attempt to salvage, in a revised philosophic mould, much of the substance of the Hegelian-Marxist theory of internal relations (see also chapter 2).


15. Ibid, p.18, whether this is true is another matter.


22. See most particularly on this G. de St Croix's opening chapters of *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, Duckworth, London, 1981; also see chapter 2 above.


24. Ibid.


27. Just how different the population of England was by the late 18th century can in part be discerned from materials in chapter 4.


30. See beginning of chapter 4 on the process. However, this process should not be assumed so easily as an emerging right wing Tory Historigraphy, under the influence of Maurice Cowling, makes clear; it points to the importance of the concept of a confessional state in England right into the 19th century, J.C.D. Clark, English Society 1688-1832 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.

31. After Virtue, p.36.

32. I draw here on chapter 5 of After Virtue, 'Why the Enlightenment project had to fail', p.49-59.

33. Ibid, p.50.

34. For detail on this see Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability, Cambridge University Press, 1975.

35. After Virtue, p.52.

36. Ibid, p.53.

37. See the interesting work of Peter Gay especially Freud for Historians, OUP, 1986.


43. Paul Piccone (Gonzales), 'Rethinking Radical Politics', Telos, 48, Summer 1981. P.\textsuperscript{10}


49. Ibid, p.18-19.

50. Ibid, p.41.

51. This in itself raises many questions, especially why the concentration on avarice at this point. Lester Little has pointed to the sudden upsurge of religious movement that emphasised poverty as an ideal in the later Middle Ages, eg the Franciscans as emerging in the commercial centre of the period, as new social relations threatened the integrity of an older social order and belief systems, Lester K. Little, Religious Poverty and the Profit Economy in Medieval Europe', Paul Ely, London, 1978. No one interested in these questions can possibly afford to miss Umberto Eco's excellent novel The Name of the Rose, Secker and Warburg, London, 1983, for a wonderful evocation of the cultural conflicts of the period.


54. Ibid, p.40, but see MacIntyre's own attempt to rehabilitate the concept in After Virtue, op.cit., p.99-100.


58. Ibid, 157-158.

59. Hirschman, op.cit., p.41-42.

60. Ibid, p.42.
61. Ibid, p.50.
63. Quoted in Hirschman, op.cit., p.108.
64. Ibid, 109.
68. Ibid, p.139-140.
69. Ibid, p.140.
72. Ibid.
78. After Virtue, op.cit., p.170.
79. Ibid, 171.

81. After Virtue, op.cit., 171-172.

82. Ibid, 172.

83. Ibid, p.

84. Ibid, 173.


88. Ibid, p.60.


90. Ibid, p.62.

91. Ibid, p.63.


93. Ibid, p.177, quoting Marx.


95. Ibid, p.177 from Capital

96. The most important defence and elaboration of this view lies in Robert Brenner, 'Agarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-industrial Europe', Past and Present, No.70.


100. Quoted in Anderson, p.35.

101. Ibid, p.36, note 34.

103. Polanyi, Great Transformation, op.cit., p.65.

104. The process by which this power was broken is long and complex, generally the landowning class held on to what power it could for a surprisingly long period even in the case of Britain. See the interesting interpretation by Arno J. Mayer, The Persistence of the Old Regimes: Europe to the Great War, Pantheon Books, New York, 1981.


106. Polanyi, Great Transformation, op.cit., p.69.


108. Political Economy reduction of nature to land, humanity to labour, raises for some a problem with Marxism, i.e. Marxism as a practical orientation to the world, which political economy is also. It is arguable that Marxism can seem to reinforce that which it seeks to criticise. Its harsh and almost bitter realism, its recognition of exploitation and its sometimes 'normative' insistence on economic class struggle, seems sometimes to reinforce the logic of the system by stripping away 'moral illusions', which ironically in themselves may embody what little hope there is of transcending these social relations (see chapter 2 for a discussion of this point in regard to MacIntyre). This is, I suspect, what underpins E.P. Thompson's hostility to the later Marx in The Poverty of Theory, (Merlin Press, London, 1978), p.252-255. Perhaps there are elements of this in the domestic labour debate, which also seems to reinforce in its reductionism, that familial activity is really about producing and reproducing labour power. See Jean Bethe Elshtein Public Man and Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Martin Robertson: Oxford, 1981), p.264-5.

109. Polanyi, Great Transformation, op.cit. p.73.


115. Roy Porter, op.cit., p.70.


117. Ibid, p.64.


119. Harold Perkin, The Origins of Modern English Society 1780-1880, RKP, London, 1969, especially pages p.38-56. There are disagreements about the use of the term 'paternalism', clearly it can be a rather catch all category which brings into the 20th century the ruling class prejudices of the 18th century as E.P. Thompson suggests in 'Eighteenth Century English Society: class struggle without class?' Social History, Vol.3, No.2, May 1978, but nevertheless as Thompson concedes the concept can have some utility and much of his work on this period is concerned with the question of the actual erosion of paternalist forms of authority - (see 'Patrician Society, Plebian Culture', Journal of Social History; summer 1974). Thompson like Roy Porter op.cit., uses paternalism as a form of hegemonic exercise of power/ideology which emphasis the point that landowners thought in terms of paternalism - but shot through with contradictions.


121. Ibid, p.39.

122. E.P. Thompson, 'Eighteenth Century English Society', op.cit., p.141. This judgement does require qualification of a severe kind as Perry Anderson argues in Arguments within English Marxism, Verso, London 1980. For this state set up and maintained through force of arms the most successful commercial colonial Empire of any European state, with according to Anderson between 75% to 90% of state expenditure going for military purposes (p.92). Nonetheless on the domestic front, Thompson is making an important point about the way class power is being exercised, for the 18th century state is clearly not the centralised bureaucracy of European absolutism, it was rather part of a circuit of class power exercised principally by the landed class at the local level. See Chapter 5 of Philip Corrigan and D. Sayer The Great Arch: English state formation as cultural revolution, Blackwell: Oxford, 1985.

123. R. Porter, op.cit., p.81.


128. H. Perkin, op.cit., p.49.


130. Ibid, p.45. It is, of course, capitalist market relations that demand control of time, as each unit of time has a price attached to it, see E.P. Thompso, 'Time, Work Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism', *Past and Present*, 38, 1967, p.56-97.

131. R. Porter, op.cit., p.79.


135. This vast question can be approached in many ways. J.A.G. Pocock's *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Laws*, CUP, Cambridge, 1957 is an important source. Much of Tom Nairn's work is concerned with this question, particularly useful is his essay 'The English Literary Intelligentsia' in *Bananas* edited by Emma Tennant, in collected form published by Quartet Books, London, 1977, p.57-83, where he develops the concept of a 'synthetic conservatism'. Also extremely relevant is the question of the ideological use of history see especially Patrick Wright's *On Living in an Old Country*, Verso, London, 1985.


138. C.B. Macpherson, ibid, p.63, 'so by Burke's time the capitalist order had in fact been the traditional order in England for a whole century 'since Burke was born in 1729 I calculate that his 'partnership ... with those who are dead' stretched to his grandparents at most, but then Conservatives like Burke have always been more concerned with preserving capital accumulation than the past.

139. Quoted in Macpherson, ibid, p.60.

140. Ibid, p.61.

141. Porter, op.cit., p.111


143. Quoted in Perkin, op.cit., p.186.

144. Ibid, p.182.


146. Ibid, p.126.

147. Ibid, p.98.

148. The slave holders were themselves the heirs of the democratic and egalitarian traditions of Jeffersonian democracy, so inevitably there were counter pressures to the development of a paternalist and hierarchical ideologies. Nonetheless the success of the pro-slavery arguments and the loyalty of the non-slave holders to the regime is a powerful example of the social basis of ideologies.


150. Ibid, p.159.

151. Quoted in ibid, p.160.

152. Ibid, 230-1.

155. Bauman, op.cit., p.60.
156. Ibid.
159. Ibid, p.511.
163. Simmel, op.cit., p.286.
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid, p.298.
167. Ibid.
169. After Virtue, op.cit., p.32.
170. Simmel, op.cit., p.300-301.
171. Ibid, p.301.
175. After Virtue, op.cit., p.233.
Chapter Four
Managerialism, Class Conflict
and the Culture of Bureaucratic Individualism

The Civil Servant has as his nineteenth-century counterpart and opposite the social reformer; Saint Simonians, Comtians, utilitarians, English ameliorists such as Charles Booth, the early Fabian socialist. Their characteristic lament is: if only government could learn to be scientific! And the long-term response of government is to claim that it has indeed become scientific in just the sense that the reformers required.

Alasdair MacIntyre
After Virtue, p.82
I

PROLOGUE: THE MARKET, THE STATE AND ITS RE-EMBEDDING?

Polanyi believed that the market's victory was going to be relatively short lived, he believed its fundamental institutions, the Gold Standard and Free trade had broken down, for ever in the 1920s and 30s, to be replaced by something new. He wrote that

Out of the ruins of the Old World, corner stones of the New can be seen to emerge: economic collaboration of governments and the liberty to organise national life at will. (1)

This, written in 1944, seems a prescient observation on the Post War World of Bretton Woods; a few years ago it would probably have met with almost universal agreement. The view from 1986, allows no such comfortable conclusions, for we have seen the Keynesian consensus come apart due to profound economic crisis and the popularity of free market ideologies on a scale not seen since at least the 1920s, and possibly the 19th century itself. There is now widespread agreement today, on both Right and Left, that the fundamental reality that both national politics and the national economy have to cope with is that of the world market and that the bottom line for economic survival is international competitiveness.²

Some have been prepared to see these recent developments as little more than a triumph for right wing ideologies over a weary Post-War Social Democracy. However, most now agree that the economic crisis is real enough. It is not my intention to examine in detail the roots of
this crisis. However, I wish to make use of one recent survey of current economic thought that seems to reflect our situation. The author G.A.E. Smith - a Marxist - has been prepared to take the New Right monetarists explanations of crisis seriously and has noted the similarities between them and Marxist economic theory. He argues that some modern monetarists have in effect readopted the neo-classical theory concerning unemployment, ie that it is due to interference with the market, either by Trade Unions or Firms with excessive market power, but at the same time they implicitly reject the conclusion that market forces will tend to push the economic system towards full employment. (4)

This is because they believe that in the 1950s and 1960s there was a fall in the rate of profit so that employers were not able to employ profitably the labour force. This led to an increase in the so called 'natural' rate of unemployment, but this was hidden by the relatively favourable terms of trade between the West and the developing World. Some monetarists explain the decline in profit by increasing trade union power, but many reject this because it does not explain the decline in countries with weak unions. The alternative is that the fall in the rate of profit is an inherent tendency within the Capitalist system itself. (5)

The reasons for this fall need not detain us long, it is basically due to the Capital: Labour ratio. On one hand there is a given level of technology and a given stock of labour. As more capital is combined with labour, the increase in output due to employment of more capital will at a certain point decline.
Thus after a certain point, as the ratio of capital to labour increases the rate at which output increases begins to decline, so bringing about a fall in the rate of increase in output per unit labour. Eventually the point is reached where an increase in the Capital: Labour ratio does not result in a sufficient increase in productivity to maintain the rate of profit which begins to decline. (6)

The truth or otherwise of this argument is not in my competence to judge, but it does seem to reflect a return by orthodox economists to an analysis of the fundamental nature of the Capitalist system - something Marxist economists have long called for. It seems that this in turn reflects the depth of the problems facing the Capitalist system and a major retreat from the beliefs popular in the long Post-War boom, that fundamental 'system' questions could be put aside.

As Smith concludes:

It is the recognition by an influential group of conventional economists that the inherent features of the capitalist economic system give rise to and make necessary a permanent 'reserve army of labour'. For this reason it is profoundly mistaken to describe the analysis of this group of monetarists as simply a 'reactionary' revival of neo-classical thinking. Is is in fact, a 'revolutionary' development in conventional economic thinking (7)

The upshot of all this is that the state cannot act without respecting the behaviour of labour markets, i.e. wages and commodity markets i.e. prices.

It seems not unreasonable then to argue that far from being reintegrated or re-embedded within society, the economy in the form of its various markets continues to be fundamentally dominant. In reality it seems that Polanyi, along with many other socialists, fundamentally misread the Post-War situation. Economic co-operation between
governments and the concept of state intervention in specific national economies in no way amounted to an over coming of the market as the main regulative principle of society. A strong case can be made out that Post-war policies were by no means an attempt to re-embed the economy within the social fabric. Rather it was an attempt to keep the market economy but without its terrible social consequences. It was an attempt (which worked almost miraculously for about 30 years), to steer between 19th century laissez-faire and the new central command economies of the East. It was a centrist strategy, which in Britain was to gain all party support, and was like most British policy the creation of Establishment figures like Keynes, Macmillan, Beveridge etc. 8

Fred Hirsch in his important book The Social Limits of Growth, has pointed to the real purposes of the so called 'mixed economy', and to its problems. He sees it thus:

The essence of this strategy is to impose the necessary minimum of central control and guidance on an economy whose operating units remain motivated by individualistic aims and horizons and are guided by these individualistic aims in everyday behaviour. (9)

Essentially Keynesianism is an economic strategy to correct the systematic dangers within laissez-faire for liberal culture. In this respect it becomes important to note with MacIntyre, that it was Keynes who wrote, on reading G.E. Moore's presentation of emotivist ethics:

... it was exciting, exhilarating, the beginning of a renaissance, the opening of a new heaven on a new earth. (10)
For Keynes, as Hirsch has pointed out, the role of the state as a guide for the market economy, was really a culmination of secular liberalism. It attempts to provide economic prosperity, along with market preference and maximising individual freedom: Keynes was attempting the ultimate in privatization - the addition of morality to the sphere of individual choice. (11)

This reworked liberalism for the 20th century, meant that the managed market was still to be the market, and as such did what liberals wanted of it, ie to be neutral, for morality was what individuals would choose.

Hirsch, therefore, is aware of the critical relationship between the Capitalist market and Liberalism, its connections and its difficulties. His arguments are in some respects similar to both Polanyi and Habermas\(^2\) in that he argues for the dependence of Capitalism on pre-market and non-market forms, such as welfare intervention to cope with market dis-welfare and the necessary regulatory supervision of markets, to see they maintain a rational basis. Most important for Hirsch, is the production of a moral or normative framework, providing the necessary self controlled, truthful, agents for contractual relations.

Hirsch argues that this moral legacy, which he views principally as a kind of religious capital stock, has been steadily depleted. His framework for understanding this tends to be a rather simple version of the secularisation thesis\(^3\) and an emphasis on the operations of the Capitalist system, itself. In the latter part of the argument he
makes a valuable contribution, as we will see. Religion's role in relation to Capitalism is, of course, complex. In contrast to Hirsch, and following MacIntyre's general thesis, we are concerned with the collapse in the connection between moral frameworks and the social order, not their disappearance altogether. It is rather this separation that produces a privatisation and subjectivising of belief which achieves its apothesis in the concept of emotivism (see introduction). In relation to religion as a form, this is well brought out by Turner:

... impersonal property in late capitalism no longer requires the discipline of bodies or the physiological regulation of populations with the separation of moral bodies and regulated property, religion no longer significantly contributes to the unity of social classes, the discipline of bodies or the reproduction of economic relations. (14)

This does not imply that capitalism does not require normative grounding, rather that it achieved its autonomy as an economic system by rejecting religious regulation, but by also being parasitic upon the social character forms constructed by the older systems. However, the long run consequences of this separation has meant that religious and communal forms are less reliable in producing the necessary characters, because once less socially central these forms are more likely to change or decay.

This is especially true when considered in relation to the operations of the capitalist system, itself. For, as MacIntyre notes, all social orders imply a moral sociology and a moral philosophy. The market's moral framework is not sufficient, (indeed has never existed on its
own), to sustain non-market elements. But Hirsch points to what he terms the 'commercialisation effect' carried through by a 'commodity bias' which implies that an excessive proportion of individual activity is channeled through the market so that the commercialised sector of our lives is unduly large'. (15)

Because of the search for profit maximization this commercialisation increases, and leads to substituting explicit exchange relations for what were once informal sectors. It favours the presence of those services and items which can be most easily commodified and to the likely absence of that which cannot easily be treated so. This inevitably means an increase in individualistic concepts of self interest as the area of communal goods shrinks and conceptions of the common good become increasingly thin. 16

The consequences of this for Keynesian state intervention are important. Firstly the form of the state and the history of its emergence as a neutral bureaucratic body is a central problem and will be addressed in the main body of the chapter. However Hirsch is clearly aware of the difficulty of maintaining the liberal division, so dear to Keynes, of individual motivation and wider social results. As he argues:

It involved the progressive extension of explicit social organisation without the support of a matching social morality - more rules for the common good, having to be prescribed and adhered to in a culture orientated increasingly to the private good. The burden placed on individual morality has in this way been greatly increased. (17)
Within this framework, and as the market system makes no claim beyond itself for legitimacy; the response of an individual within a bureaucratically regulated market, is likely to be in terms of its own criteria. This means the appeal for reward for risk and effort is generally applied. We noticed in the last chapter, Bauman's contention that early capitalists fabricated the 'work ethic' to elude this process. But because of such processes as 'commodity bias', the market framework will bring to prominence, questions of 'fairness' ie the conditions of the contract become problematic. Profit maximisation means most reward for least effort. On this perspective, the various 'corporatist' experiments that precede the collapse of the Keynesian consensus, look like very weak attempts to reintegrate one aspect of the Labour market, namely wage levels, within the state as nominal representative of society.

The partial nature of this process is clear to most workers, because most other aspects of the market, including prices and control over the labour supply, are not so integrated. This means that what Hirsch calls **acquisitive power**, the product of market opportunity due to physical productivity, scarce talents, good contacts, scarce information and good luck (18) are not restrained. Whilst organisational power of say Trade Unions is. In developing Hirsch's work John H. Goldthorpe notes that:

> .... within a growing market economy, market relations and the principle of 'equal exchange' tend to enter an ever-enlarged area of social life, as the dynamics of the "commercialisation effect" work themselves out which tends to undermine a
status order of a wide ranging structure of relationships that are formed not by the 'cash nexus' but by obligation ... grounded in moral acceptance ... the distribution of economic advantage and in authority in work relations, class inequalities come increasingly to be seen for what they are - the products of the market economy - without the benefit of the normative camouflage which the status order previously created. (19)

The corporatist strategies of the bureaucratic state to patch up the spontaneous workings of the market economy, appear almost pathetically weak, lacking any real normative power. As such they have been replaced in most western countries by the grim discipline of the market mechanism.

The capitalist market remains the fundamental reality of western, 'modern' societies. But if the market erodes those forms upon which it has depended, what mechanisms of control and power are available to these social orders? It is to the analysis of the apparently neutral, managerial and bureaucratic forms of power, that we now turn.
A double movement, then, of state centralisation on the one hand and of dispersion and religious dissidence on the other: it is, I believe, at the intersection of these two tendencies that the problem comes to pose itself with this peculiar intensity of how to be ruled by whom to what extent, with what methods, etc. It is a problematic of government in general.

Foucault 'On Governmentality',20

II

THE LIBERAL SELF

It is not necessary to entirely endorse Foucault's methodology to feel that the above quotation goes near to the heart of the problems of modern politics, with its double emphasis on both objective and subjective aspects. In what follows I connect both aspects together. However, I begin by looking at the subjective dimensions of the problem.

We have seen how the market acts as a paradigm example of a form of social organisation dominated by external goods. Clearly the market depends upon and reinforces other elements which must allow it this freedom of operation. A key element of this is the kind of state, i.e. the liberal state which in part creates and in turn depends upon a certain notion of citizenship, i.e. a particular, socially produced, sense of self. However, our interest in the state is not merely because of its contribution to the creation of a market based culture of Capitalist Modernity, but also because of the complex effects such a culture has on the power of the state and most particularly upon the way that power is exercised, especially in its bureaucratised form. Philip Rieff has seen that
ends, the causes there to be served, are means of acting; they cannot escape service to power. (21)

Bureaucracy becomes in certain crucial ways immune from critical investigation and moral condemnation, as no clear source of its power is visible and no secure vantage point is attainable from which to make moral judgements.

As a preliminary we must briefly attempt to examine how this aspect of the liberal state came in existence, not from mere antiquarian interest, but because the charting of change aids theoretical clarity by allowing us to make contrasts, and highlight what is specifically new about our situation.

It will come as no surprise to those familiar with the origins of modern politics, to learn that our modern conception of the state emerged from crucial conflicts and debates in the medieval world. In particular the critical conflicts that took place in medieval Europe concerning the 'Great Schism' as two Popes made competing claims to authority. The question for medieval theorists was how to adjudicate between different claims to authority. One important resolution as Quintin Skinner has shown, was conciliar constitutionalism - ie that ultimate power in the Church, lay not with the Pope but with a General Council of the Church - proposed by Jean Gerson but having its origins in the work of William of Oakham. He argued that the Church was but one species of political society, and hence made general arguments about the nature of the sovereign state, which proved quite radical, leading to the view that no ruler can be greater in power than the community over which he rules. Ultimate power must always remain, at all times, within the body of the community itself, and as a
consequence of this the status of a ruler is that of a minister or rector, rather than an absolute monarch. Gerson developed a 'subjective' theory of rights, which equates possession of a right with power to dispose of something freely. But he makes clear no ruler, not even the Pope, can treat a commonwealth or the goods of its members, as his own property. As Skinner points out:

So it follows that no ruler may be said to have rights over a commonwealth: he has duties as a minister or trustee of other people's rights, but no rights of ownership himself. (24)

So no ruler is above the law. Such ideas developed in the late 14th century and early 15th century, to deal with the problem of competing power in medieval society, would be of mere curiosity value had they not been taken up, in the dramatically changed political situation of 16th century Europe, with its powerful nation states and religious conflicts.

Gerson's conciliarism was first taken up by John Mair in the early 16th century and then most dramatically by the Huguenots later in the same century. The Huguenots made a crucial move in the secularisation of the concepts of conciliar rights. As Skinner puts it, they moved

from a purely religious theory of resistance, depending on the idea of a covenant to uphold the laws of God, to a genuinely political theory of revolution, based on the idea of a contract which gives rise to a moral right (and not merely a religious duty) to resist any ruler who fails in his corresponding obligation to pursue the welfare of the people in all his public acts. (25)

The Huguenots then on this reading produced the first genuinely 'political' revolution (Liberal revolution of a kind) in European history. Providing ideas that were quickly taken up in Holland and there moved to England and provided a crucial ideological background to the Revolutions of 1640. The reasons why they did this are instructive for us. Firstly they made up about one-fifth or more of
France's population, too many to be easily crushed by the state, but, as they were rather dispersed from centres of power, not sufficient to make for a sensible Calvinist Revolution, of 'God's people rising to overthrow a Godless state'.\textsuperscript{26} Hence, what Skinner describes as the need to engage in

the vital ideological task of appealing not merely to their own followers but to the broadest possible spectrum of Catholic moderates and malcontents.\textsuperscript{(27)}

It was clearly force of circumstance that encouraged the Huguenots to make the move from religious to that of political rights, which could serve the dual purpose of both defending the lawfulness of resisting, on the grounds of conscience, to their own Huguenot supporters, and at the same time, convince those of another faith of the constitutionnel basis of their action. Naturally such a move logically leads to religion being inessential, in regard to the state, and contributing powerfully to the secularisation of the state and political language.

The key, therefore, to the emergence of the modern Liberal state lay in the collapse of definitive authority in the medieval world for complex reasons that cannot be addressed here. However as Skinner points out:

\begin{quote}
as soon as the protagonists of the rival creeds showed that they were willing to fight each other to the death, it began to seem obvious to a number of politque theorists that, if there were to be any prospects of achieving civil peace, the powers of the state would have to be divorced from the duty to uphold any particular faith.\textsuperscript{(28)}
\end{quote}

Clearly this view marked a tacit surrendering of any final possibility of achieving positive agreement on substantive issues of belief and an acceptance, albeit tacit, that belief is grounded in the ultimate sovereignty of the existential self. This marks the certain emergence
of MacIntyre's criterialess self. For this settlement of religious disagreement in the 17th Century provides something of a model by which all irreconcilable beliefs have been dealt with, for once the state withdrew from the commitment to uphold 'true religion', it had implicitly accepted, in this area alone at first, the minimal, atomistic, alienated self, as the ultimate source of sovereignty. Hence, it could not hope to seek to embody a concept of the common good, that extended beyond mere negative liberties.

III

MANAGERIALISM, IDEOLOGY AND ARBITRARY WILL

However, co-ordination and cohesion must be maintained, power is still to be organised and exercised. How is this to be achieved by a state whose subject is the minimal sovereign self of liberal theory. MacInytre gives us part of the answer in the emergence of bureaucracy and its embodiment in the form of the Manager. It is essential to grasp the relationship between this particular notion of self, and the form of bureaucratic state which is its necessary complement. We will piece together this process throughout this chapter, but for the moment we must note MacIntyre's understanding of the emergence of bureaucracy. He argues:

It is when traditions begin to break down that modern bureaucratic organisations characteristically arise. Traditional societies have always had formal organizations, always had to justify themselves against appeals to the authority of the tradition which the organization served. (29)
These traditions can be various, from the Catholic Church to the disciplines of the natural sciences. The autonomous self can have no conscious tradition but it requires managing. The manager is generally seen in our culture as morally neutral and in virtue of the skills he possesses, can devise the most efficient means of achieving whatever end is proposed. He or she is the supreme example of the prioritising of external over internal goods. In appropriately Weberian terms, the high priest of formal as opposed to substantive rationality. The upshot of this is that concepts of efficacy and effectiveness become the ultimate source of their own legitimacy and become inseparable from a form of practice in which the achievement of ends means of necessity, the manipulation of human beings into compliant patterns of behaviour. But if the manager is neither morally neutral nor possessing special expertise, then once more in human history we are presented with ideology and spectacle, masking the exercise of power and domination. But is this, in reality, the case?

MacIntyre claims that managerialism is a moral fiction, because the kind of knowledge required to maintain it, does not exist, and that the claims of modern social science to possess such knowledge, are largely false. Managers, he claims, require something like factual law-like generalisations which would enable them to predict that if an event occurred, then some other event, of a specific kind, would result. In other words managers need causal explanations to control the social environment. Now we can break the claims of bureaucratic managerialism, down into two component parts.
1) That there exists a domain of morally neutral facts about which the manager is to be an expert.

2) That law-like generalisations and following applications to particular cases, can be derived from the study of the domain of facts.

It hardly needs pointing out that the great bulk of what we know as social science from the days of Comte, through Weber himself (though he sought probabilistic Laws), to the managerial sciences and Organisational studies of our own day, have been concerned, with variants of these two related issues. If bureaucratic power is an ideology (in the sense we will discuss below) then social science is what Marxist social scientists and other radicals, like M. Foucault, have always said it was, a crucial accomplice in domination.

But the question is, are these two points true? The nub of MacIntyre's response is clear; it consists, as he puts it, in turning W.V. Quine's *Word and Object* on its head. Quine argues that to provide a science of human behaviour precise enough to have a law-like character, then it must be formulated in such a way as to eliminate all references to reasons, intentions and purposes, on the part of the human subjects involved. This is because knowledge of the beliefs of the subjects, and the massive complexity this would then introduce, due to the inherent contestability of beliefs, would not produce the kind of evidence which could be used to confirm or contest a law. MacIntyre
agrees, but, because of his teleological Aristotelianism, believes a science of human behaviour, which made no reference to beliefs or intentions would be not worth having (MacIntyre's approach to this is examined in the final chapter).

In essence no science of human behaviour can have the mechanistic quality that may be possible in the natural sciences. As is well known in the 19th Century a mechanistic science of human society was much sought after. However, as MacIntyre argues,

prophecies in this area may be translated not into real achievement, but into a social performance which disguises itself as such achievement. (33)

We are jumping ahead a little here. For so far we have only noticed what a peculiar project, social science in a Quinian form would be. We have not seen, within its own terms, whether it is achievable.

The first element to note in answering this, is to remember that bureaucrats and managers want, above all else, from social predictions knowledge concerning the outcomes of alternative policies, and that social scientists are very poor at providing such knowledge.

If we look at one of MacIntyre's examples: Smythe and Ash, have shown that forecasts based on the most sophisticated economic theory for the OECD since 1967 have produced less successful predictions than would have been arrived at by commonsense, or naive theories for forecasting rates of growth, by extrapolating the average rate of growth for the past ten years. Humorous examples of the failures of almost all
social sciences to produce accurate predictions could be produced, much could be said about social science theory, concerning the inadequacies of positivism, and the necessarily recursive nature of social scientific knowledge, ie that it can be read by its subjects. However, I shall confine myself to adumbrating four of the reasons put forward by MacIntyre for supposing that the predicative law-like generalisation that bureaucratic power requires, are in fact impossible to achieve, now or ever in the future. 35

1) Radical conceptual innovation in the natural sciences or other disciplines cannot be predicted, because in certain important ways making a prediction about what will be invented, has in some part contributed to inventing it already, at least as a concept, eg it is suggested that at some point we will be able to grow back damaged limbs. This cannot claim the status of radical innovation, because it puts together two elements of existing knowledge. 1) Certain reptiles grow back limbs and this is connected with their genetic code; 2) The existence of genetic engineering, which may allow humans to do the same. It follows that any new discovery based on radically new concepts cannot be predicted, therefore neither can their consequences.

2) This concerns the unpredictability of individual agents actions. Briefly put, this entails the simple notion that if I have not made up my mind between two different courses of action, I cannot predict which one I will take. Others will possibly to able to estimate what
my action may be but will not be able to predict their own future choices, which will in consequence, have there effects on other people's choices including my own, and so on ad infinitum. As MacIntyre points out, following Aquinas omniscience excludes making decisions:

If God knows everything that will occur, he confronts no as yet unmade decisions. He has a single will which, as MacIntyre also points out, may give us some idea of what those who want to get rid of unpredictability are trying to do. 36

3) A further source of unpredictability can be understood because of the efforts of game theorists, in the social sciences, to predict the future. All complex situations have an open and indeterminate character, eg a general strike or a war have no limited set of factors which can be said to comprise 'the situation', situations are never static and anything with an international dimension is probably unwappable. Further more Game theory is endlessly reflexive, "I predict your move, you predict mine. I predict you predict mine", etc etc.

4) Finally, we come to the role of pure contingency, also present in no.3. A crucial agent dies before getting to a meeting, or someone is ill and can't concentrate, such events can make all the difference. Incidentally, anyone who believes that awareness of contingency is alien to Marxism should read Trotsky's in History of the Russian Revolution on the crucial role of Lenin, in making the Revolution.

All this does not imply that generalisations about social life are
impossible or that a measure of predictability about life is impossible or that Social Science is worthless. It does imply that a well founded and thoroughly researched generalisation about the social world, will have to live with counter examples to it, as it does now.

Also that the social science should not treat all predictive error as a failure. The absurdity of the grander claims of social sciences to be able to predict the world, are, I would suggest, one of the reasons for their relatively low social standing. MacIntyre, in his paper *Social Science Methodology as the Ideology of Bureaucratic Authority*\(^{37}\) elaborates his argument concerning the legitimising role of the social sciences for the bureaucratic manager. He argues that conventional social science methodology incorporates a very particular and limited view of the social world in its methodology, which in turn dovetails with the concepts and needs of managers and bureaucrats. He denotes five corresponding elements between social scientists and bureaucrats. Firstly, he claims the world is seen as composed of discrete and identifiable variables. Secondly, that the researcher can label these in a neutral and non-contestible way. Thirdly, that the process of conceptualisation about the subject matter, is a matter of his scientific convenience rather than culturally determined by social factors outside the discipline eg 'operational definitions'. Fourthly, the researcher constructs law-like or probabilistic generalisations from the data. And finally, fifthly, the kind of generalisation sought, provide some lever for producing reasonably predictable events in society, in other words, it provides those with access to this
knowledge and resources, with certain types of manipulative ability.

The response of many social scientists will be that this ideal type is really a straw man. Donald Levine, for example, protests that few sociologists now want to produce universal, law-like generalisations but now rather concentrate on probabilistic ones. In fact MacIntyre is well aware of this, but argues that restriction to probabilistic conclusions would not alter the nature of the methodological enterprise.

The key question is why do private and public bodies commission research, certainly not principally out of intellectual interest. Is it really possible for a social scientist to honestly admit that none of their number have aspirations summarisable in MacIntyre's five points. What of those in organisational theory, or Business Studies, who, like Herbert Simon, the author of a classic text of that genre, Administrative Behaviour, could write in the 1960 edition:

We can predict that in the world of 1985 we shall have psychological theories that are as successful as the theories we have in chemistry and biology. (40)

But the affinity of this conception of social science with bureaucracy only becomes apparent when we see MacIntyre's description of the bureaucrat.

First the bureaucrat has to deal in discrete items which can be given an established and unique classification ... Secondly the classificatory scheme which it gives rise to, which in an important sense creates those (discrete) variables, must itself be treated as non-contestable. The scheme has to be accepted independently of the evaluative viewpoint of particular individuals or social groups. Thirdly it is the bureaucrat who is free to create the
classificatory scheme; it is he, who, so to speak, operationalizes his concepts so that items will be handable by him in his way. (41)

Obviously these correspond precisely to the form of the ideal typical, methodological scheme he set out. In themselves, they embody the idealised self-picture of bureaucratic practice.42 The same is true for the final two elements, because the bureaucrat must operate upon the classified materials, to produce desired consequences, so he or she must be equipped with sets of rules that correspond to causal generalisation. The operation of these rules then has definite effects, ie social manipulation.

It is crucial to understand that MacIntyre's argument is, in important ways, a culturalist one. He is not claiming that bureaucracy or social science directly correspond to these form, but that it is significantly important that they both exist together, in our culture, as modes of legitimisation. The claim is that when authority is challenged, or answers are demanded for a problem, it is to these cultural forms that appeal is made. In this process conflict is made both marginal and manageable, technique and modes of manipulation triumph over the claims of substantive value.

It seems, then, we may well be in the presence of ideology, dependent, like all ideology is, on partial truths. There are built in features of uncertainty in human action, but can probabilistic approaches fill the expert gap? MacIntyre argues not, because statistical correlations cannot alone provide a definite causal link between factors and that
the social science have inherent problems of repeatability of sets of events, not present in the natural sciences. 43

It would seem that the law-like generalisations, the expert bureaucrat or manager requires, are not available. But what of the other prior condition, that is, that there exists a domain of morally neutral facts, which he (expert or bureaucrat) discovers out there, and then confronts us with. For even if law-like generalisations are not possible, cannot, at least, a manager or bureaucrat claim to be a master of the 'facts', and hence, the unavoidable nature of reality with which we must live. This is a peculiarly important claim within our culture, which takes us to the very heart of the claims made for the Liberal state, and those of citizenship, and sovereign subjectivity. We saw above, how in a critical ideological moment, religious conflict moved partially in the direction of a Liberal polity in the case of the Hugenots in France, setting an important ideological precedent. This marked the gradual withdrawal of the state from judgement about values and beliefs. This was partly the product of, and partly reinforced by intellectual and idealist tendencies, which moved in the direction of the separation of 'is' from 'ought', 'facts' from 'values' or formal from substantive rationality. Crucially for MacIntyre, in the philosophical and scientific rejection of Aristotle (see Chapter 2 above for some implication for our reception of Marxism now on this basis) and the consequent giving up of any notion of 'man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos' in favour something like 'untutored-human-nature-as-it-is'. 44 In the
first context ethics allows a human being to pass from where they are, to where it is in their nature to go. In the second, one is left with basic human nature on one hand, and a system of ethics on the other, which seem radically incompatible with one another, with no linking concept of necessarily guided development to an end. With the consequence that ever since, moral conservatives like Kant have advocated duty in ethics, whilst radicals like D.H. Lawrence have emphasised release.

So too, in the social and political realm, it has been common now for several centuries to deny the possibility of deriving an 'ought' from an 'is'. Hence the strong emphasis placed on purely negative liberties in that tradition. Also the strong imperative to distinguish a distinct domain of empirically knowable entities uncontaminated by 'spurious' metaphysical assumptions like teleology. The implications of this radical distinction between the domains of Values and Facts are quite awesome when transferred onto the analysis of social relations. For once normative value judgement have been thoroughly severed (a process that historically has taken a good deal of time to work through, in western societies) from the binding externalities of both nature and social relations, so becoming the property then of the sovereign liberal subject's choice. Then liberal theory becomes false, even on its own terms; this is because sovereign subjects must be free to choose, which they cannot all be; society must cohere, social relations continue, cohesion be achieved. It therefore follows that those liberal subjects who manage or engineer
social reality, have little choice but to treat others in the manner of a Quinian social science program. This is because intentionality and subjectivity are far too complex and lack the durability to enable them to be specified in a manner that might allow, other things being equal, accurate prediction. MacIntyre explains:

... the concept of a state of belief or enjoyment or fear involves too many contestable and doubtful cases to furnish the kind of evidence we need to confirm or disconfirm claims to have discovered a law. (47)

What seems to happen when this is tried, is that subjectivity is frozen into the tabulated forms of Public Opinion Polls or market research findings, which transpose consciousness into one more set of objective disconnected social facts to be accounted for in the process of manipulation, in line with the manager's subjective valuation of necessity.

MacIntyre notes, utilising Marx's Third Thesis on Feuerbach:

What Marx understood was that such an agent (i.e., manager) is forced to regard his own actions quite differently from the behaviour of those whom he is manipulating ... he stands at least for the moment as a chemist does to samples of potassium chloride and sodium nitrate ... but (in the process of the) ... changes the technologist of human behaviour brings about, (he) must see exemplified not only laws which govern such changes, but the imprinting of his own will on nature or society. (48)

Nichols and Beynon found this approach permeating managers' thinking, in that most sophisticated of 'managerial' industries; chemicals:

One manager, pointed to a maintenance marker board. 'Pity we haven't got one for labour. You know, with a column here to tell you which ones are defective, one for those completely u/s, one for replacement... for the most part this view of workers as things - as people - objects, to be worked on - takes more subtle forms. But that manager think like this is not surprising, in view of these men's
technical training and the job they are paid to do, which involves thinking in terms of 'labour costs' and treating the labour-power of other men as a commodity. (49)

This seems to support the view that liberal capitalist societies are as Marx noticed (above all in the Grundrisse), societies of personal independence based on objective dependence. In this sense they are not 'societies' in a traditional sense at all. Social coordination must take the form of either 'legitimate' coercion in the name of rational necessity or the manipulation of other apparently 'independent' wills, in accordance with social 'need' or 'utility', as expertly as possible, by those with knowledge, competence, and above all else, power.

But as we have seen, such competence does not in any strong sense, (ie in the degree to necessary to legitimise the grand claims daily made) exist. It therefore follows that much of what passes as objectively grounded claims by managers and experts, are unreal performances which legitimise the use of power.

It is at this point that we must develop MacIntyre's account of bureaucratic power. This involves the question of the concept of ideology and of capitalism itself. MacIntyre agrees that all his talk of masks and theoretical disguise is deeply connected with Marx's conception of ideology: 50

Yet of course part of the conception of ideology of which Marx is the ancestral begetter does indeed underlie my central thesis about morality. If moral utterance is put to the service of arbitrary will it is someone's arbitrary
will, and the question of whose will it is, is obviously of both moral and political importance. (51)

He goes on to say, that it is not his task, to answer this question. This seems to be rather disappointing, though clearly connected with his disavowal of politics especially Marxist politics, but also with his view that 'what we are oppressed by is not power, but impotence', because noone has the knowledge of a law-like kind to confer that kind of real authority, claimed by managerialism. There is important truth in this which explains, in part, why totalitarian societies like Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia are so inefficient, as well as why anything like total control by management in a capitalist society, is impossible. But MacIntyre does concede that he has no intention of denying that:

the activities of purported experts have real effects and that we do not suffer from those effects and suffer gravely. (54)

He is principally concerned to expose a masquerade of authority, but looking at the effects of that apparent authority is clearly of equal importance.

However, my disappointment remains for several reasons. Firstly, the notion MacIntyre presents of the absence of any real control over capitalist society, including that of capitalists, is in fact central to Marxism. No one does, or can, control capitalism. The capital accumulation process controls capitalists, as well as workers, hence the understanding that they are alienated too. But secondly, and more importantly in this context, is the fact that the whole drift of his analysis points towards a view, as I have shown, that our current
conceptions are partly due to our market based capitalist culture. Indeed, we can echo Frederic Jameson's claim for *After Virtue* that the first section of this book offers the most probing and devastating analysis of the reification of moral categories under capital, which we possess. (55)

We have outlined in Chapter Three MacIntyre's relationship with the narrative of *The Great Transformation*, to a capitalist society.

The simple truth is that a crucial aspect of that transition is the rise of a managerial capitalism, with both ideational or ideological and *material* aspects. For on MacIntyre's own account, there seems no reason to deny that in large part, the interests that lie behind the exercise of 'arbitrary will' are those of capital. At least as conceptualised in a sophisticated manner as, say, for example, by Claus Offe. 56

This makes it all the sadder that MacIntyre, in his critique of managerialism has not chosen to deploy some of the important recent work on the origins of bureaucratic managerial power by such writers as Marglin, Pollard, Braverman. 57 (This seems to rather strengthen some of the suspicions voiced by Peter Sedgwick concerning MacIntyre's self-imposed isolation from supporting intellectual positions in which he might find some degree of fellowship.58) For what these writers stress in a variety of ways, and with a variety of emphasis, is the emergence of a *new* type of control and authority, which is no longer
decked out in the traditional forms and images, of a hierarchical social order, and without the powers of compulsion that can be exercised over unfree labour. The matter is complex, but it seems from work like Marylin's and Pollard's, that the emergence of a generalised commodity based economy, posed specific problems for capitalists in relation to one special commodity, namely labour. The fluctuations of the market, gave the commodity producers at certain phases of the economic cycle, a degree of control and leverage, vis a vis the capitalist, especially over the rate and efficiency of production. The factory emerges as a key institutional embodiment of what Giddens describes as the transformation of allocative (rights of ownership) into authority relations (rights of control) via what is in essence, the dual nature of the worker as both a human being, and a commodity. The transformation is, of course, mediated via the labour contract, which makes a certain period of the workers time the property of the employer, to be done with, more or less, as the employer thinks fit. The modern division of labour meant, however, more detailed control than ever before and it is this, of course, that provides the background to the question of scientific management. However, unlike most Marxist writers on the labour process and radical analyst of the emergence of surveillance and the disciplinary society like Foucault, my concern is not to emphasise the potency and effectiveness of such things, but rather their role as an ideology and masquerade of power. In this instance, it is interesting to parallel the above analysis by MacIntyre of the 'performance' of managerialism, with a Marxist critic of Braverman, Michael Burawoy, who argues that
what is absolutely crucial about capitalism, at least at a higher industrial phase of technique where relative and absolute surplus value are equally co-present, is that the capital-labour relation obscures surplus value not only from the worker, but also from the manager.

Burawoy argues that compared with feudalism, where the dues owed by peasants to their feudal lords made exploitation clear and open; capitalist relations allow no clear distinctions for either workers or capitalists, between the production of value and surplus-value. The struggle over the surplus between Capital and Labour is not over a tangible entity, visible to all. Profits are the product of complex procedures and are not normally constituted until well after the process of production has taken place. The workers' share of total value is the result of struggle, material ideological and political. But capital's securing of the necessary surplus for capital accumulation to continue, is no clearer. This is because value depends not only on production, but also on realisation on the market - frequently an uncertain arena. Therefore how much capital can concede to Labour is almost always a question that is genuinely uncertain; company 'figures', 'projected profits' are therefore part of the class struggle. This means that the coming to consciousness of the surplus is as much a function of ideological and political factors as of purely economic ones. It follows from this, that scientific management had an extremely important ideological role, in that

crucial aspect of domination under advanced capitalism, namely the appearance of ideology in the guise of science. (62)
As a part of the process of obscuring and securing the surplus for capital. How does this process work?

Burawoy's major contention is that interests, i.e. class interests, are not given, they are shaped by ideological and political understandings. This means:

that capitalist control, even under the most coercive technology still rests on its ideological structure that frames and organises 'our lived relationship to the world' and thereby constitutes our interests. (63)

Drawing on William Baldamus's work Efficiency and Effort, Burawoy points to the way workers construct compensatory strategies as means of coming to terms with unpleasant or monotonous forms of work, or as he significantly puts it, 'work realities'.

These strategies, as Burawoy points out, normally take the form of games, and are present in almost all work environment, as some element of psychological compensation, but also as a means of resisting management demands. However, Burawoy develops this point in important ways, he suggests:

that participation in games has the effect of concealing relations of production, at the same time as co-ordinating the interests of workers and management. (65)

In this context a 'game' consists of a set of rules with a range of possible outcomes, and a preferential ordering of these outcomes. The appeal of the game is that it is both controlled, by the workers, yet uncertain in outcome. They provide the appearance of control and the exercise of reason and skill. In reality, of course, they have a marginal impact on the work environment, which generally sets severe
limits on what can be done. But

the ideological effect of the game is to take 'extraneous' conditions (like having to come to work) as unchangeable and unchanging, together with a compensatory emphasis on the little choice and uncertainty offered in the work context. Thus the game becomes an ideological mechanism through which necessity is presented as freedom. (66)

Burawoy argues that for the most part, shop managers aid and abet these games especially those connected with output. The preservation of these work games is one of the ways the interests of workers and managers are co-ordinated, day to day adaptions of workers create their own ideological effects, it is this reality that managers help to shape and utilise, in moulding the opaque social relations of capitalism.

Managerial ideologies can also be part of the process of shaping the concepts of interest, and co-ordination, it is in this light, that Taylorism should be seen. In the US it may have had paradoxical effects, in making it more difficult to secure the surplus through intensifying control and sharpening class antagonism, rather than co-ordinating interest. However, it was, despite this, incorporated into the self image of management. 67 Burawoy shows, by drawing on C.S. Maiers work, 68 that scientific management was taken up, and played a crucial role in the 1920s and 1930s, in those European countries facing political crisis. Both Right and Left took up the approach, Fascists in Italy, the new Soviet leadership, Conservatives in Germany and even the IWW in the US. Although clearly all very different from one another, they all, as Burawoy puts it:
shared in the attempt to transcend immediate political institutions by mobilising scientism in the projection of a utopian vision of a harmonious society where 'politics' becomes superfluous. (69)

This is the recurring theme of managerial ideologies, the offer of pure technique, neutral and value free. The environment of MacIntyre emotivist self, because of its obliteration of the distinction of power and authority, manipulation and non-manipulation. It is in some versions of the Human Relations school of management, that this process reaches a peak, especially in the blurring of authority. James J. Cribbin of the American Management Association can write of what he calls the 'collaborator manager' -

He does not hesitate to be forceful when circumstances require, but he does not resort to directiveness as a matter of course. He prizes self discipline and constructive suggestion, over submissive conformity. Viewing authority as based on competence rather than position. This leader interacts with his followers in a process of mutual influence. As a team builder he realises that his objective is to help employees satisfy some of their needs, while achieving the goals of the group and the firm communication is free flowing, constructive and directed to the purposes for which the group exists. Finally, if possible, conflict is resolved by the synthesis of diverse views. (70)

Richard Sennett tells us that this is a common view, held by those involved in American management training. He points out that just because the language is vacuous, does not mean it does not have real effects. Like MacIntyre, he views these psychological concepts as means of human manipulation

the point is not simply for the employee to develop him or her self, but for the employee to become more loyal and productive in the process. And in practice the manipulation can be subtle. (71)

Theo Nichols has shown how 'Human Relations' approaches, encouraging
'participation', can carry it through for complex reasons. It is partly done, because of a feeling that workers are under motivated. He reminds us that even F.W. Taylor thought a 'mental revolution' among workers, a pre-condition for maximum efficiency in factory work. But Nichols, like Sennett, sees little sign of this happening. Sennett claims:

In the midst of tight economic periods as well as prosperous ones, what industrial sociologists call unmotivated resignation have been steadily on the rise. (73)

Nichols notes that ChemCo workers' expectations of work are low.

Accepting they are workers they do not expect their work to be satisfying and they have entered into a grudging bargain with their employer. Part of just one more generation of working class men and women, well used to being denied meaning and control over their lives, like industrial whores, they do enough, to get enough. 'It's a job', they say. This, is the real problem ChemCo managers face. (74)

MacIntyre argues that the problem is located in the forging of concepts of work and interest, upon which bureaucratic capitalism depends, ie in the wider context of Burawoy's 'game' situation. Bureaucratic authority, as simple and effective power, is dependent on the apparent merging of interests, ie of a particular conception of work and the institutions within which it is carried out, both public and private. He claims that:

the dominant way of understanding such work under capitalism - and not only in America - is that whereby workers, management and investors all share in the distribution of what is jointly earned. In order to get as much as possible, what matters is that as much as possible is produced. (75)

So this means all three groups have a common interest to which their particular interests ought to be subordinated.
This is, of course, the dominant view within all major political parties in Britain and America. But the basis of it is the view, as MacIntyre notes, that:

men are primarily consumers and they work in order to consume. (76)

This can be seen as a quite rational and a viable way of conceptualising interests in Burawoy's terms.

Central to MacIntyre's case, is the view that this way of conceptualising work, is also much at home in public bureaucracies. Inhabiting as they do a society where external goods have triumphed over internal ones.

But, MacIntyre insists, there are other equally rational ways of viewing work, in terms of seeing

what is essentially human is rational activity and consumption exists to serve activity and not to be served by it. (77)

When work serves consumption then it is bound in some degree to be uninteresting and sapping of motivation, hence the endemic problem of motivation in well ordered and successful areas of capitalism. On the first view my fundamental interest as a member of one group, is how large a share of the product I consume. But on the second view I can have no fundamental stake in a social order based on such motivations. If the first view prevails, then conflicts over interest will be local, although sharp and real, but ultimately capable of containment by able management, mobilising common concepts of interest. These conflicts would be distributional in nature, whether over power,
resources or money. But on the second view conflicts would be central and endemic. MacIntyre claims that the

managing and owning class, do not have to fight this particular battle over interest and privileges, as fiercely as they might ... because they have for the most part won the battle over how interest and privilege are to be conceptualised and understood. (78)

In this view MacIntyre is supported by recent comparative studies by Duncan Gallie 79 and Scott Lash, 80 on British and French workers and American and French workers. These works reveal the importance of ideological concepts, and traditions embodied, of course, in organisational forms, in maintaining political radicalism and alternative conceptions of work. As Gallie puts it:

the experience of work, even in an authoritarian setting, was not sufficient to account for the translation of class resentment into specifically political terms. Rather the extent to which workers believed that the existing structure of society could be remoulded through political action depended on their exposure over time to radical party ideologies. (81)

Similarly Lash claims:

that worker militancy is not primarily determined by objective variables, but by political parties and trade unions as agents of socialisation. (82)

It would seem that the opaque quality of social relations under market capitalism, compared. say with feudalism, does indeed make for a culture in which emotivism is at home. In which power is legitimate, because of its effectiveness in achieving ends that are organizationally given. If values and ends are private judgements, then it is those values and ends implicitly institutionalised in the market that will command power. It is to the institutionalised form of that power, as it changed into the state, that we now turn.
I have shown in the above, the deeply problematic basis of modern authority, and how MacIntyre's critique of this can be supplemented and deepened by utilising some aspects of contemporary Marxism. I now wish to continue this process by reconnecting the discussion with the development of the Liberal state, that we began with, by utilising some important retrieval work done by Derek Sayer, on the early Marx, showing that Marx is far from exhausted as a theorist of modernity. Sayer's work reveals how Marx's understanding of the concept of the state, can be usefully employed to supplement MacIntyre's views, in a way which, via our case study, illuminates the concept of 'bureaucratic individualism'.

We traced briefly at the beginning of the chapter a crucial early moment in the secularisation of the state, (a process we will see repeated, in a formally similar way, in the case of English radicalism in the mid-nineteenth century). This should not be dismissed by Marxists as being of no importance, for Marx clearly saw that feudalism was structured by religion as ideology, where 'Catholicism played the chief part'. We noted how Skinner saw this as crucial for the emergence of the liberal state. It is interesting to compare this with Marx's view of the state, that Sayer detects in The German Ideology, in the importance he places on the state/civil society couple.
what amounts now to almost conventional fashion, Sayer shows the inter
relationship of state and civil society. Civil society being the arena
of personal and private interests, whilst the state is 'the locus of
general, public, universal concerns'. Marx is quite explicit in The
German Ideology:

The term 'civil society' emerged in the 18th century when
property relations had already extricated themselves from
the ancient and medieval community. Civil society as such
develops only with the bourgeoisie. (87)

So much is well known, but Sayer draws out the logical corollary of
this, namely that civil society emerges with the bourgeoisie, so then
in a sense, so must the state. This point is of potentially great
importance for Sayer says:

... it implies that the state is emphatically a historical
category, in other words the concept is not a synonym for
any and all forms of government (or ways in which ruling
classes rule) but describes a definite and historically
delimited social form; the social form, specifically of
bourgeois class rule. (88)

It is certain that Marx understood the matter is this way from a very
early stage for in 1843 he was able to write:

The abstraction of the state as such belongs only to
modern times, because the abstraction of private life
belongs only to modern times. The abstraction of the
political state is a modern product. (89)

It is surely correct to see this move in theoretical understanding as
quite cruci ally important, for it breaks with a whole tradition of
Marxist understanding, which despite its vaunted commitment to history
has, in fact, seen the state as an eternal entity short of full
communism, and completely failed to historicise the concept. The
word itself, as a political legal category not making sense outside
the context of post-reformation Europe. But most important of all it
allows us to begin to grasp what is, both politically and culturally, specific about the modern state.

It is valuable for my purposes is to tackle the problem of class, individuality and the state. Particularly, how the state can be both directly experienced as an instrument of domination and force, but also experienced as a source of meaning and identity. We have seen how the emergence of the modern state may be objectively grounded, in the emergence of the capitalist division of labour and market relationships that ensue, and subjectively in the opaqueness of social reality, with the unsettleable disputes between different, moral, political, economic and religious perspectives. As concepts of private, and public, became central means of organising society, the state becomes in important ways both greater, and lesser, than previous historically given forms of government. It becomes the central arena of general, public concerns, it becomes in this alienated world an 'illusory' or substitute community which enacts the general will through the abstract process of law. This process has the simultaneous effect of de-politicising civil society, partly because an individual's particular circumstances are no longer the bearers of different political and legal statuses, but also because they nominally encounter their own will, enacted through formal law as the general will, which acts upon them. This does not mean that there is no politics in civil society, merely that politics is only one's personal opinion until translated through the formal procedures of voting, parties, etc once more into an aspect of the general will.
Politics then becomes a specialised activity,\textsuperscript{92} an aspect of the division of labour in society.

This society of private individuals, the political elements of whose lives have been torn from them, in Alan Wolfe has called 'the expropriation of people's sense of community'\textsuperscript{93} via the creation of a distinct civil society. However, this separation of the 'individual' from the bonds of society is only apparent, for this process underpinned by the increasing division of labour and market relations which generates the separation of economic and political life, also develops deeper levels of interdependence, as we become more separate in consciousness, so we become more dependent in reality; here is the heart of our alienated condition. We fail to recognise, because we fail to experience, our mutual relationships, so treating each other instrumentally, or as forms of external necessity. The production of life, as we have noted, becomes opaque, out of anyone's personal control, life appears to be governed by chance more than ever before, in our imaginations, we as individuals, as Marx put it:

\begin{quote}
\textcolor{red}{\textsuperscript{94}}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
seem freer under the domination of the bourgeoisie than before, because (the) \ldots conditions of life seem accidental, in reality, of course, they are less free because they are more subjected to the violence of things.
\end{quote}

The imposition of external necessity or 'the violence of things' will be of special importance as we analyse an example of social conflict in 19th century Britain. As people observe others as 'means to ends' or the obstacle to the realisation of private wishes, so the state may be the instrument, under its managers both old and new, by which
'necessity' imposes itself on those recalcitrant enough to ignore it.

In essence then the post-feudal, materially and morally, fragmented capitalist classes, were forced to constitute themselves as Sayer puts it:

... as 'we', as a moral person, as the state, in order to safeguard their common interests as much because of as despite their general fissiparousness as a class. In this sense the state is central to bourgeois society, one of its conditions of possibility. (95)

In other words it is forced to delegate to specialised bureaucracies some of its power. At the early stage of capitalist industrialisation this is most crucial to create and maintain the conditions for capital accumulation, it is the paradox of bourgeois society that its common interests as a class reside in its ability to continue to compete as distinct separate individuals. Law creates the framework of individual interactions and is the source from Smith to Hayek of the liberal tradition of circumscribing the role of the state, to creating the 'free market' whilst not interfering in it. As Sayer puts it the key liberal principles for Marx are that they

are formal, universal and abstract, in that their reference point is to the individual as such, irrespective of the differences in real individuals' material or social circumstances. For Marx they suppose precisely the 'isolated individual' of specifically bourgeois society. (97)

At this point it becomes crucial to emphasise the subjective and cultural aspect, so often elided in conventional Marxist accounts. To emphasise that Marx did talk of the state as an 'illusory' or substitutable community, for without this dimension much of modern class politics becomes obscured. It is around the apparently contradictory
nature of the capitalist state as both, formal, universal, and abstract, as well as simultaneously that which is invested as a space for communal purpose, that particular attention will focus in the illustrative case study.

Before turning directly to the case study it will be useful for my account to explore a little further the cultural and ideological significance of the emergence of the liberal state. How does this 'illusory community' that is the state, operate upon, or connect with its individuated citizens? We have noted what a pervasive role 'chance' and 'the violence of things' plays in these societies, yet as we have seen, some element of the notion of a moral community survives, of necessity embodied in the state. For reasons to be discussed in the final chapter, it seems unlikely that we can ever entirely ignore question of interpretation and purpose. Indeed, in the early stages of capitalist development, the state or rather the statesman, became the focus of a rejuvenated Republican philosophy, which attempted to limit the expanding and enveloping capitalist market, and the spiralling socially defined needs.98 A good deal of this tradition of criticism survives in the interesting and important work of William Connolly, who contributes to our understanding of the basis of the relationship of the citizens to the state even in the corroded environment of late capitalism. The nub of the argument can be understood by recalling how 'external necessity' or 'chance' etc limits the reality of individual freedom, despite our powerful self images as free citizens able to make our own choices and decisions. How does this contradiction
Connolly answers this problem by placing considerable weight on the rational element in our behaviour; we feel ourselves to be free, he argues, if the kind of roles we play in social life, converge with meanings and purposes we adopt by reflection. He argues that:

We can see ourselves as free, free as a people, if the central institution of electoral accountability and public action is widely believed to have sufficient resources to act with effectiveness in the pursuit of collective ends. The internal connection between my sense of individual freedom and my belief that the state is the locus of effective collective action is this: If I find certain role requirements to be both conventional and unjustifiably restrictive, if I can neither reconstitute them by myself nor adapt others, my freedom is still potentially intact if we can collectively reconstitute them should others come to agree with my assessment. (99)

In other words, an unskilled worker on the receiving end of an uncertain and capricious labour market, is likely to have his or her self image as a free self determining citizen, seriously eroded by their life experience of work and consequent lack of access to resources and the means of control over their own life patterns. However, their self image might remain intact if they feel they can act collectively, and this tends to mean in some important circumstances, (not all, as the existence of bodies like Trade Unions indicates) via the state, as an electorally constituted entity. They can then reconstitute their social relations or, and, it is a politically important addition, act together via the state for other collective or 'national' purposes. As Connolly puts it:

this is the basis - the rational basis - of that emotional bond between citizens and the state, we call patriotism. (100)
The cultural and political significance of a desire, often felt most acutely by those with least material well being, for retaining some identification with a wider social order, should not be underplayed. The promises that this process holds out to people are undoubtedly, continuously frustrated. This is because, as we have noted, the modern conception of the state, arrives with capitalism and the bourgeoisie. This state cannot freely reconstitute its social relations, in an uninhibited way without undermining the conditions of its own existence.\textsuperscript{101} This crucial inability on the part of the state, is the breeding ground for cynicism and disenchantment about the whole nature of politics, to the extent that can be readily seen in the use of the 'politics' as a synonym for self interested, corrupt and dishonest practices, in any organisation. This leads to the erosion of the citizens self image of freedom, whilst not destroying it altogether, for the state is still the locus for crucial co-ordinating and communal functions, eg welfare provisions and defence.

In this situation, the pathologies of patriotism and collective national endeavour, in terms of nationalistic wars and ferocious internal repression, against those who seem to threaten the national common good, become explicable in terms of the frustrated promise held out by the 'illusory community' of the liberal state.
V

'RADICAL' OLDHAM

We will now examine through the prism of a particular local case study, the process by which 'the state', as we have defined it in the last section, emerged. That is the process at the end of which, we are left with a state, which is both a formal, universal and abstract bureaucracy, and yet, the ill designed receptacle of the hopes of 'illusory community'. The state is caught in the contradictory demands of a capitalist society in which market based external goods, have won priority, but with ineradicable traces of notions of purposes, beliefs and meanings, still available even if marginal, as questions to pose to the state.

Although this is clearly not an exhaustive account of the emergence of such a 'state'. The case study will allow us to see in a concrete setting, the potency and consequences of the bureaucratic form, as the neutraliser and manager of conflict. The case study concerns a 19th century northern English industrial town in which class conflict and radical struggles generated a crisis of authority for the ruling class and the government, in the period from 1812 to 1847.

Oldham is an old industrial town a few miles to the north of Manchester. It is important since in both economic and political terms it provides a clear picture of the dramatic changes that affected
English workers in this period. And of the political and economic responses that working class pressure produced from the bourgeois class and the state. Oldham has been the subject of a major piece of historical research in John Foster's *Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution*\(^\text{102}\) and it is this account that I draw on below.\(^\text{103}\)

Oldham lay at the centre of that area of Britain to the west and north of the Pennines which are deeply associated with the heart of the Industrial Revolution, having been the centre of the cotton industry. Politically, for the period from the 1790s to 1848 it had a more or less continuous history of radical activity. The United Englishmen had a popular base in the 1800s and according to Foster:

> during the guerilla campaign of 1812 it was the scene of a two-day battle between armed workers and troops. (104)

During the second quarter of the 19th century the town was under the control of sections of the organised working class. The network of organisations that made up local government in this period, were generally subordinated to working class interests. Radical MPs like William Cobbett were elected to Parliament. The new poor law was not enforced for just over a decade. This situation only changed in the late 1840s in a process that Foster terms 'liberalisation', a complex matter to which we shall return.

Oldham provides us with a particularly graphic example of the real and sharp consequences of a society that has made the transition to a capitalist market, as its principal social mechanism. From 1790 to the 1830s the British state began, in a fairly through going manner to...
separate the economy from its traditional embeddedness in society. Most economic controls were dismantled after 1815; trading restrictions went, taxes on consumer goods were reduced, the authority of local justices of the peace to fix wage rates was removed and this was left to the market place. Monetary and banking policy was substantially revised with the restrictions on transactions in money and shares virtually eliminated. The Elizabethan law requiring craftsmen to serve seven years as an apprentice before they could practise trade, was repealed in the Statute of Apprentices in 1814 - many trades petitioned against it, but the interests of the hirers of labour won out and craftsmen were thence exposed to the vagueries of the open market.105

Within the context of these explicit attempts to re-fashion the social order, we can also, for the first time, see the full consequences of a working capitalist system on the new working class itself. From 1750 to 1850, Oldham's main industry was weaving and cotton-spinning - replaced in predominance from the middle of century by machine building and engineering. From 1790 to 1850, the cotton industry underwent two periods of severe crisis. The first lasted from the middle of the 1790s to 1820. The growth of continental competition in the finished goods market - broke the prosperity of the merchant houses and placed the whole weaving sectors under threat. Although machine spinning enjoyed continual growth. Yet despite technological changes, handloom weaving remained by far the largest employer in Oldham, right into the 1820s. The response of the employers was wage
cutting and unemployment. Pressure on wages threw the whole traditional forms of authority and control into crisis. These forms had managed to absorb the conflicts and riots over rising food prices, in part, because those in authority regarded the merchant as somewhat in the wrong, and hence shared some of the norms and values of those in rebellion. 106

However, the second crisis that lasted from 1830 to 1847, was the result of a structural imbalance between the mechanised spinning and unmechanised weaving sectors. This was the more serious of the two. It seems that by the turn of the 18th century European cotton producers were using English machine-spun yarn, so pushing England from her traditional markets for woven cloth. This in effect forced the largest sector of the English working class into competition with workers in Europe, who were generally more cheaply fed. This meant that for nearly two decades employers were attempting to push down living standards.

Foster's work on Oldham is most famous for its account of the development of class consciousness. Foster sets this out by linking it explicitly to the two stages of crisis. The first crisis he argues produces a 'special form of trade union consciousness', which in the process of struggling against the pressure on living standards, resulted in the removable of bourgeois political control from the town, and fought off attempts by the state to reimpose control. The second crisis, Foster argues, went on to produce a mass revolutionary
class consciousness, and was explicitly anti-capitalist. This typology has been criticised by Stedman Jones:

But working-class political control of the town was continuous from the 1810s to the 1840s. No sharp break appear: In itself, this argument is as compatible with a thesis of qualitative growth as it is with that of a qualitative leap. (107)

Critical acclaim and criticism for this book, of which there has been a good deal, have generally concentrated on these questions of class consciousness and especially Foster's unusual use of the concept of 'labour aristocracy'. In this process other elements, in what is a complex book, tend to get ignored. I have, therefore, extracted and re-interpreted elements of Foster's work, highlighting the changing nature of the state form in its relationship with class politics. Drawing out the material and ideological consequences for the working class of the emerging bureaucratisation of the state.

However, the question of social conflict is nonetheless crucial. Clearly whatever the mechanisms of consciousness involved, there can be no doubt that industrial conflict was at the heart of the social conflicts in Oldham, as Foster puts it:

within only a decade of building their first factories Oldham's employers had been forced to put on army uniform and use their sabres. (109)

Traditional forms were under pressure and indeed broke down principally because the new society of the late 1790s and 1800s was forced, as we have seen, to treat labour as just another commodity. This in turn produced not only hardship but also outrage in a population immersed in the forms and ideas of a prior social order,
which provided the criteria of criticism and much of the motive of mobilisation against the new.

Until 1824 trade union organisation was in itself illegal, and even after the repeal of the Combination Acts in 1825, many union practices such as attempts to enforce closed shops, apprenticeship schemes, etc remained offences at common law.

Naturally this required the ability to organise effectively within the community, to be able to 'frame rules affix penalites, and inflict punishments'. It seems most likely, though perhaps insufficiently stressed by Foster, that what made organisation possible within the local community, were pre-existing traditions and cultural practices from the 18th century. These traditions included gatherings in the alehouses, and the radical, free thinking congregations of Lord Street and Dobb Lane Chapel, with over a hundred, two pence a month paying members, connected to other groups in Manchester and Yorkshire. The strength of organisation was such that it proved quite impossible to even attempt to enforce the Combination Acts between 1818-1822, convictions only exist for well garrisoned centres such as Manchester and Preston, for Oldham there is nothing. One coalowner explained it thus:

About Oldham the colliers are universally out... the masters have not the courage to proceed against them for combination or neglect - although the workmen's committee sits on stated days at a public house in Manchester as if on legal business. (111)

Regular union activity continued for the next 20 years with regular
incidents of disputes, picketing, machine breaking etc, and what made all of this possible was the inability of the central government to enforce law. Generally in the early years of the century law enforcement was difficult in working class areas, leading to an increasing use of troops. According to Foster in 1812 there were 12,000 troops on garrison duty in the industrial areas of England and Wales by the 1830s this figure had risen to over 30,000. These troops were very blunt instruments to use against opposition that was embedded within the community. Small garrisons, ie anything less than 200, were considered dangerous as they could become easily isolated and cut off from support. Because of this, Oldham lost its temporary garrison in 1820, 1827 and in 1834. Central government control involved a complex expansion of state activity and a change in social relationship which will be explained later. The key point, however, is that central government seems to have lost control of the situation at the local level in Oldham, largely because it lost control of the local administration. Without the co-operation of local officials, the army could do very little, save repress large outbreaks of violence, but it could not control the organisation that lay behind the opposition. The due process of law, as the ruling class in Britain at this time saw it, was effectively paralysed in its efforts to act against working class opposition, without the co-operation of jurors, the police (as they were then) and the Poor law officials, there could be no systematic arrests, no evidence presented and no successful prosecutions. For over 20 years the conflict raged between fairly successful working class organisation and the central state allied
with the local ruling class.

What this raises are questions about how the working class won control and how in the long run, the state won it back.

When looking at working class domination of local administration in this period, we are examining a section of the population who were effectively excluded from participation in the electoral process - the franchise was based upon being a property owner or rate payer. The key point in this respect lay in the divergences within the electoral grouping in terms of their relationship with the propertyless classes. According to Foster, about one fifth of those entitled to vote consisted of the wealthy families who owned the industry and land of Oldham, plus those professional grouping closely tied to them, clergy, lawyers and surgeons. But for the rest, they were largely shopkeepers, publicans, small masters and small farmers. This latter group were almost all dependent in some form, upon working class custom, for selling provisions of various kinds, such as milk or beer and food stuffs.

As we have noted above, English working class (or lower class) radicals had a considerable history and experience of organising around the questions of price rises in consumer goods (see Note 106). Consumer boycotts of shops that put up prices above those set as 'radical prices', were organised well into the 19th century. It was but a small step from this to the practice of 'exclusive dealing',
which involved the organisation of a trading boycott of those who would not vote for radical candidates, there being no secret ballot at the time. In 1832 the radical candidates, Cobbett and Fielden, got into Parliament as MPs for Oldham with large majorities over the Tory and Whig candidates backed by the employers, and the seats remained largely in radical hands until the late 1840s.\textsuperscript{114}

However impressive it may seem to be able to get your candidates to Parliament whilst still formally excluded from the voting procedures, the key element in working class political control, lay elsewhere. It was naturally the area of state power, or 'law and order', that was most central to those workers, whose everyday defensive industrial activities in trade unions lay formally outside the law. Hence it was control of the policing function that was the top priority for the organised working class.

At the beginning of the 19th century the maintenance of law and order lay with the Vestry of each township, which meant in Oldham township and the out of townships of Chadderton, Crompton and Royton. Each Vestry elected two constables annually, who were jointly responsible for policing, which meant functions like hiring and supervising the police, giving permission for public meetings and appointing jurors at inquests. The vestry maintained over all control, by its right to refuse to sanction expenditure presented by the constables each quarter. Voting at the Vestry was open to all who paid rates.\textsuperscript{115}
Such a close and formal connections between the voters and the constables had always meant they were susceptible to popular pressure, eg both in 1757 and 1796 the state failed to conscript its quota of militia men from many parts of the county because the constables would not supply lists of men. It seems that it was in 1812, through the usual practice of 'exclusive dealing' that the organised working class, put their own constables in, the so-called 'Jacobinical' constables. Reports to the Home Secretary indicate that they refused to intervene on occasions when property was attacked and in 1816 allowed a universal sufferage meeting to take place. In 1818, a constable who was a working weaver, spoke at such a meeting.

The state's response to such a situation was to try and reconstruct the legal and administrative framework in favour of the ruling class and significantly, in the long run, in favour of the central state itself. Firstly in 1818 the Regulation of Parish Vestries Act was passed, which meant that those in arrears lost their vote at Vestry elections, while persons with a rateable value of more than £50, got an extra vote for every £25 of extra rateable value they had up to a maximum of six. Whatever its effects elsewhere, the Act does not seem to have had the desired effect in Oldham, as Constables were still able to appoint hostile jurors the following year in 1814 to examine the death of a local man killed at Peterloo.

The state then tried to use an old crown office: 'The Right of the Hundred Court Leet Steward', in this case the crown put forward a
stipendary magistrate from Manchester, who had the right to overrule a Vestry election and appoint constables of his own choosing. In 1820 he appointed two employers. But in 1821 the radicals appealed through the courts right up to the King's Bench, until the case was dismissed.

However, this situation was inherently unstable, because although responsibility for law enforcement lay with the crown appointees, control of the expenses still lay formally with the Vestry.\textsuperscript{119} For example, in 1821 the Vestry refused to refund expenses incurred in garrisoning troops brought in for the period 1819-20. It was clear to the leading employers in the town that more legal reconstruction was necessary, to which effect they petitioned Parliament. The result was the 1826 \textit{Oldham Police Act}, which set up a Police Commission funded by a levy on rates and mortgages. Qualification for membership of the Commission was £60 rateable value, which meant only the largest shopkeepers and, of course, the employers were eligible.\textsuperscript{120} But once again this solution did not prove all that successful, somehow perhaps by 'exclusive dealing' or maybe by intimidation the local working class organisation was able to prove that it was not beaten yet, for in 1831 they were able to get a majority on the Commission and dismiss the police force. Clearly the organised working class's position had been weakened and they could not always hope to hold the Commission but as Foster puts it:

\textit{... things were uncertain enough to make the police wary of interfering with the unions. In 1834 an example was made of two over-zealous policemen ordered by the magistrates to seize some trade union papers. After being man-handled by the mob, they were censured by the Commission and dismissed from service.} (121)
It seems to have become clear to the authorities (defined by Foster as the Home Office and its local intelligence network, the local military command, the sixty or so capitalist families who, as Foster puts it:

appear variously as yeomanry cavalry, special constables, and 'principal inhabitants', along with the JP (122)

that the only long term solution lay in getting rid of the ratepayer controlled police, and replacing it with a body under more central control. In 1839 the County Police Act was passed allowing Lord Lieutenants to recruit a permanent police force paid for out of the county rates. These new police were used extensively in the early 1840s and in 1842 during the General Strike, they arrested 49 local working class leaders on the charge of sedition.123 In 1842 a Bill was passed removing control of the parish police from constables to magistrates, and at the end of the '40s the Commission and Vestry were abolished when the town was incorporated and a new Borough force was created.

Much the same story can be told about the organised working classes domination and control of poor relief, except that they seemed to have a firmer grip on it than they had on the police. They even managed to block the implementation of the Poor Law Amendment Act until 1847. In essence the administrators of the poor law in Oldham were generous. Clements, a government commissioner in 1846, compared the rate of increase in Oldham with other parts of Lancashire, where the amended Act was in operation, Oldham's growth was 279% compared with 68% elsewhere. As with the various pieces of legislation concerning the police, The Poor Law Amendment Act was, in part, aimed at
restructuring the balance of class forces in particular localities. The Board of Guardians was to be elected by secret ballot, no doubt in part to weaken 'exclusive dealing' and intimidation, and rates were distributed in accordance with the size of one's rateable value. County Magistrates were put on the boards with full voting rights. In addition to this a central board in London could challenge expenditure decisions. This last element was perceived as a decisive shift of power towards the centre, and whatever the actual limitations of its authority, it was clearly intended to back the restructuring of local class power, with some element of centralised bureaucratic authority. As Derek Fraser has noted:

> Many magistrates and middle-class political leaders opposed the centralisation of the new system and resented the slur on their own administration implicit in the condemnation of the Old Poor Law. (125)

Whatever the intentions, the Amendment was successfully resisted for almost a decade and a half, largely because the organised working class controlled the administration and prevented the procedures for the election of new guardians from taking place. The end to this long and effective resistance came in 1847 when the Poor Law commission served writs of mandamus, and the workers did not contest the election, allowing the employers in.

From the point of view of the state, the social conflict and absence of effective control, the situation in Oldham can be periodised into three. Foster summarises these thus:

> a defensive holding operation for the first years of the century; near paralysis by the end of the second decade; and from the middle of the fifth the reassertion of state power. (126)
Once it became clear that raising a militia from a cross-section of the community was a hazardous procedure, from 1790 onwards. One solution was to raise 'volunteers' hand picked loyal forces, entirely by employers. But they, like small bands of troops, were considered too vulnerable and they were disbanded. The key problem of Oldham for the military was the lack of a barracks, billeting troops with the local population brought the danger of fraternisation, especially in the 1820s and early '30s. But as we have seen the authorities were loath to risk small groups of troops, without an adequately defended barracks, for fear of physical danger.

The situation was that:

> for two decades the ultimate military sanctions of class rule could not be properly applied in Oldham. The results show up in the failure of the magistracy and the breakdown of the spy system. (128)

By 1843 there was an adequate barracks built in Oldham. So by the early 1840s the build-up of the local presence of state power was quite considerable. The new County police force acted more or less as a political police so that by 1842 the area military command was able to keep a close watch on local working class leaders. As Foster puts it:

> Though arrests on the 1842 scale were not repeated, the memory of the imprisonment; the presence of the army and the reality of industrial victimization (used openly in the 1847 election) must have done a good deal to weaken further resistance. (129)

In looking at the way in which the grip of the organised working class was broken in Oldham politics, a key question emerges as to why was it possible for state repression to be successful in the early '40s. Also
why did the radical leadership appear to lose heart so quickly in the mid 1840s, after facing down so many carefully constructed assaults on its power over the past 20 years or so. Now clearly over this period the mechanism and institutions of state authority were being gradually restructured in favour of ruling class interests, and in the interests of the central state. So naturally the organised workers were experiencing the beginning of a bureaucratic state apparatus in its most repressive form. However, this in itself cannot constitute anything like a full explanation for clearly outright repression, of almost as severe a form had been experienced before. The question is how was the process Foster calls 'liberalisation' so easily achieved. In a moment we look at Stedman Jones' interpretation of the process, on a national scale. But how did it occur in Oldham?

In essence according to Foster by 1846 it was clear that another severe depression was imminent; two leading Tories came out in favour of The Ten Hour Bill. This effectively split the radicals, for rather than risk losing this major working class demand, a Tory-Radical alliance was formed and the adoption of the pro-Anglican Morgan Cobbett for MP. Neither some of the non-conformist tradesmen nor some of the deist or atheists'old revolutionaries', could stomach this, and they moved to put forward another candidate. The following year the split became worse when another, 'Whig' group of big mill-owners put up a non-conformist candidate for Parliament, on a platform of Church disestablishment and household suffrage, both likely to appeal to radicals. With many supporters detached from the radicals, the two
groups 'Tory' and 'Whig' now did a electoral deal for the 1847 election. As Foster writes:

Against this the radicals, with their organisation shattered and faced with systematic victimisation by the employers, went down to fairly easy defeat. As Felden (a radical candidate) put it afterwards 'a more foul coalition never existed'. (130)

By 1852 only a small and isolated group of old Chartists had independent existence, as the non-conformist tradesmen and many ex-Chartists were tied to the group of 'Liberal' employers, whilst the 'Tory' employers gained the support of the small masters, working class shopkeepers and trade union radicals committed to the ten hour campaign.

How was it then that the parties of the propertied class in Oldham and elsewhere had been able to gain so much of the allegiance of the working class and their allies? The answer lies in the nature of the radical movement's conception of itself and its aims, and in the changing nature and form of the state itself, most particularly in relation to the economy. And as such, as we shall see, the explanation flows directly from the analysis presented in the first half of the chapter.

In the first place the key to understanding 'liberalisation' or 'stabilisation' lies not just in seeing what new events caused it but in examining the nature of the radicalism that was nullified. The central novelty of Stedman Jones' analysis lies in doing precisely this; he puts radicalism, of which Chartism is for him but the latest
development, within the context of the political history and theory of the preceding century and before. Stedman Jones rightly sees radicalism as first and foremost, as the language of a politics of political exclusion, no matter what the social character of those excluded:

Its strength indeed its definition, was a critique of the corrupting effects of the concentration of political power and its corrosive influence upon a society deprived of proper means of political representation. As such, in various forms, it could provide the vocabulary of grievance to a succession of political and social groups. (131)

Taken in its widest sense, the politics of the whole historical epoch from the decline of feudalism, to the rise of the liberal capitalist democracies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It can be traced right through, as we noted above, from the moment of the move from the language of religious to political rights in France through the Netherlands more sharply formulated in the English Civil War, passed on as Jones notes, in the ideology of the Country Party in the 18th century and thence taken up, more radically broadened, and coherently codified, in the ideology of the French Revolution. The Revolution in turn stimulated the radicalism of Tom Paine and the English Jacobins, and then the Chartists, such diverse social and cultural setting, so many different groups, inevitably means a diffuse set of ideological themes but they are none the less real for that.132

The franchise was extended to the middle classes and they were granted more of a place within the political structure. As the bulk of the population experienced the new problems posed by the impact of
the Industrial Revolution, so they extended radicalism's analysis to incorporate the theory of economic discontent; so the middle classes became more alienated from radicalism. The consequence was that by the 1830s radicalism became more and more a working class movement, but this did not in any automatic sense lead to a fundamental change in radicalism's ideology, as Stedman Jones writes:

The self-identity of radicalism was not that of any specific group, but that of 'the people' or the 'nation' against the monopolizers of political representation and power and hence financial or economic power. (133)

This became de facto a working class ideology, not at all by intention but because others had changed, as the social situation changed. The ideology could remain intact as long as it was plausible to believe that the source of working oppression lay in the ruling class having a monopoly of political and legal power, rather than their control and ownership of the means of production. As long as the unreformed state could be typified as 'Old Corruption', so it remained plausible to see unemployment, low wages, poverty etc as rooted in a fundamental political disorder. As soon as this disorder was remedied it would be possible, to curb the excess of 'machine production' in a cross alliance which crucially included the 'productive' middle classes. The reason for this lay in the simple fact that radicalism was not opposed to property, but as Jones puts it:

Chartism did not regard the working class as propertyless. For since the only legitimate source of property was labour, labourers were therefore in possession of the most fundamental form of all property. (134)

It is quite crucial to note the acceptance of property in the case of the radical workers of Oldham, for they never raised the legitimacy of
property as a political demand. They might be viewed as anti-capitalist, but only so far as they subscribed to a Lockean labour theory of value, derived from popular radical writers, like Thomas Hodgkin, who saw the relationship between labour and capital as unequal exchange, which had been acquired by the capitalist monopoly of the means of production. Hence the enthusiasm for co-operatives, and the perceived need for political rights, by means of which it was often assumed the capitalist had acquired his advantage.  

Chartism then, as the working class form of radicalism in the 1820s and '30s, acquired its strength as an organising political ideology, precisely from the sense it made of a situation like the one we have described, in Oldham, in this phase. It was also able to articulate this experience, into a coherent and nationally organised movement of a quite remarkable kind. The repression and the collusion of the Liberal Government with the Oldham employers must have all too clearly borne out the truth of radicalism as an ideology. Thus it was the owners monopoly of political power which gave them the ability to outlaw trade unions, break-up the old poor law system, and create the new police. However, the very strength and explanatory power of radicalism in the 1820s and 1830s was to be its undoing in the 1840s. It was because of the nature of the radicalism they faced, that forced the state and the owners, to act in a way that Foster says for Oldham: 

confused and dispirited the movement, and did so precisely because it resulted from a new plausibility in arguments for the existing order, not from outright repression. (136)

We saw above, how in Oldham, the radicals were unable to cope with the
transformation that local, and also national politics was then undergoing. Most fundamentally of all, at both the local and national level, radicalism was unable to resist the important reconstruction of the state, undertaken most particularly by Robert Peel.

The space for manœuvre discovered in the political forms of the 1840s surprised many of the radicals, undoubtedly the ruling class had been seriously intimidated by the radical actions of the 1830s, culminating in the General Strike of 1842. But the desire of both Liberals and Tories, to support different aspects of the reform programme of the organised working class, had similar effects elsewhere to that it had had in Oldham. The Ten Hour Act nearly got through in 1844, and was finally passed in 1847. The fact of this, with the obvious improvements that it brought, was bound to throw into question the whole notion of 'Old Corruption', with its sealed and exclusive state. Improvement now seemed possible within the existing political system. Radicalism was ideally suited to the initial authoritarian thrust of the new bureaucratic state in its aspect of domination, as Jones puts it:

The activity of the state could thus be seen as the brutal culmination of the ambitions of artificial wealth and monopoly power, which had been at work ever since 1688. The centralisation of the powers of the state at the expense of local representation, combined with the apparent scheme to establish a tyranny over the producers in the context of the structural changes and by cyclical difficulties experienced in the economy, created a potentially formidable opposition in the localities - both working and middle class, Radical and Tory. (137)

In this context, radicalism made a great deal of sense since it was
designed to concentrate on the malicious activity of the state. However, it was not prepared for the kind of bourgeois politics that came into existence in the 1840s, partly in revulsion at the brutality and offence given to so many interests, both working class and middle class. It was basically the creation of a coherent, fully liberal bourgeois state, that fundamentally undermined radical politics and provided the basis for a reconstructed political consciousness. This was the task that Robert Peel carried through in those famous landmarks of British social history: the repeal of the Corn Laws, The Mines Act of 1842, the creation of Joint Stock Companies, The Bank Charter Act, followed by the reduction of tax on consumption goods, particularly affecting the working class. In all these measures he attempted as Jones notes:

the effective raising of the state above the dictates of particular economic interests — whether landlords, financiers or manufacturers. (138)

It should be clear, if one follows Sayer's argument that it is really only at this point that 'the state' as a social form specific to bourgeois class rule has emerged, at least in its full form, ie as the abstraction of the state standing above particular interests in civil society. Thus it seemed to lose the connection which had earned it the title 'Old Corruption'. However, it must be remembered, that this was a process of completion, whatever amendments had been made to the legislation of the previous decade much of the apparatus of state power, so created, remained intact and indeed developed. The Police force spread rapidly, the centralising elements of Poor Law administration remain, to name but two. In essence the state as
bureaucratic domination was never to be frontally challenged in all its scope again. The Old Country Party ideology of Tory Radicalism and its counterpart in ideology, 'the moral economy', amongst the working classes, had been decisively defeated partly by the actions of state, but also as F. Hearn points out, by the operation of the market as capitalism became the only experiential mode. New forms of conflict and sectional strife emerged among workers who played the rules of the capitalist game sometimes successfully against the capitalist himself, and they no longer viewed these rules as aberrations from nature. Now it was no longer possible to see unemployment and poverty as directly political creations. Most of the political evils remained, the workers still did not have the vote, but the tight connection between this and poverty no longer held. Peel the believer in Laissez Faire began the process of separating the state and the economy; the state could be seen, more plausibly to stand above civil society as the collective 'we' the bourgeois were forced to invent, as well as stand for the hoped for 'illusory community'. Thus the two moments of the state, we spoke of above, domination and substitute community, were in their recognisable modern place, and with it civil society as the private arena occupied by the liberal self, slowly emerged into its future full bloom. Now only a politics of material transcendence of these antinomies (ie socialism) would pose the vision of a different society.

The 10 hour day is often seen in radical circles both then and now as a triumph of the political economy of the working class over that of the bourgeois. However, perhaps it should be seen as more of an
indication of how deep the fundamental nature of capitalist social relations had bitten, and as an example of the opaqueness of those social relations, that Burawoy has pointed to, in terms of the difficulty of securing the surplus. For what lay behind the acceptance of the Ten Hour Day Bill was the the destruction of handicraft production and the restabilisation of the labour process on a new basis. As is clear from Foster's work, the new skilled workforce in, for example, engineering, in places like Oldham, did not possess anything like the same control over production that the craft workers had had. Fundamentally this meant an acceptance by workers of the division of labour and the wage contract, and a relative ease for new technical innovation. Confusion was felt by both Capital and Labour in this new situation, it had the obvious effect of displacing conflict away from control and on to wage struggle. But the opaqueness of the 'rising' surplus provided a material basis upon which a whole range of confusing bourgeois political strategies, concessions and new cross-class alliances, could be built. The Ten Hour Day Bill should be seen within the context of the shift from formal to real subordination of the working class within the labour process, which had in turn, produced the space for new cultural, political and ideological forms.

As capitalism modernised, albeit unevenly, and as the moral and political culture of the previous century receded from memory, so the state as 'illusory community' - now it had withdrawn from invidious associations and been suitably moralised by Peel and then by Gladstone - would be the focus for those in all classes who sought a transcendence of the new social relations. So that by 1880, bourgeois writers like
Ernest Barker could compare favourably what they termed 'economic socialism', with the political radicalism of 1848 and 'the idea of social readjustment by the state' (compared with laissez faire). In 1889 Bland could write in the Fabian Essays of a...

... sort of unconscious or semi-conscious recognition of the fact that the word 'state' had taken to itself a new and diverse connotations — that the state idea had changed its content among the working class also, who see it as a 'potential saviour' rather than fearing it as an enemy'. (141)

But the state as 'illusory community' would also be accompanied by the state as, bureaucratic domination; the abstract manager of reality and the imposer of external necessity. These roles, given the opaqueness of social reality to both ordinary capitalist and workers and the public and private split, would be based on the maintenance of an image of authority and competence, but with real power consequences. The state form had produced its ideological effects, helping to shape the political consciousness of its people. In the process a state was to emerge which eventually could be made to manage capitalism in the manner Keynes recommended. It would provide the bureaucratic side of bureaucratic individualism. 'Illusory community' would stay illusory. Only a politics based upon radically different conceptualisations of what it is to be a worker and a citizen could break from this situation. A politics based upon a rejection and transcendence of both liberal individualism and the priority of market exchange and consumption.
NOTES


2. For an analysis of the widespread acceptance of this even by left wing European political parties and governments see *The Special Issue on French Socialism* Telos, No.55, spring 1983 and James Petras, 'The Rise and Decline of the Southern European Socialist Parties', New Left Review, No.146, July/August 1984.


4. Ibid, p.45.


15. F. Hirsch, op.cit., p.84.

16. Ibid, the question is discussed in Chapter 5 'The Economics of Bad Neighbours', p.71-83.
17. Ibid, p.120.
24. Ibid, p.117.
26. On Calvinist radicalism see ibid, 225-238.
27. Ibid, p.322.
30. On Weber's analysis in this area, see especially Roger Brubaker, The Limits of Rationality: an essay on the social and moral thought of Max Weber, Allen & Unwin, London, 1984. This book brings out very well the powerful tensions that Weber saw in the modern world, and deeply reflected in his own make up. As Brubaker puts it: 'the tension between the formal rationality of the capitalist economy and its substantive irrationality from the point of view of egalitarian, fraternal and caritative values. This antagonism is 'one source (quoting Weber) of all 'social' problems and above all of the problem of socialism', p.38. See also Wolfgang Mommsen, The Age of Bureaucracy, Blackwells, Oxford, 1974. But also the criticism of Weber in Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953, especially chapter 2 on the Fact and Value distinction and also E.B.F. Midgley, The Ideology of Max Weber: a Thomist Critique, Gower, Hants 1983 both the latter work have some affinities with what is presented here.
31. Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Social Science Methodology as the Ideology of Bureaucratic Authority', p.55-56.

32. The full argument of MacIntyre's concerning facts and laws in the social sciences is to be found in chapters 7 and 8 of After Virtue, p.76-102. Also see 'Social Science Methodology as Ideology of Bureaucratic Authority', op.cit.

33. After Virtue, op.cit., p.81.

34. Ibid, p.85. The article is D.J.C. Smyth and J.C.K. Ash, 'Forecasting Gross National Product, the rate of Inflation and the Balance of Trade: The OECD Performance', The Economic Journal, 85, 1975. In a much less specific sense than is intended here, it might be argued that social scientists, have made predictions that were accurate, e.g. the work of John Rex and his co-workers at the Ethnic and Race Relations Unit, and Stuart Hall and his co-authors of Policing the Crisis, Macmillan, London, 1978, all of whom it might be argued predicted the urban riots of 1981. However, they could not, nor would they claim to be able to have predicted precisely when or where such riots would occur in the manner necessary for an efficient management science to utilise. Nor is it obvious that their various books on racism and the inner city have any cognitive privilege over the work of good community relation journalists working for the serious press or TV.


41. A. MacIntyre, 'Social Science Methodology', op.cit., p.55.

42. A good example of an attempt to make the bureaucrat fit this ideal model is A. Downs, 'Decision Making in Bureaucracy' in F.G. Castle et al (ed.) Decisions, Organisations and Society, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p.59-78.

43. Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Ideology, Social Science and Revolution', op.cit., p.335.
44. After Virtue, op.cit., p.50.

45. These questions are very complex and controversial. In chapters 4, 5 and 6 of After Virtue give some philosophical background in an historical form. David Knowles The Evolution of the Medieval Mind, Longman, London, 1962 is useful for the medieval context. It is worth mentioning a possible historical precedent for the fact/value distinction, which is the so-called double truth theory of later medievalism (unmentioned by MacIntyre). This theory held that something could be true in theology and false in philosophy. A point that seems to revived in the Reformation, with Luther's prioritising of faith over or indeed in spite of reason, solved by Luther by the primacy of will in his theology. The tension between faith and Reason is present throughout Protestant theology, down to the 19th century, Kierkegard being a distinct product of it. A tension that is passed on in a secularised form to Weber given his pessimism over resolving the tension between formal and substantive reationality, see Midgley, op.cit.

46. An interesting analysis that bears on this question is Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger and Hansfried Kellner, The Homeless Mind, Penguin Harmondsworth 1974. This and Peter Berger's essay collection, Facing up to Modernity, Penguin Harmondsworth 1979, contain interesting comments on the role of intellectuals as carrying through a rationalisation process in which the strict observance of the fact/value distinction is carried through all spheres of life, systematically. The 'Liberal' intellectual is an important cultural figure who demands greater sociological attention.

47. After Virtue, op.cit., p.80.


50. He will not use the word ideology because he feels it is part of, in Marx, the very would-be social science of law-like generalisation that he is opposing, see After Virtue, p.104.


52. Ibid, p.72.


56. See for a clear statement of Offe's view his 'Theses on the theory of the State' in C. Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State, Hutchinson, London, 1984 on p.120 he states, 'since state power depends on a process of accumulation which is beyond its power to organise, every occupant of state power is basically interested in promoting those political conditions most conducive to private accumulation'. There is nothing in After Virtue, that would cause MacIntyre to dissent from this view.


58. Peter Sedgewick, 'An ethical dance - a review of Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue', The Socialist Register 1982, Merlin, London, 1982. He writes, 'MacIntyre's life has been a long polemical itinerary, battling against massive and deliberately chosen odds with the weapons of a ruthless honesty ... But the very intensity and rigour of his adversary role has, over the long series of battles in and outside the political left, tended to isolate him from any base in a collective endeavour ... (an example of this). That radical tendency in ideas ... approximating to MacIntyre's present position - the school of European Critical Theory ... is never referred to in After Virtue except in the surely amalgam we have noted between the Frankfurt School and Managerial Conformity' (p.265). However, I do not believe Sedgwick's review is adequate to the real importance of After Virtue, particularly in regard to the related questions of MacIntyre's Aristotelianism and his critic of individualism.


60. Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Macmillan: London, 1981. This is perhaps the central element of Marxism that Giddens retains in his social theory.


63. Burawoy, op.cit., 264.

64. Ibid, p.264.


68. Ibid, p.279, Maier's work see note 62 above.

69. Ibid, p.280.

70. Cited in Sennett, op.cit., p.43.

71. Ibid, p.43.


73. Sennett, op.cit., p.42.


75. MacIntyre, 'Social Science Methodology', op.cit., p.44.

76. Ibid, p.44.

77. Ibid, p.44.

78. Ibid, p.45.


85. Sayer, op.cit. Sayer is, of course, only one of a number of contemporary writers on Marx to emphasise the State/Civil Society, relation see eg, the interesting critique of the Marxism of the late Marx in Jean Cohen, Class and Civil Society, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1983. See the overview of this literature by C. Pierson, 'New Theories of State and Civil Society: Recent Developments in Post-Marxists analysis of the State', Sociology, Vol.18, No.4, November, 1984.

86. Sayer, op.cit., p.231.

87. Ibid, p.231 emphasis in original.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid, p.230.

90. Engels for example, seems to use the notion of the State quite freely to describe quite diverse ruling bodies see The Origin of the Family Private Property and the State in Marx and Engels Selected Works, Vol.II, Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1962, p.170-327. Naturally as long as the use of the word is properly defined in different contexts. The purpose here in this thesis and in Sayer's work is to reveal the specificity of the state as we know it.

91. Marx uses the phrase 'illusory' in terms, one suspects, of his essence/appearance distinction (see Chapter 2) in this sense the illusions have a real materiality. For MacIntyre it is also an illusion, for the grounds of a real community have been destroyed by - in this he agrees with Marx - by the transition from Feudalism to Capitalism, but he does not believe in any 'real necessity' that will transcend this situation. For further analysis of Marx's view of the state as an illusory community, see John Maguire's Marx's Theory of Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978. See especially his discussion (p.18-23) on the state's role as representing 'illusory communal interests' and in maintaining both ruling class cohesion and a 'suspended' repressive function. In addition see Hal Draper Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution: Vol.I, State and Bureaucracy, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1977. Draper's work is an
excellent source book; he provides a useful overview of Marx's understanding of the state in *The German Ideology*, on p.189-193.


93. Ibid, p.149.


97. Sayer, op.cit., p.244, emphasis in the original.


100. Ibid, p.166.

101. See Claus Offe, op.cit., see p.120.


103. It should be noted that although I draw on Foster for his information on working class action and the State's response, this does not imply endorsement for Foster's version of the labour aristocracy argument.


(food riots) were legitimised by the Old Paternalist moral economy. Although the legislation against forestallers and regraters had been largely repealed ... it endured with undiminished vigour, both in the popular tradition and in the minds of some Tory paternalists, including no less a person than Lord Chief Justice (Kenyon) who made known his view in 1795 that forestalling and engrossing remained offences at common law'.

107. See Gareth Stedman Jones, 'Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution' in his The Language of Class, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 1983, p.41. Both Francis Hearn, op.cit, and in a more rigorous fashion, Craig Calhoun in The Question of Class Struggle, Blackwells, Oxford, 1982 argues that of central importance to social conflict, were the inherited cultural traditions of craft and locality, that produce radicalism rather than a narrowly defined class consciousness as set by Foster.


109. Foster, op.cit, p.34.
111. Ibid, p.50.
112. Ibid, p.44.
113. Ibid, p.52.
114. Ibid, p.54-56.
115. Ibid, p.57.
117. Ibid, p.58.
118. Ibid, p.58.
119. Foster is rather cursory in his treatment of the Judicial system, he seems to see basically as mystificatory, cloaks for ruling class interests. Both E.P. Thompson Whigs and Hunters, Penguin Harmondsworth, 1975 and P. Corrigan and D. Sayer, The Great Arch, op.cit., are much more sensitive to the historical construction of legal forms, which are not simply functional to the interests
of the dominant class at any particular moment, but have to be worked upon and transformed to suit such interests. On some occasions this kind of action may be blocked.

120. Foster, op.cit., p.58.
121. Ibid, p.59.
122. Ibid, p.65.
123. Ibid, p.60.


126. Foster, op.cit., p.65.
130. Foster, op.cit., p.208.
132. The literature here is, of course, vast and an interesting selection from it is noted by Jones op.cit. p.102 note 28. However, two sources I have found useful in tracing the interconnections between radical tradition in such diverse settings and periods are John Cannon, Parliamentary Reform 1640-1832, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973 and Derek Jarrett, The Begetters of Revolution: England's Involvement with France 1759-1789, Longman, London, 1973.

133. Stedman Jones, op.cit., p.104, emphasis in the original.
134. Ibid, p.108.

137. Stedman Jones, op.cit. p.175.
138. Ibid, p.177.


140. Francis Hearn, op.cit., especially p.158-165, see also Chapter 3 above.

Chapter Five

Conclusion: Narrative and Communities

What "ought to be" is therefore concrete; indeed, it is the only realistic and historicist interpretation of reality; it alone is history in the making; it alone is politics.

Antonio Gramsci
This thesis has attempted to examine a core problem of the human sciences - the relationship between individual and communal life. I have located this problem through an assessment of the impact of market pressures upon forms of thought and upon the state, and upon political and moral practices. This has been carried out by the utilisation of the work of the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre. It is to MacIntyre's work that we return, in this conclusion. Here, we examine his account of human life as narrative. We do this in order to illustrate what resources there might be in ordinary human practice, to resist the individualising and abstracting processes of advanced capitalist societies, and to see what elements exist for the construction of a counter-process of human community in life and thought.

However, a cautionary note should be added, for it is clear that what follows is both the legacy and the cost of abandoning Marxism in its original form. The fragility and difficulties of what follows reveal that MacIntyre and perhaps most of us are only at the beginning of a reassessment of the classical tradition of political thought, of which Marxism was the culmination.

FORMS OF LIFE

MacIntyre has perhaps inevitably been attacked for the apparent conservatism of his attempt to find a new coherence and unity to
social and moral life. This issue must be carefully addressed, but in the end, can only be answered by an attempt to demonstrate the usefulness of this thought in reconceptualising socialism in a manner that transcends the tradition of radical liberalism.

Nevertheless, there are those on the left who will push the argument about conservatism at a deeper philosophic level. Some see attempts to establish coherence, particularly of narrative ordering of social life, as either hopelessly anachronistic or downright reactionary, especially in the guise of an appeal to tradition. I am, of course, referring to the post-Nietzschean philosophy called Post-Structuralism or Deconstruction, most commonly associated with the work of Derrida and Foucault. The central point of this tradition was put well some years ago, minus the Nietzschean flourish, in a critique of Marxism:

Epistemology conceives of discursive objects through a play on words which assimilates the specific entities designated in discourse to the general status of independently existing objectivity and objects-to-be-known. To deny this form of conceptualisation is to argue that what is specified in discourse, i.e., its "objects" can only be conceived through discourse; either through the discourse which specifies them itself, or through another discourse. (2)

This seems to be the central thrust of Derrida's work. It is what he means, in his much quoted phrase, 'There is nothing outside of the text'.³

For our purposes, however, it is precisely this element of deconstruction that is the problem. Its emphasis on the fatal nature
of the play on words, for knowledge, with its hunting down of the metaphysics of presence or logocentrism, the breaking up of settled attempts to describe a prescriptive truth spoken or written into an endless play of random sense; all this threatens narrative unity. For, as Christopher Norris has put it:

Deconstruction is therefore an activity performed by texts which in the end have to acknowledge their own partial complicity with what they denounce. The most rigorous reading, it follows, is one that holds itself provisionally open to further deconstruction of its own operative concepts. (4)

It is not difficult to see why this form of philosophy and criticism is appropriate in an age of modernist and post-modernist art and literature since like the works themselves, it constantly calls its truth claims into question, and celebrates its own knowing self awareness, and disrupts the steadying influence of continuous narrative and coherent form. It is truly a culture 'when all that is solid melts in air'. In this context, even the suggestion of constructing a narrative order of human life and social institutions, would seem to be doing nothing but providing more targets for radical scepticism about the coherence of such things as human identity over time. It must seem an example of the foolishness of trying to tell one story, as though it were the only one to tell.

It is, however, possible to engage with this question of philosophical scepticism and thereby implicitly defend the possibility of a teleology of human life and community. I want to suggest that some of the resources for this task lie in the later work of the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. At first sight it might seem that Wittgenstein's concerns and arguments are very similar to those of a figure such as
Derrida. Like Derrida, Wittgenstein argues that once words are taken as primarily signs of something else, i.e., extra discursive, and verification is based upon intuitions of the reality these signs refer to, then there will always be a gap between direct experience and linguistic expression. The attempt will always be to fill this gap by some concept of representation between signs and sources of meaning. We will then be caught in an infinite regress between expressions of knowledge on one hand, and a necessary but ultimately unreachable certain, direct knowledge, on the other.

So their thinking is quite close, and there is a second and related sense in which Wittgenstein's work seems to parallel that of the French Deconstructionists. This is concerning the so-called 'death of the subject'. As we shall see shortly, thinking for Wittgenstein is not a separate activity from doing. It is not something that takes place in addition to our relationships with objects; it is, rather, a particular way in which a person relates to his or her direct involvement in the world. From this it becomes clear that thinking is not representational; it is more a part of acting, than a separate form. As Altieri puts it:

Consciousness is essentially not a way of relating to objects but of relating to actions we learn to perform. The basic condition of human experience is not minds facing a world of objects but a wide variety of activities constituting a complex interrelated web of cultural and natural forms towards which we can behave in a creative way if we need or care to. (7)

But what stems from this view in regard of the subject, is that there is no special subject that we can arrive at by self-reflection. As
Wittgenstein shows in the *Philosophical Investigations*, when he says:

> It's true, "Now I am having such-and-such an image", but the words "I am having" are merely a sign to someone else; the description of the image is a complete account of the imagined world - you mean: the words "I am having" are like "I say" ... (8)

This means that if conscious thinking is a way of simply relating to a specific practice, then being aware of oneself is only being aware of oneself acting in a particular way; there is no getting at a separate thing called 'the self' that pre-exists the practices. Viewed in this way the constitutive self to Wittgenstein looks suspiciously as it does to Derrida and Foucault: the residue of a metaphysical ghost - the philosopher, obsessed with attempting to find a point of origin for all phenomena. To anticipate the argument a little, the point of difference between Wittgenstein and the Post-Structuralists, is that the latter remained trapped within the Cartesian tradition even as they seek to transcend it. As Giddens puts it:

> Derrida's denunciation of the "presence" of the idea as the essence of signification leads him to retreat from the signified as far as possible, into the signifier. He does not take the more radical step of rejecting the signifier/signified distinction (as Wittgenstein does ...). The problem concerns the signified. The withdrawal from the object into the internal play of difference, ... cannot be accomplished, hence the nature of the signified has been left in obscurity, or the term has been used ambiguously to include both concept and object. (9)

As Giddens points out, for Wittgenstein however, signifier or concept and signified or object, are understood in terms of their inclusion within the practices which compose forms of life: as Wittgenstein says, 'Don't look for meaning, look for use.\textsuperscript{10}

The 'practicality' of Wittgenstein's philosophy can be illustrated by
looking at the use Altieri makes of it in understanding interpretation. Clearly, if consciousness is a way of representing some external reality, then as Altieri says:

it follows that consciousness is always interpretation, always the imposition of tenuous forms on an unknowable but felt flux. (11)

However, Wittgenstein argues that:

the sense of the given as commonly held forms of behaviour greatly limits the sphere in which the problematics of interpretation apply. (12)

Altieri identifies three distinct ways in which Wittgenstein argues we make sense of situations. Firstly, 'seeing', when we recognise something by seeing that it fits with the 'forms of life', or language games we are used to seeing it in. Secondly, 'seeing as', when a range of contexts that something may occur, explains and gives significance to a particular action or object. Thirdly, 'interpretation' in the traditional sense: in the second situation we still had not added anything that was not part of the internal relations of the situation. However, two new elements are present in the third situation; a) a sense of doubt, that the situation does not allow a response in terms of our normal expectations; and b) a felt need to introduce a new concept or hypothesis, to make sense of the disjunctions in the situation. The central point is that interpretations are problematic because we only use them when our 'normal' procedures have ceased to serve us. Altieri quotes Wittgenstein pertinently here:

What happens is not that this symbol cannot be further interpreted, but I do no interpreting. I do not interpret, because I feel at home in the present picture. When I interpret, I step from one level of thought to another. (14)
Altieri can now make his fundamental point concerning Wittgenstein and philosophy:

... abstract philosophy is interpretation because it has traditionally been speech from the outside, from men who consciously reject a perspective from within ordinary experience in order to put these experiences in another, more systematic and abstract light. Philosophy then has always been second-order discourse and thus has been doomed to the continual uncertainties besetting those who cannot rely on the secure stopping points and agreements experienced in ordinary behaviour. (15)

The point about Wittgenstein's philosophic intention can be clinched by one more revealing quotation from the *Investigations*:

... The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question - Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples, and the series of examples can be broken off. Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem. (16)

The differences and similarities between Wittgenstein and the Post-Structuralists should now be clear. To some it may seem that the divergences are virtually those of cultural temperament. For Derrida, having rejected the claims of a representational theory of truth, glories in the Nietzschean freedom of the free play of signifiers; accepting almost limitless possibilities; a perfect promethean philosophy for the culture of modernity, and now post-modernity.

Wittgenstein is clearly opposed to such a move, by returning us to the 'forms of life' that are rooted in real experience.

This would appear to raise a political question, for is not
Wittgenstein inevitably a Conservative philosopher and Derrida the radical? The point has been made for many years that Wittgenstein's 'forms of life' are a celebration of the status quo. Part of the answer to this paradox has been mentioned earlier in Anderson's comment (see note 5). A more fundamental explanation is offered by Fergus Kerr who sees the left having a misunderstanding of what he (Wittgenstein) meant when he spoke of "language games" and "forms of life". He introduced the term "language game" (his italics) so he says (Philosophical Investigations 23) to emphasise that speaking of language is always interconnected with some activity. Such an activity he calls a "form of life ... In fact the text could not be plainer that he has very basic small-scale activities in mind, without which no human society whatever, would exist, whether classless or otherwise. His catalogue includes ... reporting, making up a story, surmising, play acting, singing, joking etc etc. (18)

If we are serious in regard to the necessity of theory being related to action, then we can understand the political implications of the famous remark of Hegel's that he did philosophy to be at home everywhere in the world. In this respect we can understand Wittgenstein's philosophy as an attempt to make philosophy at home in the world, rather than the indulgence of alienated intellectuals. It seems that in Wittgenstein's view the gap between the mind and the world is closed, in the full appreciation of particular human forms of life and the full depth of 'convention' in human life. It implies, as Stanley Cavell has argued:

that the sense of gap originates in an attempt or wish to escape (to remain a "stranger" to be "alienated from") those shared forms of life, to give up responsibility for their maintenance. (19)

The central point of Cavell's massive commentary on the
Investigations, is the weight of conventions: not in the sense of this or that particular set of cultural arrangements, which separate one set of human beings off from another, but rather 'forms of life' which any group of humans shares, who possess a past, who respond to, a geographical/spatial environment, which they manipulate and exploit for understandable human motives. It is this that marks, Wittgenstein's discovery

not only of the conventionality of human society but, we could say on the conventionality of human nature itself, what Pascal meant when he said, "custom is our nature" (Pensees 89) (20)

We are now in a position to see how this scepticism about scepticism, can be so politically liberating, when appreciated in its full depth. So 'convention' or 'forms of life' can be understood as constitutive of what it is to be human, rather than as accidental and encumbering sets of social arrangements. Therefore, it follows that the intellectual alienation of a modernist culture can be understood for what it is: an explicable response to and product of Capitalist modernisation; but one that misses fundamental elements of continuity through history and across cultures. It is these elements of continuity, these basic characteristics of living in and through human culture, that allow MacIntyre to make the attempt to piece together from within the social and moral tradition, some core conception of the virtues, that could be extended into the future. MacIntyre must root the search for a new community - that is as we have seen the core of the socialist project - in patterned, meaningful historical and cultural situations. It cannot be recovered from the free play of the signifier, in a world
that can be made afresh each day, by the free flow of interpretations. Such an awareness is also deeply rooted in Wittgenstein; Cavell captures this well:

The internal tyranny of convention is that only a slave of it can know how it can be changed for the better, or know why it should be eradicated. Only masters of a game, perfect slaves to that project, are in a position to establish conventions which better serve its essence. This is why deep revolutionary changes can result from attempts to conserve a project, it takes it back to its idea, keeps it in touch with it. To demand that the law be fulfilled, every jot and title, will destroy the law as it stands, if it has moved too far from its origins. (21)

II

PRACTICES AND TRADITIONS

It is at this point we begin to see how important it is for a Socialist project to recover from the Right a distinct sense of tradition, and it should come as no surprise that this is central to MacIntyre. However, for the central role of tradition to be understood, it is necessary, as promised in the introduction, to explain MacIntyre's use of two concepts which logically precede it, namely a practice and secondly the narrative order to a human life.

A practice is above all else for MacIntyre, the social background within which a coherent practice of the virtues is intelligible. It can be most easily understood where in fact MacIntyre agrees that it is at its most simple, ie in his discussion of Heroic society, those
societies that immediately precede, and in some senses, continued to morally inform, those of classical Greece (societies described or idealised in Homer) and early medieval Europe; (societies described or idealised in Saxon and Norse sagas). Here:

every individual has a given role and status within a well defined and highly determinate system of roles and statuses, the key structures are those of kinship and of household. In such a society a man knows who he is by knowing his role in these structures; and in knowing this knows also what he owes and what is owed to him by the occupant of every other role and status. In Greek (dein) and in Anglo-Saxon (AHTE) alike, there is originally no clear distinction between 'ought' and 'owe', in Icelandic the word 'skyldr' ties together 'ought' and 'is kin to'. (22)

Here morality and social structure are one and the same, questions of evaluation are for the most part questions of social fact, morality is inseparable from context, morality is wholly internal to definite social practices.

It is important for MacIntyre's argument that these societies are in most respects polar opposites to our own in regard to the connection between 'is' and 'ought', but it is also crucial that they and the intervening social forms, are part of our own tradition. It is the intervening social forms, especially the ethics of Aristotle that provide, in amended form, the resources for reconnecting, in a critical manner, morality and the social.

A practice then is defined by MacIntyre as a

coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity through which goods internal to the form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are
appropriate to, and partially definitive of that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence and human conceptions of ends and goods involved are systematically extended. (23)

Now it is clear from MacIntyre's account of the concept of a practice; that although such a conception is perhaps marginal to our political and social life today, it is at least recognisable in such activity as playing a game, writing serious poetry, engaging in an academic subject. It is also clear that it is not only in modern society, but also in ancient and medieval ones that practices may be complex and highly diverse in character. Heroic society provides a kind of ideal type, rather than ideal form; for these practices are integrated and virtually synonymous with social structure. Here the possibility of deep conflicts within and between practices is limited, but also the possibility of change and historical development is curtailed.

Let us now turn to see how a practice operates before discussing its implications any further. What then is meant by goods internal to a practice? MacIntrye uses the example of wishing to teach a child chess who has no particular desire to learn. So you encourage the child, by telling the child that although it will be difficult, with effort they can win a game for which he/she will get some sweets. However, so long as the child plays for sweets, s/he will have no reason not to cheat and indeed will have every reason to do so, if s/he can get away with it. But as MacIntyre argues, 

... we may hope, there will come a time when the child will find in those goods specific to chess, in the achievements of a certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity, a new set of reasons not just for winning on a
particular occasion, but for trying to excel in whatever way the game of chess demands. Now if the child cheats, he or she will be defeating not you, but himself. (25)

Macintyre finds himself forced into using examples from games or other highly specific practices, like portrait painting, in part because of the meagreness of our language for speaking of internal goods and because of the extremely subordinate place for such practices and goods in modern Industrial Capitalism. However, there remains even in these societies, partial elements of such practices sufficient for us to understand the difference between internal and external goods. We saw in previous chapters how the market functioned almost as a paradigm case of the dominance of external goods. However, it is worth emphasising that almost any practice, including chess can convey both internal and external goods, ie those goods that are contingently attached to chess - playing and other practices, by the accidents of social circumstances. What is crucial is which predominates in the actor's motivation. Now here we can begin to see important social differences between internal and external goods. It is a basic characteristic of external goods that when they are gained they are always some individual's property and possession. On top of this it is also true that the more someone has of them the less there is for others. This is true, both for tangible goods like money or property (in a market system) and intangibles like fame, or charisma which by their very nature can only be had by some. Therefore external goods are always the object of competition, in which there are going to be losers as well as winners. Now it is also true that internal goods
will be gained by competition to excel, but it is also characteristic of them that their achievement is good for the whole community who participate in the practice. For example when the four minute mile was run, or when Joyce's *Ulysses* was written, a practice was extended in a way that practitioners could in some sense share in, emulate and perhaps ultimately surpass in turn.

We can now see how virtues have a key role in sustaining these practices, for practices must generally have some kind of institutional setting, and are not maintained simply by the excelling in the goods of that practice. MacIntyre put it thus:

> Every practice requires a certain kind of relationship between those who participate in it. Now the virtues are those goods by reference to which, whether we like it or not, we define our relationship to those people with whom we share the kind of purposes and standards which inform practices. (26)

However, practices are not to be simply equated with institutions, because institutions are of necessity involved with the getting of resources, the distribution of power and status, and hence with external goods. But the relationship between an institution and a practice is generally intimate and quite crucial; the practice cannot be sustained without the institution, but is always vulnerable to the corrupting power of an unrestrained pursuit of external goods. Hence the making and sustaining of human communities and hence of human institutions, has all the hallmarks of a practice, and an important one for it is upon this practice, the success of other human practices ultimately depend. It is this crucial question we shall return when we
discuss the necessity of particular traditions and a socialist politics of the common good.

So far we have seen how the concept of a practice, drawn in part from the past as well as limited areas of modernity, might connect up with the pursuit of non-market based internal goods. However, the question arises how is one to choose between the multiplicity of goods available from within the context of a variety of practices. MacIntyre refuses to place practices in any ad hoc hierarchical relationship, although he will allow a causal priority within his scheme to those practices which foster institutional forms which in turn provide the necessary social context, within which other practices can be sustained. This in itself, does not, however, settle the question that is Aristotle's 'what is the good life for man'. Even the causal priority of the sustaining of institutions may conflict with the manifest good of, say, being an artist or writer, they may even on occasion be incompatible, eg the poet Gerald Manley Hopkins' desire to write poetry, with his commitment to the Jesuit order.

In this context, has not the culture of 'bureaucratic individualism' reappeared, in which the goods internal to practices after all find their ultimate justification within the apparently arbitrary choice of the modern criterialess self. Finally, the question of authority in our lives raises itself, ie that which binds us to the social, that which is threatened to be severed by much modern epistemology. For finally without some conception of a telos for the human life viewed
as a unity, an inevitable arbitrariness must enter, which must leave us trapped in a modern differentiated market order. As we saw in the chapters on Marxism, this was a major element in understanding its appeal for MacIntyre. No sense (as Scott Meikle shows positively and Castoriadis negatively) can be made of Marx's concept of a fully Communist society without the unifying concept of labour as the transhistorical essence of humanity, able to fully realise itself in a free social individuality.

The question remains, can some teleological unity be salvaged on some other theoretical and social basis, than that posed by Marx, considered so problematic by the many modern social theorists? As is no doubt clear, the central terrain for rescuing these conceptions lie in the formulation of human life in terms of narrative and tradition.

The key to MacIntyre's argument lies in the view that there is no such thing as 'behaviour', that can be identified independently of intentions, beliefs, and settings. We can understand a human action only by situating it in two kinds of context. Firstly by locating the action with reference to the person's own history and secondly by reference to the actor's role in the history of the setting or settings. The examples he uses to illustrate these points seem banal enough, a man gardening and the possible reasons for doing so, but this example has deeper significance, as we will see. MacIntyre asks what is this man doing, 'digging', 'gardening', 'taking exercise', 'preparing for winter' or 'pleasing his wife'. Which of these
descriptions is the more important for the man is clearly crucial for understanding the significance of the activity. 27

Firstly, the action is placed in a cycle of domestic activity because the behaviour presupposes a household-cum-garden setting with its own particular narrative history of which this behaviour is part. Secondly, this behaviour is also situated in the narrative history of a marriage in a different but related social setting. So therefore the behaviour is part of two particular narrative histories which happen to meet. It follows, that as we cannot understand this behaviour without knowing the intentions, it is also true that we cannot understand the intentions, independently of the setting or context which make the intentions understandable to the agents themselves. However, the setting of these two narrative histories may well have histories themselves, the household may have a history stretching back decades or centuries. The marriage itself clearly has a history which itself must presuppose the particular point that has been reached in the history of the institution of marriage.

The example focusing on a household activity does seem to contain for MacIntyre a prescriptive charge, for his work is itself dependent on the historical origins of our own concepts and our own institutions. He is at pains to tease out older elements in our culture of modernity that still exist in an incomplete form. The focus on the household seems opportune, as the household in pre-capitalist times was both the centre of economic production and the locus of moral and emotional
life and ties. It is precisely the relatively marginal persistence of
such forms in the modern world, that makes MacIntyre's work
intelligible to us and upon which he hopes to build. For as he says in
his preceding discussion of self as a narrative unity:

Just because it has played a key part in the cultures
which are historically the predecessors of our own, it
would not be surprising if it turned out to be still an
unacknowledged presence in many of our ways of thinking
and acting. Hence it is not inappropriate to begin by
scrutinising some of our most taken-for-granted, ... insights about human actions and selfhood in order to show
how natural it is to think, of the self in a narrative
mode. (28)

The prescriptive implications of the Household example can be clearly
seen in the only vaguely political conclusion MacIntyre can allow
himself to draw:

what matters now at this stage is the construction of
local forms of community within which civility and the
intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the
new dark ages which are already upon us. (29)

Unsurprisingly forms of life that stretch back behind the emergence of
our capitalist market culture, make a natural point of reference for
MacIntyre. Through such examples he seeks to re-educate our
intuitions, by reconnecting us to older patterns of human narrative so
easily hidden within our culture. He is therefore bound to place some
hope on the cultural and ideological impact of these examples, being
able to contribute in whatever small measure, to a redirection of our
conscious attention. How is this possible?

If there can be no pure science of behaviour, because beliefs and
intentions are central, indeed constitutive, elements in human
behaviour. Then even the sociological pressure of modern Industrial
Capitalism with its prioritising of external over internal goods and separation of public and private, (work and leisure consumption from production), cannot totally eliminate the elements of narrative based understandings, from human life. Possibly much of our 'unhappy consciousness' stems from attempts to do so.

MacIntyre provides a particularly telling vindication of this in his paper *Epistemological Crisis, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science*, where he reveals the inability of Descartes' own radical doubt to disown the particular historically conditioned tools of interpretation, particularly his knowledge of French and Latin. As he argues

... he does not put in doubt what he has inherited in and with these languages, namely, a way of ordering both thought and the world expressed in a set of meanings. These meanings have a history; seventeenth century Latin bears the marks of having been the language of scholasticism, just as scholasticism was itself marked by the influence of twelfth and thirteenth century Latin ... he (Descartes) did not notice ... how much of what he took to be spontaneous reflections of his own mind was in fact a repetition of sentences and phrases from his school text books. Even the cogoito is to be found in Saint Augustine. (31)

MacIntyre goes on to point out that to have put these matters into doubt would have been to take the road to mental illness not philosophy.

If narrative, then, is crucial to being human, we can return to the process of spelling out what use the narrative ordering of a human life can have in overcoming market-modernity. How does MacIntyre specify narrative role? Firstly by posing the question: 'In what does
the unity of individual life consist? and answering 'unity is the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life'. The good is then defined by how best to live out that narrative and bring it to completion. Facts and values are reconnected in human praxis by the necessarily interpretative and connected nature of human action. To ask what is the good for man, is to find what all single life narratives have in common. Naturally, they have much in common because in a crucial sense, they are embedded in particular historically conditioned settings. However, at this point a further quality of a narrative must be noticed, namely that it is going somewhere moving towards an end, but not just any end, but towards some resolution or completion of the narrative itself. Every human narrative must then embody some purpose, quest or telos, to which it is constantly striving to move towards. As MacIntyre puts it: 'Some conception of the good life for man is required' for the narrative to have any meaning at all. His own provisional answer at this point is the apparently circular one, that the good life for man is the search for the good life for man. But this is only so because the analysis lacks its final component, which could be called that of a corporate tradition. For no one can be a questing agent, as a pure individual, it is not simply that the conception of the good life varies, from one place and period to another place and period. But also that each individual enters their social circumstances as the bearers of a particular social identity whether they realise this, or pace Descartes, do not. The agent always belongs in a whole set of ways to a community, or set of interlocking communities; son or daughter of
someone, citizen of some city or nation, member of some political religious or intellectual tradition. All these elements are inherited in a way quite opposed to all Liberal Individualist thinking, that assumes we are always free to choose in the abstract about what one will choose to take responsibility for. This conception must not to be taken as automatically or necessarily conservative, it is not an argument for accepting the limitations of a tradition as we found it. One can rebel against a tradition, by adopting another historically available tradition. Or on the other hand, one can also dissent within a tradition, for a tradition as MacIntyre defines it, is partly composed by the debate over what the tradition consists, eg what it means to be English, Irish or a Socialist.

The crucial point being made, concerns the futility and danger of attempting to ignore or disregard the presence of the inherited practice or tradition itself:

I am born with a past, and to try to cut myself off from the past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships. The possession of an historical identity and the possession of a social identity coincide. (34)

Without particularity to begin from, there could be no beginning and no movement towards culturally constituted goods and truths. To recognise this is to reconnect ourselves to our pasts, this can renew confidence and avoid the spurious arrogance of the detached observer, coming from nowhere and going nowhere.

The parallels with our earlier discussion of Wittgenstein must be
clear. We are writing of what is specific to being social products. Something constitutive of being human, but which Enlightenment liberalism has hidden or refused to recognise for its own ideological reasons. Enlightenment liberalism could only use tradition as a negative; something to be abandoned. It left the concept to be taken over by conservatism, starting with Burke, who made a positive virtue of the implicit liberal contrast between reason and tradition. Modern conservatism (when it is not liberalism in another guise) is liberalism's alter ego, both failing to realise that all conflict and development take place within the context of some historically given traditional thought and action. For MacIntyre, Burkean tradition is always a tradition in decay. This is because a concept of tradition, that simply counterposes it to reason, means that a key element in the life of a tradition has been lost. For, as we have noticed, a tradition to be meaningful must involve debate about what constitutes itself as a tradition.

Clearly, therefore, the pursuit of the end or telos of a human narrative can neither be a one-sided celebration of the past, or an individualistic practice. It is the fact that our market based liberal culture is still marked by the inheritance of past non-individualistic communities, that makes possible the internal critique of these societies, from a perspective other than their own value system. In some respects, MacIntyre's work on a telos governed human praxis, built from the forms of the past, recalls, despite differences, something of the form of the Hegelian Marxism we discussed in the
first and second chapters. There is something of a developmental notion of human consciousness that in its movement from the Greeks to the present, recalls the structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind.

III

REPUBLICS, COMMUNITIES AND POLITICS

I wish now to illustrate some connections between the kind of concepts employed by MacIntyre and some recent developments in socialist thought. This means work that takes both narrative and community with great seriousness, and I will end with some discussion of the consequences for the historically constituted nature of real communities, of the attempt to foster a 'Politics of the Common Good'.

The first of these tendencies renews emphasis on 'civic virtue' and is represented by writers like William Connolly in the USA and to a lesser degree in recent work by Raymond Williams and Michael Ignatieff in Britain. These writers confront the problem facing Marxist socialism as it has been summarised by MacIntyre:

Marxist socialism is at its core deeply optimistic. For, however thorough going its criticisms of capitalism may be, it is committed to asserting that within the society constituted by those institutions all the human and material preconditions of a better future are being accumulated. Yet if the moral impoverishment of advanced capitalism is what so many Marxists agree that it is, whence are those resources for the future to be derived? (36)
This is a question that must haunt serious socialist thought if it is deprived of the developmental logic of essentialism. But even Hegelian essentialism which sees history mediated through consciousness, must be aware of the possibility of massive subjective blocks on socialist development. The tradition of civic virtue, therefore, self-consciously identifies itself with now older and historically marginal traditions. Connolly sees modern Utopian socialism as the bearer and preserver of the republican tradition, with its desire to promote civic virtue among citizens who reflectively identify with a way of life shared with other citizens. And who adjust their political demands and behaviour to the norms embedded in that way of life. In this sense this Socialist tradition is very close to MacIntyre's own argument concerning the bearers of the tradition of the virtues for, as he says:

Republicanism in the eighteenth century is the project of restoring a community of virtue. (38)

MacIntyre sees something of the tradition of the virtues at work in the Jacobin republican clubs, inheriting from the medieval guilds and the renaissance republics, a desire for equality between members, with a strong corporate ethos. Each member having equal rights and equal obligations, to the society and its members. It was also older traditions, handed down from pre-market societies that produced the new named virtue of fraternity, embodying something of the Aristotelian virtue of friendship and the Christian love of the neighbour.  

Andrew Fraser's work on American Republicanism and its complex and
ambivalent relationship to American Republicanism, and its equally complex and ambivalent relationship to American capitalism, is instructive at this point, especially in the case of the rise of the Modern Business Corporation. Fraser shows that despite the elitist nature and class bias, inscribed in Republicanism in the early 19th century, it represented an attempt to hold on to a political community facing destruction in the shape of a generalisation of capitalist social relations. As he put it:

Under the impact of money and commerce the realm of the political as a distinct sphere of human experience dissolves. (41)

In a fascinating reworking of the Managerialist thesis of Berle and Means, he shows how the separation of ownership and control was crucial in generating a purely capitalist market orientated entity, the new Corporation. Fraser argues that:

Most leftist critiques of the managerialist thesis have failed to perceive that the fusion of ownership and control endowed the traditional logic of property with a decidedly political significance. (43)

In essence he argues that:

the common law doctrines governing the corporation assumed that even the private business corporation should be treated as a "body politic", that is "as an association of persons imbued with the civil ethos appropriate to a genuine republican community". (44)

What this means is that the separation of ownership and control was a crucial step towards the elimination of the political dimension that the common law had introduced into the investment relationship. Now it was possible for stockholders to relate to the new coporation as simply investors and not as members of a legally constituted political community.
Paradoxically this shift, in the USA at any rate, was no simple working out of bourgeois class interests. For the shift seems to have been achieved in part, by an important element of American radicalism, ie the individualistic and anti-institutional, evangelical Christianity - secularised versions of which are important elements in contemporary western radicalism. The reason for this, Fraser argues, is that so long as the Corporation stood as a 'little republic' endowed with an identity and purpose of its own (by act of the legislature) it remained open to radical attack as a bastion of monopoly and special privilege. It was only when general incorporation opened the Corporation up to anyone who had the means to utilise it for their own private economic gain, was the spirit of radical individualism satisfied. In this sense it poses for us one of the clearest historical examples of the political problems posed to both Left and Right, by the emergence of capitalist market societies. In so far as the Left partakes of individualistically orientated politics, it both celebrates and intensifies the conditions of its own subordination. As Fraser points out in this context:

Capitalism is a process of generalised abstraction which involves the ever deepening alienation of human beings from their own social being ... Capitalism becomes a process of generalised social wealth that liquidates both private property and the public realm, thereby undermining the necessary foundations of a genuine political community. (45)

If, as I have argued throughout this thesis, the potency of bureaucratic forms in our culture, is in reality the other face of the individualisation of the human subject through a set of (Kantian type) general principles, corresponding the abstract nature of capital, then
what can a narrative socialist tradition do to oppose it? Fraser suggests in the American context - in his article on radical legal thought\textsuperscript{46} that:

it is not inconceivable that the vision of a regenerated republican polity may yet turn out to be a more realistic solution to the 'fundamental contradictions' of our social being than a form of critical legal discourse that stands so much in fear of any stable or enduring source of authority ... They (radical lawyers) may find they have much to learn from those who once championed a conservative republican ethos grounded in the 'traditional logic of property' against a socially corrosive ... capitalist rationalisation. \textsuperscript{(47)}

If elements of the American left seeks to build upon the republican tradition to resist market rationalisation, is it possible to discern in Britain resistant social forms?

It is possible to see the 1984-5 British Miners strike within a similar perspective. Here a determined workforce, located within very specific communities, were fighting an equally determined modernising right-wing government, prepared to use force and the arguments of neo-liberalism to break both a union, and forms of communally organised life.

The year long strike astonished many observers, in revealing the degree of communal self-organisation and the powerful sense of purpose felt by the mining communities. It seems likely that miners were sustained in their struggle by the manner in which class, occupation and community, frequently coincided, and this combined with the sheer desperation of their situation, produced a level of communal mobilisation not seen since 1926. Initiated as an attempt to prevent
pit closures, and the massive reduction of coal mining capacity, the miners strike has been the most important strike to protect employment, in the post-oil shock recession. The desperation, and the way the strike was policed, 'produced' as Huw Beynon has written, an uncompromising amalgam of solidarity and bitterness emotions so intense that "this will never be forgotten; not in my lifetime anyway..." (48)

In some respects there are similarities in the nature of the miners' radical opposition, with that of the radicalism in early 19th century England, that I described in the previous chapter. As Craig Calhoun has emphasised this radicalism was greatly dependent upon the nature and organisation of the community, which acted as a crucial material and ideological resource. Raphael Samuel has noted these similarities:

... in the first place a struggle for the survival of villages. Its heartland is in places knit together by an almost private sense of collective self. Like village radicalism in the 19th century it is animated at the local level by an exclusive sense of belonging, a republican spirit of independence; and an assertion of total and unilateral control over the conditions of the everyday environment ... The ideology, as so often in the popular movements of the past, is that of radical conservatism, a fight to protect the known against the unknown, the familiar against the alien, the local and the human against the anonymous and the gigantic. (50)

Just as the early radicalism of the last century had been fought over the moral terrain of craft control and the 'moral economy', so the 1984-5 strike was fought largely in defence of crucial aspects of the 1945 Labourist settlement. This settlement had, in partial and perhaps contradictory but nonetheless important ways, reproduced elements of this village culture in the network of social arrangements within the mining industry in its nationalised form; especially in the central place of the union in the complex set of industrial committees that
administer much of the industry. The miners, indeed, have more than any other group of workers in Britain, looked to the state for elements of industrial regulation, from the Mining Acts of the 19th century right through to state ownership in the 20th century. It is this phenomenon, that explains the depth of the miners' political commitment to a form of state intervention. As McCormick puts it:

The coal mines were nationalised because the miners were no longer prepared to work for the private coal owners. (53)

The miners indubitably fought the closure programme because they had no alternative, but there can be little doubt also, that much of the bitterness sprang from the feeling that a whole set of long-established political and moral obligations had been unilaterally severed.

The miners' experience has been remarkable and important. It illustrates again the two aspects of modern state power, noticed above, as an apparent bearer of communal purpose and identity, and as managerial power acting 'efficiently' to impose the external pressures of the market. The Thatcher government had come to power in 1979 with a clear commitment to the neo-liberal strategy of the imposition of market discipline on British society as a whole. From the beginning this government had wished to break the old consensus; doing away with the class compromises and collective forms of life and relationships. So the NCB was seen to be too 'cosy' in its relationship with the unions and Ian MacGregor was put in to restore discipline and market competitiveness.
With all **corporate** forms apparently in crisis the powerful articulation of **individualism** was made to seem both fresh and plausible. During the strike the tension between the strands of communalism and individualism in working class culture surfaced frequently, orchestrated and amplified by the aggressive neo-liberal populism of the government. The phrase 'right to work' was deflected from its social-democratic meaning of a **public** commitment to full employment, towards a citizen's right to sell unhindered, one's labour, as an individual, in the market place. The issue of the absence of a national strike ballot was connected to this theme (and exploited by the government) as the democratic and the solidaristic traditions of trade unionism pulled in different directions. The long tradition of balloting in the NUM has strengthened and deepened the democratic tradition, so that one miner could describe feelings in the 1982 ballot "It's my vote", that's the way they think." But, on the other hand, the pattern of proposed closures meant some areas seemed safe and others not, so that Peter Heathfield could argue:

> it cannot be right that one man can vote another man out of a job. (56)

The Thatcher government in Britain, has raised in many painful ways, the question of individual self interest versus a collective tradition run into deep trouble. Such a tradition is heavily dependent upon state regulated forms of work to sustain locality and community. In 1912 the pamphlet *The Miners Next Step* published by the Unofficial Reform Committee in South Wales, insisted that nationalisation was not the way forward and would merely create a national trust backed by the state. In the same year Noah Ablett, the Welsh Syndicalist leader
argued that nationalisation would

simply place an important section of the working class in the hands of a state servile to capitalists' interests who would use their opportunity to increase the servility we abhor. (57)

A profound intuition of the immense difficulties of constructing forms of communal living and self regulation that can eliminate or minimise the pressures of the market. It was perhaps inevitable that late 19th century workers would begin to turn to the state to alleviate what Marx had called their subjection to the 'violence of things', as this state claimed to be the collective 'we' of all citizens. But as we have noted this state could only provide a limited communal form whilst the capitalist market economy remained the dominant external reality. This state form would continually manoeuvre between the twin bases of legitimacy of democratic representation, and technocratic efficiency, corresponding to its twin roles as 'illusory community' and administrative power.

Both these themes were powerfully present throughout the strike. The miners were portrayed as anti-democratic and a threat to the rule of law. The government, most of the non-Labour opposition and most liberal commentators, were agreed that the miners must be beaten for this reason. But perhaps more fundamentally they were treated as deeply unrealistic in their objectives. Their heartfelt defence of their communities may have been applauded but 'hard-headed' realism had to prevail in the end.

This last point is quite crucial for the exercise of bureaucratic
power. For during the strike, the deeply opaque and contentious social and economic relationships of advanced capitalism, were constructed as simple and clear cut, by the state and the NCB. The NCB, it was claimed, was massively unprofitable, therefore uneconomic pits had to be closed. But we now know that this is a particular rendering of reality, an alternative set of 'experts' could construct the NCB accounts in quite another way. One leading accountant who has examined these accounts, has described them as 'a supreme masterpiece in the art of obfuscation' and that for the purpose of identifying uneconomic pits - these accounts are virtually useless. (60)

This authority turned, in his analysis, the NCB operational deficit of £358 million in to a surplus of £17 million.

The correctness, or otherwise, of these figures is not our immediate concern, they do indicate, however, how the state reified a complex and shifting situation for political and coercive purposes. Public authority in effect used apparently formal and technical procedures to legitimate, as Raymond Williams has pointed out, a series of shifts of meaning, that as it were, constructed the meaning of the market place within the state sector. As Williams puts it:

what 'management' says, is offered as a set of unchallengeable technical decisions, when the actual management - now very clearly the old master or employer - again and again arrives at these within a determining context of short-term political and commercial calculations. (61)

In this context, talk of restoring the 'right to manage', is clearly a crucial aspect of the theatricality of power we have examined in
MacIntyre's work. It is a means of reasserting in an apparently modern and neutral guise the fundamental realities of power in a capitalist society. As Williams adds:

It is in fact double-talk for the categorical and arbitrary rights of an employer. (62)

In earlier chapters I have elaborated the connections that MacIntyre has laid out between individualistic conceptions of human association and bureaucratic power. It seems clear that any socialist rethinking must attempt to transcend the limits of liberal radicalism. Building on the core aspects of human sociality and perhaps on older intellectual and political traditions. For the problem is, to quote Raymond Williams again, but in another context:

... what has really failed inside the movement and inside the whole society, is any valid concept of the general interest. That is why appeals to it are so often resisted or rejected. In the forms in which we have known it - the undifferentiated 'nation', the needs of the 'economy' - it has again and again been a false general interest ... That is a sort of success, for these versions ... are indeed in their usual form false. But it is a dangerous sort of success, if all that is left is the defence and advancement of particular interest. (63)

The question is do we know any other? Is it possible to rescue elements of the older traditions of social and political community, both intellectual and material, to resist the worst consequences of our capitalist culture on our lives? Some guidance may be given by William Connolly who has attempted to revive the anti-liberal concept of the common good. The concept deriving from 18th century Rousseauist origins, was crucial for the formation of civic Republicanism and in many ways anticipated the political content of Marx's socialism. 64
In anticipation of the kinds of criticism Williams referred to, Connolly is anxious to distinguish the common good from the politics of the public interest. The public interest, he argues, frequently amounts to no more than an aggregation of individual or group interests. The interests of the majority of people have as private individuals, as workers, consumers or owners, may at any particular moment outweigh the interest they share as members of the public. When the public interest is conceived in this way then policies designed to further it tend to concentrate on policies giving incentives or imposing penalties designed to bring the individual interest of each person more closely in line with the public. This is the familiar picture of compromise, badgering and on occasion, coercion or exploitation, experienced by all who live in the capitalist democracies.

The common good takes us squarely back to the civic ethic and republican ethos, that was so clearly seen by MacIntyre as looking both back to organic societies of Europe's pre-modern past, whilst looking towards the future of a free equal citizenship. They had sought to preserve the ethic of a political community from the depredations of the capitalist market. Connolly attempts to articulate a concept of the common good, that will yield to a socialist resolution of our discontents. In language that is strikingly similar to MacIntyre's, he defines an appeal to the common good as an appeal to a set of shared purposes and standards which are fundamental to the way of life prized together by the participants. The participants have an obligation to respond to these appeals, even when the net interests of
everyone, when each consults only his own interests moves in another direction ... The citizen with civic virtue is asked to give presumptive priority to those dimensions of his own good shared with others. (65)

He quickly notes the obvious objections of liberals and radicals. The liberal must fear a rhetoric of the common good, which suppresses the autonomy of the individual; radicals will fear that in a stratified capitalist society such appeals will amount to no more than those at the bottom carrying the bulk of the sacrifices while the ones with money or power prosper. Connolly recognises the moments of truth within these criticisms but then points to the logic of failure inscribed within the concept of public interest minus civic virtue. Our context, he argues, is one of expanded self-consciousness among citizens via the mass media, literacy, visible interdependence between states which makes people realise they participate in an order resting on human convention, rather than nature. Without civic virtue the public interest policy will be a hollow sham, as atomised cynical individuals keep the letter of the law whilst evading the spirit, summed up by Rousseau's dictum

Laws are equally powerless against the treasures of the rich and the indigency of the poor; the first eludes them, the second escapes them, one breaks the net and the other slips through. (66)

So what are the resources for mobilising an authentic socialist orientated concept of the common good, amidst the exploitation and corruption that Connolly, like MacIntyre, sees all around him. Like MacIntyre, Connolly attempts to see amongst division, dissolution and heightened consciousness of self, those basic elements which are
common to human beings. That to be an individual one must first be in society, and to share a language which is acquired before our capacity to criticise. To share a language is to share criteria for making distinctions and making judgements. He says:

"to participate in life is to carry an enormous load of settled criteria of judgement standards of appraisal and beliefs. In sharing a language we share imperfectly these pre-understandings, and we bring them to bear on specific issues." (67)

The similarity of this formulation with Wittgenstein's appeal against radical Cartesian doubt, is quite obvious. However, it does run in quite the opposite direction to another and very influential radical theory of the construction of a common interest, that of Jürgen Habermas. Habermas argues that the very existence of human language creates the possibility of a rationally arrived at consensus between people. This is possible because

the "rationality" of the discursively formed will consists in the fact that the reciprocal behavioural expectations raised to normative status afford validity to a common interest ascertained without deception. The interest is common because the constraint-free consensus permits only what all can want; it is free of deception because even the interpretation of needs in which each individual must be able to recognise what he wants became the object of discursive will-formation. (68)

We will not enter into the full ramifications of Habermas's views here, except to point to the excessively rationalistic element in this approach. Compared with MacIntyre and Connolly Habermas, as Anderson has noted, is a rationalistic intellectual. Within his work

lies no fin-de-siecle Wagnerian overtones, but the earnest ideals and serious optimism of the German Enlightenment. (69)

In an important survey of Habermas's recent work Jeffrey Alexander has
revealed the sharp contrasts between mythical and rational thought, interpreted in a progressivist way, that creates problems for his handling of culture.\textsuperscript{70} Alexander argues that this problem flows from Habermas's desire to argue for communication based on agreements that are completely unconstrained. This means that actors must not only be free from external material constraints; they are also free from internalised controls that would place the meaning and the origin of their behaviour out of their conscious reach. (71)

It seems then, that Habermas is the latest of social theorist seeking to ground what MacIntyre calls the \textit{Enlightenment Project} in the 'transcendental' guarantees of the rules of speech,\textsuperscript{72} subjects without presupposition making their rational choice! But the problem for such theorists, as Alexander points out, and MacIntyre would concur, is that despite cultural differentiation and the real growth of rationality,

\ldots arbitrary, unconscious, fused and, yes, irrational elements of culture have not at the same time disappeared. Language and world view continue to predefine our understanding of the object world before we even begin to subject it to our conscious rationality. Nor can we regard our linguistically structured world views as simply humanly constructed interpretations, which are therefore completely open to criticism, since our 'regard' is, ineluctably, conditioned by the preconscious world itself. It follows, then, that there is an inevitable investment in the world of things and the world of ideas with some kind of dogmatic, uncritical status \ldots there seems to be abundant evidence that moderns still seek to understand the contingency of everyday life in terms of narrative traditions whose simplicity and resistance to change makes them hard to distinguish from myths. (73)

It is clear that both MacIntyre and Connolly place a good deal of weight upon these rooted, pre-understandings and the elements of cultural particularity, as providing the basis of a shared life. The fragility and uncertainty of such an approach is clear, Connolly is
painfully aware of them when he states somewhat hesitantly:

Out of this background of imperfectly ... shared distinctions, standards and purposes a sense of the common good, might crystallise, though there is no guarantee ... that it will occur. (74)

For both MacIntyre and Connolly, the institutional setting for pre-understandings is vitally important. But again such institutional settings must share collective values and purposes to orientate behaviour towards some desired good, whether it is scientific research or the production of an affluent society of free and equal citizens.

If the bearers of socialist politics find themselves rejecting Marx's essentialist concepts and with it the teleological movement towards unalienated social individuality, they must replace them urgently! A Republican civic ethic, with a common moral framework committed to constraining economic growth, ie the criteria of market efficiency as life's framework; this may be a possible motivating ideal. A progressive sociology after MacIntyre, could contribute to this as Donald Levine suggests, by being a discipline that

seeks to identify the social and cultural functions proper to particular historical settings, to delineate the external resources and internal practices needed to realise them, and to show ways of establishing conditions that both sustain us in the quest for the good and furnish us increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good. (75)

Levine ends his review with MacIntyre's call for a new sociology, which is, of course, an old sociology: that of Adam Ferguson. I shall end there too:

It is Ferguson's type of sociology which is the empirical counterpart of the conceptual account of the virtues which I have given, a sociology which aspires to lay bare the empirical, causal connection between virtues practices and institutions. (76)

2. Graham Burchell, Review article on the work of Paul Q. Hirst and Barry Hindess, Radical Philosophy, No.18, 1977, p.22-30. Not so much a review as an extended exposition of the then new 'post-structuralist Marxism'. Burchell's words were symptomatic on the British Left, of what Richard Johnson called 'The epistemological agonies' ('Culture and Ideology' in Barrett et al Cultural Production, Croom Helm, London, 1979) in which a whole generation of young theoretically minded radicals were frightened and captivated by a heady theory that denounced the real. Perhaps a unique moment in British intellectual history as those nurtured in an empiricist culture so hostile to theory lay helpless before the latest imported French theoretical fashions (see Chapter 2).


5. This quotation from Marx is the title of Marshall Berman's book (Verso, London, 1983). An important work that directly connects and celebrates social modernity and cultural modernism. In an important review essay Perry Anderson has made the following point which we will have cause to return 'The cohesion and stability which Berman wonders whether communism could ever display, lies for Marx in the very human nature that it would finally emancipate, are far from any mere cataract of formless desire. For all its exuberance, Berman's version of Marx, in its virtually exclusive emphasis on the release of the self, comes uncomfortably close - radical and decent though its accents are - to the assumptions of the culture of narcissism' 'Modernity and Revolution' New Left Review No.144, March/April 1984, p.111.


7. Altieri, op.cit., p.1403.
9. Giddens, op.cit., p.37-38. The Cartesian nature of post-structuralism is important, for it was exactly cartesianism that Wittgenstein and much Anglo-Saxon philosophy set itself to combat. The essential point about Cartesian confusion over the self has been made by Denys Turner, in the course of an analysis of Althusser's theory of ideology, which is also implicated in this confusion. 'But epistempological subjects are not (Cartesian) psychological selves. Subjects are in my sense materialistically conceived bodies and are the sources of the individuation of experiences. Subjects in the cartesian sense are idealistically conceived as consciousnesses and are individuated by their experiences', Denys Turner 'The "Subject" and the "Self"', New Blackfriars, Vol.59, march 1978, p.137.
10. Giddens, ibid.
13. Ibid.
15. Ibid, p.1408.
17. The point was made by the same Perry Anderson in his famous 'The Components of the National Culture' essay in New Left Review, No.50, 1968.
18. Quoted in Fergus Kerr, 'Wittgenstein and Theological Studies', New Blackfriars, December 1982. Kerr has written a series of very interesting essays on Wittgenstein's relationship with other philosophers and thinkers (which clearly in part inspired Eagleton's essay in New Left Review, No.135 op.cit). See especially Fergus Kerr, 'Russell vs Lawrence and/or Wittgenstein, New Blackfriars, October 1982. The issues he deals with are complex and varied, but are in part inspired by Perry Anderson's now rather dated essay, 'Components of the National Culture', op.cit., concerning Britain's lack of connection with continental thought. Kerr's response was to point out that what was at the
centre of continental debates, was an engagement with Heidegger. This could be seen in the work of Kojève, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Althusser and Lacan. In Germany, Adorno and Habermas and the theological work of Bultmann and Karl Rahner. The upshot of this was that what Heidegger could do for you (see his 'The Use of Heidegger', New Blackfriars, February 1982), F.R. Leavis/D.H. Lawrence as local equivalents could also do, and that there was 'a fundamental affinity between Leavis and that real focus of European thought, Heidegger' (Kerr October 1982).

The reason for this was as Anderson had pointed out, the real centre of critical thought in Britain, had vacated philosophy and moved into Leavisite literary criticism. Backed by Lawrence's work, it allowed us to 'become able to identify and explore the deep meanings of our experience, and sometimes to resist and reverse the positivist interpretations of it.' The connection with Wittgenstein, Kerr went on to argue, lay in the fact that they shared a common opponent in Russell's logical atomism, as Lawrence put it: 'the state of disintegration where in each separate little ego is an independent little principality by itself' (in Kerr, October 1982) Kerr claims that unbeknown to Leavis, he had a philosophic ally in Wittgenstein, criticising Russell's atomism from inside philosophy. So in the end Wittgenstein, Kerr argues, can do for you what Leavis/Lawrence/Heidegger, can, in 'an exercise in persuading the individual to acknowledge his or her essential dependence on the community' (emphasis added New Blackfriars, October 1982, p.439).


21. Ibid, p.120-1.
23. Ibid, p.175.
24. Ibid.
27. Ibid, p.192.
29. Ibid, p.245.
32. MacIntyre, op.cit., p.203.
33. Ibid, p.204.
34. Ibid, p.205.
36. MacIntyre, After Virtue, op.cit., p.244.
38. MacIntyre, op.cit., p.220.
39. Ibid, p.221.
40. See A. Fraser, 'The Corporation as a Body Politic', Telos, No.57, Fall 1983 and also his 'Legal Amnesia: Modernism vs The Republican Tradition in American Legal Thought', Telos, No.60, Summer 1984.
43. Fraser, 'The Corporation', op.cit., p.6.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid, p.33.
46. Fraser, 'Legal Amnesia', op.cit.
47. Ibid, p.52.


54. Huw Beynon and myself have documented this process in our 'Decisive Power: The New Tory State Against the Miners' in Huw Beynon ed. *Digging Deeper: issues in the Miners' Strike*, Verso, London, 1985. In this essay we outline the careful strategic planning carried out by the Tories, while in opposition and continued in government. We show how elements of the state were reorganised to face down a large scale strike. This involved most particularly the organising of those industries and utilities owned by the state, as in effect tools of a clear political strategy. We illustrate the authoritarian potential within those corporatist elements of the state, in the hands of a government determined to break the post war consensus.


58. Recently Andre Gorz has wrestled with this problem in his *Farewell to the Working Class: an Essay on Post-Industrial Socialism*, Pluto Press, London, 1982. Gorz suggests the notion of a dual society, in which there would be what he calls a heteronomous sphere which is equated with the continuation of industrial production and all the technical necessities that flow from that. Outside of this there would exist a sphere of autonomous, self-organised activity. On this view unpleasant production cannot be abolished but it can be minimised and subordinated to the realm of freedom. His argument is important it seeks to insulate spheres of life from market domination and could, perhaps, provide a basis for reconstituted communities. However, it is important to note that his conception of two sectors, is not too far away from neo-liberals models of small scale self organised, secondary market sectors, existing outside
the main labour market. These liberals wish to introduce this form to relieve the major market and state sectors of the 'surplus' population.

This means that for a decent and fulfilling autonomous sphere to exist it would have to be protected and promoted economically and politically, presumably by political and economic organisation directed towards the state. It seems likely then, that the autonomous sector would be in a more or less permanent conflict with the hetronomous sector and its allies in the state. This, of course, raises again the question of politics, who and what groups can be mobilised for such ends and how?

See also the interviews with Gorz 'The limits of self determination and self-management' and his article, 'The Reconquest of Time' in Telos, No.55, Spring 1983 and his 'The American Model and the Future of the Left' in Telos, No.64, Summer 1985.

59. Marx in The German Ideology, see chapter 4, p.312, Note 94 for reference.


61. Raymond Williams, 'Mining the Meaning: Key Words in the Miners' Strike', New Socialist, No.25, March 1985, p.6-9.

62. Ibid.


64. See Luci Colletti's introductory essay to Karl Marx's Early Writing, (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1975), concerning Marx's debt to Rousseau.

65. Connolly, op.cit., p.91.

66. Quoted in ibid, p.118.


71. Ibid, p.419.

72. See D. Held, op.cit., p.331.

73. Alexander, op.cit., p.421.

74. Connolly, op.cit., p.111.


76. MacIntyre, After Virtue, op.cit., p.182.
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Note on abbreviations:

OUP - Oxford University Press
CUP - Cambridge University Press
RKP - Routledge and Kegan Paul
NLB - New Left Books


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