Wilfred Cantweil Smith’s concept of faith: a critical study of his approach to Islam and Christianity

Stevens, Philip Terence

How to cite:

Use policy

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to present and evaluate Wilfred Cantwell Smith's concept of faith, and to examine the way in which he uses it to approach and understand material from the traditions of Islām and Christianity.

Chapter one consists a brief introduction and a biography of Wilfred Cantwell Smith. The second chapter analyses Smith's concept of faith, relating it to cumulative tradition, belief, truth and his vision of a world community.

Chapter three examines Smith's treatment of various material from the Islamic tradition: the meaning of Islām, the shahādah, truth, the Qur'ān, and some studies of faith. Chapter four examines material from the Christian tradition: faith in the New Testament, faith in the baptismal rites of St Cyril of Jerusalem, and religious pluralism. These items illustrate his concept of faith and the way in which it is used in his approach and understanding of Islām and Christianity.

Chapter five provides an evaluation of Smith's concept of faith and of his approach to Islām and Christianity. It is argued that although the concept of faith helps the student of religion in general and Islām and Christianity in particular to keep his eyes open to the personal existential aspects of human religious life, Smith's approach has some serious deficiencies. In particular faith itself is difficult to study other than in a selective, subjective way. His approach undervalues the corporate, institutionalized aspects of religious life, and the symbolic function played by the externals of religion. Furthermore, his understanding of faith is ill-equipped to handle the conflicting truth-claims found amongst the various traditions.
Wilfred Cantwell Smith's Concept of Faith: A Critical Study of his Approach to Islām and Christianity

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements 5
Notes on the Transliteration of Arabic words 6
Abbreviations 7
Chapter 1. Introduction 8
  1.1. Scope and Limits of the Study 8
  1.2. Biographical introduction to Wilfred Cantwell Smith 10
Chapter 2. The Concept of Faith 12
  2.1. Faith and Cumulative Tradition 13
  2.2. Faith and Belief 37
  2.3. Faith and Truth 46
  2.4. Faith and World Community 59
Chapter 3. Studies in Islām and the Concept of Faith 65
  3.1. The Meaning of Islām 66
  3.2. The Shahādah 88
  3.3. Truth - a Study of Three Arabic Roots 94
  3.4. Is the Qur'ān the Word of God? 100
  3.5. Studies in Faith: Ḥiyyān, Taṣdiq and Arkān 105
Chapter 4. Studies in Christianity and the Concept of Faith 114
  4.1. Faith and the New Testament 115
  4.2. Baptism and Creed 127
  4.3. The Challenge of Religious Pluralism to Christian Faith 134
Chapter 5. Conclusion 145
Notes 167
Bibliography 200
  Section 1. Works of Wilfred Cantwell Smith 200
  Section 2. Other Works Consulted 204
The material contained in this thesis has not previously been submitted by me for a degree in this or any other university.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
I wish to record my sincere thanks to all those who have assisted and encouraged me in the preparation of this thesis. In particular to Prof. S. W. Sykes who got me started and supervised me during the first few months of study; Dr R. W. J. Austin who helped me with Arabic; the Revs. Colin Chapman, Don Cupitt, Christopher Lamb, Prof. Isma'īl al Fārūqī, and others who corresponded with me; Mr Richard Harrison who telephoned me every week for a progress report, and whose pertinacity has eventually been rewarded; and especially to Prof. Edward Hulmes who supervised me during the bulk of the work, and whose capacity to be enthusiastic and encouraging has known no limits.
Notes on the transliteration of Arabic words.

The following system of transliteration has been used where necessary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Transliteration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ا</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ب</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ت</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ث</td>
<td>th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ج</td>
<td>j</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ح</td>
<td>h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>خ</td>
<td>kh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>د</td>
<td>d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ذ</td>
<td>dh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ر</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ز</td>
<td>z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>س</td>
<td>s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ش</td>
<td>sh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ص</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ض</td>
<td>dh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ط</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ظ</td>
<td>z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ع</td>
<td>u</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>غ</td>
<td>gh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>خ</td>
<td>h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ف</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ق</td>
<td>q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ك</td>
<td>k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ل</td>
<td>l</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>م</td>
<td>m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ن</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ه</td>
<td>h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>و</td>
<td>w</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ي</td>
<td>y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The diphthongs and vowels are written:

- a for fathah
- i for kasrah
- u for dammah
- ā for alif
- ū for wāw
- ī for yā
- ay for ی
- aw for ٍ
ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used to refer to works of Wilfred Cantwell Smith:


Section 1.1. Scope and Limits of the Study

The aim of this study is to expound and illustrate Wilfred Cantwell Smith's concept of faith, and to assess its value as a conceptual tool for understanding religious life and approaching Islām and Christianity.

Since Smith nowhere defines his concept of faith systematically, it is analysed in Chapter two in the light of some of his other major concerns. Chapters three and four serve to illustrate and test his concept of faith by looking at the way in which it is applied to specific material from the Islamic and Christian traditions. This procedure has been adopted in order to demonstrate Smith's own use of the concept, to assess critically its value as a conceptual tool, and to examine Smith's approach in the light of the Islamic and Christian material under discussion. The concluding chapter evaluates the concept of faith, with reference to the responses of various scholars.

The traditional names of the 'religions' Islām and Christianity have been deliberately retained in the title, notwithstanding Smith's own rejection of such usage.\(^1\) Even Smith himself would not pretend that what has customarily been termed Christianity and Islām do not exist.\(^2\) Rather he claims to offer a more appropriate conceptualization by which to understand the whole range of human life conveyed by these terms. Hence it is appropriate to retain these customary names in the title rather than to presume upon the results of the study.\(^3\)

The primary sources for this study are the written works of Wilfred Cantwell Smith. A complete list of Smith's works consulted in English is provided in the Bibliography, Section 1.\(^4\) Secondary sources include the
growing body of articles and books which study or build upon Smith's
concept of faith and approach to religious life. These and other works used
for this study are listed in the Bibliography, Section 2.\textsuperscript{5}

This study is inevitably constrained by a number of limitations. The
first is the wide spread of Smith's intellectual interests. Even limiting
the discussion to his treatment of Islamic and Christian traditions it is
necessary to be very highly selective, since he covers a vast range of
topics in considerable detail.

Secondly, a full evaluation of his early historical works\textsuperscript{6} has been
omitted despite the continuing significance of these works for Islamic
Studies. Although these works illustrate in many places Smith's approach to
Islām they were written before his conceptual framework was formulated.

Following from the decision to omit a full discussion of these earlier
works, a full analysis of Smith's historical method has also been omitted.
Smith frequently insists that he is primarily a historian, bringing an
historical and global perspective to the attention of theologians. A full
treatment of his historical assumptions or method would require a
theological critique of history, which is beyond the scope of this study.\textsuperscript{7}
Wilfred Cantwell Smith was born on 21st July 1916 in Toronto, Canada. His early religious faith was fashioned by the Presbyterian allegiance of his father, a strict morality and disciplined personal life, and a Calvinistic orthodoxy. As an undergraduate at the University of Toronto he was active in the leadership of Christian and missionary groups. There he gained his basic grounding in the Semitic languages and Near Eastern history, graduating in Oriental Studies in 1938. In 1939 he married Muriel Mackenzie Struthers, and subsequently had five children.

He gained his theological training at Westminster College, Cambridge, whilst further pursuing Arabic and Islamic studies under H.A.R. Gibb at St. John's College, Cambridge. From there he went to India in 1941 to serve in a number of capacities. He taught Islamic History at Forman Christian College, Lahore; he represented the Canadian Overseas Missions Council; and he was ordained and recognized by the Presbyterian Church of Canada. In 1943 he published his first book, Modern Islam in India: a Social Analysis. After the war Smith took a doctorate at Princeton University, studying under Philip K. Hitti. He submitted his dissertation 'The Azhar Journal: Analysis and Critique' in 1948.

He then held academic posts in three universities. From 1949 - 1964 he was at McGill University in Montreal. He was appointed W.M. Birks Professor of Comparative Religion and in 1951 became first director of the University's new Institute of Islamic Studies. The Institute, under Smith's direction was notable for its insistence that half the student and staff bodies should be Muslims so that all the statements about Islam could be verified by the Muslims present. It was here in the context of working alongside Muslims and listening to their views that he produced what is
perhaps his major deposit to Islamic Studies as such, *Islam in Modern History*, and also his important methodological essay 'Comparative Religion: Whither - and Why?' It was also here that his concept of faith was developed, and presented beyond the confines of Islamic Studies in his seminal work *The Meaning and End of Religion*.

In 1964 he became Professor of World Religions at Harvard University. At Harvard Smith was forced to consider in greater detail the implications of his approach to religion for Christian theology, and to consider wider interfaith issues. He then spent a few years back in Canada as Professor of Religion at Dalhousie University, 1973 - 1978 during which time he was able to devote himself more fully to the research which went into his books *Belief and History* and *Faith and Belief*. He then returned to Harvard as Professor of the Comparative History of Religion, and Chairman of the Committee on the Study of Religion.

Throughout his career Smith has travelled widely, and this has enabled him to experience in action the faith of many Muslims from various differing backgrounds, and to engage in lively dialogue with them.

In addition to his academic career and a concern for Western scholarship in its widest sense, he has engaged in the life and work of the United Church of Canada. One of his most notable contributions being the reformulation of the Church's doctrinal statements about 'non-christian religions', taking into account the existence of faith as a quality of human life for all people.
This chapter gives an analysis of Wilfred Cantwell Smith's concept of faith as it is presented in his major written works. Smith himself has always been hesitant to define faith in too much detail, preferring to see it as a personal quality; a mundane historical reality rather than a philosophical abstraction. It is possible, however, to show the meaning of his concept by relating it to his other major religious concerns: cumulative tradition, belief, truth, world community. This is the procedure adopted in this chapter, as it seems the best way to gain an understanding of his concept. A critique of his concept of faith is to be found in the conclusion, chapter five.

As a working introduction, Smith's concept of faith might be outlined thus: faith is a personal quality or characteristic by which the participants in religious (or non-religious) cumulative traditions are enabled to find meaning in and live out their lives. It is not a matter of assent to certain credal formulations or beliefs. These are observable deposits of faith (itself, of course, unobservable); they may point to the truth; and they may nurture faith. But faith itself is a personal affirmative response to the transcendent, by which the truth is actualized in the individual's and the community's life. The idea of response must be balanced by the idea that faith is given or evoked by God (or the Truth, the Transcendent) within human life, thus making that life fully human. As such faith is a universal quality of human life, which though not automatic, is not limited to any one religious tradition. Faith is therefore to be seen as the major asset and driving force in the formation of a world community.
Section 2.1. Faith and Cumulative Tradition

This section is devoted to a survey of the background and content of The Meaning and End of Religion in which Wilfred Cantwell Smith's concept of faith was first explicitly presented. Smith's early understanding of religion is examined in the first subsection; this is followed by a subsection on his rejection of 'religion' as given in the first five chapters of The Meaning and End of Religion. This paves the way for an examination of Smith's new conceptualization of religious life in terms of faith and cumulative tradition in the third subsection.

The Meaning and End of Religion is a highly original and influential book which aimed to initiate a new way of understanding the religious life of man. Smith argued that it is misleading to focus attention in religious studies upon 'religions' as though these were distinct entities of great significance. Instead he argued that we should see the religious life of mankind as made up of an inner and an outer dimension. The outer dimension, comprising the external paraphernalia of religious practice, institution and doctrine, he called 'cumulative tradition'. This is the dimension of religious life which is open to empirical observation, and it is subject to continual change. The inner component, whereby these externalities gain meaning for the devout, Smith termed 'faith'. Faith is not of itself open to empirical observation, since it has to do with the person's relationship with the transcendent; but the effects of faith can be observed in his life. It is this inner dimension which is seen by the religious man to be central to his life, and thus it cannot be ignored by the student of religion. Furthermore, since the very word 'religion' tends either to confuse the picture, or to focus attention misleadingly upon the externals, Smith argued that this word (together with all the 'names' of the 'religions') should be abandoned unless used in an adjectival sense.
Smith's Early Understanding of Religion

Although the concepts of faith and cumulative tradition were first presented in detail in The Meaning and End of Religion, the development of these notions can be traced in his earliest works. Wilfred Cantwell Smith had been conscious of the need to devise an appropriate definition of religion, and method for its study, from his earliest days in Lahore. His early works reveal that he was already concerned to understand the relationship between the observer and the religious man, between the historical and the eternal, between the external observables of religion and their inner meaning. These two themes from his early works are now sketched as a backcloth to the study of The Meaning and End of Religion: (a) the inner dimension of religion - the man of faith, and (b) the outer dimension of religion - the observable data.

(a) The Inner Dimension of Religion - The Man of Faith

Smith's longstanding desire to accept the judgement of religious men themselves when trying to understand their religious life led him to observe in 1943 that 'A scientific study of religion waits upon many things; of which one is a clear definition of its terms.' He went on to use the following definitions in that book:

'religion: that aspect of a person's life, or of his society's life which that person regards as religion. Muslim: any person who calls himself a Muslim. Islam: the religion of the Muslims.'

Whilst these definitions are ultimately inadequate, they reveal Smith's refusal to impose an outsider's judgement on that which religious people hold dear.

The same preoccupation is to be found in Pakistan as an Islamic State - a preliminary draft published in 1951. Again and again he refers to the
need to understand and speak of Islamic matters through Muslim eyes. For example:

'What does it mean to speak of Pakistan's becoming Islamic? To be more precise, or anyway more methodical: what does this phrase mean to the Pakistani Muslims?' 6

'Only a Muslim has a right to expound what an Islamic state ought to be.' 7

In his inaugural lecture of 1949, given on his appointment as W.M.Birks Professor of Comparative Religion at McGill University, Smith graphically dismisses the work of those historians of religion who fail to grasp the inner meaning of a religion for its adherents:

'Such scholars might uncharitably be compared to flies crawling on the outside of a goldfish bowl, making accurate and complete observations on the fish inside, measuring their scales meticulously, and indeed contributing much to a knowledge of the subject, but never asking themselves, and never finding out, how it feels to be a goldfish.' 8

In the preface to Islam in Modern History Smith insists that his work should be regarded as a failure if 'Muslims are not able to recognize its observations as accurate, its interpretations and analyses as meaningful and enlightening'. 9 This concern was later expressed by Smith in the form of a proposition: 'that no statement about a religion is valid unless it can be acknowledged by that religion's believers.' 10 This proposition has since been dubbed 'Smith's method of verification'. 11

This concern for understanding became for Smith increasingly a concern for mutual understanding. He summarized his methodological argument in a widely quoted passage from the important essay 'Comparative Religion: Whither - and Why?'

'The argument may be summarized briefly, in pronominal terms. The traditional form of Western scholarship in the study of other men's religion was of an impersonal presentation of an "it". The first great innovation in recent times has been the personalization of the faiths observed, so that one finds a discussion of a "they". Presently the observer becomes personally involved, so that the situation is one of
a "we" talking about a "they". The next step is a dialogue, where "we" talk to "you". If there is listening and mutuality, this may become "we" talk with "you". The culmination of this process is when "we all" are talking with each other about "us". 12

To a large extent, then, 'the study of religion is the study of persons'. 13 It involves understanding what religious life means to those who participate in it. This principle was embodied institutionally at McGill University: 'it is formal policy at its Institute of Islamic Studies that half of the teachers and half of the students be Muslims'. 14 In such an atmosphere all the statements may be verified by the Muslims present, and the inner meaning of the externalities may be articulated by them.

(b) The Outer Dimension of Religion - The Observable Data.

In addition to his emphasis on the meaning of the religious data for men of faith, Smith also insisted in these early days that the study of religion must involve the historical study of persons. In other words the comparative religionist is preserved from gullibility by his historical and empirical appreciation of the religious material. The student of religion must know that different men will acknowledge different statements at different times in his life. Smith was therefore able to write, in the face of (for example) a sophisticated Muslim who disparaged village Islam as not the real Islam: 'The religious historian, of course, with less subtle distinctions, takes a religion as he finds it, and has no prejudice which keeps him from seeing that a religion, though it uses the same name, may be essentially different in different environments'. 15

In May 1948 Wilfred Cantwell Smith presented his doctoral thesis 'The Azhar Journal - Survey and Critique', to the Department of Oriental Languages and Literature, Princeton University. This journal, published monthly in Cairo, is the official organ of the Azhar Mosque, a great
Islamic centre in Cairo. Smith examined the content of the editorials and articles appearing in the journal since its inception in 1930, noting the different stances adopted by contributors during its two editorships: the first editor was one of the traditional ulama or classical scholars of Islam; the second was a modernist under whom 'a subtle irreligiousness' can be discerned to permeate the journal's presentations. Smith's conclusion is stated thus in his own summary: 'Those who, in the fullest sense, know the religion, have largely lost contact with the modern world, while those generally orientated to modernity have to a remarkable degree lost contact with their religion'. Smith managed in that work to come to an understanding of some of the modern developments in the Arab world as they have been seen through Muslim eyes, whilst retaining a right to criticise and assess as an outsider.

Wilfred Cantwell Smith's early approach to the study of religion is therefore inherently both personalistic and historical. A knowledge of the historical and phenomenological data must be accompanied by, and interpreted by, a knowledge of the persons who participate in the religion. 'To know Islam, as to know any religion, is not only to be appraised of, even carefully acquainted with, its institutions, patterns and history, but also to apprehend what these mean to those who have the faith'. 16

Both the inner and outer dimensions of religion were important, but it is clear that the inner dimension was central to Smith:

'We hold that behaviour, institutions, creeds and other externalities are real and significant, but are not religion. At least they are not all of it, and particularly are not faith. Religion, we suggest, is what these things mean to men. A study of religion, then, to be scientific must deal with meaning, with the personal considered as personal, not as an "object".' 17
The above survey has shown that these two aspects of the study of religion concerned Smith greatly in his early works. It is now possible to turn to an analysis of The Meaning and End of Religion in which Smith came to reject 'religion' as an unhelpful concept, and developed his own understanding of religious life in terms of the personal faith of the participants and the cumulative tradition which is accessible to the observer. The book is treated here in some detail because of its significance for an understanding of all Smith's work, and especially of his concept of faith.

The first chapter introduces some of the major considerations which have to be taken into account in the study of religion. In particular, Smith points to: the data and methodology of scientific analysis; the multiplicity of religious traditions, brought into closer contact by the developments of the modern world; the diversities within each tradition; the sheer fact of change, affecting all aspects of human life, including the religious; and the persistence and 'vitality of faith' despite 'the onslaught of modernity'. Most study of religion fails to do justice to all these factors, and especially it fails to hold together both the external data accessible to the observer and the depth of insight intelligible to the man of faith. These difficulties have led some to suppose that the whole attempt is futile, preferring either to limit their scope to the 'mundane manifestations' of religion, leaving aside questions of meaning and transcendence as inaccessible, or to follow their own religion without facing the facts of comparative religious history. For Smith the quest for an intellectual understanding of religion is part of a larger practical task in the modern world: at the individual level, one must ask 'how to find meaning in life'; and at the group level one must ask
'how to turn our nascent world society into a world community'. These primarily practical problems nevertheless call for an understanding of religion which can do justice to its inner and outer dimensions. Intellectual and spiritual questions are forced upon us by the need for harmonious coexistence between men of faith; and these are serious challenges. As Smith puts it:

'Unless a Christian can contrive intelligently and spiritually to be a Christian not merely in a Christian society or a secular society but in a world ..., a world in which other intelligent, sensitive, educated men are ..., Muslims ..., then I do not see how a man is to be a Christian ..., at all.'

In view of the fact that no general definition of religion has been fully adequate, Smith suggests that we should shift our attention away from a concentration on 'religion' in search of other, more manageable categories. He wants to avoid questions about 'the nature of religion', or 'the essence of Christianity', aiming to approach these issues from another perspective - not focusing on 'religion', but rather on 'faith' and 'cumulative tradition'. Chapters two to five are taken up with a historical survey of the use of the term 'religion' and the names of the 'religions' (Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, etc.) and chapters six to eight are a presentation of his alternative perspective.

Chapter two traces the use of the word and concept 'religion' in the West from pre-Christian times to the present day. Smith tries to show that major developments have taken place in the usage of this term. Pre-Christian images of religio included the designation of 'a power outside man obligating him to certain behaviour under pain of threatened awesome retribution, a kind of tabu', but it also implied 'the feeling in man vis-à-vis such powers'. It was used of ritual practice and cultic observance and also of personal piety. These two uses are to be found, for example, in Lucretius and Cicero respectively, and Smith observes that:
'A great deal of all studies of religion since, including the most modern, can be arranged in effect on the one side or the other of this dichotomy. There are those on the one hand primarily concerned with objective realities, with that outside man to which he is related in religion; and those on the other hand primarily concerned with subjective attitudes, with the involvement by which he is related'. 23

The word was taken over into Christian usage, and was frequently used in the early centuries to distinguish Christian from pagan rites and observances. Religio was used to designate the structural organization of the church,24 and became a title applied to bishops and other clergy.25 Smith is greatly interested in the meaning of this word which 'reflects the clash of religious systems and the new exclusivist situation'.26 A distinction began to be drawn between 'our way of worshipping' and 'your ritual practices'.27 Further, these ceremonies and practices could be designated vera religio or falsa religio, but not, says Smith, in the sense of the 'much more sophisticated and developed notion' that 'one religion is true, others false'.28 St. Augustine used the term, as in the book title De Vera Religione, meaning 'On Proper Piety', or 'On Genuine Worship'.29 For Augustine 'true religion means the worship of the one true God',30 and it represented a personal relationship with the divine. Smith argues that this emerging notion of true religion paved the way for a later institutionalized meaning. The personal focus of Augustine was nevertheless given

'a Platonic form .... which perhaps enabled others later to think of it as a general community possession, eventually identifiable with an overt institutional phenomenon.' 31

After Augustine, religio was little used until the renaissance,32 except that in the Middle Ages it was used as a designation of the monastic life. The major concept was faith.

In 1474 Fucino published De Christiana Religione, in which the word receives a 'new orientation'.33 In contrast to all the changing customs and practices of man, Fucino wrote that religio 'is universal to man .... the
fundamental distinguishing human characteristic, innate, natural, .... primary .... stable'. This might be translated as 'religiousness', possessed in varying degrees by all men. The ideal, in the platonic sense, is the Christian religion, i.e., that pertaining to Christ. For whilst it is better, in Fucino's eyes, to worship God in any way than not to worship at all, the best form of religiousness is that which takes its example from Christ. Fucino also wrote a major work entitled Theologica Platonica, in which he assigned the name religio to 'his idea of a universal instinct in mankind to seek the good, which .... is to seek the divine'.

Luther did not address himself to a concept of religion, being more concerned with faith (fides, Glaube). Zwingli and Calvin, however, used religion widely. Zwingli's De Vera et Falsa Religione Commentarius (1525) is not concerned to prove 'Christianity' as a better religion than other religions, one true and others false. This idea would have been quite foreign to him. Instead 'religio is a relation between man and God' and the work deals 'with the true and false religio of Christians'. He called men from the false religion of 'an oversanctification of popes, councils, church authorities', and in modern terminology, from 'the tendency whereby men give their allegiance to religion rather than to God'.

Smith suggests that the popularity of Calvin's Christianae Religionis Institutio in its many editions and translations had much to do with the increasing currency of the phrase 'Christian Religion'. But Smith maintains that for Calvin the phrase would not have been understood to mean 'one of the religious systems of the world'; it still carried the sense of 'Christian piety'. It was during the Enlightenment that the name 'religion' was applied to the systematic and abstract intellectual constructs which they devised. The term was given to the system of the Christian 'religion', and it could be
used in the plural to compare systems elaborated in other 'religions'.

Smith designates that change in use as a change 'from a Platonic to a propositional concept of truth'. In the case of Hugo de Groot, for instance,

'Traces of the former orientation are to be found, viewing the Christian as one instance of a general (Platonic) type, but a surpassingly excellent instance, so that it is true religion. On the whole, however, he is concerned to show that it is the true religion, by proving that its precepts are statements of fact'.

The Enlightenment was a time of schematization, and religion was seen in precisely this way: 'Christianity is a scheme'. It was also 'an age of controversy and conflict in the religious realm'. Religious groups may consider their own religion in personal terms 'piety, faith, obedience, worship and a vision of God', but controvert with an 'alien "religion" (as) a system of beliefs or rituals, an abstract and impersonal pattern of observables'. This treatment of religion was essentially that of the outsider; but in order to defend his own religion from attack, insiders adopted the same stance. This gave rise to the plural 'religions', in contrast to words like 'piety, obedience, reverence, worship', none of which permit a plural form. Another concept to arise was that of 'religion' as 'the total system', a generalization of 'the sum of all systems of beliefs'.

The nineteenth century saw three further developments in the notion of religion. The first change is to be found in Schleiermacher's *On Religion*, which Smith designates as 'the first book ever written on religion as such'. The significance of this work for Smith's purpose is that religion is not to be understood as that which is observed but as the inner 'emotions and dispositions' of the heart. Those things which could be observed were designated the 'positive religions' by Schleiermacher, and the rise of the historical and comparative study of these phenomena gave rise to the second development: the concept of religion as 'a
self-subsisting transcendent idea that unfolds itself in dynamic expression in the course of ever-changing history'. The third development was that proposed by Ludwig Feuerbach in his books *The Essence of Christianity* and *The Essence of Religion*, namely that religion, and each individual religion, has an essence. 'Ever since the hunt has been on', says Smith, to find that essence. He comments,

'This is to carry the process of reification to its logical extreme: endowing the concepts that an earlier generation has constructed (rather haphazardly, and dubiously, in this case) with a final and inherent validity, a cosmic legitimacy'.

This whole development in the word and concept 'religion', Smith calls a process of reification, by which inner piety and outward practices are turned into systematized entities or constructs which somehow exist independently of those who may or may not experience them.

Smith concluded chapter two by identifying ways in which 'religion' is used today. First there is the sense of personal piety; secondly it refers to beliefs, practices, values, etc., as a system of ideals; thirdly it relates to these beliefs, practices, values, etc., as they really are historically and sociologically; and finally, the word is used to mean religion as a generic aspect of human life. Smith proposes that the word 'religion' be dropped in all but the first sense.

The third chapter of *The Meaning and End of Religion* is entitled 'Other Cultures. "The Religions"', and here Smith considers whether and how the process of reification has affected other cultures and other religious traditions. First he notes that among non-civilized peoples, and among ancient civilizations and non-European cultures, there are no words corresponding to our systematized or generic notions of 'religion'. These cultures had words for personal piety, and for aspects of their practices and beliefs, but they lacked terms to conceptualize institutional religion,
or 'to discriminate conceptually between the religious and the other aspects of (their) society's life'. This lack has caused several cultures to adopt words to cover the modern notion.

Smith next addresses the question as to the way in which the individual 'religions' have been named. He found that this practice of naming religious traditions is a very late one. With the exception of Islam, most of the religions were named for the first time by Westerners in the nineteenth century. In the seventeenth century most traditions were referred to as 'the religion of ....' and prior to that Smith found references to 'the sect of ....'. But with the exception of 'Muhammadanism' and its derivatives, the religious '-isms' were an invention of the nineteenth century. Only those traditions which did not develop beyond the boundaries of the civilizations or communities in which they arose escaped this process of naming. Such traditions remained as 'the religion of the Incas', etc.

Smith also observed that this process of naming 'religions' is now to some extent being reversed. As western scholars studying Hinduism, Buddhism, and so on, have reached a greater appreciation of the 'religions' they study, they have increasingly realized that these abstract nouns are inappropriate to describe the religious life they observe. For example, one scholar writes 'Confucianism, a misleading general term ....'. The appellation 'Hinduism' is 'a particularly false conceptualization' in Smith's judgement. 'Hindu' originally meant the river Indus, and thus the territory around it. It was not applied as a religious expression until the Muslim invasion of India, when foreigners, and then natives began to so designate the 'indigenous' peoples and their traditional ways. The term 'Hinduism' did not appear until 1829, when it was applied by Westerners. These designations remain confusing to those to whom they are applied,
and distort their religious life by implying a conceptual unity which Hindus themselves deny. Smith gives similar accounts of the rise of the terms 'Sikhism', 'Buddhism', 'Confucianism', 'Taoism' and 'Shintoism'. These terms, and the conceptualizations they imply, were invented and applied by people who stood outside the traditions they sought to describe and the notions remain foreign to most of the people whose religious life they attempt to describe.

At the end of the chapter Smith turns to 'Judaism' and 'Christianity'. The notion of 'Judaism' arose as the Jewish community fought against the threatening impact of Greek ways. This was recorded in II Maccabees as a struggle primarily, Smith argues, for 'Jewishness'. Whether it originally implied an ideal 'Judaism' or an adjectival 'Jewishness', it soon came to be used and seen as the name for the Jewish religion. The name 'Christianity' is first used by Ignatius, whilst under sentence of martyrdom. He uses it (Christianismos) in the sense of an ideal by which individual Christians should live, and in contrast to that by which Jews lived (Judaismos). But the term was not commonly used until the reformation.

Smith concludes that the process of naming a religion is basically the work of outsiders, or the product of struggle and conflict. The names, once coined, have tended to be used to refer to the historical and empirical data, and especially to the doctrines, formulated as abstract intellectual constructs. He further concludes that the process of reification, whereby the emphasis has shifted from the inner heart to the external and abstract aspects of religious life, is common to all the religious traditions as a result of Western influence. Thus a large amount of valuable material is accumulated by the 'Historians of Religion', but Smith regrets a lack of 'a sympathetic insight' into the heart of people's faith:
'We have learned more about "the religions", but this has made us perhaps less, rather than more, aware of what it is that we have tried to mean by "religion".  

Chapter four, entitled 'The Special Case of Islam', shows that despite initial appearances to the contrary, the same processes are at work in the case of Islam. In Smith's view, the name Islam has come to stand for the external, observable data rather than the inner piety of Muslims. Smith also traces the emergence of the concept of religion in ancient Persia, and its influence on the three great monotheistic traditions.

In the fifth chapter of The Meaning and End of Religion, Smith looks back over his analysis of religion, and concludes that the concept of religion is inadequate. He does not wish to suggest that what we have tended to call 'religion', or 'Buddhism', or 'Hinduism', or whatever, do not exist. Nor does he claim that these concepts are incapable of making any meaningful sense of the religious data. What he does contend is that these concepts are 'imprecise and liable to distort what they are asked to represent'.

Smith lists several Christian and other writers who support this view that the concept of 'religion' and the names of the 'religions' are inadequate. No great religious leader ever 'founded a religion', and no reformer preached religion. All called men from a preoccupation with mundane institutions and systematic formularies, to the transcendent beyond them, to an awareness of life in all its wholeness. The engaged participant is not able to recognise in 'religion' an adequate account of his personal relationship with the divine; the notion misses the heart of the matter. The concept is essentially that of the outsider. But Smith urges that it is ultimately inadequate for the outsider or observer as well; the concept fails to grasp the heart and transcendent context of the religious man's life, and thus gives the outsider a distorted view. 'Outsiders, ... in
their conception of other men's religions, have tended to drain these of any but mundane content. Further, the notion of an essence of religion, or of a particular religion, is too rigid to encompass the rich diversity of a dynamic life of faith. For, 'what exists cannot be defined'. It might be possible to define 'an ideal Christianity', for instance, but 'not the empirical Christianity of history, not the actual religious life or the actual institutions of Christians in all their ramifying and diverse objectivity'.

Smith concludes the chapter by stating and demonstrating the inadequacy of five ways of understanding the names of a particular religion. (i) To see it as the earliest form of religion is 'virtually to ... assert that it has had no history'. (ii) To see it as the lowest common denominator between a group of people is to deny its richness. (iii) To see it as a transcendent ideal having 'a succession of mundane and therefore imperfect, compromised manifestations' is to miss the point that it is precisely mundane and imperfect human beings who are involved with religion. (iv) To see it as a series of ideals that (eg.) 'Muslims have held of Islam' is both to overlook the imperfections of the Muslim and to ignore the Muslim's claim that Islam is beyond his own understanding of it. (v) To limit the term to history alone is to forget that 'faith is greater than its history'. The transcendent, the abiding, the ideal, is tied up with the mundane, with the changes and imperfections of history.

So Smith rejects the concept of religion as inadequate to comprehend human religious life, and proposes two new concepts: faith and cumulative tradition.
In the first five chapters of *The Meaning and End of Religion* which have been examined above, Smith has striven to demonstrate the inadequacy of the concept 'religion' and the distortions implicit in naming the 'religions'. It was against this that he offers his own conceptualization of religious life in term of cumulative tradition and faith. The analysis arose from the recognition that the man of religious faith lives, as it were, in two worlds: the mundane and the transcendent. The existence and nature of the transcendent sphere, and its relationship with the mundane are issues which have long taxed students of religion, and Smith proposes that scholars must acknowledge that these are open questions. He therefore proposes to bypass these questions in order to continue with the study of religious life, rather than to postpone the study until these questions have been resolved. Whatever the link between these two spheres metaphysically or theologically, the link historically is man. Man's involvement with the transcendent Smith calls faith. The externals of religious life are part of the mundane world with which the man of faith is involved, and Smith gives them the name cumulative tradition. In his view this way of conceptualizing mankind's religious life is acceptable to both participant and observer.

The first example given of cumulative tradition in chapter six is that of the Hindus. The unknown writer of the Creation hymn in Book X of the *Rg-Veda* inherited a particular tradition up to his time including '.... almost certainly, many of the other hymns now collected into the *Rg-Veda*, .... rites and practices, norms, ideas, group pressures, family influences, vocabulary, social institutions, and what not ....' All these were external to him, and may be observed by analysts. He received this cumulative tradition, and added to it new hymns.

'He added to it something that emerged from the interaction within his
own personality between that external tradition and some personal quality of his own ...'

"... inside that man's person something unobservable happened of which the outward consequence was a new hymn. And this product of his faith was thereupon added to the cumulative tradition, which has therefore never been quite the same since." 78

The cumulative tradition is thus seen as a constantly changing historical deposit which "sets the context for the faith of each new generation", 79 serving as 'windows through which' men and women of faith 'see a world beyond'. 80 It inspires in those who inherit it an understanding of its meaning and a vision of transcendent truth, which, when expressed, modifies and transforms the tradition. Likewise the humble participant in just one small segment of the cumulative tradition 'interiorizes it to make what she can or will of its meaning, translating the outer forms into a personal faith, petty or profound; and then in turn she hands it on to her son, modified in an outward sense perhaps only minutely or negligibly, yet personalized. If it meant nothing to her inside, the historian may be sure that the next generation would handle even its externals differently." 81

The notion of cumulative tradition is then illustrated from Islam and Christianity. In these 'historically orientated' faiths 82 historical events may themselves be transcendent (eg. the figure of Jesus as divine, or the Qur'an) but this does not invalidate Smith's analysis. Instead it fully recognizes that the study of 'religion' must adequately account for both the mundane and the transcendent. The Islamic cumulative tradition as an evolving historical phenomenon was altered, for example, by the elaboration of the shari'ah as a legal system by al-Shafi'i. It is possible, and important to see how the Islamic tradition became 'what it has observably become ... by gradual and complex historical processes that can be studied'. 83 The meanings and interpretations which Muslim faith may find do not invalidate the recognition that there are observable historical forces at work here. Again, the Christian cumulative traditions known to different Christians at different places and in different eras have been profoundly
divergent, but within or through them, the transcendent has been perceived by men of faith. The idea of cumulative tradition allows the observer 'to do justice to the diversity of the phenomena and at the same time not to do violence to a conviction of those involved that through it all there is a common element of transcendence'.

Smith is concerned to show that his concept is not to be seen as an entity in its own right, as the concept of religion has been (wrongly) seen. Instead he claims that it is

'a human construct offered to order what is given. It is a devise by which the human mind may rewardingly and without distortion introduce intelligibility into the vast flux of human history or any given part of it. It refers .... to something intelligible, and empirically knowable, though not to an independent entity, intrinsically coherent or self-subsisting'.

Smith's exposition of the notion of faith is contained in the seventh chapter of The Meaning and End of Religion. The chapter is taken up primarily, however, not with faith itself, but with the observable expressions of faith. Faith itself is not open to observation, but the outsider can see 'the role that it has played in the religious history of mankind'. Faith expresses itself 'in words, both prose and poetry; in patterns of deeds, both ritual and morality; in art, in institutions, in law, in community, in character; and in still many other ways'. In each case it is impossible to grasp fully the outward phenomena without an appreciation of the inner faith of which it is an expression.

Religious art is the first obvious example discussed by Smith. The materials of the work are mundane, but 'its significance lies in the fact that it points beyond itself' first 'to the spirit of the man who framed it and beyond him to the transcendent vision that he saw'. It thus gives expression also to the faith of those 'who continue reverently to cherish' the work of art.
Secondly he considers the expressions of faith in community. Although Smith believes that religious faith is personal, he does not accept that it is 'individualistic'. Community and social institutions are cohesive because they express personal faith, and whilst these obtain a momentum and life of their own once formed, they gradually disintegrate if members fail to see them as expressions of personal faith.

Next Smith comments on the expressions of faith in character, and in ritual and moral practice. Then comes an important section on the expressions of faith in prose formulations of creed and theology. The peculiarly high significance attached to these in the Christian tradition has been due in part to the influence of Greek thought. Another factor to affect Western Christendom was the lack of a verb associated with the noun 'faith' (fides, foi) such that the verb 'believe' (credo, croire, etc) has had to be used, giving rise to considerable confusion. Smith holds that language is the instrument of meaning for persons, as such it cannot be meaningful in itself. Religious language is not statements of propositional truth, but can be the vehicle for expressing the faith of persons who are involved with transcendence. Questions of truth, Smith argues, should not be asked until we have understood that religious statements are expressions of personal faith rather than of propositional truth.

This procedure ensures that our presuppositions do not distort our analysis. Smith does not exclude a critical assessment of doctrines: 'I certainly do not mean that all religious doctrines are equally true, just as one would hardly hold that all works of art are equally beautiful or all ethical systems equally good'. Intellectual formulations refer to a transcendent reality only indirectly, that is, through the life of those persons whose faith the formulations express. Smith quotes Aulén in support: 'Theology .... does not determine faith, but analyses Christian
faith as it actually is'. The section ends with the following summary:

'Theology is part of the traditions, is part of this world. Faith lies beyond theology, in the hearts of men. Truth lies beyond faith, in the heart of God'.

So Smith begins to show how faith functions in the religious life of mankind. Like all the really significant human qualities: love, loyalty, despair, etc., faith itself is unobservable. It functions as the locus of 'a dialectical process between the mundane and the transcendent'. The cumulative tradition will be different for each individual, since each will have experienced subtly or profoundly different exposures to previous expressions of faith. No two person's faith will be identical, indeed no individual's faith is static, but 'new every morning', and giving rise to fresh expressions, or 'deposits'. These deposits constitute the cumulative tradition of the next generation, through which their faith is germinated and nourished. The mundane results of faith are the cumulative traditions, and these are the mundane causes of the personal faith for those who participate in the tradition. In a summary paragraph, Smith outlines how the dialectic would operate for an individual within a tradition.

'Each person is presented with a cumulative tradition, and grows up among other persons to whom that tradition is meaningful. From it and them, and out of the capacities of his own inner life and the circumstances of his outer life, he comes to a faith of his own. The tradition, in its tangible actualities, and his fellows, in their comparable participation, nourish his faith and give it shape. His faith, in turn, endows the concrete tradition with more than intrinsic significance, and encourages his fellows to persist in their similar involvement'.

Smith believes it is possible (and necessary, if we are to properly apprehend human religious life) to become aware of, and to understand the faith of other persons. Such an understanding can never be 'with complete assurance but with reasonable confidence', and it is the new task of comparative religious studies to address this aspect of religious faith. Such study will be indirect; 'The proper study of mankind is by
inference', treating the observable traditions as signposts to the personal faith of those involved. This is essentially an historical procedure for understanding what faith has been in actuality, rather than a philosophical analysis of what faith is. Indeed Smith asserts strongly that this is the only way to correctly understand faith, 'To see faith truly is to see it actually, not ideally'. Only in abstraction can one see faith as identical from man to man, even within the same tradition. The evidence of the empirical data of religious study makes it plain that in historical reality men's faith has differed. This analysis applies not only to the observer, but also to the participant. For the man of faith recognizes that

'We are all persons, clustered in mundane communities, no doubt, and labelled with mundane labels but, so far as transcendence is concerned, encountering it each directly, personally, if at all'.

It is not some theoretical abstraction (eg. The Christian Religion, or even the Christian Faith) which is fundamental to the man of faith, but the actual historical reality of personal faith. Thus Smith is able to assert that 'faith not only is, but ought to be, mundane'. The point of unity for men is not therefore their cumulative traditions nor the faith by which they respond, but 'the transcendent' itself. 'The traditions evolve. Men's faith varies. God endures.'

In the concluding chapter of The Meaning and End of Religion, Smith admits that he has deliberately eschewed a detailed examination of the 'nature' of faith and cumulative tradition, and hopes that it might be possible to attempt such a study in the future. But he urges his readers to reassess the conceptual framework which we have inherited. In place of 'religion' he urges us to recognize the 'amalgam of inner piety, outer institution', which he has described in terms of personal faith and cumulative tradition. He wants the word 'religion' to be dropped, in all but the sense of 'piety'; the plural 'religions' is therefore improper, and the names of the various 'religions' should likewise be dropped. He wants
to retain the adjectival form 'religious', as this is consistent with his personalist understanding. He also notes three areas in which his thesis might be tested: the discipline of the 'history of religions', inter-religious dialogue, and personal affirmation of believers. In each case the proposed conceptualizations must enable observers and participants to better comprehend human religious life.

Smith particularly commends his analysis to the Christian church, whose theology must be 'more closely attuned both to contemporary history and to the fullness and majesty of God', observing that 'the two important movements of Christian thought in the twentieth century so far, liberalism and neo-orthodoxy, have been orientated to one or the other of these, not to both'. Innovation and novelty are demonstrable facts of theology in the past, and Smith wants to provide for the emergence of 'self-consciousness' as a feature of religious history. For we are involved intimately in the formulation of the cumulative tradition, in the interpenetration of traditions, and in the theological expressions of faith. In this process Smith calls us to be 'conscious and responsible' participants. His vision of the 'new age' is clear,

'Men of different religious communities are going to have to collaborate to construct jointly and deliberately the kind of world of which men of different religious communities can jointly approve, as well as one in which they can jointly participate'.

'On the threshold of that new age', Smith writes,

'The end of religion, in the classical sense of its purpose and goal, that to which it points and may lead, is God. Contrariwise, God is the end of religion also in the sense that once he appears vividly before us, in His depth and love and unrelenting truth all else dissolves; or at least the religious paraphernalia drop back to their due and mundane place, and the concept "religion" is brought to an end.'
(iv) The Concept of Faith - Insights Gained in this Section.

This section has traced the development of the concept of faith and cumulative tradition in some of Smith's early works, and particularly in his major work *The Meaning and End of Religion*. In order to clarify his notion of faith which is beginning to emerge, the following points are summarised.

(a) The concept of faith, together with cumulative tradition, provides a more satisfying way of understanding human religious life than does a concept of 'religion'.

(b) The cumulative tradition is Smith's name for the whole range of external, observable phenomena of religious life. It is constantly changing; and since each person will have access to slightly different aspects of this historical deposit, each person may be said to have their own cumulative tradition.

(c) Faith is the inner, personal dimension of religious life which cannot be observed as such by the outsider.

(d) Faith is Smith's name for man's involvement with the transcendent, yet faith is not itself transcendent, it is the participant's present awareness of that transcendence/eternity/God.

(e) Faith and cumulative tradition are in a dialectical relationship with each other. The cumulative tradition enables, nurtures and generates faith, by which the participant gains insight, inspiration, etc. The cumulative tradition 'shapes' faith, and is the means through which the person of faith relates to the transcendent. His faith affects his observable behaviour, eg. his character, his art, his theological
statements, and these thus add to the constantly changing deposit of the cumulative tradition.

(f) Faith itself is not static, but changes from person to person, and within the same person from day to day.

(g) Although faith itself cannot be observed directly, its effects and expressions can be seen, in arts, creeds, character, etc.

(h) It is possible to understand the faith of another person by inference through a sensitive study of its effects, and by establishing what these religious expressions mean to the person concerned.

(i) Faith should be studied as it actually has been, rather than as it theoretically could be.

(j) Since the concept of faith should be acceptable as a working tool to both observer and participant, it provides a sound basis for the establishment of a self-conscious world community in which people of all religious communities may participate with respect and approval.
Section 2.2. Faith and Belief

This section outlines Smith's understanding of belief; how belief differs from his concept of faith; and how faith and belief are related. It has already been noted that Smith regards creeds and theological statements as parts of the cumulative tradition; these are 'expressions' of faith, and not to be confused with faith itself. Smith then developed this view in Belief and History and Faith and Belief, although he also tackles some of the issues in various other works.

(i) The History of Believing

Belief and History was originally delivered as a series of lectures at the University of Virginia, 1974 - 1975. Its main purpose is to subject the word 'believe' to historical investigation, and to examine its Biblical occurrence. The book begins with a consideration of the contribution of the linguistic philosophers to our understanding of religious language and meaning. It may be fairly said that Smith has little time for linguistic philosophical niceties, and here he admits to a 'lack of serious acquaintance' with current philosophical views. He nevertheless feels able to dismiss their literature as 'rather superficial, and irrelevant', arguing that it has failed to reckon with the religious and historical quality or the comparative contexts of religious statements. These particular criticisms might be to some extent valid, but his argument is not helped by his failure to understand the import of the linguistic philosophers' concerns.

He then goes on to trace 'the modern history of "believing"'. In brief, he argues that 'I believe' originally meant I hold dear, I love (cf.
beloved, give allegiance to, value highly; but it has come to mean in the twentieth century 'I hold an opinion', indeed it denotes a degree of uncertainty about that opinion.\(^{119}\) He outlines three stages in this change of meaning. First there was a shift from a personal to an impersonal object of the verb, so that, for example, it changed from describing a trusting relationship between two people, to describing a person's word as trustworthy, and further, to describing a propositional 'belief that' some statement is true.\(^{120}\) The second stage was a shift from the first person to the third person as the subject of the verb. 'I believe' gave way in large part to 'he, they believe', such that the element of personal trust gave way to the assertion that he or they hold certain opinions.\(^{121}\) The third stage was a shift in the relation between belief and truth. Whereas the verb initially implied a knowledge of what was true and a giving of the heart in commitment to that, Smith observes that the word came to imply a degree of uncertainty or hesitancy, and at last falsehood.\(^{122}\) The modern meaning of believe, Smith asserts, is to hold an opinion, regardless of whether or not that opinion is true.

In the final chapter of *Belief and History* Smith sets out to examine the Biblical use of the word 'believe'. He argues that the idea of holding an opinion about a proposition is not a notion which appears in the Bible. In other words, the concept of belief, holding various opinions about doctrinal statements, is not a Biblical concept. The key Biblical and religious category is faith. Furthermore, this key concept is normally used in an absolute sense - without any reference to an object. The Bible, he maintains, draws attention to faith itself, not to faith in this or that. Faith may indeed have an object, (eg. God, Christ, etc.) as may love; but as in the case of love, Smith sees faith as a personal quality - and insists that this is the Biblical perspective.\(^{123}\)
(ii) Faith and Belief

In Belief and History Smith had shown that believing, i.e. holding an opinion about propositions, was not a major concern for the New Testament writers; in his next book, Faith and Belief, he shows that it has not been the major concern within any religious tradition (including the Christian tradition) until modern times. He also examines the relationship between faith and belief, and outlines the intellectual dimension of faith.

He examines the relationship between faith and belief from the standpoint of each of the religious traditions in turn; Buddhist, Islamic, Hindu and Christian. The Islamic and some of the Christian material is discussed in the relevant sections below, whilst the Buddhist and Hindu material must be omitted as outside the limits of this study. These specific presentations are followed by an expanded and developed version of the material which Smith had already presented in Belief and History and which has already been outlined above. The introduction and conclusion of Faith and Belief hold together and build upon the specific presentations, and make general observations about the nature of faith and belief in global, comparative context. The introduction and conclusion are therefore considered in this and the following sections. Unfortunately this rather piecemeal treatment does not capture the grandure of this remarkable book, in which Smith's comparative and historical abilities are amply demonstrated. It is probably his most significant book to date, although the thesis of The Meaning and End of Religion is more immediately startling, and has so far received more attention in studies of his work.
The introduction of Faith and Belief begins with a basic résumé of Smith's notion of faith as a quality of human life; a quality 'that has been expressed in, has been elicited, nurtured and shaped by, the religious traditions of the world'. He is concerned with 'fides quaerens intellectum, faith in pursuit of self-understanding .... the search for conceptual clarification of man's relation to transcendence'. In this context he lists three aims for his work: to call attention to the importance of this problem, to concentrate on the relation between faith and belief as 'an interim step towards elucidating the nature of man's faith', and beyond that there is the 'aspiration .... to make a contribution towards a new planetary self-consciousness about faith'.

The rest of the introductory chapter attempts to set the faith/belief issue in global perspective with three general observations. First, religious beliefs have differed radically over history and between cultures, whereas religious faith has been considerably more constant. This is not to say 'that faith is everywhere the same .... faith is too personal for that'. But, 'the variety of faith seems on the whole less than the variety of forms through which faith has been expressed', and ' .... such variety of faith as is found cuts across formal religious boundaries'.

The historian of religion is able to report that faith as a personal quality of human living is to be found in other religious communities. 'At its best' such faith

'has taken the form of serenity and courage and loyalty and service: a quiet confidence and joy which enable one to feel at home in the universe, and to find meaning in the world and in one's own life, a meaning that is profound and ultimate, and is stable no matter what may happen to oneself at the level of immediate event. Men and women of this kind of faith face catastrophe and confusion, affluence and sorrow, unperturbed; face opportunity with conviction and drive; and face others with a cheerful charity.'
At the opposite extreme from this positive quality of faith 'stands the mean, cramping faith of blind and fanatical particularism'. Again 'the opposite of faith is this (positive) sense is nihilism, a bleak inability to find either the world around one, or one's own life, significant'.

A global perspective on faith and beliefs reveals, secondly, that the relationship between these has varied from place to place and from century to century. For example, belief has always played a more important role in the Christian church than in other faith communities, in which theological precision has sometimes been regarded with suspicion.

Thirdly, Smith reaffirms his conviction that beliefs are expressions of faith, and thus part of the tradition which serves to arouse and nourish faith in other people. But

'Beliefs have the very special quality, among faith's many expressions, of being subject to the imperious pressure to be true .... symbolically true and straightforwardly true .... By "symbolically true", we mean that life lived in terms of them should be true: true in relation to the mundane environment in which it is lived, and truly human, in the highest, final, cosmic sense'.

'The faith which any symbol expresses or elicits ought to be true faith. A belief, in addition, insofar as it is propositionally structured, is expected also to be cast in the form of true statements'.

(b) Faith as Generically Human

In the conclusion to *Faith and Belief* Smith refuses to attempt a definitive answer to the nature of faith itself, insisting that he has cleared the ground for further thinking rather than reached a final understanding of faith. He does argue, however, on the basis of his comparative and historical studies, that faith is to be seen as generically human.

'Whatever idea of faith one may form, it must be an idea adequate to
faith as a global human quality'. 135

'Standard man is man of faith; and negative secularity is a strange and sometimes fierce asceticism directed against the spirit, which it can suppress but cannot eliminate. Faith is not something extra to human life, but essential'. 136

Smith observes that in each faith community, 'A person is not a human being and then also a Jew, or also a Christian, or a Muslim. One is a human being by being one or other of them'. These are 'various ways in which man has been man'. 137

It is only a modern aberration of secularists to suggest that man is merely empirical and unrelated to transcendence. 'To think or feel that human behaviours may on occasion be inhuman, that people may be "less than human", that, unlike crocodiles, we persons may become or fail to become our true selves, is to recognize "man" as a transcendent and not merely an empirical concept'. 'Faith bespeaks involvement in transcendence'. 138 Or, to speak theologically, 'Faith .... is .... Man's responsive involvement in the activity of God's dealing with humankind'. 139

Having insisted that faith is a normal generically human quality, Smith then insists that it is not automatic. It is always unpredictable and 'ubiquitously astonishing'. 140

(c) Beliefs: a Group's Intellectual Formulation of Truth

The change in the meaning of the term 'believe' which Smith has outlined in Belief and History and Faith and Belief corresponds to a change in worldview. The major change is from a medieval Christian worldview to a modern, secular scientific rational worldview, or the replacement 'of a transcendence-orientated outlook by one increasingly impervious to anything loftier than the empirical'. 141 This 'new non-transcendence-orientated
culture', which Smith reckons to be the 'first such in human history', is accompanied by new concepts which serve and perpetuate the worldview. The present concept of believing 'is part and parcel of (this) particular historical ideology'. This and other newly re-defined concepts, such as 'knowledge' and 'truth', all tend towards a 'depersonalized and detranscendentalized' notion of reality, where knowledge of the truth is supposed to be 'objective' and 'amoral', indifferent to the life of the observer. The concept of 'belief' as holding an opinion, became a way of reducing the faith and perceptions of others to mundane terms. The church has contributed to this by its own increasingly secular stance whilst still holding on to the traditional words 'believe' and 'belief'. It also contributed by its negative attitude to the faith of other groups - interpreting such faith as 'mere' beliefs.

Smith notes, however, that certain concepts have escaped the dehumanizing and detranscendentalizing trends: symbol, myth, and especially understanding, insight, seeing the point, awareness, recognizing. All these retain an essential element of personal engagement, meaning that one not only knows the facts but also appreciates the meaning. Indeed failure to understand is an intellectual shortcoming with these concepts. When trying to grasp what another group (whether in the past or present) has understood, Smith contends that we must 'go beyond what we think that they believed' in order to gain an understanding of what they meant.

The attempt to understand our fellow men is not, in Smith's view, to sidestep the questions of truth. This matter is pursued further in section 2.3. below. But his analysis does suggest that a revision is needed in our current notions of truth and knowledge and belief, in order to re-establish their personal locus. In this context a belief should be seen as 'an intellectual formulation in the mind of some person or group .... of the
truth, insofar as that person or group has apprehended it ...". 146

In Smith's view it becomes more helpful to divide beliefs into two categories: not true and false, but those held by oneself and one's own group, and those held by other people and their groups. According to Smith we have an imperative obligation to ensure that our own beliefs and affirmations are true, and an imperative obligation to ensure that we understand the beliefs and affirmations of others. In this way we retain a responsible attitude to truth and commit ourselves to following it, without dismissing the views of others.

The understanding of belief outlined in this section raises various questions relating to the nature of truth, and these are considered in section 2.3. below.

(iii) The Concept of Faith - Summary of Insights Gained in this Section

This section has compared the concept of faith with that of belief, and examined something of the interrelation between them. The following points may be noted.

(a) Faith is quite different from the modern notion of believing, which denotes holding an opinion.

(b) Faith is a key Biblical concept, but belief is not.

(c) Faith is a personal quality, a universal human characteristic.

(d) The effects of this personal quality of faith are not limited to any one tradition, but are to be observed as living realities in all religious communities.
(e) The function of beliefs for people of faith is to give intellectual expression to the truth insofar as that person or group has apprehended it. Hence the beliefs of others are to be respected and understood.

These insights raise several questions relating to the nature of truth, and these are discussed in the following section.
Wilfred Cantwell Smith's insistence that religion should be understood in terms of faith and cumulative tradition at once raises various questions concerning the nature of truth. If beliefs and doctrinal statements are to be regarded as part of the changing cumulative tradition, is truth simply reduced to a mundane, historical, changeable idea? If personal faith is taken as central, does truth become a purely private matter of existential experience? How are we to explain the contradictory truth-claims found within the traditions? What is the importance of truth for persons of faith? These and other questions were tackled by Smith at various points, mostly before his thorough analysis of belief.

The aim of this section is to consider the nature of truth in Smith's understanding of religious life, and how this affects his understanding of faith.
The first point to be noted about Smith's concept of truth is that truth is not primarily a quality of statements or propositions, but of persons. It has already been noted that for Smith, faith is not an item in a religion but a quality in some men's hearts; he now argues that the same is also the case with truth - its locus is persons, not religions or beliefs or theological formulations.

This idea was argued or hinted at in several of Smith's works, but perhaps the clearest is his paper 'A Human View of Truth'. The paper was delivered in 1970 at a conference held in Birmingham under the chairmanship of John Hick. It is clear from the published proceedings that Smith's work received considerable attention at the conference. The concluding article by Hick is a critique of Smith's contribution, and the book ends with a 'rejoinder' from Smith himself.

In 'A Human View of Truth' Smith draws attention to the fact that although truth is normally understood in contemporary Western society in propositional terms, this has not always been the case, and some other cultures have continued to understand truth differently. He cites medieval Arabic notions of truth as an example. The Arabic root sadaqa emphasises the personal integrity of the person involved. Thus the verbal noun derived from this root, tasdīq, is not primarily about generating logical or even accurate statements, but concerns recognizing the truth and subscribing to it for oneself. The observer must incorporate it into his 'own moral integrity as a person'. It has to do with speaking or affirming the truth, and with verifying or confirming it, but even beyond this it carries the idea of taking steps to actualize the truth, to make it come true. Smith illustrates this with a passage from al-Ṭabarī, in which 'He refers
to a group of people who spoke the truth with their tongues, but did not go on to give what they had said tasdiq in their deeds.\textsuperscript{152}

The Western propositional notion of truth, then, is not universal; the medieval Arabic notion may be called personalist, as it puts the emphasis on the persons involved rather than the propositions. Although Smith is not able to demonstrate his case conclusively, he goes on to use the moral argument that it is in fact better to view truth in personal terms, and the cultural argument that the devaluation of this aspect of truth constitutes a serious cultural loss.

It should perhaps be mentioned here, also, that the medieval Muslim theologians more or less equated faith with tasdiq,\textsuperscript{153} an equation which comes very close to Smith's own understanding, as will become clear in section 2.3.(viii), below.

(ii) Religious Material can \textbf{BECOME} True for Persons

In \textit{Questions of Religious Truth} Wilfred Cantwell Smith examined several issues relating to the notion of truth. In the book's third chapter, he asks 'can religions be true or false?' The idea that a religion can be true or false is widespread, but of course in Smith's scheme such an idea could not be envisaged. He asserts that truth does not reside in religion or in religious teaching, but in persons. He then goes on to say that a religious teaching can \textbf{become} true for the person of faith as he participates in his religious tradition and makes it become true in his life.

Smith can therefore go on to recognise that his own Christianity is 'not very' true - in other words he does not live up to it at a constant level. He can also make a similar point about some Muslims, who
'have tended to affirm that Islam is the true religion; and .... (have) neglected to heed the warning that even so it requires to become true in their personal, concrete life, have lulled themselves into complacency by passively applauding its abstract truth while doing nothing about it, or by basking in the assurance that this true religion contains within itself the ideal solution to all man's problems, while those problems in fact go unsolved, partly because their personal Islam is not a living, dynamic, true faith.' 154

From this analysis of religious truth it is clear that for Smith, faith is that active response of life by which a religious tradition and its theology becomes true for the person. Truth should not be seen as an abstract concept, but must be related to the lives and faith of persons. 155

This understanding of truth may be illustrated by taking the question which Smith asks in Questions of Religious Truth, chapter two, 'Is the Qur'an the Word of God?' 156 This question is problematic, and cannot be answered by a straight yes or no, because intelligent and sincere men are to be found on both sides. Smith contends that it is not enough to hold some abstract theological notion of the Word of God. The Qur'an may become the Word of God for people as they hear God speaking through it, and as they put it into effect in their lives. As such the initial question becomes an historical rather than an abstract theological one. In this way Smith feels that Muslims and Christians can begin to approach the question in the same way.

'The historical facts that give sense to the proposition that the Qur'an is a mundane product, can no more be gainsaid by Muslims than can, by outside observers, the religious facts that give sense to the proposition that it is a divine word, a power of God unto salvation for those who believe'. 157

This does not mean that Muslims and Christians will cease to differ, but 'intellectually their understandings must converge, even if morally they choose to respond differently'. 158 So the statement, 'the Qur'an is the word of God' is not simply true or false. It can become true in the lives of individuals. 'It becomes true through faith'. 159
The Precedence of the Personal or Moral Aspect of Truth over the Abstract Logical Aspect

It was noted above that Smith employs the moral argument that his personalistic notion of truth is better than the propositional. This is because he regards moral integrity as more crucial than a conceptual clarity which lacks personal morality.160

This sort of moral reasoning is used in another of Smith's papers, originally presented to a group of theologians in Montreal in 1961, and reproduced in The Faith of Other Men.161 The basic point in this lecture is that in our relations with people of other religious traditions, the matter of truth is not solely an issue of logical propositions - it is also a moral engagement. Where a logical theological statement leads to immoral behaviour, the moral considerations should lead to a rejection of the statement, however logical it may be within its own framework. He quotes as an example the statement 'without the particular knowledge of God in Jesus Christ, men do not really know God at all'. This, he maintains, encourages arrogance, and is therefore to be rejected, irrespective of its supposed truth within a body of Christian dogma.162

Commenting on the conflict between theology and ethics, Smith admits, 'If I had to choose, I personally would choose the moral dimension of Christian faith; for I feel that of the two, it is the more truly Christian.'163

The 'Objective' Side of Truth

In view of what has been said about the primacy of personalistic truth
over propositional truth in Smith's understanding, it is perhaps necessary to redress the balance by recording that Smith does not regard the propositional element as being unimportant. He has often been accused of proposing a very individualistic idea of the 'truth for me', which might be different from the 'truth for you'. In fact he argues specifically against 'sheer gullibility'\(^{164}\) and 'mere sincerity or well-meaning intention'.\(^{165}\)

He also asserts quite specifically that his argument is not at all that one should choose personal morality rather than objective truth .... When truth is seen as personal, a man's statements must not only cohere within his .... inner life, but must also relate to objective facts in (an) exacting fashion'.\(^{166}\)

This leads on to two further observations about Smith's understanding of truth in an interfaith context. The first is Smith's concern to ensure that students of religion allow their statements about other people's faith to be verified by the people involved. This point has already been noted in section 2.1. above, and in 'A Human View of Truth' Smith advances it as a principle 'that no statement about human affairs is true that cannot be existentially appropriated by those about whom the statement is made'.\(^{167}\)

This verification principle is further elaborated in Towards a World Theology, as

'No statement involving persons is valid .... unless theoretically its validity can be verified both by the persons involved and by critical observers not involved'.\(^{168}\)

The second observation is that which was made in section 2.2. above; that beliefs should not simply be divided into those which are true and those which are false, but into those held by oneself and one's own group, and those held by others. There is an imperative obligation upon us, says Smith, to ensure that those beliefs which we ourselves hold and those which our group holds are objectively true. Our obligation towards those beliefs
held by others is that we should understand them, and we should resist the
temptation to dismiss them as false simply because they hold no meaning for
us and our group. He regards it as naive 'to theorize or to adjudicate
about truth within an established conceptual framework without regard to
its being one ideational system among others'.

It is these considerations which render obsolete the simple true/false
classifications, by which one worldview passes judgement upon another.
Smith's comparativist position is to recognize, as we have seen, that all
men have, or are capable of having, faith. As such the beliefs, concepts
and statements, however alien, with which they give expression to that
faith, must be assumed to have meaning and to convey some understanding of
reality or truth. As an example, Smith cites the belief of Copernicus that
the sun stood still at the centre of the universe whilst the earth revolved
around it, superseding the belief that the earth was fixed whilst the sun
revolved around it. Modern scientific knowledge sees 'the sun to be more
vagrant than Copernicus thought the earth to be, and no nearer than the
earth to the centre of the physical universe'.

'Copernicus's belief was the conceptualization of an insight into
reality. The insight was, and remains, valid; the conceptualization,
like all ideational activity, (including our own modern scientific
categories) was human, finite, and historical'.

The same principles must apply in our understanding of more specifically
religious beliefs.

(v) The Problem of Conflicting Truth Claims - an Invitation to Synthesis

In the conclusion to Truth and Dialogue, John Hick assesses the problem
of 'Conflicting Truth Claims' between world religions. He accepts Wilfred
Cantwell Smith’s insistence on the need for ‘the moral truthfulness of a person’s life’, as Hick prefers to call the idea of personalistic truth. He also accepts that it is not holding belief about God, even true beliefs, which constitutes faith or a relationship with God. But despite this the problem of propositional truth remains. A belief either does or does not point to a divine reality, a practice either is appropriate or is not appropriate. As Smith himself would wish to assert, Hick insists that sincerity in itself is not enough. Sincerity itself demands of the theologian a commitment to a more exact expression of propositional truth. Therefore Hick concludes that we should continue to search for a resolution of the conflicting truth claims made by the various religious groups.

'We must live amidst unfinished business; but we must trust that continuing dialogue will prove to be dialogue into truth, and that in a fuller grasp of truth our present conflicting doctrines will ultimately be transcended'.

In a rejoinder, with which the book ends, Smith explains why he dislikes the expression ‘conflicting truth claims’. First he reminds us that the great religious traditions represent total Weltanschauungen which embrace and make sense of everything, and must therefore be taken as a whole, rather than broken down into various claims. Secondly, Smith dislikes the term ‘claim’, because great religious men have born witness to the truth, not claimed it. Hence he prefers to speak of a ‘diversity of good news’ proclamation. Thirdly, he does not think it is necessary to see statements made by the various religious groups as ‘conflicting’. Statements are certainly different, and may be divergent, but there is no need in Smith’s view to speak of conflict. ‘Tschaikovsky is radically different from Bach; whether they conflict or not is a judgement’. For himself, Smith would rather see these differences in religious statements as ‘an invitation to synthesis’. Finally, he wants to preserve the insight that we are claimed by the truth rather than making truth claims.
On a number of grounds, then, Smith is reluctant to accept the idea of conflicting truth claims. Such differences as do exist are to be seen as a stimulus to working together with all men in order to gain a more true approximation to that Truth by which all people of faith have been claimed.

(vi) Faith as Recognizing the Truth and Responding to it

The conclusion to Faith and Belief ends with a section entitled 'The Intellectual Dimension of Faith', in which Smith spells out that faith involves insight and response. As a general illustration of all the points made in his conclusion he names five 'spokesmen' of faith. Without giving any references to their work, he asserts that each held different beliefs, that none considered belief to be faith, and that despite their conviction as to the importance and truth of certain matters, they did not hold their own intellectual positions to be the final criteria of human destiny. They are thus presented as supporting Smith's general thesis. For each 'spokesman', faith, intellectually 'includes two salient components: insight and response'.

Insight is the 'difference between knowing that something is true, and knowing its truth, recognizing it.' This is rather like the difference between knowing that a joke is funny (for example, by watching everybody else laughing) and seeing the joke for oneself. At the intellectual level, religious faith involves the ability to see the point of a tradition or a proposition, to move beyond the formulation to the truth which it seeks to show. In the case of the five spokesmen, they recognized a transcendent reality beyond the immediate mundane world, and they recognized that its reality far transcended their own insight or apprehension into it. 'They were unanimous in saying that anything that they might have to say about
that reality fell far short of the whole truth. Further, each of them affirmed that however partial his insight into the transcendent truth, here was something important to be shared with others in his writing. The modern student of faith must not only try to understand these men's beliefs but also to recognize what they saw and knew to be important about reality. This means an understanding of their disparate 'beliefs' in order to see what it was that they tried to share. It does not mean an abandonment of the critical faculties but 'Insofar .... as they proclaimed a truth that they saw, I put forth my best endeavour to study their reports .... in order to see whether in the reality that surrounds and informs me and my fellows and my world I can see it too.' Such a critical study will, of course, show up the errors and distortions of the image of truth both in the propositional formulations and in historical practice. But we must be quick to acknowledge that our own group has been just as guilty of limited visions of the truth and practical debasement of even the truth we have seen.

Faith is insight, it is also response: 'a dedication to living in terms of the truth, and of the good.' This, of course, involves the whole personality, private and social, but again the section concentrates on the intellectual dimension. In this sense 'faith is a saying "Yes!" to truth', "Yes!" to the truth as one has seen it, as one's group has seen it - be that through Christ, through the Qur'ān, or whatever. Faith as response, intellectually, means a loyalty to the truth as one's group has so far seen it. At the same time the five spokesmen of faith recognized that the truth was in reality greater than they had seen. 'They held that faith means loyalty to the truth as such, to reality as such, primarily and overridingly - and to the particular truth/reality that they had seen.' Each of them wrote in terms of a distinct conceptual framework which 'mediated' the truth to those who were able to 'see'. In no case was that
'mediating conceptual complex' to be confused with faith, yet neither could faith or the truth be understood without it.\textsuperscript{187}

The intellectual response, which is a dimension of faith, must involve a loyalty or continuity with faith in the past, despite the diversity of past 'beliefs'.

'Persons of faith, the history of religion makes manifest, have not "believed" any one thing. Yet it does not at all follow that ideas can be set aside, to let faith wallow innovatively in sentimental a-rationality'.\textsuperscript{188}

At the same time, Smith insists that we do not have to accept their beliefs or old worldviews. Beliefs and 'Ideas are part of this world, of its transient flux; they are human constructs .... Ideas do not capture knowledge; but if we are sensitive and fortunate, they may be instrumental to it'.\textsuperscript{189} Our loyalty must not therefore be to inherited patterns of belief, but to the truth - the truth whatever it be. In which case, Smith speculates,

'there is no reason, in the modern world, why in principle an intelligent and informed Jew or Muslim and an intelligent and informed Christian .... should have different beliefs. Yet there is also no reason why they should not continue to live in terms of differing symbols and differing coherences of symbols.'\textsuperscript{190}

Finally, to conclude this section, a paragraph from\textit{Faith and Belief} in which the intellectual dimension of faith is explained, and the relationship between faith and truth in Smith's schema is shown.

'In its intellectual dimension, faith is first of all recognition of truth, insight into reality; and its conceptualization (the "belief" that goes with it) must on the one hand be sincere, subjectively, a close approximation to what one personally apprehends (is apprehended by), and on the other hand be valid, not only in the objective sense of being a significantly close approximation to Reality, to final Truth, but in the dynamic and demanding sense (thus linking the subjective and the objective) of the closest approximation possible.'

'... Faith, let us remind ourselves, involves loving not only truth but all goodness - God - and loving one's neighbour. Even in relation to truth it means living loyally in terms of such truth as one knows, and of that truth towards which one's particular tradition and situation encourage and enable one to reach out'.\textsuperscript{191}
This section has outlined Smith's understanding of truth, and examined how this affects his concept of faith. The following points may be noted in summary.

(a) As with faith, the locus of truth is persons, not propositions or religion.

(b) By faith the religious propositions (and other material) can become true for persons.

(c) The personalistic, or moral, aspect of truth is of primary importance, but this is not to say that the person of faith should be indifferent to issues of propositional truth. Quite the contrary, persons of faith have an obligation to ensure that their own beliefs and conceptualizations are true, and that they make only statements about the faith of others which can be accepted and verified by those to whom they refer.

(d) Differing religious groups make different statements concerning the truth, and persons of faith should attempt to understand each other's statements and work towards some kind of synthesis.

(e) Faith has an intellectual dimension which involves insight and response: the recognition of truth, and loyalty to it.

(f) The truth itself always transcends our partial vision of it. Faith demands a commitment to truth itself, rather than to our limited vision of it, whilst at the same time retaining a continuity with, or loyalty to that vision which has so far been grasped.
The need for people of faith to remain loyal to their own group's vision whilst at the same time pressing on to a fuller grasp of the truth leads on to the next section: How are people of differing beliefs and traditions to relate, and to live creatively in a world community?
Wilfred Cantwell Smith's concept of faith originated as a tool for understanding religious life in a world of many different religious commitments and groupings. The aim of this brief section is to collect together some of Smith's suggestions as to how people of differing religious traditions might interrelate, and to capture something of Smith's desire for a world community.

For Smith is essentially a visionary, who wants people of faith to make an historical impact upon the world by turning 'our nascent world society into a world community'. But he is also a theologian, with a theological basis for his vision. Addressing people of all traditions, he is able to point to their unity in the transcendent reality: 'what they have in common lies not in the tradition that introduces them to transcendence, not in their faith by which they personally respond, but in that to which they respond, the transcendent itself'. Addressing theologians from his own, Christian, tradition he is able to root his vision in the revelation of God in Christ:

'if we really mean what we say when we affirm that his life, and his death on the cross, and his final triumph out of the very midst of self-sacrifice, embody the ultimate truth and power and glory of the universe - then .... there follows an imperative towards reconciliation, unity, harmony, and brotherhood. At this level, all men are included: we strive to break down barriers, to close up gulfs; we recognize all men as neighbours, as fellows, as sons of the universal father, seeking Him and finding Him, being sought by Him and being found by Him. At this level we do not become truly Christian until we have reached out towards a community that turns all mankind into one total "we".'

(i) Respect and Understanding

The need to respect those of other faith is soon evident to those who want to understand human religious life. It may have been possible from a
position of religious isolation to assume that members of other religious
groups must be insincere or unintelligent, but it is impossible to go far
in the study of other religious traditions without realizing that other
religions have participants with equal and greater devotion, integrity and
intelligence. This growing respect for other religious persons, not to
mention the moral imperative to love, demands that the attempt be made to
understand their beliefs and practices and faith.

It was noted above that Smith advocated this need to understand the
faith and the expressions of faith in others. It is not acceptable for the
person of faith to write off the beliefs and practices and symbols of
others as meaningless. These are, rather, the opportunity to try to see the
vision which they have seen, and to assess whether their vision is helpful
for one's own group.

Linked with this need for understanding is the need for verification by
those whose faith and beliefs are being examined. His verification
principle was noted above:

'no statement about human affairs is true that cannot be existentially
appropriated by those about whom the statement is made'. 195

This principle demands a considerable degree of cooperation and dialogue
between religious groups, and presupposes a mutual trust.

(ii) Pluralism - Disparate Loyalties

Mutual respect and desire for understanding imply a willingness to
accept a world community which is religiously plural. The attempt to
understand the religious beliefs and traditions of others would also be
combined with the freedom to remain loyal to one's own religious community.
This may be illustrated in the case of the question discussed above, 'Is the Qur'ān the Word of God?' Smith holds that it should be possible for Muslims and Christians to accept the same historical and religious facts, whilst continuing to be Muslims or Christians: 'intellectually their understandings must converge, even if morally they choose to respond differently'.

Smith's aim, then, is 'to be pluralist without losing an intelligent, steadfast loyalty to one's own vision'. Or, in worldwide terms, Smith hopes that we will become a 'global community' in which a 'self-conscious intelligent pluralism or relativism (is) pledged, through our several disparate loyalties to truth and our mutual respect for each other'. As was noted above, Smith sees the point of unity between mankind not in our various traditions, nor yet in our faith, but in our relation to the transcendent itself, to truth, to God. It is the willingness to accept that others have a genuine experience of that transcendence, however this might be expressed, which leads to a happy acceptance of religious pluralism.

(iii) World Theology

In Towards a World Theology Smith invites people of other religious and non-religious faith to join with him in an exercise of 'corporate critical self-consciousness'. His aim is to create, or at least to set in motion the framework in which to create, a global theology (or indeed a 'transcendentontology', if that word would help non-theists to join in the task). There may be some place for an intermediate task of Christian and other theologians generating their own interfaith theologies, but his ultimate aim is for all to engage together in this common task.
Smith urges modern intellectuals to 'attempt to give a valid vision of the world a conceptual form' so that our world community may be established in the knowledge that human life is involved in both the historical and the transcendent. In other words this task is intended to undergird the process of forming a world community, so that faith is recognized as a universal quality, which draws people of faith to a common aim, whilst rejoicing in its diversity of expression and loyalty.

In pursuit of a world theology, Smith believes that the Truth will increasingly emerge, since each group will be willing to listen to and learn from the visions of the others.

(iv) Mission

What place is left for mission in the religiously plural world which Smith envisages? Several of the religious traditions are involved with 'missionary' activities, how should they, in Smith's analysis, regard this activity? For how can they respect and try to understand the faith of others, and work together for a world theology, whilst at the same time engage in proselytizing those of other traditions?

Smith hints at an answer to this question in several of his works. In a paper entitled 'The Mission of the Church and the Future of Missions' he insists that only the insensitive could settle for either of two 'facile' solutions: 'on the one hand to call off the movement, abandoning all spiritual responsibility beyond one's own borders, or on the other hand to continue the unilateral proclamation of a uniquely saving faith, hoping to convert'. These solutions are inadequate because the first fails to acknowledge the value of this central 'impulse' of Christian and other
traditions, and the second because it fails to acknowledge the value of disparate loyalties within the world community. Indeed it is the disparate loyalties which in part demand that the missionary effort be continued, and which contribute to the realization of the truth.

But within the world community for which Smith is pleading, such missionary effort will be marked by a much greater humility and a rather different aim. In the Christian case, which is the only case he treats directly, this would involve seeing

'... God's mission in the church as one part of his mission to mankind; not as his whole mission to one part of mankind (the fallacy of indifference) nor as his sole mission to all mankind (the fallacy of arrogance).' 206

For ' "The mission with which the church is entrusted ... is a mission from God to men, not a mission from Christian men to non-christian men".' 207

Alongside this goes his plea to Christians to see 'God's mission in the Islamic venture; God's mission ... through the Hindu complex ....' 208

In a pluralist society, mission is no less a part of the religious life of its members, and in Smith's view it is an essential part of spiritual growth, for:

'Only as we learn to see God's activity in other movements and in other communities shall we learn to serve Him well in and through our own'.209

Finally, in Smith's view, men of faith have a specific mission to fulfil together. Together they must confront the world's problems and together they must forge the world community in which the historical and the transcendent dimensions of human life are valued. This demands an end to proselytizing missions, even something beyond dialogue. Smith suggests the term 'colloquy', representing the commitment of men and women of faith to face the world's problems together and to build a common world.210
This section has considered the implications of Smith's religious understanding for the life of our world community, and the contribution of people of faith to that community. The following summary points may be made concerning the concept of faith.

(a) People of faith will recognize that experiences of the transcendent are not limited to their own particular religious group. This recognition will engender a growing mutual respect.

(b) In a religiously plural society people of faith will attempt to understand the visions of others, whilst remaining loyal to their own tradition.

(c) All people of faith can engage in the movement of critical self-consciousness in order to gain greater intellectual understanding of our divergent religious life. People of faith will contribute to the formation of a world community which is conscious of both historical and transcendent involvements.

(d) Persons of faith will see their mission not as one of proselytizing members of other faith communities, but as together recalling mankind to acknowledge transcendence, and together facing the problems of the historical world.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate some of the specific studies related to Islam which Smith presents in the elucidation of his argument; to illustrate the way in which he uses his concept of faith in the treatment of Islamic material; and to examine critically his approach to Islam.

The section shows how Smith regards Islam in terms of faith and cumulative tradition. He examines the external, historical phenomena of the Islamic tradition in order to elucidate the inner dimension of faith. He argues that the inner dimension of Islam, i.e. personal faith, was fundamental to the original revelation to Muhammad, is central in the Qur'an, and has been central for most sensitive Muslims. Excessive emphasis on the structures and systematizations of Islam have been the result of external, Western influence. Smith tries to offer this inner quality of faith, and its associated notion of truth, as beneficial for Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

Smith's approach is found to be a helpful re-emphasis of the inner dimension of Muslim religious life, but it gives a rather one-sided view. His approach is highly selective, and tends to impose a rigid personalist interpretation on the material.
Section 3.1. The Meaning of Islam

The first item concerns the meaning and usage of the term islam. Several of Wilfred Cantwell Smith's early works demonstrate his understanding of this term, but this section concentrates on his fullest treatments appearing in The Meaning and End of Religion (chapter 4), and in the paper 'The historical development in Islam of the concept of Islam as an historical development'.\(^1\) This is followed by an examination of a critical article by Isma'il R al Fārūqī, 'The Essence of Religious Experience in Islam'.\(^2\)

(i) The Reification of Islam

Smith argued in The Meaning and End of Religion that the great religious traditions have undergone a process of reification, such that what used to refer to personal piety has come to be applied to ideal or empirical systems, or to religion as an aspect of human life. The case appears to be rather different in Islam, so he devotes chapter four to 'The Special Case of Islam'.

First Smith notes that the Islamic tradition has its own built-in name. Islam is used in the Qur'ān, so Muslims affirm this name has the sanction of God himself. 'This day I have perfected your religion for you, and completed my favour unto you; and have chosen for you as a religion Islam'.\(^3\) 'Verily, the religion in the eyes of God is Islam'.\(^4\) This quranic use of islam has been at the root of Muslims' recent attempts to get their own name into general Western usage, in place of the totally unacceptable names such as 'Muhammadanism'.\(^5\)

Furthermore, Muslims have from classical times been happy to use the Arabic word din (religion) to mean both 'piety' and a particular religious system. This second usage admits of a plural form adyan, so that Muslims
'can affirm that "the religion of Muhammad (is) the best of the religions of mankind". Also '.... the word in its systematic sense can be used both ideally and objectively, of own's own religion and of other people's, the true religion and false ones'. The word din has been used to denote a generalized personal religiousness, as well as a religious system. Other religions may thus be seen as 'phenomena of essentially the same kind', of which 'one may be affirmed as the best .... but it is one a kind, not something sui generis'.

The Islamic tradition seems therefore to have had since earliest times these two features which in Smith's analysis are absent from other traditions: a self-appointed (God-appointed) name and a willingness to see Islām as a system which may be compared to other religions. Yet he is able to trace a development of these self-consciously reified notions within the Islamic tradition. Smith finds himself able to discern three stages in the process: external, pre-islamic forces; internal forces; and western influence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

(a) External, Pre-Islamic Forces of Reification.

Pre-Islamic Forces - Zarathustra

Smith turns his attention first to the religious history of Persia. In particular he seeks to show the role of the religious movements surrounding Zarathustra and Mani in the developing religious consciousness of the Middle East. Unfortunately his arguments are complicated somewhat by his introduction of much material which cannot be treated here. What follows here is only an outline of the salient points of Smith's presentation.

Zarathustra (to give him his Persian name, or Zoroaster, in Greek) is generally given a prominent place in the history of religious ideas. This
is not because there are vast numbers of followers tracing their religious
d History back to him but because of the considerable Zoroastrian
influence on other living religious traditions. Persian ideas are
reckoned to have influenced the Jewish tradition during the period of the
exile in Babylon. The traditional dating of Zarathustra's death (c. 541 BC)
is just before the conquest of Babylon by the Persian king Cyrus. Ling
notes that 'by this time Zarathustra's religious teaching had exerted a
wide enough influence in Persia for the Jewish exiles to have become
"thoroughly impregnated with Zoroastrian ideas"'.

Smith lists the following ideas of Zoroastrian thought which have
contributed to our religious development: 'cosmic conflict-dualism
(rehabilitated by Marx), heaven and hell, the Devil, angelology, and in
part messianism'. He also adds some ideas which became current in the
Jewish community after its contact with the wider Middle Eastern world:
'personal immortality and salvation, a Day of Judgement, and much else'.
These ideas have been widely discussed by historians of religion and Old
Testament scholars, but Smith goes on to add 'it may be that the very
phenomenon of an organized religious community and the concept of
systematic religion should be added, as contributions related to this
tradition'.

So Smith claims Zarathustra as the initiator of the reification of
religion. The suggestion is an unexpected one, for Zarathustra himself is
known to have opposed institutional religion. John Hinnells writes,
'Perhaps the characteristic feature of Zoroaster's teaching is his emphasis
on personal religion'. A more obvious proposal might have been to think
of Zarathustra opposing the reifying tendencies that were already at work
in the religious life of the Persians. Smith admits that 'the development
was certainly neither immediate nor precise'; he nowhere spells out
exactly what he means by his proposal, nor offers any direct evidence; but our purpose here is not to assess his treatment of Zarathustra.

Next Smith switches to the rise of the Christian church in the Mediterranean world. The church demonstrated an 'either/or emphasis' and embodied a 'new conception of a religious community'. These phenomena are traced historically to

'ideas current in the Jewish community and its environment after its members had become participants in the wider flux of the then Middle Eastern world. These included .... a way of looking at the world that sees mankind as divided (metaphorically) into two great opposing groups. The sheep and the goats, the saved and the damned, a voluntary membership organization (to which one either does or does not belong) - these are fundamental ideas. In their historical emergence Persian conflict-dualism as a cosmic postulate had played a part'.

Smith's claim is this that our reified notion of religion as denoting religious communities and systematic entities arose in the Zoroastrian religious life of Persia, became part of Hebrew religious thought at the time of the exile, and so entered the Christian church. In the West, the church finally triumphed over indigenous religious traditions and 'over other comparable new systematized intrusions from Persia such as the cult of Mithra'. In the Middle East, and further East, the church did not triumph over existing religious communities and there emerged 'a pluralism of "religions"'.

Pre-Islamic Forces - Mani.

The next stage in Smith's argument on the pre-Islamic process of reification concerns Mani. Mani set about specifically to create a religion, self-consciously to generate a systematized religious community and body of beliefs. Smith argues that Mani had found well established concepts of scripture, prophethood, religious community, etc., in the traditions of the Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians and Buddhists with whom he
had contact in the cosmopolitan world of the Sassanian empire. With these forms in mind, Mani gave new content to these established forms. Mani claimed to supersede Zarathustra, the Buddha and Jesus, but unlike these leaders whose message preceded and gave rise to forms of organization and doctrine, Mani reversed this process. He sought to provide a better religion.

Smith admits that the precise role played by Mani is not known, but:

'It is in the conceptualization of the generic entity of religious system - that there exists a series of these, each one of which is of an abstractly comparable kind - that I see the role of Mani as significant, as either an original or an illustrative thinker and actor'. 23

Further, although the exact historical location of this development is not known, 'there is some evidence that Mani's systematizations contributed to the crystallizing of other traditions'. 24 Again,

'The emergence of a Manichee community .... may be seen as a stimulating factor in, or just a symptom of, a wider tendency. In any case, the fact is that the centuries from the second to the sixth or seventh in the Aramaic- and Persian-speaking world are a time of increasing systematization, crystallization, and definition of what previously had been a more chaotic welter of unorganized movements and what gradually became a situation of self-conscious religious plurality'. 25

Before relating this development to the emergence of Islām, Smith focuses upon the linguistic 'vehicle' by which this reified concept of religion was expressed throughout the Middle East.

Pre-Islamic Forces - Linguistic Developments.

The term by which this conceptualization was expressed throughout the Middle East was dēn, and its equivalents in the other languages. Smith notes that this term has never been the subject of sustained research. 26 He discusses the etymologies and usages of various terms current at that time. 27 In each case Smith holds that a word was already in existence, and
that the new, reified usage, brought about by Mani, began to permeate the region. In Arabic, for example, there were two early uses of ُdinُ: the verbal noun from an ancient Semitic root, meaning 'judgement, verdict', as found in the expression ُyawm al-َُdin، day of judgement; and the indigenous Arabic meaning 'conformity, propriety, obedience, and also usages, customs, standard behaviour'. To these existing usages, the new concept of systematized religion was added.

This part of Smith's argument may be summarized thus: there arose in Persia, associated with the views and character of Zarathustra, a new element in the religious thought of the world, namely that of a dualism in which people could be divided into groups as the saved and the unsaved. This 'either/or' notion was incorporated into the Hebrew tradition at the time of the exile, and so taken into the Christian tradition. In the movement surrounding Mani, this was taken a stage further - religion was seen not so much as a personal quality of human life but rather as a system which an individual could either have or not have. Religion became for Mani a reified system and a reified religious community. This new notion entered the thought-forms of the Middle Eastern world through the new usage of the already common word ُdinُ and its equivalents. This linguistic development may be seen as a parallel to the western usage of the term religio.

Influence of Pre-Islamic Forces on the Emergence of Islām.

Having established these developments in man's religious understanding, Smith returns to his treatment of Islām, which emerged soon after these developments had taken place. He outlines the ways in which these developments affected the proclamation and reception of Islām in its earliest days.

Smith carefully writes that there is no need to assert that Muhammad was
influenced consciously or unconsciously by these notions of religion when he gave his teaching. This view would be energetically denied by Muslims. Yet he proffers a more subtle suggestion that

'some Middle Easterners in the early days of the Muslim community, when they heard the Qur'an or thought about Islam, were influenced .... by such pre-Islamic pressures.'

This would seem to suggest that the quranic message was received and understood by some Muslims in a way which was not in accord with the original message. 'The true meaning of a given passage may be transcendentally given, but the actual meaning to particular persons has been historically conditioned, and may be historically elucidated. The historian may help the theologian, perhaps .... to understand why men have misunderstood'.

In this part of his argument Smith seems to be saying that whilst a systematized understanding of religion in general and Islam in particular is a possible interpretation of the quranic message, this understanding might be a mistaken one, and at the time of the original revelation historical circumstances were ripe for such an interpretation to be placed upon it.

If this is right, it is a far-reaching claim. For as he notes, 'it is sound Islamic doctrine that the Jewish, Christian and Islamic as historical systems are variations on a single theme'. The suggestion that this sound Islamic doctrine might be based upon a misunderstanding of the quranic material ill befits a scholar committed to a view that 'no statement about a religion is valid unless it can be acknowledged by that religion's believers'. This is made worse when Smith goes on, 'Muhammad to some seems self-consciously and deliberately to have set about establishing a religious system. .... Jesus .... could not have conceptualized "Christianity". Muhammad, on the other hand, seems to some observers and to
some Muslims to have known what he was about when he talked of Islam'. Is Smith suggesting that Muhammad was responsible for perpetrating a mistaken interpretation of Islam and the Qur'an? Would it not be more in line with his stance to accept that the reified notion of Islam is part of authentic Muhammadan and contemporary Islam?

Smith is on firmer ground when he notes that self-conscious Christian and Jewish communities in seventh century Arabia had reified notions of religion. These communities and their ideas were 'facts .... in the light of which the Islamic message was preached and was received'. He now argues that the reificationist conceptualizing of Islam was given added momentum by the fact that Muhammad saw himself as a reformer of these outside traditions. Smith had already shown that the practice of naming a religion and conceptualizing it as an entity was primarily the work of outsiders to the religious traditions involved. Now he observes

'... that the Islamic seems to be the only religious movement in the (present day) world that arose historically not primarily out of a reform of the indigenous religious tradition of the people to whom it was presented. It arose rather among, and was preached to .... a people for whom it was the reform of outsiders' religious traditions'.

In view of this, those non-Christian and non-Jewish Arabs who received the message saw as outsiders all that needed to be changed in the religious systems of the Jews and the Christians, and saw their own new faith as a rival, perfected version of the same kind of conceptual form.

The question in hand, it will be remembered, is 'why does Islam appear to have this reified notion of itself as a "religion", where this process of reification can be seen to be a late development in the other great religious traditions?' So far Smith's consideration of the external factors
have been described. Before moving on to the internal and modern forces, it may be helpful to quote Smith's own summary of this part of his argument:

'...of all the major religious communities of the world today the Islamic is the only one that has come into historical existence this side chronologically of that period in human history when schematized religious systems had evolved, and in that part of the world where the process of systematizing them was developing. Secondly, we have seen that the practice of naming a religion and conceptualizing it systematically is appropriate primarily for outsiders, for those for whom it is not a medium of faith; and the Islamic is the only religious movement in the world that was launched by a reformer and accepted by a people standing outside the tradition (in this case the two traditions) being reformed'. 39

(b) The Internal Forces Towards Reification.

Smith turns next to consider those internal forces which have been at work within the Islamic tradition 'by which Muslims themselves have tended over the centuries to reify their own concept of their faith'. 40

Although the reified images of islām and religion are possible interpretations of the quranic and Muhammadan teaching, Smith maintains that there are and have been other interpretations, which the historian of religion must report. He holds that the non-reified image/understanding of islām has several advantages. First it is more in keeping with 'traditional usage in the Arabic language' and especially peninsular Arabic. Further it was held by 'persons more sensitively religious', those 'less superficial in their response', and 'less liable to an outsider's mundane view'; those 'more perceptive of transcendent overtones', and those who were 'leaders' in those early days. 42

In my opinion Smith is here seeking primarily to suggest his thesis and persuade his readers, rather than to convince with conclusive evidence. This is one of the few sections in The Meaning and End of Religion where
one would have liked more detailed substantiating notes. For whilst he discusses the meaning of islām, he gives no comparison between the work of 'more sensitively religious' persons and that of the less sensitive. (Although presumably the reference to Taftāzānī is intended as an example of one more sensitively religious writer) Indeed it is difficult to know how one would be able to classify early members of the Muslim community without begging the question.

Looking to the Qurʾān, Smith notes that it 'is concerned, and presents God as being concerned, with something that people do, and with the persons who do it, rather than with an abstract entity'. 43 This statement is backed up to start with by some basic data on the frequency of various words in the Qurʾān.

The word islām is the verbal noun (or gerund, maṣdar) of the verb aslama, which is itself the IVth derived form of the verb salima. The word īmān is the verbal noun from the verb āmana, IVth form of the verb āmuna. Aslama occurs in the Qurʾān in all its forms 72 times, of which the 'direct active personal' verbal use accounts for 22 times; the 'personalist adjective or noun' (muslim) occurs 42 times; and the 'gerundial, generic' usage (islām) occurs 8 times. Āmana occurs in all forms 812 times, of which the verbal use accounts for 537, the personalist adjective or noun (muʾmin) 230, and the gerundial, generic form (īmān) 45. 44 From this statistical material, Smith notes that the active, operational uses of these words greatly predominate; and that the word islām itself is infrequent.

Smith further contends the personalist interests of the Qurʾān by examining the meaning of the word īmān. He maintains that the word is most accurately to be translated by 'faith' rather than 'belief', as īmān has to do with 'the richness and warmth and the engagement of "faith"'. 45 The engagement and commitment of faith is to be contrasted in the Qurʾān with
the rejection by the kāfir of all that he really knows is true. Kafara, the root from which kāfir is derived, 'means not to disbelieve, but rather to reject: it too is active, engage'. The Qur'an is interested in the dynamic relationship of man with his creator, and its terms stress the actions and decisions of men's response, not the 'institution' or 'social system' in which that relation is lived. Smith insists that this understanding of īmān is that of the classical theologians, and refers to the fourteenth century Taftāzānī in support.

The position is similar with the quranic use of the word islām. In some cases the personal quality is 'inescapable' as in Sūrah 9.74, wa-kafarū ba' da islāmihim, which Smith translates 'they refused, after they had accepted'; also in Sūrah 49.17, islāmakum 'your islām, your personal commitment to heed God's voice'. Even those 'classical verses which in modern times have been used as proof texts for reification' need not be interpreted as defining islām in systematic or impersonal terms. Sūrah 3.19, Inna-l-dīnā cinda-llahi-l-islāmu in modern times translated 'Verily the religion in the eyes of God is Islām', was in Smith's view originally taken to mean 'the proper way to worship Him is to obey Him - or, simply, true religion .... is obeisance'. This interpretation is supported by a reference to al Ṭabarī's commentary. 'Vivid and dynamic - and personal: these are the qualities of the term islām in the Qur'ān. What was proclaimed was a challenge, not a religion'.

It is Smith's contention that this personalist use and meaning of islām, which he sees as characteristic of the Qur'ān, is typical of 'the preponderating majority, at least among leaders in the early Muslim community, and has been the interpretation held 'by many, if not most, of the leaders of Muslim religious thought in the early centuries'. But, as he has already argued happened in the West, he maintained that 'over the
centuries' there has been 'a very gradual closing in of the reificationist view'. Unfortunately Smith does not document this gradual change here, but does refer to the study to be examined below in which the relative frequencies of the Arabic words for 'faith' and 'islām' are compared in the titles of Arabic books over the centuries. He claims that this gives an 'index' for the process he describes, in which the change is to be observed first in the case of secular writers, and increasingly in 'more religious writers'. Despite the tendency over the centuries, it is not until the end of the nineteenth century that this process is visible in most religious writers.

This concludes the account of the second, internal process by which Smith holds that the Islamic tradition has undergone the same reificationist development which also characterizes the other great religious traditions.

(c) Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Western Pressures Towards Reification.

The third process by which Islām has come to be seen as the most reified of the religious traditions, is the response to massive western pressures since the latter part of the nineteenth century. In Smith's view apologetics is the major contributing factor to the reificationist trend since the nineteenth century. When this apologetic use was added to 'the internal secular tendencies towards institutionalizing' it seems to have become an 'irresistable' combination. Again Smith does not document this process, but refers again to the paper to be discussed in section (ii) below. Nor does he consider the question as to why precisely modern apologists have changed their usage while earlier apologists presumably found it unnecessary to do so.

The extent of the reificationist understanding of Islām is demonstrated
by the modern use of the term nizām, meaning system. This word is now used commonly to describe Islām as a religious system. But Smith has found no example of its use in this sense before the modern period. It now denotes a total, idealistic, systematized Islamic entity.

(d) The Meaning of Islām.

From the historical treatment of the use of the term islām, Smith highlights three distinct uses. First there is the personalist, existentialist use, denoting a man's personal submission and commitment to God. This correlates closely to Smith's own term 'faith', and in his opinion represents the earliest and central core. Secondly, there is the empirical actuality of islām, as the Islamic community has in history actually been. This is a use taken over from the other religious communities of the Middle East and the Arabian peninsular at the time of the revelation and preaching of Islām. It has gained currency, according to Smith, especially amongst the more secular elements of the community. Thirdly, islām has been used to denote an entity, a religious system which may be compared on the same level with other 'religions'. This use has gained in frequency by influence from the West, and in pursuit of apologetic aims.

'The Special Case of Islam', which is the fourth chapter of The Meaning and End of Religion, does not represent a fully conclusive argument. Despite the considerable notes and references, there are several points at which documentation, or substantiation, is lacking. The following section examines some of the material which Smith offers as evidence for his thesis that a reified notion of Islām is a late development.
The Concept of Islām as an Historical Development.

In 1958 Wilfred Cantwell Smith delivered a paper at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, entitled 'The Historical Development in Islām of the Concept of Islām as an Historical Development'. In it he compared the frequency of the occurrence of the words īmān and islām in Arabic booktitles over the centuries. The paper was originally published without the list of titles concerned. It has since been reproduced with the list of titles in On Understanding Islam.

In his introduction to the reprint, Smith writes that this paper proved very significant for the development of his own thinking, and that some of its points helped him to come to the thesis he finally presented in The Meaning and End of Religion. Already in 1958 Smith had seen that there were three levels on which people spoke of religion: the personal, existential level; the objectified systematic level; and the objectified institutional level. In this paper he tried to examine what various people at various times have thought Islām to mean and how they have used it. He therefore undertook a study of the uses of the terms īmān and islām in Arabic book titles, attempting to find some pattern. Since this is the only work quoted in The Meaning and End of Religion to show the historical progression towards reified notions of Islām, it is worth examining this paper and his methodology in some detail.

The substance of Smith's data is three lists of Arabic booktitles in which the term islām occurs. The first list (List A) comprises all such books published before 1300 AH, as cited in Brockelmann's Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur. The second list (List B) comprises books more recent than 1300 AH. This list contains all items found in Brockelmann, plus extra works contained in the two libraries in which Smith did most of his research, and in his own collection. The third list (List C) is a further
four books which were brought to his attention after the study was completed, and these are offered as illustrative of his thesis. The first two lists are then analysed according to the meaning of the term *islām* in the title.

List A consists of 84 entries, out of a total of fifteen to twenty thousand entries listed by Brockelmann for the period up to 1300 AH. Smith analyses these entries according to the sense in which the term *islām* seems to have been used in the title:

(a) There are nine titles where Smith is certain from the context that the personalist sense of *islām* is implied.

(b) There are 14 in which the expression *al-Imān wa-al-islām* (or vice versa) occurs; these begin to appear from about the 8th/14th century. Here Smith admits that either the personalist or the systematized meaning could be implied, but ultimately feels that these belong to the group which correlates *islām* with personal faith.

(c) A further group of 37 titles include the expressions: *sharā'i* al-islām, *qawā'id al-islām*, *arkan al-islām*, *qawāti* al-islām, etc. This group occurs from the 3rd/9th century. Although Smith admits that he has not been able to check the use each author made of the term *islām*, and that the evidence is ambiguous, he himself finds it most persuasive to regard these as indicative of the personalist interpretation in many instances. This suggests to him that a transition is apparent, that *islām* might have been used personalistically by their authors, and that the ambiguity of these titles might in itself have contributed to the systematizing trend.

(d) In the remaining titles, Smith considers that *islām* is used in non-personalistic senses. Two were written by non-Muslims (including the earliest book on the list). One (or possibly three) represents an idealized system of *islām*. In ten cases, beginning in the 6th/12th
century, *islām* implies the community, the mundane historical actuality. The 'secularizing tendency'\(^60\) reaches its climax in a group of six works dating from the 8th/14th century. Four titles receive no comment.

List B comprises 81 titles of books dating from after 1300 AH. Only 51 are taken from Brockelmann, who lists some five to ten thousand titles for the period. In his analysis of this list, Smith does not give a full account of many of the titles, but the picture is in fact much clearer. The following points are worthy of note:

(a) Only eight titles continue the personalist or 'Medieval' use of *islām*. One of these is in a subtitle, not the title itself. This personalist use persists in a few cases right up into the 14th/20th century.

(b) All the remaining titles seem to use *islām* in its mundane sense. They refer occasionally to the principles of systematized *islām*; and there is a rise in the use of *islām* referring to Islamic civilization.

Smith notes a large proportion of translations of Western authors, works by non-muslim Arabs, and apologetic-type replies to the West. This Western influence is clearly visible.

Smith concludes his study:

'To sum up, then, one may say that to an outsider it would seem that there has been a tendency over the centuries and especially in modern times for the connotation of the word 'Islām' gradually to lose its relationship with God, first by shifting from a personal piety to an ideal religious system, a transcendent pattern, then to an external, mundane religious system, and finally by shifting still further from that religious system to the civilization that was its historical expression.' \(^61\)

There are several comments and criticisms which may be made concerning the methodology and conclusions of this paper. First, there are the several problems which Smith himself mentions: i) the entries were unchecked to the
original titles, and the interpretations of the titles unchecked to the content of the books. ii) There are certain omissions from Brockelmann. iii) Titles are subject to a certain amount of stylization. iv) There is uncertainty about the origin of the titles in some cases, the possibility being that they were later additions in response to fashion or style.

Secondly, anyone who has tried to predict the content of a book from its title will be aware of the problems involved. Smith's designation of the group containing al-īmān wa-al-īslām (and vice versa) as personalistic is purely speculative. Furthermore, the juxtaposition of the two terms may as easily serve to highlight the divergence of the two words rather than their convergence.

Thirdly, if this group is included with those uses of īslām which Smith designates as ambiguous, we find in List A that:

9 are definitely personalistic,
51 are ambiguous,
3 are idealistic/possibly idealistic,
2 are by non-muslims,
10 refer to the mundane community.

These results can hardly be dubbed conclusive, and when it is remembered that they represent only a tiny proportion of Brockelmann's entries, (9 occurrences of a personalistic use of īslām in 15 - 20,000 titles! ) it is difficult to ascribe them any statistical validity at all.

Fourthly, to designate ambiguous entries as illustrative of a 'transition' is purely to read the theory into the data.

Although Smith admits elsewhere that the process of reification in the use of īslām was by no means a neat development, I submit fifthly that, given the enormous overlap of the dates for all the groups identified by
Smith in List A, the personalistic, the systematized and the mundane usages have all been in currency throughout the period in question. To claim more than this is to go further than the evidence permits.

Sixthly, Smith is on much firmer ground in his conclusions to the data of List B. Despite his rather less thorough treatment of this list, it is clear that there is a considerable shift in use in the modern period, with evidence of Western influence upon that shift.

Finally Smith uses this study in *The Meaning and End of Religion* to support his argument for a development in the reified use of *islām*. In addition to the restatement of his conclusion, he also produces a graph comparing the frequencies of *islām* and *īmān* in the Qurʾān, in the titles of List A (ie. pre-1300 AH), and in List B (ie. post-1300 AH). The results were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><em>īmān</em></th>
<th><em>islām</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qurʾān:</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List A (pre-1300):</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List B (post-1300):</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Smith offered this graph as an 'index' to the process of reification; arguing that Islam as a system and as a mundane phenomenon has been increasingly more prevalent than the personalistic term *īmān*. Al Fārūqī rightly describes this statistical method 'frivolous and misleading'. It takes no account of the infrequency with which the classical writers used these terms in their titles. It is also questionable to compare the content of the Qurʾān with the titles of other works, whereas a comparison of the content of these books with the quranic material might prove instructive.

To conclude, I agree with Smith that this data is 'unquestionably imperfect' and 'highly restricted'; that his method is incomplete, for he has still 'to read the book(s) with imaginative care' in order 'to determine the meaning that the word had for the author in each instance';
that his conclusions are most definitely 'unpersuasive' such that we certainly await 'more meticulous and thorough research' in this field if we are to make any reliable progress. There may be a certain interest in discovering the way in which a scholar reaches his conclusions, but it is strange that Smith should republish such an unpolished piece, especially as he found it necessary to write just a few years previously:

'...that only those things should appear in print that their authors regard as thought through and polished, and with which they are fully satisfied as a final position that will probably stand up well and long to criticism.'

(iii) Al Fārūqī's critique of Smith's interpretation of Islām

Al Fārūqī's article 'The Essence of Religious Experience in Islam' begins with the assumption that Islām has an essence. To his knowledge, no Muslim or Orientalist has ever denied or questioned this before Wilfred Cantwell Smith. He therefore launches into a stinging attack on Smith's argument from The Meaning and End of Religion, chapter four. Al Fārūqī is not entirely fair in all of his criticisms, and has at one point misrepresented Smith's argument. He is also quick to complain that the treatment of Islām in The Meaning and End of Religion does not accord with Smith's own condemnation of 'all interpretation of Islam made under alien categories.' In short he holds that Smith questions fourteen centuries of Muslim quranic scholarship in order to reach his conclusion that Islām as a system with an essence is only a modern phenomenon.

Al Fārūqī questions each of the three processes of reification in turn. To the first: that Persian, Christian and Jewish religion was already reified, al Fārūqī claims that this proves nothing - had God not done his homework? Was it not obvious that the increase in conceptual precision implied by reification would be taken advantage of by any subsequent
religious movement? Smith nowhere proves the negative implications of this process, but negative he always assumes them to be. He nowhere establishes 'the necessary incompatibility of reification with religiousity'. As for the Greek influences on Islām, al Fārūqī dismisses these as too late to be relevant. The third process of reification as a result of apologetics with the Western world in modern times is similarly dismissed on the basis that the results so obtained are qurānic.

Al Fārūqī reserves some of his strongest remarks for Smith's treatment of the Qur'ān. 'Not only does he tell Muslims what Qur'ānic meanings are but he takes the fanciest issues with their linguistic and exegetical scholars and makes some quite unusual pretensions'. Al Fārūqī comments first on Smith's translations of some key passages. Whilst Smith translates Sūrah 3.85 (Wa man yabtaghi ghayr al-islāmi dīnān fālān yuqbalā minhu) 'If anyone opts for anything other than self-surrender as a norm, it shall not be accepted from him', al Fārūqī insists that this is only one side of the meaning of this verse which he himself translates 'Whoever seeks a religion other than Islam, it will not be accepted of him'. Smith does not actually claim that his is the only possible interpretation, but he does claim to represent 'many, if not most, of the leaders of Muslim religious thought in the early centuries'. Al Fārūqī insists that no Muslim would dispute Smith's interpretation, but would wish to add that this is not all the verse means: "That "Islam" means submission and personal piety does not preclude it from meaning a religious system of ideas and imperatives'. Both reified and the personalistic meanings have been common to Muslims across the centuries. Al Fārūqī also criticises Smith's citation of al Ṭabarî in support of his one-sided interpretation, for although al Ṭabarî does indeed define islām as al-inqiyād bi-al-tadhallul wa-al-khushū',(submission to My command and self-determination to obedience to Me) he adds immediately the words 'in
accordance with its obligations, prohibitions and notable recommendations prescribed by Me for your benefit, thus combining the reified and personalist interpretations into a single definition.

Further Smith sees the translation 'This day I have perfected your religion for you, and completed my favour unto you; and have chosen for you as a religion Islam' as a 'modern' interpretation, meaning that this Surah was revealed to Muḥammad at the end of his life and closed the 'exposition of Islam as a now completed system'. Smith claims that al Ṭabarī is silent on this particular interpretation, but al Fārūqī quotes al Ṭabarī's knowledge of the position in the life of the Prophet at which this Surah was revealed. He also cites the works of several other early writers which confirm this dating of the Surah as the concluding revelation to Muḥammad.

The final example given by al Fārūqī is that of Ibn Ishaq (d. 151 AH/768 AC) author of the 'earliest biography of the Prophet'. This biographer uses the term islām in both the personalist and the reified senses. 'In one passage he calls the Ansār of Madīnah "the battalion of Islam".'

Having dismissed Smith's objections, al Fārūqī goes on in the second part of his article to examine what exactly is at the heart of religious experience in Islām: the character of God, and submission to his revealed will. This understanding is also that of Jane I. Smith, who sees from the earliest commentators an emphasis on the content implicit in islām as well as the personal response to it. As A. Yusuf Ali comments on Surah 3.85 'In essence it amounts to a consciousness of the Will and Plan of God and a joyful submission to that Will and Plan'.

Al Fārūqī, in my opinion, occasionally exaggerates his case a little, but he nevertheless poses some important objections to Smith's treatment of
the Islamic religious material: the central contention being that personalist and reified understandings of islām are both quranic, and both have been present throughout the Muslim centuries. Al Fārūqī admits a certain increase in the reified or systematized uses of the term islām, but denies any significance to the development, since the results are equally quranic.
Section 3.2. The Shahādah

In this section we examine the fourth chapter of Smith's book *The Faith of Other Men*, entitled 'Muslims'. The first part of this book (chapters 1-7) was originally presented as a series of radio broadcasts in Canada in 1962. Smith adopts a delightful style, addressing his material to a non-specialist audience. In this more popular form Smith illustrates the theoretical principles argued in more detail in *The Meaning and End of Religion*. It contains a clear and simple example of his understanding of faith in its Muslim occurrence, and therefore demands attention here.

The book's introduction makes it clear that Smith does not intend to mass together a huge volume of information about 'the various religious systems', but rather to assist his readers and listeners to come to understand the faith of other men themselves. His method in each case is to focus attention in a single item which will serve to represent in a small way the faith of each community, so that we begin to understand the meaning which these items have for participants themselves. This understanding is important because it helps us to see and feel the world as it appears and feels to those of other faith. This level of treatment in 'comparative religion', the level 'of men's faith' is to be distinguished from the 'sheer presentation of facts', to which Smith does not intend to add.

There is also a third level in comparative religious studies, according to Smith, that of generalizations about religious life in the light of the specific studies of each religious tradition. This third level is considered in the concluding chapter of *The Faith of Other Men*, but throughout the book his 'attempt to understand the fact of faith itself' is evident.

Chapter four examines the Muslim confession of faith, the shahādah, as a
symbol of the faith of Muslims. Smith uses this confession to try to understand the meaning of its words to the man who utters them, and also to try to capture the compelling call to commitment which the Muslim feels.

'There is no god but God, and Muhammad is God's apostle', La ilaha illa-llah wa Muhammadun rasulu-llah. This is the compact affirmation, which to recite intentionally is to become a Muslim. There are certain features of this formula which Smith notes as 'intrinsically interesting in itself' before he focuses on the meaning of the formula. It is very short and tidy, in the Arabic language it bears an insistent force. It is also the subject of many great calligraphic efforts. The formula is in constant use within the life of the Muslim: at birth, at death, in the five-times daily call to prayer, the adhān, in the rhythmic repetitions or incantations of the Sufi orders, and even, Smith reports, in the workaday life of a Himalayan road-making gang. Next he observes some basic differences between Muslim faith and symbolism and those of Hindus, Christians and Jews. The Hindu temple is ornate and complex like the truth it testifies, whilst both architecture and philosophy in the Islamic tradition maintain a simplicity and order in which incongruity or basic conflict of doctrine can have no place. Unlike the symbolism of the cross for Christians, the shahadah is a verbal symbol. This difference is also seen in revelation - Christians pointing first to a person, Muslims to the verbal revelation of God to the Prophet. The Christian creed tends to be regarded more as an affirmation of belief, as in intellectual assent, whereas this Muslim 'creed' (not so called by Muslims themselves) constitutes more a bearing witness to those truths which are taken for granted as self-evident. Furthermore, as in the Jewish case, where the word of God is seen primarily as an imperative, the shahadah itself becomes a command to worship the one true God.
Smith now turns in the remaining six pages of the chapter to the question which he sees as primary - what does the shahādah mean to the Muslim? The first affirmation, there is no god but God, means in its most obvious sense 'a rejection of polytheism and idolatry', originally expressed in the smashing of the idols in Muslim conquests, and embodied in its doctrines of monotheism and the transcendence of the one true God. At a more subtle level the affirmation has also implied 'a rejection of human tyranny'. For 'to impose a purely human yoke on man's neck is an infringement not only of human dignity but of cosmic order, and to submit to it would be sin'. This has sometimes, especially in times of decline, led to a kind of 'fatalism'; but in Smith's opinion 'it is legitimate and proper, in interpreting other men's faith as in one's own, to try to see it at its best and highest'. There is a 'third level of meaning', found especially amongst the mystics, where to turn from idolatry is to turn not just from the physical statue, but also from 'false values - the false gods of the heart. To pursue merely earthly goals, to value them, to give them one's allegiance and in a sense to worship them ... says the sensitive Muslim conscience, like the sensitive Christian or Jewish one, is to infringe the principle of monotheism. Nothing is to stand in the place of God in the hearts of men, and we are to rely on none but Him. Finally there is an interpretation of this phrase which, although not particularly common, Smith includes because it speaks particularly to him. This is the view of the mystics that a 'process, a movement in faith' is implied by the first part of the shahādah. One cannot arrive at true faith in 'God' without first knowing the depths of 'no god' in the darkness of unbelief.

The second proposition of the shahādah, Muhammad is the apostle of God, is also to affirm something about the character and activity of God. It presupposes, first, 'that God has something to say to mankind' and chooses to communicate through a man of his choice. It further affirms that
God has communicated his own moral law to mankind, of his own initiative. 'Man's business in the religious life is not a quest but a response'.

Thus God has revealed through the Prophet how his people are to live, and from this the 'theoreticians and systematizers have extracted and constructed a law, finally elaborated in all detail and ultimately turned into a static system'. Finally the statement concerns Muḥammad's function, not his status. He fulfils a place comparable to that of the Christian apostles rather than to that of Christ or the New Testament.

The chapter we have been considering from The Faith of Other Men is typical of Wilfred Cantwell Smith's approach to Islam, and of his treatment of the Islamic material. He is concerned not just to state the data but especially to identify the meaning which is attached to it. That meaning concerns not only the place of the item in the Islamic schema, but also, and especially, the meaning of the shahādah to individual Muslims. He emphasises not only the theoretical function of the item in the textbook, but also the imperative or the challenge which it presents to the individual. He aims to eschew a purely detached or even agnostic approach in preference for an understanding of the commitment or engage faith which it calls forth and affirms in the men who recite the shahādah. Indeed he is most satisfied when he can treat Muslim faith as it speaks to him. His preoccupation with the personal and living faith of the individual Muslims is shown not so much by a full statement of the exact character of that faith, which in fact Smith has never attempted, but rather by continued references within the chapter to the devotion or surrender implied by the religious symbol in question. For example, in describing the neat rows of people bowing together at prayer, he comments on their purpose, 'as a token of their personal and corporate submission to the will of God'. In his travelogue report of the road-menders in the Himalayas, he draws attention to 'a kind of living in which a split into religious and secular has not
yet come ..., to segment life', whereas in the towns the mu'adhdhin has to 'summons the faithful to turn for a moment from their routine affairs to the life of the spirit'.

In trying to understand Islam he wants to distinguish between Western and Islamic uses, such as of the term 'creed' to describe the shahādah, in order to lead his readers to a more accurate insight into the Muslim's own self-understanding. He also wants to keep his readers from a superficial expectation that the religious faith of all men will be expressed in forms or patterns similar to our own. Throughout his presentation Smith takes many such opportunities to remind his readers that the object of studying this material is to give greater insight into the faith of Muslims.

There are two comments which may be made at this stage concerning Smith's approach to Islam as illustrated by this book. First, although this little book addresses a non-specialist audience, and must therefore make a very basic presentation, in many respects it differs only slightly from the treatment which might be expected from some phenomenologists of religion. Considerable space is, despite the comments in his introduction, devoted to the 'sheer presentation of facts', suitably handled to retain the interest of the radio audience. He is concerned with the functions of the shahādah, comparisons with other religious traditions, and general religious observations. Even Smith cannot help but become involved with what is 'intrinsically interesting in (the symbol) itself' quite irrespective of its religious meaning. Such a distraction, it seems to me, is both inevitable and desirable if we are to come to a sound understanding of the Islamic tradition, and Smith is wrong to criticise those whose interest in these intrinsic characteristics keeps them from a treatment of symbolic meaning. Such studies have a valid place in the study of religion.
Secondly, despite his desire to present an introduction to aid our understanding of what Muslims themselves have found important and challenging for personal faith, Smith nevertheless has included at least one interpretation simply because he finds it 'personally attractive'. This process of selection is also evident in other chapters. It is inherent in this approach to Islam, and all religious traditions, for the study is aided, and perhaps even made possible, by a sympathetic rapport with the faith of another. But its great danger is this sort of subjective selection of the data to be considered, based on the faith and idiosyncracies of each observer.
Section 3.3. Truth - a study of three Arabic roots.

In chapter two, above, section three, it was noted that in Smith's view, truth does not reside in 'religions' or in propositions, but in persons. Religions are not entities which can either possess or lack the quality of truth, but the traditions can become true in the personal lives of men and women of faith. This section considers the paper 'A Human View of Truth', in which Smith argues for this view on the basis of material from the Islamic tradition. The material discussed in this section is closely related to that in the next two sections.

The aim of 'A Human View of Truth' is to suggest that truth is best understood not as a property of statements, but as a quality of persons; that truth is primarily personalistic rather than propositional. His argument is based on an examination of the meaning and use of three Arabic roots which in differing ways convey the notion of truth. As is often the case, Smith does not claim to offer a rigorous proof of his thesis, but rather to suggest and propose. In addition he claims the moral argument that it is better to see truth in personal terms, and the cultural argument that the devaluation of this aspect of truth constitutes a serious cultural loss.

The three roots discussed by Smith are ḥaqqa, ṣadaqa, and sahha. The verb sahha and its adjective saḥīh denote being sound, healthy, appropriate, etc. These words are used to express the accuracy of statements or information. Smith observes that this root has the least moral connotation of the three: an outdated railway timetable may be ghayr saḥīh, but this fact is of no cosmic consequence. Furthermore this word and its derivatives do not appear in the Qurʾān. By contrast the other two roots are strongly moralistic, and 'reverberate in (the Qurʾān)
The word *haqq*, from the root *haqqa*, is like the Latin *verus* and the Sanskrit *satyam* in that it can be translated either by 'true' or 'real'. The dichotomy between truth and reality which is common in the West today is not found in the Arabic. *Haqq* 'refers to what is real, genuine, authentic, what is true in and of itself by dint of metaphysical or cosmic status'. As such the term applies supremely to God, *al-Haqq*, who is the ultimate Reality. Here, then, we have truth in the sense of the real; which can be contrasted to the *bāṭil*, the false or 'the phoney'. 'Behind the one is metaphysical power, while the other in strident dichotomy from it is ludicrously vain and vacuous'. The task of distinguishing and choosing between these 'is one of man's most decisive tasks or prerogatives'.

Smith devotes most of his discussion to the root *sadaqa*. Whereas *haqqa* has to do with the truth of things, and *sahha* has to do with the truth of statements, *sadaqa* has to do with the truth of persons. *Sadaqa* is concerned with 'honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness: ... It involves being true to oneself and to other persons, and to the situation with which one is dealing'. There is complete coincidence between outward expression and actual fact, there is a genuineness of intention on the part of the speaker which is in complete contrast to *kadhaba*, lying. Smith observes that in modern English we still have a personalist dimension in such negative concepts as lying or cheating, for these depend not only on the statements or actions of the participants, but also on their attitudes and intentions. *Sadaqa* refers not just to speech, but also to other actions: giving true advice, suggesting both the sincerity of the counsellor and the practical appropriateness of the counsel; fighting a true battle, suggesting both genuine zeal and good effect. The abstract, or verbal, noun from the root is the word *ṣīdq* meaning 'that quality by which a man speaks or acts with a
combination of inner integrity and objective overt appropriateness. It involves saying or doing the objectively right thing out of a genuine personal recognition of its rightness, an inner alignment with it.\textsuperscript{113} These points are all stressed in the medieval Arabic dictionaries used by Smith.

Wilfred Cantwell Smith turns next to the word \textit{tas\=diq}, the verbal noun from \textit{s\=adaqa} (the IIInd derived form of the verb \textit{s\=adaqa}). Smith gives \textit{s\=adaqa} the causative meaning 'to make come true', 'to render true'. As for the meaning of \textit{tas\=diq}, Smith gives four from his medieval dictionaries: (i) to 'recognize the truth of something', which is better than saying merely to 'believe', since it is possible to believe what is false.\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Ta\=diq} goes beyond recognition of an external fact, but includes the act of subscribing to it, incorporating it 'into my own moral integrity as a person'.\textsuperscript{115} (ii) The word means the realization that someone is a speaker of the truth. (iii) The word is used of verification, as in the case of a scientific experiment.\textsuperscript{116} (iv) Beyond these, the word \textit{tas\=diq} has a more active sense of taking steps to cause something to become true. 'To summarize. \textit{Ta\=diq} is to recognize a truth, to appropriate it, to affirm it, to confirm it, to actualize it .... it .... is the inner appropriation and outward implementation of truth.'\textsuperscript{117}

Having discussed these linguistic matters, Smith notes that when 'the clasical Muslim thinkers' were asked to explain what faith is, they 'affirmed almost to a man' that faith is \textit{tas\=diq}.\textsuperscript{118} On this understanding of faith, it involves recognizing what is true as authentically applicable to oneself, plus commiting oneself to acting in the light of that truth, a notion which comes very near to Smith's understanding of faith. On a mystical level, faith has to do with 'the discovery of the truth .... of the Islamic injunctions: the process of personal verification of them,
whereby living them out one proves them and finds that they do indeed become true, both for oneself and for the society and world in which one lives.\textsuperscript{119} This equation of faith with \textit{tasdiq} will be considered in more detail in section 3.5. below, but an important remark of Smith's may be noted. Having commented that these are good definitions of faith, he adds: 'They are not, and are not meant to be, definitions of Islamic faith; rather, they are Islamic definitions of human faith.'\textsuperscript{120} So Smith tries to argue here from the Islamic material his point that faith is a universal human quality, which men experience through varying traditions.

In the remaining part of 'A Human View of Truth', Smith considers these notions of truth in the context of modern Western society, where, Smith believes, the human dimension of truth has been lost in the general concern for objective propositional truth. Human integrity in his view is at stake, and the very truth we seek to preserve is in question. Smith therefore advocates a return in our society to an understanding of truth which corresponds to the meaning of \textit{sidq}. On the one hand we should reject a pursuit of a purely objective external truth which condones the hypocrisy of personal insincerity ('the way to Hiroshima or to bacteriological warfare (is paved) with good objective science'.\textsuperscript{121}). On the other hand \textit{sidq} is more than 'well-meaning intention'.

'There is no room here for that kind of truth that leaves unaffected the moral character and private behaviour of those who know it. Equally, there is none of that modern nonsense whereby one has simply to unbottle one's emotions, whatever they be, so that feelings are to be expressed regardless of consequences or propriety, or so that we come close to hearing that it is honest to tell a lie provided that one really wants to tell it.'\textsuperscript{122}

'A price that we have paid for divorcing objective truth from sincerity, is to divorce subjective emotionalism from all discipline - and from community cohesion. We have made truth amoral, the next generation has made self-expression amoralistic also'.\textsuperscript{123}

So Smith makes a plea for a personalistic understanding of truth, in which
the external objective exactitude of our knowledge is matched by the inward orientation of our hearts and lives.

Much of the material which we have discussed here is re-used by Smith in a paper presented at a conference in honour of Harry A. Wolfson, reproduced in *On Understanding Islam*. In that paper Smith returns to some of the *kalam* texts to see if his concept of faith can be shown to make sense. It is a pity that he there limits himself to such a select group of writers which demonstrate his case. Most of his examples are from Taftazānī, with some references also from al Baghdādī, al Tabarī and al Kastalī. In that paper Smith accepts Wolfson's analysis of *taṣdiq* in the falsafah tradition as meaning the mind reaching a decision, but asserts that in the *kalam* texts its use is shadowed by the interpretation which has been discussed above.

An understanding of Smith's use of truth is essential for an understanding of his concept of faith. It is easy to fall into the trap of caricaturing Smith's position as 'anything goes, as long as you have faith'. Smith in many ways invites this kind of misunderstanding, for example by refusing to address himself to the question of whether my religious affirmation has any link with an objective reality, and by failing to perceive the seriousness of the task undertaken by the linguistic philosophers to that end. But in 'A Human View of Truth' he spells out more clearly than in most places the importance of what a man says corresponding to what is in fact the case. 'When truth is seen as personal, a man's statement must not only cohere with his .... inner life, but must also relate to objective facts.'

In his approach to Islam, Smith is looking not just for information about Islam, nor even for Islamic notions of truth and faith, but for
Islamic insights into the nature of human faith and its relation to truth.
In 1963 Wilfred Cantwell Smith gave his first public lectures as a theologian in a series at Yale Divinity School. The first of his lectures was entitled 'Is the Qur'an the Word of God?', and it was published in 1967 along with three other chapters to form the book *Questions of Religious Truth*. Whilst this lecture was not concerned with matters of technical Islamic study, it deals with a topic of considerable importance to his understanding of Islam, and highlights Smith's understanding of faith and its relation to truth. The main thrust of *Questions of Religious Truth* is to argue for and illustrate his notion of truth which does not reside in statements or systematic formulations of 'religion', but a truth which can become true for persons of faith as they live their lives in the light of that which they know of the Ultimate Reality.

The fact that God has spoken is a glad assumption of religious faith, at least it is certainly so in Islamic and Christian faith. But when it comes to examining the particular claim that the Qur'an is the word of God there has, of course, been disagreement between these two great faith communities. Smith's aim is not primarily to try to solve this fourteen-century-old dispute, but rather to use the fact of the disagreement as a way of thinking about how we hold to our religious truth. Traditionally the 'yes' and 'no' answers to this question have been held by isolated and distinct communities, each possessing a vigorous assurance that their answer is the right one. Each camp has been occupied by persons of intelligence and sincerity, as well as those who inevitably follow the lead of more able proponents. Furthermore, this question has never been seen as peripheral or minor, despite the fact that it has not been articulated as such. Those who have held that the Qur'an is indeed the word
of God have taken it very seriously through times of attack or through indifference, and have lived their lives in the light of that which is revealed to them through it. For those who have held that the Qur'ān is not the word of God, it has still not been a minor issue, for their very indifference to the question shows the profundity of their assurance that their answer is right. In both cases, however, the conviction that the Qur'ān is or is not the word of God is not the result of reading the Qur'ān and reaching a conclusion; instead those who affirm this word of God read it in order to hear what God would say to them, and those who do not recognize here the word of God either do not read it or they read it for some quite different purpose. In both cases, then, the answer is prejudged; both sides are actually prejudiced.

Smith states that it is a function of religious Weltanschauungen to give their members sets of presuppositions, and that it is a task of the academic comparative religionist to draw into the open such presuppositions as are inherent in the man of faith's position. In this case, the answer to our question is already determined by the religious presuppositions of the parties concerned. Not only are the answers prejudged, both the positive and negative answers are self-authenticating to those who give them. The self-authentication gives a certain 'pragmatic justification' for those entrenched positions held.

'Those who have held the Qur'ān to be the word of God have, by holding this, found that God does in fact speak to them through it. They have ordered their lives in accord with it, and have found that that pattern rewards them by bringing them into the divine presence.'128

At the same time,

'Western scholars .... and many others, approach the Qur'ān quite heedless of a possibility that it might be God's word; persuaded that its source was mundane, they look for that source in the psychology of Muḥammad, in the environment in which he lived, in the historical tradition that he inherited, in the socio-economic-cultural milieu of his hearers. They look for it, and they find it. They find it, because quite evidently it is there. 129
Both those who answer 'yes' and those who answer 'no' find that their views are confirmed by reading the Qur'an.

In the past these two groups have been almost completely isolated, whereas today there is considerable intercourse between the two groups. We are moving towards Smith's vision of the 'one world', with its 'global society'. In such a world the continuing divergence on this important issue poses an intellectual and moral challenge. No longer, Smith insists, can we evade the empirical evidence that both camps contain men of intelligence and sincerity, psychologically satisfying as such a fallacy may remain. Neither, in Smith's opinion, can we hope to remove the problem by missionary efforts to conversion on either side.

Already it is clear to Smith that there is evidence of a growing awareness that the old isolationists' answers are failing to serve. In the new climate it is essential for both sides to take stock of the other's insights. The Western scholar can make sense of the facts about the Qur'an, but he cannot thereby account for the vitality of the life of faith which he can now see for himself in the Muslim community. In the style of scientific enquiry, there is additional data here which calls for the formation of new hypotheses. Smith draws attention to a Western Islamicist and a Christian missionary/theologian who have begun such a reformulation: Hamilton Gibb, who admitted the term "'Revelation' ... as the description of Muhammad's personal experiences'; 130 and Kenneth Cragg, who 'no longer' rejects the Qur'an theologically. 131 Similarly Smith believes that 'the best minds and most honest spirits in (the Muslim) community are themselves sincerely searching for a new answer to our question, one that will do equal justice to the transcendent element in their tradition, and yet will at the same time be meaningful and persuasive to those whose horizon is global and whose historical understanding is realistic'. 132
Smith's vision of the unity of knowledge and the unity of mankind leads him to 'imagine that the only answer to our question that will satisfy the non-Muslim and the only answer that will satisfy the Muslim will in coming years be identical'.\textsuperscript{133} Despite this hope, Smith does not expect Christians and Muslims to cease to be different. He suggests that 'intellectually their understandings must converge, even if morally they choose to respond differently'.\textsuperscript{134} But it is not until chapter three of \textit{Questions of Religious Truth} that Smith gives any further clues as to the shape of that intellectual convergence. In that chapter he expounds his view that truth does not reside in religions or in religious statements, but that these can become true in the life of faith of individual men and women. On this view of truth, the question about the Qur'ān is seen not as a question about the essential truth of the book, or whether it is in itself the word of God. The question becomes 'does God actually speak to people through it? Can it become true for people of faith?' Finally, in another later article Smith insists on an empirical historian's view of the question, for, 'the true meaning of scripture is the solid historical reality of the continuum of actual meanings over the centuries of actual people'.\textsuperscript{135}

There are several comments which can be made about this question and Smith's treatment of it. First, I find it difficult to reconcile Smith's acceptance of an intellectual convergence and moral divergence between the two camps, with his insistence upon moral and intellectual integrity in 'A Human View of Truth'. If we can both accept the intellectual formula that in the life of faith that X has lived today, X found that his reading in the Qur'ān presented him with a word from the living God, this intellectual admission permits no moral divergence between us.

Secondly the discussion illustrates Smith's approach to Islām as both objective data for consideration, and also personal response. A related

103
parallel is to be found in Mawdūdī's 'Introduction' to A. Yusuf Ali's translation and commentary of the Holy Qurʾān. Mawdūdī acknowledges that people come to a reading of the Qurʾān with differing presuppositions. These may be positive or negative as to whether the book is divinely inspired. His advice to both groups is to leave their presuppositions behind. Instead he gives them some basic information about the Qurʾān and its reception by Muḥammad, and invites them to read expectantly, to see if God does not speak to them through it. It seems that here we have a synthesis of the two sides in Smith's debate for the purposes of Islamic apologetics - the reader is invited to be both objective and expectant.

Thirdly it is in keeping with Smith's approach to be dissatisfied with any solution to the question which is not acceptable to both Muslims and non-Muslims. But it is far from clear that this is the case here. It may be acceptable for a Christian to expect God to address him in all of life, so that if in reading the Qurʾān we find that God is speaking to us, we may wish to express this fact in the terms which Smith suggests. But the traditional devout Muslim wants to affirm that God has spoken today because he has spoken eternally, the Qurʾān has become for him the word of God today because that is what eternally it is. It seems impossible to reconcile Smith's understanding of the problem with 'the transcendent elements in the (Muslim) tradition'.

136

137
Section 3.5. Studies in Faith - Ḥman, Taṣdiq and Arkān.

This section examines three chapters of On Understanding Islam in which Smith discusses Islamic material relating to faith. The aim of the section is once again to see the way in which Smith understands faith and approaches Islām.

(i) Faith In the Qur‘ān - Ḥman

This section examines the use of Ḥman and related terms in the Qur‘ān. Smith treated the subject in a pair of lectures delivered in 1974 as the Iqbal Memorial Lectures at the University of the Punjab in Lahore. These argued from the Islamic tradition the case which was later developed in broader perspective in Faith and Belief.

The central thrust of Faith and Belief, we saw in section 2.2. above, is that faith is not the same as belief; that believing is not a primary religious category; and that it is faith which is of ultimate significance. If this is true, it is a serious mistake to translate certain biblical and quranic words by the modern English word 'believe', which denotes holding opinions of uncertain foundation. The Qur‘ān is interested in knowledge of the truth and commitment to it, engagement with it; there is no significant place for the holding of opinions.

The words Carafa and Calima are very frequent in the Qur‘ān (especially the latter); knowledge holds a central place in the Qur‘ān. The word which in later Islamic theology became standard for 'believing' is īraqada, but this word does not appear in the Qur‘ān. The root from which īraqada derives (Caqada) does occur seven times in various forms, meaning 'originally "to tie a knot", either literally or in the figurative sense of
binding a person by a legal or moral commitment, to make a binding engagement. Smith has found that \( \text{taqada} \) appears in medieval kalām texts at first with the meaning 'to bind oneself, to commit or pledge oneself to, to take on the engagement of living in accord with a given position; and that only gradually across the centuries does it take on the more neutral meaning of "to believe" something intellectually'. Unfortunately, as in other places where Smith sees a change in meaning occurring 'gradually over the centuries', he provides no further data to substantiate the claim.

The Qurʾān is concerned fundamentally with 'God, presented as Creator, Sovereign, and Judge, powerful, demanding, succouring, majestic, laying on humankind inescapable imperatives and offering us inexhaustable rewards. The fundamental category on the manward side is that of faith. Iman is thus the manward side of this central concern of the Qurʾān. It means 'almost precisely, s'engager'. The word imān seems to stress the existential engagement of living faith. This is further illustrated by the English word 'amen', which comes from the same semitic root through Hebrew, as the Arabic root āmana. The muʾmin, the man of faith, is he who is able to say 'amen', to include himself in the worship of the whole. 'By it, he identifies himself with the communal and cosmic activity'.

The positive word for faith, īmān, presupposes the divine summons, and describes the human response. The same is true of the words for rejection. The main word here is kāfir, from the root kafara, to reject, to cover or hide. This word is often translated 'infidel', or 'unbeliever', but these do not do justice to the force of the word. The word could not possibly be used of someone who happens to hold different opinions about the nature of things. The word implies, rather, that although the man knows what is true, yet he fails to accept it or obey it. Similarly kufr means not so much
'infidelity' but 'almost a spitting in God's face'\textsuperscript{144} despite the full force of his authority and mercy. Another similar verb, meaning to deny or repudiate, \textit{jahada}, is used in \textit{surah} 27.14; \textit{jahadū bi-hā wa-stayqanat-hā anfusuhum}. Smith translates it 'They rejected (the signs of God) although they knew very well in their hearts that they were true'.\textsuperscript{145}

Another interesting \textit{surah} includes a word derived from \textit{kafara} and also \textit{Tmān}. Arberry renders \textit{surah} 2.109 'Many of the People of the Book wish they might restore you as unbelievers, after you have believed, in the jealousy of their souls, after the truth has become clear to them'.\textsuperscript{146} It is clear that the verse refers to a situation in which the People of the Book would like the Muslims to repudiate that to which they are now committed, and that which the People of the Book themselves know to be true.

The same presupposition of the truth about God is made in the word \textit{mushrik}. This word is sometimes translated 'polytheist', 'pagan', 'idolater'; but it is derived from the root which means to associate. The \textit{mushrikān} are those who associate other beings with God. But Smith's point is that such people cannot be seen as those who believe in many gods. The assumption of the Qur'ān is that these people foolishly and perversely continue to associate more/other beings with the one and only true God. The very word in fact presupposes monotheism - it does not point to an alternative system of beliefs.

In the Qur'ān, then, Smith asserts, the concept of belief is absent. The Qur'ān does not concern itself with the opinions of others, it simply assumes its own set of presuppositions. Faith, rejection and association are all responses to the one reality which is never questioned but always presupposed. Faith, in the Qur'ān, is about commitment to that which is known, not about holding one set of opinions in contrast to some other. It is to this commitment that the \textit{mu'min} bears witness in the \textit{shahādah}, not to
the precise formulation of his 'beliefs'.

The remaining parts of Smith's Iqbal Memorial Lectures are not analysed here. They go on to examine in more detail the differences between faith and belief in the Qur'an and then in the Christian tradition.

(ii) Faith in later Islamic history: tasdiq and arkan.

This section examines Smith's treatment of three ways in which Muslims have understood faith. These three ways are performing some external acts, making confession with the lips, and possessing some inner quality. These three elements of faith were combined into a rhyming formula: al-tinān huwa tasdiqun bi-al-janān, wa-iqrārūn bi-al-lisān, wa-camalun bi-al-arkan. 147 All three of these aspects have been important for Muslims through the centuries. Faith as an inner matter of the heart tended to become the dominant theme of the major theological schools; faith as confession with the lips or recitation of the shahādah has been the dominant theme for mundane and social functions; faith as performance of good works became the standard of the Khārijī movement. 148

In several places Smith argues that the personalist theme is dominant in all three of these elements. We saw in section 3.2. above, his conviction that the note of personal commitment is central to the confession of the lips in the recitation of the shahādah. We saw in section 3.3. above, that he demonstrates the personalist orientation of the term tasdiq, and this theme is continued in one of the papers we are about to consider. 149 In the other paper to be considered here, we find Smith's treatment of the third element of the rhyming formula, where he demonstrates that even al-arkan is best understood in personalist terms. 150
a. Taṣdiq

Smith accepts Wolfson's argument that in the writings of the falāsifah, taṣdiq is used to indicate the mind's making a judgement. This philosophical and logical usage is in direct continuity with late Greek thought. But Smith contends that the word is used differently in the kalam or theological writings. At this point Smith repeats several pages from his paper 'A Human View of Truth', namely the discussion of the three roots relating to truth in Arabic: ḥaqqa, šadaqa and šahha, and the discussion of the meaning of taṣdiq. These have already been examined in section 3.3 above, so need not be repeated here.

Armed with his definition of taṣdiq as active commitment to that which is known as the truth, Smith now addresses the question of how this term is used in the kalam texts. He examines some selected passages from Taftāzānī, al-Kastalī, al-Tabarī, al-Baghdādī and a few others, and shows that the philosophical usage is inappropriate to the intention of these writers. They spoke not of opinions or 'beliefs', nor even of knowing the truth. To quote from al-Kastalī (ninth-century AH commentator):

'Al-taṣdiq does not mean knowing the truth ....; no, it is rather a yielding to what is known and a letting oneself be led by it, and the soul's being quiet and at peace with it and its accepting it, setting aside recalcitrance and stubbornness, and constructing one's actions in accordance with it'.

Smith focuses especially upon the moral nature of faith in the Islamic tradition. God's revelation to man in the Qur'ān is mubīn, clear, and leads to knowledge. But man must come to the point of realizing that that truth applies not to man in general, but to me as an individual. Taṣdiq here is that inner response in the heart by which I know that I must do as commanded, and actually doing it. 'Faith is the appropriation of truth by the heart that comes to the point of decision and compliance.'
Al-ţmān huwa taṣdīqun bi-al-janān describes faith not as belief in the heart, nor yet as knowing with the heart, but as personal appropriation by the heart. In this way Smith once again draws our attention away from the conceptual content of faith towards its personal focus and form.

The same is true for the second clause of the formulation: wa-iqrārun bi-al-lisan. Confessing with the tongue, or reciting the shahādah, is primarily an expression of commitment rather than a declaration of belief. (See Section 3.2., above.)

b. Arkan

It is to the final word of the three-fold rhyming definition of al-ţmān that Smith turns in chapter 8 of On Understanding Islam. Al-arkan may refer to the so-called 'pillars' of Islam (ie performance of the prayers, almsgiving, fasting, pilgrimage, and recitation of the shahādah; although presumably the recitation of the shahādah is implicitly excluded in this case because it has already been treated in the second part of the rhyming formula: iqrārun bi-al-lisan) or alternatively, al-arkan may refer to the limbs of the body.

The radicals r-k-n which form the root of arkan convey the notion 'to incline towards, to lean upon, to rest upon, to be supported by'. The noun rukn, of which arkan is the plural, 'signifies that upon which something rests, by which it is supported; according to the classical dictionaries it denotes the strongest side of a thing and, generally, strength, resource'. Hence the possibility of arkan referring to the pillars of Islam. Other meanings include the philosophic essential condition, and although not common, human limbs or members. It is this last meaning which Smith argues in this paper, and on this understanding the phrase camalun bi-al-arkan which occurs in the three-part formulation of

110
faith, is equivalent to \textit{Camalun bi-al-jawi\textbar{r}ih}.

The main reason to suppose that \textit{ark\textbar{n}} denotes the pillars of Isl\textbar{\textbar}m is that this is the major religious use for the term. This interpretation is given by many but not all Muslims and Western scholars. But Smith presents a considerable amount of evidence to support the contrary view that \textit{ark\textbar{n}} in this context is equivalent to \textit{jawi\textbar{r}ih}, and bears the meaning members or limbs of the body.

First, if the pillars were intended, we might have expected a definite \textit{al-Camal} rather than the indefinite \textit{Camalun}. Some translators insert the definite article: 'the practice of Islam's chief duties', rather than allowing 'a matter of external, physical behaviour'.

The second point is the tentative suggestion that the use of the preposition \textit{bi-} is 'just a whit awkward'. Smith feels that \textit{li-}, or an accusative or an objective genitive might be a smoother choice if the pillars are intended.

Thirdly, Smith notes that the first two phrases refer to parts of the body, and that the progression heart, tongue, limbs, is more obvious than the alternative: heart, tongue, pillars. Further, as we noted above, one of the five pillars is already advocated in the expression \textit{igr\textbar{r}un bi-al-lisan}, and although there is one commentator who explains the third phrase as 'the remaining four pillars', there is another who refers to \textit{Camal bi-sat\textbar{r}ir al-jawi\textbar{r}ih} (action with the remaining bodily members).

Next Smith moves on to more substantial matters which in his view prove decisive. Our question is set in the wider context of the debate between faith and works, whether or not faith involves doing anything. This debate takes place in the \textit{kalam}, and especially surrounds the Mu\textit{tazilah} and the whole Kh\textbar{\textbar}rij\textbar{\textbar} movement. In this debate the two expressions \textit{al-jawi\textbar{r}ih} and
al-arkan are used interchangeably, although the former is more frequent than the latter in early texts, and there is no suggestion that this change in phrasing implies any change in meaning.

Smith's fifth reason for asserting that arkan does not refer primarily to the five (or four) pillars, is that works of faith are not to be limited to the pillars alone. Al-Baghdādī, for example, quotes the hadīth which refers to over seventy parts of faith 'the meanest of which is, not one of the pillars, but merely removing an obstruction from a path'. The citation of this hadīth immediately follows the three-fold definition, ending .... bi-al-arkan. In addition works of supererogation are also discussed in these terms. So, too, is the possibility of committing sin bi-al-arkan; which does not mean that, say, not committing adultery is one of the pillars, rather that the behaviour of the body is central to faith.

Smith turns lastly to the question of historical development; as there are various versions of this formula available. He sees a process by which first the expression Cāmal bi-al-jawārih was replaced by Cāmal bi-al-arkān; and secondly al-arkān came to be seen to refer not to al-jawārih, but to the pillars. The reason for the use of al-arkān in preference to al-jawārih is that this produces the neat rhyme: .... bi-al-janān .... bi-al-lisan .... bi-al-arkān. As evidence for this tendency to generate a rhyming triplet, Smith notes a similar process in the first phrase of our formula: the common word qalb has been replaced of late by the 'rare synonym' janān, which one commentator felt he had to explain to his readers. Of the various versions of this formula available, the earliest historically has no rhyme, in the middle there are some which have two rhyming elements, and the final form is that in which all three phrases rhyme. The earliest version is qalb/lisan/jawārih; in between we find qalb/lisan/arkān; and the final form is janān/lisan/arkān. Unfortunately, as in so many of Smith's
'progressions over the centuries', the process is by no means straightforward, and the data is subjected to considerable interpretation. In the notes, Smith refers to the first example of the triple rhyme in the work of the fourth/tenth century Ḥanbalī writer, Ibn Battah (d. 387/997). The middle position is to be found in the hadith collected by Ibn Mājah (d. 273/886). Smith gives no early reference to the unrhyming version.

Other evidence for this point is that several writers use the qalb and jawāriḥ in their major discussions and expositions, but consistently use the rhyming versions, janān and arkarān, when the whole formula is cited. Examples of such writers are Bāqillānī and al Ghazālī.

The final stage in the development, which Smith is careful to cover, is the way in which the word arkarān has been understood by those who read the triplet. In Islamic tradition the 'pillars' have not always been referred to as al-arkān, as early hadith show, but it is clear that this term came to be applied to them. Since in religious use the term al-arkān usually refers to the pillars, it is not surprising that as people read the three-fold formula of faith they have assumed that the pillars were being referred to. Whilst a considerable number of Muslim and Western scholars normally accept this later interpretation, Smith reports that there are also those who have assumed that the earlier jawāriḥ interpretation is implied.

This concludes the discussion of the primarily Islamic material. In this last section we have seen how Smith finds the personalist focus of faith to be more in keeping with the Qur'ān, and is to be preferred to a structured, systematized form or to an emphasis upon the content of faith.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate some of the specific studies related to the Christian tradition which Smith presents in the elucidation of his argument; to illustrate the way in which he uses his concept of faith in the treatment of Christian material; and to examine critically his approach to Christianity.

Smith argues that questions of belief are not central to the Christian tradition; faith is the key concept in the New Testament, and in early baptismal rites and creeds. He also argues that the central moral and theological tenets of the Christian tradition demand that Christians find new responses to people of other faith, both practically and theoretically. In his view, Christians must see people of other faith as sharing this basic human quality of faith with them.

Smith's approach to Christianity is found to highlight this important aspect of the biblical and early Christian tradition: that men and women must respond in faith to the God who has made himself known to them. But Smith's approach involves selective interpretation of the material. There is considerable evidence to suggest that right beliefs about the truth of God's dealings with mankind are necessary preconditions to the sort of faith which Smith emphasises, and that other external factors are part of the total response which man must make to the divine. Personal faith must be seen as a key factor in understanding Christianity, but this must not be allowed to dominate.
Wilfred Cantwell Smith specifically deals with the Biblical material in the third chapter of *Belief and History*, a book which traces the development in meaning of the word 'believe' through the ages and shows how the modern term differs from faith. Having shown that the modern word 'believe' means to 'hold an opinion, regardless of whether or not that opinion is correct', Smith goes on to argue in chapter three that this modern notion is quite absent in the New Testament. The central biblical category is faith, as commitment and trust, so he concludes that it is wrong to translate any word in the New Testament by the modern word 'believe'. The following paragraphs give a summary and critique of his reasoning.

In the King James Version, the noun 'faith' appears 233 times, whilst the word 'belief' appears only once. There is no verb in English which corresponds to the noun 'faith', so the verb 'believe' is used instead, and it occurs 285 times. Words in the 'believe' family (believer, unbelief, believing, etc.) occur 355 times in the KJV. Smith states that the translators of the KJV generally used words of the 'faith' family wherever they could. In the Old Testament the root אָמַן appears 320 times, of which 45 are translated by 'believe' words, and only 5 are of the type 'believe that'. In the New Testament words like πιστίς, πιστεύω, ἀπίστος, etc., occur some 603 times. Of these only four percent are followed by a 'that' clause (i.e. ἤδη, or accusative and infinitive.). The verb appears in the New Testament as follows: with no object 34%, with a personal object 41%, with a non-personal object (including word, promise, etc.) 12%, and with a propositional object ("that ...." clause) 12%.

After this introductory data, Smith quotes several New Testament
scholars to show that it is 'a common-place among New Testament scholars that the scriptural notion of faith is fiduciary, a trusting, entrusting of oneself, and also obedience, fidelity; and in other ways is more than intellectual'.

He then shows by examining New Testament references, that faith is not more than intellectual, faith is not intellectual at all, it is something quite other. In order to prove this he examines a selection of the passages in which πίστευειν and its related words occur; first those few which are followed by a subordinate clause or independent statement beginning '.... that', secondly those which take a non-personal object, thirdly those which take a personal object directly or indirectly, and finally those which take no object at all.

(i) Πίστευειν with a 'that' clause

The first group of references to be examined are those in which the Greek verb πίστευειν takes a propositional statement as a direct object, i.e., δι' or an accusative plus infinitive. This group makes up four percent of the total occurrences of words from πίστις/πίστευειν in the New Testament, and Smith chooses just three examples for consideration. Even in these cases where perhaps the translation 'believe that' is most obvious, Smith feels that it has become a mistranslation so to render the scriptural notion.

The first verse to be considered is James 2.19, 'Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well: the devils also believe, and tremble'. The problem with the belief described in this verse is that there is no follow through, no sincerity on the part of the devils who 'believe'; it does not affect them positively, it does not affect their lives in worship and obedience. It is, however, not an impartial or detached speculation on
their parts: the devils are involved existentially, for \( \phi r i s o u s i v \), they tremble. Smith suggests that here is the only place in the New Testament where \( \tau \iota \iota \sigma \tau \varepsilon \upsilon \varepsilon i v \) does not mean having faith, at the same time he insists that it most certainly does not mean believe in the modern sense of holding an opinion. The devils know and have seen God's oneness, yet they reject, they repudiate that which they know for themselves - they do not hold opinions about existence or unity of the divine. Smith offers the translation 'You recognize God's oneness? Good! But the devils also recognize, and tremble'. 6 The idea is very similar to Smith's treatment of the word \textit{kāfir} in Islamic thought, that wretched ingrate who rejects that which he knows. 7

In John 13.19, Jesus says to his disciples at the Last Supper, 'From henceforth I tell you before it come to pass, that, when it is come to pass, ye may believe that I am he'. 8 Smith wants to translate this as, ' .... in order that you may recognize that I am He'. Smith holds that it would be quite wrong to suppose that John is portraying Jesus as wanting his disciples to hold certain opinions about him. Instead Jesus is portrayed as wanting his disciples to recognize the truth about him.

The last verse considered by Smith in this group is Hebrews 11.6, 'But without faith it is impossible to please him: for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him'. 9 Here Smith again would translate \( \tau \iota \iota \sigma \tau \varepsilon \upsilon \sigma \kappa \alpha \) by recognize, for the original does not allow the modern notion of holding an opinion that God exists, irrespective of whether or not he does. The emphasis here, according to Smith, is that faith must precede belief, just as in this verse it does. In other words, we should only believe in as much as we know - first we should catch a glimpse of God, and only then believe in him. 'Belief follows after faith, and theology is simply an honest human attempt
to conceptualize, in the terms of one's day, the faith that one has priorly had, the vision that one has seen. Belief, various opinions about God, are not the entrance fee to the vision of God, rather belief is the result of the mind's attempt to grapple with what one has come to know for oneself.

(ii) \( \textit{\Pi \iota \sigma \tau \epsilon \upsilon \nu \iota \nu} \) with a non-personal object

The second group of passages consists of those in which the concept of faith is followed by a single object which is a thing rather than a person. These are slightly more common in the New Testament than the first group where the object of faith seemed to be a proposition; even so together these constitute only a small proportion of the total. To represent this group Smith cites two passages, 2 Thessalonians 2. 10 - 13, and 1 John 4. 16.

In 2 Thessalonians 2. 10 - 13, \( \textit{\Pi \iota \sigma \tau \epsilon \upsilon \nu \iota \nu} \) appears twice, and the noun once, in each case having direct objects which are non-personal. Smith paraphrases the passage using parts of the text from the Revised Standard Version (indicated by "....") and the New English Bible (indicated by '....') thus:

The writer .... 'sets up a sharp contrast "between those who are to perish" on the one hand and "you, brethren beloved by the Lord" whom "God chose ... from the beginning to be saved". The former will perish "because they refused to love the truth and so be saved". 'Therefore God puts them under a delusion, which works upon them to' have faith in the Lie, 'so that they may all be brought to judgement, all who do not' have faith in, opt for, give their allegiance to 'the Truth but make sinfulness their deliberate choice'. It is over against these that the Christians to whom the letter is addressed are said in the next verse to be loved by God and saved "through sanctification by the Spirit and" faith "in the Truth".'

The conflict between the Truth and the Lie reminds Smith of Persian dualism, and thus he places them in capital letters. There is a direct
parallelism between 'love of the truth' and 'faith in the truth', and between 'faith in the lie' and 'pleasure in unrighteousness'. There is no doubt that here the primary issue is not the holding of opinions, a fault of 'mere intellectual error'. Here the issue is recognition of the truth, a recognition which may give rise either to acceptance of it, alignment with it, or to rejection of the truth and rebellion against it with one's whole being.

In 1 John 4:16, the direct object of the verb πίστευεν is τὴν ἁγίασματικές τῆς ἀγάπης. Smith interprets the opening part of the verse to affirm:

"We have come to know the love that God has in us" and adds τεσσαρεία πνευματικά τῆς ἀμέτρητος ἀγάπης meaning that in response we have dedicated ourselves to live in terms of that love. Not only do we know it; more, we accept it, and give ourselves over to it; we orient our lives henceforth in alignment with it.

Smith concludes this second group of passages with the pronouncement, 'Once again, there is expressed here no element of believing (in today's sense) at all. Not a whiff of it. There is no trace of it; not the merest hint of a suggestion of it.'

(iii) Πίστευεν with a personal object

The third group of references identified by Smith are those where πίστευεν and related words take a personal object, notably God or Christ, but also other persons. In the case of the verb, this is the standard occurrence in the New Testament. In the case of the adjective πιστος (meaning trusting, trustworthy, loyal, faithful) the reference is, of course, primarily to persons. In the case of the noun, this group constitutes only a very small proportion.

In this part of his discussion Smith does not comment upon any specific
Bible verses, but offers a reflection on this usage. He holds that the participants in the Christian movement 'did not think that they believed anything' and therefore it is unimportant to ask what it was that they believed. The student of religion should instead see the significance of the new faith to which their belief-system gave a pattern; indeed it was the faith which gave rise to the belief-system. The primary focus of their faith was Christ, but:

'The Christian movement arose not as a body of persons who believed that Jesus was the Christ, but as an upsurge of a new recognition in human history: a sudden new awareness of what humanity can be, is, all about; the dawning of a new insight into what what had previously been called divine could, and should, be understood as meaning .... a new recognition of human potentialities'.

Faith is not primarily to do with the propositional level at all, but if we must look at this aspect of faith, Smith admits that there has been a change - the change, however, is not in what people believed, but in what they recognized.

Although Smith gives no examples, it may be helpful to see his point in a concrete setting. John 14.1 is rendered in the King James Version, 'ye believe in God, believe also in me'. In Smith's terms this has come to mean 'You hold the opinion that God exists, have this opinion of me too'. This makes nonsense of the intention. Modern translators have rightly rendered τιστευσε as trust, so The New English Bible gives 'Trust in God always; trust also in me', and the Jerusalem Bible has 'Trust in God still, trust also in me'. Here there is recognition of Christ, together with a call to commitment. Certainly the focus of faith in the early church was personal, it was Christ.
(iv) *πίστευειν* with no stated object

The final group of verses in which *πίστευειν*, *πίστις*, etc., appear are those in which there is no stated object, the absolute use. This is the most frequent occurrence of these words in the New Testament: in the noun 88% are absolute, and in the verb, 34% are without an object. All the words like 'lack of faith', 'little faith', (*ἀπιστοσ, ὀλίγος*) appear without an object. This majority usage Smith claims as evidence for his thesis that the New Testament is concerned with faith as a quality of persons, an activity 'in and of itself, not as explicitly directed to an object'.

A few examples are given to illustrate this point:

"When the son of man comes, will he find faith on earth?" (Luke 18.8)

"0 ye of little faith" (Matthew 6.30, etc.)

"Thy faith hath made thee whole" (Matthew 9.22, etc.)

"And now abide faith, hope, charity, these three ...." (1 Corinthians 13.13)

"By faith Abraham .... obeyed .... through faith .... Sara .... By faith Moses ...." (Hebrews 11. 8, 11, 23.)

Rather than immediately assuming that 'of course they meant faith in Christ .... or God', Smith advises caution and further consideration, for in his opinion this is to read the New Testament in the light of 'present-day orientations and conceptual presuppositions'. Leaving aside for a moment, then, the possibility of an unexpressed content of faith, Smith prefers to focus on faith itself. Just as we accept that there is a quality of love, which may be described, praised, etc., (as in 1 Corinthians 13, for example) without denying that there is someone who is loved, so Smith wants to focus on the faith of the religious man - and this, he asserts, is the New Testament stance.
In the gospels Smith feels there is no reason to suppose that any object is intended for faith. Only once is the phrase 'faith in God' found in the sayings of Jesus. In the sayings of Jesus πίστις occurs twenty one times, the compounds ὀλίγοπίστος, ὀλίγοπιστία occur six times, ἀπιστος five times, and the adjective πιστος nine times. In Matthew 8. 10, 'I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel', Jesus seems to imply that faith is a quality which may characterize a person to a greater or lesser extent. He also quotes Mark 9.24, translating it, 'Lord, I have faith: help my lack of faith' as an example of faith as a personal quality in Christ's hearers. A further illustration of this emphasis is St. Paul's expression 'in Christ'. This is not 'the subject/object distancing involved in many modern conceptions of human faith vis-à-vis an external "object" .... (but) .... a union, .... a relationship between the human person and God'. For Smith, faith is the name of that relationship, or at least of the human side of that relationship.

(v) The 'content' of faith

Smith admits that in some cases it is plausible to understand the absolute verb as applying to some unstated object. He suggests Acts 14.1 as an example here; 'a great multitude both of Jews and also of the Greeks πιστεύω'. Although he prefers to render this 'found faith', he accepts that it might relate to an unstated object, such as the kerygma or the Lord. He also admits a certain, very limited, plausibility in the case of the Epistle to the Romans, where both verb and noun are frequent, and 76% are absolute. But in the case of the gospels, as we saw in the last paragraph, he insists that there is no need to suppose that any object is intended for faith.
Smith comments on a book by Oscar Cullmann which aims 'to argue that, in the early church, faith means faith in Christ'. Smith is surprised that such a book needed to be written, for so far as their faith was 'faith in anything, he may well be largely right'. But to the question of what faith itself is, Cullmann does not address himself. It is Smith's contention that since the content of faith is not a major issue in the New Testament, we err if we concentrate primarily on that as opposed to the nature of faith as a quality of persons. By concentrating on the early Christians as 'believers', our minds are directed automatically to something outside themselves, and diverted from thinking that, whatever may elicit or focus it, faith may essentially be, and certainly historically was, a transforming personal experience.

In the closing sections of Belief and History, Smith finally focuses on 'the unexpressed context, ideationally; the presuppositions within which the articulated conceptual expression of faith is cast; the uncriticized intellectual framework'. It is these which approximate to the modern notion of 'beliefs'. In one of Smith's many aphorisms, he suggests that 'one's faith is given by God, one's beliefs by one's century'. At the same time 'it matters enormously that we find a proper belief to elucidate our faith'. Whilst the modern concept of believing, of holding an opinion, does not occur in the New testament, obviously the New Testament writers did believe many things. The important things to remember are that such beliefs were not described by words like πίστευειν, πίστις, etc.; and that their opinions and presuppositions were almost incidental to the life-enriching faith which they professed.

Smith makes two further points which are worth stating. The student of comparative religion must learn to take seriously the presuppositions of other people, and to handle their 'patterns of preconceptions' without
difficulty. Smith is amongst those who do not want to demythologise the New Testament, but to recognize its myths, and gladly accept them as myths. His second point is to remind us that our 'labels', our concepts, are less than the reality they describe; God is greater than our conceptions of him. In the New Testament, then, such beliefs (in the modern sense) or presuppositions as may be seen, are not to be taken as objects of faith. Instead they must be seen as secondary to that quality of life and that relation to God and the world, which is faith.

(vi) Assessment

The following comments may be noted on Smith's treatment of faith in the New Testament.

(a) It is clear that the words 'belief' and 'believe' have changed their meanings over the centuries, and Smith is right to draw attention to the confusion which is caused by the standard English translations of the Bible.

(b) It is a pity that Smith makes so little use of the vast literature on the subject of faith available in the writings of New Testament scholars. The commentaries contain countless discussions of the meaning and usage of πιστεύειν, πίστις, etc., in the New Testament, and the problem appears to be more complex than Smith allows. As we have seen, Smith acknowledges that it is 'a commonplace among New Testament scholars that the scriptural notion of faith is fiduciary, a trusting, entrusting of oneself, and also obedience, fidelity'. At the same time, however, he claims that New Testament scholars have not addressed themselves to the nature of faith.
(c) Smith's decision to treat all words deriving from πίστευεν, πιστεύσις together is both confusing and misleading. The 'standard' use of the verb is with a direct personal object; the most frequent use of the noun is in an absolute sense. In addition to the purely grammatical reasons for this difference, it could easily be taken as support for Oscar Cullmann's view noted above. Faith (what Smith calls the absolute use of the noun) could be seen as the state of having faith in Christ (the verb with direct personal object).

(d) Smith says that the case for no object of faith is very clear in the sayings of Jesus. But for the verb πίστευεν this is far from obvious. Of the twenty one occurrences of the verb in the sayings of Jesus recorded in the synoptic gospels, eight have an expressed object, at least four refer to an object by clear implication, and only a maximum of nine are absolute.

(e) Smith asserts in his final paragraph that 'It matters enormously that we find a proper belief to elucidate our faith'. Yet at the same time he finds it is unimportant to investigate the beliefs of the New Testament writers. If we are enriched in faith by the New Testament, might we not also find the 'beliefs' expressed in the New Testament enriching?

Further, whilst the New Testament may not focus upon its ideational presuppositions, it has much to say about holding right conceptions about God, opinions, practices and doctrine. It is quite wrong to say that 'Participants in this movement did not think that they believed anything'. The confession of Peter, recorded in Mark 8.29, Matthew 16.16, and Luke 9.20, is set in the context of the opinions of others. Jesus asked his disciples "Who do men say that I am?" and the disciples report some of
the opinions they have heard expressed; John the Baptist, Elijah, Jeremiah, etc. "But who do you say that I am?", Jesus asked. Peter's reply was "You are the Christ". Peter was a participant in the 'movement' who self-consciously held an opinion, a belief, about Jesus. Peter's confession was a statement of opinion or belief about Jesus of Nazareth which could be compared with the opinions or beliefs which others held of him. The gospel writers obviously held it to be the right opinion, and Jesus is portrayed as applauding it. It also seems to have carried with it a commitment of faith. The participants in this new movement knew that they believed certain things, and put great emphasis upon them.

(f) In my opinion, Smith's preference for the word 'recognize' instead of 'believe' does not help. He describes the Christian movement as 'an upsurge of a new recognition in human history .... the dawning of a new insight into what had previously been called divine could, and should, be understood as meaning (God is not simply high and lifted up, in the sanctuary, He is a carpenter in a small town .... ). But in addition to those who recognized this, there were those who recognized God on the contrary to be one whose essential nature makes it impossible for him ever be a carpenter in a small town. Thus the use of 'recognition' in preference to 'belief' is still to beg the question of what it is that they recognize, and how this compares with the recognitions of other religious groups.
In chapter five of *Faith and Belief* Wilfred Cantwell Smith considers a selection of Christian material relating to the distinction between faith and belief. This section examines his treatment of the lectures of St. Cyril of Jerusalem on baptism and the place of the creed in baptism. Smith argues that the baptismal confession \( \text{πιστεύω} \) (Latin *credo*) relates to commitment of the heart, i.e., faith, not belief. From this he goes on to argue that the creeds which began as baptismal vows, are now wrongly understood as propositional declarations of belief in the modern sense.

St. Cyril's lectures consist of the Procatechesis, an introductory lecture to the newly enrolled baptismal candidates, in which the seriousness of their undertaking and the need for persistence are stressed; eighteen catechetical lectures, in which various matters relating to conduct and the articles of the 'creed' are explained; and five mystagogical lectures, delivered to the newly baptized, in which the meaning of the sacraments is explained. In the matter of faith, the Procatechesis makes it plain that a momentous commitment of life is intended, and the first three mystagogical catecheses in particular further emphasise this central aspect of the baptismal act.

Smith concentrates most of his attention on the mystagogical lectures, giving a graphic description of the ceremony and relating it to the life and death issues which were symbolically reenacted.

'The crux was authenticity of purpose: a man's genuine intent to move from the old life to the new, his determination to turn from "the world" to Christ'.

'Accordingly, the central moment of the ceremony, the plunging into the water, involved each participant's expressing verbally and
publically his personal dedication to the purpose of the act', his commitment of himself 'to God the Father ... to Jesus Christ ... and .... the Holy Spirit'.55

After their baptism it was said of them, 'that they "became christs".' On the life-changing significance of baptism in the early church, Smith writes 'the act by which they (joined the church) .... was seen as an act of momentous right-about-face, the discarding of one life and adopting of another. It marked a transition of decisive consequence, by which was transformed the inner and outer life of the person concerned, both historically and cosmically'.56

Smith makes three points arising from his presentation of St. Cyril's exposition of baptism. The first is that the candidate committed himself in 'taking an existentially decisive step'. It was an act of self-engagement in which 'the words were performative'.57 Secondly, this act was also seen as the work of God to be received. The candidate not only decided actively to renounce evil and choose the life of Christ, he had also to receive, passively, the grace of God to save. This coincidence of active choice and passive reception is likened by Smith to the marriage vows.58

The third point is rather more substantial, and takes us to the heart of Smith's contention. The central 'saving confession'59 was the candidate's affirmative response to being asked 'whether he believed in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost'.60 In Greek 'the performatory utterance of commitment'61 was πίστευω; in the Latin of Western Church rites, the candidate affirmed credo. Credo seems to be a compound of cor, cordis, heart, and -do, put, place, set; its root meaning is thus 'I set my heart on', or 'I give my heart to'.62 Although the primary meaning of credere in classical Latin was 'to entrust, to commit, to trust something to someone', Smith feels that at this 'crucial moment .... of personal engagement .... credo came close to its root meaning .... "I hereby give my heart to Christ".'63 πιστεύω as used in the Greek of St. Cyril's rite is not directly synonymous with credo, but it does have these
classical meanings, and plays precisely the same decisive role in the baptism.

Having established this dramatic, existential meaning for credo and \( \tau \iota \sigma \tau \epsilon \iota \omega \), Smith proceeds to make several further points.\(^6^4\) Two in particular are pertinent to this study. First, he holds that baptism was not about 'moving from non-belief to belief'.\(^6^5\) The ceremony was not envisaged in that way, and the words \( \tau \iota \sigma \tau \epsilon \iota \omega \) or credo did not designate such a movement.\(^6^6\) 'In the course of the ceremony there was no enquiry of the baptizands as to whether they believed anything'.\(^6^7\)

Secondly, Smith reminds his readers that the liturgical use of creeds predates their doctrinal use.\(^6^8\) The word credo 'was used by the Church first in the ceremony of self-dedication that is baptism, and only a good deal later in the realm of theoretical issues'.\(^6^9\) The creeds were originally not about believing, but about commitment; indeed they contained no propositional statements, the principle verbs were performative.\(^7^0\) Smith states that there was a gradual shift of attention from the original issue of commitment to the precise definitions of theology so that credo could be spoken 'casually as if it were no more than a preamble to a theoretical delineation, designating a relationship to one or another of various possible intellectualizations'.\(^7^1\) The question "Do you commit yourself to this, or do you not?" was transformed into "Is it this, or is it that, to which we all commit ourselves?"\(^7^2\)

Neither baptism nor creeds were originally about believing anything. Of course those who were baptised and those who recited creeds believed things, and their beliefs were not unimportant, but the affirmations \( \tau \iota \sigma \tau \epsilon \iota \omega \) or credo were not used to denote their beliefs. Their affirmations certainly implied and presupposed beliefs,\(^7^3\) but \( \tau \iota \sigma \tau \epsilon \iota \omega \) or credo did not prefix the listing of those beliefs.
(ii) **Assessment**

In assessing Smith's approach to this Christian material, and his understanding of the faith implicit in the act of baptism, the following points may be made.

(a) It must certainly be accepted that baptism is concerned primarily with commitment rather than with beliefs.

(b) It is far from clear that Smith has demonstrated a 'transition' by which 'gradually' attention was diverted from the performative, self-committing meaning of *credo* to a mere statement of formulae of belief. Smith's study has certainly shown that *credo* and *πίστεως* have both been used with different meanings at different times, but it is far from clear that one use predates the other. Indeed the Nicene creed (325 AD) predates the account of baptism given by St. Cyril (c 315 - 386 AD), and there were certainly antecedent creeds emphasising the formulae of *πίστεως*, and baptismal rites emphasising the commitment of *πίστεως*.  

(c) There is evidence to suggest that from very early times baptism was seen to include both belief and faith. Smith himself quotes from Dom Gregory Dix in support of his view about the origin of the creeds, but he specifically omits the following passage from *The Shape of the Liturgy*,

>'From the earliest days repentance and the acceptance of the belief of the Church was the condition sine qua non of baptism into the Body of Christ, (Acts ii.38; viii.37; etc.) and formal interrogation as to both was made of converts before they received the sacraments'.  ⁷⁷

Repentance (μετανοια) is literally that 'right-about-face' of which Smith speaks and Acts 2.38 describes this as integral for baptism. Acts 8.37 is omitted from the best manuscripts, but was probably inserted under the influence of later practice. At the same time, 'acceptance of the belief of the church' is implied by St. Cyril's insistence upon the 'rebaptism' of
those baptised by heretical groups. In such groups a commitment had been made, but it lacked the basis of right beliefs, and so 'their former baptism was not baptism'.

St. Cyril's view of the rebaptism of heretics was not universally held, but there is considerable other evidence to support the view that in the early church the faith affirmed in baptism had a doctrinal content and an act of commitment. E. H. Gifford notes the occurrence of this view in Clement of Alexandria, the Apostolic Constitutions and St. John Chrysostom. The cognitive element of faith is also present in the prebaptismal preparation described by Justin Martyr, 'As many are persuaded and believe that which we teach and say is true, and undertake to live accordingly, are instructed to pray and entreat God ....'

(d) Belief and Faith in St. Cyril

In my view Smith has treated St. Cyril's lectures on baptism rather superficially, and at several points Smith's view is refuted by Cyril himself. Here I present just a few items from the lectures to which Smith pays little or no attention.

Most of the pre-baptismal, catechetical lectures consist of an exposition of the Jerusalem creed. In Lecture IV St. Cyril explains 'the reason for the teaching of the Creed and for expositions upon it'. He says that godliness consists of both 'pious doctrines' and 'virtuous practice', and that God accepts neither one without the other. He gives them 'a short summary of necessary doctrines'. The first is to be a foundation laid in the soul, 'the doctrine concerning God'. To hold wrong doctrine, though one be 'nobly temperate', amounts to being an 'impious blasphemer'. In several places the candidates are instructed to believe a proposition, for example 'Believe then that this only-begotten Son of God
for our sins came down from heaven upon earth'.

At the end of Lecture X, after giving evidence for the doctrines about Christ, first from scripture, then from the witness of the holy places in Jerusalem, St. Cyril called 'any one who formerly believed not, let him now believe; and if any one was before a believer, let him receive a greater increase of faith, by believing in our Lord Jesus Christ, and let him understand whose name he bears'. Here the candidates are called not to place their trust in Christ, but to consider the evidence of scripture and the events of his life (marked by the holy places which surrounded them in Jerusalem) and to move from unbelief to belief; from other opinions about Jesus Christ to the orthodox dogmas to which the evidence points.

The eleventh lecture begins with the charge: 'But we must not simply believe in Christ Jesus nor receive Him as one of the many who are improperly called Christs'. It seems to me that here St. Cyril calls the candidates to hold right opinions about Christ, so that their commitment to him might be undivided. If their commitment is to be sound, they must have a right understanding of the one to whom they commit themselves. Towards the end of the lecture, St. Cyril repeats the article of faith 'We believe in one Lord Jesus Christ ....' and follows it with a list of contrary opinions which are to be 'silenced'.

We could multiply many times these examples which clearly show that those being baptised were to hold right beliefs. Admittedly the ceremony of baptism itself was not primarily concerned with those beliefs, and no enquiry was made in it to the orthodoxy of the candidates' opinions. But it is not enough to say that these beliefs were merely 'implied' or 'presupposed' by the act of self-commitment, προσφυγή. Right beliefs were already engendered in the candidates through the catechesis, and the act of commitment was only possible in the context of those beliefs. Furthermore,
it is plain from our examples that the verb πιστεύω was in fact used to
denote both the act of commitment and the holding of right beliefs.

This is conclusively demonstrated by a final passage from St. Cyril's
fifth catechetical lecture.

'For the name of faith is in the form of speech one, but it has two
distinct senses. For there is one kind of faith, the dogmatic, ( τὸ
δοξομαθηματικὸν ) involving an assent of the soul on some particular
point: and it is profitable to the soul .... For if thou shalt believe
that ( τισευεις δαι ) Jesus Christ is Lord, and that God raised
Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved ....

'But there is a second kind of faith, which is bestowed by Christ as a
gift of grace .... this faith .... is not merely doctrinal, ( οὐ δοξομαθηματικὸν ἑστῖν ) but worketh things above men's power .... Have thou
therefore that faith in Him which cometh from thine own self, that
thou mayest also receive from Him that faith which worketh things
above man.' 92

St. Cyril seems to anticipate Smith's debate. The candidates are taught to
use their minds to reach a right opinion 93 and give assent to it. Cyril
asserts that this belief is enough for salvation, and involves the 'assent
of the soul' to which Christ himself adds his own gift of faith, that faith
which is 'not merely doctrinal, but .... worketh things above men's power'.
The close proximity of people of other faiths has brought the Christian Church in the West face to face with a great challenge. In the opinion of Max Warren it is a challenge which may make that of the impact of agnostic science seem like child's play by comparison. Several of Smith's works make a contribution towards meeting this challenge. This section centres upon one of Smith's early attempts to treat these issues, a lecture given in May 1961 to a group of theologians, Church historians and Biblicists, entitled 'The Christian in a Religiously Plural World', and reproduced as the second part of The Faith of Other Men.

(i) General Problems Affecting all Men of Faith

The fact of religious diversity poses problems which are intellectual, moral and theological, and which affect all men of faith and goodwill. Smith feels that we need a revolution in thinking similar to that of Newton. It was once thought that objects like apples, being on earth, fall to the ground, whereas the moon and the planets were thought to be subject to other forces such that they go round in circles above. It is now known that they are all subject to similar forces influencing their movements. In a similar fashion many Christians still feel that whereas 'the Christian's faith has come down from God, the Buddhist's goes round in the circles of purely human aspiration ....' There is an intellectual problem to be grappled with here.

The major moral problem which Smith sees as posed by religious diversity is that it disrupts community; and this too, is a problem to be tackled by all men of faith. From his early espousal of Marxist ideals to his latest
quest for a World Theology, Smith has insisted that 'Perhaps the single
most important challenge that faces mankind in our day is the need to turn
our nascent world society into a world community'.\(^97\) This life-long
preoccupation and constant quest for world community reveals what is
perhaps the greatest motivating force behind Smith's work. He is driven by
a moral imperative which finds its roots in his own Christian faith and in
all his contacts with people of other faiths.\(^98\) It is an imperative to
overcome the conflict, suspicion, ignorance and indifference in order to
value, to understand and to share. Smith believes 'that the task of
constructing even that minimum of world fellowship that will be necessary
for man to survive at all is far too great to be accomplished on any other
than a religious basis'.\(^99\) If there must be rivalry between religious
groups, let us 'rival each other in our determination and capacity to
promote reconciliation'.\(^100\) But his 'own prayer would be that we should not
compete in this but learn, somehow, out of loyalty each to our own vision,
to collaborate in it'.\(^101\)

Furthermore, religious diversity gives rise to theological problems
which face all men of faith. Whilst each community of faith must wrestle
with its own theological problems, there is ultimately a level at which
these must be shared in a common quest for theological (or
'transcendentological')\(^102\) conceptualizations of the ultimate. It is this
problem which Smith treats in \textit{Towards a World Theology}, and in the
conclusion of \textit{Faith and Belief}, although both of these go beyond the
Christian interests of the present chapter.

These are some of the general moral and intellectual problems which face
all men of good will as they look out on our religiously divided world.
What are the problems which Smith sees as confronting specifically the
Christian man of faith?
(ii) Moral Problems for Christian Faith

The Christian in a religiously plural world faces several moral challenges. First, by virtue of their faith they have an obligation to love their neighbour. In a sermon preached on the 9th August 1959, Smith reminds his congregation that in the parable of the Good Samaritan Jesus 'deliberately ... cuts across religious frontiers' in showing who is the neighbour to be loved.

Secondly, that love impels Christians to try to understand and appreciate the faith of other men. 'Let us not fool ourselves into thinking that we can love a Hindu .... if we refuse to take seriously what is his most precious possession, his faith, and if we are supercilious about the tradition through which he finds and nourishes it .... Other men might disdain an outsider's religious faith, but a Christian has no business doing so'. Such an understanding is not to be obtained easily, and there are many pressures to divert the Christian from this task. One practice which Smith believes is particularly unhelpful is that of labelling men as 'non-Christians'. In The Christian Century Smith writes, 'there is perhaps no more effective way of misunderstanding the faith of Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and so on than by thinking of them negatively, stressing what they are not, instead of acknowledging what they are'.

Thirdly, there are moral problems relating to Christian doctrines. On the one hand Smith accuses the Church of not putting into practice in its relations with people of other faith the practical or moral implications of its theology; whilst on the other hand he holds that some of its doctrinal formulations are not compatible with the moral imperative of the Christian faith. Smith refers to 'a lack of integration .... between the moral and intellectual facets of our relations with our fellowmen'.
It is Smith's contention that Christian affirmations about God's revelation of himself in Christ, about 'the ultimate power and truth and glory of the universe' embodied in Christ's 'life, and his death on the cross, and his final triumph out of the very midst of self-sacrifice' should lead Christians to certain kinds of action. They should be actively engaged in pursuit of

'reconciliation, unity, harmony, and brotherhood. At this level, all men are included: we strive to break down barriers, to close up gulfs; we recognize all men as neighbours, as fellows, as sons of the universal father, seeking Him and finding Him, being sought by Him, and being found by Him'.

Whilst it does not immediately follow, from the affirmation under discussion, that Christians 'should recognize all men as .... seeking Him and finding Him, being sought by Him, and being found by Him', it is clear that Christians do not live up to the implications of this lofty theological assertion in their relationships with people of other faith.

At the same time, Smith sees that there are other theological affirmations made by Christians which give rise to morally unacceptable behaviour and attitudes. As an example, he discusses the phrase 'Without the particular knowledge of God in Jesus Christ, men do not really know God at all'. Quite irrespective of the truth or otherwise of this statement, Smith contends that it is arrogant. It may have a limited value in the quiet confines of the study,

'But except at the cost of insensitivity and delinquence, it is morally not possible actually to go out into the world and say to devout, intelligent, fellow human beings: "We are saved and you are damned"; or "We believe that we know God, are we right; you believe that you know God, and you are totally wrong".'

'Here my submission is that on this front the traditional doctrinal position of the Church has in fact militated against its traditional moral position, and has in fact encouraged Christians to approach other men immorally. Christ has taught us humility, but we have approached them with arrogance'.

'Any position that antagonizes and alienates rather than reconciles, that is arrogant rather than humble, that promotes segregation rather than brotherhood, that is unlovely, is ipso facto un-Christian'.

137
Again Smith gives another example; of those who argue that if Christianity is true, then it must follow that all other religions are false. Smith argues, in a passage which is in my view one of his most powerful (and therefore I have quoted it in full) that this 'gets tied up in un-Christian knots'.

'It is possible to go on to the converse position: that if anyone else's faith turns out to be valid or adequate, then it would follow that Christianity must be false - a form of logic that has, in fact, driven many from their own faith, and indeed from any faith at all. If one's chances of getting to heaven are dependent upon other people's not getting there, then one becomes walled up within the quite intolerable position that the Christian has a vested interest in other men's damnation. When an observer comes back from Asia, or from a study of Asian religious traditions, and reports that, contrary to accepted theory, some Hindus and Buddhists and some Muslims lead a pious and moral life and seem very near to God by any possible standard, so that, so far as one can see, in these particular cases at least faith is as "adequate" as Christian faith, then presumably a Christian should be overjoyed, enthusiastically hopeful that this be true, even though he might be permitted a fear lest it not be so. Instead, I have sometimes witnessed just the opposite: an emotional resistance to the news, men hoping firmly that it is not so, though perhaps with a covert fear that it might be. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the situation theoretically, I submit that practically this is just not Christian. It will not do, to have a faith that can be undermined by God's saving one's neighbour.'

Before turning to the theological problems which confront the Christian as he grapples with the fact of religious diversity, the following observations and comments may be made.

(a) In this 'lack of integrity' which Smith has rightly discerned, he shows an admitted preference for the moral over the theological, so that Christian theology must change if it falls short of ethical ideals. But according to Smith, both 'theological systems .... and .... moral codes' fall into the category of cumulative tradition and are thus subject to continual change. How is one aspect of the tradition to be rated as more fixed than another?

(b) It may be possible to hold an exclusive theology whilst resisting
the arrogance which Smith deplores. Indeed the humility of Christ before
the religious leaders after his arrest was all the more praiseworthy in
view of his known convictions about them. At the deepest level there
were profound theological and religious differences between them, which
Jesus sometimes expressed in quite 'arrogant' terms, but still he knew
how to be humble before them.

Whilst it is certainly true that the teachings and example of Christ
encourage humility rather than arrogance, it is difficult to see how this
applies to propositional statements of doctrine. Is not the locus of
arrogance, like that of faith and truth, persons not propositions? Perhaps
propositions can become arrogant if people choose or acquiesce in using
them arrogantly.

Some doctrinal statements may have encouraged some Christians to
approach other men immorally or arrogantly. At the same time it is not
necessary for a man who accepts the statement 'Without the particular
knowledge of God in Jesus Christ, men do not really know God at all' to
accost any 'devout, intelligent, fellow human being' with an assertion that
'We believe that we know God and we are right; you believe that you know
God, and you are totally wrong'.

(c) In view of the example of Jesus to which we have referred, it is
very difficult to accept Smith's assertion that 'any position that
antagonizes and alienates .... promotes segregation .... is ipso facto
un-Christian'. The message as well as the activity of Jesus antagonized
and alienated many, it segregated people into those who heard, received and
obeyed, and those who rejected. This is part of the hard evidence which the
observer must also report. A theology or theory of religion which fails to
account for rejection as well as acceptance of the gospel may be just as
(iii) Theological Problems for Christian Faith

The Christian in the face of religious diversity faces not only moral problems, but also theological ones. He is confronted with the need to express conceptually his faith, in the light of the data of comparative religious studies. Wilfred Cantwell Smith touches on these theological issues in all his major books, and several important articles. This section continues to focus on his presentation in The Faith of Other Men, part II, despite the fact that he makes further refinements in his later works. The later developments result from his personalist notion of truth, outlined in Questions of Religious Truth, and his recognition of the distinction between faith, belief and theological formulations, as found in the concluding chapter of Faith and Belief.

Smith's aim in analysing some of the theological problems is not so much to propose a watertight alternative to traditional Christian doctrine, but to indicate some of the factors to be taken into consideration in the formulation of such an alternative. He presents his major problem in two ways: 'how to account, theologically for the fact of man's religious diversity?'; and the question 'as to whether or how far or how non-Christians are saved, or know God'. These two questions are obviously very closely related, but before concentrating on the second, Smith remarks that, so far as he knows the first 'has got .... almost no serious answers of any kind'.

The second question has received considerable attention, and Smith limits himself to a discussion of the answer we have already seen: 'Without the
particular knowledge of God in Jesus Christ, men do not really know God at all. Smith emphasises that there is of course, a very positive affirmation here of basic and ultimate Christian faith, for 'in Christ God died for us men and for our salvation, .... through faith in him we are saved.' This central, positive affirmation 'must be preserved' in any 'new formulations' which may be produced. But there is also a negative aspect which gives rise to several difficulties: epistemological, empirical and internal.

On the level of epistemology, Smith contends that whilst it may be possible to assert reasons for knowing that one's own faith is true and valid, it is difficult to present cogent grounds for knowing that the faith of people in other traditions is false. He suggests that most people make this judgement on the basis of logical implications from theoretical premises. Smith is not prepared to give that much place to the force of logic: 'The damnation of my neighbour is too weighty a matter to rest on a syllogism.'

Smith's empirical observations suggest to him that, in contrast to the negative pronouncement of the doctrinal statement, there are many individuals in other religious traditions who appear to know God. Amongst his personal friends there are those whom he feels it would be 'preposterous to think about in any other way'. This argument has already been seen above, and elsewhere Smith calls for 'theological .... pronouncements about the religious life of men outside the Christian Church (to) be inductive, based on some actual knowledge of those men and their religious life'. He is highly critical of those who write negatively about the faith of other men on the basis of their own Christian premises, and claim the authority of revelation against any rational argument or empirical data. In an impassioned review of a book by Emmanuel Kellerhals,
Smith writes that their 'position seems thoroughly logical, and once one has walled oneself up within it, impregnable. Those of us who, after our study of Islam ..., have come to know that these religious traditions are ..., channels through which God Himself comes into touch with these His children - what answer can we give?' 133

Smith likens this refusal to take note of the empirical evidence to the nineteenth century refusal to accept that the world was more than six thousand years old. A theological response to religious pluralism must involve accepting the empirical evidence that there are people of faith in all religious traditions. This does not involve rejecting divine revelation, although it does mean recognizing that revelation is always subject to human, and therefore fallible, interpretation. To change our interpretation of the revealed word, as a result of empirical observation, is not the same as to dispense with revelation altogether. The notion of divine revelation survived the nineteenth century crisis.

Finally, Smith questions whether the doctrinal statement about men not really knowing God who do not know him in Jesus Christ is consistent with the rest of Christian theology. Quoting again from Smith's review of Kellerhals' Der Islam:

'If God is what Jesus Christ has revealed Him to be, a loving, personal Father, searching out sinners to forgive them, yearning to bring them into fellowship with Himself and all His children .... then God is not remote from Muslims .... If He is willing to suffer on the Cross for my sake, then He will not let Himself be frustrated by a theological proposition from reaching out to a sincere, devout, humble and pious member of the Muslim world who seeks Him'. 134

Smith's ultimate criticism, then, of this and other orthodox doctrinal statements, is that they fail to treat God seriously as Jesus has revealed him to be. It is the Christian's faith itself which demands a change in his theology.

These considerations lead Smith to make two very cautious suggestions about the shape of an alternative theological position. First, it 'may
perhaps run along the lines of affirming that a Buddhist who is saved, or a Hindu, or a Muslim or whatever, is saved, and is saved only, because God is the kind of God whom Jesus Christ has revealed Him to be.\textsuperscript{135} Then he poses a question in the form 'Does God let Himself be known only to those whom He has let Himself be known through Christ? Does God love only those who respond to Him in this tradition?'\textsuperscript{136}

The aim of this study is not to solve the theological questions which Smith has raised, still less to attempt to create a satisfying Christian theology of other religions, but to state and assess his treatment of this Christian material. The following brief points may be made.

(a) Smith has pin-pointed a very real theological problem for Christians. The Christian Church still has to find answers to these questions. It may be said that these questions are being tackled in some quarters of the church, and that some shift from the traditional position has seems to be the trend, but it is far from clear where this process of theological reflection will end.\textsuperscript{137}

(b) In relation to Smith's question about the origins of religious diversity, which he feels has received 'almost no serious answers'.\textsuperscript{138} In fact a considerable amount of energy has been given to this question by historians of religion, and by conservative missionary theologians.\textsuperscript{139}

(c) Smith's treatment of the epistemological problems involved in the area of interreligious theology is rather limited. He is right to draw attention to the problem of asserting that another person does not know God. It is equally hard to see how 'an observer' can establish empirically
that a man of another faith does know God.\textsuperscript{140} This 'empirical', or even 'historical', method begs more epistemological questions than it solves moral problems.

This concludes the chapter on Smith's approach to various items from the Christian tradition. He tries to show that personal faith, rather than belief, is the central concern of the New Testament and of early baptismal rites and credal affirmations. In approaching Christianity, then, Smith wants to focus attention upon the personal commitment and trust which characterizes the individual participants. He sees Christians as sharing this basic human quality of faith with all persons of faith, irrespective of the religious tradition in which their faith was formed. This insight, Smith insists, must influence the way in which Christians relate to people of other faith.

Smith's approach is thus to centre on the faith of the persons involved. Whilst this is a most helpful emphasis, Smith fails to do full justice to those elements of the tradition which speak of the necessity for right beliefs to accompany and facilitate the act of commitment and the life of trust.
Chapter 5. Conclusion

Wilfred Cantwell Smith's concept of faith has received considerable attention from numerous scholars in various disciplines. His basic emphasis on the personal dimension of religious life has been widely applauded as a necessary antidote to an excessively detached study of religion. But his concept of faith and his approach to religious life have also been widely criticised for a variety of reasons.

The foregoing chapters have outlined Smith's concept of faith, and illustrated and assessed it in the context of Islamic and Christian material. This final chapter analyses various critical responses, and attempts to evaluate the concept of faith as a tool with which to approach and understand Islam and Christianity.
Smith contends that the term 'religion' is too ambiguous and misleading a concept to focus on as the object of Religious Studies. He holds that the word 'religion' should no longer be used, except perhaps in an adjectival form to denote inner piety or religiousness. In the same way he advocates the abandonment of the names of the 'religions' - Hinduism, Christianity, etc. - as these are reifications which wrongly suggest that religion and the religions have an essence, and detract from the inner heart of faith. It was against this dissatisfaction with a concept of 'religion' that Smith presented his alternative concepts of faith and cumulative tradition.

Most scholars, even those who accept the basic principles of Smith's work, wish to retain the word 'religion' and the names of at least some of the religions. Some of the arguments in defence of religion are presented below.

a. Religion has an essence.

In contrast to Wilfred Cantwell Smith there are many who would argue that in fact religion does have an essence, although not necessarily a fixed and static essence. Two studies which relate this question specifically to a discussion of Smith's work argue that Christianity and Islam each have an essence.

In an article entitled 'The Essence of Christianity', S.W. Sykes is critical of 'Smith's attempt to connect the quest for the essence of Christianity solely with the Enlightenment'. Sykes has traced the phrase 'essence of Christianity' back to a controversy between John Edwards and John Locke in the years following Locke's *Reasonableness of Christianity* as
delivered in the Scriptures.² That debate makes specific reference to accounts by Tertullian of the regula fidei. Far from originating in the Enlightenment,

'the question of the "essence of Christianity" is continuous with the very long-standing debate about which of the articles of Christian faith were binding on all believers and what the status was of theological enquiry outside these articles'.³

In the case of Islam a similar criticism is made by Isma‘īl Raji al Fārūqī.⁴ He observes that to his knowledge no Muslim or Orientalist has ever before denied or questioned that Islām has an essence. He insists that Islamic scholars have always seen Islām as 'a coherent, autonomous system of truths about reality, of imperatives for action and of desiderata for all kinds and levels of human activity .... at the center of this system stood God ....'.⁵ This position is expanded in al Fārūqī's later book Tawḥīd: Its Implications for Thought and Life,⁶ in which Tawḥīd, the principle of the unity of God, is expounded as 'The Essence of Religious Experience', and 'The Quintessence of Islām'. Tawḥīd is also presented as the central principle of history, knowledge, metaphysics, ethics, social order, the ummah, the family, political order, economic order, world order, and esthetics.⁷

b. Reification is Inevitable in Religious Life.

Smith rejects the word 'religion' because in his view this tends to encourage the reification of piety. It makes 'religion into a thing, gradually coming to conceive it as an objective systematic entity'.⁸ Religion thus becomes an ideal, existing somewhere in heaven and given as a complete system to be followed by adherents; it becomes a non-human thing, rather than a personalistic involvement.
The notion of reification is one derived from the social sciences referring to the process by which social systems come to be regarded as objective reality. Reified systems become constructs having a life of their own, independent of the persons who generated them and imposing a structure of reality upon people. Studies in the sociology of knowledge suggest that reification has an essential part to play both in social cohesion and in personal individuation:

"it would .... be a mistake to look at reification as a perversion of an originally non-reified apprehension of the social world, a sort of cognitive fall from grace. On the contrary, the available ethnological and psychological evidence seems to indicate the opposite, namely, that the original apprehension of the social world is highly reified both phylogenetically and ontogenetically." 9

A reified conception of reality seems to be an inevitable and essential part of socialization, even if a dialectic is recognized between the 'given' order and the individual's actions such that they modify each other.

It may be argued that the problem of reification runs deep and is central to our understanding of religion. Reification implies that the human object under consideration has been converted into or apprehended as a thing established as an eternal construct. It is not possible to speak of reification in the case of, say, the traditional Muslim view of the revelation of the Qur'an to Muhammad. In the Muslim view to speak of an eternal construct would not be to reify that which was a human product, but to recognize it for what it is. Reification can only be said to have occurred where a human product has been wrongly elevated to the status of an eternal construct. In other words, Smith's very use of the notion of reification makes his analysis unacceptable to those who like al Faruqi regard their religion as a given from God.

If one is ready to go along with Smith in this respect, however, his solution does not exclude its own form of reification. In my opinion
cumulative tradition and, to a lesser extent, faith are themselves in danger of reification. Smith's designation of cumulative tradition as a 'human construct' which is passed from one generation to another; personalised and transmitted; 'the mundane cause of the faith of men in the present' is already suggestive of reification. As soon as Smith uses expressions like 'The Faith of Other Men' or 'the faith of Buddhists' the danger of a reification of faith is as real as it is in 'the religion of other men'.

c. Barth's rejection of 'religion' is not compatible with Smith's.

It was noted at page 26, above, that Wilfred Cantwell Smith refers to various Christian and other scholars who call for the rejection of 'religion'. He claims these as supporting his own thesis. But many of these writers (especially Barth, Brunner, Bonhoeffer and Tillich) criticise 'religion' in a way fundamentally different from that of Smith.

C. Douglas Jay insists that Barth, Brunner and Bonhoeffer reject religion 'not on the ground that man's cumulative traditions are not adequately comprehended in a blanket concept, but because human tradition tends to become an idolatrous substitute for the divine word.' In fact the position is more subtle than Jay allows. For Smith also deplores the reification of human tradition as if it were the eternal word. Smith could well argue that these German theologians were rejecting a concept of religion which lacked precisely the concept of faith to which he draws attention.

Certainly for Barth, this meant rejecting all religions other than Christianity - which stood beyond 'religion' because it was 'the sole vehicle of salvation'. This is a view which Smith explicitly rejects,
so it is hard to see how he can claim Barth's support for his thesis.

d. The Ambiguities of 'religion' are Inherent.

Smith argues that the diversities of meanings which have been applied to religion make it an ambiguous and confusing term.

In my view Smith has not demonstrated that this ambiguity is inappropriate. It could be argued, as it is for example by Ninian Smart,\textsuperscript{18} that religion is essentially multi-dimensional and that an aspect of human life so diverse must of necessity be subjected to a wide range of interpretations.

In the cases of Islam and Christianity Smith devotes considerable space to arguing that the 'reified' notions of religion as systematic entities and institutionalized structures are late developments. His argument in the case of Islam is discussed in section 3.1., above, where his treatment is shown to be far from conclusive. As al Fārūqī comments, Smith has failed to demonstrate the 'necessary incompatibility of reification with religiosity'.\textsuperscript{19}

(ii) The Cumulative Tradition

The concept of cumulative tradition has been recognized as a valuable one by several writers. Eric Sharpe\textsuperscript{20} finds it a helpful reminder that each individual in a group does not share precisely the same tradition - it is specific to each participant. David Miller\textsuperscript{21} finds cumulative tradition a useful tool in discerning the sources of Hindu ethics because it focuses attention away from the classical Sanskrit texts and onto the persons of

150
faith who wrote them and use them. In Miller's view 'the dynamic, sacred
centre of Hinduism is .... the enlightened guru, whose charismatic
leadership creates the institution for philosophical, religious and social
change'. This corresponds closely to Smith's notion of cumulative
tradition, and illustrates the dialectic between faith and cumulative
tradition. A further benefit of the concept of cumulative tradition is as a
reminder of the interrelatedness of the religious traditions.

But the notion of cumulative tradition has also been criticised on a
number of counts. It was noted above that Eric Sharpe applauded the
reminder that each individual in a group should not be assumed to share
precisely the same tradition. At the same time, and rather paradoxically,
Sharpe makes the point that

'Perhaps it needs to be stressed more strongly than Smith is prepared
to that there is a corporate, as well as individual cumulative
tradition.'

Pyle finds an implicit dualism in Smith's notion of cumulative
tradition for it suggests that the mundane religious paraphernalia are of
limited importance, and separable from the question of any relationship
with the transcendent. In Pyle's view, the religious paraphernalia are
valued 'in themselves as elements of a relationship of absolute worth.'

This point is taken up and clarified in an excellent summary and
critique of The Meaning and End of Religion by the Swedish Theologian
Hallencreutz examines the dialectic which Smith sees operating between
faith and cumulative tradition but finds Smith's emphasis on the creative
and decisive rôle of personal faith in the history of religion to involve
an undervaluation of the equally decisive symbolic function of the
religious phenomena. Christian theology emphasises 'the impact of the
"sacred" on the history of religion' and makes it necessary 'to extend
Smith's view of the dialectic between the transcendent and the mundane and consider .... how far the divine mediates through the material provided by "cumulative tradition" when creating the nurturing "personal faith".\(^\text{30}\)

This is essentially the objection of many phenomenologists of religion, who on the whole get a rather bad hearing from Smith.\(^\text{31}\) They wish to insist that the phenomena of the tradition matter in themselves since it is these that are valued by participants as occasioning the encounter with the transcendent.

In my opinion it is possible to make too much of the divide between Smith and the phenomenologists of religion. Ninian Smart has written critically of Smith in several places,\(^\text{32}\) yet he is willing to concede the importance of Smith's emphasis on the 'human dimension of religion'.\(^\text{33}\) At the same time Smith produced a series of radio talks, later reproduced in The Faith of Other Men\(^\text{34}\) containing a good deal of material which would not be out of place in a similar work by a phenomenologist.

(iii) Faith

a. Faith must be defined in relation to its object.

In 1973 Eric Sharpe took up Smith's suggestion that the conceptualization of religion in terms of faith and cumulative tradition should be tested in the area of inter-religious dialogue.\(^\text{35}\) After summarizing his own view of dialogue Sharpe asks how Smith's analysis might be of use. He is happy with cumulative tradition, as was noted above.\(^\text{36}\) But with the concept of faith Sharpe is less persuaded for he insists that 'faith exists only in relation to a highly specific understanding of the object of faith'.\(^\text{37}\) In Sharpe's view it is not possible to abstract faith
from the transcendent 'object' whom the partner in dialogue trusts, nor from the imagery and symbolism with which it is attended.\textsuperscript{38}

Sharpe's article is followed by a rejoinder from Smith,\textsuperscript{39} in which he struggles to show that their views do not differ as much as Sharpe supposes. 'I have been at great pains to try to insist that I am not "defining" faith and especially not specifying its content, nor even its shape'.\textsuperscript{40} But this is precisely Sharpe's criticism, faith must be defined, and it must be defined in terms of its specific content and object. As an abstract concept, separated from these concerns which are central for religious persons, the notion is of no value. Smith is right to point out that one's faith is in God, not in one's conception of God; but to this extent he concedes Sharpe's point.\textsuperscript{41} In his later works Smith tries to justify a treatment of faith as a human quality in its own right, independent of its 'object'.\textsuperscript{42}

b. The Corporate Nature of Faith.

Smith has been criticised by several, notably British, writers for failing to give sufficient weight to 'the corporate nature of faith'.\textsuperscript{43} In the words of the Doctrine Commision of the Church of England,

'We do not just take from the tradition what is meaningful to us, but we feel with our indebtedness a sense of obligation. The tradition is not there for us to do just what we like with it. We choose to stand within it, to associate ourselves with it and to become, humanly speaking, responsible for it.' \textsuperscript{44}

In this way we gain a sense of 'belonging'\textsuperscript{45} and hold to a shared faith in which even those who lack mental abilities (the young or handicapped) may be a part - even if they appear incapable of faith in Smith's sense.

This is a point also made by Kenneth Cragg, who is concerned that
Smith's personalist interpretation of religion 'is liable to atomize shared, and indeed corporate, realities'. Cragg's book The Christian and Other Religion deliberately takes note of The Meaning and End of Religion in its title: using the singular 'religion' to designate 'living commitment .... beyond the formal category, the heart rather than the system'. But Cragg contends that Smith overstates his case 'when he claims that each "personal submittingness - if we may use such a term - is, of course, quite distinct from any other person's". Cragg responds, 'I, speaking English, am unique; but the English I speak is not unique to me. Is it not more deeply so with faith than with language?'

In response to this sort of criticism, Smith gave considerable space to the issue in his later books. In Belief and History he replies:

'I would say .... that by "religious" I mean personal, so long as one is not so individualistic still as to imagine that personal is over against social. On the contrary: the counterpart of social is individual, the counterpart of personal is impersonal. An individual becomes a person in society; and a society becomes a community by being personal, just as it becomes dehumanized, a juxtaposition or congeries of alienations, by being impersonal.'

Smith clearly does not advocate any form of isolated individualism, yet, in my opinion, there remains an overvaluation of the individual aspect of religious life at the expense of the corporate.

c. The Impossibility of Knowing the Faith of Another Person.

If Smith's understanding of religion in terms of cumulative tradition and faith is accepted, there remains the question as to whether it is possible to investigate and know the faith of another person. A.R.Gualtieri has produced several articles which sympathetically analyse Smith's concept of faith yet he finds it necessary to ask 'Can We Know the Religious Faith of Others?' He follows Smith with an affirmative answer based on
the evidence of inferences from external behaviour, of disclosures of faith by friends, and of the interpretive role played by the personal faith of the enquirer.

Smith himself insists that there are limits to an observer's ability to penetrate another's faith: 'the student's first responsibility is to recognize that there is always and in principle more in any man's faith than any other man can see.'\(^{52}\) But Gualtieri observes that there is another limitation. The possibility of knowing another's faith is limited to 'where there is an essential similarity of faith in the observer and the observed'.\(^{53}\) The extent to which this limits the task of knowing others' faith depends upon how widespread is such similarity of faith. For:

'the kind of apprehension of the faith of another about which Smith is talking is fundamentally the recognition that the personal faith or selfhood of another person, though induced and expressed by a different tradition, is akin to one's own. It is not a matter of knowing another faith, strictly speaking, but of recognizing the essential identity of another's self-understanding with one's own'.\(^{54}\)

The question of how far it is possible to know the faith of another is taken a step further by R D Baird\(^{55}\) in a telling assessment of Smith's *The Faith of Other Men*. This book was first published in 1963, although it had been delivered as a series of radio broadcasts in 1962. It is, in my view, one of Smith's most delightful books, attempting to reach a non-specialist audience and constituting an excellent non-technical introduction to his approach.

*The Faith of Other Men* aims to provide an understanding of what it feels like to be Buddhist or Muslim, etc., to come to an understanding of a Buddhist's or a Muslim's faith. In order to reach this aim, Smith attempts to present his listeners with a single item from the tradition of each of the religious communities under consideration and tries to understand the meaning which these items have for the participants. It also involves
treats seriously what religious adherents have to say for themselves about their faith and the particular items under consideration. In my view Smith fails to achieve his aim.

In the case of the Hindus, for example, after introducing tat tvam asi as the item from the Hindu tradition, Smith immediately turns not to Hindu eyes but to his listeners/readers: "you" - (each one of you reading this book) - are in some final, cosmic sense the total and transcendent truth that underlies all being.56 All his examples or applications of this dictum are Western, and he concludes the chapter with a theological comparison with Christianity. One comes away with a profound sense of what a Western comparativist intellectual has understood by tat tvam asi, but still wondering what it feels like to a Hindu to view the world through this symbol.

The same may be said for the chapter on the faith of Muslims. Here the symbol examined from the Islamic tradition is the shahadah 'there is no God but God, and Muhammad is his apostle'. In asking the question 'What belief is presumed, for those who go on to commitment?'57 Smith deliberately chooses aspects which are not particularly representative of Muslim thought. For example 'This (belief) has not been widespread, even among (the mystics); yet I mention it because I personally find it attractive'.58 Again in the chapter on 'The Chinese', Smith writes 'what I myself see in the yang-yin symbol ..... if I may be allowed this personal note.....59 So much for seeing the matter through Muslim or Chinese eyes.

It is the chapter on the faith of Buddhists that R D Baird criticises in a similar way. The symbol chosen here is a Burmese village initiation rite of Shin Byu - a reenactment of Siddhartha Gautama's Going Out. As elsewhere Smith's aim is to understand the faith of the participants: 'Can we learn something of that faith, and appreciate in part the inner meaning, by
exploring the significance of these outward forms? .... the task of comparative religion (is) to ascertain .... what these things mean to those who participate in them .60 Much of what follows in the chapter consists of descriptive material such as one might find in a text book of a phenomenologist of religion (it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise). Only two pages are devoted to an attempt to apprehend the meaning of this ceremony to the participating parents and boys. Smith admits that we cannot fully apprehend what the ceremony means to the participants, and that it will differ from boy to boy. He therefore resorts to the expedient that we must 'generalize, but we should remember that that is what we are doing'.61 Finally Smith can say no more than 'I leave you to judge'62 what are the impressions, spiritual overtones, sense of nostalgia, sense of mischief, etc., which a boy might feel as he seets off to the monastery outside the village; and 'who can tell', he asks,63 what the ceremony means to the sophisticated, educated man as he remembers his experience. It is here that R.D.Baird comments, 'this is precisely the point: who can tell?'.64

It is impossible to know the faith of another - that seems to be the conclusion forced upon us by this work. If Smith with all his insight cannot penetrate and bring to light the personal faith of another, how shall a less experienced student? But even if this is the conclusion to which this book points us, it also shows us the value of the attempt. For here is a book which gives central place to the personal qualities of observer and man of faith in the study of religion.
The basic thesis that faith is not the same as belief has received almost universal support from scholars of various persuasions. For some this has led to the sort of radical reappraisal for which Smith yearns. Others have held that this thesis is not as radical as he supposes. But other scholars, whilst accepting his thesis that faith is not the same as belief, continue to wonder if Smith has properly elucidated the nature of faith and its relation to belief.

Before considering some of the more fundamental objections to Smith's elucidation of faith and its relation to belief, there are a number of writers who criticise specific aspects of his presentation. These are primarily concerned with the Christian material, since this constitutes the major portion of both Belief and History and Faith and Belief, and also because the work has not yet received as much critical attention as it deserves from scholars of other traditions.

First, his treatment of Aquinas has been described as 'shallow' by Horvath and confusing by Swinburne. It appears that Smith has confused Aquinas's notion of faith (fides) with that of formed faith (fides formata). Secondly, although Swinburne finds Smith's treatment of baptism in St Cyril of Jerusalem persuasive, I have subjected it to analysis in section 4.2. above, and found it to be inadequate. Thirdly, Smith's treatment of Vatican I, Augustine and other varia receive brief critical comments in the reviews of Horvath and Swinburne.

As to the more substantial matters, Smith's treatment of modern linguistic philosophers has been subjected to considerable criticism. It has already been noted above that Smith admits a lack of serious acquaintance with their work, and he is criticised for failing to show the
same sensitivity to their endeavours as he does to those from other religious traditions. This means that Smith's use of terms like believe, presuppose, recognise, see, know, etc., are not related to modern philosophical usage; and 'new' and 'modern' are used as pejorative terms. This leads to 'tendentious' distinctions being made between these terms. Wiebe accuses Smith of a naive epistemology because of the way he tries to distinguish between belief and presupposition such that he wrongly equates unconscious presuppositions with knowledge. Swinburne also argues that Smith's preference for the term 'recognise' in biblical passages does not achieve his purpose of excluding a notion of holding propositions, for to recognise already includes the idea of 'believing - that'.

His failure to consider some of the issues raised by modern philosophical treatment of faith and belief has left Belief and History and Faith and Belief 'philosophically obscure'. In view of this philosophical obscurity, a number of writers are left puzzled about how to understand Smith's concept of faith, and what precisely is its relation to belief. Cupitt 'doesn't quite know whether he is a thoroughgoing American pragmatist who in the end takes a non-cognitive view of faith - or whether his view is in some sense cognitive.' It is perhaps a similar confusion which made Hick uncertain about whether Smith included creeds and theologies as parts of the cumulative tradition. Wiebe is similarly bewildered by Smith's capacity to give seemingly incompatible definitions of faith: some explaining faith as 'inseparable from belief', others as 'quite other than belief'. Wiebe feels that Smith does not determine 'whether the relationship (between faith and belief) is one of necessity or merely one of contingency.'

In my view it is clear that Smith's concept of faith is non-propositional - he repeatedly insists that faith is a human quality,
not a holding of various propositions. Yet Smith's concept of faith has to do with man's total response to the transcendent. He cannot accept an understanding of faith as solely a matter of the will or the intellect or any other 'part' of our human life. It is precisely the orientation of the whole of human life which Smith calls faith. Our participation in all the dimensions of the cumulative tradition, including beliefs, is made meaningful by faith. But Smith's presentation of his non-propositional position is sometimes obscured by his almost total concentration on the intellectual dimension or expression of faith, and his insistence that we still have an obligation to get our beliefs right. For Smith, belief remains a major category in Religious Studies, but it can never be regarded as the major category.

(v) Faith and Truth

Smith's understanding of truth has received considerable attention from reviewers of his work. There is a major strength in Smith's affirmation that the locus of truth is persons. Truth is not merely a matter for abstract philosophical debate, but an issue of moral integrity for all people. Smith's affirmation has established the conviction that Race expresses: 'Truth, especially in religious matters, belongs within a whole context of life and culture'.

A further strength is Smith's formulation that religious material can become true for participants by faith. This has given encouragement to the view that the various religious traditions are 'historical embodiments of the same impulse to realize - to make real and authentic - the experience of God - in the lives of individuals'. On this personalist understanding of truth, the rôle of faith is clear: 'a personal response in faith to a
divine initiative which only becomes authentic as a consequence of the individual's response to the divine. Truth is to be attained, or better, experienced, in the situations of everyday life. In this sense the personal appropriation and moral dimension of truth are more important for the development and maintenance of faith.

But the problem remains as to how faith may be expressed in terms of true beliefs. It has already been noted that Smith considers this to be an 'imperative obligation' upon men and women of faith. In Swinburne's terms, the obligation is in earnest, for 'you cannot get to London, let alone to heaven, without some true beliefs'. For he insists that even viewing faith in terms of commitment and response, this includes recognizing, seeing the truth, and that already implies the 'belief-that' things are as recognized.

This inevitably leads to the problem of conflicting truth-claims. For differing religious traditions, and indeed differing religious persons, have responded to the 'imperative obligation' to express their faith in terms of true beliefs. In the process they have come up with expressions which are not just different, but contradictory. For example, Smith in one place describes the Christian movement as 'an upsurge of a new recognition in human history .... (the insight that) .... God is not simply high and lifted up, in the sanctuary, He is a carpenter in a small town'. But using the word recognize does not remove the problem of conflicting truth-claims, for, as I observed above, there are also those who have recognized a God who is so exalted and set apart that he could not possibly be a carpenter; and such people have lived a life of faith in the light of this insight.

Even if we accept Smith's reservations, the problem of conflicting truth-claims remains. Differing statements concerning the truth are not
only an invitation to synthesis by the process of dialogue,\textsuperscript{96} they also remain as pointers to fundamentally differing apprehensions of ultimate reality.\textsuperscript{97} In the eyes of traditional people of faith their own apprehensions of reality are seen as sufficiently close to the mind and purpose of God to negate Tillich's dictum 'faith, if it takes its symbols literally becomes idolatrous'.\textsuperscript{98} In this case our discussion has returned to the question of the place given to the religious phenomena.\textsuperscript{99} Is it possible to distinguish 'assent to the truth as such', from assent to the symbols which 'become true by faith', and 'through which the truth is conveyed'?\textsuperscript{100}

(vi) World Community

This study of faith in Wilfred Cantwell Smith would be incomplete without a statement about its implications for world community. Since his very earliest works Smith has been concerned for the political outworking of his intellectual interests.\textsuperscript{101}

For this reason there is always a visionary element in Smith's writing which sometimes makes it come across like a sermon. One reviewer has referred to Smith's 'dream' of a world community and world theology;\textsuperscript{102} another writes of the 'complex motivation' which inspires Smith's work.\textsuperscript{103}

Faith must give rise to socio-political expression. In our religiously plural world there is an obvious need for respect, for clarifying our mutual understandings and relating together in the formation of a new world community in which the transcendent is recognized.

Smith's vision of a world community is based upon a specific theological understanding of the gospel. In his view the gospel imperative demands
reconciliation, unity, harmony, and brotherhood .... all men are included: we strive to break down barriers, to close gulfs; we recognize all men as neighbours, as fellows, as sons of the universal father .... At this level, we do not become truly Christian until we have reached out towards a community that turns all mankind into one total "we". 104

At one level, no Christians would wish to disent from this call for justice for all, but many would feel it necessary to keep hold of the more divisive and painful aspects of the gospel, which find little place in Smith's package. It may also be argued that Smith is willing to sacrifice too much of the particularity of each tradition in achieving his dream. He wants Christians, for example, to move away from a Christocentric theology towards a less problematic theocentrism. 105

(vii) Approaching Islām and Christianity

Chapters 3 and 4 examined Wilfred Cantwell Smith's treatment of various items from the Islamic and Christian traditions. These chapters included critiques of his presentations and his approach. Despite his known dislike for methodology, 106 his approach embodies a methodology of his own. 107 Islām and Christianity are to be understood in terms of faith and cumulative tradition, all the emphasis being on the demonstration that faith has primacy over all other considerations.

But one comes away from a study of his approach to Islamic and Christian material with a distinct impression that he has in many cases read his conclusions into the data. Examples of this in the case of Islām: it is far from clear that a gradual process of reification can be observed from a study of Arabic booktitles; 108 it is far from obvious that those who held a 'reified' notion of islām were 'less sensitively religious', and he makes
no attempt to examine the strengths they saw in an institutionalized, systematized *islām*.\(^\text{109}\) In the case of Christianity: in his treatment of the biblical material, Smith is simply wrong to say that the first Christians did not think that they believed anything.\(^\text{110}\) In the case of Aquinas and St Cyril, Smith seems to have missed the material which does not accord with his conceptual presuppositions.\(^\text{111}\) In his excessive emphasis on the inner dimension of faith, Smith almost seems to lose sight of the major part which the outer dimensions of belief and institution also play in the religious life. In several sections of *The Meaning and End of Religion* further evidence and substantiation is required to support his thesis.\(^\text{112}\)

This leads on to a further criticism. If the study of religion is the study of personal faith, and the quality of a student's research is to some extent determined by his ability to empathize with the faith of another, then this approach seems to have a built-in filter which will ensure the exclusion of divergent material and the inclusion of spurious material. There are several examples of this in Smith, such as his treatment of St Cyril on beliefs, and his inclusion of an obscure mystical interpretation of the *shahādah* which happened to 'speak' to him.\(^\text{113}\)

Finally, in my opinion, Smith's insistence on the universal quality of human faith and his vision of world community have led him to an unacceptable treatment of religious pluralism. It has led to a gross underplaying of the significance of particularity in religious life, as was discussed above in some detail.\(^\text{114}\) It has also led to an unacceptable view of human integrity. In his treatment of Christian and Muslim understandings of the Qur'ān, Smith holds that it may be possible for Christians and Muslims to reach a point where intellectually they agree on the status of the Qur'ān as the word of God, whilst 'morally they choose to respond
This follows directly from Smith's notions of faith and truth. But in my opinion, if Muslims and Christians can agree intellectually, there can be no place for moral divergence without subscribing to a view of human integrity which seems quite irreconcilable with Smith's most treasured ideals.

(viii) Conclusion

Wilfred Cantwell Smith's concept of faith is of considerable value in focusing attention in Religious Studies upon persons. His distinction between faith and belief is particularly useful. The concept of faith is a helpful tool which encourages us to see the meanings which religious persons attach to their religious activities, beliefs and experiences. Along with this goes the necessary reminder to students of religion that they need to become much more involved existentially in the object of their study if they are rightly to penetrate the inner dimension of another's faith.

But Smith's understanding of religion cannot be regarded as fully satisfactory without limiting or distorting those complex realities which have been known as Islam and Christianity, (etc.), and have been experienced by men and women of faith. The following points may be mentioned especially:

a. First there is the problem of studying faith in Smith's terms. The need for empathy between the observer and participant inevitably leads to selectivity in the material to be considered - the material is limited by the faith of the observer and by that which 'speaks' to him.

b. Secondly there is the unhelpfully negative attitude which Smith seems to
have towards the corporate, structured aspects of religious life. He suggests that these have been of little importance to the most 'sensitively religious' persons. This undervalues the symbolic function of the externals of religion as vehicles for the encounter with the divine, and depreciates the intrinsic worth attached to these elements by participants in the tradition.

c. Amongst the many external factors of religion, beliefs and opinions about the nature of reality seem to have been self-consciously held since the beginning. This is certainly the case with Islām and Christianity, even if the terms with which those beliefs have been described have evolved over the centuries.

d. In my opinion Smith's scheme is ill-equipped to handle the conflicting truth-claims found between the various religious traditions.

e. It seems unhelpful to dispense with words like religion, Christianity, Judaism, etc., even if more care must be exercised in their use. There is always a tendency to reify human constructs, and Smith's new conceptualizations of faith and cumulative tradition are no exception from the same tendency.

Wilfred Cantwell Smith's concept of faith is a helpful tool for approaching and understanding Islām and Christianity, especially in their inner dimensions. But it can only be regarded as one of many items within the student's tool bag. The concept of faith must be used alongside other concepts and theories of religion which give insights into the nature and functions of the external, corporate and propositional aspects of human religious life.
Notes to Chapter 1 - Introduction

1. See below, pp 24, 25.


3. See John Hick's comment, 'even if we have to continue to speak of the various named religions .... because these terms are so firmly embedded in the literature, no one who has been influenced by The Meaning and End of Religion can do so without an acute sense of the often profoundly misleading character of the language.' (Hick's preface to the 1978 edition MER, pp xvii, xviii.)

4. See p 200, below.

5. See p 204, below.


8. The biographical details in this section have been drawn from various sources. The fullest biographical sketch readily available is that given in the introduction to W.G.Oxtoby, op. cit.


Notes to Chapter 2


5. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Pakistan as an Islamic State - a preliminary draft (Lahore: Ashraf£, 1951). Much of this work was later included in Islam in Modern History.

6. Smith, Pakistan as an Islamic State, p 12.


15. Smith, Modern Islam in India, p 46.


17. Smith, loc. cit.

18. MER, p 3.

19. MER, p 7.

20. MER, p 8.
(Notes to chapter 2: pp 12 - 64)

21. MER, p 11.
22. MER, p 20.
23. MER, pp 204, 205, n 5.
24. MER, p 25.
27. Eg., Arnobius, MER, p 27.
28. Lactantius, MER, p 27.
29. MER, p 29.
30. MER, p 211, n 35a.
31. MER, p 30.
32. Certainly not in book titles, which is Smith's major source.
33. MER, p 32.
34. MER, p 33.
35. MER, p 34.
36. MER, p 35.
37. MER, p 39.
40. MER, p 42.
41. MER, p 43.
42. MER, p 43.
44. MER, p 44.
45. Hegel, MER, p 47.
46. Das Wesen des Christenthums, Leipzig, 1841, MER, p 244, n 156.
47. Das Wesen der Religion; see MER, pp 243 - 244, n 155.
48. MER, p 47.

49. MER, pp 47, 48.

50. For a critique of the process of reification, see section 5. (i) b., below., pp 147 - 149.

51. Smith specifically discusses the following cultures and civilizations: the Greeks, the Romans, ancient Egypt, ancient Iran, the Aztecs, classical India, China and Japan. See MER, pp 53 - 60.

52. MER, p 56.

53. ISLAM is a special case, treated by Smith in a separate chapter, MER, pp 80 - 118.

54. 'Boudhism' (1801), 'Hindooism' (1829), 'Taouism' (1839), 'Zoroasterianism' (1854), 'Confucianism' (1862), etc., MER, p 61.

55. I have found this view is corroborated by William Carey's An Enquiry into the obligations of Christians to use means for the conversion of the heathens, (Leicester, 1792). The Enquiry gives a 'survey of the present state of the world', noting 'the extent of the several countries, their population, civilization, and religion' (p 38). The only 'ism' entered is 'Mahometanism', under the heading 'religion' for 'Turkey in Asia' (p 46). Even so ISLAM is usually given as 'Mahometans'. Other entries under 'religion' are various types of Christians (Papists, Protestants, Deists, etc.), Jews and Pagans.


57. MER, p 63.

58. MER, p 256, n 46.

59. The first reference to 'Hindu' in this sense found by Smith was AD1001; MER, pp 256, n 49.

60. See eg., the British Censuses of India; MER, p 65; and pp 257 - 258, n 53.

61. MER, p 72.

62. See MER, p 73, pp 264 - 266, nn 82 - 86.

63. Smith records a summary of the titles of the books published between the fifteenth and the twentieth centuries containing the expressions 'Christian faith', 'Christian religion' and 'Christianity'. He finds that the proportion of those containing 'Christianity' increases over the period (0% to 84.9%), whilst those containing 'Christian faith' decreases. The proportion of those containing 'Christian religion' reaches a peak in the seventeenth century, but thereafter declines. For a further description and critique of his book title exercises, see section 3.1., below. See also MER, pp 76 - 77, 269 - 270, nn 106 - 108.
64. MER, p 79.

65. MER chapter 4 is discussed in some detail in section 3.1., below.

66. MER, p 125.

67. Those cited are Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Paul Tillich, C.S.Lewis, Dietrich Bonhöffer, Milton Steinberg, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maha Thera U Thittila, Saïd Ramadan. See MER, pp 125, 126; 302, 303, nn 4 - 13.

68. Except perhaps Mani; but Smith suggests that this is why we don't think of him as great. MER, p 128.

69. MER, p 141.

70. MER, p 144.

71. MER, p 145.

72. MER, p 148.

73. MER, p 150.

74. MER, p 151.

75. MER, p 153.

76. The substance of this paragraph is treated by Smith in a crucial, but rather confusing passage; MER, pp 154 - 157.

77. MER, p 158.

78. MER, p 158.

79. MER, p 159.

80. MER, p 160.

81. MER, p 160.

82. MER, p 162.

83. MER, p 164.

84. MER, p 167.

85. MER, p 169.

86. MER, p 171.

87. MER, p 171.

88. MER, p 173.

89. MER, p 172.
90. MER, p 174.

91. The significance and uses of the words is discussed in section 2.2., below.

92. See section 2.3., below.

93. MER, p 184.


95. MER, p 185.

96. MER, p 187.

97. MER, p 186.

98. MER, p 187.

99. MER, p 188.

100. MER, p 188; quoting from 'Comparative Religion: Whither - and Why?', p 35.

101. MER, p 189.

102. MER, p 191.

103. MER, p 192.

104. MER, p 192.

105. MER, pp 193, 194.

106. MER, p 198.


108. MER, p 200.

109. MER, pp 200, 201.

110. MER, p 201.

111. See p 29, above.

112. See p 31, above.
113. Notably some of the essays collected together in On Understanding Islam (The Hague: Mouton, 1981); hereafter OUI.

114. See pp 158, 159, below, and accompanying notes.


118. This view is supported by Slater, Penelhum, Swinburne, Wiebe, etc.; see details in chapter 5 below, pp 158, 159, and accompanying notes.

119. Smith's 'prize example of this .... is taken from the .... Random House dictionary, published in New York in 1966. The first entry under the word "belief" defines it as "an opinion or conviction", and at once illustrates this with: "the belief that the earth is flat".' B&H, p 65.

120. B&H, pp 46 - 52.


123. This chapter of B&H is discussed in some detail below, section 4.1.

124. Sections 3.5. and 4.2., below.

125. See pp 37, 38.


128. This insistence that the questions are more important than his own answers to them is common to several of Smith's works; see eg., p 162, 'The Mission of the Church and the Future of Missions', in George Johnson and Wolfgang Roth (eds.) The Church in the Modern World: Essays in Honour of James Sutherland Thomson, (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1967) pp 134 - 170.


135. F&B, p 133.
138. F&B, p 139.
139. F&B, p 140.
140. F&B, p 142.
141. F&B, p 143.
142. F&B, p 143.
143. F&B, p 149.
147. The following works are particularly relevant: MER, Questions of Religious Truth, (London: Gollancz, 1967), hereafter QRT, B&H, F&B.
148. In J. Hick (ed) Truth and Dialogue (London: Sheldon, 1974), pp 20-44. The Islamic material in the paper is discussed in more detail in section 3.3., below.
149. Of the ten papers published only three fail to include some discussion of Smith's contribution to the topic, and index entries to Smith and his works are more numerous than any other single entry.
150. The rejoinder is discussed in section 2.3.(v), below.
154. QRT, p 69.
155. See QRT, p 94.
156. QRT, pp 37-62. Also reproduced in OUI, pp 282-300. See a further discussion in section 3.4., below.
157. QRT, p 59.
158. QRT, p 61.
159. QRT, p 94.

161. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Faith of Other Men, (New York: New American Library, 1963); hereafter, FOM. The lecture was originally given at a joint meeting of the Canadian Theological Society, the Canadian Society of Church History, and the Canadian Society of Biblical Studies, held at Montreal on May 18th, 1961. For a further discussion of the lecture, see section 4.3., below.

162. FOM, p 130. See section 4.3. for a fuller treatment.

163. FOM, p 94.


166. Smith, op. cit., p 38.


168. TWT, p 60.


176. Smith, loc. cit.; see below, p 60, 61; although applying this argument back to Tchaikovsky and Bach, it is hard to see why they should be subjected to synthesis.

177. The 'spokesmen' are: 'The Christian Hugh of St. Victor (ob. 1142), the Jewish poet and essayist Judah ha-Levi (ca. 1080 - 1141), the Muslim revivificationist Ghazzali (1058 - 1111), the Hindu philosopher Ramanuja (1017 - 1137?), the sometime Buddhist neo-confucian Chu Hsi (1130 - 1200)'. F&B, p 159.
(Notes to chapter 2: pp 12 - 64)


182. See above, p 44.


185. F&B, p 163.

186. F&B, p 165.


188. F&B, pp 166, 167.

189. F&B, p 167; emphasis mine.

190. F&B, p 171.


192. MER, p 8.

193. MER, p 192.

194. FOM, p 129.

195. See, 'A Human View of Truth', p 35; see above, pp 15, and 51.

196. See p 49, above; see also section 3.4., below.

197. QRT, p 61.


199. F&B, p 156.

200. See p 33, above, based on MER, p 192.

201. TWT, p 59.

202. TWT, p 183.

203. TWT, p 191.


208. Smith, op. cit., p 166.

209. Smith, op. cit., p 166.

210. TWT, p 193.
(Notes to chapter 3: pp 65 - 113)

Notes to Chapter 3

1. In Bernard Lewis and P.M.Holt, eds., Historians of the Middle East (Historical Writings on the Peoples of Asia, 4) (London: Oxford University Press, 1964) pp 484 - 502. Also reproduced in OUI, pp 41 - 77.


3. Sūrah 5.3., as cited in MER, p 81.


5. See MER, p 60 for further examples.

6. MER, p 81.

7. MER, p 81.

8. MER, p 82.

9. Smith introduces material relating to the progress of the Christian church in the West, he relegates a great volume of primary material to the notes, and he gives summary treatment of detailed issues relating to diverse aspects of gnosticism, Mandaeanism, Middle Persian grammar, etc. This material is treated throughout MER chapter 4 and the related notes.

10. In fact there are probably no more than 200,000 Parsis living today - mainly descendents of those who fled Persia to India after the Muslim invasion of Persia, and some 17,000 are known to follow the religion of Zarathustra in Iran today. R. C. Zaehner puts the figure at no more than 120,000 living souls; in 'Zoroastrianism', in The Concise Encyclopedia of Living Faiths, 1977 edn., (London: Hutchinson, 1977), p 200.

11. Smith is keen to stress that 'influence' is a rather inappropriate expression, since joint participation is a more suitable description of the interreactions between religious traditions, see MER, p 89; the point is made in another context in 'The Crystallization of Religious Communities in Mughul India', in Mojtaba Minovi and Iraj Afshar, eds., Yād-Nāme-ye-Irāini-ye Minorsky (Tehran: Instishārāt Dāneshgāh, 1969) pp 197 - 220.

12. Trevor Ling, A History of Religion East and West (London: Macmillan, 1968) p 75. A considerably earlier date for the life of Zarathustra is now accepted by many scholars, c 1500 BC. See Mary Boyce, A History of Zoroastrianism, Vol 2, in Handbuch der Orientalistik, I, VIII, 1, 2, 2A, (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1982). If this date is correct, then the teaching of Zarathustra would have been all the more established by the time of the exile, but it also means that Smith's argument for a late development of the notion of religious systems is less cogent.

13. MER, p 89.

14. MER, p 90.
15. For a brief statement, see eg. F.F.Bruce, Israel and the NATIONS (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1963), pp 116 - 117.

16. MER, p 89.


18. MER, p 89.

19. MER, p 90.

20. MER, p 90.

21. MER, p 90.

22. MER, p 91.

23. MER, p 284, n 55.

24. MER, p 96.

25. MER, p 97.

26. MER, p 286, n 58; there is also a doctoral thesis by Jane I Smith, supervised by Smith and published in 1975 An Historical and Semantic Study of the Term "Islām" as seen in a Sequence of Qurʾān Commentaries (Montana: Scholar's Press, 1975). Jane Smith is able to confirm that no detailed study had yet been carried out on this term, but her own study contributes much to an understanding of the use of this word in the Qurʾān and tafsīr.

27. Smith discusses the words: daēnā, ḍēn, dyn, dynē in Persian; dāth in Aramaic and Hebrew; ḍēn in Parthian and Sogdian; ḍēn in Armenian; din in Arabic and other languages of the Semitic family, eg Syriac. See MER, pp 98 - 100.

28. MER, p 102.

29. Documented variously by Smith, see especially MER, chapter 2; and see pp 19 - 23, above.

30. MER, p 105.

31. MER, p 104.

32. MER, p 106.

33. 'Comparative Religion: Whither - and Why?', p 42.

34. MER, p 106.

35. MER, p 105.

36. See MER, chapter 3.
(Notes to chapter 3: pp 65 - 113)

37. MER, p 107.

38. MER, p 108.

39. MER, p 108.


41. MER, p 110.

42. MER, p 110.

43. MER, p 111.

44. Based on information from MER, p 111, and pp 295 - 296, nn 88 - 92. I have confirmed the figures for islām, muslim and imān.

45. MER, p 111; for Smith's distinction between faith and belief, see section 2.2., above.

46. MER, p 112.

47. MER, p 112.

48. MER, p 112.

49. MER, p 112.

50. MER, pp 112 - 113, p 297, n 100.

51. MER, p 113.

52. MER, p 110.

53. MER, p 113.

54. MER, p 114.

55. See below, section 3.1.(ii).

56. MER, p 115.

57. MER, p 115.


59. OUI, pp 41 - 77.

60. OUI, p 57.

61. OUI, pp 63 - 64.

62. OUI, p 54.
(Notes to chapter 3: pp 65 - 113)

63. So MER, chapter 4.
64. MER, p 116.


68. 'Telling Muslims what is a truer understanding of their scriptures' is hardly a fair assessment of 'a substantial part of his book', al Fārūqī, op. cit., p 188.

69. Namely the assertion that the second tendency or process of reification to which Muslims have been subject in history was the 'influence .... of the reifying hypostases of Greek thought upon Islamic thought', al Fārūqī, op. cit., p 188. See above, section 3.1.(i).

70. al Fārūqī, op. cit., p 187.
71. al Fārūqī, op. cit., p 188. See my own argument to that effect below, section 5.(i).b.

72. al Fārūqī, op. cit., p 190.
73. MER, p 113.
74. al Fārūqī op. cit., p 190.
75. MER, p 113.
76. al Fārūqī, op. cit., p 190.
77. MER, p 297, n 100.
78. al Fārūqī, op. cit., p 190.
79. Sūrah 5.4, as cited in MER, p 81.
80. MER, p 297, n 102.
81. al Fārūqī, op. cit., p 192.
82. Jane I. Smith, op. cit.
84. FOM, p 17.
85. FOM, p 19.
86. FOM, p 19.
87. FOM, p 20.
88. FOM, p 55.

89. Although Smith himself feels this is a late interpretation of the word credo, and this will be discussed in detail in chapter 4, section 2.

90. FOM, p 60.
91. FOM, p 61.
92. FOM, p 62.
93. FOM, p 62.
94. FOM, p 63.
95. FOM, p 64.
96. FOM, p 65.
97. FOM, p 65.
98. FOM, p 53.
99. FOM, p 57.

100. See chapter 5, section (iii), below for a further critique of this book. For further studies of shahādah, see Kenneth Cragg's Call of the Minaret. Cragg exemplifies a similar desire to understand the faith of Muslims, and if anything displays a greater sensitivity to both Muslim and Christian attitudes. The shahādah is treated in chapters 2 and 3 in rather more depth than Smith's broadcast allowed. For a Muslim treatment of the shahādah, see e.g., Abū l A‘lā Mawdūdī, Towards Understanding Islam, new revised edition (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1980), pp 61 - 86.

101. FOM, p 19.
102. FOM, p 55.

103. Smith, 'A Human View of Truth', p 34.

104. FOM, p 63.

105. Eg., FOM pp 32 - 38, 79.

106. See Chapter 5, section (iii).c., below.

107. The rest of the conference material presented in John Hick, ed., Truth and Dialogue, is omitted here, as are Hick's conclusion and Smith's rejoinder, as these are not primarily Islamic in purpose or content. See
chapter 2, section 3.(v), above.

108. Smith says here that there is no clear opposite to this root; elsewhere he suggests that the root s-q-m is a possible opposite, see OUI, p 313, n 10; saqîm means sick, ill.


111. Smith, op. cit., p 23.


114. As was seen in our discussion of Belief and History in Chapter 2, section 3, above.


116. It is interesting to note that tasdiq appears only twice in the Qur'ân, both times in this sense. In both cases the wording is walākin tasdiqâ-l-ladhi bayna yadayhi, referring to the way in which the Qur'ân confirms those holy books which went before it. Sûrahs 10.37, and 12.111.


120. Smith, op. cit., p 29.

121. Smith, op. cit., p 37.

122. Smith, loc. cit.

123. Smith, loc. cit.


127. It is also reproduced in OUI, pp 282 - 300, and the theme is further developed in 'The True Meaning of Scripture: an empirical historian's non-reductionist interpretation of the Qur'ân', in International Journal of Middle East Studies, 11, 1980, pp 487 - 505.
128. OUI, p 292.
129. OUI, p 292.
130. OUI, p 296.
132. OUI, p 298.
133. QRT, p 59; OUI, p 299.
134. QRT, p 61; OUI, p 299.
137. OUI, p 298. Smith resorts to a rather dubious expedient in 'The True Meaning of Scripture', where he sweeps the problem away with the words that God 'must be a pretty good historian', p 504.
138. Originally 'Faith and Belief', subtitled 'some considerations from the Islamic instance', and 'some considerations from the Christian instance', now reproduced in OUI, chapters 6 and 15 (in part only).
139. OUI, p 121.
140. OUI, p 121.
141. OUI, p 122.
142. OUI, p 123. Smith comments that the mutakallim al Taftāzānī uses the Persian word giravidan (girav means virtually the same as the French gage) to explain the meaning of ʿīmān.
143. OUI, p 124.
144. OUI, p 123.
145. OUI, p 123; Ali translates 'And they rejected those Signs In iniquity and arrogance, Though their souls were convinced Thereof', in loc.
146. Arberry's verse 103, in loc.
147. The meaning of this sentence is part of the purpose of this section.
148. OUI, p 164.
Notes to Chapter 4

1. The first chapter deals with the work of the linguistic philosophers, (who are given a far from fair treatment, it is clear that Smith has not entered imaginatively into their worldview. As he himself admits, he is no philosopher, but an historian. See above, p 37; and 'Traditional Religions and Modern Culture', in Religious Diversity, pp 67 ff). The second chapter has already been commented upon in our section 2.2., above, and the third chapter contains the discussion of the biblical material.

2. II Thessalonians 2.13.


5. KJV; συ πιστευεις δτι εἰς ἐστιν ὁ Θεος; καὶ ἡ ποιεῖς. καὶ τὰ δαιμονία πιστεύοντι καὶ φρονοῦσιν.


7. See Section 3.5., above.

8. RV; Smith's translation, B&H, p 75; ἀπ' ἀρτι λέγω ὑμῖν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι, ὑμαὶ πιστεύετε ὅταν γενήσθαι ὅτι ἔχω εἰμί.

9. KJV; ἄριστος δὲ πιστεῦσεν ἀναντον εὐθεστησθηκι. πιστευοντι γὰρ δει τον προσερχομενον τῇ θεῳ, ὅτι ἐστιν καὶ του εκχειτουσιν αὐτὸν μισθαποδοτης γίνεται.


12. v. 10, τὴν ἁγίατον τῆς ἀληθείας and v. 13, πιστις ἁληθείας and v. 11, το πιστεύοι τῇ ψευδαι and v. 12, εὐδοκητατες τη ἁληθεια.


14. καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐχονεκαμεν καὶ πεπιστευκαμεν την ἁγιατον ην ἐχει ὁ Θεος ἐν ηνι.


17. There are 71 occurrences in the New Testament; 8 describe things, 14 relate to God or Christ, 49 to human beings.


20. πίστευετε εἰς τὸν Θεόν, καὶ εἰς ἑαυτούς πίστευετε.


25. ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐστίν ὁ Θεός, Mark 11. 22, even here Smith speculates on the translations 'faith from God', 'divine faith', B&H, p 126, n 32.


28. ἐν Χριστῷ.


34. B&H, pp 95, 96.

35. B&H, p 96.


38. C. E. B. Cranfield's Commentary on Romans, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 2 vols., (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1975 & 1979), is just one which treats faith in considerable detail; see index entries 'faith', 'πίστις' and 'πιστεύειν'.


40. B&H, p 92.


42. See pp 121, 122, above.

(Notes to chapter 4: pp 114 - 144)


47. B&H, p 88.

48. A text which expresses this very clearly is 1 John 2.22, in which denial of a propositional statement is seen as denial of Christ himself. 1 John 5.1 puts it positively - he who believes that Jesus is the Christ has a relationship with God.


52. As in John 6. 68, 69.


54. For a further analysis of the distinction between believe and recognize, see R Swinburne, Faith and Reason (London: Oxford University Press, 1981). He demonstrates that to recognize already includes to believe.

55. F&B, p 73.

56. F&B, p 73.

57. F&B, p 74.

58. The analogy of marriage is also made by St. Cyril, but for a rather different purpose; cp. F&B, p 73, p 232, n18.

59. τὴν σωτηρικὴν ἔκπληξιν , Myst. II.4.
Citations from St. Cyril in this study are as follows: the Procatechesis (referred as Procat.) and the five Mystagogical catecheses (referred as Myst.) from Frank Leslie Cross, St Cyril of Jerusalem's Lectures on the Christian Sacraments, (London: S. P. C. K., 1951); the 18 catechetical lectures (referred as Cat.), from E. H. Gifford, Nicene and Post-Nicene Christian Fathers, (1893)

60. Myst. II. 4; Smith translates, 'if he commited himself to ....', F&B, p 73.

61. F&B, p 75.

62. Credo, Smith observes is a cognate of śraddhā, a Sanskrit word which is analysed in chapter four of F&B (see esp. pp 59 - 68, and 208 - 246). Śraddhā seems to be a compound of śrad (or śrat) heart, and dhā, to put.
The term does not appear in the Rg-Veda, but in later Hindu religious usage it means 'to place, put or set one's heart on'.

63. F&B, p 76.

64. The last two pages of Smith's section on St. Cyril and *credo* generate some 19 pages of notes.

65. F&B, p 77.


67. F&B, p 77.

68. Eg., F&B, pp 254 f., n 27, quoting J. N. D. Kelly; and p 272, n 38, quoting Dom Gregory Dix.

69. F&B, p 76.

70. F&B, p 77; pp 255 - 258, n 29.

71. F&B, p 78.

72. F&B, p 77.

73. F&B, pp 264 - 267, n 34.

74. F&B, p 77.


76. F&B, p 272.


78. F&B, p 73.

79. Procat. 7.

80. Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* II.c.12.; *Apostolic Constitutions*, VIII.c.1; and St Chrysostom, *Hom.* XXIX in 1 Cor XII.9.10; E. H. Gifford, op. cit., p 31, n 5; p 32, n 5)


82. της πιστεως διδασκαλία, Cat. IV 2.

83. δοξατων εἰσεθων; προςευν λεγονων; Cat. IV.2.

84. ἀναγιακαὶ ν δοξατων, Cat. IV.3.

85. δοξατα περι θεου, Cat. IV.4.
86. Cat. IV.2.
87. πιστεύει, Cat. IV.9.
88. Cat. X.20.
89. Cat. XI.1.
90. πιστεύειν, Cat. XI.21.
91. Cat. XI.22.
92. Cat. V.10, 11.

93. The first definition of δογμα given by Liddell and Scott is 'that which seems to one, an opinion', and δογματικα is given as 'of or for opinions'.

94. Reported in FOM, p 121; from an address at Scarborough, Ontario, October 18th, 1958.

95. FOM, p 124.


97. FOM, p 126.
98. See pp 136 - 140, below.
99. FOM, p 127.
100. FOM, p 128; see also p 96.
101. FOM, p 96.
102. Or 'transcendentological', TWT, p 183.


105. FOM, pp 94, 95.
(Notes to chapter 4: pp 114 - 144)


107. FOM, pp 128, 129.

108. FOM, p 129; this is, so far as I am aware, Smith's only reference to the resurrection.

109. FOM, p 129.

110. This phrase was under discussion by the United Church of Canada's Commission on Faith; FOM, p 130.

111. FOM, pp 130, 131.

112. FOM, p 130.

113. FOM, p 131.

114. Smith later argued that religion must become true in the lives of the faithful, QRT, 'A Human View of Truth', see section 2.3., above.


116. FOM, pp 131, 132. See also 'Christianity's Third Great Challenge', pp 507, 508; and 'The Christian and the Religions of Asia', pp 11, 12.

117. '.... this conflict between our theology and our ethics has never been resolved. If I had to choose, I personally would choose the moral dimension of Christian faith; for I feel that of the two, it is the more truly Christian.' FOM, p 94.

118. MER, p 157.


120. Eg., 'You vipers' brood!', Matthew 12. 34, NEB.

121. As Smith puts it, the doctrine 'is arrogant. At least, it becomes arrogant when one carries it out to the non-Western world'. FOM, p 130.

122. FOM, p 130.

123. FOM, pp 130, f; although this bears a marked similarity to some of the Johannine sayings of Jesus, see eg., John 8. 55, 'But you have not known him; I know him'.

124. quoted above, p 137; FOM, p 131.

125. FOM, pp 132, f. It seems that even Smith is unable to avoid the use of 'non-Christian' here! See above, p 136.

126. FOM, p 133.

191
(Notes to chapter 4: pp 114 - 144)

127. FOM, p 133.
128. FOM, p 133.
129. FOM, p 135.
130. FOM, p 135.
131. See above, p 138; FOM, p 131.
133. FOM, p 136.
135. FOM, p 139.
136. FOM, p 139.
138. See p 140, above.
139. For a survey, see E. J. Sharpe, Comparative Religion, (London: Duckworth, 1975)
140. See p 141, above.
(Notes to chapter 5: pp 145 - 166)

Notes to Chapter 5


2. Published 1695.


5. Al Fârûqî, op. cit., p 186.


7. Al Fârûqî, op. cit., chapter headings.

8. MER, p 51.


11. MER, p 169.

12. MER, p 186.

13. FOM, chapter 3.


17. See MER, p 10.


24. P 150.


29. Hallencreutz finds that any comparison between Smith's dialectic and that Barth and the dialectical theologians can only be superficial, for the Barthian dialectic is between Christian faith and human religion. See discussion above, pp 149, 150.


31. The reviewer Huston Smith makes this point vividly. He quotes Wilfred Cantwell Smith's assertion that for a century scholars have been studying the data of the traditions of religious life and that this should now be followed by a "next step" of discovering and making known the personal faith of those involved, the reviewer observes: 'it is not clear how his "next step" differs from what the phenomenology of religion had been trying to do for some time. ("Phenomenology" does not appear in the book's index.) Richard Bush asked in an early review whether Otto, van der Leeuw, Heiler, Petazzoni, Daniélou, Massignon, Eliade, and Benz overlook(ed) the faith-kernal inside the husks they studied. They all worked before Smith's "next step" and without his language reform. Meaning and End does not mention their names,' p 307, Huston Smith, 'Faith and Its Study: What Wilfred Smith's against, and for', in *Religious Studies Review*, Vol 7, No. 4, October 1981, pp 306 - 310.


(Notes to chapter 5: pp 145 - 166)


35. E. J. Sharpe, op. cit., p 89.

36. See p 150, above.

37. Sharpe, op. cit., p 98, emphasis his.


40. ibid., p 108.

41. An earlier assessment of Smith by Sharpe is found in his Comparative Religion (London: Duckworth, 1975). But Sharpe is not quite fair to Smith in asserting that "Faith" is the individual's attitude to whatever he conceives the transcendent to be', (p 282).

42. The question of whether faith has an object is treated by Smith in B&H and F&B. See section 2.2., above.

43. This is the sub-title of The Report by the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England, Believing in the Church (London: SPCK, 1981). MER is discussed briefly in part 2 of chapter 9, by David Young, pp 256, 257. Young wrongly states that Smith 'uses the term "faith" to refer to the individual's belief....', (p 256).

44. Church of England, Doctrine Commission, op. cit., p 256. This whole report raises various questions relevant to Smith's work. One interesting aspect is the report's use of the terms faith and belief in their traditional senses. See our section 2.2. for Smith's analysis of the development of the term 'belief'. Other considerations are omitted here for reasons of scope.


48. Cragg, op. cit., p 121, n 13; the internal quote is from MER, p 117 (p 107 in 1964 edition).


52. MER, p 141.


54. Gualtieri, loc. cit. Smith, it should be remembered, insists that faith is a universal human quality, but he does not claim that every person's faith is the same. This is pursued by Smith in several of his later works, see p 42, above. But this begs the questions: what is it that they share in common so that the same term 'faith' may be applied in each case?, is not this to reify the concept of 'faith'? - the question raised above, p 149.


56. FOM, p 27.

57. FOM, p 60.

58. FOM, p 63.

59. FOM, p 79.

60. FOM, p 42, 43.

61. FOM, p 43.

62. FOM, p 45.

63. FOM, p 46.

64. Baird, op. cit., p 106.


67. Eg., Slater quotes Buber's I - Thou relationship, Lonergan's idea of
love, and Erickson's notion of trust, in 'Three responses to Faith and Belief', pp 113, 114; Fowler sees Smith's ideas present in Neibuhr and Tillich, op. cit., chapters 1 and 2.

68. Eg., Cupitt, Swinburne, Wiebe.

69. Although some responses are available from within other traditions, see eg., Fazlur Rahman, review of Faith and Belief, in Muslim World, LXXI, 2, April 1981, pp 146, 147; Frank Whaling, ed., The World's Religious Traditions.


71. Swinburne, review, p 240; Faith and Reason, p 122.

72. Horvath, op. cit., p 125; Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p 123.

73. See p 37., above.

74. Eg., Slater, 'Three responses to Faith and Belief', p 116; Penelhum, op. cit.

75. Slater, 'Three responses to Faith and Belief', p 114.

76. Swinburne, Review of Faith and Belief, p 241; Wiebe, 'The Role of Belief', p 237.

77. Wiebe, 'The Role of "Belief"', p 238; 'Three responses to Faith and Belief', p 118.

78. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, pp 121, 123, n 1; review, p 241.


81. John Hick, preface to MER, p xvi.

82. Wiebe, review, p 119.

83. Penelhum questions how far faith, already 'distinguished .... from its presuppositions about God and man, can be distinguished from other fruits of those presuppositions, such as hope and love....' op. cit., p 434.

84. See section 2.3.

85. Wiebe has misunderstood the subtlety of Smith's position on this point, and rightly receives a riposte from Smith in 'Belief: A Reply to a Response', in Numen, Vol XXVI, No 2, 1980, pp 247 - 255.

86. Eg. Colin Chapman, Christianity on Trial, Vols. 1 - 3, (Lion, 1972 -

87. Alan Race, op. cit., p 144.
89. Hulmes, op. cit., p 81.
90. See p 50, above.
91. Swinburne, review, p 242.
93. Smith, B&H, p 87.
94. See p 126, above.
95. Smith, 'Conflicting Truth Claims: A Rejoinder', in John Hick, ed., Truth and Dialogue, pp 156 - 162; see also the discussion in section 2.3.(v), above.
96. So Hick, Hulmes, Parrinder, Race, etc.; see also section 2.4., above.
97. George Chryssides insists that it is not enough to say that the claims of the various religious traditions are only 'different symbolizations of identical truths'. If that were the case, he maintains, it would be impossible to say that any teachings were false, and it would preclude the notion of development in religions - they 'simply change the way in which they say the same thing.' op. cit., p 57.
99. See above, sections 5(ii), 5(iii).
100. F&B, p 168.
101. Eg., Modern Islam in India: A social Analysis, and his early articles in Islamic Culture.
104. FOM, p 129.

105. See TWT. Although Peter Slater has described this as 'a reflection of (Smith's) own cultural background in self-negating Canadian internationalism', p 99, in 'Three views of Christianity', in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, L, 1, pp 97 - 109.


108. See above, section 3.1.

109. See above, pp 74, 75.

110. See above, pp 120, 125, 126.

111. See above, section 4.2.

112. For example, MER, p 26, references required for 'the new all-inclusiveness' of religio; p 38, no evidence for suggestion that the name religion was 'first' given to 'the system in general' and then 'increasingly to the system of ideas' to which 'attention was increasingly turned'. Similar criticisms are made in this study of other works by Smith, see eg. pp 77, 82, 83, 113, 130, etc., above. Another point is noted by E.J. Sharpe, in 'Dialogue and Faith', that the statement 'several theologians' (MER, p 184) gives way to a single William Temple in note 12, p 321. Smith's argument often rests on his own impressions rather than precise data, as he himself admits at one point, 'My feeling .... (is) impressionistic', MER, p 221, n 66.

113. See above, section 4.2. and 3.2.

114. See above, section 5(ii).

115. QRT, p 61; OUI, p 299.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Section 1 The works of Wilfred Cantwell Smith.


BOOKS


Pakistan as an Islamic State: a preliminary draft. Lahore, Sh. M. Ashraff, 1951.


ARTICLES, CONTRIBUTIONS TO BOOKS, ETC.

'The Mughal Empire and the Middle Class: A Hypothesis', Islamic Culture, Hyderabad, 18, 1944, pp 349 - 363.

'Lower-Class Uprisings in the Mughal Empire', Islamic Culture, Hyderabad, 20, 1946, pp 21 - 40.

'The Comparative Study of Religion: Reflections on the Possibility and
Purpose of a Religious Science', in McGill University, Faculty of Divinity, Inaugural Lectures. Montreal, McGill University, 1950 pp 39 - 60.


'The Place of Oriental Studies in a Western University', Diogenes, No 16, 1956, pp 104 - 111.


'Law and Ijtihad in Islam: Some considerations on their Relation to Each Other and to Ultimate and Immediate Problems', Dawn, Karachi, January 5th 1958.


'The Historical Development in Islām of the Concept of Islām as an Historical Development', in Lewis, Bernard and Holt, P.M., eds., Historians of the Middle East. (Historical Writings of the Peoples of Asia, 4) London, Oxford University Press, 1962, pp 484 - 502.


"'The Finger that Points to the Moon": Reply to Per Kvaerne' (Kvaerne, "'Comparative Religion: Whither - and Why?" A Reply to Wilfred Cantwell Smith', in the same issue), Temenos, Helsinki, 9, 1973, pp 169 - 172.

'Faith and Belief (some considerations from the Islamic instance)' and 'Faith and Belief (some considerations from the Christian instance)', in Al-Hikmat: A Research Journal of the Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab, Lahore, 6, 1975, pp 1 - 43.


'Interpreting Religious Interrelations: An Historian's View of Christian


Section 2 Other Works Consulted


Davis, Charles, 'Wherein there is no ecstasy', in Studies in Religion/Sciences religieuses, 13, 4, Fall 1984, pp 393 - 400.

Demarest, Bruce, Review of Towards a World Theology, in Themelios, 7, 2, January 1982, pp 33, 34.


Gilkey, Langdon, 'A Theological Voyage with Wilfred Cantwell Smith', review article, in Religious Studies Review, Vol 7, No 4, October 1981,


Hick, John and Hebblethwaite, Brian, eds., Christianity and Other Religions. London, Fount, 1980


Jackson, Robert, ed., Approaching World Religions (World Religions in


