

## Durham E-Theses

---

### *State capitalism and the agricultural sector: aspects of political and economic development of Algeria*

Al-Heeti, Abd al-Majeed N. Mahmud

#### How to cite:

---

Al-Heeti, Abd al-Majeed N. Mahmud (1987) *State capitalism and the agricultural sector: aspects of political and economic development of Algeria*, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/6771/>

#### Use policy

---

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a [link](#) is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the [full Durham E-Theses policy](#) for further details.

STATE CAPITALISM AND THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR :  
ASPECTS OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF ALGERIA  
1962-1982

by Abd al-Majeed N. Mahmud al-Heeti

Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the  
Degree of Ph.D. in the School of Oriental Studies - University  
of Durham.

1987

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.  
No quotation from it should be published without  
his prior written consent and information derived  
from it should be acknowledged.



17 FEB 1988

## ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to examine some aspects of Algerian state capitalism and to situate it within a theoretical context derived from similar experiences in the Third World. The main emphasis has been placed on the state's policies towards agriculture, the most socially, economically, and politically important sector in Algerian society.

The thesis looks at state capitalism in general as a transitional phase which, although involving approaches identified by some writers as 'socialist', leads ultimately to the development of 'conventional' capitalism. Algeria is viewed as a country which, despite having had the opportunity to erase much of its past and to reconstruct its economy on entirely new lines, has ended up developing according to capitalist laws.

This development is traced to the nature of the socio-political forces that took over the leadership of the anti-colonial struggle and subsequently of the Algerian state. The analysis extends to include various aspects of the National Liberation Movement under colonialism and its development after independence. The thesis then describes the main characteristics of the economy immediately before and after independence and the major steps taken towards social and economic reconstruction.

The state's agrarian policies are considered in the context of the social and political objectives of the ruling strata. These include attitudes to the self-management movement as a whole and in agriculture in particular, and the various measures of agrarian reform applied in the private sector. The reform is viewed as an essential precondition of the full incorporation of the agricultural sector into the state capitalist economy.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to extend my warmest thanks and appreciation to Dr. Peter Slugglett for his guidance and unfailing encouragement during the preparation of this thesis. Special thanks and gratitude are due to Dr. Marion-Farouk Slugglett for the efforts she has made in reading the manuscript and for her invaluable detailed advice and comments which were of great importance in shaping my work. I feel privileged for the many hours they both spent with me in discussing the various issues related to the subject of this thesis. They have helped me in every possible way during my study in Durham.

I would also like to thank Dr. Richard Lawless for his readiness to help me in the early stages of my study, and Mr. Sami Zubiada for reading and discussing a major part of this thesis with me.

It is a pleasure to acknowledge the kindness and the assistance shown to me by the secretaries and library staff at the School of Oriental Studies.

I should like to pay tribute to the memory of my dear friend Adel Ashkanani, whose tragic and untimely death has been a great blow to me and to many others. Much of the discussion that follows owes a great deal to his insight and inspiration, and I can never express sufficient thanks for his unforgettable acts of kindness and friendship. To his wife Ebtihaj I dedicate this work for the great example in courage that she gave to everyone who knew her.

Finally, I would like to thank every single member of my family for their unfailing help and generosity. The encouragement and financial help of my father, the patience of my mother, and the support of all my brothers were inestimable. I would like to mention in particular



the enormous efforts that my brother Khalid has made during my two visits to Algeria for which I am deeply grateful. Last but not least to my future wife Hala I owe a great deal for her patience and unfailing support at all stages of preparing this thesis.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations and Glossary

### Part I Agriculture and the State ; Some Theoretical Considerations

Chapter 1	: Introduction	1
Chapter 2	: State, State Capitalism and Agriculture : a Theoretical Framework	9

### Part II Historical Background ; Algeria before Independence

Chapter 3	: The Political and Socio-Economic Background of Colonial Algeria, c. 1800-1962	115
Chapter 4	: The Algerian National Movement and the Struggle for Independence	172

### Part III Economy and Society in Independent Algeria

Chapter 5	: The Rise of the Algerian Petty Bourgeoisie and its Accession to Power	242
Chapter 6	: The Construction of State Capitalism after Independence : Social and Political Developments, 1962-67	275
Chapter 7	: The Economy under Ben Bella and Boumedienne	336

### Part IV Agriculture and the post-Colonial State

Chapter 8	: Agriculture between Colonialism and State Capitalism	364
Chapter 9	: Agrarian Reform within the Framework of Algeria's Development Strategy	398
Chapter 10	: The Implementation of Agrarian Reform	427
Chapter 11	: Towards an Evaluation of the Agrarian Reform	452
Chapter 12	: Agricultural Policies since 1971: State Capitalist and Capitalist Penetration	490
Chapter 13	: Conclusion	507
	Bibliography	513

## ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

AARDES	Association Algerienne pour la Recherche Demographique, Economique, et Sociologique.
AD	Algerian Dinar; the basic unit of currency in Algeria. In 1978, the official rate of exchange was four AD to one United States dollar.
ALN	Armee de la Liberation Nationale.
AML	Amis du Manifeste de la Liberte.
ANP	Armee Nationale Populaire.
APC	Assemblee Populaire Communale.
APCE	Assemblee Populaire Communale Elargie.
APW	Assemblee Populaire de Wilaya (province).
'Arsh	Refers to both tribal land and a form of property based on the actual labour invested in the land. <u>Arsh</u> property may be inherited but cannot be alienated.
Azil	Turkish public domain which was also used as spoil. The <u>Azil</u> can also refer to the permission given by the Turkish government to the local Algerian notables to collect taxes.
Beni- Oui-Oui	Abusive name for Arab <u>Caid</u> collaborating with the French.
Bey	Provincial representative of the Turkish government.
BCA	Banque Centrale d'Algerie.
BNA	Banque Nationale de l'Algerie.
BNASS	Bureau National d'Animation du secteur socialiste.
CAEC	Cooperative Agricole d'Exploitation en Commun.
Caid	A local administrator used by both the Turks and the French at the begining of the colonization of Algeria.
CCAA	Conseil Communal d'Animation d'Autogestion.
CAPAM	Cooperative Agricole de Production des Anciens Moudjahidins.
CAPCS	Cooperative Agricole Polyvalent de Commercialisation et de Service.
CAPRA	Cooperative Agricole de Production de la Revolution Agraire.

CCE	Comite de Coordination et d'Execution.
CNRA	Comite Nationale de la Revolution Algerienne.
CNRA	Commission Nationale de la Revolution Agraire.
CNRS	Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.
COFEL	Cooperative de Commercialisation des Fruits et Legumes.
Commune	A village or local community; it is both a residential and an administrative unit.
CORA	Cooperatives de la Reforme Agraire.
CRESM	Centre de Recherche et d'Etudes sur les Societes Mediterraneennes.
CRUA	Comite Revolutionnaire d'Unite et d'Action.
Daira	An administrative unit at a level midway between the local community and the province; the equivalent of a county.
Dey	Title of the commanding officers of the Janissaries who from the 18th century onward became governors of the Regency of Algiers.
Dour	Hill vilage.
ENA	Etoile Nord-Africaine.
FLN	Front de la Liberation Nationale.
FNRA	Fonds National de la Revolution Agraire.
GEP	Groupement d'Entraide Paysanne.
GI	Groupement Indivisaire.
GMV	Groupement Pre-Cooperative de Mise en Valeur.
GPRA	Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne.
Habus	Pious donation of property for the benefit of a foundation devoted to religious activity or a charitable and cultural institution.
Hectare	The basic unit of land area measurement. One hectare equals 2.471 acres or 100 sq. metre.
Khammes	(plural Khamamis), farm tenants who received, in turn for their labour, land tools, seeds, animals, one-fifth of the harvest.
Makhzen	Refers to tribes who, in turn for their allegiance to the

Turkish government, received land and tax compensation.

MARA       Ministere d'Agriculture et de la Revolution Agraire.

Melk       Private property similar to European freehold. However, it was less easily alienated than freehold.

MNA       Mouvement National Algerien.

Moudjahid: Guerrilla fighter, derived from the term the holy war.

MTLD       Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertes Democratiques.

OAIC       Office Algerien Interprofessionel de Cereales.

OFLA       Office des Fruits et Legumes d'Algerie.

ONACO      Office National de Commercialisation.

ONRA       Office Nationale de la Reforme Agraire.

OPU       Office des Publications Universitaires.

OS        Organisation Speciale.

OAS       Organisation de l'Armee Secrete.

PCA       Parti Communiste Algerien.

PPA       Parti du Peuple Algerien.

RADP       Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire.

SAP       Societe Agricole de Prevoyance.

SEP       Secretariat d'Etat au Plan.

SE-SEMPAC Societe Nationale des Semoules, Pates Alimentaires, et  
Couscous.

SNED       Societe Nationale d'Edition et de Diffusion

SONATRACH La Societe Nationale pour la Recherche, la Production, le  
Transport, la Transformation at la Commercialisation des  
hydrocarbures.

UDMA       Union Democratique du Manifeste Algerien.

UGTA       Union Generale des Travailleurs Algerien.

Ulama      The plural of the Arabic 'alim, educated man. In the Algerian context it designates the religious reformers around Ben Badis and his followers from 1930's.

UNPA       Union Nationale de la Paysannerie Algerienne.

USTA      Union Syndicale des Travailleurs Algeriens.

Wali      Head of administration at the district level.

Wilaya    Military zone during the Algerian war. There were six wilayas:  
Aures, North Constantine, Kabylia, Algiers area, Oran area,  
and Sahara. Today the term refers to an administrative dis-  
trict.

To my Family and to Ebtihaj

**PART I**

**AGRICULTURE AND THE STATE : SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS**



## CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION

The importance of analysing the state, its relations with social classes, and its impact on the processes of economic and social transformation taking place in contemporary Third World societies derives not only from the state's expanding role and involvement in economic, social, and political activities in these societies, but also from the fact that the experience since independence over the last two or three decades has produced few of the results for which many people had hoped, and indeed fought for, namely an independent and sustained socialist or egalitarian development.

Thus country after country where hopes were so high and which only few years ago were described as "socialist" or, more prudently, "having a socialist orientation", "progressive" etc. have proved their inability to avoid total submission to what was always represented by the new rulers as the principal enemy, international capital, let alone even supporting what they had claimed to have set for themselves as a supreme aim, the achievement of sustained economic, social, and political development.

In comparison with the hopes that were raised and the promises that were made before and after independence with regard to the aims of development, the elimination of social inequalities, and the granting of liberty and democracy, the results are extremely disappointing. Despite the "progressive" nature of the various measures of nationalization, land reform, development programmes, and the expansion of education and health and other social services, the overall outlook seems bleak. Economic imbalance, total submission to and dependence on



multi-national corporations and capitalist enterprises and organizations remain the dominant features in almost all yesterday's "progressive" countries. Social inequalities, reflected by the acceleration of impoverishment at one end of the scale and the accumulation of wealth in few hands at the other (usually those who manage to dominate political power) are accelerating. Political repression and coercion is unparalleled in the history of many of these countries.

Algeria is one of the few countries in the Third World where it was hoped and believed for some time that it not only had the opportunity to erase its colonial past and to build a new, even socialist, society in its place, but that this process was actually happening. Such hopes and beliefs were sustained mainly by the events that surrounded the achievement of independence in 1962.

First, independence was accompanied not only by the withdrawal of French troops and the establishment of a sovereign state, but more importantly by the mass departure of the colonial bourgeoisie. In the process, factories, estates and properties of different sorts and sizes were suddenly abandoned by their former owners. The workers moved in to control these properties and established their own Comites de Gestion, promising that Algeria would follow a path of development different from that of most other post-colonial societies.

Secondly, the particular nature of the colonial regime, and the fact that it functioned primarily to cater for the needs and interests of a minority of European settlers and to exploit the country's resources in order to promote the process of the capital accumulation in the metropolis, led to the alienation of almost all the indigeneous population. This was one of the main reasons for the adoption of a unified stand by the independence movement after 1954.

The nature of colonialism and its impact on the socio-economic structure of the country gave considerable importance to the intermediary strata (which will be termed the 'petty bourgeoisie' in the course of this study), which came to spearhead the struggle for independence. The breadth of popular involvement in the national movement, together with the constraints on upward mobility produced by the colonial system combined to ensure that the indigenous Algerian petty bourgeoisie adopted a genuinely anti-colonial position. However, its social and economic heterogeneity was reflected in open factionalism and eventually in struggles for the leadership of the newly independent state. Each faction tried to win the support of wider sections of an already radicalized and politically involved population. These factors played a significant role in strengthening the process of social and economic transformation in Algerian society, or at least the potential for such transformation. In fact, in the eyes of some sympathetic observers, Algeria appeared at one stage to be an 'African Cuba'.

However, this impression seems to have been based on a superficial evaluation of the socio-economic development of Algerian society rather than on any deep understanding of the social nature and political character of the strata in control of the state apparatus. Not only did the later history of the country prove that Algeria was developing along capitalist lines, but this development was deeply rooted in the way in which French colonialism had affected the social structure and the nature of the anti-colonial struggle. In other words Algeria's failure to achieve many of its declared objectives lay in the inherent limitations and inabilities of the social groups which ruled the country.

In the immediate aftermath of independence, the population was

still predominantly rural. The principal economic transformation brought about by the French had been the creation of agrarian capitalism, as the agricultural sector constituted the backbone of the economy. Moreover, although led by forces based in the cities, the struggle for independence was carried out essentially by the rural population. While it lacked a coherent and defined programme during the armed struggle, one of the FLN's most publicised objectives apart from the achievement of independence itself was an extensive agrarian reform to enable the rural population to regain its lost land. These factors combined to make the agricultural sector of preeminent importance in the economy and society of independent Algeria.

Therefore, a study of state capitalism in Algeria and the impact and nature of the socio-political forces involved must be primarily concerned with the agricultural sector. State agrarian policies vis a vis the agricultural sector and their relevance to the latter's division into self-management and private sectors are essential for an understanding of Algeria's development within the framework of state capitalism. These policies reveal the nature of the ruling social strata and their incapacity to bring about 'socialism'; they also enable us to understand the character and limitations of state capitalism in general.

The aim of this study is to analyse the origin, character, and impact of state capitalism as a socio-economic phenomenon which developed out of the specificities of post-colonial society. Algeria provides an example of this phenomenon and its development. Hence, in the context of Algerian state capitalism, considerable emphasis will be placed on the impact and nature of the social and political forces in control of the independent state apparatus, by examining the conditions

under which they emerged and which shaped their political consciousness. The importance and specificities of the Algerian agricultural sector and its rural population will be examined at various stages of this study, and the events surrounding the achievement of independence and their influence on contemporary political forces will also be analysed. The thesis is based primarily on the official publications of the Algerian government since independence, and a variety of secondary source materials in Arabic, English and French. Two visits to Algeria were made for a few weeks in 1984, but bureaucratic obstruction at a number of levels made it impossible to carry out the programme of field research which had been envisaged.

Chapter Two, which follows this introduction, will present a general theoretical framework of the state structure in post-colonial societies and the nature of state capitalism in these societies. It emphasizes the impact of the state structure and its autonomy upon those who staff this vital apparatus and thus the influence that the ruling socio-economic strata is able to exert on social and economic development in general. It looks at state capitalism as a specific socio-economic phenomenon which finds its roots in the nature of the social forces from which the state bureaucracy emerged in the course of the anti-colonial struggle. The main characteristics and tendencies of state capitalism and its relation to the economy in general and to the private sector in particular will be demonstrated. It shows that state capitalism is likely to produce new contradictions that necessitate major rearrangements in the role of the state in the economy and society. Finally, there is a brief discussion of the nature of capitalist penetration in agriculture and the likely effect of state capitalism upon the agricultural sector.

Chapters Three and Four provide the background of the impact of colonialism on the Algerian socio-economic structure and the development of the national movement. After a brief discussion of the major characteristics of pre-colonial Algeria, Chapter Three concentrates on the changes that the colonial system had made in Algerian society. Colonialism's main characteristics, development, and trends in being a settler one together with the consequences upon the agricultural sector and the rural population will be discussed in this chapter. Chapter Four gives a description of the political developments in Algeria leading up to independence in 1962. It traces the emergence of the National Movement from early 20th century until independence. It also discusses its major political and ideological divisions and parties together with the effect of the colonial political order upon its operation and later its radicalization. The factional conflict that erupted within the FLN immediately before and after independence is described.

The rise of the 'petty bourgeoisie' in Algerian society and the impact of colonialism upon its structure, composition, and political consciousness, together with the origins of its anti-colonial stand and the extent and limitations of that stand, are discussed in Chapter Five. Its factional divisions and struggle after independence is linked to its social and economic heterogeneity. The effects of this struggle on the functions of the FLN as the single Party of independent Algeria and on the ascendance of the Army and the Bureaucracy are discussed in this chapter.

Chapter Six deals with the social and class struggle which erupted immediately after independence and centered around the properties left vacant by the colons. The petty bourgeois state's attitude towards the

workers' self-management movement and the constitution of the latter are also discussed. The political change of 1965 is seen as a direct outcome of the need to have the state superstructure corresponding to the concrete social development.

Chapter Seven contains a brief description of the Algerian economy at the end of the colonial period. It also discusses the major economic trends and policies undertaken during the regimes of Ben Bella and Boumedienne.

Chapters Eight, Nine, Ten, Eleven and Twelve provide an analysis of the agricultural sector and the agrarian policies of the state towards it. Chapter Eight traces the major characteristics of Algerian agriculture and its inherited division into modern and traditional sectors and the contrasts which result from this at many levels. It also depicts the state's attitude towards the self-management movement in the agricultural sector and the latter's gradual erosion in favour of state control.

Chapter Nine situates the agricultural sector within the general framework of Algeria's development strategy. The main aims of this strategy and the role assigned to agriculture within it are discussed. It examines the general situation of agriculture before 1971 in the light of the function that it was expected to play in the development of the country, and shows that agrarian reform had to be undertaken in order to achieve the aims of the strategy. Chapter Ten examines the implementation of the agrarian reform, which the government of the day described as an 'Agrarian Revolution'. It shows how far the reform was used by the state to enhance its political legitimacy while at the same time those landlords most likely to be affected were often able to evade the nationalization or limitation of their properties in a

variety of ways. The bodies charged with the implementation of the reform and the concrete results are also described.

Chapter Eleven tries to evaluate the general impact of the agrarian reform on the agricultural sector. Through a discussion of the main changes it brought to the structure of rural employment, the politics of the implementation of the reform, and the establishment of the cooperative system in the private sector, a general picture is drawn of the impact of the reform upon the agricultural sector in general. The nature of the ruling strata and the capitalist incorporation of the agricultural sector are also discussed. Finally, Chapter Twelve analyses the principal agricultural policies implemented after the agrarian reform in the fields of investment, credits, marketing, and pricing. The resulting difficulties produced by these policies which crystallised later in the policy of liberalization and the encouragement of the private sector are also described.



## **CHAPTER TWO : STATE, STATE CAPITALISM, AND AGRICULTURE : A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

One of the keys to an understanding of the socio-economic development of the post-colonial societies lies in the analysis of the state, its specificities and characteristics, and its impact on social classes and the economy. The social classes and strata that play an active role in dominating the state apparatus, their class connections and interests are also very important here. However, to tackle this problem it is useful to examine classical Marxist theory on the state and to see what it offers in the context of Third World societies.

### **Classical Marxist Theory of the State**

It is often stated by authors who have traced the development of the concept of the state in Marx's writings (1) that Marx never attempted to develop a single, coherent, and comprehensive theory of the state. Hence his ideological legacy in this respect is usually derived from an uneven and unsystematic collection of excerpts from his philosophical analysis of particular historical and political conjunctures, such as the 1848 Revolution in France and Louis Napoleon's dictatorship or the Paris Commune of 1871. However, it is beyond doubt that Marx alone deserves the credit for clearing away much of the mystification that has always surrounded the concept of the state.

For Marx, the material conditions of a society are the basis and determinant of its social structure and of human consciousness. The state, as part of the superstructure, is a product of the development of these material conditions. It is not a creation of the human mind or

of the collective will of men. Nor does it stand above society and express the collective interests of the individuals within it. Rather, it is created, determined, and conditioned by the material conditions of society. This view finds its expression in the famous statement in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy:

"Legal relations as well as forms of the state are to be grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human mind, but rather have their roots in the material conditions of life, the sum total of which Hegel..... combines under the name "civil society", that, however, the autonomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy..... The general result at which I arrived and which, once won, served as a guiding thread for my studies, can be briefly formulated as follows: In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of the society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness" (2).

Marx connected the emergence of the state, as the product of a certain mode of production, with the division of society into conflicting classes, a division inherent in the emergence of private property. The state is , therefore, a product and expression of class struggle, in that it is a tool in the hands of the economically dominant class for the subjugation of the dominated classes. It does not represent the general will of society but is instead an active participant in the class struggle, serving the interests of the dominant class. The Marxist view of the state is summed up in Engels' often quoted statement:

"The state is therefore by no means a power imposed on society from without; ..... Rather it is a product of society at a particular stage of development; it is the admission that .....

this society has involved itself in insoluble self-contradiction and is cleft into irreconcilable antagonism, classes with conflicting economic interests, shall not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, a power, apparently standing above society, has become necessary to moderate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of "order"; and this power, arising out of society but placing itself above it and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state" (3).

Engels also goes on to add that:

"As the state arose from the need to keep class antagonisms in check, but also arose in the thick of the fight between the classes, it is normally the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which by this means becomes also the politically dominant class and so acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class" (4).

Regarding capitalist society, on which his work concentrates, Marx showed that since it is a class society dominated by the bourgeoisie, the state is the political expression of this domination and is thus simply a tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie to assure its domination over the working class. Hence the state "is nothing more than the form of organization which the bourgeoisie necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests" (5). In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels stated that: "The Executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (6), and that "political power..... is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another" (7).

This is what Miliband calls the primary Marxist view of the state, as "there is to be found another view of the state in his (Marx's) work, which is none the less of great interest..... This secondary view is that the state as independent from and superior to all social classes, as being the dominant force in society rather than the instrument of a dominant class" (8). But before discussing this case, Miliband drew attention to the fact that Marx noted that in certain circumstances

"those who actually run the state may well belong to a class which is not the economically dominant class" (9). This is a very important point for it is quite relevant to the situation of many post-colonial societies.

It is often the case that conflicting classes in a society become too weak or too strong to permit one of them to assume state power on its own and to direct it towards achieving its own interests. In such circumstances the state plays an independent role and ceases to be the instrument of a single class. Marx demonstrated this kind of state in his analysis of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte's empire (1852-1870) (10). In such instances bourgeois rulers and laws themselves can develop into a threat to the bourgeoisie's own interests and power, and thus render it impossible to continue to preserve the bourgeois social order. In this respect Marx wrote that the bourgeoisie "confesses that its own interests dictate that it should be delivered from the danger of its own rule; that in order to restore tranquility in the country, its bourgeois parliament must, first of all, be given its quietus, that in order to preserve its social power intact, its political power must be broken" (11). Marx also demonstrated that no matter how independent the state becomes and how representative it claims to be, its function remains, at the last resort, the preservation of a social order based on private property. Thus in 1848 in France, the Bonapartist state came into being for the purpose of maintaining and strengthening the existing social order and the domination of capital over labour.

Finally, although his main interest was the study of European capitalism, Marx devoted some of his work to analysing the social system of the "Asiatic Mode of Production" which, he considered, had one outstanding characteristic, the absence of private landed property.

In this mode of production, he wrote, "there is no property, but individual possession: the community is properly speaking the real proprietor". In this system, he wrote, the direct producers are not "confronted by a private landowner but rather, as in Asia, (are) under direct subordination to a state which stands over them as their landlord and simultaneously as sovereign.... the state.... is then the supreme lord" (12). The state has to perform this role largely because of a variety of physical circumstances including the climatic and territorial factors which require it power to organize public works, particularly in hydraulic societies, in a centralized manner. This analysis is useful in understanding an important feature of the state in post-colonial societies; the major economic role that it has always performed in society, which it has inherited from the colonial or pre-colonial period.

## **The State in Post-Colonial Societies**

### **1-State Centrality**

Since the state is the product of the specific underlying material conditions of a particular mode of production and is affected and conditioned by these material conditions, there is bound to be a great difference in the role and nature of the state in post-colonial societies from that in the European capitalist countries on which classical Marxist theory is based. This is because of the historical specificity which characterizes all post-colonial societies, a "specificity which arises from structural changes brought by the colonial experience and alignment of classes and by the superstructure of political and administrative institutions which were established in that context, and secondly from radical re-alignments of class forces which have been

brought about in the post-colonial situation" (13). This has produced a form of social and economic development and, concomitantly, a relationship between state and socio-economic structure that is not paralleled in, and is in many ways more complex than, that of the classical bourgeois societies of Europe.

Here we are faced with a mode of production which contains a multiplicity of forms of production, each with its specific socio-economic structure and its specific laws for the creation and appropriation of economic surplus. The result of this is that "the class structures of the Third World differ from those of the advanced countries in two principal ways: they are more complex, and the classes themselves are usually weaker" (14). Thus unlike class formation in the advanced capitalist countries, where, at least in abstract terms, society contains two fundamental classes (the bourgeoisie and the proletariat), the picture is quite different in post-colonial societies. Varying from country to country in accordance with the differences in their pre-capitalist social formations, their different encounters with colonialism, and the extent of their subsumption by peripheral capitalism, post-colonial societies are generally characterized by a plurality of social classes belonging to different and conflicting social formations, a reflection both of colonial penetration and the survival of pre-capitalist formations. As far as the indigenous society is concerned, none of these classes can be easily singled out as the dominant class.

Hence class antagonisms and interests are not coterminous with modes of production, with two fundamentally conflicting classes, exploiters and the exploited. Instead a plurality of forms of production and, in turn, of classes, exists, none of which is sufficiently

powerful to dominate society and to impose its mode of production. This is reflected by the role of the state in these societies, a role which underlies the structural differences between advanced capitalist and post-colonial societies, in which the state plays a more important role than being simply the instrument or "manager" of "the common affairs" of a single class. Here it acts as an institution capable not only of creating economic surplus but also of coordinating between the various scattered and independent forms of production and of concentrating and directing the surplus in such a way as to enable one form of production to become dominant (15). Thus the state possesses much more power vis a vis the underlying social structure than envisaged in classical Marxist theory, which enables it to intervene more directly and more visibly in the organization of economic, social, cultural, and political processes.

One of the outstanding contributions to the study of the role and nature of the post-colonial state is that of Hamza Alavi. In his analysis of Pakistan and Bangladesh, he emphasizes the particularly significant relationship of the state to social structure. He attributes this to two main factors; the first is what he calls the "overdevelopment" of the state in comparison to the socio-economic structure. This is summarized as follows:

"The bourgeois revolution in the colony, insofar as that consists of the establishment of a bourgeois state and the attendant legal and institutional framework, is an event which takes place with the imposition of colonial rule by the metropolitan bourgeoisie. In carrying out the tasks of the bourgeois revolution in the colony, however, the metropolitan bourgeoisie has to accomplish an additional task which was specific to the colonial situation. Its task in the colony is not merely to replicate the superstructure of the state which it had established in the metropolitan country itself. Additionally it has to create a state apparatus through which it can exercise dominion over all the indigenous social classes in the colony. It might be said that the

'superstructure' in the colony is therefore 'overdeveloped' in relation to the 'structure' in the colony, for its basis lies in the metropolitan structure itself, from which it is later separated at the time of independence. The colonial state is therefore equipped with a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus and mechanisms of government which enable it through its routine operations to subordinate the native social classes. The post-colonial society inherits that overdeveloped apparatus of state and its institutionalized practices through which the operations of the indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled" (16).

In this thesis the state apparatus in post-colonial societies comes essentially from outside, having been imposed by the metropolitan bourgeoisie on a relatively undifferentiated social structure with weak indigenous classes. This superimposition involves a process of replicating the superstructure of the state as it exists in the metropolis in order to subsume the indigenous social classes, and it is thus overdeveloped in relation to the social structure of the native society. Thus the state is a reflection of the domination of the metropolis rather than the product of the internal class situation. The second major aspect of the significance of the state apparatus in post-colonial society is that it "directly appropriates a very large part of the economic surplus and deploys it in bureaucratically-directed economic activity in the name of promoting economic development" (17).

For Alavi these two points explain the centrality and the importance of the state in post-colonial societies. Saul, on the other hand, while accepting the significance of the post-colonial state within the structure of post-colonial society and its relevance in the context of East Africa, considers another factor particularly significant. He argues that the state in post-colonial society has a very crucial ideological function to perform:

"the state's function of providing an ideological cement for the capitalist system is one which has evolved slowly and surely in the imperial centres, in step with the latter's economic transformation. In post-colonial societies, on the



other hand, and particularly in Africa, this hegemonic position must be created, and created within territorial boundaries which often appear as quite artificial entities once the powerful force of direct colonial fiat has been removed. Peripheral capitalism, like advanced capitalism, requires territorial unity and legitimacy, and the post-colonial state's centrality to the process of creating these conditions (like its centrality in 'promoting economic development') further reinforces Alavi's point about the state's importance" (18).

Moreover, Saul observes that in the East African context the colonial state "became 'overdeveloped' not so much in response to a need to 'subordinate the native social classes' as a need to subordinate pre-capitalist, generally non-feudal, social formations to the imperative of colonial capitalism" (19).

Alavi's and Saul's essays have aroused a great deal of discussion on the subject of the state in post-colonial societies. Much of this has centred around the significance of the idea of the relative autonomy of the state and its implications and impact for those who staff it and upon society as a whole. However, some objections have been raised to their hypotheses of the inherited 'overdeveloped' state apparatus and its subsequent implications. Colin Leys, for example, finds the overdeveloped state a contradictory, and even inaccurate explanation, for if the phenomenon is based on the need to subordinate pre-capitalist social formations "why should this call for a particularly strong state if there were no strong classes to defend their interests in the old social formation?" (20). He considers that Alavi's approach to the question of post-colonial society is misleading;

"it is really that this whole way of approaching the question of the significance of the state i.e. starting from its structure or scope, whether inherited from an earlier situation or not, is a mistake. In order to understand the significance of any state for ~~the class struggle we must start out from the class struggle, not from the state~~" (21).

~~Leys went even further to question the plausibility of the centrality~~

of the post-colonial state by pointing the "relatively low share of national income taken by government revenue and expenditure in underdeveloped countries" in comparison with the developed ones.

While admitting the centrality of the state and its significance in peripheral societies, Ziemann and Lanzendorfer echo similar criticisms of Alavi and Saul. They argue that such an approach "can lead neither to a materialist-based account of the position of the state in peripheral societies, nor of possible socialist development initiated by the state apparatus, nor even of the role played by those who staff the state apparatus" (23). They emphasize the importance of analysing the social and economic structure of society itself, its dynamic, and its position vis a vis international capitalism in order to come to a satisfactory explanation of the role of the state apparatus. Otherwise, "if the 'overdeveloped' state is inherited, how to explain the comparable state formations in societies which have been independent for over 150 years (e.g. Latin America) or never colonised (e.g. Ethiopia, Turkey, Afghanistan)?" (24).

For Ziemann and Lanzendorfer the state undoubtedly occupies a central position in peripheral society. This position should be understood in terms of factors relating to the society's social and economic structures. "The possibility and necessity of economic activity by the peripheral state are (more likely to be) structurally rooted in the historical disruption of the economic structure of peripheral society, i.e. the partially in deficit, and relatively stagnant expanded reproduction" (25). This fact brings about some specificities and contradictions in peripheral societies and states. The state becomes the engine that on the one hand introduces capitalist development by breaking up pre-capitalist formations and, on the other, secures structural hetero-

geneity as a specific condition both for the world market and for national reproduction (26). To fulfil these functions the state becomes an instrument of economic and political reproduction at the same time. Furthermore, the ideological function of the state "derives far more from the fact that capitalist commodity relations have not been generalised - on the one hand there is the semblance of formal freedom and equality for all commodity owners which derives from the mystification inherent in capitalist production, on the other, the social integration by means of commodity and financial ramifications is incomplete" (27).

Goulbourne also admits the centrality of the state in post-colonial societies, stating that "it is not enough to assume that this centrality is part of the general behaviour of the state.... there are certain factors prevalent in the economic and social context which are forcing these states towards greater and greater 'centrality' within their specific functions" (28). He cites, for example monopolism and the increasing internationalization of capital as one factor in "forcing contemporary capitalist states of all kinds to intervene directly in social and economic arrangements". Another factor is the nature of social classes in post-colonial societies, and their weakness, which tends to accentuate and reinforce the central role of the state. Also "the contradictions that emerge between national and foreign capital, tend to pull the state more into the economic field, thus enhancing the already existing economic power possessed by these states" (29).

Finally, Frank also asserts the centrality of the state in the peripheral countries, arguing that the weakness of social classes in general and the local bourgeoisie in particular often pushes the latter into an increasingly profound incorporation and dependence on the world

capitalist system. Therefore the state becomes the mechanism whereby the bourgeoisie makes the resources of the periphery available to international capital; hence it must intervene relatively often to repress resistance to, and facilitate, this exploitation. "The peripheral state becomes much more crucial to the whole development (underdevelopment) project in the periphery than the metropolitan state is to development in the metropolis" (30).

However, Frank also talks about the "weak character of the Third World state (as) dependent financially, technologically, institutionally, ideologically, militarily, in a word, politically, on the international bourgeoisie(s) and its metropolitan states" (31). For Frank, the state in the periphery is conditioned by a process of underdevelopment that is set in motion and controlled by the metropolitan bourgeoisies and the power of the metropolitan states that these bourgeoisies command. It is they who define the international division of labour and hence the development possibilities on the periphery. If there is any centrality attached to the role played by the state in the periphery it is because of the position that the periphery occupies in the world capitalist system, and because of the incorporation implied in this position. The state is only weak as far as its relation to its master is concerned; this weakness does not rule out its central role in the periphery's own socio-economic structure and the considerable impact that it can bring to bear on future development.

## 2-State Autonomy

However the problem of the state in post-colonial societies is analysed, the fact remains that in such societies, in the light of the superimposition of the state apparatus on social formations with weak indigenous social classes, especially the bourgeois class (32), the state has considerable freedom to direct and condition social development by intervening directly in the appropriation and distribution of the economic surplus. Thus it can exhibit a great deal of centrality, for it is the most organized economic and political force or institution able to control and regulate social and economic development and the process of social differentiation. Especially in countries where it is very strong economically, the state becomes a major force both in the formation of new classes and strata and enhancing established ones through its overall control of income distribution.

This brings us to Alavi's second point, that against a background of relatively weak social classes "the state in post-colonial society is not the instrument of a single class. It is autonomous and it mediates between the competing interests of the three propertied classes, namely the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie, and the landed classes, while at the same time acting on behalf of them all to preserve the social order in which their interests are embedded, namely the institution of private property and the capitalist mode as the dominant mode of production" (33).

Taking the first part of this statement, and given the state's centrality in relation to the social classes, it is quite plausible that it should assume a role in which it does not act according to the interests of a particular class, since its role is in inverse propor-

tion to the capacity of the social classes. All social classes will strive for maximum representation under a variety of forms in the state apparatus, since without it their social promotion and interests cannot easily be attained. In such circumstances the greater representation of a particular class will lead to the state becoming the focus of the class struggle (34).

However, regarding Alavi's second point, that the state is a mediator between the propertied classes and acts on behalf of them, it seems that this particular feature is mainly relevant to specific countries and that it cannot be generalized to all post-colonial societies. In fact the economic laws of colonial capitalism are the same everywhere, but the consequences for society differ in accordance with the socio-economic and historical conditions in which the laws operate (35). The relationship between the state and the social classes depends more on the specificity of the particular society's pre colonial social formation, the extent of the transformations brought about by colonial penetration, the way in which independence was achieved, and the extent of the decolonization process.

Therefore in countries like Pakistan or Bangladesh where relatively established social classes already existed, and where independence did not involve a radical restructuring of the relationship with the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the landed classes could join forces with the metropolitan bourgeoisie to bring about a situation of class balance in which no single class could dominate either the state apparatus or society as a whole. Each class was powerful enough to prevent the other from dominating the state apparatus and at the same time not strong enough to control the state by itself. The indigenous bourgeoisie has been able to develop in

situations where it has managed to establish the necessary relationship with the state bureaucracy, but it is still not strong enough to eliminate the domination of a large part of the economy by the metropolitan bourgeoisie, whose economic and political presence and activities did not come to an end at independence. At the same time the large landowners still held sway over the countryside and were represented within the political parties and the army. Class interests dictated that these classes found more ground for alliance than for conflict as, especially after independence, they found themselves interconnected at many levels. In these circumstances the state and the people who staff it emerged as the arbiter between the classes. They enjoyed a large degree of autonomy from the social classes, an autonomy which sometimes enabled the "bureaucratic-military oligarchs" to dispense with the politicians and political parties if their activities went beyond providing a "mantle of legitimacy", absorbing public discontent and channelling grievances, and came to constitute a real danger for the stability of the social system.

There are other societies, especially in Africa and the Middle East, on which our analysis will now concentrate, where the colonial experience inhibited the creation of distinct social classes or where independence disrupted the existing social structure and resulted in the total or partial elimination of the established bourgeoisie (Algeria is a case in point). Here the imbalance between the state and the social classes is more apparent (36).

In these circumstances the state is directly confronted with the metropolitan bourgeoisie while it exerts relatively great power over the indigenous social formation. This power strengthens the position of those directly in control of the state apparatus and enables them to

become the direct determinants of the development and direction of society. On them and their social composition, their class origins, their class affiliation and interests, their ideology and political orientation, their relations with the social classes (especially the metropolitan bourgeoisie), will depend the direction, method, and speed of future capitalist penetration. Their cardinal importance derives not only from the inherited centrality of the state, but also from the fact that the post-colonial state and its superstructure are in a continuing process of formation, in the sense that the newly forming relations of production have not yet reached a level where they could constitute a major obstacle to the specific direction of the development of productive forces. In such circumstances, "the radical transformation of the traditional relations of production does not start from the 'bottom' i.e. by the forces of production, in as much as from the 'top' i.e. by the impact of the superstructure" (37). This means that the state acquires an additional role in the future development of society, which in its turn will make those who control the state apparatus the effective determinants of which mode of production is to be established in this or that country and which economic laws are to become dominant.

Without denying the importance of this aspect of the state's role, and by extension of the influence of those who staff it, its autonomous nature should not be exaggerated. To do so would make it seem as if the state was somehow above the social formation and possessed some sort of omnipotence over the social classes. Implicit in this belief is that the state is able to enhance, or even create the dominant class, which in its turn is subordinate to it. Hence the way in which society is moving is regarded simply as one option among others; for its supporters it is the reflection of the good will of the state and its...



leaders, while critics represent it as a premeditated plot or 'conspiracy' to direct society towards a particular goal (38). In fact the opposite is the case, since the extent of the state's autonomy and its freedom of manoeuvre are functions of the existing social order. Again this should not be regarded as diminishing the importance of those who staff the state apparatus, since their background together with the existing social structure has very important implications for the future direction of the process of social reproduction.

It is therefore essential to examine the socio-political nature of the social forces in control of the state administration in order to assess their impact upon the future development of society. One manifestation of the complex nature of the socio-economic structure of underdeveloped societies and its transitional character is the relatively large socio-political weight exerted by the intermediate strata. In most cases they were the major power behind the anti-colonial struggle and became established within the ranks of the 'new' bureaucracy which emerged after independence.

Our analysis will be restricted to situations where the struggle against colonial control was spearheaded by the petty bourgeoisie, and where the state bureaucracy has emerged from within this stratum. It will exclude societies in which the leadership after independence was taken by the 'national' or comprador bourgeoisie in such a way that economic and social development has become controlled and supervised by international capital. It also excludes societies in which political power was taken by revolutionary forces which immediately opted for the scientific socialist theory of the working class.

## The Petty Bourgeoisie

The term petty bourgeoisie is used by Marx and Engels to describe small-scale producers and owners:

"In countries where modern civilization has become fully developed, a new class of petty bourgeoisie has been formed, fluctuating between the proletariat and bourgeoisie and ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society. The individual members of this class, however, are being constantly hurled down into the proletariat by the action of competition, and, as modern industry develops, they even see the moment approaching when they will completely disappear as an independent section of modern society, to be replaced, in manufactures, agriculture and commerce, by overlookers, bailiffs and shopmen" (39)

In this sense the petty bourgeoisie includes that form of small business in which the same person is both a worker and the owner of the means of production, generally without employing paid workers or doing so only occasionally, and where surplus is derived directly from the work of himself and his family. It also includes small traders operating in a similar way (40). This form of production is analysed by Marx as a transitional stage from which fully fledged industrial capitalism would eventually emerge. It follows from this that the petty commodity producers or the petty bourgeoisie are also transitional and fated to disappear. This process accelerates as a result of competition and is exemplified by the promotion of a part of the petty bourgeoisie into the ranks of the bourgeoisie and the gradual sinking of large numbers of the same stratum into the ranks of the proletariat (41).

Basing his argument on the notion that "relations of production alone are not sufficient, in Marxist theory, to determine the place a social class occupies in a mode of production and to locate it within a social formation", Poulantzas emphasizes the vital importance of ideological and political relations in determining social class: "In a

given social formation, a class which is capable of constituting itself as a social force can only be located when its place in the relations of production produces 'pertinent effects' at the political and ideological level" (42). Following this, Poulantzas also includes certain groups which have quite different places in the economy from the category mentioned above, as part of the petty bourgeoisie. Unlike the small-scale producers and owners these groups are not fated to disappear. He calls them the 'new' petty bourgeoisie and defines them as non-productive salaried employees. As well as those employed in the circulation of capital (salaried employees in commerce, banking, insurance, sales, advertising etc.), they include civil servants working in the various branches of the administration. These groups only share with the small-scale producers and owners the 'negative' characteristic "that they belong neither to the bourgeoisie nor to the proletariat" (43). But on the ideological level both groups share very similar objectives, embodied in their "status quo anti-capitalism"; an anti-monopoly outlook that wishes to reform the system without changing it, "the myth of the ladder"; belief that they can join the bourgeoisie through the rise of the 'best' and 'most able' individuals, and "power fetishism"; the belief in a 'neutral' state which is above classes.

These are the main ideological aspirations shared by both groups of the petty bourgeoisie, which derive from the economic situation and the exploitation of each group by the bourgeoisie; in production as far as the small-scale producers and owners are concerned, and in matters affecting their legal situation as far as non-productive employees are concerned. The situation of the petty bourgeoisie here and its ideological and political objectives emerge from the existence of two polarized and established classes; the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

The colonial experience not only created new economic conditions but also new social structures and new forms of social and class differentiation in the colonized societies. One of the most important aspects of colonial penetration was the destruction of the foundations of the indigenous social formation, and the subsequent articulation of the economy of the colony with the capitalist mode of production in the metropolis. The result was the creation of a new type of social and economic formation which, although linked directly and indirectly to the capitalist mode of production in the metropolis, differed significantly from the one existing in capitalist Europe (44), since it was based almost entirely on agricultural and mineral exports, and often involved the destruction of traditional agricultural and artisanal activities. This implied large scale rural to urban migration; the migrants were uprooted from their previous rural and agricultural occupations and were obliged either to gain their livelihood in the marginal services sector created by the colonial economy or to remain unemployed. Thus a large lumpenproletariat emerged in the course of the establishment of the colonial economy.

However, the construction of this economy implied the creation of various economic and services activities that could absorb larger numbers of the native population. Such activities were expanded far beyond the industrial sector which absorbed only an insignificant part of the labour force. Various socio-economic groups came into existence including small traders, the owners of small workshops, white collar workers, and civil servants, all of whom were connected in one way or another with the colonial economy or with the creation and expansion of the colonial state.

These social groups constitute the petty bourgeois strata in

colonial and post-colonial societies. In contradistinction to its composition and structure in advanced capitalist societies where it constitutes a transitional class absorbed gradually by the fundamental classes, the petty bourgeoisie in post-colonial societies is not located in the centre between the two polarized classes. It constitutes a relatively large socio-political force and is second in size only to the peasantry. In particular it dominates in the urban centres, and greatly influences the course of the development of the whole society. Secondly, it is heterogeneous not only in terms of its division into 'traditional' and 'new' petty bourgeoisie, but also in the sense that both categories consist of many different strata and groups, experiencing varying degrees of exploitation and fears of proletarianization and different political and ideological outlooks.

Some groups within the petty bourgeoisie owe their existence to the small-scale artisanal and commercial activities which existed in the urban centres and their surrounding areas well before colonial penetration. This applies to small-scale production units based on family ownership, producing the goods for the subsistence requirements of the community. Colonialism had varying effects on these units, generally destroying those linked to the subsistence economy and encouraging those linked to the colonial economic and services sector. Many small-scale individual petty producers now working in the cities and towns of underdeveloped countries originally acquired their skills in capitalist wage employment. Their enterprises are usually very small, to the extent that many of them are in reality 'self-employed workers' (45). With little or no prospect of upward mobility for most of them, they are in a state of constant insecurity, in that their livelihood depends entirely on the occasional and temporary opportuni-

ties provided by the colonial or post-colonial sector and they are constantly threatened with being squeezed out by the expansion of capitalist production. Hence this section of the petty bourgeoisie is economically very weak and fragmented and it has not established deep economic roots. Although colonial domination has encouraged the creation of some parts of this stratum, it has also destroyed its most effective elements and slowed down its reproduction (46).

The above attempt at an analysis of the various economic groups constituting the 'petty bourgeoisie' highlights the difficulties inherent in the use of concepts and terms for developing societies which were originally developed for the analysis of the advanced capitalist societies of Europe. The incorporation of these non-European societies into the capitalist world market after colonisation triggered off a process of rapid social differentiation which affected all sections of society and which is still continuing. However, in contrast with the situation in developed capitalist societies, where two antagonistic classes emerged - the bourgeoisie and the proletariat - the process of social differentiation in developing societies was blocked for a variety of reasons, and the 'bourgeoisie' and 'proletariat' never developed into fully fledged classes. In addition these societies were characterised by a high degree of social fluidity as a result of the uprooting of a significant proportion of the rural population which migrated into the urban centres and engaged in the various activities described above. Hence an important feature of these societies is the numerical dominance of the 'middle strata', which include very diverse social groups, to which we refer - for the lack of any more precise term - as 'petty bourgeoisie'. Similarly, the terms 'bourgeoisie' and 'proletariat' are used in the specific sense of their manifestations in

colonial and post-colonial society.

We saw that colonial penetration resulted in the creation of a large state apparatus with substantial coercive and administrative powers to facilitate externally-generated capitalist development. This is what has been referred to as the 'overdeveloped' state "in the sense that the excessive enlargement of the powers of control and regulation which the state has accommodated and elaborated extend far beyond the logic of what may be necessary for the orderly functioning of the social institutions of the society over which the state presides" (47).

The expanded state provides permanent employment for a significant number of those privileged enough to possess the education required to occupy government (civil and military) salaried jobs. By virtue of their education they are the most politically influential within the petty bourgeoisie and within society as a whole (48). Concentrated in large urban centres, relatively better organized than other groups, with developed lines of communication, they provide the political cadres necessary to mobilize the rest of society in the struggle for independence. However, their very education distances them from the rest of society and renders them a special group within the petty bourgeoisie whose "conception of the world is largely shaped by the administrative milieux in which they are located" (49). To a far greater extent than any other group in peripheral capitalist societies, they are subject to influences and ideas emanating from the metropolitan countries. Members of this group represent the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie whose link with the lower groups derives from their belonging neither to the bourgeoisie nor to the proletariat, and their fundamentally anti-colonial attitude which enables them to spearhead the anti-colonial struggle. However, since the state is the largest and

best paying employer the thrust of their political demands is often directed towards acquiring positions of power in the state apparatus (50). Even when some members of the salaried upper strata find their interests and position secure within the framework of the colonial order, and became supportive of this order, independence does not necessarily mean that they can be dispensed with, since their services are vital for the smooth running of the new political order.

We can see, therefore, that the petty bourgeoisie is heterogeneous and that the political weight of its leadership lies substantially within its most organized group, the military and civilian employees of the state, with their literate, administrative and managerial capacities which can control or organize the popular anti-colonial struggle and will dominate political power during and after independence. The state bureaucracy emerges from within this group as the avant garde of popular aspirations in so far as political independence is concerned, although independence itself often does not result in any radical alteration of the domination of metropolitan capital over the native economy and society. It is at this point that the complexity of the new state bureaucracy emerges in the context of the new relationship between metropolitan capital and the indigenous social classes.



## **The State Bureaucracy**

Like the state itself, the nature, composition, and impact of the state bureaucracy varies from one society to another in accordance with the extent and form of colonization, the way in which it came to an end, and the balance of social forces on the morrow of independence. The centrality of the state apparatus and the expanding role that it comes to play in economy and society means that it is natural that those who staff the state apparatus acquire major responsibility for the determination of the future development of society. This becomes particularly apparent and is felt much more strongly in situations where colonial penetration did not result in the creation of a defined and established bourgeois class or where independence has undermined that class.

This centrality of the state bureaucracy and its relative autonomy within society and its key role for future capitalist penetration has led to two different theoretical views of its nature and of the implications which this may have for both state and society. First, there are those who see the state bureaucracy as a group emanating from the petty bourgeoisie in a situation in which there is no significant indigenous grande bourgeoisie, a small proletariat, and a proportionately large and influential petty bourgeoisie. As well as representing all strata of the petty bourgeoisie the bureaucracy is also supposed to represent the aspirations of the poor masses. It is exposed to a variety of contradictory influences, national and international, which are reflected in internal struggles within its ranks, whose outcome cannot be predicted in advance (51).

This view takes as its point of departure the belief that post-

colonial social formations are generally characterized by having 'unformed' classes, especially with regard to the strata which control the state after independence. Accordingly the class character of the post-colonial state is not only undetermined but there is even the possibility that the petty bourgeois leadership may use state power as the means to make the transition to Marxist-proletarian socialism. This phenomenon is referred to as 'revolutionary democracy'.

"In the course of the further development of national liberation revolution, under the influence of the theory and practice of world socialism, many petty-bourgeois theories and policies in developing countries are undergoing significant changes. Revolutionary democracy emerged in consequence. Revolutionary democrats not only express the interests of small proprietors, but take into account the aspirations of the workers, the working peasants, and the revolutionary intellectuals and officers in their countries". (52) (Emphasis in original).

In this view different historical alternatives are possible even including socialist transformation, depending on the balance of forces and on the victory of the 'revolutionary' wing of the petty bourgeoisie, which will identify itself with the interests of the working class. "Many revolutionary democrats choose the socialist orientation because they have come to accept the principles of scientific socialism" (53). In other words, the newly independent 'Third World' country dominated by a petty bourgeois leadership is supposed to have a 'choice of paths of socio-economic development' towards either capitalism or socialism. The choice of path seems to be mainly influenced by the tastes and preferences of the particular persons in power (54). According to this theory an alliance may develop between the petty bourgeois leadership and the revolutionary forces, and a policy of persuasion and criticism then becomes necessary in order to push towards the process of socialist transformation.

This view, which was widely popular in the socialist countries and particularly among Soviet scholars, was associated with what became known as the theory of the 'non-capitalist road of development'. It envisaged the possibility of socialist development in the course of a process in which the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist attitudes of the petty bourgeoisie would be radicalized and become anti-capitalist through the enhancement of the role of (the representatives of) the most disinherited sections of this stratum. The 'progressive' measures and policies pursued by independent states such as nationalisation, the expansion of the state economic sector, and the struggle with foreign capital were seen as evidence of shifts in the balance of power in the direction of the more radical elements of the petty bourgeoisie (55).

The second view, associated mainly with the dependency theory, sees the state bureaucracy as a stratum or even as a class that finds its interests and cohesion through the control of the 'central' state apparatus, whose interests "in the longer run coincide with the interests of imperialism as a whole" (56).

"A vehicle of the dependent local state capitalism, the petty bourgeoisie becomes the transmission belt of imperialist domination, thus taking the place of the latifundary comprador bourgeoisie that was the vehicle of the dependent private capitalism of the previous period" (57).

The control of the most effective machinery in society, i.e. the state, will give the bureaucracy (already distanced from the rest of society by virtue of its education and administrative capacities) the impetus to establish a place for itself in the existing relations of production and to act as a distinct class.

Members of the state bureaucracy are drawn essentially from the upper levels of the petty bourgeoisie, from groups of intellectuals, teachers, higher civil servants, prosperous traders, and military and

police officers who are of overwhelmingly urban origin. However, given the weakness of the indigenous classes and the continuing presence of foreign capital which independence was unable to expel, the post-colonial bureaucracy falls much more directly under the thumb of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, which has by now become internationalised. Its role does not go beyond being a governing class, while the international bourgeoisie retains its position as the ruling class. Describing the state bureaucracy in Mali, Meillassoux characterized it as a "body generated by the colonizers to carry out the tasks which could not (or would not) be undertaken by the Europeans" (58). He also stated that:

"Given the economic dependence of the country, the bureaucracy is itself a dependent group, and its origin as an instrument of Western interests continues to influence its development. Instead of striving towards real independence, after winning the right to assert themselves as political intermediaries with the outside world, the bureaucrats are content to return (with a higher international rank) under the rule of the old master" (59).

Moreover, the various measures undertaken by the state bureaucracy (nationalization, socialist villages, etc.) are seen as "methods adopted by the governing class to extend its control ... whatever the anti-capitalist nature of the ideology, and the well-meaning activities of individual socialist intellectuals, this process has only served to strengthen the domination of the ruling class - the international bourgeoisie" (60). These measures are also seen as steps which the bureaucracy had to take "to infiltrate the national economy through the creation of a nationalized economic sector.... under the label of 'socialism'" (61). Hence such measures, particularly nationalization, did not alter the continuing domination of the international bourgeoisie over the national economy since they only affect its 'peripheral' interests which can be allowed to be compromised whereas its 'vital interests' have remained untouched. In this context Shivji pointed out

that "the international bourgeoisie, due to its age-old sentiments with respect to private property, may make vocal protests against the measures initially, but eventually they come to be reconciled and in fact objectively may benefit even more" (62). Indeed, it is often the case that the interests of the international bourgeoisie are made more secure after the nationalization and takeover of the commanding heights of the economy by the state, since it is often the case that this bourgeoisie "needs activist states on the periphery, states that are strong to suppress, by whatever means, growing social contradictions and states that can make foreign investment profitable and profit secure despite various unfavourable circumstances within the national and world economy" (63).

Turning back to the first view of the state bureaucracy, it is not only that the recent historical experience of almost all countries once considered either to be 'socialist' or to be undergoing 'socialist transformation' has proved that it was unrealistic, but that it was also based on false theoretical assumptions. It has become clear by now that countries such as Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, Somalia, etc. which claimed to be following an independent, non-capitalist, non-Marxist, yet socialist path to self-reliant development have lost their original orientation (64). In several countries the regimes have become profoundly reactionary or have succumbed to military coups d'etat while elsewhere immobilization and slow but definite capitalist and dependent development have become the dominant features.

More fundamentally, it is simply wrong to assume that the state bureaucracy represents the whole petty bourgeoisie, let alone the peasants and the working class. Even though it may include some individuals whose class affiliation or origin derives from lower strata, this

is not of decisive importance, since their origins and ties do not need to be identical with those of the dominant class. The function of the state as the cohesive force for the social formation and the engine of reproduction of the conditions of production is not entirely determined by the class origin or affiliation of the bureaucracy, but is objectively determined by the interests of the dominant class. In the context of capitalist society, Poulantzas stated that:

"Although the members of the state apparatus belong, by their class origin, to different classes, they function according to a specific internal unity. Their class origin - class situation- recedes into the background in relation to that which unifies them - their class position: that is to say, the fact that they belong precisely to the state apparatus and that they have as their objective function the actualisation of the role of the state. This in its turn means that the bureaucracy, as a specific and relatively 'unified' social category, is the 'servant' of the ruling class, not by reason of its class origins, which are divergent, or by reason of its personal relations with the ruling class, but by reasons of the fact that its internal unity derives from its actualisation of the objective role of the state" (65).

However, it can be argued that the function of the bureaucracy in post-colonial society is different from that in developed capitalist countries, and that given the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the bureaucracy, the class origin of the individuals who staff it and their impact on the functioning of the state cannot be entirely ignored. In general, these origins tend to work in favour of the privileged classes rather than the working class or the peasantry, or even the lower strata of the petty bourgeoisie. Members of the bureaucracy drawn from these latter strata, who were always a minority, only owe allegiance to their class in terms of their origin rather than of their affiliation, since their current position in the bureaucracy implies that they are no longer workers or peasants. Secondly, in the absence of a revolutionary ideology and in generally hostile circumstances, they may well

be less representative of the classes from which they were recruited than in more favourable conditions. In the former circumstances they function almost as a labour aristocracy.

Therefore, if class origins and affiliations cannot be dismissed, which is often the case under circumstances where the state has extensive autonomy, it seems that they will favour the privileged classes in particular, since immediately after independence the higher echelons of the bureaucracy and the military are in fact generally recruited from landowning or rich families or the bourgeoisie, because they alone have the required level of education. "It is not surprising.... that despite commitment, in some cases at the highest levels, to programmes such as land reform, these have failed to be implemented effectively, for the class that is affected is directly represented within the state apparatus by virtue of the class origin of its officials, and is able thereby to undermine the implementation of measures directed against itself" (66).

Secondly, there is no logical progression from anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism to anti-capitalism and socialist construction. Anti-capitalism is based on completely different material conditions and requires different forces. It is clear that at a certain stage the national bourgeoisie in a colonial or post-colonial society has interests which conflict with those of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. It is also the case that petty bourgeois antagonism towards the colonial order and international capital often far exceeds that expressed by the national bourgeoisie and can often take a more radical form. However, even this hostility only operates on the level of opposition to direct foreign rule and of foreign policies in support of other national liberation movements, and it is often the case that colonialism and

imperialism are simply identified with the former colonial power. This indicates that "There is no consistent appreciation of the collective imperialism led by the US, as a global system of capitalism functioning in a most sophisticated way through structural links with under-developed countries reinforced by international institutions" (67).

Again, the petty bourgeoisie's control over the economy may include the nationalization not only of foreign capital but also of the property of the indigenous bourgeoisie, which may experience some limitations on its activities and suffer expropriation in the production, trade, and service sectors. Thus the petty bourgeoisie is often engaged in direct political and economic confrontation with the international bourgeoisie and its local allies in the bourgeois and land-owning classes. This is normally accompanied by violently nationalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric and, in many instances, by attempts to mobilize the workers and peasants.

Such confrontations also reflect the imperative necessity of subduing those private interests, both foreign and local, which have failed to introduce sustained and all round development, and also indicate that a great deal of this mobilization and rhetoric, however extreme, is not mere hypocrisy, but reflects a genuine desire to combat the international bourgeoisie and its internal allies. Nevertheless, this confrontation does not take place in order to abolish private property, but rather because it is essential to transfer some of this property to the control of the state, whose primary function is to secure the domination of the capitalist mode of production, irrespective of the extent of nationalization or the expansion of the public sector. Moreover, as we will see, these nationalizations are usually confined to particular productive sectors of the national economy and



do not include all productive activities, of which a significant part remains in private hands. Although the extent of nationalization varies from country to country, it generally stops when a certain balance of the distribution of activities between the state and the private sector has been achieved (68).

Furthermore, the apparent hostility of the petty bourgeois-controlled bureaucracy towards the international bourgeoisie encompasses a variety of economic and political dimensions which have nothing to do with socialism. Most important of all, the transfer of ownership to the state is carried out without any drastic reconstruction of the social relations of production. State ownership does not transform the conditions of exploitation of labour in any fundamental way, but is generally restricted to bringing about a shift in the source of exploitation and perhaps a change in the disposal of the surplus, in that a greater percentage is now reinvested locally rather than exported to the metropolis (69). Furthermore, relations with the international bourgeoisie are not terminated by the nationalization measures, as economic links are not cut off. Various forms of dependency develop between the state and international capital through deals and contracts in exports and imports and the supply of technology, and it is generally only a matter of time before a complete reintegration with foreign capital takes place. In fact there are growing economic pressures for such reintegration, often parallel to increases in the power of the bureaucracy.

This does not mean that pressure from the masses on the bureaucracy is fruitless, but such pressure by itself is only likely to slow down the pace of 'new' capitalist development, since this is based more on objective factors than on the willingness or wishes of the bureauc-

racy. Hence the 'resumption' of capitalist relations is not the result of ignorance and apathy or even mistakes on the part of the political leaders of the petty bourgeoisie but has its origins in the very foundation of the social and economic structure of society.

However, one should be careful not to jump to the conclusion that such state bureaucracies are simply a tool in the hands of the international bourgeoisie and that all the measures and policies pursued by the state bureaucracy are 'mere manipulation' ultimately designed to conceal its intention to act as a direct servant of the international bourgeoisie. Of course there are cases where independence was achieved as a result of combinations of factors which include external ones and not merely as a result of internal class struggle, involving the succession to political power by a state bureaucracy whose relationship with the international bourgeoisie was only slightly restructured. but there are also cases in which independence was achieved through prolonged mass struggle, spearheaded by the petty bourgeoisie. A radical change in the relationship with metropolitan capital then took place and a serious confrontation followed, resulting in a true polarization of interests between the petty bourgeoisie and international capital which cannot be dismissed simply as manipulation.

Again, it cannot be denied that there is a great deal of hypocrisy, fraud, and contradiction inherent in the policies of the bureaucracy at all levels, but it does act according to interests which are dictated above all by the material conditions of society. There are times, especially in the early period of its accession to political power, when its own interests have generally coincided with those of the masses, and will thus be antagonistic to those of the international bourgeoisie. This is largely because colonial penetration has often

resulted in the emergence of classes and strata whose interests are contradictory to colonial rule and even to international capital. Only by recognizing this can one really understand the nature of the direct military and economic confrontations which have taken place between international capital and regimes led by the petty bourgeoisie (70).

## **State Capitalism as a Form of State Intervention**

In the previous discussion we concluded that state apparatus is the best organized and most effective institution to determine the course and direction of social and economic development in post-colonial societies. The state's direct and indirect intervention in almost every aspect of social and economic life is not governed by psychological considerations emanating simply from the wishes of those who staff the state apparatus in such societies to satisfy nationalist feelings as some writers try to assert (71), but rather by the objective conditions emerging from the concrete circumstances of social and economic underdevelopment and the need to bring about the profound transformations that cannot be achieved without such intervention (72).

This is revealed not only by the expanding role that the state plays in underdeveloped societies, but also by the gradual disappearance from conventional development literature of the notion that state intervention in the economy restricts development potential and runs counter to the interests of private capital. Thus there is a widespread realization of the need for state planning and intervention even if capitalist development is the declared aim.

However, state intervention varies in nature and degree from country to country and from one situation to another in the same country, depending on the nature of the state structures and on the strategies and aims adopted. In general, state capitalism, is a form of direct and indirect state intervention in the economy, aiming at modifying some of the spontaneous effects of economic mechanisms and designed to arrive at particular goals according to the nature of the social system in which a particular state functions. Although state capitalism means

intensive state intervention, it should not be confused with other forms of intervention in underdeveloped societies, where the state acts as a 'handmaid' to private capital and its activities are confined to spheres where private capital is unable or hesitates to invest, either because of poor prospects of profit or because profits only come after a very long gestation period.

This kind of state intervention, while varying from one country to another, reflects certain solid situations where the impact of colonialism on the indigenous socio-economic structure is combined with the impact of changes brought about by an independence movement led by the native bourgeoisie, which aims primarily at achieving development along capitalist lines. Whether or not this form of capitalist development can achieve what the bourgeois class in the advanced capitalist societies has already achieved is outside the scope of our analysis. The main feature of this pattern of development is that private capital, local and foreign, continues to hold the largest share in national production and depends on the state to provide the means whereby it can expand its activities and introduce capitalist relations of production, especially in the agricultural sector. Relations with foreign capital are modified only slightly to allow local capital to have a larger share in production through newly erected protective tariffs on the goods that can be produced by this capital, mainly light consumer goods. Therefore, the colonial pattern of capital investment has basically remained unaltered, and the main change is that complementary investment, which used to be undertaken by the private sector, is now the responsibility of the public sector.

In contrast, state capitalism represents a completely different path of development involving different social classes leading the

process of transformation and implies specific mechanisms. One of the important features of regimes following this path of development is the dominant role played by the state in the economy, not in support of the private sector but as a real competitor and, sometimes, a substitute for this sector. Here, the state's own sector is expanding increasingly, especially in industry, foreign trade, banking, and insurance, at the expense of the private sector which sees a decline in its own share of national production. This is often achieved by the nationalization of foreign and national companies and by new state investment in various projects. The expansion of the state sector is accompanied by the restructuring of property rights and changes in the forms of production in agriculture. The latter is usually achieved through land reforms which break feudal and semi-feudal estates into small individually owned properties and establish forms of cooperation and collectivization. It is also accompanied by an increase in trade and other links with the socialist countries.

These policies, and particularly the extent and scale of the nationalizations, encouraged some adherents of the theory of the 'non-capitalist road of development', which we have examined in the previous section, to believe that such regimes were actually establishing the necessary conditions for the achievement of socialism. Thus advocates of this theory came to refer to states which adopted one form or another of such development as 'states with socialist orientation' (73).

The theory of the 'non-capitalist road of development' is essentially based on defining the class character of the state in state capitalist societies as neither bourgeois nor proletarian. State power has no definite class character but is said to be in a state of transi-

tion towards socialism; "it is no longer a bourgeois-type state, but not yet a socialist-type state" (74). This kind of class character, according to the theory, is a reflection of the impact of colonialism whose major feature is the absence of a strong national bourgeoisie capable of imposing its own rule over society. Furthermore, even if such a class existed, it would be anti-imperialist, since foreign capital has blocked any opportunities for it to assume a large role in the economy and has rendered it hostile to foreign economic and political domination. This also implies the absence of a large and well organized working class capable of having an effective impact on society in general and the state in particular. Therefore the class character that the theory gives to these states is described as follows:

"A specificity of non-capitalist development in the anti-imperialist nation states in Asia and Africa is to be seen in the fact that under conditions in which the national bourgeoisie proves to be incapable of releasing a general democratic programme on the road of social progress, and in which the working class is not yet in a position to directly take over the leadership of the revolution, representatives of petty bourgeoisie intermediary strata, in particular revolutionary-democratic forces from within the intelligentsia, take over hegemony in the liberation movement and stand in for anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist transformations which can lead towards socialism if revolutionary aim is respected and deepened" (75).

Relying heavily in their assessment of the class nature of the states of 'non-capitalist' regimes on the claims made by those regimes' leaders and on their declared constitutions and programmes, advocates of this theory consider that development towards socialism can only be achieved "by ousting bourgeois and bourgeoisified elements from power and consolidating the position of the forces supporting socialism"(76). In fact they see such development as involving only a gradual severing of relationships between these regimes and the imperialist power,

without consideration of the existence of classes in the 'socialist oriented societies' and, thus, without recognizing class relations as the dynamic factor conditioning socio-economic development. In other words the only existing contradiction is that between these societies as a whole and foreign capital. In this way the nationalizations undertaken by the regimes in these societies are seen "as a process whereby state enterprises 'are finally returned to the rightful owner-the people of the developing countries', ignoring the Marxist precept that the state is a class-based phenomenon in all countries" (77). In Algeria or Iraq or Ethiopia (countries often considered as primary examples of the non-capitalist road), it is evident that there are distinct classes, one of which is in control of the state and the other of which does the producing, whose needs and interests are not identical (78).

Finally, in analysing the conditions and structures of state capitalism it will become clear that this form of transformation will lead to the creation and reproduction of capitalist relations of production; what were regarded as 'anti-imperialist' and 'progressive' measures were simply necessary conditions for particular socio-economic forces to establish a place for themselves in the capitalist mode of production.



## Conditions for the formation of State capitalism

As a form of transformation characterizing some post-colonial societies, state capitalism has its foundations in objective internal and external conditions. Weak peripheral economies with weak national bourgeoisies and disorganized popular forces outweighed by intermediary strata, together with a new set of international determinants have facilitated the emergence of these regimes.

As far as the last factor is concerned, the rise of state capitalism occurred in a situation of rapidly changing international relations, which provided opportunities for anti-imperialist and national movements to gain ground. While independence meant that the post-colonial society left the orbit of domination of a single metropolitan country, this took place at a time of increasing inter-imperialist rivalry and of a general decline in imperialist domination over the underdeveloped countries.

The emergence of the socialist bloc as an effective challenger to the dominance of the capitalist world significantly reduced the possibility that a single imperialist power (especially the USA) could stand as a stumbling block in the face of popular Third World governments, and expanded the latter's room for manoeuvre in such a way as to make the emergence of state capitalist regimes possible and tolerable (79). Partly for this reason the anti-imperialist position taken by the state capitalist regimes amounted essentially to expressions of opposition to the US or the rejection of the domination of the former colonial power without implying that any drastic changes would be made in their relations with the capitalist world as a whole.

State capitalism also emerged in response to the utter failure of

externally induced development carried out under the supervision of the ex-colonial power or international capitalist financial agencies which stressed the leading role to be played by private capital. The lack of domestic capital and the fierce competition carried on in international and even national markets by foreign capital blocked all possibilities of sustained and independent development. The outcome was a tremendous aggravation of social inequalities and mass deprivation, the persistence and exacerbation of sectoral imbalances, increased mass unemployment and underemployment, and a tightening of the grip of dependency relationships with the capitalist world. Foreign investment, which was thought of as the panacea for social and economic problems, produced, where it took place, generally undesirable consequences aggravating already existing miseries by redirecting the exploitation of national resources for the benefit of the advanced capitalist countries and their local allies by enhancing export-oriented agricultural and raw material production without any significant reduction of mass unemployment (80).

State capitalism, therefore, was seen partly as a step that had to be taken to complete formal independence, which it, was soon discovered, was incomplete if not accompanied by freedom of choice in economic decision making. Thus it was not only a response to direct colonial rule but also to the problems produced first by colonialism and then by the activities of private foreign and local capital during the early period of independence. Economic independence came to be viewed as part and parcel of sovereignty and as indispensable for the achievement of sustained development.

~~Since~~ The origins of state capitalism lie generally in the objective conditions of the socio-economic structure of post-colonial societies,

and not in the leaders' desire for economic independence. These conditions are largely determined by the very low level of development of productive forces, and thus very low social differentiation, which gave the state a larger role in the transformation process (81). This situation is primarily reflected in the weak position of the 'national' bourgeoisie, which, in underdeveloped countries, is not the product of the natural process of capitalist development. It is structurally different from the vigorous European middle class that was able to transform itself into a fully-fledged bourgeois class and also to galvanize society as a whole into a dynamic organism with developing and expanding forces of production. This difference naturally affects the future formation and development of the national bourgeoisie and the nature of the production relations connected with its rule (82). To draw a simple comparison between the European middle class and the 'national' bourgeoisie of the underdeveloped countries we recall the following statement by Paul Baran:

"While in advanced countries, such as France or G.Britain the economically ascending middle class developed at an early stage a new rational world outlook, which they proudly opposed to the medieval obscurantism of the feudal age, the poor, fledgling bourgeoisie of underdeveloped countries sought nothing but accommodation to the prevailing order. Living in societies based on privilege, they strove for a share in the existing sinecures: they made political and economic deals with their domestic overlords or with powerful foreign investors, and what industry and commerce developed, in backward areas in the course of the last hundred years was rapidly molded in the strait-jacket of monopoly- the plutocratic partner of the aristocratic rulers. What resulted was an economic and political amalgam combining the worst features of both worlds- feudalism and capitalism- and blocking effectively all possibilities of economic growth" (83).

The 'national' bourgeoisie in the underdeveloped countries grew out of the ~~destruction and disintegration~~ inflicted upon the rising indigenous bourgeoisie by colonial penetration (84). It is in fact the

product of an 'abnormal' capitalist development geared to satisfy the needs of the metropolis, a development of restricted and disorganized capitalism within the framework of colonial control and dependency. The history of the formation of this class is in itself the history of the formation of colonial relations, a structural relationship of dependency between two different social structures, between a capitalist social structure which has long completed its development and entered into its imperialist phase and a social structure that has not yet completed its development (85).

Colonialism has in fact not released the development of the capitalist forces of production. And if it did transform parts of these forces for the benefit of capitalism in the metropolis, it has done so in a distorted and fragmented manner. One of the main implications of this distortion is that the 'national' bourgeoisie of the underdeveloped countries is characterized by its structural weakness, which emanates from its unequal relationship with the bourgeoisie of the metropolitan countries. This weakness is reflected in its inability to bring a new social system into being, unlike the bourgeoisie of Europe. The latter showed itself able to destroy the old structure and to build a completely new one on its ruins, while the former was created and superimposed by 'abnormal' capitalist development through colonial penetration, primarily to facilitate the domination of the metropolitan bourgeoisie over the colonized society.

Despite having introduced capitalist relations into the colony, colonial penetration did not destroy all pre-capitalist forms of production; rather, through the particular social transformation which it brought about, it preserved some of these forms and thus generally hindered fully fledged capitalist development. It is for this reason...

that the native bourgeoisie is often a tiny and marginalized one, dependent on the metropolitan bourgeoisie and on the activities created by the colonial sector. It consists mainly of large landowners whose products are oriented towards the satisfaction of metropolitan needs in exchange for consumer goods, large compradors, and industrialists producing only light consumer goods (86).

However, its relationship with the metropolitan bourgeoisie, despite its dependency, is not one of identity of interests, and in fact, fields of confrontation exist at many levels. The anti-colonial position of the industrial bourgeoisie stems essentially from its efforts to expand its activities by reconstructing its relations with foreign capital. However, it does not follow that it is willing, let alone able, to put an end to the relations of dependency with the foreign and metropolitan bourgeoisie, for two main reasons.

First, the industrial bourgeoisie did not develop out of an artisan class, but was always tied to the landed classes. Industry first emerged as an ancillary sector to agriculture - flour mills, meat packing plants etc - and remained an integral part of dependent development (87). Thus it is very difficult to draw a demarcation line between the 'industrialist' fraction of the bourgeoisie and other fractions represented by the large landowners, compradors, and bankers. There is considerable interaction between the various fractions of the bourgeoisie where an individual can be a landowner, industrialist, and a merchant at the same time (88). In fact this is not an expression of the outstanding vigour of the national bourgeoisie as much as of its structural incapacity. Second, even if such a line can be drawn, and ~~this seems to be the case after independence, the expansion of foreign capital to include the remotest societies and the changes brought about~~

by the new international division of labour (including the export of capital to underdeveloped societies) has significantly incorporated the indigenous bourgeoisie and its industrialist fraction into the world capitalist system.

Thus it continues, especially after independence, to develop in close alliance with foreign capital through a wide range of economic activities from the supply of technology and know how to trade, loans, joint ventures, patents, and licensing agreements (89). Hence, as Frank has shown, the national bourgeoisie, after assuming political power in a battle with its internal enemies, which in many cases was supported directly and indirectly by the metropolis, "voluntarily and enthusiastically adopts the free trade policy, which elsewhere the metropolitan powers often imposed by force" (90). The national bourgeoisie's inability to achieve independent capitalist development meant that it was equally incapable of transforming society along capitalist lines. Similarly, in periods of crisis during which there was popular pressure for a substantial reallocation of resources, the national bourgeoisie was likely to be superseded by other elements from outside this class.

The weakness and structural incapacity of the national bourgeoisie also makes for a weak working class. The reason for this is the small size of industrial establishments and the structure of such industries, which are usually capital intensive and only employ a very small segment of the labour force. Again, since capitalist development in the colonial context was not governed by the logic of capitalist expansion as in Europe but by capitalist restraint of the forces of production, those who have been displaced from their previous pre-capitalist occupations are not absorbed by industry and transformed into a prole-

tariat. In addition, the severe repression directed against any form of mass organization during the colonial and post-colonial periods effectively denied the labour movement any significant socio-political role, which meant that it was severely limited and confined to popular outbursts which lacked the kind of leadership needed to provide an alternative social and economic system.

There remain the large masses of the petty bourgeoisie created by the incomplete process of capitalist development. Although heterogeneous, consisting of socially and economically different groups, these strata include the relatively better organized sections of the population that can, at a certain stage of development, provide a form of political leadership capable of capitalising on the weakness both of the national bourgeoisie and the working class to mobilize the masses and overthrow the old regime. These factors played the decisive role in facilitating the emergence of state capitalism as an alternative system of transforming post-colonial society.

### **State Capitalism as 'Petty Bourgeois Rule'**

State capitalism is a phase in the transition of pre-capitalist societies to a higher stage of development. It is a reflection of the incapacity of the indigenous bourgeoisie to transform society along capitalist lines, and also of the inability of the working class to challenge the bourgeoisie successfully and to impose itself as an independent social and economic force able to provide an alternative socialist transformation. It is therefore an 'abnormal' phase resulting from the structural deficiencies which characterize underdeveloped societies, and represents a phase of development during which the petty bourgeoisie assumes the role of ruling the society. Thus state capita-

lism arises mainly from the peculiar nature of the petty bourgeoisie and its relations with other classes and with the state.

We have seen that the petty bourgeoisie can only be defined in negative terms, in that it belongs neither to the bourgeoisie nor to the proletariat. However, it differs from its counterpart in the advanced capitalist countries by being very heterogeneous, having a great deal of differentiation within its ranks and by its large size in relation to other classes. It includes a wide variety of social and economic groups and strata, each with its own political and ideological outlook. Like the indigenous bourgeoisie, it is a product of a development instigated and shaped by colonial penetration and is one of the consequences of the destruction of pre-colonial forms of production and of the superimposition of the colonial state.

While the most important characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie in advanced capitalist societies is that it is a transitional class, historically fated to disappear, holding fluctuating ideological and political attitudes, siding with the bourgeoisie at one time and with the proletariat at another, and at no time able to assume the role of ruling class, the petty bourgeoisie in underdeveloped societies is structurally and functionally different. It is a product of an 'abnormal' underdeveloped capitalism that blocks its social and economic mobility and constantly threatens it with impoverishment and destruction. However, the relations introduced by the colonial economy constitute the objective basis of the existence of the petty bourgeoisie and its continuity.

In other words, while contradictions exist between the petty bourgeoisie and the metropolitan bourgeoisie's direct control over the ~~society, the underdeveloped capitalist relations and the framework of~~



structural dependency on the advanced capitalist system set up by colonialism represent the material bases for the petty bourgeoisie. Cutting off this relationship entirely would run counter to the interests of the local petty bourgeoisie, a factor which limits the scope and extent of the contradiction and confrontation between itself and metropolitan capital. Even in its most extreme form the confrontation will result in a reshaping and redirection of the dependency relationships rather than in a total rupture, since the nature of the rupture is not governed by the degree of the contradiction and confrontation but rather by the class structure, interests, and struggle that characterize a particular underdeveloped society. This means that the structural rupture with imperialism derives from a comprehensive process of radical change in society, which emanates from the mode and relations of production. Without such a change dependence on the capitalist system remains intact, no matter how far reaching the degree of contradiction or confrontation with a particular imperial power (91).

Therefore, because of its objectively limited aims in the fight against colonialism, "the most it (the petty bourgeoisie) could do was to liquidate those specific features which tied the economy and the institutions to a particular metropolitan country (mother country) and instead multilateralize the imperialist domination thereby becoming authentically part of the world capitalist system" (92).

Unlike the petty bourgeoisie of the advanced capitalist countries, the petty bourgeoisie in underdeveloped societies is confronted with the task of anti-colonial struggle. While this struggle is not necessarily directed against the existing mode and relations of production but ~~against the mode of domination exerted by the metropolis, it is often~~  
~~the case, for the reasons mentioned above, that the petty bourgeoisie~~

came to spearhead this struggle and hence coordinated its own interests with those of the underprivileged masses as far as the struggle to put an end to colonial rule was concerned. Thus the petty bourgeoisie in these societies has often assumed the historic task of leading society and subsequently taken on the role of ruler, a task which its counterparts in the advanced capitalist societies could never perform. To borrow Amilcar Cabral's words; "in the capitalist countries the petty bourgeoisie is only a stratum which serves, it does not determine the historical orientation of the country; it merely allies itself with one group or another. In underdeveloped countries on the other hand, the colonial struggle endows the petty bourgeoisie with a function of ruling" (93).

What are the characteristics of such rule? Is it likely to bring about a mode of production different from that introduced by colonialism? To answer these questions we have to tackle two problems; the first concerns the specificities attached to the political 'representatives' of the petty bourgeoisie who constitute the bulk of the civil and military officials controlling the state apparatus, while the second relates to the nature of the petty bourgeoisie as a whole and the place it occupies in the social production. Regarding the first point, one of the major differences between the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie or the proletariat lies in the specificity of its 'representatives'. Unlike the other two classes, the petty bourgeoisie's 'representatives' emerge less according to their embodiment of the interests of the masses of the petty bourgeoisie than according to their economic and social differentiation and alienation from the rest of its strata. Education and urban occupations, both created by colonialism, enable some members of the petty bourgeoisie to lead the rest

(94). Accession to power enhances the differentiation between the political 'representatives' of the petty bourgeoisie and the other members of its strata since control over the state apparatus by those 'representatives' is likely to open up opportunities of social promotion to them, and thus increase their independence from the rest of the petty bourgeoisie. This is emphasized by al-'Amil as follows :

"the class representatives of the governing petty bourgeoisie, in their class differentiation, within their 'class' framework, generally form a stratum distinct from the petty bourgeoisie, with its own class interests which do not necessarily coincide with the class interests of the petty bourgeois masses, and can even run contrary to them" (95). (Emphasis in original)

For this reason some authors are reluctant to use the term 'petty bourgeoisie' to describe the state capitalist oriented strata which seize power and impose their own imprint on society, and tend to use the terms 'intermediary strata' or 'ruling class' (96).

Going back to the nature of the petty bourgeoisie as a whole, al-'Amil distinguished between 'class domination' and 'class control'. He goes on to assert that the first is only appropriate for the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as fundamental classes, capable of introducing a new social system, while the petty bourgeoisie cannot assume the role of a dominant class because of its incapacity to bring a new social system into being, but there are cases, especially in underdeveloped countries, where the petty bourgeoisie takes on the role of controlling society.

"The attainment of class control by the petty bourgeoisie ..... runs counter to the logic of history in the evolution of the class struggle. It is quite natural that the dominant class (whether the capitalist bourgeoisie or the proletariat) should arrive at class control, because this is part of the logic of its class evolution, and therefore of the logic of historical development. ~~It is 'abnormal' that a non-dominant class should assume the role of controlling class, and if this takes place, it represents~~

an exception in the logic of history" (97).

From this exception emanate all the features that characterize the rule of the petty bourgeoisie, and for this reason its acquisition of power is carried out in an exceptional manner, different from the social revolution of the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. It is usually the military coup d'etat which brings the petty bourgeoisie to power, and in order to maintain its rule it has to practise constant political coercion and repression in support of its regime.

Theoretically, in Poulantzas's words, occupying the middle ground between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and because of its economic closeness and antagonism to both,

"the petty bourgeoisie believes in the 'neutral' state above classes. It expects the state to nurture it and arrest its decline. This often leads to 'statolatry': the petty bourgeoisie identifies itself with the state, whose neutrality it supposes to be akin to its own, since it sees itself as a 'neutral' class between the bourgeoisie and the working class, and therefore a pillar of the state-'its' state. It aspires to be the 'arbitrator' of society, because, as Marx says, it would like the whole society to become petty-bourgeois" (98).

Hence, due to the particular place it occupies in the social production, the petty bourgeoisie sees the state not as an instrument to enhance its rule but as rule itself. This becomes more obvious in the case of the petty bourgeoisie in underdeveloped countries, since the most effective part of it, namely the civil servants and the military men, realize their social and economic well-being through the state as the major employer.

Therefore, the state under the rule of the petty bourgeoisie, already central and significant for historical and economic reasons, acquires extra powers versus the social structure in general. On the political level, the state assumes, in many cases, the role of public organizer and overshadows or even replaces political parties and orga-

nizations, even those of the petty bourgeoisie, mobilizing the masses on the one hand and repressing them on the other. This is what Goulbourne described as the "tendency for the political and politics to merge or.... the political to become preponderant over politics" (99), or using Poulantzas' definitions of these terms, the preponderance of the juridico-political superstructure of the state, which can be designated as 'the political', over the political class practices (political class struggle) which can be designated as 'politics' (100).

This can be explained by the weakness or even the absence of a solid social base to provide social and political support for the 'representatives' of the petty bourgeoisie in control of the state apparatus, and hence the necessity to establish a facade of consensus based upon the belief that there is only one national interest, uniting the whole people under the banner of the national solidarity implied in the state. Classes and class struggle are taken to be non-existent since the people have a single interest, that of achieving independence. If the existence of classes and class struggle were to be admitted this would be shown to be unnecessary as well as a threat to unity, national independence and security.

More important, perhaps the single most important source of further class formation within the petty bourgeoisie and the focus of future class struggle, is the role played by the petty bourgeois state in the economy. As noted by Debray;

"the petit-bourgeoisie does not possess an infrastructure of economic power before it wins political power. Hence it transforms the state not only into an instrument of political domination, but also into a source of economic power. The state, the culmination of social relations of exploitation in capitalist Europe, becomes in a certain sense the instrument of their installation in these countries (101).

The crisis produced by colonial control or by the failure of the national bourgeoisie to introduce a sound capitalist transformation and to achieve real redistribution of wealth and power, constitutes the material base for the petty bourgeoisie to lead the popular struggle and to assume political power in order to bring about the better alternative aspired to by the masses. The petty bourgeoisie, however, and those strata who constitute its 'political representatives' in particular, are characterized by the lack of an independent socio-economic base in any way commensurate with its political power. Hence for those 'representatives' the state represents not only the means of consolidating their political control but also the means of establishing a social base for themselves by various means. The state is also used to achieve their economic aspirations, moving towards their transformation into a bourgeois class whose nature, interests, and outlook imply a role which is qualitatively different from simply acting as the 'representatives' of the petty bourgeoisie. This mobility is not achieved in a smooth and linear fashion by which any ruling petty bourgeoisie would be transformed automatically into a bourgeois class. Rather it is a complicated process governed by multiple and inter-related factors, including the nature, political mould, and interests of the political 'representatives' of the petty bourgeoisie. Relations with the outside world do have an impact on this process through the response of international capital to the changes introduced by petty bourgeois rule.

## **State Capitalism as a Transitional Phase**

The expansion of the state's economic base is carried out through two interrelated processes, both of which involve a rearrangement of the relationship between the state and private sectors, and represent a drastic shift in weight and size in favour of the state sector. The first involves a process of nationalization directed against private national and international companies. Such nationalizations, and those of foreign companies in particular, provide the state with the principal sources of economic surplus and thus with the means to carry out or influence development. They also play a political role by giving substance to the nationalist claims made by the ruling strata, thus providing them with the political legitimacy on which they are able to base their endeavours for public mobilization. Hence these nationalizations are viewed as blows directed against imperialism and a step towards socialist transformation. It is here that the contradictions or even the confrontation between the ruling petty bourgeoisie and foreign capital are likely to be expressed. They vary, however, in extent and nature according to the strategic importance of the nationalized resources both to foreign capital and to the national government (102).

The second is carried out through the expansion of state investment in infrastructural, industrial, and other economic activities. Such investments are limited by the size of the state's revenues which are derived either from taxes imposed on national and foreign private capital or the export of natural resources or both. Since state capitalism implies the control of the state over this capital, the contribution of state investment to the expansion of the state economic sector

tends to be small compared with the contribution made by the nationalizations especially if the state lacks the necessary revenues.

The result of these two processes is the creation of a relatively large state sector with a dominant role in the economy. The size of this sector is expanded by the gradual growth of state control over external and internal trade and banking in addition to a significant part of the service sector. However, state domination over the economy is far from complete as various economic roles remain for the private sector, which develops increasingly close relations with the state sector and participates in its functions. These range from activities connected with the control of internal trade to the ownership of small-to-medium-size industrial enterprises, control over transport, building, and service activities and almost total control over the agricultural sector. Thus, most agricultural production and even most manufacturing and internal trade remains in private hands. As far as internal trade is concerned, there are no major visible changes, apart from state control over external trade and indirect control through prices and subsidies, and the establishment of a limited number of state retail stores, so that its essentially private character is maintained. Moreover a network of private contractors emerges, tied to the state sector in various ways, dependent on executing parts of some state projects and expanding with the expansion of the state sector itself.

Most importantly, the creation and expansion of the state sector is not accompanied by a radical change in the social relations of production. The only major difference between the state sector and the private sector is the replacement of the role played by the previous private owners of the means of production by state managers, technocrats, and bureaucrats, but profit orientation, the hierarchy of



authority, and market forces remain essentially unaltered. Thus the creation of the state sector does not imply any drastic changes in the conditions of exploitation of labour but simply reflects a shift in the source of exploitation as the state replaces private capitalists in the ownership of the means of production and in the control of the surplus value created. Independent workers organizations are usually suppressed and replaced by state sponsored unions controlled by the state's political party, and play a supportive role in favour of state capitalism in mobilizing the workers to endorse and support any measures introduced by the state and in suppressing any demands on the part of the workers for the introduction of genuine improvements (103).

The expansion of the state sector also creates the means for the state apparatus to dispose of and direct a relatively significant amount of accumulated capital and surplus. Such an expansion of the available surplus is depleted, however, by an equal or even greater expansion of unproductive, but labour and resource consuming, governmental and administrative employment (104). Thus the increase in the state's surplus is directed towards solving the pressing problem of unemployment in such a way that the ruling strata of the petty bourgeoisie soon has the social base necessary for its rule. The swollen size of the military, police, and administrative apparatuses is partly a reflection of the desire to solve the problem of unemployment, since such employment does not entail additional expenditure other than the wages and salaries paid to the new employees. This means little expansion in the productive sectors and therefore an insignificant participation of these sectors in absorbing existing unemployment because the proportion of the surplus allocated after the amount allocated to the state's consumption has been subtracted from this surplus and not vice

versa. Even when the productive sectors are able to absorb part of the unemployed, they do so in a way that exceeds their real needs, causing a serious deterioration in productivity (105).

The extension of the state's role in the economy is accompanied by another important measure also motivated by political and economic considerations, namely land reform. Varying in its nature and intensity, this measure, apart from the extension of capitalist relations of production, has not led to any radical changes in agricultural relations in almost all state capitalist countries as far as private ownership of land and other means of production are concerned. Although large semi-feudal holdings were broken up, pronounced differentiations in the size of land ownership and the means of production either remained or soon developed as a result of the failure to introduce collective relations of production. The major change brought about by the land reform was the increasing role played by the state in agriculture, particularly in the provision of the necessary infrastructures, production and marketing facilities. These are the general features of state capitalism which, as we can see, are the conditions for further class formation and development and indeed for the qualitative leaps which, as the experience of almost all state capitalist countries has shown, heralded the development of a form of capitalism not so different in its general features from that introduced by colonialism.

First, the creation or the wide expansion of the state is carried out within a framework of the reproduction of private property relations. Hence despite the curbs imposed on the development of the private bourgeoisie, especially in the initial phases of state capitalism, ~~the state sector has never eliminated the material base for the~~ conditions of its reproduction. This would imply, (in contrast to the

experience of the state sector in the socialist countries which was created on the ruins of private property), that no matter how far reaching the size of the state sector, it will still coexist with an active and prosperous private sector concentrated in agriculture, construction and commerce since state control has not obviated the role of private ownership.

A certain balance in size and weight exists between the two sectors. However, neither of them functions in isolation from the other; rather, types of interrelations and exchange exist at a multiplicity of levels, and the revenues of both sectors depend on the exchanges made between them. For example the state sector transfers part of its income to the private sector in the form of public investment in infrastructural activities and agriculture, and the latter does the same in the form of taxes. Therefore, given the relationship of interdependence, the issue for the private sector has been to find "a configuration which maximized one's ability to benefit from the state's economic developmental and expansion efforts while maintaining discretionary independence from the state" (106).

In addition, a variety of mixed forms of production relations exists which involve degrees of participation and a mixture of resources from both sectors. al-Khafaji presents a theoretical model (107) which clearly demonstrates that the mere existence of the private sector with its relations with the state controlled sector, even without taking into consideration the social and economic forces working in favour of the former, would objectively mean the flow of resources from the state sector to the private sector since the taxation applied in the context of state capitalism is incapable of preventing this because the taxes themselves are an indicator of the size of private incomes.

Thus in order to increase taxes private capital had to be in a position and of a size capable of satisfying the state's need for revenues; "the only way in which tax revenue can increase is by the continuous growth of the private sector, a solution which brings the economy of state capitalism to a dilemma requiring on the one hand a decline in private capital accumulation and on the other the necessity for growth in the private sector as the main provider of tax revenues" (108).

However, the benefit accruing to the private sector from investment made by the state sector without the latter being able to counter these benefits with equivalent taxes on the former is only one side of the outflow of resources from the state to the private sector. Another aspect is the salaries and wages paid to the employees of the state sector which, when they exceed the upper level of consumption, represent a net transfer of resources to the private sector. The latter also benefits from the pricing policy imposed by the state on the products of the state sector without having any obligation to follow the same policy with regard to its products because of the absence of comprehensive central planning and of complete control over prices.

The expansion of the state service and administrative sector to the point at which it becomes the largest sector in the economy, a common phenomenon in state capitalist countries, plays a further role in depleting the state's resources and directing them to the private sector, since the state sector has the lion's share in financing this expansion, and wages and salaries are paid to the employees which constitutes a net flow into private accumulation (109). Finally, the private sector is involved in activities in which the productivity of capital is very high and where returns are acquired in a short space of time, in contrast with the state sector which is involved in projects

where returns are generally slow.

Therefore, as the private sector exists and remains effective in activities like agriculture, industry, construction, and transport and is the main supplier of a variety of goods to the state sector, it would be right to suggest that any expansion in the state sector will be translated into parallel growth and expansion in the private sector--and not the reverse, unless the state sector undertakes the production of the goods and services produced by the private sector.

These factors will have a crucial impact on the structure of society and in particular on the socio-economic character and dynamics of the strata constituting the ruling petty bourgeoisie. It is therefore natural that since neither the state nor the state sector has any specific class nature, an objective and spontaneous development will govern the process of transformation initiated by state capitalism. These developments would render state capitalism, despite the social and economic characteristics which differentiate it from other capitalist regimes, despite the intensive state intervention in the productive activity, and despite the raising of political slogans, simply a phase in a sequence of capitalist development. Contrary to what one might expect initially, the absence of this class nature becomes more pronounced if the particular state capitalist country is endowed with one or more exportable natural resources which will give the state the vital additional means to finance its expansion and its control over the economy. In this way the state's role as the chief determinant of social and economic power becomes exclusive and independent of the productive efforts of the society. On the economic level the state functions as agent for the expenditure of the revenues derived from the export of natural resources. Given the nature of the strata in control

of the state apparatus, the existence of such resources will be translated into vast increases in public consumption which takes the form of the expansion of state administration including defence, inordinate increases in state salaries and financial rewards which set the standard for earnings in the private sector in terms of increased consumption of its products and in terms of income tax reductions and exemptions which favour the private sector as well. This will mean that certain groups and strata close to the state will benefit more from the state's pattern of consumption. Rapid increases in demand for luxury housing, modern services, durable consumer goods and luxury foods, all of which are of particular interest to these groups, will increase their opportunity to double their income at the expense of other classes and strata located far away from the state apparatus (110).

On the other hand the availability of these revenues, which are generally independent from the rest of the national economy and in particular from the productive sectors, threaten the creation and expansion of a productive base capable of producing the necessary industrial goods by having increasing recourse to imports (111). In these circumstances the state possesses a relatively large amount of revenues which make state expenditures beneficial to those private interests which are tied to the state on the one hand, and reduce the state's need to expand its productive base, rendering the economy dependent on imports from the outside world, effectively from the world capitalist system, as shortages in the supply of industrial goods can be met through imports, since "the liberty of 'unlimited' financial capital in foreign exchange turns into a general licence for imports" (112). ~~The limited character of the market to which natural resources are directed and the difficulty facing any attempt to change it accord-~~

ing to internal needs plays an additional role in tightening the economic links with the outside world and reduces the possibility of achieving independent development.

This brings us to the second point which relates to the relations with the outside world and particularly with international capital, and the changes in these relations produced by the initial nationalizations of foreign assets. It is clear that such nationalizations are markedly different from those undertaken elsewhere, not only in their size and extent but also in the nature of the assets nationalized, and whether or not compensation was paid, as well as the aim of the nationalizations (113). Although the relations of the state capitalist countries with international capital received a major shake up as a result of the nationalizations, and vigorous confrontation took place which was not a mere manifestation of "age old sentiments" on the part of the international bourgeoisie, these relations by no means came to an end. What resulted was effectively a shift from direct to indirect control over the economy on the part of international capital, usually accompanied by a geographical redistribution of control from the bourgeoisie of a single metropolitan country to the international bourgeoisie of the world capitalist system. This is expressed in the shift from direct foreign investment, usually undertaken by capital from the metropolitan country, to partnership agreements with the governments of particular countries. Apart from an insignificant increase in trade with the socialist countries, usually motivated by political factors, foreign trade remains largely unaffected as far as the international market is concerned, and the capitalist countries and corporations have remained ~~the most important trading partners with the state capitalist countries~~ (114). ~~The only significant change is in the direct state monopoly of~~

external trade, with growing and expanding network of private commissioners.

The overall picture can be described as one of a facade of economic independence sustained by the apparent control of the state over national resources while foreign capital continues, though in a different guise, to play a determining role in development and increasingly strengthens its grip over the national economy. In fact some argue that, in the long run, the international bourgeoisie are better off under the new conditions introduced by state capitalism, since it is much more convenient for them, and politically more secure, to deal with the state than to be involved directly in the juridical ownership of the means of production. It can make and transfer profits from the periphery under other titles than those derived from formal ownership. "As long as the social relations of production do not undergo any more decisive change, transnational corporations have therefore no inhibition to participate in joint ventures with the state and negotiate on forms of nationalization acceptable to them" (115).

What are the effects of these economic changes on class formation in society in general and on the ruling strata of the petty bourgeoisie in particular? It is quite obvious that the expansion in state capitalism does not only mean the formation and development of the productive base and other related factors such as the expansion of the national market, the increase in per capita income etc. but also, and more importantly, it means the emergence of a new basis for class formation and new class interests and struggle. That the state now controls the means of production without any significant or radical change in the relations of production means, in addition to the fact that the state is no longer merely a part of the superstructure but has become an



important part and a major participant in the economic base, that class interests are formed following a line of proximity to the state apparatus. This means a rapid expansion in the size of the groups and strata dependent on the state, each through a distinct mechanism; "absorbing the interests of the lower classes in the state, expanding the lower middle class through the state and defending the new upper class with the state" (116).

At the bottom the expansion of the industrial labour force is limited by the slow process of industrial investment and by the bias of such investment towards high technology. However, although the main emphasis is on large-scale capital intensive enterprises, varying from country to country according to the resources available for investment, a gradual if slow increase in the size of the industrial working class does take place. This increase is offset by the unproductive character of employment policies, reflected in a vast expansion of the lower white-collar categories of the bureaucracy including the army and police, as a result of the expansion in the state administrative and service sector. This reduces the relative weight of the working class in the society to a minimum and creates a social base for the ruling strata which will in the long run stand against any pressure which might be exerted by the working class. It is also offset by the state's clampdown on independent workers' organizations, thus reducing, at least politically, the impact of this increase in numbers on political development. Both categories are highly dependent on the state whether through their incomes or through their access to goods and services.

At the top there emerges an upper stratum of bureaucrats in command of the state who assume the role of political and economic leadership and decision making, and a body of technocrats to run the state's

economic enterprises. Although these groups are not the legal owners of the means of production, and most of them have no significant economic activity outside the bureaucracy, their position in the state apparatus and in the social division of labour places them as the stratum in effective control of the means of production, thus possessing the power of decision making with regard to social production. Since economic control or the ability to appropriate surplus value does not necessarily depend upon legal ownership of the means of production (117), the control and total right of disposal over the means of production provides the bureaucracy with the means of controlling the surplus value created, and thus presents them with the means of appropriating a larger proportion of the surplus value for themselves. For this reason the bureaucracy acts in exactly the same way as the private capitalist with regard to state enterprises, where they have total freedom of decision making. This freedom allows the bureaucracy to deprive the notion of state ownership of the means of production of its social content and effectively, although not legally, changes state ownership into 'collective' private ownership on the part of the members of the state bureaucracy, thus setting the conditions for the bureaucracy to acquire characteristics which are increasingly different and distinct from those of the rest of the petty bourgeoisie. These characteristics becomes clearer with the development of capitalist relations and with the growth of the private sector, when the bureaucracy starts to assume an identity of its own which is alienated from the rest of society. This alienation places the bureaucracy in a position to dominate the rest of society, including the national bourgeoisie. In this way it emerges as a distinct stratum constituting the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

Although it cannot be described as a class, since this cannot be determined merely by participation in the distribution of national income (118), the bureaucratic bourgeoisie possesses some characteristics which exhibit a sort of unity and solidarity (119). Its privileges are drawn from its administrative position which allows it to appropriate the economic surplus. However, this appropriation is not carried out in the same way as under private capitalism; instead it assumes the form of a deduction from the whole social surplus, including revenues from natural resources. This becomes possible because of the control over the state by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and its subsequent transformation into a means of exploitation. "Only when the state power becomes, through nationalizations of means of production, not simply the agent of oppression, but also that of exploitation, and a social group, because of its control over the state, exercises control over the means of production, only then can we identify the emergence of bureaucratic-capital and thus of a bureaucratic bourgeoisie" (120). Political control of the state apparatus, therefore, represents the most important a priori condition for the continuing existence and reproduction of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, especially in the initial stages when its grip over the economy has not yet been established. Moreover, the reproductive conditions of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and those of the post-colonial capitalist economy are mutually inter-linked and inseparable. Private accumulation of capital is not undermined by state control of the means of production since such control has not involved any radical change in the relations of production. What is new is that a significant part of such accumulation is carried out by the state. Therefore, political control by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and state control over the means of production together

with the continuity of private accumulation are the main conditions for the reproduction of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

The main criterion determining affiliation to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie is not size of income or position in the hierarchy of the state apparatus, but primarily the extent of influence over social, economic, and political decision making in the various spheres of production at local and national levels (121). The major contradiction that governs the bureaucratic bourgeoisie is that between the dominance of state ownership of the means of production as the material base for its class control and the necessity for the existence of capitalist relations of production, together with the need to preserve an active private sector as a means of accumulation of bureaucratic capital. Free disposal of the means of production and the capacity for the private accumulation of a significant part of the surplus (whether through high salaries which greatly exceed the average wages and salaries paid to other employees of the state, or by legal and illegal means, such as commissions and embezzlement, or by shares in profits made by private national and international capital participating in the activities of the state sector) push the bureaucrats to search for outlets for investment. Thus a significant part of the capital accumulated is reinvested in the private sector through a network of family members and relatives and through participation in the activities of the national bourgeoisie. This creates a form of class solidarity between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the rest of the bourgeoisie functioning outside the state sector. In this way an objective possibility exists for the bureaucratic bourgeoisie to be united with other elements of the traditional bourgeoisie to form a united economic, social, and political front to defend its class interests in support of a free

economy and capitalist development, as well as a close alliance with foreign capital and international monopolies which is the essence of neo-colonialism (122).

It is here that the need to keep an active private sector tied in various ways to the state emerges. Moreover, with further accumulation of capital, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie becomes more alienated from the petty bourgeoisie and more and more integrated with private capital. Foreign capital has a vital interest in establishing various economic, political, and even personal links with members of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie who play an intermediary role.

Despite the bureaucratic bourgeoisie's claim that it is a force located above classes and the class struggle, which, even if its existence is admitted, should be ended for the benefit of society as a whole, the political implications of these developments will be a gradual distancing from the masses and an increasing resort to repression and coercion. This will give the bureaucratic bourgeoisie even more absolute rights of disposal of economic surplus and thus assist it to increase its capital. It will also lead to some moderation of the anti-imperialist and anti-reactionary rhetoric, under the pretext of 'maturity' and 'productivity'.

In socio-economic terms, this leads to greater integration with private capital and an increase in the role of the private sector. In other words, class solidarity between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and other sections of the national bourgeoisie is transformed into a more genuine alliance and translated into measures aimed at reviving the private sector and encouraging private capital, national and foreign, to participate in the economy. Thus, depending on various internal and external political and economic factors, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie

quickly finds its interests identified with measures of 'liberalization' which openly and legally encourage private capital and limit state economic activities. This liberalization policy, which aims at reversing the trend of state control originally initiated by state capitalism, is the common dominator characterizing almost all state capitalist regimes (123). It involves a tendency to dissolve whatever were viewed as socialist measures in the past, and includes measures to reprivatize the basic means of production and the reopening the economy to foreign capital. Whatever justification may be given to this policy, whether the emphasis is on productivity and efficiency or on the particularities of this or that country's 'socialism', it is a reflection of the crisis of state capitalism and is an expression of the termination of this system as a transitional phase towards a capitalist, though still dependent, system.

This crisis takes a multiplicity of forms. For Cooper it is a 'resource crisis'; "in order to create the necessary social mobility and to generate the resources to sustain the absorption of interests in the state, the state becomes committed to an aggressive policy that is beyond its means. The state's economic enterprise is hard-pressed to meet the demands of both populism and developmentalism. The mass subsidization of subsistence coupled with the constant expansion of employment in the state and an aggressive policy places the regime in an extremely precarious resource position" (124). This will definitely result in the "beating back the state's role". For al-Khafaji, it is a crisis of resource depletion, which stands as a stumbling block in the face of the development of the state capitalist system. It is "a manifestation of the inefficiencies from which the state capitalist system suffers as a result of its inability to control the spontaneous develop-

ment generated by its own mechanisms" (125). For al-'Amil, on the other hand, liberalization is a way of tackling the class crisis and the expression of the transformation of the representatives of the petty bourgeoisie into new 'national capitalists' whose class interests lie in the development of the private sector" (126).

With the arrival of the latter development the sequence of state capitalism is complete. The outcome is the generation of a system that is equally dependent and tied to the world capitalist system. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie unites with the most oppressive and reactionary sections of the bourgeoisie to dominate economy and society. International capital remains economically dominant and finds its interests structurally connected with the national bourgeoisie in its bureaucratic and private sections.

As with other developments, the time scale of this sequence and the form it assumes are governed by interrelated social, economic, and political factors. However, as summarized by Petras, the cycle generally ends when the state capitalists start "to accumulate wealth through salaries and other perquisites, to open opportunities for investment through the state, to finance private investments through private savings and public loans and to eventually 're-invite' foreign capital for joint ventures" (127). This implies that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie acts as a temporary agent for the national and international bourgeoisie, and that what appeared as 'progressive achievements' are simply the necessary conditions for the ultimate stability of capitalist development, which can only be dependent on and articulated with the world capitalist system. Thus a further incorporation of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in international capital and its political submission to the imperialist centres is the ultimate consequence of its

rule. The crucial role played by the state in this development makes the bureaucratic bourgeoisie not only a local phenomenon but one characteristic of many underdeveloped countries.



## State Capitalism and the Agricultural sector

The importance of analysing the agricultural sector under state capitalism stems principally from the large size of this sector and its considerable importance and contribution to social and economic development in almost all countries where state capitalism has emerged. Furthermore, the phenomenon of state capitalism itself came into being largely as a response to the incapacity of this sector to support its dramatically growing population adequately, let alone to perform an active role in the development of society. It is mainly this sector and the rural population which experienced the most brutal and vicious processes of uprooting and disintegration at the hands of colonialism. It is therefore not accidental that state capitalism emerged in countries with relatively large agricultural sectors and sizeable rural populations. Nor is it a coincidence that agriculture is naturally the first of the sectors to experience profound changes under state capitalism, whether in the system of land tenure, in its role in the economy and society, or in its relations with the state. State capitalism involves a wide range and variety of measures which aim directly at transforming the backward and dislocated agricultural sector, which in many cases presents a threat to the existing social and political order. These measures derive essentially from the realization of the effective social and economic contribution that agriculture could make to development (128), regardless of the specific aims of such development, since "both capitalist and socialist development strategies require peasants to provide the resources necessary for the development of the urban, industrial economy" (129).

As pointed out earlier, agrarian reforms aimed at transforming the agricultural sector and at incorporating it into the national economy are the cornerstones of the policies not only of state capitalist regimes but also of any state aiming to achieve a breakthrough in harnessing the forces of agricultural production and to introduce capitalist relations of production in the economy as a whole.

However, agrarian policies in general under state capitalism differ significantly in nature and extent from other agricultural policies pursued by other regimes in underdeveloped countries. In these countries such policies, particularly agrarian reform, are only a manifestation of the strength of the ruling strata and in particular the bourgeoisie and its ability to risk the sacrifice of the large landowners to the cause of bringing about the modernization desired together with greater incorporation into the capitalist system.

Given the class nature of the state capitalist strata, agrarian reform is an indispensable step in the direction of rearranging the class structure in the countryside and directing a serious blow to pre-capitalist relations of production based mainly on semi-feudal ownership. These constitute a serious hindrance to the incorporation of the agricultural sector into the national economy and are also a glaring example of the sharp inequalities in wealth and income. Agrarian reform under state capitalism goes farther than just putting an end to the rent paid to parasitic landlords, and therefore contributes to the incorporation of the agricultural sector into capitalist development. It is usually carried out along with other measures that aim to introduce effective state control over agriculture whether in the sphere of production or in the distribution of inputs and outputs.

Agrarian reform under state capitalism is in many cases the result

of direct popular and peasant pressure, which itself contributes to the emergence of state capitalism as a system which is likely to improve the abysmal living standards and endemic un- and underemployment of the rural population.

Having analysed earlier the nature of state capitalism and its sequence as a transitional phase along the path towards capitalist development under conditions where capitalist forces are weak, it is not surprising that state capitalist agricultural policies are also used by the state to gain political control over the rural masses and to provide the state with an economic base by methods similar to those followed in other sectors of the economy. Therefore, the following argument will not concentrate on proving whether state capitalism has incorporated the agricultural sector into the framework of capitalism, since this is evidently the case, but rather in showing how this incorporation has actually taken place.

Since it is admitted that capitalist penetration in agriculture is quite different and more complicated than in industry, it is useful to look at the debate on this issue and then to describe how far and along what lines state capitalism has incorporated agriculture into capitalist relations of production.

### **Capitalist Penetration into Agriculture**

"Agriculture does not develop according to the same process as industry; it follows laws of its own" (130). Together with the fact that capitalism brings about drastic and revolutionary changes in agriculture, this statement constitutes what one might call the common ground on which the debate on capitalist penetration in agriculture is based. This debate derives from the fact that "peasant farming is far

from dead" (131), as represented by the persistence of family farms and peasant household production not only in the agriculture of underdeveloped countries, but also because the same system continues "to exhibit a remarkable vitality precisely in those countries where capitalisation of industry has progressed the furthest" (132).

Vergopoulos, for instance, cites numerous examples in which he demonstrates clearly that family farming dominates agriculture in the most developed capitalist countries, and further that it "constitutes a relatively recent structure" (133). This is not because capitalism is either unable or unwilling to penetrate the agricultural sector, or that its development has not (or has not yet) included the agricultural sector within its orbit. On the contrary, agriculture represents the essential foundation on which capitalism is built, and capitalist development cannot take place without the full incorporation of agriculture. Again, this does not indicate that the incorporation of agriculture into capitalist development would not introduce into the former a profound transformation whether in forms of ownership or in social and economic relations. Rather, the expansion of capitalism has fundamentally changed the structure and organization of agriculture and of peasant reproduction. The destruction of the peasant's domestic industry and with it the insularity characteristic of the countryside was the first effect of capitalism. With capitalism came the end of peasant self-sufficiency and a new system in which money and market became the prime motivators for agricultural activity; "peasants have become linked to the market in several ways, namely through both the sale of part of their produce and the purchase of items of productive consumption (agricultural inputs) and individual consumption such as food, clothes, and other household consumption items" (134). Technical improvements

and the use of scientific methods in farming became imperative under capitalism since the producer had to increase productivity and to face the peasant's consumption and market demands. Specialization of agricultural production and the revolution in transport enhanced peasant dependence on the market. Capitalism also meant a profound restructuring of the socio-economic forces in the countryside. Thus growing numbers of peasants experienced constant deprivation and impoverishment leading to the loss of their land, while small numbers of landowners benefited and saw their wealth and properties expanding rapidly. Large scale farms owned by individual owners, based on wage labour provided by the landless peasants and on mechanization and specialization in specific agricultural products emerged as one of the major features brought about by capitalist penetration into agriculture.

However, "the destruction of the 'peasant economy' does not necessarily imply a weakening of the basis for the reproduction of the peasant household" (135). The continuing vitality and functions of the peasant household and the family farm in some of the most advanced capitalist countries as well as in the developing countries is a reflection of this fact. This does not undermine or refute the Marxist theory of capitalist development and in particular the theory of the transitional nature of petty commodity production; on the contrary it is only within the context of this theory that this phenomenon can be fully analysed and explained.

There are two main explanations for the persistence of petty commodity production in agriculture reflected by peasant households and "distinguished from capitalist commodity production by its logic of subsistence (meeting the needs of simple reproduction) as opposed to the logic of the appropriation and realization of surplus value and the

accumulation of capital" (136). The first relates to the nature of the development of capitalism and to the process of capitalist accumulation, and the second relates to the peculiarities of agriculture and the conditions of capitalist development within it as well as to the specificities of the peasant household and the family farm within the capitalist context.

Despite the general trends of the development of capitalism which produce a completely new mode of production based on specific social and economic laws, a mode of production qualitatively different from the feudal one and from petty commodity production, it is nevertheless often neither able nor willing to dissolve non-capitalist forms of production in various areas of society. Rather it articulates such forms and directs them to satisfy the requirements of capitalist development. "Capitalism neither evolves mechanically from what precedes it, nor does it necessarily dissolve it; indeed, far from banishing pre-capitalist forms, it not only coexists with them but buttresses them, and even on occasions devilishly conjures them up ex nihilo" (137). This clearly means that capitalism as a mode of production can, even must, contain some forms and relations of production which are in essence non-capitalist and might belong to the previous mode of production. "Under certain conditions, the intensification of commodity relations of production for the domestic and international market is consistent with the persistence of (non-capitalist) 'forms' operating at an extremely low level of productivity" (138).

Regarding petty commodity production as a non-capitalist form, the process of concentration and centralization of capital in many cases, and particularly in industry does not, as Kautsky stated, implant ~~itself at once in all spheres of production;~~

"it conquers them in succession. Where it establishes its dominance, the small enterprises disintegrate, which does not mean, however, that all the small entrepreneurs become workers in the large enterprise. They go over to other professions and encumber those..... Nor does this process express itself in a general decline of small enterprises; here and there they may actually increase, which could give the impression that they are therefore thriving" (139).

Thus property relations whether in industry or in agriculture are not the only indicators of capitalist penetration.

"When capital is implanted in a non-capitalist environment, such as that represented by peasant farming, the effect of the penetration of capital is to break up the existing system of production, but not necessarily to destroy the system of property relations with which production systems are associated" (140).

Non-capitalist forms of production, and in particular petty commodity production, are manipulated to serve the needs of the process of capitalist accumulation. Here petty commodity production is not a hindrance to capitalist development but acts as a support for and an integrated part of this development. Similarly peasant household and family farms become part of commodity production when they are incorporated into the capitalist market without necessarily incurring any drastic changes in the social forms of peasant production and reproduction.

"Peasant forms of production can provide surplus to an expanding capitalist economy without being subsumed by the logic of capitalist accumulation. This is not to argue, of course, that peasant forms of production are never subsumed and dissolved in the advance of capitalism.... It is not necessary for the expanded reproduction of capitalism that peasant forms of production be transformed into capitalist forms of production" (141).

The impact of colonialism on the social and economic structure of

the colony should be seen from this angle, since it has incorporated

into capitalism various pre-capitalist and non-capitalist forms of

production through the appropriation of the economic surplus created by those forms of production and directed it towards the metropolis without needing to transform the native forms of production and their production relations. In many cases capitalist incorporation not only preserved non-capitalist forms of production, but also especially in agriculture, enhanced the development of new relations which are also non-capitalist such as some forms of family cooperation and tenancy relationships and land exchanges, which "emerge as a specific response to the penetration of capitalism in the rural economy" (142). It is for this reason that Kautsky asserted the necessity of going beyond the size of farm in order to arrive at an understanding of the agricultural question within capitalism. He stated that;

"to study the agrarian question according to Marx's method, we should not confine ourselves to the question of the future of small scale farming; on the contrary, we should look for all the changes which agriculture experiences under the domination of capitalist production" (143).

Why has agriculture been the sector where capitalist penetration is more likely to fail to introduce parallel capitalist forms and relations of production similar to those in industry? Or why is it that "capitalist development appears to stop, as it were, at the farm gate"? (144). Many writers have cited different reasons, all of which seem valid in various ways for the continuation of the peasant household and family farms which, though fully incorporated within capitalist development, are non-capitalist forms of production. Vergopoulos emphasized that the 'perverse' character of land in the capitalist social system is the main reason for the persistence of family farms in agriculture. This perverse nature is manifested by two characteristics which distinguish land from other factors of production: these are "the rigidity of ~~land supply~~ and the decreasing returns of agricultural profits" (145).



These two characteristics give rise to land rent which is to be appropriated by those who monopolize its ownership. This rent constitutes a net deduction from the economic surplus which capital has to pay to those who monopolize the land, whether in the form of feudal landlords or of agrarian bourgeoisie who "by tending to take advantage of the rigidity of the land supply, constitute an obstacle to the growth of industrial capitalism" (146).

Family farming, on the other hand, constitutes

"the most successful form of production for putting the maximum volume of surplus labour at the disposal of urban capitalism. It also constitutes the most efficient way of restraining the prices of agricultural products" (147)

This is so not only because family farming represents a considerable gain to urban capital without paying land rent, but also because of the

"facility and the rapidity with which the family productive unit adapts itself to the requirements of the urban system: it modifies its production, its specialization, its investment and its work more easily and rapidly than capitalist enterprise, and it certainly knows how to restrict its costs much more effectively" (148).

Therefore, family farming represents a form of production where capitalism, in certain circumstances, can benefit more from agriculture.

These factors were also observed by Kautsky in stating that "as long as the peasant repays the capitalist and the state, his property is sacrosanct. This poses a serious obstacle to the growth of big landed properties" (149).

This, however, does not mean that small family farming is always more suitable for capitalism. In fact Kautsky cited many advantages which make large scale units, whether in industry or in agriculture, superior to small scale ones. But "in agriculture this is true only up to a point" since the expansion of an agricultural enterprise, unlike ~~in industry, is usually accompanied by "greater loss of material, a~~

greater deployment of efforts, resources, time, for the transport of material and men" (150). These losses stem from the nature of agricultural activity and its dependence on natural conditions and the long and frequent interruptions where farm labour, management, and materials are out of use, thereby offsetting the advantages of the large scale unit of production.

Mann and Dickinson, on the other hand, emphasized the unfavourable nature of agricultural production from the point of view of capitalist accumulation. They see that the explanation for the survival of family farming and its co-existence alongside a dominant capitalist mode of production lies neither in the 'subjective approach', focussing on the peculiar behaviour of family labour and its ability to produce under severe conditions of 'self-exploitation', nor in the 'objective approach' linking the persistence of family farming to improvements in labour productivity resulting from advances in the forces of production and in particular farm technology (151). For them this survival can be attributed to the unattractiveness of agriculture for capitalist investment because of the wide gap between production time and labour time which characterizes it.

Labour time is the period when labour "is actually applied in production", while production time includes, as well as labour time, "the period when the 'unfinished' commodity is 'abandoned to the sway of natural processes' without being at that time in the labour process" (152). Since it is only during labour time that the surplus value is realized, it is quite natural that capital will strive to penetrate those spheres of production where labour time and production time coincide, or at least where the time when the unfinished commodity is left over for natural conditions is at a minimum, because such time

does not absorb labour and therefore does not create surplus value. Capital will also try to dominate those spheres of economic activity where the length of production time is short, because this will mean a shorter turnover time and thus a higher surplus.

As well as having long production time compared to industry, agriculture is characterized by the wide gap separating labour from production time. "In this case the reduction of production time is severely restricted by natural factors and thus cannot easily be socially modified or manipulated as occurs in industry proper" (153). Other related factors limiting capitalist penetration in agriculture are inefficiencies in the use of constant capital. "Constant capital lying idle during the excess production time finds its value whittled away by physical depreciation and social obsolescence rather than being transferred bit by bit to the value of the commodities produced" (154). Again there are severe problems in the sphere of circulation arising from the peculiar nature, as far as capital is concerned, of agricultural products with regard to their perishability and durability (155), as well as labour recruitment and management problems "arising from the seasonal and periodic hiring of wage labour, which is a reflection of the non-identity of production time and labour time" (156).

Moreover, Mann and Dickinson observe that "the capitalization of agriculture progresses most rapidly in the spheres where production time can be successfully reduced. These spheres are better represented by poultry and egg production and food processing "which have become virtually continuous production processes in which labour is almost constantly applied and absorbed: it is these spheres which are becoming increasingly produced along capitalist lines" (157). Therefore according to the authors, "as long as there are natural objective constraints

on the social manipulation of production time, capitalism will regard these as high risk and high cost areas of production (and that) when conditions of production are sufficiently altered by advances in science, technology, etc.... there is no reason to believe that capitalism will not move in and conquer them as it has done in areas of industry proper" (158).

Although one cannot agree more on the effectiveness and viability of these points as factors limiting capitalist penetration in agriculture, they nevertheless ignore the fact that even under conditions where labour time and production time coincide, family farming presents capital with the advantages of very low agricultural prices, since the producers here "frequently display a willingness to let their merchandise go to market for less than the price which would be charged by a capitalist producer using the same techniques. Thus by relinquishing their claim to as much surplus value as would be due to them, they offer a subsidy to capital in general" (159). By doing so they also exhibit a tendency to "survive the development of capitalism and the expansion of commodity relations because of their ability to deliver goods to consumers at lower prices than capitalists" (160).

However, this should not overshadow the fact that under certain conditions and with regard to certain crops, developments along capitalist lines take place at every level at an accelerated rate, resulting in the emergence of privately owned large scale farms depending primarily on wage labour and submitting to the logic of capital accumulation. Colonial penetration has often resulted in the expropriation of lands from their original owners and for the production of agricultural commodities on farms run by settlers or capitalist companies. These farms were large units of production which required a

continuous supply of wage labour and produced essentially for the needs of the capitalist economy.

Capitalist incorporation of agriculture meant also the development of inequalities among peasants in their access to the whole range of resources and income, and thus made the emergence of wealthier peasants inevitable. Although not relying on purely capitalist relations of production, rich peasants are well equipped to meet the demands of the market and to accumulate wealth. They do not only own more land than others, but "usually command more farming labour and more and better tools with which to cultivate. They are more likely to employ hired labour and can do so at lower wage costs than poorer farms .... They are more likely than others to purchase land or rent land .... and they have far greater access than others to credits, extension services, sprays and fertilizers" (161). However, capitalism in agriculture does not necessarily assume that large capitalist units of production become dominant over small peasant households and family farms.

## State Capitalist Agriculture

One of the major weaknesses of most studies of the agricultural sector in state capitalist societies, which has created a great deal of confusion in determining the nature of the state's policies towards this sector is the lack of a proper consideration of the appropriate linkages between policies, and the exact nature of the social forces and strata that are directing the state power. In other words, agricultural policies and strategies should be directly related to the immediate and long term political and economic interests of the 'representatives' of the petty bourgeoisies and of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in the case of state capitalist countries.

Given the social and economic nature of this bourgeoisie, the peasantry and agriculture have a crucial role to play in maintaining the state capitalist system. This is because of the possibilities of direct and indirect accumulation that agriculture can provide for the ruling strata and equally because peasants can play an active political role in support of these strata. In many cases they were themselves the main force contributing to undermining colonial control and it was because of their claim to represent the rural masses that the petty bourgeoisie succeeded in taking over the state apparatus. Capitalist incorporation of the agricultural sector within the national economy represents the only means through which agriculture can contribute significantly to national strategies of development and accumulation within the framework of state capitalism and to the reproduction of the ruling strata and the accumulation of its wealth. Given the reluctance of private capital to invest in the agricultural sector other than in activities which do not relate to the production process, state capita-

list strata have "a more direct interest in the development of commodity relations within any given country than international companies which mobilize capital and switch investment on a global basis" (162).

The main aim of state capitalist agrarian policies is to change the terms of the intersectoral relationship between agriculture and the urban sector and particularly to establish terms of exchange between town and country which determine the size of the marketed surplus that agriculture can contribute to the productive and consumptive activities of the urban sector.

Various methods are employed to achieve this relationship, the most important of which is agrarian reform and related policies of cooperation and the introduction of some limited forms of collectivization. Despite the fact that agrarian reform an indispensable policy followed in almost all underdeveloped countries regardless of their political and economic systems one can distinguish the reforms undertaken by state capitalist regimes by their emphasis on bringing the agricultural sector and the rural population in general under direct state control. This is shown by the various measures that accompany agrarian reform relating to new forms of agricultural organization in production, marketing and the supply of credits.

Agrarian reform generally tends to break up very large landholdings and distribute them to landless peasants. Thus with varying degrees of intensity, it usually results in sustaining a number of small agricultural units of production at the expense of large estates. As well as resulting in a slight improvement of the lot of the small peasants, the process tends to consolidate the position of the medium size farmer. Thus inequality in the distribution of land is not eliminated and there is still a relatively wide gap separating the medium

size farmers, whose holdings generally remain intact, from the rest of the peasantry. As the reform is restricted in scope by the limited amount of land to be distributed (since it is confined to large ownership and does not concern medium owners) it is unable to solve endemic problems of landlessness and rural to urban migration. Furthermore, the reforms do not involve any radical changes in the form of landownership, which remains in essence private. This is despite the introduction, usually by bureaucratic measures, of new forms of agricultural organization such as cooperation and some forms of collectivization managed and supervised by the state. Hence, production is still carried out primarily on an individual basis, dependent on the work of family members with the employment of seasonal wage labour on relatively large farms, or primitive peasant forms of cooperation in the peak seasons. Agricultural products change from subsistence to cash crops according to the intensity of the newly established links with the urban sector.

Agrarian reform gives the state some desperately needed political legitimacy and contributes to the consolidation of the power of the bureaucracy, since it represents a direct blow to the semi-feudal lords whose mere existence was synonymous with drastic poverty and inequality. Thus at least in the short term the reform presents the ruling strata of the petty bourgeoisie with significant mobilizing power over the peasantry, since one of its immediate consequences is the provision of some kind of satisfaction and security to part of the peasantry in the sense that the reform acts as a catalyst towards a system in which the small peasantry are the predominant forces in the countryside.

The political legitimacy acquired both by the state and the ruling strata of the petty bourgeoisie by the promulgation of agrarian reform is soon overshadowed by the emphasis on modernization and by the other



policies it introduces to increase productivity. These range from the introduction of new forms of agricultural organization represented by cooperation and state farms to compulsory programmes of marketing and pricing together with supplies of inputs, machines, and credits. The essential aim of such policies is to achieve state control over agricultural production and to mobilize its marketed surplus for the benefit of the urban sector.

Far from eliminating private property, agrarian reform has in fact asserted it and apart from trying to abolish pre-capitalist forms of production has brought almost no change in production relations as far as private property is concerned. On the other hand, cooperation enhances state control over farms which remain managed on an individual basis. It "merely meant the control of inputs (seed, fertilizer, pesticides) and the forced marketing of outputs" (163). Moreover, despite its potential for increasing production and for providing the peasants with inputs, the impact of cooperation is limited by the bureaucratic methods through which it is implemented. In order to create a shift in agricultural production towards satisfying the needs of the urban sector, the emphasis of cooperation is more towards directing the peasants what to produce than towards anything else. Cooperation is accompanied by state supply of inputs and state purchase of output; it exerts almost total control over agricultural prices and thus over the peasants' incomes. These mechanisms together with the state supply and the introduction of new services in agriculture, make the state able to penetrate more and more comprehensively into peasant life. The political incorporation of peasants through the promotion of certain individuals as intermediaries linking small peasants to the bureaucracy will intensify such penetration.

Given the fact that agrarian reform has not radically tackled the problem of inequality, since it preserves the holdings of medium size farmers which considerably exceed those of small peasants, it is often the case that the various policies pursued by the state tend to favour wealthier farmers who benefit most from state services, the provision of inputs, and agricultural investment, simply because most of these services and inputs and much of the advice offered are appropriate only for them. They will be the first to apply capital intensive methods of cultivation since they are the most able to meet the state's requirements for the provision of machines and other inputs. Their incomes and their better access to credits and loans enable them to raise the initial capital and to increase their productivity and, therefore, to increase their capital further. This is true especially if we recall the family links that connect the state bureaucracy with the wealthy farmers which further emphasise the favourable terms that those farmers enjoy under state capitalism. These links enable wealthy farmers to control the newly established cooperatives and to manipulate them and their facilities for their benefit. It is quite common to see the cooperatives headed by rich farmers who by providing the bureaucracy with political support, acquire for their own use assets which are supposed to be for the equal use of all peasants.

Moreover, by virtue of their relatively large holdings, wealthy farmers are able to evade state control over their outputs by shifting production towards those products which are not controlled by the state such as fruit and vegetables and animal products. The prices of these crops, which are difficult for the state to control, rise rapidly as a result of the general development strategy of state capitalism which places higher emphasis on the urban sector and as a result of the

increasing demand from higher income groups. Wealthy farmers possess the technical means to meet the requirements of such production which are generally capital intensive. They are able to allocate a significant part of their land to fruit and vegetables and use their access to state loans and credits to mobilize the inputs required by such products. The size of their holdings, their relations with the bureaucracy and their incomes allow them to use quite different factors of production to those of the rest of the peasantry and to exhibit a more capitalist pattern of cultivation such as the use of wage labour and capital equipment.

This trend is opposed by the attempt by the small peasants to meet the additional burdens resulting from the state penetration and control. They tend to multiply their efforts in order to increase the size of their land, a process which involves more surplus being extracted by the state and more intensive forms of peasant exploitation. What further enhances the role played by the wealthy farmers is the failure, at least in the early stages of state capitalist agrarian policies, to bring about a sustained increase in total agricultural production or for this production to match the growth in the population and its demands.

One major reason for this failure is that because of the sectoral imbalance characterizing the development strategy which favours the urban sector over the rural sector, the agricultural sector becomes increasingly discriminated against in terms of employment and wages. Increasing demand for agricultural products is met by increasing imports. This has very serious implications for the reproduction of the ~~bureaucratic bourgeoisie~~ especially in the absence of other resources that can compensate for state expenditures. With more emphasis on

production and productivity, which becomes apparent when a serious agricultural crisis is in prospect and when the growth of agricultural production does not keep pace with population increases, there is a sharp rise in the prices of certain foods, normally those produced by the wealthy farmers. In such circumstances the latter receive additional facilities from the state, and this leads to more pronounced differentiation and inequality.

The liberalization policy is reflected in the state's position towards the wealthy farmers who by trying to expand their resource base, start to provide the inputs over which state control is gradually lifted (164). Emphasis on production and productivity overshadows, or indeed replaces, the concern to abolish or reduce inequality and even becomes reflected in the relaxation of ownership ceilings and the transfer of usufruct rights from the state to private lessees. State policies towards production, marketing, and the supply of inputs and material are gradually relaxed (165). The main emphasis is now placed on trying to stimulate the private agricultural sector and further facilities are introduced to encourage this sector. In the process rich farmers find new ways to invest and to expand their activities.

Thus the sequence of state capitalism which starts with an emphasis on social justice and equality ends with policies emphasizing efficiency and productivity which tend to promote the wealthy farmers whose fortunes and interests are directly tied to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. If state capitalism involves the establishment of state farms as pioneer production units, it is the wealthy farmers who will benefit from turning such farms into private enterprises as they ~~possess the political and economic means to do so~~ (166).  
... We can conclude from these general tendencies that whatever the

intensity and radicalness of the agricultural transformations under state capitalism, the task of agriculture during this phase is to carry the burden of the development strategy. Beside the evident failure to introduce a sustained increase in agricultural production, this policy leads to the agricultural sector's integration into the national and international capitalist market and thus to new forms of differentiation and inequality.

UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN

THE UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN



## Notes

- (1) See for example:  
Miliband, R., Class Power and State Power,  
Verso, London, 1983, Chapter One, pp.1-25.  
  
Carnoy, M., The State and Political Theory,  
Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984, p.45.  
  
Jessop, B., The Capitalist State,  
Martin Roberston, Oxford, 1982, pp.1-31.
- (2) Quoted by Carnoy, op. cit., p.46.
- (3) Engels, F., The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State,  
Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1972, p.229.
- (4) Ibid., p.231.
- (5) Marx, K., and Engels, F., The German Ideology,  
Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1970, p.80.
- (6) Marx, K., and Engels, F., Manifesto of the Communist Party,  
Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p.38.
- (7) Ibid., p.59.
- (8) Miliband, op. cit., p.9.
- (9) Quoted by Ibid., p.9.
- (10) Marx, K., The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon Bonapart,  
International Publishers, New York, 1972.
- (11) Ibid.
- (12) Quoted by Miliband, op. cit., p.13.
- (13) Alavi, H., "The State in Post-Colonial Societies; Pakistan and Bangladesh"  
New Left Review, No. 74, July-August 1972, p.60.
- (14) Roxborough, I., Theories of Underdevelopment,  
Macmillan, London, 1979, p.72.
- (15) al-Khafaji, I., Ra'smaliyyat al-Dawla al-Wataniyyia,  
(National State Capitalism),  
Dar Ibin Khaldoon, Beirut, 1979, pp.81-83.
- (16) Alavi, op. cit., p.61.
- (17) Ibid., p.62.

- (18) Saul, J., "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania"  
The Socialist Register, 1974, p.351.
- (19) Ibid., p.353.
- (20) Leys, C., "The 'Overdeveloped' Post-Colonial State:  
A Re-Evaluation"  
Review of African Political Economy,  
(5), 1976, p.42.
- (21) Ibid., p.43.
- (22) Ibid., p.42.
- (23) Ziemann, W., and Lanzendorfer, M., "The State in Peripheral  
Societies",  
The Socialist Register, 1977, p.144.
- (24) Ibid., p.145.
- (25) Ibid., p.147.
- (26) Ibid., p.161.
- (27) Ibid., p.148.
- (28) Goulbourne, H., "Some Problems of Analysis of the Political in  
Backward Capitalist Social Formations", in  
Politics and State in the Third World,  
ed. by Harry Goulbourne,  
The Macmillan Press Ltd. London, 1979, p.28.
- (29) Ibid., pp.28-29.
- (30) Frank, A.G., Crisis in the Third World, (Chapter 7)  
Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., London, 1981,  
pp.230-279.
- (31) Ibid., p.235.
- (32) To cite an example of the colonial superimposition of the state  
apparatus on the indigenous social formation apart from that of  
Algeria, Marion and Peter Sluglett wrote describing this process  
in Iraq:  
"The Iraqi state was created 'from above' in the  
course of the peace settlement after World War I. The  
principles on which the state was organised had been  
imported from Britain and the new structures were  
directed primarily towards ensuring the protection and  
furtherance of the interests of Britain and of the  
monarchy"  
Farouk-Sluglett, M., P. and Sluglett,  
Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship,  
Kegan Paul International, London, 1987, p.216.

- (33) Alavi, op. cit., p.62.
- (34) Ziemann and Lanzendorfer, op. cit., p.162.
- (35) This is best summarized by Alavi when he writes:  
 "Every society builds on inherited societal, institutional, and cultural products of the past. Capitalism does not erase them totally and substitute new social institutions brought out from nowhere, it takes the legacies from the past as the raw materials for building its society of the future, combining them with societal and cultural realities that it also creates"
- Alavi, H., "The Structure of Peripheral capitalism" in Introduction to the Sociology of the 'Developing' Societies, ed. by Hamza Alavi and Teodor Shanin, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1982, p.174.
- (36) Alavi, H., "State and Class Under Peripheral Capitalism" in Introduction to the Sociology of the Developing Societies ed. by Hamza Alavi and Teodor Shanin, 1982, pp.289-307.
- (37) al-Ali, S.Y., "Mawadhu'at Hawla Mafhum al-Burjwaziya al-Burokratiya"  
Al-Nahj, (Marxist Leninist Note Books of the Arab World)  
 No.7, Feb.1985, pp.150-151.
- (38) al-Khafaji, I., al-Dawla w'al-Tatawur al-Ra'smali fi'l-'Iraq, (State and Capitalist Development in Iraq; 1968-78) Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, Cairo, 1983, p.20.
- (39) Marx and Engels, The manifesto....., op. cit., p.63.
- (40) See Nadel, S.N., Contemporary Capitalism and the Middle East, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982, pp.182-215.
- (41) Marx and Engels, The Manifesto...., op. cit., pp.43-44.
- (42) Poulantzas, N., Fascism and Dictatorship, Verso, London, 1979, p.237.
- (43) Ibid., p.239.
- (44) See Cliffe, L., "Class formation as an 'Articulation' Process: East African Cases", in Alavi and Shanin ed. pp.262-278.
- (45) Geary, C. and Bribeck, C., "The Petty Commodity Producer in the Third World Cities: Petit-Bourgeoisie or 'Disguised Proletarian'?" in The Petite Bourgeoisie: Comparative studies and the Uneasy Stratum, ed. by Frank Bechhofer and Brian Elliot, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1981, pp.121-154.



- (46) See Ben Husain, L.M.,  
"Mu'alaja Manhajiya le-Mafhum al-Burjwaziya al-Saghira",  
(Methodological Treatment to the Concept of the Petty Bourgeoisie"  
Al-Nahj, No.6, Nov.1984, pp.200-217.
- (47) Alavi, "State and Class...." op. cit., p.302.
- (48) See Ake,C., A Political Economy of Africa,  
Longman, Essex, 1981, pp.71-78.
- (49) Petras, J., "State Capitalism and the Third World",  
Development and Change, 8:1, 1977, p.3.
- (50) Alavi, "State and Class...", op. cit., p.299.
- (51) See for example:  
Popov, Y., The Developing Countries from the Standpoint of Marxist  
Political Economy,  
Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977,  
Chirkin, V.Y. and Yudin, Y.A.,  
A Socialist Oriented State: Instrument of Revolutionary Change,  
Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978,  
Andreyev, I., The Non-Capitalist Way; Soviet Experience and the  
Liberated Countries  
Moscow, 1977.  
See also al-Thaqafa al-Jadida (Monthly Magazine Published by the  
Iraqi Communist Party)  
Numbers during the period 1970-1976.
- (52) Popov, op. cit., pp.101-102.
- (53) Ibid.,
- (54) Pfeifer, K., "Three Worlds or Three World Views? State Capitalism  
and Development",  
MERIP Report, No.78, Vol. 9, June 1979, p.6.
- (55) Saul, op. cit., p.363.  
Saul also considers the 'Arusha Declaration', a package of  
policies which aimed at a wide nationalization of foreign and  
national enterprises in Tanzania, "represented, first and  
foremost, an initial victory for a progressive wing of the petty  
bourgeoisie" op. cit., p.362.
- (56) Shivji, I.G., "The State in the Dominated Social Formations of  
Africa: Some Theoretical Issues", in  
Debate on Class, State, and Imperialism,  
ed. by Y.Tandon and A.M. Babu,  
Tanzania Publishing House,Dar es Salam, 1982,p.180.
- (57) Amin, S., Unequal Development,  
Harvester Press, Sussex, 1976, p.380.

- (58) Meillassoux, C., "A Class Analysis of the Bureaucratic Process in Mali",  
Journal of Development Studies,  
Vol.6, No.2, Jan.1970, p.105.
- (59) Ibid., p.108.
- (60) Freyhold, M.V., "The Post-Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version",  
Review of African Political Economy,  
(8) 1977, p.75.
- (61) Meillassoux, op. cit., p.106.
- (62) Shivji, I., "Tanzania-The Silent Class Struggle", in  
Socialism in Tanzania, ed. by Lionel Cliffe and  
John Saul, East Africa Publishing House, Nairobi,  
1972, p.308.
- (63) Freyhold, op. cit., p.78.
- (64) Ahmed, E., "Post-Colonial Systems of Power",  
Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.2, No.4, p.356.
- (65) Poulatzas, N., "The Problem of the Capitalist State",  
New Left Review, (58) Nov-Dec. 1969, p.73.
- (66) Alavi, "State and Class...." op. cit., p.300.
- (67) Shivji, I., Class Struggle in Tanzania,  
Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., London, 1976, p.65.
- (68) "It is difficult to say that the existence of nationalization is an indication of the transformation of a backward country to socialism. In the latter case, one can be sure of this transformation only through the existence of nationalization to include not only the unprofitable sectors or important industries, but also sectors of material production and distribution including the gradual control of the state over the agricultural sector, meaning effectively not only the diversion of private capital from one outlet to another, but blocking possibilities for the accumulation on the part of private capital"  
al-Khafaji, Ra'smaliyyat....., op. cit., p.105.
- (69) Petras, op. cit., p.7.
- (70) To cite only few examples; the Suez Crisis in 1956, Iran 1952, and Algeria 1971.
- (71) See for example:  
Johnson, H., A Theoretical Model of Economic Nationalism in New Developing States,  
Chicago, 1967, pp.1-17,  
Benton, A., "The Economics of Nationalism",  
Journal of Political Economy,

- (72) "In the last quarter of the 20th century, faced with the mighty power of the multi-national corporations, whatever 'national' effort in the Third World is forthcoming requires a vastly expanded role on the part of the state"  
Petras, op. cit., p.1.
- (73) Chirkin and Yudin, listed the following countries as taking the path of socialist orientation out of twenty other:  
"the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, the Republic of Guinea, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, the People's Republic of Benin, the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, the People's Republic of Mozambique, the People's Republic of Angola, Ethiopia"  
Chirkin and Yudin, op. cit., p.8.  
The list used to include Egypt and Somalia.
- (74) Ibid., p.18.
- (75) Quoted by Meyns, P., "Tanzania-The Struggle for National Independence" in  
Y.Tandon and A.Babu ed. p.26.
- (76) Chirkin and Yudin, op. cit., p.15.
- (77) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.8.
- (78) Ibid.
- (79) "The explicit and implicit threat made by some (underdeveloped) countries to accept aid from socialist countries, during the cold war, was an assisting factor in the flow of large amounts of aid from both (capitalist and socialist) regimes.  
al-Khafaji, Ra'smaliyyat....., op. cit., p.97.
- (80) See: Baran, P., The Political Economy of Growth,  
Monthly Review Press, New York, 1968, pp.177-198.
- (81) al-Khafaji tries to establish a relationship between the level of development of the forces of production expressed in per capita income and the adoption of state capitalism. He arrives at the conclusion that the per capita income of all state capitalist countries, except Iraq, is below \$200, and in the majority of these countries it is less than \$100. Thus it can be said that the more backward the forces of production are in a country, the more likely it is that state capitalism would be adopted in that country, since backwardness means a low level of class differentiation which is an important factor contributing to the emergence of state capitalism.  
al-Khafaji, Ra'smaliyyat....., op. cit., pp.110-120.

- (82) For a full account of the structural weakness of the national bourgeoisie see:  
 Frank, A.G., Crisis in the Third World, op. cit.,  
 Frank, A.G. Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment,  
 Monthly Review Press, New York, 1978.
- (83) Baran, P., "On the Political Economy of Backwardness", in  
Imperialism and Underdevelopment,  
 ed. by Robert Rhodes, Monthly review Press, London,  
 1970, pp.287-288.
- (84) In many of today's underdeveloped countries there exists plenty of  
 evidence to suggest the appearance of signs of 'normal' capitalist  
 development before the colonial conquest, which was viciously  
 aborted by colonialism. See for example:  
 Baran, O., The Political Economy..., op. cit., chapter 5,  
 al-'Amil, M., Muqadamat Nadhariya le-Dirasat Aathar al-Fikr  
al-Ishtiraki fi Harakat al-Taharrur al-Watani, in Arabic  
 (Theoretical Introductions to the Study of the Impact of Socialist  
 Thought on the Liberation Movement)  
 Dar al-Farabi, Beirut, 1980, p.264.
- (85) al-'Amil, op. cit., p.265.
- (86) The very small size (which characterizes the activity of the last  
 category) of the national bourgeoisie and the fact that its indus-  
 trial activities are generally limited to the production of light  
 consumer goods, has pushed some writers to regard the native  
 'industrial' bourgeoisie as a stratum within the petty bourgeoisie  
 whose expansion is blocked by colonial control.  
 See al-'Amil, op. cit., pp399-400.
- (87) Munck, P., Politics and Dependency in the Third World,  
 Zed Books Ltd., London, 1984, p.89.
- (88) Referring to the period before and immediately after 1958  
 Revolution in Iraq, M.S. Hasan Wrote:  
 "Often, a bourgeois at one and the same time owns irri-  
 gation pumps and agricultural land and some urban real  
 estate, undertakes transaction in one or more branches  
 of commerce and owns industrial stocks and shares if he  
 is not the main founder of an industrial establishment"
- Quoted by Farouk-Sluglett, M. and Sluglett, p.,  
 "Labour and National Liberation: The Trade Union Movement in Iraq,  
 1920-1958"  
Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.5, No.2, Spring 1983, p.142.
- (89) Beckman, B., "Imperialism and the 'National Bourgeoisie'",  
Review of African Political Economy,  
 No.22, Oct.-Dec. 1981, pp.5-19.
- (90) Frank, A.G., Dependent Accumulation..., op. cit., p.165.

- (91) The most recent example of this is the direct political and even military confrontation between the USA and the Islamic Republic of Iran. There is no indication that such confrontation is accompanied by structural anti-imperialist social or economic changes in the latter country.
- (92) Shivji, Class Struggle....., op. cit., p.22.
- (93) Quoted by Ibid., p.22.
- (94) See for example  
Allen, C. and Williams, G.,  
Sociology of 'Developing Societies', Sub-Saharan Africa,  
Part VI, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1982.
- (95) al-'Amil, op. cit., p.214.
- (96) See for example Petras, op. cit.
- (97) al-'Amil, op. cit., p.73.
- (98) Poulantzas, Fascism...., op. cit., p.241.
- (99) Goulbourne cites an example of one post-colonial state where "the functions of the Ministry of Labour and those of the leadership of the trade union movement merged so that the same person is both secretary general of the trade unions and minister of labour"  
Goulbourne, op. cit., p.28.
- (100) Poulantzas, N., Political Power and Social Classes,  
Verso, London, 1978, p.37.
- (101) Debray, R., "Problems of Revolutionary Strategy in Latin America"  
New Left Review, No.45, Dec.-Oct. 1967, p.35.
- (102) Some writers, Shivji in particular, dispute the seriousness of the confrontation with foreign capital. He relates them primarily to "old age sentiments with respect to private property" of the international bourgeoisie which after a short while "come to reconcile and in fact benefit even more"  
Shivji, "The Silent Class Struggle....." op. cit., p.308.
- (103) "In Algeria the evidence is that, despite rhetoric to the contrary, the working class is not allowed to have trade unions or political parties independent of the ruling single legal party. Either the working class remains subordinate to the petty bourgeoisie or a violent confrontation will be necessary to change the power structure"  
Pfeifer, op. cit., p.8.

- (104) During (the decade of) the sixties government consumption as a proportion of GNP has increased in the majority, if not all, of the countries described as state capitalist. This meant that the proportion of governmental consumption exceeded the proportion of GNP growth from 14.7% in 1960 to 21.7% in 1969 in Algeria, and from 17.6% to 23.5% in Egypt and from 14.8% to 24% in Guinea in the same period. This percentage has also increased, though at a lesser extent, in other countries such as Congo; from 19.2% to 20.4%, Somalia; from 19.6% to 21.4%, and Tanzania; from 9.3% to 11.7%.  
al-Khafaji, op. cit., p.133.
- (105) In Iraq, the concern about increasing productivity acquired a new dimension in 1976 and became an opportunity to reveal the deficiencies that accompanied the function of the state sector. In a series of meeting between the Vice-President at that time (Saddam Husain) with ministers and general managers it became clear that state enterprises involved a great deal of waste and losses. This was later used as a means of encouraging the private sector to take over important activities that used to be controlled by the state.
- (106) Cooper, M., "State Capitalism, Class Structure, and Social Transformation in the Third World: The Case of Egypt", International Journal of Middle East Studies 15 (1983), p.458.
- (107) al-Khafaji, op. cit., pp.139-170.
- (108) Ibid., p.153.
- (109) This sector represents a significant limitation on the size of the productive sectors not only in directing financial resources away from the latter but also in its monopolization of a large labour force which could be employed in productive activities.
- (110) See Katouzian, M.H., "Oil Versus Agriculture: A Case Study of Dual Resources Depletion in Iran", Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol.5, No.3, 1987.
- (111) See Stork, J., "Oil and the Penetration of Capitalism in Iraq: an Interpretation", Peuples Meditteranees, (9) 1979.
- (112) Katouzian, op. cit., p.351.
- (113) See William, M.C., "The Extent and Significance of the Nationalization of Foreign Owned Assets in Developing Countries (1956-1972)", Oxford Economic Papers, Vol.27, No.2, July 1975.

- (114) In 1982 less than 2% of Algeria's trade was with Third World countries and only 5.7 and 1.2 respectively of its exports and imports were with Comecon countries.  
Middle East Executive Report, July 1983, p.10.
- (115) Freyhold, op. cit., p.77.
- (116) Cooper, op. cit., p.462.
- (117) Bettelheim, C., The Transition to Socialist Economy, Harvester Press Ltd. Essex, 1978, p.44.
- (118) For a group of people to constitute a class in scientific terms, they have to play an independent role in the social formation. This means that they should have an independent base in the economic structure of the society and that they can reproduce themselves in an independent form regardless of the political system prevailing in the society.
- (119) Since the term 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' has by definition a social and political connotation, one can not talk about absolute unity of coherence among the ranks of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The continuing process of class formation in the society will find its reflection in the nature and coherence of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in such a way that a parallel differentiation (at least in decision making) might take place among members of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie themselves. This is manifested in continual political crises, the political displacement of some sections of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and the consolidation of the power of others. With the absence of democratic institutions and parliamentary authority, inherent in the petty bourgeoisie's rule, this crisis can take violent form as in Iraq in 1979.
- (120) Mamdani, M. and Bhagat, H., "Comment on the Political Economy of Imperialism" in Tandon and Badu ed. op. cit., p.38.
- (121) al-Ali, op. cit., p.164.
- (122) Ibid., p.156.
- (123) Describing this process in Iraq in 1985 and its impact on the foreign trade, the Middle East wrote:  
".....Added to this the dramatic growth of Iraq's trade with France, Britain, West Germany, Turkey, and Japan, and you have something very much like a U turn. Iraq is not, of course, the first Arab country to move in this direction. Egypt after Nasser and Algeria after Boumedienne have followed broadly similar courses in softening their socialism, diversifying their trade and if possible their sources of arms, of cultivating the friendship of the United States. In Iraq's case, the interesting question is how far this process has been hastened along by the Gulf war"  
The Middle East, No.131, Sep. 1985, p.7.

- (124) Cooper, op. cit., p.465.
- (125) al-Khafaji, Raismalyvat..., op. cit., pp.168-169.
- (126) al-'Amil, op. cit., p.327.
- (127) Petras, op. cit., p.8.
- (128) See for example:  
 Ghatak, S. and Ingersent, K.,  
Agricultural and Economic Development,  
 Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., Sussex, 1984,  
 Johnston, F. and Mellor, J.,  
 "The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development",  
American Economic Review, Vol.4, Sep.1961, pp.566-593.
- (129) Williams, G., "Taking the Part of Peasants", in  
Rural Development: Theories of Peasant Economy  
 and Agrarian Change,  
 ed. by John Harriss,  
 Hutchinson University Press, 1982, p.389.
- (130) Kautsky, K., "Summary of Selected Parts of Kautsky's:  
The Agrarian Question,  
 Trans. and Comp. by Jairus Banaji, in  
The Articulation of Modes of Production:  
 Essays from Economy and Society, ed. by H.Wolpe,  
 Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1980, p.45.
- (131) Goodman, D. and Redclift, M.,  
From Peasant to Proletarian: Capitalist Development and Agrarian  
 Transition,  
 Basi Blackwell, Oxford, 1981, p.23.
- (132) Mann, S. and Dickinson, J.,  
 "Obstacles to the Development of a Capitalist Agriculture"  
The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol.5, No.4, July 1978, p.466.
- (133) "In the six countries of the EEC in 1974, 95.5 per cent of farms  
 had less than 50 hectares each, and 2,147,000 farm 'entrepre-  
 neurs' were 'exploiting' 1,147,000 farm wage labourers, which  
 gives an average of two 'entrepreneurs' for each wage labourers.  
 In the same year there were in Belgium 12 'entrepreneurs' for  
 each wage labourers, in Denmark 6.3, in Federal Germany 5, in the  
 Netherlands 4.27, and in France 4.1 ..... Even in the USA, where  
 the myth of agrarian capitalism is the most diffused, wage labour  
 does not exceed 29 per cent of the total active population in  
 agriculture (1970) which, in relation to the number of commercial  
 farms (2,780,000), gives an average of 2.7 'enterprenuers' for  
 one wage labourer.  
 Vergopoulos, K., "Capitalism and Peasant Productivity",  
Journal of Peasant Studies,  
 Vol.5, No.4, July 1978, p.457.



- (134) Evers, Hans-Dieter et al, "Subsistence reproduction: A Framework for Analysis", in Household and the World Economy, ed. by Joan Smit, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Hans-Dieter Evers, SAGE Publication, London, 1984, p.30.
- (135) Ibid., p.31.
- (136) Brenstein, H., "Notes on Capital and Peasantry" in Joan Harriss ed., op. cit., p.163.
- (137) Foster-Carter, A., "Can We Articulate 'Articulation'?", in Economic Anthropology ed by John Clammer, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1978, p.213.
- (138) Goodman and Redclift, op. cit., p.53.
- (139) Kautsky, op. cit., p.72.
- (140) Goodman and Redclift, op. cit., p.53.
- (141) Glavanis, K. and Glavanis, P., "The Sociology of Agrarian Relations in the Middle East: The Persistence of Household Production" Current Sociology, Vol.31, No.2, Summer 1983, p.38.
- (142) Ibid., p.72.
- (143) Kautsky, op. cit., p.46.
- (144) Mann and Dicknson, op. cit., p.467.
- (145) Mouzelis, N., "Capitalism and the Development of Agriculture" Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol.3, No.4, July 1976, p.484.
- (146) Ibid.,
- (147) Vergopolous, op. cit., p.446.
- (148) Ibid., p.458.
- (149) Kautsky, op. cit., p.74.
- (150) Ibid.
- (151) Mann and Dickinson, op. cit., pp469-471.
- (152) Ibid., p.472.
- (153) Ibid.
- (154) Ibid., p.475.
- (155) Ibid., pp.475-476.

- (156) Ibid., p.477.
- (157) Ibid., p.473.
- (158) Ibid., p.478.
- (159) Perelman, M., "Obstacles to the Development of a Capitalist Agriculture: A Comment on Mann & Dickinson", Journal of Peasants Studies, Vol.7, No.1, 1979, p.120.
- (160) Williams, op. cit., p.387.
- (161) Ibid., pp.384-385.
- (162) Bernstein, op. cit., p.174.
- (163) Cooper, op. cit., p.455.
- (164) For the experience of Iraqi agriculture in the context of the 'liberalization' policy, see:  
Springborg, R., "'Infintah', Agrarian Transformation and Elit Consolidation in Contemporary Iraq"  
Paper Presented in the Conference of International Political Science Association" Paris, 15-20 July 1985.
- (165) "In early 1984 the (Iraqi) Deputy Premier went on record indicating (the liberalization) system by saying:  
"Farmers must be given greater freedom to cultivate their land in a way they think suitable and most profitable"  
Quoted by Ibid., p.8.
- (166) Ibid.

## **PART II**

### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND : ALGERIA BEFORE INDEPENDENCE**

### **CHAPTER THREE : POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF COLONIAL ALGERIA, c. 1800-1962**

No social, economic, political, or even cultural issue concerning Algeria can be presented or analysed without going back to the history of the French colonial period, whether to its beginning, its development, or its end. The significance of this colonization lies not only in the fact that it lasted for more than 130 years but also, and more importantly, in the structural changes and transformations that it created in Algerian society.

Pre-colonial Algerian society, which was variously affected and conditioned by this colonization, was totally changed and its ways of life drastically altered. The existing equilibrium between man and resources, production and consumption, imports and exports were effectively disrupted. However, the effects of French colonization are more evident in the agricultural sector than in any other sector of the economy. A set of new socio-economic relationships was introduced, based on private property in land and on the production of exchange value and the gradual substitution of a market for a subsistence economy. The foundations of rural society were violently destroyed by privatizing and expropriating its essential means of production, i.e. the land, and transferring ownership to a relatively small number of European settlers, who developed their agriculture on a capitalist basis, and linked it directly to metropolitan France.

This chapter tries to trace the development of colonization, the stages it passed through, and the changes it introduced into Algerian economy and society in general and into the agricultural sector in

particular. In order to grasp the scope and extent of the structural transformations created by the colonization process, a brief description of the society of pre-colonial Algeria is necessary.

### **Algeria: Pre-Colonial Background**

"Algeria (in the first half of the 19th century) was no barbarian country inhabited by illiterate people with anarchic or sterile institutions. Its human and economic values attained a high level, and while the concepts and criteria of civilization differed somewhat from those of France, they also belonged in many of their aspects to certain universal forms".(1)

Pre-colonial Algerian society was predominantly rural, with 95 per cent of the population engaged in cultivating crops (mainly cereals) and raising livestock. However, it was not homogeneous; its ways of life varied according to geographical and climatic conditions. It was composed of settled highland cultivators organized into village communities, semi-nomadic tribes on the steppes, and nomadic tribes in the desert who depended entirely upon raising livestock.

The tribe was the focus of social organization, and an individual's ultimate allegiance was to the tribe or to a real or imaginary ancestor linking the individual to the rest of society. However, the influence of this basic social unit varied from one region to another depending on various factors, the most important of which was the type of agriculture practised, whether based on settled cultivation of the land or on raising livestock in the semi-arid area, and on the proximity to an urban centre. The tribe was subdivided into several agnatic lineages composed of numerous nuclear or extended families. The size of

the tribe varied from a small cluster of hamlets dotted about one or two mountain slopes to an immense unit occupying a wide region (2). The administrative body which settled all communal affairs was the jama'a (group) councils on which every family was represented by one vote, given to its senior member. Daily matters were discussed and agreed upon by the members of the jama'a which functioned as the kernel of pre-colonial Algerian political organization (3).

Agriculture was the main economic activity of rural Algeria, and production was directed essentially towards satisfying the needs of the producers with only an insignificant proportion of surplus produced for exchange with neighbouring tribes and the urban centres. Cultivation was generally practised by primitive methods with primitive implements, and cereals, olives, and livestock constituted the principal agricultural products. Devastating calamities due to invasions of locusts and agricultural diseases were quite common and regular and forced starving peasants to migrate or to resettle in other areas (4).

As well as the rural population, there existed a few urban centres which remained under the direct control of the Ottoman Empire until 1830. These centres were relatively isolated from the countryside and depended mainly on artisanal activities and on commercial exchanges with the outside world. The taxes provided by the countryside constituted one source of income for these centres, which Nouschi has estimated at about 2 per cent of all agricultural production (5).

## Socio-economic Structure

### 1-Urban Centres

On the eve of colonization, Algeria was under the control of the Ottoman Empire. It was governed by the Dey who represented the Ottoman Sultan, and who was assisted by three governors called Beys representing him at provincial level in Algiers, Constantine, and Oran. Algiers was the administrative centre of the Ottoman government. At the state level, the power structure was hierarchical, that is, political authority radiated from the centre.

Ottoman rule, which lasted somewhat intermittently from 1519 to 1830, had shaped the socio-economic structure of Algerian society but it did not destroy it as French colonization did. The reason for this was that Ottoman rule did not extend beyond the major coastal cities and their surrounding areas. The only contact that the Ottomans had with the countryside was the imposition of taxes on agricultural production or more often on the agricultural products bartered by the tribes. Of an estimated total population of three million Algerians in 1830, the major cities were inhabited by 160,000 persons distributed as follows (6):

Algiers	60,000	Constantine	35,000
Tlemcen	20,000	Mascara	12,000
Oran	10,000 (7)	Miliana	10,000
Medea	10,000	Cherchell	3,000

In these cities lived a socially, economically, and ethnically heterogeneous population composed of the ruling elements, merchants, artisans, and apprentices (8). These cities presented many features of

early capitalist development; important commercial activity, small manufacturing workshops, advanced financial institutions, market-oriented agricultural production, and sharecropping arrangements (9).

Three major important economic activities formed the essential sources of income for these urban centres. First, and the most important of all, was piracy. Algiers was, for a long time, the main harbour for pirates raiding European merchant vessels in the Mediterranean (10). Secondly, it is significant that the urban economy was unable to realise any considerable surplus except through commerce, which occupied an important position in the list of economic activities. Exports of agricultural products produced in the nearby areas and of locally manufactured products reached Spain, France, and even Holland. Many arrangements and protocols were made in order to facilitate Algeria's exports and imports (11). However, the monopoly of trade by the Ottoman state, which favoured European trading companies, had the effects of eliminating Algerian merchants from international trade (12). In fact almost all economic activity was controlled personally by the Dey, who had absolute power in deciding who should exercise his privileges and under what conditions. Thus the main revenues of the state, which were hard to distinguish from those of the Dey himself, came from commerce. Nevertheless, wealthy individual merchants, who also occupied some posts within the state, contributed to a certain extent to trading activities. Hence the families of Bushnaq, Bakri, and Sforno played an important role in the export and import activities at the same time as being state functionaries (13).

Small manufacturing workshops producing textiles, metals, and leather were concentrated in the cities of Algiers, Constantine, Medea, and Tlemcen. They were owned either by the state or by individuals



employing members of their families, producing both for the internal market and for export (14).

Finally, there was some commercial agricultural production, mainly of wheat, under the Ottoman administration. As we shall see, the state owned a considerable amount of land (beylik), worked either by sharecroppers (Khammas) and agricultural labourers or by members of allied tribes working lands known as 'azil'.

In addition to all these sources, there was the income which came from agricultural taxation which was the Ottomans' sole economic contact with the inside hinterland. These taxes were usually collected by a number of loyal tribes called makhzan tribes which were rewarded for their services and which remained in direct conflict with the rebellious tribes which refused to pay these taxes. In this way Ottoman rule kept society fragmented by maintaining already existing tribal conflicts and protected its rule by preventing any widespread unified action against itself.

## 2-Rural Areas

As has been mentioned earlier, 95 per cent of the Algerian population lived in the rural areas with agriculture constituting the principal economic activity, which meant that land was the most important, and sometimes the only means of production. Differences in climate and ecological conditions led to wide variations in the specialization of production. The settled villagers of the North, for example, grew mainly cereals and fruit mostly for home consumption but also producing some surplus for exchange with urban centres and nomadic tribes. Population density in this area was relatively high, perhaps as much as 70

to 100 inhabitants per square kilometre. Typical combinations of agricultural and pastoral activities were found in areas of average density (about 15 inhabitants per sq.km.) as in the villages, plains, and foothills of the Tell. In the southern regions, on the other hand, the population density dropped markedly and pastoral activities predominated. Variations in agricultural production left their mark on the way the land was owned. In the sedentary villages and in areas where cultivation needed considerable attention in order to yield a good harvest, the privatisation of land had advanced very much faster than in agro-pastoral areas where collective ownership of the land by the members of the tribes predominated.

A simple glance at pre-colonial Algerian land ownership would suggest that it was of an egalitarian nature. According to the shari'a to which Algeria adhered, land belonged to God and man was entitled to the usufruct of the land by mixing his labour with it. According to pre-colonial Algerian law defining property relations, entitlement to property ownership could be achieved by means of any of the following procedures: a long and continuous occupation of a plot of land, the clearing of uncultivated woodland, by purchase or inheritance, or through the medium of mugharisa, a planting contract which granted the planter ownership of half the land he had planted with fruit trees (15). Such conditions were usually fulfilled by groups rather than individuals since the Algerian social formation reflected the predominance of group over individual rights "where the group with its burden of conformism, indifferentiation, and solidarity outweighs individual initiative, and collective tenure outweighs private property"(16). Thus the structure of Algerian pre-colonial land ownership was mainly based on the collective possession of this essential means of production. The

individual's access to the land was part of the group's access, and no individual was able to monopolise the land.

A typical example is that a tribe of at least several thousand people held customary rights over an area of thousands or even tens of thousands of hectares. The tribe in its turn was subdivided into segments which each retained a certain degree of autonomy in their pastoral life. These segments were in their turn subdivided into duwars or villages, each numbering about a hundred or more people. These tribes and their areas were called 'arsh'. Each member of the duwar had access to the land which belonged to it collectively. Cultivation was carried out on a collective basis and each family participated in the work and gained a share in the harvest. The population of the duwar was supposed to consist of the descendants of a common ancestor, but it could also be composed of fractions from different tribes. As well as the common land of the village, each family possessed a small plot of land for personal cultivation. This plot was usually inherited by the members of the family but if there were no heirs the land itself reverted to the commune to be assigned by the jama'a assembly to other families.

With the passage of time, there was a tendency to shift the social importance towards the village rather than the tribe, especially in the areas which were near to, or had more contact with, the urban centres. Inter-tribal conflict generally became less frequent than conflicts between the fractions of a single tribe. This was indeed a clear sign that the society was not static, and that the disintegration of some tribal ties was under way, although at a very slow rate.

The second form of ownership besides arsh was private land, melk which belonged to private individual owners who had the right of selling it or bequeathing it to their heirs. This form appeared more in the

Northern part of the country or in Kabylia where intensive cultivation was practised and land needed considerable labour. Melk property developed out of communal land, and as early as 1837, the French colonial authorities recognized it in the following terms: "private property existed and was perpetuated in Algeria on the same basis as among us; it is acquired, transmitted, and held and recognized by long possession, Muslim testimonials, and regular titles; the law protects it and the court assists it "(17). A French parliamentary committee which studied the question of land tenure in 1873 established that about 4.5 million hectares of arable lands were held in melk (18).

In Kabylia, for example, the process of privatization of the communal land had gone further than in any other area and "what was left of the communal land was limited to assembly places, slaughter-areas etc."(19). However, this private property was not identical to its counterpart in the pre-capitalist societies of Europe, since it was limited at two levels. On the one hand, land was not costomerily owned by an individual but by the family as a whole, including the father, mother, sons and their wives, daughters, uncles, and cousins. In contradistinction to many other parts of the Muslim world, the practice of shiyu'a was wildely applied in Algeria, under which the land owned by a family was nor normally divided after the death of its head. On the other hand, the family and the tribe retained a prior right to retain possession of any part sold by one of the co-owners by providing a prospective seller with the exact sum that he had paid for it originally. This right of pre-emption was known as shaf'a.

Thus in spite of the existence of private ownership, land tenure in general was still dominated by, and under the influence of, the tribe and the family. No individual possessed the full rights of dispo-

sal over what was supposed to be his private property. The melk system of ownership shows how the individual's right, even when it was held sovereign, was set in a communal framework.

However, the rise of private property did not stop at the family unit, due to their social and religious influence, some important families were able to obtain larger plots than other families. Gallissot, for example, pointed out that "he who, together with his close family, dominated the hawsh, enjoyed not only the prestige of descent claimed direct from the eponymous ancestor, but also and primarily access to income arising from the labour of other families" (20). Similarly, Bennoune has written that "there existed in pre-colonial Algeria a big landlord class whose holdings constituted large latifundia. Most of them were absentee estate owners who lived in towns and cities; their estates were cultivated by khammassats or sharecroppers" (21). In these ownerships, relations of production were based more on social, and sometimes religious, prestige than on serf-feudalist ties.

The third form of land ownership was the habus lands. They were those lands constituted as a pious trust by donations in favour of religious corporations or institutions, normally mosques or religious schools. This form of ownership appeared more in the areas around Algiers and Oran than in any other part of the country. Habus revenue was used for the upkeep of sanctuaries and for charity and above all for teaching and propagating the religious life. Statistics about the amount of land belonging to this category are lacking but it was estimated to be between 40,000 and 50,000 hectares, although the figure may have been as high as 75,000 hectares (22).

The habus lands were managed by families known as marabouts who

claimed to be descendants of the Prophet (23). Their control of these lands ensured their existence and provided them with a standard of living which put them socially and economically above the peasants who worked these lands. On the eve of the colonial conquest, the authority of the marabout families often equalled that of the tribal shaikhs of acknowledged warrior nobility. We can see, therefore, that in spite of the supposedly collective nature of this form of ownership- in that it belonged to God- it contributed further to social and economic differentiation in pre-colonial Algerian society and has paved the way for private ownership, which was consolidated by appropriating the surplus of labour for private interests.

The last form of land ownership was the public property of the Ottoman state which extended over an area of 146,693 hectares (24). This property was divided into two categories:

- 1-The beylik lands (known as amiri in other parts of the Empire); often the most fertile lands surrounding the cities. Cultivation of these lands was carried out either by neighbouring tribes or by sharecroppers (khammesa), recruited from landless or impoverished peasants who were supplied with seeds, draft animals, and food, and received one-fifth of the total yield at the end of the harvest. These lands were administered by government officials appointed by the Bey and should not be confused with the Bey's personal property.
- 2-The 'azil lands; these were the lands expropriated or purchased by the Bey who granted them to:
  - High government officials who employed sharecroppers.
  - Loyal tribes called 'azil in return for some of the harvest. The lands cultivated by those tribes were also called 'azil.

-Individual tenants in exchange for some kind of taxes.

Finally, there was mawat (dead) land which was usually unproductive territory, and any one clearing and cultivating it gained title for it.

From the above description it appears that Algerian society on the eve of the French conquest was not socially homogeneous, and that collective forms of ownership were existed alongside individual and family forms. In fact it is difficult to talk about a uniform social structure. On the one hand, exploitation, though it occurred and developed over time, was not of the flagrantly feudalistic nature which ties the cultivators to the land he does not possess; rather, it was mystified by the legal/communal form of ownership and hidden under the guise of social and religious prestige. Dispossession of cultivators and concentration of ownership took place very slowly because of inheritance and demographic pressure. A more pronounced differentiation was developing in the lands in the vicinity of the cities owned by state officials, on which the cultivators were obliged to produce a surplus in order to pay taxes. Generally, it can be said pre-colonial Algerian rural society just before the French occupation was in a state of gradual transition towards a more socially and economically differentiated structure, partly but not wholly set in motion by the extension of the tax-collecting activities of the local representatives of the Ottoman state.

## **The French Conquest**

The 5th of July 1830 (the day in which Algiers fell to the French troops) was the culmination of a new era in Algeria's relations with France which had begun long before this date. The colonization of Algeria satisfied the demands of two influential centres of power in the frame of the July Monarchy, both of which saw their interests threatened by the loss of colonies to England. The first of these was the army which saw its glory fading as a result of defeats inflicted upon it by the English army, and the second was the mercantile bourgeoisie, especially in Marseilles, whose trade had become stagnant because of the blockade of the Algerian ports and the effects of the Greek war of independence (25).

From the beginning the French conquest was characterized by a degree of violence and brutality almost unparalleled in recent history. It involved the destruction and the impoverishment of Algeria's urban centres and of its countryside together with its economic, social, and political structures. The urban centres were completely ruined; their populations were either massacred or fled for ever. In the early years of the conquest, for example, 45,000 citizens of Algiers were killed or exiled (26), and Oran, which had a population of 40,000 in 1831, was reduced to 1,000 in 1838 (27). Furthermore, considerable damage was inflicted on those who remained; their houses were demolished, their properties confiscated without compensation, and their business ruined. Rozet, a French historian, described the demolition of houses in order to use the doors and windows frames together with fruit trees as heating fuel (28).



However, the brutalities committed by the French troops in the Algerian cities were insignificant in comparison with the violence and destruction of the "fine villages" in the countryside (29). Indeed their policy of devastation was not simply the result of the stiff resistance shown by the Algerian people, but was a conscious plan to destroy the basis of Algerian social and economic structures. The means of implementing this plan were proudly described by the French generals; Marshal Bugeaud, the commander of French army in the 1840s wrote:

"more than fifty fine villages, built of stone and roofed with tiles, were destroyed. Our soldiers made very considerable pickings there. We did not have time, in the heat of the combat, to chop down the trees. The task, in any case, would have been beyond our strength. Twenty thousands men armed with axes could not in six months cut down the olives and fig trees which cover the beautiful landscape which lay at our feet"(30).

Colonel Forey wrote in 1843 describing the results of one operation:

"we gained 3,000 head of sheep, fire was set on more than ten villages and about 10,000 fig and olive trees were cut or burned". Another army officer, Bouteilloux, wrote in 1842 that: "since December our troops made organized raids on all the surroundings of Blida. These well organized raids have ruined, or started to ruin, the country.... we have inflicted heavy losses on the peasants"(31).

Stiff resistance to the French was led by the Amir 'Abd al-Qadir, who succeeded in uniting the tribes in the west of Algeria, led to the temporary establishment of an independent Algerian state in the north-west of the country. But this was only for a short time since 'Abd al-Qadir was forced to surrender in 1847. A series of regional insurrections took place in other parts of the country especially in Kabylia, but all were defeated, and were followed by more violence and brutalities and the gradual consolidation of France's grip over Algeria.

## French Land Tenure and Agricultural Policies

From the outset the French colonial authorities realized that in order to "establish a lasting colony and that as a consequence it (France) will bring European civilization to these barbaric countries"(32), the existing Algerian social, economic and political systems had to be destroyed. Having already weakened the basis of the emerging Algerian mercantile bourgeoisie in the cities by expropriating its properties and by forcing the civilians to leave the cities, the colonial authorities began to implement a well conceived plan to penetrate the countryside and to destroy the basis of the peasantry by eliminating the existing system of land tenure and by replacing it with one more likely to bring settlers to Algeria.

The French authorities saw that the only means of dominating Algeria was by the physical occupation of the land. They also realized that in order to establish themselves on Algerian territory, their control over the rural areas was a vital precondition. The first measure was an attempt to transfer the native property directly to members of the invading army. This happened very soon after the first landings when General Clauzel, who took over the command of the French army immediately after the invasion, acquired three plots of land on his own account on which he intended to settle colonists, and he encouraged the foundation of a joint-stock company to exploit 1,000 hectares of land near Maison Carree, leased at a nominal annual rate of one franc per hectare (33). From now on the appropriation of the land became the main feature of French policy. There were, in fact, three main means by which this policy was implemented; public expropriation, delimitation (cantonement), and most devastating of all, the widespread introduc-

tion of private property.

1-**Expropriation:** In the early years of the colonization the bulk of the land acquired by European settlers was handed over to them at a nominal price by the colonial administration after being expropriated from the proprietors. A series of laws and decrees were enacted for this purpose. Considering itself the heir of the Ottoman state, the French administration began by expropriating the properties that belonged to the Dey and the beys, in accordance with a decree issued on 8 September 1830. This was followed by another decree of 10 June 1831 which provided for the expropriation of the properties of those of Ottoman origin who had stayed in Algeria and who "are known for their spirit of opposition to the authority of France". On 1 March 1833 a commission was created to verify title to properties before 1830. This commission required proprietors to produce their titles of ownership within three days or to see their properties confiscated (34). These decrees were followed by continuous, and sometimes ad hoc, actions aimed at enabling the French to acquire more lands (35). In 1844 another decree declared that all uncultivated lands in specified areas would be classed as vacant if nobody could prove rights of ownership. As far as habus property was concerned, the colonial administration claimed that "perpetual rents have lost their primitive utility and constitute today an obstacle to the development of industry; the time has come to declare it (habus property) resalable at the legal monetary interest rate". In other words, habus property was abolished (36).

One of the major source of confiscation was the war and the resistance put up by the indigenes to the occupiers. Tribes and individuals who had participated in such acts of resistance saw their lands confis-

cated. An ordinance of 31 October 1845 regulating the rules of sequestration, clearly stipulated that "in the future sequestration will be established only on the movable and unmovable property of most indigènes who:

- commit an act of hostility against the French or tribes which have submitted to France or who give direct or indirect assistance to the enemy,
- leave their lands and join the enemy"(37).

By about 1850, 364,341 hectares had been expropriated by the colonial authorities and the most of them were handed over to European settlers. In the Mitidja, for example, the French colons established sixty farms over an area of 14,500 hectares an average of 240 hectares per farm (38).

The defeat of the revolt of Muhammad Mukrani in 1871 triggered off a further wave of expropriation. A war indemnity of 36.5 million francs was imposed on the region of Kabylia; this was estimated to constitute 70 per cent of the total capital of the people involved in the revolt (39). In addition to that, all the lands of the tribes who had taken part in the rebellion were sequestered by a decree of 31 March 1871. The total amount of the land which was confiscated as a result of this decree amounted to 400,00 hectares (40).

**2-Cantonnement:** This term refers to the practice of defining and reducing the extent of the tribal lands. The provisions of the previous decrees before 1846 had become insufficient in relation to the needs of the colons for land. The revolution of 1848 and the coup d'etat of 1850 triggered off a large wave of immigration from France, and it became necessary to devise a new form of acquiring land. The definition of the tribal lands was a disguised form of land appropriation from the Alger-

ians for the benefit of the colons. the colonial administration considered that the tribes possessed more lands than they really needed, and, relying more on its judgment than on the claims of the tribes, decided to expropriate all lands which were "not used" by the tribes. Since the property claims of the tribes were of course not properly documented, as the administration was well aware, this practice meant that a great loss was inflicted upon the tribes in terms of land, particularly forest land, which resulted in a considerable decline in the number of their herds. In the Mitidja, for instance, a commission facilitated the granting of 16,190 hectares to the state in 1851, leaving the tribes with 20,810 ha. for 304 families or 16 ha. per family. The tribe of Abid el-Feraila owned 8,941 ha. at Kantera; this was reduced to 3,983 ha. in 1857. In 1860 the herd of the same tribe was reduced by one third (41).

The policy of "cantonnement" culminated in the promulgation of the Senatus Consulte in March 1863 which, as described by one contemporary author, A. Vassiere, was "the most efficient war machine that one could imagine against the native social order, and the most powerful and fertile instrument which could have been put in the hands of our settlers"(42). The main aim of this law was, besides the the breaking up of the central organizational unit and its replacement by the village duwar, to institute private ownership of land. Article 1 and 2 stipulated that:

- the tribes of Algeria are declared the proprietors of the territory they cultivate in a traditional and permanent manner,
- the following measures will be undertaken administratively and as soon as possible:

- 1-the definition and delimitation of the tribal territories,
- 2-their distribution among the different duwars of each tribe of the Tell (Northern Algeria) and other agricultural areas except those lands which should keep their character as communal proprietors,
- 3-the establishment of individual property among the members of the duwars wherever this measure is suitable and possible (43).

In terms of area, and up to 1870, the delimitation concerned a total of 372 tribes who possessed 6,833,811 ha. of land. Out of this total only 1,003,072 ha. were retained by those tribes, or 14.9 per cent of the total, an area a little bit larger than the province of Algiers (44).

Generally, the application of this law resulted in the definition and reduction of the territories of 709 tribes. Between 1863 and 1930 the tribes were broken up into 1,196 duwars (667 duwars in 1870). By 1956 out of a total 801 tribes, only eight had not yet been dismembered (45).

We can see, therefore, that the significance of this law lies not only in the fact that the tribes were deprived of their lands and thus eventually became impoverished, but also in the setting up of individual property as the backbone of the new mode of production, a condition which created further loss and impoverishment for the local population.

**3-Private ownership:** This was the most important factor in the destruction of the foundations of Algerian rural society and in the transformation of its structures. Expropriation and cantonnement generally reduced the lands available to the Algerian population, and sometimes

forced the tribes to move from their villages to less fertile areas in the South as a result of the direct and violent methods of land expropriation. However, these two factors did not entirely changed the ownership system, although it was widely affected and its efficiency was reduced. In the pre-colonial period, and in fact until the 1870's, agricultural taxation was often extracted either by the state, the armed forces, or the social or religious power of the dominant group rather than through the mechanism of the market. This had to wait until the official constitution of private property in land, a factor which, by establishing an exchange value and a market for land, created the basis of capitalist development in the countryside and contributed to the further impoverishment and destruction of Algerian rural society, which now had to compete on unequal terms with the European settlers.

This official recognition of individual ownership was embodied by the Warnier Law of 1873 which was a revision of the Senatus Consulte. This law extended the French legal definition of property by recognizing only individuals as landowners whether of communal land or of family holdings. Thus all forms of collective property were abolished and what was formerly communal land was transformed into the individual property of the members of the collectivity.

Special commissions were established charged with defining ownership and with handing out property certificates to members of the collectivity. The mere news that such distribution was imminent was sufficient to attract property speculators even from among the Algerian population. Lack of information and the general ignorance of the peasants made it easy for speculators to acquire more land, either by getting the lands of others recognized as their own, or by using "straw men" to whom they could attribute land traditionally cultivated by

others. One result of these manipulations was the creation of a class of large landowners who collaborated with the French until the end of colonial rule (46).

For the colons, this new law created an additional means of acquiring land but this time in a more subtle way than the flagrant violence of the state, although it was no less effective. By invoking Article 827 of the French Civil Code which stipulated that "if real estate cannot be conveniently divided a legal sale must ensue" (47), this law gave the colons the means of acquiring the melk land of the Algerian peasantry at incredibly low prices (48). By means of this law of 1873 the French office of colonization appropriated 309,891 ha. out of 2,239,095 ha. surveyed during this period, that is 13 per cent of the total (49). The real beneficiaries of the Warnier Law were the settlers, who acquired 563,762 ha between 1877 and 1898. ha. (50).

Taken as a whole, the three policies resulted in two complementary and interrelated developments which fundamentally changed Algerian rural society and affected its future development. The first was the virtually total destruction of the traditional social, economic, and political structures of Algerian society, and the second was the development of a new set of economic and social relations based essentially on ensuring the economic well-being of European settlers.



## **The Disruption of the Algerian Social Structure**

The first attack directed by the French colonisers against the Algerians hit their emerging commercial bourgeoisie. A process of impoverishment and migration of this class took place immediately after the occupation of the major Algerian cities. This resulted both from the violent measures taken to break the resistance of the people and the actual mechanism of colonial development.

A wave of immigration from the cities to the rural areas to escape the brutalities inflicted by the colonial army took place shortly after the occupation (51). This led the colonial administration to expropriate all the properties belonging to the migrants. In 1831, for example, out of 5,000 buildings in the city of Algiers, 3,000 became the property of the colonial state (52).

Another factor played an important role in the destruction of the Algerian urban bourgeoisie was the inflation that took place after 1830 which was aggravated by the introduction of French currency. Augustin Berque wrote in 1949 that: "one of the new factors which ruined the local bourgeoisie was the rise in prices after 1830 as a result of the inflation in the paper note currency. We imported into Algeria a considerable amount of money. It soon chased away the local currency which was declared not convertible"(53). As a result prices went up very quickly. At Algiers, for example, the price of one hectolitre of wheat rose from 5 francs in 1830 to 15 francs in 1837 and to 18 francs in 1840 (54).

However, what really eliminated the indigenous urban elite from the economic scene was the influx of Europeans in increasing numbers.

They could replace the local traders and destroyed the traditional manufacturing system because they were directly connected with the metropolitan France. It was not surprising that after a few years of colonisation the Algerians started to buy burnous manufactured in Marseille (55), an indication that the economy was being transformed and that the Algerian cities were losing their commercial and artisanal strata. In 1900 an official of the colonial administration realised that members of many formerly well-off Arab families had become impoverished (56). It became clear that members of the indigenous elite would either have to be incorporated into the colonial system, which was very difficult (although not impossible) because of the discriminatory measures taken by the administration against the Algerian population, or to be confined to very marginal economic activities and to act as a mediator between the native population and the colons. This was to have crucial implications for the role to be played by the elite in the national movement, which was relatively marginal, as we shall see in the following chapter.

For rural Algeria the effects of colonisation, in terms of the destruction of the existing structures and the impoverishment of the indigenous population were little different from those endured in the cities. The only major difference was the extent and degree of the process of destruction and its dramatic effects upon rural society.

The penetration of French colonisation into Algerian rural society took place in two distinct but complementary phases, each being a byproduct of the development of capitalism in the metropolis itself. As the latter was weak in the early stages of colonisation, we can see little development in the rules governing the organization of property and, in turn, in the social structure of the rural areas. What took

place was a transfer of ownership of vast areas of land from the Algerians to Frenchmen and other Europeans. The generals personally took the lion's share of these transfers. Until 1851 the Algerians lost about 1,583,000 ha. to French colonisation, of which 504,000 ha represented the most fertile in Northern Algeria and was given to French settlers. The remaining 868,000 ha consisted of forest and grazing lands (57). In the years between 1863 and 1870, and as a result of the application of the Senatus Consulte, Algerian rural communities taken as a whole lost an average of 14 per cent or over one million hectares of the best arable land and forest to the colonial public domain which controlled the transfers of land from the indigenous peasantry to the French settlers (58).

One of the consequences of these spoliations was that the indigenous rural population was forced to cultivate the less fertile areas in the South of the country and to become essentially dependent on extensive cultivation of land to produce even the most minimal means of subsistence. The loss of land also meant a decline in animal production due to the decrease in the area of the grazing lands, which severely disrupted the existing agro-pastoral equilibrium. A process of real impoverishment of the population immediately followed the process of colonisation, mainly as a result of the expropriation of property and of the heavy taxes which were imposed on the population. From now on famines and diseases became the constant lot of the Algerian rural population, resulting in a sharp decline in the population. From three million in 1830, Algeria's population declined to 2,656,100 in 1856 and to 2,462,900 in 1876, and it was not until 1880 that it returned to its original level in 1830, that is 3 million.

However, despite all this the structure of landownership and the

organization of rural society remained largely intact until 1870, when European migration to Algeria underwent a dramatic increase. The tribe remained the central organization of society, and the tribal aristocracy in its pre-colonial form continued to be the spearhead of fierce and widespread resistance to the French. Communal and family landholding was still dominant in many areas. At this stage it was not yet necessary for the progress of capital accumulation in the metropolis or for the settlers in the colony to introduce drastic structural changes throughout the country as long as it was possible to extract a surplus through the existing framework of pre-capitalist social relations. It was not until 1870-1880 that more direct pressure from the metropolis to create outlets for the investment of its capital and its products in the colony became more insistent. In order to achieve this, the indigenous social structure had to be drastically weakened.

In this respect, apart from the physical liquidation of some parts of rural society by arbitrary expropriation and constant impoverishment, the most efficient method was the formal and legal imposition of individual ownership of land, particularly in the fertile North of the country. This accounts for almost all the structural transformations that engulfed Algerian society during the 19th and the 20th centuries, leading to the loss of what had been largely inalienable property. Sales of land became more and more frequent. Gradually those who had formerly owned their land, whether individually or communally, became khammas or sharecroppers on the same land. As they were very often unable to meet the fiscal demands of the colonial administration and could usually only do so by selling all or part of their crops (59), taxation worked to undermine subsistence production and forced cultivators to become more and more involved in the market. The fact

that they were forced to participate in the market under the most painful and unfavourable conditions meant that many cultivators found themselves in a vicious circle, which as Germaine Tillon put it: "starts when the peasant is forced to sell his produce immediately after the harvest in order to pay off his debt - to sell, that is to say, at the bottom price. It continues when five or six months later he is compelled to buy the same produce back at the top price, which means at least double the figure he was given for it" (60).

The need to borrow money led to impoverishment and dispossession as money lenders and speculators used unscrupulous methods to obtain land from their creditors. Almost all the literature, whether sympathetic or hostile to colonisation, has denounced the effects of usury. Rates were as high as 120 per cent and repayments were often scheduled on a weekly basis (61). To the phenomenon of usury was attributed the destruction and dispossession of the Algerian rural community. In a note written by General Martinprey in 1860 he admitted that the increase in the occurrence of usury which resulted from the French colonisation had drastically changed the former conditions of existence of the indigenous people (62).

More borrowing meant more dispossession and more pauperisation of the cultivators. By 1917 the Algerian peasants had lost about 2,317,466 ha of their best lands to the colons through direct and indirect expropriation, as is shown in the following table.

Colonial Land in 1917 (Hectares)(63)

Region	Forest	Cultivates Land	Total
Algiers	24,672	365,832	390,504
Oran	23,962	937,786	961,712
Constantine	145,561	819,669	965,230
Total	194,159	2,123,787	2,317,446

To give one example of the land loss, in a village in Eastern Algeria called el-Akbia, the amount of land per capita fell from 2.78 ha in 1867 to a mere 0.84 ha in 1907 (62).

This considerable loss of land and especially of grazing land, which coincided with a drastic demographic increase at the end of the 19th century, meant a real impoverishment of the rural population and a real decline in their standard of living. After the First World War the per capita production of grain in the areas cultivated in the traditional manner by the Algerian population fell to about half of what it had been before the War. The decline in the number of sheep was even more spectacular; a herd estimated generally at 7.5 to 8.5 million head before the First World War fell to 5 to 6 million afterwards (64).

The negative effects of colonisation upon indigenous agriculture are suggested in the following table.

Impact of Colonisation on Agriculture (65)

	1863	1911	1938	1954
Population (million)	2.2	5.6	7.2	8.8
Cereals (m.ha)	2.2	-	-	3.47
Cereals Production(mq)	20-22	18.7	17.7	18.3
Yield in q. per ha.	9-10	-	-	5.4
Kilos of Cereals per Head	1000	337	231	202
Cattle (million)	10.0	8.5	5.9	6.0

For the impoverished rural population, the only salvation from famines, epidemic, and collective despair lay in wage labour or share-cropping on the newly constituted colonial farms. The introduction of the vine in the 1860s accelerated the process of proletarianization of those who were previously owners of land. Thus a "free" labour force

started to appear before the end of the 19th century in such great numbers that some colons were induced to warn the authorities of the potential dangers of this labour force ( 66). At the end of the 1880s there were between 16,000 and 20,000 Algerian wage labourers. Their average wage was between 1.25 and 1.50 francs per day, or the equivalent of 8 to 10 kilos of wheat (67). This number reached 428,032 by 1930. The number of sharecroppers (khammas) increased by 81 per cent between 1901 and 1930 as the following table shows.

Algerian Agricultural Labour Force (1901-1930) (68)

Year	Landowners	Khammes	Agricultural Workers	Agricultural Active Pop.	Agricultural Population
1901	620,899	350,715	151,108	1,135,166	3,320,647
1910	350,211	426,851	207,707	1,164,769	3,525,768
1914	565,218	407,050	210,205	1,163,532	3,605,449
1930	617,544	634,600	428,032	1,730,947	4,419,943

More proletarianization and dispossession meant not only the creation of a large wage labour force but also the concentration of lands in the hands of the European settlers and some wealthy Algerian landowners. By the early years of the 20th century there large land holdings began to appear owned by individual owners and worked by large numbers of agricultural workers producing essentially for export. The table below, although it does not distinguish between holdings owned by colons and those owned by Algerians, serves to illustrate this point.

Structure of Agricultural Property in 1920 (69)

Size	Number	%	Area	%	Average
Less than 10 ha	443,000	68.7	1,781,000	17.9	4.2 ha
10 to 50 ha	147,000	22.8	2,852,000	28.8	19.06
50 to 100 ha	42,000	6.4	1,960,000	19.5	46.07
More than 100 ha	13,000	2.1	3,316,000	33.5	255.47

The destruction of the landownership system of pre-colonial Algeria led to the dislocation of the tribal structure and the disappearance of other social institutions which used to assist needy individuals in bad years. The process of dislocation was completed by official measures aimed at replacing tribal and kinship ties with identification with a particular locality. Indeed fractions from different tribes were either combined to form a single duwar, or fractions of the same tribe were divided up into a number of duwars (70).

For the aristocracy, the results of colonisation meant its relegation to insignificance and the destitution of that part of it that was based on tribal and religious prestige, especially those who resisted the French. Conversely, the process of colonisation resulted in the promotion of that fraction which based its social power on owning more land and on acting as agents of the colonial administration.

After the failure of the colonial authorities to establish a system of authority which relied heavily upon the indigenous notables (71), a new group of non-aristocratic origin was promoted to fill the role of caïd and to act as tax collectors and informers for the administration. Through the facilities offered to it by the administration, this group acquired more lands, especially in the areas that the colonists had not yet penetrated, and came later to constitute the Algerian rural bourgeoisie.

Finally, there were two principal reasons why the penetration of capitalism in Algeria had such particularly disruptive effects. First, neither the existing class structure nor the framework under which social conflict took place were congenial to the rapidity with which capitalist structures were being introduced. Secondly, capitalist



'development' was being imported from outside and primarily served the process of capital accumulation in the metropolis and the enrichment of the European settler minority. The existence of this minority served to channel the surplus created in Algeria to the metropolis by connecting the colonial economy and way of life with the metropolitan economy.

### **The Development of the Colonial Sector**

The process of destruction explained above was paralleled by a process of building a new society based on settling European migrants in Algeria and on serving capital accumulation in France.

From the beginning of 1840 the Chamber of Deputies in France decided unanimously that "Algeria is a land which will never be abandoned by French domination". And in order to fight Amir 'Abd al-Qadir, Bugeaud was appointed governor general. Considerable human and material means were put at his disposal. From now on there was a consistent development of the colonial sector in Algeria. However, this development, as mentioned earlier, was affected directly by the development of capitalism in France. And as the latter was only beginning in the early stages of the colonisation process, the colonial policies were concentrated mainly on finding solutions to the social and political struggles in France and in creating jobs for the unemployed in French cities. The example of 1848 shows that Algeria, in the early stages of colonisation, was not considered so much a place of capital investment but as a "penal colony" for the surplus population of France and "troublesome" working class elements. In that year, after the revolution of 1848, the French Government decided to rid France of 20,500 workers who had dared to erect barricades. From the end of 1848

to 1850 those proletarians were forcibly transformed into "reluctant pioneers". Upon their arrival in Algeria they were assigned to 56 Centres de Colonisation that had been established to receive them. The colonial army provided them with houses, arable land, instruments of cultivation, livestock, food, and pocket money (72). On 21 June 1871 the French Government granted 100,000 hectares of land in Algeria to 8,000 refugees from Alsace-Lorraine. Moreover, the phylloxera disease which ruined the French vineyards during 1875 induced a considerable wave of migration of French vine growers to Algeria.

The following table shows that it was only after 1906 that the natural growth in the settler population exceeded its influx into Algeria. However, a considerable number of those migrants were not of French origin (73). One half of those who migrated in 1848 were Spanish, Italian, and Maltese; in 1876, out of a total European population of 344,000, some 153,000 were not French (74).

Colonial Immigration (1833-1954) (75)

Year	Colonial Pop.	Growth	
		Natural	By Migration
1833	7,812	-	-
1841	37,374	- 1,711	+ 24,524
1851	131,283	- 10,790	+ 46,752
1861	192,746	+ 3,461	+ 30,038
1872	245,117	- 3,923	+ 31,050
1881	412,435	+ 9,274	+ 58,412
1891	530,924	+ 14,902	+ 51,202
1901	633,850	+ 26,922	+ 28,448
1906	680,263	+ 27,418	+ 18,955
1911	752,043	+ 38,082	+ 33,698
1921	791,370	- 11,725	+ 23,442
1931	881,584	+ 34,865	+ 13,360
1948	922,272	+ 80,359	- 76,277
1954	984,031	+ 63,940	- 2,181

In its early stages, colonial agricultural policy aimed at the creation of small agricultural holdings owned by the new settlers.

Between 1842 to 1845, 45 villages were created and some 105,000 ha were freely distributed. From 1846 to 1848, 27 new villages were established in the Sahel of Mitidja. Wheat was the main crop in the colonial agricultural sector. In 1860, 9 per cent of the total area allocated to wheat production was occupied by the Europeans. Some new crops started to appear but only on a very small scale. The first vineyard was founded at Staouelie in 1843, and in 1854, for example, 2,306 ha were planted with vines producing 11,000 hectolitres of wine. Tobacco began to be cultivated as well, and up to 1872 the area allocated to this crop reached 1,496 ha (76). The area allocated to cotton production increased during the five years between 1860 and 1865 from 1,200 ha to 4,024 ha and production increased from 159,000 kg. to 656,000 kg. (77).

Under the Second Empire (1852-70), the colonial agricultural policy underwent substantial changes, favouring agrarian and banking joint-stock companies which received very large concessions (78). This coincided with the large-scale introduction of vine cultivation into Algeria after the destruction of the French vineyards by phylloxera.

From now on the process of land acquisition and of the creation of colonial villages proceeded very fast through the mechanisms explained earlier. The table below shows the increase in the area of the colonial agricultural sector until 1933.

The Development of the Colonial Sector (79)

Period	Colonial Centres	Area (ha)
1841-1850	126	115,000
1851-1860	85	250,000
1861-1870	21	116,000
1871-1880	264	401,099
1881-1890	107	176,000
1891-1900	103	120,097
1901-1920	199	200,000
1921-1933	67	270,481
Total	972	1,648,481

However, the figures shown in this table, which were produced by the colonial administration, seem to underestimate the extent of the process of land confiscation and to minimize considerably the amount of land under colon control. More accurate figures were produced by Bahloul (80), with which other authors seem to agree (81).

Year	Area of the Colonial sector
1850	115,000
1880	1,245,000
1900	1,912,000
1920	2,581,000
1940	3,045,000
1954	3,028,000

Located in the most fertile and most productive lands of Northern Algeria, the colonial agrarian sector soon had to develop new methods. New socio-economic structures were set up based on large private estates and private capital, on the employment of a free labour force, and on the production of a marketable surplus. Three factors created the preconditions for this development and accelerated the process under which the capitalist development of the colonial sector was consolidated.

First, the opening of the external market to Algerian agricultural products enhanced the development of capital accumulation. Phylloxera reduced the area of the French vineyards to about half of what it had been previously (82), and this pushed the French authorities to encourage Algeria to provide the necessary amount of wine. Thus the protective tariff on French wine which was relatively high was reduced from 5 francs per hectolitre in 1871 to 4.5 in 1881 for Algerian wine and to 2 francs only for Spanish and Italian wine in the same year (83). Vine-

yard plantation in Algeria became very profitable (84), and the colons were encouraged to expand the area allocated to it. Wine exports to France increased rapidly from 17,000 hectolitres in 1880 to 2,338,000 hectolitres in 1905. As a percentage of Algeria's total exports wine increased from 9.9 per cent in 1881 to 49.3 per cent in 1892 (85).

Secondly, the availability of capital to the large landowners provided by large financial institutions in France accelerated the process of capital accumulation in the colonial agricultural sector. In addition to the Bank of Algeria which established special financial institutions for agricultural business, other financial groups also supplied loans to large landowners, especially wine growers (86).

Thirdly, and most important, there was the cheap labour force made up from those who were driven out of their lands either through the internal mechanism of colonial expansion or through drastic demographic increase. This large labour force was necessary because of the introduction of the new capitalist farms based on labour intensive techniques. Wine growing in particular needed large amounts of labour with different qualifications; unskilled labour for land reclamation, ploughing, and grape picking; specialists in grafting and pruning; and technicians for wine-making and for the maintenance of the implements. These functions were performed in the early stages by the European settlers themselves but the Algerian labour force soon came to replace the Europeans because of their competitiveness in terms of wages.

These three factors contributed to the emergence of specialised and mechanized agricultural holdings, with wine being the dominant product, both in the area allocated to its production and in its proportion of total Algerian exports which reached 60 per cent in 1933. The table below shows the development of wine production in terms of area

and the amount produced between 1880 and 1934.

#### The Development of Wine Production (87)

Year	Area (ha)	Production (hl)	Export (hl)
1880	23,724	-	-
1885	70,886	-	-
1890	110,048	-	-
1900	154,430	-	-
1910	152,129	-	-
1921	168,742	7,034,267	4,236,120
1924	180,757	10,141,589	7,394,048
1927	207,367	8,402,618	7,121,531
1930	234,916	12,821,141	10,939,434
1934	373,292	16,613,032	11,652,304

The differentiation in income which accompanied this development existed not only between the colons and the indigenous population but also between the colons themselves. Concentration of property in the colonial sector proceeded very fast and soon the wine growers emerged as the new agrarian aristocracy (88). Many small cultivators among the European settlers were gradually forced to hand over their property to large landowners and to move to the towns and urban centres.

Together with wine production, the colons introduced other products, such as citrus fruit, cotton, and tobacco, for which the major demand also lay in metropolitan France. With these new products and the methods under which they were produced, Algeria's agriculture was drastically transformed. It became part of the social division of labour in the metropolis, and its products were exclusively for export.

The Algerian rural population was uprooted and dramatic changes took place in its social and economic structures. Traditional modes of property holdings and tribal social relations were disrupted and replaced by capitalist ownership and wage labour. In the course of this transformation, a major part of the population was alienated from its

means of production and was directed to serve capitalist accumulation in the colonial sector, while the rest was pushed to search for living on meagre resources. The colonial sector which gradually came to dominate the Algerian economy was much more geared to meet the demands of the metropolis than of the Algerian population. It was the source of the prosperity of the European settler minority at the expense of the impoverishment and destitution of the majority of the Algerian population.

The nature of the colonial sector came to determine the features that characterized Algerian society and economy and established the pre-conditions for its dependence and dislocation. This meant that Algerian society became sharply divided into a very small minority which monopolised the means of wealth and a very large majority which witnessed continuous deprivation in a variety of ways. Being oriented almost totally to the outside, the development of the Algerian economy was determined, shaped, and affected by the conditions and the needs of the outside world, mainly of France. This had further grave consequences on the situation of the indigenous population which experienced aggravated social and economic problems. This was in fact the general trend of development in Algeria until the 1950s, when the problems which these developments created were reflected in a violent reaction on the part of the oppressed people. The following section tries to trace the main characteristics of Algerian society and economy prior to independence, which formed the material background to the Algerian war of independence.

## **On the Eve of Independence**

Before independence Algeria, was a typically underdeveloped country with one exception, familiar to most colonial settler societies, namely that its social and economic divisions were founded on a community split between a minority of European settlers and a majority of the indigenous population. This meant that the class structure and class conflict in Algeria as a whole reflected the domination of the European and French colons over the Algerian population. In this sense Algeria presented a situation which was different from the majority of other colonised countries where the colonial administration, whether British or French, relied on a local aristocracy connected economically and politically with the metropolitan country which served to facilitate the colonial authorities' domination. In Morocco and Tunisia, for example, the colonial power supported either the landowning feudal aristocracy or the embryo mercantile bourgeoisie. Nothing comparable happened in Algeria where the process of colonisation actually confined the development and role of the local agricultural bourgeoisie to a minimum (89).

However, it should not be concluded that the only differentiation which existed was between the European and the native population. In fact the sharp contrast which existed between the two communities should not conceal the social and economic inequalities within each community. If the process of colonisation transformed Algerian society into a more differentiated one by impoverishing the native population and relegating it to the status of landless and workers, this process was further aggravated by the promotion of limited number of Algerians



who constituted no economic or political threat to the continuing existence of colonial domination.

All the phenomena of the colonisation process, namely the division of the society into two communities, the subdivisions and the differentiation within each community and especially within the native community, the nature of colon society, their social, economic, and political origin, their way of life, their attachment to France, and the nature and needs of French metropolitan capitalist accumulation, all contributed to a various degree not only to shaping the framework and the essence of Algerian society before independence but also, and perhaps more importantly, to the subsequent development of independent Algeria, its social classes and groups, its political and national movement, and its strategies of development after independence.

Before going on to explain the situation of Algerian agriculture on the eve of independence, it is useful to examine the state of the Algerian population and in particular its rural component, its growth, its labour force, and its standard of living.

### **Population**

The main characteristics of Algerian society shortly before independence were its rapid growth and its sharp division into wealthy European colons and impoverished Muslims. While the population of metropolitan France increased by 8 per cent between 1911 and 1954 (from 39,605,000 to 42,777,000), Algeria's population increased by 73 per cent in the same period as the table below shows. Taking only Northern Algeria, the population density was 41 inhabitants per km., or less than half of that of France (90). Undoubtedly, given the meagre resources available, this huge increase resulted in the impoverishment of the Algerian population and further aggravated its economic and social

problems. The rural component of this population was as much as 76 per cent.

The Growth of the Algerian Population (1856-1954) (91)

Year	Total	Estimated Rural	Estimated Urban
1856	2,487,373	-	-
1866	2,921,246	-	-
1876	2,867,626	-	-
1886	3,817,306	3,061,091	226,126
1896	4,429,421	-	-
1906	5,231,850	3,704,453	341,691
1911	5,563,828	-	-
1921	5,804,275	-	-
1931	6,553,451	4,419,943	606,440
1936	7,234,648	4,847,814	722,293
1948	8,681,785	5,747,930	1,129,482
1954	9,529,726	7,051,796	1,397,536

However, the figures presented in the table above conceal the profoundly dichotomous structure of the Algerian population. There existed two socially and economically and even sometimes geographically different communities. The European settler minority numbering about one million, or 11 per cent of the total population (92), had acquired over a quarter of the most fertile and productive land of Northern Algeria which was developed to produce cash crops, namely wine and citrus fruits for export. While the urban population of Algeria in 1954 was estimated at 26 per cent of the total, 82 per cent of the European population lived in towns and cities, where they were mostly administrators, bankers, technicians, traders, and skilled workers. Their concentration was greatest in the big cities with Algiers, the capital and major port, which contained over one-third of all Europeans (93). With a relatively low rate of fertility and mortality (19 and 9 per thousand respectively), the rate of population growth within the European minority was relatively low (1 per cent per annum), and life

expectancy was between 63 and 65 years. The number of children (under 15 years) was a bit higher than in France, 27 per cent against 24.8 per cent, and they benefited from primary education. In 1954 only 6.3 per cent were illiterate compared with 90 per cent of the Algerian Muslim population (94).

On contrast, increasing at an annual rate of 3 per cent or three times the annual rate of the European population growth, the Muslim population nearly doubled between 1911 and 1954, from 4.7 million to 8.4. Such a fast increase, with a life expectancy of 46 years, meant that the Muslim population represented one of the youngest populations in the world, in which 52.6 per cent were under 20 years of age. Very few Algerians received any education or technical training and very few Algerian workers participated in industry or other non-agricultural economic activities.

The native Algerians constituted nearly 84 per cent of the rural population. However, the high rate of population growth among them and the gradual depletion of agricultural resources led to a massive rural to urban migration during the last years of colonisation. Since the advent of the 19th century larger numbers of destitute and landless peasants were driven to the urban centres mainly because of the lack of resources in the rural areas. Part of the migrants were recruited as cheap labour in metropolitan France and other Western countries (95). With the persistence of the process of impoverishment, the extent of the migration problem became quite apparent during the years before independence. Hence between 1959 and 1962, the urban Muslim population increased by 56 per cent, from 2.3 million to 3.7 million.

The total number of the economically active population of Algeria was 3,512,000 persons or 37 per cent of the total population; the

agricultural sector alone mobilized about 80.8 per cent of this number (2,810,000), 2,573,000 of which were Muslims. The landowners represented 19.5 per cent of the total active labour force, the rest were essentially wage workers (22 per cent) and aides-familiaux (55 per cent).

Unemployment and underemployment was very high within the Muslim population, particularly in the countryside. In 1954, it reached a total of 850,000 males or 46 per cent of the total active Muslim agricultural population.

Wealth and natural and economic resources were very unequally distributed. The European settlers controlled almost all the riches of the country especially the most fertile lands of Northern Algeria leaving the Muslims the less fertile and sometimes unproductive lands of the steppes. This was reflected in the distribution of income, which showed a sharp contrast between the two communities in favour of the European minority. According to the a report published by the colonial administration (96), which divided Algeria's population into five income groups, the average per capita income for the year 1953 was 54,000 francs (\$154.28 at the official exchange rate of 350 f. to the dollar). However, this figure is highly misleading since it conceals wide discrepancies among different groups in the society.

At the bottom was 73 per cent of the rural Muslim population, roughly 65 per cent of the total, with a per capita income of \$55 per year. 78 per cent of this income was devoted to food, and 6.1 per cent was derived from relief. Next to this was an urban group, also entirely Muslim, with a per capita income of \$164 per year, 57.4 per cent of it was devoted to food and 3.6 per cent was derived from relief. The two groups combined to form 93 per cent of the Muslim population and had a

per capita income of \$78.49 a year. In the centre there was a group of wage earners, artisans, and small shopkeepers with a per capita income of \$372.50. Its Muslim component was 53.6 per cent (6.4 per cent of the Muslim population). Next to the top was a small "middle class", only 8.6 per cent of which was Muslim with a per capita income of \$673. It contained less than 1 per cent of the Muslim population. The leisured or well-to-do group at the top, which included no Muslims, had a per capita income of \$4,657. Some rich proprietors had over a million dollars a year. Assuming that Muslim and European incomes in the two mixed classes were equal, which is incorrect, the per capita income for all Muslims would be \$98.03 per year, while that of all non-Muslim would be \$587.44. The ratio indicated of 1 to 5.88 should be 1 to 6 if not worse (97).

### **Economy**

The agrarian nature of capitalism established in the course of French colonialism meant that the economy of Algeria was to be determined by the nature of its agricultural sector which was to occupy a dominant position in both a social and economic sense. The agricultural sector's immediate importance lay in the fact that in 1954 it supported in one way or another about 75 per cent of the Algerian population, accounted for one-third of the Gross Domestic Product, earned 67 per cent of export value, and employed 81 per cent of the total work force.

Algeria, therefore, was a typical rurally dominated society in which agriculture not only represented an economic activity but a way of life for the overwhelming majority of the population. Outside agriculture, apart from the extraction of mineral and hydrocarbons which started at the end of 1950s (98), and the very small and fragmented

industrial enterprises which were mainly connected with processing agricultural products for export, there was no industry to speak of. This was because the colons "had never been truly entrepreneurial (we build this country up from nothing), the real risks had been incurred by the state"(99). Thus there was no class capable of creating a true industrial infrastructure. The colons, who constituted the elite, were sometimes described as having a peasant mentality because of their rooted hostility to any further transformations either of the rural scene or of the economy as a whole. Large wine-growers sometimes preferred to invest their capital in politics as senators, deputies, and counsellors in the French and Algerian assemblies, or to defend their interests and to act as a colonial lobby. They did not invest their huge profits in industrialization but they invested them in politics "not out of any deep political conviction but for the purpose of consolidating and increasing their position and maintaining the status quo"(100).

Lack of capital was an important factor restricting the growth of industry. Profits made from capitalist agriculture were either invested in local property and services, exported to the metropolis and invested there, or consumed in the hedonistic life-style of the colons. The French or other foreign companies exploiting minerals and hydrocarbons also exported their profits.

The closeness of France was another factor limiting the expansion of any sector other than the agricultural export oriented sector. It meant that any industry would have been in competition both in France and Algeria with established French industry. Moreover, the poverty of the indigenous Algerian population restricted the size of the potential market.

Thus in spite of the favourable conditions created during the Second World War, when imports of manufactured goods from France were severely restricted, industrialization in Algeria remained limited and confined to some mining and extractive activities over which the metropolitan state exercised complete control. The annual rate of growth of the whole of industrial and crafts production was very low. After being 1.2 per cent until 1930, it increased to 4.7 per cent between then and 1955. In that year large-scale industry, which was mainly based on food processing and other light leather and textile industries, still only provided 10 per cent of gross domestic product (101).

The extent of the area cultivated by the colons remained more or less the same in the last decades before independence, as is shown by the following figures (102):

1930	2,345,000 ha	1951	2,726,000 ha
1941	2,720,000 ha	1962	2,393,000 ha

Productivity in this sector also failed to increase significantly during this period. Apart from the relatively new fruit and vegetable sector, which achieved a satisfactory growth rate of 3 per cent between 1945 and 1955, production of almost all major crops was either stagnating or declining. This was mainly due to the exhaustion of the soil and the colons' disinvestment in agriculture. Cereal production, which increased at a fairly uniform rate of 1.7 per cent a year between 1850 and 1919, rising from 5.2 to 18.8 million quintals, remained stagnant at around 20 to 21 million quintals between then and 1955 (103). Wine , Algeria's main product and principal export, had a long-term growth rate of 3 per cent till 1940, but after 1948 this growth declined to almost nothing. In terms of area, vine cultivation declined from 364,000 ha in 1931-45 to 350,000 ha in 1956-60. Similarly, production

decreased from 18,351,000 hectolitres to 15,299,000 hl. during the same period. This was accompanied by a decline in yield per hectare from 61.37 hl. in 1928 to 53.91 hl. in 1938, to 35.86 hl. in 1940, and to only 25.36 hl. in 1947. Only the production of citrus fruits and vegetables achieved a notable increase. From 7,500 ha in 1938, the area allocated to these crops increased to 34,445 ha in 1961.

Algerian agriculture was mainly oriented to satisfy the needs of the outside world and particularly that of metropolitan France. This appears from the relationship between the total value of the production of the main products and the total value of exports as revealed by the following table (104).

The Distribution of the Algerian Agricultural Exports in 1960  
(Milliard Old Francs)

Products	Total Pro.	Total Exp.	European Share in Pro.	European Share in Exp.
Wine	971	1,038*	89%	925
Vegetables	369	135	52%	70
Fruits	236	162	65%	105
Cereals	723	82	41%	34
Tobacco	59	49	50%	25
Others	835	83	60%	33
* as stated in the original table				

### Dichotomy of Agriculture

#### 1-Production and Methods of Cultivation

Algeria extends over an area of 2,381,741 sq.km., including the Sahara, and of that area only Northern Algeria, or 210,000 sq.km. represents the agricultural sector, as the rest of the country is almost completely unproductive desert. According to a note of the government of Algeria in 1960, Northern Algeria was divided as follows:(105)



Agricultural Lands	10,000,000 ha
Forestry Lands	3,000,000 ha
Unproductive Lands	8,000,000 ha

Behind the general features of the Algerian agricultural sector, there was a sharp contrast between the two agricultural sector which differed in almost every aspect of production, orientation, ownership, etc. By 1950, due to more than a century of a consistent policy on the part of the colonial administration to settle European migrants on the best lands, which were either seized compulsorily, purchased, or collectively expropriated, a clear and defined demarcation line can be drawn between two agrarian sectors, regionally compartmentalised and contrasted in their social and economic organisations.

The first was the modern sector, extending over the most fertile land and was based on very large-scale private farm units and on the utilization of relatively advanced means of intensive cultivation and mechanization, worked by agricultural labourers. This sector extended over the area where the European settlers had managed (by means which have been explained earlier) to expel the original owners to less fertile land in the interior of the country. The products of this sector were totally oriented towards the metropolitan market, and in 1953 it produced 65 per cent of gross agricultural output (including 100 per cent of all alfa, cork, and sugar beet, 93 per cent of citrus fruits, 90 per cent of wine).

The second sector was the traditional or Muslim sector. It extended mainly over the less fertile land and was essentially destined to satisfy the needs of the growing population who had been pushed into these areas by the policies of the colonial regime. It consisted largely of private and collectively owned land (although the latter had

sharply declined in importance), cultivated by a vast number of small farmers employing primitive methods of cultivation, with a consistent deterioration both in productivity and in the amount produced.

The contrast between the two sectors was reflected by many indicators, the most important of which was the yield of the land unit; it was estimated that land cultivated by Europeans yielded on average three times per hectare more than the land cultivated by the Muslims in the traditional sector (106). Thus the traditional sector, though occupying an area three times as large as that of the modern sector, produced only one-third of total agricultural output, and only 10 per cent and 7 per cent respectively of the lucrative wine and citrus fruits. Moreover, the modern sector possessed about three times more tractors than the traditional sector. A further contrast between the two sectors was in the average size of agricultural holding, 11.6 ha in the traditional sector, and 124 ha in the modern sector. Finally the amount of credits received by each sector throws more light on the nature of the two sectors. While the traditional sector received 40 milliard old francs during the period between 1953 and 1962, the modern sector, on the other hand, received 34 milliard francs in 1960 alone. The modern sector was rich since it possessed in 1954 a capital totalling 600 milliards of francs and had an annual income of 93 milliard francs. "This was the golden age of the European proprietors since the annual per capita income of these proprietors was 780,000 francs compared with 237,000 francs for the owners in France itself"(107)

## 2-Structures of Ownership

According to the census of 1950-51, the distribution of the land among the two sectors was as follows (108):

Traditional Sector	7,133,000 ha
Modern Sector	2,703,000 ha
Total:	9,836,000 ha

State property 11,000,000 ha  
(mostly grazing and  
uncultivated land)

The traditional sector was exclusively occupied by the Muslim population who in 1954 accounted for 89 per cent of the total population and 98 per cent of the rural population. This sector was composed of 543,310 agricultural holdings in Northern Algeria extending over an area of 7,131,000 ha, with 75 per of these holdings had an average size of less than 10 ha.

The Structure of Land Ownership in the Traditional Sector (1950-51)(109)

Size	Holdings No.	%	Area (ha)	%
Less than 1 ha	105,954	16.8	37,200	0.5
1 to 10 ha	332,529	52.7	1,341,200	18.5
10 to 50 ha	167,170	26.5	3,185,800	43.3
50 to 100 ha	16,580	2.6	1,096,100	14.9
More than 100 ha	8,499	1.3	1,688,800	23.0
Total	630,732	100.00	7,349,100	100.00

It appears from this table that the area of this sector was unequally distributed and that intense inequality seems to have developed. A wealthy class of cereal cultivators owning more than 50 ha and representing only 3.9 per cent of the total, had enriched itself by taking advantage of the conditions created by colonial land policies. This class was differentiated from the mass of peasants not only in its

income but also in its mode of cultivation depending mainly on agricultural workers and sharecroppers (khammasat).

On the other hand, 70 per cent of the landowners owned less than 19 per cent of the area in this sector. This category of agricultural holdings varied substantially in size of holding, soil fertility, methods of cultivation, and standard of living. Beneath this category of owners, there was the mass of aides familiaux (1,436,000 persons), the khammassat (57,600), daily workers (357,500), and seasonal workers (77,100). There were also the agricultural proletarians who worked in the modern sector and who had an average per capita annual income of 11,000 francs compared to 20,000 francs for the small landowners (110).

The modern sector was controlled by the European settlers. It covered an area of 2,720,000 ha of the most fertile land and was divided into 22,037 agricultural holdings whose average size was 124 ha, and 29 per cent of these holdings occupied about 87 per cent of the land in this sector. It depended in its operations mainly on the agricultural workers recruited from the traditional sector. The number of these workers was estimated in 1954 at 112,000 permanent workers plus 80,000 seasonal workers.

Given the circumstances explained above, Algeria, as a colonised country, presented a situation which was unique, in the sense that any meaningful political independence, let alone economic independence, would require the elimination of the power of the local elite whether of European or Algerian origin. The impoverishment and oppression which engulfed nearly all sectors of society meant that the forces likely to unite to achieve independence would include a wide spectrum of society, and that a serious struggle within these forces would follow the achievement of independence.

As far as the agricultural sector was concerned, any serious development plan aiming to achieve a sectoral balance and to reintegrate this sector into the national economy would require major structural changes either in the social relations governing the production process, and thus in the balance of forces among existing social classes, or in the nature of production itself towards the satisfaction of the actual needs of the Algerian economy. The effectiveness and efficiency of these changes would be conditioned and substantially affected by the nature and interests of the forces which would carry out these changes.

## Notes

- (1) Lashraf, M., al-Jaza'ir al-Umma wal Mu'itama',  
(Algeria: Nation and Society)  
Trans. by Dr. Hanafi Ben Isa,  
Algiers, 1983, p.263.
- (2) Bennoune, M., "The Origin of the Algerian Proletariat"  
Dialectical Anthropology,  
Vol.1, No.3, May 1976, p.203.
- (3) Bennoune, M., "The Introduction of Nationalism into Rural Algeria  
1919-1954"  
Maghrib Review, Vol.2, No.3, 1977, p.1.
- (4) See Valensi, L., On the Eve of Colonialism,  
Africana Publishing Company, London, 1977.
- (5) Halvorsen, K.H., "Colonial Transformation of Agrarian Society in  
Algeria"  
Journal of Peace Research,  
Vol.XV, No.4, 1978, p.327.
- (6) Bennoune, M., "The Origin...." op.cit., p.207.
- (7) There is a wide variation in the estimation of the Algerian  
population in the pre-colonial period. Lashraf, for example  
estimated the population of Oran during this time at 40,000.
- (8) For a good account of Algeria's pre-colonial cities see:  
Lashraf, op. cit. .
- (9) Halvorsen, op. cit., p.326.
- (10) See Valensi, op. cit.
- (11) Ibid., pp.57-70.
- (12) Bennoune, "The Origin..." op. cit., p.202.
- (13) Goinard, p., Algerie, l'Oeuvre Francaise,  
Edition Robert Laffont, Paris, 1984, p.53.
- (14) Nouschi noted that "the celebrated silk of Algiers and the woollen  
garments of Tlemcen, passed their respective regional boundaries"  
Quoted by Benissad, M.E., Economie du Developpement de l'Algerie,  
Office des Publications Universitaires, OPU, Alger, 1979, p.6.
- (15) Bennoune, M., Impact of Colonialism on an Algerian Peasant  
Community: A Study in Socio-Economic Change,  
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Michigan, 1976, p.72.

- (16) Berque, J., "The rural System of the Maghrib" in State and Society in Independent North Africa, ed. L.C. Brown, Washington, 1966, p.165.
- (17) Quoted by Bennoune, "The Origin...." op. cit., p.205.
- (18) Bennoune, "Socio-Economic Change in Rural Algeria: 1830-1954" Peasant Studies News Lettre, April 1973, p.12.
- (19) Halvorsen, K., op. cit., p.329.
- (20) Gallissot, R., "Pre-colonial Algeria" Economy and Society, Vol.4, No.4, 1974, pp.421-422.
- (21) Bennoune, "Socio-Economic Change..." op. cit., p.12.
- (22) Lazreg, M., The Emergence of Classes in Algeria, Westview Press, Colorado, 1976, p.29.
- (23) For more details of the religious families and their economic and political power see:  
Colonna, F., "Cultural Resistance and Religious Legitimacy in Colonial Algeria" Economy and Society, Vol.3, No.3, 1974, pp.233-52.
- (24) Lazreg, M., op. cit., p.30.
- (25) Abun-Nasr, J., History of the Maghrib, Cambridge University Press, 1977, p.237.
- (26) Lashraf, op. cit., p.201.
- (27) Ibid., p.229.
- (28) Ibid., p.202.
- (29) For a detailed description of the violence and destruction committed by the French troops, see:  
Lashraf, op. cit., p. 103ff.
- (30) Quoted by Quandt, W., Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, Cambridge, 1969, p.4.
- (31) Lashraf, op. cit., pp.108-109.  
For more evidences see: Bennoune, "The Origin..." op. cit., pp.210-212.
- (32) Quoted by Bennoune, "The Origin..." op. cit., p.210.
- (33) Abun-Nasr, op. cit., p.239.
- (34) Henni, A., La Colonisation Agraire et le Sous-developpement en Algerie, Algiers, 1982, p.17.

- (35) For more details of the process of land expropriation, see:  
Sari, D., La Despossession des Fallahs,  
Algiers, 1978.
- (36) lazreg, M., op. cit., p.41.
- (37) Benachenhou, A., Formation du Sous-Developpement en Algerie,  
Algiers, 1978, pp.47-48.
- (38) Sari, D., op. cit., p.16.
- (39) Abun-Nasr, op. cit., p.255.
- (40) Gallagher, C.F., The United States and North Africa,  
London, 1963, p.67.
- (41) Henni, A., op. cit., p.26.
- (42) Quoted by Halvorsen, op. cit., p.335-336.
- (43) Benachenhou, A., op. cit., pp.52-53.
- (44) Sari, D., op. cit., p.31.
- (45) Bennoune, M., "The Introduction...." op. cit., p.1.
- (46) Halvorsen, op. cit., p.336.
- (47) Lazreg, M., op. cit., p.45.
- (48) To illustrate this point, see the following example cited by  
Bennoune in "The Impact...." op. cit., p.94.

"Individual commutable Property was constituted by virtue of francaisation (application of French laws) of an undivided portion of land consisting of 292 ha in Mostagenem area which had been distributed on Paper among 513 assignees. Once the operation terminated, a settler, assisted by his lawyer, bought the share of one of these co-owners for 20 francs. His lawyer requested and obtained the authorization of a court sale by auction which took place in the office of the same lawyer. A former clerk of the lawyer acquired all the 292 hectares for a mere 80 francs. However, the cost of the legal suit amounted to no less than 11,000 francs, payable by all the co-owners. This operation resulted in the expropriation and total ruin of the former co-owners"

This example was also cited by Benachenhou, op. cit., p.69., and Henni, op. cit., p.43.

- (49) Bennoune, M., "The Impact..." op. cit., p.92.
- (50) Sari, op. cit., p.56,47, and 58.



- (51) Louis Veuillot, stated in 1841 that "the indigenes did not find any means to fight against us other by leaving Algiers city" Quoted by Lashref, op. cit., p.201.
- (52) Ibid., p.202.
- (53) Ibid.
- (54) Henni, op. cit., p.62.
- (55) Ibid., p.63.
- (56) Bennoune, "The Introduction...." op. cit., p.219.
- (57) Henni, op. cit., p.29.
- (58) Bennoune, "The Introduction...." op. cit., p.1.
- (59) Taxes had doubled with the arrival of the French, and from 1845 they had to be paid in money and not in produce.
- (60) Quoted by Bennoune, "The Origin...." op. cit., p.218.
- (61) Lazreg, op. cit., p.46.
- (62) Bennoune, "The Impact..." op. cit., p.99.
- (63) Sari, op. cit., p.97.
- (64) Smith, T., "Muslim Impoverishment in Colonial Algeria" Revue de l'Occident Musulman, No.17, (1er Semestre 1974), p.140.  
He also stated that in 1877 there had been 3.97 sheep per Algerian. This fell to 2.85 between 1885 and 1889, and to 1.65 between 1910 and 1914, reaching by the outbreak of the revolution only 0.78 sheep per Algerian.
- (65) Murray, R. and Wengraf, T., "The Algerian revolution" New Left Review, No.22, Dec.1963, p.32.
- (66) See Henni, op. cit., p.64.
- (67) Ibid.
- (68) Benachehou, A., op. cit., p.236.
- (69) Henni, op. cit., p.52.
- (70) Lazreg, M., op. cit., p.47.
- (71) During the military phase of the administration of rural Algeria (1840-1870), the French employed on average about 650 tribal leaders for the collection of taxes and the execution of certain

military and judicial functions. A majority of these leaders were chosen from families of known regional and local influence and prestige. They were landowners and the number of landless and sharecroppers was practically zero.

Van Sivers, P., "Algerian land Ownership and Leadership: 1860-1940" Maghrib Review, Vol.3, No.2, 1979, p.58.

- (72) Bennoune, "The origin..." op. cit., p.213.
- (73) For details of the origin of the settlers and their politics in Algeria see:  
Kraft, J., "Settler Politics in Algeria"  
Foreign Affairs, (39), 1960-61, pp.591-600.
- (74) Murray and Wengraf, op. cit., p16.
- (75) Henni, op. cit., p.82.
- (76) Benachenhrou, A., op. cit., p.87.
- (77) Henni, op. cit., p.120.
- (78) Concession of 25,000 ha in the Setif region to the Compagnie Genevois; 1865 concession of 20,000 ha to Societe General Algerienne (later Compagnie Algerienne)  
Murry and Wangraf, op. cit., p.18.
- (79) Sari, op. cit., p.69.
- (80) Bahloul, H., al-Qita' al-Taqlidi wal- Tanagudhat al-Haykaliya fi al-Zira'a b-il- Jaza'ir  
(The Traditional Sector and the Structural Contradictions in Algerian Agriculture)  
Algiers, 1976, p.133.
- (81) See for example, Ruedy, J., Land Policy in Colonial Algeria,  
University of California Press, 1967, p.101.
- (82) The area of French vine was reduced to from 2,492,000 ha to 1,817,000 ha in 1890.
- (83) Henni, op. cit., pp.123-24.
- (84) One hectare of vine rendered an income of 4,000 francs in the 1880s, while the income of a hectare of wheat was estimated at 300 francs only.
- (85) Hennie, op. cit., pp.126-27.
- (86) See Benachenhrou, op. cit., pp.102-112.
- (87) Ibid., p.137.

- (88) The rapid concentration of European landownership is seen in the following figures:

European Holdings Below 50 ha		
Year	Number	Area
1840-95	32,000	600,000
1951	13,000	158,000

Murray and Wengraf, op. cit., p.18.

- (89) "An inquiry carried out in 1949 showed that out of 721 claiming to represent the aristocracy, only 100 belonged to authentic feudal origin, 200 were religious chiefs, and the others had no authority and were called caid only because the colonial administration had demanded from them the functions of surveillance"  
Raffinot, M. and Jacquemot, P., Le Capitalisme d'Etat Algerien, Francois Maspero, Paris, 1977, p.39.
- (90) Lequy, R., "L'Agriculture Algerienne de 1954-1962"  
Revue du l'Occident Musulman, No.8, (2eme Semestre) 1970, p.54.
- (91) Bennoune, "The Origin..." op. cit., p.214.
- (92) This includes the Algerian Jews who were naturalized French.
- (93) Lawless, R., "Algeria: The Contradictions of Rapid Industrialisation" in  
North Africa, ed. R. Lawless,  
Croom Helm, London, 1984, p.153.
- (94) Lequy, R., op. cit., p.1.
- (95) At the end of the colonial period there were more than 600,000 expatriate Algerians in France, Belgium, and Germany.
- (96) Knight, M.M., "The Algerian Revolt: Some Underlying factors"  
The Middle East Journal, Vol.10, No.4,  
Autumn 1965, p.359.
- (97) Ibid., p.360.
- (98) In January 1959, the first oil well in the Algerian Sahara began producing in Ajila oil field.  
See Sulaiman, A., Ma'rakat al-Betrol f-il-Jaza'ir,  
(The battle for Oil in Algeria), Beirute, 1974, p.13.
- (99) Murray and Wengraf, op. cit., p.37.
- (100) Behr, E., "The Algerian Dilemma"  
International Affairs, Vol.34, No.3, July 1958,  
p.282.

- (101) Amin, S., The Maghreb in the Modern World,  
Penguin Books, Ltd., England, 1970. p.42.
- (102) Benachenhou, op. cit., p.244.
- (103) Amin, op. cit., p.36.
- (104) Benachenhou, op. cit., p.361.
- (105) Tidafi, T., L'Agriculture Algerienne at ses Perspectives de  
Developpement  
Francois Maspero, Paris, 1969, p.25.
- (106) Ibid., p.26.
- (107) Lequy, op. cit., p.49.
- (108) Tidafi, op. cit., p.25.
- (109) Raffinot and Jacquemot, op. cit., p.313.
- (110) Lequy, op. cit., p.49.
- (111) Small holdings (less than 10 ha) covered only 1.5 per cent of  
the total colonial land.
- (112) Smith, T., "The Political and Economic Ambitions of Algerian Land  
Reform"  
The Middle East Journal,  
Vol.29, No.3, 1975, p.26.

## CHAPTER FOUR : THE ALGERIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

The 5th of July, the day on which Algeria fell to the French troops in 1830, is also the day on which Algeria achieved its independence and became a sovereign state in 1962. Between the two dates there were 130 years of consistent and systematic French colonization. The preconditions for the development of policies at all levels after independence derive not only from the eight years of the liberation war but extend further back to include the whole period of French colonization, during which the whole society had seen varying degrees of social and economic transformation. Therefore, in order to grasp the realities of today's Algeria, it is necessary to look at the history of colonization.

The most recent past of this history covers the emergence of the Algerian National Movement which led to Algeria's independence. And since our study is particularly concerned the nature of the Algerian state and its role in agriculture, it becomes equally necessary to analyse the conditions under which the independent Algerian state was created, together with the social and political forces which played an active part in this movement.

We have seen in the previous chapter that French colonization had forcibly introduced capitalist relations into part of the Algerian society at the expense of isolating and impoverishing the other. It destroyed the existing social and economic balance for the benefit of a small minority of European settlers. Those settlers, known as the pieds- noirs, controlled the country's major resources and regarded Algeria as an indivisible part of France. They imposed almost total

economic, social, and cultural dominance over the native population and met any sort of resentment or opposition by the latter with fierce repression, following policies which would give Algeria a European rather than an Algerian destiny.

Algerian nationalism was, in many ways, both a contradiction and a response to this assumption. French domination over Algerian society meant that any sort of economic, social, cultural, or even religious activities on the part of the natives would be considered as resistance to the colonial regime. Thus, conditions were favourable for the emergence of a resistance movement in which tradition and religion were to play a major role.

Effective resistance to colonization, therefore, started almost from the day when French troops landed in Algeria. The most striking of the early acts of resistance was the revolt by Amir 'Abd al-Qadir which lasted until 1848, in which an Algerian sovereign territory was recognized by the French. Sporadic uprisings took place between then and 1870-71, the year Shaikh Muqrani's Kabyla revolt which was put down with severe brutality and destruction by the French occupiers.

However, these and other smaller uprisings were local movements that reflected resistance to French colonial penetration and opposition to the (colonial) plunder of lands, and represented geographically and regionally isolated uprisings rather than any sense of Algerian national identity or a struggle for independence and no sense of national movement had yet developed. This did not happen until the end of the First World War which acted as a major watershed. In its earliest stages, the national movement had two main origins. First, the educated sons of privileged native families, probably through their education and their close contact with the Europeans, began to resent their

position as subjects or second class citizens of France, and demanded equal civil and political rights. Some sought assimilation into French society and acted politically to achieve this goal. At the same time other groups, especially from the lower strata of the Muslim population either in Algerian cities or among the migrant workers in France, adopted a more radical attitude and believed that only the total independence of Algeria from France would satisfy the Algerian people's aspirations for social equality. These two trends dominated Algerian national politics throughout the years up to 1954 and were countered by the pieds-noirs' opposition to any sort of concession to the demands made by either group.

In 1954, the newly founded FLN, which at that stage consisted of small guerilla force, realized the futility of carrying out the struggle within the institutional framework of the colonial regime, and succeeded in mobilizing the great majority of the native population around armed struggle as the only means of achieving national objectives. After nearly eight years of costly and bitter fighting, the FLN demonstrated its strength by forcing France to grant Algeria total independence in 1962.

This chapter is an attempt to trace the development of the Algerian national movement since the 1920s. It tries to identify the social classes and the dominant political forces involved in the national struggle. The creation and development of the FLN as a party and mass movement around which almost all Algeria's social classes and political forces were gathered will be analysed. Finally, the nature and the causes of the infightings and internal conflicts which dogged the FLN since its birth and persisted up to and beyond independence will be discussed. The discussion, however, will not deal with the

creation and the political struggle on the part of the pieds-noirs or the politics of France with regard to the Algerian national movement (1). It will, nevertheless, deal with the policies of successive French governments towards Algeria as far as these affected the development of the FLN.

## **Two Trends within Algerian Nationalism**

Until the end of the First World War, the participation of the Algerian native population in the political life of the colonial system was almost non-existent. This was the result of the colons' total refusal to recognize Muslim political rights through the Code de l'Indigenat of 1881 which denied the native population basic civil rights and excluded them from participation in the administration. However, it was in theory possible for those Muslims who wished to renounce their status as Muslims to be given French citizenship. But this was always hedged about with complicated restrictions, and in addition the renunciation of personal status meant that the Muslims had to abandon their cultural heritage and, more importantly, their practices in matters of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and religion. Such apostasy would be met with stiff resistance by the Muslim population and anyone who accepted those terms would be resented and referred to as "Beni Oui Oui" or the tribe of yes-men.

After the First World War, France eased the requirements for Muslims to qualify for citizenship as a concession based primarily on their service in the French army or in industry (2). Coinciding with the growth of national feeling that followed the war, which was accelerated by the October revolution in Russia (3), the younger generation of educated Muslims or those who were in close contact with the French



culture both inside Algeria and in France were encouraged to demand the equality of their people with the Europeans. They realized, on the one hand, the great misery which their people was suffering as a direct result of colonial exploitation and, on the other hand, that Muslim population, if given the opportunity to develop their potentialities, they will not lay behind the Europeans (4).

Within this generation some viewed Algeria's aspiration largely in terms of obtaining more concession from France with regard to the status of the Muslim population. They demanded the total assimilation of Algeria into French society and considered that the abolition of discrimination between natives and colons could be achieved simply by regarding all Agerians as French citizens. Political and religious organizations were set up to achieve these aims. Others, on the other hand, adopted more radical positions and believed that equality would not be achieved without the total independence of Algeria and the complete withdrawal of French troops.

Before going on to analyse the two trends in Algerian nationalism, it is useful to recall the political and the socio-economic impact of the colonial situation on the population of Algeria as a whole.

### **Foundations of Native Opposition**

Above all, although French colonization in Algeria was a direct one, its relationship with the colonized masses was kept at a minimum through the existence of weak native intermediaries as we have seen. This was largely because of the presence of about a million European settlers who controlled every aspect of Algerian life. They dominated Algeria's economic activities including agriculture, industry, trade, banks, etc. creating the virtual pauperization of native Algerian

society, which became identified with the dominated and exploited classes. The settlers also had complete control of the cultural life of the native population. They did not see Algeria as a colony or as a "country being steered, by however slow a process, towards independence (as).... for countless generations all French school children have learned as part of their curriculum that l'Algerie, c'est la France" (5). They regarded themselves without equivocation as the masters of the Muslims and called for the bloody repression of any independent Muslim political movement. They had total control over Algeria's political and administrative life, and except for the tribal affairs where hand-picked caids held sway, the whole administrative apparatus, including the local police, the bureaucracy of the Governor General, and the Algerian branches of French ministries, were in settlers' hands (6). The settlers unanimously and violently rejected all calls for equality between themselves and the native population. With regard to the rise of the Algerian national movement, except for a handful of individuals and organizations not dependent upon French control of Algeria who were working beneath the surface to maintain rapport between the Muslim and European communities (7), the settlers acted collectively as a single "party", despite the structural and social differences between them, to suppress this movement and to deny it any concessions from French liberals.

As regards native Algerian society, the impact of colonization, in as much as it transformed its foundations and disrupted its existing balance, was incoherent and contradictory. On the one hand, the destruction of the traditional economy released an enormous work force and thus created the conditions for the spread of capitalist relations, and, on the other, this development remained mostly limited to enclaves

directed towards the metropole. In consequence colonization did not replace the disintegrating values and tradition of the native society with a new and universal set of social and political relations. It was geographically confined to enclaves and settlements based on relatively advanced technology and methods of production but isolated from the vast majority of uprooted former cultivators who had been driven into the cities and towns after having seen their properties expropriated and transferred to the settlers. These masses constituted the newly emerging proletariat and lumpenproletariat who were cut off from their past without being able to forget it, since the colonial regime did not provide them with a solid alternative. Some of them also constituted a petty bourgeoisie of professional and commercial intermediaries whose occupations depended on the activities of the colonial economy.

Colonization, therefore, injected into Algeria a form of capitalist development which could not embrace the whole population, despite the damage and the destruction it inflicted upon traditional society. The new urban classes created by this process of capitalist development were too weak either to manipulate the countryside or to play a role independent of the colonial structure.

The native urban elite which was integrated into the marginal sectors created by the colonial economy, was limited in its actions by the extent of the process of proletarianization, and by the colons' monopoly over the most important sectors of the economy. It represented some social strata which descended from heterogeneous origins, including local caïds and administrative intermediaries, large landowners who took advantage of the colonial property laws, merchants and owners of small industrial workshops, and intellectuals incorporated into the colonial institutions.

The working class, on the other hand, was small in relative and absolute terms, and also was burdened by the existence within it of a large number of Europeans. Mostly concentrated in the colonial agricultural farms, it was a juxtaposition of different groups often organized on a regional basis (8). The agricultural workers consisted either of owners of small holdings or landless cultivators who were fortunate enough to find stable work in comparison with the other landless who had to migrate to the towns. They never developed any form of elementary trade union action and their influence over the trade unions existing in the cities was effectively nil (9). Thus, the Algerian working class was on the defensive against the deruralized and unemployed masses. It was reduced to a daily struggle for bare subsistence (10). In these conditions the competition for employment among the members of this class reinforced tendencies towards economism and syndicalism, as the concerns and the attitudes of the workers were not independent of the conditions that governed their subsistence. In these circumstances, the working class found it difficult to develop any revolutionary class consciousness. The absence of a conscious working class party which could unite the class struggle and the national struggle explains the limited participation of the Algerian proletariat in the national struggle. The Algerian Communist Party, which was closely linked to its French counterpart, failed to see the real social and economic dichotomy between the Algerian and the European communities and generally dismissed the national question as an irrelevance.

There remained the rural masses who were the most hard hit by French colonization. The process of economic and social degradation and pauperization initiated by the colonial conquest never ceased; rather, it was intensified by many new factors. The confiscation of lands was

carried out in a vicious manner as a result of the introduction of the French property laws which made this process a continuous one. The drastic demographic increase came to add to the misery and pushed increasing numbers of the peasantry to migrate to the cities and towns, crowded into bidonville settlements. However, the rural population was the only part of the society whose relations with the past were never completely cut off. They still remembered the lands that used to be their own. The memory of insurrection against the occupiers and its heroes still lived in their minds (11). Describing the feeling of the rural population during the war of independence F. Fanon wrote:

"The memory of the anti-colonial period is very alive in the villages, where women still croon in their children's ears songs to which the warriors marched when they went out to fight the conquerors. At twelve or thirteen years the village children know the names of the old men who were in the last rising, and the dreams they dream in the duwars or in the village are not those of money or of getting through their exams like the children of the town, but dreams of identification with some rebel or another, the story of whose heroic death still today moves them to tears" (12)

In the eyes of the rural population there was no indication whatsoever that the colonial system would improve their deteriorating situation, because they considered that same system as the sole cause of their misery. They therefore retained a genuine potential of hostility against colonialism and against the settlers who had stripped them off their basic resources. However, this hostility never developed into a solid national feeling; it expressed itself in a sequence of spontaneous rural protests and insurrections lacking any clear political programme and deprived of urban support, which were treated simply as problems of law and order (13). There was no means whereby the rural population could unite so as to constitute a real threat to the colonial system, as feelings of solidarity never rose above the boundaries set

by tribal relationships. Above all the rural population were totally isolated from the political struggle going on in the cities and towns, not only because they resented city dwellers who were always identified with the settlers, but also because the national political parties in the urban centres could only conceive of a struggle taking place within the limits permitted by the colonial legal institutions and they did not develop any links which might turn this potential hostility into forms of conscious action that could threaten the existence of the colonial regime. This did not come into being until 1954, the year in which the pioneers of Algerian nationalism rallied a revolution which was largely based in the rural areas.

### **Forms of Political Action**

French colonization and its impact upon the native social classes created within its course, definitely had its effects in moulding the Algerian national movement. As the colonial system, or at least colonial political domination, did not represent the interests or aspirations of any class or strata within the native society apart from a very small elite, there was common hostility towards the common enemy who had either reduced the participation of one class in the system to a minimum (the small indigenous bourgeoisie) or, in the case of the rural population, abolished it altogether. However, the cause and the form of this hostility differed greatly between one class and another. This important point should be taken into consideration in any attempt to studying the Algerian anti-colonial revolution.

One of the most interesting studies of the Algerian revolution was made by William Quandt, who made an effort to present historical events in connection with specific types of leadership, which were in their

turn the products of specific conditions and varying social and cultural backgrounds. He divided the leaders of the various political movements in Algeria into three categories; Liberal "assimilationists", Radical "Messalists and Centralists", and Revolutionaries "OS-FLN". In explaining the differences between these three categories, Quandt accorded due importance to what he called the "historical accidents" which had produced men whose views and politics differed significantly (14). By "historical accidents" Quandt means the social background, the political socialization, and the date at which they entered the movement. From these conditions, factors such as family, school, age, and political environment in which the men involved in the political movement grew up and were educated, emerge as the main or even the only determinants in tracing the difference between the three categories which dominated Algerian politics between 1930 and 1962. According to Quandt the Liberals "were perhaps more products of French school than of their societies, and not surprisingly their first political demands were for equal rights with Frenchmen, including French citizenship, rather than independence" (15). For the Radicals, the school was "the most important element in shaping their political socialization", there they not only "learned that colonization was bad, but also they learned about the National Movement" (16). The Revolutionaries, on the other hand, differed from the previous two in their socio-economic status and in their educational level.

In fact, although these factors are useful and important for an understanding of Algerian political history, their utility is largely confined to providing possible explanation for the political behaviour of an individual or a group of individuals. They remain insufficient as explanations of the differences in programmes and strategies that

emerged in the course of the national struggle.

One cannot dismiss social interests and origins as important factors in shaping the main objectives of the political parties and movements in Algeria. For the fragmented Algerian elite created by and dependent upon the colonial structure, which dominated the political scene between the two wars, the goal was integration with France which would bring about equality of civil and political rights. If met this demand would mean the further enhancement of the role that the elite could play in society in that it would have more opportunity to participate in the non-marginal sectors of the economy.

As it was isolated from the rest of Algerian society, because it was basically urban in a predominantly rural society, and not having been fully integrated into the colonial structure, the Algerian elite could only turn to the metropole. Assimilation would abolish the barriers which prevented its expansion, because equality in civil and political rights would mean giving it equal terms to compete with the settlers, the main group that stood in its way.

The political movement which represented the Algerian elite was the Federation des Elus Musulmans d'Algerie (Federation of elected Muslims of Algeria) (FEMA), founded in 1927. This movement saw assimilation with France as the ideal solution to the problem. Being drawn almost entirely from french-educated intellectuals and former officers of the French army, who acted on behalf of the surviving pockets of the traditional middle and upper classes and for the higher strata of the petty bourgeoisie (clerks, teachers, traders, professionals, etc.) "assimilation was, in fact, a real possibility only for this group because it was in some sense already assimilated" (17). It saw the Algerian problem purely in terms of its own dependence on the few



opportunities provided by the colonial system and its inability to benefit fully from that system.

Led by its most prominent figure, Farhat Abbas, a pharmacist from Setif, the FEMA adopted a strategy of non-violence during the 1930s and appealed to French liberals and governments to grant their requests.

They demanded:

- the parliamentary representation of indigenous people in proportion to their numbers;
- equal conditions in civil and military employment and promotion;
- the uncompromising application of legislation to initiate public education;
- equal political and judicial rights.

However, since the FEMA represented only a fragment of Algerian society, it could only claim political representation on behalf of a part of the national movement. Its limited appeal was demonstrated by the creation of another grouping, the Etoile Nord-Africaine (ENA), in France by Hadj Qadir, a member of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, which recruited its first members from the large number of Algerians working in France. In 1927 the Etoile came under the leadership of Messali Hadj, a member of the French Communist Party and a worker in Paris who later resigned from the Party because he refused to accept that nationalism was a reality only in industrial Europe and had no relevance to a non-industrial country like Algeria (18).

The Etoile under Messali put forward an uncompromising nationalist programme which demanded:

- complete independence for Algeria;
- the complete withdrawal of the occupation forces;
- the creation of a national army and a national revolutionary government and the creation of a constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage;
- the confiscation of large properties controlled both by the feudalists who are allied with the conquerors and by the colons and the financial companies and the redistribution of land among

landless peasants;  
-free and compulsory education at all levels in the Arabic  
language.

The Etoile gained its support essentially from migrant industrial workers in France and to some extent from working people in the cities and towns of Algeria itself. When it was forcibly dissolved by the government for the first time in 1929, it claimed 4,000 members (19). It was revived again in 1933 and gained considerable popularity, largely because it was the first real national movement to express the aspirations of the majority of Algerians for independence, and in a matter of few years the Etoile became a real threat to the domination of the bourgeoisie over Algerian politics. However, like the bourgeois movement, the Etoile remained isolated from the countryside, a limitation which greatly hampered its activities. This was evident from the fact that the continuous and systematic repression exerted by the French authorities succeeded in putting a brake on the expansion of the movement until it was dissolved altogether in 1937.

As well as these two movements, there was the Association of Ulema, founded in 1932 to purify Islam from decadent mystical trends. The Ulema came to lead a large educational, religious, and political movement emphasizing Algeria's Islamic specificity and its separateness from Western culture. Their motto was: Islam is my religion; Arabic is my language; Algeria is my fatherland. Their influence spread to the cities and towns in Algeria and to some extent to the countryside where they were able to undermine the authority of the French-sponsored Marabouts (20). The Ulema represented the tradition of the pre-colonial Algeria and gained the support of those Muslim intellectuals who defended the interests of Algeria's traditional classes of absentee landlords and city merchants "who saw in Arabic-Islamic values an instru-

ment of ideological struggle against colonialism" (21). This can be deduced from the fact that despite the common programme that they shared with the Etoile regarding demands for independence, they allied themselves in the political action with the FEMA in 1936. In fact they adopted a gradualist strategy so as not to disrupt the existing hierarchy and also to limit popular participation in politics (22).

The only other organization to play a positive role before 1954 as far as national aspirations were concerned was the Algerian Communist Party. This had been created as a branch of the French Communist Party and was dominated by radical European intellectuals whose efforts were limited to seeking social and economic reforms within the colonial framework. Despite this the PCA had a certain importance in the development of the national movement in Algeria, as it was the only European political group in Algeria to be involved in a dialogue with Muslim nationalists on a basis of mutual respect.

Confronted by the two major trends in the Algerian national movement, self-determination versus assimilation, the colons stood firmly against the demands of both groups and forced the French governments to apply total repression. On several occasions their lobby was able to block the introduction of liberal reforms demanded by the assimilationists, the most important of which was the defeat of the Blum-Viollette project. Leon Blum's Popular Front came to power in France in 1936 promising to alter the relationship between Europeans and Muslims. The Blum-Viollette project proposed to grant rights of citizenship to between 20,000 and 25,000 Muslims. Had it succeeded, the project would have boosted the hopes of the assimilationist, in particular the elus and would have reinforced their position within the national movement. However, the colons displayed stiff resistance to the project viewing

it merely as a preliminary to their general absorption by the native society. Their objections were symbolized by the collective decision of the European mayors to submit their resignations until the project was defeated. The colons then intensified their pressure on Paris to suppress any sign of nationalist feeling and in particular to ban all the nationalist parties. Their demands were, in fact, met when the Etoile was dissolved in March 1937.

## **Intensification of National Struggle**

Shortly after its dissolution, Messali succeeded in transforming the Etoile into the Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA). The PPA programme, though less radical than the Etoile's, still advocated national independence, but put more emphasis on pan-Arabism and Islam and showed less signs of Marxist influence in its economic programme.

The PPA gained considerable support inside Algeria, and Messali Hadj soon emerged as the leading figure in the nationalist movement. His speech delivered at a mass meeting in Algiers in 1936, in which he declared his firm rejection of the Blum-Viollette project, announcing that "this land is ours and is not for sale" (23), captured the minds of the Algerian people. The PPA organizations spread quickly in the cities and smaller towns and to some extent to the surrounding rural areas (24). Both workers and intellectuals began to gravitate towards the Party, which pressed more than ever before for uncompromising nationalist demands. Messali's paper al-Umma stated in July 1939 that "no sentiment links North Africa to France except the hatred that a hundred years of colonialism have bred in our hearts" (25).

However, before the PPA could acquire a significant hold on the Algerian people, the French authorities banned it two years after its establishment and arrested its leaders, forcing it to go underground and to keep its 10,000 members under secondary leaders (26). Messali was the first of the PPA leaders to be arrested. In 1941, a military court sentenced him to 16 years hard labour for sedition. He was pardoned in 1943.

The assimilationists were dealt a major blow by the defeat of the Blum-Viollette project, and became disillusioned and even embittered by

the colons' persistent refusal to meet their most elementary demands. This disillusion was aggravated after the fall of France by the Vichy government, which then controlled Algeria, since this government was known to be particularly hostile to aspirations for independence. It paid more attention to the wishes and demands of the European settlers who, encouraged by the defeat of Blum's project, moved towards an openly pro-fascist position. The Vichy government received the support of the colons, suppressing all the nationalist parties and arresting their leaders.

Quite unintentionally, such policies resulted in a radicalization of the demands of the assimilationists, who realized that their position had become untenable. After making several unsuccessful appeals to the colonial administration, Farhat Abbas, who remained at liberty, adopted a more radical line and shifted from the position of trying to persuade the French to give all Algerian Muslims French citizenship on equal terms with the Europeans to a commitment to the notion of Algerian autonomy. This shift can easily be traced from the following statement he made in 1941:

"It is enough to examine the process of colonization in Algeria to realize how the policy of "assimilation" automatically applied to some and denied to others, has reduced Muslim society to utter servitude..... The salient and continuing characteristic of French colonization is the subjection of the entire country, its humanity, its wealth...., and its administration, to the European and French elements. It is here that the policy of linking Algeria to metropolitan France, the so-called "policy of assimilation", finds its source, its justification, and its truest expression.

Politically and morally, this colonization can have one concept, that of two mutually alien societies. Its systematic or disguised refusal to allow the Muslim Algerians into the French community has discouraged all those who have favoured a policy of assimilation extended to the aborigines. this policy appears today, in the eyes of all, as an inaccessible dream, as a dangerous device in the hands of colonization" (27).

Thus Abbas abandoned FEMA and organized the Union Populaire Algerien (UPA), a movement similar to its predecessor but more explicit in its demands for progressive Muslim enfranchisement. In 1942 the Anglo-American forces landed in Algeria and defeated the Vichy government. On 3 June 1943 General de Gaulle came to power in France and in the following month, in an attempt to create a new political balance against the mainly pro-Vichy colons, he issued a decree which embodied the Blum-Viollette proposals. This gave 60,000 Muslims (holders of university degrees, former army officers etc.) access to French citizenship. For the assimilationists, these measures were too little and too late. They did little to decrease the colons' overwhelming control over the country's political and administrative institutions. Even before this, Abbas, influenced by various factors such as the American attitude towards the emancipation of the colonial territories, the defeat of France, the loss of French prestige in Muslim eyes, and the inflexible attitude of the Europeans (28), had gone too far to retreat. In February 1943, he produced a famous document signed by 55 Muslim elus and politicians, which became known as the "Manifesto" in which he sharply criticized French colonization, demanding a federal solution for Algeria and its right to home rule within French political framework. It contained other specific and familiar demands such as freedom and equality for Algerians; freedom of worship, the separation of church and state, the freedom of speech, the press and of association, free and compulsory education, the institution of Arabic as a national language alongside French, the elimination of the colons' land monopoly, and the acceptance of Muslims in the Algerian government (29).

Although far from being revolutionary, as it did not demand full self-determination, the Manifesto represented a crucial development not

only in Abbas's position but also in that the national movement as a whole. With Messali Hadj released from prison in April 1943, although remaining under house arrest in Shellala, Abbas now emerged with considerable freedom to manoeuvre and to consolidate his position as a nationalist leader. In response to de Gaulle's initiative of giving citizenship to some Muslims and after the rejection of his manifesto by the Algerian government, Abbas launched a new organization on 17 March 1944, in his home town of Setif, the Amis du Manifeste de la Liberte (Friends of the manifesto of Liberty) (AML).

This new organization, which received the approval of both the PPA and the Ulema, established the first unified front in the national movement and symbolized a minimum broad agreement on their goals. Political differences and rivalries were subsequently expressed within a common organization whose main aim was to create an Algerian republic federated with France. With the lifting of political restrictions by the French authorities, the AML recruited 500,000 members. The banned PPA could now work within this front, but it never abandoned its militancy or its uncompromising demand for independence, and in fact it now had a chance to extend its political influence among the workers and the rural population. The strength of the PPA and its leaders' rejection of moderate nationalist demands were revealed in the AML's congress held in Algiers from 2 to 4 March 1945. Messali was still under house arrest, but his followers dominated the congress. They defeated a motion by Abbas calling for an autonomous Algerian republic federated with France, and pushed two other motions through the congress, calling for the release of Messali "the undeniable leader of Algerian people", and another for the formation of an Algerian parliament and government without any commitment on its future ties with France (30).



## **The 1945 Uprising and the Rise of Revolutionary Action**

Despite the existence of the AML front, the national movement remained sharply divided into two major factions, the former assimilationists who had moved a step forwards in the direction of demanding Algerian self-rule, and the PPA which demanded complete independence. However, both movements were unable to mobilize the support they required in sufficient quantity, whether from the French authorities, for the assimilationists, or from the Algerian population, for the PPA.

The years that followed the foundation of the AML and the revival of the PPA witnessed increasing Muslim agitation. Uncoordinated and isolated attacks on French property and the appearance of leaflets in the streets denouncing colonialism became regular occurrences. An attempt to free Messali from house arrest was discovered by the French authorities and resulted in his being put under closer surveillance. Abbas and his supporters tried to distance themselves from the PPA and its activities, and Abbas released a statement in April 1945 declaring that "the AML is not responsible for any incident caused by suspicious elements" (31). Despite this the widespread hostility towards colonialism was accompanied by a growing understanding of the need for more vigorous pressure for independence, and the tensions were further aggravated by the acute economic crisis.

In May 1945 Algeria was shaken by an uprising unparalleled since 1871 both in its extent and in the violence with which it was encountered. On the first of May the traditional parades were permitted, and the Muslim processions in the cities of Algiers, Bone, Oran, and several other towns were turned into PPA demonstrations in which the Algerian green and red flags were waved and calls made for Algerian

independence and for the release of Messali. In the town of Setif, the French police provoked a bloody clash between the Muslim and European demonstrators as a result of their attempt to seize the flags, and by the end of the day, 21 Europeans had been killed. The police moved swiftly, punishing the Muslim participants indiscriminately and firing savagely into the crowd. Both sides reported significant casualties but the estimates of Muslim deaths vary between the official (under) estimate of 1,500 and the nationalist figure of 45,000 (32).

Whatever the figure may be, it is clear that the repression was extremely brutal, and that no effort was made to distinguish between the guilty and innocent. The colonial administration seemed to have been determined to use this occasion to wipe out the Algerian national movement, which developed significantly at all levels from then on. The AML, which was thought to be primarily responsible for the demonstration, was banned immediately.

The events of May 1945 proved to the Algerian nationalists that independence must be their objective and also that it would not be achieved except by force. However, this final step was not taken for another nine years, during which the national movement underwent a series of bitter internal struggles. Although the scale of the repression and the brutalities committed by the colonial authorities in 1945 confirmed the PPA's position regarding the futility of relying on French "good will" for a solution, the movement as a whole and the PPA in particular was not able to formulate an adequate alternative strategy to replace agitation within the framework of the legal and political institutions of the colonial system. Part of the reason was that the PPA was unable to exploit the potential hostility of the countryside towards the colonial regime; as we have already indicated, the rural

population remained almost completely isolated from the struggle waged in the cities.

The moderate middle class leaders who took no responsibility for the events of 1945 tried to disassociate themselves from responsibility of similar incidents occurring in the future. Once again Abbas warned against any further actions which might evoke such a response; furthermore, when he realized that the PPA had been implicated in the Setif events, he abandoned the AML coalition and founded another organization, the Union Democratique du Manifeste Algerien (UDMA). Like his previous organizations, the UDMA recruited mostly among Muslim intellectuals, and gained little mass support. Abbas claimed that the programme of the new organization was the same of that of the AML. On 7 May 1946, he published in Le Courier Algerien an appeal to Algerian youth, both French and Muslim in which he described his political aspirations as being neither assimilationist nor separatist. He appealed to French youth to overcome its "colonial complex" and to Muslim youth to rise above "anarchic Muslim nationalism" (33). The UDMA adopted a programme which demanded an autonomous Algeria federated to France, so that the organizational split in the national movement appeared once again.

In June 1946, Messali Hadj was released from detention, and organized the Mouvement Pour le Triomphe des Libertes Democratiques (MTLD), to act as a front for the PPA, which had been forced underground. The new movement was virtually the revived PPA, and its members were also drawn from workers, students, and intellectuals. Many were convinced of the need for direct and violent action to achieve Algerian independence. The MTLD stood for much more than autonomy for Algeria; its programme included universal suffrage, the removal of French control over religion and schools, and the evacuation of French troops from the

country. Its resolutions were in favour of complete independence and were opposed to any federal status. Between 1946 and 1954 the MTLD became a mass party, penetrating a large part of the middle-class and exercising almost exclusive influence among the sub-proletariat who were organized in committees of the unemployed, and who were generally first or second generation of landless rural migrants. This led to the establishment of the first links between the national struggle in the cities and the countryside.

Despite the French government's failure to give any real consideration to the demands put forward by the UDMA for autonomy and federation to France, limited political representation for the Muslims was introduced. The Statute of 1947 created Algerian assemblies and municipal councils with two electoral colleges, the upper one for the French and the Muslim beneficiaries of the 1944 ordinance and the lower for the other Muslims.

The strength of the national movement at this time was increasing considerably, as was clear during the municipal elections in October 1947, and the Assembly elections in April 1948. Having boycotted the previous elections, the UDMA and the MTLD decided to participate, although not without much debate and effort to persuade their members of the utility of these elections. Between them they took a high percentage of the lower college seats in the municipal elections and were only prevented from doing the same in the Assembly elections by widespread ballot-rigging.

## **The Emergence of the Armed Struggle**

By 1950, the national movement was going through a period of tortuous and futile struggle over whether or not it should continue to function within the existing colonial system, which satisfied neither the colons nor the nationalists. While the latter were aware of the almost total control exercised by the colons over the political, administrative, and economic machinery, and the ineffectual nature of any "reforms" which might be introduced by Paris to alleviate, if not to eliminate, the inequalities that existed at all levels, they had not forgotten the violent retaliation by the French authorities in Setif which made them hesitate to resort to violent open conflict with the colonial system.

The elite and its moderate leaders took the events of 1945 as a pretext to stick to its demands and aspirations towards gradual development or "legal revolution" and their hope that French liberals would put forward suitable solutions to the problem. This policy was reflected in the UDMA, whose popularity gradually declined year after year, emphasizing the incapacity of the middle and upper classes even to bring about a settlement appropriate to its own status. Their position within the colonial structure had relegated the Algerian elite to a marginal position. Thus it was struggling to achieve the impossible as it was faced with a dilemma that could only be solved in a revolutionary manner, that is, a solution which would necessarily nullify its role. The collapse of Algerian bourgeois politics was revealed in the decline of the UDMA and the growing strength of the FLN in 1954, and its realization that its role would be overshadowed by other social strata for many years to come.

Among the poorer strata and the petty bourgeoisie represented by the PPA-MTLD, much of the struggle centred around the issue of whether armed action was the only means of achieving independence or whether it was useless. In spite of its uncompromising programme calling for unconditional independence, the PPA's social structure had undergone considerable changes since it began to expand, and it now included a number of intellectuals and professionals, who occupied high ranks within the Party. In the absence of the clear ideological education and the disappearance of the collective party mechanism that had characterized the work of the Etoile, power-seeking individuals who could attract a larger block of supporters behind them emerged as the most effective disciplinary force within the Party. At many levels, adhesion to this or that tendency was often determined less by political choice than by personal relations. This tendency was favoured by the absence of any reference, in the course of the struggle, to the social questions which would emerge after the achievement of independence. The level of political education and the absence of democratic practices and procedures, which colonial repression played a significant part in its development, were important features in creating this situation (34).

As the MTLD became increasingly dependent on the continued existence of the politico-legal framework of the colonial system, and the latter's tolerance of its activities and programme, a number of rival factions began to spread throughout its organizations. Even Messali Hadj, who had acquired a certain charismatic appeal, also experienced a number of challenges from other leaders of the MTLD. Much of this confusion was caused by the indecisiveness and the ambiguity that accompanied the creation of the MTLD, whether it was simply intended to

be a parliamentary cloak for the PPA (which remained working underground and presided over by Messali) or whether it was intended to replace it. This incoherence reflected the movement's fundamental indecision about legal politics, since the MTLD continued to participate in the sterile parliamentarianism denounced by the clandestine PPA (35). A great degree of dissatisfaction and confusion within the ranks of the PPA was caused by MTLD's decision after fierce argument during the congress of March 1947, not to form a para-military force, but to press for reforms in a non-violent manner.

In 1949 a group of more radical members of the MTLD established a clandestine operational body, Organisation Speciale (OS), which was the first organization dedicated to the use of violence in order to attain independence. The leaders of this organization were all young men in their twenties, and came from humble backgrounds in which notions of moderation and legality made no sense (36). Except for Ait Ahmed and Boudiaf, none of them was college-educated or considered as intellectual. After seeing how easily the colons could manipulate the electoral process, they became convinced that only direct armed action could destroy the colonial regime. They had also become disenchanted with Messali's charismatic leadership and critical of his dependence on the legal framework of the colonial system, and, unlike him, did not believe in spontaneous mass agitation. The first leader of the OS was Hocine Ait Ahmed, followed by Mohammed Ben Bella in 1949, but in general a form of collective leadership of the former MTLD members prevailed.

The OS set itself the task of galvanising the population by direct attacks on colonial targets. They concentrated both on raids and on obtaining supplies of money and arms. The first successful operation

undertaken by the OS was Ben Bella's attack on the central Post Office in Oran in 1949, which netted about thirty million francs (37). By 1950 the OS claimed 1,800 members but in March the same year the French secret service discovered its existence and arrested about a hundred of them, including Ben Bella, who remained in prison until his escape in March 1952. The existence of the OS produced heated discussions and arguments within the MTLD. After some indecision the MTLD dissolved the OS and denounced the use of force as a means of obtaining its objectives.

### **The Emergence of the F.L.N.**

After the disbanding of the OS, the national movement underwent a further split, but on different terms from the earlier one, the issue now being the way in which Algeria could achieve complete independence. The division over whether armed struggle was a vital precondition for the achievement of independence became finally crystallized in an organizational split four years later, which proved that despite the success it claimed earlier, the old national leadership could not overcome its social origins. The relative weakness of the social strata which this leadership had represented meant that the struggle became limited in a way which was inappropriate to conditions in Algeria, where a revolution would require a degree of mass mobilization that would include the rural population and capitalize on their genuine hostility to the colonial system. The early 1950's marked the end of the political careers of those leaders who had set out their objectives without formulating the necessary means of achieving them.

A third generation of politicians now emerged, which differed from the two previous generations in being able both to set its objectives



and formulate the means of attaining them. As well as the accumulated political experience which the movement had been able to acquire before 1950, this group differed from its predecessors not only in that they had grown up in a different political environment but, more importantly, in that they came from social strata which had nothing to do with the colonial regime. They represented, or at least acted for, the most disinherited groups in the population in the sense that they were not prepared to function within the colonial legal framework.

Thus the MTL D eventually fell victim to an internal struggle which exhausted it and rendered it ineffective (38). As non-violence became a central tenet of its policy, discontent grew larger and larger. Opposition to Messali came first from the Central Committee of the MTL D, led by Hocine Lahoual, which held a congress in April 1953 to debate the issue of restructuring the OS, voting down Messali's request for greater power. In his turn Messali dissolved the Central Committee at a congress held in Belgium in mid-July 1954 in which he was elected life President of the MTL D. The emergence of the conflict between Messali and the members of the Central Committee, who later became known as Centralistes was usually expressed in terms of personality conflicts, but it has also been suggested that even before the split, the Centralistes were moving towards more legalistic means of action and away from a revolutionary programme (29).

In his appeal of 11 March 1953, following the creation of Comite du Salut Public (Public Salvation Committee), Messali exposed his differences with the Central Committee by stating that

"the national Movement is going through a crisis that is not without gravity .... For three years, during which I was struggling inside the Party in silence and in an orderly manner, to protect the national movement from sliding towards adventurism and from abandoning the revo-

lutionary struggle .... a policy of superficiality and compromise has developed since that period .... and a real bureaucracy with functionaries, telephones, Pashas, and Chaouchs .... was instituted in the Party" (40)

On the initiative of Mohammed Boudiaf (41), a member of the OS, which continued to function clandestinely since its foundation, and together with other members of the organization, who tried to put an end to the exhausting and costly war of attrition among the leaders of the MTLN, a third force, called the Comite Revolutionaire pour l'Unite et l'Action (CRUA), was formed in March 1954. Its aims were to end the deepening internal struggles within the MTLN (which occasionally erupted in violent clashes (42), to reunite the national movement, and to inaugurate the armed struggle against the colonial system. The CRUA initially included two members of the OS and two Centralistes. It held a meeting in 22 July 1954 in Algiers attended by 22 members, who delegated five members (Boudiaf, Ben Boulaid, Didouche Mourad, R. Bitat, Ben M'Hidi L'arbi) to organize a series of coordinated activities which would take place at the same time, to draw attention to the existence of a national armed movement. This group decided that these activities were to begin on 1 November 1954. The external delegation of the MTLN which was based in Cairo and included Ait Ahmed, Ben Bella, and Mohammed Khidher, affiliated to the CRUA in July 1954. A Central Committee of the CRUA consisting of nine members (43), who came to be known as the chefs historiques was established. During August and September 1954 the CRUA made an attempt to reconcile the two factions of the MTLN so that the revolution could be launched with united support, but it was not successful (44). In its second meeting in an Algiers suburb in October, the date of the revolution was agreed upon and the name Front de la Liberation nationale (FLN) was adopted with the stipulation that the Front must be open to all political groups.

Before going on to describe the new situation brought about by the creation of the FLN, it is useful to recall that the rise of militancy within the national movement was directly connected with the severely worsening economic and social conditions within Algeria. Aggravated by the sharp demographic increase, social and economic inequalities continued to grow rapidly. We saw in the previous chapter that 93 per cent of the Muslim population lived on a per capita income of \$78.49 compared to an average income of \$578.44 for the Europeans. Unemployment was very high and was estimated at 2 million within the Algerian population; more and more cultivators became forced to leave their villages and migrate to the cities and towns to search for jobs. This situation increased the discontent among the Algerians in general and their bitterness against the French colonial system. It was against this background, which implied a greater degree of discrimination and repression, that the revolutionary tendency within the national movement was gaining momentum.

## **The Socio-Political Origins of the FLN**

The FLN was the central force behind the Algerian revolution. It enabled the nationalists to wage one of the longest, most violent and most successful wars against colonialism in the 20th century. It emerged out of a situation in which both the colonial regime and the Algerian national movement had reached an impasse. The creation of the FLN represented a decisive turning point not only in the history of Algerian anti-colonial revolution but also in the modern history of Algeria. A significant part of the social, economic, and political development that Algeria has experienced since that date derives from the nature of this new movement and the conditions under which it was created. by launching armed resistance, the FLN succeeded in mobilizing almost all sectors of Algerian society, particularly the rural masses, who had remained almost entirely isolated from the national struggle until 1954.

The founders of the FLN were all young men who had come into politics through the PPA and the MTLN during and after the Second World War. They had a common dedication to the national cause and they shared a common belief not only that complete independence was the only answer to Algeria's problems, but also that this independence could not be achieved without armed struggle. Many of them had been effectively involved in this struggle even before the creation of the FLN, through the OS. They also believed that a revolutionary situation had existed in Algeria since 1947 and that either because of fears of a Setif-style retaliation by the colonial authorities or because of reformist tendencies within the movement, the PPA/MTLN would not exploit this situation effectively. Hence they opposed Messali who wanted to settle the

political fragmentation that had enfolded the MTLN before becoming involved in armed struggle, and also opposed the Centralistes who considered this to be premature and were inclined to organize the Party around a form of politics that would be permitted within the limits of the colonial framework.

Socially, the men who established the FLN came from a variety of backgrounds. They included the sons of aristocratic families, whose power and properties had been weakened or even abolished by colonialism, sons of merchants, proletarians and professionals. None of them had any full-time employment (except in the French army), and they felt the contempt of clandestine militants towards a class whose aims until the revolution, according to Harbi, had been identical to those of the French petty bourgeoisie (45). They did not maintain any strong links with their social origins and instead tried to establish ties with the urban and rural population from whom they would draw support.

Ideologically, they lacked any sort of defined programme or theory that would have given them a profound understanding of their society (46). Partly because of the mechanisms by which the PPA-MTLN was run, their only common ideological background was their absolute contempt for colonialism and their dedication to putting it to an end. They regarded colonialism as being primarily responsible for all Algeria's social problems and they also tended to identify it with capitalism and feudalism. They considered that the misery and poverty of the Algerian masses was simply a direct result of the colonial system. Their demands for land reform and social justice were made largely because of their conviction that the colonial regime had introduced social inequality and divisions. Their total commitment and dedication to rid Algeria of French colonization through armed struggle inevitably led them to

oppose, and indeed to fight, any political group whose aims were not identical to their own. They used all possible means and arguments to justify their position and to mobilize the masses around themselves. Religious and traditional arguments were put forwards to convince the rural population that it was their duty to fight colonialism. For them Islam was a vital mobilizing force, which could expose the misery to which the masses were condemned and encourage them to fight to put an end to colonial exploitation.

Finally, they looked at Algerian society as a single entity; if they saw any divisions within this society, it was only between the exploiting colons and the exploited Algerian people, and they considered that to have any faith in gradual development or improvement by means of the colonial structures was simply to misjudge the nature of colonialism; any one who maintained such beliefs was urged to abandon them and to rally to the armed struggle. Above all they were nationalists and populists who believed that an Algerian national identity had existed before French colonization, and that this identity could only be regained through popular participation. Their common broad beliefs in independence and in direct confrontation in order to achieve it largely masked the potential divisions between them. As in many other national movements, the absence of clear ideological aspirations on the part of the Algerian leadership served to unite groups of varying social backgrounds and political beliefs, since the goal of independence acted as a unifying force. After the achievement of independence, however, when concrete decisions on policy had to be taken, the underlying differences inevitably came to the surface.

## **FLN: Supremacy in the National Movement**

The Algerian anti-colonial revolution broke out on 1 November 1954 with seventy small but coordinated attacks, organized by the preparatory committee, against French military and police garrisons (47). The attacks were concentrated mainly in the Aures area and Greater Kabylia, the homeland of the Berber population, which became a major theatre of war. The initiation of the revolution was accompanied by the issue of the FLN's first public statement which declared explicitly that:

"After decades of struggle, the National Movement reached its final phase of fulfilment .... a group of responsible young people and dedicated militants, gathering about it the majority of wholesome and resolute elements, has judged that the moment has come to take the National Movement out of the impasse into which it has been forced by the conflicts of persons and influence, and to launch it into the true revolutionary struggle" (48).

With few human and material resources (49), the fighters of the FLN succeeded in drawing public attention towards a new political force and in obtaining support from most of the Algerian people. However, during the early months of the revolution and until mid-1955 the military activities of the FLN lacked adequate organization and preparation, and amounted to little than sporadic acts of terrorism and banditry. This was because the founders of the FLN rushed into armed struggle "in order to take advantage of the confusion created by the crisis (of the MTLD) and of the smoke screen of conflicts to escape possible repression" (50).

In fact the declaration of the revolution on 1 November was not only a declaration of war against colonialism but also against the leadership of the MTLD, and was an attempt to draw the support of the Algerians away from Messali and the Centralistes. Referring to 1 Novem-

ber, Ben Bella later commented (51):

"We anticipated two results from the action of the 1st November. The first and most important was the long-term result of rallying the entire Algerian people by means of this action launched by a vigorous minority. The second hoped-for result depended on the enemy making a mistake: the mistake was duly made, as we had anticipated, and we benefited enormously from it. We knew that, if the situation became really serious, the French government would not fail to dissolve the MTL and imprison its leaders. To our unspeakable relief, this was exactly what happened. The government thereby relieved us of the presence of a lot of political meddlers who were assumed to be our accomplices but who, in fact, were a terrible hindrance to our movement because of the confusion which they created in the mind of the public. On the 1st November, the Organisation Speciale had founded the Front de Liberation nationale (the FLN); now thanks to the enemy, it became the only political force in Algeria".

The destruction of the colonial order was the supreme objective of the FLN, together with the aim of achieving "national independence through:

- 1-restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social within the framework of Islam;
- 2-preservation of all fundamental freedoms, without distinction of race or religion"

The FLN appealed to "Algerian patriots of every social position and of all parties" to join the national struggle. After emphasizing the objective of national independence and explaining the means of achieving it declared that "French culture and economic interests will be respected, as well as persons and families" (52).

Thus through the proclamation the FLN presented a broad and general programme which had a great political and psychological appeal to the Algerian people, reflecting the concern of the founders of the FLN to obtain maximum political support from the masses and replace the old political parties.

A military wing of the FLN was established by the internal leadership early in 1955, called the Armee de la Liberation Nationale (ALN).



Two principles were followed in organizing this apparatus; decentralization, and the priority of the interior (those within Algeria) over the exterior (those outside Algeria). Because of the nature and the vast size of the country it would be impossible for the struggle to be led by highly centralized organizations; thus Algeria was divided into six zones (later called Wilayas), each with its own command and army, and accorded freedom of action on this principle. The priority of the interior over the exterior meant that nothing was to be done without the agreement of those who were fighting inside Algeria. The armed struggle was organized in order to create an atmosphere of political instability and thus to establish liberated zones in the interior of the country which would be used as bases for military action.

The external delegation of the FLN, consisting mainly of Ait Ahmed, Ben Bella, and Khidher, had the task of establishing, with Egyptian aid, a network to supply the interior with arms and of organizing a diplomatic and propaganda campaign to rally international support for the revolution.

Within a year of the beginning of the revolution, the FLN fighters were able to expand the sphere of their operations not only against French military and police targets but also against native collaborators with the French. For example, in the rural town of Tazmalt, the FLN militants organized twenty-one different assassinations of local Muslim bureaucrats in the French administration, which had the effect of totally eliminating Muslim officials in the towns (53). Until the end of 1956, the FLN was able to draw on immense support and to organize an accelerating process of recruitment among the militant of the MTLN and then among the rural population. By the summer of the same year the armed struggle had expanded to extend over the whole country for the

first time.

The FLN became the central political and military force of the national movement, which thus entered into a new phase of direct confrontation with the colonial system. The other political forces saw the FLN assuming the initiative by armed action, and realized that from now on they had to accommodate themselves to its programme and leadership. But it did not take long for them to see that they had lost the battle to the FLN and that if they still wished to be involved in the national struggle, it had to be through the FLN, which now appealed to all other Algerian political forces to dissolve themselves and join its ranks. The Centralistes were forced to consider this new development and realized that they had to take action before it became too late. Eventually they rallied to the FLN under their leader, Benkhadda, in 1955 after seeing that many of their members had already joined the FLN.

The moderate UDMA was headed by Farhat Abbas, who had been a staunch supporter first of assimilation and then of federation. He had once maintained that violence was merely "desperation, disorder, and adventure", but he was now driven by a combination of his political failure, the blockage of his freedom of manoeuvre by the colons, and by several threats on his life from the FLN (54), to announce that the UDMA would support the FLN. Later, it affiliated to the FLN in April 1956, together with Tawfik al-Madani of the Ulema.

By now the FLN had become a major national front, uniting the different political factions whose common aim was the achievement of independence. Thus for the time being the internal struggles within the national movement had been abandoned and almost all sections of Algerian society began to find to find common ground through a single political body.

However, the FLN did not arrive at this position without difficulty and confusion or even, in many instances, without clashes with other forces in the national movement. Messali now found himself in a curious position, after losing the initiative to his opponents while he was busy trying to check the disintegration of the MTLD before engaging in armed action. He immediately formed the Mouvement Nationale Algerienne (MNA), which initially gained considerable power, spreading mainly in Algiers and in France, eventually becoming a major rival to the FLN. He made several attempts to join the FLN but on his own terms, negotiating through his representatives in Cairo with Ben Bella for the entry of the MNA en bloc into the FLN. Ben Bella did not agree, insisting that the MNA must first be disbanded so that its members could join the FLN individually after rejecting their old allegiance. Messale refused the FLN's terms, and he later began to condemn the FLN openly. Large scale armed clashes took place between the two factions between 1956 and 1958, both inside and outside Algeria, claiming hundreds of victims on both sides, to the great benefit of the French troop and police which manipulated the conflict in order to destroy both sides. The MNA actually ended up fighting the one force which could pose a major threat to the colonial regime, the FLN. This is the origin of the accusation on the part of the FLN that the MNA and Messali personally were traitors and allied with the enemy, an accusation which would have been the other way around if the balance of forces was in the MNA's favour. The gradual collapse of Messali's movement cleared the way for the FLN's overwhelming pre-eminence in the fight against the French. It showed how serious and ruthless the FLN was in totally eliminating any challenge to its domination over the national movement.

The only other force which remained outside the FLN was the Alge-

rian Communist Party, which also found itself in an unenviable position after denouncing armed struggle. The PCA later participated effectively in the armed struggle but insisted that its activities should be kept separate from those of the FLN. The latter intentionally directed large numbers of Communist fighters to take part in risky operations where the chances of survival were slim. Thus they were ruthlessly and callously eliminated, as were many other Communists with the ALN (55). However, the Communists were able to prove their fighting merits to the FLN leaders, and their willingness to die for the cause of Algerian independence (56).

The year 1956 saw the birth of the Union Generale de Travailleurs Algeriens (UGTA) as a separate legal trade union, an a rival to the one controlled by Messali, Union Syndicale des Travailleurs Algeriens (USTA). The FLN sponsored the UGTA, which had more success inside Algeria and was able to recruit 110,000 workers (57). From its early days UGTA members and leaders submitted to the orders and instructions of the FLN, which exercised a complete monopoly over its activities. However, the success of the workers' leaders within the organization gradually became much more dependent on their relations with the FLN than on their links with the workers and the defence of their interests.

### **The FLN and the War of Independence**

By 1956, after almost all the national parties had rallied to the FLN, the movement gained considerable momentum both inside and outside Algeria. Through political and armed action against both the French army and the rival national forces, the FLN managed to score substantial successes. Based in Cairo, the external delegation of the FLN,

which had to handle finance and arms supplies as well as diplomatic relations, was able to rally considerable Arab and world wide support to the Algerian cause. One of its achievements was managing to persuade a number of Arab and other sympathetic countries to urge the UN General Assembly to consider the Algerian problem in September 1955 (58).

After witnessing with surprise the mounting success achieved by the FLN, France finally began to realize the seriousness of the situation. After the failure of the integration project introduced in 1955 by the Governor General, Jacques Soustelle, which attempted to isolate the rural population from the revolution by trying to make contacts between the Muslims and the European community and by gradually extending political rights to Muslims, the French government, which was now under constant pressure from the settlers, realized that only a serious and effective military response would contain the FLN, especially after it had received a major boost by the grant of independence to Tunisia and Morocco. By this time no part of Algerian territory was spared from armed ALN attacks against the French police and army and the lives and property of the settlers. In fact some parts of the country, especially some sections of the Aures and Kabylia and the Constantine area were effectively under the control of the ALN. Part of the frontier region near the Tunisian border was also completely under ALN domination, as was a section of terrain along the Moroccan border in the west, where Tlemcen was partially besieged.

In response, the French government raised the number of troops in Algeria to 40,000 in 1956, equipped with better and more efficient arms, and in April and May of the same year it mounted a counter-offensive which was undeniably successful. The ALN had to give ground and fall back to avoid incurring heavy casualties. With good intelligence

nce and air support, the ground troops were able to search out and harry the ALN, which was poorly equipped and in no sense trained to match such a violent and ruthless offensive. However, the violence and the atrocities committed by the French army in its attempt to combat the revolution contributed indirectly to achieving what the FLN had initially hoped for, since these acts alienated more and more of the rural population from the French, and galvanized their hostility to the colonial regime and their passive sympathy for the FLN into active participation in the national struggle.

### **The FLN First Conference of the Soummam Valley**

Besides the initial successes achieved by the FLN, the expansion of its activities over almost all Algerian territory, and the growing intensity of the fighting as a result of France's evident determination to put an end to the revolution, the FLN also exhibited its organizational efficiency by preparing, in extremely difficult circumstances, a conference of its leaders inside Algeria, which took place in the Soummam Valley, in Kabylia, on 20 August 1956. Preparation for this conference began in March, and its main purpose was to solve the continuing problem of establishing the unified military and political leadership which had so far been lacking. It was hoped to put an end to the political and organizational confusion that had accompanied the functioning of the FLN since its formation, and also to draw up a policy and programme which would regulate and guide its activities.

The conference discussed a wide range of issues including the division of political and military responsibilities, the division of authority between the internal and the external leadership and the relations between them, the human and material resources of the FLN,

the regional division of authority, and elaborated a political programme setting up the objectives of the revolution and the military tactics to be used against the enemy (59).

The conference marked the emergence of an important but hitherto latent conflict between the leaders of the FLN. This took the form of disagreements over the respective authority of the internal and external leadership, each of which tried to exert its own control over the movement. In fact, the conference was only saved from actual conflict by the inability of the external delegation to attend, allegedly because poor communications and the absence of security meant that the safety of the external delegation could not be assured. But given the conflict, it is reasonable to assume that the external delegation was deliberately excluded from the conference in order to prevent it being dominated by Ben Bela. The external delegation waited in Italy for about three weeks for the signal to slip secretly into Algeria, but this signal never came (60), and they only learned about the decisions of the conference after they had already been taken.

The most important of these decisions was the creation of Conseil National de la Revolution Algerienne (CNRA) as a sovereign parliament, authorized to consider and approve the decisions of the FLN with an executive, the Comite de Coordination et Execution (CCE). regarding the balance between military and political objectives, the conference gave a higher priority to political than to military matters. It decided that political prerogatives would prevail, emphasizing that this provision affirmed "the essentially political aim of our struggle: national independence".

The conference also decided that the guerrillas of the interior were to have political and military precedence over the political and

military leaders stationed in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, and that in any conflict between internal and external activities or needs, the internal should take priority. The conference laid down details for the standardization of the ALN; ranks were introduced, and each Wilaya commander became a Colonel.

The decisions taken at this conference underlined the conflict within the FLN leadership and represented a clear victory of the internal (dominated by three personalities, Ramadan Abbane, Belkacim Krim, and Omar Oumrane) over the external, headed by Ben Bella, who was implicitly condemned by the delegates several times during the conference when they referred to the need to avoid any cult of personality and to maintain the independence of the influence of any foreign power. The delegates also condemned the efforts of Ben Bella to attempt to negotiate a settlement without having consulted the internal leaders. In his turn, Ben Bella showed his dissatisfaction with the results of the conference on many occasions, stating that:

"The congress undeniably gave to the Revolution the structure, the hierarchy, and the organization which it lacked. But at the same time it also introduced bureaucracy and red tape, which succeeded in gradually detaching the movement from the realities of the struggle. The main error of the Congress was in appointing to executive posts politicians who had always opposed the transition to armed rebellion, and who had not hesitated to publicly denounce our action after the 1st November..... The leadership of the FLN now became full of confusion and contradiction, and was noticeably lacking in strong principles and well thought-out revolutionary strategy. Our capture a few months later (61) left the field clear for the politicians, both left-wing and conservative, who had none of the training required for the organizing of a revolution" (62).

Ben Bella's objection to the decisions of the conference also appeared in a letter to the CCE in which he criticized the "the non-representative (character) of the conference. The Aures, the external delegation, Oran, and the Eastern zones have not attended" (63).



For the internal leaders, especially the military leaders, the Soummam conference was a landmark in the FLN's development as front with a clear programme and objectives, headed by an authoritative and established leadership. In the words of Mohammed Sa'id, one of the military leaders inside Algeria, the Soummam conference "represented a second 1st November; until then, I was scared to death, because in view of the past, the organization could fail. After 1956, I no longer had any fears because solid structures were established" (64).

In fact the antagonism between the internal and the external leaders, although exaggerated by the French as a struggle between Berbers and Arabs for control of the FLN, did have a certain ethnic dimension. Given the large Berber representation in the FLN and its leadership (65), it would be incorrect to dismiss altogether, as many authors have done (66), the ethnic differences as simply one element among others in the conflict between the internal and the external leaders (67). Here Harbi has noted that "the 'Arab/Berber' thesis, used to serve the purpose of the colonial is not entirely without foundation, since regionalism is a donee reelle of Algerian political, social, and cultural life" (68). In fact Arab-Berber differences had become apparent within the MTLN since 1948, centering around the issue of the definition of the cultural identity of the Algerian nation. Messali's slogan "l'Algerie arabo-musulmane" was contested and opposed by the slogan "l'Algerie Algerienne" raised by the Kabyle leader of the Federation de France du MTLN, Rashid Ali Yahya, who stressed that it was necessary to recognise that a substantial minority of Algerian Muslims were not Arab either in language or culture (69). Thus it is by no means implausible to suggest that the internals were sensitive to what they saw as an Egyptian attempt to control the FLN. However, it

would be incorrect to consider the ethnic element as the only factor in this antagonism, since political differences also played an important part and should not be overlooked; it would otherwise be difficult to explain the conflicts which developed between the internals which resulted in the assassination of Ramadan Abbane by his comrades Belkacim Krim, Bou Souf, and Ben Toubal, all Berbers who took an active part in the Soummam conference (70).

The antagonism was only temporarily cast aside by the capture of the four leaders of the external delegation by the French authorities on 22 October 1956, and their imprisonment for the rest of the war. This incident was to have a crucial impact on the structure of the leadership, since it kept the four, who had been in the centre of the political conflict, away from these rivalries for the next four and half years. They also benefited, especially Ben Bella, from the public attention given to their capture and imprisonment, a factor which enabled them to have a substantial influence on the course of events, and also to play an influential political role when they were released at independence.

The Soummam conference drew up the first political programme for the FLN in which vague and broad socialist and populist ideas were presented. The programme emphasized the objective of complete independence through the unity of the people without any reference to distinctions between classes. It divided the Algerian people into strata rather than classes and emphasized the role of the stratum with the larger and less privileged numbers. According to the programme, the leadership of society should not be accorded to a specific class but to a collective leadership composed of the most honest, uncorrupt, and courageous elements. No mention was made in the programme either of

social questions or social differentiation within society.

The conference covered other important issues concerning the revolution: relations with the PCA and the Jewish minority, the role of women and youth, peasants and trade unions, and the social reforms to be enacted after independence. But its most remarkable feature was the terms it laid down for peace with France. There was to be no cease-fire before the recognition of independence, and negotiations only would take place on the basis of existing Algerian borders (i.e. including the Sahara) and of the refusal of double citizenship for the pieds-noirs (71).

Most important of all was the creation of bodies representing the process of formalizing the structure and institutions of the FLN. The CNRA was composed of 17 members, with a further 17 substitutes named in case there were casualties, making a total of 34 members (72). The selection of the members reflected the balance of forces among the contesting groups of the FLN. In all, the interior was represented by 16 members and the exterior by 13 (73).

The domination of the interior was reflected more in the composition of the CCE, whose role was to make decisions between meetings of the CNRA and to ensure smooth liaison between the Wilayas, and to ensure that all followed the master plans which had been decided upon centrally. The CCE was composed of five members of the CNRA, Abbane, Belkacim, Saad Dahleb, Ben Khadda, and Larbi Ben M'Hidi, all from the interior.

In the course of the revolution the CCE or more precisely the policy adopted by the conference, was directly responsible for the policies which were to have a long-term effect on the conduct of the war. The most important of these was the adoption of urban guerrilla

warfare as a supplement to the struggle in the countryside, a new move apparently taken in the belief that urban violence would draw much more attention to the FLN inside and outside Algeria, especially in France where public opinion would be against a prolongation of the war. This led to the "Battle of Algiers" in which sporadic bombings took place in the hitherto colon-dominated capital in the summer of 1957 (74). This battle led to savage and violent French reprisals resulting in the quasi-annihilation of the urban political cells of the FLN, and eventually forced the CCE to flee to Tunisia and Morocco.

## Military Retreat

Militarily, the year 1957 was disastrous for the FLN. Having realized its potential strength, the French authorities started to act more effectively and efficiently, trying to crush it by force. As mentioned earlier, the armed forces were increased and were supplied with more effective means of combatting the rebellion, the Air Force was brought to Algeria for the first time, and this, together with the use of napalm, made the movement of ALN guerrillas inside the country very difficult. In addition, the construction of mined and electrified fences (Morice Line) along the borders with Tunisia and Morocco effectively prevented the bulk of the better trained and armed elements of the ALN from entering the country and supporting the guerrillas inside with men and weapons. The successful and efficient surveillance by the French of the ports and international waters resulted in the seizure and appropriation of a large amount of arms destined for the ALN, depriving it more and more of major sources of arms and ammunition. The most devastating of the policies pursued by the French which had a long term effect not only as regards the FLN, but also as regards the future social and economic development of Algeria, was that of regroupement, inaugurated in 1957, which involved moving some 2 million people away from areas considered favourable to the guerrillas and resettling them in camps under military guard.

These policies largely succeeded in limiting the operations of the ALN to a minimum and caused a temporary defeat for the insurrection. Heavy casualties were inflicted upon the ALN, and it was reported that in the first months after the construction of the electric barrier the ALN lost 6,000 men and 4,300 weapons (75). The defeat was reflected in

the sinking morale of many Algerians. In fact about 30,000 Algerians were employed by the French army at the end of 1957 as auxiliary fighters and informers (Harkis), drawn primarily from ex-FLN fighters and starving peasants who had lost hope in the revolution. In the cities, and especially in Algiers, which was a major focus of FLN attacks against Europeans, the French police and army were able to hit out hard at the underground cells of the FLN and dismantle its organization. By the end of 1957 the French government and the settlers felt confident that they would succeed in breaking the FLN, as they had come to believe that the rebellion was over. The French government even set about initiating some political reforms which introduced more representation for the Muslim population in the administrative and political structures.

#### **The Establishment if the G.P.R.A.**

The military defeat inflicted upon the forces of the ALN inside Algeria had a direct impact upon the structure of the leadership and on the tactics subsequently followed by the FLN. The ALN adopted entirely new fighting methods, so that from now on the remaining forces inside Algeria had to change their tactics by abandoning any direct engagement with the French Army and reverting to the guerrilla tactics of the first year of the war. This meant that it tried to base its hopes for an eventual political victory on the threat of an indefinite continuation of the fighting.

The bulk of the FLN armed forces was forced to stay outside Algeria. An army of 40,000 men was stationed on the Tunisian and Moroccan borders, cut off from the battle theatre by formidable French defence lines. They were regarded with disdain as outsiders by the military

leaders inside the country who (thereby) acquired more autonomy in decision-making in military and political matters, which added to the existing divisions among the military and politicians outside Algeria.

The military defeat of the internal forces, and the inability of the bulk of the ALN to enter Algeria meant that the leaders of the CCE and the CNRA who were based in Cairo and Tunisia had to concentrate their efforts in the diplomatic field to gather support for the Algerian cause. On 9 September 1958, the CCE proclaimed the establishment of the Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne (GPRA) in Tunis to represent the Algerian government abroad. This move came mainly because of the stalemate which resulted from French military reprisals and partly in response to President de Gaulle's speech of 4 July 1958, in which he promised equality of political rights to Algerian Muslims. The establishment of the GPRA was intended to show that only the FLN could represent the Algerian people, and that it would not accept any solution short of total independence.

The members of the GPRA, the last of the political institutions to grow out of the wartime FLN was a combination of former assimilationists and Centralistes, together with the four hijacked leaders, now in jail in France, as honorary members (76). At the head of the GPRA stood Farhat Abbas as prime minister, symbolizing the principle that the leadership should include all factions, although his appointment to this position gave the moderates and the right wing the opportunity to influence the course of the revolution. However, as well as being only loosely in touch with the internal leaders, and generally unable to control or influence them, the GPRA was at odds with the forces of the ALN outside Algeria. Thus in the years after the creation of the GPRA there was a profound internal struggle between the three distinct

centres of power within the FLN; the GPRA, the ALN, and the internal Wilaya commanders, which was further escalated by personal rivalries. The result was a great deal of confusion and incoherence within the leadership and constant reshuffles within the GPRA. The most notorious incident in this struggle was an abortive coup attempt against the GPRA in 1959, involving a group of seven officers of the ALN General Staff in Tunis led by Houari Boumedienne (77). In addition, after the creation of the GPRA the army emerged as a major new contender for power. As the most disciplined force within the FLN it became the decisive force in determining the chances of victory by any faction over the others.

### **The Evian Agreements**

From its base in Tunis, the GPRA waged an intensive campaign to win diplomatic recognition and to gain support for the cause of Algerian independence. Much credit has been assigned to the GPRA's endeavours in this respect; as M. and D. Ottaway had put it, "it was largely because of this diplomatic offensive that Algeria obtained independence after the French had won the war militarily" (78). However, one should not forget that political stability continued to be greatly disrupted and that there was a constant threat of violence. This together with the development of new French interests in Algeria brought about by the discovery of oil, made the French government more inclined to play down the demands of the colons in favour of those of the nationalists in order to bring about a more stable situation in Algeria. Hence considering negotiations with the FLN became increasingly popular in France.

After gaining recognition from many Arab countries and other



members of the United Nations for the Algerian cause (79), the FLN campaign culminated in de Gaulle's proclamation in June 1960 that he was ready to negotiate a peaceful settlement. The GPRA offered to negotiate immediately. After a series of meetings between the French and the GPRA representatives, cease-fire negotiation began in May 1961, but soon broke down when the two parties failed to agree on an agenda. Nevertheless the meeting represented a major breakthrough in the relations between the FLN and the French government and an unprecedented success for the FLN in that it had finally gained recognition from the French as the representative of the Algerian people.

However, even this success could not conceal the fact that after 7 years of war the FLN still suffered from a lack of a comprehensive political and military coherence, as was evident from the mounting antagonisms between the FLN leaders over how the GPRA ought to handle the cease-fire negotiations. The ALN General Staff, led by Boumedienne, opposed all concessions to France, whose main concern was to secure guarantees for the civil and property rights of French citizens and to maintain France's economic interests in Algeria. The GPRA, on the other hand, favoured a more flexible approach and was prepared to make further compromises in order to be certain to obtain independence.

In March 1962, the CNRA authorized the GPRA to renew negotiations with France, and a delegation headed by Ben Khadda and Krim Belkacim succeeded in reaching a cease-fire agreement with the Gaullist government at Evian (Switzerland) in 18 March 1962. The agreement ranged over a wide variety of issues including future relations between Algeria and France on a number of levels (80). According to the agreements, a Provisional Executive, or a temporary government, composed of three Europeans and nine Muslims was constituted to govern the country during

the transition period between the cease-fire and the referendum which would decide the future of the country. The French settlers' property rights and citizenship were preserved and France was granted the right to maintain military and economic control over part of the Sahara region for a five year period and to occupy the French naval base at Mers El-Kabir (81).

The agreements inaugurated a new and historic phase in Algeria's relations with France; for the first time in modern history the Algerians were able to decide on their own political future. Yet the agreements took the conflict within the different elements of the FLN leadership a stage further, since the ALN and its General Staff refused to endorse them. After the Evian agreements, the four recently released leaders were also divided on this issue; Ben Bella condemned the agreements as a sellout to France, while Boudiaf and Ait Ahmed endorsed them. Indeed, the agreements added to the widening rift within the leadership.

### **The Tripoli Congress of the C.N.R.A.**

Eventually Ben Bella, who was now in direct confrontation with the GPRA which was itself weary of the opposition of the army, succeeded in inducing the CNRA to hold a meeting in Tripoli (Libya) between 25 May and 7 June 1962 in order to draft a new FLN programme to be implemented after independence, following the conclusion of the Evian agreements. This meeting was also intended to prepare for the transfer of power from the GPRA to a constitutional republic by establishing a Political Bureau, which would form the core of the new government. The GPRA tried unsuccessfully to block this meeting, seeing it as a trial of its legitimacy (82). Thus the congress was the scene of open confrontation

between all factions of the FLN since it was attended by all the members for the first time (83).

The meeting started by debating the Projet de Programme pour la Realisation de la revolution democratique et Populaire which became known as the Tripoli Programme. This programme was drafted under the direction of Ben Bella by Mohammed Harbi, a Marxist, Mohammed Yazid, a former Centraliste, and Mustafa Lashraf, a professor at the Sorbonne (84).

The programme presented a brief analysis of Algeria's socio-economic conditions since the beginning of French colonization, and outlined the political programme of the FLN. It opened up with an analysis of the conduct of the war, heavily criticizing the leadership of the FLN (meaning the GPRA) for its ideological ambiguity and its authoritarian attitudes towards the masses:

"The ideological idleness of the FLN, its feudal mentality and petty bourgeois attitudes which these produce indirectly, risk turning the future Algerian state into a mediocre and non-democratic bureaucracy in reality if not in its ideology" (85).

The programme then gave a brief description of Algerian society, in which four classes were outlined; the poor peasants, the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, and the feudalists. According to the programme the National Liberation Movement was supported by:

"the poor peasants, the chief victims of colonialist seizures of land, segregation and exploitation,.... the urban proletariat, a relatively small group and teeming sub-proletariat .... another intermediate social category .... which is composed of artisans, menial and middle-rank workers, functionaries, small shopkeepers and certain members of the liberal professions, all of whom together make up what might be called the lower middle class. This group has frequently taken part in the fight for liberation and contributed political staff .... a relatively unimportant middle-class, composed of businessmen, wealthy merchants, managerial personnel and a few industrialists. These last two social categories have participated sporadically in the movement, perhaps

from patriotic conviction or perhaps from opportunism. Exception must be made for flagrant administrative feudalists and certain traitors who have sold themselves body and soul to colonialism" (86).

The programme moved on to consider that the content of the Algerian revolution "is the deliberate construction of the nation within the framework of socialist principles and of power in the hands of the people". (Emphasis in the original). According to the Programme this implies "the elimination of the social and economic structures of feudalism and its survival and the establishment of new structures and institutions capable of fostering and guaranteeing man's emancipation and his full and entire enjoyment of his liberties. .... Algeria's development .... should necessarily be planned in a socialist perspective". It goes on to stress on the necessity of the people's unity in achieving the goals of the revolution:

"The tasks of the democratic revolution in Algeria are tremendous. They cannot be accomplished by a social class, however enlightened; only the people are prepared to carry them out- that is, the peasantry, the workers in general, the youth, and the revolutionary intellectuals". (Emphasis in original)

It then went on to elaborate the orientation of the FLN and drew guidelines for the leadership. The most important elements were:

- the war of weapons is to be succeeded by ideological combat (through) the construction of the nation within the framework of socialist principles;
- the work of national reconstruction will embrace all Algerians, class interests will be suppressed. Algerian culture is to be revolutionary, national, and scientific;
- the leadership will foster an agrarian revolution in which land will belong to those who work it. This will include the modernization of agriculture;
- ultimately, the FLN will sponsor the nationalization of credit, foreign trade, mineral resources, and energy resources;
- to realize the social aspirations of the masses, the FLN dedicates itself to the progressive improvement in living standards, the elimination of illiteracy, the acceleration of efforts to improve health conditions and the emancipation of women;
- in foreign affairs, the FLN is to be in the forefront of movements assisting the liberation of colonial dependencies,

fighting imperialism and striving for Arab unity. (87).

The programme also described the role of the Party and its relations with the state, emphasising its leading role in guiding society, and stipulating that the head of the government and the majority of ministers should be members of the FLN. The programme also warned at the same time against the possibility of bureaucratic relationships developing between the Party and the mass organizations.

While the programme emphasized the necessity of avoiding socio-economic development along capitalist lines, this was to be achieved by preventing the national bourgeoisie from playing a significant political role either in the state or the Party. On the other hand, there was no mention of the total economic elimination of this bourgeoisie which was believed capable of playing a subordinate but useful role in economic development. Socialism on the other hand, was considered only in terms of erecting the machinery to inaugurate the nationalization of major means of production, which would be followed by the rational planning of the economy.

Although all conflicting factions of the FLN in the congress were able to adopt this ideological programme easily without a single modification, they were to face enormous difficulties in resolving the question of political power. This does not mean that the internal struggles and infighting within the FLN had no ideological basis, still less that the factions were ideologically homogeneous. At this stage the most important issue was not to ensure specific ideological orientation but to decide who would assume political power, since that person or group would then be able to impose his own ideology, because at that stage ideology would follow power and not vice versa. This can be illustrated by the attitude of Farhat Abbas, a moderate right wing

leader, who while describing the programme as "Communisme mal digere" (ill-digested communism), and having undoubtedly nothing in common with communism, had nevertheless voted to accept it.

Although a minority in the GPRA, Ben Bella and his supporters (88) appeared to constitute a majority in the CNRA strong enough (in any case) to convene the Tripoli congress inspite of GPRA objections (89). In an attempt to undermine the position of the GPRA, he proposed the names of seven men to staff the new organ, the Political Bureau (90). Another list, including many more names and opposing Ben Bella's list was presented by Krim Belkacim. When it came to the vote on the membership of the Political Bureau there was great confusion and many members withdrew, which resulted in the adjournment of the congress in disarray without any decision taken on this matter (91).

### **The Political Crisis and the Triumph of Ben Bella in July 1962**

Thus at the end of the Tripoli Congress the FLN appeared to be torn apart more than at any previous time, and the divisions and splits threatened to break out into imminent civil war. By July 1962 there were at least four major groups competing for power. The first was that of the supporters of Ben Bella, who was evidently the most popular figure, but who lacked the means to impose himself and assume power. The second was the GPRA headed by Ben Khadda, who replaced Farhat Abbas in September 1961, and claimed to have been instrumental in achieving independence after the negotiation with France. The third was the ALN and its General Staff headed by Boumedienne, and the fourth, the wilaya commanders who were themselves divided between supporters of the ALN and of the GPRA. The latter were aware of the risks of being deprived of the power which they had obtained during the years of the war. Three

wilaya commanders from wilaya 2 (North Constantine), 3 (Kabylia), and 4 (Algiers) blamed Boumedienne for not supplying them adequately with arms (92).

The conflict turned into a serious political crisis when the GPRA published its decision to dismiss Boumedienne and two other ALN commanders from their posts before entering Algeria. The decision enabled Ben Bella to exploit the situation and to develop his relationship with the ALN into an alliance with Boumedienne, and both Ben Bella and the ALN refused to accept the decision.

To add to the confusion that developed after the Tripoli Congress, two members of Ben Bella's Political Bureau, Ait Ahmed and Boudiaf, refused their seats in the body (93). Nevertheless, when Ben Bella succeeded in forging an alliance with the ALN, he had secured the support of the most organized and disciplined force in Algeria. Thus when Ben Khadda and the GPRA arrived in Algeria to set up their government on 3 July 1962 after a massive vote for independence by the Algerian people, Ben Bella arrived shortly afterwards in Tlemcen with an ALN force from Morocco and announced the formation of the Political Bureau as the supreme government on 22 July. For his part, Boumedienne marched on Algiers after defeating the forces of wilayas 3 and 4 who had rallied to the GPRA and convincing those of wilayas 1 and 2 to join him. The clashes between the ALN and the wilaya fighters in which thousands were killed, were on the verge of developing into a devastating civil war, had the local population not intervened and taken over the streets of the cities and towns, demanding the immediate halt of the agony of nearly eight years of war with France.

Thus by September Ben Bella, backed by the ALN was able to extend his control over the whole country. Algeria then entered into a new

phase of its history, in that not only did the eight agonising years of war come to an end but also 130 years of systematic and consistent French colonization. What followed later was of course rooted in this history but more particularly in the conditions under which the colonial era came to an end.

Finally it is necessary to try to shed some light on the origins of the political infighting which had accompanied the Algerian national movement between its emergence and the achievement of independence. Going back to what I have already said, it would be misleading to suggest that the differences and conflicts within the various political organizations can be attributed only to differences in political socialization or to the "historical accidents" that moulded the people who joined these organizations. In fact the consideration of social origins cannot be ignored in any analysis of the participants in the Algerian national struggle and is important even in the context of the conflicts within the FLN factions before and after independence.

We have seen that the Algerian middle classes originally fought unsuccessfully for political rights which were to be achieved either by complete assimilation with France or by the revival and modernization of the Islamic nation. Their failure was largely due to the acceleration of the process of colonization, which put severe limitations on their economic development potential and rendered their demands impossible to achieve. Similarly, this process also resulted in the emergence of a deprived petty bourgeois social stratum, which, since it was closer to the mass of the population in the sense that its social upward mobility was constantly checked by the existence of the European colons, saw that the liberation of Algerian society could only be attained through the destruction of the colonial system. By capitali-



zing on the failure of the former political movement, it had been able to dominate Algerian national politics since 1930. In this context the birth of the FLN represented a shift in the political approach of the petty bourgeois stratum to that of achieving national liberation by means of armed struggle.

The nature of the colonial regime and the inherent inability of a movement led by petty bourgeois elements to develop a unified ideology of its own induced it to carry out its struggle on the basis of very broad and largely undefined objectives. It claimed to represent the whole of Algerian society, and in this way appealed to all socio-political forces to join the struggle for independence. This permitted two major developments to emerge in the course of the liberation War.

First, by exploiting the mechanisms under which the FLN had been created and was run, the more bourgeois elements of the national liberation movement were able to play an important role in the revolution, encouraged indirectly by French liberals and the French government, as well as by the international reputation they acquired during the diplomatic campaign. Secondly, the conditions under which the revolution developed contributed to the emergence of an independent and disciplined force, the ALN, most of whose members came from a petty bourgeois background. This force was less willing to compromise and less tolerant of the educated and well-off politicians who had been yesterday's assimilationists.

Hence the divisions within the FLN must be considered in terms of social conflict. The GPRA felt able to assume power, and saw a golden opportunity to achieve this with the aid of the assistance promised in the Evian agreements. However the role of the ALN after its alliance with Ben Bella ensured the victory of the more petty bourgeois

elements within the movement. This was the underlying reason for the struggle which ensued, but the role played by personal rivalries and divisions within the factions cannot be ignored. Severe repression and the almost total absence of democratic institutions and procedures within the national movement had of course greatly aggravated this situation.

## Notes

- (1) For a detailed discussion on this subject see:  
Horne, A., A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962,  
Macmillan, London, 1977.
- (2) Jackson, H.F., The FLN in Algeria: Party Development in a Revolutionary Society,  
Greenwood Press, London, 1977, p.9.
- (3) Harbi, M., Le FLN, Mirage et Realite,  
Paris, 1980, p.14.
- (4) In an interview with William Quandt, Farhat Abbas, a leading figure in Algerian politics stated that "I often used to get first place in French language exam"  
Quandt, W., Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria 1954-1968  
Cambridge, 1969, p.30.
- (5) Behr, E., "The Algerian Dilemma",  
Foreign Affairs, Vol.34, No.3, July 1958, p.280.
- (6) Kraft, J., "Settler Politics in Algeria"  
Foreign Affairs, 39, (1960-61), p.597.
- (7) Besides the Algerian Communist Party which established links with the indigenous working class, there were some French individuals, whose dependency on the metropole was at minimum, and even some Governors who foresaw the danger which lies in the colons total objection to Algerian national demands. Viollette, for example, Governor-General of Algeria between 1925-27, warned in 1936 in a speech to the French National Assembly by saying "take care, lest the nation of Algeria undoubtedly through your fault, should find that it has no country of its own. The Algerians are seeking one and they ask that it be France. Give it them, or failing that they will make one of their own"  
Behr, E., op. cit., p.283.
- (8) Harbi, op. cit., p.13.
- (9) al-Soufi, F., "Harakat al-Idhrabat fi Mantaqat Wahran"  
(Strikes Movement in Oran region)  
Paper presented to the conference of the Arab Labour Organization, Algiers, 1982.
- (10) Bennoune, M., "The Origin of the Algerian Proletariat",  
Dialectical Anthropology,  
Vol.1, No.3, May 1976, p.222.

- (11) "In contradistinction to a commonly held belief, the period that followed the 1871 Insurrection up until the rise of the urban movement, was not marked by political tranquillity in the rural areas. A wave of revolts and rebellions swept the entire country from 1876 to 1920. They occurred in March 1876 in El Amari oasis and spread in the mountains of the Ziban (Tell); in the Aures Mountains, in May 1879; in Southern Orania, in 1881 which culminated in an insurrection that took place in Marguerite in 1901, to name but a few"  
Tlemcani, 'R., State and Revolution in Algeria,  
Zed Books Ltd., London, 1986, p.46.
- (12) Fanon, F., The Wretched of the Earth,  
Penguin Books, London, 1967, pp.90-91.
- (13) Murray R. and Wengraf T., "The Algerian revolution"  
New Left Review,  
No.22, Dec.1963, p.42.
- (14) Quandt, op. cit., p.15.
- (15) Ibid., p.27.
- (16) Ibid., p.46.
- (17) Murry and Wengraf, op. cit., p.45.
- (18) Messali Hadj was regarded as the father of the Algerian National Movement. For an account of his political life see:  
Stora, B., Missali Hadj, Le Sycomore, Paris, 1982.
- (19) O'Ballance E., The Algerian Insurrection: 1954-62,  
Faber and Faber, London, 1967, p.29.
- (20) The Marabouts were itinerant Muslim "holy men" who practised saint worship, mysticism and forms of superstition. Orthodox Muslims regarded them as heretics, a status that placed them consistently under the attack from the Ulema. The Marabouts usually resided in the countryside, and the French sometimes supported them against the Ulema as means of dividing the Muslim population.
- (21) Harbi, M., Aux Origines du FLN: Le Populisme Revolutionnaire en Algerie,  
Christian Bourgeois Editeur, Paris, 1975, p.69.
- (22) Harbi, Le FLN ...., op. cit., p.11.
- (23) Ibid., p.21.
- (24) In November 1938, M. Boumendjel, a PPA candidate, was elected a municipal councillor in Algiers, and the following April, a PPA member, a tramway employee named Douar was elected a conseiller-general.

- (25) Clark, M.K., Algeria in Turmoil,  
Praeger, New York, 1959, p.20.
- (26) Jackson, op. cit., p.13.
- (27) Clark, op. cit., p.21.
- (28) O'Ballance, op. cit., p.32.
- (29) Clark, op. cit., p.21.
- (30) Abun-Nasr, J., A History of the Maghrib,  
Cambridge University Press, 1971, p.324.
- (31) Harbi, Le FLN ..., op. cit., p.28.
- (32) For a detailed description of the events of 8 May from a point of  
view of a defender of French colonialism, see:  
Clark, op. cit., pp.29-38.
- (33) Abun-Nasr, op. cit., p.326.
- (34) See Harbi, Le FLN ..., op. cit.
- (35) Murray and Wengraf, op. cit., p.63.
- (36) The architect of the OS was a nationalist intellectual, Hocine Ait  
Ahmed. Then aged 22, he was a militant who had grown impatient  
with the MTLD's non-violent methods. Other core members of the OS  
included Krim Belkacim, also 22 who had served in the French army  
during the Second World War; Mohammed Boudiaf, 27, another former  
solder and the man who first proposed the formation of a para-  
military force; Rabah Bitat, 21; Ahmed Ben Bella, 28, a former  
master sergeant in the French army; and Mohammed Khider, a former  
PPA nationalist, who at 34 was the oldest member of the group.  
Jackson, op. cit., p.18.
- (37) For more details on this attack see:  
Merle, R., Ben Bella,  
Michael Joseph, London, 1967.
- (38) Harbi, Aux Origines ..., op. cit.
- (39) Lazreg, M., The Emergence of Classes in Algeria,  
Westview Press, Colorado, 1976, p.64.
- (40) Harbi, Le FLN..., op. cit., p.94.
- (41) Quandt, op. cit., p.90.
- (42) See Harbi, Le FLN..., op. cit., pp.100-101.
- (43) They were: Boudiaf, Ben Bella, Belkacim, Khider, Ait Ahmed, Bitat,  
Ben M'Hidi, Mourad Didouche, and Ben Boulaid.

(44) O'Ballance, op. cit., p.38.

(45) Harbi, Le FLN ..., op. cit., p.116.

(46) As we will see later, the lack of an ideological perception and a defined socio-economic programme was one of the most striking features of the FLN during the war. This was to have an important implications on the future development of independent Algeria. In fact the lack of a coherent and defined ideology is a common feature of most petty bourgeois political organizations and leaders who manage to assume power through either leading a struggle on very broad objectives, such as independence, unity, etc. or through undertaking coup d'etats. In the Iraqi experience, for example, Peter and Marion Sluglett wrote describing the Ba'th ideology:

"it is inconceivable that it (the Ba'th Party) would ever have gained power through a ballot box ..... When the Ba'th seized power in 1968 it had no definite or developed plan of action, and thus had to fall back on the generalities of doctrine elaborated by 'Aflaq. In the beginning it tended to justify its own position almost entirely within the framework of Arab unity, the issue on which it had been fighting the left since 1958".

Farouk-Sluglett, M. and Sluglett P.,

"Iraqi Ba'thism: Nationalism, Socialism and National Socialism" in Saddam's Iraq, ed. by CARDRI, Zed Books Ltd. London, 1986, p.102.

Along the same lines N. Cigar wrote about the theoretical foundations of socialism in Egypt:

"The timing of its (socialism's) appearance was itself somewhat unusual in the Egyptian context, for in this case, at least part of the theory quite clearly preceded practice and set a pattern for the future, whereas in all other instances the reverse had been true, with formal theory as such serving more or less the function of providing a rationalization for faits accomplis".

Cigar, N., "Arab Socialism Revisited: The Yugoslav Roots of its Ideology",  
Middle East Studies, 19 (1983), p.154.

(47) For an account of these attacks see:

Boudiaf, M., Ou Va l'Algerie, Paris, 1964,

Clark, op. cit.,

Horne, op. cit..

(48) Horne, op. cit., pp94-95.

(49) Harbi noted that the number of the FLN fighters was very small during the early days of the revolution. In North Constantine, while the MTLN numbered about 7,000, the number of the FLN was derisory, estimated by Ben Toubal at 50 fighters, there were also 350 armed men in the Aures, 450 in Kabylia, 50 in Algiers, and 60 in Oran.

(50) Boudiaf, quoted by Harbi, Le FLN..., op. cit., p.121.

- (51) Merle, op. cit., p.94.
- (52) FLN, 1st Novmber Declaration, quoted by Horne, op. cit., pp.94-95.
- (53) Jackson, op. cit., p.25.
- (54) It was alleged that Farhat Abbas had been frightened into taking this step. His nephew had been assassinated after a customary warning for cooperating with the French authorities. The killer was immediately shot by the police, and it was said that in his pocket was an ALN document ordering the assassination of Abbas himself.
- (55) O'Ballance, op. cit., p.59  
Horne, op. cit., p.138.
- (56) See Harbi, Le FLN ..., op. cit., pp.139-140.
- (57) Jackson, op. cit., p.32.
- (58) Ahmad al Shuqairi was the prominent Arab speaker in the United Nations who represented the Arab delegation in presenting the Algerian cause. For a full text of his speeches in the UN, see: al-Shuqairi, A., Qissat al-Thawra al-Jaza'iriya, (in Arabic) (The Story of the Algerian Revolution), Beirut, undated.
- (59) For reasons which are not entirely clear, there is no agreement on the number of the delegates who actually attended the Soummam Conference. Harbi pointed out that according to Yves Courrier, 16 delegates participated in the conference (the same figure is also given by Horne), but the minutes of the meeting of 20 August indicate that there were only six delegates: Ben M'Hidi, Abbane, Belkacim, Zigout, Oumrane, and Ben Toubal. (Harbi Le FLN ..., op. cit., pp.175-176.) On the other hand, Jackson gives the number of the delegates as 50 (p.34), as does Quandt (p.99). O'Ballance puts the number at 200 (p.71), while Abun-Nasr gives 250 (p.332).
- (60) Horne, op. cit., pp.143-146.
- (61) On 22 October 1956, Ben Bella, Boudiaf, Ait Ahmed, Khider, and Lashraf, were captured by the French in Algiers when the plane in which they were flying from Morocco to Tunisia was hijacked.
- (62) Merle, op. cit., pp.106-107.
- (63) Quoted by Harbi, Le FLN ..., op. cit., p.187.
- (64) Quoted by Hermassi, E., Leadership and National Development in North Africa  
University of California Press, 1972, p.137.

- (65) "The immensely greater role which they (Berbers in Kabylia) played in the national movement and in the leadership of the wartime FLN (is revealed by the fact).... that the CNRA, nine of whose thirty-four members were Kabyles, that is two and half the times the proportion of Kabyles in the total Muslim population"  
 Roberts, H., "The Unforeseen Development of the Kabyle Question in Contemporary Algeria"  
Government and Opposition  
 Vol.17, No.3, 1982, pp.324-326.
- (66) Including, Lazreg, op.cit., p.68,  
 O'Ballance, op. cit., p.71,  
 Jackson, op. cit., p.37.
- (67) For more discussion on the issue of Berber participation in the Algerian revolution and on the Berber community in contemporary Algeria, see:  
 Roberts, H., "The Economics of Berberism: the Material Basis of the Kabyle Question in Contemporary Algeria"  
Government and Opposition  
 Vol.18, No.2, 1983, pp.218-235.
- (68) Harbi, Le FLN ..., op. cit., p.193.
- (69) Roberts, "The Unforeseen..." op. cit., p.22.
- (70) For more details on the assassination of Abbane Ramdane and those responsible see:  
 Lebchaoui, M., Haga'iq 'an al-Thawra al-Jaza'iriya in Arabic  
 (Facts on the Algerian Revolution)  
 Beirut, 1971, pp.179-191.
- (71) Horne, op. cit., p.145.
- (72) First CNRA (20 August 1956):  
 Full members: Ait Ahmed, Abbane, Abbas, Boudiaf, Ben Boulaid, Belkacim, Ben Bella, Ben M'Hidi, Bitat, Khider, Belkacim, Debaghine, Mokrane, Oumrane, El-Madani, Yazid, Zigout.  
 Substitute Members: Aissat, Ben Toubal, Bousouf, Ben Yahia, Dehiles, Francis, Said, Mezhoudi, Mellah, Mourad, Mehsas, Mahri, Saddek, Thaalbi, Zoubir.  
 Names underlined are the wartime pseudonyms of personalities who had to remain anonymous.  
 Humbaraci, A., Algeria: A Revolution That Failed  
 Pall Mall Press, London, 1966, p.274.
- (73) Quandt, op. cit., p.103.
- (74) For a full account of the "Battle of Algiers" see  
 Horne, op. cit., pp.183-207.
- (75) Ibid., p.266.



- (76) First GPRA (September 1958):  
President of Council: Farhat Abbas. Vice President: Belkacim Krim, Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed, Bitat, Boudiaf, Khider, Debaghine, Mohamoud, Bentoubal, Bousouf, Mahri, Francis, Yazid, Ben Khadda, El-Madani, Lamine Khan, Oussedik, Stomboli.  
Humbaraci, op. cit., p.274.
- (77) For more details on this infighting see:  
Harbi, Le FLN ..., op. cit., pp.225-259.
- (78) Ottaway, D. and Ottaway, M., Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution,  
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970, p.14.
- (79) In 1958, the Political Commission of the UN recognized Algeria's right to independence, which was further confirmed by a vote in the General Assembly on 19 December 1960.
- (80) For a full account of the Evian Agreements, see:  
Ahmad, N.M., al-'Ilaqat baina al- Jaza'ir wa Faransa,  
(Relations Between Algeria and France)  
Cairo, 1978, pp.23-32.
- (81) Ibid.,
- (82) Yefsah, A., Le Processus de Legitimation du Pouvoir Militaire et la Construction de l'Etat en Algerie  
Editions Anthropos, Paris, 1982, p.55.
- (83) According to Harbi, 66 delegates attended the meeting.  
Harbi, Le FLN ..., op. cit., p.339.
- (84) The contributions of the participants in drafting the Programme are cited by Ibid., pp.340-341.
- (85) The Programme Of Tripoli, translated by Charles Lam Markmann, in Joesten, J., The New Algeria, Chicago, 1964 pp.202-228.
- (86) Ibid.
- (87) Lewis, W.H., "The Decline of Algeria's FLN"  
The Middle East Journal  
Vol.20, No.2, (Spring 1966), p.164.
- (88) Ben Bella found support from two of his jail companions, Khider and Bitat, who believed that he could gather wide support and bring consensus to the government of an independent Algeria, because he was more popular than the other leaders.
- (89) Jackson, op. cit., p.58.
- (90) The names presented consisted of the four ex-prisoners, Ben Bella, Khider, Boudiaf, and Ait Ahmed, plus Mohammadi Said, the least influential member of the GPRA and Colonel Hadj Ben 'Alla.

- (91) Quandt states that Ben Bella later claimed that the Political Bureau which he proposed received the support of the majority of the delegates, but Harbi claims that the Ben Bella's list received 33 votes against 31 votes for Krim Belkacim's list. Harbi, Le FLN...., op. cit., pp.166-167.
- (92) Lazreg, op. cit., p.73.
- (93) It is often argued that the antagonism between Ben Bella and Boudiaf was more personal than anything else. Horne, for example, quotes Mabrouk Belhocine, who had attempted to act as mediator saying that "Boudiaf and Ben Bella, after spending five years in jail together, couldn't stand each other. They would argue over anything whether the tea should be served hot or cold, how much sugar should be in it. It was just like a scene out of Sartre's No Exit. The crisis was simply a scramble for power" Horne, op. cit., p.536.

**PART III**

**ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN INDEPENDENT ALGERIA**

## **CHAPTER FIVE : THE RISE OF THE ALGERIAN PETTY BOURGEOISIE AND ITS ACCESSION TO POWER**

Over the last two decades the social and economic development of Algeria has been so rapid and has assumed such a drastic form that the impression initially given was that the country was following a qualitatively different form of social transformation from that of many post-colonial societies. Moreover, the benefits of this development have been fairly widely distributed in comparison with other oil-rich states in the Third World (1). Popular mobilization was frequently involved in this development, and some forms of democratic institutions were created in its course. State involvement in the economy and society far exceeded the standard set by similar experiences in other newly independent countries. However, if Algeria has greater claims to be considered as a 'socialist' country, this should be traced to its inherited characteristics and the consequences of 130 years of French colonization and particularly of the eight years of violent confrontation with the colonial power.

First, the protracted war followed by the sudden exodus of the European colons who had formed the core of the country's elite made it impossible for any single social class to assume the responsibility of transforming society. This has meant effectively that the indigenous upper middle classes, structurally weak and ill-equipped in terms of capital and skills, had to be content with a very marginal economic and political role for a considerable time, and its actual survival depended on conditions largely outside its own determination and control. Hence the state was the most suitable vehicle to mobilise the resources required for the transformation of the economy.

Secondly, the war of independence played a very significant role in mobilizing the Algerian people and in transforming their political attitude and awareness, since it effectively combined aspirations for social justice with those of independence. Discussing the radicalization process which the Algerians experienced during the war, Bourdieu stated that:

"everywhere the same consciousness of their rights is now in evidence: the right to work, the right to decent housing, the right to the different social benefits (social security, family allowances, etc.). For the attitude of the beggar who comes humbly to solicit a charitable gift there has been substituted a demanding and revolutionary state of mind which is inducing the Algerians to insist on their rights to social benefits and service" (2).

Thus the war not only brought a large section of the population into direct confrontation with the colonial power, but also greatly radicalised the attitude of most Algerians. As a result the state has found itself under continuous pressure to satisfy demands which were not attainable during the colonial period (3). This meant that to be effective, development policies had to give serious consideration to the interests of all sections of the population, and above all that they were not supposed to benefit particular groups at the expense of the majority.

Given the central role which the state plays in such a society, these developments brought about increased pressure for the widest possible representation of all social forces, and also made individuals within the state apparatus seek to win the support of as much of the population as possible. Any attempt on the part of a particular group to dominate the state is constantly checked by the interests of other groups and classes. In other words, the specificities of historical and social development under French colonization have made it difficult for

a minority to disregard the interests of the majority for its own benefit. Translated into the political action of the leading strata after independence, this meant that revolutionary action and rhetoric was the only means by which the leadership could achieve legitimacy, since "there is no legitimacy outside the revolutionary symbol, groups and policies" (4). The purpose of this chapter is to try to explore the social origins of the strata who led the anti-colonial struggle and subsequently imposed their authority on the independent state.

### **The Emergence of the Algerian Petty Bourgeoisie and its 'Representatives'**

French colonization destroyed most of the foundations of native Algerian society. Through various mechanisms, it managed to transform this society into a series of disorganized and uprooted entities. This was achieved mainly by the imposition of French property laws and the drastic changes in the social and institutional structures of society which followed. However, despite the fact that the colonial regime kept in minimal contact with the indigenous population and worked essentially through the European settlers, and despite the virtual liquidation of the traditional aristocracy, the colonial regime also introduced a considerable degree of social stratification within Algerian society. This was done either through the promotion of certain elements to act as intermediaries between the colonists and the colonized society and to help in imposing law and order (5), or through the encouragement of a social category which had direct contacts with the colonial sector (landowners in rural areas and businessmen, exporters, traders, and intellectuals in the cities) and which came to form the Algerian rural and urban bourgeoisie. While structurally weak and small in size,

playing only a marginal economic role in the colonial sector, this group was nevertheless relatively privileged and enjoyed a higher standard of living than the rest of the native population. However, despite the important role played by the educated sons of this group in the early stages of Algerian nationalism, their own particular aspirations could neither be satisfied by the colonial administration nor they were shared by the rest of the Algerian population.

The first coherent demands for independence came from the migrant Algerian workers in France in the 1920's, and also from those petty bourgeois groups who became increasingly exposed to French education and involved in the colonial economy and institutions. French colonization had also created various middle strata who, though dependent on the colonial economic and administrative sector, were less privileged and less wealthy than the former group. They consisted of different social and economic groups including the new middle and small traders and owners of small workshops, army officers, intellectuals, and civil servants. It is very difficult to determine the exact numbers in these heterogeneous groups not only because of the lack of accurate statistics but also because of the wide differences in their income and social position.

The origins of these strata are diverse; some of the small traders belonged to the traditional urban society especially those involved in buying and selling of tobacco, others, such as greengrocers, traders in agricultural products, and retailers of other goods emerged as a result of colonial development, the commercialization of agriculture and the increase of money in circulation. There were also a large number of small traders with very little capital who were in fact a "refuge pour des sous-proletaires" . The larger merchants were involved in the trade

of grain and olive oil, and in imports and exports. After eliminating these two extremes, Ageron estimated the number of Algerians involved in trade at 79,000 in 1954 (6). He also estimated that there were about 1,500 owners of small and medium sized workshops engaged in tobacco and cigarette manufacture, and in the production and distillation of alcohol.

Apart from the development of the colonial economy, and the increase in the amount of money in circulation, a major factor contributing to the emergence of these new social strata was labour migration, which "has not only permitted numerous Algerian families to survive, but also has favoured a certain degree of social mobility" (7). Remittances from migrant workers to their families were a major source for the latter's economic activities, especially if one considers that the migrants transferred about 37 and 38 milliard francs each year between 1950 and 1954, which represented  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the salaries paid in Algeria by commerce and industry, and equivalent to almost all agricultural wages (8).

Any attempt to analyse the society of colonial Algeria in this period must also take account of the French army which helped to elevate certain members of the indigenous population to relatively important social positions. In 1942 8,000 Muslims were retired pensioners with a grade of officer or under-officer (9). At the same time, the development of primary, secondary and higher education was one of the most important factors in creating a new and widespread social stratum which began to shape a growing political and national consciousness and played an important role in undermining the colonial system.

The educational system in Algeria "had always been the fulcrum of political struggle between the colonial bourgeoisie and the state



authorities on the one hand, and between the colonial bourgeoisie and the Algerian people on the other" (10). The colons were profoundly opposed to any expansion of education among the native population (11). Apart from the possibility that education would fuel patriotism and nationalist sentiment within the native population, it would also be very costly. "They repeated ceaselessly in the colonial newspapers that the financial burdens have hampered the natural development of colonization. They crudely but clearly stated it: 'Let us keep our money where it would be better employed: in agriculture, an area in which colonisation is vitally interested.' " (12). The colonial authorities considered the extension of education to the native population not only as a means of bringing about social peace by creating a stratum of native intellectuals and bureaucrats attached to and dependent on the existence of the colonial regime, but also as a technical necessity for the reproduction of colonial relations. It therefore sought to make school attendance compulsory and to provide a minimum basic welfare programme for the majority of the urban population. It also aimed, as far as the Muslims were concerned, to compete against the Muslim schools where teaching was in Arabic, and to combat nationalist feeling (13). A decree was passed on 6 June 1917 requiring, for the first time in colonial history, compulsory attendance for all children residing within three kilometres of a school building (14).

However, both the number of school places and the quality of education available for the Muslim population were low, as the table below indicates. The main beneficiaries of the expanded educational opportunities at that period were the sons of the urban notables who were already to some extent assimilated within the colonial economy and society.

Primary and Secondary Education in Algeria Between 1919-1921 (15)

Year	Primary Education		Europeans	
	Muslims			
1919-1920	41,144		115,308	
1920-1921	42,904		112,223	
Normal Schools				
1919-1920	55		367	
1920-1921	51		347	
Secondary Education				
Year	Public Schools		Private School	
	Mus.	Eur.	Mus.	Eur.
1919-1920	477	8,639	23	10,272
1920-1921	434	9,000	24	9,929

Nevertheless, education expanded rapidly during the 1940's. While only 7,605 certificates of primary education were delivered to native Algerians in the thirty years between 1883 and 1913, this number increased to 12,000 in 1944 (16). In 1943, out of an estimated population of 7.5 million Muslim Algerians (of whom 1.25 million were children aged between 6 and 14), 110,200 children (boys and girls) were receiving primary education (17). In November 1944 a plan for education approved by the Governor-General of Algeria was drawn up to cover the period between 1945 and 1965. This plan aimed at the creation of 20,000 classes for one million Algerian primary pupils. Between 5 December 1944 and 5 December 1945, 449 new classes were opened for 24,301 pupils, increasing the classes available from 2,073 to 2,522 and the number of pupils from 110,636 to 134,987 (18). The following table shows the sharp increase in the number of Algerian students in primary, secondary, and university education after 1945.

Number of Primary, Secondary, and University Student in Algeria  
1945-1960 (19)

Year	Muslims		Europeans		Total	
	Males	Females	M.	F.	M.	F.
1901	24,975	1,779	115,576	57,404	140,551	59,183
1911	40,778	3,527	136,979	67,140	177,757	70,967
1921	42,904	4,131	112,223	55,687	115,127	59,618
1931	67,738	8,410	124,015	63,357	191,735	71,467
1945	108,663	19,804	132,543	65,397	241,206	85,201
1954	306,215	80,370	134,848	66,532	441,063	147,002
1956	272,417	83,818	131,782	64,133	404,199	148,351
1957	345,533	109,287	131,224	64,871	476,757	174,158
1959	609,545	227,428	136,136	67,314	745,681	294,742
1960	714,774	268,844	125,305	59,127	840,079	327,971

Despite this increase, the number of registered native students remained very small in relation to the size of the Muslim population. The percentage of those receiving education only increased from 3.8 per cent in 1908 to 4.5 per cent in 1920 and 6 per cent in 1930 (20). The bulk of those receiving education came from the relatively privileged urban population who started to realize the immense benefits that education could provide, since it was only through education that they could gain access to public employment or the liberal professions. Thus the number of Algerian civil servants increased from 4,000 in 1930 to 9,600 in 1944 and to 33,147 in 1954 (21). These figures show the prime importance of education in creating a semi-privileged social force primarily composed of school and university graduates who could find permanent employment in the administration and secure relatively high incomes for themselves. However, this was not the only function of education, since it also came to play a major role in the spread of nationalist feeling and in agitating the Algerian revolution as we will see later.

By 1955, according to figures presented by Samir Amin (22), 135,000 persons could be classified as middle class, including those working in small-scale industry and business, in liberal professions and as junior executives in the administration. Together with white-collar workers in the big and small businesses and in government service (numbering 90,000), they formed 50 per cent of the urban working population (460,000). They had an average annual income of 270,000 francs, and were thus relatively better off than the workers whose annual incomes were about 150,000 francs and the unemployed, who numbered between 150,800 and 230,000.

Although primarily intended to benefit the colons, French land policy also contributed to the emergence of numerous large and middle-size proprietors in the rural areas. Their land holdings varied from one region to another according to the quality of the land, its fertility and the kinds of crops grown. The rise in the prices of cereals and animal products after 1919, and the difficulties facing the smaller peasant landowners had enabled some owners with marketable surpluses to acquire more land despite the considerable rise in land values. Similarly, during the period between 1930-1945, the depression of the 1930's had brought further impoverishment to the small peasants and led to increases in the size of the property of those wealthy neighbouring landowners who were able to buy more land. Moreover, between the two world wars and for the first time, the European colons sold more lands to the Algerians than they bought. Thus Muslim Algerians regained 25,000 hectares between 1918 and 1920 and 43,000 hectares between 1941 and 1946 (23).

These groups then were the main components of the Algerian petty bourgeois strata before independence. Their importance lay not only in

their relatively large numbers in relation to the rest of society, but was also underlined because of the structural weakness of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, neither of which was able to impose its hegemony over society. As has already been pointed out, the Algerian elite or middle classes never developed into a fully fledged bourgeoisie, and the lower classes did not develop into a homogenous working class, despite the very rapid process of proletarianisation which resulted from French colonisation policies.

It was thus the more numerous petty bourgeois stratum which was to play the intermediate role and to become the principal social milieu out of which the various groups developed which dominated the political struggle for independence. In addition, many other factors, such as the persistence of aristocratic values and aspirations (despite the virtual annihilation of the material base of the Algerian aristocracy (24)), the heterogeneous nature of the petty bourgeois strata and their extremely diverse socio-economic composition, made the adoption of a unified and coherent political position impossible. The struggle of the emerging classes was taking place within these strata since their diversity was wide enough to include the aspirations of conflicting interests and world views.

However, a number of factors made the position of the Algerian petty bourgeois groups towards colonialism more or less unified, principally the simple fact that colonial policy towards the native society was based on its almost complete subjugation and on the promotion of the European minority. This played an important role in shaping the outlook and awareness and later in determining the actions of the petty bourgeois groups. In the final analysis Algerian independence became the aim around which almost all Algerians could unite, and to

postpone at least for the time being the various conflicts of interests and views on the future shape of Algerian society to which these different groups aspired. The aspirations of many of those involved in the national movement were greatly influenced by their education. In order to grasp its importance one should discuss briefly the role played by the colonial educational system in shaping the political outlook and awareness of those Algerians who were the first to acquire such a privilege and to translate it, given the colonial specificities, into a force that would contribute to undermine the colonial system.

## **The Development of the Political Action of the Petty Bourgeoisie**

### **The Role of Education**

Although French educational policies were primarily intended to create a social base for French rule among some sections of the indigenous population, the expansion of education also resulted in the exposure of pupils and students to the ideas and values of French society, often for the first time. "The history of French schools in Algeria since 1885 was one of identification with that of the French schools in the metropolis at the level of programmes of the taught techniques and ideologies" (25). Naturally, this had a crucial effect on the awareness and consciousness of the Muslim students who now became acquainted with such values, especially such notions as 'the public interest', 'equality of opportunity', and other ideals of the French Revolution. These values were in striking contrast with the actual circumstances of existence of the Muslim population, which were dictated by the colons, which were based on repression, the almost total exclusion of Algerians from political life and the institutionalization of economic and social

inequality. The impact of education became even more significant when the 'modern' sector of the economy began to require the development of new technical and administrative skills. As a result the social composition of those receiving education began to go beyond the sons of the native bourgeoisie and notables, to include a wider range of Muslims from lower social strata (26).

Thus it is not surprising that together with other factors discussed below, particularly the continuous resistance of the colons to any native participation in wealth and position, school and university education made Algerian students increasingly aware of their own situation, and contributed to their resistance to colonial exploitation and the repression of the native people as well as encouraging the growth of elementary nationalist feelings and the sense of a separate national identity (27). It was also at school that Algerians discovered that they were not only considered inferior to and thus exploited by Europeans, but that they were entitled to equal rights with Europeans, since they were "intellectually and morally as good as Frenchmen" (28). Thus education not only created a new category of intellectuals and professionals but also imbued them with profound nationalist sentiments. In this context it is necessary to consider colonial economic policy towards the indigenous petty bourgeois strata, and the political impasse which had arisen as a result of the total rejection of the early nationalists' demands for equality.

## Economic Limitations

Despite the fact that colonial policies, especially after the Second World War, had led to the growth in the middle stratum of Algerians, total numbers in this group remained very small, barely exceeding the size of the European middle class. However even this limited growth was fiercely resisted by the colons who did not want to have an Algerian middle class competing with them for jobs and social position. Thus despite the relatively privileged status which it enjoyed, this middle stratum remained inferior to the colons, who continued to occupy the key positions in the economic and administrative structure of the country. In terms of income, the Algerian equivalent of the urban middle class working in small-scale industry and businesses, the liberal professions, and as junior executives, received an average of only a quarter of that of their European counterparts, or 270,000 francs against 1,150,000 francs for the Europeans (29). Moreover, Algerians were constantly excluded from the public administration despite their qualifications, which should have enabled them to enjoy opportunities equal to those of the colons. Thus they had to be content with the lowest echelons of the bureaucratic apparatus, as is shown in the following table.

Structure of Job Occupation of Algerians in the State (30)  
1955

Category	% of Algerians
A. Governors, Secretary Generals, Cabinet Directors	2.8
B. Office Supervisors, Skilled Personnel	14.4
C. Clerical Personnel	25.2
D. Messengers	25.2



The lack of Algerian private capital was a further limitation in absorbing the increasing numbers of the educated native cadres, although it was also the case that Algerians were refused access to the technical schools and colleges. Thus in 1953, the National School of Agriculture had 120 students, none of them Algerians, and the three national higher schools (Technical, Commerce, and Industrial) had 355 students in 1953, of whom only nine were Algerians (31).

The colons' control of most aspects of political and economic life restricted the activities of small-scale owners and traders who were often squeezed out of business by increasing competition from modern industry as well as by economic stagnation. Rapid population growth during the 1940's and 1950's worsened the lives of the urban population and made their situation intolerable.

In these circumstances, their nationalism and their recognition that they had an identity separate from that of the colons represented the only means by which politically conscious Algerians could achieve the status they sought. Thus the petty bourgeois strata were able to channel and mobilize public discontent by transforming the vague aspirations of the national movement into a genuine anti-colonial colonial independence struggle.

### **Political Crisis**

As we have already seen the Algerian nationalist movement had originally been dominated by two main factions, broadly speaking the assimilationists on the one hand, and the populist/nationalists on the other, who stood for complete independence from France, which it was thought initially could be achieved by means of the colonial legal

system. Although the latter's adherents came from fairly disparate social groups, it is probably correct to say that the majority of the poorer sections of Algerian native society supported them.

By the 1940's attempts to achieve assimilation had failed conclusively, partly because the colons had totally rejected the accommodation of even the simplest demands of the assimilationists, but also because the day to day experience of life under French rule for the vast majority of the native population made the ideas of assimilation appear unreal and utopian. After the events of Setif in 1945 the main concern of the Algerian nationalist movement was to find an effective method of achieving political independence, since all legal avenues had been exhausted without achieving any significant improvement in the conditions of the vast majority. Hence violence and armed struggle came increasingly to present themselves as the only alternatives. However, the adoption of armed struggle meant that the national movement had to be fundamentally broadened to incorporate as many of the native population as possible. Although the leadership of the national movement generally came from a lower middle class or petty bourgeois background, it expressed the immediate aspirations for national independence of the Algerian people as a whole.

## **The F.L.N.: the Obfuscation of Social and Factional Struggle**

The choice of armed struggle did not develop out of the particular interests of certain classes or strata, but was the direct response to the political and economic repression imposed by the colonial system. Thus although the decision was initially taken by a minority of leaders who had become disillusioned with more conventional means of agitation, the revolution led by the FLN soon managed to attract almost all factions of the Algerian nationalist movement with the exception of the MNA led by Messali Hadj (32).

The FLN appealed to "all Algerian patriots from all social levels and from all truly Algerian parties and movements to join in the struggle for liberation" (33), and made it clear that the achievement of national independence "will not be the work of one party, but that of all Algerians" (34). The fact that most Algerian nationalist factions came to support the FLN meant that it had to transform itself from a conspiratorial group into a more broadly based political movement (35). Although it managed to obtain an unprecedented measure of support from the native population, disputes among the various leaders continued unabated and in fact became more intense as the years passed, largely because the FLN had come into existence as a liberation front rather than as a political party (36). These conflicts reflected the divergent interests and expectations of the varying social strata represented within it, whose leaders had temporarily united around the immediate objective of national independence.

However, the disputes within the FLN were not simply a rigid reflection of the different interests and aspirations which it

contained. The political conditions under which it was established and forced to operate, and the lack of a clear and defined ideology also played a significant part. A further complication was caused by the fact that bureaucratic apparatuses developed within the FLN, particularly the GPRA which "provided the bourgeois elements with the means to play a part in the revolution while at the same time enlarging their base by recruiting younger members with no political affiliation" (37).

Thus the wartime FLN was a conglomeration of individuals who represented varying political forces and different social strata but were united around the single objective of national independence. There was little interest in working out a coherent political or ideological doctrine, a point which has been noted by almost all writers on the Algerian revolution. This is usually explained by the FLN's need to unite all forces behind it, but although this was certainly important, the fact that many of its leaders represented very disparate interests within the petty bourgeoisie is probably also have been significant. Of course, this is not to imply that social and ideological conflict did not exist, but rather that the structure of the FLN and its accommodation of different socio-political groups had made such conflict more or less inevitable. The differences were shelved during the war, mainly because the presentation of a united front (in the form of the FLN) was the only way to win support and to gain independence.

However, independence quickly revealed the internal struggles within the FLN, and marked the end of the period of artificial unity. The divisions that resulted exposed Algeria to a virtual civil war, involving personal rivalries, individual aspirations, historical animosities and ad hoc alliances and counter alliances (38).

As we have already seen, the main division was between the GPRA,

dominated by the former assimilationists, and the Political Bureau led by Ahmed Ben Bella. This represented a fundamental ideological divide within the leadership on the nature of the future of the Algerian state. Most of former elite sided against Ben Bella in the more 'moderate' faction working in the GPRA . Each side felt entitled to assume political power, but neither faction was able to mobilize enough popular support to secure overall political control. With the rise of the army as "the best organized and only truly national (that is, drawing from the entire population) group in the country (and) the strongest political institution to grow out of the Revolution" (39), it became clear that the victory would go to whichever faction managed to win its support. Given the structure of the army, and the animosity of its General Staff to the GPRA, it was natural that it would strike up an alliance with Ben Bella.

### **Independence: the Petty Bourgeoisie in Power**

Although there were major divisions within the FLN this did not mean that each faction was sufficiently organized or homogeneous to form a coherent and disciplined political force, especially as factions "were not primarily ideological in character. With the exception of the Marxist led by Mohamed Harbi and the liberal Right led by Farhat Abbas,..... alliances were based on personal loyalties rather than doctrinal agreements" (40). In these circumstances, Ben Bella's group emerged as an alliance of the various factions whose support was essential to counterbalance opposing factions which remained excluded from power (41). As has already been mentioned, the army, led by Boumedienne and the 'Oujda clan' (42), was the most effective and organized force within the alliance. Ultimately this alliance did not provide the

regime with sufficient stability because of the pressing need both to preserve a facade of national unity and to keep the opposition in check. Ben Bella's political actions indicated that in order to minimize the threat to his leadership and to consolidate his personal power, he attempted to eliminate the factions within the regime and weaken or neutralise those excluded from power (43). It was against this background, together with the radicalisation of the Algerian population which has already been mentioned, and the vacuum created by the departure of the colons, that the process of building the state institutions, the Party, and the implementation of a number of crucial economic measures took place during the first three years after independence. Pragmatism, inconsistency, and incoherence, therefore, were the dominant features of Ben Bella's policies towards a number of political and economic issues.

#### **The Changing Role of the F.L.N.**

After independence, the FLN underwent drastic structural changes, resulting partly from its disintegration into a number of political factions and partly the attempt to transform it from a national front into a political party to provide the leadership with legitimacy and support (44). The Tripoli Programme specified five points on which the wartime FLN had committed grave mistakes, among which were; its underestimation of the real potentialities of the people of the countryside, its lack of ideological firmness, its growing feudal and petty bourgeois spirit, and the gap which it had created between the leadership and the base (45). The Programme stated that " the conversion (of the FLN) into a political party has become an imperative necessity for

our forward progress..... (this Party), founded on the ideological, political, and organic unity of the revolutionary forces that it embraces,..... should unify all social classes of the nation round itself in order to achieve the objectives of the revolution" (46).

This conversion of the FLN into a political party coincided both with the need to build a new Algerian state in circumstances where it was "the sole direct body capable of 'doing something valid for the country'" (47), and with the fierce competition and intrigue among the factions within Ben Bella's regime. The social, economic, and political disorder that followed independence required a degree of rapid reorganization in order to cope with the problems created by this disorder and to set up an effective economy. This implied that the Party would play an auxiliary role in this process, drawing its legitimacy from the role it had played, as a front, during the war. The vacuum created by the colons' sudden departure, especially from the administration, led to the 'defection' of large number of party militants to positions in the civil bureaucracy, local administration, and various ancillary services. Thus "while many retained membership within the FLN, their basic loyalties shifted to the new elites which crystallized within the vacuum created by the departure of the Europeans" (48).

The role which the Party was to play in Algerian society was a matter of dispute, largely because of the conflicting ideals and interests of the various factions, and it came to be used as an instrument in their struggle to gain political power. Hence, despite the tasks assigned to the Party as the body that "draws the guidelines of policy for the nation and inspires the acts of the state" (49), it was rendered unable to play any significant role. While Ben Bella advocated the idea of a vanguard party 'a party of militants' and not a

'political gang, a political oligarchy', Mohamed Khider, the Secretary General of the Political Bureau, and Rabah Bitat, a party cadre, favoured a mass party (50). This dispute resulted in the resignation of Khider from the Party and the further consolidation of Ben Bella's power as he took over the post of Secretary General. But even before this dispute, both Ben Bella and Khider had used the Party to limit the responsibilities of the National Assembly, created after independence, which was headed by Farhat Abbas and included many deputies opposed to Ben Bella (51).

The Party was also used directly by the regime to suppress the activities of the mass organizations, in particular the UGTA, which had shown a considerable degree of independence and clearly resented the Party's interference in its affairs. This became evident during the UGTA Congress in January 1963 where Khider and 'several hundred goons' invaded the Congress and forced the Union leaders to hand over their posts to pro-Party individuals. The result was that the UGTA lost its autonomy and was forced to accept a leadership appointed by, and subordinate to, the Party.

However, this merely indicates that the Party was used as an instrument to consolidate Ben Bella's power rather than for the purposes suggested by the Tripoli Programme, since "Ben Bella was not in fact willing to accept the practical implication of the theory, namely that he himself, the prime minister was subordinate to Khider, the Party's Secretary-General" (52). Despite the rapid expansion in the rank and file of the Party (53), mainly as a result of the recruitment of people who sought to reap the numerous advantages of affiliation to it, it remained a force "that competes with rather than organizes the masses" (54). It lost whatever capacity it may have had to mobilize the



people on a social revolutionary basis or to elaborate the socialist principles of the Tripoli Programme. At the same time, although now bureaucratized and the "refuge of the former nationalists without political training, it could not compete with the bureaucratic strata within the state apparatus" (55). The Party was only effective as a "symbol of national unity and of continuity with the revolutionary period.... and serving as standing pretext, by its mere existence, for the ban of all rival political formations" (56). Its inadequacies were noted by many of the leaders; thus while Ben Bella accused the Party under Khider of being composed of scum, Boumedienne after the coup of June 1965 questioned the entire existence of the Party other than on paper and with its banners; "Party members, Boumedienne stated, were informed of decisions only after they had been taken and executed" (57).

The Party was to remain insignificant in Algerian politics and society for many years despite the efforts made to revive it and to give it a proper role. The leadership's main interest in the Party was as an instrument to control the masses and suppress any autonomous action and provide it with the socio-political base it so desperately needed. Thus it is not surprising that the population in general became greatly disenchanted with the Party, and was profoundly critical of the relationship between the leadership and the base, since the latter's role in decision making was always minimal (58).

## **Army and Bureaucracy: the Consolidation of Power**

The army's strength was evident long before independence and increased with the growing incompetence of the FLN. It is difficult to determine whether Ben Bella or the army had used the other to steal a march on the GPRA and to seize power (59). In fact it was clear from the beginning that as the most organized and disciplined force that remained intact during the war of independence, the army's role would not be confined to assuring Ben Bella's success, but would extend to pressing for its own participation in determining the nature of the future Algerian state and its structures.

This was clear from the relatively high representation of the army in the political institutions created after independence (60), and also by the increasingly influential role which it played in the development of society in general. The first National Assembly, elected in 20 September 1962, whose candidates were nominated by the Political Bureau of the FLN, came from a list chosen by Ben Bella and Boumedienne (61); 18 per cent of the 194 deputies belonged to the ANP (Armee nationale Populaire) (62), as the regular army was renamed after independence, and together with the supporters of Ben Bella they formed the dominant alliance. Similarly, army representation in the new 17 member Political Bureau of the FLN, created in the Congress of April 1964, was very high, as nine of them were serving or former military officers. The same was true of Ben Bella's ministers, who although selected because of their technical competence, demonstrated the decisive importance of the army in Algerian politics (63). With the power it now exerted in the principal political institutions it became evident that no major changes could take place against the army's will or without it being

closely involved (64).

This consolidation of power was matched by a parallel process of creating a coherent, centralized, and well equipped and trained ANP, carried out independently from the FLN under the direct supervision of Boumedienne who "had always refused to accept any interference from the Party and had set up an independent political commissariat" (65). This process required the conversion of ex-guerrilla fighters and wilaya leaders into disciplined members of the ANP; it also involved the formation of new military regions, and the promotion of competent professionals who had been trained in the French army (66), without regard to their previous political affiliations and uniting those with the guerrilla commanders and officers of the *armee de l'exterieur*. By having the second largest share of the national budget after education (67), Boumedienne was also successful in equipping his army with advanced weapons and in introducing various training schools that helped to make the Algerian army one of the best equipped and trained in the region. One indication of the army's special status was its being assigned a degree of control over various economic enterprises, notably the farms abandoned by the colons. The army played a decisive role in defeating the principal manifestations of opposition, especially the revolt of the ex-wilaya leaders and the insurrection in Kabylia, thus rendering Ben Bella more and more dependent on it for the consolidation of his own power.

The ANP saw itself as the guardian of the revolution and as a national organization above regional and factional conflicts. Its leaders asserted its unity on the principles of the revolution and proclaimed its concern for efficiency and strong state structures (68). Hence, when the leadership realised that Ben Bella was using it as one

more faction to be played off against other factions, it acted unanimously in overthrowing him on 19 June 1965 (69). In this way it proved its supremacy in Algerian society and initiated a new era in the country's development, based on the emphasis of principles of efficiency and on the creation of a strong state apparatus capable of introducing far-reaching economic transformations.

If the army's power derived from its control over the means of coercion and from its role in the war of independence, as well as from the absence of any serious opposition, the civilians in the state bureaucracy realised that their own power emanated from the dominant role played by the state in society in general and from the damaging administrative vacuum which had resulted from the colons' mass departure from Algeria in the summer of 1962. The colonial bureaucratic apparatus had been staffed almost exclusively by Europeans, with native Algerians only at the lowest levels. Efforts were made by the colonial authorities during the war, mainly through the Constantine Plan, to initiate a programme to "train Algerians for mid-level administrative positions within the colonial bureaucratic structure in order to sever the FLN from its social base and belatedly to redress the job inequalities of the past. The Algerians who were selected for this program came from a bourgeois and petty bourgeois background" (70).

The outcome of these efforts was largely insignificant, and it was the sudden departure of the colons that provided "an immense puff of oxygen for all the intermediary strata (small traders and small functionaries), brutally thrown up in front of the scene and rendered indispensable by the vacuum" (71). The destruction inflicted by the war and by the activities of the OAS (72) made it vital to recruit some of those who had served in the colonial administration as well as those

who participated in the liberation, "who attempted to occupy all possible positions of power, both as their reward for their efforts (jihad) and as a base from which to enact programs to continue these rewards" (73). A major reshuffle of personnel took place, involving the promotion of personnel in B positions to A positions, while C and D categories were reserved for war veterans. Hence, particularly in the upper echelons, the administration not only had to rely heavily on members of the former colonial administration, but also had to promote them in large numbers, as is clear from the following table.

Members of Algerian Administration early in 1963 (74)

Category	Percentage of Members in Colonial Administration
A	43
B	77
C	12
D	3

Since A and B positions were occupied by those with decision-making powers and managerial responsibilities, the nature of the colonial administration was hardly affected (75). Not only had a number of those office holders collaborated with the colonial regime, but also and more importantly their ethos and training was quite alien to their new task, which was to enforce a system qualitatively different from the one to which they were accustomed.

Moreover, the administration expanded rapidly after independence. Hence the 'old' administration was swollen by another type of bureaucracy, including the administrators that had been formed abroad, primarily in Tunisia, Morocco and France, and also those trained within the framework of the Evian Agreements. For instance, 1,200 people from the central administration and 1,700 financial experts were trained in

special centres in France (76). The administration had 70,000 employees on its payroll on April 1963, but this number soon reached 100,000. In 1959, the number had been 63,000 (77). This involved frequent over-staffing, especially at the lower levels, mainly to provide jobs for the unemployed.

The importance of the consolidation of the bureaucratic apparatus for Algeria's social and economic development derives mainly from two factors. First, the whole administrative structure which was built and staffed to satisfy colonial-capitalist needs was preserved, and secondly, this structure was asked to perform functions which were supposed to serve socialist objectives. The social composition of the Algerian bureaucracy was to govern its actions in a way that would ultimately benefit the social groups from which it originated. Thus the first years of independence saw a major struggle between the bureaucracy and other forces, particularly over the issue of workers' self-management. The bureaucracy tried to expand its sphere of activity and to entrench itself in the system to further its interests and that of the social strata and classes from which it descended, while the 'socialist forces' struggled for more freedom of action and less interference in their initiatives on the part of the administration. As we have already indicated, this struggle took place in circumstances where the state was the only mechanism capable of undertaking sound social and economic transformation. In addition to attempting to identify the socio-political conditions that governed state action in the economy and agriculture, the following chapters will explore some aspects of this struggle.

## Notes

- (1) Roberts, H., "The Politics of Algerian Socialism", in North Africa, ed. by Richard Lawless, Croom Helm, London, 1984, p.7.
- (2) Bourdieu, P., The Algerians, Beacon Press, Boston, 1962, p.160.
- (3) Hermessi, E., "State and regimes in the Maghrib", in Contemporary North Africa, ed by Halim Barakat, Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, Washington D.C. 1985, p.158.
- (4) Zartman, W., "The Algerian Army in Politics", in Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib, ed. by William Zartman, Pall Mall Press, London, 1973, p.211.
- (5) In 1889, the French Government ordered the military to "strengthen the authority of the native chiefs, and to appoint at the head of tribes and villages only those notables who have real hereditary influence over their countrymen or notables whose prestige was beyond any doubt"  
Quoted by Lazreg, M., The Emergence of Classes in Algeria, Westview Press, Colorado, 1976, p.50.
- (6) Ageron, C.R., "Les Classes Moyennes dans l'Algerie Coloniale: Origines, Formation et Evaluation Quantitative" in Les Classes Moyennes au Maghreb, ed, CNRS, Paris, 1982, p.61.
- (7) Ibid., p.62.
- (8) Ibid., p.63.
- (9) Ibid., p.60.
- (10) Tlemcani, R., State and Revolution in Algeria, Zed Books Ltd., London, 1986, p.56.
- (11) Benachenhou, A., Formation du Sous-Developpement en Algerie, OPU, Algiers, 1978, p.374.
- (12) Tlemcani, op. cit., p.56.
- (13) Kaddache, M., Histoire du Nationalisme Algerien, Tome 1, OPU, Algiers, 1981, p.40.
- (14) Tlemcani, op. cit., p.57.
- (15) Kaddache, op. cit., p.44.

- (16) Ageron, op. cit., p.59.
- (17) Documents Algeriens 1945,  
(Synthese de l'activite Algerienne), p.44.
- (18) Ibid., pp.44-46.
- (19) Benachenhou, op. cit., p.376.
- (20) Ibid.
- (21) Ageron, op. cit., p.67.
- (22) Amin, S., The Maghrib in the Modern World,  
Penguin Books, London, 1970, pp.78-71.
- (23) Ageron, op. cit., p.68.
- (24) Lazreg, op. cit., p.48, 66-67.
- (25) Benachenhou, op. cit., p.374.
- (26) For those people who were the first to benefit from education and who came mainly from the families which profited from the colonial system, their education alerted them to the injustices of the colonial regime and its discrimination against the natives, but it also it gave them the image of France as their saviour and that "if only she were aware of the injustices in Algeria, would institute reforms"  
See Quandt, W., Revolution and Political leadership: Algeria 1954-1968  
Cambridge, 1969, p.29.
- (27) After moving from his small town to Tlemcan to pursue his studies, Ben Bella recalls that "Discrimination hits you in the face, even at school. At Tlemcan I felt, for the first time, that I belonged to a community which was considered inferior by the Europeans. For the first time I realized that I was a foreigner in my country"  
Merle, R., Ben Bella,  
Michael Joseph, London, 1967, p.42.
- (28) Quandt, op. cit., p.29.
- (29) Amin, op. cit., pp.7071.
- (30) Tlemcani, op. cit., p.57.
- (31) Benachenhou, op. cit., p.380.
- (32) Lazreg raise a question on the ambiguous fact that while the FLN declared itself open to all political groups it sought to annihilate the Messalists rather than reach an agreement with them.  
"The fact that Messali was supported by the rank and file who happened to be proletarian could be indicative of an ideological conflict between the FLN and the MNA"



- Lazreg, op. cit., p.67.
- (33) Mandouze, A., La Revolution Algerienne par les Textes,  
Paris, 1961, p.241 (Quoted from the FLN Declaration  
of 1st November 1954).
- (34) Ibid., p.33.  
(Quoted from El-Moudjahid, the wartime FLN organ No.3 etc 1956).
- (35) Lewis, W.H., "The Decline of Algeria's FLN",  
The Middle East Journal,  
Vol.20, No.2, Spring 1966, p.164.
- (36) "In as much as it was a front, (the FLN) was in reality a  
'multiparyisme' in which all the currents of Algerian nationalisim  
before 1954 were diluted but never disappeared".  
Yefsah, A., Le Processus du Legitimation du Pouvoir Militaire  
et la Construction de l'Etat en Algerie,  
Editions Anthropos, Paris, 1982, p.44.
- (37) Lazreg, op. cit., p.84.
- (38) For a full account of the struggle that followed independence,  
see:  
Harbi, M., Le F.L.N.: Mirage et Realite,  
Le Sens de l'Histoire, Editions j.a., Paris, 1980,  
Quandt, op. cit..
- (39) Zartman, op. cit., p.212.
- (40) Roberts, op. cit., p.8.
- (41) For a detailed discussion on the opposition to the Ben Bella  
regime, see:  
(39) Ottaway, D and Ottaway, M.,  
Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution,  
Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1970, pp.87-105.
- (42) This is the group of politicians so called because of their war-  
time role as staff officers at the Moroccan HQ of the army of the  
frontiers at Oujda, namely Cherif Belkacem, Ahmed Medeghri, Abde-  
laziz Bouteflika, Kaïd Ahmed, and Mohamed Tayebi Larbi.  
Roberts, op. cit., p.43.
- (43) Ibid., p.9.
- (44) Leca, J., "Parti et Etat en Algeire"  
Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord,  
CNRS, Vol.8, 1968, p.13.
- (45) "Programme du Front de Liberation Nationale Adopte a Tripoli par  
le CNRA en Juin 1962", Annuaire de l'Afrique de Nord,  
Vol.1, 1962, pp.689-691.
- (46) "The Tripoli Programme" Trans. by Charles Lam Markmann, in  
Joesten, J., The New Algeria,

- (47) Leca, J., "Algerian Socialism, Industrialization, and State-Building" in Socialism in the Third World, ed. by Helen Desfosses, Jacques Levesque, Praeger, Pub. New York, 1975, p.123.
- (48) Lewis, op. cit., p.168.
- (49) "The Tripoli Programme", op. cit., p.226.
- (50) Lazreg, op. cit., p.143.
- (51) Ben Bella warned the deputies in December 1963 that it was not their prerogative to establish policy:  
"I think it is necessary to define the relations between the Assembly, the Government, and the Party. These relations are based on a clear principle: the government and the assembly have a role of execution, but the elaboration of the political thought of the nation is reserved for the party"  
Quoted by Ottaway, op. cit., pp.73-74.
- (52) Ibid., p.74.
- (53) By the time of the FLN Congress in April 1964, the Party claimed a membership of 153,000 full members and 619,999 'adherents', aspirant members undergoing indoctrination.
- (54) Lazreg, op. cit., p.146.
- (55) Etienne, B., L'Algerie Culture et Revolution, Editions du Seul, Paris, 1977, p.38.
- (56) Roberts, op. cit., p.28.  
This was observed by many writers; Lacouture wrote in the Lo Monde, 14 Nov. 1964 that;  
"But the party does not exist. Because that is the culminant discovery that one has to find out today in visiting Algeria: the FLN has a prestigious past, it has maybe a great future, but in the present, literally, it does not exist"  
Quoted by Tlemcani, op. cit., p.86.
- (57) Boumedienne interviewed by Lutfi al-Khouli in al-Ahram, 8-10 Oct. 1965. This interview was reported mistakenly as being made by Mohammed Hasanien Heykal, both by Quandt and Humbaraci.
- (58) See Lazreg, op. cit., pp146-152.
- (59) Yefsah, op. cit., p.5.
- (60) "Despite the crucial role of the Armee de Liberation Nationale (ALN) during the war, most of the individuals in the military group first held important political positions only after independence"  
Quandt, op. cit., p.110.

- (61) Jackson, H.F., The FLN in Algeria: Party Development in Revolutionary Society, Greenwood Press, London, 1977, p.78.
- (62) Salah-Bey, A., "L'Assemblee Nationale Constituente Algerienne" Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, Vol.1, 1962, p.118.
- (63) For details of the composition of Ben Bella's governments, see Quandt, op. cit., pp.204-234.
- (64) Zartman, op. cit., p.212.
- (65) Ottaway, op. cit., p.123.
- (66) "Boumedienne had even integrated into the ANP some 250 Algerian officers trained in the French army, many of whom had rallied to the FLN cause only late in the course of the war. Most prominent among these officers were Slimane Hoffman, commander of the tank corps, and Major Abdelkader Moulay, alias Chabou, member of the General Staff and Boumedienne's chef de Cabinet in the Ministry of Defence"  
Ottaway, op. cit., p.198.
- (67) "Before Ben Bella ordered an austerity policy in early 1963- establishing a composite budget for the first time- total ANP receipts were earmarked at \$100 million. This figure compared to \$490 million for economic development, and \$580 million for the elephantine bureaucracy that Ben Bella erected in his state-building program"  
Jackson, op. cit., p.191.
- (68) See Zartman, op. cit., pp27-223.
- (69) In an attempt to undermine the position of Boumedienne and the Oujda clan, Ben Bella resorted, to two measures in addition to dismissing some members of the clan from the Cabinet: first, the establishment of the 'Milices Populaires' to counterbalance the power of the army, and secondly, the appointment of an ex-wilaya leader, Tahir Zbiri, as a head of the General Staff without consulting Boumedienne trying, according to Boumedienne, to divide the army. Both tactics proved futile since the head of the 'Milices Populaires' and Tahir Zbiri, participated in arresting Ben Bella in 19 June 1965.
- (70) Lazreg, M., "Bureaucracy and Class: The Algerian Dialectic" Dialectical Anthropology, Vol.1, No.4, Sept. 1976, p.300.
- (71) Etienne, op. cit., p.49.
- (72) Organisation de l'Armee Secret (OAS), a terrorist organization formed by the colons as a last resort to stop Algeria gaining its independence which carried out mass killings of innocent

Algerians.

(73) Zartman, op. cit., p.213.

(74) Clegg, I., Workers' Self-Management in Algeria,  
Monthly Review Press, New York, 1971, p.113, see also,  
Raffinot, M. and Jacquemot, p., Le Capitalisme d'Etat Algerien  
Francois Maspero, Paris, 1977, p.59.

(75) "Ben Bella, prodded by deputies, the UGTA, and his left-wing advisors, promised again and again that a full-scale purge (of the administration) would be carried out. Such a purge never took place, however, partly because there were simply no replacements for the graduates of the colonial promotion and partly because Ben Bella was afraid of stirring up a political storm. The administration was a beehive of clans, each one controlling a ministry, a service, or a department, and consequently purging one official meant provoking the resentment of a large number"  
Ottaway, op. cit., pp.84-85.

(76) Tlemcani, op. cit., p.92.

(77) For more details of the Algerian administration, see:  
Ottaway, op. cit., pp.83-86.

## CHAPTER SIX : THE CONSTRUCTING OF STATE CAPITALISM AFTER INDEPENDENCE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 1962-67

### The Unfolding of Class Struggle

The previous chapter described the course of events before and immediately after independence. These events constituted the political background of a more complex and multi-dimensional struggle, which developed in the post-independence period. This was largely caused by an event which was both unexpected and unplanned, the sudden mass departure of the European colons. Indeed a great deal of Algeria's subsequent social, economic, and political development can be attributed to this event, not only because it involved the sudden disappearance of almost all the capitalists, administrators, and technicians (1), but also because it opened various alternatives and courses of development for Algerian society. Almost uniquely in the post-colonial world, Algeria had the opportunity to erase much of the legacy of the past and to reconstruct its economy on entirely new lines. That this opportunity was not taken is a matter of historical record, but the conditions for it certainly existed in the autumn and winter of 1962-1963.

Each social force found its opportunity in the social and economic vacuum created by the colons' departure to seize power and to impose its dominance. As the colons abandoned their properties and positions, the social and class struggle that followed their departure centred around these properties and positions. This struggle was intensified by the disintegration of the FLN, the fact that the ranks of the political 'representatives' who came namely from a petty bourgeois background.

were divided and had no thoroughly worked out analysis or programme for the future.

The most spectacular o this exodus was the the self-management (autogestion) movement. Its importance lies not only in its immediate impact on the economic system particularly in agriculture, but in the new and lengthy struggle which it triggered off among the newly emerging social forces. This movement came almost as a result of spontaneous action on the part of those members of the Algerian working class employed formerly on the colon farms and factories. Faced with a chaotic situation after the owners had left their properties having inflicted a great deal of damage on them, and faced the danger of unemployment and even starvation, the workers themselves took the inititiave and began to run the enterprises. They established a Comite de Gestion (management committee) in each abandoned enterprise, in order to restart production and to provide employment and incomes for themselves. This took place when there was no other alternative and at the same time no authority to stop them. (2).

Despite its lack of conscious political leadership during its initial phases and despite being a defensive move "directed more against the local proprietors, who tried to take the colons' position, than against the colons themselves" (3), the self-management movement was soom extended to almost all the properties vacated by the colons. It began to acquire a national dimension and to provide a social and economic organization that represented the interests of the working class, transforming its action from a merely self-interested one to a class conscious action in defending the new system against the attacks and intrusion of its enemies. It also acted as a polarizing factor for various political and social trends and currents by contributing to the

radicalization of the supporters and enemies of self-management outside the working class (4). The supporters of this system, represented by the left wing of the FLN and the student movement together with the working class themselves, saw it not only as a positive achievement of the revolution which should be defended, but also as a system for economic and social development that should be extended to include every aspect of society and the economy. As noted by Michel Rapis, self-management was envisaged by the militants "not as a simple economic relationship characterizing the management of the economic units of the base, but as a more general relationship that should mark the whole country's socio-political system (5). However the self-management movement raised a great deal of resentment and dissatisfaction on the part of those who viewed it as a source of disorder and chaos. The Union Generale des Commerçants Algeriens (UGCA) published a pamphlet in which it openly attacked 'class struggle' as a "hideous ideological speculation which generates chaos, arbitrariness, injustice, misery, and adventurism" (6). Self-management also played a part in the resignation of certain liberal politicians, including Farhat Abbas and Ahmed Franes from their posts, even after it was accepted and legalized by the government. Very rapidly self-management went beyond the limited functions of being a way of organizing and running vacant properties after independence. It became a major social and political issue that provided Algeria with a socialist ideology and a progressive image for many years, and shaped and reorganized the country's socio-political forces.

## The Birth of Self-Management

As mentioned earlier, the birth of the self-management movement came amidst, and was a result of, a period of almost complete disorder and chaos. All sorts of properties, ranging from cars to villas, furniture and lands were sold by both panic-stricken colons and the Algerians who acquired them by various means, at very low prices. Although it is difficult to prove, it is known that many Algerians made fortunes out of these bargains, which became the basis for the development of new forces and enlarged the material base of the new petty bourgeoisie (7). Wealthy Algerians rushed to Europe to search for the departed settlers in order to strike bargains with them for their properties. Thus:

"an astonishing spectacle, of business speculators and petty capitalists, rushing to France, Switzerland, to look for repatriates willing to sell them their farms, their businesses, their factories. By this stalking for the property titles, the Algerian bourgeoisie set about inheriting French colonization" (8)

Leading members of the state apparatus, the army, and the Party did not hesitate to seize any opportunity to take over the abandoned properties. This phenomenon was described as follows:

"Some Algerians, often those who had suffered the least from the war, rushed in pursuit of biens vacants. The harvest had been done and the crops sold or placed in clandestine silos since the summer of 1962. In the general confusion that prevailed, the abandoned grape harvest have permitted some people to procure substantial gains. The vacant properties became the object of frantic speculation whose beneficiaries had often been precisely those who remained secure from want, such as responsible militants of the Party, of the Administration, of the Army and also proprietors and big businessmen. (9) (Emphasis added).

However, these bargains together with private appropriations of colon properties were limited by various factors, the most important being the lack of capital to purchase properties which were often



concentrated and large-scale such as farms and factories (10). It was also difficult for private individuals to take over firms and factories because the workers in these enterprises knew very well who the owners were and were not ready to accept orders from just anyone, (11), and finally, the state of uncertainty about the future development of Algeria and its way out of its crisis made private purchases extremely risky (12).

It was in these abandoned enterprises that self-management was spontaneously established and spread. However, this process was assisted and accelerated in the rural areas in particular by the role played by the more politically conscious members of the UGTA who seized the opportunity to take the initiative to resume production and to organize the workers to take over the management of the abandoned enterprises. In this regard Juliet Minces noted that;

"young trade unionists, just released from prison, began to go out to the countryside persuading the peasants to resume their work without further delay; 'The boss is away, for the time being we'll do without him. Later on, we'll see'" (13).

The UGTA set up a 'commission d'autogestion' to advise on the formation of Comites de Gestion. It also organized work teams to help in providing financial, technical, and organizational support for the workers in the abandoned enterprises. Thus in the Algiers area, railway workers volunteered to repair equipment on the farms.

While there is a semi-consensus on the part of the analysts of the Algerian self-management movement on the spontaneity of its birth (14), mainly because its theoretical outline had not appeared in the programmes of the FLN or of other political forces before the FLN, there is disagreement on the motivation of the movement. Ian Clegg, for example, considered that it can be traced to the immediate economic interests of

the workers and did not emanate from their ideology, which was generally conservative. On the other hand, the involvement of the UGTA in its organization, and the support that it received from the left wing political forces, had led others, particularly Tlemcani, to see it as "authentically revolutionary" and a conscious reaction directed, within the process of decolonization, towards establishing political power for the workers in order to match that of the bourgeoisie and to prevent the privatization of the means of production. In fact given the conditions that favoured the emergence of the movement together with those which hindered it, which will be listed below, it is difficult to draw any very definite conclusions. Immediate economic interests, for example, could also have led to the division of the property among the workers in an enterprise or at least their involvement in selling the land to private owners especially as the situation was highly uncertain. On the other hand, the revolutionary nature of the action would suggest that any attempt to attack it would be vigorously resisted. In practice neither of these alternatives occurred in any noticeable way. The movement certainly marked a rare moment in which the immediate economic interests of the working class corresponded with its aspiration to be recognized in the balance of social forces. Hence spontaneity was quickly manipulated into a strategy that would accommodate working class interests in the collective appropriation of the means of production. In this lies the causes both of the movement's immediate success and of its long term failure, since, unlike a strike movement that might endanger the immediate interests of the participants or confront them with violence, it emerged under relatively favourable conditions, and was immediately espoused by the most dedicated elements within the UGTA. However, this factor also meant

that the movement lacked the capacity to resist the manipulations of the bureaucracy. in undermining their full control over the properties as will be demonstrated later.

In its initial phases, self-management encountered various immediate obstacles. First, not all the workers in the abandoned enterprises were willing to move towards collective appropriation and management. Raptis, one of the active participants, noted that;

"Because there was a near-total vacuum in effective political power and a vast agricultural, industrial, commercial and rented sector, there was a great temptation to make individual expropriation of 'empty property', albeit via a collective 'management committee'" (15).

Duprat cites some examples where the workers in agricultural enterprises in some regions demanded the division and distribution of the abandoned farms into lots of 40 to 50 hectares (16). Second, the Provisional Executive whose functions, due to its nature and to the conditions under which it was created, were essentially to set the basis for future cooperation with the Algerian middle classes, were not at all enthusiastic that instituting self-management or giving official recognition to the management committees. Thus "far from encouraging the bleeding of men and properties, in which case risking the birth, by the movement of workers management, of an Algeria very different from the planned model, on the contrary (the Provisional Executive) sought the return (of the colons) and worked for the paralysis of the workers' initiatives" (17). After the number of abandoned colon properties had greatly increased, a decree published on 24 August 1962 put them under the protection of the administration of the 'biens vacants' which guaranteed the rights of the owners of these properties and appealed to them to come back and resume their management. If the owners failed to return within thirty days after the publication of the decree, the

prefects were authorized to appoint managers to run the enterprises, chosen for their "technical and professional competence". Thus self-management was not authorized by the highly unstable political authorities which, by their very nature were pledged to Franco-Algerian cooperation and looked to the French to save Algeria from chaos (18).

Moreover, for a variety of reasons, the army, which did not have a unified view towards self-management, took over large parts of the abandoned farms, placing them either under its direct control, in the case of larger estates, or distributing them among ex-combatants. In doing this the army in many cases dissolved the spontaneously formed management committees by force and expelled the original permanent workers (19). There were also cases where local notables and some commanders of the interior took hold of vacant farms on their own initiatives and for their own benefit (20). Thus approximately 400,000 hectares of European land disappeared during the period of confusion, either sold by the departing colons or taken over by the army and later turned into special cooperatives for war veterans (Cooperatives Agricoles de Production des Anciens Moudjahidine) (CAPAM).

These setbacks, however, can be seen as spontaneous and ad hoc reactions from different elements to self-management which, like the workers themselves, tried to benefit from the state of confusion and chaos created by the colons' departure. They were in many cases a reflection of the factionalism that developed out of the war situation and did not yet represent the development of a coherent and unified body of opposition to self-management as a system of workers' control over the means of production. This did not in fact come into being until self-management was constituted and legalized by the government. By then the movement had acquired political implications as a national

system which would crystallize the interests of workers, and ceased merely to represent a form of more immediate benefit for workers rather than for the local bourgeoisie. It was developed to provide the workers with an economic and political base from which they could defend their interests. In developing in this direction the self-management movement was bound to antagonize some social forces whose interests lay in replacing the colons both economically and politically. Thus the elite and those employed in the administration and the Party saw self-management not only as a limitation on their own economic and social advancement, but also as a threat to their position. However, as self-management gradually became an accomplished fact and was increasingly supported in various quarters, the issue for these social forces became one of containing and undermining the new movement rather than abolishing it altogether, which they could not do.

## The Constitution of Self-Management

The recognition of self-management as an economic strategy of management was a practical, political and ideological necessity (21), given the economic disorder and the urgent need to deal effectively with the 'biens vacants' in a way that would guarantee the resumption of production. This was apparent in a speech delivered by Ben Bella introducing the March Decrees which inaugurated the self-management system:

"Two solutions were presented: should (the 'biens vacants') be entrusted to the management of the state? should they be managed by the workers? In fact it was impossible to hesitate. The principle of self-management of the enterprises by their workers was already written in the realities of the Algerian revolution by the spontaneous and conscious action of the Algerian working masses. The strong movement of the Comite de Gestion which had spread all over the country awaited simply its legislation in all its revolutionary entirety" (22).

This legislation came in two stages; the first was driven by the utmost necessity to defuse the situation and also to bring an end to the chaos in the abandoned enterprises. It was represented by two decrees No. 62-3 and 62-3 issued on October 22 and 23, 1962. These aimed to put an end to speculation and to forbid further transactions involving abandoned properties in order to prevent their appropriation by large landlords and private owners, and to give legal standing to those management committees which had already been established. The property rights of the French owners would be preserved if they returned, but the decree also stated that the committees should continue to participate in the management of the farms. Between this stage and the second there was a period of semi-official silence over the issue of self-management, in

which only a few comments on the decrees and on the inauguration of the management committees were made in the press and the National Assembly (23). The enterprises controlled by the management committees lacked a definite and clear form of organization and "there were as many forms of self-management as the number of enterprises" (24). All indications seemed to point at to a belief, at least on the part of the government, that the colons would soon return after order was restored but when this did not happen the government had to act to put an end to the situation of uncertainty. Three important decrees were issued on 18, 22, and 28 March 1963 marking the beginning of a new era in which Algeria became known for its system of self-management and 'socialism'. These decrees, which were largely inspired by the Yugoslav model of workers' self-management (25), were the work of a few left wing intellectuals led by Mohammed Harbi and Michel Raptis, and represented a profound transformation of the government's attitude towards the self-management movement (26).

These decrees came to affect 1,200,000 hectares of land, 1000 industrial and commercial enterprises (27), and 200,000 apartments and houses. Not all the concerns affected were put under self-management, since the decree of 22 March provided that those enterprises considered to be of 'national importance' would be placed under state control and managed directly by the state. Thus self-management was limited to enterprises of local importance, which restricted its application in the industrial sector in particular. This exception was used later by the government as a legal means of converting self-managed enterprises into state-controlled ones; a decree issued in 9 May 1963 allowed property and enterprises to be put under state protection if there were 'public disturbances' in their methods of management

and production (28).

### **Self-Management as a Source of Political Power**

"The March decrees legalized what was already fact, making the quasi-spontaneous establishment by the workers of the management committees in estates abandoned by the French settlers appear to be the fruit of a socialist initiative on the part of the Government" (29). At the same time they ended a relatively long period of uncertainty and speculation concerning not only the fate of the 'biens vacants' but also the organization of the economy and society as a whole. Many alternative policies to deal with the new situation existed, the government could have adopted the workers' action as its own and legalized a de facto situation, or have intervened directly to transform the abandoned properties into state-owned enterprises, or have allowed private owners to purchase and appropriate them, or have distributed the lands to landless peasants as promised in the Tripoli Programme. The actual course of events showed that Ben Bella's government went all the way in recognizing and supporting the workers' action in seizing the vacated enterprises. This became apparent not only in the March Decrees but also in the later decrees of July and October 1963. These completed the nationalization, of all the colonial concerns especially the landed strata, including those not covered by the March Decrees.

It is difficult to determine the real intentions of Ben Bella's regime in instituting self-management without considering contemporary political and economic conditions, and the impact of the system upon the social and political structure and upon the regime's efforts to consolidate itself. In other words, to state that the institution of



self-management was a mere manoeuvre on the part of the newly established government, or that it represented a genuine attempt to build socialism, without incorporating this into the wider context of the system and the nature of the regime, would amount to drawing general conclusions from an uncertain and confused situation in which a multiplicity of motivations and aims existed.

None of the documents of the wartime FLN contained a well defined policy and programme for dealing with the organization of economy and society after independence. Allusions to agrarian reform were simply "an instrument of propaganda destined to mobilize wider participation in the armed struggle" (30). Even the Tripoli Programme which drew up the basic principles of economic policy saw "economic planning and the control of the economy by the state" with the participation of the workers in management as a 'vital component' in building up an independent and prosperous economy. It also envisaged an agrarian reform that would follow the principles of the:

"restriction of holdings according to crops and production, expropriation of holdings in excess of the maximum to be decided, free grants of expropriated lands to landless peasants or to those with insufficient land, the democratic organization of the peasants into production cooperatives, and the creation of state-owned farms on parts of the expropriated land managed by the state with the participation of the workers of these farms in their management and profits" (31).

This reveals very clearly that self-management was neither anticipated nor considered by the leaders of the revolution to be the system upon which Algeria's economic and in particular agricultural organization was to be based. However, as self-management became a 'fait accompli' especially in the socially and economically most important sector -agriculture- it became an issue too large to be ignored by the political leaders at a time of factional division and

infighting, with each faction claiming to have its authentic roots among the people and in particular among the peasants who had carried the armed struggle on their shoulders.

One of the major priorities for the new state was to stop the nascent middle classes from taking possession of the properties vacated by the colons. Ben Bella repeatedly attacked the 'bourgeoisie'; "there is no place in the country for the bourgeoisie, for those 4 to 5 per cent who have found the means of massing fortunes" (32). Thus in order to legitimize its claim to represent the interests of 95 per cent of the Algerian people it was imperative for the government to try to find a way to wrest economic power from these groups. Self-management served at the time the most effective means of accomplishing this task. However, significant part of the rural population, whose entire struggle had been essentially for the land, were deeply committed to acquiring jobs in the vacated farms of the colons. The high rate of illiteracy within this population and the limited size of the other economic sectors made the agricultural sector the most secure source of employment. Thus although self-management did not concern more than a fraction of the rural population, mainly the agricultural workers on the colonial lands which were themselves geographically distant from the war, for the winning faction of the FLN it represented the fulfilment of a promise to the rural population, expressed in the slogan 'the land belongs to those who till it'.

Moreover, self-management provided Ben Bella's regime with a precious and urgently needed political and ideological legitimacy, giving it the image of being revolutionary and 'building socialism'. This was important for a regime engaged in bitter fighting with internal opponents and political factions, all claiming to represent the Algerian

people, and forming a fragile alliance among relatively heterogeneous groups and forces. Without trying to discredit his zeal and commitment to self-management, it was natural for Ben Bella to be concerned with the introduction of this system, since self-management as a revolutionary measure could be a useful method of discrediting the regime's adversaries and of developing a rural constituency by mobilizing the support of the peasants (33). Furthermore, "Ben Bella's popularity was greatly enhanced by the establishment of the self-management system which strengthened his hand against his ally-turned-enemy Khider" (34). Thus the political advantages gained by instituting self-management helped to transform this system from a purely pragmatic form of action into a political choice affirmed in October 1963. At that stage the government decided to liquidate the remaining French-owned landholdings, and to nationalize a number of industries which it subsequently converted into workers' self-managed enterprises.

## **The Deficiencies and Contradictions of the March Decrees**

The concern with the politics of the self-management scheme was reflected not only in the fact that the government paid far more attention to its 'socialist' ideological dimension than to the self-managed enterprises themselves (35), but also in the inherent structural and functional contradictions and discrepancies in the March Decrees. The hasty formulation of these rules reveals that "the state had allied itself with the power base and not with the issue as such" (36). In the first place the decrees did not take adequate account of the general illiteracy, lack of knowledge and experience of the workers. If the latter knew of the existence of the decrees, they did not have an adequate understanding of their contents (37), and no officials, either from the state or the Party, made any serious efforts to explain these decrees to them (38). In fact any sense of the need to create simple institutions which could effectively permit the masses of illiterate and uninformed people to exercise direct and real management, seemed to have been alien to the authors of the texts (39). This opened up possibilities for the intervention of the state bureaucracy in matters which were supposed to be the workers' concern. Thus worker participation in the establishment and elections of the self-management organs was reduced to a minimum. Juliet Minces, writing in 1967 about the application of the system to agriculture, stated that "the members of the management committees, instead of being elected, are frequently appointed by the 'trustee authorities' i.e. the National Office of Agrarian Reform (ONRA), the prefecture, the local section of the Party, or other administrative authorities" (40). Similarly Duprat reported

that only 40 management committees out of the 250 existing in the Mitidja in June 1964 had 'really' democratic elections (41).

Complaints about the duplication and overlapping of functions within the organs of self-management and the ambiguous nature and role of each were commonplace in descriptions of the March Decrees and their rules. The task of the General Assembly, for example, and that of the Workers' Council was almost identical, so that there was little point in having both. Both organs had little power compared to the management committee or the director. The role of the latter was so contradictory and ambiguous in that he was, on the one hand, the executive agent of the decisions taken by the management committee and by the Workers' Council under the authority of the president, and on the other hand, the representative of the state within the enterprise and could thus oppose all decisions that did not conform to the national plan. The ambiguity of his role was compounded by the fact that the president, who was normally an ordinary worker, found it difficult to find the necessary time to check all the matters proposed for his signature (42). This gave the director, who was often the only literate member of the concern and was thus usually called upon to explain the decrees (43), the opportunity to assume for himself alone the responsibilities of the decisions concerning the daily running of the enterprise. Moreover the decrees had already given the director very wide powers and had in fact situated him outside the self-management framework, since he could veto any decision on technical grounds without having his power challenged.

The explicit division between permanent and seasonal workers (which effectively denied the latter all the rights enjoyed by the former) under the pretext that "the seasonal workers would not have the long-

term interest of the enterprise at heart and would, consequently, act in an openly instrumental fashion" (44), led to a straightforward exploitation of the seasonal workers, who were hired to do the hardest tasks at derisory wages (45), and to the effective division of the workers into two groups, thus weakening their power vis-a-vis the state and the bureaucracy (46).

### **The Function of Self-Management**

Theoretically, self-management is a socio-economic system which supposes that the human resources of a society are mobilized to the fullest extent by activating everyone's participation. In practical terms it involves the direct ownership, control, and management of the means of production and of the surplus produced by those who operate them. It is an expression of the existence of 'social property', to be achieved essentially through economic decentralization and, in particular, workers' self-management. In the context of the self-management system economic enterprises are seen as the property of society as a whole, while the employees of each enterprise are to manage them on society's behalf. Decision-making power is rooted in the base and is vested in workers' councils which are elected freely by the workers. These councils take decisions about the short and long term operation of their enterprise at all levels including production, marketing, and the distribution of revenues. The councils are headed by a general manager or a director, who is also elected by the workers and is supposed to run the enterprise's business, execute the decisions of the workers' council and other bodies of management as well as representing the workers. The role of the state is mainly to coordinate the activities of the various enterprises and to insure the avoidance of competi-

tion among them on the basis of efficiency. These are the main principles of the functioning of the self-management system, which is meant to involve management by the workers of their means of production (47). Examining Algerian self-management against this theoretical background requires a brief look at the general socio-political environment that surrounded the creation of this system and the difficulties it encountered in its relationships with the state institutions created to cater for its needs.

### General Environment

The contradictions that were contained in the March Decrees were to prove very vital in the next, and most important stage, in which self-management came into existence and attempted to prove itself to be the optimal system in economic and social terms. The importance of these contradictions lies in the fact that they represented the sphere of conflict between the self-management system and its opponents. This is not to say that if these contradictions had been removed or overcome, self-management would have prospered and expanded, since the forces opposed to it not only existed but managed to occupy the positions from which to launch an assault. In fact instituting any kind of self-management would have been a revolutionary step, but only a step in a long process of social struggle which could not be settled without long and enduring efforts to release the creative initiatives of the workers and to undermine the power of the forces whose interests it threatened.

A study of Algerian self-management institutions would show that "it was a case of theory improvised upon the spur of the moment to correspond with practice" (48). This practice or the reality in which

self-management existed was anything but supportive of a system based on workers owning and managing the means of production. Although the system had been initiated by the workers themselves, they were also driven by fears of unemployment and the prospect of starvation. Self-management did not represent an offensive against the power of the colonial bourgeoisie as much as a defensive move against the intrusion of the nascent Algerian middle classes. No matter how successful the workers were in taking these defensive measures, they remained quantitatively and qualitatively weak and lacked an effective theory and leadership. However, the nascent middle classes, the large landowners, industrialists, merchants, and high functionaries in the state apparatus, were not in a much better position, as "many of these people were able to keep their wealth at the cost of lying low and using their economic power base politically for defensive purpose only" (49). Under constant attack from various quarters and on many occasions identified with those who benefited from colonialism, the upper and middle classes had to rely on indirect action carried out by forces which were not completely identical to them but to which they had various connections, either by origin or by shared values and ideological affiliation, such as the newly established bureaucracy in the administration, the Party and the army. In this sense, given the degree of independence it possessed due to the weakness of other social groups, the bureaucracy could cater for the interests of those social groups, from which its members mainly came. Although its action was not fully representative of the rising middle classes no matter how strong the ties connecting the two, there was no doubt, given its composition and the way its members were able to take up their positions, that it would adopt an antagonistic attitude towards workers' attempt to assume the ownership and management of the



means of production. In fact it is in this context that we must investigate the difficulties facing the system of self-management, which crystallized the struggle within Algerian society over the nature of the whole future course of socio-economic development.

### The Structure of Self-management

As we asserted earlier, the ambiguities in the March Decrees enabled the bureaucracy to assign the tasks of effective management and the daily running of the enterprises to the representatives of the government on the management committees. However, the appointment of the director as the state's representative, with power to veto any decision which did not conform to the 'national plan' was, as Benhouria correctly noted, not of itself the actual instrument that rendered the autonomous function of self-management difficult; it was the formation of the supervisory bodies from the successors of the colonial administration that was primarily responsible. In fact self-management does not in principle rule out the establishment of some form of incorporation of individual enterprises within the national economy through the creation of economic activities which are centrally planned and controlled by national bodies. What matters is the way in which this incorporation is carried out and the nature of the superstructure required. In Algeria, as summed up by Ian Clegg;

"In the absence of any theory on what the relations between the (self-managed) enterprise and the centre should be, the superstructure was pieced together in an ad hoc fashion. Each successive stage in this process placed the comites more firmly under central control until the administration came to control every essential aspect of the economic activity of the comites, rendering the concept of autogestion derisory" (50).

The process of creating the superstructure of self-management involved the establishment of a series of institutions whose declared

aim was to coordinate the activities of the self-managed enterprises and to integrate them with the entire economy as well as providing them with technical and financial assistance. Alongside the legislation of the March Decrees the Office Nationale de la Reforme Agraire (ONRA) was created as an independent institution of the Ministry of Agriculture. Another institution to supervise self-management had already been created for abandoned hotels, restaurants, and cafes, the Office Nationale de Tourisme (ONAT). In April 1964, the Bureau National d'Animation du Secteur Socialiste (BNASS) was set up with the task of "education, stimulation, coordination and supervision of the socialist sector" (51). Since it duplicated the functions of ONRA, BNASS became confined to industrial self-management, and when self-management was restricted to agriculture after the incorporation of the industrial enterprises into the state economic sector, BNASS was left without any real function and was eventually dissolved.

These institutions were not in fact created from nothing but grew out of institutions which had been set up before independence and kept the essentials of their structure and personnel unchanged. ONRA, for example, was developed out of the SAP- the Societes Agricoles de Prevoyance, created in 1952 to provide credit and technical advice for small farmers but which "behaved like a conservative banker rather than an imaginative innovators" (52). In 1965 ONRA had nineteen engineers, only eight of whom were Algerians (53). Through the tasks assigned to them and by exploiting the prevailing situation of need and inexperience on the part of the self-managed enterprises, these institutions were gradually able to deprive them of their autonomy in production, investment, marketing, financing etc. ONRA, headed by Ali Mehsas, who believed in state control and not in self-management (54), was soon to

possess wide powers vis-a-vis the self-managed enterprises in agriculture through the different specialized local bodies (55). Thus as well as interfering in the inner workings of the management committees as far as elections were concerned, ONRA controlled the granting of credits, the purchase of equipment and the sale of produce on the self-managed farms.

The criteria used by these institutions in dealing with self-managed enterprises were purely profit and market oriented. The provision of credit, for example, followed strict rules and required levels of productivity and profitability which were often very difficult for the newly established enterprises to meet. Thus self-managed enterprises were often forced to borrow from private sources at inflated interest rates. Difficulties and obstacles were met by these enterprises every time they turned to the appropriate government institution which was supposed to be providing assistance to them. And since these institutions controlled almost the whole range of activities of the self-managed enterprises, including wages, inputs and outputs, one can imagine the disorder that characterized the functions of these enterprises and hindered their development (56).

The effects of these difficulties upon the self-management system in general and in agriculture in particular were tremendous; they "created the conditions that made workers' self-management appear as a non-viable alternative to socio-economic development " (57). With personnel trained under the colonial administration who had a deep animosity towards the system of self-management and others who had only minimum of experience or competence, 'self-management' was soon to have no more than a fictional existence. Thus what appeared in the early stages of the development of self-management as incompetence and

disorganization on the part of the administration, resulting in many scandals that were reported in the national press (58), became a means to enable the bureaucracy to indulge in a social and economic struggle against the workers' movement. The bureaucracy began to assert values and practices that would institutionalize a form of development in which it could consolidate its own socio-economic position and benefit the forces from which it had emerged or which it sought to join. In order to combine this task with the fact that it was asked to implement a programme with 'socialist' goals, the bureaucracy's struggle had to be carried out behind a facade of revolutionary and left-wing rhetoric, claiming to represent the interests of the workers while in effect undermining the independence of their movement and benefiting the private sector.

The manifestation of this struggle and the awareness of its implications on the part of the workers took numerous forms, notably protests and complaints expressed by workers on many occasions, particularly at the various congresses held at that time. These protests were quite revealing of bureaucratic infringements and manipulations aimed to deprive the workers of their autonomy and attempts to turn the self-management system into a mere propaganda achievement for the bureaucracy. Words such as 'dictators', 'newbosses', and 'caids', were very commonly used by the workers to describe the directors and the officials of the state administration, who were accused of exceeding their rights and in acting as bosses towards the management committees (59). In a Congress in March 1964, the workers in the self-managed industrial sector voiced their concern and criticisms of the bureaucracy which was trying to create every possible obstacle in the way of healthy function of their enterprises. The spoke about the "messieurs,

the civil servants who on the one hand approve President Ben Bella and on the other do nothing but create problems for us" (60). As well as discussing their technical problems and pointing the finger towards the state officials, the delegates demanded, after comparing their status with that of the private sector, more organization for themselves in order to resist the manoeuvres of this sector and those of the bureaucracy and its attempts to "suffocate the experience of self-management". They attacked the "juridical and administrative structure of the state (which) does not correspond to the socialist option" and pointed out that "the actual state apparatus does not help self-management, rather it has sabotaged it". One delegate stated that "we did not fight for the flag, we did not fight against France but against oppression" and declared that "another revolution is to start which concerns politics and the economy- socialist revolution starts only today" (61). A clear description of the nature of the forces which were in real control of self-management and implied a recognition of the class nature of the struggle with the bureaucracy, was made by an agricultural worker in a self-managed farm in Ain-Temouchent in the course of the Congress of the Federation National de Travailleurs de la Terre in December 1964, who after comparing the life style of the workers with that of the officials declared that "we should liquidate the bourgeoisie which is leading us ..... Give us democracy and we will show you how we will defeat them" (62). Another worker declared that "the March Decrees gave the workers the right to manage their farms, but certain functionaries prevent them from doing so". Voices of discontent and attacks on the state officials were very frequent, criticising them not only for encroaching on the autonomy of the workers' management and for ~~the persistence of poverty and the lack of improvement in the workers'~~

standard of living, but also on their extravagant life style and their ambivalent attitudes towards the workers. As one delegate declared in the same Congress "the functionaries of ONRA come to us in their 404\* and tell us that there is no money to employ the unemployed workers" (63). Despite the fact that 300 out of 700 delegates were ONRA officials, the final resolution of the Congress expressed the workers' demands and their understanding of who their real enemies were (64).

It also happened that workers in certain enterprises translated their protests into collective petitions and written complaints to the ministry concerned, or to the highest levels in the state, condemning the bureaucratic practices of the state officials and their infringements of their autonomy, or exposing the malpractice of particular persons in the administration and demanding their punishment (65). Although not part of a nationally organized campaign, strikes on the self-management farms took place in 1964, protesting against the difficulties encountered with the administration and the long delays in the payment of salaries, highlighting the fact that the workers were becoming increasingly disillusioned and alienated from the means of production they were supposed to own and manage by themselves and the fact that they felt, or believed becoming simply wage labourers in enterprises controlled by the state.

---

\* The Peugeot 404 was the status car of the Algerian Bureacracy at that time.

## The Impact of Bureaucratic Control on Self-Management

This perception on the part of the workers enabled a clear line to be drawn between them and the bureaucracy in the running of self-managed enterprises. The workers were no longer confronted directly with the owner of the means of production but with the bureaucracy, which was just as antagonistic to their interests and autonomy. How did the bureaucracy act vis-a-vis self-management, and what was the outcome of its actions?

Although the importance of the role played by the bureaucracy in a society like Algeria can hardly be stressed sufficiently, it was difficult in the 1960's to try and define its members other than as a faction of the petty bourgeoisie. To define it as a class, as Clegg does, encounters serious objections relating to the basic criteria for the determination of class and to the fact that members of the bureaucracy also belong to a variety of other social groups. Although the bureaucracy enjoyed considerable material and social privileges, which distinguished it from the rest of the working population (66), this factor is not a sufficient condition to enable it to be considered as a class, since class nature is not determined by wealth and privileges but by relations to the means of production and the social reproduction of these relations. Hence the importance of the bureaucracy's attitude towards the issue of a self-management lay not in the fact that this somehow contributed to its definition as a class but in the impact this action was to have on subsequent socio-economic development.

By various manipulations and manoeuvres, the bureaucracy was able to put serious obstacles in the way of self-management, which not only succeeded in limiting its expansion and its extension to the rest of

the economy, but also reduced its effective size eventually restricting it to part of the agricultural sector after having undermined its operations in the industrial sector. Certain members of the bureaucracy were able, by various means, to obtain significant material rewards and privileges which facilitated the emergence of new interests and aspirations within its ranks. This action had the effect of safeguarding the interests of the Algerian middle classes and new links developed between them in the process of preserving the rights of private ownership and in efforts to incorporate the interests of the private sector with those of the public sector. An equally important link between the bureaucracy and the middle classes was that they took a common stand vis-a-vis the workers. Thus if self-management was tolerated for reasons beyond the control of both the bureaucracy and the middle classes, it had to be limited and as far as possible deprived of its social content as a system of workers' control and management.

Looking at self-management from a wider perspective shows that although the petty bourgeoisie was divided and factionalized at the political level, its leaders realized that they could only establish a socio-economic base for their rule by tolerating and endorsing the workers' initiatives, in a bid to associate themselves with their own claim to represent the interests of the people against those of colonialism. In practical terms, the leadership tried to remove the autonomous social content of these initiatives by placing its own bureaucratic faction at the head of the self-management movement and by using various manipulations, both to regulate its action and to limit the workers' initiatives. However this group, which was under pressure from various sources, did not have the same priorities as other factions of the petty bourgeoisie which supported the establishment of a strong



state apparatus and saw workers' management as an impediment to enhanced and sustained development. The former had to reconcile, neutralize, and eliminate different centres of power and social forces. It also sought to establish a popular base among the workers and peasants in the face of the urgent need to build up the economy. This may account for the lack of consistency and for the improvisation on the part of the political leadership with regard to vital matters of social and economic organization and to the precise role of the state in society.

The outcome was a constant divergence between the declared aims and the actual methods of constructing society and the economy, with the bureaucracy constituting the most important instrument in this process and a factor which helped to produce new social groups and interests. In other words, there were inconsistencies between the nature of the forces in control of the state apparatus and the administration on the one hand and the tasks assigned to them on the other, between the declared policies and the methods of implementing them, resulting in a great deal of incoherence in the policies themselves and major inefficiencies in their application.

## Developments Leading to Political Change

These, then, were the objective conditions that rendered Ben Bella's regime permanently vulnerable. Bureaucratic control over the economic machinery was exerted on a larger scale than the political leaders intended. This often resulted in inconsistencies and improvisation in policy-making and also in a general failure to arrive at a defined programme of development.

The regime proclaimed its intention to build socialism in many documents and speeches issued and delivered by its leaders. The most important of these was drawn up during the FLN Congress of April 1964, known as the Algiers Charter (Charte d'Alger). This charter, drawn up by left wing supporters of Ben Bella, spelled out the aims and ideology of the revolution. Apart from its first section which emphasized the importance of Islam and denounced the impregnation of Arab culture with Western values, the Charter exhibited an overtly Marxist analysis that emphasized the idea of class struggle and the necessity of an alliance between workers and peasants and the struggle against exploitative private property both in the countryside and the city. It openly stated that;

"the role of the urban workers, together with the agricultural workers of the self-managed sector, will become more and more decisive because the social bases of revolutionary power can only be the working masses allied to the poor peasants of the traditional sector and the revolutionary intellectual elements" (67).

The Charter stressed that the self-management system was the principal economic organization guiding the transition to 'socialism' and stated that it had "brought about the need to extend agrarian reform and nationalization in agriculture and industry" (68). It also emphasized

the "necessity to build a state of a new kind, which will express the interests of the peasants and workers and become more and more an instrument of production and not of coercion" (69). It went on to warn of the dangers of;

"new and rapidly developing social strata (which) threaten to appear in the form of the instinctive anti-socialism of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (and) which is forming in the machinery of the administration, the state and the economy" (70).

It was stated that the solution was to assign key positions to militants who possessed sufficient political training and revolutionary consciousness to guard the revolution from 'bourgeois and petty bourgeois deviation'. In order to achieve the aims of the revolution, the charter emphasized the necessity of creating an avant-garde party separate from the state and based neither on the masses nor on an elite of intellectuals and professionals. Finally, the Charter promoted the ideology of anti-imperialist struggle as the cornerstone of the advancement of the revolution. This can only be translated into an "uncompromising policy of national independence", by rigorous control of the economy based on planning and the gradual nationalization of private capital, and into continuous "denunciation of imperialism" and alignment with the Arab, African, and Asian peoples fighting against imperialism and with all democratic forces of the world for liberation, democracy, and peace.

In its essence the Charter affirmed the socialist choice of Algeria and appeared sufficiently revolutionary for Henri Alleg, a leading Algerian communist and a co-editor of the communist daily Alger Republicain, to believe that "from now on nothing can make (Algeria) retrace her steps. She will advance irresistibly along the way marked out, 'the way of socialism'" (71). The essence of the Charter, however,

can be traced to the regime's attempt to inject an ideology into its socialism (72), which permitted Harbi's Marxist group to push for a radical and socialist programme, capitalizing on the inability on the part of the army, now the main faction opposing Ben Bella, to find a body of intellectuals capable of drawing up an alternative document. However, Harbi's group had no social base of its own to push its line through, and in the absence of the revolutionary avant-garde party they wished to create, could only fulfil their own ideas through the very state and party bureaucracy which they were attacking (73). Ben Bella tried to make use of the second Congress of the FLN in a bid to gather support for himself by giving Algeria an ideological platform and by mobilizing the Party against his opponents.

However this Congress marked the beginning of a profound new split between Ben Bella and the army, controlled by Boumedienne, which was only temporarily patched up in return for several compromises by each side. These included the distribution of the higher posts of the Party in such a way as to guarantee the army a sizable presence in the Political Bureau, the incorporation of the army's modifications of the original text of the Charter emphasizing Algeria's Arabo-Islamic culture and heritage, the exclusion from the Political Bureau of the leftist elements and Mohammed Harbi and Abdelaziz Zardani, the authors of the Charter, together with mounting pressure against the Communist Party and its influence. These compromises enabled Ben Bella to legitimize his position and to strengthen his hand against the opposition (74).

However, Ben Bella's tactic of "reducing the number of factions in play ~~within his regime, instead of containing them and submitting their interplay to binding arbitration~~" (75), did not come to an end with the

FLN Congress. In fact it became evident that his strategy was being extended to include the army, on which the regime had depended heavily to eliminate and quell other opposing factions. In other words, Ben Bella became determined to eliminate Boumedienne and the Oujda clan from his alliance. This was implied in a number of measures which he took either to counterbalance the power of the army by creating the 'people's militia' linked to him and by promoting ex-wilaya leaders, known for their animosity to the regular army, to higher posts in the army, or by overtly dismissing Boumedienne's supporters from the government, such as Ahmed Medeghri and Kaid Ahmed. Moreover, Ben Bella started to move closer to the mass organizations of workers and students which shared his desire to reduce the power of the army, trying to re-establish the confidence of these organizations in him. Thus after a period of control imposed by the FLN and government officials on the activities of the UGTA and other organizations outside the FLN, considerable freedom was given to them and many of their demands for autonomy and independence were accepted. Ben Bella's addresses to the workers showed a remarkable shift in tone, away from pleading for hard work, moderation and a low profile to the affirmation of workers' rights to manage their enterprises. At the agricultural workers' Congress in December 1964 mentioned above, Ben Bella accused the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture of exceeding their powers, promised support to the workers' union against the intervention of ONRA, and supported the affiliation of the agricultural workers to the UGTA (76). Ben Bella's shift in attitude towards the workers was illustrated further during the UGTA Congress in March 1965, in which, ~~after having been forced to accept an FLN appointed leadership at their first Congress in 1963, the delegates were allowed to elect a new~~

leadership whose members were known to be very critical of the more docile previous one and stubborn opponents of any infringements of the Union's autonomy. This attitude, which was also echoed in the Students' Union, can only be explained by Ben Bella's wish to appear as a champion of the people and his desire to acquire more popular support in order to silence his opponents. The outcome was a period of revolutionary fervour as the leftist forces inside and outside the FLN seized the opportunity to push for the application of the March Decrees and the Algiers Charter in a move which was only halted by the army coup.

#### **Ben Bella's Lack of Social Power**

The most striking feature of the 1965 coup d'etat was the comparative ease with which the army succeeded in ousting Ben Bella in spite of his apparent popularity. However, popularity is one thing and having a solid social power base another. Ben Bella did not create or at least did not sufficiently strengthen any independent institution which could serve his rule in the long term. Under Ben Bella the National Assembly and the Party lost much of their influence; the latter in particular became an instrument of coercion to prevent the growth of any independence on the part of the mass organizations and its popularity generally declined. Ben Bella's measures in favour of the workers and peasants were motivated more by his need to consolidate his power than out of concern for their well being or an expression of ideological commitment and were in fact a response to challenges from forces directly hostile to the proclaimed 'socialist option'. D. and M. Ottaway wrote:

"To every challenge (Ben Bella) responded with a concession to his opponents or with announcement of a popular decision, Khider tried to impose himself as the strong man of the regime, and Ben Bella reacted by publishing the March Decrees. Ait Ahmed openly defied Ben Bella in

the fall of 1963, and Ben Bella answered by nationalizing all remaining French lands. The army became a threatening ally, and Ben Bella turned to the UGTA, giving it the autonomy it demanded and even proposing to nationalize all private enterprise" (77).

Ben Bella's alliances were formed on an ad hoc basis and directed to serve his prime aim, the consolidation of his personal power, which had the effect of rendering the structure and composition of his regime incoherent (78). Thus his alliance with the revolutionary forces was based not on his identification with their aims and strategies, but on gaining more power and popularity for himself. At the same time he remained as mistrustful and afraid of these forces as ever, depriving them of an effective voice in the running of the country and also depriving himself of the chance of gaining any long term support which might emanate from popular initiatives. This situation reflected the true position of a leader claiming to be the sole representative of the people without translating this claim into more than rhetorical phrases.

Gradually the population became disillusioned and could no longer control the bureaucracy or prevent the opponents of the revolution from eroding its achievements. This was recognized, if somewhat belatedly, by Ben Bella himself in an interview in 1985, in which he admitted that those who surrounded him and shared his power "were essentially motivated by their own interests in extending their authority and in expropriating the initiatives of the people, in a situation that required revolutionary changes and purges" (79). Ben Bella also admitted that the people lacked the means to carry out the tasks assigned to them: "My historical mistake was that I did not act fast and give the power to those who had achieved in a short time of self-management, what had really amazed me.... had I released them at that

time (sic), had I armed them, a second revolution would have taken place" (80).

#### **The Coup d'Etat of 19 June 1965**

As his regime remained under constant threat and as he continued his 'juggling policy', Ben Bella became too weak to confront the army, without whose support he would never be able to stay in power. In fact when it became clear to Boumedienne that Ben Bella was not only determined to weaken the army's role in the state and society, but also to eliminate Boumedienne himself, the latter needed only to make contact with about thirty opponents of Ben Bella who occupied sensitive posts inside and outside the army (81) to assure his arrest and removal from power. The army coup d'etat, which took place in the early morning of 19 June 1965, suddenly exposed the fragility of Ben Bella's power and influence. It proved what the army officers had been expressing in private for some time, that "Ben Bella is nothing.... he has no force to back his power .... we could take care of him in a few hours and no one in the country would raise a voice in his defence" (82). In fact some voices were raised in the main cities of Algeria but they were too weak to affect the course of events.

In the first proclamation addressed to the people of Algeria and signed by Houari Boumedienne on behalf of the new Council of the Revolution, the coup leaders described their act as having been necessary to put an end to a 'dramatic situation' to which the revolution had reached. Accusations of "sordid calculation, political narcissism, and morbid love of power" (83), were directed against Ben Bella whose rule according to the proclamation had resulted in:

"personal power, (where) all national and regional institutions of the party and state are at the mercy of one



man who delegates power to suit himself, whose actions are dictated by unsound and improvised tactics and who imposes policies and men according to the mood of the moment, whim and caprice".

The proclamation went on to affirm that the continuity of the revolution should be based on 'efficiency' and that "realistic socialism based on the country's needs must replace day-to-day publicity-seeking socialism". It put strong emphasis on the necessity of "serious construction of a state which will survive governments and men".

### **What the Coup Really Represented**

In order to evaluate the effect of the coup upon Algeria's social and economic development, it is not enough to look only at the immediate causes that drove Boumedienne and his allies to act in this way, but also to assess the nature of the army, and how it regarded itself and its role in Algeria. In the first place, as a force which was created in specific conditions and drew its strength mainly from the peasantry, the army exhibited conservative ideological convictions generally very different from those of Ben Bella. This explains why its opposition to Ben Bella's regime was expressed in terms of the argument that Islamic and traditional values should be integrated with socialist and egalitarian values. Thus the army leaders were quick to announce in their first proclamation that "the radical transformation of our society cannot take place without taking into account our faith, our convictions, the secular traditions of our people and our moral values". They objected to the Marxist orientation of the Algiers Charter and to the existence of a group of foreigners among Ben Bella's advisors who inspired the adoption of Marxist doctrines as the ideological platform of his regime. These objections were openly expressed by Boumedienne

after the coup in an interview with al-Ahram where he stated that "Algerians did not launch the revolution of 1st November and sacrifice a million and a half martyrs in order to make it possible for an opportunist group of Trotskyites under the leadership of their apostle 'Raptis' or 'Pablo' as he calls himself, to rule Algeria and to become custodians of the revolutionaries in the name of socialism" (84). In his criticism of the previous regime and its "divorce from the traditions of Algerian society for which the revolution took place"

(emphasis added), Boumedienne stated that:

"when we wanted to talk about the past, they said let us talk about the future, the past has gone and let us leave it to the history. When we wanted to talk about our personality and about our Arabic and Islamic heritage, they said these are reactionary thoughts and that religion is the opium of people" (85).

Despite the fact that Boumedienne was not opposed to socialism in principle, he favoured orderly state control rather than 'anarchic' self-management (86). He saw socialism as "part of our historical heritage (and) a choice objectively imposed by the Algerian reality as a way of life and development" (87), but rejected Ben Bella's 'verbal socialism as a mere 'falsification' based on "the improvisation of the means and the use of emotions". He asked on one occasion "does socialism mean the nationalization of some cafes and small shops, and is it the enactment of a host of contradictory measures concerning the expropriation of properties and the nationalization of certain enterprises which have no economic importance for the state?" (88), and on another "where is the national plan? Where is the land reform about which we heard so much?" (89). For him "socialism is not this collection of incoherent and improvised measures of personal impulses. It is a lengthy and difficult process requiring a rational plan established in political, economic, and social terms" (90). It is natural, therefore, to

find Boumedienne justifying his action by referring to the inconsistencies, improvisation, and lack of efficiency that characterized Ben Bella's rule.

Secondly, and most important, is the fact that at no time did the army, which was establishing itself as an increasingly coherent force, view its position and role as one of a regular and classic army whose functions were confined to the defence of the country's borders. Instead it saw itself as the "worthy heir of the glorious Army of National Liberation". On many occasions Boumedienne asserted the claim that the ANP is not an army in the classic sense of the word; "our military men are not military men in the true sense" (sic) (91). On another occasion Boumedienne stated that;

"The ALN was created from those who took up arms without any previous training or conventional military experience to fight the colonialists, and from among them also the ANP was established after independence. Who are they? They are the people, and they are the revolution" (92).

In this general atmosphere it is hard to imagine that the army or its leaders could be apolitical or accept a role in the shadow of Ben Bella's cult of personality, let alone that it should be prepared to be weakened or undermined. On the contrary, it saw itself as a bearer of a historical message, and considered its action in overthrowing Ben Bella to be the embodiment of the aspirations of the people from which the army "sprang and from which it draws both its strength and raison d'etre" (93). Thus it never regarded its action as a military coup; rather it was a 'historical commitment' or "the style of revolutionary legitimacy practised by the militants in order to save their revolution from the deviation, inaction, and the sickness of the cult of personality which characterized the rule of Ben Bella" (94).  
Thirdly, given the importance and the weight of the army in the

politics of Algeria and the fact that it had become the most powerful and organized force in the country, it was quite natural that such a force should react sharply to any attempt to weaken or undermine it. Thus, in the light of Ben Bella's attitude to the army and his manoeuvres to divide it and prevent it from constituting a power base which might compete with his own personal power, the coup d'etat represented a 'legitimate' reaction, a defensive act on the part of the Oujda clan which saw its existence threatened by Ben Bella's policy and intentions (95). This threat was expressed by the various attempts on Ben Bella's part which have been mentioned briefly above (96) to divide the army and eliminate its leaders. It was intensified after the reconciliation between Ben Bella and Ait Ahmed, whose violent revolt against Ben Bella was put down by the army. This not only involved negotiating the release of Ait Ahmed, who had been sentenced to death, and a general pardon for his supporters, but also his incorporation into the government as Foreign Minister in place of Abdelaziz Boutaflika, member of the Oujda clan and a close supporter of Boumedienne (97). The fact that the Second Afro-Asian Conference was due to open in Algiers in June 1965 might have pushed Boumedienne to act more quickly in order not to let Ben Bella gain more international popularity and prestige.

What political changes resulted from the coup? From the subsequent course of events and from eyewitness accounts, it seems that the coup was masterminded and executed by a small group of army leaders led by Boumedienne. The group then attempted to incorporate as many political groups as possible into the Council of the Revolution in order to "avoid giving the impression that the army, which was not popular in the country, acted alone and that Algeria was held by a military dictatorship" (98). Thus the composition of the Council of the Revolution

was not revealed until July 5; it consisted of 26 members and was assigned the task of functioning as the "supreme instance of the Revolution" until a new constitution was drawn up which would redefine the structures of authority (99). Its composition indicated that Boumedienne and his group had been fairly successful in winning over a significant number of politicians and army leaders from Ben Bella's regime; ten out of the seventeen original members of the defunct Political Bureau became members of the Council of the Revolution and only two members of this Bureau, Ben Alla and Neccashe, in addition to Ben Bella himself, were arrested. This seemed to confirm Boumedienne's claim that his action "did not aim at changing the regime but only replacing the president" (100). In the face of the role played by the army and the Boumedienne group before the coup, this claim might have had substance, as no major political change would be likely if Ben Bella was simply removed and the already inactive institutions he had created such as the Political Bureau and the National Assembly were to be formally abolished. However, given Ben Bella's role and his impact on political development as a result of the concentration of power in his hands, his removal was bound to have a profound effect on the course of socio-economic development. However, these changes did not have the same impact at all social, economic, and political levels because of the character and priorities of the Ben Bella regime and also because of the composition of the new alliance.

The new regime represented a new and broad alliance in which Boumedienne, unlike Ben Bella, managed to act effectively as the arbiter of the interplay between the factions (101). Boumedienne was able to incorporate the ex-wilaya leaders within his alliance, together with the two most prominent figures from the Ben Bella regime, Mehsas

and Bouma'za, and others known for their technical competence and expertise rather than their political affiliation or beliefs. None of the leaders outside the Oujda clan who were expelled during the Ben Bella regime were brought into the Boumedienne alliance, which suggests continuity in the exclusion of those leaders who supported liberal and capitalist development. Nevertheless, the alliance was a broad one as Boumedienne tried to incorporate a large number of factions into his government. This had the advantage of ensuring relative stability for some time and the disadvantage of virtually paralyzing any decision-making (102). Thus it was not until the end of 1967 that "the internal profile of the regime had been effectively rationalized, the factions reduced to a manageable number. With the ensuing stability, it was possible for coherent policy-making at last to be undertaken (103).

On the level of policies, the new regime was quick to emphasize the continuity of the revolution and its socialist orientation set out in the March Decrees and the Algiers Charter, and to warn against any deviation from their principles. As one member of the Council of the Revolution declared;

"I warn all those who doubt, all those who have unjustified hope in seeing us change our present policies and jeopardize the gains of the revolution, I tell them with force and frankness that anybody who sets himself against our present policies, .... against the decision of the (Party) congress contained in the Algiers Charter, will be crushed by the revolution" (104).

The new regime stressed that the course of the Algerian revolution would not be changed. Ben Bella was blamed for every deviation from the principles of the revolution which resulted in the growth of his personal power, the impotence of the political institutions, the alienation of real militants, and improvisation in policies. Furthermore, as the coup took place against a background of persistent deterioration in the

social and economic situation with high unemployment and declining revenue, investment, production and productivity, all these defects were attributed by the new regime to Ben Bella's incoherent and improvised policies that had resulted in the inefficient running of economic enterprises and in the wastage of human and economic resources.

With its general aims and orientations apparently unchanged, and in fact firmly emphasized, the new regime placed great emphasis on the need for order, discipline, skills, stability, efficiency, planning, hard work, and economic development. The intervention of the state was regarded as essential to achieve these aims and to produce coherent policies which could be applied efficiently. Thus the most urgent priority was given to building up a strong state structure and institutions, which was reflected by Boumedienne's constant references to the impossibility of consolidating the revolution without such a structure:

"It is important to build a state based on morality and real social commitment, representing our Arab and Islamic values. We have to moralize our institutions, to build an effective state machinery capable of insuring revolutionary order and discipline and of protecting the agents of the state and administration from any form of pressure or solicitation" (105).

Emphasis was also placed on the need to follow criteria of technical competence in the recruitment of state economic cadres and administrators (106).

What impact did the coup have on the socio-political forces of Algeria? The coup took place partly because, for various reasons, Ben Bella had made undeclared alliances with the revolutionary forces and with the UGTA in particular at a time when popular enthusiasm had not yet evaporated, despite the manoeuvres of the bureaucracy, and also at a time when Algeria still had an international image as the "African

Cuba'. Despite their claims, the action of those who overthrew Ben Bella was bound to result in a great deal of demoralization and disappointment on the part of the revolutionary forces and to bring their expectations to an abrupt end. On the other hand, it aroused great optimism and satisfaction on the part of the reactionary forces, since the previous regime had managed to antagonize significant sections of the population either by the 'socialist' content of its ideological programme or by the continuous threat of land reform accompanied by random nationalizations of small private concerns and agricultural properties. The religious leaders and conservative groups expressed their support for the Council of the Revolution in a flurry of telegrams and messages in the days following the coup (107). Certain Western countries also expressed satisfaction, presumably in the hope that the coup would lead to basic changes in domestic and foreign policies which would enable the Western world to establish closer relations with Algeria.

However, the outcome was to prove more complex than had been initially anticipated and hoped, since, despite being part and parcel of the class struggle and despite its class implications and impact, the coup did not take place as a direct response to a particular antagonistic situation on the part of class interests outside the petty bourgeoisie. It was very much a part of the factional struggles within the ruling stratum. It was more a response on the part of a political group which felt itself to be threatened but which also had access to the means to enable it to assume a leading political role. Thus, while under the previous regime there was a considerable gap between actual social development and the claims and commitments of the political leadership, (because the latter was unable to achieve economic develop-



ment on a scale which would correspond with its political and ideological commitments, thereby causing great incoherence and serious social and economic bottlenecks) the new regime came in to redress the situation in favour of the social environment and order which had already been established, in the form of tight bureaucratic controls. Ian Clegg sums up the coup with regard to its impact on social development by stating that:

"The 19 June coup was not a counter-revolution in the classic sense. It marked a point of rationalization and acceleration of a counter-revolution that had been under way since soon after independence. Under Ben Bella the new middle class had already become firmly entrenched in the state and party apparatus. The achievements of the workers in 1962 had already been eroded significantly. The coup was part of a class struggle that was already under way. In this struggle Ben Bella represented a populist mystification; his removal clarified and sharpened its lines" (108).

### **The Army in Power**

One of the major tasks facing the new regime was to give itself legitimacy in a highly volatile situation. First, the Algerian people were still very demanding and had a high expectation of the state's capacity to provide them with what had been denied them under the colonial system. Secondly, the popularity of the ALN in the war of independence was insufficient to provide the ANP with legitimacy especially when the latter had just ousted a popular leader. The new leaders knew that their tasks were formidable, and realized that the mere exposure of the previous regime's 'deviations' would not be enough to legitimize their own power.

With this in mind, and with its declared intention to adhere to the principles and orientations set out in the earlier documents, the

new regime gave a new interpretation of the aims of the revolution. 'Socialism' and 'socialist objectives' now were directly linked to economic development based on planning and industrialization and the mobilization of all available resources, including private capital, under the leadership of the state. In the face of constant criticisms of the previous regime, socialism became devoid of its populist content as a mere slogan imposed in order to gain popularity and to enhance Ben Bella's personal power. State control over the economy, with the emphasis on criteria of efficiency and profitability, was stressed as the way forward to enhanced and accelerated development and the only alternative to economic anarchy and disorder.

During the early years of the new regime, new interpretations of the objectives of the revolution were reflected in minor and sometimes contradictory changes in general policies, which revealed the immobilization of the new leadership and its incapacity to produce a major breakthrough in economic and political development. In the early months after the coup, following criticisms of the Ben Bella regime for promoting "a haphazard and propagandist socialism", expressed in popularity-seeking nationalizations of firms of no vital importance, the new regime expressed its objection to his policy in a series of denationalizations of a number of small workshops, hotels, cafes, and shops. In the confusion created by the coup and partly as a reflection of the accommodation of the interests of the 'enemies of socialism' within Boumedienne's alliance, this series of random denationalizations included the return of peasant-run lands to their former feudal owners in the provinces of Constantine and Oran, lands which had been seized under the previous government because their owners had collaborated with the French.

In the region of Al-Asnam (formerly Orleansville), for example, the Bouthiba, big landowners, regained possession of their lands. The worker-run sections of industry were also affected by this 'liberalization' and various enterprises were given back to the former owners, such as the 'Norcolor' paint and building materials factory (109).

In 1966, twenty important economic enterprises which were expropriated because they belonged to collaborators with colonialism were returned to their previous owners (110).

The new regime's outlook and its commitment to economic development and the notion that the state must play a major role in this development, had ambivalent and contradictory repercussions on attitudes towards the self-management system, which eventually resulted in its total erosion and its gradual transformation into state-management (111). Thus while this system was rhetorically praised and presented as a reflection of the "political maturity of the peasants and workers (and of) their initiatives and awareness" of their role in independent Algeria (112), great emphasis was placed on the necessity of producing 'positive results' in production and productivity, where responsibility was to be shared equally between managers, workers, and state organs. Thus while stating that "despite certain people attacking self-management, one should clearly affirm that it remains a fundamental option, particularly in agriculture" (113), it was clear that the regime regarded economic criteria as the most efficient way for self-management to survive and produce desirable results. This position was reflected in its clearest form in an interview with Boumedienne in Le Monde in April 1968:

"We are for self-management, but a viable self-management that yields profits, that results in an efficient organization of work and an increase of production. To liberate the worker .... is a revolutionary principle, but to produce is also a necessity" (114).

Moreover, while accepting the existence of the enemies of self-management and their efforts to undermine this system by various means, and while condemnations were frequently made of state bureaucracy's expropriation of workers' rights, the regime also showed its disapproval of the workers' attitudes and blamed them for their low productivity and negligence:

"The era of paternalistic autogestion is over.... No more favouritism... the workers in autogestion must pay their enterprise taxes: they will get no more loans; they must pay for the amortization of their capital goods, in a word, they must, in future, run their sector rationally. Only after an experience of this sort can we make a definitive and rational judgement on autogestion" (115).

In a speech addressed to representatives of the socialist agricultural sector in April 1970, Boumedienne accused the workers of not "having understood the meaning of self-management" and exhorted them to work harder and produce more, reminding them that "you are lucky because the revolution enabled you to gain control of this sector which includes the richest lands of Algeria (thus) you are responsible for any negligence or slackness" (116).

It became clear that instead of being encouraged and expanded, self-management was only allowed to exist within a framework of increasing state control over the economy, and was asked to function correspondingly as a part of a state capitalist system, but only because there might be serious political repercussions if it was to be abolished. As mentioned earlier, the new regime was not totally responsible for the erosion of self-management; it only completed a process that was already under way because of the limitations of the system itself and the process of its incorporation into a system of state capitalism, while initiating a conscious process of creating and expanding the state economic sector as we will see later.

The criticisms of the previous regime in general and of self-management in particular did not strictly speaking reflect a new perception and outlook towards Algeria's economic development. The preconditions for this were the state's growing control over the economy and the incorporation of the self-management sector into the state sector, together with the tolerance of the existence of an active private sector, all of which had occurred under Ben Bella. The purpose of the criticisms was generally to provide legitimacy for the new regime and they were not translated into coherent action until 1967, following the abortive coup d'etat by Tahir Zbiri. It was at this point that the regime managed to move out of its immobilization, which was largely the result of the broadness of the alliance that brought Boumedienne to power and the heterogeneity of the factions within it. Even cohesion within the individual factions was not based on social homogeneity but on the role of the members during the war of independence. However, such heterogeneity did not mean that they had nothing in common. Their experience under Ben Bella, and the fact that they owed their positions to the roles which they had played in the armed struggle either inside or outside Algeria made them more committed to the notion of the supremacy of the army and the state as the prime means of introducing transformations in the economy and society. Thus, after the coup the army was consistently presented as the army of the people that would play a major role in the 'national and socialist' construction of the country. It experienced a continuous process of modernization and expansion. In 1968 it was composed of 70,000 men. Its tasks were not limited to military matters but extended to include various civil functions in the administration and the economy. In a word, its role as the most organized force in society was greatly enhanced. Hence despite

the emphasis of FLN documents on the necessity of the control of the Party over the army, reality suggested that the latter and especially the Political Commissariat of the ANP remained totally independent of the Party.

However, with the setting up of various state structures the decisive role of the army receded into the background and became less apparent, although it remained the source of authority and power. With these general orientations in the background, Boumedienne undertook the delicate task of harmonizing his alliance. This involved the elimination of "certain factions definitively, especially those linked to ex-guerrilla commanders, usually by coaxing their leading members into substantial responsibilities outside the government .... or into purely token positions within it .... in which they were badly placed to maintain an organised following of political significance" (117). It also resulted in the alienation of the civil ministers in charge of agriculture and information and their subsequent elimination, and culminated in the rupture of the alliance after the Chief of Staff of the ANP Tahir Zbiri failed in his attempt to assume power. The outcome was the consolidation of the authority and power of the Oujda clan and thus a breakthrough in the state's attempts to present a more coherent programme of development. Hence in the following years there was a more consistent consolidation of the state apparatus at national as well as regional levels, together with the initiation of ambitious economic programmes. This was accompanied by the comprehensive nationalization of foreign capital operating in Algeria and the extension of central economic planning, which rapidly expanding the size and importance of the state economic sector. The following chapter will analyse the particularities of the Algerian economy and the impact of colonialism .

and the way it came to an end, in order to examine the state's policies towards the economy in general and the agricultural sector in particular in relation to the nature of the strata in control of the state apparatus.

## Notes

- (1) Clegg, I., Workers' Self-Management in Algeria,  
Monthly Review Press, New York, 1971, p.39.
- (2) Seibel, H.D. and Damachi, U.G.,  
Self-Management in Yugoslavia and the Developing World,  
Macmillan, London, 1982, p.278.
- (3) Benhouria, T., L'Economie de l'Algerie,  
Francois Maspero, Paris, 1980, p.33.
- (4) See: Laks, M., Autogestion et Pouvoir Politique en Algerie,  
(1962-1965),  
EDI, Paris, 1970, pp.244-251.
- (5) Quoted by Duprat, G., Revolution et Autogestion Rural en Algerie,  
Paris, 1973, p.116.
- (6) Laks, op. cit., p.250.
- (7) Ibid., pp.139-141.
- (8) Quoted by Tlemcani, R., State and Revolution in Algeria,  
Zed Books Ltd, London, 1986, p.96.
- (9) Quoted by Ibid.
- (10) Raffinot, M. and Jacquemot, P., le Capitalism d'Etat Algerien,  
Francois maspero, Paris, 1977, p.65.
- (11) Ottaway, M. and D., Algeria; The Politics of a Socialist  
Revolution,  
University of California Press, 1970, p.53.
- (12) Laks, op. cit., p.140.
- (13) Minces, J., "Workers' Management in Algeria",  
New Outlook, Vol.10, Part8, Nov.1967, p.21.
- (14) There were a few right-wing opponents of independence who saw the  
self-management movement as a carefully conceived plot designed  
to prevent the return of the colons.  
Clegg, op. cit., p.45.
- (15) Raptis, M., Socialism, Democracy, and Self-Management,  
Allison and Busby Ltd., London, 1980, p.67.
- (16) Duprat, op. cit., p.84.
- (17) Laks, op. cit., p.144.



(18) Ottaway, op. cit., p.50.

(19) Clegg, op. cit., p.50.

However, some divisions of the army in the Mitidja Vally nea Algiers played the opposite role in helping, the workers of the self-management by organizing loans for the harvest and 'security stocks' of cereals on the basis of fixed price per Quintals.

Lazreg, M., The Emergence of Classes in Algeria,  
Westview Press, Colorado, 1976, p.89.

(20) See Ottaway, op. cit., p.52, and Clegg, op. cit., p.48.

(21) Parodi, M., "L'Autogestion des Exploitations Agricoles Modernes en Algerie",  
Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 1963, pp.62-64.

(22) Quoted by Ibid., p.63.

(23) Ottaway, op. cit., p.55.

(24) Teillac, J., Autogestion en Algerie,  
Paris, 1965, p.26.

(25) Minces, op. cit., p.25.

(26) The first decree defined 'vacant enterprises' in industry, commerce, agriculture, and housing. Any enterprise that ceased normal production and any house or apartment left unoccupied by the owner or his legal tenant for more than two months was to be declared vacant and put under the protection of the President of the Council. The second decree dealt with the management system and established that all vacant enterprises would be managed by the workers represented by the following organs:

-The General Assembly; composed of all permanent workers in the enterprise. It was the supreme body in the management of the enterprise as controlled the activities of other organs of management. It was charged with the adoption of the annual development plan and the programmes of production and investment elaborated by the comite de gestion together with marketing and consumption. It also had charge of "adopting the arrangements concerning the organization of work and the definition and distribution of functions and responsibilities" and approved the accounts The General Assembly was to meet at least once every three months, and to elect the Workers' Council where the number of workers exceeded thirty.

-The Workers' Council; this met once every month and had between ten and one hundred members. At least two-thirds of its members were to be engaged in production, and it was charged with tasks similar to that of the General Assembly but those which concerned direct management such as the adoption of the enterprise's various plans, decisions over the application of the internal rules and the admission or expulsion of members.

-Comite de Gestion (Management Committee); elected by the workers' General Assembly and composed of between three and eleven members. It met at least once a month and is charged with the day-to-day running and management of the enterprise such as making decisions concerning short-term loans, marketing, the hiring of seasonal workers and the distribution of functions.

-The President of the Committee; elected by the committee and chaired its meeting as well as that of the Workers' Council and the General Assembly. He represented all financial and legal documents of the enterprise. He was to be elected annually while the members of the management committee and of the workers' council were elected for three-year terms, one third being elected every year.

-The Director; appointed by the state to represent it in the enterprise in order to make sure that the decisions and the operations of the self-managed enterprise conformed to the national plan. He could oppose any decision that contradicted this plan by his right to veto. He was also responsible for day-to-day operations by being a full member of the management committee. He oversaw economic and financial operations--signing legal and financial documents, holding funds in cash for current expenses and checking the annual accounts. In addition to that the director "determines annually the optimal number of permanent workers technically necessary to carry out the economic programme of the enterprise". Since he was appointed by the state, he was not responsible to the management committee but to the state, and could only be dismissed by the supervisory body in agreement with CCAA (see the following) for a 'serious offence' or 'obvious incompetence' or if the CCAA withdrew its recognition.

The decree set up local bodies to supervise the operation of self-management, called Organisation d'Animation d'Autogestion. Each commune was to have a Conseil Communal d'Animation d'Autogestion (CCAA) composed of the presidents of the management committees and representatives of the Party, the UGTA, the army, and the communal administrative authorities. Its role was to assist in the creation and organization of management bodies in enterprises, the coordination of their activities, and to help with technical and financial assistance in coordination with the departments concerned. It was to meet at least once every three months, on the initiative of its president elected from among the presidents of the management committees.

The third decree No. 63-98 of 28 March established the system of distributing revenues in the enterprises and concerns under self-management. The annual income, constituted by the annual production of the enterprise was divided into two categories; levies to the state and revenues to be shared between the workers. There were three forms of levies; for the financial liabilities incurred by the enterprises, to the national investment fund, and to the national fund for balanced employment. Incomes shared by the

workers were subdivided into four categories;

- 1- salaries paid to seasonal workers employed by the enterprise,
- 2- the basic wages paid to permanent workers according to the type of job,
- 3- productivity bonuses due to permanent workers and paid on a periodical basis,
- 4- the remainder to be shared between the enterprise's investment fund, the social fund and any other resource judged necessary.

For a detailed description of the tasks of the various bodies of self-management within and outside the self-managed enterprise, see:

Koulytchizky, S., "Comment Sont Prises les Decisions dans l'Autogestion"  
Revue Algerienne, 1969, pp.1153-1162.

- (27) Clegg, op. cit., p.60.
- (28) Ibid.
- (29) Minces, op. cit., p.24.
- (30) Raffinot and Jacquemot, op. cit., p.10.
- (31) "Documents Algerie" Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 1962, p.699.
- (32) Quoted by Duprat, op. cit., p.124.
- (33) Minces describes the state of Ben Bella when Khider managed to assume some power after defeating the leadership of the UGTA in its first Congress, by stating that:  
"Ben Bella found himself momentarily without backing, in a position of weakness in the race for absolute power he was continuing to run against the Secretary General of the Party. Upon the advice of young Marxist counsellors, Ben Bella played the 'management committee' card; he knew the peasants well".  
Minces, op. cit., p.24.  
For more details on the correlation between the 'revolutionary' measures of the Ben Bella government with regard to the self-management system and other nationalizations with the political context represented mainly by the activities of the opposition, see: Laks, op. cit., pp.212-213.
- (34) Ottaway, op. cit., p.63.
- (35) Helie, D., "Industrial self-management in Algeria" in  
Man, State and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib,  
ed. by William Zartman, Pall Mall Press, London, 1973, p.446.
- (36) Djabri, A., The Agrarian Policies of Algeria: 1962-1982,  
M.A. Thesis, University of Warwick, 1984, p.45.

- (37) In a survey carried out in thirteen self-managed farms in the Mitidja Vally, Chaulet reports that, although almost all of the skilled workers were able to define the March decrees, more than half of the permanent unskilled workers and all of the seasonal workers, had no knowledge of their existence. In some cases, the word 'March' evoked the cease-fire of 19 March 1962 just before the proclamation of independence.  
Lazreg, op. cit., p.94.
- (38) Minces. J., "Autogestion et Lutes se Classe en Algerie"  
Les Temps Modernes, June 1965, pp.2210.  
He also noted that in the course of the Congress of the agricultural workers in the self-management sector in December 1964, certain delegates demanded the launching of a new and extended campaign to explain the contents of March Decrees to the workers.  
Ibid., p.2211.
- (39) Raffinot and Jacquemot, op. cit., p.271.
- (40) Minces, "Workers' management...", op. cit., 25.
- (41) Duprat, op. cit., p.288.
- (42) Koulytchizky, op. cit., p.1163.
- (43) Clegg, op. cit., p.166.
- (44) Ibid., p.62.
- (45) See Benhouria, op. cit., pp.49-54.
- (46) For more details on these conditions, see:  
Raffinot and Jacquemot, op. cit., pp.270-274.
- (47) Fore details on the history of the self-management system and its theoretical principles, see:  
Seibel and Damachi, op. cit.,  
Clegg, op. cit., chapter 1.
- (48) Singh, K.R., "The Algerian Experiment in Socialism"  
International Studies, 8 (1966-7), p.447.
- (49) Zartman, I.W., "Algeria: A Post-Revolutionary Elite" in  
Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East,  
New York, 1975, p.268.
- (50) Clegg, op. cit., p.66.
- (51) Ibid., p.67.
- (52) Stewart, P.J., "Algerian Peasantry at the Crossroads: Fight Erosion or Migrate"  
: I. D. S. Duscussion Paper, No.69, 1975, p.19.

- (53) Duprat, op. cit., p.150.
- (54) Ottaway, op. cit., p.62.
- (55) These organs were:
- Direction de Services Agricoles (DSA),
  - Commission Departmentale de la Reforme Agraire (CDRA),
  - Centre Cooperatif de la Reforme Agraire (CCRA),
  - Coopertives de la Reforme Agraire (CORA),
  - Cooperatives d' Ecoulement (CORE).
- (56) For more details, see: Clegg, op. cit., pp.156-157.
- (57) Lazreg, op. cit., p.99.
- (58) See the scandals in the press reported by Minces, "Workers'..." op. cit., pp.28-31.
- (59) Minces, "Autogestion...." op. cit., p.2218.
- (60) Ottaway, op. cit., p.111.
- (61) Laks, op. cit., pp.222-231.
- (62) Koulytchizky, op. cit., p.1175.
- (63) Ibid., p.1176.
- (64) The final resolutions call on the workers to:
- Denounce the manoeuvres and plots of the enemies of the working class who are sabotaging the construction of socialism by impeding the operation of autogestion either by refusing the socialist sector the cadres it needs or by not allowing self-managed concerns financialy.
  - Protest against bureaucratic methods which are concentrating the powers of management in the hands of state functionaries, which ought to be in the hands of the organs of self-management.
- Quoted by Clegg, op. cit., p.129.
- (65) See Minces, "Workers' ...." op. cit., pp.28-31.
- (66) Revolution Africaine, an FLN weekly, wrote in 24 October 1964 that:
- "if independence has little materially ameliorated the standard of living of the masses, .... the end of colonial domination has permitted certain individuals of occupying embellished functions with a number of privileges; villas, cars salaries, influence. Those do not live any more at the same standard as the people, they are separated from them. Most often, they have acquired the place of the pieds-noirs. They do not aspire for anything other than keeping their places within and against all".
- Quoted by Raffinot and Jacquemot, op. cit., p.56.

- (67) Clegg, op. cit., pp.214-215.  
Two sections from the Algiers Charter concerning the ideological foundations of the Agerian revolution and a discussion on the problems of transition from capitalism to socialism are translated in full by Clegg, op. cit., pp.210-220.  
Some more extracts of the Charter text are also found in Alleg, H., "The Revolutionary Character of the Algiers Charter" Political Affairs, Vil. 44, No.8, August, 1965, pp.13-25.
- (68) Clegg, op. cit., p.214.
- (69) Alleg, op. cit., p.17.
- (70) Clegg, op. cit., p.213.
- (71) Alleg, op. cit., p.25.
- (72) In regards to Ben Bella's obsession with socialism, Humbaraci wrote:  
"In fact Ben Bella was no socialist, and neither was his ministers .... (he) and his colleagues were quick enough to grasp the usefulness of the myth of 'socialist Algeria'. At home their regime cashed in on the desire of the 'have-nots' for a better life; abroad its profession of socialism was aimed at serving Algeria's economic and diplomatic interests".  
Humbaraci, A., Algeria: A Revolution That Failed, Pall Mall Press, London, 1966, pp.110-111.
- (73) Clegg, op. cit., p.128.
- (74) For more details of these compromises, see: Ottaway, op. cit. pp.115-124.
- (75) Roberts, H., "The Politics of Algerian Socialism" in North Africa, ed. by Richard Lawless, Croom Helm, London, p.9.
- (76) Ottaway, op. cit., pp.133-136.
- (77) Ibid., pp.175-176.
- (78) "A frequent saying among the workers that, apart from the President himself, his entire entourage was 'rotten'. They seem to overlook the fact that it was Ben Bella himself who chose part of that entourage out of political considerations" Minces, "Workers'....." op. cit., p.30.
- (79) Khalifa, M., Ahmed Ben Bella, Beirut, 1985, pp.224-225.
- (80) Ibid., p.226.

- (81) For details on Boumedienne's preparations for the coup and his contacts, see:  
 Lebjaoui, M., Haga'iq 'an al-Thawra al-Djaza'iriyva,  
 (Facts on the Algerian Revolution)  
 Beirut, 1971, pp.247-262.
- (82) Humbaraci, op. cit., p.217.
- (83) The full text of the 19 June Proclamation is translated by Ibid.  
 pp.219-222.
- (84) Boumedienne, interviewed by al-Ahram, 8-10 October 1965.
- (85) Boumedienne speech in 19 June 1966, in:  
 Balta, P. and Relloux, K., Isteratiyyat Boumedienne,  
 (Boumdienne's Strategy),  
 Beirut, 1979, pp.39-45.
- (86) Ottaway, op. cit., p.179.
- (87) al-Ahram, op. cit.
- (88) Speech of Boumedienne, 1 November 1965, Balta, op. cit., p.39.
- (89) al-Ahram, op. cit.
- (90) Boumedienne speech in 1st November, op. cit.
- (91) Boumedienne, quoted from his argument with Lebjaoui about the coup.  
 Lebjaoui, op. cit. p.257.  
 The Political Commissariat of the army affirmed the same position  
 by stating that:  
 "The ANP, contrary to the classical concept, is not a  
 force living on the outskirts of society; it does not  
 form a caste; it is not hardened by years of tradition,  
 it has been created and structured since the outbreak of  
 the Revolution and is composed of peasants and workers"  
 Quoted by Zartman, W., "The Algerian Army in Politics", in  
Man, State and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib,  
op. cit., p.219.
- (92) al-Ahram, op. cit.
- (93) Quoted by Humbaraci, op. cit.
- (94) al-Ahram
- (95) Yefsah, A., Le Processus de Legitimation du Pouvoir Militaire  
 et la Construction de l'Etat en Algerie  
 Editions Anthropos, Paris, 1982, p.99.
- (96) For Boumedienne's account of these attempts, see his interview in  
 the al-Ahram.

- (97) Quandt, W., Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria 1954-1968, cambridge, 1969, p.234.
- (98) Ottaway, op. cit., p.187.  
Lebjaoui's account gives the impression that after the coup, Boumedienne was keen to contact large number of politicians in order to convince them to join his regime.  
Lebjaoui, op. cit., pp.247-262.
- (99) Quandt, op. cit., p.241.
- (100) Lebjaoui, op. cit., p.259.
- (101) Roberts, op. cit., p.10.
- (102) Quandt, op. cit., p.237.
- (103) Ali Mendjali, quoted by Ottaway, op. cit., p189.
- (104) Roberts, op. cit., p.11.
- (105) Boumedienne, H., "The Third Anniversary of Algerian Independence" A speech delivered in 5 July 1965, in Man, State and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib, op. cit., pp.127-130.  
Boumedienne's emphasis on the state is reflected in the results of a survey of the frequency of this word in 175 short speeches made by him between June 1965 and June 1970, where the word 'State' was repeated 705 times, 'Revolution'; 1968, 'Building'; 401, 'Nation'; 221, 'Army; 196, and Party; 161.  
Yefsah, op. cit., p.187.
- (106) This might explain the fact that Boumedienne government relied for the first time on members who owed their positions to their education and technical expertise. See:  
Quandt, op. cit., pp.243-246.
- (107) Ottaway, op. cit., p.190.
- (108) Clegg, op. cit., p.134.
- (109) Alleg, H., "Algeria Seven Years After: Socialism or Capitalism" Marxism Today, Vol.14, No.3, March, 1970, p.77.
- (110) Raffinot and Jacquemot, op. cit., p.87.
- (111) For details on the immediate consequences of the coup for the self-management system, see:  
Duprat, op. cit., pp.280-285.
- (112) Boumedienne speech in 1st November 1965.
- (113) Quoted by Temmar, H.M., Strategie de Developpement Independent: Le Cas de l'Algerie: un-Bilan,



OPU, Algiers, 1983, p.130.

(114) Quoted by Ottaway, op. cit., p.270.

(115) Quoted by Clegg, op. cit., p.134.

(116) Boumedienne speech in 1 April 1970, in Balta, op. cit., p.108.

(117) Roberts, op. cit., pp.10-11.

## CAPTER SEVEN : THE ECONOMY UNDER BEN BELLA AND BOUMEDIENNE

We saw earlier how colonialism had profoundly transformed the social and economic conditions of Algeria and how Algerian independence was achieved in an extremely chaotic and disorderly social and economic circumstances. In order both to measure the extent of the problems with which the new independent state was faced and to estimate the importance of the agricultural sector in the economy it is necessary to look at the general state of the Algerian economy at independence and the effects of the war upon it.

Two prominent and interrelated features characterized the economy of Algeria; the predominance of the agriculture, and its external orientation towards satisfying the demands of metropolitan France. As in a typical colonial economy agriculture played the most important role in the social and economic life of the Algerian population, for a variety of reasons. First of all agriculture provided the major source of income for the vast majority. Between 1955 and 1964 almost three-quarters of the population lived in the rural areas and 60 per cent of the total population derived their livelihood directly from agriculture. The agricultural sector mobilized 80.8 per cent of the total active population, estimated in 1954 at 3 512 000, and 87.8 of the economically active male population (1). The majority of the labour force was composed either of small farmers who used no paid labour or of labourers on the colonial farms who together constituted 75 per cent of the total rural population (2). Second the agricultural sector's share in the structure of Gross National Product on the eve of independence did not reflect the importance of this sector in the

society, mainly because of the dualism inherent in the colonial economy as will be discussed below. However, with the sectoral imbalance that characterized the Algerian economy, the agricultural sector accounted for a relatively large share in the composition of the GDP as revealed in the following table (3):

Structure of GDP between 1950 and 1962  
(in percentage)

	1950	1954	1958	1962
Primary Sector	37%	33.5%	26%	24%
Secondary Sector	27%	27%	27%	36%
Tertiary Sector	36%	39.5%	47%	40%

This only needs to be compared with the percentage of the agricultural sector's share in 1974, which was 7.4 per cent to show the real importance of this sector on the eve of independence. Furthermore, as an economy dominated by agrarian capitalism, agricultural exports, and especially those products produced on the colonial farms, formed the principal source of growth in Algeria. They played the same role in the development of the Algerian economy as that of cotton in Egypt or coffee and sugar in Brazil (4). A very large proportion of the most important agricultural products was exported; 90 per cent of wine, 70 per cent of fruit and vegetables, and 40 per cent of cereal production (5). At independence, agricultural production accounted for 80 per cent of all Algerian exports and just before the advent of oil and gas, wine formed 53 per cent of the annual trade receipts of the economy.

The predominance of agriculture in the economy and the heavy reliance on agricultural exports implied the relative underdevelopment of industry and the weakness of the industrial sector, and the predominant role of small-scale and artisanal activities. However, the mining

and extractive industries owned by French capital also saw noticeable growth during the last years of colonialism. Oil production, for example, increased from 3.2 million barrels in 1958 to 159.5 million in 1962 (6). Also, as a result of rapid urbanization, there was rapid growth in the construction industry and basic public works whose share in GNP rose to 8 percent. This was in fact the main reason for the sudden growth of the secondary sector between 1950 and 1962 as shown in the table above. The service sector was over-inflated as a result of the concentration of capital in commerce and finance. Sectoral imbalance was one of the most striking features of the Algerian economy, and there was also very weak integration between the various sectors. In 1954, for example, the industrial sector absorbed only 25 per cent of local agricultural production and in turn a mere 8 per cent of the value of industrial production was directed towards the agricultural sector (7). This was basically due to the externally-directed nature of the economy towards mainly metropolitan France. In 1960, 80 per cent of Algeria's exports and 75 per cent of its imports were to and from France. The main Algerian exports were primary products, agricultural and other raw materials, and its main imports were manufactured goods.

Slow growth and stagnation was another feature of the Algerian economy which was entirely dependent on the colonial state for new investment. The absence both of a large internal market and of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie together with the domination of French industry over the Algerian market, made substantial industrial development impossible. Thus profits made by local capital in agriculture and in mining industries were either exported to France or invested in local property and services, or spent on luxury consumer goods. Two

important indicators demonstrated the stagnation of the economy; the rate of population growth exceeded that of material production, and a trade deficit, estimated at AD 4,351 million, existed in 1960.

However, a more serious and important weakness, mentioned earlier, lay behind these general characteristics. This was the dual nature of the economy and the sharp division of the population into a minority of wealthy European settlers and a majority of impoverished Muslims.

We saw earlier how colonialism had produced two agricultural sectors; one modern, large scale and capitalist, in which production was destined for export, and the another traditional, dominated by the indigenous population and destined for subsistence. We also saw that the colons monopolized the key economic and political positions while Muslim population remained impoverished. The vast majority of the latter occupied the rural areas; half of them were landless and another third were living at bare subsistence level. They saw a continuous process of impoverishment and degradation of their lives with the underdevelopment of the economy and the very few opportunities open for their survival. The high rate of Muslim population growth (estimated at more than 3 per cent per annum) further aggravated the situation. It resulted in an increasing wave of rural to urban migration and in congestion in the urban centres with marginalized people surviving on very small incomes derived from casual jobs in the service sector. Thus more than one third of the non-agricultural labour force was unemployed or semi-employed in 1954. As a result, many Algerians were forced to migrate to France in search of employment. Hence the number of Algerian migrant workers increased rapidly during the last years before independence reaching as we saw earlier more than half million. Thus generally, while the annual per capita income of the colons in 1954 -

ranged between \$502 for the lowest groups and \$3181 for the highest, that of an average Algerian was \$45 per year. The European population of about one million took 47 per cent of national income, while the indigenous rural population took only 18 per cent.

Against this background the war of independence broke out, inflicting additional strains upon the economy. Private French capital, which was already incapable of changing the bleak situation, was rapidly transferred to the metropolis, 430 milliard AF in 1959, 528 in 1960, 616 in 1961, and 712 in 1962. In an attempt to restore the political stability threatened by the war and to guarantee capital accumulation in the oil sector which had been increasing rapidly since 1956, and in order to lay the foundations for a neo-colonial relationship between France and Algeria, the government of General de Gaulle introduced an ambitious Five Year economic development plan known as the Constantine Plan. The importance of this plan lies more in the fact that it set the basis for the industrial development of independent Algeria than that it introduced any real structural transformation of the economy, since only a minor part of the plan was ever realized.

As well as making massive investments in socio-economic infrastructure (8), the plan sought a policy of "growth poles" through which heavy industrial investment for the transformation of natural resources was to be initiated in a few coastal locations. A steel complex at Annaba, an oil refinery at Algiers, a petrochemical complex at Arzew near Oran, and a gas line from Hassi Ramel to Arzew, in addition to several import substitution industries which were suggested in the plan, had a profound impact on the Algerian economy and influenced the direction and character of its development (9), since those projects subsequently formed the basis of the industrial policy of independent Algeria.

## **The Effects of the Liberation War on the Economy**

If the long history of colonialism had profoundly transformed the Algerian economy and introduced structural disequilibrium and imbalance within it, the way in which it came to an end and the subsequent flight of the colons precipitated a social and economic disaster. As a result of the war severe disruptions took place in the structure of the population and its geographical distribution. The war had inflicted heavy human losses on the Algerian population, estimated at around one million, and about 400 000 children were left orphans. Another half million people were forced in the course of the war to live outside Algeria in Tunisia and Morocco. More importantly, the policy of "regroupement", initiated by General Challe in order to pacify the rural population involved the uprooting of over two million inhabitants from their villages and their resettlement in camps under military guard called "regroupement centres". Together with the use of napalm in combating the FLN fighters in the rural areas, this policy had an extremely damaging effect upon traditional agricultural activities. In the traditional sector, for example, wholesale theft and destruction of live-stock took place. Half the goats, 70 per cent of cattle, and 40 per cent of sheep were slaughtered (10).

However, the real impact of these phenomena was apparent immediately after the end of the war. A very large number of those who had been "regrouped" left their camps after independence and flooded into the urban centres to join those who already had fled from the countryside during the war (11). With the limited capacity of the various economic sectors to absorb sufficient amounts of labour, this had drastic consequences on levels of un- and underemployment. Thus

unemployment in the new republic was estimated at 70 per cent of the total labour force, or two million in the industrial and service sectors. Population growth, together with the existence of 400,000 orphans, resulted in an extremely youthful population with 47 per cent under 15 years of age.

The departure of the colons resulted in complete economic devastation and paralysis. By 1964 over one million Europeans had left Algeria for France. In six months alone about four-fifths of all Europeans, or 800,000 persons, emigrated, and some 328,000 Europeans departed during the single month of June 1962. The major consequence of this sudden departure was that Algeria was left almost entirely devoid of professional and technical personnel since the Europeans constituted, as we saw, the bulk of administrators, teachers, technicians etc. Some 300,000 of the Europeans had been engaged in active work: 15,000 had belonged to the higher administrative levels or liberal professions, 33,000 were from managerial levels, 35,000 were skilled workers, and some 200,000 occupied posts requiring a higher than average technical or general level of education (12). Given a rate of illiteracy within the Algerian population of more than 80 per cent one can imagine the paralysis which engulfed the economy and administration after the departure of the colons. This departure also meant the closing down of shops and factories and the abandoning of farms owned by the Europeans, aggravating already chronic problems of employment and production. In addition the departing Europeans committed acts of destruction and sabotage to buildings, railways, machinery, documents, and effectively everything they could put their hands on which might be of use to the new republic.

--- This chaotic situation was bound to have a drastic impact upon the



economy in general and upon the level of production in particular. National income declined by about 23.5 per cent from AD 11,000 million in 1959 to AD 8,400 in 1963 (13). By 1963 the real value of production had dropped by 35 per cent below that of 1960. The most immediately affected sectors of the economy were the industrial and the service sectors. Apart from the oil sector, which, because of its geographical distance from the area of conflict, and because it was owned by the French state and international companies, was not affected by the flight of the colons, almost all industrial production and investment sharply declined. The production of manufacturing industry expressed in current prices fell from an index of 100 in 1959 to less than 80 in 1963 (14). Electricity and water supply in terms of volume reached the index of 88 in 1963 from a base of 100 in 1959. One source lists the following levels of utilization of production capacity in the months after the ceasefire(15):

per cent	
Textiles	50
Olive Oil	71
Fish-canning	14
Fruit-canning	40
Sugar-refining	0
Chemicals	40
Metallurgy	25

Activities in the construction and public works sector were closely connected with the level of investment and this level fell sharply after independence from 366,000 million Francs in 1959, including 142,000 million in the oil industry, to 83,000 million in 1963 of which 15,000 million went into oil (16). Thus in the sector of construction and public works, formerly the largest single employer in the

non-agricultural sector, production dropped 55 per cent in 1963 in comparison with 1962, and the number plummeted from 200,000 to 30,000 (17). The eight years of war had affected a number of agricultural activities especially industrial crops, forest, and animal production which constituted 30 per cent of the value of the agricultural production and which were mainly in the hands of the Muslim population, whereas most production in the colonial sector was not affected at all (18).

However, the effects of independence on the agricultural sector were felt more in commercial and distribution circles than on the level of production. This was mainly due to the fact that agricultural production depended more than anything else on climatic conditions, and since the latter were favorable during 1962 and 1963, agricultural production was extremely good. As crops had already been planted before independence and because of the energetic actions of the management committees which ensured that most crops were saved and harvested, levels of production were generally maintained. Wine was the only product which recorded a drop, of about one-third from 18.4 to 12.6 million hectoliters in 1963 due to the sudden departure of skilled European labour. The condition of the agricultural machinery in the colonial sector deteriorated either as a result of sabotage by the departing colons or because of the lack of local skill. Within a year of independence their potential was reduced by 60 per cent (19).

The commercial market for agricultural products was the most hard hit, as the colons owned and operated the apparatus of agricultural distribution and exports and their flight meant the sudden disruption and paralysis of normal trade channels. The export of fruit dropped by 22 per cent in 1962-63 and by a further 27 per cent in 1963-64. Vegeta-

ble exports dropped by 39 per cent in 1962-63 and by a further 45 per cent in 1963-64 (20). However, the flight of the colons and the disruption of external trade channels were also reflected in the decline of the level of imports, as the market for imported goods became noticeably limited. Thus the value of imports declined from AD 6,298 million in 1960 to 374 million in 1964 and remained fluctuating around this amount until 1968. With the gradual growth of oil exports the trade deficit was reduced from AD 4,351 million in 1960 to 30 million in 1964.

However, this seemingly positive aspect was only made possible at the expense of the destruction of the economy and a major reduction in employment. Moreover despite this and despite the fact that the value of oil exports constantly increased and in fact exceeded the value of agricultural exports for the first time in 1963 (as can be seen from the tables below) the state budgetary situation worsened. This was due to a number of factors; the deficit was no longer covered by the metropolitan budget, and tax revenues declined sharply by 30 per cent, because of the flight of the colons who used to provide 46.3 per cent of these revenues, leaving the state budget with a monthly deficit of between 100 and 150 million Francs (21). More importantly, oil did not produce a dramatic change in the economy and its benefits to Algeria remained almost nil. The increase in the value of oil and gas exports after independence did not involve the same increase in state revenues, since this sector was still largely controlled by French companies. Thus while the value of exported oil and gas exceeded that of agricultural exports in 1963, it was only after 1967 that treasury receipts from oil and gas exceeded the value of agricultural exports.

Oil Production, 1960-1966 (in thousands of tons) (22)

Year	Production	Year	Production
1960	8,631,6	1964	26,488,9
1961	15,689,4	1965	26,481,3
1962	20,690,7	1966	33,868,1
1963	23,887,1		

The Value of the Agricultural Exports and the State's Income from Oil (1963-1969 in million AD) (23)

	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1967	1969
Agriculture	1,150	1,394	1,137	930	579	623	929
Oil and gas	257	259	376	631	800	1,133	1,320

This deficit meant a heavy reliance on external sources to cover expenditure. Thus in 1963 out of total investment receipts of 2,245 million AD, Algeria provided only 154 million itself. In that year foreign sources provided 50 per cent of total government revenues (24). The prime supplier of these sources was France, which was committed under the Evian agreements to provide Algeria with financial aid to cover the compensation paid to the Europeans if their properties were national-ized together with the costs of the projects initiated before independence. During the years 1963, 1964, and 1965 French aid to Algeria amounted to AD 1,050 million, 950 million, and 716 million respectively, excluding technical and educational aid which reached AD 50,150, and 154.5 million in these three years (25).

Therefore, the independent Algerian state inherited an underdeveloped, undercapitalized, and externally oriented economy which besides being unbalanced and incapable of providing employment for the rapidly

increasing population, saw a sudden and violent disruption to its structure after independence. Yet one can not go to the next section without mentioning what was called by Chaliand and Minces the "positive heritage of French colonialism".

At independence Algeria inherited an economic infrastructure that was more developed than that of almost all the ex-colonial countries. Although it lacked the means to man them and the people to serve (26), Algeria owned at the time of independence 10 important ports, three of which were international ports, 10,000 KM of roads, 3000 KM railways, 20 civil airports, together with a relatively developed network of electricity and water supply (27). Most important was the agricultural and industrial infrastructure which offered considerable potential for future economic development.

### **The Ideology of Algerian Development**

Although underdevelopment and economic misery was an underlying course of the Algerian revolution, no systematic economic programme was formulated by the leaders of the FLN during the war of independence. However, some ideas about the economic development of independent Algeria were presented in FLN documents during the war generally stressing the needs to build "national, authentic, and integrated economic development (through) destructive and constructive processes" (28). The destructive action consisted of eliminating the ties of dependence upon the outside world and particularly with the metropolis, 'eradicating exploitation', and removing all mechanisms blocking economic development. Constructive action, on the other hand, involved the optimal utilization of national resources and organizing the economy towards

satisfying internal needs (29). These ideas remained, however, part of the FLN propaganda for legitimacy and popular recruitment, and only when Algeria's independence became inevitable and in sight were they formulated, as we saw, in the Tripoli Programme. This acknowledged that political independence would remain meaningless without sustained and independent economic development capable of severing the neo-colonial relationship and enforcing rather than compromising the democratic and socialist ideals of the revolution. According to the Programme, this was to be achieved by the total rejection of "foreign domination and economic liberalism" which would "increase economic dependence on imperialism", and the adoption of the "control of the economy by the state with the participation of the workers" through economic planning. The latter would "permit the accumulation of the capital required for profitable industrialization in a relatively short period, for the centralization of the most important decisions concerning investment, and for the elimination of waste and false costs arising out of competition among enterprises"(30).

The basic means of achieving such economic development were to be: an agrarian revolution involving the modernization of agriculture and the conservation of land resources at a national level, the profound restructuring of property rights through a radical land reform which would guarantee the distribution of lands to landless peasants and their democratic organization into production cooperatives. This would create the necessary conditions for the development of industry, which was to be oriented towards satisfying local needs and be based on the full exploitation of national human and natural resources. Another means was to be nationalization, which would include all the major sectors of the economy particularly banking, insurance, foreign trade,

and mineral resources and sources of energy. The ultimate aim of this development was to be the achievement of 'socialism' raising the standard of living of the masses and by extending basic services to the Algerian people. The Programme defines socialism as state control over the key sectors of the economy, rejecting any approach which would leave the "the solution of basic Algerian problems to the discretion of an embryonic middle class tied to the economy of imperialism by the nature of its activities .... The state, here, should represent the totality of the Algerian people since the tasks of the revolution cannot be accomplished by a single social class whatever its involvement may be ". This broad and general definition of socialism would, as Temmar has noted, serve to justify a number of contradictory sociopolitical choices; the justification of the self-management system as the most democratic organization (1963-1965), the shift to an institutional model of centralized statist organization (1965-67), and adopting the institutions of socialist forms of management within state enterprises (1977) (31).

Along the same lines but with additional components incorporating the self-management system as a major feature of Algeria's 'socialism', the Algiers Charter became the official programme of the FLN after its adoption during the FLN's first congress in April 1964. In fact the Charter went further in rejecting the capitalist way of development and adopting socialism which it defined as "not only ... the nationalization of the means of production, (but) also and especially ... self-management" The national tasks laid down in the Tripoli Programme were asserted again in the Charter, as it regarded the current stage of Algerian development as a stage of transition from capitalism to socialism.

Both texts were, in fact, motivated to a great degree by the political priorities of the groups struggling for power. The remarkable shift towards emphasis on the self-management system represented one facet of this, since approval of the system was only given after it had become an accomplished fact. Also the emphasis on state ownership and the centralization of decision making after the coup of 1965 while continuing to retain the ideology of 'socialism' exhibits the broadness of this ideology, whose content and the methods of implementation were subject to considerable change. Like the formulation of the ideology itself these changes were determined by the interests of the ruling groups and directed to mobilize wide popular support for their rule. Thus ideology increasingly became an abstraction and "acquired a life of its own independent of the reality of which it is expected to provide an interpretation" (32).

### **Ben Bella's Economic Policies: Pre-conditions of State Capitalism**

In the early years of independence, economic decisions were influenced partly by the political struggle within the FLN factions but principally by the government's bid for survival. The major step of legalising the workers' de facto occupation of the abandoned colon properties together with the nationalization of French-owned lands at the end of 1963, was dictated by the same pressure, to gain popular support and to weaken the regime's the opposition by isolating it.

However, these moves did not provide an immediate solution to Algeria's major economic problems, of underdevelopment and unemployment. Beside involving a great deal of improvisation and incoherence especially with regard to the nationalization of a number of small



enterprises whose economic importance was very limited, the effectiveness of these moves in changing the structure of the economy was limited by two main factors: first, despite the promising new social system that they introduced, they were imposed by the urgent necessity of keeping running what properties were left intact simply to provide a livelihood for those working on them. The recognition of self-management by the state was also undertaken out of political expediency and thus represented a compromise rather than a preconceived ideology of the nature of the socio-economic system. Second, the outcome of these moves, whose effects varied from one sector to another, was not the complete substitution of one socio-economic system for another. Outside the agricultural sector, where the colonial farms were placed under the system of self-management, the application of this system was very limited. In the industrial sector only 450 enterprises, mostly of artisanal activities, were placed under self-management at the end of 1963, accounting for no more than 12 per cent of the industrial labour force. Only 5 per cent of the self-managed enterprises had an important industrial character, employing more than 100 labourers each (33). The commercial sector, on the other hand, remained largely unaffected. With the exception of the creation of state commercial enterprises to monopolize the import and export of certain products of vital importance and to limit speculation in basic commodities, the vast majority of commercial activities remained in private hands. Even in agriculture, about three quarters of the cultivated area remained unaffected, although the part covered by the self-management system included the most fertile lands of the country and produced the bulk of Algeria's agricultural exports. Thus the new system of self-management was too limited to provide an immediate or drastic solution to Algeria's

economic problems.

The state's attempt to put the economy in order was dictated by various factors: first of all by the desperate need to establish coordination and organization within the economic sectors and enterprises on the one hand, and between them and the state after a period of confusion and disorganization on the other. Secondly, in the light of the scarcity of the state's resources it was vital to provide some assurance and guarantees to private capital to operate in Algeria. Finally, the state did not desire not to break off relations with France since Algeria was heavily dependent on French economic assistance.

While the self-management system was publicly hailed as the core of Algeria's socialism and was regarded as an economic panacea for Algeria's problems, a steady process of temporization was in fact under way. Thus if 1963 was the year of socialization, 1964 was the year of organization (34). The latter process involved the consolidation of state control over the self-management sector together with the establishment of state enterprises in the key economic sectors. The same process also meant the scaling down of the application of the land reform outlined in the Tripoli Programme, confining to almost one third of the agricultural sector. This meant that 8,500 agricultural holdings each covering more than 100 hectares and 15,000 holdings of more than 50 hectares remained untouched. This policy set the basis for the creation of an economic system dominated by state capitalism, based primarily on direct state control of important economic sectors, notably the system of agricultural self-management, together with the survival of private foreign and local capital in the economy and its complementary links with the state sector. In practical terms this was

translated into the creation of various state enterprises, notably ONACO (Office Nationale de Commercialisation) which was charged with the organization of the external trade, SNTA (Societe Nationale des Tabacs et Allumettes), SNS (Societe Nationale de Siderurgie), SONATRACH (Societe Nationale de Transports et de Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures), and EGA (L'Electricite et du Gaz d'Algerie). Many of these enterprises carried out the projects which were envisaged by the Constantine Plan which, surprisingly enough, was also based on the idea of establishing state-owned enterprises in the strategic sectors of the economy. The state acquired the participation with the French state in a number of companies operating in Algeria: 56 per cent of the oil company S.N. Repal and the oil refinery of Algiers, 20 per cent of CAMEL (Compagnie Algerienne de Methane Liquide d'Arzew), 40 per cent of Caral-Renault, 30 per cent of Sabab-Berliet, and 20 per cent of the Union Industrielle Africaine (35). At the same time self-management sector was gradually eroded and transformed into state management. In the industrial sector self-management committees were placed under the control of the Ministry of Economics and self-management units were integrated slowly but effectively into the growing state sector by their conversion into state-owned and state-run enterprises (36). In the agricultural sector, a less explicit process of integration and absorption was carried out by subordinating the self-managed farms to state institutions in a number of ways and transforming the workers in these units from owners of the means of production into state employees, while at the same time using the issue as a means of gaining political support for the new rulers. Thus profit mechanisms and wage hierarchies were soon to govern the internal function of the self-managed units with state financial and commercial institutions assuming

the decisive role.

Given the small size and the limited area of activity of private capital outside modern agriculture and the oil sector, the creation of state enterprises was not designed to limit the activities of the private economic sector. In fact during the early years of independence, the Algerian leaders seemed to have realised industrialization of their country would be achieved by private, almost exclusively foreign, capital (37). Thus Ben Bella lost no time in assuring the bourgeoisie on 20 Nov. 1962 that "there is a vital sector in our country, i.e. the public sector, but there will be also a semi-public sector and a private sector. Even in socialist countries, there sometimes exists an important private sector. Nationalizational (of the private sector) and draconian measures are rumoured: there is no question of that"(38). Guarantees and assurances to foreign capital were legally spelled out in the first Code of Investment of 26 July 1963 (39). Among the general assurances and benefits to private capital were: freedom of investment and its equality before the law, that expropriation would only be introduced within a legal framework and "when the net benefits equal the amount of the invested capital", that "all those expropriated are to be given the right of just compensation", and tax exemption on industrial and commercial profits relating which were re-invested in Algeria. Hence the existence of the private economic sector was by no means prohibited, but was encouraged and institutionalized, paving the way for the gradual development of complementary links with Algerian socialism, an important factor which was to play a crucial role in shaping the socio-economic development of the country. Therefore, while private properties in the Muslim agricultural sector were not affected by independence and large landlords remained in control of sizable

agricultural areas, a survey of industry in 1966 revealed that the private sector with 599 enterprises (48 per cent of all industrial concerns) employed 40,570 workers or 40 per cent of all employees in the industrial sector; if artisanal firms were excluded the private sector still employed about 25 per cent of the industrial labour force at that time. This sector constituted a major competitor to the industrial self-managed sector, as it could exhibit far greater flexibility and greater capacity to accommodate itself to market needs.

Within this context the government's economic policies in the first three years of independence were characterized by their ad hoc nature, trying to repair the damage to the economy and to fill the gaps left by the termination of colonialism. Restricted by the lack of financial resources, state investment swung between first one sector and then another. Thus while agriculture received the highest proportion of government spending (36 per cent) in 1963 mainly to cover the maintenance and purchase of equipment, as a part of a declared policy of favouring agriculture over industry (40), education and training received the lion's share of 42.4 per cent of total government spending in 1964, and 30.8 per cent was spent on economic infrastructure (41).

## **The Boumedienne era: State Capitalism as Official Policy**

The main components of Algerian state capitalism, the expansion of the state economic sector, the incorporation of self-managed enterprises into this sector, and the preservation of the private sector, were substantially reinforced and systematized under Boumedienne. Immediately after the coup, assurances were made to private capital, which was hesitant and in a state of constant fear of random nationalization. On 1 November 1965, Boumedienne clearly pronounced the division of tasks between the state and the private sector by stating that "if the major means of production must be kept under the control of public domain, it is ..... in the national interest not to exclude, and particularly not to discourage, private investment". He also appealed to the private sector to understand the new situation which did not rule out its active participation, but rather sought its cooperation with the state sector: "all that we are asking it (the private sector) is that it should be .... in harmony with the policy of the country and that it should not hamper the implementation of state projects"(42).

These assurances were accompanied by a series of de-nationalizations of the properties of Algerian nationals that had fallen under the control either of the self-management system or the state sector during the regime of Ben Bella. They were later formulated in a new Code of Investment of 1967, as we will see shortly.

More important, the creation of the state capitalist system was presented as the "genuine basis" of the political independence achieved in 1962, which would remain insufficient without independent economic development based on the efficient utilization of available human and economic resources. "Exploitative foreign capital", in Boumedienne's

words, constituted an obstacle to this development, that is capital which does not submit to the rules and regulations imposed by the national state and does not function within the limits and directions of planned development. Thus state monopolies of transport, banking, insurance, textile production, steel, chemical, and most export-import trade started gradually to emerge in 1966 through the nationalization of foreign owned companies, and moved slowly into the oil and gas complexes in 1968 and 1969, culminating in 1970 with the take-over of the remaining French oil interests. State control was exercised through the establishment of National Corporations (Societes Nationales) which were not put under the system of self-management, a clear indication of the disenchantment of the regime with this system, which was considered a source of disorganization and anarchy:

"As for Algeria, we have decided, in spite of all the criticisms, to create national corporations because our task is to put an end to anarchy, squandering, and chaos in this sector (i.e. the socialist sector)"(43).

Despite being financed and having their managers appointed by the state, these National Corporations, which officially replaced the system of self-management outside agriculture, possessed a great degree of autonomy in investment, production, and marketing. Each corporation operated one sector of the economy and functioned semi-independently. The internal logic of their functions was arranged along lines little different from that of capitalist companies. In Henri Alleg's words, "their constitutions, far from bearing the hallmark of a revolutionary determination to make them the weapons of socialist choice, instead have the characteristics and outlook of foreign bourgeois economists "specialist in the Third World" and ideological agents for new colonialism"(44). They seemed to function somewhat like the Federal Trade

Commission and Interstate Commerce Commissions in the United States (45). The directors of these corporations acted in exactly the same manner as private capitalists, motivated by purely economic criteria of productivity and profitability (46). Their attitude to the workers was like that of a capitalist employer with regard to hiring and wages. The workers were denied the right to participate in the running of these corporations, and if there was some sort of representation of the workers in the management of the enterprises, it was purely symbolic. Their role became purely consultative through the workers' committees set up in every production unit or through a central workers' council which meets once a year to provide the director-general of a particular corporation with some feedback (47).

These corporations were soon to cover all the vital sectors of the economy (48), exercising independent control over most industrial and commercial activities. The predominance of these corporations "was not the result of technical decisions, but rather of a particular policy: those who run the country today have only a limited confidence in the possibilities of worker-management, just as they are suspicious of.... the participation of of the workers in the political and economic running of the country"(49).

However, this organizational framework did not rule out the participation of foreign and domestic private capital in the development of the country. Such participation was in fact further encouraged and investment was invited according to the regulations set out in a new Code of Investment published in 1967. This Code established the principles of coexistence and complementarity between the private and the state sectors and, unlike the previous Code of 1963, it tackled the status of both foreign and national private capitalists. It provided



guarantees and benefits for investment capital, including a "ten years total or partial exemption from real estate tax", a reduction on duties paid on imported capital goods, "a total, partial, or progressive exemption from tax on industrial and commercial profits". If an investment is higher than AD 500,000, an "exclusive" production right may be granted in specific geographical areas (50).

This indicates that opportunities for private capital and interests continued to be available, giving it the means to function in and exert influence upon the economy. The only difference was that private capital could now only function if it established economic links with the expanding state sector.

Within this form of economic organization, primary emphasis was placed on the development of heavy industry by the state economic sector (based primarily on petrochemicals and steel) by encouraging the transformation of national resources into products for domestic consumption. This strategy and its accompanying organizational forms has come to shape and articulate the interests of the newly emerging social strata. While it preserved, and indeed encouraged, the right of private capital to invest and function within the space left by, and connected with, the state sector, which is by no means insignificant (51), giving the Algerian and the international bourgeoisie a means of extending their activities and influence, this form of development has also been "responsible for the emergence of a comparatively wealthy, powerful and ideologically 'untrustworthy' upper bureaucratic elite which is an important barrier to the construction of a more egalitarian society" (52). This elite was to become a distinct social force with interests and values of its own and was to leave its imprint on Algeria's social and economic development not only through its vital influence on

policies, but also through its relationships and links with other social classes. Hence agricultural policies cannot be isolated from the nature and interests of the dominant social forces and from the imperatives imposed by the adopted strategy of development and its organization.

## NOTES

- (1) Lequy, R., "L'Agriculture Algerienne de 1954 a 1962",  
Revue De L'Occident Musulman,  
Numero 8, 2eme Semestre,1970,p.46.
- (2) Amin, S., The Maghreb in the Modern World,  
Penguin Books, London,1970, p.62.
- (3) Raffinot, M and Jacquemot, P., Le Capitalisme d'Etat Algerien,  
Francois Maspero, Paris, 1977, p.34
- (4) Benissad, M.E., Economie Du Developpement De L'Algerie,  
OPU, Algiers,1979, p.9.
- (5) Raffinot, M. and Jacquemot, P.,op. cit.
- (6) Lawless, R.I. "The Contradictions of Rapid Industrialisation", in  
North Africa,  
Edited by R.Lawless ,Croom Helm,London,1984,p.(9)
- (7) Raffinot and Jacquemot, op.cit., p.31.
- (8) The plan sought the creation of 400,000 new jobs,redistribution of  
250,000 ha. among small peasants, extending education to include  
two-thirds of Algerian children, and the construction of 200,000  
new homes.
- (9) Lawless, op.cit., p.3.
- (10) Griffin, K.B., "Algerian Agriculture in Transition",  
Oxford University Institute of Economics and  
Statistics Bulletin,  
Nov.1965, Vol.27, Part 4, p.237.
- (11) Between 1960 and 1963, Algerian cities received 800,000 new inha-  
bitants, half of them in Algiers and its suburbs.
- (12) Humbaraci, A., Algeria: A Revolution That Failed,  
Pall Mall Press, London, 1966, p.88.
- (13) Griffin, op. cit., p.230.
- (14) Amin, op. cit., p.129.
- (15) Clegg, I., Workers' Self-Management in Algeria,  
Monthly Review Press, New York and London, 1971, p.79.
- (16) Amin, op. cit., p.136.
- (17) Clegg, op. cit., p.79.
- (18) See Lequy, op. cit.

- (19) Teillac, J., Autogestion en Algerie,  
Centre des Hautes Etudes Administratives sur L'Afrique et L'Asie Modernes, Paris, 1965, 31.
- (20) Ibid., pp.35-36.
- (21) Ahmed, Nazli, M., al-'Ilalat baina al-Jaza'ir wa Fransa,  
(The Relations Between Algeria and France)  
Cairo, 1978, p.118.
- (22) Annuaire Statistique de l'Algerie, 1966-67, p.114.
- (23) Andersson, C., Peasant or Proletarian?  
Wage Labour and Peasant Economy during Industrialization: The Algerian Experience,  
Almqvist and Wiksell International, Sweden, 1985,  
p.63.
- (24) Clegg, op. cit., p.81.
- (25) Ahmed, N., op. cit., p.121. See also Raffinot, op. cit., p.73.
- (26) Amin, op. cit., p.243.
- (27) Chaliand, G., and Minces, J., L'Algerie Independant  
Francois Maspero, Paris, 1972,  
pp.70-71.
- (28) Quoted by Benissad, op. cit., p.18.
- (29) Ibid.
- (30) Tripoli Programme, Annuaire de L'Afrique du Nord,  
1963, pp.683-704.
- (31) Temmar, H.M., Strategie de Developpement Independant: Le Cas de L'Algerie: Un Bilan,  
Office des Publications Universitaires, Algiers, 1983, p.12.
- (32) Lazreg, M., The Emergence of Classes in Algeria,  
Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1976, p.136.
- (33) Chronique Economique, Annuaire de L'Afrique du Nord  
1963, p.596.
- (34) Ibid.
- (35) Raffinot and Jacquemot, op. cit., p.66.
- (36) See Clegg, op. cit., pp.142-161.
- (37) Annuaire, 1963, p.606.
- (38) Quoted by Tlemcani, R., State and Revolution in Algeria,

- (39) See the Annuaire, 1963, pp.837-842.
- (40) Ibid., p.601.
- (41) Annuaire, 1964, p.246.
- (42) Quoted by Raffinot and Jacquemot, op. cit., p.87.
- (43) Boumedienne, quoted by Lazreg, op. cit., p.104.
- (44) Alleg, H., "Algeria: Seven Years After- Socialism or Capitalism", Marxism Today, Vol.14, No.3, March 1970. p.84.
- (45) Farsoun, K., "State Capitalism in Algeria", MERIP, No.35, 1975, p.11.
- (46) For more details see Raffinot, op. cit., pp.98-125, 243.
- (47) Lazreg, op. cit., p.104.
- (48) They included: Societe Nationale de Transport et Communication des Hydrocarbures (SONATRACH), Societe Nationale des Industries Textiles (SONTEX), Societe Nationale des Matériaux de Construction (SNMC), Societe Nationale des Industries Chimiques (SNIC), Societe Nationale de Recherche et d'Exploitation Minière (SONAREM), Societe Nationale d'Electricite et de Gaz (SONELGAZ), Societe Nationale de Siderurgie (SENS).
- (49) Alleg, "Algeria...." op. cit., p.82.
- (50) Lazreg, op. cit., p.113.  
By March 31st 1968, the National Investment Commission, responsible for undertakings costing more than 500,000 AD, had dealt with 28 plans, 11 involving foreign participation, while the Regional Investment Commission in Algiers, Oran, and Constantine had dealt with 41 proposals for undertakings costing less than 500,000 Dinars. The rate of investment has increased considerably since then. In Sept. 1968 the total of authorised investment rose from 53 million Dinars to 161 million. Between Oct. 1968 and Feb. 1969, 86 new undertakings were approved.  
Alleg, op. cit., p.83.
- (51) By 1968, and despite the rapid expansion of the state corporations, the private enterprises of the industrial sector covered 52.8 per cent of the total enterprises. They employed 31,604 or 32.8 per cent of the wage workers, and that more than 50 per cent of all industrial enterprises employing more than 20 wage workers were private.  
Lazreg, op. cit., p.114.
- (52) Nellis, J.R., "Socialist Management in Algeria", The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.15, No.4, 1977, p.533.

**PART IV**

**AGRICULTURE AND THE POST-COLONIAL STATE**

## CHAPTER EIGHT : AGRICULTURE BETWEEN COLONIALISM AND STATE CAPITALISM

Algeria's colonial legacy was most apparent in agriculture, not so much because of the creation of the modern sector, but because of the agrarian nature of capitalism created in the course of colonialism and its impact on the whole social structure involving the traditional indigenous agricultural sector. Mainly for this reason, together with the overall importance of agriculture, an examination of sector became crucial for an analysis of the relationship between the state's policies and the the strata in control of the state apparatus, and the impact that these policies would have on the development and character of new social structures.

### **The Colonial Heritage on Agriculture**

As emphasized earlier, colonialism had presented Algeria with, two technically and socially distinct agricultural sectors. They differed significantly in their structure of ownership and production as well as in many other levels relating to the utilization of technology, productivity, and incomes.

The difference between the two sectors represented a drastic inequality favouring the modern colonial sector. Thus while the latter occupied 2.7 million hectares of the most fertile lands of North Algeria shared among 22,000 European proprietors, the less fertile 4.5 million hectares of land located in the arid or semi-arid zones of Algeria, which constituted the major part of the traditional sector, were shared among 618,000 Algerians. There was also a large difference in the structure of ownership within each sector. In the modern sector

the land was concentrated in a very few hands; 6,000 proprietors, or only 30 per cent, owned 2,381,900 hectares or 87 per cent of the total colonial land. In the traditional sector, on the other hand, the majority of owners (70 per cent) possessed less than 10 hectares each and shared less than 20 per cent of the total area of the traditional sector (1).

The two sectors differed in the nature of their production. While the modern sector mainly produced crops destined for the market, and primarily for the market of the metropolis such as wine and citrus fruits, production in the traditional sector was destined for subsistence and only a small part was directed to the market. The difference in the use of technology was striking, with the modern sector employing advanced scientific methods of cultivation and technology. It was even more mechanized than French metropolitan agriculture and depended mainly on permanent and seasonal salaried workers. The traditional sector used primary and backward means of production, which was reflected in the striking differences in levels of incomes between the owners within the two sectors, which showed that an owner in the colonial sector received some 48 times more than for his counterpart in the traditional sector.



## **Independence: The Embodiment of the Agricultural Division**

Despite the declared objective of land reform pronounced in the FLN's Tripoli Programme, the achievement of independence and the state's new policies for agriculture in fact intensified the division among the two sectors. Thus while the modern colonial sector was converted to "self-management" after the workers occupied the colonial farms, the traditional sector was left to its own devices and remained largely unaffected by the events that accompanied independence. Hence the state's agricultural policies would have different implications for the two sectors, since the striking differences between them in the structure of ownership, production, and productivity remained unchanged. This would mean that the mechanism of development and its impact on each sector would not be the same. The following is a brief description of the structure and the situation of both sectors following independence.

### **The Self-Management Sector**

The actual size of the self-management sector varied considerably from time to time. This was partly because not all colonial land was converted into self-management, and partly because of the constant nationalization and denationalization of various properties that took place during the early years of independence (2). A significant part of the colonial land, estimated at 400,000 ha, was donated to 10,000 ex-combatants of the war of independence, and 4,000 C.A.A.M. (Cooperatives Agricoles d'Anciens Moudjahidine) were set up (3). These cooperatives had a different status from that of self-management farms and the status of agricultural workers on them remained unchanged. Thus the theoretical figure of 2.7 million ha was in fact never achieved and the

size of the self-management sector is usually estimated at 2.3 million ha, or 35.3 per cent of the total cultivated area.

The 22,000 colonial farms were drastically reduced following the state's decision to regroup the self-managed agricultural units to 3,000 and then to 2,000 units each of an average size of 1,066 ha. The following table shows the distribution of self-managed agricultural units according to area in 1964.

Distribution of the Self-Managed Units According to Their Size (4)

Size of Units	Number	%	Area h.	%
Less than 50 h.	27	1.23	625	0.03
50 to 100	40	1.82	3,105	0.13
100 to 200	130	5.96	19,460	0.84
200 to 500	553	25.27	193,670	8.30
500 to 1000	620	28.33	447,715	19.19
1000 to 1500	327	14.94	396,705	17.01
1500 to 2000	183	8.38	314,450	13.48
2000 to 2500	131	5.99	292,480	12.54
2500 to 3000	63	2.88	172,515	7.39
3000 to 3500	41	1.88	134,285	5.76
3500 to 4000	18	0.82	67,720	2.90
4000 to 4500	33	1.50	145,755	6.24
More than 5000	22	1.00	144,375	6.19
TOTAL	2,188	100.00	2,332,860	100.00

An inquiry carried out in 1969-70 indicated that the number of self-managed agricultural units had been further reduced to 1,999, bringing the average size of each unit to 1,231 hectares (5).

The economic weight of the self-management sector arose largely because the Algerian economy had generally been constructed to satisfy the needs of the metropolis rather than those of Algeria. Since this sector represented an embodiment of the orientation towards the metropolis and was owned by the colons, its economic importance was significant, it contributed 30 per cent to National Income and produced 60 ..

per cent of total agricultural production (6). The major components of production in this sector were crops demanded by the French market. The most obvious example was wine, which was not consumed at all by most of the Muslim population. Despite the fall in wine production in 1964-65 to 10 million hectoliters from 15 million in 1957-58 it still constituted 60 per cent of agricultural exports and was equivalent to one-third of petroleum exports at that time. The self-management sector produced about 90 per cent of the citrus fruits and more than half the market crops which also constituted a vital part of agricultural exports. The following table reveals the predominance of the self-management sector in the production of crops oriented towards market and exportation:

The Share of the Self-Management Sector in the Area and Production of Major Crops (1969-70) (7)

Crops	Area 000 h.	% of the Total	Production	%
Wine	262.3	87	7.7 m.hl.	88
Citrus Fruits	40.9	87	4.4 m.q.	89.4
Market Crops	48.6	45	4.0 m.q.	55
Industrial Crops	13.0	65	648,000 q.	60
Fruits	14.0	60	542,000 q.	68
Olive	3.5 m.trees	35	342,000 q.	35
Date Palms	0.8 m.trees	8	72,000 q.	10
Cereals:				
Summer Cereals	8.1	68.5	12,588 t.	78
Rice	1.7	89.3	6,139 t.	91
Winter Cereals	792.8	26.4	6.3 m.q.	34.6
Hard Wheat	368.1	24.5	2.3 m.q.	32.7
Soft Wheat	317.9	45.6	2.6 m.q.	55.1
Barley	78.7	10.6	0.7 m.q.	15.7
Oats	20.1	30.2	0.8 m.q.	51.3

It appears from this table that despite the higher productivity of the self-management sector in cereals (8), the latter were essentially produced by the private sector except for some crops which were parti-

cularly demanded by the market such as soft wheat or summer crops.

In comparison to the private sector whose size was more than twice the size of the self-management sector, the latter was remarkably mechanized. It possessed in 1966 about three times more agricultural machinery than the private sector as revealed by the following table:

Distribution of Agricultural Materials Between the Two Sectors (9)

Sector	Wheeled Tractors	Caterpillars	Combined Harvesters
Self-Management	11,250	6,150	2,600
Private	3,100	1,900	100

Moreover, the self-management sector monopolized almost all fertilizers applied in 1965, with 85 per cent leaving the private sector with only 15 per cent.

Despite the real importance of the self-management sector in agriculture in particular and in the economy in general, its contribution to employment was relatively limited especially in comparison with the private sector. In 1964-65 the self-management sector supported an agricultural population of 841,300, only 15 per cent of the total (10). This limited contribution was reflected more in the actual number of people employed in this sector. Thus while the agricultural sector provided employment for 1,293,413 persons or 56.7 per cent of the total active population (estimated at 2,280,972 persons according to the census of 1966), the self-management sector employed an average number of 252,360 workers in 1967-68 or only 19.5 per cent of the agricultural labour force. Those workers were composed of two categories: permanent and seasonal workers. The first category included those who were members of the workers' assembly after meeting the conditions set out

in the March Decrees, principally to have had uninterrupted work within the unit for more than six consecutive months. The second, on the other hand, was composed of workers who were recruited to perform occasional and seasonal tasks and who were not eligible for membership of the organs of management. The division into permanent and seasonal workers varied over time as the following table shows:

Development of the Labour Force in the Self-Management Sector (11)

	64-64	68-69	72-73	76-77
Permanents	134,430	133,020	121,301	100,504
Seasonals	100,000	123,430	117,991	99,610
Undetermined	—	13,390	—	—
Total	234,430	269,840	239,212	200,114

In fact except for the change in the structure of ownership and management, the general characteristics of the self-management sector were inherited from the colonial period without any remarkable transformation. Apart from its economic weight, the importance of the self-managed sector lay in its political impact as a sector "controlled and managed" by the workers. Hence state policies towards this sector were shaped to a large extent by this factor and reflected the attitude of the ruling strata towards the potential of expanding workers control and management, as will be seen below.

### **The Private Sector**

Despit the fact that the burden of the Liberation War was carried essentially on the shoulders of the peasants, the achievement of independence was not accompanied by any radical changes in the private agricultural sector. Extending over an area more than twice the size of

the self-management sector, where more than 5 million people lived, the private sector exhibited a great degree of diversity. Generally it was located in the less fertile parts of the country, utilizing backward techniques and methods of cultivation and producing essentially for subsistence. For the great mass of peasants the land was not sufficient to support their families, while at the same time a few landowners controlled very large land holdings.

#### 1-Structure of Land Ownership:

Until the launch of the "Agrarian Revolution" in 1971 the general characteristics of this sector remained unaltered. However, some changes took place in the structure of land ownership over the years without resulting in a radical shift in inequalities in land distribution. These changes can be intraced in the following table which shows the distribution of the lands in the private sector at three different periods:

Distribution of Privately Held Land, in 1963, 1965, and 1973 (12)

Size of the Unit h.	Number of Units	%	Area h.	%
1963				
Less than 10 h.	450,000	69.8	1,390,000	19.3
10 to 50	170,000	26.4	3,260,000	45.3
50 to 100	16,000	2.5	1,050,000	14.6
More than 100	8,450	1.3	1,500,000	20.8
Total	644,450	100.0	7,200,000	100.0
1965				
Less than 10	423,270	72.1	1,318,125	22.6
10 to 50	147,043	25.1	2,967,454	50.8
50 to 100	11,875	2.0	765,585	13.1
More than 100	4,665	8.0	786,905	13.5
Total	586,843	100.0	5,839,660	100.0
1973				
Less than 10	578,884	79.2	1,536,421	29.5
10 to 50	138,528	19.0	2,492,485	47.9
50 to 100	10,007	1.4	610,913	11.7
More than 100	3,439	0.5	567,801	10.9
Total	730,858	100.0	5,207,611	100.0

The difficulty in carrying out an accurate census in a widely disorganized and scattered sector like the private sector in Algeria probably accounts for some of the discrepancies in the figures between from one census to another. However, the reduction of the area in this sector by more than 1.5 million hectares between 1963 (whose figures were based on the census of 1950) and 1965 can be attributed to reasons beyond the effects of erosion or random nationalizations of the properties of those who had collaborated with colonialism. This reduction, which affected mainly those units of more than 50 hectares, which lost about a million hectares, and specifically those more than 100 hectares (whose number was nearly halved, from 8,450 to 4,665), was almost certainly the result of a deliberate attempt on the part of the large landowners to prevent the expropriation of their properties. This becomes more plausible especially if we know that the 1964-65 census was completed amidst threats of carrying out the land reform promised in the Tripoli Programme. This indicates that the 1965 statistics underestimate the exact size of the large private holdings. Thus Raffinot and Jacquemot suggested that "to the 1.55 million hectares occupied by the exploitations of more than 50 hectares each, one should add 1.8 million hectares together with 400,000 h. lost by the self-management sector from the global total of the colon land, thus indicating that large private proprietors (over 50 h. each) occupied more than 3 million hectars prior to the "agrarian revolution" (13).

Nevertheless, the figures presented in the table above still reveal stark inequalities in land ownership, since less than 3 per cent of owners controlled more than 26 per cent of the land, while the vast majority of peasants (72 per cent) scratched a living on less than 23

per cent of the land. Nearly 32 per cent of the latter category (134,780 owners) owned less than 1 h. of land, too small to support an average family of six persons. Moreover, in 1964-65 an estimated 0.5 million in the private sector were landless and were either employed as wage labourers or assisted their families working on lands they did not own (14). Furthermore, although it is quite difficult to determine, the amount of unemployment in the private sector was staggering. After calculating the demand for labour based on the working days needed for each crop (150 million working days for the private sector), and comparing this figure with the effective labour supply (at least 30 million working days), Temmar estimated that the rate of unemployment was almost 50 per cent (15). This becomes much more alarming if we realise that this sector supported more than 5 million persons.

This means that independence did not immediately bring the promised alleviation in the conditions of misery and poverty of the majority of the rural population. The persistence of these conditions accounted for a continuous and accelerated rural to urban migration which had the potential to cause serious social and political problems.

## 2-Forms of Production:

Unfortunately there are no precise statistics on the division of the private sector into specific forms of production which go beyond the differentiation in the size of properties to include types of operation, investment, production, etc. Nor there is any indication on the distribution of investment among the different farms in this sector which might give indications on the type of operation of the different forms. However, according to the descriptions in various sources (16), one can roughly divide the private sector into four categories:



1- Large and medium-sized farms, occupied according to Raffinot and Jacquemot one million hectares (each with over 50 h.), located in the relatively fertile zones of North Algeria. These belonged to the modern capitalist farmers, since it was engaged in productive investment and produces essentially to satisfy market needs. Modern equipment and waged workers are employed to perform the majority of the operations of production.

2- Other large-scale farms using extensive cultivation on less productive land with little use of mechanization and only nominal investment. These properties were organized on traditional share-cropping and renting terms that tended to parcel the land into small tracts renting it out to tenants and sharecroppers. Production here was directed mainly towards subsistence crops using primitive methods of cultivation.

3- Smaller farms whose size ranged between 10 to 50 hectares often using modern equipment for heavy operations such as ploughing and harvesting. This equipment was generally rented from capitalist farmers or state agencies, and seasonal workers were also employed. While production was essentially directed for self subsistence, a marketable surplus of crops was produced for covering the expenses of inputs.

4- The majority of non-mechanized and very small plots of poor soil in remote mountainous areas. Holdings in this category were too small to provide sufficient incomes for their owners and supplementary employment was necessary. Agricultural production was directed towards subsistence and very primitive methods of cultivation were practised.

This multiplicity of production forms implied that the Algerian peasantry was equally heterogeneous, comprising various socio-economic strata. At the top of the scale were about 5,000 capitalist farmers who owned sizable plots of land that were operated with modern machinery and paid workers, and who invested in the land in order to expand their various agricultural activities. They were followed by medium size owners who were engaged in activities described by Raffinot and Jacquemot as potentially capitalist which, besides insuring production for self consumption, were directed to the enlarged reproduction of their activities. There was also the "half-owner, half-worker" category estimated at about 220,000 whose holdings were not sufficient to support their families, and were thus forced to search for complementary work outside their holdings. They were composed of 75,000 seasonal workers in the private sector and 120,000 temporary workers in the self-management sector. Finally besides the landless unemployed, there were 200,000 permanent salaried agricultural workers who derived their incomes from working in the private and the self-management sectors and who had no land of their own. Hence while the private sector was usually grouped under one heading simply to distinguish it from the self-management sector, it exhibited a great degree of heterogeneity in terms both of size of ownership and in type of operation. Evidence for the existence of an expanding capitalist sector within it was widely supported by the increase in the number of the permanent waged workers. This category doubled from 47,000 to 97,000 between 1954 and 1968. Moreover, larger farming units tended to absorb higher numbers of workers, especially permanent workers, indicating that capitalist farms had been established within the larger properties. Thus, as shown in

the following table the average farm of one hundred hectares and more employed four permanent workers and 30,500 permanent workers were employed by farm units of between 10 and 50 hectares. However, pre-capitalist forms of agricultural organization reflected by share-cropping and renting in kind were still significant before the agrarian reform of 1971. They occupied 14 per cent of the total land area in the private sector. Direct owner operation of farms was highest within the 50-200 hectares category where the capitalist farms were mainly located (17).

Distribution of Wage Workers, by Size Category of Private Farm Unit, (1968) (18)

Size Category of Farm Unit	No. of Farms	No. of Per. Wor.	No of Per. Wor. Per Farm	No. of Tem. Workers	No. of Tem. Wor. Per Farm Unit
0-<10 ha.	440,600	40,800	0.09	49,150	0.11
10-<50 ha.	89,300	30,500	0.34	51,300	0.57
50-<100 ha.	4,500	6,300	1.40	6,000	1.33
100 ha. and up	3,500	14,000	4.00	4,200	1.20
Landless	25,000	4,000	0.16	350	0.08
Not Determined	5,000	2,200	0.44	1,000	0.20
Total	567,900	97,800	0.17	112,000	0.20

### 3-Production:

Given the components of production in the self-management sector and its share in total agricultural production, it is easy to see that the economic role of the private sector was essentially to feed the rapidly growing population. Hence more than half the self-managed area was allocated to the production of cereals, mainly winter cereals, for the immediate needs of the agricultural population. Even among the cereals hard wheat and barley constituted the dominant crops occupying more than 80 per cent of the cereal area and reflecting the importance of local consumption within this sector. Animal production was also

essential and was almost monopolized by the private sector with 90 per cent of total production. In fact it constituted about 42 per cent of the total value of agricultural production in this sector. As well as cereals and animal production, a variety of crops were also produced in the private sector, depending mainly on the climatic situation and on the orientation of production of the farm unit, either for subsistence or for commercial exchange. Thus market and industrial crops together with wine and fruits were produced in this sector in varying quantities. Hence, despite the fact that for the majority of private holdings production was oriented essentially towards producing food for the owners and their families, 60 per cent of the private sector's total output was sold on the market in the period between 1965 and 1971. Pfeifer estimated that in 1968 about 25 per cent of private farm units could be classified as "commercial" (that is selling more than 70 per cent of their output on the market), 44 per cent were in "subsistence" (selling less than 30 per cent), and 31 per cent were "in transition" (selling between 30 to 70 per cent of their output) (19). She also noticed that the larger the farm the more it was oriented towards the market. However, despite the fact that commercialization is not a sufficient condition for determining the nature of the form of production, it does cast more light on the heterogeneity of the private sector and the existence of modern capitalist farms within it.

Similarly, despite being generally at a low level, the use of mechanization and fertilizers was unequally distributed within this sector. Thus the 24,000 tractors owned by this sector, for example, were concentrated in 1.8 million hectares of North Algeria or on only 26 per cent of private farms (20), and fertilizers were used on only 10 per cent of those farms (21).

## State Versus Agriculture

Algeria shared the experience of most post-colonial societies in that the question of agriculture was a social and political problem rather than simply an economic one. However, Algeria differed in that its agricultural problems were usually socially and politically complex, as was clear from the existence of very contradictory phenomena relating to the nature of the social structure in the countryside. On the one hand, agricultural workers controlled nearly one-third of Algeria's most fertile and modern agricultural sector in the self-management movement. On the other hand the power of large landowners and the agrarian bourgeoisie in the remaining two thirds of the agricultural sector (known as the private or the traditional sector) remained persistent, and the conditions of the vast majority of landless peasants did not undergo any significant change between the end of colonialism and the agrarian reform of 1971.

Given the nature of the ruling strata of the state, this represented a real dilemma at both ends of the scale. The mere existence of workers' control, let alone its potential expansion, and the possibility that it might jeopardize the authority and power of the ruling strata represented a large political problem. This problem could not be settled by the state in favour of its dominant forces without a consistent and multi-dimensional process of undermining the autonomy and power of the workers' control of the means of production. The persistence of inequalities in the private sector meant that the large mass of peasants who had carried the brunt of the fighting, whose interests the ruling strata claimed to represent, were left without a share in the colonial legacy and remained in very poor circumstances. More important-

tly, despite the dismantling of the core of the rural bourgeoisie in the course of the self-management movement, the social and economic power of the large landlords and of rural bourgeoisie was by no means totally eliminated. The essential promises made before and after independence had not been yet fulfilled which constituted a further brake on the political and social power of the state and its ruling strata.

Within the interplay of these factors the agricultural sector was assigned a specific socio-economic role in the global development strategy compatible with the interests of the ruling strata and the social classes connected to them. In other words, agriculture had to play an integral role in the transformations that were to be introduced within the framework of state capitalism. However, to enable it to play this role and for it to be integrated into the state capitalist economy in general, state policies towards agriculture became more complex and delicate, and had social and political aims as well as economic ones. Given the social and economic division of Algerian agriculture, these policies had different connotations and implied different emphases on the organization of each sector, with the general aim of incorporating the agricultural sector in the economy of state capitalism.

### **The 'Confiscation' of Agricultural Self-Management**

Words such as "mirage", "deformation", "distortion", "statization", "submission", "failure", are commonplace in the description of the fate of the self-management experience in general and in agriculture in particular. Fears for the future of self-management in its initial phase, following attempts to limit workers' control and their freedom to manage were soon to give way to a consistent and successful

policy of containment on the state's part and the incorporation of self-management and its transformation into state management.

We have explained earlier the contradictions accompanying the constitution of self-management and the spheres in which the bureaucracy intervened and found itself in conflict with the workers. As the subject of the "statization" of self-management has been widely documented (22), we intend here only to describe the elements through which the divorce between the judicial forms of managing and controlling the means of production and the capacity of the workers to manage effectively was achieved, with the result that agricultural self-management was deprived of workers' control and the power of the bureaucracy finally asserted. This was achieved through policies covering the organization of management, the commercialization of inputs and outputs and the supply of credits to this sector. First of all, as asserted earlier, although there certainly were contradictions in the texts which established the system of self-management, these were not primarily responsible for, but only facilitated, bureaucratic control over the management and the suppression of workers' initiatives. This process in fact derived from the state's vision of development and the nature of the institutions that it created ostensibly to supervise and assist the functions of the self-managed farming units.

It was clear from the early days of independence that the state sector rather than the self-management sector would be the core of Algerian economic reconstruction, and that agriculture under self-management was to be an important source of capital for this. This was carried out by direct and indirect policies that aimed at incorporating the self-management sector within the state sector. These policies were carried out by O.N.R.A. (Office National de la Reform Agraire), the

supreme body outside the Ministry of Agriculture created by the March Decrees, on the recommendations of Rene Dumont, with the aim of "organizing the management" of the self-managed farms (23). ONRA, built upon the former colonial network of SAP (Societe Agricole de Prevoyance) was soon to establish its authority and to become not only the supervising organ for the management committees in agriculture and a source of raw materials and technical aid, but also the main source of financial assistance and the organizer of marketing outputs.

Because of its nature and its history, ONRA exhibited a great degree of hostility to the freedom of the workers to run their farms and made every effort to assume direct control over the organization and management of the self-managed farms. By exploiting the high level of illiteracy and the general ignorance of the texts of the March Decrees on the part of the workers, ONRA imposed its own candidates at the head of the self-management committees (24). At the level of organization ONRA followed a systematic concentration of holdings. Thus under the pretext of "technical necessity" and of the absence of the cadres capable of effective management, the 22,000 colonial farms were regrouped to become 2,800 and then 2,000, a number which has not greatly changed over the years (25). With an average size area of 1,231 hectars, each self-managed farm regrouped several of the ex-colonial units. This concentration was carried out in a bureaucratic manner in which there was no attempt to consult the workers or to investigate their performances. There were no proper attempts to arrive at an optimal regrouping of the land, the rationalization of cultivation or the most efficient utilization of materials (26). In this way the farm units became too large, often regrouping 70 permanent workers, and too difficult to be managed effectively by the workers and their elected



representatives who had little experience or knowledge of the newly constituted enterprises. However, the real effect of state policies on the decision making power of the workers and the autonomy of the self-management sector emerged from the complex system of state organizations in charge of marketing of inputs and outputs and supplying credits, technical materials and assistance, which were created immediately after the constitution of the self-management system.

#### 1-Marketing:

The marketing of agricultural produce was undertaken by specialised state institutions concerned with particular products. The first of these institutions was O.A.I.C (Office Algerien Interprofessionel des Cereales) created in 1962. In the self-management sector the marketing of outputs during the early years was carried out by two state institutions descended from the colonial SAP: C.O.R.E (Cooperative d'ecoulement) supplying the national market, and C.O.R.A. (Cooperative de la Reforme Agraire), charged with the collection of fruit and vegetables destined for export. Although the councils of CORA were formed of the presidents of the management committees, the officials of ONRA exhibited total control over matters of ploughing, harvesting, and marketing, as well as deciding how much was to be allocated to the units as seeds or for consumption. This enabled the state to impose an exchange system and a price policy which did not take the interests of the self-management sector into account.

Deficiencies and incompetence in marketing output and in payments were quite common, sometimes resulting in huge losses especially when products were left to perish because of delays in collection and transport (27). In fact it was often the case that, as one source put it, "the self-managed farms were neither associated with the marketing of

their products nor informed about the conditions under which marketing takes place" (28). Instead, the state marketing institutions, which operated according to market laws, exhibited total control over marketing the output of this sector. The outcome was a continuous "separation of production from exchange and a denial of the rights of the workers to control conditions of sale of their products" (29). This was reflected in various demonstrations of workers' opposition; illegal consumption of products became a regular practice, and some produce was sold secretly and illegally to private intermediaries.

## 2-Supply of Credits:

This was one of the principal ways in which the revolutionary character of self-management was neutralized. Through the credit policy, self-management farms became entirely dependent on the state to perform the simplest functions, but also faced a precarious financial situation which had a very negative impact upon their performance. In fact financing arrangements and regulations were continually changed and disrupted over the years, involving a multiplicity of institutions and a noticeable degree of confusion and complication. Until 1964 the B.C.A. (Banque Central Algerien), undertook this operation directly by according a global amount to the ONRA to be distributed on the farms through the Caisse Centrale de Societes Agricoles de Prevoyance C.C.S.A.P., and the Caisse Algerienne de Credits Agricoles Mutuels (C.A.C.A.M.).

Actual distribution was carried out by a subsidiary of ONRA, the Societes Agricole de Prevoyance SAP (now under the name of Cooperatifs de la Revolution Agraire). For its part the Central Bank had access to the funds earned by ONRA from its marketing profits and exports (30). This policy applied mainly to short term operational credits.-ONRA was

charged with the task of assessing equipment credits and the allocation of medium and long-term investments. It operated in a very centralized way, making purchases and allocations on behalf of production units. Self-management committees had to deal and negotiate with ONRA to get their share of credits and equipment, in a way which made it impossible for them to manage their farms properly or to set up their own accounting system. (31). Before approving a credit, ONRA demanded the farm units to show proof of their profitability, a condition which was quite difficult for newly established units to meet especially as they were functioning in hostile conditions. After the dissolution of ONRA in 1966-67 the granting of credits was relatively decentralized when the self-management units started to deal individually with the CACAM (which used to finance the European sector during the colonial period).

In 1967-68 the CACAM network was integrated into the National Bank of Algeria (BNA), which became the sole organization financing the self-managed units. However, complicated procedures for granting credits persisted involving long delays and sometimes a refusal of the grant. In many cases this meant the stoppage of agricultural activity or the inability of the unit to pay the workers' wages, thus creating formidable difficulties for the smooth running of the units and adversely affecting their productivity and production (32). More important, the autonomy of workers in production and exchange was greatly affected, since in order to obtain credits the self-managed units had to meet certain criteria imposed by the state institutions. In asking for financial assistance the workers' representatives found themselves on a different footing from the ONRA or the representatives of other state institutions. The latter were able, therefore, to intervene directly at many levels in the conditions of production of the units and often

became the effective managers of the farms.

The difficulties encountered by the management committees in acquiring credits were reflected in the sizeable difference between the amount of credits allocated to the self-management sector by the state and the actual amounts it used. Thus in the years 1966, 1967, and 1968, the credits used by the self-management sector represented only 0.7, 4.1, and 9 per cent of total credit allocated (33).

Similar bureaucratic practices were carried out by the state agencies in supplying the self-managed sector with its agricultural equipment, materials, seeds, etc. which resulted in the gradual transformation of the autonomous movement of self-management into a state sector whose relations with the environment in general were closely controlled and directed. Thus, the orientation of the socio-economic activities of the workers became increasingly determined at the central level by a power over which they had no influence. The bureaucratic practices were also strongly condemned by the workers themselves who demanded that more freedom should be assigned to them in the organization of production which was to be the core of their responsibilities.

### 3- Management Organs:

Another aspect of the state's hold over the self-management sector was the internal function of the management committees at the level of production units. This cannot be isolated from the general environment in which the self-management sector was forced to operate but in fact was directly influenced by the state's endeavours to transfer the workers' rights to own and run the means of production to itself via its representatives. This entailed the preservation of colonial practices relating to the relations of workers to the means of production

and hierarchical divisions between the workers.

We saw how the March Decrees stipulated the insertion of the director as the representative of the state within the management committee in order to insure that the production plan of the farming units was compatible with the national plan. Together with the inherent contradictions that accompanied the Decrees, this played a major role in facilitating the implementation of the state's fundamental desire to empty self-management of its social content.

The elected organs of the management became increasingly separated from the rest of the workers, as those minority of technically competent and qualified workers who controlled the management became distinguished from the majority of less or non-qualified workers. Control of the workers' collective was not particularly affected by this phenomenon since even under 'natural' conditions it is normal that the more knowledgeable, informed, and competent workers are elected to represent the others. What really had a negative effect on the workers' collective management was that the organs of management became a means of wage discrimination and upward mobility and of isolating those in charge of them from the mass of the workers, a phenomenon which was greatly enhanced when the workers were not able to assume their effective role and remained simply wage labourers with no control over the process or means of production. Hence instead of representing the collective interests of the workers against the bureaucracy and the exploiting classes, the organs of management became an element enhancing traditional forms of social solidarity in the sense explained by Clegg, whereby nepotism as an expression of the normal values of traditional society became a criterion for employment and upward mobility

(34). ~~... of the relations of the workers to the means of production~~

Nearly all commentators on the Algerian experience of self-management have highlighted the monopolization of power by the state appointed managers on the management committees and have shown how because of the contradictions and vagueness of the Decrees, the latter were able to capitalize on the importance of their role and often behave as if they were the real proprietors. This created fundamental confrontations and divergences of interest between the manager and the management committee.

However, the problem was not related to the appointment of the manager, since, as we asserted earlier, some kind of coordination between the nascent self-management and the state was necessary for the former to function properly. Neither does it lie entirely in the vagueness and lack of definition of the manager's role or, more importantly, in the definitive class character and values of the managers, as Clegg has suggested. In fact despite the importance of the latter, the fact remains that the relations between the state and the enterprise in general have been primarily responsible for the deformation of self-management. The power of the manager was essentially derived from the position the state assigns to him. In the Yugoslav experience of self-management, for example, the power of the General Manager, who was also appointed by the state, over the workers was at the highest when the state was responsible for "administrative-operational management", i.e. when state control over self-management was greatest (35). In these circumstances managers could pursue their interests and values, and their social background and ambitions were immediately reflected in their actions.

...In Algeria, a large number of committee managers were appointed from among the minor officials of the colonial SAP. In the administra-

tive vacuum created by the colons' departure and the general lack of technical and administrative qualifications, the appointment to the post of manager needed only the lowest educational qualifications, the Certificat d'Etudes Primaires, together with the appropriate connections. Hence it would have been difficult to trace homogeneous class values and a degree of unified ideological commitment that would group the managers under one class. Their hostility towards the workers stems from their position as appointees of the state which ultimately aimed to contain self-management and transform it into state management. Therefore, if conflict dominated the relationship between the state managers and workers' representatives, it was mainly because this was an inevitable consequence of specific state policies whose general effect would be to enhance the managers' pursuit of material satisfaction. It can be seen, therefore, that the inner functioning of management at the level of the production units was also subordinated to a policy of depriving the collectivity of workers from effective management.

While managers behaved as if they were the real proprietors of the self-managed agricultural units, imposing their will and control over the most important aspects of management including production, the number of workers, and wages, the other management organs were separated from the workers and thus could not perform their assigned tasks effectively. In many cases the presidents of the committees were referred to by the workers as new caids who were detached from the interests of the workers. The functions of the management organs became too formal. Meetings of the General Assembly became very rare, and if they took place much concern was paid to the workers' immediate problems relating to appointment, wages, division of work and so on (36).

In a word, self-management was transformed through the mechanisms discussed above into state management and the workers' autonomy was lost.

#### **The Self-Management Reform of 1969**

This state's containment of the self-management system was carried out during a period of political instability during which a clear and coherent economic policy was not yet elaborated. It involved nevertheless a high degree of centralization and bureaucratization, and state institutions gradually came to intervene directly in almost every aspect of self-management.

This has resulted in widescale inefficiencies and bottlenecks at different levels of activity in the self-management sector, concerning financing, the supply of materials, and the marketing of produce which was immediately reflected in the level of production and productivity. Thus while this sector was looked upon as a major source of capital for the economy in general, the level of production was a disappointing and even fell in the years following independence.

Index of Agriculture Production in the Self-Management Sector  
(1964=100)

1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
100	100	70	57	70

Cereal productivity in the self-management sector recorded a sharp fall in comparison to the colonial period falling from an average of 10 to 6.7 Quintals per hectare (37).

Despite the confusion that followed the Boumedienne coup, especially with regard to the government's attitude towards the self-manage-



ment sector, repeated assurances were made for its preservation. However, it was emphasised that its reorganization must be more effective. It was also recognized that rigid centralization was a major cause for paralysis of the most important activities in this sector. Thus the necessity of introducing some form of autonomy into self-managed production units was also recognized. However this did not derive from an understanding of the essential basis of self-management, the workers' autonomy in running the means of production, but from the desire for an effective and efficient control by the state over the self-managed unit. Hence "for better control of the self-management sector, we should decentralise and put an end to abuses" (38).

Thus in November 1965 the Council of the Revolution issued a decree which drew up the broad lines of action to be undertaken by the new government, emphasising the need for more autonomy for the self-managed units. However, apart from the dissolution of ONRA in September 1966 and the administrative regrouping of the self-management sector under the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, few modifications of substance were made (39). These related mainly to the assignment of various ONRA tasks concerning marketing and the supply of agricultural materials to a number of newly created state agencies and offices (40). At the end of 1968 an ordinance was passed dealing with the management of the farms in the self-management sector, which was later explained in a series of decrees on 15 February 1969. The declared aim of these decrees was to clarify the roles of the management bodies and to introduce more autonomy to the workers by correcting and completing the 1963 decrees. The major concern of these decrees was the definition of the membership of the workers collective on farms under self-management. (decree no. 69-15, 15 Feb.), of the powers and

functions of the management bodies (decree no.69-16,15.Feb.), and of the income of the farms under self-management and its allocation (decree no. 69-17, 15 Feb.) (41). On 5 April 1971, an ordinance explained in a series of decrees of the same date was passed recognising the rights of the workers to social security, invalidity,maternity, and family allowances (42).

The major change introduced in the 1969 decrees was the elimination of the differentiation between the full-time and the part-time workers within the enterprise. This gave the rights of a full-time worker and thus the membership of the workers collective to any person who worked for a total of 200 days per year in the enterprise. On holdings cultivating a single crop (that is any unit where 80 per cent of its income was derived from one crop), the minimum working days needed for qualification for collective membership was 160 days (43). This provision of the decree put an end to the previous rule whereby six successive months of work were required for full membership, which had been widely abused by the directors who would sack unwanted workers before they become eligible. In consequence the number of full-time workers immediately increased from 133,000 in 1969 to 173,770 in 1970 (44).

Management bodies established since 1963 were retained by the decrees of 1969 with almost no changes in their assigned tasks. The only change introduced in this respect related to the organization of the meetings of these bodies. The number of members of the workers' council was changed to range between 18 and 45 members, at a rate of 6 members for every 15 voters. The presidency of the management committee became a full-time job, and the president, who was to be elected by the General Assembly, with a vote between two candidates, was to be

nominated by an outside administrative unit, the Communal Commission (45). He was also elected to serve a term of three years. The state was still represented within the management committee by the director, who retained his right to veto any decision by the committee which he considered not to conform with the national plan. He also retained the main functions assigned to him by the March Decrees without any significant changes. The Wilaya Directorate of Agriculture provided the technical advisors and controllers of the self-managed farms, now with more flexibility than during the period of ONRA since they now dealt with each farm individually. Financial arrangements were to be carried out directly with the BNA, and state control over this section remained.

The reform stated explicitly that the Ministry of Agriculture held the ultimate responsibility for the direction of the self-management sector. This was to be implemented through the intervention of the Wilaya Directorate of Agriculture in determining levels of production investment. The text stated that "the Minister of Agriculture determines the technical and economic direction of the agricultural self-managed enterprise; he supervises and decides the technical assistance granted to the production units . . . ., he indicates to the specialized bodies of the agricultural self-management the designed objectives that conform to the national development plan" (46). Thus the power of the state was retained in the determination of the most important activities of the self-managed farm especially production and cultivation.

Despite the fact that the self-management reform was supposed to introduce more autonomy to workers' management, its impact in this respect remained negligible. In fact this autonomy and decentralization was carried out by streamlining state control over the workers in order

to avoid the rigidity and inefficiency that had previously characterized the state's relationship with the self-management sector. In other words, the main concern of the reform was to change the shape of state control over self-management by making it more efficient in order to avoid the difficulties created in marketing and the supply of credits and agricultural equipment. The fact that the reform was initiated by the state on its own initiative without any significant participation of the workers may explain why it was more concerned with increasing production than in freeing the workers' initiatives. It was a state affair, largely concerned with the modernization of the methods integrating the self-management sector within the state economic sector. Thus it was mostly concerned with the clarification of the roles of the management bodies, particularly that of the director, asserting their submission to the state. In this sense the reform was a technical and not a social one trying to avoid the negative effects of state control over self-management without eliminating it.

Thus despite the resentment of the workers, self-management gradually and finally lost its social content. From being an achievement which promised a radical transformation of Algeria's social and economic structure, the self-management movement was reduced to a mere transfer of colonial properties to the state. Workers' management was practised within the confines delimited by the state and gradually management bodies submitted to the organs of the state institutions through various mechanisms. Capitalist laws now dominated the environment within which self-management had to function; this was reflected in production and exchange activities and in the status of the workers as simple wage labourers (47).

47. *Le mouvement de la gestion autonome en Algérie*, op. cit., p. 100.

## Notes

- (1) See Tidafi, T., L'Agriculture Algerienne et ses Perspectives de Developpement, Francois Maspero, Paris, 1969, p.40-42.
- (2) Considerable land of self-management was lost as a result of urbanization process which entailed the transference of land into non-agricultural use. Between 1969 and 1974, the agricultural useful area of the self-management sector in the East of Algeria was reduced from 24,800 ha. to 22,700 ha. or a reduction of 10 per cent.  
Bedrani, S., L'Agriculture Algerienne Depuis 1966, Economica, Paris, 1982. p.32.  
During the same period agricultural land between Oran and Arzew in West Algeria lost a total of 1,840 ha. of productive land to non-agricultural activities.  
Couderc, R., and Desrie, G., "Croissance Urbaine et Milieu Rural: La Desorganisation de l'Agriculture Autogeree entre Oran et Arzew (Algerie)"  
L'Espace Geographique, No.1 1975, p.21.
- (3) Raffinot, op. cit., p.293.  
Benhouria, on the other hand, puts the size of the land allotted to the CAAM at 300,000 ha., and that the number of cooperatives at 350.  
Benhouria, T., L'Economie de L'Algerie, Francois Maspero, Paris, 1980., p.37.
- (4) Ministere de l'Agriculture et de la Reforme Agraire, (MARA) Structure des Exploitations Agricoles Autogerees, Statistique Agricole, No.2, 1967, p.15.
- (5) Ministere de L'Agriculture et de la Reforme Agraire Enquete Sur le Secteur Socialiste Agricole: Resultats de la Campagne 1969-1970. Statistique Agricole, No.12, Dec.1971. p.13.
- (6) Temmar, op. cit., p.124.
- (7) MARA, Statistique Agricole, No.2, Dec.1971, Annuaire Statistique de l'Algerie, 1970, Benhouria, op. cit., p.101.

- (8) In 1969, the productivity of cereals in both the self-management and the private sector was as follows:

Cereals	(quintals Per Hectar)	
	Self-Management	Private sector
Hard Wheat	7	5
Soft Wheat	8	5
Barley	9	4
Oats	8	5
Maize	10.3	8.3
Rice	34.8	27.2

Source; Secretariat d'Etat au Plan, Direction des Statistiques, Annuaire Statistique de l'Algerie 1970, p.92.

- (9) Tidaft, op. cit., p.80.
- (10) Direction Generale du Plan et des Etudes Economique  
Sous-Direction des Statistiques  
Annuaire Statistique de l'Algerie 1966-1967, dec. 1969, p.102.
- (11) Bedrani, op. cit., p.58.
- (12) 1963, Tidaft, op. cit., p.40.  
1965, Annuaire Statistique de l'Algerie, 1970, p.86,  
1973, Karsenty, J.C., "Les Investissements dans l'Agriculture  
Algerienne" in  
Les Problemes Agraires au Maghreb  
ed. by (CRESM). 1977, p.116.
- (13) Raffinot, op. cit., p.314.
- (14) Annuaire Statistique....1966-1967, p.103.
- (15) Temmar, op. cit., p.107-108.
- (16) See, for example, Raffinot, Bedrani, Andersson.
- (17) Pfeifer, K., Agrarian Reform Under State Capitalism in Algeria,  
Westview Press, London, 1985, p.21.
- (18) Ibid., p.20.
- (19) Ibid., p.19.
- (20) Bouchenak - Khelladi, M.S.,  
Problemes Poses Par la Politique Agricole Dans L'Economie  
Algerienne  
Memoire en Vue de l'Obtention d'un D.E.S. en Sciences Economiques  
Universite des Sciences Sociales de Grenoble. 1972-73, p.49.
- (21) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.22.
- (22) See Clegg, op. cit.

- (23) In his work, Les conditions de la Reussite de la Reforme Agraire en Algerie, Dumont wrote that:  
 "An hierarchical organization of management, from the arrondissement (district) to the department of Algiers, will go through twin channels: technical on the one side and financial on the other. It will be topped with a national office, empowered with autonomy of movement, permitting it to devise administrative and accounting rules. This then requires an immediate organization, the Office National de la Reforme Agraire ONRA, or another responsible Office, empowered with actual authority over self-management committees"  
 Quoted by Tlemcani, *op. cit.*, pp.100-101.
- (24) See Clegg, *op. cit.*, p.145.
- (25) Karsenty, J.C., "La Politique Agricole Algerienne"  
Maghreb - Machrek No.77, (July-Sept.)1976, p.31.
- (26) Bedrani, *op. cit.*, p.26.
- (27) See Clegg, *op. cit.*, p.157.
- (28) Bouchenak - Khelladi, *op. cit.*, p.72.
- (29) Benhouria, *op. cit.*, p.69.
- (30) Bedrani, *op. cit.*, p.208.
- (31) Djabri, A., The Agrarian Policies of Algeria; 1962-82  
 M.A. Thesis, University of Warwick, March 1984,  
 p.67-68.
- (32) Bedrani, *op. cit.*, p.210.
- (33) Karsenty, *op. cit.*, p.127.
- (34) Clegg, *op. cit.*, p.168.
- (35) Seibel, H.D., and Damachi, U.G.,  
Self-Management in Yugoslavia and the Developing World,  
 Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1982, pp.43-45.
- (36) Raffinot, *op. cit.*, p.286.
- (37) Smith, T., "The Political and Economic Ambitions of Algerian Land Reform 1962-1974",  
The Middle East Journal, Vol.29, No.3, Summer 1975,  
 p.267.
- (38) Boumedienne, quoted by Raffinot, *op. cit.*, p.295.
- (39) For the sequence of these modifications see:  
 Guin, J.P., Les Institutions Agricole Algeriennes,  
 C.R.E.S.M., Paris, 1974, pp.69-71.

- (40) Among these agencies and offices were:  
OFLA, (Office des fruits et Vegetables d'Algerie), ONCV (Office National de Commercialisation du Vin), ONAMA (Office Nationale du Material Agricole), ONLAIT (Office national Du Lait).
- (41) Ministere de l'Agriculture et de la Reforme Agraire,  
Direction de la Reforme Agraire,  
Recueil des Textes Relatifs a l'Autogestion dans l'Agriculture  
1977, pp.7-36.  
See also:  
International Labour Review, Current Information  
"Algeria's Workers' Management in Agriculture" (100), 1969,  
pp.595-598.
- (42) Ministere de l'Agriculture et de la Reforme Agraire,  
Direction de la Reforme Agraire,  
Secteur Socialiste Agricole, (not dated), pp.57-140.
- (43) MARA, "Recueil....." , op. cit., p.12.
- (44) Annuaire Statistique de l'Algerie, 1980, p.183.
- (45) The communal commission was composed of a local member of the Party, a representative of the Agricultural Ministry, a representative of the farm Union (FNNTT), and two members of the Communal Popular Assembly (APC).
- (46) MARA, "Recueil..." op. cit., p.34.
- (47) For a discussion on the status of the workers in self-management see: Benhouria, op. cit.



## CHAPTER NINE : AGRARIAN REFORM WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ALGERIA'S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

The importance of the "Agrarian Revolution" launched in 1971, nearly ten years after independence, lay not only in the provisions of the laws it introduced, but also, and more significantly, in the fact that it was the first measure by the state which implied a direct change in the social and the class structure of society and transcended previous measures such as the nationalization of foreign capital and the assertion of political and national independence. Even the constitution of the self-management system, despite its social implications, was driven mainly by nationalistic motives expressed in the confiscation of the lands and properties owned by Europeans and transforming them into Algerian hands. In fact since the achievement of independence the state did not address itself to any restructuring of social relations within Algerian society. The process of erecting the state economic sector depended primarily on the implementation of broad national tasks expressed in building an independent national economy and required the nationalization of the properties owned by metropolitan capital. If the nationalization process had affected some indigenous elements, it was also motivated by the same nationalist factors since those whose properties were nationalized had been collaborators with the colonial system. Thus ten years elapsed for the major and long promised restructuring of the social balance in Algeria's most socially important sector, i.e. the private agricultural sector.

As much as this delay in carrying out the agrarian reform (1), could be explained by the nature of the ruling strata and the dominance of certain classes, the enactment of the reform and its timing threw

further light on this. Besides analysing the extent and impact of the changes brought about by this reform in socio-economic relations in agriculture, these general features of economic and political conditions and in particular the role assigned to agriculture in the state's development strategy, are essential factors in understanding the nature of this reform in its explicit and implicit goals. This in its turn gives further insight into the character and nature of the leading social forces in control of the state and its development programme.

Despite differences in emphasis, nearly all commentators agree on the combination of factors that induced the state to undertake these measures. These factors can be summarized as being economic, social, and political. We will dismiss, however, the argument presented by some commentators (2), which attribute the delay in the initiation of the agrarian reform to "administrative unpreparedness" and the lack of cadres to carry out the reform. This would imply that the reform could be launched because Algeria had attained some level of administrative skill and experience. In fact we think that the importance of the above factor lay more in the way how efficiently the agrarian reform was carried out and did not extend to the intention and preparedness of the state to direct a blow to one faction or more of the propertied class. The latter hinged on more important social, economic, and political factors which will be described below. Moreover, Algeria's lack of skilled cadres was obvious even during the time when the agrarian reform was enacted. In 1969, only two years before the launch of the reform, Viratelle estimated that out of 30,000 specialists needed in agriculture, Algeria had only 2,000 and many of them were foreigners. The Institute National Agronomique had not trained more than 107 engineers since independence (3). The "administrative unpreparedness"

argument was still valid but did not prevent the enactment of the reform.

In order to situate the agrarian reform within its proper context, in an attempt to examine its goals and impact, we have to look briefly at the global development programme of Algeria, the role and the place assigned to agriculture within this programme, and the effects of this upon agriculture which in its turn played a part in the institution of the agrarian reform.

### **The Algerian Development Strategy**

Within the institutional framework of state capitalism, the ultimate goal of Algerian development strategy was the achievement of economic independence by freeing the economy from subordination to the economies of Western Europe and other capitalist countries. Changing the material base of society through rapid industrialization was emphasised as a vital precondition for breaking with all forms of economic dependence.

The economic policy to achieve this development became clear only under the regime of Boumedienne. It was formulated between 1966 and 1967 and was mainly influenced by the theoretical work of the French economist Destane de Bernis. After combining the theory of growth poles with that of industrialization in the U.S.S.R., Perroux and especially de Bernis came up with a specific development model for the Third World in general and Algeria in particular. This model was essentially based on the development of "industrializing industries" (4). The ultimate aim of this model was to develop a productive sector capable, by utilizing national resources, of generating development in other sectors of the economy in addition to satisfy long term public consumption needs.

According to this model, "some industries, particularly the power producing ones, have stimulating capacities: that is to say in the countries where they have developed they give rise to a series of associated industries, both up-stream and down-stream. The entire economy is thereby stimulated" (5). The priority of this model is, therefore, the development of industry rather than agriculture and the development of heavy and capital intensive industry directed towards producing the means of production, rather than light industry directed towards the production of consumer goods.

This model was adopted by the Algerian development strategists and soon came to represent official doctrine in its various speeches, charts, and codes. The nature of industrialization presented by this model was seen not only as a formidable cure for the problem of unemployment through the creation of secondary industries, although in the long term, but also as a means of diversifying the country's exports. Algerian produced commodities would be competitive in the external market since they would be produced with cheap labour from by the traditional sector. Thus Boumedienne asserted on more than one occasion that rapid heavy industrialization would not only enable the country to diversify its exports, but also to export the people's labour instead of exporting raw materials at low prices (6).

In the context of Algeria the "industrializing industries" were hydrocarbon processing, metallurgical and other mineral processing, mechanical engineering, and the production of organic and inorganic chemicals. These were to act as the "motor" of the development process producing raw materials and machinery for other sectors of industry and for agriculture. In doing so, and by backward and forward linkages, they would stimulate development in the backward sectors of the economy

until the entire economy would become highly advanced and modernized. Oil and gas revenues were to be the major source for funding the higher rate of investment, with foreign loans and the currency earned by migrant labour in Europe designed to play a significant role in the process of accumulation (7). 1980 was targetted as the year when Algeria would attain the phase of innovation, by which time a complete industrial system would be installed, supplying employment for 40,000 persons annually (8). In that year, according to predictions made by Algerian planners, the Algerian economy would be capable of producing anything it chose.

This strategy was to be implemented through a series of Development Plans; the Three-Year Pre-Plan (1967-69), the first Four-Year Plan (1970-73), and the second Four-Year Plan (1974-77). 1978 and 1979 were to be the years of transition and re-assessment before the introduction of the Five-Year Plan (1980-84).

After 1967 and throughout the years of the implementation of this strategy, investments were concentrated primarily in the industrial sector, with heavy industry receiving the lion's share of the capital allocated to the latter. Thus while industry received 49, 44.5, and 43.5 per cent of total investment during the three-year plan (1967-69), the four-year plan (1970-73), and the four year plan (1974-77) respectively, heavy industry in the hydrocarbon sector and capital and intermediate goods were allocated 80, 87.6, and 88.5 per cent respectively of total funds directed to the industrial sector in these plans.

Structure of Investment 1967-1977  
(in Percentages) (9)

Sector	1967-69 Plan	1970-73 Plan	1974-77 Plan
Hydrocarbon	24	16.5	17.5
Productive Industry	15	22.5	21
Consumption Industry	10	5.5	5
Agriculture and Irrigation	17	14.5	15 *
Infrastructure	10	12	14
Housing	3.5	5	7.5
Education	9.5	12.5	9
Health	2.5	3.5	0
Collective Equipment	8.5	0	5
TOTAL	100	100	100
*) 11 for agriculture and 4 for irrigation			

Furthermore, the absolute amount of investment increased twice between the plan of 1967-69 and that of 1970-73 (from AD 10,3 to AD 30.6 billion). It also increased more than three times between the plan of 1970-73 and that of 1973-77 (from 30.6 to 109.4 billion AD) (10), mainly due to increases in oil revenues, especially at the end of 1973. In fact as a result of this increase the size of the second four year plan (1974-77) was doubled "overnight" from 54 to AD 110 billion.

Light industries were considered by the Algerian development strategy as of insignificant importance for the first stage since their development would take on momentum only after the heavy industrial sector was erected.

In fact the strategy contained different contradictions and either overestimated or under-estimated certain important factors relating to its implementation. We are not concerned to discuss these contradictions and deficiencies here (11); we will look at the impact of this strategy upon the agricultural sector in general through the role

assigned to it which gradually combined to make the introduction of the agrarian reform an urgent necessity.

### **Agriculture in the Development Strategy**

A quick glance at the figures in the table above suggests that a deliberate choice not to invest in agriculture was an important part of the development strategy. In fact this was the case despite the state's continuous emphasis on the balanced development between agriculture and industry expressed in the often cited slogan: "marcher sur deux jambes". The development and modernization of agriculture was to be carried out by giving "priority to industrial investment which does not produce the means of consumption, but contributes to the construction of the basis of the industrial sector and will, in the same time, supply the necessary products for the modernization of agriculture" (12). The development of the agricultural sector, therefore, would take place as part of the development of heavy industry, which would itself have various backward and forward impacts on stimulating agricultural production and productivity. The huge differences in investment between agriculture and industry were explained by the argument that agriculture was already an ongoing sector "with its base in the soil" whereas industry had to be built from practically nothing (13).

However, if agriculture was neglected in terms of investment, it was assigned a quite distinct and multi-faceted role by the development strategy in order to achieve the objectives of economic independence and sustained growth. Agriculture was to play five major important functions:

- 1- To supply the cities and urban centres with food at lowest cost in order to minimize industrial expenses. This supposes the achievement of national self-sufficiency in the production of basic food products.
  - 2- To maintain the work force which cannot be absorbed by industry.
  - 3- To provide the economy with an investable surplus.
  - 4- To provide an outlet for industrial products in the form of agricultural equipment, tractors, threshers, fertilizers, pesticides, or in the form of consumer goods for the rural population.
  - 5- To supply the industrial sector with the necessary raw materials such as fibres, textiles, sugar beet, tobacco, etc.
- (14).

It was believed that with the expansion of industry, farms in both the self-management and private sectors would raise output to feed the burgeoning urban work force and would respond to the availability of mechanization by increasing their productivity. In other words, the way in which the agricultural sector would increase its production and productivity, in itself a precondition for the success of the strategy, would at the same time be an embodiment of industrial expansion and its response to the needs of the internal market.

However, Algerian development strategy inherited many difficulties were reflected in one way or another in agriculture, exacerbating its problems. Lack of investment meant that the technological level remained unchanged and in some cases even deteriorated. Projects to bring more land into cultivation were not successful. Moreover, the



internal terms of trade of agriculture were deteriorating, since the prices of basic agricultural products under the control of the state remained stable throughout the 1960s. This had serious consequences for the responsiveness of the agricultural sector to the demands of the development strategy concerning the total integration of agriculture in the economy. In the light of these problems we will discuss briefly the general problems of agriculture until the introduction of the "Agrarian Revolution", and difficulties they placed in the way of the implementation of the development strategy which constituted the social and economic base for the launch of the reform.

### **The Situation of Agriculture before 1971**

On the eve of the agrarian reform, of Algerian agriculture was divided into two contrasting sectors as regards both structure of ownership and production. This division together with the passive role assigned to agriculture in the development strategy meant at least theoretically that only the self-management sector could be respond to the expansion of industrialization. Despite the enhancement of modern capitalist farming, the private sector remained relatively less integrated into the rest of the economy, and imposed strong constraints on the development of the modern capitalist sector. The non-capitalist landlords who controlled the majority of the land in this sector preferred extensive cultivation and indirect tenure because they did not want to invest in agriculture, with the result that few improvements were introduced on these properties (15). Small holdings, which accounted for the majority of agricultural production units in the private sector, were generally unable to improve the conditions of production or to invest in their lands, and remained largely unaffected

by the develop-ment of the economy. Self-sufficiency in production remained their ultimate and major goal. In general, despite the existence of increasingly developing capitalist farming, non-capitalist production remain-ed predominant in agriculture.

In these circumstances, until the launch of the agrarian reform, state credits and prices policies were characterized by a deliberate neglect of agriculture in general. Credits assigned to the agricultural sector were very small in comparison to total credits allocated to other sectors of the economy. Thus in the period of the three plans 1967-69, 1970-73, and 1974-77, agriculture received only 18.6, 11.9, and 7.5 per cent of total state credits (16). Moreover, despite its higher capacity to utilize the credits allocated, the private sector was discriminated against in the absolute amount of credits being assigned to and utilized by it in comparison to the self-management sector. The table below reveals that in the years up to the agrarian reform, the private sector was allocated less than half the credits allocated to the self-management sector, yet the latter occupied less than 30 per cent of the useful agricultural area of the country.

Within the private sector, credits tended to favour mainly the low-risk higher income cultivators who were able to meet the conditions put forward by the granting agencies. The most important of these conditions was that the cultivator should have an exact account of quantity, size, number, etc. of his products and that he should sell his produce to the state marketing agencies. These besides other conditions (17), meant that only rich farmers and especially those who were willing to invest in their farming units could receive the credits. Hence the number of private cultivators who managed to acquire some form of credit did not exceed 15,000 in 1966 and 20,000 in 1967 (18), a

number even less than the credit beneficiaries in 1958 under the colonial order (19). In fact if it is assured that there was a positive correlation between the average value of the credits and the size of the holdings, it can be stated that large holdings have received 66.5 per cent of the total sums loaned by the SAP and the BNA during the period between 1966-67 and 1972-72 (20). Moreover, credits received by wealthy farmers tended to cover essentially the expenses of investment in agricultural machinery, while those allotted to poor peasants were destined to prevent further deterioration in their living standards. The difficulties encountered by those attempting to acquire credits (caused by the bureaucratic practices of the state granting agencies) also contributed to reducing the size and extent of the credits distributed to private cultivators.

Allocated and Used Credits Per Sector 1966-1974  
(in Million Current AD) (21)

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
<hr/>									
Allocated credits									
State Sector	95	200	273	270	210	315	400	485	485
Private sector	100	130	130	130	100	60	40	60	-
Coop.Sector	-	-	-	-	-	-	155	155	250
Total	195	330	403	400	310	375	595	700	735
Share of Private Sector(%)	51	39	32	32	32	16	7	9	-
<hr/>									
Used Credits									
State Sector	1	10	17	113	171	229	308	475	245
Private sector	90	113	102	150	110	61	24	14	9
Coop.Sector	-	-	-	-	-	-	105	105	161
Total	91	123	119	263	281	290	437	594	415
Share of Private Sector(%)	98	92	86	57	39	27	6	2	2
<hr/>									

Between 1963 and until after the launch of the agrarian reform,

the prices of basic agricultural products, the principal products of the majority of farming units, remained stable. This was due to a deliberate state pricing policy of keeping the cost of food for the urban population at low levels in order not to make the reproduction process of the industrial workers a barrier to the accumulation of capital, as shown in the table below.

Price Index of Some Agricultural Products 1963-1978 (1965=100) (22)

Year	Soft Wheat	Hard Wheat	Barley	Lentils	Wine*	Olives**	Olive Oil
1963	100	100	100	-	-	-	-
1965	100	100	100	100	-	-	-
1967	100	100	100	100	-	-	-
1969	108	106	105	92	127	-	-
1971	108	106	105	92	127	100	100
1973	118	108	105	92	127	-	-
1975	144	128	135	102	139	145	172
1977	221	200	199	275	138	160	198

\*) 1968 = 100

\*\*) 1971 = 100

The price index of cereals increased from 100 in 1964 to only 105 in 1971, while that of wine had hardly increased at all (100 in 1966 to 101 in 1970) (23). In fact only the products which escaped state control, such as garden vegetables and poultry, saw their prices increasing in response to growing urban demand. These products were mainly produced on a minority of holdings, usually belonging to the modern capitalist category of the private sector.

The table above shows that the prices of basic agricultural products did not rise significantly until after 1974. The prices of inputs rose rapidly during the same period, making the terms of prices unfavourable towards agriculture. Between 1969 and 1973, the cost of machinery for cultivation, irrigation, and planting (excluding tractors

and harvesters), increased by 37 per cent. The price index of a 65 h.p. tractor of 100 in 1969 had increased to 180 by 1973, that of a combined harvester to 135 in 1973, and that of a seeder (6 meter) to 205 in 1973 (24). Despite the subsidies, prices of fertilizers rose similarly during the same period, far more than the increase in the price of agricultural products. As a result of the increase in the demand for labour in the non-agricultural sector within the framework of the development plans and the subsequent departure of part of the agricultural labour force into other activities, the cost of labour in agriculture increased by 55 per cent between 1969 and 1973, contributing further to distorting the terms of exchange between agriculture and other sectors of the economy as the prices of agricultural products remained static.

These factors had a strong impact in limiting the expansion of capitalist farming in the private sector by discouraging investment and resulting in the deterioration of production and living conditions of the majority of peasant farmers. Partly due to these factors and partly due to the continuous threat of agrarian reform, investment in the private sector as reflected in the purchase of tractors declined considerably over the years.

Purchase of Tractors by the Private Sector (1962-1973) (124)  
(Unit = Tractor)

Type	1962-1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	Total
Wheeled Tractors	4400	1730	1385	1110	753	38	57	17	15,090
Caterpillars		100	348	161	39	24	20	1	693
Total	4400	1830	1733	1271	792	62	77	18	10,183

The self-management sector was driven into debt and its production units were unable to make a profit mainly because agricultural prices decided at the centre were kept low. Despite the fact that credit was made available to this sector in increasing amounts in comparison to the private sector, there was very little new investment. Workers in this sector became increasingly disenchanted with their conditions of production and refused to make greater efforts to increase their productivity. Practices such as hoarding part of their output for their own consumption became common, and increasing numbers of workers abandoned their work in the self-managed units and left for the cities (26).

The overall picture was stagnation, and indeed decline, in agricultural production in a quite appalling fashion and as population growth registered its highest rate, agricultural production per capita deteriorated drastically as revealed by the following table:

Index of the Agricultural Production 1966-1974 (27)  
(1952-56 = 100)

1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
64	77	93	89	94	91	108	93	88
Per Capita Production								
59	70	81	75	76	71	82	68	62

With great variation from year to year depending mainly on climatic conditions, cereals production in 1972 was the same as that of 1962 (slightly over 20 million quintals), whereas the population had increased considerably. This meant that agriculture production became increasingly and drastically incapable of satisfying local demand. Since the latter was increasing considerably, not only because popula-

tion was expanding at one of the world's fastest rates (between 3.2 and 3.3 per cent per annum), but also because of the increase in the level of consumption resulting from the monetarization of the economy (28) and the general rise of incomes in the urban centres, Algeria became unable to feed itself (29).

Thus while Algeria's food production met 70 per cent of consumption in 1969, it met 55 per cent in 1973 and only 35 per cent in 1977 (30). Thus imports became an essential means of feeding the growing population. Food imports have greatly disrupted the Algerian commercial balance, increasing in 1974 by nearly four times the figure in 1967. In 1971 the value of food imports constituted about 40 per cent of the value of oil and gas exports (31). Since that year agricultural imports have greatly exceeded agricultural exports. The ratio of the cost of imports to that of exports, after being positive during the three year plan (98 per cent), deteriorated considerably to reach only 15 per cent during the second four year plan (1974-77) (32).

Cereal imports increased drastically from 200,000 tons annually between 1963-66 to more than 350,000 tons in 1970 and to more than double this amount in 1971. In fact imports of food were so large that even the rural population became increasingly dependent on imported food for its own consumption. An inquiry carried out by AARDES in 1967-69 showed that the population of the rural communes purchased 67 per cent of the grains they consumed and a similar percentage of flour. The rate was 75 per cent for potatoes, 80 per cent for vegetables, 66 per cent for fruits, and 69 per cent for meat (33).

With prices of imported food fixed at the international level at a drastically increasing rates, the dramatic increase of imports was bound to have an adverse effect on the implementation of the develop-

ment strategy. Algeria "is eating one-third of its oil in food", according to the Algerian Finance Minister (34). This shows not only that agriculture had failed to meet one of the most important functions assigned to it by the development strategy, namely that of feeding the growing population at the lowest cost, but also that food imports acted as a serious brake on the implementation of this strategy, so that some solution to redress the agricultural situation became an absolute necessity .

The effects of agricultural failure were not only economic but social and political as well. The deterioration of living conditions in the rural areas as a direct result of agricultural stagnation, coupled with a very high rate of population growth, led to a massive exodus of the rural population to the cities. Between 1966 and 1973 nearly one million left the rural areas, almost 120,000 migrants every year (35). This meant that the agricultural sector was deprived of the most competent, qualified, and youthful part of the labour force, since it is often the case that migration attracts those who are able or willing to find jobs in the non-agricultural sector. As a result the age of the agricultural labour force became higher than the national average. The census of 1977 shows that while the national average age of the labour force was 34 , the average age of the agricultural labour force was 39, and that 12 per cent of the agricultural work force were over 60 (36). More importantly, massive migration brought serious social and political problems in the cities, since the capacity for industrial expansion was too limited to absorb the increasing number of rural migrants. It also meant that agriculture became unable to contain the rural population, so that another major function assigned to the agricultural sector within the development strategy had not been achieved.



This situation was the background of the urgent need for a profound restructuring of the agricultural sector. It became increasingly apparent that the stagnation of agriculture was due to the prevailing conditions of production and mainly to the structure of landownership. This was later expressed in the introduction of the Agrarian Revolution. However, this situation had existed long before the reform was launched, although it was aggravated drastically at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. This implies that other factors relating to the state's recognition of the necessity of agricultural restructuring played their part in the launching of the agrarian reform. In other words a new situation had developed and new objectives had emerged to make the launch of the long promised agrarian reform a reality.

### **The Objectives of the Agrarian Reform**

The official objective of the Agrarian Revolution was to "eliminate the exploitation of man by man and to organize the use of land and means of production in a way that would ameliorate production by the application of efficient techniques which would also insure a just distribution of revenues in agriculture" (37).

However, it would be misleading to take the officially announced objective of the "Agrarian Revolution" at its face value, since there were as many implicit aims to be achieved by the reform as explicit ones (38). From the nature of the agrarian reform introduced in 1971, its aims and implementation, and its socio-economic impact upon agriculture, it can be discerned that the objectives of the reform were not merely to overcome the dislocation of the private agricultural sector from the rest of the economy and the economic and political problems

which this posed, but also to achieve a particular social and political rationale desired by the social strata in control of the state apparatus. In other words, the task of redressing the situation of agriculture to facilitate its more active participation in the development strategy also constituted an opportunity to achieve certain social and political objectives because of the interrelation of economic transformation with social and political struggle. This implies, contrary to some arguments, that agrarian reform had several interrelated, long and short term, economic, social, and political objectives (39).

#### **1-Economic Objectives:**

Given the nature of the Algerian development strategy and its primary emphasis on heavy industrialization, together with the situation in agriculture, an urgent restructuring of agriculture to improve its performance became essential if the state was to stick to its industrialization programme. Thus agrarian reform also had the definite economic objective of transforming the agricultural sector in such a way that it would respond more positively to the needs of this strategy. In the words of one Algerian economist, "if the agrarian revolution is before all a demand for social justice, it is also, in the present conditions of our country a primary economic necessity" (40). However, the objective was more to provide the state industries with the outlets for their products which they desperately needed than simply to contribute to capital accumulation by financing investment. Between 1971 and 1973 the fertilizer factories produced four times more than the quantity consumed, and that tractor factories produced more tractors than the number possessed by the self-management sector (41). This meant that without a restructuring of agriculture in a way which

would facilitate the absorption of local industrial products, the industrialization process would be seriously hampered. Hence the stated objective of the Charter of the Agrarian Revolution that this revolution constitutes a stimulant for industry.

"The modernization of agriculture and the elevation of living standards in the rural areas will expand the internal market and favour the growth of industry. The creation of production units practising modern methods of cultivation will increase demand in the mechanical and chemical industries" (42).

Moreover, despite the validity of the contention presented by M.Ollivier (see note 39), and shared somehow by H.Roberts (43), that oil revenues could pay for food imports, or in other words that the effective contribution of agriculture in the process of capital accumulation (by providing cheap hard currency) was less important than providing a market for industrial products, one should not overestimate such ability. First, as we saw earlier, the cost of food imports became higher than could be tolerated by a developing economy. Second, oil and gas revenues at the time of launching the reform were not as high as few years later, when the increase in the prices of oil after 1973 had many times multiplied their revenues. In 1969 oil revenues were \$ 267 million, about 17 times less than the revenues in 1976. Hydrocarbon participation in the composition of GDP in that year was 16 per cent only, compared with that of 1976 when oil revenues were \$ 4,589.1 million and its GDP participation was 25.2 per cent. Hence the poor performance of the agricultural sector and the subsequent drain of capital resulting from the massive imports of food constituted a serious brake on the process of capital accumulation and on the success of industrial expansion. Finally one could also argue that the availability of oil revenues gave the state the means to increase the investments needed for the modernization of agriculture.

The economic objective of the agrarian reform, therefore, besides the expansion of the internal market for industrial products, was to increase agricultural production and decrease dependency on the outside world in feeding the growing population. Another factor which prompted agrarian reform was the fact that, given the capital intensive nature of the expanding industrial sector, Algeria desperately needed to expand employment opportunities. Through the intensification of production, agrarian reform could absorb part of the unemployed or underemployed labour force and reduce rural to urban migration.

Thus behind the stated objective by the Charter of the "modernization of agriculture, through increasing the consumption of fertilizers and selected seeds and the use of agricultural materials", in order to increase production and productivity to reach self-sufficiency in the production of basic foodstuffs, lay an implicit objective, the commercialization of agriculture. In order for peasants to be able to consume the inputs produced by industry, they would have to turn over all or most of their produce to be marketed. In this way, besides increasing productivity, the agricultural sector was to be integrated with the industrial sector.

## **2-Social Objectives:**

In order to achieve this objective, i.e. the opening up of the agricultural sector to the economy, certain social forces and forms of ownership had to be eliminated. These forces were mainly absentee landlordism and pre-capitalist forms of production, whose continuing existence constituted a brake on the development of agriculture in that instead of investing in their holdings, those landowners generally diverted the agricultural surplus towards sectors outside agricultural

(44). Hence they contradicted the objective of the accumulation of industrial capital to reduce the purchasing power of agricultural producers as far as industrial means of production and consumption were concerned. Moreover, their properties were not only run according to archaic forms of tenure and methods of cultivation but were stark evidence of maldistribution of land and of inequality in the countryside. Hence besides removing some fetters on increasing investment and agricultural productivity, the reform aimed to put an end to inequality and social injustice in the Algerian countryside. This meant that the agrarian reform had the social objective of directing a blow at those landowners who were less affected by developments during the ten years of independence.

Besides the argument of social justice and economic efficiency, the reform represented a certain trend in the development of socio-political forces and an emergence of new contradictions among them. In this sense given the fact that it was imposed by the state, the reform "reflects much more a development , at a given moment, of the balance of forces within the Algerian leading class than a positive response to the demands clearly expressed by the poor peasants" (45). It was a manifestation of the fact that further developments of the dominant forces within the state and the state capitalist sector were being impeded by the existence of the landed bourgeoisie, mainly in the form of absentee proprietors within the Algerian social structure.

In trying to achieve this social objective, the agrarian reform, or at least its text, was, as we will see shortly, indeed only radical in the sense that it aimed not only at the liquidation of absentee ownership, but also "the limitation to a narrow degree the category of agricultural entrepreneurs engaged in one form or another in capitalist

relations" (46). However, the radicalism of the reform text does not of course determine the nature of the reform and its real impact. This would be determined essentially by the prevailing social relations, the nature of the social forces in charge of its implementation, and the nature of the state's agricultural policies accompanying and following the reform. Furthermore, instead of dismissing any radicality that the text of the reform might have implied, as Raffinot and Jacquemot seem to suggest (47), one should stress that radicalism does not necessarily mean the elimination of capitalist relations of production. It is often the case that the capitalist incorporation of agriculture can be achieved most efficiently within the framework of small family farms. Here we think that, given the protection of the private property in agriculture implied in the reform text, an implicit objective lying behind the expropriation of large land owners was the enhancement of family merchant farming based on the commercialization of production, alongside production cooperatives operating on the same basis.

### **3- Political Objectives:**

The reform had equally important political objectives. The issue of agrarian reform was as old as the Algerian national movement, and was one of the basic promises which it had made. Despite this and despite the emphasis of both the Tripoli Programme and the Algiers Charter on the urgency of conducting radical agrarian reform, nothing had materialized in the first ten years of independence. Apart from the relatively few agricultural workers on the ex-colonial farms, the Algerian peasantry did not experience any significant changes in their social and economic lives during the years following independence.

Attempts to carry out an agrarian reform in 1964 and 1966 did not

result in concrete action despite a lot of public discussion (48). One reason for this was probably that the projects were drawn up by the Party and not by the Ministry of Agriculture. Another was that an immediate agrarian reform might jeopardize the new alliance brought by Boumedienne regime which was formed on the basis of opposing the regime of Ben Bella, thus grouping heterogeneous social and political factions.

However, the idea of introducing structural changes in the private agricultural sector did remain alive in official speeches and programmes, although the accent was changed from an "agrarian revolution" developed in the Algiers Charter into "agrarian reform" during the early years of Boumedienne (49).

The result of this stalemate together with the neglect of the countryside was the increasing disenchantment and immobilization of the Algerian peasantry, which was not expressed in open political opposition but in a continuous revival of their conservatism expressed in a spate of mosque building and a renewal of interest in religious brotherhoods and traditionalism (50). With their history of militant political struggle, the peasants could undermine government calls for improving production, as well as continuing to swell the congested cities demanding welfare services, or provide the nucleus for a new form of political insurgency (51). This situation constituted a potential threat that might be mobilized by any existing urban-based opposing group, thus contributing to the long term destabilization of the country (52).

Hence it became imperative to "incorporate the somewhat refractory population of the countryside into the national political community by responding to its material aspirations" (53). The regime also sought

to enhance its legitimacy and popularity by drawing on the support of the peasantry whose interests it claimed to represent. This, in fact, is very crucial for a regime which assumed power after having deposed a popular leader, in order to improve its image not only amongst the peasantry, but also, given the popularity of an issue like agrarian reform, amongst intellectuals and left wing organizations. Thus the agrarian reform represented a process of 'rapprochement' between the regime and an important part of the intelligentsia (54).

The political importance of the agrarian reform was expressed vigorously in the course of its implementation. This allowed the Boumedienne regime to assert its authority by breaking off with the elements associated with the agrarian bourgeoisie. Its popularity was enhanced through the mobilization of great popular support expressed in the involvement of mass organizations and students in the implementation of the reform. Therefore, it is often argued that the "agrarian revolution" constituted a watershed in Algeria's political and social life marking the country's radical transformation and the deepening of its struggle in the direction of socialism.

... ..

... ..



## Notes

- (1) By judging its impact, which we will see later, we tend to agree with Pfeifer in describing this state measure as an agrarian reform and not an "agrarian revolution" as it was called in the official texts. In fact the use of the term "revolution" itself might be explained by the state's need for popular mobilization and its bid to acquire a revolutionary mantle.
- (2) See for example Smith, op. cit., p.270.
- (3) Viratelle, G., L'Algerie Algerienne,  
Les Editions Ouvrieres, Paris, 1970, p.181.
- (4) See De Bernis, G.D.,  
"L'Economie Algerienne Depuis l'Independance",  
Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 1969, pp.13-141,  
  
"Les Industries Industrialisants et Les Options  
Algeriennes"  
Revue du Tiers Monde, No.47, July-Sept. 1971.  
pp.545-565.
- (5) Lawless, op. cit., p.8.
- (6) Boumedienne, quoted by Raffinot, op. cit., p.236.
- (7) Lawless, op. cit., p.10.
- (8) Temmar, op. cit., p.158.
- (9) Ibid., p.30.
- (10) Ibid., p.29.
- (11) For a detailed discussion on this subject see:  
Lawless, op. cit., Temmar, Raffinot, pp.137-186,  
Tlemcani, pp.111-117.
- (12) De Bernis, "L'Economie...." op. cit., p.41.
- (13) Farsoun, op. cit., p.6.
- (14) For a discription of these functions see; Bedrani, op. cit.,  
pp.7-8.
- (15) Pfeifer, op. cit., pp.21-22.
- (16) Bedrani, op. cit., p.9.

- (17) To acquire credit for purchasing a tractor, for example, the minimum agricultural area owned or worked by the applicant should be 50 ha. or more in the dry cultivation, a limit which far exceeds the average owned by the majority of owners.  
Bedrani, op. cit., p.231.
- (18) Raffinot, op. cit., p.319.
- (19) Bedrani, op. cit., p.215.
- (20) Ibid.
- (21) Bedrani, op. cit., p.218.
- (22) Ibid., p.148.
- (23) Karsenty, "La Politique...",op. cit., p.32.
- (24) Bedrani, op. cit., pp.123-124. See also Pfeifer, op. cit., p.226.
- (25) Karsenty, "Les Investissement....", op. cit., p.140.
- (26) Between 1969-70 and 1976-77, more than 75,000 workers left the self-management sector in agriculture.  
Annuaire Statistique de l'Algerie, 1980, p.183.
- (27) United Nations, Statistical Year Book, 1974. pp.94-135.
- (28) The quantity of money in circulation has increased from 5,558 million AD in 1966 to 30,584 million in 1975.
- (29) Rapid urbanization, changing patterns of consumption, and higher living standard have contributed to the increase of the per capita consumption of food.
- (30) Mutin, G., "Agriculture et dependance Alimentaire en Algerie",  
Maghreb - Machrek, 90 (1980), p.47.
- (31) Bedrani, op. cit., p.130.
- (32) Mutin, op. cit., p.47.
- (33) Bedrani, op. cit., p.116.
- (34) Quoted by MEED, 23 May 1975, p.10.
- (35) Benachenhou, A., L'Exode Rural en Algerie,  
OPU, Algiers, 1979, p.10.
- (36) Mutin, op. cit., p.59.
- (37) Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire,  
Presidence du Conseil,  
Charte de la Revolution Agraire p.41.

- (38) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.11.  
Benissad, op. cit., p.88.
- (39) Marc Ollivier, for example, sees the agrarian reform's importance in mainly its short term political objective. He argues that the reform did not have a social or economic purpose. For him "it did not aim at destroying a dominant class of land owners, since this objective was achieved by the National Liberation War and the subsequent nationalization of the colonial lands.... Neither did it aim at dismantling pre-capitalist social relations... (moreover), the reform did not have any decisive economic or financial role in the short term, such as developing the resources of the country in hard currency... and contributing to the accumulation by financing investment: every one in Algeria knows that the decisive role in this field is played by the hydrocarbon sector.... What was the essential short-term role of the agrarian revolution? It was a political role which did not lie only at the level of the rural sector but at that of the entire Algerian nation".  
According to him the "revolution" was a manifestation of the fight against the reactionary forces within the state apparatus which insured the continuation of the struggle carried since independence for liberating the country from the domination of imperialist interests in certain strategic sectors. The reform, according to Ollivier, was a means of mobilization and organization of the social and political forces through which the regime asserted its socialist option.
- Ollivier, M., "Place de la Revolution Agraire Dans la Strategie Algerienne de Developpement", in CRESM ed.  
Les Problemes Agraire au Maghreb,  
1977, pp.91-114.
- The same position was, in fact, taken by the Socialist Avant-Garde Party(PAGS) in Algeria regarding the agrarian reform as a step forward in the socialist orientation of the country.  
See for example:  
Benabdelkrim, A., "Agrarian Revolution in Algeria",  
Marxism Today, 19Oct.1976, pp.118-126.
- (40) Akkach, A., Quoted by Sutton, K.,  
"Agrarian Reform in Algeria - The Conversion of Projects into Action",  
Afrika Spectrum, Vol.9, No.1, 1974, p.52.
- (41) Etienne, B., L'Algerie Cultures et Revolution,  
Editions du Seul, Paris, 1977, p.216.  
"The recent rural electrification found that the poor peasants just could not afford the 10 dinars necessary to pay for the meter to be installed"  
Sutton, Op. cit., p.53.
- (42) Charte de la reforme Agraire, op. cit., p.25.

- (43) Roberts, H., "The Politics of Algerian Socialism" in North Africa, ed. by R. Lawless, Croom Helm, London, 1984, p.12.
- (44) The inquest of the labour force in the private sector in 1968, showed that 32.4 per cent of the total agricultural area in this sector or 1,380,000 ha. were exploited indirectly, and that 60.4 per cent of the holdings that exceeded 200 ha. in size were exploited in this way.  
Ministere de l'Agriculture et de la Reforme Agraire,  
Direction des Etudes et de la Planification.  
Resultats de l'Analyse se l'Enquete Main-d'Oeuvre dans le Secteur Prive, 1968, p.17, Table 169.
- The inquest also showed that 25.1 per cent of total costs per hectar in the private sector went as payment for the right of land ownership.  
p.72, Table 205:2.
- A. Prenant, in his study of the structure of the landownership of the city dwellers in the region of Tlemcan and Sidi Bel Abbes, estimated that more than one-fifth of the private agricultural land belonged to townsfolk from which was exacted rents equivalent to one-tenth of the total agricultural production of Algeria's private sector. The bulk of this capital, estimated at 200 million dinars a year, would be flowing right out of the agricultural sectors.
- Quoted by Sutton, op. cit., p.53.
- (45) Zghal, A., "Pourquoi la Reforme Agraire ne Mobilise-t-Elle- Pas les Paysans Maghebine?" in CRESM ed.  
Les Problemes Agraires au Maghreb , 1977, p.295.
- (46) De Villers, G., "L'Etat et la Revolution Agraire en Algerie", Revue Francaise de Science Politique, Vol.30, No.1, 1980, p.115.
- (47) See Raffinot, op. cit., pp.322-326.
- (48) For the details of the early attempts to introduce an agrarian reforme and the changing attitude of the state towards this issue see:  
Lesbet, D., Les 1000 Villages Socialistes en Algerie, OPU, Algiers, 1983, pp.40-47.
- (49) Ibid., p.41.
- (50) Ottaway, D., and Ottaway, M.,  
Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution  
Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1970, p.41.
- (51) Knauss, P., "Algeria's Agrarian Revolution: Peasant Control or Control of Peasants?",

- (52) Kielstra, N., "The Agrarian Revolution and Algerian Socialism",  
MERIP, No.67, p.6.
- (53) Roberts, op. cit., p.12.
- (54) De Villers, op. cit., p.125.

## CHAPTER TEN : THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AGRARIAN REFORM

### The Main Principles of the Reform

On 8 Nov. 1971 H.Boumedienne signed ordinance no.71-73 of the Agrarian Revolution composing 280 articles and proceeded by the Charter of the Agrarian Revolution in which its general aims were defined. The main principle of the "revolution" was formulated in the slogan that "the land belongs to those who till it" (article 1). This was defined by the introduction of a chain of structural changes which concerned the juridical, institutional, and socio-economic organization of the private agricultural sector. The main changes were:

- 1- The restructuring of the area of an individual's landed property to the upper limit of what could be tilled, taking into account variations in climatic and social conditions, and the abolition of all indirect exploitation of land. This meant the limitation of large properties and the total nationalization of absentee properties.
- 2- The distribution of nationalized land to landless peasants, who were to be grouped in various forms of production cooperatives.
- 3- The redistribution of land were to be accompanied by a campaign of rural development; new villages, schools, health centres, communications, administrative services etc.

## Regulations of Implementation

### 1-Nationalization

The National Fund of the Agrarian Revolution (F.N.R.A.) was created by the text to take charge of the nationalized land to be distributed afterwards. All communal land and that belonging to the state was to be transformed to the FNRA. Habous land (religious property) was also to be nationalized and put under the control of this institution. The nationalization of privately held land was to be carried out in two ways: the total nationalization of the properties of the "non-exploitant", owners who for one reason or another did not directly operate their land, and the partial nationalization or limitation of private property which exceeded the limit of ownership established by the reform. To be considered as "non-exploitant" or an absentee, and thus as the owner of indirectly exploited land and thus to be nationalized a landowner would not be participating effectively in agricultural production (article 2). In article 30 he was defined as the person "who does not live directly and personally on the exploitation of the agricultural or potentially agricultural land on which he has a right of ownership". This included those who lived outside the commune where their properties were located, and those who had non-agricultural activities which rendered them an annual income between AD 9,000 and AD 13,000.

General and specific exceptions were made for those who either owned very little land (less than 0.5 ha. irrigated and 5 ha. dry farming), or who had been forced to leave their land during the war of independence, or who were physically unable to exploit their land directly (articles 50-54). The ascendants and the descendants of the

martyrs of the independence war were also exempted from nationalization, although exempted "non exploitants" were not allowed to keep properties above the established ceiling of ownership.

In establishing the maximum area of ownership of privately owned land, the text suggested first that the income of a private owner should not exceed three times the annual salary of a full-time farm worker in the self-management sector. However, the level of this income was allowed to rise by one-third for one dependent child, and by 50 per cent for two or more dependent children, so that the farm income could be supplemented by up to 13,500 AD per year. Another criterion for limiting private land was that the size of the area should not exceed three times the size of land distributed to the beneficiaries of the reform in similar conditions. According to these two criteria, the average size of area retained by private owners will represent about 43 hectares per private farm unit (1).

The text provided that a private owner "who personally and directly exploit an agricultural land could resort waged workers "d'appoint"" (article 95). Given that the notion "d'appoint" was not defined, the use of waged labour could be very broadly interpreted (2). The text also provided for compensation to be paid to the owners of the nationalized land at 2.5 per cent interest, realizable in equal instalments over a period of 15 years.

As we can see, the elimination of absentee landlordism was the main aim of the reform. Private property in land was preserved and protected and inequality of ownership was allowed to persist in the form of the three-fold disparity in the size between the unexpropriated part of the large and medium holdings and the holdings distributed to the beneficiaries.



## 2-Distribution

The beneficiaries of the agrarian reform were to be chosen from the landless peasants and the small owners. Priority in allocating the nationalized land by the FNRA was in the following order: agricultural workers and sharecroppers on the nationalized lands, landless anciens Moudjahidines and the sons of the martyrs of the independence war who had not benefited from any measure since independence, the landless and the small owners whose ownerships were smaller than that to be distributed among the beneficiaries of the reform. The distribution of land was to be determined in a form that the minimum income of the average family living solely on the products of the distributed lot, was to be equivalent to the income of the family of a worker in a self-managed agricultural enterprise, working 250 days a year. (article 110).

The beneficiaries were required to join one form or other of the state organized cooperatives depending on the nature of the cooperatives created. While membership of cooperatives was compulsory for the beneficiaries, it was optional for the private owners who were already established before the reform. In the case of the total nationalization of the property, the agricultural workers employed on such property were to constitute the membership of the cooperative (article 111). The distributed land could only be operated individually where the economic and social conditions for exploitation under a form of cooperation were too difficult to attain. However, if such conditions could be met affiliation to a cooperatives was compulsory.

A three-level structure of cooperatives was to be established:

- 1- Pre-Cooperative Groupings; three types of grouping within this category were to be erected; if the beneficiaries received land

that was abandoned, or of insufficient fertility and was in a need of preparatory work in order to become productive, they were to be organized in a "Groupement de mise en Valeur" GMV whose aim was to improve the land until a reasonable level of production was achieved. During the period of improving the quality of the land the beneficiaries were to receive help from the state, the amount and nature of which was to be decided by subsequent decrees. In order to maintain the unity of an expropriated property where the beneficiaries did not wish to divide the land for the time being, the beneficiaries can form a "Groupement d'Individaires" GI. Another pre-cooperative form was the "Groupement d'entraide Paysanne" GEP, which was to be formed from among the beneficiaries of already existed holdings. Here each member cultivates his land and appropriates his production individually, but within the framework of a single plan of cultivation, organizing the hiring of machines and exchanging work.

2- Cooperative Groupings; They represent a more organized forms of cooperation than was to be attained by the previous forms after fulfilling the necessary conditions. Two forms of cooperative were to be created:

a) Cooperative Agricole d'Exploitation en Commun, (CAEC)

where the land and the production remain individually appropriated, and that only the means of production other than the land were to be commonly owned. Each member of this form of cooperative had to follow a cultivation plan decided by all members who could include small holders established prior to the reform.

b) Cooperative Agricole de Production de la Revolution Ag-

raire (CAPRA) in which both the land and the means of production are owned and operated collectively. The members were to organize and carry out collectively the plan of cultivation and all matters relating to the marketing of produce and the acquisition of credits and materials. The income is divided among the members according to the number of working hours and days performed by each member. This form of cooperation is very much like the organization of the self-management farms, and only the legal status of the land is different. It was regarded as the optimal form of cooperation and all other forms had to aim to reach this level of organization in the future.

- 3- Service Cooperatives; The organization of the above forms of cooperative was to be completed by the institution of service cooperatives at the level of the rural communes, la Cooperative Agricole Polyvalent Commercial de Service (CAPAS). These large cooperatives were responsible for providing all the necessary services for agricultural production such as marketing, finance, hiring of machines, supply of seeds and fertilizers, etc. These cooperatives, organized by the Ministry of Agriculture, were open to all agriculturalists with membership being obligatory for the beneficiaries of the reform as well as for the older-established Cooperative d'Anciens Moudjahidines and the self-management farms. For the reform beneficiaries they also functioned as an intermediary for state assistance and as a watchdog to ensure adherence to the text of the reform.

## **The Institutional Bodies of Execution**

The reform was to be executed by various institutions at three levels:

- 1- At the local level, the main organ was the Enlarged Communal and Popular Assembly APCE which was formed from the local APC, established in 1967 and re-elected in 1971, with the addition of a local representative of the Party, and a representative of the newly created Union National du Paysans Algeriens UNPA. The APCE, aided by a technical committee formed from among the local APC, the local organ of the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Finance, was charged with the task of administering the execution of the reform text at communal level. This would include tracing the map of the commune, nationalizing and insuring the transfer of the land to the FNRA, establishing the criteria for land limitation, drawing up the list of beneficiaries (including admitting new members to the production units and expelling old ones) and organizing them and their lands into various types of cooperative units.
- 2- At the regional level, the Assembly Populaire de Wilaya APW and its executive organs were to organize the operations of the reform at the level of the Wilaya. They were to supervise and approve the work of propositions of the APCE, mainly concerning the criteria of nationalization and limitation and the lists of candidates. The executive organs of the APW include in their meetings, concerning the operations of the reform, representatives of the Party, the Army, and a delegate from the Ministry of Agriculture who was assigned the task of providing to the APW and APCE all the necessary information relating to the execution of

the agrarian reform.

- 3- At the national level, there was the Commission Nationale de la Reform Agraire (CNRA), presided by the Minister of Agriculture including representatives from the majority of the ministries, the Party, the UGTA, and the president of the Council. This Commission was charged with elaborating and proposing all administrative and legal measures, establishing the budget for execution, and providing all the material means necessary to facilitate the smooth execution of decisions at the local level.

### **The Execution of the Reform**

The agrarian reform was to be implemented in three phases, each with a different emphasis on the kind of land to be nationalized and distributed. The first phase which was to commence on 1st January 1972 and to end on 16th June 1973, consisted of two elements; on the one hand, to conduct a general census of lands that belonged to the private sector, and on the other hand, the nationalization and partial distribution of communal, habous, and public lands. The second phase, between 17 June 1973 and 16 June 1975, entailed the nationalization of the lands that were indirectly exploited together with the limitation of the large land holdings by nationalizing the part exceeding the established limits. Phase three which was to begin on 17 June 1975, was to concern the nationalization of all public pasture lands which would involve about 15,000,000 hectares. Herds of absentee owners and large-scale animal proprietors were to be expropriated and redistributed to the herdless wage workers and share herders employed by the formers. Since the third phase has not yet been completed and was officially postponed in 1979 for an indefinite period, especially as regards the

process of nationalization, our discussion of the agrarian reform will be limited to the impact of the nationalization and distribution of the agricultural lands i.e. the first and the second phase.

Before looking at the actual changes brought by the two phases, the following are the findings of the census carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture demonstrating the inequalities in land ownership before the reform which was published in the Charter of the reform:

16,500 owners of more than 50 ha. controlling 25% of the private sector's land.

147,000 owners of between 10 to 50 ha. controlling 50 per cent.

114,000 owners of between 5 to 10 ha. controlling 15 per cent.

310,000 owners of less than 5 ha. controlling 10 per cent (3).

Against this background and with the official announcement of the beginning of the "Agrarian Revolution", the government, in an attempt to promote the idea of "national solidarity" and of a society without classes together with the notion that the reform does not run counter to the interests of any group, made an appeal to large-scale proprietors to donate their lands to the reform bodies without compensation. However, the results of the donation campaign, which received a large amount of publicity, were insignificant. By January 1973 donations of 60,000 ha. of land shared amongst 1,232 individuals, or 48.7 ha. per donor were received by the FNRA together with 4,000 fruit trees and 4,000 date palms (4). Two years later in 31 July 1975, the number of donors increased by 1,453 donating 22,285 ha., bringing the total number of the donators to 2,685 and that of the donated land to 82,285 ha.(5). As we will see, this campaign was in actual fact overshadowed by strenuous efforts on the part of private owners to evade both

nationalization and limitation of land by various means. Moreover, the donation of lands, whose quality has never been revealed and was naturally an "off-loading" of the less fertile land, was in fact used by certain groups of owners to be better in a better position to avoid nationalization or limitation by virtue of the reputation they have made in the course of the donation campaign (6).

### **Phase One**

Despite the enormous land area affected during this phase, the actual cultivated land included in the category of public ownership was relatively small. The impact of this phase on the transformation of the structure of ownership lay essentially in the elimination of pre-capitalist forms of tenure and arrangements which were already undergoing a process of erosion and decay.

The dominant form of appropriation of public land before the agrarian reform was that the best located and most fertile lands were generally controlled by large landlords or wealthy farmers. These lands were then leased and worked under the auspices of those owners, either in association with middle and poor peasants, or through the employment of wage labour or share-croppers. After the announcement of the reform, significant holdings that were locally known to be under the control of rich farmers were erased from the registry (7).

This phase started effectively in March 1972 with a general census of all the agro-pastoral land except that of the self-management sector. Following this census, which covered 8 million hectares, three million hectares of cultivable and potentially cultivable land was transferred to the FNRA. Little more than quarter of this amount or 800,000 ha. was currently cultivated. An additional 3.5 million ha. of

pasture land and 1.5 of forests and grasslands were added to the Fund. The first distribution of land started on 17 June 1972 at Khemis el Khechna and the first phase ended officially in 31 January 1973 (8).

However, the figures of the operations during this phase varied quite considerably. In 1975, the count had fallen from 3 million to 1.6 million hectares concerning the land transferred to the FNRA, of which no more than 600,000 ha. were currently cultivable. Pfeifer attributed this decline in the size of the land to the reason that "some influential leaseholders had pressured their communes into refusing to actually give up the land" (9). The size of the distributed area also underwent continual variations. It has varied between 1973 and 1974 from 730,756 ha. to 675,000 ha. then to 788,284 ha. and the number of cooperatives constituted during this passed from 2,614 to 2,489 and then to 2,921. N.Abdi sees that the main reason for this fluctuation could be traced to the phenomenon of "desistement" or withdrawal of the beneficiaries from their distributed lots. Thus in 1973 out of a total number of beneficiaries of 50,040, 3,842 or 7.7 per cent have withdrawn from their lands (10). This phenomenon was explained by various factors, the most important of which were the rigid and authoritarian integration of the beneficiaries into cooperatives particularly CAPRA without sufficient process of preparation, the bad quality of the distributed lands, the attraction of the non-agricultural sectors, and the insufficiency of the installation premium of AD 150 per month (11).

By the end of 1975, approximately 303,127 palm trees on public lands had been nationalized. The results of this first phase were presented by Raffinot and Jacquemot as follows (12):



Number of beneficiaries	53,674
Size of distributed area	788,284 ha.
Number of CAPRA	1,748
Number of CAEC	601
Number of GMV	572
Number of individual distribution	2,316

Those who received land during this phase represented only 25 per cent of the registered 200,284 candidates. The average size of the distributed land was 14.7 ha. per person, a relatively large area mainly because the majority of this land was cultivated with cereals. About 75 per cent of the distributed land in this phase was usable for cultivation. The remainder was to be made into usable agricultural land by the beneficiaries themselves who were organized in GMVs and were aided by the state in supplying them with the means of production and a minimum wage of AD 150 until the land became productive.

## **Phase Two**

This was the most crucial phase of the agrarian reform since it was politically sensitive and included the major changes implied in the reform and thus the nature of the reform in general was expressed during this phase. Its objectives were the abolition, through the total nationalization, of the property rights of the "non-exploitants", and the limitation of large properties.

Before we look at the outcome of the nationalization and distribution process of this phase, we must recall the figures in the table on page 371. The census of 1973, conducted for the purpose of carrying out the agrarian reform showed that the total amount of agricultural

land in the private sector had shrunk by nearly 2 million ha. since 1963, when there had been an inquiry based on the agricultural census of 1950. With no structural changes in land ownership in the private sector having taken place during this period, this could be attributed, as Pfeifer rightly does, to deliberate attempts on the part of land owners to conceal the true ownership of their land because of the threat of an agrarian reform. The figures of 1965 recorded a considerable decline in the total of land to 5.8 million ha. from 7.2 million ha. in 1963. The latter figures had also been produced for the purpose of introducing an agrarian reform, although this had not materialised. The table shows that the most significant part of the land which has disappeared was within the category that was more exposed and threatened by the nationalization of the agrarian reform i.e. owners of more than one hundred hectares. The land in this category was reduced by 62 per cent, from 1.5 million ha. to 0.8 million in 1965 and then to 0.6 million in 1973. The holdings in this category witnessed a similar reduction by 59 per cent, from 8,450 in 1963 to 4,665 in 1965 and to 3,439 in 1973. Hence the percentage of the share of this category in private sector land dropped from 20.8 per cent in 1963 to 13.5 per cent in 1965 and then to only 11.3 per cent in 1973. The number of units of less than 10 ha. saw a considerable increase by 32 per cent between 1963 and 1973, while the land area that belonged to this category increased by only 19 per cent for the same period. This suggests that "large-scale proprietors were at least half undercounted in 1973 and that therefore half of them remained entirely outside the reform framework" (13). Moreover, in certain regions, the system of "indivision", had permitted certain large local families to limit the effects of nationalization (14). Because of this tradition of

"indivision" which allowed one large farm, under one rich farmer's control, to be officially registered as a set of parcels each belonging to different family members, many large agricultural units were in fact disguised as small units each with different owner. This inflated the number of the small holdings and allowed a significant number of large owners to escape the regulations of the agrarian reform.

The operation of this phase commenced on the basis of the statistics produced by the 1973 census which, as we saw, undercounted, the large-scale proprietors. Two surveys of private holdings were made. An initial one was done in 1972-73 collected information from all land-owners, relating to their place of residence and the type and extent of their holdings. This was followed by a more detailed census carried out by the local authority, namely the APCE, concerning the verification and obtaining of further data relevant to the criteria of nationalization and limitation. The results of the first survey, in which all property holders were required to make a "declaration of residence" together with information on their main source of income and their properties, were presented by listing the property holders surveyed into four categories:

- 1- Those not concerned, whose directly worked holdings were too small to be considered in the reform.
- 2- Absentees, whose properties were to be expropriated in full.
- 3- Limitable owners, whose properties were judged to be larger than they could work themselves.
- 4- The "non-touches" or those not affected who were either absentees or large-scale owners whose properties were exempted from the reform.

The results of this survey with their extrapolation at the nation-

nal level was presented by K. Pfeifer in the following table:

Lists of Property Holders in Algeria, Pre-Reform  
(Recensement General de l'Agriculture, 1973) (15)

Lists (Types of Property holders)	No. of Holders	% of Holders	Land Area Held (ha.)	% of Land Area	Avg. Size of and Area ha
1- Not concerned	809,441	69.52	1,274,494	15.90	1.57
2- Absentees	34,096	2.93	243,057	3.03	7.13
3- Limitables	25,904	2.22	1,398,033	17.45	53.97
4- Not affected	294,937	25.33	5,099,467	63.63	17.29
Total	1,164,378	100.00	8,015,051	100.00	6.88

Given the provisions of the reform texts which clearly stated that the properties of all the "non-exploitants" should be nationalized, N. Abdi, following the publication of the text, estimated the area available for nationalization at 2,300,000 ha., since, according to him, a third of the private agricultural area was exploited indirectly (16). However, in the course of the reform which was an outcome of government initiative only, and in the absence of initiatives taken at the base level by the peasantry, this objective was too difficult to achieve (17).

Thus, according to the table above, and on the assumption that each limitable proprietors would be left with an average 30 hectare property and that the properties of the absentees would be nationalized integrally, only 900,000 ha. of private land was potentially nationalizable. Those potentially affected (categories 2 and 3) turned out to be only about 5.2 per cent of all proprietors, holding about 20.5 per cent of all registered lands. Hence, according to Abdi (18), the number of "non-exploitants" was considerably restricted for two reasons:

- 1- The system of exemptions provided in various articles, especially

those exempting war veterans together with the ascendants and descendants of the martyrs of the liberation war from being considered as "non-exploitants" permitted a large number of absentees to escape the nationalization of their properties. Given the extent of the human losses in the Algerian countryside during the war, very many landowners were related to one or more martyrs, so that this escape clause to stay outside available to a large number of owners. Furthermore, exemptions were also granted to the elderly (those over sixty years old), invalids, miners, migrant workers, and youth on national service, thus enlarging the base for many landowners to evade the nationalization of their properties.

- 2- The "non-exploitant" category was further reduced by the decrees concerning the application of the agrarian reform. They have opened a possibilities for landowners not "living exclusively" on the income derived from their agricultural activities. This has allowed the agricultural income from the farm (which was in the range of 9,000 to 13,500 AD) to be supplemented with extra non-agricultural income of between 9,000 to 13,500 dinars a year, depending on the number of dependent children. As well as being difficult to insure that this extra-agricultural income did not exceed its established limits, it allowed a certain degree of integration between agricultural and non-agricultural activities. It also allowed the total income of the owner to be six to nine times higher than the average salary of an agricultural worker in the self-management sector or that of the reform beneficiary.

Moreover, the 1965 agricultural survey shown on page 371, indicated that holdings of 50 ha. and more covered 1.5 million ha.. While

half the land (750,000 ha.) in this category belonged to city dwellers (19), the 1973 census showed that the average size of the farms owned by the absentees was only 7.13 ha., indicating that only small holding absentees were affected by the reform, often those whose properties were too small to be worth returning to the countryside to work or who did not have the means of influence and manipulation to evade nationalization. Hence the bulk of the absentees especially those that owned middle size properties were able to find ways of staying outside the reform framework.

However, the undercounting of the large-scale owners and the absentees was not confined to the results of the statistics of 1973 on which the operations of nationalization and limitation were based. The actual lists used to carry out the reform were modified by the local authorities, namely the APCE in each commune, in 1974-75 to suit local conditions as they surveyed them. On average, across the country as a whole, 13 per cent of all proprietors disappeared in this second survey, an epidemic comparable in magnitude to the erosion of the properties themselves in earlier surveys, so that they were left outside the framework of the reform altogether (20). Hence the percentage of potentially affected absentees and large-scale proprietors was further reduced from 5.15 per cent to just 3.36 per cent of all property holders with the result that potentially nationalizable land in the whole country was reduced from 900,000 ha. to under 600,000 ha (21).

As well as the system of exemptions and the recognition of the right to extra-agricultural income which permitted large number of property holders whether absentees or limitables to escape nationalization, many ways were followed by the holders that enabled them to be considered not affected. By taking advantage of the system of "indivi-

sion", many limitable owners resorted to parcelling up large-scale property into several parts registered in the names of family members in order to escape nationalization. False information concerning the size and extent of the properties and the concealment of evidence on fertility and technical levels were common practices on the part of owners of limitable properties. Large scale proprietors who knew that they would not escape nationalization responded to the donation campaign submitting part of their lands to the FNRA and thus were in a better position to impose their influence on the bodies charged with the reform implementation in a way that would guarantee that they kept the better plots for themselves. When all else failed, the proprietors made legal appeals for the revocation of the nationalization decrees. By June 1975, 5,000 such appeals were being heard nationwide. In the Wilaya of Setif, for example, out of 94 appeals, 26 decrees were annulled, returning 1,007 hectares to their original proprietors (22). Moreover, besides the official exemption of a large number of absentees under various titles, those who did not find any way of being recognized under one of these titles were able simply to declare their residence on the land they owned thus avoiding the nationalization of their properties. However, the attempts of the landowners to avoid expropriation did not stop at trying to forge and fabricate evidence and information on their properties. As we will see shortly, they were engaged in a direct political and ideological struggle to discredit the reform and empty it of its contents in order to lessen its effects.

By July 1973, after the completion of the two surveys, the monetary values of the maximum income of the the property holders were translated into real terms with the publication of the decree no.73-78 of 17 July 1973 establishing the "fourchettes", or maximum and minimum

holdings permissible for large landowners. Excess holdings above the specified limits were expropriated against the indemnity specified in the reform Charter.

For the reasons stated above, which demonstrate that the landowners were quite prepared for the reform and had exhibited ingenious methods of evading expropriation, it was quite understandable that the concrete results of the operations of this phase fell far short of expectations. They did not only fall short of the pre-independence estimate of 2.8 million hectares held by 25,000 proprietors of 50 hectares or more, but also of that of the authors of the reform texts who estimated that 25 per cent of the private sector land belonged to only 16,500 proprietors of more than 50 ha.

By September 1973 the first results of the second phase of the reform were being published. In the Wilaya of Constantine 56, 000 ha., belonging mainly to absentees, had been nationalized. 26,000 ha. of these had been redistributed to 1,600 beneficiaries grouped into 75 production cooperatives (23). Redistribution of some lands took into account the nature of the crops planted so as not to disrupt the process of production. At the national level the results of this phase varied from time to time and from one state body to another, but by 1977 about 500,000 hectares and 649,770 palm trees had been nationalized and redistributed to the beneficiaries of the reform who were grouped into various cooperative units. This brought the total of land distributed in the course of the agrarian reform to 1.2 million hectares of land, of which around 900,000 hectares were agriculturally useful. This has represented about 13.3 per cent only of the total registered agriculturally usable land in the country (24). The total number of palm trees nationalized at the end of 1977 was 837,410 or 11



per cent of the total (25).

General Results of the Agrarian Reform Operations (26)  
(June 1978)

	Phase One	Phase Two	Total	
Area Transferred to FNRA	1,224,200	510,400	1,734,600	
of which:				
Agriculturally Useful Area	683,300	438,800	1,122,100	
Area to be Put in Use	540,900	71,600	612,500	
Distributed Area,				
of which:				
Agriculturally Useful Area	640,200	368,600	1,008,800	
Area to be Put in Use	176,300	81,300	257,600	
Number of Nationalized Palm Trees*	392,522	711,537	1,103,879	
Number of the Distributed Palm Trees*			1,083,528	
Number of Beneficiaries Organized in:	52,202	38,569	90,771	(No.)*
CAPRA	31,404	26,590	57,994	4,873
CAEC	4,825	1,318	6,143	614
G.M.V.	11,011	5,497	16,508	497
G.E.P.	790	1,855	2,645	1,569
Individual Beneficiaries	4,172	3,309	7,381	
CAPCS*				645
Average Area Per Beneficiary**				13.3 ha
* = 1980				
** = 1977				

In all, by 1978 25,867 private proprietors were affected by the expropriation process, less than half (43 per cent) of those estimated as being potentially affected in the survey of 1973. They were divided into a majority of wholly expropriated absentees, forming 80 per cent of the total or 20,611 proprietors, and a minority of 5,256 larger owners. Since the average size of an absentee holding, according to the survey of 1973, was 7.13 ha. while that of the limitable property was 53.97 ha., it is easy to notice that those most affected by the exprop-

riations were the small-scale absentees whose properties were not enough to support them and their families and who were forced to work outside their holdings, while large-scale owners were little affected during the second phase of the reform. A regional study by INEAP in the Daira, (the administrative unit between commune and department [wilaya]), of Sour El Ghozlane in the Tell Atlas, supports this contention (27). The following table below from this study shows clearly that small proprietors lost relatively larger parts of their land than larger proprietors.

The Effects of Land Nationalization on Different Categories of Farming Units in the Daira of Sour El Ghozlane in Tellatlas (28)

Category of Units	Average Nationalization per Unit (1978)	Change in Average Unit Since 1973
Less than 10 ha	1.34 ha	-19.85 %
10 to 50 ha	1.25 ha	- 5.13 %
50 ha and more	5.90 ha	- 7.73 %

We can see therefore that the relative average area decreased among the smaller agricultural units following the agrarian reform (minus 20 per cent in the category 1-10 ha.) exceeded that of the larger agricultural units (only minus 5 per cent in the category 10-50 ha.).

However, the aggregate figures of the size of expropriation many not reveal the exact impact of the reform in changing the structure of ownership in the private sector and in the creation of the new cooperative sector. The quality of the nationalized and distributed land and the types of crops planted in it is of great importance in indicating the nature of the land in the new cooperative sector. Government statistics indicate that the majority of the nationalized land in the agrarian reform sector was composed either of land planted with cereals

(46 per cent) or of fallow land (39 per cent), as shown by the following table:

Distribution of Private Sector Land According to Type of Crop  
(1970-71/1977-78) (29)  
(in hectares)

Crops	1970-71	1977-78	
	Private Sector	Coop. Sector	Private Sector
Cereals	2,300,000	508,510	1,533,880
Fallow Land	2,410,000	424,390	2,647,960
Natural Meadow	20,000	3,450	13,650
Wine	40,000	9,380	34,350
Fruit Plantations	211,000	59,870	242,380
Unproductive Land	299,000	45,870	268,710
Total	5,280,000	1,051,470	4,740,930

This shows that the major part of the land in the agrarian reform sector was planted with cereals, which means that capitalist private sector was not as much affected by the reform as might have been expected. Although there was no indication on the level of crop productivity of the land in this sector, the choice was left to the limitable proprietor to determine the part of his land that would be expropriated, which suggests that this part would be of lower fertility and productivity than the part which remained under his control. Apart from the creation of the sector of the "agrarian revolution" on a small part of the private sector, the organizational system of production and ownership both in the remaining part of the private sector and in the self-management sector remained unchanged.

However, despite the relatively small amount of land which materialized from the operations of the two phases of the reform and its apparent low quality, the major effect of the reform was the reorganization of ownership and cultivation of public land and the lands of absentee owners. Through the reform these lands were transformed from

being controlled by renters and run by share-croppers on a pre-capitalist basis into a different mode of operation characterized by the new cooperative organization with its new orientation of production using modern means of cultivation. Since the amount of transformed public land exceeded that taken from the absentee owners, it may be suggested that, despite the importance being given to the second phase of the reform and the publicity that was expressed in its course, the major structural change introduced by the agrarian reform lay in its first phase. Thus the main thrust of the reform was in the reorganization of the structure of ownership and mode of cultivation in the direction of freeing lands that were tied to low productivity methods of cultivation and backward tenancy arrangements and their reorganization into the newly commercialized cooperative sector. The second phase, on the other hand, apart from capturing the land that belonged to small-scale absentee owners, was more oriented towards political change than towards introducing solid changes in the organization of cultivation and production. This meant that the second phase, unlike the first, did not disturb the prevailing mode of production in its target area of operations which was predominantly commercialized, with the greater enhancement of the capitalist form of production. It also meant that the commercialization of agricultural sector was the most important goal of the reform.

## Notes

- (1) Raffinot, op. cit., p.328.  
For a sample of limits set in different zones on different types of crops, see Sutton, op. cit., p.60.
- (2) Raffinot, op. cit., p.329.
- (3) Charte de la Revolution Agraire, op. cit., p.11.
- (4) Sutton, op. cit., p.57.
- (5) Benhouria, op. cit.
- (6) Bessaoud, O., "La Revolution Agraire en Algerie: Continuite et Rapture dans les Processus de Transformations Agraire",  
Revue de Tiers Monde, Vol.12, (July-Sept.1980), p.609.
- (7) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.49.
- (8) Raffinot, op. cit., p.334.
- (9) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.49.
- (10) Abdi, N., "Reforeme Agraire en Algerie",  
Maghreb - Machrek, 69, (1975), p.34.
- (11) Ibid., pp.34-35.
- (12) Raffinot, op. cit., p.335.
- (13) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.50.
- (14) Bessaoud, op. cit., p.610.
- (15) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.53.
- (16) Abdi, op. cit., p.36.
- (17) Ibid.
- (18) Ibid.
- (19) Ibid., p.37.
- (20) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.52.

- (21) Ibid.  
Raffinot and Jacquemot, on the other hand, contend that the percentage of the potentially affected in the lists of the APCE was dropped to 1.24 per cent only, representing out of 1,164,345 property holders 96,669, (0.84% absentees and 0.41% limitables). Raffinot, op. cit., pp.336-37.
- (22) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.54.
- (23) Sutton, op. cit., p.60.
- (24) Pfeifer, op. cit., pp.54-55.
- (25) Annuaire Statistique de l'Algerie, 1980, p.180.
- (26) Bedrani, op. cit., p.329,  
Burgat, F., "Mille 'Villages Socialistes' Pour Une 'Revolution Agraire': Ordre Juridique, Enjeux Politique, Impact Socio-Economique" in  
Les Villages Socialistes de la Revolution Agraire Algerienne, ed. by F.Burgat and M.Nancy,  
Edition de CNRS, Paris, 1984, p.89,  
Annuaire Statistique de l'Algerie, 1980, p.180.
- (27) Andersson, op. cit., p.67.
- (28) Ibid., p.68.
- (29) RADP, Direction des Statistiques,  
L'Algerie en Quelques Chiffres, 1973, 1979.

## CHAPTER ELEVEN : TOWARDS AN EVALUATION OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM

### The Effects of the Reform on the Organization of the Labour Force

If the reform seemed to have some impact in transforming the organization of cultivation and ownership in parts of the rural areas, and if it aroused a certain degree of political debate and expectation, its effects in changing the living standard of the rural population and their conditions of production were minimal. The small amount of land already nationalized meant that only a small number of beneficiaries were affected. We saw that the number of the beneficiaries in the first phase represented only a tiny fraction of the applicants for the reform plots. With the completion of the redistribution operations in the second phase the total number of beneficiaries reached about 90,000. Even with the persistence of the phenomenon of "withdrawal", where many beneficiaries replaced others who withdrew from their allotted plots, this number still represented less than half the number of the applicants, let alone of potential beneficiaries, if the reform was to meet its goal of improving the living standards of the poor and landless members of the rural population (1).

In fact, if land redistribution in the course of the reform had solved anything, it did not solve the chronic problems of unemployment and under-employment in the rural sector. According to the statistics of 1964, the number of landless peasants was estimated at 400,000 and that of the poor peasants (with less than 10 hectares) was 425,000. Taking demographic growth into account which was at its highest rate amongst the rural population, there were at least 900,000 potential beneficiaries at the time of the launching of the agrarian reform. Thus if 10 ha. per beneficiary would provide the minimum for nourishing the

beneficiary and his family, about 5 million hectares were required for distribution to the landless rural dwellers and a further 3 million hectares to complement the properties of the small-scale owners who constituted the total number of potential beneficiaries. In the conditions of the availability of agricultural land in Algeria, even a "radical" agrarian reform could not distribute more than 2.5 million hectares, including the communal and public lands sequestered during the first phase, and even this would satisfy only half the landless (2).

However, due to the high ceilings of ownership and to the many outlets for avoiding nationalization which permitted large landownership to continue to exist, the total nationalized area was too restricted to allow a larger number of beneficiaries to be incorporated in the newly created sector of the agrarian reform. Thus only slightly more than one million hectares were nationalized in the course of the two phases of the reform. Until 1978 the beneficiaries of the reform represented less than 10 per cent of potential candidates.

Grouped in a total number of 5,261 cooperative units at the end of 1974 each with an average size of 217 ha and an average membership of 15, each beneficiary had on average 14.3 ha. (3). This was slightly reduced in 1977 to 13.3 ha, and represented the minimum necessary for the subsistence of the beneficiary and his family.

With this scarcity of land for distribution, one would have expected that great competition would take place among the applicants or the beneficiaries to hold on their allotted plots. However, like the first phase of the reform, the problem of "withdrawal" continued to persist all along the period of implementing the reform. A total of 4,885 during the first phase and 3,155 in the second withdrew from their plots. The total number of beneficiaries of 85,788 at the end of 1974



declined to 82,500 in 1976, because a number of beneficiaries had renounced their allotments and left their cooperatives. The official figures of the percentage of withdrawal vary between 8 to 10 per cent of the beneficiaries. While this phenomenon was general, the most affected Wilayas were Algiers, Blida, and Constantine (4). Most studies on this subject show that there was some correlation between the phenomenon of withdrawal and the process of industrialization-urbanization which was accelerated at the end of the first four-year plan, together with the various problems which the new beneficiaries were facing (5). The immediate effect of this phenomenon was that it contributed further to limiting the impact of the agrarian reform in radically changing the structure of employment in the agricultural sector.

Thus, even adding in the landless herders organized into cooperatives on state lands in phase three (who had received 3,837 rams and 102,770 ewes by 1976), the total employed directly in agricultural production in the reform sector came to only 110,000 persons, about 7.2 per cent of the active rural male population (6).

With a total agricultural population of 8.2 million in 1980 and an annual increase of 550,000 persons between 1974-77, of which 85,000 are economically active, the reform did not have even a temporary palliative impact on the problem of employment in the agricultural sector (7). The number of beneficiaries was of the same order of the annual increase in the active agricultural labour force. Since many of the beneficiaries or at least 50 per cent of them were already working, as the priority of distributing the land was given essentially to those who were working on it, the impact of the reform on improving the total members employed was minimal.

On the contrary, certain aspects of the reform had even compli-

cated life for the small peasants (8). The area of sharecropping or "association" cherka, had been reduced since the property of the absentee landowners had been nationalized. "This substantial reduction in the area available to small peasants under the "association" system might have caused greater rather than lesser structural differences in rural Algeria" (9). Thus the number of the reform beneficiaries was lower than the former employees on the land of waged workers, Khammas, or the tenants of public and communal lands who were replaced by the new beneficiaries.

By 1976 there were still 940,000 poor and landless agricultural workers untouched by the reform, divided into 630,000 landless and 310,000 owners with less than 5 ha (10). Some of them were dependent either on occasional employment in the non-agricultural sectors or on remittances from emigrant workers abroad (11). Others found seasonal employment in the three sectors of agriculture including the sector of the agrarian reform.

By 1978, after the completion of the agrarian reform, the number of the people employed by the state agricultural sector, that is the self-management sector together with the cooperative sector created by the agrarian reform, was in the range of 300,000, divided approximately equally between the two sectors. Together they supported a population of 2 million. This meant that the conditions of 6 million or three quarters of the agricultural population, had hardly been affected either by the agrarian reform or by independence.

The minimal, or rather the negative, effects of the reform on employment in the agricultural sector together with increasing employment opportunities in the non-agricultural sectors which were greatly enhanced after the "oil crisis" of 1973, meant the persistence of the

problem of rural to urban migration. This migration, which was in a range of 50,000 to 100,000 per year, was not ameliorated with the introduction of agrarian reform. Since the expansion of employment in the non- agricultural sector was based much more on the expansion of construction and administration than of industry (12), and since employment in these activities became limited after the basic industrial infrastructure had been installed, the gravity of the migration problem has continued to persist.

### **The Politics of Implementation**

Part of the deficiencies in the implementation of the reform and its the generally insignificant results with both regard to the confiscated areas and its impact on employment related to the way that the reform was implemented and the nature of the institutions charged with its implementation.

From the outset the agrarian reform was presented as an embodiment of "national solidarity" in which all Algerians had an immediate and long term interest. "The Agrarian Revolution will never be a class struggle, but will achieve national solidarity" (13). And if such "national solidarity" implied some form of struggle it was a "struggle between the revolutionary forces who have faith in the destiny and the future of the people and certain category of counterrevolutionary forces which work for its particular interest" (14). Opposition to the reform was never linked with other than certain counter-revolutionaries which had no faith in the future of Algeria. Those forces or elements, on the other hand, according to the Charter and the official speeches, could be found anywhere in society and were not identified with particular social classes or fractions of classes since the existence of

classes was rejected. And if the reform aimed at limiting large properties and eliminating archaic and backward forms of production and tenure, it did not run counter to the interests of any social group. In other words, according to the official view, if there was opposition to the agrarian reform, it was a political one expressed by people who had no faith in the Algerian revolution or who had misconceived ideas about the future of Algeria.

Thus no attempt was made to identify opposition to the reform with the agrarian bourgeoisie as a socio-economic class, which by definition would oppose any reform that aimed not only at the "elimination of the exploitation of man by man", but also any which would result in even a partial expropriation of its properties. On the contrary, not only were assurances made, whether in the Charter or in the President's speeches, to proprietors that the reform would preserve their properties, but they were even invited to participate actively in the operations of the reform. In its first pages the Charter drew attention to the fact that "the agrarian revolution aims at the modernization of agriculture....It does not aim at the abolition of the rights of property as such.... On the contrary, it confirms the rights of the small and medium proprietors...It will compensate the owners of nationalized properties" (15). In the belief that the landowners would support the reform (and that if some did oppose it, this was because of their lack of faith in the people and not because they were objectively against the aims of the reform) they were invited to participate in the operations of the reform through the "campaign of donations" launched at the beginning of the reform. Moreover, although the reform was made in the name of the poor and landless peasants and not in that of the large and medium landowners, the former did not find any means of expressing their

interests or willingness to implement the reform. Thus, in the words of Zghal, "the agrarian reform seemed to mobilize certain radical elements in the city rather than the poor peasantry" (16). The poor peasants and the agricultural workers remained outside the framework of the reform implementation and had no significant influence upon it. On the contrary, the landed proprietors, merchants and other entrepreneurs, and state and party officials, who formed the backbone of support for the national ruling class, constituted the authorities responsible for implementing the reform (17).

The organ chiefly responsible for the reform implementation was the elected APCE which held wide powers, cited earlier, in translating the reform text into reality. These organs included various representatives from the army, the peasants union (UNPA), the state services and marketing network (CAPCS), the local branches of the national bank (BNA), and members of the original APC (the Communal Popular Assembly), who were elected locally after having been nominated by the party. The former representatives were added to the APC mainly in order to "compensate for the weakness of the expertise of the technical cadres" (18). It was also officially propagated that such an enlargement would democratize the process of the reform implementation. However, as asserted by Etienne: "this enlargement was not necessarily done to benefit the landless peasants. In the region of Oran in particular,.... on the contrary, it has permitted the "internal enemies" (feudalists, absentiest bourgeois) to infiltrate and to participate in making the lists of beneficiaries" (19).

In fact the Charter of the agrarian reform provided in article 174, that "the persons who are invited to participate in the implementation of the Agrarian Revolution should not hold any interest liable

to be affected by measures of total or partial nationalization". However, this provision was never respected."The members of the elected APCE or the APW (at the regional level), the party, and the state functionaries, were quite often landed proprietors themselves, and some of them put the defence of their interests before any concern for socialist solidarity" (20).

Hence if potentially affected landowners were not directly present, they were effectively represented through various means or connections within the local and regional authorities. The elected members of the APC, for example, were mainly middle-level proprietors, shopkeepers, rural intelligentsia such as schoolteachers, and civil servants (21). Moreover, as Weexsteen remarked "it is not unusual that the presidents of the APCs, who appoint the presidents of the Enlarged Popular Communal Assemblies, are themselves big or middle landowners. The cleavages between partisans and opponents of the Agrarian Revolution erupt frequently in these Assemblies" implying that these cleavages discourage new reforms and initiatives (22).

Although representatives of the peasants union were present in the APCEs, the ratio of peasant representation was much lower than that of middle property owners. At the regional and national level, this lack of representation could hardly escape notice. Furthermore, the peasants union, in which membership was categorized into rich and poor peasants or between employing farmers and wage labourers (23), was in fact formed from small and middle owners. Far from being able to take the agrarian reform into its hands it was in fact constituted in the same time as the reform operations launched. Thus it "had only a symbolic role and looked very much like the peasants mouthpiece of the FLN and the army" (24), contributing more to the predominance of the interests

of the landowners within the organs of the reform.

These shortcomings were reflected in the sluggishness of the APCEs in carrying out the reform. In the operations of expropriation the APCs allowed generous exemptions to be made, so that large absentee proprietors who were threatened with expropriation were often allowed to sell part of their properties, while potentially limitable proprietors were allowed to choose which lands to give up. This explains why those most severely affected by the reform were the small-scale absentees who were not present to defend their properties. On some occasions the cooperatives which were constituted by the APCs were formed from among the bad candidates so as to distort the cooperative experience and to ensure its control by middle and rich peasants (25).

The manipulations of the implementation of the reform by supporters of rich farmers aroused a great deal of opposition from the spontaneously organized student volunteers who surveyed the countryside every year as part of a volunteer programme to help peasants acquire an adequate knowledge of the "agrarian revolution". They exposed and condemned in many occasions such manipulations on many occasions. One student volunteer wrote exposing the way the reform was introduced by the APC to the poor peasants, that:

"The APCEs, which was to care for diffusing and implementing the agrarian revolution, were controlled by the landed proprietors who had done all things to sabotage the (revolution's) operations. Meetings were organized to inform the peasants about the revolution, but they were held.... in classical Arabic and not in the (Algerian) dialect. Moreover, the reading of certain articles was omitted. In some regions where the rate of rural illiteracy reached 90 per cent, information was given on posters. These manoeuvres were often accompanied by pressures on poor peasants not to register in the lists of beneficiaries. A counter-propaganda has developed" (26).

Moreover, the influence of the landowners on the bodies responsible for implementing the reform which allowed them to avoid having their properties expropriated, did not prevent them from engaging in political and ideological struggles against it. When expropriation seemed inevitable for some they resorted to means of open resistance and ideological campaigns designed to discredit the reform and to provide a hostile ground against it. Reports by Algerian Student Volunteers even spoke of a "counter-revolution on the part of large landowners. One report stated that "the big landowners do not hesitate to distort the fundamental principles of the agrarian revolution to threaten and directly intimidate the poor and landless peasants so that they do not put their names down in the lists of recipients (of distributed land)" (27). There were cases when the large landowners forcibly prevented some potential beneficiaries from signing up for the reform, or allowed them to sign up on the agreement that the landowners would then purchase the titles and destroy them (28). In trying to mobilize the peasants against the reform by invoking their traditional Islamic militancy, the large landowners tried very hard to portray the reform as an infringement of the law of Islam and the teachings of the Qur'an in that it was designed to abolish private property. Hence the drought of 1973 and the floods of 1974 were presented as evidence of God's anger at the agrarian reform.

We can see therefore that the denial of class struggle and the emphasis on national solidarity did not prevent the landowners from engaging in this struggle mainly through their connections with, and frequently control of, the bodies responsible for implementing the objectives of the agrarian reform or through direct means aiming at limiting the effects of the reform upon their interests. The result was



a drastic restriction of the land area over which the reform operated and the preservation of inequality in landownership. This meant that although some capitalist farmers had the limitation of their properties limited, capitalist forms of production were still preserved.

### **The Establishment of the Cooperative System**

"The land to those who till it", represented one part of the agrarian reform. Another important aspect was "to organize the use of the land and the means of production in a way that will permit the amelioration of production by the application of efficient techniques". The latter was simply viewed as the organization of agricultural production and its integration in a new cooperative system. Hence the reform text stipulated that all the beneficiaries should join a cooperative of some kind.

For the authors of the reform text the cooperative system represented the optimal form, outside self-management, of the intensification of agricultural production. Its choice reflected not only the state's disenchantment with the system of self-management, whose existence was tolerated rather than supported or enhanced, but also the peasants' opposition to collective exploitation. A wide section of the peasantry were familiar with the problems with which the workers in the self-management sector were faced with, and it was therefore quite predictable that they would resist affiliation to a new system of extended self-management (29).

## The C.A.P.C.S

The establishment of the cooperatives was proceeded by the creation by the Ministry of Agriculture at the level of the rural commune of the Cooperative Agricole Polyvalente Communal de Services (C.A.P.C.S.), designed to articulate and coordinate the functions of entire cooperative units. The function of the CAPCS was "to put at the disposal of its members all the services necessary for the best exploitation of the land on which they work, the intensification and diversification of the production of these lands, and, eventually, for the marketing of these products under the supervision of the bodies concerned" (30). The CAPCS was to "constitute one of the technical-economical supports of the state within the policies of rural development on the communal level" (31). Therefore, it had the function of organizing the reform beneficiaries, making sure that each one farmed his allotted lands, conformed to the production requirements of the national plan, and participated in public work projects. It was also charged with the task of providing agricultural inputs and marketing the produce of the cooperative units. It was to act as extension agency, service station, agricultural credit institute and sales agent. In short, CAPCS was to be a supervisor and an organiser of the cooperative units (32). Once established, it was to participate actively in the implementation of the agrarian reform. Furthermore, its functions were not to be confined to the agrarian reform sector but were also to include the self-managed and the private agricultural sectors. Hence membership in the communal service cooperative was compulsory for the state agricultural sector (that is the self-managed and the agrarian reform sector), and optional for the private sector.

It was planned to establish 600 CAPCS, one for each rural commune. Physically this involved the construction of an office, two storage barns, and a repair workshop. Later on further buildings would be added according to the local agricultural specialisation (33). By 1973 the first service cooperatives were being inaugurated. One of the first was at Aneur el Ain, 80 km west of Algiers. Its members are ten self-managed estates, one "cooperative des anciens moudjahidines", and one agrarian reform cooperative, established during the first phase (34).

By 30 June 1979, 674 CAPCS were created in a total of 703 rural communes. In the course of the second four-year plan (1974-1977), the CAPCS acquired about 4,000 tractors, 1,300 combined-harvesters, 1,400 disk ploughs, more than 1,300 ploughshares, and 1,260 lorries (35).

The administrative hierarchy of the CAPCS was composed on the one hand of a Management Council including a President who were to be democratically elected by the members, and on the other of a Technical Council including a treasurer and a director who were appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture. The director and not the president of the CAPCS was to assure that the running of the cooperative conformed with the national plan. This was the same dual structure that had been institutionalized within the self-managed farms and the reform production units; it ensured the close supervision by unelected local representatives of the national government. On this subject P. Knauss commented that:

"Like the history of the self-management bureaucratization (the control of vital offices by the state), is another example of the government's desire to keep the peasants within the constraints of its rather narrow objectives: namely, to increase levels of agricultural production and to slow down the rural-urban exodus".(36)

The Management Councils of CAPCS were formed from among the bene-

ficiaries of the agrarian reform and the workers of the state agricultural sector who represented 46 and 23 per cent of the councils members respectively in 1977 (37). The representation of the private sector was limited by factors such as the requirement that private farmers who chose to join the CAPCS agreed to coordinate their production with the communal and national plan, and that as the operations of the reform were not yet officially ended many private owners could not join. However, the percentage of the representation of private farmers within the management councils was relatively significant (23 per cent). The remaining 9 per cent of representatives were divided equally into employees of state and local agencies, representatives of the UNPA, and a collection of artisans, merchants, members of APC, teachers, administrators, etc.

Given the close state supervision of the functions and the structure of its administration, the CAPCS represented another state agency organising and supervising the functions of the state agricultural units and to some extent the private farms. S.Bedrani agreed with the conclusion of one journalist who wrote that "in a number of cases, the management council of the CAPCS existed only on paper, the affairs were steered, often in an authoritarian manner, by the director..... The democratic functions of the CAPCS was also blocked, and the peasants' only relation with the CAPCS straightforwardly commercial ones" (38).

The work of the CAPCS was also open to the manipulation and influence of the rich farmers and the state bureaucracy. In fact some researchers directly observed cases in which the personnel of the CAPCS used its facilities for their own private gain (39). In practice, the CAPCS acted as "the employer of the "cooperators" of the Agrarian revolution, working for monthly pay, and it had very little to do with

a "Cooperative" (if this means that its operations are controlled by the producers)" (40).

The first CAPCS did not seriously begin operations until September 1975. During the first years of its functions CAPCS concentrated its activities on the support of the state agricultural sector. With a relatively large technical and material base CAPCS was able to meet the demand of the state agricultural sector and to some extent that of the private sector. This resulted in limiting the activities played by agricultural entrepreneurs (who are often the large landowners) in renting out agricultural material. They faced strong competition from CAPCS, since the latter possessed relatively new materials hired at stable and low prices (41).

However, private suppliers of agricultural materials and wholesalers were not totally replaced by the activities of CAPCS. When the state opened the financial flow to the private sector at the end of the 1970s, after a period of neglect and in a bid to increase agricultural production, the work of the CAPCS was soon to run into problems as the demand for inputs increased in a dramatic way. It became increasingly incapable of meeting demands for inputs and for the efficient marketing of agricultural produce. Structural problems relating to the location of the CAPCS offices and their distance from the farms, inadequate transport and storage facilities, and the lack of trained personnel, affected the capacity of the CAPCS to supply the agricultural sector adequately with its needs. Private suppliers and wholesalers who were often themselves large landowners were encouraged to undertake the tasks which CAPCS was too slow or unable to achieve. They dealt with the private sector and, illegally, with part of the state sector by supplying them with materials and marketing produce, charging and

paying in both cases higher prices than that of CAPCS.

In dealing with agricultural farms whether in the private or state sector, CAPCS followed strictly economic criteria which tended to favour the most efficient and profitable farms. As far as the private sector was concerned, this meant that rich farmers were better situated to take advantage of the services provided by CAPCS. As emphasized by S.Bedrani;

"The agrarian capitalists are certainly much more favoured than the subsistence or semi-subsistence producers. In fact, their social relations, the prestige and the authority that are embedded in their fortunes, make the CAPCS, whose management as we have seen is not very democratic, give them priority over other private producers in that their credits and machinery orders are much more easily granted" (42).

#### The Cooperative Units

The establishment of the cooperative units went hand in hand with the operations of the reform. It was carried out by the APCEs from among the beneficiaries chosen by the same bodies. The beneficiaries had no say in deciding which cooperative to join or the number of workers in each unit. The APCE decided these matters. It also retained the authority to admit new members and expel old ones from the cooperative unit.

By 1977-78, the area occupied by by the agrarian reform sector and under some form of cooperative system reached 1,005,600 hectares or little more than 13 per cent of the total useful agricultural area of the country, estimated at 7.5 million hectares. With nearly 100,000 beneficiaries and 10,000 seasonal workers the reform sector employed about 8.2 per cent of the active agricultural population in that year. At the level of production, the reform sector produced in 1977-78 13.6

per cent of total cereal production in Algeria (2.1 million quintals), 11.8 per cent of dry vegetables, and 8.2 per cent of market crops.

Among the five types of the cooperative, the CAPRA was designed as the most advanced form of cooperation that was to be achieved by the other types after a period of development. The management arrangement of the cooperative units varied according to the type of cooperation. In the advanced form of CAPRA the management was organized in the same way as in the self-management sector, where the workers were to elect their own president and management council from among themselves, while the Ministry of Agriculture was to appoint a technical director and supply an extension agent, and the national bank was to assign an accountant to audit the finances. The same organization was to be followed by other types with differences in the representation of the state within the cooperative unit.

By the end of the reform operations, more than 90 per cent of the beneficiaries were organized into production cooperatives. The individual beneficiaries represented exceptional cases since their numbers did not exceed more than 7,481 or little more than 8 per cent of the total beneficiaries (224). The table below shows the distribution of the beneficiaries over the different types of cooperative together with the number of cooperatives created in the course of the reform:

TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFICIARIES BY TYPE OF COOPERATIVE

THE END OF THE REFORM OPERATIONS (1963-1964) (IN THOUSANDS)

Formation of Cooperatives, 1974-1977 (44)

Units of Production	1st Phase 31/12/1974		2nd Phase 31/12/1974		Both Phases 31/12/1974		Total 31/3/1977	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
CAPRA	1,748	60	1,854	79	3,602	68	4,203	72
CAEC	601	20	214	9	815	15	528	9
GMV	572	20	186	8	758	14	930	16
GEP	-	-	86	4	86	2	170	3
GI	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	0.2
Total Coops.	2,921		2,340		5,261		5,841	
Individual Allotments	2,316		3,907		6,223		9,814	

The size of land area and the number of beneficiaries of each form in 1977 were as follows: (45)

Unit	Area (ha)	%	Members	%
CAPRA	735,906	82.0	52,000	65
CAEC	58,334	6.5	5,650	7
GMV	90,964	10.0	18,400	23
GEP+GI	13,462	1.5	3,950	5
TOTAL	898,666	100	90,000	100

The tables above show that CAPRA represented the predominant form of cooperation established by the reform. Apart from the GMVs, which were required because of the scarcity of cultivable lands and, because of the poor quality of some parts of the distributed land, which needed improvement and preparation, other forms of cooperation were quite negligible. The GEPs and the GIs, which were designed to include the small and the middle peasants of the private sector, represented a very small part of the cooperative units or only 3.2 per cent. Private peasants were reluctant to join the cooperative system and preferred to



stay independent of state control even if this meant, especially for small owners, that their incomes remained lower than that of the reform beneficiaries (46). For the majority of the private peasants staying outside the cooperative system meant that they could determine the consumption and sale of their products. It also meant that they were free to move to other occupations inside or outside agriculture. The predominance of the CAPRA form of cooperation and the tiny fraction of cooperatives in the GEP and GI reflected the reform's preference for larger, more productive and more profitable units (47). This is demonstrated by the table above in showing the decline by 35 per cent in the number of CAECs as transitional units between 1974 and 1977 which meant that some CAEC cooperatives were pressured by the Ministry of Agriculture to become CAPRAs.

### **The Cooperative System in Practice**

This description of the situation of the cooperative system suggests that despite the different types of cooperative units that the reform was supposed to establish, only the form of CAPRA was in fact encouraged, regardless of whether the conditions necessary for its establishment were present. This reflected above all the interest of the reform in expanding state control over the agricultural sector and production, since this system was the only way of providing maximum state control over the peasantry (48). The imposition of this form of cooperation was mainly a result of a technocratic vision which considered that only the regroupment of land under the form of cooperative production could provide the outlets necessary for the industrial programme (49).

However, the predominance of CAPRA implied that the cooperative

system would face various structural problems and conflicts which might be reflected negatively upon the performance of the production units. First of all the beneficiaries who composed the membership of the cooperative units were remarkably heterogeneous. They had different and sometimes conflicting material interests and they lacked the social and economic cohesion necessary for the formation of the cooperative unit. There were those beneficiaries who were small or even medium owners and who retained their properties within the cooperative units in which they were members, and there were the landless beneficiaries who did not own any land. Within the latter there were also ex-sharecroppers and ex-agricultural workers (50). This diversity of the socio-economic background of the beneficiaries was the source of conflicting material interests between "those who owned private parcels and those who did not own, between those who draw concurrently extra-agricultural incomes and those who live solely on working the cooperative land" (51). This conflict and lack of cohesion had a serious effect on the performance of the units.

Other problems that faced the running of the cooperatives related mainly to the nature of the work force employed by the cooperative sector with regard to its age and technical and educational qualifications and training. A sizable part of the working force in the cooperative sector over 50 years old and had lacked the optimal physical capacity to undertake the jobs assigned to it in an efficient manner or to acquire the necessary training for the efficient use of modern techniques. Also, according to many studies, the level of qualification was noticeably low; 38 per cent of the beneficiaries were illiterate, and had less experience in the use of the advanced methods and techniques of cultivation (52). Former sharecroppers, renters, and wage

workers often did not have enough knowledge of modern farming to avoid making costly errors in soil preparation, seed planting, and plant growth supervision.

Moreover, the lands distributed to the beneficiaries were not of equal quality in terms of fertility, location, proximity to the market and to the CAPCS centres, and the availability of trained cadres. The variation among the cooperative units in the possession of these facilities was reflected in the variation of their incomes. Thus, some units were able to make profits mainly because they had more fertile land or better access to the facilities and services necessary for the production process, while other units were in serious deficit. Hence in 1974 out of 3,164 cooperatives, only 1,233 or 39 per cent were showing profit, while the remaining 61 per cent were in deficit (53). This difference in profitability was much more related to the initial endowments of the units than to the actual efforts made by the beneficiaries.

Although the initial distribution of land was undertaken on the basis that the size of the distributed plot would provide a determined level of income, many cooperatives proved unproductive and could not reach the estimated income after their creation. This was either because the land was not properly prepared to become productive or because it was unsuitable for mechanization. It was often the case that the cooperatives established in the lands recovered during the first phase of the reform faced many problems relating to fertility and the availability of water resources. Hence a number of CAPRA were soon converted to GMV cooperatives when it became obvious that they were still in a situation where the land needed extensive preparation before it could become productive. This might explain why the number of the coopera-

tives under the form of GMV in the table above only changed slightly between 1974 and 1977, since although many GMVs were converted into CAPRAs, as many CAPRAs were converted back into GMVs.

Other problems that faced the newly established cooperatives related to a variety of factors such as the location of the work places and their proximity to the residences of the cooperators which was in some cases too far to make daily labour practicable. Serious difficulties faced the supply of materials and equipment and the marketing of products resulting in regular delays which all affected the ability of the cooperatives to achieve a satisfactory level of performance (54).

As a result of these difficulties, which were mainly due to the generally poor quality of the land in the reform sector compared to that of the self-management sector or to the unaffected part of the private sector, which meant that it was extremely difficult to attain a level of high productivity, the cooperators resorted to many practices regarded as illegal by the state which run counter to the spirit of cooperation. Low wages induced the cooperators to carry out activities similar to those noticed in the self-management sector such as self-consumption of the produce instead of selling it to the state marketing agencies, or keeping their animals on the cooperative land illegally and independently of the other members. Other cooperators sought, also illegally, temporary employment outside the cooperative, since wages on their holdings were not enough to support their families.

The most serious consequence of these problems was the intensification of the phenomenon of withdrawal where the beneficiaries abandoned their cooperatives altogether to either join the stream of rural to urban migration or to find some sort of other employment in the agricultural sector. Withdrawal took place immediately after the

distribution of the lands when beneficiaries found that their assigned plots were inadequate and therefore sought employment elsewhere. However it continued even after the beneficiaries had accepted membership of the cooperatives when they found that working conditions were too hard and that it was difficult to attain a desired level of income. Withdrawal of the cooperators was at its highest near the large urban centres following the increase in the demands of urban employment that took place after the reform. In the region of Algiers the withdrawal rate was around 40 per cent in 1974. Officially, for a total number of withdrawal up to 1977 of 8,040, only 4,665 replacements had been found. The scale of the withdrawal phenomenon was reflected in headlines in the national press: "land without beneficiaries, why?", "the withdrawal, a consequence of the bureaucracy", "Mahema, a commune seeking beneficiaries" (55). The size of this phenomenon in certain regions was quite apparent to the extent that the Walis (Governors) of El-Asnam, Oran, and Annaba provinces, ordered that any reform beneficiary who had withdrawn from his cooperative should be barred from employment in other sectors of the economy (56).

### **The Socio-economic Nature of the Reform Cooperatives**

The general structure and organization of the cooperative units were bound to be influenced by the nature of the tasks which they were supposed to fulfill. One of the major aims of the agrarian reform was the greater incorporation of the agricultural sector in the economy through the creation of modern, profitable, and productive agricultural units together with the expansion of state control over this sector. This, would have a real effect on the general nature of the reform and the status of the beneficiaries and their power vis-a-vis the state.

Our discussion on the nature of the cooperative sector will cover the period until 1982.

#### 1-The Decision making Power

The text of the reform and the organization of the cooperative system stipulated that the General Assembly of the cooperators was responsible for determining the distribution of the means of production and the plan of cultivation. However, in deciding these matters the Assembly was to operate within the confines of the communal plan elaborated by the representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture. This meant that the latter was able to modify the plan of cultivation if, as in the case of the self-management sector, it was thought to be contradicting the national or the communal plan.

Translated in real terms, the cooperators were only able to carry out the orders of the state representatives. The decision on the nature and quantity of crops to be cultivated was taken by the state although this was often concealed by the fact that, the wishes of the latter in the matter of the cultivation plan frequently coincided with those of the producers. In fact natural conditions and the amount of labour available offered little choice of possible alternatives (57). State control also extended to decisions regarding investment and the supply of credits and their use. Members of the cooperatives could not decide on the distribution of their capital without authorization from the state banking or administrative agencies. The use of the credits granted by the state was specified in detail. The cooperators could not, for example, buy a motor pump with the money granted for the purchase of a seeder, and all expenses, even less important ones had to be authorized by the BNA (58). This applied also to the manner in which the revenues of the cooperatives were distributed, where the General Assembly could

only put up proposals to the administrative or banking authorities. Despite the relative freedom of the cooperatives in comparison to the self-management sector, marketing was carried out through the CAPCS and other state marketing institutions. The division of the surplus into consumption and investment was also outside the control of the cooperators and was decided in a bureaucratic fashion by the representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture.

The organization of labour within the cooperative units differed from that in the self-management sector in that with the exception of the president there was no labour hierarchy matched with differentiation in income remuneration. Apart from the seasonal workers employed in the cooperatives, all the cooperators possessed equal rights and duties regarding the division of work and the distribution of revenues. The relatively small size of the cooperative units compared with that of the self-managed production units favoured a better management of the enterprise and ensured an easy organization of the labour.

However, despite the relative freedom of decision enjoyed by the cooperators in comparison with the self-management sector, it is not an exaggeration to speak of them, especially in units which faced problems or were in deficit, simply as waged workers with no influence over the means or the process of production. In fact, they were considered by the state representatives, especially at the local level as waged labourers who were incapable of comprehending the "general interest" (59). The power of the technical director appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture exceeded that of the workers and he was accountable to no one in the cooperative, as he reported directly back to the planning authorities at the Wilaya level (60). The president of the unit who was required to be literate and to have some education was often a rich

farmer who possessed various links and connections with the administrative authorities. He and the members of the managing council often did no physical labour themselves but directed the labour of others.

Thus the structure of the cooperatives did not prevent some form of differentiation among their members. In the areas recovered during the first phase in particular, the rich peasants, who became reform beneficiaries because they had formerly been farmers, managers or renters of the nationalized public and private lands, tended to use the cooperative unit as a base for furthering their own interests. Through continuing to work alongside the former wage workers and sharecroppers whom they had supervised on the very same land in the pre-reform period, they were able to use their profits from agricultural and non-agricultural activities to purchase more means of production and extend their commercial and processing operations (61).

## 2-The Aim and Orientation of Production

The creation of the cooperative was viewed as a technical aspect of raising agricultural production and productivity. It was not conceived as a part of a whole operation aiming at the employment of the available labour force in the countryside, but as a policy aiming to create units of production which were profitable in purely financial terms and which would provide each member of the cooperative with an annual income of AD 3,000. For this reason the main concern of the production process was to minimize costs and to maximize profits.

This meant that the cooperatives were to be operated as capitalist enterprises whose prime aim was profits, with no solidarity between the cooperators and the landless workers or the small owners. The cooperatives even acted as capitalist employers of seasonal workers who were often hired to performed the hardest of jobs with very low wages. In



fact seasonal labour constituted very important part of the labour force in the majority of cooperatives. In some cooperatives where the members used no more than 56.6 per cent of their available time working in their units, the percentage of working days performed by seasonal workers reached 53 per cent of the total working days. During the agricultural year 1974-1975 the 95 CAPRA in the departments of Alger, Tizi-Ouzou, Bouira, Adrar, and Tamanrasset which grouped 1,182 beneficiaries, employed 725 seasonal workers, or to 61 per cent of the permanent members (62).

Although natural conditions limited the choices of crops in this sector, the general policy of the state was to impose through various means the production of marketable crops. Self-consumption of the crops produced was widely denounced and prevented. Production, therefore, remained oriented to price levels and market demand.

Finally one can qualify the cooperative sector simply as an expansion of the state agricultural sector under a different form. If the cooperators possessed some form of freedom, it was only within the framework of the state's imperatives which effectively decided the plan of cultivation, the amount and direction of investment, and the distribution of revenues. The cooperative sector was in general the product of a state capitalist policy which aimed primarily at the integration of agriculture within the economy. It represented the means through which the state was able to replace pre-capitalist forms of tenure and ownership with market-oriented and profit-seeking agricultural enterprise. The nature of the cooperative sector was in fact determined by this role which meant that despite having minimal impact on the structure of rural employment and land and income inequality in the countryside, it was a stimulus for activating the agricultural sector. This

was to be done by expanding state control over that part of the private sector which was run under archaic and backward forms of production. The beneficiaries of the reform constituted, under the form of cooperation, state employees charged with implementing the integration of agriculture into the state capitalist economy. The creation of the cooperative sector was carried out not through the eradication, but rather through the maintenance, and indeed encouragement, of private property in agriculture, since the accompanying state credit and pricing policies favoured the most successful and profitable agricultural enterprises whether under state control or in the private sector.

### **Agrarian Reform : Failure or Success?**

Answering a question like this will depend entirely on one's expectation and understanding of the nature of agrarian reform under state capitalism. We warned earlier of the danger of taking officially stated objectives at their face value since the reform had equally important implicit aims. Given the discussion above, there is no definite answer to this question. The reform was a failure in certain aspects and a success in others.

We saw that the reform's impact on rural employment and in changing the structure of ownership in the direction of greater equality was undermined by various factors including the resistance of the propertied class. Only a small amount of poor quality land was taken away from the private sector, mostly either public land or owned by absentee landlords. Even within the last category only a small fraction, usually tiny plots, was affected by the reform. However, the reform was successful, through affecting mainly these lands, in tackling the problem of pre-capitalist rental and sharecropping tenures which had prevented a

significant part of the private sector from being integrated in the economy and responding to the increasing urban demand for food. By nationalizing these lands and establishing the cooperative sector upon them, the reform achieved its stated objective of eradicating backward forms of production and ridding the peasants of the exploitation and debt bondage of the landlords.

However, the reform hardly touched the private capitalist form of production. If the properties of some agrarian capitalists had been affected, the reform together with the state agricultural policies which accompanied it actually encouraged private production. The land nationalized in the course of the second phase belonged mostly to small absentee owners. Despite the emphasis of the reform text that only direct exploitation of the land would be preserved, wage labour persisted and has by no means been abolished. It became clear that the slogan of "the land belongs to those who till it" was translated in the actual fact into that "the land belongs to those who (efficiently) exploit it". The most productive and profitable agricultural enterprises, whether in the state or private sector, were encouraged and supported. This was clear through the policies of the state institutions servicing the agricultural sector which, in seeking to enhance competition and profitability, and therefore economic inequality, in fact favoured and encouraged those units which were able to achieve profits through various means.

Moreover, the small size of the land sequestered by the reform operations meant that only a small fraction of the potential beneficiaries would acquire nationalized land under one form or another. Hence ~~the problem of unemployment in agriculture was hardly affected by the~~ reform. The real importance of this however, is that this number is

much smaller than the numbers who worked on the nationalized lands in the pre-reform period and who were displaced by the nationalization. This implies that the number of waged workers available for hire by the capitalist units has increased contrary to the emphasis on direct exploitation. Moreover, for the majority of the agricultural workers and, indeed, even the small owners, the effects of urban expansion and the increase in the oil money had a much stronger impact on their living conditions and future than the agrarian reform, since these factors played a far more decisive role in determining their future. The changing patterns of consumption and work which followed have resulted in a situation in which a wage income was necessary for a standard of living above basic needs in 1972, by 1982 a wage income was the base, and that agriculture became the means of increasing non-basic consumption (63). Hence the commercialization of agriculture was one of the direct achievements of the reform, in that it not only meant the integration of agriculture with industrial development through an increase in the use of inputs which was explicitly aimed at by the reform, but also the enhancement of capitalist exploitation and differentiation.

Even if the reform's effectiveness was measured by purely economic criteria expressed by production and productivity increases, the results are disappointing. Algeria in the 1980's, with 20 million inhabitants is producing less cereals than it did with 5 million at the beginning of the 20th century. Hence it remained heavily reliant on imports and food subsidies to feed its population. While national food production met 70 per cent of consumption in 1969, it only met 55 per cent in 1973, 35 per cent in 1977, and only 30 per cent in 1983 (64). Imports and state subsidies of foodstuffs cost the Algerian budget in

1980 \$3 billion, nearly one quarter of export earnings (65).

What did the reform represent for the state and its leading strata? We stated earlier that political objectives and realignments of social classes and strata was at the heart of the reform. The delay in its launch can be explained by particular class interests, in that Boumedienne's regime included within its alliance a fraction of the landed bourgeoisie. The initiation of the reform indicated that such an alliance was no longer viable. The petty bourgeoisie now could not only afford to dispense with this group, but also it was urgently necessary for it to proceed with a development programme which implied the abolition of the non-capitalist landowning class.

However, the limited application of the reform even in own terms reveals the contradictory nature of the petty bourgeoisie and its non hegemonic character in the sense that its class domination was hampered by its structural heterogeneity. Such a heterogeneity meant that even if it aimed at the elimination of the landed bourgeoisie, its common boundaries and the various structural and ideological links with this fraction has limited its ability to implement this objective. The wide range of devices that the big proprietors were allowed to use and the complacency shown by the implementing bodies towards evasion and exemption were signs of these links.

One should not, however, over-emphasize the deficiencies in the application of the reform as deliberate attempt by its enemies to paralyse it and to empty it of its social content; such deficiencies are inherent in the nature and the objectives of the reform and the economic and social context in which it was introduced. The reform did not represent a total break with the existing social structure but a shift of emphasis away from control of land as the basis of power

towards the necessity of industrial development within the framework of state capitalism which follows the logic of profit. It was an expression of the state's attempt not only to expand its social base by incorporating the peasantry but also of extending its sources of accumulation to agriculture. This meant that the agrarian fraction within the state's leading strata whose power was based essentially on the ownership of land had to be dismantled. Agrarian activities had to be in line with the industrial programme in the sense that agricultural units had to follow the logic of profit and, therefore to rely heavily on the inputs produced by industry. By definition this would not imply a radical transformation of the ownership structure but only a reorientation of production and changes in methods of cultivation in a way that would enhance capitalist exploitation. It would also imply that some of the material base of certain landlords would be eroded by the reform.

The resistance which certainly existed did not necessarily reflect opposition to the basic structure of economic power. That some individual interests were affected by the reform did not mean that the latter would act as a brake on capitalist development in agriculture. "In any capitalist society, the role of the state is not necessarily to protect individual capitalists, but to maintain the system as a whole, which may sometimes require the sacrifice of some particular interests" (66). Rather, both resistance to and support for reform was motivated to a large degree by political and ideological factors expressed in different forms and was certainly pushed by those who were most affected by it.

Politically, the reform was "primarily a political and ideological operation, made possible by agriculture's rather modest rôle in nation-

al development plans from a purely economic point of view" (67). It opened the way for the elimination of the landed bourgeoisie from state power. As concrete evidence, high state officials such as Walis (governors), and more importantly, members of the Revolutionary Council, well known as big proprietors, were removed from office once they refused to donate their lands to the FNRA (68). It also provided the leading state strata with the political means to demonstrate its revolutionary credentials. Hence, besides the mobilization of popular support by involving mass organizations and student volunteers in the operations of the reform application primarily under the control of the state administration (69), the state fully exploited the implementation of the reform for revitalizing the party and ridding it of the undesirable elements. Through the implementation of the reform, a temporary parallel administrative structure was developed, designed to outflank the influence of vested interests. The army was given more explicit and increased participation in the reform thus improving its popularity after its repressive role in 1962-67 (70). All these measures had boosted the revolutionary image of the regime and enhanced its political reputation. Thus, despite its weak material results, the reform was one of the most politically important measures undertaken by the Boumedienne regime.

Therefore, judging by its outcome and its repercussions at various levels within the framework of state capitalism, one could conclude that the agrarian reform did not fall short of its most important objectives. In the following section we will examine the effectiveness of the reform on the new rural structure in the light of the agricultural policies that followed it.

## Notes

- (1) In the region of Algiers, for example, three hectares only were nationalized in the second phase, while the number of beneficiaries was estimated at 3,000.
- (2) Raffinot, op. cit., p.338.
- (3) Abdi, op. cit., p.38.
- (4) For more details on this subject, see:  
Benhouria, op. cit., pp.194, 200-201,  
Raffinot, op. cit., p.339.
- (5) Bessaoud, op. cit., p.616.
- (6) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.57.
- (7) Raffinot, op. cit., p.352.
- (8) Andersson, op. cit., p.67.
- (9) Ibid.
- (10) Ollivier, op. cit., p.109.
- (11) In Fact the agrarian reform had indirectly created some forms of employment mainly in the services sector. As of 1977, the Ministry of Agriculture employed 15,580 permanent workers. The services cooperatives also employed seasonal wage labour indirectly in agricultural production (844,970 days of it in 1975-76) on those lands not allotted by the reform but held by FNRA.
- (12) See: Ben Husain, M.L., "Qita' al-Dawla fi al-Jaza'ir wa al-Thawra al-Wataniya al-Dimuqratiya",  
(State Sector in Algeria and the National Democratic Revolution)  
al-Nahj, 13 (1986), pp.116-132.
- (13) Charte de la Revolution Agraire, op. cit.
- (14) Boumedienn, quoted by Benhouria, op. cit., p.177.
- (15) Charte de la Revolution Agraire, op. cit., p.15.
- (16) Zghal, op. cit., p.296. He rightly affirms that this was not because of that poor peasants accept with passivity their life conditions, but because they were denied the proper means of affecting these conditions.
- (17) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.58.



- (18) Knauss, p., "Algeria's Agrarian Revolution: Peasant Control or Control of Peasants?",  
African Studies Review, No.20, Dec.1977, p.58.
- (19) Etienne, B., "La Paysannerie dans le Discourse et la Pratique" in  
Les Problemes Agraires au Maghreb,  
ed. by CRESM, Editions CNRS, Paris, 1977, p.31.
- (20) Lesbest, op. cit., p.55.
- (21) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.60.
- (22) Quoted by Knauss op. cit., p.72.
- (23) Despite that reforms were introduced un the structure of the UNPA after 1973 which required the Union to include the beneficiaries of the reform and to exclude the owners affected by the nationalizations of the reform, and with which the membership of the Union reached 750,000, the UNPA remained submitted to the Party who nominates the candidates for its ledership.
- (24) Tlemceni, op. cit., p.128.
- (25) Raffinot, op. cit., p. 369.
- (26) Quoted by Raffinot, op. cit., p. 369.  
For a fictional portray of the work of the Student Volunteers and their confrontation with the functionaries within the organs of the reform, see the novel by Tahir Wattar, al-Laz, Second Book, Algiers, 1982.
- (27) Quoted by Lazreg, op. cit., p.107.
- (28) See Raffinot, op. cit., pp.369-372.
- (29) Thus it is not surprising that in their campaign against the agrarian reform, the landowners attempted to spread the feeling within the potential beneficiaries that the state is aiming at the generalization of the system of self-management and transforming all the peasants into waged workers in the state farms.
- (30) Article 4 of the Decree 72-156 of 27 July 1972 on the type-status of the CAPCS. Quoted by Burgat, op. cit., p.101.
- (31) Ibid.
- (32) Besides its major functions, the CAPCS organize the work on the part of the land that is not yet distributed to the beneficiaries by employing wage and seasonal workers.
- (33) Sutton, op. cit., p.62.
- (34) Ibid., p.63.

- (35) Bessaoud, op. cit., p.612.
- (36) Knauss, op. cit., p.72.
- (37) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.63.
- (38) Bedrani, op. cit., p.255.
- (39) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.64.
- (40) Andersson, p. cit., p.68.
- (41) Bessaoud, op. cit., pp.612-13.
- (42) Bedrani, op. cit., p.327.
- (43) Bessaoud, op. cit., p.615.  
The regional location of each form reveals that CAPRA was dominant in the zones of high plains (Tiaret, Setif, Constantine), the CAEC were concentrated in the Weasyern regions of the country (Sidi-Bel-Abbas and Tlemcen), the GMV were located in the East of the country (Biskra, Tebessa, Guelma, etc.), and the GEP and GI were formed essentially in the south of the country and al-Asnam.
- (44) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.70.
- (45) Bessaoud, op. cit., p.618.
- (46) Kielstra, op. cit., p.9.
- (47) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.69.
- (48) Knauss, op. cit.
- (49) Bessaoud, op. cit., p.619.
- (50) A sample survey carried out by AARDES in 1975 of 2,370 households of the beneficiaries in 140 communes in norther parts of the country found the following distribution of previous occupations among the beneficiaries:

Job	Per cent
Renters of Land	26.5
Permanent wage workers	26.1
Small Peasants	17.2
Temporary wage workers	15.8
Other Activities	8.2
Unemployed	5.0
Sharecroppers	1.1

Pfeifer commented on this distribution by highlighting the strikingly low percentage of sharecroppers and te unemployed; together they were only 6.1 per cent of all beneficiaries although they were officially the prime object of the reform. The 'other activities' category which means non-agricultural

occupation such as government functionaries, commercial and services workers, was higher at 8 per cent.

- (51) Bessaoud, op. cit., p.617.
- (52) Ibid., pp620-623.
- (53) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.76.
- (54) When surveyed, the cooperative members themselves gave the following list of problems they felt influenced their ability to hold out. Seventy per cent said work conditions were bad (poor pay, too far to travel to work, too few members to do the work, absenteeism, internal misunderstandings, and too little seasonal labour). Sixty-one per cent complained of insufficiency of materials and equipment (either non-existent, delayed, or in ill-repair). Forty-one per cent complained of an insufficiency of inputs such as seeds and fertilizers (Prices too high, delivery delayed, poor quality, inadequate quantity). Thirty-nine per cent said their rented equipment arrived too late to be useful. Thirty-six per cent complained of poor soil or an inhospitable climate. Thirty-four per cent said that bank credits were insufficient or granted too late to be used. Finally, 20 per cent said that they had insufficient technical information.  
Ministere d'Agriculture et de la Revolution Agraire, Enquete sur les Cooperatives de la Revolution Agraire, Campagne 1975-1976, 1978, pp.31-32.
- (55) Tlemcani, op. cit., p.130.
- (56) Bedrani, op. cit., p.335.
- (57) Ibid., p.334.
- (58) Ibid., see also Karsenty, "Les Investissement..." op. cit., pp.135-136
- (59) Bedrani, op. cit., p.335.
- (60) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.73.
- (61) Ibid.
- (62) Bedrani, op. cit., pp338-339.
- (63) See conclusions of Andersson, op. cit., pp.193-204.
- (64) For more details on the performance of Algerian agriculture after the agrarian reform, see Bedrani, pp.357-400.
- (65) "Algeria's self sufficiency in food has fallen from 70 per cent to only 40 per cent and about one-fifth of export earnings have to be spent on purchasing basic foodstuffs from abroad. In fact, the country now has to import about a fifth of its cereals, a third of its milk, and almost all of its butter and sugar, and three quarters of its fats"

- (66) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.46.
- (67) Kielstra, op. cit., p.10.
- (68) "Many FLN-ALN cadres rewarded themselves with land during the armed revolution and the moment of independence. As a case in point, Kaid Ahmed, head of the FLN (1967-72) and member of the Revolutionary Council, owns more than 3,000 ha in Tiaret, which he had not, according to some people, owned prior to independence. His removal from the FLN was associated, according to people close to the pinnacle of power, with his refusal to give part of his property, as other ruling elements did, to the FNRA, the National Fund of the Agrarian Revolution, and his opposition to the agrarian revolution in general."  
Tlemcani, op. cit., p.135.
- (69) In 1976 10,000 of Algeria's university students had participated in the reform operations assigned to them during the summer holiday.
- (70) Roberts, op. cit., pp.13-14.

## **CHAPTER TWELVE : AGRICULTURAL POLICIES SINCE 1971; STATE CAPITALIST AND CAPITALIST PENETRATION**

One of the most important characteristics of the state's agricultural policies after the reform was the emphasis on increasing production and productivity. Within the framework of state coordination of production and its control of credit allocations, marketing, and distribution of the means of production, the state looked at agricultural units in both the state and the private sector as economic and profit-maximizing enterprises which were to be encouraged to increase production and productivity. Through the creation of CAPCS at the local rural level, the state aimed at decentralizing decision making and at reducing power at the national level in favour of giving more autonomy to agricultural enterprises.

### **Investment and Credits**

The financing of investment for agricultural enterprises was provided by two sources: the state and the enterprises themselves. State financing of investment was carried out through two channels: current government expenditures which concerned primarily the building of the agricultural infrastructure and its distribution by the public treasury, and credits distributed by the bank to agricultural enterprises for their equipment and current expenditure.

The state's bias in favouring its agricultural sector which was expanded by the reform remained the most obvious feature of its policy regarding the provision of credits and agricultural investment. This was because the state sector contained the units most likely to increase their productivity and to direct their output towards the mar-

ket. However, within this policy the state sought to encourage agricultural enterprises to make their own investments out of their own projects. This explains why only a minor increase in public investment in agriculture took place after the reform. Thus current expenditure on agriculture by the central government declined from over 4 per cent to less than 3 per cent of total expenditure from 1970 to 1977. Investment expenditures on agriculture by the central government rose to a peak of 17.6 per cent in 1973 (during the reform) and then declined to 6.7 per cent in 1977. While gross fixed investment by the public sector only doubled in the first six years of the land reform (1970-1976), investment in hydrocarbons increased sevenfold and in manufacturing sixfold (1). This was reflected in the small size of the credits allocated to the agricultural sector in general during the seven years between 1970 and 1977. Hence, with a total amount of allocated credit of AD 3,990 million of which AD 2,900 million were actually used, less than AD 50 annually in credits was allocated to each hectare of agricultural land (2). Out of this the private sector received a very small amount, AD 490 million. In fact this sector did not receive any credits during 1974 and 1975 because of the application of the agrarian reform, and between 1974 and 1977, it received only AD 90 million of which only 40 million AD were used. Moreover, while the credits allocated to agricultural enterprises increased only by 22 per cent between the first four year plan (1970-1973) and the second four year plan (1974- 1977), the global volume of investment for the whole economy increased by more than 60 per cent for the same period (3).

The state had, in fact, encouraged agricultural units in the three sectors (self-managed, agrarian reform, and private) to finance their investments either with their accumulated capital or by borrowing from

the national bank. Hence as well as the equipment and the materials owned by CAPCS to be hired to the units, the state increased the supply of agricultural machinery and inputs produced by the internal industrial sector. Agricultural units in the state or private sector could apply directly to the BNA at the Wilaya level for credit to purchase their own equipment, independent of CAPCS, if they chose. After the agricultural year 1974-1975, the national bank adopted a new method of financing the state sector by negotiating directly with the representatives of the agricultural enterprise the amount and the terms of settling the credit (4). The rate of interest on the credits was, in fact, very low. Given an annual rate of inflation of 13.9 per cent in the 1970s, real rates of interest were negative for loans and, in effect, constituted subsidies to agricultural producers (5).

The granting of credits still favoured those units that were able to show that they were more productive and that such credits would increase their revenues. The criteria for granting the credits for purchasing equipment were whether the equipment already in place was being used efficiently (that is, profitably), the level of outstanding debt (if old debts were not repaid, new credits were not forthcoming), and the maximum profitability which could be expected from the unit in the future. This implies that credits were used as an inducement for the units to market their produce in order to be able to compensate for their investment and to repay the granting agencies.

While short-term credits were directed essentially to small agricultural units which were in desperate need of cash to manage their operations until the next harvest, long-term credits went mainly to the larger, capital intensive units which could afford to be accumulating capital and expanding production. In general, the amount and terms of

credits represented the means of maximizing the incomes of the mechanized and profit-seeking agricultural enterprises in the three sectors and provided the ground for the integration of agriculture into the economy. Thus while the agrarian reform maintained private property in land, state investment policy also encouraged it and enhanced economic differentiation in agriculture.

### **Pricing and Marketing Policies**

We saw earlier that before the agrarian reform state pricing policy was aiming at favouring industrial accumulation by deliberately keeping down agricultural prices. We also saw that the prices of agricultural inputs and materials were rising considerably. This has resulted in unfavourable terms of exchange between agriculture and other sectors of the economy and contributed, besides other factors, to the disinvestment process which began after the last years of colonialism.

The prices of agricultural products were kept low mainly because of the state's almost total control over the institutions and agencies of product marketing which decided the level of the prices. They were in fact fixed by decree for the majority of products and especially of those of the state sector. Thus, despite the increasing demand for agricultural products and particularly for foodstuffs, state marketing agencies paid low prices for the basic products to the agricultural units (6). In many cases the prices of some agricultural products paid to the producers did not even cover the actual costs of production (7).

Following the state's emphasis on increasing production and productivity of agriculture after the agrarian reform a major switch in the state's pricing policy took place after 1974. In order to increase



the income of the farming units as an inducement for production increases and for the use of advanced methods of cultivation, thus providing cash crops for the market, the state allowed the prices of agricultural products to increase rapidly and considerably. Thus prices for raw agricultural outputs rose dramatically after 1974. Overall they rose by about 90 per cent from 1973 to 1976 (8). However, this increase was only possible because of the dramatic increase and diversification of demand for these products which had exceeded the supply. This in its turn was due to the fast urbanization process and to increases in the level of income of the population. Rising production costs and the continuous existence of the private "Parallel market" contributed further to the increase.

Increases in prices, however, did not occur in a uniform fashion for all agricultural products. Market crops, which were more likely to escape the control of state marketing agencies and were usually produced by rich farmers, had their prices increased in a more rapid way than other crops, implying that price increase had benefitted the rich farmers more than the state or the small producers. Moreover, with a rapid increase in the cost of production, the rise in the price of agricultural products meant that only those units which were able to cover the the rising costs of production and inputs through raising their marketable output could benefit. They were mainly those efficient and market oriented units which were somehow capable of acquiring the necessary capital to finance the use of inputs and materials. On the other hand, smaller units which were directed for subsistence and produced small quantities for the market were to face difficulties in meeting the costs of production and to make full use of the rising prices of the output. This was, in fact, in line with the state's new

policy of increasing the commercialization of agriculture and favouring efficient and market-oriented enterprises.

The state's control over agricultural prices was, as we stated above, made possible by the functions of the state's marketing institutions and their deliberate policy of purchasing and distributing agricultural outputs at low prices in favour of the urban sector. The existence of these agencies restricted the activities of private merchants and intermediaries. However, it has not abolished these activities altogether. Rather, private networks of marketing are legal and remain active, taking full advantage of the deficiencies and difficulties that faced the work of the state agencies and have full control over crops whose production was too complicated to be controlled by the latter. They used to pay higher prices to producers, making marketing through their networks easier and more profitable. They also charged the consumers higher prices than the state distribution taking advantage of the limited supply and the rapidly increasing demand. Their favourable terms of exchange with the producers expressed mainly by higher prices attracted larger numbers of units within the state agricultural sector to sell their products to these networks secretly and illegally, while the producers in the private sector were allowed to market their products freely through private channels. This has expanded their sphere of activity and made their existence complementary to and interdependent with that of the state marketing sector.

Moreover, private merchants and intermediaries, who were often rich farmers themselves, did not restrict their activities to the marketing of the agricultural products, but were also engaged in various activities such as acting as creditors to small private producers and small retailers and as lessors of agricultural machinery. In

1974 private commerce controlled 65 per cent of fruit and vegetable distribution and almost all meat and fish distribution. In 1973 less than half of all cereals produced were sold through the OAIC (Office Algerien Interprofessionel des Cereales) channels.

With the launch of the agrarian reform and the creation of CAPCS, the state aimed at decentralizing and organizing the process of output marketing more efficiently. Thus, instead of limiting state control over this sphere and expanding the already flourishing private marketing networks, the state tried to modernize and expand its marketing agencies even more. Hence new regulations were issued extending the public circuits of marketing at the expense of private commercial capital and governing the marketing of specific agricultural crops. The marketing and the distribution of the fruits and vegetables, for example, were to be carried out by CAPCS, COFEL (Cooperative des Fruits et Legumes de la Wilaya), and OFLA (Office des Fruits et Legumes d'Algerie) (9).

However, this did not abolish the private circuits of marketing, and in fact they remained quite important. Private merchants were even allowed to export (10). Private food processing factories could buy their inputs either directly from the producers or from the state marketing agencies, benefitting to a large extent from the state's pricing policies. Their activities in this sphere demonstrated the interweaving of the private and public economic structures (11).

Moreover, the structural inefficiencies of the state's marketing institutions were not overcome by the new regulations. Irregular supply and delays remained commonplace. From the producers' point of view, they were the source of production loss and financial disruption (12). They still had no power over the marketing institutions which decided

the time and amount of the harvest according to their own interests. From the consumers point of view, the state marketing agencies always failed to satisfy their needs by providing regular and diversified supply of all the necessary agricultural goods. Fluctuations in supply and food shortages were very frequent especially in regard to the market crops. State marketing circuits failed to reach the retailers and the direct consumers who often turned to the private circuits which charge higher prices. Since 1974, the CAPCS and the COFEL established centres for direct sale to the consumers in the large cities. These centres, however, remained very few and were often far from the popular quarters where those in most need of goods at low prices actually live (13). Determining the actual amount of imported agricultural goods, and particularly of cereals, by the state agencies was subject to wide fluctuations due to a lack of accurate knowledge of the amount of nationally produced crops and in the supply of the world market. This has resulted in frequently irregular supply of the most necessary crops.

These difficulties had contributed to a large extent in attributing an increasing importance to private marketing networks and boosting their activities. It was often the case that due to the above difficulties the producers in the state sector turned to the private sector to sell their products (14). They exhibited a high degree of efficiency and had a better terms of exchange with both producers and the consumers. They paid higher prices to the former and provided the latter with regular supplies of good quality. Those merchants who owned an agricultural exploitation were in an ideal situation since the producers in the private sector were allowed to market their products freely without passing through CAPCS networks. This has led to the

submission of the small owners to the dictation of private commercial capital, ready to exploit the difficulties encountered and created by the state agencies.

### **Liberalization : a Solution for Capitalist Organization**

The inefficiencies in marketing and the frequent shortages in the supply of basic agricultural goods together with the general stagnation of agricultural production have been a source of great popular frustration. All fingers were pointing to the structural weaknesses of the state marketing agencies and their rigid and bureaucratic handling of their functions. In fact the problem of agricultural performance as a whole was linked mainly with the organization of marketing. This implied that any solution to the current problems in this sphere could only be found by reducing the power and influence of the state institutions established to service the agricultural sector.

By 1980 the first measures of liberalization which were initiated after the death of Boumedienne were reflected as it was generally anticipated in reducing the sphere of intervention of the state's marketing agencies. Agricultural exploitations whether in the private or in the state sector were allowed to sell part of their crops on the free market without going through the state agencies (15). Private wholesalers and middlemen were allowed to have full legal rights, for the first time since independence, to market all agricultural products. This meant that CAPCS, which were created, as we saw, in the course of the reform, lost their monopoly of the sales of the production of the cooperatives and the state farms.

However, these measures were not isolated ones. They were in fact part of a whole policy which was materializing by the end of the

Boumedienne regime, involving the mobilization of private initiatives in almost all sectors of the economy (16). In 1980 a serious and a wide ranging debate within the FLN took place concentrating on the organization and nature of Algeria's future development. The most important issue was whether to systematize the scattered and uncoordinated measure of liberalization and the elevation of the status of the private sector in the economy, or to proceed with tight state control and central planning. It soon became clear that the first option would be adopted.

Liberalization in the form of reducing the influence of the central planning and of allowing a more scope to market forces were the most important characteristics of the development programme of 1980-1984. In 1980 the FLN's Central Committee adopted a resolution which urged the state to assist the private sector in all domains, technical, human, legislative and financial (17). On 13 March 1982, a new investment code which incorporated the Central Committee's above resolution was enacted. The code provides a legal framework "to stimulate, guide and control" the "non-exploitative private sector". In particular, private investment in housing, construction materials, hotels, restaurants, and light industry was to be encouraged. In April another law provided tax exemptions for joint venture companies with minority foreign partners (18). State corporations in heavy and light industry and in public works witnessed in the same year a far-reaching reorganization involving their being split up into smaller units with their management decentralized away from Algiers. Emphasis in efficiency and profitability was the driving force behind such reorganization. This implied that the economic criteria were to be more effective.

These measures were taken amidst a fierce campaign against

corruption and bureaucratic rigidity, as these phenomena were directly linked to the state's tight control (19). In other words the liberalization measures and the relaxation of the restrictions on private capital in the economy were viewed primarily as a response to the urgent need for efficiency and to curtail the problem of the bureaucratic red tape. They were to be legitimized by with the new regime that followed Boumedienne by crackdowns on corruption and embezzlement which became the most obvious features of the state's intervention in the economy. In the context of state capitalist development this reflected the realization that state intervention had come to constitute a hindrance, not only to the smooth running of the economy and to the efficient provision of goods and services to the people, but also, and more importantly, to the socio-economic development of private capital which was accumulated by various means within the framework and, indeed, protection and encouragement of the same intervention. Corruption and bureaucratic practices were issues which the private capital attempted to expose in order to justify its claim for more room and freedom in which to operate.

In the agricultural sector this policy was reflected in a number of ways . The self-management system was the object of severe criticisms by the Central Committee of the FLN after its third session in 1980. The latter did not hesitate to question the efficiency of the self-management which "remains to show that it is a worthwhile and operatable form in the sphere of economic management" (20). The organization of production and the cooperative forms which were introduced by the reform were also a subject of great deal of criticism on the part of the FLN. Thus, one of the latter's resolutions demanded from the government and legislative organs "to attempt to introduce the forms

of management which are most suitable for the concrete realities" (21).

Growing emphasis was placed on the need to relax the state's control over agricultural activities in all the three sectors and to open more room for the private sector to take into its hands the activities that were controlled by the state institutions. A further attempt at agrarian reform, which was already scaled down, was abandoned. Hence, "It was not an act of God that made the "Agrarian Revolution" disappear from the name of the Ministry of Agriculture which, under Chadli Bendjedid, became the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries" (22). Distribution of land ceased to be the prime concern of the state and emphasis was placed more on the efficient organization of land to obtain higher productivity.

One of the criticism of the previous agricultural policies which started to appear in the official press and evaluations was their neglect of the private sector. The National Preparatory Commissions's report of the Fifth FLN congress, issued in September 1983, explicitly attributed most of the agricultural problems to the previous policies that neglected the private agricultural sector and put clear emphasis clearly on the need for further encouragement of this sector as a remedy for problems of low productivity and production (23). Before that the Central Committee of the FLN adopted a resolution on the private agricultural sector in December 1981 which gave producers and entrepreneurs in this sector total legitimacy and encouraged the government to provide every possible help for them (24). Hence the aim of increasing agricultural production was gradually linked with encouraging the private sector and facilitating its functions. The previous random measures of liberalization and reducing the interventions of the ~~state national offices and marketing boards in favour of the private~~



sector's freedom were transformed into a consistent policy of explicit encouragement for the private sector. The process of restructuring public enterprises and decentralizing their decision making which had started at the beginning of the 1980's, was reflected in curtailing their influence and monopolies over vital activities such as marketing, supply of materials, and even export and import. This meant that private farmers started increasingly to assume, under conditions of support for profitable and commercialized units, a larger role in determining the conditions of production and to see the scope of their activities expanding rapidly.

A new bank for agricultural and rural development was entrusted with the job of constraining the credit system to respond solely to profit criteria and to apply those criteria uniformly to all farms in all the agricultural three sectors. The amount of credit accorded to the private producers had risen substantially since 1979. With the fast growing urban demand for agricultural products together with the relaxation of state control over prices, capitalist forms of production in activities where the capital turn-over is the fastest experienced rapid expansion. Hence, full free rein has been given to producers of poultry, eggs, meat, dairy products, fruit and vegetables, in order to curb imports and promote exports through market mechanisms (25). This was reflected in noticeable increases in the production of these products which are in fact more consumed by the privileged groups in society (26). State control over agricultural exports and imports was also relaxed for the benefit of both the private merchants and the urban higher income groups who became able to find what they needed in the market even at inflated prices. Following the advice of the World Bank, it was believed that the influx of competition from foreign

products would stimulate Algerian producers to improve their products and processes of production (27).

The state agricultural sector was equally affected by the new policies of liberalization and the emphasis on raising production and productivity. Self-managed units were seen as too large to permit the efficient utilization of resources. Hence new organizations were introduced enabled these units to be broken down into a larger number of much smaller units. Competition among these units was allowed to take place through policies which favoured the most productive and efficient units. This even involved the sale of marginalized and underused public land to private owners. Private distribution of land that were occupied by the dissolved CAPRAs became frequent (28). 450,000 hectares of land nationalized during the agrarian reform has been redistributed to individuals as private property (29). Relaxation on the ceilings of land ownership became apparent when the operation of land reform were ended, so that private owners could buy and sale lands freely. Briefly, with these measures market forces became the dominant factors in organizing Algerian agriculture; a phenomenon which manifests clearly that the sequence of state capitalism has ended up in a full incorporation of Algerian agriculture into the capitalist market and its laws of operation. Such incorporation had become constrained by state intervention in a wide range of activities. Thus in order to release the forces of production, state control had to be limited, which was the essence of the liberalization policies.

## Notes

- (1) Pfeifer, op. cit., pp.223-224.
- (2) Nadir, M.T., L'Agriculture dans la Planification en Algerie de 1967-1977, OPU, Algiers, 1982, pp.454-455.
- (3) Ibid., p.456.
- (4) Bedrani, op. cit., p.213. Before that year the director of the agricultural office at the level of wilaya, negotiates with the bank the amount of credits allocated to each unit without the presence of the unit's representatives.
- (5) As of June 1977, these annual money rates of interests were applied to agriculture:
- |   |      |
|---|------|
| Short-term (less than one year)         | 4.0% |
| Medium-term (1-5 years, 2 years grace)  | 3.5% |
| Long-term (5-10 years, 2 years grace)   | 3.0% |
| Long-term (11-20 years, 2 years grace)  | 2.5% |
| Long-term (to reform cooperatives only) | 2.0% |
- Pfeifer, op. cit., p.224.
- (6) To cite one example, in 1969 the prices proposed by the private merchants in the Haut Cheliff varied between AD 4.5 to AD 5.5 for the kilogram of live sheep, while the ONAD (the state marketing agency for meat) used to pay AD 4.80 for the same amount. The prices of fruits and vegetables paid by the OFLA were 40-50 per cent lower than that paid by private merchants to the producers. Bedrani, op. cit., p.142.
- (7) See Ibid., pp.140-141.
- (8) These increase, however, were not passed on directly by the marketers as increased retail prices for food, which rose only 30 to 40 per cent in the same years, because they would have forced urban industrial wages up sooner or later as well. Rather, the central government covered most of the differences out of its current budgets in the form of subsidies from general revenues to the processor agencies, OIAC (for cereals), ONAPO (for sugar and vegetable oils), and SN-SEMPAC (for flour milling).
- (9) The CAPCS receives the output at the level of the commune from the producers in the three sectors, it then distributes it on retailers of the commune and sells the surplus to the COFEL. CAPCS also distributes on the retailers the products which are not produced in the commune that it purchases from the COFEL. The latter receives the surplus of the CAPCSs at the level of the wilaya and distributes them on the CAPCSs which lacks such products, and then sells the surplus to the OFLA after purchasing from the latter the products which are not produced at the level of the wilaya. The OFLA, after receiving the surplus from each

wilaya and distributes them on the wilaya which are in need, exports the surplus to the international market and imports instead products that are not produced in ALgeria. Bedrani, op. cit., pp.41-342.

(10) Ibid.

(11) Pfeifer cites the example of cereals processing and distribution as the most revealing one for this interdependence:

"The assigned role of the OAIC (Office Algerien Inter-professionnel des Cereales) was to collect domestic grain and to import foreign-produced grain as needed, which it transferred to processors to be made into flour, pasta, and couscous. The OAIC was charged with the rationalization of the relationship between agricultural producers and industries processing agricultural outputs, assuring the first of a buyer and the second of a supplier. The major processor to which OAIC sold was SN-SEMPAC, the national miller. There remained, besides, private millers who sold their grain products either back to OAIC or on private market. State pricing policy benefited the private processors as part of its rationalization programme after 1974. OAIC's policy was to charge the processors prices less than its costs, in effect subsidizing the costs of transport and storage, and taking a loss which it recouped out of general state revenues".

Pfeifer, op. cit., pp.231-232.

(12) A famous scandal of potatoes in Mascara at the end of 1977 broke out and revealed the loss of 7.8 per cent of the production due to the problem that it was not taken in time by the marketing agencies and to that they were not stored properly.

(13) Bedrani. op. cit., p.345.

(14) In 1978, for example, the Wali of Annaba authorized the agricultural producers in the state sector to sell their output directly to private merchants, because the state commercial sector could not do this task efficiently. A year before that, the OFLA received from the Ministry of Agriculture the authorization to sell fruit in a mutual agreement with the private groceries. Bedrani, op. cit., p.346.

(15) Elsenhans, H., "Contradictions in the Algerian Development Process: the Reform of the Public sector and the New Approach to the Private Sector in Industry", The Maghreb Review, Vol.7, No.3-4, May-August 1982, p.66.

(16) Ibid., pp.66-70.

(17) Tlemcani, op. cit., p.133.

(18) "Algeria's Economic Liberalization" Africa Contemporary Record, 1982, p.B16.  
~~Algeria's Economic Liberalization~~

- (19) This campaign was expressed in a wave of trials dealing with corruption, racketeering, mismanagement and embezzlement. It involved 400 managers in state organizations being put on trial. It reached a critical point when many high officials, notably Abdelaziz Boutaflika, Foreign Minister from 1963-79, and members of the Council of the Revolution, and others, were prosecuted for 'embezzlement'.  
Ibid., see also Tlemcani, op. cit., p.159.
- (20) Burgat, F., "L'Etat et l'Agriculture en Algerie: Vers de Nouveaux Equilibres"  
The Maghreb Review, Vol.8, No.3-4, 1983, p.86.
- (21) Ibid., p.87.
- (22) Tlemcani, op. cit., p.132.
- (23) "Development and Planning: Evaluations of Development Plans", Report of the National Preparatory Commission to the fifth Congress of the FLN, 19 September, 1983.(in Arabic), pp.90-96.
- (24) Burgat, "L'Etat et l'Agriculture....", op. cit., p.88.
- (25) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.233.
- (26) Bedrani, op. cit., pp.358-359.
- (27) Pfeifer, op. cit., pp.233-234.
- (28) Burgat, "L'Etat et l'Agriculture....", op. cit., p.87.
- (29) Pfeifer, op. cit., p.234.

## CHAPTER THIRTEEN : CONCLUSION

Between 1962 and 1982, the social, political, and economic structure of Algeria underwent a series of profound transformations. The extent and nature of this process was rooted in the impact of 130 years of French colonialism, and particularly in the nature of the social forces which arose during the colonial period. It became clear at the end of the two decades which followed independence that Algeria had lost much of its apparently 'socialist' momentum and that political rhetoric, even when accompanied by major economic and infrastructural achievements, is not equivalent to the creation of a classless society.

Although three different regimes came to power between 1962 and 1979, they all adopted policies which formed a natural continuation from those of their predecessors. In reality the regimes were the natural consequence of the socio-economic structures created in the course of the decolonization process under the leadership of the 'petty bourgeois' social strata. In other words Algeria's development and its shifts in political and economic emphasis can be seen more as inherent in the broad nature of state capitalism, itself a product of the rule of the petty bourgeoisie, than as the result of particular political changes, either in 1965 or in 1979.

This is a feature which Algeria shares with other state capitalist societies in the Third World. However, what distinguishes its experience from that of most of its counterparts is the nature and composition of its ruling socio-political forces. First, the indigenous petty bourgeois strata came into existence during a period of deep economic and political crisis and in consequence came to adopt a genuinely anti-

colonial stand. They entered into direct armed confrontation with the colonial power in order to obtain independence, and became the leaders of the national liberation movement. Their origins and the circumstances under which they rose to political power largely determined the nature of subsequent changes.

Secondly, the way in which independence was achieved and the events that surrounded it ensured that the petty bourgeoisie, which was then in control of the most autonomous apparatus in society (the state administration), came under direct popular pressure to bring about greater equality and a fairer distribution of resources. These two factors played a major role in radicalizing Algerian state capitalism and in expanding its egalitarian dimension. Hence the claim that 'socialist' policies were being pursued was valid to the extent that it was impossible to implement policies which flagrantly favoured certain social classes or strata at the expense of others. Thus in addition to their function in building up the national economy, state capitalist policies which expanded the role of the state economic sector and nationalized foreign-owned enterprises could be adduced as evidence that Algeria was constructing socialism.

However, because of the nature of the social strata and their limitations, more concrete social developments were taking place. These can be summarised as the development within the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie, who were now in control of the state apparatus, of certain interests which were in direct confrontation with the construction of 'socialism'. Their position in the administration, together with the continuation of capitalist relations of production, enabled them to manipulate the state's role in the economy in order to enhance their own positions and to develop beneficial links with private capital. The

administration managed to frustrate the working class initiatives which had been expressed in the self-management movement and its policies gradually came to be considered as seriously 'deficient' from a socialist point of view. However all this took place in an atmosphere in which the ruling strata were desperately in need of revolutionary legitimacy, which explains why the frustration and 'deficiencies' could not develop to a point at which widely accepted popular goals came under open attack.

'Promise fulfilled and promise breached' became a commonplace description of the state's social and economic policies. Therefore, although Algeria was able to erect a modern national economy under state capitalism whose infrastructural facilities were developed far beyond the levels attained under colonialism, its social structure remained highly stratified and permitted the development of interests which favoured the development of 'conventional' capitalism.

As well as being economically vital, control of the Algerian agricultural sector was socially and politically important for the rule of the petty bourgeoisie. After having managed to empty the agricultural self-management system of its ideological content, and having submitted it to effective state management, the state's ability to proceed with its development programme now appeared to be threatened by the situation in the private sector, the only part of agriculture which had so far escaped state control.

By the end of the 1960's it was clear that the dislocations in agriculture were acting as major constraints on economic growth. This unsatisfactory situation was accompanied by constant tensions in the countryside, and the continuing uncertainty seems to have been instrumental in prompting the ruling strata to take measures which affected



the social forces connected with large landownership, in other words to inaugurate an agrarian reform. However, the reform failed to bring about a major restructuring of social relations in the countryside, since most of those likely to be affected were able to take steps to avoid the nationalization and limitation of their properties.

The reform had only very limited success in changing the structure of rural employment. Its main effect was to incorporate a major part of the agricultural private sector into capitalist production by eliminating pre-capitalist forms of production, such as sharecropping and absentee landlordism, and putting it under the control of the state economic sector through the establishment of production cooperatives. As an expression of the economic, social and political objectives of the ruling strata, the deficiencies in the implementation of the reform clearly revealed the linkages between the leadership and the landowning classes, which explains the very limited amount of land affected by the reform.

Thus while the reform abolished most pre-capitalist forms of production in the private agricultural sector, it did not eradicate capitalist inequality and exploitation. Instead it even enhanced such exploitation, since wage labour was expanded rather than abolished. Furthermore, those workers who 'benefitted' from the reform and were incorporated into the cooperative system were treated mainly as wage labourers in profit-maximizing units.

To put it in a wider perspective, the reform represented another way of expanding state control within the framework of state capitalism. Various economic and political factors made the initiation of such measures an urgent necessity. As the reform preserved, and indeed enhanced, capitalist relations in agriculture while securing the

state's control at the same time, new contradictions emerged. Hence while opportunities for accumulation expanded rapidly for capitalist farmers, their activities became increasingly limited by the state's intervention in the provision of inputs and credit and in the marketing of outputs. The outcome was a major process of disinvestment especially in basic food production and a noticeable shift towards activities that escaped the state's control, including non-agricultural ones.

Moreover, the extent and nature of state control also came to pose problems for the satisfaction of urban demand for agricultural and consumer goods. Urban private capital which was accumulated through various means, including the use of official positions in the administration, increasingly came to feel that such thorough-going domination of the economy by state enterprises acted as a crucial limitation for the expansion of its activities. In particular, potentially profitable investment opportunities were limited by the development strategy's emphasis on heavy industry.

By the end of the 1970's state capitalism had produced more contradictions than could be solved in its own terms. Different social classes and strata became disenchanted with the new developments for different reasons. State control itself led to the development of socio-economic forces within the state whose interests gradually became threatened by it. In fact state capitalism came under fire both from the right for its inefficiency and bottlenecks and from the left for its inequality.

The death of Boumedienne came at a time when a major change in Algeria's development strategy had to be made. By then it was clear that the advocates of an openly capitalist approach were the most influential in determining the future course of events. Hence liberali-

zation was gradually transformed from a series of random measures designed to overcome particular inefficiencies and difficulties created by state enterprises into a consistent policy of opening wider opportunities for private capital. It was therefore not the death of Boumedienne as such that initiated Algeria's change of direction, but the conditions for this new development were certainly inherited from his era. Nevertheless his death accelerated the process of change since it set in motion a political reshuffle whose general effect was to assign a more important role to the advocates of open capitalism.

The changes that were introduced in agriculture by the new regime in the general direction of assigning a more important role to capitalist farming came to conform with the new approach which Algerian development has since assumed. In general, the later development of Algeria has been very similar to that of the experience of other state capitalist regimes where, despite the achievements and the rhetoric surrounding them, state capitalism has served as a transitional phase for the nurturing and establishment of a 'conventional' capitalist mode of production.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Publications of the Algerian Government

Documents Algerien, (Synthese de l'Activite Algerienne),  
30 October 1945 - 31 december 1946.

Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire (RADP),  
Direction des statistiques, Annuaire Statistique de l'Algerie,  
1966-67, 1970, 1980, 1982.

\_\_\_\_\_, L'Algerie en Quelques Chiffres, 1973, 1979.

Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire (RADP),  
Ministere d'Agriculture et de la Revolution Agraire (MARA)  
Structure des Exploitations Agricoles Autogerees,  
Statistique Agricole, No.2, 1967.

\_\_\_\_\_, Enquete sur les Cooperatives de la Revolution Agraire  
Campagne 1975-76, 1978.

\_\_\_\_\_, Statistique Agricole, No.12, December, 1971.

\_\_\_\_\_, Enquete sur le Secteur Socialiste Agricole: Resultats de  
la Campagne 1969-1970,  
Statistique Agricole, No.12, December 1971.

\_\_\_\_\_, Direction des Etudes et de la Planification,  
Resultat de l'Analyse de l'Enquete Main-d'Oeuvre dans le  
Secteur Prive, Document Provisoire, 1968.

\_\_\_\_\_, Direction de la Reforme Agraire,  
Secteur Socialiste Agricole, (not dated).

\_\_\_\_\_, Direction de la Reforme Agraire,  
Recueil de Textes Relatifs a l'Autogestion dans l'Agriculture,  
1977.

Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire (RADP)  
Office National de Statistique,  
L'Evolution de l'Agriculture, (Series Statistique),  
No.2-1, 1984.

Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire,  
Presidence du Conseil, Revolution Agraire.

Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire,  
Front de Liberation Nationale,  
Development and Planning: Evolution of Development Plans,  
Report of the National Preparatory Commission to the Fifth  
Congress of the FLN, 19 September 1983.

## Periodicals and Reports

- al-Ahram, 8-10 October, 1965.
- African Contemporary Record, Algeria's Economic Liberalization, 1982, pp.B16-B17.
- Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, Chronique Economique, 1963, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Programme du Front de Liberation Nationale Adopte a Tripoli Par le CNRA en Juin 1962, 1962, pp.683-704.
- Economist Intelligence Unit, Algeria, Annual Supplement, 1983.
- International Labour Review,  
Algeria: Workers' Management in Agriculture,  
Current Information, 100,(1969), pp.595-598.
- The Middle East, No.131, September 1985.
- Middle East Economic Digest, 9 March 1973, 23 May 1975.
- Middle East Executive Report, July 1983.
- United Nations, Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook, 1974.

## Books and Articles

- Abdi, N., "Reforme Agraire en Algerie",  
Maghreb-Machrek, 69, (1975), pp.33-41.
- Abun-Nasr, J., A History of the Maghreb,  
Cambridge University Press, 1971.
- Ageron, C.R., "Les Classes Moyennes dans l'Algerie Colonial: Origine, Formation et Evolution Quantitative", (in)  
Le Classes Moyennes au Maghreb, ed. by CNRS, Paris, 1982,  
pp.52-75.
- Ahmed, E., "Post-Colonial Systems of Power",  
Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.2, No. 4, Fall 1980, pp350-363.
- Ahmed, N., al-'Ilalat bain al-Jaza'ir wa Faransa,  
(The relations Between Algeria and France), Cairo, 1978.
- Ake, C., A Political Economy of Africa,  
Longman, Essex, 1981.

- Alavi, H., "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh", New Left Review, No.74, July-August 1972, pp.59-81.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "State and Class Under Peripheral Capitalism", (in) Introduction to the Sociology of 'Developing Societies', ed. by Hamza Alavi and Teodor Shanin, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1982, pp.289-307.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Structure of Peripheral Capitalism", (in) Hamza Alavi and Teodor Shanin ed., pp.172-192.
- al-Ali, S.Y., "Mawdhu'at Hawla Mafhum al-Burjwaziyya al-Birukratiyya", (Essays on the Concept of the Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie) al-Nahj, (Marxist-Leninist Notebooks of the Arab World), No.7, February 1985, pp.126-170.
- Alleg, H., "The Revolutionary Character of the Algiers Charter", Political Affairs, Vol.44, No.8, August, 1965, pp.13-25.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Algeria Seven Years After: Socialism or Capitalism?", Marxism Today, Vol.14, No.3, March, 1970, pp.76-89.
- Allen, C., and Williams G., (ed.) Sociology of 'Developing Societies': Sub-Saharan Africa, Macmillan, London, 1982.
- 'Amil, M., Muqaddamat Nadhariyya le-Dirasat Athar al-Fikr al-Ishtiraki fi Harakat al-Taharrur al-Watani, (Theoretical Introductions to the Study of the Impact of Socialist Thought on the National Liberation Movement), Beirut, 1980.
- Amin, S., Unequal Development, The Harvester, Press, Sussex, 1976.
- \_\_\_\_\_, The Maghreb in the Modern World, Penguin Books, London, 1970.
- Andersson, C., Peasant or Proletarian? Wage Labour and Peasant Economy During Industrialization: The Algerian Experience, Almqvist and Wiksell International, Sweden, 1985.
- Andreyev, I.C., The Non-Capitalist Way: Soviet Experience and the Liberated Countries, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977.
- Bahloul, H., al-Qita' al-Taqlidi wal-Tanaqudhat al-Haikaliyya fi al Zira'a b-il-Jaza'r, (The Traditional Sector and the Structural Contradictions in the Algerian Agriculture), Algiers, 1976.
- Balta, P. and Rellaoux, C., Istratiqiyyat Boumedienne, (Boumedienne's Strategy), Beirut, 1979.

- Baran, P., The Political Economy of Growth,  
Monthly Review Press, New York, 1968.
- , "On the Political Economy of Backwardness" (in)  
Imperialism and Underdevelopment, ed. by Robert J. Rhodes,  
Monthly Review Press, New York, 1970, pp.285-301.
- Beckman, B., "Imperialism and the 'National Bourgeoisie'",  
Review of African Political Economy,  
No.22, October-December 1981, pp.5-19.
- Bedrani, S., L'Agriculture Algerienne Depuis 1966: Etatisation ou  
Privatisation, OPU, Algiers, 1982.
- Behr, E., "The Algerian Dilemma",  
International Affairs, Vol.34, No.3, July 1958, pp.280-290.
- Benabdelkrim, A., "Agrarian Revolution in Algeria",  
World Marxist Review, 19 October 1976, pp.118-126.
- Benachnou, A., Formation de Sous-Developpement en Algerie,  
OPU, Algiers, 1978.
- , L'Exode Rural en Algerie,  
OPU, Algiers, 1979.
- Benhouria, T., L'Economie de l'Algerie,  
Francois Maspero, Paris, 1980.
- Ben Husain, M.L., "Mu'alaja Manhajiyya le Mafhum al-Burjwaziyya al-  
Saghira"  
al-Nahj, No.6, 1984, pp.200-217.
- , "Qita' al-Dawla fi al-Jaza'ir wal-Thawra al-Wataniyya  
al-Democratiyya",  
al-Nahj, No.13, 1986, pp.116-132.
- Benissad, M.E., Economie de Developpement de l'Algerie,  
OPU, Algiers, 1979.
- Bennoune, M., Impact of Colonialism and Migration on an Algerian  
Peasant Community: A Study in Socio-Economic Change,  
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Michigan, 1976.
- , "Algerian Peasants and National Politics",  
MERIP Reports, No.48, 1976, pp.3-24.
- , "The Origin of the Algerian Proletariat",  
Dialectical Anthropology, Vol.1, No.3, May 1976, pp.201-224.
- , "The Introduction of Nationalism into Rural Algeria: 1919-  
1954", The Maghreb Review, Vol.2, No.3, 1977, pp.1-12.
- Benton, A., "The Economics of Nationalism",

- Bernstein, H., "Notes on Capital and Peasantry" (in)  
Rural Development: Theories of Peasant Economy and Agrarian Change, ed. by John Harris,  
Hutchinson University Library, London, 1982, pp.160-177.
- Berque, J., "The Rural System of the Maghreb" (in)  
State and Society in Independent North Africa,  
ed. by Leon Carl Brown, Middle East Institute, Washington DC,  
1966, pp.192-211.
- Bessaoud, O., "La Revolution Agraire en Algerie: Continuite et Rupture  
dans les Processus de Transformations Agraire",  
Revue de Tiers Monde, Vol.12, July-Sep. 1980, pp.605-626.
- Bettelheim, C., The Transition to Socialist Economy,  
The Harvester Press Ltd., Essex, 1978.
- Bouchenak-Khelladi, M.S., Problemes Poses par la Politique Agricole  
dans l'Economie Algerienne,  
Memoire en Vue de l'Obtenation d'un D.E.S. en Sciences  
Economique, Universite des Sciences Sociales de Grenoble,  
1972-1973.
- Boumedienne, H., "The Third Anniversary of Algerian Independence", (in)  
Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib,  
ed. by William Zartman, Pall Mall Press, London, 1973,  
pp.127-130.
- Bourdieu, P., The Algerians,  
Beacon Press, Boston, 1962.
- Brown L.C., (ed.) State and Society in Independent North Africa,  
Middle East Institute, Washington DC, 1966.
- Burgat, F., "Mille 'Villages Socialistes' pour une 'Revolution  
Agraire': Order Juridique, Enjeux Politique, Impact Socio-  
Economique" (in)  
Les Villages Socialistes de la Revolution Agraire Algerienne,  
ed. by Francois Burgat and Michel Nancy, CNRS, Paris, 1984,  
pp.67-232.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "L'Etat et l'Agriculture en Algerie: Vers de Nouveaux  
Equilibres", The Maghreb Review,  
Vol.8 No.3-4, 1983, pp.85-90.
- Carnoy, M., The State and Political Thought,  
Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Chaliand, G. and Mincas, J., L'Algerie Independante,  
Maspero, Paris, 1972.
- Chirkin, V.Y. and Yudin, Y.A.,  
A Socialist-Oriented State: Instrument of Revolutionary Change,  
Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978.



- Cigar, N., "Arab Socialism Revisited: The Yugoslav Roots of its Ideology", Middle Eastern Studies, 19, (1983), pp.152-187.
- Clark, M.K., Algeria in Turmoil, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1959.
- Clegg, I., Workers' Self-Management in Algeria, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1971.
- Cliffe, L., "Class Formation as an 'Articulation' Process: East African Cases" (in) Hamza Alavi and Teodor Shanin ed., pp.262-278.
- Colonna, F., "Cultural Resistance and Religious legitimacy in Colonial Algeria", Economy and Society, Vol.3, No.3, 1974, pp.233-52.
- Cooper, M.N., "State Capitalism, Class Structure, and Social Transformation in the Third World: The Case of Egypt", International Journal of Middle East Studies, 15, (1983), pp.451-469.
- Couderc, R. and Desrie, G., "Croissance Urbaine et Milieu Rural: la Desorganisation de l'Agriculture Autogeree entre Oran et Arzew (Algerie)", L'Espace Geographique, No.1, 1975, pp.17-30.
- Daniel, J., "The Algerian Problem Begins", Foreign Affaires, 40, (1961-62), pp.605-611.
- De Bernis, G. D., "L'Economie Algerienne depuis l'Independence", Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, CNRS, 1962, pp.13-41.
- , "Les Industries Industrialisantes et les Options Algeriennes" Revue du Tiers Monde, No.47, July-Sep. 1971, pp.545-565.
- Debray, R., "Problems of Revolutionary Strategy in Latin America", New Left Review, 45, (Sep.-Oct.1967), pp.13-41.
- De Villers, G., "L'Etat et la Revolution Agraire en Algerie", Revue Francaise de Science Politique, Vol.30, NO.1, 1980, pp.112-139.
- Djabri, A., The Agrarian Policies of Algeria: 1962-82, M.A. Thesis, University of Warwick, March 1984.
- Duprat, G., Revolution et Autogestion Rural en Algerie, Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Armand Colin, Paris, 1973.
- Elsenhans, H., "Contradictions in the Algerian Development Process: the Reform of the Public Sector and the New Approach to the Private sector in Industry", The Maghreb Review, Vol.7, No.3-4, May-August 1982, pp.62-72.
- Engels, F., The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1972.

- Entelis, J. P., "Algeria: Technocratic Rule, Military Power" (in) Political Elites in Arab North Africa, ed. by William Zartman, Longman, New York, 1982, pp.92-143.
- Etienne, B., L'Algerie Culture et Revolution, Edition du Seuil, Paris, 1977.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "La Paysannerie dans le Discours et la Pratique", (in) Les Problemes Agraire au maghreb, ed. by CRESM, CNRS, Paris, 1977.
- Evers, H.D., Clauss, W., and Wong, D., "Subsistence Reproduction: A Framework for Analysis" (in) Household and the World Economy, ed. by Joan Smith, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Hans-Dieter Evers, SAGE Publication, London, 1984.
- Fanon, F., The Wretched of the Earth, Penguin Books, London, 1967.
- Farouk-Sluglett, M. and Sluglett, P., "Labour and National Liberation: The Trade Union Movement in Iraq, 1920-1958", Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.5, No.2, Spring 1983, pp.139-154.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Iraqi Ba'thism: Nationalism, Socialism, and National Socialism", (in) Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction, ed. By CARDRI, Zed Books Ltd., London, 1986, pp.73-107.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, Kegan Paul International, London, 1987.
- Farsoun, K., "State Capitalism in Algeria", MERIP Reports, No.35, 1975, pp.3-32.
- Foster-Carter, A., "Can We Articulate 'Articulation'?", (in) The New Economic Anthropology, ed by John Clammer, Macmillan, London, 1978, pp.210-249.
- Frank, A.G., Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1978.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Crisis in the Third World, Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., London, 1981.
- Freyhold, M.V., "The Post-Colonial State and its' Tanzanian Version", Review of African Political Economy, 8,(1977), pp.75-89.
- Gallagher, C.F., The United States and North Africa, Cambridge, 1963.
- Galliot, R., "Pre-Colonial Algeria", Economy and Society, Vol.4, No.4, 1975. pp.418-445.
- Gatak, S., and Ingersent, K., Agriculture and Economic Development,

Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., Sussex, 1984.

- Geary C. and Bribeck C.,  
"The petty Commodity Producer in the Third World Cities", (in)  
The Petite Bourgeoisie: Comparative Studies and the Uneasy  
Stratum, ed by Frank Bechhofer and Brian Elliot,  
Macmillan, London, 1981.
- Glavanis, K. and Glavanis, P., "The Sociology of Agrarian Relations in  
the Middle East: The Persistence of Household Production",  
Current Sociology, Vol.31, No.2, Summer 1983, 1-109.
- Goinard, P., Algerie: L'Oeuvre Francaise,  
Robert laffont, Paris, 1984.
- Goodman, D. and Redclift, M.,  
From Peasant to Proletarian: Capitalist Development and  
Agrarian Transition, Basi Blackwell, Oxford, 1981.
- Goulbourne, H., "Some Problems of Analysis of the Political in Backward  
Capitalist Social Formations" (in)  
Politics and State in the Third World, ed. by Harry Goulbourne,  
Macmillan, London, 1979, pp.11-32.
- Griffin, K.B., "Algerian Agriculture in Transition",  
Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics  
Bulletin, Vol.27, Part 4, November, 1965.
- Guin, J.P., Les Institution Agricoles Algeriennes,  
CRESM, Paris, 1974.
- Halvorsan, K.H., "Colonial Transformation of Agrarian Society in  
Algeria", Journal of Peace Research,  
Vol.XV, No.4, 1978, pp.323-343.
- Harbi, M., Aux Origines du F.L.N.,  
Christian Bourgois Editeur, Paris, 1975.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Le F.L.N.: Mirage et Realite,  
Le Sens de l'Histoire, Paris, 1980.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Party and the State" (in)  
Man, State, and society in the Contemporary Maghrib,  
ed. by W. Zartman, Pall Mall Press, London, 1973, pp.159-167.
- Helie, D., "Industrial Self-Management in Algeria" (in)  
Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib,  
ed. by W. Zartman, Pall Mall Press, London, 1973, pp.465-474.
- Henni, A., La Colonisation Agraire et le Sous-Developpement en Algerie,  
SNED, Algiers, 1982.
- Hermassi, E., Leadership and National Development in North Africa,  
Bekerly, California, 1972.

- \_\_\_\_\_, "States and Regimes in the Maghrib" (in) Contemporary North Africa, ed by Halim Barakat, Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, Washington D.C., 1985, pp.157-163.
- Horne, A., A Savage War of Peace, Macmillan, London, 1977.
- Humbaraci, A., Algeria: A Revolution That Failed, Pall Mall Press, London, 1966.
- Jackson, H., The F.L.N. in Algeria: Party Development in a Revolutionary Society, Greenwood Press, London, 1977.
- Jessop, B., The Capitalist State, Martin Roberston, Oxford, 1982.
- Joesten J., The new Algeria, Follett, Chicago, 1964.
- Johnson, H., A Theoretical Model of Economic Nationalism in New Developing States, Chicago, 1967.
- Johnston, F. and Mellor, J., "The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development", American Economic Review, Vol. 4, Sep.1951, pp.566-593.
- Kaddache, M., Histoire du Nationalisme Algerien, (Tome 1), SNED, Algiers, 1981.
- Karsenty, J.C., "La Politique Agricole Algerienne", Maghreb-Machrek, No.77, 1976, pp.31-39.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Les Investissements dans l'Agriculture Algerienne", (in) Les Problemes Agraires au Maghreb, ed. by CRESM, CMRS, Paris, 1977, pp.115-142.
- Katouzian, M.A., "Oil Versus Agriculture: A Case Study of Dual Resource Depletion in Iran", The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol.5, No.3, 1978.
- Kautsky, K., "Summary of Selected Parts of Kautsky's (The Agrarian Question)", Trans. and Comp. by Jairus Banaji (in) The Articulation of Modes of Production: Essays from Economy and Society, ed. by Harold Wolpe, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1980, pp.45-92.
- al-Khafaji, I., Ra'smaliyyat al-Dawla al-Wataniyya, (National State Capitalism), Beirut, 1979.
- \_\_\_\_\_, al-Dawla w'al Tatawwur al-Ra'smali fi'l-Iraq, (State and Capitalist Development in Iraq: 1968-1978), Cairo, 1983.

- Khalifa, M., Ahmed Ben Bella: Hadith Shamil,  
(Ahmd Ben Bella: Comprehensive Interview), Beirut, 1985.
- Kielstra, N., "The Agrarian revolution and Algerian Socialism",  
MERIP Reports, No.67, pp.5-11.
- Knauss, P., "Algeria's Agrarian Revolution: Peasant Control or Control  
of Peasants?", African Studies Review,  
20 (Dec.1977), pp.65-78.
- Knight, M.M. "The Algerian Revolt: Some Underlying Factors",  
The Middle East Journal, Vol.10, No.4, Autumn 1956.
- Koulytchizky, S., "Comment Sont Prises les Decisions dans l'Autogestion  
Algerienne", Revue Algerienne, 1969, pp.1151-1194.
- Kraft, J., "Settlers Politics in Algeria",  
Foreign Affairs, 39, (1960-61), pp.591-600.
- Laks, M., Autogestion et Pouvoir Politique en Algerie: 1962-65,  
Editions et Documentations Intaernationales, Paris, 1970.
- Lashraf, M. al-Jaza'ir: al-Umma w'al-Mujtama',  
(Algeria: Nation and Society),  
Trans. from French by Hanafi Ben Isa, Algiers, 1983.
- Lawless, R. I., "Algeria: The Contradiction of Rapid Industrialisation"  
(in) North Africa, ed, by Richard I. Lawless,  
Croom Helm, London, 1984, pp.153-190.
- Lazreg, M., The Emergence of Classes in Algeria,  
Westview Press, Colorado, 1976.
- , "Bureaucracy and Class: The Algerian Dialectic",  
Dialectical Anthropology, Vol.1, No.4, Sep.1976, pp.295-305.
- Lebjaoui, M., Haga'iq an al-Thawra al-Jaza'iriyya,  
(Facts on the Algerian revolution), Beirut, 1971.
- Leca, J., "Parti et Etat en Algerie",  
Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 1968, pp.13-42.
- , "Algerian Socialism, Nationalism, and State Building" (in)  
Socialism in the Third World,  
ed. by Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesque,  
Preager Publishers, New York, 1975, pp.121-160.
- Lequy, R., "L'Agriculture Algerienne de 1954 a 1962",  
Revue de l'Occident Musulman,  
Numero 8, 2eme Semestre, 1970, pp.41-99.
- Lesbet, D., Les 1000 Village Socialistes en Algerie,  
OPU, Algiers, 1983.

- Lewis, W.H., "The Decline of Algeria's F.L.N.",  
The Middle East Journal, Vol.20, No.2, Spring 1966.
- Leys, C., "The 'Overdeveloped' Post Colonial State: A Re-evaluation",  
Review of African Political Economy, 5, (1976), pp.39-48.
- Mamdani, M and Bhagat, H., "Comment on the Political Economy of  
Imperialism", (in)  
Debate on Class, State, and Imperialism, ed. by Y. Tandon  
Tanzania Publishing House, Dar es Salam, 1982, pp.36-40.
- Mandouze, A., Le Revolution Algerienne par les Textes,  
Editions d'Aujourd'hui, Paris, 1961.
- Mann, S.A. and Dickinson, J.M.,  
"Obstacles to the Development of Capitalist Agriculture",  
The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol.5, No.4, July 1978,  
pp.466-481.
- Marx, K, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonapart,  
International Publishers, New York, 1972.
- Marx, K. and Engels, F., Manifesto of the Communist Party,  
Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977.
- \_\_\_\_\_, The German Ideology,  
Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1970.
- Meillassoux, C., "A Class Analysis of the Bureaucratic Process in Mali"  
The Journal of Development Studies,  
Vol.6, No.2, January 1970, pp.97-110.
- Merle, R., Ben Bella,  
Michael Joseph, London, 1967.
- Meynes, P., "Tanzania: The Struggle for National Independence and  
Socialism", (in) Debate on Class, State, and Imperialism,  
ed by Y. Tandon, Tanzania Publishing House, 1982, pp.16-35.
- Miliband, R., The State in Capitalist Society,  
Quartet Books, London, 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Class Power and State Power,  
Verso, London, 1983.
- Minces, J., "Autogestion et Lutttes de Classe en Algerie",  
Le Temps Modernes, June 1965, pp.2204-2231.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Workers' Management in Algeria",  
New Outlook, Vol.10, Part 8, November 1967, pp.20-33.
- Mouzelis, N., "Capitalism and Development of Agriculture",  
The Journal of Peasant Studies,  
Vol.3, No.4, July 1976, pp.283-292.

- Murray, R. and Wengraf, T., "The Algerian Revolution",  
New Left Review, No.22, December 1963, pp.14-65.
- Mutin, G., "Agriculture et Dependance Alimenraire en Algerie",  
Maghreb-Machrek, 90, (1980), pp.40-64.
- Nadel, S.N., "Contemporary Capitalism and the Middle Class,  
Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978.
- Nadir, M.T., "L'Agriculture dans la Planification en Algerie de 1967  
a 1977", OPU, Algiers, 1982.
- Nellis, J.R., "Maladministration: Cause or Result of Underdevelopment?:  
The Algerian Example", Canadian Journal of African Studies,  
Vol.13, No.3, 1980, pp.407-422.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Socialist Management in Algeria",  
The Journal of Modern African Studies,  
Vol.15, No.4, 1977, pp.529-554.
- O'Ballance, E., "The Algerian Insurrection: 1954-62,  
Faber and Faber, London, 1967.
- Olliver, M., "Place de la Revolution Agraire dans la Strategie de  
Developpement Algerienne", (in)  
Les Problemes Agraires au Maghreb, CRESM, 1977, pp.91-114.
- Ottaway, D. and Ottaway M.,  
Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution,  
Bekerley, California, 1970.
- Parodi, M., "L'Autogestion des Exploitations Agricoles Modernes en  
Algerie", Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 1963, pp.61-84.
- Perelman, M., "Obstacles to the Development of a Capitalist  
Agriculture: A Comment on Mann and Dickinson",  
The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol.7, No.1, 1979, pp.119-21
- Petras, J., "State Capitalism and the Third World",  
Development and Change, 8:1, 1977, pp.1-17.
- Pfeifer, K., "Three World or Three Worldviews? State Capitalism and  
Development", MERIP Reports, No.78, June 1979, pp.3-11.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Agrarian Reform Under State Capitalism in Algeria,  
Westview Press, London, 1985.
- Popov, Y., "The Developing Countries from the Standpoint of Marxist  
Political Economy,  
Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1977.
- Poulantzas, N., "The Problem of the Capitalist State",  
New Left Review, 58, November-December 1969, pp.67-78.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Fascism and Dictatorship,

- Verso, London, 1971.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Political Power and Social Classes,  
Verso, London, 1978.
- Quandt, W., Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria 1954-1968,  
M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1969.
- Raffinot, M. and Jacquemot, P., Le Capitalisme d'Etat Algerien,  
Francois Maspero, Paris, 1977.
- Raptis M., Socialism, Democracy, and Self-Management,  
Allison and Busby Ltd., London, 1980.
- Roberts, H., "The Unforseen Development of the Kabyle Question in  
Contemporary Algeria",  
Government and Opposition, Vol.17, No.3, 1982, pp.312-334.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Economics of Berberism: The Material Basis of the Kabyle  
Question in Contemporary Algeria"  
Gonernment and Opposition, Vol.18, No.2, 1983, pp.218-235.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Politics of Algerian Socialism", (in)  
North Africa, ed. by Richard Lawless,  
Croom Helm, 1984, pp.5-49.
- Roxborough, I., Theories of Underdevelopment,  
Macmillan, London, 1972.
- Salah-Bey, A., "Le Assemblee Nationale Constituyente Algerienne"  
Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 1962, pp.115-125.
- Sari, D., La Despossession des Fallahs,  
OPU, Algiers, 1978.
- Saul, J.S., "The State in Post-colonial Societies: Tanzania"  
The Socialist Register, 1974, pp.349-372.
- Schnetzler, J., Le Developpement Algerien,  
Masson, Paris, 1981.
- Seibel, H.D. and Damachi, U.G.,  
Self-Management in Yugoslavia and the Developing Countries,  
Macmillan, London, 1982.
- Shivji, I.G., "Tanzania-The Silent Class Struggle", (in)  
Socialism in Tanzania, ed. by Lionel Cliffe and Joan Saul,  
(Volume II), East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1972,  
pp.304-330.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Class Struggle in Tanzania,  
Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1976.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The State in the Dominated Social formations of Africa: Some  
Theoretical Issues" (in)  
Debate on Class, State, and Imperialism, ed. by Y. Tandon,



- Tanzania Publishing House, Dar es Salam, 1982, pp.172-181.
- al-Shuqairi, A., Qissat al-Thawra al-Jaza'iriyya,  
(The Story of the Algerian Revolution), Beirut, (Not Dated).
- Singh, K.R., "Algeria: Revolution or Change?",  
Africa Quarterly, Vol.6, 1966, pp.197-205.
- , "The Algerian Experiment in Socialism",  
International Studies, 8, (1966-67), pp.444-456.
- Sivers, P.V., "Algerian Land Ownership and Leadership 1860-1940:  
A Quantitative Approach",  
The Maghrib Review, Vol.3, No.2, 1979.
- Suliaman, A, Ma'rakat al-Bitrul fi al-jaza'ir,  
(The Battle for Oil in Algeria), Beirut, 1974.
- Smith, P.A., "Algeria Stresses Long-Term Objectives for Agriculture",  
Middle East Economic Digest, 23, May, 1975.
- Smith, T., "THE Political and Economic Ambitions of Algerian Land  
Reform 1962-1974", The Middle East Journal,  
Vol.29, No.3, Summer 1975, pp.259-258.
- , "Muslim Impoverishment in Colonial Algeria",  
Revue de l'Occident Musulman, No.17, 1er Semestre, 1974,  
pp.139-162.
- al-Soufi, "Harakat al-Idhrabat fi Mantaqat Wahran"  
Paper Presented to the Conference of the Arab Labour  
Organization, Algiers, 1982.
- Springborge, R., "Infatih, Agrarian Transformation and Elite  
Consolidation in Contemporary Iraq",  
Paper Presented to the International Political Science  
Association, Paris, 15-20 July 1985.
- Stewart, P.J., "Algerian Peasantry at the Crossroads: Fight Erosion or  
Migrate", I.D.S. Discussion Paper, No.69, March 1975.
- Stork, J., "Oil and the Penetration of Capitalism in Iraq: An  
Interpretation", Peuples Meditteranees, 9,(1979), pp.125-52.
- Sutton, K., "Agrarian Reform in Algeria: The Conversion of projects  
into Action", Afrika spectrum, Vol9, No.1, 1974, pp.50-68.
- Sutton, K. and Lawless R., "Population Regrouping in Algeria: Traumatic  
Change and the Rural Settlement Pattern",  
Transaction New Series, Vol.3, No3, 1977, pp.331-350.
- Teillac, J., Autogestion en Algerie,  
Centre de Hautes Etudes Administratives sur l'Afrique at l'Asie  
Moderns, Paris, 1965.
- Temmar, H.M., Strategie de Developpement Independant: Le Cas de

- l'Algerie, Un Bilan, OPU, Algiers, 1983.
- Tidafi, T., L'Agriculture Algerienne et ses Perspectives de Developpement, Francois Maspero, Paris, 1969.
- Tlemcani, R., State and Revolution in Algeria, Zed Books Ltd., London, 1986.
- Valensi, L., On the Eve of Colonialism, Africana Publishing Company, London, 1977.
- Vergopoulos, K., "Capitalism and Peasant Productivity", The Journal of Peasant studies, Vol.5, No.4, July 1978, pp.446-465.
- Viratelle, G., L'Algerie Algerienne, Les Editions Ouvrieres, Paris, 1970.
- Williams, G., "Taking the Part of Peasants" (in) Rural Development: Theories of Peasant Economy and Agrarian Change, ed. by John Harris, Hutchinson University Library, pp.381-38.
- Williams, M.C., "The Extent and Significance of the Nationalization of Foreign Owned Assets in Developing Countries (1956-1972)", Oxford Economic Papers, Vol.27, No.2, July 1975, pp.260-274.
- Yefsah, A., Le processus de Legitimation de Pouvoir Militaire et la Construction de l'Etat en Algerie, Editions Anthropos, Paris, 1982.
- Zartman, W., "The Algerian Army in Politics", (in) Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib, ed. by William Zartman, Pall Mall Press, London, 1973, pp.211-224.
- , "Algeria: A Post-Revolutionary Elite" (in) Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East, ed. by Frank Tacha, John Wiley, New York, 1975, pp.255-291.
- Zghal, A., "Pourquoi la Reforme Agraire ne Mobilise-t-elle pas les Paysans Maghrebine?", (in) Les Problemes Agraires au Maghreb, ed. by CRESM, CNRS, Paris, 1975, pp.295-311.
- Ziemann, W. and Lanzendorfer, M., "The State in Peripheral Societies", The Socialist Register, 1977, pp.143-177.

