A critical investigation of the role of concepts, skills and attitudes within religious education in the secondary school

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A critical investigation of the role of concepts, skills and attitudes within religious education in the secondary school.

A historical survey of the development of the specification of appropriate concepts, skills and attitudes in religious education examines the general writings on the subject, agreed syllabuses and examination proposals. A critical examination of the objectives model of the curriculum, on which the above development is based, suggests that this may be the wrong approach to education. An examination of the process model of the curriculum suggests that this is a model that reflects more accurately the nature of education. The rest of the thesis is concerned with an attempt to show how religious education could be planned within a process model. An examination of the nature of religious belief gives an indication of what the intention of religious education should be. There follows an examination of the contribution that can be made to the planning of religious education by an understanding of each of the three aspects of learning; concepts, skills and attitudes. It is suggested that the central concept on which learning should be based in religious education is the concept of ultimacy. The intention of the learning experience should be that the pupil gains some form of realisation. Attitudes are seen as of the essence of learning, and are of particular relevance to religious education within a process model. The principles upon which religious education in a process model would be planned are set out and explained, both general principles and principles that are particularly appropriate to religious education. Finally, some implications of the introduction of religious education within a process model into the curriculum of a secondary school are considered.
A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ROLE OF CONCEPTS, SKILLS AND ATTITUDES WITHIN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN THE SECONDARY SCHOOL.

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Master of Arts in Education

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Appendix A - Common agreement in learning theories 232
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INTRODUCTION

It will be helpful to explain at the beginning of this thesis why it was written as this will go some way to explaining why it has taken the format in which it appears. The original reason for starting the thesis was to clarify for myself what religious education should be, what was justifiable under the title religious education, what the intentions of a teacher of religious education should be. The way that these questions were to be answered was by an examination of the place of the three aspects of learning, i.e. concepts, skills and attitudes. A definition of these three aspects, as objectives, is currently being used by many people as the basis on which a religious education syllabus can be founded.

During an historical analysis of the development of concepts, skills and attitudes it became clear that they did not provide a complete picture of what religious education should be. Whilst the historical analysis is primarily descriptive I have included some of my evaluation of particular items. The evaluation is not consistent in that it has not been applied to every document or syllabus that has been reviewed. It is intended to provide an illustration of the misgivings that I felt as the material was reviewed. There are many more comments that could be made but that did not seem the way that offered the most progress. The way to progress lay, I felt, in examination of the curriculum model that gave rise to the three aspects of learning in the form that they are used.
This required, firstly, a careful description of the objectives model and then a critical examination of how it is intended to operate. The criticism of the objectives model is not original, the comments made in the thesis have been made by many other people, no doubt much more clearly and convincingly. The criticisms that I have made are a summary of many of the criticisms expressed by others, with an emphasis on some of those that I considered most relevant. Simply criticising the current model is of little help unless changes can be put forward that will satisfy the criticisms. This led to a consideration of another model of the curriculum, the process model.

The process model reflects a particular view of education and, having shown how it would avoid the pitfalls of the objectives model it was to replace, it was then necessary to show how it could be used to plan a curriculum, and how it would affect the planning of a religious education syllabus. A method of using the model to plan a curriculum has already been set out by other writers and this is reviewed in some detail. The problem that nobody seems to have considered is how this model could be used to plan a religious education syllabus.

I have tackled this problem in two parts. Firstly I felt it was necessary to set out precisely what religious education should be about and this meant that an examination of the
nature of religion had to be undertaken. This thesis is, of course, woefully inadequate to define the nature of religion, it has therefore confined itself to a discussion of the nature of religious belief. Even this is necessarily brief and its conclusions have had to be modified in the light of the place that religious education occupies in a state school. However, I feel that a working description of religious belief has been possible.

The second part was to show how this working description of religious belief could be incorporated into a religious education syllabus. This has been done by an examination of the three aspects of learning that have already been mentioned. This approach was chosen for two reasons, firstly that each of the three aspects must be considered in the learning of a pupil and it seemed that an examination of each of them would be the way to clarify the contribution that each of them can make in the new model. Secondly, they represent to a large extent the current basis for the planning of a syllabus, albeit in a different model. Clearly there has been much thought put into the way that they can serve a pupil's educational needs and it would be foolish to ignore the insights of other writers concerned in the same field.

The last part of the thesis was then to suggest how religious education could be planned within the new model of the curriculum that had been adopted. As a final word, some implications of the adoption of this model for education in
I thus believe that my original intention in writing the thesis, that of clarification for myself as to what constitutes religious education, has been fulfilled. This does not, of course, close the matter. A problem now exists which is outside the scope of this thesis. That is, how religious education can be taught within the new model and according to the principles that have been set out in the thesis. Thus the next step must be to plan a syllabus for religious education within a process model of the curriculum.

One final note is necessary and that is throughout the thesis I have used "he" where "he or she" would be more appropriate. This is simply to improve the flow of the text.
CHAPTER ONE

AN HISTORICAL SURVEY

This chapter will seek to show how the planning of religious education has developed from syllabuses based on content to syllabuses based on an objectives model, with the objectives specified in terms of concepts, skills and attitudes.

Since the writing of Tyler in 1949 educational thought on curriculum development has been heavily influenced by the objectives model. This model looks to the end result of the process of education as the determining factor as to what should take place in the classroom. It is a model that is based on aims and objectives. The natural development of this model is to state the aims of a course and then to go on to specify those aims in terms of objectives. The purpose of the objectives is to clarify, and enable the fulfilment of, the general statements of the aims. Bloom (1956) produced a taxonomy of educational objectives which can be seen as based on the work of Tyler, as Tyler had originally proposed the aims and objectives model of the curriculum. The taxonomy was divided into basically two parts within the cognitive domain, knowledge and skills. The second domain was the affective domain. If notice is taken of these divisions then it suggests that objectives need not be descriptive statements but could specify objectives within each of the three areas that can be identified as concepts, skills and attitudes. It would then be by specification in these three areas that the greatest
precision in the elaboration of the aims could be expected. A more detailed look at the objectives model will be undertaken in the second chapter. It is against this background that the historical survey will be conducted.

The survey will be in three parts. First the general development of syllabus planning based on concepts, skills and attitudes, from syllabus planning based on content, will be considered. Secondly, the way this theme has been developed in Agreed Syllabuses will be examined, and finally the influence of these developments on assessment as it appears in examination proposals will be considered. Within each of these parts the maintainance of chronological order will usually be observed.

General development

The 1944 Education act intended that religious education should be a Christian education and implied a syllabus based on content. Agreed syllabuses that followed were concerned mainly to specify that content and examinations were, for the most part, tests of knowledge of the scriptures. Religious education was seen in terms of teaching the Christian faith and bringing the pupils up to be Christians.

There appears to have been no significant move away from the content based syllabus until the 1960's. Loukes, writing in 1961 and 1965 does not move completely away from the content
based syllabus as he speaks of
"the "something" that we are asked to teach"
(Loukes, 1965, 96)
by which he means content. He also produced a syllabus that was based on content in his "problem syllabus". However, he takes into account the actual educational practice of what he calls "good" schools and this leads him to three fundamental demands. First that the ground on which the teaching is based is the ground on which the adolescent stands ie. it must be identifiable by, and relevant to, the pupil. Secondly that the ground must be open, with no preconceived ideas or bias. Third is the demand for
"a line of progress from experience, through analysis, to personal choice." (Loukes, 1965, 113)
The line of progress that he sought was from fact, through meaning, to value. This is similar to the progression of content, understanding and evaluation that can be found in the requirements of assessment that will be examined later. Loukes clearly made a move away from the syllabus that is based on content alone to a syllabus where relevance to the pupil is paramount. It is the consideration of what is relevant to the education of the pupil and how to achieve it that is the concern of the aims and objectives model.

Loukes, however, did not adopt an aims and objectives model of the curriculum, his emphasis was different. Instead of focusing on the end of education he focused on the process. He claimed that
"Good teaching is .... a process of dialogue about experience." (Loukes, 1965, 99)

The emphasis on process in education will be considered further in chapter three.

Loukes identified a dilemma in teaching children religious concepts that would appear to be too difficult for them to grasp and saw the solution in

"applying to religious education the fundamental concepts of all education." (Loukes, 1965, 96)

He shares this concern with Goldman and his writings of 1964 and 1965. Goldman applied an educational understanding of concept development to the understanding of the Bible and some Christian concepts. His proposals were still based on a content of Christian education but they also conformed to the current educational thought, particularly to the ideas that had been proposed by Piaget.

Smart emphasised, in 1968, the need to teach "how" rather than "that", thus expressing his idea that religious education should be in the direction of initiation into understanding the meaning of religion and into questions about the truth and worth of religion. He produces what can be seen as the start of a list of objectives in religious education when he says

"Religious education could be designed to give people the capacity to understand religious phenomena, to discuss sensitively religious claims, to see the interrelations between religion and society and so forth." (Smart, 1968, 96)
All three of the above writers were concerned that children should understand what was being taught rather than just accept it. This was the general trend of the times and was summed up in the Durham Report on Religious Education:

"All major educational reports in recent years have made it plain that the principal argument for religious education in county schools is that it is a subject with its own inherent educational value and must have its place on the curriculum for educational reasons. We entirely agree."

(Durham Report, 1970, 98)

The report recognises that there are other arguments for religious education based on the nature of society and public opinion, the cultural, religion and morality, and tradition but these it relegates to being of supportive value only.

Hirst still felt the need to argue in 1976 that educational principles are independent of religious belief. He argued that a theology of education must not be inconsistent with these autonomously justified educational principles but will give the teacher

"an important religious rationale for involvement in education but will at the same time preserve him from improperly looking to religious resources for his educational principles" (Hirst, 1976, 157)

Once this principle of justification had been accepted then religious education as a whole was considered according to the
current educational thinking. This meant consideration of
curriculum development in terms of the aims and objectives
model because this was the model that was predominant in
educational thinking at the time. Cox makes the implications
clear in an article in 1971 in which he identified four aims
for the teacher of religious education. These were

"1) To enable pupils to understand what religion has
contributed to our culture.

2) To help pupils to understand what people believe and
how their beliefs influence their lives.

3) Helping pupils to understand that a rational attitude
to life includes making up one's own mind on certain
fundamental or ultimate questions of the nature of life and
human personality.

4) Helping the pupils to decide for themselves ..... their
own religious stance." (Cox, 1971, 5)

It was at this time that the influential Working Paper 36 was
published by the Schools Council. The working paper
surveyed the current state of thought on religious education
and attempted to produce a synthesis from its findings. It was
not the first to attempt this task. J.W.D. Smith had proposed
a compromise, between the "implicit" approach of Loukes and
the "explicit" approach of Smart, in 1969. The working paper
went further in that it not only broke down the aims into the
kinds of objectives that teachers might have and be able to
use; it also commented on content and methods that might be
appropriate, all on an educational basis. The general aims
that it broke down into examples of objectives were

"1) Awareness of religious issues.

2) Awareness of the contribution of religion to human culture.

3) Capacity to understand beliefs.

4) Capacity to understand practices.

5) Awareness of the challenge of religious belief.

6) Awareness of the practical consequences of religious belief."  (Schools Council, 1971, 44-45)

It is possible to criticise these aims as being vague, they are open to a wide variety of interpretations and hence do not precisely indicate of what religious education is expected to consist. Equally they could be phrased in a number of different ways and still refer to the same ideas and intentions for religious education. It is the purpose of objectives that they clarify what is meant by the aims. The working paper only gave examples of the objectives that might be considered appropriate but even if the objectives had been specified exhaustively they were still phrased in a general descriptive manner. It is hard to see how objectives thus phrased can ever give a precise description of the aims and intentions of the syllabus that is not open to interpretation, let alone be definitive of the aims.

Lupton (1975) takes up this criticism of the objectives model and argues that

"Aims must be subject to considerable elaboration if they
are to be of application to the work of the practising teacher" (Lupton, 1975, 135)

He went on to say that this had so far not happened. A fuller discussion of the degree of elaboration that might be required will take place in chapter two.

To refer back to the work of Grimmitt in 1973 it is possible to see what Lupton means. Grimmitt attempted to combine a dimensional approach with an experiential approach and he offered what he called a conceptual framework for these two approaches. His list of aims in the area of situational themes is quite detailed, far more so than in any other area of the experiential approach, or in the dimensional approach. He states ten aims for situation themes, including such aims as

"perceive the connection between beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviour" (Grimmitt, 1975, 204)

Whilst this has the generality of an aim it does indicate a fairly detailed analysis of the intention of education as moral development. This detail might reflect the greater amount of work that had been done in the field of moral education compared with religious education, for example the work of Wilson (1970). Even so, the objectives in the area of situational themes still only give a general framework rather than precise details of what is to be taught, or learnt. Within the dimensional approach, the approach that is more concerned with the study of "explicit" religion, the aims and objectives are practical examples of what might be included rather than a detailed analysis of what is possible or what
should be included. Whilst Grimmitt may well say that he did not intend to produce a syllabus his examples do lack precision in their definition of his intentions. His book does however offer a useful survey of the developments in religious education up to that time.

In 1975 Naylor surveyed the field of curriculum development and offered a suggestion of the way in which religious education should move. He looked at a variety of curriculum models and outlined his ideas on

"five phases (objectives, content, learning experiences, organisation and integration, and evaluation) with examples from R.E." (Naylor, 1975, 123)

Of particular note is that the objectives come before the content. He sees the objectives as being in two parts, aims, which are value judgements, and objectives, which are aims reduced to specific educational objectives. Naylor's article is intended to be of a theoretical nature, the proposal of a way of development for religious education that is firmly based on the current educational thinking. He concludes with the conviction that

"a means-end approach ..... is central to a planned curriculum" (Naylor, 1975, 134)

Naylor's article was a survey and was hence derivative but it does reflect the direction in which religious education was moving at the time.

In 1975 and 1976 Attfield published some detailed work on
concepts in religious education which deserves careful attention and which will be examined more closely in chapter five which deals specifically with concepts. Briefly, Attfield proposes a taxonomy of religious concepts and a series of steps for the development of the taxonomy as a tool for syllabus construction in religious education.

In 1976 and 1977 the Religious Education Council of England and Wales produced two documents that represented the consensus of opinion of the members of the council. They sought to examine the place of the agreed syllabus within the context of contemporary conditions in society and current educational thought. They argued for the expansion of religious education into the area of life stances although they also argued that the religion that had

"chiefly fashioned the culture in which one lives would be dealt with more extensively than fringe belief systems, or even other belief systems." (R.E. Council, 1977, 12)

They do not presume to define content beyond this but recommend understandings to be developed, of which they list nine that they would expect to see included in any list, as a minimum. It is possible to criticise these general statements of objectives on the grounds that they would need to be much elaborated, and completed, if they were to meet the criterion of Lupton that they should be applicable to the work of the practising teacher. It should be noted however that these documents do not claim to be syllabuses. It was at this time
that a new type of agreed syllabus appeared that was no longer based on content, and these will be considered in the next section.

Also in 1977 there appeared two new documents from the Schools Council. One of these was the handbook for the teaching material that they produced and was entitled "Journeys into Religion - Handbook A". In the first part of the handbook there is the rationale behind the material that is produced for use by teachers. The writers suggest that there is wide agreement on the aims of religious education and that these include

"a) to promote awareness of religious issues
b) to develop awareness of the contribution of religion to human culture
c) to promote understanding of religious beliefs and practices
d) to awaken recognition of the challenge and practical consequences of religious belief
e) to give support to pupils in their search for a faith by which to live." (Schools Council, 1977a, 17)

The aims are then divided up into objectives, which they call goals. The goals are expressed in terms of concepts, skills and attitudes and these are subdivided into three areas. These are a) those offered primarily by religious education; b) those offered by the humanities; and, in the case of skills and attitudes, c) those offered by most subjects. The concepts,
skills and attitudes are prefixed with the word "key" and are only meant as examples. They give a useful description of what is meant by the aims they consider are widely accepted but do not, nor claim to, go beyond that.

The second document was called "A Groundplan for the Study of Religion" and is of a more theoretical nature. It is not intended to be a syllabus but rather seeks to

"define what sort of knowledge, what sort of experience, and what sort of criteria for evaluation of religious material need to be included in the religious education curriculum in order to enable the pupils to react to whatever religious phenomena they may encounter in the reasonable manner of an educated person." (Schools Council, 1977b, 12)

This document will be considered in some detail as it raises several important matters.

Whilst recognising other possible approaches to religion in schools the one that the groundplan seems to adopt is Smart's phenomenological approach. This is seen as imparting certain skills of understanding and it is these skills that the groundplan attempts to define. It also contained a list of concepts that it claims are central to religion.

The groundplan clearly states that it does not deal with the pupils own search for a faith by which to live and calls its area of concern "religious studies" by which it means the study of our own and other peoples belief systems (p.13). It
seems quite reasonable to talk about the study of religion in terms of appreciating certain concepts, developing certain skills and approaching the study with certain attitudes. What is more difficult to accept is the separation of this study from the pupils own experience.

The groundplan is divided into three areas; knowledge, understanding and evaluation and the interrelated nature of these three is shown in diagrammatic form. If just evaluation is considered, this means an approach to study from the observer's own point of view. The groundplan seems to recognise this when it suggests that the evaluation should be done with reference to personal relevance. Obviously evaluation implies a standard by which to evaluate and personal relevance is one of many possible standards and can be argued for as worthwhile. The difficulty comes in separating evaluation that is by reference to personal relevance from the pupil's own search for a faith, necessarily personally relevant, by which to live.

The groundplan seems to be concerned with an objective approach to the study of religion but as Bishop Leslie Newbigin wrote that

"If "objectivity" .... means "without any presuppositions about what counts as evidence and what makes sense", then it is impossible". (Newbigin, 1978, 3)

The groundplan fails to take the progressive development of
the pupil's understanding of his own experience and the interpretation of such as a necessary part of his development of religious understanding. The groundplan does make a distinction between "understanding of religion" and "religious understanding"; the latter it defines as a way of looking at, an approach to, the world which is based on a credal framework in which one believes.

This problem with the groundplan is accentuated by the comments made on attitudes. It suggests that any attitudes that are developed should start with the willingness of the pupil to learn. It is hard to see how the pupil's interest can be stimulated in something that does not involve the pupil's own experience. The other comments on attitudes are limited to a list of the type of attitudes that are thought appropriate bearing in mind the obvious pitfalls in developing attitudes in religious education and the necessity for the attitudes to be educationally justifiable. There are no explicit affective objectives in the groundplan, these are left as an approach to the subject rather than as targets and so are outside the scope of the groundplan.

Finally, it uses "skills of understanding" to cover concepts, skills and attitudes. This does not really clarify matters at all but rather introduces a term that is less precise and unnecessary.

The groundplan raises the question of what exactly is meant
by religious education and how best it could be taught in the school context. Cox (1975), amongst others, has made the point that we need to first of all find out how much of the study of religion, and the techniques for the study of religion, can we expect pupils to understand below, say, graduate level. The next question must be to what extent religious education should be an objective study, and to what extent should it be concerned with the development of the pupil's personal faith. Until these questions are answered satisfactorily it is not possible to assess the worth of the groundplan for the classroom teacher. A discussion of the nature of religious belief, the start of an answer to the above questions, is in chapter four.

In 1980 the Christian Education Movement started to publish their Professional Papers. In the first of these (Lealman 1980) Grimmitt contributed an essay in which he divided religious education in terms of "pure" and "applied" religion and identified abilities and attitudes in each area. His "pure" religion seems quite close to what has previously been called the "explicit" study of religion, and in this area he divides his aims and objectives into four groups. These groups are the answers to four questions,

1) What is necessary to achieve an understanding of religion and its place and significance in everyday life?

2) What special abilities are necessary to achieve this understanding?

3) Are there any other, more general abilities which the
study of religion promotes?

4) Are there any attitudes which the study of religion promotes and which are necessary in order to study religion effectively?" (Grimmitt, 1980, 18)

He gives, in answer to these questions; aims (question 1) and objectives phrased as abilities and which consist of concepts and skills (question 2), general study skills (question 3) and attitudes (question 4). As the concepts and skills are set out as abilities they are of the nature of general statements and are not an analysis of the aims.

The second part, that of "applied" religion, is concerned with the contribution that the study of religion can make to a pupil's personal and social development. This contribution he identifies in terms of abilities for each area, personal and social. He also identifies some attitudes which are developed. In each of these areas of personal and social development the abilities that he sees as relevant are, he claims, promoted by the study of religion and so they are not necessarily to be seen as the aims of the study of religion. The abilities and attitudes that he feels are promoted may thus be quite acceptable in the general terms that he offers without being of any great help to the teacher of religious education.

The second Professional Paper (1981) continued the development of the aims/objectives model without considering concepts, skills and attitudes separately. Of interest is some material which is provided by Avon L.E.A. to help teachers in schools
in making their own syllabuses and which is reproduced in the papers. Skills are divided up into the general and the particular, the general being study and learning skills that would be applicable to most subjects. The particular skills are not only skills but also include concepts, for example the skill "to appreciate the reasons behind religious ritual" entails a concept of ritual. It would perhaps have been better if they had used the term ability rather than skill.

Bloom (1954) drew a distinction between skills and abilities. He claimed that the term "ability" refers to a competence in a situation in which skills and use of knowledge are needed i.e. specific recall of knowledge allied to mastered skills. Thus skills can be seen as theoretically separate from content. The attitudes are set out in a useful way and will be considered more closely in the chapter on attitudes. Also worthy of note is John's analysis of skills (1983) and this will be referred to in chapter six. He proposes a list of six skills which he claims are particularly relevant to, used and developed in religious education.

These represent the most influential and relevant of the writings on the subject in recent years.
The Agreed Syllabus

The agreed syllabus is a legal document which local education authorities are required to produce, or adopt from another authority, under the terms of the 1944 Education act. It must be agreed by a committee which is comprised of four groups:

1) the Church of England

2) such religious denominations as the local authority think ought to be represented

3) representatives of teachers

4) the authority itself.

The original intention of the 1944 act was that religious education should be Christian education and the committees seem to have been involved in doctrinal rivalry in producing the early agreed syllabuses. More recently the emphasis has been on the educational nature of the document. Early syllabuses were content based and it was the precise content that was under debate. Recent syllabuses have paid more attention to current educational thinking and several major developments have taken place. It is reasonable to say that in recent years teachers have taken a greater share of the writing of the agreed syllabus and it is their interest in education that has been reflected in the recent documents. The agreed syllabuses that will be looked at have been produced in recent years and have been the most influential or have introduced stages in the development of the agreed syllabus. The development that will be traced is from a content based
syllabus to an objectives based syllabus and from objectives described by general statements to objectives described in terms of concepts, skills and attitudes.

The Birmingham Agreed Syllabus (1975)

This syllabus was a radical departure from earlier syllabuses in its format. The actual syllabus is very short, covering only four pages, but it is accompanied by a large, loose leaf folder which is intended to be up-dated by supplements. There is no formally stated aim but there is an intention stated in the introduction

"The syllabus should thus be used to enlarge and deepen the pupil's understanding of religion by studying world religions, and by exploring all those elements in human experience which raise questions about life's ultimate meaning and value" (Birmingham L.E.A., 1975, 4)

The syllabus acknowledges the presence of significantly large minorities of people within the area who are committed to religions other than Christianity and so, whilst it was made compulsory to study Christianity, it was also made compulsory to study some of these other religions. It was also recognised that there were people who believed in

"a stance for living which shares many of the dimensions of religion whilst not admitting belief in realities transcending the natural order." (Birmingham L.E.A., 1975, 10)

A study of one of these stances for living was made compulsory
for pupils in the upper school. This was not an entirely new idea but it was one that caused a furore when the syllabus was first published.

The syllabus was divided into four sections which were to take into account the stages of development of the pupils which, it was claimed, were generally recognised. The groups were 3-8 years, 8-12 years, 12-16 years and the sixth form. This showed up a major weakness, in the educational thinking behind the syllabus. Like its predecessors, it was content based and thus the differentiation between the age groups was in terms of differing content. However, with much of the content, it is the way in which it is approached that makes it suitable or unsuitable for a particular age group. It is a criticism of any syllabus that is presented purely in terms of content that it does not say what is to be done with it. With the Birmingham Agreed Syllabus there is no direction given with regard to intention or approach beyond the passage in the introduction. This is inadequate to express clearly the committee's intentions.

The syllabus did more than expand the type of content in an agreed syllabus though. Perhaps its most important contribution to the development of the agreed syllabus was in its recognition of the professional ability of the teaching staff in the area. The shortness of the syllabus meant that the development of courses and the implementation of the syllabus were left to teachers. It gave the teacher the
opportunity, in fact it required the teacher, to choose materials and approaches according to their own strengths and professional judgement. Thus the element which will later be argued for as the most important in education, the process of learning, was much more under the control of the professionals, the teachers.

The Avon Agreed Syllabus (1976)

This was again a short document and was to be backed up by papers issued after it had been published. These papers were to be on topics where teachers might need help, such as specific issues in religious education, case studies of work in school and lists of resources. The second part of the syllabus deals with "The provision and arrangements for Religious Education in Schools" and this will not be considered further as it is not relevant to the present survey. It is the first part which is of particular interest. It is entitled "Aims and general objectives for Religious Education" and is the main body of the syllabus. The principal aim of religious education is stated as

"to enable pupils to understand the nature of religion and what it would mean to take a religion seriously."

(Avon L.E.A., 1976, 4)

The aim is then split into two parts; 1) understanding of explicit religious beliefs and practices and 2) implicit questions of meaning and value.
The novel part of the syllabus is the way in which it expands the aim into general objectives without specifying content although there is a considerable amount of content in the objectives. The general objectives are separated into three stages that are close to those used by Birmingham and are similarly justified. The objectives are intended to be achieved by the time the pupil reaches the upper age limit of each stage. There are between four and six objectives for each stage. The objectives are in the form of descriptive statements and can be separated into various types.

1) Content based: general, eg. (age range 9-13) "Have some factual knowledge of the historical and contemporary expression of Christianity and other major religions". This is so general as to provide enough scope on its own for an entire course.

2) Content based: specific, eg. (3-9) "Have some knowledge of the daily life of children at other times and in other countries, including that in first century Palestine". This is one of the few specific areas of content and it appears to have little to do with the aim of understanding the nature of religion.

3) Skill based, eg. (9-13) "Be able to enter imaginatively and with sensitivity into other people's experience and attitudes". This illustrates a shortcoming in the syllabus in that there is no mention of attitudes such as the desire to empathise. Possession of a skill does not imply a wish to use it and whilst this is a difficult area some mention could have been made of attitudes that might be thought appropriate.
4) Concept based, eg. (13-16+) "Have gained some understanding of the nature of religion ....".

5) Experiential, eg. (13-16+) "Have explored the relationship between belief and life". Experiential because only an experience is required, there is no specific end or even any learning stated.

There is no explicit description of what is meant by the nature of religion in the syllabus. What the syllabus appears to be is a description of what religious education might aim towards that is no better or worse than many others that could be suggested because it is no more or less explicit. The general objectives do not analyse the aim and only describe it in the vaguest of ways. The objectives do not make up a coherent whole that pinpoints what religious education should be about. Avon later published some guidance for teachers who were preparing schemes of work according to the agreed syllabus. This guidance contained a list of sixteen skills and ten attitudes which differ in format from the general objectives in the agreed syllabus.

The syllabus may not be perfect but it was a development away from the content based syllabus. It allows the teachers further freedom to develop their own ideas and adapt according to the circumstances.
This has been one of the most influential of the agreed syllabuses, it has been adopted by more authorities than any other syllabus. In form it is very much like the Avon agreed syllabus in that it is a short document that is supplemented by a handbook. Called "Paths to Understanding" (Laxton W. (ed.)) the handbook was published two years after the syllabus and contains schemes of work prepared by teachers working within the guidelines of the agreed syllabus. Many teachers would accept that if the schemes are representative of the opportunity given to teachers by the syllabus then it has added something to the progress of religious education.

The syllabus states that

"The principal aim of religious education in schools within the public sector is to enable pupils to understand the nature of religious beliefs and practices, and the importance and influence of these in the lives of believers."

(Hampshire Education Authority, 1978, 8)

The syllabus is set out as objectives within the usual three developmental age groups. The general objectives are descriptive statements of the aim and there are five to each age group. The general objectives are then further described by between two and four secondary objectives which are examples of what the pupil should be able to do if the general objective had been achieved. These secondary objectives are thus all behavioural. Finally, for each of the general
objectives there is some content listed which is intended as illustrative material only. The general objectives, along with their descriptions, give a much fuller analysis of the aims than do the objectives in the Avon agreed syllabus but they would still seem to fall short of the "considerable elaboration" required by Lupton.

Some relevant points are also made about the basis of the syllabus. First, it expects that the content will be drawn largely from the Christian tradition as this is the religious faith that has had, and still has, the greatest influence on our culture. Secondly it claims that religious education is concerned with questions of the meaning and purpose of existence and should help pupils in their own search for meaning, purpose and values. It seems to suggest however that this should come by way of studying the answers that other people have given rather than by actually engaging in the quest based on the pupils own experience. Thirdly it recognises the importance of the pupils gaining an insight into the experiential dimension of religion and stresses the need for encounter with believers and with the practices, customs, the art and other ways in which the believers express their feelings.

There is little reference to attitudes in the syllabus. This is common to all of the agreed syllabuses up to, and including, this one. Whilst there is the expressed desire in the aim that the pupils should be able to develop their own
faith, undertake their own quest for meaning, there is nothing in any of the syllabuses that contributes towards this. Studying other people's feelings and insights is not the same as developing one's own insights, that requires an input from one's own experience and feelings. Equally, for such a course to work in the way that is intended in the agreed syllabus some guidance is needed as to the type of approach that is considered appropriate. Approach refers both to the way that the teacher prepares and conducts the lesson and to the way that the pupil approaches the lesson. One way in which this can be to some extent specified is by stating attitudes that it is considered appropriate to encourage in the pupils. This need not be objectionable as long as the attitudes specified are those that can be commonly agreed as desirable and are not specific to a particular religious standpoint. The sort of attitudes that would meet these criteria are those that might be thought desirable for the pupil's education in other areas of the curriculum.

If the teacher is to encourage these attitudes in the pupil then the approach the teacher must take is also specified to some extent. The type of attitudes that are acceptable, by their very nature require that they be taught in a certain way. For example it is hard to see how respect for others could effectively be encouraged in a way that did not show respect for the pupils and require them to enter imaginatively into the experience of others.
The Berkshire Agreed Syllabus (1982)

Knowledge

1) Describing

2) Understanding

3) Responding

Religious Heritage

1) Stories and events

2) Festival and ceremonies

3) Moral Teachings

4) Experience and faith

5) Culture and Organisation

6) Beliefs and Concepts

7) Questions and concerns

Attitudes

1) Curiosity

2) Open mindedness

3) Critical mind

4) Tolerance

5) Self-confidence

6) Consideration

7) Appreciation

8) Commitment

Skills

1) Enquiry

2) Expression

3) Empathy

4) Interpretation

5) Reasoning

6) Meditation
The objectives are offered in a diagrammatic form, as above, as well as with a fuller explanation.

The aim of this syllabus is stated thus

"Religious education aims to help pupils understand religious beliefs, practices and insights, in order that they may form their own beliefs and judgements, and their own allegiances and commitments."

(Berkshire Education Authority, 1982, 4)

The syllabus claims that

"Aims and objectives are roads to travel on, not destinations to reach".

(Berkshire Education Authority, 1982, 18)

The point that they wish to make is that religious education starts before, and goes on after, the pupils are at school. It is a generally accepted part of the definition of education that it is a lifelong process. However it seems strange to put this meaning on the terms aims and objectives as they tend to suggest a target rather than a continuing process.

The knowledge objectives are clearly influenced by Smart's six dimensions of religion, with the addition of "questions and concerns" as a seventh. Rather than being an extra dimension similar to Smart's other dimensions it seems more to be expressing the concern of the syllabus that pupils should be engaged in their own quest for meaning. It is a point worth
making but the emphasis is inappropriate here, a pupil's personal quest for meaning is not a part of our religious heritage. Equally, the way in which knowledge has been divided into three sections is unusual. Knowledge is usually thought of as static in that it is the raw material that is operated on by the thought processes. The terms the syllabus uses are dynamic namely describing, understanding and responding and these would seem to be used as the equivalents of knowledge, understanding and evaluation. These are certainly different ways in which knowledge can be used, they are broadly the uses of knowledge in which pupils may eventually be assessed, but they refer to the use to which the knowledge is put, not to the knowledge itself. These divisions would come more appropriately under the heading of skills.

The syllabus made a serious attempt at some kind of analysis of what is meant by religious education. Despite some unusual uses of language it represents a step of progress in the development of religious education in that it further clarifies what is meant by religious education. The visual summary of the syllabus tries to express that the religious heritage is the experience that the pupils are to be given and that the three separate aspects of the quest to make sense are knowledge, attitudes and skills; or knowing, feeling and doing as the syllabus calls them. These aspects are to be seen as of equal importance and as affecting each other.
The Durham Agreed Syllabus (1983).

This syllabus starts with a discussion of aims but does not specify any. The nearest to a specification of an aim is a sentence that states

"Religious education is concerned with helping young people to mature in sensitivity to this (spiritual dimension) aspect of human experience and to appreciate a religious understanding of life and what it means to be religiously committed." (Durham Education Authority, 1983, 3)

The main problem with this is the claim that there is a generally recognised spiritual dimension and that anyone reading this will understand what is meant. Many people would not recognise that there is a spiritual dimension that is separate from certain mental and emotional aspects of a person and so some definition and justification of this phrase is required.

The objectives are in terms of concepts, skills and attitudes but the lists of these are prefaced by a remark that they are not definitive or exhaustive but contain only some of those that could be listed. It is to be expected that those listed were considered to be the most important and it may be that the writers felt that the list was complete but wished to be cautious. The lists are open to the criticism to which all such lists are open and that is that they could be expressed in many different ways and still retain a similar character. They are certainly better in this respect than general
descriptive statements but the criticism is still valid. All things considered the syllabus takes another step towards a content free syllabus that aims for understanding rather than knowledge and in this respect can be seen as a further development.

The Manchester Agreed Syllabus (1985)

The principal aim of this syllabus is stated as

"The principal aim of religious education in county and voluntary controlled schools is to enable pupils to reflect upon and respond to the religious and spiritual beliefs, practices, insights and experiences that are expressed in human-kind's search for meaning in life."

(Manchester Education Authority, 1985)

It further explains that

"The term "religion" is used broadly and includes the usual meanings given to the words "spiritual" and "ethical"."

(Manchester Education Authority, 1985)

It also feels it necessary to state that whilst Christianity will feature clearly, other faiths should also be taught.

The objectives for the secondary stage are set out in four groups, the usual concepts, skills and attitudes and also experiences. Of these 'experience objectives two' are concerned with the broadening of the pupil's experience by developing sensitivity and appreciation, they are the type of descriptive objectives that appeared in earlier agreed syllabuses. The
third is,

"To help students to broaden their experiences by ..... meeting and sharing with people of various faiths or spiritual or ethical traditions." (Manchester Education Authority, 1985)

Apart from the intention that it should broaden the pupil's experience this objective has no end in view, it does not state specifically what should come out of the meeting and sharing. This is a new type of objective in an agreed syllabus, it is the first experiential objective that is intentionally experiential rather than behavioural. The same could not be said for the experiential objectives in the Avon syllabus because there the mixture of objectives is such that no intention can be assumed. As such it could be seen as a further development of religious education.

Examination Proposals

The Schools Council 18+ Research Programme N and F Proposals (1977)

These were intended as replacements for the G.C.E. at advanced level and were designed to give greater breadth of study, at the expense of some depth, to sixth form students. A student would study a norm of five subjects, three at normal (N) level and two at further (F) level. Within religious studies one group, the Basingstoke group, were asked to prepare an approach through the listing of objectives. Their brief was to convert the aim,
"to enable pupils to develop an understanding of religion and its place and significance in everyday life."

(Schools Council, 1977c, 2)

into specific objectives. The objectives that they formulated were

"1) The ability to IDENTIFY religious phenomena.
2) The ability to UNDERSTAND religious phenomena.
3) The ability to APPLY religious perspectives.
4) The ability to ANALYSE and EVALUATE information gathered." (Schools Council, 1977c, 2) (their emphasis)

Whilst they recognise that other objectives could have been included they claim that these represent an irreducible minimum core. They further explain what they mean by each of the objectives and claim that mastery of them by the student would produce an educated and skilful student of religion. In the next part of the document are schemes that set out how the objectives could be applied to selected aspects of Buddhism, Christianity and a study of some contemporary religious beliefs and practices. These schemes are intended to be exemplary and not a syllabus, they do however provide some guidance as to how the objectives are intended to be developed and attained. At the time the use of objectives presented in terms of abilities in religious understanding was a significant move forwards for the assessment of pupils in religious studies. This is because it related assessment to the most recently accepted ideas in curriculum development, in this case the means/end model.
It is worthwhile noting that many current mode 1 syllabuses in religious studies are still set out in terms of content only. It was also possible until recently to gain acceptance for a mode 3 scheme that sets out as objectives only general study skills. Often assessment objectives and skills in both modes are descriptions of content with words such as "understand" or "evaluate" as a prefix. The N and F proposals show much clearer thought about the educational objectives needed to achieve an aim that is specifically directed at the understanding religion rather than simply knowing about religion.


The Schools Council were involved in the preliminary work for this examination and Hogbin (1981) provides a useful summary of their report. In it four basic principles involved in religious study are stated.

"1) Every pupil should have knowledge of the religious traditions within which the culture and institutions of the United Kingdom have developed.

2) Every pupil should have knowledge of his own religious tradition where this differs from the mainstream United Kingdom tradition.

3) Every pupil should understand that his own religious tradition is one among a number.

4) Every pupil should gain a knowledge of religion that
enables him to achieve greater personal development and social competence." (Hogbin, 1981, 15)

These principles make it clear that the content of any course should include Christianity and also other religious traditions.

The paper also expects the National Criteria to be in the form of aims and objectives as it is in this form that insights and skills most likely to be of lasting value can be expressed. It is not expected that the aims and objectives can or should be comprehensive but, for the purpose of illustration, certain aims are identified. The objectives that are given are acknowledged to be limited to those that can be assessed. The objectives are in terms of abilities and for the most part relate a skill to a particular, though often wide, area of content, for example,

"Ability to recognise and use religious language."

(Hogbin, 1981, 20).

The National Criteria themselves provide the criteria to which examination proposals in the future will have to conform. They are not intended to prescribe an 11-16 syllabus in religious education but are concerned solely with the G.C.S.E. examination at 16+.

The assessment objectives are those upon which the candidate may be called to demonstrate his ability and upon that demonstration will depend his final grade. They are not a full
description of the aims. The aims are intended to be the
general aims of the course and will not all be assessed. When
an aim that starts,

"2.3. to help candidates to identify and explore questions
about the meaning of life...." (National Criteria, 1985, 1),
is considered it is clear that it is not the help that
students receive that is to be assessed. The two groups; aims,
which are of an educational nature, and assessment objectives
illustrate that there is often a difference between what is
educational and what can be assessed.

The assessment objectives read as objectives that describe
the aim of understanding religion and in this they are nearer
the current thought and practice of teachers than are the
previous examination syllabuses that were defined by content.
Given that these criteria are to apply nationally and must
therefore be general rather than specific they can be seen as
a further development in the field of assessment. As the
exemplary material shows they are wide ranging and adaptable.

It is possible to criticise the criteria and one criticism
could be that although a wide variety of combinations of
content are allowed for there is no mention of any
consideration of a humanistic approach to life. Also the
allocation of marks places an emphasis on knowledge that may
be unwelcome to some teachers who would regard the acquisition
of skills as of greater importance. Knowledge counts for
approximately as many marks as understanding, and each of
these counts for approximately twice the number of marks as evaluation.

Further criticism of the National Criteria comes in a document called "Religious Studies at 16+" by Wood (1984). This was concerned with assessment in a multi-cultural society and points out the danger that the content of the G.C.S.E. course could be entirely Christian or, if following a thematic approach, could lack coherence. This criticism is still valid now that the National Criteria have been published as it is quite possible to follow a course that is entirely Christian in content.

Of interest are Wood's discussion points for the future development of assessment. The first three are that:

1) there should be a common core of skills rather than a common core of content

2) assessment should be resource based ie. that stimulus material should be included in examinations

3) the feasibility of practical tests in religious studies should be seriously considered.

These three pointers to possible future development of assessment suggest a different type of course from that which has so far been suggested. For pupils to be able to cope with assessments based on these principles the course should develop the skills required and also provide a familiarity with stimulus material and practical work in religious studies. The possibilities that are opened up by these changes
in assessment are wide and some of them will be considered in this thesis.
Summary

Religious education has moved from a content based syllabus to one based on the objectives model of the curriculum, in line with the general trend in education.

Religious education has developed from a confessional stance to one that is largely based on the study and understanding of the phenomena of religion. As well as understanding it also seems necessary that the pupil's own beliefs, based on the pupil's experiences, are developed.

Since the Birmingham Agreed Syllabus opened up agreed syllabuses to the study of a wide variety of beliefs there has been no agreed syllabus of influence that has been confessional in nature.

Within the recent agreed syllabuses there is a development in the description of the aims of religious education. These have been described in terms of general objectives, more specific objectives and, currently, in terms of concepts, skills and attitudes.

Assessment seems to be making some progress in the direction of assessment of understanding, rather than just knowledge, with the introduction of the National Criteria for G.C.S.E. There are suggestions for further development which indicate a different emphasis in religious education.
CHAPTER TWO

THE AIMS/OBJECTIVES MODEL OF THE CURRICULUM

In the previous chapter, the historical survey of the development of concepts, skills and attitudes in religious education, it was noted that it was an aims and objectives model of the curriculum that was being developed. The use of concepts, skills and attitudes as objectives represents the latest development of the aims/objectives model in religious education. It was also noted in passing that there are some apparent weaknesses in that model. This chapter will examine the model more closely to assess its value for the planning of the pupil's education. It will start with a more thorough description of the aims/objectives model and then go on to examine some criticisms that have been made of it.

The development of the aims/objectives model of the curriculum.

It is reasonable to say that three principal factors have been influential in the development of the aims/objectives model. These three are educational theory, psychology and changes in society. Their influence has been inter-related but for the moment they will be considered separately.
1) Educational Theory

One of the most influential, and one of the earliest, writers to propose an aims/objectives model for the curriculum was R.W. Tyler in his book "Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction" published in 1949. In it he offered a systematic approach to the development of the curriculum. By systematic is meant an attempt at the rational planning of educational thinking about the curriculum. He argued that we could set out our objectives in education in three ways. The first two are, a) to specify the activities of the teacher and b) to specify the content to be covered. Tyler argues that neither of these can claim to give us educational ends. In the first case it is unreasonable to specify teacher activities before stating the changes that are desired in the students. In the second case there is no indication of what is to be done with the content and thus there is no clear idea of the curriculum that may result from this specification.

Tyler then identifies a third way of stating educational objectives, that of expressing them in terms of the behaviour to be developed in the student ie. as a behavioural objective. Tyler does not mean by behavioural objective a statement such as "to develop critical thinking". He requires the statement to specify the behaviour more precisely. Neither will, "to be able to write a critical essay" satisfy him as he also requires that all objectives should be linked to content. The type of objective that he requires should state clearly the ability to be learnt and the area of content
in which this ability can be demonstrated, for example "to write clear and well organised social studies reports" (Tyler, 1949, 47). An objective should be stated in this way to facilitate the selection of learning experiences. It has the apparent advantage of making assessment relatively straightforward as well, both of the ability of the student and the effectiveness of the teacher. Thus Tyler's meaning of behavioural objective includes both the intended behaviour of the student and relevant area of content, guides the selection of learning experiences and indicates the end result of an educational process (Tyler, 1949, 62).

2) Psychology

The influence of psychology on curriculum development has been based on theories of learning and the transfer of learning. Taba (1962) describes three theories of learning that are relevant to education, and the notions of transfer of learning that go with them, in her book "Curriculum Development - Theory and Practice". The first theory can be called the faculty theory and it sees the mind as already containing all mental faculties which just need training and practice to bring them to the required standard. This theory assumes a complete, or almost complete, transfer of training. This degree of transfer was challenged by many psychologists including Thorndike and Woodworth, and the theory is now outmoded in that it would be dismissed by the vast majority of psychologists.
The second theory can be called the associationist theory or the stimulus/response model. This suggests that learning consists of building up a collection of responses, each one to a particular stimulus, there being little or no transfer of training.

The third theory, often called the field theory, is the one that has gained the widest acceptance and has been stated in a wide variety of ways. Basically it suggests that cognitive processes are a fundamental characteristic of human responses even at its most simple levels and that man perceives and creates relationships from his perceptions. This theory accepts that there is some transfer of training and suggests that new perceptions are interpreted in the light of previous learning and are adapted into generalisations that have already been made. This is a complex theory and finding agreement even between those who hold this theory can be difficult. Hilgard has produced a list of fourteen points that he feels are fairly commonly agreed. This list has been combined with a similar one from Wheeler and the list thus produced of sixteen points could be said to be commonly agreed upon as reflecting accurately the way in which we learn. This list is added as appendix A.

The list is important for two reasons. Firstly for teachers as providing some criteria for selection of suitable learning experiences with which to obtain their educational objectives. Secondly, and more relevant to the development of the
objectives model, is that they indicate a certain kind of curriculum and syllabus planning. They require the student to be active, involved, motivated and encouraged to make connections and generalisations. A model of the curriculum that is based on the attainment of behavioural objectives, where there is an emphasis on developing the skills and understanding of the students, could be considered to satisfy these requirements. By using the points of agreement as the basis for choosing learning experiences to attain the objectives the teacher can then argue that he is planning his teaching as effectively as possible according to the current agreed understanding of the learning process.

3) Changes in Society

Society is a very broad term but there has been an increasing call for education in schools to equip students for life in society after school. What is meant by society in this context can best be shown by illustration, for example Taba (1962) claims that Chase (1956) listed five aspects of society that set tasks for education. These were:

"1) A tremendous enlargement of the environment to be understood and the culture to be transmitted.
2) An ever increasing demand for an increasingly skilled and literate workforce.
3) The necessity for the establishment of intercultural communication among the diverse cultures of the East and the West as a basis for building a world community."
4) The difficulties involved in sustaining wide latitudes of free individual choice in a world of magnified power and shrunken space and time.

5) A constantly accelerating rate of change which makes forecasting hazardous and outspeeds the efforts of education to draw abreast of needs." (Taba, 1962, 40, 41)

These new conditions in society require a different curriculum from one that is based on a fixed content. They also indicate the type of person that could be expected to come from the process of education. It is clear that a curriculum model that is based on aims and objectives could provide the framework for the type of education that is being called for.

Apart from the three principal factors, detailed above, it is possible to suggest two other factors in society that have encouraged the adoption of this particular model. These are the reduction in the amount of respect for teachers and the education system, and the increasing concern for value for money and the demand for accounting for money spent. Whilst these two factors are not so well documented as the others that have been considered they do seem to have had an influence on education. They have resulted in teachers justifying their work in terms of what they intend to produce, i.e. in the stating of behavioural objectives.

Finally there has been a great expansion of the content that
could be included in a pupil's education. This can be clearly seen in religious education with the introduction of religions other than Christianity. It is impossible to cover all religions in the same detail that Christianity was once covered and therefore decisions were necessary about what should be in the syllabus. The result has been an emphasis on understanding and on learning how to evaluate experiences. It is this type of education for which the aims/objectives model has been considered as providing an appropriate model.

A description of the aims/objectives model.

Goals

The term goals can be used to include both aims and objectives, and so we need to make some distinction between them and establish the relationship between them. Wheeler (1967) has divided goals into three types and these are

a) ultimate - the goals for planning the whole curriculum, what are usually call aims.

b) mediate - the behavioural objectives derived from the ultimate goals and which are used to plan courses.

c) proximate - the objectives that are used for the planning of specific lessons.

The relationship between aims and objectives.

The aim of education is the educated man and this is usually
considered to be by definition a desirable state. Those that complain that education is poor or restrictive will usually go on to say what education should be like, thus demonstrating that they do believe that education is a desirable state. The aims of education are value judgements that prescribe desirable states that go to make up what would be considered the desirable state that is called educated.

Objectives are descriptive of the intended outcome of teaching. Harris suggests that there are two ways in which objectives may be related to aims:

a) as pre-conditions for the fulfilment of aims

b) as objectives, the achievement of which constitutes the achievement of the aim. (Harris, 1972, 116)

In many areas it appears to be impossible fully to describe that which is by nature prescriptive. For example, where a value judgement is made and some form of art is prescribed as beautiful it is not possible to describe exactly what it is that makes it beautiful. Similarly it is not possible fully to describe aims that are prescriptive of desirable states.

Even in training it is difficult to see any useful activity can fully be described that is not learnt purely by rote. For example there may be a requirement that a student should be able to use a chisel and it may be possible to describe an action that is appropriate to the use of a chisel. However, as soon as a value judgement is introduced into the use of the chisel, say to use the chisel in a manner that is both safe
and efficient, the nature of the problem changes. With the vast range of ways in which a chisel may be used, particularly bearing in mind the uniqueness of each wood grain, description of the actions required must give way to the learning of principles. Thus objectives of type b seem logically unacceptable for educational aims.

The only way in which type b objectives can be used in education is if they are tautologous of the aim. For example, "appreciating Hamlet" can only be a type b objective if the aim was "to appreciate Hamlet".

It is reasonable to suggest that there can be two types of objectives and that these are:--

a) pre-conditions for the fulfillment of aims
b) objectives liable to promote the fulfillment of aims.

The second group of objectives include not only behavioural objectives but also what have been called experiential objectives. Consideration will now be given to these two types of objectives, ie. behavioural and experiential.

Behavioural Objectives.

White (1971) suggests that there are two types of behavioural objectives:--

"1) objectives which themselves consist in the pupils behaving in a certain way.
2) objectives whose attainment is tested by pupils behaving in
This distinction can be shown by considering three examples.  
a) In an elocution lesson the objective "to speak in a correct way" is clearly a behavioural objective of both types. It is the same behaviour that satisfies both criteria.  
b) In a course on clear thinking one objective might be that a student will "test the validity of arguments". The activity of testing arguments is a behavioural objective in sense (1) but only by questioning the student can it be said that it is a behavioural objective in sense (2). The questioning of the student to see if they do test arguments is not the same as the actual testing of arguments. However, the objective is still behavioural in both senses.  
c) In a course on aesthetic appreciation an objective might be "to appreciate the beauty of a particular painting". The appreciation can be tested by questioning and so this is a behavioural objective in sense (2). However, behaviour is active and intention guided whilst appreciation is a state. Appreciation may be accompanied by actions but it is in essence passive. It is therefore not possible to say that this is a behavioural objective in sense (1).  

Pratt (1976) notes this by suggesting that behavioural objectives are characteristically stated in such terms as "perform, demonstrate, write down" ie. by performance criteria. Where there are objectives characterised by such terms as "know, understand, be able to" then states are being
defined rather than actual behaviour. These states are passive and so would be behavioural objectives only in White's sense (2) and not sense (1).

MacDonald Ross claims that there are four characteristics of an adequate behavioural objective and that these are

"1) The objective relates (somehow) to the general educational aims.
2) The objective states what the student will be able to do after the learning experience (that he could not do before).
3) The objective is brought to the appropriate level of detail by specifying the conditions relevant to the performance.
4) A standard of performance is indicated".

(MacDonald Ross, 1975, 151)

Experiential Objectives.

An experiential objective does not have a particular end in view nor is it a means to a long lasting state. The objective is to present the student with an educational encounter, with an experience from which they may learn or bring to bear what they have learned previously. The experiential objective describes the encounter and not the end result. Eisner calls these objectives expressive and describes them thus:

"The expressive objective is intended to serve as a theme around which skills and understandings learned earlier can be brought to bear, but through which those skills and understandings can be expanded, elaborated and made

The learning from the experience is not predetermined. The experience could be such as solving a problem, tackling a task; more specifically such as interpreting a poem or making an object from wire and clay. The student should use those of his previous learning experiences that he considers appropriate and develop in his own direction. The intention of the objective is that the student has an opportunity to develop his own personality along the lines that he chooses.

Whilst experiential objectives do not seem to be part of the orthodoxy of the objectives model they do represent a development of the model which offers a signpost to a different model, one that will be considered further in chapter three. Experiential objectives can be seen as an attempt to answer some of the criticisms of the objectives model and of behavioural objectives in particular. It is these criticisms that will now be considered.

Criticisms of the Objectives Model.

There have been many criticisms made of behavioural objectives and of the objectives model. MacDonald Ross (1975) lists sixteen criticisms of behavioural objectives

"1) No consistent view exists as to the origin of objectives.
2) In the educational domain no well-defined prescriptions are available for deriving objectives."
3) Defining objectives before the event conflicts with voyages of exploration.
4) Advocates do not show how teachers can use objectives to guide unpredicted classroom events.
5) There is an extremely large number of paths through any body of knowledge, thus reducing the effectiveness of objectives in design.
6) In some disciplines criteria can only be applied after the event.
7) Objectives do not prescribe the validity of test items.
8) Objectives are inherently ambiguous.
9) The level of specificity problem has never been solved.
10) Objectives do not communicate intent unambiguously, especially to students.
11) Trivial objectives are the easiest to operationalise, and this is a problem.
12) The relevance of goal-referenced models of education can be questioned.
13) Weak prescriptions lead to cycling. This can be costly.
14) Lists of behaviours do not adequately represent the structure of knowledge.
15) The use of behavioural objectives implies a poverty-stricken model of student-teacher interaction.
16) The behavioural objectives scheme suffers from many of the weaknesses of any operationalist dogma."

(MacDonald Ross, 1975, 178,179)

He suggests that the most important of these are 1,2,7,9, and 13 to 16. He also claims that many of the more detailed
objections can be traced back to 14, 15 and 16, which he regards as fundamental. Of the difficulty in writing objectives, he suggests that the cause is some combination from the above list. Space and time do not permit an exhaustive study of the objections but some of those will be considered that seem to be the most important. These refer to whether the model is the best way to improve education, if the model can be considered workable, the model's interpretation of the structure of knowledge, and finally whether it correctly reflects the nature of education.

The improvement of education.

One of the arguments for the objectives model of the curriculum has been that it provides a basis for the improvement of the practice of the teacher and hence an improvement in the education of the pupil. However, Stenhouse (1975, 83) suggests that seeing the objectives model as being the way of improving teacher practice rests on a fundamental mistake. He argues that practice is not improved by setting higher and higher standards but by giving people the opportunity constructively to criticise their performance. It is consideration of the process that leads to changes and improvement in practice and not whether a certain standard has or has not been achieved. The objectives model fails in this respect in that it only indicates success or failure and not the reasons for the outcome of the educational process. Some assessment of actual performance could be incorporated into
the way that the model is taught but such assessment is not an intrinsic part of the model.

The production of objectives.

If the objectives model is to be workable it must be possible to generate a clear and comprehensive list of objectives from the aims of the course. Some of the problems of deriving objectives that fully describe aims, from the aims that are themselves prescriptive, have already been considered.

The problem of writing objectives became obvious during the consideration of aims and objectives within religious education. Frequently the objectives were expressed as descriptive statements that were as vague as the aims that they were supposed to be describing. When the objectives were not vague they were often interpretations of the aim in a very narrow sense. For example, where the aim was "understanding of Christianity", the objectives could be the broad and vague "knowledge of the life of Christ"; or the narrow "knowledge of St. Mark's gospel as it shows the teaching of Jesus" where there is little reference to other interpretations or aspects of the life of Jesus. Clearly there is no agreed level for the mediate goals that these objectives represent. Mediate goals are intended to expand the aims such that the course can be planned, such that it will reflect the aims accurately. To do this they must not only expand parts of the aims but must also include all aspects of the aims that are to be included in the
course. There will be a great deal of room for interpretation between mediate goals and proximate goals, which give the objectives for each lesson, and only by looking at the proximate goals can a clear idea of the substance of the course be gained. However, it is fair to say that the first example of a mediate objective was too vague and the second, whilst having the necessary detail, requires many other objectives alongside it to cover all aspects of the aim.

Neither of the examples of objectives given above was behavioural in that they indicate passive states. Nor are they experiential because they do not describe an educational encounter but rather an end state. There are several other examples of objectives within the field of religious education where the descriptive statements of objectives are more appropriate to an earlier time in education when the curriculum was stated in terms of content. For example, the objective from the Avon Agreed Syllabus that requires that pupils "have some knowledge of the daily life of children at other times and in other countries, including that in first century Palestine" has already been noted.

When it was found that concepts, skills and attitudes were listed to describe the aims of religious education it was found that there was often a qualification to the list that these were among those expected to be the objectives of the course. There was never a claim that the list was exhaustive and that, when mastered, constituted the achievement of the
aims of the course. Thus even when mediate goals are considered in their most analytic form, that of concepts, skills and attitudes, they still fall short of providing a definition of the prescriptive statements of the aims. They constitute an incomplete description of the aims. Whilst aims are prescriptive and can only be assessed on a subjective basis, objectives are intended to relate to behaviour that can be assessed objectively and they themselves are open to assessment. It should also be noted that of concepts, skills and attitudes, only skills could be considered as behavioural objectives in White's sense (1). Even these may be rare as it is difficult to formulate an objective that requires the pupil to behave in a certain way that would not be thought objectionable by some group of people. For example, "that the pupil can pray according to a particular faith" would be objectionable to people of other faiths.

Many skills objectives, and all attitude objectives, will only be behavioural in White's sense (2). For example, statements that require pupils to "appreciate" or "understand" such things as religious language are skills in this sense. It is important to note that these do not state the outcome of the pupil's appreciation and are hence not objectionable in the same way as the example of a behavioural objective in White's sense (1).

Concepts per se must be considered as content although they are often written as understandings. For example, "understand
the meaning of commitment to a believer" can be expressed as having a concept of religious belief as entailing commitment.

MacDonald Ross suggested that an adequate objective has four characteristics and an example of deriving a proximate goal from an objective may illustrate some of the problems involved. An aim of a course in physical education could be that the students become physically fit. This would include some commitment on the part of the students as well as learning. Mediate goals would include the understanding of the importance of such things as diet, rest and hygiene. In order to assess the commitment of the students some objectives relating to standards of performance would need to be included. An example of a proximate objective of this aspect of the course may be that the student should "be able to run 2,000 metres in under six minutes". This states what the student will be able to do after the learning experience, although he may have been able to do it before. It also indicates a standard of performance. Another characteristic of objectives, according to MacDonald Ross, is that the conditions relevant to the performance must be specified. Certain qualifications to the objective must be added such as wind speed, altitude, type of track, weather conditions, slope of track, and any others that may affect the performance.

However, fitness is a relative term, relating to the individual. The asthma sufferer may never be able to make such a sustained effort and others may find it either hard or easy,
much depends upon for which group of students this objective is thought to be suitable, particularly for which age group. If each student is to be treated as an individual, and each student is to be assessed at the same level of fitness relative to his own abilities, then the objective must be written for each student on an individual basis. This may well be considered as impractical if we are to bear in mind the number of objectives and the number of students who are the responsibility of a single teacher.

This example from physical education highlights two of the major problems of writing objectives. The first is the problem of writing objectives that define the prescriptive aim. The second problem comes from the first and is the difficulty of stating adequate qualifiers to the objective to make it precise and unequivocal.

The example of fitness was used because few would doubt the desirability of fitness, although some may question its place on a school curriculum. It is difficult to find an objective in religious education that would not be questioned as to its value and desirability by some group. For example, in a religious education syllabus a mediate goal may be that "the pupils have an understanding of Christianity". The range of possible meanings of this objective are vast. It could be used as an objective in an Infant School or in a Theological College. Within the secondary sector of education the range of meaning could extend from that of a Church School to that
put on the objective by a school in a multi-faith community. This is to disregard for a moment those who would argue that an understanding of Christianity has little or no value, and no place on the school curriculum.

Fitness is only one aspect of physical education and an ability to run is only one aspect of fitness. So understanding of Christianity is only one aspect of religious education and "understanding the doctrine of God" is only one aspect of understanding Christianity. To ask the question of whose doctrine of God illustrates some of the problems that have to be faced in the formulation of proximate objectives, and thus in the writing of qualifiers for the objectives within religious education. To further require that each pupil reaches an understanding of the doctrine of God that is compatible with his ability, and comparative to the abilities of other pupils; and that this achievement is assessed for each pupil, seems to take the specification of objectives into the realms of impossibility.

The fourth characteristic of an objective to be considered is that the objective relates properly to the aim. In this example the objective test is not the same as the educational intention of the aim. A student who can achieve that objective may be fit but achieving the objective is not the same as being fit, it is not the same as achieving the aim. It is an indicator objective in that it is an indicator of the intention but is not the same as the intention itself. If the
aim is to be fulfilled then a series of objectives must be written which can be tested objectively. Even then the question of whether the aim has been achieved could still be open to debate. Fitness is not a precise description but rather a value judgement, it depends upon the individual point of view whether a person is considered fit or not. There may be a large degree of public agreement about what constitutes fitness but there will always remain some scope for disagreement. This is the problem that has been mentioned before, that descriptive objectives cannot fully define prescriptive aims.

Two problems have been examined in this section, the difficulties in writing objectives, both proximate and mediate with regard to the detail and complexity necessary, and the difficulty in making a list of objectives complete such that the achievement of all of the objectives constitutes the achievement of the aim. As was noted when White's distinction between types of behavioural objectives was considered, some behavioural objectives can only be tested indirectly and this introduces further problems into the writing and assessment of objectives, for then assessments must be devised and it must be demonstrated that success in the assessment constitutes achievement of the objective. When Harris was considered it seemed that a full description of aims in terms of objectives was impossible in many areas due to the prescriptive nature of aims. After the above criticisms of the objectives model it would seem that it is the responsibility of the supporters of
the objectives model to show that it can work, that a complete list of precise objectives is possible and realistic. There appears to be no such demonstration, particularly in the field of religious education.

This is a fundamental problem in that no educational justification of the objectives model can be valid unless it can also be shown that the model is practical, that it can work as the basis for curriculum planning in schools. Neither is it an answer to say that teachers must be trained, and put in more effort to make it work. The problems that have been outlined appear to show that the working of the objectives model is unrealistic.

The structure of knowledge.

By structure of knowledge is meant the way that discrete data are inter related. Structure of knowledge refers to the way in which man integrates knowledge to give a coherent pattern to his experiences. Bruner (1960) further explains this and emphasises the importance of the structure of knowledge when he makes four basic claims for the teaching of the fundamental structure of a subject. These were that

1) Understanding the fundamental structure makes the subject more comprehensible.

2) Human memory can better retain structural patterns rather than random details.

3) Understanding of fundamental principles and ideas appears
to be the main road to adequate transfer of training.

4) The gap between elementary and advanced knowledge of a subject is reduced by emphasis on structure.

MacDonald Ross, in his list of criticisms of the objectives model, lists as number 14

"Lists of behaviours do not adequately represent the structure of knowledge." (MacDonald Ross, 1975, 179)

By this he means that lists of behaviours do not reflect the coherence of the ideas contained in the lists.

Stenhouse (1975) suggests that education should enhance the freedom of man in that it should induct him into the knowledge of his culture as a thinking system. In other words that education should be such that the educated man is free to think because he has learnt the modes of thought. This again outlines the importance of structure, the educated man has been introduced to the structure of a subject and can now develop his own thoughts in a coherent manner. Stenhouse goes on to claim that

"Education as induction into knowledge is successful to the extent that it makes the behavioural outcomes of the students unpredictable." (Stenhouse, 1975, 82)

The idea of education as producing a man freely thinking, and reacting to his thoughts, is contradictory to the idea of education as being stated in terms of behavioural outcomes.
The nature of education.

Stenhouse's comments raise the question of what is meant by education, what is the nature of education? This provides the final criticism that will be made of the objectives model. It is the least substantiated of the criticisms but it may be the most important in that it opens up an alternative line of enquiry to follow, an idea to replace the model that has just been criticised. There is no real agreement as to what education should be, that is, there is no well defined prescription of the educated state that is the intention of education. There are, however, a great many writers that have concerned themselves with the nature of education. They have not prescribed what it is to be educated but have indicated the form that the prescription should take. Peters suggested that education

"implied the transmission of what is worthwhile to those who become committed to it." (Peters, 1966, 45)

He further describes education as taking part in worthwhile activities, which he described as

"activities that have standards in them rather than requiring justification in terms of what they lead on to."

(Peters, 1966, 155)

This echoes a point that Bertrand Russell made when he wrote that

"the essence of what is useful is that it ministers to some result which is not merely useful." (Russell, 1926, 15)
When applied to education there is the possibility of two conclusions. Firstly that education is useful in that it results in the educated state, which is not merely useful. This takes a utilitarian view of education but in an unusual way. Education should produce an educated state, a tautology, but this state must be more than useful, it cannot be training or lead to any particular outcome that might be described as useful. Certainly objectives fit in to this pattern of education so far but the problem is with the aims of education. These must be justified not in terms of usefulness but in other terms, that of leading to an educated state that is of value in its own right, but if it has intrinsic value then it needs no justification. Therefore the aims of education can be stated according to personal preference, they are value judgements requiring no justification. Little agreement as to the aims of education can be expected and to ask where the value lies in a set of aims is the same as asking what use they have, hence implying that their value is not inherent but extrinsic.

The second conclusion is that the process of education itself is of a value that is not merely useful. This is the view taken by Blenkin and Kelly when they wrote that if educational provision

"must be justified in utilitarian or instrumental terms, we will be denying pupils access to something of vital importance - an appreciation and understanding of the concept
that some things can be valuable for their own sakes."

(Blenkin, 1983, 313)

They believe that one thing that is valuable for its own sake
is education, consisting as it does, or should do, of
worthwhile activities.

It is this concept of the nature of education as of intrinsic
worth, whose worthwhileness lies in its activities, its
process rather than in its end, that contradicts the notion of
curriculum planning through pre-specified objectives. It will
not be argued that behavioural objectives, and the objectives
model in general, are worthless but that there are inherent
deficiencies in the model. In looking for a different model on
which to base curriculum planning it is not reasonable to go
back to the earlier model based on content, for exactly the
reasons that led to the introduction of the objectives model
in the first place and which are still relevant now. The model
that will be considered in the next chapter is based not on
the end of education but on the process of education.

There has already been some suggestion that this might be an
appropriate direction in which to proceed. Loukes emphasised
the process of education in his description of good teaching.
Also, the objectives model itself has spawned experiential
objectives which are concerned with providing an experience
for the pupils with no preconceived ends to the experience.
Thus the emphasis is on the process and not the end. It would
seem a logical progression to inquire as to whether it is
possible to formulate a model of the curriculum based on the process of education.
Summary

There have been three principal factors in the development and adoption of the aims/objectives model of the curriculum. These are educational theory, psychology and the changing nature of society. Other factors can also be suggested.

In the objectives model the objectives are intended to specify what is meant by the aims. Objectives can be categorised in a variety of ways, amongst these is the distinction between behavioural and experiential objectives.

There are many arguments against the aims/objectives model of the curriculum, among the more important are a) the model does not provide the best way to improve education, b) the production of comprehensive objectives is not possible, c) the model does not reflect the structure of knowledge, d) the model mistakes the nature of education.

These arguments against the model do not seem to be answered adequately. This means that the objectives model may be an unsafe model to adopt as the basis of the curriculum.

A study of the nature of education and the notion of experiential objectives may provide some suggestion of another model that could be developed and adopted.
A view of education was presented at the end of the last chapter that is not consistent with the objectives model of the curriculum. It suggested that planning of the curriculum be based on the process of education not the end of the process, the educated state. Before looking at the planning of a curriculum based on a process model of the curriculum some further consideration of the features of the model may be useful.

Features of the process model.

Kelly (1983) suggests that the process model represents a tradition that has developed from a range of sources, each of which has been operating on similar principles. The most fundamental principle of the model

"is its insistence that education must be planned and assessed in terms of its own intrinsic values and merits rather than as instrumental to the achievement of goals or the creation of products that are extrinsic to it."

(Kelly, 1983, 11)

This is the argument that was presented in the previous chapter and it constitutes a definition of education about which there can be disagreement. It does, however, represent a
view of education that is justifiable, as has been shown, and it is the view of education that will be considered further. It is the only model available that offers a realistic alternative to the objectives model that has already been examined and found wanting.

Another feature is that education be thought of

"in terms of activity and experience rather than of knowledge to be acquired and facts to be stored."

(Hadow, 1931, 75)

This represents the desire that the curriculum be designed with the intention of the development of the pupils according to their needs rather than according to the demands of bodies of knowledge that may be thought to be useful. This again emphasises the process of education rather than an end result, and also the central importance of the pupil in the process. This view is endorsed by the current understanding of learning as represented in the list as appendix A.

A third feature is that there is no division made between basic skills and other, apparently more sophisticated, forms of learning. This division is difficult, if not impossible, to make and as there is no agreed definition of what is a "basic skill" can have little meaning. As an example of what is meant by this division, pupils are often put off reading by an emphasis on mechanical ability rather than reading for enjoyment and appreciation of the literature. This manifests itself in a constant progression to harder and harder books
rather than allowing the pupil a choice of books based on interest. The result is often that reading is seen as a task and there is no development of the "higher skills" of appreciation, comprehension is considered all important.

This problem of differentiation of skills is also shown in Bloom's taxonomy of educational objectives. This offers one interpretation of the complex structure of learning and the problem can best be shown by example. The statement "Harold Wilson was Prime Minister" can be seen as a simple piece of knowledge. However, to understand the full implications of the statement requires much more advanced concepts such as government and democracy. Gribble (1970) makes a further point that has been referred to before, and that is that the objectives are not educational as they stand, they can only be deemed educational when applied to some suitable content. A value judgement as to what is educational needs to be made, a prescription of what is education is necessary.

A final comment on this feature of the process model can be seen in Bruner's declaration, based on his claims for the structure of knowledge, that

"Any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development." (Bruner, 1960, 33)

Whilst this statement does not necessarily apply exclusively to the process model it is certainly within the capacity of the model to fulfil the requirements of the statement.
A final feature of the process model that is noted by Kelly is

"the idea that knowledge should be seen as largely undifferentiated, that subject boundaries, far from being sacrosanct, are arbitrary and ephemeral". (Kelly, 1983, 12)

He qualifies this by saying that the only time that the demands of a subject should impinge upon a pupil's education is when it is necessary for the organisation of the pupil's experience. Kelly was writing for the primary school, the situation is different in secondary schools where the current practice is for the timetable to be based on subjects. That is not to say that the point can be dismissed and it is one that will be returned to later on in another chapter. The next step is consideration of how a process model can be used in the planning of the curriculum.

The process model in practice.

"Education should be rational and meaningful.
Rationality and meaning entail intention.
Therefore education should be intentional."

(Pratt, 1976, 19)

There can surely be no question that education should be intentional, the problem is how to put these intentions into practice. The way that these intentions are put into practice to some extent reveals what the intentions are. With the objectives model the intentions are stated in the form of
aims, the intentions of the process model must be realised in some other way.

Dearden (1976) suggests that these intentions will not be prescriptive of the content but rather along the lines of what he calls relational aims. He describes relational aims as those concerned with a pupil's positive attitude to learning. He goes on to claim that

"These relational aims can be conveniently grouped under three main headings: 1) intrinsic interest (eagerness, curiosity, learning to learn, absorption etc.); 2) self expression (expressing one's individuality, being oneself, etc.); 3) autonomy (making independent judgements, choosing with confidence, self direction, learning by discovery etc.)."

(Dearden, 1976, 54)

He then goes on to suggest that whilst these relational aims are important it is also necessary to give guidance on the substance of these educational activities. He suggests that teachers formulate aims based on initiating pupils into

"the main forms of knowledge or understanding which have been historically developed". (Dearden, 1976, 55)

He also claims that direction to educational activities should come by ensuring that content and skills will have

"future usefulness, whether for the later stages of education itself or by way of "preparation for life"."

(Dearden, 1976, 55)

By placing such value on the end product of education, by making it a main focus of education, Dearden is not using the
notion of education as process in the way currently under consideration. The criticism could also be made that by formulating aims based on the initiation of the pupils into forms of knowledge, however specified, he is to some extent prescribing the intentions of education. This is related to the problem of how to select content that was raised by Kelly in his comments on the artificial boundaries between subjects.

Stenhouse (1975, 5) is concerned that the intention of the curriculum should be open to critical scrutiny. If the intentions of the process model are to be open to critical scrutiny then the principles upon which the curriculum are planned must be carefully set out. Unlike the objectives model it is not possible to describe the end result, rather the intentions of the course should become clear by the way in which the task of teaching the pupils is approached. Peters suggestions as to the nature of education have already been considered.

The process model will now be considered in relation to two aspects; transmission or approach, and content. Whilst in practice these two are to a large extent inseparable they will be considered separately. In each case some method of defining the method of selection of the learning will be sought that will leave the intentions of the course open to critical scrutiny. Content will be considered first; it has already been mentioned in relation to some problems and these have a bearing upon the definition of the approach.
When Stenhouse (1975) proposed a process model of the curriculum he based it on Hirst's forms of knowledge. That is, he reasoned that the forms of knowledge provided the basis on which the content could be selected. He argued that the curriculum should cover all forms of knowledge and that the forms of knowledge directed what needed to be taught.

Barrow (1976) does make the point that even if the different forms are valid it still does not follow that they can be the basis of a curriculum in that it would not necessarily be said that each form needs to be mastered for the student to be considered educated. Indeed, it is hard to say what might be meant by "mastery" of a form. It could be argued, however, that an education that did not include each of the forms of knowledge and its basic thought structures was not a comprehensive education in that it did not allow a man to be completely free in his thought. He would be restricted by not having experience of one form of thought, its structure would not be known to him.

There are several theories of knowledge that propose a similar scheme to the forms of knowledge. Hirst's has been the most influential in this country and so it is the one on which attention will be concentrated. Phenix's realms of meaning have been criticised due to the arbitrary nature of his choice of the characteristics of true
propositions upon which our realms of meaning are based. Equally relevant is the criticism that a realm of meaning is not the same as a realm of truth, there can be meaning without truth. Although the realms are different from Hirst's forms they are also open to the main criticism that will be considered in relation to the forms.

Hirst's forms have been challenged by many writers and some of the challenges do not appear to have been answered satisfactorily. Brent (1978) and Smith (1981) raise points that are not only valid but also are of concern in other areas and so it is these two that will now be considered further.

Both Brent and Smith criticise Hirst on the point of the objectivity of the forms of knowledge. For Hirst the forms are objective in that they deal with concepts that are expressed linguistically and are recognised by more than one person. They constitute shared knowledge rather than purely personal awareness ie. their objectivity lies in their linguistic intersubjectivity. Brent disagrees with Hirst in that he suggests that they cannot be considered properly objective if they are not transcendent of culture ie. that they are not applicable only to a particular culture or cultures. He also argues that if they are not transcendent of culture then they are not a suitable basis of an educational curriculum. In that case education would have to be seen as reinforcing the pattern of society by limiting
the students thought to a particular, culturally determined, pattern rather than developing the individuality and creativity of the pupil as a person.

Brent argues that the forms are transcendental. He bases his argument on Toulmin's (1949) notion of "limiting" questions ie. that our reaction to a situation determines the question that we will ask and the answer that is appropriate. That there are a limited number of reactions, and hence a limited number of forms of knowledge, leads Brent to claim that "It is these reactions that constitute the primitive differentiation of consciousness which has developed into the ..... schema as we have it today."

(Brent, 1978, 201)

Smith (1981) also criticises the forms of knowledge from the standpoint of objectivity and Hirst's use of the term "criterion" and his criticism seems more fundamental. Smith's argument is quite technical and to fully explain it would take up more space than is available. Therefore, a much shortened form of the argument is given here.

Smith points out that the word criterion has a general sense of a "standard by which anything is judged or estimated"

(O.E.D.)

but it also has a technical sense in which the word "points not to the grounds for applying a concept in
particular cases, but to the normal circumstances in which
the concept has application”.

(Smith, 1981, 20)

He then argues that the linguistic intersubjectivity that is
Hirst's grounds for the forms of knowledge is in fact not
the criterion for truth but the criterion for objectivity,
meaning that it is this

"underlying level of agreement that makes possible our
concept of objectivity.”

(Smith, 1981, 20)

Thus in the technical sense of the word criterion, which is
the one that Smith believes Hirst is using, the result is
not forms of knowledge but forms of objectivity. These forms
can be described as forms in which individuals can
communicate experience to others. They are equally the
underlying conditions that give us our notions of falsity as
of truth, nonsense as of meaning. Brent is equally open to
this criticism. There may be a limited number of reactions
communicable as Toulmin suggests and these form the bases of
communication but these give meaning to objectivity and not
to truth. This argument will be referred to again in chapter
four.

Barrow (1976) claims that the crucial test for the
different forms of knowledge is the third of Hirst's
criteria ie. that each form has a distinctive method of
testing for the truth. From this Barrow does not accept
any form other than mathematics and science because he is
unable to show that any of the other forms is able to satisfy this criterion.

The question must now be asked as to whether the use of the Hirst's forms of knowledge as the basis of the curriculum can be considered as valid. If they are, as Smith claims, forms of objectivity, forms in which we communicate our experience, rather than forms of knowledge then they may still be of some value to us. They cannot, however, be used as Stenhouse uses them, that is to dictate the areas of the curriculum that are to be studied. They are, rather, a guide along the lines of the comment of Stenhouse, that has already been noted, to the effect that education should free the thought of the students. The forms would thus represent the ways in which the students can think and communicate their thoughts. It is important therefore that students should understand how to use these ways of thinking and to understand other peoples use of them.

Equally, Barrow's criticism that according to Hirst's criteria only two forms are clearly identifiable raises a further question. If Hirst's criteria can produce only two forms and that even these are not of the same nature as put forward by Hirst then the whole validity of the basis of the forms is called into question. There seems no reason to consider them as an adequate basis of the curriculum in the way that Stenhouse does.
Barrow (1976) made an interesting point when he suggested that there are two basic interpretative attitudes, religious and scientific. He defined the men that hold these positions as

"someone to whom the mystery of life is ultimately only explicable in some religious terms, and someone to whom this kind of explanation is unnecessary and meaningless."

(Barrow, 1976, 57)

Upon this differentiation he makes a case for the inclusion of religious studies in the curriculum in order to counter any tendency to indoctrination of the pupils into the scientific attitude. This may at first seem a poor justification for religious education, and would not necessarily appeal either to the scientist who is a believer or the atheist. However, the argument does have some weight. It acknowledges that no view of the world can be ignored and that a view of the world that has such wide support as that of the religious view, in all its many forms, deserves some consideration as part of a person's education. This is particularly relevant if education is seen in terms of initiation into forms of thought that consequently allows freedom of thought. Secondly, it strikes a chord with those who would argue that there is a spiritual dimension to life and that introduction to this dimension is an essential element in a person's education.

The approach of the process model will now be considered before returning to the question of content.
Approach

Whereas in the objectives model the teaching strategies and approach would be considered after what the pupils should learn has been established, in a process model the approach forms the basis of the syllabus.

Peters has put forward the notion that instead of having aims to direct the teaching it should proceed according to certain principles. These he calls principles of procedure. They apply not to what the pupil should learn but to the way in which the teacher initiates the learning process. Even the word "initiates" suggests some particular approach to teaching, different from, for example, the word "instructs" and so must be treated carefully.

Peters (1959, 89,90) develops what he means by principles of procedure by drawing a parallel between two men in politics. One of them, in pursuit of equality, wishes to introduce measures that would lead to all people being equal, for example, introducing some system where no man has more money than another, disbanding any institutions, such as the army, where one man is placed in authority over another. The second man merely insists that any changes that are made treat all men as equal unless there is a good reason why they should not be treated as equal. For example, it would be foolish to force all men to go to university as not all men would benefit from that kind of education. It is from the second man, the man who
had certain principles as to how he should act, that Peters takes the idea of principles of procedure. Peters goes on to suggest that most disputes in education are not about aims but are arguments about principles of procedure. He gives as examples, the use of authority, teaching by example and the validity of conditioning.

Principles of procedure offer a way in which the intentions of the course can be open to scrutiny and yet not be prescriptive of an end. However, the process model encourages the pupil to be active, to take part in enquiry. If this is to be done honestly then no artificial restrictions can be placed upon the enquiry such as subject divisions. This tends to suggest a fully integrated curriculum but this would not be widely accepted as viable for a secondary school as it runs contrary to current practice, as has been noted before. Phenix claims that

"while attention to the structure of the disciplines is surely not a sufficient condition for maximum learning, it is a necessary condition for such learning." (Phenix, 1964a, 47)

The emphasis put on structure by Bruner has already been noted. Phenix claims that these disciplines are to be found in

"the various specialised communities of men who follow certain common rules and procedure governing the scope and methods of the inquiry." (Phenix, 1964a, 47)

From this it is possible to argue that the pupils need content to be structured in some way and that the structure
needs to be understood by the teacher. The areas of content that already have a structure to them are the disciplines. This does not mean that all teaching should fall within particular disciplines. This would be wrong for two reasons, primarily because the disciplines are culturally based and only offer one pattern of knowledge which varies with time and culture. For example, astrology is no longer considered by most people to be a valid academic discipline. Secondly, and related to the first, it is necessary for the pupils to understand the inter-related nature of knowledge. This is so that, for example, if they are introduced to astrology they can compare it to other areas of their knowledge and make an appropriate judgement about it. A process model seems to require, by its very nature, that enquiries are allowed to go beyond subject areas but that does not mean that they should not be planned around the structure of a subject area.

Principles of procedure would come from at least three sources. Firstly from an analysis of the way that children learn, that is that the principles would reflect the current understanding of the psychology of learning. To this end there is the list of commonly agreed statements about how pupils learn in appendix A. Secondly, they should reflect the understanding of the nature of education that has been adopted, they should reflect the principles of the process model of education. As an example of what might represent this category of principles there is Rath's "criteria for identifying activities that seem to have some inherent worth"
(Raths, 1971, 716). These are included as appendix B. Thirdly they should come from the area of the curriculum around which the learning is to take place. Bruner (1969) points out that subjects are based on certain attitudes, for example, physics is based on

"attitudes about the ultimate orderliness of nature and a conviction that order can be discovered" (Bruner, 1969, 20)

If principles of procedure are also to reflect the subject then a close look at the nature of the subject must be taken.

Criticisms

In the chapter on the objectives model of the curriculum the criticism of the model was primarily concerned with four main points. It seems reasonable and fair to see if these criticisms could also be applied to the process model. This exercise in no way should be taken to indicate that these are the only criticisms that the process model must answer because the model may be open to completely different criticisms which do not apply to the objectives model.

The argument for the process model was based on an interpretation of the nature of education. There are certainly other interpretations of the nature of education and the supporters of these other interpretations may well claim that the process model does not accurately reflect their view of education. However, this thesis has adopted a particular view of education and the process model, coming as it does from
this view, is consistent with that view of education.

With regard to the structure of knowledge, the process model requires pupils to engage in inquiry that is not unduly restricted. This means that pupils have an opportunity to build up their own structure of knowledge. The previous section requires that the educational experiences of the pupil are planned with regard to the structure of the subject. The question of integration will be considered later. It seems fair to say that the process model is not open to this criticism.

When Stenhouse suggested that the objectives model was not the best way to improve the practice of education his reason was that it did not require the teacher to examine their methods, only their results. The process model does require the teacher to examine his methods and may therefore be a model which will improve practice because of the model rather than in spite of it.

Finally there is the question of whether the model is workable and that, to a large extent, is the subject of the rest of the thesis, how can the model be put into operation with regard to religious education.
Religious education in a process model.

The above argument has attempted to show that a process model that is based upon subject disciplines is rational and viable. No consideration has been given to the basis on which the curriculum would be planned to make sure that pupils received a broad educational experience. That lies outside the scope of the thesis. Neither has any proper discussion of integration taken place, although that will be considered at a later stage. This thesis will attempt to investigate and illustrate two sets of criteria with regard to religious education being planned within the framework of a process model of education. These two sets of criteria are the structure of the subject and the principles of procedure that are appropriate to the subject. These would form the basis of the planning of a religious education course according to a process model.

The basis for this investigation will be twofold. Firstly a consideration of the nature of religion and the implications that this would have for the study of religion. From this it should be possible to indicate the nature of the subject of religious education. Secondly a consideration of the concepts, skills and attitudes that have been offered as appropriate to, and as a definition of, religious education. These represent the most recent thought and analysis of religious education that is taken from the point of view of the planning and preparation of a course to be taught as religious education. They also represent the three aspects of learning
that have been identified. As such they can provide guidelines for the investigation. It is also necessary to demonstrate how these three aspects of learning fit in to the process model of education. They will therefore each be considered in two ways, for what each of them reveals of the nature of religious education, and for the place that each of them has within a process model of the curriculum.
Summary

The process model of the curriculum is based on a view of education as of intrinsic value. Thus, the curriculum should be based on the process of education.

The intentions of the curriculum should be open to scrutiny, therefore the principles on which the curriculum are based must be stated clearly.

Hirst's forms of knowledge may be criticised to such an extent that they cannot be taken as the basis of curriculum planning.

Barrow's notion of two interpretative attitudes suggest that religious education has a part to play in education, as a way of thinking that is different from others.

Peter's notion of principles of procedure offer a way in which the process model can be planned and in which the basis of planning is open to scrutiny.

It is possible to argue that content needs to be structured in some way but that there should not be rigid divisions between disciplines.
The nature of religion and its implications for religious education will be examined from two points of view. Firstly that of the educational theorists who have examined religion and religious education with regard to its place in the curriculum. These have regarded religion as a way of knowing. Secondly, that of some philosophers and theologians who are concerned with the nature of religion with regard to the believer. These distinctions are not exact but serve to give some shape to the inquiry.

Education theorists.

Phenix

Phenix argues that there are six realms of meaning and religion comes within two of these realms. Each of these realms is described in two ways, according to quality and quantity that, it is argued, are the two logical aspects of meaning. That there are three of each logical aspect and that they each inter-relate gives nine generic classes. Religion belongs, first of all, to the realm called synoptics and has the generic classes of comprehensive and norm. The generic classes reflect that religion is concerned with a totality of
knowledge and the meaning refers to what ought to be. It also belongs to the realm of synnoetics and the generic classes of singular and fact. The meanings in this group

"arise out of concrete existence in direct personal encounter." (Phenix, 1964b, 26)

They involve meaning of one thing in actual existence, and this is the group in which religion as experience is placed.

Religion as a synoptic is seen as comprehensive and the element in religion that integrates all of the realms is, according to Phenix, ultimacy. He describes it thus

"The term "ultimacy" is a general designation for such ideas as infinitude, absoluteness, the unlimited, transcendence, perfection, completeness, all-inclusiveness, the supreme, and many others." (Phenix, 1964b, 244)

As it is comprehensive it should include all of the other realms in its scope and Phenix describes how each of the realms can be related to and interpreted by this concept of ultimacy. He claims that, with regard to content, that anything can be the content of religion as long as it is looked at from the standpoint of ultimacy. As to the method of inquiry, in this realm Phenix points to such means as prayer, meditation, ritual, and active commitment.

Smart (1975) also makes a similar point, he suggests that questions of ultimate meaning are questions about deep values and it is this depth of values that is called religious. He does point out, though, that all questions of value have depth
but only the deeper ones are called religious. Ultimacy is perhaps the wrong word as it is a matter of degree of depth and so Smart describes religious questions as those at or near the limit of ultimacy.

Phenix emphasises the need to go beyond the finite to the infinite for understanding in this realm. This does not mean a another realm beyond the finite but a totally different type of experience. For this reason understanding requires a basis of faith rather than the characteristic forms of understanding of the other, finite, realms. Phenix states his understanding of religion as

"Religion means nothing apart from a relation of natural and supernatural, finite and infinite, the latter being another order of reality from the former."

(Phenix, 1964b, 246)

To those who are committed to the transcendent there is some new and essential perspective that can only be gained by going beyond the finite to this new realm of meaning. In going beyond the finite there is a new illumination of the Whole, an illumination that is often referred to as revelation. In this part of Phenix' theory there is a clear similarity to some modern theologians, such as Tillich, who would claim that

"the name of this infinite and inexhaustible depth and ground of all being is God" (Tillich, 1949, 63)

There is also a similarity to Ramsey's disclosure situations that will be considered later.
Religion in its experiential aspect belongs, according to Phenix, to the realm of synoetics, the realm of personal knowledge. He claims that this personal knowledge is the same as the I-Thou relationship of Buber. He thus seems to separate the synoptic religion of the theologian from the synoetic experience of the believer.

Hirst

Hirst (1976) included religion as one of his forms of knowledge. As a form of knowledge religion should have categorial concepts. These are concepts which all knowledge in that form presupposes and which are characteristic of the form. Brent (1978) suggested that in the religious form the categorial concepts are God, sin and the transcendent. Other concepts are substantive and this includes such concepts as prayer, ritual and sacrifice. Brent demonstrates the way in which the categorial concepts define what is meant by religion by comparing two accounts of creation. The first account is one involving creation by God, one that would be accepted by many people as true. The second account is science fiction and starts

"Our universe was created by a black cloud"

(Brent, 1978, 105)

He then goes on to describe, in scientific terms, how the black cloud created and sustains the universe and how it has many of the attributes of God, such as omnipresence. However, the account of the black cloud would not be seen as a
religious account according to Brent. The reason for this is that the black cloud does not command the use of the word God, it is not transcendent and it could not be sinned against. Similarly, substantive concepts would not be used in relation to it. For example, it would not be the object of prayer because prayer presupposes transcendence. Barrow's notion of interpretative attitudes has already been noted. Further to this he offers as a definition of religion

"religion as any set of beliefs involving a supernatural being who has influence over our lives and a code of conduct."

(Barrow, 1981, 142)

This seems to me to be similar in form to the definition offered by Brent. Smart (1975), however, argues that there is no satisfactory definition of religion based on content and there certainly seems to be no definition that includes all that might be considered religion whilst excluding all that is not considered religion.

There are two notions from the above analysis of religion that are useful and will be referred to later and these are that religion is concerned with ultimacy and the importance of categorial concepts.
Smart (1975) produces a definition of religion by looking for common, formal characteristics of religions. He claimed that there are six dimensions of religion that can be identified: myth, doctrine, ritual, social, ethical and experiential. To these he has now added a seventh, the symbolic. Smart places emphasis on the experiential dimension, explaining that it would be hard to account for the other dimensions without the experiential. Smart also emphasises that the experiential element involves hope of, or realisation of, experience in an other world, an invisible world. It is the lack of any concept of this invisible world that leads him to reject Marxism and Humanism as religions. The concept of an invisible world is linked to revelation, the experience of the invisible world is revelation, and the concept of an invisible world is so broad as to allow all of those beliefs that are normally called religious to be included.

Sealey (1982) comments that the dimensions are not specifically religious, they are only religious when they are related to an appropriate categorial concept. A more serious criticism along the same lines comes from Surin (1980) to the effect that the experiential is not an autonomous dimension but is an integral part of all of the dimensions of religion. He presents a two stage argument.
1) ordinary experience is the starting point of religion and reflection on religion

2) intellectually valid reflection on religion requires the adoption of the approach of the phenomenologist. That is that religious concepts grow out of elements of finitude in human existence.

Hardy (1979) notes difficulties in Smart's approach for the study of religion. The study of religion as 'what men do', that is in terms of phenomena, has two problems

1) the dimensional matrix affirms similarities in religions. It is not "aids to seeing" what is there but rather "what is there", a phenomenological construction becomes an ontological statement.

2) If what occurs in one tradition is true then all other similarities in other traditions are dissimilar because they do not have the element of truth.

Hardy also notes that the idea of studying the truth claims of a religion is a prejudgement, to the believer they are not truth claims but the truth. A religion must be presented as true to the believer and not as a matter of truth claims that disinherit the believer.

Ramsey

Ramsey (1976) claims that there are two elements to religious belief and that these are discernment and commitment. This discernment comes from disclosure situations which can be
described as situations which are given a new depth by some discernment that goes beyond the apparent situation, by some insight. He lists six types of disclosure situation of which the last, cosmic disclosure, is the one that he equates with religious disclosure proper. These cosmic disclosures are mediated through the other five types of disclosure ie. linguistic, perceptual, theoretic, moral and personal. These disclosures give rise to commitment, as Gill says

"disclosures give rise to attitudinal and behavioural commitments which are commensurate with that which is disclosed therein"  (Gill, 1976, 61)

There are two points to note about this commitment when it comes to cosmic disclosure ie. religious commitment, a) it comes from outside rational decision and b) to give up the commitment would mean a great upheaval.

With regard to education Ramsey makes two points that need to be kept in mind.

"No religious apologetic, nor religious teaching, will be worthwhile if it does not a) evoke the appropriate kind of situation and b) recommend language of a suitably odd nature"

(Ramsey 1967 P.5)

Ramsey speaks particularly about religious belief within a Christian framework, in some way connected to a deity. In fact Ramsey suggests that we may be able to use the word "God" as a class term for all cosmic disclosure.
Wittgenstein seems to take a wider view of religious belief. Wittgenstein saw religious belief as a form of life, a distinctive language game in which the objects are radically different from the objects in other language games. To understand religious belief, or any other language game, any utterance must be placed in the language system to which it belongs and there must be awareness of its functional component. Wittgenstein's interest was in the meaning of religious belief, and what it is to be a believer, rather than in the object of belief.

His concern for the object of religious belief, for which I will use the term God for convenience, comes into his thinking mainly when he is concerned to show that religious belief is only intelligible and justified in the fact that the language is used in such a way that religious terms cannot be replaced by non-religious terms without loss of meaning. That is that God is nothing other than God. In the same way he argues that any statement that can be empirically tested cannot be a religious statement and if used in a religious way is superstition.

Wittgenstein was also concerned to show that religious belief is logically distinct and he clearly demonstrates, with regard to what would be considered as evidence for a belief, that religion and science are logically distinct. There is accepted
as evidence for belief such things that would be laughed at if they were used as evidence in a scientific statement, things such as dreams and feelings. For example, St. Paul's conversion was on the basis of a vision, in no way would this be accepted as scientific evidence but it was enough for St. Paul to change his life. Science requires that each experiment can be reproduced, with the same results, an endless number of times. Religious belief can be the result of a single experience, and the interpretation of that experience by the believer.

Wittgenstein said that, when evidence for a belief is considered, that religious belief is not a matter of evidence. The strength of a religious belief cannot be judged by the strength of the evidence for it, as would be the case in science, but on the amount that a man will risk for that belief. Ramsey (1967) suggested a similar thing when he reflected on Butler's idea that with religious belief the smallest piece of evidence on one side can be enough to tip the balance in favour of one answer, but then the commitment to the answer is great and out of all proportion to the balance of evidence.

Wittgenstein explains his main idea about religious belief as the believer "using a picture". This is a grammatical and not a derogatory remark and is intended to show the way in which the believer sees reality. This point needs to be stressed, that from the point of view of the believer he is not using a
picture, what he sees is reality. When a believer makes a statement such as "God's eye sees everything" he is making a statement based on his picture. The way to understand his picture is to ask what he means by his statement, what consequences does he draw from this statement. In this example such questions as "Does the believer think about the length of God's eyebrows?" would need to be asked. The answer gives a clue to the way that the believer uses the term "God's eye" and a clue to the way he uses his picture. The "techniques of usage" of the picture need to be learnt in order to understand what it is that the believer believes.

Before a term such as "God's eye" can be understood a knowledge of what an eye is in ordinary language is necessary. Then it is possible to judge what particular qualifications the believer puts on the words and thus the consequences that he draws from the statement. Religious language is thus qualified ordinary language. It is these qualifications that give religious language its distinctiveness, they are the way in which religious belief is expressed as a distinct form of life. It is here that there is a reminder of Ramsey and his language of a suitably odd currency.

This brings up a particular problem for religious education. If each man is using a picture and all the pictures are to some extent individual, then to what degree, if any, can there be any teaching about religious belief. That is to say,
if each man uses a different picture, has a different view of
the world, then how is it possible to communicate a picture
to any other person.

Wittgenstein further explains the problem when he refers to a
discussion between a believer and an unbeliever. When the
believer is questioned about his belief he will eventually
reach a point when rational argument is exhausted and he is
left with a final statement "that is what I believe". Ramsey
noted this statement in ordinary life, for example when a
fisherman tries to explain his enjoyment of fishing he will
end up with "That is what I like, the type of person I
am". Equally, in a discussion between a believer and an
unbeliever, what the unbeliever does not believe is not the
same as what the believer does believe. They are not really
arguing about the same thing because they are using different
pictures, they are starting from different positions. Only
someone who uses the same picture as the believer can
understand what it is that he believes. Augustine of Hippo
noted a similar point when he wrote

"Understanding is the reward of faith. Therefore
do not seek to understand in order that you may believe, but
make the act of faith in order that you may understand; for
unless you make an act of faith you will not understand".
Understanding will only come to someone who believes, who
uses the same picture.

An answer to this problem for religious education lies in
Smith's interpretation of Hirst's forms of knowledge. The basis of the forms is their linguistic intersubjectivity and this gives criterion for objectivity, that is that the forms are

"forms in which a non-solipsistic consciousness will articulate its experience".

(Smith 1981 P.20)

The linguistic intersubjectivity that is the basis of the forms, and the criterion that permit us to use such terms as truth and meaning are

"the regularity of the world and the consistency and agreement of people's response to the world. ..... This underlying level of agreement makes possible our having the concept of objectivity and all its aspects: knowledge, meaning, truth and so on."

(Smith 1981 P.20)

Men have a shared experience, on the grounds of which communication is possible, and this communication allows the sharing of individual experience with others. The extent to which it is possible to communicate personal experience to other people is another matter but communication is possible. It may be that ultimately it is not possible really to communicate because different pictures are used and proper communication is only possible with those that use the same picture, that already agree with the particular point of view. It is possible however to communicate with other people so that they can appreciate a point of view and a person's feelings and it is on this level that religious education in
schools can work. Perhaps when Smith describes the forms as "forms in which a non-solipsistic consciousness will articulate its experience" it should be added "and expects to be comprehensible".

Finally, Hudson (1975) suggests that Wittgenstein offers a threefold answer to the question of what is a religious believer, and that is that a believer

a) makes use of certain pictures as explanatory of life set in the dimension of God

b) uses these pictures in a commissive way in that he takes risks for them

c) uses these pictures in an affective way in that pity, terror, awe are part of the substance of his belief.

Hardy

Hardy is concerned to remove the idea of religions as "eggs in a basket" ie. as separate, enclosed systems. He acknowledges that each of at least the major religions offer a coherent explanation of life and according to Wittgenstein these would be separated from each other by their use of different pictures. However, Hardy argues that these systems are not, like eggs, closed to the environment, rather

"In place of seeing religious tradition as closed systems, they need to be seen as open systems of a high order which have been successively re-structured and elaborated in response to a progressive interchange with their environment"
in and beyond the world."

(Hardy 1976 P.61)

If these religious traditions are reactions to the same environment then they have at least that element in common, there is something on which to base a dialogue between the religions.

Hardy also points out that many people do not subscribe to a major religion but rather have a folk religion. By this he mean that they have beliefs which are not really those of any particular religion but are a reflection of many different beliefs. This folk religion will not usually be coherent or even conscious but does motivate the persons opinions and actions. It is in this area that there might be found the religion of the Millwall Football Club supporter.

Hardy also reflects Wittgenstein's point about religious doctrine not being truth propositions for the believer, to him they are the truth. Thus it is impossible ever to fully appreciate a religion except as an insider, as a believer. If a man does not use the picture he cannot fully understand it, and this is particularly true of the affective element of the picture.

Hardy sees religious education

"as a struggle to enable an open communication between religious traditions and between these and non-religious traditions in classroom situations."
Wilson thinks that education is about attitudes and he claims that:

"any concept of religion as a sui generis activity ought to rest primarily upon a central emotion of awe; and upon a central activity, the activity of worship."

(Wilson 1971 P.33)

It should be noted how closely the awe and worship of Wilson matches the discernment and commitment of Ramsey, worship implying commitment to the object of which we are in awe.

Conclusions

If Wittgenstein's analysis of religious belief is accepted as correct then the next stage must be to draw out the consequences for religious education.

These are that first of all the pupils must learn the rules of the language game, they must be able to make the proper connections, draw the correct consequences, understand the qualifications of religious statements. Only once they have learned the language will they be able to engage in a full dialogue with people who use different pictures, both in terms of understanding others and expressing themselves clearly.

Secondly, there are two elements to consider in religious education and these are the development of the pupil's understanding of his own experience and the dialogue with
people who put a different interpretation upon their experience of life. In Wittgenstein's terms, learning about their own picture and learning about other people's pictures.

Hardy suggested that the centre of religious tradition is not in the ideas or concepts that are used. He suggests that the believer does not start with concepts but with experience and this would involve the other two elements in Wittgenstein's threefold description of a believer, the commissive and the affective. It is an old maxim of education that you start with the child's own experience and work out from there. It is particularly important that religious education follows this order. Religious belief is to a large extent non-rational and unless the pupil understands that his own actions and emotions come from his use of a picture, his way of interpreting the world, then he can hardly be expected to make sense of another persons reactions to their own picture.

From the above may come a definition of what religious education should be something on the lines of:-

Religious education involves the pupil in a questioning of the way in which he sees the world and of his actions and emotions that are involved in that interpretation; a dialogue with other people about the way in which they see the world; and involved in, and necessary to the above, is the learning of how to play the language game that is religious belief, how to make the appropriate connections to the statements of belief.
The above definition of religious education is of a kind that is acceptable for a process model of the curriculum, it envisages no particular end save the learning of the language game and this can be seen as necessary to further inquiry into what is considered a worthwhile area of learning.
Summary

Phenix offers a view of religion that is based upon the notion of ultimacy.

Hirst suggests that forms of knowledge each have categorial concepts by which they can be recognised. Whilst the theory of the forms of knowledge may be unsatisfactory, the notion of categorial concepts could be useful.

Religion must be presented as true to the believer.

Ramsey claims that there are two elements to religious belief, discernment and commitment. Discernment arises out of disclosure situations.

To Wittgenstein religious belief is both a form of life and a language game. It is a form of life as the believer makes "use of certain pictures set in the dimension of God". It is a language game to the extent that to understand a believer the right connections must be made to the words the he uses.

Religious belief also entails affective and commissive elements.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCEPTS IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

This chapter will first seek to clarify what is meant by a concept by looking at the definition of a concept. It will then go on to look at how concepts have been used in religious education in an objectives model and how the scope of religious education is determined by the selection of the concepts involved. An investigation of the classification and categorisation of concepts will be followed by a consideration of the place of concepts in a process model of religious education.

Definition

There appear to be two ways in which concepts are operated, abstraction and generalisation. In generalisation an hypothesis is formed which is tested by further examples whilst in abstraction there is abstracted from a variety of examples a common element. In practice it is difficult to distinguish between the two in relation to the formation of concepts but there is a difference in relation to the definition of concepts. As an example, the concept of religion can be defined in either way. A generalised statement of the concept of religion is very difficult to compose if it is to include all that is regarded as religion whilst excluding all that is not regarded as religion; the result is usually
unsatisfactory. By abstraction a precise definition is not produced but there can be a useful clarification of thought, such as in Smart's six dimensions of religion. Smart does not seek to produce a definition of religion but does identify and describe what he sees as the essential elements of a religion.

A generalised approach to the definition of the term "concept" may give a statement such as "a concept is basically a system of learned responses, the purpose of which is to organise and interpret the data provided by sense-perception". Whilst this may be a reasonable definition more can be learnt about concepts by the process of abstraction.

Professor W.E. Vinacke (1952, chapter 7) suggests the following criteria for defining concepts

1) "Concepts are not themselves sensory data but systems which are the products of our past responses to characteristic situations stimulus." Concepts have no existence of their own but are entirely dependent upon the individual and his experience.

2) "Using concepts is simply applying past learning to a present situation." There are two ways in which the new experience will operate upon concepts, assimilation and accommodation. With assimilation the new experience is absorbed and integrated into previously organised concepts, it involves reinforcement rather than new learning. With accommodation the new experience will modify previously held concepts or will require the building up of a new concept. It
is in this process that most learning takes place.

3) "Concepts relate discrete sensory data." There are two types of relationship between the discrete data. In identity classes a variety of different stimuli are recognised as being of the same event or object, for example photographs of a baby, a young man and an old man may be recognised as being of the same person, a noise and a sight may be identified as having the same source. In equivalence classes different items are treated as in some way the same, for example chairs, benches and stools are all seats.

4) "In human beings words or other symbols are the means of linking discrete items of experience."

5) "Concepts have two ways of functioning; the extensional use and the intensional use." The extensional use of a concept is very similar for all people and can only be defined ostensibly i.e. by an actual instance of what the concept refers to. Once established this function of a concept is not likely to vary greatly during a lifetime, assuming a large enough sample of those instances to which the concept relates were experienced in the learning of the concept. It is the common extensional aspect of a concept which allows communication between people. The intensional use varies from person to person and is the affective attitude to a concept. For example, if the concept of a dog is considered, the extensional use will not vary greatly between people, assuming that the people have sufficient experience of dogs. People can identify as dogs even dogs of breeds that they have not seen before and can agree on the identification. To teach someone else the concept
of a dog it would be necessary to show them examples of dogs. Intensionally however the concept of a dog may vary widely, one person may feel warmth and affection to dogs whilst another person may feel fear. It is the intensional use of a concept that may change greatly and rapidly even in a concept that has been held for a long period of time, for example in a religious conversion such as that of Saint Paul.

6) "Not all concepts are rational or even meaningful." There is no great harm in irrational or meaningless concepts as long as they are recognised as such.

7) "Concepts need not be consciously formulated." This may be particularly true of concepts in their intensional use. The recognition of this by the pupil, and the bringing of concepts to the conscious mind of the pupil, may be an important part of the teacher's activities. For example a concept of religion as mere superstition and hence meaningless may result from childhood experiences and may need to be consciously confronted before respect for other people's beliefs is possible.

Concepts and the objectives model

The various aims offered for religious education appear to have certain themes in common. There seem to be three themes that are readily identifiable and these are that the pupil

1) will be able to understand religious language, symbols and those elements by which believers express their belief.
2) will appreciate the meaning of belief to the believer.

3) will be able to question and develop his or her own beliefs.

Of these three the first relates to religious concepts, concepts of things that would usually be considered as specifically religious. For example, the concept of God and the particular ways in which language is used to describe the concept of God. The second relates to concepts such as belief, faith, commitment and devotion, and it relates to an understanding of the intensional use of the specifically religious concepts of the first aim. These concepts are not specifically religious themselves as they have functions outside of the religious, for example, the concept of devotion applies to duty. The third aim relates to the intensional use of the concepts made by the pupil himself.

The lists of objectives that are offered in support of the aims include concepts that are of a general religious nature. This is what is to be expected of a list of mediate goals. Only when proximate goals are listed could specific religious concepts reasonably be expected. For example, as a mediate goal "an understanding of the concept of religious symbol" is acceptable, the proximate goals may offer such concepts as that of bread and wine as appropriate. Whilst it is desirable that pupils understand the general religious concepts, in the interests of transfer of learning, these can only be learnt through specific examples. Understanding the general concept is important as it is only through this
general understanding that pupils could be expected easily to recognize other specific concepts of a similar nature. It is also possible that the pupil may then forget the precise meaning of the specific concepts that have been learnt and yet still retain the general concept, for example, the pupil may be able to recognize a religious symbol and appreciate that it has meaning for the believer without being able to recall other religious symbols or their specific meanings. This point may be minor but it does illustrate a difference between knowledge and understanding and the importance for the pupil of understanding rather than just knowledge, a point emphasised in the current thinking on how pupils learn.

The scope of religious education

Of the three aspects of learning that make up objectives; concepts, skills and attitudes, it is concepts that define the subject area. Only if there are skills that are specific to religious understanding could these claim a place in the definition of the subject area, otherwise they are only subject specific when linked to content i.e. to concepts. The existence of specific skills will be considered in the next chapter. Any consideration of concepts would not be complete unless it examined the scope of the subject for this is the only way in which a decision can be made as to what are the appropriate concepts for an understanding of the subject.

If religious education is to be concerned with the religion of
the believer then a definition of the believer is necessary. Wittgenstein gave a definition of a religious believer as one who makes use of a picture. Hudson provides a commentary on this point and describes a believer as one who makes use of a picture

a) as explanatory of life set in the dimension of God
b) in a commissive way in that he takes risks for them
c) in an affective way in that awe, pity etc. are part of the substance of his belief.

This definition is acceptable as far as it goes but it does exclude certain groups who would normally be considered as religious believers, for example some Buddhists do not have a belief in God. It also excludes some groups that are not normally considered as religious believers but whose beliefs offer an alternative to conventional religions, for example Humanists. Both of these groups fulfil the second and third criteria. They both act upon their beliefs and take risks for them. Equally, they both use their pictures in an affective way, for example, Bertrand Russell, (1966, 107) in describing his humanistic beliefs, wrote that the soul's habitation should be on the firm foundation of unyielding despair. The precise emotions that are evoked will depend upon the picture that is being used but it seems clear that it is not only those beliefs that are generally considered to be religious that can fulfil the second and third criteria.

However, it is not acceptable simply to remove the words "set in the dimension of God" from the first criteria. The
Wittgensteinian criteria cannot be applied to any belief, they describe a particular kind of belief. Equally, not every belief comes within the scope of religious education. Stopes-Rowe was making this distinction when he wrote:

"The basic criterion which determines whether a definite system can be accepted as a "religion" or (more generally) a "life stance" is its sufficiency in relation to ultimate questions of fact, value, meaning and concern."

(Stopes-Rowe, 1976, 26)

He also offers a test that can be applied to beliefs to see whether they satisfy this criteria. The test is whether the system under consideration can be combined

"consistently, and without oddness, with two genuine life stances which take contrary views on ultimate questions".

(Stopes-Rowe, 1976, 27)

As an example of the way in which the test works a consideration of "communism" is helpful. If "communism" is considered as a political system which may be held by Marxists and Christians alike then it fails the test, it is not a life stance. If, however, by "communism" is meant a system that is synonymous with all of the teachings of Marx then it would pass the test. This type of "communism", Marxism, is clearly an alternative belief system to Christianity and is inconsistent with it. The test is not above criticism, for example what is to count as a life stance in the first place, but does give a good illustration of belief systems that are compatible with the first criterion of Wittgenstein if the words "in the dimension of God" are removed. There are, of
course, the other two criteria that the belief system must also satisfy, the commissive and affective aspects of the use of a picture. What is really necessary is a new form of words to replace "set in the dimension of God". This form of words must limit the beliefs that conform the criteria to those that are religious or that take the place of a religion.

Miller and Pound (1969) suggest that there are five characteristics of any belief system worthy of the name religion and these are

1) Give a total world view
2) Consider fundamental questions
3) Show a practical expression or way of life
4) Demand a serious concern from its adherents
5) Show a corporate or social aspect

(Miller and Pound, 1969, 100)

The fifth criterion gives a description of religion rather than a definition of religious belief, but apart from that the characteristics are similar to Wittgenstein's definition of religious belief. The first two can be likened to the idea of using a picture as explanatory of life set in the dimension of God, without mentioning God. They offer an alternative form of words that does not exclude certain belief systems that have already been mentioned as possibly within the field of religious education. The third and fourth characteristics compare with the commissive and affective elements of Wittgenstein's analysis.
There are some conclusions that can be drawn from the above analysis of concepts and the way that they define the subject area. The first is that there appears to be a number of life stances, or belief systems, that are outside the analysis of religious belief offered by Wittgenstein, that operate upon the believer in the same way as those within the terms of the analysis. These life stances conform to the commissive and affective aspects of the analysis but do not use a picture as explanatory of life set in the dimension of God. What they do however is to use a picture, in all the ways that Wittgenstein sees religious belief as using a picture, without the reference to God. To expand Wittgenstein's analysis to include these other life stances the definition could be changed to describe the believer as one who "uses a picture as explanatory of life in its ultimacy". By this is meant that the life stance gives consideration to questions about the final cause as opposed to the efficient, to fundamental questions of meaning and value, and provides answers of some kind to these questions. This does restrict the areas of inquiry that could be pursued. There are some areas of inquiry which will be excluded because they are not capable of answers at any more than an immediate level, they are not capable of answers of any great depth. For example, questions about preferences for one food rather than another, or questions that relate to purely mechanical situations such as about the way that an engine works.

The concern for ultimacy also has a great effect on the way
in which the inquiry is approached and conducted. Questions must be pursued to the point where no further questions are possible. For example, the question of abortion must go beyond an answer such as "It is murder", beyond "It is wrong to take life", beyond "everyone has a right to life", to the question of why everyone has a right to life. Even answers to this question may require further answers, for example, what does it mean that all men are God's creatures. Eventually the answer may come that "That is my belief", there are no further answers. This is what is meant by a concern with ultimacy, the asking of fundamental questions of meaning and value.

The second conclusion that can be drawn is with regard to the type of concepts involved in religious education. That the use of picture is explanatory of life in its ultimacy means that specifically religious concepts will be involved, as will other concepts not specifically religious but dealing with the beliefs of groups such as Marxists and Humanists, groups who have their own specific concepts. Of the concepts within each belief system more will be said in the next section. Whilst these specific concepts can be dealt with in an explicit manner there are other concepts, such as depth, meaning and value that cannot so easily be dealt with explicitly. The commissive and affective aspects concern the understanding of concepts such as faith, commitment and belief. These two groups of concepts are those that were found as represented by the first two aims that are commonly stated as aims in the objectives model of religious education. The third aim, that
of the pupils' developing their own beliefs, will also appear in a process model, both explicitly and implicitly. This concern will be expressed in some way in the principles of procedure, but it also figures in the whole philosophy of the process model. The pupil engaged in inquiry and organising the direction of this inquiry will inevitably develop his own understanding and beliefs, will develop his own picture.

A classification of concepts in religious education

Goldman investigated the area of the development of religious concepts in young people. His work was primarily concerned with Biblical concepts but pointed a way forward for religious education in general. Attfield has done some more recent work based on the claim that

"religious education best begins from and should be built up around a particular core of subject matter"

(Attfield, 1973, 13)

He followed this statement with an assessment of the work needed to follow up Goldman's lead. Attfield claimed that Goldman's technical validity had not been seriously questioned and that what was needed was research into how it should be applied. It is the form that this research should take, and some progress in it, that he described in a series of articles.

Attfield pointed out (in 1974) that whilst concepts build upon each other this should not be seen as a series of steps.
By this he meant that if concept A relies upon a pupil having concept B it does not mean that the pupil must have a fully developed concept of B before concept A can be learnt. The notion of a fully developed concept is debateable in itself but the point that Attfield was making is that concept A and concept B will develop together in a complex relationship. A knowledge of this relationship is necessary, he claims, in the planning of learning. Bruner made a similar point when he claimed that knowledge of the structure of a subject enables the gap between elementary and advanced understanding to be bridged and the inter-relationship of concepts is clearly an important part of the structure of a subject. The importance of this point to religious education can be seen when teaching the concept of God as father is considered. This concept relies on the pupil's concept of father, a concept that is developing as the pupil grows older.

Attfield identifies conceptual research as a main area of research to be undertaken in education and he describes it thus:

"The main claim being made for conceptual research simply amounts to saying that the central concepts involved in a school subject should receive attention on the part of educators, that what is implicit in having or gaining a key notion should be analysed and clarified logically and philosophically before we can turn to the empirical and practical questions of teaching, its method and content."

(Attfield, 1976a, 91)
He sees the task of conceptual research with regard to religious education as a series of systematically ordered steps, of which he identifies six. These steps are

1) the identification of the categorial concepts.

2) the alternative interpretations of these central concepts need specification and the relationship of these alternatives investigated. It does not seem clear exactly what is meant by this but it seems to require the specification of the ways in which each of the categorial concepts can be qualified, described and interpreted. This would seem to require an investigation of, at least, religious language as it relates to the categorial concepts. For example, the specification of those ways in which man can express his concept of God and the variety of interpretations open to these expressions.

3) the essential religious concepts need to be specified and alternatives considered. For each group within a religion the emphasis will be different, even if only slightly. This difference may well be revealed by each groups specification of what they consider to be the essential religious concepts and the emphasis that is put on each of them. For example, a Roman Catholic may include a reference to the Virgin Mary as the Mother of God as an essential religious concept whereas a Protestant is unlikely to do so.

4) the main logical features of each important concept should be specified as preparatory to the teaching of them. This step seems to require an identification of the right connections to be made for each concept.
5) the pre requisites for acquisition of these important concepts and the other concepts they depend on should be exhibited

6) some tentative move towards investigation of the way that concept acquisition can be prepared for in the minds of the students.

The meaning of some of the terms used will become clearer when the next part of Attfield's work is considered.

In an article later that same year he put forward the outline of a taxonomy of concepts in religious education. The concepts that he analysed are those of what he describes as kerygmatic language, this being the minimum of religious language needed by a believer to express his belief. The concepts are also confined to those that express belief in God rather than those concerned with moral or historical statements. Finally, he applied his taxonomy to those terms that can be found in "A theological word book of the Bible". Thus the taxonomy is concerned only with a small area of the scope of religious education, what may be regarded as the most traditional area.

In the taxonomy he identifies the following categories of concepts

a) Categorial (C) These are the concepts that "demarcate the foundation of an entire way of thinking, they denote what underpins a distinct form of knowledge" (Attfield, 1976b, 70)

These are the categorial concepts of Hirst's forms of
knowledge. It is not necessary to accept Hirst's theory to recognise that certain concepts are fundamental to a way of thought, that they are the logical subject, or presupposition, of other concepts in that subject area. Attfield identifies four categorial concepts and these are God, Lord, Holy Spirit and Word.

b) Independent (I) These are concepts that are used outside religion and are made theological by their reference to categorial concepts. An example of this is love, as it is used in the love of God.

c) Religious (R) These are concepts that are distinctive of religion but are not categorial. They are divided into two groups, Essential Religious (Ra) and Inessential Religious (Rb). Ra concepts are those that are "indispensable to a minimum articulation of the religious perspective of the simple believer" (Attfield, 1976b, 71). Rb concepts are required for a fuller explanation of a religious belief but are not essential to a basic explanation of it. Examples of Ra concepts are Church and sin, of Rb concepts are covenant and prophet.

d) Theological (T) These are devised for theological language, to express precise positions in discussions. They can be seen as a second order level, where independent and religious concepts are insufficient. They represent the technical language of the subject. Examples are Sabbath and Spirit.

The taxonomy may be criticised in terms of the placing of the
concepts within the particular categories. These are a matter of personal judgement, there is no objective criterion for their placement. However, much more important is the question of what value the taxonomy has. It is a pattern that is placed upon the concepts, it has no existence in reality, that is the concepts do not belong in these groups except in this particular classification of them. If it has any value it must be because of the help that it provides to teachers, and researchers, in the pursuit of their work. Ultimately it will only have value if it facilitates improvement in the process of education. This also applies to the tasks that Attfield set out for conceptual research, their value is not intrinsic but dependent upon the results that they produce for the process of education.

Inasmuch as the analysis of concepts may reveal the structure of knowledge within a particular religion, or a particular group within that religion, it may be seen to be useful. However, this would seem to imply the production of something along the lines of Barth's "Church Dogmatics", that is an attempt to work out a complete system of belief. Theologians seem to have moved away from this kind of undertaking and it would not seem relevant to the pupil in a secondary school. Certainly it is necessary for the teacher to be able to present the views of a religious group accurately but this presentation would seem to be a reaction to the pupil's inquiry rather than as a planned, systematic study of a religion. Just as the believer reacts without ever working out
fully his position with regard to his beliefs, so the teacher may present beliefs as a reaction to questions and without a conscious awareness of all the possible connections and implications. There must also be the question of how far it is possible to work out and present all of Attfield's steps. The taxonomy he presents may be useful for the planning of a course and for consideration when reacting to the pupil's inquiries, but it is not clear that the greater detail that may result from a full working out of a taxonomy along the lines that Attfield suggests would be of much greater help to the teacher. It would seem to be an undertaking that would occupy a great deal of time which could perhaps be more profitably spent on other areas, certainly with regard to teaching. The taxonomy that Attfield (1976b) presents may be all that the teacher requires for the planning of a course or as a guideline when reacting to the inquiries of pupils.

From Attfield's taxonomy there are three categories of concepts that are important for religious education. These are the categorial (C), the essential religious (Ra) and the independent (I). The inessential religious and the theological would only be examined specifically by the more advanced student or believer. Their use in schools is more likely to arise from some inquiry by the pupils rather than being intentionally planned as part of the lesson. The categorial concepts are obviously important if they are, as claimed, the presuppositions on which all of the other concepts rely and to which they all refer. Through the essential religious concepts
it is possible to elaborate on the beliefs that are held, to expand the meaning of the categorial concepts into a more complete belief system. It is through the use of the independent concepts that the categorial and religious concepts become comprehensible, it is through these concepts that the appropriate connections can be made. Without reference to things outside of the religious it would remain an inpenetrable code that had no meaning for anyone other than the individual believer. Even with the independent concepts the question of how far one man's beliefs can be understood by another man is open to question and has already been considered.

Attfield's list of tasks for conceptual research require a very detailed specification of the concepts and their interrelationships. However, the more detailed this specification becomes the more the religion specified becomes the religion of the individual and not the group. Every religion could be said to contain a large variety of quite similar, but not identical beliefs. This is because no two men will have the same experience or place the same interpretation on a specific event, they will not use exactly the same picture. Consequently the more closely a particular picture is specified, the more people are excluded from the group that use that picture. This is illustrated by the numbers of different groups within each religion divided by theological dissensions. This is acknowledged by Attfield in the second of his tasks for conceptual research, the specification of
alternative interpretations of the central concepts. This specification could become a very extensive task if each believers picture is to be considered. Also, the more detailed the specification of the inter-relationships of concepts and the prerequisites for the acquisition of them, the greater the difficulty in applying an objectives model to the task of teaching them. This may seem paradoxical but the more precise the specification, and the greater the number of connections that will result from this process of specification, the more onerous the task of teaching each one of them becomes. Attfield makes no mention of how detailed this specification should be but there are clear problems for the objectives model if the work is completed in a thorough manner. It would seem that the research and classification are not entirely appropriate for religious education in a process model. The contribution of concepts to the planning and teaching of religious education and the work that needs to be done with them must now be considered.

Categories of concepts in religious education.

Before the value of concepts in religious education is considered there is something to be noted about the nature of religion. Attfield's taxonomy was concerned with only one religion, and if the taxonomy is of value the same work would have to be carried out for all of the religions that were to be included in religious education. Many of the concepts in Attfield's taxonomy for Christianity would also appear in the
analyses of other religions. When it came to specifying the appropriate connections to be made for each concept there would be many differences but there would also be many similarities. This would tend to reinforce the point made by Hardy that religions are not "eggs in a basket" but are interrelated systems of belief. However, it would seem likely that the differences within, for example, Christianity would outnumber the similarities, even if they are not of equal weight. Between different religions it seems reasonable to suggest that the differences will grow and the similarities diminish. As life stances, other than those that are usually considered as religions, are included by this thesis as part of religious education this may well serve to reduce the similarities to a concern for ultimacy. This is not a concept that would be explicitly stated by many, if any, life stances but it may be the only concern that all of the life stances have in common.

Concepts and their inter-relationships form, in their intensional and extensional aspects, the structure of the subject. They also provide the basis on which religious education could be planned within a process model of the curriculum. A process model would not require such a detailed analysis of concepts as that suggested by Attfield because, by its nature, it is an exploration of concepts and not the learning of a predetermined pattern. It is necessary to identify those concepts with which religious education should be concerned and which can be used as a basis for the planning
There appear to be four categories of concepts that are involved.

1) Concepts that describe a life stance. The analysis of concepts within Christianity that was produced by Attfield provides an illustration of this category. Each life stance can be seen as being based on the believer's understanding of certain categorial concepts, these are fundamental to his belief, to the picture that he uses. These, together with the specific concepts that Attfield termed "essential religious" and the other concepts that Attfield termed "independent" can be used to provide a reasonably accurate picture of the beliefs held by the believer. If these concepts and their inter-relations are identified then the structure of that religion or life stance can be accurately presented. They do not define the structure of religion but only of a religion. This identification of concepts is best done by the believer as only the believer can describe properly the connections that he makes with each of the concepts.

The three other categories of concepts describe the structure of religion. Two of them describe the extensional use of concepts within the structure of religion and these follow to some extent the ideas of Phenix. They can be said to describe the quantitative and qualitative nature of the subject respectively. The third describes the intensional use of
concepts within the structure of religion.

2) Concepts which are the subject of religious discourse. This category does not necessarily have any limits. It is possible that anything may become the subject of religious discourse. There are certainly some concepts that are more often considered by religions and upon which religions are expected to offer the opinions that reflect their beliefs. Examples of these concepts are authority, creation, truth, the nature of death etc. That is not to say that all discourse even on these concepts is religious.

3) The concept that differentiates between religious and non-religious discourse is the concept that may be said to define the quality of the nature of religion. This concept has already been identified as the concept of ultimacy and which is related to the concepts of meaning and value. Without this element the discourse is not religious. Opinions offered that do not refer to the ultimate are not founded on a religious basis. The second and third categories describe the scope and quality of a religion, they refer to the first of Wittgenstein's criteria for religious belief.

4) The fourth category of concepts relates to the second and third of Wittgenstein's criteria and is concerned with the intensional use of religious concepts. The category includes such concepts as belief, faith and commitment. These are concepts of religious experience without which all other religious concepts make no sense.
Concepts in a process model of religious education.

Having identified the categories of concepts that are the concern of religious education it is now necessary to show how these relate to religious education in a process model. It may also be useful to indicate the work that needs to be done with regard to concepts in this context.

A definition of the structure of a belief is necessary, and must be understood by the teacher, if the pupil is to explore the faith of the believer rather than an impression that the teacher has of a believer's belief. Hence it is important that the concepts, and their inter-relations, are specified, and specified by the believer. Further work is also required to compare the concepts are used by different life stances. In this way the principal concerns of religion, the areas that are considered most important by religions, can be identified. For each of the concepts involved in these central concerns the different interpretations put on them by the different life stances need to be indicated, once again so that the beliefs of the believer are not misrepresented.

The work that has been suggested above lies within the realm of religious studies and could be used to form the basis of a syllabus for such a course. It is not necessarily what is intended by religious education nor does it readily lend itself to be the content of a process based syllabus. The work
tends to imply that the course based on it would require the pupils to recognise the accuracy of the representations of the believer's life stances and possibly to attempt to understand and empathise with them. The work does not take any account of the development of the pupil's own beliefs. The above work is necessary, however, so that the teacher can act properly as a guide to the learning experience.

Whilst it is important that teachers are able to present the beliefs of other people accurately this aspect will not necessarily form the greater part of the syllabus of religious education. It is important to engage the pupils in inquiry into areas that the pupils can see as relevant to themselves. In this way the pupils are more likely to be motivated particularly as they will be able to see a justification for the subject for themselves. There are many concepts that are relevant to the pupils and which are the subject of religious discourse but that would not come within the group of concepts that would generally be used to describe and define the structure of a religion. For example, the concept of family is one on which most, if not all, life stances would offer an opinion based on the beliefs of that life stance. However as the concept of family is not essential for the definition of the beliefs of a life stance the concept would not be included in those that are examined in the first category of concepts. The identification of these other relevant concepts and the development of learning experiences based on them is also part of religious education. That these concepts will be treated in
a religious way will be ensured by conforming to the principles of procedure that reflect the nature of religion and the subject of religious education. The particular principles are those that relate to the concept of ultimacy and the concepts related to religious experience.

The concept of religious experience, and the concepts within the category of religious experience, are worthy of some further consideration. Smart's phenomenological approach to the study of religion is often characterised as the "explicit" approach to religious education. It is seen as the other side of a coin to the "implicit" approach. The differences in the two approaches have been emphasised and Smart's approach has been seen more in terms of the study of religious phenomena rather than the faith of believers. Smart himself emphasised that an empathetic approach is essential. He placed the experiential dimension at the centre of his study of religion (Smart, 1971) and emphasised its central importance to the believer. This emphasis is echoed by Hardy (1976) when he made the point that the believer concentrates on the practices of religion rather than ideology. By this he does not mean that the believer is most concerned with the external practices of religion but on the inner practice, the believer is most concerned with the heart rather than the head. This leads to the conclusion that to conduct religious education properly it would seem necessary to involve the pupils not only in the study of religion and its practices but also in the experience of religion.
To experience religion does not mean that the pupil must be converted to a particular set of religious beliefs, even if it were possible it would not generally be considered desirable. It means that pupils must be involved not only in experiencing religious discourse at an academic level but also involved in the emotions that come from realisation. Realisation can be seen as a new insight which demands affective and commissive responses. Realisation may be interpreted as revelation by some religions but the term is used here to describe only the experience of the believer and not the source of the experience. The term "believer" is appropriate, applied as it is here to the pupil, because each pupil is a believer of their own realisations. In the terms of Wittgenstein's criteria as they have been adapted earlier in the thesis, each pupil uses a picture to interpret their experiences no matter how unconscious that use or how undeveloped the picture. Realisation also carries the implication that the insight is the truth and this is also appropriate because to the pupil as believer it is the truth.

Weightman (1982) considers the nature of realisation further. He compares the actual with the real, the actual being that which is fact and the real being that which is value. For example, the child who wishes to avoid a test at school may complain of a stomach ache. His complaint "I have a stomach ache" is fact, they are the words that he actually uses. The value of his statement is that he wishes to avoid a test at
school, that is what he really means. Weightman further compares the actual and the real with the notions of existence and essence. He suggests that existence has a poverty of value and purpose but the certainty of facticity. Essence has a richness of purpose and value but an uncertainty of facticity, essence carries only the possibility of being, of actually existing. For a full understanding both knowledge of fact and a realisation of the value of the fact is necessary. Clearly, in religious education, where the concern is with fundamental questions of meaning and value, realisation is important as the intention of the pupil's learning. This means that realisation is the intended outcome of the pupil's learning experiences. This does not mean that realisation is a behavioural objective, or any sort of objective, in the way that they are used in the objectives model. Realisation is the essence of what religious education is about.

If the development of the pupil's experience is the intention of education, and this is seen as a worthwhile area of experience, then it can be argued that realisation forms the substance of a true education in religion. It also reflects most accurately the concern of the believer. If this is so then the only possible curriculum model for religious education is a process model. It is inconceivable that behavioural objectives could be stated that would then be achieved through the commissive aspect of the realisations that are somehow induced. The work following from acceptance of the above argument seems quite clear and it is not
primarily of an academic nature. The work is practical in that it requires teachers to develop ways in which they might set up situations and provide experiences in which the pupil may come to these insights that have been called realisations.

There is one further aspect of concepts that needs to be emphasised and that is the need for pupils to become familiar with the connections that are made to religious concepts. This involves the pupil in the use of what is usually called religious language and includes not only words but symbols as well. Whilst it may not be necessary to include this element specifically in the principles of procedure, the teacher should always be looking for ways in which to develop the pupil's ability to recognise and use religious language. In this way the pupil is more able to recognise, understand and share other people's religious experience. In this way they will be able to develop better their own realisations and be able to communicate these to others.

Realisation and the non-rational

Otto (1931) refers to the claim of Fries that there are three forms of understanding. The first of these, knowledge, involves the building up of concepts to order one's sensations. This description of knowledge as a structure in which experiences are conceptualised and ordered has been referred to before in this thesis. The other two forms of understanding are faith and presentiment. Whilst knowledge
involves both concepts and sensations, faith and presentiment only have one of these characteristics each. Faith involves concepts without sensations, that is while the faith may be certain it cannot appeal to sense data for proof. Presentiment involves sensations for which there are no adequate concepts, the sensations are definite but not able to be articulated.

In his book "The idea of the holy" Otto (1923) argues that the basic category in religion is the holy. This category includes both the rational and the non-rational. The rational is obviously open to consideration, reason and discussion, it is accessible to normal teaching methods. The rational and non-rational are bound together and thus both elements must be considered in the teaching of religious education. In order to distinguish the non-rational element of religion Otto coined the term "the numinous". This non-rational element is the form of understanding identified as presentiment.

Realisation involves both rational and non-rational elements. Clearly much of a pupil's realisation will involve reason, realisation includes the appreciation of the conclusion of an argument, the perception of an illustration. For example, the term realisation can be applied to the understanding that in the parable of the Good Samaritan, Jesus is showing that by neighbour he means all men, and the implications of this realisation for the behaviour of the followers of Jesus is also realised through reason. To give an example in words of a realisation on a non-rational level is, by its very nature,
impossible. It is possible to give an example in general terms. For example, realisation on a non-rational level could be involved in the appreciation of some aspect of God in a way that causes an emotional response of awe. There have been many attempts to describe this, essentially indescribable, experience. These include the writings of Christian mystics, the writings of nature mystics such as Jefferies "The story of my heart", and essentially secular writings such as the description of an experience at the end of Huxley's "Eyeless in Gaza". Thus the numinous, whilst intended by Otto as, perhaps, relating only to the religious, has parallels in Humanistic life stances.

It is hard to see how any exploration of the numinous could be planned within the framework of behavioural objectives. Even within a process model it is an area which has not been explored at any great depth. Potter, in Minney and Potter (1984), has attempted a variety of teaching strategies to develop a sense of awe and wonder in pupils and concludes

"there are teaching methods which prompt a receptivity to awe" (Minney and Potter, 1984, 27)

The work was based on the Durham Agreed Syllabus but was not developed within a behavioural objectives framework. Clearly, any teaching which prompts in a direction, rather than setting out to achieve a particular result in terms of change in the pupil, cannot be planned within a behavioural objectives model. That it prompts in the direction of receptivity may be seen as an emphasis on the process, there is no indication of
how the pupil should react on experiencing awe, if any experience of awe should take place as the result of the teaching at all.

The non-rational element of realisation is important in religious education, it is not properly separable from the rational element. It is therefore possible to argue that if this element, the numinous, is so important in religious education then the objectives model is shown as an unsuitable model for the planning of religious education. In this case the model is shown as unsuitable specifically for religious education. It must therefore be considered when it comes to develop a framework for religious education in a process model.
Summary

It is concepts that define the subject area. It is possible to define the subject area of religious education in a satisfactory manner by adapting Wittgenstein's view of a religious believer. To include beliefs that are not usually considered religious, a believer is one who "uses a picture as explanatory of life set in its ultimacy".

Attfield's taxonomy of concepts is too complex to have much use for the classroom teacher beyond being a reference source during planning. It does help to be able to identify the categorial and essential religious concepts of a belief system. The independent concepts may be necessary in an understanding of religious language.

Four categories of concepts in religious education are identifiable. These are 1) the concepts that describe a life stance, 2) concepts that are the subject of religious discourse, 3) the concept of ultimacy, 4) concepts of religious experience such as belief and faith.

Religious education in a process model should plan for the pupils to experience moments of realisation.

Realisation should be planned for at the non-rational level, the level of the numinous, as well as the rational level.
CHAPTER SIX

SKILLS IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Definition

Much has been written about skills and the word "skills" can be used in different ways.

Borger and Seabourne (1966, 127) point out that the word "skill" is used in two different ways. Firstly it is used to denote the ability to do something, the emphasis is on the activity. For example it might be said that someone has the skill to drive a car. The second use relates to the level of ability, for example a skilled wood carver suggests a man with a high degree of ability in that area. The term will be used in this thesis in the first sense, the interest is primarily in the ability to perform the activity and not in the level of performance.

Transfer of learning

Transfer of learning is also referred to as transfer of training and has been mentioned earlier in the thesis in the section on psychology as an influence in the development of the objectives model. In that passage the faculty theory, that assumes almost complete transfer of learning, was dismissed as outmoded. In fact, Stones (1966, 87) points out that transfer
of training is less than was commonly thought. This means that it is no use teaching, for example, Latin because it trains a person to think logically either generally or in other subject areas.

There is both positive and negative transfer of training. Positive transfer is where a previous experience enables a person to complete the task in an easier or a better manner. Negative transfer, interference, means that previous learning inhibits or prevents the completion of the present task.

Thomson (1959, 56-8, 144-5) points to a conclusion that can be drawn from the results of Maier's "hat trick" and "pendulum" experiments. This is that

"Positive transfer of relevant past training to a present task only takes place if the subject can make use of a mediating factor: this may come from uses within the task situation or as a result of the activity of the thinker."

(Thomson, 1959, 144-5)
The first case in which transfer can be expected, uses within the task situation, is the most obvious case. If the current task has elements in it that are similar to some aspect of previous learning then transfer would be expected. For example, if a man is good at tennis then it would be reasonable to expect him to be able to hit a squash ball competently in the type of strokes where the motion is the same as, or similar to, the motion of hitting the ball in tennis. This takes the point into the realm of degree of skill
rather than just competence. Whilst the good tennis player may have a basic competence in certain squash strokes he will only become a good squash player by practising and mastering the specific strokes needed for squash.

The second element that enables past learning to be applied to a present task, as a result of the activity of the thinker, requires a separate note because of its importance to education and teaching. Klausmeier (1961, 425) explains this point more fully when he deals with generalisation and transposition theory. He quotes Judd's darts experiment to show that knowledge of principles can be a major factor in transfer of learning, i.e. transfer by generalisation. In transposition theory Klausmeier refers to the work of Johnson and Zara (1960) and concludes that

"The more extensive the knowledge of relationships gained during initial learning, the greater the transfer."

(Klausmeier, 1961, 425)

Klausmeier lists the following principles of retention and transfer

1) Setting and starting to attain a goal initiates and focuses activities.

2) Perceiving the relatedness of components of a task facilitates the initial learning and retention of all types of learning outcomes.

3) Experiencing feelings of success in connection with initial learning promotes retention.
4) Attaining concepts and principles and developing abilities facilitate vertical and lateral transfer.

5) Applying newly acquired concepts, principles and abilities increases their permanence.

6) Learning over a period of time is essential for developing stable abilities and comprehensive knowledge."

(Klausmeier, 1961, 425)

These points should clearly be the concern of, and be considered by, all teachers.

Transfer of learning in religious education

It is certainly true that such general skills as "interpretation of evidence" are used in many subject areas but a skill such as "interpretation of a theological statement" will be considered solely or principally within the realm of religious studies, although the specific skill may also be required in history in some cases. Whether it is necessary to think of the specific skill as separate from the general skill depends upon the degree of transfer of learning from one area to another.

It seems that with both positive and negative transfer from within the whole range of the pupil's experience it is virtually impossible to conduct any experiments on transfer of general skills such as "interpretation of evidence". There will be far too many factors in the background of the pupil's experience to allow the test results to be reliable. All
conclusions in this area must therefore be tentative.

It can certainly be shown that there are elements to a skill such as "interpretation of evidence" that are common to all uses of the skill, for example the appreciation of authorship. If these elements are learnt as principles then some transfer of learning from one area to another could be expected. Similarly, when dealing with rather more specific skills such as "ability to interpret the teaching of Moses" and "ability to interpret the teaching of Paul", as long as the additional information was available some transfer of learning would be expected because the skills have a great deal in common.

It would also seem reasonable to say that "interpretation of evidence in history" and "interpretation of evidence in the Bible" contain significant elements of similarity and so some transfer is to be expected. However they each contain significantly different elements and so some new learning is essential. It would seem reasonable to say that within the subject area of religious education the careful teacher would make sure that they had identified those skills which are necessary to a study of religions, to the interpretation of other men's beliefs and to an appreciation of their own experiences. The teacher would also look for, but not assume, some transfer of learning of skills from other similar areas in the curriculum and use these to the pupil's best advantage. Other points to note about the teachers use and development of skills can be read from the previous section on the definition
Skills exclusive to religious education

Bloom's (1954) distinction between skills and abilities, abilities being skills allied to specific content, has already been noted. Bloom however treated skills and abilities as one in his taxonomy, or at least he made no further distinction between them. Obviously no skill can be exercised in the absence of content. Thus if skills are to be listed that a teacher would be concerned to foster in a religious education course then the examples of skills will describe the skill as applied to some content that is considered as appropriate to religious education. That is not to say that the skill is exclusive to religious education.

Before it is possible to say that there are no skills that are exclusive to religious education two criteria need to be satisfied

a) that any skill that is claimed as exclusive to religious education can be applied to some content outside the subject area

b) that transfer of training is such that a pupil who has mastered the skill as applied to some area outside religious education would be able to apply that skill within the field of religious education with no further learning.

Of these criterion (a) is the most crucial. With the previous
comments on transfer of learning in mind, criterion (b) can be satisfied if the two situations are similar in that the content on which the skill is now to operate is similar to the content on which the skill was learnt. A qualification should be made to this that the learning of the skill should take place in such a way that the pupil understands the principles on which the skill is based and is not merely able to perform the skill. This may seem a rather vague basis on which to claim that criterion (b) can be satisfied but it has already been noted that the area of transfer of learning is complicated, particularly by the pupil's previous learning that he brings with him to any new learning situation, and the possibility of a definite demonstration that criterion (b) can be satisfied in each case seems remote if not impossible.

To further consider criterion (a) it is useful to examine what would have to be demonstrated to show that religious education could have exclusive skills that are not duplicated by some other subject area. To demonstrate this it would be necessary to show that the subject is of a different order from other subjects, that it involves a different form of knowledge, requiring different skills for understanding of the form.

Whilst there have been noted some important and telling criticisms of the forms of knowledge of Hirst, they do provide an analysis of religion as a different order from other subjects and so the analysis is useful to the present question. Hirst suggested that there are four logical distinctions that
distinguish each form of knowledge and these are

1) each form involves certain central concepts that are peculiar in character to the form.

2) a distinctive logical structure; in a given form concepts, denoting certain aspects of experience, form a network of possible relationships by which experience can be understood.

3) statements made in each form are testable by experience in accordance with the criteria that are peculiar to that form.

4) particular techniques and skills for exploring experience and testing their distinctive expressions resulting in a mass of symbolically expressed knowledge.

The first of Hirst's criteria deals solely with content, it makes no comment about skills. The second criterion deals with a distinctive logical structure and this structure is the way that the concepts relate to one another. Within a form the concepts link in a rational manner, it is not skill that makes the proper links but having a proper understanding of the concepts. In this way the rational connections between the concepts are made and thus the distinctive logical structure is understood. Thus the skills involved are general skills applied to a specific structure and not exclusive skills. To give an example of this, in the list of objectives that are produced by Avon to help teachers to prepare their own religious education syllabuses, there is a list of general, rather than particular, skills. They include
"To organise information through concepts and generalisations." (Lealman, 1981b, 37)

Also from the Schools Council, in a list of key skills offered by most subjects

"Ability to pursue a line of enquiry by making connections, thinking logically, recognising what is of chief importance......." (Schools Council, 1977a, 17)

The third criterion deals with distinctive tests for truth and the ability to apply these, if they exist, and is important to religious education. The educated man would be one who could apply the tests for himself on new perceptions, not merely a man who knew of the tests. However, Barrow (1976) fails to identify any distinctive tests for truth within religion and so concludes that religion is not a distinctive form. Hirst (1970b) seems to accept this in his reply to Phillips (1970).

The fourth criterion suggests that each form has particular skills and techniques for exploring experience. Whilst the position of religion as a form of knowledge has been called into question this is the criterion that offers most help in identifying skills specific to religion and is worth considering further.

The nature of religious belief as the "use of a picture" means that belief is a personal thing in that no two people use exactly the same picture. This is true even though the pictures are grounded in a form of life which is largely
shaped by the community of faith. Each person's picture is influenced by his personal experience, which is unique to him. They will therefore react in different ways to new perceptions that need exploration. The degree of accommodation or rejection of the perception will only be entirely relevant to the person that explores that experience. The truth will be subjective in that the precise truth is only the precise truth for the person who explores the experience although a very similar perception may be shared by many people. It is this similarity of perception that allows meaningful communication to take place. The similarities can be seen in agreements such as creeds, to which many believers may subscribe, and which state the salient features of the picture.

It is this personal perception of truth that was being considered in the previous chapter in the examination of the notion of realisation. Realisation refers to insights that are set in the realm of ultimacy. Whether this realisation can be seen as a skill is another matter. To be a skill it must be possible to acquire, develop and refine the ability to gain insights of this nature. Certainly the steps on a mystical path may be seen as developing a skill but this view would not necessarily be shared by those who take this path. The process of self denial and openness to some Other may be a skill developed by self or some gift of grace and revelation by a Deity. It is not within the scope of this thesis to examine the nature of religious experience in this way and progress
along a mystical path is not the usual intention of religious education in a state school. It is however one road that is a logical extension of the development of realisation in the pupils. This raises the important question of the distinction between religious understanding and understanding religion. This distinction will be dealt with in the next section.

If realisation is to be developed then there may be particular skills that enable the pupil to gain more frequent and deeper insights. Realisation has parallels with what Ramsey (1957) called disclosure; religious insights he referred to as cosmic disclosure. However, Ramsey also identified five other types of disclosure situation and there is no reason to suggest that, if there are any particular skills associated with disclosure situations, that these are not general to all disclosures, there are none that have been identified as specific to cosmic disclosure. It can be also be argued that these skills, if they exist, are similar to those that would be developed by a person going through certain forms of self analysis within the realm of psychiatry, or developed by training in De Bono's lateral thinking. The difference lies in the content, or rather, in this, case in the context. For it to be religious it would need to be in the context of ultimacy.

To conclude, it seems that if there are any skills that are exclusive to religion that they lie in the area of realisation in the context of ultimacy, that these skills may also exist
in some other form of realisation not in the context of ultimacy is open to question. There may also be some skills associated with prayer, similar to those of meditation. Both of these come within the definition of religion that has been developed from Wittgenstein to include life stances and they are also open to the same question as above as they both seem to be ways of realisation.

There is a further point to be made that in the "use of picture" there are no particular rules about the way in which a new perception must be accommodated or rejected. There is no reason to suggest that the "use of picture" follows rules of logic or consistency, these are not skills that are necessarily relevant to the believer. Religious beliefs may be held that appear to be contradictory but that are perfectly valid to the believer. They may be seen by the believer in terms of mystery, for example Jesus as God and man, or God as One and a Trinity.

Religious understanding and understanding religion

The distinction between these two forms of understanding was raised in the last section and needs to be clarified. The understanding of religion, with which the Schools Council (1977b) groundplan was concerned, would be seen as the usual concern of religious education. It is concerned with the study of religion and the skills involved are those associated with study. It is this understanding that religious education
will explicitly develop.

Religious understanding is an outlook on life, it is the experiences of life interpreted through religious belief. The skills involved are those of being religious, the skills that Wittgenstein described as being required by the believer. This understanding may be developed implicitly in religious education as the pupil explores and develops his own experiences and beliefs.

Cox (1983) considered the distinction carefully and set out the questions that need to be answered with regard to religious education. The first question that he asked is whether there is a unique form of understanding that can be called religious understanding. This question has already been considered in some detail and there are different answers according to what is meant by a unique form. If Hirst's criteria are to be used then Barrow would claim that religious understanding is not a unique form. However, if Wittgenstein's notion of what may constitute evidence for religious belief is taken into consideration then religious belief, and hence religious understanding, may claim to be different from other forms of understanding. Wittgenstein's notion of "use of picture" also gives a uniqueness to religious understanding in that it is an overarching understanding, it is the determinant of the way that the person approaches life. It may also be claimed that religious belief, in the way that this thesis has defined it, is unique in that it seeks understanding in the
context of ultimacy. Whilst these arguments are not conclusive they do indicate a way in which religious understanding may be considered to be a unique form of understanding.

To the question of whether this religious understanding requires commitment or whether objective study is sufficient, the answer must be that, according to the definition of religious understanding that has been taken, religious understanding implies commitment. According to the view of religious understanding taken, it is also necessary to say that it is not confined to those of a conscious religious stance. All men make use of a picture to interpret experience and just as it is not unreasonable to suggest that a fully conscious picture is rare, if possible, then some people's pictures will be barely, if at all, conscious.

Cox's final question is whether religious understanding is appropriate for religious education in schools. The answer that is suggested by Cox is that religious education should start with observation and ask the pupils to put themselves into other people's shoes. This places an emphasis on empathy, to develop religious understanding through other people's beliefs and experiences. The approach that has been taken by this thesis is not dissimilar, except that the emphasis has been placed on the pupil developing their own experiences and beliefs through inquiry into issues of fundamental meaning and value.
Skills in the objectives model.

Whilst it is difficult to identify any skills that are exclusive to religious education except where skills are identified by content, there are skills which are of particular concern to religious education. These are skills that are necessary to religious education and are emphasised in religious education. There is also a group of general study skills that are used in religious education.

General study skills are specified in conjunction with the more particular skills of religious education in two documents, Schools Council (1977a) and the material offered by Avon to help teachers prepare their own religious education syllabus (Lealman, 1981a). A combination of these two give the following general study skills

1) To research and collect information from a wide variety of sources and ascertain its validity in terms of relevance and reliability.

2) To understand and organise information through appropriate concepts and generalisations into a coherent pattern.

3) To test and evaluate information objectively.

4) To present findings in an intelligible, complete and attractive manner.

The second group, skills particular to religious education, is more complicated. The skills are one aspect of the
objectives that attempt to specify the aims of a course in religious education, thus the skills specified will depend on the view taken of a man educated in religion. The skills are also specified in a variety of ways. Avon and Hampshire produce lists of objectives that combine concepts, skills and attitudes in descriptive statements and are therefore not particularly useful when the interest is solely in skills. The Schools Council (1977a), Durham and Manchester specify skills related to content that is particularly religious. The problem with these is that the skills specified are in terms of mediate goals, they are broadly descriptive of the aims rather than definitive. Obviously, the more precisely the skills are specified in relation to content the greater the list becomes, and the less manageable, one of the criticisms of the objectives model. Berkshire specifies a broad skill and then relates the skill to religious education in a descriptive statement of its relevance, once again referring to content.

The skills thus specified overlap greatly, as is to be expected. Any comparison would be difficult due to the variety of forms in which the skills are presented and would not seem to offer much help in the development of the process model of religious education which is the current concern.

Skills in the understanding of religion

Johns (1983) adopts a somewhat different approach when he suggests that there are at least six major skills involved in
religious understanding and these he describes thus

1) Classification - which he describes as

"the ability to judge correctly which conceptual schema applies to an object, action or statement."

(Johns, 1983, 70)

In this one skill he combines the first four skills that are identified by Bloom in his taxonomy. The remaining skill in Bloom's taxonomy is evaluation.

2) Evaluation - which is

"the skill of knowing how an object is used, or the rules which give an action meaning ..., or the logic and truth criteria of a statement" (Johns, 1983, 71)

Evaluation is for the most part inseparable from classification, if it is known how to classify an object, the reason for that classification is usually known and that is the skill of evaluation. Johns continues

"The skill of evaluation implies .... at some level, the ability to apply the correct truth criteria"

(Johns, 1983, 71)

3) Explanation - which builds upon evaluation and requires that an explanation of religious activities can be given in terms that the believer would accept. This is the last of the objective skills in that the skills of classification, evaluation and explanation could equally apply to any scientific study as they do to religious study. The addition of the words "that the believer would accept" leads on to a different group of skills, those used in interpersonal relationships.
4) Self examination - relates the basic requirement of being able to express one's own beliefs and therefore knowing what are one's beliefs. Whilst self awareness is obviously important in religious education this does not appear to be a separate skill but rather a combination of the above three skills, particularly explanation, applied to a particular area of content ie. the self. Self awareness would seem to be essential if the next skills are to be developed.

5) Empathy - which is the ability to understand the importance of another man's beliefs to him. This is the appreciation of the subjective nature of beliefs that have been given an objective explanation, it relates to an understanding of the commissive and affective aspects of the use of a picture. It would seem reasonable to suggest that the more a pupil becomes aware of his own beliefs and the importance of them to him the more ready he is to develop an empathetic approach to other people's beliefs. It is hard to see how a pupil who does not attach, or perceive, any importance to his own beliefs could appreciate empathetically the importance of beliefs to other people. The development of empathy, and its exercise, is made problematic by the degree to which it is ever possible to appreciate the feelings of another person whose experience and outlook on life is not shared. However, empathy is possible to the extent that emotion and experience are common to man.

6) Epoche - which is the ability to suspend judgement, to bracket out ones own preconceptions to see the essence of religious phenomena. The essence of religious phenomena can be
said to lie, for the teacher of religious education, in their meaning to the believer, not only in how they contribute to his view of life but also how he reacts to them affectively and commissively. To suggest that the essence of religious phenomena lies elsewhere, for example in a Deity, as the believer might do, is the meaning of the religious phenomenon for the believer; it is the way the phenomenon is interpreted by his use of picture. Thus to see the essence of a religious phenomenon is to share in the beliefs of the believer. In this respect epoche may be seen as a similar skill to that used by method actors when they assume a part. Epoche can be said to be distinct from empathy in that empathy asks the pupils to appreciate the emotions of others by relating the other person's experience to their own experience. Epoche asks the pupils to enter the experience of others and share their emotions. It would seem that empathy requires that the pupils have sufficient relevant experience to which to refer before empathy is possible. Epoche can be seen as a more advanced skill in that pupils are asked to enter into an experience which may be new, and then appreciate the emotions that come from this new experience. Even when the pupil has relevant experience he is asked to bracket out his own experience.

There are several points to note about these skills of religious understanding and the first is that they are related to the study of religion, of other people's beliefs, rather than the development of the pupils own beliefs. Of the six skills only self examination refers directly to the pupil and
his own experience. They may well be said, however, to contribute to the development of the pupil's own beliefs in that they develop his understanding of his own experience.

Whilst the first three skills may be approached in an objective manner the second group of three are bound up with the pupil's feelings, they involve certain attitudes. For example it is not possible to develop empathy unless there is an attitude of respect for others, an intention to treat other people as equals. These attitudes are prerequisites for the application of empathy.

The skills are complementary and rely on each other for their full development within the individual. Also, Johns would argue, these skills are not only necessary to the study of religion but they are also essential in a liberal democracy. Particularly important, with regard to a liberal democracy, is empathy. A liberal democracy relies to a great extent on each member of the community having respect for the other members of the community. It may be suggested that in the ideal of such a society the freedom of the individual would be guaranteed by the respect shown to him by the other members of the society. It would seem reasonable to suggest that empathy plays a great part in the development of this respect. Respect can be built up by fear but this would not seem to be the type of respect required in the society that is being described. Appreciating the emotions of others requires care and concern for the other person's situation and the ability to recognise
in that situation elements of one's own experience. Hence respect for self leads, via empathy, to respect for others, by virtue of common experience. The care and concern is shown by the willingness to empathise, the recognition that the effort is worthwhile also shows respect for others.

This list of skills is more useful for the current purpose of setting out the framework for a process model of religious education than are the other skills that have appeared in relation to the objectives model. This is because they are free from content and do not need to be seen as objectives, they can be seen simply as those skills that will be used. Epoche can be seen as useful to the development of realisation as it is concerned with insight into the essence of religion, that is the beliefs of the believer as experienced in all its aspects.

It has already been noted that these skills relate to the study of religion rather than the development of the beliefs of the pupil. Religious education is concerned with both of these aspects although they are by no means separate. In studying the beliefs of the other people the pupils are enlarging their own experience and may be thus developing their own beliefs, if the study is approached in the right way. Before skills in a process model are considered a look at the skills of the believer may be useful.
Skills for the believer

Wittgenstein suggests that there are four ways in which the believer must learn the techniques of using a picture and these are

1) learning psychological techniques of concentration so that the picture will stay in the foreground of ones own mind.

2) of persuasion, so that one can hold it tellingly before the mind of others.

3) learning certain arbitrary logical connections in accordance with which the picture is used.

4) recognising which of the ordinary logical implications of the term employed to express the picture must be drawn out and which not. (Hudson, 1975, 188,9)

These will be considered in reverse order.

The fourth of these skills refers to the use of language, which also includes symbols. This use of language is the way in which beliefs are communicated by relating them to everyday language and thus to everyday experience. The language is used in an odd way, according to Ramsey, and these specific uses need to be understood in order to make communication effective. The believer needs this expertise in using language to articulate and rationalise his own beliefs to himself, to communicate with those believers who use a similar picture so that he may learn more, and to justify his actions to others. This may be considered as a proper understanding of the
concepts involved rather than as a skill but there seems to be an element of skill in the interpretation of connections that are new to the believer.

The third technique seems to deal with the internal structure of belief, the inter-relationships between concepts. This, it has already been suggested, is a correct understanding of the concepts rather than a skill, considering Peter's second criterion for a form of knowledge. This is important to the believer for the same reasons as the fourth technique, that is in the articulation and rationalisation of his beliefs. These two techniques relate to the extensional use of a concept.

The second technique relates to the intellectual understanding of one's belief and therefore includes the use of the two techniques already considered. The technique has two areas of use, as a defence in the face of criticism, and in the propagation of one's own viewpoint. In the first sense it must include the ability to preserve one's faith in the face of attack but not necessarily in open expression of one's belief. It need not be involved in open contradiction of the opposing viewpoint but may consist of some psychological practice that preserves the faith, for example a Christian may remind himself, particularly in an affective manner, of part of the Sermon on the Mount that promises blessings for those that are persecuted for the sake of their beliefs. In the second sense it would require some skill in debate and oratory.
as well as a thorough understanding of one's own beliefs. It is not necessarily the intention of religious education to produce orators but it is to be hoped that pupils would have the confidence to express their beliefs and it would then be the duty of the teacher to see that these beliefs were given the respect that they deserve. There is another implication for education in that whilst a pupil that is able to defend his/her own point of view may be desirable, the pupil should also be willing to listen to other people's points of view and, if necessary, to adjust his/her own views accordingly. Thus this technique may involve the teacher in a consideration of the importance of such skills as those relating to the interpretation of evidence and of discernment.

The first technique shows the importance of belief to the believer, that belief is intended to dominate the life of the believer, that it is a faith by which to live. This comes from the intensional use of a concept, it carries the compulsion to act. It relates to the intention of attitudinal change and development in that the life stance adopted, the picture used, requires certain standards of behaviour and attitude, in most life stances at least, and the believer will wish to conform to these. Thus there will be certain reactions to experience that are considered the correct reactions according to the life stance and the believer will aim to react in these particular ways.

From an educational point of view these techniques may seem to
be related to an education for mental health in that they relate to the understanding of a particular position, the understanding of the way that the picture reflects the experience of the believer, and its relation to life in the sense of living according to one's use of picture consistently.

Skills in a process model of religious education

First of all it must be said that there do not appear to be any skills that are specific to religious education. There are some that would appear to be specific to religious education but on closer examination these turn out to be a non-specific skill that is attached to some content that is religious in nature. These skills that are not exclusive to but are, rather, of particular concern to religious education are important to the process model as they will be required by the pupil in his educational activities and inquiry. These particular skills can also be developed, to the extent that a pupil can use the appropriate skill in dealing with new material, or with old material in a new situation. There also appears to some sort of hierarchy of skills which are dependent upon each other.

The implications of these points for the process model are straightforward. The teacher should be aware of the skills that may be required in any activity and should plan activities on the basis of the ability of the pupils to complete the activities in some sort of satisfactory manner.
This does not mean that each activity should result in success for the pupil because the pupil may be able to learn more from failure on some occasions. It would seem reasonable to expect the teacher to plan activities that will build upon skills that the pupil already possesses and also to develop other skills that are seen as further up in the hierarchy. Thus the activities should be chosen to challenge and develop skills as well as to keep the pupils interest.

The skills that seem most important to religious education are those of empathy and epoche. The contribution of the skill involved in appreciating another person's feelings with regard to respect, that is empathy, has already been noted. It is however the skill involved in sharing another person's experience and feelings, that is epoche, that seems to be most likely to lead to moments of realisation in the context of ultimacy, with reference to other people. The area of inquiry which is likely to lead to realisation in the context of ultimacy outside of interpersonal relationships will involve the pupils in some kind of contemplation in depth about their experience.

It is possible to distinguish between two categories of realisation, and these may be referred to as primary and secondary realisation. Secondary realisation comes as a result of empathy or epoche. It is the appreciation of what is true to another person. It does not mean acceptance of the beliefs of the other person as the truth but rather an acceptance, and
appreciation, of those beliefs as true for the other person, what these beliefs mean to the other person both on a rational and an emotional level. There is, of course, the problem of whether it is ever possible to fully appreciate the beliefs of another person, what is true to them, without accepting those beliefs as true oneself. The truth of the belief is an essential element of that belief to the other person. This is the area in which the skill of epoche is essential, allowing as far as possible a realisation of what is true to another person, what their realisation of the truth is, without accepting their realisation as true. This would only seem to be possible on the basis of common experience.

Primary realisation does not involve the appreciation of the truth claims of another person but is a realisation that originates from an appreciation of the value and meaning of one's own experience. This would involve such reactions to phenomena as awe and wonder and the understanding and commitment that comes from these reactions. It would include any other realisation of a rational or non-rational nature that comes from one's own experience. This is what is meant by a realisation that comes from a contemplation in depth about one's own experience.

The techniques and skills that may be developed as liable to lead to realisation are not fundamentally objectionable to the curriculum in a state school, or to the model of the curriculum that has been proposed, that is a process model.
They must be directed, however, to the development of the pupil's own insights, rather than to the acceptance of some insight that the teacher may wish the pupils to accept, if they are to remain neutral and acceptable in the curriculum. Within the process model they must obviously remain as tools that are available to the pupil in his inquiry rather than directed towards any end. For them to remain neutral it is also necessary that they are not based on any presuppositions with regard to an end. For example, prayer as a technique liable to lead to a realization may be acceptable within a religious community but not within a school. The reason is that prayer presupposes a something to which it is worthwhile praying. Meditation, which does not presuppose any particular object to which the meditation is directed, would be acceptable.
Summary

It does not seem possible to identify any skills that are exclusive to religious education unless they lie in the area of realisation in the context of ultimacy. That is, in the development of a religious understanding of life.

Religious education should be concerned with both an understanding of religion and the pupil's religious understanding.

Of six skills identified by Johns as necessary for an understanding of religion, the most important are empathy and epoche. Of these two, it would seem that epoche will be the one most likely to lead to moments of realisation by the pupils.

Empathy is important with regard to the basis of the process model of the curriculum. Empathy should lead to respect and a liberal democracy, upon which the process model is to an extent based, relies to a large extent on the mutual respect of the members of the community.

Wittgenstein identifies four skills that are necessary for the believer and these will be the skills that are developed in religious education with respect to the pupil's own beliefs.
ATTITUDES IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Attitudes are most important to, some say would the essence of, the learning process and it has been suggested that

"Among the various tendencies and predispositions which are acquired and modified by learning, none is more important to individuals and social welfare than attitudes and ideals."

(Kingsley and Garry, 1957, 471)

Definition

The above quotation emphasises the importance of attitudes and gives some clue as to what they are, namely predispositions or tendencies. Allport defined an attitude as

"a state of readiness organised through experience exerting a directive and/or dynamic influence upon the individual's response toward all objects or situations with which it is related" (Allport, 1935, 45)

Mouly describes attitudes as emotionally toned ideas and suggests that they can be considered as having three basic components

"a) An affective component ie. a certain feeling tone, sometimes quite irrational, which influences the acceptance or rejection of the attitude - object.

b) A cognitive component consisting of ones views regarding the attitude - object."
c) An action component, predisposing the individual toward specific overt behaviour." (Mouly, 1968, 452)

These components may exist at various levels of intensity and in varying degrees of interdependence to each other.

Klausmeier takes the same approach as Mouly in that rather than define attitudes he describes five defining attributes (Klausmeier, 1961, 357). These are

1) Learnability. All attitudes are learnt and they vary according to their level of awareness of learning. Some attitudes are acquired almost unconsciously whilst others, for example best buys in consumer tests, are carefully learnt.

2) Stability. There can be considered three terms that are relevant here: taste, attitude and value. For example, in music one may have a taste for a particular piece of music and this may change frequently; one may also have an attitude to categories of music which change rarely; one's value of the role of music in society may never change. These are not hard and fast divisions but are indicative of the stability of attitudes.

3) Personal - Societal significance. Attitudes are involved in, and affect, relationships between people and other people, and between people and society.

4) Affective - cognitive element. Cognitive refers to the informational content of the attitude whilst affective relates to the degree of emotion that is associated with the attitude. For example, a fear of spiders is high in affective
content but low in cognitive content.

5) Approach - avoidance directionality. This describes how the attitude will affect ones behaviour, for example a favourable attitude to church will make one approach it, an unfavourable attitude to sport makes one avoid it. Klausmeier puts these attributes into a diagrammatic form.

without awareness -- Learnability -------- intentionally

temporary ---------- Stability ------------ permanent

low -------------- Personal/Societal ---- high significance

high affective ------- Affective/Cognitive -- high cognitive element

high approach ------- Approach/avoidance --- high avoidance directionality

Klausmeier also claims that attitudes are learnt in one of three ways

a) observation and imitation

b) classical and operant conditioning

c) intentional securing, thinking about and evaluating information.

There are several further points to be made about attitudes in relation to concepts, beliefs and ideals. Klausmeier claims that
"The main difference between an attitude and a concept is that the former directly influences the individuals acceptance or rejection of attitude objects, persons, events and things.

(Klausmeier, 1961, 382)
This active, directional element in attitudes is not only concerned with the acceptance-avoidance attribute but also gives them their personal-societal significance.

It is clear from the point above, and that attitudes have an affective component, that attitudes are closely related to the intensional aspect of concepts. This can be seen clearly when the concept of a dog is considered. In this example the intensional aspect of one's concept of a dog will also govern one's attitude to, and one's action towards, dogs.

More complex attitudes are built up from several concepts that are synthesised into a particular view. For example, one's attitude towards immigration would be built up from concepts of coloured people, overpopulation, unemployment, equality of man etc. It may well be the case that the attitude is built up partly of attitudes, for example one's attitude to coloured people, and partly from concepts, for example the concept of equality of man.

Attitude, in some cases, is closely related to belief. Where one's attitudes are in the realm where Klausmeier uses the term value then the terms value and belief may be interchangable.
For example, to value all men as equal could be stated as a belief in the equality of man. Attitudes tend to be specific and definite with respect to the object to which they refer, and it is in this that they differ from ideals. One's tolerance of a minority group would be described as an attitude to that group whereas tolerance as an abstraction would be an ideal.

Attitude development and change

Attitudes clearly permeate man's existence and, as part of the learning process, schools must be concerned with the learning of attitudes in an organised way. However, attitudes are difficult to change because they are so closely related to the total personality, that is they are the basis of the self concept.

Teaching of attitudes is not something that can be ignored and thought beyond the sphere of education. Teachers cannot help but teach attitudes because they will be used as a model in the formation of attitudes. It is therefore important that the teacher, in his behaviour, does not contradict the values that he wishes the pupils to adopt. It is often claimed that attitudes are "caught and not taught". This means that attitudes are learnt more by non-rational methods than by information and evidence. As an example of what is meant, it seems that the fostering of desirable attitudes is much more likely to result from the personality and approach of the
teacher than it is from the subject matter. For example, teaching about democracy in an autocratic manner is not likely to be very effective. Mouly suggests that

"Some attitudes are learned as the result of conditioning through emotionally toned experiences."

(Mouly, 1968, 455)

This means, quite simply, that a pupil may come to dislike a subject not because of the subject itself but because of the way that the subject is taught, for example by a teacher who constantly ridicules the pupil. The attitude to the subject is also likely to last a good deal longer than the memory of the content of the subject, particularly where there has been such negative reinforcement of the learning. This is a particularly important point if education is seen in terms of getting pupils committed to areas of knowledge as Peters does. Mouly goes on to suggest that

"Desirable attitudes are probably best developed through meaningful participation in worthwhile activities designed to influence attitudes." (Mouly, 1968, 455)

It has already been suggested that religious education in a process model would be planned on the basis of the pupil being involved in activities that are considered worthwhile. That they should be designed to influence attitudes would seem to be part of the definition of education and will be a primary concern of this chapter.

Stenhouse and Verma produced an hypothesis from their
research, from 1972 to 1977, that suggested how difficult attitude change may be for the teacher to bring about. In a project called "Problems and effects of teaching about race relations" they produced statistics that led them to suggest that

"When teaching about race relations meets the educational criteria of appeal to the judgement of those that are taught, as opposed to the procedural principles of indoctrination or brainwashing, a fairly substantial minority will, during teaching, shift attitude in the direction judged undesirable by the teacher." (Stenhouse and Verma, 1981, 336)

This would seem to confirm that for teaching to be effective in the changing of attitudes it is essential to consider non-rational as well as rational influences. The following section gives an example of this.

Cognitive dissonance

The problem of developing and changing attitudes is complicated by the wide variety of attitudes that the pupils will bring into the classroom with them that have been formed independently of the teacher's influence, attitudes that have been formed by their parents, their peers etc. These attitudes may show a strong resistance to change, a point which is developed in Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance. This suggests that

"the amount of dissonance that exists after a decision has
been made is a direct function of the number of things the person knows that are inconsistent with that particular decision." (Festinger, 1964, 5)

What this means is that the greater the difficulty in making the decision the more the person will attempt to justify it afterwards, the chosen will be made as attractive as possible whilst the rejected will be made less attractive, thus attempting to reduce dissonance. This theory has important implications for religious education when the nature of religious belief is considered. In a previous chapter it was noted that a belief may be based on the most minimal of evidence in favour of that belief but will then be adopted with a commitment out of all proportion to the evidence. These are precisely the conditions in which Festinger suggests the greatest dissonance, and hence resistance to change, occurs.

In general terms, dissonance will be created in the pupil's mind whenever the cognitions offered by the teacher to the pupil are not in accord with the pupil's own cognitions. This is one way of looking at what happens in education all of the time, the pupils are required constantly to adjust their view of their environment, of themselves or their view of the world. Where a specific decision has been made to which the new information (cognition) provided is relevant, the new cognition will be either consonant or dissonant with the pupil's decision. This will affect the reception of the new cognition.
Where no decision that is relevant exists the cognition may be treated in an impartial and objective manner. Where a relevant decision does exist, that is, one of two or more options has been rejected, the process of dissonance reduction may affect the reception of the cognition. Where a cognition is dissonant with a decision already made defensive processes may prevent the new cognition from becoming established.

Within religious education the teacher may deal with two separate groups of pupils in the same class, those who have committed themselves to one of the alternatives relevant, that is a religious belief, and those who have made no such commitment. These two groups will react differently to cognitions that are relevant to the decision made by the committed pupils, as will pupils who have made different decisions about the relevant alternatives. These different reactions are to be expected if religious belief is a matter of using a picture, Festinger's theory suggests a resistance to change that is particularly relevant to the teaching situation.

There are further implications of the theory in that if the subject is disliked by the pupil, or perceived to be unimportant, for whatever reason, there may be a rejection of all attempts to interest the pupil, and a rejection of all interesting material and presentations. Even if the subject is
not rejected, pupils will not seek out material that is liable to be dissonance-increasing unless there is a particular reason; for example if it is seen to be useful to them, perhaps in another context. This point is important for any teaching strategy that allows, and requires, pupils to select their own material, for example in inquiry and project work. The pupils will tend to seek out information that reinforces their own point of view rather than material that will challenge their view and thus broaden their experience.

Attitudes in an affective taxonomy

Krathwohl (1964) gives a description of what is meant by "attitude" in his "Taxonomy of educational objectives in the affective domain". This was an extension of Bloom's work in the cognitive domain but was less successful than the earlier work primarily because, in the affective domain, the terms are less precise in that the meaning of each term has less common agreement. The taxonomy does, however, have a useful contribution to make to the discussion on attitudes.

Krathwohl produced a table showing the meaning of certain terms measured against his taxonomy continuum. In this continuum he suggests that the term "attitude" has the same range of meaning as the term "value". The range of meaning for these two terms is given as including a willingness to respond and a satisfaction in response; the acceptance of, a preference for and commitment to a value; and the
conceptualisation of a value. Attitudes, according to Krathwohl, do not go beyond a single event, they are the reactions to specific circumstances. He suggests that the organisation of a value system, where values are brought into an ordered and consistent relationship with each other, is beyond the term attitude. He also makes no distinction between attitude as a means and as an end, he is concerned with an affective reaction. Whilst he is concerned with the affective domain he also brings in the cognitive function of an attitude in the examples that he gives. The taxonomy is concerned with the internalisation of cognitive perceptions such that they form the tendency to react in certain ways.

The highest level of affective reaction is that of characterisation, this being described as

"the integration of these beliefs, ideas, and attitudes into a total philosophy or world view."

(Krathwohl, 1964, 184)

One of the examples given of this is "to develop a consistent philosophy of life". Characterisation can thus be identified with Wittgenstein's use of picture to the extent that the philosophy of life is religious. With the adaptation of the use of picture to the dimension of ultimacy rather than of God it seems reasonable to suggest that characterisation is the province in which religious education should operate. This refers to the notion of the "use of picture" as the one comprehensive determinant of a person's view of life, and the stimulus for his behaviour. Characterisation involves the
development of a total philosophy of life by interpretation of the relevant aspects of a person's life.

Thus characterisation involves the development of a world view that could be seen as the same in function as the believers "use of picture". If religious education is to be concerned with the pupil as believer then it is concerned with characterisation, that takes account of the coherent nature of his belief.

Whilst considering the affective nature of an attitude it is useful to look at Wilson (1971) who was particularly concerned with the education of the emotions. He claimed that

"any concept of religion as a sui generis activity ought to rest primarily on the central emotion of awe...."

(Wilson, 1971, 33)

He thus identifies emotion as central to religious education. If the teacher is to be concerned with the mental health of the pupil then it seems necessary that the education provided takes account of the education of their emotions. Wilson (1971) emphasised the importance of emotions in religious education. He provides a basic framework in which the education of the emotions can be planned in a rational way. Whilst the framework, Wilson calls it a taxonomy, is so basic as to provide little help for teachers it does serve to emphasise one point. If there is an intention to change a persons attitudes, or promote in them certain attitudes at the expense of others, then success is more likely if the
emotional element is catered for as well as the cognitive element of the attitude.

Limitations on the teaching of attitudes

Attitudes relate to teaching in two ways, as means and as ends. The difference between these two uses is important and it is necessary that it is made clear. Attitudes that are the end of education can be seen as two groups, attitudes that are specific to a religious belief and more general attitudes. This second group of attitudes will be further considered in the section on attitudes in an objectives model. These attitudes are those to which education is generally directed. The first group of attitudes includes the pupil's attitude to man, life etc. and are the components of the pupil's life stance. Attitudes as means are those attitudes that the pupil must bring to the learning process itself, attitudes such as interest and concern for truth. Attitudes as means and attitudes as ends of the second type are not always separated in lists of objectives and a clear separation is not, in many cases, possible because many attitudes will appear in both groups, for example a tolerance of another person's point of view. The reason for indicating a distinction between means and end is that in a process model only attitudes that are means will be stated explicitly.

However, that is not the whole picture. The lists of attitudes as objectives that have been produced have been
careful to exclude certain attitudes. These excluded attitudes are those that, seen as objectives, would lead to a charge that the syllabus required the teacher to engage in some form of indoctrination. That is, attitudes that are ends of the first type. Thus the attitudes in the lists are those that define an approach to the study of other people's beliefs and to one's own experience. In this they can be seen as acceptable to most people. Almost any attitude that is presented as an aim may be challenged by some group or individual but there are certain attitudes about which a large measure of agreement could be found that would endorse them as suitable as objectives in education, for example respect for other human beings as equals. These attitudes that would find a large measure of agreement include those that are implicit in the view of education in a liberal democracy.

The attitudes that may be specified as objectives of the process of education are justified by one's view of the nature of education and society. One could give many reasons as to why one should respect one's fellow man, depending upon the life stance adopted. One could say that it is because we are all God's creatures, or because it is commanded by God or simply because one wishes reciprocal respect. These further explanations are a reflection of the picture that is used and are not the concern of religious education as objectives but only as content. The attitudes that one may be concerned to promote are those that reflect the nature of the society, they are those attitudes upon which society depends for its
existence. Without the people having the attitudes appropriate to a liberal democracy that liberal democracy could not exist.

As well as society the particular attitudes that the teacher would hope that the pupils would adopt are those relevant to the view of the nature of education that is taken. If a process model of the curriculum is to be adopted then it would be required that the pupils have an interest in their work. A process model requires that the motivation for the inquiry comes from the pupil and this obviously requires the pupil's interest for it to be successful. Equally, the pupils cannot have their inquiry and horizons limited to one set of beliefs or values. It is necessary that the pupils direct their own inquiry within this model. The teacher must be prepared to accept that the pupil may see truth as different from that of the view of the teacher.

The process model is clearly opposed to the imposition of any particular views, values or beliefs. Inasmuch as the model reflects a view of society it reflects a belief in a liberal democratic society and by this is meant a belief in a form of society rather than any political intentions. This view of society and the model of education it implies provides an interesting anomaly. To offer a process model of the curriculum as the only proper model for a particular view of education reflects a particular view of society. It also commits its advocates to a particular approach and to the encouragement of particular attitudes in the pupils. These
attitudes may be directly opposed to those of other people who take a different view of society and of education. For example, the religious man who believes that wisdom is an increasing knowledge of God through the reading of the Bible and prayer would not necessarily accept that all religions are equally worthy of study, or equally worthy of respect. A fascist view of society may not take the view that all men are equally worthy of respect, the Marxist may also take a different stance with regard to desirable attitudes.

It is reasonable to say that a process model of education is linked to a liberal democratic view of society. The model requires that pupils decide upon their own beliefs and that no undue pressure should be put on them to accept any particular life stance. This could mean that a pupil may reject the very attitudes with which he has been encouraged to approach his learning. If the pupil does reject the values inherent in the model then the teacher is not at liberty to use any other means to convince the pupil other than to present to him this view as an alternative to his own. As has already been noted from Stenhouse and Verma and from Festinger, the rejection of the values of the model is quite possible and may be very difficult to change, or even gain consideration for any alternative views. There is no other way in which the case for the attitudes inherent in the process model may be presented to the pupils other than as a possible alternative, within the model the end is the means.
There is the further point that a pupil may become interested in the arguments of a fascist group and wish to pursue them as part of his inquiry into the beliefs of others. According to the principles of the process model the teacher would be obliged to provide the information and the forum for discussion of beliefs that contradict the principles on which the learning experience is based. Unless certain conditions are laid down as to the extent of the pupils inquiry there can be no argument with the pupil embracing fascism and also trying to persuade other pupils to accept it. It would be the bold teacher who would claim that the principles inherent in the process model will always be more attractive to pupils than any other life stance with less tolerance of other people and their attitudes.

The case for some limitations on the inquiry of pupils will come in the principles of procedure, those that limit the inquiry to the area of religious education. This still leaves a large area that can legitimately be covered and beliefs involving, for example, racial intolerance will still come within the scope of the subject. Obviously the teacher has the advantage of choosing the methodology for presentation of what they might consider as undesirable views but this may be seen as a masked form of indoctrination and hence would not be acceptable.

It is possible that there is some moral limit to the teacher's acceptance of the pupil's inquiry. For example, the teacher
may not accept from the pupils any inquiry that led to the breaking of the law, or inquiry into groups that preach the breaking of the law. This would limit inquiry in that openly racist groups, or those that endorse terrorism as a legitimate weapon of protest, would not be studied. It is possible to argue however that certain laws have been changed because people have disobeyed them as part of a protest that has led to an improvement in the law. For example, the law that required the wearing of a motor cycle crash helmet compulsory for riders of motor cycles even though their beliefs about religious dress made this impossible. It could also be argued that a group such as some of the peace campaigners, whose protests include illegal acts such as criminal damage to fences, are a legitimate area of study as part of an inquiry into peace and war. Equally, it would be unbalanced to study religious conflict in Northern Ireland without some consideration of the I.R.A.

The answer may have to be pragmatic. It is hard to find any viewpoint that is not supported by at least a small group of people but that does not mean that all viewpoints should be equally worthy of consideration, nor that all viewpoints are suitable subjects for study in school. It could be said that all viewpoints are legitimate as areas of inquiry unless the study involves the pupil in activities that would be condemned by a large majority of the people in the country. Thus a study of the policies of the I.R.A. may be valid, a study of the methods that they use and why they use these
methods may be valid, but a study of the various techniques that they use would not be valid. Even a study of their methods and the reasons for these methods would obviously need careful thought and preparation. The views and practices of certain sexual deviants may be considered as completely unsuitable under any circumstances.

If questions are asked by the pupils about these viewpoints that are opposed by a large majority of people then it may be seen as the teacher's duty to forcefully dissuade the pupil from the inquiry in such a way that the objections to the viewpoint are made clear without spending too long on a consideration of the viewpoint. It is obvious that the viewpoints and practices that are not acceptable may change as society itself changes, and that teachers may well make what can be seen later, or on further reflection, as mistakes. This may be the price that has to paid for the type of education that has been put forward, it can also be argued that education inevitably involves the possibility of mistakes.

The problem needs careful consideration before a process model is put into operation. The conclusion may well be that any dangers that may arise, and these may also exist in an objectives model to a lesser extent, are such that they must be coped with when the situation arises, and that certain techniques can be developed that enable the teacher to overcome such difficulties. It may be felt that education involves risks, and that they are worth taking.
Attitudes in the objectives model

Attitudes have been compiled into lists as suitable objectives for religious education and it is these lists of attitudes that will now be considered. There are six lists of attitudes where the attitudes have been listed separately from other objectives and these have been compared in the chart in appendix C. Two of these are almost the same, the Schools Council (1977a) and the notes that were presented as guidance for teachers who were preparing a syllabus according to the Avon agreed syllabus (Lealman, 1981a). The Schools Council also offered another list in a different form (1977b). The other three lists all come from agreed syllabuses, those of Berkshire (1982), Durham (1983) and Manchester (1985).

The comparison in the table is by no means definitive and there are arguments for it to be changed to some extent. It is rather an example of the way that the lists could be compared. What can be seen, however, is that the lists are largely similar in content. Each has a different emphasis and because they are descriptive statements they should not be expected to agree exactly.

The lists given by the Schools Council (1977a) and Avon differ principally in the headings given to the attitudes, although the wording does vary slightly at times. The only time a difference in wording changes the sense of the attitude to any great extent is in the last one and in this case the
alternative wording is also included. Elsewhere the wording is that of the Schools Council as they were the earlier to publish and hence the most likely compiler of the list. The difference in headings shows a difference in emphasis. Avon relates the attitudes to the areas of content within religious education to which they will apply whereas the Schools Council relates them to the subject areas that might make use of them. The Schools Council are thus able to identify two attitudes that relate primarily to religious education and hence to some extent reveal what religious education is thought to be about. The second of these relates to a need for commitment in the search for a life stance by which to live. The first of these raises some interesting points.

Many of the attitudes are not simply attitudes but are attitudes linked to content. It is only the content, in many cases, that makes them specifically religious. There would appear to be three groups of attitudes listed

a) non-religious attitudes, for example, Curiosity: the desire to know more and understand better. This has no specific religious connection.

b) attitudes made specifically religious by the specification of content, for example, Critical mind: pupils should be developing an interest in religious beliefs and practices, and in the main questions and issues with which religions are concerned. A critical mind is not specifically a religious attitude, the attitude as it is stated is specifically religious linked as it is with religious content.
c) religious attitudes, for example, Wonder and awe in the presence of true mystery. Despite the specification of content, in the form "in the presence of true mystery", it can be argued that any experience of awe is a fundamental religious reaction. This implies that all reactions of awe are reactions that are fundamentally religious in their nature. This uses the term "religious" to include reactions that recognise in phenomena something beyond the empirically explicable. Not all such reactions would qualify as religious, but a reaction such as awe would be included. The reason that awe would be included is because it seems that awe involves the recognition of some element in the phenomenon that is of the nature of ultimacy, it goes beyond everyday experience to an experience of the numinous.

The attitude of "awe and wonder in the presence of true mystery" echoes to some degree the view of religion given by Wilson (1971) which is quoted above. There is no real corresponding attitude to this mentioned in any of the other lists of attitudes although it is mentioned in some of the other documents, for example Durham refers to something similar in its list of concepts. This particular attitude, as it is stated, may well be contentious in that some people would deny the existence of such thing as true mystery in any sense that it may be used in a religious context. If Barrow's (1976) theory of two interpretative attitudes is accepted then those that would consider any mystery of life interpreted in religious terms as unnecessary and meaningless would also
reject this attitude on the same grounds. Thus if consideration is to be given to all interpretations of the meaning of existence on the same basis, an approach without presuppositions as to a final truth, then this attitude would have to be rejected as it already implies a particular view of life.

It has already been noted that whilst awe and wonder might be a reaction to phenomena at a fundamental level, they do not have to be religious in the "usual" sense of the word religious. That is they do not have to be attached to a belief in God. Poets, for example, attempt to express awe and wonder without reference to God. Thus, if the words "in the presence of true mystery" are removed, the attitude of awe and wonder may still be an appropriate attitude for religious education, if not a key attitude.

Of the other two groups of attitudes that are included in the lists of attitudes, it is possible to consider them as one group if those of group (b) are read without including the references to content that is specifically religious. Both group (a) and (b) can then be seen as attitudes not exclusive to religious education. The attitudes are intended to describe an end state, this is what would be expected of attitudes stated as objectives. It is reasonable to suggest that the attitudes, when devoid of references to religious content, would each be included in a list of the attitudes that most people would consider to be the attributes of an educated man.
This also includes the attitude of awe and wonder to some extent. It is an attitude that may appear in a list of the general attitudes required by a man in order to be considered as educated. This is because it is an attitude which gives a depth to the view of a particular situation or phenomenon, the depth that might be expected of an educated man. This would tend to suggest that in an objectives model some kind of religious education would be necessary to give this depth, this consideration of ultimacy, that would be expected of the educated man.

The attitudes, even with their religious content, may also be seen as attitudes that are required by the pupil in his study. They are attitudes that do not need to be seen as the end result of religious education, or of education in general when devoid of religious content, but as those attitudes that it is necessary for the pupil to adopt in order for his education to be successful. Even an attitude such as commitment is required if it is seen not as a commitment to a particular religious stance but to learning itself. This may seem to be a debatable point but commitment to a religious stance, through the learning in religious education, is in one aspect the same as commitment to learning. No particular religious stance is put forward in the lists as the one to which the pupil should become committed. This is, of course, as it should be. The pupil's commitment is to that which he considers, or feels, is right. This is based on his interpretation of his learning experiences. In the respect that he becomes committed to the
end result of his learning he is committed to the learning.

It is important that these attitudes can be seen as part of the process of learning rather than only as an end. They are then relevant to a process model of religious education. Having suggested that these attitudes, seen as means rather than as ends, are those that can be considered appropriate to the process of education, it is now desirable to examine the place of attitudes in a process model of religious education.

Attitudes in a process model of religious education

Whilst the process model of the curriculum has no desired end but rather concentrates on the process of education, it is useful to examine the concept of the educated man as it provides a useful illustration of the importance of attitudes. The educated man will certainly be knowledgable but it is not so easy to identify a particular piece of knowledge and be able to say that without that piece of knowledge a man could not be considered educated. The case is not so clear with regard to skills if they are seen in a general way. If, however, they are linked to a particular area of content, such as may have to be done if there is to be a reasonable degree of certainty that there will be transfer of training, then it might be possible to say the same for them as has been said about knowledge. These are tentative proposals and it is easy to exaggerate them. However, with attitudes the case is much clearer. Few would argue that a man is educated if he did not
possess certain attitudes, for example a respect for rational argument and intellectual integrity. Thus to the educated man certain attitudes are essential.

The same can be said to apply to attitudes and the process model, for it to work successfully certain attitudes are essential, on the part of the pupil and the teacher. Certain attitudes are required of the teacher before the teacher would embrace the notion of education as process and before they could with integrity teach it in the way required by the nature of the model. Certain attitudes are also required from the pupils so that they will respond to the type of learning experience that will be offered within the model. The process model assumes and propagates the attitudes of a liberal democracy, as that is the view of society in which a view of education as process is possible and can flourish.

Religious education does not require any special attitudes other than those that sustain a liberal democracy. The attitudes that are represented as particular to religious education seem to be general attitudes that are attached to a particular piece of content, that are represented in one aspect of the general attitude. For example, to respect the religious beliefs of other men is one aspect of respect for one's fellow man applied to the area of religious belief. The list of attitudes in appendix C, when devoid of content and seen as means rather than ends, are those required of the pupil by the process model. They are also those that the
Religious education also deals with attitudes in another way, in that it deals with concepts towards which it asks the pupils to develop an attitude. It does not require them to develop any specific attitude although it would be hoped by the teacher that the attitude thus developed did not contradict any of the attitudes on which the model is based. The attitude that it is hoped the pupil will adopt then becomes part of the pupil's life stance. Such attitudes relate to concepts such as the nature of man. The subject also deals with the pupil's attitudes in a reflective way in that it will ask the pupils to examine their attitudes and develop them into a coherent life stance.
Summary

The teaching of attitudes must be as much at a non-rational level as at a rational level. A purely rational approach may not have the desired effects and may be resisted by the pupils for a wide range of reasons relating to the pupil as an individual with his own interpretation of his experiences.

Characterisation, the development of an overall, consistent attitude to life, is the province in which religious education should operate.

Within a process model the teaching, and therefore the teaching of attitudes, is limited by the nature of the model and the nature of society on which it is based. There are limited responses open to the teacher when a pupil wishes to follow a line of inquiry which the teacher, and society in general, find undesirable.

Only attitudes relating to awe and wonder may be, possibly, the exclusive realm of religious education.

The process model requires that the teacher and the pupil adopt certain attitudes towards the learning process.
The task

The task of this chapter is to provide a framework in which a syllabus for religious education could be planned within a process model of the curriculum. This can be seen in two stages, firstly a definition or description of the principles upon which a process model of the curriculum could operate, and secondly a definition or description of the area that is meant by the term religious education. Peter's principles of procedure, and the way that Stenhouse uses the notion to offer a way of describing a process model, have already been examined. It is this line of thought that will be developed in this chapter.

The function of principles of procedure in describing a process model can be expressed quite simply. Basic to the process model is a view of education as of intrinsic value. If it is the process that is important then it can operate on an almost infinite range of content. Much of the content would not normally be included in a curriculum but, because of the nature of the model, it cannot be excluded and may become part of the pupil's inquiry. For example, the pupil may wish to pursue the topic of torture, either from some stimulus such as the work of Amnesty International or from a morbid interest in
the inflicting of pain. For whatever reason the pupil is interested in the subject it is a valid area of inquiry, particularly in religious education with its concern for the nature of man. Within the process model it is not possible for the teacher to state that the aim of his teaching is for the pupil to recognise the inherent evil in torture. What the teacher must do is proceed in such a way that the pupil is given the opportunity to realise the nature of torture and relate it to the rest of his experiences and his own view of life. Well adjusted pupils, given sufficient facilities to investigate the subject and enough experience of their own to which to relate the new learning, should be able to recognise the evil in torture for themselves. The principles of procedure set out the way in which the teacher should approach the task of teaching such that pupils may be able to form their own, informed opinion. They should also offer principles on which the selection of content can be based. The challenge in writing a set of principles of procedure is that they must be sufficient to ensure that it is education, of intrinsic value, that takes place in the classroom and not learning of any other kind. Thus it is by reference to the principles of procedure that, if a study of torture was to be included as a planned part of a course, it would be studied not as a useful practical lesson but to bring out its inherent evil nature and to illustrate some more fundamental question of values.
General principles of procedure

For the general principles of procedure that describe the view of education as process there are two examples that give guidance. The first of these is Raths' "criteria for worthwhile activities" (see appendix B) and these offer a useful starting point. They are certainly not beyond challenge, for example the suggestion that areas of inquiry that are not normally explored provide more worthwhile activities than common areas of inquiry does not appear to particularly useful, or even valid. It is not easy to see why this was considered important by Raths, certainly it would not be desirable that pupils went over the same topic many times but this is not necessarily the point that Raths is making. However, it is possible to accept the general purpose and tone of Rath's criteria without accepting each point individually.

Raths' criteria are very general, as they were apparently intended to be, but they also seem to lack coherence. They are certainly all directed towards the same end but they appear as random statements rather than as a planned group of statements that cover all the relevant areas of concern for the planning of teaching. However, Raths' criteria will be used as the basis of the general principles of procedure which are to be proposed although they will be placed into a form of organisation.
The other example that can be drawn upon is the pedagogical aims that are connected to M.A.C.O.S. (Hanley, Whitla, Moo, Walter, 1970, 5). These are linked to a particular course and cannot be taken to apply to any other course as they stand. They are therefore less general than the criteria of Raths but they do offer some further ideas as to what could be included in a list of general principles of procedure for the description of a process model.

The following principles of procedure are an amalgam of those points of Raths and Macos that seem to be most important and relevant. They seem to offer a general description of what is intended as teaching within a process model of the curriculum.

A) With regard to the learning conforming to the view of education as a process, within a liberal democracy.

Activities should conform to the criteria that they
1) require students to engage in inquiry into ideas, theories, beliefs and explanations of phenomena.
2) permit students to make informed choices in carrying out the activity and to reflect on the consequences of their choices.
3) involve the students in the application and mastery of meaningful rules, standards and disciplines.

B) With regard to the pupil as a person.

Activities should be such that
4) students can recognise the legitimacy of the search,
and appreciate and accept the risk of success or failure in the search for definitive answers.

5) they involve the students in that which is relevant to them, and is recognised by them as relevant.

C) With regard to pedagogy.

Activities should be such that
6) they involve the student with realia (i.e. real objects, materials, beliefs).
7) they may be accomplished successfully by students at several different levels of ability.
8) they require the students to re-examine in a new setting, and build upon, ideas, an application of an intellectual process or a current problem that has previously been studied.

D) With regard to the role of the pupil.

The students should take active roles in the learning situation and be required
9) to rewrite, rehearse, and polish their initial efforts.
10) to share in the planning, the carrying out of the plan or the results of an activity with others.
11) to set realistic targets for themselves, and make an accurate assessment of their activities and results.

E) With regard to the role of the teacher.

12) the role of the teacher should be that of guide and resource.
These groupings and headings should not be seen as definitive. It is possible to move some of them around to other groups, for example, (6) could be in group B or group C, by placing the emphasis on a different word in the statement. The groupings and headings are rather an attempt to make the principles as coherent and as comprehensible as possible. Neither are the principles themselves definitive, they are only descriptive statements and are hence open to interpretation. For example, (7) requires the activity to be capable of being accomplished successfully by pupils of different abilities. What is meant by "successfully" may be different for pupils of different abilities, and may also have a variety of meanings for different teachers. The principles of procedure have deliberately been kept short in order to enable them give a manageable impression of a process model. Some of them may require further explanation in order to make their intention clear.

The difficulty of the precise definition of educational objectives has been considered carefully. Principles of procedure are not intended to be definitive of the process of education, that would seem to be impossible. Neither is it necessarily desirable, the principles are principles upon which the educational experience will be planned. They are intended to be descriptive of the process of learning that is the essence of an understanding of the nature of education.
The principles are not rigid rules, all of which must be complied with at all times. They are rather the principles on which the teacher will act when a situation arises relevant to that particular principle. The first group are somewhat different from the others in that if the learning is not according to the spirit of these three criteria, which reflect the view of education as process in a liberal democracy, then the learning would not normally be within the definition of education that has been adopted. They can thus be seen to some extent as criteria rather than as principles. This applies not only if the content cannot be made to conform to the criteria, for example learning to type cannot meet criteria 1 or 2. It also applies if the content is presented in such a way that acceptance of a proposition is expected without the pupil being given an opportunity to consider possible alternatives.

Principle 4 requires a certain attitude from the student towards his learning, one that must be fostered by the teacher and which is closely connected with the way in which the teacher plans the approach to the learning. It requires that the pupil adopts the same attitude to education that is held by the teacher, that the process of education is of intrinsic value. It is not easy to specify strategies that will bring about this attitude in the pupils but it may well be the case that the first steps would come through the interest of the pupil, that the pupil enjoys the learning. This in turn is recognised by principle 5, the pupil is more likely to respond positively to that which is perceived as relevant rather than
irrelevant. This can also be seen as justification for the inclusion of principle 6. It is reasonable to suggest that realia is more likely to be perceived as relevant by the pupil than secondary sources, although this may not always be so with regard to the interest of the pupil. It may be argued that principle 6 is not worthy of a place in the list, it may seem to be a minor consideration compared to many others. It is not necessary, however, that all of the principles should be of equal importance, just that they are all relevant to the pupil's learning and this principle is consistent with the impression of the type of education being described.

Principle 7 reflects the need for all pupils in a learning experience to be able to respond at their own level, a particularly important consideration in classes that have pupils of different abilities. There is also a correlation with the previous group of principles in that it would seem unlikely that a pupil would perceive as relevant any situation that he found incomprehensible or trivial. It is also possible to refer this principle to the comment of Bruner that by teaching the structure of knowledge it is possible to teach anything in an intellectually respectable manner to different levels of ability. Principle 8 reflects some of the points in the list of commonly agreed points of understanding about learning.

The principles in group D can be seen as referring, amongst other things, to the development of the pupil's learning how
to learn. Principle 9 relates to the development of self discipline, in not accepting the first results as an easy option, as well as learning. Principles 10 and 11 require the pupil to look at the process of learning and to make realistic judgements about it.

Principles of procedure for religious education

It could be argued that the general principles of procedure are quite adequate and that all that is needed is to specify the content that is appropriate to the subject area. The principles that will be put forward do specify, or rather indicate, the area that is religious education. They also go further in that they indicate the type of approach that is appropriate to the subject. They are thus able to offer more direction to the teacher of religious education than a list of content. It would be inaccurate to call them principles of procedure that are specific to religious education as some of them are clearly not specific. They are rather principles of procedure that are particularly appropriate to religious education.

The activities that are particularly relevant to religious education are those that require the students

1) to examine questions, aspects of life and their experience in the dimension of ultimacy.

2) to become involved in experiences that are liable to open the students to realisation, in both its rational and
3) to consider other people's views of life alongside their own.

4) to examine the ways that belief may affect and motivate the believer.

5) to suspend their own beliefs and judgements and enter into a situation from another person's point of view.

6) to use religious language and symbols.

7) to become involved in inquiry into the fundamental, categorial, concepts of life stances.

This list is not definitive, it consists of descriptive statements that can be phrased in other ways and does not contain all that could be included in the list. As with the previous list of general principles of procedure the list is descriptive not definitive. In this case it is descriptive of what is understood to be the essence of religious education. It offers the basis on which religious education could be introduced to pupils within a process model of the curriculum. Each of the statements requires some explanation as to its precise intention.

Principle 1 sets out the adapted version of Wittgenstein's first characteristic of religious belief. It requires that pupils look beyond the immediate, beyond the initial reaction and the first impact of a perception. It involves the pupils in a search for value and meaning that relates to the depth of experience. To give a simple illustration, when a person runs
out of words and declares "that is what I believe" that is the province of religious education. Religious education should not be satisfied with the statement "that is what I believe" but then go on to look at the implications of the belief that is acknowledged thus. The concept of ultimacy has been referred to by many thinkers under many different titles, many of them specifically religious but others capable of a secular interpretation. In the final analysis ultimacy seems to be beyond description and is most closely experienced in the feelings of believers. This is the area that is referred to by some as the spiritual but without the presuppositions of that term. It even has meaning to those that deny any ultimacy, by reference to their denial their picture is set in the dimension of ultimacy in that to them the ultimate is also the temporal.

Principle 2 requires that the pupils be given an opportunity to have what may be interpreted as a religious experience. To those that deny any such thing as religious experience, interpreting such experience in psychological terms, the term "insight" might be preferable. Either way the phenomenon under consideration is that type of perception that has an effect on the perceiver not only in terms of understanding but also in that it requires some change in the perceiver as a result of that perception. In fact the term believer can be substituted for perceiver because the type of perception that is being referred to will become part of the picture that is used by the perceiver, hence it is part of their belief.
The two principles above deal particularly with the pupil's own search for belief by requiring the pupil to look at content in a manner that may be seen as of the essence of religious inquiry. They also require the pupil to become open to experiences that will develop the picture that the pupil uses to interpret life. The next three principles are concerned primarily with the way that the pupil approaches other people's views of life.

Principle 3 refers to the attitude that it is necessary for the pupil to adopt if the type of education that is envisaged is to be possible. Thus this requirement, to some extent, underpins the others. By "consider" is meant that the pupil makes an examination of the views of others that is both honest and respectful. By "honest" is meant those qualities of intellectual integrity and fairness, and by "respecting" is meant that the inquiry is based on an acceptance of the validity of the other person's belief to that other person. In this case "validity" refers particularly to the believers seeing his beliefs as true and being committed to them. It also includes his right to hold his beliefs. The willingness to consider other people's views on these terms is essential for religious education in the process model. Without this attitude the pupil cannot look at the beliefs of another person in any way they reflects the true nature of the belief to the believer. This principle refers primarily to the rational nature of the other person's belief.
Principle 4 requires the pupil to examine the effects of the belief on the believer. It reflects the importance of the other two characteristics of Wittgenstein's view of religious belief, the affective and commissive components. This principle will require the pupils to be engaged in the use of the skill of empathy in order to examine, to any extent, these aspects of belief. "Motivate" refers not only to the observable reactions of the believer but also to the requirement placed upon the believer to change, to live up to the life stance in which he places his faith.

Principle 5 goes one stage further than principle 4 and requires that the pupils become involved in the reactions of believers to their belief. This will involve the pupil in the use of the skill of epoche if the pupil is to enter realistically into the feelings of other people. By use of this skill it is also possible that the pupil will be involved in situations that lead to a realisation on the part of the pupil.

The last two principles relate primarily to the selection of content. Principle 6 needs more amplification than most of the other principles because it is much briefer than the implications that it carries. The use of religious language is not simply a matter of using terms such as God but, as has been shown earlier, making the appropriate connections to the qualifying terms such as father. These connections are
particularly important if there is to be any useful form of communication between believers about their beliefs. Thus the pupil needs to be able to make the appropriate connections when other people communicate their faith to him. The pupil also needs to be able to consider his own picture and express that picture to others and for this he needs to be able to use religious language. This may seem to be an objective rather than a principle. It could be worded, for example, as "the pupil will be able to understand the correct connections to make in religious language". It is a principle and not an objective because the choice of content that allows the pupil to practise the use of religious language does not specify what the pupil is to make of the language, what interpretation is to be put on it. Obviously the interpretation that is to be desired is that of the believer. However, it is not necessarily always true that the teacher understands the mind of the believer better than the pupil. Particularly where the pupil's own beliefs may be closer to those beliefs under inquiry than the teachers. Also it is necessary to bear in mind the point made by Wittgenstein that what the non-believer cannot accept is not what the believer claims to believe. This exposes the shortcomings of the comparison of the way that two people use a picture that is possible with any language, including religious language. Thus this intention is not meant as an objective but as an essential part of the process. The more able the pupil is in the use of "religious" language the better he can communicate with others and make himself understood.
Principle 7 reflects the importance of the presuppositions on which the picture of the believer is based. This principle is related to principle 4, the consideration of other people's views should take into account the fundamental concepts of that view. They are necessary to a proper understanding of the way that other people use a picture.

The above two sets of principles of procedure provide the framework within which religious education in a process model can be planned. They are guidelines, principles by which to be guided, rather than laws that must be observed dogmatically. It is possible that, in certain circumstances, two principles may contradict one another. For example, the risk of success or failure does not fit in easily, in all circumstances, with the principle that requires the pupils to rehearse and polish their initial efforts. The first one seems to require spontaneity whilst the second requires a much more deliberate approach. It is not difficult to see that these two principles may clash. It is for the teacher to decide the emphasis to placed on particular principles in each area of inquiry.

There are only hints in the principles of procedure as to the selection of content and this is another area in which the teacher must make decisions. There are many factors that must be taken into account before such decisions can be made. It would seem that only the teacher is in a position to take into account all of the relevant factors. Clearly the process model
places a great emphasis on the professionalism and the competence of the teacher. It would now seem appropriate to look at some of the other considerations that are relevant to the development of religious education in a process model.
Summary

It is possible to propose two sets of principles of procedure on which the planning of religious education in a process could take place.

General principles of procedure can be compiled from those offered by Raths and M.A.C.O.S.. These give general principles relating to the process model of the curriculum.

Seven principles of procedure are proposed as relevant to, and descriptive of, the area of religious education. These were compiled from the discussion of concepts, skills and attitudes, and the nature of religious belief, in the previous chapters.
This chapter will look at some of the points that have been raised in previous chapters and that have been brought up by setting religious education in a process model. It is not intended to be an exhaustive inquiry into all of the considerations that need to be taken into account before religious education within a process model should be taught in school. For example, no mention is made of the facilities that would be desirable, or necessary. It is intended to outline some of the aspects of implementation that should be considered, and offer some comments on them.

Integration

The process model raises the question of subject boundaries and the problem of whether they present artificial barriers to learning. The process model emphasises the intrinsic value to the learner of being involved in the process of education, it emphasises the value of the inquiry. It also emphasises that the important thing is the learner understanding, making sense of experience, rather than the understanding of a subject. In this sense the process model sets out the value of an integrated approach to learning. Blenkin and Kelly make this point when they suggest that

"This is the real and only point of a unified approach to
curriculum, namely that the basis of its coherence is the internal logic of the individual's organisation of his own experience rather than only the logic of the subject - matter itself."

(Blenkin and Kelly, 1981, 134)

This takes a view of subjects as of secondary importance to the understanding of the learner. There is a sense however in which the subjects do contribute to the understanding of the learner. It is clear that subjects can offer a pattern of understanding of some aspect of human experience. They offer a discipline by which to study some aspect of experience that has shown itself profitable in terms of understanding. The Keele Integrated Studies Project claimed that

"The main thing at stake is to regard subjects as tools of enquiry and not just bodies of information."

(Schools Council, 1972, 10)

The subjects can be seen as tools of inquiry that have demonstrated their worth. This does not mean that the approaches of the various relevant disciplines cannot be combined into an integrated approach to the study, and understanding, of some aspect of experience. It seems however that in any integration of the various disciplines into a unified approach the characteristics of each approach should not be lost, as it is these characteristics that have made that approach to the understanding of experience successful.

By setting out the particular principles of procedure that are particularly relevant to religious education, the
characteristics of the approach of religion to the understanding of experience have also been indicated. Thus, in an integrated study it is possible to identify the contribution that may be made by an approach that is "religious". The process model requires that no artificial restrictions on learning are placed on the learner, and this is a point that should be remembered in religious education in a process model, and thus the development of an integrated approach in this model may be inevitable. One of the first steps that it seems necessary to take, the identification of the particular contribution of each of the disciplines involved, is represented by the particular principles of procedure as stated for religious education, for the field of religious inquiry.

Realisation and bias

Religious education in a process model seems to offer a form for religious education that cannot be seen as objectionable by any rational parent because it does not require the pupils to adopt any particular point of view. This does not mean that it is an education into agnosticism but rather that no one viewpoint is taught as the truth, and all other viewpoints as in some way flawed. There is however one aspect in which agnosticism may be necessary. The teacher should not use their position to influence the pupils towards any particular viewpoint and so the teacher should not assert as true one viewpoint against a contrary opinion or belief. If questioned
by the pupil the teacher may have to revert to the statement that certain groups believe one thing and that other groups believe another. The teacher should adopt the position of fellow seeker, an agnostic position, with the pupil.

The only area in which religious education in a process model might be seen as objectionable is if the content that is studied is considered objectionable. This situation might exist if such subjects as astrology were examined, some parents who are fundamentalist Christians, or Jews or Muslims, may see these subjects as outside the experiences that they wish their children to have.

The other objection from some parents is that religious education is not directed enough towards the pupil's understanding of a particular life stance, a life stance that the parents endorse and/or an understanding of which is considered important for the pupil. One would assume that if the importance of this life stance were so great, the parents themselves would introduce it to the pupil, and in fact it represents the picture that is used by the parents. To some extent religious education in the process model may reinforce the teaching of the parents in the home. If realisation is an important part of the development of a life stance, as has been suggested it is, then this realisation is likely to have the content of that which is most familiar to the pupil. To suggest a parallel, if a Roman Catholic has a vision it is more likely to be of the Virgin Mary than it is to be of

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Shiva, in the same way that a Hindu is more likely to have a vision of Shiva. Thus realisation is most likely to reflect the background of the pupil, the background supplied by the most influential elements in their life. Among this small group of influential elements must surely come the home.

The content of religious education

There has been no specification of the content of religious education within a process model as yet. Some of the principles of procedure indicate some of the elements of content that should be the subject of the pupil's activities, for example religious language and categorial concepts, but there has been no suggestion as to what religious language or from which religion the categorial concepts should be taken. Certainly it has been suggested that the content may be set by the interests of the pupil, if the pupil wishes to make an inquiry into any relevant area then it seems to be part of the nature of the process model that the pupil be permitted, and encouraged, to make that inquiry. This is far removed from the planning of the educational experience that is required of teachers, it seems quite obvious that the teacher cannot simply wait for the pupil to declare an interest in some relevant area.

The teacher must therefore choose the content on which to base the pupil's learning experience. The principles of procedure give some help in this but not very much. In fact
the model is quite adaptable to a wide range of approaches with regard to content. For example, teachers may decide that their own experience and expertise lies primarily in the Judaeo/Christian tradition and that the content of the syllabus that will be presented to the pupils will be based on that tradition. Another teacher may feel that a much wider range of content is necessary reflecting a wider range of beliefs in the local community. As long as both teachers conform to the principles of procedure, and allow the pupil to question and develop his own lines of inquiry, then they can both use the process model as the basis of the planning of their teaching. What cannot be acceptable is for the Christian, or any other, faith to be presented as the only source of truth, this would be contrary to the principles of procedure.

The process model may even be followed by those involved in the organisation of the Christian group that is often found in schools as an extra-curricular activity. That much more questioning of the faith may be the result of adopting the process model is quite possible but this will only reflect the current attitude of some in the Anglican Church, that faith is an exploration rather than a set of dogma. There seems to be a similarity between this idea of faith and the process model of education that may deserve some serious consideration by those within the Christian religion who are concerned with the education of the young in that faith. This would seem to be more relevant to Christian education than perhaps Islam, which
has a different attitude to God and to revelation.

Constraints on implementation

Edwards (1983) suggests that there are at least three constraints on the implementation of the process model in a secondary school and these are related to the attitudes of the pupils to education in school. Firstly, the pupils expect a secondary school to be highly structured and authoritarian. This is a constraint because a process model requires the pupil to develop their own inquiry, to propose and carry out activities on their own initiative. This aspect of the process model is expressed in the general principles of procedure that were proposed in the last chapter, specifically that they should share in the planning of activities. This would seem to be a particular problem if only some subjects were taught according to a process model and others were taught according to an objectives model, the pupil may find the necessary adjustment difficult. However, it is a problem that may well disappear when the pupils perceive what is required of them within a process model, and pupils do react differently to different subjects according to their different perceptions of them.

The second constraint is that pupils expect education to be instrumental and utilitarian. This attitude is experienced frequently in religious education, the pupils will often question the point of doing religious education because they
do not want to be a vicar. Once again, this point is recognised in the general principles of procedure, requiring the pupils to recognise the legitimacy of the search. It is a valid point that has no simple solution. It requires the pupils to change their attitude towards learning.

The third constraint is that pupils perceive work that is not written as of less importance. This seems to be a minor consideration, the pupils may well be required to produce some written work as part of their inquiry. They will also be required, according to the general principles of procedure, to rewrite and rehearse their initial efforts and this is liable to produce in the pupils a perception of their work as of value.

Assessment

The methods of assessment that are used within an objectives model of the curriculum are not necessarily of value within a process model. Within the objectives model there are prespecified targets for the pupil to reach and it is thus possible to use criteria based referencing, although the general methods of assessment that are used are norm based. Within the process model, criteria based referencing is not possible, by the nature of the model it is not possible to set certain standards of skill and knowledge that must be attained by the pupil to gain a certain grade. Equally, with regard to norm based referencing, the process model is concerned less
with results than with the activity, the assessment of the pupils should reflect this concern by assessing the way that the pupil performed in the activity rather than just by the end result. This does not mean that the end result will not be assessed, it is an important part of the assessment because it is the culmination of the activity. Its importance is by reference to its part in the activity rather than as an end.

The general principles of procedure require the pupils to assess their own activities and results and this is an essential part of the learning within the process model. By self assessment it is possible for the pupils to learn more about themselves and also to improve their performance in the next activities. This is a reflection of the comment by Stenhouse (1975, 83) with regard to teachers and the objectives model. Improvement of practice does not come from raising standards higher but by examination and criticism of current performance. Detailed discussion of the possible methods by which this assessment can be made is not practical in the limited space available but it is an area that requires and deserves careful consideration.

The role of the teacher

It may be argued that the best of teacher models in an objectives based view of the curriculum, such as care and concern for the pupil as an individual person, are part of the requirements of the teacher operating within the process
model. This is part of the challenge of the process model to teachers that it demands of the teachers the highest professional practices for it to be successful, it requires the teachers to examine and improve their practice. It is possible to suggest that as a result the education of the pupils will improve, which is the intention of all committed teachers.
APPENDIX A

COMMON AGREEMENT IN LEARNING THEORIES.

1) Behaviour is a function of the learners perception.
2) A motivated learner will learn more quickly than one who is not motivated.
3) Motivation that is too intense may be accompanied by distracting emotional states.
4) Learning under the control of reward is usually preferable to learning under the control of punishment.
5) Learning under intrinsic motivation is better than under extrinsic motivation.
6) Tolerance for failure is best taught through providing a backlog of success that compensates for experienced failure.
7) Individuals need practice in setting realistic goals for themselves which will lead to more satisfactory improvement.
8) Individual differences affect learning. Such differences may be biogenic or socio/cultural.
9) Similar situations may elicit different reactions from different learners.
10) Active participation by a learner is preferable to passive reception.
11) Meaningful material and tasks are more readily learnt than nonsense.
12) There is no substitute for repetitive practice for memorization of unrelated facts or the overlearning of skills; particularly with spaced or distributive recalls.

13) Information about the nature of a performance aids learning, particularly if it is immediate.

14) Transfer is much less than is usually expected but can be increased if the learner discovers relationships and if experience is wide, particularly of applying principles.

15) Group atmosphere affects both learning product and accrued satisfaction.

16) All learnings are multiple. Though focus may be on one particular (desired) outcome other learnings take place simultaneously.
APPENDIX B

RATHS "CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING WORTHWHILE ACTIVITIES"

All other things being equal, one activity is more worthwhile than another if:-

1) it permits children to make informed choices in carrying out the activity and to reflect on the consequences of their choices.

2) it assigns to students active roles in the learning situation rather than passive ones.

3) it asks students to engage in inquiry into ideas, applications of intellectual processes, or current problems, either personal or social.

4) it involves children with realia (i.e. real objects, materials and artefacts).

5) completion of the activity may be accomplished successfully by children at several different levels of ability.

6) it asks students to examine in a new setting an idea, an application of an intellectual process, or a current problem which has been previously studied.

7) it requires students to examine topics or issues that citizens in our society do not normally examine - and that are typically ignored by the major communication media in the nation.
8) it involves students and faculty members in "risk" taking— not a risk of life and limb, but of success or failure.

9) it requires students to rewrite, rehearse, and polish their initial efforts.

10) it involves students in the application and mastery of meaningful rules, standards, or disciplines.

11) it gives students the chance to share the planning, the carrying out of a plan, or the results of an activity with others.

12) it is relevant to the expressed purposes of the students.

(Raths, 1971, 716)
a) Offered by most subjects
1) Curiosity: the desire to know more and understand better.

2) Ingenuity: using one’s wits to work things out.

3) Integrity: in the form of a concern for accuracy in understanding and expression.

b) Offered by humanities
4) Fair-mindedness: eg: respect for honest and open beliefs of others.

5) To self

6) Healthy self esteem (eg: positive and realistic.

7) Acceptance and appreciation of others.

8) Sensitivity to the needs of others.

9) On the physical world

10) Respect for resources and reverence for life.

c) Offered primarily by R.E.

1) Wonder and awe in the presence of the human mystery.

2) Responsibility and determinism in the quest for meaning, purpose and values.

3) The stimulation of each pupil’s search for a meaningful pattern of his life which is both ethical and consistent with reason.

4) A readiness to be tolerant of others’ views without abandoning one’s own vision of truth.

5) The promotion of greater willingness to accept the possibility that experience is open to non-scientific analysis as well as empirical explanation.

6) The development of willingness to adopt alternative and juxtaposed viewpoints on suggested explorations of one’s own and the same phenomena, to use different disciplines relating to the same subject matter.

7) The promotion of greater willingness to accept the necessity for applying intelligence to the area of religion.

8) The willingness to exercise responsible judgement with respect to competing claims for ‘truth’ in this area.

9) An acceptance of the possibility that one’s own position needs continual reassessment; that truth questions in this area must be left open.

10) The development of confidence in facing up to non-empirical questions such as those associated with death and suffering.

11) The willingness when forming one’s own attitudes, to take into account the wide variety of current attempts to “make sense of the human situation”.

12) The promotion of greater willingness to give serious attention to religious phenomena and ideas.

13) An acceptance of the need for continual reassessment of one’s own Open mindedness.

14) To others

15) Critical mind. Pupils should be developing an inclination to examine ideas about religion critically, and to be on their guard against bias, indoctrination, superstition and falsehood.

16) Open mindedness. Pupils should be developing a preliminary attitude of respect for religious beliefs and practices, and should be ready to change their ideas and judgements as they learn more.

17) Self confidence. Pupils should be developing confidence in their own capacity to reflect on religious questions, and confidence in their own family and cultural background.

18) Consideration. Pupils should be developing consideration for the beliefs of others - each other in school and in friendships, teachers and other adults, their families, and groups and individuals in society at large.

19) Appreciation. Pupils should be developing a readiness to find religious ideas and practices of value to themselves, as they seek to understand their own experience of life.

20) Compliment. Pupils should be developing a readiness to identify themselves with a particular religious tradition or philosophy of life, and to explain their views in argument and debate.

21) Tolerance. Pupils should be developing a willingness to maintain and protect the legal right of religious believers to practice their religion, and also the rights of people not to practice a religion.

Note: Above express the final point thus

10) Responsibility. To appreciate the continuing nature of the human quest for meaning, purpose and value.

11) The promotion of greater willingness to accept the possibility that experience is open to non-scientific analysis as well as empirical explanation.

12) The development of willingness to adopt alternative and juxtaposed viewpoints on suggested explorations of one’s own and the same phenomena, to use different disciplines relating to the same subject matter.

13) An examining and responsible approach to life generally and in particular to the fundamental and religious questions which it presents.

14) A personal, intellectual and moral integrity.

15) A sensitive but critical approach towards religious beliefs, practices and institutions.

16) A measure of self-confidence in their own capacity to reflect on religious, spiritual and ethical questions, and confidence in their own family and cultural background.

17) Respect and consideration for other people.

18) Willingness to use other traditions and beliefs in their search for a meaning in life.

19) Commitment as they evolve their own religious or ethical philosophy and the ability to explain this.

20) Respect for the freedom both to practice and not to practice a religious belief as a fundamental human right.

See attitude 2

To help pupils in their personal development by showing:

1) An active interest in spiritual and ethical commitments, traditions, beliefs and practices.
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