The quest for autonomy: sociology’s advocacy dimension

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ABSTRACT

Antony Conrad Garrett

The Quest for Autonomy: Sociology's Advocatory Dimension

This work is an historical account of the development of sociology in Britain. It examines the institutional and intellectual issues affecting sociology during the 1920s and '30s, through the years of the Second World War and into the immediate post-war period.

The work focuses on the attempt by sociologists to assert and sustain the autonomy of their discipline, within the wider field of British social science. Particular attention is paid to a series of 'acts of justification', representing crucial strategies in sustaining the institutional and intellectual boundaries of the discipline. The negotiation of resources essential to the continuity of the field is considered to be an integral feature of sociology's advocacy dimension, wherein its practitioners construct and deploy a series of programme statements, disciplinary agendas and institutional initiatives, as means of asserting the potential of sociology.

A detailed examination is made of significant 'moments' in sociology's development for the period in question, in order to assess the manner in which sociologists have contested prescriptions of their activities by both social scientists and non-sociologists. Among the issues examined in the course of the work are; the funding of knowledge, the wartime education debate, the deliberations of the Clapham Committee, an attempt by sociologists to construct a synoptic science of society and William Beveridge's 'Natural Bases Scheme' for the social sciences at the LSE during the inter-war period. All are portrayed as features of sociology's advocacy dimension and in terms of their relative significance in the social construction of British sociology.
The Quest for Autonomy: Sociology's Advocatory Dimension

Antony Conrad Garrett

Ph.D.

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Submitted to the University of Durham

October 1987

Research conducted in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy
"for Kathleen, Frances, Alexandra
and the memory of my Mother"
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Acknowledgement

The production of a thesis is never an individual effort. Certainly, there are examples of extraordinary, individual achievement, but these are rare. This work, like the majority of theses, is the result of much effort, enthusiasm, support and good faith on the part of a host of individuals, in different places and over a number of years. In terms of supervision, it began with the encouragement and enthusiasm of the late, Professor Philip Abrams. After his death, it was rescued and nurtured through the talent and sensitivity of Robin Williams, at a time when its author thought all was lost. I consider it an honour to have been supervised by Robin Williams, especially when there was no obligation upon him to have done so, but this is a mark of his commitment both to other scholars and to sociology generally. While a postgraduate student in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy at Durham, I met and formed a continuing friendship with Jim Grieves. It is to him that I owe an incalculable debt of gratitude for his willingness to listen, understand and give moral support in those bleak hours when confusion reigned. Jim's encouragement became a sustaining influence throughout the course of the project. However, there is one person to whom the completion of this thesis is essentially attributable - my wife, Kathleen. She quietly, confidently and unceasingly supported me over the years, sacrificing much for my self-indulgence. These few words of acknowledgement seem utterly inadequate in compensation. Nevertheless, 'ab imo pectore gratias'.

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INTRODUCTION
Introduction

In 1924, Reginald Wellbye published a paper entitled 'Sunlight and Sociology'. It represented a serious attempt to establish the connection between sunlight and sociology, in so much as the former was deemed to possess a 'beneficial physiological influence on the living organism', and that it was the function of the latter, through the study of social conditions leading to the enactment of appropriate legislation, to safeguard the public interest by contributing to the debate on town planning. Lest this appear to be merely a sociological curio, or the more bizarre of contributions to the Sociological Review during the inter-war period, it should be pointed out that Wellbye was an influential member of the Sociological Society and would, some nine years later, initiate a crucial debate on the nature and purpose of sociology during the 1930s and in the future. In many respects, Wellbye's (1933) prescription for a pragmatic social science represented one of a number of similar programme statements, agendas and intellectual initiatives characterising attempts by sociologists to assert and sustain the nature and purpose of their endeavours.

It is my intention to examine British sociology's quest for intellectual and institutional autonomy during the 1920s and 1930s, and into the period of the Second World War. The latter period will also encompass a consideration of a series of arguments which were to be crucial to sociology's immediate, post-war form.

A central theme of the work, one which animates the general topic of the quest for autonomy, will be the portrayal of the social construction of sociology by its practitioners, as a process of science-building. The latter project was, as I will argue, one in which sociologists endeavoured over time, to establish a discrete and socially valued field of ideas and practice, through a series of 'acts of justification' (Foucault, 1974). I will examine such acts of justification through a category of analysis which I shall refer to as sociology's advocatory dimension.
The decision to introduce the notion of sociology's advocatory dimension arose as a result of an attempt to account for an activity characterising what I shall refer to as, the sociologists' and their supporters' need to sustain the intellectual and institutional viability of sociology (however defined, defended or discredited) on the basis of the discipline's potential or promise alone. I was prompted to conceive of the pursuance of sociology in the aforementioned manner, as a result of an unresolved problem referred to briefly in the work of Philip Abrams (1968); that of the difficulty of establishing where the origins of sociology in Britain 'end' and how, where and by whom does an autonomous tradition commence? Lest this appears to be an artificial problem, it should be remembered that sociology did survive the First World War, entering quite a different historical frontier from the one it had emerged in, prior to the cataclysm. That war had undermined many of the certainties and conditions which may have engendered a sociology based previously on anodyne and ameliorative principles and practice. In the years following the Great War, sociology stumbled on in an intellectually fragmented and organisationally factious state. Much of the disarray within the field stemmed from a series of frustrations confronting sociologists and their disciples from outside the discipline. These influences upon sociology were compounded further by the emerging cleavage within the discipline, giving rise to two quite distinct intellectual and organisational 'wings' within the discipline (Marshall, 1967): one given to developing sociology within a socio-philosophical and historical perspective, the other, concerning itself in the main, with the construction of an empirical science, based on the rigours of the scientific method. Add to this the increasing degree of specialisation and professionalisation within the other social science disciplines, and it is understandable that the fate of sociology soon began to occupy the time and minds of its practitioners. The question of the changing relationship of sociology to the other human sciences posed a significant problem for sociologists during the period in question, and until that issue had been addressed adequately, the definition of sociology - its intrinsic nature and social purpose - remained a crucial item on the sociologists' agenda. A preoccupation with sociology's private troubles, namely its theoretical and
methodological disputes, while serving to widen the cleavage referred to above, also contributed to the increasing difficulty of its practitioners to manage sociology's project as a discipline central to the possible coordination of the human sciences.

In the chapters that follow, I intend to focus upon the participants in the debates referred to above, the strategies evolved and deployed in the process of negotiating sociology's identity and authenticity within the domain of social science and culture generally. I shall examine too, the contingent relationship between the domain of its ideas and the strategic presentation of its case for social recognition, largely on the basis of its promise or potential alone. In saying that sociologists have been given to 'negotiating' sociology's intellectual and institutional forms, I do not mean that they have somehow participated in a process of overt, collective bargaining. Rather, the notion of negotiation is viewed as an activity which involves sociologists in recognising that others' prescriptions and expectations of the sociological enterprise, will affect directly, the status of the discipline's knowledge claims. Thus the construction of sociology is characterised by a distinctive form of strategic discourse, the subtlety and complexity of which, will emerge when I examine in detail, specific moments in the discipline's history, especially during the inter and intra-war periods.

Although it is not my intention to examine specific sociological theories, methodologies and practices, reference to them will occur occasionally, as I focus on the conditions and contexts (in an institutional sense) which form the 'framework of change', in terms of the grounding of sociological knowledge in historical, economic, political and social events. The discursive organisation of sociology and the philosophical protocols which engender it, though not of direct relevance to my investigation, are, nevertheless recognised as a dimension of sociology which, though largely abstract, remain institutionally contingent.

In the early part of the work, I intend to examine what I consider to be two crucial 'moments' in sociology's inter-war history. The first moment comprises an account of a series of inter-war conferences devoted
to the evolving relationship between the different social science disciplines, with special reference to sociology. The conferences in question provided an important opportunity for sociologists to advance their project for a synoptic science of society, wherein sociology was to play a central, coordinating role. Such a science of society was considered by its architects to constitute a scientia scientiarum: a grandiose scheme, reminiscent of the projects of 19th Century positivists. My aim in focusing on the sociologists' arguments at the conferences of the middle and late 1930s, will be to highlight the recurring theme of sociology's place in the hierarchy of inter-war, British, social science. In particular, I shall consider the sociologists' strategy for advancing their case and the attempt by other social scientists to oppose it.

A second and equally controversial 'moment' in the history of British social science will entail an examination of the growth of social science at the London School of Economics and Political Science, with special reference to sociology. Again it is my intention to enlarge upon the theme of sociology's advocatory dimension by an examination of a number of issues raised initially in the chapter on methodology. The episode in question will entail an extension of my examination of sociology's development within a complex and controversial institutional setting. This will enable me to investigate the fortunes of sociology within a series of opportunities and contradictions, as far as its institutional and intellectual prospects were concerned. The analysis will encompass notions of the funding of knowledge; the production of knowledge in response to the objects and interests of individuals and organisations external to the community of social scientists; and the imposition of a particular scheme on which to base the future intellectual and institutional destiny of British social science.

Subsequent chapters will be devoted to a more detailed and comprehensive examination of the intellectual and institutional configurations which have influenced sociology during the period under examination. This will become apparent when I attempt to trace the fate of sociology during the intra-war years. The transformation of British society during this period will provide an opportunity to examine the social, economic and political imperatives affecting the reordering of knowledge, largely
on the basis of a universally recognised 'national need'. The war years will be viewed as a period of opportunity for social science, especially with the marked increase in political interest in those forms of knowledge which would lead not only to the successful conduct of the war, but the social and moral reconstruction of post-war Britain. Whereas the pre-war period had given rise to a widening cleavage within the sphere of sociology and a general move toward increased specialisation within other fields of social science, the war and its attendant imperatives, had led to a re-evaluation of those forms of knowledge regarded as essential to the rebuilding of British society in an age of economic and social planning via state control. The political changes wrought by the coalition government and especially the incoming Labour administration of 1945 were regarded by many, not least the sociologists, as possible opportunities for the realisation of a reconstructionist sociology. Although laudable aspirations, could they be achieved, especially in view of the need for sociologists to challenge the established hierarchy of British social science - particularly the institutional and intellectual dominance of economics?

The final part of the argument will focus on two particularly important issues, which I feel were crucial to not only sociology's post-war prospects, but the future of social science generally. The first I shall refer to as the education debate and the second, the research council debate. In fact the two 'debates' were, in most respects, connected by a common argument, namely, the role of the state in relation to the nature and purpose of higher education. Henceforth, the determination of both the curriculum and the focus of research (in this case within the domain of the social sciences), would arise within the political and administrative controversies over the most 'appropriate' educational policies to reflect the prevailing national need. In future, sociology's development would be contingent upon the increasing organisational and financial management of higher education and the institutional arrangements for research through the research council system. The funding and re-ordering of knowledge through the intervention of the state and its mediating agencies, represented a significant transformation within those structures of funding and control of the production of
knowledge in contrast to the pre-war period. The arguments and strategies deployed by the sociologists during the latter period, had been confined largely to the domain of a social science increasingly indifferent to the cause of a sociology seeking a central role in the reconstitution and control of the former disciplines. With the war and its aftermath came the possibility of regaining not only the interest of fellow social scientists in the potential of a reconstructionist sociology, but the additional support of politicians and other influentials, in assisting the discipline and its practitioners in their quest for intellectual and institutional autonomy.

I will, through an examination of the deliberations of the Committee on the Provision for Social and Economic Research (Cmnd. 6868, 1946) and its subsequent recommendations for the establishment of a University Grants Sub-committee for Social Science and an Interdepartmental Committee for Social and Economic Research, explore the reaction of both sociologists and social scientists to the prospect of increasing state interest in the research and teaching of those subjects. Consideration will also be given to the question of whether or not the hierarchy of British social science had been affected significantly by the outcome of the Clapham debate.

Although the social, political and economic contexts within which sociology has developed have changed over the decades since its pioneers proclaimed its intellectual and institutional bona fides, one feature of such proclamations has remained constant throughout the one hundred and fifty years of the discipline's history (based on Abrams' estimation (1981)): an in-built sensitivity, or insecurity harboured by sociologists over the identity and authenticity of sociology, in terms of its intrinsic, cognitive and organisational form, either actually or potentially. This may have something to do with its close proximity to other disciplines whose practitioners claim similar rights to special insight into human action and organisation. Considered thus, this project represents a modest attempt to examine and account for a recurring theme in the pursuit of sociology by its practitioners: an activity which has and continues to preoccupy sociologists, notwithstanding the additional task of establishing its substantive content of ideas and practice. The following three quotations give a clear indication of the sociologists' dilemma referred to above:
"We cannot yet assume that Sociology means the same thing to all people ... Not only are there still many who deny the bare existence of Sociology, but, what is more serious, among Sociologists there are still many deep divergences of view as to the nature and province of the enquiries which they professedly pursue in common. This divergence is, however, not a sign of disease but rather of the raw vigour and exhuberance of youth. An enemy is doubtless entitled to make the most of the fact that the enthusiasts for a science have not hitherto been able to decide among themselves what their science is about."

Thus wrote Hobhouse in 1908 (Abrams, 1968, pp.247-248) shortly after taking up the first Chair in Sociology at the L.S.E. He was conscious of not only the internal disagreement among sociologists over the intrinsic nature of their specific field of interest and competence, but the adverse affect this was having on the discipline in terms of its public identity and performance. Twenty years later, Victor Branford would continue to lament the consequences of sociology's private and public troubles (Branford, 1928, p.341).

"Can we not all work together now as we did at the beginning of the movement? At the best we are few and of no great strength confronting a resistant world, which is anti-sociological, when it is not un-sociological; and leavened by a slender margin of thinkers, writers and publicists to whom we can appeal. By long years of labour we have increased that margin, I fear by only an insignificant percentage. In view of the work still to do, we need surely more than ever to show a united front. The things that separate us, vis-a-vis a public, which, even in its educated members, is for the most part either indifferent or hostile to a generalised social science."

Even by the middle 1970s, commentators on the schismatic nature of sociology would seek to place a positive construction on the discipline's private troubles, thus highlighting once again, the root of the problem in sociology's quest of autonomy (Pahl, 1974, p.504):

"It would be a mistake to dismiss all the inner contortions of the subject as products of intellectual immaturity or parochialism. Indeed, I would argue that the current doubts, controversies and clashes of intellectual traditions may be seen as the essential seedbed from which we may get new growth in social theory."
Sociology's 'perpetual infancy', as Weber lamented, its perennial imminence seems still to constitute its promise. The discipline's unfulfilled potential gave substance and impetus to early programme statements and agendas for a branch of knowledge and practice, which, as its practitioners realised, depended increasingly upon the construction and deployment of strategies to secure a future which seemed to hold nothing but uncertainty.
CHAPTER ONE

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Methodological Considerations

1. Histories and sociologies of sociology

Debates about sociology's nature and purpose are perpetually bound up in the discourse of its current dilemmas, crises and problematics etc., to the extent that widespread, rigorous and increasingly ritualised introspection has become a prominent feature of the field that its practitioners lay claim to. Central to the latter endeavour, is the additional complication, that defining the intellectual and institutional form of sociology has never been the prerogative of its practitioners alone. The participants in such debates, the issues at stake and the locus of discussions have, upon examination, revealed the considerable vulnerability of sociology to the different institutional (in the sense of the political, economic and social) resistances and opportunities which affect directly the development of any branch of knowledge. There is thus, in a sense, a multiple tension governing sociology's existence, whether accounting for it in its intellectual or institutional forms.

Until quite recently, sociology has had to contend with an often hostile and once, almost fatal relationship with the other social sciences. Such a contested intellectual position within the human sciences was compounded by its precarious 'public presence', whereby it has been variously construed as, or indeed offered itself, as a panacea to willing politicians and social reformers. At other times, and in more controversial circumstances it has retreated to a respectable and safe redoubt within academe, when its status was either confused, abused or threatened by what its critics conceived of as, mediocrity or dogma. In becoming eventually a permanent fixture of the academic curriculum, sociology had attained what most of its early practitioners regarded as an essential step in establishing and maintaining the discipline on a secure, institutional basis. This would not necessarily explain how such a profusion of institutional and intellectual diversity came to pass, and although such an image of coherence and establishment would seem to indicate
an undisputed place for sociology within the education system specifically, and as part of culture generally, such a conception would be flawed. The position of sociology among the social sciences and humanities remains somewhat insecure with its disciplinary boundaries continually being disputed (Urry, 1981). The relationships of sociology both with allegedly non-scientific notions about society and with other social sciences are uncertain and beset with problems of demarcation that touch upon each of the various claims which can be made for sociology: its purportedly superior precision of fact finding, the internal consistency of its theories, its scope, and its relevance. For many of its practitioners, the latter claims form the basis of sociology as an authoritative science. To others, such claims cannot be substantiated, should never have been made on behalf of the discipline and will ultimately bring about its demise.

I am not arguing that sociologists, until recently, have never contested among themselves or indeed with others, the essential nature of their enterprise. This fact gives sociology its socially contingent status vis-a-vis other branches of knowledge. Indeed, this aspect of its development in Britain represents a central feature of my argument. However, what I do contend in terms of both its intellectual and institutional emergence is, that owing to its relatively late development as an academic subject and research activity; the scarcity of its practitioners and protagonists in general; the absence of a coherent and distinctive corpus of theory and methods, for a substantial period of its existence and a further absence of a discernable intellectual ancestry, or history of intellectual 'achievement', were all factors which tended to induce sociologists during the formative period of the discipline, to promote and defend sociology largely on the fragile basis of its potential. This feature of sociology's development makes it somewhat unique within the wider field of contemporary human science.

The claim that sociology is an exact, empirical science, or, that it is essentially a critical/interpretative synthesis, are consequent upon an appropriate history when substantiating either of the aforementioned claims. Thus the formative period of sociology may be for some, the escape from metaphysical system building into the rigours of empiricism
with its associated methodological exactitude, and the allegedly corres-
ponding transition from such enlightenment to the despair recounted
in the work of Geoffrey Hawthorn (1976). Just as natural science
is purportedly an enterprise of intrinsic and acquired social purpose,
the former to render nature understandable and controllable, the latter,
an unremitting quest for knowledge in the service of mankind, so too
is sociology ascribed with a similar purpose, albeit in less Herculean
terms than perhaps was the case in projects associated with Comte, Saint-
Simon and the positivists who reigned supreme in America from the 1930s
to the 1960s. Attempts to reconstruct and subsequently project the
sociological enterprise upon the basis of a common nature (technē)
can be only a partial account or explanation of either branch of knowledge's
cultural dimensions.

It is this disposition toward the contested forms of sociology which
increasingly involved sociologists in the process of negotiating with
others, its nature and social function. Such a process entailed often
very subtle forms of strategy and tactics, which were consciously evolved
in response to the audience to which the case for sociology was being
addressed.

I referred above to the notion of 'others'. By this I mean individuals,
organisations (public and private), groups and agencies, practitioners
within other fields of knowledge, and anyone whom sociologists considered
crucial to the expansion of their discipline. In referring to sociologists'
concern with the importance of constructing appropriate strategies
with which to expand the intellectual and institutional bases of their
discipline, it is important to remember that shifts in sociological
perspectives and concerns within the discipline are closely linked
to the history of British society as a whole. This in turn, has affected the
kinds of sociological problems that are felt to require investigation,
in addition to emphasising the power of certain modes of explanation
and analysis at the expense of others. Thus, the socially contingent
nature of the discipline's theoretical and practical dimensions, in
turn gives rise to sociology's political and moral status among other
branches of knowledge. All sociological activity, whether it be research,
theory construction or teaching, entails the production or reproduction of the aforementioned contingent form and ethical status of the discipline.

Professor Donald MacRae (1974) has suggested a possible project which, if successfully pursued, might provide not only a more comprehensive and accurate account of the development of sociology in Britain, but could also shed some light on the issues raised above, especially the manner in which sociology is socially constructed. His notion of an 'unconventional history of sociology', though not in itself a radical departure from conventional historical accounts, nevertheless provides a series of fruitful alternatives to orthodox histories of the discipline.

The major limitation of MacRae's 'alternative history' is that it is essentially programmatic and confined to novel innovations, which are suggestive of possible approaches, without any reasonably detailed, substantive examples. MacRae's project also imparts a sense of incompleteness, or rather, a perpetual confusion and distortion in comprehending sociology's historical becoming, in the sense that much of its history remains unwritten. These 'faults' he attributes to the inadequacy of rendering a truly institutional history and the tendency to portray sociology's development as a continuous celebration of cumulative successes in both its intellectual and organisational spheres. Of the necessity to focus on the institutional minutiae of such a history, MacRae has argued that (1974, pp.405-406):

"Any history of sociology that is not concerned with its institutional base will be nugatory. This is hard, boring work. It is concerned too with trivia, and this in a double sense. There are the trivia of the founding, the financing and the administration of journals, of university departments and of societies either of learning or of social reform and welfare. The reason, then, why there is no satisfactory history of sociology, is in part that there is no real history of sociology as a social institution.

In the matters of objectivity and a willingness to account for periods of discontinuity and failure in the history of sociology, he insists that these dimensions need to be explored and explained, emphasising that (1974, p.405):
"History must not be a story of success if it is to be valuable, nor should it take its parameters for the study of the past from the current fashions and strengths of the present. The importance of this justice, here, is for sociology itself."

Further consideration of MacRae's thesis will indicate those elements of his analysis that I wish to incorporate in my own account of the development of sociology in Britain.

In essence, MacRae (1974) contends that there exists 'no satisfactory history of sociology', nor, we are told, any 'satisfactory histories of aspects of sociology' (1974, p.401). This assumption is framed as a question, rather than an assertion, thus enabling him to rescue 'critical exegesis' from the implied criticism, that all else is 'propaedeutic to intellectual history', although he does cite a number of works as exceptions to the general rule. MacRae's criticisms and observations therefore imply a method, or strategy (as he prefers to call it), for the construction of a 'satisfactory history of sociology'. What, according to MacRae, are the shortcomings of existing historical accounts of sociology? They can be listed briefly as follows:

a) A conspicuous lack of the accurate chronicling of institutional history, whether it be of sociological societies and associations.

b) An absence of institutional histories of the sociological teaching and research organisations of nations, or particular universities.

c) A lack of historical accounts of 'quasi-institutions' like, for example, the Durkheim school.

d) A dearth of institutional histories of the Foundations and charitable bodies directly or indirectly engaged in promoting sociological researches.

e) The absence of 'collective studies' of sociologists, how trained and educated.
A further absence of studies of sociology as providing 'socially operative ideology' (MacRae considers Marxism as an example of this) which may include - Comteanism in Brazil, Spencerianism in Japan, Durkheimianism in Turkey.

MacRae does acknowledge the fact that a number of important contributions have been made to the history of sociology especially in terms of what he considers to be, contributions, or rather, 'necessary prerequisites for historiography', namely sections of Parson's Structure of Social Action (1937), Ginsberg's Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy (1956-61), Aron's Main Currents in Sociological Thought (1965-67), and other 'special studies' such as W. Mommsen's Max Weber und die Deutsche Politik (1959), and J.D.Y. Peel's Herbert Spencer (1971). Although he refers also to the smaller literature of special studies of empirical investigation, notably Oberschall's Empirical Social Research in Germany, (1965), he includes too, the work of Philip Abrams, The Origins of British Sociology (1968), a text which, I would suggest, cannot really be included in such a category. In setting out his strategy for an appropriate history of sociology, MacRae considers the probable reasons why no one has attempted previously, the kind of historical account which he feels is lacking in the field and which would serve to fill in the significant gaps in our knowledge of the development of the discipline. Again they can be conveniently listed as follows:

a) 'Sociologists are too busy doing sociology and that on the whole, historians have not been much interested'.

b) Accurate chronicling is a very tedious and complex task and although it would not be necessary to emulate the monumental achievements representative of the works of Gibbon and his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, there is, nevertheless, a need to attempt such an exercise, especially as the 'story of sociology is briefer and narrower'.

c) The use of the term story by MacRae is important and I think his reasons for incorporating it in his strategy are worth noting (MacRae, 1974, p.403):
"The word story has entered my text. In the last resort all real history is narrative. Sociologists tend to think that narrative is easy; in fact it is very difficult and even in the fields of political and military transactions the number of completely successful narrative histories is very small. The history of sociology cannot be merely the history of ideas, but even as a history of ideas the difficulties are immense. No wonder, then, that what is often called the history of sociological thought has so often been dehydrated and second-hand biography plus intellectual exegesis."

The above 'shortcomings' in existing histories of sociology and the accompanying reasons for their existence, leads MacRae to formulate a strategy for the production of an historical account which would reflect the components implied in the lists set out above and thus give to sociology's development a more compelling and socio-historical grounding. MacRae's suggestions are somewhat unorthodox (at least for the period when he began to formulate the ideas upon which his paper is based; and when interviewed in 1980 they still provoked an intense debate) and rather than risk misinterpreting their relevance to his suggested project, I think it necessary to quote the relevant sections of his paper.

MacRae begins his plan for a new approach to the history of sociology by singling out a feature of historical writing which he deems a drawback to the intended project (1974, p.403):

"One thing that is not a strategy is biography. In the late 19th century it was eccentric to define history as the sum of an infinity of biographies, today it is merely absurd. That does not mean that one does not need biographies soundly based in scholarship. These should concern themselves with the milieux of their subjects as the writer attempted in his work on Herbert Spencer and as J.D.Y. Peel succeeded in doing in his study of the same writer.

What we do not need are, I think, either works of piety, suppression and distortion like Marianne Weber's life of her husband, Max Weber: Ein Lebensbild (1926) or of psycho-biography. The latter element may, of this date permit - which in general they do not - a contribution to the psychological disciplines but not, the point is analytic, to either history or sociology."

This 'problem' out of the way, MacRae concentrates on the more productive aspects of his strategy (1974, pp.403-404):
"One of the possible strategies is that of Lovejoy's justly famous first chapter of The Great Chain of Being (1936). This strategy can work only for what sociologists rather loosely call 'theory'. It is to treat the unit idea as the protagonist of the history. To be successful it demands minute scholarship and sustained application of a kind not yet, I believe, ever given to a sociological theme. It is at once a broadening and a narrowing approach: broadening because the genealogy of unitary concepts is always complex: narrowing because it isolates concepts from men and their circumstances."

MacRae gives two examples of his notion of a sociological, 'unit idea', namely, function and community. A further strategy propounded by the author entails a critique of the sociology of knowledge (1974, p.404):

"Another strategy would be through a critique of the sociology of knowledge and of why this activity has been so alluring and so, relatively, barren. Such a critique, using sociology as its empirical referrent either at large or in specific times and places, could not fail to be both valuable and historical. Indeed, if sociology is what it claims, its strengths and weaknesses manifests themselves in the sociology of knowledge."

MacRae's notion of a critique of the sociology of knowledge assumes that all "persuasions" would, through introspection and comparison, come eventually to a better understanding of each others' enterprise within the discipline. MacRae's suggestion is not as superficial nor narcissistic as it may first appear. However, a problematic feature of such a project would entail the predetermination of the form that such a critique would take, as a critical analysis would necessitate the adoption of a specific theoretical perspective. This in itself implies some form of objective criteria with which to evaluate competing theories and a strategy for adjudication.

MacRae continues with a series of procedures and categories which, when combined, give rise to the scope of his strategic approach to an historical account of the development of sociology (1974, p.404):

"But the basic requirements are still those of good, craftsman-like, critical narrative history of men and ideas; of institutions, groups and schools; of research techniques, results and interrelations with ideas, with theory, with policy and ideology;"
of the social milieux, formation and origins of sociologists; and the growth of sociological community, its communication network - not journals and conferences alone - and the value judgements which operate in it."

In concluding his strategy for a 'satisfactory history of sociology', MacRae argues that apart from the intrinsic merit of such a project, two additional and important aspects emerge. First, he considers his scheme to be "inevitably diagnostic", and second, it would be a further step in establishing sociology as a "major form of human self-consciousness in our time" (1974, p.405).

There is much in Donald MacRae's thesis which is both contentious and novel. This is due, in part, to his style of argument and his commitment to the preservation of sociology from ideological taint and exploitation. A number of ideas incorporated within MacRae's notion of a satisfactory history of sociology have appeared in other publications by him (MacRae 1960, 1961, and 1964). Although he concentrates on the institutional element of such a history, there is sufficient evidence in his argument to suggest the relevance of both the sociology of sociology and the sociology of knowledge, to the proposed strategy. Considered thus, it would appear reasonable to categorise his general approach to analysis, as methodologically eclectic.

There is, I believe, another important reason for adopting MacRae's eclectic approach to the study of sociology's development in Britain, especially in view of my contention that the sociology of sociology necessarily entails the incorporation of a sociology of knowledge. This relates to the problematic nature of sociology's 'object' of study; the nature of sociological discourse as a means of comprehending and accounting for its object of study (in all its complex and contestable forms) and the bearing all this has on the changing status of the discipline's epistemological and organisational nature as a social process.

One recent study in the sociology of knowledge has attempted to explore the interdependency of the above approach with that of a wider sociological perspective, albeit for a study of scientific knowledge. Michael Mulkay's
Science and the Sociology of Knowledge (1979) provides new and very useful strategies and insights into an alternative account of customary views of science. Mulkay has endeavoured to account for the development of scientific thought in terms of the influences of non-scientists and by the actions and cultural acquisitions of scientists themselves in non-scientific contexts. The interesting feature of Mulkay's work is that with adaptation, its central hypothesis and the mode of analysis employed to account for the growth of scientific knowledge in society, could serve a similar purpose in examining sociology. There are several aspects of Mulkay's project that I wish to identify and consider briefly, as I believe that with an element of experimentation and substitution, they support my own methodological intentions, and highlight a common feature of both my own and Mulkay's project; that of the primary role of science within contemporary Western culture as a major influence in shaping the modern episteme.

Mulkay has considered one particular aspect of the production of scientific knowledge which, I believe has implications for an understanding of the development of sociology, especially its tendency, during the inter-war period and up to and beyond the post-reconstructionist, pre-Heyworth eras: the tendency of many of its practitioners to subscribe to, and deploy the norms of science as an integral component of their technical discourse. The normative structure of science serves as not only quasi-technical vocabularies of meaning within the social scientific community and the activities associated with it, but also as a resource in the construction of strategies and negotiating tactics, crucial to the expansion of its institutional boundaries. Furthermore, the deployment of such strategies serve as a means of portraying the discipline as but one among a number of other scientific endeavours, seeking official recognition and support within those political and administrative domains, where decisions affecting the institutional future of such disciplines are taken. Recourse to the aforementioned vocabularies albeit somewhat modified, also serve a useful purpose in the public domain, where the credibility of sociology is regularly contested. Mulkay has considered the relationship between social norms and the production of scientific knowledge, and it is the role of the actor (sociologist/scientist) and the use of purposive vocabularies that is relevant to my approach (Mulkay, 1979, p.93):
"The meaning of norms is always socially contingent; that is, it depends on interpretation by actors in varying social contexts. Because any specific norm can be made consistent with a wide range of apparently different actions, we cannot regard the production of knowledge as a simple consequence of conformity to any particular set of normative formulations. I have suggested instead that it is more appropriate to treat the norms of science as vocabularies which are employed by members in negotiating meanings for their own and their colleagues' actions."

The importance of Mulkay's observations stem from his belief that the process of negotiation, on the basis of a 'considerable variety of formulations' (norms as vocabularies), leads to interpretations which become accepted by participants through the formal and complex processes of 'social interaction and negotiation', (1979, p.94):

"... that is, as members exchange views and attempt to convince, persuade and influence each other, these views may be modified, abandoned or reinforced."

Thus social negotiation (in Mulkay's case, within the field of science) is contingent upon such factors as, "members' interests, their intellectual and technical commitments, members' control over valued information and research facilities and the strength of their claim to scientific authority" (1979, p.94). Mulkay also provides important insights into the spurious attempt by some observers to differentiate between patterns of technical and social norms which provide important sources for scientists in their negotiations. Again his arguments and observations apply to an analysis of attempts by sociologists to negotiate within similar contexts and for virtually the same reasons (1979, p.94):

"Not only are social norms socially variable, but cognitive/technical norms are also open to a considerable range of interpretation in any particular research area. In other words, general evaluative criteria such as 'consonance', 'replicability', as well as the content of specific bodies of knowledge and technique, all require interpretation in particular instances in much the same way as do social norms (Böhme, 1977)."
Mulkay then points to the feature which has equal relevance to his study and mine, especially in terms of intra-sociological debates on the nature of its competing forms and the implication of its contested status in terms of its future intellectual credibility and institutional expansion. As I have stated earlier, the evaluation of the discipline and the knowledge it produces, is a social process, involving individuals and agencies 'external' to the discipline, and subject to negotiation, (1979, pp.94-95):

"Indeed, it is difficult to envisage how technical resources could be employed differently from social resources in this respect because, as every case study demonstrates, there is no clear separation between the negotiation of social meaning and the assessment of knowledge-claims. Both social and technical formulations have to be selected and interpreted by participants in particular instances: and both kinds of resources are inextricably combined in the sequence of informal interaction as well as formal demonstration whereby specific knowledge-claims come to be ratified. (Thus the distinction between social and technical resources must not be reified. Cognitive/technical formulations are merely one kind of interpretive social resource)."

There is another sense in which Mulkay attempts to demonstrate the essentially 'socially contingent nature of science' (one which has received considerable attention by Yaron Ezrahi (1972)). Mulkay's portrayal of the status of science, and its practitioners' dependency on common cultural resources to negotiate its intellectual and institutional presence, highlights the fact that sociology too is confronted with an identical set of extra-disciplinary protocols when faced with the need to negotiate its organisational needs and social relevance, although Mulkay's thesis does not incorporate the latter reference to sociology. What Mulkay does have to say about science in the former context, applies equally to sociology (Mulkay, 1979, p.118):

"... when scientists enter social contexts outside the research community, such as the wider realm of political activity, they select from and reinterpret their cultural resources, both technical and social, in response to the social context and in accordance with their position within it."
I will give detailed examples of sociologists and other social scientists' attempts to 'select from and reinterpret their cultural resources, both technical and social', whenever they engaged in strategic discourse to expand both the institutional and subsequently, the intellectual boundaries of their respective disciplines*. Moreover, the general practice of seeking sympathetic allies within existing institutional arrangements necessary to sociology's development, will provide clues to understanding the relative success, or otherwise, of divergent forms of sociological theory and practice; the continuity or discontinuity of one tradition over another and the establishment of a preferred scholarship in opposition to alleged orthodoxies and ideologies. In terms of agendas, programmes and priorities for the development of sociology, their construction and successful implementation, demonstrate the connection between a conceptual scheme (including a philosophy of social science) for a branch of knowledge and the material conditions which influence its realisation. Indeed, it is the reference to what Mulkay regards as the "imaginative inheritance" (1979, p.99), within the composite discourse of scientists and 'others', as the former group engages the latter in social contexts and arguments crucial to the intellectual and institutional expansion of the domain of science, that will provide clues to the strategic presentation of sociology by its practitioners, for purposes similar to those of their scientist counterparts. It is Holton (1973, p.101) who has given a clear indication of the consequences for science and subsequently society, of the engagement of scientists in debates in the public domain, on the nature and purpose of their enterprise:

"What is interesting is that on certain occasions, during the transformation of conceptions from the personal to the public realm, the scientists, perhaps unknowingly, smuggles the commitment of his individual system, and that of his society, into his supposedly neutral, value-indifferent luggage."

* See Appendix One for a brief account of the significance of the inaugural lecture in terms of sociology's advocatory dimension.
The situation referred to by Holton has more problematical and controversial implications for the sociologist when a similar attempt is made to produce a repertoire of basic themes or presuppositions to span the boundaries between the domain of professional sociology and the wider community. Moreover, the contrasting nature of sociological thought with that of natural science, places the sociologist in a more contentious and intellectually precarious position to that of his or her counterpart in the sciences. This is particularly the case when sociologists endeavour to defend publicly, the entitlement of the discipline to receive the recognition and resources it requires to sustain and advance its endeavours.

The key to understanding the relative 'success' of science to sociology's case in such public debates, lays partially in the historical ethos and authority of science (and the concomitant reverence with which the public hold its ideas and practitioners) but mainly in the ability of scientists to sustain two interdependent illusions: the logical process of discovery, and the separation of scientific knowledge and practice from other non-scientific, branches of knowledge. In the case of the former, great emphasis and reliance is placed on the inviolability of the scientific method and the formal processes of reasoning in science. Science is thus construed as an exemplar for other forms of knowledge and practice. In the case of the latter, the purported disassociation of science from the more speculative and less precise intellectual disciplines, is linked specifically to the position of science in contemporary culture (Mulkay, 1979, p.99):

"This is one of the crucial differences between modern science and its predecessors. The cultural and social roots of knowledge have been hidden away in modern science, on the mistaken assumption that true knowledge should not involve reliance on unverifiable assumptions."

Holton (1973) has presented a number of case studies to demonstrate that the cultural connection between science and society today, is less distant than it is made to appear. Again, Mulkay (1979, p.99) has developed this argument within his conception of the role of 'informal negotiation' as a mediating factor in, and between the wider public domain:
"There is in practice a continual cultural exchange between science and the wider society. Interpretative resources enter science mainly through informal thinking, usually with only a very limited awareness of their external origins on the part of participants. They are refined and modified in the course of informal negotiation; and they are allowed into the public annals of science only after appropriate reformulation. These interpretative resources are not generated by the 'facts of nature', nor by the social life of a segregated research community alone. They must be understood at least in part as products of the social processes of society at large."

Thus the self-proclaimed and ascribed status of scientific knowledge arises - as a distinctly sociological process. In the case of sociology itself, its practitioners and their knowledge claims undergo a similar process of informal negotiation with a number of added difficulties. Although Holton has shown that scientists can often reach their conclusions on the basis of very haphazard means, and that all too often there is no regular procedure, no logical system of discovery, no simple continuous development, and that the process of discovery has been as varied as the temperament of the scientist, the ethos and authority of science within the public domain and as an exemplar for other practitioners to emulate within their own fields of endeavour, remains a vital component of the scientists' strategic repertoire. The apparent success of scientists in sustaining the illusion of the 'power' of science, rests upon the ability of its practitioners to intervene in the processes of nature, rendering it understandable and controllable, with the additional benefit of converting such knowledge and practice to the 'service of mankind' through industrial and technological processes and artifacts.

The technical competence of its practitioners, the practical performance of science, and its integral relationship to the national economy have since the last war in particular, become one and the same in terms of the attributes of an allegedly prosperous economy and an enlightened culture. This is potent imagery and is constantly conjured up in debates about the provision and distribution of resources to and within the sciences, either by way of the 'science vote' to the Research Councils (including the Social Science Research Council) or, the funding of
the universities via the University Grants Committee. Despite the controversy over the methodological basis of scientific discovery, or indeed the assumption that the natural world, as the object of study by scientists, is insensible, yet an ordered and orderable entity; the powerful and attractive image of the scientist as a manipulator of 'natural forces', led sociologists in the formative period of the discipline, to present sociology within the scientific mode and by way of a social world equally susceptible to the manipulative control attending the pursuit of an authentic science. Epistemology, methodology and ontology became of necessity, central components of sociological debate and analysis. The project of a 'scientific sociology' increasingly faltered, both as an intra-disciplinary issue and subsequently, as a feature of a public and certainly more political debate over the evaluation of those forms of knowledge and practice which were considered most responsive to a changing array of social, economic and political imperatives, expressed generally, through different versions of 'the national need'.

In referring to Mulkay's argument on the 'social negotiation of knowledge' in various kinds of scientific research, the notion of 'context' emerges as a fundamental influence on the production of scientific knowledge. Although a sociology of knowledge would assume the crucial significance of social context to an account of the content, growth, diversity and diffusion of ideas in time, it is Mulkay's notion of the 'social negotiation of knowledge' which is of importance to my emphasis on the sociology of knowledge as an implicit feature of my account of the development of sociology for the period in question. Such a methodologically eclectic approach to the analysis is essential, in view of the historical moments I have chosen to examine and explain.

2. 'Acts of Justification' and the Social Construction of Sociology

Although it is not possible to separate the nature of sociology from conceptions of its social purpose, both its practitioners and non-sociologists in particular, have tended to frame an understanding of its enterprise within such a comprehension and evaluative context, from Comte to the present day. Sociology's perpetually precarious
relationship to other branches of the human sciences, and in turn, the position of the latter group of disciplines within the wider intellectual culture, derives from a dilemma referred to by Michel Foucault (1974, p.348):

"What explains the difficulty of the 'human sciences', their precariousness, their uncertainty as sciences, their dangerous familiarity with philosophy, their ill-defined reliance upon other domains of knowledge, their perpetually secondary and derived character, and also their claim to universality, is not, as is often stated the extreme density of their object; it is not the metaphysical status or the inerasable transcendence of this man they speak of, but rather the complexity of the epistemological configuration in which they find themselves placed, their constant relation to the three dimensions that give them their space."

Foucault proceeds to trace the origin of the dilemma of the social sciences to a precise and 'extremely well-determined epistemological arrangement in history', namely the three-dimensional space of the modern episteme (Foucault, 1974, pp.346-347). These 'dimensions' comprise the mathematical and physical sciences; the 'sciences of language, life, and the production and distribution of wealth', which Foucault argues when combined with the first dimension, serve as a 'common place', by way of a "... domain of the mathematicisable in linguistics, biology, and economics" (1974, p.347). The third dimension entails that of philosophical reflection, itself forming a common plane with the dimension of linguistics biology, and economics. Thus arises a paradox, or rather the dilemma of the place of the human sciences within the three-dimensional structure, referred to above (1974, p.347):

"From this epistemological trihedron the human sciences are excluded, at least in the sense that they cannot be found along any of its dimensions or on the surface of any of the planes thus defined. But one can equally well say that they are included in it, since it is in the intersection of these branches of knowledge, or, more exactly, in the volume defined by their three dimensions, that the human sciences have their place. This situation (in one sense minor, in another sense privileged) places them in relation to all other forms of knowledge: they have the more or less deferred, but constant, aim of giving themselves, or in any case of utilising, at one level or another, a mathematical formalisation; they proceed in accordance with models or concepts borrowed from..."
biology, economics, and the sciences of language; they address themselves to the mode of being of man which philosophy is attempting to conceive at the level of radical finitude, whereas their aim is to traverse all its empirical manifestations."

In deriving intellectual form and content from within the interstices of the aforementioned branches of knowledge, Foucault asserts what he considers to be an additional project for the human sciences: one which represents a primary task of an authentic science (1974, pp.345-346):

"Hence that double and inevitable contestation: that which lies at the root of the perpetual controversy between the sciences of man and the sciences proper — the first laying an invincible claim to be the foundation of the second, which are ceaselessly obliged in turn to seek their own foundation, the justification of their method, and the purification of their history, in the teeth of 'psychologism', 'sociologism', and 'historicism'; and that which lies at the root of the endless controversy between philosophy, which objects to the naivety with which the human sciences try to provide their own foundation, and those same human sciences which claim as their rightful object what would formerly have constituted the domain of philosophy."

It is within the contest to establish and retain an autonomous epistemology and the consequences this has for attempts by the individual human sciences to assert their respective disciplinary independence, that gives rise to sociology's perennial problematic. I use the word 'attempt', as the quest for autonomy is perpetually frustrated by two factors highlighted by Foucault, one of which refers to the primary role of "concepts" (1974, p.357), the other, the consequence that attempts to claim exclusive, proprietorial rights over certain of those concepts, has for the different human sciences (1974, pp.357-358):

"Thus, these three pairs of function and norm, conflict and rule, signification and system completely cover the entire domain of what can be known about man ... All these concepts occur throughout the entire volume of the human sciences and are valid in each of the regions included within it: hence the frequent difficulty in fixing limits, not merely between the objects, but also between the methods proper to psychology, sociology, and the analysis of literature and myth... In this way all the human sciences interlock and can always be used to interpret one another: their frontiers become blurred, intermediary and composite disciplines multiply endlessly, and in the end their proper object may even disappear altogether."
Foucault goes on to say that the project of the human sciences is not futile and that its composite disciplines take on an independent form through the use of "formal criterion for knowing what is on the level", (1974, p.358) for subjects like psychology and sociology, by way of using a 'fundamental' model in addition to distinctive 'secondary models', thus making it possible to "... know at what point one begins to 'psychologise' or 'sociologise'..." (1974, p.358).

In a later chapter, I shall endeavour to give a number of concrete examples of sociology's attempt to sustain its claim as not only an autonomous branch of knowledge and practice within the social sciences, but, during a particular moment in its inter-war history, as the most appropriate discipline within that group of subjects to provide the organisational and intellectual bases of a synoptic science of society. On that occasion, one which coincided with another attempt to reconstruct the same group of disciplines within what became known as William Beveridge's 'Natural Bases Scheme', constant reference was made to the fundamental role of appropriate methodologies for the different social sciences, with the example of the natural sciences as the exemplar. Again, Foucault has alluded to the consequences of this when the architects of social science were striving to develop both a discrete epistemology and a practical focus for the object of their study (1974, pp.366-367):

"It is useless, then, to say that the 'human sciences' are false sciences; they are not sciences at all; the configuration that defines their positivity and gives them their roots in the modern episteme at the same time makes it impossible for them to be sciences; and if it is then asked why they assumed that title, it is sufficient to recall that it pertains to the archaeological definition of their roots that they summon and receive the transference of models borrowed from the sciences ... Western culture has constituted, under the name of man, a being who, by one and the same interplay of reasons, must be a positive domain of knowledge and cannot be an object of science."

It is thus, as Foucault has argued, that the 'justification' of the methods of the social sciences, and the 'purification' of their history; the 'ceaseless obligation' on the part of their practitioners to seek their own foundation and the 'endless controversy' between themselves
and other, more ancient and established forms of knowledge, that will provide the focus of my own analysis of the development of sociology in Britain over the period in question. The aim of my investigation is quite simple in terms of Foucault's deceptively subtle and provocative thesis: I wish only to discern those moments in the development of sociology which characterise Foucault's notion of the 'endless controversy', especially the quest for disciplinary autonomy via a 'foundation' which represents intellectual and institutional space within the wider context of the modern episteme. My major concern then, will be with acts of justification, and their associated forms of strategic discourse, tactical negotiations and the consequences that the former 'acts' have had for the 'purification' of the discipline.*

Sociology's development in Britain entailed a gradual incorporation within existing and changing institutional arrangements. The latter institutional contexts became increasingly influenced by more dominant, or pervasive forms of knowledge, like science and the engineering/technological 'sciences', and the concomitant influence of those disciplines' practitioners within social settings other than their attributable spheres of influence and expertise. The transitional process affecting sociology, its transformation from a disparate collectivity of ideas and individuals to an increasingly institutionalised and formal branch of knowledge, occurred despite the internal schisms over its intrinsic nature,** and more importantly, its social purpose. The dissent among its practitioners derived from not only the expected differences between existing

* The works of Baldamus (1972), and Horkheimer and Adorno (1973) have shed additional light on this dimension of sociology's development. The former theorist, through an exploration of the discipline's "collective community" and its associated "collective style of thought". The latter authors, in terms of sociologists' attempts to attain disciplinary autonomy through a "positive science". Joham Goudsblom (1977, p.150 ff., and 1970, pp.1-45) and Shils (1970, pp.810-814) have attempted to set these issues within a wider, social context.

** This is made abundantly clear in Kettler et al (1984, pp.118-124) when considering the contributions of Karl Mannheim to sociology in Britain between the two world wars.
theories and methodologies, but as a result of a significant degree of divergence over the aims of the discipline. The crucial point to bear in mind here, is the apparent failure on the part of many sociologists to recognise the contingent relationship between the two; the former being the legitimate preoccupation of a professor of sociology, the latter, an activity to engage the minds and time of 'others'. What many failed to appreciate was the effect that the 'others' would begin to have upon the determination of the content of ideas and practice within sociology itself.

I have, at several points in the text above, referred to two aspects of sociology's extant and evolving form, namely its nature and purpose. Although I have taken them to represent respectively, the general dimensions of the discipline's epistemological content and its social actuality, it may be germane at this juncture to enlarge upon the significance of these two dimensions, especially sociology's much proclaimed potential, itself an expression of its practitioners and others' comprehension of its social purpose, as either a science or non-science, the social panacea of the modern era, or, a form of social thought and action which would displace social revolution with a techno-bureaucratic evolution. This is not to assume that sociology's epistemological nature is neither complex nor relevant to a discussion of its purpose, but that its cognitive dimension is influenced by the moral and political prescriptions imposed upon the practice of sociology, both within and increasingly, from outside the discipline. It is within the process of establishing the social purpose of sociology, the intra-disciplinary contest, and the extra-disciplinary conflict of setting its agendas through time, that both sustains and imperils its existence. Notions of promise and potential are not necessarily rhetoric, but declared responses to the demands made upon the discipline as perceived by both its practitioners and those who sponsor its enterprise, and anticipate, or experience the fruits of its labour. Considered thus, the limits of its endeavours are not necessarily set by the so-called failure of its practitioners to construct a coherent and comprehensive body of theory and practice, equivalent to the natural sciences (for some the primary object of sociology), but rather, its potentialities and limitations arise from successful, (or unsuccessful) engagement in debates about the nature
and purpose of the discipline, and the controversial implications of social knowledge for social action. Such debates, the participants, their location, the significance of the occasion, the inherent discourse and strategies employed to articulate the case 'for' sociology become crucial to an understanding of the development of the discipline through time and within a changing social milieu.

There is another sense in which sociology's purpose may be either misunderstood, or misconstrued. The notion of purpose should not be construed solely as a form of social utility of knowledge, (I shall enlarge upon this conception of the discipline when discussing Philip Abrams' (1981) 'models' of sociology's enterprise) rather, and in relation to the variety of intentional or designated programmes for the discipline, sociology's purpose continues to be portrayed variously as a means of intellectual liberation, social critique, a fundamental interpretative/analytical tool, a science (both 'hard' and 'soft'), and the basic component of a liberal education. The aforementioned are either complementary, or contrasting ways of thinking about and accounting for society, social action and human agency in time. They also imply appropriate forms of methodology. Thus, notions of nature and purpose are inextricably linked. Purpose does not necessarily mean that sociology is essentially goal oriented or task directed, on either a modest or grandiose scale. This depends on both the sociologist's and non-sociologist's conception of the field and an appropriate operational definition of the discipline, which may not be commonly shared. In many respects, the latter problem is viewed by sociologists and historians of the discipline, as its central dilemma, giving rise to sociology's apparent heterogeneity.

Debates about the nature and purpose of sociology cannot be the prerogative of its professors alone. It is this characteristic that distinguishes it from natural science, at least to the apparent extent that scientists have been more successful in separating the more esoteric and complex aspects of their craft from other activities crucial to the development of science, namely, funding their research, generally institutionalising their disciplines and professionalising their practitioners. Such activities have tended to be less fraught, notwithstanding the intercession of 'funders', politicians and civil servants, than has historically
been the case for the social sciences, especially sociology. The former disciplines, through the efforts of scientists and their particularly influential political lobbies, have successfully engendered the social credibility of science, in part from the fortunate conjunction of science to modern technology and its associated economic imperatives. This has been the case in Britain, at least since the war.*

Whatever sociology was construed to be, became as complex an issue as determining and asserting its social purpose. The search for allies within the existing institutional arrangements necessary to sociology's development (what I consider to be the pursuit of sociology) provide clues to understanding the relative success, or otherwise, of divergent forms of sociological theory and practice, the continuity or discontinuity of one tradition over another and the establishment of a preferred scholarship in opposition to alleged orthodoxies and ideologies.

I have argued above, that Foucault has made an attempt to situate the social sciences within the 'three-dimensional structure of the episteme'. More important to my argument though, is the manner in which the human sciences, with specific reference to sociology, have managed to consolidate and sustain their existence within those Foucaultian 'dimensions'. Again, Foucault has suggested that it is by way of 'acts of justification' that the human sciences continue to perpetuate their respective enterprises. Indeed, such 'acts' are crucial to my notion of sociology's advocatory dimension, providing a medium within which to

* Several attempts have been made to examine the response of sociology to the claim that it possesses a 'natural' affinity with a radical-liberal tradition within British politics. It is in this sense that sociology has been subjected to detailed scrutiny within a context of political imperatives, (cf. Berkócn (Rex ed.), 1974); Ziff (Abrams ed.), 1980); and in terms of the social career of social theory, Gouldner (1971).
examine the controversial, unconventional and certainly the complex minutiae of evidence, which MacRae believes would have a crucial bearing on accounts of the development of sociology, but often becomes discarded in the pursuit of methodolatry. Awkward, seemingly uncategorisable information, evidence or data, constitutes a significant proportion of the supporting material and its consideration within the advocatory dimension. Moreover, and in keeping with MacRae's project for a faithful and detailed history of sociology, a comprehensive account should encompass that which is often ignored by the historian, or that which is given a cursory reference in passing, or, worse still, the use of categories and contexts of such huge, amorphous and overarching dimensions, that the historical account can only retain its coherence and meaning in somewhat general terms, and within academically acceptable limits of abstractness. Considered thus, histories of the development of sociology such as Mullins (1974), animated by his 'discovery' of the standard American sociologist' (1974, pp.316-317), although incorporating sociologists as vital participants in the construction of the discipline, (thus rescuing the account from an abstracted and disembodied catalogue of core ideas and theories), relegates the importance of the individual sociologist (and his or her work) to one of a name within a circulation of elites and in terms of a perpetual citation index. The sociologist as a person possessing motives (sincere and alterior), aims, aspirations and other sensitivities and needs, are forgotten in accounts like Mullins. The aforementioned emotions, features of character and biography exist in addition to the degree of erudition possessed by a sociologist, through his or her specialised command of the subject matter. Moreover, it is the combination of these factors, when given expression through the political necessity of acts of justification, that establish the sociologist as, simultaneously, a scholar/practitioner and citizen. It is because of the object of the sociologist's study, the fact that he or she is part and parcel of that same entity in an intimate and interacting, historical sense, and the additional features of a common language and culture of which the sociologist cannot dispossess himself or herself of, all of which precede, and compromise claims of scientific detachment. This is perhaps why the quest for autonomy, by way of many strategies, the most noteworthy being the vehicle of an authentic science, have become a prominent feature of the wider sociological
enterprise. Certainly Alvin Gouldner's work, *For Sociology* (1973) perhaps more than his earlier thesis, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (1971), represents an attempt to address the issue of the inescapable morality of the sociological enterprise with particular reference to the plight of the sociologist.

3. Sociology as Advocacy: Abrams' 'Five Models'

It is important to distinguish what I shall refer to as sociology's advocatory dimension from other notions of advocacy, especially that attributed to Philip Abrams' use of the term within his conception of sociology's 'five models' (Abrams, 1981b). This will then enable me to present the advocatory dimension, with reference to not only concrete examples of it as action and discourse in the social construction of sociology, but as a category for the analysis and explanation of the continual negotiation between sociologists and others in the quest for intellectual and institutional autonomy, mainly through what I have referred to above as acts of justification. These in themselves constitute a dependence upon the strategic presentation of the discipline in terms of its substantive nature and social purpose.

On what was to be Philip Abrams' last public and professional performance as a 'professor' of sociology, he was, once again engaged in the promotion of the discipline, with a style and conviction borne of a commitment to the demonstrable use of sociology. The occasion in question was the Annual Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, in fact its one hundred and fiftieth anniversary as an Association. The opportunity and the occasion, provided an ideal context in which to mount both a strategic defence of the discipline in the face of growing, political hostility toward it, and simultaneously, celebrate the prospect of sociology's future, through a demonstration of its general social utility, and certainly its unfulfilled potential. Ironically, Abrams' contribution to the anniversary meeting, by way of its timing and poignancy as a stand against the prevailing political and economic imperatives which were eroding increasingly the institutional and intellectual development of sociology in Britain, was itself a primary example of sociology's advocatory dimension. I shall return
to an examination of that occasion later in this section of the chapter. Suffice it to say that Abrams' paper, "The Uses of British Sociology 1831-1981", reflected the passionate, professionalising instincts of those earlier sociologists, who sought to enhance the institutional and professional prospects of their chosen field, through the establishment of their own Section in the British Association. The history of the latter episode in sociology's odyssey has been carefully documented by Geoffrey Nelson (1975). The importance of Nelson's thesis, in terms of its relevance to my argument, relates to his emphasis on the strategies deployed by social scientists (with special reference to sociologists) to gain essential recognition from "... existing intellectual elites and from society as a whole" (Nelson, 1975, p.237). Nelson regards such recognition as a condition of entry to key institutional arrangements within society, without which no discipline could hope to achieve and sustain, intellectual and institutional autonomy.* Nelson employs the notion of a strategic dimension to explain the integration and development of sociology within scholarly institutions like the British Association. Although his account tends to portray 'strategic events' in a somewhat mechanistic and to a certain extent, deterministic manner, his deployment of the concept within an historical account is nevertheless, most revealing. I tend to assume, that within such a seemingly rational and methodical approach to some collectively identified goal, there lurks the prospect of unanticipated events and influences; the usurpation by 'external' agencies of original aims and motives, and occasionally and unexpectedly, serendipity. The notion of strategy tends to imply a logical and coherent plan of action - the term is applied usually to things military - and yet it is defined as an 'art'. I also assume

* While I recognise both the importance and relevance of the process of professionalisation to the overall development of sociology, a concerted move to 'professionalise' the discipline in Britain only began after the inauguration of the British Sociological Association in 1950. Prior to this event, sociologists' concern with their field of interest and practice tended to take the form of a 'professional approach' or attitude, rather than a formal attempt to establish protocols, selection procedures and the control of entry and modes of formal professional practice etc. It is only recently that the BSA has endeavoured to formulate and encourage adherence to a 'code of ethics' in terms of the practice of sociological research. Such a code, in a formal sense, enforceable within a profession and supported by the ultimate penalty of expulsion, has not emerged in sociology. Accounts of the professionalising process have been produced by Hardin (1977), Parsons (Tiryakian ed., 1971), Wilensky (1964) and in a broader context by Halsey and Trow (1971).
the notion of a strategy to encompass an enabling mechanism as part of the wider process of institutionalisation. Thus the process of negotiation, as an act between two discrete parties, becomes crucial to my operational definition of strategy and in its particular application to the development of sociology in Britain. Negotiation of sociology's organisational presence within conventional institutional settings has a direct effect upon its substantive nature (as a body of theory and practice), and in the sense of its disciplinary status vis-a-vis other branches of knowledge.

Advocacy is portrayed by Abrams as a constituent of his 'five models' of 'useful' sociology. I think it important to distinguish between his own conception of advocacy, as it applies to sociology (as a form of enlightenment) and my own conception of it, as a more comprehensive category for the development of an historical account of sociology.

Abrams five models, which are derived from the history of the discipline over a period of one hundred and fifty years, portray the potential and demonstrable use of sociological knowledge. They can be schematically represented as follows:

**Uses of Sociology: 1831-1981**

1. Policy Science
   - ENGINEERING
2. Socio-technics
   - 5. Education
3. Clarification
   - ENLIGHTENMENT (from Robbins and Heyworth onward)
4. Advocacy

Abrams argues that his five models of the possible use of sociology have at various times been influential in British sociology. Moreover, the models are distinguishable from one another on the basis of their, "... underlying assumptions about the possible and proper relationship between social knowledge and social action" (Abrams, 1981b, Abstract). His project entails a sociology of sociological knowledge, in the sense that an attempt is made to trace the historical careers of the models through the recognition and use of sociology in Britain, from the early part of the nineteenth century to the early
1980s. Abrams presents the latter process as a movement away from ideas of the use of sociology as a resource for government and towards a, "... sense of sociology as a resource for politics, away from 'engineering' models of applied sociology and towards 'enlightenment' models", (1981, Abstract). Abrams was convinced that it would be possible to identify "scientifically acceptable strategies" for the use of sociology, especially as a resource for politics, though in terms of its strength as an argumentative discipline, rather than an authoritative science. Such a project was viewed with optimism.

Borrowing Janowitz's distinction between enlightenment and engineering models, as major classificatory categories, Abrams proceeds to construct his five models, assigning them a place within those two categories. He also outlines an additional task for his project (1981b, p.2):

"Yet behind such differences in the immediate outcome proposed for sociological work lie deeper differences, rooted in assumptions about the nature of the social and of sociology as a science of the social and in inferences from those assumptions about the nature of the gap between social knowledge and social action and about the possibility of closing or joining it sociologically. To follow the working-out of these deeper differences a refinement of the basic engineering/enlightenment distinction such as that envisaged in my five types of use seems helpful."

Thus the engineering view comprises two significantly different versions; policy science and socio-technics. The former entails (1981b, p.3):

"... the possibility of authoritative social knowledge and hence a firm closing of the gap between knowledge and action. The appropriate outcome of social knowledge is planning, an increasingly purposive and concerted movement toward a better society. Whether presented as facts or as prescriptive recommendations sociological knowledge effectively pre-empts politics - that pre-emption may indeed be seen as a principal use of sociology since politics will probably be understood as inherently irrational and the new combination of social scientists and policy makers as imperatively rational."

The latter, socio-technics, constrasts with the abovementioned 'policy science' in that it is portrayed as a 'weak engineering model' (1981b, p.3):
"The target of activity is still government rather than politics and in principle the sociologist is still seen as capable of generating conclusive (if not now authoritative) knowledge across a wide range of specific social problems (if not now the whole range). ... The tendency will be either to see the need to negotiate with policy-makers or to adopt the role of technician in relation to them. In either case the closure of the gap between social knowledge and social action achieved by sociology is significantly less than perfect."

The enlightenment view comprises two fairly distinct perspectives; enlightenment-as-clarification and enlightenment-as-advocacy. The former notion of enlightenment-as-clarification entails a process (1981b, p.4):

"... of competently creating a knowledge-base (whether or not that is understood as incorporating theory) for a sociological view of the world - and then more or less leaving it at that... sociology enters the world by a gentle osmosis of public opinion ... clarification is seen as taking the form of demystification, dispelling illusions and unmasking myths, or reformulating issues or problems by elucidating assumptions or revealing hitherto unperceived realities of social structure or meaning, or of changing the possibilities of social action by changing the language of public discourse."

In contrast to this, Abrams develops what he considers to be a "thoroughly un-sanguine" model of advocacy which shares some of the features of the general enlightenment view, to the extent that the relationship between knowledge and action is an argumentative, or political matter, in the sense that, authoritative social knowledge is not to be had, as it actively enters the arena of argument (1981b, p.4):

"In effect, this view of the use of sociology impels the sociologist to become a lobbyist for a preferred reading of sociological evidence. Taking up Booth's view that a coupling of evidence and intensity of feeling is needed if sociology is to move the world aright, the sociologist adopting the Advocacy model of use will seek to treat sociological knowledge as a means of political persuasion. The advocate, like the socio-technician will have a close relationship with policy-makers but they will be relationships of argument or partnership in argument rather than of service. The assumption that policy-making is at bottom a matter of technical rationality will not be a prominent feature of the propriety of bringing good evidence to the support of a good cause."
Abrams' final model is that of 'Education' (198lb, p.5):

"The reasons for treating this as a distinct conception of the use of sociology is (quite apart from the fact that it is widely advocated by contemporary British sociologists) that it combines elements of the other models in a curious mix of its own leading to a quite distinct image of good sociological practice. ... it is seen as a way of producing policy-scientists or advocates, socio-technicians or clarifiers, whether understood as method, knowledge or scepticism the distinctive use of sociology in this conception is teaching."

The 'education model' is thus perceived as an active synthesis of the other four models, and through which sociology itself, as an academic subject, serves as a mechanism for the production of educated individuals, schooled and skilled in the arts of the aforementioned models. It is somewhat puzzling that Abrams does not devote more attention to the education model, especially in view of its fundamental role in the creation and transmission of those ideas and practices central to the other models.

It will be seen from the model of advocacy postulated by Abrams, that he views its 'use' as complementary to the task of enlightened political argument and social policy formation. Through a "preferred reading of sociological evidence" the sociologist endeavours to persuade politicians and policy-makers of the need for both reasoned and reasonable arguments, as a basis for enlightened social policy. The distinction between Abrams' conception of advocacy, as it applies to sociology, and that of my own notion of sociology's advocatory dimension is as follows: whereas Abrams regards sociological advocacy as sociology and sociologists in pursuit of enlightened, political decision-making, I regard sociology's advocatory dimension as the historical and extant activity of sociologists in pursuit of their discipline. A further and substantial difference also exists between mine and Abrams' use of the concept of advocacy, and it is this distinction which I feel tends to confine Abrams' account of the use of sociology to a more contemporary period than his stated span of one hundred and fifty years. This entails his consideration of the 'non-use' of sociology (198lb, p.20):
"There is actually not all that much sociology to be used. The establishment of an extensive, theory-saturated and self-conscious basis of knowledge is the crucial condition for any of the uses of sociology I have discussed to flourish.

In effect, Abrams' statement tends to confine the construction and application of his models to the large-scale development of sociology in the decades following the post-war period, in Britain at least. This is why the educational model is so important to the institutional expansion of the discipline, and why prior to the Second World War, the notion of sociology's use (within Abrams' framework of analysis) depended largely on its few, influential practitioners' claims for the discipline's potential; hence the proliferation of programme statements, agendas and model curricula. Moreover, Abrams has himself suggested that, notwithstanding the rise and fall of other sociological traditions within British sociology, 'Socio-technics' continues as the dominant paradigm (1981b, .7):

"Nevertheless, Socio-technics once launched in the 1830s proved impossible to suppress. Alone among my five models of use it has a continual actual history in British practice from 1831 to the present. Indeed, the history of British sociology as a whole has been permanently tied to an interest in augmenting and advancing this type of use of social knowledge."

It is Abrams' opinion that "... using social knowledge Socio-technically has been the pivot and trigger of the history of British sociology ..." (1981b, p.11) although other models of use have always received some recognition.

There are two further points to make about Abrams' project. They are again features which distinguish his use of the concept of advocacy from my own, in addition to highlighting certain elements of his analysis which tends to assign too great a degree of exclusivity to the models used to form its basis.

First, I would suggest that there is a greater degree of model-overlap and integration: the models are both historically and analytically less distinct than the evidence would suggest. Second, notions of use and usefulness are contingent categories. By this I mean that any
intrinsic or social value attributed to sociology depends upon the respective interests and assumptions of those who participate in the process of negotiating the political meaning and social potentialities of the knowledge produced by sociologists. The construction of sociology's nature and purpose, both as an intra and extra-disciplinary project, through time, remains as conflict ridden today as it did during the discipline's formative period in Britain. The context of the aforementioned negotiations, in terms of sociology's contested form, has always been a fluid and complex combination (through temporal and cultural dimensions) of competing claims for institutional space and intellectual authenticity, with the role of strategic discourse as crucial to the exercise as assertions of sociology's theoretical and methodological diversity. Negotiating sociology's social function and cognitive identity thus becomes a crucial exercise in the light of Abrams' contention, that there is not 'that much sociology to be used', especially in relation to a 'theory-saturated and self-conscious basis of knowledge'. The latter point has also been made by John Urry (1981) in reference to the 'parasitic' nature of sociology, especially the tendency of the discipline since the mid-1960s, to advance on an ever-increasing, dependent basis (Urry, 1981, p.27):

"... the term 'sociological discourse' refers to the set of social practices characteristic of the members of such a discourse - such practices being structures in terms of common concepts, beliefs, theories, traditions, institutions, methods, techniques, exemplars, and so on. In most cases those individuals who happen to bear the official label 'sociologist' are agents who are part of, and contributors to, this on-going set of reproducible social practices known as 'sociological discourse'. However, this is not always the case, in part precisely because of sociology's parasitic and hence rapidly changing nature. There is thus an important disjuncture 'sociological discourse/practitioners of sociology' - the latter may not be agents of the former."

In considering sociology's parasitic nature as the discipline's central strength, Urry's argument, especially on the organisation of sociological discourse, contains a reference to a feature of sociology's development which I consider to be a distinctive characteristic of its political form, referred to above in the first section of the current chapter (1981, p.37):
"It is obviously the case that sociology involves a large degree of political struggle over exactly which aspects of which disciplines can be incorporated within it. And this struggle is likely to be more complicated and involve more diverse interests than in the neighbouring social sciences... In the site of sociology many new developments enter, and the radicals of one generation may, five years later, be the conservatives of the new generation. Thus, it is not the case that sociological discourse needs to be dominated by the left - indeed my argument would suggest that domination is difficult for any perspective."

Urry's reference to the 'political struggles of incorporation' is not, as he has suggested, a phenomenon of contemporary, British sociology. Rather, they have always constituted its developmental form. I shall present two detailed examples of this in the following chapter, one of which highlights the inter-disciplinary struggle between sociology and the other social sciences during the middle and late 1930s.

H.M. Collins and T.J. Pinch (1978) have devised a very novel and useful strategy for investigating and accounting for the 'growth and subsequent recognition' of certain areas of science, which have, and continue to undergo a very arduous process of incorporation within the field of orthodox science. They have taken parapsychology as their field of investigation, viewing parapsychologists' attempts to undergo "metamorphosis" as a "tactic" in acquiring the necessary bona fides of scientist for the practitioner of parapsychology, and the status of 'science' for his or her discipline. The authors examine too, the efforts of those who, in the past and presently, continue to thwart the intentions of parapsychologists within an opposing set of 'strategies and tactics', emphasising the latter process as an attempt "... to deny them (parapsychologists) this stamp of legitimacy" (Collins and Pinch, 1978, p.237). It would appear from the framework of analysis employed by Collins and Pinch, that it represents the closest approximation to that of my own category (sociology's advocatory dimension). Likewise, it is an attempt to explain the development of a branch of knowledge and practice, by reference to its 'extra-disciplinary' dimension, whilst not ignoring the significance of a discipline's substantive content, and the relevance of the latter in negotiating the intrinsic and social value of those forms of knowledge which appear to threaten convention.
I shall examine briefly, the essential elements of Collins and Pinch's argument. This will serve to clarify aspects of my own framework of analysis through a consideration of methodological and substantive issues common both to their project and my own.

The authors are concerned, in the main, with the "... social processes involved in knowledge production" (1978, p.237). Although the analysis is confined to the field of parapsychology and its struggle for legitimacy within the wider domain of science, it is Collins and Pinch's comprehension of the 'processes of production' as conflict ridden, negotiable and "strategic based", that takes it beyond a conventional account of the growth of knowledge as a rational, rule-governed, cumulative and a solely peer-group, monitored process. More importantly though, is their suggestion that the growth of a branch of knowledge can be understood by way of reference to two interrelated analytical categories, namely the "constitutive" and "contingent" forums. The latter components of a discipline are designated as forums of debate (forum often substituted by the term 'arena'). In fact, the notion of forum is central to their argument as they perceive such domains, especially the latter (the contingent forum), as public space wherein opposing groups of scientists and their supporters contest the legitimacy or otherwise, of claims being made on the part of 'unorthodox science'. These public debates are important because their outcome can affect substantially, not only the specific credibility of the contesting participants, but also the public's perception of the general field of science, and the apparent threat to its inviolable constitution, posed by those individuals and their allegedly counterfeit discipline. While it may be thought that because parapsychology is a somewhat preternatural branch of knowledge, possessing a very controversial history, it would be relatively easy for the authors to construct an account of its history and ideas on the basis of an obvious and anticipated rejection by 'normal science'. Quite the contrary: it is because of parapsychology's determination to be accepted on the grounds of conventional scientific criteria of methodology etc.; the demands of its practitioners' performance to be subjected to peer-group scrutiny, and a determination to gain access to established and authoritative journals to publish their work, that makes the case for parapsychology so important. It is not the alleged controversiality of parapsychology that constitutes its sensational
career, rather, it is the reaction of the established scientific community toward the parapsychologists' case that promotes a greater insight into the social production of knowledge.

Collins and Pinch's use of 'constitutive and contingent forums' to classify and examine the growth of a discipline, within the field of science in particular, would appear to have a wider application than their project suggests. The categories and their deployment would seem also to undermine certain features of a Kuhnian account of the development of science. However, I wish only to allude to the aforementioned categories in terms of their relevance to my own project, especially the significance of the contingent forum, as a key medium for the process of negotiating a cultural meaning and subsequently, the social construction of a branch of knowledge.

The authors distinguish between the constitutive and contingent forums as follows (Collins and Pinch, 1978, pp.239-240):

"On the one hand there is what we will call the 'constitutive' forum, which comprises scientific theorising and experiment and corresponding publication and criticism in the learned journals and, perhaps, in the formal conference setting. On the other hand, there is the forum in which are set those actions which - according to old-fashioned philosophic orthodoxy - are not supposed to affect the constitution of 'objective' knowledge. We will call this the 'contingent' forum, and would expect to find there the content of popular and semi-popular journals, discussion and gossip, fund raising and publicity seeking, the setting up and joining of professional organisations, the coralling of student followers, and everything that scientists do in connection with their work, but which is not found in the constitutive forum."

Least it be thought that the authors have imposed a rigid division between 'scientific activity' and 'non-scientific, or scientifically related activities', note should be taken of the following qualifications (1978, p.240):

"... even actions properly within the constitutive forum do not have any specially privileged epistemological status, so that, ... the separation of the two forums relates to no underlying distinction in the construction of 'scientific' knowledge per se."
The authors argue further, that it is possible to generalise about the type of arguments and actions which may be legitimately expressed, in the normal way, within the abovementioned forums, (1978, p.240):

"In the constitutive forum, actions should be seen to be based on universalisable non-contingent premises, whereas, in the contingent forum, actions may be of any kind, but normally they will not look as though they are constitutive of scientific knowledge."

In concentrating on only the "explicit mechanisms" (1978, p.241) of the forums, the authors cite examples, "where anomalous activity is found within a forum, that is when the normal boundaries are seen to be crossed, and are allowed to be crossed" (1978, p.241). Crucial to the classifactory schemes employed by Collins and Pinch, are the notions of "tactics of legitimation and rejection in the constitutive and contingent forums." They cover such areas and issues as; "using Symbolic and Technical Hardware of Science" (p.242); "Blank Refusal to Believe" (a particular tactic of the critic of parapsychology), (p.244); "Using the Symbolic Hardware of Philosophy" (p.245); "Association with Unscientific Beliefs" (p.246); "Attacks on Methodological Precepts" (p.247); "Accusations of Triviality" (p.247); "Unfavourable Comparisons with Canonical Versions of Scientific Method" (p.248); "Laundering the Funds" (p.254); "Ad Hominem Arguments" (p.255); "Denying Orthodox Publications" (p.258); and "Diluting Orthodox Publication" (p.258).

Just as Collins and Pinch have sought to stress the importance of tactics, in negotiating the meanings and intentions of the parapsychologists in their quest for autonomy within the wider field of science, I too intend to focus on this feature of science-building, albeit within the field of sociology. Furthermore, I intend to take my analysis beyond the internal institutions of sociology, which, in themselves provide a cognitive and social framework for competing 'schools' to assert their respective authority, as individually the authentic form of sociology within the wider field of the discipline.
4. Sociology's Advocatory Dimension

In what follows, I shall be concentrating upon the theme of the advocatory dimension, giving examples of the discourse, events, organisational and individual relationships, the conditions and domains of negotiation, the strategies associated with the latter contexts and categories, and the effects these have had in influencing sociology's contested intellectual and institutional forms. It is, as I have argued above, important to understand the methodological distinctiveness of the advocatory dimension, as a means of discovering and accounting for the historical becoming of sociology within an historical series of acts of justification.

The advocatory dimension is not a repository for rhetorical devices to engage the attention and support of non-sociologists. By this I mean that although it is possible to be retrospectively critical of those sociologists who may have deployed the grammar of progress in extolling the potential of sociology, it should be remembered that in general, recourse to such a strategy tended to occur during the presentation (justification) of the discipline as science (especially harder versions of positivist projects). In such a case, the sociologist tended to utilise the normative structure and associated categories of science, as a means to illustrate the substantive nature and social purpose of sociology. I shall dwell upon this feature of sociology's development when considering the importance of the 'science movement' as a valuable resource to the construction and presentation of sociology both to the scientific community and the public.

What form have acts of justification taken during crucial moments of sociology's history in Britain, and what events and contexts within sociology suggest, or constitute activities which do not entail, essentially, the creation of, or innovation within, its substantive domains of epistemology and praxis? The following represent several of the aforementioned contexts and activities, and although not an exhaustive list, nevertheless gives some indication of the array of sociological phenomena which are crucial to an understanding of sociology's history, as either an institution, intellectual activity, or both.
1. Conferences and symposia. These tend to take the form of public assizes of sociology. Among the most significant to have taken place with a specific theme of identifying an authentic sociology within the mainstream of British social science, were the conferences of the middle and late 1930s, the Sociological Review 'debate' in 1933, and the British Sociological Association Conferences of the middle 1950s and 1980.

2. The establishment of professional associations, specialist interest groups, and within the wider community of social scientists, organisations or societies sponsored by sociologists for the protection of the discipline in the face of hostile imperatives. These groups and associations would include the BSA, ALSISS, and extra-mural, ad hoc groups such as Hobhouse's 'Sociology Club'. These activities can either spring from the events outlined in 1.) above or, coincide with them.

3. Introductory textbooks. This medium provides the sociologist with a valuable opportunity to present to the discipline's novitiates, a preferred version of sociology's nature and purpose. While it may be thought that the proliferation of such texts can occur only with the diffusion of the subject within the education system as a whole, introductory or explanatory works on sociology and sociologists in Britain appeared during the inter-war period.* The scale of publication does not alter the purpose of the textbook, which purports to explain what sociology is, or ought to be doing as an autonomous branch of knowledge and practice, in addition to serving as a practical guide to practicing the craft/science/discipline etc.

* 'Modern Sociologists' was a series of 'critical studies of the theories of great modern sociologists'. The series was edited by Morris Ginsberg and Alexander Farquharson and published by Chapman and Hall in the late 1930s. Volumes appeared on the works of Tylor, Pareto, LePlay, Comte, Owen and Marx.
4. The nature of strategic discourse associated with crucial moments in sociology's development i.e. programme statements, agendas, organisational and cognitive tasks and initiatives (especially the direction of research). To the preceding can be added, the negotiation of institutional space for sociology and the art of grantsmanship, especially as a component of the process of conditional bargaining between beneficiary and benefactor. The importance of the Inaugural Lecture beyond its ceremonial and status conferring functions.


6. Public perceptions of sociology generated by the media. Accounts of the discipline which occasionally appear in the debates of the House of Commons and Lords (Hansard). Academic and professional images of sociology and the sociologist. The role of 'pop sociology' in diffusing sociological concepts and terms within common parlance.

7. The process of professionalisation, especially the role of commercial research organisations and the differential status of sociologists who work within them, in comparison with those who are employed in the public sector and other state agencies.

8. An exploration of the role and influence within sociology of what C. Wright Mills (1963) has referred to as 'cliques', 'influentials', 'interest groups' and their biographical experiences as professing sociologists or protagonists in support of the expansion of the discipline.
It is quite obvious from the above list of features of sociology's development, that some categories overlap, and generally constitute formal elements of more conventional accounts of institutional or intellectual histories of sociology. While this may in fact be the case, and I do not intend to dispute the matter here, what I do wish to make clear, is my contention, that in the quest for disciplinary autonomy, sociologists and their supporters have devised and deployed purposive strategies in the pursuit and subsequent consolidation of their domain of intellectual and technical competence. These acts of justification are constituted less from an unequivocal demonstration of a distinctive, sophisticated and coherent body of theory and methodology, than from the deployment of what I have referred to previously as strategic discourse. The latter became increasingly an integral feature of the sociologists' wider discursive repertoire for the social construction of sociology. The nature and function of such a discourse can best be demonstrated and explained by an examination of examples of it, as a mode of argument within strategic presentations of cases made for sociology at different periods of the discipline's development in Britain. The examples to be considered can be thought of as specific moments in sociology's history. A theme common within arguments asserting the intellectual and institutional autonomy of sociology, was the constant reference to the discipline's promise; whether as an authoritative science, or, an enlightened medium for the construction and dissemination of ideas upon which similarly enlightened social policy would be founded.
CHAPTER TWO

SCIENCES OF SOCIETY: INTER-WAR PROJECTS
The two sections of this chapter deal with separate, though related moments in sociology's quest for intellectual and institutional autonomy. The first entails an examination of a series of conferences held during the inter-war period. The second is concerned with the growth of British social science's major centre of teaching and research in those disciplines, the London School of Economics and Political Science: an institution in which sociology maintained a tenuous and often tense existence. Each of the moments in question, represent what I consider to be significant events within the history of the human sciences, to the extent that their respective outcomes would not enhance sociology's future prospects. The case for sociology would not be revived until the outbreak of the Second World War and the ensuing review of all forms of knowledge, on the basis of quite clearly defined, national imperatives.

1. Sociology and the social sciences; the promise of a synoptic science of society.

There are several descriptive accounts of the institutional and intellectual development of sociology in Britain between the turn of the century and the early 1930s (cf., Zueblin, 1899; Branford, 1906, 1928 and 1930; Harrison, 1910; Palmer, 1926; Barnes, 1927; Ginsberg and Farquharson, 1935; Spiller, 1933; Wellbye, 1933 and Brearley, 1940). Some of these authors were American commentators and tended to portray the discipline in a state of intellectual and institutional disarray. In such accounts, one is usually presented with a description of the parlous state of affairs in British sociology, in comparison with the 'advanced state' of the subject in America. Although the accounts given by British observers, though not always by practicing sociologists, evidence characteristics of what I have referred to as sociology advocatory dimension, it was not until the middle and late 1930s that sociologists began in earnest, to evolve a more-or-less coherent strategy which sought to establish sociology as the central, coordinating discipline within the field of the human sciences. Rather than examine in detail the accounts given by the authors referred to above, I wish to focus upon a series of public conferences which were convened in the middle and latter part of the 1930s. This is for two reasons. First, the inter-war
conferences represented the first, major public assize of sociology as a discipline in its own right and in relation to other fields within the social sciences. Second, the case made by sociologists for sociology, at the conferences in question, represented the culmination of an intense debate within sociology itself. The latter exercise had engaged representatives of the two major divisions within the discipline (see Appendix Two for T.H. Marshall's (1967) designation of the major 'cleavage' within British sociology). This point was made quite clearly publicly, by Victor Branford, although privately, he feared that the issues which divided sociologists, would continue to undermine their quest for disciplinary autonomy (Branford, 1930, p.218):

"Of the conditions necessary for progress in sociology, some at least can be defined with clearness and assurance. Pure, or theoretic sociology needs a working conception of the social process of direct filiation with biology, capable of incorporating the products of psychological and other relevant specialised research, and at the same time well adapted to systematic open-air studies. Applied or practical sociology, can only grow effective as it affords a plan of co-operation whereby everyone concerned in maintenance of the social fabric, betterment of environment, sustenance and development of life, individual and social, may contribute his or her own day's work, undertaken for livelihood or for interest."

The issues which continued to frustrate the prospect of a unified sociology became formalised through the initiation of a debate on the role of sociology in relation to the establishment of a 'new social order'. The latter debate had been inaugurated by Reginald Wellbye in the twenty-fifth anniversary issue of the Sociological Review in 1933. The inter-war conferences provided the sociologists with a public opportunity to establish not only the importance of sociology as an intellectual and practical endeavour but also an occasion on which to promote a project for the unification of the social sciences under the coordination of sociology - a synoptic science of society.

In the years, 1935, 1936 and 1937 a series of conferences were held in London with a recurring theme: that of examining the state of the social sciences as emergent disciplines. Consideration was given to such issues as the position of the social studies in higher education, their relationship to the humanities, their individual nature and aims,
and their respective relationships to one another. The arguments presented at the conferences provide a valuable insight into the actual and intended status of the different social science disciplines for that period. I consider them to be of such importance,* as to examine critically the arguments of four of the principal participants. Two of the contributors, Morris Ginsberg and Karl Mannheim, were amongst Britain's most influential sociologists of the period, and the third, T.H. Marshall was emerging as a recognised specialist within his own field. The fourth person, Alexander Carr-Saunders, had emerged as a central figure within the wider field of social science in Britain, and whose influence would have a significant impact upon the development of those disciplines during the 1930s, the intra-war years and the immediate post-war period.

The sociologists endeavoured to persuade their fellow social scientists of the merits and utility of uniting under the controlling ethos of a general sociology. Each component subject, whilst retaining a relative degree of autonomy, would work collectively toward the production of a coherent and comprehensive science, within quite specific and well defined intellectual boundaries. Why did the sociologists feel the need to initiate a reorganisation of social science, and what gave them the impression that they and their discipline were eminently suited to this enterprise?

J. Rumney (Gurvitch and Moore, (eds.), 1945, p.582), optimistically and with remarkable understatement, attempted a tentative assessment of the general feeling of those participating in the inter-war conferences:

* Indeed, in her article entitled 'Dissolution of the Institute of Sociology' (Sociological Review, Vol. 3, 1955, p.169) Dorothea Farqharson has suggested that these conferences were of significant importance to the development of the social sciences, especially their respective relationships to sociology during the period in question (Farqharson, 1955, p.169):

"One of the most effective activities at this time was the organisation by Professor Marshall and others of the conferences on the relationship between sociology and the allied sciences, reports of which were published in book form and have been regarded as important contributions to social studies."
"The three conferences ... in general endorsed this closer co-operation (although not all the participants were sure as to how this could best be done) and bear eloquent testimony to the work of Hobhouse, Ginsberg and the Institute of Sociology."

The above quotation is an extract from an article written during the closing stages of the last war. Rumney was quite enthusiastic about the prospects of the discipline in the post-war era. His assessment conveys a sense of the grammar of progress, wherein sociology is imbued with a rational and balanced continuity, the progress of which is only occasionally marred by intellectual dissent and institutional variation. I shall be arguing that there was significant disagreement amongst the community of social scientists at that time, especially with regard to the possibility of progress within the sphere of science-building.

I shall now examine the arguments of Karl Mannheim, Morris Ginsberg and Alexander Carr-Saunders. Their respective cases in support of sociology deal with two interrelated problems: the actual nature of sociology and its extant relationship to other social sciences, with the envisaged role of sociology as the basis of a unified (or synoptic) social science.

1.1 Karl Mannheim

Karl Mannheim was acutely aware of the precarious position of British sociology during the inter-war period. His arguments display a forthright approach to the 'place of sociology.' His forensic advocacy in stating the case for sociology appears to be irresistible, if not invincible. Mannheim's thesis rests essentially on the major premise; that, "... a picture cannot be gained from the field of any one of the specialised social sciences." (Marshall (ed.), 1936, p.179).* This 'picture' relates to what he considered to be the functioning mechanism and the social differentiation of particular societies and of 'society as a whole'. He avoids defining the nature of sociology as a distinct branch of knowledge, seeking instead, a consideration of it in terms of its function

* This is made clearer in his notion of 'relationism' (cf. Kettler, Meja and Stehr (1984, Chapter 2, pp.33-76)).
and operational tasks, depending upon, and simultaneously evolving in direct relationship to the other social sciences. In support of his programme for a co-ordinated discipline, he endeavoured to present an image of the future social scientist/sociologist as master of mankind's destiny. A vision of sociology as a project for social engineering may not have been such an extravagant desire or utopian ideal for Mannheim, especially in view of his experiences in Germany.

Mannheim recognised the central importance of introducing sociology as "a basic science" into the curriculum, research work and school. If this didn't occur, then an opportunity would have been missed to, "... educate a generation of citizens on whose correct understanding of the functioning of the society in which they live ... depends on whether the social process is in future to be guided by reason or unreason" (Doughdale, 1937, p.189); and "... very much depends upon whether we can - before it is too late - succeed in building a science of society." (1936, p.164). The latter concern with the urgency of such a programme for sociology, is a clear example of what I have referred to as sociology's advocatory dimension, in as much as Mannheim is attempting to formulate a role for sociology on the basis of its potential rather than adopt a passive stance and allow the inherent nature of the subject matter to appear as somehow, self-evidently of intellectual value and social utility. The point here being that sociology requires a spokesman to reveal its potential, to articulate its tasks and ideas. In the case of sociology, its social presence has to be established, space for it has to be won in a manner quite distinct from that of science and technology, largely because the latter two preceded sociology, although science did engage in a protracted warfare with theology. The public perceive the social presence of science (notwithstanding its abstract nature) through its progeny - technology - which furnishes tangible proof of its existence. This in turn manifests itself in the ethos and authority of science, and accounts for the power and status of scientists even when they enter the arena of politics, although their domain of competence lies elsewhere.
Mannheim asserts the fundamental position of sociology within the process of the construction of a science of society, in terms of a controlling and collectivising device, thus striking a blow against the growing tendency towards specialisation within the wider field of social science (1936, p.179):

"... co-operation between the social sciences can be established only if the co-ordination of the problems of those sciences and the comparison of the results reached by them is made the specific discipline which has as its raison d'etre the construction of a consistent general theory of society - and that ... discipline to be sociology as the basic discipline of the social sciences."

and as a critique of increased specialisation (1936, p.173):

"... the specialised social sciences are no longer in a position to elaborate the theory which underlies their particular investigations, or to follow up the historical diversity of the phenomena they encounter."

Mannheim had no qualms about the status of sociology. It was a science, without which social science could not fulfil its envisaged task of formulating a 'general theory of society.' Not so much a grandiose, theoretical scheme, or some newly discovered gnosis, but a sociology implying action, and involving a special method which would serve as the 'theoretical foundation of the social sciences' (1936, p.181). Furthermore, he underlined his claim for sociology by adding that (1936, p.180):

"It is absurd to expect that there can be any organic division of labour in the field of the social sciences without general sociology as the basic discipline."

Considered thus, the absence of a common methodological basis for the construction of a corpus of social scientific knowledge, is regarded as a major hinderance to the formulation of a general theory of society. However, this 'inadequacy' can be corrected. In doing so, we encounter
a central feature of Mannheim's argument,* one which entails the widescale adoption of sociology as the 'basic social science', (1936, p.188):

"Sociology, therefore, is - as you see - on the one hand a clearing-house for the results arrived at by the specialised social sciences and the other hand, a new elaboration of the material on which they are based."

Central to Mannheim's thesis is the notion of sociology's 'special method', one which would serve as the procedural basis for his notion of a reconstructed social science. Thus conceived, sociology as the foundation of the social sciences, would function on three, 'methodological planes.'

The first of the 'planes' concerns the notion of a systematic, or general sociology, and entails an exposition of the, "variability of social phenomena to their basic elements and concepts, of a more or less axiomatic character which makes society possible at all" (1936, p.181). The second methodological plane consists of a procedure which Mannheim believed to be fundamental to the other social sciences, yet chose to describe it as comparative sociology, rather than comparative method, at least in the sense that Ginsberg, Hobhouse and other sociologists have employed the concept.

Mannheim's notion of comparative sociology entails an empiricist conception of knowledge via observation and comparison, leading to the isolation of causal factors. In some respects it is a weak form of positivism. Nevertheless, it is a curious device, in view of the fact that Mannheim

* In J.S. Eros and W.A.C. Stewart's (eds), of Mannheim's Systematic Sociology, R. & K.P., London, 1957, the authors cite a similar, dual function for sociology (1957, p.1):

"It is on the one hand a synthetic discipline, trying to unify from a central point of view the results of the separate disciplines; and it is on the other hand an analytic and specialised discipline with its own field of research."

The above construction of sociology's synthetic and autonomous roles, vis-a-vis social science, came from Mannheim's lecture notes during 1934-35.
intended the procedure to immunise the production of general concepts within systematic sociology from any philosophical or speculative tendencies, thus achieving a high degree of objectivity. He was also of the opinion that such a procedure could be equated with the idea of the experiment, which is a fundamental procedure in the natural sciences. The third methodological plane is concerned with the explanatory potential of Mannheim's protoscience. In outlining the elucidatory power of sociology for revealing patterns of social behaviour, whether in abstracto, or in 'specific constellations', he raises the issue of structural-sociology. The latter also encompasses his ideas on 'statics and dynamics.' Very briefly, his theory of statics involves the following consideration of social equilibrium and persistence (1936, pp.184-185):

"The theory of statics deals with the problem of the equilibrium of all the social factors (not only economic ones) in a given social structure. It tries to show what makes different societies work. Which of the block-factors are responsible for the continuous reproduction of the main processes, which regenerate the same typical situations and the same structure again and again?"

In the case of the 'dynamic' aspect of his structural sociology, Mannheim outlines its central task in explaining social change (1936, p.186):

"In dynamic sociology we concentrate on those factors which are antagonistic in their respective tendencies. Here we stress the working of those principles which in the long run tend to a dis-equilibrium and thus bring out changes which transform the social structure."

It is important to distinguish between Mannheim's consideration of sociology as the basic discipline of the social sciences and his notion of the nature and purpose of structural sociology. The former, sociology as the basic social science, entails the methodological functions and the manner in which they sustain the discipline itself, and consequently inform and direct the methodological procedures of the component disciplines. The latter, structural sociology, is an integral feature of his general sociological enterprise, indeed, it emerges from one of the aforementioned 'sociological planes', as a function of systematic sociology. More importantly, and this is critical to understanding the basis of Mannheim's
scheme for a co-ordinated social science (animated by sociology), structural sociology represented a programme for the construction of such a composite discipline. It is important to quote him at length on this matter, in order to give a clear indication of the proper role of structural sociology within his scheme (1936, p.188):

"My argument is that only structural sociology which is capable of a comprehensive synthesis of all these facts which are the outcome of the separate social sciences, because it is its special task to deal continually with the elaboration and comparison of the social structures as wholes. It is only the structural view of sociology which enables us to transcend the stage of a mere cumulative synthesis, by relating the data of the special social sciences to our hypothetical conception, which views the functioning of society as a continuous adjustment of all their parts to one another. But structural sociology could not present this wider hypothesis if it had not at its disposal the fruits of the analytical work done by the systematic and comparative sociology, or if it did not keep in constant touch with the various specialised branches of knowledge."

It is interesting to note the similarities between the intentions of those, who at the turn of the century, envisaged a sociology that would "demonstrate the possibility of an approximate synthesis of sociological knowledge via the application of the comparative method", (Branford, 1928) and the scheme proposed by Mannheim. The latter's programme echoes the earlier call for a synoptic social science based on the co-ordinating influence of sociology.

In terms of sociology's advocatory dimension, Mannheim had opted to present the case for sociology based on its potential, rather than its extant form. This is understandable in view of the fact that during the 1930s, sociology was by far the most underdeveloped of the social sciences (at least institutionally and professionally speaking). Although Mannheim did incorporate some substantive and theoretical issues within his case 'for sociology', they were of less importance (more illustrative and general in nature), than his central discussion of the role of sociology within a synthetic science of society.
Thus the relationship of sociology to the other social sciences began to emerge as an issue of critical importance. Mannheim's project involved a large-scale synthesis of the 'products' of the individual specialisms, which, when compared to former programmes for a general science of society, served as a sophisticated refinement of earlier ideas, conceived originally in hope, but without any detailed indication of how such schemes might come to fruition. Of course a composite science of society did not appeal to all social scientists. I shall consider shortly the origin and degree of dissent, noting the position of economics and history. Nevertheless, Karl Mannheim's thesis represented a forthright and direct appeal to the community of social scientists, to consider once again, the fundamental relationship of sociology to their respective disciplines. In part, Mannheim's projected role for sociology was an attempt to arrest the encroaching process of specialisation within the field of social science, and the attendant consequences of the fragmentation of knowledge.

1.2 Morris Ginsberg

Morris Ginsberg's approach to the question of 'the place of sociology' entailed a sensitive and balanced explication of the nature of British sociology; its status in terms of other disciplines and indeed, its limitations. His argument's somewhat sedate tenor was in contrast to the vigour of Mannheim's and the scepticism of Alexander Carr-Saunders'. Ginsberg opens his case on the confident assumption that, "... most people will cheerfully admit the need of a general science of society" (Marshall, 1936, p.190).

As England's foremost sociologist of the period, a position enhanced by the occupation of the discipline's only Chair, the burden of responsibility as sociology's senior spokesman, meant that his participation in the conferences would have a marked influence on the reception of the sociologists' case. The presentation of sociology as intrinsically important, in addition to its prospective position within a redefined social science, was sustained despite the claims of its critics that the process of specialisation would eventually undermine such a project.
That sociology might not achieve the recognition it sought, is reflected in Ginsberg's argument, thus betraying a fear for the discipline's fate should the experiment fail (1936, p.200):

"In this, as in other connections, the problem of the precise allocation of functions to different specialisms is a secondary matter. The important thing is to resist the tendency of the social sciences to become isolated from one another and from general sociology, which can surely only flourish by their systemisation."

Ronald Fletcher has drawn attention to Ginsberg's predisposition toward the fruitfulness of the synthetic approach to the production of knowledge about man and society, and in particular, the need for a sociology that was informed by both psychology and philosophy (Fletcher, 1974, p.11):

"One was his (Ginsberg’s) equally insistent conviction that no study of man in society could possibly be satisfactory unless psychology, sociology, and moral and social philosophy, were correctly interrelated with each other."

Fletcher also points to Ginsberg's portrayal of the special relationship of sociology to the existing social sciences, one which hints at the increasingly dependent nature of the discipline to the latter group of subjects and which formed the central plank in his argument some thirty years previously, (Fletcher, 1974, pp.11-12):

"... sociology had to see clearly its relations with, and had to co-operate with the other social sciences. And another, of great importance, was that sociology could not possibly be a satisfactory science in isolation - if only because of the depth, detail, and largeness of scope of its subject-matter when properly appreciated - with other subjects such as history, jurisprudence, and comparative and historical studies of many kinds."

Ginsberg remained consistent in his belief that sociology's future lay in its ability to enhance the essentially limiting perspectives of individual, specialist branches of knowledge, extending to the domains of social policy and planning, thus raising the issue of the consequences for sociology and sociologists, should a concerted effort be made to
claim a greater degree of expertise on the part of its practitioners, and a corresponding assertion as to the sufficiency and utility of their knowledge, which might not be possible to substantiate or sustain. Ginsberg became particularly sensitive to these issues as the Second World War reached its climax and the fervour of post-war reconstruction was at its height. His contribution to the Second World Congress of Sociology (Fletcher, 1974, p.177), gives a clear indication of both the dilemma of sociology, as an instrument of social change and as a branch of knowledge which might yield to the temptations of professing itself as an applied policy science, and subsequently unable to fulfil others' expectations of it. These issues were raised in an article published in 'The Listener' (Vol., 39, May 20th, 1948, pp.822-823). His Congress paper, represented a somewhat cautious advocacy of sociology. His balanced and restrained approach to the presentation of sociology's case, as synthesiser of the products of other social sciences, was also evident in his earlier, pre-war conference papers.

Ginsberg displayed great diplomacy in arguing sociology's fundamental role within a synoptic science of society. He appeared to be acutely aware of the vulnerability of the discipline, and never omitted to consider its inherently dependent status vis-a-vis the other, more specialised social sciences. His argument is a careful explication of the discipline's uniqueness in one sense, yet universality in another. The former relates to what he regarded as (Marshall, 1936, p.193):

"... a group of specialisms, in part not covered by the other disciplines, and implying a certain attitude to social studies, inspired by the recognition of the inter-dependence of social facts and the desire to proceed beyond the description of particular situations to general rules."*

* The group of specialisms referred to by Ginsberg comprise the following areas of investigation under the rubric of 'sociological analysis': comparative study of social institutions, comparative morals, social statistics, demography and population studies, social geography, social psychology, social biology and social economics, (Ginsberg, 1936).
The latter notion of universality applied to the tendency of various specialisms within the broad spectrum of social science, to encounter particular aspects of social life, interpreted in accordance with an analytical framework specific to that particular discipline, (i.e. economics, history or political science) which in turn, can be incorporated within a synoptic account of its particular relationship to other parts or aspects of society as a whole. Sociology, in Ginsberg’s sense, would provide the necessary coalescence of specific, yet fragmented interpretations of elements of social organisation and action. Its task was to infuse the specialists’ accounts of a particular social phenomenon with the special qualities to be derived from the sociological perspective. As this perspective was to become a vital component of each specialism within the social sciences, the notion of sociology’s universal influence in providing an integrated and composite view of the functioning of society "as a whole", is thus conceived. It is the task of general sociology, with its reliance upon elaborate inductive study, via the exacting methodological procedure of the comparative method, that must be recognised as the most effective form of sociological analysis, not only by other sociologists, but by those engaged in the pursuit of the other specialisms.

The task of sociology was regarded as a "synthesis of the social sciences", with the comparative method heralded as the superior methodological technique, needing only to be deployed "on a large scale". Moreover, the discipline’s central concern with the questions of social evolution and societal development raised the possibility of discovering "trends" and the sequential causes that gave rise to them. This in turn implied the additional possibility of "rational investigation" and most importantly and appealing to those sceptical of the potential of sociology, the eventuality of rational social control, which, for Ginsberg, was a "necessary assumption of sociology" (1936, p.206).* The task before sociology was, as far as Ginsberg was concerned, a straightforward one: rather grand in scope, but somewhat ambiguous in clearly specifying

Bolton examines the consequences of pursuing a social science which takes the notion of control as a major criterion for scientific success.
the detailed means by which such a programme was to be successfully carried out (1936, p.206):

"... increasing our knowledge of the history of civilisation and contemporary social facts, is, I suggest, the task of sociology regarded as a synthesis of the social sciences."

It is possible to detect in both Ginsberg's and Mannheim's programmatic statements for a systematised social science, certain idealistic undercurrents which were an integral feature of Hobhouse's vision of sociology, encompassing a complex synthesis of philosophy and science. The basic elements of Hobhouse's sociological thought* entailed an organic view of rationality. Rumney (1945, p.577) has located Hobhouse within the often conflicting attributions of British sociology's 'evolutionary' roots, quite removed in fact, from the orthodox, Spencerian school:

"Social development is indeed the central idea of Hobhouse's sociology. But development not in terms of the unfolding of some spiritual principle as with the idealist philosophers, and not in terms of biological evolution as with Spencer, who equated evolution with progress, but in terms of a harmony based on the free and rational cooperation of men."

Barker (1929) and Ginsberg (1931) have both dwelt upon the political implications of Hobhouse's work; the former giving prominence to the new Liberalism implicit in Hobhouse's ideas, particularly his attempt (Barker, 1929, p.536):

"... to deepen liberal thought: to reconcile its old conceptions with new social demands and a new social philosophy: to turn Liberalism from Laissez-Faire to a genuine sympathy with Labour."

Hobhouse's optimistic view of sociology and its potential as an agent of constructive social change through enlightenment, influenced significantly the thought of Ginsberg. The latter, in concert with Mannheim, advocated

*Cf. L.T. Hobhouse The Metaphysical Theory of the State, (1918); The Rational Good, (1921); Elements of Social Justice, (1922); and Social Development, (1924). These texts comprise the essential features of his 'sociological system'.
a discipline able to make a contemporary response to the demands being made on social science in general. The emphasis was on not only what are the social sciences, but equally, what are the social sciences for? The attempt to define the nature and purpose of sociology in terms of its relationship to the other social sciences began to expose its vulnerability as an autonomous branch of knowledge. Sociology was becoming problematic in a very different sense to that of its earlier developmental form.

Morris Ginsberg remained adamant about the crucial role of sociology in relation to the other social sciences: through it they would flourish, without it, they would face the prospect of barren isolation. As far as the project to construct a synoptic science was concerned, it is difficult to establish whether or not he was moved out of a purely intellectual commitment to the possibility of such an exercise, or whether his scheme for sociology was borne out of a rather disconcerting realisation that the other component disciplines were developing rapidly - both intellectually and institutionally.* The different social science disciplines were able to command greater attention in the struggle for resources for the expansion of teaching and more importantly, research within their respective fields. Could it have been that Ginsberg realised that sociology's future lay with the other social sciences, and not without them? The prospect of the absorption of sociology within the wider field of social science was a strong possibility when considering its precarious position within academic and public domains. Sociology's somewhat limited body of theory and methods could quite conceivably have become diffused within other related fields of social science, without those same disciplines having to relinquish either their autonomy, or subordinate themselves as a result of the controlling ethos of a single discipline in the gradual systemisation of a science of society.

So far, I have attempted to draw from Ginsberg and Mannheim's arguments, the essential elements of what I have previously referred to as sociology's advocatory dimension: in particular the construction of a case for

* In moments of despair, Ginsberg often wished that he had remained a philosopher. An account of his contribution to sociology is given by Freedman in: The Science of Society and the Unity of Mankind, R. Fletcher (ed.), 1974, Heinemann, London.
sociology, dependent upon a presentation of not only the discipline's intrinsic importance as a discrete body of ideas and practice, but more importantly, the significance of sociology for social science as a whole, in the construction of a synoptic science of society, in which sociology would serve as the central, coordinating element. The sociologists continually stressed the potential of their discipline within a prospective, systematised social science. A remarkable feature of their case entailed the virtual absence of any reference to substantive issues within sociology itself. Advocating the role of sociology, in what was referred to as a "super-science", by one of the scheme's critics, also involved its practitioners in a process of negotiating sociology's future vis-a-vis an increasingly diversifying social science.

Although the issue of a compromise, or radical revision of the sociologists' project was never actually raised at the conferences, it was, I would suggest, a prospect that would figure large in the sociologists' assessment of the arguments of their antagonists. I am not suggesting that Ginsberg, Mannheim or any other member of the community of sociologists attending the conferences, would have compromised the principles and practice of sociology merely to placate, or entice fellow members of the social science community toward an acceptance of the fundamental role that sociology should be allowed to play in the development of a 'super-science'. This would imply a rather Machiavellian scheme. Nevertheless, I would not exclude from my analysis the fact that inter-war sociology had developed institutionally and intellectually by only a comparatively small degree, and that its practitioners must have been aware that the construction of a synoptic science (postulated as early as 1903), or, a social science wherein sociology would maintain a controlling function, might not have succeeded solely on the conditions advanced by the sociologists. Such a project would involve an element of exchange and cooperation, with the prospect of 'bargaining' a pertinent issue. Much of the process of negotiating space for sociology emerged within a hypothetical prospectus for a new science of society. Essentially, it represented a claim for intellectual autonomy of a sufficient degree to enable sociology to assert its indispensible role within such a project. This is in contrast to post-war claims for intellectual autonomy, with similar demands for institutional space in the context of an expanding system of higher education and the inauguration of continuous, large-scale state benefaction for the social sciences.
1.3 Alexander Carr-Saunders

Alexander Carr-Saunders occupied the Chair of Social Science at the University of Liverpool at the time of the inter-war conferences. It is doubtful whether he would have considered himself a sociologist in the sense that Ginsberg, Mannheim or Marshall had accepted the title. His main interests lay in the field of large-scale social surveys, conducted within the empirical tradition associated with Charles Booth. In fact, the Chair at Liverpool was designated The Charles Booth Chair of Social Science and during Carr-Saunders' occupancy of it, he managed to attract large-scale benefaction from the Rockefeller Foundation. His long and fruitful relationship with that foundation, gave rise to the grants which led to the funding of what was regarded as a milestone in the field of survey work; the Liverpool Social Survey of 1934, (three volumes). The Survey was considered to be "... one of the finest pieces of empirical social study in recent years" (Sociological Review, 1934). Not only did it enhance the "reputation of scientific social research", (New Statesman and Nation, 1934) it also elevated the status of Carr-Saunders as a social scientist. Three years after its publication, he was appointed to the Directorship of the L.S.E. - the most powerful and prestigious position within the social sciences, both in Britain and its Empire.

The general tenor of his conference paper, entitled; 'The Place of Sociology', gave a clear indication of his suspicion of the intentions of the sociologists and their programme for a synoptic social science.

The processes of interpretation and comparison were considered by him to be fundamental to the systematisation of social knowledge from the various branches of social science. Moreover, it appeared that the case for a general sociology, with sociologists as the architects of a unified science of society, was placed immediately in jeopardy (1936, p.213):

"They (sociologists) ... are particularly fond of thinking that this is their particular province."
Carr-Saunders conceived of sociology as part of a wide field of general social study, wherein the sociologist could not lay any prior, or exceptional claim to the analysis of social phenomena. That sociologists should think that they had an advantage over others in the realm of social analysis, is attributable to accident, rather than design, and by way of foresight (1936, p.215):

"He (the sociologist) is largely concerned with the family, class and certain other social phenomena. There is no logical reason for this; his pre-occupation with these matters is inexplicable except as a historical accident. They have not become the subject of ordinary specialised study; they manifest themselves through all recorded time and in every place and are therefore attractive to the professed sociologist, who finding the ground clear has appropriated it."

Sociology as a motive force within the sphere of social science appeared to suffer from an additional deficiency, apart from its questionable prospect as synthesiser of the data from component disciplines. This related to both its cognitive and organisational structure, especially an apparent lack of consensus among sociologists over the actual nature and function of sociology. This aspect of its nature led Carr-Saunders to conjecture (1936, p.215):

"It is difficult to specify the characteristics of academic sociology, or sociology in the hands of its professed exponents, because they by no means agree among themselves."

For sociology to appear in an apparent state of intellectual disarray, would not enhance its prospects as the coordinator of a 'new' science. Neither Mannheim's nor Ginsberg's papers displayed any overt references to the internal divisions that existed within the discipline during the period in question. As Martin White had urged in 1928; the presentation of a united front in the face of criticism, was an essential feature of the image that sociology should convey of itself within academic and public domains.
Although Carr-Saunders proceeded to castigate sociology and its practitioners for their apparently willful intentions and deficiencies, he nevertheless endeavoured to steer clear of any attempt to balance his somewhat caustic critique by dealing with what he regarded as one of the discipline’s major shortcomings – a definition of sociology. There is evident in his argument, an assumption that sociology could not be an autonomous branch of knowledge, though why this should be so is not clearly stated in the narrative. There is thus an element of hypocrisy in his critique, to the extent that he is given to remonstrating against the sociologists for their lack of consensus in defining their own intellectual sphere, while himself abdicating the responsibility for... doing so. The onus was upon others (1936, p.219):

"What his work (the sociologist's) may be in the theoretical sphere it is for others to say."

Perhaps the most important aspect of his critical analysis of 'the place of sociology', concerns the nature and function of the comparative method and the role of history in sociological analysis. He maintained a general suspicion of the methodological soundness of such analytical tools, pointing to the 'exaggeration' of the possibilities for their widespread adoption and use within a synoptic science. His insistence that sociologists could not lay special claim to the use of historical evidence, or facts, in any distinct or original manner, represented a further attempt to deflate any claim that sociologists may have thought they had on the primary role that their discipline might assume in the construction of a synthetic science. Carr-Saunders sought to reinforce the criticisms levelled at sociology by the historians, in emphasising the point that, although most historians had recourse to some form of sociological analysis in the course of their investigations, they did not lay any special claim to, or monopoly over the use of such a framework for analysis, (1936, p.213):

"All historians talk some sociology all their lives without knowing it ... some of them indeed would repudiate the suggestion that they (those working in the social field) were sociologists with vehmenence."
This implicit sociological dimension was, he believed, characteristic of any analysis within the 'social field' and that whilst it may be a prevalent feature of such accounts, it was by no means universally recognised, nor generally accepted. To this criticism was added another, and one which struck at a very vulnerable feature of sociology's professed autonomy: the discipline's failure never to have evolved a coherent corpus of theory and methods - its own distinctive, substantive content. This, argued Carr-Saunders, should seriously undermine its claim as a synthesiser of the knowledge generated by the other disciplines within the wider domain of social science. Apart from the general tendency of sociology to exaggerate its potential, Carr-Saunders regarded its weaknesses as a result of its origins in the 'evolutionary and scientific movement'. Moreover, it had misconceived the nature and purpose of the process of specialisation (1936, p.217):

"It hopes to surmount specialisation by finding relations between special fields of study; but no sooner are such relations proved to be fruitful lines of work than they become specialisms in turn."

Considered thus, the essential dilemma of late, inter-war sociology is embodied in Carr-Saunders' critique, particularly the phenomenon of specialisation within the various fields of social science. I believe that he sensed an apprehension amongst the sociologists of increasing isolation, evidenced especially in the arguments of Morris Ginsberg. Whilst the movement toward specialisation may have adversely affected sociology, much of Carr-Saunders' critique derived from the abstract division he imposed between his notion of 'academic sociology' and the sociology of the 'professed exponents.' The former being criticised for its alleged tendencies for wide-ranging generalisation and speculation, whereas the latter, (the professed sociologists), were given to, "... the ground attack on a vast front...", whereby relevant facts may be omitted or misinterpreted.

It would appear from the preceding criticism of sociology by Carr-Saunders, that the sociologists had failed to capture the imagination and cooperation of their fellow social scientists for their proposed scheme for a synoptic science of society. How crucial was this apparent failure
for sociology's intellectual and institutional development? Other social scientists attending the conferences made quite clear their opposition to the sociologists' project. It is within their criticisms that it is possible to detect the encroachment of the process of specialisation within the various fields of social science, as an underlying theme of the antagonists' case.

In order to assess both Ginsberg's and Mannheim's commitment to the feasibility of such a project, and as a test of the climate of opinion amongst other social scientists on the subject, it may be germane to consider some of the obstacles in the path of those proposing to unify the individual social sciences under the direction of sociology. In doing so, it soon becomes evident that much doubt surrounded the initial but confident assumption, that the social science community would be as receptive to a general, synoptic social science, as originally anticipated. There is evidence of premature judgement of the strength of feeling amongst fellow social scientists. In fact, it is possible that Ginsberg in particular, underestimated the degree of commitment among other social scientists toward the increased specialisation of their respective disciplines. Certainly those who were ensconced within the L.S.E. had much to gain by way of the institutional expansion taking place there under the Directorship of William Beveridge. This level of expansion also had consequences for intellectual growth by way of increased research staff, enhanced faculties and student numbers. Political scientists, historians, and particularly economists attending the inter-war conferences could at least speak from an increasingly strengthened institutional position, and in marked contrast to the position of sociology. While their arguments questioning the possibility of a synthetic science of society may not have been any more convincing than those of the sociologists, their authority derived from their numerical strength and influence within social science's foremost institutional setting.

The historian, Michael Oakshott was very critical of the claim made by some sociologists that their 'science' and the study of history possessed both a common understanding of, and approach to, the study of the past (Marshall, 1936, p.81):
"... in spite of the use a social science may be able to make of the facts of the recorded past, it can make no use whatever of historical facts."

And from such a general criticism to a more specific one (1936, p.60):

"Social science and history must think about the past in different ways and with different presuppositions. What history says is not denied by science, it is simply irrelevant to science."

One suspects that Oakshott and his colleagues were sensitive to the claims being made upon 'their' domain of history as a fundamental basis of not only sociology, but other branches of social science. Oakshott considered history to be the preserve of the historian, and any attempt to utilise the content of that discipline's rather special fund of knowledge, especially by a discipline with scientific pretensions, was to engage in a form of pseudo-science, which must cast doubts on that discipline's validity as a discrete, or autonomous branch of knowledge.

Another historian, M. Postan, echoed Oakshott's uncertainties and in particular, questioned the need to further sub-divide the existing social science community, especially the necessity of giving sociologists an exalted status among fellow social scientists. Postan questioned what he regarded as a case of special pleading by sociologists (Marshall, 1936, p.6)) particularly the apparent need:

"... of a special body of sociologists to co-ordinate and generalise from facts which other social sciences gather."

Opposition to the architectonic science was also based on the contention that, as the lesser evil, specialisation was a preferred process to eclecticism. Professor G.N. Clarke, (Marshall, 1936, p.59), argued that:

"... in a time of re-orientation like ours, it is futile to attempt a rigid classification of the sciences, a demarcation of spheres, and worst of all to plan a super-science which shall combine the results of all subordinate enquiries."
Clarke raised the sensitive issue of the effects upon the individual social sciences should a particular discipline attain supremacy over the others in the ensuing process of co-ordination. His remarks indicate the determination of practitioners of the different social sciences (and this applied to certain areas of the Humanities) not to tolerate a subordinate role for their respective disciplines, should a 'super-science' become a reality.

Amongst the economists, G.F. Shove was quite clear about the relationship of his discipline to the other social sciences. It is possible to detect in his arguments, not only a reassertion of the 'superior' status of economics itself, but a subtle attempt to present his case as a counter-claim to sociology's, as the basic discipline within a synoptic science. Economics would not serve in the capacity of under-labourer to any controlling discipline.* Whilst the process of specialisation may have been considered by some as detrimental to the progress of social science, others regarded it as a safeguard, particularly in preserving the privileged status of disciplines like economics (Marshall, 1936, p.163):

"How in view of the increasing and inevitable specialisation which is the mark of our time, is it possible to build up an educational background, based on the various branches of social study, which will do for the new generation of economists what 18th century culture did for Adam Smith."

* As Professor J.L Stocks remarked on the position of economics in British universities of the period (Marshall, 1936, p.59):

"In universities we find that Departments of Economics ... represent the most highly developed and best organised sections of the sociological field."

Economics had also infiltrated those most impenetrable barriers to the social sciences; Oxford and Cambridge.
Attacks were also made on the general utility and applicability of Mannheim's and Ginsberg's intended role for the comparative method, as a fundamental methodological procedure within a unified social science. Oakshott singled it out for special criticism, particularly in terms of its purported effectiveness as an instrument for sociological analysis (Marshall, 1936, p.80):

"... the serious logical defects of the comparative method ... Where comparison begins, as a result of generalisation, history ends."

Considering the importance of the historical dimension to sociological analysis, and the intentions of its practitioners to proceed with the construction of a general theory of society (Mannheim considered such a project to be of singular importance for social science), Oakshott's following comments indicate further his suspicions of not only sociology's role in such an exercise, but its wider aspirations and claims of scientificity (Marshall, 1936, p.78):

"History and social science can be brought together only by those who are ignorant of the nature of either and careless of the interests of both - the match-makers of the intellectual world."

There is more than a suggestion of an antagonistic relationship between the domains of Oakshott's history and others' social science. Whilst not always referring specifically to sociology, his critique does display an open hostility toward those social scientists who proceeded to 'use' history as a reservoir of data, to be drawn from when necessary and subjected to the somewhat suspect comparative method, in the expectation of generalising about social change. Oakshott could not be considered an ally in the cause of a unified social science. That sociology encountered hostility and criticism in its plans for a synoptic science may have had more to do with academic/intellectual protectionism, than any specific problem relating to the actual feasibility of the
project itself.*

* It is somewhat ironic that forty years later, Gareth Steadman Jones (1976) would criticise historians for invading the domain of sociology in a similarly misguided manner. Writing on the relationship of history to sociology (Steadman Jones, 1976, p.300):

"Even if sociology possessed the theory which history required, it would be difficult to justify the eclectic manner in which historians have sometimes shopped around in it."

He draws particular attention to the inherent difficulties of using sociology in such a manner (1976, p.300):

"... academic sociology is no more a science or even the approximation of one than academic history. The vague and shifting character of its object, the inconsistency of its definitions, the non-cumulative character of its knowledge, its proneness to passing theoretical fashions and the triteness of some of its laws suggest that its theoretical foundations are contestable and insecure."

Steadman Jones does consider however, the contributions of sociology to history (1976, pp.301-304), yet laments the "primitiveness of current historical categorisations in sociology", emphasising that this represents a "symptom not a cause of its inadequacy" (1976, p.301).
I have elected to include T.H. Marshall in my consideration of the inter-war conferences because he not only made a contribution to the specific debate on the role and relationship of sociology to the other social science disciplines, but in addition, he published a retrospective account of sociology's endeavour to construct a synoptic science at the events in question. There is another reason for examining Marshall's arguments. He has, at several points in his career, reflected on the position of sociology as, potentially, the most appropriate discipline within the wider field of social science, to systematically coordinate the findings of individual disciplines within a synthetic human science (cf., Marshall, 1967 and 1974).

In reviewing the issues discussed at the penultimate conference, T.H. Marshall attempted to sum up the diversity of themes inherent in the debate on the 'place of sociology' and its relationship to the other social sciences. His comments apply also to the primary issue of sociology's claim to a central and co-ordinating role in a unified social science (Marshall, 1937, p.156):

"Last year sociology seemed to be a poor relation of the old-established subjects, or even a changeling with no right to a place in the family at all. People asked "what is sociology?" and were manifestly dissatisfied with the answers they received."

The confusion over the nature of sociology related to not only its epistemological status and general intellectual autonomy, but to the particular claim that its practitioners were making in terms of its potential within a synthetic science of society.

Marshall regarded sociology's attempt to establish itself at the core of the social sciences, as a campaign of reorganisation and reorientation of social study in Britain. At several points in the history of sociology in Britain, Marshall has paused to reflect on its development. Moreover, these occasions have served as opportunities to consider both the institutional and intellectual influences upon the discipline, in a manner that encompassed elements of his own instrumental role in the formation
of the subject from the early inter-war period, into the middle 1970s, in conjunction with a general chronicling of sociology's development.

Marshall's references to the appropriate "attitude" to be adopted by sociologists and the ideological conflicts which he regarded as destructive tendencies within the pursuit of a rational sociology, represent more than a characteristically, descriptive aspect of surveys of the field. Marshall's analyses of sociology's development evidence a significant feature of sociology's advocation: dimension, namely, that intellectual diversity, however apparently extreme, can nevertheless be accommodated within the scope of the same discipline. This is quite clear in his reference to the cleavage in British sociology in the period just before the First World War and into the inter-war years, (Marshall, 1967, p.362):

"There was more than a hint in the atmosphere that the issues on which sociologists were divided reflected a struggle between progressives and conservatives."

The grammar of progress is employed by Marshall to explain the curious ability of sociology to simultaneously diffuse and synthesise conflicting epistemologies. The entrenched dichotomy of the "progressive-reactionary" has, somehow and somewhere along the way, given way to a plethora of schools, theory groups, specialist categories of sociologists and various realms designated the sociologies of this-and-that (Marshall, 1967, pp.362-363):

"And the former hint of a struggle between progress and reaction is fading. The drawing together of the two streams of thought that I mentioned a moment ago has not eliminated differences between schools of thought ... But the progressive-reactionary dichotomy does not survive, because there is progress taking place on all fronts, and this is generally recognised."

The preceding quotation contains a crucial element of sociology's advocation dimension, to the extent that Marshall, in his role as surveyor of the intellectual scope of sociology, endeavoured to promote an image of the discipline as increasingly complex, sophisticated and both technically and intellectually diversified. Its earlier crusading science-
building role had been progressively superceded by a multi-paradigmatic form, infused with a rational ethos, in keeping with the technological era in which it was evolving. The attempt to separate the ideas and methods that constitute sociology from their cultural contexts would appear to have been a success. Indeed, Marshall's thesis required that this should be the case, otherwise sociology would eventually disintegrate into conflicting ideologies. Institutional space and intellectual autonomy could not have been achieved outside the political and bureaucratic structures of academe, nor could it be attained without the assistance of the agencies which determine and distribute the resources essential to the growth of any branch of knowledge. Sociology, and indeed the other social sciences, are particularly vulnerable to the political determination of the national need, especially as it affects the production of knowledge.

In 1936, Marshall endeavoured to recast the role of sociology in the light of the sociologist's experiences at the previous year's conference. His review of the event contained a reference to the sociologists' confidence in their project, though the initial assumption about the central role that sociology was to play in the scheme of things had been revised. Moreover, Marshall gave his audience a hint as to the possible reasons for the negative reaction to sociology's envisaged project (1937, p.156):

"I think it is because we have been talking so much about methods and technique that sociology has acquired for us an appearance of solidity and concreteness."

There is an inconsistency in this admission. Marshall had previously argued that, "sociology emerges as a science in its own right," and in addition; "For we have not only discovered an enormously important field that belongs to the sociologist, but we have seen that methods exist which can be used in that field with some hope of success" (1937, pp.156-157). This tends to jeopardise the claim that, ipso facto, sociology is a science, if its research methods and techniques become to any substantial degree, problematic to the function of such a science. I am not arguing that methodological procedures and research techniques
are not in themselves problematic for scientists (indeed they are), however, what I am suggesting, is that they are usually considered to be the basis of the activity of science itself, irrespective of the field of investigation. This issue has been considered in some detail by Foucault (1970), MacIntyre (1979), Bergner (1981) and Urry (1981). In the previous year's conference, Karl Mannheim had been quite categorical about the role and significance of sociology's research methods. In particular, the comparative method, as I have explained above, was acclaimed as the method par excellence, not only for sociology, but as a basis for coordinating the other social sciences. It is therefore difficult to understand the concern expressed by Marshall over the question of 'the solidity and concreteness' of sociology by way of its methodology. It may have marked a departure from the original claim of superiority for certain elements of the discipline's methods and research techniques. In fact there are signs of a retreat from the original campaign wherein sociology's methodological prowess was employed as a central plank in the argument for sociology as the primary and coordinating component within a unified science of society (1937, p.161):

"... I feel doubtful how far the comparative method can establish social generalisations with causal significance."

Marshall did qualify his position on the matter of the effectiveness of the comparative method* and the claims made on its behalf, with the proviso that (1937, p.162):

"... the comparative method must be combined with the historical method."

The latter condition may have been a concession to the historians, a discipline in which Marshall himself had been 'elected' to, through a Fellowship at Cambridge in October, 1919. His consideration of the implications of the comparative method for sociology, was extended to the possibility of giving it an anthropological basis, for use in

* The conference of 1936 also discussed the possibilities of adopting the techniques of the anthropological field worker for research into contemporary British society (cf., Marshall, 1937, pp.163-164).
research of contemporary Britain. Moreover, such a method, coupled to the techniques of the statistician, might according to him, give rise to a formidable device for sociological analysis and prediction. The drawbacks to such a scheme were, according to Marshall, a lack of trained workers, the organisational base, and the necessary funds. Such a plan, conceived in the late 1930s would be resurrected in 1946 under the auspices of the Clapham Committee (1946), which virtually mirrored Marshall's conception of an organisational base for the direction and funding of research in the social sciences.

Marshall was not alone in his criticism of those social scientists who continued to thwart the intentions of the sociologists. Although I have already considered Karl Mannheim's contribution to conference debates, I think it important to consider briefly, one or two comments made by him in the light of his experiences at the first conference in 1935 and his subsequent reaction to the events of the one held in 1936.

In support of Marshall's advocacy of the fusion of the historical and comparative methods as a basic research technique for sociological research and analysis, Karl Mannheim, in a rather different approach from his original statement of sociology's case at the previous conference of 1935, highlighted the role that many speakers at the 1936 conference advocated for sociology. Mannheim's impatience is evident in his criticism of what C. Wright Mills would come to refer to as 'abstracted empiricism' some twenty three years later (1937, p.180):

"... the mere collection of facts, with the hope that when all the million facts are collected a theory will automatically spring from them."

This somewhat sarcastic aside at the empirical tradition within British social science may have been a reflection of Mannheim's predisposition toward the centrality of theory as the motive force of sociological analysis, a legacy of his intellectual formation within the German sociological tradition. Apart from a reaffirmation of his faith in the historical and comparative methods, (though there were some discrepancies
between his and Marshall's interpretation of the nature and deployment of the comparative method), Mannheim's promotion of the historical method in particular, served not only to counter what he regarded as the prevailing empiricism within British sociology, (an asset to Ginsberg's position) but gave some indication of the distinct cleavage that existed in the sociological community over the question of the appropriate paradigm within which to cast the infant discipline (1937, p.180):

"There is in this country a tendency to put a premium on pure description, surveys, collections of statistical data, to the exclusion of theoretical and historical analysis of society."

When one considers the fact that the aforementioned research techniques served as the foundation of social science in Britain, it is quite understandable that exponents of those techniques would assume that sociology should conform to the accepted (acceptable?) standards of empiricial analysis, common to the other social sciences, especially economics. A parting shot from Mannheim gives some indication of the intellectual arrogance ascribed to the sociologists and the claims made on behalf of their project for a synoptic science of society (1937, p.180):

"I feel like asking those who think the social sciences can get on without sociology and theoretical questioning, whether if Newton had confined his field-work with apples to counting and describing them, he would have found his theory of gravitation."

The frustration in Mannheim's remarks is quite apparent. It denotes the increasingly precarious relationship between sociology and related disciplines, whereby the sociologist had attempted to establish the crucial role that the discipline ought to be allowed to play in the construction of a unified science of society. Without the co-ordinating function of sociology, any study of society would be partial and incomplete: the incorporation of the separate branches of social science within the field of sociology and its special methods, would help to arrest the fractionation of knowledge about man and society, which, as some sociologists argued, was a result of the allegedly negative effect of the process of specialisation.
The inter-war conferences were probably the last occasions on which sociologists made public the discipline's 'private troubles'. The Second World War would end the somewhat, abstract debate about the appropriate relationship between sociology and the other social sciences, in which the former encountered increasing resistance to not only its claims for special status in the process of science-building, but doubts as to whether or not sociology could demonstrate convincingly, that it possessed a specialised methodology and corpus of ideas to qualify it for the proposed project.

The presentation of sociology as the linch-pin in the mechanism of social study was not conducted in completely auspicious circumstances. The general opposition to the sociologists' case was summed-up rather caustically, by Alexander Carr-Saunders (Carr-Saunders, 1936, pp.212-213):

"... sociologists have no monopoly of interpreting social experience, because they have no monopoly of generalising about it, or even relating different aspects one to another."

Throughout the inter-war period, and especially the years of the conferences, sociologists became increasingly aware that their own conception of sociology should not diverge significantly from that of their fellow social scientists. To engage in the process of science-building, wherein a particular discipline would assume a central and coordinating role, entailed a shrewd appreciation of the potential and limitations of that same discipline. The claims of other social sciences to have reached an advanced stage of development and thus act as suitable candidates for the role envisaged by sociology, were not without foundation. I shall give consideration to such claims, when I examine William Beveridge's preference for economics and social biology.
2. William Beveridge: a crusade for social science

The inter-war conferences provided an opportunity for sociologists to present a case for sociology, in terms of its potential within a synoptic science of society. The conference debates can be viewed as quite public and concerted acts of justification on the part of sociologists. Sociology's special projet was largely a theoretical programme. Rather than being construed as a threat to the existing hierarchy of British social science, those who opposed it, regarded sociology as increasingly irrelevant to the specialised interests of the other social sciences.

The rejection of sociology's case on intellectual grounds, coincided with significant developments taking place in the institutionalisation of social science within its largest centre of teaching and research for those subjects - the London School of Economics and Political Science. An institution in which sociology was precariously placed, and seemed likely to be increasingly compromised, as the School's Director, William Beveridge, relentlessly pursued his personal ambition to create a natural basis for social science. This episode raised issues and engendered conflicts within the hierarchy of British social science which were fundamental to the intellectual and institutional development of those disciplines, throughout the 1920s and '30s, and through to the present day. It was within such a context that sociology would seek to maintain what intellectual and institutional autonomy it had managed to achieve since it acquired its first Chair in the early years of this century.

William Beveridge's plans for the development of social science at the L.S.E., were based on his organisational and intellectual strategy known as the 'Natural Bases Scheme'. The Natural Bases Scheme became the major research activity within the School for the period 1919 to 1937, the year he resigned as Director of the L.S.E. Central to the 'Scheme' was the issue of the funding of knowledge. The conditional nature of such funding will be examined in terms of the ideological predispositions of the benefactor (the Rockefeller Foundation), and that of the beneficiary (William Beveridge and 'his' School).
2.1 William Beveridge's philosophy of social science

It is important first, to understand what can be loosely described as Beveridge's philosophy of social science. Although I do not wish to engage in a detailed analysis of that philosophy, I nevertheless think it important to highlight essential features of it, as it influenced generally, his wider conceptual programme to evolve the 'Natural Bases Scheme'.

In examining Beveridge's model of social science and in turn, comparing it with that of one postulated within the official programmes of the Rockefeller Foundation, I hope to demonstrate the existence of a common conception of the relation between knowledge and action which, although denied by Beveridge, when elaborated in a social context, implied political theory. He was certainly aware of the ideological underpinning of social research, and it may have been this realisation which drove Beveridge to condemn bitterly, members of the faculty at the L.S.E. during the period of his directorship, and may also account for his subsequent recantation of a previously held conviction, that intellectuals should actively engage in political and other extra-curricular activities. Eventually, and for reasons I will expand upon later, Beveridge changed his ideas about the possibility of separating scholarly activity from the vagaries of politics and journalism.

It is difficult to encapsulate the basic tenets of Beveridge's notion of a natural scientific base for the social sciences. However, a clue to its essential nature seems to lay in the alleged connection between the apparently discrete domains of natural and social scientific knowledge. It is within a consideration of the promise of a scientific social science* that we can perceive the attraction of science as a resource for Beveridge, both as an exemplar and subsequently, as a strategic component of the negotiations with funding agencies to secure the necessary resources for his project at the L.S.E. Fay (1975, p.21)

* A more detailed analytical account of the relationship between social science and science, particularly the philosophical and socio­logical aspects of it, can be found in a multitude of texts. For example: Keat and Urry (1975); Ryan (1970); Ravetz (1971); Natanson (1963); Mulkay (1979); Barnes (1979) and Fay (1975).
has said of the attraction of the model of the natural sciences for social scientists:

"Only a social science will give an inter-subjectively verifiable (or at least falsifiable) account of how the social world operates, and only a social science will give us causal explanations which are of the type that allow one to prevent the occurrence of an unwanted event, or permit one to bring about the occurrence of one that is desired: it is for this reason that only a social science, conceived as a body of knowledge analogous to that of the natural sciences, can satisfy the condition which modern society demands be satisfied if it is to continue without substantial suffering and ultimately without a total breakdown."

It was the apparent ability of the natural sciences to predict results that impressed Beveridge and his fellow social scientists, realising too, that such an inherent potential formed the basis of the 'power' of scientific knowledge.

Beveridge's idea of a science of society was not out of place in an institution whose founders believed that traditional political methods could no longer serve the interests of the people. In fact it was Sidney and Beatrice Webb's enthusiasm for the power and promise of social science within the political realm, coupled to their Fabian faith, that gave impetus to the foundation of the L.S.E.

Jose Harris (1977, pp.284-285) has argued, that apart from the recurring problem of academic dissension characterising Beveridge's directorship of the L.S.E., the central and pervasive conflict within the School revolved around the issue of the nature and method of the social sciences:

"The debate on the nature of the social sciences was the most prolonged and all-pervasive of the subjects in dispute .... When he came to the L.S.E. he was convinced that the social sciences were still 'too theoretical, deductive, metaphysical' and that 'the way ahead' lay in empirical studies of social phenomena rather than in deductions based on analytical postulates about the nature of human behaviour."
Harris points to the influence upon Beveridge of the biologist Thomas Huxley, referring to the former as a disciple of the latter. This observation, though not in any sense confirmed by Harris, is quite accurate, for reasons which will become clearer later. Harris also notes what I have alluded to above in consideration of Fay's account of an empiricist philosophy of social science and the manner in which William Beveridge conceived it (Harris, 1977, p.285):

"Men would 'gradually bring themselves to deal with political as they do with scientific questions ... and to believe that the machinery of society is at least as delicate as that of a spinning jenny and little likely to be improved by the meddling of those who have not taken the trouble to master the principles of its action'."

From this somewhat naïve and unsophisticated philosophy of social science, Beveridge proceeded to formulate his programme for a natural basis for the social sciences. Considered thus, his theory comprised a curious amalgam of philosophy and ideology and can be expressed in terms of the following categories:

a) an ideal of value-free, scientific knowledge.
b) the methodological unity of the natural and human sciences.
c) a special status for the academic (especially the social scientist) particularly a requirement to practice uncompromising objectivity in the course of teaching and research.
d) social science as a valuable national resource to effect beneficial social change.

Beveridge believed the social sciences, including sociology, to be "too theoretical, deductive and metaphysical", and that their future progress lay in the development of empirical studies of social phenomena, rather than in deductions based on analytical postulates about the nature of human behaviour" (Harris, 1977, p.285). More importantly, he believed that there existed a gulf between the natural and social sciences (as far as they had developed in the 1920s); a gap which could be bridged by a careful and detailed working-out of the manner in which the latter group of subjects would benefit directly from the proven,
technical sophistication of natural science. It was the scientist's ability to predict and control natural events through the processes of observation and experimentation that drove Beveridge to the conclusion, that if this problem could be solved, if the discontinuity between natural and social knowledge and the methods employed to obtain it could be bridged, then the ideal of the methodological unity of the sciences would be realised.

It is interesting to note Beveridge's conceptualisation of the 'borderland' between the natural and social sciences as representing the interstices of those branches of knowledge. Whereas Foucault (1970, pp.345-348) has attempted a similar presentation of the human sciences within the modern episteme, albeit in a more complex and radically philosophical setting of the history of ideas, Beveridge's estimation of the tension between science and social science was less problematic: the two systems of thought could be brought into closer relationship (unity) by creating an additional branch of knowledge, that of necessity, would draw upon the methodological and theoretical components of existing fields of science and social science. Such an instrumental problem could be resolved if the 'superior' methods (and ideals) of science could be systematically introduced to the social sciences by way of an appropriate medium: this was to be achieved by the creation of an additional sphere of mediating subjects. Beveridge thus began to draw up an ambitious programme for development of research into the natural basis of the social sciences, emphasising the need for establishing that group of disciplines (Harris, 1977, p.286):

"... a third group of studies is required, dealing with the natural basis of economics and politics, with human material and its physical environment and forming a bridge between the natural and the social sciences."

Although the components of this new, eclectic body of knowledge comprised Anthropology, Psychology, Geography, Meteorology and Public Health, it was Social Biology which was to serve as the primary and coordinating discipline; the fulcrum between science and existing social science disciplines. Social Biology itself was to embrace genetics, population,
vital statistics, heredity, eugenics and dysgenics. Before I consider the matter of the Chair of Social Biology, and the manner in which it was funded, it is important to give further consideration to Beveridge's ideas on the nature of science and its special relationship to social study.

The remarkable feature of Beveridge's commitment to a science of society is the consistency of his views on the matter over the decades. They were proclaimed initially, via a public address at the L.S.E. in 1920 and periodically revived in a number of subsequent books and articles, and during negotiations with funding agencies (Beveridge, 1920; 1953; 1937; 1947; and 1960). His oration, delivered to the School on vacation of the post of Director in 1937 included the "four methods" he had learned from his revered teacher, Thomas Huxley (Beveridge, 1937, p.460):

"The four methods were, first, observation of facts; second, comparison and classification of facts, leading by induction to general propositions; third, deduction from general propositions to facts again, so as to foretell facts in advance of observation; fourth, verification of deductions by fresh observations."

Beveridge believed that, whereas economics and politics were the more developed of the social sciences, it was through further application of the scientific method that social facts would reveal knowledge of the social world and therefore account for human agency within it. Social Biology seemed to him the appropriate discipline to coordinate those combined branches of knowledge that were to occupy the borderland between the purer, natural sciences and the less well developed social sciences. The envisaged role for Social Biology in Beveridge's scheme caused some concern among the few sociologists at the School, who were equally concerned to promote their own subject as the central, coordinating discipline within a synoptic science of society.

The importance of collecting facts as the basis for theory construction within Beveridge's notion of a science of society bordered on the obsessional (Harris, 1977, pp.284-285). Such was his dedication to fact-gathering, that over the years he became increasingly intolerant of
those given to historical or speculative theorising in other fields of social research. His criticism of the ideas of Keynes highlights that tendency (Beveridge, 1937, p.464):

"It is the duty of the propounder of every new theory, if he has not himself the equipment for observation, to indicate where verification of his theory is to be sought in facts - what may be expected to happen or to have happened if his theory is true, what will not happen if it is false. That is the demand that would be made of the propounder of a new theory in every natural science. It is not the demand that has been made of Mr. Keynes by his fellow economists."

Beveridge made some rather scathing remarks about Keynes' 'General Theory', partly because it was so widely available to the general public, 'at a low price' and thus likely to misinform the populace, and consequently, harm the scientific image of economics.

Methodological rigour was a central criterion for the construction of a useful social science. Just as the natural sciences had demonstrated their utility over the decades, so must social science render mankind a similar service (Beveridge, 1937, p.471):

"The practice of observation, as the basis of theories and for their control and verification, is one condition for the assured progress of our sciences in service to mankind and in public estimation."

Beveridge was conscious also of the need for social science to attain intellectual autonomy, essentially as a prerequisite to gaining the status and public credibility of other scientific disciplines. He was sensitive to the attitude of others towards social science (1937, p.461):

"To-day the Social Sciences have need of friends and, I think, of counsellors, also ... If to-day we consider where the Social Sciences stand in public estimation, we encounter a paradox ... Year by year appreciation grows of the importance to mankind of understanding just those things which here it is our function to teach, or solving the riddles of economic and political and social organisation. But if one asks whether it is to us first and foremost, to economists and political
scientists and sociologists, that men look for the solution of these riddles, the answer is less cheering. In our field, horse-sense is treated as better than knowledge. Men of other training - engineers and botanists and chemists - write books about economic problems, invading our territory in all good faith, as they would not invade the territories of one another."

And finally, with reference to the seemingly perpetual infancy of social science, particularly the status of its knowledge (1937, pp.461-462):

"For other scientists, as for men of affairs, the field of our studies is still a wilderness for pioneers, not an ordered realm of knowledge. For this failure of our studies to secure the same recognition as other sciences, more than one reason can be given."

Beveridge was convinced that the touch-stone of methodological rigour, fundamental to the natural sciences, would, if emulated within the field of social science, demonstrate convincingly their scientific authenticity (1937, p.463):

"I have given one reason for the common failure to recognise the Social Sciences - an external misunderstanding for which those who pursue these studies cannot be blamed. But there are internal reasons, also, for which we can be blamed; there are two reasons in particular. We cannot claim recognition as scientists, unless our methods are scientific. We cannot claim recognition as scientists, unless we dig deep and clear the boundary between science and the practical arts of government."

The latter reason is an oblique reference to the bitter feud between himself and some faculty members over the conflict of interests between the role of a scientist and that of political activist. I shall refer to this when considering the conditional grants awarded to the L.S.E. by the Rockefeller Foundation.
2.2 The Natural Bases Scheme and the role of Social Biology

It is understandable that sociology should have felt vulnerable during the period of Beveridge's campaign. It was a small department, amongst a School wherein the remaining social sciences continued to consolidate themselves through increased specialisation and the receipt of funding for research projects, in keeping with a preferred notion of 'scientific research.' Ironically, it would be the very process of specialisation and the increasing autonomy of the various social science disciplines within the School, that contributed to the eventual failure of Beveridge's project. Moreover, and as I have already explained above, that same process became a significant factor in frustrating the plans of the sociologists in their attempt to construct a synoptic science of society, at a time when the experiment in Social Biology was on the verge of collapse. Harris (1977, pp.285-287) has attempted to draw together the undercurrents of intellectual dissent and interpersonal conflict which ensued as a result of Beveridge's Natural Bases Scheme.

From the outset, Hobhouse (then the most influential of England's sociologists) objected to the severe inductionism of Beveridge's 'science' of society. It clashed with the purportedly speculative, and abstract sociology associated with Hobhouse and even caused consternation within the Department of Social Administration, usually given to research and teaching within the classical, empirical tradition. It was the imposition of Beveridge's ideas, rather than their intrinsic, intellectual value, or compelling innovatory nature, that kindled hostility amongst some members of staff in the School. Many of the School's academic staff supported Beveridge, with the particular exception of Hobhouse. The latter individual protested that he had not been consulted about the Natural Bases Scheme, and that (Harris, 1977, p.287):

"...'the non-sociological teacher in these subjects is indifferent and in nearly all cases ignorant of the sociological point of view'."
Harris argues that privately, Beveridge believed that, "the tradition represented by Hobhouse does not necessarily go with social science" (1977, p.288). When the move was made to establish Social Biology as the key discipline to occupy the borderland between the natural and social sciences, Hobhouse again protested that not only was the title an unfortunate neologism, but that much of the subject matter came under what he assumed to be the wider field of sociology. What Hobhouse and others failed to appreciate, in terms of the strategic aspect of Beveridge's programme, was the latter's overriding influence within two key executive bodies, both of which exercised significant control over decisions affecting the academic composition of the School. They were, the Emergency Committee* and the Professorial Council. Beveridge had influential allies within these important coteries of power. Harris refers also to the enthusiasm and support of Malinowski, Laski, and Beveridge's personal secretary and confidant, Mrs. Janet Mair (1977, p.287). I consider Mrs. Mair's influence among the academics and her relationship with Beveridge to be of considerable significance, particularly in terms of her alignment with the *scientific* social science lobby (Harris, 1977, p.281):

"... and she was warmly admired by Hogben and Malinowski, who saw her as a consistent champion in their campaign for a more 'scientific social science'."

There are other aspects of the relationship between Mrs. Mair and William Beveridge that serve to highlight the importance of Wright Mills' (1963) notion of "cliques" in shaping the development of the social sciences. Although they are set out in greater detail in Beveridge's own work; 'The London School of Economics and Its Problems 1919-1937', I nevertheless think it important to refer briefly to certain parts of that text, in order to give an indication of the degree and extent of influence

* This Committee was established in 1921 with a remit to decide matters of academic policy, "the acquisition of property, discipline of students and employment of staff" (Harris, 1977, pp.304-305). Its membership may have lent credence to the belief of some of the more senior staff at that time, that Beveridge was presiding over a benign autocracy. The Committee comprised Beveridge, Sidney Webb, four businessmen governors, and two members of the Professorial Council (the latter increased to three in later years).
amongst those who were strategically placed to enhance the funding of Beveridge's schemes. Particular note should be taken of the extraordinary connections that existed between Beveridge and Mrs. Mair, and the chairman of the University Grants Committee, Sir William McCormick. In a period when state funding for the universities was on a small scale, the U.G.C. actively encouraged the universities to vie for funding in the 'market place', thus putting many of the provincial universities at a disadvantage, with the exception of Oxford and Cambridge, which were relatively wealthy institutions via endowments. The notion of laissez-faire was a policy which governed the economic thinking of both the U.G.C. and ministers responsible for over-seeing the financial affairs of the universities. This attitude toward the financing of grants is evidenced in the following quotations, wherein Beveridge appears to be well versed in the art of grantsmanship and the importance of having friends in the right places. When referring to the attitude of the U.G.C. toward the L.S.E. and its request for financial aid from the former organisation, Beveridge noted (Beveridge, 1960, p.22):

"They (the U.G.C.) came to so favourable a conclusion on its chances that, contrary to their habit at that time, in addition to increasing our annual grants that they gave us a capital grant of £45,000 towards the buildings so desperately needed."

Beveridge gives a further example of the benefits accrued through the fortuitous relationship between Mrs. Mair and Sir William McCormick (1960, p.22):

"Sir William McCormick had taught at St. Andrews, had taught Janet (Mrs. Mair) there, and thought very highly of her. I do not suggest that the School would not have received a capital grant without this happy accident; McCormick felt that money granted to the School would be well spent. I still think that it was spent well while Jance was concerned with it."

And in the matter of additional financial support from the London County Council, another essential source of revenue used by Beveridge to expand the School (1960, p.22):
"We were fortunate also in our personal relations with the London Council Council where we dealt with Philippa Fawcett. She had been Senior Wrangler at Cambridge in the year after Janet's husband David has been Second Wrangler, which was also the year before Janet's brother William Philip became third Wrangler. Personal contacts with the LCC could not have been easier."

It should also be noted, that the Webb's relation with the L.C.C. provided another contact point within the array of funding agencies used by Beveridge to support his institutional and intellectual projects within the L.S.E.

In order to bring his Natural Bases Scheme to fruition, Beveridge believed that, before social science could ever achieve a level of maturity possessed by the natural sciences, a third group of subjects needed to be created in order to 'complete the circle of the social sciences'; thus providing a bridge between themselves and pure science. The new area of knowledge would encompass several subjects with social biology as the key discipline. In keeping with his firm belief that economics was by far the most scientifically advanced of the existing social sciences, he resolved to appoint "a man of biological training to learn economics and politics" (Harris, 1977, p.287). The latter experiment was beset with problems from the start. As Harris has said of the scheme (1977, p.288):

"Nevertheless, from the start the social biology experiment was fraught with dissension and conflict - difficulties which stemmed partly from the lack of facilities for experimental research, partly from the personalities involved, and partly from the inherently controversial nature of social biology as an academic subject."

Harris provides a candid account of the personalities, individuals and cliques referred to by Wright Mills, that sought actively to influence the depth and texture of intellectual and institutional development in the golden era of pre-war social science, funded by unlimited Rockefeller dollars. From the early 1920s up to Beveridge's resignation as Director of the L.S.E. in the late 1930s, the School was rent by growing dissent amongst the academics over the proper nature and purpose of social science. The cleavage was most apparent in the matter of empirical research. Staff divisions and intellectual preferences, along the lines of competing methodologies became bound up in political and moral remonstrations. Harris has attempted to assess the gulf between the methodological traditions that had given rise to the polarisation of faculty members (Harris, 1977, p.288):
"Hobhouse died in 1929, but in the early 1930s the gulf between the methodological traditions reasserted itself in various ways. On the one hand, the economics department under Robbins and Hayek became increasingly deductive and analytical and increasingly hostile to 'problem-oriented' research; and on the other hand the department of government under Laski became increasingly associated with the teaching of Marxist political theory."

What is absent from Harris' account and needs to be emphasised, is the fact that the L.S.E. was intricately enmeshed in the social, political and economic turmoil of the 1920s and '30s, to a degree and in a manner uncharacteristic of other institutions of higher education of that time. The range of academic subjects and the level of post-graduate and sponsored research ensured a continuous fermentation of conflicting ideas and ideologies. The rise of European Fascism, the flight of intellectuals in its wake, the economic crisis within Western capitalism and the apparent contradictions inherent in the 'great Soviet experiment', were not merely phenomena of a theoretical nature, but affected directly the social science taught at the School. For some, the latter disciplines needed to be rescued from this worldly taint and distortion: this could be achieved through methodological rigour and the purificatory powers of science. For others, the development of a 'relevant' science of society entailed praxis; the notion of the committed and involved academic community, articulating and pursuing ideas beyond the confines of academe. With the creation of a Chair in Social Biology in 1929, occupied by Lancelot Hogben, formerly a professor of Zoology at a South African university, there began a prolonged conflict within the School, centring on the new department. Much of the history of this episode at the L.S.E. is well documented by Harris, and my reference to it is to emphasise the manner in which social scientists engaged in debates, sought allies and generally developed strategies to promote, or advocate preferable forms of social science to those being pursued by others.

Harris' reference to Hogben's contempt for much of what passed as scientific social research animates his consideration of the situation at the School during those turbulent years, (Harris, 1977, pp.288-289);
"Hogben himself furiously opposed both the 'unscientific' commitment to Marxist dogma which he perceived in the followers of Laski, and the 'secular Platonism', 'ostentatious uselessness' and devotion to the 'idol' of academic purity which prevailed in the study of theoretical economics. Hogben's views were strongly supported by Beveridge who was increasingly hostile to 'pure theory' and to partisan commitment in academic research."

It would seem reasonable to assume that life for the sociologists was becoming increasingly difficult, in view of the hostility of those who regarded its practitioners, namely Hobhouse, as too metaphysical in their approach to their subject matter. While it could be argued that such intrigue and rivalry are normal aspects of inter-disciplinary and intra-disciplinary existence within institutions of higher education, particularly in terms of securing resources to maintain a sound teaching and research base, such a contemporary interpretation may miss the point that for the period in question, the different social science disciplines, and particularly sociology, were by no means as securely established either institutionally or intellectually as they are today. Events within the L.S.E. were to have a significant effect upon the subsequent development of social science in Britain up to the post-war era of university expansion and the political direction of resources to those same disciplines.

Beveridge, writing in 1953, remained a committed advocate of his earlier scheme to found social biology in the complex domain of the borderland between natural and social science (1953, p.251):

"On the face of things an institution (the L.S.E.) designed for the scientific study of human society cannot omit study of man himself. Economists, political scientists, and sociologists if they are to be scientific at all, must have intimate co-operation with those engaged in the study of man as an individual, that is to say with biologists, anthropologists and psychologists."

Some concessions had been made by the 1950s, but the importance of biology to the 'scientific enterprise' remain. The experiment in social biology eventually failed in 1936, with the vacation of the Chair by Hogben. Despite the fact that Hogben's critics were well entrenched in their departments, confident in the growth and continued specialisation of their respective disciplines, they complained continually to the
School's Director that Hogben and his department had received preferential treatment. It was not the case that other academics were being starved of funds to pursue their own interests, but that Beveridge appeared to be channelling a disproportionate amount of Rockefeller funds toward the social biology experiment. The response from Beveridge was that the programme to develop the natural basis of the social sciences was one agreed between himself and Officers of the Foundation in 1925, and ratified by the Professorial Council; it was therefore essential to disperse the grant in accordance with the aforementioned agreement. The nature of that agreement is of crucial importance to understanding the development of social science at its major centre in Britain for the period in question, and one I shall consider shortly. However, before I do, I wish to conclude my examination of the case of social biology at the L.S.E. with a reference from Harris and Lancelot Hogben. Their remarks give a clear indication of the tension, frustration and conflict that characterised the aforementioned episode, and remains important to an understanding of the history of a particular field of knowledge and the content of its ideas. As Harris has said of Beveridge's Natural Bases Scheme (1977, p.290):

"To Beveridge the eclipse of social biology was a crushing blow - an end to his hopes of establishing a new 'science of society', based on cross-fertilisation of disciplines and inductive methods. Among his colleagues the end of the experiment was generally greeted with relief, though some at least thought that it had never been given a fair trial. Many of them blamed the failure on Beveridge's own mismanagement - on his hostility to pure theory, his resistance to criticism and his failure to consult his staff."

Under a benign autocracy, Beveridge had attempted to enforce his ideas within groups of practitioners of a variety of social science disciplines. The resulting opposition was, in part, due to the reluctance of some social scientists to allow their own specialist fields to become underlabourers to some major, new branch of knowledge, which would incorporate existing subjects. A similar attempt to construct a synoptic science had been attempted by the sociologists (using the platform of several major conferences in the years, 1935, 1936 and 1937). Although the
type of disciplinary synthesis that Beveridge had in mind was unlike the one proposed by the sociologists, it nevertheless raised the issues of the possible loss of autonomy for individual social science disciplines, with corresponding reductions in institutional and intellectual developments that the existing level of diversity evidenced, particularly within the University of London and especially within the departmental arrangements of the L.S.E. There was also a somewhat paradoxical aspect to Beveridge's scheme: the much vaunted notion of 'cross-fertilisation' would seem difficult to 'realise in view of the fact that the different social sciences had achieved varying degrees of theoretical and methodological sophistication. Those actually professing, or teaching the respective social sciences varied in number, with sociology ranking amongst the lowest. It would seem reasonable to argue that the better funded, more institutionally entrenched of the social sciences would be at an advantage in any scheme to create a 'new' science of society. They would also be disposed to either frustrate or undo similar plans: economics portrayed by its practitioners as the 'queen' of the social sciences, subsequently perceived the function of social biology in the proposed scientia scientiarum as a significant threat. Indeed, the following observations by Hogben, reveal the success of his 'opponents' over the seven years in which he and Beveridge had collaborated to bring the Natural Bases Scheme to fruition (Harris, 1977, p.290):

"Hogben himself, however, saw the failure as a victory for a factious and traditional academic establishment, obsessed with age-old battles between worn-out metaphysical creeds."

Hogben, in a letter to Beatrice Webb, referred bitterly to his wasted years, in what turned out to be a short-lived department (1977, p.290):

"... and if there had been four people in the place with the determination to make a realistic programme of social studies I am sure he (Beveridge) would have played ball. The trouble was that the Left Wingers were just as dialectical as the Right, and the few who (like Robson) were sympathetic to realistic research (as opposed to tautological necromancy and belles letters) were not in powerful positions ..."
That will end an inglorious and rather humiliating chapter of my life. Just now I am on top of the world again. The biological opportunities are stupendous. But if what is called social science is what is done at the L.S.E. thank Heaven I am a biologist ..." 

Another factor contributing to the demise of Beveridge's scheme was his insistence that social scientists should always refrain from abusing their position within an academic establishment, by publicly expressing political opinions of any kind. Beveridge asserted, that a precondition for successfully establishing a science of society was the requirement of its practitioners to refrain from clouding scientific judgement with values: 'they had no legitimate place in the new discipline. Such a form of contrived detachment is evident in his assertion (Beveridge, Universities Quarterly, 1946-47, Vol. 1, pp.238-239):

"... that those who devote their lives to these studies should practice emotional detachment - above all from political controversies and the organisation of parties."

This was a direct reference to his experiences with radical elements of the student body, in addition to Laski's increasingly militant stance on the major political issues of the period. And yet, there is a somewhat paradoxical aspect to the demand he came to make on the new breed of social scientists implicit in his project and their function in the construction of an equally new field of science: the so-called 'new science' was founded on a fundamental contradiction. If its function was to discover social facts (Beveridge's principal obsession), how would it be possible to ascertain those same facts, prior to the creation of a science of society? Within what scientifically informed sphere of activity would a researcher operate, in order to discover and collect social facts from which the new science was expected to emerge? The subordination of practitioner to his art, and of the subject-matter to the technology of the discipline, were two essential elements of Beveridge's vision of a reconstituted science of society. For, as he argued, 'there can be no science of society till the facts about society are available.' It would appear that defining the discipline into existence would suffice.
2.3 The funding of knowledge: the institutional context of the Natural Bases Scheme

In this and subsequent sections of the chapter, I wish to examine the source and manner of funding William Beveridge's Natural Bases Scheme for the social sciences at the L.S.E. This will entail consideration of the role of the private foundation, not only in terms of its involvement in funding Beveridge's scheme, but as a primary component of American culture. Furthermore, I wish to explore the adoption and deployment of the normative structure of science as a fundamental component of the private foundation's investment programmes, wherein the scientific method in particular, was regarded by both the Officers and Trustees of the foundation, as an exemplar for the production of all other forms of knowledge. Here I will focus upon the conception of science's role in the development of social science at the L.S.E. - an agenda for science-building common to both benefactor and beneficiary.

There is an additional, yet equally important argument which is crucial to an understanding of the process of the funding of knowledge. This entails the conditional nature of the provision and distribution of resources for the production of knowledge.

Large-scale benefaction, from whatever source, is never granted unconditionally and attempts to disguise or conceal a mutual interest, which generates or sustains the production of knowledge, becomes increasingly difficult to manage when the motives of both the benefactor and beneficiary are examined closely. Such motives may encompass a shared ideology, which is presented for public and professional consumption within the rhetoric of, say, the national need, or, a narrow definition of disciplinary advancement. This is not to assert that all funding of knowledge proceeds on a conspiratorial basis. Merely that private benefactor and grantee, or, the state funding agency and the recipient institution, regard the allocation of resources as necessarily contingent. Moreover, the relationship between the benefactor and beneficiary (often subject to intermediary direction by a third party, i.e. the U.G.C. or the E.S.R.C.) may depend upon a conception of knowledge, in this case certain
branches of the social sciences, which serve the needs of one party or interest group, over another. Consequently, the more technical and esoteric elements of a social scientist's claims for his discipline may, or may not be shared by a private or public funding agency. These issues become sharpened when economic, social and political imperatives impinge upon the institutional structures which support those branches of knowledge and practice. This in turn affects a discipline's legitimacy and the claims made by its practitioners on its behalf. The predicament in which a branch of knowledge and its practitioners may find itself, arises as a result of the historical relationship between the cultural and social context of knowledge, the manner in which it is maintained, and how and why it relates to the objectives and interests a society possesses.

It will be through a consideration of the private foundation as part of American culture generally, and an examination of the ideology which sustained the Rockefeller Foundation (R.F.) in its support of the L.S.E. as an important investment in social science, that the preceding argument on the conditional nature of funding will be pursued.

2.4 The nature of American philanthropy: private wealth and public influence

Foundations are a unique feature of American culture. Their history is well documented (Cf. Whitaker, 1979; Bremner, 1960; Fosdick, 1963; Chambers, 1948; Curti, 1963 and a rather sardonic chapter on their activities in Levison, 1979). It is in their attempts to legitimate themselves as self-evidently, non-political organisations, that is to be found an understanding of their creators and Trustees' desire to achieve public acceptance. The generosity of the foundations and the benefits of giving have been considered by Karl and Katz (Karl and Katz, 1981, p.252):

"Money carefully given sometimes makes friends among its recipients, and that was certainly the case with the foundations. The universities were quickly won over, as were numerous private and public agencies which had been helped by the philanthropists."
And more specifically on the role and significance of intermediary institutions. (1981, p.252):

"The foundations encouraged the development of intermediary organisations, such as the Social Science Research Council, to mediate between themselves and competitors for the support proffered by the foundations and they thus succeeded in creating a belief that they were not permanently aligned with any one set of individual research workers or with particular institutional recipients of their awards ... what was to be avoided was the appearance of investment in research which touched on controversial political questions even when this was in fact the objective of foundations and research workers."

In fact, the above strategies failed on several noteworthy occasions: the extensive funding of William Beveridge's project for a natural basis for social science was criticised by both his academic colleagues at the L.S.E. and subsequently, by officers of the Rockefeller Foundation. The infamous Reece Commission (the 'Special Committee To Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organisations', House of Represent- atives Eighty-Third Congress, Second Session on H. Res., 217, Dec. 16, 1954) accused the foundations of funding research of a "leftist trend" in the social sciences, being "subversive" to the extent that they had, "worked to undermine some of our basic moral and religious and political principles" (1954, p.204). Despite the nature and origin of criticism of the foundations as gatekeepers of contemporary intellectual life in the America of the 1920s and '30s, their central role as benefactors for the intellectual and institutional development of the social sciences both in America and Britain (especially at the L.S.E.), cannot be overlooked in the construction of historical accounts of those disciplines.

In what came to be known as the "New Era" of the 1920s, the foundations engaged in what Karl and Katz refer to as a "new social-scientific utopianism and the development of voluntary, non-governmental systems of bringing about desired change in American society", (1981, p.267). In the absence of a welfare state, or for that matter, any coherent structure of federal welfare or social security, a growing consciousness of the desirability of national programmes of social welfare emerged amongst a national elite of industrial reformers. Their aspirations
were in opposition to a general political culture which could not accept a national government committed to such a scale of reform. As Karl and Katz have argued (1981, p.238):

"It was a culture which would have been threatened down to its partisan and regional roots by any attempt to create a nationally unified conception of social policy. Into the gap created by this impasse stepped the modern foundation, a system of national philanthropy - privately devoted to increasing the welfare of mankind."

The crucial role played by the foundation thus began to displace its critics' major condemnation of it as an institutional device for legitimising tax evasion: as a corporate form of charity, the foundations emerged to play a major role in the development of the modern American state. By supporting research and thereby influencing the choice of social policies, the philanthropists were able to shape governmental actions in what was increasingly identified as the private sector.

By the late 1920s, the foundations had come to appear traditional, inevitable and acceptable. So much so, that President Herbert Hoover, in the early months of his office, assembled a group of America's most prominent social scientists to study the state of the nation. In addition, he approached the major foundations and obtained their organisational and financial support. Hoover's intentions were quite simple in principle, although the practicality of the intended project represented a somewhat unique departure in government policy making, for the reasons stated above. The outcome of his and the social scientists' endeavours was eventually published after several years of careful and meticulous research as, 'Recent Social Trends in the United States' (1933). It was intended as a document of "policy research" for use by the President and as a basis for a national programme of social reform. Karl and Katz have estimated the significance of the project as an exercise in social research, and as a means to effect political change within a culture perennially suspicious of a centralist approach by the state, to manage the private affairs of its citizens (1981, p.268):
"No such massive social survey had been done before, nor has one been done since. A privately financed effort which utilised the support of government staffs and agencies as well as staffs from public and private research institutions, it remains a unique model of the kind of co-operative public-private effort of which the founders of the major foundations had dreamed."

The late 1920s and '30s in America would seem to have been a period of opportunity and opportunism for the nation's social scientists, at least in terms of institutional and professional consolidation of their disciplines (cf. Oberschall, 1972; Hinkle and Hinkle, 1954). The status of the disciplines in question, especially their public identity and respectability, were greatly enhanced by the task put to them by the nation's leading citizen: a greater accolade would be hard to come by. Without over-stating the significance of the Social Trends project, it would seem that as a national exercise in the conscription of a branch of knowledge for political ends, a major step had been taken in the promotion and development of social science which, historically, may account for the essential difference between itself and its British counterpart. In considering the similarities and differences between American and British social research, beyond the limitations of scale and funding, it could be that in the case of the latter nation, no amount of 'social intelligence' could ever supplant, or positively influence, the political wisdom of its politicians and the inherent conservatism and general myopia of the Civil Service, especially during the period in question. America's cosmopolitan culture seemed more susceptible to experiments in social engineering than Britain, whose governmental and civil administrations were both ancient and somewhat impervious to singularly personal and somewhat inspirational crusades of social reform. What is interesting in Karl and Katz's account of the Social Trends project, is the precedent that it set in the relationship between social science and government; one that gained in strength (via philanthropic benefaction) despite the establishment of the Executive Office of the President (1981, p.268) which, henceforth, would provide the necessary funds for the commissioning and conduct of similar research projects (1981, p.268):
"Even the hostility towards private business that ultimately came to dominate the New Deal did nothing to stop the expansion of influence by privately supported research on the making of governmental policy...

In the period after the Second World War, the relations between foundations and the makers of national policy grew even closer as foundations provided government with international research opportunities which would have run into opposition from Congress..." 

The key role played by the foundations in creating an extensive, national network of influentials, whose careers evolved by way of passage in and between the centres of power and decision making in American society, gives some indication of the control exerted by those same foundations over the culture of that nation (1981, pp.268-269):

"... at least from the perspective of a kind of organisational pattern developed over half a century, the inter-relations and interpenetrations reflected a triumph of ad hoc procedure. Administratively, foundations became one of the crucial foci in the training of the country's managerial elite and the creation of the research techniques and the data that the elite needed. They were part of a system which provided governments and universities with advice and staff, in turn drawing their own staff from universities and government. The course of careers from foundation to university to government and back again became the track which the United States depended upon to develop staff and leadership for its system of government, as well as ideas."

Kenneth Kusmer (1973) has developed this theme of the circulation of influentials within a network of institutions that play a significant role in shaping a nation's culture, emphasising the degree of dependency that exists between individuals within relatively small, but strategically located groups, whether in the universities - education in general - government, civil administration and social work.

Charles Levinson's book, *Vodka Cola* (1980) is based on the thesis that the phenomenon of detente is essentially ideological and the post-facto servant of an economic reality. Despite his somewhat swashbuckling approach to the problem, he nevertheless uncovers some startling evidence to support many of his assertions about the contest between the official
doctrines of East and West. In particular, his consideration of the Foundations, though confined largely to their contemporary form, serves to locate the role of those institutions in the exercise of power and the management of wealth, especially in America, but with additional reference to other nations. The following reference from Levinson's work, highlights the contemporary position of the most powerful Foundations, though the situation he refers to is rooted in the spectacular expansion of Foundation influence within areas such as higher education between the wars, (Levinson, 1980, p.159):

"In fact the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations exercise a decisive influence over political and social affairs. They direct and, if necessary, modify the development of morals, ideas, values and institutions. These private agencies take the place of public bodies and government and form an administration of their own with extensive means of pressure and ways of influencing public opinion. The fact that they represent the source of real power goes a long way to explaining why they are tolerated by politicians."

It is the reference to the direction and modification of a culture's moral and institutional structures that is of relevance to my argument; in that it implies the actual domain within which the ideas and values associated with cultural development are produced and transmitted, namely, though not exclusively, the system of higher education. There is evidence to suggest that Foundations, particularly the R.F., endeavoured through its particular programmes and projects, to engender an approach to the solution of mankind's problems (a grandiose aspiration, yet the hallowed goal of philanthropy) that entailed the selective choice of particular branches of knowledge and its exponents, which shifted significantly the fortunes of those disciplines within their institutional contexts. This in turn had implications for the manner in which a nation's 'problems' are defined, examined, understood and subsequently resolved. Such a process would seem to imply a pragmatic and yet rational approach to ending ignorance and chaos. Moreover, it also assumes that the resolution of a problem (remembering that for the Foundation, the problems most worthy of a solution had usually to be of at least national proportion) lies within the domain of those best 'qualified' to recognise and resolve it: this tends, as many Foundation programmes
do, to conceptualise problems, be they social, economic, or political as essentially technical and therefore amenable to a correspondingly instrumental approach for their resolution. Considered thus, it is understandable why, when the R.F. went in search of fundable projects, be they the extension of an institution devoted to the resolution of economic and political problems (the L.S.E.), or individuals (William Beveridge), with ideas about the need to make the social sciences more scientific and therefore likely to enhance the prospects of those working in the latter institution to solve the nation's problems, philanthropic largesse carried with it very precise implications for the most appropriate theoretical and methodological bases for the social sciences.

2.5 The Rockefeller Foundation: science as a model for morally dominative philanthropy

In its 1953 Annual Report, the R.F. presented a cautious and calculated defense of its philanthropic support of the social sciences since its incorporation of the earlier Rockefeller fund, The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial in 1929. The justification of its support for social science contained two of the major components of the funding of knowledge (in this case, via private benefaction), expressed in terms of what I have referred to above as the relationship between the nature and purpose of social science, and the subsequent construction of its agenda. The latter exercise - the construction of an agenda for social science entails the essential notion of its purpose - whereby the component disciplines are dynamic forms of knowledge, having consequences for social action. Thus the sponsors of social science are central to its contingent status and propagators of the current imperatives as defined by the funding agency. The 1953 Annual Report gives a clear indication of the rudimentary nature and purpose of R.F. social science; one adhered to since the early 1920s and of a form in keeping with that of one of its most favoured beneficiaries, William Beveridge. The author of the report considered that such a social science evidenced the following characteristics (The Rockefeller Foundation, 1953, p.19):
"There was no illusion about the rudimentary character of the so-called social sciences or about the severe limitations which are encountered in attempting to apply the methods of the physical sciences to man's own behaviour. Nevertheless, it was felt that there might be sufficient regularity about human behaviour to permit fruitful study, and that a scientific approach might evolve methods of study which, if not a direct application of the techniques developed in the older sciences, might lead to surer bases of knowledge than we now have."

And in the matter of the purpose of the social sciences as dynamic forms of knowledge (1953, p.19):

"A further impulse behind the interest in social studies was a conviction that the strengthening of our own free institutions required a better understanding of the processes of a free society and the framework within which a citizen enjoys the privileges and bears the responsibilities of liberty itself. At a period when free institutions came under challenge from totalitarian ideology of both the left and the right, it was felt that penetrating studies of our own free economic and political institutions would help them to withstand assault."

The Annual Report made repeated references to the "inevitability" of applying the methods of the natural sciences to human affairs. This somewhat elementary form of contemporary positivism remained a common feature of R.F. social science throughout the inter-war years and into the post-war era. The 1937 Annual Report gives a clear indication of the way in which R.F. Executives perceived the gradual maturity of social science from speculative to authoritative scientific disciplines (The Rockefeller Foundation, 1937, p.43):

"Gradually, although as yet only in part successfully, social studies are freeing themselves from medieval logic and preoccupation with metaphysical speculation; they are slowly cutting loose from the idea that the philosophising of armchair thinkers can take the place of observation and verification."

Again, in a similarly confident vein (1937, pp.43-44):

"The scientific observation of facts as the basis of theories in relation to political, economic and social organisation has been proved possible."
J.A. Barnes (1979) has commented on the institutionalisation of social inquiry, especially the status and utility of knowledge gained from social research, focusing on the transformation of such knowledge from what he has referred to as a passive form; the collection of information (largely descriptive), leading to informed decisions on ad hoc, social problems. The social policy that ensued as a result of such social inquiry was directed, in the main, to the solution of local problems within the community. In contrast to this, and according to Barnes' assessment of social research over the last forty years, knowledge gained from social inquiry tends to be of a more active nature. Although the results of the former type are still used today, the latter tends to be associated with applied social science, particularly vogues in social engineering and the rise of policy science. However it is Barnes' reference to social engineering and its origins that is of greater relevance to my concern with the R.F. and its sponsorship of social science at the L.S.E. As Barnes observes (1979, p.44):

"The possibility of social engineering, of sociologically informed intervention in social life, was envisaged by Jeremy Bentham and found a prolific advocate in Lester F. Ward, whose *Applied Sociology* appeared in 1904 (cf. Barnes, H.E., 1966: 126-43). In practice, sociology did not begin to be applied in this sense until after the First World War, and serious issues of public principle arose only after 1945. Speaking very broadly, sociology and economics began to be applied scientifically at much the same time, with declarations of the possibility of application before 1914..."

It is possible to gain some indication of the pragmatic nature of much of American academic culture, within which the Officers of the R.F. (who negotiated with Beveridge), would themselves have been educated. These influences would direct the Foundation's gatekeepers in their assessment of viable projects within the field of international social science. Another significant dimension of American academic culture entails the ethos and authority of science and the rise of technology, as major sources of images, vocabulary and metaphor deployed in the general construction and justification of social categories within fields of knowledge outside of the natural sciences. An understanding of the diffusion of science, its growing public visibility and influence,
is essential to an understanding of the rationale of R.F. philanthropy between the wars, and its particular effects upon the development of social science in Britain, especially its Officer's and their Programme architects' obsession with the scientific method. As Daniels (1971) has observed of the 'Progressive Era' and immediately afterwards (Daniels, 1971, pp.289-91):

"... nothing was more important to that era (Progressive Era) than 'science'. It was a word to conjure with; a word to sweep away all opposition by labelling it 'benighted', 'romantic' or 'obscure'; a word to legitimise any programme no matter what fundamental reorientations it might entail or what sacrifices it might call upon particular groups to make. In the name of science, one might reorganise a city government, fundamentally alter the relations between labour and management (sic) revolutionise a school curriculum or consign whole races of men to genetic inferiority."

The central, compelling feature of science, one which seemingly mesmerised those who stood in awe of its achievements, was its methodology. Its purported powers were accorded a virtually miraculous status by its popularisers (1971, pp.289-291):

"Progressive leaders believed that the successes of science were based upon a known technique termed the 'scientific method', and that this method could be applied to all human problems. By the beginning of the Progressive Era, American scientific popularisers were generally agreed that the scientific method, which they presented as the simplistic adding up of 'facts' relevant to a problem, was the only gateway to determining truth. Science which had been distinguished from other forms of knowledge in the early nineteenth century, had now come once again to be identified with all knowledge."

The 'success story' of science, as an exemplar for other forms of knowledge and as a code of practice (a normative structure), to be emulated by practitioners in other fields, received wider public recognition as 'pure' science became transformed into tangible objects of consumer convenience. The conversion of science into technology and its associated artifacts had a significant affect on the increasingly affluent American public (1971, p.291):
"Technology especially fired Americans' imaginations giving them unlimited hopes for the future (they) were increasingly impressed by the visible manifestations of the power of technology that had appeared at an accelerating rate since the third quarter of the nineteenth century - the same manifestation that had cleared the way for the rise of a pure science ideal among American scientists. The telephones, telegraphs and electric lights ... were more powerful arguments from the layman's point of view than the most elegant theorem of mathematical physics."

Daniels gives a clear indication of the influence of technology in shaping the public's conception of the power of science, although the image that was engendered owed more to the immediate familiarity with gadgets and public services, than the complexities of the scientific principles underlying the physical object. What is significant in this public conception of science, the disinterestedness, or deferential wonderment and ignorance of the complex and esoteric aspect of pure science, is that it reinforced and perpetuated the authority of the scientist, within and beyond the domain of his competence. I shall return to this theme when considering a similar phenomenon during the inter-war period in Britain.

Science had thus begun to make significant inroads into the hierarchy of American values. Indeed, and particularly in America, it has played an influential role as an absolute, able to justify and expected to motivate individual behaviour. Don K. Price (1965) attempts to pinpoint the reason for the rapid infusion of the ethos and authority of science within American culture, particularly the sphere of politics (Price, 1965, p.101):

"For better or worse, science escaped from the institutional domination of the older culture very early in the history of the United States, and in its relation to the administrators of academic and public affairs it has been in a position of predominant influence ever since. The traditional culture, derived from theology and the old philosophy, had comparatively little organised influence on politics; there is simply no conservative political faction of any consequence that has its intellectual roots in the old tradition, to counterbalance the newer and more radical influence in science."
Thus the natural sciences emerged as agents of industrial and political recomposition. This in turn gave rise to a construction and utility of science as a basis of cultural recomposition affecting especially the culture of work. The consequences of this have been clearly examined by Mike Hales (1982). The important change taking place in science, apart from the process of discovery, was the inherent ideological form of science, whose nature and purpose became increasingly influenced by individuals other than its practitioners. While the older conception of science as a source of power nature and subsequently a meaningful way of justifying and ordering the pursuit of knowledge remained in tact, this ancient tenet and the echo of the 'New Philosophy', transformed the ideological projection of science, especially its methods, as a force of production. Science was no longer a marginal form of practice; its relationship to economy and culture emerged within a context of new institutionalised conventions - science as morality. George Simpson has given careful consideration to the transformation of science within the modern episteme, particularly its subsequent bifurcation (science as morality) with sociology (Simpson, 1953, pp.13-14):

"But there comes a point where the conquest of nature through science and applied technology itself develops a type of culture which turns science from an enemy of convention into a bulwark of the established order. Society wins the war with science by assimilating it into existent power-relations based upon economic organisations which dwarf those who were supposed to have been emancipated."

Simpson continues with an extension of the preceding argument to encompass social science (1953, pp.14-15):

"The conquest of nature is then organised to subdue man through a system of social relations: which restricts inquiry, and application of basic findings, concerning its own workings. Morality becomes massive, not rational; and the manipulation of the masses itself becomes a technology. Natural science enslaves social science to the power-relations which its technology has made possible. And individuals, whom social science sees as the constitutive elements of a culture become not the actual or potential bearers of rationality but the receptacles of a reason in society whose chief aim is to render rational values impotent by blunting the edge of social research. Social research itself becomes part of conventional morality, and professional standing becomes judged by the statistical mores."
The importance of science, its pervasive ethos and authority within the system of values associated with American culture in the decades before the Second World War, provided a context in which social institutions like the Rockefeller Foundation and its managers could, without sacrificing the principles of the Foundation's Trustees, devise strategies and programmes to perpetuate a cultural system which served to sustain and reproduce an economic elite without which the 'Free World' would be placed in jeopardy. From such an ideological vantage-point the power of science appeared a natural ally in the promotion of morally dominative philanthropy. In many respects, the social auspices under which scientific endeavours operate are themselves representative of a prevalent morality. Science is organised through a social process that accords with conventional morality. Truth is being discovered to enhance the acquisitive aggregations which subsidise it. There is a taint of the promiscuous and mischievous about an investigation which has not taken place under proper supervision. The ideology of philanthropy served to explain, defend, and buttress this conception of the instrumentality of science. Fisher (1980, p.284) gives a clear indication of the predisposition of the Rockefeller Foundation toward the development of social science and the consequences for those same disciplines in Britain between the wars:

"During the inter-war period Rockefeller philanthropy consistently encouraged the development of the social sciences along the lines of the natural sciences. The aim was to convert these disciplines into scientific disciplines in the mode of the natural sciences. Rockefeller officers cultivated the scientific approach, that is, the 'proper attitude' toward social problems. In their terms this meant that research should be quantitative, practical and realistic. They emphasised a particular methodology and encouraged researchers to tackle the immediate problems of the age.

In the 1930s the Rockefeller Foundation was particularly concerned to see an increase in the cooperation between social scientists and the business community. They had no use for abstract theorising. Rather they wanted the social sciences to be harnessed to solving western capitalism's problems and to provide on the spot service to 'men of affairs'."
It is through an explanation and understanding of the objectives and strategies of the officers of the R.F., their somewhat grandiose schemes for selecting and funding international sites for the promotion of preferred social scientific knowledge and the expansion of the institutional and intellectual bases of the social sciences at the L.S.E. under the fostering tutelage of Beveridge, that constitute the substantive issues affecting the historical context within sociology sought to assert and sustain its autonomy during the inter-war period. Those same issues comprise elements of sociology's advocatory dimension.

2.6 The funding of William Beveridge's Natural Bases Scheme: the pursuit of a common agenda.

How important were R.F. funds to the development of social science in Britain, especially for the L.S.E. during the inter-war period? Moreover, how important was the L.S.E. to the general development of the social sciences in Britain during the same period? What were the main objectives and policies underpinning the R.F. programmes, which as I have argued, incorporated a scientistic conception of social science?

The first question has been answered by William Beveridge himself (Beveridge, 1953, p.252):

"The School would never have obtained from Beardsley Ruml and his Memorial the magnificent grants which meant so much for teachers and students throughout the School if we had not planned for the Natural Bases of Social Science."

The strategic presentation of an appropriate form of social science by Beveridge and the expression of its nature in terms of an anticipated unity of the sciences, served as the core of his advocacy of a synthetic science. The common denominator in both Beveridge's notion of a science of society and that espoused by the funding agency upon which he and the L.S.E. depended for revenue (essential for the promotion of his experiments in science-building), entailed an unshakeable belief in the techniques of modern science. The scale of private funding of the social sciences has been examined by Fisher (1980) and gives a
clear indication of the concentration of investment in developing those disciplines between the wars in Britain (Fisher, 1980, p.285):

"The two Rockefeller Foundations, the L.S.R.M. and the R.F., were responsible for approximately 95 per cent of the total expenditure (from 1919-1940 on the social sciences from the major Foundations) during this period ... There was no government research council like the Medical Research Council that dealt with the social sciences and government departments made very few research grants during the period ... It becomes apparent that the contributions from American philanthropy, far from being small, were the mainstay of the support that social science received."

Fisher also points out that the University Grants Committee did provide support for social science departments, but it was generally an extremely small proportion of all the funding of social science for the period 1919 to 1940.

The L.S.E. became a focal point for R.F. benefaction. It was, as Lord Withenshawe pointed out, "an important world centre for the social sciences, ..." (University Quarterly, May, 1948, p.260). Through the formation of the Beveridge/Rockefeller alliance, the major institutional setting of social science in Britain underwent an unprecedented change between the years 1923 and 1939. Again Fisher (1980, p.288) gives an accurate indication of the scale of subventions by the R.F. to the School:

"During the period 1923 to 1939 the Memorial and the R.F. gave approximately £430,000 (over 2 million dollars) to the L.S.E. During this same period the School expanded rapidly and came to be regarded as '... the leading centre of research in the Social Sciences ...' for '... Great Britain and the British Empire ...' and it became the leading research library for the Social Sciences in Britain."

The L.S.E. also led the field in the percentage increase of full-time students for the aforementioned period, with a corresponding increase in full-time teachers. As Fisher has observed (1980, p.288):
"As part of the general increase in enrolments, the number of students reading for higher degrees rose from 84 to 293 in those years. The L.S.E. had by the end of the 1930s become an international centre training many foreign students and was still the only institution in Britain at which undergraduate teaching was devoted exclusively to the social sciences."

The L.S.E. was also the validating agency for external degrees via the University of London, on whose Boards L.S.E. representatives served. The curricula of other universities would therefore be affected by way of the composition of syllabuses designed on the model of those within the L.S.E. The University of London's role as a validating body for degrees in the social sciences, remained an influence that persisted even after the advent of the C.N.A.A.

Further evidence of the L.S.E.'s influence upon the social sciences is contained in a published appraisal of the influence of the activities of the School on the University system of Britain. This piece of work was commissioned by the R.F. in 1937 and was reviewed in the Review of the Activities and Developments of the London School of Economics and Political Science, 1923-1937, under the sub-heading of, 'The School and Recent Developments in the Status of the Social Sciences', (1937, pp.24-28). Its general argument represented a departure from the Webb's original plans for the institution (1937, p.24):

"The years since the war have witnessed a notable development in the status of the Social Sciences in university studies, in training for certain professions and in the world of administration and business."

The Webbs had regarded the School as a socialist redoubt in the struggle to provide a viable political alternative to the Marshallian, individualist/laissez-faire economics which had as its influential centre, Cambridge. This cherished belief was undermined somewhat as Hayek, Robbins, Gregory and Cannan embraced orthodox economic theory and persisted in refining it still further. The L.S.E. of the late 1930s seemed somewhat remote
from the spirit which inflamed its founders' ideals. As Donald Winch has argued (Winch, 1969, p.58):

"Implicit in the foundation of the School was the belief that any impartial study of society would ultimately support the cause of socialism."

External students were prepared for the degrees in Economics, Law and Commerce. The Review (1937) states that most of the teaching in the social sciences done at the former University Colleges was conducted under the general subject areas previously mentioned. This was the case for the University Colleges of Exeter, Hull, Leicester, Nottingham, and Southampton. The Review also drew attention to the contribution that the School had made to other autonomous universities in the United Kingdom, Europe and elsewhere in the world, emphasising in particular its influence upon departments of Economics, Economic History, Sociology and Social Science. Emphasis was also given to a number of 'firsts' in terms of innovations and experiments in newer branches of knowledge and those perhaps older and more orthodox, but yet to receive the distinction of a Chair. Among the most noteworthy were; the Chair of Anthropology, established at the School in 1927, believed to be the first in that subject in a British university; the Chair of Legal History created in 1931, unique in Britain at that time; the institution of the Diploma in Public Administration by the University of London, for which the School had the responsibility entirely for teaching (the latter led to further development of the subject elsewhere); the institution of the School of Modern Greats at Oxford and influenced by developments which had taken place within the School; the foundation of Nuffield College as a research centre for the University of Oxford was in itself a recognition of the importance of the type of organisation of which, hitherto, the L.S.E. had been the sole representative in Britain.

Related to the preceding institutional innovations, and attributable to and within the L.S.E., is the important aspect of the distribution and destination of its graduates and scholars, funded under the R.F. Fellowship Programme. Fisher (1980) considers this to be an important
feature of the Foundation's programmes, one that found expression within a definition of education as a form of investment. He cites the Foundations as among the first organisations to apply 'a theory of human capital' to education, referring specifically to the funding of individuals who showed promise within their respective fields of expertise, (1980, p.304):

"Education, as represented by the institution or the man, was seen as a form of capital investment, the capital being the 'knowledge', 'the Brains', 'the leadership' that education produced. This view of education received expression consistently in the Rockefeller negotiations, but has been especially noticeable when Foundation officers have referred to either the larger institutional grants or their fellowship programmes. Education, in these contexts, becomes almost a special 'means of production' that will solve all society's problems."

Fisher supports his argument with a reference to the ideology of philanthropy, which may account for his contention that Foundations represent yet another manifestation of capitalism's tendency to maintain and extend a social system necessary for its preservation. In the R.F. Annual Report of 1941, the author proclaims the contribution of the social sciences to the aforementioned process (Fisher, 1980, p.305):

"... Foundation confidently believes that the work it has helped to finance in the social sciences has given this generation better men and better tools for analysis and judgement, and has contributed to the growing reserve of knowledge of human relationship and of those institutions and processes through which that relationship is organised and expressed."

'Investment in people' through the establishment of training programmes for promising graduate students within centres of excellence, became a central component of the Rockefeller policy of investment in the social sciences in Britain during the inter-war period. Moreover, preferential treatment was extended to those workers within fields who had previously established themselves as leaders in their own subject areas. This was the case for scholars such as Malinowski and Carr-Saunders, each of whom owed a considerable debt to R.F. benefaction in the pursuit of their respective researches, and subsequently, their renowned careers. Through the munificence of the R.F. Malinowski toured the American
university circuit, espousing his theory of functionalism and its crucial role within sociology. Carr-Saunders was able to undertake an extensive tour of the United States, bringing him into contact with many influential American social scientists, before accepting the Charles Booth Chair at the University of Liverpool. R.F. money played a significant part in the careers of several of Britain's most influential social scientists, enabling them to consolidate their intellectual and institutional presence within the developing disciplines.

I think it important not to portray British social scientists as unwitting pawns in a sophisticated conspiracy of American imperialism (intellectual or otherwise) with the R.F. and subsequently Beveridge as its central agents. As sophisticated and credible as Fisher's argument may be, it should be tempered by the fact that, however successfully the Foundations had been in establishing the necessity of social science to enlightened social policy in America, certain cultural, political, and therefore structural elements within British society would not necessarily ensure a similar development on a scale witnessed in America between the two world wars.

Beveridge had begun his negotiations with the Rockefeller Foundations as early as 1923. Commentators on that period, namely Jose Harris (1977), Beveridge's biographer, (and indeed Beveridge himself), refer to that date as the beginning of an epoch in the funding of Beveridge's project for a natural base to the social sciences. Although Beveridge regarded his new partnership with the R.F. as an indication of a common understanding of the need to base social science upon the principles and practice of natural science, it would seem from his account of the potential of social science, that other important factors contributed to his enthusiasm for the project. I have quoted Beveridge's reference to the conditional nature of the R.F. benefaction, and although it would seem reasonable to argue that he was conscious of the need to 'comply' with his benefactors at the risk of losing much needed finance, another reason may have influenced significantly the outcome of his early negotiations with R.F. Trustees. There existed at the time of his meetings with Beardsley Rumr of the R.F. Memorial, an unprecedented success within American social science: one which greatly enhanced
the status of those disciplines as a national asset. It sprung from the extensive and prolonged investment by the R.F. in 'its' university (Chicago) and other academic institutions, and particularly in the field of practical, 'problem solving' social research. While R.F. benefaction for medical research was a relatively safe form of philanthropy, adventures into the potentially dangerous field of social research (because of its association with policy and politics) caused considerable internal conflict within the Foundation. Nevertheless, the potential of social science as a basis of social reform appealed greatly to the Rockefellers. As Karl and Katz note (1981, p.267):

"The decision by the Rockefeller Foundation to support social science had earlier roots in John D. Rockefeller Sr.'s interest in research in economics; but such expansion in the 1920s and the support of the Social Science Research Council, the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the Institute for Government Research (later named the Brookings Institution in honour of its philanthropic founder) were all Rockefeller entries in the field of research on social science with practical intentions."

From the evidence considered here, it is not unreasonable to assume that Beveridge may have subscribed to a somewhat fiercely empiricist version of social science, prior to his appointment as Director of the L.S.E. Apart from the fact that his term of office provided an opportunity to institutionalise and develop his theories, the subsequent programme which arose for the scientific basis of the social sciences received a sustained impetus from his association with the scheme's major benefactor. Beveridge was well aware of the conditional nature of the R.F. grants, which in turn reinforced his motives for subscribing to a natural bases scheme. Not so much a conspiracy, rather the skillful management of a project that would have an effect on the development of social science in Britain over the next thirty years. Beveridge's strategy in promoting his project is clearly evident from his concession to the R.F. in allowing them to establish the order of priorities, rather than the Professorial Council to which he was accountable, (Beveridge, 1960, p.87):
"Thinking over the emphasis which Ruml had laid on our developing the Natural Bases of Social Science, I reversed the order on July 16th. In the covering letter, I said to Ruml that I had put the Natural Bases first in the memorandum, as he suggested."

The Council had made quite clear to Beveridge the need to secure endowment for specific capital projects, in addition to a Chair in Political Economy. Beveridge was well aware of this fact, yet considered the ordering of such priorities as the Director's prerogative, notwithstanding the collective wishes of his colleagues, (1960, p.85):

"There developed an interesting difference of priorities, as between Beardsley Ruml and myself, as to where money was most needed. He was attracted immensely by the idea of promoting study of the Natural Bases of the Social Sciences. But though I wanted that extension of our scope, I knew well that there were several other things for which money was indispensable to us at once."

William Beveridge was sufficiently astute in his negotiations to appreciate the consequences for the L.S.E. should he attempt to override the interests of the R.F. Sufficiently skilled in the art of grantsmanship, he knew the importance of being able to massage 'the system' to his own advantage. Of course it is important to appreciate the fact that when Beveridge recounted his early period as Director at the L.S.E., one in which he successfully attracted vast sums of R.F. money, his reconstruction of events seems to accord him the role of a somewhat influential, cunning and adroit negotiator (Beveridge, 1960, p.85):

"It became obvious, in discussion with Ruml that the School would have a far better chance of dollars for these prior needs, if it asked also for endowment of the Natural Bases."

There is no doubt that Beveridge and his colleagues did have their own plans for the development of the School, and that as far as a coincidence between their own and their major benefactor's conception of a social science, founded on the tenets of the natural sciences, no great conflict ensued. What may have been overlooked (ignored?) by Beveridge in his conformity to the conditions of R.F. grants, was the profoundly ideological
nature of the latter organisation's conception of the nature and purpose of such a social science. Officers and Trustees of the R.F. regarded social science as the most promising field of knowledge between the two world wars and into the post-war era, up to the debacle of the Reece Commission in 1954 (although the R.F. soon regained a cautious optimism thereafter). R.F. social science, its stern positivistic nature was imbued with the morally dominative philanthropy that Fisher regards as the vehicle for the transmission of a correspondingly dominative service, pursued from a position of great assurance about American, middle-class values.

There was also a more subtle and binding element to Beveridge's Natural Bases Scheme and its benefactor, one that has been referred to by Harold Laski (1930) in his criticism of the relationship between foundations and the universities, (Laski, 1930, p.174):

"The foundations do not control, simply because, in the direct and simple sense of the word, there is no need for them to do so. They have only to indicate the immediate direction of their minds for the whole university world to discover that it always meant to gravitate swiftly to that angle of the intellectual compass."

Laski has also considered the somewhat, paternalistic and subserviant aspects of grantsmanship, a theme developed in greater detail by Eduard Linderman, who perceived a more sinister function to the role of foundations as gatekeepers (Linderman, 1936, p.19):

"Foundations do not merely exercise power and control over those who accept their money. Such influence is obvious even when the foundations making grants insist to the contrary. A more subtle and much more widespread control comes about by reason of the multitude of indirect relationships in which foundations play a part. Those who accept foundation grants often turn out to be radical critics, in private, of the control which has been exercised over them and their programmes. Those who live in anticipation of receiving foundation grants are the more servile."
Laski portrayed the seeker of foundation munificence as a parasitic individual, with weather-vane attitudes in keeping with those of his or her potential benefactor. Such individuals sought to curry favour with the representatives of foundations, particularly on the campuses of the American universities and colleges (Laski, 1930, p.170):

"When you see him at a college, it is like nothing so much as the vision of an important customer in a department store. Deferential salesmen surround him on every hand anticipating his every wish, alive to the importance of his good opinion, fearful lest he be dissatisfied and go to their rival across the way. The effect on him is to make him feel that he in fact is shaping the future of the social sciences."

Laski considered that such a 'feeling' was in fact, a concrete strategy of foundations, being clearly mapped-out in their famous Programmes. Again, Linderman has cited another example of the foundations' strategies for influencing the development of a particular branch of knowledge (Linderman, 1936, pp.19-20):

"Another device for projecting foundation control has become popular in recent years: foundations frequently supply the initial funds for a new project, these funds to be used for exploratory and conferencing purposes. In many cases the foundation acts as host for such preparatory groups. By the time the final project is formulated it becomes clear that nothing will be proposed or performed which may be interpreted as a challenge to the orthodox conception of value which characterises foundations as a whole. Very few important cultural projects of any size are consummated in this country without having experienced either the direct or indirect impact of foundation philosophy and influence."

Although Linderman was referring to America between the wars, his observations have been confirmed by those who have endeavoured to trace the connection between private benefaction and the production of knowledge within an historical and cultural context (cf. Fisher, 1980). In many respects, Fisher has expanded Linderman's earlier thesis (Linderman, 1936, p.12):
"In other words, foundations do not represent a "conspiracy" on the part of the guardians of vested wealth designed to influence culture in one direction. More accurate would be the statement that these vested funds represent a consistently conservative element in our civilisation, and that wherever their appropriations are accepted there enters at the same time this subtle influence in the direction of protecting the value system in existence, that is, conserving the status quo."

Both Linderman's and Laski's criticisms came in an era when large-scale funding from state agencies was virtually non-existent, and in spite of the fact that such strictures might have offended the sensibilities of the executives of the foundations.

Before the large-scale investment of R.F. funds in British social science, the Foundation concentrated its efforts in consolidating the position of those disciplines within the system of higher education in America. Perhaps the greatest monuments to that enterprise were the establishment of the American S.S.R.C. and the University of Chicago. However, the direction of R.F. funding was to shift from a concentration upon the institutional centres within which social science would emerge, to that of investment in specific 'fields of interest.' Thus from the middle 1930s R.F. programmes in the social sciences were directed toward, "... realistic training and research in the social sciences." The Annual Report of 1935 gives a clear indication of this transition within the funding of knowledge, and although it is in the main, directed toward an assessment of the influence of the R.F. upon American social science, it is possible to detect the implications for those same disciplines in Britain within the wider context of R.F. support. The aspirations of Rockefeller executives via programme policy became enmeshed in the conditional features of their grants. This in turn would, as my consideration of Beveridge's crusade demonstrated, have consequences for a form of social science that did not depart too far from the one envisaged by its benefactor. The R.F. considered its successes in American social science as proof of the value of its investment policy and the vehicle of the programme as the means of effecting change within a field of knowledge. Success in the metropolis would mean success in the satellite countries where the R.F. increasingly directed its attention, especially within the field of social science.
Thus the R.F. began to run down its allocation of resources for specific institutional research programmes (particularly in the U.S.) although some ground-work needed to be done in Britain, instead, directing its efforts toward the development of (R.F. Annual Report, 1935, p.194):

"... specific areas of activity which hold possibilities of aiding in the solution of pressing social problems."

The purpose of R.F. social science reflected a trend in social research that had gained considerable recognition and prestige from the recent Social Trends project of 1933; an experiment in policy research commissioned by the then president Herbert Hoover. Foundation programmes were exported to the L.S.E. in the form of grants that possessed a specific earmarked component to complete previously financed 'institutional research programmes'. The following table gives an indication of the scale and nature of the resources provided by R.F. benefaction in 1935.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of facilities for research and postgraduate teaching</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of land</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library development</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research in the social sciences</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant to end Foundation support of 'Institutional Research Programmes'</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$292,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Even taking into consideration the rate of exchange and the relative value of the pound then (middle 1930s), in comparison to today's value, the scale of R.F. benefaction was considerable. In fact it exceeded
the amount from public sources in Britain for the funding of social science. In his paper, Fisher (1980, pp.299-300), states quite categorically the motives of those given to such generosity:

"Rockefeller philanthropy had, during the inter-war years, clearly defined policies. The officers had explicit objectives which were pursued unremittingly, objectives that emerged from discussions in New York rather than negotiations in London, Oxford or Cambridge ... Rockefeller philanthropy was not impartial, did not react to proposals that emerged independently. Instead, its officers pursued explicit goals and were actively involved in preparing the proposals that were made to the foundations."

A meticulous approach to the establishment of a sound, institutional base for the social sciences in satellite countries is evident in the R.F. annual reports of the 1930s. Such a solid institutional base was regarded as an essential prerequisite to the subsequent support for the 'production' of individual social scientists possessing the necessary expertise to develop training and research programmes, in addition to comprehensive postgraduate schools. Europe was regarded as a sphere of undeveloped potential for the kind of social science that the R.F. had underwritten in the United States. While the L.S.E. was receiving an increasingly larger proportion of the revenue directed toward its European ventures, the University of Paris was also earmarked as a centre of "realistic research" in the social sciences during the late 1920s and early 1930s (Annual Report, 1935, pp.198-199):

"In 1934 a formal request (was received) from the University of Paris for an appropriation to further research in the social sciences, for which a base had been carefully laid."

The Officers of the Foundation were committed to remedying "... the retarded development of realistic research in the social sciences in France ..." by urging the "... importance of the projected programme ..." and subsequently granting tens of thousands of dollars over a period of five years, (1935, p.199).
Stockholm University received considerable financial support from the R.F. in order to employ an American sociologist to train postgraduate students to "... undertake concrete investigations" (1935, pp.198-199). As in the case of the French experiment, funds were provided on a conditional basis. Furthermore, the case of the University of Paris demonstrated the production of a programme that met a central criterion of R.F. benefaction of that period: work within the social sciences must direct itself toward the solution of, "... important current questions..." (1935, p.199).

I have considered briefly above, the importance that the R.F. attached to its Fellowship Programme. It is equally important to appreciate the significance of the Foundation's 'investment in brains' during the late 1920s and '30s, as it formed an integral part of its overall strategy to expand its interest in the social sciences through the medium of the programme, rather than by an extension of its earlier concern with establishing the institutional base of those disciplines.

The R.F. continued to pursue abroad, the philosophy of its fellowship programme so well developed within the system of higher education in America. The latter is evident in its relationship with the S.S.R.C. in the United States. In fact the R.F.'s influence was of a multiple nature in terms of underwriting the support of chosen influentials within the field of social science. Not only did it fund directly the sponsorship of fellowships within the various university departments, but continued through its financial support of the S.S.R.C., to fund the latter's own programmes. The following table gives some indication of the balance between the two sources of fellowship support, emphasising the importance attached to it by the R.F. through both its direct and indirect subvention of the scheme.
Summary of New Fellowship Appointments in the Social Sciences made by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Social Science Research Council from 1924-1935.


The R.F.'s officers possessed very clear ideas about the purpose of the fellowship programme, which in turn implied equally precise ideas on the nature of the research it expected from those whom they financed (Annual Report, 1935, p.200):

"... to furnish opportunities for promising young scholars in the several social science disciplines to broaden their experience and to develop capacity for making useful contributions to research."

What passed as 'useful contributions to research' was bound up in the chosen R.F. Programme of the moment, i.e. social security, international relations, public administration and other socially ameliorative projects. This attitude to both the nature and purpose of social science and its research initiatives, the former, a rigorous pursuit of factual data, the latter, the transformation of research into enlightened social policy for benevolent social control, became the hallmarks of the R.F.'s conception of social science for export, and appeared as a most attractive import to customers like William Beveridge. I have examined previously the consequences of such a vision of social science above. The R.F. actively sought to support social scientists who displayed the qualities of leadership within their chosen field and who may have also possessed
the potential to carry such influence beyond the realm of academia into centres of power within government and civil administration. Grants, sponsorship and fellowships followed in the wake of Rockefeller recognition. Investment in individuals (human capital), represented a carefully nurtured strategy for the R.F. (Rockefeller Annual Report, 1949, p. 46):

"These fellowships represent investments in men and in the future. They are investments in intellectual capacity, imagination and character. A Foundation can find no better use for its money."

Although a somewhat mechanistic notion of the production of an intellectual elite, it is nevertheless, in accord with what I have referred to previously as the R.F.'s instrumental approach to the method by which appropriate forms of social knowledge can be produced and subsequently converted into enlightened social policy. The latter process could only be facilitated (as far as R.F. social science was concerned), through a rigorous pursuit of a natural scientific approach to the problems of the world. There is evident in such a conception of social science, an explicit ideological component which characterises scientism; to the extent that the accumulation of codified knowledge can substitute for politics and ideology as the matrix of social choices or norms of collective conduct. The ethos and authority of science had been a significant factor in creating such an illusion and may account for the close analogy between the preoccupation of science with manageable problems and a concomitant claim of a decline of ideology, and the growth of professional expertise in politics and business. Rockefeller Foundation funding policy for the social sciences was pursued with a clear view of increasing the bureaucratisation and professionalisation of government and industry and in promoting the growth of scientific approaches to management and administration. Such goals may have been attainable within the administrative and governmental structures of American society, but for reasons alluded to above, such a purpose for social science, although in keeping with the aspirations of William Beveridge, was an unlikely prospect, in view of the contrasts with similar institutions in British society. The similarity between Beveridge and R.F. social science,
in terms of its specific nature, implied a cumulative process of collecting scientifically certified facts or truths, which carried the force of socially compelling laws.

Certainly the value of R.F. fellowships to aspiring British social scientists could not be overlooked. Such a programme provided a convenient medium to extend an individual's influence beyond professional and academic circles within Britain. The L.S.E., Oxford and Cambridge certainly took advantage of the R.F. fellowship programme. The latter scheme had, as I pointed out above, enabled Malinowski to visit America and present his functional view of anthropology to many of the notable social scientists of that nation. His attendance at the annual conference of the American S.S.R.C. in 1926 provided an occasion to argue for a form of sociology (the institutional and functional) that sought the establishment of definite laws of social process. Although he also regarded the introduction of scientific methods into anthropology as crucial to the advance of that discipline, he nevertheless perceived an important role for sociology within the wider field of social science.

Accompanying the growing trend toward specialisation within the various branches of social science, came a move toward professionalisation of its practitioners. The existence of 'proven' influentials within the different disciplines became a crucial factor in successfully negotiating resources essential to their future development. The R.F. sought investment in both individuals (human capital) and institutions (centres of excellence) which demonstrated a purportedly shared conception of the nature and purpose of social science, yet determined largely on the basis of criteria propounded by the benefactor. In an era when the funding of social research depended largely on private sources, the relationship between benefactor and beneficiary was of critical importance. Personalities and the depth of relationships were, as the consideration of the Beveridge crusade has demonstrated, significant factors in the development of social science at the L.S.E. This is made quite clear by the author of the R.F.'s Annual Report of 1953, (p.29) when observing the effects of the Foundation's international interests, especially in fields like the social sciences:
"... the Foundation has sought the most fertile ideas, the most urgent needs, the most capable men, and the most promising institutions wherever they could be found."

The preceding quotation contains the essential components of the funding of knowledge, whether in relation to private or public sources, although the latter process does entail the additional feature of allegedly neutral, intermediary agencies. While notions of 'the most fertile ideas, the most urgent needs, the most capable men, and the most promising institutions' can be employed as criteria for determining the distribution of resources to and within any branch of knowledge, the consequences for subjects like the social sciences, tends to emphasise their particularly vulnerable position within the modern episteme, especially their cultural tension as moral forms of social thought and action.

In considering the role of the R.F. in the development of social science at the L.S.E. during the inter-war period, I have endeavoured to examine the intellectual and institutional context within which sociology struggled to exist. Although I have confined my analysis generally to Beveridge's experiment in social science, it was essential to understand sociology's marginal, and certainly contested form during a period when the individual social sciences were consolidating their positions both within and outside of the L.S.E. Increasing specialisation and emerging professionalisation within the social sciences added increasingly to the confusion and contention over sociology's professed autonomy. Fragmentation of the discipline gave rise to a significant and quite distinct cleavage of its intellectual and institutional forms. The competition for the discipline's only Chair had been 'won' by exponents of a socio-philosophical approach to sociological analysis, whereas those who persistently contested such a perspective, remained without substantial representation in higher education. The latter necessity had featured significantly on all the agendas and programmes produced by those sociologists who viewed such an achievement as an essential stage in the discipline's career.
In concentrating on William Beveridge's crusade for social science, I have attempted to emphasise the importance of examining the funding of knowledge, not only in terms of its influence upon the connection between cognitive form and institutional context, but also its necessarily conditional nature. Furthermore, in presenting the evidence to support my argument on the funding of social science at the L.S.E. for the period in question, I have attempted to demonstrate both the importance and significance of the use of strategic and tactical arguments as components of the art of grantsmanship. The deployment of such a strategic discourse enabled those negotiating the resources vital to the development of the social sciences, to make claims on behalf of the disciplines without specific reference to their substantive content. Thereafter, constant reference to the promise, or potential of social science formed the basis of negotiations and subsequently sustained the discourse between benefactor and beneficiary. The extraordinary role of the R.F. in the making of British social science did not end with the outbreak of the Second World War. Indeed, it continued to influence the development of those sciences in the early years of the war and into the immediate post-war era. This is an episode which involved organisations and individuals crucial to the outcome of the debate initiated by the Parliamentary Committee on Social and Economic Research (1946), commissioned toward the end of the Second World War, and to which I shall return during the course of the next chapter.

With Beveridge's resignation as Director of the L.S.E., and the failure of the experiment in social biology, it appeared that the Natural Bases Scheme initiated by the School's Director under the guidance of representatives of the R.F., had not given the social sciences the direction and impetus so desirous of its architects. Although Lancelot Hogben and Beveridge may have considered their project a wasted effort, the institutional and intellectual expansion of social science at the L.S.E. had nevertheless occurred, and largely within the framework envisaged by its major benefactor. The latter process was a considerable success when estimating the central role of the L.S.E. in generally influencing the course of social science in Britain, both within the inter-war period and the decades following the last war. Making the social sciences more 'scientific' had been achieved, though possibly not to the degree,
nor the extent envisaged by William Beveridge. The exploration of the 'borderland subjects' which purportedly lay between the more technically advanced, empirical social sciences, and the natural sciences, (emphasising the crucial role of social biology in bridging such a cognitive and technical gap) became a project that faltered increasingly as a result of the somewhat intolerant and uncompromising position adopted by its central exponent, Lancelot Hogben. Economists, demographers, political scientists and other practitioners within the various social sciences had sought to introduce what they considered to be more scientific methods into their respective disciplines, despite the often excessive claims being made for such a methodology by William Beveridge. Moreover, other preoccupations diverted their attention away from the more unquestioning zealots of the 'new science', namely, the increased move toward specialisation and a concern to professionalise branches of the social sciences in response to the demands that were being made upon those disciplines from outside the confines of academia. Members of the Department of Sociology at the L.S.E. had been severely criticised for their reluctance to participate in Beveridge's Natural Bases project. Both Hobhouse and Ginsberg saw merit in a rigorous approach to the study of society, but neither were willing to sacrifice the benefits of a socio-historical and ethical/psychological approach to social analysis, especially for the sake of a methodology which appeared to derive its compelling necessity more from the dubious 'hard sell' by its major exponents, than from any convincing demonstration of its intrinsic logicality.

Explaining the tenuous relationship between sociology and the other social sciences during the inter-war period, especially the development of the latter disciplines at the L.S.E. and the plight of the sociologists in attempting to establish their discipline at the heart of a synoptic science of society, requires consideration of evidence which, upon examination, is not easily contained and presented within conventional historical accounts. Variation within sociology, (its contested forms) and those of its practitioners who sought to establish the supremacy of one form over that of another, became gradually aware of the relevance of their debates to the developments taking place within other branches of the social sciences.
Social research was not the prerogative of sociology. The generic term sociological may have sufficed as an inclusive category for the investigation of social phenomena (usually through the social survey) but those given to practicing 'social' research were not necessarily sociologists (cf. T.H. Marshall, 1967, p.361). Indeed, there was common and widespread confusion over the precise intellectual and organisational activity that ought to be included within the amorphous category of sociology. This problem was compounded further by the disagreement over which disciplines actually constituted the field of social science. These problems have also made it difficult for the historian to discover sociology within the proliferation of social sciences between the wars.

Sociology's quest for autonomy faltered through internal disputes over its nature and purpose. Its claim to possess a discrete corpus of theory and methods was continually undermined by other social scientists who in criticising sociology, sought to question its practitioners' claims that despite its relative infancy as science, its potential as an instrument of social analysis and social change, more than compensated for its apparent intellectual and organisational shortcomings. Sociology appeared to be losing ground within the general advance of inter-war social science.

However, with the onset of the Second World War, the nature, scale, location and composition of the participants in the debate about the nature and purpose of social science, would alter significantly the fortunes of those disciplines in the decades to come. What had been largely intra-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary concerns for social scientists, would now become an agenda item for Government consideration and action. Sociology was about to confront the 'national interest'. What opportunities could it seize in the light of its inter-war experiences?
CHAPTER THREE

The emergence of the national interest: a context for the evaluation of knowledge
The Emergence of the National Interest: A Context for the Evaluation of Knowledge

1. The Second World War: from national crisis toward social reconstruction.

I concluded the previous chapter by posing the question: what opportunities would sociology seize in response to emerging national needs occasioned by the outbreak of a prolonged period of war? Sociology had, by the late 1930s, reached a rather crucial stage in its development. Its claims of intellectual and institutional autonomy had been contested from two quarters within the general intellectual and institutional milieu of the social sciences during the inter-war period. The first, within Britain's major centre of teaching and research in the social sciences, the L.S.E. The second, during the course of three consecutive and important annual conferences devoted to the theme on the relationship between the various social sciences, with special reference to sociology.

The title of the current chapter denotes the nature of the socio-historical context within which sociology would confront a significantly different set of imperatives than those associated with its inter-war odyssey. Within the latter experience, the discipline and its practitioners endeavoured to contest and establish the nature and purpose of sociology as an essentially, internally generated debate and within the general boundaries of the wider field of social science. However, with the outbreak of the Second World War, and the attendant social upheaval, fundamental and far-reaching changes occurred affecting the order of knowledge. Sociology and the other social sciences, their relationship to all other forms of knowledge within the episteme and its cultural limitations, were severely ruptured with the outbreak of the war and the subsequent period of social reconstruction following it. The phenomenon of the national need became the predominant imperative for the justification of forms of social control unprecedented in the course of the nation's history. It is within the context of the production of knowledge and the national need that I intend to examine the development of sociology.
during and immediately after the Second World War. It is also my intention to incorporate within an examination of the national need, a consideration of a cultural phenomenon, though emerging during the inter-war period, would nevertheless serve as an essential, intellectual and organisational resource for not only an increasingly larger number of social scientists, but politicians, civil servants and other influential groups within wartime Britain. Considered thus, what I shall refer to as the science movement, possessed political, economic, intellectual and social dimensions which engendered a series of imperatives gaining substance and expression, largely through the ethos and authority of science. The science movement also provided a strategic model (and associated discourse) for the institutionalisation of knowledge and practice. This in turn led to the eventual establishment of a national framework for the funding of knowledge and associated criteria for the acquisition and disbursement of state funds to this end. The war, the attendant emergence of the national interest, the consolidation and influence of the science movement and the process of the evaluation of knowledge on the basis of a series of expedient imperatives, formed the complex milieu in which sociology would again strive to assert its autonomy.

In focusing on the case of the social sciences and especially sociology, I will concentrate on the nature of the debate about the social function of social science, in contrast to its inter-war form. Before I can proceed with any of these tasks, it is essential to consider briefly, some of the fundamental changes that occurred in British society as a result of a prolonged period of war. This will provide important social, economic and political detail to the context within which the analysis will proceed.
The Second World War was, to employ a rather overworked phrase, a watershed in the history of sociology's development in Britain. It was a period of opportunity and opportunism. A chance to transform the pre-war project for a sociologically centred social science into a project which transcended its pre-war, inter-disciplinary parochialism, to an issue of potentially national importance. The perceived role for sociology in the future would evolve within an atmosphere of initially limited national debate. The opportunity for sociology, as indeed the other social sciences, resided in the existence of an appropriate medium for recasting its intrinsic nature and social purpose. The vehicle for such a programme would be the post-war phenomenon of large-scale, social and economic research, or at least that was the intention of its architects (both social scientists and politicians), a debate animated by the pervasive notion of social reconstruction and the growing commitment to the potential of planning. The debate in question began long before the cessation of hostilities, and immediately engaged the attention and participation of not only academics and politicians, but civil servants and to an increasing extent, the general public. It was against this background of social and intellectual reconstruction and the growth of political commitment in favour of increased social and economic research, that social science was to engender a 'public' image. If the transition to peace and the construction of a new post-war world was to proceed in a manner envisaged by politicians, academics and the general population, then information about the social structure of Britain, upon which wide-ranging social policies were to be wrought, would become a matter of priority. Social science, including sociology, moved to the centre of the political stage.

Although some branches of the social sciences (namely psychology) were actively engaged in the prosecution of the war itself, others were regarded as better able to participate in winning the peace. Crucial to the question of the potential of social science in the latter role
was the nature and purpose of those disciplines as conceived by individuals other than social scientists. This also applied to a conception of their cognitive products: in what sense was the latter knowledge specific to the particular theoretical and methodological practices of social science, rather than 'information', often construed by non-social scientists as the raw material for conversion into enlightened social policies. This is both a crucial and complex matter and I will consider it in due course.

The exigencies of war wrought massive and permanent changes of an unprecedented nature on the social organisation of British society. Every institution and organisation, ancient and contemporary, every custom and practice, every citizen experienced the disruptive effects of war. The control of production, the rationalisation of public administration, reorganisation of the economy on a war footing, the efficient distribution of goods and services, indeed the control and direction of all the productive energies of the nation's population toward the 'war effort' became the sole, sustaining social activity for the six years that Britain was at war. The scale of this enterprise was unprecedented in the history of the British people. Forced into prominence as a result of this mammoth task of organisation and control came the expert. Whether the 'boffin' of back room origin, concerned with military matters of destruction, or, the civil servant or local administrator intent upon the formulation and administration of social policy, the demands of war meant that the commodity of expertise was at a premium for the successful conduct of hostilities. An important constituent of the growth and diffusion of technical expertise, as a fundamental element in the active processes of warfare, was a corresponding growth in the level of prestige accorded to those individuals and organisations able to demonstrate their essential contribution to the salvation of the nation.

Invention and discovery, adaptation, artificiality and impermanence, all wrought their permanent effects upon the social structure and consciousness of the people of Britain. Reaction to the profound changes brought about by war created expectations and insights which carried over into the post-war era.
A remarkable feature of wartime Britain was the transformation which occurred in the political and economic management of the nation, despite the composition of the coalition government. The economy was mobilised to its highest point when there were no more labour or gold reserves left and Britain devoted a high proportion of her resources to actually fighting the war. In order to defeat the onslaught of Nazism, Britain adopted collectivist and socialist policies. Churchill, who constantly talked of liberty, was considered by his opponents to be a dictator who mobilised women and children in the factories and mines. Whatever the outward form of the government, the Emergency Powers Act of May 1940 gave it absolute power. This was necessary, but it was not Conservative or Liberal policy, and the war effort thus brought a swing to ideas put forward during the 1930s in favour of a managed economy, planning, a welfare state and nationalisation. Circumstances converted many to ideas previously thought impossible, and the impact of total war compelled the government to pass measures which laid the basis for the acceptance of Labour plans in 1945. Bevin, Cripps and Beveridge emerged as the well-known names on the home front, and Labour, by running the home policy cabinet committees, came to have a dominant voice, while Churchill was more concerned with strategy and diplomacy.

Reconstruction became a prominent feature of both parliamentary and public debate as early as 1939 - the year in which war broke out. The main impetus for reform came from Labour, and this naturally aroused Tory fears as the ethos of reconstruction emerged as a developing theme in debates on most issues, whether they were directly connected with the conduct of the war, or, to do with the 'home front'. The latter provided the central context for reconstructionist politics. Reform was based on three main ministries: Reconstruction, under Woolton, Health under Willink; and Town and Country Planning under Reith. The war years with their upheavals and strains came after a period that many regarded as lacking in progress. But the same period had provided a wide range of new ideas and during the war, these were turned into practical politics by distinguished reformers. New ideas accepted by the establishment were to form the basis of economic and social thinking until the mid-1970s. They were to change fundamentally the direction of government action and to prepare the way for a collectivist, egalitarian, welfare state.
Politicians, especially within the Labour Party and the left in general were quick to respond to a growing tendency within large sections of the working class and groups of liberal intellectuals, to actively criticise aspects of the war effort, particularly members of the military and political leadership. There was a noticeable change in the social and political consciousness of the population, a phenomenon reflected in the warning issued to parliament by Clement Attlee of the betrayal of the people after the First World War (Parliamentary Debates, 1939, pp.20-21):

"We remember what happened at the end of the last war - derelict areas, derelict industries, derelict human beings ... what kind of Britain is going to emerge after this war?"

And to emphasise the significance of the deprivations and devastation of war with regard to its eventual outcome (1939, p.21):

"This struggle involves us all, and it is going to have the most profound effect on the social structure of this country."

Although I will be examining the role of Attlee in the establishment of the Clapham Committee in a later part of the argument, his warning to the House at such an early stage of the war, coupled to his perception of the effects upon the social structure of Britain of prolonged hostilities, highlight not only a shrewd political awareness, but also an ability to perceive fundamental social change as it occurred. For him, the war represented a supreme, collective effort in pursuance of a common end - victory. Victory however, beyond the field of battle and to the peace. His reference to a struggle involving 'us all', can reasonably be construed as the effect of the war on the existing class divisions within society for that period (1939, pp.22-23):

"Collectivism is being forced upon the government by the logic of events ... if you want to win this war you will have to have a great deal of practical socialism."
Although Attlee was addressing the House in November 1939, just two months after the outbreak of hostilities, he, amongst others, would urge Parliament that (1939, p.23):

"Our people are asking: for what are we fighting? What kind of world, what kind of Britain will emerge from this war?"

Parliamentary debates subsequently took on a new dimension. While the business of the House necessarily revolved around the conduct of the war, the themes of reconstruction and planning became issues of major importance. Early debates on both the former and latter subjects inevitably contained references to the track records of past administrations, particularly for the period following the First World War. The social, political and economic elements of post-war reconstruction thus became significant features of the different political parties' programmes for peace. Politicians of both left and right adopted the notion with varying degrees of commitment and for both genuine and alterior motives. For many Labour and socialist politicians, topics relating to reconstruction became virtual manifesto statements for a future majority government. Conservatives tended to make cautious, ambiguous, paternalistic and non-committal noises on a subject that they regarded as essentially impractical and dangerously utopian: as Chamberlain said at the time (1939, p.30):

"... we do not yet know enough about the changes which will inevitably have taken place before the end of the war to give us confidence that it is possible to-day to make a plan which will be useful then."

For the Prime Minister and his colleagues, it was, at least in the early days of the war, better to, "wait and see ... win the war first" (1939, p.30). A policy of 'wait and see' epitomised the Conservative element of the wartime coalition government in many areas of post-war reconstruction issues, a marked contrast to the confident and forthright approach of Labour politicians who believed that they sensed a change in the minds of the people. As Immanuel Shinwell prophesied in the House during the period of a possible invasion of Britain (Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 418, 1940-41):
"Is the Hon. Gentleman aware that it is going to be mighty difficult to ignore the constructive proposals of the Labour party after the war?"

And in support of such a prediction, a Mr. Sloane M.P. asked (1940-41; Vol. 418):

"... millions of working class workers who are regimented in the military and industrial machine in this fight for democracy are looking forward to the complete socialisation of industry."

Although seemingly premature in anticipation of the outcome of the war and the political complexion of the peace-time government, such remarks displayed a growing awareness amongst increasing numbers of politicians, that the mood of the people was changing, be they in industry or bearing arms.

Throughout the war many White Papers and reports were produced which provided information for the incoming government in 1945. In many respects, those documents served as blueprints for the social and economic structure of British society after the war. The content and tone of the reports and White Papers varied considerably. Those of the Coalition Government were cautious; those by independent observers more radical. There was also a fierce debate about new ideas. Keynesian economics, planning, welfare economics and state education were not accepted without a murmur. But the overall impression of that period is that planning was accepted.

The blueprints for social and economic reform were also made possible by the close cooperation of what Peter King (1980) has referred to as 'the consensus establishment' that had been growing in the 1930s. The latter had been engendered by the desire to examine the role of the state and to combat extremism, combined with the seriousness of the economic crisis and the collapse of political norms in many countries, which led to a wider questioning of the historical controversy between individualism and socialism. In the midst of the political and cultural contest of extremes of left and right during the 1930s, there emerged
a consensus in politics based on a need to find a new basis for Western capitalist society after the old basis had been eroded in the aftermath of the First World War. Although the exigencies of war gave the practice of large scale planning a necessity and direction quite different from its nascent pre-war form, the latter movement toward a planned, modernised and rationalised economy was at the centre of the emergent political consensus. A managed, mixed economy was to be the answer to the ills of the depression and Britain's still declining position. Thus planning was to be extended to a wide field of human activities, including leisure, to utilise resources and create a civilised society, while social policy was to be based on a welfare state which was ever increasing its benefits and thereby raising living standards. Central to the process of planning was the fusion of the ethos and authority of science, with a basic moral predisposition toward social need and welfare (expressed within political writing, party programmes and generally at the core of social policy and research). Scientists like Julian Huxley advocated social reform during the inter-war years, and viewed the importance of social science within the context of instruments to effect beneficial social change, providing its researches were based on a rigorous pursuit of facts. A number of initiatives appeared in the 1930s, with the purpose of developing a gradual transformation of British society. Thus was set in motion a gradualist/progressive movement toward social change that did not pose a revolutionary threat to the established order, yet met the criticisms of Labour, that change must exceed ineffectual state benevolence. The influential organisation Political and Economic Planning (P.E.P.) and its journal of the same name embodied much of the active commitment toward the potential of a rationally planned political and economic order. In 1931, P.E.P. began publication. By 1935 it had grown sufficiently in both confidence and influence to publish a project entitled 'The Next Five Years' (1935). This was followed two years later by 'A Programme of Priorities' (1937). Among P.E.P.'s proposals were nationalisation, financial planning, extended welfare, progressive taxation, a national economic 'general staff', a national development board and educational change. Those involved in P.E.P. came from a wide field of public life, and included Sir Josiah Stamp, Israel Sieff, Lord Allen, Lionel Curtis, J.A. Hobson, Gilbert Murray, H.G. Wells
and Archbishop Temple. Inevitably, both major political parties began to take an interest in P.E.P.'s work. The government responded by appointing Sir Montague Barlow (1937) to investigate population, and his report was one of the major blueprints for wartime planning of peacetime Britain.

Changes to the system of state welfare, though modest by post-war standards, was underway in the period between the wars. This must be borne in mind when assessing the impact of war upon a process which had its roots in the incremental advances in state provision for the 1920s and '30s. The social change brought about by the Second World War and a redefinition of the national need served to redirect, enhance and focus political attention upon the practical necessity and immediate benefits of large-scale planning for beneficial social control.

In examining the impact of war on culture, or as Marwick (1974) has termed it, 'war's interaction with society', I have endeavoured to consider the reshaping of the historical and structural context within which knowledge is correspondingly reshaped and changed. The contexts and contingencies of war modified social and cultural conditions which in turn, engendered a corresponding series of objectives and interests articulated within notions of the national need. The evaluation of ideas and practical skills became established on principles and precepts quite different from other historical periods. Expediency, relevance and responsiveness to urgent and specific imperatives provided the categories within which to assess and ascribe the value and substance of various forms of knowledge. The social sciences, including sociology neither withdrew, nor were they excluded from the latter process. I wish now to focus greater attention upon those disciplines, the manner in which the reordering of knowledge arose, the resources, images and strategies employed both to ascribe and claim differential value for one form of knowledge over another.
2. The national need: a context for change and control

Marwick, perhaps more than any other historian of the effects of war on a society, has managed to extend and develop an explanatory and organising model to account for social change in Britain between the years, 1939 and 1945. His "four tier model" (Marwick, 1974, pp.11-14) and its use for explaining and analysing the social consequences of war, represents a marked departure from more conventional historical accounts. In applying his model to the period in question, Marwick suggests an interesting effect, or to use his term 'test', brought about by the 'challenge' of war to an organised society. This notion of a test, when considered in conjunction with other elements of his model, (namely 'participation' and the 'psychological' experience), are suggestive of, but remain unstated in his analysis, of a concept employed universally throughout the war as a device to effect change and maintain control in every sphere of human endeavour: this I shall refer to as the national need.

The meaning, history and usages of the concept of the national need, or alternatively, the national interest, has been examined in some detail by Joseph Frankel (1970). I do not intend to consider the notion of the national need as a philosophical concept, rather, I wish only to draw upon the significance of its usage within the socio-historical contexts that form the parameters of my examination of the development of sociology in Britain.

As a category of political analysis, the national interest has been examined in varying detail by several authors; Rosenau (1968), Beard (1934), Morgenthau (1966), Wolfers (1962) and Osgood (1953). In fact, there is a dearth of material dealing specifically with the concept, although it emerges as a frequent component of the discourse on ideology, especially within the field of the sociology of knowledge, and more specifically, Marxist critiques associated with the latter branch of sociology.
In most accounts of the nature and function of ideology, the national interest remains an unexpressed ideological assumption amongst the baggage of false consciousness. Although Frankel examines the national interest as a central element in the foreign policies of national states, the concept applies equally to the domestic issues of individual countries. The formulation of the national interest, the process, the agencies involved, the images, motivations and values of those who determine the nature and purpose of such interests or imperatives, will feature during the course of my examination of its relevance to the differential value ascribed to various forms of knowledge on the basis of the categories and objectives outlined above. My major concern with the national need will be as an instrument of political action, serving as a means of justifying, denouncing or proposing policies.

It would be tempting to explain away the notion of the national interest as merely a myth, but this would deny the crucial significance of its often vivid and powerful imagery. Whether it is expressed as a manifestation of a ruling class, as a device to hoax the masses, or, as the true and logically necessary aspirations of 'the party' as vanguard of the people,* the interests of the nation and its custodians are never the monopoly of a single, perpetual social group. Such a view would tend to deny the significance of history. Nor is the idea of the national interest simply a rhetorical device for the purposes of political deception. This view tends to underestimate the depth and complexity of a nation's

* Cf. Eccleshall (1976); Kay (1979); and Therborn (1979).
culture and political practices. Nor can the notion of the national interest be considered as a collective representation of the purported existence of the 'common good', as this tends to imply a perfect accommodation among interacting partial interests. Furthermore, if national needs, priorities, initiatives, strategies and imperatives are presented as derivatives of purportedly rational political decisions, this may be considered as highly suspect, as even a cursory analysis would reveal a high incidence of the non-rational, emotive elements of sheer stupidity and of chance. In fact there is an element of circularity in the latter process, as political decisions are themselves often no more than expressions of what currently passes as the national interest.

Between the years, 1939 and 1945, it is possible to detect several elements, or components of the national interest, at least to the extent that they convey a focused and coordinated effort toward a universal goal - victory over an enemy which had threatened the nation's very existence. The state exercised considerable control over its citizens in order to achieve this. Political exhortation and the subtleties of propaganda served to diminish overt political resistance to achieving an end to hostilities. Within the need to achieve such an end can be found the antecedents of the objectives and interests which would sustain those who regarded the war as a means for achieving a re-ordering of society, beginning in the period of reconstruction. Thus we have, as argued above, the emerging discourse of reconstruction in the midst of imminent invasions; the pursuance of an extraordinary scale of planning, though ostensibly for the duration, it was regarded by many as the basis of post-war
economic policy; a redefinition of the nature and future of education as an integral feature of manpower planning; a re-evaluation of discrete forms of knowledge in terms of their effectiveness for the conduct of warfare, and a bases upon which to construct present and future social and economic policies. The wartime coalition government endeavoured to promote a version of the national interest which was used as an instrument of political action to propose and justify policies which it regarded as essential to the successful conduct of the war. It is therefore important to focus the analysis upon the decision makers within the process of constructing and justifying the national interest. In this context, it is possible to examine what I have previously referred to at the beginning of the chapter as the 'external' agents in the debate on the role of social knowledge as an issue which had previously been confined to a period (pre-war) and participants within the more exclusive domain of the social sciences.

In the preceding sections of this chapter, I have often referred to 'the people' or 'the nation' as the respondents to, or bearers of the national interest and its attendant social, economic and political imperatives. While such groupings may appear to be somewhat nebulous categories, they are not meaningless. Moreover, a clearer understanding of the process of the national interest can be gained by examining those agencies, individuals and groups who are determined such as 'interest' and deployed it as an instrument of political action to justify, denounce or propose a host of policies with which to effect the necessary degree of social control.
3. The evaluation of knowledge: political preference and professional assertion.

Conventional wisdom* has it that the movement to establish the importance and relevance of social and economic research to the formulation of 'sound' social policy, both during and after the war, began with the convening of the 'Clapham Committee', Committee on the Provision for Social and Economic Research (Cmnd. 6868, 1946). Apart from the assumption this makes about the nature and purpose of social research it indicates an error perpetuated in conventional historical accounts of the development of social science in Britain, especially histories of post-war empirical research. Such a misunderstanding of the genesis of that movement is similar to the impression gained by some historians, that the idea of a Research Council for the social sciences was first mooted amidst the deliberations of the Clapham Committee (named after its Chairman). Calls for such a Council have been a recurring theme in the history of sociology in Britain, both before the First World War, and during the inter-war and post Second World War periods up to the early 1960s.

Several factors influenced the evaluation of the social sciences as branches of knowledge likely to contribute to the formulation of wartime policies on a host of social and economic issues, in addition to their potential to similarly serve the interests of those individuals and agencies who regarded those same disciplines as fundamental to the material and moral reconstruction of a post-war world. Not all the social sciences were accorded an equivalent value, and it is this prescribed, differential

* Payne et al (1981); Abrams (1981); Cherns (1963; 1979); MacRae (1961); Eldridge (1980).
status for the various social science disciplines and the attempt by their respective practitioners to claim intellectual and institutional recognition (and the resources that go with it), that is at the core of my argument in this section of the current chapter. It is in the examination of the reaction of social scientists, especially the sociologists, to externally imposed models of the nature and purpose of their respective disciplines, that it is possible to detect any changes in the intellectual tensions that characterised their pre-war form. For sociology the war offered opportunities and resistance to a discipline that had, up to the outbreak of hostilities, tended toward intellectual polarisation (see above for the emergence of the inter-war cleavage). I shall consider the issues at stake here when I examine in detail the case for sociology presented to the Clapham Committee. Other factors influenced the process of the evaluation and re-ordering of knowledge as a result of the exigencies of war. Firstly, individuals other than social scientists came to exercise a significant degree of influence over the role of social research and the use of its results. Politicians, Civil Servants and administrative agencies both within and outside of government actively engaged in this process. There emerged within these enclaves of non-social scientists an often enthusiastic, but naïve conception of the nature of those disciplines as 'sciences'. The latter, often derived from a somewhat narrow comprehension and operational definition of a model of natural science which, in the main, entailed an expectation of a social science which produced information (social facts/data). Although substantially different in content from 'scientific' data, such information was nevertheless assumed to be similarly obtainable and of equal utility. A fusion of the ethos and authority of science with a basic empiricism served to displace the complexities and subtleties of epistemology as a central problematic for disciplines like sociology. Yaron Ezrahi (1972) and Oscar Handlin (1972) have each explored the popular conception of science and its consequences for social science. The unequivocal imperatives of war served to heighten people's expectation of the potential of science, which was carried over into perceptions of the social sciences and the forms of knowledge they generate. As Handlin says of such a phenomenon (Handlin, 1972, p.260):
"Common to all these assertions of the pre-eminence of science was the assumption that every deficiency in man's world was definable as a problem to which the correct ways of knowing would supply an appropriate solution. The staggering optimism of this article of faith ... endowed science with the vital force to sway the opinions of the increasing number of its clients. Ultimately it promised that the organised use of intelligence, through its procedures, would perfect man."

Handlin's observations, although concerned with the public image of science, nevertheless underpin the more visible manifestation of the union of science and technology; a phenomenon brought about by the exceptional circumstances of a world war. Of course the conflict within sociology of the natural science model and the non-natural science model is not just a product of the modern day, instead, it has a long history. Without making it a totally causal argument, one may view part of the conflict as coming from a need to achieve academic legitimacy. There is no doubt that technological imperatives generated by the urgent demands of wartime Britain did force into prominence a utilitarian/instrumental emphasis on scientific products, or rather on applied science and technology. Considered thus, technological by-products provided tangible evidence of the power and potential of science, although this tended to be based upon assumption rather than an understanding on the part of the public at least, of the complex and somewhat closed universe of discourse of the scientist.

Secondly, certain disciplines within the social sciences were considered of immediate relevance to the problems created by the intensification of hostilities. Albert Cherns has thrown light on this somewhat dark and obscure period of social science's history (Cherns, 1963, p.96):

"The War with its attendant needs for increased control over the social and economic life of the nation also accelerated advances in economics, social statistics and the study and practice of social administration. With total national resources both physical and human, under scrutiny, a second flowering of statistical and factual studies and administrative reports helped to lay the foundations of the post-war "Welfare State"."
The mobilisation for problem-solving is apparent in Chern's argument, especially the belief that social knowledge derived from an authoritative social science would serve the needs of those who sought to, "provide a blueprint for the kind of society Britain was to have after the war" (Cherns, 1963, p.97). Cherns also sees the lack of social knowledge and the personnel who produce it as providing the necessary stimulus for government action (the Clapham Committee). The latter Committee can in retrospect, be seen to represent the pragmatic nature of much of the Labour Party's socialist policies, especially a commitment to the formulation of such policies on the basis of extensive research (1963, p.97):

"Studies were made of land use, scientific manpower and the social services. Few of these studies failed to make the case for the need for a great increase in the supply of adequate data on which political decisions in the economic and social field should be based. This in turn pinpointed the scarcity of people trained in the social sciences."

Chern's account of the events during this period present a picture of the social sciences on the verge of an extraordinary breakthrough in gaining public recognition and resources. It is quite true that their potential had yet to be fully recognised (all of the disciplines, but especially sociology had devised their programme statements for future development on the basis of their potential) but in keeping with what I have argued previously about sociology's advocatory dimension, Chern's account is indicative of an incrementally progressive evolution of social science. Such accounts render the positive achievements of the disciplines through the grammar of progress without much emphasis on the controversy and conflict which has so often surrounded their development since the last war. What is absent from Chern's account of the development of the social sciences during the period in question, is any consideration of the fact that the construction of agendas for the social sciences, including their research initiatives, became an area of interest for individuals and agencies outside the community of its practitioners. This began in earnest with the publication
of the Clapham Report in 1946, in addition to being influenced by the emerging controversy of the changing relationship between the universities and the state. Nevertheless, what Cherns has to say about the politicians' expectations (within the Labour Party at least), for the production of enlightened social policy, based on authoritative research is largely true, at least for the intra-war years and the immediate post-war period.

Although Cherns mentions psychology, economics and statistics in his review of the period, greater emphasis needs to be placed on the advantages that both economics and statistics gained over the other social sciences, and the consequences this had for subsequent deliberations on the level of social and economic research being undertaken at the time of the Clapham Committee. The latter committee would make important recommendations concerning the nature and distribution of resources vital to the development of social science in Britain. Therefore, the relative intellectual and institutional strengths and weaknesses of the respective social science disciplines would be important factors influencing decisions about their future funding.

Jay Rumney (1945) sensed the importance of the effects of war on the social sciences, especially sociology. His optimism is perhaps more indicative of a sense of opportunity for sociology, yet is predicated on the ubiquitous presentation of the discipline on the basis of its potential and future contribution to the social and moral reconstruction of post-war Britain (Rumney, 1945, p.585):

"The present war, with its profound economic and political changes, may be the turning point in English sociology. But whether it will stimulate it or retard it depends on the social transformations the peace will bring."

His observations highlight two features of my argument about the development of sociology: that its cognitive and institutional dimensions are contingent upon the cultural context in which it resides; and that in the case of the preceding quotation, Rumney hints at not only the importance of the latter condition of sociology's development, but that it had entered the war in a very precarious position vis-a-vis the
other social sciences. The latter situation became apparent during the years leading up to the war, an episode in the discipline's history considered in the previous chapter.

What advantages had branches of the social sciences other than sociology managed to gain during the course of the war? What did this mean in terms of sociology's prospects and why was it so important? For an answer to the first question, it is important to consider briefly the intellectual and institutional strengths of some of those disciplines, especially economics and statistics.

In many respects, of all the branches of social science, economics was bound to become a vital component of those forms of knowledge regarded as essential for the conduct of war. Without a strictly managed economy, including the control of labour, Britain would have been unable to wage war. Another factor which enhanced the prospects of economics was its central position within and influence upon political ideology. Labour politicians seized the initiative during the war years to introduce social and economic controls which reflected a longstanding commitment to collectivist policies. The war gave rise to the enactment of legislation not far removed from the principles and precepts of the pre-war conception of socialism. Economics had entered the war in a position of intellectual and institutional strength, far in advance of the other social sciences and despite the threat posed by Keynesian theory to the prevailing orthodoxy of the middle and late 1930s.

Prior to the war, economics was the most widely taught of the social sciences. E.M. Burns (1935) has highlighted the importance of the L.S.E. in conditioning the curricula of other institutions outside the University of London, emphasising too, that up to the middle 1930s, most of the discipline's teachers had been trained at the universities of Oxford and Cambridge. This, Burns contends, may account for the profound influence of Marshall within the discipline. Guillebaud's (1953) historical survey of the teaching of economics provides a comprehensive description of the field from the early 19th century to the 1950s.
In addition to the degree of entrenchment within academia, economics possessed a significant institutional presence in a number of other organisations and associations. Among the most influential of these extra-curricula media for the promotion of economic research and public interest in the discipline generally were: The Royal Institute of Public Administration (founded in 1922); The National Institute for Economic and Social Research (founded in 1938); Section 'F' of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (economics incorporated with statistics in 1864); The Royal Economic Society (founded in 1890); The Association of Teachers of Economics (founded in 1924). The preceding organisations were among a number of other clubs and private societies, all of which were dedicated to the advancement of the discipline, whether as a rigorous and authoritative science, or, on the part of the clubs and private societies, as forums for general discussion on economics and related topics, with a view to advocating its 'social importance'.

Guillebaud sums up the academic presence of economics in the period before the Second World War (Guillebaud, 1953, p.25):

"By the end of the inter-war period every university had established honours schools in which it was possible to obtain degrees involving a large measure of specialisation in economics .... At the same time, at most universities, economics could also be taken at a lower level as an important part of the pass degree. Nowhere was it true to say that economics could only be studied as a subordinate part of some other discipline."

The confidence of some economists in the importance and potential of their discipline did not necessarily arise as a result of the demands placed upon their skills during the war and thereafter. The inter-war conferences, the subject of a section of the previous chapter, demonstrated the significance of this feature of sociology's advocatory dimension, whereby criticism of one discipline, (or branches within it), or the promotion of another, constitute strategies for disciplinary development without any reference to substantive issues of epistemology or methodology. An example of this, one which gives some indication of the predisposition of an influential economist of the period toward another branch of the social sciences, can be found in the arguments of P. Sargant Florence (1936, p.146):
"Psychologists and sociologists should make themselves familiar with the economist's framework of thought, so as to be in a position to answer his questions that depend so fundamentally on human attitudes of mind and human institutions."

It is tempting to form the impression that Sargant Florence's remarks bear the hallmarks of intellectual arrogance. The suggestion that disciplines like sociology and psychology should act as underlabourers to economics is not entirely absent from his criticism. His preoccupation with discouraging 'fads' and shoddy scholarship was directed, in the main, to the newer branches of the social sciences, especially social psychology and its particular relationship to economics (1936, p.146):

"... quite the little darling of the social sciences ... But unless someone deals harshly, it is in danger of becoming a spoilt child, ... social psychology has not been helpful to and co-operative with economics."

Sargant Florence was particularly critical of what he considered to be the pretensions of social psychology and its apparent failure to serve economics in an appropriate manner. Despite its 'omissions and short-comings' psychology did possess a saving grace; its diligent application to the perfection of a sound research methodology via the fusion of research techniques such as observation, measurement and 'not too much abstract thought.'

Sargant Florence*, considered by many to be an influential figure in the community of social scientists, both before and after the war, also singled out sociology as a discipline which would benefit ultimately from a closer association with economics. The following comments on this possible relationship give a fair indication of the general state of economics in a period when Keynes was about to publish his 'General Theory' (1936, p.151):

* Member of the wartime, British Association's Committee on Scientific Research on Human Institutions; member of the Royal Economic Society and contributor to the Clapham Committee.
"To keep in touch with sociologists generally, economists should adopt a more intelligible method of solving their problems. At present, economics is nothing but a framework of thought, a series of untested hypotheses. This framework should be adapted to fit observed and measured facts and effort made to state hypotheses in such a way that they can be tested by those facts."

Apart from an obvious commitment to the efficacy of positivism as a fundamental basis in which to ground the social sciences, Sargent Florence's definition of the relationship between economics and the other social sciences tended to undermine sociology's intention to act as the coordinator of those same disciplines within a synoptic science of society. I have discussed this at length in the previous chapter. Actually economics did not need sociology. Those of its practitioners who advocated a sociologically centred science of society, could not find favour with their fellow social scientists. Sociologists who believed this to be an impracticable project, and who tended toward the view that the role of sociology was the development of an autonomous discipline, whose ideas and techniques could be progressively diffused within other branches of the social sciences, as a means of off-setting excessive specialisation and ultimately the fractionation of social knowledge into unrelated and unrelatable categories, were also finding it difficult to convince other social scientists. Interestingly enough, both the former and latter groups of sociologists tended to represent one, or the other divisions within the inter-war, Marshallian cleavage in sociology set out in Appendix Two.

In answering the first question posed above: what advantages had branches of the social sciences, other than sociology gained during the course of the war, I have also partially replied to the second question concerning the consequences of this for sociology. Economics had entered the war as a discipline of demonstrable utility, as far as the requirements of large-scale planning and control of the economy was concerned. Other disciplines, like psychology were pressed into service for both civilian and military purposes, (Cf. Chens, 1963, pp.95-96; G. Duncan Mitchell, 1968). The role of the statistician also increased in importance, not only in the field of economics, traditionally a discipline given
to statistical analysis, but in other areas of civil and military work. Government departments required additional statistical support on a scale unknown before the war. However, and despite the central importance of economics within the reordering of knowledge in response to obvious, national imperatives, discernable gaps appeared in the provision of social knowledge, without which the Government and its administrative agencies were unable to exercise the degree of social control essential to the successful conduct of the war.

4. The Science Movement: a model for scientific social research

I referred above to the extraordinary increase in the activity of the state in imposing controls on both the immediate and long-term patterns of civilian life. Such activity necessitated an expansion in the field of social and economic research, with a view to collecting information of both immediate, practical utility and of a kind that would be of value in the construction of quite extensive plans for eventual post-war social policy. The emphasis tended to be upon the quest for data. This led academics, politicians and civil servants to question whether or not sufficient individuals and agencies existed who were competent enough to produce the information in terms of the desired quality and quantity. While demand for research may have evolved directly as a consequence of the national interest, a commitment to the value and potential of social research resulted from a combination of several factors.

The evaluation of social and economic information about the population and the manner in which it had been acquired was influenced by the apparent success of science and technology to sustain the needs of a state engaged in a global war. Science and scientists were portrayed increasingly as very potent institutional and intellectual agents, standing between the enemy and the last vestige of democracy in Europe - Britain. A crucial component of this image of science was the seemingly inviolable nature of its method for establishing 'the facts'. Although I do not wish to become embroiled in a detailed exposition of the philosophy
of science, a debate which continues to receive a considerable amount of attention, I nevertheless think it essential to examine an intrinsic feature of that project - the conceptual potency of the methodology of science as an important symbolic resource. The latter informed the general discourse and especially, the conceptual framework within which the nature and potential of the social sciences would be assessed as branches of knowledge capable of contributing to the solution of both the long and short term problems brought on by a nation at war. What is important to bear in mind when considering the ethos and authority of science and its attendant models and imagery, is that such an interpretation of its enterprise derived from the gradual incursion of scientists and their influence, into areas outside of their traditional spheres of technical competence and expertise, and into the domains of politics, civil and military administration and generally, the imagination of the public. Moreover, the ethos and authority of science would provide sociologists on the 'practical wing' of the discipline with a valuable conceptual device to include in their strategic repertoire. I shall explore the latter consequences for the development of sociology in the post-war period, when examining the evidence submitted to the Clapham Committee.

The ethos and authority of science and the influence of its practitioners was not entirely a wartime phenomenon. There existed within the intellectual culture of pre-war Britain, what I would suggest can be reasonably described as a science movement. Its particular intellectual and institutional components, its progenitor and supporters, in addition to its general pervasiveness require an examination beyond the scope of this work. However, I believe that the inter-war science movement served to inform and sustain practitioners and supporters of sociology's practical wing, whom, as I have argued above, lacked the vital institutional asset of a formal presence within higher education. The latter position may not have been the disadvantage that many of the protagonists of the practical wing believed it to be. Once the war began, and a redefinition of the role of education and the reordering of knowledge occurred, adherents of the latter division within sociology were able to present a case for their discipline that derived its substance from the categories and context of science's rapidly expanding position.
The phenomenon of a science movement is not unique to Britain during the period in question. Tobey (1971) has provided convincing evidence of the existence of a similar movement in America during the 1920s and 1930s. Evidence of the diffusion of the basic tenets of such a programme for American science within the field of the social sciences, can be found in the previously examined Rockefeller Foundation support for 'scientifically' based, social research and the implications for its funding. The latter led eventually to the production of the 'Social Trends' project in the United States in 1933. A conscious attempt was made to equate the normative structure of science with the sentiments and morality of democracy (Cf. Price, 1965, pp.94-95). George Simpson (1953) has argued that the most extreme position in favour of the bifurcation of science and morality has been taken in sociology, citing George Lundberg and the emergence of the behaviourist, neo-positivist school of sociology in America as a prime example of that relationship. This was not the case for sociology in Britain during the same period (1930s and into the post-war era): the point being that British sociology had not attained equivalent intellectual and institutional autonomy to that of its American counterpart (for the reasons stated above). Nevertheless, there were, I believe, similarities between the American and British science movements, which in turn had consequences for the development of the social sciences in their respective historical and cultural contexts. The scale of the 'movements'; the number and influence of those who supported them, the strategies and tactics deployed to further their respective causes; and the degree of success of their respective enterprises, differed markedly between cultures. Whilst a detailed comparison of the two movements would be an interesting project in itself, it is beyond the scope of this work. However, I do intend to concentrate upon the essential features of the science movement in Britain, as it has a direct bearing on the events surrounding the re-evaluation of social knowledge during the last war. Furthermore, it will also be necessary, when appropriate, to take into consideration both the sociological and philosophical aspects of the norms of science,

* R.C. Tobey (1971) has argued that during the inter-war period in America, an influential scientific pressure group actively sought to promote within government and among the general public the notion that democracy was the political version of the scientific method.
as they have important implications for the manner in which both scientists
and their supporters generated styles of thought and vocabularies,
which were used subsequently to span the boundaries between the scientific
community and society. The political and ideological elements of the
preceding processes are of vital importance to an understanding of
science as a potent cultural resource (cf. R. Lapp (1965); Schoek and
Wiggins (1960); Lakoff (1977); Greenberg (1969); Weingart (1970); and
Haberer (1969)).

The ascendancy of science as a major influence in the conduct of war
was brought about by the imperatives to defend and sustain the state.
In addition to this assertion, I have also suggested that the pre-eminence
of science and its practitioners was not essentially a wartime phenomenon.
While the rise of a science movement was a notable feature of those
decades, other changes within several important intellectual and experi­
mental fields of research occurred, giving the science movement its
general direction and impetus. In Astronomy, major advances included
the discovery of the planet Pluto, with a growth in the development of optics
leading to the construction of powerful telescopes, which in turn encour­
raged new theories of the universe. The work of Sir James Jeans (1930)
and Sir Arthur Eddington (1933) highlighted these new developments.
In Medicine, significant advances had been made in the field of vitamins,
and two important discoveries had been made with the production of
insulin by Banting and Best, and penicillin by Fleming in the late
1920s. The subsequent isolation of penicillin by Florey and Chain
in 1939-40 paved the way for the massive increase of drug treatment
in medicine. Perhaps the most potent image of science, one which certainly
created the notion of it as a mysterious and to some extent, awesome
power, was generated by the media in its attempt to popularise the advances
occurring in the field of physics. The concept of matter as energy
and particles evolved through the earlier findings of Max Planck,
followed by the growth in atomic physics. With the splitting of the
atom and the later construction of the first accelerator, Newton's
idea of a constant universe became a historical novelty (albeit of
profound importance to the development of physics) as Heisenberg's
uncertainty principle occupied the place once accorded to Newton's
ideas. All of the latter developments occurred against the background of formidably complex, though fundamental changes wrought upon physics by the ideas of Albert Einstein. It would seem reasonable to portray the period between the wars, in so much as it is possible to characterise the order of knowledge and its ethos, as a quest for certainty. Certainly within the field of philosophy, a great deal of effort had been expended in an attempt to develop and systematise empiricism with the aid of the conceptual equipment furnished by modern research on logical and mathematical theory. Logical positivism and the concern with the verifiability principle held sway during the period in question, to the extent that its principles began to influence other branches of knowledge outside of the field of philosophy. Central to all of the preceding advances within the wider sphere of science, including medicine, was the manner in which scientists purportedly made their respective discoveries: through the use of the **scientific method**.

In general terms, the science movement's central themes comprised a custodial role for science and its practitioners, the presentation of science as a 'mission' of truth and enlightenment, the special status of its knowledge via the operation of an exclusive methodology and discourse.* All of these themes were interrelated, and subject to differential emphasis according to the motives of those espousing the virtues of the movement, and the forum in which the case for science was being discussed. Thus the notion of science's normative structure could be said to derive from the inter-war science movement's concern with the extra-scientific role of its practitioners in utilising their authority and the ethos of their discipline within other cultural spheres. Moreover, the ethos and authority of science gave an authoritative dimension to the issues and debates in which scientists either chose to engage in, or were called upon to participate in. The nature and function of the ethos of science has been defined by Robert Merton (Merton, 1962, p.20):

"The ethos of science refers to an emotionally toned complex of rules prescriptions, mores, beliefs, values and presuppositions which are held to be binding upon the scientist.

* FOOTNOTE OVERLEAF
While it may be thought that these themes are a particular feature of the normative structure of science, they were very early enshrined with the establishment of the London School of Economics and Political Science. As John Watkins has observed (Watkins, 1972, pp.175-176):

"The L.S.E. must therefore be an independent academic institution with no political bias imposed upon it. It did not matter what political views its members held so long as they believed in and practiced the methods of scientific research.

The reason why Beatrice (Webb) attached a high value to scientific methods was more romantic. She had a religious temperament; but she was not a believer. I get the impression that the vacuum was at least partially filled by a fierce belief in scientific method as an austere code demanding self-abnegation and humility before the facts. Scientific method was a lifelong concern of hers."

Watkins quotes an especially illuminating extract from an address given by Beatrice Webb in 1906, at the L.S.E., which gives a fair indication of her commitment to the precepts and practice of the scientific method (1972, p.176):

"What we have to do in social science is to apply the scientific method to the facts of social life. There is only one scientific method - that used in physical science. It consists of three parts - observation, conjecture as to the cause and effect of the facts observed, and afterwards verification by renewed observation. That is the scientific method."

phases of this complex may be methodologically desirable, but observance of the rules is not dictated solely by methodological considerations. This ethos, as social codes generally, is sustained by the sentiments of those to whom it applies."

Although there are features common to both the normative structure of science and Merton's description of the ethos of science, the essential component of the latter phenomenon is the manner in which the 'complex' of its properties are projected into public and political spheres either by the scientists themselves or by those who, for a variety of motives, support the aims and objectives of science and its community of practitioners. While it is tempting to construe the ethos and authority of science as simply vacuous rhetoric, it has served nevertheless, as a singularly important strategy in the repertoire of scientists, politicians, civil servants and academics, in the quest for public recognition and the acquisition of resources essential to the pursuit of research and an enhanced institutional presence. Moreover, the ethos and authority of science has served as a potent cultural resource for other disciplines aspiring to emulate its principles and practices for reasons other than, as Merton (1962) has argued, those 'dictated solely by methodological considerations.'

Although it is difficult to provide an example of a single, definitive work, wherein the central tenets of the science movement are expounded; a book by Lancelot Hogben entitled, Science for the Citizen (1941) does contain an important section on what I would regard as the embodiment of the movement's themes. It is referred to by Hogben as 'The New Social Contract', and differs from the remainder of his book, in which an attempt is made to educate the layman in the "wonders of science"; the popularisation of science, in which the subject is offered as, "an essential part of the education of a citizen" (1941, p.11).

Hogben's new Social Contract depended on the recognition and acceptance of his notion of "Scientific Humanism", by government and the citizen. He regarded the fundamental issues of scientific humanism as separate from the axioms of orthodox politics: thus an example of the presentation
of science as morality and as a mission of truth and enlightenment. In order to introduce and manage the new social contract, Hogben suggested an appropriate cadre of specialists (1941, p.1090):

"Men and women who bring the live curiosity and painstaking industry of the naturalist to bear on problems of contemporary society will not be products of an established social culture. Like the Webbs, they will be the symbol of a popular movement ... the makers of the New Social Contract will be the founders of a new social culture."

Again, the reference to a 'popular movement' and the role of those who will usher in the new order are indicative of another theme within the science movement; the custodial role for science, its practitioners and supporters. Hogben's Social Contract also made provision for the redistribution of wealth based on a notion of 'constructive democratic statesmanship'. The latter, which was fundamental to the envisaged, orderly revolution of democratic social change, could not occur unless the 'new intelligentsia' received an appropriate education (1941, p.1082):

"... the cleavage between mere goodwill and knowledge is deeper than it has ever been before, and that an education which will fit statesmen to take advantage of the new powers for social well-being or fit citizens to choose them must be deeply imbued with naturalistic knowledge."

I have dwelt upon the notion of a mechanistic production of an intellectual elite above, when considering the Rockefeller Foundation's instrumental approach to the method by which 'appropriate' forms of social knowledge can be produced and subsequently converted into enlightened social policy. The latter process depended to a large extent upon a naturalistic approach to the solution of social problems. Thus conceived, social science exhibits an explicit ideological component indicative of scientism: the assumption that the accumulation of codified knowledge can substitute for politics and ideology as the matrix of social choices or norms of collective conduct.
Another influential figure in the science movement, one who perhaps more than most contributed to the diffusion of science within the education system specifically and culture generally, was Sir Richard Gregory (Armytage, 1957). Richard Gregory strove throughout his lifetime to evolve a mantle for science which he believed would influence the 'affairs of men' within every sphere of intellectual and social endeavour. I shall now consider briefly, the role of Sir Richard Gregory in the inter-war science movement, restricting my examination to his association with other influentials within the movement and the consequences this had for the social sciences, up to and during the Second World War.

W.H. Armytage's book (Armytage, 1957), is a rich source of material on the life and works of Richard Gregory, especially his influence within the science movement. In particular, Armytage's work is important to my concern in highlighting several of the themes which coalesced to give the movement its cultural dimensions and impetus. In the main, those who extolled the virtues of the movement rarely referred to the substantive issues of science itself (its theoretical and methodological components). Instead, the credibility and 'power' of science was sustained through the public management of appropriate images and accompanying discourse.

Armytage's assessment of the social standing of Sir Richard Gregory after his Knighthood in 1919, gives an indication of the significance of 'informal networks' and the importance of frequenting institutions wherein the right connections could be made, (Armytage, 1957, p.85):

"His respectability and therefore his authority, had been further symbolised by his election to the Athenaeum under Rule 2. There, like Mathew Arnold, 'he enjoyed something approaching beatitude'..."

While it would be rash to argue that the development of science in Britain stemmed from the discussions of those who frequented the Athenaeum, it is worth remembering that the function of informal networks, as a means of influencing opinion, is important in any estimation of the institutional structure of British science during the inter-war period. In a prestigious institution such as the Athenaeum, there could be
found influential scientists among His Majesty's Cabinet at play. The contacts made there could have as King (1974) has suggested, influenced the professional and organisational bases of British science. As King has said of the period (King, 1974, p.11):

"Up to the Second World War, the size of the British science system was small enough for internal adjustments and policy direction to be in the hands of a few outstanding personalities belonging to the same coterie. Coherence and mutual understanding were probably achieved rather effectively, if utterly informally, through frequent, easy, but often unplanned contacts between the leading figures of the Royal Society, the research council secretaries, and senior civil servants, all of whom were habitues of the Athenaeum Club."

Sir Richard Gregory (Armytage, 1957) made strenuous efforts to publicise the value and importance of the 'scientific spirit' (1957, p.69):

"We seek to justify the claim of science to be an enobling influence as well as a creator of riches ... For science is not to be measured by practical service alone, though it may contribute to material prosperity: it is an intellectual outlook, a standard of truth and a gospel of light."

It is tempting, with hindsight, to consign such a conception of science, especially the manner in which Gregory portrayed it, to the category of absurd novelties. However, the notion of the 'spirit of science' was, perhaps, a sentiment easier to harbour and express publicly before the outbreak of a World War and the subsequent role of science in its conduct. A diminution in the spirit of science would be more than compensated for by the kindling of faith in post-war technology. Gregory's quasi-religious portrayal of the spirit of science is somewhat reminiscent of the Saint-Simonian enthusiasm for 'the religion of Newton' (Hawthorn, 1976, p.69) and the subsequent reverential status accorded the new positive philosophy. While Gregory and his supporters may not have intended to create a new hagiocracy of science, considerable effort was expended in elevating the status of the scientist in society. It should be remembered that the science movement and its supporters while espousing the virtues of the ethos and authority of science within the public realm, sought also to establish science within a domain
likely to guarantee its permanent cultural presence; the national curriculum. The latter aspect of the science movement relates to my consideration of one of its general themes: the special status of its knowledge via the operation of an exclusive methodology. Gregory and his associates managed to alter significantly the composition of the curriculum at various levels within the education system through the activities of two corporate bodies; 'The Humanist Council' and the 'Neglect of Science Committee' (Armytage, 1957, pp.70-74). The former comprised teachers and advocates of the 'humanistic studies' and other 'traditional subjects', the latter, individuals from a host of intellectual fields, committed to the installation and development of the teaching of natural science within the curriculum.* As early as 1907, Gregory had been campaigning publicly for the recognition of science. He strove to emphasise the role of scientists and their special knowledge as the foundation of a democratic order (The Times, December 31, 1907):

"It should be the object of scientific men to promote the extension of scientific knowledge over as wide an area as possible so that the scientific method and the scientific spirit should be known to all who are prepared to read or listen."

Gregory's influential position as editor of the journal Nature, provided the science movement with an invaluable public platform.

Although the 'Neglect of Science Committee' endeavoured to introduce the teaching of natural science within the school curriculum on a par with more traditional subjects, it supported generally, the aims and objectives of a curriculum designed to provide 'technical preparation' for adolescents who would eventually enter the 'professions or other technical occupations'. Furthermore, the Committee advocated a change in the school curriculum which would allow for an easier transition to further and higher education, again within the fields of scientific and technical subjects. A concerted effort was made to reform education

* It is worth noting that among the many achievements of Sir Richard Gregory was his prolific production of textbooks on science, of both a specific and general nature; over two hundred up to his death in 1952.
within and across the curriculum and at every level within the system. Gregory and his associates made special efforts to introduce changes within the university curriculum, a programme that began as a result of the First World War and the emergence of the 'Haldane Principle'.

Coupled to his adventures within the education system, Gregory, through the offices of the British Association, continued to exploit every available opportunity which allowed him access to what he considered to be his most important audience - the general public. His very close friendship with H.G. Wells, whose works of science-fiction Gregory thought an admirable medium for cultivating the scientific imagination of the populace, provided him with an association that would have consequences for Gregory's later enthusiasm with the scientific study of society. Gregory regarded his responsibility toward the public and its enlightenment through a knowledge of science as of primary importance. He regarded the act of lecturing, be it in public, or in a more formal institutional setting, as an essential vehicle for engendering an interest in his cause. There is an interesting parallel between his appreciation of the lecture and its relevance to the period of reconstruction following the First World War and the circumstances surrounding the use of the same medium during the Second World War under the auspices of the Army Bureau of Current Affairs. In both cases, an attempt was made to engage the audience in contemplating the importance of enlightened citizenship in a post-war world. Moreover, the role of science and social reconstruction were themes common to the issues raised during the course of his post World War One lectures and courses (British Association, 1916):

"After the war (the First World War) there will be a new public for lectures and courses on a wide range of subjects: but one of the main purposes of the lectures should be to show as many people as possible that they are personally concerned as citizens with their position in the state, in industry, and in education."

Bearing in mind what I have said previously about the general themes associated with the science movement, it is possible to detect the gradual attempt by Gregory and his supporters, to carry their programme
for science into other domains within the national culture. In doing so, a greater emphasis was placed upon the strategic importance of the project to convert those individuals and their environments toward a more accommodating approach to the importance of science. Gregory was well aware of the fact that scientific knowledge itself could not alter effectively the status quo (Armytage, 1957, p.81):

"Science needs champions and advocates, in addition to actual makers of new knowledge and exponents of it."

In the case of the inter-war science movement, a vigorous attempt was made to assert the authority of science within the political domain. The role and significance of 'scientific knowledge' was a crucial factor in the success, or otherwise, of such a project, as Ezrahi has pointed out (1974, p.226):

"The social prevalence of the view that scientific knowledge, which is identified with public information, is a legitimate and even superior basis for social choices and public policy is bound to provide scientists with significant resources of influence over the course of public life."

The scientists, engaging in what I have referred to as their custodial role within the promotion of the social virtues of science, made a concerted effort to establish its political uses in the public domain. This was most apparent during the war, although advocates of the science movement succeeded in establishing the necessity of its enterprise in connection with what were considered to be the most pressing social issues of the decades between the wars. Members of the science movement endeavoured to establish the organisation of scientists in public affairs, in terms of political rather than intellectual association. Thus lay perceptions of the claims of science became contingent upon the public posture of the socially recognised spokesmen and spokeswomen of science. In the process of blurring the particular, logical and social limits of scientific discourse, exponents of the science movement could not only equate scientific with social criteria of evidence and rationality, but also identify the goals of science with those of society.
Furthermore, the emergence of a relationship between science and politics provided scientists and their growing lobby with an opportunity to influence public opinion, in addition to establishing important contacts within industry, commerce, civil administration and most importantly, those agencies, both public and private, upon which scientific research depended for its resources. What is important to bear in mind here, is the crucial role of the strategic presentation of science. The manufacture and management of images associated with the ethos and authority of science were crucial components of the repertoire of exponents of the science movement. Furthermore, definitions of science and its socio-political role within a cultural context, (essential elements of the discourse on the relation between science and politics) were projected between the coordinates of political space and time, influencing social behaviour and the social distribution of power and influence. Although the latter distribution may not have been on a scale common in the decades following the Second World War, British scientists and their spokesmen of the inter-war period began to engage in debates which were directed toward an extension of the influence of science beyond its traditional domain, and into formally discrete, political and bureaucratic jurisdictions. Gregory and his supporters endeavoured to establish the role of the scientist within the polity, in a manner considered by Ezrahi, (1974, p.223):

"Consequently, in a democracy the authority of scientists, like the authority of statesmen or bureaucrats, though in fact it may be discretionary, may rest on the ability to sustain the fiction that its roots lie in public consensus or participation."

The determination of the science movement's adherents to involve the scientist in politics and national culture would have significant consequences for the social sciences in Britain, especially in the period leading up to the Second World War, and the years of reconstruction following it. This was for several reasons. First, the rise of science within public and political domains was orchestrated within a fairly well defined 'movement' and led by scientists and supporters of considerable influence. They occupied positions within the essential spheres of politics and civil administration (the Whitehall-Westminster-Athanaeum,
triangle). Second, science began to be widely incorporated into the national curriculum at all levels of the education system. Third, technology, the progeny of science, provided quite powerful, tangible 'proof' of the ethos and authority of science. Every-day artifacts provided the citizen with ocular proof of the 'bounty of science' and the service it rendered mankind. Finally, the popularisation of science through the media and the works of science fiction, especially those of H.G. Wells, assisted greatly the movement's project. All of the preceding features of the diffusion of science within the national culture and consciousness of the public represented major factors in existing and future debates involving the political and economic determinants of the map of knowledge and its relationship to the national need. Science and its practitioners had engendered an image of itself as an authoritative form of knowledge and practice essential to national progress. The credibility of such an image of science was contingent upon the expression and management of the compelling authority of its knowledge, rather than a rehearsal of its complex, substantive form.

The professionalisation and institutionalisation of natural science proceeded in advance of the social sciences. The extraordinary dilemma for social science entailed the simultaneous tasks of evolving their own epistemological and methodological form, while endeavouring to acquire and sustain, sound and acceptable institutional and professional bases. It wasn't as though the social sciences had never aspired to emulate the natural sciences during their development. The point here is that the physical sciences have never achieved stability. Their internal organisation and their relationship to society has changed significantly since their initial recognition and Royal patronage in the seventeenth century and the disestablishment of theology, brought about by the secularising rationale of science. Barnes and Dolby (1970) touch on the latter point in their critique of the Mertonian notion of the scientific ethos. For those social scientists who saw the institutional destiny of their disciplines (and here I include those exponents of sociology's practical wing) as being a scientific one, the science movement must have provided an attractive model to incorporate within and subsequently deploy,
as part of their strategic discourse and wider quest for intellectual and institutional autonomy. It may also have been the case generally, that as the natural sciences were rapidly becoming major institutional and intellectual forms within the episteme during the inter-war period, the genesis of the spread of the pathology of the natural sciences to the social sciences in Britain can also be traced to this period (cf. Rex, 1970; Wright Mills, 1963 and 1976). While certain branches of the social sciences had sought to establish their knowledge claims of the basis of the inductive method, theories and research technologies, though purportedly similar across the spread of disciplines, did not possess the compelling 'reality of proof' indicative of the natural sciences. Social scientists were thus able to capitalise on the authority of science by reference to its essential, methodological sophistication, emphasising the obvious potential for the study of society, by diligent application of the principles and precepts of an already proven method. Thus the promise of the human sciences were established, and with it the conditions of their future intellectual crises.

5. Science and Labour

Advocates of the science movement began to gather support in other institutional and political domains during the 1920s and 1930s. Efforts were made by H.G. Wells, Julian Huxley and Sir Richard Gregory to forge an alliance between labour (through the emergent Labour Party) and science, (Armytage, 1957, p.86):

"... the conversion of the Labour Groups to a belief in science rather than political action; their awakening to the importance of improving the means of production rather than appropriating too much of its accrued surplus."

It is possible to view the motives of the movement's central figures as alterior in nature when assessing the connection between science and labour. The increasingly politicised exposition of the social role of science began to evolve as a distinctive ideology. Could it have been that Gregory and his supporters appreciated the social and economic implications of an increasingly disenchanted labour movement, and that perhaps the radical tendencies within it could be usefully employed to construct a scientific democracy, rather than bring about social chaos through revolution? This is implied in the following extract from an address by H.G. Wells to the Portsmouth Brotherhood, in May, 1921, wherein an attempt was made to present science as the primary, organising 'force' within society (1957, pp.90-91):
... Science will endure and rule, but that Labour with a capital L, as the name of a class of human beings organised for distinctive class ends, will pass away. ... if the Spirit of Science is to be carried right through human affairs, it means a complete organisation of human society for all common ends, educational and economic ...

Social evolution, without social revolution, via the 'spirit of science' became a political project within science. This is an early indication of the potential role of the social sciences in such a project, one which emerged within the compass of the movement's conception of the application of the scientific method to social problems. In addition to the theory of a scientific estate, created through the union of science and labour, a concrete effort was made by Wells to establish his movement's ideas through election to Parliament, standing for the Parliamentary seat of the University of London. Those individuals associated with the Association of Scientific Workers (known as the National Union of Scientific Workers until 1927, when it adopted the prefix 'Association' in place of National Union) such as H.M. Langton, N.R. Campbell, Dr. Franklin Kidd, H. Jeffreys and the Association's Secretary Major A.B. Church, all became eager supporters of the science movement. They actively sought the patronage of Wells and Gregory in the hope of establishing, at some future date, a 'scientific international'. The latter intention gained substance during the Second World War, in the debate about the role of science in the period of post-war reconstruction. Nevertheless, the science movement's interest in the possibility of constructing a rational and progressive civilisation, led to the inclusion of the 'study of society' within its programme. Indeed, the envisaged partnership between science and the emergent Labour Party was intended to demonstrate the social efficacy of scientific research as the key to the establishment of the new social order (1957, p.95):

"... that is why the advent of a Labour Party will mean a greater obligation to sustain and extend scientific subjects and scientific research not only in physical, but also financial and social research."
Although privately, Gregory mistrusted a democracy which would allow "power in the hands of the people" (1957, p.97), he and his supporters made strenuous efforts to maintain the momentum of the collaboration between science and a 'democratic' Labour movement. Much of the effort expended toward this end was channelled through the British Science Guild. As its Director, Gregory and his associates continued to 'bridge the gap between the public and the man of science'.

Perhaps the most important symbol of the professed coalescence of the Labour and Science movements during the early inter-war period, took place at a conference in 1924 entitled, "Science and Labour", held in conjunction with the British Empire Exhibition of the same year. Such a joint celebration afforded science and democratic socialists with an opportunity to extole the much vaunted relationship between their respective manifestos and programmes for social change. The object of the exercise was, as Armytage explains (1957, p.100):

"... to illuminate the lines upon which science could be directed and applied more widely and effectively to increase human happiness and efficiency, to reduce human toil, and to develop human personality."

Such noble objectives would no doubt have inspired the advocates of sociology on either side of the 'Marshallian cleavage', yet those sociologists given to the practice of rigorous empirical analysis, rather than a socio-philosophical approach, would have found it easier to identify with the aims and objectives of the science movement. The latter's programme and its architects would provide allies and inspiration for sociologists and other social scientists within the discipline's practical wing. It should also be noted that the then Labour Prime Minister, Ramsey MacDonald, an old friend of Sir Richard Gregory, actively supported the latter in his work, especially the potential of science (again a theme of the science movement) for enlightened political judgement and (1957, p.100):

"to impress upon the public the necessity of treating political questions in a scientific spirit, and not merely in a shut-vision, partisan frame of mind."
MacDonald also endeavoured to explain the reasons for the vagaries of the democratic process and its attendant political abuses and absurdities, which had direct implications for social science (1957, p.101):

"... it is mainly owing to the fact that scientific methods have hardly yet been applied to society itself. I hope that as a result of your conference a beginning will be made in the scientific study of the problems which confront Parliament."

Sydney Webb, who shared the platform at the 'Science and Labour' conference in 1924, and whose educational establishment, the L.S.E., embodied many of the principles and precepts articulated within the fusion of science and politics, shared in the frustration of not being able to fruitfully nurture the project in question, especially the alliance with a majority political party as the Labour government fell in the Autumn election of 1924. Undaunted, Gregory and his supporters continued to enlist the assistance and interest of influential politicians and academics in the campaign to establish the science movement within academe and the corridors of power. Rather than maintain a strategy of association with a single political party, the science movement sought a route to the centre of political decision-making via the establishment of a pressure group in politics - an essential prerequisite to commanding political and parliamentary respect and influence, irrespective of the political party in power. There thus came into existence the 'Parliamentary Science Committee', and subsequently, privileged access by scientists to the political decision making process and administrative centres of government. Scientists now possessed an important medium through which to engage the opinion of politicians on matters in which they had an interest. The significance of this achievement would become evident in the years following the Second World War, especially in the contests for the distribution of resources to and between the Research Councils for the support of research and education in the disciplines which those Councils funded (although the U.G.C. would have greater control over the disbursement of funds in the field of higher education generally). Science was now poised to not only present itself as a major candidate to serve the nation's needs, but also to share in the determination of those same national needs and the cultural imperatives which they engendered.
Another important institutional change occurred within science during the inter-war period. One which would have specific implications for the development of the social sciences. With the merging of the British Science Guild (passim) and the British Association, advocates of the science movement who considered the need to incorporate branches of the social sciences within the van of science were able to extend the scope of scientific knowledge without which, they argued, a democratic society was thought unable to progress. Toward the middle and latter part of the 1930s, the Association became increasingly preoccupied with 'social problems'. The Guild had, since its inception prior to the First World War, devoted itself to the 'promotion of scientific method and results to social problems and public affairs'. The Association possessed the necessary prestige and influence among those institutions and influentials likely to enhance the prospects of science, and as such became a natural ally of the science movement. Furthermore, the Association provided a direct route to the Parliamentary Science Committee (passim) another important aspect of the network of influence being cultivated within the institutional framework of science. The Association's constituent member of the Parliamentary Science Committee served as an important link between the professional echelon of the disciplines' practitioners and additionally, as an important source of influence on matters of science within government.

The diffusion of the ethos and authority of science continued unabated, with significant consequences for the social sciences. An important change occurred in the British Association's disposition toward the latter disciplines, with the establishment of a specially appointed committee to (Armytage, 1957, p.135):

"...consider how the Association might indicate the importance which it attaches to the development of the social sciences."

Unfortunately, sociology was not, on the occasion in question, a candidate for inclusion within the Association's appreciation of those disciplines worthy of the accolade science. Nevertheless, such a development would provide social scientists with an opportunity to establish their credentials and the status of their respective disciplines as bone
fide science. Such an attraction and opportunity for the social scientists may account for their apparent criticism of sociology's socio-philosophical wing whose exponents had attempted to postulate a synoptic science of society under the co-ordinating influence of sociology, during the important conferences of the middle and late 1930s. The campaign to recruit social scientists to the science movement led the more prudent exponents of the Ginsberg 'school' of sociology to adopt a strategy of accommodation and negotiation, in the face of the assault upon its rather fragile existence within the wider field of sociology. The final inter-war conference did indicate a somewhat modified view from the sociologists toward their original project for a synoptic science of society.

Toward the end of the inter-war period, the science movement had progressively extended its remit to encompass those individual scientists whose expertise could be brought to bear on the solution of social and political questions. Once again, the alliance between science and the Labour movement became a matter of public debate. Indeed, as Bevin remarked in his address to the T.U.C. in 1937, (1957, p.141):

"... the significance of scientific discovery in all fields of research will be of incalculable value, not only to our movement but also to the community. The General Council cordially welcomes the opportunity to consult with representative scientists by means of such an advisory council and panels of scientific workers from whom we can obtain the information and advice we need in dealing with our problems."

Such an intention amounted to not only a reiteration of Labour's earlier commitment to the potential of science for socialism, but highlighted the foundation upon which Labour's social policies would be based. It is no coincidence that Clement Attlee would call for an enquiry into the adequacy of social and economic research during the latter stages of the war. The Labour contingent of the wartime coalition government regarded the role of scientific planning as the key to successful post-war social reconstruction. A social science would be the means by which socialist policies were to be demonstrated as the moral and logical necessity of a new social order. In this respect, a socialist
conception of social science was in keeping with the pragmatic political
science espoused by the Webbs and derived from their version of Fabianism.
Labour's commitment to large-scale social reform meant that the prospect
of planning would necessarily entail a considerable increase in social
and economic research. Such a commitment was eventually expressed thro-
ugh Labour's support for the establishment of a Scientific Advisory

6. Science and War: a role for social science

The diffusion of the ethos and authority of science within the intellectual
and institutional milieu of inter-war Britain was extensive and permanent.
This was the case especially in the 1930s, and particularly within
the emergent relationship between science and political administration
on the one hand, and as a framework within which to construct and implement
social reform on the other. The latter, associated in large measure
with the collaboration between the science and labour movements and
the former, as an expression of what Armytage (1965) has referred to
as 'state-craft'. The scientific ethos was regarded as an essential
prerequisite for 'moulding state policy'. The Chairman of the Institute
of Professional Civil Servants (Armytage, 1965, p.271):

"... called for a reform of entry into the administrative
grade, so as to ensure a larger quota of entrants familiar
with the history and methods of science and sympathetic to
the scientific outlook."

In examining the evolution of the science movement, I have attempted
to explain its nature and purpose in terms of several of its constituent
themes. In addition, I have also endeavoured to present an account
of its influence within the inter-war current of ideas and the wider
cultural context. What is important to bear in mind, as far as the
aims and objectives of the movement were concerned, is that they did
not cease, nor did its supporters disperse as a result of the outbreak
of war. In fact, its institutional base underwent significant consolida-
tion as hostilities commenced, in addition to an intensification of
the public debate on the moral and social function of science in
both war and peace. Although the Parliamentary Science Committee was disbanded in 1939, it re-emerged bearing a similar title and committed to its previous 'Aims and Objectives'. Amongst those aims and objectives was the belief that (Powell and Butler, 1980, p.12):

"... substantial benefits should result if the numerous Societies concerned with scientific activities combine their influence with the object of ensuring that Parliament shall have proper regard for the importance of scientific methods in relation to public affairs."

Powell and Butler (1980) provide an interesting account of the history of the Science Committee, with an explanation of its establishment in 1939, including its official remit and attendant 'Procedures'. Essentially the Committee was concerned with the funding of science, the promotion of the 'scientific point of view', monitoring legislation which affected science, provide M.P.s with 'authoritative scientific information', and generally ensuring that science should always be presented as a matter of 'public interest'. The disposition of the 'scientific viewpoint' and the presence of its lobby in the corridors of power, though quite separate from the substantive issues within science itself, were, nevertheless of equal importance to its subsequent development. Although social scientists possessed neither the access nor the influence of their scientist counterparts within the political domain, some measure of recognition of their work might have been possible through a closer association of the two groups. Sharing a common, public platform at conferences and symposia was one way of achieving this end, in addition to participation in public inquiries and Royal Commissions. The Committee was also to play a major role in convincing the government of the urgent need for scientific manpower in the immediate post-war era. Its own sub-committees were instrumental in preparing, adopting and publishing major reports on the Universities and the Increase of Scientific Manpower (1946); Colleges of Technology and Technological Manpower (1947); and Technical Education and Skilled Manpower (1950).

In addition to the increasing institutional entrenchment of science within government, civil and military administration and research,
scientists themselves continued to advocate the need for widespread application of their methods to other economic, social and political spheres. In particular, the role of science in industry was considered to be vital, in view of the nature and scale of hostilities, and the effect this would have on Britain's post-war industrial structure and international economic standing. It is understandable that politicians would give the scientists and technologists every opportunity to revive the industrial base of Britain's ailing post-war economy. Although Britain had benefitted from the 'Lend Lease Acts' of 1941 - providing the economy with over 26,000 million dollars - the agreement was suddenly cancelled in 1945, leaving Britain with no alternative but to raise a loan from the United States (cf. McCurrach, 1948). Britain's post-war reconstruction was intricately related to the dominant position of America as the directive centre of the ensuing global reconstruction process, both in terms of scientific and technological development, and capital movement. The ruination of European industry for the second time within half a century consolidated America's position as the leading economic power, by virtue of both its massive capital reserve and its closely related military and technological resources and expertise.

The out-break of a world war provided the institutional base of science with a clearly defined context and purpose. The contingent relationship between social context and the production of knowledge was bound by the immediate demands of the state. The funding of research, discovery and invention (part of the 'progress' of science) proceeded at an astonishing pace. The national need provided the essential ideological impetus and political imperative for action. Amidst the mobilisation of science and the general reordering of knowledge, scientists created opportunities for social scientists to make a claim on behalf of their own disciplines and expertise.
The presence of a growing and influential science lobby within government ensured that scientists and their Parliamentary supporters were able to supervise not only what science ought to be done, but how it was to be done, thus exercising considerable control over not only science's institutional structure, but influencing in turn the growth of scientific knowledge. It was within this tumult of institutional control and rapid expansion of scientific knowledge and practice, that social science sought to establish and consolidate its intellectual and institutional bases. The 'scientific approach' in the administration of the affairs of a state at war became a litany common to the natural scientist, the social scientist and the politician. As Geoffrey Crowther (1942)* author of Science and World Order argued in 1942 (Crowther, 1942, p.25):

"The example of science encourages the hope that the methods which reconcile freedom and authority in the investigations of nature may presently be adopted by social administrators, and lead to a similar reconciliation in the realm of social activity."

Enter the social scientist.

Those given to espousing the social value of science during the inter-war period, referred constantly to the prevailing conditions of wartime Britain as an example of the necessity of giving science and its practitioners full reign in the cause of preserving democracy and establishing a new social order after victory. The pre-war association between the Labour and science movements strengthened, and indeed, a particularly strong, socialist theme emerged and became expressed through several very popular publications produced during and at the conclusion of hostilities, (Cf. Science and World Order, Crowther et al., 1942 (passim); Science and the Nation, Association of Scientific Workers, 1946; The Social Function of Science, Bernal 1939; Science at War, Anonymous, 1940, (this was the first Penguin to be published

* Crowther, an influential publicist for science and its role in the modern world, became a member of the U.G.C.'s Sub-Committee on Social Science, established as a result of the Clapham Committee of 1946.
anonymously, although Armytage (1957) explains that its contributors totalled twenty five). All of these books, although some qualification is needed in the case of Bernal's work, concentrated on the crucial role of science in not only the conduct of war, but as the basis for the moral and social reconstruction of post-war Britain. They convey the essential precepts and principles of the ethos and authority of science, and generally exhibit what I have referred to as the science movement's central themes.

Although an attempt to establish a 'Popular Front' in Britain had not been successful during the inter-war period, the political commitment to such a project had not floundered entirely. Moreover, the ascendancy of the science and labour movements provided an alternative vehicle for the unification of those social groups and class elements which, according to Coombes (1980), had 'failed to achieve a common revolutionary purpose' under a popular front. Coombes also suggests that such a failure could be attributed to a continuous "assent to established class-rule and dynastic continuity, and of submerging the British revolutionary tradition", to the extent that Coombes 1980, p.71):

"... there was no longer available to the British Left an actively progressive rhetoric, capable of uniting tactically, workers and liberal middle and lower-class elements by reference to past revolutionary aims and achievements.

Interestingly enough, science could serve equally well the aims and objectives of ideologues of either the left or right, as each appreciated the political and economic potential of organised science within society.

Of the several texts referred to above, whose central theme entailed the social function of science in war and the subsequent reconstruction of Britain, Science and World Order (1942), and Science In War (1940), provide an invaluable amount of information on the conduct of scientists during the war years beyond their respective fields of technical competence and into the spheres of politics and other branches of knowledge. In particular, the former volume, which was based on the proceedings
of the 'Conference on Science and World Order', arranged by the British Association for the Advancement of Science, through its Division for the Social and International Relations of Science (held between the 26-28 of September, 1941), serves as a singularly important example of an occasion when 'science and statecraft came together in open conference for the first time'. The timing of the conference, the status and influence of the participants and the nature of its business, especially the decision to establish a Committee for the consideration of scientific research on human institutions, (formed during 1942), demonstrate clearly the opportunities created by scientists for social scientists to participate in the former's project to install science at the co-ordinating centre of Britain's struggle for survival. What was of crucial significance for social science, and especially sociology in responding to the opportunities that such an imperative re-ordering of national priorities and the attendant forms of knowledge that would facilitate their realisation, was the fact that those disciplines, and the production of social knowledge, would have to evolve within and in response to, the epistemological and methodological criteria being forcefully asserted within the emergent ideological paradigm of wartime science. Science was becoming increasingly bureaucratised and politicised, to the extent that scientists willingly offered their craft as a substitute for politics, a vocation which some scientists at least, regarded as the reason for the national crisis. Politicians had failed to prevent the outbreak of war. Now it was up to scientists, in the words of H.G. Wells, to pull 'our scatterbrained world into sane, effective mentality.' The public and political profile of the pre-war science movement heightened as a result of the demands placed upon science during the war. Its representatives within the wartime Parliamentary and Scientific Committee were ideally placed to persuade politicians and civil servants alike of the crucial role of science to the war effort, both on the home front and in the actual theatres of war itself. With the outbreak of war, the ethos and authority of science, a contestable proposition in the peace of pre-war Britain, became a universal, secular credo, recited with urgency and fervour amongst the legions of the newly converted. For many social scientists, the essence of the credo had always been at the centre of their faith. For other practitioners
of those disciplines the conversion was swift and expedient. For some, there would be no, on the road to Damascus experience, although a healthy agnosticism would safe-guard their interests in a period of institutional and intellectual potential for those social science disciplines willing to avail themselves of the opportunities being created through the wide-scale incorporation of science within the state apparatus. The crucial 'test' for disciplines like sociology would occur in attempts to demonstrate the contribution that it was capable of making in response to national imperatives. It is the nature of those responses (as a feature of sociology's advocatory dimension) which would determine the prospects of the discipline in the long-term.

Crowther (1942) introduced his volume with a declaration of the aims and objectives of the 1941 Conference, emphasising the importance of the international element of the event, (1942, p.9):

"They (the scientists) met to discuss the kind of world that must come out of the war, a world in which the plentitude of science would be used not for destruction, but for the emancipation of mankind from want and fear."

The pre-war science movement's central themes of science as a mission of truth and enlightenment, and the role of the scientist as custodian of science's special knowledge and practice, were projected upon this important gathering of scientists and their supporters as an international crusade, charged with the task of restoring democracy. The importance of the conference should not be underestimated, especially in terms of the alliance forged between not only statesmen and scientists in Britain, but the nature and degree of international co-operation established through the extraordinary procedural arrangements. The latter entailed day and night radio transmissions of the proceedings around the world, and the added facility for 'round-table', Trans-Atlantic radio discussions. The Conference was convened with the intention of establishing a gradual but permanent momentum in the new relationship between science and the state. A number of 'expert committees' were established as a result of it and further conferences were also arranged
in order to deal with the specialist nature of some aspects of the original Conference proceedings. The mood of the participants and the fervour with which they approached their task is aptly portrayed in Crowther's reference to Julian Huxley's expectations of the event and its import for the restoration of peace and the new post-war world (Crowther, 1942, p.15):

"The greatest social revolution in the whole of human history is in progress. The war is a dreadful, bloody phase of it. But we can, as Dr. Julian Huxley pointed out to the Conference, win the war and lose the peace. In the winning of the war, men of science are key men. They are not super-men but they can bring to the problems ahead of us their knowledge and experience. The message of the Conference on Science and World Order is that henceforth science and statecraft must work together."

The reference to the 'winning of the peace' and the role of the scientist is a crucial indication of the kind of expert that the scientific community and its statesmen supporters would actively seek to recruit during, but especially in the period immediately following the end of the war. The commodity of expertise, and the role of the technical expert would form the basis of one of the most significant post-war, Government Reports affecting the determination and means of increasing scientific manpower; The Barlow Report (1946). This report was to determine the immediate post-war policy for university expansion. It is noteworthy that in the absence of any other instrument for framing Government policy on higher education, it fell to this committee on scientific manpower to shape the first stage in a plan of expansion which led, step by step, to the Robbins Report in 1963. I shall return to the significance of the Barlow Report later when examining the expansion of the system of higher education and the consequences of this for sociology.

How did the scientists envisage an extension of their role and interests within a culture beleagued by war and in contrast to that which they had traditionally occupied as their own province of specialised knowledge and practice? Moreover, what affect would such a transformation of
science and its practitioners have for social science and its practitioners? A clue to the first question can be gained from a consideration of the portrayal of the new scientists by the anonymous contributors to the volume entitled *Science in War*, (1940, p.139):

"What we are calling for, not as an ideal, but as an urgent practical need in a desperate situation, is the effective utilisation of scientific method, scientific advice and scientific personnel."

In support of this, but on a more political and philosophical note (1940, p.140):

"The pre-war world has gone under in the struggle in which we are engaged, but its ghost still haunts our thoughts. Laissez-faire individualism and gentlemenly Civil Service Government are now only obstructive and dangerous survivals ... The only effective organisation is scientific, it is also the democratic one. Science and democracy are no longer merely desirable goals: they are conditions of survival."

The scientists and their supporters did not content themselves with stirring rhetoric or tendentious critiques of the ancien régime. The central tenet of the pre-war science movement - the ethos and authority of science - received an infusion of pragmatism, giving rise to a series of "necessary conditions", all of which comprised a "framework for organised science in war" (1940, p.142). The dimension and substance of this organisational framework were not confined to the technical products of warfare, but extended to other spheres of social and economic activity; formerly alien domains for the natural scientist. Furthermore, social science and its practitioners were to be accommodated within the envisaged wartime 'framework of science'.

The scientists were determined to conscript the social scientist into the service of the nation. Any reservations they may have had about the potential of those disciplines to respond in an appropriate manner, entailed the failure of other authorities to appreciate the contribution that they were capable of making to the war effort. The
scientists qualified their case for the use of social science. Attention should be drawn to three aspects of their argument. First, it was assumed that the collection of social data should be a priority directed toward the creation of an effective propaganda service, in conjunction with a nationwide assessment of morale. The central role of psychology is implied rather than stated in this assumption, as the authors of *Science in War* argued (1940, p. 131):

"It is a platitude among politicians to say that this human factor - (commonly called "morale" when applied to the Services, or the "Home Front" when civilians are meant) - is of major importance in war."

Concerned in the main with the likely disastrous effects of uncontrolled, mass evacuation and a 'refugee problem' (it should be remembered that the preceding volume was published very early in the war) the scientists regarded the necessity of controlling the populace as an essential task of the government. This was to be achieved by using the expertise of the social scientist (1940, p. 131):

"It seems doubtful, however, whether the authorities are taking all the necessary steps to establish morale and an intellectual preparedness which will safely exclude the possibility of such things happening in Britain.

It is the job of the social sciences to illuminate these problems; to analyse morale into its constituent parts; to foresee the points of tension; and perhaps to suggest solutions."

Still on the theme of the first point alluded to above, social science was considered by the scientists to have no precedent for the use of its techniques under war-time conditions, (1940, p. 132):

"No precedent therefore exists for the use of techniques for social science in wartime."

Another important reason for the alleged non-use of social science was the ignorance of politicians to the potential of its various, composite disciplines (1940, p. 132):
"Another reason for neglect was the novelty of the machine, a novelty which rendered it suspect to politicians."

The second factor which the scientists regarded as a possible handicap to the social sciences was their tendency to intellectualism. This is somewhat hard to accept in view of William Beveridge's crusade for social science at the L.S.E. between the wars (1940, p.132):

"Unfortunately, there was also a weakness in social science itself, which further damaged its position. It was essentially tied up with the Universities and with a highly academic personnel, whereas the essential nature of its subject matter, the people, was unsuitable for study from above by persons with a strong intellectual bias. Indeed, it may truly be said that not only did the Government neglect social science, but social scientists themselves neglected what was essentially a main part of their studies."

The preceding statement may not seem as misplaced as it suggests. The point being made is not so much an indication of an utterly, negative weakness inherent in social science per se, rather an unstated assumption about the appropriate intellectual form that the disciplines within social science ought to evolve in response to the immediacy of a war. This emerges in the third qualification of the scientists' case for a relevant social science, and deals with the essential methodological prerequisites of such a science. The following statement encompasses the scientists' adherence to the technical sophistication of the quantitative methods associated with other, more rigorous branches of the applied sciences (1940, p.132):

"There were, therefore no established methods comparable in prestige with those existing in, for example, the fields of aerodynamics or nutrition for studying the mass of the people.

Because of all this, new techniques of social science have so far scarcely been applied in this war. It is clear, however, that their application was never more demanded."
Cases of civilian 'attitudes and apathies' affecting the functioning of several important Ministries were cited as evidence of the need for social science in war. A clue to a possible contender for the title of 'methods of appropriate exactitude' can be gleaned from the reference in the last paragraph of the preceding quotation, wherein mention is made of the 'new techniques of social science' which 'have so far scarcely been applied in this war'. They relate to the methods used in Mass Observation. Mass Observation appeared to be a form of social research which appealed greatly to the scientists responsible for the production of Science in War (1940, p.133):

"... there has been a steady growth in the use of existing scientific methods for assessing reactions of the people and for estimating changes in public and private opinion. In recent weeks, moreover, official use has been made of both statistical methods for sampling opinion in the whole population, and for the analytical, penetrative methods of a qualitative sort, largely developed since 1937 by 'Mass Observation'. The results of this work have proved, and are proving, of increasing immediate value. But the adoption of these techniques has come very late. And their usefulness is not yet recognised by several Departments, especially by Service Departments.

The authors of Science in War employed a very inclusivist designation for activities which they regarded as 'propaganda'. Nevertheless, they considered it to be of fundamental importance to the war effort, arguing that it must, (1940, p.135):

"... today have an "almost scientific" precision based on scientifically accurate diagnosis."

And on a final warning note (1940, p.136):

"Refusal to recognize the scientific applications of social research and of propaganda technique endangers everything."

It is ironic that the authors should condone the use of 'snooping' as an effective aspect of propaganda, for the Ministry of Information was dubbed, 'Cooper's Snoopers' as a result of early attempts to ascertain
public opinion on a variety of often quite sensitive issues. It appeared obvious to most, that the government needed, as a matter of urgency, a comprehensive, reliable and responsive organisation capable of collecting and disseminating information for the control of the population. Whether the nature or degree of control amounted to outright propaganda, or, the assessment of public opinion, an effective means had to be found to collect the necessary data. The absence of such an arrangement caused both embarrassment and confusion within both Westminster and Whitehall. Apart from the fairly well established groups of economists and statisticians distributed throughout various Ministries and Government Departments, it soon became apparent that the state did not possess the hevewithall (either in resources or personnel), to obtain the kind of information which would allow it to introduce the measure of control in required. Indeed, some Ministers balked at what seemed like totalitarian manoeuvres to achieve an end more in keeping with a regime which the nation was at war with. Angus Calder highlights this apprehension during the period when the Wartime Social Survey was established, (Calder, 1971, p.542):

"In the spring of 1940, the Wartime Social Survey was set up, under the Ministry of Information, yet such was "the doubt and hesitency which were prevalent among the heads of the ministry as to its necessity and value" (as the S.C.N.E.* found), that the enterprise was kept secret."

During the early period of the war, the relationship between the state and its citizens was forced into stark relief against the backdrop of imminent invasion. An expansion of the system of information gathering during this period has also been considered by Marjorie Ogilvy-Webb (1965, p.56):

"It was far from being generally accepted in Whitehall that government/public relations were of central importance. It was the approach of war which speeded up the expansion of government information services still further."

*S.C.N.E. (Select Committee on National Expenditure).
Ogilvy-Webb has argued convincingly, that the consolidation of the information function of the state, as a 'service' to its politicians and civil servants, can in Britain be attributed to the events of the Second World War (1965, p.57):

"The information services became particularly important after the fall of France, when it became clear that all our resources and the total mobilisation of the population would be needed if we were going to win the war; this implied a multitude of special duties in the field of information. Total war in a democratic country can only be waged if people understand what the government is doing and can be persuaded to cooperate with it. It meant explanation to people who were unlikely to read Parliamentary debates or government White Papers."

G.D. Mitchell has argued similarly (Mitchell, 1968, p.212). While this may generally be the case, the nature and degree of cooperation and willingness of both the government and the people to participate in the common pursuit of a shared goal is easy to portray with the benefit of hindsight. The cloak of the Official Secrets Act has, for decades, covered the less successful attempts of the government during the war, to gain the support of its citizens. Nevertheless, as Ogilvy-Webb has argued, the war did bring to the attention of the Government the urgent need to introduce legislation which would enhance its domestic intelligence service.

In this section of the current chapter, I have argued that the science movement and its supporters sought to evolve and deploy a series of strategies which would enhance the political and moral necessity of science, anticipating the consequences this would have for the 'proper' relationship between science, the state and its citizens. In the main, the movement's members tended to focus upon the somewhat nebulous notion of the ethos and authority of science as a pretext for evoking the 'obvious' virtuousness of the latter relationship. Science became an exemplar for all forms of knowledge and a basis for political action. Scant reference was ever made to the problems of science's substantive nature.
With the outbreak of a national crisis, such as a world war, the case for science seemed almost irresistible if not invincible. Other forms of knowledge and practice would also be evaluated with reference to the context and categories of the scientific enterprise. In the case of social science and its practitioners, natural scientists and their spokesmen began to prescribe the intellectual and organisational dominion of the former group of disciplines. In determining the division of labour and knowledge between the physical and social sciences, emphasis was given to the superiority of the methodology of the natural sciences (1940, p.115):

"What is the scientific method as contrasted with the Platonic? It consists in the use of experiment guided by the constructive imagination. It prepares its users to recognise the novelties and possibilities in any situation. It produces a creative attitude towards facts. It is actually impossible to discover any new facts without scientific method."

The authors begin the preceding definition of 'the scientific method' with reference to its philosophical basis but conclude by slipping into an evaluation of the normative/prescriptive nature of that method, as an appropriate moral disposition, readily applicable to any branch of knowledge. The prevalence of support for such a model of science would have consequences for sociology both during and after the war. It should also be remembered that, notwithstanding the contentiousness of such a philosophy of science and its consequences for other branches of knowledge, the circumstances of wartime Britain were not conducive to the important, but nevertheless leisurely, academic polemics that characterise contemporary debates on the issue. The case being made by the scientists at the outbreak of the war possessed a compelling urgency heightened by the national crisis. It is likely that their arguments were received without contest or protestation, if only because the potential of science and its practitioners to actively intervene in the conduct of war rested on a corpus of theory and methods developed over centuries and made manifest in the artifacts which the non-scientist tended to regard as ocular proof of the reality of science. If science could alter and control nature, then it appeared reasonable to assume
that it could also impose itself in a similar fashion on society's problems in time of war.

Echoing the 'New Social Contract' espoused by Lancelot Hogben during the latter part of the 1930s, the authors of Science in War gave a clear indication of the opportunity that war presented to scientists. It marked both the beginning and end to the manner and degree to which science and the scientist formed part of the national culture. From a position of peripheral importance and nominal institutionalisation, its practitioners seemed poised to assert their craft within a social and historical context which, as Marcuse (1968) has argued, gave rise to an age in which scientific-technical rationality and manipulation became welded together into new forms of social control.

In this chapter I have concentrated upon several features of the inter-war and intra-war period which I felt were of significance to the development of social science in Britain. I argued that the transition from the period of peace to the tumult of war engendered significant shifts in the processes and production of knowledge, whereby the evaluation of various forms of knowledge tended to reflect the needs of a state at war. Criteria of relevance, utility and expediency informed judgements and interpretations of the social, economic and political imperatives associated with the ubiquitous 'national interest'. I focused in particular on the social relations of science, especially the emergence of the science movement and the importance of its role in asserting the contribution that science could make to national culture and the waging of war. I endeavoured to portray the ideological underpinning of the ethos and authority of science, as a strategy deployed by scientists and their supporters, to extend their influence beyond traditional boundaries of disciplinary competence and cultural convention. Hence my reference to the assumption held by some members of the science movement, that democracy was the scientific method writ large.

Although I have tended to concentrate upon the role of science and its social relations during the course of this chapter, my main intention was to focus upon those issues and contexts which would come to influence
the growing political debate on the role of social science in serving the interests of the state in time of war, and equally important, during the period of social and moral reconstruction following it. While the connection between these events and the development of sociology may seem somewhat tenuous, it should be remembered that it would be within the intellectual categories and cultural contexts of wartime Britain, that sociology would come to be evaluated as a resource in the construction of peace-time Britain. How would the sociologists respond to this opportunity to once again advocate the potential of their discipline?
CHAPTER FOUR

Sociology and the evaluation of social research:
The Clapham Debate
1. The conscription of social research

In 1943, members of the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee put on the House of Commons Order Paper the following motion, which received the support of 207 M.P.s, (Powell and Butler, 1980, p.19):

"To call attention to research and scientific knowledge; and to move, that this House, recognising the vital part which research and science and their effective application can play in reconstruction, as a means of increasing our national prosperity, raising the standard of living, recovering our export trade and developing the national resources of our Empire, urges the declaration of a bold and generous government policy directed to the expansion of teaching and research facilities in our universities and technical colleges, to the extension of pure and applied research in all fields by the State, by industry through private firms and research associations, and to the effective and rapid application of the results of research."

The motion was the subject of a full day's debate in the House of Commons on 19 April 1944. Moreover the Lord President of the Council, Clement Attlee, promised that the government would give assistance 'on bold lines'. The Committee's advocacy of science was of fundamental importance to its further institutionalisation. The Motion although sincere in intent, nevertheless contained all the components of a carefully presented strategy to enhance the prospects of science during and after the war: scientists were to be at the forefront of post-war reconstruction; upon their efforts depended the nation's prosperity standard of living, and economic recovery in general. Reference was also made to the role science could play in sustaining a legitimate interest in Britain's Empire. Such a declaration of intent would be difficult for any government to dispute or ignore (see above my reference to the shift in association from political party to parliamentary support by members of the inter-war science movement). Through a fundamental reordering of the map of knowledge, Britain could recover all that she had lost and more, despite the social and economic disaster of a world war.

Another important indicator of the increased interest of the state in all forms of scientific research can be found in the response to the claims being made by the scientific community on behalf of its specialised knowledge and practice. One of the most noteworthy respondents to the science lobby was the Lord President of the Council, Clement Attlee. He was a former teacher of social work at the L.S.E. in the early 1920s, and initiated the government's Committee of Inquiry into The Provision for Social and Economic Research, Cmnd. 6868, (1946).
In accepting the task to review the intellectual and institutional arrangement of the various social sciences in Britain for the period in question, sociologists would have to undertake a detailed review of both the nature and purpose of their discipline, and the consequences this would have for its future status as an autonomous branch of knowledge and practice. The intra-war debate on the role of science had a significant impact on the latter issue, one that emerges when I examine shortly the evidence given to the Clapham Committee (Cmnd. 6868).

I wish now to consider the government's approach to the specific problem of a lack of sufficient and adequate information to inform its decision making, and the measures it adopted to alter the situation.

The war created circumstances in which a government and its civil administration contemplated the prospect of large-scale, programmes of social and economic research. The importance and complexity of fulfilling the needs of the various agencies, ministries and individuals, regarding the commissioning and utilisation of research necessitated the creation of extra, specialised divisions and departments within Whitehall and elsewhere. While it is important to consider the general division or classification of the activities of the wartime 'information machine', attention should also be drawn to another significant consequence of the expansion of social research within government: this concerned the general awareness and acceptance of the benefits to be obtained by carefully organised social and economic research. While civil servants and politicians may not have necessarily made the connection between social research and social science, as the war progressed, even with the topic of post-war reconstruction becoming an item high on the political agenda, the connection between planning and the necessity of research was an association that possessed both an apparent degree of logic and urgency, especially as hostilities began to draw to an end.

The potential for salient social research was hampered by other more practical deficiencies. Harold Laski, writing toward the end of the war, lamented the fact that in the spheres of 'research and intelligence'
in the British Government, there existed no survey of the individual work of the separate Government Departments 'over the years', (Laski, 1944, p.11):

"A mass of important knowledge, of course, has been accumulated over the years by Departments like the Board of Inland Revenue, the Home office, and the Board of Agriculture. Most government offices had their intelligence branches, and even their public relations officer. Yet no survey of the whole must but emphasise the general incoherence of the pattern involved."

Laski went further, pointing to the inter-war situation as the basis for the confusion and uncertainty which characterised the attitude of government in attempting to come to terms with demands that a world war placed on the nation and its resources.

The emphasis was upon the collection of data, which could then be converted to information for use by the various ministries and other government departments. Wideranging, longitudinal studies were not the order of the day. Time was of the essence, as was the timing of the various educational and propaganda campaigns and the subsequent initiation of 'controls' essential to the efficient management of the home front. Researchers were unable to engage in scholarly exegeses and polemics; rather, the relentless pressure to conduct surveys and continually canvass public opinion, took priority over what, in time of peace, would have proceeded at a more leisurely and academic pace. However, such activity did not pass entirely unnoticed, and the potential of social research on the scale being initiated during the war (for the post-war period and beyond) became the subject of a wartime, British Association 'Committee on Scientific Research on Human Institutions' (1942) following on from an earlier conference on 'Science and World Order'. This Committee had an important bearing on the evidence given to the Clapham Committee (Cmnd. 6868) and I shall consider it when examining the deliberations of that Committee.

The Government may have wished to increase actual and potential social and economic research, both during and after the war, but how extensive
and diverse was the nation's research base at the beginning of the war and what plans did it have to consolidate and expand such a base in order to meet the needs of the state?

Mark Abrams (1951) gives a fairly comprehensive description of the array of private agencies conducting social research and canvassing public opinion before the Second World War. It is interesting to note, that approximately two thirds of all market research during that period was carried out by the market research departments of three advertising agencies; the London Press Exchange Ltd., J. Walter Thompson Company and Lintas Ltd. (1951, p.55). He also notes that the research managers of those organisations were all former students of Professor Bowley.

In addition to market research, there existed the British Institute of Public Opinion, established in the 1930s. Mass Observation, established in collaboration with Julian Huxley, Charles Madge and Tom Harrison in 1937 represented a considerable departure from orthodox survey methods. Government departments continued to engage in some measure of research work, but it tended to be, in the main, on an ad hoc basis. The Medical Research Council and to a lesser extent the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, (cf. Ian Varcoe, 1974), initiated what could be construed as social research, although the nature of that research tended to be rather specialised, especially in the case of the latter organisation. The inter-war years was also a period in which a number of very important poverty surveys were either repeated or initiated, i.e. the London, Liverpool, Middlesbrough and York surveys. University departments of social science (I use the term in its widest sense), were largely responsible for initiating the preceding surveys, although it often depended on the ability of an influential academic, possessing favourable connections with a private funding agency to initiate a project. A number of Royal and National Institutes for the promotion of social research came into existence during the inter-war period, in addition to the highly productive and respected Political and Economic Planning organisation (P.E.P.). All of the preceding organisations, departments, Institutes and agencies had one thing in common: the use of, and confidence in administrative statistics, surveys and empirical investigations. Although I have not mentioned every source of survey
work, or producer of social statistics, I have endeavoured to give some
indication of the variation and spread of those bodies engaged in some
form of social research prior to the outbreak of the war. Despite
the availability of the latter, the wartime government chose to establish
its own information service and subsequently, a social survey unit.
Although Laski (1944) pointed to the narrow-mindedness of politicians
and civil servants for ignoring the abilities and experience of the
nation's social scientists, such disregard and perhaps in some cases
scepticism of the contribution that they may have been able to make to
the war effort, was a result of a confusion still being perpetuated
until quite recently (Cherns, 1979, p.30):

"Most academic research is concerned more with the past than
the future and is more diagnostic than predictive or prescrip­
tive, so that the university system is inadequate for, or
inappropriate to, policy-oriented research and to interprofes­sional activities."

Certainly the government wanted to utilise the expertise of various
social scientists: in the case of the sociologists, T.H. Marshall was
despatched to the Foreign Office (German section); David Glass became
the deputy director of the Statistical Division (overseas) of the Ministry
of Supply. Economists and statisticians were brought into the service
of many government Departments and as the war progressed, Operational
Research was developed to include studies employing social
scientists. The institutional pattern of social science and social
research, and the associated formalism of its techniques became to consoli­
dated within the bureaucratic constraints of a state at war. This develop­
ment had quite significant consequences for the kind of sociology likely
to emerge in the immediate post-war era, especially after its formal
definition into existence via the evidence given to the crucial Clapham
Committee. Moreover, the Marshallian cleavage of the pre-war period
was fast becoming a chasm in the light of intra-war developments. The
socio-philosophical wing of pre-war sociology may have possessed the
discipline's only Chair, but of what consequence was that in the turmoil
of large-scale, social disruption occasioned by war? Empiricism would
be further exalted not by virtue of its self-evidently and historically
proven indubitableness, but because of more obvious social determinants. C. Wright Mills (1963) has suggested the distinction here (1963, p.14):

"It is not all true that only as "general principles" are discovered can social science offer "sound practical guidance"; often the administrator needs to know certain detailed facts and relations, and that is all he needs or wants to know."

As I stated above, the social survey and associated methods of empirical investigation formed the methodological basis of pre-war, social research within the existing field of social science. The evolution of the survey method is now part and parcel of the odyssey of British empiricism, and I do not intend to dwell upon the various accounts of its development, nor do I wish to engage in a protracted debate about its validity as a technique of social enquiry.* However, I will refer to aspects of these issues at salient points in my examination of the evidence submitted to the Clapham Committee, especially its examination of the work of the Wartime Social Survey (WSS).


The notion of a 'Ministry of Information' was not an entirely new concept. A Ministry of Information had been established during the First World War, although its successor in the Second World War was created out of a greater necessity to find the best ways of "selling to people the commodities and attitudes which the government thought were good for them" (cf., Calder, 1971, pp.542-547). Although private agencies continued to provide a research facility for the government, the Ministry of Information's (MOI) Wartime Social Survey (WSS), served as the first occasion on which large-scale social research became an activity of its civil administration. At one stage during the war, the MOI employed over

* These issues have been addressed in the works of the following authors: Caradog Jones (1941); Simey (1968); Kent (1981); Easthope (1974); Abrams (1951); Mitchell (1968); Stevenson (1977); critical exegeses of the latter can be found in Hindess (1973); Benton (1977); Wright Mills (1963); Abrams et al (1981); Bell and Newby (1977); Birnbaum (1971); Pollock (1976); Cicourel (1964); Willer and Willer (1973); Phillips (1971 and 1973).
three thousand staff, excluding postal censorship workers, and other Government departments employed in excess of seventeen hundred people engaged in what Calder has referred to as "information work" (1971). According to Ogilvy-Webb (1965), the WSS made perhaps the most important contribution to social research, notwithstanding the work of private organisations. It should also be remembered that research on some topics could not of necessity be contracted out to the latter agencies for reasons of national security.

The origin of the WSS has been well documented, but briefly it was established in April 1940 by the MOI as a "Machine" for carrying out statistical studies of public opinion and for undertaking market research studies for other government departments. When first established, a government memorandum (T161/1301) stated that, "the scientific side of its work was under the auspices of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research" (NIESR), (1945, T 161/1301). The NIESR although established via the munificence of the Halley Stewart Trust, depended largely upon the benefaction of the Rockefeller Foundation for continued financial support. The latter Foundation assisted in its general budget to the extent of $150,000 for a five year period beginning in 1938. Interestingly enough, its Chairman Sir Henry Clay, members of its Council of Management, including Alexander Carr-Saunders, Sir Hector Hetherington (also dual members of the Institute's Executive Committee and Governing Body) were all, simultaneously, members of the Clapham Committee; the Government committee charged with the task of assessing whether or not adequate provision existed for economic and social research in Britain. It is important to consider carefully the arguments and evidence given by the former individuals in the course of the deliberations of the Clapham Committee, especially in the light of the Institute's 'Principal Functions', general objectives and programme statements.* I have considered

* Among its general objectives and specific programme statements appear the following: "By the scope and character of its programme the Institute will keep the continuing support of men of affairs. It must remain free of any suspicion of political association or propaganda; to encourage the realistic study of the problems of contemporary society." (Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1937, p.243). The Institute's Principal Functions included: the conduct of research, provision of assistance and facilities for research to members of university staffs and others working on projects within 'the Institute's programmes'; to seek funds for economic and social research.
previously above, the conditional nature of Rockefeller funding and the constraints that this placed upon the recipient.

Although the NIESR provided the 'scientific side' of the WSS's initial work, the former organisation was unable to sustain such support, and consequently, reliance was placed upon various 'scientific consultants' until the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Committee of twelve consultants in 1944. The memorandum states (1945, T 161/1301):

"It has been the practice for the Survey to discuss proposed investigations with the Scientific Advisory Committee* before any work is put in hand. The consultants have provided a link between the Survey and other scientific organisations, and the Survey has found their assistance to be of definite value."

Of course it depends on the significance attached to the notion of 'scientific' and 'scientist' when assessing the style and content of the memorandum. Yet in view of my preceding arguments on the ethos and authority of science and the role of the natural scientist in war, I think the author's understanding and presentation of the role of the Survey during the war to be more than a matter of semantics, and actually constitutes a strategy for the perpetuation of the Survey, in some form, after the cessation of hostilities. While conceding that the author was its Director,

* The following were members of the Scientific Advisory Committee of the WSS at the time of the submission of the memorandum (1945): Chairman, Lord Moran, President of the Royal College of Physicians; Vice-Chairman, Professor F.C. Bartlett, Medical Research Council, Professor of Psychology, Cambridge; Professor Cyril Burt, Professor of Psychology, University of London; Professor A.B. Hill, Professor of Medical Statistics, University of London, Statistician to the Medical Research Council, Secretary of the Royal Statistical Society; A.M. Carr-Saunders, Director of the L.S.E.; D. Caradog Jones, formerly Reader in Sociology, University of Liverpool, Director of the Merseyside Survey; Aubrey Lewis, Clinical Director of the Maudsley Hospital; Professor D.M. Newitt, Professor of Chemical Technology at the Imperial College of Science; Professor J.M. Mackintosh, Professor of Public Health and Dean of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Mary A. Hamilton, formerly Governor of the B.B.C. and formerly of the Office of the Ministry of Reconstruction; D. Houghton, Secretary of the Inland Revenue Staff Federation, Member of the Civil Service National Whitley Council, broadcaster on Social Problems; Stephen Taylor, former Director of the Home Intelligence Division of the Ministry of Information.
this is no guarantee of objectivity. Those arguing the case for the retention of the Survey certainly indicated a resolute partisanship amongst its supporters. This emerges in the memorandum's reference to the relative efficiency and effectiveness of commercial organisations with that of the WSS. The author recognised the contribution that such agencies could make to the to the field of government sponsored research. However, two reservations were expressed with regard to the extensive use of private research organisations. The first concerned the need to ensure that any government department wishing to commission research outside the existing organisational arrangements should be made through a single 'experienced', coordinating body or department. The obvious candidate here would be the MOI, or, a section of the latter, namely the Survey division itself, in concert with the Scientific Advisory Committee (1945, T 161/1301):

"In so far as use is to be made of these outside bodies it will be desirable that an approach to them should be made through a single department or organisation rather than that approaches should be made by departments etc., without coordination and with the risk of overlapping and excessive cost. Provided that the work can be allocated at a central point where experience is built up, it is probable that some inquiries can with advantage be put out to contract..."

The second reservation entailed the question of whether or not the private sector possessed the degree of skill, technical capability and scientific rigour to conduct research on behalf of government departments (1945, T 161/1301):

"... others (research projects) should be placed with the Survey so that there may be complete assurance that the work will be impartially and objectively done with the benefit of the distinctive scientific and technical methods which the Social Survey has worked out and with the help of the Advisory Committee."

The technically and scientifically privileged status being claimed for the WSS is difficult to account for. One possible reason may have been to do with its inauspicious inauguration in 1940, whereby its activities were likened to a "snooping Gestapo", and that its mode of enquiry was
merely "new fangled nonsense" (1945, T 161/1301), or, that "it was the business of Members of Parliament to express the state of feeling amongst their constituents on any given subject", (1945, T 161/1301). A poor public reception in the initial stages of its work caused it to be reorganised and "its field limited to the scientific collection of social facts needed for administrative purposes and not available from other sources", (T 161/1301). The wrath of the public and the condemnation of M.P.s were attributed to the "unsuccessful attempt to use psychiatric social workers to obtain statistical assessments of public morale", (T 161/1301). From June of 1941, the Survey worked under the general supervision of the MOI's Home Intelligence Division. Toward the end of the war it possessed a staff of 146, having conducted 337,000 interviews on factual enquiries, which were "necessary in order to guide a ministry in some particular policy, and not for enquiries which attempt to assess morale" (T 166/1301). It had conducted research for sixteen government departments and ministries* in both England and Scotland. Research proposals needed to be costed and endorsed by the Treasury before they were commissioned. The results could be made public at the discretion of the contracting Minister.

It is likely that the MOI was asked to submit evidence to the Clapham Committee for two reasons. First, its WSS division was thought to possess a high degree of expertise in the field of survey work under the supervision of a team of scientists (the Scientific Advisory Committee). Second, the influential members of the latter committee had broad research experience in their own specialist fields, in addition to having worked on projects sponsored by other non-governmental agencies and sundry Institutes. It could therefore be assumed that not only

were they generally confident in the work of the WSS, to which they were directly attached, but that such individuals should be able to pass comment and make informed judgements on the question of whether or not the provision of economic and social research was adequate for the nation's needs (in effect, the remit of the Clapham Committee).

The role of influentials, cliques and personalities is crucial to an appreciation of manner in which individuals were chosen for membership of the Clapham Committee, and the role they played in the debate on the extension of social and economic research in Britain in the post-war world. It is therefore important to recall the role of Alexander Carr-Saunders in social science's intellectual and institutional development between the wars. He was now a member of the WSS's Scientific Advisory Committee, (also the Director of the L.S.E.), in addition to serving on the Clapham Committee, the body to which the MOI memorandum had been sent for consideration. With this in mind, it is important to remember that Carr-Saunders had been a major critic of sociology's inter-war project to construct a synoptic science of society. This 'influential' in British social science, along with others, discussed the work of the WSS at a meeting of the Clapham Committee in December, 1945 (T 161/1301). In view of the date recorded on the MOI's memorandum, November 1945, I assume that it was considered at the Clapham Committee meeting. The minutes of the meeting disclose Alan Barlow's confidence in the proven utility and potential of the WSS (1945 T 161/1301):

"... it would have helped the Ministry of Labour in framing their pre-war legislation to have had some organisation as this at their disposal. The study of public reaction was very valuable to making policy."

Mr. L. Moss further urged that the continuation of the WSS should occur along the organisational lines of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research or the Medical Research Council. Although Carr-Saunders believed that the WSS was costly, it was nevertheless 'useful'. T.S. Simey, though not present at the meeting in question, regarded the MOI's Social Survey as a restriction on the possibilities of sociological research, which implied the evolution of broad generalisations within
a broadly defined 'problem area' (T 161/1301, meeting of the Committee, October 24, 1945). The minutes of the December meeting indicate that the Committee's Chairman was not entirely convinced by the arguments of either those individuals directly involved with the MOI, or the WSS, nor with practicing social scientists. The proof of the WSS's value as an essential adjunct to the formulation of social policy was deemed to rest with those government departments who had actually commissioned it to do research on their behalf. A decision was thus taken to ask for a submission of evidence from such Ministries, specifically in terms of the value of the services provided by the WSS.

Several of the most important war-time ministries provided written evidence to the Clapham Committee on the value of the WSS to the work of their respective departments. Submissions were received from the following ministries: the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Food and the Ministry of Fuel and Power. The substance of the submissions are of sufficient importance to quote them at length:

Ministry of Town and Country Planning, (Confidential letter from Mr. Geoffrey Whiskard, dated December 20, 1945, (CAB 124-530)):

"I am bound to say, however, that in my view the promise of the Wartime Social Survey has been better than its performance, except in those cases where the terms of reference have been fairly strictly defined."

With specific reference to the 'Middlesbrough Survey':

"Its contents are extremely detailed, but in a large degree irrelevant, and it looks to us as though someone in the Wartime Social Survey is thinking more about producing another publication than about its use for planning purposes."

Mr. Whiskard's assumption proved correct, for The Social Background of a Plan: A Study of Middlesbrough, was published by Routledge, in 1948. The editor was Ruth Glass. In an accompanying letter to the above submission, Professor D. Holford added (CAB 124 - 530):
"... but if the Wartime Social Survey regards itself as competent to decide what should be investigated, as well as how the investigations should be carried out, it is liable to produce extremely unequal results."

Ministry of Health, (Letter from W.S. Douglas, dated December 20, 1945, (CAB 124 - 530)):

"Apart from risks of a political "blow-up" or of incidents in connection with "the snoopers", as risks, they were worth taking."

Ministry of Food, (Letter from F.N. Tribe, dated January 4, 1946, (CAB 124 - 530)):

"To speak quite frankly, the results have not been highly satisfactory. Their presentation has often been obscure and frequent inconsistencies in them have cast doubts upon the efficiency of the machine for attaining any degree of accuracy. The feeling here, therefore, is that, except for work of a very general and non-specialist character, we should prefer not to have to rely upon the service of the Wartime Social Survey."

Ministry of Fuel and Power, (Letter from Donald Fergusson, dated January 8, 1946, (CAB 124 - 530)):

"I personally am inclined to doubt the real value of the results of the Ministry of Information's Social Survey or the reliance that could be placed upon the results... There is a tendency because a thing is called an Official Survey to assume that it provides valid evidence."

Fergusson expressed concern over the possibly erroneous deductions that might ensue from unsound statistical techniques. Furthermore, he considered that the WSS's work in the sphere of agriculture as "exceedingly amateurish."

It is reasonable to assume that the preceding submissions represented the views of the individual ministries and not the personal grievances of individual members of their respective staffs. If this was the case,
then it tends to question the received view, common to celebrations of the Social Survey in wartime, a feature of some historical accounts of empirical research in Britain, (cf. P.E.P. Broadsheet, No. 250, 1946; Kelsall, 1960). It cannot be claimed that the WSS was of unquestionable value to those government departments which called upon its services. No doubt it did render service to the government, but the estimation of its technical proficiency, the interpretation of the results of its researches and the subsequent presentation of policy options in a manageable form for the relevant Minister of the Crown, depended upon the technical ability and disposition of senior civil servants. It is understandable that politicians would assume that the WSS actually 'worked' as they were the recipients of the end product of a commissioned piece of research. However, administrators (in this case senior civil servants) acted as intermediaries between the WSS technical staff and their advisors, and the politicians.

Caradog Jones (1949), (member of the WSS's Scientific Advisory Committee), was a staunch advocate of the above separation of responsibilities. His arguments on maintaining the intellectual integrity and independence of the social scientist in the course of his or her research work are indicative of the moralising nature of the normative structure of science, especially its attendant, mythical 'spirit of science', which permeated the more extreme rhetoric of those espousing the intellectual virtue of the inter-war science movement. Of course this criticism is easy to make so many years after the events of the period. Nevertheless, the claims of scientific exactitude and analytical rigour had both been expressed and pursued by the WSS's technicians. The latter group regarded such issues as central to their responsibilities as social scientists, and a necessary condition of the service which they endeavoured to offer to those who had cause to use the Survey's facilities. For them, any assessment of the efficiency and efficacy of the Survey could and should be justified on such grounds. For those politicians who maintained overall responsibility for their respective ministries, the central concern remained the need to acquire adequate information with which to make reasonable decisions (not all political decisions are necessarily
reasoned). Such individuals were less likely to concern themselves with the technical fidelity of the scientist in producing the information. The politician was more sensitive to the demands of Party and career, although, as I shall show shortly, the fate of the social sciences in the post-war world would become a political issue.

The role of the intermediary - the senior civil servant - may have been more crucial to the wider evaluation of the contribution that the WSS had made to, first, the war effort in general, and second, the operation of the individual ministries that drew upon its services. The civil servant possessed knowledge and experience of the operation of the WSS and its personnel, in addition to the vagaries of political decision making on the part of the Minister, notwithstanding the advice of his 'servant' advisors. As early as the summer of 1945, T.M. Wilson of the Treasury had written to John Clapham (Chairman of the Committee considering the adequacy of provision for social and economic research in Britain) suggesting that someone from the WSS should be invited to give evidence, (July, 1945, T 161/1301). In a reply to Wilson, Clapham expressed some reservations about the MOI and its WSS with a cryptic reference to the aspirations of the latter, on the basis of 'inside' information (July, 1945, T 161/1301):

"With a daughter in the Ministry of Information, I know a little about that organisation and do not at present want a 'Department of Social and Economic Research' to run a successor to it."

Clapham did eventually ask for a submission of evidence from those ministries who had had cause to use the Survey. Nevertheless, there is an element of doubt (perhaps even suspicion) in the mind of the Committee's Chairman about the form that a post-war research organisation may have taken, based, in the main, on the use to which such an organisation would be put, and lest it might be subject to political interference or control. The latter suspicions were made quite clear in the course of the Committee's deliberations. It seemed unlikely that the WSS would be dismantled at the end of the war. Therefore, the central issue revolved
around the post-war, organisational structure of social and economic research, in a form that would somehow perpetuate the apparent independence of the WSS, especially its purported non-political status, allowing it to serve the needs of government departments. This was a very sensitive issue and may account for the political solution that eventually resolved the matter.

There were two elements to the problem which highlight the political and cultural contingency of both the funding and production of social knowledge. The first entailed the fact that, despite the controversy over the role of the WSS, it had, for most politicians, served the needs of the departments for which they were individually responsible. This although a debateable issue, helped to sustain the case of those who wished to see the continuation of the WSS in some form after the war. Considered thus, the 'service function' of the WSS seemed politically uncontroversial, and within the best traditions of scientific neutrality and institutional independence, especially as the Survey was serving the needs of a coalition government. However, with the prospect of an election at the end of the war and a 'socialist triumph' to follow, the role of social and economic research at the service of a single political party presented a different set of problems. Secondly, the war led to the creation of a state administrative apparatus of unprecedented scale and effectiveness, and this, coupled to an increasingly vociferous Labour Party, both within and outside of the House, meant that the issue of social and economic research would henceforth increase in salience and remain an intellectual and institutional activity of both public and political sensitivity. The discussions within the Clapham Committee reflect an anticipation of the changes that were taking place and the consequences that would arise as a result of them.

It is clear from the evidence submitted to, and the discussions within the Clapham Committee, that the WSS's preservationists outnumbered the abolitionists, notwithstanding the criticisms of the Survey's work in a number of areas. However, a clearer understanding of the reasons why the WSS survived the war is only possible through a more detailed consideration of the significance of the Clapham Committee within the wider context of the social sciences and political practice. An integral
feature of the latter process entailed the emerging controversy over the relationship of the system of higher education to the needs of the state in post-war society. This issue was the subject of considerable importance to the Labour Party, and similarly, to those who fiercely contested the notion of dirigisme. The connection between the issues central to the Clapham Committee and those of the debate on the autonomy of the universities is important for two reasons. First, the actors central to the deliberations of the Clapham Committee were also engaged in the wartime debate on the fate of the universities in the post-war world. Second, the two national issues; the provision of social and economic research and the role of the universities in a planned society, were largely features of a profound and complex transformation occurring within British society during the period of a world war. The political debates of the period clearly demonstrate a realisation, that the production of knowledge and its relationship to the national need were contestable issues within the struggle for political power. The resolution of these issues would entail significant consequences for changing the social, economic and political conditions which had historically, sustained the objectives and interests of certain sections of British society. A whole range of post-war legislative measures, usually following the recommendations of government committees of inquiry, began to reshape the cultural context within which a re-ordering of knowledge occurred.

3. The Clapham Committee and its deliberations: the sociologists' arguments I.

Conventional historical accounts of the development of sociology in Britain, either in terms of its institutional or intellectual forms, tend to portray the Clapham Committee* as the genesis of a formal recognition

* Membership of the Clapham Committee was as follows: Sir John Clapham (Chairman), Sir Alan Barlow, Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders, Sir Henry Clay, Sir Hector Hetherington, Sir Walter Moberly, Professor L. Robbins, Professor R.H. Tawney, Mr. T.M. Wilson (Secretary); Report of the Committee on the Provision for Social and Economic Research, Cmnd. 6868, 1946.
of the potential of social knowledge as a basis for social action, especially in a period following a world war when the ethos of social and moral reconstruction permeated all manner of public and political debate. In one sense this is correct. Whether or not the Clapham Committee's recommendations were carried out fully, and as a consequence sociology benefited or suffered as a result, depends to a large extent on the importance attributed to the Committee's findings. At any point after the publication of the Committee's Report, the historian can relate the discipline's extant form (in institutional and intellectual terms) to that of its earlier prospects, the latter of which were entirely contingent upon not only the Committee's observations and recommendations (the substance of the official Report), but equally importantly, to the crucial arguments upon which the former Report was based. I am not suggesting that the Clapham Committee Report was a travesty of the truth, rather, I would suggest that all official committees of inquiry, including Clapham, publish reports on the basis of evidence and argument, and that such an exercise necessarily entails a less logical, coherent and objective process than the publication of a final report may appear to confer on its deliberations (cf. Rhodes, 1975). Questions then arise as to how accurately does the official report reflect the committee's deliberations? How and why was the Clapham Committee established? Who was chosen to serve on it, and what consequences would this have for a discipline like sociology? Who was asked to submit evidence and why? These and other questions and the answers to them gave rise to the context in which sociology and its practitioners and supporters would endeavour to make their case for the future of the discipline. Such a contextual ferment would therefore require the historian to at least attempt to consider the internal background debates upon which the official report was based. Herein lies a paradox. The historian's version of the events of the period, especially the details suggested in the preceding series of questions, necessarily acquire a greater degree of detail and accuracy if the documents relating to the Clapham Committee are scrutinised. However, the quality and detail of the historical account is not governed entirely by the ability and diligence of the historian, rather, it would seem to depend upon the operation and application of the Official Secrets Act. Access to
the aforementioned material appeared to me to be vital, and it was therefore
down to luck, and the requisite security clearance, that access was
granted to the Clapham evidence. The 'Thirty Year Rule' (or for that
matter, any of the 'Year Rulings') present a considerable obstacle to
the reconstruction of history.

The Clapham evidence has provided an unusual insight into not only the
workings of a government committee of inquiry, but one that was crucial
to the development of social science in Britain both in the immediate
period following the publication of its report, and for many years there-
after. In considering its recorded deliberations and submissions of
written evidence, I will examine the Committee's arguments
about social science against the back-drop of its official, published
report. It is within this general, comparative approach, that I will
attempt to single out the presentation of sociology's case amongst the
many issues of concern to the Committee.

Cherns' (1963 and 1979) account of the reasons why the Clapham Committee
was established generally reflect the social, economic and political
conditions of the time and the attendant reasons for a demand for social
knowledge (1979, pp.35-36):

"There was an acute awareness that Britain would lack resources
other than those represented by the skills of its people
and of the need for a social structure that would allow these
to be fully exploited. Studies were made of land use, scientific
manpower and the social services. Few of these studies failed
to make the case for the need for a great increase in the
supply of adequate data on which political decision in the
economic and social field should be based. This in turn
pinpointed the scarcity of people trained in the social sciences.
Therefore in 1945 the government appointed a committee under
the chairmanship of Sir John Clapham to consider 'whether
additional provision is necessary for research into social
and economic questions'."

There are two points that need to be clarified here. First, it was
the case that social conditions of the time seemed conducive to a closer
and certainly more active alignment between social science and the emergent
technological politics. However, this 'new' arrangement had been the
focus of the inter-war debate on the place of science in a democracy. Moreover, it had featured in the wartime conferences and sub-committees of the British Association. Such a programme for post-war social science required the active support of a committed political party and a corresponding degree of enthusiasm within the civil service and the universities. Second, and in relation to the first point, political sensitivity to the structural changes taking place within British society became a central theme within debates of post-war reconstruction. The latter became, for the Labour Party at least, the medium for a bloodless revolution. But who in the Government (a coalition government) called for the establishment of the Clapham Committee and why?

On September 20, 1944, Clement Attlee, Lord President of the Council, wrote to Sir John Anderson, Chancellor of the Exchequer stating that in the former's opinion (T 161/1301/5 4680/1):

"... adequate provision for application of the "natural sciences" to industry, health and agriculture already exists and needs are served by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Medical Research Council and Agricultural Research Council, which promote research in the relevant fields."

More importantly though, Attlee expressed a personal opinion, the strength of which would have consequences for the inauguration of a committee of inquiry (T 161/1301/54680/1):

"I feel the time has now come to do something for the social sciences. They are of increasing importance in throwing light upon the problems of public policy, and I am given to understand that we are dangerously dependent upon American Foundations for financing research in this wide field..."

The reference to being 'dangerously dependent upon American Foundations' for the funding of social research is an interesting remark. Although I have not been able to trace a direct connection between the sentiments expressed in the Attlee letter and the published thoughts of Harold Laski on the same subject, (H.J. Laski, The Dangers of Obedience, 1930), their long association in politics, and their connections with the L.S.E., may account for shared suspicions on the implications of private benefaction for the funding of knowledge. This collective apprehensiveness of American cultural imperialism was the subject of my examination of Beveridge's Natural Bases experiment at the L.S.E. during
the inter-war period, especially the conditional nature of Rockefeller funding for that scheme. It is likely that Attlee had knowledge of this project. Moreover, his position as Lord President of the Council made him responsible for the affairs of the research councils referred to in his letter. What was implicit in Attlee's argument about the nature of the funding of social research up to the Second World War, is an intention to create an alternative arrangement for financing the social sciences. That this should take the form of another publicly funded research council, was an intimation that became a controversial issue during the course of the Clapham Committee's lengthy deliberations.

In the reply to Attlee's first letter, Sir John Anderson (Chancellor of the Exchequer) seemed considerably exercised over what should be meant by the collective category of 'the social sciences'. This he thought required early clarification in order to allow the suggested committee to convene with a clear remit, and a working definition of social science. The problem of defining clearly and precisely, those disciplines which were thought to comprise the social sciences, remained a constant source of difficulty for the Committee members. This problem was compounded by the differences in definition attributed to the latter disciplines by those who submitted evidence to the Committee. Although the Committee's final report concluded that, "the practitioners of the various social sciences are by no means agreed on the precise boundaries of their subjects", the Committee thought that it was not necessary to "give exact definitions of the fields of research covered" (Cmnd. 6868). This sustained confusion presented difficulties for those sociologists who made representations to the Committee.

The whole question of an 'appropriate' designation for social science and its composite disciplines was characterised by the allowance of considerable definitional latitude on the part of the Committee's Chairman. Terms such as, 'sociological', 'social science', 'sociological research', 'social research', 'social studies' and the 'humanistic studies' were variously and indiscriminantly used to designate the general field of social and economic research. The latter became the focal point of
the Committee's activity. In 'doing something for the social sciences', as Attlee requested, the Chairman and members proceeded to interpret such a direction, as attending to the needs of those disciplines as far as adequate provision could be made for their research initiatives. In some respects, this tended to discriminate against sociology from the outset. The point arises in Sir John Anderson's reply to Attlee's original letter on the proposed Committee (1944, T 161/1301):

"The so-called social sciences, with the possible exception of economics, have not reached the stage of exact knowledge at which the natural sciences have arrived. Moreover, political considerations affect the study of sociology much more than they do that of the natural sciences."

Anderson also thought that, "... it would be a good thing to avoid using the term "social sciences" ..." (1944, T 161/1301), and that the safest place for consideration of 'sociological questions' was the universities. Anderson's remarks reveal the conventional assumption of the supremacy of the natural science model for all other forms of knowledge to aspire to. The estimation of the scientific status of economics was common among economists.

Further correspondence was exchanged between Anderson and Attlee on the matter of the nature and definition of subjects that the proposed Committee might draw within their remit, and matters to which the committee members should address themselves. On one point the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Lord President of Council did agree (Letter from Anderson to Attlee, November 27, 1944, T 161/1301):

"... that the development of public policy after the war would be greatly aided by a rapidly increasing knowledge of social processes."

In a letter from T.M. Wilson, (of the Treasury and the Committee's Secretary) to Sir John Clapham (the Committee's Chairman), one which followed a missive from R.H. Tawney, who expressed a hope that the terms 'economic' and 'social' would encompass the work of the political scientist (Tawney did not want the economists to dominate the work of the Committee),
Wilson expressed concern over the 'time and energy' expended reviewing the disciplines for which the Committee had been established. The members of the Committee were never to aspire to the level of conceptual tidiness wished for by their secretary. Tawney's concern about the over-representation of the views of the economists was shared also by T.S. Simey. The Committee may have been taking a long time to establish the nature of the disciplines which it felt should be included under the rubric 'social science', but many of the social scientists, other than the economists, did not want the existing, institutional and intellectual dominance of economics to displace other branches of the social sciences which were less well represented within the universities and the service of government during the period of wartime Britain. It is clear from the evidence submitted to the Committee, that many of the social scientists arguing the case for their respective disciplines were acutely aware of the somewhat vulnerable position of their subjects vis-a-vis economics; but more importantly, there was a degree of sensitivity and self-consciousness about the status generally of their disciplines when they came under public scrutiny, or, when their performance was expressed as a measure of success in comparison with the natural sciences. The major problem was perceived as the difficulty of the social sciences becoming bona fide sciences (Cmnd., 6868, 1946):

"As regards the study of social questions, little more than a beginning has been made. There exists a few Chairs of Social Science in British Universities. But holders are chiefly engaged in training social workers, and the exact scope of their studies on the scientific side has still to be determined."

The concern of the sociologists about the ease with which economics could apparently attract funding for its researches is expressed in a reference to the relative plight of sociology (Cmnd., 6868, 1946):

"The holder of one of these Chairs told the Committee that he had more difficulty in getting support for his studies than his colleagues, in say, economics, because they were not yet thought "respectable". He made no complaint, for, he said, sociologists had not yet done the work that they ought to have done to make theirs a fundamental study ..."
It is unlikely that important developments will take place in this field (sociology) until more are engaged on it. We feel that, in particular, there is scope here for development of the study of social organisation and of the use of social and regional surveys."

There are several important points in the preceding extract from the Clapham Committee's Report, all of which have a bearing on the subsequent support of the discipline in the immediate, post-war period. First, the 'holder of a Chair' had reiterated an indictment against sociology which was commonly cited by its critics during the inter-war debates who argued against the discipline's attempt to assert itself as the co-ordinating element of a synoptic science of society. This probably confirmed the prejudices of those economists who were Committee members.

Second, the sociologist giving the evidence in question, also prescribed publicly the form that sociology should henceforth take -asserting again - its apparently perpetual state of intellectual infancy. The cue to the 'appropriate' form that the discipline should evolve was subsequently interpreted by the Committee to entail a 'useful' and constructive form of empiricism, indicative of the sociology associated with exponents of its practical wing. It should be remembered that the WSS had evolved a network of regional survey teams and monitoring groups: this would have implications for the debate on the fate of the WSS after the war.

Third, the initial Ministerial instruction to ascertain the needs of the social sciences, as aids to effective policy making, had influenced the context and discourse within which had occurred an evaluation of those disciplines likely to produce appropriate forms of social knowledge.

Why had the sociologist cited in the Clapham Report made the case for sociology in the manner stated? Examination of the evidence reveals that the sociologist in question was T.S. Simey. Consideration of his evidence to the Committee will give a clearer indication of the strategic component of the sociologists' case.

The continuing confusion over the nature of sociology and its precise intellectual boundaries vis-a-vis the other social sciences is evident in the minutes of the Committee for the meeting of May 4, 1945 (T 161/1301):
"If more provision for research was needed it would probably be on the sociology side. The scope of sociology was not easy to define."

Thus argued Alan Barlow, supported by R.H. Tawney, who urged that any interpretation of 'sociological' should be in the "broadest sense." Professor L. Robbins appeared to be similarly disposed toward the need to make provision for the social sciences by an increase in resources to them, though the kind of social science he had in mind is clear from the following minute of the May 4th meeting (T 161/1301):

"Economics was well established as a practice but sociology was of a younger growth and there was a need for expenditure and research. The social sciences were not so clearly recognised. Research was hampered by the difficulty of securing laboratory equipment, calculating machinery, specialised researchers, computers etc."

In view of sociology's contested position during the inter-war conferences, it is difficult not to construe Robbin's remarks as somewhat hypocritical. The confusion in the Clapham Committee over the nature and relationship of sociology to the other social science disciplines was not as disadvantageous to the position of the sociologists as it had been toward the end of the inter-war period. An opportunity now presented itself for the revitalisation of the discipline.

In a meeting of the Committee on 24th of October, 1945, T.S. Simey lamented the state of sociology (T 161/1301). He regarded the 'status of sociology as very' precarious indeed.' His personal experience upon returning from the West Indies (where he served as Social Welfare Advisor to the Comptroller for Development, from 1940-45), was to find his own work "discredited and the subject considered not altogether respectable" (1945, T 161/1301). Moreover, he said his colleagues in economics and other social sciences could get assistance more easily than he could; "he could not, however, complain since sociologists had not yet done
the work which they ought to have done to make theirs a fundamental study." (1945, T 161/1301). The latter statement was incorporated verbatim into the Committee's final report in 1946. Simey argued further, that the "... task of sociology was the working out of fundamental principles, and to show the relation of those principles to particular studies" (1945, T 161/1301). The reason for sociology's failure in making progress in this area was attributed to a lack of staff and facilities. Simey also advocated the 'essential need to work closely with government agencies, particularly in obtaining the vital statistical material to support sociological analysis'. Furthermore, he argued that, "... general theories would emerge from the data, which was the task of the universities to perform" (1945, T 161/1301). A reference was also made to the dearth of courses in sociology within higher education, causing Simey to make a reply that is characteristic of contemporary criticism of the discipline (1945, T 161/1301):

"... course structures were difficult to formulate because, sociology was not considered respectable by employers and others; and until it was, by the production of the textbooks and the study of fundamental principles ... there must necessarily be a vicious circle."

In making a case for sociology, there is implicit in Simey's advocacy the institutional and intellectual forms that the discipline should evolve. This is a characteristic feature of sociology's advocatory dimension, in as much as any argument for sociology, though not necessarily a direct expression of a particular theoretical disposition or specific substantive issue associated with the discipline, nevertheless imply such. Arguments which appear to be of an essentially strategic nature, (the basis of sociology's contested form within the medium of a government committee), and which are constructed either to preserve or enhance the prospects of the discipline, are predicated upon a variety of internal tensions. Such tensions take the form of intra-disciplinary disputes over theoretical and methodological issues, which are central to the practice of sociology as an intellectual activity.
Simey's evidence had a significant impact on the Committee's deliberations, especially his recommendation that university faculties of social science be strengthened via additional grants to the universities through the University Grants Committee. The system of earmarked grants was adopted as a means of enhancing the funding of the social sciences (see Appendix Three). Established departments of social science or social studies would benefit from the earmarked grant arrangements. So much so, that the Sub-Committee on Social Sciences of the University Grants Committee (established upon the advice of the Clapham Committee) found it necessary to give special consideration to the position of the L.S.E., which, because of its size and special place in the field of social science in Britain, might affect adversely, the finite resources available for funding the social sciences, whether through earmarked monies, or, the usual proportion of the quinquennial grant allotted by individual institutions to their respective faculties or departments of social science.

The L.S.E. was regarded by the U.G.C.'s social science sub-committee as the "base" for the social sciences in England, and therefore decided that its status merited separate attention in the allocation of resources to maintain its position. Nevertheless, the L.S.E. and the manner and degree of its financial support would effectively reduce the finite sum of revenue available to support the funding of social science in other universities (UGC 8, Minutes of the U.G.C. Sub-Committee on the Social Sciences, November 6th, 1947):

"It was also agreed that rising salaries and maintenance costs especially at the L.S.E. might trench upon monies available for other institutions."

The recommendations of the Clapham Committee and the influence and actions of the U.G.C.'s sub-committee were crucial factors in the disbursement of funds to the social sciences in the immediate post-war period. The latter sub-committee had to contend with appeals for initial and extra funds from those universities who felt they had not received the financial support they deserved from the distribution of earmarked grants. This led the U.G.C. sub-committee to review the definition of social science adopted by the Clapham Committee in order to reduce the number of claims
on the 'Clapham Money'. I shall return to this matter shortly, as it entails the establishment of criteria for the allocation of resources which, as a bureaucratic procedure, would nevertheless have a longlasting effect on the definition of the legitimate field of social science which the state would underwrite. The same sub-committee also considered the consequences of State funding upon the eventual cessation of large-scale financial support for the social sciences from private sources. Attlee's initial letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and its reference to Britain's 'dangerous dependence' upon American Foundations for the subvention of research in the social sciences in Britain, implied the connection between the funding of knowledge and the interests of the benefactor. Many of Britain's most influential social scientists had been the recipients of Foundation largesse, and it had been the policy of both the U.G.C. and individual universities to actively encourage the 'free market' approach in the competition for research funds. Those espousing the virtues of such a mode of funding believed it to be a safeguard against the incursion of the state into the realms of academic freedom and the independence of the universities. These issues came to the fore during and immediately after the war,

I have stated above that Simey's evidence influenced the Chairman of the Clapham Committee to the extent that a number of the former's suggestions became incorporated within the Report's recommendations. That a sociologist of Simey's standing should have been summoned to give evidence owes more to good fortune than any objective procedure to seek the collective and representative views of the practitioners of social science, notwithstanding the confusion over the definition of those fields of study and research. Although Rhodes (1975) has endeavoured to present the phenomenon of the Committee of Inquiry as a relatively rational exercise in the process of parliamentary democracy, his thoughts on the manner by which such committees constitute their membership and subsequently decide upon who and why certain individuals and organisations should give evidence, seem difficult to reconcile with the events surrounding the establishment of the Clapham Committee, and more especially, the U.G.C.'s sub-committee on the social sciences and the Interdepartmental Committee on Social and Economic Research (another committee recommended by the Clapham Committee).
The membership of the Clapham Committee was not entirely representative of the social sciences for the period in question. There was not a sociologist amongst its members (economists, social demographers and an historian). In fact, one of sociology's major critics between the wars, Alexander Carr-Saunders (a social demographer), exercised significant influence on the Committee's deliberations. Moreover, most of the Committee members were elected to serve on the post-Clapham, Interdepartmental Committee on Social and Economic Research and the U.G.C.'s sub-committee on the social sciences, thus taking with them, the ideas, opinions and predispositions toward the social sciences either engendered, or reinforced through service on the Clapham Committee.

In choosing people who may have been 'worthwhile' consulting, there appears to have been no discernable, nor rational method adopted by the committee. Certainly the choice of individuals who would give oral, in addition to written evidence to the Committee, would influence significantly the discourse on the nature and purpose of those disciplines which the Committee considered to fall within their somewhat, inclusivist category of social science/studies. Furthermore, those who would be called upon to submit evidence, would themselves need to anticipate and respond to the expectations of the Committee members, especially as the latter possessed preconceived notions of the intellectual and institutional dimensions of British social science. It should be borne in mind that the Committee was neither commissioned nor intent upon hearing elegant and esoteric presentations or treaties on substantive issues from those making representations on behalf of the various social science disciplines. This would prove more of a problem for the sociologists than, say, the economists, who already had the advantage of sympathisers within the Committee membership. The sociologists had still to overcome ignorance and prejudice of their subject and more importantly, a suspicion of their intentions for a place within the pecking order of disciplines likely to be favoured with state funding in the immediate post-war period.
The emphasis had therefore to be upon the strategic presentation of their discipline as an academic subject and a research based activity. The former would be essential for securing revenue and the prospect of an increase in sociology's presence within higher education. The latter, was an essential project for the discipline, as its practitioners had assured both its critics and supporters that it had an important role to play in the social reconstruction of Britain (cf. Mannheim, 1940). As components of the sociologists' case for their discipline, they also provided the basis of sociology's quest for intellectual and institutional autonomy. Least this appear to be too contrived and purposefully orchestrated, it should be borne in mind that the sociologists had met concerted resistance from other social scientists in their pre-war attempt to construct a synoptic science of society. Moreover, the discipline's most influential practitioners had learned valuable lessons from the pre-war conferences, wherein much attention had been devoted to considering the relationship between sociology and the other branches of the social sciences. The sociologists' case for an expansion of their subject within the sphere of higher education had been dealt a particularly heavy blow during the 1930s. This had been made quite clear in T.H. Marshall's summary of a discussion on the place of sociology within the university curriculum* for social science (Marshall, 1936, p.55):

"We have not really made up our minds what it is that we are trying to do. Courses have not been carefully designed, or rather, their designers have not had a free hand. Tradition has been too strong, and reformers have had to proceed by way of bargain and compromise. This was the case, as Professor Morris Ginsberg (London School of Economics) pointed out with the London Degree in Sociology."

Such resistance to sociology was commented upon above by Simey in his caustic remark about other social scientists assuming that the discipline was somehow, not yet "respectable". However, sociology's plight in the late 1930s and middle '40s, was not a predicament somehow borne.

* Cf. Appendix Four for a summary of the provision for teaching and research in sociology up to the convening of the Clapham Committee in 1945.
of a sudden rejection of sociologists and their work: it was indicative of the discipline's perpetually contested status within the domain of the human sciences and culture generally. Of those who chose not to dismiss sociology out of hand, it did not follow that they necessarily embraced the discipline in its entirety. Those who looked to sociology for an indication of its intellectual worth, sought an expression of its form that complied with criteria of relevance and utility associated with the exemplar of the natural sciences.

The deliberations of the Clapham Committee are crucial to an understanding of the sociologists' attempt to provide yet another set of agendas and programme statements for a sociology able to participate in the moral and social regeneration of Britain. The crucial feature of a revivified, post-war sociology, was the fact that it was likely to be underwritten by the state, thereby freeing its practitioners from the pre-war patronage of private benefactors, the latter of whom had placed greater faith in forms of social science more in keeping with a preferred series of moral and intellectual prescriptions. Nevertheless, sociology would still have to contest its place within the re-evaluation of those forms of knowledge essential to the pursuance of the national need, which in turn would have consequences for the kind of sociology most appropriate to the tasks in hand. The sociologists had first to convince the Government's Committee, established to assess whether or not they, and other social scientists, were able to respond to such an imperative.
CHAPTER FIVE

Teaching and research in social science: The education and research council debates and the future of sociology
Teaching and Research in Social Science: The Education and Research Council Debates and the Future of Sociology

1. A research council for the social sciences: the hierarchy challenged.

The co-ordination of the social sciences under the direction of some form of national council, whereby funding and research initiatives would become the subject of central, political control, is a theme which recurs frequently in the written and oral submissions to the Clapham Committee. The following consideration of arguments for and against the establishment of some form of research council for the social sciences*, a project which had been mooted on several occasions prior to the outbreak of war, provides crucial clues to the prospect for sociology in the years following the war. The research council debate posed a threat to the established hierarchy of British social science: an intellectual and institutional edifice erected largely upon the privilege and patronage of morally dominative philanthropy and its chosen beneficiaries.

The notion of a research council for the social sciences arose as a matter of discussion at the first formal meeting of the Clapham Committee in early 1945. Professor Robbins, an opponent of the proposal to create such a council, expressed considerable disagreement from the outset. He argued that, because of the nature of social research, politicians may not be able to resist the temptation of 'using' a central co-ordinating body for political ends. Furthermore, the apparent dangers of social research might also impinge on the neutrality of the universities (T 161/54689, minutes of meeting, May 4th, 1945):

"The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research did work in practical and non-controversial fields which would not be the case in respect of a central organisation covering the social sciences. The government could not farm out controversial matters involved in social and economic research to the universities, although universities should be in a position spontaneously to initiate its own studies."

And in specific reference to a proposed social science research council, Robbins queried the need for (T 161/54680):

"... any central organisation to direct research to particular problems. If such an organisation was an official body, it would be open to pressure from interested groups."

* It is possible to detect in the Clapham debate two quite distinct, though not entirely mutually exclusive positions on the relationship between social knowledge and the needs of the state. One in which social science and its researches should be allowed to evolve within modified institutional arrangements which would ensure their preservation from political direction or influence. The other envisaged the establishment of new institutional arrangements which were more conducive to the production of forms of social knowledge essential to the moral and social reconstruction of post-war Britain, and the years beyond. The latter position, social science in the service of a planned society, entailed a conception of a rational, technocratic model of social scientific knowledge being produced by its practitioners in the service of the state.
There was a discernable degree of apprehension among the participants of the first meeting that the social scientist would run the risk of becoming a servant of some new, political order. Sir Alan Barlow, while suggesting that the new, post-war age may require the creation of what he referred to as "the new scientist - the genuine sociologist", he was nevertheless aware of the possible politicisation of social research (T 161/1301/54680/1):

"... so long as the object was the obtaining of facts, he did not feel that this difficulty was really serious and that it was not possible to refrain from getting the facts, for fear that the politicians might make a bad use of the material obtained."

Implicit in the above argument and indeed, much of the debate about the nature and function of a council for the social sciences, was the prospect of the political control of social research for ideological purposes. It would appear that none of the recipients of Foundation largesse, several of whom were amongst the members of the Clapham Committee, had considered the conditional nature of private funding for social research, although this had been pointed out to them during the course of the December 5th meeting of the Committee in 1945. Professor Stephan, reviewing the arrangements for the organisation and financing of social science research in America stated to the Committee (T 161/1301/54680/1):

"... that often, the National Bureau of Economic Research had a tendency to pay too much attention in framing their programmes in terms which were likely to attract grants."

Whether this was a warning of the 'dangers' of private funding versus public financing of social research, is difficult to estimate. However, it is important to recall the risks attached to private benefaction outlined in Chapter two, especially the case made by Laski in his book, The Dangers of Obedience, (1930). Professor Stephan pointed out the manner in which social research was funded in America, i.e. that it was almost entirely dependant upon what he referred to as "private enterprise". This consideration of the manner in which social research was to be
funded is important for two reasons. First, the majority of funds for the conduct of social research in Britain between the two wars had come from private sources - whether from Britain or America - the latter providing a substantial proportion of the revenue. The U.G.C. had actively encouraged such a form of competition for grants, arguing that the free-market approach should supplement its basic quinquennial grants. Whether one was committed to the philosophy which underpinned such an economic arrangement for the funding of knowledge or not, did not alter the fact that for individual social scientists and their respective disciplines, this was the only way to enhance the intellectual and institutional prospects of the social sciences. Hence the importance of individual 'connections' with the more generous Foundations and the necessity of being well schooled in the art of grantsmanship. The key to successfully obtaining large-scale funding for projects was to be both well known in the world of the Foundations and their associated cliques of influentials, in addition to possessing membership of an equally influential, professional Association, Institute or Society. The more ancient, respectable and august the organisation, the greater the prospect of circulating within those coteries of power and influence essential to the making of contacts and contracts between the hopeful beneficiary and the potential benefactor. The assumption that such an arrangement for the funding of knowledge, especially the more contentious domain of knowledge about society, stood a better chance of remaining untainted by the vested interests of the state, rested on a combination of political naivety and inter-disciplinary élitism, the latter of which accounted for the differential level of professional and institutional autonomy amongst the various social sciences. An example of the latter was the relative positions of economics and sociology in terms of the preceding contexts and categories.

Second, and contingent upon the first point, is the historical aspect of the nature of social science funding in Britain during the inter-war period. The arrangements tended to favour certain branches of the social sciences rather than others. I have argued previously, and as Simey had stated in his submission to the Committee, economics fared better
than any of the other social science disciplines in the quest for funds to further its researches and to swell the ranks of its practitioners within the universities and government departments. In view of this fact, it is understandable why, amongst the many reasons preferred by the economists (notable amongst the opponents for the establishment of a research council for the social sciences) they should tend toward the preservation of the existing arrangements for funding and co-ordinating research within the social sciences. There existed no alternative method of substantial and sustained funding of social research between the wars. Even in America, the mainstay of research funding came from the major foundations and Trusts. Considered thus, any alternative method of subvention for social research, or the expansion of departments of social science within the universities, must have caused those who had benefitted most from the existing arrangements, a certain degree of anxiety and concern. Not only would different organisational arrangements constitute new and therefore unfamiliar circumstances, more importantly, the nature of any new conditions for the support of social science would be influenced by the political and economic context of a post-war, 'socialist Britain.' The pre-war era had not engendered a national need as compelling and pervasive as the post-war ethos of reconstruction. As a consequence of this, the production of knowledge in response to the national need had implications for the social sciences which had never before been contemplated, either within those disciplines, or within the universities. The implications of this for sociology, both institutionally and intellectually, were quite significant. This was for two major reasons.

First, the changing relationship between the universities and the state, the plethora of government inquiries and reports, and the establishment of the welfare state through planning and direct management of the economy, emphasised the importance of centralised control over almost every facet of national life. Although disputes would continue over those forms of knowledge essential to the development of the economy and the maintenance of the state in its post-war form, the prospects of a more equitable distribution of resources to and within the social sciences seemed imminent.
The somewhat preferential, pre-war system of allocating funds to the aforementioned disciplines, and the economic system it reflected was in jeopardy. Those who had enjoyed the fruits of the pre-war system, especially the economists, may have developed their resistance to the creation of a 'collective' organisation for social science out of a conservative inertia in the face of radical change. What seemed more likely, in view of the circumstances, was that some social scientists anticipated a challenge to the previously uncontested institutional bases of certain branches of their disciplines, especially economics. Economists had steadfastly adhered to the Marshallian edifice of laissez-faire, notwithstanding the changes taking place in the management of the wartime and post-war economy along the lines of Keynes' ideas: an economist who had conducted a pre-war, frontal assault on the citadel of pure and perfect competition and its attendant mythology of the free market. This could have been perceived as a challenge to traditional, orthodox economic theory, and equally, to its ideological form within the power and social structures of pre-war Britain. It is ironic that the authors of the Clapham Committee Report should have warned its readers that there was a need to guard against the "... danger of a premature crystallization of spurious orthodoxies," (Cmd., 6868, paragraph 29). Although the preceding reference to 'spurious orthodoxies' may have been interpreted by commentators and historians of social science as a warning against the production of too much abstract and tendentious theorising, a close examination of the Clapham evidence would seem to suggest that the economists at least, were fully aware of the likely event of a post-war election victory for the Labour Party and the prospect that its plans for managing the economy would be founded on the principles of Keynesian theory, or some hybrid version of Marxist/Leninist economic principles, associated with the Soviet version of a planned economy.

Second, and in connection with the prospects for sociology; any reorganisation of the system for co-ordinating and funding the social sciences would necessarily have a direct effect on the discipline's future institutional and intellectual form. If the pre-war arrangements for the support of social science remained largely intact, then sociology's fragile autonomy would be endangered. Considered thus, sociologists needed
a reformed system for the equitable disbursement of funds to and between
the social sciences, a means of ensuring that U.G.C. grants to the univer-
sities would contain an element of bias toward the funding of academic
posts, and general departmental expansion and enhanced facilities for
research within the discipline. Such bureaucratic arrangements did
evolve as a result of the Clapham Committee's recommendations, namely,
the establishment of a U.G.C. sub-committee for the social sciences
and an Interdepartmental Committee for Economic and Social Research.
However, the effectiveness or otherwise of those bodies in making sociol-
ogy's future more secure is an issue to which I shall return shortly.

There was a further irony associated with the Clapham debate on the
proposal to establish a social science research council. One of the
Committee's most influential members, and critic of the scheme, was the
then Director of the L.S.E., Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders. The latter
gentleman had figured prominently in the inter-war debates on the nature
and relationship of the individual social sciences to one another, and
with particular reference to sociology, (cf. Chapter two, Sciences of
Society: Inter-war Projects, Section 1.). Reference to the latter chapter
will show that Carr-Saunders had been sceptical of the sociologists'
claim that they possessed a corpus of theory and research methods of
adequate sophistication, thus enabling them to claim an autonomous status
for sociology within the general field of social science. He was also
quite hostile toward the sociologists' additional claim, that they were
somehow strategically placed within the range of social science disciplines
to manage a project for the creation of a synoptic science of society.
2. **The co-ordination of research: the sociologists' arguments II**

In chapter four, I introduced the arguments of the sociologists, especially those of T.S. Simey, in their attempt to revive an earlier claim for a recognised role for sociology within the expanding realm of social science. With the outbreak of war, the case for a 'relevant' social science had become a project of the utmost importance for social scientists, politicians and planners, especially in the light of post-war reconstruction. As the Clapham Committee deliberations progressed, an opportunity arose for the sociologists to present a document in which they were able to restate a revised programme for sociology, on the basis of a significant reorganisation of the funding and organisational arrangements for the support of social research, and a revision of the training and general education of sociologists within the system of higher education. Although I shall shortly examine the significance and relevance of the 'education debate' to the future of sociology and social science in general, I wish first to examine in detail, not only the evidence submitted in the confidential report from the Institute of Sociology, but several other written submissions presented directly to the Clapham Committee, including a report from a special committee of the British Association for the Advancement of Science concerned with 'scientific research on human institutions'. All of the reports and submissions deal with the topic of whether or not a research council for the social sciences should be established, in order to provide the necessary support for social science in Britain. The latter question and its resolution became crucial to the case made by the sociologists to the Clapham Committee.

In a confidential report to the Clapham Committee, the secretary of the Institute of Sociology, Alexander Farquharson, endeavoured to present the case for sociology in its claim for adequate recognition among the social sciences and corresponding financial support, should the Committee recommend a 'general increase in the funding of social research.' The Institute of Sociology did not long survive the Second World War, though its journal, *The Sociological Review* did. The influence of Morris Ginsberg and T.H. Marshall upon the activities of both the Institute and its journal became quite apparent toward the end of the 1930s.
Examination of the arguments contained in the Institute's memorandum is important to my argument for several reasons. First, it is an example of another opportunity for the discipline's practitioners to advocate the nature and purpose of sociology within those forms of knowledge essential to the post-war project for the social and moral reconstruction of British society. Second, and in keeping with an important aspect of sociology's advocatory dimension, the claims made on behalf of the discipline tended to emphasise the potential of sociology's cognitive form as a basis for social praxis. Third, the preceding first and second programme statements on behalf of sociology's potential were contingent upon the establishment of some kind of formal organisational arrangement, preferably government sponsored and financed, which would ensure an equitable distribution of resources for the institutional and intellectual expansion of the discipline. Implicit in the last conducive condition for sociology's post-war growth, was the component of the control of the production of social knowledge for political ends. In order to understand the significance of the sociologists' case for the creation of a council for the social sciences (with special reference to sociology) it is necessary to consider both the first and second points raised above.

The Institute's submission, (T 161/1301/X/P 07439, 28.1.46) gave a clear indication of the role it envisaged for sociology and its researches in the post-war period (1946, p.2, paragraph 5):

"Wartime needs have already produced rapid and major advances in the study of many features of social and economic life in this country, and prospective changes in our social fabric will intensify the need for further research in the future."

The confidence of the Institute's members in making the preceding prediction of the future role of sociology was predicated on the following, confident assertion (1946, p.2, paragraph 5):

"I take it that it is unnecessary here to argue the case for the development of sociological research."
Staking a claim for sociology in the post-war world implied a fairly clear project for the discipline, one which tended to emphasise the practical wing of the pre-war, Marshallian cleavage referred to earlier. Accompanying programme statements on the intrinsic nature and social purpose of a revivified sociology indicate the emergent relationship between social policy and sociological research. Implicit in such a connection is the role of social knowledge in the construction of the welfare state, a projection of sociology within the domain of post-war politics, (1946, p.2, paragraph 5):

"Fresh administrative provision will be required in economic and other fields; and social provision more carefully adjusted to the ideas and ideals of individuals and groups in our society is also urgently required. As a basis for policy in such matters, a continuous and expanding programme of research is essential. Such research cannot now serve its purpose if limited by the outlook and methods of a single social science; we are now becoming aware of the interrelation of the various influences and tendencies at work in our society; the relevance of the all round view cultivated by the sociologist, and his methods of relating results in different fields, is gaining growing acceptance."

The concluding remarks in the preceding quotation are of particular importance to my argument for two reasons. First, Farquharson's reference to the potential role of sociology as a policy oriented discipline, in the post-war period, is as much a statement about the intellectual predisposition of sociology as it is a strategic concession to those outside of the discipline who may call upon its practitioners to assist in the re-building of the nation's moral and social fabric, under the benevolent guidance of the newly elected 'people's party'. The latter conception of the connection between sociology and politics may account for, in part at least, the perennial and standard misconception: sociology equals socialism. Second, and more importantly, is the filtering through in Farquharson's programme statement of the pre-war concern of sociologists to establish their discipline's facility for providing a synoptic view of society, through a composite social science, under the co-ordinating method of a general sociology. I argued in chapter two, section 1, that sociologists had anticipated the distorting affect brought about
by the growing tendency of individual social science disciplines to provide only a partial, or fragmented view of society from their respective, narrow and specialised perspectives. Farquharson's argument is interesting in an additional sense, for he is sufficiently sensitive to recognise and recall, not only the form of pre-war sociology advocated by Ginsberg and Mannheim (sociology as a scientia scientiarum), but mindful of the need to emphasise the importance of maintaining the empirical tradition of those generally associated with the discipline's practical wing (1946, p.2, paragraph 6):

"Sociological research is based, broadly speaking, on activities of two kinds; a) field work (i.e. first hand contact with individuals and groups) and b) the use of records, themselves often derived from administrative or other enquiries in the field. The latter resembles closely the use of records for historical purposes, and requires a training similar in many respects. Field work, with its constant and varied contacts with individuals and groups, requires for its success a careful selection of suitable workers, and a training which should be of some length, should be systematic, and should be in the hands of persons who themselves have had some years experience in such work."

The Institute's programme for post-war sociology presents a clear and unequivocal commitment to empirical research, as the preceding quotation reveals. However, the restraining influence of Ginsberg in tempering a view that might be construed as insensitive empiricism is evident in the following reference to the crucial role of 'general sociology' in the Institute's project*, especially its significance in the training of a 'body of research workers' (1946, p.2, paragraph 7):

* The Institute's document set out a number of definitions for the term 'sociology', giving emphasis to those forms it considered appropriate to its own fields of work and research interests. It defined 'general sociology' as follows: "... the study of human society in general - its forms of organisation, institutions, trends and tendencies past and present, and so on; sometimes known as "General Sociology" (1946, p.1, Section 3(a)).
"It cannot, however, be too strongly urged that training in such sociological research will produce only a limited and even sterile result, unless it is associated with the broader view of human society that can only be obtained from the study of general sociology ... It may therefore be urged that (apart from any other values it may have) the development of such study is an essential step towards the training of a body of research workers capable of undertaking the tasks in view."

Again Farquharson refers to general sociology as a means of humanising what some sociologists had regarded as the crude and obsessive collection of facts associated with the more excessive forms of empirical social research (cf., Mannheim, 1937 and 1940). Mannheim's concern with a 'diagnostic sociology' in the years when the concept of large-scale social and economic planning had become a reality, reflected his own and to a certain extent, Morris Ginsberg's attempt to establish a form of sociology which incorporated both an historical and philosophical approach to social theory and research, in addition to the adoption of the comparative method by the other social sciences. What is made apparent in the preceding quotation, is an attempt by Farquharson to steer a reasonably steady course between the often conflicting branches of sociology, the author being ever mindful that the sociologists' claims and projects would be the subject of discussion by not only a Committee of Inquiry, but upon the publication of its report, a matter of political and public debate.

The Institute's sociologists also endeavoured to promote another key aspect of their strategy for a revivified sociology. This entailed a claim for an increase in the number of professorships in the discipline, coupled to a re-evaluation of existing university departments of social science/social studies, as appropriate institutional sites for the expansion of sociology (cf. Appendix Five). The crucial feature of such an argument is the recognition by members of the Institute, that for the latter development to occur, sociology would need to establish an inter-disciplinary approach within the envisaged syllabuses of existing or new university departments. Such an argument indicated sociology's somewhat precarious intellectual and institutional autonomy. It also highlighted its continuing dependent status after the abortive,
pre-war, synoptic science project, and the reluctance of other social scientists to participate in such a scheme. There is another aspect to the argument contained in the Institute's memorandum which requires consideration. One that relates to my earlier contention, that sociology's meagre presence within a number of university departments of social science (wherein social work training courses provided a vehicle for the teaching of sociology) offered the discipline a tenuous existence outside of the L.S.E. (1946, p.2, paragraph 7):

"The aim should be the setting up of a permanent full professorship in all universities in this country and in university colleges that include the social sciences in their curriculum. It is desirable that the possibility of close relations between the teaching of social anthropology, political science (in its more concrete form), social psychology and sociology, should always be kept in mind. It is believed that such a development would be welcome to departments and teachers of other social sciences, and those concerned in training schemes for social work and for teaching."

Such arrangements would serve to enhance sociology's institutional base, something which had handicapped its pre-war development. The important point to bear in mind here, is the fact that, whereas the sociologists had had to endure increasing isolation within the wider field of pre-war social science, confronting quite hostile criticism of its synoptic science project, the Clapham Committee presented a different set of opportunities for the discipline. In particular, it appeared to the sociologists, that, notwithstanding the reception of their current case by members of the Committee, general political support had grown for the need to review the provision of resources for what Clement Attlee had termed 'sociological research'. Just as the politicians had 'established' the importance of the Wartime Social Survey to the needs of the Ministries that had had cause to use its facilities, so too had a similar judgement been made on the role of social research in post-war Britain, hence the creation of a government committee of inquiry.

Not only did the sociologists concur with the general assumption, that more sociological research was essential, but that it was an activity
which was better suited to the function of the university. The Institute's position on this matter was unequivocal (1946, p.3, paragraph 13):

"It was suggested above that Universities and University Colleges would find other reasons for promoting sociological researches, in addition to their value in training research workers. The latter function may, indeed, be considered as subsidiary to the duty (and opportunity) of academic bodies to develop and give order and system to knowledge in fresh fields ... Experience already gained makes it clear that apart from training schemes a large part of the burden of sociological research must in future be carried by Universities and University Colleges, and further that, given adequate resources, they will not be unwilling to shoulder this."

This was an important argument for the sociologists, in that moves to "... develop and give order and system to knowledge in fresh fields ..." would enhance greatly, the prospects of sociology amongst the existing fields of social science, the latter of which were relatively well established within the curricula of a number of universities. Sociologists needed to take advantage of the opportunity to advocate the importance of research in response to national imperatives. However, the prospects for full participation in any enhanced programme of social and economic research in the post-war period, would be significantly improved if sociology acquired the status of an autonomous, academic discipline, within a larger number of universities. Thus the strategic presentation of the case for sociology had reached a critical stage. To many of the pre-war critics of sociology's scheme to co-ordinate a synoptic science of society, the discipline appeared increasingly irrelevant to the development of the other individual social sciences. If the sociologists had been unsuccessful in their pre-war attempts to convince their fellow social scientists of the importance of sociology to the construction of a comprehensive science of society, then the opportunity to direct their case beyond the community of social scientists and into the political arena via the Clapham debate, would enhance significantly the prospects of obtaining the recognition and resources essential to its continued intellectual and institutional survival.
The Institute's agenda for the development and expansion of sociological research in the post-war period was set out in a series of recommendations, or, as the author chose to call it, a 'general plan or scheme'. It is a crucial statement about the most effective means of ensuring both the survival and further development of sociology, on the basis of government support via preferential disbursement of resources to the discipline, especially its research initiatives. Equally important is its declaration, that in order to ensure the equitable distribution of resources to sociology, an 'independent' mechanism would need to be established to oversee both the allocation of resources to and within the social sciences, in addition to selection and co-ordination of research and course development, especially within the field of sociology. The 'general plan' recommended the following courses of action over a period of ten years (1946, p.4, paragraph 17):

"a) Further development, as opportunity occurs, of research by Government Departments.
b) Widespread growth of research in Sociological Departments or Institutes, in Universities and University Colleges.
c) Free initiatives and development in research, under suitable conditions, in independent institutions.
d) Opportunities for individual research workers.
e) Establishing of post-graduate training schemes for sociological research workers.
f) Setting up of under-graduate courses in Sociology in Universities and University Colleges, as a groundwork for training in research.
g) As a necessary corollary, suitable provision for the co-ordination of all these research activities."

As I have argued previously, the key to understanding the prospects of sociology in the post-war era lay in the contest between those who actively supported the concept of a social science research council, and those who did not, or in the case of the latter, those who wished to see it play an innocuous role within the field of social science. The central elements of the sociologists' argument lay in their claim
for the potential of increased sociological research in a period of recon-
struction. Farquharson and his Institute colleagues pinpointed the major
issues that needed to be settled by political intervention and decision,
and which lay at the centre of sociology's continuing, precarious wartime
form (1946, p.4, paragraph 18):

"For such a general scheme generous financial provision will
be required; and, while private benefactors may make some
provision, it is safe to say that, if development is to be
rapid, the main source must be grants from Government funds.
In the case of academic institutions, provision for training
schemes could be dealt with suitably by the University Grants
Committee (which might make known its desire to receive proposals
on the lines envisaged). Provision - general or specific -
for research schemes requires fresh machinery; this is needed
also in the case of non-academic institutions (and of individuals),
and in the task of coordination."

Following on from the preceding outline of the nature and source of
the envisaged large-scale funding, came a suggestion for the possible
form that a statutorily constituted and financed coordinating body might
take (1946, p.4, paragraph 19):

"The main recommendation follows on this. It is the setting
up of a Provisional Committee for sociological research, with
full Government recognition and support, and financed from
Government funds. Its function should be to promote sociological
research of all types that appear useful, and to administer
Government funds for this purpose. It should make grants
to Universities and University Colleges for research projects;
and should have power to assist independent institutions that
put forward suitable schemes. While prepared to finance certain
bodies and projects completely, it should encourage the provision
of funds from other sources."

It is curious that the Institute should suggest a 'Provisional Committee'
for the coordination of sociological research, especially in the light
of its earlier recommendation for a more formally organised 'council'.
This may have been a compromise between the two types of organisation
within which to supervise the support of the social sciences. Again
it is possible to detect in the preceding quotation the kind of sociologi-
cal research favoured by the Institute, namely 'useful'.

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It mattered not, whether the Institute's memorandum suggested the establishment of a standing committee, or some form of provisional arrangement to control the resources going to the social sciences, for at the heart of the matter rested the consequences of any plan for the development of sociology. Although the Institute's members seemed to be advocating support for 'all types of sociological research', there was every likelihood that the more established branches of the social sciences would continue to receive the lion's share of any funds made available through the proposed scheme. Unless sociology received preferential treatment in the allocation of resources, then it seemed unlikely that its position vis-a-vis the other social sciences would change significantly from its pre-war situation. After all, when it came to an examination of the relative degree of autonomy for the different disciplines, sociology had not been able to advance its case beyond its pre-war state. Moreover, the sociologists' case had not been positively advanced during the course of the Clapham Committee's deliberations, especially by the admission of T.S. Simey, that sociology's plight was the fault of the sociologists, (sic) for they "... had not yet done the work which they ought to have done to make theirs a fundamental study." Simey had also lamented the 'precarious' position of sociology and the fact that both social scientists and the public regarded it as "... not altogether respectable".

Another crucial aspect of the case for a research council or standing committee entailed the connection between the arguments propounded by the sociologists for a synthetic science of society (a central feature of the pre-war conference debates) and those being presented to the Committee for consideration in 1946. I have suggested above, that the resolution of the problem as to whether or not there should be a research council for the social sciences, depended upon a political decision. Those who tended to favour some form of innocuous, titular organisation, merely to co-ordinate 'interest' in the diverse fields of social study and research, regarded a government funded and directed body as potentially, a politically controlled organisation (I shall explore the arguments of this group shortly). The latter group regarded the independence
of social and economic research as paramount, and thus likely to remain so if the separation of funding and coordination of research was to remain largely as it had done in the past, notwithstanding a recognition that the war had brought about a new set of social and economic imperatives. This same group tended to frame their arguments within the context of the new and controversial debate on the relationship between the universities and the state in the post-war world.

Those who believed that there was a need for a fundamental change in the financial and institutional support for social research and in particular, its academic setting, argued that government should take responsibility for the transformation of existing arrangements, largely because the scale of that change was considered to be substantial. The future of sociology lay in the successful promotion of this line of thought. Furthermore, the sociologists probably realised that, in order to negotiate a place within the scheme of things, they would have to take cognisance of the arguments and conditions presented, or imposed from outside of the community of social scientists. It is possible to detect in the Institute's 'general plan', thematic components of the sociologists' pre-war programme for a synthetic approach to social science, although in the Institute's memorandum greater emphasis was placed upon such an approach within the sphere of research. The reference to an interdisciplinary approach to social research was a genuine one, although as I have stated previously, the memorandum would need to be framed and worded on the basis of the forum in which it would be debated (1946, p.5, paragraph 20):

"More important, however, is the promotion of a synthetic view of research problems, with the object of bringing to bear upon them the work of specialists of various schools. It is already widely recognised that many human problems require for their effective study cooperation between biologists, psychologists, sociologists, and social anthropologists, with a combination of their various methods."

The preceding quotation highlights the somewhat purposeful construction of the memorandum, in that the Institute had, since its inception, endeavoured to promote the 'teaching and study of sociology' whenever and
wherever possible with particular emphasis upon the use of the 'sociological survey'. The pre-war condition of sociology had been one of dependency rather than autonomy, at least to the extent that the latter position was one enjoyed by many of the other social sciences, especially economics. In the case of the latter discipline, the memorandum's author made special reference to the shortcomings of those subjects which neglected the benefits of 'co-operating with other specialists' (1946, p.5, paragraph 20):

"Many would add that the economist who specialises on the descriptive aspects of his science, and the historian also, have important contributions to make, and no doubt a case may also be made for the cooperation of other specialists."

Once again the key role of the sociologist is advanced within a strategy to secure institutional space and material resources, and provides a clear example of sociology's advocatory dimension (1946, p.5, paragraph 20):

"No rigid definition of the field of co-operation is required here: the point is stressed, as success in sociological research in the future may largely depend upon the co-operation of fully trained sociologists with other specialists."

If social and economic research was to flourish in the post-war world of large-scale reconstruction, then the role of the sociologist must be recognised and resourced. The irony of such an argument is that it appeared to be a reassertion of the case made by the sociologists in the middle and late 1930s. In other words, sociology's future lay within the domain of others' interests, at least for the foreseeable future. Not so much an admission of intellectual inadequacy, rather, a tactical presentation of sociology's case.

The concluding paragraph of the Institute's memorandum dealt with the future of the Wartime Social Survey (WSS) and the possibility of converting the temporary arrangement for a proposed Provisional Committee of the social sciences, to one of a permanent 'Council' or 'Department'. The reasons given for the maintenance of the WSS in some post-war form
are worth quoting, as they will have a bearing on my examination of the arguments of those who opposed the establishment of a council for the social sciences.

Essentially, the Institute's members wished to see the WSS retained and linked, on a formal basis, with the proposed Provisional Committee (through a financial bond). The memorandum suggested the following arrangements (1946, p.5, paragraph 21):

"Its continuance seems useful for several reasons; it should, however, take its place on a peace-time basis as one important institution among several for sociological research. This might be arranged if the War-Time Social Survey became an incorporated or chartered body in close association with Government Departments, but financed by the Provisional Committee; its position would then be somewhat similar to that of a research institute associated with and financed by the Department of Industrial and Scientific Research."

Those who tended to oppose the establishment of a research council for the social sciences, may have been somewhat alarmed by the preceding reference to the level of financial control intended for the Provisional Committee. Furthermore, the status of the latter Committee was viewed as equivalent to an existing government research organisation (in this case the DSIR). If such a committee or council were to be created, then it would represent a significant departure from the system of funding and coordinating social research which had operated during the inter-war period.

The Institute's memorandum concluded with a reference to the need for a formal organisation to both fund and coordinate research within the social sciences (1946, p.5, paragraph 22):

"The name Provisional Committee has been suggested as it is thought that the small scale organisation here envisaged could serve its purpose for only a limited period, and would then suitably give place to a Council or Department of greater scope. A provisional development seems suitable at the moment;
the experience gained in the course of the Committee's activities would be the best guide in establishing a permanent organisation at a later date."

The Institute's case for a research council was of crucial importance to the sociologists. However, what might not have occurred to its members, was the contingent matter of the debate on the relationship of the universities to the state; an argument that was gaining momentum as the war drew to a close, with the prospect of a radical change in the political and economic structure of Britain. It was thought that this might bring with it a significant shift in the nature and purpose of disciplines within the social sciences. Those who foresaw the possible changes within the political composition of parliamentary and state administrative structures (with the emergence of 'state control' of the system of higher education were generally opposed to the creation of a research council, which, it was argued, might become an instrument of political domination. Before making a detailed examination of the confidential report entitled, *The Vitalisation of Research in the Social Sciences*, (Cabinet Papers, CAB 124/592), submitted to the Lord President of the Council, (Herbert Morrison)*, I wish first to consider what I shall refer to as the education debate and the relevance of it to the prospects of sociology. The 'Vitalisation' document contained very specific and crucial statements on the question of a research council for the social sciences, citing the funding of research and the universities as important factors in such a project.

* Herbert Morrison was a staunch advocate of what I shall refer to in the education debate as a 'centralist', i.e. centralised funding and direction of higher education.
3. The Universities and the State: the intra-war debate

I suggested above, that apparently innocuous, strategic arguments for or against sociology, carry within them certain tacit commitments to explicit forms of politics and morality. Furthermore, I argued that in large measure, the Clapham Committee's consideration of the role of post-war social science was predicated upon the much more politically contentious issue of the changing relationship between the universities and the state. The latter controversy framed the more specific debate about those forms of knowledge considered essential to the needs of the state in a period of post-war reconstruction. Such issues would, in turn, influence those who sought to establish the fundamental role of the social sciences as primary sources of knowledge within the latter process. It is within the ferment of such controversies that I wish to consider the arguments of those who were generally opposed to the establishment of a research council for the social sciences - an institutional innovation - which some social scientists, especially sociologists, considered essential to the development of their disciplines.

Price (1978) has examined what I consider to be the two most important factors in the institutional development of sociology in post-war Britain: the changing relationship between the system of higher education and the state, and the increasing importance of state subsidised research activity, both within and outside of the universities. Although Price concentrates on the genesis of such developments (between the years 1943 and 1946) his arguments are focused on the political and cultural implications of shifts in patterns of funding, directing, administering and discussion about the production of knowledge in the decades following the Second World War. As I argued earlier, the rise of science and the enhanced role of scientists during the crisis of war, provided the context and direction of the debate on the production of knowledge and the national need (Price, 1978, p.357):
"The proposal for the comprehensive forecasting of requirements for scientists and for the training which was to be required by the forecast would bear on all institutions of higher education; it raised fundamental issues of the responsibility of universities for meeting "national needs", and the administrative co-ordination of their educational and research activities."

It is within the central issues of the debate between those who opposed the "... organisation and development of university education and research (as) a branch of state activity ..." (Price, 1978, p.361) and those who desired to see the replacement of the traditional arrangements for controlling the aforementioned elements of the system of higher education, that it is possible to detect the crucial background arguments which framed the Clapham debate, especially the proposal to establish a research council for the social sciences. To the latter issue can also be added the matter of preferential funding of the social sciences (via ear-marked grants) and the establishment of ad hoc committees and sub-committees of the University Grants Committee (UGC). In fact all of the preceding proposals, with the exception of the council for the social sciences, actually materialised as a result of the recommendations of the Clapham Committee. Moreover, the notion of a research council for the social sciences became the major agenda item in subsequent debates on the future of the social sciences. What had been a central issue within the Clapham deliberations, became a reality nineteen years later upon the establishment of the Social Science Research Council in 1965.

Those who contested the role of higher education in the period of reconstruction can be conveniently divided into two quite distinct but opposing groups. On the one hand, there were those committed to the retention of pre-war arrangements for the funding of the universities via the UGC, in addition to the maintenance of the function of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) as an intermediary body between the universities and other public and private institutions, which may have had an interest in the universities. In many respects, the latter body represented the collective views of the universities in any and
all matters which affected them directly. On the other hand, there were those who regarded the preceding arrangements as no longer able to fulfil the needs of society in its radically altered post-war, economic, political and social form, and who proposed the following measures as a means to create a more responsive, accountable and equitable system for governing and resourcing the system of higher education: the creation of a more 'active planning body', in the form of a 'development committee' for the universities; the UGC to be made responsible to the Lord President of the Council (already responsible for the work of the existing research councils) and the creation of powerful 'advisory committees' to aid in the determination of planning initiatives (cf. Price, pp.358-361). The former group, those who argued for maintenance of the status quo (though there were some who were willing to accept a degree of modification to existing arrangements) I shall refer to as supporters of the dispersed initiative (essentially a strategy which entailed the distribution of power and decision making within and among traditional institutions and groups in the system of higher education). The latter group, those who sought to alter significantly the pre-war structure of power and autonomy within the universities and its ideological basis, I shall refer to as supporters of centralised planning.

The debate between the two groups was of significance to the development of sociology for the following reasons. First, the most influential participants in the education debate, namely Sir Hector Hetherington, Sir Walter Moberly and Sir John Anderson (of the dispersed initiative group) were also key members of the Clapham Committee. As the question of war and post-war planning and university autonomy had arisen as a contentious issue in the period, 1943 to 1946, the deliberations of the Clapham Committee could not but be influenced by the arguments associated with the debate on the role of the university in a planned society. The Clapham Committee convened in 1944 and published its final report in 1946. It is most unlikely that the individuals mentioned above, would either subscribe to, or seek to espouse, a separate series of arguments on the forms of knowledge that were considered essential for the resolution of post-war problems of reconstruction and the most
appropriate institutional arrangements for funding and directing such a process. Such arguments implied the same political and moral dimensions, and tended to be framed within identical ideological presuppositions. These factors are thrown into sharper relief when one considers the fact that Sir Hector Hetherington was, during the period in question, Chairman of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, Sir Walter Moberly was Chairman of the University Grants Committee and Sir John Anderson was Chancellor of the Exchequer. These individuals held positions of considerable power and influence within the three most important institutions crucial to the development of the system of higher education. Their additional involvement in the Clapham Committee also affected significantly, the outcome of the debate on the future of the social sciences in Britain in the years following the Second World War.

Secondly, sociology's institutional presence within the wider field of social science was relatively insignificant. Examination of the Institute's memorandum indicated clearly the importance of expansion in that sphere. Although the Clapham Committee's brief was to explore the possibility of expanding the research potential of the social sciences, it soon became apparent to the committee members that this could not occur without appropriate institutional development of existing sites wherein the social sciences were both taught and researched. Moreover, and in the case of sociology, without preferential support, the discipline was unlikely to make the contribution toward the production of social knowledge anticipated by those who would legislate the introduction of the welfare state, nor would it aspire to the potential being attributed to it by its few, but vociferous practitioners. Considered thus, the expansion of the universities was a debate of crucial importance to sociology's future. Indeed, it would be a subsequent review of the role of the universities within a redefinition of the nature and purpose of education (the Robbins Report, Cmnd. 2154, 1963-64) which would again provide sociology with an opportunity to gain a wider institutional presence within higher education.
Thirdly, the question of a research council for the social sciences became an issue which the participants in the debate on the role of the universities in relation to the needs of the state, were able to assess in terms of diminished autonomy for the universities, and the extra demand upon the Exchequer for resources which had traditionally gone to the existing research councils and institutes, notwithstanding the financial needs of the universities themselves. The supporters of the dispersed initiative tended to frame their arguments about the prospect of creating an additional research council for the social sciences within the preceding context, coding their arguments in oppositional terms through contemplating the prospect of a socialist state emerging at the end of the war. The preceding debates highlighted the essentially moral basis of such arguments, which the supporters of the dispersed initiative presented as instrumental difficulties. However, they could not resist the attempt being made by the supporters of centralised planning to strike at the heart of a defense of elitism and a resistance to large-scale social change, all of which had implications for the cultural context in which knowledge arises, how it is maintained, how it relates to reality, but also how it relates to the objectives and interests a society possesses by virtue of its historical development.

Herbert Morrison (Lord President of the Council), Sir Ernest Simon (Chairman of the Council; Manchester University), Professor R.H. Tawney, Sir Henry Tizard (members of the UGC), Sir Maurice Hankey (Chairman of a Government Committee on Scientific Manpower), J.D. Bernal (Royal Society), Ernest Bevin (Minister of Labour and National Service) and Clement Attlee (former Lord President of the Council and Deputy Prime Minister) featured among the most influential supporters of a centralised approach to planning within the system of higher education. To the preceding group can be added the collective voices of the Association of Scientific Workers and the Parliamentary Scientific Committee. The former organisation tended to demand a more fully-fledged dirigisme, whereas the latter group, in common with the Association of University Teachers, tended to adopt a more modified version of centralised planning. For all of these individuals and organisations, the relationship between the universities and the state was of profound importance, especially in the light of the
political, economic and social changes taking place within British society during the course of the war. An example of the degree of expectation and demand for wide-ranging changes in the structure of education and the manner in which it was funded, administered and the curriculum devised, took the form of a conference sponsored by the British Association in 1941 entitled, "Science and World Order". The British Association also established a special committee for the consideration of 'scientific research on human institutions' in 1942. The latter Committee made special reference to the need for a revised curriculum to incorporate an expansion in the field of the social sciences (cf. The Advancement of Science, Vol. 2, 1942, pp.345-356).

The point here is that a growing number of individuals and organisations began to consider the need to redefine the concept and practice of education at all levels, with the universities viewed as primary sites which had, hitherto, served to perpetuate the transmission of a culture, through ideas and practices, which seemed increasingly remote from the social and economic crises of the 1920s and '30s. The latter decade had culminated in a world war, declared between two of Western civilisation's most cultured nations. The war itself was bloody and costly, both in human and material terms, and had to be endured. The peace and its attendant political and economic forms did not. These features of society could be made, transformed and undone by human agency and design. In many respects this would entail more than a change in government: the significance of education as a vehicle to effect social change rather than perpetuate dominant and oppressive social structures became a focal point of the political debate on the theme of education and the role of the state.

W. Kenneth Richmond (1945) has given a fairly clear indication of the scale of the emerging, wartime education debate (1945, p.143):

"Education was in the air. The atmosphere was a-simmer with expectation. "Equality of opportunity", "State control", "social security", "the dual system" - these were on everyone's lips, phrases to juggle with for the man in the street: and, though he had often only a remote understanding of their full implications, he did at any rate feel himself vaguely concerned. If it was not wholly front-page news, education had acquired a distinct copy value for the newspapers."
This susurrus of interest was the seedbed from which sprang what can only be described as a renaissance of English educational thought. Treatises which once upon a time would have been intended for specialists only suddenly found themselves vying the best sellers. England, still in the valley of the shadow, began to talk of reconstruction. Book-titles of 1940-43 suggest something of the altering mood - Diagnosis of our Time, Education and Social Change, Education for a New Society, Education for a World Adrift, Education in Transition .... or even (to compare small things with great) Blueprint for a Common School."

Richmond makes an important observation regarding a feature common to all of the preceding works on the future of post-war education policy (1945, p.143):

"However much they differed from one another individually, all these works had this much in common, that they looked to education "to repair the ruins" in ways never dreamed of in Milton's philosophy. They looked to it, not as an infal­lible nostrum, nor as some mysterious amulet against Fate, but as a new sociological influence without which there could be no betterment of human life and affairs."

He goes on to cite the political and economic dimensions of education policy-making and the transformation that this process would undergo in the post-war era (1945, pp.143-144):

"In the past those affairs had been largely rough-hewn by circumstances; by unbridled individualism, competition, by the fetish of capital, by an entire code of living based on mistaken values. From now on the determination was to control circumstances of this kind, to shape the future aright even if it meant resorting to methods of compulsion and restraint. For whatever the solution to the problem facing modern civilisation was - and it was inextricably tied up with social, economic, political and religious factors - the first term in it was concerned with education. The first duty of the planners, therefore, was to subordinate details of structure and admini­stration to a thorough requestioning of basic principles.

Long before the end of hostilities was in sight, indeed, at a time when the outcome was very much in doubt, England's appetite for a new deal in education was whetted as never before."
In terms of the classification of individuals and groups associated with 'centralised planning', Richmond was to become an ally and publicist for such a radical initiative in educational policy.

Clement Attlee, author of the crucial letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, recommending the establishment of the Clapham Committee, wrote to Ernst Bevin, in his capacity as the Lord President, urging the latter to ensure that appropriate pressure was applied in the relevant quarters, for an urgent expansion of the universities (Price, 1978, p.363):

"Attlee wrote to Bevin that this was "... a very serious matter, as we cannot hope to solve our post-war problems, unless we can increase the supply of trained men and women in the various departments of our national life"."*

A key to the management, or central control of the universities lay in the direction of University Grants Committee's policy toward the distribution of its grant. It is this feature of the centralist approach to the question of the relationship between the system of higher education and the state, that had a direct and significant bearing on the fate of the social sciences, especially sociology. Supporters of a central planning initiative recommended the introduction of ear-marked grants for certain disciplines. This strategy emerged prior to the publication of the Clapham Committee's report, and the subsequent adoption by the UGC of such a means of funding specific branches of knowledge. In many important respects, the issue of ear-marked grants, a factor common to both the Clapham and education debates, highlighted the increasing emphasis on knowledge and its production. The dynamics of sectional interests both political and economic, forced the issue of education into a context wherein different forms of knowledge became the subject of evaluative scrutiny, based not always on financial return for investment.

With the war came a transformation in educational policy making, influenced by both political ideology and the consequences for the Exchequer, should a vast expansion occur. To many in the dispersed initiative camp, the direction of large amounts of money to higher education (whether for teaching or research in selected fields) entailed the political control of the most important resource a society possessed - the medium for the generation and transmission of its culture. Supporters of the dispersed initiative sensed a profound change taking place in the political mood of the nation toward the end of the war. With the prospect of an election of a socialist government, there could well be an accompanying change in the nature and purpose of the university vis-a-vis the state. Certainly the centralists wished to transform the system of higher education from its pre-war position in society: one portrayed by Theodore Roszak (1969, p.12):

"One might perhaps count on the fingers of one hand the eras in which the university has been anything better than the hand-maiden of official society: the social club of ruling elites, the training school of whatever functionaries the status quo required."

If any significant change in the control of the universities (or, for that matter, an increase in their number) was to occur, then the role of the UGC would be crucial. Price (1978) actually refers to the centralists intention to achieve "government" of the universities' control over their subjects (1978, p.364) via ear-marked grants. Resistance to such a possible political manoeuvre came from the Chairman of the UGC, Sir Walter Moberly (also a member of the Clapham Committee), (Price, 1978, p.365):

"In response to this the vice-chancellors had expressed a strong preference that if such a system were introduced, it should be "on as informal a basis as possible and for a temporary
period only."* Moberly, as chairman of the University Grants Committee, was reluctant to use the "power of the purse", and only in the case of medical and dental education did he suggest to the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals that "ear-marking" would be necessary."

Least it be thought that the issue was only one of an instrumental or organisational nature, whereby more effective and efficient administrative procedures would overcome the difficulties of the funding of knowledge, it is important to consider the quite profound political and philosophical bases of the debate in question. Although Price (1978, p.365), has cited the argument of post-war expansion in the field of science and the role of the universities in achieving this, his reference to "divergent views" on the national distribution of science, is perhaps more significant than has hitherto been appreciated. This is for two reasons, one of which had a direct bearing on the development of the social sciences, as contested within the forum of the Clapham Committee.

First, Price has cited the example of science as a special candidate for extraordinary financial support and development within the post-war structure of the universities, focusing attention on the attempt to enhance the institutional basis of a particular branch of knowledge. This in turn implies the social context within which science evolves, especially its contingent status through an evaluation of its relationship to other forms of knowledge, a prescribed role for its practitioners, and an explicit expression of its intrinsic capacity to fulfil the requirements of the prevailing notion of the national need. What is important in Price's analysis of this particular episode in the history of British science, is not the associated round of inquiries and investigative committees into the 'national distribution of science in university departments' (although this procedure has been applied to the social sciences) rather, the matter of a fiercely contested debate over the philosophical and social bases of science formed the crucial background to the whole affair. Thus a social theory of science, while largely

* Minutes of Meeting between representatives of the University Grants Committee and the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, 8 May, 1944, Public Record Office, UGC 2/25, quoted in Price (1978, p.365).
unstated and often portrayed in crude ideological terms was, nevertheless, at the centre of the intra and post-war debates on the production of knowledge and the national need. Indeed, the latter debate encompassed the political assessment of the role of the social sciences in the period of post-war reconstruction - the remit of the Clapham Committee.

Michael Polanyi and J.D. Bernal are cited by Price (1978, p.365) as the central figures in the debate on the contrasting social theories of science. I do not intend to examine the respective theories implied in the more general wartime debate on the national distribution of science subjects in university departments. Polanyi's position on the subject has been set out in, 'The Growth of Thought in Society', (Economica, Vol. 21, 1941) and more recently in, 'The Republic of Science', (Minerva, Vol. 1, 1963). Bernal's thesis appeared under the title, The Social Function of Science, (1939), and in a more contemporary and elaborated form in the four volume, Science in History, (1969). The former author conceived of the development of scientific thought, in a quasi-evolutionary sense: a form of natural selection of the intellect. Competition for the 'best brains' in any field was viewed as a fundamental element of that process, reflecting in fact, the funding philosophy of the UGC and those private funding agencies which had acted quite discriminantly in the provision of resources to favoured quarters within higher education. The similarity between the principles and practice of laissez-faire, a preferred method for the distribution of funds to the universities by the UGC, and Polanyi's theory of the 'growth of knowledge' are quite striking (Royal Society, 1946);

"... a satisfactory condition in each science would come about naturally, provided that each university chose the most distinguished leaders for its posts."

In contrast to this, and included in the same Royal Society Report, is the view propounded by the centralists, but in this case, through the arguments of J.D. Bernal (1946, paragraph 3):
"... a balance would be best secured by encouraging special subjects in certain places, regarding the universities of the country as a whole."

The Royal Society's report was eventually submitted to the UGC and the Vice-Chancellors of every university with the following observation and endorsement of Polanyi's thesis (1946, paragraph 3):

"General opinion of those at the meeting was in favour of free development according to the first view."

The reference to "the first view" represents the argument expounded by Polanyi, although some qualifications were made regarding grants for lectureships in special subjects. Consideration of the motives and actions of the supporters and exponents of the inter-war science movement (considered above) in addition to the financial policies of the Rockefeller Foundation during the same period, would tend to undermine the apparent 'extra-social' nature of the growth of knowledge according to Polanyi's theory. Furthermore, the nature and source of pre-war funding of knowledge was never the issue it had become toward the end of the war and into the immediate post-war period. Private, or at least, unregulated benefaction was supposedly subject to market forces and freedom of choice. With the prospect of a major change in the political order of British society after the war, in addition to a regulated economy, the relationship between the universities and the state suddenly became a 'problem' of profound ideological proportions: state funding was considered by supporters of the dispersed initiative, to entail not only an assault on the freedom and autonomy of the universities, but a serious threat to the very social and economic fabric of British society. A society whose economic system had previously given rise to and nurtured a system of higher education which was, according to Polanyi and his supporters, under threat of mindless intervention and centralised control.

Second, those given to opposing the views of centralised planning, of whom Polanyi, perhaps more than most, represented the philosophical expression of that opposition, occupied strategic positions of power and influence within both the UGC and Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals. Moreover, the centralist position, tied as it was to...
a political manifesto for radical, social and economic change, necessarily presented its exponents with considerable institutional and intellectual resistance from within those spheres of influence. Not only did the centralists need to forcefully advocate their case generally for a revision of the system of higher education, it was equally essential for those advocates to gain entry into the organisations, institutional arrangements and ad hoc committees of inquiry, wherein the debate on the nature and purpose of a university in a reconstructed Britain was taking place. Thus the question of access to the key forums of discussion and decision making was one which would ultimately affect the success, or otherwise, of the opposing view. The matter of J.D. Bernal and the Clapham Committee is a case in point.

I have argued above that the Clapham debate took place against the back-drop of the more public and certainly sensitive issue of the autonomy of the universities. Reference was also made to the central figures engaged in the latter discussion, emphasising the fact they too held positions of influence within the Committee on the Provision for Social and Economic Research (Cmnd., 6868). During the course of nominating individuals to give evidence to the latter committee, the question arose of whether or not J.D. Bernal should contribute. In view of his arguments on the function of the university in society, in marked contrast to that of Polanyi's, I would suggest that his rejection owed as much to his likely influence upon the members of the Clapham Committee (and sympathetic politicians, namely Attlee) than to his exclusion on the grounds that his work was of peripheral importance to sociological research. The coincidence of the increasingly heated education debate with that of the Clapham Committee, meant that issues central to both, would coalesce within a general conception and definition of higher education, its nature and purpose, and those forms of knowledge regarded essential to the fulfilment of the prevailing social, economic (and for some, political) imperatives. Social Science could not be excluded from such a controversy.

John Clapham wrote to T.M. Wilson of the Treasury (Letter to T.M. Wilson from J. Clapham, 28.8.45, T 161/1301) expressing an opinion on those
who might be called to give evidence to the Committee. The following extract gives an indication of the method employed to make such a choice, with whim, prejudice and a measure of ignorance consigning to oblivion, certain individuals who may have had potentially, significant contributions to make to the debates in question. Moreover, I would suggest that the exclusion of Bernal was for reasons other than prejudice and caprice (T 161/1301):

"I am sure Hogben and Haldane would have a lot to say. Bernal has not, I think, written directly on our theme. His Social Functions of Science is a plea against pure science, and I think, propaganda for politically directed science. No doubt he touches our subject - as I should say tendentiously ..."

Can you consult Carr-Saunders on the Bernal/Huxley question? All are really men of science with sociological interest. If he thinks we ought to hear one or more, then we might."

Carr-Saunders did not think Bernal should be heard. The role of the former individual as a referee is significant. Carr-Saunders exerted considerable influence within the wider sphere of social science and in view of the faith invested in his judgement on the matter of contributors to the Clapham deliberations by the Chairman of that Committee, it is likely that he also influenced the selection of the sociologists who would be called upon to submit written and oral evidence. Certainly the prospect of hearing sociologists was almost dashed owing to Clapham's complaint over the length of the list of potential contributors. Clapham's ignorance in this matter almost put paid to the calling of Simey to present a case for sociology (T 161/1301):

"I'm afraid I know nothing about Simey. I doubt if we will hear Parker, he is really a student of political thought, a subject for which there is, I should say, pretty ample provision - several teachers at Cambridge and some in Oxford."

The comment on political thought and its provision within higher education reflected a common, elitist view of what constituted 'ample provision': if it was taught at Oxford and Cambridge, then that was sufficient to cover both supply and demand within that sphere of knowledge.
Another important feature of the education debate entailed an estimation of the number of universities that would be required in the post-war period. Bernal and other supporters of the centralised planning approach believed that if there were to be sufficient numbers of graduates in the natural and social sciences after the war, then the need to establish new universities was a question which required urgent consideration. The matter centred on whether or not the existing system would be able to cope with the anticipated increase in student numbers after the war. This gave rise to the invidious, 'more means worse' argument, proffered by those opposing the centralists' case. Such an expansion would have greatly enhanced the institutional prospects of sociology.*

The publication of the Barlow Report (1946) on the other hand, while making specific reference to the need for more scientific manpower, nevertheless pointed to the more fundamental need for a review of the system of higher education in Britain. A prospect which caused much disquiet in the sleepy back-waters of the Isis and Cam. In effect, this report was to determine the immediate post-war policy regarding university expansion. It is noteworthy that, in the absence of any other instrument for framing Government policy on higher education, it fell to this committee on scientific manpower to shape the first stage in an expansion policy which led, step by step, to the Robbins Report in 1963. As J. Stuart Maclure has observed of the significance of the Barlow Report (Maclure, 1973, p.231):

"The main recommendation of the Committee was that the universities should be expanded so as to double the output of scientists. With this went the rider, not strictly within the terms of reference, but highly important in the event, that 'a substantial expansion in the number of students studying the humanities should not be sacrificed to the need for an increased output of scientists and technologists'. In a phrase which should be remembered in view of the spate of new university foundation in the 1960s, the Committee observed: 'there is nothing sacrosanct

* The irony of such a plan was that it did eventually enhance sociology's development, albeit some twenty years later after the publication of the Robbins Report (1963). Like its predecessor, the Barlow Report (1946), the Robbins Committee considered the adequacy of higher education as a system which could respond effectively to the prevailing national need.
about the present number of universities in the kingdom and we are attracted by the conception of bringing into existence at least one university which would give the present generation the opportunity of leaving to posterity a monument of its culture'. Lord Lindsay of Birker became Principal of the University College of North Staffordshire in 1949."

This concession to culture had no immediate and significant effect on the institutional expansion of sociology.

Sir Walter Moberly opposed the central argument of the Barlow Report. As an advocate of the dispersed initiative, Chairman of the UGC and supporter of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, he continued to thwart the intentions and manoeuvres of the centralists. Price sums up the latter's position on university expansion (Price, 1978, p.366):

"For the immediate future of the universities he believed the important factor would be the shortage of teaching staff, and he could consequently see no prospect of any rapid increase in student numbers which would not involve a serious decline in quality. He remained doubtful of the wisdom of founding new universities on the direct initiative of the University Grants Committee lest such new universities stand in a different position to the Committee from that of other universities."

Although the UGC and the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals continued to resist the move to expand the number of universities, some concessions were forthcoming in the area of special provision for certain branches of knowledge taught and researched in those institutions. It is interesting to note that a central recommendation of the Clapham Committee; the establishment of a UGC sub-committee, "to advise on matters relating to the social sciences" (Cmnd. 6868, 1946, paragraphs 27-28), happened to coincide with the UGC's agreement to establish several sub-committees to 'fill the gaps in the existing fields of knowledge'. I would suggest that the presence of Sir Walter Moberly on the Clapham Committee and its decision to recommend the establishment of a UGC sub-committee on social science, owed more to a general policy within the UGC (a form of political resistance) to stave off whole-sale intervention in the affairs of the universities -thus protecting their alleged autonomy, than an ad hoc decision of the Clapham Committee, based on the evidence before it. A sub-committee for the social sciences, under the guidance and direction of the UGC, would also enable the latter
organisation to nurture the development of those disciplines, within
the universities at least, along the lines of such a strategy and in keeping
with the ideological prescriptions of the intrinsic nature and social
purpose of those forms of knowledge. What many historians of the social
sciences have regarded as an initiative on behalf of social science
by a government committee of inquiry, was largely a strategy derived
from a policy of resistance by those who regarded any attempt to exert
centralised control over the universities as a political threat to
those institutions' autonomy. Thus, as I have argued previously, the
development of the social sciences, including sociology, has been influenced
significantly by the cultural context in which they have arisen, and
in particular, how they relate to the objectives and interests a society
possesses by virtue of its historical development. In this case, through
the mediation of particularly powerful and influential groups of individuals
within the realms of government and higher education.

The fundamental questions of the constitutional position of the universi-
ties, of the adequacy of their internal administration to fit into "planning
for national needs", and of the necessity of central direction remained
the subject of controversy, both within the above-mentioned domains
and up to Cabinet level throughout the war and into the immediate post-war
era. Although the UGC had accepted that some degree of benevolent,
political direction of its affairs was necessary within an age of centra-
lised planning, it had managed, in conjunction with the Vice-Chancellors,
to forstall the degree of dirigisme envisaged by those who advocated
a centralist approach to the question of the appropriate relationship
between universities and the state in post-war Britain. Together with
the Treasury, the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals had managed
an extended defence of that relationship, based on the principles of
the dispersed initiative, though making some concessions to the notion
of 'general guidance' in the formulation of policy on higher education.
4. **Further support for a research council for the social sciences: the hierarchy preserved.**

The education debate and the issues associated with it, give a clear indication of the wider context within which the case for a research council had been made. The following examination of *Vitalisation of Research in the Social Sciences* (CAB 124/529), provides further evidence of the connection between those two issues i.e. the funding and direction of social science and the most appropriate and politically acceptable, institutional arrangement to achieve this. Reference will also be made in this section, to additional documents and discussions affecting the establishment of a research council, and in turn, the effects that those debates would have on the future of sociology.

There are essentially three interrelated themes running throughout the 'Vitalisation' document, all of which coalesce within a comprehensive programme for the development of social science in the post-war period. They are as follows: an analysis of the existing system of higher education, which accounted for the institutional resistance to the emergent social sciences; the nature of social knowledge, which in turn implied its political status as a basis for social action; and a recognition by the author that the two previous points were relevant to the current debate (early to middle 1940s) on the appropriate relationship between the universities and the state. The document is replete with strategic statements on the means by which such a programme could be formulated and implemented.

The author begins his argument with two unquestioned assumptions: the prevailing institutional and financial arrangements for the funding of research, via the existing Research Councils, was adequate and that such an arrangement should be extended to encompass the social sciences; that although there were risks attached to the allocation and distribution of resources via the UGC to the universities, such an arrangement could, if carefully monitored, assist greatly the institutionalisation of social science. In the case of the former (the structure of support) the example of the natural sciences was cited as a branch of knowledge
which was both crucial to the realisation of the national interest and
that such a mechanism of support for science could be adapted to the
advantage of social science. The latter assumption was contingent upon
an equivalency between the methods by which knowledge is produced within
two discrete domains. I do not intend to examine the latter issue,
other than to refer to the implications of such an epistemological argument
for the case being made on behalf of social science. Although the author
endeavoured to equate the social sciences with that of their 'natural'
counterpart, the more contentious issues with which he had to deal
were clearly stated in the formal title of the document itself - 'The
Vitalisation of Research in the Social Sciences: with special reference
to the role of the universities in a planned economy'. The second part
of the title and the timing of the document's publication, at the height
of the debate on university autonomy and following the publication
of the Clapham Committee Report (Cmd. 6868), give a clear indication
of the wider issues and discourse which would affect directly, the develop­
ment of post-war sociology.

The 'Vitalisation' document states its purpose clearly, (CAB 124/529,
p.1, paragraph3):

"... by what means is it possible to vitalise the study of
the Social Sciences in our universities with a view to ensuring
fruitful contribution to the national effort commensurate
with national expenditure on higher education and research?"

The author was aware of the key role of the universities in furthering
the interests of social science in the spheres of teaching and research.
It is understandable that its arguments on the nature of higher education
and the role of the professoriate within it, should find favour with
the then Lord President (CAB 124/529, p.2, paragraphs 5 and 9):
"5. The professorial hierarchy of the University has been nurtured in a tradition of laissez-faire. In that framework it has been more concerned to propagate a rationale for the status quo, or at best to controvert its claims, than to undertake factual research to service a planned economy. The more senior members who have grown old in this tradition are unlikely to respond readily to the new situation. Since they control the use of University finances, allocation by the University Grants Commission of funds earmarked to encourage a more healthy growth of the Social Sciences may fail therefore to accomplish any useful result through lack of external control.

9. The objection which stresses the dangers of political control of the Universities is largely a hang-over of laissez-faire. Fundamental research in the social sciences should be concerned with exploring human needs, the material resources available for satisfying them and the institutional machinery for implementing their satisfaction. In a democracy it is for the people's representatives to decide what immediate action such knowledge invokes and what are the priorities."

The future of the social sciences became inextricably bound up in the political furore over the conflicting nature and purpose of the university in a society which had, for the first time, elected a political party committed to the wide-scale introduction of socialist policies within the framework of a welfare state. With the latter came many of the theoretical and substantive issues which would provide the staple diet of sociologists in the decades up to the 1970s. The inter-relationship between theories of society, of the State, of social problems and of social policy would soon preoccupy the sociologist and give the fledgeling discipline what Urry (1981) has considered to be its 'parasitic' form. The latter manifesting itself in terms of the organisation of sociological discourse (cf. Urry, 1981, pp.27-37). The reference to 'knowledge invoking social priorities' is a crucial statement, in as much as social knowledge has consequences for social action. Moreover, the general argument contained in documents like the 'Vitalisation' and the previously considered Institute of Sociology's submission to the Clapham Committee (and the shortly to be considered, 'Report on the Co-ordination of Social Sciences', (T 161/1301)), indicate a distinctively prescriptive role for social science in the post-war period, one that implies an alignment with a pragmatic, political consensus, finding expression through the
collectivist initiatives of a socialist government, and sustained generally
by a commitment to the ethos of planning and centralism. Vic George
and Paul Wilding (1976, p.8) give an indication of the essential difference
between the general approach to social policy on either side of the
last war:

"In spite of the criticisms levied against functionalist explana-
tions of social policy, they do have the merit of turning
attention to the social and economic system and away from
such individualistic explanations of social policy as those
of Dicey and Hayek. At least they see social policy as emerging
out of the processes associated with social and economic change
rather than out of the fertile intellect of super-men, or
out of a process of mass deception by well-meaning but basically
misguided reformers."

Social priorities and programme statements, or agendas for social science
and its research initiatives, became intermeshed and explicated within
differing themes of advocacy for the potential of those disciplines.
In an era of socialism this may have accounted for the perpetuation
and further entrenchment of the mythical equation, that social science
and socialism were one and the same. The Vitalisation document certainly
implied the need to establish a social role for the social scientist
and his or her craft in the post-war world. It is also worth noting
that in the above reference to the distinction between the production
of social knowledge and its subsequent use, the social scientist is
viewed as an independent agent in the process of transforming theory
into social praxis. This image of the neutral scientist fits in well
with the popular, pre-war model of the similarly disposed natural scientist
serving the interests of society first and his vocation second. The
same argument, contained in the document, also imputes a distinct separation
of roles and responsibilities for the politician and scientist. The
former, a custodian and articulator of the nation's interests, the latter,
a technical/instrumental practitioner of a craft upon which the former
individual would come to depend increasingly in a complex, technological
age. Such a conception of the relationship between politician and expert
compromises the nature of social knowledge and its implication for social
action. At least with hindsight, this criticism is comparatively easy to make.*

The second theme characterising the 'Vitalisation' document's agenda for an enhanced role for social science in a planned economy, entailed three proposals to increase the knowledge base of those disciplines. This latter strategy comprised the means to achieve both the intellectual and institutional objectives set out in not only the Vitalization document, but others I have referred to previously when citing programme statements as important declarations on the nature and purpose of sociology within the advocatory mode. Considered thus, the author of the Vitalisation programme suggested the following proposals to ensure the "... fruitful contribution to the national effort commensurate with national expenditure on higher education and research" (CAB 124/529, p.1, paragraph 4):

"(a) a greater measure of encouragement from the University Grants Commission for extension of existing and creation of new departments of Social Science;

(b) creation under the Privy Council for an ad hoc body analogous to the M.R.C. and D.S.I.R. to subsidise individual projects in or outside university departments;

(c) enlargement of the scope of War Time Social Survey to function as a body comparable to the National Physical Laboratory or the National Medical Research Institute, geared into the present needs of government departments but free to undertake enquiries of less immediacy."

Of the three proposals, it is perhaps (b), the recommendation that a research council for the social sciences should be established, that proved to be one of the most controversial issues. And yet here again, the same demand for such a council appeared in a document submitted to the Lord President of the Council, which in turn, was passed on to the UGC sub-committee for social science. As I have argued above, such

* It should be remembered that during the course of the inter-war conferences, the presentation of such an image of the sociologist as the new, 'expert technician', was part of Mannheim's reconstructionist repertoire, especially his project for a synoptic science of society under the controlling ethos of sociology (cf. Diagnosis of Our Time, (1943), Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, (1940), Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, (1950), Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, (1952)).
A proposal remained a contentious issue throughout the Clapham deliberations and never ceased to be a major 'issue' within social science, until the creation of the Social Science Research Council in 1965. Although proposal (c) was adopted eventually, this was despite the criticisms made of the Survey's work by those Ministries which had cause to use its facilities. The W.S.S.'s continued existence rested on the estimation of its 'success' by the political heads of government departments. The political support for the W.S.S. was quite widespread, despite the suspicions of some of its opponents that it too would become an instrument of state investigation and oppression. Thus the issue of the W.S.S., although a distinctly political affair, was less contentious perhaps, than the case of (a) and (b) above. In both the latter proposals, issues of university autonomy and the funding of knowledge were at stake, and this placed them within the wider and certainly more politically sensitive context of the national debate on education.

Another feature of the Vitalization document's argument in support of a council for the social sciences, was its assumption that the existing model of a similar organisation for the natural sciences, would suit the organisational and research needs of the social sciences. There are two points which I think require clarification here. First, such a conception of both the organisational and intellectual/research needs of social science being similar (if not identical) to those of the natural sciences confuses and conflates the essential differences which characterise the two activities in their cognitive and practical forms. It could have been that the author viewed the nature and function of existing research councils as the only appropriately, practicable media of extramural support for scientific research upon which to base a scheme for the social sciences. However, this implies another related aspect of such a strategy, and this leads me to my second point. There is something of the Rothchild, 'customer/contractor' principle (Cmnd. 4814, 1971) in the case being made for a research council similar to that of the system of support for the natural sciences. Such a model for the funding and direction of research tends to underestimate the problem of the use or applicability of discrete or divergent forms of knowledge. This tends to be based upon a common misconception of the manner in which knowledge
is institutionally generated* i.e. scientific knowledge arises as a result of a common, or universal process, which is neither contextually bound by culture, nor influenced by sectional interests within it. Although this conception of the sociology and philosophy of science has been largely undermined in recent years, the author of the Vitalisation document assessed the factors affecting the process of the production of scientific knowledge as a series of quite discrete variables, presenting only instrumental and organisational problems (CAB 124/529, p.1, paragraphs 1-2):

"1. With reference to the application of natural science (here taken to include medicine, engineering and agriculture) to industrial organisation and social services, there exists:

(a) recognised bodies of experts such as the Royal Society or the Royal College of Physicians to whom Administrators and Statesmen can turn for information concerning relevant knowledge available;

(b) institutes and university departments where research is actively prosecuted outside government service with direct support from public funds administered by the Privy Council;

(c) university departments or technical schools where students receive practical training which fits them for technical appointments in public service and industry.

2. Outside the domain of the natural sciences with just as strong a claim to public support there is a wide field of contemporary social studies, including: finance and international trade, organisation, control, and location of industry, labour relations, growth of population, standards of life, selection of personnel, town and country planning, public administration, and welfare of colonial

* By this I mean the external system of support for the production of knowledge in Shils' sense of the concept (Shils, 1970, p.763):

"It (institutionalisation) also entails the organised support of the activity from outside the particular institution and the reception or use of the results of the activity beyond the boundaries of the institution."
peoples. While day to day work of government departments involves an ever-increasing volume of ad hoc enquiries into social conditions and economic organisation with a view to implementing public policy, there exists outside government service:

(a) little organised research into social institutions and human relations, prospecting and anticipating issues with which the administration may have to concern itself;

(b) little machinery of instruction to supply government offices with experts trained in the practical techniques of such social investigations as fall within their province."

What was lacking in the field of social research was an institutional structure of support, equivalent to that in the natural sciences. Again the model of science is employed as a feature of the strategy to advocate the potential of social science. This strategic association between natural and social science, is made clear in the following demand for equivalency in national recognition and status for social science, (CAB 124/529, p.3, paragraph 10):

"The problem of fitting the pursuit of social studies in our universities into the framework of a planned national economy is indeed the problem of endowing them with a recognised social function as explicitly (or implicitly) recognised as the need for the natural sciences."

The whole project of vitalising the social sciences rested on the question of whether or not the universities could be induced to make wider provision for them, in addition to the establishment of a social science research council. The creation of the latter had, as I have argued above, serious consequences for the former, in so much as the UGC and the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (and other supporters of the dispersed initiative) regarded such a proposal as a move in the direction of overt political control over the production of knowledge. The author of the revitalisation document endeavoured to tactfully present a proposal for a research council that would not immediately undermine the nature and function of existing councils, (CAB 124/529, p.2, paragraphs 6-7):
"6. In so far as a Social Research Council on all fours with the MRC and DSIR could (with proper safeguards) exercise a necessary modicum of control, proposals 4(a) and 4(b) are therefore complementary, and are jointly in line with the existing set-up which guarantees for departments of the natural sciences within the universities a necessary minimum of freedom to undertake projects with no promise of an early return and ensures a close link of such research to its applications. The essential feature of this set-up is that every department of natural science has both (a) an ample basic grant allocated directly from university funds; (b) access to public funds from the MRC, ARC, DSIR, or Development Commission for ad hoc projects which it is possible to justify as deserving public encouragement."

The matter of the future role of the Wartime Social Survey under the control of a research council for the social sciences, and the need for an expansion of university departments in the latter disciplines was of particular concern to the author (paragraph 7):

"7. The proposal to set up a Social Research Council is also complementary to proposals to enlarge the scope of the Social Survey. Under the control of a statutory body comparable to the MRC, Social Survey could in fact fill a niche comparable to that of public research institutes within the existing set-up of the natural sciences; but it cannot of itself undertake the training of university graduates to undertake factual research of value to a planned economy. Such training presupposes the existence of university departments where active factual enquiries provide a basis for instruction in the requisite statistical techniques, sources of data and methods of field study. Neither indiscriminate allocation of funds to the universities nor an ample appropriation for Social Survey can suffice to remedy the moribund state of the Social Sciences in the universities and ensure that graduates trained in university departments of the social sciences will have adequate qualifications for the tasks of government service."

The preceding paragraph contains most of the essential elements of the pre-war debate on the nature of social science, which were given particular prominence during the three conferences referred to in an earlier chapter. More important than this though is the reference to the "moribund state of the social sciences" up to the conclusion of the Second World War. The latter observation had been made by contributors to the Clapham Committee, and in so doing, provided an opportunity for the social scientists themselves to devise a programme of revivification, in addition
to new initiatives for their ailing subjects. As I have argued earlier, any such programme for social science would necessarily include a claim upon the system of higher education, in addition to other forms of extra-mural support and resources. The 'new social science' would also encompass quite clearly defined objectives, in keeping with the post-war, reconstructionist ethos: the training of competent technicians geared to the "tasks of government service" and prepared to "undertake factual research of value to a planned economy." The post-war patterns of teaching and research had been clearly defined, thus reasserting a tradition within the field of social research and thought, which had faltered during the inter-war years and had only begun to gain its momentum once again toward the end of that same period. Furthermore, a striking feature of the Vitalisation document, and also a characteristic of programme statements or agendas for social science expressed within the advocatory dimension, was the virtual absence of any specific reference to substantive issues within those disciplines.

There is another feature of the document, especially the content of paragraphs 6 to 9, which is worth noting. In those sections can be detected echoes of the Beveridge/LSE/Rockefeller episode. Certainly the preferred form of post-war social science meant a continuation of the empirical tradition, with the LSE as the vanguard of that tradition. With the probable withdrawal of the Rockefeller Foundation as the major benefactor of future, large-scale expansion within British social science, the argument for the creation of a research council became of crucial importance to the continuation of funding for those branches of knowledge. Consequently, the argument for the creation of such an organisation led to a critique of the social and political arrangements which had previously sustained the disciplines in question. Within such a critique lay specific criticisms of those social institutions which supporters of the dispersed initiative had sought strenuously to defend.

An attempt to ascribe a social function for social science in post-war Britain was another feature of the author's Vitalisation argument (CAB 124/529, pp.2-3, paragraphs 9-11):
"9. Within the scope of this understanding there is room for ample freedom of enquiry, as experience of the way in which the MRC, ARC, DSIR, work has shown. A more serious objection is that the personnel of such a Council would inevitably be drawn from the existing hierarchy of the Universities, and would carry on the existing tradition of university departments under its umbrella.

10. To circumvent this danger it is necessary to recognise the historical background of the situation. Within the milieu of laissez-faire, society had practical tasks for experts in the natural sciences; and these were recognised community targets as a basis for public encouragement of their work. Hence the dichotomy already emphasised. A laissez-faire society delegated no such function to the academic student of social conditions and social institutions. Socially profitable research into social conditions or social institutions was largely the outcome of individual initiative such as that of the Webbs, Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree, none of whom had any direct affiliations with higher centres of so-called learning. The problem of fitting the pursuit of social studies in our universities into the framework of a planned national economy is indeed the problem of endowing them with a recognised social function as explicitly (or implicitly) recognised as the need for the natural sciences. As the Webbs themselves recognised, factual study of social conditions as a recognised academic discipline has received its most powerful impetus from the impact of medicine. This is of special importance, because the universities are already responding to the call of a National Health Service by the creation of Chairs of Social Medicine to encourage the study of health and disease in relation to the social conditions of all sorts.

11. This means that there does exist a nucleus of professional personnel alive to the role of science in a planned economy of human welfare and deeply concerned with the study of social conditions or social institutions as themes of enquiry with peculiar problems and difficulties of their own. Thus the danger that a Social Research Council would merely confer additional prestige on the mandarins of the so-called humanities in our universities can be circumvented by placing it under the direction of an administrator having at the same time a lively sympathy with the peculiar claims of social studies as such and direct affiliations to interfacial problems of medicine like those for which the Industrial Research Board of the MRC is responsible. That such a choice is administratively feasible is evident from the fact that Dr. Stephen Taylor* himself a medical man, was appointed as Director of Wartime Social Survey, and in that capacity has contacts both with research in the social and in the natural sciences."

* Dr. Stephen Taylor was also a member of the Scientific Advisory Committee of the Wartime Social Survey.
Negotiating the 'social function' of social science thus became a central feature of the document's strategy to establish the primary role of social knowledge in the construction of the welfare state. Science, in both its institutional and cognitive forms, served as a vital resource for the social scientists and their supporters. In addition, the moral and political bases of social research and its consequences for social action, became explicit in attempts to demonstrate not only the social function of social science, but that such forms of knowledge were, in themselves, potential criticisms of the prevailing economic and political systems.

Paragraphs 12 and 13 (CAB 124/529, p.3), of the document give a clear indication of the direct connection between the case being made on behalf of all the social sciences, and the more contentious public debate on the autonomy of the universities. The content of those paragraphs highlight the contingent status of the former disciplines upon the resolution of the latter problem. Furthermore, it is also possible to detect the author's position vis-a-vis the education debate and the manner in which it had been publicly discussed, through exponents of either the dispersed initiative or centralised planning. The following extract from the document gives a clear indication of where the author's allegiance lay, gaining expression within an argument about the possible establishment of a research council for the social sciences (CAB 124/529, paragraphs 12-13, p.3):

"12. By the creation of a Social Research Council, enjoying parity with MRC and DSIR, the Privy Council would become the custodian of all university research with reasonable claim to public support. It would thus be in a position both to safeguard the interests of research in the universities and to exercise a reasonable control on expenditure for university research in the national interest. Such a step would therefore have far-reaching and salutary consequences with reference to the anomalous position of the universities vis-a-vis their claims to public support.

13. A lukewarm reaction of the universities to the need for educational expansion in response to demands for a wider distribution of educational opportunity in the national interest reinforces the case for bringing the administration of the universities within the province of the Ministry
of Education. Admittedly, there are good reasons for advocating such a proposal, if only because progressive democratisation of our educational system presupposes eventual integration of all instruments of higher education including agricultural colleges, teachers training colleges and polytechnics in larger regional units comparable with the Middle West State Universities. Only by such coordination is it possible to promote closer contacts between theoretical and practical research, to disperse more widely the intellectual freedom of the university life and to bring the life of the universities into more intimate contact with community needs."

It can be appreciated from the above quotations why the creation of a research council for the social sciences seemed an unacceptable proposition for those members of the Clapham Committee who opposed it. To have given the scheme unqualified support would have undermined a firm commitment to the principle of university autonomy. Preferential treatment of one branch of knowledge over another entailed the prospect of 'interference' with that form of knowledge's allegedly, 'natural evolution' within the system of higher education - at least according to Polanyi's theory, advanced in support of the dispersed initiative.

The Vitalisation document concluded with a further reference to the essential connection between the potential of the universities in producing knowledge in response to the national need, providing the system for controlling those institutions lay within the jurisdiction of an office above that of the UGC. Such a proposal struck at the very heart of the defence of the universities (as expressed within the argument of the dispersed initiative) (paragraph 14, p.3):

"If there is a good case for a closer tie-up between universities and other levels of the educational system now directly under the authority of the Ministry of Education, there is an equally strong case for comprehensively safeguarding the interests of university research by making the University Grants Commission an organ of the Privy Council. Pending further examination of these issues, it would seem that the creation of a Social Research Council could act as a powerful stimulus to an all-round development of socially useful research in the universities."
Much of the evidence considered above on the general debate about the autonomy of the universities had a direct bearing on the future of the social sciences in the post-war era. Central to those arguments was the claim being made by social scientists on behalf of their respective disciplines, should a research council responsible for the initiation, funding and coordination of social research, be established as a major part of a strategy to encompass those disciplines within the van of national reconstruction. It should be pointed out, that both the education debate and the enquiry into the provision for social and economic research (the remit of the Clapham Committee) became vital, public issues after an earlier event to assess the potential of social science as a national asset. The latter review of social science occurred some three years prior to the convening of the Clapham Committee, and at least one year before the question of the relationship between the universities and the state became a public issue. I wish to consider briefly, the general features of that debate and the context in which it ensued, this will then enable me to assess the success, or otherwise, of the social scientists' attempts to pursue their programme for revived investment in the intellectual and institutional potential of their respective disciplines.

In the preceding sections I examined in detail, the attempt by certain politicians and groups of social scientists to reassess the potential of social knowledge in the post-war reconstruction of British society. The latter group of individuals sought to produce programmes for a revived social science that would respond to a definition of the national need determined increasingly by the exigencies of war and the aspirations of a Labour movement given to wide-scale planning in every sphere of national life. Hence the length to which I have gone in order to explain the consequences of the latter transition within politics and social theory, for the system of higher education, as a crucial medium for the production and transmission of knowledge. The emergence of the expert and technician and the ethos and authority of science, provided important conceptual models and resources for both the politician and social scientist to incorporate in their respective conceptions of the nature and purpose of social knowledge. While the spread of this vision of a rational/technical social science began in the middle and
late 1930s, the period of war and the attendant social, economic and political upheaval that accompanied it introduced an urgency into the assessment of those forms of knowledge that had become, and would certainly in the future, be assessed in relation to a host of new and historically different, cultural imperatives.

I pointed out that Labour members of the wartime government and leading socialists had sensed the depth of feeling in the population, that with the onset of a world war, there must follow a profound change within British society. For the majority of the population the war meant the end of more than the tyranny of international fascism. With it came an opportunity for ending social inequality and recurring economic recession. Politicians of the left in particular sensed this and promised to fulfil the expectations of those who looked beyond victory and to a period of social justice and economic prosperity. In order to achieve the latter, the politicians would need to engage the assistance of a host of specialists, within fields that, under normal circumstances, would have been considered anathema to traditional customs and protocols of 'political wisdom' and especially, the principles and practices of the civil service. It will be recalled that Clement Attlee had suggested a potential form of social intelligence gathering, with his letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. An opportunity for the social scientists and their knowledge had been created within an official context; but this 'call to arms' had been preceded by an earlier attempt by social scientists, including sociologists, to co-ordinate their efforts and to provide their services in the formulation of public policy.

A committee* for the consideration of 'scientific research on human institutions' was formed during 1942 under the auspices of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, holding its first meeting on August 26. It subsequently met about once a month until June 9, 1943. Its terms of reference were as follows (The Advancement of Science, Vol. 2, 1942, p.245):

* The Committee consisted of: Professor P. Sargent Florence (Chairman); Mr. L.J.F. Brimble (Hon. Secretary); Mr. H.J. Braunholtz; Professor G. Catlin; Professor C.H. Desch, FRS; Mr. A. Farquharson; Professor Morris Ginsberg; Professor Lancelot Hogben, FRS; Dr. Julian Huxley, FRS; Professor Harold Laski; with the President and General Officers of the British Association.
"To consider how the results of scientific research on human institutions and human needs and their interrelations can best be co-ordinated and brought to bear on the formulation of public policy."

Within the above-mentioned terms of reference can be found the basic elements of the pre-war programme statements of those social scientists committed to 'progress' in the field of social research, on the basis of empirical analysis. The onset of war appeared to enhance the latter's case, especially the increased need to produce information on an immediate and ad hoc basis. The relationship between public policy formation and social research, in the main a pre-war aspiration, had now become a feasible enterprise, with only instrumental difficulties to surmount. Certainly Lancelot Hogben's presence on the Committee bore testimony to the most ardent and sustained pre-war attempt to establish social science (at the LSE at least) within the framework of 'pure science'; though the connection between the practice of scientific research and the process of policy making may not have been a prospect he relished, especially in view of his experiences at the LSE during the 1930s. Morris Ginsberg's inclusion as a committee member is not altogether surprising in view of the fact that he was then, England's foremost sociologist and would have been invited to participate on the basis of his additional work in the field of psychology. Huxley, Catlin, Desch, Flugel and Braunholtz's participation indicated the source of inspiration for the convention of such a body, in addition to their involvement in the pre-war science movement. The chairman, Professor Sargent Florence had been critical of sociology and psychology in his remarks to the inter-war conferences. To him scientific research and its application to public policy meant economic analysis and its relationship to economic policy. The interesting feature of the final report of the Committee, presented in 1943, is the evident attempt to incorporate the often previously conflicting views of the social scientists. The apparent consensus evidenced in the British Association's (B.A.) report, would seem to support my earlier contention, that the construction and presentation of programme statements on the nature and purpose of social science (especially its existing and intended research initiatives) could be significantly influenced by the social context in which such agendas
were set. The war had provided an ideal opportunity for social scientists to demonstrate the potential of their respective disciplines. This aspect of a public assertion of the promise of social research - as a vital aid to enlightened policy making - was as much a result of the sincerity of social scientists in promoting such a conception of their craft, as it was a strategy promulgated and reinforced by the exceedingly influential group of scientists associated with the science movement and other radical, natural scientists, who regarded social science as a major component of a centrally organised and rationally planned society.

An indication of the scope and depth of the B.A.'s Report can be obtained from the areas it examined under its remit, (1943, p.345):

"I. Introduction

II. Scope and Method of Research on Human Institutions and Needs and their Inter-relations.

III. Education in the Social Sciences and their Relation to the Natural Sciences.
   (a) The Present Situation.
   (b) Plan for a Co-ordinated Syllabus.

IV. A Council for the Social Sciences.
   (a) Need for Co-ordination in Direction of Research and in the Disbursement of Funds.
   (b) The Need for Advice on the Preparation of official Social Statistics.
   (c) Need for Initiation and Supervision of Practical Training.
   (d) Need for Publication of Information and Results.
   (e) The form of Organisation."

The document and the occasion which gave rise to it, is of considerable importance for several reasons. First, it represented the first occasion, since the inter-war conferences, whereby eminent practitioners from the various disciplines came together under the auspices of the highly respected British Association, with a view to reconsidering issues which had been the subject of those conferences. Second, the B.A.'s Committee and subsequent report, was less of an academic affair than the reports of the pre-war conference proceedings. There was therefore
a greater opportunity for its recommendations to be carried to more influential quarters, either within Westminster or Whitehall. Third, the period in which the Committee was convened and reported, was one of national crisis. The national need had been clearly defined and constantly extolled, with the emphasis on not only victory, but reconstruction. Again the convening of the Committee had followed the British Association's spectacularly successful three day, international conference in 1941 on "Science and World Order", the prime mover of which had been Sir Richard Gregory, president of the B.A. during the war, and a leading figure in the pre-war science movement. On the occasion of the B.A. conference, the social scientists would negotiate the construction of a programme of development for their respective disciplines in conjunction with natural scientists. This would entail a common understanding of the nature and purpose of science, and presupposed a model of the production of scientific knowledge (which may not have been shared by all of the Committee's members). This is apparent in the section of the B.A.'s report on "Scope and Method of Research on Human Institutions and Needs, and their Interrelations". However, it should be remembered, that the British Association was generally regarded as a progressive agent in coordinating the natural and social sciences, and that this would have important consequences for sociology's future.

The report was unequivocal on the universal nature of the scientific method, as the common, unifying element in the project to "co-ordinate" the fields of natural and social science, and especially what it referred to as "the borderland subjects" that lay between them (1943, p.346):

"The natural and social sciences are not distinguished by the use of different methods but by the subject-matter which they investigate; for both employ deduction, classification and induction. They are alike in that they take no account of values, but are concerned with the assembly, analysis and classification of data from their chosen fields.

All sciences are concerned with specification of laws of behaviour. Some laws of behaviour are relevant to idiosyncrasies of socially organised mankind, others to idiosyncrasies of molecular orientation in plastic products."
The Committee considered that among its various tasks was the need to carry the debate about the relationship between natural and social science beyond the limitations of purely academic discourse. The Committee's report dealt with two matters crucial to the co-operation between the fields of natural and social science (1943, p.346):

"(a) how far workers in the natural and social sciences can co-operate in the conduct of border-line research which impinges upon both types of enquiry.
(b) to what extent common action is desirable to promote more effective research in the latter."

The Report placed great emphasis on the need for quantitative precision, in what it termed, "profitable fields for the study of human relations". In examining such fields, every effort was to have been made to ensure (1943, p.346):

"(a) recognition of available methods for attacking them;
(b) a clearer understanding of the extent to which people trained in the natural and social sciences can severally contribute to such studies;
(c) examination of the adequacy of existing methods of training in our universities to development of fruitful themes;
(d) the relevance of investigable topics to pressing social needs in the period of post-war reconstruction."

The last element of the proposed strategy is of significance for two reasons. First, it established the potential role of the social sciences in their proposed relationship with the natural sciences in the service of the state. Second, the prediction that social science would be able to fulfil such a role, was made approximately three years prior to Clement Attlee's request that the government should investigate the needs of those disciplines, in view of the contribution that they might be able to make in the years of peace and planning. The influence of the B.A. and the members of the 'Committee on Scientific Research on Human Institutions' may have been a significant factor in Attlee's decision. The
membership of the Committee had Harold Laski amongst its number, and it is likely that senior Labour members of the coalition government would be receptive to the notion that social science could facilitate a more effective and efficient system of wide-scale planning, the vehicle for the Labour Party's social and economic policies.

Certainly from an examination of the Committee's report it is possible to detect what I have referred to as a reaffirmation of the empirical-analytic philosophy of social science, characteristic of the inter-war period. By this I mean the acquisition of social knowledge (in most cases, nomological knowledge about social relations), whereby the particular status of that knowledge is constituted by an interest in technical control, in increasing the possible extent of human domination over social reality. Such a model of social science was viewed as an essential prerequisite for the accumulation of information required for rational, feedback-controlled, instrumental activity. The latter was based on the assumption, set out in the Committee's report, that there was little, or no significant discrepancy in the actual nature of both natural and social science: they both operated within the empirical-analytic mode (1943, p.347):

"The distinction between pure and applied science is, however, much less clear and much less important in the social than in the natural sciences; less clear because no social fact is devoid of human interest; less important because all social sciences can be applied to solve social problems, and indeed because most of those who undertake pure study have an eye to its application. Thus it seems best not to make this distinction in the case of the social sciences."

The ideological component of such a philosophy of social science, especially its consequences for social theory and political action, emerge from the report's consideration of the 'ends/means' question (1943, p.347):

"It should be stressed, however, that questions of value are outside the scope both of the natural and the social sciences. Sciences ask what things are and how they work: they do not ask whether things are good or beautiful, but the fact that value judgements are outside the scope of science, whether
natural or social, does not invalidate the relevance of such research to issues of pressing topical importance. We commonly accept certain social objectives, such as the health of the individual and the survival of the community, social security, efficiency of production and minimum standards of living, as targets of community endeavour. In so far as we do so, practical social problems (e.g. of reconstruction) are problems about means rather than ends. The study of social institutions should therefore be able to prescribe what social techniques are best fitted to promote acceptable ends."

Brian Fay (1975) has given careful consideration to the implications of this approach to the 'ends-means' question as it applies to the construction of a policy science, a programme made quite explicit in the B.A.'s report (Fay, 1975, p.51):

"So it is that a policy science that attempts to provide a structure in terms of which political questions could be settled 'rationally' must involve reference to just those considerations that the idea of policy science was designed to eliminate, namely, notions of significance and worth. As a result, debates between policy scientists about the most efficient means would still be inherently 'political' in the sense that the choice of standards of what is to count as evidence and proof of some social policy being the 'best' (in this case, the meaning of the criterion of efficiency) would necessarily reflect the values of the disputants.

This argument is related to the difficulty of drawing a sharp and enduring distinction between what is an end and what is means. For every means is an end relative to the means required to achieve it, so that any given course of action may be either a means or an end depending upon the point of view which one adopts."

Such a view of science, as set out in the report implies a distinct, though unacknowledged project for politics. The quest for a rationally ordered society, via the canons and axioms of a scientific social science also imply a prescribed status for science. Implicit in such a belief that an applied science can perform the tasks now seen as political, is the tacit presumption that science provides the paradigm example of proper thinking, and that as long as any human enterprise is not treated in a scientific way it is being treated in an imperfect way. The style and tone of the B.A.'s report is indicative of much of the discourse on the ethos and authority of science between the wars and
during the intra-war period. It tended to permeate and reinforce the
viewpoint which underlies the single most important element in the whole
social engineering view of politics, namely, that there is a correct
way of proceeding in human affairs and that it is the responsibility
of the decision-maker to discover what this way is.

In excluding the relevance of values to the scientific enterprise, the
authors of the B.A.'s report sought to explain why mankind had hitherto
been deprived of an enlightened, rational and "ethically neutral" science
of society (1943, p.347):

"At the present day it is often said that the resources of
science are not sufficiently used for the benefit of mankind,
and in this there is no doubt much truth. One reason for
this is that there is not enough applied science; this is
as true of the natural as of the social sciences, and is especi-
ally true of those fields the elucidation of which demands
collaboration between social and natural scientists. Another
and more important reason is that those responsible for political
and social action are only to a very limited extent aware
of and guided by such applied scientific knowledge as exists.

In short, the difficulty lies precisely within our terms of
reference: in the interrelations of the sciences and in bringing
the results of scientific research to bear on the formation
of public policy."

In order to resolve the latter difficulty, the report set out a programme
of appropriate educational measures.

A special section of the report dealt with several aspects of the academic
status of the social sciences, making a number of recommendations concerning
the composition of future syllabuses in those disciplines. It also
dealt specifically with the nature of academic sociology and its signifi-
cance for a comprehensive science of society. In setting out a model
for a "co-ordinated syllabus", the report highlighted the central elements
of the sociologists' case, as stated in their submission to the inter-war
conferences.
Under the heading of the "Study of Human Society and Institutions" (1943, p.348), the authors of the report endeavoured to present a synthesis of existing specialist fields within social science, on the assumption that, "each has problems at the interface of natural science" (1943, p.348). It is within this synthesis that a definition and purpose of sociology is elaborated (1943, p.348):

"Under this heading we include (i) the natural history of social structure, i.e. types of human association and organisation - economic, political and voluntary; the comparison of the social structure and the urban and rural 'class', and other distribution of the population, of different countries and the effect of geographical and material conditions. (ii) Connected with this intimately is the study of social function, i.e. the way in which the structure works, is regulated and sustained. This clearly involves a study of the actual operation of law, morals, and religion in society, and of other forms of social sanction and control, including the economic price mechanism. (iii) Dynamics of social change or the study of short- and long-range trends in the life of societies, and the conditions, often technological, underlying these trends."

Considered separately, the preceding elements of a 'study of human society and institutions' reflect the dominance of several fields within the wider domain of the social sciences. Moreover, there is a distinct indication of the importance of structural-functionalism (the uncontested paradigm within British anthropology at that time) to the enterprise in question. 'Comparative Social Institutions' was also considered to be an essential feature of the co-ordinated syllabus; this being already a feature of the B.A. Sociology degree at the LSE. However, perhaps the most important feature of the proposed syllabus was the emphasis upon a synoptic dimension via a specifically 'sociological' approach (1943, p.348):

"These studies in close interconnection may be called sociology. It will be readily seen that for their proper development the help and co-ordination of many disciplines are required. For example, social change can be studied through history. Parts of the structure are, or should be studied by other disciplines - e.g. political science (in so far as factual), and realistic economics. These should not be unduly isolated but treated in relation to the rest of the social structure.
In the study of social functions reference is made to law, morals and religion. These, of course, have their own disciplines, but what is wanted here is a treatment of them from the point of view of the part they play in the life of societies: in other words, law not as studied by the lawyer, or religion by the theologian, but rather the sociology of law, morals and religion. The task can only be successfully achieved with the co-operation of specialists willing to look at their problems as part of an integrated social science."

The preceding quotation is of crucial importance in view of the sociologists' pre-war attempt to construct a synoptic science of society, under the direction of sociology. I have argued above that the attempt to promote sociology within a composite social science arose as a result of the sociologists' attempt to arrest the process of disciplinary specialisation which had, according to Mannheim, led to a progressive fractionation of knowledge about society. Ironically, the pre-war disputants in the debate on sociology's intended role within a reconstructed social science, namely demographers, economists, psychologists and historians had again (in 1943) to reconsider the potential of sociology as a co-ordinating mechanism within a similar project, but on this occasion, at the behest of natural scientists. The latter individuals were acting, not in the capacity of arbitrators, rather as architects of a grand synthesis of two previously distinct domains - the natural and social sciences - with the borderland subjects providing the essential, cognitive bridge between the two. Social science was generally being coopted within the scientists' scheme to produce a comprehensive scientia scientiarum with a distinct social function, in the Bernalian sense of the concept.

The determination of scientists to encompass social science within their grand synthesis received impetus from another source: the political commitment of some scientists, and certainly a number of members of the B.A.'s Committee, to the principles and practice of planning and state control, beyond the exigencies of wartime measures and into the post-war period. The report contains a reference to the ideological conflict in which the whole 'co-ordination project' had been immersed (1943, p.348):
"Some of us have maintained that the social sciences should be ethically neutral. Great confusion has certainly resulted from the failure to keep distinct the study of society as it is and society as it ought to be."

I would suggest that this was a direct reference to the running conflict between Harold Laski and his opponents.* It should be remembered that the role of science in society and the associated issue of its proper place within higher education, had become issues of very heated debate throughout the war, and that the division of contestants in such a dispute tended to divide also along ideological lines commensurate with the larger issue and accompanying debate on the changing relationship between the universities and the state. Social scientists could not exclude themselves from those issues, neither could they shed the moral and political consequences of aligning themselves with the participating factions in the latter disputes. Such dilemmas give sociology and the other social sciences and the knowledge they produce, their essential moral and social dimensions within a culture. The disclaimer cited in the preceding quotation unwittingly underlines the private recognition of this crucial feature of social science, which in turn gave rise to a public denial by its practitioners, in the quest for authentic science and professional credibility.

The direct reference to the role of sociology in the B.A.'s proposed 'co-ordination scheme' provides some clues to the kind of sociology the natural scientists and members of the B.A.'s various divisions thought appropriate to the task in hand. I have given some indication of the nature of such a sociology, though it is important to consider the origin of it in terms of its pre-war constitution and practice. In so doing, it soon becomes apparent that concessions seem to have been made between the groups of sociologists who had previously gathered under what I have hitherto referred to as the discipline's professional and practical

* Laski had caused a stir at the LSE throughout the inter-war period with his political writings and the effect they had on both William Beveridge and Lancelot Hogben. Laski was also to become the victim of Winston Churchill's attempt to raise a 'Red Scare' during the run-up to the 1945 General Election.
wings. In outlining the essential features of the co-ordination project, especially the methodology common to the different component disciplines, it can be seen that those sociologists who fostered a strong empirical tradition, with particular emphasis on survey work and sociography, seemed to have had an influence upon, or their form of sociology conformed more closely to, the prescriptions of the natural scientists, than those sociologists who tended to operate within a more philosophic/ eclectic tradition. This issue was highlighted in the proposals for a co-ordinated syllabus (1943, pp. 348-349). What was interesting about the proposed syllabus, was the reference to the need to incorporate social philosophy, thus offsetting the prospect of creating too harsh a mixture of empiricism and pragmatism. I would suggest that the presence of Morris Ginsberg on the Committee gave rise to this provision. He was, after all, England's foremost sociologist (occupying the discipline's only Chair) in addition to teaching the discipline at the LSE, which awarded the B.A. degree in the subject. Furthermore, the British Association Committee viewed the inclusion of social philosophy as a component of a possible policy science (1943, pp.348-349):

"'The formation of public policy' (to quote our terms of reference) involves questions not only of fact, i.e. of the actual conditions of social life, but also of values, i.e. of the goals or ends of human endeavour and of the just distribution of the means available for their realisation ... though social science and social philosophy are different disciplines, both are necessary for an effective handling of human problems ... the study of social science should be accompanied by a study of social philosophy, which for this purpose may be described as dealing with the ethical elements in social relations, e.g. the basis of political authority, the criteria of just law, the legitimacy and limits of the political use of force, the problem of conflicting loyalties, the moral basis of the family, of property and other social institutions. As was pointed out above, ethical problems raise issues of fact susceptible of analysis by the methods of natural science."

The concluding sentence in the preceding quotation emphasises the confidence of the scientists in the power of their methodological techniques. One can only speculate on the reaction of Morris Ginsberg to this claim, especially in view of his thoughts on the matter set out in the pre-war conferences. Although the B.A. report did not incorporate conflicting
views on substantive issues, Ginsberg must nevertheless have agreed to the document's content, for at the very least, he was generally committed to a synthetic basis for a science of society, with sociology playing a major co-ordinating role. It was in this possibility that the future of sociology lay, and the prospect of enhancing the discipline's future had now been placed on the agenda by not only a prestigious organisation such as the British Association, but that this had occurred at the behest of the natural scientists, and shortly (in 1944) the Lord President of the Council and the Deputy Prime Minister, Clement Attlee.

The most ironic feature of the co-ordination scheme related to the two pre-war projects in the development of social science in Britain, each of which I have already examined in some detail, yet nevertheless, indicate the priority attached to the process of co-ordinating the natural and social sciences (and to diffuse the methods of science within the latter domain) and the fact that within the B.A.'s programme, another opportunity had arisen to revive the pre-war debate on the matter. Resurrecting elements of the pre-war schemes referred to earlier, may have resulted from the fact that the Committee's membership contained several of the central participants in the social science projects. It is certainly possible to detect specific strands of those pre-war debates woven into each part of the B.A.'s co-ordination programme.

As I shall show shortly, it was not so much the problem of formulating a programme of co-ordination that threatened the B.A.'s plans, rather, it was one of the major components of the project - the intention to establish a research council for the social sciences - which placed the scheme in jeopardy.
The B.A. report contained four "reasons" for the establishment of a council for the social sciences (1943, p.349):

"There is a need to co-ordinate the direction of research and the disbursement of funds devoted to social research; there is the need to advise public and private departments and agencies on the co-ordination of methods of presenting data, of ensuring accuracy of data and of securing completeness of data; there is a need for initiating and supervising the training for practical administration of civil servants and other persons charged with forming and carrying out public policy in the use of scientific methods and results; and finally there is the need for publishing the results of research and information of interest to social science as a whole."

The four preceding functions of a proposed council for the social sciences remained largely intact, when again submitted to the Clapham Committee for consideration almost three years later. However, on the latter occasion, the supporters of such a scheme would have to contend with the issues of alleged political control of such a council for specific political ends and a general wariness on the part of the opponents of such a scheme that alternatives to the existing, pre-war structure of financial support for social research may seriously undermine the existing institutional and intellectual order of the social sciences, in which economics held perhaps the most favourable and influential position. The sociologists were depending on a significant alteration to the existing system for the funding of knowledge. The Report's argument for a council was related directly to the terms of reference for the B.A.'s Committee, especially the need to co-ordinate research and to bring it to 'bear on the formation of public policy'. It even went so far as to cite several 'problems' urgently in need of a co-ordinated and well funded research effort (1943, p.350):

"The practical problems with which society will have to deal in the immediate future are largely of this border-line nature involving the use of a number of sciences, natural and human. We may instance:

(a) Population resettlement after dispersion and evacuation.

(b) The managerial control of large-scale industry.

(c) Public policy on venereal disease."
(d) Anthropological studies bearing on colonial government.

(e) The use of natural resources for the greatest public benefit."

In putting forward a plan for a research council, the B.A. hoped to arrest the process of excessive specialisation. It also highlighted a key argument which was to reappear in the Clapham deliberations, (1943, p.350):

"... more funds are required in the social than in the natural sciences since a large number of workers are involved in social surveys, and publication of statistical findings is expensive."

I dare say that not all the natural scientists would necessarily agree with such an estimation of comparative costs in the field of research. Nevertheless, the report's arguments gave an indication of the potential costs of social research, citing examples of existing organisations which could have been used as models on which to base such a council. In particular the authors refer to the American Social Science Research Council as an example of a "... sound working organisation" (1943, p.350). The American SSRC being founded and funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and dependent for its continued existence upon private benefaction, may have seemed an appealing model for a similar U.K. council, especially as it appeared to be without any direct connection to the state apparatus, a fear that had caused a number of Clapham Committee members to reject the creation of a research council for the social sciences. In fact, the B.A. report was sensitive, to a minimal degree, to the possible politicisation of social research, or, research conducted for specific ideological purposes (1943, p.355):

"The proposed Council should be independent of the Government and should not admit Government nominees."

In attempting to highlight the deficiencies in British social and economic research, the report contained a reference to an attempt by a number of social scientists to organise a 'Consultative Conference on Social and Economic Research' as a means of correcting this. The history of the Conference is of importance to my argument on the funding of knowledge
within the domain of social science, especially the attempt to convince members of the Clapham Committee to support a scheme for a research council. The opponents of the scheme and their arguments - to be considered shortly - provide important evidence of an attempt by several influential social scientists and their supporters, to perpetuate a system of funding social science in Britain, which would sustain its hierarchical, disciplinary structure and simultaneously, provide a buttress against those who were advocating a re-ordering of knowledge on the basis of the national need. I shall consider separately, the significance of the 'Consultative Conference' to the Clapham debate on the question of a research council for the social sciences, following the current examination of the B.A.'s report.

The British Association's report also examined in considerable detail the need for 'Official Social Statistics', under the general heading of a proposal for a research council. The reason for such an emphasis on statistics and their consequences for the kind of social research considered appropriate by the B.A., is made quite clear in the following section of the report, (1943, p.351):

"If scientific research on human institutions and human needs is to be brought to bear on the formation of a practical public policy such research must be founded on accurately recorded and measured facts and comparison of facts."

Coupled to the detailed exposition of the need for factual data as a prerequisite to public policy formation, was the additional need to create sufficient numbers of competent research technicians. Here the report's authors had in mind the establishment of "refresher courses" actually under the direct control of a research council (1943, p.353):

"Refresher courses should also be initiated for training in the social sciences under the control of a council of wide experience. For particular purposes such as training for a specific career, practical courses need to be initiated and supervised, and linked up to the career in prospect."
Amongst those groups of professionals considered likely to benefit from such an arrangement were; colonial officers, civil servants, those working in the field of social medicine and social workers. The reference to social work is an interesting one in as much as it makes the observation and prediction, that the demand for social workers had expanded considerably during the war, and was likely to increase in the post-war period and thereafter. The relevance of the social sciences to the teaching and training of social workers was clearly stated in the report, an initiative which gave rise eventually, to the creation of institutional sites for the subsequent expansion of sociology as an academic discipline, (cf. Appendix Five).

The recommendations on the role of a research council as an "initiator" and "controller" of specific courses in the social sciences, connected directly with the professional careers of specific groups of public servants must have given cause for concern amongst the members of the Clapham Committee who had endeavoured to oppose such a scheme. Not only did such a programme of 'practical instruction and training' have consequences for the distribution and hierarchical composition of those influentials within the community of social scientists, but the suggested scheme also had implications for the autonomy of the universities, in terms of the degree of control over those disciplines they were willing to support and accredit. These became some of the key issues at the centre of the Clapham debate.

The report also considered another significant deficiency in British social science, which the creation of a 'British Society for Factual Research' could help to overcome. This entailed the creation of an effective system for the collection and publication of information and results of research. Its suggestions on this matter included a reference to the system that existed in the field of the natural sciences. Lancelot Hogben had campaigned for such a facility within the field of social science throughout his period at the LSE in the Department of Social Biology. The interesting feature of the report's recommendations on this subject was its reference to the importance of the social survey as the most significant contributor to the accumulation of 'social facts' (1943, pp.353-354):
"In this country the most important contributions to the quantitative study of social phenomena in recent times have been made in connection with the various forms of social surveys. From this point of view of methodology their contribution has been chiefly in two directions. First they attempt to set up certain standards, such as Rowntree's 'Human Needs Standard', approximation to which by individuals or groups is then measured. Second, they have sought to perfect various sampling methods, which have enormously simplified the task of securing the necessary data."

The report also considered the need for an authoritative social science journal for the compilation and presentation of 'the positive results of social research.' The authors argued that without such a medium for recording the work of social scientists, practitioners in the various fields of the discipline would be severely disadvantaged in comparison with their colleagues in the natural sciences (1943, p.354):

"Partly, if not wholly, as a result of this situation, the research worker in Britain, who is primarily concerned with the discovery of new information about social phenomena does not enjoy a prestige or influence among his colleagues comparable with that of the research worker in the natural sciences. The young research worker who undertakes factual enquiries in the social sciences does so with proportionately less hope of gaining the respect of elders or of getting promotion and consequent enlargement of opportunities. For the copious means of publication which minister to the circulation of discoveries in the natural sciences, assure the prestige of those most active in carrying them out, bring their names and work before the attention of their colleagues and provide the teacher with means of keeping abreast of new techniques as well as of new results, are denied to those who now take up factual social research as a career."

From every point of view, poverty of available means of publication, indeed the absence of any medium of publication exclusively devoted to factual research in the social sciences is of pivotal importance ..."

The case of a 'Society for Factual Research' was closely aligned to that of the one for a research council. The former was regarded as complementary to the latter. However, within the arguments in support for such a Society lay several recommendations which would prove difficult to the fragile discipline of sociology (1943, p.355):
"Its inauguration would guarantee the removal of outstanding obstacles to the prosecution of social research of a factual nature, a due measure of prestige to the rising generation of research workers, and funds to active departments capable of carrying out such research. By its existence it would co-ordinate the most pressing needs of the social sciences, in so far as the social sciences are factual in their own right".

A major function of the Society was to have been the co-ordination of research results, with the express purpose of "influencing public policy" (1943, p.355). Such a function was also regarded as a "... necessary prerequisite of effective popularisation of accredited research in the social, no less than in the natural sciences" (1943, p.355). If the Society in question was to have been instrumental in the 'removal of obstacles' in the way of creating more factual social research, encouraging the disbursement of funds within 'active departments capable of carrying out such research', then the prospects for sociology may not have been very auspicious under such arrangements. After all, there were no such departments in British Universities at the time, at least none that would have been able to measure up to the criteria postulated by the report's authors. Those departments in which social scientists did exist, tended to be economics and statistics, political science, demography and history. The L.S.E. could boast a Chair in sociology, but the research carried on under the supervision of Morris Ginsberg seemed somewhat remote from the kind envisaged in the report.
In examining the preceding aspects of the B.A.'s report, I have endeavoured to show that there were many features of the project which would have given social scientists other than the sociologists, cause for concern. I am not suggesting that the report's proposals were entirely negative, nor that the aims of the natural scientists constituted a sinister plot to undermine British social science. Rather, I would suggest that in putting forward such a scheme, the existing intellectual and institutional hierarchy of social science may have been somewhat threatened. The reason for this is that the B.A.'s project implied a political function for social knowledge, and although this may not have been stated categorically, the constant reference to the relationship between social knowledge and public policy (in accordance with a specific cultural imperative) implied such, notwithstanding the disclaimer outlined in the report. A primary example of the resistance to the establishment of a research council for the social sciences, by a significantly influential group of social scientists, can be found in a report submitted eventually, to the Clapham Committee, and referred to in the B.A.'s report under the Consultative Conference on Social and Economic Research (1943, p.350). As the history of the latter 'Conference' is important to my examination of the significance of the research council debate, I wish now to consider its relevance to the latter issue.

In an earlier chapter, I endeavoured to point out the degree of influence within British social science of the Rockefeller Foundation (R.F.); by virtue of its financial investment in the funding of knowledge, and the apparent consensus it shared with its beneficiaries on the philosophical and ideological bases of the nature and purpose of disciplines like the social sciences. The British Association's account of the inauguration of the above-mentioned 'Consultative Conference', corresponds with that of Alexander Carr-Saunders', though the latter's account of the origin of the 'Conference' was contained in a covering letter to
Sir John Clapham, some three years after the former's version. The common feature of both accounts relates to the role of the R.F. in directing the organisations it had previously and currently funded (1939), to 'take steps' to avoid any unnecessary overlapping in the research programmes of the recipient institutions. In fact, the organisations who responded to the R.F.'s request, constituted virtually the entire institutional basis of social science up to the out-break of the Second World War. They were as follows: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, The National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Nuffield College (University of Oxford), The Oxford Institute of Statistics, Political and Economic Planning (P.E.P.), The London School of Economics (University of London) the Manchester Economic Research Section (University of Manchester), and Chatham House, (British Association, 1943, p.350 and T 161/1301, Letter from Alexander Carr-Saunders to Sir John Clapham, 7.8.45). The B.A. and Alexander Carr-Saunders's statements on the frequency of the Consultative Conference's meetings contradict one another, with the former organisation saying that the Conference met 'thrice yearly' and the latter stating that it convened 'roughly once a year'. Although a minor point, it is somewhat puzzling, as Carr-Saunders acted as the Conference Chairman from its inauguration until 1945.

As I have stated above, the Consultative Conference was regarded by the B.A. as the closest approximation to the American Social Science Research Council that could be found in Britain. The Conference had no executive functions and acted as a consultative body. Its main purpose was the "... interchange of information, with the object of ensuring so far as possible that the energies of research workers and the expenditure of the limited financial resources available are not wasted by avoidable duplication" (British Association, 1943, p.350). However, I would suggest that the R.F. motives went beyond the practice of prudent management of its affairs and investments abroad. As the war progressed, and there arose a move toward centralisation and large scale planning of the economy, in addition to a corresponding shift in the political climate of the nation, it may have occurred to the Officers of the R.F., that future investment in British social science should be rationalised and suspended until the end of the war in Europe. No doubt the outcome of the education
debate would be another factor influencing the future plans of the Foundation. It is also interesting to note, that the Consultative Conference added representatives from the Reconstruction Secretariat and the Office of the War Cabinet to its membership during the course of the war. In time, a member organisation, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, undertook to produce a 'Register of Research in Progress or in Plan'. It is also worth noting that Alexander Carr-Saunders, apart from his chairmanship of the Consultative Conference, was also the Director of the LSE (another member organisation of the 'Conference') and a member of the Council of Management of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (the latter organisation could also boast five members of the Clapham Committee, in addition to Hector Hetherington, Chairman of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, and Sir William Beveridge, former Director of the LSE). It is the relationship between the British Association's Committee on Scientific Research on Human Institutions, the report of which I have just been discussing, and the Consultative Conference on Economic and Social Research's ad hoc Committee's report, entitled, Report on Co-ordination of Social Science (T 161/1301, 1945), that I wish now to examine, as the latter document opposes a number of recommendations in the former. The document was also critical generally, of the proposal to establish a council for the social sciences and does not correspond to the central thesis of the Institute of Sociology's report, nor to the case set out in the document 'Vitalisation of Research in the Social Sciences'.

In a letter to Sir John Clapham (T 161/1301, 7.8.45) from Alexander Carr-Saunders, the author explained the origin of the 'Report on the Co-ordination of Social Sciences'. The same letter also referred to the disagreement that existed among the members of the Consultative Conference on the British Association report, which included the previously considered strategy for a research council for the social sciences (T 161/1301, 7.8.45):

"... Professor Sargent Florence brought formally before the meeting a report issued by the British Association, which recommended a Social Science Research Council for this country. A debate followed from which it became clear that there was considerable divergence of view among those present. I was
asked to nominate a small committee to consider the whole programme and to make a report. The committee consisted of D.N. Chester, Henry Clay, L. Farrer-Brown, T.H. Marshall and myself."

In view of my previous consideration of the pre-eminent position of economics and economists within the intellectual and institutional hierarchy of British social science up to the Second World War, the likelihood of a "considerable divergence of view" on the question of a research council for the social sciences should have come as a surprise to no one, especially the sociologists and their supporters within the British Association. It was ironic that Carr-Saunders should have been asked to select the members of a committee to debate the research council question, particularly in view of his pre-war conference criticism of the sociologists' case of a synoptic science of society; a project which would have involved the co-ordination of the social sciences through sociology. Perhaps even more crucial to an understanding of Carr-Saunders' role in convening the committee and its stated opposition to the establishment of a research council, is the influential position he held within British social science throughout the period in question, and the relationship he maintained with the Rockefeller Foundation while holder of the Charles Booth Chair of Social Science at the University of Liverpool, and subsequently, as Director of the L.S.E. Carr-Saunders would have been well aware of the extraordinary generosity of the R.F. in funding not only his own projects, but those of the researchers and their departments during the inter-war period and into the war years. There was no guarantee that the establishment of the proposed research council would actually come to fruition, and to support such a scheme, with the consequences it entailed, may have jeopardised significantly, the longstanding financial relationship that existed between British social science and its major benefactor, the Rockefeller Foundation. As I have argued previously, such a relationship entailed a common understanding of the nature and purpose of social science, one that appeared to be based on methodological and theoretical consensus, though in fact, tended to arise from the ideological prescriptions of the benefactor. The matter of William Beveridge's Natural Bases Scheme was a case in point. There was also the matter of the conditional nature of funding: Foundation
benefaction tended to be regarded as deriving from a neutral source, whereas the prospect of State funds was thought to imply state control and the conduct of social research in the service of a dominant political ideology. The latter suspicion became a subsidiary argument of the education debate referred to above, though it arose during the Clapham Committee deliberations. It is also possible to detect elements of the same issues in the 'Report on Co-ordination of Social Science'.

The 'Co-ordination' document set out several major functions of a proposed research council for the social sciences, based on the B.A.'s report, submitted to the 'Consultative Conference', and the deliberations of the latter's sub-committee established to examine the former organisation's report. The functions of the council were described as follows (T 161/1301/56/80/2, p.1):

"(a) to advise the Government on the conduct of enquiries and the collection of data for research in the Social Sciences:

(b) to advise educational trusts on the allocation of grants for social research:

(c) to improve the standing of the Social Sciences in the scientific world and urge their claim to a larger place in the Universities:

(d) to prevent overlapping:

(e) to cover ground lying neglected between the existing specialist societies in the field of the Social Sciences, and particularly to provide opportunities for publication of work at present lacking an outlet:

(f) to promote co-operation in developing border-line studies between the natural and Social Sciences: and

(g) to secure a co-ordinated approach from different angles to problems in the field of the Social Sciences of which existing specialisms studied only isolated aspects."

It is interesting to note that the preceding programme for a research council for the social sciences possessed features common to several other agendas and proposals for a council, many of which arose during
the course of the war, and examined in detail in the current chapter. However, there was one component of the Co-ordination document that reflected an important, recurring theme throughout the decades up to the Second World War, namely (c) above; "to improve the standing of the Social Sciences in the scientific world and urge their claim to a larger place in Universities." As early as 1903, sociologists and their supporters had been advocating an almost identical requirement of their discipline (and social science in general) to achieve the essential institutional status of a bona fide university subject; both taught and researched and without which, intellectual development was thought impossible (Branford, 1928, p.340):

"To aid in establishing the academic status of sociology in the universities of this country in general and more particularly in that of London, and to create a body of academic opinion in favour of reorganising the curricula of social studies in universities, on a basis which more adequately recognises synthetic sociological conceptions."

The preceding extract from a memorandum submitted to the University of London prior to the establishment of the first chair in sociology gives some indication of the central and recurring importance of programme statements to an effective advocatory strategy for disciplines within the field of social science, especially sociology. The 1903 memorandum and the Co-ordination document possessed another common statement on the 'possibilities' of social science (Branford, 1928, p.340):

"To show that the special social sciences of man and the general or philosophical studies of Humanity will each and all gain by being brought into more direct relation with each other."

The preceding statement from the 1903 memorandum, apart from being an inter-war conference theme for the sociologists, resonated again within the case being considered in the Co-ordination document (T 161/1301/, p.1):

"(g) to secure a co-ordinated approach from different angles of problems in the field of the Social Sciences of which existing specialisms studied only isolated aspects."
The issue of specialisation referred to above, had been a pre-war development within the various branches of the social sciences and had led to the increasing difficulty of sociologists in establishing their discipline as the central, co-ordinating subject within a synthetic science of society. The revival of the issue, albeit within the framework of a scheme to create a research council, lent credence to its pre-war case. However, the oppositional strategy of the Co-ordination discussion would undermine not only the case of those in favour of a research council, but simultaneously, erode the prospect of sociology deriving the benefits that such an institutional innovation could have bestowed upon the discipline.

I will consider now, in order, the seven points referred to in the Co-ordination document, emphasising their implications for sociology.

The first point examined by the members of the Consultative Conference on Economic and Social Research's sub-committee* was the function of a research council as an advisory body to the Government on the range of work being carried out within the various branches of the social sciences. Its opinions on the matter did not bode well for the future of sociology (T 161/1301, 7.8.45):

"We are of the opinion that the existing specialist societies, representing economists, statisticians, geographers, psychologists, etc., if used, should be able to meet most needs that the Government may experience. The best safeguard against the employment by the Government of advisors who are technically inadequate is the development of the sciences concerned and the establishment of professional standards of competence in them. This will also ensure that the Government will have its attention called to such matters as the collection and presentation of official statistics which are needed if development is to take place."

Even if we assume that sociology is included somewhere in the category of "etc." of the 'specialist societies' mentioned above; the more established social sciences, with their equally well established professional

* The membership of this committee was as follows: D.N. Chester, Henry Clay, L. Farrer-Brown, T.H. Marshall and Alexander Carr-Saunders.
societies and associations, were, in comparison to sociology, better placed strategically to both respond to and influence the 'needs that the Government may experience.' This was certainly the case for economics and statistics. It should also be remembered that sociology's own 'professional' Institute, was about to undergo dissolution, and that this would have consequences for the discipline, especially in terms of the Co-ordination document's recommendations on the appropriate relationship between 'specialist societies' and the research and information needs of the government. Members of the committee also regarded the social sciences as essentially technical sciences, whose practitioners possessed esoteric knowledge and practical skill.

The second function of the research council considered in the Co-ordination document entailed the funding of research in the social sciences. The comments of the committee on this crucial matter extended to the 'appropriate' relationship between a possible research council and the then existing mechanism of funding the social sciences, namely the private Foundation, (T 161/1301, 1945, p.2):

"The educational trusts making grants have their own organisation for assessing claims on them; their policy must be related not only to the claims on them but also to the total amount of funds they have at their disposal and the policies they are following. It would be difficult, therefore, for any committee or council, representative only of claimants to do more than respond to requests for advice. Even this function would be difficult to perform adequately unless the council was accepted as completely representative; it is probable that older, more specialised bodies would continue to prefer their claims direct, and certain that the Universities would do so."

There is an element of contradiction in the stand taken by the committee on the matter of funding the social sciences, especially in regard to the first sentence of the preceding quotation. One of the major criticisms of those who opposed the establishment of a research council was that it would become an organ of the state, through which a government could seek to direct social research for 'political ends'. Recipients of private benefaction were either oblivious to, or studiously avoided the conditional nature of funding when financed from such a source.
Harold Laski (1930) remained convinced that the latter case applied to the transactions between benefactor and beneficiary. Within the reference to the 'policies they are following' as it applied to the Foundations, lay the crux of the matter on the conditional nature of the funding of knowledge. The funding of the social sciences at the L.S.E. during the Directorship of William Beveridge is a case in point. As to whether or not such a council could be considered as, 'accepted as completely representative' indicates two of the most striking features of inter-war social science in Britain, one of which caused many problems for a fledgling sociology. First, the established framework of funding for social science had served as a most satisfactory arrangement for those influentials and disciplines within the traditional, intellectual and institutional hierarchies of British social science. The example of the American Social Science Research Council may often have been cited as a model for a British counterpart, but the system already in operation in Britain had served the needs of those who had benefitted most. Second, whatever was to be construed as a council which could be considered as "completely representative" of the disciplines that it would serve, dependend largely on the prescriptions of the most influential among the community of Britain's social scientists. In view of the willingness of individuals and institutions to accept Foundation benefaction during the inter-war period, and especially in the light of the extraordinary role of the Rockefeller Foundation in dominating the funding and direction of research within the social sciences and latterly, its instruction to its recipient organisations to 'consult together' to avoid overlap in research and wasted investment (the origin of the Consultative Conference) the following statement by the committee members appears somewhat hypocritical (T 161/1301, 1945, p.2):

"At the present stage in the development of the Social Sciences the complete centralisation of advice on the disbursement of funds is undesirable. Even in more evenly and maturely developed fields of study, alternative sources of authoritative advice are an advantage. There should be a sensible exchange of information between the advisory bodies, but their advice should be framed independently."
It would seem from the comments on the efficacy of diversity in framing advice on the disbursement of funds for research, that rather than presenting a response to a suggested function of a proposed research council, the committee in fact, proceeded to extol the virtues of the Consultative Conference in that sphere. Furthermore, referring to the social sciences as a group of under-developed disciplines became a judgement which was incorporated in the Clapham Committee's final report (Cmnd. 6868, 1946), although T.S. Simey must shoulder some of the blame for that. In addition, such caution about the state of the social sciences was conspicuously absent in the pre-war conference debates on the nature and relationship of the social sciences to one another. Again we have an example of those discipline's perpetual infancy, though on the occasion in question, no reference was made to their potential.

The third function of the proposed research council related to the 'standing of the social sciences in the scientific world and their claim to a larger place in the universities'. I have dwelt at length on each of the aspects of social science's claims (or rather, of the social scientists and their supporter's claims) to be authentic sciences and worthy of a place within the universities. The comments of the committee on this matter are somewhat brief though poignant (T 161/1301, 1945, p.2):

"This purpose was one that seemed to us of importance, but not one to be achieved merely by setting up a representative organisation. Immediately it called for the building up of comprehensive departments of Social Science in the Universities severally. Ultimately, it can be achieved only by work of a quality that compels recognition. It is only if there are branches of the Social Sciences which lack the means of publishing their work and so asserting their claim that a mere organisation could help."

Once again, the committee members asserted the importance of extending the institutional basis of social science as a crucial factor in its achievement of a status similar to that of the natural sciences. Although mention is made of the necessity for the social sciences to produce work 'of a quality that compels recognition', no attempt was made to cite any substantial examples that would constitute good practice. There is an element of a 'catch 22' situation in such a recommendation:
work of compelling quality is regarded as a qualification of intellectual
worth and a passport to entry into the wider domain of the system of
higher education, and yet, without a significant presence within the
universities, the social sciences could not engage in the level and
variety of research that would enable its practitioners to 'improve
the standing of the social sciences in the scientific world' (T 161/1301,
1945, p.1).

The fourth function considered in the committee's report received scant
attention, although it had exercised the time and patience of social
scientists, especially the sociologists throughout the inter-war period.
The notion of "overlapping" was regarded as an effective method of
co-ordinating specialists subjects within the field of social science.
Such a remark, made almost in passing, ignored the fact that specialisation
within the various fields of social science, had been the major pre-occupa-
tion of those disciplines during the pre-war period. Sociologists had
sought to arrest such a process, as they believed that it would lead
to a partial, or fragmented view of society.

The three remaining functions of a proposed research council were taken
into consideration together. They entailed, the "neglected ground between
the existing specialist societies", and the provision of opportunities
for publishing "work at present lacking an outlet"; promoting the 'border-
line' studies "between the Natural and Social Sciences"; to encourage
an eclectic approach in the analysis of 'problems', "which existing
specialisms studied only in isolated aspects" (T 161/1301, 1945, p.1).
There appears to be a confusion of the functions considered by the committee,
especially in regard to the notion of 'overlapping' (point four) and
that of encouraging an eclectic approach in social research (point seven).
It is the extraordinary role accorded to the professional association
or 'Society' that animates the position of the committee on the whole
question of the possibility of a research council. Hence the following
statements on the implicit and explicit role of existing organisations
and their actual and potential ability to cope with the demands of repre-
senting practitioners and their respective disciplines (1945, p.3):
"They (the remaining three functions) constitute in our opinion the only sound reason for adding to the burden already resting on scholars the labour of maintaining an additional organisation. We had examples of inquiries which were not adapted to any existing society's transactions or journal, and of inquiries that called for the co-operation of several types of specialist."

It is in examining the committee's consideration of "certain difficulties" which they felt faced any attempt to create an organisation representative of the whole field of the social sciences, that it is possible to detect the central reasons for rejecting the proposal for such a research council.

Ironically, the Co-ordination document sets out many of the issues which continue to trouble social scientists today. One of the first "difficulties" entailed the heterogeneity of the social sciences and the corresponding variability of methodological sophistication of the individual disciplines, and the consequences this had for the "authority of their results" (1945, p.3). The authors of the report then equate this to the relative level of 'scientific standing' of the 'Societies', which in turn, is thought to have consequences for any attempt 'to combine a number of societies in any sort of federation'. Considering the fact that sociologists had raised the issue of a need for uniformity of methodology within the field of social study during the inter-war conferences, it is interesting to note that the members of the committee viewed as a primary function of a research council, the formation of a "grand society" to foster and promote the collective interests of individual societies (1945, p.3):

"A broad uniformity of standard and identity of aim are requisite if a number of societies are to be combined in any sort of federation. This condition is lacking in the Social Sciences."

Such a 'condition' was also lacking in the natural sciences, yet the committee members seemed to regard the organisational arrangements within those disciplines as a model worthy of emulation. Moreover, a condition of that nature appeared to be based upon a similar conception of science as an exemplar. The authors of the report are quite clear on the difficulties of achieving the necessary degree of uniformity (1945, p.4):
"Thus the field is divided between societies which have a purely scientific object and others which (though aiming at scientific objectivity in their inquiries) have primarily a practical or political aim. Since most propagandist societies undertake some inquiry it is difficult to draw the line if any societies with practical object are included. Again, among purely scientific societies, some exist merely to provide facilities for publication and impose no tests or standards on admission; others hold meetings and require evidence of ability to profit by membership, while others again insist on technical qualifications which give membership something of the character of a degree or diploma. These differences are important in a field in which there is wide public interest most of which is not of an expert or scientific character, so that a danger exists of any general organisation being swamped by a popular unscientific membership."

No doubt some social scientists became increasingly anxious about the politicisation of certain branches of their disciplines. In the main, the so-called popularisation of their work tended to be based on the potential of social science in the period of reconstruction following the end of the war. Here one can think of the works and arguments of Mannheim and Laski. It is clear that members of the committee were sensitive to the association between socialist politics and social science, a connection that many practitioners had been at pains to discredit for decades. Perhaps the socialist science of J.D. Bernal had heightened the sensitivity of the social scientists to the issue. Furthermore, the reference to a 'general organisation being swamped by a popular unscientific membership' may also have had something to do with the fact that many within the Sociological Society became increasingly conscious of the catholicity of its membership, despite the attempt by its founders (Branford, 1928) to establish a somewhat elite membership, devoted to the rigours of a scientific study of society. The establishment of the Institute of Sociology represented an attempt (short-lived as it was) to arrest the rise of 'popular sociology'. Donald MacRae has also pointed to the decline in the quality of material published in the Sociological Review, another 'risk' to the public credibility of social science as a scientific enterprise (MacRae, 1961, p.22):

"The Sociological Review despite some excellent articles touched a nadir of quality and sentiment in these years (inter-war period). (It even published lengthy and uplifting free verse)."
There could no longer be a mingling of expert and layman; of esoteric knowledge and received wisdom - the age of the technocrat had been ushered in with the war. The language and culture of the 'technopolis' was in vogue, engendered by a new and more urgent set of industrial and technological imperatives.

The report dealt also with the effect upon the existing institutional arrangements should a research council be established, referring to the division between university departments of social science and the extra-mural arrangements for Societies and Associations (the report's use of the generic term 'organisation' is most confusing). In giving an example of the adverse affects associated with the creation of a research council upon existing organisational arrangements for social science, citing the case of Economics, it is possible to assess not only the relatively superior position enjoyed by the latter discipline, both within and outside of higher education, but also the necessity for establishing a research council as a means to improve the intellectual and institutional prospects of sociology (T 161/1301, 1945, p.4):

"In Economics for example, there co-exist the large and flourishing Royal Economic society and the series of University departments of Economics, linked with one another by a variety of professional ties, and linked also in most Universities with other branches of Social Science. To ignore the latter type, would not in our opinion be an effective way to promote the co-ordination and extension of scientific studies."

The preceding reference gives a clear indication of the well established position of economics. Any 'new' organisation created to foster the co-ordination of the social sciences would hardly lead to the disestablishment of economists from their positions of influence referred to in the above quotation.

The 'Consultative Conference's sub-committee concluded its report with a carefully qualified proposal. One that sought to maintain the existing institutional arrangements within which social science received the bulk of its funding; preserve the professional status of its practitioners, and perpetuate the hierarchical structure of the respective, component
disciplines, in addition to sustaining the individual prestige of its most noteworthy influentials. Considered thus, the proposal was (1945, p.5):

"... directed to creating the minimum of new organisation needed to effect the object we have defined. It would not supercede or disturb any existing organisation, but would supplement the existing provision in such a way as to provide an opportunity for co-ordinated study by specialists of different disciplines and at the same time offer an opening to specialists who have no existing outlet for their work."

Apart from offering another medium for publication of lesser known work in the social sciences, the proposal would not harm the status quo, in fact, such an arrangement would not assist sociology in enhancing either its intellectual or institutional development to any significant degree. Moreover, a new arrangement could not compel specialists from other disciplines to co-operate through inter-disciplinary initiatives. The authors of the report specified the detail of their proposal as follows (1945, p.5):

"The organisation we propose is an Annual Conference of the Social Sciences with a Standing Committee. The purpose of the Conference would be to bring together specialists from different fields in the examination of some selected problem, or problem which is of interest to several specialists."

Such an arrangement was a far cry from the British Association's proposal for a research council, the consideration of which formed the remit of the sub-committee. It should be recalled, that the 'Consultative Conference on Social and Economic Research' had been established upon the direction of the Rockefeller Foundation, and in meeting as often as thrice annually, had fulfilled partially, the proposed function of the 'Standing Conference'. The key to understanding the effect that such a standing conference would have upon sociology can be gained from the following reference to the suggested composition of the conference's membership (1945, p.5):
"Membership of the Conference should be individual, not by federation of existing societies; in order to ensure that discussions and contributions were scientific in their approach membership should be confined to University teachers and research workers (present and past)."

Such a condition of membership would discriminate against the less well established social sciences in the universities, especially sociology. The dominance of economics and statistics would be ensured and the nature of the 'discussions and contributions' predictable and untainted by the unscientific pretentions of lesser disciplines within the wider realm of social science. The function of the Conference's Standing Committee would ensure the essential 'quality' of the material to be submitted for discussion at the annual Conference. Such a gatekeeping function would be essential for maintaining the standard of proceedings and the enforcement of the membership regulations. It would also contribute to sustaining the prevailing institutional and intellectual hierarchy within British social science.

It is also possible to detect in the proposal for an annual conference referred to above, elements of the then current theory of the growth and diversity of knowledge gaining currency in the ideas of Michael Polanyi ('The Growth of Thought in Society', *Economica*, Vol. 12, 1941). Although I have considered previously the implications of Polanyi's ideas for the growth of scientific thought and the appropriate relationship between the universities and the state, there are echoes of his theory in the arguments of the sub-committee's report, especially the notion of 'automatic selection' and 'spontaneous individual association'. The membership was also thought to be a crucial determinant in the gradual collaboration between the natural and social sciences (T 161/1301, 1945, p.6):

"The basis of this proposal is a belief that the students who need and desire some form of new organisation would be, as it were, selected automatically by the opportunity of taking part in conference discussions on some actual subject of common interest to all (or most) specialists in the field of the Social Sciences. Since membership would be open to all University teachers and research workers, the way would be opened for collaboration and discussion between the natural and the Social..."
Sciences. At the same time, since membership would be by spontaneous individual association, no need would arise to define either societies to be admitted or branches of study to be recognised."

A further indication of the reluctance of the sub-committee to support a council for the social sciences is evident in the following reference to the perpetual infancy of the disciplines, and the general level of inexperience in the field of science-building: such a negative stance on the matter tends to reveal the determination of the more influential social scientists (although I find it hard to believe that T.H. Marshall could have whole-heartedly supported the recommendations contained in the report), not to alter significantly the institutional structure which had sustained the social sciences up to the Second World War (1945, p.6):

"This is a starting point; until we have more experience, it seems to us unnecessary and unwise to attempt to create any elaborate organisation. What we propose is the minimum required to provide an opportunity of co-operative study, not anything in the nature of a new Sociological Society."

It is difficult to estimate whether the reference to a new 'Sociological Society' meant that the existing organisation of that name already fulfilled a specific function in the field of what the report referred to as, 'co-operative study', or, that the term 'sociological' was being used in its generic sense, to denote all forms of social study, analysis or thought, which would embrace the social sciences under that rubric. If it was in reference to the then, existing Sociological Society, then surely T.H. Marshall would have been aware of the parlous state of its affairs. In any respect, the proposal did not bode well for sociology.

The report dealt finally with the matter of the relationship between the 'Consultative Conference' (which had commissioned the report in response to the B.A.'s proposal for a research council), and a council for the social sciences, should one be established. The authors were careful in their distinction between the nature and function of their own 'Conference', namely to review the work in progress and prospect within the wider field of social science, and in receipt of Rockefeller funds, and that of a proposed Standing Conference, rather than a fully
fledged research council. The former exercised considerable influence within the sphere of social science in Britain via its funding of research and institutional provision for those disciplines. The latter, prospective 'research council' (the proposed Annual Conference) was certainly a less authoritative and permanent institution within the domain of social research. A rather innocuous organisational framework, providing an annual medium for those interested in a common aspect of social phenomena, and the prospect of inter-disciplinary collaboration. The concluding sentence of the report gave a clear indication of where the committee's allegiances lay: in perpetuating the careers of established social scientists and the hierarchy of disciplines that comprised the edifice of British social science (1945, p.7):

"It will be clear from the general tenor and conclusions of our argument that we consider any such formal and elaborate organisation as that proposed by the British Association Committee to be undesirable in the present state of the Social Sciences in this country."

Once again, the authors argued that the social sciences were immature and therefore unable to benefit from an organisation like a research council. Such conservative resistance to the project represented a minority view, especially in the light of the efforts of others, expressed in the programmes and documents I have examined above. Considered thus, the Consultative Conference's sub-committee document, although a dissenting view on the subject, was, nevertheless, an influential one, and in keeping with the attitude adopted by the members of the Clapham Committee on the subject. However, before, during and after the Clapham Committee deliberations, other influential individuals and organisations had, in making their case for a research council, referred to the general importance of sociology to the revivification and utilisation of social science during the war and especially in the period of reconstruction following it. All of the issues that would continue to remain crucial to sociology's post-war expansion, especially in the early 1960s, had been raised either prior to, or, during the Second World War.
In concluding my examination of the evidence submitted to the Clapham Committee, its subsequent deliberations and final report, I would like to give some indication of the effect that several of the preceding documents (and correspondingly, the influence of their authors) had upon the Committee's decision on the case for the establishment of a research council. This will then enable me to consider the consequences of the Clapham Committee's findings for the development of sociology in the post-war period, as the report's conclusions would entail the establishment of at least two institutional innovations that should have enhanced the discipline's prospects in the post-war period up to the mid-1950s. Considered thus, it will be possible to appreciate the significance of my earlier contention, that it is possible to detect within what I referred to as the Clapham debate, two quite distinct positions on the relationship between social knowledge and the needs of the state. One in which social science and its researches should be allowed to evolve within modified, institutional arrangements, which would ensure their preservation from political direction or influence. The other, a general conception of the role of post-war social science, which envisaged the establishment of new institutional arrangements more conducive to the production of forms of social knowledge considered essential in the post-war period.

Among the Clapham Committee's recommendations can be found the following judgement on the question of whether or not the establishment of a research council for the social sciences would aid the advancement of those disciplines (Cmnd., 6868):

"The creation of a special council disposing of special funds is in our judgement, unnecessary. As a matter of fact we doubt whether the desire for this sort of development is widespread. If a few of those whom we consulted were in favour of the proposals, more were definitely unfavourable. These latter, we believe, were more likely to be representative of the majority among social scientists."

This was quite an extraordinary statement in view of the number of formal and detailed submissions made directly to the Committee, either by individuals, or, in the form of comprehensive, written depositions from other interested
institutions and organisations. I have considered above, a number of the latter, with only the Consultative Conference's, sub-committee 'Report on the Co-ordination of Social Sciences' (T 161/1301, 1945) evidencing a dissenting view. In view of the Clapham Committee's recommendation, I would suggest that the considerable influence of vested interests prevailed over the compelling demonstration of a need for a council for the social sciences. An example of this was the contribution to the Committee's discussion on the form of social research considered to be most appropriately conducted within the university. At the Committee meeting of February 4, 1946, T.H. Marshall, consulted in his capacity as a sociologist, stated that his "... primary interest was in Social Survey work ..." (T 161/1301, Minutes of meeting 4.2.46), arguing that "great opportunities" lay ahead in the field of social science, providing the "new psychological technique" could be applied extensively throughout its various disciplines. More importantly though, was his assertion that (T 161/1301, 1946):

"... there was a prima face case for establishing a research council for the social sciences, to give stimulus to new work and to direct it into fruitful channels."

What is remarkable here is the fact that Marshall had been a member of Alexander Carr-Saunders' Consultative Conference sub-committee to examine the British Association's formal proposal to establish just such a research council. Morris Ginsberg had served on the latter Association's 'Human Institutions' committee to address the research council question. The sociologists' case had been ignored on two important occasions, which may account for the specific criticism expressed by Carr-Saunders and members of the Clapham Committee, notwithstanding the general opposition toward the case for the creation of a research council. I would suggest that in supporting the latter project, the sociologists had associated themselves with a programme of change within British social science, which would alter significantly, the existing hierarchy of those disciplines and those most influential within them. This, coupled to the critique of the discipline by other social scientists, would not have assisted sociology's continuing struggle to attain intellectual and
institutional autonomy. It is also worth noting, that at the same meeting (4.2.46) Professor Firth added his support to the research council project.

I have argued previously, that without such an institutional innovation, the prospects for sociology's post-war development would be handicapped significantly. Again, and contrary to the evidence, the Committee could not countenance the creation of a council to promote greater collaboration between the individual social science disciplines, a project that had been championed by the sociologists throughout the inter-war period, and again, during the course of the war (Cmnd., 6868, paragraph 30):

"Such a proposal is both premature and misconceived ... there is little evidence that this desirable co-operation requires to be stimulated by an external council, or that the absence of such a council is the main impediment."

It would appear from the above statement that the influence of Carr-Saunders and his colleagues on the Committee's deliberations was significant, for such a recommendation had been made by the Consultative Conference sub-committee, of which he was a member (in addition to the chairmanship of the Consultative Committee). The Clapham Committee had also assumed that with the establishment of a research council would come the "danger of a premature crystallisation of spurious orthodoxies", (Cmnd., 6868, paragraph 29).

The minutes of the Clapham Committee meetings contain many references to the issue of whether or not a research council would aid the development of the social sciences. In addition to those occasions cited previously, the following highlights the persistence of those individuals continuing to argue the necessity of keeping the issue alive (T 161/1301, Minutes of meeting, 25.6.45):

"The investigation of sociological problems was outside the scope of research councils. They could not themselves take steps to fill what they regarded as a 'real need'."
This argument was made by Mr. Barnard from the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (one of the aforementioned existing research councils). Furthermore, he suggested that a fourth research council be established to cover 'problems that were arising from research in the physical sciences and requiring examination within the domain of the social sciences'. Carr-Saunders used the occasion of the meeting to argue that the D.S.I.R. might consider extending its remit to conduct research on 'social and economic matters'. Moreover, he also proceeded to prescribe the role of the universities within the field of social research, an argument which reflected the case of those who supported the dispersed initiative stance on the appropriate relationship between the universities and the state (T 161/1301, 25.6.45):

"The universities ought to pay more attention to social accountancy. Great care would be needed to avoid the dangers that would arise if they got too deeply involved in political questions."

Such an assertion emphasises my earlier contention that the Clapham debate and the education debate were directly inter-related. Carr-Saunders' position in this matter placed him squarely within the dispersed initiative camp. As it turned out, the Clapham Committee recommendations did not undermine the traditional role of the universities in maintaining the right to self-determination. The Committee thus acknowledged the autonomy of the universities, a decision which reflected the presence of the Chairman of the University Grants Committee and the Chairman of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, both of whom served on the Clapham Committee throughout the period of its existence (Cmnd. 6868, paragraph 28):

"... while the universities should spontaneously initiate developments on the lines we have indicated, the University Grants Committee should (as part of its duty) survey systematically the range of work in this field (social sciences) undertaken by the several universities, if gaps are revealed, they are to offer such stimulus as may be necessary to secure that they are effectively filled."
In an earlier meeting, Sir Walter Moberly had raised the issue which was at the heart of the Clapham and education debates, one which served to highlight the suspicions of those who subscribed to the principles of the dispersed initiative (T 161/54680, Minutes of meeting for 1.10.45):

"Sir Walter Moberly thought the suspicion unavoidable that the Government of the day would be suspected of subsidising enquiry on lines suitable to its political complexion."

In the same meeting, and in connection with the proposal to establish a research council on the basis of the role of universities in the field of social research, Sir John Clapham argued (T 161/54680):

"... that clear cut Social Science departments in the universities did not yet exist and a supervisory organisation could hardly be erected on this non-existent foundation."

At the following meeting of the Committee on November 26, 1945, the whole of the business concerned the problematic relationship between the universities and the state, in reference to the appropriate role that the respective organisations should play in the conduct of social research. Once again the suggested solution was the establishment of an intermediate body, in the form of a research council (T 161/54680, 26.11.45):

"... the field for investigation in the social sciences was so wide and the amount of public money needed so considerable that Ministers of the Crown must have an overall responsibility for the choice of field and the machinery of coverage."

Thus argued Mr. Leonard Elmhurst, a suggestion which must have mortified those members of the Committee whom in their other capacities, had considered such an idea anathema to the separation of government and the system of higher education. However, Elmhurst did perceive the consequences for the universities of complete control over 'applied research' in the field of social science (T 161/54680, 26.11.45):
"It would be straining the function of the universities to give them anything approaching complete responsibility for applied research and it might easily lay them and their staffs open to a variety of economic pressures from outside."

Sir Walter Moberly recognised such a possibility although he thought that rather than economic pressure being the major 'threat', it would in fact be that of political interference (T 161/54680):

"... it was unavoidable that there would be a tendency to government interference in the event of government control, and that the universities could be counted upon not to allow everyday political factors to interfere."

To avoid such an eventuality, Elmhurst suggested the following, (T 161/54680):

"... if public money was to be used in social science research, then a Research Council would be the most appropriate agency to create."

At other meetings of the Committee, namely on the 4.5.45; 20.7.45; 7.8.45; 1.10.45; 26.11.45; 5.12.45 and the 4.2.46, members discussed or heard evidence on the question of a research council for the social sciences. On each of those occasions, a somewhat negative stance was adopted by the more influential members of the Committee. Even well documented and carefully argued submissions to the Committee could not sway the decision in favour of a research council, mainly for the reasons stated previously. Moreover, it would seem, in examining the Clapham Committee report, that its recommendations tended to reflect the opinions and prejudices of the few, rather than any apparent consensus based on the evidence. This is why it is important to appreciate the significance of the Clapham debate as an historical source in the reconstruction of the history of sociology and social science in general.

In several respects, the Clapham Committee provided the necessary revivification of a declining pre-war debate on the nature and purpose of sociology: an opportunity for its practitioners to devise a series of strategies with which to capture the institutional space crucial to the discipline's
further intellectual development. In portraying the Committee's deliberations in such a manner, I hope to have altered the received view of the Clapham Committee as merely a State, bureaucratic exercise, giving rise to a number of obligatory recommendations, or, in a more grandiose sense, accord it the status of the genesis of sociology 'as we know it' in Britain, as some commentators have suggested. In some respects, the Clapham Committee did represent such a beginning for sociology, although this needs to be qualified carefully. What is perhaps more significant to the development of sociology in the years following the Second World War, were the social, economic and political changes within British society and an associated series of imperatives which generated national interests and the growth of knowledge (cf., Barnes, J., 1979; Barnes, B., 1977; and Arblaster, 1974). Certainly the political terrain of post-war Britain provided firmer foundations for an investment of both faith and resources in the potential of social and economic research, especially during the period of immediate, post-war reconstruction. The latter notion of reconstruction became an exceedingly effective precept and practice within the sphere of policy-making during the years of the war, and shortly thereafter. In particular, Karl Mannheim used the notion of reconstruction as his central concept in the production of a sociological programme for the social and moral regeneration of a war-torn world (Mannheim, 1940; 1943 and 1950). In the construction of such a programme, Mannheim had portrayed sociology as a primary vehicle for the generation and transmission of ideas essential to the maintenance of a democratic society. Implicit in such a project was the equally vital role of the sociologist; an individual indispensible to the reconstruction of modern Britain.

Although I have argued above, that the Clapham debate provided clues to the prospects of sociology's future development, it is important, nevertheless, to bear in mind some of the Committee's recommendations included in its final report. A brief consideration of these will provide a clearer understanding of the essential institutional developments which followed upon those recommendations.
There were two recommendations included in the Clapham Committee's final report (Cmnd., 6868, 1946) which tended to ensure that any developments within the field of social science would be kept under the control and influence of individuals and institutional arrangements, which had previously managed to successfully resist attempts to bring their respective domains of power and autonomy within the collective authority of the state, and the process of centralised planning. The first was the establishment of a sub-committee of the University Grants Committee (UGC) specifically for the social sciences. The second comprised the appointment of an Interdepartmental Committee on Social and Economic Research. The former remains in existence to this day; the latter ceased to function several years after its creation. These two post-Clapham developments appeared to many as both appropriate and necessary to sustain the developmental impetus initiated with the convening of the Clapham Committee. Furthermore, they appeared to be two complementary institutional initiatives which would both ensure the equitable disbursement of future resources to and between the various social science disciplines, in addition to enhancing their respective research potential, through the supervision of 'planned growth' of social and economic research, between the hitherto and purportedly autonomous domains of the state and higher education. However, was this actually to be the case in the years following the war? The answer to this question lays in a consideration of the recommendations themselves and a detailed analysis of the activities of both the UGC social science sub-committee and the Interdepartmental Committee on Social and Economic Research. It is beyond the scope of the present project to give a detailed account of the work of the two committees apart from brief references to their activities as they impinged on the future development of sociology after the war.

The first of the two Clapham recommendations was as follows (Cmnd., 6868, 1946, paragraph 32 (c)):

"That the University Grants Committee be asked to consider the establishment of a sub-committee to advise on matters relating to the social sciences."
Such a recommendation arose as a result of an argument set out elsewhere in the Clapham report, (1946, paragraph 32b):

"That favourable consideration be given to increases of the university grant with a view to strengthening developments conducive to the spread of research into economic and social questions, both through the provision of more chairs and other teaching posts, and through much more liberal provision for libraries, calculating machines, computing assistants, and similar facilities."

I think it more than a coincidence that the central plank of such an argument should have coincided with the long-standing aims of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research. Economics was by far and away the most institutionally developed and intellectually established of the social sciences up to the outbreak of the Second World War, and as such was bound to benefit from any increase in the resources made available under Clapham. Moreover, the most influential and numerous members of the Clapham Committee were economists. Departments in sociology were virtually non-existent and could not mount the necessary lobby to influence the new state benefactors. This was in marked contrast to the position of departments of economics. Control of resources and the growth of 'newer' social science disciplines could also be maintained through the auspices of the UGC, a mechanism central to the intra-war debate on the question of the control of higher education.

The second recommendation referred to above was as follows (1946, paragraph 32 (a)):

"That a standing Interdepartmental Economic and Social Research Committee be set up to survey and advise upon research work in government departments."

This suggestion arose largely as a result of the arguments of the economists on the Committee (1946, paragraphs 9-10):

"9. It is highly desirable that the Government departments which collect and analyse material relevant to social and economic research should be in continuous contact with outside experts who can keep them aware of the needs"
which are arising in the speculative branches of the field, and who can assist in assessing the value and possible uses of material which is already being collected.

10. There is a need for improved efficiency of the interdepartmental mechanisms for collation, correlation and assessment of potential value of material (data) that separate departments suggesting new methods of areas of collection."

The preceding recommendation and the paragraphs from which it is derived, is important for two reasons. First, there existed prior to the war, an extra-governmental standing committee, known as the 'Consultative Conference on Economic and Social Research'. The latter Consultative Conference was chaired by the influential Alexander Carr-Saunders (I have discussed the significance of this Conference above, when referring to the Report on the Co-ordination of the Social Sciences (1945) whom, under the direction of the Rockefeller Foundation sought to establish a network of communication between those research organisations and institutes, which the latter Foundation continued to finance. The aim of the Standing Conference was to avoid the overlap and duplication of research, and to provide an annual report of social and economic research, in both progress and prospect.* Second, the Consultative Conference served as a model of an established and functioning framework of liaison, fostering a series of mutually beneficial, organisational and individual connections within the field of social science. The latter clique of influentials within the wider domain of social science would provide what the Clapham Committee report described as the necessary intermediaries between government departments and the sphere of higher education. These so-called "outside experts" (1946, paragraph 9) were to become the organised body of consultants serving on the Interdepartmental Committee on Social and Economic Research.

* There had also been established in 1928, a 'Social Science Research Training Committee'. This Committee's function was, according to the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, (1935, Vol. 1, p.246), "... to encourage the scientific development of economics and sociology, and to secure the advantages of inter-changeability and comparability in the results of research work at different universities. The Committee awarded scholarships for research which would demonstrably emphasise 'the methodological potentialities of a problem chosen for investigation' rather than any intrinsic importance in the subject itself. I have been unable to trace the fate of this Committee, but it would appear from the criteria for awarding scholarships, that at the time, economics was likely to fare better than sociology.
There is another reason why the two recommendations contained in the Clapham Committee's report may be construed as frustrating the aims and objectives of the sociologists. Both recommendations gave rise to the establishment of specific institutional arrangements which prevented, or at least, postponed the creation of a research council for the social sciences. The sociologists had, as I have attempted to demonstrate above, argued strongly and frequently of the need for such a research council to co-ordinate the activities of the various social science disciplines. They regarded the existence of a social science research council as a forum in which sociology would be able to receive a fair hearing in its requests for disciplinary recognition and the receipt of resources necessary to sustain and expand its activities - as frail as they may have been, prior to the convening of the Clapham Committee in 1944. Furthermore, the likelihood of sociology receiving immediate recognition and resources seemed somewhat remote, in view of the operational policies of both the Interdepartmental Committee and the UGC social science, sub-committee. The former, focusing on the primacy of government research needs, the latter, tending to maintain the status quo, as far as the existing structure of British social science within the universities was concerned. In fact, the UGC sub-committee had established a gatekeeping function shortly after its inauguration. This had the effect of determining what were, in the eyes of the committee, the legitimate branches of the social sciences, thus preventing a proliferation of subjects from seeking recognition and funding from the UGC. The categories of recognised branches of the social sciences were as follows (CAB/UGC 8, 1947):

"In view of the recommendations of the Clapham Committee, the criteria should be:

a) Are the activities in the Universities being carried on in the interests of the social sciences.
b) Are they expanding.
c) Will they expand if they are not grant aided.

The conclusion was; that there should be two classes of subjects:

1. Those obviously belonging to the social sciences.
2. Those on the borderline.

It would consequently be one of the functions of the sub-committee to discriminate between the two classes."
The preceding quotation came from the minutes of the UGC social science sub-committee* of September 9th, 1947. A meeting at which the Chairman, Sir Walter Moberly, (Chairman of the UGC, and ardent supporter of the dispersed initiative) argued, that any funds available for distribution by the UGC were limited, and if 'too many subjects were included in the social sciences, there might not be enough money to finance them'. As a consequence of this, a memorandum was drawn up for submission to the UGC, in which the following subjects were included as having a legitimate claim on the Exchequer (CAB/UGC 8, 1947):

2. Economic and Social History.
4. Statistics and Demography."

In the case of Economic Theory and Organisation, members of the sub-committee agreed that the qualification, "pure" and "applied" should be added to the sub-title Economics. Agricultural Economics was considered to be a borderline subject. Economic and Social History was a subject area which generated considerable debate among the committee members, with a resolution being passed (six votes to three) for the retention of the full title, Economic and Social History. History proper was excluded from the subject category. Sociology was subjected to a critical examination, resulting in the addition of a qualification; that the discipline should be classed as "General" and "Applied", and that criminology should form a separate 'sub-title'. Statistics and Demography, the sub-committee argued, should also specify statistical theory as it 'applies to the social sciences'. It is interesting to note that those who were active in the field of demography, would, in later years, be referred to, or describe themselves as, sociologists.

* The following individuals were members of the first UGC sub-committee for the social sciences: Sir Walter Moberly (Chairman), Professor D.W. Brogan, Sir Henry Clay, Professor G.O.H. Cole, Mr. Geoffrey Crowther, Professor H.C. Darby, Professor J. Jewkes, Professor T.H. Marshall, Professor L.C. Robbins, Mr. E.A.G. Robinson, Professor T.S. Siney, Mr. J.R.W. Stone and Professor R.H. Tawney. It will be noted that five of the UGC sub-committee members served on the Clapham Committee, which in itself comprised of only eight members (excluding the Secretary) of whom one member, Sir John Clapham, had died before the convening of the sub-committee.
An intriguing feature of the early activities of the UGC sub-committee on the social sciences involved the bureaucratic definition of the field of social science. Thus defined, the field received 'official' recognition, as described above, for a number of years, notwithstanding the intellectual division of labour that had characterised the debates of the pre and intra-war periods preceding the Clapham Committee. It is important not to underestimate the significance of the establishment of a UGC sub-committee for another reason. The Clapham Committee and the institutional arrangements which ensued from its recommendations, gave rise to the first occasion on which the social sciences had been given not only political recognition, through state support via the UGC and in underwriting its research and teaching requirements, but that this same support, or rather, social evaluation of a branch of knowledge, had occurred within the wider context of a redefinition of the nature and purpose of higher education. The latter development reflected the political determination of the production of knowledge on the basis of the national need. For the incoming Labour government of 1945, committed to the centrality of large-scale planning in every quarter of the economy and society, the realisation of its manifold policies required the radical revision of those social institutions without which its aims would never be more than manifesto promises. The spheres of manpower control, the changes to be introduced in education, at all levels, the introduction of health and welfare policies, the management of the economy through industrial and labour reforms etc., would, according to senior Labour Cabinet Ministers, require not only a socialist commitment, but the skills of individuals and forms of knowledge and practice which Clement Attlee believed could only be made available, if the field of social science received the necessary support it required. Hence his letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1944, the result of which gave rise to the convening of the Clapham Committee.

The UGC sub-committee for social science and the Interdepartmental committee provided an infrastructure of coordination and financial support for British social science. Unfortunately, the scale of financial support for social science in general, and sociology in particular was rather small and tended to enhance the future of the more established disciplines
like economics. In addition, although the state was preparing, henceforth, to provide the resources necessary to the maintenance and subsequent development of disciplines like sociology, thus removing the dependency of the social sciences on private benefaction, some sources of financial support did remain available to those disciplines from the latter domain.

I have argued above, that the transition from private benefaction to state funding of much of the research and even whole departments in the universities, had proved to be a major issue in the education debate, as well as the Clapham debate. For many of the participants in those debates, the issue of state funding implied the notion of state control, anathema to the principles and practices upon which higher education in Britain had been founded and, ironically, controlled. With the gradual diminution of private benefaction for the social sciences, it is possible to understand the resistance of social scientists to the significance of establishing a research council for the social sciences, especially during a period when a socialist government appeared to be set on the direct control of all institutional arrangements crucial to the fulfilment of its policies. The spectre of such an ideologically directed council, in the service of a government, had been conjured up by members of the Clapham Committee, serving in the end as a reason for opposing the establishment of such an institution. However, the research council debate was never to disappear. In fact, its major exponents, the sociologists and their supporters, were to sustain the pressure for an 'SSRC', until the convening of the Heyworth Committee in the early 1960s. The latter Committee followed the publication of another government report crucial to the future of sociology, also published in the early 1960s - the Report of the Committee on Higher Education (the Robbins Report, 1963).

The issue of the funding of knowledge became and remains a central political issue: one which has implications for the determination of those forms of knowledge which governments and other powerful interest groups consider to be in keeping with a series of preferred aims and objectives - something which may not coincide with the national interest, although the latter notion is employed as a token to invoke an assumed, collective need.
Concerted political action as a means of realising the national interest, especially through manipulation of the nation's system of education, can either enhance or destroy a culture. Cultural Revolutions, the alleged supremacy of the Aryan race, or the myth of market forces in 'freeing the people', all necessitated the creation and transmission of the ideas central to such beliefs. A nation's system of education thus becomes a crucial medium for the generation of such 'knowledge'.

It is beyond the scope of the present work to devote the time and space necessary for a detailed analysis of the importance of the Interdepartmental Committee on Social and Economic Research. Much important and relevant detail about the activities of the Committee can be found in its periodic reports (cf. First Report of the Committee, Cmnd. 7357 (1948); Second Report of the Committee, Cmnd. 8091 (1950) and Third Report of the Committee, Cmnd. 9621 (1956)). Lest it be thought that the Interdepartmental Committee was largely a remote government quango, quite distant from the aims and aspirations of the sociologists, it should be remembered that such an institutional arrangement provided virtually the only active forum (in an extra-curricula sense) in which sociologists were able to act, in either a liaison capacity, or, through membership of its many sub-committees. Moreover, several sociologists had made a number of promises concerning the potential of their discipline during the course of the Clapham debate, and the opportunity now arose for them to fulfil them through a contribution to social research. Certainly those sociologists whom I have previously referred to as belonging to the discipline's practical wing, made significant contributions to the work of the Committee, thus helping to sustain the ethos and authority of empirical research as a fundamental tradition within sociology. Association with the Interdepartmental Committee also provided an opportunity for sociologists to demonstrate the intrinsic value of social research to the wider process of social reconstruction and the period following it. Thus the discourse of planning and administration became infused with the ideas, concepts and practices which were part and parcel of the sociologists' repertoire.
The Interdepartmental Committee's activities may have been pragmatic and ad hoc, yet it never varied its original terms of reference (Cmnd., 8091, 1950):

"To survey and advise upon research work in government departments, and in particular; (a) to bring to the notice of departments the potential value for research purposes of the material which they collect and to suggest new methods and areas of collaboration; (b) to advise on how there could be made available to research workers, information gathered for their own purposes by the departments, which has potential value as material for research.

It is our continuing aim to stimulate and foster collaboration in the field of research between departments and the universities and other research institutions and to help to bring them together in those cases where our help is needed and sought."

It became apparent from reading the Committee's reports that it acted as a clearing house, in addition to a gate-keeper and co-ordinator of research in a number of spheres. It tended to evaluate potential research projects on the basis of the needs of government departments and their associated administrative apparatuses, thus engendering research in areas connected directly with the requirements of the government of the day. This process aided also the fulfilment and subsequent assessment of its social and economic policy objectives.* The same process, in

* The Committee's report of 1950 sets out the criteria which engendered such a need, in addition to the affect it had subsequently on the nature and scope of the sociological research of the period (Cmnd., 8091, 1950, p.1):

"Our raison d'être lies in the increasing extent to which central government departments which need themselves to obtain information for their own purposes of day-to-day administration, have become in consequence important sources of the raw material necessary for research in the social sciences."

And in relation to the connection between government policy and its social consequences (1950, p.1):

"This has been brought about partly by the extended field of government enquiry, partly by the introduction of new forms of statistical enquiry such as the Census of Distribution, and partly because, as the result of changes in the administration of such services as those connected with public assistance, with hospitals and social insurance, information formally collected by local authorities or private agencies is now gathered into department files."

The Mannheimian notion of 'democratic planning' would appear to have been realised, through the creation of an extensive state administrative apparatus. Government departments were, henceforth, to adopt the role of "consumers" in the process of initiating its research needs. In many respects a novel precursor to the Rothschild principle of the "customer/contractor" arrangement (Cmnd., 4814, 1971).
turn, had a direct affect upon the nature and range of sociological research for the period in question. The following examples give a fair indication of the scope and depth of the Committee's work up to the late 1950s.

1. Co-operation between research institutions and government departments:
   (a) The Board of Trade: research carried out on behalf of the aforementioned department by, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, the University of London and the University of Birmingham.
   (b) Ministry of Food: the Department of Economics at Cambridge University.

2. Collaborative work between several institutions and government departments, in addition to the involvement of a private funding agency:
   The London School of Economics, the Nuffield Foundation, the Ministry of Labour and National Service and the Central Office of Information. This collaborative group produced an occupational and social mobility study (a long-term study), in addition to the work of the Population Investigation Committee, all under the auspices of the Interdepartmental Committee. The result of the research assisted the then Labour Government in its plans for full employment. Other by-products of the work contributed information on 'employment problems of young persons' and the socio-psychological aspects of job/career patterns.

3. A number of sub-committees of the main Interdepartmental Committee were formed for the purpose of collating and coordinating existing material within various government departments. Academics were co-opted as a means to achieve this end. It was argued at the time, that the latter individuals possessed "special knowledge" in particular fields.

   (a) The Ministry of Education's resources and data sources were reviewed. In 1950, a Staff Inspector for Educational Research was appointed.
(b) The Board of Trade: A survey of the department's divisions to establish its information and research needs.

(c) A number of "Guides to Official Sources" (first published in 1948, H.M.S.O.) were inaugurated.

(d) The selection and preservation of documents was commenced under the auspices of the Interdepartmental Committee. This applied to material which was thought to possess a use for "social and economic research", (1950, p.11).

The Committee's report for the year 1956 contained a review of the work of both the Interdepartmental Committee and its various sub-committees. Mention is made of "fostering a number of worthwhile research projects which might not otherwise come to full fruition" (Cmnd., 9621, 1956, p.5). In fact, the Committee was responsible for the production of six extensive lists of unpublished government papers which were circulated to sixty-nine libraries; 184 unpublished documents were made available and approximately 20 government departments co-operated on a continuing basis to supply information amounting to the production of thousands of copies of individual reports and documents. Other significant pieces of research which arose as a direct result of the Committee were as follows: Study of Labour Mobility in Great Britain 1945-49; Social Mobility in Britain, edited by Professor David Glass (1953); a national income study of Scotland under the auspices of the University of Glasgow's Department of Economics and Social Research; an investigation on the consumption of food, in conjunction with the Department of Economics at the University of London; various publications including, Studies on Medical and Population Subjects; Internal Migration (Newton and Jeffery), External Migration (Carrier and Jeffery), Statistics on the use of Land in the U.K., Statistics on Crime (T.S. Lodge, Home Office publication), and Britain: An Official Handbook (Central Office of Information publication).* Another important feature of the Committee's activities entailed a consideration of the tabulations used in the 1951 Census. The Report for 1956 makes specific reference to the co-operation of the sociologists Professor David Glass (L.S.E) and Professor T.S. Simey (Liverpool University).

The Clapham Committee and the events associated directly with its recommenda-
dations can in many respects be interpreted as the genesis of a clearly discernable and coherent institutional and intellectual movement within British social science. In particular, I have endeavoured to show that in the case of the Clapham Committee, notions of strategy and tactics and especially, the role of cliques and influentials (in the sense portrayed by C. Wright Mills to account for their function in shaping social science (1963)), played a significant part in determining the outcome of its deliberations. However, it is worthwhile reiterating my earlier consideration of the difference between the appearance and impact of an 'official' government report, and the background to its initiation, especially the consequences such factors have on the course of its deliberations. As I have argued above, the relative significance attributed to the Clapham Committee Report, depends upon whether or not the historian places greater emphasis upon its findings and recommendations, and the subsequent effect these would have on the development of disciplines like sociology, or, whether, as I believe, that the document published at the conclusion of the Clapham debate, represented a less logical, coherent and objective process than the production of a final report may appear to have conferred on its activities. I would suggest, that in the case of the Clapham Committee, the evidence submitted and the arguments recorded, provide a remarkable insight into the intellectual and institutional hierarchy of British social science during the inter-war period and up to the conclusion of the Second World War. This is why the outcome of what I have referred to as the Clapham debate, became so crucial to the future development of sociology in Britain.
CONCLUSION

Taken together, the preceding chapters in this work provide an historical account of the development of sociology over a relatively short period of its history in Britain. Considered individually, each chapter examines a particular feature of that history within the analytical framework discussed in the first chapter. In keeping with similar historical accounts, mine has not proven anything other than the fact that, hopefully, in producing a somewhat different insight into the growth of sociology, some measure of understanding can be gained of how and why the discipline has achieved its current, social and intellectual presence among other branches of knowledge and culture generally.

At one point in the argument, I referred to the function of the historical account, suggesting that the motives of the historian influence significantly the way in which he or she choses to portray the growth of the discipline over time, notwithstanding specific concerns with objectivity, accuracy and the focus of the narrative, i.e. an institutional, intellectual, or biographical account. Considered thus, history becomes a useful resource to assert and sustain a preferred sociology. In accepting or rejecting one sociological theory rather than another (though not in the Popperian sense), or, adopting or denying one corpus of methods in preference to others, entail the notion of the purpose of sociology. The central ideas and contrasting perspectives within sociology, its constitutive form, remain contingent and controversial as ever. The latter state of affairs (sociology's purpose) gives rise to an associated series of moral obligations and political consequences through the pursuit of the discipline, affecting in turn, the status of sociological knowledge. An unfortunate example of this can be found in the infamous Gould Report (1977).

In examining the process of science-building, the major preoccupation of sociologists and their supporters for the period covered in this project, I have endeavoured to highlight both the relevance and importance
of a strategic presentation of sociology by its practitioners and sponsors, as a fundamental activity within the general quest for institutional and intellectual autonomy. Although my analysis has ranged across and within conventional categories of; institution, ideas, biography and socio-political contexts, often combining specific elements of those individual categories, I have sought to maintain the integrity of sociology's composite form, both in terms of its history and actuality. Thus the pursuit of sociology implies the existence of institutional resistance to it, whereby the history of its ideas becomes contained and shaped by those same institutional resistances and opportunities.

In the opening chapter, I considered a number of historiographical issues associated with an account of sociology's history, particularly the explanatory framework to be adopted for the project. Through an earlier and subsequently abortive attempt to examine British sociology as a series of major, 'British' theories, espoused by a correspondingly discrete set of theorists, (a project assumed to be quite feasible on the basis of work carried out by Nicolas Mullins (1974)), I realised that many significant aspects of the discipline's institutional development would be excluded from the account. Moreover, such a project indicated a naïve conception on my part of the origin and nature of what I had assumed to be British sociological theory. Further consideration of a project based on Mullins' model made it quite obvious that I held a number of questionable assumptions about the institutional and intellectual dimensions of sociology in Britain, especially the degree of contingency between the former and latter dimensions. While there appeared to be an astonishing array of intellectual diversity and institutional variation within the field, sociology's apparently consolidated state in Britain owed much to a number of quite recent events, all of which appeared to have originated, or culminated in the 1960s and subsequently affecting its contemporary form. While the 1960s and 1970s were certainly periods of rapid expansion in sociology, the growth that took place in those decades seemed to have been the result of a number of conducive conditions affecting the general growth of knowledge. An expansion of intellectual activity engendered by often conflicting, but clearly discernable, economic, political and social imperatives. Sociology's growth sprang from the
changes taking place in the system of higher education, and the transformation of the nation's research base, in terms of its general ethos and direction, giving rise to a proliferation and variation of sites in which to conduct research. This was accompanied by a widespread commitment to the importance of postgraduate research in all fields of knowledge, all of which were predicated on a changing political climate, wherein the determination of the national need became expressed increasingly through a common faith in the potential of science and technology as means to sustain continued economic growth. It therefore seemed that a project concerned with the development of sociology in Britain since the early 1960s, would need to take account of the aforementioned conducive conditions and their effects upon the growth of the discipline, both as an intellectual and institutional activity. A complete revision of my original research project led me to conclude amongst other things, that the factors affecting the development of a branch of knowledge and practice, in this case sociology, must be common to all fields and that they could perhaps, be of an invariant rather than a transient nature. A primary example of this was the mechanism, or rather, process of the funding of knowledge. Although the latter example and its effect upon the development of sociology since the last war presented itself as a somewhat straightforward element of the project I had in mind, the situation as it obtained before the last war was quite a different matter altogether. This also seemed to be the case for all the other factors that I had managed to identify above.

The early revision of the project mentioned above also helped to clarify another problem, one which I have dealt with in the chapter on methodology, namely, the identification of an appropriate approach to analysis. Several options appeared to fit in with the account that I wished to give, yet having conceived of the methodological dimension of my research in such a manner - a shopping list mentality - for the 'selection' of the 'correct' analytical framework, I soon realised that the adoption and rigorous adherence to a single method, just for the sake of methodological fidelity, may have led to the exclusion of arguments, seemingly awkward evidence and alternative lines of investigation. I knew that my work would entail a combination, or, at the very least, a variation
on conventional lines of analyses, such as, the sociology of sociology, the sociology of knowledge and the general category of a history of ideas. My approach therefore became eclectic, open-ended and somewhat experimental. I then decided to direct my investigation to a period in sociology's history from the early years of this century, to the late 1940s. In the early period of my work, those years appeared to be bereft of what I had come to know as sociology in its prolific, contemporary form. I now believe that my initial commitment to an historical account which would go beyond mere description of sociology's institutional and intellectual activities for the period in question, led gradually to the conclusion, that the sociologists' project in the years under examination, involved them in an activity which I have referred to as the pursuit* of their discipline, a project that coincided with the practice of sociology itself. Although contemporary sociologists are engaged in a similar activity, confronting similar opportunities and constraints, in the case of 'modern sociology', its practitioners continue to develop their activities within an increasingly defensive mode - the defence of the sociological realm - whereas sociologists of the formative period (the focus of my investigation) were intent on establishing the kingdom. The latter activity seemed to be a major component of the sociological enterprise and crucial to the future of a discipline that, until the Second World War, seemed destined to oblivion.

In the first chapter, I gave careful consideration to the work of several authors whose ideas I considered to be suggestive of the kind of approach required for my own project. Indeed, it was through a consideration of some seemingly diverse methodological frameworks that I decided to introduce an additional, but complementary category to the more conventional approaches referred to above, namely, sociology's advocatory

* Pursuit in the sense that sociologists and their supporters endeavoured to evolve and deploy a strategic approach to the development of their discipline, whether in relation to other branches of the social sciences, or, in terms of other fields of knowledge generally. The establishment and extension of intellectual and institutional boundaries thus constitutes the processes of pursuing sociology, rather than a specific endeavour to attain some objectively defined goal for the discipline.
dimension. This posed a number of problems, especially the need to be specific about the nature and function of such a category, intended in the main, as an aid to the construction of the kind of historical account that I had in mind. The concept possessed a dual function in terms of its deployment in the aforementioned account. In one sense it represented the actions of sociologists - a contingent dimension - wherein practitioners either individually or collectively pursue strategies crucial to the social construction of sociology. In another sense, the advocatory dimension could also be employed as a category for the classification of the phenomena associated with the aforementioned, contingent dimension. An example of the latter was, as I have suggested, the engagement of sociologists with others, in a very subtle, complex and purposive process of negotiating sociology's autonomy through the deployment of what I have referred to as strategic discourse. In the former sense of the concept, Donald MacRae's notion of a 'prescriptive history of sociology' provided an example of the technical format for my own account, whereas Michel Foucault's notion of the development of the human sciences as a series of 'acts of justification' served as a basic organising idea. The notion of an advocatory dimension seemed to facilitate an exploration of the evidence within the somewhat, conceptually flexible notion of acts of justification and the more pragmatic exercise of chronicling history. The degree of detail involved in the latter exercise was a direct result of endeavouring to adhere to one of MacRae's conditions, or, in the light of the effort required, the consequences of his call for a 'satisfactory history of sociology'. For MacRae, institutional and biographical minutiae are as relevant and important to the history of sociology as a grand tour of its major ideas and influentials. Another dimension of such a history would be, according to MacRae, the recording and analysis of sociology's failures: without such a component, the 'story' would be distorted and biased and likely to attract the criticism, that sociology's development was but a succession of intellectual triumphs, untouched and unaffected by the social milieu in which it had evolved. The future of the discipline depended as much on the value ascribed to its ideas and practice, as the ability of sociologists to establish sociology's intellectual autonomy in relation to the proximate disciplines within the domain of social science itself.
In the second chapter, I endeavoured to explore the progress of sociology in the middle and late 1930s through an examination of what I considered to be two major events affecting the intellectual and institutional form of social science during the inter-war period. I did not dwell to any significant extent upon the discipline's substantive content, apart from one or two issues associated with a series of inter-war conferences. My major concern was to examine sociology within the analytical framework set out in the first chapter, and this necessitated a consideration of the construction of sociology by its practitioners through a series of strategies not connected directly with its substantive dimension. The emphasis here was upon the process of negotiation and the resources employed and the method of their deployment in making the case for sociology as the coordinating discipline within a synoptic science of society.

In the second part of chapter two, I developed the argument that expressions of the nature and purpose of sociology, through the postulation of various agendas, programme statements and intellectual initiatives, including a synoptic science of society, implied a corresponding set of contingent political, economic and social conditions, all of which impinge on sociology's extant and potential nature. In electing to use a case study of the development of the social sciences at the L.S.E. during the inter-war period, I hoped to demonstrate the effect of diverse influences within the process of institutionalisation upon intellectual form. The central theme of that part of the work entailed a detailed examination of William Beveridge's Natural Bases Scheme. That scheme and its consequences for the future development of British social science generally and sociology particularly, was examined within several, related categories, all of which would have a subsequent bearing on the evidence and associated arguments contained in the remainder of the work. They were as follows: the valuation of knowledge, in terms of intrinsic and social criteria; the funding of knowledge, a process in which the aforementioned criteria of valuation are defined and deployed; the role of influentials, cliques and interest groups (in Wright Mills sense) outside of the community of practicing social scientists, who have influenced significantly the development of social science during the period in question; and the increasing importance of the pursuit
of sociology on the basis of its latent potential or promise. In the case of the first category, the valuation of knowledge, I examined William Beveridge's Natural Bases Scheme, with special reference to its somewhat contrived and fiercely positivist philosophy of social science. I suggested that such a scheme and its attendant philosophical basis had not only consequences for the epistemological status of those forms of knowledge known collectively as social science, but that the same scheme also implied an ideological dimension for those disciplines. This became clear in the accompanying examination of the funding of knowledge, wherein I dealt at length with the funding of Beveridge's various projects at the L.S.E. In portraying the relationship between the benefactor (the Rockefeller Foundation) and the beneficiary (Beveridge and the L.S.E.) as a contractual one, in both a formal and informal sense; the former through contracts and specified revenue grants, the latter, through an implicit, yet shared and binding understanding of the nature and purpose of social science, I endeavoured to demonstrate the connection between a conceptual scheme for a group of disciplines and the material means by which they were to evolve. Considered thus, the history of those disciplines was shown to be intimately bound up in their institutional setting. Furthermore, large-scale benefaction, from whatever source, did not seem to be granted unconditionally, and attempts to disguise or conceal a mutual interest, which generates or sustains the production of knowledge, appeared to become increasingly difficult to manage when the motives of both the benefactor and beneficiary were examined closely. It appeared that those motives encompassed a shared ideology, presented for professional and public consumption within the rhetoric of the national need, or a narrow definition of disciplinary advancement.

The second chapter provided an opportunity to consider the increasingly precarious position of sociology throughout the middle and latter part of the 1930s. This arose as a result of two, inter-related developments within British social science. First, sociologists became increasingly sensitive to their declining influence within that period, especially in terms of their attempts to provide sociology with a coordinating role within a reconstituted science of society. Second, toward the end of the inter-war period, sociology became increasingly irrelevant
to a growing and diversifying number of social science disciplines. The latter disciplines became preoccupied with tasks of specialisation and professionalisation and the acquisition of resources with which to develop and consolidate their respective research bases.

Although chapter three was somewhat lengthy and detailed, this arose as a result of the need to explore the social context of wartime Britain. The focal point of the argument at that stage, concerned the production of knowledge and the national need, whereby interests and the growth of knowledge, affected directly the order of knowledge itself. The implications of this for sociology were quite clear. Whereas the pre-war period was one in which sociology had struggled to assert and sustain its intellectual and institutional autonomy, the debate and the issues central to it tended to be confined to the domain of the social sciences and their somewhat limited institutional settings. The Beveridge 'experiment' revealed the ideological underpinning of the funding of knowledge, which in turn had consequences for the valuation of knowledge based upon a series of criteria engendered by implicit and explicit conditions of the contractual relationship between benefactor and beneficiary. Sociology seemed to be losing ground within the general advance of inter-war social science. Sociology's 'troubles' remained largely private.

It appeared as though sociology would no longer be able to sustain its case for autonomy within the domain of British social science. However, the contexts and contingencies of war modified significantly, the social and cultural conditions of Britain, which in turn engendered a corresponding series of objectives and interests articulated within notions of the national need. Thus the evaluation of ideas and practical skills became established on principles and precepts quite different from other historical periods. Expediency, relevance and responsiveness to urgent and specific imperatives provided the categories within which to assess and ascribe the value and substance of various forms of knowledge. The social sciences, including sociology, neither withdrew, nor were they excluded from the latter process. The debate about the relationship of sociology to the other social sciences was transformed from a largely
interdisciplinary issue, to one in which the production of social knowledge, the stated objective of those same disciplines, became incorporated within the much wider, public debate on the production of knowledge in response to the national need. The initiation of the latter debate provided an important opportunity for sociologists to engage in a much wider discussion on the status and potential of their discipline, especially as a medium for the generation of 'sociological knowledge', essential to the moral and social reconstruction of post-war Britain.

The war gave rise to the imposition of large-scale social and economic control by the state. The formulation and implementation of social and economic policies required the collection and organisation of information about the population. Without such information there could be no planning, organisation, or control of the populace. Although the mechanism of control could quite easily have been invoked through general legislation and additional emergency powers, a gap existed in so far as the state did not possess sufficient nor adequate information about its citizens. The consequences of this could have meant defeat. There thus occurred a mobilisation for problem solving. As I argued in part four of the chapter in question, the evaluation of individual branches of knowledge proceeded on the basis of criteria which encompassed a notion of demonstrable utility and expediency. Thus the importance of research technologies (methodology) became a key feature of the evaluative process. Even though the social, political and economic imperatives which engendered such a quest for 'data' by agencies of the state would be superceded by a different version of the national need in the post-war period, the framework essential to the evaluative function had been established during the war. This framework consisted of a whole series of personal relationships, organisational contingencies, institutional arrangements, mediating factors and interest groups.

An integral component of the aforementioned evaluative framework entailed a corresponding conceptual dimension, namely, a preferred method or rather, an exemplar with which to assess the various other forms of knowledge which may have been able to contribute to the war effort. In postulating the existence of a Science Movement, I hoped to demonstrate
the predominance of the ethos and authority of science as a central resource for not only those who sought to establish science as a fundamental component of the national curriculum, but as a method to be adopted in the sphere of politics: a technological politics implying a policy science. The Movement's most influential supporters, both scientists and non-scientists, did not seek to proscribe the human sciences from their project. Rather, they viewed the role of social science in wartime, but more importantly, in the post-war period, as of fundamental importance to the process of reconstruction. An authentic social science should, according to the exponents of the Movement, be founded upon the principles and practices of natural science. The diffusion of the scientific method (in effect the normative component of science) within the social sciences was a prerequisite to their attaining scientific maturity and social utility. The pre-war, Beveridgian dream had not yet faded.

Chapter three encompassed another dimension of the widening public debate on the role of social science in the war and reconstruction. This entailed the evolving alliance between the Labour Party and the Science Movement. As the war progressed, Labour's commitment to large-scale social reform meant that the prospect of planning would necessarily entail a considerable increase in social and economic research. Furthermore, the conditions of war led to the establishment of an infrastructure of formal communication and the sustained funding and control of science by and for the state. An institutional pattern of support and containment of science once established, would be likely to remain in existence in the post-war period. With the emergence of a national debate on issues such as planning and the role of the state in the management of the war effort, there arose a number of additional problems which, when given sufficient political and public attention, would have far-reaching consequences for the future of those institutions wherein the nation's culture evolved and subsequently became transmitted from generation to generation - the universities. The questions beginning to be asked in the light of people's wartime experience were: whose universities; whose culture? The role of the state in wartime, the valuation of knowledge for immediate and obvious ends, the prospect of radical political change, the general acceptance of the need for social and economic planning beyond the period of war
and the contribution of the universities to the war effort, provided a complex and controversial context within which sociologists sought to reassert and sustain their claims for intellectual and institutional recognition. The deputy Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, provided the necessary opportunity for the sociologists to once again pursue their discipline; the convening of the Committee of Inquiry into Social and Economic Research.

In chapter four, I focused attention on the various opportunities and frustrations confronting social science as it responded to the imperatives of a nation at war. All of the issues referred to immediately above, constituted the political and social turmoil within which sociology sought to revive itself. Sociology had become enmeshed in the controversy of the funding and control of the production of knowledge. Educational policy, and especially the distribution of resources to sustain research became, henceforth, some of the most important items on the political agenda. Understanding the implications of such a transformation in the funding and ordering of knowledge would, I argued, provide a corresponding appreciation of the issues which would confront sociology well into the post-war period. The social conditions of the time seemed conducive to a closer and certainly more active alignment between social science and the emergent, technological politics. The Clapham Committee, instigated at the request of Clement Attlee, represented the beginning of that association.

In chapter five, I endeavoured to highlight the significance of the Clapham debate in terms of the effect that its outcome would have on the hierarchy of British social science: an edifice erected in the pre-war era of seemingly limitless Rockefeller largesse and often, the selective interests of a few influential individuals. In particular, I focused on what I perceived to be two distinct lines of argument proffered by those participating in the aforementioned debate. There were those social scientists who regarded any form of control over the nature and direction of social and economic research (this also included the construction of the curriculum) as an unwarranted encroachment by the state
for political ends. Others contributing to the debate regarded the role of the state as a less totalitarian intervention, a somewhat more benign intrusion, with the added advantage of public funds to support research and teaching within the social sciences. The former group tended to comprise those social scientists who were well established in their respective fields, having enjoyed and benefitted from the institutional expansion of pre-war social science via the mechanism suggested above. Furthermore, their continued influence within the wider domain of social science might be seriously undermined, should public funding of their endeavours be entrusted to a central agency of the state. The question that arises here is whether or not this group of social scientists possessed genuine or alterior motives in springing to the defence of their respective disciplines. The latter group of social scientists, especially the sociologists welcomed the prospect of a reordering of the previously mentioned hierarchy. The sociologists had virtually everything to gain should social and economic research and teaching be centrally funded. This was, of course, based on the assumption that such funding would occur on an equitable basis and that all social science disciplines would receive the resources necessary for their future development, both as teaching and research activities. Public subvention of social science also appeared to threaten the structure of the private and voluntary funded research agencies and organisations which had evolved and prospered both before and during the war. The resolution of this conflict of interests revolved around the issue of a research council for the social sciences.

The research council debate occurred against the background of a more controversial though related issue; that of the relationship of the universities to the state in an age of social and economic planning. The Mannheimian project of a sociology engaged in such a reconstructionist exercise seemed in some large measure to indicate clearly, the general disposition of sociologists toward the role of the state in the sphere of higher education. This was for two reasons. First, as I pointed out in chapter five, the sociologists were looking to the universities to provide the necessary sites for sociology's future academic development. Second, the education debate, examined in chapter five, revealed the
major distinction between those who viewed the universities as inviolable institutions, to be protected from the political machinations of party and state; and those who regarded the universities as potentially the most essential group of institutions which could, if sufficiently democratised and equitably funded, play a vital role in the moral and social reconstruction of post-war Britain. The former group of individuals I referred to as supporters of the dispersed initiative, the latter contingent as proponents of centralised planning. Considered thus, I endeavoured to show the connection between the education debate and the issues which sustained the deliberations of the Clapham Committee. The arguments of the sociologists though directed in the main toward a strategic presentation of a case for a revived post-war, reconstructionist sociology, were, nevertheless, contingent upon, and yet derivative of the issues central to the debate on higher education.

The arguments put forward in the document entitled Vitalisation of Research in the Social Sciences, examined in chapter five, gave a clear indication of the inter-relationship between the education and research council debates. The author of the 'Vitalisation' document made the fundamental connection between socio-political interests and the growth of knowledge, citing the 'imaginary' danger of political control over the production of knowledge as a hang-over from laissez-faire. In retrospect, this may appear to be a somewhat naïve assumption on the part of those espousing the virtues of an unfettered social science, yet such an argument constituted a central component of the strategic discourse employed by sociologists during the period in question.

The dismissal of the case for a research council for the social sciences could be viewed as a victory for those members of the Clapham Committee who, ostensibly, viewed its establishment as a manifestation of state control of social science. Their views were, as I have suggested, influenced by the corresponding debate on the role of the state in relation to the universities. The arguments and strategies devised and deployed on the part of the sociologists and other sympathetic social scientists to counter the former case, failed to succeed for reasons other than
their inherent cogency and committed presentation. Rather, those who opposed the case for a council and an increased role for the state in education, held key appointments within those institutions and organisations engendering and espousing a concerted opposition (i.e. the University Grants Committee, the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, members of existing research councils and research institutes, and a number of the most influential of Britain's social science community, especially economists, in addition to the director of the L.S.E.). Furthermore, the objectors' arguments were framed within a somewhat elitist notion of the hierarchy of the social sciences, with economics as the apex and the other, under-labouring disciplines comprising the base. Such a conception of social science sprang from many intellectual and institutional sources, a number of which I have alluded to throughout the course of the text. When collectively expressed, they formed the impediments frustrating the aspirations of sociologists seeking to enhance the prospects of their fledgling discipline. The century was by then almost half way through and sociology, though clinging to the chances that may have arisen from the findings of the Clapham Report, coupled to the opportunities that may have arisen from the election of a Labour government intent on educational reform, had at least had the opportunity to participate in a debate that provided it with a platform to advocate its potential as a branch of knowledge and practice, crucial to the reconstruction of the post-war world. At least the hierarchy had been challenged and sociology had been placed on the agenda of not only those who would henceforth deliberate its intrinsic contribution to the field of social science, but it had also entered the public domain through the work of the Army Bureau of Current Affairs, gained allies and support through the interest of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, sought and found support within the coalition and Labour administrations. There was cause for a degree of optimism.

In the future, the sociologists' preoccupation with intra-disciplinary issues (i.e. methodology and epistemology and the nature and social purpose of post-war sociology) would henceforth, become activities of interest to non-sociologists within a number of organisations and for a variety of reasons. With the establishment of the welfare state, there arose a general consensus on the necessity of planning, the need for social
and economic information with which to formulate, implement and assess the effects of an increasing number of social and welfare policies, whether in the spheres of education, social security and social services, housing, or industry. The 'new world' may have arrived, but sociology had not entered it in very auspicious circumstances. The new political and social order of the post-war period seemed poised to create the opportunities sociologists needed, and yet, they would not be able to realise their aspirations to any significant degree until the middle 1960s. Ironically, the two issues which had previously given rise to the possibility of enhancing the prospects of sociology's wartime and post-war expansion, namely the establishment of a research council for the social sciences and the expansion of the system of higher education (albeit on a significantly larger scale), once again provided the institutional conditions and intellectual opportunities for sociologists to pursue their discipline by advocating its potential.

Ideally, I would like to have extended my examination of sociology's quest for autonomy into the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. However, to have done so, at least with the degree of detail in evidence in the present text, would have taken the work well beyond the conventional restrictions of a thesis. In attempting to fulfil some of the conditions of Donald MacRae's project for a history of sociology, namely the consideration and presentation of the minutiae of institutional history, it became essential to limit the period under investigation. This can have an adverse effect on the production of an historical account to the extent that, whatever may be gained in narrative detail, tends to be at the expense of an adequate timescale. The latter is essential in order to grasp some sense of change occurring within not only the social milieu of which sociology is part and parcel, but the corresponding cognitive and organisational transformations within sociology itself. Although I have touched upon several aspects of the development of sociology from the turn of the century to the immediate post-war period, it was through the adoption of an additional category to the more conventional approaches to analysis (namely, sociology's advocatory dimension) which allowed me to select what I considered to have been certain crucial
moments in sociology's history. They represented what I believe to be features of sociology's quest for intellectual and institutional autonomy. In one sense, the account has tended to be exclusive rather than inclusive. It was not possible to encompass every event which appeared to have either a direct or indirect bearing on sociology's becoming.

There is certainly a need to extend the use of the concept of sociology's advocatory dimension beyond the historical period covered in this project. This would then establish whether or not for instance, sociologists' tendency to deploy what I have referred to as strategic discourse in the pursuit of their discipline, characterises only the formative stages of the social construction of sociology. Is such a feature of sociology's acts of justification a fundamental and perennial component of its changing, historical form? The items included in the categories attributed to sociology's advocatory dimension represent phenomena which, although partially explored within the scope of this project, nevertheless require additional, detailed investigation. They would include areas of post-war and post Robbins changes in higher education, especially the negotiation of sociology syllabuses within the universities and polytechnics. The vital connection between individual sociologists' biographies and the history of the discipline; changing patterns of research, i.e. the 'resolution' of the research council debate and the expansion of postgraduate research in sociology. An examination of changing national needs, their inherent imperatives and the subsequent effect they have had on the ordering of knowledge in the decades following the Second World War. The effect of the latter on transformations within the national research base and the consequences of this for the development of sociology. A further examination of the criteria for the evaluation of knowledge and the problems this has posed for sociology since the last war and an analysis of the formulation and deployment of strategies by sociologists and others within the field of the human sciences, in response to contemporary criticism of sociology's knowledge claims. Finally, a comparative analysis of early and contemporary Inaugural Lectures for the reasons set out in chapter one. Such categories and contexts of sociology do not comprise an exhaustive list. However, they do suggest possible sites and media in which to explore the intellectual and institutional opportunities and constraints which have, and continue to affect sociology's quest for autonomy.
If I appear to have portrayed sociology's development as a continuous and unremitting struggle, with its practitioners perpetually contesting its identity within, and its authenticity without, then I think that, rather than view sociology's becoming as a pessimistic and crisis ridden odyssey within the western intellectual tradition, its continuously contested and contestable nature and purpose actually contain the source of sociology's vitality. Although Norman Birnbaum (1971) viewed sociology's 'fatal and recurrent crux' as the 'tension between ideology and science', I rather think it is the perpetual tension between sociology and its social agencies, in which it acts and by which those same activities are contained that constitute its central dynamic. This is bound to affect sociology's substantive dimension. Moreover, it would seem that in the 1980s, sociology's struggle to overcome such constraints provide the source of such intellectual and spiritual dignity as it possesses.
APPENDIX ONE
The Inaugural Lecture in Sociology

The inaugural lecture is important for several reasons, but especially because such an occasion presents sociology and its most recently and ritualistically esteemed professor, an opportunity to advocate on behalf of his, or her, chosen field within the discipline. It represents the creation or entrenchment of institutional space, in addition to a public proclamation of the kind of sociology that the 'professor' bears witness to, bearing in mind the current status of the discipline and the risk involved in shattering consensus. Most inaugural lectures therefore take the following form (Abrams, 1972), comprising three basic themes which may be treated either in combination, or, with one being given particular emphasis: a general survey of the discipline; acknowledgement of past achievements of predecessors and the identification of a singularly important tradition to be further advanced; the presentation of an agenda pointing to the important work to be done in the future. The inaugural lecture thus provides an ideal opportunity to advocate sociology amongst representatives of other branches of knowledge and within an institutional setting crucial to its existence. While it may be reasonable to criticise such an occasion as one of arcane tradition, or hollow ritual, in the formative period of sociology, such achievements were rare and opportune moments.
T.H. Marshall's classification of the intellectual cleavage within British inter-war Sociology.

During the inter-war period, the processes of specialisation and professionalisation continued to affect the differential growth of the various social sciences. Such differences were thrown into sharp relief when the competition for scarce resources, essential to the expansion of any branch of knowledge, became a focal point in their respective institutional careers. Moreover, it is worth contemplating the manner in which the case for sociology may have been presented for a synthetic science of society, had one of the practitioners on the other side of the pronounced intellectual cleavage within the discipline, occupied the strategic position of Chair-holder at the L.S.E. It is likely that the "field-study-empiricists" (one of a selective number of designations ascribed to this group by T.H. Marshall) may have encountered a less hostile and suspicious opposition to sociology's project, elaborated in detail during the pre-war conferences. Marshall's experiences of this crucial period in sociology's history have been alluded to previously, but it is, nevertheless, worthwhile citing his recollection of the general cognitive divide within the discipline during the inter-war period (Marshall, 1967, p.361):

"And underlying all their (Hobhouse and Westermarck's) work was the search for a theory on the grand scale, a theory of social development which would include within itself a theory, or theories, explanatory of the compatibility of institutional forms and the coherence of social systems.

Meanwhile slow but steady progress was being made on the other front, that of the field survey and quantitative analysis....

The result of this unfortunate cleavage was that academic or "professional" sociology had too little to do with fieldwork, had too little to do with sociological theory or, which is equally important, with the perspective that can be derived from historical and comparative studies. It was, of course, in the first of these two schools that the young sociologists were being trained."

Marshall's reference to the importance of the historical and comparative methods is significant, in that it highlights their central position within the particular methodological frameworks of those sociologists
who endeavoured to establish sociology at the core of a reconstructed
science of society. This was an integral feature of my examination
of that episode of its inter-war history. Although schematic diagrams
can often deprive an explanation of essential historical context and
related structural form, the following representation of sociology's
inter-war cleavage - encompassing its professional/academic and practical
wings - may serve as an indication of the discipline's diverging intellec-
tual and subsequently, institutional pre-war forms. It is based, in
the main, on T.H. Marshall's classifications (see Diagram 1 on following
page).

Geddes and Branford were associated with the discipline's practical
wing, and from the period around the First World War, the Society's
journal, the Sociological Review, tended to reflect their influence.
The latter was reinforced with the foundation of the Le Play House Trust
in 1920, by supporters of the Geddes school. Increasing emphasis began
to be placed on the correlation of the numerous civic surveys associated
with this group of sociologists. At about the same time, 1918/19, Hobhouse
established his 'Sociological Club' within the L.S.E., aimed at coordinating
the work of students 'in the fields of the social sciences.' The latter
move by Hobhouse may have represented a genuine attempt to stimulate
an interest within academic circles for a project to construct a syn-
thetic science of society. However, his gradual estrangement from the
activities and somewhat conflicting interests of the Sociological Society
would seem also to have been a contributory factor in his attempt to
cultivate support for a programme of development for sociology, that
diverged significantly from those associated with the Society. It should
also be remembered that while Hobhouse and subsequently Ginsberg occupied
the sole Chair in sociology in England during the inter-war period,
practitioners and protagonists of the discipline's practical wing
found important support within the same University and its School of
Economics and Political Science. Toward the end of the 1930s, Mass
Observation contributed to the popularisation of a form of sociological
analysis that its exponents regarded as infinitely superior both in
terms of scientific exactitude and 'relevance', to that of the detached
and grandiose abstractions of its academic counterpart. Those associated
with the discipline's practical wing tended to support the work of Tom
Harrison and his Mass Observation movement.
**Diagram 1**

**SOCIOMETRY IN BRITAIN: 1919-1939**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional Wing</th>
<th>Practical Wing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sociology as an academic subject: &quot;professional sociology.&quot;</td>
<td>Sociology as a rigorously scientific and empirical study based on quantitative analysis via the social survey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair at the L.S.E., 1907.</td>
<td>Sociological Society founded in 1903.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data/evidence derived via historical documents, first-hand observations/second-hand commentaries recorded by others.</td>
<td>The social survey employed as the central method of obtaining data/evidence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Sociological Society divided into several factions: practitioners representing various social sciences, specialists engaged in research, and those with general interests and, 'practical workers', encountering 'sociological problems' in the course of their work.

As diversity of subjects appeared in the Society's debates and publications, an attempt was made to broaden the view of the specialists in their respective fields, rather than attempt to develop a new 'synthetic science'.

Adherents of this 'school' propounded a synthetic sociology. The conferences of the 1930s used as a vehicle to advocate such a programme.

Proponents of the practical wing advocated the diffusion of a quantitative/empirical, "sociological approach" within the emerging specialisms.

Although it is convenient to portray the development of sociology within this period as comprising essentially, two distinct intellectual forms, this would tend to obscure the level of overlap and synthesis that often characterised sociological analysis in the years between the wars. Sociology's struggle extended beyond its internecine warfares to contests within the domain of what Beveridge referred to as, the more highly developed social sciences, especially economics. Sociology's intellectual boundaries were continually in dispute, with repeated attempts being made to construct programmes and agendas as a means of giving the discipline an element of disciplinary coherence and direction. However, such strategies implied the additional commitment to a definition of the subject, a dilemma which was compounded by profound disagreement over what could be effectively substantiated as a distinct corpus of theory and methods under the rubric, sociology. From such disagreement arose a number of disaffected groups and individuals who held the conviction that perhaps socialism, and not sociology, would usher in a polity which the latter discipline, for some of its aspirants at least, would serve only to provide endless social analysis, rather than social action. The 'promise' of sociology remained unfulfilled.
### TABLE OF EARMARKED GRANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>1 Total additional Expenditure for 1947/48 involved in Universities' proposals to the UGC.</th>
<th>2 Installments of Grant for 1947/48 already on account.</th>
<th>3 Recommended additional grants for 1947/48.</th>
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<td>£58,000</td>
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**Notes**

1. "The figures in column 1 are (a) those extracted from the quinquennial estimates as representing expenditure on new developments in the social sciences, plus (b), one fifth of the extra expenditure given in supplementary statements from the universities as likely to be incurred during the current quinquennium.

2. It was not thought worthwhile to propose any grant for the remainder of the session for those universities whose total expenditure is under £1,000." (UGC; 6/11/47).
A Summary of Existing Provision for Sociological Teaching and Research in England and Wales (1945)*

1. Universities

London School of Economics and Political Science

The largest and most comprehensive School specialised in the Social Studies.

Functions

Teaching - undergraduates and postgraduates. Also a centre of research in the abovementioned fields.

Chairs/Readerships - Martin White Chair of Sociology. Readership in Sociology. Two teaching posts in Sociology. One lectureship in Social Science.

Studentships/Fellowships - The Leon Fellowship: for the promotion of postgraduate or advanced research on any subject but preferably in the fields of Economics or education.

Gerstenberg Studentship: an award to postgraduates in Economics.

Fellowships/scholarships offered by the L.S.E. - tenable only at the School.

Cambridge

Chairs/Readerships - No Chair in Sociology. No Readerships in Sociology, Social Studies or Social Science. One in Political Science. Two readerships in Economics and one in Statistics.

Oxford

Chairs/Readerships - One Chair in Political Theory. No Readerships.

Institutes and Special Departments (Oxford) - Institute of Social Anthropology - Nuffield College - a 'special case' as far as Oxford is concerned. Established for the purpose of "objective research in social and economic problems", with the special intention of promoting collaboration in the study of these problems, between those engaged in academic work and those occupied in business and the social services. The College is designed exclusively for postgraduate research.

* Based on a memorandum submitted to the Clapham Committee by Sir Henry Clay, (T161/1301/54680/3, 1945).
Manchester

Chairs/Readerships - No Chairs in Sociology. One in Social Economics. No Readerships. Significant concentration on Economics and Statistics. A research section in the Faculty of Commerce and Administration.

Birmingham

Chairs/Readerships - No Chairs in Sociology. A Department in Social Studies.

Liverpool

Chairs/Readerships - Charles Booth Chair of Social Science. Two Readerships in Social Statistics. One lecture­ship in Social Science, with the remainder in Social Statistics and Economics.

Leeds

Chairs/Readerships - No Chairs or Readerships in Sociology or Social Studies. One lecturer in Social Policy and Economics. Diploma course on 'Social Organisation'.

University College Nottingham

Chairs/Readerships - None in Sociology. Lecturers in Political and Social Theory. Director and Assistant Directors in Social Studies.

Wales University College Aberystwith

Chairs/Readerships - None in Sociology. Political Science 'well represented here'. So too Economics and Political Science.

University College South Wales

Chairs/Readerships - Chair in Political Science.

University College Swansea

Chairs/Readerships - Chair in Economics. Assistant Lectureship in Economics.
2. Societies which promote, sponsor or initiate sociological research.

Royal Statistical Society - For the study and application of statistical methods in industrial and agricultural production.

Royal Economic Society - Unspecified.

Manchester Statistical Society - For the collection of facts illustrating the condition of society. The discussion of political and social theory on a non-party political basis.

Royal Geographical Society - Unspecified.

Royal Anthropological Society - Unspecified.

British Association for the Advancement of Science - Comprising a number of specialist 'Sections', including, Economics, Psychology, Geography and Anthropology.

Institute of Sociology - Le Play House, formerly the Sociological Society. Its object is to promote the investigation and education of the social sciences. To promote common ground for the meeting of workers from all fields and schools concerned with social phenomena.

3. Institutes which promote, sponsor or initiate sociological research.

Institute of International Affairs - For the encouragement of scientific study of international affairs.

National Institute of Economic and Social Research - A specialised, independent institution supplementing university departments and acting as a channel of communication between academic research and government departments. Concerned with realistic and statistical work in the field of economics and social studies. Its field of work lies mainly in the measurement of changes, the discovery of trends and the analysis of structure.

National Institute of Industrial Psychology - For research into the problems of industrial and vocational psychology affecting the human factor in occupational life.

Institute of Public Administration - For the development of the Civil Service, municipal and other public services as a profession.
Political and Economic Planning

Main objective: to define the 'facts' bearing on any given problem in the social and economic fields; to interpret them accurately and honestly; to draw sound conclusions and policy from them. PEP defined as an 'Educational Trust' governed by Trustees on a Governing Council. Non-political and non-profit making. Maintains close contact with industry.

4. Other Associations, Societies and Groups

The Fabian Society

- 'For the education of the public in the general problems of socialist policy; research into these problems, preparation of detailed and practical schemes for implementing such policy.'

The Association for Planning & Regional Reconstruction Ltd.

- For the preparation of surveys and plans on a regional scope in any area. For the encouragement of 'factual' research.

Association for Education and Citizenship

- Its main object was, "to advance training in the moral qualities necessary for the citizens of a democracy; the encouragement of clear thinking in every day affairs and the acquisition of the knowledge of the modern world." The Association started its work through an investigation of the "best" methods for education in citizenship for different sections of the educational system of Great Britain. It appointed committees to investigate and report on the work of its seven different sections.

Barnet House

- "To advance the systematic study of social and economic questions. To advise and train men and women who wish to take-up social work, either under the state, or in settlements, or the voluntary organisations."

5. Trusts and Foundations

(British)

a) Leverhulme Trust
b) Pilgrim Trust
c) Nuffield Trust
d) Halley Stuart Trust
e) Seebolme Rowntree Trust
f) Rowntree Trust
g) Bournville Village Trust
h) Carnegie Trust
a) The Rockefeller Foundation
b) Carnegie Corporation

I have not listed the entire contents of Clay's memorandum to the Clapham Committee. The above sections are representative of almost all of the organisations engaged in the promotion of "sociological" teaching and research. The contents also give a fairly accurate indication of both the liberal interpretation of the notion 'sociological', and the heterogeneous nature of the institutional context in which such research was either sponsored, promoted or initiated.
APPENDIX FIVE
SOCIOMETRY AND SOCIAL WORK TRAINING: THE UNIVERSITIES

It was not uncommon in the first years of this century to hear arguments which considered universities as quite disreputable institutions for the pursuit of studies about social questions and their possible solution by practical methods. This represented the extreme view. Others were more tolerant of the potential for attaching 'schools' of training in social work to the universities, their arguments being tempered by the belief, that although they may be inappropriate institutions they could, nevertheless, facilitate a more practical basis for that vocation. Leubuscher (1946, p.22) refers to these attitudes in a short survey of facilities for training in social service:

"Affiliation to the university was opposed from an academic point of view especially by Professor Chapman, Manchester University and by Professor Foxwell of University College, London."

The universities had to be protected from mixing up theory and practice in its teaching. Furthermore, and indicative of a perennial and invincible prejudice which frustrated early attempts to introduce sociology into higher education (1946, p.22):

"It was imperative that the teaching of the Universities should be free from any suspicion of bias in controversial matters."

This is in contrast to Leubuscher's citation of another commentator on the prospect of introducing courses for those training in social service (Leubuscher, p.22):

"... that they would be wiser to keep clear of the universities which, in social questions, were amateurish and academic and were designed to produce graduates."

Notwithstanding the latter's admonition, it was generally argued that the inclusion of social work training within the realm of the university and in accordance with strict scientific principles, would somehow
imbue the service with professional status. The attempt to give social workers a systematic and soundly practical training via the creation of departments of social science and social study, provides an explanation of the evolution of several of the older departments bearing those titles in English universities. I wish to examine briefly the history of the School of Sociology as an example of this development.

A history of the School is contained in Charlotte Leubuscher's contribution to a short work co-authored with T.H. Marshall (Marshall and Leubuscher, 1946). The transformation of the School into the Social Science Department of the London School of Economics is an episode in the history of sociology which is noticeably absent from Philip Abrams' definitive work on the subject (Abrams, 1968). This is somewhat puzzling in view of the depth of his analysis and requires brief consideration if only to highlight Leubuscher's account.

Abrams examines the apparent parallelism of Edwardian sociology (I use the term in its broadest sense) and the eventual institutionalisation of the major strains of sociological thought of the period. On the one hand there was the 'pure', theoretically oriented account of the nature of sociology. Hobhouse carried this tradition with him to the new Department of Sociology at the L.S.E. in 1907. Although much is made of the fact that this was the first Chair in the subject, it in no way represented the academic enshrinement of the pre-eminent tendency within prevailing sociological thought. On the other hand, there was the Sociological Society, an organisation which served the needs of those who espoused an eclectic, pragmatic and empirical brand of sociology. Statistics, Eugenics, Civics, Education and Social Economy were well represented within the Society. In fact, all the aforementioned, apart from statistics enjoyed committee status within the Society. This structure was dominated by two of the committees, which in turn, owed their strength to the power and influence of their most prestigious members. Abrams argues that with the creation of the Department of Social Science, the divergence of academic sociology had been confirmed. For Abrams the intellectual and organisational differences within the Sociological Society had, by the First World War, been carried into the L.S.E. (Abrams, 1968, p.113):
"... the recognition in the 1920's that peaceful coexistence between divergent modes of social science and not an integrated sociology was the best that could be expected in the immediate future."

The School of Sociology and Social Economics was established in 1903* on the initiative of Charles Loch. It became the Social Science Department of the London School of Economics in 1913.† In its pre-university form, it enjoyed the patronage and active support of a number of university lecturers, who, as Leubuscher points out, "supplied a large part of the theoretical instruction" (Leubuscher, p.22). Loch, Tooke, Price, Geddes and W.H. Beveridge were among those who performed the aforementioned task. They were also major contributors to the Sociological Society and its journal. Its Director, E.J. Urwick, headed the new Department at the L.S.E. upon its establishment in 1913. Abrams may have described him as an advocate of the older ameliorist tradition of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, but during his office as director of the School of Sociology, he encouraged an approach to social problems which was reminiscent of Hobhouse's philosophical construction of them. Such an approach in no way displaced the emphasis upon training and the interventionist theme of social work education. Rather, it was to serve as a complementary dimension to the syllabus. This is an important point, in view of the subsequent institutionalisation of sociology, albeit in its divergent academic forms. Leubuscher summarises the attempt by the School's Director to balance the curriculum (Leubuscher, p.23):

"The School lived up to the obligation implied in its name, for the syllabus showed a distinctly sociological approach to social problems, and was less determined by immediate practical concerns..."

* D.C. Marsh has the date as 1901 (cf. Marsh, D.C., (1965)), An Introduction to the Study of Social Administration, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

† Again Marsh has the year as 1912, (Marsh, 1965).
The syllabus was divided into three areas: Social Theory and Administration; Sociology, which, according to Leubuscher, included the analysis of social structure, the history of social growth and change, and the theory of the 'social forces' and their interactions; and practical instruction in Poor Law Administration. It could be that the somewhat fierce partisanship implied in Abrams' account of the divergence between the two major traditions within sociology, coalesced in the Department of Social Science's embryonic form — the School of Sociology. There are two additional points to bear in mind when considering the importance of the School and its subsequent transition to a university department.

First, the School served, in many respects, as a model for the schools of social work training which were established in other parts of the country in the period before the First World War. For example, the School in Liverpool. This School was eventually fully incorporated into the University of Liverpool before the First World War. The School had had a long and close association with the University prior to this. Second, other universities began to introduce Social Studies courses either by way of coordinating series of isolated courses of lectures on 'social subjects', or, from the outset as quite separate schools in their own right. Birmingham, Leeds and Bristol were universities where this pattern of institutionalisation occurred. Apart from the professional kudos which accrued from inclusion within the system of higher education, the emerging departments of social studies/sciences provided not only a basis for social work training, but served as institutional sites for incorporating later developments within the field of sociology. Understanding the intellectual ethos and institutional function of such departments enhances a clearer appreciation of sociology's developmental form between the wars and into the post-war era. Moreover, Leubuscher's account explains the importance of the department of Social Study/Science to the less well established subjects within the wider field of British Social Science (Leubuscher, 1946, p. 25):

"Within the universities, the Departments have supplied the framework for instruction in a number of subjects, concerned with the study of society, for which, mainly because of their relative novelty, there was little interest in other Departments.
It is thus to a large extent due to the Social Science Departments that subjects like Social Economics, Social Administration, Social Psychology, and Criminology have found a place in the curricula of some universities."

I think it reasonable to add sociology to Leubuscher's list of disciplines, as subjects which benefitted from the post-war expansion in social science in Britain, especially during the post-Robbins/Heyworth period (cf. K. Jones, 1971).
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