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ABSTRACT

THE REGIONAL GEOPOLITICS OF THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR.

John G. O'Reilly.

Security of passage of the Strait of Gibraltar is an imperative for the world community. To achieve this, there must be stability on the northern and southern shores of the Strait. Peace in the region is currently threatened by the "creeping jurisdiction" which both Spain and Morocco wish to exert over the waters of the Strait. Other factors which threaten stability are the historical rivalry which exists between Spain and the Islamic southern shore; the legacy of disputed sovereignty in the Crown Colony of Gibraltar and the Spanish Plazas in North Africa; the economic divide between the EC and Maghreb along the Strait axis; and the possible threat of militant Islam. Contentions also exist between Morocco and Algeria, eg the Western Saharan War. The re-establishment of a strong "power hierarchy" in the area must be supported by such international instruments as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982). The Crown Colony and the Spanish Plazas must be decolonized once Spain is firmly integrated into the EC and NATO, and once Morocco has reached a level of economic and political development that is conducive to closer ties with Western institutions.
THE REGIONAL GEOPOLITICS OF THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR.

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Durham.

Department of Geography, University of Durham.

DECLARATION

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ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

AACR...........The Association for the Advancement of Civil Rights.
ACE.................................Allied Command, Europe.
ACLANT............................Allied Command, Atlantic.
AFSOUTH...........................Allied Forces, Southern Region.
Baksheesh (Backsheesh)...............Bribes, gratuity, tip.
Bidonvill................................Shantytown.
B/O........................................Barrels of oil.
Dar al Harb................................Lands of war.
Dar al Islam.............................Lands of peace.
Dar al Subh: Lands where Muslims live under non-Islamic regimes.
Dar al Muhajirin.....................Lands with Muslim refugees.
EC...............................(EEC) European Community.
EEZ........................................Exclusive Economic Zone.
Emir..............Prince of the Faithful (descendant of the Prophet).
FAR.................Forces Armée Royal (Royal Armed Forces) (Morocco).
FLN.....................(NLF) Front de Liberation National (Algeria).
GDP...............................Gross Domestic Product.
GNP...............................Gross National Product.
HQ.................................Headquarters.
IBERLANT............................Iberian Atlantic Command.
ICJ.................................International Court of Justice.
ICNT...........Informal Composite Negotiating Text (UNCLOS 1982).
ICO...............................Islamic Conference Organization.
IMO..............................International Maritime Organization.
ITM.........................(MTI) Islamic Tendency Movement (Tunisia).
IWBP..................Integration With Britain Party.  (Gibraltar).
Jihad...................................................... Holy war.

LNG............................................. Liquified Natural Gas.

LOS.................................................. Law of the Sea.

LPG............................................. Liquified Petroleum Gas.

LTDP............................................. Long-Term Defence Program (USA).

Maghreb........................................ North Africa.

Mare clausum...................................... Closed seas.

Mare liberum..................................... Freedom of the seas.

Medersas......................................... Islamic educational institution.

Medina........................................ Arab city/town (traditional urban centre).

MEDOC.......................................... Western Mediterranean Command.

MOD.............................................. Ministry of Defence.

Mujahidin........................................ Muslim soldier (guerrilla).

MTI............. (ITM) Mouvement de Tendance Islamique (Tunisia).

NATO............................................. North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NAVOCFORMED................................. Naval On-Call Force, Mediterranean.

NLF.................. (FLN) Algerian National Liberation Front.

nm................................................. nautical miles.

OAU............................................... Organization of African Unity.

ODA.............................................. Overseas Development Authority.

OR................................................. Official Records.

PCE.............................................. Communist Party of Spain.

Plazas............. Spanish Sovereign Territories in North Africa.


Politische Ansammlung.. Indirect control of strait states by the seapowers.

Presidios: Literally 'penal colony', but used in relation to the Spanish Territories in North Africa.
PSOE................ Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (Spanish Workers Socialist Party).

RAF................................. Royal Airforce (UK).

RAF.................. (FAR) Royal Armed Forces (Morocco).

RDF............................... Rapid Deployment Force/Central Command.

Res Communis................................. Common ownership.

Res Nullis................................. Sovereignless.

Ribat..................................... Islamic monastery-fort.

RN........................................ Royal Navy (UK).

SACEUR................................. Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

SACLANT................................. Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

SADR........................... Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic.

(El) Sharia.................................... Islamic Law.

SNT.... Single Negotiating Text (used in preparations for UNCLOS (1982)).

Souk.................................... Arab market.

SOVMEDRON...................... Soviet Mediterranean Fleet.

SSBN.................................. Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine.

STANAVFORLANT................... Standing Naval Force, Atlantic.


UCD............................... Union of the Democratic Center (Spain).

Umma................................. The global Islamic community.


UNGA.............................. United Nations General Assembly.

VLCC................................. Very Large Crude Carriers.

Wahhada........................... "Oneness", unity in Islamic community.

Zaouias.............................. Islamic educational institution.
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The research on which this thesis is based was conducted over the period 1984 to 1987. In addition some of the information presented here, particularly in relation to Islam and the Arab world result from the author's six year sojourn in the Maghreb (1978-84). I wish to acknowledge the financial assistance of of the Department of Geography, University of Durham, for fieldtrips to the study area, attendance at international conferences and the purchase of computer data. Dr Gerald Blake was most supportive in my application for these funds.

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I would like to acknowledge the friendly assistance of the Right Honourable Bruce George MP, for arranging visits to the House of Commons, and interviews with people dealing with Mediterranean affairs. Access to reading material at the House of Commons proved invaluable to the research. The advice and encouragement of Dr George Joffe (SOAS) in relation to material on the Arab world and particularly Morocco is greatly appreciated. Though limited, the data supplied by the Spanish and Moroccan Embassies (London), were most welcome. The essential data for shipping and transit of the Strait of Gibraltar was most kindly provided by Lloyd's Maritime Information Services and A and P Appledore Ltd. The correspondence of Dr Louis Saliba, Director of the Mediterranean Action Plan (UN Environmental Program) was greatly appreciated. The director and staff of the Arab League headquarters (Tunis), were also most kind in providing information on the Maghreb and related issues.

I should like to thank the people of Gibraltar for their hospitality and help, particularly Sir Howard Davis, Deputy Governor (1971-78) and Financial and Development Secretary (1965-71); the Director and staff of the Garrison Library; Mr Bill Thomas, former manager of HM Dockyard; Mr Brian Abbott, Director of 'Gibrepair'; the Port Captain, F. Haywood; Captain Prior, Assistant Port Captain; Dr John and Mrs Mary Fitzpatrick; Mrs Dorothy Ellicott (descendant of Admiral Rooke who helped establish the British presence in Gibraltar in the 18th century) local historian, founder of the Gibraltar Museum and first woman politician to take office in Gibraltar; Mr Mike Banner, the Chief Lighthouse Keeper; Mr Tony Calaghan, history teacher; Mr
J.P. Gibbins, Ministry of the Environment; and Lieutenant Commander, T.G. Lowrie (RN/NATO Gibraltar). A day spent in the company of Mr John Searle, Editor of the Gibraltar Chronicle, proved to be one of the most interesting and informative experiences during the research period. The assistance of Sr Paula Mc Corrie and Community of the Loreto Sisters (Europa Point Convent) was invaluable in the arrangement of interviews, introductions to politicians and Gibraltarian society. Trips in the Strait area and accommodation on board the Omega, were made available by Captain Jon Van Damen. Besides the incredible hospitality and homely accommodation offered by Marighéad and Tito Gabay, (of the Gibraltarian civil service), they also helped arrange introductions and interviews.

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A special acknowledgement is given to Profs. Saul Cohen, George Mikesell, Louis Alexander, and John Agnew for giving of their valuable time and comments on the geopolitics of the
research area, and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS 1982). Discussions with Professor Bernard Oxman, member of the US delegation at UNCLOS III, were also most informative. Concerning the LOS and straits, Dr Rob Smith, the Geographer, for the US Department of State was of invaluable assistance on several occasions, particularly as his own post graduate research had been on the topic of international straits. The variety of data from every possible source and in all languages provided by the Library of Congress, Washington DC, proved to be a treasure trove of information; many thanks to Bruce Martin, Director of Research Facilities, and the staff of the Library for their patience and assistance, and valuable office space provided.

In conclusion I would like to thank my family, especially my mother, Kathleen O'Reilly, and my sister, Olive Doody, for their support and encouragement. Also many thanks to Lindsay Boocock for her valuable comments and suggestions in relation to the production of this thesis, and invaluable help with cartographical materials.
PREFACE.

This preface outlines the aims, major themes and structure of the thesis, sketching the methods employed, the data sources and the problems encountered.

The author's interest in the western Mediterranean region dates largely from 1978, when I went to live in Algeria, intending to stay there for one year. However I remained in the Maghreb for six years, working at academic institutions in Algeria (1978-81) and Tunisia (1981-84), and travelling widely in Morocco, Spain, France, Italy and the Arab world. My interest in the political geography of the region and Islam laid the foundations for my MA thesis in geography (O'Reilly, 1983); and has led to further research in the geopolitics of the Maghreb and Iberia. Any understanding of the western Mediterranean region requires an indepth analysis of the pivotal role of the Strait of Gibraltar, linking the Atlantic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea, and joining the EC to the Arab world.

Aims:
The aim of this study is to analyse the interaction between regional and global power protagonists in the western Mediterranean region, with particular reference to the Gibraltar area. This embraces the themes of the importance of straits in international commerce and naval deployment, use of Gibraltar, and the issue of sovereignty over waters in the Strait region, and implications of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS 1982) for Gibraltar. In attempting to elucidate geopolitical processes in the region, a major theme is that of the "disputed sovereignty" of the Crown Colony of Gibraltar and the Spanish Plazas in North Africa. However as the geopolitics of Gibraltar are closely inter-related with global processes, it is important to juxtapose global geopolitical models with regional factors such as the EC and Islam. An understanding of these themes should help to further peace and security in the area (see figure 1).

This study is unique in that it attempts explanation with reference to the LOS, decolonization, Islamic fundamentalism and politics in the Gibraltar region. The Strait's cardinal role in the global order is the all important background to these political movements and events. Sectoral studies do exist relating to such aspects of Gibraltar's geography as the history of the Crown Colony and the International Tangier Zone (1923-56), Morocco's role in the Arab world and so on; but to date no work exists which attempts to embrace the entire geopolitical mosaic of the Gibraltar region.

Hypothesis:
The central hypothesis of this work is that security of passage of Gibraltar is an imperative for the world community. To achieve this, there must be stability on the northern and southern shores of the Strait.

This is currently threatened by: (i) the "creeping sovereign jurisdiction" which both Spain and Morocco wish to exert over the waters of the Strait; (ii) the historical rivalry which exists between Spain and the Islamic southern shore; (iii)
the legacy of disputed territories and hence the acrimonious issue of "decolonization" of the Crown Colony of Gibraltar and the Spanish Plazas in North Africa; (iv) the so called North-South divide along the Strait axis; and (v) the possible threat of militant Islam. Hence dialectics exist between Morocco and Spain, and between them and the major powers. In the global political order there is rivalry not only between the first-order powers, but second-order regional powers like Spain, Morocco and Algeria. These antagonisms are accentuated by the issues of legal transit passage regimes, decolonization, unbalanced EC-Maghrebi trading relations, and anti-Western sentiments among militant Muslims. Morocco and Algeria are struggling for predominance in the area. These second-order regional powers have a significant role to play in relation to the first-order powers such as the USA, USSR and EC, as well as in the Mediterranean, Arab and Muslim worlds. Instability in Morocco, especially if galvanized into militancy by Islamic fundamentalists could threaten the balance of power. The fundamentalists seek not only to "liberate" Morocco from the present political regime, but also the Plazas from Spanish rule, and to challenge the present international order, particularly the power of the West. Because of the power hierarchy which existed in the Strait area between the 18th century and the 1960s, with Britain at the apex, security could be ensured by a combination of "force" and international "accords". If the Crown Colony and the Plazas are decolonized, there will be a radical restructuring of the power hierarchy in the Strait region.

A synthesis of the geographical and political factors shows that security of the Strait has been maintained in the historical context by a combination of force and legitimizing treaties. To ensure future stability, the Crown Colony of Gibraltar must be eventually retroceded to Spain and the Spanish Plazas returned to Morocco, once Spain is firmly integrated into the EC and NATO, and when Morocco has gained a level of economic and political stability conducive to greater positive political interaction with such Western institutions as the EC and NATO. Morocco, Spain, Britain and the USA must give greater support to the LOS (1982), which could be strengthened by additional accords catering specifically for the Strait of Gibraltar.

Structure:
In Part One, the geopolitical and legal attributes of straits are examined. Chapter one seeks to analyse the geographical heterogeneity of straits in the global context, particularly the problem of definitions for straits and the eternal dialectic between state hegemonism and freedom of the seas. In chapter two, we look at the use made of Gibraltar by international shipping, and the Strait's political and legal history. In chapter three, the geographical phenomenon of straits is juxtaposed with the institution of legal regimes for straits, and the quest for a legal passage regime for Gibraltar. The complexity of the situation is illustrated by the different viewpoints of the riparian states, and those of the major seapowers, in relation to the rights and duties of nations
wishing to make transit of Gibraltar.

Part Two deals with the history and politics of Gibraltar. In chapter four, the history and continuity of competition between the riparian states, Morocco and Spain, and between them and outside powers is examined. Particular attention is paid to the fragmentation and attempted internationalization of the southern shore of the Strait, in the form of the Tangier Neutral Zone (1923-56) and the Cape Spartel Lighthouse (1865-1956) during the colonial era. The partial success of these experiments until 1956 was made possible by the colonial presence of Britain on the northern shore. The Spanish presence in Ceuta, provided the second pillar of the geopolitical hierarchy in the region. Chapter five examines the geopolitical role which Spain has played on the southern shore of the Strait since the 15th century from the Ceuta and Melilla bases. With the winds of change still sweeping the region, possible future scenarios concerning the disputed Plazas are analysed in depth. Chapter six examines the historical and geopolitical significance of the Gibraltar Crown Colony. The issue of its disputed sovereignty between Britain and Spain and possible future scenarios are discussed.

Part Three presents the Strait in the regional and global geopolitical contexts. Chapter seven looks at geopolitical models and the role of Gibraltar in global and superpower organizational structures. Chapter eight examines intra and extra-Maghrebi affairs from the viewpoint of future stability in the region.

Methodology:

In general the methodology used is based on a combination of inductive and deductive processes within a broad empirical framework. This has included many interviews, both oral and "written" in the target study area, closely following Maghrebi and European media analyses of events pertinent to the region, extensive travel, library searches and analysis of shipping data.

In the past, geopolitical analyses were carried out from a purely quantitative perspective, which enhanced our geographical knowledge, but did little to elucidate the political processes and "realities" of the chief protagonists in any geopolitical study, the people who inhabit the target study area. In this study, quantitative techniques are only employed in so far as they support a humanistic perspective.

Because of the complex nature of this study, a "doctrinaire" approach or "rigid schematic viewpoint" have not been adopted. The issues involved such as "international rights", "decolonization", "security" and "Islamic militancy" could lend themselves to extremist viewpoints and interpretations.

If the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS) (1982) was comprehensive enough to cater for all problems relating to international usage of straits, then there would be far fewer contentions between Spain and Morocco, and between them and other states. Unfortunately for all its merits, the LOS (1982)
has not solved all the problems. Yet some analysts persist in invoking the LOS (1982) in disputes as if it were a deus ex machina. Likewise the issue involved in the Crown Colony and Spanish Plazas sovereignty dispute, is not merely a "classical" case of decolonization. However some analysts invoke the UN principles of "self determination" or "territorial integrity" as the panacea to these disputes. By examining a broad number of factors which go to constitute the geopolitics of the Gibraltar region, it is hoped to present the complex inter-linkages which will shape future processes and events in the region.

Research:
This section includes field-work, travels, interviews and experiences, as well as data sources.

Having lived in the Maghreb for six years (1978-84) and travelling extensively in the research area as well as the Middle East (1978-85) has given the author a thorough knowledge of the geography, politics and languages of the region. Trips to the Spanish Territories in North Africa (1979, 1981, 1985), Spain (1982, 1985) and the Crown Colony of Gibraltar (1985) helped reinforce knowledge of the Gibraltar area. Library searches in several countries, and interviews with experts in the USA (December 1985-August 1986) were also of immense value.

While in the Maghreb, it was possible to carry out some 300 oral and "essay-type" interviews with students and staff at the local universities. Because of the secretive nature of Maghrebi society, and the respective national preoccupations with security, many of the "written" interviews were conducted by non-formal methods, as questionnaires were not appropriate. Themes relating to Islam, fundamentalism and politics were largely undertaken with university students as part of their European-language projects, and hence an "essay-type" approach was often employed by the author. Topics relating to fundamentalism, Israel/Palestine, and decolonization of the Spanish Plazas, often led to vivacious debate, but on occasion were investigated by the university or police authorities. Interviews (in French, Arabic and English) included the themes of nationalism, inter-Maghrebi relations, Arabism, Berberism, Islam and fundamentalism. Similar themes were explored with Maghrebi intellectuals, journalists, dissidents and fundamentalists.

While there is relative freedom of movement in the Maghreb, sometimes problems are encountered. For instance on two occasions (1980, 1982), the Moroccan border police confiscated Michelin and other touristic maps, which they claimed were banned in Morocco "because of the inaccurate boundaries illustrated on the maps". Also it was difficult to travel in the Tindouf region of Algeria, and interviews with the Saharawi people were almost impossible to arrange. While travelling in the northern Algerian-Moroccan border area in the early 1980s, the author was taken into custody by members of the Algerian army, and brought under military escort to the Oran barracks; however the author was released within a few hours, once it was confirmed that I was an employee of the Algerian Ministry of Education. In 1982, the author was threatened at the University
of Tunis by one fundamentalist group, who misconstrued non-participation in a strike at the university as being anti-Islamic. However on the whole, the Maghrebis were most hospitable and willing to discuss grass-root issues, once promises of anonymity had been assured. The respective national presses of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia also proved a valuable source of information, especially Al Bayane, El Moudjahid, Algérie Actualité and La Presse de Tunisie. An understanding of the region was also helped by closely following the Spanish, British and French (eg Sur, The Times, The Guardian). Staff at the headquarters of Le Monde in Paris were most helpful in procuring back-issues of the paper and Le Monde Diplomatique. Members of the Annaba section of the Algerian National Liberation Front also gave of their time in explaining intra-Maghrebi and Arab affairs.

Extensive travels were undertaken in Morocco (1979, 1981, 1985), these included the Atlas Mountains and Mediterranean coastal regions, and most Moroccan cities, particularly Marrakech, Fez, Casablanca, Rabat and Tangier. Fieldwork in the cities included spending time in the "bidonvilles". The "Casa bidonvilles" are a microcosm of all the problems which exist in Morocco and the Muslim world in general. The clearest insight into the complex world of fundamentalist revolution in ferment is possible in the Moroccan "bidonvilles" and on university campuses. At Tangier (1985), interviews were carried out with the Port Authorities, the French Consul, teachers and journalists, and the local population, particularly those in the Medina and "bidonvilles". The staff at the American Legation Museum and Archives were most helpful in giving access to data concerning the American presence in the area since the 19th century and the International Zone (1923-56). Unfortunately the Moroccan authorities were unable to find suitable times to permit a visit of the interior of the once International Cape Spartel Lighthouse. Interviews with bureaucrats and agencies in Morocco proved less fruitful than in other countries.

Fieldwork was also undertaken in the Spanish Territories in North Africa (1979-85). The tourist bureaus and port authorities were most helpful as were the local populations, however bureaucrats were more difficult to interview. Nonetheless, the port authorities at Ceuta were most willing to be interviewed. Once again, the local press in Ceuta and Melilla often facilitated a greater understanding of the areas. Trips to Madrid, Cordoba, Seville and Algeciras (1983, 1985) afforded a greater appreciation of the interconnections between Spanish and Maghrebi cultures. The port authorities at Algeciras (1985) though greatly pressed for time were helpful in discussing maritime traffic in the area, the intensity of cross-Strait traffic, trafficking and Spanish attitudes to the Crown Colony of Gibraltar.

Over 50 interviews were conducted at Gibraltar (1985), these included Royal Navy/NATO staff, representatives from the port authorities and commercial port businessmen, local politicians, notables, bureaucrats, teachers and reporters. A visit to the Europa Point Lighthouse, and the Signal Hill
Station with its communications centre and radar system was most helpful in coming to appreciate the international nature (including type and variety) of traffic which make transit of the Strait; and also security interests in the area. Several days were spent counting the average number of ships which transit the Strait from the vantage points of Gibraltar, Ceuta and Tangier (March–April 1985). Ten days were spent living on a yacht in the Gibraltar port (March 1985).

Other interviews were carried out with politicians and staff at the House of Commons, and the Spanish and Moroccan embassies in London. Lloyd’s Maritime Information Services, A and P Appledore Shipping Information Services, and the International Wheat Council (London) were helpful with interviews and supplying computer data. However, high costs were a prohibitive factor in obtaining more computer data from Lloyds concerning shipping in the Strait area for specific years (see chapter 2).

Discussions and interviews were also carried out with experts at conferences, eg the Law of the Sea Institute Conference (Cardiff, 1985) and the Association of American Geographer’s annual general meeting (Minneapolis–St Paul, 1986), as were meetings with geographers and international lawyers in the USA (1986), including Dr. Robert Smith, the Geographer for the US Department of State, Professor Saul B. Cohen, and Professor Louis Alexander (see acknowledgements). Maps and data on maritime limits, and the Spanish Plazas were supplied by the Geographer, US Department of State.

Library Searches:
Libraries where work has been carried out by the author include the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) Library, Annaba; the Bibliothèques Nationales of Tunisia and France (1981–84); the Centre des Recherches Maghrébines (Charles de Gaulle Centre), Tunis (1981–84); the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham; the Palace Green Library, University of Durham (for international law and the LOS) (1984–1987); the British Library (1984–1987); the House of Commons Library, London (March 1985); the Garrison Library, Gibraltar (April 1985); the American Legation Museum and Library, Tangier (April 1985); the Centre for Maghrebi Studies, UCLA, California (December 1985); the Ohio State University Library, Columbus (January–June 1986) and the Library of Congress, Washington, DC (June–August 1986). Lloyd’s Maritime Information Services also gave access to reading materials.

As with the press and interview sources, library research was conducted in English, French, Spanish and Arabic which enriched the overall viewpoint, and helped counterbalance some of the respective national prejudices. The author is responsible for all translations and hence any possible mistakes.

Maps:
All major atlas sources consulted are indicated in the body of the thesis and in the bibliography, eg (Couper, 1984, p.12), as are materials supplied by different international and state organizations. Of particular help were the cartographical
materials dealing with world straits, shipping lanes and the
Spanish Plazas supplied by the Geographer, US Department of
State. A major source of maps, aerial photographs and satellite
imagery were the House of Commons, Seventh Report from the
Foreign Affairs Committee Gibraltar: The Situation of Gibraltar
and UK Relations with Spain, (1980-81); The Spanish Red Book on
Gibraltar: Gibraltar in the Spanish Cortes, (1965); and
Negotiations on Gibraltar (A New Spanish Red Book) (1968) (see
bibliography).

Bibliography:
The bibliography includes all the principal works
consulted, such as government publications, reports, published
and unpublished materials, conventions and treaties, and a
selection of the major press articles used. Within the body of
the thesis the author's name or key words (treaties, reports,
press articles) are used, with the relevant dates. Full details
of all sources are arranged alphabetically in the bibliography.

Conclusion:
In conclusion, it may be said that at present this thesis
is particularly pertinent because of the themes which it
embraces. World attention has been focussed on issues related
to the passage rights of the USA and global community in the
claimed territorial waters of Spain (1967, 1986), Libya (1981,
1986) and Iran (1987). The mayhem in Lebanon and the
Arab/Persian Gulf, and the Arab/Israeli imbroglio threaten world
peace. The transportation of oil to the West has become a
global preoccupation. The rise of militant Islamic
fundamentalism since 1979 has captured the attention of the
world. Recurrent topical affairs in the 1980s in the media are
fishing disputes (eg Spain-Morocco and Britain-Argentina); and
the problem of disputed sovereignty and decolonization,
particularly of the Crown Colony of Gibraltar, the Spanish
Plazas, the Falklands/Malvinas, Hong Kong and Northern Ireland.
PART ONE.

STRAITS AND GIBRALTAR.

It is desirable that there be a body of international law such as that contained in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS) (1982) guaranteeing the rights of the international community and riparian states in relation to passage and usage of the Strait of Gibraltar.

It is difficult to standardize international law pertaining to legal regimes for all straits because of the heterogeneity of their geographical characteristics and their respective importance to particular states, and the world community. Precedent shows that there has always been a dialectic between states which support the freedom of the seas philosophy and those wishing to establish sovereignty over the oceans. Thus the eternal conflict between freedom of the seas and hegemonism persists. Gibraltar has been kept open to the world community as a transit route since the 18th century by a combination of force, balance of power strategies and supporting international treaties. However no single legal instrument may be cited as rendering the Strait international.

Gibraltar's geographical characteristics, contemporary usage by international shipping and history prove that it is a key international artery. Unimpeded usage of the Strait must be guaranteed by the riparian states in collaboration with other
powers such as the USA and Britain, and the relevant supra-national organizations to which they belong. Legal instruments such as the LOS conventions (1958, 1982) help support the contention that Gibraltar Strait is international, and must be bolstered by pragmatic political organization in the region with the aid of supporting accords.
CHAPTER ONE

STRAITS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES.


1.1 INTRODUCTION.

1.1.1 Geography and Straits.

Straits provide access to semi-enclosed seas, and link the isolated basins and seas of the "global ocean" (Pirtle, 1978, p.487). Gibraltar links the Mediterranean and Black Seas with the Atlantic Ocean, and ultimately the Atlantic and Indian Oceans via the Suez Canal. Because of international dependence on strategic commodities ranging from oil to grain, the "locational utility" of straits is vital, for example Gibraltar in contrast to the Strait of Magellan (Pirtle, 1978, p.487). So the maritime powers struggle to preserve freedom of the seas and passage rights through straits. "Low aggregate travel-time expenditure per unit of transport is of economic-security interest to the maritime powers" (Pirtle, 1978, p.487). Because of this, maritime traffic shows a certain inertia as regards choice of routes (Bruel, 1947, Vol.I. p.50). So straits like Gibraltar and Dover continue to be major international arteries. Most important of all, usage of straits saves distance, time and
Arctic Ocean

Hudson Bay

Baffin Bay

Gulf of Mexico

Atlantic Ocean

Caribbean Sea

North Sea

Black Sea

Mediterranean Sea

The Gulf

Red Sea

Arabian Sea

East China Sea

South China Sea

Java Sea

Indian Ocean

Key: (1-21) see Table 1.1
For extensive list of straits, see Appendix I

MAP 1.1a WORLD STRAITS: THE 21 STRAITS MOST USED FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION
GLOBAL 'CHOKE POINTS' LISTED BY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IN 1986
MAP 1.1c THE GIBRALTAR ROUTE: COMPARATIVE DISTANCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Via</th>
<th>Via</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York-Al Basrah</td>
<td>8505</td>
<td>12012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York-Singapore</td>
<td>10164</td>
<td>12380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishop's Rock-Al Basrah</td>
<td>6283</td>
<td>10921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishop's Rock-Singapore</td>
<td>7936</td>
<td>12319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odessa-Leningrad</td>
<td>4354</td>
<td>16224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KEY Distance in nautical miles

cost (see map 1.1a).

Historical, economic and political geography illustrate certain facts in relation to straits. Straits are areas of intrigue and geopolitical struggle as they constitute poles of interaction. Straits used for international navigation are foci of power hierarchies with the consequent political and spatial competition between rival powers for influence and control.

"A precarious balance exists between access to straits and its denial, and the balance hinges more on political than legal considerations" (Pirtle, 1978, p.488).

Global viewpoints concerning straits are reflected in perception, language, role and problem of definition. According to The New York Times (13 Feb.1986) at least 16 straits and canals including Gibraltar constitute "choke-points" and thus potential "flash points" in the global communications system (see map 1.1b). According to President Reagan:

"Soviet forces have placed themselves to be able to intercept the 16 choke-points in the world through which supplies and materials are shipped to Western nations" (New York Times, 13 Feb.1986).

However according to US official and non-governmental experts:

". . . the Soviet Union (is) potentially more vulnerable to the closing of choke-points than the USA" (New York Times, 13 Feb.1986).

The Strait of Gibraltar uniting the Mediterranean Sea with the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and the world community, is the quintessential international strait (see map 1.1a).
1.1.2 Perception and Definition.


"A strait is a sea passage restricted between two land areas, regardless of the type of territories, or width of channel, or the name which is given to it".

The words strait, narrow, passage, belt, sound and channel are used in relation to bodies of water connecting larger bodies of water and President Reagan has used the word gap to describe some of these geostrategic areas (New York Times, 13 Feb.1986). Like the evolution of the territorial sea concept, historically there is no common agreement as to what specific geographical dimensions constitute a strait. However there is common perceptual agreement as to the geographical characteristics of a strait.

According to Bruel (1947, Vol.I, pp.15-17), etymologically in languages of Germanic and Latin origin, the word "strait" is associated with passage, narrowness, separation, constriction and restriction. In Danish, straede means a very narrow street, and entry to the larger ocean surrounded by land. This concept of "narrow street" and "entrance to the ocean" are also found in the English "strait" (straet), Spanish diretto and French détroit. However in Latin the term "fretum or fretus" is used, signifying "ocean currents", especially in sea areas between land, the Strait of Gibraltar was known as Fretum oceani.

The word sound (sund) with its Scandinavian origins indicates 'narrow water between two coasts, an ocean street'. Also belt conveys the idea of narrowness and separation,
possibly from the Latin verb *stringere/destringere*, to pull asunder or separate. The word Baltic is derived from "belt" or band. Channel also encompasses this idea of narrow land separation and passage. In Scandinavian the word *hals* is used for both small strait and larynx. Similarly in Turkish "bogazi" means strait, narrow street and larynx, eg "Canakkale Bogazi" (Dardanelles) and "Karadeniz Bogazi" (Bosporus). Though *bab* (door) is sometimes used in Arabic, Gibraltar Strait is known as Mathiq Jabal Tariq, with *mathiq* meaning street, stream and narrowing (Balabakki, 1980). Thus straits used for international navigation are the larynxes of the global naval system, constituting vulnerable choke-points. Depending on geostrategic viewpoints, straits may be seen as gaps in defence networks (see map 1.1a,b).

Straits have been defined as a "narrow passage of water connecting two larger bodies of water" (Stamp, 1968, p.70). Such definitions convey the idea but no precise length or breadth are given. For instance the Dardanelles narrow to some 750 yards while the Davis Strait is about 164 nautical miles (nm) wide. Lack of precision has led to legal problems in distinguishing between gulfs and straits, especially in the case of Aqaba, where the Tiran passage connects Aqaba to the Red Sea (Lapidoth, 1982; Bloomfield, 1957).

A sound has been defined as:

"a long passage of water connecting two larger bodies of water, but too wide and extensive to be termed a strait; a passage connecting a sea or lake with an ocean or with another sea, or channel passing between a mainland and an island, as the sound"
between the Baltic and the North Sea" (Webster, 1959).

1.1.3 Legal Definitions.

From a geographical viewpoint, any reasonably narrow natural passage between adjacent landmasses, linking two bodies of water constitutes a strait. As of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS) 1982, the legal definition of a strait is an area of sea between territories whose breadth is 24 nm or less, whose waters wholly or partly fall within the territorial seas (12 nm) of the riparian state or states (Arts. 2-54, LOS, 1982), linking the high seas, exclusive economic zones (EEZ) (200 nm) or high seas to an EEZ, or to a territorial sea. Thus as of the LOS, 1982, some 116 straits, including Gibraltar, through which there had previously been a high seas corridor became entirely territorial sea straits once the 12 nm breadth was generally accepted (Couper, 1983, p.243).

According to Article 16 (4) of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1958), a strait may be considered as international once it is:

"used for navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state".

From a geographical viewpoint, the LOS (1982) essentially retains the same definition for straits as the LOS (1958), but
coastal states may claim territorial seas jurisdiction up to 12
nm, and different legal regimes apply for different categories
of straits. According to Article 37 of the LOS (1982), those
straits with a minimum width of 24 nm or less, are defined as
maritime areas:

" (where) international navigation between
one part of the high seas or an exclusive
economic zone (200 nm) and another part of
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone
. . . . (takes place)".

Straits such as Gibraltar which fall into this category are
subject to the legal regime of transit passage (see chapter 3).
However where there is a territorial sea at one end of the
strait, a different legal regime applies. Also sea-lanes in
archipelagic areas are subject to different legal regimes. For
the purposes of the LOS Convention (1982), the legal definitions
for archipelagic straits apply where:

" "archipelago" means a group of islands,
including parts of islands interconnecting
waters and other natural features which are
so closely interrelated that such islands,
waters and other natural features form an
intrinsic geographical, economic and
political entity, or which historically have
been regarded as such" (Article 46, LOS,
1982).

Thus legal definitions are exact, "but the application of
the definition varies with each strait" (Smith, 1974, p.88).
However, the history of states claiming sovereignty over coastal
waters suggests that there is no guarantee that the maximum
width claimed as territorial seas will remain at 12 nm, and thus
this may affect the legal definition of straits. Hence a
geographical perspective remains paramount to any discussion of straits.

1.2 STRAITS: OCEAN AND TERRITORY ATTRIBUTES.

There are ocean, territorial and state factors associated with the geography of every strait (see table 1.1, and appendix I). The following classifications are not mutually exclusive, for instance, sometimes there are several smaller seas within larger seas, and hence the problem of classifying straits as inter or intra sea straits.

1.2.1 The Ocean Factor.

From an oceanographic perspective there are five categories of straits.

(i) Inter-oceanic straits, eg Magellan.
(ii) Intra-oceanic straits, eg the Mozambique Channel.
(iii) Inter-sea straits, eg the Dardanelles.
(iv) Intra-sea straits, eg Freu de Minorca.
(v) Inter-sea-oceanic straits, (included in this category are inter semi-enclosed-seas-oceanic straits) eg Gibraltar, Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb.

Classification based on the maritime connection suggests that straits which join the same body of water (intra) are not
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(TABLE 1.1) KEY:

I NUMBER OF RIPARIAN STATES.

II SOVEREIGNTY.

III TERRITORIAL SEAS claimed (nm).

IV MARITIME CONNECTION:
   (i) Inter-oceanic straits.
   (ii) Intra-oceanic straits.
   (iii) Inter-sea straits.
   (iv) Intra-sea straits.
   (v) Inter-sea-oceanic straits.

V TERRITORIAL CONNECTION:
   a Intercontinental straits.
   b Intracontinental straits.
   c Continental-island straits.
   d Inter-insular straits.
   e Archipelagic straits.
   G Gulf.

VI MINIMUM WIDTH (nm).

VII LENGTH (nm).

VIII DEPTH (metres).


X ALTERNATIVE ROUTES: NAR = No Alternative Route. AR< = Alternative Route less than 500 nm. AR> = Alternative Route more than 500 nm.

XI AVERAGE NUMBER OF SHIPS PER DAY, AND RANK.

* Straits included in list of the 16 MOST GEOSTRATEGIC WATERWAYS in the world (potential flash-points) by the Reagan Administration (1986).

as strategic as straits which interconnect different bodies of water, because viable alternative routes usually exist.

Straits are strategic because they save distance, time and cost in communications. Strategic value is increased when no alternative routes exist. Where there are alternatives it is estimated that the maximum feasible detour is about 500 nm, as this makes a substantial difference to time and cost (Smith, 1974, pp. 88-101). The difference in distance from New York to Basra (Al Basrah) in the Arabian/Persian Gulf using the Gibraltar route as opposed to the Cape of Good Hope route is over 3,400 nm (see map 1.1c).

For the Mediterranean and Black Sea states, the only alternative point of access besides Gibraltar is the Suez Canal, where passage has been interrupted or barred twice because of the Arab-Israeli dispute (1967, 1973). Western maritime communications with the Middle and Far East are heavily dependent on Gibraltar, because of the distance involved in using the much longer Cape route around southern Africa. The journey from New York to Basra via the Cape of Good Hope is 12,012 nm, and via Gibraltar is 8,508 nm. The distance from Bishop's Rock (SW England) to Basra via the Cape of Good Hope is 11,151 nm and via Gibraltar is 6,283 nm (Map 504911(545037)12-18, the Geographer, US Dept. of State, c 1982), (see map 1.1c).

The absolute dimensions of a strait does not dictate it's strategic importance, but rather the traffic volume, including type and nature of vessel (see chapter 2). The geostrategic and
economic environments of connecting sea areas and their hinterlands help determine the importance of a strait. The Gibraltar and Turkish Straits linking the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Black Seas, and penetrating three continents interconnect the West with the communist block, North Africa and Middle East, and give access to southern and eastern Asia via the Suez Canal. The number of straits giving access to a region is crucial. Once again Gibraltar is the only natural entrance to the Mediterranean-Black Sea area. Even when there are several possible routes one is often preferred. Examples are Malacca, Dover and Little Belt. This inertia is based on geography, and on perceived or actual distance, costs, facilities and services offered on routes. Also the relationship between voyagers and the riparian state is significant. Based on interviews (March-April 1985) the author found that a majority of commercial and pleasure vessel captains prefer use of facilities at the Crown Colony of Gibraltar to others in the region because of language, range of facilities, and efficient and good quality workmanship. Even Atlantic passers, not wishing to enter the Mediterranean Sea, often make use of the facilities offered at the Crown Colony of Gibraltar.

Changes in technology, political instability and war influence choice of route, as is witnessed by international concern over Bab el Mandeb and Hormuz in the 1980s. With the blockage of the Suez Canal during the Israeli-Arab War (1967), and the oil crisis (1973) Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) became increasingly important and alternative routes to the Suez
Canal and hence Gibraltar were sought. Nevertheless there was a sharp increase in the transit of Algerian and Libyan oil through Gibraltar (see chapter 8). However the clearance and widening of the Suez Canal in the 1980s has facilitated transit of supertankers via the Gibraltar route. The construction of several pipelines to the Levant coast has enhanced Gibraltar’s potential as an energy supply route (see chapter 2).

1.2.2 The Territorial Factor.

The territorial perspective may be broken into five subdivisions:

(a) intercontinental, eg Gibraltar, Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits;
(b) intracontinental, eg Otrano, Tiran and Hormuz Straits;
(c) continental-island, eg Dover, Messina, Sicily and Corfu Straits;
(d) inter-insular, eg St. George’s and the North Channels, and the Strait of Bonifacio; and
(e) archipelagic, eg Freu de Minorca, Kithera and San Bernardino Straits (see table 1.1 and appendix I).

According to Smith (1974, p.90), "using the viable alternative route criterion" for measuring the strategic quality of a strait based on the territorial factor, straits with continental attributes are more strategic than
continental-island straits; whereas categories a, b and c are more strategic than inter-insular and archipelagic straits.

Concerning land communications, the strategic characteristics of the territorial factor are communication, and the barrier effect. Depending on geopolitical history, straits have acted as bridges or barriers between races, ethnic groups, civilisations and states. Gibraltar provides the classic example linking Europe to Africa, and Iberian to Arab/Maghrebi cultures. Straits have often functioned as barriers, for instance it is not a coincidence that the Straits of Gibraltar and Messina, and the Turkish Straits more or less constitute the boundaries of Islamic and Christian civilizations. Another example of the barrier effect is the Strait of Dover and Britain's geopolitical relationship with the rest of Europe since 1066.

Sometimes there is economic complementarity between the riparian strait states, but political cooperation has been the exception rather than the rule. Straits are an area of "interrupted land-traffic" (Bruel, 1947, Vol.I, pp.20-25). Their traffic-economic function has sometimes given rise to twin cities such as Istanbul-Skutari, Messina-Geggio, Brindisi-Durazzo, Dover-Calais, Detroit-Windsor, Algeciras-Ceuta, and Tangier-Tarifa-Algeciras-Gibraltar.

The aim of avoiding trans-shipment or break of bulk at straits is not something new. To avoid inconvenience and costs, there have been projects for land links since antiquity. Bridges were built over the Bosporus and Dardanelles
(Hellespont) during military expeditions over 2000 years ago. The Bosporus Bridge (1074 m, 1175 yards) which was opened in 1973, has alleviated much of the cross-strait traffic which once took place by sea. The Romans linked Djerba to Africa (150 AD) by a causeway which still functions today. The Little Belt Bridge was opened in 1935 (Brue, 1947, Vol.II, Part I) and the Bahrain-Saudi Arabian Bridge was constructed in the early 1980s. One of the most spectacular projects aimed at creating a fixed link between strait states is the Channel Tunnel. In 1875, France and Britain initiated plans for the Channel Tunnel. Under a treaty ratified in July 1987, the British and French governments granted a 55-year concession to Eurotunnel under which it will build and operate a rail tunnel beneath the Channel between the two countries, opening in 1993. The Eurotunnel System will incorporate two rail tunnels and, running between and linked to them, a service tunnel to provide ventilation and allow routine maintenance. Each of the tunnels will be about 50 km long. Passengers, vehicles and freight will travel on specially designed shuttle trains, direct rail travel between London and Paris, will take less than 3 hours (Eurotunnel PLC & Eurotunnel SA, 1987, p.1). To avoid usage of sensitive straits, the Kiel Kanal (Danish Straits region) was constructed in the last century, and there were proposals in the 1970s and 1980s to cut canals through the Kra peninsula (Malaysia) and the Musandam peninsula (Oman).

In 1980, Spain and Morocco signed a Convention on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, a complementary
agreement was signed to carry out research on the feasability of a fixed-link across Gibraltar. Joint meetings were carried out at Tangier (1980) and Madrid (1982) where the technological, economic and ecological aspects of the project were discussed. Research has been carried out in the Strait area to the east of Tangier (1981-84). The possibilities of a subterranean tunnel were explored, this would be some 50 km long; while a bridge would be some 25 km long. By 1985, it would seem that both governments had provisionally opted for the construction of a bridge, despite the hazards which this may pose for international navigation (see map 1.2). A fixed-link would be a major feat not only linking Spain to Morocco, but the EC to the Maghreb (see chapter 8). In 1985 and 1987, the Moroccan authorities informed the author that they were especially in favour of the project and wished construction of a bridge to commence as soon as possible; the Spanish authorities seem to consider the project as less urgent than the Moroccans. However both governments have established permanent commissions in Rabat and Madrid to deal with the project. Moroccan representatives informed the author (April 1985) that the link would be a bridge a couple of miles west of Tarifa. The Spanish authorities were less forthcoming with information.

1.3 OCEAN AND TERRITORIAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR.

1.3.1 Dimensions.

The Strait of Gibraltar runs in a general east-west
direction (see map 1.2). To the west, Cabo Trafalgar and Cabo Spartel (Espartel) form the natural entrance points, and those to the east are Europa Point (Gibraltar) and Ceuta. The Strait is approximately 36 nm (58 km) long. The breadth at the western entrance, the widest part from Cabos Trafalgar to Spartel is about 24 nm. The breadth at the eastern end, from Europa Point to Ceuta is 13 nm. The narrowest part of the Strait is some 10 nm west of Ceuta narrowing to only 7.6 nm (12.5 km). In general the Strait narrows uniformly from its western end for a distance of about 18 nm to a width of some 8.25 nm on a line running south-east from Isla Tarifa. Eastwards of here it retains this general width for about 6 nm, embodying the narrowest part (7.6 nm), before widening again to its eastern end. The channel is not particularly narrow compared with other straits, eg the Dardanelles (less than 1 nm) (Kennedy, 1957. pp.114, 115, 129, 134) (see table 1.1).

1.3.2 Depths.

The Strait's maximum water depth in the main channel used for shipping is some 935 metres (3,068 feet) and the minimum depth about 320 m (1,050 ft) (Lancry, 1982; Couper, 1983, pp.150-157; Lucchini & Voelckel, 1978; TAW, 1980; Walker, 1965; Kennedy, 1957, pp.115-116; Nairn et al. 1978, esp.p.48-50; Truver, 1980; Gulland, 1971). Some shoals lie 2-3 nm off the coast and need to be given wide berth. Thus Gibraltar is deep in comparison to other straits; Bab el Mandeb's Large Strait
Plate 1.1  View of the Strait of Gibraltar from the Southern Shore

Inset of the immediate region of the Strait.

THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR

MAP 1.3 THE GIBRALTAR AND WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION.
MAP 1.4 STRATEGIC ISLANDS AND THE STRAIT

AZORES

MADEIRA

SELVAGENS

CANARIES

IBERIA

BERBER

ALBORAN

CHAFARINAS

THE SPANISH PLAZAS

MAGHREB

WESTERN SAHARA

MAGHREB

SICILY

SARDINIA

CORSICA

MALTA

0 200 400 km

0 100 200 miles
averages 322 m, Malacca 27 m and the Dardanelles 50-91 m (see table 1.1). Gibraltar's "sills", although restricting the water flow between the Mediterranean and Atlantic to the upper layers, do not constitute a "serious barrier for water, organisms and eventually pollutants" (UNEP, 1985, p.1).

1.3.3 Pollution.

The Strait plays a crucial oceanographic role for the entire region, as about 75% of Mediterranean water lost by evaporation is replaced by inflowing Atlantic currents. Along with this, the high salinity of the seawater (38 parts per thousand) before dilution by Atlantic waters significantly influences the ecology of the region. Mediterranean water-turn-over via the Strait takes 70-80 years, a key element in regional ecology in the light of high pollution levels (Ambroggi, 1977; UNEP, 1985; Ritchie-Calder, 1972; Glassner, 1981; Borgese & Krieger, 1975, pp.144-165; Saliba, 1978, p.173; Le Lourd, 1977; IOC/IMO/UNEP, 1985, p.8; Couper, 1983, pp.176-177, 224; O'Reilly, 1987, p.105). In the 1970s, it was feared that the Mediterranean was becoming a dead sea because of intense pollution. Regional and international cooperation since the mid-1970s, in relation to the Mediterranean has helped raise ecological and political awareness of the problem. According to Dr Louis Saliba, Senior Scientist for the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP):

"By 1986 . . . (one can no longer) . . . speak of the Mediterranean as becoming a
dead sea . . . although . . . it was certainly becoming progressively so a few years ago . . . . " (letter to the author, 10 Feb. 1986).

Because of dense traffic, risk of collision is considerable, and coastal states are particularly worried about the risk of pollution and nuclear-related problems caused by accidents. Some experts fear that the proposed trans-Strait fixed-link may pose further risks to navigation.

In the Strait area, the Vandals, Levanter, and Sirocco winds influence conditions significantly producing the infamous mists and dust clouds which may reduce visibility to less than 5 nm (Pilot, 1978, Vol.I, pp.54-67). Shipping disasters were common in the past. A major collision in 1979 resulted in the loss of 50 lives and an oil spill of over 95,000 tons. In the West Mediterranean region (1975-1980), 112 ships (over 100 tons) were classified as wrecks, and there were 101 foundering and 41 collisions (Couper, 1983, pp.162-163). Disasters in the Strait area include the Jakob Maresk (300,000 barrels of oil) in 1975, the Ellen Conway (225,000 B/O) (1975) and Gogo Rambler (26,250 B/O) (1979) (Couper, 1983, pp.170-171).

Traditionally vessels navigated near the coasts of the Strait rather than in the middle in order to benefit from the currents and tidal streams to a maximum (see map 1.2). By the 1980s, an International Maritime Organisation (IMO) traffic separation scheme had been implemented with the approval of Spain and Morocco, and is helping to reduce risk of collision. Vessels entering the Mediterranean must use the lanes closest to
the African coast, and exit is via those lanes nearer the European mainland (all pass to the right). Traffic separation schemes are also successfully operating in Dover, and to a lesser extent Hormuz and Malacca.

Nonetheless according to the Port Authorities in Gibraltar and Algeciras, "cowboy captains" and those "wanting to maximize speed and minimize costs" often take the "handiest route" (interviews, April 1985). It was also pointed out that vessels cross-transiting the Strait from north to south, particularly ferries, were lax in observing the rules of the separation scheme.

The danger of pollution-related accidents is increased by the presence of two oil refineries on the southern shore of the Strait (capacity range 20,000-100,000 B/O); and one on the northern shore (capacity over 100,000 B/O) and a petro-chemical plant at Algeciras, at which explosions occurred in 1985.

Unlike Malacca which has a coastal population of over half a million people, the coastal area of Gibraltar Strait cannot be said to be densely populated. In the immediate area of the Strait the main service and transit ports are Gibraltar (population 29,000), Algeciras (100,000), Tangier (250,000) and Ceuta (80,000) (see map 1.3).

1.3.4 **Strategic Islands.**

Because of Gibraltar's geostrategic location and importance to Western defence systems, strategic islands in the orbit of
the Strait must be appreciated in any analysis of the region (see chapters 7-8), (see map 1.4).

Unlike Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb and the Danish Straits, there are no islands or drying banks in the actual Strait other than a few detached rocks very close inshore eg near Tarifa and Ceuta. Nonetheless, from a strategic viewpoint, islands in or near the region are important. These include the Spanish islands of Alborán, Chafarinas, Balearics and Canararies, and the Portuguese Azores and Madeiras (see map 1.4).

Alborán (35 56'N, 3 02') lies 50 nm S-SE of Cabo Sacratif (Spain) and 30 nm north of Ras Tleta Madari (Morocco), and 120 nm from the centre of the Strait. It has an area of about 1 sq km (0.62 sq ml) and coast length of 1 km (0.62 ml). It is flat, reddish and about 20 m (66 ft) high. Cliffs to the south are steeper than those to the north. Alborán lies on a narrow bank with a depth of less than 200 m (656 ft). The bank extends some 12 nm E-NE and 20 nm W-SW of the island, with depths ranging from 2.5 m to 38 m (8-125 ft) (Pilot, 1978, Vol.I, pp.60-61).

The Chafarinas (35 11'N, 02 26'W) afford the only natural anchorage off the coast of Morocco which is suitable for all classes of vessel (Pilot, 1978, Vol.I, p.130) (see chapter 5).

The Balearics (Majorca, Minorca, Ibiza, Formentera and islets) (38 40' & 40 5'N, 1 and 5 E) lie north east of Cabo de San Antonio (Spain) (Pilot, Vol.I, 1978, pp.100-121; Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol.III, pp.276-279). The Balearics are about 300 nm from the centre of the strait. The largest island, Majorca (2301 sq km/1430 sq ml) has many inlets and
bays, such as Alcudia and Pollenza (NE), and the Bay of Palma (SW). There are some 12 ports or harbours including Andraix, Soller and Porto Colom. The northern mountains afford great protection to the rest of the island from the violent gales to which it is exposed, and render the climate mild. There is an excellent road service and airport.

Minorca (416 sq km/260 sq ml) lies 27 nm E.NE of Majorca. Its coast is deeply indented with creeks and bays, on one of which is sited Port Mahon, reputedly one of the best natural ports in the Mediterranean. Port Mahon’s strategic importance is proven by history. It was occupied by Britain several times (1708-56, 1769-82, and 1798-1808), and France (1756-69); though Spain recaptured it (1782-98) periodically, it was only in 1808 that Spain finally gained permanent control there.

Ibiza lies some 50 nm south west of Majorca and 60 nm from Cape San Martin (Spain). It’s greatest length NE-SW is 40km (25 mls), and maximum breadth is 21 km (13 mls). The island is very indented, and has important bays such as San Antonio (NW) and Iviza (SE). South of Ibiza lies Formentera.

The Canary Islands (27 41’-29 3’N and 13 7’-18 2’W) are located in the Atlantic Ocean 60 nm off the Moroccan Coast. Alegranza island (NE) is about 680 nm south west of Cadiz and Fuerteventura (E) is 65 nm west of Cape Juby (Yubi). Hence Las Palmas is about 700 nm from the Strait. The Islands cover an area of 7,273 sq km (2,808 sq ml) and have a coastline of 1,007 km (626 ml). The 2 main ports are Las Palmas (with Porto de la Cruz) and Santa Cruz de Tenerife, which act as fuelling and
communications centres on the Europe, Africa and American routes.

The Azores (36 55'-39 55'N, and 25 -31 16'W) consist of 10 major islands and several smaller entities situated in the north Atlantic. They have an area of 2,247 sq km (868 sq ml) and are broken into three widely separated groups. They lie 900-1200 nm west of Lisbon. The islands are mountainous with a steep rugged coastline, (maximum height is 2,351 m/7,713 ft). They stretch 483 km (300 ml) in an E-W direction and 209 km (130 ml) from north to south. The main ports are Angra do Heroismo (Angra), Ponta Delgada and Horta. During World War II, the latter two were developed by the USA as allied bases, and major airports were built at Lajes (Terceira Island) and on Santa Maria Island. The US maintains a NATO base in the Azores, which provides an ideal location between the USA and Mediterranean region. During the Arab-Israeli War (1967), the bases proved invaluable in ferrying supplies to Israel.

The Madeira/Funchal Islands (32 40'N, 16 45'W) have an area of 496 sq km (308 sq ml) and lie 60 nm south west of Lisbon. The chief city/port is Funchal (32 38'N, 16 54'W). The two main and inhabited islands are Madeira and Porto Santo, while the two uninhabited island groups are Desertas and Selvagas. Madeira is the largest island, 55 km (34 ml) long, maximum width 22.5 km (14 ml) and coastline 145 km (90 mls). Maximum height is found at Pico Ruivo de Santana (1,861 m/6,106 ft). The Desertas lie 11 nm south east of Madeira and consist of 3 main islets. The Selvagas (Salvage) lie 156 nm south of Madeira. During the 19th
century, Madeira was temporarily occupied by the British (Encyclopaedia Columbia, 1966, p.1112; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1977, Vol.VI, p.468).

1.4 STRAITS: STATE ATTRIBUTES.

1.4.1 The Strategic Factor.
The strategic attributes of the state factor are:
(a) the number of riparian states represented in the strait region, interstate competition, and attitudes towards regional hegemonism;
(b) the extent and kind of sovereignty which a state claims over an adjoining strait, and its economic and military potential to enforce its viewpoint; and
(c) the linkages of the riparian states to regional and superpower groups.

Straits of major transit importance bordered by only one state are the exception rather than the rule, eg Dardanelles, Bosporus, Sunda, Lombok and San Bernadino. The majority of major straits are bordered by two or more states (see table 1.1 and appendix I). Historically there has been competition for dominance among the riparian states eg Spain and Morocco in relation to Gibraltar, Britain and France in relation to Dover, and Iran and the Arab states in the Arabian/Persian Gulf. Djibouti and Singapore largely owe their existence as states to the fact that they lie astride major international straits and
Key:
- Independent since 1945.
- States artificially created in Strait areas (Djibouti, Singapore, Brunei).
- Dependents and Disputed Territories in 1988:

1. Gibraltar (GB)
2. North African Territories (Sp)
3. Western Sahara (Morocco)
4. Namibia (South Africa)
5. Europa Is (Fr)
6. Reunion (Fr)
7. Tromelin (Fr)
8. Mayotte (Fr)
9. Diego Garcia/Chagos (GB/USA)
10. Islands in Gulf area
11. New Caledonia (Fr)
12. Papua New Guinea (Australia)
13. Kuril Islands (USSR)
14. Northern Ireland (GB)
15. Turks/Coicos (GB)
16. Navassa Is (US)
17. Puerto Rico (US)
18. Virgin Is (GB)
19. Montserrat (GB)
20. Guadeloupe (Fr)
21. Martinique (Fr)
22. Curacao (Dutch)
23. Guiana (Fr)
24. Falklands/Malvinas (GB)

MAP 1.5 STRATEGIC STRAITS, DECOLONIZATION AND DISPUTED TERRITORIES
are arguably the creation of the European colonial powers. Spain strongly objected to the Gibraltar Constitution Act (1967, 1969) and other such legislation in relation to the Crown Colony of Gibraltar, which it claimed was laying the grounds for the creation of an artificial state (see chapter 6). In strait areas a complex power hierarchy usually exists. Gibraltar, Hormuz, Tiran, Mozambique and Kattegat Straits are bordered by two states, and Bab el Mandeb by four (see table 1.1; map 1.5).

According to Bruel (1947, p.45):

"History ... shows that the power that reaches a strait is inclined to settle down on the opposite coast, or at least make sure of ... a bridgehead ... there".

One of the reasons for the Trojan Wars was the struggle for the Hellespont (Turkish Straits), which was strategic in the shipment of grain, a role which it still plays today. A cause of the war (222 BC) between Rhodos and Byzantium concerned the right of the latter to levy duty on vessels transiting the straits. Control of the straits of Messina, Sicily and Gibraltar was an important factor in the Rome-Carthage Wars (200 BC) as they were during the World Wars (1914-18, 1939-45). Spain's efforts to regain the British Crown Colony of Gibraltar, and Morocco's to gain sovereignty over the Spanish North African Territories, especially Ceuta, must be seen in this historical geopolitical context (see chapters 4-5). Historically, Muslim control of the Bosporus, Dardanelles, and Gibraltar Straits was aimed at gaining hegemony over all routes between Europe and Asia, and North Africa. During World War I, allied attempts to
gain control of the Turkish Straits provides a chronicle of one of the bloodiest periods in modern history. A major cause of the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1956 and 1967 was transit rights of the Strait of Tiran (Wainwright, 1986, p.405). These same straits form crucial links in the regional and global balance of power.

The geography of straits and states are intrinsically linked to national politics, which in turn influences international relations and the global order (see chapter 7).

According to Admiral Sir J.A. Fisher (1900);

"The Mediterranean is of necessity the vital point of a naval war, and you can no more change this than you can change the position of Mount Vesuvius".

Gibraltar Strait is the key to the Mediterranean theatre.

Geostrategically straits constitute choke-points and/or gaps. Legal regimes governing passage are only of secondary importance, what is essential is the geopolitical environment in which transit of straits occurs. The majority of states have an interest in the security of straits for international commerce. Reciprocal interests are not as strong concerning keeping straits open for military transit. Gibraltar is of particular importance because of superpower interest in the Mediterranean and Middle East and the deployment of Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) (Pirtle, 1978, p.491). Straits are the obvious foci of "sea-denial" forces.

The military functions of straits are:

(i) to ensure industrial supplies;

(ii) to reinforce/resupply national military forces engaged
overseas; and

(iii) to supply wartime economic/military supplies to allied states; (Turner, 1974, p.8; Pirtle, 1978, p. 492).

Thus geostrategy in relation to straits is aimed at "chokepoint control" (Turner, 1974, p.8; Holst, 1976, p.4; Pirtle, 1978, p.492).

Due to the fact that passage through straits can be easily disrupted, coastal states have the possibility of controlling transit. Hence there is the option of preventing the passage of suspected enemies or belligerents as the Arab states tried after 1948 in the Straits of Bab el Mandeb and Tiran. Strait states may also try to prevent certain types of transit considered as compromising or non-innocent, as Spain did during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. As none of the Maghrebi states officially recognize the state of Israel, and the main Moroccan political parties are openly hostile to it, the Strait of Gibraltar is by no means outside the range of the Arab-Israeli geopolitical sphere. In 1975, the US and Israel signed a Memorandum of Agreement regarding the Red Sea region (USA: Memorandum of Agreement, 1975). Paragraph 14 of the Agreement provides that the US regards Bab el Mandeb and Gibraltar as international waterways, and supports Israel's right to "freedom of passage" and "flights" over "such straits" (Wainwright, 1986, p.400).

Strait states have the potential of interrupting international navigation as the mining of the Red Sea (1984), and Iraqi and Iranian attacks on neutral vessels in the
Arabian/Persian Gulf (1986-1987) illustrate. Strait states may try to lever benefits from the international community in the form of tolls (eg Denmark until 1857), beneficial agreements, political importance and advantageous alliances (eg Morocco-USA, PDR Yemen-USSR, Djibouti-France). Strait states may be prone to over-assert national pride or nationalism, Spain and Indonesia have both been accused of this.

The corollary is equally applicable. Strait states fear being blockaded and unable to launch an offensive, or reduced to naval incapacity in terms of commercial and military traffic, the position of Turkey is of concern to NATO in this respect. Historically the location of the Russian/Soviet empire in relation to the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Seas illustrates the point. The USSR is "straits bound". Gibraltar is the main communications artery for Soviet naval operations in the Mediterranean (see chapter 7) (Blake (c). 1983, pp.558-260; O'Reilly, 1987, pp.104-105). Though not a riparian state of the Strait of Gibraltar, France like Spain has Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets and historically both states have always had the problem of "linking" the fleets via Gibraltar Strait in emergency situations.

Besides the risk of being blockaded, semi-enclosed sea and strait states run the risk of having constraints being imposed on them by international restrictions and conventions, for instance usage of the Turkish Straits and the Montreux Convention (1936). Other examples include the Treaty of Commutation of the Sound and Belt Dues (1867) largely dictated
by the USA, and the Anglo-French (1904) and Franco-Spanish treaties (1904, 1912) in relation to Gibraltar and Morocco (see chapters 4-6), (Wainwright, 1985, pp. 125-129; Gregoire, 1977, pp. 115-117; De Luca, 1977, pp. 503-524; Roberts, 1981, pp. 581-585; Froman, 1977, pp. 681-717). Tsaltas and Lacatzis (1983, pp. 57-68) suggest that the legal regime of transit passage for straits used for international navigation contained in the LOS (1982, Part III, Articles 34-44) imposes constraints on strait states and thus detracts from their sovereign prerogatives. Some strait states, including Spain, Morocco, Indonesia, Malaysia and Iran fear the effective loss of sovereignty in their territorial seas in strait areas. Some strait states including Morocco, Albania, PDR Yemen and Indonesia feel a sense of frustration, having undergone the colonial experience, and now international constraints being imposed on them in the post-colonial era (see map 1.5). The whole question of the Moroccan colonial experience and continuing territorial dispute with Spain over the Plazas in North Africa, and Spain's demands for the "decolonization" of the Crown Colony of Gibraltar must be viewed in this context (see chapters 4-6). Today the threat of pollution in territorial waters by ships in transit in straits symbolizes the dialectic between state sovereignty and international passage rights (see chapter 3).

History proves that economic intercourse and balance of power strategies are contingent on access to straits. Anglo-French rivalry in the Mediterranean, Muslim and Asiatic worlds between the 18th century and 1904 offers a geopolitical
precedent. Since 1945, the same holds true for the USA and USSR. The possibility of blocking off belligerents, including strait states, offers maritime powers tactical advantages. According to Bruel (1947, p.25), history shows that:

"... naval operations will be centered in or around straits and surrounding waters, which thus becomes the focus of war at sea".

In order to get the full benefit of the geostrategical advantages offered by straits, control of adjacent coasts is necessary (see map 1.5). Though a belligerent in World War I and neutral in World War II, the history of Turkey illustrates this. Spanish neutrality during both World Wars detracted from the tactical advantages offered by the Crown Colony of Gibraltar to the Allies. Spain's refusal to permit the USA use of its sovereign territory and seas during the Arab-Israeli War (1967) and the air-raid on Libya (1986) provide examples of the political constraints which may be imposed on the maritime powers.

Belligerent powers entering semi-enclosed seas face the possibility of their retreat being cut off, hence the necessity of bases and special relationships with strait states or friendly countries. In the western Mediterranean, the British/NATO base at Gibraltar and US special relationship with Morocco and Spain help assure usage of the Strait. From a geostrategical viewpoint, British bases in Cyprus and formerly Malta, and US base rights in Pantalleria Island (Italy) and Rota (Spain/Strait region) illustrate the importance of the Mediterranean arena (see chapter 7). Ultimately the USA has the
possibility of using several of these bases in emergency situations.

When great powers cannot directly control straits they inevitably call for some form of internationalization, demilitarization or a liberal passage regime. These goals were attempted in the region to the Strait of Gibraltar in 1859 and 1904 (see chapters 2, 4, 6). Other examples include the 'Chile-Argentine Agreement' (1881) catering for neutralization of the Strait of Magellan.

According to Bruel (1947, pp.27-28), the basis for:

"... estimating the naval importance of straits, their value in this respect will in all essentials remain the same as before, because the elements upon which it is predicated are purely of a military-geographical and therefore constant nature" (sic) (Bruel, 1947, pp.27-28).

The institution of special legal regimes for certain straits like Gibraltar is an attempt to reconcile the diverging interests of strait states and seapowers (see chapter 3).

Politische Ansammlung or indirect control of straits, is a strategy employed when direct control is not possible (Maull, 1925). This policy aims at controlling straits via weak littoral states, as with the Gibraltar and Turkish Straits in the historical context. In the case of Gibraltar no single regional or global power has been able to control both coasts of the Strait continuously. Spanish-Muslim shadow dancing in the area (11th-17th centuries) was superceded by Anglo-French competition (1704-1904) which resulted in the creation of the Crown Colony of Gibraltar (1712) and partition of the Moroccan
Kingdom (1912). However Britain remained the dominant force in the region (1704-1939). With US involvement during the Second World War (1942-43) in the region, the USA established a special rapport with Britain and the Crown Colony of Gibraltar, and eventually set up bases in Morocco and Spain. However the relationship between strait states and the superpowers is the cardinal factor in the politics of vital straits like Gibraltar.

Politische Ansammlung may be summed up as indirect rule, often linked to complex balance of power strategies. Politically strait states have the advantage of being able to play off interested powers for political gain. Since the 1970s, this has been particularly evident with Soviet involvement in PDR Yemen and Ethiopia. The pro-Western stance of the Moroccan regime in international affairs, and Morocco's application to join the EC (1985-87), less than a year after its union with Libya must be seen in this context (see chapters 7-8).

Strait states run the risk of misjudging their strength or role in international affairs and may have to suffer the consequences. Attempts by the some Arab states to deny Israel and its allies usage of straits in the Gulf and Red Sea area have not been successful. There are certain similarities between the last example and Indonesia's attempts (1970s and early 1980s) to limit the superpowers and Japan's usage of the Malacca and Lombok straits. Considering that straits act as foci of trade and naval movements, an historical perspective helps illustrate a certain geopolitical continuity. "Shadow empires" such as Britain and France still work in close harmony
with many of their ex-colonies such as Oman, the UAE, Singapore and Djibouti; while the major "shadow empires" have cooperated closely with the USA since 1945 ((Toynbee, 1963, p.107; Kinder & Hilgemann, 1978; Chaliand & Rageau, 1983, pp.33-51; Kidron & Segal, 1984). (see map 1.5). According to President Reagan:

"... bases would help the US protect vital sea lanes that pass through choke-points . . . that the Soviet Union would try to close in a conflict" (New York Times, 13 Feb.1986).

Doubtless, the USSR has similar fears about Western strategy.

From the 18th century until 1945, most of the world's strategic straits were under the control of the colonial powers, particularly Britain, France and The Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Spain, Italy and Japan. Britain controlled the largest empire the world has ever seen. Gibraltar and the Crown Colony was a key not only to the Mediterranean but also to the Indian Ocean and hence the far flung empire. Control of strategic straits was achieved by force, colonization, legitimizing treaties and the establishment of bases, as well as policies of indirect rule (see map 1.5).

1.4.2 US Straits Policy.

The US straits policy of force and diplomacy has a long precedent. This was clearly formulated over a hundred years ago during the Chile-Argentine discussions on the status of the Strait of Magellan (1881). The US declared:

"that the Government of the USA will not
tolerate exclusive claims of the Strait of Magellan by any nation whatsoever" (Moore, 1898; Bruel, 1947, Vol.II, Pt. III).

Many similar statements have been made by the US Government in the past 20 years in relation to the straits of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb and Gibraltar. (Wainwright, 1986, pp.361-414). "Force remains the most effective form of power in many issues and in many situations" (Wainwright, 1986, p.367). As early as 1857 the US was instrumental in forcing Denmark to abolish the Sound dues which had existed for centuries. With its superior naval power, the USA forced the opening of the Japanese straits in the late 19th century (Brueel, 1947, p.277). Since 1945, the USA has been active in pursuing a policy of indirect control of straits once controlled by the Japanese Empire. The strait strategy of the USA in the region includes the bases at Misawa on Honshu, astride the Tsugaru Strait and within easy range of La Perouse Strait, Sakhalin and Kurile Islands; presently it is the site of the largest US base expansion program in the Pacific (Christian Science Monitor, 4 April 1986).

Under US aegis the Egypt-Israel Peace Accords (1979) clearly stipulated that the Red Sea straits would be open to all nations without distinction of flag.

Overall US straits policy falls into four historical/geographical categories:

(i) Direct control in the Americas in the 19th century, was achieved by force and diplomacy.

(ii) US involvement outside the Americas possibly began with the establishment of US bases in the Philippines from
1898 on.

(iii) Military bases, bilateral and multilateral treaties, and privileged relations with strait states throughout the world have been established since 1945.

(iv) The USA has been active in gaining access to strait areas once controlled by Britain, either by treaty with independent states or agreement with Britain as in the case of Diego Garcia (Madeley, 1985) and Gibraltar via NATO (see map 1.5).

The straits policy of the USA has been greatly influenced by the geopolitical theories of Mahan (1890) and Mackinder (1904, 1919, 1942) and their "landpower/seapower" concepts (see chapter 7). Concerning the Strait of Gibraltar, the USA was party to the internationalization of Cape Spartel (1856) and Tangier Neutral Zone (1923-56). Since the 19th century, the USA has acted as the international champion of the freedom of the seas philosophy. This was stressed again and again by US representatives during the UNCLOS conferences in the 1970s, and in US naval policies in the Mediterranean and Gulf region in the 1980s, e.g. Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb. The US still only claims a 3 nm territorial sea. Significantly in the past 30 years, crises in which the USA has been involved include the strategic sea areas of the Florida Strait (Cuba), Gulf of Tonkin (Vietnam), Sirt (Libya), Tiran and Hormuz.
1.4.3 The Soviet Straits Policy.

Concerning the USSR, historically the development of the Russian Empire was constrained by its continental position, ice-bound ports and the large number of surrounding states. The siting of St Petersburg (Leningrad), Odessa and Vladivostock was aimed at Russian access to the seas (see map 1.1a,b). The contentious history of the Russian/Soviet Empire with the Baltic states, Ottoman Empire/Turkey and Japan is in large part due to it's "strait bound" location (see maps 7.1). This thrust towards ice-free ports has been well documented in relation to the Turkish and Danish Straits (Alexandersson, 1982). Today as in the past, Japanese geography forms a barrier to Soviet maritime aspirations in north-east Asia. The Sakhalin and Kurile Islands dispute symbolises this struggle. Since the 1960s the Soviets have been following the traditional straits policies of the older maritime powers, establishing bases and friendly relations with states in the orbit of straits such as Cuba, Libya, Algeria, Malta, Syria, Egypt, Ethiopia, PDR Yemen and Mozambique. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) leaves it within the orbit of the Arabian Sea and Strait of Hormuz. Overall, the Soviet policy is one of indirect control, and support for the LOS (1982) and the regimes for straits (Arts.33-54). Like the USA and Britain, the USSR supports the legal regime of transit passage for the Strait of Gibraltar, which the riparian states reluctantly accept (see chapter 3).
1.4.4 Islam and Straits.

Since the 8th century, Islam has been a force in the region of the Strait of Gibraltar. While its power has waxed and waned in relation to the Strait, Islam has always been a crucial element in the geopolitics of the region (see chapters 7-8).

While none of the Muslim states are major maritime powers, they are directly involved in the straits question (Amin, No.3, 1981, pp.387-405; Amin, 1981, pp.1-235). Historically with the spread of Islam from the pivot area of Saudi Arabia, the Muslim kingdom took control of most of the then known vital straits; Gibraltar, Sicily, Otrano, Dardanelles, Bosporus, Bab el Mandeb, Hormuz, Malacca, Sunda and Lombok. Despite the decline of the Golden Age of Islam, the European colonial experience and the development of separate states; there is a spiritual and cultural unity in the Muslim world which lends it geopolitical potential in relation to six of the world’s most strategic straits (see maps 1.1a,b,c; table 1.1). This situation must be seen in the light of the Arab-Israeli dispute and fundamentalist reaction to neocolonialism and the superpowers (see chapter 8).

Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have not signed the LOS (1982) as of 1987, however Morocco has. Since the 1940s, the Middle Eastern Arab states states have called for the Aqaba area to be declared an historic bay/semi-enclosed sea under Arab sovereignty. This argument is pursuant to the fact that all (save Egypt) do not officially recognize the riparian State of Israel. Also, whether officially stated or not most Arab states favour Arab dominance in the Arabian/Persian Gulf and Hormuz
area. Libya's claim to Sirt is also partially inspired by Arab nationalism. Militant Islamic fundamentalists wish the consolidation of Islamic sovereignty over territories and seas; this became evident with the mining of the Red Sea (1984) and Arabian/Persian Gulf (1987).

In 1982, at the time of Iran's signing of the LOS, it's representative Hodjtaba Mirmehdi, placed on record:

"(t)he understanding . . . that only states party to the LOS Convention shall be entitled to benefit from the contractual rights created therein".

He specifically stated that this applied to the right of transit passage through international straits (UNCLOS, 10 Dec. 1982, Declarations and Reservations. Islamic Rep. of Iran). Iran's policies have set a precedent for fundamentalist groups in other Islamic states including Morocco (see chapter 8).

The legal regimes for passage of straits catered for in the LOS (1982) is an attempt at reconciling the coastal state control, and freedom of the seas philosophy. However, as in the past, geopolitical factors will continue to determine control of straits such as Gibraltar.

1.5 GEOGRAPHY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA.

1.5.1 Hegemonism Versus Freedom of The Seas.

From an historical perspective, states have striven for control of territories, and with advances in technology states continue to struggle for sovereignty over the seas. Sovereignty
over the waters of straits poses a threat to their use by the international community.

The codification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS, 1982) did not occur in a conceptual vacuum as the theoretical aspects have been debated since Roman times, and especially at periods when certain states (seapowers) could actively exploit and control the oceans. Traditional Roman law held that hydrospace was a community asset open to use by all, that is "common ownership" or res communis in the broadest sense. In contrast res nullis or the belief that the sea belonged to no one, led to the argument that appropriation by the state is legitimate. This latter philosophy was enforced by Venice in the 13th century with a declaration of sovereignty over areas of the Adriatic Sea. Hegemony was enforced by tolls on ships or denial of entry. This set the precedent for other geopolitical entities like the city state of Genoa and the Scandinavian kingdoms to do likewise in the surrounding seas. Ever since, res nullis has been a source of debate, war, treaties and agreements, because sovereignty on land automatically implied to many states de jure control of a band of adjacent territorial seas. Until 1982 there was no universal agreement as to the width of territorial seas. Claims have varied from 1.5 nm to over 200 nm and consequently this has affected passage rights through straits.

Over the centuries power groups have tried to apply the res nullis philosophy far outside their claimed territorial sea limit. As early as 1493, Pope Alexander VI divided the world's
oceans between Spain and Portugal by the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494); with Spain claiming sovereignty over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and Portugal appropriating the Indian Ocean as well as Atlantic waters south of Morocco. The other maritime powers of that period, especially Britain, challenged the legitimacy of such acts by invoking res communis. Is it not one of the ironies of history that five hundred years later, these same states are actively engaged in trying to delimit and control hydrospace in the region of the Strait of Gibraltar.

The ageold conflict of hegemonism versus freedom of the seas was formulated as early as 1609, when Hugo Grotius under the commission of the Dutch East India Company challenged Iberia’s monopoly with his famous treatise Mare Liberum, advocating res communis to be implemented by force if necessary (Grotius, 1972; Lapidoth, 1975, pp.263-266; Knight, 1925, pp.79-112). The US-Libyan dispute (1970s-80s) over passage rights in the Bay of Sirt and adjacent waters re-echoes Grotius’ arguments. In response to Grotius, John Seldon upheld the res nullis thesis in his Mare Clausum (1634), justifying Britain’s claim to the waters around Britain and Ireland (Lapidoth, 1975, pp.266-268; Fulton, 1911, pp.366-367). Seldon pointed out that whatever the de jure position may be, many states exercise de facto control over appropriated waters. Therefore sovereignty over hydrospace existed in practice and thereby in principle. This situation is obvious in the Gibraltar region where despite de jure problems, Britain exercises de facto control over the waters surrounding its Crown Colony. Likewise Spain controls
not only waters around its coast, but those off its sovereign territories in North Africa; and Morocco is taking an ever greater interest in its surrounding seas (RJPEM, Vol.6, 1979).

From a spatial viewpoint, Seldon and Grotius' arguments are not diametrically opposed. Ultimately both accepted the imperative of control of coastal waters. The key issue has always been the exact extent and nature of state sovereignty over these waters. Basically the principle of res nullis was accepted for coastal waters and res communis for the high seas. In the 1970s, a majority of non-industrialized states proposed a form of the res nullis principle to be applied to the deep seabed or "area" with its resources and profits to be vested under the control of an International Seabed Authority. This became a controversial issue in the international community.

The absolute triumph of mare liberum from the 17th century until the 1950s has been eroded because of such factors as:

(i) the great increase in number of independent states;
(ii) ever greater widths of territorial seas and other zones being claimed by coastal states;
(iii) the hegemony of the great maritime powers being challenged politically and economically;
(iv) the increasing ability of many coastal states to defend their claims militarily; and
(v) changes in technology permitting greater maritime resource exploitation and control.

In this century the principles of international law have
been abused in relation to the oceans, especially in matters of right of passage in territorial seas and straits: for example, pollution and submerged transit of straits by user states, and strait states trying to impose restrictions on transit, such as demanding "notification" or "authorization" for the passage of certain types of vessel. However, concerning international conventions, agreement in principle on issues such as the breadth of territorial waters and transit rights does not automatically imply agreement in detail.

1.5.2 Territorial Seas and Cannon Shot Rules.

Historically the first written reference to the cannon shot rule was in 1610 during a fishing dispute between Britain and The Netherlands. However, in the 17th-18th centuries, the rule was popularized and gave rise to the marine league concept. The Scandinavian states calculated the marine league as 4 nm while other coastal states considered it to be three. By the late 19th century the majority of states had adopted 3 nm as the width of their territorial seas, in which they allowed other states a right of innocent passage. Several Mediterranean states and the Ottoman Empire claimed 6 nm, and in 1927, the USSR claimed sovereignty up to 12 nm. Because of the lack of international agreement on the width of the territorial sea, the imperative of self-defence and ever-increasing range of cannons, this led to contentions. The invocation and different interpretations of the cannon-shot rule have been a major point
of dispute between Britain and Spain since Britain gained control over the Gibraltar colony (1704) (see chapter 6). Though the cannon-shot rule may seem somewhat antiquated today, it has formed the basis of Britain's claim to waters and the isthmus adjacent to the Rock of Gibraltar. Colonel Qadhafi's claims to the Gulf of Sirt are in a sense based on a modern interpretation of the cannon shot-rule. He has reiterated time and again that the presence of foreign naval vessels in the Gulf poses a threat to Libyan national security. From his viewpoint there are certain ambiguities associated with territorial seas and security zones. The US declared "security zones" in the Cuba region in 1962, and Britain's security zone around the Falkland/Malvinas Islands during the 1982 War was a variation on a similar theme (Barston & Birnie, 1983, pp.14-25). In the unlikely event of armed conflict between Spain and Morocco in relation to the territorial dispute over the Plazas, "security zones" could endanger the transit rights of the international community through the Strait of Gibraltar (see chapter 5).

1.5.3 Overlapping Jurisdictions.

Along with the problem of territorial waters and straits many other issues have had to be tackled in relation to political control of hydrospace such as regulation of fishing, environmental conservation, jurisdiction over customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary matters, neutrality and security outside the territorial sea, and the status of islands and bays.
Attempts to codify law in relation to straits have included the **London Convention** (1841) and the **Paris Conference** (1894). In the wake of World War I, it was foreseen that changes in world political geography would necessitate a clearer code for ocean usage in order to avoid conflict. Attempts in this sphere included notably the **International Law Association Conference for the Codification of International Law** (1930) at The Hague, attended by 47 states. The issue of a 3 nm territorial sea with a 9 nm contiguous zone were on the agenda. While no agreement was reached concerning the width of the territorial sea, The Hague Conference (1930) did confirm that in those waters of straits which constitute territorial seas (generally accepted as 3 nm):

"... it is essential to ensure that in time of peace in all circumstances the passage of merchant vessels and warships through straits between two parts of the high seas forming ordinary routes for international navigation" (Hague, 1930, p.148; Sharma, 1980, p.112).

There were strong differences of opinion in relation to warships, but in time of peace, in practice states did allow access (Bruel, 1947, p 230). At The Hague (1930) as in all subsequent conferences, the economically and militarily weaker states obstructed agreement on principles that had been developed and imposed in the past by the major seapowers.

The **US Truman Proclamation** (1945) to regulate fisheries in areas of high seas adjacent to the coast, and imposing jurisdiction over the adjacent continental shelf within the 200 metre isobath, set a precedent for rest of the world. Shortly
after, Mexico claimed the same rights as the USA, while in 1946 Argentina claimed the entire continental shelf and superadjacent waters. In 1947, Peru and Chile extended their sovereignty over a 200 nm maritime zone. Since then, states have been claiming ever-greater jurisdiction in sea areas. In geopolitical terms, this constitutes creeping jurisdiction (Glassner, 1978, pp.1-24; 1981, pp.1-4).

The United Nations Convention on The Law of the Sea (1982) (LOS) is the result of the efforts of the world community to standardize international law in relation to the oceans. It is based on convention or international agreement and hence is only legally binding on signatory states. Conventional law has the disadvantage of being dependent on the goodwill of contracting parties only. International/conventional law is codified, whereas customary law is based on precedent and is more flexible. In the past, different state practices in relation to the seas led to controversy because of the abuses of the oceans and the unilateral nature of sovereign claims to hydrospace. Basically, unrestricted usage, intense competition and "creeping jurisdiction" became the cause of disputes in the international arena. For instance fishing problems between Spain and Morocco, contested territorial sea claims in the Gibraltar area and US-Libyan hostilities over the Gulf of Sirt (1980-87) may all be quoted.

1.5.4 Decolonization and The Seas: 1958-1982.

Until 1946, state competition was mostly oriented towards
territorial acquisition, since then the vast increase in the number of sovereign states has focussed the state viewpoint on the ocean frontier (see map 1.5). Historically, the oceans had been the preserve of the seapowers. The scramble for the oceans necessitated UNCLOS (1958, 1960, 1973-1982). The 1958 conference was attended by 86 states and eventually four conventions were adopted and ratified on:

(i) the territorial sea and contiguous zone,
(ii) the continental shelf,
(iii) high seas, and
(iv) fishing and conservation.


The creation of many new states and changes in technology since World War II heightened awareness of the diverse uses of the seas (see map 1.5). Despite air and space technology, navigation continues to affect the economy, security and strategy of almost every state. Navigational uses vary from merchant ships to fishing vessels, super-tankers, warships, submarines and nuclear powered vessels, as well as research and intelligence vessels.
With the world population explosion, fishing activities are highly significant for many states and those not capable of exploitation on a large scale wish to gain revenue from selling licences, or conserving stocks for future usage; Morocco and the Falklands provide classic examples. In the mid-1980s, about 26% of world oil was drilled in offshore areas. The recovery of manganese nodules (containing at least 27 elements, especially manganese, nickel, copper and cobalt) has become feasible (Blake (a), 1984, pp 56-60). Offshore areas became sites for greater scientific research, waste disposal, recreational pursuits and espionage. In the interest of world peace, the LOS attempted to legislate for the oceans and thus to reduce interstate strife.

Some coastal states including Morocco and Spain wished a greater clarification of the law dealing with such contentious issues as passage rights in territorial seas, pollution, and transit of naval vessels and military aircraft (Clingan & Alexander, 1973; Ahmady, 1979, pp.73-93; Ouallalou, 1979, pp.50-59; RJPEM, Vol.6, 1979; Koh, 1982). Spain and Morocco wished their territorial seas in the Strait to be subject to the same legal regime as other territorial waters (see chapter 3).

1.5.5 Legal Maritime Zones.

The LOS (1982) (Arts.2-33) permits a state to claim a territorial sea up to 12 nm over which it has complete sovereignty, except for the right of innocent passage which has to be afforded to all nations in time of peace and
non-belligerents in time of war. This right of innocent passage is obligatory as long as it "is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state" (Art. 19 (1)). This leaves room for a wide latitude of interpretation. According to Article 19 (2) (LOS, 1982) passage may not be considered as innocent if a vessel engages in:

(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal state;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military devices;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to the LOS (1982) Convention, (both rather vague terms with a perceptual basis and difficult to prove);
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communications or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State; and
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.

According to Article 20 (LOS, 1982):

"In the territorial sea, submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag".
However there is much contention over aerial and submarine passage of straits. While it is stipulated in LOS 1958 that submarines must surface navigate and fly the flag while transiting territorial waters in straits; there is no such expressed provision in the LOS, 1982 in relation to the regime of transit passage to be used in straits used for international navigation (Arts.37-45). The legalities of this situation have given rise to much debate, but since there is no express prohibition in the LOS, 1982 against submerged transit of straits like Gibraltar, then this right exists (Reisman, 1980, pp.48-77; Moore, 1980, pp.77-121). Arguably, de facto usage solidifies this right in legal and political terms.

According to the regime of innocent passage, nuclear-related vessels have a right of passage, but must observe specified precautionary measures internationally agreed upon (Art.23, LOS, 1982). Sea lanes and traffic separation schemes may be introduced by the coastal state in collaboration with "the competent international organisation" (Art.22). Despite protests, warships enjoy a de facto right of innocent passage in time of peace (Art.29-32). In a contiguous zone (maximum width 24 nm from the base line of the territorial sea), the coastal state may exercise control in relation to customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws and a right of pursuit exists for crimes committed within the state or territorial seas (Art.33).

With the adoption of LOS, 1982, the trend has been towards national legislation implementing the rights and duties of a 12
nm territorial sea. By 1986, 27 states had claimed territorial seas greater than 12 nm with 15 asserting 200 nm limits. Yet of these 27 states, 23 had signed the LOS (1982) and 4 had ratified it (Smith, 1986, p.2). This situation is not conducive to stability.

Intrinsically linked to the issue of territorial seas is passage rights through straits (Arts.34-54, LOS, 1982). According to Louis Alexander (interview, April 1986) there are over 300 straits which are used for international navigation. Smith (1973) and Koh (1982, pp.24-26) state that there are some 220 straits which may be classified as international. Usually the figure of 116 is quoted when speaking about straits used for international navigation, whose waters fall within the 12 nm territorial seas of the riparian states, of which 16 are of major commercial and naval importance, and 6 are vital (see map 1b; table 1.1) (New York Times, 13 Feb.1986; Kennedy, 1958; Geographic Bulletin (US), 1969, pp.22-27; Elliot, 1947, pp.30-35). Depending on the classifications used for analyzing straits used for international navigation, and with a minimum breadth of 24 nm or less, there may be as many as 133 straits in this category (see appendix I). Included in this group are the Straits of Gibraltar and Lombok/Ombai-Wetar which are crucial to the Western nuclear deterrence system (Pirtle, 1978, p.488). Regarding volume of traffic, Gibraltar ranks among the most vital international straits (see chapter 2).

During the discussions (1973-82) leading up to the LOS (1982) the developing countries wished to consolidate
sovereignty over their territorial waters. They wanted their territorial waters, including those waters within all straits to be subject to the same legal passage regime. The major maritime powers wished to preserve freedom of the seas, reducing state control to a minimum (see chapter 3). (Bergsten, 1973, pp. 102–124; Glassner, 1978, pp. 8–10).

Many straits historically deemed as international now fall within the territorial waters of the riparian states. Depending on historical geography and degree of functionality, major international straits like Gibraltar are subject to the transit passage regime (LOS, 1982, Part III, Articles 33–44). This is basically a compromise position between innocent passage and freedom of the high seas regimes. The principal characteristics of the transit passage regime are:

(i) It applies only where there is an area of high seas or EEZ at both ends of the strait, where there is territorial seas at one end, only innocent passage applies.
(ii) Transit passage is the exercise of freedom of passage and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious passage of the strait.
(iii) Submarines are not required to navigate on the surface.
(iv) Sea lanes and traffic separation schemes may be implemented by the strait state, but only with the approval of the "competent international organisation".
(v) There may be no suspension of transit passage.

In straits where there is only territorial sea at one end, or where a strait runs between an island and the mainland and there is a high seas route or EEZ of similar convenience seaward of the island, the transit passage regime does not apply, and these
straits are subject to the innocent passage regime, but here non-suspension of innocent passage applies, unlike the situation in ordinary territorial seas. Concerning the regime applicable to "archipelagic sea lanes passage" (LOS, 1982, Part IV), this applies when the archipelago forms "an intrinsic geographical, economic . . . political entity" (Art.46). In this circumstance the normal innocent passage regime may apply or the "archipelagic sea lanes passage" regime, which is basically the same as the transit passage regime. However if the archipelagic state does not designate sea lanes or air routes, archipelagic sea lane passage rights may be exercised through the routes normally used for international navigation.

Some observers claim that the LOS (1982) Parts III and IV in relation to straits is a labyrinth of semantics divesting coastal states of real sovereignty in the territorial seas (Tsaltas & Lacatzis, 1983, pp.57-68). What many coastal states deem as "prejudicial" to their interests is a viewpoint not wholly shared by the major seapowers. According to PR China, the Soviet concept of what is "non-prejudicial" to coastal states seems to decay with distance from the Eurasian landmass of the USSR (Koh, 1982, p.184). The Malacca Straits crisis of the 1970s, whereby the riparian states, particularly Indonesia and to a lesser extent Malaysia, wished to prohibit the passage of VLCCs, and make foreign states "give notification" and "seek authorization" for their naval vessels to transit the strait, illustrates the extent of what may be consider as "prejudicial" by some coastal states (Vertzberger, 1984; Oliver, 1973,

Between 1970-80, there were some 22 major oil spills in the Strait-Mediterranean-Black Sea region (Couper, 1983, pp.170-171). However none of these were on a scale comparable to the Torrey Canyon or Amoco Cadiz disasters. The Liberian oil tanker Torrey Canyon was fully loaded with 119,000 tons of crude oil when it sank in 1967 about 7 nm north east of the Scilly Isles. Though outside British territorial waters, in a massive effort to curtail the effects of pollution, the RAF bombed the wreck in order to try and burn off some of the oil. The Amoco Cadiz disaster caused even worse pollution than the Torrey Canyon. This Liberian tanker was fully loaded with crude oil when it became stranded near Portsal (northern France) in 1978. A special commission established that the steering gear system of the vessel had failed. But despite this, the tanker could have passed to Lyme Bay much further offshore without increasing her passage distance or time significantly, and thus increasing her safety margin (Couper, 1983, pp.168-170).

Disasters like the Torrey Canyon oil spill (1967) were seen as a poignant example of a threat to national security by coastal states. The functional claims of coastal states in relation to territorial waters and by implication straights has caused great alarm in the international community. By 1986, 29 states required that warships receive permission for entry to these maritime zones, while 9 demanded prior notification and 5 insisted on similar prerequisites for transit (Smith, 1986, p.2). Along with the right of innocent passage for state or
military vessels which many coastal states dispute, in 1985, Libya began allowing commercial vessels innocent passage rights in its territorial seas only during daylight hours once prior information concerning the vessel was given. Evidently certain state practices are developing heterogeneously.

The maritime and industrial powers object to this challenge to freedom of the seas and are fearful of further creeping jurisdiction to such areas as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which extends to a maximum of 188 nm beyond the 12 nm territorial sea according to LOS, 1982 (Part V, Arts.55-75). The international consensus is that non-resource related high seas freedoms, such as navigation and overflight should be preserved in this zone as codified in the LOS, 1982 (Arts.55-75). By 1986, some 65 states had claimed an EEZ, with 9 including designated areas, where states may try to regulate passage in accordance with their national pollution legislation, thus affecting transit rights. Several states already claim security restrictions in a contiguous zone lying within the EEZ. Therefore straits of all sizes have become affected by maritime jurisdiction and diverse interpretations of LOS, 1982.

The width of the territorial sea and EEZ is measured from the same baseline as legislated in the LOS, 1982 (Arts.5-14). This baseline demarcates the seaward limit of sovereign internal waters. The inclusion of islands and bays within the baseline limits may further restrict the area of the high seas and lead to disputes, eg the current Libyan claim to the Gulf of Sirt as
an historic bay with a 300 nm closing line theoretically constituting the baseline.

With the LOS (1982) not yet in force as of 1987 the eternal question of res communis versus res nullis is very evident on different spatial scales. Due to the restricted area of the Strait of Gibraltar and the contingent geopolitical issues, the straits debate is far from being over in the Gibraltar region.

1.6 CONCLUSION.

By juxtaposing global perspectives on world straits and Gibraltar, we may conclude that straits constitute foci of maritime and territorial interaction. Because of their geographical heterogeneity, all straits are not of equal importance to the international community. Gibraltar’s ocean, territorial and state attributes give it major geopolitical significance as an artery in global trade and naval deployment.

History shows that straits like Gibraltar are coveted by the riparian states, as well as the regional and global powers. Hence there is a continuous struggle for control of these choke-points. The ageold quest of strait states like Morocco and Spain for absolute sovereignty over the waters of key straits has been blocked by the colonial powers in the past, and the enforcement of the freedom of the seas philosophy championed by the UK and USA. Special legal regimes, for straits used for international navigation, like that of transit passage for Gibraltar (LOS, 1982), provide a compromise between the
conflicting stances of the strait states and the major seapowers.
CHAPTER TWO

THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR.

"By the Law of Nations, navigation is free to all persons . . . Every nation is free to travel to every other nation and to trade with it".

Hugo Grotius.
Mare Liberum (1609).

"The Sea does not act as a barrier between the two great continental masses of Spain and North Africa, but rather as a river which unites more than it divides, making a single world of north and south . . . a 'bi-continent'."

F. Braudel.
(Vol I, 1972, p.117).

2.1 INTRODUCTION.

Volume of traffic has always been a major factor in determining the geostrategic importance of straits, and hence their political history. As early as 1947, Bruel (p.50) suggested that traffic volume should be one of the main criteria in deciding which straits should be singled out for a special legal passage regime, which he termed "legal" or "international" straits. He suggested that Gibraltar should be included in this category. Following the 1982 LOS Convention, Gibraltar's waters can be legally claimed as territorial seas by the riparian states (see chapter 3; maps 3.1-3.2). In the past two decades Spain and Morocco have striven for greater jurisdiction over the waters of the Strait. This is problematic because of Gibraltar's geography, volume and type of traffic, and the
number of national flags which transit the Strait (O’Reilly, 1987, pp.104-105).

2.2 USAGE.

2.2.1 Number of Passing Vessels and Data Sources

Gibraltar ranks among the world’s four busiest straits (see table 1.1). Because of the massive volume of traffic and cargoes, and geopolitical sensitivities, obtaining exact data about traffic can prove to be problematic. In order to analyze the number, type and flag of transiting vessels, the author spent several days (March-April 1985) observing passing traffic from the vantage points of Ceuta, Tangier, Cape Spartel, Europa Point and the NATO/MOD Signal Hill station (Gibraltar). At the latter, the author was permitted to study traffic in the Strait by means of the most sophisticated equipment, including radar and radio contact. Thus it was possible to appreciate submerged as well as surface traffic. One of the most fascinating experiences there was the constant radio contact between the authorities and passing ships giving information about the name and type of vessel. However it must be noted that all vessels do not answer the radio calls.

As well as NATO/RN-MOD personnel, port and lighthouse authorities also offered information. Lloyds Maritime Information Services Ltd and A & P Appledore Ship Market Database proved invaluable to the present study. The following analysis is based on the above sources.
Taking into consideration the constraints of verbal interviews, some of the following statements may seem somewhat contradictory, however they serve to highlight the complexity and diversity of usage of the Strait.

According to MOD/NATO representatives interviewed by the author (March 1985), some 45%-50% of vessels (over 1,000 GT) which transit the Strait, "normally" respond when contacted by the Signal Hill station giving the name of the vessel and registration. Some 20% "sometimes" respond when "repeatedly requested to". However "at least 30%" of transiting vessels remain unidentified. This percentage often increases substantially in summer because of poor visibility. Also identification at night poses problems, reducing accuracy. A MOD/NATO spokesman also stated that on average the through traffic was 150 vessels (over 1,000 GRT) per day, with approximately 75 transiting in each direction, but there are significant seasonal variations. Shipments of grain into the Mediterranean/Black Sea region (Sep-Oct) increase traffic substantially. He estimated that about one third of the traffic consists of oil tankers.

The Chief Lighthouse Keeper at Gibraltar (Europa Point) stated that at least 250 "sizeable" ships passed through the Strait daily, not including yachts. By way of confirmation of this, the author observed approximately 10-12 vessels in transit including fishing and war ships at any time of day in March-April 1985. This would suggest over 240 vessels a day pass through the Strait.
Based on data supplied by Lloyds for 1981, some 40,077 vessels passed through the Strait that year (110 per day), but this figure does not include small fishing vessels, warships, yachts and ferries. However the *Times Atlas of the Oceans* (TAO) suggests the figure of 200 a day (1983, p.157). In comparison some 57 merchant ships a day transited the Dardanelles and 80 vessels passed through the Suez Canal at the same period. The figure for other straits are 50 for Bab el Mandeb, 140 for Malacca and 80 for Hormuz (Couper, 1983, pp.150-157). Concerning Dover Strait, Cuyvers (1986, p.55) states that 300 ships a day pass through, while the TAO (1983, p.156) averages some 350 (see table 1.1).

2.2.2 Energy Supply Route.

Gibraltar Strait is an important energy supply route, through which over 200 million tons of oil are transited yearly (Couper, 1983, pp.150-151,157). In 1981 approximately 12 oil tankers a day passed through the Strait, 8 through the Suez Canal and most of the 80 ships transiting Hormuz were tankers. Phosphates, iron ore, liquified natural gas and petroleum gas (LNG, LPG), aluminium and bauxite also pass through Gibraltar. These are mostly northbound. With reference to southbound traffic, the flow of manufactured goods is significant from the west European and north American states to the less developed countries (Blake (c), 1983, pp.258-260; O'Reilly, 1987, p.105), (see maps 2.1-2.5).
MAP 2.1a COMMODITY FLOWS: OIL, IRON ORE, COAL (1987)

OIL

Iron

SSE Asian

Export: 89.9 million Tonnes
Import: 127.3 million Tonnes

Figures in million Tonnes

10-25
25-50
50-100
100-200
> 200

IRON ORE

Iron Flows
Exports: 5 million Tonnes
Imports: 273 million Tonnes

Figures in million Tonnes

1-10
10-15
15-30
30-100
> 100

COAL

Coal Flows
Exports: 8 million Tonnes
Imports: 8 million Tonnes

Figures in million Tonnes

1-5
5-10
10-25
25-50
> 50

MAP 2.1b COMMODITY FLOWS: GRAIN, BAUXITE, CONTAINERS (1987)

GRAIN

- Concorde 29-2
- USA 188

EGYPT

AFRICA

AFRICA

Eurasia & USSR

OTHER FLOWS

Exports: 21.5 million Tonnes
Imports: 6 million Tonnes

Figures in million Tonnes

1-5
5-15
15-25
25-50
>50


BAUXITE

- North America 19.9

- Other Europe 10.5

- Far East and Japan 11.8

- Africa 2.7

- Australia 2.4

Figures in million Tonnes

1.25
2.5-5
5-10
>10


CONTAINERS

- North America 11.0
- Caribbean/Caribbean 0.6

- USSR 0.5

- Far East and Japan 13.9

- India and Middle East 1.3

- Africa 2.7

Figures in million TEUs

0.1-0.5
0.5-1
1-25
25-50
>5

Map 2.3 Oil Refineries

**Libya**
- Haifa, Messad El Idrissi

**North Africa**
- Algeria, Morocco

**Arabian Gulf Refineries**
- Planned
- Under construction
- In production
- Minor onshore refineries in production
- Planned

**Arabian Gulf Refineries**
1. Shuwayba
2. Mina al Ahmadi
3. Mina al Falah
4. Mina Sahd
5. Ras al Khafji
6. Jubail
7. Ras Tanura
8. Sina
9. Bahrain
10. Damaged in Gulf War
11. Planned refinery at Jujaimah canceled 1983

METALLIFEROUS MINERALS

- Antimony
- Bauxite
- Chromite
- Cobalt
- Copper
- Gold
- Iron
- Lead (with occasional silver)
- Manganese

NON-METALLIFEROUS MINERALS

- Muds
- Mercury
- Uranium
- Zinc
- Lignite
- Mica
- Phosphates
- Potash
- Sulphur

*Indicates mineral not currently explorable (end of 1983)

In 1981, Blake (b) (p.235) estimated that:

"... the strategic significance of Bab el Mandeb (was) about to increase, as the numbers of tankers in transit rises sharply from ... 500 a year".

This would indicate that before the widening of the Suez Canal (first phase) less than 2 tankers a day passed through Bab el Mandeb. If the second phase of the widening of the Suez Canal (originally due for completion in 1988-89), was completed it could take all but a few of the world's largest supertankers. Increased usage of Bab el Mandeb would have a direct bearing on east-west traffic in Gibraltar.

According to Cuyvers (1986, pp.55-62), some 11.3% of vessels transiting Dover Strait in the early 1980s, were oil tankers. His research in relation to traffic at Dover revealed that:

"... the principal traffic flows came from Spain and Gibraltar, Africa ... Cape of Good Hope ... Rotterdam, Antwerp, Scandinavia and Germany".

Thus in terms of oil tanker transit, it is arguable that Gibraltar ranks as the third most geostrategic strait in the world after Hormuz and Dover, and within the next decade will become even more important. Gibraltar is a major energy artery for the international community (Odell, 1983), (see map 1.1).

The Suez Canal was closed between 1967-75. Between 1975-1981 enlargement works were undertaken in the Canal. The Camp David Accords (1978) reduced contentions between Israel and Egypt, and helped bolster international confidence in security
of passage of Suez. In March 1981 alone some 45 tankers passed south and only 1 north. When phase two of the Canal development plan is completed, fully loaded tankers of over 250,000 DWT will be able to make transit. Traffic flow at the Canal is significantly influenced by Canal charges, fuel costs and time. In 1981 some 20,795 vessels transited the Canal; of these 2,921 were tankers and 190 warships. In the early 1980s, some 70-80 ships per day passed through the Canal (Couper, 1983, p.153). Usage of the Canal by the major maritime nations by flag (net RT) was Greece (13.9%), Liberia (12.1%), USSR (7%), UK (66%), Norway (6.1%), Panama (5.1%), Japan (4.9%), France (4.5%), West Germany (3.8%) and Singapore (2.5%) (Couper, 1983, p.153). A significant proportion of this would transit Gibraltar. Besides tankers passing through the Canal, those from Algeria and Libya also passage the Strait, and those which use the Levant oil pipelines (see maps 2.2-2.4).

Existing and proposed Iraqi trunk lines are the Dortyol Line which runs 980 km from Kirkuk (Iraq) to Dortyol on the Turkish Mediterranean coast. In 1984, it reached a maximum output of 1 million barrels a day (b/d). The Banias Line runs 850 km from Kirkuk to Banias (Syria) with a spur to the Lebanese port of Tripoli; its capacity is 1.4 million b/d. The Haifa Line runs 1,000 km from Kirkuk to the Israeli port of Haifa, with a capacity for 100,000 b/d, but has been closed since 1948. Iraq rejected Israel’s proposal of re-opening the line in 1984. Iraq has projects for building a 900 km trans-Jordan Aqaba Line from Haditha to the port of Aqaba with a projected capacity of 1
million b/d. In 1987, Iraq began exporting oil by road to the port of Aqaba (Jordan) in an effort to avoid Iranian attacks on shipping using the Hormuz route. An Iraqi LPG line (capacity 3 million tons per year) to Dortyol (Turkey) was under construction in the mid-1980s.

Tentative proposals existed in the mid-1980s, to lay both an oil and a gas pipeline from Ahwaz (Iran) across Turkey to ports on the Mediterranean or Black Seas. Concerning Saudi Arabian oil, Tapline runs 1,710 km from Ras Tanura to Sidon in Lebanon (500,000 B/d). In the mid-1980s, sections of the line in Syria and Lebanon were closed but exports to Jordan’s Zarqa refinery continued. Egypt’s Sumed (capacity, approximately 2 million b/d) runs 320 km from Ain Sukhna in the Gulf of Suez to Sidi Kerir near Alexandria. The Gulf War has heightened the strategic importance of Sumed. Israel’s Tipline runs 260 km from Eilat on the Red Sea to Ashkelon and Haifa on the Mediterranean coast. The 42-inch line has a 900,000 b/d capacity, but has been closed since 1979 when the Islamic Republic of Iran stopped oil deliveries to Israel (Petroleum Economist, 1984, p.264).

Because of the Iran-Iraq War (1980--) and disruption of usage of the Strait of Hormuz, it is envisaged (1987) that Iraq will try to export greater quantities of oil via pipeline to the eastern Mediterranean coast, once again increasing tanker flow through Gibraltar. In the 1980s, almost 67% of the world seaborne trade in crude oil, passes through Hormuz (Couper, 1983, p.154).
Both Spain and Morocco wish the strict application of a comprehensive legal passage regime for Gibraltar, which would reduce risk of pollution from oil tankers to a minimum. In principle the world community supports the ideal of control of pollution, however Spain and Morocco are not convinced that the LOS (1982) fully caters for their interests in relation to pollution (see chapter 3). In the years preceding the LOS 1982, there was much research concerning "flag of convenience" vessels (O'Connell, 1982). The Singapore Authority passed legislation to remove itself from the category of "open registry states". Hence the remaining five are the Bahamas, Bermuda, Cyprus, Liberia and Panama. In all, there are about 6,000 vessels in the open registries, of which about 5% are actually owned by nationals of those states. The majority of the Cypriot fleet is either Greek owned (64.5%), German owned (17.5%), British owned (5%) or owned by London Greeks (4%). Some 87% of open registry vessels fly the Liberian or Panamanian flags. Over 40% of the US fleet, almost all of Monaco's and 75% of Switzerland's fleet are under flags of convenience. (APA Database, 1984). The length to which a state will go to "protect" vessels flying it's flag, or vessels carrying strategic cargoes to particular countries has been proven by the action of the USA and Britain in the Strait of Hormuz in 1987, by "reflagging", escorting and military action.
2.3 TRAFFIC ANALYSIS.

By analysing statistics supplied by Lloyd's Shipping Information Service (1987), it was possible to calculate that some 40,077 vessels (688,391.63 thousand GT) transited the Strait in 1981. The main categories of vessel were general cargo, bulk, containers, ro/ro, oil tankers, LNG/LPG and special cargo carriers (see table 2.1; appendix II). In terms of number of vessels, general cargo ranked first with almost 49%, followed by bulk carriers (17.4%) and oil tankers (11.2%). However in tonnage terms, oil tankers ranked first with just over 38%, followed by bulk carriers (32.4%) and general cargo vessels (16.1%) (see table 2.1; appendix II). To this traffic density must be added yachts, local fishing boats and cross-Strait ferries.

2.3.1 General Cargo Vessels.

General cargo vessels are by far the most common type found in the Strait area, averaging almost 49%. However the average tonnage of these vessels is less than that of oil tankers and bulk carriers. The variety of trades on which these are employed is very varied. As with bulk carriers, the Crown Colony of Gibraltar acts as a staging point for vessels operating on the charter market. General cargo vessels pose less threat of pollution to the environment than other categories of vessel.
## TABLE 2.1  TRANSIT THROUGH THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>EASTWARD</th>
<th>WESTWARD</th>
<th>TOTAL TRANSIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G.Ton. %</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>G.Ton. %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Car.</td>
<td>38523.45</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>9651 49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulk Carriers</td>
<td>73152.83</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>3184 16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Container Car.</td>
<td>9524.81</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>815  4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ro/Go.</td>
<td>5132.19</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1059  5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Tanker</td>
<td>106914.95</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>2433 12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquif.Gas**</td>
<td>5442.19</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>448  2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sp.Car.Car***</td>
<td>8910.84</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1881  9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Types</td>
<td>2672.75</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>291  1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>252274.01</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>19763 100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**=Tonnage equal times 1000.
***=LNG/LPG Carriers.
****=Special Cargo Carriers.

2.3.2 Bulk Carriers.

This category includes bulk carriers, combination carriers such as bulk/container, bulk/oil, ore and ore/oil. In 1981 this group represented 6992 ships or over 17.4% of the number of transiting vessels and 32.4% of the GT. Some 904 vessels were ore and ore/oil carriers representing over 18% of total GT.

Gibraltar is at the crossroads for a number of bulk carrier trades (see map 2.1). The South America to Mediterranean/Black Sea route is important, particularly for grain. The Morocco to Mediterranean/north Europe route is highly significant in the transportation of phosphates. Morocco has the world's largest known phosphate deposits on which the EC is highly dependent (see chapter 8). The North America to Mediterranean/Middle East/Far East route is important for grain, coal and general cargo flow.

In the geopolitics of wheat, the Strait is a lifeline for many Mediterranean states, particularly those of the Maghreb, and indeed the USSR in the 1970s. Bread-related issues including shortages and increase in prices caused serious revolts in Morocco and Tunisia in 1983-84 (see chapter 8).

According to the International Wheat Council (1986, p.35), Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt imported approximately 13,000 thousand tons of wheat for the period June/July 1984-85 mostly from the USA, Canada and the EC (see table 2.2). Almost 50% of the wheat came from North America, most of it inevitably transported via the Strait. Over 4,300 thousand tons came from the EC, transited both via the Strait
TABLE 2.2

IMPORTATION OF WHEAT BY THE MAGHREBI STATES AND EGYPT, PRINCIPALLY VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT, JUNE/JULY 1984/85.
in '000 tons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>1,129</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,798</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2,208</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>1,628</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2,453</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3,018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2.3


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EASTWARD</th>
<th></th>
<th>WESTWARD</th>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL TRANSIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G.Ton.*</td>
<td>No. G.Ton.*</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>G.Ton.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-2k</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>293.37</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>295.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5k</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>576.05</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>535.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-10k</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>755.95</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>684.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15k</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>2901.53</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>2808.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-25k</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>8678.98</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>7816.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-50k</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>18181.50</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>15910.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-100k</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>29013.98</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>23782.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100k+</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>48513.51</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>25489.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2433</td>
<td>108914.95</td>
<td>2043</td>
<td>77323.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*=Tonnage equal times 1000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True Flag</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>393</td>
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<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>84</td>
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<td>China</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>E. Germany</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Greek*</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 4 068 100

* = vessels owned by London based Greeks.

and intra-Mediterranean routes.

2.3.3 Oil Tankers.

In 1981, some 4,476 tankers (about 12 per day) traversed the Strait, thus representing 11.2% of the total number of vessels and over 38% of the GT (see table 2.3). Of this number 3,113 were over 15,000 GT, and 565 were 100,000 GT or more. During the same period approximately 8 tankers per day passed through the Suez Canal. The tanker numbers per day for the other major straits were Hormuz (75-80) and Dover (26) (Couper, 1983, pp.153-4; Cuyvers, 1986, pp.55-62), (see maps 2.2, 2.3).

2.3.4 Gas Carriers.

This category includes LNG, LPG and combination LNG/LPG carriers. These vessels voyage mainly between Algeria/Libya and North America/Europe. Some 897 gas carriers transited the Strait in 1981. Though only representing 2.2% of the total number of passing vessels and 2.3% of tonnage which passed that year, gas is highly significant for the Maghrebi economies and their relations with the EC and North America. Algeria possesses the world's fifth largest known deposits of natural gas (see map 2.4).
2.3.5 Container and Ro/Ro Vessels.

In 1981, 1,657 container and part-container carriers transited the Strait; and 2,125 ro/ro vessels (Lloyd's Maritime Information Service, 1987). Though representing almost 9.5% of traffic, they accounted for just over 6% of GT. A significant number trade the Persian Gulf/Red Sea region from northern Europe and North America. Because the Middle East exports almost nothing but oil, vessels on these trades tend to be empty when egressing the Mediterranean via Gibraltar. (see map 2.1).

2.3.6 Special Cargo Carriers.

Included in this category are barges as well as cement, vehicle, livestock and fish carriers, fish factories, chemical and wine tankers, and refrigeration ships. Both Morocco and Spain forbid foreign vessels to fish in the territorial waters of the Strait. Soviet fish factories make major use of Gibraltar in their journeys between the west African Atlantic fishing grounds and the Black Sea.

Chemical tankers numbered 1,319 (5917.43 thousand GT), of which 1,191 were 15,000 GT or less and 128 were over 15,000 GT. Like oil tankers, chemical tankers are considered to be in the high-risk pollution category by the riparian states.

The Strait acts as a crossroads for reefers (refrigerated cargo vessels). Typically a vessel will finish discharging (fruit, meat, dairy produce) in the Middle East and then proceed to the Crown Colony of Gibraltar to await orders which could take it to south Africa (fruit), south America (meat), Central
America (fruit or meat) or northern Europe (dairy produce) to load its next cargo. In 1981, some 1,508 reefers (7582.32 thousand GT) passed through the Strait.

2.3.7 Other Types of Vessel including Yachts and Ferries.

Other types of vessel included in the Lloyd’s survey for 1981 are cable, depot, drill, salvage, supply (11), support (4) and training ships (1), dredgers, icebreakers, passenger vessels (248), pipe layers, pontoons, semi-subss and tugs. Also research ships (48 in all, 30 passing east, 18 west) have been included in this category. Concerning passenger vessels, many called at the Crown Colony of Gibraltar, which averages 10-15 calls per month, including many Soviet vessels. The majority are at mid-point in their cruises.

(a) Yachts.

Though not included in the above global figure for number of vessels transiting the Strait, yachts add significantly to traffic flow. Along the Spanish coast to the east of Gibraltar are a number of major marinas and yacht centres, including Sotograde, Puerto de la Duquesa, Estepona, Puerto Jose, Banus and Malaga. This is one of the most fashionable areas in Europe for owners of large yachts. It has been estimated that there are over 1,000 yachts of over 50 feet (1,524 m) length moored in the marinas between Gibraltar and Malaga alone. This number is greatly increased by the regular passing traffic in Spring and Autumn. Many yacht owners migrate between the Mediterranean and
the Caribbean. Over 5,000 yachts (30-40 ft/900-1200 m length) enter the port of Gibraltar per year. In 1983 alone some 5,573 yachts called at the port of Gibraltar (Gibraltar Port Handbook, 1984, p.9).

(b) Ferries.

Like yachts, local ferry and ferry/container vessels add to the volume of traffic in the Strait. Their number increases between April and October when demand is higher. In April 1985, the author observed about 27 ferries per day. Providing for same-day return journeys on all routes save that between Algeciras-Melilla, the total was Algeciras- Ceuta (12). Algeciras-Tangier (8), Tangier-Tarifa (2), Tangier-Gibraltar (4). There may be some 9,000-10,000 N-S crossings per year. In comparison, it is postulated that Dover has about 300 ferry crossings per day (Cuyvers, 1986, pp.55-60). If one adds the estimated number of ferry crossings and average number of yachts calling at the Crown Colony, to the total of E-W passages, then over 55,000 vessels per year may use Gibraltar Strait. This number does not include local fishing vessels (see chapter 4) and warships (see chapter 7).

2.3.8 Number of National Flags Transiting the Strait.

According to a survey made by Appledore (1983), concerning usage of Gibraltar Strait (Oct-Dec 1982) for vessels in the 500-40,000 GT range, (Panamax beam 32.3 m, the largest size which can be dry docked at the Crown Colony), some 4,705 vessels
passed through the catchment area of the Strait in the last quarter of 1982. Of this number 4,068 traversed the Strait and 637 were Atlantic passers in the Strait’s catchment area, but not transiting it. The corresponding totals for the Gibraltar catchment area, for the same three month period in 1981 was 4,889 vessels, 4,852 in 1980 and 4,789 in 1979. This would indicate that on average some 19,234 vessels in this category voyaged in the Strait area annually in the early 1980s, with over 16,000 transiting the Strait per year (APA Database, 1983). This category (500-40,000 GT) represented approximately 40% of the total number of transiting vessels in 1981. According to Appledore (1983) the above statistics represent 18% of the world’s merchant fleet in the 500-40,000 GT size range, and indicates that perhaps one ship in six of the world fleet passes Gibraltar every quarter.

In the Appledore (1983) survey period Oct-Dec 1982, of the 4,068 vessels which passed through the Strait, some 25 national flags were predominant accounting for 3,358 vessels (82.5%) (see table 2.4). Broken down by country of ownership/true flag, the states most represented were Greece (13%), USSR (10%), West Germany (6%), Spain (5%) and UK (5%). The Netherlands, Poland, Denmark and Norway each accounted for about 4%. Italy, Hong Kong and Yugoslavia scored about 3% each and the USA approximately 2.5%. Other states accounted for 1% or less. Hence most of the world’s major ship owning nations are represented. Though Appledore’s survey only included some 40% of the total passages and does not include VLCCs, this may act
as an indicator for total usage by flag.

Of the 25 states/flags most represented, 9 Mediterranean/Black Sea countries accounted for 38% of traffic, hence some 62% of passing flags were extra-regional. EC states accounted for over 42.5% of the total and the USA for 2.5%. Seven communist states (regional and extra-regional) accounted for about 23% of traffic. Interestingly states as diverse as Japan, India and China each represent about 2% of transits. While land-locked Switzerland represents 0.5%. Not including north-south passages, Spain accounted for 5% and Moroccan representation was negligible.

Hence volume of traffic, diversity of vessels, number of states represented, and importance to global trade dictate that security and usage of the Strait be assured to all nations. Unquestionably the Strait of Gibraltar is international because of usage by the world community. Monopoly of the Strait by any country or group thereof would result in a serious escalation of tensions in the international community.

2.4 GEOPOLITICAL CONTROL OF THE STRAIT.

Among the leading maritime powers which have striven for control of the Strait are the Phoenicians (1100 BC), Greeks (700 BC), Carthaginians (600 BC) and Romans (200 BC). The Arabized Berber Tarek-el-Zaid led the jihad across the Strait in AD 711. Gibraltar is a corruption of the Arabic Djebel Tarek (Tarek's Mountain), denoting the famous Rock. With Muslim control of the
Strait the north-south axis acted as a bridge for the flow of goods, people and ideas, a major stimulus for the Renaissance in Iberia and Europe. The Great Sahel Mediterranean Gold Route flourished from AD 1100-1400. However the Moors banned non-Muslim transit through the Strait.

The Spanish retook the northern shore in 1502 and continued the Crusade into Africa, establishing Sovereign Plazas and other possessions throughout the Maghreb (Braudel, 1972), finally gaining control of the northern zone of Morocco in 1912 (see chapter 4, map 4.1). Despite the process of Spanish decolonization of Morocco since 1956, Spain still holds five outposts (see chapter 5, maps 5.1-5.5). This provides a major cause of dispute and detracts from Spain's case for the "decolonization" of the Gibraltar Crown Colony gained by Britain under the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) (see chapter 6, maps 6.1-6.3). With the rise of the British Empire and the opening of the Suez Canal (1869), Gibraltar became one of Britain's most strategic assets. In the 19th century, Spain, France and Britain vied for control of the Strait, eventually culminating in a hierarchy of tripartite control (see chapter 4). Britain intervened in the Spanish-Moroccan War (1859-60) in order to prevent France from gaining control of the southern shore.

The first attempt at internationalizing the Strait came with the establishment of the "special status" of the Cape Spartel lighthouse (1865) by international treaty, which lasted until 1956. The Anglo-French Declaration of 1904 confirmed France's interests in Morocco and role in the Strait region.
The Algeciras Act (1906) signed by ten states, while reasserting Moroccan sovereignty on the southern shore, paved the way for the Treaty of Fez (1912) establishing the Franco-Spanish Protectorate (1912-56). The Franco-Spanish Treaty (1912), like the 1904 Declaration, forbade the erection of fortifications and strategic works on the southern shore only, but neither the dismantling of pre-existing batteries nor the demilitarization or neutralization proper were implemented. The nearest the Powers came to this was the establishment of the Tangier Neutral Zone (1923-56). During the World Wars, the British possession of Gibraltar proved invaluable to the Allied cause, in denying passage to enemy shipping, as an assembly point for convoys, and in victualling, refitting and repairing ships. It served as a key assembly point for the invasion of the Maghreb (Operation Torch, 1943), and was also used during the Falkland/Malvinas War (1982). Like Singapore, the main geostrategic threat to Gibraltar comes from land rather than sea. This was witnessed during World War II when the Japanese invaded Singapore by land in a matter of days, while the British had been expecting a sea attack.

Today, the Rock provides a base for British and NATO units (which could include Spanish forces in the future), and Signal Hill serves as a monitoring station. The Mediterranean is an extremely important theatre for submarines. US and NATO nuclear-powered missile submarines use the Strait as do certain Soviet vessels which are not permitted to traverse the Turkish Straits as stipulated in the Montreux Convention (1936) (see
chapter 7). In order to transit the Turkish Straits, all warships must give 8 days notice of transit along with details of their characteristics. Some 262 warship passages were made in 1980 of which 229 were Soviet and 16 American. Foreign aircraft carriers are prohibited from using the Straits, but the Soviet carrier Kiev has made the transit as an anti-submarine cruiser. Likewise there are restrictions on submarine passage. Thus certain Soviet naval vessels may only gain access to the Mediterranean region via Gibraltar. The volatile situation in the eastern Mediterranean region enhances the strategic value of the Strait of Gibraltar as a supply route as was witnessed during the 1973 Middle East War (see map 8.5).

Concerning superpower SSBN deployment, usage of the Strait of Gibraltar is an imperative as it connects SSBN operating theatres. The only other straits in the world to have such a vital geostrategic function are Indonesia's Ombai-Wetar and Lombok, and the GIUK Gap (Osgood, 1974, pp.1-36). Spain placed an extra burden on US strategists by prohibiting use of its airspace over territorial seas in the Strait area, and use of US bases in Spain during the Middle East War (1973), the Iranian Crisis when the US decided to send a force of jet fighters to Saudi Arabia (Jan.1979), and the air-raid on Libya (April 1986) (see chapter 7).

2.5 THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR.

Concerning Gibraltar Strait, the opinion of the eminent
legal expert Erik Bruel (1947, Vol.II, pp.192-193) is as pertinent today as it was when he made it several decades ago:

"... the legal regulation of the position of the Strait of Gibraltar is in the highest degree fragmentary."

Unlike the Turkish, Danish and Magellan Straits, no single document or treaty can be cited as rendering the Strait of Gibraltar a legal international strait. Nevertheless its legal status has been affected by declarations, agreements and LOS (1958, 1982). Fundamentally there are three stances concerning passage and the international status of the Strait:

(i) that such was secured by the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904 (Colombos, 1967, p.222; O'Connell, 1967, p.567);
(ii) that such a declaration (1904) only confirmed a right to a free passage regime that was already considered to exist (Bruel, 1947, p.152; Truver, 1980, pp.178-179); and
(iii) that historical usage, customary law, and conventional law (LOS, 1958,1982) render the Strait international and thus subject to the regime of transit passage, when and if 60 world states, including Spain and Morocco ratify the 1982 Convention. However, this is a contentious legal issue as the question arises as to whether non-signatory states of the LOS (1982) are bound by the rights and duties of the Convention (Wainwright, 1986).

Overall the fragmentary legal instruments concerning the status of the Strait are nebulous and the implementation of the transit passage regime depends on how the LOS 1982 evolves, and in particular upon Morocco and Spain ratifying Part III of the Convention concerning straits used for international navigation.

Because the width of the Strait is only 12.5 nm at its eastern entrance and 24 nm at the western entrance, decreasing
to 7.6 nm between Tarifa and Punta Ciris, effectively these waters can be claimed as territorial seas (see map 3.1, 3.2). Historically Britain has claimed a 3 nm territorial sea around the Crown Colony, while Spain had claimed a 6 nm zone. As the narrowest point of the Strait is less than 9 nm Spain has always regarded the centre of the Strait as constituting territorial waters (Brue1, 1947, p.146; O’Connell, 1982, p.321). Spain reiterated this point at the meeting of the UN Enlarged Seabed Committee on 24 March 1972. Now the riparian states save Gibraltar, claim a 12 nm territorial sea.

The \textit{de facto} manifestations of Spanish sovereignty in the maritime area of the Strait have been many over the centuries. As early as 1780, during one of the many Spanish sieges of Gibraltar, Spain issued navigational regulations for neutral vessels stating that transiting ships would not be molested or prevented passage provided that they did not try to break the blockade; kept to the African shore, avoiding Europe; their papers were in good order; and that they did not act suspiciously (Brue1, 1947, Vol.II, p.166; Lapidoth, 1972, p.92; O’Connell, 1982, p.321). In essence, these regulations are similar to the rights of neutrals traversing territorial seas in time of war under customary international law and LOS (1958). In former times such eminent jurists as Hautefeuille contended that this was prejudicial to the freedom of the high seas (Hautefeuille, 1868, p.60); but ultimately it could be argued that passage was not forbidden to non-belligerents and Spain was reverting to the oldest of all laws, that of self-defence.
It must be remembered that for decades Spain insisted that merchant vessels transiting the Strait fly their flags for identification purposes. This practice lasted till 1864 when the British ship 'Mermaid' was shelled by Spanish cannons from Ceuta. Seemingly the accident came about because of lack of visibility and human error (Lapidoth, 1972, p.92). A British-Spanish commission produced a joint report stating that:

"Il y avait donc eu une simple maladresse de tir dont L'Espagne devait supporter les conséquences, en indemnisant les victimes de l'accident" (De la Pradelle & Politis, 1856–1872, pp.491-497).

(Simply an accidental shot occurred for which Spain is responsible and must bear the consequences by compensating the victims of the accident).

The practice of merchant vessels having to fly the flag was officially abolished by Spain in 1856.

The centuries old friction between France and Britain over dominance in the Strait of Gibraltar was relieved by the Entente Cordiale (1904). Article VII of the Anglo-French Declaration (8 April 1904), basically concerned their respective strategies in Egypt and Morocco. Reciprocal gestures concerning both Powers in the Suez Canal and Strait of Gibraltar regions were made. De jure, the two Powers of that period cannot be said to have internationalized the Strait, but rather to have accommodated each others' maritime strategies in the region in the scramble for straits and colonies, while at the same time avoiding confrontation with other powers such as the USA and Germany, which had interests in the Strait. Thus the 1904 Declaration reaffirmed historic usage of the Strait by the international...
communtiy, in essence a free passage regime throughout most of the channel. The Declaration stated that:

"Afin d'assurer le libre passage du détroit de Gibraltar, les deux Gouvernements conviennent de ne pas laisser élever de fortifications ou des ouvrages stratégiques quelconques sur la partie de la côte marocaine comprise entre Melilla et les hauteurs qui dominent la rive droite de Sebou exclusivement.

Toutefois cette disposition ne s'applique pas aux points actuellement occupés par l'Espagne sur la rive marocaine de la Méditerranée" (De Martens, 1939, Vol.32, 2ème Série, p.15).

(In order to secure the free passage of the straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Moroccan comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the Sebou river.

However, this condition does not apply to the places at present held by Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean).

Hence free passage of the Strait was reaffirmed by bilateral agreement and a prohibition against the erection of fortifications on the southern shore, excluding the areas within the Spanish Plazas (see chapters 4,5). Because of the secret annexes to the Anglo-French Agreement (1904), namely leaving France a free-hand for the "pacific penetration" of Morocco, and recognising Spain's interest in acquiring the north Moroccan zone as a protectorat in the future, this had serious implications. It distanced France from direct physical control of the Strait, but at the same time gave France a direct say on the southern shore. Eventually France would be responsible for the foreign affairs of the entire Moroccan Kingdom and
consequently treaties between Morocco and other states such as Spain. Can such bilateral agreements be accepted as internationally binding in relation to the legal status of the Strait?

Spain was presented with an Anglo-French *fait accompli* at the time, and states like Germany took exception to the agreement. However France succeeded in getting Spain to adhere to the Declaration by the Franco-Spanish Declaration (October 1904) (De Martens, Vol.32, p.57); only after a provisionally secret treaty had been signed by the two states (De Martens, Vol.V. p.666; Le Matin (Paris), Nov.1911). Unlike France, Spain interpreted the secret annexes as securing its control over the entire southern shore of the Strait including the Tangier region (see chapter 4). At the time of the Anglo-French negotiations leading up to the Declaration, neutralization of the Strait area possibly embracing parts of Spain, the Sahara and Balaeric Islands was proposed, but ultimately only the southern shore was mentioned in the agreement. Obviously neutralization of the entire Strait area would have necessitated a full internationalization of the question, hence involving all of the interested states as with the Treaty of 1865 establishing the special status of the Cape Spartel Lighthouse (Bruel, 1947, pp.157-159). Overall the usual customary right of passage in straits used for international navigation was reinforced and a prohibition imposed on the construction of “fortifications or strategic works” on the southern shore, but not dismantling of existing military associated works, nor demilitarization proper
In the event of Spain not being able to protect the southern shore, Britain and France undertook to cooperate in preventing another state taking possession of the area. The principles of the 1904 Anglo-French Declaration were confirmed by Article VI of the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 27 November 1912 (De Martens, 3ème série, Vol.7, pp.323-341, Art.VI, p.326; Lapidoth, 1972, p.93; Bruel, 1947, p.155). Thus it could be argued that by signing the 1912 Treaty, Spain adhered to the principle of "libre passage" (free passage) as stipulated in the 1904 Declaration.

During the World Wars the Allies supervised shipping transiting the strait but did not interfere with neutrals. German-Austrian U-boats (1914-18) and later (1939-45) German-Italian submarines frequently transited the Strait, whether submerged or not while in neutral Spain's claimed territorial seas is arguable. According to Ramsey (1978, pp.40-53), Spanish neutrality was far from impartial, especially in the territorial seas adjacent to the British Crown Colony (see chapter 6).

During the Spanish Civil War, there were several British-Spanish disputes concerning jurisdiction in the territorial seas, especially in the area of the Algeciras/Gibraltar Bay (see map 6.3). In 1937 fascist Italy and Britain concluded a Gentleman's Agreement taking cognisance of "the freedom of entry into, exit from and transit through" the Strait (O'Connell, 1982, p.322; Bruel, 1947, Vol.II, p.191).
All the above mentioned accords, treaties and declarations confirmed freedom of passage in the Strait of Gibraltar based on the assumption that it was international because of its geographical characteristics, usage by many states, and balance of power strategies of the seapowers. Besides these, what are the present day implications?

The 1904 and 1912 Declarations stipulated freedom of passage of the Strait and that fortifications would not be constructed on the southern shore by the contracting states. They also agreed to prevent other states establishing themselves in the area and from erecting fortifications on the southern shore. The 1912 Franco-Spanish Convention was signed after Morocco became a French Protectorate, unlike the 1904 Declaration. With Moroccan independence (1956), did Rabat legally inherit the obligations concerning the Strait agreed upon by France in its name? (Rowny, 1969, pp.89-123, esp. 111-112).

France and Morocco signed the Rabat Accords on 20 May 1956. In this document Art.II could be interpreted as englobing the 1912 agreement:

"Le Maroc assume les obligations résultant des traités internationaux passé par la France au nom du Maroc, ainsi que celles qui résultent des actes internationaux relatifs au Maroc, qui n'ont pas donné lieu à des observations de sa part" (RGDIP, 1956, Vol.60, pp.481-483).

(Morocco accepts the obligations resulting from international treaties engaged in by France in the name of Morocco, as well as those consequent to international acts in relation to Morocco, which did not occasion Moroccan reservations).
De jure France signed the 1912 Treaty in its own name. Then as in 1956, Morocco made no reservations concerning the Strait nor militarization of the Moroccan coast. Lapidoth (1972, p.94) interprets this as meaning that Morocco is legally bound by the Treaty of 1912 by virtue of the Rabat Accords (1956), concluding that:

"l'interdiction en question n'est pas incompatible avec l'indépendence". (. . . the prohibition in question is not incompatible with independence).

Be that as it may from a legal viewpoint, the modern geopolitical realities of Morocco would render such arguments academic. Since Moroccan independence (1956) the nationalist Istiqlal Party has been pursuing a policy of recuperation of territories claimed on historic grounds by Morocco but not returned by Spain in 1956. To date the heavily militarized bastions of Ceuta and Melilla have not been regained. If these Spanish outposts were returned to Morocco, it is unlikely that they would be demilitarized. Anyway their militarization is catered for in the 1904 and 1912 Treaties. Besides the de jure aspects, the realities of decolinization, nationalism and extension of sovereignty up to 12 nm in territorial seas, render the legal aspects somewhat theoretical. With the often cited Article 51 of the UNO Charter concerning the right of self-defence, a more radical regime in Morocco could deem that it has no legal obligation to maintain the status quo which has existed since 1956. With independence, Morocco once more regained full sovereign control of the international Tangier
Neutral Zone at the western entrance to the Strait and the Cape Spartel Lighthouse, both having been controlled by international committees.

The leader of the Moroccan delegation at the UNCLOS sessions at Geneva (1975) stated that the legal regime for transit of the Strait of Gibraltar was anachronisic because:

"... sous prétex de liberté de passage, tire son essence non pas d'une pratique internationale normalement et pacifiquement établié, mais d'un acte colonial remontant au début du 20 ème siècle et trouvant son expression dans les accords franco-britannique et franco-espagnol de 1904 et franco-espagnol de 1912" (UNCLOS, OT. VOL.IV, 17 March 1975 & 10 May 1975; pp.77-78)

(. . . under the pretext of freedom of passage, the present regime is not based on international practice normally and pacifically established, but rather on a colonial act dating from the beginning of the 20th century, expressed in the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish Agreements of 1904, and Franco-Spanish Agreement of 1912).

2.6 CONCLUSION.

Undoubtedly Gibraltar is one of the most strategic straits in the world from the viewpoint of energy supply, international trade and naval deployment. Many questions remain as to future security in the region and the regime of transit passage. Throughout the UNCLOS negotiations, both Morocco and Spain insisted that the waters of the Strait be categorized as territorial seas, and strove for the regime of innocent passage to be applied, or an amended form of the regime of transit
passage (LOS 1982). However this did not imply a simple adherence to the LOS (1958) with its rather unclear definition of innocent passage. Both states wished clearer criteria to be established in matters of type of vessel, cargo and purpose of transit of the Strait. For instance it is common knowledge that states signatory to the 1958 Convention often transit the Strait submerged, though this was prohibited. Despite the riparian states belief that the new transit passage regime is not satisfactory, Morocco signed the LOS (1982) in 1982 and Spain did likewise in 1984. As of 1987, neither state had ratified the Convention. Hence the legal status of the Strait is as ambiguous as it ever was. Lack of clarity on Spain’s part in relation to the Strait debate complicates the issue hindering de jure agreement. Also the question of the Spanish Sovereign Territories in Morocco is contingent to the problem (see chapter 5).

Professor Bernard Oxman, a US representative and Chairman at several UNCLOS sessions informed the author (interview 1985) that despite de jure pretentions and contentions:

"the USA (and indeed USSR) will go through the Strait of Gibraltar, how and when it wants to, particularly as the situation demands, regardless of all the rhetoric . . . and we (USA) consider the straits question as settled".

Nonetheless, most strait states would disagree. While the major maritime powers have not ratified LOS (1982), ironically they expect Spain and Morocco to abide by the regime of transit passage (LOS 1982). In the 1980s, the Reagan and Thatcher
administrations have constantly spoken about international morality, and law and order; yet they have not provided exemplery leadership in relation to the establishment of the LOS (1982) by ratifying it. From the viewpoint of many strait states and the developing countries, they are becoming sceptical of international institutions and conventions; because of the perceived flagrant betrayal of their principles by the very states which were instrumental in establishing them. For instance the USAs' withdrawal from UNESCO, refusal to abide by ICJ and World Court decisions in relation to Nicaragua, and violation of international norms in relation to Grenadan, Nicaraguan and Libyan sovereignty (Christian Science Monitor, 7 April 1986, p.5). While denouncing war and terrorism, the Reagan Administration has been involved in supplying arms to Iran and the Contra forces in Nicaragua.

Because of its geography, the Strait of Gibraltar remains a coveted arena. Although it necessitates a special treaty to establish it de jure as a special international Strait once and for all, it is unlikely that treaties similar to those of Montreux (1936) or the Suez Canal (1869) will come about in the future. In the interests of security in the region the maritime powers must ratify LOS (1982), thus securing the regime of transit passage and giving a lead to the riparian states to follow suit. To strengthen the legal regime of transit passage, global leader states and the riparian countries of at least the 16 most geostrategic straits should work towards the establishment of a separate UN agreement to support the LOS
The support accords should take cognisance of the unique geography of certain straits like Gibraltar, guaranteeing a right of non-suspendable innocent passage to neutrals in time of war, where some or all of the riparian states are belligerents, and otherwise the regime of transit passage. The main point of such an agreement would be to bolster the LOS (1982) with the geopolitical power of the UN in the form of UN armed forces. These forces could be committed to protect Gibraltar Strait in the event of being asked to do so by the Strait states or if threatened by outside forces. In the event of hostilities between Spain and Morocco, UN forces would have a right to protect and supervise the passage of neutral vessels.

In the Gulf War, on 18 May 1987, the frigate USS Stark came under attacked by an Iraqi Exocet. The "accident" resulted in the death of at least 37 crewmen and the vessel was crippled. The previous day, a Soviet oil tanker, Marshal Chuykov (leased by Kuwait) hit a mine off Kuwait, blowing a large hole in the hull. Also on 17 May 1987, the Norwegian owned supertanker, Golar Robin, was set ablaze in an attack by Iranian boats (Guardian, 19 May 1987, p.1). Between 1980 and June 1987, a total of 280 merchant ships, mostly tankers, were attacked by Iraq and Iran in the Hormuz/Gulf region. At least 2 of the 5 British merchant ships which were attacked were apparently cases of mistaken identity (Guardian, 23 June 1987). From January-June 1987, the Royal Navy "accompanied" 119 vessels, flying the British flag or substantially owned by British companies through the Strait of Hormuz. This represents four
times as many as the US accompanied in the same period. British warships are authorized to "exercise their right of self-defence", while as of May 1987, the US Navy is under instruction to shoot at aircraft or vessels which merely demonstrate "hostile intent" (Guardian, 23 June 1987, p.5). This precarious situation is reminiscent of the 1965 attack in the Gulf of Tonkin which justified President Johnson's declaration of war against North Vietnam.

With the escalation of hostilities in the Gulf War neutral vessels have been shelled by both Iran and Iraq. The idea that one superpower or combination of allies appoint themselves as a police force to uphold the LOS is fraught with danger in the regional and global contexts. Certain riparian states may see this as an act of war, or commitment to one of the belligerents; while other seapowers may interpret this as expansionism or imperialism. The Gulf dilemma provides a clear indication that the legal regimes pertaining to straits like Gibraltar catered for in the LOS (1982) must be supported by further conventions guaranteeing the commitment of UN armed forces, with the backing of the UN Security Council.
CHAPTER THREE

THE QUEST FOR A LEGAL REGIME FOR GIBRALTAR.

"It is a well known principle that princes and states are not bound to observe a treaty contrary to their interests".
Cardinal Alberoni (1664-1752).
Political Testament.

3.1 INTRODUCTION.

The legal regimes for straits are based on physical, historical and political criteria. Legal regimes are a compromise position between mare liberum and mare clausum stances (see chapter 1). Broadly there are three juridic categories of straits; those which have high seas running through their entire length; those in which the entire width or at least part of the strait is within the internal waters of one state; and those where the entire width or part of is in the territorial seas of one or more states. Traditionally, a 3 nm territorial sea was claimed by Morocco and the Crown Colony of Gibraltar, and 6 nm by Spain in the Strait area. Historically the international community only recognized a territorial sea of 3 nm. Hence there was a high seas corridor running throughout Gibraltar, even at its narrowest breadth (7.6 nm). Vessels making transit of the Strait through the high seas corridor were completely outside the jurisdiction of the riparian states and therefore not subject to any of the regimes applicable in the sovereign territorial seas. Internationally the trend has been towards the creation of a 12 nm territorial sea limit (see maps
MAP 3.1 THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR: MARITIME ZONES

Spain

Cape Trafalgar

Algeciras

Gibraltar (U.K.)

Point Marroque

Tarifa

Point Ceres

Ceuta (Spain)

Cape Espartel

Tangier

Ports

- International boundaries

- - - - - - 0-3 nautical miles offshore

- - - - - - Over 12 nautical miles offshore

- - - - - - Traffic separation scheme

- - - - - - Possible bridge/tunnel connection

Miles

Kilometres

MAP 3.3 MARITIME BOUNDARIES.
3.1-3.3). This fact was recognized in Article 3 of the LOS (1982):

"Every state has the right to establish its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles."

3.2 INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT.

International concerns in relation to the establishment of judicial regimes for straits are to ensure maximum mobility for all vessels, goods and persons in the interests of trade, self-protection and deployment. Security interests including navigational aids and light houses are also vital.

Juxtaposed with these factors are the major interests of strait states. These include:

(i) security;
(ii) national economic interests;
(iii) environmental protection; and
(iv) securing the national image in relation to regional and world powers.

However it is difficult to legislate comprehensively as all straits do not play the same role in terms of commercial and naval traffic. All categories of vessel make transit of Gibraltar (see chapter 2, table 2.1).

(a) Regular commercial vessels as opposed to vessels with high pollution potential (eg oil tankers) or "special circumstances" vessels (eg nuclear-powered ships and research vessels), or warships, constitute the greatest volume of
shipping. Here the pollution threat comes from marine litter and oil spills. Vessels in this category may be responsible for the transportation of contraband, which is a major problem in the Gibraltar region. Likewise this category may be used to carry out activities in territorial seas in contravention of international agreements such as neutrality, sanctions and embargoes. The use of neutral waters for the transport of goods, ammunitions, political leaders or technicians of belligerent states or their allies may compromise the neutrality of the strait state. Disputes of this nature occurred during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). Other examples are incidents of sanction and embargo busting which occurred during the UN blockade of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (1966-68).

(b) The second major category of vessel includes those with high pollution potential, especially oil tankers. Over 38% of vessels transiting Gibraltar are tankers. Included in this category are vessels transporting liquified natural gas (LNG) and petroleum gas (LPG), for which Gibraltar is a major artery (see tables 2.1 & 2.3).

(c) Grey area or "special circumstance" vessels include nuclear-powered ships and submarines, oceanographic research vessels, and craft known to be of a highly dubious nature, such as the infamous Soviet intelligence collecting vessels often disguised as fishing vessels. A collision took place between a Soviet "fishing vessel" and a submerged Soviet submarine transiting Gibraltar in 1984. The USS Pueblo alleged spying incident in North Korean claimed territorial waters (1968) has
made coastal states ever more vigilant (Akinsanya, 1975, pp. 488-500).

(d) The last significant group is naval vessels and submarines. Differing views are expressed by experts and states as to the respective dangers posed by submerged as opposed to surface transit. However the vast majority of strait states are opposed to these vessels being in their sovereign waters.

3.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIFFERENT LEGAL REGIMES.

3.3.1 Historical Perspective and the "Usage" Criterion.

Special category straits covered by regulation prior to the LOS (1982) have received attention in international law writings and treaties over the past three hundred years, yet Gibraltar cannot be termed a treaty strait like the Turkish, Danish and Magellan Straits. A sample of treaties concerning the Bosporus and Dardanelles is the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainnardji (1771) between the Russian and Ottoman Empires, the Anglo-Turkish Treaty (1809), and the Treaties of Adrianople (1829) and Paris (1856). All these treaties laid the bases for the Conventions of Lausanne (1923) and Montreux (1936). According to Article 35 (c) of the LOS (1982) Gibraltar is not subject to:

"the legal regime in straits in which passage is regulated in whole or in part by long-standing international conventions in force specifically relating to such straits"

As early as 1947, Bruel (1947) pointed out the necessity for special regimes for legal or international straits in which
he included Gibraltar. Among the key criteria which he proposed was usage of the strait. He suggested that the juridic status be determined on the basis of such factors as:

"... the number of ships passing through the strait, their total tonnage, the aggregate value of their cargoes, the average size of the ship and especially whether they are distributed among a greater or smaller number of nations ... all of which seem to give good guidance, no single factor, however being decisive ... "


Bruel concluded that only certain straits like Gibraltar which were vital to international commerce should have the special regime deemed necessary for international/legal straits.

He defined an international strait as one whose use is "worldwide". This concept had already been expressed by other authorities in terms like "routes maritimes indispensables", "routes maritimes nécessaires à la navigation", "grandes routes maritimes", "passage habituel", "international highways", "highways for international traffic" and "natural traffic routes" (Bruel, 1947, p.43; O’Connell, 1982, Vol.I, pp.301-306; Pharand, 1984, p.92). Hence by the 1950s, it was apparent that all straits could not be governed by similar legal regimes; straits like Gibraltar had to have a special status in international law. However the riparian states objected to such a move. The dilemma was highlighted by the famous Corfu Channel dispute (1948) between Albania and Britain over passage rights.

3.3.2 The Corfu Channel Case: Prelude to the LOS (1958).

Albania challenged the dominance of the seapowers and the
mere liberum philosophy. The legal findings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in this case provide a precedent and basis for the legal regime of straits like Gibraltar. The Corfu Channel dispute is significant in the history and geopolitics of straits in that it was the forerunner to attitudes and stances of strait states which were to manifest themselves in the following decades. It provided a signal that the pre-World War II or colonial global order was disintegrating; no longer could seapowers presume an absolute right of transit in straits bordered by weaker riparian states. Armed conflict in the Corfu Channel led to legislation concerning international usage of straits and only predated the Geneva Convention LOS (1958) by a decade. This may suggest that military force may precede legitimizing international treaties.

In the tense geopolitical context of the Balkans and Aegean Sea during the 1940s, and sovereignty disputes between Albania and Greece, Albania contested the right of the British Navy to transit the Corfu Channel. On 15 May 1946, British warships entered the Channel and were fired on by Albanian shore batteries. Britain had warned the Albanian authorities that they were exercising the right of innocent passage. Albania argued that foreign vessels entering its territorial waters had an obligation to request prior authorization. Opposing stances led to deadlock. To test Albania’s resolve, on 22 October 1946, Britain sent a naval squadron through the Channel without prior permission. Several crew members were injured or killed due to contact with anchored automatic mines. On 13 November 1946,
British minesweepers cleared the North Corfu Channel of 22 moored mines. There was no evidence to prove that Albania had laid them, but the ICJ held that it had constructive knowledge of their presence by virtue of its supervision of the Channel, some 30 nm long and narrowing to 6 nm. At that time both Greece and Albania claimed a 3 nm territorial sea with the midline principle being used in the Channel.

In presenting its case before the ICJ, Britain stated that:

"... the character of the channel as an international route depends on the fact that it connects two parts of the open sea and is useful to navigation; not on the volume of traffic passing through it" (ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, Pleadings, 1949, Vol.II, p.242; Pharand, 1984, p.92).

However:

"... apart from coastal traffic, it (Corfu Channel) is a commonly used route for traffic from the heel of Italy on the north Adriatic ports plying to Greece or the east Mediterranean. For navigational reasons many types of ships prefer a coastwise route in this area" (ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, Pleadings, 1949, p.21)

The British representatives also stated that the Channel:

"... has long been used, frequently and unrestrictedly, by shipping without distinction of flag as an international highway. It was for that reason that the North Corfu swept Channel was so quickly re-established as a maritime highway in 1944, and notified as such to the Government of Albania... As such the Strait is subject to the principle of the freedom of the seas..." (ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, Pleadings, 1949, p.23)

Britain highlighted the international nature of the Channel
by producing evidence that during an eight month period in 1937, some 2,884 vessels of 7 different nationalities had called at the port of Corfu; and stated that this number did not include the many other vessels which transited the Strait without putting into Corfu, for which statistics were not available. Britain also indicated that it had been using the Strait for over 80 years as had other navies. The aim here was to emphasize international usage and historic right.

Albania countered that the Channel was not a major or only route for connecting the high seas, it was not a "grande route" but an alternative byroad, "une voie laterale et secondaire".

For the first time, geographical constraints, customary practice, navigational imperatives and the territorial seas issue in straits were presented in a legal setting.

A major question the ICJ had to consider was had Britain:

"... under international law violated the sovereignty of the Albanian People's Republic by reason of the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters. ... and is there any cause to give satisfaction" (ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, (Merits), 1949, p.6).

The judges held that:

"It is ... generally recognized and in accordance with international custom that States in time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas without the prior authorization of a coastal State, provided that the passage is innocent. Unless otherwise prescribed in an international convention, there is no right for a coastal state to prohibit such passage through straits in time of peace" (ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, (Merits), 1949, ICJ Rept. p.25).
By a majority of 11 votes to 5, the Court held that Albania was responsible under international law for the explosions and loss of life. The Court insisted on there being no requirement of prior notification, but taking into account the exceptional circumstances (Albania-Greek dispute), Albania would have been justified in issuing regulations in respect of passage of warships through the Channel. As Britain was not technically at war with Albania, the Court concluded that the manner of passage of the RN was in accordance with the right of self-defence. However the ICJ found that the minesweeping operation and gathering of a large number of naval vessels for such was a violation of Albanian sovereignty.

Concerning the question "whether the test is to be found in the volume of traffic passing through the Strait or in the greater or lesser importance for international navigation"; the Court stated that:

"the decisive criterion is rather its geographical situation as connecting two parts of the high seas and the fact of its being used for international navigation" ((sic) ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, Reports, 1949, p.28; Pharand, 1984, p.93).

The official and authoritative text in French reads:

"Le critère décisif paraît plutôt devoir être tiré de la situation géographique du Détroit, en tant que ce dernier met en communication deux parties de haut mer, ainsi que du fait que le détroit est utilisé aux fins de la navigation internationale" (ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, Reports, 1949, p.28; Pharand, 1984, pp.92-93).

The official French text arguably attributes less importance to
the fact that the Strait is used for international navigation than to the geographical features. The English translation seems to give equal weight to the usage criterion. The debate as to the semantics of the texts in French and English has led to scholarly dispute over since.

The importance of the Corfu Channel Case in defining international straits and relevant regimes as opposed to other types of straits is:

(i) international straits were defined as those which connect the high seas and were used for international navigation, regardless of alternative routes; and
(ii) it was established that warships like merchant vessels had a right of innocent passage through straits.

Thus the right of innocent passage was upheld, and the right of all nations to transit territorial seas in straits was reinforced. Also it would seem that the 'usage' or 'functional' criterion was taken into account, though many observers dispute the latter point. The findings of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case helped lay the foundations for conventional law pertaining to straits as found in the LOS (1958, 1982). For henceforth, a strait of more than the legally accepted width of the territorial seas and used for international navigation could be considered as a legal strait, if the high seas route in the middle was not suitable or convenient enough for navigation (Art.36, LOS, A/CONF.62/122, 1982; Pharand,1984, p.90). Also it could be argued that because of the precedent set in relation to
the ICJ's decision on the issue of minesweeping in the territorial seas of straits, several navies including those of the USA and Britain participated in the mine-clearing operations in the Red Sea in 1984 (Wainwright, 1986). In 1987, the USA tried to enlist the aid of Western navies in clearing the Arabian/Persian Gulf of mines, so as to avoid allegations of non-innocent action as happened in the Corfu Channel Case. There were calls at the UN for concerted naval action under the auspices of the UN Security Council. The British government stated that such joint action involving the maritime powers of the West and East would be impossible to coordinate.

Despite the major break-through brought about by the ICJ (1949), in relation to the legal right of the international community to transit straits like Corfu, no clear definition of usage was established for types, tonnage, cargoes, aggregate value or number of flag-vessels. Instead the vague terms international and considerable usage were used. De Visscher (1969, p.142) who had participated in the Corfu Channel Case, stated in 1969 that some of the data produced were not conclusive but mentioned that the four cardinal factors were:

(i) the number of ships using a strait;
(ii) tonnage;
(iii) cargo value; and
(iv) number and diversity of flags represented.

O'Connell (1970, p.497) also emphasises the functional element:

"... the test of what is a strait, ... is not so much geographical, therefore
Some of the dissenting judges in the Corfu Channel Case expressed doubts as to the legal definitions for international straits and the issue of codifying global laws for a geographical phenomenon which is quite unique for each individual strait, because of differences in geographical characteristics such as coastlines, indentation, breadths and lengths. Judge Alvarez noted that apart from the existence of special rules governing certain straits such as the Dardanelles and Bosporus, that are applicable under certain conventions, there was no special regime for straits and their position was assimilated into that of the territorial sea.

"Some writers consider that the wide differences between one strait and another prevent the adoption of any general rule" (ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, (Merits), 1949, p.104).

Another dissenting judge, Krylov, stated:

"... that there is no such thing as a common regulation of the legal regime of straits. Every strait is regulated individually" (ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, (Merits), 1949 p.74; Butler, 1967; Koh, 1982, p 30).

Nonetheless Judge Alvarez stated that he favoured:

"... the adoption of a general regime for straits of a "certain kind", supplemented by special rules for individual cases" (ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, (Merits), 1949, p.104).

This viewpoint was supported by the majority of judges. Basically the ICJ wished it to be clear that the regime for
territorial seas and straits could not be identical. In the context of the Strait of Gibraltar, Judge Alvarez's opinion is pertinent.

As the findings of the Corfu Case were to set precedents, perhaps more attention could have been paid to the viewpoints of the dissenting judges. Since 1948, many newly independent strait states like Morocco, and older sovereign states like Spain have contested the passage regime for straits used for international navigation (see map 1.5). However the ICJ established the legal precedent that: (a) a strait which joins two parts of the high seas, and (b) is used for international navigation must be deemed an international strait. This was particularly relevant to straits like Gibraltar. The ICJ (1948) had laid the bases for the establishment of legal regimes for international straits in LOS I and II.


Article 14 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone provides for innocent passage in straits so long as it is non-prejudicial to the interests of the strait state, but stipulates that submarines are required to surface navigate and fly the flag. Agreement could not be reached concerning the transit of warships, so the Convention remained ambiguous on the issue, as customary international law had been. In 1927, Jessup (p.120) maintained that:
"(warships) should not enjoy an absolute legal right to pass through territorial waters any more than an army may cross the land territory".

In 1947, Bruel (p.108) found that:

"the legal position of straits as regards the right of passage in time of peace . . . (is) . . . the right of innocent passage for both merchant vessels and ships of war, the right of the latter, however, (is) not yet fully established".

In 1949, the ICJ stated that:

"It is . . . generally recognized and in accordance with international custom that States in time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas" (ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, (Merits), 1949, ICJ Rept. p.25).

By 1985, eight Mediterranean states required advance notice or authorization for military vessels to enter their territorial seas, and two of the eight require permission for the entry of nuclear-related vessels (Limits, 1985).

Whatever the de jure ambiguities of the 1958 Convention may be on the issue, de facto naval vessels continued to transit straits without coastal state permission (Thorpe, 1985, pp1-25).

A major breakthrough of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1958) was Article 16 (4), which stated:

"There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits that are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state" (UN Treaty Series, 1958, Convention on the Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zone. Vol.DXVI, p.205).
The criteria which emerged for defining legal international straits with the Geneva Convention (1958) (LOS I) fall into three categories.

Firstly, actual usage, but inherent in this is an historical stance not catering for future changes and a feeling of discrimination or loss of sovereignty by those strait states most affected.

Secondly, the strait does not have to be a necessary route for international navigation but can be a secondary one.

Thirdly, the strait must have a continuous history of usage.

This leaves room for dispute as is evidenced by Canadian-US contentions over usage of Polar straits (Pharand, 1984, Financial Times, 12 Sep. 1985; Dudley, 1984). The LOS (1958) did not make any reference to the number of vessels or national flags transiting straits, which might act as a guideline for considering them as international, as had been hoped by some states.

3.4 GIBRALTAR AND THE LOS (1982).

By 1982, there was a general acceptance by the international community of a 12 nm territorial sea. The LOS 1982 covers at least five categories of international straits and provides for four different legal regimes. This leaves a
certain scope for diverse interpretation.

As with previous conventions, the maritime powers strove for a special regime for straits used for international navigation, basically a free passage regime, akin to freedom of the high seas in matters of navigation and overflight. The US draft articles for straits at the UN LOS discussions in 1971 provided that:

"In straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State, all ships and aircraft in transit shall enjoy the same freedom of navigation and overflight, for the purpose of transit through and over such straits, as they have on the high seas" (UN Doc. A/AC. 138/SC II/L.4, (30 July 1971); Pharand (1977) p.73; Koh, 1982, p.103).

Of course this meant freedom of passage for warships and submerged transit for submarines akin to the high seas regime. This was the stated stance of the USA, if it was to recognize a 12 nm territorial sea; the issue of submerged passage and warship transit not having the backing of the Geneva Convention (1958). The transit proposals of the USSR presented at the 1972 UNCLOS sessions were almost identical:

"In straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas, all ships in transit shall enjoy the same freedom of navigation, for the purpose of transit through such straits, as they have on the high seas" (UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC II/L.7 & 18 (25 July 1972)).

Significantly the Soviet proposal did not include straits joining the high seas and territorial seas eg Tiran.
To counter the free transit lobby, Spain and Morocco along with Cyprus, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Yemen, introduced a proposal entitled "Draft Articles on Navigation Through the Territorial Sea, Including Straits Used for International Navigation" (UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.18 (27 March 1973)). Fundamentally they wished to keep their straits linked to the territorial seas regime, in many aspects similar to the 1958 Convention, allowing for the right of non-suspendable innocent passage but requiring prior notification for the transit of warships, nuclear related and dangerous vessels. Some of the most contentious articles were those dealing with the transit of oil-tankers and pollution. Other provisions included compulsory insurance for vessels and prerogative for strait states to designate traffic lanes.

The deadlock between these opposing groups was broken somewhat by the compromise articles introduced by Britain at the UNCLOS session at Caracas in 1974, entitled "Passage of Straits Used for International Navigation" (UN Doc.A/Conf. 62/C.2/L.3 (3 July 1974)). In essence this is what appeared in the LOS 1982. The new term transit passage replaced the more contentious wording of the superpowers; "freedom of navigation as on the high seas" became "transit of international straits". The proposal limited the application of the transit passage regime to straits joining two parts of the high seas and retained innocent passage for straits joining one part of the high seas with the territorial sea of a foreign state. Though incorporated into the LOS 1982, many coastal states do not fully
support the new transit passage regime.

The LOS (1982) is not as clear on the straits issue as many international jurists would like it to be. The following classification of regimes for "international straits" is based on the 1982 Convention.

(i) Nothing in the Convention affects "the legal regime in straits in which passage is regulated in whole or in part by long standing international conventions in force specifically relating to such straits" (Article 35 (c)). For example, the Turkish Straits.

(ii) High seas or EEZ routes through straits used for international navigation or "routes of similar convenience" within them will be subject to freedom of navigation and overflight as on the high seas or EEZ. "Similar convenience" refers to "navigational and hydrological conditions" (Art. 36).

(iii) International straits with a route of high seas or EEZ not of "similar convenience" will be governed by the right of transit passage (Art. 38). Such straits are provided for by implication in article 36 which states that "this part does not apply to a strait used for international navigation if there exists through the strait a route through the high seas or EEZ of similar convenience". According to Pharand (1984, p.96): if the condition for the exclusion of such straits is not met, then they are included in the application of Part III on international straits and therefore subject to the right of transit passage; these straits join parts of high seas or EEZ's.

(iv) With reference to transit passage, Articles 37 and 38 apply to straits which "are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or EEZ and another part of the high seas or EEZ" (eg Gibraltar). "All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage which shall not be impeded, except that, if the strait is formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland, transit passage shall not apply if there exists seaward of the island a route through the high seas or
EEZ of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrological characteristics" (Art. 36).

Hence the right of non-suspendable innocent passage is applicable here.

(v) International straits joining one part of the high seas or an EEZ with the territorial sea of a foreign state are governed by the right of non-suspendable innocent passage (Art. 45, 1b and 2).

(vi) International straits joining a part of the high seas or an EEZ to another part of the high seas or EEZ and not included in the previous categories are subject to the right of transit passage regime.

(vii) There is also the possibility that a strait composed exclusively of internal waters might be used for international navigation, e.g. in Greek, Canadian and Indonesian waters. If such arises due to the establishment of straight baselines, then these territorial waters would become subject to the "the regime of archipelagic sealanes passage" (Part IV, Arts. 46-54).

Essentially, this may be either the regimes of transit or innocent passage, unless the waters are internal by reason of historic title.

The regime of innocent passage is applicable to foreign vessels which do not pose a threat to the "peace, good order or security" of the coastal state. The regime of "transit passage" (Arts. 37-44) is applicable to Gibralatr, as the Strait joins the high seas to EEZs (Art. 37). According to Article 38 (LOS, 1982):

1. "all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded . . . ."
2. "Transit passage means . . . . the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait . . . . however . . . . (this) does not preclude passage through the strait for the purpose of entering, leaving or returning from a State bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry to that State". 
Thus all ships and aircraft have the right of transit passage of Gibraltar, and access to Spanish and Moroccan ports, as well as the Crown Colony of Gibraltar and the Spanish Territory of Ceuta in North Africa.

Article 39 lays out the duties of ships and aircraft during transit passage.

1. Ships and aircraft, while exercising the right of transit passage shall:
   (a) proceed without delay through or over the strait;
   (b) refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States bordering the strait, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
   (c) refrain from any activity other than those incident to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress.

2. Ships in transit shall:
   (a) comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices for safety at sea, including the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at sea;
   (b) comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of ships.

(Both Spain and Morocco feel that "generally accepted international regulations" in relation to pollution are not comprehensive enough).

3. Aircraft in transit shall:
   (a) observe the Rules of the Air established by the International Civil Aviation Organization as they apply to civil aircraft; state aircraft will normally comply with such safety measures and will at all times operate with due regard for the
safety of navigation;
(b) at all times monitor the radio frequency
assigned by the competent internationally
designated air traffic control authority or
the appropriate international distress radio
frequency.

(Spain and Morocco would like greater clarification of the term
"normally apply" (3 (a)).

Article 40 stipulates that research or surveys are
forbidden without authorization from the strait state. Article
41 stipulates that sea lanes and traffic separation schemes used
for international navigation may be designated by the coastal
state in accordance with the "competent international
organization". However the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) or other relevant bodies are not actually named. A
traffic separation scheme is already in force in Gibraltar (see
chapter 1).

Article 42 covers the duties of the coastal state. They
may "adopt laws and regulations" in relation to "the safety of
navigation and regulation of maritime traffic" as provided in
Article 41; and the "prevention, reduction and control of
pollution". Strait states may also "prevent" fishing, and the
loading or unloading of "any commodity, currency or person" in
contravention of national laws. According to Article 42(5)
"The flag State of a ship or the State of
registry of an aircraft entitled to
sovereign immunity which acts in a manner contrary to such laws and regulations or
other provisions of" Part III (Strait States Used
For International Navigation) "shall bear
international responsibility for any loss or
damage which results to States bordering
strait”.

Observers point out that Article 42 is highly dependent on the good will of the “flag State” or “State of registry”.

Article 43 concerns navigational aids and pollution control and states that the “user States” and riparian states “should by agreement co-operate”. Perhaps the most important article of the LOS (1982) in relation to Gibraltar is Article 44:

"There shall be no suspension of transit passage".

Overall in straits used for international navigation, the regime of transit may be that of transit passage, non-suspendable innocent passage or innocent passage depending on the geography, history and state sovereignty in the strait area.

3.5 **MARITIME JURISDICTION: MOROCCO, SPAIN AND THE CROWN COLONY OF GIBRALTAR.**

No part of the Mediterranean Sea region lies outside the sovereignty of one of the surrounding states, whether in the form of territorial seas, contiguous zones, or EEZs. For the 23 straits in the region, the various legal regimes apply.

There are 18 sovereign states in the Mediterranean, and the British sovereign possessions of Gibraltar, and the Cyprus bases. The application of the LOS (1982) has led to disputes between Greece and Turkey, Cyprus and Turkey, Spain and Britain, Libya and the USA, and Israel and its neighbours. Future disputes are inevitable, possibly in the Gibraltar region,
particularly in relation to Morocco. All Mediterranean states, except Albania and Israel, have signed the LOS Convention (1982); Algeria, France and Greece made qualifying "declarations" at the time of signing (Limits, 1985) (see map 3.3).

In relation to Spain and the LOS, on 25 Feb.1971, Spain became party to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. By Governamental Act (no 10/1977) a 12 nm territorial sea zone was proclaimed. By royal decree (no 2510/1977), Spain made corrections to its straight baseline system, for which legislation had been enacted in 1976. Consequently, Spain defined the straight baselines in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas. In the latter case, the longest stretches from Punta Carbonera, east of Gibraltar to Cabo de Salou, south of Tarrogna. Two short segments link Barcelona to Arenys de Mar and Cabo Bagur to the French boundary line. Overall these baselines do not push Spain's claims seaward. Straight baselines have been drawn around the Balearic Islands, with Ibiza and Formentera being joined. As the coasts are not deeply indented nor fringed around the above mentioned islands, this action is not easily justifiable. By Law No 15/1978, Spain laid the limits of the EEZ to be drawn from archipelagic baselines established in 1977 for island groups. Concerning the contiguous zone, Spain declared it to be 12 nm in 1968, and legislated for customs jurisdiction. Perhaps Madrid had the Crown Colony of Gibraltar and waters of the Strait in mind at this significant date (see chapter 6). Concerning the
continental shelf, tardedly Spain became party to the relevant 1958 Convention in 1971. In 1974, boundary agreements with France (Bay of Bascay) came into force. In 1983, incidents in this area led to French naval vessels shelling Spanish fishing boats. Boundary agreements were also signed with Portugal (1976), and others accords entered into force with Italy in 1978. With reference to fishing, a 6 nm zone was established in 1964 and extended to 12 nm in 1967. Spain is also a signatory to the European Fishing Convention. In 1978, a 200 nm EEZ was created by Spain. Madrid signed the LOS (1982) in Dec.1984, but to date has not ratified it. With Spanish entry to the EC, Community maritime laws and agreements will become effective by the early 1990s. Spain has not enacted specific legislation in relation to the Strait of Gibraltar, nor made reference to special provisions concerning the Strait. The non-peninsular areas of the Spanish state are covered by the above mentioned legislation. Spain lays claim to the territorial waters around its North Africa Territories, including Ceuta (Limits, 1985, pp.158-159) (see chapter 5).

The laws relating to maritime zones which have been promulgated and registered with the UN by Morocco are fewer in number than those of Spain. A 12 nm territorial sea was implemented in 1973, and by decree (1975) limits in the Strait of Gibraltar by coordinates were specified, according to the Median line principle (Ahamdy, 1979, p.74). Straight baselines were established by decree in 1975. In 1981, a 24 nm contiguous zone was instituted. In 1958, Morocco declared its continental
shelf jurisdiction to be to 200 metres water depth or to the depth of exploitation. Boundary agreements concerning the shelf were signed with Mauritania in 1976, at that time both states were becoming embroiled in the West Saharan War (see chapter 8). Concerning exclusive fishing zones, Morocco declared a 12 nm zone in 1962, and specified 6 nm in the Strait of Gibraltar. In 1973, the fishing zone was extended by national law to 70 nm, and a 200 nm EEZ was decreed in 1981 (Limits, 1985, p.120). This led to sabre rattling in Ceuta and Melilla, and an ostentatious display of Spanish naval power in the Ceuta area (see chapter 5). Neither of the latter laws made specific mention of the Strait. Morocco signed the LOS Convention in December 1982. As of 1987, Morocco had not ratified the LOS (1982).

Traditionally, Britain claimed a 3 nm territorial sea around the Crown Colony of Gibraltar in accordance with the straight baseline and equidistance principles. Historically Spain has always contested Britain sovereignty over the Crown Colony, together with British jurisdiction over the isthmus joining the Rock of Gibraltar to the mainland proper and the runway projecting into the Bay of Algeciras/Gibraltar. The latter two areas have the effect of pushing seaward Britain’s claim to territorial waters. The only laws promulgated and registered with the UN which apply to Gibraltar are the Territorial Waters Jurisdictional Act (1878), which incorporates the global clause that the Act applies to all British dependencies (Limits, 1985, p.179). According to the UK
Territorial Sea Act (1987):

"the breadth of the territorial sea adjacent to the UK shall for all purposes be 12 nautical miles" (Territorial Sea Act 1987; 1(a), p.1)

It is stipulated that this Act caters for Northern Ireland (4(1)), and the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man ((4(4)). Unlike the Territorial Waters Jurisdictional Act (1878), it is not stipulated that the 1987 Act applies to "all dependencies".

As late as 1985, when the author asked the Port Authorities and other government agencies in Algeciras, Ceuta, Tangier, Rabat and Gibraltar, for official maps of the Strait area showing maritime boundaries, the situation was far from clear. The Moroccan authorities willingly showed maps dating from the 1960s, without definite boundaries in the Strait, but informed the author that the Ministry of Marine Affairs (Rabat) was engaged in research, whereby Morocco's maritime area had been divided into 7 regions, 6 of which had been carefully mapped, but the seventh (the Strait and Mediterranean) had yet to be completed. The Spanish authorities spoke of their 12 nm territorial seas, median lines, equidistance and so on, but were unable to provide maps clearly indicating their maritime jurisdiction in the Strait region. The Gibraltarian authorities showed the author a map of the area (dated 1969), which ostensibly was an official map but also contained lines drawn in, in pencil and ink. The pencil marks indicated areas/demarcations open to dispute, which while being held to be Gibraltarian demarcatory lines were treated with a certain
sensitivity by the local authorities. The lines drawn in ink, were considered to be contentious but were not open to discussion, because of de facto Gibraltarian control of those areas.

3.6 MEDITERRANEAN STATES AND STRAITS.

Despite the restricted area of the Mediterranean Sea there are at least 23 straits with different functional usage, and used by the international community. The nine most used straits of the western Mediterranean are Gibraltar, Minorca, Bonifacio straits, the Corsica-Elba, Elba-Italy, and Giglio-Italy straits (see table 1.1). The straits of Messina, Sicily, and Pantelleria-Tunisia are also key arteries. These straits fall wholly or partially within the territorial seas of Spain, Morocco, Italy, France and Tunisia. The remaining straits of the central and eastern Mediterranean zones are bathed by the territorial waters of Italy, Malta, Tunisia, Albania, Greece, Cyprus and Turkey. Many Mediterranean strait states with the exception of France and Italy feel that the LOS (1982) in relation to regimes for straits was a denegration of the right of innocent passage, largely dictated by the USA and USSR.

According to Tsaltas and Lacatzis (1985, p.59):

"... the ... majority of jurists still consider the implications of its (LOS 1982) provisions to be somewhat doubtful".

Tsaltas and Lacatzis (1985, p.60) state that because of US and Soviet naval strategies, the superpowers strove for free transit
regime principles, trivializing coastal state jurisdiction; and that some Mediterranean states feel that:

"transit passage" is "an inherent and inseparable complement of the freedom of navigation and overflight of the high seas".

Mediterranean strait states like Spain, Morocco, Cyprus, and Greece feel that "since the principle of innocent passage is applicable in regard to the territorial sea, it should also be applied in the case of straits used for international navigation". They declare that their sovereignty extends to those straits that form part of "their territorial seas" (Tsaltas & Lacatzis, 1985, p.60). In line with the evolving political ideologies of the 1970s; Dupuy (1975-76, p.31) argues that in the international community:

"current practice . . . in UNCTAD, the Declaration on the New Economic Order, and the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States resulted in the proclamation of the principle of compensatory inequality, . . . (thus this). . . extends to the LOS, which is above all situational law, which takes into account the geographical locations of States and the resulting consequences thereof".

Strait states argue that they should not be penalized because of their geographic configuration.

Many developing states support the Spanish and Moroccan stance on territorial seas and straits. Strait states fear that the transit passage regime used for international navigation poses a threat to their independence, as it means "the exercise . . . of the freedom of navigation and overflight . . . of the strait" (LOS 111, Art 38 (2)). Unlike LOS 1958, it is not
stipulated that submarines should surface navigate, and it is stipulated that there is a right of overflight. A radical change in the Moroccan power structure, would arguably wish to reassess the transit passage regime for Gibraltar.

Spain and Morocco like the other Mediterranean strait states are aware that Article 45, LOS (1982) precludes the right of innocent passage of straits used for international transit. The regime of innocent passage applies only to straits used for international passage which are excluded from the regime of transit passage, but these are the very straits that are used for the bulk of international navigation like Gibraltar and Sicily. Yet if a strait connects the territorial sea of a coastal state with the high seas, it is automatically part of the legal waters of that state (Depuy, 1975-76, p.66). Mediterranean strait states believe that they have lost aspects of sovereignty over their territorial seas.

3.7 Spanish and Moroccan Attitudes to the New Transit Passage Regime.

The legalities of the transit passage regime (LOS 1982) for straits used for international navigation have now been under discussion for more than a decade. Though Spain and Morocco have signed the LOS (1982), it is interesting to look at their proposals during the UNCLOS conferences (1970s) and see the respective national stances and possibly how this will shape
future events in the Strait region. At all stages Spain and Morocco opposed the introduction of the transit passage regime.

At the UN Sea-Bed Committee meeting (16 March 1972), the Spanish representative stated that:

"The traditional safeguard of coastal states had become more urgently necessary with the growing demonstrations of naval power in certain waters and with technological development, since warships, nuclear-powered vessels, giant tankers and ships carrying dangerous goods represented a potential threat to the peace, good order and security of the coastal states. After all, to go beyond the present regime would amount to requesting of non-innocent passage" (sic) (UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.48, p.13; 16 March 1971).

Spain and Morocco vehemently supported the arguments of Canada (A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.54, p.12, 24 March 1971), Indonesia (A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.4-23, p.113, 13 August 1971) and Malaysia (A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.4-23, p.88, 12 August 1971) in relation to the need for greater protection under the regime of innocent passage against pollution, which endangers the security of the state. Spain was particularly concerned about threats to its fishing industry.

Morocco and Spain in conjunction with Cyprus, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Yemen were instrumental in the preparation of Draft articles on navigation through the territorial sea including straits used for international navigation (sic) UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.18; 27 March 1973). The proposal comprised 23 articles. The following considerations were taken into account.

Firstly, navigation through the territorial sea and straits
used for international navigation should be dealt with as an entity, since the straits in question are or form part of the territorial sea.

Secondly, regulation of navigation should establish a satisfactory balance between the particular interests of coastal states and the general interests of international maritime navigation. This is best achieved through the principle of innocent passage which is the basis of the traditional regime for navigation through the territorial sea.

Thirdly, regulation must contribute to the security of the coastal state and international maritime navigation. This can be achieved by the reasonable and adequate exercise by the coastal state of its right to regulate navigation through its territorial sea, since the purpose of the regulation is not to prevent or hamper passage but to facilitate it without causing any adverse effects to the coastal state.

Fourthly, the regulation should take account of the economic realities and scientific and technological developments which have occurred in recent years; this requires the adoption of appropriate rules to regulate navigation of certain ships with special characteristics.

Fifthly, the regulation should meet the deficiencies of the LOS Convention (1958), especially in relation to passage of warships (Koh, 1982, p.115).

The draft adopted made no distinction between the
territorial seas regime to be applied in coastal areas, including straits used for international navigation, with the exception that there would be no suspension of innocent passage in these straits. Thus non-suspension of passage was reliant on the fact of it being "innocent". As the LOS (1958) was unclear as to the definition of innocent passage, neither the strait states nor the maritime powers could agree on a clear definition of the principle, particularly in relation to pollution and passage of naval vessels. Concerning the draft article, the Spanish representative stated that any attempt to set up separate regimes for the territorial sea and for straits would clearly violate the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the coastal state over its territorial sea (A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.60, p.188; 4 April 1973). The eight-nation draft was criticized by many delegations, including the Ukraine SSR, which pointed out that it would give some 12 to 15 states control over most of the world's shipping. Also it would subject the international community to the decisions of individual coastal states and the convenience of military and political groupings (A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.71, p.24; 8 August 1973). Doubtless, the Strait of Gibraltar was on the list of priorities, because of the geopolitical orientations of the riparian states.

Before the Informal Single Negotiating Text (SNT) was drafted in 1975, there were some 12 proposals submitted to the Second Committee of the Third UNCLOS, dealing with straits. However none of these were comprehensive enough to resolve the
straits dilemma (UN Third UNCLOS, Off. Records, Vol.3. UN, New York, 1975). Among the groups which contributed proposals were Spain (10 July 1974), Draft articles on the nature and characteristics of the territorial sea: Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Yemen (22 July 1974) Draft articles on navigation through the territorial sea, including straits used for international navigation; Algeria (23 July 1974), Draft articles on straits used for international navigation; semi-enclosed seas; Algeria, Libya, Tunisia et al. (7 Aug.1974) Draft articles on definitions of straits used for international navigation. While none of these proposals were comprehensive enough nor wholly supportive of the US or Soviet position, those of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya clearly highlighted their locational viewpoint as littoral states bordering a semi-enclosed sea. They did not wish the strait states to wholly dictate their usage of Gibraltar. However they were in favour of making the Mediterranean into a zone of peace, closed to the warships of the superpowers.

The Oman proposal (UN Doc.A/CONF.62/C.2/L.16; 22 July 1974), was sponsored by Morocco as well as Malaysia and Yemen. Its standpoint was based on the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1958), but with elaborations on the concept of innocent passage, the rights and duties of coastal states and the regulation of warships and vessels with special characteristics. Provision was made for the regulation of navigation, sea lanes and traffic separation schemes. It dealt with territorial seas and straits as a single
entity. Prior notification or authorization might be required for the passage of warships (Part I, Art.15); they could be required to pass through certain scalanes (Art.16). Non-compliance might result in the suspension of the right of passage of warships in territorial seas (Art.17), but this would not apply in straits. Once again this illustrates the crux of the matter. If territorial seas and straits were to be treated as an entity, then the provisions of Article 17 are less than clear. It was also unclear as to what degree this would apply to Gibraltar Strait. However, Article 22 stated that a coastal state would not be permitted to discriminate, in form or in fact, against the ships of any particular state or against ships carrying cargoes or passengers on behalf of any particular state in the territorial seas of straits. Likewise the coastal state would not be permitted to obstruct channels by placing facilities, structures or devices on the seabed.

Included in the list of non-innocent activities were acts of propaganda, espionage, information gathering and research (Art.3(2)); which had not been present in the British proposal for a transit passage regime. Another modification to the British proposal was that the words "such as" (Art.3(2)) were included, indicating that the list of activities considered as non-innocent was not exhaustive. In other words, while the non-suspendable right of innocent passage in international straits was retained (Art.22(2)), non-innocent passage could be prevented.

Unlike the UK proposal (UN Doc.A/CONF.62/C.2/L.3;
Art.18(2)(a); 3 July 1974) which contained a general prohibition against any laws and regulations applying to design, manning or equipment of foreign ships, the Moroccan proposal made no mention of such provisions. For nuclear-related vessels the coastal state might require notification or authorization for passage in the territorial sea (Art.8(2)). For research and hydrographic vessels "authorization" might be required (Art.8(3)). Oil and chemical tankers, or those carrying noxious liquids or nuclear-related materials might be required to make passage through designated lanes in the territorial sea. Most significantly, no provision for overflight was made in the proposal; it was not contemplated! The proposal had the support of the Group of 77, which comprized over 100 developing states (Koh, 1982, p.137-8) (see map 8.2c).

Kuwait, speaking also on behalf of the UAE, favoured the single innocent passage regime only for straits connecting two parts of the high sea (UN Third UNCLOS, OR,Vol.2, p.139, 23 July 1974). China claimed that under the guise of the innocent passage regime, the USSR deployed warships and nuclear submarines to implement its expansionist policies in such areas as the Mediterranean, thus endangering peace, good order and security (UN 3rd UNCLOS, OR Vol 2, p.133). In 1974, Morocco and Spain as well as Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen and other strait states still favoured an innocent passage regime in straits. States in favour of the transit passage regime in certain straits (including Gibraltar) were Algeria, Iraq, Israel, USSR, UK and USA.
With developments and refinements of a dual regime for straits (1974-79), and the eventual triumph of the transit passage regime for certain straits used for international navigation, Spain tried to reopen the issue. At the 1978 UNCLOS sessions held in Geneva, the Spanish representative stated that the straits articles contained in the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) (1977) were the outcome of negotiations in which a number of states directly concerned had not participated, and that the negotiating group had made only a general study of the question and had not engaged in any genuine negotiations (UN Third UNCLOS. OR, Vol.9. 17 April 1978, UN New York 1980). The USA insisted that the issue had been settled and could not be reopened. Despite this, Spain and Morocco submitted substantial informal suggestions to amend the straits provisions (Koh, 1982 p.145). Though they were not incorporated into the ICNT 1979, which was the blueprint for the sections on straits in the LOS 1982, they clearly reflect the attitudes and reservations of Spain and Morocco.

The Spanish delegation suggested amendments to the ICNT 1977 as follows:

- Aircraft should not enjoy a right of transit passage under Article 38.
- The scope of Article 38(3) should be widened to include the application of "other rules of international law" to any activity which is not an exercise of the right of transit passage.
- Article 39(1) should include the prohibition that ships "refrain from any act of propaganda or act intended to collect information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal state, or intended to interfere with its communications or any other facility or
installation".
- Article 39(2)(a) and (b) dealing with compliance of certain regulations and procedures of ships in transit, should include "as well as with those established by the coastal state, in accordance with the provisions of Article 42".
- Article 39(3), which deals with aircraft in transit should be deleted.
- States bordering straits should be empowered to make laws and regulations under Article 42(1) regarding "the protection of navigational aids and facilities, of cables and pipelines, and of other facilities and installations in accordance with Article 44".
- States should ensure that:
  (I) ships flying their flag are provided with adequate insurance to cover any loss or damage which they may cause in the exercise of the right of innocent passage;
  (II) recourse is available in accordance with their legal systems for prompt and adequate compensation in respect of any loss or damage caused by ships flying their flag in the exercise of the right of transit passage.

Spain also proposed an amendment to Article 234 of the ICNT 1977, that the sentence "Nothing in sections 5, 6 and 7 of this Part of the Convention shall effect the legal regime of straits used for international navigation" be deleted or replaced by the wording "Nothing in sections 5, 6 and 7 of this part of the present Convention shall effect the legal regime of transit passage through straits used for international navigation" (UN Third UNCLOS, OR, Vol.10, New York (undated) p.185). In effect this would mean that any measure and enforcement taken by Spain or Morocco could affect the legal regime of Gibraltar, thus
widening the scope of the coastal states powers.

At the same UNCLOS session, Morocco submitted informal suggestions. The most significant in relation to Gibraltar was that Article 39(2)(a) of the ICNT 1977 (duties of ships and aircraft during passage) be amended so as to included extra prohibited activities.

- Exercise or firing practice of any kind.
- The use of weapons of any kind.
- The taking off or landing of aircraft on board.
- Hydrographic surveys or other research operations.
- Any deliberate acts of pollution.
- All fishing activities.
- Any act designed to interfere with telecommunications system or other installations of the state bordering the strait (Second Committee, Informal Meeting C.2/I.M./4 of 28 April 1978; Platzoder, 1978, p.959; Koh, 1982, p.147).

Morocco also proposed that ships maintain radio contact with the coastal state during passage of the Strait with a view to informing the state of damage, any unforeseen stop made in the strait, or any measure rendered necessary by force majeure. Clearly the obligation of continuous radio contact would have imposed an extra burden on vessels, and would have had wide-ranging geopolitical implications not only for the superpowers and NATO, but also regional powers like Spain, Algeria and Israel.

In relation to aircraft in transit, Morocco suggested amendments to Article 39(3). It was proposed that:

Aircraft in transit were to:
(a) Refrain from the following activities in the strait zone:
   (i) Exercise or firing practice of any
kind:
(ii) The use of weapons of any kind;
(iii) The taking of photographs;
(iv) Low altitude flights over shipping;
(v) Dive-bomber flying;
(vi) Refuelling while in flight;
(vii) Any act to interfere with the telecommunications system or other installations of the State bordering the strait.

(b) Observe the Rules of the Air established by the International Civil Aviation Organization as they apply to civil aviation.

(c) Take proper care not to violate the regulations governing air corridors and altitude of flight above the strait as fixed by the State bordering the strait, and to avoid flying over its territory rising above the water, insofar as the air corridor established by the State bordering the strait does not provide for such overflight.

(d) Maintain radio contact at all times with the air traffic control tower of the State and follow its instructions, in the light of the air safety requirements, in the exercise of the transit passage.

(e) At all times monitor the radio frequency assigned by the appropriate internationally designated air traffic authority or the international distress radio frequency.

Morocco proposed a widening of the powers of the strait States to make laws and regulations under Article 42(1) on the protection of navigational aids and other installations, the protection of cables and pipelines, the conservation of living resources and on marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys (Koh, 1982, p.148).

Morocco also wished to add to the duties of states making use of straits by adding three new provisions to Article 44, ICNT 1977:

A: States shall enact such legislation and
regulations as may be required to ensure that all ships flying their flag and all aircraft registered in those States shall, when exercising the right of transit passage, carry adequate insurance to meet any claim in respect of loss or damage caused to the State bordering the strait.

B: Any damage done to States bordering a strait, their nationals or legal entities as a result of the transit passage of ships shall create liability for redress by the owner of the vessel or any other person responsible for the damage, and failing them, by the flag State of the vessel.

The stipulations of C were similar to those of B but in relation to aircraft. These provisions were intended to erode the rights of the transit passage regime and did not find their way into the ICNT 1979 nor LOS 1982.

Against this background, it is not surprising that some implications of the LOS (1982) and the transit passage regime are still causing contention. Transit passage is not subject to any form of notification or authorization. There is no specific provision in the transit passage regime (LOS 1982) for surface navigation of submarines, unlike the LOS 1958. This is still a contentious issue in Spain and Morocco as are the grey areas concerning pollution legislation and the mechanisms for implementing legal and compensatory action against offenders for crimes committed while transiting Gibraltar.

3.7.1 State Preference on Regimes for International Straits.

By cross-tabulating certain geopolitical indices for
Mediterranean states such as location astride international straits, importance of merchant marines, dependence on seaborne trade, location in relation to semi-enclosed seas, and strategic dependence on naval mobility; it is possible to get an overview of the attitudes of these states on the straits issue.

States which favour the non-suspendable right of innocent passage are Albania, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Syria, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. States in favour of transit passage are France, Israel, Italy and Britain (Gibraltar). Morocco would prefer the regime of innocent passage only, in international straits. The position of Spain and Greece is somewhat less clear. Neither are satisfied with the transit passage regime, yet both are well aware that the regime of innocent passage for all straits is not possible. Besides, submerged passage and overflight of Gibraltar and other straits has been in practice for decades, some argue that this in itself constitutes "rights" under customary international law (Wainwright, 1986). As well as being a strait state, Spain has a large merchant marine, is dependent on seaborne trade, and is strategically reliant on naval mobility.

3.8 CONCLUSION.

Legal regimes for straits are an attempt at reconciling the interests of the international community and those of strait states. Because of the diverse geographical nature of straits there are several types of legal regimes.
Although many states including Morocco and Spain have not ratified the LOS (1982), arguably Gibraltar is subject to the transit passage regime. The rights of this regime have been in effect in practice (if not in theory) over the past decades, including submerged passage and overflight. Thus the LOS (1982) could be viewed as legitimizing what was already de facto practice or customary law in the Strait of Gibraltar. For instance a 12 nm territorial sea with right of "innocent passage" was tacitly accepted by most maritime states, but the waters of the Strait, especially outside 3 nm from the respective Spanish and Moroccan coasts were not viewed as being subject to a similar regime by the international community.

Though Spain and Morocco signed the LOS (1982), they have not ratified it and have reservations as is evidenced by their proposals and informal suggestions during the LOS negotiations before 1982. In effect international treaties such as the LOS, are instruments which serve to legitimize the de facto practice of power protagonists. Regional powers like Morocco and Spain may yet take contentious actions to redress the situation in the Strait of Gibraltar, but most likely initially in relation to contingent issues such as territorial disputes or change of political regime in Morocco.
HISTORY AND STRAIT POLITICS.

The Crown Colony of Gibraltar and the Spanish Territory of Ceuta are the keys to control of the Strait of Gibraltar and historically they have constituted the pillars of the geopolitical organization in the area.

During the colonial era, possession of the Crown Colony by Britain, and the Sovereign Territories in North Africa (Plazas) by Spain, functioned in the spatial and political contexts to reduce instability to a minimum and guarantee security of passage of the Strait to all states. However at present, the continuing territorial disputes in the area constitute a threat to stability. Historical forces have established the present territorial and political arrangements in the region and consequently the contentions which exist there.

Decolonization in the Gibraltar region is essentially a matter of decolonizing territories rather than peoples. The decolonization of Gibraltar and the Plazas must come about in an ordered manner catering for the legitimate aspirations of the states and communities involved. Also the interests of the regional states and international balance of power must be taken into consideration.
CHAPTER FOUR

GEOPOLITICAL HISTORY: THE LEGACY.

"The past exists in the present and the present only exists because it makes way for the future".

James Joyce, 1914.

"The unique distinctive idea under which the shores of the Straits are organized has been the strategic need of Great Britain, the dominant naval power of Western Europe, to control the area or to keep it in the possession of a weak power. The geographer may profitably inquire whether either Gibraltar or Tangier can effectively control the Straits and whether no other point has a comparable advantage".

Norman Pounds, 1952.

4.1 INTRODUCTION.

A geopolitical analysis of the Gibraltar region necessitates an historical perspective (i) to see how the past has created the present geopolitical environment; (ii) to evaluate policies or models which may influence future organization; and (iii) to formulate general deductions concerning the geopolitics of straits.

The power mosaic in the Strait area is essentially the product of historical rivalry between Islam and Christianity. This dialectic has been responsible for the development of strong cultural distinctiveness on opposite shores of the Strait, embodied in powerful nationalistic sentiments in Spain and Morocco. The fact that Spain is a fragmented state
consisting of most of Iberia, the Balearic and Canary Islands, and the Sovereign Territories in North Africa, is partly due to Spain's history as a strait state. Spain's offshore possessions lie in close proximity to the Strait (see maps 4.1, 5.1, 5.2).

Morocco and Spain were once the western cornerstone of the Islamic Empire, with hegemony over the Strait (711-1462). With the decline of the Pax Islamica, Spain Reconquered the northern shores in the 15th century, and established bases on the southern shore. Though Morocco was the last country in the Arab world to come under the direct control of imperial European powers (1912), its independence (1956) was incomplete with Spain maintaining colonies and territories in the Sherifian kingdom. Historically both decaying empires were superceded by Britain and France in the 18th century. Britain's Crown Colony of Gibraltar is a mirror image of the Spanish Sovereign Territory of Ceuta. The Crown Colony and Ceuta probably offer the two best strategic sites for guardianship of the Strait. Since antiquity, these Pillars of Hercules as they were once known have been coveted by nations, and particularly seapowers wishing to control the keys to the Mediterranean. The military bases on the respective promontaries are the physical expression of balance of power strategies. The possession of these coveted bases offers Spain and Britain geopolitical "clout" in the strategic Mediterranean theatre and the Arab world. By a combination of war, legitimizing treaties, and skilful statesmanship, Britain and Spain established themselves in the territories, gradually consolidating their hold and expanding
their jurisdiction on both land and sea. The populations of the Crown Colony and Ceuta were created by Britain and Spain not as settler communities or colonists but rather to serve the needs of the naval bases. Their roles as free-ports was to reduce central government expenditure, provide funds for local bureaucrats and powerful families, and perhaps a certain chauvinistic rivalry between them. Since Moroccan independence (1956), France, Britain and the USA have maintained close relations with the Moroccan government.

The geostrategy of creating bases in the Strait area has thus left a legacy of "interrupted" and disputed sovereignty, as well as the problem of minority populations. This has affected the internal politics of Morocco and Spain, their bilateral relations, and rapport with Britain. In turn normal relations between them and the supranational organizations to which they belong has been affected (see chapters 7-8).

In looking at the different historical periods of the Strait, it is possible to see constants such as geopolitical competition for control of the strategic locations of Gibraltar, Ceuta and Tangier, not to mention Cadiz, Tarifa and Melilla. Freedom of passage for all nations through the Strait has been ensured by Britain since 1704 from the vantage point of the Gibraltar Colony. This was reinforced by the internationalization of the Cape Spartel lighthouse (1865-1956) and Tangier Neutral Zone (1923-1956), reflecting geopolitical models developed by major powers. The LOS (1958, 1982) attempted to guarantee freedom of passage through the Strait for
all nations, in the internationalist tradition of Britain and the USA. Will the historic model of military bases (Gibraltar, Ceuta, Melilla) lead to increased militarization in the Strait area? If there are sovereignty transfers, will Morocco automatically use Ceuta and Melilla as bases? After 1956, Morocco did not militarize Tangier or other areas on the northern coast under its jurisdiction. Historically within the Strait area there are micro-models of neutralization and militarization spatially juxtaposed. The problem of decolonization and potential for major political upheaval in Morocco render the Strait a potentially volatile area.

4.2 HISTORY AND CONTINUITY: THE SOUTHERN SHORE.

The history of the southern shore of the Strait has created a legacy of territorial disputes. This increased competition between the respective riparian states, and between them and outside powers, leading to micro-spatial fragmentation. A hierarchy of geopolitical power arose, which despite inter-state and inter-allied contentions, managed to create a certain stability in the area. The power equilibrium was strengthened by historical inertia and international approval of the status quo. The international community tacitly accepted the Spanish presence in the North African Territories, and Britain's sovereignty over the Gibraltar Colony (see table 4.1, appendix III). Since the 1950s, with the reassertion of national independence and greater claims to maritime jurisdiction, Spain
### TABLE 4.1

Long Cycles of Global Power and Involvement in the Area of the Strait of Gibraltar.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycles</th>
<th>World Powers</th>
<th>World Wars</th>
<th>Legitimizing Treaties</th>
<th>Key Institutions</th>
<th>Landmarks of Decline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Italian Wars (1494-1517)</td>
<td>Ordesillas (1494)</td>
<td>Global network of bases.</td>
<td>Spanish Annexation (1582-1583)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Spanish Wars (1579-1517)</td>
<td>12 Year Truce with Spain (1609)</td>
<td>Mare Liberum.</td>
<td>English Revolution (1688-1701)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>French Wars (1688-1713)</td>
<td>Utrecht (1713). Command of Seas.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Independence of USA (1783-1867)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>French Wars (1792-1815)</td>
<td>Paris (1814)</td>
<td>Free trade.</td>
<td>Imperialism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and Morocco are now leader states in the western Mediterranean region and feel that they have a greater role to play in the Strait's politics (see chapters 7-8).

4.2.1 Geopolitical Models and the Strait.

Monopoly. When Islamic powers controlled both coasts of the Strait (711-1462), passage was forbidden to non-Muslim vessels between the 8th and 13th centuries. Between the 16th and 17th centuries, Spain assured safe transit to friendly states. Since 1704, British policy enforced from the Crown Colony of Gibraltar, has pursued an internationalist policy. This strategy ensured that neither a Muslim power nor Spain would fully control both shores of the Strait. The Spanish Protectorate Zone in northern Morocco (1912-56) did not include the Tangier Neutral Zone nor Cape Spartel, and besides, Spanish policy was largely dictated by the French Protectorateship. King Hassan II of Morocco, believes that the international community and especially the USSR will not allow Spain to control both keys to the Strait, Ceuta and Gibraltar (Le Grand Maghreb, 1985, no.37, p.21; ibid, no.38, p.87). In claiming sovereignty over these two bases, Spain is pursuing an age old quest for monopoly.

The dual control model. Bipartite control in the real sense has never existed. The nearest the Strait came to being under dual control was in the 15th and 16th centuries, when Christian Spain and Muslim Morocco struggled towards a power...
equilibrium. This model was fraught with strife and instability in Spain's constant effort to establish monopoly. Because Spain and Morocco are extremities of several systems, diametrically opposed, -geographically, economically, culturally and politically- Spain remained the dominant force largely because of its control of the northern shore of the Strait and the Plazas on the southern shore (see map 4.1).

Morocco is presently at a level of development not suitable for direct dual control with Spain, unlike the dual British-French model operating in the Dover Strait area. The British presence in Gibraltar since 1704, and French strategy in the Maghreb since 1830 ensured that Morocco and Spain maintained a Strait policy in keeping with the *mare liberum* philosophy (see chapters 1, 3). This was reinforced by the fragmented nature of territorial control on the southern shore in the form of internationalization, attempted demilitarization, protectorates and Plazas (see map 4.1). Theoretically, the weaker power, Morocco, was nominally in control of most of the southern shore, and so Spanish attempts at monopoly there were frustrated.

Tripartite control model. This has only existed in so far as Britain, Spain and Morocco controlled the Strait (1704-1912, 1956--). Spanish and Moroccan activities in the area were only permitted in so far as they did not jeopardize British policy and freedom of passage. Their power was contingent on that of Britain. By a combination of force and diplomacy (legitimizing bilateral and international treaties), Britain acted as a moderating influence, containing Spanish and Moroccan ambitions.
limiting French influence, and keeping the strait open to international navigation. Britain did not monopolize control of the Strait, but the power of the riparian states and international Powers was contingent on British support or approval (see table 4.1, appendix III). Britain remained effectively at the apex of a power hierarchy there, between the 18th and mid-20th centuries. This could be termed the geopolitical principle of hierarchical contingency.

The contingent hierarchical model. This was based on fragmented spatial control of the territories bordering the Strait and a pyramidal power system with Britain at the apex and Morocco at the base. The international powers, especially Spain and France formed the intermediary levels. As no single power could gain absolute control over the Strait area, it was fragmented on macro and micro scales, with the establishment of bases, including the Spanish Plazas, and Britain’s short sojourn at Tangier, and later permanent establishment at Gibraltar (see map 4.1). Spanish and Moroccan power in the Strait region was contingent on British supremacy until the late 19th century. Thereafter, Britain had to reach a compromise with France (1904 and 1912), the international Powers (the Treaty of Algeciras 1908) and the USA (Cape Spartel Treaty, 1865; Tangiers Neutral Zone 1923, 1946). This led to further fragmentation in the form of zones rather than bases at Cape Spartel, Tangier, and the French and Spanish Protectorates.

The internationalization of the Cape Spartel Lighthouse (1865) was a watershed in the geopolitical history of the
Strait, as fragmented control thereafter became a truly international pursuit; thus appeasing the demands of the international powers, preventing the riparian states from gaining monopoly and guaranteeing Britain's stewardship from the Crown Colony. With Moroccan independence (1956) and the vicissitudes of Spanish politics since the 1930s, stability in the Strait area was maintained because of the precedent set by the international models of Cape Spartel and Tangier, and especially British stewardship. While good relations have existed between the USA and the riparian states in this century, British Gibraltar has remained invaluable in the US and NATO context (see chapter 7).

The major maritime powers found the stance taken by Spain and Morocco concerning the Strait in discussions leading up to the LOS 1982, less internationalist than they would have liked it to be (see chapter 3). Hence the question remains if there are sovereignty changes on both shores of the Strait, will the complex spatial and power equilibrium be replaced by an equally workable system and who will be at the apex of the power pyramid? Would the system revert to the dual control model? With sovereignty transfers in the disputed territories, there would be a certain power vacuum. Ironically, the disputed territories arguably form the bases of the contingent hierarchical model which has guaranteed safe passage of the Strait since the 18th century.

The principles of decolonization, territorial integrity of the state, and right of socio-political groups such as the
Ceutis, Melillinese and Gibraltarians to some form of self-determination has to be juxtaposed with the above mentioned models, especially that of hierarchical contingency.

4.2.2 Gibraltar and Other International Straits.

Spanish monopoly of the Strait is hardly feasible in the light of the lessons of history. The maritime powers are unlikely to support the development of a situation in Gibraltar whereby Spain could dictate international usage of the Strait. Historically the fragmentation of sovereignty in the Bab el Mandeb region mirrors to a certain extent the Gibraltar experience. In the 19th century scramble for strategic straits, Britain, France and Italy established themselves in the region and created the Djibouti (French) and Aden (British) bases (see map 1.5). With the decolonization of the region, Aden was integrated into PDR Yemen, and Djibouti ostensibly became an independent state. One of Spain’s main concerns is that the creation of the artificial state of Djibouti may have set a precedent for the Crown Colony of Gibraltar (see chapter 6). If under the sovereignty of a more militant Moroccan regime, the Ceuta base could pose a threat to Western interests. Soviet activities in Aden are closely monitored by the Western powers.

Overall, the geopolitical models that were experienced on the southern shore of the Strait of Gibraltar since the 18th century were pragmatic, minimizing instability and ensuring security of passage. This has implications not alone for the
future of Gibraltar but also other international straits. The principle of contingent hierarchy in the coastal area of Gibraltar will continue to operate in one form or another because of the matrix of geographical factors. Because of superpower competition and ever-increasing geopolitical influence and awareness of the Strait states, the power dialectic in the Gibraltar region will continue.

4.3 EUROPE VERSUS ISLAM IN THE REGION.

Control of geostrategic straits such as Gibraltar and long cycles of global politics are intrinsically linked. Between the 8th and 15th centuries Dar al Islam (The Islamic Kingdom) encompassed the Atlantic shores of Iberia and the Maghreb, while the eastern frontier of the Pax Islamica was the Pacific Ocean. Thus at the zenith of Islamic power, all geostrategic areas connecting Europe, Africa and Asia were under Muslim control. The Maghrebi scholar Ibn Khaldoun in analysing history and the organization of Muslim society, theorized that empires have a definite lifespan leading to a cycle of growth, powerful maturity and inevitable decline in old age (Megherbi, 1980). The Christian Reconquest of Iberia in the 15th century and establishment of bases in the Maghreb caused a major trauma in Dar al Islam, signifying the beginning of the end for Muslim hegemony on the Atlantic frontier. Since the 1970s, militant Muslims have been trying to re-establish Islam as a global geopolitical force (see chapter 8).
In Modelski's (1978, 1986) theory of "long cycles in world political affairs and their spatial orientation" he states that long cycles are a macro-picture of world politics. He postulates that rhythms exist within global political systems. The study of these rhythms is termed chronopolitics and is based on an analysis of war, hegemony, and political and economic control. Modelski's global system begins in 1500 and develops in a cyclical manner. Each cycle is of approximately 100 years duration. Within each cycle, there are four major stages. Each cycle is associated with a world power whose core area is the state. This state is associated with over half the "order keeping" functions of the global system (Taylor, 1985, p.51). Modelski's analysis only covers the 16th to the 20th centuries, and thus the Islam Empire is not included. According to the Modelski framework, Portugal dominated the 16th century and the Netherlands the 17th century; both powers being successors to Islamic hegemony in Africa and Asia. Britain is unique in having dominated two cycles in the 18th and 19th centuries, while the USA has dominated the cycle in the 20th century. The stages within each cycle are clearly defined:

Stage One: because of a weak global organizational structure there is severe political competition which leads to war;
Stage Two: the victor is able to restructure the international political system;
Stage Three: legitimizing treaties lend respectability to the victor and formally
set in progress the new world order; and
Stage Four: the development of bipolar and consequently multipolar systems leads to decline, competition and war; and the cycle begins again (see table 4.1 & appendix III).

For almost eight centuries before what Modelski terms cycle I, the Strait of Gibraltar lay within the Muslim sphere of influence, the largest and strongest global leader of the period. With the decline of the Pax Islamica in the Strait region, this marked the end of the closed door policy, and thereafter free passage for the world community evolved. In Iberia’s rise to power, strategic locations on the Maghrebi shore were acquired. Significantly one of the lines of demarcation of the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) ran through Penon de Velez de la Gomera, which remains a minor Spanish possession on the Moroccan coast (see map 5.5), and another demarcatory line ran just south of the Canary Islands. In cycle II, the Mare Liberum philosophy triumphed, and in cycle III, during Britain’s rise to empire, an Anglo-Dutch force conquered the Gibraltar peninsula (1704). The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) provided Britain with a key to command of the seas. In cycle IV, Gibraltar remained a lynchpin in Britain’s control of the oceans. In cycle V, though the Mediterranean is no longer the centre of the global system, the USA has cultivated strong links with the riparian states of the Strait, and because of the “special relationship” with Britain, and NATO commitment, the
USA has access to the Gibraltar base. Under NATO auspices the USA may have access to the Spanish North African bases at Ceuta and Melilla in an emergency situation (see chapter 5). All global powers listed in the Modelski model have had strong historical, military and treaty associations with the Strait. Because Modelski’s political framework of long cycles of global power is constructed on vast temporal and spatial scales, it is somewhat reductionist. Nonetheless it is a valuable aid in analyzing Gibraltar’s role in world geopolitics (see chapter 7). Comparing the history of the Strait region and the Modelski model, at present the USA may be seen as the "world power" ultimately guaranteeing security of passage of the Strait in "the global order" (Stage Three). However besides the bipolar contentions of the superpowers, regional powers like Spain, Morocco and Algeria are competing for dominance in the region (Stage Four), (see chapter 7).

History would suggest that global powers maintain their hegemony in a pyramidal power structure. They gain the active or passive support of former or "shadow empires" (Toynbee, 1963), often by imposed treaties or agreements tilted in favour of the dominant power. The complex series of treaties (18th century) between Britain, The Netherlands and Spain in which the status of the Gibraltar peninsula is mentioned corroborates this viewpoint (see appendix III). This situation affords the dominant power a modus operandi and the "shadow empires" a modus vivendi, while both collaborate in the control of a whole hierarchy of weaker political entities.
In the context of the Strait, absolute Muslim hegemony ceased in the late 14th century. Theoretically both Spain and Morocco controlled the Strait until the 18th century, with Spain being the dominant military force. From 1713 until 1945, Morocco, a shadow Muslim empire and Spain a rapidly declining global power had to pursue Strait policies within a framework largely dictated by Britain. Britain was instrumental in shaping policies in the region, because of it's naval strength and eventually the Entente Cordiale with France (1904), which helped determine future French treaties with Spain and Morocco. The latter two states were more or less presented with a fait accompli. Britain was instrumental in establishing international control over the Cape Spartel lighthouse (1865-1956) and the Tangier Neutral Zone (1923-1956). With the involvement of the USA in both World Wars and its rise to Superpower status, significantly the Gibraltar base was used in Operation Torch (1943–44) which led to the liberation of the Maghreb and western Mediterranean from the Axis Powers, and acted as a prelude to national independence in the Maghrebi states. Since 1945, the USA has established several treaties with Morocco and Spain, and within the NATO context has access to the Gibraltar base (see appendix III).

Out of some 105 major treaties, protocols, agreements and declarations between 1462 and 1987 in relation to the territories or seas of the Strait area, and its hinterlands, such as the Crown Colony, Plazas and Tangier, the international participation has been very significant. There were some 326
permutations of inter-state action or agreement in relation to the Gibraltar area. Of these 326 variables, Spain accounted for 21%, Britain for 17%, France for 17% (including Protectorate responsibilities for Morocco 1912-1956), Morocco for 10%, Portugal for 9%, the Netherlands for 8%, the USA for 7%, Russia/USSR for 3%, the concerted Colonial Powers (1860-1956) for 6%, and others 2%. Between 1701-1987, Britain has been involved in some 44 of these instruments and between 1919-1987, the USA has been active in some 21 (see table 4.1, appendix III).

4.4 THE SOUTHERN SHORE: TANGIER.

Tangier (35 47'N, 5 50'W) (pop.300,000, 1986) sitted at about 14 km from Cape Spartel to the west and 10 km from Cape Malaba to the east, is sited on a beautiful bay at the western entrance to the Strait. From the 18th century on:

"it became a pillar of British policy to retain Tangier in the hands of a weak and preferably Berber power" (Pounds, 1952, p.166).

To counter French and Spanish influence on the southern shore, Britain supported the creation of the Tangier Neutral Zone (1923-1956) (see map 4.2). Since 1956, Morocco's pro-western regime has not developed Tangier into a major base, nor offered important naval facilities to foreign powers (see chapters 7-8). In the future, an unfriendly regime in Morocco, could radically alter the dynamics of security in the area by developing
MAP 4.2 THE TANGIER INTERNATIONAL ZONE (1923–1956).

International Cape Spartel Lighthouse (1865–1956)

Tangier

Spanish Morocco

Benzu

Ceuta (Sp)

Tetouan

Strait of Gibraltar

Atlantic Ocean

Gibraltar

Mediterranean Sea

Spain
Plate 4.1   Fishing Village at Cape Spartel

Plate 4.2  View of the Bay and Strait from Tangier

Tangier's naval potential.

Because of its geostrategic location many powers have sought control of Tangier, yet all have recognized that its location and natural advantages are less than those of Ceuta or the Crown Colony of Gibraltar. Tangier's relatively greater distance from the European coast has rendered it less important in the geostrategy of the Strait than the latter. Tangier is more exposed to attack by land and sea than Gibraltar or Ceuta. A strong power ensconced in Tangier would have lessened greatly the dominant power of Britain. "Tangier must remain in the hands of a neutral power like Morocco", wrote Lord Nelson, "or England must own it" (Pounds, 1952, p.167).

Because of its location and mild climate, Tangier became the unofficial diplomatic capital of Morocco in the 19th century. In the 20th century, it provided a significant example of internationalization and neutralization strategies for the Strait. Being relatively cut off from the Moroccan power cores of Rabat and Casablanca, Tangier has declined economically and politically since 1956. This chronically underdeveloped city at the western entrance to the Strait and on Europe's doorstep is a seedbed of social and political discontent, which could be exploited by forces with a vested interest in causing instability in the Strait region (see chapter 8).

4.5 TANGIER BEFORE 1923.

Tangier is Morocco's most northerly city and hence closest
to Europe. Some 27 centuries ago, the Phoenicians established the trading port of Tingis there. Like their successors the Carthaginians, they were absorbed by the local Berber population (Laroui, 1976). Under the Romans, in AD 42, the port city became the military and administrative capital of the North African colony of Mauritania-Tingitana. This is consistent with the fact that it was only in 1969 that King Hassan II of Morocco formally recognized the state of Mauritania, thereby relinquishing his historic claim to those territories. After the Roman era, the city was successively occupied by Vandals, Byzantines, Visigoths and the Christian city was invaded by the Arabs in AD 682. The Arab city of Tanja served as one of the bases for Muslim expeditionary forces to Spain (711). In the 12th and 13th centuries, it was a flourishing Muslim Berber trade and naval base. The Crusading Portuguese captured the city in 1471. It became Spanish in 1580 and was returned to Portugal in 1640. In 1657 the English General, Monck wrote that:

"There is a castle in the Streight's mouth which the Portugals have called Tangar, on Barbary Side, and which, if they would part with it withal, it would be very useful to us... An hundred men will keep the castle and half a dozen Frigates there would stop the whole trade in the Streights to such that shall be enemies to us" (Pounds, 1952, p.167).

Just four years later England acquired the geostrategic site. It was given as part of the dowry of Princess Catherine of Braganza to Charles II of England in 1661. The English base was constantly under siege by the local Rifians with the
collusion of Spain. In 1684, England destroyed the city before evacuating it. Because of the rivalry of Portugal and Spain for control of the southern shore, the English evacuation had repercussions which have influenced the Strait's geopolitical mosaic ever since. Britain took the Gibraltar peninsula in 1704 and Tangier never again came under the control of a powerful state. Because of the Muslim occupation of the city, it was bombarded by France three times between 1684 and 1737. In 1743, Tangier lost its autonomous status and became subject to the Moroccan Sultan. By a combination of war and diplomacy, Spain and France vied for control of the city, but with the Treaty of Tangier (1844) (Moroccan-Spanish Wars), Britain dashed French hopes of effectively gaining possession. Britain and the USA pursued a policy of upholding the Sultan's sovereignty there. During the Moroccan-Spanish War (1859), Britain let it be known that it would protect Tangier. By this time Tangier (not Fez) was effectively the diplomatic capital of Morocco, and the consular system in operation there was changed to that of legations. During Moroccan attacks on the city in 1891, Britain let other concerned powers know that it would accept partition of the kingdom, if it were to receive Tangier in return (Stuart, 1955, p.13). In an attempt to forestall the dismemberment of the Kingdom by the European powers, the Sultan offered Morocco as a protectorate to the USA (1871). The Sultan greatly feared for the security of the northern region:

"especially Tangier, a place commanding in a great measure the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea. . ." (Archives of the American Legation at Tangier, Dispatch Book
The USA declined the Sultan's offer. By the early 20th century, Tangier was the home of all foreign diplomats to Morocco, though it was not the seat of Moroccan government. The foreign community largely controlled life in the strategic city, which in large part was owned by them. All these attributes tended to confer a special character on Tangier.

Different states strove for diplomatic pre-eminence, and sought the most favoured nation clause in agreements with the Sultan. It was awarded to the USA (1837), Britain (1856), Spain (1861) and France (1863) at different stages. The foreign powers often abused the protégé system whereby many Muslims and Jews in the area obtained the diplomatic protection of foreign state missions. Effectively many Moroccan protégés sought foreign nationality, and were thus outside the control of the Sultan. At the Madrid Conference (1880), (attended by Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, the USA, Belgium, France, Britain, Italy, Morocco, The Netherlands, Portugal, Norway and Sweden), Britain, the USA and Morocco were in favour of abolishing the protégé system. France, supported by Germany and Italy, managed to have it retained. With the Madrid Convention (1880), all the Powers were placed on an equal footing in Tangier. The foreign powers began to organize and cooperate on municipal committees dealing with such issues as sanitation and health, although strong rivalry continued. In a journal of the time, La République Française, it was stated that:

"Europe will do wise to keep a close watch
over Great Britain's policy at Tangier. The maintainance of the European Equilibrium imposes on her the duty of resisting the intrigues of a nation which would willingly make Morocco a second Egypt" (Times, (London) 10 June 1892; Stuart, 1955, p.40).

In 1899, Britain and France delimited their zones of influence in North Africa, and with the Entente Cordiale (1904), France gained a relatively free hand in Morocco. Though not stated, it was understood that Tangier constituted a special case. It was agreed that if there were any major changes in the politics of the region, Spain was to be allowed to extend control around its Plazas. With the secret Franco-Spanish Treaty (1904) agreeing on the partition of Morocco, the internationalization of Tangier was mentioned. Both states had little choice considering the historical and political geography of the Tangier area and Britain's Strait policy. Indeed, "every governor of Gibraltar" was instructed "to keep ready to occupy Tangier, the city as well as the country district" (Die Grosse Politik der Europa ischen Kabinette, 1922-27, XVII, p.312; Stuart, 1955, p.56).

The first official statement in relation to a special status for Tangier appeared in a draft treaty between France and Spain (1902), which Spain ultimately refused to sign. Article 4 declared that:

"The two High Contracting Parties, recognizing the importance of the city of Tangier with reference to the necessary freedom of the Strait of Gibraltar would not oppose the eventual neutralization of the city" (Becker, 1915, App.I).
According to Article 9 of the Franco-Spanish Treaty (1904):

"Tangier was to keep the special character which the presence of the diplomatic corps and its municipal and sanitary institutions have given it" (British & Foreign State Papers. CII, p.432; Stuart, 1955, p.44).

This was the first time that Tangier was given a "special character" in a ratified treaty. However, in spirit, neither Spain nor France ever relinquished hope of gaining control of Tangier. Article VII of the Anglo-French Treaty (1904) catered for free passage of the Strait. The Algeciras Conference (1906) did nothing to advance the question of the internationalization of Tangier. With the Treaty of Fez (1912) establishing the French protectorateship over Morocco, Britain and France prepared preliminary drafts for the internationalization of the city and its region, essentially based on the concepts of non-fortification and international control.

During his famous visit to Tangier (1905), the German Kaiser declared that he would defend the Sultan and Islam, and upon German insistence the Algeciras Conference (1906) was held, much to France's displeasure. While the Conference ostensibly concerned the future of Morocco, the international community was getting a greater say in shaping the future geopolitics of the Strait region. With the famous gunboat diplomatic mission of the German Panther vessel to Agadir (1911), many feared the outbreak of a major European war. In return for a free hand in Morocco, France ceded over half its Congo territories to the Kaiser (1911).

The process of internationalizing the Tangier area was
retarded by World War I. During the war, Primo de Rivera, the leader of neutral Spain, let it be known that his country would renounce claims to Tangier and other points in Africa (probably Ceuta) in exchange for the British Colony of Gibraltar. Britain refused. According to The Times (London) (11 Oct. 1917) because of the Spanish Zone in Morocco which encircled Tangier, the covert pro-German sympathies were:

"not only a threat to the present, but will prove a danger to the peace in Europe in the future".

The French parliament also asked its president, Clemenceau,

"to give particular attention to the political destiny of Tangier, whose importance is very great for France and for the French position in Africa, the Mediterranean, Islam and the world" (L'Afrique Francaise, Nov. 1918, p.381; Stuart, 1955, p.69).

These statements were classic indicators of the development of French geostrategy and its Eurafrica policy (see chapter 8).

But Spain had similar ambitions.

According to the Spanish Ambassador to Britain, speaking before the Royal Geographical Society (1920):

"Tangier belongs geographically, ethnologically, psychologically, and therefore logically to the Spanish Zone. It is as Spanish as other towns in (Spain). Spanish is spoken by the high and the low, Europeans, Moroccans and Jews. Thought and feeling, life and sentiment there, are Spanish. The names of the streets, the money, the press, the theater, and the songs of the children are Spanish . . . " (L'Afrique Francaise, March 1920, p.92).
Similar sentiments were reiterated by most Spanish politicians, the army and press. Osorio Gallardo, a Minister of the Maura Cabinet (1920) stated:

"Tangier is for Spain the key for the security of the interior and guaranty for the neutrality of the Strait" (Stuart, 1955, p.72).

The Heraldo de Madrid advocated taking Tangier by force in 1920, "similar to d'Annunzio's march on Fiume (Trieste)" (Interviews from El Dia, quoted in Stuart, 1955, pp.71-72). The efforts of the Protectorate powers (France and Spain) to gain control of Tangier were blocked by Britain with international support.

4.6 TANGIER 1923-1956.

The Tangier Statute (1923) was a formal diplomatic instrument drawn up by Britain and France. The Statute became a Convention in 1924 and hence legally binding on all signatory states. The main difference between the 1914 and 1923 texts was the retention of sovereignty over Tangier by the Sultan. However the Sultan did not have independence of action, but had to act under French auspices, because of the protectorate status of Morocco since 1912. Though opposed at all stages to the internationalization process, Spain signed the Convention in 1924. It was eventually signed by all signatories of the Treaty of Algeciras (1906) (see above), except Austria, Germany, Russia and the USA. The administration of the 170 sq ml Zone was placed under international administration, providing for
permanent neutrality, demilitarization of the port of Tangier, and adherence to the open door principle in trade (see map 4.2). The Sultan’s legal sovereign prerogative over Moroccan citizens living in the Zone was exercised by his official representative to the International Zone, the Mendoub; but actual authority was held by a Committee of Control, made up of delegates of the signatory states. In 1928, it was revised to include Italy as a principal controlling power beside France, Spain and Britain (Spencer, 1980, pp.102-103). With the 1928 revisions, Spanish public opinion remained disillusioned and frustrated in its aspirations to create a Spanish Tangier.

The international government of the Tangier Zone was regulated by the 1923 Statute. It is interesting to note that at this time conventions were also being prepared for the Turkish Straits. The Tangier Convention (1924) was revised in 1928, abolished by Spain between 1941-1945, temporarily reintroduced in 1945 and finally revised in 1952, before its abrogation in 1956. Political competition took precedence over financial and administrative matters. Spain like France believed that it was just a question of time before they would gain control of the Zone. Effective international administration was virtually impossible because of the diverse interests of the powers. According to Article 25 of the Tangier Statute (1923):

"The autonomy of the zone cannot prejudice the sovereign rights of His Majesty the Sultan".

As the Sultan’s representative, the Mendoub was responsible for
almost 75% of Tangier's population. Hence France was in indirect control. Until 1945, the Assembly comprised 26 members: 4 French, 4 Spanish, 3 British, 3 Italian, 1 Belgian, 1 Dutch, 1 Portuguese, 6 Muslim and 3 Jewish subjects of the Sultan. The USA had the right to send one representative, but not having signed the original Statute did not take its seat until after World War II. France being the Protectorate power in Morocco controlled not only the French seats in the Assembly but also the Muslim and Jewish seats.

There were major difficulties encountered in trying to balance the administrative budget of the Zone as well as controlling the contraband trade because of the almost open frontier. Another major problem was the organization of the judicial system, trying to accommodate the laws of the Christian states and those of the Muslim Sharia and Jewish Rabbinical courts, with the population accountable to the respective court systems, and a complex combination thereof. The USA kept its own consular court and protégé system. However the codes were largely based on those of France and Spain. The very limited success of the judicial system offers a poignant example of the almost insurmountable problems encountered in trying to legislate for a multinational and multireligious population. If some form of condominium were set up in the future in any of the disputed territories in the Strait area as has been suggested, a major lesson to be learned from the Tangier experience is the herculean problem of catering for permanent residents of different nationalities in terms of the judiciary
which consequently affects economic and political organization (see chapter 4). It thus seems highly unlikely that an accommodation of Islamic and Spanish law would satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Ceutis and Melillines. Likewise the political allegiances of the Tangierines led to mutual distrust and concern to the Powers, which came to the fore during World War II.

As Spain never lost its desire to take control of Tangier, Britain and France were suspicious of its intentions in the Zone. Because the member powers of the Zone were at war and neutral powers like Belgium became impotent, this left neutral Spain in the strongest position. All powers feared a German invasion, including Mussolini who coveted the Zone for Italy. In 1940, Franco informed the French Ambassador to Madrid of his intention to occupy the Tangier Zone temporarily, ostensibly to forestall an Italian invasion. In order to lend legality to the act, the Spanish Caudillo delegated the occupation to the military forces of the Khalifa, who invaded on 1 June 1940. Spain made every effort to have the Tangier Zone incorporated into the Spanish Protectorate Zone.

In 1940, a Consul General of the Third Reich was established in Tangier to spy on Allied activity in the Strait region. In 1941, Spain facilitated the escape of three Italian submarines via its territorial waters, which had been supposedly interned in Tangier harbour. Spain supported propaganda activities against Britain and tampered with the local British press and postal system. In 1944, because of covert Spanish
activities, the USA suspended oil shipments to Spain, which were being indirectly sold to Germany. Subsequently, Spain agreed to close the German consulate in Tangier and to expel German agents and saboteurs. The Tangierines had not forgotten the Kaiser's theatrical defence of Islam in 1905 (see above), and the latent anti-Jewish sentiments of the Muslim population facilitated Spain in flagrantly abusing the neutral status of Tangier. This lesson was not forgotten by Britain or the USA.

In 1946, Spain released an official publication entitled "Tangier under the Protective Action of Spain During the Second World War" (Stuart, 1955, pp.146-147), in which Spain proudly pointed out its investment in medicine and achievement in introducing compulsory primary education. With the Allied invasion of North Africa, Spain was willing to hand back Tangier to international control, but wanted it to be understood that Spain would be the dominant power as France had lost its prestigious international image.

In 1944, both Britain and the USA produced plans for the future of the Zone, which were similar in essence: (i) to keep the zone international, though in a revised form to the pre-1940 situation, and (ii) to make Spain end its occupation. Britain proposed a strengthening of the 1923 Agreement with the USA and USSR ratifying it. In 1945, the USA, Britain and France met in Paris to discuss the future of the Zone. Stalin made it clear that he would not support Franco at the helm in Tangier. Although the 1924 Convention was more or less reactivated and applicable to those who had signed the Algeciras Convention
Article I gave the USA and USSR representation on the Committee of Control and International Legislative Assembly, with each receiving three seats. They were on a par with Britain, while Spain was deprived of all administrative posts. The USSR issued a unilateral declaration stating that Spain should not be admitted to participate in the permanent administration of the Zone as long as its government remained fascist. The Soviets also wanted to exclude Spain from the interim arrangements. Despite some condemnations of the Franco regime by the other powers, they insisted on permitting Madrid to participate in the provisional government, as the largest percentage of the European population in Tangier was Spanish and most food supplies came from Iberia. With Spanish withdrawal from the Neutral Zone in October 1945, the USA appointed its representatives to the governing body, but the USSR did not. The USSR did not send representatives to the Committee or Assembly; sections of the new Statute were therefore prepared by the USA and then ameliorated in consultation with the other governments. Because of the Soviet absence, no effort was made to secure Soviet approval (Stuart, 1955, p.153). The new Tangier Statute afforded greater advantages to the local inhabitants, reasserting that sovereignty resided in the Sultan and that equality of commercial opportunity was open to all nations. Some of the proposed changes were:

(i) the delimitation of exact boundaries, a process started in 1925 and never completed;

(ii) cooperation with the UN Security Council in securing
(iii) diplomatic agents with military, naval and air attachés to replace the consular corps;
(iv) freedom of speech, assembly, press and religion;
(v) the establishment of educational institutions by interested Powers; and
(vi) a new form of representation for the Muslims.

US involvement in the Zone marked a major milestone in its rise to power as a global maritime leader and in its straits politics. From then on, the USA partially achieved indirect control of the Strait via Britain and Morocco. The USSR then, not being a major maritime power, missed a golden opportunity of gaining influence in the Strait area. Stalin's ideological intransigence regarding participation with Francoist Spain was a gamble which did not pay off. The Soviets like France, believed that the Allies would not permit a fascist regime to remain in power in Spain.

In the post-World War II period, Tangier prospered as an international banking centre, smuggling entrepot, refuge for Moroccan nationalist leaders and headquarters for the Voice of America (Spencer, 1980, pp.102-103). The American presence in the Maghreb during World War II offered local nationalists greater hope for independence. During the Casablanca Conference (1943), President Roosevelt had supported Mohammed V's demands for Moroccan independence.

In 1944, the Istiglal Party was set up in Morocco with its manifesto being based on many Allied declarations, such as the
right to self-determination, and the Atlantic Charter. The Istiqlal also stressed the value of the Moroccan war effort in support of the Allies. Under the orchestration of the Istiqlal, the Sultan, Mohammed Ben Youssef publicly demanded the independence of his country at Tangier in 1947, and spoke with praise for the Arab League as champion of all Muslim Arabs. The international community heeded the warning, and Morocco began to receive diplomatic support. The Sultan pursued a policy of obstructionism, while France intensified its military control. In 1951, the four main Moroccan political groups signed the Pact of Tangier. This called for independence from France, collaboration with the Arab League and a policy of non-collaboration with the communist party. This fiercely anti-communist stance in relation to internal politics was maintained after independence (see chapter 8).

In 1952, during celebrations commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Treaty of Fez which established the Protectorate, rioting broke out in Tangier in which 9 Moroccans were killed and over 80 wounded, and cars belonging to the foreign community were damaged. The Committee agreed that reinforcements of police and troops be brought in when necessary from the Spanish and French Zones. By 1952, the population of the Tangier Zone had grown to 172,300 people, made up of 105,000 Moroccan Muslims, 15,000 Moroccan Jews and 52,000 Europeans and others.

In 1952, subsequent to a dispute between France and the USA concerning US base activities in Morocco, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) reaffirmed that under the Treaty of Fez (1912), Morocco was a sovereign state. By inference this included the Tangier Neutral Zone. With the Moroccan case being debated in international fora such as the UN and Arab League, the days of the Zone were numbered. With the end of the Moroccan Protectorate, the Tangier Statute was abrogated in 1956. A special Royal Charter was granted to cover the transfer of powers back to Morocco (1957-59). All international controls were formally abolished.

4.7 OVERVIEW: THE TANGIER NEUTRAL ZONE.

As a model of neutralization astride the Strait, the Zone was a success in that an actively belligerent power did not gain control of the area nor was it used as a base to obstruct international passage, despite the dubious activities of Spain during World War II. It formed part of a complex geopolitical symbiosis and the ending of its international status left a certain power void which to date has not been exploited by hostile forces. The abrogation of its special status enhanced the importance of the Crown Colony of Gibraltar for the international community. As Morocco has often pointed out, the present international balance of power could not tolerate Spanish control of the Gibraltar peninsula and bases on the southern shore also (Le Grand Maghreb, no. 37, p.21; ibid, no.38, p.87).

Despite Tangier's limited port facilities, and the Zone's
limited natural resources including water, international cooperation made it functional. Although there was active cooperation in many spheres, the Zone was never completely international in the same sense as Danzig was under the League of Nations (1919-1939). It was more like a territory under the sovereignty of the Sultan and the Powers, but the Sultan's actions were dictated by France. In turn French policy was limited by treaty obligations and Paris had to act within the limits agreed upon with Britain (1904). In turn Spanish action was determined by France (1904, 1912), and consequently indirectly by Britain.

British policy since the 18th century had dictated that Tangier be either British, Moroccan or international. In real terms the participation of other states in the administration of the Zone (save the USA after 1946) reinforced Britain's Strait policy. The fact that the Zone was taken over by Spain (1940-45) so easily shows the weakness of the international community to uphold Tangier's special status. Britain's efforts to have the Soviet Union participate in the administration of the Zone after 1945 shows that there was a genuine desire to reinforce the ideal of Tangier as a neutral international Zone. With the setting up of the UNO (1945), the US Ambassador to Portugal suggested that Tangier be chosen as the home of the organization. Besides struggles for prestige and the varying objectives of the administering states, the ultimate result was that the Zone enhanced security of the Strait and aided in guaranteeing freedom of passage for all nations. However this
security was primarily contingent on Britain's Crown Colony.

With the demise of the Zone, Britain continued to play its traditional role of guaranteeing free passage to the international community and ensuring that a strong hostile power did not establish itself in Tangier. Britain has also continued to act as an indirect mediating force between Spain and Morocco in relation to the Strait, Spanish decolonization, and the Plazas. Though Tangier was not militarized after 1956, there is no guarantee for the future. The "union" which took place between Libya and Morocco in 1984 was viewed with alarm by states as diverse as Algeria and the USA. Despite the fact that it was obvious to most observers that the union would neither be harmonious nor long-lived, and that it was primarily a Moroccan strategy to gain Libyan support against the Polisario Liberation Front and counterbalance Algeria's strong system of regional alliances, there was apprehension in the international community. The union came to an end in 1986. However the union was symptomatic of the precarious nature of intra-Maghrebi politics (see chapter 8).

During the international period, the local population of Tangier was not exploited in the traditional colonial manner, but neither were the people treated as equals by the foreigners. In fact the 1923 Statute effectively defranchized them. However their standard of living was higher than in most areas of Morocco. Today Tangier is one of the poorest Moroccan cities, rarely visited by King Hassan, and having no royal palace or university so evident in other cities patronized by the monarch.
The Tangierines regret their lost prosperity, and the Zone now forms part of the local mythology. In general the author found that the King was far less popular in Tangier than in other areas of Morocco (interviews March-April 1985). When there are violent upheavals in the future, Tangier is most likely to be a centre of agitation.


In general researchers tend to view Tangier from an historical viewpoint only. One is almost led to believe that Tangier disappeared in 1956. Perhaps this is due to a Eurocentric vision of world history and the fact that the international community tends to think only of the Crown Colony of Gibraltar when the Strait is mentioned. Because of the base and Britain's ability since the 18th century to guarantee freedom of passage, there is a tendency to forget that Tangier is also a key to the Strait. With the rise of regional powers, nationalism and militant Islam since the 1970s, Tangier can no longer be viewed as an historical vestige nor quaint touristic attraction, particularly when the sovereign status of the Crown Colony and the Plazas may be changed in the future. Tangier's spatial and political symbiosis with the northern and southern shores of the Strait in the 1980s must not be dismissed.

Tangier is a city where myth, legend and history have nurtured political intrigues and ongoing fiction. The politics and economy of the city are elusive and yet as real as in any
Graham Greene novel. The urban amphitheatre setting on the bay has drawn attention throughout the ages, ranging from the Phoenicians to the Americans, coming as artists, merchants, tourists and soldiers. Tangier's most recent golden age (1923-1956) has left an environment full of colourful vestiges. The city in Dickensian manner is full of great expectations, waiting for something to turn up. Besides the day-trippers discovering Africa from the hotels of the Costa del Sol and the Crown Colony, and the tourist through-traffic; the Moroccan secret police, like the staff of the 14 consular missions are all waiting for "something" to turn up there or in the Strait. Tangier is a city which abounds with rumours. Free-enterprise is evident everywhere with the trafficking of counterfit artifacts, kif/hashish, cocaine, sex and currency. There is some good real estate along the coast between Tangier and Cape Spartel, much of which is owned by non-nationals, especially from the oil rich Gulf states. Some Tangierine youth spoke disdainfully of the rich landowners and stated to the author (1985) that their co-religionists are not loyal to the precepts of Islam (see chapter 8).

Outside the traditional Muslim areas - the Grand and Petit Soccos (souks) - and the kasbah, are the old Jewish sectors and the decaying Rococco-like European areas. On the outskirts, bidonvilles have mushroomed since the 1960s, augmented by the rural exodus, especially from the Rif. Beni Makada (locally referred to as Beni Makadam), once a small suburb is now a vast slum area, a microcosm of the infamous bidonvilles of
Casablanca. To the east of Beni Makada is sited Casa Barata (Cheap House), equally poor but a little less miserable. Some of the youth here, like their contemporaries on Moroccan university campuses, feel that militant fundamentalism might offer them and Tangier a better future (see chapter 8).

Tangier is an important regional port, and traffic there, especially from Atlantic passers (which do not actually traverse the Strait) is significant in increasing traffic density at the western entrance to the Strait. Tangier is the sixth port of Morocco, with artisanal fishing and industrial activities as well. The free port zone localized within the port area has not drawn traffic away from the ports of Ceuta and Gibraltar as was intended by the Moroccan administration. Tangier draws most of its livelihood from tourism and associated activities. In the early 1980s about 270,000 passangers arrived annually at the local airport, and approximately 1 million by sea (Fauvel et al, 1981, p.75).

The port is situtated about 1.6 km from the town and 12 km from the airport, and has sufficient water for the largest of vessels. The outer mole has a length of 1,219 metres. There are five quays; numbers 1, 2 and 3 have a length of 522 metres, and depths of 6.1 m, 8.23 m and 10.67 m respectively. Numbers 4 and 5 have a length of 250.1 m, and depths of 3.96 m and 4.88 m respectively (Lloyds, 1984, p.48). There are crane facilities, one 50/75 ton, seven 6-t, two 3-t and one 2-t (Lloyds, 1984, p.48; Pilot, 1978). Ro/Ro facilities are provided, but bunker facilities are not available. Only minor ship repair services
are obtainable. Fresh water, meat and other provisions are available in plenty. Pilotage is compulsory.

Though situated between the waters of the Atlantic and Mediterranean, local authorities state that Tangier is not self-sufficient in fish, large quantities of which have to be brought in by sea and road from Rabat, Alhocima and M'diq. Of the 1,902 tons of fish which were officially landed at the port in 1984, 1,613 tons arrived in locally registered vessels (Andaloussi, interview, 1985). According to the local authorities, the fishing sector of the economy has been steadily growing since the late 1970s. In 1981, the number of fishing boats registered at Tangier was 67, 68 in 1982, 73 in 1983, and 76 in 1984. Between 1983 and 1984, the fish catche increased by 14.51%. Also the number of visiting ships rose from 97 in 1983 to 116 in 1984 (Andaloussi, interview, 1985).

Despite several fishing agreements between Spain and Morocco since 1956, there are fish-related problems in the Tangier orbit. In 1973, there were exchanges of gunfire between Spanish and Moroccan warships over fishing rights, and incidents continue (Couper, 1983, p.233). On average between 1975 and 1985, the Tangierine authorities were responsible for the arrest of about 9 Spanish fishing vessels annually. In 1984, 9 Spanish trawlers were captured and catches confiscated, and in January 1985 alone, 3 such vessels were impounded (Andaloussi, interview, 1985). The main fishing areas for the Tangier region are Ras Kebdand near Saida, and the seas off Nador and Al Hoceima (adjacent to the Spanish territory of Alhucemas) (see
maps 5.1, 5.2, 5.5). Coral gathering takes place in the Al Hoceima-M'diq area. Smaller artisanal fishing ports are located at Ksar Seghir between Ceuta and Tangier, Oued Dalila, and Ben Younich where coral gathering is important to the local economy. Tangier is trying to develop an ice-factory/refrigeration centre to encourage the fishing potential, but government investment is comparatively low in contrast to other Moroccan ports, despite plans for greater development of fishing activities not only in the Tangier area but also that of Melilla.

Tangier (1985) hosts several types of fishing vessel: (i) trawlers using simple net techniques, of which about 9 fish the surrounding waters; (ii) some 10-12 sardiniers engage in surface and pelagic fishing at night; and (iii) various types of small boats, 82 of which have outboard motors, with 300-400 of a more traditional design. About 75 Moroccan trawlers work the Strait zone and also venture into Atlantic waters. The locals want greater investment in the industry and feel that some of the richest fishing grounds are in the Ceuta and Alhucemas areas (Andaloussi, interview, 1985).

Resolving the social and political problems of Tangier could yet prove to be a task more onerous than that of decolonization in the area.

4.9 INTERNATIONALIZATION: THE CAPE SPARTEL LIGHTHOUSE.

The Treaty of 31 May 1865, relating to the neutralization of the lighthouse on Cape Spartel, some 14 km from Tangier, offers another example of the efforts of the international
community to secure safe passage of the Strait (see maps, 4.1, 4.2). This has helped reinforce the international character of Gibraltar Strait.

As early as 1852, a British diplomat to Morocco recommended to his government the erection of a lighthouse at Cape Spartel shortly after the stranding of the British vessel Calpes there. When the Britain government did not act, the initiative was taken by Spain after the loss of a Brazilian corvette in 1860, with the loss of over 125 lives off the Cape Spartel promontory. With the Spanish-Moroccan Commercial Treaty (20 November, 1861), Spain had a clause inserted in Article 43, in which the Sultan undertook to build and maintain a lighthouse at Cape Spartel (Brue, 1947, Vol.II, p.157).

The erection of the lighthouse began in 1861, under French direction and became operational in 1864. Immediately Britain began to have misgivings:

"if for no other purpose than to prevent the latter power (France) having the exclusive jurisdiction of a work occupying such a commanding position and so near Gibraltar" (Archives of the American Legation, Tangier, Despatch Book 1848-1861, p.97).

During the construction period, Britain proposed to France and Spain, that a petition should be made to the Sultan for a regulation guaranteeing the neutrality of the lighthouse in time of war. The potential of the lighthouse as a navigational aid and signalling station was obvious to all. The Sultan was agreeable in principle to this request, if the powers agreed to bear the costs. After negotiations, the 1865 Treaty was signed
Plate 4.3 The Cape Spartel Lighthouse (1985)

by Austria, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Norway, the USA and Morocco, who gained supreme control and administration of the lighthouse. While the costs were borne by the powers, paying equal sums (1,500 French francs), the Sultan was responsible for repairs and reconstruction if necessary. The Sultan undertook to guarantee security in case of internal or external aggression. The powers agreed to respect the neutrality of the lighthouse in time of peace and war.

In 1892 a semaphore was installed by Lloyds. France and Britain agreed that it be placed under the special regime already in existence for the lighthouse, except that the signatories would be entitled to have it closed down in time of war (Rouard de Card, RGDIP, Vol.II, p.319; Bruel, 1947, p.159). This ambivalent agreement somewhat diminished the neutral status of Cape Spartel, as the protection afforded to the semaphore was less than that given to the lighthouse. In 1905 fog signals were installed. Later France strongly objected to British plans for the establishment of a wireless station there (Documents diplomatiques francaises, 21ème série, Vol.III, No.75, p.101; Bruel, 1947, Vol.II, p.159).

With the establishment of the French Protectorate (1912) over Morocco, there was no significant change in the legal status of Cape Spartel, since the treaty obligations entered into were not altered by the Protectorate. According to Bruel (1947, Vol.II, p.159), up to World War I the administration of the lighthouse worked extremely satisfactorily and proved:
"... that a really international administration, ... where it concerns a purely technical institution, is quite possible if only the community of interests of which it is the expression is strong enough."

The neutrality of the lighthouse was respected during both World Wars. After 1918, Austro-Hungary, Germany and Russia ceased to pay their contributions; Morocco (under French aegis) took on this obligation. Obviously this policy was pursued by France with the intention of gaining more power in the proposed Tangier International Zone, in which Cape Spartel was enclave (see map 4.2). Article 53 of the Tangier Statute (1923), describes the 1865 Treaty as only being provisionally in force.

In 1926, a proposal of the Sultan suggested that after modernization the lighthouse should be placed under the supervision of the technical section of the Tangier administration. In essence this meant under a Frenchman. Italy and the USA blocked this attempt to undermine the neutrality of the lighthouse on the grounds that the Tangier Statute (1923) to which they were not signatories could not abrogate in any form the provisions of the 1865 Treaty, "res inter alios acta". This problem was resolved within the context of the 1865 Treaty.

On the whole the Cape Spartel model of neutralization worked somewhat better than that of the Tangier Neutral Zone. Because of the difference in area and purely technical aspects of the administration, there was less scope for rivalry on significant matters. With independence (1956), Morocco regained Cape Spartel and responsibility for the lighthouse, which has
functioned ever since without major problems for the international community. The historical and political geography of the Cape Spartel lighthouse is significant because it represents yet another attempt to enhance the international character of the Strait.

4.10 CONCLUSION.

From the 18th century until 1956, Britain with the collaboration of the international community ensured that Tangier's geopolitical role did not pose a military threat to international usage of the Strait, and reinforced its international character. The Neutral Zone like Cape Spartel enhanced security and the international ethos of the area reinforcing the philosophy of freedom of the seas. The models of internationalization at Tangier and Cape Spartel only worked because of their spatial juxtaposition within the geopolitical power hierarchy with Britain at the apex. The Lighthouse and Zone experiments were in keeping with imperial policies of the period, as is evidenced by passage politics and treaties in relation to the Suez and Panama Canal Zones, and the Turkish Straits. However the Tangier model was probably the most developed and successful in internationalization experiments in territories adjacent to straits. Significantly in 1956 Morocco regained control over the Zone, and Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal (often seen as the first step in the Islamic resurgence of this century); while within a few years Turkey was drawn into
the NATO alliance. With the ending of international control of the Zone, it proved once and for all that internationalization of territories adjacent to Gibraltar was a lost dream, and once more that there was no *de facto* legal instrument catering for the Strait's international status. Thus security of passage had to be guaranteed by a strong power upholding the internationalist tradition, with the legitimizing support of the world community. After 1956 Britain reverted to the original Strait policy which it had employed in the 18th and 19th centuries. By 1958, the international community was ready to debate the straits issue in the UN forum.

The Tangier model is clearly no longer feasible in the post-colonial era. It is doubtful whether Tangier will remain demilitarized, especially if Gibraltar is retroceded to Spain. Sovereign security of strait states like Morocco is perceived to be more vulnerable than that of other types of states. After 1956, Morocco re-asserted its sovereign prerogatives in reclaiming Ceuta and other Spanish Territories in North Africa, and laid claim to 12 nm territorial waters. Like Spain during the third UN conferences on the law of the sea (1967-82), Morocco sought to have the waters of the Strait equated with territorial waters subject to the legal regime of innocent passage, which was blocked by the maritime powers (see chapter 3). Since the 1970s, Morocco has been actively engaged in promoting the idea of a trans-Strait bridge in the Tangier area (see chapter 1). Morocco has sought membership of such supranational organizations as the EC (1987), stressing the
advantages of its geostrategic location. In terms of distance, Tangier is the closest African, Arab and Muslim city to the EC (see chapter 3).

The poverty and corruption evident in Tangier is symptomatic of Morocco's present social and political problems, which the army or fundamentalists may yet try to redress. Exploitation of Tangier’s geopolitical and strategical advantages in threatening security of the Strait would be a major card to play in attracting international attention in a revolutionary situation.

Like the Rifians, the Tangierines earn a substantial part of their livelihood from illicit trade with the Crown Colony and Ceuta (see chapters 4-5). An increase in food prices and stricter customs controls on the Moroccan side of the Ceuta frontier led to serious rioting in December 1983 and January 1984. Decolonization of the Spanish Plazas and particularly Ceuta will prove to be far more problematic than that of the international Zone in 1956.

The present geopolitical mosaic of the Strait region is the result of the historical competition between Morocco and Spain for control of both coasts of the Strait, and interaction between them and extra-regional global powers such as Britain. The spatial juxtaposition of micro-models of neutralization and militarization within the region, with British stewardship from the Crown Colony assured security of usage of the Strait from the 18th to the mid-20th centuries. From this it may be deduced that the spatial organization and hierarchy of power control in
the area assured the major powers and international community security of passage of the Strait.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE SPANISH SOVEREIGN TERRITORIES IN NORTH AFRICA.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Since the 15th century, Ceuta on the southern shores of the Strait of Gibraltar has been disputed by Spain and Morocco. With the establishment of British power at Gibraltar (1704), Moroccan-Spanish contentions were limited by British strategy, and Spain's imperial designs were circumscribed by Britain's. Both Spain and Morocco claim sovereignty over five territories (Plazas) on Morocco's northern coast (see maps 5.1-5.5). Spain claims them on historical grounds, right of conquest, terra nullis principles, longevity of occupation, national security, territorial integrity of the state, and the fact that the vast majority of residents there are Spanish. Morocco counter-argues that the Spanish presence is anachronistic, the "territories" are the sequestrals of colonialism; they obstruct economic and political independence; the bases threaten the security of the state being legitimate targets in a dispute to which Spain is a party and Morocco not, hence the territorial integrity principle applies (UN General Assembly Res. 1514(XV), parag.6); and Spanish arguments for the recovery of the British Colony of Gibraltar substantiate Moroccos' to the Plazas (see appendix V). Because of the intensity of Spanish actions in trying to recover the Gibraltar Colony since the 1960s, and powerful global re-assertion of Islamic independence since the 1970s, Morocco wishes to regain the geographical advantages offered by its
MAP 5.1 THE MAGHREB:
SPANISH COLONIAL TERRITORIES AND
MOROCCAN CLAIMS AND ACQUISITIONS

SPANISH 'SPHERE' (1956)
INTERNATIONAL ZONE (1956)
SPANISH PROTECTORATE (1956)
CANTARY ISLANDS (Spain)
IFNI (1969)
TANGIER
MOROCCO

CANARY ISLANDS
(SPAIN)

INTERNATIONAL
ZONE (1956)

SPANISH
'SPHERE'
(1956)

MOROCCO

TANGIER

MAP 5.2 SPANISH POSSESSIONS ON MOROCCO'S MEDITERRANEAN COAST IN 1988

- Gibraltar (GB)
- Strait of Gibraltar
- Ceuta/Sebta
- Penón de Vélez de la Gomera
- Penón de Alhucemas
- Melilla
- Islas Chafarinas

Gibraltar (GB)
Strait of Gibraltar
CEUTA/SEBTA
Penon de Velez de la Gomera
Penon de Alhucemas
Melilla
Islas Chafarinas

0 km
0 miles
20
20
MAP 5.5 THE MINOR PLAZAS
Islam failed to secure permanent sovereignty on both coasts of the Strait, unlike the situation at the Bosporus and Dardanelles. During the Crusades, Christian Spain reconquered not only the northern shore but established several bases on the southern shore of the Strait. Those still held are the two Major Plazas de Soberanina or Sovereign Territories of Ceuta and Melilla, and three Minor Plazas, Penóns de Vélez de la Gomera, Alhucemas and the Chafarinas Islands. Collectively they cover an area over 31 sq km (see maps 5.1-5.5).

Usually only Ceuta and Melilla are discussed because they are the largest, and Ceuta is geostrategically situated at the eastern entrance to the Strait. Sometimes these territories are referred to as Presidios, so called because of their original function as penal colonies. They are commonly referred to as enclaves. While Ceuta and Melilla are enclave from a territorial viewpoint, the Minor plazas are not. All the territories have access to the sea and are therefore not enclaved entirely by the Moroccan state. As the Plazas de jure form an integral part of the Spanish state, the 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions would substantiate Madrid’s claims to jurisdiction over adjacent territorial waters (UNCLOS, UN A/Conf.62/122, 1982, Arts.3-15). Thus ingress and egress to the Plazas is not legally dependent on Morocco. None of the Plazas are economically viable. They cast a shadow over Moroccan-Spanish relations and could yet be a cause of instability in the Strait region. After centuries of rule,
Spain still finds itself in the position of having to defend its sovereign claims legally, politically and militarily.

Spain vehemently asserts its right to sovereignty over the Plazas, yet protests at the British presence in the Crown Colony. This paradox is a result of the complex historical geopolitical organization of the Strait area and the cultural conditioning of a once imperial people now reduced to being a shadow empire state. There are social, economic and political problems in the Plazas which are affecting not only Spanish-Moroccan relations but will eventually have geopolitical repercussions on the entire region.

In 1956, Tunisia gained independence receiving ill-defined frontiers. Algeria won independence (1962) within disputed boundaries, especially to the west and gained mammoth hydrocarbon-rich areas in the Sahara. Morocco achieved independence (1956) with a fragmented territory. Morocco was left with the problem of trying to reconstruct its territorial integrity. With the ending of the French and Spanish Protectorates (1956), Spain only relinquished the protectorate territories. It took Morocco over 20 years to regain Tarifya and Ifni from Spain, and withdrawal from the Western Sahara (1976) has led to a bloody war between Morocco and the Saharawi people (see chapter 8, maps 8.4.a,b,c). The Spanish Plazas on Morocco's northern frontier give access to the Mediterranean Sea. The two major ones possess natural harbours with the consequent negative economic, political and naval effects on the Moroccan state. In Spain, Ceuta is often referred to as the
Pearl of the Mediterranean. Throughout history, most major powers have vied for control of these bases.

5.2 THE PLAZAS.

The Balkanization of Morocco's northern frontier, and apartheid organization within the Plazas can no longer be seen as a purely bilateral issue, as contentions pose a threat to security of the Strait. The dispute has negative effects not only on geopolitical relations between Spain and Morocco but also the supranational groups to which they belong such as the EC, NATO, Arab League and Islamic Conference (see chapters 7-8). The frequently-reported violent conflicts between Muslims and Europeans in the Plazas (1985-87) could easily escalate (Le Monde 30 Jan.1986, p.4; ibid, 13-14 April 1986, p.xiii; ibid, 22-23 June 1986, p.5; Economist, 28 June 1986, p.60; ibid, 22 Nov.1986, pp.62-63; Financial Times, 30 Sep.1986, p.2; Times, 18 Nov.1986, p.9; ibid. 9 Feb.1987, p.6; Guardian, 1 Feb.1987, p.6; Observer, 8 Feb.1987, p.10).

5.2.1 Spain Vs Morocco.

Spanish strategy in the Plazas has always had the dual function of being offensive and defensive:

(i) to defend Iberia against the jihad;
(ii) to control the Strait;
(iii) to enhance its prestige as a Mediterranean power;
(iv) to influence Morocco's Strait policy and that of other interested states;
(v) to strengthen Spain's "crusade" and Christian "mission" in the Maghreb (historically the Plazas furnished refuge to Christian ships);
(vi) to make use of the bases during its colonial wars against Morocco (1859-60, 1909-1923); and
(vii) to enhance Spain's position in relation to global leaders, ranging from the Portuguese to the British, and currently NATO.

One of Morocco's main arguments in demanding sovereignty over the Plazas is that of the territorial integrity of the state. Physical and historical geography would support this contention.

Historically Moroccan strategy in trying to regain sovereignty over the Plazas has been a mixture of:
(i) direct attack and siege mounted by the Sultan's army;
(ii) attacks mounted by the Rifian tribes, often with the covert aid of the Sultan;
(iii) treaties with Spain, affording Morocco time to mount other campaigns;
(iv) diplomatic activity via third parties such as France and Britain; and
(v) monitoring the balance of power in the Strait, in the belief that any change in status of the Crown Colony of Gibraltar would be the signal for a change of sovereignty
It was only in 1906 that the Presidios lost their status as penal colonies. With the Spanish offensive during the Rif War (1909-27), Madrid tried to use the Ceuta and Melilla bases as "bridge-heads" in penetrating the Protectorate Zone which necessitated heavy investment in port and military installations. The great Arab-Berber leader, Abd el Krim, became a legendary international figure during the Rif War. To the Arab/Muslim world he was seen as leading the jihad against Spain and France, but his struggle was also one for independence in the historic tradition of the Berbers, he was not fighting on behalf of the Sultan. The great independent spirit of the Rifians has been manifest throughout history and as recently as January 1984, during riots in the Melilla region. Berber-Rifian nationalism, despite an Islamic identity with other Maghrebis is based on ethnic and cultural roots. The grinding poverty of the Rifians stands out in sharp contrast to King Hassan's Arab oligarchy. For many decades the Rifians have depended on the freeports of Ceuta and Melilla for a substantial part of their livelihoods. With the Spanish-Moroccan Convention of Fez (1866), customs frontiers were organized, which have since greatly affected the Moroccan hinterlands.

5.2.2 Population.

One of Spain's major arguments in justifying its continued
sovereignty over the Major Plazas is that they have been continuously occupied for centuries by Spaniards who form the majority of the population.

In 1986, Ceuta had a population of about 55,000 Spaniards and approximately 15,000 Muslims. Melilla had a population of 45,000 Spaniards (including a 15,000 strong military garrison), with perhaps 27,000 Muslims, half of whom are technically illegal immigrants (Economist, 28 June 1986, p.60). It is estimated that there are some 20,000-27,000 Spanish troops stationed in Plazas (Heiberg, 1983, p.20; Le Monde, 13 Nov.1986, p.4) Both Plazas are military strongholds, freeports and centres for smuggling. Most of their area lies within prohibited military zones, the civilian population crowding together on the remaining land. Smuggling and trafficking at the official cross-border posts and the frontiers riddled with gaps is rife. Although the Plazas are some 500 km apart, most Spaniards see them as an entity. Ceuta being only 30 km from Algeciras is embedded in the culture and economy of Andalucia. Because of distance from Iberia, Melilla has a closer economic and cultural symbiosis with Morocco, but this has not led to a harmonious relationship between the Europeans and Muslims. The negative effects of the siege mentality (racism, intransigence, and residual fascism) are more evident in Melilla than Ceuta, presumably because the Melillinese feel more threatened.

Ceuta and Melilla were sparcely populated until about 1906 and thereafter grew continuously until 1940. The population rose substantially between 1950-62, receiving an influx of
Europeans or Pieds Noirs, from the newly independent states of Algeria and Morocco. Since the 1970s, the European population has been decreasing.

The civilian population of the Chafarinas Islands (60.7 ha) fell from 500 in 1950 to 38 in 1973, with a garrison of 195 service people (150 males and 45 females) (Rézette, 1976, p.73). The military presence has decreased and by 1987, the civilian population had dwindled to a few fishermen.

The main link between the Chafarinas and the outside world is via Melilla, which is administratively and militarily responsible for the Minor Plazas. The Minor Plazas have no economic activities to sustain a sizeable population.

Penón de Vélez de la Gomera (3.9 ha) has experienced a demographic trend similar to that of the Chafarinas. It's civilian population fell from 500 in 1950 to 8 in 1973 and a garrison of 71 people (66 male and 5 female) (Rézette, 1976, p.73). By 1987, Vélez was almost deserted of civilians, and had only a token garrison presence.

Alhucemas' (1.2 ha) population fell from 322 (1950) to 3 in 1973, hosting a garrison of 63 people (61 males and 2 females) (Rézette, 1976, p.74). By 1987, there was only a token military presence.

The residual port petrol products industry at Ceuta, like the mining industry at Melilla is in decline. Most of the locals earn their livelihood from fish and tourist related industries. Like military spending, legalized smuggling under the regime of free ports furnishes an artificial economic
activity (Rézette, 1976, p.75; Memoria Anual, Puerto de Ceuta, 1982, p.19). Like Gibraltar, Ceuta has to import everything from abroad.

(a) The Ceutis.

The Ceutis are mostly of Andalusian origin, with the majority employed as merchants, sailors and fishermen. Fish-related industries, such as canning and drying are the main employers. Muslims work in the fish plants and stores. The number of Jewish and Asiatic merchants was substantially augmented by immigration from the Tangier Neutral Zone in 1956. With the ending of the Spanish Protectorate Zone (1956), the Plazas were heavily militarized. Everywhere religious and military symbols attest to the fact that Ceuta is a frontier town.

The demography of Ceuta has greatly fluctuated over the centuries, with population expansion constrained by the limited area. In the late 18th century, Ceuta’s population numbered about 7,000 people, of which over 50% were prisoners or soldiers. By 1900 the population had risen to about 10,000. In 1970, there were 73,000 residents, with about 4,000 not being officially registered. Of this number 5,000-10,000 were military personnel (Rézette, 1976, p.70). In 1987, the population was estimated to be about 70,000 people (Economist, 28 June 1986, p.60). The number of military personnel is estimated at about 12,000. Accurate population statistics are not readily available for Ceuta. This is partly for political reasons but also the fact that it is difficult to enumerate the
number of people living in the Muslim bidonvilles of Benzou and Prince Alphonse. When Franco bestowed Spanish nationality on many Muslims who had served in the Spanish army, the Muslim population of Ceuta officially doubled to 6,000 (1960). There are three legal mosques.

The largest immigration of Jews dates from the 1860s. Indian and Pakistani immigration occurred mostly via the Crown Colony of Gibraltar and the Tangier Neutral Zone. The majority of these people are engaged in trading activities. The Jewish and Asiatic groups constitute about 1% of the population, but are extremely important to the business life of the community. Nowadays, the majority of young Ceutis go to mainland Spain for educational and work opportunities, while those coming to Ceuta are not longterm residents.

(b) The Melillinese.

Like Ceuta, Melilla has demographic problems. In 1860, the population was about 1,880 persons, but the excessive poverty of 1867-68 reduced numbers by 50%. With Spanish penetration of the Rif region (1893-1909), the population rose steadily numbering some 41,000 by 1910. By 1950, there were 81,000 Spanish nationals in the Plaza. This number fell to 79,000 by 1960 and 58,000 by 1974 (including 2,000-3,000 garrison personnel). Since then there has been a drop in births and marriages in the area. In 1974, some 1,200 Jews were listed as permanent residents, mostly inmigrants from Algeria and protégés of France. In 1974, officially over 90% of the population was Spanish and 3.5% consisted of assimilated Jews (Rézette, 1976,
In 1987 it was estimated that the population numbered about 60,000. According to Le Monde (22-23 June, 1966, p.5), there are about 27,000 Muslims in Melilla and 45,000 others. According to the official Spanish census (1986), the Muslim population was found to be only 17,000, instead of the usual estimate of 27,000. However between 5,000-10,000 Muslims may enter and leave daily (Financial Times, 30 Sep.1986, p.2).

In 1985-86, violent intercommunal strife flared up in the Plaza because of Madrid's new aliens laws, which directly affected most of Melilla's Muslim population. In 1986, about 6,000 Muslims were awaiting decisions on their applications for Spanish nationality; while only 4,500 hold Spanish passports, 2,400 have residence permits and 4,800 hold "special status cards". The latter cards do not entitle holders to travel freely, draw social security or rent a house (Financial Times, 30 Sep.1986, p.2). Madrid attempted to introduce an 18 month integration plan for the Muslim community (1986) but this encountered major problems as its scope was limited in real terms, for instance Muslims born in Melilla do not automatically receive Spanish citizenship. For naturalization 10 years residence has to be proven, with the onus on the individual, rather than the administration to clarify the bureaucratic procedures, which has denied the legitimate presence of many Muslims for decades.

Concerning the Melillinese Muslims demand for Spanish citizenship, only 418 were granted Spanish nationality in 1986, out of a total of 17,000 requests. The Muslims say that they
will print their own identity documents, if Madrid does not grant official ones. "In their view the ideal would be joint Spanish-Moroccan nationality for all the inhabitants of Ceuta and Melilla" (Economist, 22 Nov.1986, pp.62-63). On 8 November 1986, during a general meeting, they passed a resolution affirming "the Arab and Maghrebi character of Melilla". For the first time in history, the Plaza's Muslim population formally demanded reunion with Morocco. Arguably these events in Melilla are a forewarning of possible future scenarios in Ceuta.

In 1987, the leader of the Muslim community, Omar Mohammed Dudu urged parents to withdraw their children from Spanish schools, unless they were taught Arabic and the Quran, and suggested that a parallel administration be set up if the local authorities continued to represent "only one of the city's two communities" (Economist, 22 Nov.1986 62-63). In January 1987, Dudu, claiming that his life was in danger fled to Morocco to take up temporary self-imposed exile. On 31 January 1987, rioting broke out in the Muslim quarter of Melilla when a group of people marched through the streets chanting: "Get out of here. This land is ours" (Guardian, 2 Feb.1987 p.6). A special contingent of riot police were flown in from Spain to restore order.

Because of Muslim attempts to get a fairer deal, there has been a backlash from the Christian population with Francoists gaining support. In 1986, the leader of the Spanish National Party of Melilla, Juan Diez de la Cortina, was allegedly involved in terrorist plots and there was much speculation about
the organisation of paramilitary groups. This is reminiscent of
the OAS (Organisation Armée Secrète) which plunged Algeria into
an ethnic-religious bloodbath (1956-62) aimed at destroying the
social and economic infrastructure before European withdrawal

The non-Muslim population fear that any type of franchise
for Muslims will be the death knell for their supremacy.
Frustrated by the local administration and the ambiguous
attitudes of Madrid, Muslims are looking towards Rabat for
support. In 1986, Spain pledged over £40 million for
infrastructural projects; the first investment on this scale in
over 50 years (Financial Times, 30 Sep.1986, p.2). Yet about
40% of the residents have acquired houses in mainland Spain.
This clearly indicates how uncertain the Melillinese feel about
their future (Cambio, no.16, 1986; Le Monde, 13-14 April 1986).

The Muslims of Melilla and Ceuta are found in the menial
jobs and are ostracized from the mainstream of life. This has a
spatial representation in the bidonvilles. Many of those who
commute daily to work from Morocco have to go through a complex
sociology of relationships with officials on both sides of the
frontier. Trafficking is carried out on all scales and is
facilitated by the backsheesh system (bribes and reciprocal
obligations). Thousands of women and children transport the
illicit merchandise.

Unless positive long-term action is taken by Madrid,
greater polarization of the different communities will take
place, with the possibility of Ulsterization. Since the Muslims
have begun to make their demands as an organized group, the Christian majority has become more mobilized, with extreme rightwing candidates winning a majority in local elections. In January 1987, rightwing nationalists in Melilla, fearing that Madrid would eventually give in to pressure from Rabat and hand over the Plaza to Morocco, appealed to the British Prime Minister for support, asking Margaret Thatcher "to convince Madrid to follow her example in the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar" (Guardian, 2 Feb.1987, p.6). A demonstration organized to this end with the waving of British flags and pro-Thatcher slogans was forbidden by the authorities. The Spanish National Party of Melilla, led by Juan Diez de la Cortina has made no secret of its anti-Moroccan stance, based on anti-Muslim and racist sentiments. In Melilla one of the main topics of conversation is the organization of extremist rightwing paramilitary groups.

5.3 CEUTA/SEBTA.

Ceuta has an area of about 19 sq km (see map 5.3). The Ceuta peninsula narrows to an isthmus before broadening into the Almina peninsula to the north east upon which is sited Mont Hacho (181 metres) which is of volcanic origin. Almina/Mont Hacho is chiefly a military zone. The civilian settlement is located on the isthmus and western part of the peninsula broadening into the mainland. There are 20 km of sea coast and 8 km of land boundaries. Spain claims territorial waters
Plate 5.2 One of Ceuta's many Military Establishments

Plate 5.3
Mosque and 'Bidonville' near Mont Haclo
Plate 5.4

View of the Port of Ceuta from Mont Hacho

extending to 12 nm around the territory.

Jutting to the north of the isthmus is the land-locked harbour protected by two breakwaters, with an area of 340 acres, leaving an entrance of 416 metres in width, depth 14.02 metres (Lloyds, 1984, p.45). Ceuta has 5 wharves, a fishing port and free port. Water displacement at low tide is about 17.70 m. Maximum tide amplitude is less than 1.40 m. The port is subject to dominant east and south-east winds. Currents are less than 1 knot in the area.

The anchorage north-west of the harbour is in depths ranging from 18.3-22.14 m, at about 416 m off breakwater, but vessels have to leave this anchorage when there are strong east winds. The bottom off the north-west side of Dique de Poniente is mostly rocky. The largest vessel size capacity is 220 m long, 10.2 m d (Lloyds, 1984, p.45). Concerning accommodation, the West Mole hosts vessels with a maximum length of 220 m. Number 1 berth is not used because of shallow depths, no. 2 has ice, cold storage plant and bunkering facilities for fishing vessels. No. 3 berth is used for discharge and delivery of bunker oil grades (max. depth 10.21 m). No. 4 berth is used for loading and discharging goods and bunker oil grades. There are three warehouses on this berth with a surface area of 1036 sq m, (max. depth 9.7 m). No. 5 berth is used for general goods and petroleum products (max. depth 9.45 m), attached is a warehouse (1,036 sq m) for storing containers. Three electric 3/6 ton cranes and one 20/30 ton crane travel along berths numbers 4 and 5. The East Mole hosts vessels with a maximum
length of 180 metres (max. depth 9.45 m), and is used for loading and discharging petroleum products. Espana Pier (max. 8.84 m d) is used for loading and discharging general merchandise, and as a ferry berth. Three warehouses are attached, each with a surface area of 1,036 sq m. The pier is equipped with four 3/6 ton electric cranes. Canonero Dato Quay (798.5 m length) has a total capacity of 2,700 cubic metres of refrigerated chambers. There is one ro/ro ferry berth without a gangway (8.84 m d) and four ro/ro ferry berths with car gangways (7 m d). There is one LNG berth available. Concerning repair facilities, there are no dry docks, but one small shipyard with slip, can take ships up to 400 ton net. Fresh water supplies are available. The nearest airports are Tangier (96 km), Gibraltar and Malaga. Ceuta's limited natural resources are compensated for by proximity of supplies from Spain.

5.3.1 History.

The Phoenicians used Ceuta and Melilla as relay centres which were supplemented by Carthage. Ceuta derives its name from the Latin septem fratres, because of the seven hills which dominate the peninsula; the Latin Septa was Arabized to Sebta and Hispanized to Ceuta. With the Muslim penetration of the Maghreb in the 8th century, Arab geographers often referred to the ocean beyond the Strait as the "Sea of Shadows", from the vantage point of Ceuta.

Apart from Fez, Ceuta is the most chronicled city in
Morocco. Islamic savants such as Cadi Iyyad, Hadrami, Ibn Khamis Imam, Mahamed Ibn Qacim, Al Ansari, Bekri, Ibn Khaldoun, Idrissi and Ibn Idara have all spoken about the historic city. Ceuta was the point of passage for the "Golden Route of the Sudan" linking Aoudaghost, Sijilmassa, Fez and Cordoba. During the Muslim period, Ceuta was a centre of export to most Mediterranean and Maghrebi cities, reaching its apogee in the 12th and 13th centuries, with about 1,200 Christians enjoying freedom of worship there. In 1260, the Pope created the bishopric of Ceuta. The port's naval and military organization was essential in holding off the Christian reconquest of Iberia. In the 9th century, Abou-1-Fida Ismael stated that Ceuta had been the "terminal point of Morocco and portal of the jihad". In the 15th century Al Ansari stated that Ceuta had a thousand mosques, 62 libraries, 43 zaouias and ribats, and was a thriving university city, a major culture core of Islam (Naciri, Istiqqa, pp. 111-144, Rezette, 1976, p.27). The inter-Muslim disputes of the 14th century encouraged partisan Christian powers to support different factions, thereby furthering their own interests on the southern shore of the Strait (see map 4.1).

In 1415, Juan I of Portugal took Ceuta by force in the name of Christendom. It became the first permanent Christian Crusade settlement in the Maghreb (and will possibly be the last). Neighbouring Tangier and Ksar el Seghir on the Strait were captured in 1458 by Portugal, but liberated by Ismael and his mujhaidin in 1691. The bloody capture of the Presidios prompted one governor to state:
"it is a battle that will last for centuries". (Ceuta and Melilla, 1964, Official Spanish Brochure, p.26)

Though Ceuta was taken by Portugal in 1415, it became Spanish by the union of the Iberian crowns in 1580. With the dissolution of the union (1640) and the treaty of 1663, the Ceutis opted to remain with Spain. Five years later, Ceuta was definitively incorporated into the Spanish state. For almost two centuries after that, Ceuta was subjected to sieges and attacks. In classical colonial manner, Spain tried to eradicate everything Muslim there, putting its own cultural imprint on all Islamic vestiges; the present Plaza do Africa was once the centre of the old medina with its mosques, palaces and medersas.

Originally Ceuta and the other territories served as fortresses. In the 17th and 18th centuries, they were used as prisons (Presidios) for political and common law prisoners. It was only in the 19th century that they gained economic importance. One of the great Muslim sieges of Ceuta was helped by a blockade mounted with the aid of Britain's Admiral Rooke, who was also instrumental in establishing British control over the Crown Colony of Gibraltar (see chapter 6). Muslim attacks were strongest against Ceuta between 1727-28, 1732 and 1770-71. The mujahidin also besieged Melilla several times, 1694-96, 1774, and 1775, in the latter siege Britain aided the Muslims.

5.3.2 Economy.

Though made into free-ports in the 19th century, it was
only in the early 20th century that there was substantial investment in the ports of Ceuta and Melilla. Fundamentally this was necessitated by the need to send reinforcements of soldiers, materials and supplies during the 1908-09 War. During the Protectorate era (1912-56), these ports were Spain’s direct entrance to the Northern Zone. The geostrategical position of Ceuta is mirrored in the ports history as a general port (Law of 7 May 1880, Royal Decree, 1928), as a free port (Law of 7 May 1880, Royal Decree, 1929, law of 1955), and as a major fishing port (Ministerial Decree, 1935). Since the 1950s, considerable reconstruction has taken place at the commercial port (see above).

In 1953, Ceuta was Spain’s first port; it is now often referred to as Spain’s second port. In 1972, of the 11,720 ships that docked there, 6,689 came from or were going to other countries, and 5,031 were involved in coastal trade (including that of the mainland). Of the 614,000 tons of merchandise landed and loaded, 346,000 tons were international and 268,000 tons were domestic (Rézette, 1976, p.77-81).

In 1982, some 9,253 vessels docked at Ceuta. Of this number 5,696 were Spanish (Memoria Anual, Ceuta, 1982, pp.15, 55, 66). Vessels bearing the flags of some 63 states called at Ceuta (see table 5.1). Concerning numbers of vessels per nation/flag, Spain accounted for almost 62%, followed by the USSR with just over 5%. The USA accounted for just over 1% and Morocco for a little over 0.5%. Concerning tonnage Spain ranked
### Table 5.1

NUMBER OF VESSELS WHICH DOCKED AT CRUZA IN 1982, BY FLAG.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>No. of Vessels &amp; %</th>
<th>Tonnage (GT) &amp; %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>5,695 (61.96%)</td>
<td>10,011,729 (27.05%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>58 (0.63%)</td>
<td>163,365 (0.29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>31 (0.33%)</td>
<td>79,656 (0.22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>64 (0.68%)</td>
<td>98,909 (0.27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>11 (0.11%)</td>
<td>34,503 (0.97%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>27 (0.27%)</td>
<td>101,312 (0.26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>16 (0.17%)</td>
<td>76,659 (0.21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>64 (0.91%)</td>
<td>278,329 (0.76%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>10 (0.16%)</td>
<td>11,730 (0.33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>237 (2.57%)</td>
<td>367,924 (1.04%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>46 (0.43%)</td>
<td>165,171 (0.29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>175 (1.98%)</td>
<td>619,799 (1.73%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Germany</td>
<td>213 (2.33%)</td>
<td>723,927 (2.05%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Germany</td>
<td>66 (0.71%)</td>
<td>283,198 (0.57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>324 (3.52%)</td>
<td>3,488,375 (9.66%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>15 (0.16%)</td>
<td>15,300 (0.43%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>18 (0.18%)</td>
<td>266,277 (0.75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>23 (0.23%)</td>
<td>29,582 (0.83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>57 (0.61%)</td>
<td>306,417 (0.85%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>34 (0.36%)</td>
<td>228,188 (0.64%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>155 (1.66%)</td>
<td>1,539,491 (4.36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>26 (0.28%)</td>
<td>181,664 (0.28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>127 (1.38%)</td>
<td>250,488 (0.71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>54 (0.56%)</td>
<td>254,774 (0.72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>225 (2.44%)</td>
<td>1,184,259 (3.35%)</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
<td>36 (0.38%)</td>
<td>156,038 (0.44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>127 (1.38%)</td>
<td>658,613 (1.86%)</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>31 (0.33%)</td>
<td>63,766 (0.18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>44 (0.47%)</td>
<td>301,667 (0.85%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>29 (0.31%)</td>
<td>44,686 (0.13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>42 (0.45%)</td>
<td>66,912 (0.18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>49 (0.53%)</td>
<td>415,082 (1.17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>337 (3.66%)</td>
<td>763,059 (2.16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>97 (1.05%)</td>
<td>346,421 (0.98%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>477 (5.18%)</td>
<td>3,999,084 (1.34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>119 (1.29%)</td>
<td>767,796 (2.00%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (27 flags)</td>
<td>76 (0.39%)</td>
<td>454,954 (0.96%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9,253 35,262,594

Source: MEMORIA ANUAL 1982, Puerto de Ceuta, MOPU, Dirección General de Puertos y Costas, Ceuta.
first with almost 48%, followed by Greece (9.66%). Some 571 tankers docked at Ceuta in 1982. Of these, 326 were Spanish (1,115,143 GRT) and 245 foreign (2,144,588 GRT) (Memoria Anual, Ceuta, 1982, p.67). In the early 1980s, the port annually handled over 3 million tons of petrol-related products. In 1982, this included 843,136 tons of combustible liquids. Significantly, some 368 Spanish military vessels (282,425 GRT) also used the port that year.

In 1982, over 183 Spanish fishing vessels (5,607.25 GRT) used the port facilities, and 46 foreign fishing vessels (4,471 GRT). That year, there were some 64 vessels (910 GRT) registered in Ceuta. In 1982 over 1,572,367 kilos of fish were landed (molluscs 79,066 kg, crustaceans 53,480 kg and other types 1,439,821 kg). This amounted to over 165 million Pesetas, with the crustaceans accounting for over 17 million Pesetas of the total (Memoria Anual, Ceuta, 1982, pp.69, 83). Melilla's catch averages twice that of Ceuta.

In terms of merchandise handled by the port (1982), after mainland Spain (2,598,483 ton), the USSR landed 92,346 tons, followed by the Netherlands (70,710 tons) and West Germany (70,447 tons). Officially 45,645 tons of British merchandise were landed at the port (1982) and 46,087 tons were officially embarked for Britain: this would strongly suggest a strong linkage with the Crown Colony of Gibraltar (Memoria Anual, Ceuta, 1982, p.79). Between 1981-82, there was a 44.33% increase in tonnage from foreign navigation, mostly due to the importation of combustible fuels (Memoria Anual, Ceuta, 1982,
243

p.15). The private commercial sector of the port activities brought in 9,984,884 Pesetas (Memoria Anual, Ceuta, 1982, pp.47-59). Over 19.5 tons of alcohol and associated products were landed in 1982. Tobacco, cacao and coffee amounted to 1,356 tons and imported automobiles came to 380,855 tons. Official statistics do not include a clear breakdown of types and number of vehicles imported (Memoria Anual, Ceuta, 1982, p.78). Hence Ceuta is a major port in the region, valued by Spain and coveted by Morocco.

The ferries, Victoria and Virgen de Africa (100 vehicle capacity); and Ciudad de Tarifa (150 vehicle capacity) make connections between Ceuta and Cadiz, Melilla and the Canary Islands as well as Algeciras (see chapter 2). The number of passengers using the port in 1970 was 1,943,000 and vehicles numbered some 147,000 (Rézette, 1976, p.80). In 1981 and 1982, the port received over 2.5 million passengers annually, with 1,316,751 entries and 1,252,642 exits in 1982. For the same year the port handled 290,551 vehicles; with 156,834 entries and 133,717 exits (Memoria Anual, Ceuta, 1982, p.15). Most of these figures for passengers and vehicles represent through traffic en route for Spain or Morocco. Ceuta is also an oil port used to resupply vessels. Morocco has made it national policy to use the port of Ceuta as little as possible, in an effort to further the economy of Tangier and detract from Ceuta's economic dominance. Thus Ceuta is not only important from a geopolitical viewpoint, but it is also a commercial and fishing port of stature in the regional context.
Antimony is mined at Ceuta. The outcrop deposit is some 8 by 2 km. There are six exploitable beds in the Plaza and surrounding mountain region, but since 1956, the Moroccan-Ceuta border has retarded the development of the industry, particularly on the Moroccan side. In Ceuta the only exploitable deposit left, at San Pancrasio is derisory, with only 125 tons extracted in 1969 and 60 tons in 1973 (Rézette, 1976, p.93). Between 1973-1986, production varied from 50-100 tons per year.

5.3.3 Administration.

Throughout the centuries Ceuta has been more closely integrated into Spain than the other Plazas. In theory, administration in the Plazas is civil, but in practice it is military, regulated by statutes (1955) and decrees (1962, 1964, 1973). Ceuta is administered by a Delegate of the Government, a Major General, "Commander General of Ceuta", Chief of the Army of North Africa. Command of the Strait is under the military zone of Cadiz. A commander general in Melilla is responsible for the Minor Plazas. Most of the administration is linked to Granada. Ceuta's court of justice is in Seville and Melilla's in Granada. Ceuta hosts the consulates of Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, Panama, Portugal, Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

Politically the Ceutis and Melillinese are conservative. It is not surprising that the signal for the Falangist coup came
from these Plazas on 17 July 1936, one day before armed conflict on the mainland. Francoist iconography and ethos is prevalent in both cities. The Plazas are represented in the Cortes by mayors.

Since the crusades the religious administration of Ceuta and Melilla has been firmly entrenched in Cadiz and Malaga. Melilla has one mosque, but both cities had as many as 10 in former ages. The way of life in the Plazas reflects the inhabitants' siege culture. Emblems of Spanish prestige perpetuate the legendary hispanidad in Africa at great expense to Madrid and international relations (see chapter 8).

5.4 MELILLA.

Melilla has an area of only 12 sq km, with 3.9 km of coastline and 10 km of land boundaries (see map 5.4). As with Ceuta, Spain claims territorial waters up to 12 nm (see maps 3.1-3.2). The territory lies to the south of the geostrategic Spanish Island of Alborán (see map 1.4). Despite the extremely nationalistic Hispanic sentiments of Melilla, it is economically dependent on Morocco. Its sea port is not as good as that of Ceuta. The port entrance is 625 metres wide and has a water displacement of 9.80 m; currents do not exceed 2 knots and full tide is less than 0.6 m. The port offers 73,380 sq metres of anchorage and 11,654 sq metres of pier. The harbour depth at entrance is 12 metres. The North East Pier hosts vessels up to 10.67 metres depth. The Setolazar pier has 2 berths of 100 m
for 9.14 metres depth, and two 7 ton cranes and one 10 ton crane. The second extension of the North East pier is 197 m in length, 8.53 metres depth, with two steam cranes. Villanueva Quay is 210 m with 8.53 metres depth. Ribera Quay has two berths, one of 167 m with depths of 5.79-8.53 metres, and one 205 m with depths ranging from 4.88-7.62 metres. Compania Minas del Rif is a private loading quay some 246 m long, 11.89 metres depth (Lloyds, 1984, p.46).

There is warehouse space of 7,300 sq m, plus 2,000 cubic m of refrigerated space. Containers are handled by mobile cranes. Bulk cargo facilities are available. There are tanker terminals where discharge of fuel is effected through underground pipelines. Bunker facilities are available. Shiprepair services are available with a small slipway for vessels up to 250 tons. Pilotage is compulsory. Hospital facilities are available. Traffic in 1982 included 1,092 vessels of over 2,900,000 GRT (Lloyds, 1984, p.46). Tahuima airport is some 17 km from the city and is located on Moroccan territory, but is used jointly by Spain and Morocco. A new airport is under construction some 2 km from the harbour. From a geostrategic and commercial viewpoint, Melilla's geographical advantages are less important than those of Ceuta.

Melilla gives the impression of being a conglomerate of towers, high walls, ditches, flags, and military and Christian iconography. The feelings of the city are encapsulated in a large inscription over the local museum:

"Melilla was Spanish 18 years before the kingdom of Navarre became so; 162 years
before Le Roussillon became Spanish; 279 years before the birth of the United States of America.”

5.4.1 History.

Melilla is of Phoenician origin. The city was colonized on the orders of the Roman Emperor, Vespasian, in AD 70. Genseris, a Vandal chief ravaged Melilla and Ceuta in AD 429-432, also taking Hippone/Annaba (AD 430), Carthage (439) and Rome (455).

There is little documentation concerning the history of Melilla. Some decades after the Muslim conquest, the small town was destroyed by the Normans (859) but it was recaptured by the Caliph of Cordoba (926). After that, Muslim dynasties struggled for control, especially the Fatimids of Ifriqua/Tunisia, and the Omeyyads of Spain. Between the 8th and 14th centuries, Melilla grew with Sijilmassa, the leading city of Tafilalet, both were linked by a caravan route. Melilla acted as the main port for Fez and Taza, trading with such city states as Genoa, Venice, Pisa and Aragon (Fauvel et al, 1981, p.185). Eventually it was taken by the Spanish in 1497. Since then it has witnessed many sieges and blockades, the most famous being in 1774. Melilla's geostrategic location on the Mediterranean coast and offering access to the Rif region has meant that it has had to defend itself from attack by sea and land. Like Ceuta, Melilla served as a penal colony until the early 20th century, and has been continuously used as a military base, which acted as a major
"bridge-head" in the Spanish penetration of northern Morocco (1908-1923). Because of its bloody history over the past five centuries, it is doubtful that the present inhabitants would agree to a peaceful resolution of the sovereignty dispute in Morocco's favour.

5.4.2 Economy.

Melilla is not as strategically located as Ceuta and in the colonial era had to compete with the ports of Nemours and Oran (Algeria). It is about 185 km (115 miles) from Malaga and 200 km (125 miles) from Ceuta. Melilla is subject to the north and north-west winds, especially the Levanter which has severely damaged the port several times, notably in 1914 and 1945. Between 1946-1963, there was extensive investment in dredging, wharfage and so on. Melilla became a freeport by law in 1902 and by Royal Decree in 1928. Essentially, in this century Melilla was a mining port with rail links to the Rif iron deposits. During the Protectorate (1912-56), it exported over 1 million tons of iron ore annually from the Beni Bou Ifrour region. Maximum activity was attained in 1960, when over 1.5 million tons of ore were extracted. In its drive to build economic independence, Morocco refines some of the ore and exports the remainder via Nador. Besides ore, thousands of tons of clay and kaolin used to be exported via Melilla. Since the 1970s Melilla's percentage of Rif mine exports has been steadily declining as Nadors' develops.
Passenger traffic is much lower at Melilla than Ceuta: in the 1980s it averaged about 307,000 annually and vehicle traffic averaged about 19,000. In the early 1980s about 1,000 families earned their living from fishing and associated activities. Crustaceans (mostly shrimp) amounted to almost 10% of the total catch, but accounted for 25% of the total value. Profitable control of the fishing industry in Melilla is concentrated in much fewer hands than in Ceuta. There are eight fish plants. Morocco's extension of its exclusive fishing zone from 12 nm to 70 nm (1970) and EEZ (1981), despite several fishing agreements with Spain has had a negative effect on the local industry.

Like Ceuta, Melilla's tertiary sector and tourist trade is derisory. While both cities, especially Melilla, have a certain exoticism and rich mixture of cultures and history, they hold little potential for mass tourism. Melilla is very remote, and only the most adventurous tourists travel in the surrounding Rif region. Ceuta's touristic potential is limited by lack of space and fresh water supply. It is unlikely that either city will hinder the Crown Colony's rapidly developing tourist industry in the future. In both cities property is 15%-30% more expensive than mainland Spain. However there is a plentiful supply of cheap Arab labour. Unlike Ceuta, Melilla has an airport. It is constructed on Moroccan sovereign territory. Though used jointly by Spain and Morocco, the history of the airport is reminiscent of the British-Spanish dispute over Gibraltar airport. Ceuta and Melilla are linked by ship and road.

There is high inflation in the Plazas, and the cost of
living is higher than in mainland Spain. Melilla depends on Morocco for supplies of water and basic foodstuffs, but provides the surrounding Moroccan hinterlands with electricity.

5.5 THE MINOR PLAZAS.

5.5.1 Velez.

Penón de Vélez de la Gomera is a barren rock and with the adjoining 'Isleta' (Islet) is about 1/20 sq km or 15 acres (Geog. Rept. Spain, 1963, p.8), (see map 5.5). It is a conical island, 86 metres high in the north, with a fortress and white buildings. The island is connected by a rocky ridge to the islet (21 metres high) and is easily identified from west to north (Pilot, Vol.I, p.125). On the north-west extremity stands a lighthouse backed by a single-storied building. During low water periods, Vélez is a tombola, becoming attached to mainland Morocco by a sand spit some 100 metres long. It is situated in a beautiful site.

In former times Velez acted as a relay station between Ceuta and Melilla, being approximately half way between them. With the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), the Pope divided Maghrebi waters between the Iberian powers, with the median line running through Penón de Vélez de la Gomera, the west was to be Portuguese and the east Spanish (see chapter 1). Both parties disputed ownership of Vélez, but it was occupied by Spain in 1508. The dispute was settled in Spain's favour by the Treaty of Cintra (1509).
In 1554 Velez was captured by the Turks and provided an ideal base for Corsair attacks on Spain. However soon it reverted to Spain. On the Moroccan coast stands the hamlet of Badis, which was formerly prosperous. In the Middle Ages Badis acted as a port for Fez trading with Venice and other Mediterranean ports. It declined in 1508 with the Spanish conquest of the Penón. Badis was retaken by the local population several times and most notably in 1522. Vélez was beseiged innumerable times and its earthen fort was raised to the ground in 1702. During the Spanish Protectorate (1912-56), it was used as a prison (Fauvel et al. 1981, p.180). Though the fort was never rebuilt, Spain managed to retain the rock. Like other towns in the hinterlands of the Presidios, Badis has declined.

5.5.2 Alhucemas.

Alhucemas Penón (170 by 80 metres) is situated west of Melilla in the Bay of Ajdir and is about 4 km from the Moroccan coast, and a few kilometres from the Moroccan town of Al Hoceima, a notable tourist centre (see map 5.5). Less than 27 metres high, the 3 little islands lie some 155 km from Ceuta and 22 km east of Penón de Vélez. Ila de Mar and Isla de Tierra are adjoining low, rugged and uninhabited islets lying approximately 2.5 nm south-east of Cabo Nuevo. Closest to Ila de Mar, the northern islet, there is a shoal with a depth of 4 metres. Penón de Alhucemas lies 3 nm south south-east of Cabbo Morro.
Nuevo. At its northern extremity stands a ruined fortress, which once held a garrison of over 300 men. La Pulpera rock adjoining the Penón serves as a cemetery. The depths between Penón de Alhucemas and mainland Morocco are less than 5.5 metres and the channel is slowly silting up. Small craft can anchor south of Alhucemas. To the north-east anchorage can be obtained at depths of 13 metres (Pilot, Vol.I, p.126).

The village of Alhucemas is carved out in a cavern formed by an enormous overhanging rock. Because it is within sight of the Al Hoceima touristic complex, it is particularly embarrassing to the Moroccans and symbols of Spanish sovereignty are not as overtly displayed as in Ceuta and Melilla.

Spain occupied Penón de Alhucemas in 1673:

"It was voluntarily ceded to Charles II on the condition that Spain prevent the Turks from occupying strongholds on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco" (Rézette, 1976, p.43)

5.5.3 The Chafarinas.

The Chafarinas consist of 4 archipelagic islands with an area of about 2.5 sq km, which are located some 3.5 km from the Moroccan coast, 26 km to the east of Melilla and approximately 35 km from the Algerian-Moroccan frontier (Geog. Rept. Spain, 1963, p.4). (see maps 5.5, 1.4).

Isla Congresso lies to the west and is the largest of the islands. It has an elevation of 137 metres, but the eastern
slope is more gentle. Punta del Faro to the south offers a landing site. The northern and eastern coasts are rock-fringed. The island is uninhabited except for the lighthouse keeper at Punta del Faro. Just north-east of the northern extremity of the island lies Banco Congresso, a rock with a depth of just 3 metres over it.

Isla de Isabel II lies east of Congresso, from which it is separated by a deep channel. It is about 40 metres high and is the only inhabited island. It has numerous buildings and a hospital, and regular sea communications with Ceuta. Torres de la Conquista in the north attains an elevation of 57 metres. On the north-west extremity is situated Punta Espana lighthouse.

Isla del Rey lies closest to Isabel II, to which it is connected by a mole which has been breached near its centre (Pilot, Vol.II, p.130). The island's maximum elevation is 31 metres in the north. The eastern coast is clffy and indented, the southern part is used as a cemetery by the inhabitants of Isabel II. The island's port was destroyed by a storm in 1914 and was never rebuilt.

The Chafarinas afford the only natural anchorage which is suitable for all classes of vessel off the Moroccan coast (Pilot, Vol.II, p.130). Anchorage south of Isabel II is possible in waters of 10-16.5 m. The best anchorage is found south of Isabel II. These strategic islands are surrounded by fish rich waters.

Historically the sovereign status of these islands has never been clear, a fact noted by all the riparian states.
Spain's excuse for occupying the islands (1848) was that France had previously sent scientists to explore the area and was planning to occupy the strategic Chafarinas so close to its Algerian territories. Thus Spain pre-empted the French move. The Chafarinas were made into a freeport zone in 1863.

As with the Major Plazas, Spain considers the Minor Plazas to be an integral part of the Spanish state, and hence subject to all international laws applicable to Spain. Thus the Chafarinas archipelago, Velez and Alhucemas are catered for in Part VIII of the LOS (1982) "Regime of Islands". According to Article 121 of the LOS (1982), islands must be "naturally formed" and "surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide" (121 (1)). Hence the territorial sea and other maritime zones may be "determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention (1982) applicable to other land territory (121 (2)). Article 121 (3) also stipulates that:

"Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf".

The rocks and reefs of the Minor Plazas lie close to the islands which have been inhabited by Spanish civilians and military personnel for centuries. Nonetheless because of the very limited areas of Velez and Alhucemas, and their proximity to the Moroccan coast, it would be difficult for Spain to enforce its maritime claims in these two areas.
5.6 LEGITIMIZING TREATIES.

The Spanish–Moroccan Peace Treaty of 1776, attempted to settle questions pertaining to the Presidios, especially Articles 10 and 19. The Treaties of 1782 and 1799 dealt largely with the boundaries of Ceuta. The Muslims continued to attack the Presidios, similar to Spanish tactics with the British in Gibraltar. Where relations of force are not equal, inevitably treaties are imposed and cannot lead to longterm stability. As early as 1706, the Sultan, Moulay Ismail sent a letter requesting the English parliament to aid him in retaking Ceuta. Britain declined the offer. A similar proposal was made to France (1709) with Moroccan assurances that they would help France take Gibraltar from the British.

Because of the many wars and treaties, especially from the 19th century on, Spain on every occasion tried to secure de jure confirmation of its "sovereign rights" over the Presidios and tried to expand jurisdiction on lands around the historic citadels. For instance Ceuta's land boundaries were determined by the Treaty of Larache (1845); and those of Melilla by the Moroccan–Spanish Convention (1862), and Treaty of Tetouan (1860). Between 1863-71, Spain tried to supplement agreements on boundary protocols. Because of incidents at Melilla (1893) over construction works which Moroccan tribesmen saw as being on their lands, this necessitated another Treaty (1894) and Convention (1895). Along with the new boundaries, a neutral zone (500 metres) was established. The Sultan was responsible for maintaining it, as the agreement already provided for a
Mehalla or desert camp so designated to protect the Spanish against dissident tribes. In 1908, the Spanish abolished the Mehalla and also requested the Sultan to grant authorization for the occupation of the Mar Chica, a lagoon or sandy strip stretching in front of Melilla. The Sultan refused. Nevertheless the Spanish occupied it and Restingua, an ancient Roman port, east of the Mar Chica, with the excuse that the occupation would be of a temporary nature, aimed at preventing contraband in arms.

With the Franco-Spanish Treaty (1904) in mind, Spain used the tribal disturbances to the east of Ksar el Kebir (1911) as an excuse to send in cruisers, landing troops at Ksar el Kebir and Larache, pre-empting the partition of Morocco (1912) (see chapters 2, 4). Throughout the Rif War (1909-27), the Plazas came under attack resulting in massive casualties.

The majority of Arab and developing states support the Moroccan contention that the Plaza issue must be settled within the context of decolonization, as the Plazas have been the keys to Spanish imperialism in Morocco for centuries.

5.7 THE SPANISH-MOROCCAN DILEMMA.

In the contemporary context, two essential issues must be borne in mind concerning the question of sovereignty. Firstly, many of the historical and judicial arguments presented by Spain are defensible. Secondly, for geographical and political reasons complemented by modern law in relation to decolonization
and the right to territorial integrity, Morocco has a strong case which to date Spain has made little genuine effort to appreciate.

Like Gibraltar and the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, the question of sovereignty over Spain's North African Sovereign Territories does not fall within the classical category of decolonization that has emerged since 1945. Gibraltar, Ceuta and Melilla are essentially military bases. Fundamentally there is a dispute between two sovereign states over ownership of territories and not liberation of peoples from an imperial yoke. Similar to Spain's arguments for the retrocession of Gibraltar, Morocco's case is primarily based on the principle of the territorial integrity of the state; but present populations being the product of former colonial policies do not wish their sovereign links with the states which created them to be dissolved. Like the Gibraltarians and British; the Spanish, Ceutis and Melillinese are very attached to these remaining fragments of lost empire. Besides their geostrategic national functions, they represent the 'heirlooms' of Spain's historic drive for national unity, and the crusade imperialism of its golden age. They form part of the national historical, cultural and political psyche, symbolizing Toda por la Patria as inscribed on every public building in Cadiz, Tarifa, Algeciras, La Linea, Ceuta and Melilla. There are few members of the Spanish military forces, including the majority of Spanish citizens who do military service, who have not been based in the Plazas at some stage in their careers.
From the Moroccan stance, the Spanish presence retards economic development and independence, and is a constant reminder of the Balkanization of the nation and defeat brought about by Christian and European imperialism. In 1985, Colonel Qadhafi reaffirmed that:

"These enclaves used to be Arab towns and consequently there is no reason for Spain to keep them" (Maroc Soir, 12 April 1985, p.1).

This statement was made in the context of Arab unity and the "Arab Nation" (see chapter 8).

Unlike Algeria and Tunisia, Moroccan independence (1956) was only partial in that Spain did not withdraw from territories claimed by Morocco, which Madrid had held prior to the establishment of the Protectorate (1912) (see maps 5.1, 8.4). The newly independent state only regained about 20% of its historic claim. The nationalist vision included Tindouf, La Saura, Touat, Gourara, Tidikelt (an oases region, some 300,000 sq km in western Algeria); Saquiet el Hamra (150,000 sq km) and Rio de Oro (94,300 sq km), loosely referred to as the Spanish or Western Sahara, territories stretching to the Niger river, encompassing the modern state of Mauritania (only officially recognized by Morocco in 1969), Ceuta, Melilla and the Minor Plazas (see chapter 8).

In Morocco's struggle for independence and territorial integrity it has pursued a policy of liberating the different types of territorial entities within a framework of real potitik. Within the limits of its national capacity—economic, military and diplomatic—Morocco has regained control over
territories in order of spatial and economic importance. Rabat won the core area of the French (and Spanish) Protectorate (1956), the international Tangier Zone and Cape Spartel (1956), the Spanish colonies of Tarfaya (1958) and Ifni (1969); and Spanish withdrawal from the Western Sahara (1976). In contrast to this mammoth effort of liberation, the Plazas were spatially too small to divert the nation's energies. Inevitably in the light of Moroccan policies since 1956, it will use all means at its disposal to gain sovereignty over the Plazas once the issue of the Western Sahara has been settled (see chapter 8). Morocco's policy of avoiding direct confrontation with Spain over the Plazas is "explained by the impossibility of the Moroccan Government to engage Spain in a show of force" and also its disputes on the eastern frontier with Algeria (De La Serre et Marais, 1968, p.348). Indeed some Moroccan nationalists were ready to trade the Plazas indefinitely to Spain in return for support in liberating the French Zone in the 1950s. The leader of the Democratic Party for Independence, Hassan el Ousanni was actively aided by the Spanish authorities from 1953 on. This could not have taken place without an understanding that the Plazas would remain Spanish (Rézette, 1955, pp.232-233). The Moroccan Army of Liberation was occupied with the freeing of the south, Ifni and Western Sahara and could not divert attacks on the Plazas. The revolutionary, Allal el Fassi, founder of the nationalist Istiqlal party, father of the modern state of Morocco and architect of the official map of Greater Morocco (1956), included the Plazas within his plan of the modern state.
Since 1956, claims to the Plazas have usually been reaffirmed when relations became embittered with Spain, and played down once they improved.

Despite Morocco’s failure to gain sovereignty over lands disputed with Algeria and the establishment of Mauritania (1960), Allal al Fassi’s Greater Morocco vision is a lynchpin of Moroccan nationalism (see maps 5.1, 5.2, 8.4). These sentiments are shared by all Moroccan parties. At Alhucemas in 1957, the first head of the newly independent cabinet stated that:

"Morocco will be intransigent and will not cede a single inch of the territories included within its natural boundaries" (Del Pino, 1983. p.8).

5.8 THE SPANISH ARGUMENT.

In justifying its presence in the Maghreb, Spain invokes the classical argument of right of conquest, reiterating that Morocco was not a kingdom at the time of the Spanish occupation. Madrid also asserts that its rights were consecrated by treaties, length of occupation and the fact that the vast majority of the population in the Plazas are Spanish.

In the historical context, conquest bestows de jure rights of sovereignty in international law. But the question of the Plazas is more complex. Ceuta was ceded to Spain by Portugal, Melilla was occupied by force, Vélez was occupied with spurious
reference to the Treaty of Tordesillas. Alhucemas was given by the Sultan in order to ward off the encroaching Ottomans, and the status of the Chafarinas is not clear. The argument that Morocco was not a kingdom before Spanish incursions there does not hold much weight with the international community. From the Moroccan perspective some form of Moroccan state has existed since the 8th century, and besides under El Sharia (Islamic law), the Plazas were an integral part of Dar al Islam (the Kingdom of Islam) with the umma (Muslim community) residing there under the rule of Muslim monarchs (see chapter 8). Despite these historical arguments, the problem must be appreciated in the modern geopolitical context of the Moroccan state and Strait region.

With reference to Spanish arguments of continuous military, civil, administrative and economic occupation over the centuries, de jure this argument may be quite valid. However Spain held them by force, as Morocco continuously failed to win them back militarily. Thus in real terms Morocco did not renounce its claim to them. In justifying its continued presence in the Plazas, Spain also makes reference bilateral and international treaties. But how valid are colonial treaties? History shows that imposed treaties tend to last until an offensive can be launched. Since 1945 and the demise of European imperialism, the myth of the morality of treaties signed in the historical colonial context is no longer common coinage.

According to Article 15 of The Peace and Trade Treaty
The 1767 Treaty entrusted the representatives of their Majesties with the task of:

"... renewing the boundaries of the Presidios and making them with pyramids of stone" (quoted in Rézette, 1976, p.124).

However before the stones were laid, Moroccan forces besieged Melilla. The Sultan argued that there were lexicographical differences in the Spanish and Moroccan texts.

The Treaty of Meknes (1799), renewed the 1767 Treaty and confirmed the 1782 Agreement on:

"... the boundaries of the camp of Ceuta and the extent of the pasturage for the flocks of the said place" (quoted in Rézette, 1976, p.124).

The Treaty recognized that the Moors of "Melilla, Alhucemas and Penón (de Vélez) were unruly and troublesome" and were "a disturbance". The Sultan agreed that if he could not control them:

"the Spanish fortresses were within their rights to use cannons and mortars in case of offensive action, experience having shown that musket fire was not adequate to impose reason on such people" (Rézette, 1976, p.124).

Tribal attacks almost resulted in a war in 1844, but the Larache
Con... (1845), confirmed the 1799 Treaty and saved the situation. After serious incidents in 1859, the Convention of Tetouan (1859), gained for Spain an extension of Melilla's territory, "as far as necessary for the defence and tranquility of this Presido". The limit was to be set at "24 cannon shot" (Art.2) and "a neutral zone" was to be established on Moroccan territory (Art.4). The Sultan promised to place forces on Melilla's frontiers to curtail attacks by the Rifians (Art.5). Similarly a Caid and troops were to be placed near Penons de Vélez de la Gomera and Alhucemas:

"... to enforce respect for Spain's rights and effectively to enforce free entry into these towns of necessary foodstuffs and supplies for its garrisons" (Art.6).

Within three months the Spanish engineers fired their cannons which laid the limit at 2,900 metres to the south of the town. This acted as the point for minute demarcation of the north-western and eastern limits. The neutral zone was set at 500 metres. The Act delimiting the Sovereign Territory of Melilla was only signed at Tangier in 1862. As a result of the Moroccan-Spanish War (1859-60), Ceuta's current boundaries were demarcated in a similar manner to those of Melilla.

The Peace and Friendship Treaty of Tetouan (1860), brought the Moroccan-Spanish War to an end. Article 2 prescribed the extension of the:

"... territory under the jurisdiction of Ceuta as far as necessary for the safety and complete defence of its garrison".

Article 3 defined in detail a zone "ceded in full possession and
sovereignty" to Spain, demarcated by posts and markers. A "neutral camp" was defined as extending from the opposite slopes of the ravine to the mountain summits on both sides of the sea (Retzette, 1976, p.127). The Treaty also noted that the 1859 Convention had not been ratified by the Sultan and reaffirmed that guards of the Sultan's army were to be posted at the edge of the neutral ground of all the Penôns. Article 7 granted to Spain unlimited rights to build fortifications and defence installations to ensure safety. The Convention (1859) and Treaty (1860) defined the boundaries which exist today. It must be noted that the Chafarinas Islands were not mentioned. These islands are the only "jurisdictional territories" without any sovereign status decreed by convention between Spain and Morocco.

The sovereign status of the Plazas was confirmed by other conventions in 1864, 1866, 1871, 1895 and 1910. These instruments did not contain any new territorial clauses but dealt with customs and problems caused by the Rif tribes. While the ink was still wet, Morocco disputed most clauses.

Besides right of conquest and bilateral treaties, Spanish sovereignty over the Plazas was recognized by the great Powers in such instruments as the Franco-British Declaration (1904) (Art.8); the Franco-Spanish Convention (1904); and the Treaty of Fez (1912) catered for Spain's territorial possessions on the Moroccan coast (see chapter 2).

Spain also invokes the demographic argument, which in this case is irredentist as the vast majority of the population is
ethnically and culturally Spanish. However Spain chooses to overlook the fact that these territories were historically populated by Muslims who were driven out or killed by the Spanish armies. The rapidly increasing Muslim communities of Ceuta and Melilla, though not vehemently pursuing unionist policies with Morocco, are treated as second class citizens and hence their situation is colonial. Possibly at some future date Madrid will hold a referendum on the future status of the Plazas in Ceuta and Melilla, following the example set by Britain in Gibraltar (1967). Being assured of a landslide victory for continued union with Madrid, such referenda in the context of sovereignty disputes in the Strait area do little to defuse tensions.

Because the Sovereign Territories are an integral part of the Spanish state, with the majority of the population being Spanish, they were not inscribed on the list of non-autonomous territories drawn up by the UN in 1947. Spain claims that the UN Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 covers both Gibraltar and the Plazas on the grounds of "territorial integrity" of the state (see chapter 6, appendix V).

5.9 THE MOROCCAN ARGUMENT.

Despite _de jure_ arguments concerning right of conquest and sovereignty, since 1945 the majority of world states no longer favour claims to sovereignty based on criteria of annexation or imposed treaties, in the form of conquest, colony, union or
protectorate, which were the classic tenets of territorial acquisition by colonial powers. Throughout the centuries, Spain like other states has struggled to establish secure physiographic boundaries; the Pyrenees Mountains offer a salient example. Historically the process of state-building in Morocco was interrupted by European imperialism. The annexation of the Plazas, and especially Ceuta and Melilla, led to the implantation of a European population. Ceuta and Melillas' boundaries are essentially anthropogeographic rather than physiographic boundaries. In Morocco as elsewhere this has led to inter-ethnic strife and interstate conflict. Since the 1960s the UN tends to favour the legal principle of territorial integrity. Morocco contends that this principle is essentially the same as the geographic concept of natural or physiographic boundaries.

As long as the Spanish Sovereign Territories in North Africa exist, Morocco will be denied the right of territorial integrity. The gravity of the situation for Morocco is augmented by the fact that Spain holds the most strategic locations on the shores of its northern frontier. Ceuta, Melilla and possibly the Chafarinas Islands are among the most geostrategically advantageous locations on Morocco's coast, with great economic possibility, if integrated into their natural hinterlands. Because of Spanish control of Ceuta and Melilla, Morocco has had to divert a substantial percentage of national investment into the northern ports of Tangier and Nador, with duplication of facilities.
Despite these facts, Madrid has continuously rebuffed Moroccan arguments, yet in all international fora has insisted that the British military base in Gibraltar poses a major threat to Spain's national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Yet Spain denies that its own military installations in the Plazas constitute a threat to Morocco. Morocco is closely monitoring Spain's integration into NATO and is concerned about any future role the Plazas may play in the Alliance. In any conflict to which Spain is a party and Morocco not, the Plazas become legitimate targets (see chapter 7).

Along with Spanish military dominance in the Plazas and its implications, the bases are a constant reminder of Morocco's colonial inheritance, a blight on its national self-image internally and in the Arabo-Muslim world, and the geographical expression of its military and economic weakness.

Smuggling in the region of the Plazas is responsible for the loss of millions of dinars to the Moroccan exchequer. About $800 million worth of illegal merchandise enters Morocco via Ceuta and Melilla annually (Kroner, 1985, p.9). The contraband trade has also created powerful barons and clans in the Rif. While the trade is advantageous to the local economy, it poses a threat to the central government, as was proven during revolts in the area in response to economic reforms and tighter customs controls in 1983-1984. The Plazas have created a false economy in the Moroccan hinterlands, detracting from national economic integration and complementarity.

Spanish insistence on territorial waters around the
Sovereign Territories rich in fish and possibly other resources is greatly resented by the Moroccans and is seen as further territorial annexation. The Spanish claim to maritime jurisdiction obstructs Morocco's efforts to regulate its sea space, and despite official accords on such issues as fishing there are continuous disputes. As the Plazas de jure form an integral part of the Spanish state, Article 1(1) of the LOS Convention (1958) as well as Articles 2, 3 and 15 of the LOS Convention (1982) lend support to the Spanish case, whereby:

"The sovereignty of a state extends, beyond its territory . . . to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast".

While the equidistance principle may be implemented in relation to the Major Plazas (see maps 3.1-3.3), the situation in the Minor Plazas is more problematic because of their limited area and distinctive geography. Interestingly, Spain does not officially recognize British claims to territorial waters around the Crown Colony (see chapter 6). In the Strait area, the Spanish claim to territorial waters around Ceuta further balkanizes maritime jurisdiction and detracts from Morocco's power and prestige. The Spanish presence on both sides of the Strait has denied Morocco its natural advantages as a strait state.

International public law specifies that for sovereignty to be legitimate, the actual occupation of territory should be peaceful and uninterrupted. Spanish occupation of the Plazas has been rarely if ever pacific. History would suggest that the present peace in northern Morocco is tenuous, and that it is
only a matter of time before Morocco deploys greater efforts for the recuperation of the Plazas. This largely depends on the outcome of the Western Saharan War (1974--), (see chapter 8). Historically the Spanish occupation has not been uninterrupted and all the Plazas save Ceuta have been cut off for months at a time from Spain. Also while the Plazas are considered as an integral part of the Spanish state, they are officially referred to as "North African Territories under Spanish Supervision", "Plazas de Soberania" and "Presidios".

Similar to Anglo-Spanish treaties concerning the Crown Colony, treaties in relation to the Plazas have not always been respected. Spain occupied the neutral zones on Moroccan sovereign territory around Ceuta and Melilla, particularly after 1908, despite the protests of the Sultan and France. Ceuta and Melilla acted as points d'appui for Spanish penetration of northern Morocco (1912-56), and as supply routes for Franco's occupation of the Tangier Neutral Zone (1940-45). In the 20th century, Spain's Africanista policy envisaged an empire stretching from the Pyrenees via Tangier to the Senegal River (see map 7.3), including the western region of Algeria and the Saharan Territories (see chapter 8).

Several times in their history (especially 1868-1937), Spain made overtures to exchange Ceuta for British Gibraltar. This detracts from Spain's arguments of the hispanicity of the Plazas. It is unlikely that Spain would ever consider trading Cadiz or Tarifa for the Crown Colony.

In presenting its case, Morocco has not yet insisted upon
fact that a growing percentage of the populations in the Plazas are Muslim. However the Maghrebis recognise that Spain is historically responsible for the diaspora of the umma (Islamic community) of Ceuta and Melilla (see chapter 8). Discrimination against Muslims resident in the Plazas will inevitably lead to greater conflict, making Rabat nationally and internationally responsible for their future.

5.10 CEUTA: PILLAR OF HERCULES OR THE WEST’S ACHILLES HEEL?

In the 1950s, while in exile in Cairo, the Moroccan leader, Allal al Fassi, advocated his Greater Morocco theory highlighting the international and Muslim implications of decolonization. Since then, several Maghrebi leaders, including Colonel Qadhafi have supported Morocco’s claim to the Plazas (La Presse de Tunisie, 12 Dec.1982, p.1; Maroc Soir, 12 April 1985, p.1). As early as 1955, the historic Bandung Conference, forerunner of the Non-Alignment Movement and Group of 77, affirmed “Morocco’s independence and integrity within its natural boundaries” (Rézette, 1976, p.150), (see maps 8.2). All Afro-Asian and African conferences have also mentioned the dispute, especially the Cairo Conference (1957) and pan-Maghrebi Tangier Summit (1958) (see chapter 8). From 1956 on, the Committee of the Arab-Maghreb issued several declarations in support of Morocco.

In 1961, Morocco asked the UN General Assembly to recognize its rights over the towns and islands of the north occupied by
Spain. In 1961, Hassan II brought up the Plaza question at the Non-Aligned Nations conference in Belgrade stating that:

"... the Spanish colonists continue to occupy entire southern regions of our country, ... and maintain enclaves and bases in the north, in Ceuta and Melilla" (Rézette, 1976, p.151).

In 1961, in retaliation for Moroccan endeavours on the diplomatic front, Spain introduced stricter border controls and many Moroccans were expelled from the Plazas. In 1962, Spain enraged the Moroccans by publishing a bulletin at its Rabat embassy entitled "Ceuta, the Second Port of Spain". In response Morocco forbade its nationals and Spaniards working in Morocco to reside in Ceuta or Melilla and vice versa. At that period Morocco also stopped cooperating with the tourist through traffic via Ceuta and Melilla. This policy has been interrupted many times since. On 29 June 1962, the Moroccan government demanded the return of Ceuta and Melilla. The next day Morocco extended its territorial waters from 6 nm to 12 nm. Spain fortified the military bases and sent warships to protect fishing vessels in the disputed waters. This act mobilized public support in Morocco for the government. In 1962, the Spanish Foreign Minister declared that:

"... as far as Ceuta and Melilla were concerned, Spain had nothing to negotiate" (Rézette, 1976, p.152).

The War of the Sands between Algeria and Morocco (1962-63) interrupted Rabat's offensive on the Plazas as well as its efforts to recuperate Ifni and the Western Sahara. In 1962,
while inspecting the military at Ceuta, General Alonso proclaimed that:

"... the entire nation and its army would defend Ceuta and Melilla if necessary" (Rézette, 1976, p.153).

On 6 July 1963, Hassan II and Franco met at Madrid's Barajas airport. There is little written evidence as to what both leaders agreed upon, but it was widely believed that Franco wished to abandon the Minor Plazas and Ifni in return for Hassan's promise to respect the status quo in the Major Plazas.

In 1967, the Istiqlal party restated Morocco's right to "the liberation" of all of Morocco including "Ceuta and Melilla". The Moroccan monarchy pays close attention to the wishes of the nationalist Istiqlal which had mobilized the masses for national independence and founded the modern Moroccan state.

At the UN, Morocco has continuously supported Madrid's claim to the British Crown Colony of Gibraltar and thus indirectly its own claim to the Plazas. In a press conference in 1975, Hassan II stated that:

"(he) supposed that sometime in the future, England will logically restore Gibraltar to Spain. If the English restore Gibraltar to Spain, the latter should restore Sebta and Melilla to (Morocco)" (Maroc Soir, 26 Nov.1975, pp.1-2).

Hassan II stated that:

"... the day that Spain comes into possession of Gibraltar, Morocco will of necessity get Sebta and Melilla. No power can permit Spain to possess both keys to the same Strait ... Gibraltar-Sebta-Melilla
is of necessity a Spanish-Moroccan affair,. for the faster the Spanish recover Gibraltar (immediately and automatically) Morocco will get Sebta and Melilla" (L’Opinion, 26 Nov.1975).

In 1985, in an interview with King Hassan for Spanish television, (the passages relating to the Plaza question were censored for transmission in Spain), Hassan stated that if Spain recuperates Gibraltar:

". . . . the equilibrium in the Mediterranean would be seriously affected".

He stressed that if Spain tried to retain the Plazas thus controlling both sides of the Strait, the USSR:

". . . . could not tolerate a NATO member state controlling all the keys" (Le Grand Maghreb, No.38, p.87).

With the waxing and waning of Moroccan-Spanish relations concerning the evacuation of the Western Sahara in the 1970s, Hassan II let it be known that the issue of the Plazas would not be forgotten. In a Moroccan memorandum sent to the UN in 1975 concerning the Spanish presence in Morocco, it was addressed to the 'Chairman of the Decolonization Committee in reference to Ceuta, Melilla and the Chafarinas Islands'. The memorandum referred to the five Plazas as being among "the last vestages of colonial occupation", and reiterated the need for the restoration of Morocco's "territorial integrity" (UN. Doc. A/AC-109-475, 31 Jan.1975). Morocco stated that:

"Spain wants to perpetuate its colonial presence on what is properly speaking Moroccan territory, at the same time instituting international action to liberate
Gibraltar which is in an identical position from all points of view as the Presidios”.

Thus Morocco formally asked the UN to place the Plazas on the UN list of non-autonomous territories and to apply resolution 1514 on decolonization.

Spain replied to the UN, stating that the Plazas were culturally and ethnically Spanish (UN. Doc. A/AC-109/477, 13 Feb. 1975). Spain laid title to the Plazas as successors of Rome, Byzantium and the Visigoth kingdoms; and added that even when Spain was Muslim, the Plazas were part of a Spanish-Muslim state. This line of historic reasoning illustrated an entrenched chauvinism and Eurocentric vision of geography, reminiscent of France’s arguments in annexing Algeria (1830-71). The Spanish representative laboured to point out that there were no similarities between the Gibraltar issue and the Presidio dispute; with Ceuta being ceded by Portugal to Spain, Melilla being almost deserted of its Muslim population at the time of Spanish occupation, Vélez being conquered from Turkish pirates and not Moroccans, Alhucemas being ceded by the Sultan to Spain in order to prevent Ottoman occupation and the fact that the Chafarinas were sovereignless and unoccupied at the time of the Spanish penetration; unlike Gibraltar where the natives were driven out by invading armies. Spain insisted that the Plazas were “sovereign territories” unlike the “Crown Colony of Gibraltar” and hence not “non-autonomous territories” (Moroccan Memorandum to UN, 7 March 1975; Spanish Memorandum to UN, 18 April 1975). Spain’s diplomatic defensive at the UN did not
strengthen its case.

On 8 February 1975, Spain sent two escort vessels, two troop transporters, a battalion of marines and tanks, a submarine and armed helicopters to the Plazas in a show of strength. Later that month at an OAU Conference in Addis Adeba, some 25 states lent their diplomatic support to Morocco (see map 8.2). On 15 February 1975, the Arab Ministers of Information met in Cairo proclaiming:

"... their support of Morocco in its current fight for the liberation of its territories occupied by the Spanish, including Sebta and Melilla as well as the other islands off the Moroccan coast" (Rézette, 1976, p.160).

In June 1975, several bombs exploded in Ceuta and Melilla killing one person and wounding two others. Some 400 Moroccan nationals were summoned for interrogation at Ceuta (June 28-29) and several Moroccan notables were forced by the authorities to take Spanish nationality or be expelled from the Plazas along with several dozen Moroccan families. The Moroccan government protested. Tension was further heightened in July 1974, when a young Muslim sweet vendor in Ceuta was shot in the head by a Spanish policeman. (L'Opinion, 8 July 1975; Le Matin, 10 July 1975). Perhaps it was a coincidence that the victim had recently acted as a guide to the editor in chief of Radio Monte Carlo while compiling a report on Ceuta. Morocco lodged a protest with the Secretary General of the UN denouncing:

"... violations of the rights of man committed by the Spanish authorities in the Moroccan enclave of Sebta ... (and stated) ... if such practices continue,
the Moroccan government will be constrained to take the necessary measures to protect the rights and interests of its nationals" (UN.Doc. A/AC. 109/498, 18 July 1975).

As a result of the events at Ceuta in 1975, the Ceuti refugees in Tetouan sent messages of thanks to Hassan II for the efforts made to assist them "when they were expelled from (their) town", along with declarations of loyalty to the Moroccan state and its struggle for the liberation of the Plazas (L'Opinion, 6 Sep.1975, p.1). On 30 August 1975, the Non-Aligned Countries demanded that Spain enter into direct negotiations with Morocco for the immediate return of the Plazas. On 7 October 1975, at the UN General Assembly, Morocco once again requested Spain to enter into negotiations on the issue. Thirteen days later, Spain closed the Ceuta land boundary when 400 Moroccans twice attempted to invade peacefully; similar to Morocco's 350,000 strong Green March on the Spanish Sahara (1975), which helped speed up the Spanish evacuation there (see chapter 8).

Tension decreased in November 1975, when Spain, Morocco and Mauritania signed an agreement on the Western Sahara. However Spanish ambiguity in relation to the future of the Western Sahara, and intransigence on the Plaza issue only postponed the problem rather than settling it. Along with these problems, Morocco felt that Spain was not honouring the fishing accords (1975, 1977) and vigorously protested at Madrid's negotiations with the West Saharan, Polisario Liberation Front (1978) for the release of eight Spanish fishermen. Rabat also looked with suspicion upon Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez's official visit to
Algeria (1979) during which he met the Secretary General of the Polisario.

After 1975, Morocco intensified efforts in international fora, stressing the importance of national territorial integrity. The Western Sahara and Plaza issues acted as national rallying cries, taking some of the pressure off Hassan II for constitutional change in Morocco. Between 1975-1978, there was an attempt at democratization within Morocco, the monarchy being obliged to placate the nationalists, whose relationship with the Crown had been strained because of the tripartite accords signed between Hassan II, Algeria and Mauritania in relation to the Western Sahara (Hodges, 1984; Thompson & Adloff, 1980). In essence the 1977 legislative elections were a pretence at democracy; nevertheless all party manifestoes included calls for the recuperation of Ceuta and Melilla (Del Pino, 1983, p.12). All parties called for Spanish withdrawal with a new intensity when Adolfo Suarez visited Ceuta and Melilla in 1980.

Besides the question of the Plazas and Gibraltar, in 1978 there was much talk in the Maghreb about the status and hispanicity of the Canary Islands, with the question being addressed at an OAU Conference in Khartoum. The OAU and Algeria also held talks about the hispanicity of Alboran Island and the surrounding sea. The ambiguities of the Moroccan-Spanish fishing accords led to many incidents at sea between 1978-82.

With the election of the Spanish Workers Socialist Party (PSOE) in 1982, Morocco expected that the new government would
overtly support the Plazas and Algeria at Hassan's expense. Instead Sr Moran took a more conciliatory stance on the Plaza dispute, possibly influenced by British-Spanish experiences over Gibraltar. Moran advocated greater cooperation between the two states, especially in relation to economic development in Ceuta, Melilla and their Moroccan hinterlands as well as the ports of Beni Ansar and Nador. He advocated a liberalization de jure and de facto of the status of the Muslim populations in the Plazas. Of course Spanish aspirations for the economic development of Ceuta and Melilla would have bilateral repercussions helping to defuse the situation, but it must also be seen as part of Madrid's strategy for entry to the EC. Besides, these towns are not economically viable without the complementarity of the Moroccan hinterlands. Liberalization policies aimed at the Muslim populations of Ceuta and Melilla were also an imperative rather than a purely conciliatory gesture in the light of Spain's new democratic image. Pragmatic PSOE self-interest policies in the Plazas did not undermine Morocco's territorial claims.

In 1982, Morocco put its case before most international organizations and in particular the Arab League, Islamic Conference and OAU (see maps 8.2). The Moroccan strategy included talk of petrol embargoes, a minimization of major economic agreements with Spain, and the possibility of including on international agendas the theme of the "dubious" hispanicity of the Canary Islands as well as the threat of non-renewal of bilateral fishing agreements with Spain. Hassan II enlisted the
help of the Moroccan ulemas, getting the support of the highest religious councils in the state, with overtones of Islamic Kingdom (Dar al Islam) and jihad indirectly implied. Morocco intensified its economic isolation of the Plazas and introduced a tax (500 Dihrams) for Moroccan passage from Ceuta or Melilla. With the temporary reconciliation between Morocco and Algeria (1983–84), in the context of the Union of Arab Parliamentarians at Rabat (1983), Algeria and all other Arab states lent support to Morocco's stance on the Plazas. A resolution passed by the representatives of the Arab Nation called for an end to colonialism, cooperation among Mediterranean states, and especially Spain and the Arab world; along with security and stability in the region with a "definitive and just solution to the question of Ceuta and Melilla" by negotiations restituting Moroccan "sovereignty" to all the Presidios (Del Pino, 1983, p.17).

The Moroccan mass-media presents in detail Spain's evolving strategy in pursuing its claims to Gibraltar, and Spain's support of Argentina's claims to the Falkland-Malvinas Islands. As Al Alam, the daily newspaper of the Istiqlal party puts it, Morocco expects a more positive approach from the PSOE in relation to sovereignty, than that of previous Spanish Governments (Al Alam, 21 Dec.1983, p.1).

5.11 THE SPANISH-MOROCCAN DILEMMA.

Spain continuously treats all issues pertaining to the
Plazas as internal, and is reluctant to accept that it is a bilateral problem, intentionally ignoring the international dimension in all official statements. Despite rumours of secret understandings between Rabat and Madrid, especially in 1956, 1963 and 1975, and unofficial reports that King Juan Carlos supports discussions on the sovereignty issue; Spanish intransigence could lead to further instability in the Strait region. It is believed that Juan Carlos committed himself to the restitution of the Plazas to Morocco in 1981. It would seem that this engagement was undertaken by the King in a letter transmitted to Hassan II by the intermediary of the Sherifian Minister of Tourism during a ministerial visit to Madrid in May 1979. When news of this (non-officially verified) secret correspondance was leaked, the Ceutis, Melillinese and Spanish army reacted with alarm. In an effort to calm the situation the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs then stated that Ceuta and Melilla would automatically be included in any future agreements between Spain and NATO (Gaudio, 1981, p.87), (see chapter 7). Thus the Cortes has less room for diplomatic manoeuvres in resolving the dispute due to the military's commitment to maintain the Plazas within the Spanish state.

It is unlikely that the Spanish military establishment would actively repress the extremist groups in the Plazas which have been organizing since the early 1980s, especially in Melilla. There is the possibility of the "Algerianization" of the situation with extreme polarization of the ethnic communities and autonomous action on the part of the military. Whatever the
internal perspectives within Spain concerning the Plazas may be, the overall attitude is that of traditional strait state politics, with Spain wishing to hold the geostrategic areas on the northern and southern shores for offensive and defensive reasons.

Along with the national arguments, Morocco has laid great emphasis on the international aspects to the dispute. For instance, Morocco emphasizes the precedents which may be set by a British-Spanish resolution of the Crown Colony dispute, East-West relations and Soviet perception of the balance of power in the Strait region (Le Grand Maghreb, No.37, p.21), and the Maghrebi, Arab-Muslim, African and Third World viewpoints on the issue (see chapter 8). In 1985, in relation to the Plazas, Colonel Qadhafi of Libya stated that:

"Nobody in the world has the right to oppose the legitimate Arab aspirations to liberation, unity and self-defence . . . (and in relation to those who denigrate the Arabo-African Union) . . . such an attitude can only be taken up by the enemies of unity, but such people will be surpassed by the flow of events and their destiny is suited to the dustbin of history" (Al Bayane, 12 April 1985, "La Conference de Presse de Colonel Khadafi: Reaffirmation de Marocanite de Sebta et Melilla et de leur necessaire reintegration à la mere patrie/L'Union Arabo-Africaine, Noyeau de l'unité Arabe"; pp.1,3).

In 1985, according to the Moroccan daily, Al Charq al Awsat, Hassan stated:

". . . . there can only be a peaceful solution: unless the Spanish take an altogether different initiative: that is to say, a military one. In such circumstances, Morocco will be forced to defend itself"
Amid rumours and conflicting press releases, it was understood that Hassan had set January 1983 as the deadline date for recuperating Ceuta and Melilla, (Radio Report, "Cadena Ser", 11 Dec.1982; Diario 16, 11 Dec.1982; La Presse de Tunisie, 12 Dec.1982, p.1). This may have been a tactical manoeuvre on Morocco's part to warn Spain and the international community that any change in the sovereign status of the Crown Colony would have to cater for changes in the sovereign status of the Plazas. The Spanish daily, Diario (11 December 1982), reported that Hassan II's main problem is to know just how far the Spanish Government is prepared to go to defend Ceuta and Melilla. However Diario emphasized that sources close to the socialist government had stressed that Ceuta and Melilla were not negotiable.

A peaceful resolution of the Plaza question is of major importance to stability within the Spanish state because of the Franco heritage which is still strong in the army. In October 1984, the Captain General of the Saragossa Military Region, Manuel Alvarez Zalba, was dismissed from his official duties by the government for making "explosive statements" concerning the Maghreb. He deplored the Morocco-Libyan Union (1984-86) affirming that:

"... this treaty in reality affects (Spain and was) without doubt the reason for the government's decision to elaborate a new national strategic plan" (Le Monde, 2 Nov.1984, p.5).
Analyzing Ceuta and Melilla in this context he stated that:

"(Spain was) . . . not sufficiently prepared to defend these two towns from the interior in the event of a Moroccan occupation: (and could) only hold them by launching an attack (itself)."

He pointed out that the USA could not support Spain in an armed conflict with Morocco because of its close relations with Rabat:

". . . besides the USA did not allow us (Spain) to use our M-48 tanks during the Green March (Western Sahara, 1975), which obliged us to use French made AMX-30s" (Le Monde, 2 Nov. 1984, p.5).

The Captain General was voicing the opinion of sections of the army disillusioned with the loss of Spanish imperial possessions in Morocco, and in particular the government's last minute complicity with Rabat in facilitating the success of the Green March (1975) leading to a peaceful withdrawal by the Spanish forces. Alvarez's statements greatly embarrassed the Spanish Government, which at that period was trying to establish bilateral military accords and joint manoeuvres with Morocco. However, since late 1984, joint manoeuvres have taken place in the Strait zone.

The monarchy, ulemas and all political parties in Morocco are in agreement on the Sherifian Kingdom's right to the Plazas on the northern frontier within the historical and natural boundaries as laid out by Allal Al Fassi in the 1950s. Since 1956, the gradual decolonization of Morocco has absorbed much of the national effort, but has reinforced nationalism in the state. While Morocco cannot risk open conflict with Spain,
Hassan cannot relinquish claim to the Plazas because of the strength of the Istiqlal party and nationalistic spirit of the masses. Also in an economically and politically volatile state like Morocco, the Plaza dilemma serves as a national unifier. Despite the fact that Morocco is deprived of its two most important Mediterranean ports, the local populations benefit greatly from the contraband trade. Disturbances in Ceuta and Melilla resulting from the unfair treatment of the Muslim community have led to the development of Spanish extremist groups as well as Islamic fundamentalist organizations (Economist, 22 Nov. 1986, pp. 62-63). Such disturbances are putting greater pressure on Rabat to take a more aggressive stance on the issue. However King Hassan's regime is aware that Britain's future role in the Strait area, and by implication that of the superpowers will largely determine the future of the Plazas. In essence a micro dominoes situation exists.

Hassan's meeting with Franco at Madrid airport (1963) produced the "spirit of Barajas" or a tacit understanding that Morocco would respect the status quo in Ceuta and Melilla in exchange for the resolution of other sovereignty disputes such as Ifni and the Western Sahara. Neither the Istiqlal nor the Moroccan Left supported this agreement. At a national congress in 1972 and many times since, the Moroccan socialist party has proclaimed:

"... the necessity to mobilize the Moroccan people for the liberation of Ceuta, Melilla and the Chafarinas Islands, and to demand a clear definition of the government position in this respect (and especially its strategy for the) liberation of these
The Moroccan Left also emphasizes Spain’s relationship with NATO and the implications of this (see chapter 7). The Plazas are historically connected with Franco and are shrines of the Phalangist movement; the Ballesta Plan for their defence against Morocco is taken quite seriously by many Spanish military leaders. When the Saharan War comes to an end, undoubtedly Morocco will put all its national efforts into the liberation of the Plazas.

Those Spanish political organs which support peaceful withdrawal from the Plazas are hindered not only by the burden of history and the army but also by the Spanish constitution, which was approved by the nation in 1978. Articles 62.2 and 69.4 expressly mention the Spanish sovereign status of Ceuta and Melilla. Articles 2, 8.1, 61.1 and 63.3 confer on the military forces the mission of guaranteeing the sovereignty and independence of the Spanish state and to defend its territorial integrity. Articles 167.1, 167.3 and 1.2 proclaim that national sovereignty resides within the Spanish people. This may be interpreted in two ways, either the Ceutis and Melillinese have the right to veto any of Madrid’s actions concerning possible changes in their sovereign status, or the people of the Spanish state as a whole by referendum have the right to make amendments to the constitution and consequently decide on the future of the Plazas.

Spain’s second major problem hindering discussions with Morocco is the presence of a substantial resident Spanish
population. Though created by colonial opertunism, they do not wish to be decolonized and consequently invoke their rights as Spanish citizens within the Spanish state.

Concerning the regime of free ports created in 1863, Spain has not seriously approached the problem of establishing a new fiscal regime. This could be undertaken immediately, aside from any negotiations concerning sovereignty, as an act of good will. Ironically the clandestine trade has negative effects on southern Spain as well as Morocco. The duty-free and contraband trade originating in Ceuta and Melilla, enters the Spanish mainland via Algeciras, Tarifa and Gibraltar. In 1985, as many as 800 women were engaged in trafficking between Ceuta and Algeciras. On average there are about 15 arrests per day at the port of Algeciras, sometimes reaching a peak of 200 (Kroner, 1985, p.9). While according to Moroccan estimates as much as $800 million worth of illegal merchandise enters Morocco via the Plazas (Del Pino, 1983, p.23). By implication since 1 January 1986, this is also a problem for the EEC.

5.12 THE FUTURE.

5.12.1 Possible Future Scenarios.

(a) Plebiscite. Depending on local and bilateral developments, it is possible that at some future date Madrid might follow Britain’s example in Gibraltar (1967) by holding a referendum in the Plazas on the question of sovereignty. The main problem posed here would be the possibility of
gerrymandering, and the creation of the myth of a "permanent majority" by preventing Muslims from taking an active role in the community.

Though possibly feasible in the long term, a referendum would not resolve the present contentions. In the light of the British experience in relation to the referendum in Gibraltar, a similar procedure in the Plazas would be of little constructive value in defusing the situation. To be sure, Madrid could claim that the procedure was in the democratic tradition (even though the Plazas are constitutionally part of the Spanish state, unlike the British relationship with the Crown Colony), but in the long term Madrid would find that its field of manoeuvre was further restricted, as is the case with Britain in relation to the Gibraltarians and Falkland Islanders. As an exercise in international relations, this type of referendum in areas of disputed sovereignty has borne little fruit.

(b) Intensified diplomatic action. If Britain retrocedes Gibraltar to Spain, Morocco has made it quite clear that it will take control of the Plazas by diplomatic means, or by force if necessary. In January 1987, Hassan II sent a personal letter to Juan Carlos via the Spanish Interior Minister, who was on an official visit to Morocco. Hassan described the Plazas as "an anachronism" and suggested a negotiating committee be established to discuss their future. Spanish officials were categorical in rejecting the invitation, stating that:

"There is not the slightest possibility in either the short-or the medium-term of discussing the futures of the enclaves" (Guardian, 2 Feb.1987, p.6).
Morocco has pointed out that it has the support of most Arab, Muslim, and developing countries, and enjoys good relations with both superpowers. Hassan has stated his belief that the USSR would find it hard to permit Spain, a NATO member to control both Gibraltar and Ceuta.

Though never officially confirmed it has been suggested by Spanish sources, that Madrid might consider trading Melilla and the Minor Plazas with Rabat in exchange for Moroccan acceptance of Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta (Guardian. 2 Feb.1987 p.6). It is improbable that Rabat would accept this as a longterm solution. Nonetheless, the Moroccan strategy of gradually reintegrating territories into the state, renders this approach possible in the Plaza context.

Considering the history of treaty relations between Spain and Morocco, Rabat might well follow precedent, recuperating Melilla and the Minor Plazas, and then concentrate national energies into the Ceuta campaign. Overall, Ceuta remains the epicentre of the Plaza dispute because of its overriding geostrategic advantages, the future of the other Plazas is directly contingent on that of Ceuta.

If frustrated by Spanish inaction, a Moroccan military invasion would have the support of the masses as well as several Arab regimes.

(c) Military Action.

(i) Paramilitarism: Local groups with the possible support of sections of the Spanish armed forces might try to
"Algerianize" the situation (Horne, 1977, Alleg, 1981). However, such action could only lead to short-term conflict, but would endanger safety of passage through the Strait. Muslim groups within the Plazas might also be supported covertly or overtly by the Moroccan army or other interested states.

(ii) The Greater Maghreb Union: In any form of future Arab union, within the context of the Greater Maghreb ideal or Qadhafi style unions, it is possible that the liberation of the Plazas could be undertaken by military action (see chapter 8, maps 8.1, 8.2).

(iii) Invasion: Hassan organized the celebrated "Green March" (1975) and it was led brandishing the Quran: it was a pre-cursor of events which were to take place some years later in Iran. Both events showed the international community the power of Islamic leaders to mobilize the masses, and the force of militant Islam. If forced by Spanish inactivity or complacency to tackle the Plaza issue, particularly if his throne becomes endangered, Hassan has a valuable card to play in uniting the Moroccans behind the descendant of the Prophet Mohammed in liberating Muslim territory. It will be remembered that in 1982, the Argentine junta tried to save its power by uniting the nation with the invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas.

In the event of Hassan being deposed, a revolutionary government would most likely be tempted to play the Plaza and Islamic cards in uniting the nation. Lack of greater initiative on the part of Madrid and the international community to accommodate Moroccan aspirations could lead to a violent
backlash against Spain and its allies. The present low level of development and chronic poverty in Morocco could lead an exasperated youthful population, (whether tempered by fundamentalism, a military regime, or the Left) to take the Plazas by force. In such a situation, the vestiges of Spanish imperialism would be identified with Western interests. Hence the Ceuta base could be used by revolutionary guards or a hostile foreign power to threaten passage of the Strait.

5.12.2 Models and Solutions.

(a) Economic integration with Morocco. The model set by Britain and Spain in Gibraltar since the lifting of the blockade in February 1985 may offer some possibilities (see chapter 6).

Penons de Vélez de la Gomera and Alhucemas are of no economic or military importance to Spain. Because of their limited size, it is doubtful whether Spain will seriously press its claims to territorial waters around these possessions, unless forced to do so in relation to asserting sovereignty over the other Plazas. History, nationalism and pressure from the military, Ceutis and Melillines, and perhaps some minor bargaining power in future negotiations would seem to be the reasons why Madrid does not transfer sovereignty of these Minor Plazas to Rabat immediately. The Chafarinas which were once of geostrategic importance to Spain and France in their spheres of influence in the Strait region, still hold possibilities for the riparian states and Spain in the NATO context. Sovereignty over
these islands would extend the riparian states territorial waters. If Spain presses claims to maritime jurisdiction around the Chafarinas, which may hold certain economic possibilities in natural resources and tourism, this would involve coterminous boundaries with Morocco and Algeria. However Spanish intentions are not clear at present. As there are almost no civilian Spanish nationals living in the Minor Plazas, Madrid does not have the problem of catering for the aspirations of local populations.

Some 17,000-27,000 Muslims temporarily or permanently reside in Melilla, (Le Monde, 22/23 June 1986, p.5). This is a clear indicator of the symbiosis between the Plaza and the Moroccan hinterlands. It is recognized by both Madrid and Rabat that Melilla can only survive economically if there is bilateral cooperation in mining, industry, transportation, fishing and tourism. Real cooperation is something of a utopic ideal because of Melilla's European heritage and standard of living, largely based on its free-port status in sharp contrast to the economic and political culture of the Rif.

Being geographically closer to Spain, Ceuta is more integrated into the Iberian economy, and most Ceutis feel that its economic future lies with Spain rather than Morocco. Like Melilla, Ceuta depends on its free port-trade, contraband and military-releated spending, as well as its offshore resources.

With the vast differences in the Moroccan and Spanish economies, it is unlikely that there could exist the free flow of goods, persons and vehicles between the Plazas and Morocco,
as is evolving between Spain and the Crown Colony. Suggestions of large-scale bilateral development projects are more quixotic than realistic and would only favour Madrid's stance on maintaining control over the Plazas, obfuscating the real issue of disputed sovereignty. Effective economic development in the region may only be possible within the context of an EC-Maghrebi development plan (see chapter 8).

(b) The Andorra Model. Autonomous Andorra has a relatively high standard of living and is not handicapped by political strife; its sovereignty is jointly vested in the head of the French state and the Bishop of Burgos. While the human problems are different in the Plazas, the Andorra system could be partially used as a model for the future status of Ceuta and Melilla if the present deadlock cannot be broken. Sovereignty could be vested in both the Spanish and Moroccan Crowns, with the Ceutis and Melillinese being responsible for local administration under the aegis of Madrid. Rabat and Madrid could share responsibility for defence, foreign affairs and fiscal matters. Rabat would probably be more receptive to such an approach than the Spanish army or local non-Muslim populations. Nevertheless it would break the present impasse. If not advancing a longterm solution, it could serve as an interim step.

(c) Condominium. Joint sovereignty in the most extensive form, including dual nationality, is a remote possibility. This would be difficult to achieve considering the internal conflicts within the Spanish state in relation to the Plaza issue. With
the increasing Muslim population of the Plazas, historical latent racism and disguised administrative apartheid, Madrid is facing a crisis situation. Because of Muslim unrest in Melilla, and Madrid's 18 month integration plan (1986-87) for Muslim residents being delayed by bureaucratic obstructionism. There were sectarian-racial riots in May, June and September 1986. Frustrated by Madrid's ambiguous policies towards them, the Melillinese Muslims are being forced to set their hopes in the direction of Rabat. For the first time, in June 1986, tracts were circulated in Melilla advocating union with Morocco (Le Monde, 22/23 June 1986 p.5).

While Spanish nationality would offer Muslims greater economic and political opportunities, it is doubtful that Spanish nationals in the Presidios would wish to be granted the rights and duties of Moroccan nationals, being linked to a state which is chronically underdeveloped, undemocratic and having a dubious human rights record. It is difficult to foresee condominium providing a solution to the present impass.

(d) Hong Kong Model. A treaty or lease could be drawn up between Rabat and Madrid, with a specified time scale, guaranteeing Morocco future sovereignty over the Plazas. The present Spanish administration could be guaranteed over a period of one to two generations, offering the local populations time for economic and cultural adjustment; saving Moroccan and Spanish honour, and offering both governments time to reconcile internal dissensions within their respective political and military establishments. If and when there is any change in the
sovereign status of Gibraltar, sovereignty transfers could be scheduled to take place simultaneously for reasons of internal stability in the respective states and to allay fears in the international community concerning the future of the Strait.

(e) NATO. It is possible that Morocco may establish closer links with NATO. Ceuta, Melilla and the Chafarinas could be further developed as military bases within the NATO mantle and jointly staffed by Moroccan and Spanish forces, thus obscuring the obvious aspects of Spanish sovereignty and defusing contentions surrounding the issue. The Gibraltar NATO base may act as a model in the future.

5.13 CONCLUSION.

Both Spain and Morocco present legitimate historical and "territorial" arguments in claiming sovereignty over the Plazas. Until recently the essential issue was one of decolonizing territories rather than peoples. However Muslim agitation in Melilla (1986-87) has now added an extra dimension, that of liberating a "repressed" minority. The question of Melilla and the Minor Plazas must be treated with sensitivity by Spain as part of the process of decolonization in the ante-penultimate stages of traditional European colonialism. It might be in the interests of Spain and the international community to study closely the policies of Charles De Gaulle and processes of decolonization which he implemented in Algeria between 1960-62. A refinement of De Gaulle's policies in implementing a
negotiated withdrawal supervised by the civil and military authorities, with adequate compensation for those members of the population who wish to be repatriated to Spain is advisable.

Despite historical and demographic arguments concerning Ceuta/Sebta, the issue now as it always has been, is the fact of Ceuta's geostrategical location, with a commanding base providing a key to the Strait. King Hassan has reiterated time and again that Morocco and other interested states will not permit Spain to control both keys to the Strait in the event of Britain retroceding Gibraltar. While Ceuta remains a thorn in the flesh of Moroccan-Spanish relations, arguably its decolonization should be viewed as a longterm project, rather than an action to be taken in haste. Spanish withdrawal from Ceuta could be seriously considered once Spain is fully integrated into NATO, and once the Crown Colony dispute has been settled. With future economic and political development in Morocco, a negotiated resolution of the Ceuta dispute could be facilitated by EC and NATO organs. This would also depend on future relations, treaties and base agreements between Morocco and the USA.
CHAPTER 6

THE BRITISH COLONY OF GIBRALTAR.

"Tarek took Gibraltar, empty and undefended, in a matter of hours. The Spanish took 150 years to oust the Moors for good. Britain, considering the counter-attacks and repulsions spent eighty years in conquering and consolidating the conquest of Gibraltar".

J.D. Stewart (1967).

"Tangier has a negative role: its function is to do nothing in the political field. Gibraltar, on the other hand is not bound by treaties".

N. Pounds (1952).

6.1 INTRODUCTION.

Both Britain and Spain claim sovereignty over the strategic Gibraltar peninsula at the eastern entrance to the Strait. Spain claims it on principles of decolonization and territorial integrity of the state. Britain contends that it was ceded to the Crown by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) (confirmed in subsequent treaties) (see appendices III, IV). Longevity of occupation, and the democratically expressed wish of the Gibraltarians to remain under British rule are also key arguments used by Britain. The issue is further complicated by micro-spatial disputes within the area of the Colony, including the isthmus, the airport constructed on it, and territorial waters (see plates 6.1-6.3).

In international fora, many states, particularly former colonies, support the Spanish case. Nevertheless, Britain from the vantage point of the Colony, has ensured free access to the
Plate 6.1  View of the Rock from the Centre of the Strait

Aerial view of Gibraltar and Algeciras Bay

Strait for all nations since 1704. Though not a superpower, Britain is still a major seapower with global commercial and naval interests as was proven during the Falklands/Malvinas War (1982) and escort and mine-clearing operations in the Arabian/Persian Gulf (1987). The Gibraltar base is still seen by many as being vital to Britain and its NATO allies. Being a founding member and cornerstone of NATO, Britain has furthered the Alliance’s interests in the region by securing passage of the Strait for all classes of vessel. As well as being a major base within NATO’s geographical boundaries, due to the "special relationship" between Britain and the USA, the Gibraltar base is an asset to Western interests in the Middle-East and Indian Ocean regions. Spain’s historic quest for control of both coasts of the Strait, North African Territories, neutrality during the World Wars, Francoist heritage, and contentious stance concerning territorial waters and passage rights in the Strait have adversely influence international opinion, in contrast to Britain’s excellent record in the region.

A peaceful resolution of the dispute must be found, catering for the legitimate aspirations of all parties. International interests in the security of passage of the Strait must be reinforced, and NATO concerns catered for. The Strait is vital as an energy supply route and is crucial to Western commercial interests (see chapters 2, 7). In an emergency situation, if the NATO states were threatened by the USSR, or on a more regional scale if the superpowers became engaged in armed conflict as a result of tensions in the Arab world, the
Strait would be crucial for deployment, as was proven during the Arab-Israeli War in 1967 (see chapter 7). Without falling into the pitfall of historical determinism, the fact must be recognized that the southern shore of the Strait is as volatile now as in former centuries, particularly because of underdevelopment, the rise of fundamentalism and Maghrebi inter-state rivalry (see chapter 8). The historical dialectic between the riparian states for control of the Strait is still being played out in the Plazas, and possibly in the future Islamic fundamentalism will challenge the status quo in the area. Being a relatively new member of NATO (1982), Spain still has to prove its credentials to the Alliance concerning the implementation of NATO policies and usage of the Strait. Britain and Spain must accommodate these interests. Bilateral agreements in the form of retrocession are unlikely in the near future. However understandings concerning civilian and military spaces, and the isthmus and airport could be achieved. In the EC context, Gibraltar and Spain may become integrated over several generations, and already Spaniards have an absolute right to buy property and reside there. Spaniards may eventually become a majority, and by that time Spain should be firmly integrated into the NATO alliance. Yet because of the acrimonious nature of the dispute, and British reluctance to 'discuss' the sovereignty issue, tensions remain high.

Although the simile "solid as the Rock of Gibraltar" has become universal coinage, in the present geopolitical climate of the region there is a certain "rocky feeling" because of the
intensity of sovereignty disputes concerning Gibraltar and Spain's North African Territories. To date British policy has ensured that the southern shore of the Strait would not fall under the control of a strong or hostile power.

Gibraltar's geostrategic location, imposing appearance, historical associations, (Hercules, Tarik ibn Zaid, Nelson, Churchill, Franco) and relationship with Spain and Britain render it unique. Gibraltar has become a symbol of power, geopolitical continuity and contention. Gibraltar was called "the Key to Spain" by Queen Isabella during the Reconquest. In the 19th century, at the zenith of the British Empire it was dubbed "the Key to the Mediterranean". History since the 17th century would suggest that the power which controls the Rock, largely controls the Strait, and the power which controls the Strait, controls access to the Mediterranean.

Despite Gibraltar's limited area, lack of water, artificial economy, controversial military advantages, and problematic relationship with NATO and the EC, it is still coveted by Spain and Britain. It is a thorn in the flesh of bilateral and international relations. Its decolonization is a complex process having ripple effects and causing speculation as to what the future of the Sentinel of the Strait will be!

6.2 GEOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW.

The Crown Colony covers some 597 hectares (2.3 sq ml), and the peninsula rises to a maximum elevation of 426 m (1,398 ft)
MAP 6.1 THE CROWN COLONY OF GIBRALTAR

Approximate area of land above 90m. (300 ft.)
Built-up area

Main Roads

0 11 Kilometre
0 6 1/2 Mile

North Mole
Commercial Mole

N

Slipway
Graving Dock
Coaling Island

Knut Einar VII Dock
Queen Alexandra Dock
Prince of Wales Dock

Wharf

Rocks

Signal Hill

1,268 ft.

Summit

1,396 ft.

Oil Fuel Tanks

Caledonian Canal

Catalan Bay

Sandy Bay

The Rock is linked to the rest of Spain by a low lying sandy isthmus. The west coast and Bay area is about 4.8 km (3 miles) long with the town and port nestled into the famous rock slopes. The east coast is steep and inhospitable. The land boundary with Spain is some 800 metres long. Gibraltar's claimed territorial waters are 3 nm. Spatially Gibraltar is less than 4.8 km (3 miles) long and 1.6 km (1 mile) wide, with over 30% of the land sloping at more than 30 degrees. Gibraltar is the second most densely populated area in Europe and ranks fourth in global terms.

6.3 SPANISH AND BRITISH PERCEPTIONS.

The mass media have made much of the fact that Spain closed its borders with the Crown Colony between 1969-1985, and engaged in other hostile acts. Throughout history, Spanish statesmen have considered Gibraltar as Spanish. There is a misconception abroad that attempts at recoupment are a Francoist heritage. The Spanish Republican Government was in the process of reactivating its claim to Gibraltar when the Civil War (1936-39) broke out in the Algeciras region. The restrictions imposed by Franco on Gibraltar, received even the approval of the Republican Government in exile.

Until the Lisbon Agreement (1980), Gibraltar's laws forbade Spanish nationals the legal right to stay overnight, acquire property, run a business or defend themselves before a judge if arbitrarily expelled from the Colony. Spaniards did not receive
the same wages as Gibraltarians or Britons there. Basically economic apartheid existed. Yet during World War II, as many as 13,000 Spaniards were employed in Gibraltar. This type of discrimination ensured that Spanish nationals would never constitute a majority. Though disguised, similar policies exist in the Spanish Plazas in North Africa (see chapter 5). Like the Plazas, the Gibraltar dispute is one of sovereignty contested by two states and not a question of decolonizing a population.

Though Spain only had sovereign control of Gibraltar for 242 years, it represents a golden period in Spanish history. It symbolizes the Reconquest, Spain's golden age of nation-state building, and its decline from empire. For many reasons Gibraltar remains a keystone in Spanish national sentiment.

Based on archaeological evidence, some researchers claim that western Europe was first peopled by way of Gibraltar from the Maghreb (Stewart, 1967, p.24). Gibraltar holds great politico-religious significance for Spain. Via Gibraltar, Tarek led the first jihad into western Europe (AD 711), ferrying over 500 horses and 7,000 foot soldiers across the Strait (Stewart, 1967, p.24). During the Reconquest, the Muslim armies, Moorish peasants, and Jews were expelled via Gibraltar. The Moorish mosque of Gibraltar was transformed into the Cathedral of St Mary the Crowned. By 1704, there were 18 religious establishments there. The shrine at Europa Point with its many lamps was the first lighthouse in the region. Historically Spain's maritime prowess was associated with ports in the Strait region. The British penetration of Gibraltar was seen not only
as a politico-military defeat but also as a blow to Roman Catholicism, a cornerstone of Spanish nationalism. The invading armies (1704) desecrated the Europa Point shrine symbolically facing the Islamic southern shore. The Franciscan Convent was transformed into the seat of British power, the governor's residence. The British base has always been seen as a threat by Spain, and has overshadowed Spain's geopolitical advantages in the Strait area. From the Spanish viewpoint, Gibraltar should complement the geostrategic advantages of its Ceuta base on the Moroccan coast.

Gibraltar was conquered by allied Anglo-Dutch forces in the name of the Hapsburg claimant to the Spanish throne (1704). In the evolution of international politics over the following decade, Britain became the dominant force and effective occupier. With this fait accompli Spain negotiated an overall peace treaty lending de jure recognition to the British presence. This was not unusual in the history of international relations of the period. Contemporary moralizing arguments based on historical facts tend to obfuscate the present problem and do little to resolve the dispute.

"For a variety of reasons the very name Gibraltar arouses great passion and feelings in some sections of British public opinion as evidenced by parliamentary concern" (HC. Rept. 1981. p.xli).

Some reasons for Britain's stance on the dispute include: the imperial herititage of a colonial people; historical and human links to the Crown Colony; an historical vision of territorial control/sovereignty embedded in its world viewpoint; national
geopolitical interests, including commitment to NATO and role in the international balance of power; a sense of responsibility to the Gibraltarians; and an excellent record as sentinel of the Strait.

Despite official statements concerning the immediate future of Gibraltar and de jure arguments based on history such as legitimizing treaties (Utrecht 1713, Seville 1729, Vienna 1731, Aix la Chapelle 1756, Paris 1763, and Versailles 1783); there is evolving a body of opinion that the present situation cannot be maintained. The problem must be approached by all parties in the context of contemporary geopolitical realities. Britain recognizes that it has broken every condition of Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) but not that of offering Spain first option of recovering the Colony, if Britain decides to relinquish it (HC. Rept, 1981, p.pxli).

While being proud of their British nationality and special relationship with the UK, the Gibraltarians recognize that they are of multi-ethnic origin, and share many culture traits with Spain. It is commonly accepted that Gibraltar's role as a military base, and duty free zone ensured them a higher standard of living than in the neighbouring regions. Gibraltarians fear retrocession, believing that Spain will not respect their distinctive culture, and that there will be a dramatic drop in their living standards. To many Gibraltarians, Spanish political culture is associated with Francoism and sieges. Some Gibraltarians feel betrayed, believing that Britain will eventually transfer sovereignty of their territory to Spain.
Many Gibraltarians feel that they are being abandoned by the British administration which created them, but are very selective in "analyzing" the historical and colonial aspects of the dispute. They also remember that in 1966, Britain leased the island of Diego Garcia as a base to the USA; and in 1968, the local population (1,200 people) was transferred to Mauritius against their wills (HC. Rept, 1981, pp.135-136). Yet a majority of Gibraltarians believe that as long as they remain united, they can block any deal between London and Madrid (Kyle, 1980, p.201).

6.4 HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY: TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION.

6.4.1 Gibraltar Before the British.

Gibraltar's political geography is a pentimento of historical relationships between Mediterranean peoples and great powers such as Britain and France. The pre-Muslim, Muslim, Spanish and British legacies are closely interwoven in the area.

Mythology tells us that Gibraltar promontory was a portion of the mountain split by Hercules in order to create the Gibraltar Channel. The southern portion of Mons Calpe (Gibraltar) was known as Mons Abyla in Roman times, and today as Djebel Mussa or Mont Hacho, near Ceuta. Although several powers controlled the Strait area, the Phoenicians (1100 BC), Greeks (700 BC), Carthaginians (600 BC) and Romans (200 BC); Gibraltar was not one of their strategic bases. In AD 711, when Tarek Ibn Zaid led the jihad across the Strait, Gibraltar was under the
control of the Visigoths. From this period on the area became known as Diebel Tarek, literally meaning Tarek's Mountain, from which the word Gibraltar is derived. From the 8th century on, Gibraltar began to play a significant role in world affairs.

During the Muslim occupation of Gibraltar (711-1462), Tarek had a castle constructed on the north-western slope of the Rock overlooking the isthmus. The town was founded in 1151 below the castle and occupied by the Moors until the Spanish took it in 1309. Gibraltar was disputed between Christians and Muslims, but also by different Muslim power groups. In 1146, the Almohads of the Maghreb launched a fundamentalist jihad against the Spanish Almoravid Muslim dynasty and Iberian Christians. With victory, the Almohad rulers ordered the destruction of Gibraltar's fortifications (1160).

The following century was one of intense Muslim-Christian strife, but Tarifa and Algeciras were the centres of battle rather than Gibraltar. With the Reconquest, Tarifa was taken in 1294, and shortly afterwards Algeciras (1309) and Gibraltar (1310) fell. Although Gibraltar only possessed a small town at the time in the proximity of the Moorish Castle, Ferdinand IV ordered the construction of defensive works there. Between 1309-1462, Gibraltar underwent eight separate Muslim sieges. After the third siege (1333), it fell to the Sultan of Fez. In 1462, it came under the control of Granada and remained in Spanish hands until 1704.

During the Moorish period, non-Muslim transit of the Strait was prohibited. It is the only time in history that one power
succeeded in effectively gaining control of both coasts of the Strait. By 1502, the northern coasts of the Strait had been reconquered by the Spaniards who continued the Crusade into the Maghreb (see map 4.1).

The Spanish period (1462-1704) was shorter than that of Islam. During the 15th century the municipal boundaries of the town were extended to include the territories of Algeciras, and the Campo de Gibraltar developed. Because of struggles between Spanish royal families, the town was besieged twice in the 15th century (1466-67 and 1506). With the unification of Spain under Isabella, Gibraltar was taken firmly under the control of the Spanish Crown in 1502. Despite its geostrategic potential, the Crown did not enhance it with fortifications. Gibraltar was sacked in 1540 by Algerians under Turkish command and subjected to other Corsair raids.

In 1693, British vessels under the command of Admiral Sir George Rooke took refuge from the French fleet at the allied Spanish port of Gibraltar. The British found it necessary to bring guns ashore as Gibraltar was not adequately fortified.

During the Spanish period ownership of Gibraltar changed hands five times, including two Muslim occupations. It was besieged twice and subjected to raids. Its reputation for impregnability only came about with the British occupation.

6.4.2 The British Period (1704/13 to ?).
Several times during the 17th century, England expressed an
interest in gaining control of Gibraltar. As Oliver Cromwell stated:

"whether any other place be attempetable, especially that of the towne and castle of Gibraltar, which if possesst and made tenable by us, would it not be both an advantage to our trade, and an annoyance to the Spanyard, and enable us without keeping soe great a fleet on the coast with six nimble friggotts lodged there, to doe the Spanyard more harme then by a fleet, and ease our own charge . . . " (The Protector to his Generals at Sea, Blake and Montagu, 28 April 1656, in Thurloe, 1742, ch.4; Levie, 1983, p.10).

In 1683, during the English evacuation of Tangier, there was speculation about taking Gibraltar in compensation (see map 4.1). Several other times during the 17th century, Britain expressed an interest in gaining control of Gibraltar (Levie, 1983, pp.7-9). The War of Spanish Succession (1702-1713) afforded an ideal opportunity. In 1700 King Charles II of Spain died without leaving an heir, the succession was disputed between two claimants. Prince Philip V of Bourbon, a grandson of Louis XIV was backed by France and Spain, and the Austrian Archduke Charles was supported by Austria, England, Holland and the Holy Roman Empire. Fearing French control of the Spanish Crown, England declared war on France and Spain.

In 1704 a combined Anglo-Dutch force under the command of Prince George of Hesse Darmstadt took Gibraltar, after the eleventh recorded siege in its history. The Spanish military forces were allowed to leave. The civilians had the choice of remaining. Because of the atrocities committed in the town and desecration of religious buildings, about 4,000 Gibraltarians
Northern limit of the neutral ground.

1908

1854

1713 (Boundary of the Gibraltar ceded at Utrecht).

Three stages in the usurpation of the Neutral Ground

MAP 6.2a THE CROWN COLONY OF GIBRALTAR: TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION FROM THE SPANISH VIEWPOINT.

MAP A
Gibraltar and its Zone in 1704.

Approx. scale 1:60,000

MAP 6.26 THE CROWN COLONY OF GIBRALTAR: TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION FROM THE SPANISH VIEWPOINT.

MAP B
Situation of the Devil's Tower and Mill.

Algocirros Bay

Old mole

Devil's Tower

Moorish Castle

Approx. scale 1:12000

MAP 6.2d THE CROWN COLONY OF GIBRALTAR. TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION FROM THE SPANISH VIEWPOINT.

MAP D
Neutral Ground.

MAP 2: THE CROWN COLONY OF GIBRALTAR: TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION FROM THE SPANISH VIEWPOINT.

Situation of Gibraltar in the British-occupied sector of the neutral Ground

Approx scale 1:60,000
(in circle, amplified for clearness)

Map 6.29 THE CROWN COLONY OF GIBRALTAR - TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION FROM THE SPANISH VIEWPOINT.

MAP 6

Location of the Fort of Punta Mala.

Approx. scale 1:40,000

MAP 6.2h THE CROWN COLONY OF GIBRALTAR: TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION FROM THE SPANISH VIEWPOINT.

MAP H
The Neutral Ground at Present.

La Línea

Approx. scale 1:16,000

Median Line drawn in accordance with the principles of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.

Boundary of Spanish Prohibited Area.

Boundary of Line of Spanish port of Algeciras/Lo Lineo as announced by Spain in 1967.

left and only 70 remained. It was agreed that those remaining would continue to enjoy the same civil status and free practice of religion as previously enjoyed. The refugees settled near the Hermitage of San Roque, a few miles north of the town of Gibraltar, and founded a new town there built with stones taken from the ruins of the Roman town of Carteria. Spain has historically viewed the residents of San Roque as Gibraltarians in exile, and legitimate heirs to the town and Rock of Gibraltar. Despite the international character of the seizure of Gibraltar, it must be remembered that the action was taken within the context of a Spanish dynastic dispute, and not in the name of England.

In 1704, the Anglo-Dutch force raised the flag of the Hapsburg claimant, and proclaimed him King of Spain. Years later the story arose that Admiral Rooke lowered the flag of Charles III and replaced it with the British standard claiming Gibraltar in Queen Ann’s name. Several sources claim that the British flag was raised, for varying reasons. Levie (1983, pp.12-13, 149-150) suggests that the myth was an historical inaccuracy perpetuated by scholars working from the same source. Some Spanish sources may have lent credence to the story in an effort to challenge Britain’s claim to Gibraltar in so far as the town was taken in the name of an Anglo-Dutch force under the command of a German officer in the name of the Austrian Hapsburgs, with legitimate claims to the Spanish throne and hence Gibraltar would be technically Spanish. The British sources may have perpetuated the idea in order to advance the
theory of right of conquest to buttress its claims. As Levic (1983, p.13) states:

"Even if the story were true, which it clearly is not, it has no effect on the present problem with respect to the future of Gibraltar. It would be helpful if both sides, Spanish and British, would leave it in the obscurity which it properly deserves".

Between 1704-13, Gibraltar was Spanish sovereign territory under allied military occupation in the name of a claimant to the Spanish throne. Yet it is popularly believed that the British period began in 1704. In 1705 a joint French-Spanish force unsuccessfully laid siege to Gibraltar, the twelfth in its recorded history. In 1711, the British Governor of Gibraltar was ordered to eliminate all foreign troops. By 1713 this had been completed, much to the displeasure of the Dutch. During negotiations with France, Britain made it clear that it wished to retain Gibraltar and also Port Mahon in Minorca. These bilateral discussions were held in secret, despite vague assurances which England had made to its Dutch partners that Gibraltar would remain an allied issue.

In the years leading up to the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), demands, refusals and diverse interpretations of proposals arise in the correspondence between British and Spanish officials that have recurred ever since in relation to Gibraltar. This type of "doublespeak" is still evident in all negotiations and declarations about the future of Gibraltar. In negotiations prior to 1713, Britain sought control of lands around the
Gibraltar settlement extending to a distance of "two cannon shot" (see chapter 1). Spain constantly refused. In 1712, King Philip of Spain bluntly refused British demands, stating that:

"His Majesty consents to yield Her British Majesty the Towne and Castle of Gibraltar with its port and bay but without any other land than that which is contained within its walls and fortifications, and without any communication by land with the continent of Spain all intercourse and commerce therewith to be had by sea . . . ." (Apostiles to Lexington, 28 Oct. 1712, Public Records Office, State Papers, 105/277; Levie, 1983, p.24).

With the culmination of British-Spanish negotiations in the Treaty (1713), it was still ambiguous as to what area had actually been ceded. Depending on the state of British-Spanish relations ever since diverse arguments have been produced by the contending parties.

"Unfortunately the Treaty did not provide a map defining the area so described, thus giving both parties the opportunity to interpret the wording as it suited them, causing much controversy in later years" (Ramsey, 1978, p.2).

Under Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) (see appendix IV) the Spanish Crown ceded:

"... to the Crown of Great Britain the full and entire property of the town and castle of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifications, and forts thereunto belonging; and he gives up the said property to be held and enjoyed absolutely with all manner of right forever, ... the above named property be yielded without any territorial jurisdiction, and without any open communication by land with the country round about".
Thus the Rock of Gibraltar was ceded to Britain in absolute sovereignty, but the text would suggest that the isthmus between the Rock and the rest of Spain was not.

The question of territorial jurisdiction and communications with Spain is covered in Article X, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Treaty. It is provided that should adverse weather conditions or other unforeseen causes endanger the survival of the population of Gibraltar by making it impossible to obtain supplies by sea, then despite the treaty prohibition against open land communication, supplies may be purchased for ready cash from Spain via the land route. Provision was made that goods would not be imported from Gibraltar into Spain. Hence Madrid was never legally bound to maintain a permanently open land frontier with Gibraltar according to the terms of the Treaty. However over the centuries land communications developed, establishing a precedent that became almost sacrosanct in Britain's view. Trafficking and smuggling became an integral part of the relationship between Gibraltar and the Campo de Gibraltar, leading to many disputes. With Spanish membership of the EEC (1986), it is obliged to maintain open frontiers with member states of the Community for the free flow of persons, goods and vehicles (Art.49, Treaty of Rome).

Despite the stipulations contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht, Britain invoked time and again the cannon shot rule, in claiming jurisdiction on land and sea (see chapter 1). From the 18th century on Britain was among the powers which wanted this rule to become an established part
of international law. This accounts in large part for British claims to the isthmus and territorial waters.

Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht stipulates that:

"... in case it shall hereafter seem meet to the Crown of Great Britain to grant, sell, or by any means to alienate therefrom the propriety of the said town of Gibraltar, that the preference of having the same shall always be given to the Crown of Spain before any others".

Thus if Britain ever wished to sever its ties with Gibraltar, it could not legally transfer sovereignty to another state without Spain getting first option. To date Britain has honoured this section of the Treaty. This suggests that Britain like Spain would not tolerate the establishment of an independent city or port state like Singapore. In 1830, Britain changed the legal status of Gibraltar from a "possession or territory" to a Crown Colony.

From the time of the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) until the present, Spanish leaders from Philip V to Franco and King Juan Carlos have called for the restoration of Gibraltar. On many occasions, not without justification, Spain has accused Britain of violating Article X of the Treaty (1713), while Britain has accused Spain of not complying with certain provisions of the Treaty. The Gibraltar problem has obstructed Anglo-Spanish relations for over two and a half centuries (see map 6.2).

6.4.3 Gibraltar's Impregnability.

On several occasions Spain has tried to recoup Gibraltar by
force, but failed. The base proved invaluable to Britain during its colonial adventures and the World Wars.

"Of all the strongholds in the world, the Rock of Gibraltar is probably the most striking and impressive" (Abbott, 1935, p.2).

The Spanish laid siege to Gibraltar in 1727, and the Rock proved impregnable for the second time in its British history. Gibraltar was a major cause of wars between Britain and Spain (1718-21, 1727-29). In the Franco-British War which began in 1754, Britain lost Minorca, so the geostrategic importance of Gibraltar was enhanced. France offered the island to Spain in an effort to win an alliance, and Britain did likewise with Gibraltar. Spain refused both offers in order to maintain its neutrality (Levie, 1983, p.15). The Spanish blockaded Gibraltar from land and sea during the Great Siege (1779-1783). This, the fourteenth siege in Gibraltar's history is well documented and still spoken about today by the Gibraltarians (Ellicott, 1975, pp.25-38). Its symbolism in Gibraltar is as potent as the Battle of the Boyne (1690) in Ireland or the Great Siege of Malta (1565) (interview, Ellicott, April 1885). The Great Siege of Gibraltar (3 Sep. 1779-12 March 1783) witnessed more than 200,000 cannon shot and shell being fired, and the tunnelling of the Rock with the construction of defence galleries in the north side, facing Spain. The Upper and Lower Galleries consist of main communication tunnels 2 m wide by 2.5 m high (7 ft by 8 ft) with embrasures and firing points at intervals. Traditionally cannons were used from these points and later they were adapted

In 1787, the Spanish Foreign Minister Floridablanca prepared a memorial in which he reiterated Spanish aspirations for the recovery of Gibraltar either by negotiation or force. He outlined plans for hindering not only land but also maritime communications with Gibraltar. Spain once again found itself as an ally of France (1795-1803) during the Revolutionary period. This was the last time in modern history that Britain and Spain went to war.

When the Spanish people revolted against the French and their new king (Napoleon's brother) in 1808, Britain and Spain found themselves as allies. Defences on Gibraltar on the British side were oriented towards the north, and some 1,500 metres away, Spanish defences were oriented south, facing the traditional enemy, the British. The La Linea line of fortifications stretched from Fort San Felipe in the west to Fort Santa Barbara in the east. In 1810, having informed the Spanish authorities, the British destroyed the La Linea fortifications to prevent them being used by the French. However with time Spanish historians have interpreted these actions as expansionist (see maps 6.2, plates 6.2-6.3). This is difficult to accept considering the geostrategic imperatives of the situation (see Levie, 1983, pp.53-55). From the time of the Napoleonic Wars until 1963, Spanish efforts to regain Gibraltar were limited to the diplomatic sphere.

During World War I, Spain officially remained neutral. In the Gibraltar context, this was largely respected by Spain and
Britain. During the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), Britain chose a neutral stance. However the Government of the Second Spanish Republic (1931-39) banned the sale of farms to foreigners in the Campo, and deployed an infantry battalion permanently at the La Linea garrison. In 1942 Spain formally occupied 650 metres of what had come to be known as the Neutral Ground in order to prevent further British encroachment on the territory of the isthmus (de La Serna, 1984, p.160). Unlike Napoleon, Hitler understood the strategic importance of the Crown Colony to the British Empire and tried to win Franco as an ally in conquering the base. The aim of Hitler's master plan, Operation Felix was to deny Britain control of the Strait (Ramsey, 1978, pp.24-35). Though negotiations took place between Spain and Germany about the future of Gibraltar, Franco procrastinated in order to keep Spain out of the war. Nonetheless Spain permitted German and Italian espionage activities to take place in the Gibraltar/Algeciras area. Spanish neutrality is questionable because of the activities of Italian saboteurs based in the Bay area, with the mission of harassing the Crown Colony (Ramsey, 1978, pp.45-53).

In spite of official denials, there is a body of historical evidence which suggests that in 1940 Sir Samuel Hoare, acting at the behest of Winston Churchill, was ready to discuss retrocession of Gibraltar in return for Spanish support in the war (Cordero Torrés, 1961, pp.357-359). Similar bargaining positions were taken by Britain several times. For instance, in 1917 Lloyd George renewed the offer of retrocession if Spanish
would support the war effort (Hermet, 1968, p.336). Several times Spain offered to trade some of its Plazas for the Crown Colony, especially in 1915 and 1935.

During World War II, a massive system of tunnels was constructed in the Rock. The gangue was dumped into the Bay to form the foundations for the seaward extension of a runway. The purpose of tunnelling was to provide accommodation sufficient to allow the garrison to live underground and resist a siege for up to a year. Provisions included water supply, electricity, sanitary arrangements, hospital and laundry facilities in addition to normal accommodation, arms cachets and a military dump. Communications tunnels included pedestrian and normal sized roads. All the communications tunnels can be traversed by Land Rover. After 1945 tunnelling did not come to an end; the celebrated Molesend Way was only completed in 1968. There are some 55 km of tunnels (Ramsey, 1978, pp.15-23).

Spain argues that the isthmus upon which the airfield is built, like the maritime area, was not ceded to Britain under the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), (see maps 6.2). Although there was a massive armaments buildup, Gibraltar was not heavily bombarded during the war (Ramsey, 1978, pp.36-44). Yet the base proved an invaluable naval asset to the Allies as it had done during World War I. The military organization made it almost impossible for German and Italian vessels to transit the Strait, but German submarine activity proved difficult to curtail. Gibraltar was chosen as the command post for Operation Torch (the Allied invasion of the Maghreb), due to its proximity
to North Africa and the possibility of air support for sea and landing operations in Morocco and Algeria. The Allied liberation of the West Mediterranean was largely due to usage of the British base. As recently as 1982, Gibraltar was used as a base for operations in the Falklands/Malvinas War.

6.4.4 The Disputed Neutral Ground.

According to the Spanish interpretation of Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) the territory yielded to Britain was limited to the land:

"which is contained within . . . (the) walls and fortifications (of) . . . the town and fortifications of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifications and forts thereunto belonging".

Britain interpreted this as meaning it had control over an area equivalent to the distance of 'two cannon shot', despite Spanish protestations to the contrary. Between 1713-1909, the British moved northwards of the town and castle claiming an area of 850 metres, of the total 1,450 metres strip of the isthmus (see maps 6.2a,d,h).

In 1713 British troops occupied the Devils' Tower and Mill, some 100 and 600 metres respectively north of the actual town and fort of Gibraltar (see map 6.2b). This action was undertaken on the grounds of self-defence. Later the occupation of these buildings was justified by arguments that they formed part of the fortifications of Gibraltar. With time, between these two posts the British army planted gardens (1720-23).
Spain protested both actions.

In 1730, Spain ordered the construction of a defensive line at the northern end of the isthmus, some 1,500 metres from the walls of Gibraltar, La Linea de Gibraltar (see map 6.2c). Spain refused to concede to British protests about the construction of the Line, indicating that it was on Spanish sovereign territory, and that the sandy isthmus was Spanish, and that the Line was built to limit smuggling. Later the British constructed a cemetery on the isthmus, and Spain lodged a complaint. In 1766, the British Governor began referring to the land between Gibraltar and La Linea de Gibraltar as the neutral ground. In 1810, the Anglo-Spanish alliance against Napoleon gave the Governor of Gibraltar the opportunity of eliminating the Spanish forts of San Felipe and Santa Barbara on the northern boundary of the neutral ground. The forts were demolished with other stone banquetas and guard houses of the Spanish Line, in an effort to prevent them falling into French hands (Ramsey, 1978, p.2).

The beginning of the dispute over the isthmus stems directly from the yellow fever epidemic of 1815. The Spanish authorities agreed to allow the British to construct an isolation camp outside the fortress walls (Ramsey, 1978, p.2). Largely because of epidemics emanating from visiting slave ships, quarantine camps were established on the neutral ground and subsequently these became temporary villages. By 1828 these had a permanent population of over 1,000 people (Levie, 1983, p.67). In 1829, the Colonial Office ordered the removal of the
village. Subsequently gardens, a well, slaughter house and drill grounds were established. In 1854 further quarantine village were built. By 1863, a zone of territory some 731 m (800 yds) from the walls of Gibraltar had been effectively taken under British control. In November 1898 shortly after an armistice agreement between Spain and the USA, Britain continued to voice its displeasure about the Spanish defenses which had been installed on the shores of the Bay and proposed that Spanish "fortifications", "batteries" or "mount guns" should not be permitted within a "radius of seven geographical miles from the Moorish castle of Gibraltar " (Red Book, 1965, p.266). Because of Spain's weakened position after the war (1898), Britain succeeded in gaining the neutralization of an arc of Spanish coastal territory around Gibraltar equivalent to the range of the largest naval gun of the time (Levie, 1983, p.76).

6.4.5 The Infamous Fence.

In 1908 the Britain Ambassador in Madrid informed the Spanish Minister of State "as an act of courtesy" of Britain's intention to erect a fence along the British edge of the neutral ground with the object, mainly, of reducing sentry duty. The letter explained that:

"The fence . . . which will in no way partake of the nature of a military or defensive work, is to be constructed of steel, and of an unclimbable pattern, about seven feet high and will be topped with three strands of barbed-wire, thus bringing the total height to nine feet. It is proposed to fix netting to the fence in
order to prevent the passing of articles through the bars. A gap will be left across the main road leading to Loina and gates provided across the Eastern Road and at the Western Beach, the former for cattle and the latter, which will be in full view of the guard room, for the passage of those persons in possession of Beach passes" (Ramsey, 1978, p.2).

Work began on the Fence despite Spanish protests. The Fence was constructed a few feet from the British sentry line, once again increasing British jurisdiction. Spain continued to protest that it considered the zone as neutral ground but within the sovereign territory of Spain in conformity with the Treaty of Utrecht.

Once and for all the Fence laid the limits of Britain's creeping jurisdiction. By the 1970s the neutral ground had been effectively "shrunk to 6 inches" (Ramsey, 1978, p.3). This action was greatly resented by Spain and features in all Spanish arguments in defence of recovering sovereignty. The Fence has been referred to as the "Wall of Shame" (Red Book, 1968, p.373) and the "Berlin Wall". On 12 July 1966, Britain affirmed its sovereignty on that part of the isthmus it had confiscated, invoking the principle of acquisitive prescription; however this mode of acquiring territories is not universally recognized by international law and besides Spain protested the action (Rézette, 1976, p.141). In July 1976, Britain extended the Fence, 9-12 m (30-40 ft) into the sea at the eastern end "to make it animal proof to stop rabies then moving south from Spain, from entering Gibraltar" (Ramsey, 1978, p.3). A twenty-man platoon patrols the border which is flood lit at
night. Two watch towers are found at either end of the demarcatory fence which is now constructed of green, plastic covered chain link, moshtoppod with barbed wire coils.

Prior to and with the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) Britain was unsuccessful in gaining jurisdiction over an area of land embracing the distance of 'two cannon shot' which it desired on the isthmus north of the Rock. This is proven by Article X of the Treaty and the successive protests lodged by Spain concerning British activities on the isthmus.

After 1713, the military governors of Gibraltar obtained de facto what diplomats had failed to get de jure, sites on the isthmus, and gradual movement northwards of the original British line. Hence the neutral ground came into being by creeping jurisdiction. Subsequently Britain claimed the southern part of the neutral ground as sovereign territory.

De facto usage and administration lent an air of legitimacy to British control of the isthmus in the international community, despite the Spanish contention that:

"All the territory which the British are occupying in advance of the town gates belongs to Spain and constitutes a neutral zone indicated provisionally by the Government of His Catholic Majesty without prejudice to Spanish sovereignty" (Spanish protest note to the British Government, 1909, quoted in Red Book, 1968, p.78).

6.4.6 Territorial Waters.

The mouth of Algeciras/Gibraltar Bay is about 5 miles (8 km) wide between Point Algeciras and Europa Point (see map 6.3). From the midpoint of this line to the Spanish mainland is just
over 6 miles (9.5 km). Spain contends that Britain has no right to waters, except for a small portion in the port area. In December 1967,

"Britain fully reserved its rights with regard to British territorial waters on the Gibraltar side of the median line in the Bay". (Gibraltar: The Dispute with Spain, BIS COI, 1969, Cmd 715615, p.18).

During the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Utrecht, Britain sought to have the 'two cannon shot' theory applied. Gradually the words 'port' and 'roadsteads' of Gibraltar became incorporated into the discussions. However Article X only speaks of the "port" and nothing more with reference to maritime jurisdiction.

Spain contends that in ceding only the town, castle and port of Gibraltar, with no jurisdiction over waters other than "those which are comprised by the actual port" (Red Book, 1965, p.238); and consequently Britain does not have a right to territorial waters (Red Book, 1968, p.493). Yet customary and conventional international law would seem to support the British claim to territorial waters as:

"the fact that only the port of Gibraltar was specifically ceded to Great Britain under the Treaty, without any mention of a cession of territorial waters, is irrelevant; since it has long been the position that a cession of territory automatically carries the cession of the appurtenant territorial waters unless the contrary is specifically stated" (Gibraltar: Talks with Spain (May-Oct.1966), BIS COI, Cmnd. 3131, p.117).

Since the 18th century, cessions of territory and
international treaties corroborate this viewpoint, as does the 
UN Law of the Sea (LOS). Article 1 (1) of the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (1958) states:

"The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond 
its territory and its internal waters, to a 
belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described 
as the territorial sea." (516 UN Treaty 
Series 205, 15 UST 1606).


"The sovereignty of a coastal state extends, beyond its land territory and internal 
waters and . . . . to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea" 
(Article 2 (1)).
"This sovereignty extends to the airspace over the territorial sea as well as to its 
based and subsoil" (Article 2 (2)).
"Every state has the right to establish the 
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit 
not exceeding twelve nautical miles, 
measured from baselines determined in 
accordance with the Convention" (Article 3)
"Where the coasts of two States are opposite 
or adjacent to each other, neither of the 
two States is entitled, failing agreement 
between them to the contrary, to extend its 
territorial sea beyond the median line every 
point of which is equidistant from the 
nearest points on the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial seas of each 
of the two States is measured". . . . "The 
above provision does not apply, . . . . 
where it is necessary by reason of historic 
title or other special circumstances to 
delimit the territorial seas of the two 
States in a way which is at variance 
therewith" (Article 15). (UNCLOS, 1982, 
A/CONF.62/122, 7 Oct. 1982, pp. 3 & 6), (see 
map 6.3).

International Law of the Sea (LOS) treaties between states 
also include dependent territories such as colonies. The 
evidence would suggest that British sovereignty over Gibraltar
carries an inherent legal right to territorial waters. The extent of these waters is not at all clear because of creeping jurisdiction on the isthmus and the changes which have taken place in the maritime space in the immediate area of the Colony since 1713. The exact proportions of the port of Gibraltar as of 1713 are difficult to specify. Concerning the area between the Old (North) Mole and the New (South) Mole, the waters bathing the shores were included in the cession, as if it were part of the port. The major problem is that Britain invoked the cannon shot theory as legitimizing its sovereignty in the Bay area. If this line of argument is accepted, then Spain could also lay claim to the entire bay using the cannon shot principle. In the restricted area of the Bay both claims overlap. In these circumstances, it is customary for the waters to be divided along the median line. No detailed authoritative map exists for the 18th century, of the castle, town, harbour or waters of Gibraltar.

The Admiralty Dockyard with its harbour of over 178 hectares (440 acres), protected by three moles was constructed on land reclaimed from from the sea between 1895-1905 (Ramsey, 1978, p.2). The issue was never settled between Britain and Spain, but over the centuries a modus operandi developed, without Spain de jure conceding to the British claim. In practice, Britain claims a 3 nm territorial sea around Gibraltar, but the median line in the Bay area is in dispute (see chapters 1-3).
6.5 MARITIME AND TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.

Historically what alarmed the Spanish authorities most was the increase in British jurisdiction to the north of the fort and town of Gibraltar and consequently that Britain would invoke the cannon shot theory with respect to the surrounding waters, eventually usurping the historic Bay. In 1851 and 1852, the Spanish Minister of State, proposed to the British Ambassador that their respective governments:

"enter into an agreement in respect of the boundaries of the Fortress and Port of Gibraltar" (Red Book, 1965, pp.182, 186-7).

Spain proposed: (i) to establish the sea and land boundaries of Gibraltar as laid down in Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713); (ii) to declare the ground between Gibraltar and the fortifications along the San Felipe Line to be "neutral" with some common waters; and (iii) both parties to renounce the use of this neutral ground. Britain did not deem it necessary to enter into such negotiations at the time. Lord Palmerston stated that:

"... this right (to extensive jurisdiction over coastal waters) touches Great Britain's interests too closely for her to renounce it by peaceful negotiation; she will not yield to force in time of war, so long as the military and naval resources of Great Britain shall suffice to maintain it" (Palmerston to Hawden, 16 Dec. 1851, quoted in Red Book, 1965, p.188, p.193; Leivie, 1983, p.69).

Spain proposed that the dispute be referred to the other European governments for a decision. Britain did not answer the proposal.
During the Spanish-American War (1898), Spain implemented military construction works in the Algeciras area. The British Ambassador informed Madrid that:

"It might relieve the Spanish Government from solicitude on this point if I inform them that Her Majesty's Government are quite ready to give them an assurance that no such operations (by US forces directed against Spain) would be permitted to be carried on, or even attempted, from any point within the territorial waters of Great Britain in the bay" (British Ambassador to the Spanish Minister of State, 19 Aug. 1898, PRO, CO 91/421; Red Book, 1965, p.259).

With the ending of Spanish-American hostilities, Britain continued to object to the Spanish constructions in the Bay area and eventually obtained neutralization of the Spanish coastal area.

Part of Spain's reason for the idea of constructing a Spanish Line to the north of the isthmus as early as 1730 was the fear that with British expansion from the town and castle, it would lay claim to the contiguous waters of the Bay by creeping jurisdiction; and Spanish vital communications between Algeciras and Ceuta would be endangered. In 1852, the Spanish Minister of State, explained why the Spanish government had had the Line construct in 1730:

"... it was not only in order to cut off communications by land with the stronghold, but to command the bay in order to prevent English ships from anchorage outside the quays of the Rock, for if that were tolerated through lack of firmness on the part of Spain, the English would end up by claiming it as a right. A foreseeing preventive measure, whose justification is shown by what occurred since the forts (of the Spanish Line) fell into ruin " (de Lis
The western terminal of the Spanish Line, Fort San Felipe, offered Spain geostrategic advantages in the Bay. Spain attempted the construction of a mole to which Britain objected, for siting a cannon. Under duress which included threat of war, Spain acquiesced. Hence the waters in that area were more or less neutralized. Britain took advantage of the situation by introduced a Quarantine Anchorage Zone between Fort San Felipe and Gibraltar's Old Mole, but extending to a point north of due west of San Felipe. This marked the beginning of British encroachment in the waters of the Bay and is most likely the origin of the disputed 'Loop'.

In 1825 during a storm two British merchant ships were driven onshore from their anchorage in the Bay. Spain objected to a violation of its territorial waters as the Royal Navy had gone to their assistance. In response to this, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1826) stated that he would:

"... proceed to point out the limits of the Bay of Gibraltar as universally recognized not only by the inhabitants of Gibraltar, but by the Spaniards themselves" (Canning to Alcudia, 30 Nov.1826; Red Book, 1965, p.180).

He claimed British sovereignty over waters to the north of the most northern limit of any territorial claim on land (see maps 6.2f,g).

In 1851, after another maritime incident Spain challenged
the British claim. Up to that period differing views concerning the extent of British sovereignty had also been expressed by several British officials, as for example in 1831, the King's Advocate wrote an opinion for the Colonial Office stating that:

"His Majesty has supreme and exclusive authority over . . . the Town and Fortress of Gibraltar . . . beyond those limits he does not possess the rights of sovereignty; and that foreign ships lying in the Bay or in anchorage Ground, beyond the limits of the port, are not amenable to British jurisdiction . . . " (Opinion of the Kings Advocate, 24 May 1832, PRO, CO, CII/123; Levie, 1983, p.87).

To the contrary, the Captain of the Port of Gibraltar replied that:

"Punta Mala forms the natural boundaries of the Port of Gibraltar and that the Spaniards can have no claim to any part of the bay to the Eastward of that point below water mark, for there is no other point by which the Bay of Gibraltar can be defined as ceded by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713)" (Sheriff to Lieutenant Governor of Gibraltar, 15 July 1831. Desp.97, PRO, CO. 91/114).

Despite Spanish offers to negotiate fixed boundaries in 1851, the issue has never been settled. While Spain disputes British rights to territorial waters in the Bay area, British sovereignty over waters to the south and east of Gibraltar have been less disputed though never formally recognized by Spain. Consequently the controversy concerning sovereignty over territorial waters also entails the question of air-space especially in the Bay area (see map 6.2e, plates 6.2-6.3). The dispute is complicated by the fact that Spain is fighting the issue on two levels, that of British sovereignty over the
Gibraltar Colony, and British rights to any territorial waters, and that of a micro-maritimo dispute in the Bay area, the product of British encroachment on land and sea.

Concerning the maritime dispute, the British correspondence of 1826 and 1851 claim the waters of the Bay as far north as Punta Mala, claiming that they were included in the cession of the Port of Gibraltar (1713), partly upon the cannon shot doctrine. Spain points out that it never accepted the cannon shot argument in relation to Gibraltar; but that even if the theory were applied, the cannon range of 1712 was inferior to that of British claims applying the same theory in the first half of the 19th century. If the cannon shot doctrine is equitably implemented between adjoining states, it has to be applied perpendicular to the coast, hence the maritime boundary line would run as an extension of the land boundary of Gibraltar’s walls or the Fence.

Britain claimed that all of the waters of the Bay to the east of a line drawn from Punta Mala, (far to the north of any land territorial claim ever made by London), to the Old (North) Mole in Gibraltar were encompassed within the term "Gibraltar, together with the port . . . thereunto belonging", as appearing in Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) (Levie, 1983, p.90). This stance taken in 1826 and vigorously supported by successive British governments encompasses waters far beyond British land jurisdiction. In 1858 and 1873, Spain proposed negotiations on the drawing of formal boundaries, but Britain felt that the claims which had been lodged in 1826 were
established and did not feel a need for revision.

Since the 1950s, Britain has modified its position somewhat, and has tried to conform to the LOS (Art.12 1958 & Art.15 1982). An official map published in 1968 (Untitled Map of the Bay of Gibraltar, Compiled and Drawn by D.I.S. Map), uses the Fence as the line for seaward projection east and west, and then follows the median line principle in a south-east direction, dividing the Bay roughly in half, with the exception of 'the Loop'. 'The Loop', some 2 miles on the line of the Fence, extends a quarter of a mile to the north of the line (see maps 3.2, 6.3).

6.6 THE AIRBASE AND RUNWAY.

In 1876, on the orders of the Governor of Gibraltar the fruit and vegetable gardens on the neutral ground were destroyed and replaced by public gardens, and subsequently a race course was constructed. This was at a period when excellent relations existed between the authorities at Gibraltar and the Spanish administration in the Campo. By 1914, it was generally accepted that the North Front or sandy area to the north of the Rock was a British possession. During World War I, experiments with seaplanes were carried out from the harbour, but attempts to use the racecourse as a landing ground were stopped following Spanish protests because of a crash on the Spanish side of the Fence (Ramsey, 1978, p.4).

In the 1920s, the governors of Gibraltar and Algeciras
formulated a joint plan for the construction of an Anglo-Spanish airfield on the Spanish side of the fence. Madrid and London did not approve the scheme. In 1931, a local aircraft company was given permission to use the race course as an airfield for use in services between Gibraltar and Tangier; however the air company closed down after three and a half months.

In 1932, the Governor was given instructions from the War Office in the form of a secret memorandum issued by the Committee of Imperial Defence, in which it recommended that plans should be worked out for the establishment at short notice of an airfield on the North Front. Inevitably this included the race course area. The Governor submitted his plans to the War Office (12 May 1932). It was then submitted to the Colonial Office, the latter expressed doubt as to the international validity of the situation as Spain had always claimed sovereignty rights up to the foot of the Rock. The Governor replied that:

"... (he was) strongly of the opinion that it would be a great mistake to open up any discussion on this point, in any case, (he) would hesitate to express an opinion on the matter without very careful research. There is much old correspondence on the subject in the archives in the Secretariat and elsewhere and as the opportunity offers this is being collected and carefully examined. For the present it would appear to be sufficient to state that our length of tenure of the area in question gives H.M. Government the strongest claims" (quoted in Ramsey, 1978, p.6).

This opinion was approved in London and construction of the emergency landing ground began on 3 September 1934 (see map 6.2e).
In early 1934, Sir Alan Cobham went to Gibraltar to make a survey and report on the feasibility of an air route between Gibraltar and Tangier for civil usage. The scheme was rejected for it would interfere with the military training ground and the recreational area on the North Front. By 10 March 1936, the 'emergency landing ground' was ready for usage.

The first evidence for a full size airfield came from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, W. Ormsby-Gore MP. who wrote to Governor General Harrington on 1 October 1936, and asked for his opinion about a proposed air base at Gibraltar, partly on an area reclaimed from the sea. However the Governor had already had discussions with Sir Samuel Hoare, First Lord of the Admiralty, and agreement had been reached that an air base was essential. On 26 November 1936, Mr. Ormsby-Gore wrote again stating that the Government had decided that while a base was essential for Imperial Defence, they did not wish to alienate Spain and create international complications by reclaiming land at that particular time. Several other schemes were discussed (Ramsey, 1978, p.7). The Air Ministry opted to revive the reclamation plan, suggesting that 1,000 yards by 800 yards (914m by 731 m) be created on the western side of the isthmus.

The Governor unofficially found out that the Franco Government was aware of the plans and was ready to fortify the neighbourhood if works began. Upon receiving the information the Foreign Office's reply to the Governor was:

"... as far as Mr. Eden is aware ... it was never contemplated that General
Franco's administration should be consulted on this subject. Unless, therefore, the fortifications of the neighbourhood of Gibraltar represents a serious threat to the neighbourhood of the Colony, a matter on which Mr. Eden is not competent to advise, he does not consider it necessary to make any notification to the Salamanca authorities" (Ramsey, 1978, p.7).

The matter was let lie for some time, then in November 1938, Harrington was replaced as Governor by General Sir Edmund Ironside, and the issue was brought up once more. It was agreed that the Spanish Nationalist Government should be informed of the proposed developments, on the lines that the emergency landing ground was to be improved, for more extensive use and that the Fleet Air Arm units from visiting aircraft carriers would be using it for training.

An article in the Francoist newspaper Arriba, (Aug. 1939) concluded:

"A few days ago, in one of our editorials, we expressed the hope that for the sake of good relations between Spain and Britain the old dispute about Gibraltar would now be settled. Today we have to confess that the attitude expressed by England in establishing this military airfield eighty metres from our lines is not the best way to arrive at an understanding or to confirm an expressed desire for friendship, particularly if these military defence works are going to be built on land over which we have today, as always, unquestionable right of sovereignty" (Ramsey, 1978, p.8).

Shortly afterwards the Governor informed the War Office that Spain was building defences on its portion of the neutral
ground and had increased the guard at the frontier. He also stated that unless bilateral discussions took place on the issue:

"... the series of pin-pricks to which Gibraltar is subjected will increase and that friendly relations with Spain will be difficult, if not impossible to achieve" (Ramsey, 1978, p.8).

In September 1939, the Royal Air Force (RAF) arrived at Gibraltar from Malta and formed No. 200 Group with its Head Quarters (HQ) in the Bristol Hotel; and began to operate flying boats from the harbour. For the RAF and Royal Navy (RN), the matter of an efficient operational airbase was by now urgent. Captain F.E.P. Barrington, Commander of the AOC Mediterranean Command stated to the military authorities that:

"It is now clear that no sanction has been given for the construction of anything more than an emergency landing ground without hanger or workshop accommodation, and the Spanish authorities have been told that the present construction is solely for that purpose. Further it is unlikely that the Foreign Office will consent to an alteration of policy. It is apparent that even when this landing strip is completed it cannot be used for any other purpose than as an emergency landing ground and that until such time as the political situation vis-à-vis Spain changes completely the suggestion to operate land aircraft from Gibraltar is impracticable" (Ramsey, 1978, p.9).

On 4 December 1939, Governor Liddell received a copy of a secret dispatch to the British Ambassador in Madrid. It was accompanied by a letter from Mr. Malcolm Mac Donald to General
Liddell, in which the Colonial Secretary stated that an aide-memoire had been given to the Spanish Ambassador in London on 25 April 1939; and that the main purpose of the works at Gibraltar would be to improve an emergency landing ground. The letter stated that:

"It is not proposed to seek the assent of the Spanish Government for the use of the landing ground for the purposes in view and, although it is not the intent of His Majesty's Government to employ the landing ground for operational purposes, it is not considered desirable to furnish the Spanish Government with any assurance on this point" (Ramsey, 1978, p.9).

During 1939-40, the different branches of the British administration vacillated on the issue of reclamation of maritime space for a runway, but work on the land runway continued.

The idea of the seaward extension of the runway faded into the background until March 1941, when the Governor, and the British Ambassador to Madrid, received a letter on behalf of Winston Churchill. It was pointed out in the letter that the presence of the German forces in Sicily posed a major threat to British communications with the Middle East and that Gibraltar could serve as an intermediate halt in liasions. Churchill referred to the fact that the Spanish Government had been informed that the landing ground was only to be used in an "emergency". He proceeded to define the term as:

"In one sense the war itself is an emergency . . . in a narrower sense an emergency is created by the fact that aeroplanes cannot fly direct to the Middle East. In a third sense landings of these aircraft will not be
Churchill stated that he agreed to the usage of the landing ground on condition that no violation of Spanish territorial rights would in practice be involved, that landings would be intermittent, and arrivals singly and unostentatiously. The letter concluded that it was not considered necessary or desirable to consult the Spanish authorities or to inform them of what was proposed.

The airfield and runway was aligned almost due east-west, roughly in the middle of the original neutral ground, with the airfield to the south of the British Fence and Spanish Line. By 6 April transit aircraft had arrived and tests were being carried out. A special committee was constituted and decided after consultation with London to increase the width of the runway and create an extension westwards. The extension formed a "V" towards the south west with the existing strip and was actually the foundation of the present runway. In his communications with the War Office, the Governor was assured that the matter had been approved at a high level (Ramsey, 1978, p.11).

The reclamation scheme went ahead with the runway extension seawards coming to 521 m (570 yds). An RAF station was erected at North Front. The USA supported the scheme. The US was keen on the project as Gibraltar could prove useful to the US Air Ferry Service from West Africa to the UK for the arrival of the first US bombers to assist in the assault on Germany.
Governor was assured that Britain would supply the labour and plant and that some plant would be supplied by the USA.

The main road between La Linea and Gibraltar could not be diverted and had to cross the runway. Besides the evident danger of accidents, some 7,000 Spanish nationals crossed daily to work in the Crown Colony. This added to the security risk because of enemy agents entering with the work force (Ramsey, 1978, pp. 36-44).

In November 1941, AOC-in-C Coastal Command, Air Chief, Marshal Sir Philip de la Ferte expressed the view that due to the geostrategic importance of the project, a seaward extension of half a mile, providing a runway of 1,646 m (1,800 yds) would be desirable. Higher authorities suggested that 1,417 m (1,550 yds) would be adequate for the moment. Work began on the seaward extension in December 1941. Blasting took place at the "Scree", on the north east face of the Rock. Further material was blasted from the Rock and extracted from the vast tunnel network. The daily load was about 7,500 tons. As the work progressed, the international political implications deemed so important in former years faded.

By January 1942, the runway had been extended to 900 m (985 yds). By April it was 1,052 m (1,150 yds) long and able to handle heavy aircraft en route for Egypt and India. By November 1942, the 1,417 m (1,550 yds) extension for Operation Torch was completed. By January 1943, the extension was 1,646 m (1,800 yds). In July it was ready for use to its full length. By 1943, nothing remained of the race course, or Victoria Gardens
on the once neutral ground. After World War II, a further 183 m (200 yds) was added to the western extension of the runway. In 1983, the Gibraltar Year Book gave the length of the runway as 1,829 m (2,000 yds). Churchill called the airfield, "Gibraltar's greatest contribution to the war" (Ramsey, 1978, p.40; Levie, 1983, p.184). After 1945, military usage of the air base continued and gradually civilian flights became important accounting for over 50% of traffic by 1969 (BIS COI, Gibraltar Airport: The Facts, 1968, p.10).

The airfield does not constitute further encroachment by Britain on Spanish territory, Levie (1983, p.79) states:

"but the putting to a new use of Spanish territory already improperly occupied, a use which has had a considerable impact on all of the surrounding Spanish territory".

Spain feels embittered that the initial actions for the construction of the airfield were undertaken when Spain was weak because of the ravages of the Civil War (Red Book, 1965, pp.373-375). Indeed the action was reminiscent of the strategy between 1704-13.

On 17 April 1967, Spain published an Order declaring that an area of territory in the Gibraltar area was prohibited to aircraft (see map 6.3). Britain raised the matter in the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) under Article 54(n) of the Chicago Convention. The Council considered the issue (10-13 May 1967). Spain invoked Article 9(a) of the Convention as the basis for declaring a Prohibited Area, which it was argued was "of reasonable extent and location
so as not to interfere unnecessarily with air navigation". Spain argued that Article 1 of the Convention upheld its sovereign right on land and territorial sea to establish such an area when considered necessary for security reasons. The UK invoked the statement of the Permanent Court of International Justice that:

"... restrictions on the exercise of sovereign rights accepted by treaty by the state cannot be an infringement of sovereign rights" (O'Connell, 1982, p.335).

The Council failed to reach a conclusion and bilateral talks broke down when Spain set the precondition that Britain accept that the land upon which the air facilities are situated was Spanish sovereign territory. Because of these restrictions civil and military air services into Gibraltar had to use the open channel of the Strait for access. Aircraft approaching the airport from east or west have to change course near the runway in order to avoid the Prohibited Area. These approaches cannot be taken in adverse weather conditions. Precision-approach radar for approaches from the east end are available, but this presupposes free flight into the Bay from the Strait. According to O'Connell (1982, p.336):

"The Spanish reticence with respect to the Straits has thus been a precondition of the continued operation of the Gibraltar airport at all. But in order not to exacerbate the situation, Royal Navy and Air Force planes are instructed not to fly within four miles of the Spanish coast. Although their maritime reconnaissance squadrons engage in surveillance over the Strait, they are instructed not to drop sonar buoys in the claimed territorial waters".
With the opening of the frontier between Spain and Gibraltar (1985), substantive discussions concerning the airport did not ensue. However several plans were suggested by London and Madrid. London offered usage of Gibraltar airport to Spain for civil and military aircraft, but the idea of joint control is more in line with the Spanish perspective. One plan that possibly has the backing of both governments is for the construction of an airport terminal on the Spanish side of the frontier linked to Gibraltar airport, which could be used for internal flights (Sunday Times, 5 June 1985, p.25).

Due to lack of constructive dialogue on the isthmus/airport issue (1985-87), Spain blocked the entry into force of the EC Single European Act on 1 July 1987. The dispute centred on the inclusion of Gibraltar airport in the air fare liberalization agreement (Guardian, 1 July 1987, p.1). The Spanish Transport Minister vetoed the package. He said that the agreement would have given airlines free access to the airport, in common with other regional facilities in Europe, thus implicitly conceding sovereignty to Britain, and prejudicing the outcome of future sovereignty negotiations (Independent, 26 June 1987, p.1). A Spanish diplomat to the EC, Jesus Ezquerra, insisted that the agreement had to exclude Gibraltar airport "which stands on disputed land". He objected to it being treated as a British regional airport (Sunday Times (Focus), 5 July 1987, p.25). Another Spanish diplomat stated that:

"Spain cannot be a signatory to any international agreement that appears to give Britain sovereignty over the isthmus. Any agreement over the isthmus which is not
decided in bilateral talks would do that" (Sunday Times, 5 July 1987, p.25).

Britain wishes the airport to be included in all international agreements. According to The Times (5 July 1987, p.25), "The British negotiators were not prepared to budge an inch". However talks on the dilemma were held two weeks later in London between Gibraltar's Chief Minister, Joshua Hassan and Britain's Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, details were not released. (Times, 14 July 1987, p.8). In November 1987, the British government offered Spain "co-operation in the use of the airport" as opposed to "joint control". In an effort to block discussions on the project, some 15,000 Gibraltarians held a demonstration in the Colony (Financial Times, 27 Nov.1987, p.3). In response Britain warned the Gibraltarians that it may "invoke the Governor's reserve powers, and impose direct rule", if they continue to obstruct an Anglo-Spanish deal on the airport (Financial Times, 2 Dec.1987, p.2). Britain's offer to Madrid includes the building by Spain of a second terminal to handle passengers to and from Spain who would be exempt from Gibraltar's passport and customs controls. Britain is also prepared to have a Spanish air traffic controller at the airport, in the interest of improved liaison between the Gibraltar and Seville control towers (Financial Times, 2 Dec.1987, p.2).

6.7 POLITICAL STATUS.

6.7.1 Sovereignty.

Gibraltar is unique in the history of British colonialism
in that over 51% of the land is owned by the Ministry of Defence (MOD), while the MOD and Property Services Agency employs about 34% of the workforce of 12,000. A further third is employed by the Gibraltar Government and the remainder in the private sector. By 1981, some 65% of the gross national product (GNP) was generated by HMG expenditure (HC. Rept. 1981, p.xli). In consequence the Governor, who is an active list officer and Commander in Chief of the garrison, is appointed by the monarch. The locally elected Government does not have absolute internal powers. In principle the Governor is in charge of defence, external affairs, internal security and economic stability.

Spanish arguments advanced in the Red Book (1965,1968) and other official publications state that Gibraltar was not given to Britain under the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) as a military base or colony. If this is the case then what exactly did the cession entail. Britain claims that Gibraltar was ceded, and as British sovereign territory, it may be used for whatever purpose the British Government deems appropriate. Spain has repeatedly put the Gibraltar issue before the UN on the principle of decolonization, yet disowns the Gibraltarians. In international fora Spain has accused Britain of undermining the security of the state because of the military base. There are evident inherent contradictions in the Spanish argument.

The text of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) reveals that: (i) the word "garrison" is used, this implies military base; and (ii) provision is made for the respect of the religious traditions of the "Roman Catholic inhabitants", obviously
referring to the Gibraltarian/Spanish inhabitants under Protestant rule. With so many references to "fort", "castle", "garrison", and "religion"; this suggests a military base and colony. Depending on the intensity of the dispute, sometimes Britain takes the premise that Gibraltar was gained by right of conquest (but it must be remembered that Gibraltar was not a terra nullis (sovereignless territory) before 1704), and subsequently British "rights" were consolidated in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713).

Gibraltar's status between 1704-13 was that of a territory occupied by allied forces in the name of a claimant to the Spanish throne. British strategy during this period left them in a dominant position. Gibraltar's status from 1713 until 1830 would seem to have been that of a territory taken by right of conquest, but legitimized in the form of a cession (Article X, Treaty of Utrecht 1713). Regardless of other contingent factors involved in shaping the Treaty, Spain's loss of an integral part of its territory to Britain was made under duress. By 1713 the British presence was a fait accompli. Spain has continuously sought retrocession. The majority of world states, especially former colonies including Morocco sympathize with the Spanish case. Yet Spain did not lodge an official protest when Gibraltar was designated a Crown Colony (1830). This status remained without change until 1950 when due to pressure from the Gibraltarians, Legislative and Executive Councils were created. The power lobby representing the Gibraltarians was the Association For the Advancement of Civil Rights (AACR). At this
point Spain feared that Britain would follow a devolutionist policy, possibly leading to some form of independent state, perhaps of the puppet genre.

Visits of the British Royal family to Gibraltar, including that of Elizabeth II (1954) and the Prince and Princess of Wales (1981) were felt as insults by Spain and it was only in 1986 that official visits to Britain by the Spanish Royal family recommenced, the first since 1905. To register displeasure at the 1954 visit, Spain stopped the issuance of new work passes to Spaniards wishing to work in Gibraltar. This was a prelude to Gibraltar's longest recorded siege (1969-85). In 1961, Anglo-Spanish discussions got underway in Madrid with Britain asking for a return to the pre-1954 regime. However the winds of change were hitting Gibraltar. Spain pointed out that the issue entailed much more than smuggling; namely the unilateral modifications introduced by Britain into the Gibraltar administration and political reforms "without consulting the Spanish Government" (Red Book, 1965, p.70).

6.7.2 The Colony.

Britain's commitments to the Crown Colony are: (i) if Britain should ever decide to relinquish sovereignty, then Spain has first option of sovereign control; (ii) Gibraltar will not be ceded to Spain against the wishes of the majority of Gibraltarians; and (iii) as a dependent territory to carry out plans for economic and social development. Professor Allen in
his memorandum to the Special Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons (HC. Rept. 1980-81, p.xliv), summed up the realities of the situation when he stated:

"The rights of the Gibraltarians, our political philosophers may reflect, are not the only rights to be considered; Spain has rights and so does the UK. In the last resort we have to face the dilemma that the Gibraltarians demand to remain indefinitely in exactly their present status, especially at very considerable cost to the UK taxpayers, may be unjustifiable, if not impossible to grant. The heart of the matter - is the indissoluble tie in the minoritie's mind between citizenship and territory; it is in the end for the majority of UK citizens, as represented by the British Government and Parliament of the day, to decide what is and shall remain British territory."

Since the 19th century, sovereignty has come to apply as a legal presumption only to territories formally constituted, accepted, and recognized by other states in the international system of states (Crawford, 1979, p.126). As Gibraltar is not a state and its inhabitants do not constitute a nation or distinct ethnic group, but possess a common/unique culture with many ethnic and cultural affiliations with Britain and Spain, the principle of self-determination cannot be deemed as sacrosanct. It is interesting that Knight (1985, pp.248-272) in his analysis of post-colonial determination on a global scale does not discuss Gibraltar, or similar situations where a sovereign state wishes to decolonize territory rather than people. According to Mikesell's (1986, pp.1-5) framework for the study of minority group aspirations, the diagnostic terms are
"recognition" of unique identity, perception of "access" and "participation" in larger national group, degree and/or aspiration for "separation", "autonomy" and/or independence. The Gibraltarians seek recognition as a unique entity, with access and participation in a state (UK) almost 1,000 mls away. While wishing to retain sovereign links with Britain, the Gibraltarians have been veering towards autonomy since the 1960s, but history and geopolitical imperatives preclude independence.

6.8 THE GIBRALTARIANS.

Since 1704 Gibraltar's raison d'être has been that of a military base, with civilian politics only allowed to develop in so far as they suited military needs. While Britain now contends that the wishes of the civilian population must be respected, Gibraltar has always been firstly a military base and only secondly a colony in so far as a civilian population was needed to help maintain the base. However by referendum (1968) the overwhelming majority of Gibraltarians have voted to remain under British rule. Spain cannot advance a demographic argument claiming sovereignty over the people of Gibraltar. With the allied Anglo-Dutch occupation of Gibraltar (1704) the population had the choice of leaving, or remaining and swearing allegiance to the Archduke Charles, claimant to the Spanish throne. About 4,000 left with the defeated army, and some 70 remained.

Today the Gibraltarians are of heterogeneous origin:
British, Cypriot, French, Genoese, Irish, Indian, Italian, Maghrebi, Maltese, Minorcan, Neapolitan, Portuguese, Spanish, Jewish and so forth. The 1961 census had a "miscellaneous" item which claimed that the resident British subjects in Gibraltar not born there nor in Britain or Spain had been born in 55 other states, while the resident alien population came from some 25 states.

In 1981, the population was 29,500 civilians; 19,500 Gibraltarians, 6,500 British and 3,500 aliens of whom 2,850 were Moroccans. There were an additional 1,850 British servicemen not counting their families. Between 1949-1981 some 1,166 Gibraltarians married Spanish nationals (mostly Spanish women) (HC. Rept. 1981, p.vii). The fact that so many Gibraltarian males have married Spanish women over the centuries has helped reinforce the Spanish language, catholicism and other facets of Spanish culture.

Since 1713, epidemics and war have caused great population fluctuations. The last major upheaval was in 1940 with the evacuation of civilians from the Colony, whereby all save 4,000 males were left with the forces. After World War II the population returned to its former numbers.

In the past, Spain’s pejorative statements in relation to the Gibraltarians and their ethnic origins has done little to endear the people of the Colony into accepting closer ties with Spain. In the 1960s, the Spanish press referred to the Gibraltarians as "neither English or Spanish" (Red Book, 1965, p.433); and "English, second rate English; Spanish, imitation
Spanish, and other forms of impure descent" (Red Book, 1965, pp. 424-425). The term "pseudo-Gibraltarian" was also used. This type of propaganda is more reminiscent of the fascist racial doctrines than the present tenor of Spanish diplomacy.

Unlike the situation in Ceuta and Melilla, where many Muslims ultimately seek the protection of the Moroccan government, the Gibraltarians do not wish any formal political links with the Spanish authorities. Spain cannot support a demographic argument in laying claim to the Colony, in the light of historical factors. By 1741, of the male population on the Rock, 45 were English, 96 Spanish, and 169 Genoese. As early as 1712, 28 shops on the main street were run by Jews paying rent and a Christian levy to the Governor. The 1753 census lists the number of civilians as 1,816, of whom 434 were globally categorized as British (the majority were Scots and Irish), with 597 Genoese, 575 Jews, 185 Spanish and 25 Portuguese. By 1779, about a third of the population were Sephardic Jews (Stewart, 1967, p.116). In the civil census of the 18th century categorized under British, Roman Catholic and Jewish, the respective statistics are 467, 1,460, and 783 in 1776; 519, 1,819 and 863 in 1777; and 512, 2,098 and 776 in 1787. The total population in 1815 was 10,136, of which 6,754 were comprised of the security forces and their families (Stewart, 1967, p.160). The ethnic composition of the civilian population in 1814 was 886 Genoese, 650 Portuguese, 527 Spanish, 489 Jewish, 403 British, 138 Minorcan and 104 Italian (Stewart, 1967, p.160).
According to the terms of Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht, residence in Gibraltar is forbidden to Jewish and Muslim peoples. Besides the historical heritage of religious bigotry Spain wished to hinder the development of a strong Maghrebi population nominally under British tutelage. Spain feared an alliance of its two traditional enemies in Gibraltar which would threaten communications with Ceuta and the Plazas. Britain never upheld this clause of the Treaty for economic and strategic reasons. Traders of different ethnic origins helped to defray some of the base's expenses and to establish Gibraltar on the major trading and victualling routes. Also good relations with Morocco was an imperative for survival, especially in procuring water and supplies of fresh food. During the most recent "siege" (1969-85), Moroccan immigrant workers replaced the Spanish "day workers". For obvious reasons Spain does not list this particular clause of the Treaty in its body of grievances concerning Britain's non-adherence to aspects of the Treaty of Utrecht. Nonetheless, Gibraltarians of non-Christian origin cannot overlook the implications of such an historic perspective.

While Spain has stated that if Gibraltar were retroceded, the Gibraltarians would be protected and their interests respected, Spanish attitudes are ambiguous (Pueblo, 30 April 1959, Franco interview; Red Book, 1968, p.391; Red Book, 1965, p.289, p.422; Levie, 1983, pp.95-96). Franco referred to the "true" Gibraltarians as the inhabitants of San Roque (Pueblo, 30 April 1959; Red Book, 1965, p.289, p.422). Because of such
statements in the past, the Gibraltarians are not convinced of Spanish goodwill. Gibraltarian politicians like Sir Joshua Hassan have reiterated time and again, the uniqueness of the Gibraltarians and their history of religious and racial tolerance. This mutual tolerance provides a striking contrast to the situation in the Plazas. In the 1970s, the Gibraltarians also witnessed Spain's mismanagement of the decolonization of the Western Sahara, in which the Saharawis were effectively denied the right to self-determination because Madrid secretly agreed with Morocco and Mauritania to divide the territory between the latter two states (see chapter 8) (Franck, 1976, pp.694-721).

Although Spain has moderated its official statements and tried to win Gibraltarian support, in the light of the overwhelming pro-British vote in the 1967 referendum, the population remains sceptical. The reasons for this attitude are manifold. The Gibraltar's multi ethnic, racial and religious matrix and polyglot origins has produced a bilingual culture which is unique. To be sure, Spanish is the language of home and religion, and English the tongue of the bureaucracy, commerce, education and social mobility; but the colonial complex of the Gibraltarian is more akin to a regional or class consciousness rather than that of the despised native.

Immigration to the Rock has been for economic reasons, or a quest for religious tolerance or social mobility; the Sephardic Jewish, Italian and Irish component of the population offers examples. The Roman Catholic and Spanish language culture of
the majority was disassociated from the Spanish religious hierarchy and educational system. Under the stewardship of the colonial authorities, the bishops and clergy of Gibraltar came from non-Spanish stock such as the Irish. From the 19th century until recently, the primary and secondary educational system for children of all religions has been the terrain of Irish nuns and brothers under the auspices of the British administration. It is somewhat ironic that Spanish is taught as a foreign language by non-native speakers using curricula similar to those used in Britain, while the vast majority of pupils speak Spanish as their first language. Similarly history and geography curricula devote little or no place to Spain, being based on British curricula.

Because of the negative attitudes expressed by Spain to the Gibraltarians the locals fear becoming stateless pawns in international affairs, like the Ugandan Asians of the 1970s. Despite a certain disdain for the visiting British administrators and MOD personnel whose cultural and ethnic prejudices sometimes come to the fore, the Gibraltarians have yet to be convinced that they would fare better under Spanish administration. They are not convinced of the viability of the Spanish economy nor democracy. Even the most apoliticized Gibraltarian is familiar with Francoism. Unfortunately frontier personnel on the Spanish side of the divide do little to dispel fears. Harassment in restricting and eventually cutting off communications between Spain and Gibraltar (1965-85) reinforced the siege mentality, engendering the concomitant folklore and
prejudices. A "ghettoization" of the generation of the 1970s and 80s has taken place. Many parents feel that open communications with La Linea will have negative social effects in such forms as drug abuse. Many fear a drop in their living standards in the event of retrocession. Gibraltar's free port status, MOD-related spending and spinoff employment, and generous Whitehall contributions has afforded the majority a high standard of living (especially 1935-1980s) in comparison to their Spanish neighbours. Between 1970-78, Gibraltar received a £4 million ODA grant for housing and schools, and other ODA grants totalling £15.8 million, some £850 per Gibraltarian capita (BIS COI, Factsheet. 1979). However the economic situation has been in a state of flux since the mid-1980s.

In 1967, in the face of protests from the UN General Assembly and Spain, Britain conducted a referendum in Gibraltar in which 95.8% of the eligible voters exercised their franchise. Of the 12,237 votes cast, 12,138 choose:

"... voluntarily to retain their link with Great Britain, with democratic local institutions and with Britain retaining its' present responsibilities".

Only 44 opted "to pass under Spanish sovereignty in accordance with the terms proposed by the Spanish Government" (HC. Rept. 1981. p.xi; Levie, 1983, p.112). Thus for the first time in the history of British-Gibraltarian relations, the civilian population was consulted about its future. Like many myths about Gibraltar, democracy is one of them. It did not exist on the Rock until after World War II, and then only within
circumscribed limits dictated by the colonial administration. Democracy as it exists today is a recent phenomenon.

The real issue of Gibraltar's geostrategic function and the British-Spanish dispute has been somewhat overshadowed by two geographical phenomena; (i) the principle of the territorial integrity of the Spanish state, and (ii) the right of the Gibraltarians to some form of self-determination. The Gibraltarians are not a homogenous ethnic group nor nation, nor a colonized people in the true sense of the word; but rather Gibraltarian British citizens. To speak of national or self-determination is not really possible. A few minor politicians have called for independence, but the majority along with the governments of Britain and Spain do not wish this to occur. The geopolitical implications of a micro-state in this location are not in the interests of the riparian states, NATO nor the EC. Besides it is not a viable proposition for the Gibraltarians. In accordance with the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), Britain has never offered sovereignty to a third state.

"... in case it shall hereafter seem meet... to grant, sell, or by any means to alienate therefrom... the said town of Gibraltar... preference... shall always be given to the Crown of Spain before any others" (The Treaty of Utrecht, 1713; Red Book, 1965, p.155-157).

It was during World War II that Gibraltarian political organization came about. Up to then any type of social unrest or trade union activity had been ruthlessly suppressed (Stewart, 1967, p.80). In 1942, Joshua Hassan set up the Association for the Advancement of Civil Rights (AACR). After 1945, local
political agitation entered Gibraltar's restricted stage. The AAGR got limited powers in the new Legislative and Executive Councils in 1950. Spain saw this as the first step in the transfer of sovereignty to the local population. In 1954, Spain imposed border restrictions on crossing, and suspended the issuance of new work permits for Spanish workers. Greater self-government was given to the Gibraltarians in 1956 and 1964. With the closing of the La Linea border in 1969, over 3,000 Moroccans were recruited as non-permanent residents for manual labour. Their spouses and families did not have a right of residence. Like the unfair treatment of Spanish workers before 1969, the Moroccans face the same problems. This lends weight to Spanish criticism of colonialism.

The sociology of Gibraltarian society is based on wealth (no matter how accumulated) and a hierarchy of interests. As in many colonies and disputed territories, home governments are technically responsible. In practice abuses arise within the society itself rendering change from the outside problematic. A similar situation exists in the Plazas. The Gibraltarians like the Ceutis and Melillinese have to face change. Doubtless this will not be smooth. As Francis Bacon says:

"He who cannot compromise is a fool. He who will not compromise is a bigot. He who dare not compromise is a slave" (Beyond the Religious Divide).
6.9 THE ECONOMICS OF SOVEREIGNTY.

6.9.1 The British Contribution.

A close look at the Gibraltar economy reveals the price of British sovereignty. Between 1969-85, over 67% of Gibraltar’s imports came from the UK and HMG expenditure amounted to about 67% of the national income with the MOD alone paying over 60% of the salaries in the Colony. Public sector employment included 1,800 British servicemen, 300 expatriate civilians, (over 500 family dependents) and over 3,000 Gibraltarian and Moroccan civilians. The naval base and dockyards employ equal numbers of the active population, 23% and 22% respectively, with only 14% in the wholesale and retail trades and 5% in tourism (Lancaster & Taulbee, 1985, p.258). In 1981, it was suggested closing the RN Dockyard as of 1983. The economic policies of Prime Minister Thatcher are gradually reducing British Government investment in the industry. The phasing out of refit and ship repair facilities could mean the loss of over 1,000 jobs. The British Government converted the dockyards (not the naval base) to private operations and management (1984); carrying grants of £28 million by way of subsidy in the first two years, and a commercial contract with the RN for three years.

interaction with the cosmopolite community of the Costa del Sol (Telegraph, 12 April 1987, p.35).

Because of its limited area, and lack of agricultural land, water and natural resources, everything has to be imported into Gibraltar. Spain being aware of this put restrictions on Gibraltar's land communications (1713) and mounted several sieges and blockades over the ages. However British and Gibraltarian will-power proved stronger than the Spanish geostrategy.

Theoretically, to import, Gibraltar has to export. Yet its manufacturing facilities are negligible, lagging behind those of Ceuta and Melilla. In 1979, out of a workforce of 11,593; 2,858 were employed in shipbuilding, only 204 were engaged in other manufacturing (Levie, 1983, p.97). Despite the tourist potential, in 1979 only 578 persons were employed in restaurants, hotels and tourist related trades. This was largely due to the closed frontier (1969-1985). The Gibraltarians and their administration are hoping to cash in on the Costa del Sol tourist bonanza. According to Le Monde (1 Nov.1986), Gibraltar has become the most fashionable area for tourists in south-western Spain.

Concerning land ownership, the Ministry of Defence ranks first (51%); and is followed by the Gibraltar Government possessing nearly as much, and the remaining 3% is under private freehold. While the Crown pays rates or property tax to the Gibraltar government, the rates are based on usage which is claimed to be very low. On this basis, the Gibraltarians have
been arguing for decades that more land should be made available to local people.

6.9.2 Entrepot: Smuggling.

Many of Gibraltar's dubious trading activities have soured British-Spanish relations, and doubtless will cause problems in the EC context. Britain recognized the ideal location of Gibraltar as an entrepot, storage and distribution centre at an early date. It was hoped that it would develop into the Hong Kong of the Mediterranean, this dream is not altogether dead in British and Gibraltarian circles, especially since 1985. Historically Spain has been aware of the commercial potential of ports in the Strait area. It is not a coincidence that the word tarif is derived from the Spanish town of Tarifa on the Strait.

Despite the stipulations of the Treaty (1713) pertaining to communication with the Campo and restrictions on trading, the Colony has been a centre for smuggling contraband, similar to the Plazas in Morocco. Crown officials and Gibraltarian administrators did little or nothing to limit the illicit trade throughout the centuries. It is common knowledge in Gibraltar which bureaucrats and leading families have amassed their wealth through illicit trading. There is no social moral censure on such business activities in Gibraltar. However some 'outsiders' in former times like the Governor of Gibraltar, Sir Robert W. Gardner were silenced or recalled to London, when they tried to break the contraband trade. In typical colonial
manner, local entrepreneurs with the backing of friendly politicians and MPs became involved. In the Gardiner case, British merchants and politicians were largely responsible for his recall in the last century. Again this is reminiscent of the situation in the Plaza. However without the aid of Spanish guards and officials the contraband trade would not be so lucrative. British-Gibraltarian entrepreneurship and disdain for Spain's economic problems have only been matched by Madrid's incapacity to control its own functionaries and actively prevent smuggling, as is the case with Rabat and its officials in the area of the Plazas.

According to Stewart (1967, p.123):

"The freeing of the Port of Gibraltar had been forced upon Queen Ann's government by the King of Morocco. The Order in Council of 1715 was issued to emphasize a previous order and to prevent abuses by the Governor of Gibraltar".

Gibraltar ceased to be a free port in 1827 when charges were levied on hulks and pontoons (used by smugglers) in the Bay by an Order in Council. In 1848, wharfage tolls were introduced and tonnage fees in 1858. In 1858 the Privy Council ordered duties on wines and spirits. But tradition dies hard, and the original grant was never rescinded.

In 1965 on the eve of Franco's blockade, the Malaga newspaper, Sur claimed that 300 smuggling ships cleared the Gibraltar port in 1959 (Stewart, 1967, p.268). During a BBC television interview in 1965, Fraga Iribarne, the Spanish Minister of Information claimed that nearly 1,000 smuggling
boats were operating near Gibraltar; of which 40 had been captured by Spain, and 20 by France, Italy and Algeria. Embarno stated that Gibraltar had "re-exported more than a thousand tons of cigarettes to Spain during 1963, and half a million motors". Smugglers also operate between Gibraltar and Tangier. The question of Pesetas derived from the contraband trade and illicit money changing (a common practice at ports on the Strait), along with the dual British and Spanish currency system on the Rock, is not advantageous to the Spanish economy.

According to the Gibraltar Chronicle (19 July 1961):

"Gibraltar has become the operations centre for smuggling organizations. Gibraltar is not a free port, but it is the next best thing. Imported goods are put in bond, for which a modest fee is charged. They can be removed and shipped out whenever the owner wishes. As long as they are not smuggled back into Gibraltar, the customs authorities do not worry too much where they go".

The Gibraltar Chamber of Commerce was confident enough to put on record in its 1960 report that the government had made storage facilities available to facilitate the smuggling trade (Stewart, 1967, p.269). The biennial government reports on Gibraltar giving import and re-export figures, groups dubious commodities with innocent ones, "so that the former cannot be subjected to separate assessment" (Stewart, 1967, p.270-272, see pp.122-141, 265-281). Statistics for Gibraltar like the Plazas suggest that the entire populations are chain smokers and alcoholics, having luxury products in triplicate.

According to Martinez (1971, pp.17-19), smuggling provides the real base of the economic life of the Colony, causing a loss
of $25 million to the Spanish exchequer between 1961-70. In 1971, Gibraltar was annually importing $5.5 million worth of US tobacco (pop. 25,000), while Spain was only importing $4.5 million worth (pop. 33 million). In 1969, over 8,000 automobile owners avoided Spanish taxes by registering their cars in Gibraltar with its 12.5 miles of street and road.

Such economic activities have greatly soured relations with Madrid, because of loss in revenue, flagrant violation of the Treaty of Utrecht, collusion of the Gibraltarian administration, and arrogance with which complaints have been received throughout the centuries. Smuggling involves both land and sea routes. The trade via the isthmus in the 18th century was minimal and further reduced by construction of the Spanish Line (1730-31). With the destruction of the Line (1810), the smugglers' path was once more open and the trade reached massive proportions with the influx of Spanish day workers from the early 19th century until 1969. Maritime smuggling in the area has always existed on a grand professional scale. Of course the problem has been exacerbated by disputes over maritime jurisdiction. Spanish protests went unheeded, while Madrid's innumerable actions in the Bay to curtail the activity were challenged by the British government as taking place within British territorial waters (Red Book, 1965, pp.217-256). Overt disputes of this nature have lessened since the 1970s, possibly as part of Spain's strategy of advancing a peaceful settlement to the sovereignty dispute, and also in the international forum, Spain is well aware that Morocco has similar grievances in
relatj.on to the Plazas.

The 'smuggling issue' is not as simple as some sources suggest, because of the often covert nature of the activity. On the evening of 6 April 1985, by chance, the author in the company of a friend employed by the local tax administration, during a 20 minute period observed a cat and mouse game between two small Spanish fishing boats and a RN patrol vessel less than 1 nm to the south west of the Rock. Ostensibly it seemed a case of attempting to fish within Gibraltarian territorial waters, yet the fishermen were trying to land in a secluded beach area. The Gibraltarian in the author's company believed that the 'fishermen' were attempting to pick up illicit merchandise.

The geography of the region lends itself to illicit trading. In February 1987, six Britons were held in a drugs raid off the Costa del Sol. The haul of half a ton of cannabis and 70 pounds of 'hashish' oil had its origins in Morocco and was transferred several times to different vessels in the vicinity of the Strait before the attempted landing on the Spanish mainland (Guardian, 6 Feb.1987).

Gibraltar has always gained a substantial part of its wealth from illicit trading. To reduce contentions, Britain must make greater efforts to bring Gibraltar's economic activities in line with EC norms. Spain must cooperate, and also re-assess unorthodox trading activities in Ceuta and Melilla which have an impact on the entire Strait region.
Once the UN became involved in the sovereignty dispute the issue could no longer be seen as a purely bilateral issue. The British-Spanish impasse had to be breached; a novel experience for two ex-colonial powers. The issue was put before the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1957 (see appendix V). Polarization of British and Spanish supporters took place, with Spain gaining the aid of many newly independent states, including the Latin American and Arab countries. Spain's decolonization policies in North Africa had a significant impact. King Hassan of Morocco supports Spanish calls for the return of Gibraltar, in the belief that retrocession automatically implies the return of the Plazas to Rabat. Though the superpowers have not become directly involved, on different occasions they voted on resolutions favourable to Spain.

The dispute illustrates that each case of decolonization is unique and global policies cannot be applied. Yet there are striking similarities with the case of the Plazas. Madrid sees Gibraltar as a colonial anachronism, and Rabat agrees including the Plazas in this category. Spain refuses to admit that there are similarities. Two states lay sovereign claim to Gibraltar and the Plazas on the principle of the 'territorial integrity' of the state. The principle of self-determination for the respective populations does not fully apply. A straight withdrawal of the colonial administrations from the territories does not offer a ready solution. Ostensibly the Gibraltar dispute is a bilateral issue, but in an era of increasing
supra-national organization, there are UN, EC and NATO dimensions. Any sovereignty changes in the region will clearly affect Moroccan-Spanish relations, and consequently those of Spain and Britain. Whatever form decolonization takes in Gibraltar, it will set a precedent for the Plazas, despite Spanish protests to the contrary. Spain reiterates the argument that Morocco was not a kingdom at the time Madrid acquired the Plazas, unlike the situation in Gibraltar in 1701.

In accordance with Article 37(e) of the UN Charter, Britain submitted the name of Gibraltar as an "administered territory" (1946), and started submitting reports. In 1957 Spain began lodging "jurisdictional reservations" with respect to Britain's right to do this, on the grounds that it considered Gibraltar an integral part of Spain. This is doubly interesting as Spain had never submitted such reports on its North African Plazas. In 1963 the Gibraltar issue was considered for the first time by the UN Special Committee. Britain refused to participate in bilateral negotiations and requested Spain not to intervene in the sessions. This British attitude to Gibraltar was no longer possible due to the changing international situation. During the hearings in September 1963, Britain supplied much of the requested information and pointed out that the Gibraltarians, through their freely elected leaders chose to retain a close association with Britain, and Britain would consider any proposals for change brought forward by them or their elected leaders.

Britain's stance is interesting because: (i) it was the
first time that any government had paid such deference to the political aspirations of the Gibraltarians; (ii) it directly involved the Gibraltarians for the first time in the international arena, giving them indirectly the full status of British citizens; (iii) because of the composition of the population and its ties with Britain, the latter was certain which way the Gibraltarians would veer in a referendum; (iv) by implication Francoist Spain was portrayed as an annexationist state, repressing its own minorities, and its subjects in the Morocco colonies, thus detracting from the sincerity of its support for decolonization; and (v) the classical colonial policy of paternalism in 'protecting' the native population took on a new moral mantle catering for the democratic wishes of artificially created majorities in disputed territories.

Spain's presentation of its revindications was not as thorough as that of Britain, despite valid arguments such as the perennial question of smuggling. In short, Spain's case heavily relied on the UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV), Paragraph 6, which abhors:

"any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the . . . territorial integrity of a country".

The Gibraltarians were represented by Sir Joshua Hassan, Chief Minister of Gibraltar's Councils, and the independent politician Peter Isola. Both stated that the Gibraltarians wanted "free association with an independent state" in conformity with Principle VI(b) of the UNGA Resolution 1541 (XV), naming Britain as the state. At this session the Latin
American and Arab states (including Tunisia) supported the "territorial integrity" principle, while Australia and Denmark supported the "self-determination" stance (Levie, 1983, p.104).

Bilateral relations deteriorated, and the Gibraltar (Constitution) Order (10 April 1964) was the ultimate provocation for Spain. This devolution of internal powers was seen as a forward step on the road to self-government.

At the 1964 meeting of the Special Committee, the Spanish delegation included the Mayor and Deputy Mayor of San Roque (The Campo), thus emphasizing the point that Gibraltar is not an island. The Gibraltarians presented a pamphlet entitled The Future of Gibraltar, published by the Legislative Council, stating that:

"... the people of Gibraltar wish to be politically associated with Britain and not Spain".

The Special Committee (1964) adopted a consensus affirming the applicability of the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" (UNGA Res. 1514 (XV)); noting that there was:

"a disagreement between the UK and Spain over the status and situation of the territory ... (both countries were invited) ... to begin talks without delay ... in order to reach a negotiated settlement ... giving due account of the opinions expressed by the members of the Committee and bearing in mind the interests of the people of the territory" (19 UN GAOR. Annexes, Annex 8 (part 1), p.314, UN Doc. A/5800/Rev.1 (1964); Red Book. 1965. III; Levie,1983, p.105).

In accordance, Spain invited Britain to engage in
negotiation (Nov. 1964). For whatever reason, Spain exacerbated ill feelings by delaying crossings at La Linea, imposing embargoes on Spanish exports to Gibraltar, non-renewal of vehicle licenses, and closing the frontier gates earlier than usual. The sixteenth siege was commencing. These actions triggered British nationalism and intransigence. Franco brought to the fore an almost outdated imperial reflex. Mutual recriminations became the order of the day. In this environment Spain's Foreign Minister, Castilla, suggested opening negotiations mentioning that despite Britain's unilateral measures concerning the administration of Gibraltar, Spain had "hitherto abstained from adopting the appropriate counter measures" and that failing a negotiated settlement, Spain "would find itself obliged in defence of its interests to revise its policy in relation to Gibraltar" (Red Book, 1965, p. 521; Bis FO, 1965, Cmd. 2632, p. 14).

Jingoism became the order of the day. The Spanish strategy would seem to have been one of attrition. It failed in relation to Britain, but in the longterm focussed world attention on the dispute. Spain highlighted the fact that it had no legal obligation under the terms of the Treaty (1713) to support the status quo of open communications, the airport situation nor British control of the southern part of the isthmus.

On the diplomatic front Britain refused to negotiate, by stating:

"that while Her Majesty's Government cannot regard the question of sovereignty as a matter for negotiation, they would normally have been willing to consider proposals by
the Spanish Government for discussions of ways in which good relations can be maintained and any cause of friction eliminated. They cannot, however entertain any proposals for such conversations so long as the present abnormal situation on the frontier continues" (Red Book, 1965, p.563; Levie, 1983, pp.106-107).

Further terse notes did not defuse the situation. The only addition to the argument was the Spanish statement that:

"all partial consideration of the problems derived from the existence of a British military base in Spain" (Red Book, 1965, p.525; Cmnd. 2632, p.7).

In February 1965, Spain reminded Britain that:

"(Spain would) . . . provide facilities so that no serious alterations (disturbances) in civilian life and in the economy of Gibraltar may occur before the opening of the negotiations and during the course of their development" (Red Book, 1965, pp.544-546; Cmnd. 2632, pp.18-19; 20 UN Gaor, 1 Annex, p.408, UN Doc. A/6000/Rev.1; Levie, 1983, p.107).

Britain restored the internal Gibraltar constitutional situation that had existed prior to the setting up of the Legislative and Executive Councils, that is the pre-1950 status.

On 5 November 1965, Spain communicated to the UN Secretary General that the border restrictions were the "exercise of Spain's sovereignty in its own territory" and that in accordance with the UNGA Special Committee "consensus", Spain wished to negotiate the issue and did "not set any prior condition" (Un Doc. A/6094, 5 Nov.1965). Because of the British stance on the frontier restrictions, Spain by
implication was telling the international community that Britain was imposing prior conditions on negotiations and retarding a settlement. In this situation Spain continued to invite Britain to negotiate and Britain continued to refuse. Quite clearly Spain did not want bilateral discussions, but rather wished that the UN Special Committee would go further in intervening in the issue.

Bilateral discussions eventually took place in 1966. At the London meeting in May, Spain's Foreign Minister reiterated that the Gibraltarians were an artificially constituted population and that the economy was based on smuggling. He also spoke about the naval base. Prior to this meeting Spain had notified Britain and other NATO states that:

"(it did) . . . not regard Gibraltar as a NATO base, and accordingly will not grant any facility for using it by the member states of NATO that may depend on Spain" (Red Book, 1968, p.340-342).

The ostensible reason given by Spain for this action was the demand made by the USSR and its satellites that the Gibraltar base be dismantled. This concern of Francoist Spain for the Soviet Block was most unusual. Thus at the London Meeting (May 1966), Spain's formal proposal for an agreement was: (i) the cancellation of Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713); (ii) a proposal to separately negotiate the British military base "whose structure, legal situation, and co-ordination with the defence organization of Spain or the Free World" would form a separate entity; and (iii) the creation of a legal regime which would govern the inhabitants (Red Book, 1968, pp.348-384,
Britain counter-argued that: the cession of Gibraltar was in absolute sovereignty; it exercised sovereignty over the ground between the Gibraltar frontier Fence and foot of the Rock; usage made of Gibraltar by it's allies was non-prejudicial to Spain; and the local economy was based on trade, tourism and military-related spending. Britain proposed that La Linea be maintained like any other international frontier, and that it would demolish the Fence, but would not renounce claims to the isthmus. Britain proposed that a resident Spanish Commissioner be appointed to Gibraltar; notification be given to Madrid prior to any constitutional changes; and reaffirmed Spain's right of first refusal in the event of relinquishing sovereignty. Britain also proposed modifications of Gibraltar's political institutions, giving it more of a municipal than a national image. Britain suggested the abolition of the free-port status and taking other actions against smugglers. London offered the Spanish MOD usage of Gibraltar's air and sea ports. The latter proposal was designed to detract from Spanish fears for national security, but grossly underestimated Spanish sensitivities on the colonial nature of the dispute.

In an effort to consolidate its sovereignty over the once neutral ground between the Rock and the Fence, Britain suggested that the matter be referred to an international tribunal as Spain had never sought this recourse. Spain responded that it had done so in 1852, when it had advocated that the matter be set before "Europe", and also in the UNGA forum. Britain
replied that "Europe" was not an international tribunal and the UNGA was a political, not a judicial body. Britain proposed that the matter be referred to the ICJ. On 13 December 1966, Spain rejected the proposal, stating that the issue was one of decolonization, suited to the UN arena (Red Book, 1968, pp.425-558; BIS FO, 1966. Cmnd. 3131. pp.50-128). In inter-governmental communications dealing with the isthmus, a large part of the correspondence dealt with Spanish allegations that British military planes were violating Spanish air-space in the Gibraltar area. It must be remembered that Spain does not recognize British sovereignty on the land or sea area on which Gibraltar airport is situated. Spain was quite sure of the support of a majority, if the isthmus issue was put before the UNGA. However, in refusing to refer the matter to the ICJ, Spain was perceived as refusing to lay its case before one of the world's most prestigious tribunals, and showing lack of compromise. Even if the ICJ had given a decision in favour of Britain, Spain still had the support of a UNGA majority. If the ICJ had found in favour of Spain this would have rendered British control of the Colony less tenable and given Spain a better stance in future negotiations. However the UN Special Committee continued to call upon both disputants to engage in constructive negotiations.

On 13 December 1966, the UNGA adopted Resolution 2189 (XXI), "Implementation of the Declaration Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples", inviting:

"the Special Committee to pay particular attention to the small territories and to
recommend to the General Assembly the most appropriate methods and also the steps to be taken to enable the population of those territories to exercise fully the right of self-determination and independence” (Djonovich, 1973, II, p.121).

This resolution was not in the interest of Spanish case. Through the Special Committee's handling of the Gibraltar issue, led by the Latin American and Arab states, they had ignored the question of the Gibraltarians by only tackling the issue of ‘territorial integrity’. On 20 December 1966, the UNGA Resolution 2231 (XXI), “Question of Gibraltar” admonished both parties to negotiate, and they as well as the Special Committee to take into account the interests of the inhabitants. Britain proposed that new talks be held with Spain on 18 April 1967. While agreeing to the proposal, Spain complicated the issue further by establishing a Prohibiter Area of airspace over Spanish territory in the Gibraltar area causing difficulty for traffic using Gibraltar airport (see above). While this act was legal according to the Chicago Convention and the rules of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), this Spanish strategy raised Britain's wrath. The talks planned for April 1967 were not held. However talks took place in June 1967, dealing with the airspace problem, but were suspended when Spain insisted on the precondition that Britain recognize that the airfield was built on Spanish sovereign territory. Originally the British raised the issue with the ICAO several times, but since 1969 has let the matter drop (O’Connell, 1982, pp.335-336). Britain suspected that if it lost the case, this
would cause London international embarrassment. By this stage a body of opinion in Britain was reassessing its tenuous claim to the once "neutral ground".

A few days after Spain introduced its airspace restrictions, Britain announced the holding of a referendum in which the Gibraltarians were to decide whether to maintain their links with Britain or be joined to Spain. Madrid strongly objected and the UN Special Committee adopted a resolution opposing Britain's actions on the grounds that it would contradict the provisions of Resolution 2231 (XXI) of the UNGA. Britain stated that its actions were in keeping with UNGA Resolution 2189 (XXI) concerning the interests of the Gibraltarians (see appendix V). At the General Assembly, Britain's Foreign Secretary asked the Special Committee if its functions included "handing a people against their will to another government" (Cmnd. 3735, p.18). In the referendum, the overwhelming majority of the Gibraltarians voted to maintain their links with Britain, which the latter reported to the UN Secretary General. However a Resolution was passed indicating that the Referendum was in contradiction of Resolution 2231 (XXI) (20 December 1966) and of the Special Committee (UNGA Res.2353 (XXII), 19 December 1967; Djonovich, 1973, p.293). Britain gained a limited advantage on the diplomatic front, but in the longterm reduced the ultimate power of Westminster, by giving the Gibraltarians a mandate on sovereignty. It also set a precedent for Spain in the Plazas. A Moroccan official in discussion with the author (April 1984) expressed the view that:
"interested power groups can create a 'democratic' majority on any issue by constructing a Berlin Wall around any area and expelling those who disagree over a period of time".

This comment was made in relation to Ceuta, Melilla and Gibraltar. He also stated that "as long as archives and graveyards exist, states will press to recoup lost territory".

Intransigence on the Gibraltar and Plaza issues is embedded in a post-colonial paralysis based on historic inertia. Anachronistic sovereignty disputes have created potential flashpoints. Client populations in these areas are pawns in changing geopolitical patterns. Their fears for the future and schizophrenic cultures have eliminated room for compromise from local politics.

Gibraltarian police and British troops had to be called in to quell violence in the Crown Colony in April 1968, which was sparked off by a local group known as 'The Doves'. They published a letter in the Gibraltar Chronicle (1 April 1968), stating that:

"More and more of us in Gibraltar are convinced that the only solution lies in a negotiated settlement both with Britain and with Spain".

Members of the Legislative Council replied that they had never objected to such a course of action provided that there was no question of a transfer of sovereignty. The Integration With Britain Party (IWBPP) stressed that negotiations would mean surrender of sovereignty to Madrid. Upon request The Doves supplied the Legislative Council with specific proposals
emphasizing that they were acceptable to the Spanish Foreign Minister. The 12 proposals published in the *Gibraltar Chronicle* (4 April 1968) were the most attractive package offered to Britain and the Gibraltarians since 1713. Essentially everything was to be British, with the Gibraltarians having the rights and duties of British citizens, but the Spanish flag would fly alongside the Union Jack, and a Gibraltarian flag would fly as a symbol of its recognition that it was the creation of a new Anglo-Spanish treaty. The IWBP rejected this solution, as did the Legislative Council, but only after violence perpetrated against The Doves. In shouting "no surrender" in the short-term, the Gibraltarians opted for long-term problems.

While the UN were adopting resolutions, the British Government promulgated the Gibraltar Constitution Order (23 May 1969). In the preamble it was stipulated that:

"... Gibraltar will remain part of Her Majesty's dominions unless and until an Act of Parliament otherwise provides, and furthermore that Her Majesty's Government will never enter into arrangements under which the people of Gibraltar would pass under the sovereignty of another state against their freely and democratically expressed wishes."

This preamble was put in at the insistence of the IWBP (Times, 5 Jan. 1970, "A Special Report"). Henceforth the Gibraltarians gained a veto over this aspect of British foreign policy.

For Spain this was a most provocative act, at a time when it felt that the issue was nearing a peaceful settlement largely because of UN support. In retaliation, on 9 June 1969, Spain
closed the La Línea crossing and 16 days later the Algeciras ferry service was discontinued. On 1 October 1969, telecommunications services were cut. Thus the blockade commenced, leaving Gibraltar completely dependent on Morocco for its immediate needs.

The UNGA continued to support the Spanish position and passed the strongest worded resolution to date (UNGA Res. 2429 (XXIII) 18 Dec. 1968). It "regretted" Britain's non-compliance with the provisions of its Resolution 2353 (XXII), "deplored the colonial situation" in the light of the UN Charter and Resolution 1514 (XV); and requested Britain "to terminate the colonial situation . . . no later than 1 October 1969", calling upon Britain to "begin without delay negotiations with the Government of Spain" (Djonovich, 1973, 12, p.177; Levie, 1983, p.115). Britain did not comply with the suggestions of the resolution.

In the early 1970s both Britain and Spain had changes of government, and in 1975 Franco died. This helped facilitate a fresh approach. The UN continued to issue reports on Gibraltar. In October 1977, the Spanish Prime Minister, Suarez, visited London. It was reported that during his visit, he stated that the Gibraltarians would be welcome to join the new democratic Spain gaining regional autonomy like other ethnic groups, and it was up to the inhabitants to decide.

According to the Spanish Constitution of 1978 (Título VIII, Chapter III, for "Autonomous communities"), Article 143 specifies that bordering provinces "may accede to
self-government" and constitute themselves "autonomous communities". Article 144 provides that the Cortes may, for reasons of national interest, authorize an autonomous community for a single province or for a territory not integrated into a province. Article 148 specifies the matters in which such a community may assume competence. Clearly the Spaniards had Gibraltar in mind when it was being drafted.

Bilateral meetings were held at Strasbourg (1977), Paris (1978) and Lisbon (1980). The Spanish Government stated that it was willing to open the La Linea frontier provided that Britain enter into formal negotiations on the future of Gibraltar. Agreement was reached on 10 April 1980, whereby negotiations would commence at a time to be decided and direct communications between Spain and Gibraltar would be reopened. Spain was so confident that the issue had been settled, it announced plans to seek membership of NATO and the EEC.


The Lisbon Agreement (April 1980) provided for the re-establishment of direct communications in the Gibraltar region and an ending of Spanish restrictions. It committed both parties to future substantive discussions. Spain interpreted this as meaning that Britain was ready to resolve the dispute in accordance with the UN resolutions which had been passed. Following the Lisbon Agreement, Spain made some concessions, for instance permitting the shipment of butane gas from Spain to
Gibraltar Port, and Madrid also agreed to work with Gibraltar on plans for a satellite communications station. Britain made reciprocal gestures such as agreeing to broadcast some television programmes in Spanish in the Crown Colony. But the thaw did not last.

Spain took exception to a number of British actions, for instance the visit of the Prince and Princess of Wales to Gibraltar (1981); the granting of full citizenship to all Gibraltarians (1982); and the usage of Gibraltar as a military depot, refuelling base and workyard during the Falkland/Malvinas War (1982). Gibraltar’s importance in the British campaign was recognized by Argentina who sent an underwater sabotage team to Spain with instructions to disrupt British naval supply lines. However the Spanish authorities arrested and deported the group (Washington Post, 9 Oct. 1983). Despite these actions, Spanish supported Argentina’s sovereignty claim in the mass media and diplomatic sphere. Spain abstained on the UN Security Council motion requesting Argentine withdrawal from the islands. "The British regarded the use of Gibraltar as consistent with the sovereign prerogatives enjoyed since 1704" (Lancaster & Taulbee, 1985, p.255). Spain watched to see if a Falklands settlement might provide a precedent for Gibraltar, or if the British experience there might dissuade it from future conflict over colonial possessions (Economist, 12 April 1982). Suggestions for a Falklands/Malvinas style-invasion appeared in the Spanish press, possibly instigated by the Spanish military who had planned a coup d'état to coincide with the 1982 general
election. The military believed that 'Gibraltar' would be a
national rallying cry in the seizure of power. But the coup
d'etat did not materialize (Lancaster & Taulbee, 1985, p.256).
As late as October 1986, when Britain announced its intention of
establishing a 150 nm fisheries protection zone around the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands, several states including Spain
objected. The Spanish Premier stated that Spanish vessels would
ignore the restrictions but in fact they indirectly recognized
them in 1987 by seeking fishing licences (Guardian, 30 Oct.1986,
12 Nov.1986).

Heading the list of the foreign policy agenda of the
Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE) in 1982, came Spanish
membership of the EC, increased security for Ceuta, Melilla and
the Canary Islands, and the retrocession of Gibraltar. With the
election of PSOE leader Felipe Gonzales, he reaffirmed that he
was Spanish first and socialist second. Significantly the
Gibraltar, Ceuta and Melilla disputes formed an important part
of his policy. Upon coming to power Gonzales stated that any
negotiated settlement of the Gibraltar problem would respect the
populations legitimate interests. For any democratic party in
Spain and especially the Socialists, a favourable settlement of
the Gibraltar dispute is an imperative in order to undermine the
Falangists. With the partial opening of the frontier to
pedestrians possessing Spanish or British passports,
Gibraltarians were annually spending £6-7 million in Spain,
while the Spanish spent virtually nothing in the Crown Colony
due to Spanish customs restrictions (El Pais, 31 July 1983).
This economic chastisement was in retaliation for the discriminatory economic laws in Gibraltar against Spanish nationals, such as the prohibition against their buying property and unequal pay for equal work.

On 27 November 1984, Britain and Spain issued a joint communiqué which has come to be known as the Brussels Agreement/Statement. The Spanish Foreign Minister, Fernando Moran, stated that it was "the biggest diplomatic success for Spain on the Rock since 1713", as Britain was prepared to discuss sovereignty (Times, 28 Nov. 1984). However, the British Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe insisted that "the British Government fully maintain(ed) . . . its commitment to honour the wishes of the people of Gibraltar" (Times, 28 Nov. 1984). As has been shown on many occasions, the Gibraltarians wish to block bilateral discussions between Madrid and London concerning sovereignty. In the historic tradition of all parties concerned, they became engaged in "doublespeak". Moran said:

"The end of the Gibraltar problem means the integration of Gibraltar into Spain and filling in Spanish sovereignty, with maximum respect for the rights of Gibraltarians" (Times, 28 Nov. 1984).

Basically Howe and Moran agreed that their Governments would apply not later than 15 February 1985, what had supposedly been agreed upon with the Lisbon Declaration (10 April 1980).

The Lisbon Statement (1980) was an exercise in international relations in the long tradition of the respective propagandas, being eventually denigrated by both parties. In
Britain, The Times, Guardian and Telegraph (11-15 April 1984), rather than examining the substantive issues, continued to stress the problem of frontier restrictions from a moralizing viewpoint, and suggested that Britain would veto Spanish entry to the EC if Madrid did not change its Gibraltar strategy. The Spanish media emphasized the sovereignty issue and UNGA resolutions in Spain’s favour, ignoring other aspects of the problem.

The Lisbon Statement (1980) involved simultaneously:

(i) The equality and reciprocity of rights for Spaniards in Gibraltar and Gibraltarians in Spain, essentially similar to those of EC citizens in any member state. This would ensure that each side would "be favourably disposed to each others citizens when granting work permits".

(ii) The establishment of the free movement of persons, vehicles and goods between Gibraltar and the "neighbouring territory".

(iii) The establishment of negotiations aimed at promoting co-operation on economic, cultural, touristic, aviation, military and environmental matters. Both sides accepted that "the issue of sovereignty will be discussed in the process" (see Lisbon Statement in The Times, 28 Nov.1984; see HC. Rept, 1981, pp.xvi-xx).

The British Government stated that it would:

"... fully maintain its commitment to honour the wishes of the people of Gibraltar as set out in the preamble of the 1969 Constitution".

The Brussels Communiqué (1984) committed Spain to undertake "the early actions necessary to allow safe and effective air communications" in relation to airspace at the eastern entrance to the Strait. It was agreed that working groups would meet
periodically to further resolve issues concerning Gibraltar. A spokesperson for the Spanish Foreign Ministry stated that:

"... this really opens a process of decolonizing the Rock ... Gibraltar becomes just one more piece of Andalusia, of Spain" (Times, 28 Nov. 1984).

Spanish state radio and television stated that:

"it was the first time since 1713, ... that the British Government has ever agreed to tackle sovereignty" (Times, 29 Nov. 1984).

Madrid said that the talks concerned:

"... both the theme of the sovereignty referred to in the Treaty of Utrecht as well as sovereignty of the isthmus, which was never ceded to Britain" (Times, 29 Nov. 1984).

"That's bloody nonsense, in my best Spanish", was Sir Joshua Hassan's reply to such Spanish euphoric statements; he stated that the Gibraltarians "have always placed "their faith in the British Government and people ... and will continue to do so" (Times, 28 Nov. 1984).

In Spain's drive to efface the Franco legacy, establish western style democracy, placate its minorities, and become integrated into the EC and NATO, opening the La Linea frontier became an imperative. The frontier gates were opened on 2 Feb. 1985. Though the mass media in Britain hailed this as a moral and diplomatic victory, and an acceptance of the pre-1969 status quo in the Colony, the issue is by no means settled. Despite London's efforts in the international community to highlight Spain's unfriendly actions in closing the frontier (1969-85), it
received little support. Clearly a majority of UNGA, EC and NATO members supported the Spanish case.

On the local scale, La Linea and the Campo de Gibraltar region suffered great economic hardship because of the closure, while the Gibraltarians were stimulated into greater self-sufficiency, reinforcing a separate sense of identity on both sides of the fronteir. Most of the points covered by the Lisbon Agreement (1980) and Brussels Communiqué (1984) were diplomatic pre-emptives. Despite suggestions that Britain would veto Spanish entry into the EC and the thorny issue of Spanish relations with NATO, these supranational organizations ensured that the Gibraltar issue would not block the centripetal forces integrating Spain into these power blocks.

According to The Guardian (28 Nov. 1984):

"... the joint communiqué (Brussels 27 November 1984) remains open to interpretation, and could be interpreted by Britain as an excuse for indefinite delay (in tackling the issue)".

It would seem that British strategy was aimed at lessening the immediate contentions but was not seriously directed at tackling the sovereignty impasse. It was hoped that Gibraltar would retain the Union Jack indefinitely, with the Gibraltarians and Spanish becoming so economically integrated that Spanish grievances would lessen. Also the economic burden of maintaining the Colony would be less onerous on London. This involved a very delicate strategy of trying to maintain sovereignty over the Colony, playing the democratic card vis-à-vis the Gibraltarians, and defusing contentions with Madrid. In
terms of the economics of sovereignty, this means encouraging the Gibraltarians to be responsible for their economic future, and somewhat ironically expecting Spain to contribute to the economy of the Colony by means of trade, tourism and joint projects, including joint usage of Gibraltar airport. Undoubtedly many Gibraltarians will buy property in the Campo region and even reside there as was the case prior to 1969, while Spaniards will be able to buy property and work in Gibraltar. Unlike the pre-1969 situation they may legally reside there and workers will not have to leave every night. The opposition in Gibraltar saw the Brussels Communique as unacceptable. Joe Bossano, leader of the Gibraltarian Socialist Party said; "We have been presented with a fait accompli" (Guardian, 28 Nov. 1984), reflecting the fear of many Gibraltarians that Britain may be preparing for withdrawal.

On the eve of the opening of the La Linea frontier, Raphael Palomino, an Andalusian socialist MP, stated that:

"We (the Spanish) understand that towards the end of the 20th century one cannot go against the wishes of a people... the people of Gibraltar have a right to be themselves" (Times, 28 Jan. 1985).

This was in sharp contrast to the statements of the Franco era. Palomino was appointed as president of a new political body, the Community of Towns of the Campo de Gibraltar, whose function was to establish new mutually beneficial relationships with the Gibraltarians. With the opening of the La Linea frontier (1985), the Gibraltarians became acutely aware that they had to become economically self-sufficient, if they were to resist
gradual integration into the Spanish state. Ironically tourism, particularly from the Costa del Sol was to be a main factor in achieving this. In 1985, the author observed on average 40 tourist coaches per day entering Gibraltar (April 1985). However the economic boom anticipated has not come about. Once more the Gibraltarians started buying perishable products and wine in Spain while the Spanish came to buy British grocery products for novelty sake. Spanish officials strictly uphold customs regulations. With Spanish accession to the EC (Jan.1986), the La Linea crossing became subject to the same rules as other EC borders.

Substantive discussions between Madrid and London did not get underway (1985-87). On the diplomatic front, Gibraltar’s ruling party, the AACR tried to have the Crown Colony turned into a freely associated state with Britain in order to increase local government powers. This project will play an important role in the 1988 elections. This would give the local government power in internal and external affairs, and consequently give the Gibraltarians a stronger hand in resisting closer links with Spain (Guardian, 30 Oct.1986). Despite lack of progress on the essential problem of sovereignty since February 1985, the Gibraltarians remain suspicious of Anglo-Spanish intentions. In December 1986, the provocative British tradition of trooping the colours at the frontier was discontinued (Times, 15 Jan.1987). In January 1987, Spain’s Foreign Minister stated that "the shadow of the Rock is projected over all our (Anglo-Spanish) relations" and Gibraltar
remains a "threat" to Spanish-British cooperation on all levels, including the EC and NATO (Times, 15 Jan. 1987). The following day "long delays" were experienced at La Linea (Times 16 Jan. 1987).

In March 1986, a Spanish cruiser entered the disputed territorial waters in the Bay, the minor incident was ignored by both governments, but the Spanish and British press felt that the crew of the vessel had tried to "torpedo" the official visit of the Spanish monarch to Britain (Le Monde, 24 April 1986). In his address to the House of Commons on 23 April 1986, King Juan Carlos urged greater Anglo-Spanish cooperation, implicitly asking Britain to speed up the resolution of the sovereignty dispute (Telegraph, 24 April 1986). Like the Gibraltarians, many Ceutis and Melillinese have been antagonistic towards the Lisbon Agreement and Brussels Communiqué.

At the time of the Brussels Communiqué (27 Nov. 1984), Britain's Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe insisted that there was "no possible link, precedent or connexion with the Falkland Islands"; and that historically, legally and geographically the case involving the islands was quite different to that of Gibraltar (Times, 28 Nov. 1984). Yet these cases of disputed sovereignty will continue to affect each other. With decolonization moving to its ante-penultimate moments on the world stage, Gibraltar like the Falkland-Malvinas Islands has focussed international attention on these vestiges of colonialism. During an official visit of President Li Xiannian of China to Spain, in 1984, King Juan Carlos said:
"China's restoration of its territorial integrity has been a process which Spain has followed and will go on following with interest and feelings of solidarity because of the analogies and parallels for both countries of the consequences of past colonialism (in relation to Hong Kong and Gibraltar)" (Times, 14 Nov.1984).

The central issue is not one of granting sovereign independence but the transfer of sovereignty from one state to another. Besides Gibraltar and the Falkland-Malvinas Islands (Franck & Hoffman, 1976, pp.331-386), other examples include Panama's claim to the Canal Zone, Cuba's to Guantanamo, Ireland's to the six counties of Northern Ireland, Morocco's to Ceuta and Melilla, and most likely in the future, a Cypriot claim to the British bases in Cyprus (Guardian, 12, 13 Nov.1986, pp.16, 14 'Cyprus Report'). The claimant's quest for territorial integrity is based on a national ideal, and desire to obliterate traumatic historical experiences such as colonialism. Most significantly, all the above examples are located close to geostrategic waterways (see map 1.5).

6.12 NATO.

For NATO to gain full advantage of the Gibraltar base, Spanish cooperation and usage of the Campo is an imperative. Britain maintains a naval dockyard, logistic facilities for naval vessels, a maritime HQ, RAF airfield and HQ, and an army garrison in Gibraltar. Dockyard facilities are capable of refitting Leander class frigates and mine countermeasure
vessels, as well as carrying out emergency repairs to naval vessels.

Within the territorial waters claimed by Britain in the Bay there is anchorage for about 30 ships which can be used for convoy facilities. As of 1981, the airfield runway was long enough to be used by all RAF aircraft except fully loaded Vulcans, VC 10s and Victors. Facilities are satisfactory for 727s and 737s. Devices on the Rock can detect shipping in the Strait over a radius of 60-70 miles in good weather and identify ships as they enter the narrows. MOD-NATO radar facilities are relatively successful in monitoring submerged passage of the Strait. Brigadier Dennis (MOD) in his statements to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons (1980-81) pointed out that the Colony could be provided with defences which "are not all sited in Gibraltar in peace time" and that Gibraltar was not invulnerable to attack from the north; thus reiterating the age old desire of Britain to secure Spain as an ally (HC. Rept. 1981, p.37). Gibraltar's 'staging function' and facilities form a significant part of Britain's contribution to NATO.

According to Rear Admiral Gueritz:

"Surveillance of the area is important to the Alliance as the straits constitute a choke-point not only for traffic serving the Allied countries on the Mediterranean littoral but also for through traffic which has significance for other Allied countries in Western Europe and North America" (HC. Rept. 1981, p.xlii).

He states that surveillance could be carried out by shore-based electronic means or by air, surface or sub-surface units
provided by NATO forces of any member state; the inference here being Spain. Modern missile systems could be mounted on Gibraltar to deny or protect shipping in the Strait.

The geostrategic and economic value of the dockyard is more advantageous to NATO as a whole rather than Britain. The naval dockyards provide an example of the deficit economics of sovereignty.

Despite Spanish vacillations and inter-party problems since joining NATO (1982), Spain is becoming progressively integrated into the Alliance. In October 1981, the PSOE party congress took the stance that NATO membership would not protect Spanish territorial integrity, in that member states would not guarantee Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar (Eusebio, 1983, p.106). Once in power the PSOE leader, Filipe Gonzalez linked Spain's continued membership of the Alliance with the Gibraltar issue. He insisted on the fact that full integration would be difficult while a member state holds a colony in Spain (El Pais, 8 Sep.1983). The Spanish navy studiously avoided military exercises with the British within the NATO cadre (El Pais, 8 Sep.1983). Despite the advantages of Gibraltar's port facilities and its willingness to host nuclear-powered vessels, the US Sixth fleet avoids making full use of the British base because of Spanish sensitivities. According to several reports Britain has all the necessary equipment to station nuclear warheads on the Rock, and there are both small nuclear missiles and anti-nuclear depth charges. "Of course Britain does not recognize or deny to any government the presence of nuclear
weapons . . . and therefore has not informed Madrid if such weapons exist on the Rock" (de la Serna, 1984, p.164). During NATO exercises in 1981, US Polaris submarines visited Gibraltar.

NATO membership has doubtless made Britain more amenable to discussions with Spain. Ultimately under NATO auspices, Spain will get access to the base because of exercises or joint military control, or a Spanish base commander being appointed, or placing COMEGIBMED under a Spanish admiral at Algeciras, Cadiz or Cartagena (see chapter 7). The possibility of a lease agreement between Britain and Spain under NATO auspices is feasible, but it is unlikely that NATO would favour such direct involvement. To date NATO has avoided offending Moroccan sensitivities over Ceuta and Melilla, unlike the Canary Islands, by not including them as NATO bases in strategic planning. The fact that Spain is now a member of the Alliance in many ways weakens Madrid's argument that the Gibraltar NATO base poses a direct threat to Spain in the event that Gibraltar would become a legitimate target in time of war in a conflict to which Britain was a party and Spain not. Nonetheless the activities of Argentine saboteurs in trying to attack the British base from mainland Spain (1982) is indicative of how Spain could become embroiled in a conflict.

6.13 THE EC.

6.13.1 Gibraltar and the EC.

Within the EC, British-Spanish contentions obstruct
integration and weaken Community mechanisms. For instance Spain vetoed the coming into force of the Single European Act because of the inclusion of Gibraltar airport as a British regional facility, in the air fare liberalization agreement in July 1987 (Times, 5 July 1987, p.25). The dispute is retarding development in the Strait region, and has a negative impact on British-Spanish trade. Whatever the longterm economic benefits to Gibraltar, EC membership has not lessened the intensity of the sovereignty dispute, but has acted as a forum to highlight contentious viewpoints.

The EC has tried to avoid overt involvement in the dispute, but provides a forum for discussions. Nonetheless if Spain regains sovereignty over Gibraltar, the transition period for the full integration of Gibraltar would be 7 years. With UK admission to the EC (Jan.1973), Gibraltar fell under Article 227(4), of the Treaty of Rome, relating to European Territories for whose external relations a member state has assumed responsibility. Unlike the Channel Islands, Gibraltar is a member of the EC and its citizens members of the Community under the auspices of Britain. However the Gibraltarians chose not to participate in the Common Agricultural Policy and VAT systems, and to remain outside the EC Customs Union at the time of British entry into the Community (1973) (Lancaster & Taulbee, 1985, p.260). The Gibraltarian decision not to fully participate in EC programmes could lead to problems if Gibraltar is retroceded to Spain, as the Gibraltarians would have no choice but to participate in the schemes to which Madrid is a
party. Legally the Spanish Territories in North Africa form an integral part of the Spanish state and are therefore part of the EC. The Plazas are the first territories of the EC to share common borders with an African state. Spain never formally linked its entry to the EC with the Gibraltar question, unlike Britain (1981-86) (Economist, 26 June 1982, 20 Aug.1983; Times, 16 April 1983; El Pais, 22 July 1983).

6.13.2 The Campo de Gibraltar.

The Campo is one of the most underdeveloped regions in the EC. The Comarca Campo de Gibraltar is part of the province of Cadiz (1,514 sq km/590 sq ml). It comprises 7 "municipos" (boroughs): Algeciras, Los Barrios, Tarifa, San Roque, La Linea de la Conception, Castellar de la Frontera and Jimena de la Frontera. The latter four towns owe their origin, former prosperity and present poverty to the Crown Colony and the changing state of Anglo-Spanish relations. In the late 1960s, income per capita in the region was around 31% of the Spanish national average, largely because of the location of some of the largest Latifundia in Europe there and its precarious relationship with the Crown Colony. In an effort to change the economic situation, over 2 million Pesetas were poured into education, infrastructural projects and development plans in 1966-67. Over 8.25 million Pesetas were invested between 1968-71. Some 7.5 million Pesetas were invested between 1972-75 (del Campo & Davis, 1980, p.4). By 1973, there were 26
industrial plants operating in the Campo, including an oil refinery, and Algeciras became an industrial centre. But investment did not keep abreast of unemployment. La Linea benefitted little in real terms and the Crown Colony continued to have a much higher standard of living, despite the blockade. Spain failed to lure the Gibraltarians with its economic policies.

When the La Linea frontier was closed (8 June 1969), there were 4,778 Spaniards working in Gibraltar, of which 2,000 were pensioned off. Others obtained work in industrial plants in the Campo, but many had to emigrate. Some 85% of these workers had lived in La Linea (del Campo & Davis, 1980, p.6). La Linea (7 sq ml) always functioned as a suburb of the Crown Colony. Though constituting only 1.2% of the Campo area, in 1960 over 32% of the Campo’s population resided there, and in 1974 over 27%. Because of the blockade (1969-85), many entrepreneurs lost business and property in Gibraltar (despite the official ban) and did not receive compensation from Madrid; unlike Spanish nationals being repatriated from the newly independent Maghrebi states. By the same token over 1,000 Gibraltarian citizens and residents had to leave their property in Spain. In human terms 1,500-3,000 families were split by the blockade.

The blockade put economic pressure on the British commitment to Gibraltar, for example some £40 million came from HMG spending in 1979 (del Campo & Davis, 180, p.8). Despite the hardships of the siege, the Gibraltarians saw the advantage of their cushioned economy in sharp contrast to the relative
failure of the Campamento (San Roque-La Linea) and Cortijo Real (Algeciras) industrial zones. La Linea experienced a drop in population between 1969-85, from 100,000 to 60,000 (Lancaster & Taulbee, 1985, p.254). Over 30% of La Linea's population were unemployed in 1984 and were waiting for an economic miracle to occur with the opening of the frontier (Le Monde, 16-17 Dec.1984). Also the Llanitos were waiting for the Government to revoke a law passed in 1932, encompassing the town in a military zone, with a prohibition on foreigners buying property there.

Fragmented sovereignty in the Strait region has hindered economic integration, complimentarity and development. However it could be argued that considering that both shores of the Strait are economically underdeveloped, Gibraltar and the Plazas have helped sustain the populations in the Campo and Moroccan hinterlands.

6.14 BRITISH-SPANISH RELATIONS.

According to Ramón Tamames Gómes, Deputy Mayor of Madrid:

"Hispano-British relations will never be completely normal whilst the UK presence remains on Spanish territory as it is installed at present" (HC. Rept. 1981, p.128).

British foreign policy objectives in relation to Spain in the 1980s are primarily economic and military. Spain wishes to establish closer relations within the EC and NATO. Concerning trade, the Gibraltar issue has retarded progress. Between 1965-79, British exports to Spain only represented 5% of the
overall export figures. During the same period Spanish exports to the UK rose by 123%. (HC. Rept. 1981, p.xliv). During this period, French exports to Spain were as high as 36% of the total export figure, while that of West Germany reached 29%. In 1986, in the EC/NATO context, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany "reminded" Spain's Prime Minister, Felipe Gonzales that the reduction which Spain was seeking in the US military presence there could seriously affect the security of all NATO countries. At the same time, Kohl emphasized the "big opportunities" for Spain and Germany to work together within the EC.

In trade terms West Germany rapidly established greater trading links with Spain since its accession to the EC (Jan.1986), becoming Spain's number one supplier and second customer after France. German exports to Spain (Jan-Sep.1986) went up by 31% to 505,900 million Pesetas (over £2.6 million) compared with France's 374,000 million Pesetas (up 13%) and Britain's 265,400 million Pesetas (7.7%). Germany and France are the most likely contenders in winning Spanish defence contracts and other high investment projects (Times, 20 Nov.1986). Britain is making efforts to increase its share of the Spanish market.

In international fora such as the EC and NATO, it is embarrassing for Britain to be accused of retarding integration and endangering the democratic experience in Spain. History shows that Madrid will react if substantive progress on the sovereignty issue is delayed. At the UN, the majority of states
and all EC members support Article 6, Resolution 1514 (XV) on the territorial integrity of the state. The NATO viewpoint is somewhat ambivalent. Spain has let it be known that comparable facilities to those at Gibraltar could be made available at Cartagena, Cadiz, or other ports. According to *The Times* (28 Nov. 1984) the "NATO factor clinched the Rock pact (Brussels Communiqué)", because of Spain's progressive integration into the Alliance. Despite suggestions from some British sources that the NATO flag could replace that of Britain in Gibraltar, this would pose problems. Spain is presently unwilling to agree to such a disguised abandonment of its sovereignty claim; and under Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht, Britain does not have the right to abdicate sovereignty to such a supranational group. Besides NATO does not enjoy the prerogatives of a sovereign state within the international community. Also the Communist Block and non-Aligned states would strongly object to such a move.

6.15 THE FUTURE.

The dispute could be resolved by bilateral agreements supported within the EC and NATO context. This can only work if both parties refrain from trying to gain tactical advantages, attempting to consolidate their claims indirectly in international treaties. Concerning Gibraltar airport, one Spanish diplomat stated that any international agreement "over the isthmus which is not decided in bilateral talks" would
appear to concede sovereignty to Britain (Times, 5 July 1987, p.25). His thesis is substantiated by history.

If the thesis is accepted that sovereignty resides in the people, then in the future, a majority of EC citizens in Gibraltar may vote for sovereign links with Spain.

A certain détente in Anglo-Spanish relations has come about since 1985, because of the integrating forces of the EC and NATO. Between 1985-87, British-Spanish discussions have been portrayed by Britain as agreements on closer bilateral cooperation, but this is essentially within the framework of multistate organizations. Spain insists that such bilateral cooperation entails future retrocession of the Colony. Britain reiterates its commitment to the Gibraltarians. But economic and geopolitical imperatives may yet force a compromise.

Hopefully Spain will not be forced into taking actions similar to those practised between 1965-85, because of inaction on Britain's part. Steps to bring Gibraltar's trading activities in line with EC norms would help. Suggestions about the construction of an air terminal on the Spanish side of the Fence linked by corridor to Gibraltar airport should be seriously studied. A combination of the British, Spanish and EC flags could be flown in the airport area. Spanish should be given equal status with English in the administration, educational system and mass media, especially as a majority of Gibraltarians speak Spanish.

The history of territorial acquisition in Gibraltar may offer a model for decolonization in stages. Within the
territory, there are several spatial levels. Namely, the area allegedly ceded in 1713, and the once neutral ground and airfield. Also within the Colony, there are the MOD-Crown lands, and the area inhabited/owned by civilians.

British "sovereignty over the fortress of Gibraltar cannot be doubted. It is founded upon Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713)", but "there is some doubt, about the UK's sovereignty over neutral ground including the airfield" (HC. Rept. 1981, p.Iv). If Britain and Spain were to put the issue of the neutral ground before the ICJ, it is probable that a decision would be given in Spain's favour. This would give both parties room for constructive cooperation on matters of mutual interest, namely the airport, base and Gibraltarians.

The MOD area could provide some leeway in the present impasse. MOD-related space could be administered by NATO-British forces as at present, but in the future joint British-Spanish forces could be used, or some combination thereof, and their respective flags. Historically Gibraltar has been a British base, but since 1942, this has been somewhat blurred by Allied and NATO usage. Gibraltar is now theoretically a multinational base. Spanish-NATO usage offers possibilities for a gradual transfer of sovereignty.

Another option is for Britain to retrocede sovereignty over the military zone to Spain with a treaty clause stipulating that Spain re-lease it to Britain under NATO auspices with a specified time clause built in, like the precedent set by Hong Kong. Another precedent which could be of use is The Agreement

Concerning the civilian zone there are the options of maintaining the status quo until and if a majority wish their status to be changed. Some form of condominium could be implemented, especially within the EC context, and/or a negotiated status within the Spanish state.

It could be argued that such a spatial "Balkanization" of sovereignty is not feasible and would be against the wishes of the majority, yet historically there is a clear demarcation between the civilian and military zones, the latter being out of bounds to civilians.

For historical and ethnic reasons Gibraltar cannot be seen as an exclave of Spain like Andorra. Yet with an open frontier, the Gibraltarians and Campogibraltarians will inevitably integrate. In this context a form of condominium may develop de facto before being established de jure with Britain being the residual partner in the relationship.

Because of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) and assurances since the 1970s, Britain will not transfer sovereignty to a state other than Spain. The EC and NATO do not have the prerogative of sovereign states, but help influence events in Gibraltar. While wishing to abide by its Treaty commitments, and obligations to NATO and the EC, Britain partially transferred sovereign prerogative to the Gibraltarians in the
1969 Constitution, thus protecting its own interests and those of the Gibraltarians, and at the same time gaining international recognition for the rights of an artificially created population. In the long term, a majority of Spanish nationals resident in Gibraltar may democratically vote for retrocession, as theoretically since 1969 sovereignty resides in the inhabitants of Gibraltar.

While the Spanish constitution refers to the territorial integrity of the state, it also states that sovereignty resides in the people and that within the territorial whole there are various nationalities. According to Article 44(b) of the Constitution, the Cortes may enact any law in the national interest which would "authorize or grant, as the case may be, a status of autonomy for territories not forming part of the provincial organization". While Gibraltar and the Campo are listed as part of the Cadiz province, it is possible to establish Gibraltar as the capital of a new autonomous province, separate from Cadiz; or it could be an autonomous community within the autonomous region of Andalucia, similar to Val d'Aran, which already has autonomy within the autonomy of Catalonia. These types of views have been expressed in the Cortes. To be involved in such negotiations would be beneficial to the Gibraltarians in the long term. They could determine the degree of autonomy which would suit them in future sovereign links. Many observers feel that the continuation of British sovereignty will be short-lived. Gibraltarian cooperation with the Spanish state is largely contingent on economic issues.
Being in a position of relative strength and having community solidarity, the Gibraltarians could negotiate an autonomous relationship with Madrid. It was stated in a memorandum to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee that the autonomy possible under the Spanish Constitution was greater than that enjoyed by Northern Ireland, Sicily or Sardinia. A status similar to that of Jersey, Guernsey or the Isle of Man is attainable (HC. Rept. 1981, p.21). From their position of strength, the Gibraltarians could discuss autonomy within a longterm perspective of several generations, and retain their British nationality, thereby ensuring that Spain under EC treaty rules would respect their rights as EC citizens within another member state.

In the event of Britain retroceding the Colony, any type of violent reaction from dissenters would be short lived. It is unlikely that separatist groups or their acclades like Eta within Spain would establish strong links with dissident Gibraltarians.

Taking into account the geostrategic importance of Gibraltar and Britain's historic role as Sentinel, as well as legitimate arguments concerning territorial integrity and the rights of the Gibraltarians, an expedient settlement of the dispute is an imperative. The importance of the Colony in guaranteeing security of passage of the Strait is not an Anglocentric fallacy but a geopolitical reality proven by history. Gibraltar holds the key to control of the Strait, and influences events on the southern shore.
PART THREE

GIBRALTAR AND GEOPOLITICS.

Geography and politics are interlinked in such a manner that events in the Gibraltar area may have serious repercussions not only in the immediate hinterland but also on the regional and global order. The Strait is an artery and geostrategic zone for the regional states and superpowers.

The Strait region is a focal area between Iberia and the Maghreb, and between the EC, NATO, and the Arab world. Between the 7th and 18th centuries, the main threat to security of passage of the Strait came from the southern shore, and now once again political instability in Morocco and the power of militant Islam could risk causing destabilization in the area.

Peace and stability must be ensured by Spain and Morocco, and regional organizations such as the EC and NATO. The Moroccan people must be aided by the international community to achieve a level of economic and political development that will encourage stability on the southern shore, and thus counteract forces like militant fundamentalism which wish to exploit problems in the region.
CHAPTER SEVEN

GEOPOLITICS AND THE STRAIT REGION.

"To each and every action, there is equal and opposite action".

Isaac Newton (1642-1727).

"Like land and air environments, the maritime environment is a potential theatre for military operations, and the warship is central to these operations".

Moineville (1983, p.31).

7.1 GEOPOLITICS.

7.1.1 Introduction.

The geography of the Strait of Gibraltar encourages the emergence of a hierarchy of politico-military power in the area reducing "risk factors" and guaranteeing security of passage to the international community. Ideally the western Mediterranean region should be a zone of stability and prosperity, with Spain and Morocco guaranteeing security of passage. Indeed in the 1970s there were efforts made by several Mediterranean states to have it officially declared a "Zone of Peace" by the UN. However this is unrealistic because of the geostrategic location and vital role of the Strait in global organization. Its security is problematic because of territorial disputes, inter-state and superpower rivalry, and the North-South divide. The riparian states must work in collaboration with each other and supranational organizations such as the UN, EC and NATO to enhance economic development and reinforce security.

"Geopolitics" is the study of the interaction between
physical and human geographical phenomena which shape the political environment, international relations and global strategies. The scale of geopolitical perception and organization may range from the micro level of Tangier to global proportions. Since the 19th century, geographers have been developing geopolitical models and theories in an attempt to understand the predominant political patterns and forces which shape global organization, and also to plan for the future (Taylor, 1985). The Strait's geographic features dictate that the riparian states and superpowers are likely to interact in this strategic theatre. While Spain would like to maintain an independent line internationally, centripetal forces dictate closer relations with Western institutions such as the EC and NATO. Because of Iberia's location Spain is geopolitically vital to NATO and US interests. Sometimes there are divergencies between Spanish, NATO and US objectives. A plethora of geopolitical phenomena also interact in relation to Morocco (see chapter 8). The British base at Gibraltar continues to be the key to the Strait, vital to British, Spanish, NATO and US interests.

One of the tenets of psychology is that all human intelligence is based on the ability to master patterns, the comprehension and interweaving of which is the key to rational organization. In the geographer's attempt to rationalize the inter-relationships between physical and human phenomena, and politics, certain models have been observed and developed into theories such as the classic Heartland/Rimland dichotomy. Some
theories have taken on a deterministic mantle, and their abuse by the NAZI school of geopolitik gave a stigma to political geography until the early 1970s (Muther, 1947, pp.1-40, Taylor, 1985, pp.40-41). Nonetheless, geopolitical research, often state-sponsored, had a long history prior to the 1930s and ever-increasing importance after 1945, albeit under different guises. Because of ever-improving global communications there has been an upsurge in geopolitical research in the past decade (Blake (d), 1984, pp.456-462; O'Tuathail, 1986, pp.1-42), although the line between diagnostic and prognostic work is not always evident.

The attraction of geopolitical research is that it apparently affords groups, states and inter-state organizations enhanced possibilities of ensuring their economic, political and military security. The main disadvantage is that geopolitical theory is open to abuse and its findings may be used to subjugate peoples, territories or states. State-sponsored, and indeed dissident group terrorism must also be seen in this context. The Cold War psychosis, and media-hyped "Muslim threat" and superpower "back-yard" perceptions now have an impact on state policy making. It is interesting to note that the third-world states, under the leadership of the Tunisian, Mohammed Masmudi, tried to establish a non-aligned newsagency to combat the global hegemony of seven international press agencies within UNESCO in the 1970s. Thanks to such monopolistic press agencies, the Tunisian and Moroccan press often contain more information about Western trivia, than they do about national
and intra-Maghrebi affairs.

The spatial spectrum between global, regional and local geopolitical perspectives is vast, complex, misunderstood and hence often politically contentious. This became particularly apparent to the author while carrying out fieldwork in North Africa (1978-84) and North America (1985-86). On one US university campus where the author conducted surveys (1986), when questioned about the Maghreb, the majority of interviewees either attributed stereotypical ideas of sub-Saharan Africa or Lebanese mayhem perceptions to it. In one geography group, only 5% of the students could locate Iran on a non-titled map of the world, while 7% could more or less locate Israel. The vast majority indicated Iran and Libya with long pencil marks stretching from the Ural Mountains to the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean. One student included Libya in Middle-America. Similar relative location tests were undertaken by the author on Algerian and Tunisian university campuses (1978-83) and revealed a far greater knowledge of the relative location of global geopolitical core states, cities, flash-points, and areas of superpower rivalry. However the vast majority of Maghrebi interviewees could offer little or no information about their respective states south of the Atlas Mountains.

Geopolitical systems work on a multiplicity of inter-related spatial scales, as is evidenced in the Gibraltar region. Obviously no single model is capable of encompassing the entire geopolitical mosaic. As with atomic theory, the "principle of relativity" must be appreciated, because of an
infinite number of "contingent elements", each of which interacts to constitute the whole. Globalist-reductionist theories often do not cater for the "contingent components" which may lead to misunderstanding and instability, for instance the question of decolonization on both shores of the Strait in relation to the social-political climate in Morocco and importance of the Strait to the international community.

In order to reduce the potential for conflict in the western Mediterranean greater diplomatic efforts have to be made. Internal political stability in the riparian states must be achieved by putting the interests of local populations before those of ruling regimes, especially in the Maghreb; the EC and USA have a major role to play in this context. Avoidance of conflict must be a major priority, for example resolving the question of disputed sovereignty in the Strait area. Likewise Western and superpower involvement in the Moroccan-Saharawi War must not escalate. There must be international cooperation in limiting hostile acts in the region on land and sea, ranging from Moroccan-Spanish fishing disputes to Libyan expansionism in the form of annexation (eg northern Chad, and potentially southern Tunisia and south east Algeria, and waters disputed between Libya and Malta). Also throughout the region, Libyan expansionism is indirectly furthered via surrogate groups, often with fundamentalist, regionalist or nationalistic aspirations. Regional and international cooperation must be strengthened to guarantee security of passage of the Gibraltar artery, especially within the LOS (1982) context (see chapter 3). Other
Prescriptive geopolitics include the need for concerted efforts to maintain a reasonable ecological balance in the region. Environmental problems such as overfishing, oil pollution and nuclear related accidents are becoming a major cause of contention, often symptomatic of underlying political contentions, and hence may provide the motor for destabilization. Territorial and maritime disputes in the region, and contingent issues must not be allowed to become the "Sarajevo" factor with rapid escalation effects. The western basin must not become a mirror-image of the eastern Mediterranean. Objective geopolitical analysis should help identify and elucidate problems, and by negotiation offer solutions to help pre-empt armed conflict.

7.1.2 Definitions.

Walters (1974, p.20) states that: 

"Geopolitical features can be defined as the geographical facts regarded in terms of their political relevance in a global context. They include such factors as geographical position, resources, movement and transportation, and technological changes . . . A global view presupposes a set of geopolitical ideas. Foreign policy in turn is shaped by the global view. Diplomacy and strategy in turn, should be dependent on foreign policy".

Kjellen (1899) was probably the first to use the term "geopoliticos" as meaning "the science of the state as a realm in space" (Muir, 1975, p.192). Pounds (1972, p.438) sees the discipline as the "geographical conscience of the state"
entailing the "geographically oriented study of politics". Muir (1975, p.193) says that geopolitics includes "studies of dynamic political processes" at levels "broader than that of individual states and within global perspectives". According to Cohen (1973, p.29) and Gray (1977, p.3) geopolitics is the relation of international political power to the geographical setting. Spracher (1983, p.14) tells us that geopolitics is "the study of the influence of such physical factors as geography, economics and demography on the politics, and especially the foreign policy of a state". Conant and Gold (1977, p.6) state that "geopolitics . . . stresses the importance of locational factors in influencing the relations among nations". Boyce (1982, p.108) feels that the geographical features of each nation or group of nations "are reflected in the political character and policies of the area".

"Nowhere are all these (geopolitical) factors as inextricibly entwined as they are in the circumstance of Gibraltar, producing a complex yet fascinating relationship among several involved parties" (Spracher, 1983, p.14).

Thus the geopolitics of the Strait region includes its physical geography and linkage to the global oceans (chapters 1-2); its economic role as an international artery (chapter 2); and political organization (chapters 3-6) at the regional and global levels (chapters 7-8).

7.1.3 Geopolitical Models.

Over the past decade geopolitical research has encompassed
areas that were traditionally the preserve of political geography, hence reinforcing its epistemology. Thus geopolitics has been defined and interpreted in many ways (see Blake, 1984, pp. 456-462; Drysdale & Blake; 1985, Taylor, 1985; Célerier, 1981). This particular study of the Gibraltar region is an attempt at analyzing the interaction of geo (territorial, maritime, locational and physical) phenomena with political forces (human, cultural, state and inter-state). It is an attempt to examine the component parts of the geopolitical organization of the region, and their intricate relationship.

"Geostrategy" implies spatial organization for the implementation of political-military policies (Célerier, 1961). Most global geopolitical models have embraced the Strait-Mediterranean region (see map 7.1).

Geopolitical thought in the 20th century has largely been shaped by Alfred T. Mahan (1900), Halford J. Mackinder (1904, 1918, 1942), Nicholas Skykman (1944) and Saul B. Cohen (1964, 1973, 1976, 1982). Mackinder has had the most pervasive effect on geopolitical thought in this century. He stressed the importance of landpower as opposed to seapower. His basic thesis was that the inner area of Eurasia is the pivot region of global politics, because of its spatial extent, abundant resources, in-depth defence capacity and consequent protection from the reach of maritime powers. Mackinder's pivotal area was surrounded by a marginal crescent, which included Islamic territories such as those of south-west Asia. Thus if the pivot
MAP 7.1a GEOPOLITICAL VIEWS OF THE WORLD: MACKINDER, SPYKMAN, AND COHEN

MAP 7.1b VIEW FROM THE USSR

MAP 7.2b THE MEDITERRANEAN: GEOPOLITICS

MAP 7.2c  US SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION, 1958-84.

MAP 7.3 HAUSHOFER'S GEOPOLITICAL VIEW OF THE WORLD.
TOWARDS EURAFRICA: EUROPEAN COLONIALISM IN NORTH AFRICA.
land-locked state should ever gain control of the marginal lands, getting access to the seas, "the empire of the world would then be in sight" (Mackinder, 1904, 1919, 1942). Though modified by him several times, Mackinder’s basic model remained unchanged (see map 7.1a).

The American naval historian Alfred T. Mahan, believed that naval superiority (seapower) was paramount. Hence the landpower competes with the seapower in the surrounding marginal crescent, to which the latter has direct access. The Mediterranean would be a key region in this struggle, and the seapower needs unimpeded passage of Gibraltar. According to Walters (1974), Western geostrategic thinking is still powerfully influenced by Mackinder’s model, despite the vast changes in geopolitical relationships and technology which have occurred since Mackinder’s time. US policy since 1945 has thus been based on a strategy of containment of the Soviet Union by a system of alliances and bases in the marginal crescent, for instance Israel, Egypt and Pakistan. The independent states which now form part of the crescent were mostly British or French territories until the 1950s. US policy is designed to prevent the heartland power, the USSR, from gaining access to the oceans. Historically the Russian/Soviet empire has thrust towards the marginal crescent seeking access to blue waters (see map 7.1b). During the Napoleonic and NAZI land invasions, Russia eventually vanquished the enemy because of the possibility of retreat, rejuvenation, and counter-attack offered by the heartland.
During World War II, Spykman (1944) advised the USA to adopt policies that would guarantee US interests in the "rimlands" (marginal crescent). Another American, D.W. Meinig (1956), postulated that some rimland states were oriented towards the heartland and others towards the oceans. The allegiance of the rimland states could veer inwards towards the landpower or outwards to the seapower, and could change with time. Egypt's history since 1956 would corroborate Meinig's thesis. Spykman and Meinig also highlighted the significance of air-power in relation to Mackinder's model (see map 7.1a).

Heartland/rimland views and landpower/seapower ideas are still prevalent in contemporary geopolitical thinking, although the landpower (USSR) is now a major maritime force, and intercontinental ballistic missiles can reach any part of the globe from land or sea bases (see maps 7.1a,b,c). Mackinder's original theory was based on the assumption that the heartland power was endemically expansionist, while the seapower was not. It is interesting to note in the historical context, that at the time of the elaboration of Mackinder's model, the great maritime powers, Britain, France and to a lesser degree the USA were competing for control of lands stretching from Morocco to the Philippines, while the US was displacing European hegemony in Latin America and the Caribbean. The heartland-rimland perceptions of the superpowers has ensured that the rimlands remain an area of strife.

Cohen (1973) proposed the concept of geopolitical regions as vital subsystems of global spanning geopolitical realms. The
The geopolitical region is derived directly from geographic regions and provides a framework for common political and economic actions. Contiguity of location and complementarity of resources are partly distinguishing marks. Cohen (1973, 1982) suggested a global view of world geostrategic regions within a framework of stable zones and shatterbelts. A shatterbelt is

"a large strategically located region . . . occupied by a number of conflicting states . . . caught between the conflicting interests of the Great Powers" (Cohen, 1973, p.253; see Prescott, 1968; Drysdale & Blake, 1985, pp.27-28).

While Cohen includes the Middle East (Mashreq) within the shatterbelt, he places North Africa (Maghreb) in a region described as "Maritime Europe and the Maghreb" (Cohen, 1982, p.232). Thus this nomenclature would indicate that while Maritime Europe and North Africa have geopolitical features in common, they do not constitute a cohesive geopolitical region. Geostrategic regions tend to be strategic in scope and nodal in structure, while geopolitical regions are tactical in scope and more uniform in structure. The Gibraltar region belongs to the geostrategic category. According to Cohen (1982, p.224) hierarchical integration is imperative for global/regional integration.

The author in discussion with Cohen (April, 1986) failed to agree as to why the Maghreb should be "so neatly" classified with Maritime Europe in his geopolitical framework. While it is true that the Maghreb is more distant from the heartland than the Mashreq, and that superpower competition is less intense
there than in other areas, Cohen seems to underestimate its unique geopolitical significance, and rapport with the Middle East shatterbelt zone. Nevertheless the Maghreb must be viewed with Maritime Europe within the geostrategic perspective. Yet from a geopolitical viewpoint the Maghreb does not neatly fit into the west European region, a factor which is often overlooked or ignored. Possibly this is due to France’s special historical relationship with the region. Extra-Mediterranean states still tend to perceive the Maghreb as a "French domain"; and are partially supported by such activities as French involvement in Tunisia (1978, 1981) and Chad (1980s) (see chapter 8). Also the Israeli-Arab conflict and the Gulf region's energy reservoir detract international media attention from the west and central Mediterranean except when Libyan news becomes headlines.

Hence concerning Gibraltar and global models, Mackinder (1904) placed the west Mediterranean region including the northern Maghreb and Strait in his "marginal crescent" in relation to the "heartland-pivot zone". In later models (1943), he placed these areas in the "seapower zone". Spykman (1944) included Iberia and France in his "rimland", but unlike previous models, the northern Maghreb was not coupled with Iberia, but rather categorized in the third zone, "exterior islands and continents". As we have seen, Cohen (1973, 1982) placed the Strait region including Iberia and North Africa in the "Maritime Europe-Maghreb Zone" (see map 7.1b).

German geopolitical models, especially those of Karl
Haushofer (1869-1946) viewed the world as four vast zones stretching from north to south, with respective core areas situated in the northern hemisphere (see map 7.3). These zones comprised pan-Russia, the Asiatic zone of co-prosperity, pan-America and Eurafrica. The latter zone stretched from Scandinavia to South Africa, with Iceland to the west, and to the east the Ukraine, Turkey and Arabian peninsula. The core comprised the Berlin region encompassing Copenhagen, Amsterdam and Brussels. The "Eurafrica" zone included the Mediterranean as the middle lake. There are possible similarities between Haushofer's model and French geostrategy in the Maghreb during the colonial era, when France annexed Algeria (1830), and made Tunisia (1881) and Morocco (1912) into protectorates (see maps 7.3, 4.1). The slogan at the time was France "from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset". Spain's "Africanista" policy in relation to Morocco also bore a certain resemblance, as did those of Italy in Libya and the Horn of Africa. Haushofer's "Eurafrica" model is interesting in the contemporary context as the Gibraltar region still forms a contact area between the developed and non-industrialized nations (Brandt, 1980; Kidron & Segal, 1984), and the EC and Muslim world (see maps 7.4, 8.2). Also it is a contact zone between NATO and the Maghreb.

At present the western Mediterranean region lies outside the "shatterbelt" zone. However one cannot be complacent about the tensions which exist there. There is intense interstate competition between Spain and Morocco, and Morocco, Algeria and Libya, all of which could develop into armed conflict (see
The Western Saharan War has repercussions not only on Morocco, but also Algeria and Mauritania, and there is risk of future superpower involvement. Separatist groups are active in Spain, and among Berber communities in the Maghreb. Militant Islamic fundamentalism is evidently gaining inroads in Morocco and Tunisia. Along with social-political unrest in the Maghreb, the Muslim masses are sympathetic towards Arab Mashreqi problems and aspirations.

### 7.2 THE SUPERPOWERS.

#### 7.2.1 The Superpowers in the Mediterranean.

According to Drysdale and Blake (1985, p.34):

"Great Power interference over the years has done little to solve the problems of national and regional integration and has sometimes created new problems".

Both superpowers claim that their presence in the Mediterranean is aimed at: (i) the deterrence of nuclear and conventional war; (ii) maintaining a balance of power; (iii) ensuring good political relations with allies in the region; (iv) "showing the flag" exercises; (v) establishing base facilities; (vi) influencing the behaviour of Mediterranean states such as Libya; and (vii) safeguarding arteries like Gibraltar (see map 7.2). The geopolitical theories as discussed above however might
suggest that the heartland and maritime powers are struggling for control of the rimlands, and exploiting regional problems to further their own strategies. By virtue of the fact that the USSR is a Black Sea state, it could be argued that despite the constraints imposed on Soviet access to the Mediterranean Sea, that it has a geographical right to be active in the region. Nonetheless, many Mediterranean states like Greece and Turkey fear that Moscow is pursuing its historic quest of gaining territorial control of access to the Mediterranean. Certain regional states and the USA fear Soviet expansionism in the region. Many Muslims feel that both superpowers are aggressors, causing unnecessary regional tensions and wish a plague on both their houses. Some Muslim fundamentalist groups dream of the creation of an Islamic superpower stretching from Gibraltar to the Philippines (see map 8.2a).

7.2.2 The USA.

The eastern seaboard of the USA is over 3,000 miles (4,800 km) from the Atlantic coast of the Maghreb, yet Gibraltar is only half way between the USA and the Arabian/Persian Gulf (see map 1.1c). Steaming from the US at about 15 knots, a ship can reach Tangier in 8 or 9 days. It may take 6 days to traverse the Mediterranean to the Suez Canal, then some 4 to reach Aden; and another 4 days to reach the Strait of Hormuz. Thus a voyage from New York to Hormuz can take up to three weeks. Civil aircraft flying time from New York to the Maghreb is 8-10 hours.
Military aircraft would be slower and may require stopover facilities (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, p.32). During the many debates leading up to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), the US made it perfectly clear that it considered protection of its right of passage through Gibraltar as essential for international commerce, the maintenance of its naval presence in the Mediterranean, and US security commitments to NATO and allied states (see chapter 3). In US perceptions the Middle East and Mediterranean are areas vital to the national interests. This perception has gradually developed over the last 150 years.

Hence according to Gueritz (1980, p.24):

"It is interesting to reflect that international action, and the first US involvement overseas, centered upon the interference with trade of the Barbary States in the early 19th century".

In the 18th century, the USA had little commercial interest in the Mediterranean. Presidents Washington and Adams opted to purchase treaties of protection with the Corsairs of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. In 1880, the Dey of Algiers (Ottoman prince) seized the USS George Washington for his own use, and attacks on other vessels continued. President Jefferson sent in US warships to protect American interests. In the Mediterranean region, the air and sea craft hijackings of the 1970s and 80s, such as the Achille Lauro vessel (1985), as well as the spate of kidnappings and terrorist acts aimed at US interests there are reminiscent of the Corsair epoch.

It was only in the early 20th century that a balanced trade
exchange between the USA and the south-west Mediterranean European states emerged. Later US imports of raw materials from the non-industrialized southern and eastern Mediterranean states developed. According to Truver (1980, pp.39-40) by the 1970s, US trade with the Mediterranean states averaged some 10% of all foreign trade, and over 10% of the tonnage and value of total US oceanborne commerce could be identified as transiting Gibraltar. "As the flag follows trade", the US Sixth Fleet's usage of the Strait is seen to be imperative.

According to Cohen (1982, pp.237-238), vital US interests are tied to its ability to secure links with the "trade-dependent maritime world". Some 25% of US GNP is involved in either imports or exports, and it uses about 25% of the earth's annual production of natural resources to maintain 5% of its population (Cohen, 1982, p.238).

Between 1965 and 1975, oil tanker tonnage globally increased by 240%, and in 1976, it was estimated that some 50,000 commercial ocean-going vessels transited the Strait in an east-west direction annually (Truver, 1980, p.39). Truver (1980, pp.49-52), estimated that trade carried through the Strait as a percentage of global trade was in the order of 24% for phosphates, 5.7% for bauxite/alumina, 4% coal, 10% grain, and 6.2% iron ore. According to Truver (1980, p.50), in the mid-1970s, the percentage of US foreign trade carried under the US flag was only 4.8%, hence almost 95% was carried in vessels bearing the flag of other nations. Thus security of the Strait and freedom of passage for all nations is essential for the US
Significantly, some 69 of the 71 strategic materials including oil, had to be imported. Yet almost 95% of these 69 materials, by tonnage in the mid-1970s were being imported into the USA by foreign flag shipping (US Cong. House Cmte. 1975, p.51; Truver, 1980, p.50). With intensification in the Arab-Israeli War and the energy crises (1970s), the USA's dependence on usage of the Gibraltar artery became obvious to everyone.

"The Maritime Administration (MARAD) of the US Department of Commerce" identifies 5 key US trade routes of the US that pass through Gibraltar, four of which have been classified as essential to the US economy. According to Truver (1980) US foreign trade passes the Strait in 1,500 ships of all flags annually.

Truver (1980, p.57) states that US oceanborne trade with the Mediterranean region in the mid-1970s was in the order of 18,000 thousand metric tons (mt) for agricultural products, 4,000 thousand mt for minerals, metals and chemicals; 22,000 thousand mt for oil, coal and gas; and almost 4,000 thousand mt for manufactured goods. US agricultural exports via the Strait at that period were exceptional because of massive Soviet grain purchases (1973-74). Significantly oil and refined products accounted for 85% of the total tonnage of US imports from the Mediterranean states. Thus approximately 25% of the total of US trade with the Mediterranean states and some 33.3% of the region's total oil exports transited the Strait in the mid-1970s. US imports of oil and associated products transiting
the Strait comprised over 12% of total US crude and product imports transported by vessel (Truver, 1980, p.66). According to Rowden (1983, p.18) some 50% of the seaborne commerce of the USA's European allies travels via the Strait and Mediterranean routes:

"without the oil transported by the 300 oil tankers and 75 super tankers underway on a daily basis in the Mediterranean, the industry of our European allies would grind to a halt".

7.2.3 Western Security.

The aims espoused by the USA in the Mediterranean theatre may be summarised as: (i) to curb Soviet expansion, (ii) to provide support for Israel, and (iii) to secure oil supplies. This policy would have been impossible to implement without unimpeded passage at Gibraltar.

With the impregnable Gibraltar base in its possession, and the neutralization of France at Waterloo (1815), Britain remained unrivalled in the Mediterranean arena until 1939. The US naval and military presence in the Mediterranean dates largely from World War II, because of the Allied liberation of the Maghreb and Italy. With the onset of the Cold War in 1946, the battleship USS Missouri carried out the diplomatic mission of bearing home from Washington DC the body of the deceased Turkish Ambassador to Istanbul, escorted by other naval vessels. The US naval mission also visited Piraeus, Naples, Algiers, Tangier and Gibraltar. The fleet "showed the flag" in support
of the rightwing faction in the looming Greek civil war. At this time, the USSR renewed its claims to Kars and Ardahan in Turkey and was seeking a revision of the Montreux Convention (1936) in relation to the transit regime of the Turkish Straits, and asked for naval bases there. The USSR gained closer relations with Albania and established a naval base at Valna (1958-61). The Soviets also sought a trusteeship over Libya (1946-48).

Gradually the US sought to establish itself in areas of former European colonial hegemony (see map 1.5). The US military presence in the Mediterranean and its diplomatic interests in the region coincided with the transformation of the USA into a global military power with "a permanent internationalist policy" (Zoppo, 1984, p.313). US economic and military aid to Greece (1947) and later Turkey signalled the implementation of the "Truman Doctrine" (essentially containment of communism and permanent US involvement in Europe) (see map 1.5). Britain had given the US notice that it would not be continuing aid to Turkey and Greece. In 1946, under US threat, the USSR withdrew from northern Iran and thus the geostrategic Gulf region. In the 1950s, the USA signed bilateral military accords with Spain, Morocco, Italy, Portugal, Iran and Libya. The containment of communist expansion remained the main US objective in the region until the Iranian Revolution (1979) unleashed the militant Islamic threat. Regional political regimes such as that of Morocco have often exploited the US fear of the "red threat", hence gaining aid for their repressive
policies. On 2 January 1984 in a televised address to the nation, King Hassan of Morocco claimed that communists were involved in the Bread Revolts. Also because of Algerian support for the Polisario Liberation Front in the Western Sahara, Hassan has continuously implied that the Saharawi are receiving Soviet aid (see chapter 8).

As of January 1946, elements of the US Twelfth Fleet began operating as a Mediterranean Squadron. That year the aircraft carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt visited Lisbon, Gibraltar, Malta and Naples. Initially the naval squadron was referred to as "US Naval Forces Northwest African Waters", but was renamed "US Naval Forces Mediterranean". By 1949, there was a rotation system in operation for US carriers, the US navy was represented in the region at all times. Six months after the establishment of NATO, the US Sixth Fleet was created (Feb.1950), and has been in operation in the region ever since. The number of vessels assigned to the Sixth Fleet averages 40 to 50 ships, with approximately 50% being auxiliary and support vessels (Truver, 1980, p.75). The Fleet can be strengthened during crisis situations by vessels from the Atlantic fleets. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the normal US two carrier task force was increased by the addition of a third force. According to the US Administration the role of the Sixth Fleet includes:

(i) Deterring aggression against Western Europe by maintaining strike forces capable of utilizing conventional and nuclear weapons and to be prepared to conduct such offensive operations as either a national or a NATO force should deterrence fail.
(ii) To promote peace and stability by its readiness and availability for deployment at
trouble spots.  
(iii) To create good-will for the US and enhance its prestige with the countries bordering the Mediterranean; and 
(iv) To protect US citizens, shipping, and interests in the Mediterranean, (The Sixth Fleet, Public Affairs Officer, Staff Commander Sixth Fleet, (undated publication (ca.1958)), Ships History Division, Washington DC).

Under current planning guidelines for a sustained conflict, approximately 90% of US military material would be transported to the area of operations by sea, with only the most critical items and personnel going in by air (Spracher, 1984, p.14). This viewpoint is corroborated by US usage of the Gibraltar-Suez route in 1987 during the Tanker War crisis in the Arabian/Persian Gulf.

The US played the role of guarantor of freedom from Soviet penetration and as mediator in local conflicts until the mid-1970s. International confidence in the US was undermined however with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (1974), the Iran hostage crisis (1979-81), failure to check the Lebanese mayhem from 1982 on, inability to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute, lack of a strong counter-response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980), and the Greek-Turkish Aegean dispute. US sanctions and military actions against Libya (1986) received little practical support from the international community, save Britain. The US stance on the Iran-Iraq war since 1980 has given the Muslim world an image of impotence, as has US unpreparedness in becoming embroiled in the Tanker War (1987) in the Arabian/Persian Gulf. US calls for "concerted" allied
action in clearing the Gulf of mines and guaranteeing freedom of passage of Hormuz met with a negative response (1987), and friendly regional states such as Saudi Arabia wish to distance themselves from US actions. The "Iran-gate" scandal (1986-87) has caused conservative Muslim regimes much concern, and above all the US image has been dealt a severe blow by the inability of the USA to counteract the actions of Muslim fundamentalist revolutionaries. The disturbances caused by militant fundamentalists at Mecca during the Hajj in 1987 was a clear warning to America's Muslim allies.

US involvement in Lebanon and Libya (1980s) did not seriously run the risk of overt confrontation with the USSR. US resolve in the Mediterranean region has not been seriously tested since the Yom Kippur War (1973). The question of securing oil routes to the West and allies such as Japan has become a global preoccupation (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, p.35). US and Soviet policies in relation to the Arabian/Persian Gulf Tanker War (1987) are broadly similar, and hence there is little risk of superpower confrontation; US resolve may yet be seriously tested by Iran.

In 1980, President Jimmy Carter declared that the US was willing to use all means necessary to defend US interests in the Gulf region. This would inevitably mean usage of the Gibraltar Strait. The Reagan Administration upheld this policy and greatly upgraded and expanded the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), now known as Central Command. To move the 400,000 men of the RDF implies usage of the Strait, and access points on route
eastwards such as Morocco, Turkey, Egypt, Israel and Oman (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, pp.34-36).

The RDF/Central Command in conjunction with the US Sixth Fleet presents a formidable force which may be jointly deployed in the Mediterranean. Because of an (inadvertent?) Iraqi attack on the USS Stark in the Arabian/Persian Gulf resulting in the death of 37 sailors in May 1987, President Reagan pledged to strengthen US military commitment in the region, particularly in enforcing the right of passage for the international community. Hence to maintain the balance of power, help secure strategic imports, and implement its Mediterranean, Middle-East, Israeli and Arabian/Persian Gulf policies, Gibraltar Strait remains vital in terms of access, distance, time and cost (see map 1.1c). This necessitates friendly relations between the USA, Spain and Morocco. As long as there remain contentions between the two latter states concerning territorial disputes, the allied British/NATO Gibraltar base remains invaluable to the US in any emergency situation.

7.2.4 The USSR.

Like the USA, the Soviets have geostrategic and geopolitical interests in the region (Weinland, 1984, pp.267-291). Soviet concern is enhanced by the geostrategic location of the Mediterranean in relation to the USSR (see map 7.1b). Because some of its bluewater ports are situated in the Black Sea region, the Gibraltar artery forms an important link
in Soviet naval deployments, and to a lesser extent trade.

The Soviet Union has the world's greatest number of international borders with neighbouring states, many of whom are hostile (e.g., China) or strong supporters of the USA (e.g., Norway, Turkey, Japan, and formerly Iran). For instance, the USSR has over 14,000 miles (2,200 km) of common borders with Turkey and Iran. There are some 750 miles (1,200 km) of Caspian Sea coastline under Iranian control. Prior to 1979, the USA had a free hand in intelligence gathering from Iranian bases. Now the USSR faces the threat of Iran exporting its Islamic Revolution to its Muslim populations (see map 6.2a). The USA has electronic monitoring equipment in Turkey, and US missiles were stationed there until the 1960s. The USSR fears arms buildups in US client states (see map 7.2c). Short range missiles, and medium range bombers and fighter aircraft are within striking range of Soviet cities from eastern Mediterranean locations. The nearest Soviet territory is less than 200 miles (320 km) from Teheran, 300 miles (480 km) from Syria, 500 miles (800 km) from the Mediterranean and 600 miles (960 km) from the Gulf (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, pp.30-32). Naturally the creation of the RDF/Central Command generated much concern in Moscow. The Soviets do not have direct territorial access to the region, nor allies of the stature of Turkey, Italy, Israel and Britain with the valuable sovereign Gibraltar and Cyprus bases.

The Soviets wish to gain allies and base facilities throughout the region. Interestingly the USSR and USA were the first two states to recognize the independence of Israel in
1948. The USSR targeted geostrategic states for aid, including Egypt (1955-72), which offered naval base facilities at Alexandria and Port Said (see map 7.2b). The Friendship Treaty with Egypt ended in 1976; while within a couple of years Egypt was re-entering the US fold, particularly with the signing of the Camp David Accords (1978).

Other Soviet allies such as Syria and Iraq also signed Friendship Treaties in 1980 and 1972 respectively; yet both states are mutually antagonistic, striving for regional hegemony. While Syria tries to follow— an independent line, ideologically somewhat akin to Qadhafiism, Iraq is more dependent on Moscow, from which it procures over 70% of its armaments. This has further alienated rapprochement between the USSR and the Iranian Islamic Republic, because of the Gulf War. Moscow enjoys good relations with PDR Yemen, thus gaining access to the strategic Aden and Socotra Island bases.

Usage of the Strait for the USSR is essential to its Mediterranean, Atlantic, African and Maghrebi policies (see maps 7.2a,b). The decolonization issues in the area, Western Sahara War, Algerian-Moroccan rivalry, and Libyan adventurism are naturally of interest to the Soviets (see chapter 8). Along with "flying the flag", Soviet fishing fleets have interests in the waters off West Africa, particularly the Saharan Bank, where research vessels operate. Since 1956, the USSR has sought good relations with Morocco, and has aided development projects there. However there is little possibility of a communist threat from Morocco, but a fundamentalist regime or one inspired
by egalitarian ideals could be forced into a position of requesting Soviet military aid.

The USSR enjoys good relations with the respective states, but none of them could be termed as satellites nor close allies (Zartmann, 1984, pp. 174-175). While Libya is anti-American, it is not unconditionally pro-Soviet. Nonetheless, on more than one occasion since 1981, Colonel Qadafi has stated that US policies could force Libya closer to Moscow. However, considering the Libyan military fiascos in encounters with US forces (1981, 1986) and Western backed Chadian forces (1987), the Soviets are maintaining a careful distance with the Libyan regime. Algeria's independent stance, and strong support for the Non-Aligned Movement and Third World causes mean that the USSR often takes a position similar to that of Algeria on international issues rather than vice versa. This fact is often misinterpreted by the USA. Morocco and Tunisia try to maintain cordial rather than close relations with the USSR (see chapter 8).

Concerning access and port facilities in the Maghreb, Soviet vessels occasionally visit Moroccan ports but do not enjoy special privileges. Large numbers of Soviet commercial and fishing vessels visit Spanish ports including Ceuta, and the coastal waters off Morocco's Atlantic coast. Algeria offers light maintenance facilities for submarines at Annaba. Rumours about Soviet naval facilities at Mers el Kebir in western Algeria, (a major French base until 1962) have not been substantiated (see map 7.2b). Tunisia offers the Soviets
drydocking facilities for auxiliary vessels and submarines at Hammamet. In October 1984, a submerged Soviet nuclear submarine was involved in a collision with a Soviet cargo vessel in the Strait of Gibraltar, and was brought to Hammamet for repairs (Times, 17 Oct.1984, p.1). Tunisia offers the Soviets naval repair facilities at the strategic Bizerte base. This is for purely economic reasons, as Western naval powers declined offers of exclusive usage. The Soviets used Libyan airfields for military aircraft on two occasions in 1981, but as of 1987, there is still no pattern of regular usage of Libyan facilities.

Overall, the Soviets do not have major port facilities in the region and so have to anchor outside the territorial waters of the littoral states. Anchorage areas used include the waters off Sollum near the Egyptian-Libyan border, areas off Hammamet in Tunisia, Banco le Sec off Tabarka near the Algerian-Tunisian border, and Banco Tofino between Spain and Morocco. Of these, Hammamet and Sollum are the principal maintenance anchorages, while the others are used mostly for operational rendez-vous.

The Soviet role in the Mediterranean is of a politico-military character. As the USSR is not dependent on Gulf oil, its principal aim in the region is to prevent encirclement, and to undertake the training and deployment of its fleet. Essentially the Mediterranean is an arena where the superpowers rival each other, struggling for predominance, but the threat to peace is arguably conventional rather than nuclear. The geostrategic importance of the Mediterranean to the Soviets was witnessed with their naval deployments during
the Arab-Israeli war (1973), and also during the airlift of supplies and personnel to Angola (1975) and Ethiopia (1977). Principally, surveillance and escort functions are carried out by the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet (SOVMEDRON).

As recently as 1963, there were virtually no Soviet vessels in the Mediterranean; in the early 1980s there were approximately 50, of which 25 were permanently deployed surface combatants (Memual, 1981, p.13). The Soviets have illustrated an impressive capacity to reinforce the Mediterranean squadron in wartime as was witnessed during the 1973 Middle East War, when the number of vessels reached almost 100 (Snyder, 1981, p.41). The only viable exit for the Soviet Black Sea Fleet is through Gibraltar, because of the vulnerability of the Suez Canal. The Black Sea Fleet has the mission of guarding Soviet naval and industrial complexes in the Ukraine, as well as supporting Soviet activities in the Mediterranean. It consists of small anti-submarine warfare vessels and gunships capable of supporting local ground force actions. The Soviets routinely move Mediterranean deployed units from the Northern Fleet at Murmansk rather from the closer Black Sea Fleet because of the constraints imposed on passage of the Turkish Straits (Mumford, 1981, p.41). The Soviets keep 10 to 12 attack submarines in the Mediterranean at any given time, which mostly have their base with the Northern Fleet (Spracher, 1983, p.21).

In accordance with the geostrategic doctrines of Admiral Gorshkov, the SOVMEDRON was developed to impressive proportions since the mid-1970s. Admiral Di Giovanni of the Italian Navy
and NATO Commander (1982, p.53) states that if one overflies the Mediterranean from Gibraltar to the Middle East one sees attack groups of the SOVMEDRON stretching from the anchorages off Alborán to Hammamet, Tobruk, Sollum, Kithera, Crete, Cyprus and Tartus; and a permanent Soviet buoy moored off Pantelleria, and many auxiliary vessels dispersed throughout the region.

Since the mid-1960s the SOVMEDRON has intermingled with elements of the US Sixth Fleet in what some have aptly called a cat and mouse game. Soviet naval exercises are held mostly in the eastern Mediterranean basin, though the SOVMEDRON does periodically join in global exercises as in 1970 and 1975. Loss of naval facilities in Egypt (1972), like those at Valona (Albania 1960), has shown how volatile superpower relations can be with Mediterranean states. The surface vessels of the SOVMEDRON rotate from the Black Sea HQ at Sevastopol. Naval-air support comes from the Black Sea Fleet, with its bases in the Crimea for the eastern Mediterranean, and also Syria. Thus Soviet naval interests can be interdicted at the Gibraltar and Turkish Straits, and the Suez Canal, all of which lie largely within the control of pro-Western states.

7.3 NATO AND IBERIA.

7.3.1 Spain and the NATO Alliance.

According to Heiberg (1983, p.64) Spain's participation in the Western Alliance is vital:

"Because Spain will facilitate the European dialogue with North Africa and the Arab
World, the Spanish presence in NATO will eventually assist in addressing the most likely area of confrontation between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

Guérin (1980, p.21) sees Spain as the key factor in the control of the western Mediterranean basin and of the deployment routes of Soviet naval forces. The major weakness of Soviet maritime power is the division of the navy between four separate naval centres, and the salient problem of access. The Iberian peninsula forms a land barrier to oceanic communications, confining international sea and air traffic to the Gibraltar artery. The Spanish coastlines in the Strait area confer upon it the power to monitor the movements of potentially hostile forces and to impose inhibitions upon their deployments. Hence good relations between Spain and the USA are essential for Western security. Within two months of Franco's death (1975), the USA and Spain signed a treaty which upgraded and extended a series of earlier bilateral military agreements. A resolution of the US Senate (21 June 1976) expressed its anticipation of "Spain's full cooperation within NATO". Certain treaty provisions were designed so as to bring Spain's defence policies into line with those of NATO.

In 1982 Spain joined the 15 nation strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Because of Spain's geographical attributes, its membership was a major coup for NATO strategies, especially those associated with the defence of the Alliance's southern flank, principally in the Strait area and Maghreb (see map 7.5).
MAP 7.5 THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR:
NATO COMMAND BOUNDARIES. (see MAP 1.4)

According to Rees (1976, p. 3):

"It should be noted, expanded Soviet naval and air facilities in North Africa could clearly outflank the entire NATO Southern Command."

Like Turkey, Spain lies astride vital geostrategic straits, at the extremity of NATO's stated boundaries, and also in the orbit of the Arab geopolitical realm (see map 8.2a). Gibraltar Strait is the only access point for NATO contingencies from northern Europe and America to the Mediterranean. Gibraltar offers major NATO base facilities. In the event of revolution in Morocco, or inter-Maghrebi contentions escalating, Iberia's role in securing Western interests would be vital. In the event of Soviet penetration of the Maghreb, Iberia would play a vital role in deterrence, or defensive or counter-staging roles. Because of Spain's refusal to cooperate with US strategies during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, this restricted the US-Israeli supply route to the Strait's international corridor, thus illustrating the vulnerability of the Strait artery. The Maghrebi states, particularly Morocco, Algeria and Libya perceive themselves to be major actors in Arab geopolitics, especially in relation to the Israeli problem. Instability in the Maghreb could endanger NATO, US and Israeli interests in relation to passage of the Strait.

Despite the ambiguous nature of the Spanish-US relationship, and bilateral military agreements and membership of NATO, sometimes their actions and aims do not coincide. For instance, in 1986, Spanish fighter planes came within minutes of
confronting US F-III bombers which strayed into Spanish airspace on their way to strike Libya. The military authorities stated that they feared the intruders might be Moroccan. The Spanish planes were called back only after urgent communications with the Spanish MOD which confirmed that the Prime Minister had been informed of the raid by President Reagan shortly before the attack was launched from bases in Britain. Mr Gonzales categorically denied the US permission to use Spanish airspace. Along with violating Spanish and Moroccan airspace, F-IIIIs were refuelled in flight by US KC-10 tankers which had taken off from the US Zaragoza base in Spain, and transferred to bases in Britain four days before the attack. Spain made its displeasure known by pointing out that usage of the Zaragoza base had violated the spirit of the base agreements (Guardian, 15 April 1987, p.1).

Essential foreign policy differences between NATO states and the USA sometimes become blurred in international perception. By association, the Israeli bombing of PLO HQ in Tunisia (1985) was perceived by some Arab states to have US support, and consequently that of NATO. Thus NATO countries like Spain fear becoming embroiled in conflicts in the Arab world. The participation of European leader states like France, Italy, the Netherlands and Britain, and smaller states like Denmark and Ireland in UN multi-national peacekeeping operations in the Middle East has enhanced Western cooperation. To the Soviets and Muslim world, this is seen as a re-assertion of Western hegemonistic aspirations. Thus the activities of such
organisations as Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad are not only directed against the USA but its Western allies also, as is evidenced in Lebanon (1982-87) and the Arabian/Persian Gulf (1987).

Spanish membership of NATO offers the Alliance further resources and the primary asset of territory, approximately 771,000 sq km, with a coastline length of over 2,038 nm, and a sea area (within EEZ limits) of some 1,219,400 sq km (Couper, 1983, p.227). This includes nearly a thousand miles of Mediterranean coastline, and strategic islands like the Balearics (see map 1.4). Additionally Spain's Atlantic coast offers improved control over the Bay of Biscay and routes to the English Channel and trans-Atlantic shipping lanes (Penas, 1979; Heiberg, 1983, p.9).

As in other NATO states, the Spanish population (38 million, 1987) is divided on the issue of hosting intermediate range nuclear weapons. The Spanish population compared with that of the European NATO total now accounts for over 10%, and it's GDP over 7% (Heiberg, 1983, p.9). The US decision to enhance radiation-blast weapons (neutron bombs) caused dissension among European members of the Alliance, being perceived as a unilateral US strategy where usage of the bomb would be wholly in the European environment. The main dialogue within NATO hinges on whether to give preference to nuclear strategies, or conventional warfare and flexible response.

Spain's location astride the Strait is invaluable in any assessment of conventional warfare in the region. Because of US
and UK commitments in other parts of the world, as was witnessed by the inclusion of UK NATO committed forces from Gibraltar to the Falklands/Malvinas War (1982); the Spanish contribution helps to strengthen NATO in the Strait region as a whole. According to the "US Department of Defense Annual Report" to Congress (1982), major objectives included in the Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP) were Spain's future role for stockage of fuel and ammunition, and mining and mine-counter measures in the Strait region (Heiberg, 1983, p.5). It is envisaged that US bilateral and NATO commitments with Spain will reinforce Western security.

For the Alliance, the Southern flank of Europe has proved to be the most problematical in it's geostrategical organization. Turkey's common frontier with the USSR and guardianship of the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits have rendered its security crucial to the Alliance. Although Turkey is one of the weaker members of NATO, it maintains over half a million men under arms, and in the early 1980s it's defence expenditure ranked among the highest in the Alliance in percentage of GNP (Heiberg, 1983, p.5). Because of Turkey's economic and political problems it is difficult to estimate how long it can continue to devote so much of the national economic effort to defence. Also because of the Turkish-Greek Aegean maritime dispute, and Greece's volatile relationship with the USA and NATO, Spain is arguably poised to become a leader state on NATO's Southern flank. While Italy is of major importance to the Alliance and the defence of the Sicilian-Tunisian Straits,
Spain offers greater geographical advantages to the Alliance. Spain's geostrategic location between North America, Europe and Africa, and relatively safe distance from the Middle East, offers NATO a major strategic platform.

The USA and NATO as yet cannot take Spain for granted within its geopolitical view. With the transition of Spanish politics from Francoism to democracy, there remains contentions; the 1981 abortive military coup was a salient reminder.

7.3.2 NATO and US Objectives.

(a) NATO.

NATO aims in relation to Iberia are:

(i) to counter any Soviet threat;

(ii) to strengthen the present boundaries of the Alliance;

(iii) to reduce contentions among NATO member states;

(iv) to benefit from the political linkages of Spain with other states, eg "intermediary" roles;

(v) to bolster democracy in Spain; and

(vi) to reinforce linkages between NATO and US policies, this is particularly true in relation to the question of US bases in Spain. (Heiberg, 1983, pp.2-10).

NATO's primary aim is to strengthen the defence of Western states against the perceived Soviet threat. Iberia offers the possibility of defence in depth which is essential to the US doctrine of forward defence, especially in the light of French
withdrawal (1965) from the integrated military structure. To date only West Germany, Italy and the UK have agreed to host intermediate-range missiles. It is hoped that Spain will follow suit.

The Spanish maritime dimension enhances the NATO defence system, in terms of an increase in number of vessels, air and sea port facilities, and geostrategic capacity in the Gibraltar, Balearic and Canary sealanes. Spain's air facilities, in collaboration with the British Gibraltar base will strengthen the Southern flank and Strait region. Spain also offers staging facilities for forces en route for the eastern and south-eastern Mediterranean destinations.

From a geographic perspective NATO boundaries are somewhat ambiguous. Participation in the discussions leading up to the Helsinki Accords (1975) included official Maghrebi "observers" (UD Dept. of State Bulletin, LXXIII, 1 Sep.1975, p.339; Heiberg, 1983, p.71). The original NATO Charter encompassed "the French Département of Algeria," but Algerian independence (1962) rendered this clause irrelevant. The Canaries, Balearics, Alborán and Chafarinas Islands fall within the NATO area as defined by the Charter. The inclusion of Ceuta and Melilla (and possibly Velez de la Gomera and Alhucemas) would require a unanimous amendment of the Charter, which is unlikely to occur.

NATO aims include reducing conflict among member states. In 1982, a survey conducted in Spain by the Spanish daily El Pais revealed that 29% of those interviewed were in favour of
military action in the national campaign to regain the Crown Colony of Gibraltar, while about 29% stated that they were not sure, thus constituting a floating vote which could be won over to a military solution (Cable, 1982, p.1523). If not solving the British-Spanish territorial dispute, NATO's auspices may help remove the possibility of open conflict.

Apart from Spain's rapport with the USA and Britain, its relations with other Mediterranean NATO states has to be taken into consideration. In the early 1980s command of the Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT) was transferred from an American Vice Admiral to a Portuguese Commander. Lisbon has categorically rejected the proposed idea of alternating command of IBERLANT with Spain. Thus there is rivalry between the Iberian states for prestige in the Alliance. Although France is not integrated into NATO's military structure, its sphere of influence in the western Mediterranean and Bay of Biscay has been catered for in French-NATO operational arrangements in a crisis situation, in which Spanish naval forces will be integrated into this plan. Both Greece and Turkey fear that NATO's acceptance of a Spanish role in French maritime areas could set a precedent for joint operations in the eastern Mediterranean which could undermine their respective claims to areas in the Aegean Sea (Financial Times, 24 Feb.1982, p.2).

Other NATO goals are doubtless to strengthen Western democratic institutions in Spain. Yet precedent would suggest that NATO will support a broad spectrum of regimes as has been witnessed in Greece and Turkey. Heiberg (1983, p.26) states
that because of Spain's history of combating terrorism, NATO believes that Madrid's expertise will be beneficial to the Alliance.

(b) US Objectivos.

While US objectives are similar to those of NATO, there are specific US national goals in relation to Spain. Bilateral relations and those in the NATO context are perceived as being potentially beneficial for US contingencies outside the NATO area, particularly in the Mashreq and Maghreb. The US acknowledges that the Spanish stance on Israel (1948-86), the Falklands/Malvinas crisis (1982), Nicaragua from 1979, and the US-Libya conflict (1986) reflected a very independent viewpoint; but doubtless believes that NATO membership will bring Spain more in line with the US position. For example, while Madrid was not officially involved in the US bombing raid on Libya (1986), US aircraft made emergency landings at US bases in Spain on the return journey. The US also enjoys close relations with Morocco and has base facilities there. Washington hopes that with Spain under the NATO mantle, a non-military solution may be found to the Moroccan-Spanish territorial dispute (see chapter 5).

The Reagan Administration recognizes that the Spanish geopolitical viewpoint is Eurocentric, akin to that of Italy and Greece, and that relations with the present political regime are very different to those which existed during the Franco era.
The USA does not enjoy the so-called "special relationship" with Spain that it does with Britain, hence Spain has to be very carefully integrated into NATO.

The USA maintains four military bases in Spain staffed by over 10,500 US personnel. Those most relevant to the Strait region are Rota (near Cadiz) and Moran (near Seville) (see map 7.2b). In March 1987, over 67% of the Spanish electorate voted in favour of full integration into NATO, but also expressed the wish for the removal of the US bases which Prime Minister Gonzales and his supporters see as a heritage of the Franco regime. On 10 November 1987, the Spanish government asked the USA to evacuate the bases by May 1989.

7.3.3 Spanish Viewpoint.

Spanish objectives in joining NATO are:

(i) to enhance its international image;
(ii) to assert its national independence in relation to the USA, and in particular the removal of US bases;
(iii) to play a significant role in international geopolitics by acting in concert with its NATO allies and as an intermediary in North-South relations and the Arab world;
(iv) to consolidate its territorial claims to the Plazas and the Crown Colony of Gibraltar; and
(v) to further its age-old strategy for dominance in the Strait area.
Spanish membership of NATO generated much public debate, media coverage, and conflicting opinions within political parties and the armed forces. Politically Spain wishes to change its international image. Because of its imperial golden age, rapid decline in the 19th century and international isolation during the Franco era, Spain wishes to redefine its role in the European power concert via membership of NATO and the EC. Concerning membership of these supranational organizations, in 1981, the Spanish Minister of Defence stated that:

"Spanish foreign policy will witness something very positive because Spain will play its role as a European power . . . . In Europe lies its strength as a state, as a society and as a nation " (Ad-Dustur (London), 24 Aug.1981, pp.32-33; Heiberg, 1983, p.32).

There is a strong current of opinion in Spain that views membership of the 16 state NATO organization as a means of avoiding becoming a US satellite. It is felt that collaboration with European NATO states will serve its interests best and relieve somewhat the perceived negative effects of the US presence. In 1981, the leader of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) stated:

"America helped Europe to free itself from fascism, and it not only did not help Spain but condemned it to dictatorship for many more years . . . . We have little for which to thank the US, the last country with which we were at war" (Ya (Madrid), Nov.1981, pp.6-7; Heiberg, 1983, pp.6-7).
Paradoxically, there is a body of opinion in Spain which feels that NATO membership offers Madrid an "opportunity" for ridding itself of US bases. Nonetheless, bilateral agreements with the USA contain a right to disapprove of US operations in relation to use of Spanish territory. Spain implemented this veto during the Middle East War (1973), the Iranian crisis (1979), and possibly the raid on Libya (1986).

In 1981, Spain's Foreign Minister Perez-Lorca stated that:

"If we join the Atlantic Alliance, clearly the bases will be placed at the service of a specific objective, which is stated in the treaty. The US will, therefore, cease to have facilities in Spain for a worldwide policy... Unless it is for the defense of Europe and North America, as a member of NATO it will have to ask permission in every individual case" (ABC (Madrid), 5 Sep. 1981; Heiberg, 1983, p. 33).

This holds significant potential for Spanish foreign policy. It must be noted that Spain was the first European state to receive the PLO leader Yasser Arafat, and only established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1986. Madrid has also had "meetings" with Polisario leaders (see chapter 8). In line with its foreign policy, Spain condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980), attended the Non-Aligned Conference at Havana (1979), and enjoys good relations with Latin and South American states including Cuba and Nicaragua. Because of its historic and cultural links with the Maghreb, and the Arab and Spanish-speaking worlds, Spain wishes to maintain its independence in diplomatic affairs, but also stresses that it has a major role to play as an intermediary. In 1982, the
Spanish Foreign Minister on an official visit to Tunisia stated that Spain considers itself an ally who will "defend the interests" of Tunisia and the entire region through its membership of such organizations as NATO and the EC (L'Action (Tunis), 23 Dec.1981, p.6).

Spanish geostrategy via NATO includes strengthening claims to the Gibraltar base, and reassertion of sovereignty over the Plazas. Prior to 1982, it seemed that a resolution of the Gibraltar issue was a prerequisite to Spanish membership of NATO. Madrid made the case that it's membership would enhance the Alliance’s interests in the Strait, if the Gibraltar base was under Spanish control. Significantly Spanish entry into the Alliance (1982) coincided with progress on the Rock problem, eventually leading to a full opening of the frontier (1985).

Concerning the Plazas, Madrid sees NATO membership as a guarantee of security. Doubtless NATO states appreciate Ceuta and Melillas' geostrategic attributes. During discussions on entry to NATO the Spanish government stated that the defence of the state included the extra-peninsular territories. Spain also indicated that the NATO framework might provide for defence of the Plazas if they were attacked by sea, but if they were threatened from land, the allies would consult. NATO forces in Ceuta would complement those on the northern shore. Spain has the prerogative of offering their usage to other NATO members. Spanish forces there could be earmarked for NATO duties, and the Plazas offer excellent sites to extend the early warning system.

For reasons of national defence and international prestige,
Spain wishes to assume command over specific NATO areas, particularly the Strait region. Evidently Madrid feels that this would help consolidate its claims to the disputed territories. Spanish opposition to the "transit passage regime" as codified in the LOS (1982), stands in sharp contrast to the US and UK stance (see chapter 3). Spain is still pursuing its historic quest for military/naval hegemony in the Strait area (see chapters 4-5). In 1981, the Minister of Defence stated that the command authority which Spain sought within NATO specifically included the Strait (El Pais (Madrid), 4 Aug. 1981, p. 10).

While Spain wishes to recapture some of its former glory by playing an active role with the NATO powers, its attitude to the "nuclear club" is ambiguous. The PSOE has repeatedly stated its opposition to the deployment of nuclear weapons. One of Spain's reasons for opposing the "transit passage regime" of the Strait (LOS, 1982) was the perceived danger of nuclear-related vessels (see chapter 3). Also a major argument in Madrid's claim to the Gibraltar Colony was the alleged presence of nuclear-related weapons at the base (see chapter 6). Yet Spain possesses 3 nuclear power stations, and 19 more are under construction. Spain has the technology and capacity to produce nuclear bombs, and it is known that the army is interested in procuring medium-range tactical defensive nuclear weapons. However the population remains opposed to the deployment of nuclear weapons.

In January 1966, a US B-52 aircraft crashed over Spain with
4 hydrogen bombs on board. It took over 10 weeks to recover the weapons, with one bomb being retrieved from the Mediterranean Sea. The Palomares and Villarrijos communities are still suffering the effects with the highest incidence of cancer-related diseases and mortality in Spain. Many Spaniards feel that the inquiry carried out by the Franco administration and USA was less than adequate. Although, after the accident Franco banned all US nuclear bombers and weapons from landing on, flying over or being deployed from Spanish territory (US bases), the Spaniards are resentful of the fact that the US was responsible for the accident. The 1976 bilateral treaty stipulated that the US nuclear submarine squadron at the Rota base be withdrawn by 1979.

For the above stated reasons Spanish governments of whatever political persuasion do not have a mandate from the population to deploy nuclear weapons. Such a contentious issue within Spain could further polarize different factions and weaken the democratic process. Overall the Spanish position in NATO is primarily aimed at achieving national territorial and maritime goals in the Strait area, as well as entailing political and economic objectives.

7.4 DEFENCE OF THE STRAIT.

7.4.1 Geostrategic Theatre.

According to Lieutenant Commander Jorge Calvar of the Spanish Navy (1980, p.3):
"The Strait is a corridor for the rest of the world: for Spain it is a permanent feature of its geography".

While Morocco and France have access to both the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea, Spain has the most advantageous geostrategic location. Such possessions as the Balearic, Alboran, Canary and Chafarinas Islands hold potential for projective action in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and North Africa. The Balearics and Canaries offer forward positions and have geographical advantages for greater military development (see chapter 1, map 1.4). The Balearics are at the fork of the main sea routes leading to the Gulf of Lions and Bay of Genoa. They are the flank of the Gibraltar-Sicilian maritime route. They possess the hydrographic conditions necessary for naval and air bases, and offer the possibility of surveillance, defensive and offensive actions. The Canaries offer similar advantages. The geostrategic triangles Alboran-Rosas-Sicily, and Azores-Cadiz-Canaries are of the utmost importance in relation to protection of the Strait. Possession of the Canaries and Plazas offer Spain strategic advantages in the event of a crisis in the Maghreb. Presently this depends on cooperation with the British in Gibraltar. These strategic factors are rendered more important by the fact that the other Iberian NATO state, Portugal, does not have a Mediterranean coast and is distant from the Maghreb.

Calvar (1980, p.3) describes the Strait as "the epicentre" of the North-South/East-West axes. The Strait is too narrow to provide space for manoeuvre during major naval operations. By
the same token, passage is vulnerable in time of crisis. The theatre of operations pertaining to the Strait is that contained within the Cape Saint Vincent meridian to the west and that of Cape La Nao to the east, essentially the area between Capes Saint Vincent and Cantin (Morocco) to the west and Capes La Nao and Tenes (Algeria) to the east, a 500 mile sleeve (Calvar, 1980, p.3) (see maps 1.4, 7.5).

According to Calvar (1980, p.5), the establishment of IBERLANT with HQ at Lisbon is an acknowledgement by NATO that strategic control of the Atlantic begins in the western Mediterranean and vice versa. Usage of the Gibraltar base and access to the Strait are cardinal criteria in IBERLANT planning. IBERLANT depends on usage of bases in the Portugal-Spain-Morocco-Atlantic Islands complex, with British and Spanish cooperation in the Gibraltar base. At present the NATO superior to COMGIBMED in the Atlantic is regionally COMIBERLANT (HQ Lisbon) who reports to SAACLANT (HQ Norfolk, Virginia). The western Mediterranean area, MEDOC (Mediterrané Occidental) will in time of peace and tension be controlled from COMGIBMED'S viewpoint, from Naples - Commander Navies South (COMNAV/SOUTH). But in wartime, the French would control routes to Toulon. COMGIBMED is of particular importance to NATO, because of problems on the Southern Flank, especially with Greece and Turkey. IBERLANT is currently responsible for western approaches to the Strait.

According to Calvar (1980, p.16), the object of naval operations in the Strait may be defined as:
"Strategic dominance, tactical superiority and logistic sufficiency in any contingency in the Strait".

He states that control of the Strait depends on surveillance. At a tactical level, threats are possible from air, submarine or surface. Because of geographical configuration, the landpower holds dominance over surface and air attack. However, terrorist type assaults are a possibility. Security in time of tension would depend on coordinated Spanish-NATO action, thus reinforcing the importance of the Gibraltar/NATO base. This would necessitate patrols by surface vessels and coastal aircraft with air to surface roles (A/S); A/S surveillance by submarines and helicopters, and land-base A/S installations like those in operation at the Gibraltar base, such as radar and passive sonar detection. In a crisis, the greatest threat would come from submarines. Admiral Saturno Suanzes de la Hidalga (1982, pp.80-83) stresses that Spain can improve submarine capability detection by closely cooperating in the "laying of fixed detection installations on the sea bed in the Strait or its approaches". Spanish possession of Alborán, Ceuta, and Melilla also offer advantages for the control of submerged passage. However since World War II, Western and NATO interests in the security of the Strait have been guaranteed from the Gibraltar base, this is of major significance as Spain has not been involved in an international war since the 19th century (see chapter 6).

The US Rota base in Spain, at the western entrance to the Strait, complements Gibraltar's. US activity at the Rota naval
and air base as of 1953 was aimed at "flying the flag" in the proximity of the Strait. Within NATO, an essential aim of SACLANT is the monitoring of Soviet submarines in the Atlantic, in which the GIUK GAP has its counterpart in the Gibraltar-Rota link (see maps 1.1a,b). Rota's dual role as a US and NATO base, afforded the US a certain independence. Spanish diplomatic history would suggest that it will not cooperate with the British administration in the Colony on NATO matters, as long as the present status quo is maintained. While supporting a peaceful resolution of the sovereignty dispute, the USA has not lent much support to the Spanish case (see chapter 6). According to Cable (1984, p.61),

"although Spain requested the US as early as 1968, to stop the Sixth Fleet using Gibraltar, US warships continue to occasionally visit the Rock. In 1981, a US Navy team inspected Gibraltar dockyard".

The geographical advantages offered by the southern shore in relation to security of the Strait are problematic because of historical and socio-economic factors (see chapters 4-5). The latter point is self-evident in the light of recent history, and the superpowers' experiences in Albania, Egypt, Libya, Malta and PDR Yemen (Aden). The major maritime powers do not possess absolute secure "territories" or a "sovereign claim" in the region, save the special case of Britain with the Gibraltar Crown Colony and sovereign Cyprus bases.

Overall the Spanish see the Strait and the southern shore as its "back-yard". Often this tends to ignore the fact that it is also seen by Morocco as its "front-garden". Hence the
Spanish, Moroccan and Western strategic aims have to be accommodated. Spain wishes to be the lynchpin in NATO's security arrangements of the Strait, thereby enhancing its national security and fulfilling its historic quest. Hence the Gibraltar base remains crucial in the regional balance of power.

7.4.2 The Gibraltar Base.

Although circumstances have greatly changed since Mahan (1894) wrote about the importance of the Gibraltar base to the British Empire and global geopolitics, Gibraltar's pivotal role has hardly diminished. The Strait remains one of the world's most strategic commercial routes (see chapter 2), and is vital to all naval powers. Contemporary geostrategic planning still emphasizes conventional as opposed to nuclear strategies. Hence the Gibraltar base has retained many of its traditional roles (see chapter 6). The fact that the superpowers demanded a liberal legal transit regime for the Strait (LOS, 1982), and were categorical in their refusal to accept any obligation of giving prior "notification" or requesting "authorization" for the transit of military-related vessels illustrates the importance which they attach to use of the Strait (see chapter 3). Also the fact that neither Britain nor Spain will renounce claims to Gibraltar is highly significant.

Whatever viewpoints exist concerning sovereignty over the Crown Colony of Gibraltar, its history and status have been shaped by geostrategic forces (see chapter 6). For Western
security it is a pivotal base. In discussions with NATO representatives, and officials in Spain and Morocco (1985), the author heard the opinion expressed that better alternative geographical locations exist in the area for a commanding base. One NATO representative stated that the prime geostrategic locations are in the Ceuta-Ksar el Seghir area. Be that as it may, nobody has created a base equal in stature to that of Gibraltar with its massive infrastructural facilities.

Since 1945 Gibraltar's value has been enhanced by many factors. France, a major Western leader state, lost its power in the Strait theatre with the independence of Morocco (1956) and Algeria (1962). Britain is no longer a major world power, but remains a close ally of the USA. It's West of Suez Policy (1971) may have set a precedent for it's Gibraltar Policy; if not overtly by retroceeding the Gibraltar base, then in terms of military and associated economic commitments. The US-British "special relationship", may yet foster a greater US contribution to maintaining the Gibraltar base. The US-British arrangements concerning Diego Garcia may offer a precedent (Madeley, 1984). The US Sixth Fleet has taken over Britain's traditional role in the Mediterranean (Crowe, 1983, pp.18-25; Williams, 1983, pp.30-38), but is dependent on host nations for bases, and is cognisant of the value of the allied Gibraltar base.

According to Beaver (1981, p.400):

"the role of Gibraltar is quite clearly defined in times of peace, tension and war".

In time of peace, Gibraltar acts as: (i) a guarantor of passage
of the Strait; (ii) a moderating force in the regional balance of power (see chapters 4-6); (iii) an intelligence gathering centre; and (iv) a crucial link in NATO strategic organization. In time of tension, it helps in guaranteeing security of passage of the Strait, eg 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Gibraltar has the infrastructure to adapt to new technology and weapons systems. The Gibraltar base military infrastructure is the best in the Mediterranean, with facilities for naval training and manoeuvres, storage facilities, and the largest drydocks in the western basin. The RN Hospital and large communications centre in the Rock can deal with every type of crisis. It affords Britain the possibility of greatly contributing to US and NATO policies, as well as its own diminishing interests in the region. While it is true that the Spanish and British bases in the region are dependent on usage of the hinterlands; precedent shows that the Gibraltar base was able to function without Spanish cooperation in the past. Spanish membership of NATO has afforded Britain and NATO the potential for greater interaction between Gibraltar and its natural hinterland (Rowden, 1983, pp.47-49).

In time of tension, the Supreme Allied Commanders Atlantic (SACLANT) and Europe (SACEUR) have given Flag Officer Gibraltar the operational task of controlling the Strait and of maintaining a NATO presence. One of NATO's technical plans "Fortress Gate" is periodically tested there. (Beaver, 1981, p.401). At the Gibraltar base, the RAF has a dual national and NATO role. With the RN, they form the joint NATO Maritime
Command. Their NATO area covers some 100 nm on both sides of the Strait as well as the Strait itself. The maritime HQ lies within the Rock and is partly funded by NATO. All ships and submarines transiting the Strait are monitored by the forces at Gibraltar and the information is passed onto NATO HQs in Naples and Lisbon.

The airbase is particularly important for NATO exercises and acts as a staging area. There are parking spaces for approximately 50 aircraft, with two large hangers and repair workshops. Fuel storage reservoirs in the Rock have a capacity of over 200 million gallons, and is piped under the runway to refuelling points. According to Colonel Dodd (1986 pp.148-150), during exercises in 1985 up to 30 aircraft at a time operated from Gibraltar, flying more than 300 sorties. However Spanish air-space restrictions remain a problem (see chapter 6). There is only a positive approach radar for aircraft landing from east to west. The resultant problems restrict some NATO states from making full use of the base. However Spain permits civil aircraft which cannot land at Gibraltar because of difficulties, to land at Rota and other Spanish airfields. Tangier and Faro (Portugal) accept diverted civil and military aircraft. Spanish air and naval forces only carry out exercises with British vessels not emanating from the Crown Colony.

At present RAF Gibraltar can control maritime patrol and aircraft operating up to a 1,000 nm from the Rock. However the airfield is exposed. The RAF Station Commander has approximately 450 RAF and WRAF personnel as well as 130 local
civilians. This strength can be increased to 2,500 when necessary (Dodd, 1986, p.150). Since the Falklands/Malvinas War (1982), the RAF have based 3 Jaguar aircraft at Gibraltar. Otherwise patrols are carried out by visiting aircraft from the RAF and NATO airforces. In 1985-86, the base provided facilities for Nimrods, Buccaneers, Hercules, Harriers and Jaguars of the RAF, US Orions, Auroras from Canada and twin engined Atlantiques from West Germany, the Netherlands and France on training and maritime patrol duties. The RN frequently operate King helicopters with dipping anti-sonars, and naval Lynx are used (Dodd, 1986, p.149). In 1986, an EXOCET land-based anti-ship missile system was delivered to the RN at Gibraltar, to meet a NATO commitment. The system consists of two twin EXOCET missile launchers mounted on trailers, a control cabin, stores and accommodation cabin, and two mobile generators. It is fully transportable using Hercules aircraft and is capable of world wide operation. It is easily transportable by sea or road, and can be rapidly deployed to other coastal or off-shore island locations (Dodd, 1986, pp.148-150). Regardless of the sovereignty changes which may occur in the Strait area in the future, and changes which may come in NATO command structures, Gibraltar's vital role in the NATO defence system is unlikely to alter.

7.5 CONCLUSION.

All geopolitical models recognize the importance of the
Strait area in global affairs. Historically and at present the Strait is an important artery in geostrategic planning. This fact is recognized by all and especially the superpowers, whose world viewpoints have seemingly been greatly influenced by the "Heartland-Rimland" model. Besides superpower rivalry, the Strait is vital to Western economic interests. Spain has a major role to play in the region, particularly in the NATO context. However US, NATO and Spanish geopolitical objectives do not always coincide. Control of the Strait's geostrategic theatre remains crucial to the balance of power, and the Gibraltar base remains a major key. Gibraltar will continue to be a coveted possession.
Chapter Eight

Geopolitics and the Maghreb.

"The Maghreb (is) different. It is in the Arab world and in Africa, but not of them. Nor is it European".

W. Parker (1984, p.18).

"Certainly the Maghrebins feel part of the Arab world because of religion, and the cultural heritage; but Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers and Rabat are closer to Rome, Marseilles, Paris and Madrid than they are to Cairo and Mecca. The flow of people, goods and often ideas is more intense with Europe than with the Mashreq".


"Civilization will go on being governed by the laws of accumulation, it's enrichment implies dialogue between cultures".


8.1 The Maghreb.

Among the Arab states, there is relative cultural homogeneity, despite local idiosyncracies. This is evidenced by the number of attempted state unions since the 1940s, eg Egypt-Syria, Libya-Morocco. The failure of these unions is due to centrifugal factors and contested state leadership, rather than major cultural divisions among the Arabs. Despite the strong influence of Berber and French cultures on North Africa, the Maghreb forms an integral part of the Arab world. Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia have an area of almost 3.2 million sq km, or
### TABLE 8.1
THE MAGHREB: TERRITORIAL, MARITIME, POPULATION AND GDP DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land area</strong></td>
<td>919,600</td>
<td>670,364</td>
<td>254,071</td>
<td>63,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sq mi/sq km)</td>
<td>2,310,764</td>
<td>1,759,533</td>
<td>659,976</td>
<td>164,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Length of Coastline</strong></td>
<td>596</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(nm)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sea area within EEZ limits</strong> ('000 sq km)</td>
<td>137.2</td>
<td>338.1</td>
<td>278.1</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% cultivated arable land.</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (1986)</strong></td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(millions)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Absolute pop. density (km).</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% pop urban.</strong></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GNP/Capita (US $)</strong></td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>8,510</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>1,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RANK</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MAP 8.2b: THE WACHIRI VIEW OF THE WORLD: THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU), AND THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT.

MAP 8.2c: THE MAGHREBI VIEW OF THE WORLD:
THE GROUP OF 77, AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EC).

Source: H.F. Young. ATLAS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS. US Department of
over 3.25 million sq km if one includes the Western Sahara. If Libya and Mauritania are taken to be Maghrebi states, then the region has an area of almost 6 million sq km (see map 8.1). The Mashreq on the other hand is about 3.7 million sq km. While the Maghrebi population (58-60 million 1987) is relatively small in comparison to that of the Mashreq (222.3 million 1987), the Maghrebis wish to be closely allied with the Mashreqis. It is estimated that by 2000 AD, the Maghrebis will number over 100 million (see table 8.1).

Distances in the Maghreb are considerable, travelling by the main roads, Tangier is some 286 km (177 ml) from Rabat and 95 km (59 ml) from Ceuta. However Tangier-Ceuta by the non-surfaced coastal road is only 50 km (32 ml). The distance from Tangier to Algiers via the main coastal road is approximately 1,229 km (727 ml) and Tangier-Tunis is some 2,121 km (1,250 ml). Tripoli is 754 km (457 ml) from Tunis. Hence Tripoli is approximately 3,875 km (1,707 ml) from Tangier (Michelin, No.153, 1983). Commercial flights between each of the neighbouring Maghrebi capitals takes about 2 hours or 6-7 hours between Rabat and Tripoli.

Algiers is some 410 nm from Gibraltar (approximately 28 hrs sailing, travelling at about 15 knots); 400 nm from Marseilles (26 hrs); 279 nm from Barcelona (19 hrs); 582 nm from Malta (38 hrs); 1,256 nm from Venice (3 days, 11 hours); 1,071 nm from Piraeus (3 days, 23 hrs) and 1,495 nm from Port Said (4 days, 3 hrs). Algiers-Leningrad is some 2,589 nm (approx. 7 days, 6 hrs); while Algiers-New York is 3,620 nm (10 days, 2 hrs).
Tangier is 539 nm from Barcelona (36 hrs), 1,505 nm from Piraeus (4 days, 4 hours) and 1,688 from Venice (4 days, 16 hrs). The distance between Tunis and Venice is some 937 nm (2 days, 14 hrs) (see map 1.1c), (Couper, 1984, pp.230-231).

Algeria and Morocco are leader states in the Maghreb in terms of area, population and international status. They also play significant political roles in the Arab world and on Gibraltar's southern flank. Each has individual policies and objectives, which have an impact on regional and global politics. Proximity to the EC and NATO dictates interactional; and linkage to the Arab World brings the Maghreb within the orbit of such centripetal forces as the Arab League, OAPEC, the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), and of course the Arab-Israeli dispute. The configuration of the Strait of Gibraltar offers the salient geographical expression of the interaction between several geopolitical systems and holds great potential in the ongoing Euro-Arab Dialogue (see maps 8.2).

8.1.1 Multipolarism.

According to Cohen (1982, pp.228-229), the global order is progressing towards one of "hierarchical integration". The key actors on the international stage are the emerging regional or second-order powers. Thus globalism and regionalism must be accommodated at these two levels of the hierarchy.

The Helsinki Agreement (1975), détente and realpolitik are symptomatic of the superpowers' recognition that bipolarism (USA
Vs USSR) is not workable, as it was believed to be between 1945 and the early 1970s. The geopolitical and geostrategic characteristics of third states form the salient component in the international order. Since 1945 both Moscow and Washington have shown an incredible capacity to deviate from their respective universalistic ideological stances (Servier, 1982), in order to accommodate the political regimes of third states. In so doing, it is debatable whether the superpowers have contributed much to the elimination of war, terrorism, famine and resource competition in the world community.

Islamic fundamentalists believe that the superpowers have been the main cause of political catastrophies. For instance, superpower relations with Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, Israel and Morocco, are believed to be the main cause of tension, war and terrorism in the Muslim world. Superpower competition in the Red Sea region (1970s-80s) (Abunafeesa, 1985), and especially in Ethiopia and Sudan would seem to have obstructed international attention and aid being focussed on famine relief in the region until 1984. Many Maghrebis feel that superpower interests in the natural resources of the Sahara, Libya and the Aouzou strip have largely dictated US and Soviet policies in the region, adding an extra dimension to Maghrebi rivalries.

The much-publicized "human rights" stances of Western governments particularly in relation to minorities and dissidents in communist states sound hollow to many Maghrebis, because of the repressive nature of the Moroccan and Tunisian
regimes which see themselves as allied to the West. While the Algerian and Libyan regimes officially espouse variations of democracy and socialism, they are one party states where individual freedom only remains an ideal. Maghrebi perceptions in relation to the superpowers are influenced by the plight of Palestinian and Afghani refugees. Despite the 1977 US announcement on restraint of arms transfers throughout the world, some 18 states were exempted for the stated purpose of maintaining regional balances. Algeria took exception to the fact that Morocco was on the list of exemptions.

In the 1980s, because of "back-yard" policies, (eg US activities in Nicaragua and Grenada, and Soviet involvement in Afghanistan), the superpowers have become more dependent on surrogates outside their immediate spheres. This is particularly evident in the Mediterranean region. There, surrogates are used as unequal partners to implement regional policies. However linkages between the superpowers and regional states are not clear cut, as Spain, Morocco, Algeria and Libya have definite national, regional and extra-regional goals which do not necessarily coincide with those of the superpowers. Hence compromise has to be reached. This imperative is particularly evident in the Western Sahara and Spanish Plazas disputes.

Concerning global geopolitical organization, Cohen (1982, p.230) is quite right in his opinion that hierarchical integration depends on interlinkages, both horizontal (global) and vertical (regional). In his model, the first-order powers
consist of the USA, USSR, EC, Japan and China. The second-order is formed by regional powers, whose influence extends throughout the immediate geopolitical region, and extra-regionally, e.g. Spain, Algeria and Morocco. Third (e.g. Tunisia) and fourth order powers are regionally circumscribed, but still play a significant role. Thus, no political-territorial entity in the western Mediterranean may be excluded from the power dialectic.

Geopolitical classifications are nothing new (see maps 7.1, 7.2; table-8.1; Mahan, 1890; De Blij, 1967; Cole, 1983). However, what is new is the recognition of the complexity of interaction between states of various geopolitical capacities, and in particular multipolarism. Geopolitical classifications include such criteria as location, area, population, natural resources, economy, self-perception and so on. However these are relative to time, technology and perception. For instance in the past decade, Maghrebi viewpoints have been significant in relation to the development of the Law of the Sea (1982), oil and gas supplies to the West, and Afro-Asian attitudes to Israel (see chapters 3, 7).

To assess second-order powers, Cohen (1982, pp.230-237) ranked some 27 states on an ordinal scale using 12 geopolitical criteria, each criterion being assigned a 1-4 scale. All the states in the Gibraltar region ranked in the lower third of the second-order powers. As this study was carried out in the early 1980s, before Spain joined the first-order EC power (1986), Spain was treated as an individual state. According to Cohen's findings, Spain ranked as the first second-order power in the
western Mediterranean region, with 26 points. Both Algeria and Morocco ranked closely behind Spain with 24 points each. Since 1982, the Western Saharan War has greatly undermined the economic and political structures of Morocco. Because of pragmatic political and resource exploitation policies, Algeria will soon emerge as the first second-order power in the region. In Cohen's (1982) classification, Israel (with 35 points) and Yugoslavia (33 points) ranked in the top third of the second-order powers. While Turkey (31 points) and Egypt (29 points) ranked in the middle third.

Using the same 27 states, and added criteria, such as geostrategic location, Cline (1980) found that Spain ranked seventh, Algeria twelfth, and Morocco nineteenth in his global rating of second-order powers. Thus in the Mediterranean context this means that Egypt ranked first, Israel second, Algeria third, Yugoslavia fourth, and Morocco fifth. Hence, the classification of second-order powers of both Cohen (1982) and Cline (1980) indicate the importance of Algeria and Morocco in the regional geopolitics of Mediterranean.

In order to maintain security in the Gibraltar area, it is arguable that the West must foster a more constructive relationship with Algeria, and reassess its preconceptions that Algiers' independent stance in international affairs is anti-Western. In the same vein, Morocco's potential for internal and regional conflict is fraught with danger. Lord Acton's famous dictum that "absolute power corrupts absolutely" is particularly relevant to the regime of Hassan II of Morocco.
In an attempt to change the dictatorial image of his regime, King Hassan attempted to introduce a mythical multi-party system in the 1970s, although many parties and political leaders remained outlawed. Essentially the feudal order of Moroccan society took on the outward mantle of a constitutional monarchy, but the King continued to rule as well as reign, and parliament legislates what the King dictates. Having the dual role of Emir (Leader of the Faithful) and King, the Moroccan Constitution states that the King is above any form of civil authority because of his divine role. The vast majority of Moroccans remain "marginalized" in political and economic terms. Indeed, Western support for the Moroccan regime is reminiscent of US policies followed in Iran until 1979 (see below). It is arguable that mounting instability in Morocco poses the greatest threat to security in the Strait region. In the past 20 years second-order powers such as Iran, Pakistan, Egypt and Israel have largely shaped regional geopolitics and consequently have had a major impact on global politics; Algeria and Morocco are poised to play similar roles in the future.

Third-order states like Tunisia (and potentially Libya) also have a significant input in regional affairs. Currently Tunisia plays the role of "intermediary" in regional and Arab affairs. Libya's behaviour since 1969, may be viewed as that of agent provocateur, both regionally and globally. In relation to Morocco, Tunisia has a moderating influence, while Libya acts as a destabilizing force. Mauritania's marginal role is restricted to diplomacy, but its geostrategic location near the Western
Sahara, Algeria, Canary Islands and Atlantic Ocean is of importance to Algeria and Morocco. Algeria succeeded in persuading Mauritania to renounce its claims to the Western Sahara (1979), and officially recognize SADH (1984) (see below). Algeria wishes to gain territorial access to the Atlantic coast via friendly weaker states.

8.2 INTER-MAGHREBI RELATIONS.

8.2.1 The Greater Maghreb Union.

The economic disparities within and between Maghrebi states, along with the phenomenal population explosion, inter-state rivalry and the seemingly interminable Western Saharan War are all factors which render the region volatile (see maps 8.3). In 1983, the Moroccan Istiqlal Party, Algerian NLF and Tunisian Neo Destour celebrated in Tangier the 25th anniversary of the historic pan-Maghrebi summit which had stated the absolute necessity of establishing the Greater Maghreb Union (see maps 8.3). Yet from 1962 on, the different “stateisms” and nationalisms became apparent causing bilateral problems, in the form of border disputes and shifting alliances.

Despite the many common attributes, each state found itself confronted by contradictory forces; anti-colonialism yet the denigration of their minority cultures; much rhetoric about democracy yet authoritarianism; the struggle for development; and cultural revolutions aimed at embellishing their Arab and Islamic heritages. The state construction ideal followed the
MAP 8.3 THE MAGHREB: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)


-bió 1000
- 1000-1999
- 2000-4999
- 5000-10,000
- >10,000

EGYPT 440
Country
690 830 860 1000
Per capita G.N.P.
*Per capita G.N.P. data unavailable. Categories estimated

path of nation-state building (Zartmann, 1984, pp.149-177), which led to entrenched nationalism despite the common heritage, and support which Tunisia and Morocco had given Algeria in its liberation war (1954-62). Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and Libya have displayed expansionist tendencies in the region, and particularly, in the western Sahara. Yet there have been abortive unions (eg Libya-Tunisia, Libya-Morocco), as well as shifting alliances.

Morocco is overburdened by what appears to be an unwinnable war against the West Saharans, and is facing the most serious crisis in the region. Morocco's appalling social and economic conditions risk turning it into "the powder keg" of the region (Le Monde, 1 Jan.1984, p.1). Some similarities exist between the situations in Iran (prior to 1979) and Morocco in 1987. These similarities are:

(i) Monarchical dictatorial regimes based on a feudal hierarchy of powerful families and clans who control the resources and wealth of the nation; Western support for both regimes in the belief that "stability" must be maintained at all costs.
(ii) Well educated intellectuals caught between Western and Soviet ideologies, Third World viewpoints, militant Islam, and traditional Islamic culture. The vast majority of the citizens adhere to traditional Islamic norms. Controversial national government policies ranging from economics to tourism and family planning are perceived as being dictated, inspired or funded by Western institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
(iii) The abject poverty of the vast majority stands out in sharp contrast to the great wealth of a small minority, eg the infamous bidonvilles of Teheran and Casablanca. The Western lifestyles of the rich are perceived as symbolizing Western decadence (see chapter 4).
Both Morocco and Iran are "old sovereign" states which display intense nationalism and aspirations for regional hegemony. Often the West supports these sentiments in the belief that these states will advance Western aims regionally and internationally. However this can prove to be a double edged sword; Iran "the policeman" of the Gulf region prior to 1979 is now using its military strength to spread fundamentalist revolution throughout the region.

The actions of the Shah were often taken in the belief that they would have unconditional Western support; this is true of Hassan II today, particularly in his relationship with the Reagan Administration.

The Iranian (pre-1979) and Moroccan regimes play the "Western card" in international affairs, gaining the support of Western governments. In relation to national internal policies there is little overt Western condemnation of the ruthless suppression of dissidents or unfair distribution of national wealth. In relations with neighbouring states (eg Algeria and Iraq), Morocco and Iran believe that they have the support of Washington.

There exists a dialectic in national governmental policies between loyalty to the Arab-Muslim world and support of the West, eg policies in relation to Israel. Zartmann (1985, pp.97-111) indirectly looks for answers to this problem in "Explaining the Nearly Inexplicable: The Absence of Islam in Moroccan Foreign Policy".

Well trained and equipped military forces largely created by the West. The Iranian armed forces have been deployed against Iraq since 1980, and the Moroccan armed forces have been used against Algeria (1962-63) and the Saharawi people since 1975. In both case these wars have arguably come about because of disputed boundaries, contested sovereignty and hegemonic aspirations.

In Iran there were popular revolts prior to 1979, and in Morocco there have been at least three populist uprisings in the past decade. Since 1970, there have been three attempted military coups d'état in Morocco aimed at the overthrow of the monarchy.
Despite Algerian dislike of the Sherifian regime, especially since the War of the Sands (1962) over disputed borders, Algiers fears that social and Berber discontent in Morocco could overspill. In 1983-84, revolts started in Marrakesh in southern Morocco and rapidly spread to the Rif region, and significantly into two Berber areas. Algiers has not forgotten its Kabyle Spring of discontent (1981), nor the air-drop of arms at Cape Sigli (Kabylia, 1978) from an undisclosed source.

Libyan tied-aid and unionist policies have retarded integration. While Mauritania accepted Libyan aid (1960s-70s), it declined to join in union. Eventually Tripoli gave material support to the Polisario in an effort to establish a United States of the Sahara, at the expense of Morocco and Algeria; then to the Saharawi and Algerians' surprise Libya joined a union with Morocco (1984-86). It is estimated that over 3,000 Tunisians have passed through training camps in Libya, ostensibly to "liberate" Palestine, but arguably in preparation for the overthrow of Tunisia's pro-Western regime (Parker, 1984, p.60): yet Libya actually joined Tunisia in a short-lived union in 1974. Tripoli expelled some 90,000 Tunisian immigrant workers in 1984-86, because of disputes with Tunis; the vast majority of the guest workers were from the impoverished southern regions, thus further exacerbating problems within Tunisia (Le Monde, 15 Nov.1984: p.6; ibid. 24 Aug. 1985, p.3; Liberation, 15 Nov. 1985, p.20). At different times Tripoli has also encouraged the Touaregs of southern Algeria to revolt or move into Libya.
Morocco and Mauritania joined in a defensive alliance in 1976, when they annexed the former Spanish Sahara (Hodges, 1984, p.4). With partition of the Spanish/Western Sahara, and ever-closer relations between Morocco and Mauritania, diplomatic relations with Algeria were severed. Algeria officially recognized the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) (1976) and actively supported the Polisario liberation fighters.

Tunisia remained a constant ally of Mauritania and Morocco, wishing to counter-the growing predominance of Algeria in the 1970s. Much to the surprise of the Arab world, Bourguiba suggested that Mauritania join the short-lived Tunisian-Libyan Union in 1974. Mauritania remained non-committal to the offer. In 1973, Mauritania was welcomed into all the Maghrebi cooperation organizations. In 1976-77, Mauritania enlisted French and Moroccan intervention in its struggle against the Polisario. After 1979, Tunisia drew closer to Algiers, fearing a Libyan invasion. After a military coup d'etat in Mauritania (1979), diplomatic relations were broken off with Morocco. Mauritania renounced all claims to the southern half of the Western Sahara, and re-established cordial relations with Algeria.

The failure of Maghrebi governments to resolve the Western Sahara dispute epitomizes their failure to create the Greater Maghreb. Since 1975, a bitter and intractable war has been fought for control of the former Spanish colony of the Western Sahara (area 266,062 sq km/102,700 sq ml). It risks leading to destabilization in Morocco, as happened in Mauritania in 1979.
when the military seized power because of: (i) the collapse of the Mauritanian economy; (ii) failure to secure control of the annexed territory; (iii) attacks by Saharawi guerrillas on strategic areas within Mauritanian; (iv) popular discontent among Mauritanians concerning social and economic issues, and the government's unfulfilled promises about a speedy end to the war; (v) the fact that the military were better equipped then, than at any other time in the history of the state, and was also receiving military aid from Morocco; and (vi) international disapproval of Mauritania's policies in the Western Sahara, particularly from Algeria and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (see map 8.2b).

8.2.2 SADR and the Union.

By 1987, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) had been formally recognized by 67 countries, half of which are members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (see maps 8.2b), and the remainder South American, Asian and Oceanic states (Irish Times, 3 Jan.1987, p.5). Morocco does not recognize SADR and lays claim to its territory (see maps 8.4). (Assidon, 1978; LFDLP, 1978).

The Western Saharan War is fundamentally a dispute over sovereignty between the indigenous Western Saharans/Saharawis and Morocco, and hinges on the principle of self-determination (see appendix V, chapters 5-6). Because of Algerian support for SADR, this has added to the rift between Rabat and Algiers, thus
MAP 8.4a THE WESTERN SAHARA: GREATER MOROCCO.

Source: The Geographer, U.S. Department of State

MAP 8.4b THE WESTERN SAHARA: NORTH-WEST AFRICA


Service personnel
144,000 Total regular service personnel

Proportion of total service personnel in
Army, navy, airforce

Number of armoured fighting vehicles (tanks, armoured personnel carriers, armoured cars (exc. self-propelled artillery))

Number of combat vessels (fast attack craft, frigates, submarines, landing craft)

Number of combat aircraft (inc. armed helicopters)

Major armaments suppliers (shown in order of importance)

U.S. U.S.A.
W.E. Western Europe
S.U. U.S.S.R. and Eastern Bloc
I. Indigenous armaments industry (development and production)
O. Other
* No longer supplying arms directly

offering scope for intervention by Libya and other Arab states, and superpower intervention (see maps 8.4, 8.5).

Because of severe drought (1868-73), the outbreak of war (1975), development of Saharawi nationalism, discovery of rich deposits of phosphates (Bou Craa, Saquiet region), proximity of massive iron ore deposits (Gara Djebilet, Algeria), and the possibility of discovering hydrocarbons, the Western Sahara became the focus of Maghrebi attention in the 1970s. Competition for productive offshore fisheries has also focussed international attention on the region. Spain, Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria have thus vied for control of the Western Sahara (Thompson & Adloff, 1980).

The offshore fishing area is one of the richest in the world, and is estimated to be able to support an annual catch of over 2 million tons. Presently about 0.25 million tons are caught by fleets from the Canaries; yet in 1974, only about 1% of the catch was landed at local ports. Spanish, Soviet and Japanese fleets were active in the area until the outbreak of the war. The Polisario claims a 12 nm territorial sea and a 200 nm EEZ for SADR, and consequently foreign vessels operating in the area are seen as legitimate targets. On several occasions, Spanish fishermen have been fired upon or taken captive (Hodges, 1984, p.6).

Concerning oil, encouraged by the French experience in the Algerian Sahara (1960-61), 43 onshore blocks covering over 37% of the territory were awarded to 11 consortia, belonging to 20 oil companies. By 1964, 27 discoveries had been made, but were
not deemed to be economically viable. Then exploration shifted to the offshore areas. To date no oil has been found. However political instability has discouraged greater exploration. The Moroccan government awarded new offshore blocks to BP and Phillips Petroleum in 1978, but because of the war the companies were forced to pull out in 1980. Thereafter prospecting shifted to Tarfaya in southern Morocco (1981 Shell) and Moroccan offshore areas (Mobil 1982) (Hodges, 1984, p.6).

Since the 1950s, the international community has expressed interest in the region’s iron resources. Deposits were found at Agracha, a few miles from the massive Mauritanian iron mines at Zouerate; in the east Saguia el Hamra, near the Gara Djebilet deposits in south west Algeria; and in the centre of the territory. Because of the war the mines have not come into operation. There has been speculation about Algeria’s desire to establish a road/rail route from its mines to the Atlantic coast via the Western Sahara. Likewise there was speculation in the 1970s, that the neighbouring states could cooperate in smelting and integrated industrial projects in the border areas (Hodges, 1984, p.6).

In the 1940s, phosphates were discovered, but a systematic survey was not carried out until 1962. It was estimated that the territory’s total deposits were over 10 billion tons and proven reserves were 1.7 billion tons of high-grade phosphates (75%-80% bone phosphate of lime) at Bou-Craa. Spain’s Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI) founded a special company, Fosfatos de Bu Craa (1969) to exploit the deposits. By 1972, export had
begun. By 1975, some 25 billion Pesetas had been invested, making for a production capacity of 3.7 million tons of ore per annum, while yearly output had risen to 2.6 million tons. The target set for 1980 was to have been 10 million tons/year, rendering the territory the second world producer after Morocco. The Moroccan annexation clearly had control of the phosphate deposits as a priority. However the industry came to a standstill in 1975. The Saharawis and friendly states like Algeria believe that revenue from mining could provide the economic basis for an independent state; however this is open to debate because of the abundance of ore in the world (Hodges, 1984, p.6).

Since 1956 Morocco had demanded the decolonization of the Spanish Sahara, and had refused to recognize Mauritanian independence (1959) (see maps 5.1, 8.4)). Hassan initiated a policy of détente with Algiers and Nouakchott in 1969; in January, a 20-year treaty was signed at Ifrane committing Algiers and Rabat to:

"submit all the questions in abeyance between them to bilateral commissions" (Journal Officiel de la RADP 8 (11) 1969, pp.82-84).

In 1970, both states convened a summit in Tlemcen, setting up a commission to resolve their border dispute. In June 1972, Morocco recognized Algeria's western border. Then Algiers helped to smooth the way for détente between Morocco and Mauritania. Eventually Hassan invited President Daddah of Mauritania to an Islamic Summit Conference in Rabat (1969), and
signed a Friendship Treaty with Mauritania the following year, hence formally relinquishing his claim to the state. Between 1970-73, the three state leaders convened two tripartite meetings (Nouadhibou 1970, Agadir 1973), at which they jointly endorsed the UN calls for self-determination for the people of the Spanish Sahara (UN Doc. A/10023/Rev.1, pp.126-7). In 1976, Morocco and Mauritania renegaded on their agreement (with Spanish collusion); and annexed the territories. With the declaration of independence of SADR (1976), everyone was aware that the insurgents could not win an outright victory. Survival of the state depended on the international community, and Algeria took up SADR’s cause.

Polisario numbers in 1982, were thought to be 7,000 armed fighters, and in 1984, 3,500 (Parker, 1984, p.116). Yet they have managed to keep 10-15,000 Moroccan regular troops held down. Because of the tenacity of the Polisario in harassing the Mauritanian army in the south Western Sahara and within the state, Mauritania signed a defence pact with Morocco in 1977. This led to the installation of over 9,000 Moroccan troops in Mauritania and the territory which it had annexed (Rio de Oro). Because of the French-Mauritanian military agreements (1976,1977), France got involved in Operation Lamantin, which entailed the bombing of Saharawi guerrilla bases (Dec.1977) and other air strikes in 1978. French nationals were kidnapped by the Polisario in 1977, but were later released, after negotiations. Polisario raids on strategic sites in Mauritania, such as the Zouerate-Nouadhibo railroad continued. The
escalating scale and cost of the war, along with severe drought brought about a military coup in July 1978. At Algiers on 5 August 1979, a new Mauritanian regime signed a peace agreement renouncing claims to the Tiris el-Gharbia. Morocco immediately annexed the region. Mauritania formally recognized SADR in 1984, thus alienating Rabat.

Since 1976 the Moroccans have been engaged in a defensive war, trying to consolidate their hold on strategic areas, with small settlements constantly changing hands. In the late 1970s, the Polisario began striking targets in Morocco. Being a traditional ally of Morocco, the US response has been somewhat ambiguous. The Ford and Carter Administrations supported the principle of self-determination for the Western Saharans, while the Reagan Administration has backed the Moroccan position. The Carter Administration agreed that US military aid could only be used in the defence of the Moroccan state, which did not include the disputed territories. In 1979, the Carter Administration agreed to sell $232.5 million worth of military hardware (including 20-F-5Es, 24 Hughes 500 MD helicopters and 60V-10s) to Morocco, and to "relax" the US position on their use in the Sahara (Parker, 1984, p.127). On Hassan's own admission there were 80,000 Moroccan troops in the territories in 1983 (Le Monde, 26 Jan.1983), and 100,000 in 1984. The Royal Armed Forces (FAR) trebled in size reaching 200,000 men by 1983 (Le Monde, 28 Jan.1983). This has increased the potential for a military coup in Morocco considering the level of discontent among the military and general public. Many soldiers and
officers come from humble rural backgrounds, and may not always be so willing to suppress popular revolts as they have been in the past.

In the 1980s, Moroccan geostrategy has entailed the construction of a series of **defensive walls** in an effort to encompass the main urban centres and strategic mines (see map 8.4). By 1986, the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) still only controlled about 25% of the territory. The defensive walls are reminiscent of France’s **Maginot Line**; or the French **Mauricet Line** along the Algerian-Tunisian frontier (1958-62) (Horne, 1977; Alleg, 1981; Courriere, 1968). In the case of the Mauricet Line, the vast desert area could not be effectively guarded against guerrilla penetration, and Tunisia was friendly to the Algerian cause. Hassan’s wall building strategy has led to the borders of northern Mauritania, thus increasing tensions and threatening Mauritania’s neutrality (Financial Times, 30 April 1987). The Walls are getting closer to Algeria’s Tindouf region; thus forcing the Polisario to circumvent the walls in very sensitive areas. Arguably Algeria will not permit Morocco the right of **hot pursuit**, and Mauritania is unlikely to agree to cooperate as it recognizes SADR, does not want to be drawn back into the war, and enjoys close relations with Algeria.

The Polisario war of attrition is undermining the economic bases of the Moroccan state. It is the main reason for the training and organization of a huge Moroccan army. The bloody struggle is tying Hassan’s hands as he has promised the masses, nationalist **Istiglal** party and the FAR outright victory. On the
diplomatic front, the war has caused the ostracization of Hassan in the international community, and is responsible for the animosity of neighbouring states. Morocco's defence-related expenditure in 1980 was estimated to be 40% of the national budget (Hodges, 1984, p.14).

The SADR conflict illustrates better than any other issue that Maghrebi unity is a long-term ideal, rather than a short-term reality. Nonetheless, in war-ravaged Europe (1946), who would have forecast a united 12 nation EC by 1986? The author carried out interviews in the Maghreb between 1978-1985. The informal interviews were conducted with academics, journalists, politicians (particularly Algerian NLF people) and university students. The "written" interviews were conducted among the author's students at the universities of Annaba and Constantine (Algeria), and Tunis (O'Reilly, 1983). Among the many themes treated was that of Maghrebi unity. Almost 100% spoke with enthusiasm about a "future united Maghreb union" based on a common history, culture and Islam, and future economic integration. They also spoke of the many inter-governmental meetings which had taken place between the Maghrebi regimes, some 286 between 1958 and 1982 (see table 8.2). However analyzing Maghrebi inter-governmental relations, many used the adage "my enemy's enemy is my friend" (or more literally "my neighbour's enemy is my friend"). This viewpoint admirably illustrates the respective national perceptions of the Maghrebis balance of power strategy (Middle East Journal, Vol.40, No.2, 1986). Also despite many government calls for
TABLE 6.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value (Thousands of US Dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1 Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2 Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>3 Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4 Tunisia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

closer economic integration, inter-Maghrebi trade is minimal (see table 8.3, see below). As Algeria and Morocco are the most powerful Maghrebi states, there can be no solution to the Saharawi war without the consent of Algeria. Though an ally of Morocco, the USA cannot afford to isolate Algeria by giving too much overt support to Rabat on the Saharawi issue.

An historic meeting took place between Hassan and Algeria's President Chadli Benjedid on 26 February 1983, at Akid Lotfi, the first since the creation of SADR (1976) and the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the two states. Communications by road, rail and air were re-established, but the King misjudged the situation in believing that Algiers had changed its policy on SADR. Chadli encouraged "discussions" between Hassan and the Western Saharans. Fundamentally, Chadli was trying to break the deadlock by offering Morocco an honourable way out of the imbroglio, within the United Maghreb context, and assuring Rabat that Algeria was not hostile to Morocco. In the same year Libya established cordial relations with Morocco, after years of hostility.

However Algeria continued to support the Polisario, as outright victory for Morocco could threaten Algeria's leadership role in the region, and the NLF are acutely aware of Morocco's irredentist "Greater Morocco" dreams which included the Algerian Tindouf region until the late 1970s (see maps 8.4). Algeria's international image, especially in Africa would suffer if it abandoned the Saharawi cause. In so far as the Polisario have declared their ideology, it is clearly more in line with that of
Algeria than Morocco.

On 19 March 1983, Algeria signed a Treaty of Concorde and Fraternity with Tunisia, which included assurances of military assistance; and invited neighbouring states to join them. Mauritania joined the treaty in 1984, thus isolating Morocco. This was Morocco’s main reason for joining its former archenemy, Libya, in an ill-prepared union in 1984. Both states also wished to gain reciprocal alliances or at least reciprocal neutrality in relation to the wars in the Western Sahara and Chad. Libya reacted to Mauritania’s adhesion to the Algerian-Tunisian treaty by proposing its own candidature. Ostensibly Tunisia supported Libya’s request, but Algeria had reservations. Arguably Algeria was asking Libya to reassess the ideal of Maghrebi unity, as Algeria had by now signed boundary accords with all its neighbours save Libya. Algeria is aware of Qadhafi’s lack of respect for boundary accords signed by former colonial powers. For instance Libyan claims to the Chad’s Aouzou zone could foreshadow Libyan claims to Algerian frontier areas, as the boundary accords were signed by France and the former King of Libya, but never ratified.

Algeria has made it clear that it will not tolerate Libyan interference in Tunisia’s internal affairs, by the 1983 Treaty with Tunisia, and the communiqués of solidarity with the Tunisian Government during the 1984 riots. It has been alleged that Libya was involved in raids on Gafsa and Kasserine (Tunisia, 1979, 1981), and the 1984 commando assault on the Algerian-Italian gas-pipeline in Tunisia. From mid-1985 to
1986, tensions heightened between Tripoli and Tunis, with the
expulsion of diplomats, forced removal of 30,000 Tunisian guest
workers from Libya, and the deployment of large numbers of
soldiers on both sides of the Libyan-Tunisian border (Le Monde,
15 Nov.1984, p.6; ibid 24 Aug.1985, p.3; Libération, 5 Nov.1985,
p.20), (see map 8.5). In 1987, Colonel Qadhafi offered generous
financial aid to Tunisia’s new president, Ben Ali, on the
condition that he would break links with the West, and implement
a foreign policy similar to that of Libya.

On 28 January 1986, at In-Amena (southern Algeria), the
Algerian President met Colonel Qadhafi. Libya once more
expressed its deep desire for a Maghrebi Union. Essentially,
Qadhafi wished to defuse the situation, because of hostile
threats from Egypt to the east, his unsuccessful campaign in Chad
to the south, and the force of Algeria to the west. Because of
the Libyan-Moroccan Union (1984) and Libyan aggression towards
Tunisia (1984-85), Algeria had maintained “distanced” relations
with Libya. Qadhafi assured Chadli that he would remove troops
from the Tunisian frontier and compensate the expelled Tunisian
workers. Libya sought Algerian support in its heightening
crisis with the USA (Le Monde, 28 Jan.1986). The day after the
In-Amena meeting, Tripoli Radio called for a “strategic
alliance” between Libya and Algeria to counter “the colonial
war” of the USA against the Arab world. The Algerian media
merely reported solidarity between “two brother peoples” (Le

The Libyan dilemma in relation to SADR is that while
Qadhafi supports all types of liberation movements and identifies with the philosophies expressed by the Polisario, the creation of a sixth Maghrebi state is diametrically opposed to his ideology of Arab unity. Hence Qadhafi's Saharawi policy is volatile. Tripoli only officially recognized SADR in 1980, while Qadhafi had been supplying aid intermittently via the Algerian corridor since the mid-1970s. With rapprochement between Tripoli and Rabat in 1983 and union (1984-86), Libyan support to the Polisario came to a halt. It is likely that Tripoli has resumed covert aid to the Polisario since the dissolution of the union with Morocco in 1986.

The SADR dilemma illustrates the fact that while the Maghrebi states have many geographical phenomena in common, and idealize the concept of Maghrebi and Arab unity, each is in the process of state and nation-state building, with the consequent chauvinism and territoriality. SADR could yet prove to be the Sarajevo factor for conflict in the Maghreb, leading to outright war in the region.

8.3 THE MAGHREB: EXTERNAL RELATIONS.

8.3.1 North-South Linkages.

According to Géopolitique (No. 10, 1985, p.1),

"... (the west Mediterranean) ... now seems to be fundamentally divided between a European north in the process of becoming integrated and a Maghreb looking for its unity both in a glorious past and a problematic future".

Figure 8.7 The Maghreb: Trading Partners

**World Trade**
- 1 Africa (inc. N. Africa)
- 2 U.S.A. and Canada
- 3 Rest of America
- 4 U.S.S.R.
- 5 E. Europe
- 6 E.E.C.
- 7 Rest of W. Europe
- 8 Asia (excluding U.S.S.R. but including Middle East)
- 9 Oceanica
- 1980 Year of statistics

**Trading Partners**
- Trading associations:
  - A Arab League (inc. Palestine - Egypt suspended March 1979)
  - B Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (O.A.P.E.C.)
  - C Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (O.P.E.C.)
  - D Council for Arab Economic Unity (Egypt suspended 1979)
  - E Gulf Co-operation Council
  - F E.E.C. co-operation agreement
  - G E.E.C. association agreement
  - H Arab Co-operation Council (Egypt suspended 1979)

**Percentage of individual country's total world trade with named trading partners**
- 0%
- 20%
- 40%
- 60%
- 80%

MAP 8.8 THE FRENCH-MAGHREBI CONNECTION.


### Table 8.6

EC (16) Share in the Trade of the Maghreb States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of each country's total exports</th>
<th>% of each country's total imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>59.8 51.6 62 51.3</td>
<td>50.3 50.3 51 50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>63.0 62.7 52 63.2</td>
<td>70.7 56.6 51 67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>56.2 68.6 63 65.6</td>
<td>66.3 61.7 57 76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>52.4 69.6 61 69.6</td>
<td>66.3 61.8 61 75.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 8.5

Share of the Maghreb in the EC's imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.56%</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1.68%</td>
<td>1.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|        | 2.35%| 2.37%|

Source: Various EUROSTAT.
Because of geographical factors, the Maghrebi states have a myriad of relationships with Spain, France and Italy (see maps 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 6.2). The cultural stamp of the Maghreb on Spanish language and architecture is remarkable (Tread, 1967), as is the impact of Spanish culture in northern Morocco. Many areas of Marseilles, and the Marbés arrondissement of Paris are culturally Maghrebi enclaves. Significantly Europeans are often referred to as Xhoumis (Romans) by the peoples of the Atlas.

There is minimal trade between the Maghrebi states (see table 8.3), and despite the official rhetoric, there is little commerce with sub-Saharan Africa and the Third World. Yet it was Algeria which launched the call for the "New International Economic Order" at the UN, and the "North-South Dialogue". Maghrebi policies show little economic precedent for South-South intercourse (see maps 8.6, 8.7). On average 65%-75% of North African trade is with the West (EC, US, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Australia), while trade with sub-Saharan Africa and the non-oil producing Arab states accounts for about 2%. France remains the Maghreb's greatest supplier of goods and the USA its greatest customer (for trading statistics for the respective Maghrebi states, see appendices VI-IX). There is no joint North American-EC economic dialogue or strategy in the region.

8.3.2. The French Connection.

During the Algerian Liberation War (1954-62), with the historic words "Je vous ai compris" (I understand you)
Charles de Gaulle, ostensibly tried to reassure the intransigent European settlers that their interests would be protected; but in fact he was signalling his intention to grant independence, and adapting to the post-colonial order. Within a couple of years the majority of colonists had left Algeria, however French influence in the Maghreb remained strong.

French interests in the Maghreb are strategic in economic, political and military terms. In the 19th century scramble for Africa, Britain and France emerged as the major powers. France annexed Algeria (1830-1870), established a protectorateship over Tunisia (1881) and secured its interests in Morocco with the Treaty of Algeciras (1904) and establishment of a protectorate there (1912).

Although the colonial love-hate relationship is evident, France's imperial mission civilatrice (Horne, 1977; Alleg, 1981; Courriere, 1968) has reaped the reward of winning the minds of the Maghrebis, establishing Paris and Marseilles as major culture beacons for them. In the mid-1980s, there were nearly 3 million Muslims in France, mostly of Maghrebi origin. In 1982 Moroccan nationals accounted for some 450,000 people, Algerians numbered over 830,000 (1.5 million, if one includes French nationals who have a claim to Algerian nationality), 250,000 Tunisians, and 57,000 Mauritanians (Hérodote, no.35, 1984, pp.131-149). Emigrant remittances to Morocco amounted to over $1 billion, $450 million to Algeria and $342 million to Tunisia in 1981 (Parker, 1984, pp.132-133). In the other direction,
there is still a significant money flow from the Pieds Noirs (former European settlers) and cooperants (development workers), often channelled through non-official routes.

Islam is now the second religion of France. The Paris mosque is the one of most prestige outside Dar al Islam (Islamic Kingdom), with capacity for 3,000 people. This intense culture flow between France and the Maghreb is epitomized by the large number of French cooperants found in every sphere of Maghrebi life, except in Libya. In 1984, there were some 8,000 working in Morocco, 2,300 in Algeria and 840 in Tunisia. Over a quarter of a million Moroccan students attend French schools in Morocco, with smaller numbers of Maghrebis at similar establishments in Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania (Parker, 1984, p.130). Despite NLF rhetoric about the imperative of Algerianizing education, most of the leading members have their children attending French educational establishments.

Although there has been a great decrease in the number of French nationals in the Maghreb since 1962, French citizens still form the largest foreign group in each of the respective states save Libya. There are some 45,000 French citizens in Morocco and 15,000 in Tunisia (Parker, 1984, p.132). In the early 1960s there were almost 3 million French nationals in Algeria, but the NLF dictum of "Le bateau ou le cercueil" (the boat or the coffin) ensured the departure of the overwhelming majority (1960-63) (Horne, 1977). In 1984, there were over 45,000 French citizens in Algeria; and French military advisers numbered some 250 in Morocco and 40 in Tunisia (Parker, 1984,
With Algerian-French détente since the death of President Houmedienne (1978), the French have learned to accept their nostalgia for the lost département. France holds an ambiguous respect for the Algerians who shattered their empire, rendered France the pariah of the international community during the War (1954-62), toppled two governments and led France to the brink of civil war (Horne, 1977). With independence, Algeria has maintained a doggedly anti-imperialist and anti-French stance. Yet Algeria has emerged as a leader state. As Presidents Giscard d’Estang and Mitterrand have stated; "on est les faux cousins" (we are half-cousins) linked by history, geography and familial ties for better or worse. Of course, the lucrative Algerian market and valuable hydrocarbon resources has strengthened the bonds. France is also largely dependent on imports of Moroccan phosphates.

France still views the geostrategic location of the Maghreb as vital to its self-defence and by association that of the West. This includes usage of air and sea ports, thus countering Soviet access to the region. France closely monitors Soviet usage of Algerian facilities and Libyan activity in the region, as is witnessed by its vital deterrence role in Chad. The Maghreb provides France with a valuable corridor to sub-Saharan Africa. Moroccan involvement in Zaire and Angola (in support of Mobutu and Savimbi in the 1970s) was largely under French auspices, with US approval. France has continuously frustrated Libyan adventurism in Chad and Tunisia. Prudently, France did
not join in the US crusade (1970s-80s) against Libya. France has tried to maintain "une politique équilibré" in relation to Morocco and Algeria, and the Western Saharan War. While President Ciscard d'Estaing's policies were more tilted in favour of Morocco, those of President Mitterand have veered slightly in favour of Algeria.

France's 1982 historic agreements with Algeria concerning hydrocarbons, was revolutionary in North-South relations, and was seen as such by the Third World, lending credibility to the North-South Dialogue and the recommendations of the Brandt Report (1980). The US looked with displeasure on the advantageous terms offered by France's socialist government, as this would influence Algeria's bargaining strategy with Washington. Like France's politique équilibré in relation to the Arab-Israeli dispute, its 1982 economic agreements with Algeria helped ensure its energy supplies and reduce the threat of embargo.

Algeria produces about 45 million tons of oil and 15 billion cubic metres of gas annually (Atlaseco, 1984, p.50). Government planning in the exploitation of gas was carefully directed at building the necessary infrastructure; by 1983 there was an LNG extraction and processing capacity of 30 billion cubic metres as compared with 15 billion cubic metres in 1982. It is estimated that there are 1,100 million tons of oil in Algeria, thus making it the sixteenth largest world reserve. However Algeria's real wealth lies in its gas deposits; reserves are estimated to be 3,700 billion cubic metres, the world's
fourth largest reserve, after the USSR, Iran and USA.

Until the early 1980s, Algeria faced two major problems with the exportation of gas; it had to be liquified at low temperatures for transportation, save what is exported to Italy via pipeline; and Algeria is looking for prices equivalent to that of thermal oil. Following Mitterand's visit to Algeria in 1982, France agreed to Algerian demands. Under the Franco-Algerian Agreement (4 April 1982), Algeria sells its gas at 20% more than the world price, and there is a clause pertaining to backpayments for gas imported by France in the past. It has been agreed that France will receive 9.1 billion cubic metres of gas yearly by 1990. French purchases of gas in 1981, represented over 50% of Algerian export revenues.

1 Concerning Morocco, maintaining his "politique équilibré", Mitterand while on an official visit there in 1983, called for a conference of west Mediterranean states to be held in Paris, underlining Rabat's importance to the region and special relationship with France (Le Monde, 1 Feb.1983).

Some 16 African states are within the French Franc Zone, and French remains an official language or is widely spoken in about 30 African states. French is an official language in all Maghrebi states except Libya. Outside the Maghreb, five Muslim-Arab states have French speaking communities and several have daily newspapers in French. In 1981, the Franc Zone in Africa absorbed over 33.3% of French exports to Africa and received over 49% of French foreign aid (see map 8.8). (Jeune Afrique, No.1195, 30 Nov.1983). While the Maghrebi states are
outside the Franc Zone, their economies are greatly influenced by its trade networks. Between 1981-82, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia ranked among the states which received most foreign aid from France (Jeune Afrique, No.1195). Morocco also received $200-$300 million, and Tunisia some $100 million in US aid in 1981 (Parker, 1984, p.132). After the 'Bread Revolts' (1983-84) in Morocco and Tunisia, French aid was substantially increased. From an historical perspective, it is arguable that France's 'Maghrebi-Africa' policy is now integrated into its EC viewpoint concerning the region (see maps 8.2, 8.8).

8.3.3 The Spanish Connection.

Since time immemorial there has been intercourse between Iberia and the Maghreb, epitomised by the Moorish occupation of Spain (711-1492), and the Spanish Protectorateship (1912-56). Since the 15th century Spain has controlled territories stretching from Tangier to Tunis; only five Plazas remain. In 1982, there were some 20,000 Spanish troops stationed in the Plazas (Heiberg, 1983, p.20). Significantly the Spanish flag bears the royal seal framed by the Pillars of Hercules, the two promontories on either side of the eastern entrance to the Strait. In the future Spain will literally provide a fixed-link (bridge or tunnel) between the EC/NATO and the Maghreb.

According to Le Monde (25 Jan.1986, p.4), the relationship between Morocco and Spain, "one successively colonized by the other, can only be passionate and ambiguous". "Tens of
thousands of Muslims" in the Plazas are technically stateless persons, "having neither Spanish nor Moroccan nationality". The number of Spanish residents in Morocco is infinitely smaller than the number of Moroccan immigrant workers in Spain: "50,000 according to official figures, or 90,000 according to unofficial sources". In northern Morocco, Spain maintains primary and secondary schools, attended by several thousand Moroccans. A large number of Spanish nuns and priests also work there, "but do not engage in proselytizing".

Despite close geographical interaction, Spain's trade with Algeria and Libya is greater than that with Morocco. Of the estimated 20,000 Spaniards (1984) living in the Maghreb, about 14,000 live in Morocco. According to Le Monde (25 Jan.1986), Spain ranks as Morocco's second client and fourth supplier of goods. Spain is a partner in the Bou Craa (Western Sahara) phosphate industry, and actively involved in the fishing sector off the Moroccan and Saharan coasts. Some 16,000 Spanish and Canary fishermen in over 1,000 boats fish in these waters, and earnings averaged over $500 million in 1981 (Parker, 1984, p.137). The 1983 bilateral fishing accord was the first to recognize Moroccan economic interests. Morocco's attempts at economic independence negatively effect Spanish fishing communities; thus both governments face political pressure from their respective peoples on fishing accords. Until Spanish entry into the EC (1986), Spain had not respected the 1979 bilateral territorial transit accords, thus prohibiting the passage of Moroccan citrus products via Iberia into the EC, but
this is now permitted. Moreover joint military manoeuvres now regularly take place, especially in the naval sphere, and Spain has supplied Morocco with corvettes.

Spain became embroiled in Moroccan-Algerian contentions over the Western Sahara in the mid-1970s. With Spanish "knowledge" of the planned Moroccan-Mauritanian partition (1976) of the former Spanish Sahara and subsequent events, Algiers took exception to Madrid's policies. Partly in response, the MLF allowed MPAIAC - (The Movement for the Self-Determination and Independence of the Canary Archipelago) - to broadcast on Algerian radio. MPAIAC carried out bombings in 1977-78, and was allegedly partially responsible for the collision of two airliners in the Canaries, resulting in the death of hundreds of tourists (Parker, 1984, p.138). Détente between Algiers and Madrid came about in 1979, when Prime Minister Suarez in his capacity as leader of the Central Democratic Union (UDC) visited Algeria and met the Secretary General of the Peoples Organization for the Liberation of the Saguiet el Hambra and Rio de Oro (Polisario). At the UN in 1986, Spain was notably the only Western state to support Algerian motions for direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario. In November 1986, Spain expelled Polisario representatives from Madrid after a Polisario attacks on Spanish sailors off the Saharan coast. Spain imports LNG from Algeria and is interested in sponsoring a gas-pipeline from Algeria to Spain. In 1982, Spain was Algeria's seventh supplier of merchandise and is interested in winning greater markets in military equipment. Spain also has
significant trading relations with Libya, and is trying to become more active in Tunisia. In relation to the EC markets, Spain is the Maghreb's greatest competitor for citrus and olive oil exports.

Spanish policy has been aimed at maintaining good relations with all the Maghrebi and Arab states, and its former stance on the Arab-Israeli dispute was warmly appreciated by them (see chapter 7). However the Moroccan Istiqlal Party vigorously attacked Madrid's decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel in 1986. Spain's non-collaboration in the US raid on Libya (1986), was noted by the Arab world.

8.3.4 The Italian Connection.

The Italian rapport with the Maghreb is less intense than that of France or Spain, but nonetheless significant. Straits of less than 90 wide divide Italy from Tunisia. The Algerian-Italian gas pipeline is the geographical manifestation of their political interaction.

In 1982, Algeria and Italy signed agreements concerning the supply of natural gas. It is planned that 12.5 billion cubic metres of gas will be supplied annually to Italy over a 25 year period (Le Temps (Tunis), 20 Sep.1982, p.9; Jeune Afrique (Paris) No.1166, 11 May 1983, p.30). The construction of the Algero-Italian pipeline via Tunisia was a major step in Maghrebi-European relations, and foreshadows the proposed pipeline between between Algeria and Spain via Morocco. Over
2,500 km of pipes were laid (1978-1981), crossing the Algerian desert (from Hassi R'Mel), the Tunisian mountains, the Tunisian-Sicilian straits and peninsular Italy as far north as Minerbio. More than $3 billion were invested in the project, of which the Italians put up $2 billion. The pipeline went into operation in 1983. It is estimated that annual revenue from the project will amount to $2 billion (the equivalent of 50% of the revenues from oil in 1982). There was a commando attack on the pipeline in the Tunisian sector in January 1984, the assailants were believed to have crossed from Libya. France, Italy and Belgium will buy over 27 billion cubic metres of gas annually from Algeria over the next quarter of a century.

In the late 19th century, Italy vied with France and Britain for control of Tunisia. Italy established substantial commercial links with Tunis, and a significant number of Italians from the Mezzogiorno established themselves in the area. Many intermarried with French and Maltese immigrants. Italy's geopolitical quest for control of Tunisia was blocked once and for all when Britain signed the Entente Cordiale (1904) with France. In the mid-1970s, Italian communities were among the last to be repatriated from Tunisia.

Italy's dream of recreating the Roman Empire was circumscribed by the French presence in Tunisia and Chad, and Britain's in Egypt and Sudan. Italian adventurism in Libya (1911-46) was the shortest colonial experience of any of the Maghrebi states (see map 4.1). This accounts for the rather ephemeral cultural stamp left by Europe on Libya. In 1984,
there were some 20,000 Italian nationals in Libya, most of whom were under contract (Parker, 1984, p.139). The Italian settler population created by colonialism was expelled by Colonel Qadhafi in the 1970s. However because of Italy's European stance in international affairs, and refusal to be identified with US interests in the Maghreb, there is much good will towards Italy in the Arab world. Considering the geographic proximity of Italy to the Maghreb, like Spain, Italy has an important economic, social and political role to play in EC-Maghrebi affairs. The estimated population of the Maghreb will be over 100 million people by 2000 AD. For Italy and the EC in general, the Maghreb thus holds enormous commercial potential. The demographic revolution means that the Maghrebi economies and social environments will need at least to produce twice as much food, build four times as many houses and accomplish a five fold increase in education and public health services, to maintain an acceptable standard of living (Garaud, 1985, p.2). Technologically, this is possible with EC cooperation, while politically this development is indispensable for stability on the EC's southern flank.

8.4 THE EC.

8.4.1 In Search of an EC Maghrebi Policy.

According to Nesterenko (1985, p.33),

"The EC's relations with the Maghreb fall within the larger framework of its relations with the states around the Mediterranean rim".
Lack of a coherent EC policy in relation to the Maghreb is like closing the door of one's house in an effort to ignore the fact that dynamite is being stored in the neighbour's house. Geographic proximity and interaction dictate that there must be a constructive rapport between the European and Maghribi Communities (see map 8.2c).

In the wake of World War II, the Powers once more recognized that poverty was a major cause of conflict. The Marshall Plan was a salient recognition of the fact. Petty nationalism and statism had to give way to a more internationalist approach based on laissez faire principles. This was capitalism's answer to Soviet expansion and the Comintern. The inception of the EEC was based largely on the financial aid of the US Marshall Plan, and inter-state complementarity. All recognized that economics were the motor for political unification in Europe. Historic geopolitical precedents were offered by Prussia's role in German unification, that of Piedmont in Italy, southern England in the UK context and the Ile de France in France. The Treaty of Rome (1958) laid the grounds for economic and political integration in Europe. The adhesion of the Iberian states to the EC (1986), not only meant the integration of the south-western states into Europe of the 12, but ever-closer geographical interaction with the Maghreb, sharing common maritime and territorial boundaries exemplified especially in Ceuta and Melilla. The Maghreb now constitutes the EC rimlands (see map 8.2c).

In the 1970s and 80s, the EC has stressed that:
"(the) Mediterranean is an area of considerable importance to the Community, and (the EC) is in a unique position, and has responsibilities it cannot shrink" (Regelsberger & Wessels, 1984, p.239).

Thus the EC has a responsibility to ensure sound future economic and political development in the Maghreb. North Africa's proximity offers the EC an opportunity of putting its espoused policies of concerted action in international affairs into operation, thus demonstrating the "European identity" in international fora (Regelsberger & Wessels, 1984, p.239). In the diplomatic sphere, the EC must play a greater role in resolving problems in the west Mediterranean region, for instance the Moroccan-Spanish disputes (Bourrinet & Torrelli, 1980, pp.38-67, 76-109). EC viewpoints on the Maghreb are divergent. In the European Parliament, the Christian Democrats have stressed the importance of a policy to curtail Soviet expansion, Gaullists wish to exclude the superpowers from the Mediterranean arena, and the Socialists want the EC to be a forum for détente. By 1987, no group had produced a coherent Maghrebi agenda.

The geopolitical forces of the EC dictate that a coherent Maghrebi policy be adopted. With the Association Agreements concluded with Greece (1961) and Turkey (1963), the EC elaborated its first formal links with third states. It is arguable that geostrategic reasons took precedence over economics. While Greece was incorporated into the EC (1984), the Turkish case is more problematic. Turkey's location renders it part of Europe and Asia; it's human, political and economic
geography dictate a more cautious approach on the part of Brussels concerning closer relations. Despite EC advise to Turkey not to formally apply for admission to the Community, Turkey did so in April 1987. Future developments between the EC and Turkey may set a precedent for Morocco.

Cooperation Agreements were signed with Morocco, and Tunisia (1969), and later Association Agreements (1976), during an era of unprecedented economic development in Europe. These accords were not oriented towards eventual EC membership, but rather served French interests in adapting to the post-colonial economic order (see above, map 8.8). In the 1970s the EC developed a 'Global Mediterranean Policy' guaranteeing free access for industrial products, and facilitating the entry of agricultural exports from the Maghreb. Included were aid and cooperation packages. By the 1980s, a complex network of accords had been established with all Mediterranean states except Libya and Albania. It was envisaged that the EC ideals of democracy and free trade would efface former hostile colonial relationships, leading to cooperation. However, it was also foreseen that the Maghreb would have a population of over 100 million consumers by 2000 AD. According to Regelsberger and Wessels (1984, p.239).

"A global Mediterranean policy was conceived to be, along with the Lomé Agreement, a central part of its (EC's) role as a civilian power as opposed to a Superpower military concern dimension".

In North Africa, EC-Maghrebi cooperation is imperative for regional security. Maghrebi leaders have reiterated time and
again that the EC rhetoric of west Mediterranean fraternity must be bolstered by more equitable trading patterns.

The oil crises of the 1970s lost a new dimension to EC interest in the region, particularly in Algeria and Libya. Significantly association agreements with the Maghrebi states were only signed in 1976. The little progress made in EC-Maghrebi relations (1976-86) became strained when Spain and Portugal joined the Community (see tables 8.4, 8.5). Future Iberian policies will have a major influence on Maghrebi views of the EC.

Spanish integration into the EC will have longterm social, economic and political consequences for the North Africans. The degree of self-sufficiency attained by the EC because of Spanish membership, and EC preference and rights systems, undermines the Maghreb's economic commitment to the EC, except in relation to hydrocarbon and phosphate supplies. With Iberian integration, it is estimated that the Community is self-sufficient in all Mediterranean agricultural products: citrus fruits (90%), small fruits (110%), tomatoes (100%), olive oil (109%), canned fish (120%) and wine (110%) (Nesterenko, 1985, p.34). Hence this means a restructuring of Maghrebi trading patterns. Because of preference for Iberian produce, pressures will be brought to bear in Brussels to strengthen trade barriers against Maghrebi produce. Because of the EC's first-power status, its surplus of Mediterranean products has the advantage of EC market mechanisms to penetrate the international market, unlike the more fragile Maghrebi market mechanisms (Bourrinet & Torrelli, 1980,
The Maghreb's intermediate technology sector (textiles, footwear and leather goods) now faces greater competition from high quality, low priced Iberian products. Morocco and Tunisia have most to lose in this area. The gradual erosion of the 1976 Agreements would corroborate this interpretation, as the EC Commission acknowledged in 1984 (EC. Rept. COMM. No.107. Parag.19. 11 May 1984). Already in 1978, the Commission accepted that there was a "serious imbalance" in its economic relations with the Maghreb (Nesterenko, 1985, p.36). On 28 March 1985, the Euro Council made a statement of intention, in the Community's name, in relation to the Mediterranean which was essentially political rather than economic. Its breadth was of a global Mediterranean nature, though it had been understood that it would deal specifically with the Maghreb and economics. Significantly only Morocco is referred to in the last paragraph.

Concerning the economic rapport, the EC is the Maghreb's largest supplier of manufactured goods. Maghrebi trade with the EC had a deficit of $1.700 million in 1980, while its share of EC imports averaged less than 2.5%. The Maghreb's export share of manufactured goods to the EC (mostly textiles) is about 1% (Nesterenko, 1985, p.36). Though small, it is significant to the local economies. Algerian and Libyan hydrocarbon exports to the Community have remained steady, as with Moroccan phosphate exports (see table 8.4, 8.5, appendices VI-IX).

To ensure future development and regional security in the Maghreb, more realistic policies have to be adopted. EC
suggestions as to development in the Maghreb entail redeployment of lands and resources, and diversification of markets. Redeployment in Morocco and Tunisia is not viable, because the physical and technological environments there are unlikely to yield products that the EC is not already self-sufficient in, or will shortly be. Moroccan economic strategies of targeting key sectors towards EC market demands in the 1970s, bear witness to this. Ironically redeployment necessitates hard currency, which theoretically should come from trade with the EC. With reference to diversification, Morocco is already vigorously pursuing export policies to the Eastern Block, America, Middle East and Africa. The main problem here is the perishable nature of produce and prohibitive transport costs. When the 1965-1970 average is compared to the 1980-82 average, the EC's share of Morocco's sum total of exports dropped from 72% to 53% for citrus fruits, by over 50% for early fruit and vegetables, from 72% to 20% for wine, and from 56% to 46% for canned fish (Nesterenko, 1985, p.43).

8.4.2 Viewpoints from the Southern Shore.

In 1985, prominent political figures in the Maghreb were interviewed by Géopolitique (No.10) and asked their views on the EC. The contrasting answers indicate the national positions. Though Libya has substantial trading links with the EC, it refuses to have formal links. Mauritania's rapport with the EC is limited, and mostly via France and the Lomé Convention.
Algeria's Foreign Minister, Ahmedaleb Ibrahimi (Geopolitique (No.10) 1985, pp.20-24), compared the political history of Europe with that of the Maghreb, and emphasized that the independence struggles there (1950s-80s) were fought in the name of a united Maghreb. Ibrahimi recognized the great achievements of the EC, but stated that its raison d'etre is a quest for economic hegemony. He asked what was the EC's attitude to the question of wine surpluses in the 1970s, from which Algeria once derived over 70% of its export earnings. He stated that the sudden shrinkage of the EC market (1976), forced Algeria to seek alternative markets and hasten its costly policy of reconverting the vineyards. Currently wine forms a negligible part of the Algerian export market. Thus he restated Algeria's scepticism about Western relations with the developing countries, and re-echoed Boumedienne's famous statement that wine was the poisoned gift of French colonialism. In the same vein of thought, he asked what the EC offers in exchange for Algeria's role in furnishing the Community with hydrocarbons, and security of supply? "Simply, a bad balance of payments". With reference to EC-Maghrebi Agreements, Ibrahimi says:

"While they have flourished commercially, with mounting deficits, the volume of financial cooperation stagnated since 1975, even though our imports have grown tenfold in the intervening period".

Ibrahimi concluded by stating that economic realism dictates that the EC will "look after itself", and the lesson to be learned by the Maghrebi states is that they must follow the
EC's example, by cooperating and economically integrating to form a United Maghreb.

Algeria's cautious relationship with the EC is based on a pragmatic appraisal of the EC's rapport with North Africa since the 1960s. President Boumediene's (1965-1978) dream of making Algeria the industrial core of a united Maghreb, the Prussia of the region, is still alive. Because of its natural resources, Algeria is less willing to accept economic dependence on the dictates of the EC market.

(b) Tunisia.

When interviewed by Géopolitique (1985, NO.10, pp.6-13), the Tunisian Prime Minister, Mohamed M'zali, stated that:

"Geopolitically (there is) . . . the . . . dramatic absence of any form of association based on solidarity between North and South".

He also said that:

"It is not the broadening of the Community which concerns us, for that is an internal matter for Europe. Rather what does concern us is the steady decline in our trade with the EC".

M'zali spoke of the characteristics of Tunisian culture and society, and its evolution towards the ideal of democracy and economic development based on Tunisian precepts. He asked the EC to respect the political uniqueness of the Maghreb, and by closer economic cooperation help secure stability. Concerning Islam, M'zali said that:

"The defence of Islam was seen as a struggle to preserve the personality of Tunisia and safeguard the cultural identity of the
Tunisians'.

Thus M'zali pointed out the geopolitical realities of Tunisia: geographically close to the developed world, but of the South; Islamic and modern aspiring to democracy, but threatened by poverty and fundamentalism if not supported by the EC.

(c) Morocco.

The Moroccan viewpoint has similarities with those of Algeria and Tunisia, but is not exactly the same. It wishes to portray an independent stance, like Algeria, but does not have the advantages of hydrocarbon resources nor internal political stability to do so. Like Tunisia, it seeks EC economic and political support for the present regime; but unlike Tunisia, the Moroccan democratic process is more fictional than real. Hassan recognizes that Morocco's relations with the EC are of geostrategic and geopolitical importance, because of proximity to Gibraltar.

In 1985, Moroccan exports accounted for less than 6% of EC imports of Mediterranean farm produce (Nesterenko, 1985, p.40). Morocco regrets that the 1976 agreements were limited to the agricultural sphere, and wants future accords to include fishing, industry and social concerns. In 1985, there were over 750,000 Moroccan nationals living in the EC, and remittances equalled almost half Morocco's trade deficit (Nesterenko, 1985, p.40). The number of Moroccan immigrants living in the EC had risen to 1 million by 1987 (Sunday Times Magazine, 15 Nov.1987, pp.74-83). Morocco wishes EC aid to be increased, or at least maintained at the level agreed upon in 1976.
Morocco believes it can make a significant contribution to the EC in the economic and political spheres (see maps 8.2). EC agriculture is heavily dependent on the importation of fertilizers. In 1982, the EC imported 50% of its requirements from Morocco, 20% from the USA, 12% from Senegal and Togo, 12% from Israel and Tunisia, and 6% from the USSR (Nesterenko, 1985, p.41). Morocco has the largest known phosphate reserves in the world. Moroccan waters are rich in fish stocks, the EC Common Fisheries Policy cannot meet the Community demand. Spain's fishing fleet, represents 70% of the EC's total tonnage, and it is estimated that over 1,000 Spanish vessels were operating in Moroccan waters in the mid-1980s. Surveys suggest that the amount of fish which may be taken in Morocco's Atlantic waters without damaging future stocks to be 5 million tons, or 8% of the world catch (Nesterenko, 1985, p.41).

Morocco wishes to play an active liaison role between the EC/West and Arabs. In an interview in 1985, Ahmed Rêda Guédira, Advisor to the King, stated the Moroccan viewpoint on the EC (Géopolitique, No.10. pp.26-31). He said that being an underdeveloped state at the time of independence (1956), Morocco was affected by the ideological hostilities of the superpowers. "Being imbued with the spirit of Bandung, Marxism-Leninism held a certain attraction in contrast to what the colonial West had to offer". However, in 1964, Morocco instigated negotiations with the EC, leading to agreements (1969, 1976). Guédira stated that the limited trading agreements put no obligation on the EC to aid Moroccan development. Because the agreements "are
manifestly of little interest to both sides", their "state and nature . . . cannot be improved". Hence in 1984, King Hassan, personally informed Brussels and the EC chairman President Mitterrand, of Morocco's intention to seek full membership of the EC, and shortly afterwards posed its candidature. Hassan's dossier highlighted three areas: (i) trade; (ii) geographical location and the proposed trans-Strait fixed-link; and (iii) political, the desire to be allied to democratic Europe.

In relation to Morocco's request to join the EC, Guedira stated that:

"Hassan II has taken his decision, and it is indeed his own, for no one else in his ministerial team would have been so bold".

Hassan stated that Morocco's candidature should be considered at the highest political level in the EC, rather than by the heavy bureaucracy, because of the political "implications and consequences at every level". Significantly when Hassan signed a Treaty of Union with Libya the same year, Guedira said that this did not affect in any way Morocco's sovereign decision to join the EC. He insisted that Morocco wished to play its role in the "marriage" of the Arab and European worlds, of Western technology and Arab wealth. To show his resolve in the affair Hassan created two new government posts, a minister for communications with the EC, and one to consolidate relations with the Gulf States. One Community diplomat told the author (1985) in private that Hassan's request for EC membership initially "caused shock", then "embarrassed silence" and
eventually "mirth". Shortly after a state visit to Britain in 1987, Hassan once again asked Brussels to accept Morocco's candidature for EC membership.

Morocco is aware of the EC's dilemma, having an impoverished state on its southern flank, yet a country of great geostrategic importance. Hassan is cognisant that the USA informally supported Greek and Spanish membership of the EC, and backs Turkey's candidature. If the EC does not adopt coherent strategies in relation to Morocco, then Western aid (particularly from the USA) offers the only panacea for Morocco's problems, apart from closer links with anti-Western states. Morocco's request to join the EC constitutes one of the greatest geopolitical gambles which the region has witnessed since the establishment of colonies on both shores of the Strait. Any form of political union between Morocco and the EC is highly problematic. Formal political links would endanger King Hassan's rule because of the nature of his autocratic regime in contrast to EC style democracy. One can only imagine the problems that would be encountered in Rabat, Casablanca or Tangier in organizing the election of Euro-MPs. Thus Hassan's application for EC membership may be seen as a warning to the West to support him financially and politically, or be prepared for a difficult future. Significantly to date, no EC state nor the Euro Parliament has officially recognized SADR. The idea of union with the EC is also sacriligious for fundamentalists as this would offer non-Islamic powers a say in governing a Muslim territory and people.
8.5 NON-ALIGNMENT.

8.5.1 Is Non-Alignment Feasible?

The Maghrebi states belong to the Non-Aligned Movement and associated bodies such as the Group of 77. History, geography, self-perception and aspired roles have significantly shaped their national viewpoints (see map 8.2b). In 1955, at the inaugural meeting of the nonaligned countries at Bandung some 29 states participated, including Maghrebi representatives. At the Summit of Non-Aligned Countries (1986) in Harare, some 101 governments were represented, including those of the Maghreb. At the 1986 summit, Qadhafi stated that there was no such thing as non-alignment and that the Movement was "a farce". Qadhafi's viewpoint reflected that of Cuba, which had attempted to push the Movement into a Soviet alliance in 1979. At the 1986 summit, the stated aims of the Movement were to encourage North-South cooperation, facilitate the superpower dialogue, and participation in international fora for nuclear disarmament. All Maghrebi delegations (save Libya) officially supported these motions.

However global agreement on political principles among the developing countries is far removed from the every-day realities of the Maghrebis states (see map 8.2a,b,c). Algeria is possibly the only state in the region to be truly non-aligned. Yet as a general rule, the Maghrebis have always hedged against polarization of their relations with the superpowers. While Morocco has shown itself to have allied stances with the USA and France, in the late 1970s it signed trade agreements for
phosphates and fish with the USSR, worth over $2 million and $300 million respectively (Zartmann, 1984, p.174).

The Maghrebi regimes recognize that the superpowers wish to establish bases in North Africa, secure phosphate and hydrocarbon supplies, and gain influence in the Strait area. US policy in the region is globalist, which has alienated Algeria somewhat and caused a violent backlash on the part of Libya. In 1987 Qadhafi vowed to install Soviet nuclear missiles along the Libyan coast if the USA attacked again. He stated that:

"Libya will declare that it is a communist country and join the Warsaw Pact, and deploy Soviet missiles on the coast of the Mediterranean" (NBC News, Qadhafi Interview, 23 March 1987, reported in The Guardian, 24 March 1987; & Le Monde, 24 March 1987).

Despite such statements it is unlikely that any of the Maghrebi peoples would permit their regimes to follow such a path due to contact with Western Europe and the strength of the Islamic ideal.

6.5.2 Maghrebi-US Relations.

The USA established consular representation in the Maghreb in the 18th century, and Morocco was the first to officially recognize the independence of the USA (1776). Because of the European scramble to partition Africa in the 19th century, the Moroccan Sultan formally requested the US to establish a protectorate, in the belief that this would save his kingdom (see chapter 4, maps 4.1-4.2). With the Allied liberation of
North Africa (1942), the US established contacts with the Maghrebi independence movements. John F. Kennedy helped focus international attention on the Algerian Liberation War (1954-62), yet the USA managed to maintain good relations with France. The US presence at the French air base of Port Layautey (Kenitra), north of Rabat, eventually became a communications centre of great importance for the US Sixth Fleet. The US established a large communications network at Tangier. By 1951, the USA had developed three strategic air command bases in Morocco, at Sidi Slimane (between Kenitra and Meknes), Nouasseur (south of Casablanca), and Ben Guerir (north of Marrakesh). The base agreements had been signed by France, which proved frustrating for the newly independent Moroccan state (1956). Morocco asked that the US air force presence be withdraw in 1963, the Kenitra complex was not evacuated until 1978. Nonetheless Morocco is cooperative with the USA on fleet visits, overflight and intelligence gathering. From 1975 on there was closer cooperation, largely because of the Western Sahara War and the Reagan Administration's quest for base facilities for the RDF. Morocco has supplied the USA with valuable intelligence concerning Soviet weapons captured in the Sahara. As US commercial interests in Morocco are negligible, and Morocco has no known hydrocarbon resources, the rapport has always been based on geostrategic principles. However diplomatic relations were strained because of the Moroccan-Libyan Union (1984-86). In 1987, the US resumed sending high level government personnel on official visits to
Like Bourguiba of Tunisia (1956-87), Hassan is perceived as a moderate by the USA. He arranged initial contacts between Israel and Egypt (1970s); Jewish communities live in relative security in Morocco; and international Jewish Congresses were allowed to be held there in the 1980s. Hassan has supported anti-communist forces in Angola, Zaire and the Arabian/Persian Gulf. Hassan’s enemies feel that his policies are inherently pro-Western and pro-Israeli; some believe that over-identification with US policies may yet lead to his downfall.

US relations with Algeria to date have been based on economic rather than political principles (see maps 2.2-2.4). In the mid-1980s the US obtained contracts with Algeria to the value of $1.2 billion (Parker, 1984, p.143). The US remains suspicious of Algeria because of its nationalization policies in the 1970s, and its anti-imperialist stance, including diplomatic support for Vietnam, the Palestinians, the New International Economic Order, the Mediterranean Zone of Peace movement, and avid Third World stances at the UN conferences on the law of the sea (see chapter 3). Algeria’s diplomatic and military support for the Polisario has retarded better relations. Algeria’s role in resolving the US hostage crisis in Iran (1979-81), was a clear indicator of its stature in the international community. Yet the USA failed to acknowledge Algeria’s actions, and insensitively signed an arms deal with Morocco within days of the release of the hostages.
Despite Algerian-US contentions in the 1980s concerning pricing and LNG contracts, it is recognized that Algerian supplies of hydrocarbons are significant to the US economy. Commercial agreement between Algeria and the USA has been more problematic than that with France and Italy. Up to the mid-1980s, US importers were prepared to meet the Algerian price, but the US government and consumer groups were not. Fears have been expressed by the US government concerning security of supply. Opponents of Algerian-US LNG agreements suggest that the flow could be interrupted for political reasons or that prices may be arbitrarily changed at short notice. This is indicative of the pervasive view that Algeria is essentially unfriendly.

The Panhandle Eastern Corporation suspended its shipments of LNG under contract in 1983, but Distrigas of Boston has continued to import 1.9 billion cubic metres annually. The outcome of the saga, is still not clear, but the symbiosis between Algeria and consumers in the north-eastern USA, some 15% of whose domestic fuel requirements were to have come from this source according to US projections in the mid-1970s, has not developed as anticipated, and it seems unlikely that it will at any time soon (Parker, 1984, p.46). The Algerian stance could yet prove advantageous to the nation, as it refuses to deplete its resources for short-term capital gain. In 1980, 86% of export revenue came from oil; in 1984, oil was still providing some 60% of the national budget. Algeria is paid for oil in dollars, and buys imports from non-dollar areas, thus
benefitting from the increased currency value.

In the early 1980s, there were over 2,000 Soviet and East European military advisers in Algeria, as well as 11,150 Soviet technicians working in the commercial sphere (Parker, 1984, p.144). However these statistics are minimal in comparison to the number of Westerners, Chinese and other foreigners working there, believed to be approximately 1.25 million. While living and working in educational institutions in Algeria (1978–81), the author found in general that there was little friendly contact between the Soviets and Algerians in the educational environment, everyday situations such as "queueing" at stores or in the social sphere. The cultural and ideological differences are rarely breached, despite the official rhetoric of fraternity. While the USA is Algeria's first trading partner, until recently Algeria remained the fourth largest purchaser of Soviet arms among the less developed countries. Since 1979, Algeria has tried to diversify its sources of arms supply: with the USA, France and Spain competing for the trade.

Tunisia enjoys excellent relations with the USA, but like Morocco, economic interests are limited. The US interest in Tunisia is geopolitical, because of location and President Bourguiba's pro-Western stance in international affairs (1956–87). The superpowers, France and Maghrebi regimes closely monitored events in Tunisia between 1978–87, because of the deterioriating health of Bourguiba, the pending leadership crisis, populist revolts and Libyan interference in Tunisian affairs. A bloodless coup d'état took place on 7 November 1987.
and the Prime Minister, General Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, took over the role of President of the republic. It is likely that Ben Ali will continue Tunisia's pro-Western policy (Times, 8 Nov.1987; p.20; ibid, 9 Nov.1987, pp.8, 17, 24; Observer, 8 Nov.1987, p.13; Independent, 9 Nov.1987, pp.1, 12; Guardian, 9 Nov.1987, p.7). There were unconfirmed reports in Tunis that Ben Ali may have informed the USA or been aided by the US in "retiring" Bourguiba (Guardian, 9 Nov.1987, p.7).

Several Western oil companies are actively engaged in onshore and offshore exploration in Tunisia (see maps 2.2-2.5). Oil and natural gas deposits were discovered in 1964 and will cover domestic needs into the next century. Oil reserves are estimated to be approximately 250 million tons and natural gas 150 billion cubic metres. Along with hydrocarbon extraction, phosphate exploitation represents just less than a quarter of the GNP. Oil production is about 5.2 million tons annually, and natural gas some 250 million cubic metres (Atlaseco, 1984, 1985, 1986). Tunisia is trying to foster refining and chemical plants; the US and EC are competing for the trade.

Relations between Libya and the USA were dictated by geostrategic and economic principles until Colonel Qadhafi came to power in 1969. Petroleum reserves are estimated to about 3 billion tons, while in 1984, it was believed that the production of natural gas could reach some 560 billion cubic metres per year (see maps 2.2-2.4), (Atlaseco, 1984, 1986). Despite the forced US evacuation of its Libyan bases and political contentions, as late as 1980, Libya was the third largest
supplier of US oil imports. Until 1981, 6 US companies were involved in oil extraction and exportation. US development projects in Libya in the early 1980s, were estimated to be valued at $10 billion, and US exports averaged some $900 million (Parker, 1984, p.145). In 1982, the majority of US citizens left Libya, and the US government embargoed the importation of Libyan oil. The US air strike on Libya (1986) was aimed at bringing down the Qadhafi regime. It was hoped that Libyan dissidents would stage a coup d'etat, and re-establish good relations with Washington. In 1987, Qadhafi stated that US "imperialism" could force Libya into seeking membership of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets have declined closer association with Libya because of Qadhafi's capacity to become involved in disputes, and the fact that Libyan military engagements with the USA (1981, 1986), and in Chad (1987) proved to be fiascos. The USA and France maintain cordial relations with Mauritania. This is aimed at countering Qadhafiism, and Soviet fishing interests in the region.

In conclusion it may be said that all the Maghrebi regimes officially declare their states to be nonaligned (see map 8.5). However Morocco and Tunisia foster closer relations with the West and especially the US. Since 1979, Algeria has developed greater links with the West, and has maintained cordial relations with the USSR without deviating from its goal of nonalignment. The pro-Soviet attitudes expressed by the Libyan regime are only significant in so far as they suit Libyan policy, which is dictated by Colonel Qadhafi rather than Moscow.
8.6 ARABISM: STATE VS NATION.

All the Maghrebi regimes have pursued policies aimed at the destruction of their indigenous minority Berber cultures. Chronically Algeria and Libya officially support minority rights groups throughout the world. At the historic Tangier Summit (1958) of Maghrebi political parties, the leaders of the Moroccan and Algerian delegations made the rallying cry: "We are Arab, Arab, Arab". This evocative slogan reflects the desire to be part of the Arab world, rather than peripheral; and to obliterate the Berber component of the culture as well as that inherited from European colonialism. Membership of the Arab League for the Maghrebi states symbolizes the desire to find their Arab identity and role in global geopolitics (see maps 8.2).

The Arab League was founded in 1945, and in 1987 consisted of 22 states and the PLO (see map 8.2a). "Paradoxically, the association has survived because of its looseness" (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, p.246). Its constitution pledges to uphold the independence and sovereignty of member states, promote cooperation and coordination. Decisions are only binding on states that accept them. Hence, few major political issues have been unanimously resolved by the League. When contacted by the author in Tunis (1984), to know if there was a definite League policy, or Arab viewpoint on the implementation of the Law of the Sea, the answer was no. However the Tunis bureau was most helpful in supplying copies of UN information.

With the signing of the 'Camp David Accords' (1978), the
headquarters (General Secretariat) of the Arab League was transferred to Tunis, because of the expulsion of Egypt from the association. Now Tunis hosts several branches of the League's bureaucracy, including the Arab League Education, Culture and Scientific Organization (ALECSO), the Arab Postal Union, and Arab State Broadcasting Union. Branches of the organization are based in other Arab cities such as Amman, Baghdad and Rabat. Significantly, the Maghrebi states now host the major bureaucratic organs of the League.

An espoused aim of the Arab League is to provide a forum for consultation and conflict resolution. For instance in 1967, it was decided that petro dollars would be given to Egypt, Syria and Jordan to aid in the war effort against Israel. At Rabat (1974) the League officially recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. At the Fez meeting (1982), the League adopted a joint Arab peace plan that implicitly recognized Israel's right to exist. The League has helped resolve disputes between Iraq and Kuwait (1961), Oman and PDR Yemen (1972-76), Egypt and Libya (1977), and Jordan and PLO forces (1970). Significantly, the PLO bureaucracy was moved to Tunis in 1983, and was bombed by Israel in 1985.

The League provides a forum for informal dialogue, eg Algeria and Morocco. It played a role in the creation of the Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU) (1964) and Arab Common Market (ACM) which Libya and Mauritania joined. The League has officially helped foster the Euro-Arab Dialogue. The League and EC Bureau in Tunis, frequently sponsor joint educational
projects. The League was instrumental in bringing together the oil producing countries including Algeria, Libya and Tunisia.

The Maghreb and Arab world are rich in hydrocarbon and mineral resources (see map 2.2-2.4). Almost 70% of the world's proven oil resources are located in Arab states. In 1960, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was founded (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, pp.90, 246-249, 258). Because of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, oil producing Arab states imposed an embargo to dissuade Western support for Israel. Other oil producing states tried to meet the demand. Imbued with radical economic ideas, (eg Algeria and Libya), by the 1970s OPEC emerged as a quasi-cartel with control over oil output and pricing. Thus the Arab states challenged the Western monopoly of the oil industry and market which it had enjoyed for decades via seven major companies (Odell, 1983). With the closure of the Suez Canal (1967-80), the tanker voyage from the Gulf to the EC was lengthened by approximately 7,700 km (4,800 mls) because of the necessity to use the Cape of Good Hope route (see map 1.1c). The Gibraltar artery remained invaluable for energy supplies between the Maghrebi oil exporting states and the West. The tanker voyage between the Maghreb and Rotterdam only takes 16 days as opposed to 62, from the Gulf via the Cape route. The proximity of Maghrebi supplies to Italian and French refineries was crucial in relieving the oil crisis, with the tanker journey only taking one day. In 1968 alone, Libyan output increased by 50%, the West became heavily dependent on Maghrebi supplies. With the 1969 coup d'état in Libya, Qadhafi immediately raised
the fixed oil prices and ordered the international companies to cut production or face nationalization. Libyan cutbacks coincided with a tightening of the oil market and heavy EC demand.

Between 1967 and 1973, because of a shortage of VLCCs, the Trans Arabian Oil Pipeline (TAPLINE) being put out of operation, and the incapacity of the USA to meet domestic demands, all spare production capacity lay in the OPEC states (see map 2.2). Libya encouraged other oil producing states to limit production. Eventually the seven major oil barons began to deal with OPEC as a block.

In 1968, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) was founded. With the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, OPEC raised prices by 70% because of the tight market, while OAPEC cut production and imposed embargoes on the USA and the Netherlands because of their support for Israel. The situation remained somewhat stable until the Iranian Revolution (1979). With the drop in Iranian oil supplies to 5 million b/d, prices soared on the open market. OPEC rose prices in stages. Between 1972-85, there was a 15 fold price increase. In 1978, the USA imported 7.8% of its oil supplies from Algeria and 7.8% from Libya. By 1983, imports from Algeria had fallen to 4.7% and Libyan trade had been embargoed. By the mid-1980s, less than a third of US oil imports were emanating from OPEC states. In the EC states, save the UK, members are still heavily dependent (75%-95%) on oil imports from OPEC (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, pp.333-336).
For the Maghreb, the consequences of the energy crisis (1967-79) have been manyfold. Algeria and Libya gained greater stature in the Arab community becoming part of the world’s greatest energy cartel. The undreamt of wealth gained by Algeria and Libya helped fund the renaissance of Arabism and Islam, and strengthen nationalism; for instance Algeria invested heavily in an Arabization campaign. Algeria and Libya were instrumental in setting up the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), an association of over 40 states (see map 8.2a). With the nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry (1970s) Algeria and Libya greatly invested in their "development revolutions", by any standards, their citizens enjoy the highest level of living in the Maghreb, as is witnessed by universal education, free medical care, massive housing campaigns and the fact that Bread Revolts (1984-5) did not occur there as in Morocco and Tunisia. Algeria emerged as the major second-order power in the Maghreb. Oil wealth helped finance the Polisario struggle against Morocco, while Morocco received aid from the Gulf states. The great transfer of wealth to the Arab oil states, and Algeria and Libya’s proximity to the EC and Gibraltar artery, made their roles pivotal in the global economy. The confidence gained by Algeria is reflected in its negotiations with France, Italy, Spain and the USA concerning the pricing of LNG in the 1980s. Because of its relatively small population and vast wealth, Libya vehemently espoused the pan-Arab and Unionist ideals. Libyan wealth also sponsored Qadhafi’s adventures in Chad, Tunisia, Mauritania, Western Sahara, and
other states.

In the 1980s OPEC has lost its monopoly because of the international economic recession, slowdown in demand due to conservation, and the soaring of petroleum production in non-OPEC states. Also radical OPEC members, like Libya and Iran, have blatantly broken the organization's quota system. For Libya, this has signalled the end of the golden age of oil wealth to finance Qadhafiism. In 1986, Libya made barter agreements with the USSR, to supply oil (in which the Soviets are already self-sufficient) for arms. The agreements have not functioned as planned and by 1987 seemed to have fallen through. Because of Algeria's large population, the declining oil wealth may yet pose serious problems for the regime. This factor has prompted President Chadli to liberalize the economy somewhat, placing more importance on the primary sector, as opposed to the former grandiose industrial schemes based on Leninist principles. Though figures are not available for Algeria's contribution to the Polisario war effort, the survival of SADR largely depends on Maghrebi oil money.

8.7 ISLAM ON THE SOUTHERN SHORE.

8.7.1 A Universalizing System.

Muslim peoples wish to strengthen their Islamic identity and develop their countries. Some believe in following Western, socialist or Soviet economic models; this has resulted in conflict. Many wish to construct a Muslim development model.
and be non-aligned. Fundamentalists wish to see the Islamization of modernity, and establishment of a universal Islamic state (see map 8.2a).

Islam is the major centripetal force in the Maghreb. Islam is a total culture system embracing every aspect of individual and social life, and territorial and political organization; there is no distinction between the religious and secular spheres. Being an all embracing culture, Islam continues to diffuse throughout the world and to Islamize subcultures. With European penetration of the Islamic territories from the 18th century on, the mutual antagonisms between the Christian and Muslim monotheistic universalizing religious systems produced a dialectic that is still seeking a peaceful resolution (see map 4.1). With European decolonization of the Muslim world, Islam is looking for a unified territorial expression, which the political leaders of many states (Libya, Algeria, Syria, Iran) pay a certain deference to. The Muslim countries and in particular the Arab states are fostering closer cultural linkages (see table 8.2) the geopolitical strength of such unions would enable Islam to play its part in the 20th century power concert. Judaism, though not a universalizing religion, is also one of the three great monotheistic religious systems, from which Christianity and Islam take their roots (Sopher, 1967). Zionism and the creation of the state of Israel (1948) has acted as a powerful motor in reinforcing a Muslim sense of identity and common viewpoint (Rodinson, 1968).

Since 1950s, and particularly the Algerian Revolution
(1954-62), the Suez Crisis (1956), the Arab-Israeli Wars (1956, 1967, 1973), oil crises (1970s) and Iranian Revolution (1979), there has been a revival of international focus upon the Muslim world. Many Western and Communist analysts all too often express viewpoints that are fundamentally antagonistic to Islam because of closely integrated historical and cultural prejudices, (eg. Laffin, 1981). According to Rodinson (1980), over the centuries, European attitudes to Islam as reflected in popular culture, literature and media have displayed certain cyclical characteristics. Within these cycles European perceptions have revolved around an interest in the exotic aspects of Islam, often imposing on the Arabs the myth of the "noble savage" from a Eurocentric optic, or else see Islam as a fantastical tyrannical system based on destruction and jihad. Rodinson (1980) states that these viewpoints seem to fluctuate with the state of European-Arab relations. With the energy crises and Iranian Revolution (1979), Western attitudes towards Islam have once more reverted to a belief in the Muslim threat. Having experienced Christian/European colonialism, the Islamic peoples (umma) now greatly fear the Western and Communist threat in the geopolitical and cultural domains. Superpower usage of Islamic territories (Dar al Islam) to further their universalistic ideologies, such as the siting of missiles in the Middle East, is seen not only as a threat to the respective Muslim states, but to the Arab nation. Leaders such as Qadhafi see American military usage of Saudi Arabian facilities as imperialistic, and sacriligious as Mecca and Medina are
epicentres of Islam.

The history of OPEC/OAPEC is illustrative of the desire of the Arab states to be masters of their own destiny. Many Muslim countries like Algeria, Libya and the Gulf states encourage non-Muslim migrant workers in target development areas. Migrant workers of all nationalities, like tourists in the Maghreb, often encounter the negative aspects of discrimination because of different cultural mores and perspectives. In Algeria for example, large scale tourism such as that found in Spain, Morocco and Tunisia is not encouraged. Foreign schools in Algeria are required to teach the official languages (Arabic and French) while Western parents often object to such requirements, particularly lessons in Arabic. Similarly in Maghrebi educational institutions, many students strongly reject the "depersonalization" of their Islamic culture by Western teachers and materials.

Contrary to Marxist and Western beliefs, religion has not receded into private life, but has re-emerged as a powerful political force in many parts of the world. Religious militancy has manifested itself with Orthodox Judaism in Israel, Sikhism in India, fundamentalist Protestantism in the USA, Catholic liberation theology in Latin America and so on. Because of the relative location of Islamic territories and a plethora of geopolitical factors, Islamic militancy has received most attention in recent years.
8.7.2 The Muslim Realm.

Whatever geopolitical criteria are used in attempting to define the Muslim realm (Dar al Islâm), it is problematical because of vastness in area, distribution of Muslims (umma), expanding religious frontiers and state boundaries (see map 8.1, 8.2a). In 1987, it was estimated that the domain of Islam embraced one billion adherents, 20% of the world's population (Factsheet: Islam 1987). Dar al Islâm (Islamic Kingdom or Domain of Peace) refers to Muslims living in an avowedly Islamic state whose Muslim nature is proclaimed in the constitution or law (Sharia) or is implicit when the overwhelming majority of citizens are Muslim. There are some 45 countries in this category. Dar al Harb (domain of war) exists in lands outside Dar al Islâm. Dar al Subh may be said to constitute part of Dar al Harb and exists where Muslim minorities live in non-Muslim states. About 33.3% of the umma (Muslim community) are in this category. The largest is the 100 million Muslims in India constituting 12% of the total population. Next is the USSR with 44 million or 15% of the population. China follows with 40 million or 4% of the population (Factsheet, Islam 1987).

The tradition of Muslim refugees (muhajirin) fleeing from their homelands to escape political and religious persecution is nothing new and dates from the 7th century when the Prophet Mohammed and his loyal followers fled Mecca for the security of Medina (Rodinson, 1968, 1971). In the Maghreb in the 11th century, the Kharedjite sect of Islam fled to the secluded areas of the M'zab in the Algerian desert, and the to Tunisian island
of Djerba to protect themselves (Laroui, 1976). In 19th century Algeria, thousands of Muslims fled to Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Syria to escape from the invading French armies. In recent decades a new social/territorial classification has come into usage, that of Dar al Muhajirin or areas with Muslim refugees or incipient refugees. Examples include the migration of 7 million Muslims from India to Pakistan (1947--), and the great movement of peoples which came about with the creation of the state of Bangladesh (1971), especially the Bihari Muslims. The Palestinian diaspora (1948-87) now numbers some 5 million people (Factsheet: Islam 1987; Hale, 1982, pp.129-145). There are more than 5 million Afghani refugees abroad because of the Soviet invasion (1980). Other examples include the plight of Muslim refugees from the Philippines to Brunei and the Saharawis to Algeria. It is estimated that there are more than 20 million refugees in the social/territorial category of Dar al Muhajirin (Factsheet: Islam 1987). Naturally many Muslim refugees seek refuge in non-Muslim countries like France, Britain and the USA.

Contemporary Islam is found on all continents. Numerically the Arabs constitute only about 25% of the global Islamic community. Some 42 of the 170 states represented at the UN are members of the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), which concerns itself with political, economic and religious matters (see maps 8.2). The ICO is the political manifestation of the aspirations of 1 billion people. The Islamic core area stretches from Morocco to Iran, more than 5,000 miles (8,000 km), about one fifth of the way around the globe. The core area
occupied by the Arabs constitutes about 5.3 million sq ml (13.7 million sq km), an area second only to the largest state in the world, the USSR. Of the 300 million people in the core area, between 180-200 million are Arabs, with some 10 million Iranians and 45 million Turks (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, p.225; Nérodote, 1984, No.36, pp.3-18). It is estimated that by 2000, the Arab population will be numerically greater than that of the superpowers. Yet the above figures for the Muslim community of the core area represent less than half of the global Muslim umma. Arabic is the world's fifth most widely spoken language after Chinese, English, Spanish and Russian. The core area contains more than two thirds of proven global oil reserves. Peripheral Islamic states such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Nigeria, Chad and Mauritania are greatly influenced by events at the Arab-Muslim core.

Within the Arab core, there is a certain homogeneity, which arguably lends itself to political union. Failure of such union is due to contested state leadership. While there are several ideologies attributed to Islam within the Muslim world, there is only one all embracing religion. For non-Muslims there is often a confusion between Islam and the ideologies which lay claim to it. The centripetal forces which integrate the Maghrebis into the Islamic community are manyfold.

8.7.3 Islam in the Maghreb.

The vast majority of Maghrebis are Sunni Muslims (97%-99%).
who follow the Malakite rite of Quranic law (see below). Very small Kharadjite groups also live there, historically associated with Shi’ism. Less than 1% of the Moroccan and Tunisian populations are Jewish.

Despite local Maghrebi characteristics such as maraboutism (local saint cults) and fraternities (secret politico-religious organizations), Islam has not experienced the great schisms and trends towards devolved religious subsystems so characteristic of other religions (Dermingham, 1954; De Planhol, 1959; Deffontaines, 1948; Sopher, 1967). During the colonial era, Christian attempts at proselytizing in the Maghreb met with failure, largely because of the political and social integrating agents of Islam such as the Quran, sunnah and fiqh (the bases of Islamic Law). According to Islam, in the 7th century, the Quran (recitation) was recited in Arabic by God to the Prophet Mohammed as the final message to humanity in the long Judaeo-Christian tradition. By the 9th century, the number of “official editions” of the Quran varied between seven and fourteen, but with only minimal differences. That recorded by Nafi is the one most in use in the Maghreb. Although some of the oldest universities in the world were founded at Tunis, Constantine and Fez, the educational tradition in the Maghreb has been largely oral. Zaouias (rural schools under the control of fraternities), masjids (mosque schools with no boarders), medersas (initially law schools often having hospitals attached to them), and machaads (general places of learning, such as maraboutic sites) were responsible for the transmission of Islam
in the Maghreb (O’Reilly, 1983; Guillaume, 1979; Kalisky, 1980; Sourdél, 1979).

Though not funded by the Maghrebi governments, traditional Quranic schools are found in most areas. The state schools offer a wider range of subjects, nonetheless during holiday periods and weekends many children attend the Quranic schools. Between 1978-81, the author conducted interviews with Algerians who had attended these schools. Over 78% of those who participated stated that they had learned to chant vast sections of the Quran and Arabic grammar, but very little of the three Rs. The classical Arabic found in the Quran is the basis of standard international Arabic as found in education, the media and government. Though there are great linguistic variations in Maghrebi Arabic, the standardized written form is a unifying force. As translations of the Quran are considered not to be valid, non-Arabic speakers (eg Berbers) have to follow their religious rites in Arabic. States like Indonesia and Pakistan encourage closer educational cooperation with Tunisia because of the excellent standards found at the Zitouna Quranic University and other educational institutions there. While the majority of Maghrebis speak Arabic, the vast majority of the literate population read and write in French. Arabists and fundamentalists reproach the local regimes for not accelerating the pace of Arabization. For the Maghrebis there is an indissoluble linkage between Islam, Arabic, and union with the rest of Dar al Islam. Wahhada (oneness) is a theological/cultural facet of Islam. Quranic Arabic remains a
The second major source of Islamic law (sharia) is the sunnah based on what the Prophet Mohammed is supposed to have said and done. The hadiths (Bosquet, 1979) which are the basis of the sunnah constitute a "law of oral tradition which superimposed itself on the written law" (Masse, 1930, p.52). Sunnah became the "practice and the theory of Muslim orthodoxy" (Masse, 1930, pp.52-53). The vast majority of Muslims are Sunnis, as opposed to Shi’a. Shi’as constitute about 10% of the umma, numbering about 80 million (Le Point, No.599, 12 March 1984, pp.21-34). The only Shi’a state is Iran, while Shi’a populations are found in Saudi Arabia (1 million), Bahrain (60% of pop), Kuwait (30% of pop), Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Yemen (Independent, 4 Sep.1987, p.8). Despite the historical schism between Sunnis and Shi’a, they are united by the Islamic concept of wahhada (oneness), and of shared or contiguous territories. As the Iranian President, Ali Khamenei has stated:

"the Imam is not limited by geographical frontiers" (Independent, 4 Aug.1987, p.8).

Thus Khomeini’s philosophies are as relevant to the Moroccans and Tunisians as they are to the Iranians.

It is nonsensical to believe that all Muslims are profoundly militant; it is equally fallacious to hold that militant Shi’a philosophies are completely divorced from trends in Sunni’ism. This is witnessed by Sunni militancy in Tunisia. The Western media often suggest that the essential differences between Shi’a and Sunni are greater than they actually are.
This viewpoint is often supported by Muslim regimes such as that of Saudi Arabia or Morocco, but is seen as an affront by other regimes and the masses, who believe in the spiritual unity of Islam.

Very small non-Sunnis communities of the Kharedjite sect exist in the M'zab (Algeria) and Djerba (Tunisia). In the Maghrebi context, the M'zabites and Djerbis lead a more puritanical lifestyle than their neighbours, and are engaged mostly in trading activities throughout North Africa. While the habitual regionalist biases exist, there is no religious or political contention between Kharedjites and their fellow Muslims. Shiism largely owes its origins to an historical leadership dispute, whereby the Shi‘a faction supported the idea of an hereditary caliph or leader of the umma. Being a minority the Shi’s were persecuted and their history provides many examples of martyrdom. A belief in prophetic leaders or mahdis is closely associated with Shiism. While never overtly stating it, Khomeini and Qadhafi have tried to take on the mantle of the mahdi. In the early 1980s, a fundamentalist leader in Algeria proclaimed himself the mahdi.

The Five Pillars of Islam (arkan’u) act as integrating agents. They are belief in one God (shahada), prayer (salat), fasting (saum), alms-giving (zakat) and pilgrimage (haj/hadj). Some schools of Muslim law include jihad or holy war as a sixth pillar. Most non-Muslim geographers fail to appreciate the geopolitical significance of shahada.

Shahada is based on faith (din) in monotheism, this oneness
(wahhada) incorporates every aspect of spiritual and human existence. Thus law and political organization (sharia) must be based on the what is believed to be God’s word (Quran). The relationship between the individual and God is based on innate intelligence and spiritual vision (haqiqat). In recognition of this Muslims are obliged to profess publicly their belief in God and the Prophet (shahada), and Islam (acceptance, peace) is shared. The oneness (wahhada) of Islamic peoples, cultures and territories, is hard to accomplish because of centrifugal processes. Muslim fundamentalists wish to establish an Islamic state in which there will be the perfect wahhada. The Maghrebi regimes have all relied on the Muslim ideal of oneness (wahhada) to support their respective political ideologies, eg Algerian Islamic socialism, Qadhafiism, and Moroccan allegiance to Emir Hassan. Essentially, the aspirations for a Greater Maghreb union are based on the ideal of Wahhada. Fundamentalists see communism and Westernism as a direct threat to wahhada (see map 8.2a).

The second pillar of Islam, prayer (salat) obliges the Maghrebis to pray in the direction of the Arabian peninsula, Mecca (qibla), five times daily. One fundamentalist interviewed by the author pointed out that it is ironical that qibla is now in the direction of the US RDF/Central Command. The obligatory communal Friday prayer (salat al jomo) held at the mosque is supplemented by a sermon (khotba), often of a political nature. Imams (prayer leaders) preside at mosque gatherings. Traditionally, imams were democratically chosen by the
community. However all the Maghrebi regimes have progressively taken over the function of choosing, educating and funding the imams. The same is true of the Maghrebi ulema or councils traditionally responsible for supervising and maintaining orthodoxy. Since the 1970s, the Libyan ulema has been divested of power, with Qadhafi's special committees taking over its function. After much contention between President Bourguiba and the Tunisian ulema (1950s-60s), a modus vivendi was achieved in the 1970s. Basically, the Tunisian ulema learned not to challenge Bourguiba's decrees. His controversial policies have included outlawing polygamy (the only Islamic state to do so), suppression of religious courts, and encouragement of workers to break the Ramadhan fast. The religious endowments (habus) owned or controlled by the ulema were also nationalized. With the removal of Bourguiba from power in 1987, it is likely that the ulema will try to regain some of its power, and reactionary tactics are possible. In 1987, several months before seizing power, Ben Ali stated that:

"Islam in Tunisia, thanks to Bourguiba, is no longer an excuse to reject progress. . . Understand me well, for us fundamentalism does not mean Islam, but obscurantism and poverty of spirit" (Independent, 9 Nov.1987, p.12).

In Algeria, Islamic reformers such as Ben Badis, Al Uabi and Al Brahimi played a leading role in shaping nationalism. In 1931, they brought together 13 groups to form an enlarged ulema, and published politico-religious newspapers. They waged war on obscurantism and introduced Algeria to the progressive trends
that were being felt in other parts of dar al Islam in the 20th century (O'Reilly, 1983, pp.350-372; Kaddache, 1980). After 1965, Boumedienne effectively removed power from the ulema by creating a Ministry of Religious Affairs and nationalizing the habs. The appointment of imams became institutionalized, they must hold educational certificates issued at theological colleges run by the state. Boumedienne was responsible for making Algeria the only Maghrebi state to revert to the Muslim weekend, observing Friday as the sabbath (thus most of Algeria's trade with the international community is reduced to 3-4 days per week). Boumedienne maintained that there was no independence without socialism and no socialism without Islam, thus the construction of mosques became a priority in NLF planning for reasons of integration and as a symbol of the triumph of Islam over imperialism. In 1962, there were barely 800 mosques, by 1982 there were over 5,000, an increase of 630% (Marin, 1982, p.147). Algerian mosques became symbols of the Islamic resurgence, the triumph of the NLF, centres for the dissemination of government policies, cores for the diffusion of Arabic, a bulwark against maraboutism and fraternities, and the physical expression of Algeria's desire to be an active agent at the core of the Arab world.

In Morocco, a ministry of religious affairs is in charge of Quranic schools, foundations and mosques; Sharia courts no longer function. The king, in his office of emir (descendant of Mohammed) presides over the ulema. However his personal life and morals are seriously questioned by the fundamentalists.
Unlike Tunisia and Algeria, Morocco has not nationalized the religious endowments (habus), which are an important source of revenue and power for the establishment.

Since the late 1970s, mosque attendance in the Maghreb has increased enormously, witnessed by overcrowding. Algeria broadcasts the Friday services on the national media. While some of the respective state bureaucracies close down on Friday afternoons, fundamentalists reproach their governments for the inconveniences caused by not making Friday the official sabbath. Students and workers are demanding more time and mosque space for prayer. Because of the rural exodus, population explosion and accommodation crisis, unofficial mosques are being established in the bidonvilles of Tangier, Ceuta, Algiers and Tunis. These mosques are progressively becoming the domain of fundamentalist cadres, drawing followers from the marginalized youth, dissidents, and students.

The third pillar of Islam, fasting (saum) provides another centripetal force. Fasting during daylight hours in the month of Ramadhan is obligatory. Tunisia is the only Maghrebi state where the saum is not a legal obligation. In the cosmopolitan centres of Tunisia and Morocco, especially near tourist complexes, food and drink is available. However in the author’s experience, the overwhelming majority of Tunisians and Moroccans observe the fast. Fundamentalists wish the fast to be a legal obligation enforced by law. To accommodate traditionalist and fundamentalist aspirations, it is significant that Algeria moved in this direction in 1981. On Ramadhan eve, the Minister of
Religious Affairs stated that:

"Whoever defies the obligatory character of the fast is condemned to death as an apostate. His body will not be washed nor covered in a shroud, nor buried in a Muslim cemetery" (Autremont, No. 38, March 1882, pp. 82-153).

Although Algeria has the most stable regime in the Maghreb, it studiously avoids confrontation with the fundamentalists, unlike the Moroccan and Tunisian regimes.

The fourth pillar, alms-giving is of two kinds, obligatory (zakat) and voluntary (sadaqat). According to the sharia, the alms-tax should be levied at 10%-20% of the donor's wealth. However, the modern tax systems found in the Maghrebi states have replaced the traditional zakat. Because of oil wealth, Libya and Algeria have been able to alleviate chronic poverty, and finance institutions such as hospitals and schools, whereas in Morocco and Tunisia, the state tax system which replaced the zakat has not succeeded in providing aid for those citizens most in need. A basic tenet of fundamentalism is the demand for a greater distribution of the wealth of the state. In the 1970s, the Arab oil states were the most generous in the world, in terms of aid to the developing countries (Kellner, 1975). Algeria and Libya's viewpoints concerning third world issues have been much influenced by zakat ideals.

Hadj is the fifth pillar of Islam. The obligatory pilgrimage (hadj) makes Mecca the epicentre for Muslim political and economic interaction. The hadj acts as an informal contact-field between governments and groups. Muslim
refugees dispersed throughout the world find the opportunity of meeting each other there, e.g. Afghans, Palestinians, West Saharan and so on. Its geopolitical significance is also appreciated by the fundamentalists (see below).

During the colonial epoch, the French colonial administration employed several strategies to prevent the Maghrebis going on the hadj, by restricting free movement in Algeria, non-issuance of visas, insufficient transport and unsuitable transport time-tables. With national independence Algeria and Libya greatly facilitated their pilgrims. In the 1960s, Bourguiba made the controversial remark that the hadj causes a haemorrhage of hard currency.

In 1950, some 95,000 Muslims went on the hadj. By 1978 there were over 1.5 million pilgrims from over 70 countries. Each year there are over 100,000 more; with 50% travelling by air, 47% by motorized transport and 3% by diverse means such as sea, foot and camel (Jansen, 1979, pp. 32-34; De Planhol, 1959, p. 74). According to The Guardian (3 Aug. 1987, p. 5) some 2 million people attended the Hadj in 1987. The first transmission of the hadj on television (1970s) had a great impact on the Muslim world. The Maghrebi media provides live coverage of the festivities. With the new-found oil wealth of the 1970s, facilities for the hadjis at Mecca were modernized and sanitized; attendance continued to rise. In 1977, attendance from the Maghreb peaked, when over 55,000 Algerians participated, in contrast to 22,674 hadjis from Morocco and almost 8,000 from Tunisia; while some 20,770 Libyans and over
1,000 Mauritanians made the pilgrimage (Guellouz, 1977, pp.126-128). This great increase is indicative of the oil wealth, interest in Islam and increasing political awareness. On average the number of Moroccan pilgrims who went to Mecca between 1970-84 was 20,050 annually (Al-Rakeiba, 1984, p.50). In terms of numbers of pilgrims, out of the 21 Arab states represented at the Hajj during the period 1970-84, Algeria ranked fifth, Libya seventh, Morocco ninth and Tunisia tenth (Al-Rakeiba, 1984, p.60). By the 1980s, over 47% of the hadjis came from Arab states, almost 44% from non-Arab Asiatic countries, some 18% from non-Arab African states, less than 0.5% from Europe, about 0.66% from the Americas and less than 0.5% from the remainder of the world (Guellouz, 1977, pp.126-128; Autrement, No.38, 1982; Al-Rakeiba, 1984, p.50). On the last day of the pilgrimage, the hadjis and Muslim world join simultaneously in the ritual sacrifice of sheep at the Aid el Fitr. While Mecca and the Hajj is believed to be in the purest orthodox tradition, leaders like Qadhafi and Imam Khomeini wish to "liberate" the sacred sites from the the present Saudi Arabian regime, which they consider to be a vassal of the USA. The hadj provides fundamentalist militant groups with an informal forum. In 1979 militants held the Great Mosque for 22 days, some 117 people were killed in battle, and 22 beheaded by the Saudi authorities (Guardian, 3 Aug.1987, p.5). During the 1987 hadj fundamentalist protests led to the death of an estimated 402 people and 649 were injured, the majority of whom were Iranians (Times, 9 Aug.1987, pp.1,11; ibid, 2 Aug.1987,
pp.1,9,25; Independent, 4 Aug.1987, p.1; Guardian, 3 Aug.1987, p.1). The protests were orchestrated by Teheran; significantly the codename for the operation was "Wahhada" (unity/oneness).

8.7.4 Jihad.

Jihad, sometimes considered to be the sixth pillar of Islam has several meanings, including struggle against evil which is believed to exist in oneself and in society, self-defence and war against non-Muslims. Despite the great humanistic themes of Islamic theology, according to the Quran (2:216) "fighting is obligatory". As in the other monotheistic systems, there is a strong belief in the exclusive possession of "truth"; an eschatological vision of existence which nurtures extremism, and conflict with other universalizing ideologies. Thus Islam is one of the strongest geopolitical ideological forces in the world.

By the 15th century, Islam was the most widely distributed religious system in the world. With the rise of European imperialism, Islam strove to keep Dar al Islam intact rather than expanding its territories by conquest. Since the 1960s, once more Islam has been competing for peoples and territories. Essentially between the 17th century and the 1970s, jihad was used as a means of self-defence. Historically the Kharedjite sect (minority groups in Algeria and Tunisia) tried to make jihad a pillar of Islam. Of the four main juridic schools of sharia, three saw jihad as an obligation under certain
conditions; if kafirs (non-believers) began hostilities and if there was a good chance of success. The Malakite school of law followed in the Maghreb favours jihad. Those who die in battle are considered as martyrs. In the Quran (13:39), changing policies and inconsistencies relating to non-Muslims is justified by the changing will of God. Territories and peoples not under Islamic control, constitute Dar al Harb (Lands of War); the Quran (13:39) asks “do they not see how We invade their land and shrink its borders”. The Quran (3:134-141) states that God wishes to “test the faithful and annihilate the infidels”. Arab-Muslims are reminded in the Quran that they “are the noblest nation that has ever been risen up for mankind” (3-99-110) and that “unbelievers are (the) sworn enemies” (Sura 4). According to Dr Ali Issa Othman (former adviser to UNRWA):

"The spread of Islam was military. There is a tendency to apologise for this and we should not. It is one of the injunctions of the Quran that you must fight for the spreading of Islam" (Waddy, 1976, p.10).

In the Maghreb there is little tolerance shown towards atheists and polytheists. With national independence, almost the entire Jewish and Christian populations of Algeria and Libya left. In conversation with Algerian social scientists, the author was reminded that a Te Deum was chanted in Rome when news arrived of the invasion of Algiers (1830). On strategic historic sites in Morocco, Algiers, Constantine, Annaba, Tunis and Carthage elaborate basilicas and cathedrals were constructed by the colonists from 1830 on.

Considering the positive attributes of Muslim civilization,
the geostrategic advantages offered by the Arab/Muslim territories, and history of European and superpower imperialism from the 18th century on, it is not surprising that Islamic militancy is manifesting itself in global matters at present.

Since the 18th century, Dar al Islam has witnessed over 60 bloody encounters with major non-Muslim powers, in the form of encroachment, invasion, colonization and war. The most recent in the chronicle are the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980), the Israeli invasions of Lebanon (1982), and US engagements with Libya (1982, 1986) and Iran (1987) (see Fig. 8.1). There were 18 imperial attacks on the Muslim world between 1790-1870, 35 between 1870-1930, and 12 between 1930 and 1987. Over the past two centuries, Britain has been involved in at least 23 of these military adventures, France in 13, Tsarist Russia in 8, the Netherlands in 7, Italy in 6, Israel in 5, Spain in 3, the USSR in 2, Greece in one and the USA directly in two (O'Reilly, 1983, pp.312-314).

"This being the historical record of militant Islam, it is surprising that Islamic antagonism towards Europe is not far greater than it is" (Jansen, 1979, p.65).

In the 20th century, calls for *jihad* by the Turkish Sultan (1914), several Arab leaders in relation to Israel and Ayatollah Khomeini (1980s) have not meet with universal approval in Muslim states. With the European invasion of the Maghreb, calls for *jihad* were made by Abd’ el Qadir (Algeria), Abd’ el Krim (Morocco) and Omar Mokhtar (Libya). It would seem that a universal *jihad* is the dream of Qadhafi, Khomeini and militant
**Figure 8.1:** European Encroachments and Conquests in 'War of Islam'

fundamentalists.

Many young Maghrebis see jihad as the mirror image of the Christian crusades and colonialism, and as a bulwark against superpower imperialism at the present time. In 1979, it was stated in The Guardian (26 Feb. 1979) that:

"there is a genuine fear that Muslims may be creating a great deal of trouble for themselves and the rest of the world by unleashing forces that they may not be able to control or direct".

In a somewhat more alarmist manner The Daily Telegraph (25 March 1979) warned that:

"Islam is once again on the march out of Arabia . . . Who knows what djinna (the Islamic resurgence) has let loose upon the world".

According to Algérie Actualité (No. 807, 2-8 April, 1981):

"The Algerian vision of international relations and thus the action of the state in relation to foreign policy is determined by concrete action and militancy".

With the ignominy of defeat at the hands of European powers, Islam was the major geopolitical force which sustained Maghrebi identity. This was proven by the response of the masses to such mujahidin leaders as Abd el Qadir, Abd el Krim and Omar Mokhtar (1830-1928). All Maghrebi resistance movements, including those which eventually liberated the states, relied heavily on the geopolitical force of jihad to mobilize the masses. With independence, the Maghrebi regimes relied on interpretations of Islam to support their respective political orientations. These regimes faced the problem of
national development and synthesizing Islam with the geopolitical imperatives of the modern world. Maghrebi fundamentalists feel that political independence from Europe did not mean Islamic independence. The Maghrebi colonial experience being bloodier than that experienced in other areas of Dar al Islam has left the populations more open to the precepts of jihad.

Islamic militancy within Dar al Islam did not dissipate with European decolonization. In Muslim countries between 1948-87, at least 29 heads of state and prime ministers were ‘killed’ and over 20 former prime ministers and ex-senior ministers. During the same period there were at least 25 inter-Muslim and civil wars. Between 1968-87, some 28 foreign diplomats were assassinated in Muslim countries. The present Maghrebi regimes have been responsible for the assassination of dissidents at home and abroad. In 1983 alone, 16 US diplomats and guards were killed at their embassy in Lebanon, and 241 marines were killed by a bombing raid on their Beirut barracks.

Fundamentalists wish to ensure that Muslims within Dar al Islam live, and have government support, in following the Quranic ethic. They wish to spread the frontiers of Islam globally. This is in the historic tradition of Dar al Harb (lands of war), or lands not yet under Islamic control. Between the two extremes of Dar al Islam and Dar al Harb, a territorial status exists known as Dar al Subh eg Melilla, Ceuta and on a grander scale in India and the USSR. Muslim refugees (20 million 1987) living in “foreign” states may be said to live in
Dar al Muhajirin (Lands of Refuge). Muslims living outside Dar al Islam are instructed to strive to establish Islamic regimes there. Fundamentalists argue that in Muslim states where the Sharia is not part of state law, or where the political regime is corrupt, or closely allied to the superpowers, then the status of Dar al Subh exists, and all Muslims are obliged by the Quran to take up jihad, overthrowing the regime. Qhomeini invoked the Dar al Subh philosophy in Iran (1979), and later in relation to Lebanon, Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel/Palestine and the Gulf states. Qadhafi indirectly invoked this philosophy in relation to Morocco, Tunisia and the Spanish Plazas in Morocco. Some fundamentalists include in this category immigrant communities in Europe, particularly the Maghrebis in France. The spate of bombings in Paris (1986) and Tunisia (1987) lend credence to fears that fundamentalism is rapidly gaining strength in the Maghreb and immigrant communities.

As fundamentalists wish to Islamize modernity, they could well argue that territorial seas, straits and EEZs adjacent to Islamic territories now constitute part of Dar al Islam. The great manifestations of this in recent years have been the nationalization of the Suez Canal (1956), attempts to bring all the waters of the Red Sea under Arab control (1960s-70s), Libya’s claim to the Gulf of Sirt (1980s), and Iranian activities in the Gulf since 1979. Fundamentalist regimes may yet try to Islamize the LOS Convention itself (see chapter 3).

In the contemporary geopolitical context, the term fundamentalist embraces integrists, pan-Arabists, Islamists,
revolutionaries of various political persuasions, terrorists, reformists and the Muslim Brothers. Outside the Islamic realm fundamentalism is often confused with traditionalism and obscurantism. Fundamentalist groups share the same historical sources, ideologues, pamphlets and recorded sermons such as those of Qutob (Hérodote, 1985, No.36, pp.68-82). There is no distinction between Sunni and Shi‘a fundamentalist aspirations and methods, as was witnessed by events in Tunisia in 1987, when bombs exploded outside the Presidential Palace at Carthage and at Monastir touristic complex (Independent, 4 Aug.1987). Significantly the bombings at Monastir coincided with Iranian sponsored rioting at Mecca. As with Nasser’s use of the Muslim Brother organization in his rise to power, Qadhafi uses fundamentalist groups and principles to further his philosophy which is essentially pan-Arabist. The paradox is that many devout Muslims in Libya deplore some of Qadhafi’s policies, for example in respect of the liberation of women.

8.7.5 Fundamentalism in the Maghreb.

In the Maghreb, fundamentalists are commonly referred to as Muslim Brothers or Quanghis, though they have few formal links with the official Muslim Brother organization which was founded by Hassan al Banna in Egypt (1928), and has been instrumental in shaping politics in the Mashreqi states. Though the activities of these groups are evident in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, specific organizational structures are hard to recognize.
In Morocco, Emir Hassan has incorporated the religious elites into his political organization. In the rural areas the traditional fraternities and sufi leaders (mystics) who control the folk religious foci, such as maraboutic shrines and zaouias believe in Hassan's baraka (grace and charisma) and are largely under his control. Fundamentalist groups are most active in the urban centres, bidonvilles and universities. It was estimated that there were as many as 15 such groups operating at Mohammed V University in Rabat in 1987. The material used by these groups is mostly of Libyan, Pakistani, Iranian and Egyptian origin. Perhaps the best known of these organizations is the League of Islamic Youth (Jama'at al-Shabiba al-Islamiya). Ironically the group was originally supported by the government as a counter to socialist organizations, but was decreed illegal in 1975 after its assination of a leader of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces. However it has continued to function in most urban centres. Its leaders describe themselves as Kharedjites and are drawn from the professional classes. Since 1979, the great upsurge in membership of judo and sports clubs, interest in Muslim literature, wearing of distinctive chadors by young women, and nature of graffiti in public places all indicate the unrest which exists. To counteract this the government has created the Popular Islamic Reform Movement and increased the religious component in educational curricula. One biology professor at Rabat University informed the author (1985) that he had been instructed by the educational authorities "to reiterate the fact of divine creation" during his lectures "on the theory
of evolution, so as to avoid conflict with fundamentalists. The intelligentsia, professional caste and army acknowledge the strength of traditional Islam in Morocco; and that despite appearances, the king pursues a Western lifestyle and policies. Hassan’s application to join the EC (1984-7), special relationship with the USA and ambiguous role in furthering the Israeli-Arab dialogue is seen as prejudicial to Morocco’s role in Dar al Islam. Hassan’s "liberation" of the Western Sahara (1976) has not provided a history of success and the Spanish Plazas remain part of Dars al Harb and Subh. The brutal crushing of populist revolts (1981, 1984) gave the fundamentalists a natural leadership role.

In Algeria, Boumedienne’s policies (1965-78) conformed in many respects to the fundamentalist ideal. His Quranic education at Zeitouna University (Tunis), and puritanical personality provided him with powerful political assets in reforming Islam within the modern state. The NLF embarked on a massive programme of mosque construction, religious education and Arabization. Nonetheless NLF policies did not aim at reinstituting the sharia in toto. Salaried women are encouraged to abandon the traditional garments. Fundamentalists allege that the NLF have overemphasized the economic and leftist attributes of state development at the expense of Islam. Since 1979, Islam once more provides a political forum for discontent and anti-Westernism among the youth, just as it did for their parents in the past. Due to the secretive nature of Algerian society, there is little information concerning fundamentalist
activities. However groups operating in Algeria seem to have less linkage with militant organizations throughout Dar al Islam than the Tunisians and Moroccans, save fundamentalist immigrants in Libya and France. The author found it difficult to get interviews with Algerian fundamentalists on university campuses, unlike the situation in Tunisia, yet the Muslim Brothers are active there.

At El Oued, in 1979, the Brothers attacked a group of people, and caused the death of a prostitute. In June 1981, students at Annaba University were attacked by fundamentalists, resulting in dozens of casualties and an undisclosed number of dead. On three occasions 1979-80, the author was informally requested by the Algerian university authorities or particular students, not to be present on campus at certain times; as if by coincidence fundamentalist rioting occurred on those days. In 1981, in Sidi Bel Abbès, an individual proclaiming himself emir (prince of the faithful), a title used by leaders of the Muslim Brother movement, was arrested in the local mosque after delivering inflammatory anti-government speeches. At Laghouat in 1981, the ejection of Muslim extremists from a mosque resulted in the death of a policeman. Besides the circulation of the usual cassettes of predicators such as El Kichk (an Egyptian integrist), there have been calls for more mosque space in public institutions, the introduction of sharia and a ban on alcohol by interested groups. There have been periodic attacks in Constantine and Algiers on people thought to have been acting or dressed in an immoral way. A massive prayer protest held at
Algiers in the early 1980s, prompted the President to address the nation confirming the NLF's commitment to Islam, peaceful development, and the right of all to practice Islam, including the Brothers. Chadli stated that:

"(he) would never accept in any manner, that certain people use Islam as a slogan to accomplish certain plans and ambitions" (Presidential address, broadcast by RTA, Spring 1981).

In the author's experience, disturbances caused by militant groups in Algeria were quickly and discreetly squashed by the authorities, unlike the policies pursued in Morocco and Tunisia where alleged fundamentalists or sympathizers are imprisoned without trial, beaten and intimidated. The NLF has the political infrastructure to channel fundamentalist discontent, this is proven by the ability of a lobby in parliament which has retarded the enactment of legislation over the past ten years, in relation to more liberal family laws. The NLF fear that fundamentalist cells may be in the control of Libya, or exploited by such figures as the deposed president, Ben Bella.

Between 1956-87, Bourguiba pursued secular policies in Tunisia, in many ways similar to those of Ataturk in Turkey. Islamic militants in Tunisia have been active since the 1970s and were involved in raids on Gafsa and Kasserine, and in the populist revolts of 1978 (over 200 dead) and 1984-5. Because of the popular discontent which exists in Tunisia, the Islamists are among several groups which wish to overthrow the present regime, and may yet emerge as leaders of the masses. Bourguiba's response to the fundamentalist threat since 1978 was
to clamp down hard on Islamic militancy. Since the Iranian revolution, Tunisian Islamists have been involved with fundamentalist groups and adventures in Libya, Lebanon, Iran and Franco.

In 1984, Iran "hailed" the approach of the "Islamic Revolution" in the Maghreb and prophesied that its doctrines/propaganda would be "fruitful" (Le Monde, 28 Jan.1984, p.1). On 27 March 1987, the Tunisian Government stated that it had evidence of an Iranian plot to topple the Bourguiba's regime and install a fundamentalist one. Consequently Tunisia ordered the closure of the Iranian embassy in Tunis which had been turned into "an active centre working to export the Khomeini revolution to Tunisia". Tunisia claimed that fundamentalist cells throughout the state were under the control of Iranian agents, and that units were trained to use ideology and psychological techniques to indoctrinate recruits and prepare the ground for mass insurrection (Guardian, 28 March 1987). The same week 8 terrorists were arrested in Paris, of whom 6 were Tunisian nationals, and members of the militant group Islamic Jihad (Times, 27 March 1987; Le Monde, 26 March 1987). The same week in Djibouti, a Tunisian national admitted to planting bombs which resulted in the death of 11 people. The act had been carried out on behalf of a Middle Eastern group called Troops of Revolutionaries and Resisters (Guardian, 24 March 1987). Yet Western researchers continue to speak of Tunisia and Morocco as being the most stable states in the Maghreb.

There are at least a dozen fundamentalist groups active on
Tunisian university campuses, particularly in the science departments. As a counter to fundamentalist groups, the government supported the Association to Protect the Quran (1970s). By 1979 a more autonomous organization had evolved from the original association, and was called the Islamic Revival Movement, with support from a broad social spectrum. Several splinter groups developed in the 1980s, the most important of which is the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), which has been refused official recognition as a political party. After an incident at an hotel in 1981, over 100 leading MTI members were imprisoned with sentences ranging up to 11 years, more were arrested in 1983, and 1986-87 (Guardian, 24 April 1987, p.4). Imprisonment and other police strategies aimed at fundamentalists and the MTI have only increased their activities, and support among the population. After disturbances perpetrated by Islamists against "immoral behaviour" and foreigners in Tunis in April 1987, the repressive actions of the government met with little support from the masses. Over-reaction by the armed forces lent the Islamists the martyr ethos. In July-August 1987, fundamentalists were responsible for planting bombs outside the Presidential Palace and at touristic complexes. A trial in the summer of 1987 of 90 Islamic militants, most of them MTI members, ended with death sentences for seven and heavy prison terms for most. The low number of death sentences was attributed to the persuasive power of the then Minister of the Interior, Ben Ali, who convinced Bourguiba that it was unwise to make martyrs out of MTI leaders.
However in the following weeks, Bourguiba had second thoughts and demanded the re-trial of the MTI case with the aim of gaining a greater number of death penalties. Without being "soft" on the fundamentalist issue, the Tunisian government and its Western allies do not want an overt confrontation between the government authorities and the Islamists. According to The Guardian (9 Nov.1987, p.7), Bourguiba’s "decision" to press ahead in his efforts to reopen the MTI trial largely "explains" why a "coup" took place on 7 November 1987 led by Ben Ali. Ironically the comparatively open policies of the Tunisian regime, and contact with the outside world, have created dialectics within the society which must be resolved now that Bourguiba has been removed from the scene. While Ben Ali has adopted many of Bourguiba's pro-Western policies, it is believed that he wishes Tunisia to take a more active role internationally in Arab and Muslim affairs. Arguably the fundamentalists may emerge as the group with the strongest popular support.

Algeria's form of Islamic socialism has been austere enough to appeal to the deeply felt Muslim sentiments of the masses who have not been exposed to what fundamentalists in the surrounding states term "Western decadence". Though Algeria has a one party state, the NLF is eclectic in that it embraces many shades of Muslim opinion. Fundamentalists there do not have access to the great numbers of marginalized groups so evident in Morocco. While Qadhafi may not be unaminously popular among Libyans, Qadhafiism is deeply entrenched in the young generation.
Despite Western predictions, the masses did not rise to overthrow his regime during the US raid in 1986. Even if Qadhafi disappears from the scene, it is arguable that Qadhafiism, though somewhat more restrained, will survive.

8.8 CONCLUSION.

Because of the intensity of international trade, and revolutions in telecommunications and weapons systems since 1945, McLuhan's (1967) "global village" philosophy is particularly relevant to the Mediterranean and Strait region. There is intense interaction between the Muslim and non-Islamic worlds, between the rich North and the poorer South, and between first-order (eg EC, USA, USSR), second-order (eg Morocco, Algeria) and third-order (eg Tunisia) powers in the area. All global geopolitical models ranging from those of Mackinder (1904, 1919, 1942) to Cohen (1973, 1976, 1982) have embraced the Strait region illustrating its vital importance in international affairs. Because of the spatial extent and intensity of geopolitical activity in the region there exist a whole range of contradictions between development and underdevelopment, democracy and autocracy, Eurocentricism and Maghrebi regionalism, nationalisms and supra-nationalisms, allegiances to Arab-Muslim traditionalism, independence and commitment to the superpowers. There is a struggle towards hierarchical integration which often results in conflict with centrifugal forces such as nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism.
Globalism, regionalism and sub-regionalism have to be accommodated at a myriad of levels ranging from the divided communities of Ceuta to the national aspirations of Spain and Morocco, and the supra-national forces of the EC and NATO. To date there are no Helsinki Accords concerning the Arab/Muslim world including the Maghreb. Those Muslim states which veer towards either of the superpowers face the overt wrath of militant fundamentalism and the latent wrath of the umma or global Islamic community. Just as Nasserite Egypt once provided the Arab world with a role model of Arabism and its geopolitical potential in the 1950s and 1960s, Iran has been providing the Maghreb with a model of how an Islamic state should function and spread a universalizing politico-religious system by revolutionary means throughout the world. Besides Khomeini's stated aims of spreading the word of God, and countering the "satanic" hegemonistic aspirations of the superpowers, fundamentalist revolution is aimed at re-asserting Muslim strength by the recreation of its golden age (AD 700-1400) and becoming a first-order global power.

In the interest of peace and security, the states of the western Mediterranean region must establish greater mutually beneficial inter-linkages, particularly between states on the northern and southern shores eg securing the interests of 1 million Moroccan migrant workers living in the EC (Sunday Times Magazine, 15 Nov.1987, p.74). The fact that Morocco has made application to join the EC provides a salient example of the historical, human and economic intercourse which already exists
between Europe and the Maghreb. A fixed-link (bridge or tunnel) spanning the Strait between Spain and Morocco should be supported in political and economic terms by the international community, strengthening Euro-Maghrebi bonds.

The aspirations of the peoples and regimes of the Maghreb to establish a United Maghreb Union has been retarded by the different political orientations of the respective regimes. Also the differences in national wealth and natural resources has fostered mutually antagonistic nationalisms. This situation has led to the continued rivalry between the second-order regional powers Algeria and Morocco. The failure of the Maghrebi governments to resolve the Western Sahara dispute epitomizes their failure to create the Greater Maghreb Union. While theoretically all the Maghrebi states are non-aligned, Morocco and Tunisia veer towards the West, and Algeria has extended the hand of friendship towards the West since the death of Boumedienne (1978). Libya sees its own interests best served by cordial relations with Moscow, however like Algeria, its main goals lie in the Arab/Muslim world.

At present, the threat to peace on the southern shore of the Strait comes from underdevelopment, poverty and corruption rather than from superpower rivalry. Dissatisfaction among the Moroccan majority is widespread. The Western Saharan War is undermining the entire economic fabric of the state and fostering a strong well-equipped army which draws its manpower from the impoverished masses. The Plaza dispute is a constant reminder to the nation of the ignominy of defeat at the hands of
European/Christian colonialism.

Islamic fundamentalism does not recognize any territorial boundaries or borders. Events in any part of Dar al Islam help shape the fundamentalist globalist viewpoint. This ranges from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Western involvement in Lebanon to such legal instruments as the LOS (1982), the Camp David Accords (1978) and bilateral treaties between the USA and Arab states such as Morocco and Saudi Arabia.

In order to avoid destabilization on the southern shore of the Strait, the economic, social and political interests of the Moroccan masses must be given priority by their closest neighbours, the EC and allied institutions. Special understandings should be established and clauses inserted in accords concerning aid, trade and defence packages between the Morocco and the EC, and Morocco and the USA and NATO. The accords should be aimed at fostering (i) respect for individual rights, (ii) a multi-party system of government, and (iii) a fairer distribution of the national wealth. However, Western political institutions must appreciate the Islamic character of Moroccan society, and its special historical and cultural linkages to other Arab and Muslim states. Despite the benefits gained by the West from King Hassan's pro-Western stance on issues relating to international affairs, it is not in the West's long-term interest to over-exploit Hassan's good offices. Indeed, his attitude is often reminiscent of that of the Shah of Iran prior to 1979. It is fallacious to believe that the viewpoint of the present regime reflects that of the Moroccan
people as a whole; real geopolitical power and security on the southern shore of the Strait resides in the Moroccan masses. Overall revolutionary Islam as a force in Morocco is maturing and will have vast consequences in regional geopolitics in the future.

While it is highly unlikely that there will be a united fundamentalist Maghreb in the future, the possibility of Islamist regimes gaining control in Morocco and Tunisia is a very real one. The ethos of corruption and underdevelopment in Morocco is phenomenal in comparison to Algeria, Tunisia or Libya. In the author's experience the Casablanca bidonvilles are the most deprived areas in the Maghreb, or indeed the Mashreq. The Tunis slums of Melassine, Algier's Bab el Oued, or Annaba's coastal bidonvilles look luxurious in comparison to those of Morocco. Morocco's marginalized population may yet provide a radical revolutionary guard. They have not forgotten the deaths of at least 600 of their fold during the Casablanca revolt (1981) and 100 in 1984-85. The present regime cannot reily on the army, considering that there were attempted coups d'état in 1971, 1978 and 1983.
Gibraltar ranks among the most geostrategic arteries in the world in terms of international trade, energy supply, and naval deployment. Hence any threat to security of passage of the Strait endangers the regional and global balance of power. Fundamentally there are three issues which risk causing destabilization: (i) the increasing national jurisdiction which both Spain and Morocco are seeking to exert over the waters of the Strait; (ii) the contentious question of decolonization of the Crown Colony, and the Spanish Plazas in North Africa; and (iii) instability on the Islamic southern shore.

History suggests that the coastal states will continue to extend their sovereignty to ever-greater expanses of maritime space, and seek to impose greater national jurisdiction in their territorial seas. Intrinsically linked to the issue of sovereignty over the seas is the right of the international community to make passage and overflight of straits like Gibraltar whose waters are constituted in whole or in part throughout its length of territorial seas. Hence the legal regime of "transit passage" as codified in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS 1982, Part III, Sec.2, Arts.37-44) which precludes Gibraltar from the traditional regime of "innocent passage" is an attempt at catering for the legitimate aspirations of the international community. Despite the positive attributes of the "transit passage regime", Spain and
Morocco are not in agreement with many aspects of the LOS Convention (1982), particularly with regard to the right of submerged passage, overflight, passage of naval vessels, and vessels with a high pollution potential. Spain and Morocco may yet decline to cooperate with the implementation of the "transit passage regime", and seek to impose ever-greater national jurisdiction over the waters of the Strait, thus causing contention in the region. The whole question of maritime jurisdiction in the region is further complicated by the fact that boundaries have not yet been agreed upon by Spain and Gibraltar (UK), and Spain and Morocco in relation to the Plazas.

The LOS (1982) may be seen as the first legal instrument to fully cater for the "international" status of the Strait of Gibraltar, despite the many historical agreements, accords, and conventions. In the interests of peace and stability, the riparian states and the maritime powers must ratify the LOS Convention (1982), and seek to support the Convention by further international agreements, including the commitment that UN forces will be deployed in the Strait area in the event that international passage of the Strait is endangered due to war or other hostile acts. Despite the fact that Spain disputes British sovereignty over the Crown Colony, and Morocco contests Spanish sovereignty in the Plazas, the riparian states must accept the de facto presence of the UK in Gibraltar, and that of Spain in the Plazas. These territories have a right to territorial waters, and hence "provisional" maritime boundaries should be agreed upon, in the interests of peace and security.
Declarations could be inserted into the agreements stating that the maritime boundaries are "provisional" and in no way detract from the sovereign claims to territories of the signatory parties.

Gibraltar and the Plazas are the historical legacy of inter-state strife between Spain and Morocco, and colonialism in the region. The micro-fragmentation of territory in the Strait area, particularly between the 18th century and 1956, was the geographical expression of a hierarchy of geopolitical power in the global community. With the decline of European imperialism and decolonization since 1945, in the longterm it is doubtful that Britain and Spain will be able to maintain their sovereign links with the Crown Colony and the Plazas respectively. However decolonization in the region is problematic, not least because of the hierarchical nature of geopolitical organization in the Strait region, and the associated bases of Gibraltar and Ceuta guaranteeing Western security, but also the fact that sizeable populations living in the disputed territories do not wish them to be decolonized. Decolonization in the region is not a classic case of liberating peoples but rather territories which both Spain and Morocco claim on the grounds of the principle of "the territorial integrity of the state". Whatever arguments may be put forward by the disputants, the legitimate interests of the Gibraltarians, Ceutis and Melillinese must be catered for. Because of British and Spanish membership of the EC and NATO, these organizations offer scope for greater cooperation between the member states and in the future the
acrimonious aspects of the sovereignty dispute should become less evident, as Britain and the Gibraltarians establish closer links with Spain. Eventually a majority of people in the Crown Colony may vote for integration into the Spanish state, while the base may be staffed by multinational NATO forces. However there is no room for complacency. By discussing the sovereignty issue from a long-term perspective and actively cooperating with the Spanish authorities, Britain may help contribute to lessening tensions in the region.

From the Moroccan viewpoint, any change in the sovereign status of Gibraltar automatically implies that Spain must return the Plazas to Morocco. However Spain maintains that the Plazas are an integral part of the Spanish state and thus their sovereignty is not an issue open to discussion. This Spanish viewpoint is unrealistic, considering (i) Madrid's arguments in relation to sovereignty over the Crown Colony; (ii) Moroccan strategy since 1956 in regaining sovereignty over the other once colonized territories; and (iii) the continuing campaign of the Moroccan people for the decolonization of the Plazas.

In an effort to defuse tensions in the region, Spain could return the Minor Plazas to Morocco immediately, as they are manifestly of little economic or strategic importance to Madrid, despite the certain advantages which the Chafarinas may hold. Decolonization of the Major Plazas is more problematic because of the opposition of the majority of inhabitants there to any change in their sovereign status. However the Muslim population of Melilla is becoming increasing militant because of its unfair
treatment by the Spanish authorities; militancy may spread to the Muslim population of Ceuta. By 2000 AD, it is most likely that Muslims and those wishing for reunification with Morocco will constitute a majority in Melilla. It is probable that Ceuta will be the last Plaza to be decolonized, because the vast majority of people there are Spanish nationals and are closely integrated into the economy and culture of mainland Spain. Also the Ceuta base is of importance not only to Spain but also Western security. At present, because of the political climate in Morocco, a hasty decolonization of Ceuta is not advisable, but rather a well-structured negotiated settlement catering for the legitimate aspirations of Spain, Morocco and the Ceutis, and ensuring Western interests there. Unless Spain makes positive efforts in this direction, it is likely that Morocco will take more militant action in attempting to regain sovereignty over Ceuta.

Historically security of the Strait has been most endangered from the southern shore. All major global geopolitical models have included the Gibraltar and northern Maghrebi region. At present, stability in the Maghreb is threatened by: (i) the powerful force of fundamentalist Islam; (ii) inter-state rivalry, particularly between Morocco and Algeria, epitomized by the Western Saharan War which is emblematic of Morocco's "Greater Morocco" dream and Algeria's quest for the leadership role among the Maghrebi states; and (iii) the dictatorial nature of King Hassan's regime. In the event of revolution in Morocco, a radical military junta or
militant fundamentalist oligarchy would emerge as the natural leaders. Such a regime would most likely struggle for greater geopolitical power in the Maghreb, particularly vis-à-vis Algeria, or struggle for a more militant Greater Maghrebi Union, as is the case with Libya. A more radical Moroccan regime would be less disposed to accepting the status quo concerning the Plazas and the "transit passage" regime for the Strait (LOS 1982). Western interests in the region would be obvious targets for fundamentalists following the precedent set by Iran since 1979. In the interests of peace and stability, Western institutions such as the EC and NATO must assist the Moroccan people in their endeavours for greater economic and political development. Unconditional Western support for the regime of Hassan II is not a feasible strategy in the longterm for ensuring stability on the southern shore of the Strait. The West must avoid becoming involved in the Western Saharan War because of the risk this runs in relation to Algeria and the Arab-Muslim world, and of course the potential for superpower confrontation in the area. Also the EC has a major role to play in ensuring greater economic cooperation with the Maghrebis, particularly Morocco. The proposed trans-Strait fixed-link in the form of a bridge or tunnel should not be merely viewed as a Moroccan-Spanish project, but rather a solid link between the EC and the Maghreb; and should have the financial support of the Community, especially as of 1986 Ceuta and Melilla are EC exclaves. With concerted NATO and US action, Spain, Morocco and the Alliance could strive to come to an agreement, whereby the
Ceuta base would be protected by the West, ensuring that hostile forces will not gain control of it.
APPENDIX I (a & b).

(a) THE MOST IMPORTANT STRAITS ON WHICH WORLD SHIPPING CONCENTRATES, STRAITS OF HISTORICAL INTEREST AND THOSE WITH FUTURE POTENTIAL: INTERNATIONAL STRAITS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimum Ocean Land</th>
<th>No. of riparian width</th>
<th>m. factor</th>
<th>factor</th>
<th>status.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRAITS.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ARCTIC** (East Siberian Sea, Laptev Sea, Barents Sea, Baffin Island)

1. Proliv Longo 69.0 (iii) c (1) USSR.
2. Proliv Vil’kitskogo 30.0 (iii) c (1) USSR.
3. Proliv Malochkin c 1.0 (iii) o (1) USSR.
4. Pro. Korskiye Vorota 29.0 (iii) o (1) USSR.
5. Pro. Dmitriya Lapteva 29.0 (iii) c (1) USSR.
6. Borey Strait 27.0 (iii) o (1) Canada.
7. McClure Strait 43.0 (v) o (1) Canada.
8. Robeson Channel 10.0 (iii) d (2) Canada. Greenland.
9. Nares Strait 14.6 (iii) d (2) Canada. Greenland.

**NORTH AMERICA** (North Atlantic Ocean, North Pacific Ocean)

10. Strait of Canso c 1.0 (ii) c (1) Canada.
11. Strait of Belle Isle 9.0 (v) c (1) Canada.
12. Cabot Strait 41.5 (v) d (1) Canada.
13. Davis Strait 164.0 (v) d (2) Canada. Greenland.
14. Hudson Strait 28.0 (v) c (1) Canada.
15. Jacques Cartier Pass 15.0 (iv) c (1) Canada.
16. Northumberland Strait 7.0 (iv) c (1) Canada.
17. Strait of Juan de Fuca 9.0 (v) c (2) USA. Canada.
18. Shelikof Strait 28.0 (i) c (1) Alaska (USA).
19. Unimak Pass 10.0 (v) e (1) Alaska (USA).
20. Amukta Pass 35.0 (v) e (1) Alaska (USA).
21. Seguam Pass 13.0 (v) e (1) Alaska (USA).
22. Samalior (Samalga) 16.0 (v) e (1) Alaska (USA).
23. Amchitka Pass 46.0 (v) e (1) Alaska (USA).
24. Adak Strait 7.0 (v) e (1) Alaska (USA).
25. Tonaga Pass 19.0 (v) e (1) Alaska (USA).
26. Agattu Strait 17.0 (v) e (1) Alaska (USA).
27. Bering Strait 19.0 (v) e (2) USA. USSR.
28. Florida Straits (E) 82.0 (v) c (2) USA. Bahamas.
29. Florida Straits (W) 42.5 (v) c (2) USA. Cuba.
30. Yucatan Channel 105.0 (iii) c (2) Mexico. Cuba.
31. N-W Providence Ch 26.0 (v) c (1) Bahamas.
32. N-E Providence Ch 24.25 (v) e (1) Bahamas.
33. Crooked Island Pass 26.2 (v) e (1) Bahamas.
34. Mayaguana Passage (E) 39.0 (v) e (1) Bahamas.
35. Caicos Passage 35.0 (v) e (1) Turks/Caicos (UK).
36. Turks Island Passage 18.2 (v) e (1) Turks/Caicos (UK).
37. Windward Passage 45.25 (v) e (2) Cuba. Haiti.
39. Anegada Passage 45.0 (v) e (1) Virgin Is (UK).
40. Guadeloupe Passage 28.0 (v) e (3) Montserrat (UK). Guadeloupe (Fr). Antigua & Barbuda.
41. Dominica Passage 16.0 (v) e (2) Guadeloupe (Fr). Dominica.
42. Martinique Passage 22.0 (v) e (2) Martinique (Fr). Dominica.
43. St. Lucia Channel 17.0 (v) e (2) Martinique (Fr).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent Passage</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>(v) (2) St. Lucia &amp; St. Vincent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica Channel</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>(iii) (3) Jamaica, Haiti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragon's Mouth</td>
<td>400 yds</td>
<td>(iii) (G) Trinidad, Venezuela.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sargent's Mouth</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>(iii) (G) Trinidad, Venezuela.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aruba-Poroguana Pass</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>(iii) (G) Venezuela.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilloen's Passage</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>(v) (2) Trinidad &amp; Tobago, Grenada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Bahama Channel</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>(iii) (1) Cuba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estrecho de la Barre</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>(1) Argentina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strait of Magellan</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>(i) (2) Argentina, Chile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoalge Channel</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>(ii) (2) Argentina, Chile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canary Island - Morocco</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>(ii) (2) Spain, Morocco.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canary Island Straits c</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>(ii) (2) Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark Strait</td>
<td>138.0</td>
<td>(i) (2) Greenland, Iceland.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gulf of Finland</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>(iii) (2) Finland, USSR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf of Bothnia c</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>(iii) (2) Finland, Sweden.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alands Hav</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>(iii) (2) Sweden, Finland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalmar Sund</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>(iii) (1) Sweden.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bornholm Sagttet</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>(iii) (2) Sweden, Denmark.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oresund @ % @</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>(v) (2) Denmark, Sweden.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kattegot @</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>(v) (2) Denmark, Sweden.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skagement @</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>(v) (2) Norway, Denmark.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Belt @ % @</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>(v) (1) Denmark.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentland Firth</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>(iv) (1) UK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Minch</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>(iv) (1) UK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Channel</td>
<td>10.75</td>
<td>(v) (1) UK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. George's Channels</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>(v) (2) UK, Ireland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strait of Dover</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>(v) (2) UK, France.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strait of Gibraltar @</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>(v) (3) Spain, Morocco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freu de Minorca</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>(iii) (1) Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strait of Bonifacio</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>(iv) (2) Corsica (Fr), Sardina (It).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corsica-Elba Strait</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>(iv) (2) France, Italy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canal di Piombino</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>(iv) (1) Italy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canal d'Uomo (Elba-Italy)</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>(iv) (1) Italy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strait of Messina</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>(iv) (1) Italy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strait of Sicily @</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>(iv) (2) Italy, Tunisia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pantellerio-Tunisia St</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>(iv) (2) Italy, Tunisia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malta Channel</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>(iv) (2) Malta, Sicily (It).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strait of Otranto @</td>
<td>39.25</td>
<td>(iv) (2) Albania, Italy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corfu Channel</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>(iv) (2) Albania, Greece.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kithero Strait @</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>(iv) (1) Greece.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kithero-Andikithera St</td>
<td>21.75</td>
<td>(iv) (1) Greece.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andikithera-Crete St</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>(iv) (1) Greece.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasos Strait</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>(iv) (1) Greece.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karpasos Strait</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>(iv) (1) Greece.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dardanelles @ % @</td>
<td>750 yds</td>
<td>(iii) (1) Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Strait Name</td>
<td>Distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90.</td>
<td>Hopsonus Strait</td>
<td>700 yds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91.</td>
<td>Korchanizki Proliv Strait</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98.</td>
<td>Turkey-Cyprus Strait</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>101.</td>
<td>Djerba-Tunisia Strait</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102.</td>
<td>Karinna-Tunisia Strait</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**EAST AFRICA AND SOUTH ASIA (Indian Ocean)**

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<th>Distance</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>94.</td>
<td>Mozambique Channel</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>(ii) c (2) Mozambique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95.</td>
<td>Mafia Channel</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>(ii) c (1) Tanzania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96.</td>
<td>Zanzibar Channel</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>(ii) c (1) Tanzania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97.</td>
<td>Pemba Passage</td>
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<td>(ii) c (1) Tanzania.</td>
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<tr>
<td>98.</td>
<td>Zanzibar-Pemba Strait</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>(ii) d (1) Tanzania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100.</td>
<td>Strait of Tiran</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>(iv) b G (2) Egypt, Saudi Arabia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>101.</td>
<td>Strait of Gubal</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>(iv) a G (1) Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102.</td>
<td>Strait of Hormuz</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>(v) b G (2) Iran, Oman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103.</td>
<td>Palk Strait</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>(ii) c (2) Sri Lanka, India.</td>
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**SOUTHEAST ASIA (Indian Ocean, South China Sea, Philippines Sea)**

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<tr>
<td>104.</td>
<td>Great Channel</td>
<td>68.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Malacca Strait</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>(v) c (2) Indonesia, Malaysia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106.</td>
<td>Singapore Strait</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>(iii) a (3) Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>107.</td>
<td>Berhala Strait</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>(iv) e (1) Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108.</td>
<td>Bangka Strait</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>(iv) e (1) Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109.</td>
<td>Karimata Strait</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>(iii) e (1) Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110.</td>
<td>Jaspar Strait</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>(iv) e (1) Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111.</td>
<td>Sunda Strait</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>(v) e (1) Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112.</td>
<td>Bali Strait</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>(v) e (1) Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113.</td>
<td>Lombok Strait</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>(v) e (1) Indonesia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>114.</td>
<td>Alas Strait</td>
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<td>(v) o (1) Indonesia.</td>
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<td>Sapudi Strait</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>(v) e (1) Indonesia.</td>
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<td>117.</td>
<td>Roti Strait</td>
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<tr>
<td>118.</td>
<td>Onbai Strait</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>(v) e (1) Indonesia.</td>
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<td>119.</td>
<td>Makassar Strait</td>
<td>48.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>120.</td>
<td>Timpaus Strait</td>
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<td>(iii) e (1) Indonesia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>121.</td>
<td>Serasan Passage</td>
<td>23.0</td>
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<td>Manipa Strait</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>(iii) e (1) Indonesia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>123.</td>
<td>Weter Passage</td>
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<td>(iii) e (1) Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124.</td>
<td>Sibutu Passage</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>(iii) e (2) Indonesia, Philippines.</td>
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<tr>
<td>125.</td>
<td>Balabac Passage</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>(iii) e (1) Philippines.</td>
</tr>
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<td>126.</td>
<td>Basilan Strait</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>(iii) e (1) Philippines.</td>
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<td>127.</td>
<td>Suriaga Strait</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>(v) e (1) Philippines.</td>
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<td>128.</td>
<td>Mindoro Strait</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>(iii) e (2) Philippines.</td>
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<td>129.</td>
<td>Son Bernardino Passage</td>
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<td>(v) e (1) Philippines.</td>
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<tr>
<td>130.</td>
<td>Verde Island Passage</td>
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<td>(v) e (1) Philippines.</td>
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<td>131.</td>
<td>Babuyan Channel</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>(v) e (1) Philippines.</td>
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<tr>
<td>132.</td>
<td>Balintang Channel</td>
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<td>(v) e (1) Philippines.</td>
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</table>

**EAST ASIA (South China Sea, East China Sea, Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, North Pacific Ocean)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Strait Name</th>
<th>Distance</th>
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<td>133.</td>
<td>Luzon Strait (Bashi)</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>(v) e (2) Taiwan, Philippines.</td>
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<td>134.</td>
<td>Hainan Strait</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>(iv) c (1) PR China.</td>
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<td>135.</td>
<td>Lemma Channel</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>(iv) c (1) PR China.</td>
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<td>136.</td>
<td>Pescadores Channel</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>(iii) d (2) PR China, Taiwan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
137. Formosa Strait 60.3 (iii) c (2) PR China. Taiwan.
138. Awanai Strait 31.0 (v) e (1) Japan.
139. Tokara Kaikyo 22.0 (v) e (1) Japan.
140. Tanogashima Kaikyo 10.0 (v) e (1) Japan.
141. Yakushima Kaikyo c 38.0 (iv) o (1) Japan.
142. Osumi St (Van Dieman) 15.5 (v) e (1) Japan.
143. Pohai Strait 19.0 (iv) d (1) China.
144. Choju Hachyup Strait 11.0 (iii) c G (2) S Korea. Japan.

145. W.Korea/Chosen Strait 22.0 (iii) c (2) S Korea. Japan.
Strait divided into 2 channels by Tsu Shima Islands (Japan)

146. Atalante-Jna Yaki St 26.0 (iii) o (1) Japan.
147. Craigie-Kamino Shima 22.8 (iii) o (1) Japan.
148. Aunt-Kamino Shima St 24.0 (iii) o (1) Japan.
149. Blakeney-Kamino Shima 25.25 (iii) o (1) Japan.
150. Vashon-Mitsu Shima 25.0 (iii) o (1) Japan.

151. E.Korea/Chosen Strait 25.0 (iii) c (2) S Korea. Japan.
Strait divided by archipelagic (strait) (Japan)

152. Futagami Jima-Iki Shima 6.25 (iii) e (1) Japan.
153. Futagami Jima-Azuchi Sh15.5 (iii) e (1) Japan.
154. Madara Shima-Iki Shima 6.75 (iii) e (1) Japan.
155. Kakata Shima-Iki Shima 6.75 (iii) e (1) Japan.
156. Yeboshi Jima-Iki Shima 4.25 (iii) e (1) Japan.
157. Yeboshi Jima-Kyushu St 6.5 (iii) o (1) Japan.
158. Yeboshi Jima-Oro Shima 10.75 (iii) e (1) Japan.
159. Oro Shima-Kyushu St 11.0 (iii) e (1) Japan.
160. Oro Shima-O Shima 18.25 (iii) e (1) Japan.

161. Sado Kaikyo 18.0 (iv) e G (1) Japan.
162. Tsugaru Kaikyo Strait 9.6 (v) e (1) Japan.
163. La Perouse (Soya) St 19.9 (iii) e (2) USSR. Japan.
164. Nemuro Kaikyo 10.0 (v) e (2) USSR. Japan.
165. Rishiri-suido 10.0 (iii) e (1) Japan.

166. P. Pervyy Kuril'skiy 7.0 (v) c (1) USSR.
167. P.Chetvertyy Kuril'skiy 31.0 (v) e (1) USSR.
168. Proliv Yekateriny 10.0 (v) e (1) USSR.
169. Proliv Friza 20.0 (v) e (1) USSR.
170. Proliv Bussol 37.0 (v) e (1) USSR.
171. Proliv Kruzenshterna 36.0 (v) e (1) USSR.
172. Proliv Nevel'skogo 10.0 (iii) c (1) USSR.
173. Proliv Tatarskiy 28.0 (iii) c (1) USSR.
174. Proliv Litke 13.0 (iv) c G (1) USSR.

OCEANIA (South Pacific Ocean. North Pacific Ocean)

175. St. George's Channel 8.0 (ii) e (1) Papua New Guinea. Australia.

176. Bougainville Strait 15.0 (ii) e (2) P.N. Guinea. Sol.
177. Manning Strait 6.0 (iii) e (1) Solomon Islands.
178. Indispensable 19.0 (iii) e (1) Solomon Islands.
179. Cook Strait 11.5 (v) e (1) New Zealand.
180. Foveaux Strait 15.0 (ii) e (1) New Zealand.
181. Bass Strait c 80.0 (v) c (1) Australia.
182. Torres Strait 2.2 (iv) c (2) Aust'. P.N.Gui.
183. Banks Strait 8.0 (v) c (1) Australia.
184. Apolima Strait 4.0 (ii) e (1) Western Samoa.
185. Vatu-i-Ra Channel 2.0 (iii) e (1) Fiji.
186. Kaulakahi Channel 15.0 (ii) e (1) Hawaii (USA).
187. Kauai Channel 63.0 (ii) e (1) Hawaii (USA).
(b) OTHER STRAYS OF HISTORICAL INTEREST AND THOSE WITH FUTURE POTENTIAL.

**ARCTIC** (East Siberian Sea, Laptev Sea, Barents Sea, Beaufort Sea)
1. Proliv Eterikan
2. Proliv Sannitava
3. Proliv Blagovshchonskiy
4. Proliv Zorya
5. Proliv Margano
6. Proliv Avatriisky
7. Proliv Britanskiy Kanal
8. Proliv Shokalskogo
9. Proliv Krasnii Armi
10. Proliv Ostsaya
11. Yeniseyskiy Zaliv
12. Gydan'skaya Guba
13. Obukhova Guba
14. Tazovskaya Guba
15. Proliv Malgina
16. James Ross Strait
17. Prince of Wales Strait
18. Prince Albert Sound
19. Dolphin and Union Strait
20. Dease Strait
21. Victoria Strait
22. Roa Strait
23. Viscount Melville Sound
24. Lancaster Sound
25. Mc Clintock Channel
26. Jones Sound
27. Lady Ann Strait
28. Byam Martin Channel
29. Belcher Channel
30. Wellington Channel

**NORTH AMERICA**
31. Gaspe Passage
32. Hecate
33. Dixon Entrance
34. Kennedy Entrance
35. Hebert Pass
36. Yunaska Pass
37. Fenimore Pass
38. Eto Strait
39. Santa Barbara Channel
40. Mouchoir Passage
41. Virgin Passage
42. Vicuca Passage
43. Honduras Channel

**NORTH EUROPE** (Barents Sea, Baltic Sea, North Sea, Atlantic Ocean)
44. Karo Strait
45. Kadet Channel
46. Fener Belt.
47. The Hole
48. North Minch
49. The Solent
50. Bristol Channel

**EAST AFRICA AND SOUTH ASIA** (Indian Ocean)
51. Comoro Is Strait
52. Cape Guardafui St
53. East Gulf of Bahrain Strait (Bahrain/Qatar)
54. West Gulf of Bahrain Strait (Bahrain/Saudi Arabia)
55. Ten Degree Channel

**SOUTHEAST ASIA** (Indian Ocean, South China Sea, Philippine Sea)
56. Djailolo Passage
57. Api Passage
58. Katl Passage
59. Molucca Passage
60. Greund Strait
61. Boston Passage
62. Dampier Strait
63. Port Timor-Lete Island St.
64. Moguedo Passage
65. Poliitio Strait

**EAST ASIA** (South China Sea, East China Sea, Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, North Pacific Ocean)
66. Shimonoseki Kaikyo
67. Okinawa Islands-Matsu St.
68. Huksan Chedo
69. Maenom Suido
OCEANIA (South Pacific Ocean, North Pacific Ocean)

Straits

09. Jonrud Strait
10. Gaschona Strait
11. Vitior Strait
12. Clarence Strait
13. Dundas Strait
14. Saipan Channel
15. Kalohi Channel
16. Auau Channel
17. Kealaikahiki Channel
18. Alalakeiki Channel

Maritime connection:
(i) Inter-oceanic straits.
(ii) Intra-oceanic straits.
(iii) Inter-sea straits.
(iv) Intra-sea straits.
(v) Inter-sea-oceanic straits.

Territorial Connection:
a) Intercontinental straits.
b) Intracontinental straits.
c) Continental-island straits.
d) Inter-insular straits.
e) Archipelagic straits.
G) Gulf.

© Straits in the region of the most used shipping lanes in the world as represented in "World Straits and Shipping Lanes" (Map) 504911(545037)12-18, Office of the Geographer, Department of State, Washington DC. (Undated Map, c 1982).

% International straits by virtue of historic/long-standing international conventions.

© Only entrance to semi-enclosed sea, gulf or bay.

Sources: "World Straits and Shipping Lanes" (Map) 504911(545037)12-18, Office of the Geographer, Department of State, Washington DC; The Times Atlas of the World (1985); Couper (1983); Kennedy (1958, pp.114-164); Koh (1982, pp.24-26); Smith (1973) (see bibliography).
### Appendix II

**Gibraltar: Traffic Flow**

(a) **Gibraltar: Traffic Passing Eastward 1981. (Class: NGROSS) 1,000 GTs.**

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**Notes:**
- Classes are categorized into different traffic sectors.
- NGROSS data represents traffic passing eastward, indicating a significant volume of maritime traffic.
- The total volume of traffic passing eastward is calculated to be approximately 2,623,844 GTs.
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(b) GIBRALTAR TRAFFIC PASSING WESTWARD 1981. (1,000 CS).

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**Source:** Lloyds Maritime Information Services Ltd. Statistical Summary Report (1987).
## APPENDIX III

### CYCLES OF GLOBAL POLITICS: TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND HISTORICAL EVENTS RELATING TO THE GIBRALTAR REGION.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Key Institutions and/or Ideologies</th>
<th>Relevance to Geopolitics of Gibraltar Region</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1711</td>
<td>Iberia</td>
<td>Maghreb.</td>
<td>Invasion</td>
<td>Land/horse power. Religion.</td>
<td>Monopoly of both coasts.</td>
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<td>1698</td>
<td>Netherlands GB.</td>
<td>Fr. England (T)</td>
<td>2 Loo-The Hague</td>
<td>N’lands vs Fr. expansionism.</td>
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<td>1700</td>
<td>N’lands GB.</td>
<td>N’lands</td>
<td>Partition</td>
<td>Multipolarism. ibid.</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>1713</td>
<td>GB. Fr. Peace (T) Utrecht. (11 April). Seapower. GB dominant power in St. region.</td>
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<td>1729</td>
<td>GB. Mor. (T) of Fez. Laisssez Faire. Mor. friend of GB &amp; Gibraltar.</td>
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<td>1731</td>
<td>ibid. (T) of Vienna ibid. ibid.</td>
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<td>1748</td>
<td>Fr. Sp. Peace (T) GB commands Aix la Chapelle. the seas. Gibraltar status quo.</td>
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<td>1756</td>
<td>Fr. GB. Peace (T) ibid. ibid.</td>
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1763 Fr. GB. Definitive Peace (T) Paris. ibid. GB Gib. status confirmed.
1795 Fr. Sp. Peace (T) Basle. Fr. aspirant to global power. Fr. tries for foot in St. power.
1796 Fr. Sp. Alliance offen & defen. ibid. ibid. (T) Son Idelfonso.
1809 GB. Sp. Peace & Alliance (T) London. Spain subjugated by GB.
1814 GB. Fr. Peace (T) Paris. France subjugated by GB.
1815 GB. Fr. Peace (T) Vienna. GB rules the waves. Fre passo of St. waves.
1845 Br. Empire. Sp. Mor (T) of Larcache. Mor subjugated Ceuta land by Sp. boundary.
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>Capo Spartoi (T)</td>
<td>Mare Librum, Int'l Laissiez Faire, Strait.</td>
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<td>1869</td>
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<td>1870</td>
<td>GB. Fr.</td>
<td>Suez Canal</td>
<td>Imperialism, Gibraltar.</td>
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<td>1885</td>
<td>Sp. Mor.</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
<td>Scramble for Plazas.</td>
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<td>1902</td>
<td>Fr. Sp.</td>
<td>Draft (T)</td>
<td>Art. 4 &quot;importance of Tangier&quot; &quot;freedom of Strait&quot; Sp. refused to sign.</td>
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<td>1904</td>
<td>Fr. Sp.</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
<td>&quot;special character&quot; of Tangier &amp; St. Secret annexes.</td>
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<td>Year</td>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>1914</td>
<td>GB. Fr.</td>
<td>Drafts for Convention</td>
<td>More Librum. Tangier Statute</td>
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<td>Int'l.</td>
<td>WWI.</td>
<td>Old order changeth.</td>
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<td>1938</td>
<td>GB. It. Agreement.</td>
<td>Free Usage of Med. &amp; St.</td>
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<td>Armistice</td>
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<td>Convention Fr.</td>
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<td>Morocco.</td>
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<td>1942</td>
<td>USA. N.</td>
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<td>GB. USA.</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Formal plans.</td>
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*Names of countries in table given as found in original treaties eg England or Great Britain.

(T) = Treaty.

APPENDIX IV

ARTICLE X OF THE TREATY OF UTRECHT

(13 JULY 1713)

The Catholic King does hereby, for himself, his heirs and successors, yield to the Crown of Great Britain the full and entire propriety of the town and castle of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifications, and forts thereunto belonging; and he gives up the said propriety to be held and enjoyed absolutely with all manner of right forever, without any exception or impediment whatsoever.

But that abuses and frauds may be avoided by importing any kind of goods, the Catholic King wills, and takes it to be understood, that the above named propriety be yielded to Great Britain without any territorial jurisdiction, and without any open communication by land with the country round about.

Yet whereas the communication by sea with the coast of Spain may not at all times be safe or open, and thereby it may happen that the garrison, and other inhabitants of Gibraltar may be brought to great straits; and as it is the intention of the Catholic King, only that fraudulent importations of goods should, as is above said, be hindered by an inland communication, it is therefore provided that in such cases it may be lawful to purchase, for ready money, in the neighbouring territories of Spain, provisions and other things necessary for the use of the garrison, the inhabitants, and the ships which lie in the harbour. But if any goods be found imported by Gibraltar, either by way of barter for purchasing provisions, or under any other pretense, the same shall be confiscated, and complaint being made thereof, those persons who have acted contrary to the faith of this treaty, shall be severely punished.

And Her Britannic Majesty at the request of the Catholic King, does consent and agree, that no leave shall be given, under any pretense whatsoever, either to Jews or Moors, to reside or have their dwellings in the said town of Gibraltar; and that no refuge or shelter shall be allowed to any Moorish ships of war in the harbour of the said town whereby the communication between Spain and Ceuta may be obstructed, or the coasts of Spain be infested by the excursions of the Moors. But whereas treaties of friendship, and a liberty and intercourse of commerce are between the British and certain territories situated on the coast of Africa, it is always to be understood, that the British subjects cannot refuse the Moors and their ships entry into the port of Gibraltar purely upon the account of merchandising.

Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain does further promise, that the free exercise of their religion shall be indulged to the Roman Catholic inhabitants of the aforesaid town.

And in case it shall hereafter seem meet to the Crown of
Great Britain to grant, sell, or by any means to alienate thencefrom the propriety of the said town of Gibraltar, it is hereby agreed, and concluded, that the preference of having the same shall always be given to the Crown of Spain before any others.

APPENDIX V

GIBRALTAR AND THE UNITED NATIONS

According to the UN Charter, Chapter XI, "Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories": Article 37(c) provides for the submission by an Administering Power to the Secretary General of reports concerning those territories. During the first session of the UNGA, it adopted a resolution pertaining to "Non-Self-Governing Peoples" (UNGA. Res. 9(1) 9 Feb.1946; Red Book, 1965, p.305; Levie, 1983, p.102). Later another resolution entitled "Transmission of Information under Art.37(e) of the Charter" was adopted (UNGA. Res. 66(1), 14 Dec.1946; Djonovich, 1973, I. III; Levie, 1983, p.102). A Special Committee was created to handle the information. On 14 December 1960, the UNGA adopted Resolution 1514 (XV), "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples". To speed up decolonization, another UNGA Resolution 1654 (XIII) was passed (27 Nov.1961); "The Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples".
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### TRADE BY PROVINCES OF PRODUCTION AND DESTINATION (VALUE IN THOUSAND U.S. DOLLARS)

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