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The Living Body of the Lord:
E.B. Pusey’s ‘Types and Prophecies of the Old Testament’
George Westhaver

In his ‘Lectures on Types and Prophecy’ (1836-7), E. B. Pusey urges the recovery of a patristic and ‘Apostolic’ approach to the interpretation of the Old Testament. This thesis will argue that for Pusey finding types and ‘typical’ prophecies of Christ and his Church in the whole of the Old Testament is not an exegetical curiosity or option, but rather a necessary expression of doctrine and spiritual discipline. For Pusey, the unwillingness of interpreters guided by the apologetic and evidentialist approach to theology in his day to follow the Fathers’ example manifests important theological differences. He advocates both the recovery of patristic exegesis and the theological vision in which it makes sense. ‘Every thing is a type’, in the books of God’s works and words, because all created things bear the impress of their creator. Moreover, all types or images, in Scripture, in nature, and in the human soul, seek a fulfilment in a salvific return to the Trinity in Unity. Drawing on both patristic and Romantic sources, Pusey describes knowledge as a form of participation in the divine life in opposition to the rationalistic and procedural presuppositions he finds implicit in the apologetic approach. For Pusey, epistemology must be treated alongside sanctification and typology reflects Christology; a sacramental or ‘typical’ reading of prophecy transforms people made in the image of God to become more like God and hence able to know God and to read with understanding. Articulating these ideas was a project which occupied Pusey and his Tractarian colleagues during the most creative years of the Oxford Movement. While in many ways they gave voice to important High Church ideals, the puzzled response which greeted this part of their work reveals its radicalism and suggests possibilities for the contemporary search for the re-integration of theology and spirituality.
The Living Body of the Lord:
E.B. Pusey’s ‘Types and Prophecies of the Old Testament’

George Westhaver

PhD in the Department of Theology and Religion
The University of Durham
2012
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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations of works by E. B. Pusey

Works by Pusey that bear less directly on the ‘Lectures’ are included in the bibliography of primary literature.

Unpublished Manuscripts


Loose papers supplemental to the ‘Lectures’ in a folder ‘Types and Prophecies’ in ‘Pusey Papers: EBP Biblical MSS’. Referred to as ‘supplemental material’.

S-BGW ‘Book of God’s Works’ (5 pages)
S-BN ‘Book of Nature’ (4 pages)
S-EL ‘Emblematic Language’ (7 pages)
S-FTL ‘Figurative and Typical Language’ (18 pages)
S-GC ‘God’s Countenance’ (11 pages)

Published Works or Pamphlets (organized here by date of publication)


TG-II (1830), Part II, London: C. J. G. and F. Rivington.

Decl., Rep. (1836, 10 March) Declaration of Resident Members of Convocation, upon the nature and tendency of the Publications of the Rev. Dr. Hampden, the recently appointed Regius Professor of Divinity in this University, to which is appended an Extract from the Report of the Committee appointed March 5, 1836. Hampden Case, i, 5215-5236, 1836, Pusey House.


HPP. (1836, 26 March), ‘Dr Hampden’s Past and Present Statements Compared: A Sequel to “Dr Hampden’s Theological Statements and the XXXIX Articles compared”’, 2nd edn, Oxford: J.H. Parker.


PS-I  (1852), Parochial Sermons, i: For the Seasons from Advent to Whitsuntide, 3rd edn, Oxford: John Henry Parker.


RFai.  (1856) ‘Real Faith Entire’, in Ibid.


Other Abbreviations

References to the Bible

References to biblical passages will come from the Authorized Version, which is the version to which Pusey most often refers or quotes.

Unpublished manuscripts


Pages of the ‘Notes’ will be referred to in the same form as those of the ‘Lectures’, i.e. M8 refers to page 8 of the ‘Notes’.


These are a copy of Marshall’s ‘Notes’, which he produced in 1899. They were never published.
Published primary works organized alphabetically by the author’s name.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Title/Author/Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Arians</strong></td>
<td>NEWMAN, JOHN HENRY (1833), <em>The Arians of the Fourth Century: Their Doctrine, Temper, and Conduct, Chiefly as Exhibited in the Councils of the Church between A.D. 325, and A.D. 381</em></td>
<td>London: J. G. and F. Rivington.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>T87</strong></td>
<td>— (1843), Part IV-VI, No. 87, <em>Tracts for the Times</em>, v, 3rd edn</td>
<td>London: Rivington.</td>
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**Secondary Works**

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 The Theological Vision of the ‘Lectures’

In his ‘Lectures on Types and Prophecies of the Old Testament’, E. B. Pusey investigates prophecy and the prophetic character of the Old Testament. They exist in a handsomely bound red leather volume in the collection of the library of Pusey House, Oxford. Pusey gave the ‘Lectures’ in the ordinary course of his duties as Regius Professor of Hebrew, a post to which he had been appointed in November, 1828. Pusey prepared the ‘Lectures on Types and Prophecies’ during the summer of 1836 and began to deliver them in Michaelmas Term that autumn. Pusey’s biographer H. P. Liddon judges 1836 to be ‘the most important year in the history of the Oxford Movement’, in a large part due to the very aspirations and conflicts which shaped Pusey’s arguments in the ‘Lectures’. On the first day of the year, Pusey’s three Tracts on ‘Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism’ were published. J. H. Newman emphasized the importance of this contribution to the Tracts for the Times, ‘not as an enquiry into one single or isolated doctrine, but as a delineation and serious examination of a modern system of theology’. It was the dangers posed, in Pusey’s assessment, by this same ‘modern system’ which led him to play a significant role in the controversy surrounding the appointment of R. D. Hampden* as Regius Professor of Divinity in Oxford in the winter and spring of 1836. Also in 1836, during the long vacation and into the autumn, Pusey began to plan the Library of the Fathers with Newman and J. Keble, a project which represented both a recovery and a search for first principles distinct from the modern approach. It was in this context that the ‘Lectures’ were conceived and took shape. In them, Pusey compares what he considers to be the

1 Life, 359.
2 See Life, 324-5, on the importance of the publication of these Tracts.
3 ‘Advertisement’ for Part II, of Vol. II of Tracts for the Times, Newman, 1839c, vi.
4 For names marked with an asterisk in this thesis there is brief biographical information in the footnote noted at the end of the sentence.

*Hampden, Renn Dickson (1783-1868). Fellow and tutor at Oriel College, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford from 1834 and Bp of Hereford from 1848.
characteristics of examinations of prophecy in his day with the way in which the Church Fathers understood the Old Testament to be prophetic. He shows that the Fathers found types and prophecies in places where eighteenth century and early nineteenth century apologists denied that any were to be found. Pusey seeks to uncover the ideas and presuppositions that lay behind these differences. On the basis of this analysis, he puts forward a theological argument for the importance of interpreting the Scriptures according to the principles of ‘typical interpretation’ or typology that one finds in the ‘antient Church’ to which he directs our attention.5

This thesis will argue that for Pusey a typological or ‘typical’ reading of the Old Testament is necessary both as the exegetical expression of orthodox belief and practice, and as a means of furthering the goal of communion with Christ who is the subject of prophecy. Pusey’s discussion of types and prophecy takes him beyond Old Testament exegesis to consider the character and possibilities of theological knowledge. This thesis will show how Pusey’s understanding of typology is inextricably connected with his understanding of the Incarnation, the sacraments and the sacramental character of the Bible, theological anthropology and sanctification, and creation and redemption. Whatever the weaknesses in his argument, Pusey is doing more than advocating the merits of a sacred deposit of authorized interpretations which are free from the contamination of the modern age. Rather, he seeks to bring to light the principles which make the Fathers’ interpretations more in tune with the character of the Bible and the conditions of religious knowledge than those of many modern interpreters. Pusey makes the investigation of types the forum for discussing the character of theology and Christian life. It is an all-encompassing investigation.

Although the ‘Lectures’ are not particularly well-known, they occupy an important place in the history of the Oxford Movement. An attendance list for the ‘Lectures’ in Pusey’s hand-writing has survived.6 Under the inscription,

5 Pusey appeals to the ‘antient Church’, to ‘the antients’, and to ‘antient interpretation’ throughout the ‘Lectures’, e.g. L3, 9, 38, 55, 81, 110, 120, 138, 168.
‘Lectures delivered on prophecy, Monday – Friday at ten minutes past one’, the forty-eight names include John Henry Newman, Walter Kerr Hamilton*, Charles Marriott*, and W. E. Jelf*. Donald Allchin comments that, in the ‘Lectures’, ‘we seem to hear a younger and more hopeful Pusey speaking than is familiar to us from his later writings’. Not intended for public dissemination, at least in the form we have them, the ‘Lectures’ are more speculative and creative than the work which Pusey produced for the more unforgiving forum of public controversy. One has the sense in reading them that Pusey is wrestling with complex theological questions without always bringing to the surface all that is implied in his own arguments, perhaps approximating to his description in the ‘Lectures’ of how ‘words we often utter are fuller than we ourselves are at the time fully aware; we feel only that we have uttered truths beyond ourselves’. (L19) Pusey conveyed this sense of inspiration to F. W. Faber*, who was present at the first lecture of Lent Term, 1837:

Pusey commenced his lectures yesterday with Noah, and I really was so carried away by the majesty of his interpretations, that I could scarcely conceive him uninspired. It seemed as if a live coal from the altar had been placed upon his lips, and that the words he spoke were not his own.  

7 Liddon writes that ‘twenty-nine seems to have been the total number of listeners at the beginning of term’. Life, 399. The attendance sheet has a small ‘29’ written on the left side which Liddon may have known to indicate the number present at the first lecture. One of the names on the attendance sheet has ‘Lecture 7’ written beside it (‘Tripp’, of Exeter College), suggesting that some attended only one or more lectures. These differences probably suggest nothing more than that irregular attendance at lectures has remained a consistent part of University life. No separate record of attendance survives for Lent and Easter Terms.

*Hamilton, Walter Kerr (1808–1869). Fellow of Merton from 1830, a High Church supporter of the Oxford Movement, he was consecrated Bp of Salisbury in 1854 and later founded Salisbury Theological College.

*Marriott, Charles (1811–1858). Fellow of Oriel, a friend of John Henry Newman, and a close associate of Pusey. Briefly principal of the Diocesan Theological College in Chichester, and later vicar of St Mary the Virgin, the University Church, from 1850. From 1841 to 1855 he was the primary editor of the Library of the Fathers (Pusey in Augustine 1857, iii).

*Jelf, William Edward (1811–1875). Tutor in Classics at Christ Church (1836 to 1849) where he had been elected a student in 1829 on Pusey’s nomination. He was an old-fashioned High Churchman and brother of Pusey’s lifelong friend, R. W. Jelf (1798–1871).

8 Allchin 1967, 56.

9 Page numbers of the ‘Lectures’ in this thesis will be given in parentheses in the text preceded by an upper case ‘L’. For example, (L8) will refer to page 8 of the manuscript.

10 F. W. Faber to J. B. Morris, 31 January, 1837, quoted in Härdelin 1965, 17 n. 52.
While all who read the ‘Lectures’ may not agree with Faber’s exalted view of ‘the majesty of his interpretations’, their creative and exploratory character invites further investigation.

Despite their relative obscurity, not having ever been published, Pusey’s ‘Lectures’ were one instance of a foundational undertaking for the Tractarians. In the early years of the Oxford Movement, the question of the interpretation of the Bible, and the significance of the sort of typological and allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures that one finds in the Fathers, was a question that occupied not only Pusey, but also Newman and Keble. Apart from their sermons, Newman’s consideration of the allegorical exegesis of the Fathers in 

Arians on the Fourth Century (1833), Keble’s Tract 89, ‘On the Mysticism attributed to the Early Fathers of the Church’ (1841), and Isaac Williams’ Tracts 80 and 87, ‘On Reserve in Communicating Religious Knowledge’ (1838 and 1840), are only the best known examples of this shared endeavour. To neglect this subject would be to neglect what served as the fertile soil in which the Tractarians’ ideas germinated and grew. The importance of this endeavour to return to the Fathers as guides in interpreting the Scriptures is described by Geoffrey Rowell:

The theological vision of the Oxford Movement was in large measure a rediscovery and reinterpretation of patristic theology. The typological exegesis of Scripture and the strong sacramentalism of the Fathers commended themselves to men who already had begun to criticize the evidence theology of the eighteenth century.\(^\text{11}\)

The elements which Rowell describes as central to the theological vision of the Oxford Movement are the same elements which one finds in Pusey’s ‘Lectures’ – a consideration of the importance of typology or of a symbolic reading of the Bible, a criticism of the apologetic theology of the empirical tradition, and a sacramental understanding of both reading the Scriptures and of Christian life. The combination of subjects is also significant. Pusey’s investigation of prophecy is not a narrow argument about exegetical technique

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*Faber, Frederick William (1814-1863). A scholar and later fellow of University College who collaborated with the Library of the Fathers. He was received into the Roman Catholic Church in November, 1845, some weeks after Newman.

or contested points of interpretation. Rather, it is a part of a far-reaching project which involved the working out of basic theological principles.

The focus in the ‘Lectures’ of Pusey’s work of retrieval is the consideration of type and prophecy in the Old Testament. A type is commonly understood to be an event, person, or ceremony in the Old Testament that corresponds to, or prefigures, similar events, people, or things in the New Testament, often referred to as the antitype. Pusey’s view of typology includes this notion of type, but broadens it in significant ways. For Pusey, types include not only things or people, but also words or prophetic sayings in the Old Testament. We will see that for Pusey a type can have many different kinds of fulfilsments, not only in the New Testament, but also in the history of the Church or in eternity; a type may correspond not only to an event in the life of Christ described in the Gospels, but may also represent or picture some truth or reality pertaining to Him. Moreover, the term ‘type’ describes not only figures in the Old Testament but also symbols in the natural world or historical characters who represent certain ideals. The Passover Lamb, a bird soaring heavenward, and the notorious dictator are all types: ‘The world is full of types; and it were probably true to say, “every thing is a type”, if we could see it’. (L14)

Pusey’s understanding of prophecy reflects this expansive notion of type. For Pusey, a prophecy is primarily a revelation of God and his ways, and only secondarily a prediction. Fundamental to his understanding of type and prophecy is the idea that these are not distinct categories. For Pusey, types are prophetic and prophecy is primarily typological. The adjective which he most often uses to describe this kind of prophecy is ‘typical’, which is both a synonym for ‘typological’ and the word he uses to emphasize the ‘type’-character of all prophecy. Pusey argues that however clear an Old Testament prophecy may appear initially or on the surface, it will also include some element that is hidden and elusive. Types and typical prophecy are necessarily veiled. Perhaps most significantly of all, in Pusey’s analysis, the study of typology extends further than the consideration of historical correspondences or the relationship of the two Testaments. When he describes the symbolical,
or typical, character of numbers, Pusey writes that ‘The principles seem to lie in the very Being of God Himself’. (L152) The typical character of the Old Testament corresponds to the character of God’s manifestation in the world and therefore expresses fundamental theological and even divine principles.

Pusey differentiates the Fathers’ willingness to explore the types of the Old Testament from a ‘modern’ or ‘apologetic’ approach, which views such readings as arbitrary, ahistorical, or subjective. Chapter 2 considers Pusey’s assessment of the apologetic approach and his response to it. Pusey finds in the apologetic and evidentialist theology of his age a superficial empiricism which narrows not only the prophetic witness of the Old Testament but also encourages scepticism about theological or spiritual knowledge more generally. Pusey seeks to bring to light and to challenge the rationalistic principles which he thinks animate this approach. Both the Tractarians’ assessment of the moralistic and dry theology of the eighteenth century and, more immediately, the appointment of R. D. Hampden as Regius Professor of Divinity in Oxford shaped Pusey’s sense of the dangers of rationalism. Pusey’s concern that rationalism posed an imminent threat to the Church of England was also informed by two periods of extended study in Germany between 1825 and 1827 and his examination of post-reformation German theology.

As Chapter 3 investigates, Pusey’s analysis of the apologetic approach raises broader theological questions about the kind of knowledge which prophecy reveals and how that knowledge is grasped – questions of epistemology and theological anthropology. Pusey describes the knowledge of prophecy and of spiritual things more generally in terms of communion with God or participation in the life or knowledge of God. Religious knowledge has a fundamentally moral character and comes with its own kind of moral trial. Pusey’s repeated criticism of superficial reason and his emphasis on the role of faith over demonstration might suggest that his argument is a pietistic and reactionary rejection of theological liberalism. In order to assess if this criticism of Pusey applies to the ‘Lectures’, it will be necessary to distinguish the different kinds of reason which he describes, and to consider how the soul made in the image of God discerns spiritual things in images and types. We
will see that Pusey’s description of the spiritual faculties offers an account of religious knowledge as the response of the whole person to God, feelings as well as the intellect, the moral sense as well as the mind, awe and wonder as well as careful deliberation.

Pusey’s understanding of type and typical prophecy will be considered in Chapter 4. Since he appeals to the expositions of the Fathers, the way in which Pusey understands their guidance and authority will be discussed here. Contrary to the apologetic approach which isolates or singles out prophecies, Pusey argues that the whole of the Old Testament prophesies Christ, the focus and interpretative centre of all revelation. Pusey challenges views which limit types to those authorized by the New Testament explicitly and argues that such examples of fulfilled prophecy serve as guides which teach the Church how to recognize types more broadly, and to discover the minute character of typical correspondences. In dialogue with his German friend and colleague F. G. A. Tholuck*, Pusey elaborates his understanding of divine intention and the ‘fullest’ sense of prophecy. In addition to the historical or horizontal correspondences between Old Testament types and their New Testament fulfilment, Pusey emphasizes a vertical dimension, the way in which types participate in the reality of the eternal Archetype, the Son of God, in whom all types are fulfilled.12

Elucidating the incarnational, sacramental, and ecclesiastical elements of Pusey’s view of type is the focus of Chapter 5. Pusey understands the Incarnation, the union of Christ with the Church through the sacraments, and a sacramental or typical reading of the Old Testament as parts of the same mystery. For Pusey, types and prophecy not only declare that union with Christ is the goal or fulfilment which the Old Testament prophesies, but reading the Old Testament typically is part of the way by which that sanctifying union is accomplished. Considering Pusey’s argument through the lens of modern-day

12 This idea of the vertical is borrowed from Crouzel 1989, 81: ‘Christian time has both dimensions, the vertical as well as the horizontal’.

*Tholuck, Friedrich August (1790-1877). A friend of Pusey and a German Protestant theologian who was profoundly influenced by the pietists and became a lecturer in Berlin and then professor at Halle from 1826 to his death.
discussions about typology and allegory helps to show why, for Pusey, the typical sense is synonymous with the Christian sense, and typical prophecies offer different levels of meaning which terminate in an eschatological or eternal fulfilment when the sense is most completely filled up or exhausted.

Pusey’s evocative statement that the principles of typology ‘seem to lie in the very Being of God Himself’ suggests the all-encompassing character of his study of types and prophecy. (L152) Chapter 6 will consider how Pusey situates his account of typology within an understanding of creation as an emanation or efflux from the divine unity and redemption as the return of all things to God who made them. Pusey can say that ‘every thing is a type’, if we could see it, because all the works of God bear some stamp or impress of their Creator. The book of God’s works corresponds to the book of God’s words because both are written and spoken by the same Word of God. The multiple meanings of typical things and words are not the fabrications of fanciful interpreters, but the necessary consequence of the web of relationships by which all the offspring of God partake, each in their degree and measure, of the same divine qualities. Even the imperfections of a type point to the perfection which it reveals. Reading the Bible typically, searching for the Archetype Christ in all types, in word and work, is a means by which we share in the longing of the whole creation to return to its Creator and to the ‘Zion of eternal and heavenly blessedness’, an eternal world which is both anticipated and remembered. (L131)

In conclusion, Chapter 7 will consider how the ‘Lectures’ were part of a shared project which both emerged from the High Church tradition and challenged that tradition. Like Pusey, Keble and Newman also described typical or allegorical interpretation as an expression of orthodox belief and criticised rationalistic or evidence-based approaches to religion. Earlier representatives of the High Church tradition had kept alive an understanding of the natural world as symbolic of the spiritual world, and an appreciation of a figurative or allegorical interpretation of the Bible. This tradition also emphasized a holy life, faith, and reserve as necessary components of religious knowledge. However, we will see that many High Church supporters of the
Tractarians were also suspicious of the project embodied in the ‘Lectures’. There was a radicalism in the ideas of Keble, Newman and Pusey, and in the way their appropriation of the Fathers was connected to an understanding of theology very much at odds with the spirit of the age. This radicalism challenged not only self-conscious exponents of the modern system, but also the allies and the heirs of the Oxford Movement, and witnessed to an integrated view of theology and spirituality which many today seek to recover.

1.2 The ‘Lectures’ as a Document

Pusey’s ‘Lectures on Types and Prophecies of the Old Testament’ offer a rich field for study, but have received relatively little attention in academic circles. Only small selections from the ‘Lectures’ are in print, in the articles and books which will be referred to in this thesis. The bound manuscript contains 169 leaves in Pusey’s difficult hand-writing, totalling more than 125,000 words. The first forty pages of the ‘Lectures’ offer a general Introduction or Prolegomenon, giving an overview of the subject and setting forth the principles by which Pusey will proceed. In the last one hundred and thirty pages, Pusey offers a treatment of prophecy according to what he calls a ‘direct Chronological order’, eschewing any questions of the kind he had encountered in Germany about the order of the history or the authorship of the books of the Old Testament: ‘The absolute certainty of their genuineness is given into our hands; and when our Lord has referred us to what is written in Moses, the prophets, and the Psalms concerning Him’. (L41) References in this thesis come from the transcript of the ‘Lectures’ which I have produced, and page numbers in this transcript follow the manuscript. Pusey’s spelling is usually followed, but the punctuation is sometimes changed to conform with generally

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13 The first 124 pages of the manuscript are numbered, but two different pages are annotated ‘42’ (hence 42A and 42B in the transcript) and there is one page interpolated between 124A and 125, numbered 124B in the transcript. Page 40 is out of sequence, and appears to belong after page 57. The unpublished transcript of the greatest part of pp. 1-63, 70-71, and page 91 of the ‘Lectures’ which was produced by the Revd. Michael Silver was a great help to me in becoming familiar with Pusey’s difficult hand-writing and in considering different readings of messy passages. I am also grateful to Ms. Cathy Larsson for assistance in transcribing pages 65-90 of the manuscript.
accepted practice, especially when this makes it easier to understand Pusey’s sense.  

The ‘Lectures’ present both practical and literary challenges to the reader. While in some sections the presentation is polished, in others the manuscript appears incomplete or fragmentary. There are missing sections and pages, and the way in which Pusey interpolates copious notes from the facing page, or crosses out and re-arranges material, occasionally resorting to cutting and pasting, can make the text difficult to follow. This unfinished form contributes to the literary challenges of the ‘Lectures’ and what one writer describes as their ‘awkward and repetitive’ structure, perhaps unsurprising in a text not prepared for the public eye. Pusey seems to have been aware that the ‘Lectures’ needed refinement. Even six years after he delivered them, from July to December, 1842, Pusey wrote a number of letters to his fellow Tractarian Isaac Williams about his ongoing work on the ‘Lectures’. After sending Williams what he had ‘recently written on numbers’ and their typical character, Pusey commented that it seemed ‘disproportioned and out of keeping’ with the rest, and that he was keen to ‘illustrate it further from the Fathers’.

At the same time he was reviewing the ‘Lectures’ as a whole: ‘Partly also I have been reviewing my lectures on types which I do not know how to bring into shape’. Although he continued to draw on the material in sermons and other writing, he never put them in order to publish them.

One particularly helpful aid to understanding the argument and structure of the ‘Lectures’ comes in the form of the detailed lecture notes of Edward Marshall (1815-1899), scholar and fellow of Corpus Christi College. On Pusey’s attendance list, he is the fourth name from the top, recorded as

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14 Abbreviations are given in their full form (e.g. ‘wld.’ becomes ‘would’, ‘OT’ becomes ‘Old Testament’).  
15 Silver (unpublished), 8.  
17 Pusey to Williams, ‘Isaac William Papers’, MS 4475, 257. Williams’ biographer, O. W. Jones, dates this letter to December, 1842. Some of the letter is quoted in Jones 1971, 257 n. 15. Pusey’s comment in the letter that he is reading Williams’ book the Baptistry (1842) ‘with my children and a companion of theirs’ also suggests this date, as do Pusey’s quotations from the same book in the section on numerology.
Marshall describes the 103 pages of his notebook as containing ‘notes and observations taken by the writer at the lectures of Dr. Pusey in 1836-7, as far as possible in the words of the lecturer, without any attempt at reordering them’. The many places where Marshall’s notes follow the exact wording of the manuscript of the lectures suggest that this is an accurate description. Marshall’s original notebook contains his notes for the first fourteen lectures. These divisions and the lecture titles which Marshall gives suggest how Pusey organized almost half the material in the manuscript and how different sections fit together. For example, according to the Marshalls’s notes, the eleventh lecture was a detailed consideration of ‘Quotations from the Fathers in support of the interpretations above given of Genesis III:22’. In this lecture, Pusey considers how patristic interpretation of Genesis 1:26 describing humankind as made in God’s image and likeness illuminates the enigmatic description in Genesis 3:22 of man becoming ‘as one of us’, in some way ‘as’ or ‘like’ God. This arrangement fits with Pusey’s generally chronological approach, since he considered the fall and Genesis chapter three in the tenth lecture. Marshall’s ‘Notes’ show, therefore, that the section entitled ‘Patristic Interpretation of Image and Likeness’ (L139-148) was used out of sequence following the conclusion of the tenth lecture. At the same time, Marshall’s notes imply that this material in some sense stood alone, since after the discussion of image and likeness in the eleventh lecture, Marshall describes ‘Lecture the Twelfth’, as ‘A Continuation of Lecture X’. This suggests how other apparently separate sections in the last half of the manuscript fit with the earlier material. For example, the section entitled ‘Numerology’ (L150-162)

19 M-Obs., preface.
20 It appears that Marshall only took notes of a small portion of what Pusey said, or that Pusey abbreviated his written material very considerably, or some combination of the two. For the eleventh lecture, Marshall’s notes are just more than one-fifth the length of the material. In the fourth lecture, they are more than one-third. Michael Silver’s assessment that Marshall’s text is about one-third the length of Pusey’s for each lecture seems generally accurate (Silver, unpublished).
21 M73-83. ‘And the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil: and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever.’ (Gen. 3.22)
22 M83.
which Pusey discussed with Williams appears to develop Pusey’s brief comments on numerology in the third lecture. (L18)\textsuperscript{23} After ‘Numerology’, a section ‘On Prophecy’ focuses on the typical or prophetic character of the psalms. (L127-137) This appears to develop the principles discussed in the Prolegomenon on the prophetic character of sayings and words. (L19-20, 28)

Marshall’s ‘Notes’ also offer important additional material that is not in the manuscript of the lectures and which sheds light on Pusey’s argument. For example, in what appears to be a question and answer session at the beginning of the fifth lecture, Pusey describes the objective and subjective elements in typical interpretations of Scripture.\textsuperscript{24} Another section of the ‘Notes’ records how Pusey drew on S. T. Coleridge’s *Aids to Reflection* (1825) to illustrate the problem with evidence writing, both supporting Pusey’s criticisms of the apologetic approach and suggesting the importance of Coleridge as a background to the ‘Lectures’.\textsuperscript{25} Finally, Marshall chronicles Pusey’s objections to Augustine’s allegorical method in *On Genesis against the Manichees*. Marshall’s ‘Notes’ help to clarify Pusey’s view of the inter-connection of the different senses of Scripture and how a typical approach to prophecy relates to allegory.

In addition to Marshall’s ‘Notes’, a folder labelled ‘Pusey: Types and Prophecies’ in the Pusey House Library contains supplemental material which belongs with the ‘Lectures’.\textsuperscript{26} These hand-written pages offer a later draft of some sections of the ‘Lectures’ or expand key arguments in the same way that the ten-page section ‘Numerology’ expands the few paragraphs on this subject in the third lecture. These loose pages are separated into a number of discrete portions labelled ‘Book of Nature’, ‘Book of God’s Works’, ‘Emblematic Language’, ‘God’s Countenance’, and the longest, ‘Figurative and Typical

\textsuperscript{23} The tilts of the section headings appear to be in the hand of Pusey’s only son, Philip E. Pusey (1830-1880). This is noted in the ‘Index to Liddon Bound Volumes’, Pusey House.
\textsuperscript{24} M29.
\textsuperscript{25} M53.
\textsuperscript{26} ‘Pusey: Types and Prophecies’ in ‘Pusey Papers: EBP Biblical MSS’.
Language of Holy Scripture’. This material will be drawn on extensively to illustrate the ‘Lectures’, especially in the later chapters of this thesis.

Another source which helps to fill in gaps in the manuscript of Pusey’s lectures is his *Letter to the Bishop of London* (1851), written fifteen years after the ‘Lectures’ were first delivered. In the *Letter*, written in response to the criticisms of his friend William Dodsworth*, Pusey discusses his understanding of absolution, the Eucharist as a propitiatory sacrifice, and the real presence of Christ. As we will see in Chapter 3, he explains the patristic use of the term ‘inebriated’ to describe the effect of the sacrament of the blood of Christ. After stating that he found this word in the ‘fathers of the Church’ to whom the formularies of the Church of England directed him, Pusey writes that ‘it may not be too long a digression to bring forward some part of what I wrote eight years ago on the figurative language of the Old Testament, to which I was led by the duties of my office’. This long quotation of around 4500 words bridges a gap in the section ‘On Prophecy’. If they are accurate, Pusey’s words that he wrote these pages ‘eight years ago’ suggest that he wrote or revised this section of the ‘Lectures’ in 1842 or 1843 when he was also working on the section ‘Numerology’.

Finally, Pusey’s Tracts, ‘Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism’, are in many ways companion pieces to the ‘Lectures’ and both anticipate and illustrate the arguments which Pusey makes there. The first part of this study, Tract 67,

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27 This material comprises forty-five pages (including facing pages with references), or approximately 15,000 words, about 12% the length of the ‘Lectures’. The labels to these sections were given by C. Stephen Finley, Professor of English, Haverford College, who read this material in June 1991. Although some pages clearly belong together, others appear to be individual sheets. Moreover, the sections into which they are currently divided may not reflect the proper order or division of the material. They will be referred to with abbreviations as noted in the front-matter. The page numbers follow the order in which they were found. I am grateful to Ms. Cathy Larsson for assistance with transcribing the bulk of the supplemental material.

28 *Dodsworth, William (1798-1861). From 1837 the perpetual curate of Christchurch, Albany St., London, he worked with Pusey to found the Park Village Sisterhood. Dodsworth’s description of Pusey’s views led the Bp of London in his Nov. 1850 charge to his clergy to express concerns about the Tractarians’ influence. See Life 297.*

29 Pusey 1851, 194.

30 The gap is between L135 and 136. When the missing portion is quoted from the *Letter*, it will take the form (L136:214). The first number refers to the page in the ‘Lectures’ where the missing section concludes, the second number is the page in Pusey 1851.
‘Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism’, was published on St Bartholomew’s Day, 24 August, 1835. The second and third parts, Tract 68 and Tract 69, followed in the autumn, on Michaelmas Day, 29 September, and St Luke’s Day, 18 October. These three tracts were published together with a preface by Pusey, dated 1 January, 1836, the Feast of the Circumcision of Christ, as the second part of the then completed Volume II of the Tracts for the Times. The Tracts are important in the history of the Oxford Movement as well as for how they illustrate the ‘Lectures’. In August, 1835, Newman had intended Pusey’s anticipated Tracts, with perhaps one or two more, to conclude the Tracts for the Times. Instead, Pusey’s substantial tracts virtually re-launched the Tracts for the Times and initiated a new approach with longer and more substantial pieces.\(^{31}\)

Like the ‘Lectures’, the Tracts on Holy Baptism attempted to bring to light the assumptions which made patristic interpretations of Scripture seem fanciful. In them, Pusey argues that a lack of an appreciation of the sacrament of Holy Baptism betrays an incipient and dangerous rationalism. To counter this view, he brings forward especially the types and typical interpretations which the early Church offered on this subject, and seeks to discern the principles inherent in these interpretations. The Tracts provided Pusey with material for his preparation of the ‘Lectures’ a year later and for his efforts to show that ‘our mode of understanding any passage of Holy Scripture is not to be considered as something insulated: resulting, as it does, from our general frame of mind, our habits of thought and feeling, and the character of our religious belief’.\(^ {32}\) In the same way that the first edition of his work on baptism was a kind of preface to the ‘Lectures’, the ideas he developed in the ‘Lectures’ flowed into the later editions of Tract 67, which he expanded from forty-nine pages to four hundred in the second edition of 1839.\(^ {33}\) While these later editions do not offer the same comprehensive approach by which Pusey brings

\(^{31}\) Life, 324.

\(^{32}\) Scr.HB., 30-31.

\(^{33}\) The second edition of Tract 67 was virtually identical with the fourth edition which was published in 1842 (T67rev.). Second editions of Tracts 68-70 were never published. However, some material from Tracts 68-70 and the Appendix, with the exception of much of the material about the seriousness of post-baptismal sin, was incorporated into T67rev.
together cosmology, anthropology, epistemology, and typology in the ‘Lectures’, one finds in the Tracts elements of the same argument which seeks to perceive in the ‘harmony of Holy Scripture’ a system which is ‘analogous to His scheme of Creation, in which the lowest things bear a certain relation to the highest’. Pusey’s summary of the ‘system of the Ancient Church’ in the fourth edition of Tract 67 suggests the comprehensive character of his argument in the ‘Lectures’:

In the view of the ancient Church, no event recorded in Holy Scripture stands insulated and alone. All have bearings every way; all belong to a vast system of which we have some glimpses, which we cannot construct as a whole, nor, consequently, tell all the bearings of the several parts: yet, by reason of this oneness of the whole system, all its parts, as being parts of one, have some relation to each other, and we, she believed, have principles enough given us, to enable us to understand and interpret some of these relations. But, chiefly, they all bear, she was persuaded, in some way upon Him, the Sun and centre of the system, our Incarnate LORD; and so again, the events of His history gleam with His own effulgence upon His body, the Church.

The ‘principles enough’ which Pusey evokes and their place in his comprehensive theology and theory of type will be the subject of the chapters which follow.

34 T67rev., 389
35 T67rev., 272.
Chapter 2 The Apologetic Approach and Rationalism

2.1 ‘The Spirit of the Age’

The ‘Lectures on Types and Prophecy in the Old Testament’ do not begin with a direct discussion of types or typical prophecy. Rather, in the prolegomenon of the ‘Lectures’, Pusey examines what he calls the ‘apologetic use’ or the ‘modern treatment’ of prophecy. Pusey specifies the problem in his introduction to the first lecture:

The modern systems of interpretation are attended with many disadvantages … our views of Prophecy have been much narrowed by the Apologetic character of our Theology and this is not so much the fault of the writers themselves as of the Laws of Interpretation which they have adopted in accordance with the Spirit of the Age.

The emphasis on prophecy as prediction, and the goal of using prophecy as a form of evidence to convince outsiders leads to a focus on the form of prophecy and the neglect of its content or substance. Pusey suggests that, paradoxically, a treatment of prophecy which is meant to establish its veracity undermines the capacity of readers or seekers to see what prophecy reveals. Pusey follows S. T. Coleridge in drawing attention to William Paley* as the representative of the confusions and dangers of this approach. This chapter will investigate Pusey’s analysis of the ‘Apologetic character’ of theology in his day in order to show how this assessment contributes to his view that a typical reading of prophecy is necessary, both as an expression of doctrine and as a spiritual discipline. Pusey not only criticizes an exegetical technique but seeks to expose the way in which rationalistic and empiricist principles have distorted the study of prophecy and theology more generally.

Pusey’s writing from the same period in which he wrote the ‘Lectures’ illuminates both the basic principles and the nuances of Pusey’s argument. In addition to his Tracts, ‘Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism’, more helpful still

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1 L4, 35; L7. The ‘modern way’ (L4), or, more pejoratively still, ‘modern unbelief’. L36.
2 M2-3.
3 *Paley, William (1743-1805). Fellow at Christ’s College, Cambridge from 1766 until he took up a parish post in the diocese of Carlisle in 1776.
are the pamphlets which Pusey wrote in response to the appointment of Renn Dickson Hampden to the post of Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford in February, 1836. Hampden’s appointment raised an uproar in Oxford, focusing on his 1832 Bampton Lectures, and resulting in the production of ‘upwards of forty-five books and pamphlets’. Many in Oxford opposed Hampden’s views so strongly that in May of that year Convocation, which did not have the authority to revoke the appointment, nonetheless censured Hampden by a vote of 474 to 94, depriving him of the right to sit on those boards which chose select preachers and evaluated questions of doctrine on behalf of the university.

Pusey took a leading role first in challenging Hampden’s appointment and then in describing and publicising what he saw to be the serious errors and dangers of Hampden’s opinions. The most significant of these in terms of complementing the argument of the ‘Lectures’ is Pusey’s pamphlet, Dr. Hampden’s Theological Statements and The Thirty-Nine Articles Compared, which he published in March, just a few months before he began to prepare the ‘Lectures’. A fortnight later, Pusey published a second pamphlet, Dr. Hampden’s Past and Present Statements Compared: A Sequel to ‘Dr. Hampden’s Theological Statements and the XXXIX Articles compared’. There Pusey examines the way in which Hampden responded to his critics in his inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of Divinity on 17 March, 1836. In addition, Pusey was probably the author of the Declaration protesting against Hampden’s appointment signed by a group of eighty resident members of Convocation (including Pusey) and of the Report which was published with it. These writings illuminate important ideas which Pusey sketches without developing in the ‘Lectures’ and suggest how they connect to broader theological and philosophical matters.

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4 Sch.Phil. and Richard Brent, ‘Hampden, Renn Dickson (1793–1868)’, ODNB.
5 Brent, ‘Hampden’, ODNB and Life, 386. See Nockles 1997, 222-29 on the Hampden controversy, 229-31 on ‘doubts about Hampden’s orthodoxy’.
6 While the Declaration and Report do not indicate which of the signatories is their author, Liddon says that they ‘betray Pusey’s hand’ (Life, 372). The way in which the Report repeats Pusey’s assessment of Johann Semler’s role in the propagation of rationalism as Pusey describes it both in the Theology of Germany and in the pamphlets which he authored during the controversy supports Liddon’s judgement.
2.2 The Context of Crisis: ‘The contest of faith and unbelief’

2.2.1 The ‘Sæculum tepidum’

The arguments of the ‘Lectures’ were forged in a context of crisis and controversy. The reader of the ‘Lectures’ quickly becomes aware of Pusey’s sense of urgency. He begins by reminding his listeners about the perils even of theological study and what is ‘to be feared … from the history of a neighbouring country’. The reference to Germany, where Pusey studied the rise of unbelief, is a warning in itself. His hope that ‘no evil’ will come from the ‘Lectures’ makes it clear that he is not simply addressing controversial academic questions. The Tractarians’ assessment of the religious life of the previous century as one which was characterized by cold formalism and moralistic or latitudinarian teaching is well known. Liddon argues that the Oxford Movement, like the Evangelical revival ‘was provoked by the prevalence of a latitudinarian theology in the last century, and by a dry and cold preaching of morality, often only of natural morality, which left out of view, or, at least, failed to assign its rightful place to the Person and Work of our Divine Redeemer’. In his book, Ethos and the Oxford Movement, James Pereiro describes the way in which this standard early assessment of the Movement amongst supporters came to be questioned and revised by those who emphasize the continuity between the old High Church party and the Tractarians. For example, Peter Nockles, in The Oxford Movement in Context, affirms that the Tractarians exaggerated both the unspiritual or moralistic elements of Georgian religion, and the supposed High Church neglect of basic catholic principles such as apostolic succession, the role of tradition in interpreting Scripture, and the sacramental life. Despite the exaggeration he attributes to them, Nockles nonetheless supports the Tractarian assessment that an emphasis on intellectual religion characterized the religious life of the previous century: ‘Hanoverian Anglican apologetic, as set forth by Warburton’

7 M1.
8 Life, 254.
and Paley, was an emphasis on the reasonableness of Christianity, and an exaltation of the claims of human reason and intellect in the discernment of divine truth." For many in England, the excesses of the French Revolution reinforced the dangers of expressing any kind of belief, religious or political, with too much enthusiasm. This meant that Tractarian criticisms of the ‘High and Dry’ school were especially pertinent in the first three decades of the nineteenth century.\footnote{Ibid. 201. See also Nockles 1997, 197-201, for a sketch of religious life in Oxford in decades preceding the Oxford Movement.}

Pereiro argues that studies of the period tend to focus on the accuracy of these different assessments, on ‘evidence for vitality or decline in the Anglican Church during the pre-Tractarian period’, rather than on contemporary perceptions of the need for reform. He demonstrates that when the state of the Church of England was described by Pusey’s contemporaries, ‘the language of crisis and decline was widespread’, whatever the fairness or validity of such opinions. Both Evangelicals and High Churchman criticized ‘the doctrinal heterodoxy of Latitudinarian and dry Arminian orthodoxy, and professed the need for reform’.\footnote{Warburton, William (1698-1779). Bp of Gloucester from 1759, known especially for his dislike of Methodist enthusiasm.}

In his study of the Victorian Church, Owen Chadwick describes the sense of crisis from a more political perspective. Government action which directly or indirectly affected the Church of England, whether pertaining to Roman Catholic Emancipation (1829), the first Reform Act (1832), the reorganization of the Church in Ireland (1833), and other proposed legislation, meant that many believed the Church of England was under attack by a Parliament which was forgetting its religious vocation. Describing the aftermath of the suppression of ten bishoprics in Ireland, Chadwick writes: ‘Without consulting church authorities a government which leaned on Catholic and dissenting votes abolished bishoprics and arranged endowments. What might such a

\footnote{Ibid. 196-7. Liddon uses ‘high and dry’ to describe Pusey’s assessment of a weakness in the High Church party. \textit{Life}, 164.}

\footnote{Pereiro 2008, 47-48, 48, 49. See Pereiro pp. 49-52 for examples of this sense of crisis.}
government do to the Church of England?’\textsuperscript{14} Keble’s Assize sermon displays this grave concern: ‘if it be true anywhere, that such enactments are forced upon the Legislature by public opinion, is APOSTASY too hard a word to describe the temper of that nation?’\textsuperscript{15} Newman’s view that Keble’s sermon was ‘the start of the religious movement of 1833’ also suggests the importance of the context of crisis and the sense of imminent danger for the ‘Lectures’.\textsuperscript{16}

The ‘Lectures’ are part of what Pusey describes in his \textit{Theology of Germany} as ‘the vast contest, which … forms the only and deepest theme of the history of the world and of man, the contest of faith and unbelief’.\textsuperscript{17} As we will see below, Pusey argues that his ‘over-practical, over-reasoning age’ displays a ‘dry, hard way’ and a ‘Pharisaic and Sadducaic spirit’ in religion and theology, encouraging in its representatives an idolatrous spirit and ‘the disposition … of the unbeliever’. (L37, 117, 38, 5). A decade later, Pusey expressed succinctly this sense of crisis, describing ‘the last dreary century’ as a ‘Sæculum tepidum’ characterized by ‘lukewarmness of life and degeneracy of faith’ and as a time when Christian truth was confounded by ‘a dry and stiff system which existed among us’.\textsuperscript{18} In the ‘Lectures’ Pusey finds in commonly held views about the interpretation of the Old Testament signs of this confusion and degeneracy, and he attempts to wake up his compatriots to dangers of which, in his view, they were not aware.

\textbf{2.2.2 The ‘philosophy of Rationalism’}

When Pusey criticizes the apologetic use of prophecy, he criticizes what he sees as elements of the system of rationalism, ‘the assumption that uncontrolled human reason in its present degraded form is the primary

\textsuperscript{14} Chadwick 1966, 60. See also Chapter 1, ‘Church in Danger’, 7-100, especially 57, 60, 64.
\textsuperscript{15} Keble 1833, 16, see also 8-11, 18-19. ‘National Apostasy’ was preached in the University Church on 14 July 1833.
\textsuperscript{16} Newman 1967, 41 and \textit{Life}, 276. Peter Nockles dates the beginning of the Movement to the rejection in 1829 of Sir Robert Peel as the MP representing the University of Oxford over his support or acquiescence in the government’s bill for Roman Catholic emancipation. See Nockles 1997, 202.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{TG-I}, 5.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{PS-I} vi, vii. The preface is dated ‘Christ Church, \textit{Lent}, 1848’. Similarly, ‘the eighteenth century was comparatively a stagnant period of the Church’. \textit{T67rev.}, 16.
interpreter of God's Word'. Pusey viewed the influence of this principle as pervasive and destructive in his day:

Our daily habits, our philosophy, our morals, our politics, our theories of education, or national improvement, are founded upon a low and carnal basis, and are at direct variance with the principles of the faith: one must give way; a more vivid faith must penetrate our social, domestic, intellectual system, or it must itself be stifled.

In his contribution to Essays and Reviews (1860), ‘Tendencies of Religious Thought in England, 1688-1750’, Pusey’s disaffected former colleague Mark Pattison* offers a similar assessment of the ubiquitous influence of rationalism at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Describing the course of English theology from ‘the Revolution of 1688’ to ‘the commencement of the Tracts for the Times’, Pattison argues that ‘throughout all discussions, underneath all controversies, and common to all parties, lies the assumption of the supremacy of reason in matters of religion’. In the years leading up to 1836 Pusey perceived a growing rather than waning influence of rationalism in Oxford. From the time Pusey won a fellowship at Oriel College in 1823, he was closely associated with the group of Oriel dons who came to be called ‘Noetics’ from their emphasis on ‘exactness in thought’ and the reasonableness of Christianity. The early representatives of the Noetics, including John Davison*, the author of the Discourses on Prophecy (1824) which will be discussed below, Edward Copleston*, provost of Oriel, and Edward Hawkins*, his successor, were considered to be defenders of orthodox Christianity against latitudinarianism and Socinianism in the 1820s. However, by the 1830s,

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19 Report.
20 Scr.HB., ix.
21 *Pattison, Mark (1813-1884). Matriculated at Oriel in 1832, fellow of Lincoln College from 1839 and rector from 1861. In 1838 he lived in the house on St Aldate’s which Pusey had taken for young men assisting with the Library of the Fathers. See Life, ii, 139.
22 Pattison 1861, 259, 257. For a contemporary assessment supporting this view, see Dyson 1982, 53.
*Davison, John (1777-1834). A fellow of Oriel College from 1800, he was a tutor from 1810-17, during which time he was the tutor of R. D. Hampden. Davison was both associated with the Noetics and admired by John Henry Newman. W. G. Blaikie, ‘Davison, John (1777–1834)’, rev. Richard Brent, in ODNB.
Pusey along with Keble and Newman, came to see the frame of mind encouraged by Noetics such as Richard Whately*, Thomas Arnold*, and R. D. Hampden himself, as representing ‘the tendency of undisciplined intellect to different forms of unbelief or misbelief, to exalt self by modifying what God has given’.25

The appointment of Hampden as Regius Professor of Divinity confirmed Pusey’s fears about the increasing prominence of rationalistic and heterodox views in the University. For Pusey, Hampden’s appointment meant that the same rationalism ‘which, after corrupting all soundness of Christianity in other countries, has at length appeared among us, and for the first time been invested with authority in the University of Oxford’. The Report which supported the Declaration protesting against Hampden’s appointment describes the controversy as ‘not so much concerned with an individual or a book, or even an ordinary system of false doctrine, as with a Principle’, i.e. ‘the philosophy of Rationalism’. Hampden’s appointment was so serious because it tacitly approved this philosophy: ‘It is the Theory of Rationalism, (as set forth systematically in the Bampton Lectures of 1832, and still more recently in Lectures addressed to Students,) which is to be considered the root of all the errors of Dr. Hampden’s system.’26 For Pusey, rationalism combines a confidence in autonomous reason with the empiricist view that knowledge is limited to the experience of the senses and reflection upon it. Newman shared Pusey’s concerns. Newman offered the same assessment that year in Tract 73, ‘On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Religion’ (1836), criticising ‘its love of systematizing, and its basing its system upon personal

*Hawkins, Edward (1789–1882). Chosen over John Keble to be the Provost of Oriel in 1828 with the support of Pusey and Newman, which support they later regretted. As will be discussed below, Hawkins’ 1818 sermon, ‘A Dissertation upon the Use and Importance of Unauthoritative Tradition’ influenced Pusey’s argument in the ‘Lectures’.
*Whately, Richard (1787-1863). Fellow at Oriel from 1811, Anglican Abp of Dublin from 1831.
*Arnold, Thomas (1795-1845). Fellow at Oriel from 1815-9, and from 1829 Headmaster of Rugby.
26 Rep.
experience, on the evidence of sense’. Although Pusey does not use the term ‘Rationalism’ once in the ‘Lectures’, the general concern with rationalism in High Church and Tractarian circles means that he did not need to name the elephant in the room. We will see that Pusey finds the characteristics he assigns to rationalism at the root of the errors of the apologetic treatment of prophecy: a belief in the possibility of establishing the reliability of prophecy by reason alone, the treatment of prophecy as a kind of evidence, and especially what Pusey calls the ‘superficial rationalizing character’ of an approach which will only accept what can be demonstrably proven. (L9)

2.2.3 German ‘Orthodoxism’ as a Warning to England

Pusey’s view of the dangers of the age and the threat posed by rationalism was profoundly shaped by his two extended trips to Germany in 1825 and 1826, and by his extensive study of post-Reformation German theology. In Göttingen, Pusey studied with J. G. Eichhorn (1752-1827), Professor of Oriental Languages from 1788 to 1827 and one of the most influential representatives of the new criticism in Germany at that time. In Berlin he met and developed an acquaintance with the philosopher and theologian Frederich Schleiermacher (1768-1834). He also renewed his friendship with the more conservative pietistic theologian Friedrich A. Tholuck, and studied with the ecclesiastical historian Johann Neander (1780-1850). Pusey published the fruit of his study of German theology as An Historical Enquiry into the causes of the Rationalistic Character Lately Predominant in the Theology of Germany (1828). While the book was generally well received in Germany, it caused controversy in England due to Pusey’s allowance for slight historical errors in Scripture and his implied criticism of the influential High Churchman Hugh James Rose. Rose* had emphasized the importance of the episcopate and subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles in maintaining orthodox belief in

27 Newman, 1839b, 2.
28 This quotation describes the ‘school of Antioch’, which Pusey describes as ‘the natural birthplace of Nestorianism, the receptacle of Pelagianism’, and as the only precedent for the apologetic use or system in the ancient Church.
29 For an account of Pusey’s German studies, see Life, 70-114.
30 TG-I.
England in *The state of the Protestant religion in Germany* (1825), a view that did not accord with Pusey’s thesis.\(^1\) To respond to criticism and clarify his argument, Pusey wrote and published in 1830 a second and longer Part II of the *Theology of Germany*.\(^2\) Together, these books constitute an in-depth and detailed study of German theology and philosophy from the end of the sixteenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Echoing the more predictable accolades of Liddon, Stephen Neil describes Pusey’s work as ‘a most remarkable production to have come from the pen of a young man of twenty-seven’ and comments that he ‘must have been possessed of amazing powers of concentration to have attained in so short a time to such a mastery of the history of German theology since the Reformation’.\(^3\)

The English audience which Pusey addressed in the *Theology of Germany* may have imagined the rise of rationalism in Germany to be the result of polemical attacks on Christian doctrine or life, some kind of equivalent of the deist controversy in England. Those aware of the rise of critical studies in Germany may have expected Pusey to focus on challenges to Old Testament history or the denial of miracles by some German scholars. Pusey’s analysis is both more subtle and, from the perspective of the English Church, more unsettling. Drawing on the ideas of Neander and Tholuck, Pusey argued that one of the principal causes of the rise of rationalism in Germany was a ‘dead orthodoxy’, a defective orthodoxy which treats Christianity as ‘a sum of credenda’.\(^4\) This ‘abstract and unpractical system’ presents the truths of Christianity ‘in a dry dialectic form, destructive of their life and

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\(^1\) Rose, Hugh James (1795-1838). In 1832 he founded the *British Magazine*, which promoted High Church ideas and writers. In 1833 he hosted a meeting in Hadleigh, Suffolk where the project which became the *Tracts for the Times* was proposed. That same year he became Divinity Professor at Durham, and in 1836 Principal of King’s College, London.

\(^2\) *TG*-II.

\(^3\) Neil 1964, 10-11. See also *Life*, 155-9.

\(^4\) *TG*-I, 42, 119. For Neander and Tholuck, see *Life*, 154, 160-2. Orthodoxy is a technical term for Pusey. The *OED* defines orthodoxy to mean, ‘The quality of being orthodox; orthodoxy’, or, in a negative sense, ‘the treating of orthodoxy of creed or doctrine as the important feature of religion; unquestioning adherence to orthodoxy’. Although Pusey is quoted to illustrate this definition, the sense in which he uses the word in the *Theology of Germany* is different from the *OED*. It is not ‘unquestioning adherence to orthodoxy’ which characterizes ‘orthodoxyism’ for Pusey, but rather it is a rigid over-emphasis on the intellect and the neglect of both feeling and moral sensibility.
influence’.  Orthodoxy ‘substitutes a barren intellectual adherence to certain truths, or certain modes of stating those truths … for the effects which those truths were intended to produce upon the heart and life’. Pusey traces the rise of orthodoxy to the way in which the Formula of Concord of 1577 was received by the Lutheran Church in Germany. According to Pusey, the ‘enforcement of the letter’ of the Formula led to ‘the establishment of mere Scholastic opinion as articles of faith, the substitution of human technicalities for the free spirit of the Gospel, a logical formalism for the Scriptural and living expression of revealed truth’. While ‘Orthodoxy’ still assents to orthodox belief, this ‘spurious orthodoxy or formularism’ is a more serious problem even than explicit unbelief: ‘unbelief is more reclaimable than a dead and contented orthodoxy’. The argument that rationalism grew through the development of the inherent tendencies of ‘orthodoxy’, a kind of proceeding ‘onward in the groove’, distinguished Pusey’s analysis from that offered by Rose.

The Theology of Germany was not a disinterested study of the problems of another place: ‘The experience furnished by Evangelical Germany is to us as the biography of an individual to one of similar character, temperament, and circumstances.’ Pusey’s analysis of German theology and orthodoxy lies behind his criticism of an evidence-based approach to prophecy in the ‘Lectures’. The rigid insistence that prophecy must conform to analytic categories and serve as evidence is also a ‘dry dialectic system’. Looking back on the situation in Germany almost thirty years after his trips there, Pusey wrote:

I could not but see some things in England which corresponded in their degree to that former condition of Germany. I could not help owning a certain stiffness among some who maintained what I believed to be the

35 TG-I, 119. See also pp. 134-135.
36 TG-II, 392.
37 TG-I, 20, 21. See also Dyson 1982, 47, for A. O. Dyson’s portrayal of the ‘wastes of a narrow, smug, and sterile Aristotelian scholasticism’ in Germany at this time.
38 TG-II, 392, TG-I, 80 n. 2.
39 TG-I, 23. Forrester discusses the difference between Pusey’s analysis and that offered by Rose. Forrester 1989, 211-16. For German criticisms of Rose, see Life, 151-2.
40 TG-I, 2.
truth; one-sidedness in those who corresponded with the pietists … Being only twenty-seven (and as yet a layman) when I wrote my ‘Enquiry’ into the causes of German Rationalism, I did not venture to speak more plainly. I hoped that the picture might speak for itself to the hearts and minds of those whom I wished to see awakened to threatened danger.41

In the same way that defects in the way that Christian faith was held or expressed contributed more to the rise of rationalism in Germany than direct attacks on Christian principles, Pusey was concerned that the defects of the apologetic approach to theology in England would have a similar corrosive effect. It was his sense of this imminent danger – ‘This will all come upon us in England’ – which led him to devote himself ‘more earnestly to the Old Testament, as the field in which Rationalism seemed to be most successful’.42

2.2.4 The Spectre of Socinianism

The destination to which rationalism tended, and the form of explicit unbelief which the Tractarians believed threatened the Church of England, was Socinianism. The appeal of Socinianism was an important factor in the sense of crisis and urgency which helped to inspire Pusey’s approach in the ‘Lectures’. Newman concludes Tract 73 by arguing that rationalism, in principle, ‘tends to Socinianism’, however ‘individual supporters of it will act’.43 This is a view which Pusey shares and which is an important background to the ‘Lectures’. Socinianism was virtually a synonym for what would now be called Unitarianism. When Pusey or his contemporaries invoked the perils of Socinianism, they referred to a loose family of rationalist and anti-dogmatic ideas which trace their roots back to the sixteenth century founders of this school, Lelio Sozini (1525-62) and his nephew Fausto Sozini (1539-1604). In his discussion of the origins of Socinianism and its influence in England,

41 Pusey 1854, 54. For Pusey’s assessment of the defects of German pietism as superficiality and hypocrisy, and their contribution to the rise of rationalism, see TG-I, 101-104, 109-10. He describes this danger in the ‘Lectures’, arguing that those who, ‘in some degree’, have lost their faith, ‘must beware how they take it up in their mouth, simply because they are convinced that it ought to be in the heart. For this forced re-assumption of it, will be unreal and hollow and is but self-deceit’. (L42B) For Pusey’s criticism of some English evangelicals as those ‘who corresponded with the pietists’, see Life, 164 and 254-6.
42 Life, 77.
43 Newman 1839b, 53.
Stephen Hampton describes its character as a form of rationalism: ‘Since the Socinians held reason to be the arbiter of all human thought, they rejected all doctrine that did not seem to square with either human reason or natural ethics.’ For them, Christ was an exalted and anointed man who could be called God only in an honorific way. Socinians rejected the doctrine of the Trinity, original sin, the Atonement, the need for infant baptism, and that the sacraments conferred grace. When Pusey and his contemporaries evoked Socinianism, they described not so much a strict system as a general or implied adherence to some combination of these tenets. They believed that some form of Socinianism was the inevitable result of rationalism.

The spectre of Socinianism took a personal form for Pusey and his colleagues. In January, 1835, Blanco White*, a man who was once a close associate of Newman and Pusey, converted to Socinianism. For Pusey, Blanco White’s apostasy displays the logical outcome of Hampden’s ideas: ‘by comparing the teaching of a frank Unitarian with that of Hampden, liberalism could be shown up for the crypto-Socinianism that it was’. Evoking the example of White, ‘who of late used the same language, and now is an avowed Socinian’, Pusey comments that ‘it is fearful to think what may be the result’ of Hampden’s views. Perhaps Pusey’s most serious charge against Hampden is that his work contains ‘the major and minor premiss of Socinianism’. In Tract 69, part three of ‘Scriptural Views on Holy Baptism’, Pusey takes pains to show that what he sees as the anti-sacramental and rationalistic views of the reformed or Calvinistic schools had historical and theological roots in Socinianism. He describes Socinianism as ‘the deadly, stupefying heresy’,

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45 White, Joseph Blanco (1775-1841). A former Roman Catholic priest who entered the Church of England and became an associate of both the Noetics and the Tractarians.
46 Thomas 1991, 81. This describes Stephen Thomas’ assessment of Newman’s response of Blanco White’s conversion (see pp. 80-87). See also Life, 313. On Socinianism as ‘a particularly potent force in English theology’ in Pusey’s day, see Hedley 1996, 242.
47 DrH, vi. For Newman’s similar assessment, see his letter to Hampden, 28 Nov. 1835 , in Life, 302. See also Pusey to W. E. Gladstone, April 25, 1834, in Life, 294.
48 Scr.HB., 143, 281-295.
and argues that it is the power of unavowed Socinian principles among his fellow Churchman which secured the acceptance of impoverished views of baptism, views which deny that baptism conveys an ‘actual gift from above’ and incorporation into Christ.\(^\text{50}\) When Pusey prepared the ‘Lectures’ the possibility that the tenets of Socinianism could corrupt the faith of the Church of England seemed to him a real threat. In the arguments of those who he criticizes in the ‘Lectures’, Pusey finds elements, more or less explicit, of a faith-destroying rationalism and the seeds of Socinianism.

2.3 The Apologetic Approach

2.3.1 Prophecy as Prediction

Pusey begins the ‘Lectures’ by identifying a problem which displays ‘the Spirit of the Age’: ‘The notion and uses of prophecy have, in these latter days, been much narrowed and obscured by the apologetic character which our theology has so largely assumed.’ (L1) The emphasis on prophecy as foretelling or prediction is one of the features of this narrow approach. Pusey acknowledges that prophecy includes the office of displaying divine foreknowledge and so revealing some aspect of God’s dispensation as yet unfulfilled; prophecy is ‘a signification of some future dispensation of God, whether in word or in act’. (L33). However, by over-emphasizing this function of prophecy, modern authors have created confusion about the nature and purpose of prophecy:

The fact is, of course, true, that prophecies were miracles of the Divine wisdom: the objection to this mode of handling them lies rather in its exclusiveness. For first it limited prophecy to the office of ‘foretelling,’ abstracted from the subject foretold. The object was to show a more than human prescience: and for this purpose, it was indifferent, what was the subject. A prediction which related to Pagan Rome or the discovery of America, was, in this point of view, as much a prediction, as one relating to the Redeemer of the world. (L1)

Pusey argues that exaggerating the role of prophecy as foretelling makes the mere fact that something was predicted correctly seem more significant than what is predicted; it emphasizes form over content. Echoing Pusey’s criticism,

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\(^{50}\) Scr.HB., 193. See also pp. 47-8.
Pattison writes: ‘The orthodox school no longer dared to scrutinize the contents of revelation.’

Pusey maintains that what prophecy reveals is as significant as the miracle of prediction: ‘It is remarkable accordingly how in Holy Scripture, other feelings are, throughout prophecy, enlisted, beyond and above contemplation of Divine fore-knowledge … Not time, but the eternal truth contained, is the subject which is alleged’. (L6) Pusey argues that the Bible presents the prophet as one who sees or interprets God’s will:

In like manner, the words principally used in the Old Testament for the most part declare, that what was uttered was the word of God, dēbar [of the LORD], nēʿūm [of the LORD], maššāʾ, or the mode in which it was conveyed to the human organ, and perhaps also its certainty, as a thing actually seen ḥzwn [vision], marēʾeh [appearance, likeness] … while there is no simple word which conveys our notion of ‘prediction’. And so, in this way also, if we follow the guidance of the very words of Holy Scripture, our minds will be principally directed to the religious instruction and impressiveness, rather than to the direct evidence furnished by prophecy. (L33-34)

The Old Testament does foretell in the sense that it shows what will be more fully revealed later. However, our attention is directed primarily to ‘the religious instruction and impressiveness’ which the prophet receives and declares:

In this view of prophecy also we must keep in mind that its predictive character is not marked out as its main function; it is doubtless one part of God’s plan that salvation through Christ should be declared ‘beforehand’ by the mouths of ‘all his holy prophets, which have been since the world began’; and since it was so, we accept its predictiveness as part of God’s goodness, and not to them only to whom it was given but to us also to whom it is continued; but equally essential is that other part of its office, ‘declaration of God’s purpose and will’ indeed the words προφητεύω, προφητής, not in their original Heathen signification only, but in their actual use in the New Testament, relates to the ‘declaration of the will of God to man’ generally not simply to the fact of ‘declaring His passion beforehand’. (L33)

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51 Pattison 1861, 261.
52 The SBL style guide for the transliteration of Hebrew has been followed as closely as Pusey’s text allows. Vocalizations are included when Pusey has them, and simple consonantal transliteration has been used when he does not.
Since the predictive element of prophecy is part of God’s gift, it is not to be
neglected. However, while Pusey describes the office of the ‘declaration of
God’s purpose and will’ as only ‘equally essential’ to the office of foretelling,
his argument taken as a whole makes it clear that the office of declaration or
revelation is the more important purpose of prophecy: ‘the highest character of
prophecy is the “relation of those things which before lay hid in God”’. (L33)

2.3.2 The Substance of Prophecy and Historical Interpretation

Pusey looks at how the New Testament describes the prophetic witness of the
Old to argue that prophecy reveals ‘eternal truth’, the things which pertain to
God and to the divine ordering of things:

The Old Testament, as cited in the New, might mostly, for the purposes
for which it is alleged, have been a contemporary document. When time
is alluded to, it is not to magnify God's prescience, but to illustrate the
harmony and unity of His dispensations. Who is ‘the same yesterday and
today and forever’ and as ‘in time past’ He ‘at sundry times and in divers
manners spake unto the fathers through the prophets,’ so ‘in these last
days hath He by His Son spoken unto us’ one and the same Truth. It [is]
the substance which is dwelt upon not the mode of its delivery. (L6)

This quotation and Pusey’s reference to Hebrews 1:1, to God who ‘at sundry
times and in divers manners spake unto the fathers through the prophets’,
offers a good example of how Pusey sees his criticism of the apologetic
approach to be connected with more general and serious problems. Months
before he made these observations, he had challenged Hampden’s
interpretation of the same passage. The problem with Hampden’s approach was
that it elevates questions about the circumstances in which the message was
given from the ‘substance’. Hampden had emphasized the importance of
studying ‘the facts recorded in the Scripture in their real historical place’.53 He
argued that philosophical or doctrinal presuppositions led the ‘schoolmen’ to
read meanings into the words of the Bible that are not there:

When a Theology of this à priori character was established, it nullified
the use of the Scripture as a record of the divine dealings with the
successive generations of mankind. The voice of God was no longer

53 Sch.Phil., 90.
heard as it spoke ‘in sundry times and in divers manners’ to holy men of old; but simply as the hallowed symbols of an oracular wisdom. The whole of Revelation was treated as one contemporaneous production; of which the several parts might be expounded, without reference to the circumstances in which each was delivered.\(^{54}\) Perhaps with some irony, Pusey argues on the basis of context that the words ‘in sundry times and in divers manners’ (Heb. 1:1) do more than direct our attention to the different circumstances and times in which the prophets spoke. Rather, he maintains that St Paul’s words offer ‘an argument against the à priori notions of the Jews, as if God must reveal himself uniformly’ as well as contrasting ‘the dignity of this last revelation through His Son, with His former discoveries of Himself through the Prophets’. ‘But’, Pusey continues, ‘assuredly they do not convey a notion of a difference in the substance of revelation’.\(^{55}\) This is the same way he presents the passage in the ‘Lectures’, emphasizing that the Son has spoken ‘one and the same Truth’ as the Prophets.

Pusey’s analysis of Hampden’s view of historical interpretation shows how his criticism of the apologetic school is connected to the defects he saw in German scholarship:

On the theory, however, of an ‘historical interpretation,’ wherein passages are to be interpreted not as the words in themselves would mean, but ‘relatively to particular periods,’ wherein revelation is not to be looked upon as one contemporaneous production, nor its sayings as ‘oracular wisdom,’ a passage e.g. in Genesis, or in the Psalms, or Isaiah, is not to be expounded in the same way as if it occurred in the New Testament, the whole instruction of the Old Testament is lowered. This was the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of the ‘historical interpretation’ as it was partially embraced by Semler, viz. that a passage was to be understood not as the Holy Spirit wrote it, but as it would appear to them to whom it was addressed.\(^{56}\) On this principle, the meaning of our Lord’s hallowed words would also soon be lowered, i.e. if they ‘may not be expounded, without reference to the circumstances in which they were delivered.’ For however these attending circumstances may occasionally illustrate His words, an over-attention to these circumstances is sure to limit and restrain the depth and largeness of their meaning. An ‘historical theology’ continually changes His words from being the fountains of...

\(^{54}\) Ibid. Also quoted in *HPP*, 21.

\(^{55}\) *HPP*, 21.

\(^{56}\) The πρῶτον ψεῦδος is the ‘beginning of errors’ or ‘first falsehood’.
Divine Truths, springing up unto everlasting life, unto those of a teacher sent from God in Judea and for Judea only.\textsuperscript{57}

In Chapter 4 we will see how Pusey’s argument in the ‘Lectures’ offer a theological foundation for his idea that the meaning of the words of Scripture is not limited by the context in which they were delivered and may serve as ‘fountains of Divine Truths, springing up unto everlasting life’. For now, it is important to see what kind of ‘historical theology’ Pusey criticizes and why. Even when he discussed the problems to which a misuse of it had led, Pusey argued that the benefits of ‘Historical Interpretation’ could not be doubted:

The principle, that an historical religion cannot be understood without the history of the era of its introduction, that no writing can be fully understood without a knowledge of other contemporary writings, which fully develop [sic] the ideas, to which itself occasionally alludes, which it modifies or corrects, nor without a clear view, whether collected from itself or from exterior sources, of the persons with reference to whom it was originally written, and the circumstances which immediately occasions it, is so obviously correct, that in this country … the contest about the ‘Historical Interpretation’ must be matter of surprise.\textsuperscript{58}

While it is unlikely that he would describe the obvious benefits of historical interpretation with the same sanguine confidence in the ‘Lectures’, even in the \textit{Theology of Germany} Pusey argued that the historical principle could lead to serious confusion unless this study were guided by theological principles.\textsuperscript{59} In the \textit{Theology of Germany} also he foreshadowed his later description of Johann Semler* as responsible for the ‘πρῶτον ψεύδος’, or beginning of errors, of historical interpretation: ‘The rival of historical interpretation by Semler became the most extensive instrument of the degradation of Christianity’.\textsuperscript{60}

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\textsuperscript{57} \textit{HPP}, 21-22. Newman also connects the lowering of ‘the meaning of our Lord’s hallowed words’ to the apologetic approach and ‘the study of the “Evidences” now popular (such as Paley’s)’. \textit{Life}, 301.

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{TG-I}, 142. See also \textit{TG-I}, 154, 176.

\textsuperscript{59} While Pusey’s views changed and developed between his trips to Germany and his writing of the ‘Lectures’, the argument of Leighton Frappell against H. C. G. Matthew and D. Forrester that this difference ‘is by no means the gulf depicted by those who write in reaction to Liddon’ appears more accurate (Frappell 1983, 3). The arguments of this thesis suggest both elements of continuity and change. See Forrester 1989, xvii, 14-18, 65, and 103, Matthew 1981, 101-124, and Frappell 1983, 2-3.

\textsuperscript{60} *Semler, Johann Salomo (1725-91). Professor of Theology at Halle from 1753-91. Although he was raised in the pietist tradition, Semler is often call the father of rationalism. Pusey describes him as ‘the most direct founder of the innovating school’ (\textit{TG-I}, 131).
Semler’s fault resulted from his inability to ‘perceive the connection of the Christian with the Jewish revelation’ and ‘the unity of the same spirit manifesting itself in various forms according to the character of the individuals through whom it was conveyed’.\(^{61}\) For Semler, the historical character of the Bible meant that much of the history and teaching of the Old Testament was of local and temporary value only. In his classic study, *Old Testament Criticism in the Nineteenth Century: England and Germany*, John Rogerson describes Semler’s position:

[He] distinguished between the Bible and the word of God, and understood by the latter those parts of the Bible that spoke to him of salvation through Jesus Christ. This resulted in dividing the Bible, especially the Old Testament, into two categories: that which witnessed to salvation in Christ, and that which did not. Much of the Old Testament came into this second category, and was regarded as Jewish national history.\(^{62}\)

Pusey argues that these conclusions were not the inevitable result of a sober and objective view of the historical details but of Semler’s ‘inability to discriminate between what was principally intended for contemporaries, and what is directly also of eternal value’.\(^{63}\) Pusey’s argument in the ‘Lectures’ suggests that he finds the ‘πρῶτον ψεῦδος’ of a merely historical interpretation lurking in the apologetic approach. The emphasis on prediction takes one’s attention away from what is of eternal value: ‘The facts were considered apart from their religious meaning’. (L1) The neglect of the religious meaning of prophecy gives a false understanding of the relationship of the Old Testament to the New and impairs one’s capacity to see how the same Spirit manifests itself in different forms at different times. The study of types and prophecy is an investigation of how the same substance is communicated in different historical and literary forms.\(^{64}\)

\(^{61}\) *TG-I*, 142-145.

\(^{62}\) Rogerson 1984, 17.

\(^{63}\) *TG-I*, 143.

\(^{64}\) For a discussion of the different emphases modern and early Christian exegetes place on ‘reconstructing the world within which the author wrote’, see Ayres 2004, 33.
2.3.3 ‘The testimony to Jesus is the Spirit of Prophecy’

Pusey argues that the most important part of the prophetic witness, the ‘substance’ of prophecy, is ‘eternal truth’. (L6) An example of this is Pusey’s description of ‘God’s mercy’ as the ‘eternal truth’ which is part of the ‘substance’ of prophecy:

It is mercy, as in the announcement of the Gospel in Paradise, or reward of faith, to Abraham, or terror to the disobedient; or, to come nearer to our own case, when the prophecy is completed, the burden is still the same, God’s mercy in ‘visiting and redeeming His people, as He had promised by the mouth of His holy prophets, which had been since the world began’ and in ‘performing His oath to Abraham’. (L6)

God’s mercy is not only predicted in the Old Testament but it is manifest in the promise made to Abraham even before that promise and prophecy were fulfilled. More fundamentally, to say that eternal truth or God’s mercy are the substance and subject of prophecy leads one to the more basic formulation that the substance and subject of prophecy is the Son of God, Jesus Christ. The mercy prophesied and offered to Abraham is ‘completed’ in Christ:

The heart and centre of it is ‘the Gospel of God which He had promised afore by His prophets in the Holy Scripture concerning His Son Jesus Christ our Lord, which was made of the seed of David according to the flesh and declared to be the Son of God with power’ (Rom. 1:2-4). The centre of the Gospel is the Redeemer; ‘the testimony to Jesus is the Spirit of prophecy’ (ἡ μαρτυρία τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς προφητείας, Rev. 19:10). (L34)

For Pusey, the Old Testament is ‘one vast prophetic system, veiling, but full of the New Testament’, and, more specifically, ‘of the One whose presence is stored up within it’. (L8)

Pusey argues that the ‘modern treatment’ offers a limited appreciation of what constitutes a prophecy of Christ. In contrast, patristic writers found prophecies of Christ in the details or apparently incidental circumstances of historic narratives, or in hints or allusions in the Psalms, as well as in clear and distinct prophetic utterances:

65 Perhaps drawing on Augustine 1853, 282.
They had Christ always in their thoughts, and so with the full persuasion that the whole of the Old Testament, the Law, the Prophets and the Psalms, shewed before of Him, they read and understood of Christ therein, whatever naturally harmonized with His dispensation, whether it would approve itself to a more rigid understanding or no. (L10)

In adopting this approach the Fathers were following the teaching of the New Testament and, more specifically, of the Risen Lord himself:

Rather, since our Lord directs us to the Old Testament to look for Him and even made it a part of His last teaching to the Apostles after His Resurrection, to unfold to them what was contained in the Law, the Prophets and the Psalms concerning Him, we might think that He intended His Church there to seek Him. [Luke 24:44] (L12)

In addition to being the one who is the subject of prophecy, Christ is also the paradigmatic prophet: ‘where the title is given to our blessed Lord, it manifestly belongs to Him, rather as “the interpreter and discloser of the Father” (ὁ ὁν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ Πάτρος ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο [John 1:18]).’ (L33)  

66 In his study of the ‘Lectures’ alongside Augustine’s *On Christian Doctrine*, Duane Arnold writes that Pusey understood the Fathers to teach ‘that Christ as the Incarnate Word was placed at the centre of their interpretive rules, rather than themselves’. 67 Pusey’s view accords with the assessment of John O’Keefe and R. R. Reno about early Christian interpretation of the Bible: ‘Jesus Christ is the crucial, recapitulating figure, and for that reason he discloses the logic of the divine economy and functions as the hub of interpretation around which the other figures revolve.’ 68

To say that Christ is the centre of prophecy means also that both the Church, the body of Christ, and the sacraments, which establish and nourish the mystical body of the Church, are the subject of prophecy as well. Pusey argues that this extension is implied in any careful consideration of what it means to describe the centre of the Gospel and the main subject of prophecy as the Redeemer, Christ, ‘the Word of Life’:

67 Arnold 1995, 211.  
68 O’Keefe 2005, 81.
With this the main subject of prophecy is included that of His Church, since a Redeemer implies persons ‘redeemed’, the head His members, the king His subjects; the subjects are united in Holy Scripture; and it adds to the profit of the consideration of our Redemption to consider what is said of those of ourselves, in whom the Redemption is to be realised. (L35)

In the same way that a Redeemer implies persons redeemed, so this redemption implies the means of redemption, the sacraments. Speaking of the way in which Christ is prophesied in the institutions, the rites and offices of the Old Testament, Pusey writes, ‘And these institutions partly represent the Redeemer Himself, partly the way in which that redemption is appropriated to us, as the sacraments are in the passage of the Red Sea and the Manna’. (L26) For Pusey, the prophecies of the Old Testament not only reveal or point to Christ, they also are correctly ‘applied to the Church, which is the Body of our Lord, or to the means of union with Himself which He has deposited in it, – His sacraments’. (L12) The original title under which the course of lectures was advertised in Michaelmas term, 1836, ‘Prophecies and Types relating to our Lord and His Church’, emphasized that Old Testament prophecies of Christ include the Church and the sacraments.69 The way in which these different subjects are part of the same mystery will be the focus of Chapter 5.

2.3.4 Prophecy as Evidence (Davison and Paley)

A second characteristic of the modern and apologetic approach, after the emphasis on prophecy as prediction, is the use of prophecy as a form of evidence to secure belief. This is a corollary of the emphasis on prophecy as prediction. The miracle of divine foreknowledge emphasized in modern treatments of prophecy becomes one of the forms of evidence which is meant to demonstrate or prove the tenets of Christian faith: ‘the apologetic use … would produce belief by the abstract argument that an event, not cognizable by human foresight, could only have been predicted by God, and that consequently the system wherein such predictions were found, came from God’. (L4) Since only God can see events before they happen, prophetic

69 See the hand-bill announcing the course of lectures to be given by the Regius Professor of Hebrew dated 18 Oct. 1836 in Papers Relating to the Proceedings of the University, 1836, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
predictions must come from God, ‘Si divinatio est, Dei sunt’. (L4) As Pusey points out, apologetic writers then used this evidence to argue for the veracity of other Christian claims, making the fulfilment of prophecy a form of evidence which proves or buttresses the whole edifice of Christian doctrine.

Pusey argues that if prophecy is to be used as evidence, then it must be capable of satisfying standards of veracity which can be demonstrated definitively by argument. According to the apologetic approach true prophecy needs to be distinguished from chance or fanciful interpretation by the application of strict standards:

For in pressing the force of prophecy as a species of evidence in a narrow sense (i.e. as that which might not be felt only, but tangibly and strictly proved demonstrably to be evidence) it became necessary to exhibit it in as compact a form as possible, baring it of all, which might not be certainly apprehended, or which to one, not already a believer nor of a believing spirit might not have the form of proof. (L1)

In order to offer such proof, prophecy must also be clear and undeniable: ‘We are anxious indeed, to trace the fulfilments of prophecy, but in a way wholly distinct; we wish to find predictions clear, apparent and undeniable, which we may sort with the events, and which on the very surface shall indisputably correspond.’ (L10) Furthermore, whether or not prophecy meets these standards must be assessed by accepted and objective criteria: ‘With this view certain criteria were laid down whereby true prophecy might be distinguished from chance coincidence or unusual foresight; and thus it was shown, that written scriptural predictions corresponded with these criteria.’ (L2)

Pusey finds an example of the influence of evidence writing and an apologetic approach on the study of prophecy in the work of John Davison, the author of *Discourses on Prophecy* (1824). Pusey says that Davison ‘has reopened a better and deeper way of handling prophecy’ and refers to him as an ‘able writer on Prophecy’. (L3, L32) Nonetheless, Pusey argues that the criteria to assess what counts as a genuine prophecy which Davison proposes – ‘clear, apparent and undeniable’ (L10) – are typical of the modern apologetic

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70 Pusey refers here to Cicero’s book *De Divinatione* (44 BC) or *Concerning Divination*, I.6: ‘If there be such an art as divination, then there are Gods.’
school. Davison’s criteria for recognizing a true prophecy include, first, ‘the known promulgation of the Prophecy prior to the event’, second, the ‘clear and palpable fulfilment’ of the prophecy in question, and third, the ‘remoteness of the event from human view’. (L3)\(^71\) According to Pusey, standards or criteria such as these effectively exclude a significant portion of what the Church has understood to be prophecy.

The work of William Paley offers a good example of how criteria like those which Davison offers and which Pusey criticizes can be used to evaluate prophecy. Paley had a profound influence in English theological circles during the first half of the nineteenth century. In his study of Biblical interpretation during this period, Peter Addinall argues that Paley ‘exercised an almost mesmeric influence over British religious figures, directly or indirectly reinforcing the appeal of a long-established natural theology’.\(^72\) Likewise, Peter Nockles argues that ‘Paley remained something of a model in much Orthodox theological discourse, and it took the Oxford Movement to finally dethrone him’.\(^73\) For Pusey, Paley represents those who ‘make conviction their professed object’, but who inevitably fail in their goal because they do not properly understand how conviction is formed. (L6)

In *A View of the Evidences of Christianity* (1794), Paley offers an analysis of the prophecy of the sufferings of the Messiah in Isaiah, chapter 53, that is characteristic of the approach Pusey criticizes. Paley emphasizes that Davison’s first criterion, that ‘the known promulgation of the Prophecy prior to the event’, is characteristic of genuine prophecy. Paley argues that it is clear to all that Isaiah is making a prophecy because ‘it is taken from a writing *declaredly prophetic*’: ‘The words of Isaiah were delivered by him in a prophetic character … and what he so delivered, was all along understood by the Jewish reader to refer to something that was to take place after the time of the author’.\(^74\) Paley affirms also that Isaiah’s prophecy has what Davison calls

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71 Pusey summarizes Davison 1824, 500.
72 Addinall 1991, 218. See also the chapter on Paley, 35-55.
73 Nockles 1994, 204.
74 *A View of the Evidences of Christianity*, Chapter 1, ‘Prophecy’ in Paley 1856, 81.
a ‘clear and palpable fulfilment’. It is obvious how the prophecy is fulfilled in the ‘evangelic history’ of the Gospels:

The application of the prophecy to the evangelic history is plain and appropriate. Here is no double sense; no figurative language but what is sufficiently intelligible to every reader of every country. The obscurities (by which I mean the expressions that require a knowledge of local diction, and of local allusion) are few, and not of great importance.  

Finally, Paley argues that the prediction of an unknown future is of the essence, the ‘material part’, of any argument based on prophecy:

That material part of every argument from prophecy, namely, that the words alleged were actually spoken or written before the fact to which they are applied took place, or could by any natural means be foreseen, is, in the present instance, incontestable.  

Paley’s description of the prediction of an event which could not ‘by any natural means be foreseen’ fits with Davison’s criterion of the ‘remoteness of the event from human view’. As we have seen, for Pusey, the trouble with this is not the acknowledgement of the miracle of divine foreknowledge, but rather the inevitable superficiality which results from making prediction the primary characteristic of prophecy.

2.4 Apologetic Diminishment

2.4.1 The Narrowing of Prophecy

Pusey argues that the approach of the evidence writers radically limits the prophetic witness of the Old Testament. Insisting upon prophecy as ‘a species of evidence’ that might be ‘tangibly and strictly proved’ leads to the removal from the category of prophecy of all ‘which might not be certainly apprehended, or which to one, not already a believer nor of a believing spirit might not have the form of proof’. (L1) Paley’s assertion that a genuine prophecy comes in a form which is ‘sufficiently intelligible to every reader of every country’ assumes this kind of standard of proof and clarity: ‘in becoming clear, it became also shallow. Men wished to grasp the whole evidence of prophecy and to collect it into one focus, and so narrowed their own

75 Ibid. 81.
76 Ibid. 80.
conceptions of it; or omitted whatever they could not gather into this one point.’ (L2) This limits both what can be counted as prophecy and the purpose of prophecy; ‘brought within the compass of a system, all those parts were lost, which lay to the right or to the left beyond the circle which men had drawn’. (L3)

The evidentialist or apologetic treatment is at odds with what the Bible discloses about the character of prophecy: ‘precisely those prophecies which were most insisted upon by our Lord and His Apostles were the least dwelt upon; they not only ceased to be brought forward, but became difficulties rather than evidences’. (L2) Old Testament sayings like ‘He shall be called a Nazarene’, ‘Not a bone of Him shall be broken’, ‘In Ramah shall a voice be heard’, are quoted in the New Testament as being fulfilled in the earthly life of Christ. However, according to Davison and Paley, these sayings could not be called genuine or certain prophecies; in the first two of these cases it is not even clear to which Old Testament passage they refer, nor that they would have been understood to be prophecies. Nonetheless, while these prophecies fail the test of the evidence writers, they pass that of the New Testament:

One should not speak, then, of one prophecy being more a prophecy or more evidently a prophecy than another; at least, this is not the teaching of the New Testament, wherein what we should esteem the clearest, are quoted side by side with those which we should regard the obscurest (as the birth at Bethlehem with the call out of Egypt) and are set forth to us in the same manner … and so having all the force of proofs, and all the same force, while some of those on which we are in the habit of laying great stress are scarcely quoted at all, or are quoted so, as on this narrow system to be rather matters of perplexity. Rather, should we, at most, speak of this one, as having more evidence to us, i.e. we understand it more easily, as lying upon the surface; whereas could we penetrate a little deeper, or lift up the veil a little, the whole institution, as being in itself prophetic, would have perhaps even the greater force, (as being a large system) and the same clearness … The greater or less clearness turns not on the things in themselves, but on our knowledge of them. (L8)

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77 Marshall gives these examples, from Matt. 2:23, John 19:36 and Matt. 2:18 respectively. M4-5.
For Pusey, the New Testament witnesses to the deficiencies of an evidentialist notion of ‘clearness’. Making what counts as ‘evidence to us’ to be the standard by which prophecy is determined effectively judges revelation by the spiritual capacities of imperfect students of the Bible.

Pusey argues that the apologetic school fails to take seriously the biblical witness to the obscurity of prophecy: ‘It is an integral part of the prophetic notice’, Pusey writes, ‘that a part, yea the larger part should not believe, “who hath believed our report and to whom is the arm of the Lord revealed?”’78 (L5) The very prophet who points so directly to Christ that Augustine suggested that he should be called an evangelist communicates God’s emphatic revelation that prophecy will not be clear: ‘Hear ye, indeed, but understand not; and see ye indeed but perceive not, Make the heart of this people fat’ (Isa. 6:9-10).79 Pusey calls this ‘the inaugural commission of the Evangelic Prophet’ and comments that it ‘is more quoted than any other in the New Testament’. (L5, 13)80 Ironically, the evidence writers neglect the clear evidence of the Scriptures about the obscurity of prophecy, and that error contributes to their diminished sense of prophecy.

2.4.2 The Narrowing of the Whole Creed

Pusey argues that an approach which radically limits the conception of prophecy also limits what can be accepted or understood more generally as part of revelation: ‘This is the case with regard to our whole creed; by striving overmuch at clearness, and practically admitting only what they could make, as they thought, intelligible to themselves, men have narrowed it far below that of the ancient Church or our own in former days.’ (L2-3) The apologetic approach diminishes ‘our whole creed’. This shows why the errors of the apologetic approach are so serious for Pusey: ‘God and His ways and His Nature we can, of course, know but in part; and our highest knowledge must be our indistinctest; for that which is most elevated must most surpass our

78 Pusey refers to Isa. 53:1, Rom. 10:16, John 12:38.
79 See Augustine, The City of God, XVIII.29.
comprehension’. (L2) It is this element of mystery, of the knowledge of what is partially hidden, that the apologetic use excludes:

… as we acquiesce not, or ought not to rest in, those parts of the divine Economy of which we can form to ourselves clear conceptions, as e.g. we should not limit our thoughts of the mystery of our sonship to God, to His Fatherly Goodness and reconciled love to us, but follow out those other hints which have been traced out for us, of an actual, not a mere relative or figurative sonship, an actual factitious inherent, Sonship, as being actual not figurative parts of His blessed Son, by means of His actual life imparted to us, whereby and wherein we live. (L70-1)

Christian faith cannot be reduced to assent to those doctrines about which we can form precise conceptions. Rather, Pusey insists on the importance of seeking a fuller apprehension and appreciation of the substance, which, as we will see in Chapter 3, can only be perceived imperfectly. For Pusey, ‘the things which we know unclearly, are our highest birth-right’. (L70)

Evoking the example both of the ‘antient Church’ and of the Caroline bishop George Bull*, Pusey argues that the apologetic treatment of prophecy obscures our capacity to perceive spiritual truth and to understand revelation:

This is well to be observed in the whole of theology. Let any one compare our theology at the present day with that of Bishop Bull and the antient Church, and he will find that we have altogether lost sight of and forgotten out of mind, much which they dwelt on habitually as part of the Catholic Faith: we have the outline of the truth, but have lost much which gives to it substance and reality, and opens to us a safe and deepening range for our contemplation. (L9)81

The approach which restricts prophecy also restricts what can be accounted for as an article of faith. In a similar way, Pattison argued that the failure of the ‘evidential school’ to establish ‘the supernatural or speculative part’ of Christianity offered ‘a complete refutation of that method as an instrument of theological investigation’.82 For Pusey, this is also a divine verdict: ‘And hence, perhaps, it may be, that God has often embarrassed formal proof with so many difficulties, that man might not attempt it or might disuse it.’ (L5)

81 Bull, George (1634-1710). Bp of St Davids from 1705. In Defensio Fidei Nicaenae (1685) he argued that the Trinitarian teaching of the ante-Nicene Fathers was the same in essential matters as that of the orthodox post-Nicene Fathers.

82 Pattison 1861, 297.
The fault which Pusey describes here is not only the one of drawing the circle too narrowly. The errors of the apologetic approach cannot be corrected by simply adopting new criteria. Rather, these mistakes are so serious because they weaken our capacity to see or understand both prophecy and spiritual truth more generally. It is a problem of perception, not just a mistake. ‘The religious element of prophecy was of necessity withdrawn from their sight, for although it has more persuasiveness, it has less of demonstration.’ (L1) The apologetic approach ‘narrows and obscures’ our understanding or ‘notion’ of prophecy. (L1) Pusey argues that if we focus our attention only on those prophecies which appear to us to be most clear and convincing we may ‘lose continually more and more our very perception of the force and character of the rest’. (L8) While the apologetic approach exercises one kind of vision, it allows our more religious faculties to atrophy: ‘Our intellectual, religious and moral perceptions are continually enlarging or contracting; and if we allow them uniformly to run within the narrower channel, they will gradually adapt themselves to it and be restrained within it’. (L9) The result is that our ‘highest knowledge’ is not simply excluded, it is lost out of mind or rendered unintelligible.

This loss of spiritual perception is the result of a kind of division in the mind or soul which evidentialist theology encourages: ‘The mind, in that it weighs the proof must, in its own despite, occupy the disposition of one to whom it is not proved, i.e. of the unbeliever: it must have a compound character, as it were, in part believing from previous conviction, in part unbelieving or doubting.’ (L5) Taking the ground of the unbeliever is not a stance of neutrality, but one which obstructs the perception of spiritual things; ‘the sort of suspension of belief which is implied by the seeking of formal evidence is unnatural and pernicious’. (L5) Because the problems with the apologetic use are as much those of discernment and sensibility as of method, correcting the fault which Pusey identifies is not as simple as pointing out an error. It involves the re-education of sensibility. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

83 L4: ‘In the apologetic use, prophecy is addressed to those who believe not, or, as if men believed not’.
2.5 The Dangers of Rationalism

2.5.1 Evidences and the Apologetic Trojan Horse

Given the authority and prevalence of evidence writing in Pusey’s day, his criticisms of the apologetic school and evidence writing would have appeared to many like an ill-conceived attack on one of the bulwarks of Christian orthodoxy. The deist controversy was the first occasion of the evidentialist approach, but by the second half of the eighteenth century it had taken on the character of a theological convention. In Essays and Reviews, Pattison described the dominance of this approach: ‘Every one who had anything to say on sacred subjects drilled it into an array of argument against a supposed objector. Christianity appeared made for nothing else but to be proved.’ In his essay in the same collection, ‘On the study of the evidences of Christianity’, Baden Powell (1796-1860), one of the progressive Oriel Noetics and a natural scientist, concurred: ‘There is scarcely one, perhaps, of our more eminent divines, who has not, in a greater or less degree, distinguished himself in this department.’ Before his departure for Germany, Pusey thought to do the same and hoped that his studies would be of assistance if he were ‘to write anything on the Evidences’. Instead, these very studies led Pusey to a view of the dangers inherent in apologetic orthodoxy.

A letter from the High Churchman Hugh James Rose to Newman suggests the radical character of Pusey’s criticisms of evidentialist theology. During the year following his appointment as principal of King’s College in October, 1836, i.e. at the same time that Pusey was criticizing evidences in his course of lectures in Oxford, Rose offered a series of lectures on ‘Evidences of Christian Religion’. Despite his disagreement with Pusey over the Theology of Germany, Rose had become a cautious, but not uncritical, supporter of the

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84 Pattison 1861, 259-260.
85 Powell 1861, 94.
86 Pusey to John Parker, May, 1825, in Life, 71. See also Pusey’s advice to his fiancée Maria Barker (4 Oct. 1827) that she should study the evidences (Forrester 1989, 59).
87 See also Pusey to Maria Barker, 4 Nov. 1835, in Forrester 1989, 74: ‘I studied evidences, when I should have been studying the Bible.’
88 Nockles 1994, 205.
Tractarians and of those ‘labouring in the good cause at Oxford’. Nonetheless, he wrote Newman in October, 1838, just a few months before his early death in Florence, to raise concerns with Newman about the ‘new number of the British Critic’. Rose maintains that ‘the vehement rejection of all evidence, except the Testimony of the Church, and of all appeals to reason … excludes wholly all consideration of unbelievers, and of faint believers’. James Ernest and Gerard Tracey’s reflections on Newman’s views of evidential theology suggest how Rose’s criticisms would apply to Pusey and the use he made of his position as Regius Professor of Hebrew: ‘To question the value of the labours of evidential theologians, however respectfully, was in itself suspect. Doing so from the university pulpit at Oxford was a direct challenge to university tradition and authority, especially in the context of the Movement.’ Apparently with a keen awareness of the challenge which faced him, Pusey sought to show why his criticisms were necessary, and why the use of evidences to establish faith was both a risky and theologically destructive enterprise.

For Pusey, the evidence writers effectively put both the Bible and God on trial. In Paley’s approach, it is the verifiable fulfilment of a prediction which enables a clear and certain prophecy to serve as evidence to prove the veracity of Christian claims. Douglas Hedley calls Paley’s approach to Scripture ‘forensic’: for Paley, ‘the Christian Scriptures can be treated like legal documents’, whose prophecies and miracles are not so much signs which reveal but bits of data which prove the truth of Christian doctrine. However, reasoned arguments for the veracity or reliability of prophecy do not convince all people. When this approach inevitably fails, the problem is transferred from the argument about prophecy to prophecy itself: ‘the stress being laid upon the

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90 Ibid. Rose refers to the writer ‘on magnetism’, who writes: ‘Do not good men grasp far too eagerly and gladly at the concurrence of philosophy with revelation … as if evidence to the Word of God were a thing to be tolerated by a Christian’ (Anon. 1838a, 304). See Nockles 1997, 200, for ‘the bias of Cambridge theology’ towards ‘evidential divinity’ and Paley.
91 Newman 2006, lxxvii.
92 Hedley 2000, 136.
clearness of prophecy, when men remained unconvinced, its inherent value came to be disparaged. The failure was not unnaturally cast on prophecy itself'. (L5) Paradoxically, attempting to use prophecy as evidence raises questions about its veracity and usefulness rather than securing them. Moreover, any approach which puts revelation on trial inevitably suggests the superiority of the human judge:

By His Providence, He has so ordered it, that Belief should be everywhere His own gift, we by this process would make it our own action, and so it makes men in some cases seem independent, the creature of our own hands, not of His. In others, it were not too much to say that it sets men above God. (L5)

The very way of proceeding which is meant to authenticate prophecy actually encourages a sense of radical autonomy which is inimical to the belief which the evidence writers wish to secure.

Pusey argues that the apologetic or modern approach does not only diminish or narrow faith, as we saw above, but that this approach conceals a trajectory toward unbelief. The contrast between the criteria of the apologetic school and the way New Testament writers refer to the Old Testament reveals not only an error but a threat: ‘And this is full of danger. We must bend our minds and conform them to the teaching of Holy Scripture, or men will end in bending Holy Scripture to their own minds, and when it will not bend, will part with it.’ (L8-9) Pusey connects this trend with the ‘apologetic character of the day’ in his writing during the Hampden controversy:

Men have now inured themselves, in all parts of theology, to look to what they can maintain against a rigid opponent, a sceptic within or without Christianity. The next step is to abandon what they cannot so maintain. First, grounds or reasons are given up; then, truths are thrown into the shade; then, forgotten; lastly, denied.93

Any approach which neglects some portion of revelation will end in opposing it: ‘that, wherein Scripture differs, becomes distasteful, then neglected, then set aside or opposed’. (L9)

93 DrH., xv. Pusey also emphasizes the danger of ‘straining of the letter of Holy Scripture in conformity with preconceived notions, and the requisitions of human reason’ in T67rev., 201.
Lurking in the kind of approach followed by Paley and Davison, Pusey finds the rationalistic principle that autonomous reason is the foundation of faith. The Church of Scotland minister Alexander Keith, to whom Pusey refers as another representative of the apologetic school, offers an example of this view. Pusey describes Keith’s book, *Evidence of the Truth of the Christian Religion derived from the literal fulfilment of Prophecy* (1823), as ‘a modern popular book on prophecy’. (L2) It had run to thirteen editions by the time Pusey wrote the ‘Lectures’. In it, Keith argues that in order to authenticate a true prophecy, ‘a patient and impartial inquiry alone is requisite; reason alone is appealed to, and no other faith is here necessary but that which arises as the natural and spontaneous fruit of rational conviction’. This states succinctly what Pusey sees to be one of the problems of the apologetic use of prophecy: ‘In this handling of prophecy … the argument was rather so set forth, as though, its own intellectual power of conviction had been such, that, but for some blindness a man could [not] escape it’. (L4) In a sermon which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, Pusey makes the same point: ‘Thus, it is almost a received formula on the evidences of the Gospel, that the province of reason is antecedent to that of faith; that we are on grounds of reason to believe in Revelation’. Pusey does not discuss when the search for reasons, which is part of faith seeking understanding (an approach which, as we will see in Chapter 3, he did approve), crosses the line to become an argument which makes evidence and discursive reason sufficient grounds for faith. That the evidence writers had crossed this line accords with Pattison’s assessment: ‘Reason was at first offered as the basis of faith, but gradually became its substitute.’

Pusey viewed the apologetic approach and evidence writing as forms of rationalism that were all the more dangerous because their destructive and heterodox tendencies were veiled by their putative role to defend and buttress Christian faith. The way in which Pusey points to the worst possible outcomes

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94 Keith 1835, 12.  
95 *AFai.*, 16. In section 3.3.2 we will see how Pusey draws on this sermon to distinguish different kinds of reason (‘But then, what Reason?’).  
96 Pattison 1861, 260.
is not simply a kind of pessimism or polemical exaggeration, but another example of the historical element of Pusey’s argument. In the *Theology of Germany* he had argued that those who attempted to refute the English deists adopted a way of proceeding that proved to be more destructive to Christian doctrine and revelation than the direct attacks which they tried to rebuff: ‘Translations of our earlier English Apologists opposed to these works did but aggravate the evil and increase the rationalist tendency; partly because they had themselves been in some degree tacitly acted upon by the systems which they opposed.’

Looking back on the situation in Germany thirty years later, Pusey repeated his view that apologetic writers contributed to the rise of rationalism:

> Yet the most startling and instructive fact was that the reign of Rationalism was not the direct triumph of unbelief, but the result of the decay of belief. The Rationalists, as they existed at last, were the lineal descendants, not of the assailants of Christianity, but of its defenders. Translations of our English Apologists had but aggravated the evil … I saw weak points in our Apologetic writers, and it was alarming to see, as a fact, that they had been arrayed against the infidel writers, and had failed, or had even aggravated the evil. I felt that, as to the Old Testament especially, we were not (in 1825) as yet prepared for the conflict with Rationalism.  

Pusey seeks to expose the faults of an evidentialist or apologetic approach to theology because this approach allowed erroneous principles inside the citadel of faith where they caused more harm than the more obvious attacks from those outside the walls. Pusey’s arguments are so pointed, and sometimes repetitive, because he believed that people were generally unaware of the danger. His study of Germany convinced him that the danger of rationalist ideas was concealed by the way in which they could co-exist for a period with the expressions of faith: ‘For a time a person or a generation may go on with this discrepancy unsettled … Yet although God may thus save individuals from the result of their own principles, it is obviously a dangerous state’. (L9) The

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98 Pusey 1854, 54-55.
99 For Pusey’s most succinct discussion of this danger, in relation to Germany and England, see *DrH*, iii-vi.
year before he wrote the ‘Lectures’, in his first Tract on baptism, Pusey described the danger as he saw it:

Meanwhile, Rationalism is taking a subtle turn, or rather its author, the author of evil, has been subtly applying it: in the days of our Deists, it openly attacked Christianity, and was defeated; now it appears as the ally and supporter of the faith, which it would undermine: it supports our Evidences; reconciles our difficulties; smooths down the ‘hard sayings’ of the Word of God, and steals away our treasure.100

The great danger of the form which rationalism takes in the apologetic school is that it appears as an ally of faith, apparently establishing the veracity of prophecy or of faith on rational grounds. However, for Pusey, rationalistic principles act as a solvent on Christian doctrine whether they appear in the arguments of the supporters or antagonists of faith.

2.5.2 The Deistic Roots of the Apologetic Approach

In the remainder of this chapter, two important components in Pusey’s assessment of the rationalism which he finds in the apologetic approach will be analyzed. First, contrary to the idea that the reason and criteria to which evidence writers appeal are impartial or universal, he seeks to show that they belong to a definite school with historical roots and presuppositions. Pusey would make the same argument in later editions of Tract 67, arguing that it is not because of their objectivity that modern writers do not find the doctrine of baptismal regeneration in Scripture but because of the ‘forced interpretations’ that they learned ‘in their own school’.101 Secondly, he argues that this kind of rationalism is also a form of empiricism or materialism which promotes a radical scepticism about Christian revelation and spiritual knowledge.

Although he does not offer the same kind of detailed historical study that he did in the Theology of Germany, there are clues that Pusey works out his argument in the ‘Lectures’ against the backdrop of a similar kind of theological genealogy, a study of the family tree which casts light on ‘the biography’ of his subject.102 In particular, he suggests that in seeking to defend the legitimacy of

100 Scr.HB., ix.
101 T67rev., 66.
102 TG-I, 2.
supernatural revelation against the backdrop or memory of deism, the apologists have accepted deist principles.\footnote{In the *Theology of Germany*, Pusey described the deist ideas by summarizing the views of some of its well-known English proponents. Lord Herbert of Cherbery (1582-1648) converted Christianity ‘into a mere scheme of Ethics’. John Toland (1670-1722), the author of *Christianity not Mysterious* (1696), was led ‘to deny all higher truths of revelation’. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in the *Leviathan* (1651) was inclined ‘to transform Christianity into a mere instrument of state policy’. Pusey also argued that ‘the constant appeal to the rationality of the system of Christianity’ led Matthew Tindal (1655-1763) in his book *Christianity as old as the Creation* (1730) to describe Christianity ‘as a mere ‘republication of the Religion of Nature’. See TG-I, 125. Pusey was willing to see the positive in the deists and even suggests that the apologists lacked both the moral earnestness and the intellectual acuteness of some of the deists. TG-I, 126-7.} According to Pusey, the supremacy of reason which was assumed by the deists also guided the apologetic writers who responded to their arguments. Pusey finds an implicit acceptance of the autonomy of analytical reason in the way the evidence writers treated Old Testament prophecy:

Its actual clearness had also in fact been misrepresented: the à priori principle of the Deist, that ‘divine prophecy must be delivered with the utmost clearness and perspicuity, and fulfilled with irresistible evidence’, though not admitted as à priori necessary, was in reality sanctioned as being à posteriori true. (L5)

Here Pusey quotes a sermon by the eighteenth century divine and Bishop of Worcester, Richard Hurd, entitled ‘False ideas of Prophecy’ (1772).\footnote{‘Sermon I: False ideas of Prophecy’, in Hurd 1811, 22. The sermons are those he gave as the first Warburtonian Lectures.} In the sermon, Hurd criticizes those who insist that ‘divine prophecy must be delivered with the utmost clearness and perspicuity, and fulfilled with irresistible evidence’. Hurd claims that deist criticisms of unreasonable revelation is nothing new, tracing this kind of criticism to the second century pagan philosopher Celsus and his assessment of Jewish and Christian prophecies as ‘fanatical, uncertain, and obscure’.\footnote{Hurd 1811, 21 n. Italics in Hurd.} Pusey argues that those who insist that no reasonable ends can be served by obscurely-expressed prophecies display the same error attributed to both Semler and Hampden of being able to discern the religious element in Old Testament prophecy. The modern school is unable to discern the Word in the words or the eternal in the
temporal; theirs is a failure to read the Scriptures according to the principles of
typical or typological interpretation.

In the ‘Lectures’, Pusey points to an example in the Gospels to illustrate
this point. Christ criticizes the Sadducees for failing to understand the full
meaning of the passage, ‘I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and
the God of Jacob’. ‘No one,’ Pusey writes, ‘I think, can doubt that He blames
the Sadducees (Mark 12.26) for not having understood the life after death to be
contained in the only title, which God gave to Himself, “the God of Abraham,
of Isaac, and of Jacob”’. (L38) However, the use of this obscure passage as a
witness to the gift of eternal life does not accord with the apologetic approach
to prophecy:

Now this passage is one of the last which a modern would have
employed for this purpose, and even now while they admit it upon our
Lord's authority, they are perplexed how to account for the selection, or
even to see its validity. And this might in itself show us that our system
of interpretation which finds such difficulty in that of our Lord, must
needs have something fundamentally defective about it. Writers seem
agreed that it must have been the clearest passage which could have been
adduced, because they would in like case have produced the clearest,
which they could find. (L39)

When John Davison described ‘our Saviour in his refutation of the Sadducees’,
he maintained that ‘we must suppose that he selected this text as one of the
most forcible and clearest of the book of the law’.106 In contrast, Pusey uses
this example to argue that the obscurities of Scripture serve a purpose. The title
which God gives himself is a typical prophecy revealing ‘that He, the self-
communicating, the fountain of life, did not leave those with whom He deigned
to stand in so close communion, without some portion of His life… and that
they who lived by Him could not die’. (L38). He continues, finding a spiritual
exercise in seeking the treasure concealed below the surface and revelation in
an obscure prophecy:

And yet, it must be admitted on the other side, that this truth, which our
Lord declares to be in these words is not their obvious historical sense …
And on this very account it follows that a sense is to be sought and found

106 Davison 1824, 168.
in words and phrases, deeper than that which is required for the mere context, and not only so, but that the neglect to do this was blameable, and neglecting a treasure which God had deposited in Scripture below the surface, and burying that talent committed to them in the earth. This is clean contrary to the boasted discovery of modern times, the so-called historico-grammatical interpretation, yet I see not what short of this will satisfy our Lord's meaning, or on what other ground the Sadducees were to blame. (L39)

This in an example of how ‘the à priori principle of the Deist’ which insists on the ‘clearness and perspicuity’ of prophecy can rather render prophecy opaque.

2.5.3 Joseph Butler on Analogy and Obscurity

Looking at Pusey’s writings during the Hampden controversy shows that, in challenging the apologetic search for perspicuity, Pusey draws on Bishop Joseph Butler’s *Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed* (1736). Whereas in the ‘Lectures’ Pusey criticized ‘the à priori principle of the Deist’, in his analysis of Hampden’s theological arguments he ascribed that task to Bishop Butler: ‘That great Divine silenced, as is well known, the à priori arguments of the Deist, by shewing that he must, if consistent, become an Atheist, since the facts of Christianity, to which he objected, were analogous to other facts in the ordinary government of God’. Butler’s* works were a standard part of the Oxford syllabus in the first decades of the nineteenth century, ‘the central modern authority alongside the classical authors for the Greats course’, and a particularly important figure for Pusey and the Tractarians. In the *Analogy*, Butler argues that deist criticisms of the supposedly unreasonable or arbitrary character of revelation are themselves based on unreasonable and arbitrary assumptions. Butler establishes the principle of analogy by arguing that one would expect to find correspondences between the character of the Bible and the character of the natural world because they have a common creator. Therefore, according to the principle of analogy, the study of supernatural revelation must encounter the same kind of difficulties or obscurities which

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107 *DrH.*, xiv and xiv-xvii.
108 Garnett 1992, 64. For Butler’s influence on Newman, see Newman 1967, 27 and Seynaeve 1953, 204-5, 221-222. For Keble, see Beek 1959, 48-60, 106-7 and Battiscombe 1963, 54.
*Butler, Joseph (1692-1752). Bp of Bristol from 1738, translated to Durham in 1750.*
one encounters in any investigation of the natural world: ‘Origen with singular sagacity has observed, that he who believes the Scripture to have proceeded from him who is the Author of Nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found in the constitution of Nature.’ Pusey’s consideration of the Sadducees’ inability to understand the prophecy implicit in God’s title offers a practical application of Butler’s argument. With regard to ‘the true sense’, he writes, ‘we are not competent judges, as we are in common books, how plainly it were to have been expected’, i.e. how ‘determinately or accurately it might have been expressed’. During the Hampden controversy, Pusey uses the principle of analogy to emphasize over-confidence which he saw in the apologetic approach:

But if we, who know not the use of all the portions of our gross material bodies, or of the elements around us, or why the air is so attempered, or how our food nourishes us, presume to say, that we understand how every portion of revealed truth affects our souls, or that we could dispense with portions thereof, or, which is the same thing, that they could not be portions of revealed truth, that they must be human theories because we see not their use, we lay ourselves open surely to the Apostle’s rebuke, ‘professing themselves to be wise, they became fools’.

In Pusey’s argument, accepting Butler’s principle that ‘we have no principles of reason, upon which to judge beforehand, how it were to be expected revelation should have been left’, is not a form of self-imposed ignorance but the principle which clears away the presuppositions which prevent those in the grip of the rationalistic ‘Spirit of the Age’ from finding the treasure which prophecy offers.

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109 Anal., Intro. 5. Italics in text. See also Anal., II.3, 182-3: ‘the acknowledged constitution and course of nature is found to be greatly different from what, before experience, would have been expected’.
110 Anal., II.3, 186.
111 DrH, xviii.
112 Anal., II.3, 184.
2.5.4 Rationalism and Empiricism: Dr. Hampden and Mr. Locke

For Pusey, the rationalism he finds in the apologetic approach is not simply a confidence in the sufficiency of reason, but also a form of empiricism which effectively denies the possibility of spiritual or supernatural knowledge:

Our general habits of mind are rationalizing; we live in the world of sense; the knowledge which we acquire, is matter of sense; what we call ‘science’ is the knowledge of things tangible to sense: a truly common-sense, or rather a common-place sense, is our rule in all things; and of all this we make our boast. This is an unhealthy atmosphere for faith, which has to do entirely with things unseen, not of sense.\textsuperscript{113}

Pusey’s argument is not that the modern school lacked divines intelligent enough to formulate a compelling argument. Rather, he argues that the attempt to prove or define prophecy must fail because the knowledge which prophecy offers, religious knowledge, the revelation of supernatural truth cannot be proved or discovered strictly by evidence or argument: ‘The religious element of prophecy was of necessity withdrawn from their sight, for although it has more persuasiveness, it has less of demonstration.’ (L1) To focus on prophecy as a kind of evidence is to focus ‘upon the surface’ (L8) and to neglect the ‘treasure which God had deposited in Scripture below the surface’. (L39, 85) This approach displays ‘our matter-of-fact way’. (L9, 10) Pusey seeks to uncover the philosophical and theological principles which explain this confusion.

Pusey traces Hampden’s confusions to an empiricist equation of revelation with a collection of facts, ‘that the Christian revelation is matter of fact … that the substance of the revelation is the doings and actions of God; some event in the history of God’s providences’.\textsuperscript{114} Pusey argues that for Hampden, ‘We can know nothing of God, except in His manifestations upon this our earth. This is not to be regarded as an insulated or accidental circumstance, but rather as indicative of the whole theory to which it

\textsuperscript{113} Scr.HB., ix (‘matter of sense’ is Pusey’s wording).

\textsuperscript{114} Hampden quoted in HPP, 26
Hampden’s writings promote the theory that ‘whatever in the teaching even of the early and universal Church goes beyond the words of holy Scripture is to be regarded as mere human speculation’. To demonstrate this, Pusey quotes Hampden’s statement that ‘All the differences of opinion, which have ever prevailed upon the doctrine of the Trinity, relate to the history of the human mind as much as to theology; and do not affect the Catholic Faith’. In another place Hampden went even further, and suggested that the doctrinal formulations of the Church, including not only the Thirty-Nine Articles, but also the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, offer a description of the logical processes of human reasoning, ‘a map of the human mind’, rather than an accurate picture of the realities they purport to describe. For Hampden, the articles and creeds are expressed in philosophical forms that distort the message of the Bible: ‘The orthodox language, declaring the Son “begotten before all worlds, of one substance” with the Father,” was settled by a philosophy, wherein the principles of different sciences were confounded. The best that can be said of such doctrinal formulations is that they are ‘only less obviously injurious’ than the more serious confusions which they exclude, implying that the language of the creeds is in some way injurious. For Pusey, Hampden’s ideas encourage a radical scepticism about any doctrine that goes beyond a simple restatement of ‘Scripture facts’.

Pusey attributes Hampden’s radical scepticism on doctrinal matters to the misapplication of empiricist principles which he learned from the philosopher John Locke:

115 HPP, 7. Although Hampden in his inaugural lecture responded to this criticism by stating that ‘Fact means whatever is, and is not in philosophical language restricted to something done’, Pusey maintained that his position was at least inconsistent and that his arguments did not reflect his broadened definition. See HPP, 26-28 for Pusey’s assessment, and Hampden 1836 for Hampden’s clarifications of his position.
116 DrH., vi.
117 Sch.Phil., 149 quoted in DrH., xxxvii.
118 Sch.Phil., 87.
119 Sch.Phil., 137, quoted in DrH., xxxvii. Pusey criticizes Hampden’s ‘unsound ignorance or indifference to the importance’ of the word ‘substance’ in Trinitarian doctrine. HPP, 6-7.
120 Sch.Phil., 378, quoted in DrH., xxxix.
121 DrH., xiii.
Pusey describes Hampden’s theological principles as a version of Locke’s philosophy. For Locke the mind is a *tabula rasa* which is furnished with ideas which are imprinted on the mind from experience and reflection upon experience: ‘Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from *experience*. In that all our knowledge is found, and from that it ultimately derives itself.’ 123 Hampden’s argument that ‘words are *signs* of ideas only’ is a version of Locke’s theory that ‘Words in their primary Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them.’ 124 These ideas also help to explain Pusey’s concern for Hampden’s Socinianism. Douglas Hedley describes Socinianism as ‘marked by a curious mixture of scriptural positivism and empiricism’. 125 This is what Pusey found in Hampden, both the positivist view that revelation is a collection of facts, and the empiricist principle which limits knowledge to sensory experience and reflection upon it, i.e. ‘the major and minor premiss of Socinianism’. 126

Hampden is guilty of a basic category error – just because we learn about the world of sense from the senses does not prove that human beings have no faculty or power by which to discern things beyond sense. According to the theory which Hampden derives from Locke, even God is constrained by the

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122 *DrH.*, xxii.
123 Locke 1975, II.1.2, 104. See also Woolhouse 1994, 149.
124 Locke 1975, III.2.2, 405.
126 *DrH.*, vi.
limitations of human understanding, God can only impart knowledge that is based on our experience. As we will see in more detail in Chapter 3, Pusey’s basic principle is that ‘spiritual things’ or spiritual truths ‘can only be spiritually understood’. (L37) According to this view, spiritual knowledge must have another source than that permitted by Hampden and Locke: ‘We can form no idea, from experience, of spirit separate from matter, and it is only by Revelation that we know that “God is a Spirit:” it is only by implicitly believing revelation, or by a “salutis mortalis” of the human intellect, that we can receive it.’ Yet this ‘fatal leap’, which is a leap beyond discursive knowledge, an immediate intuition and also a death to any claim of self-sufficiency, is precisely what Hampden denies: ‘A light from heaven [i.e. Almighty God, from whom the light cometh] cannot introduce to the mind ideas concerning divine things, essentially different from all that it ever entered into the heart of man to conceive.’ For Pusey, Hampden essentially denies the possibility of revelation and of knowledge that extends beyond the sensible world.

The connection Pusey makes between Hampden and Locke also casts light on Pusey’s criticism of our ‘rationalizing’ habits of mind and his comment that ‘a truly common-sense, or rather a common-place sense, is our rule in all things’. ‘Common-place’ is one of the terms which Pusey uses in the ‘Lectures’ to describe the inadequate character of the modern approach to prophecy. (L39, L145) Emphasizing the meaningfulness of the apparently incidental details in a study of types and typical prophecy, Pusey writes: ‘The “common sense” view, that such things were “by chance” so and so, is a naked Epicureism [sic].’ Pusey seems to evoke here the ‘Common-Sense’ school associated especially with the work of the Scottish philosopher Thomas...

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127 *DrH.*, xxii-xxiii.
128 *DrH.*, xxii. After ‘A light’, Pusey notes ‘*Philosophical Evidence*, p. 21’, i.e. Hampden 1827. The square brackets are in the text, offering Pusey’s comments on Hampden’s words.
129 *Scr.HB.*, ix, quoted in full above.
130 *T67rev.*, 347. This quotation will be discussed in more detail at 4.2.4. Pusey describes the practice of passing by ‘incidents, which upon a modern system would be termed mere casualties, things which must take place somehow’, rather than seeing than as meaningful, as ‘a common-sense way’ (p. 272).
Reid and his book *An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense* (1764). Reid* adopted an empirical approach to the study of the mind and used the Newtonian method to challenge John Locke’s theory of ideas, which he believed contributed to David Hume’s scepticism.131 The philosopher Dugald Stewart, a student of Reid, developed his teacher’s common-sense philosophy. In *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind* (Parts I-III, 1792-1827), Stewart* applied an empirical and inductive approach based on the natural scientific theories of Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton to questions of metaphysics, psychology, and moral obligation.132 Despite the objections of both men to Humean scepticism and elements of Locke’s theories, the way they made empirical observation the basis for addressing metaphysical or religious questions appears to be at the root of Pusey’s objections to this school. In a letter to Newman in 1829, Pusey, wrote about the importance of reviving the study of genuine ‘Metaphysics’ at Oriel, ‘not the modern trash which in Messrs Stewart and Reid has assumed the name’.133 A genuine metaphysics is one that considers not only ‘the knowledge of things tangible to sense’ but also the communication imparted by the ‘light from heaven’.134

The ‘Lectures’ furnish more evidence that Pusey’s criticisms of the apologetic school are a criticism of this Lockean empiricism. Locke represents for him the ‘tendency of undisciplined intellect to different forms of unbelief or misbelief, to exalt self by modifying what God has given, and if it reject not revelation altogether, to become heresiarchs or schismatics’. (L60A-61) Pusey adds: ‘For one Plato one has many Diogenes; for one Berkeley many Lockes, for one Athanasius many Arius’. (L61) Pusey groups Locke with the prototypical empiricist and a Christian heretic who was incapable of seeing

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131 *Reid, Thomas* (1710-1796). Scottish natural and moral philosopher and Presbyterian minister. Minister at Newmachar, Arberdeenshire, from 1737-51. Regent of King’s College, Aberdeen from 1751-64, and Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow from 1764. See Paul Wood, ‘Reid, Thomas (1710–1796)’, *ODNB*.

132 *Stewart, Dugald* (1753–1828), Professor of Mathematics at the University of Edinburgh from 1775-85, of Moral Philosophy from 1785-1810. See Michael P. Brown, ‘Stewart, Dugald (1753–1828)’, *ODNB*.


134 *DrH.*, xxii, quoted above.
beyond the veil of the flesh to the eternal and divine Word.\textsuperscript{135} For Pusey, Locke’s denial of the possibility of spiritual knowledge, a mistake repeated and amplified in Hampden, corrupts Christian faith and promotes heresy. Pattison also linked the rise of rationalism with the influence of Locke: ‘The title of Locke’s treatise, \textit{The Reasonableness of Christianity} [1695], may be said to have been the solitary thesis of Christian theology in England for [the] great part of a century.’\textsuperscript{136} Pusey’s analysis of Hampden and the connection he makes between Hampden and Locke also show what is at stake in the confusions of the apologetic school and the promotion of a patristic understanding of prophecy. Whatever the origins of a distrust of typology, in the ‘Lectures’ Pusey connects this distrust with a rationalism which judges revelation according to the abilities of autonomous and limited human reason and which imports an empiricist epistemology into theology. Pusey’s critique of evidence-writing and the apologetic approach is also a criticism of the influence of utilitarianism in theology: ‘an over-practical, over-reasoning age, which from having developed these qualities at the expense of the rest, has at last no sense for that, which must be perceived, not demonstrated’. (L37) While this suggests another way of approaching the problems of rationalism, the criticism of the reduction of truth to its ‘so-called practical application’ plays a more significant part in Pusey’s writings against Hampden than it does in the ‘Lectures’.\textsuperscript{137}

2.5.5 Rationalism and Scientism: ‘The operation of the anatomist’

Pusey uses images of anatomy and dissection to emphasize the destructive effects of an empirical or evidence-based approach to prophecy. He argues that treating the contents of the Old Testament like evidence in order to establish its meaning or to prove the truth of prophecy is like dissecting a dead body in order to find the life which once animated it: ‘But if the Christian enquire scientifically how much the Jew may have understood, he is entering upon an

\textsuperscript{135} Describing Diogenes as a ‘staunch empiricist’, Megan Mustain writes: ‘Put in metaphysical terms, Diogenes’ philosophy rejected the notion that anything unexperienced might be real.’ Mustain 2011, 106.

\textsuperscript{136} Pattison 1861, 258.

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{DrH.}, xv-xvi. See also \textit{HPP}, 33.
examination for which he is not qualified … He is anatomizing a, to him, lifeless body in order to discover the seat of life.’ (L30) Elsewhere Pusey speaks of the ‘patronizing air (so to speak) which natural science takes when used as evidence’, as, for example, when ‘the main stress of the argument is made to rest on the discoveries of modern travellers with regard to the physical state of Edom, Moab and the like’. (L4, 2) This kind of approach cannot uncover the ‘living God’, but rather produces a ‘dead idol’. (L5) The ‘demonstrations’ of the modern approach compared to the ‘unlaboured persuasion’ of the ancient Church ‘are much what the operation of the anatomist, in detaching the several sinews and muscles, is to their action in life’.  

Pusey challenges the reduction of knowledge to what can be grasped and studied by the senses. This theme is connected to the sacramental rather than mechanistic view of the natural world which one finds in the Tractarians more generally. When Pusey seeks to expose empiricist principles in theology, he resists what Donald Allchin calls ‘scientism’, a view which denies ‘the necessity of other forms of knowing and thinking than those employed in the investigation of natural phenomena’.  

The contemporary philosopher Charles Taylor calls this bias ‘naturalism’, a term which for Taylor describes both the ‘temper’ and ‘the epistemological assumptions’ which ‘tend to allow the natural sciences a paradigm status for all forms of knowledge’. Pusey refers to this same two-fold aspect of the apologetic use – it expresses both a kind of sensibility, a temper, and epistemological assumptions about what counts as clear and certain knowledge. In his opposition to evidentialist theology, Pusey opposes not science, but naturalism or scientism. Taylor’s assessment of the

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138 *T67rev.*, 389. In a variation on the theme of dissection or taking apart, Pusey argues that those who use prophecy as a form of evidence to convince unbelievers have ‘unstrung what in Holy Scripture is knit together’. By dissecting or disentangling what can only be appreciated as a whole, ‘they unwove the tapestry of scriptural prophecy in order to exhibit the single threads of which it was woven, the many coloured yet wonderful garment’. L5.

139 Allchin 1984, 3.


141 See Nockles 1991, 159-64 for a criticism of the portrayal of ‘the Tractarian attitude to both the natural and physical sciences … as a blind, narrow-minded antipathy based on a fear that the dogmatic edifice which the movement extolled might be thereby damaged’ (p. 159).
problem described by Allchin and Pusey is significant because it is part of the approach which, as will be argued later, makes it possible for Taylor’s examination of John Locke to illuminate Pusey’s arguments in the ‘Lectures’.

2.5.6 Rationalism and Idolatry: Paley and Pantheism

One can get a better sense of the scope of Pusey’s theological and epistemological project by returning to his criticisms of Paley and considering them through the lens of Pusey’s critique of rationalism and empiricism. Pusey directs attention not only to Paley’s forensic approach to prophecy and evidence, but also to his version of natural theology which Pusey styles as ‘artificial reasoning from final causes’. (L6) Pusey seems to have in mind Paley’s well-known argument from design in the first paragraph of his *Natural Theology* (1802). Since a watch displays both purpose and design, one can therefore infer the existence of a watch-maker. According to Paley’s argument, the world is like a watch in that it also shows evidence of purpose and design. By examining, for example, the way in which the organs and body parts of a person or of different animals serve to promote their preservation and well-being, one can infer the existence of a wise, almighty, and good creator.\(^{142}\) The final cause which explains what we see in the natural world is the wisdom of God who ensures that all things work together to achieve their purposes:

> It is only by the display of contrivance, that the existence, the agency, the wisdom of the Deity, *could* be testified to his rational creatures. This is the scale by which we ascend to all the knowledge of our Creator which we possess, so far as it depends upon the phenomena, or the works of nature.\(^{143}\)

In a passage which offers what seems like a paraphrase of Paley’s conclusion, Pusey writes: ‘So far from that being true that *such* study of “nature leads up to nature’s God” it rather brings down nature’s God into Nature, or identifies Him with it.’ (L5) Pusey describes Paley’s principles as leading inevitably to Pantheism, which for Pusey was the ultimate destination of rationalism and Socinianism: ‘All unbelief and heresy will probably sooner

\(^{142}\) For a sympathetic appraisal of Paley’s approach see LeMahieu 1976, 52-5.

or later be resolved into it, and it will be the deadliest antagonist of the Church’. The only kind of god which Paley’s approach can prove is either an idol, a human creation, or ‘an anima mundi’: ‘one cannot but see that the Deity or Divinity, which men prove to themselves, by such means, is very little better than a dead idol and “work of men’s hands”, or an anima mundi, very different from the “living God” who is “a consuming fire”’. (L5) Pusey does not accuse Paley of idolatry simply because it is the best way to emphasize what he sees to be the dangers of the apologetic approach. Rather, he is saying that idolatry or Pantheism is the only form of religion consistent with the most extreme forms of empiricism: ‘Pantheism assumes that “God is whatever thou seest”’. Pusey sees Pantheism as a kind of theistic empiricism that Hampden unwittingly promoted. Since ‘we can form no idea, from experience, of spirit separate from matter’, the denial of divine illumination, of revelation not limited to the materials ‘of experience in this sensible world’, leads to Pantheism and materialism: ‘How then, on the way of analogy or experience, are we to arrive at the idea of any thing so high as even the ‘anima mundi’ of Spinozism? Rather men must stop in a materialist-Pantheism, wherein not only the world is a part of God, but is God.’ Autonomous human reason alone cannot bridge the gap between an argument from nature and the existence of a God beyond or apart from nature.

Echoing Pusey’s view that Paley’s argument from design identifies God with nature, Leslie Stephen remarks that Paley leaves us with ‘an anthropomorphic deity’, a deity who is ‘almost a material part of the universe’, and who ‘has all but become an object of scientific investigation’. In the ‘Lectures’ and associated papers, Pusey argues that the natural world, ‘the works of God’, both by their creation and ongoing existence, ‘must reflect

144 PS-I, xxii.
145 PS-I, xxi.
146 DrH., xxii-xxiii.
147 Stephen 1962, i, VIII.44, 350-351. ‘Looking back along the series of phenomena as far as we please, we come to nothing but phenomena; and must, therefore, make a sudden spring from the phenomenal to the transcendental, or limit ourselves to an anthropomorphic deity. Paley declines to make the spring. His God exists in time and space.’
However, Pusey distinguishes sharply between the ‘reasoning about the wisdom of contrivances and the like’ and the kind of vision which perceives the divine or spiritual truths that the works of God symbolize. (L16) For him, Paley replaces the life-giving sacrament with a divine mechanism.

Pusey’s discussion of the problems with Paley’s approach to natural theology shows once again the broader context of Pusey’s analysis of the apologetic school and its approach to prophecy and displays his attempt to shed light on unnoticed problems implicit in the theological conventions of his day. Paley’s *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* (1785) was part of the Cambridge syllabus from 1787 to the early nineteenth century, and all second year undergraduates were examined on his *Evidences of Christianity* from 1822 to 1920.149 Douglas Hedley sums up Paley’s reputation: ‘Paley was a highly esteemed defender of Christian theology against the learned despisers of Christianity amongst the figures of the British Enlightenment.’150 Nonetheless for Pusey, Paley especially embodied the principles of rationalism and scientism that lead through Socinianism to Pantheism. It is likely that both Paley’s close association with Locke and his suspected heterodoxy would have influenced Pusey’s judgement. While a fellow at Christ’s College, Cambridge, Paley based his lectures primarily on Locke’s *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* and his *Reasonableness of Christianity*.151 Hedley describes this Lockean heritage in a way that shows why Pusey points to Paley as representing the worst tendencies of the apologetic school: ‘As a pupil of Locke, Paley was very much a conventional Englishman of the eighteenth century, and because of the Socinian roots of Locke’s theology Paley seems not just an empiricist but doctrinally close to Unitarianism.’152 Hedley acknowledges that Paley’s ‘doctrinal minimalism’ may have expressed a latitudinarian desire for comprehensiveness rather than an avowed Socinianism. However, Paley evokes Hampden’s anti-dogmatic and empiricist

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148 S-BN, 1.
149 James E. Crimmins, ‘Paley, William (1743–1805)’, *ODNB*.
150 Hedley 2000, 46.
151 *ODNB*, Ibid.
152 Hedley 2000, 49.
principles by his insistence that ‘The truth of Christianity depends upon its living facts and upon them alone’. The influence of Paley even in High Church or orthodox circles would have made the errors perceived in his approach and ideas seem even more dangerous to Pusey. Paley’s wariness about dogma and his close association with the group of Cambridge dons who sought to reform subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles, an endeavour which Hampden later promoted in Oxford, would probably have linked Paley closely to Hampden in Pusey’s mind, and made him a representative of the Socinianism of which Pusey accused Hampden.  

2.6 Pusey and the ‘higher philosophy’ of S. T. Coleridge

One of the most interesting aspects of Pusey’s criticisms of Paley is the way in which Pusey drew on the ideas of S. T. Coleridge. Marshall records that near the beginning of the eighth lecture Pusey quoted Coleridge’s *Aids to Reflection* to show that the kind of evidence writing that collects together tokens of the authenticity of the Scriptures often fails to produce the expected results. The words in italics follow Coleridge’s text very closely:

> This shews that we must not look for conviction in the way of Reason – Coleridge, in his Aids to Reflection says that *the great fundamentals of our Religion, in Christian countries are taught so early and with such associations that the words ever after bring to us Realities, not thoughts or sensations. [...] We hear in after life the Proofs of these with the same feelings that a Prince at a Coronation listens to the Champion as he is calling upon non-existent opponents. Doubts may be driven out at first by our Lord’s words. The looking for Proof only tends to encourage doubts. A man’s implicit belief as it is not founded on the understanding cannot

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153 *Evidences of Christianity*, III.8, ‘Conclusion’, in Paley 1856, 158. Both Hedley and Stephen quote this passage as representative of Paley’s thought. See Hedley 2000, 49, and Stephen 1962, i, VIII.47, 353. While Hampden and Paley share in Pusey’s censure for their empiricist principles, Hampden sets himself in opposition to Paley’s moral philosophy, and in particular to Paley’s utilitarianism in his *Course of Lectures introductory to the study of Moral Philosophy* (1835). Brent, ‘Hampden, Renn Dickson (1793–1868)’, *ODNB*.  
154 Nockles 1994, 204.  
155 For Paley’s association with the campaign to reform subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles, see Crimmins, ‘Paley’, *ODNB*. Hedley writes that Paley ‘was associated with Socinian-Unitarian radicals’ who ‘agitated to abolish subscription to the Trinitarian Thirty-Nine articles’. Hedley 2000, 49.
be spared by that. The belief arising from Reason is like unbelief. What will overcome the belief of a child, who has not learnt to doubt? Coleridge compares arguments meant to prove religious faith to the Champion who pretends to guarantee the Prince’s coronation. However, it is only pretending; the Prince’s coronation does not depend on the Champion since there are no actual challengers who the Champion must defeat. A person who reads Paley or other evidences may come to think that his faith rests on the support of rational argument. However, this is a confusion. Rather, it is the belief which is already present, ‘the belief of a child’, which accepts the arguments of the evidence writers as, at their best, part of a pageant where belief is already enthroned. The prior conviction, Coleridge argues, ‘of a gracious Creator is the Proof … of the wisdom and benevolence in the construction of the Creature.’ Whereas Paley offers evidence for this benevolence, in Coleridge’s argument, as in Pusey, the sense of benevolence is the proof. Coleridge’s argument here accords with Pusey’s view that ‘prophecy is given to direct and guide faith, not to create it’. (L4) Prophecy can prove or offer evidence in that it confirms what one already believes, but it does not create or establish that belief: ‘In the Bible, then, Prophecy is as evidence, throughout given to believers – i.e. to such as held fast what they had hitherto received. The belief is already there in the germ; it has but to be developed or expanded.’ (L4)

Like Pusey, Coleridge describes Paley as the archetypal representative of the evidentialist theology which he opposes: ‘I believe myself bound in conscience to throw the whole force of my intellect in the way of this triumphal Car, on which the tutelary Genius of modern Idolatry is borne, even at the risk of being crushed under the wheels!’ Despite the gravity of Coleridge’s concern, and his contention that Paley’s ideas foster scepticism

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156 M53-54. The italics are mine, showing where Pusey quotes Aids, 237-238. At the ellipsis Pusey appears to leave out a very long sentence, or Marshall does not note it.
157 Aids, 238.
158 This is a form of what Newman calls the ‘principle of Tradition’. The Tractarians pointed to Edward Hawkins, Provost of Oriel College, and later an opponent of the Oxford Movement, as one of the most recent teachers of this principle in his 1818 sermon, A Dissertation upon the Use and Importance of Unauthoritative Tradition. See Newman 1967, 20-1.
159 Aids, 409.
about the truth and reality of Christian doctrine, Coleridge is nonetheless convinced that it is Paley’s views that will sound ‘plausible and popular … to the great majority of Readers’. This is the same approach Pusey adopts. He seeks to cast light upon the erroneous principles conveyed in popular books, almost certainly with the awareness that his concerns will be misunderstood. Hedley maintains that ‘Paley represents, for Coleridge, the hegemony of a Lockean-Sozinian-empiricist tradition within the Church of England’. This is the same way in which Pusey presents Paley and why he is for Pusey as well as for Coleridge the paradigmatic example of the problems and dangers of evidence writing.

The common line of argument that Coleridge and Pusey adopt against Paley and evidence writing points to broader areas of convergence. The way Pusey draws on Coleridge corresponds to Newman’s assessment. Comparing Coleridge’s role to that of Walter Scott, whose ‘history in prose and verse’ responded to ‘the need which was felt both by the hearts and the intellects of the nation for a deeper philosophy’, Newman writes:

> While history in prose and verse was thus made the instrument of Church feelings and opinions, a philosophical basis for the same was laid in England by a very original thinker, who, while he indulged in a liberty of speculation which no Christian can tolerate, and advocated conclusions which were often heathen rather than Christian, yet after all instilled a higher philosophy into inquiring minds, than they had hitherto been accustomed to accept. In this way he made trial of his age, and succeeded in interesting its genius in the cause of Catholic truth.

The ‘Lectures’ suggest that Pusey shared both the positive and negative elements of Newman’s assessment. On the one hand, Pusey criticizes as an intolerable ‘liberty of speculation’ Coleridge’s view that the references to the talking serpent and the tree of life in Genesis 3 show that the account of the Fall is an allegory:

> ‘No unprejudiced man can pretend to doubt,’ says Mr Coleridge, ‘that, if in any other work of Eastern origin he met with Trees of Life and of Knowledge: talking and conversable snakes: Inque rei signum serpentum

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160 Aids, 410.
161 Hedley 2000, 48.
162 Newman 1967, 84, quoting an article in the British Critic, Apr. 1839.
serpere jussum; he would want no other proofs, that it was an allegory he was reading, and intended to be understood as such.’ But (setting aside for the while the flippancy and arrogance of this speech) if we find the fragments of this same story in other nations, encircled with different accompaniments, but still the same basis, then they could no longer doubt that it was a real fact. (L46)

On the other hand, Pusey shared Newman’s more positive assessment of Coleridge also, that Coleridge ‘instilled a higher philosophy into inquiring minds’ and promoted the cause of ‘Catholic truth’. In his *Theology of Germany*, Pusey referred to the *Aids to Reflection* to correct those ‘who think that in the reception of Christianity the intellect alone is concerned’. In other words, he describes Coleridge’s approach as a necessary antidote to orthodoxyism. Jasper points to this connection when he argues that by drawing on Coleridge in the ‘Lectures’ Pusey ‘provided an alternative to the contemporary “Paleyite” apologetic which Pusey designates “orthodoxism”’. In the same vein, Donald Allchin argues that Pusey’s attack ‘on the old “orthodoxism” of the previous age’ in the ‘Lectures’ reminds one of Coleridge. Whatever misgivings Liddon may have had of Coleridge, he comments that Coleridge ‘was a great force in making men dissatisfied with the superficiality so common a hundred years ago in religion as in other matters; and in this, if in no other way, he prepared the English mind to listen to the Oxford teachers’.

Whether or not specific correspondences between Pusey and Coleridge point to direct influences or common sources, or both, we will see in this thesis that ‘Coleridge’s ‘higher philosophy’ offers a useful framework with which to...

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163 Pusey quotes *Aids*, 258.
164 TG-I, 52-53 n. 3.
165 Jasper 1983, 57.
167 *Life*, 254. Allchin suggests that this resemblance may have been one of the reasons which gave Liddon concern about the contents of the ‘Lectures’, a concern that will be discussed in Chapter 6 (Allchin 1967, 57 n. 1). Christopher Snook puts forward Tilottama Rajan’s argument that ‘the Tractarians’ hesitant acknowledgment of Coleridge’ may be the result of his association with urban life, the continent, and a spirit of impropriety. See Snook 2001, 8 and Gilley 1983, 228.
examine some of Pusey’s key arguments. In his study of Pusey’s *Sermons on Solemn Subjects*, Christopher Snook contends ‘that Coleridge offered the Movement both a language and a theory of knowledge in which to articulate its increasingly sacramental vision of the world, and one which corresponded closely with its notion of God’s “reserved” manifestation of Himself in nature, the Sacraments, and the Church’. We will see the importance of this combination of ideas in the following chapters. Hedley argues that the *Aids to Reflection* is, like the ‘Enneads’ of Plotinus, ‘a spiralling ascent of the mind; a spiritual exercise aimed at divesting the reader of materialistic assumptions and errors, and providing aids to a bending back or “reflection” of the soul to its divine source.’ This is a helpful way in which to approach the ‘Lectures’ also, both an argument and, in parts, an ascetic exercise. We have seen already that Pusey also seeks to expose the ‘materialistic assumptions and errors’ characteristic of the modern approach to theology. Also according to Pusey’s argument, the solution is not as simple as correcting an error, it requires the re-education of sensibility. We will see in Chapter 3 and following that his exposition of typology is not only a description of a certain kind of exegesis but a sacramental practice meant to restore the image or reflection of God in the soul. Hedley describes Coleridge’s project:

The real conflict, Coleridge insists, is not between religion and enlightenment; belief and secularity; reason and ignorance … but between a spiritual and a materialistic metaphysics. Once one accepts that our organs of sense are framed for a sensory world and our organs of spirit for a spiritual (cf. *BL* i. 242), one can see that the real conflict concerns metaphysics and values.

Like Coleridge, Pusey seeks to demonstrate that the problem of rationalism or empiricism is not confined to those who explicitly attack or disregard Christian doctrines. Rather, Pusey seeks to expose and correct the ‘materialistic

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168 There is a general consensus that Pusey was influenced by Coleridge. David Jasper comments that Pusey ‘drew extensively, if critically, upon his reading of Coleridge’ for the ‘Lectures’ (Jasper 1985, 154). Martin Roberts finds a ‘Coleridgean ethos’ in Pusey’s concern for ‘the ascent of consciousness and its concrete ecclesiastical focus or shape’ (Roberts 1983, 45).


170 Hedley 2000, 8.

171 Ibid. 146.
metaphysics’ embodied in the apologetic approach to Scripture. Hedley’s
description of another concern of Coleridge applies to the ‘Lectures’ directly:
‘a bad philosophy, i.e. empiricism, will lead to Socinianism or an outright
hostility towards Christian tenets’. Having exposed both the rationalistic
assumptions and empiricist scepticism which he finds in modern approaches to
the Old Testament, Pusey will go on to consider the spiritual faculties, ‘our
organs of the spirit’, by which we may receive spiritual truth. Pusey’s
discussion of types and prophecy in the Old Testament is not only a discussion
about exegesis, but a project which offers an alternative approach to theology.

172 Ibid. 55.
Chapter 3 Knowledge as Participation

3.1 Knowing through what is Divine in Us

Pusey’s search to uncover the Rationalist principles and assumptions of apologetic or evidence-based approaches to prophecy leads him to consider broader theological questions about the kind of knowledge which prophecy reveals and how that knowledge is grasped. Fundamentally, Pusey understands religious knowledge to involve a participation in the divine life. Therefore, this knowledge is not only a matter of intellect, but is affected by moral character and perception, it is both a frame of mind and a kind of vision. Coming to see what Scripture reveals is also a test or trial which is itself a means of sanctification. The unsystematic character of Pusey’s account of our spiritual faculties makes it difficult to bring together the different aspects of his argument. However, despite these complexities there is a necessary connection between how he conceives perceiving the meaning of prophecy and the soul and character which grasps that meaning. Pusey’s theory of knowledge is interwoven with his account of the constitution and powers of the human soul. This chapter will investigate the issues of epistemology and theological anthropology which belong together in Pusey’s argument.

For Pusey, how much we can understand what prophecy reveals is a particular example of the more general question of how it is possible to know God or spiritual things at all. Pusey explains the necessary obscurity of human knowledge of God in terms of theological anthropology:

God and His ways and His Nature we can, of course, know but in part; and our highest knowledge must be our indistinctest; for that which is most elevated must most surpass our comprehension; it belongs to another sphere, and just touches, as it were, upon that wherein we dwell; its centre is not in this world, and so we cannot surely it encompass; its very proportions we can discern only here and there as we see ‘parts of His ways’ bearing one upon another; as a whole we see nothing, can judge of nothing; because we are not at the centre whence it can be seen; our most spiritual faculties are just allied to it, for we are in the flesh. (L2)
Pusey argues that we know God as much as we are like God, while conversely because we are unlike God our knowledge of Him must be limited:

Because we are of God and born of God, we have some sense for beholding the things of God; but because we are in the flesh, and ‘no man can see God and live’, the light but parts from between the clouds lest we should be struck down to the earth and blinded. (L2)

Here Pusey follows the characteristic Platonic idea that like knows like. We cannot comprehend fully what we discern of God because we are ‘in the flesh’. The focus on empirical forms of knowledge in theology creates the illusion: ‘Men think that they gain in clearness, but they lose in depth’. (L24) At the same time, knowledge of God is accessible to us because there is a likeness or similarity between the knower and the object of knowledge, ‘our spiritual faculties are just allied to it’.

Our highest knowledge of God is a participation in knowledge which is first and primarily God’s knowledge. The human capacity to know God or the things of God is directly related to our share in what belongs to God: ‘The soul, through that which is divine in it, just putteth forth itself and half-seeth things invisible, but cannot declare them or embody them in words. St Paul’s highest revelations and visions were “unspeakable words which it is not lawful for a man to utter”’. (L2) Our likeness with God is not merely an accidental similarity, but involves a genuine communion, a sharing in the life and knowledge of God. We can know God and supernatural revelation because we are ‘born of God’ and have something of the divine life in us. However, Pusey holds in tension this view of knowledge as participation with an emphasis on the distinction between humanity and divinity. Our knowledge of God is limited by his transcendence as well as human incapacity to apprehend the Divine. In his study of Pusey’s ‘Lectures’, Donald Allchin argues that central to the ‘Tractarian vision of the world and of God’ is the idea ‘that at the moment of recognising the utter transcendence of God we also experience his agonising nearness’. Both these elements of nearness and transcendence are part of Pusey’s account of participation.

1 Allchin 1967, 53-4.
Marshall indicates that in addition to patristic sources, Pusey referred to Richard Hooker’s *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* V.56.7-8 and V.56.11 to fill out the implications of ‘The participation of the divine Nature’. In these passages, Hooker emphasizes the ‘mystery of our coherence with Jesus Christ’ whereby ‘by virtue of this mystical conjunction, we are of him and in him even as though our very flesh and bones should be made continuant with his’. Hooker uses the language of participation explicitly: ‘We are therefore adopted sons of God to eternal life by participation of the only-begotten Son of God, whose life is the well-spring and cause of ours.’

What Pusey suggests about knowledge as a kind of participation in other writings also helps one to see the importance of this idea in the ‘Lectures’. In an Easter sermon in the first volume of his *Parochial Sermons* (1848) entitled ‘The Christian’s Life in Christ’, Pusey argues that New Testament references to being ‘in Christ’ or ‘dwelling’ in God describe more than the ‘mere lifting up of our affections to Him’ or being ‘enwreapped in contemplation of Him’. For Pusey, humanity’s union with God is the ‘great difference between us and the brute creation’: ‘By dwelling in us, He makes us parts of Himself, so that in the Ancient Church they could boldly say, “He deifieth me,” that is, He makes me part of Him, of His Body, Who is God.’ This idea is so important that in the preface to the volume he vows to return to it again and again:

The writer, however, rather wishes to remark what sort of repetition he did not wish to avoid, the inculcation of the Great Mystery, expressed in the words to be ‘in Christ,’ to be ‘Members of Christ,’ ‘Temples of the Holy Ghost,’ that Christ doth, through the Holy Ghost Whom He hath given to us, dwell really and truly in the hearts of the faithful. This

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2 2 Pet. 1:4 quoted in *Laws*, V.56.7, 249. For Marshall’s references, see M82.
3 *Laws* V.56.7, 249-250. Hooker refers to Eph. 5:30.
4 *Laws*, V.56.7, 250.
6 Ibid. 233. Pusey quotes Athanasius, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Cyril of Jerusalem in support of this argument. See Allchin 1988, 56-61, for another consideration of the importance of the ‘patristic understanding of the indwelling of God in man’ (p. 58) both for Pusey and the Oxford Movement. See also Rowell 1983, 81-82, and Hedley 1996, 238-51.
doctrine he has the more insisted upon, as it is to be feared that it is habitually neglected, even by many who do not in words deny it.\(^7\)

In his study of the Oxford Movement, Owen Chadwick argues that the consideration of a person’s participation or incorporation in the divine life has a particular emotional or mystical force in Pusey’s writing when compared to other Tractarians:

Upon the doctrinal plane, Pusey’s language imparted a new note to the common language of the Tractarians. The Church is the Body of Christ that is common to them all. But Pusey almost feels the individual’s incorporation into the Body. His language is more mystical (in the modern rather than the contemporary sense) than the language of any other Tractarian, and in its dwelling upon the participation of the Christian in the divinity of Christ, the union of the soul with its Redeemer, can rise to heights of beauty. Brilioth, indeed, named him the *doctor mysticus* of the Movement.\(^8\)

We will see in this chapter that this doctrine of participation and the understanding of humankind as made in God’s image fundamentally shapes Pusey’s understanding of epistemology in the ‘Lectures’.

In emphasizing the idea that knowledge of God is a kind of participation, Pusey understands himself to be challenging the apologetic approach and correcting the confusions of rationalism. Ten years after he delivered the ‘Lectures’, he argued that one of Hampden’s most serious errors was to describe as a ‘Pantheistic notion’ the idea of “‘a participation of Deity’, or an actual deification of our nature”.\(^9\) Pusey writes: ‘It is then very serious, when the doctrine of “the participation of the Divine Nature” (2 S. Pet. i. 4.) is represented as Pantheistic; it is directly to prepare the way for error, to represent the truth as involving it.’\(^10\) For Pusey, the empiricism and pantheistic materialism that he criticizes in Paley and Hampden, and which we considered in the last chapter, is an attack on the doctrine of participation: ‘This very

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\(^7\) *PS-I*, v. See also pp. xix-xxi, especially n. x, where Pusey discusses his understanding of participation.

\(^8\) Chadwick 1990, 39. See also Brilioth 1933, 296. On the importance of the doctrine of participation for the Oxford Movement, see Louth 1983, 74: ‘it is this realisation that God gives us not just His gifts, but Himself, that is the deepest conviction of the Fathers of the Oxford Movement’.

\(^9\) Pusey quotes *Sch.Phil.* in *PS-I*, xx, in the footnote.

\(^10\) *PS-I*, i, xix-xx, footnote.
narrowness of conception with regard to men’s practical character is tending to make them moral or religious machines, instead of realizing their privilege of union with God.\textsuperscript{11}

Conceiving knowledge as participation assumes a spiritual sense which comes not primarily from analysis, but from communion with God. In these terms, insisting on the clarity and intelligibility of prophecy is a method which seeks to ascertain divine truth from the outside, by reading the surface of things. Rather, Pusey describes knowledge as communion by using the image of dwelling in a house. Examining the structure or character of truth from the outside will not do, one must dwell in the house: ‘It is not the question, whether … the design would have given us such or such notions, but now that the building is reared and we are dwelling therein … to understand our own way in that building’. (L30-31) Or to put it in another way, as he does both in the ‘Lectures’ and in the Tracts on baptism, we can only grasp the importance and place of any idea or truth in the divine economy from the centre, from within the divine life:

If we imagine that we can assign to each truth its class or place in the divine economy, or weigh its value, or measure its importance, then we are again forgetting our own relation to God, and from the corner of His world in which we are placed, would fain judge of the order and correspondences and harmonies of things, which can only be seen or judged of, from the centre, which is God Himself.\textsuperscript{12}

In his study of the ‘Lectures’, Donald Allchin describes Pusey’s criticism of the apologetic tendencies in prophecy according to the priority he gives to an internal apprehension of spiritual truth:

Clarity and intelligibility are of course in themselves good. Their danger in theology is that they should give us an external notion of things, that we should gain a wrong sort of objectivity, seeking to grasp divine truths from outside, where in fact there are realities which can only be understood in so far as we are entering into them and being grasped by them.\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} DrH., xvii.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Scr.HB., 5. See also L2 above.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Allchin 1967, 58.
\end{itemize}
While we ought not to revel in obscurity, we cannot force interpretation and reach the centre, ‘which is God Himself’, by work of the human intellect alone. Rather, the goal of our interpretation must be to see things from within the divine life. In the search for ‘the religious element of prophecy’, the primary agency is not human but divine. The knowledge which is sought is not a lifeless fact but a living truth which grasps the one who knows.

3.2 The Moral Character of Religious Knowledge

3.2.1 Unbelief and Rationalism as Moral Problems

The way in which knowledge of God goes along with likeness to God points to a central tenet both of the ‘Lectures’ and of the Tractarian arguments generally. Religious knowledge has a moral character. Knowledge and the formation of character must go together because in God truth cannot be separated from righteousness. Since knowledge is a function of likeness, epistemology and theological anthropology cannot be separated, and both are subservient to theology. Prophecy reveals the Incarnate Lord, ‘Full of grace and truth’ [John 1:17]. (L24) When he describes the Son as the true image of God, Pusey draws on Origen to emphasize this unity of truth and holiness: ‘the image of God is wisdom, the image of God is righteousness, but Divine Wisdom and Eternal Righteousness’. (L148) What a person knows about God cannot be separated from becoming more righteous or holy, sharing in the life of God. A true understanding of revelation, the ability to read the Scriptures with understanding, is the result of sanctification more than the correct application of analytical reason. A good argument will not solve the problem of unbelief because the sort of unbelief which darkens our mind is primarily a moral rather than an intellectual problem: ‘unbelief originated in moral or religious defects. “They could not believe because their hearts were hardened.”’ (L5) It is this hardness of heart, the type of unbelief which has the character of sin, which

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14 Pusey also warns about the perversity of ignoring what is clear: ‘these flashes, so to speak, out of the cloud, impress us often even more with God’s Presence than the noon-day brightness. Of course, a very perverted use might be made of this feeling, if persons were to look out for passages which should thus strike them, or so prefer them as to lose out of sight the depth of God’s direct teaching.’ T67rev., 65.

15 See Origin, De Principiis, IX.4.
prevents us from understanding the words of the prophets or the deep meaning of Christ’s parables:

And accordingly, it is said of prophecy, as of the parables of our Lord – as indeed in other respects these mutually bear upon each other, the parables being prophetic, the prophecies parabolic – of both it is said, that they would be so constructed as to be hidden from those of wrong tempers. (L5)

Pusey argues that the study of Scripture requires not simply certain analytical tools and extensive knowledge, but a character which displays likeness with God.

Pusey’s approach in the ‘Lectures’ develops ideas he put forward in the Theology of Germany:

For it is obvious that if scripture is to be understood from itself, those only can rightly and fully understand it who have a mind kindred to that of its author … In religious writings it is plain that the spirit required is a religious spirit; that none can truly understand St. Paul or St. John, whose mind has not been brought into harmony with theirs, has not been elevated and purified by the same spirit with which they were filled.16

Pusey traced the rise of rationalism to moral defects as well as to theological or intellectual ones. Pusey saw this exemplified in Johann David Michaelis*, Professor of Oriental languages at Göttingen and a teacher of Eichhorn: ‘Deep insight into religion were indeed inconsistent with the intemperate habits and low moral character of Michaelis’.17 In order to be able to read and understand prophecy, it is this wrong temper and character which must be addressed. In Owen Chadwick’s words: ‘Pusey believed that the monster which he termed “rationalism” was always due to a failure in morals.’18

3.2.2 Practical holiness and the formation of right belief

Pusey’s argument is not just that moral problems prevent one from understanding prophecy or religious knowledge more generally, but that a life of practical holiness can repair the disordered understanding. Acting on belief and training the will offers its own kind of argument and demonstration:

16 *TG-I* 26-7. See also *TG-I*, 120, 143, and *TG-II*, 421.
17 *TG-I*, 136.
18 Chadwick 1960, 59.
We are not formed to seek conviction, but to have it. It is brought to us in the way of our duty. In all practical matters we live in belief and through acting on belief, believe in the things of God, and thereby attain a higher kind of belief, and an insight into our belief. (L6)

Pusey described this approach in a letter to Tholuck in 1839: ‘Our Great Divines and we after them say; yes, “crede ut intelligas”, believe in order that you may understand.\(^\text{19}\) This does not mean only that faith seeks to discern the rational truth of Christian doctrine. The Christian seeks understanding by acting on what is grasped only imperfectly and by faith, and by this response of the whole person, the eye of intellect is turned toward the divine light.

Pereiro’s description of Keble applies equally well to Pusey:

The remedy was to strengthen the eyes of the intellect by means of repentance, devotion, and self-denial, so as to make them able to stand the light of divine truth … Intellectual acuteness and industry, if not accompanied by that moral training, would be equivalent to the blind leading the blind.\(^\text{20}\)

According to Pusey, the sanctified life is the organ, the eye, and also the power which enables the Christian to perceive the deep truths which prophecy reveals. Donald Allchin sees this as characteristic of the Tractarian vision which is embodied in Pusey’s ‘Lectures’. In order to appreciate or experience God’s revelation, ‘all the resources of the human mind and heart must be summoned to its apprehension, in the end no words can express it. It must be known in life.’\(^\text{21}\)

Once again, Coleridge serves as a useful guide in approaching the ‘Lectures’. Coleridge writes, ‘Christianity is not a Theory, or a Speculation; but a Life; – not a Philosophy of Life, but a Life and a living Process.’\(^\text{22}\) In order to prove Christianity, one does not elaborate evidences, rather, one must live it. To prove it, says Coleridge, ‘TRY IT.’\(^\text{23}\) The Christian sees spiritual things and divine light only through the lens of his whole life, not by the applications of analytical processes. The ‘phantasms’ which were formed by

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\(^{19}\) Pusey to Tholuck, 19. Nov. 1839, LBV-127.
\(^{20}\) Pereiro 2008, 96.
\(^{21}\) Allchin 1967, 54
\(^{22}\) Aids, 202
\(^{23}\) Ibid.
walking in darkness or ‘the Bodings inspired by the long habit of selfishness, and self-seeking cunning’ are like a mist which veil or confuse the pilgrim’s perception of the divine light.\textsuperscript{24} If bad habits and confused desires can impair a person’s ability to grasp religious truth, reformed habits and sanctified desires can function as reliable guides. Coleridge argues that the goal of Christianity is to ‘moralize the affections’.\textsuperscript{25} He describes ‘a tranquil habit of inward life’ as ‘a spiritual Sense’.\textsuperscript{26} In a phrase that characterizes Pusey’s approach equally well, the Cambridge divine F. J. A. Hort describes this as ‘the doctrine of the ultimate identity of knowledge and moral excellence, which is latent through Coleridge’s philosophy’.\textsuperscript{27}

The theme that practical holiness goes together with the formation of right belief appears in Pusey’s writings throughout his life and in the writings of other members of the Oxford movement. Pusey’s first sermon, preached on 7 September, 1828, was on the text ‘Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord’ (Heb. 12:14). Liddon comments on the importance of this idea for Pusey and the Tractarians: ‘It is remarkable that the first of Mr. Newman’s published Parochial Sermons is on the same text and subject. The movement in which they both took so leading a part was, before all things, a call to “holiness.”’\textsuperscript{28} Peter Nockles argues that the Oxford Movement’s emphasis on the importance of the formation of character was a reaction to a prevailing emphasis on the power of the intellect exemplified by the Oriel Noetics: ‘the Tractarians … reacted against the “presumptuous turn of mind, the reliance on intellectual ability, supposed to result from instruction addressing itself to the intellect alone”, in favour of “formation of moral character by habit” and the inculcation of the deeper ethical and spiritual truths of moral philosophy’.\textsuperscript{29} In his study of Pusey’s ‘Lectures’ and the Tractarian use of the Bible, Andrew Louth sees this emphasis on the moral character of

\textsuperscript{24} Aids, 36.
\textsuperscript{25} Aids, 96.
\textsuperscript{26} Aids, 89
\textsuperscript{27} Hort 1856, 324.
\textsuperscript{28} Life, 144.
\textsuperscript{29} Nockles 1994, 202.
knowledge as a work of retrieval. The Tractarians shared with the Romantics a ‘common stress on the moral conditions of real human knowledge, something derived from their common indebtedness to Greek wisdom’. 30 Both in reaction to prevailing trends, and in an effort to recover a way of thinking which they believed endangered, the Tractarians emphasized the link between knowledge and formation of character. Owen Chadwick writes: ‘it is not likely that any sound Christian thinking will again lose the integral connexion between faith and the conscience, that essential link between religious propositions and moral judgements, which is one contribution of the Oxford Movement to English thought’. 31 In the ‘Lectures’ Pusey applies a basic Tractarian ideal to the interpretation of Old Testament prophecy.

3.2.3 Reading prophecy as a means of sanctification

Pusey’s understanding of the moral character of religious knowledge also means that understanding prophecy is a way by which one’s character is formed and shaped. Pusey argues that prophecy offers a sort of trial or test:

The marks which God therein gave to His people, as the birth – of a virgin – at Bethlehem, were so many tests whereby to distinguish this true Messiah: tokens, given to as many as looked and longed for Him whereby they should know Him for whom they looked and longed. (L4)

The nature of a ‘token’ or a ‘test’ is that it is possible to fail to see that which they reveal. What prophecy shows is not the type of knowledge which can be taught to all equally well, provided only that they have sound cognitive abilities.

Pusey’s argument here appears to be influenced once again by Joseph Butler's Analogy of Religion. From the observation that in day to day situations we act on the basis of probability rather than absolute certainty Butler derives his famous dictum that ‘probability is the very guide of life’. 32 Even though we must weigh various kinds of uncertainty in seeking success in any undertaking,

30 Louth 1984, 36. See also Hort 1856, 324, for this idea discussed in relation to Coleridge.
31 Chadwick 1960, 61. See also, p. 26: ‘The mode of receiving or apprehending doctrine is believed, by all these men, as they react against the “merely” intellectual, the school of religious philosophy, to be related to moral and spiritual capacity.’
32 Anal., 3.
we are accountable for how we respond to those uncertainties and for what kind of choices we make. According to the principle of analogy, ‘There seems to be no possible reason to be given, why we may not be in a state of moral probation, with regard to the exercise of our understanding upon the subject of religion, as we are with regard to our behaviour in common affairs.’³³

There are two closely related aspects to this which are important to identify and distinguish. On the one hand, our moral character affects our capacity to receive and understand religious knowledge; it has, in Pereiro’s description of Butler, an ‘intellectual dimension’.³⁴ The attentiveness, seriousness, impartiality, or concern with which we consider uncertain evidence or difficult problems reflects our moral condition:

And in general, levity, carelessness, passion, and prejudice, do hinder us from being rightly informed, with respect to common things: and they may, in like manner, and perhaps in some further providential manner, with respect to moral and religious subjects: may hinder evidence from being laid before us, and from being seen when it is … that those who are desirous of evading moral obligations should not see it; and that honest-minded persons should.³⁵

We have seen the importance of these views for Pusey above. Failing the test or trial of prophecy reveals our moral condition.

However, for Butler as for Pusey, our moral or spiritual condition alone does not determine how we understand religious knowledge in a straightforward or static way, so that a person of such a level of holiness will understand the same level of revelation. Rather, the act of reading and seeking to understand is a kind of trial, a spiritual or ascetic exercise. How one responds to uncertain evidence in matters of religion affects whether or not we will change to become more like God: ‘The evidence of Religion not appearing obvious, may constitute one particular part of some men’s trial in the religious sense: as it gives scope, for a virtuous exercise, or vicious neglect of their

³³ Anal. II.6, 234.
³⁴ Pereiro 2008, 92, offers a helpful summary of Butler’s understanding of how weighing evidence is a form of moral probation.
³⁵ Anal. II.6, 244-5.
understanding, in examining or not examining into that evidence.\footnote{Anal. II.6, 234.} We have seen the importance of this idea in the ‘Lectures’ in Pusey’s interpretation of Christ’s rebuke of the Sadducees and, more generally, in the unwillingness of apologetic writers to discern what obscure passages teach. Accepting uncertain evidence or an obscure prophecy is a sanctifying trial which requires the exercise of virtue so that one does not evade the evidence that a more humble or attentive regard would see.

The idea that the obscurities of Scripture may serve a providential purpose which give scope for the exercise of virtue and virtuous interpretation extends beyond Butler to the early ages of the Church. One finds this also in Augustine’s \textit{On Christian Doctrine}, the influence of which Duane Arnold maintains is clearly evident in the ‘Lectures’.\footnote{Arnold 1995, 207-16.} Augustine writes that the ‘ambiguities and obscurities’ of Scripture were ‘provided by God to conquer pride by work and to combat disdain in our minds, to which those things which are easily discovered seem frequently to become worthless’.\footnote{Augustine 1958, 2.6.7, 37.} This trial is necessary to overcome that pride and disdain ‘by which those things which are easily discovered seem frequently to become worthless’.\footnote{Ibid.} The need for a ‘virtuous exercise’ of the understanding that one finds in both Butler and Pusey is articulated by Augustine also. The movement toward God, the ‘journey or voyage home’, is not a journey through space, but one of ‘cleansing’: ‘we do not come to Him who is everywhere present by moving from place to place, but by good endeavour and good \textit{habits}'.\footnote{Ibid. 1.10.10, 13.} This moral and spiritual purpose is the primary end served by Scripture: ‘the end or purpose in this and every thing, must be instruction, edification, not gratification of our curiosity, or indulgence of the imagination’. (L12)

Pusey argues both that the pursuit of a holy life is necessary in order to read prophecy with understanding, and that reading prophecy faithfully sanctifies the soul. In their book \textit{Sanctified Vision: An Introduction to Early}
Christian Interpretation of the Bible, John O’Keefe and R. Reno argue that this double emphasis is characteristic of the patristic period: ‘the notion that exegesis fosters and flows from a disciplined life’ was ‘universal in the early Church’. They find in the first Theological Oration of Gregory of Nazianzus the idea that theology is ‘the discipline of thought that emerges from the formation of the mind in accordance with scripture’. For Gregory, this discipline is ‘only for those who have been tested and have found a sound footing in study, and, more importantly, have undergone, or at the very least are undergoing, purification of body and soul’. In the ‘Lectures’, Pusey turns to Gregory of Nazianzus in a similar way, to argue for the need for the priest who ministers the Eucharistic Sacrifice to be formed according to the character of that sacrifice:

… no one is worthy of that Great One – God, and Sacrifice, and High Priest – who has not first presented himself a living holy sacrifice to God, nor has sacrificed to God the sacrifice of praise and a broken heart (which sacrifice alone He who giveth all things asketh back from us). (L118) An interesting element of this analysis is the insistence of both Pusey and Gregory that there is a danger involved in the interpretation of Scripture. Any genuine knowledge of God involves entering into the divine presence and thus an encounter with a holiness, goodness, and power which is beyond human imagining or control. Not only is intimate knowledge of God not possible for those who are not becoming like God, it is not safe. Gregory writes that ‘For one who is not pure to lay hold of pure things is dangerous, just as it is for weak eyes to look at the sun’s brightness’. Pusey applies this danger to the recovery of a patristic interpretation of Scripture:

… it may be that all of us are, or have been, too much influenced by the atmosphere, with which we have been surrounded, ever to see clearly where the antient Fathers enjoyed such undisturbed vision. Nor would too hasty a return be safe; and a mere constrained adoption of their views, and a determination to see with their eyes, would restore no healthful, or clear sight; we cannot make ourselves see. (L38)

41 O’Keefe 2005, 139.
42 Pusey quotes ‘In Defense of his Flight to Pontus’, 2.95, in Gregory Nazianzen 1994, 223.
43 Gregory of Nazianzus, Theological Orations, 27.2 in O’Keefe 2005, 139.
O’Keefe and Reno’s aptly reflect Pusey’s views: ‘Vision must be sanctified if one is to see rather than be blinded by the mystery of God.’

3.2.4 Pusey’s Theory of Knowledge and the New Criticism

Pusey’s account of knowledge as participation helps to explain another surprising aspect of his focus in the ‘Lectures’. In the mid-1830s, Pusey was one of scholars in England most familiar with the results of the historical-critical studies which were transforming biblical studies in Germany and challenging views about the Bible which Pusey and most self-confessed orthodox Churchmen in England, High Church or Evangelical, would share. Since Pusey believed that the Old Testament presented an accurate picture of the history of Israel and that miracles were reliable signs and evidences of the divinity of Christ, it is significant that in the ‘Lectures’ he did not address himself to the most obvious representatives of that ‘tide of scepticism’ which he believed was coming to England. His description of the Essays and Reviews (1860) as containing ‘nothing to which the older of us had not been inured for some forty years’ suggests that Pusey’s choice to focus on the problems of the evidentialist and apologetic school in the ‘Lectures’ was not simply a misjudgement brought about by not seeing where things were headed. Rather, for Pusey, defective forms of historical criticism were the fruit of the problem of rationalism, not its root.

Pusey’s assessment of Heinrich Paulus (1761-1851), Professor of Exegesis and Church History in Heidelberg from 1811-41, exemplifies Pusey’s views. Although knowledge of German scholarship in England was still meagre in the 1830s, Rose had already described for English readers Paulus’ explanation of the miracle of the drachma in the fish’s mouth (Matt. 17:24-7). According to Paulus, the miracle gave an embroidered description of how Peter

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44 O’Keefe 2005, 139.
45 In his classic study, John Rogerson argues that it was not until the 1840s that German Old Testament scholarship was regularly reviewed and translated in England. See Rogerson 1984, 158-79, and Life, 72. Prior to that, knowledge of German biblical scholarship was most advanced among Unitarians (pp. 158-9, see also Rose 1825, 67, 82, for this association).
46 Pusey 1868, iii.
paid the tax with the money he earned from catching fish. In a similar vein, Paulus demythologized the miracle of Christ walking on water (Matt. 14:25-9). Christ had not joined the apostles in the boat on that occasion because the voyage would have been inconvenient against a contrary wind. Instead, he followed the boat on foot, along the water, not on top of it, and lifted Peter from the water while he stood on land (a mistake Paulus attributes to a mistranslation of ἐπὶ). Presumably with such examples in mind, Pusey censures ‘the low and vulgar tone of mind, in which Paulus degraded every thing spiritual and divine in the Gospels to the sphere of civil every-day life, the mean and earthly principles which he attributes to its actors’. By this approach, ‘far more injury has been produced than by the soon exploded and now almost forgotten explanations of the miracles’. For Pusey, the denial of miracles was a symptom of rationalism, not its cause. Explaining miracles by natural causes can only undermine trust in the Scriptures if faith is already weakened: ‘The physical expositions of the Christian miracles again, which held in German a very pernicious, although short reign, are too preposterous to be received where the mind has not been already weakened’. 

Pusey’s assessment of J. G. Eichhorn, whose lectures on the books of Moses Pusey attended in Göttingen during his first visit to Germany in the summer and autumn of 1825, illustrate Pusey’s criticisms of Paulus. Eichhorn’s analysis of the Jehovist and Elohist sources that lie behind the Pentateuch is similar to the more developed documentary hypothesis put forward and popularized later by Julius Wellhausen (1844-1918). However, for Pusey, the greatest ‘evils’ of the theories of J. G. Eichhorn did not result from his reassessment of Old Testament history, but from his ‘common-place views of the persons, actions, institutions, and doctrines of Scripture’. Eichhorn treated the opening chapters of Genesis as a genuine account of the experience

47 Rose 1825,153-4.  
48 Rose 1825, 155-6.  
49 TG-I, 137.  
50 TG-I, 137.  
51 TG-II, 421. His comments on the ‘short reign’ of this view indicates that some parts at least of his assessment were inaccurate.  
52 TG-I, 137.
of primitive human beings, but argued that what was written needed to be understood as expressing that experience according to primitive or mythological modes of thought: ‘What lay behind Genesis 2-3 was the experience of a human couple who had become aware of their sexual differences as the result of eating slightly poisonous fruit from a tree. They had been driven in fright from their oasis by a thunderstorm, which to them indicated divine judgement.’

In Pusey’s assessment, theories like this one were ‘constructed on the assumed human origin of every phenomenon in revealed religion’. While Pusey was impressed with Eichhorn’s extensive grasp of historical and critical information, he was shocked by his ‘total insensitivity to the real religious import of the narrative’, i.e. his inability to interpret it. Pusey does not focus on the conclusions of Eichhorn’s studies of Old Testament history. Rather, he describes him in the same terms as Semler – it is the character of his mind and the principles which make his conclusions possible which are the real problem, not the simple fact that he draws on the tools of historical study. Pusey argues that insensitivity to the supernatural leads to a ‘common-place’, ‘vulgar’ or ‘carnal’ approach, an approach he learned from Paulus. This is another form of Pusey’s criticism of empiricism and its results which we considered in detail in the last chapter. The struggle between this empiricist or common-place approach and a spiritual one is part of ‘the only and deepest theme of the history of the world and man, the contest between faith and unbelief’. Pusey puts this argument most succinctly thirty years later. In the preface to his lectures on the prophet Daniel, published as a response to *Essays and Reviews* (1860), Pusey argues that unbelief is the cause of erroneous forms of historical criticism rather than the result:

53 Rogerson 1984, 18.
54 TG-I, 137. See *Life*, 74: ‘the supernatural element was treated not as an objective reality but as representing an ancient and profoundly interesting phase of mind.’
55 *Life*, 73.
56 In the same way Pusey criticised Semler’s ‘attempt to conciliate rationalism’ rather than the theory of positive accommodation which exercised Pusey’s English contemporaries. See TG-I, 130, 139-40, 144, Rose 1825, 48, and Blunt 1874, 482.
57 TG-I, 137, 130.
58 TG-I, 5.
Disbelief of Daniel had become an axiom in the unbelieving critical school. Only, they mistook the result of unbelief for the victory of criticism. They overlooked the historical fact that the disbelief had been antecedent to the criticism. Disbelief had been the parent, not the offspring of their criticism; their starting-point, not the winning-post of their course.59

Pusey’s analysis of the apologetic school in the ‘Lectures’ finds the origin of this disbelief in a rationalistic and empiricist approach which confused the collection of evidence from an understanding of the religious import of the narrative. His account of the moral character of knowledge shows why for Pusey a recovery of the patristic model of interpretation was the best antidote to the root problem.

3.3 Reason and the Rational Soul in the ‘Lectures’

3.3.1 Assessments of the Character of Pusey’s Thought

Pusey’s line of argument could suggest that his criticism of the apologetic school involves a pietistic or conservative reaction to the intellectual trends of his day; that he is unable or unwilling to address the theological issues involved in the arguments which he criticizes and so labels them as immoral or unfaithful. This kind of reading of the ‘Lectures’ would fit with how some scholars have characterized Pusey’s later work. In his article, ‘Edward Bouverie Pusey: From Scholar to Tractarian’, H. C. G. Matthew argues that while in his early work on German theology Pusey showed promise as a progressive and insightful scholar, he later retreated into a narrow and reactionary authoritarianism: ‘Although spiritually he enlarged the boundaries of Anglican devotionalism, intellectually and theologically he led Anglo-Catholicism, which he himself did so much to establish, into a dead end.’60 Similarly David Forrester sees Pusey’s contribution to the Oxford Movement in pietistic rather than intellectual terms: ‘In joining the Tractarians, therefore, it is not unlikely that Pusey hoped to foster an objectivized and institutionalized form of pietism such as he had experienced from his reading

59 Pusey 1868, vi.
60 Matthew 1981, 123.
of Spener and found practised among his German friends." Forrester’s argument seems to find support in the way in which, in the first part of his *Theology of Germany, Pusey quoted with approval Schleiermacher’s maxim, ‘The endeavour to introduce philosophical systems into theology is generally at variance with a correct interpretation of Scripture.’ Liddon refers to this as one of those maxims of Schleiermacher to which Pusey later referred to as ‘useful to bear in mind.’ In his study of Pusey’s appropriation of the ideas of the Fathers, Robert Crouse argues that Pusey’s acceptance of Schleiermacher’s maxim is indicative of an approach which carried Pusey’s suspicion of rationalism to a dogmatic ‘neo-pietism’. Crouse argues that Pusey ‘was oblivious to the philosophical foundations and character of patristic thought; it must stand upon authority alone, and allegiance to it was simply a moral question’. Crouse sees this as an expression of the Tractarian emphasis on piety over critical thought: ‘Characteristic of Pusey’s thought, and, indeed, or Tractarian thought in general, was the conviction that critical reason must always be subordinated to moral and religious ends.

While these assessments are generally based on works written considerably later than the ‘Lectures’, they affect how people approach the ‘Lectures’ and Pusey’s work more generally. On the basis of the Library of the

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61 Forrester 1989, 114–5. For Pusey’s view of the importance of Spener, see *TG-I*, 72–82.  
62 *TG-I*, 115 n. 1. Pusey quotes Schleiermacher from his *Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums* (1811), later translated as *Brief Outline of the Study of Theology*.  
63 *Life*, 84.  
64 Crouse 1983, 147.  
65 Ibid. 146. See also Crouse 1990, 333. Albrecht Geck sees the Hampden controversy in these terms, with Pusey taking up an orthodoxist and moralistic position against Hampden’s free enquiry (Geck 2009, 95). The argument of Chapter 1 of this thesis suggests that this assessment gives insufficient notice to the theological and philosophical issues Pusey raises in his pamphlets opposing Hampden’s view.  
66 Ibid. 143. It is not clear how Pusey used the term ‘philosophy’ in the reference to Schleiermacher’s maxim. Even in the *Theology of Germany*, where that quotation appears, Pusey praises the Platonist Philo (*TG-I*, 143). In Tract 67 Pusey uses the term philosophy in both negative and positive senses; negatively as a synonym for merely human reasoning, positively to describe the knowledge which perceives spiritual realities (T67r, 132, 274). Henry Wilberforce, who aligned himself with the Tractarians in arguments about subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles, referred to ‘those elegant and scientific pursuits which in our day … have usurped almost exclusively possession of the title of philosophy’ (Pereiro 2008, 89). If Wilberforce is articulating a generally held view, then in criticising the application of philosophy to the interpretation of the Bible, Pusey would be criticising primarily an empirical and rationalistic approach, naturalism or scientism, rather than one which draws on other kinds of philosophical reflection.
Fathers alone, Nockles argues that ‘to regard the painstaking patristic labours of the Tractarians such as Pusey as something of a turning of the back on genuine academic scholarship … is less than fair’.  

Rather, ‘the rise of the Oxford Movement’, a rise to which Pusey contributed so significantly, ‘was partly the product of a spirit of intense intellectual enquiry’. Timothy Larsen also describes Pusey’s work of retrieval as expansive rather than narrow: ‘Indeed, Pusey’s commitment to thinking about the contents of Holy Scripture along with the voices of the great tradition of Christian thought is positively fashionable in our own day … making the claim that Pusey was an obscurantist who drove into a dead end ring ever more hollow’. 

Another contemporary scholar, Christopher Seitz, also emphasizes Pusey’s theological ‘comprehensiveness’: ‘Pusey’s defence of Daniel’s authorship engaged “text, church, and world” with just as much seriousness as something later to be called specialized academic discourse.’

Determining the merits of Pusey’s later biblical scholarship is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, despite the importance of sanctification in Pusey’s theory of knowledge, the assessment of Pusey’s later work as dogmatic and reactionary does not adequately describe Pusey’s argument in the ‘Lectures’. We have seen already how Pusey’s description of the moral character of religious knowledge is closely connected to his understanding of knowledge as a kind of participation. His emphasis on the moral and religious character of knowledge needs to be seen in this light rather than as a merely pietistic emphasis on morality in the face of challenges to traditional mores or patterns of education. Andrew Louth’s analysis of William Sanday’s assessment of Newman supports the view that Pusey’s approach to patristic

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68 Ibid. 146.
69 Larsen 2009, 521.
70 Seitz 2001, 15, and 16-9, on the character of Pusey’s theological ‘comprehensiveness’.
71 Some of the scholars referred to already have attempted this. For Timothy Larsen, ‘Daniel the Prophet is as direct and thorough and learned an engagement with all the latest findings of the higher criticism of the Bible as one could imagine’, ‘so formidable that, in Britain at least, it was unanswerable’. Larsen 2009, 506. See also 507 (referring to Livesley 1983, 75–6) and 513 and Faught 2008, 143. R. W. Moberly supports Matthew’s verdict; while ‘Pusey’s deepest instincts were in many ways sound’, he allowed confessional presuppositions to get in the way of discovering the best construal of the Hebrew text. Moberly 2002, 182.
exegesis and typology reflects his theory of knowledge. When considering the ‘balance and combination of qualities’ needed to write a classic modern life of Christ, Sanday wrote: ‘What is wanted is a Newman, with science and adequate knowledge. No one has ever touched the Gospels with so much innate kinship of Spirit as he.’

Louth comments: ‘But the proviso – “with science and adequate knowledge” – is significant … For the presuppositions involved in filling such a lack as Sanday felt in Newman would have seemed to Newman himself, and his fellow Tractarians, as endangering the whole attempt to come closer to an understanding of Christ.’

Louth’s description of the problem with Sanday’s assessment of Newman applies equally to Pusey for the same reasons. In his rejection of the apologetic method and his advocacy of a typological reading of Scripture, Pusey emphasizes precisely the character of knowledge and the kind of science which is needed in the interpretation of the Bible. As we have seen in this chapter, ‘kinship of spirit’, or like knowing like, is a fundamental principle, not a desirable accessory. Pusey was the member of the Movement best equipped with the scientific tools of the Biblical scholarship of his day, yet he did not think that historical criticism would offer the key to unlock the meaning of prophecy. What is important to see is that he did not think that the appropriate application of historical or linguistic tools alone could unlock the meaning of Scripture, and that Pusey came to this view on the basis of theological principles. Pusey’s theory of knowledge and his exegesis of Scripture belong to this wider theological vision.

3.3.2 The Image of God in the Reasonable Soul

Examining what Pusey says about the soul and the spiritual faculties which enable a person to discern spiritual things demonstrates the theological character of his approach: ‘the soul, through that which is divine in it, just putteth forth itself and half-seeth things invisible’. (L2-3) It is the soul which receives or comprehends revelation and comes to know ‘God and His ways and His Nature’, which is our ‘highest knowledge’. (L2) What Abraham knew of

72 Sanday 1906, 240.
73 Louth 1984, 30.
‘the day of Christ’ he knew because of the light which ‘God poured into his soul’, and it was ‘his soul, as being more susceptible to divine truth’ which ‘understood things unspeakable, above what our thoughts reach to’. (L71) Pusey’s explanation of how prophecy is best understood and interpreted is also a study of theological anthropology, an examination of the character and capacities of the human soul. Pusey also calls these capacities or powers ‘our spiritual faculties’. (L2) In Pusey’s argument, the interpretation of Scripture goes together with the transformation of the soul which is made in the image of God and called to grow in the likeness of God.

Pusey develops both his doctrine of participation and his understanding of the soul through a lengthy consideration of patristic expositions of Genesis 1:26, ‘And God said, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.”’ Pusey argues that according to the Fathers these words imply an ‘actual participation of His Godhead’, and treats them as a prophecy of the New Testament understanding of humankind’s communion with God through Christ. (L139) Pusey introduced this discussion with an analysis of Adam’s creation:

He was made bĕṣalĕmēnû kidĕmūtĕnû ‘in Our image, after Our Likeness’, or as is repeated bĕšlmw ‘in His image’, ‘in the image of God’. The words must mean more than a mere external resemblance, of authority [as the Socinians say]; for this very external resemblance does but shadow out, and is a result of that internal likeness ‘let us make man in Our Image and after Our Likeness, and let him have dominion’; the dominion is not the image but the consequence, yea the image of the Image. That very emphasis on the words would lead us to more than this; but with the light of the New Testament which teaches us Who is ‘the Image of the Invisible God’, (εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ, Col. 1:15; εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ, 2 Cor. 4:4), the Impress or Express Image of his Person (χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, Heb. 1:3) we can have no doubt that he was formed (in what way, we know not) after and in Him, who is the Image of God that ‘in His likeness, in the likeness of God’, means ‘in

74 L.139-48. In ‘Notes’ Marshall gives the title as ‘Lecture the Eleventh, Quotations from the Fathers in support of the interpretations above given of Genesis III:22’. (M73) As discussed in the Introduction, Marshall’s ‘Notes’ show that Pusey used this material after the conclusion of the tenth lecture on L.51.

75 M69.
Him who is the likeness of God’, that *dmwr* [likeness], and *slm* [image] are no more *mere* abstract terms than εἰκὼν and χαρακτήρ. (L49)

Pusey’s account of the soul and the spiritual faculties begins with a consideration of what it means for humanity to be made in the image and likeness of God, and in what ‘that internal likeness’ consists.

An important part of Pusey’s examination of how the Fathers understand the image of God in humanity has to do with determining the role of reason and the relationship of human reason to the divine reason. In accord with the New Testament passages quoted above, Clement of Alexandria describes the Son as the primary or true image of the Father. Humankind is the image of this true image. ⁷⁶ Clement describes this image in humanity:

Moses relates that ‘the reasonable (λογικη) soul was from above breathed by God into his face: […] wherefore man was formed after the image and likeness of God. For the image of God is the Divine and Royal Logos, ἀνθρώπος ἀπαθής [the impassible man], but the image of that image is the human mind (νους) [εἰκόν δ′εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς’]. (L144) ⁷⁷

In this quotation, the ‘reasonable’ or rational soul is not the faculty which rationalizes, which can only judge things according to sense, but rather the image of God in human person. Pusey draws on Clement again to clarify the difference between the reason which, in a corrupted form, is manifest in rationalism and the image of God in the ‘reasonable’ soul:

The true image of God is His Word and the true Son of the (Divine) Mind is the Divine Word; Light the Archetype of Light; but the image of the Word is man; the true mind that which is in man, which is therefore said to have been formed after the image and likeness of God, being likened to the Logos or Reason on account of the φρονησις κατα καρδιαν and thereby itself partaking of the Logos. (L144) ⁷⁸

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⁷⁶ Pusey also finds this description in Clement of Rome: ‘The Λογος is the Χαρακτήρ of the Hypostasis of the Father, and man, in some way, in that he was formed after the image of God, was the χαρακτήρ of His image.’ L140.


Clement describes the Son as an image of the Divine Mind. The ‘true mind’ of humanity is an image of this image which therefore participates in the Reason or Logos which is identified with the Son. This ‘true mind’ may refer to the whole ‘reasonable’ soul in the previous quotation, or perhaps only to the higher part of the reasonable soul, the human reflection of the divine mind (‘ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς’). ‘Mind’ is the term which Pusey most often uses in the ‘Lectures’ to describe the intellect in a positive or neutral way. It is to a right ‘frame of mind’, that ‘God discloses truth’. (L91)\(^{79}\) There is something wrong in the ‘frame of mind’ which would find a kind of ‘self-satisfaction, as sight had then substituted for faith’ at the ‘first proposal of evidence’. (L5) ‘Reasoning,’ Pusey writes, ‘goes directly counter to the frame of mind wherein belief is received’. (L6) For Pusey, ‘mind’ appears to describe the higher part of the reasonable soul, the restored and enlightened human intellect, where the image of God is either being reformed or distorted. The significance of Pusey’s description of the ‘true mind’ in terms of an ‘understanding heart’ will be considered below, in relation to the spiritual faculties more generally.

In order to understand the importance of this description of the image of God in humanity as the true mind it is important to consider how Pusey qualifies or limits this identification:

But because Clement here speaks of the intelligent (νους) or ruling principle in man, as that which is formed after the image of God, let no one think that this is said in any modern sense, as if our likeness to God consisted (in any common-place way) in our being rational beings among the irrational. (L144-5)

Pusey distinguishes the image of God in humanity, ‘the human mind’ or ‘the intelligent (νους) ruling principle in man’, from ‘our being rational among the irrational’. The ‘common-place’ error which Pusey wants to avoid is the equation of the image of God in the human mind with the merely instrumental or analytical powers of reason, however powerful. It is the later kind of reason which he criticizes as ‘rationalizing’ in the ‘Lectures’. Paley’s argument from design exemplifies ‘artificial reasoning’, and biblical types are hidden from a

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\(^{79}\) Pusey refers to this ‘frame of mind’ throughout the ‘Lectures’, including L5, 5, 8, 87, 91, 112.
‘precise and clear and reasoning habit of mind’. (L11) Whereas the sun is a
symbol for revelation and its warmth, the moon symbolizes the ‘cold light of
reason which governs the night and ever-changing earthly wisdom’. (L17) 80
Pusey may be drawing here on Johann Hamann (1730-88) and his critique of
the Enlightenment reason as ‘a cold, unfruitful moonlight’. The equation of all
reason with this ever-changing power is at the root of the rationalism Pusey
finds in evidentialist theology.

3.3.3 Restoration and Sanctification: From Image to Likeness

Pusey’s account of the moral character of knowledge helps to explain the
distinction he makes between a common-place notion of rationality and the
image of God in humanity. He continues to refer to Clement of Alexandria:
“‘And be not,’” he represents our Saviour saying, “be not better than the
irrational animals in reason only: For to give you the Λογος, the knowledge of
God, I will give you Myself wholly.’” Knowledge of God is a form of
participation in the life of God. Therefore, growing in knowledge of God
involves becoming more like God who is ‘righteous and holy with wisdom’:

… he alone may be called and must be believed to be ‘the image of God
with His likeness’, having been made by Christ Jesus righteous and holy
with wisdom, and so far, already like unto God. And again he says, in the
more scientific work, Stromata 7: ‘The image most truly divine and like
to God is the soul of the righteous man, wherein, through obedience to
the commandments He is enshrined and setup.’(L146) 81

For Clement, the gift of the likeness of God which is also the gift of wisdom is
a movement from being made in the image of God to sharing the likeness of
God. Pusey quotes Clement again: ‘ye were of the old image (εἰκόνες) but not
all like (ἐμφαρεῖς), I wish to restore you to that Archetype, that you may also
be like Me (ινα Μοι και ομοιο γνέφθε).’ 82

In addition to Clement of Alexandria, Pusey draws on the testimony of
Clement of Rome, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus of Lyon, and Origen to argue that

80 See Betz 2012, 5.
81 Pusey quotes Clement of Alexandria, Exhortation to the Greeks, Chap. XII, and The Stro
mata, or Miscellanies, VII.4. See Clement of Alexandria 1960, 256-9, and 1994, 527.
that ‘image’ and ‘likeness’ are not simply synonyms. (L139-148) Rather, the image describes the way in which humanity was first made and given a share in God’s character by creation. The Fall badly damaged and tarnished this image, but it did not destroy it: ‘that fuller likeness, which originally it bore … is, in a measure, defaced, it is not effaced’. 83 Through the Incarnation, Christ restores the image of God in humanity: ‘Now again I will show you how He made the second creation (πλάσιν) which relates to us. The Lord says, “Behold I make in the last days, the last as the first – Behold then we are again re-formed.”’ (L139) 84 Being made ‘after the likeness of God’ describes the process by which a person who has been restored to God’s image is sanctified and changed to become an ever more true image, a genuine likeness. Commenting on this idea in Clement of Alexandria, Pusey argues that it is an insightful distinction in the Fathers more generally:

Clement also retains the distinction between εἰκόνα and the ὁμοιώσεως, and we must needs think that they have done rightly, and faithfully, not at once, in a careless way, taking them to be parallel because the differences between them does not force itself upon our notice, noticing rather that the image or form is at once impressed, the likeness is continually and may endlessly deepen, until it could be finally perfected, and therewith agrees the Scripture saying that we are formed in the image of God but after His likeness, which implies a completion in the one case, a gradual conformation in the other. This first formation is in Baptism, the heightening of the likeness the subsequent work of the Holy Spirit. (L145)

Interpreting the Bible is not an intellectual process by which verifiable data is extracted from the text of the Old Testament through the application of certain processes. Recognizing one form of God’s image in the types and prophecies of the Old Testament is part of the transformation of the soul, which is also an image, into a truer image, i.e. the likeness of God.

3.3.4 Theological Anthropology and Epistemology

The connection between theological anthropology and epistemology, between an account of the soul and an account of the senses of Scripture, is

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83 S-BN, 1.
84 Pusey quotes the Epistle of Barnabas, VI.13.
part of the necessity of a typical reading for Pusey. This argument finds support in Lewis Ayres’ article ‘The soul and the reading of scripture: a note on Henri De Lubac’. Ayres examines Henri de Lubac’s consideration of ‘the plurivocity of the Scriptures’ and argues that ‘De Lubac’s understanding of Christian attention to the various senses united under the label “spiritual” depends on a robust notion of the soul, its transformation and purification’. For de Lubac, Ayres maintains, ‘At its “highest or “deepest” the soul is constituted by a gift which is nevertheless its own and which enables contemplation of the Spirit and Christ whose life wells up within and through this gift’. Similarly, for Pusey, the wisdom by which we know God is super-added to the soul and completes the soul. Quoting Irenaeus and commenting on him, Pusey argues that ‘the perfect man is the union of the soul receiving the Spirit of the Father, and united with that flesh, who is formed according to the image of God’. The human person made in the image of God remains incomplete ‘unless he be continually made like unto Him’ by the effusion of the Holy Spirit: ‘But if the Spirit be wanting to the soul (anima ψυχη) who is such, is of a truth, animal (ψυχικη) and carnal, and being so left imperfect; having indeed the “Image” impressed on his being, but not receiving the “likeness” through the Spirit.’ (L143) True spiritual knowledge is always a form of participation, and the human soul is complete by the sanctifying work of the Spirit through which we become more and more like God. In his study of de Lubac, Ayres points out that de Lubac has ‘polemical targets in his sights’ and that he ‘openly attacks post-Enlightenment accounts which either describe human reason and action without reference to the transcendence of the human towards the divine, or which assume that the full reality of human mental life and experience can be described in purely psychological (or psychoanalytic) terms’. In the same way, Pusey’s account of the soul criticizes both the Enlightenment confidence in the sufficiency of autonomous human reason and the Lockean psychological empiricism evident in the

86 Ibid. 181.
87 See Irenaeus, Against Heresies, V.6.1. Irenaeus 1872, 460-1.
88 Ayres 2008, 182.
apologetic approach. For Pusey, the modern system denies both the necessary transcendence and dependence of spiritual knowledge and so impairs the transformation of the soul from the image to likeness of God.

3.3.5 Natural Reason as distinct from ‘a mirror of the Mind of God’

Pusey’s examination of the patristic interpretation of image and likeness in the ‘Lectures’ appears to offer the research with which to begin an argument rather than an argument in its final form. One must piece together his views from the way he quotes the Fathers and the comments he offers. However, the interpretation of Pusey’s argument offered here is supported by other material related to the ‘Lectures’. In the same box-file which contains the supplemental material which appears to include later drafts of some sections of the ‘Lectures’, as well as Marshall’s ‘Notes’ and his ‘Notes and Observations’, there is a hand-written draft of a sermon on the relationship of reason and faith.89 The sermon was preached as ‘All Faith the Gift of God’ at the University Church, St Mary the Virgin, on the Twenty Third Sunday after Trinity, 1855.90 In the sermon, Pusey describes the relationship of reason to faith and the distinction between the ‘true mind’ which is the image of God in humanity and merely rational powers in a way that is consistent with the ‘Lectures’, but more systematically. These arguments are supplemented by a second sermon, ‘Real Faith Entire’, published alongside ‘All Faith’ and originally preached on the next Sunday at the University Church.91 Although one does not find a hand-written version of ‘Real Faith Entire’ with papers associated with the ‘Lectures’, this sermon also addresses questions about the make-up of the soul and the relationship of reason and faith.

In ‘All Faith the Gift of God’, Pusey calls the faculty to which evidence is proposed by the name of ‘natural reason’:

If man arrived at faith through the mere use of his natural reason, accepting or rejecting what is proposed for his belief according as the

90 *AFai*., reprinted as Sermon VII in Pusey 1879, where the original preaching date and venue is specified.
91 *RFai*., also reprinted in Pusey 1879, as Sermon VIII, with the original preaching date and venue.
evidence is or is not adequate to satisfy his natural reason, then undoubtedly it would be through unaided exercise of that same natural reason, that his faith must be maintained, strengthened, enlarged, defended.\textsuperscript{92}

This ‘natural reason’ is the ‘unassisted human reason’ of the ‘Lectures’, reason which is cold, demonstrative, and superficial, the power which makes us ‘rational beings among the irrational’. (L35, 145) Pusey argues that the origin of the error which treats such reason as the basis of faith is the idea that ‘since reason is a gift of God, it will not conflict with His other gift, Revelation or Faith’.\textsuperscript{93} The problem with this argument is that it does not distinguish between different kinds of reason:

But then, what Reason? Reason, such as Adam had it, before the Fall, unwarped by prejudices, unswayed by pride, undeafened by passions, unallured by self-idolizing, unfettered by love of independence, master of itself because subdued to God, enlightened by God, a mirror of the Mind of God, reflecting His Image and likeness after which it was created; a finite copy of the perfections of the Infinite? Truly, no one would demur to the answer of such an oracle as this. A work of God, which remained in harmony with God, must be in harmony with every other creation of God; for both would be the finite expressions of the one Archetype, the Mind of God. But that poor blinded prisoner, majestic in its wreck, bearing still the lineaments of its primeval beauty and giant might, yet doomed, until it be set free, to grind in the mill of its prison-house and make sport for the master to whom it is enslaved, this, which can not guide itself, is no guide into the Mind of God.\textsuperscript{94}

The argument that the two gifts of God, reason and faith, should support one another moves onto uncertain ground when it is assumed, as Pusey had argued against Hampden, that because in the ordinary course of things we learn from experience in ‘this sensible world’, that we have no other faculty capable of knowing truths beyond sense.\textsuperscript{95} Perhaps drawing on his exposition of Clement of Alexandria in the ‘Lectures’, Pusey describes the capacity or faculty in humankind which can know truths beyond sense as a ‘mirror of the Mind of

\textsuperscript{92} A\textit{Fai.}, 3-4.  
\textsuperscript{93} A\textit{Fai.}, 16.  
\textsuperscript{94} A\textit{Fai.}, 16.  
\textsuperscript{95} Pusey, \textit{DrH.}, xxii.
God’ and a finite expression of ‘the one Archetype, the Mind of God’. In the same way that Clement describes wisdom and righteousness united in the Archetype, Pusey’s sermon maintains that the reason which Adam had ‘before the Fall’ reflects God’s holiness, being ‘unwarped by prejudices, unswayed by pride’.

As a result of the Fall, Pusey says that reason is doomed to ‘grind in the mill of its prison-house’. Nonetheless natural reason still has the capacity to investigate what we learn by experience or to make arguments based on principles or logic: ‘Acuteness and power of combination, inventiveness and grasp of intellect are the fit framers of discovers and organizers of human science and human philosophy’. The powers which reason retains after the Fall are ‘the lineaments of its primeval beauty and giant might’. Pusey argues in the ‘Lectures’ that the ‘great might’ of natural reason brings with it a sort of danger: ‘all might, intellectual as well as physical, is naturally opposed to render any service at all, to submit to any, and so to God also’. (61A) This opposition is evident in ‘the tendency of undisciplined intellect to different forms of unbelief or misbelief, to exalt self by modifying what God has given, and if it reject not revelation altogether to become heresiarchs or schismatics’. (L60A-61). This is the danger lurking in the apologetic approach which accepts implicitly the exaltation of human reason. As we saw above, in the ‘Lectures’ and in the tradition represented by Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine, one of the roles of the obscurities of Scripture is to subdue the powers of reason: ‘All human might, whether physical or intellectual, may be brought in the kingdom of God, and, in its proportion, render its service unto God … but all needs to be subdued’. (61A) Demanding clarity and proof is a kind of rejection of the intellect’s necessary dependence on God. In the Theology of Germany, Pusey suggested that it was a lack of this sense of dependence which led to the abuse of the tools of the theological sciences: ‘Not the pursuit of science in itself, not the depth of speculation, but the engrossing power which they exert over the

96 Wisdom 7:26 refers to wisdom as ‘the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of his goodness’. See also 2 Cor. 3:18.
97 AFat., 27.
unaccustomed mind … interferes with the harmonious and proportionate development of the intellectual and religious faculties’. Pusey’s view that ‘the very first condition of our restoration is entire self-surrender, and prostration of our whole selves, our imaginations, our minds, our wills’ may also be influenced by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and his understanding of faith as a feeling of ‘absolute dependence’. The importance of Schleiermacher for Pusey’s understanding of the soul will be discussed below.

Pusey describes human reason before the Fall as participating in or mirroring the divine reason, the Mind of God. The consequence of the Fall means that it is no longer part of reason’s normal powers to perceive naturally or directly the kind of knowledge which is inaccessible by empirical investigation or logical reflection: ‘intellect, unenlightened by Divine light intuitive as it may be in human things, is blind in Divine … The knowledge which pure intellect lacks, is not outward but inward; not natural but supernatural’. Nonetheless, this inward and supernatural knowledge is attainable, at least in part, by the work of grace, by the illumining of the Holy Spirit: ‘But reason, healed, restored, guided, enlightened, by the Spirit of God, has a power of vision above nature, and can spiritually discern a fitness, and correspondence, and harmony in the things of God which, through faith, it has received and believed’. In the ‘Lectures’ Pusey argues that because we are born of God we may have a knowledge of God and His nature. He makes the same point in ‘All Faith the Gift of God’, where he argues that ‘God only unfolds the things of God; through God only can we understand the things of God’. What the sermon adds to the ‘Lectures’ is a clearer description in his own words of the kind of reason which is part of ‘our most spiritual faculties’

98 TG-I, 121.
99 RFai., 70 See Schleiermacher 1968, I.4.1, 4 and I.6.1, 12, 16-17, 26. See also, AFai., 25: ‘It is part of the dependence in which God seeth it to be good for the creature to abide, that the creature should not know God, except through the Revelation of God.’ For the possible influence of Coleridge on Pusey’s sense of dependence, see Roberts 1983, 46 and Snook 2001, 12.
100 AFai., 24.
101 AFai., 17.
102 AFai., 24.
and which ‘half-seeth things invisible’, and how this reason, the image of God in the reasonable soul and mind, is distinct from rationalizing. (L2)

In the sermon, ‘Real Faith Entire’, published alongside ‘All faith the gift of God’ Pusey quotes St Bernard of Clairvaux to argue that ‘the reasonable soul’ is the image not simply of the Divine Son or Logos in humankind, but of the Trinity:

That Holy and Eternal Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, One God; Supreme Power, Supreme Wisdom, Supreme Goodness, created a certain trinity in Their Image and Likeness, to wit, the reasonable soul: which therein showeth forth some trace of all the Supreme Trinity, in that it consisteth of memory, reason, and will.¹⁰³

To explain how the ‘memory, reason, and will’ are an image of the Trinity in the human soul, Pusey refers the reader to Book XIII of his translation of Augustine’s *Confessions*: ‘I would that men would consider these three, that are in themselves … To Be, to Know, and to Will. For I Am, and Know, and Will’.¹⁰⁴ Pusey also quotes the *City of God*: ‘And we recognize in ourselves an image of God, that is, of the Supreme Trinity … For we both are, and know that we are, and love to be this and to know it’.¹⁰⁵ Pusey argues also that the soul created in the image of the Trinitarian God seeks a greater conformity or likeness to this image, ‘that, abiding in Him, it might be happy in the participation of Him’: ‘Man, however fallen, corrupted, decayed, perverted, still bears such impress of the image wherein he was created, that he seeks as his end something akin to the Attributes of God’.¹⁰⁶ In the ‘Lectures’, Pusey comments also that the ‘thoughtful Ancients … in Pagan Antiquity’ anticipated Christian revelation in their perception that the form of the Trinity, ‘the union of Three in One’, was ‘impressed on … man’s mind’. (L154)¹⁰⁷ What he says in the sermons develops this idea and complements his treatment of the character of the human soul which is sanctified by a typical reading of the Old Testament. The language Pusey uses to describe the image of God in the soul is

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¹⁰³ *RFai.*, 39-40.
¹⁰⁴ Augustine 1838, XIII.11.12, 283-4
¹⁰⁵ Ibid. XIII.11.12, 283 note t, where Pusey quotes *City of God*, XI.26.
¹⁰⁶ *RFai.*, 40, 41.
not original. What is important to see is how in the ‘Lectures’ Pusey draws on this tradition, and how his theological anthropology and his epistemology belong together with his treatment of types and prophecy as an antidote to the problems of his age.

3.3.6 ‘In thy light shall we see light’

Aside from his consideration of how the mind is made in the image of God, Pusey uses the metaphor of light and vision to describe the spiritual faculties which both discern divine truth and participate in that truth. The sentences from the ‘Lectures’ which describe what we can know about ‘God and His ways and His Nature’ which we have considered already are bracketed by images of light and vision. The problem with advocates of the apologetic or rationalistic approach is that they privilege the wrong kind of light and vision. In Pusey’s description different kinds of natural light symbolize different kinds of sight – ‘the natural world is an emblem of the spiritual’. The dim light of the natural world, the ‘rising and setting light’, symbolizes the inward and spiritual vision which can illuminate hidden and spiritual things, but only indistinctly, by a spiritual light, ‘those glimpses into a far distant land, which indistinct, though they may be, open a wider range of vision’. The ‘mid-day Sun’ enables one to see the objects of sense clearly, but the brightness of this light can lead the observer to fall into the error of empiricism, forgetting that there are other kinds of objects that one can see: ‘whatever then we gain in distinctness and precision we lose in depth; our furthest point of vision is just where “light and darkness part”’. (L2) Using a similar image, Pusey says that in the apologetic approach, ‘an unnatural glare of light had been thrown upon certain predictions, and these had been made to stand out unduly’. (L5)

In Pusey’s sermon, the light by which the soul perceives spiritual things is a spiritual or inward light which we do not simply see, but in which we participate: ‘in His light shall we see light. (Ps. 36:9) … Christians are light, as indwelt by His Presence, and reflecting His holiness’. The intellect which is

108 See also Allchin 1967, 57-8, for this passage.
109 S-EL, 5.
‘penetrated by the Spirit of God’, is intellect which is ‘irradiated by His Light’ and which ‘reflects’ this light: ‘Intellect, penetrated by the Spirit of God, irradiated by His Light, kindled by the glow of Divine love, reflects to after-ages the light which it has caught, illumines mysteries, guards truth, unfolds our spiritual nature, orders the whole sum and relations and proportions of Divine and human knowledge.’ As in the ‘Lectures’ Pusey describes Divine Light as an attribute of God and the light by which a human person perceives the things of God: ‘God alone can comprehend God. Through the brightness of the Divine Light in us, shall we, if, by His grace we attain, behold, each in our measure and degree, the Infinite, Incomprehensible, Essence of God.’

At the same time, Pusey uses the image of light to emphasize the distinction which we considered above between divine and human attributes and faculties. Based on 1 Timothy 6:16, he writes that God is ‘Light inapproachable, whom no man hath seen or can see’. (L23) The light by which we see is nonetheless inapproachable, it blinds or conceals as well as illuminates and reveals. This emphasis on the apophatic character of theology suggests Pusey’s indebtedness to the Greek Fathers in particular. With these images, Pusey distinguishes ordinary reasoning powers from a higher reason and a kind of seeing by the divine light which offers an intuitive understanding of divine and invisible things. Once again, we see that in Pusey’s theological anthropology, there is no such thing as a complete and independent human being, or an autonomous and coherent account of human knowledge.

3.3.7 Substantial and Procedural Reason

Pusey’s distinction between a higher kind of reason which offers an intuitive vision of spiritual or supra-sensual realities and a lower form of discursive or analytical reason is, of course, not unique. Charles Taylor’s account of this distinction in Sources of the Self (1999) is particularly helpful in terms of understanding Pusey’s argument because Taylor demonstrates the dialectic

110 Afai., 23-4.
111 Afai., 25.
112 Aidan Nichols find in the ‘Lectures’ an emphasis on apophatic theology, on ‘the mystery character of Christian truth’, which Pusey and the Tractarians learned from the Greek Fathers. Nichols 1993, 121-2.
between the pursuit for knowledge and anthropological considerations. In Taylor’s argument, both the goal of knowledge and what can be known are inextricably connected with how human nature is understood, with both implicit and explicit forms of self-understanding.\textsuperscript{113}

Taylor describes the way in which the kind of analytical reason which Pusey finds in the apologetic approach came to be the primary model for reason in the early modern period. According to Taylor, in the tradition represented by Plato and Augustine, and which informs the western theological tradition, human reason in its highest form was understood to reflect or participate in divine reason. According to this view, the truth of a reasoned argument is judged by its conformity to the substance of the truth which is known. That substance might be conceived of as Platonic Ideas, a divine order, the thoughts or the will of God. It is possible to use reason to advance in knowledge of the truth only because there is a correspondence between human reasoning and the mind of God. Furthermore, this relationship is not one of external similarity, as if the two just happened to correspond, but rather an organic and internal relationship. Taylor calls this a ‘substantive conception of reason’: ‘Rationality is tied to the perception of order; and so to realize our capacity for reason is to see the order as it is.’\textsuperscript{114} In the modern period, in the tradition exemplified by René Descartes (1596-1650) and John Locke (1632-1704), reason came to be viewed as an independent analytical power or process. Taylor calls this a ‘procedural’ view of reason: ‘Rationality is above all a property of the process of thinking, not of the substantive content of thought.’\textsuperscript{115} Andrew Louth describes in a helpful way this same post-Cartesian distinction between a ‘substantial’ and ‘procedural’ view of reason:

We say, ‘I think therefore I am’, that is, thinking is an activity I engage in and there must therefore be an ‘I’ to engage in it; the Greeks would say, ‘I think, therefore there is that which I think – to noeta’. What I think is something going on in my head; what the Greek thinks, to noeta, are the

\textsuperscript{113}Taylor 1989, 127-176.
\textsuperscript{114}Ibid. 121.
\textsuperscript{115}Taylor 1989, 168. On the contrast between substantive and procedural reason, see also pp. 85-6, 156, 163, 242-3.
objects of thought that (for example, for Plato) exist in a higher, more real world.\textsuperscript{116}

Louth’s description also suggests the connection between the procedural view and human autonomy; ‘thinking is an activity I engage in’ independent of the substantial content of thought, ‘to noeta’.

A recurring theme of the ‘Lectures’ is that the apologetic or modern approach to the interpretation of prophecy gives a false priority to the criteria or processes by which prophecy is guaranteed over the object of prophecy, over the truth that is revealed. In Taylor’s terms, evidentialist theology expresses a procedural rather than a substantive view of reason. This is what Pusey criticised when he said that the modern approach would make ‘a prediction which related to Pagan Rome or the discovery of America’ as important as a prediction ‘relating to the Redeemer of the world’. On the other hand, the patristic exegesis to which Pusey points embodies a substantive view of reason. Understanding prophecy entails seeing the correspondence between God’s unchanging purposes, the Divine Mind or Reason, and the manifestation of that reason in the Old Testament witness. A proper understanding of prophecy both recognizes that correspondence and serves as a guide to draw human reason into conformity with the divine pattern.

Placing Taylor’s analysis of Descartes’ \textit{cogito ergo sum} alongside Pusey’s description of the dangers inherent in the apologetic school of prophecy casts light on the wider context of the debate in which Pusey is engaged. Of Descartes’ proof of God, Taylor writes:

The thesis is not that I gain knowledge when turned towards God in faith. Rather the certainty of clear and distinct perception is unconditional and self-generated. What has happened is rather that God’s existence has become a stage in \textit{my} progress towards science through the methodical ordering of evident insight. God’s existence is a theorem in \textit{my} system of perfect science. The centre of gravity has decisively shifted.\textsuperscript{117}

Taylor acknowledges that Descartes’ \textit{cogito} is for Descartes inseparable from belief in God. Nonetheless, Descartes’ mode of arguing not only opens the

\textsuperscript{116} Louth 1981, xv-xvi.
\textsuperscript{117} Taylor 1989, 157.
possibility that it will be received and understood differently, but that the form
of argument makes the movement to a disengaged and procedural view of
reason imaginable and even appealing.\textsuperscript{118} According to Taylor, after Descartes,
it begins to be possible to conceive of human rational powers as autonomous
and to imagine that the appropriate exercise of those powers generates certainty
or truth. This change undermines the view that human reason is organically and
substantially related to divine reason: ‘The judgement now turns on properties
of the activity of thinking rather than on the substantive beliefs which emerge
from it.’\textsuperscript{119}

Pusey’s characterization of the ‘modern treatment’ of prophecy has
striking similarities with Taylor’s description of Descartes and the tradition
which he helped, perhaps unwittingly, to establish:

The very office of proving the existence of that which is invisible is not
far apart from that of creating it; it is a sort of mental creation, though, in
fact, it is only creating the presumption of that which exists; yet what is a
cause of the belief of the existence thereof, is so far the cause of its
existence \textit{relatively to us}; And whatever may be the case of individuals
or whatever ought to be the case, man is elevated by this sort of proof,
not God glorified. (L4)

Taylor argues that Descartes’ proof makes God ‘a theorem in \textit{my} system of
perfect science’, an abstract concept which we give ourselves. Pusey says that
the apologetics of the modern school turn God into a ‘mental creation’, an
abstract concept which we give ourselves. Taylor says that for Descartes,
certainty is ‘self-generated’, while Pusey maintains that the arguments of the
modern school give the presumption of generating or creating God’s existence,
in that they are the cause of God’s existence ‘\textit{relatively to us}’. For Descartes,
following a careful procedure of reflection and analysis banishes doubt. In
Pusey’s description, the modern school seeks to drive away doubt and secure
conviction by adhering to a procedure which generates evidence of genuine

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid. 157-8, 160. Taylor contrasts Descartes’ proof with that offered by Augustine in \textit{On
Free Will}, Book II (pp. 132-135). Taylor says that for Augustine, this inward turn leads to an
upward movement which takes us beyond the confines of subjectivity to the knowledge of
God, the source of life and the dynamic structuring principle of the soul, whereas, ‘for
Descartes the whole point of the reflexive turn is to achieve a quite self-sufficient certainty’ (p.
156).

\textsuperscript{119} Taylor 1989, 156.
prophecy and promises objective validity. Pusey’s description of the ‘self-satisfaction’ which the ‘seeking of formal evidence’ stirs up also evokes Taylor’s argument that what is attractive in instrumental reason is not the objective claim of truth only, but the sense of mastery and freedom which it offers, ‘the idea of the disengaged self, capable of objectifying … the surrounding world’.\textsuperscript{120} The apologetic approach is a moral appeal which is based on our sense of what is good and necessary as well as what is true.

Pusey finds in the modern school the same trends which Taylor describes. Taylor sees the philosophy of John Locke as both exemplifying and promoting the procedural understanding of reason which he finds in Descartes.\textsuperscript{121} We have seen Pusey both criticizes Locke directly, and makes the arguments of Locke’s disciple Paley the focus of his attacks on the confusions and dangers of the apologetic approach. Pusey also blamed Locke for Hampden’s empiricism: ‘Into this he has been betrayed by the shallow philosophy of Mr. Locke.’\textsuperscript{122} These connections show the relevance of Taylor’s description of procedural reason for Pusey’s analysis. Taylor’s argument helps to show that Pusey’s disagreement with the modern school and his analysis of patristic interpretation is part of a much more fundamental debate about theology, theological anthropology, and the goal and conditions of knowledge.\textsuperscript{123}

\textbf{3.3.8 Coleridge on Reason and Understanding and the ‘Lectures’}

Pusey’s understanding of reason involves more than an attempt to retrieve a patristic model, reaching back behind intervening developments. The

\textsuperscript{120} L5 and Taylor 1989, 21. See also 147-151, 170 for the mastery which instrumental reason offers.
\textsuperscript{121} Taylor 1989, 168, 160-76.
\textsuperscript{122} DrH., xxii.
\textsuperscript{123} Taylor’s assessment of Locke is challenged, for example, by Nicholas Wolterstorff who denies ‘that Locke and Descartes adopted a procedural view of rationality’ and argues that for Locke reason is ‘a faculty of apprehension … whereby we apprehend necessities in general’ (Wolterstorff 1996, 240, 233-46). However one understands these disagreements, Pusey’s interpretation of Locke, and of Hampden and Paley as representatives of a Lockean approach to theology, fits remarkably closely with that of Taylor. One could also compare Pusey’s view of the moral character of knowledge with Taylor’s idea that the sense of truth is inevitably connected to a conception of different kinds of goods and their moral appeal. See Taylor 1989, 321-40.
dissatisfaction with the Enlightenment appeal to reason which one finds in the ‘Lectures’ is a common theme of the Romantic movement. We have already seen that Pusey refers explicitly at least twice in the course of the ‘Lectures’ to Coleridge’s *Aids to Reflection*. One of the main tasks which Coleridge sets for himself in *Aids to Reflection* is to distinguish Reason from Understanding. Coleridge’s distinction corresponds in significant ways to Pusey’s view of the higher mind or illumined sight which perceives spiritual things as distinguished from natural reason or rationalizing. This distinction also corresponds to Taylor’s view of substantial reason contrasted with procedural reason. Coleridge’s account may have influenced Pusey and can, in any case, help us both to understand and to see the weaknesses in Pusey’s argument.

Reason and Understanding are for Coleridge technical terms. Understanding is the lower and less spiritual of these two faculties or powers. He describes this faculty as ‘natural reason’, the same term which Pusey uses. Referring to ‘the founder of the Critical Philosophy’, Immanuel Kant, Coleridge defines ‘the Understanding’ as ‘the faculty of judging according to sense’. It is the discursive faculty by which we compare, reflect, or generalize. Reason, on the other hand, is the faculty of the supersensuous or, in Pusey’s terms, the faculty of the spiritual sense: ‘Reason is the Power of Universal and necessary Convictions, the Source and Substance of Truths above Sense, having their evidence in themselves’. In describing reason and understanding in a way which reverses normal English usage Coleridge appears to be following Kant.

Reason is both the faculty or power in man which discerns or grasps truths which are not accessible to the senses, and the truths which are known. In Taylor’s terms, Coleridge is speaking about substantial, not procedural, reason. In his study of Coleridge, Douglas Hedley writes that Coleridge uses

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126 *Aids*, 225, 229.
127 *Aids*, 216.
the term reason to mean ‘both the realm of the ideas transcending the finite mind, and the ideas as immanent in human thought’. Reason accomplishes what the understanding cannot, it sees truths ‘above sense’: ‘what the eldest Greek Philosophy entitled the Reason (NOYΣ) and Ideas, the philosophic Apostle names the Spirit and Truths spiritually discerned’. Like Pusey, Coleridge describes the human faculty which beholds God as a divine power and knowledge as participation: ‘Reason is pre-eminently Spiritual, and a spirit, even our Spirit, through an effluence of the same grace by which one is privileged to say Our Father’. The truths of reason are not grasped or approached through discursive argument. Rather, they are perceived by ‘an Intuition or immediate Beholding, accompanied by a conviction of the necessary and universality of the truth so beholdest not derived from the Senses’. Coleridge writes: ‘Reason indeed is much nearer to Sense than to Understanding: for Reason (says our great Hooker) is a direct aspect of Truth, an inward Beholding, having a similar relation to the Intelligible or Spiritual, as Sense has to the Material or Phenomenal.’ Coleridge’s description of Reason as an intuitive power or a kind of sight which perceives spiritual truth fits well with Pusey’s account of divine light by which we see light.

One thing which Coleridge offers and that is lacking from Pusey’s account in the ‘Lectures’ is an explicit description of the relationship of this higher form of reason and the understanding or, in Pusey’s terms, natural reason. Having stated that understanding is a faculty we share with ‘Beings higher or lower than man’, he adds:

But there is, in this sense, no human Reason. There neither is nor can be but one Reason, one and the same: even the Light that lighteth every man’s individual Understanding (Discursus), and thus maketh it a

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128 Hedley 2000 196.
129 Aids, 146. Beer notes: ‘To Coleridge the eldest Greek philosophy meant Pythagoras (6th century B.C.) and Heraclitus (whose work is dated c 500 B.C.)’ (p. 146 n. 2).
130 Aids, 218.
131 Aids, 234, note *.
132 Aids, 223-4.
133 For Coleridge, unlike Kant, the powers of reason are not limited to the sphere of phenomena. Whereas for Kant, the truths of practical reason, the ideas of God, Freedom, and Immortality, are regulative only, for Coleridge, ‘AN IDEA’ is ‘CONSTITUTIVE, and one with the power and Life of Nature’. SMan., 144. See Prickett 1976, 21-3.
reasonable Understanding, *Discourse of Reason* – ‘one only, yet manifold: it goeth through all understanding, and remaining in itself regenerateth all other powers.’ (Wisdom of Solomon, c. viii)\(^{134}\)

Coleridge describes the divine light of Reason as the light which enlightens the Understanding, or Pusey’s natural reason. Coleridge warns that when the Understanding usurps its bounds and ‘is made the measure of spiritual things’ it becomes ‘the mind of the flesh’,\(^{135}\) or, in Pusey’s terms the ‘undisciplined intellect’, which tends ‘to different forms of unbelief or misbelief’. (L60A-61)

Nonetheless, Coleridge makes it clear that the discursive powers of the Understanding are a ‘Discourse of Reason’, an imperfect and partial expression of reason: ‘And yet to the forms of the Understanding all truth must be reduced, that is to be fixed as an object of reflection, and to be rendered expressible’.\(^{136}\) In one sense, Pusey implies something similar in his description of natural reason as ‘bearing still the lineaments of its primeval beauty and giant might’. On the other hand, both Pusey’s use of the term ‘rationalizing’ as a synonym for ‘reason’ and his view that natural reason is ‘enslaved’ and so ‘no guide into the Mind of God’ suggests a radical disjunction between the reasoning powers and what is divine in humanity. As we have seen, in the right ‘frame of mind’, the power of natural reason ‘may be brought in the kingdom of God, and, in its proportion, render its service unto God’. However, Pusey is not clear about the way in which this power shares in the restoration of the image of God in humanity. His criticisms of a ‘precise and clear and reasoning habit of mind’ do not seem to acknowledge that he nonetheless uses such reason to make a case against rationalizing and to lead people to appreciate a higher form of reason. (L11) When he wrote in favour of evidence-writing, H. J. Rose reminded Newman that all authors need ‘to recur to logic, to reason’.\(^{137}\) In this sense, critics of Pusey’s ‘narrow’ or ‘dogmatic’ response to rationalism point to a weakness in his argument.

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\(^{134}\) Aids, 218-9.

\(^{135}\) Aids, 239.

\(^{136}\) Aids, 233 n. *

3.4 The Spiritual Faculties

3.4.1 The Moral Sense

Pusey’s account of the spiritual faculties which enable the soul to know divine things extends beyond a consideration of the character of reason or understanding. In his *Theology of Germany*, Pusey referred to Coleridge as showing the fault of this approach and as giving ‘seasonable advice to those, who think that in the reception of Christianity the intellect alone is concerned’. In the *Theology of Germany*, Pusey expressed a similar dissatisfaction. He argued that Kant’s limitation of ‘real truth’ to ‘such as can be found in human reason’ demonstrates the need for another kind of knowing. He writes:

… by shewing the inadequacy of speculative reason in matters unrecognizable by sense, it led many, who were not bound by the fetters of the new philosophy, to listen to the voice of nature, the revelation of God within them, and to seek as the direct result of consciousness, the truths which speculation was unable scientifically to justify.

For Pusey, Kant accurately described the limitations of analytic reason, but was incorrect with regard to the capacity of the soul to know ‘matters unrecognizable by sense’ by an intuitive vision.

In the ‘Lectures’, Pusey describes the way by which the truths of revelation, and which speculation cannot justify, are communicated to a consciousness which extends beyond mental capacities:

Our conviction also is of a compound character and made up of various emotions: in moral subjects it cannot be mainly intellectual; in Divine things, awe, wonder, the absorbing sense of infinity, of purity, and of holiness, infuse conviction more directly than reasoning; nay reasoning in that it appeals to one faculty only, and that for a time is erected into a judge, and so, as it were sits superior, constantly goes directly counter to the frame of mind wherein belief is received. The chance sight, so to say, of a flower illumined by the sun’s rays, or of the starry heavens, the

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138 Pusey, *TG-I*, 52-3 n. 3, quoting ‘Coleridge (Aids to Reflection, p. 136)’. He may refer to Coleridge’s criticism of ‘the pious Deists of the last Century’ or to his description of how the self which is fallen is to be found, not in the intellect, but ‘in that Will which is the true and only strict synonyme of the word, I, or the intelligent Self’. See *Aids*, 139-40, esp. 139 n. 15 for the editor’s reference to *TG-I*.

139 *TG-I*, 163, 164.
moon and the stars which God has ordained, impress the feeling of God upon the soul more than any artificial reasoning from final causes (however clear it may in itself seem to be, as in Paley). Like the centurion by the Cross we are awed into belief. (L6)

This quotation includes many elements which we have already seen in Pusey’s description of religious knowledge. This kind of knowing is a type of vision which sees God in and through the natural world, even a ‘chance sight’. The language of impression suggests that the insight produced is an immediate action of God upon the soul, it is ‘infused’. Moreover, this seeing is not the result of reason understood as the power of analysis; ‘reasoning’ alone is insufficient, it is ‘artificial’ and it ‘appeals to one faculty only’. For Pusey, ‘moral subjects’ or ‘divine things’ appeal to our sense of fitness or goodness, our will or conscience, as well as to the intellect and our sense of correspondence or truth. Commenting on the ‘Lectures’, Donald Allchin maintains that for Pusey it is impossible to ‘reduce the whole economy of God’s revelation to conceptual terms’. In the images of the Old Testament, the Word of God ‘speaks not to our minds alone, but also to our wills, affections, consciences, imaginations’.140 Lewis Ayres’ description of Henri de Lubac’s distillation of the pre-modern understanding of the soul in similar terms suggests that Pusey is giving voice to a patristic and medieval as well as a Romantic sensibility: ‘The soul is the seat of our activities of attention, imagination, judgement and contemplation.’141 In the patristic examples to which Pusey refers, at least some of the non-conceptual powers or faculties to which Ayres refers belong to the reasonable soul made in the image of God.142

One may see here another sign of the influence of Coleridge, or at least an indication of the way in which both he and Pusey attempted to cast light on the moral element of conviction. According to Coleridge’s definition, any apprehension of Reason, of truths above sense, is an apprehension of ‘necessary Convictions’ which have ‘their evidence in themselves’.143

140 Allchin 1967, 70.
142 See Augustine 1838, XIII.11.12, 283-4, quoted above: ‘For I Am, and Know, and Will’.
143 Aids, 216.
Moreover, what is perceived addresses our moral sense or conscience. Speaking of ‘The Idea of the Living God’, Coleridge writes: ‘this idea presents itself to our mind … with the attributes of Holiness, Providence, Love, Justice, and Mercy’. In a phrase which articulates well Pusey’s view of the importance of wonder in preparing the mind to perceive spiritual things, Coleridge describes a sense of wonder as the springboard of thought: ‘In Wonder all Philosophy began: in Wonder it ends: and Admiration fills up the interspace.’ In Pusey’s terms, ‘awe, wonder, the absorbing sense of infinity’ contribute to conviction because they result from a vision of God rather than a neutral reflection on data about God. (L16)

For Pusey, the moral character of religious knowledge means that worship is not simply a form of prayer, but a means of enlightenment and sanctification. Awe and wonder ‘infuse conviction’ because they are closely related to the attitude of worship which is the correct attitude of the human person before God. (L6) In the modern approach, prophecy is adapted ‘to those who viewed it from without, amid the glare of robust day, not to those who were admittedly within the shrine, contemplated and worshipped’. (L5-6) Conviction in divine things is formed when they are known from the inside, from ‘within the shrine’, rather than ‘from without’, standing apart from what is known or looked for and submitting it to analysis: ‘men argued when they should have worshipped’. (L1) The apologetic arguments which Pusey criticizes hinder the communion with the divine which is the way to knowledge. The arguments from evidence call us back from ‘the contemplation of those works to reflect on their own convinciness’. (L6) Worship brings all the aspects of the human character, not just the analytic mind or discursive reason into relation with divine things. Worship is also an ‘habit of mind’ (L29) and attitude which is suited to reach out toward that ‘highest knowledge’ which is both ‘most elevated’ and which ‘must most surpass our comprehension’. (L2)

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144 Aids, 168.
145 Aids, 236.
3.4.2 Feeling as a Spiritual Faculty

While he never states it explicitly, Pusey uses ‘feeling’ in the ‘Lectures’ to describe one of the spiritual faculties of the soul. The soul does not only ‘see’ or ‘believe’, it also feels God; it is the feeling of God which the vision of God in nature impresses on the soul. This feeling is not the same as reasoning, but it is still a ‘frame of mind’. (L6) As we saw above, he describes conviction as formed of ‘various emotions’ and describes an apprehension of God as ‘the feeling of God’. (L6) This ‘feeling’ seems to be a kind of spiritual judgement or discernment. When he criticizes the apologetic approach for emphasizing prophecy as prediction, Pusey describes prophecy as appealing to ‘feelings’ rather than reasons: ‘It is remarkable accordingly how in Holy Scripture, other feelings are, throughout prophecy, enlisted, beyond and above contemplation of Divine fore-knowledge.’ (L6) For Pusey, the human aspiration after God is a ‘feeling and following after the Infinite’. (L16) He also describes the people of Israel’s understanding of the prophetic content of their rites and institutions as ‘feelings which were to them as sense’. (L31) In a more negative context, when people were not content with the authority of the Church as a guide to reading Scripture, they began, not to reason, but to ‘feel their way after some clearer and independent evidence for the truth of Holy Scripture’. (L32)

Pusey never defines what he means by feelings, nor explains how he distinguishes feeling from sight. Against the confusions of orthodoxism in Germany, Pusey had asserted the principle which he describes as ‘the impregnable bulwark of religion’, that ‘the original seat of religion is in the feeling, not in the understanding’. He makes this assertion while commenting on the work of G. E. Lessing and quotes with approval other remarks of Lessing: ‘He, whose heart is more Christian than his head, pays not the slightest regard to those objections since he feels what others content themselves with thinking.’146 While Pusey does not express himself in exactly these terms in the ‘Lectures’ he is clear that religious understanding cannot be separated from feeling or feelings.

146 TG-I, 52 n. 3.
Pusey’s understanding of feelings as a faculty of spiritual discernment may have been shaped by the ideas of Friedrich Schleiermacher. During his two visits to Berlin in 1825, Pusey attended Schleiermacher’s lectures on the Acts of the Apostles and on St. Paul’s Epistles to the Thessalonians and Galatians. Schleiermacher also met privately with Pusey and later corresponded with him.\textsuperscript{147} Pusey considered Schleiermacher to be a positive influence contributing to the revival of German religious life despite the grave errors of his theology. In a letter to Bishop Lloyd about the commentary which Schleiermacher planned to publish on St Paul’s Epistles, Pusey described Schleiermacher as a scholarly pantheist: ‘Scholarship and thought may be expected from the translator of Plato; but of Christianity no more than is consistent with Pantheism.’\textsuperscript{148} Nonetheless, Schleiermacher is ‘that great man who, whatever be the errors of his system, has done more than (some very few perhaps excepted) any other, to the restoration of religious belief in Germany’.\textsuperscript{149} Liddon says that Pusey admired Schleiermacher for ‘the direction in which, on the whole, his mind was moving’, away from a dry religion of the mind, rather than for his ‘actual belief’.\textsuperscript{150} It is remarkable how Pusey’s two-fold assessment of Schleiermacher, positive in his sensibility but seriously misguided in his approach to Scripture, mirror’s Newman’s assessment of Coleridge, an assessment which, as we have seen, Pusey seems to share.\textsuperscript{151}

Pusey’s appreciation of Schleiermacher appears to extend to his emphasis on feeling as a faculty of religious knowledge. In a letter to Keble, written on Easter Sunday, 1829, Pusey discussed his understanding of feelings in religion:

On the province of ‘feelings’ in Religion, I fear that I shall be widely mistaken: it would be almost too much to expect that a distinction should be made between ‘feeling’ and ‘feelings’: the one the faculty of the mind, the other the outward manifestations of that faculty – the emotions. It is I think the employment of the latter as a test of religion which has caused

\textsuperscript{147} Life, 82.
\textsuperscript{148} Pusey to Bp. Lloyd, autumn, 1826, in Life, 82.
\textsuperscript{149} TG-I, 115 n. 1.
\textsuperscript{150} Life, 83.
\textsuperscript{151} Newman 1967, 94, discussed in Chapter 1.
so much mischief and self deception and misery; while the neglect of the
former appeared to me also to have been injurious to Religion by causing
the intellect to be alone considered.\footnote{Pusey to Keble, 18 April, 1829, LBV-101.}

In his study, “Science” in the Service of Orthodoxy: The Early Intellectual
Development of E. B. Pusey’, Leighton Frappell argues that Pusey found the
distinction between ‘feelings’ and ‘feeling’ as a faculty of discernment in
Schleiermacher. Frappell writes:

In his \textit{Der christliche Glaube}, (\textit{The Christian Faith}), 1821-2,
Schleiermacher located grounds of religious assent in the feelings, or
rather in the ‘feeling’ (\textit{Empfndung}), religious reason, which he
distinguished from ‘feelings’ (\textit{Gefuhl}), religious sentiment or emotion, as
well as from the critical faculty. The distinction became important to
Pusey, as to others, for it provided an answer both to religious
rationalism and ‘enthusiasm’ by locating religious conviction neither in
the formal reason nor in the affective sentiments but in a distinct faculty
which partook of elements of both.\footnote{Frappell 1983, 10.}

Schleiermacher also proposes, in his \textit{On Religion} (1799), that religion is
‘rooted in immediate pre-reflexive feeling and intuition’, which in their purest
forms are united.\footnote{Schleiermacher 1996, editor’s introduction, xi.}
For him the intuition of the infinite is always ‘connected
with a feeling’ and ‘the strength of these feelings determines the degree of
religiousness’.\footnote{Ibid. 29. For feelings as the ‘noblest part’ of religion, see pp. 45-7.}
For Pusey also, discernment without feeling appears corrupt
or ungrounded. Despite Pusey’s caveat in his letter to Keble that ‘it would be
almost too much to expect that a distinction should be made’, Pusey appears to
accept the principle that ‘feeling’ is a kind of religious reason, a ‘faculty of the
mind’ which discerns or receives religious knowledge. This faculty is not
simply an expression of affections; for Pusey ‘the employing of feelings as a
criterion of religion is mischievous, because delusive; unduly elating to some,
distractingly depressing to others’.\footnote{Pusey to Maria Barker, 4 Oct. 1827, in Forrester 1989, 21. See also \textit{Life}, 124.}

On the other hand, in the quotation
above, he refers to those ‘emotions’ which have a necessary role in forming
conviction and which are guided by genuine spiritual discernment. (L6)
Pusey’s account of feeling situates his theory of knowledge in the context of the Romantic response to an exalted and Enlightenment view of reason. Charles Taylor describes the Romantic ‘striving’ for God in a way that fits with Pusey’s treatment of feeling as a sense of God reaching toward God: ‘It is through our feelings that we get to the deepest moral and, indeed, cosmic truths.’ However, it is important to see that Pusey understands feeling not only through a Romantic lens, but also in relation to the tradition which conceives of knowledge as participation with God. A. J. Festugiére argues that in the Platonist tradition, both Christian and pagan, this participation in not simply a fusion of intellect, but a mystical union associated with a kind of feeling and delight: ‘the soul “aspires to a knowledge that is a direct contact, a “feeling” (sentiment), a touching, something seen. It aspires to a union where there is total fusion, the interpenetration of two living things.”’

Similarly, Andrew Louth describes Diadochus of Photike (mid 5th c.) and his view of the ‘soul’s spiritual sense’ in terms of a ‘bold conjunction of feeling and the mind, the heart and the intellect’: ‘aisthesis noos, feeling of the mind, aisthesis noera, intellectual feeling (or intellectual – or spiritual – sense)’. It is not clear exactly how Pusey forms his notion of feeling as a faculty of the mind, but in describing the soul’s spiritual sense in this way there were a variety of sources available to him, near at hand and more remote.

Andrew Louth’s discussion of ‘the doctrine of the spiritual senses’ in Origen and Bernard of Clairvaux suggests another possible source for Pusey’s notion of feeling as a spiritual sense and a faculty of the mind. Louth’s discussion of this doctrine in Origen is particularly illuminating because it casts light on the significance of the language of types and typical interpretation in shaping an understanding of the spiritual senses and the feeling of the mind. Louth describes the way in which ‘Origen is able to interpret the highly sensuous world of the Song of Songs in terms of the love between Christ and the Church, the love of the soul for God, responding to His love for her’.

159 Louth 1981, 128.
Seeing this as a Christian development of the Platonic understanding of the ascent of the soul he adds: ‘The doctrine of the spiritual sense is used to express the way in which the soul wakes up to the world of inner spiritual reality and begins to experience that world by learning to use its new found senses.’\textsuperscript{160} Pusey also uses highly sensuous language to describe the ‘ecstasy’ or ‘transport’ of the soul which is ‘caught up’ or ‘present with its Lord … penetrated with Him and His Divinity’. (L136:209) Finding support in a typical interpretation of the ‘joyousness’ of Joseph’s brothers who ‘drank and were inebriated (זכרו) [yškrw] with him’, (L136:209-10) Pusey draws on the Song of Songs to describe the gift of the sacrament of Holy Communion in terms of intoxication:

When, then, in the song of spiritual love, this same word is used in the same way, as something over and above ordinary drinking, ‘drink and be inebriated, loving and beloved,’ one cannot doubt that it, too, has its proper force, and that it designates some gift peculiar to those in Christ’s Church, who share the myrrh of His Passion, and ‘eat and drink at His Table in His Kingdom;’ and that, in proportion to their love, so are they not refreshed only, but inebriated. (L136:211)\textsuperscript{161}

Pusey transfers terms associated with the most passionate forms of earthly joys to what Louth describes as ‘the world of inner spiritual reality’, suggesting that as there is an analogy between earthly and spiritual joy, so is there an analogy between bodily senses and spiritual senses. He sometimes calls this feeling, and sometimes a form of mind, both of which suggest elements of the spiritual sense which Louth finds in Origen.

In his treatment of types, Pusey will emphasize often that God chooses to communicate to humanity in an embodied way, in symbols and signs that human perception can receive and understand. It is the Spirit added to the body as well as to the soul which makes a complete human person.\textsuperscript{162} So is the communication of religious knowledge accommodated to the embodied

\textsuperscript{160} Louth 1994, 62.
\textsuperscript{161} See Gen. 43:34.
\textsuperscript{162} Pusey’s discusses Irenaeus’ view of the image of God in humanity: ‘this joint character he remarkably expressed by the language, “the spiritual man”, if you detach from him soul and body, would be not man, but either “the spirit of man” or “the Spirit of God”’. (L143). See also Irenaeus, Against Heresies, V.6.1 in Irenaeus 1872, 460-1.
character of our spiritual faculties: ‘spirit is revealed to us in the flesh. We perceive by the Spirit, yet not directly, but as things are reflected to us in a material mirror.’ As we will see in more detail in Chapter 5, Pusey’s theory of knowledge is incarnational. He conceives of a union of the material and spiritual elements of language analogous to the union of the human and divine in Christ: ‘And thus our very words are two-fold; they are taken from material things, have a material substance, yet act invisibly, have an immaterial meaning, as they are received by the eyes and ears but act on the soul.’ This is the form of knowledge which is suited to the character of the human person, an embodied soul, not purely spiritual intellect. Donald Allchin emphasizes the importance of this part of Pusey’s argument: ‘If we are to know God at all, it is with a knowledge in which the body and the senses participate. If we are to know the divine, our ears and eyes no less that our hearts and minds must be made apt to the perception of heavenly realities.’

Another element of Pusey’s treatment of the soul which seems to blend Romantic, patristic and scriptural elements is his use of the term ‘heart’. When Pusey describes ‘feeling’ as offering insight into divine things, he appears to be discussing feelings in a way which has similarities with the Scriptural use of the term ‘heart’ as a place or power of discernment and decision. In his discussion of the problem of unbelief in the ‘Lectures’ he quotes Scriptural passages which speak of the heart as a spiritual faculty, the seat of judgement which is in need of proper formation, a heart which understands or is too dull or ‘fat’ to understand (Isa. 6:9-10). (L5) In his discussion of image and likeness Pusey quotes Clement of Alexandria to describe the ‘true mind’, the restored and enlightened human intellect, as ‘φρονησις κατα καρδιαν’, an ‘understanding heart’. (L144) The way this same phrase is rendered as ‘the affections of the soul’ in another translation suggests how this conception

163 S-EL, 7. The idea that humankind perceives spiritual or intelligible realities through a material mirror is a rich image which is explored helpfuly in relation to Coleridge and the Platonic tradition by Hedley 2000, esp. Chapter 2, ‘Inner word: reflection as mediation’, 129 and 109-15.
164 S-EL, 7.
165 Allchin 1984, 2.
166 This is how Butterworth translates Clement’s phrase. Clement of Alexandria, 1960, 214-5.
includes an emotional or affective sensibility.\textsuperscript{167} Pusey does not draw attention to this reference to the wisdom of the heart other than by not translating it. However, it may be that Pusey avoided the use of ‘heart’ to describe the faculty of mind or discernment which perceives spiritual things because of the Romantic sensibilities and use of the day would connect ‘heart’ with superficial or unstable emotions or passions.

3.4.3 The Imagination in the ‘Lectures’ and in Coleridge

In some places in the ‘Lectures’, Pusey describes the faculty which perceives correspondences between types and their fulfilment as the imagination. Pusey postulates that it is the imagination which discerns the way in which ‘the natural works of God’ offer poetic symbols for moral or religious truth. (L15) As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, religious poets show that the ‘expressiveness’ of types ‘really lies in the objects and is not the work of imagination (otherwise than as imagination is employed in tracing out the mutual correspondence of images with their reality, or with each other)’. (L16) Pusey here distinguishes a fictional ‘work of the imagination’ from the imagination as a faculty of discernment, ‘tracing out the mutual correspondence of images with their reality, or with each other’. The capacity to perceive the correspondence between ‘the stubble before the wind’ and the idea of ‘contemptible dispersion or destruction’ is, for Pusey, the same capacity which recognizes the correspondences between the types and prophecies and their fulfilment. (L16) In the context, once again, of addressing the concern that the interpretation of types which the Fathers offer are subjective creations, fancies, Pusey describes the faculty which perceives ‘actual resemblances’ as the φαντασία, the imagination. In doing this, he distinguishes the sense of ‘fancy’ as an arbitrary or deluded notion from the Greek root which describes ‘a making visible’, the power which makes objects present to the mind:

Harmonies, which to one age or one mind, appear obvious and undoubted by another are derided as fanciful; a word which does, in fact, admit the existence of the harmony in question, only denies its practical importance; and in that they condemn it as fanciful, and not as unreal or

\textsuperscript{167} Clement of Alexandria 1994, 199.
untrue, they are indeed unwilling witnesses to its truth; for the perception of these analogies does indeed belong to the φαντασία and they who condemn them as fanciful, do at all counts admit actual resemblances, only that it is such as cannot (they contend) abide the test of a severe reasoning. (L37)\(^{168}\)

The charge that patristic interpretations are fanciful displays the rationalist and utilitarian confusion of truth with practical importance that was discussed in Chapter 2. If it is difficult to ‘demonstrate the likeness even of a corporeal image’, it is more difficult still in matters above sense: ‘How much more in spiritual things, which require a more exercised mind to discern, a more fruitful discernment, and being spiritual, can only be spiritually understood. And can we, at the last, read the characters wherein they are written or have we ever tried?’ (L37) This is the work of the imagination, to discern or find ‘in the characters’ of the types of Scripture the religious element, ‘in those deeper hieroglyphics, which mysterious as they stand, signify far other things than would on any superficial acquaintance appear’. (L37) The imagination is the faculty which discerns these ‘other things’, the substance or spiritual things which are communicated through the images of Scripture.\(^{169}\) In that it perceives analogies between supersensual reality or truth and the images of Scripture, or images drawn from nature and history, the imagination is a mediating faculty in Pusey’s account by which what is known through intuition may be communicated in sensible images.

Pusey seems to be drawing on Coleridge’s notion of the imagination. In *The Statesman’s Manual*, Coleridge juxtaposes the ‘mechanic’ or superficial histories characteristic, for him, of the eighteenth century, with the histories he finds in the Bible:

> In the Scriptures they are the living *educts* of the Imagination, that reconciling and mediatory power, which incorporating the Reason in Images of the Sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the Senses by

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\(^{168}\) ‘Fancy’ is a short form of the Middle English ‘fantasie’ which comes into English and French through the Latin *phantasia*, and ultimately from the Greek *φαντασία*, ‘a making visible’. Skeat 1993, 346.

\(^{169}\) Allegorical interpretation is a kind of interpretation which discerns these ‘other things’, ‘allos’ or ‘other’ meanings, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. It is possible that Pusey was aware of this allusion.
the permanence and self-circling energies of the Reason, gives birth to a
system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and consubstantial with
the truths, of which they are the conductors.\textsuperscript{170}

For Coleridge biblical history offers ‘a system of symbols’ given in ‘Images of
Sense’ which correspond to or are consubstantial with spiritual truths, with ‘the
Reason’. The imagination is the mediating faculty by which the truths of
Reason are perceived in these symbols and images: ‘In the Scriptures therefore
both Facts and Persons must of necessity have a two-fold significance, a past
and a future, a temporary and a perpetual, a particular and a universal
application.’\textsuperscript{171} In his study of the way in which Romantic writers like
Coleridge influenced the Victorian Church, Stephen Prickett describes
Coleridge’s notion of imagination as a faculty of stereoscopic vision:

Thus over and over again we find Coleridge describing the ‘Imagination’
in terms of the bringing into a single focus two separate levels of
experience, and seeing them as a coherent whole. His concept of the
Imagination is essentially ‘stereoscopic’; it stands at the intersection of
two different perspectives, and so enables us to see ‘in depth’.\textsuperscript{172}

This is essentially how Pusey describes the imagination, as the faculty which
enables one to read in images available to the sense, ‘both Facts and Persons’,
the spiritual truths which they communicate, to trace out ‘the mutual
correspondence of images with their reality, or with each other’. (L16) Johann
Semler’s inability to perceive ‘the unity of the same spirit manifesting itself in
various forms according to the character of the individuals through whom it
was conveyed’, which we considered in Chapter 2, was the beginning of errors
of historical interpretation and a failure of imagination.\textsuperscript{173} Chris Snook
maintains that Coleridge’s view of Imagination, ‘a faculty that can mediate
between reason and emotion, and apprehend the spiritual in the material’, is
similar to Schleiermacher’s conception of ‘religious reason’, and suggests the
influence of both on Pusey.\textsuperscript{174} Hedley discusses the way in which Coleridge
distills the patristic inheritance to which Pusey also looked: ‘The concept of

\textsuperscript{170} SMan. 28-9.
\textsuperscript{171} SMan. 29.
\textsuperscript{172} Prickett 1976, 19.
\textsuperscript{173} TG-I, 142-5.
\textsuperscript{174} Snook 2001, 9.
imagination in Coleridge lies rooted in Neoplatonism and, specifically, in the Romantic reception of late antique metaphysics of nature and mythology. ¹⁷⁵ The importance of these connections will be more evident when Pusey’s theory of type and symbol is considered in the next chapter.

Coleridge’s description of the imagination can also help one to understand Pusey’s view of knowledge as a participation in the divine knowledge. Coleridge describes the imagination as ‘a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM’. ¹⁷⁶ The symbolising work of the imagination, discovering spiritual truths in the images of sense and their relationships with one another, corresponds with the work of God who established these correspondences in the work of creation. As we have seen, Pusey described human Reason as created to be ‘a mirror of the Mind of God … a finite copy of the perfections of the Infinite’. ¹⁷⁷ When this finite mind finds in types and prophecies a reflection of spiritual truth, it mirrors the creative work of God who bequeathed to creation its harmony and coherence. In this way the work of the imagination both manifests the image of God in the soul and shares in the work of restoration accomplished in the reading of Scripture. In his book Nicaea and its Legacy, Lewis Ayres describes how the work of typical or figurative interpretation involves a participation in divine creativity: ‘The figural reader seeks figures within the text both to understand the incarnate Word and to participate in the divine speech and action in creation.’ ¹⁷⁸ Pusey’s description of the imagination in Coleridgean terms as the mediating faculty which perceives spiritual truth through sensible images is another example of the way in which Pusey’s theory of knowledge, his understanding of the capacities and constitution of the soul, and his understanding of type are interwoven. To appreciate the importance of these ideas for the ‘Lectures’ it is necessary now to turn to a more detailed discussion of Pusey’s understanding of type.

¹⁷⁵ Hedley 2000, 128. See also 127-30.
¹⁷⁷ AFai, 16.
¹⁷⁸ Ayres 2004, 37.
Chapter 4 Types and ‘Typical’ Prophecy

4.1 The Fathers and the ‘Apostolic mode’

This chapter will consider Pusey’s argument that the investigation of Old Testament prophecy is primarily an investigation of type and what he calls ‘typical prophecy’. (L11) The goal will be twofold; to explain Pusey’s notion of type and to show that it is the lens through which he understands all prophecy. As part of this exposition it will be shown why, for Pusey, reading the Old Testament according to the principles which he articulates is necessary.

Throughout the ‘Lectures’, Pusey contrasts the unscriptural and rationalistic approach to prophecy, the ‘modern way’ (L4, 118), with the ‘undisturbed vision’ (L37) and biblical approach of the Fathers. Pusey draws extensively on a wide range of patristic writing, both Latin and Greek. He quotes from Augustine more than any other source. Liddon’s description of the period when ‘he “lived in St. Augustine,” so that his whole thought became saturated with that of the great African father’, seems to apply to the ‘Lectures’.1 Pusey also seems especially familiar with Chrysostom, whose works his father gave to him as a graduation present in 1824 and which, Liddon asserts, ‘had guided and fed his veneration for those great teachers’.2 At the most basic level, Pusey argues that any search for Catholic agreement among the Fathers must embrace the Greek as well as the Latin Fathers:

Our Church … was originally of Greek origin, and then, from the later Augustine, had blended with it, more of the character of the Western Church, so, in its reformation and its later divines, has it united for its model, East and West, the Fathers of all Churches, and formed its teaching upon all.3

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1 *Life*, 413. In light of the extensive quotations in the ‘Lectures’ and in the later editions of his Tract on Baptism, Liddon’s description of Pusey’s ‘meagre sort of knowledge’ of the Fathers at this time seems incorrect, and would probably better describe the period up to 1835, perhaps including the period when Pusey wrote the first edition of Tract 67.
2 *Life*, 409. Pusey may have received some collection of the Father’s works, not only those of Chrysostom. Tuckwell 1900, 138.
3 Augustine 1838, xvi. For an explantion of the supposed ‘Greek origin’ of the Church in England, on the basis of the etymology of the term ‘Church’ (from ‘Κυριακὴ οἰκία, or the Lord’s House’), on the early origin of the British Church, its indepedence from Rome, and
What Yngve Brilioth says of Pusey’s sermons also describes the ‘Lectures’: ‘Augustine and the other Latin Fathers (Tertullian, Ambrose, Leo) served rather as a channel of the piety of the Greek Church; and proof can be abundantly given, that Pusey in his preaching drew directly from Clement of Alexandria, Irenaeus, Gregory of Nazianzum, Chrysostom, Cyril, and others.’

While Pusey acknowledges disagreements and different emphases among the Fathers, he puts more stress on them as embodying a common approach distinct from that of the modern Church.

In the preface to his translation of The Confessions of S. Augustine (1838), the first volume of the Library of the Fathers, Pusey offers his most developed and systematic statement of his understanding of the authority of the Fathers at the time he wrote the ‘Lectures’. The Library of the Fathers is one of the best-known fruits of the Oxford Movement and an important backdrop to the preparation of the ‘Lectures’. Its full title highlights again Pusey’s emphasis on the common faith of the Fathers over the differences among schools and individual authors: ‘A Library of the Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church anterior to the Division of the East and the West’. Geoffrey Rowell argues that this project ‘undoubtedly gained particular impetus from the Hampden controversy’, a description which, as we have seen, applies to the ‘Lectures’ also.

In the preface to the Confessions, which also serves as a preface to the Library, Pusey argues that he does not put the Fathers before the Bible but rather before the contemporary Church:

from ‘the Asiatic custom in keeping Easter, and in its manner of administering baptism’, see Wordsworth 1844, 1-2, 132-133.
5 See Augustine 1838, i-xxxii. See also Pusey’s ‘Prospectus’ for the Library, in Cyril 1839, 368-70.
6 For a discussion of the importance of the Library and Pusey’s role in the endeavour, as well as a full list of the titles, translators, and prefaces, see Liddle, Life, 433-440, and 445-447. For a contemporary assessment of the importance of the Library for Pusey, and for the way the Tractarians drew on the Fathers, see Middleton 2001, 267-306, especially, 280-285. See also Rowell 1983, 78-79.
7 Rowell 1983, 78.
The contrast, then, in point of authority, is not between Holy Scripture and the Fathers, but between the Fathers and us; not between the Book interpreted and the interpreters, but between one class of interpreters and another; between ancient Catholic truth and modern private opinions; not between the word of God and the word of man, but between varying modes of understanding the word of God.8

This is the same argument that Pusey makes in the ‘Lectures’, it is the modern system which is most distinct from the Bible, not that of the early Church. Only the authority conceded to the Apostles as inspired writers of the New Testament prevents people from charging them with the same excess of fancy as the Fathers:

… had it been St. Ignatius, who had professed in his epistles, that the care of the priesthood was implied in the comment ‘Thou shalt not muzzle the ox, which treadeth out the corn’ … should we not have heard much of his undue exaltation of the priesthood, and of fanciful allegorizing? And yet, St Paul urges this passage and this as the chief meaning of it (1 Cor. 9:9, 1 Tim. 5:18). (L11)

The similarities between St Paul and Ignatius show the ‘Apostolic’ character of the Father’s exegesis:

This might well awaken the suspicion that theirs not ours, is the Apostolic mode, or, at least, approaches the nearest to it. Were their system even so defective, it would still remain to be shown how, precisely this defect, one which implies a system so wholly different from our own could have appeared so early and so universally. (L10)

The universality of typical interpretation in the early Church is a key part of Pusey’s argument. He sees in the Fathers a general agreement on this system, whatever the differences in specific interpretations:

For let any one regard such types as not one or the other father, but all agree in, not the later only, but the earlier, writers of different habits, independent of each other, and dependent on Scripture and the Apostles, and see whether the system which he finds throughout, is not one essentially different from that now prevalent, whether it would not, not in its details merely, but in its broad outline, be regarded fanciful. (L10)

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8 Ibid. iii. See also iv, and p. ii for the importance of the act of Convocation of AD 1571. See also Life, 410-413 (Pusey to W. A. Greenhill, 6 June 1838).
In his preface to Augustine’s *Confessions*, Pusey also emphasizes the catholicity of what he calls ‘spiritual interpretation’ or, in the preferred terminology of the ‘Lectures’, ‘typical interpretation’:

At the same time, in this as in other cases, a distinction must be made between the general principle, (in this instance, what would to most, as being unaccustomed to it, appear an extreme of spiritual interpretation,) and the particular applications of it. The first is Catholic, the second may frequently be individual, although in the details also there is a Catholic system, and fragments of it may frequently be traced.\(^9\)

While the system of typical interpretation may be ‘a Catholic system’, Pusey cautions that, however eminent, the view of any single author is still only the view of a single witness: ‘The words then of an individual Father may be only those of an enlightened man; it is only by their harmony or unity with others that we ascertain them to be part of the Catholic Verities.’\(^10\)

The notable exception which proves the rule of a common and catholic system is ‘the school of Antioch’ which Pusey characterizes as the home of patristic ‘orthodoxism’ and the only significant aberration in the rule of typical or spiritual interpretation in the early Church. (L9-10) Pusey separates ‘not Origen and his school only … but St Irenaeus, and all’ from ‘the one Judaizing school of Antioch’, (L9) and attributes to this school the same faults and heretical tendencies which he finds in the evidence writers and the apologetic approach:

For their inability to perceive the relations of the Old Testament to the New Testament was part of its superficial rationalizing character; hard in admitting proof, ‘slow to understand’ the spiritual relation of things, deficient in contemplation, and in fineness of senses, dry in its theories which made it the natural birth-place of Nestorianism, the receptacle of Pelagianism. (L10)\(^11\)

Another example of Pusey’s emphasis on a common approach in the early Church is the way he puts the Antiochean bishop Theodoret’s typological interpretation of the crossing of the Red Sea alongside that of his theological

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\(^9\) Ibid. xv. See xxv for ‘typical interpretation’ in the preface.

\(^10\) Ibid. vii.

\(^11\) Pusey’s view of the Church of Antioch may be influenced by Newman. See *Arians*, 3, 25, 126 and Seynaeve 1953, 307. For a contemporary assessment of the problems with characterizing the ‘school of Antioch’ in this way, see Louth 2009.
sparring partner Cyril of Alexandria as well as those of Augustine, Ambrose, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Cyril of Jerusalem: ‘the sea was an image of the laver. The cloud, of the gift of the Spirit; Moses, of the Priest; the rod, of the Cross; Israel passing through, of the baptised; the Egyptians pursing, of the demons; Pharaoh himself was an image of the devil’. While Pusey notes differences in details (Augustine sees Moses as a type of Christ rather than a priest), more important is the general consensus to which these authors witness.

One could characterize Pusey’s approach to some extent as polemical or cavalier, overlooking differences to sharpen his attack on the apologetic use. There is, no doubt, a polemical aspect to his emphasis on the undivided Church. For example, he finds further evidence of a common system among the Fathers in that, according to modern standards, even the ‘unsoundest’ interpreters of Antioch see ‘fanciful analogies between the Old and New Testaments’. (L9-10) However, while he emphasizes similarities over plurality of understandings, he does so with the support of a great deal of primary evidence. Moreover, although he sees an inherent correspondence between typical interpretation and Christian orthodoxy, Pusey’s discussions in the ‘Lectures’ do not focus on the details of the Christological or Trinitarian controversies in the fourth and fifth centuries. Alongside Hampden, for example, who suggests that terms such as ‘ὁ ὑπάρχων’ have given occasion for theologians ‘to arm themselves in defence of the phantoms thus called into being’ and who implies that the language of the Creeds is tainted with the injurious confusions of the schoolmen (which in Hampden’s system includes at least the Alexandrian Fathers and Augustine as well as Aquinas), one can see why Pusey focussed his appeal for recovery at a more general level. He argues in the ‘Lectures’ that whatever differences exist, one sees in the early Church a system markedly different from that of Hampden, Paley or the apologetic school more generally. While Pusey did not, in the ‘Lectures’, probe the significance of differences among the Fathers, this was not a sleight of

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12 Theodoret quoted in T67rev., 315-6 n. 5. See 315 n. 4 for Cyril of Alexandria and Augustine, 317-8 n. 2 for Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, and Cyril of Jerusalem.
13 See for example, T67rev., 312-20.
14 HPP, 6 and Hampden 1837, 55, also 82-83. See also DrH., 2-5.
hand – those whom he criticized also treated the Fathers as monolithic, with Origen perhaps standing out for particular censure. Viewed more positively, Pusey displays here something of the tendency which Lewis Ayres finds in the interpreters of the early Church. On the basis of ‘a complex notion of the scriptural text as the primary resource for the Christian imagination’, they were willing to explicate it ‘through the use of whatever lies to hand and may be persuasively adapted’. As Ayres points out, and as will be discussed at the end of Chapter 5, it is precisely what counts as ‘persuasive adaption’ that is the matter of debate.

4.2 Pusey’s Comprehensive View of Type

4.2.1 The Old Testament’s ‘fulness of type’

While the ‘Lectures’ are an investigation of ‘types’, Pusey never offers a simple definition of types as he does for prophecy. This lack of definition is in itself instructive. Pusey criticizes those who attempt to define narrowly the meaning of type and puts forward rather a conception of type that is co-extensive with prophecy itself. The search for types is a response to ‘our Lord’s … last teaching to the Apostles after His Resurrection’, which we considered in Chapter 2, that they should seek him in the whole of the Old Testament, in the law, the prophets, and the Psalms: ‘It were even to put force upon the mind to exhibit one event, or person or institution as a type of its Lord, and then refuse it liberty to see a type of Him in another event, or person or institution similar to the former. (L12) At the most basic level, types for Pusey include events, people, or institutions that prophesy or reveal Christ:

But the Old Testament in consequence of the preparatory office assigned to it had in it a fulness of type, which could not exist elsewhere. And here, of course, one must in the first instance place the positive institutions of God (whether rites or offices) and His direct doings. … In these must be accounted principally as of greatest account, the ritual ordained by God; but so also other ordinances or orderings of God, as the

15 See, for example, Intro., 607-8, quoted at 4.2.3.
16 Ayres 2004, 392.
17 Ibid. See 5.2.2 of this thesis.
18 See also 2.3.3.
sacrifice of Isaac. And these institutions partly represent the Redeemer Himself, partly the way in which that redemption is appropriated to us, as the sacraments are in the passage of the Red Sea and the Manna. (L26)

At first glance, Pusey’s description of types seems to fit with the kind of definition which K. J. Woollcombe offers in his classic essay on biblical typology: ‘Typology, considered as a method of exegesis, may be defined as the establishment of historical connexions between certain events, persons or things in the Old Testament and similar events, persons or things in the New Testament.’ However, Pusey’s comprehensive notion of type not only embraces the common understanding of type but broadens it considerably. The sacrifice of Isaac or that of Noah are as much types as the ‘rites and offices’ of the Mosaic law. In harmony with his notion of the unity of Christ with his body, Pusey sees such ordinances as types or prophecies of the sacraments as well as ‘the Redeemer Himself’. In material which appears to be a later draft of this section of the ‘Lectures’ Pusey explains further what he means by the Old Testament’s ‘fulness of type’: ‘But the whole Old Testament, whether history, or character, in word or in action, had in it, by reason of God’s Presence in it, fitting it for the preparatory office He assigned it, a fulness of type which could not exist elsewhere.’ It is important to see that Pusey refers to types ‘in word’ as well as ‘in action’, sayings as well as things: ‘Besides these physical correspondences of things animate and inanimate, there is yet another very extensive application: that of words’. In Pusey’s system, ‘The reproaches of them that reproached Thee fell on Me’, is as much a type and prophecy of the Redeemer’s Passion as Joseph in prison or the Passover.

Whereas many writers take great efforts to distinguish types from other kinds of prophecy, for Pusey types and prophecy are synonymous. This is crucial to the argument of the ‘Lectures’:

One type thoroughly developed will throw much light over the whole typical character of the Old Testament. It should further be noticed, in illustration of the importance and extent of the subject, that types are by no means confined to what are usually designated by the name. For types

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19 Woollcombe 1957, 39.
20 S-FTL, 7.
21 S-FTL, 16.
are everywhere taken up into prophecy itself; its language is mainly typical. (L12-13)

The simple idea which organizes his investigation of prophecy in the ‘Lectures’ is that prophecy is ‘mainly typical’. ‘Typical’ rather than ‘typological’ is the most common way Pusey describes prophecy throughout the ‘Lectures’ – prophecy is typical, and types are prophetic:

Israel then was in a three-fold manner typical: First, in its institutions, wherein it was to live, until by constantly living in them, it imbibed their Spirit, and so became susceptible for the teaching, which unfolded their meaning, Secondly, in God’s general guidance, Third, in their own particular character and conduct, as a people guided by God. As a people, they will be emblematic of the Christian Church, or of the Christian life; God’s Providence and His mode of their deliverance, also of His dealings with that Church, and in a measure also, as man, of the Head of the Church, the Son of man, who is also Son of God, and Institutions would be typical of doctrines. (L86)

Pusey describes the history of Israel as one great system of type and typical prophecy.\textsuperscript{22} In addition to the ‘historical connexions’ between Old Testament types and the New Testament antitype which Woolcombe’s standard definition includes, Pusey finds correspondences between these types and the ongoing life of Christ’s body, the Church. Pusey’s sense of ‘type’ is comprehensive not only in what may serve as a type, but in how a type is fulfilled. Types are typical of doctrines – not just of the Redeemer’s death on the Cross but also of the Atonement; not just of the Resurrection but also of the character of eternal life. Pusey evokes Augustine’s classic formula: ‘A deeper investigation of type and prophecy would also show them in the Old Testament the principal doctrines of the New. “Novum Testamentum in vetere latet, vetus in Novo patet”, says St Augustine’. (L36)\textsuperscript{23}

When Pusey speaks of a type or a typical prophecy, part of what he means is that some aspect of its meaning is hidden. To discover what is revealed it is necessary to ‘penetrate a little deeper, or lift up the veil a little’.

\textsuperscript{22} A non-exhaustive list of Pusey’s description of prophecy as ‘typical’ or of ‘typical’ as a synonym for ‘prophetic’ includes: L2, 3, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 20, 25, 26, 48, 54, 72, 86, 96.

\textsuperscript{23} ‘The New lies hidden in the Old Testament, and the Old Testament is opened up in the New’. Augustine Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 2.73.
The meaning of typical prophecy is a ‘mystical meaning’, a meaning which is hidden as well as manifest. Pusey describes typical prophecy in terms of the ‘dark speeches’ of Numbers 12:8, ‘where God declares the character of the prophecies of Moses ḥydh “enigma” on account of the veil at first cast over them’. (L33-34) The Old Testament is ‘one vast prophetic system, veiling, but full of the New Testament’. (L8) The Fathers’ expositions of types uncover ‘a hidden treasure, which lies below the surface of Holy Scripture; they contained however, even for the present, some full although veiled promise’. (L85) Pusey sometimes describes the veiled meaning as the ‘higher’ meaning: ‘Many prophecies and especially the Psalms will have a higher meaning, than if read in our matter of fact way’. (L28) The higher meaning is also deeper, ‘deeper than that which is required for the mere context.’ (L39) This deeper or veiled sense is ‘a treasure which God has deposited in Scripture below the surface’. (L39)

All of these expressions not only describe the kind of meaning which types offer, but they emphasize that these types may be overlooked or misunderstood. Pusey sometimes calls types ‘hieroglyphics’ which need to be deciphered: ‘The hieroglyphics which were the deposit of such wisdom appear but a confused mass of shapeless and arbitrary signs, to those who can no longer decipher them.’ (L10) Richard Hurd whose influence on Pusey we considered in Chapter 2, also described ‘the prophetic style’ of Scripture as constructed ‘on the symbolic principles of the hieroglyphics; which were not vague, uncertain things; but fixed and constant analogies’. Pusey found in Egyptian hieroglyphics a timely image to describe the ancient language of types. Although the Rosetta stone with its inscriptions in hieroglyphics, demotic, and Greek was discovered by Napoleon’s troops in 1799, it was not until the early 1820s that the work of Jean-François Champollion made it possible to decipher the hieroglyphics. For those who could no longer decipher the symbolic language of the Old Testament Pusey’s work could serve as a typological Rosetta stone.

4.2.2 The Apologetic Approach to Types

Pusey distinguishes his comprehensive notion of type and typical prophecy from the apologetic approach to Old Testament types. He describes two classes of apologetic writing which acknowledge the principle of types but which arbitrarily limit them. The first class ‘admits the principle of types, but limits their application’, while the second ‘makes it their principle to accept the application of types, whereon they have the authority of the New Testament but restrain the principle itself.’ (L12) Pusey seems to have in mind the kind of definitions and classifications that one finds in Thomas Hartwell Horne’s* *An Introduction to the Critical Study and Knowledge of the Holy Scriptures* (1818), a book that was required reading for divinity students in Pusey’s day.25 Whereas Horne makes it clear that interpreting types is an important part of the study of the Old Testament, his precision about what counts as type and what does not, and his emphasis on definite or ‘certain criteria’ to determine a sense which is ‘sufficiently clear and intelligible’ show why he is a good representative of the apologetic approach.26 When Pusey describes errors in the modern approach to types, he uses as his examples the very sources Horne puts forward to justify his views in his *Introduction*. For example, in his chapter ‘On the Interpretation of Types’, Horne quotes extensively from Bishop Marsh’s *Lectures on Biblical Criticism and Interpretation* (1809-16). Herbert Marsh* was Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity in Cambridge from 1807 until his death, and his lectures were considered to be a classic at the time Pusey delivered the ‘Lectures’.27 Although Pusey does not specify in the

25 Landow 1980, 21. While Landow’s discussion of the importance of typology in the Victorian period may appear to contradict Pusey’s argument, Landow’s approach is different. For example, Landow refers to both Newman and Horne to exemplify interest in types without distinguishing their approaches as Pusey does (pp. 20-26). Also, Landow’s view of the essentially historical character of biblical types and of the tension between the historical and the spiritual differentiates his approach from that of Pusey (pp. 54-57).

*Horne, Thomas Hartwell (1780–1862). On the basis of Horne’s book, the Bp of London ordained him. He was offered the curacy of Christ Church, Greyfriars, in 1819, and in 1831 a prebendary in St Paul’s Cathedral.

26 Intro., 604, 608.

27 *Marsh, Herbert (1757-1839). He was appointed Bp of Llandaff in 1816, and Bp of Peterborough in 1819. Before his appointment as Lady Margaret Professor, he studied in Germany with J. D. Michaelis, from whom he learned the critical methods of biblical interpretation common in Germany at the time.
‘Lectures’ the identity of those who limit the principle of types, we know from Marshall’s ‘Notes’ that he named Bishop Marsh.28 For example, when Pusey censures those who ‘pass by … even some of the New Testament itself’, i.e., its types, he appears to have Marsh in mind. (L11) Horne quotes the offending passage, but with approval:

And even when comparisons are instituted in the New Testament between antecedent and subsequent persons or things, we must be careful to distinguish the examples, where a comparison is instituted merely for the sake of illustration, from the examples where such a connexion is declared, as exists in the relation of a type to its antitype.29

Horne also quotes Marsh to illustrate how to distinguish an ‘illustration’ from a genuine type:30

To constitute one thing the type of another, as the term is generally understood in reference to Scripture, something more is wanted than mere resemblance. The former must not only resemble the latter, but must have been designed to resemble the latter … It is this previous design, and this pre-ordained connexion, which constitute the relation of type and antitype.31

This principle displays what for Pusey is the evidentialist search for definitive proof. For Marsh, the New Testament provides the required evidence of a ‘pre-ordained connexion’:

Whatever persons or things, recorded in the Old Testament, were expressly declared by Christ, or by his apostles, to have been designed as prefigurations of persons or things relating to the New Testament, such persons or things so recorded in the former, are types of the persons or things, with which they are compared in the latter. But if we assert, that a person or thing was designed to prefigure another person or thing, where no such prefiguration has been declared by divine authority, we make an assertion for which we neither have, nor can have, the slightest foundation.32

28 M19. In his letter to Tholuck about English theology (24 May 1830), Pusey writes that ‘Bp Marsh has published a set of lectures on the criticism and interpretation of the Bible, but having been addressed to younger students of Theology, they are elementary only’. Life, 246.
30 Intro., 614.
In Pusey’s argument this approach represents a widespread practice. Pusey points to the Bishop of Durham, William Van Mildert*, as one of those who only allows such types as are authorized by Scripture. According to Pusey, Van Mildert here follows the eighteenth century divine Daniel Waterland*, but did not carry the mistaken principle as far as Marsh:

Fearful of unskilful application, they draw the line as to admit only what are types in the New Testament, but leave the rest in abeyance. To this school Waterland belonged (Preface to Sacred Scripture Vindicated p. 18). He will only allow as types those which Sacred Scripture has directly or indirectly Typified. This is corrected in a degree by Bishop van Mildert though he too in part admits it (Brampton Lecture vii). Bishop Marsh carries it still further than even Waterland. This is dangerous like all timid policy. It endeavours to get rid of all typology and to make us suspicious of them, it draws also an arbitrary line.

Horne quotes Van Mildert from the Bampton Lectures of 1814, The General Principles of Scripture-Interpretation, the same lectures to which Pusey also refers:

It is essential to a type, in the Scriptural acceptation of the term, that there should be a competent evidence of the divine intention in the correspondence between it and the antitype, – a matter not left to the imagination of the expositor to discover, but resting on some solid proof from Scripture itself, that this was really the case.

This is a notion of intention which Pusey challenges and which exemplifies for him the problem of evidentialist approach to prophecy: ‘brought within the compass of a system, all those parts were lost, which lay to the right or to the left beyond the circle which men had drawn’. (L3) Pusey faults the approach which Marsh, Waterland, Van Mildert, and Horne represent as a species of the apologetic approach to prophecy, displaying its ‘precise and clear, and reasoning habit of mind’ and ‘entertaining a secret repugnance to the undefined

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33 *Van Mildert, William (1765-1836). Van Mildert was appointed Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford in 1813, Bp of Llandaff in 1819, and translated to Durham in 1826 where he helped to found the University of Durham.
34 M18-19.
35 Van Mildert, Lecture VII, quoted in Intro., 614.
Pusey’s criticisms of Waterland, Marsh, and Van Mildert suggest the controversial character of the ‘Lectures’ which we will consider in more detail in Chapter 7. Many High Churchman regarded Waterland as one of those who encouraged a lively faith and an appreciation of the Fathers during the dry and superficial eighteenth century. According to the influential High Churchman, J. W. Burgon, Bishop Van Mildert was one of those ‘holy and earnest men’ whose work prepared the ground for the Tractarian revival. Finally, Bishop Marsh was considered by many, in both positive and negative senses, as a ‘rigidly Orthodox’ champion of religion in Cambridge. In those whom the historian V. F. Storr describes as ‘lineal ancestors’ to the Oxford Movement, including two of the three ‘ablest’ bishops of the orthodox or High Church tradition, Pusey uncovered the ‘timid and apologetic tone’ characteristic of both the apologetic approach and rationalism. Newman shared a similar view, and described Waterland as well as George Bull and Van Mildert as ‘Antiquarians and Doctrinists, not Ecclesiastical Historians’. In his study of Newman, Ben King argues: ‘What Newman regrets about “Doctrinists,” from Bull and Waterland to Van Mildert, is that detail overwhelms plot: they are “Antiquarians” who are interested in the past for its own sake, not “Ecclesiastical Historians” who tell the story of the past in order to change lives in the present.’ This description brings together elements of Pusey’s criticism of the apologetic approach to prophecy and shows how his argument was also a challenge to the High Church tradition. Pusey’s willingness to mention Marsh, Waterland, and Van Mildert, but not Horne, may be another example of his reluctance to mention living authors in some of his works, a

37 Burgon, Lives of Twelve Good Men, in ibid. 11-12, also n. 38.
38 Nockles 1994, 29 and 102. For Marsh’s orthodoxy, see also 65-66.
39 Storr 1913, 80, 79 and Life, 413-414.
40 King 2009, 16, also 15-17.
41 Ibid. 16.
practice to which he refers explicitly in the *Theology of Germany*, and which he seems to adopt, for the most part, in the ‘Lectures’. 42

4.2.3 Types as Guides and the Counter-example of Cain

Horne cautions his readers against the ‘excess of spiritualizing’ and the tendency to ‘seek for mystical meanings in every passage’, which he finds ‘among many of the fathers, as Cyprian, Jerome, Augustine, and others, and particularly in Origen’. 43 At the end of his consideration of the ‘Spiritual Interpretation of the Scriptures’, he leaves his reader with a warning to ‘adhere with jealous care to the plain and unforced dictates of the word of God; lest … he should inadvertently contribute to the adulteration of Christianity, and the consequent injury which must thence arise to the spiritual interests of his fellow-creatures.’ 44 Pusey turns this kind of criticism on its head and argues that it is not the search for hidden meanings which contributes to the injury and adulteration of Christianity, but rather rules which limit the principle of types. These false limits are dangerous because they create a feeling of suspicion toward the Bible and the sacred writers: ‘For this proceeding, amidst its apparent modesty, does in fact *assume* the precariousness of types; its very object is to get rid of the question of typology as unsatisfactory and so, it, of necessity engenders a suspicious feeling with regard to those which remain.’ (L12) One of Pusey’s fundamental principles is that the types which are described or quoted in the New Testament are not limits which restrict what counts as a type, but rather examples or signposts which reveal the principles of typology:

… what the Apostles took and authorized were not isolated phenomena but specimens, as it were, of the rich treasure stored up within it, given to kindle our diligence in searching after it, not as the bounds of our search; [but] guides to direct where and how to seek, not guards to withhold us from prying beyond what it has authoritatively disclosed. (L8)

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42 TG-I, 177 n. 1: ‘the mention of living authors has been for the most part purposely avoided’.
43 Intro., 607-8.
44 Intro., 608.
Whereas for writers like Bishop Marsh, the ‘divine authority’ of the type is secured only by New Testament quotations, for Pusey this divine authority is provided through the guidance which the clearest types offer:

And obviously our wisest course of investigation is to take as our guides such types as are pointed out to us in the New Testament to examine their principles and character and criteria, and then compare with them those generally recognized by the Church or read with eyes so opened the Old Testament itself. One type thoroughly developed will throw much light over the whole typical character of the Old Testament. (L12)

New Testament types do not exhaust the storehouse, but rather show how to interpret the Old Testament and ‘the system of interpretation which we ought to adopt’. 46

With the ‘modest reserve’ that our interpretations cannot claim the same authority as those of the Apostles which are given to us in Scripture, Pusey writes, ‘it appears more grateful to follow out the hints which God has given, and under the guidance, as we might hope, of His Holy Spirit, compare like things with like, than simply to keep without increase, the talent committed to our care’. (L12) Without stating it explicitly, Pusey implies that refusing to look for types deserves the similar stern rebuke of the Lord: ‘Take therefore the talent from him, and give it unto him which hath ten talents.’ (Matt. 25:28) The description which Reno and O’Keefe offer of the Fathers’ approach sums up Pusey’s understanding on this point:

… they did not view interpretive modesty as a theological virtue. They believed that God saturated scripture with a great wealth of truth, and zeal was the right disposition to take as an interpreter. ‘Seek and ye shall find’, was a basic hermeneutic principle that they felt with existential force. 47

In Pusey’s argument, those who fail to see the whole of the Old Testament as one great system of typical prophecy fail to do what God has required of them and neglect the most basic hermeneutical principle.

45 Bp. Marsh in Intro., 614 n.
46 M13.
In a particularly strong and even shocking image, Pusey suggests that Cain, the first murderer, is a type or symbol for those who neglect types and typical prophecy because they neglect the hints or guides which God has given: ‘Cain appears, in the first instance, as the type of those, who profanely neglect what is not directly commanded them, nor act readily upon the intimations of God’. (L53/54) Pusey draws this conclusion on the basis of his interpretation of the Fall in Genesis 3. Drawing on Ambrose’s homily *Paradise*, Pusey seeks to uncover the deeper meaning of the fig leaves which Adam and Eve sewed together to cover themselves, and of the ‘coats of skins’ which God made them (Gen. 3:6, 21). In addition to Ambrose, Pusey refers to Irenaeus and Chrysostom[^49] to argue that in the Fall Adam and Eve lost the clothing of virtue and the robe of sanctity. (L48) The clothing which God gave them is a sign of the mercy of God by which sin is covered or forgiven. Pusey draws on Keble to sum up the tradition, in his poem for Sexagesima: ‘Yet mercy hath not left us bare: *| The very weeds we daily wear | are to faith’s eye a pledge of God’s forgiving might.’ (L48)^

More particularly, Pusey finds in the clothing provided by God a type and prophecy of the need for vicarious sacrifice to forgive sin. Abel’s offering of the ‘firstlings of his flock and of the fat therefore’ (Gen. 4:4) looked back to the gift of skins to his parents and forward to the vicarious sacrifice of Christ, the one who would crush the serpent’s head, cover human sin, and provide a new and more lasting garment of grace and sanctity:

> And so, in this inexpressible condescension of God lay the foundation of all sacrifice; and Abel’s offering looked back to and was a reminiscence and recognition of the unspeakable mercy, which lay enveloped in this act of God, that by death, man’s shame was covered, as well as forward to that vicarious death of the woman’s seed, whereby their enemy was to be crushed. We hear not of sacrifices being directly appointed, or that these were the skins of beasts offered in sacrifice; and therefore it is best not to supply what is concealed: but it is said that God made coats of

[^48]: Pusey used this material in his sermon ‘Eve – The Course of Temptation’, preached at St Mary’s Oxford, Lent, 1870. Sermon VI, Pusey 1874, 107-127.
[^50]:  *XnYr.*, Sexagesima. The italics are in Pusey, not Keble.
skin, and so the text presupposes the death of the animals; and Abel in sacrificing to God, was imitating this action of God, and setting forth the truth therein declared. And sacrifice throughout the world is but the indistinct, and often confused, echo of this revealing act of God: and so had a root in the human breast, deeper than they who used it, were conscious of. (L48-49)

Since Adam and Eve’s need for clothing was a result of sin, and since providing this clothing in the form of animal skins necessitated the death of unoffending animals, God’s act in providing clothing for Adam and Eve taught that the shedding of innocent blood would be necessary in order to forgive or ‘cover’ sin.

Pusey emphasizes that while Abel was not explicitly commanded to make a sacrifice, in doing so he imitated God. This reception of what is only imperfectly known, and acting on it, is part of the character of faith:

Abel’s sacrifice carried out into action the promise conveyed by God in the death of those unoffending ones, with whose skins God had covered our first parents’ sin; not, as far as it appears, by any command, but an act of faith, imitating with a childhood-docility the pattern set before him. (L53/54)

If Cain is an emblem of those who ‘profanely neglect what is not directly commanded them’, Abel exemplifies the obedient and probing faith which Pusey and other members of the Oxford movement hold up as an exemplary standard. This kind of faith discovers that which is not explicitly commanded, and discerns prophecy which is not clear and verifiable. Abel learned the truth of the sacrificial principle which is wrapped up in the provision of skins for Adam and Eve. Cain’s first sin was not the murder of his brother, but the neglect of the hints which God had given. He failed the trial of prophecy which we considered in Chapter 3. By suggesting that Cain’s fault was the emblem of those who neglect the principle of typology, Pusey shows how serious he believes this error to be.
4.2.4 The ‘minute agreement’ of Types

Pusey emphasizes not only general correspondences between types and their fulfilments, but that these correspondences extend to minute particulars. The minute correspondence of types, the way in which all the details of a type are significant, is another one of Pusey’s fundamental principles. For Pusey, nothing is by chance, ‘things, apparently the most minute, were full of hidden meaning’. (L12) Having considered the way in which the sacrifice of Isaac was emblematic of Christ’s sacrifice, Pusey notes: ‘The history in its minute and mysterious particulars must have made a deep impression upon the elder inquiring Church and to us, it may, besides its direct instruction, be a warning how we reckon any things common or of slight account, which God has sanctified.’ (L71) He explains this principle also in later editions of Tract 67: ‘It is a principle with the ancients, that whether they see the right application or no, or only one or more of many right applications, still nothing in His history was accidental, nothing without its meaning.’ Subordinate means or incidental details are not just explanations or local colouring, but are themselves vehicles of revelation. Pusey argues that failing to consider the ‘deeper meaning’ of all ‘outward circumstances’, the details of a type is an expression of empiricism or epicureanism:

He willed that His people should enter the promised land through the Jordan, though not the obvious way; or He raised the axe's head, though (as people would now often speak) it ‘chanced’ that it was by the Jordan that the sons of the prophets had, by Elisha’s permission, gone to make them a dwelling. The ‘common sense’ view, that such things were ‘by chance’ so and so, is a naked Epicureism [sic]; enough for us that they were so; and if so, were designed to be so, i.e.: they had a meaning.

In the ‘Lectures’, Pusey argues that ‘It is probably one part of the lesson intended to us by the minute provisions of the law, not to “despise the small things” of the Gospel, but to search in them also, as the Jew did in the law, what these things should mean.’ (L92) Once again, O’Keefe and Reno find this

51 *T67rev.*, 272.
52 *T67rev.*, 347. See also 272-3 for examples: ‘moderns find evidences of the truth of the narrators, where the ancients saw doctrine and divine wisdom.’
same principle in early Christian interpretation of the Bible: ‘The dense particularity of the two sides of the typological interpretation does all the work of illumination.’

Pusey points to the example of the Paschal lamb as an example of the principle of minute correspondence:

In the emblem of the paschal lamb we are doubly required to look for a minute fulfilment, 1) by the very fact of the minuteness and repeatedness of the distinctions, in itself implying importance and significance; 2) by the circumstance, that one detail, which to us apparently would have seemed most minute, and have been altogether passed over, has been singled out by St John as designed with this view, ‘that the Scripture should be fulfilled, “a bone of Him shall not be broken”’ (John 19:36), as if to instruct us that nothing is of little account, or without meaning, for certainly we should not [have] seen that this was a portion of the completeness of His sacrifice, that it should be perfect when offered, and when completed, His holy person, which He offered should retain its perfection, as a symbol of its greatness, its completeness, its durability, its acceptableness, while out of His pierced side there flowed the blood and water; ‘not’, as St Chrysostom says, ‘accidentally or by chance did that fountain spring forth from Him, but because through both, His Church was founded; and they who are partakers of the mysteries know this; for by water being regenerated, by the blood and flesh are they nourished.’ And all this God had in the Passover portrayed long before, in the perfection of the lamb, the entireness of its form (and in this sacrifice alone were not the bones to be broken, or the hidden marrow eaten) and yet the sprinkling of its blood, and the nourishment through it.

Comparing his ‘matter-of-fact age’ with the ancient Church, Pusey writes that ‘their thorough conviction of the divinity of every the least jot or tittle, every fringe and bell in the rich embroidering of God’s word – that every thing in the whole economy had its designs and meanings, – enabled them to use proofs which would be closed to moderns’.

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53 O’Keefe 2005, 72.
54 Chrysostom, *Homilies on St John*, 85.3, on John 19:34.
4.3 ‘Typical’ and ‘Direct’ Prophecy

4.3.1 The ‘Typical’ Character of All Prophecy

As we have seen, Pusey does not sharply distinguish type and prophecy: ‘For types are everywhere taken up into prophecy itself; its language is mainly typical.’ (L13) Pusey describes ‘typical prophecies’ as the paradigmatic form of New Testament prophecy which shows how the Old Testament should be read:

There is, however, another class of prophecies and that the most frequently introduced in the New Testament, precisely that sort which has most suffered by modern treatment, and which seem inserted, in part at least, as a sort of hint, how we may read the Old Testament with most fruit – the typical prophecies. (L7)

The other class of prophecies from which Pusey distinguishes typical prophecies he calls ‘direct’ (L7, L29) or ‘simple’ (L33) prophecies in the ‘Lectures’. He uses the term ‘direct’ in two ways. In a technical or neutral sense, direct prophecies are Old Testament prophecies which are fulfilled only in Christ, they do not have a secondary or prior fulfilment in the Old Testament. Pusey explains his view of ‘direct’ prophecy in a letter to Keble in November, 1836, when he was delivering his lectures. Pusey explained to Keble the meaning of his ‘denying any typical basis to such places as Ps. 2:4-5, and to those parts of Isa. 40-end which relate to our Lord, contrary to modern notions which say, This psalm was first fulfilled in David, then in Christ: but I think this was intended to be confined to particular places, not in all’. In Psalm 2:4 – ‘He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh: the Lord shall have them in derision’ – there is a direct reference to the Ascended Christ, the ‘Lord’ who ‘dwelleth in heaven’, words which were not fulfilled in a secondary way by David or in any other Old Testament personage. Therefore, it is a direct prophecy. However, more commonly in the ‘Lectures’, Pusey uses ‘direct’ in a more pejorative sense to describe the label given to those prophecies which meet criteria like those of Paley and Davison described in Chapter 2. One finds these sorts of prophecies listed at the back of some Bibles under a title like

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55 Pusey to Keble, 20 Nov. 1836, LBV-101. See also Liddon, Life, 400.
‘Old Testament Prophecies of Christ’. As we have seen already, Pusey believed that this approach to prophecy misunderstands the prophetic character of the Old Testament:

Holy Scripture does not favour our mechanical views of prophecy, as containing so many items, as it were, as there are striking passages; as though prophecies admitted of being counted up, and the entire evidence of prophecy was to be weighed according to the number and contents and tangibleness of these several predictions. (L7–8)

Such a mechanical view of prophecy is promoted by the apologetic school which uses prophecy as a form of evidence. The implication of terms such as ‘direct’ prophecy is that this kind of prophecy is the best or definitive kind of prophecy, and that other forms are of secondary or uncertain importance. Rather, for Pusey, prophecies which are clear serve as guides to the prophetic witness of the Old Testament more generally, and the details of even obscure prophecies are important (i.e. what he says about types applies also to typical prophecy).

Pusey argues that the distinction between direct and typical prophecies serves to obscure prophecy rather than uncover it. Pusey distances himself from those who make such distinctions: ‘I would not, then, distinguish, as some eminent foreign writers have done, between direct and typical prophecies, or again between these and types, otherwise than in form.’ (L33) Without mentioning him by name, he refers to the work of his friend August Tholuck, whose dissertation ‘On the Citations from the Old Testament contained in the New’, was before him at the end of July, 1836, when he was preparing the ‘Lectures’:

I have read your 1st Beilage, and, as whole & in the main I agree with it & like it very much: only whereas you point out, that the distinction between typical prophecies, which result from the character of the Old Testament dispensation, & those, wherein there was a special inspiration often melts away and then two classes melt into each other.\(^{56}\)

Pusey repeats this assessment in the ‘Lectures’, where he refers to Tholuck cryptically in the class of eminent foreign writers: ‘Rather, as one of these

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\(^{56}\) P-Thl., lines 144-148. Geck uses italics to show the letters he adds to fill out Pusey’s abbreviations.
writers, has himself noticed, the several classes, into which men have distinguished prophecy are continually melting into each other; so that e.g. although some point more directly to the Christ, others are more veiled’. (L32) Alongside his general approval of Tholuck’s exposition Pusey finds in Tholuck’s analysis vestiges of the apologetic approach which evaluates prophecy by the kind of clear evidence which it can offer: ‘I think namely that too broad a distinction is made between direct & typical prophecy: as if after all typical prophecy were a lower grade, and a lower grade of evidence and a lower value.’ Typical prophecy seems like a ‘lower grade of evidence’ in Tholuck’s argument because Tholuck says that the evidence offered by typical prophecies has only a ‘persuasive rather than convincing power’ when compared to direct prophecy. As we have seen in Chapter 2, Pusey thinks that distinguishing prophecy according to standards of clarity and evidence comes from focusing on the surface of the prophecy. In his letter to Tholuck, Pusey sketches the ideas which he develops more fully in the ‘Lectures’: ‘If the typical prophecy be less clear & evident, it is only relatively; if a person can look under the veil or look through it, it is as clear & evident as if there were no veil; but we have had the habit of fixing our eyes on the veil.’ The veil is what is available to various kinds of empirical study. Focusing on the historical context or linguistic questions gives a priority to associations which can be analysed or proven with scientific tools. This was Pusey’s point of contention with ‘the boasted discovery of modern times, the so-called historico-grammatical interpretation’ (L39), and with Hampden’s notion of ‘historical interpretation’ discussed in Chapter 2. However, simply because this level of meaning can be studied or evaluated by categories which modern empirical approaches privilege does not mean that it is the only or primary locus of meaning: ‘If one realizes to one’s self the whole dispensation of the Old Testament as one prophetic system, full of Christ as looking forward to an

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57 Ibid. lines 151-154.
58 Diss., 207. For the distinction between direct and typical in Tholuck, pp. 191-5.
59 P-Thl., lines 156-158.
accomplishment, then one loses the idea of arbitrariness, which people have attached to typical prophecy.60

Pusey demonstrates the difficulty in distinguishing direct and typical prophecies according to their clarity or what they reveal by considering the different ways in which God’s promises to Abraham, on the one hand, and Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac, on the other, are prophetic. For example, God’s promise to Abraham, ‘in thy seed shall all the kingdoms of the world be blessed’, could be viewed as a direct, or simple, prophecy. (L31)61 On the surface, it may seem to be a straightforward prophecy that some descendent of Abraham will be a source of blessing to the peoples of the world, i.e. it prophesies the birth of the Messiah. However, for Pusey, the distinction between a typical and a direct prophecy does not arise from a Scriptural view of the character of prophecy, but from the evidentialist search for clarity and perspicuity:

Yet the whole comparison between the evidence of types and what is called ‘direct prophecy’ turns upon this, that men fix their standard of clearness and obscurity by that which it would have been to the Jews before Christ’s coming; and so e.g. because the promise to Abraham ‘in thy seed shall all the kingdoms of the world be blessed’ was beforehand clearer than the action of the sacrifice of Isaac, therefore they conclude that it is so now and not only so, but turn their mind wholly to the one to the exclusion of the other. (L31)

There are two aspects to this criticism. Pusey argues that the apparent obscurity of types results from the erroneous notion that types cannot reveal more to Christians that they did to the Israelites.62 Secondly, Pusey insists that even prophecies which are clear and evident on the surface also have a depth of meaning. Later in the ‘Lectures’, Pusey returns to the promise made to Abraham to show that this prophecy is also a typical prophecy. In particular, he focuses on the meaning of the ‘seed’ of Abraham in which the world will be

60 P-Thl., lines 162-6.
62 Andrew Louth argues that Pusey’s argument here supports the view advanced by Hans-Georg Gadamer and others that ‘the presuppositions of historical criticism are radically unhistorical: for they imagine that we, who are engaged in this process of understanding, can in some way abstract ourselves from our own historical context’. Louth 1984, 40.
blessed. According to Pusey, in Romans 9 and Galatians 3:8-29 St Paul shows that the full meaning of this prophecy was veiled and hidden. The promise of the ‘seed’ included not only the Redeemer who would be in some way Abraham’s descendent, but also ‘the individuality of the Deliverer’, and ‘his spiritual birth … not after the matter of men’. (L65) Furthermore, this seed also describes the body of Christ, ‘the oneness of the Church’ (L66), and that the redeemed become the seed of Abraham by another spiritual birth: ‘In that we by baptism are “made members of Christ” and are in Christ so are we in the seed of Abraham, and are Abraham’s seed, inasmuch as we are part of Christ, who is that seed.’ (L68) Pusey argues that all this typical meaning is encapsulated in what is sometimes described as a direct prophecy.

If what are sometimes called direct prophecies also have a typical meaning, then types may also offer as much clarity and precision as any so-called direct prophecy. To make this point, Pusey considers the sacrifice of Isaac. The ancient Church saw in the sacrifice of Isaac a clear type of Christ and of his sacrifice:

The offering up of Isaac, as it was the highest act of faith ever demanded by God, so it has by all antiquity been seen to be significant; and since the vicariousness of sacrifice was known, and Abraham had before been told ‘in Isaac shall thy seed be called’, it represented at once the vicarious death of the promised seed, in whom all nations were to be blessed and by whom the serpent’s head was to be crushed. (L71)

For Pusey, the agreement of antiquity is so strong that this typical exposition has ‘the same certainty, as for those which bear the Apostolic stamp’. (L12) He quotes Origen, Irenaeus, Ambrose, and Augustine as examples of how the offering of Isaac is interpreted.\textsuperscript{63} Origen sees in God’s words to Abraham, ‘because thou has not withheld thy son, thy only Son from us’, a prophecy of St Paul’s description of God in Romans 8:25 as ‘He who spared not his own Son, but freely gave him up for us all’. Origen concludes: ‘See God with a bounteous liberality rivalling men. Abraham offered to God his mortal son, who should not die. God gave to death His deathless Son for all.’ (L70B)\textsuperscript{64} In

\textsuperscript{63} Ambrose, \textit{On Abraham} I.8.66-79.
\textsuperscript{64} See Homily 8, ‘On the fact that Abraham offered his son Isaac’, § 8, in Origen 1982, 144.
his own words, Pusey summarizes the way in which Abraham’s willingness to offer up his son Isaac prophesies the sacrifice of Christ:

Setting aside, however, how much Abraham saw, the history in itself conveys the mystery of the redemption; the very circumstances, and the words wherein it is commanded, ‘a father giving his only Son to death’, his μονογενης, his Son, born not after the manner or the will of the flesh, his well-beloved Son (for we have in the very command not the μονογενης only, but the αγαπατος, ‘Thy son, thy only Son, whom thou hast loved and whom no other could represent or replace, … not, says St Ambrose (de Abraham I.8.67), with any recent impulse of affection but with a long-ingrained and tried love a υἱός ἀγαπητός ἐν ᾧ εὐδόκησεν (Matt. 3:17, 17:5, 2 Pet. 1:17), the Son, the heir of all things, the often-promised son, in whom as a representative, all nations of the world were to be blessed: again, the Son going as a lamb to the slaughter, slain for no sin of his own … communing cheerfully with his Father, bearing his own cross, willingly yielding himself a sacrifice, in order to do the will of his father, bound on the wood; recalled again the third day from death, as the Apostle adds, as in a figure of him who had by a miracle been born, was now by a miracle recalled as from death, by the voice of God Himself, and on this resurrection, as it were, the promise is renewed and confirmed. (L70B-71)

According to Pusey and with the testimony of the patristic expositions that he quotes, the offering of Isaac shows both how much a supposedly ‘indirect’ prophecy may reveal, and how important are the details.

Pusey’s exposition of sacrifice of Isaac is an elaboration of a point he makes to Tholuck: ‘The offering of Isaac is a fuller prophecy when understood, than Genesis 3:15; and it contains the μονογενης, as scarcely any other prophecy does.’ Pusey’s examples show that prophecy cannot be easily divided between what is direct or simple and what is veiled:

For all these are incidental and temporary distinctions, for them to whom they were given. Nor does Scripture make any distinction; but quotes all, even that wherein we shall have discovered no prophecy at all, unless it had been thus authoritatively declared, and that which we think we shall have seen most clearly, as being in the same way and in the same degree prophetic. (L32)

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65 lines 162-6., line 160-162. Gen. 3:15: ‘And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel’. We will consider this prophecy in more detail below (4.4.2).
For Pusey, first and second-class distinctions display ‘a scepticizing spirit’ which searches for ‘some clearer and independent evidence for the truth of Holy Scripture’. Rather, prophecy is ‘mainly typical’ and types are the basic language of prophecy: ‘we shall find comparatively few prophecies which have no typical meaning, i.e. no immediate or secondary purpose’. (L32)

Having emphasized the typical character of all prophecy, Pusey has ‘no objection to dividing it into subordinate classes, even according to accidental distinctions, if it be borne in mind, that they are accidental merely’. (L33) Pusey divides prophecy into two broad categories, ‘figurative’ and ‘simple’ or ‘direct’. While he allows for the possibility of direct prophecy, Pusey emphasizes that there is ‘comparatively little’ of such prophecy, and subdivides this class no further. Pusey focuses on figurative or typical prophecies into two categories: ‘in Word’ or ‘in Act’. He often uses some variation of the phrase ‘God’s words and works’ to describe the totality of what is prophetic. (L5, 12, 16) Pusey describes figurative prophecies ‘in Act’ as ‘Types commonly so called’, i.e. prophetic institutions or people. Prophecies ‘in Word’ include both sayings and historical descriptions, a category which especially melts into types ‘in Act’. Pusey takes his own warning that these distinctions or categorizations are merely formal so seriously that having laid them out, he does not mention them again in the ‘Lectures’ apart from his more general references to prophecies in word or in deed.

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66 See Pusey’s chart at the end of this section for Pusey’s ‘subordinate classes’ and ‘accidental distinctions’.
67 M41.
Pusey’s Subdivisions of Prophecy (L33)\(^{68}\)

- **Prophecy**
  - Figurative
  - Simple
    - [or Veiled]\(^{69}\)
    - [or Direct]\(^{70}\)
  - In Word
    - [Types commonly so called]\(^{71}\)
  - In Act
    - institutions
    - persons
    - [declaratory]\(^{72}\)
    - historical or objective
      - typical prophecy
    - particular, personal, subjective
      - prophetic gyνωµατ

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\(^{68}\) ‘it may be subdivided in the following way, always remembering, that the divisions are merely formal’. M40.

\(^{69}\) ‘Veiled’ is scored out in the manuscript.

\(^{70}\) ‘or Direct (of which there is comparatively little)’, M41.

\(^{71}\) ‘Types commonly so called’, M41.

\(^{72}\) ‘declaratory’ is scored out in the manuscript.
4.3.2 Typical Prophecies ‘in Word’ and the ‘fullest’ Sense

Focusing on the question of intention, particularly as it applies to typical prophecies ‘in Word’ helps to uncover the nuances and significance of Pusey’s presentation of types and typical prophecy. He describes words or prophetic sayings as types:

From the typical character of individuals or of the people, follows more directly that other sort of type of which I spoke, – the type of words used originally with reference to particular events but formed by the Spirit of God so as to be able to bear reference to spiritual truths of much higher meaning, and belonging most entirely to that, to which they most fully correspond, the highest truth. Thus they assume the character of sacred proverbs, of manifold application in the same line, and receive their importance not from the character or the meaning of him who first uttered them, or the immediate occasion upon which they were uttered, but from the truth which they convey and the position which they bear in the history of God’s dealings. (L28)

On the one hand, typical sayings cannot be separated from typical history, from the ‘particular events’ from which they arise: ‘it should however be noticed that since the persons and actions stand in an actual relation to the persons and actions of the New Testament, so also do the words often spoken by them, in that they concern that which is itself emblematic’. (L75C) In this point Pusey agrees with Tholuck or follows him: ‘If Old Testament circumstances and events are outward prefigurations of what must be fulfilled in a spiritual sense, the men placed in those relations would use expressions, which, in a higher sense, would be fulfilled in the representations of the New Covenant.’73 On the other hand, Pusey argues that the sense of words cannot be limited by historical context, or even what we can know about the intention of the human author or speaker. More than people or events, ‘words having in them more of a spiritual character, and being less interwoven with human character, and more connected with the Divine Word, are more flexible and true representations of the Divine meaning’. (L75 C).

Pusey’s view of the ‘spiritual character’ of words stands out more clearly in relation to Tholuck. Looking at Old Testament citations in the New

73 Diss., 193.
Testament, Tholuck sought to distinguish between those where there is evidence of a veiled meaning, ‘αὐπονια intended by God’ and those where ‘the parallel is rather taken by the author than given by God’. For Pusey, this is a form of the evidentialist search for definite proof, Marsh’s ‘pre-ordained connexion’ or Van Mildert’s ‘competent evidence of the divine intention in the correspondence between it and the antitype’. It focuses too much on what Pusey calls the veil, on the historical context as it is recreated very imperfectly by modern exegetes, or on what can be known of the human intentions of the author of prophecy or on the human understanding of that prophecy. Pusey emphasizes instead that words are not only used in reference to particular events, but they are ‘formed by the Spirit of God’. Tholuck had described the inspiration of the Spirit as characteristic especially of direct prophecies.

Considering the way Christ refers to Psalm 110 in Matthew 22:43 – ‘How then doth David in spirit call him Lord’ – Tholuck commented that ‘by the phrase ἐν πνευματι [in the spirit] it is declared that David could utter this only in a higher state of inspiration’. Typical prophecies, on the other hand, do not require such inspiration: ‘The expression in the Psalms, cited as typical: “The zeal of thy house hath eaten me up,” requires no supposition of a special spiritual elevation of the poet in order to explain it’. However, in Pusey’s argument, the work of the Spirit is evident not in the clarity of the prophecy, but in the capacity of the words to communicate a ‘higher meaning’, and this correspondence shows that the words ‘belong’ to this meaning. (L28, above) In the ‘Lectures’, Pusey fills out what he first wrote to Tholuck:

Every deep saying must have some central points, to which it applies most fully; and when this is found, then it belongs more to this, than to any other beside. And so all γνωμα which had their fulfilments in Christ, as ‘The zeal of Thy house & cetera’ was more fulfilled in Him & so

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74 Diss., 202.
75 Bp. Marsh and Van Mildert, both quoted in Intro., 614.
76 Diss., 191, also Diss., 194. This distinction is not entirely clear in Tholuck, because he also refers to the ‘peculiar inspiration’ of Psalms 22 and 40, which he later describes as ‘to be reckoned pre-eminently among the typical Messianic Psalms’. Diss., 195, 204-205.
77 Diss., 195. Ps. 69:9 is quoted in John 2:17 to explain Christ driving the money changers out of the temple.
belonged to Him more completely, than to him of whom they were first spoken.\(^78\)

Discussing the way in which Sarah’s description of Isaac and Ishmael is a prophecy of Christian liberty, Pusey articulates the fundamental principle:

The principle, however, which is herein of fundamental importance is this, that the words so spoken were not words of Sarah only, but of God: as St. Paul quotes them ‘but what saith the Scripture?’ In that they are words, spoken with reference to God’s eternal plan and purpose, and as such preserved in Holy Scripture, we are to regard them as suggested or directed by God, so as in fact to be His words, and as such valid for all times. This principle is widely applied to Holy Scripture and would naturally be as extensive as the typical personages themselves, speaking upon occasions wherein they are typical. (L28-29)

For Pusey, the meanings of typical words are determined by their religious element, ‘the truth which they convey’ (L28, above); this is a teleological rather than empirical principle of meaning.

Rather than speaking about intention, the way Pusey most often characterizes the veiled and prophetic meaning of typical words as the ‘fullest’ sense:

In all it is to be remarked that though the words have many meanings, they have one eminent and full meaning, but that it is altogether accidental whether that meaning be the one intended by him who uses them. We find no scruple in remarking to another a meaning which people would technically say, ‘his words will bear’, but which in truth we remark to him as the *true real meaning* of the words themselves even though, so interpreted, they convey a lesson to himself which he before overlooked: and we hesitate not ourselves to acknowledge in the case before supposed, that that sense which we afterwards discover to have lain in the words which we use, was *their* real sense, although it was not at the time thought by us. *The* meaning of the words is that which most fully exhausts their meaning. (L20)

This idea of what the ‘fullest meaning’, or the meaning which most fully exhausts the sense, is a key concept for Pusey’s understanding of typical prophecy. We saw this above, in his comments on ‘The zeal of Thy house’ and the truth ‘to which it applies most fully’. Pusey also uses the idea of the

\(^{78}\) P-Thl., lines 177-82. In the supplemental material, Pusey uses the same example; the words, ‘The zeal of thine house … had their plenary fulfilment’ in Christ. S-FTL, 16.
‘fullest’ sense to explain ‘the joy and delight’ which we find in discovering that Psalm 34:8 offers a typical prophecy of Holy Communion:

Thus, when, in the Communion Service, the Ancient Church used the Psalm, ‘O taste and see that the Lord is gracious,’ [Ps. 34:8] she gave the fullest and most accurate meaning to the word ṭמ [ṭ m, taste, perceive], and the mind feels a joy and delight, as having a new sense opened in it, and acknowledges that the word is thus the most exhausted and fulfilled, and all its meaning completed. (L136:206, cf. L22)

Pusey also uses the concept of the fullest meaning to explain the patristic interpretations of the creation of humanity in the image and likeness of God which were discussed in Chapter 3 (Gen. 1:24). Commenting on the interpretation of the words, ‘Let us make men after our image, and after our likeness’, in the Epistle of Barnabas, Pusey writes: ‘St Barnabas not only strikingly parallels man’s first creation with his re-creation in Christ Jesus, but also points to this our new creation, as the fullest completion of the words, wherein the old is related.’ (L139-140) Pusey finds this principle acknowledged both in the writings of the Fathers and in the ordered worship of the Church:

A principle of this sort may [be] observed generally in the antient liturgies, where by a sort of spiritual tact the Church appears to have been guided to recognize the blessings of the sacraments where even mention is made of the elements therein consecrated and when we are wont to think either of the mere element without the spiritual blessing, or the blessing without the elements, to combine both (as in the employment of the words, “as the heart panteth after the water-brooks” [Ps. 42:1] “a fountain shall be opened for sin and for sin and for uncleanness” [Zech. 13:1] “Ho, every one that thirsteth come ye to the water” [Isa. 55:1] of the Sacrament of Baptism, which at an early period one finds to have been universal in the Church). (L22)

In a question and answer session at the beginning of the fifth lecture, Pusey explained that the sense of a passage can be determined objectively by considering what it reveals, rather than subjectively by asking how well the human author saw the object of revelation: ‘The speaker’s exactest meaning is that which he is aware of. Subjectively, the superficial one is the truest,
Objectively the fullest’.\footnote{M29.} This sense is objective because the meaning which is discovered accords with the rule of faith and the doctrine of the Church.

Pusey’s explanation of the fullest sense supplements and explains his critique of Hampden’s notion of ‘historical interpretation’ and helps to bring to light the latent empiricism of the apologetic approach. A recent MA thesis by Kevin John Boddecker which assesses Pusey’s biblical scholarship on the basis of the ‘Lectures’ connects the way in which the modern approach limits the notion of intention with the epistemology of John Locke.\footnote{Boddecker 2010, 17-18.} As we saw in Chapter 2, Pusey sees Locke’s empiricism as contributing to Hampden’s rationalism. For Locke, ‘Words in their primary Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them’.\footnote{Locke 1975, III.2.2, 405.} When this is applied to the words of Old Testament prophecy, the kind of prophecy which would meet Davison or Paley’s criteria, then what a prophecy conveys must be judged by how well it communicates the ‘Ideas in the Mind’ of the biblical writer, effectively limiting the meaning of a biblical passage to what the author knows. This denies the possibility that the ‘words we often utter are fuller than we ourselves are at the time fully aware’, a possibility which is integral to Pusey’s understanding of the fullest sense. (L19) Boddecker assesses the impact of Locke’s epistemology on how we conceive of the ‘intention’ of a prophecy:

Now, when this idea about the meaning of propositions was ushered into the consideration of prophecy, it meant that if anyone was to speak meaningfully about a fulfilment of prophecy, they would have to demonstrate that the prophets were in fact predictively describing the events which took place in the life of Christ. So, in this way prophecy was limited to descriptive prediction.\footnote{Boddecker, 18.}

This approach also emphasizes the importance of historical context, because only the data of context can furnish the mind with the material of prophecy; the notion of illumination, apart from the most instrumental kind of miraculous insight, does not fit with this approach. When Pusey challenges the notion of

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{M29.}
\item \footnote{Boddecker 2010, 17-18.}
\item \footnote{Locke 1975, III.2.2, 405.}
\item \footnote{Boddecker, 18.}
\end{itemize}}}
intention which he finds in apologetic writers, explicitly in Marsh or Van Mildert, or more subtly even in Tholuck, he unveils the problems associated with the influence of Locke’s epistemology.

4.4 Types and the Archetype

4.4.1 That ‘wherein the whole substance dwells’

The necessity of learning the language of type arises not only from the character of the Scriptures, but from the character of reality. We will see in Chapter 6 that Pusey finds this principle not only in Scripture, but ‘in the very Being of God Himself’. (L152) The fundamental or metaphysical character of types, the way they are knit into the order of things, is evident in the way Pusey describes the relationship between a type and its fulfilment. Pusey does not follow the common practice of describing the New Testament fulfilment of an Old Testament type as an antitype. This is how baptism is described in 1 Peter 3, the ἀντίτυπος or antitype of the flood out of which ‘eight souls were saved by water’.

O’Keefe and Reno describe the importance of this passage for the early Church:

The meaning of anti-type in 1 Peter is the one adopted by the fathers. In that context, Christ is presented as the central or disclosing type, the pattern of redemptive suffering that organizes and clarifies our understanding of Old Testament prefigurations and our current experiences or ‘post-figurations.’ The church fathers describe this central role as anti-typical, drawing on the sense of ‘in the place of’ or ‘replacing’ that is the primary meaning of the prefix anti.

Horne usually follows this practice and uses the term ‘antitype’ to describe what is prefigured by the type. However, Pusey almost always speaks of the fulfilment of the type rather than of the antitype. On two occasions only, and

83 1 Pet. 3:20. Also, v. 21: ‘ὁ καὶ ὑμᾶς ἀντίτυπον νῦν σώζει βάπτισμα’, ‘The like figure whereunto even baptism doth also now save us’.
84 O’Keefe 2005, 81, cf. Woolcombe 1957, 64: ‘The basic meaning [of ἀντίτυπος] in classical Greek is ‘corresponding to’, as an impression corresponds to a seal.’
85 See especially Intro., 609-615.
86 Among many others: L13, 20, 26, 45, 49, 146.
one of these is a quotation, does Pusey use the term ‘anti-type’ to describe the New Covenant fulfilment of the Old Testament type.\textsuperscript{87}

In order to understand Pusey’s terminology, one must look in more detail at his description of types and their fulfilment and, especially, his understanding of ‘the Archetype’. (L23, 24, 141, 144) The concept of the Archetype is an organizing principle in the argument of the ‘Lectures’. That which most fulfils the meaning of the types of the Old Testament, and which is also the fundamental reality of which they are copies or images, can be described as the Archetype or the substance of the type. Speaking of Old Testament types as shadows, and their New Testament fulfilment as images, Pusey describes the relation of these types to the Archetype:

Neither these shadows nor our images are of course any thing in themselves, but what they are and were, they both derived from the Substance, whence they are expressed … the ‘type’ is that which contains the substance less fully, than that of which it is the ‘type’ and although there can be only one Archetype, that namely, wherein the whole substance dwells, there may be many degrees of types, whereof the one approaches to the Archetype nearer than the others and of which those which are more distant are, in a way, types and figures. (L123)

For Pusey, the Archetype usually describes the Word and Son of the Father. When the prophets ‘spake of Christ more plainly and more fully’, Pusey argues, ‘the types receded from their view and the Archetype stands more revealed before us’. (L6) Similarly, for O’Keefe and Reno, Christ is ‘the master type in which all other types, whether before or after, find their fulfilment’.\textsuperscript{88} For Pusey, the Archetype is ‘“the Image of the invisible God” … having in Himself, of the Father, all which the Father hath’,\textsuperscript{89} he is ‘Light the Archetype of Light’. (L144) Therefore, the Archetype is both first type (the prototype) and the fulfilment of the type: ‘He was the Archetype of our race, \textit{in

\textsuperscript{87}’Abel, again, was the representation of that Just One, since “for a good work” he was slain, for obedience to his Father, and for envy, of the ungodly. One difference between the type and the anti-type is pointed out in the New Testament, namely that “the blood of Christ spake better things than that of Abel”, for Abel’s blood cried out for vengeance, Christ’s for mercy even upon His murderers’. (L53/54). Pusey also quotes Gregory of Nazianzus speaking of the Eucharistic sacrifice: ‘how should I dare to offer unto Him that sacrifice which is without, that anti-type of the great mysteries’. (L118)

\textsuperscript{88} See O’Keefe 2005, 81.

\textsuperscript{89} S-GC, 1, 3.
whom we were to be formed, and being formed in Him and made One with Him to be outwardly and visibly conformed also’. (L141)\textsuperscript{90} We see here the integral connection Pusey makes between sanctification and the typical reading of Scripture. Humanity is a kind of type destined to be conformed to the Archetype in whose image it was originally made. In an analogous way, the types which prophecy Christ are, on the one hand, shadows and images of the Archetype, deriving whatever substance or reality they have from him, and, on the other, are fulfilled when their highest sense conforms to the Archetype.

Pusey’s use of the term substance is sometimes difficult to distinguish from his use of Archetype. Pusey quotes Irenaeus using ‘the Substance’ to describe the nature or being of God which in different measures and degrees God imparts to created things: ‘He himself deriving from Himself the Substance of things created’. (L140)\textsuperscript{91} This is the sense of the quotation above also where Pusey describes the ‘one Archetype’ as that ‘wherein the whole substance dwells’ (L123). He adds that ‘since the substance is come’, the types are fulfilled, ‘the outline is filled up’. (L123) However, Pusey also uses the word ‘substance’ to describe the religious element of prophecy, the truth which it manifests: ‘I would then, at once turn to the history of man’s Fall and God’s promise of a deliverer as being, in fact, the substance of all subsequent prophecy and containing the germ of all’. (L42B) Similarly, when the Old Testament is cited in the New, it is not foreknowledge, but ‘the substance which is dwelt upon’. (L6) These two uses of ‘substance’ are not opposed, because Christ the Archetype is both the message of prophecy and the Word through whom all things are created and given substance or reality. The ‘substance’ can describe the message of prophecy, the heavenly realities which the types reveal, and the life of God which is the origin and being of both. These different senses also account for the way Pusey uses both ‘substance’ and ‘archetype’ with upper or lower case first letters, depending on whether he is using them as a synonym for God, or to describe spiritual truth or reality in some way distinct from God.

\textsuperscript{90} Pusey refers to Irenaeus, Against Heresies, V.16.2.
\textsuperscript{91} Pusey quotes Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV.20.1.
Pusey’s understanding of archetype and substance helps to explain why he does not use the language of ‘antitype’. Pusey sees both types and their fulfilment in the New Testament as copies of a more fundamental reality. This corresponds with K. J. Woollcombe’s basic description of a type: ‘The word τύπος is the principal noun formed from the stem of τύπειν, ‘to strike’, and has the basic meaning in classical Greek of a ‘blow’, or the ‘mark’ left by the blow.’ In the sense of a mark left by a blow, or a character stamped by the typeface, a type is a copy, an impression or image of a pattern. So for Pusey a type is the image or the shadow which bears the imprint of the more perfect reality. Understood as something secondary or derivative, both τύπος and ἀντίτυπος are copies, types, of what is more true and real. For example, in Hebrews 9:24 the ‘holy places made with hands … are figures [or antitypes] of the true’ (ἀντίτύπα τῶν ἁληθινῶν). The basic pattern is both the originating principle, and the fulfilment, that ‘wherein the whole substance dwells’. This two-fold relation will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Using the word ‘anti-type’ could imply incorrectly that it is the type which comes first. Also, describing prophecy in type-antitype pairs could suggest that there is only one fulfilment of any Old Testament type, encouraging the kind of connect-the-dots approach to prophecy and fulfilment which Pusey sought to correct.

4.4.2 The Archetype and Multiple Fulfilments of the Type

The view that types are copies of an Archetype explains the importance of multiple fulfilments of types for Pusey: ‘there may be many degrees of types, whereof the one approaches to the Archetype nearer than the others and of which those which are more distant are, in a way, types and figures’. (L123) Pusey’s reflections on the Lord’s words to the serpent in Genesis 3:15 – ‘And I

92 Woollcombe, 60.
93 See also Heb. 8:2, where the earthly sanctuary is a copy of ‘the true tabernacle’, ‘τῆς σκηνῆς τῆς ἁληθινῆς’.
94 Woollcombe says that ‘τύπος and ἀντίτυπος are synonymous in Hebrews, as in many patristic works’. (Woollcombe 1957, 64 n. 3). However, Woollcombe differentiates the understanding of type one finds in the Epistle to the Hebrews from what he sees as the characteristic Pauline use of ‘τύπος in the sense of ‘pattern’ or ‘model’ (p. 67). In this conception, τύπος is the primary reality. Pusey’s use follows what Woollcombe describes as the Hebrews’ model.
will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her
seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel’ – offer a
characteristic example of the importance of the notion of multiple fulfilments
in Pusey’s treatment of typical prophecy:

The prophecy in its fulfilment, is a remarkable instance, how much and
how varied meaning is comprised in God’s word, and how manifold its
fulfilment. Each interpretation has its place; only men err, when they
mistake the lowest for the highest. Even they, then, who see nothing
further than that man shall destroy the literal serpent’s actual brood, are
so far right. The words are even thus fulfilled. (L45)
Pusey goes on to consider how the word ‘seed’ here is a type which is fulfilled
not only in Christ but in the Church. This type prophesies the way in which
‘each victory over Satan in any of God’s faithful servants before the
Redeemer’s coming’ prophesies Christ’s ‘great conquest’:

Then, as to the question, whether the ‘seed of the woman’ contain the
whole human race, or the one who was eminently so, as being the ‘seed
of woman’ only, it might be safely answered, both; for both are fulfilled,
and both are in fact one; since we triumph in and through Christ, and He
in us, His members. And He has deigned to consider His victory over
death and hell not complete, until what He had done for us, be also
perfected in us, His Church; so each victory over Satan in any of God’s
faithful servants before the Redeemer’s coming was a petty type of that
great conquest, – and an earnest also, in that it shewed that God had not
forsaken the woman’s seed, but the enmity, which He had placed, He
was carrying on to victory – every victory since, as it is a fruit, so also is
it a reflection of that great Archetype, and an earnest also of the
fulfilment of His promise that His disciples shall tread on serpents and on
all the power of the Enemy, that God shall bruise Satan under our feet
shortly. Only, from these words it will appear that they are mainly
fulfilled in Christ, who is the centre, in Him wholly, in us partially; in
Him primarily, in us, whether before or after, secondarily and
derivatively. And in His special and primary fulfilment, it is remarkable
how words, which in the more general fulfilments have a more general
meaning, have a closer and more specific meaning. The ‘seed of the
woman’ in that more general sense, is man in general, born ‘by the
woman’ (1 Cor. 11:12); in the more specific, our Lord, who was ‘born of
a woman’ (Gal. 4:4) exclusively through the operation of the Holy Ghost.
(L45)

In Pusey’s argument, multiple fulfilsments express his understanding of the
necessary relationship of the Archetype to the types which in different ways
prophesy or reveal it. The same eternal purposes or ‘scheme’ are manifest in different ways in history, but according to a common pattern or stamp: ‘For prophecy is co-extensive with the whole system of God’s Providence and Dispensations; for every earlier part of the scheme, in that it is adapted to some later part, preparatory for it, corresponding to it, becomes thereby prophetic of it.’ (L3) Pusey’s approach argues that such correspondences are not the creation of interpreters but expressions of the consistency of God’s purposes through time. This is another way in which the origin of the principle of types seems to extend to ‘the very Being of God Himself’. (L152) Once we have looked at Pusey’s doctrine of creation in Chapter 6, it will be possible to consider another element of Pusey’s explanation of multiple fulfilment.

4.4.3 Shadows and Images of the Archetype

Pusey’s theory of types does not only describe the relation of the Old Testament to the New, but the way in which both Scriptural types and the life of the Church express spiritual realities beyond time and history. At the most basic level, types are not confined to biblical history. Both the Eucharist, the sacrifice of the Church, and the Passover are types: ‘the “type” is that which contains the substance less fully, than that of which it is the “type”’. (L123, above) Pusey quotes the ‘Second Oration on Easter’ by Gregory of Nazianzus: ‘We shall partake of the Passover, still indeed typically, although it be more open than that of old. For the legal Passover I say boldly, was an obscure type of a type.’ (L124A)\(^95\) Pusey explains the relationship of Old Testament types to New Testament fulfilment according to the relationship of each to the Archetype and to a fulfilment which is still to come:

This relation of the Jewish types to the Christian images we find expressed in the fathers, in reference to St Paul’s words, ‘the law having the shadow (σκιά) of the good things to come (τῶν μελλόντων ἄγαθῶν), not the express image of the things (οὐκ ἀυτὴν τὴν εἰκόνα τῶν πραγμάτων)’ [Heb. 10.1], and the words certainly express strikingly the faint delineation or outline in the shadow of the law, as contrasted not only with the things themselves, but with the ‘very image’ or ‘expressed pattern’ of the things. Thus Ambrose says ‘The shadow is in the law, the

\(^95\) Oration XLV.23, in Gregory Nazianzen 1994, 431.
image in the Gospel, the reality in the heavenly place (cælestibus ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις [Eph. 1.3]). Formerly a lamb, a calf was offered, now Christ is offered and He offers Himself as a priest, that He may take away our sins. Here in an image, there in reality when, as it were an Advocate, He intercedes for us with the Father.’ (L124A)  

This description brings together Pusey’s view that there are multiple fulfilments of a type with the idea that that which fulfils the type most completely is the Archetype, that wherein the substance dwells most fully:

Neither these shadows nor our images are of course any thing in themselves, but what they are and were, they both derived from the Substance, whence they are expressed. But in that ours have the greater fulness, in consequence of our Lord’s having actually come, theirs may be in a degree, said to be types of ours. (L123)

The types of the Old Testament are shadows which offer a faint delineation of the reality or substance, while the types of the New Testament are images, more substantial types, but still types of the Archetype. In his study of ‘figural reading’, John Dawson finds in Origen the idea that ‘there is really only one Passover of the Lord’, which occurs on different occasions, the ‘most complete’ of which is the ‘celestial Passover’.  

In Pusey’s argument, the Eucharist corresponds to this celestial Passover, the “very image” or “expressed pattern” of the things’. (L124, above)  

As we saw above, Pusey draws on the Fathers and the New Testament to describe the unity of substance of the Father and the Son in terms of the Son being the express or true image of the Father. By describing the Eucharist as the ‘very image’ of ‘the good things to come’ Pusey emphasizes the union between the image and the reality, the type of the Eucharist and the Archetype which it figures and communicates.  

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98 John Keble’s reflections show many similarities to Pusey’s argument here. See, Keble 1859, II.48, 79 and 78-84.

99 It is interesting to note that for Pusey a proper understanding of the types of the Passover will help one to distinguish truth from error in debates about the Eucharist. (L102-125) See Douglas 2012 for a reflection on Pusey’s eucharistic theology as it is expressed in the ‘Lectures’.
While Pusey’s reflections on the relationship of Old and New Testament Types focus on the Eucharist, he also applies this distinction between the multiple fulfilments of a type and the one Archetype more generally:

This distinction we find expressed frequently among the fathers, so that the Jewish figures are (though in a subordinate degree, and in Christ only,) looked upon as emblems of things correspondent in the Christian Church, which again have their reality in Heaven. Thus the Jewish Church was an image of the Christian, which as being imperfect here, is, although the commencement, still an image only of the kingdom of Heaven, as finally perfected in Heaven. The Jewish Church was a type of the Christian Church Militant, and this, of the Christian Church triumphant. (L123-124)

Making the same connection, Woollcombe describes how a Eucharistic typology whereby the consecrated bread and wine are seen to participate ‘in the being of the object which it symbolized’ also ordered patristic typology more generally: ‘The probability is that if it was considered in the ancient world that a sign or symbol actually \textit{was}, in some sense, that which it represented, it was also considered that a type or figure actually \textit{was}, in some sense, that which it prefigured.’ As will be seen in more detail in Chapter 5, Pusey offers a sacramental theory of types whereby types, both in Scripture and in the life of the Church, participate in the invisible and spiritual realities of which they are images.

\subsection*{4.4.4 Types as Symbols}

The way Pusey uses the language of ‘symbol’ complements his sacramental theory of types. In Pusey’s argument ‘symbol’ and ‘symbolic’ are synonyms for ‘type’ and ‘typical’. For the Fathers, ‘the language of Scripture … bore the stamp of a symbolical character impressed upon it’. (L85) In like manner, a

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\textsuperscript{100} Woollcombe 1957, 74, 75. Woollcombe makes the connection by considering Cyril of Jerusalem’s \textit{Catechetical Lectures}, 22.3, 23.20, and 14.20. At L85, Pusey refers to Cyril’s \textit{Catechetical Lectures}, 12.17, as a witness to the charity required on the part of the faithful communicant and in support of the interpretation of Gen. 49:11 as a type of the Eucharist (‘he washed his garments in wine, and his clothes in the blood of grapes’). Woollcombe also refers to Chrysostom to explain the realistic view of symbol in the Fathers: ‘We have already seen that Chrysostom believed that the two parts of a type-pair had a common \textit{πρᾶγμα} [concrete reality]; it is therefore likely that he believed in a relationship of being between them, and that he called this relationship \textit{συγγένεια} [kinship]’ (p. 75). What Woollcombe calls a common ‘\textit{πρᾶγμα}’, or ‘matter’ (p. 73), Pusey calls a common substance.
typical prophecy may be described as a ‘symbolic expression’. (L29, 34)101 The ass on which Christ rode into Jerusalem was ‘a symbol of His humility’. (L85) He describes the manna and the brazen serpent both as types and as symbols. (L87) Christianity is expressed through the ‘symbols’ of the Old Testament. (L94) The scapegoat was a ‘great visible symbol’ of the way in which the people’s sins were remitted on the day of the Atonement, ‘the substitute, upon which they were laid, going far away to carry them, as it were, out of sight’. (L96)103 Looked at from another perspective, ‘the two goats … manifestly formed part of one symbol’.104 Of this combined type, Pusey writes that ‘The symbol speaks almost in the words of St Paul, “He died for our sins, and rose again for our justification,” “He ever liveth to make intercession for us.”’ (L97) The Passover lamb ‘which was ordered to be roasted whole, was a symbol of that offering of the cross, whereby Christ was to suffer.’ (L124) Pusey describes the bread and wine of the Eucharist as ‘symbolic of the Body and Blood of Christ’ (L104), or as ‘the symbols’ through which the body and blood ‘are conveyed.’ (107) The ‘visible star’ which guided the Gentiles to Bethlehem was ‘the symbol’ of the ‘hidden star, and pointed out its rising to those, whose eyes were opened to see’. (L168) Pusey describes prophecies which reveal ‘the universality of Christ’s kingdom’ in expressions such as ‘His dominion shall be from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth’, as ‘symbolical prophecy’. (L157) He writes of ‘prophetic types’ that ‘the appearance of the Archetype illumined their symbolical character’. (L29) What Pusey describes as ‘the typical meaning’ of numbers in one place (L160),

101 On some occasions, Pusey seems to use symbolic in a more technical sense, to describe the typical meaning of a passage that cannot have a literal meaning, where ‘a physical, or even the metaphorical will not stand’. (L85) He speaks of occasions when ‘words in no case admit of being literally taken; it is a question only between two figurative meanings, only the one of earth, the other of heaven’. (L84) This is another example of a lack of system in the ‘Lectures’; much like the Fathers, Pusey uses the same terms in a variety of ways.

102 Of the same kind as the manna was the other temporary symbol, which was evidently of a character to be immediately understood … This was the brazen serpent. L87

103 Lev. 16:10: ‘But the goat, on which the lot fell to be the scapegoat, shall be presented alive before the Lord, to make an atonement with him, and to let him go for a scapegoat into the wilderness.’

104 See Lev. 10:15, 20-22. Pusey writes: ‘one was sacrificed to the Lord for a sin-offering, and by its blood atonement was made for the whole congregation; over the head of the other all the sins of Israel were confessed, and he carried them wholly away; we have death and life joined in the work of atonement – death for atonement to God, life for complete remission’. L97
he describes as the ‘symbolic sense’ or ‘symbolic character’ of number in another. (L152) C. S. Lewis’ description of the sacramental character of the language of symbolism helps one to see the significance of this language in Pusey: ‘it is possible that our material world in its turn is the copy of an invisible world … The attempt to read that something else through sensible imitations, to see the archetype in the copy, is what I mean by symbolism or sacramentalism.’

4.4.5 Coleridge’s Theory of Symbol

In describing types as symbols, Pusey appears to have been drawing on the ideas of S. T. Coleridge as well as the Fathers. Coleridge uses the term ‘symbol’ to describe the participation of words or things in an eternal reality. In Aids to Reflection, which Pusey quotes at least twice in the ‘Lectures’, Coleridge refers in passing to ‘Symbols and symbolical expressions; the nature of which as [sic] always tautegorical (i.e. expressing the same subject but with a difference).’ With a note after this sentence, Coleridge invites the reader to follow the ideas which will be ‘explained at large in the Statesman’s Manual, p. 35-38’. There, Coleridge writes:

… a Symbol (ὁ ἔστιν ἄει ταυτηγόρικον) is characterized by a translucence of the Special in the Individual or of the General in the Especial or of the Universal in the General. Above all by the translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal. It always partakes of the Reality it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative.

We considered already Coleridge’s discussion of symbols in relation to Pusey’s account of the imagination. It appears that Coleridge influenced Pusey’s symbolic theory of type also. Using Pusey’s terms, one could say that Coleridge describes how the temporal and individual ‘type’ or ‘symbol’

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106 Aids, 206.
107 Aids, 206.
108 SMan., 30. ‘The Greek means “which is always tautegorical”’ (p. 30 n. 30). In Aids, Coleridge writes: ‘A Symbol is a sign included in the Idea, which it represents: ex. gr. an actual part chosen to represent the whole, as a lip with a chin prominent is a Symbol of Man; or a lower form of species of a higher in the same kind’. Aids, 263.
partakes of the infinite and eternal ‘Reality’ of the Archetype: ‘in all finite Quantity there is an Infinite, in all measures of Time an Eternal; that the latter are the basis, the substance, the true and abiding reality of the former; and that as we truly are, only as far as God is with us’.109 Stephen Prickett who, as we saw in Chapter 3, describes Coleridge’s notion of the imagination as stereoscopic vision also describes Coleridge’s notion of symbol as stereoscopic communication: ‘In a symbol, he suggests, the material and temporal becomes as it were a lens whereby we can bring into focus for an instant the eternal abstraction of which it is a fractional and incomplete part’.110 The lens which Prickett describes is not simply an object, it is a ‘living part of that Unity, of which it is the representative’. Pusey uses this kind of language in his reflections on Isaiah 4:2: ‘In that day shall the branch of the Lord be beautiful and glorious, and the fruit of the lands excellent and comely for them that are escaped of Israel’. The branch is not a metaphor, but a living power or symbol: Yet if one considers that the ‘branch’ or ‘off-shoot’ is not a mere metaphor, passing almost, as among us it does, into a proper noun, but a living symbol, then it is nothing at all strange, that as Son of God He should be designated as ‘the offspring of Jehovah’, but ‘the fruit of the earth’ as to His earthly descent, that Nature, which He was to take of us, to give life by death. (L135) Pusey’s description of a type as ‘a living symbol’ offers an organic description of the way in which types contain the substance of the Archetype, distinguishing his view from ‘the mechanical views of prophecy’ which he found in the apologetic school. This is Coleridgean language, evoking Coleridge’s view of symbol as a ‘living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative’. (L8)111 When Prickett analyses Coleridge’s understanding of symbol, he comments that ‘Coleridge’s thought is always basically Platonic’.112 Similarly,
Hedley writes that ‘Coleridge’s symbol theory is Neoplatonic’. Seeing Pusey’s theory of type in relation to Coleridge and a Platonic understanding of symbol is helpful in a couple of ways. It demonstrates the importance of considering Pusey’s understanding of Scriptural types in the context of a broader philosophical and theological framework. In his case, that framework includes the Romantic appropriation of patristic sources and elements of Christian Platonism which Coleridge appears to have helped to communicate to Pusey. We will return to the question of Pusey’s use of Platonic sources or ideas in Chapter 6. As a representative of this tradition, Coleridge offers a theological and philosophical framework which illuminates Pusey’s theory of knowledge and the spiritual faculties, and his understanding of the way in which types, or symbols, reveal the eternal in the temporal, or communicate spiritual truth through sensible images. His description of a symbol as that which ‘partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible’ illustrates Pusey’s understanding of type. When he describes Christian types as images of heavenly realities, Pusey suggests that at least some types, namely the types which are also sacraments, confer a participation in the substance which they ‘contain’ and from which they are ‘derived’. (L123, above) Pusey offers both a Eucharistic theology and a soteriology in the form of typology, and an account of types which is both sacramental and sanctifying. The sacramental character of types and the theological roots of that idea will be the subject of the next chapter.

113 Hedley 2000, 128. Hedley discusses Coleridge’s Platonism at length, pp. 7-12, and with special reference to Coleridge’s conception of symbol, pp. 127-136. Hedley, p. 134, writes: ‘The decisive term “tautegoric” is rooted in the Platonic Sophist where Plato uses the categories of identity and difference (ταυτότης and ἐτερότης) along with categories of rest and movement.’
Chapter 5 Types and the Mystery of Christ

5.1 Types and the Incarnation

5.1.1 ‘Blended as parts of the same Mystery’

The investigation of the types and prophecies of the Old Testament is an investigation of the mystery of Christ. For Pusey, the typical character of prophecy is an expression of the doctrine of the Incarnation, and reading prophecy typically is a sacramental approach which is a means of participation in the Incarnation. In this argument, first, the understanding of type and typical prophecy which he advocates is necessarily connected with a proper understanding of the person of Christ and the union of the Church with Christ through the sacraments. Pusey offers an example of this connection in Augustine’s commentary on Psalm 40:

Christ our Lord speaking sometimes in His own person, sometimes in that of His members says ‘Sacrifice and offering thou wouldest not’. Now then are we now left without a sacrifice? God forbid, for ‘a body hast Thou perfected for me’: those thou wouldest not, that Thou mightest perfect this; those (sacrifices) Thou wouldest until Thou perfected this … In this Body we are, of this Body we are partakers … A Body is perfected for us, be we perfected in the Body. (L124-125)\(^1\)

According to Augustine, Christ speaks in this Psalm both for himself and for the Church, his members. The body which is ‘perfected for us’ is the body of Christ in the Eucharist by which we are ‘perfected’ in Christ’s body (the Church):

I have quoted more of this passage than was absolutely necessary, because it well illustrates how in these deeper views, our Lord's incarnation, His mystical Body in the Eucharist, and the mystical Body the Church which is thereby kept alive, and held together, are blended as parts of the same Mystery and bear the same name, so aptly might the same type under different modifications represent them all. (L125)

The investigation of the types and prophecies of the Old Testament is an investigation of ‘the same Mystery’ of Christ.

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\(^1\) See Augustine 1848, Psalm 40, §12, 144-145.
Second, the exploration of the types and prophecies of the Old Testament is not only an exploration of the mystery of Christ, but also a means of entering into this mystery. Like the ‘holy mysteries’ of Christ’s body and blood, the mystery which Pusey describes has an outward and visible element, united with an aspect which is spiritual and hidden: ‘its very proportions we can discern only here and there as we see “parts of His ways” bearing one upon another’. (L2)² Similarly, Lewis Ayres describes the connection between ‘figural reading practices’ and the ‘progress of purification or sanctification that constitutes Christian life’ as an actualization of ‘the mystery of incarnation … by which members of the Christian community are united to the person of Christ and purified toward the vision of God’.³ This chapter will show that for Pusey, reading the Old Testament typically is a kind of sacramental reading by which the reader is incorporated more fully into the body of Christ and so united with the head of the Church, Jesus Christ.

For both these reasons, discovering the typical character of Old Testament prophecy is intrinsically connected with discovering the truth of the Incarnation and with the way in which members of the Church come to participate in the divine nature. This is why typical reading is not an option, or a mere curiosity of historical theology. Rather, since it expresses orthodox belief and practice, it is a necessary way of reading Scripture. What Ephraim Radner says about the ‘unavoidable demand’ of ‘figurative exegesis’ in his study of John Keble also applies to Pusey’s argument – if ‘patristic exegetical practice’ is rejected, ‘so too must be any pretence to holding orthodox theistic convictions’.⁴

The combined emphasis on the Incarnation and the indwelling of God in the Church by the means of the sacraments is a well-known feature of Pusey’s work and the writing of the Tractarians more generally. We considered this in Chapter 3 in relation to Pusey’s theory of knowledge as participation in the divine knowledge. In his introduction to The Oxford Movement, Eugene

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² For ‘these holy mysteries’ and this description of the sacraments, see ‘Holy Communion’ and ‘A Catechism’, Book of Common Prayer (1662).
³ Ayres 2004, 37.
Fairweather writes: ‘The Tractarians saw the Incarnation, the Church, and the sacraments as contiguous and inseparable elements in God’s redemptive economy.’ For Pusey the doctrine of the Incarnation describes not only how God took on human nature in Christ, but also how the body of Christ, the Church, is united with the divine head. In the ‘Lectures’ Pusey emphasizes that the sacraments are the ‘means of union’ between the Church and Her Lord. (L12) He finds this idea explicated by St John Chrysostom in his reflections on 1 Corinthians 10:17, ‘For we being many are one bread, and one body: for we are all partakers of that one bread.’ Pusey writes:

So again, this one image portrays to us the mysterious connexion between the Body of Christ, which is His Flesh, and the Body of Christ, which is the Church, and how, by partaking of that Body, we ourselves become what we partake of. ‘Having said,’ says St. Chrysostom, ‘the Communion of the Body, He sought again to express something nearer; “For we, being many, are one bread, one body.” “For why speak I of communion?” saith he; “we are that self-same body”. For what is the bread? the Body of Christ: and what do they become who partake of it? the Body of Christ: not many bodies, but one body.’ (L136:199 Letter)

For Pusey, the Eucharist is one of the chief means of grace by which a person is conformed more and more to the likeness of Christ in whose image he is made. He speaks of the Eucharist as a kind of continuation of the Incarnation and a means of participation in the Incarnation.

There is also a polemical component to Pusey’s contention that the Incarnation and the union of the Church with Christ through the sacraments are ‘blended as parts’ of the same mystery. Pusey finds in Hampden’s conception of the sacraments the same rationalist confusions which led Hampden to connect the doctrine of participation with pantheism. Pusey paraphrases a passage of Hampden’s Bampton Lectures: ‘The ready reception of the theory that Christ, as the sole primary cause of grace, conveyed that grace through the sacraments … is sufficiently accounted for by the general belief in magic, in the early ages of the Church.’ Whereas for Hampden this ‘theory of

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5 Fairweather 1964, 11.
6 See Chrysostom 1839, 327-328.
7 DrH, xli, paraphrasing Sch.Phil., 314-5.
Sacramental influence’ is an expression of the ‘popular belief respecting the power of incantations and charms’, for Pusey it is a necessary expression of an orthodox understanding of the Incarnation and, as we shall see, of an approach to reading the Old Testament which Pusey characterizes as sacramental.\(^8\) When Pusey emphasizes the importance of the sacraments as means by which the Head is joined with the body and proposes a sacramental theory of types, he is responding to the threat of rationalism which he sees inherent in the apologetic and empiricist approach to prophecy and theology more generally.

### 5.1.2 The ‘compound nature’ of Sacramental Types

In an important section in the fourth lecture, Pusey describes the types of Scripture as a kind of sacrament:

> It has been well said, that God has appointed, as it were, a sort of sacramental union between the type and the archetype, so that as the type were nothing, except in as far as it represents, and is the medium of conveying the archetype to the mind, so neither can the archetype be conveyed except through the type. Though the consecrated element be not the sacrament, yet neither can the soul of the sacrament be obtained without it. God has joined them together, and man may not and can not put them asunder. (L23)

There is a necessary union, a ‘sacramental union’ between the type and ‘the archetype’. In the same way that the ‘soul of the sacrament’ cannot be communicated without the consecrated bread and wine, so neither may the archetype be communicated without the type. Commenting on this passage, Brian Douglas notes that ‘Pusey’s use … of sacramental realism assigned an important place to the type.’\(^9\) In his study of the ‘Lectures’, Donald Allchin argues that the struggle ‘to bear witness to the unity of all things in God … was, Pusey believed, being worked out in the nineteenth century, in his attempt to reassert the essentially sacramental nature of God’s revelation in Scripture and tradition alike’.\(^10\) For Pusey the principle of typology is fundamentally a

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\(^8\) Sch.Phil., 315 in DrH, 58. As an example of the influence of magic, Hampden quotes Augustine’s Lectures or Tractates on the Gospel according to St. John, Tractate 80.3: ‘Accedit verbum ad elementum, et fit sacramentum [The word is added to the element, and there results the sacrament].’

\(^9\) Douglas 2012, 208.

\(^10\) Allchin 1967, 69, see also pp. 68-71.
sacramental principle by which spiritual or eternal truth is communicated by typical elements consecrated through Christ’s self-emptying in the Incarnation.

Having specified the danger of his age as the danger that of attempting to grasp the truth of God and his ways without revelation, Pusey explains ‘the sacramental union’ between a type and its fulfilment as an expression of the doctrine of the Incarnation. The sacramental principle and the incarnational principle belong together in typology as they do in the mystery of Christ:

The whole system of religion, contemplative and practical, is one of God’s condescension: God cometh down to us, not we mount up to God. Its cornerstone and characteristic is ‘God manifest in the flesh.’ And with this, as God has appointed it, all is in keeping. Neither the letter without the Spirit, nor yet the Spirit without the letter – prayers, which God cometh into the midst of us to hear; earthly Sacraments, yet full of Heaven, earthly words, yet full of the Word, λογοί proceeding from and setting forth the Λογος. (L23)

In the same way that God is manifest in the flesh when Christ takes on human nature, so is the Divine Word, the Λογος, manifest in the earthly words and typical prophecies, the λογοί, of Scripture. The doctrine of the Incarnation serves as the model by which Pusey understands both the union and distinction of the divine and human elements of typical prophecy.¹¹ Pusey maintained that rationalism subtly undermined an apprehension of this union. In his study The Tractarian Understanding of the Eucharist, one of the first studies which brought the ‘Lectures’ to public attention, Alf Härdelin sees the emphasis on type as part of Pusey’s response to both ‘the intellectualism of older orthodoxy’ and to rationalistic abstraction:

Viewed in a wider historical context, this insistence on the living Word is a manifestation of the ‘romantic’ reaction against the preceding classicism and neology; it is the vital and concrete over against the static and abstract. The time had come for a new appreciation of Biblical language, and for the typological, or ‘allegorical’ exegesis of the Fathers.¹²

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¹¹ Tholuck referred to this approach in Pusey’s thought when he told Pusey that he was a scholar who loved not only the ‘λογοί’ but also the ‘Λογος’ in them. Geck 2009, 36.
¹² Härdelin 1965, 32-3.
The permanence of the union of the human and divine in Christ is also a key part of Pusey’s theory of type. Pusey criticizes attempts to distil a spiritual essence from types or typical language as a kind of pseudo-spiritualism which seeks to know God without revelation: ‘the pseudo-spiritualist would behold Him whom “man cannot see and live”, the “Light inapproachable, whom no man hath seen or can see”’. (L24) For an example of the pseudo-spiritualist tendency to abstraction Pusey looks to ‘a book once popular, Dr. Campbell’s On the Gospels’. (L24) This is George Campbell’s translation of the Gospels, The Four Gospels, Translated from the Greek, with Preliminary Dissertations and Notes Critical and Explanatory (1789). Campbell (1719-1796) was a Scottish enlightenment theologian and philosopher who was profoundly influenced by the empiricism of John Locke. As such, he represents the tendencies or the principles which Pusey finds in the apologetic school. Attempts to express the embodied and particular images of Scripture in more abstract language are not only translations but distortions:

Translate, as moderns have been wont to do, ‘new-birth’ into ‘change of state’, ‘the word which I have spoken to you’ (John 15:3) into ‘the instructions which I have given you’, ‘abide in me’ into ‘adhere to me’ or ‘abide by me’. ‘What I have heard of the Father’ into ‘What I have learnt’, ‘He whom God hath sent’, into ‘Whom God hath commissioned’ … or again ‘renovation’ into ‘amendment’ [sic], ‘to be in Christ’ into ‘a Christian’, ‘a member of Christ’ into ‘a member of the body of Christians’, and by translating God’s language into man’s you will not have changed the type into the archetype, but have stripped the type of that whereby it resembled the Archetype, – that in it which was divine. ‘God chose’, says a thoughtful German, ‘yea the figuration or picture-language of the East was the very choice of God, in order to reveal Himself: why should we be wiser than He and paraphrase His language’. (L24)

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13 Pusey’s discussion of type and typical prophecy includes a discussion of the characteristics of Hebrew and Greek which make them particularly suited to serve as the languages of revelation: ‘The peculiarities of Hebrew as a language are its picture-character and its undefinedness. Thus, even when metaphor is not prominent, its language, not being bound down to one meaning, is applicable, with different degrees of precision, to different though allied subjects. This admission of degrees furnishes the very character of a type’. (S-EL, 1) He also argues that classical Greek was humbled and shaped to enable it to serve this purpose as well: ‘The language of Greece, powerful and rich and copious and clear in expressing the refinements of human thought, was not in itself His choice, but He made the ambition of empire and the chastisement and wilfulness of His own people the means of bringing the...
Both the neglect of types and what Pusey calls the ‘translation’ of them is another form of rationalism which seeks a pure and reasonable religious truth abstracted from the peculiarities of culture, history, and even dogma: ‘When moderns then attempt to translate into plain terms the figurative language of Holy Scripture, and to substitute abstract, and as they would fain have it, clearer terms for the types or typical language of the Old Testament, they uniformly by this transmutation evaporate much of their meaning.’ (L24)

Pusey argues that Christian doctrine is embodied in the peculiarities of a particular form of revelation which cannot be left behind. In the last chapter, we considered this emphasis on minute particulars as characteristic of Pusey’s theory of type and saw how this belonged to the same Platonic understanding of symbol to which Coleridge gives expression. A. H. Armstrong’s characterization of Platonism helps to explain why, for Pusey, the particular details of a type, ‘every the least jot or tittle, every fringe and bell in the rich embroidering of God’s word’, (L118) enable it to communicate spiritual truth:

‘It is important, if you are to understand Platonism at all, to understand that it is by being themselves that things image their archetypes.’¹⁴ In the same way, Pusey describes the concrete and particular imagery of the type as ‘that whereby it resembled the Archetype, – that in it which was divine’. (L24, above) Even now that the prophecies of the Old Testament have been, at least in part, fulfilled, humans cannot dispense with means or instruments by which that prophecy was delivered, any more than they could receive the gifts which the sacraments convey without the means or instruments by which they are conveyed:

The knowledge of these types is obviously of importance to the Christian for the understanding of the Gospel now that it is given, as to its practical

apprehension beforehand, since it is in its language that much of the mysteries of the Gospel are still shadowed out to us: we know definitely to what the language applies, which they did not; but what is figured in that language, precisely we know not: we are still in the land of shadows.

Pusey’s emphasis on the minute details of types and their enduring importance expresses his understanding of the Incarnation. The human words of the Old Testament are inseparably joined to the Eternal Word and cannot be laid aside. Pusey also describes the necessity of types in terms of the ongoing necessity of mediation and a Mediator: ‘Nor is the whole office of the types concluded, although their preparatory ministry is at an end; our eyes still need the mitigated light, that we may contemplate the Eternal Light under more varied aspects’. In Pusey’s analysis, holding a correct view of the Incarnation does not only require assent to an orthodox statement of faith. An orthodox belief in the Incarnation will express itself in a theologically grounded understanding of hermeneutics and a sacramental and incarnational understanding of Old Testament prophecy.

Pusey also describes the union of the material and immaterial elements of language as a kind of sacramental union. As God is manifest in the flesh of Christ and in the body of the Church, so is he manifest in the fleshy or material elements of language:

While in the flesh, our sight, hearing, knowledge of God can only come to us mediated through the flesh. Throughout hath God reference to our compound nature; there is an outward form allied to our material nature, an inward spiritual meaning, addressed to our spirit. Through bodily senses, in bodily forms, our spirits receive what is spiritual.

Augustine’s *On Christian Doctrine* may serve as a guide for Pusey here. Augustine offers an analogy of the Incarnation to describe how words communicate thoughts: ‘How did He come except that “the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us?”’ (1 Cor. 1.21) It is as when we speak. In order that what we are thinking may reach the mind of the listener through the fleshy

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15 *T67rev.*, 390
16 *S-EL*, 7.
ears, that which we have in mind is expressed in words and is called speech.\textsuperscript{17} Typical prophecy is a means of communication which is ideally suited to address the human spirit through forms suited to our material nature.\textsuperscript{18}

For Pusey, as we have seen, the connection between the type and the reality which it communicates or embodies can be understood by analogy with the sacraments of the Church and the union of the human and divine in the Incarnate Christ. Pusey sees an analogous union of the material and spiritual not only in the message of words, but in the character of language:

And thus our very words are two-fold; they are taken from material things, have a material substance, yet act invisibly, have an immaterial meaning, as they are received by the eyes and ears but act on the soul, so that we may in some states of mind, lose all consciousness of seeing or hearing them.\textsuperscript{19}

A typical understanding of language and Scripture allows language to fulfil its purpose of communicating an inward and spiritual meaning through a kind of material form. The movement from the literal or obvious sense to the various kinds of typical or spiritual meaning that is expressed in language is the movement of sanctification which itself foreshadows and prophesies the transformation which shall be realized at the Awakening ‘when the body is glorified into the nature of spirit.’ (L131)

5.1.3 The Old Testament as the ‘living and true Body’ of the Lord

On the basis of his incarnational and sacramental understanding of Scripture, Pusey describes the Old Testament as the living body of Christ. He emphasizes that Christian life cannot leave this body behind: ‘The Old Testament is not to the New like the chrysalis, out of which the living \textit{ψυχή}, has burst, and is now

\textsuperscript{17} Augustine 1958, I.13.12, 4.

\textsuperscript{18} S-EL, 7: ‘When God the Son appeared to Men of old, it was in a material form; even the blessed Angels whom He hath made to be “spirits” came in the form of flesh; when we saw ‘the glory of the Only Begotten, full of grace and truth’ he had ‘become flesh’: when God spake, it was as thunder; when He revealed Himself to his servants the prophets, it was in visions, and dreams, and enigmatic or emblematic speeches; prophets were entitled ‘seers’ as ‘seeing’ in figurative forms the truths of God.’

\textsuperscript{19} S-EL, 7.
only a lifeless casement.’ (L24)20 While the body of the Old Testament is not left behind, like the body which Christ took on it is both raised and transfigured:

The Old Testament is not to the New like the chrysalis, out of which the living ψυχή, has burst, and is now only a lifeless casement; rather is it like the personal appearance of Him, who had in man’s sight ‘no form or comeliness’, but which, when He appeared in His glory, was transfigured, and shone transparently, with a portion of that Majesty which was veiled within it: or so again, that His risen Body, still bore the print of the nails and of the spear, and could be handled, although it was no longer subjected to the laws of flesh, but shewed itself to be a ‘glorified Body’, and what before seemed the exception and a miracle, when It walked on the water, now appeared as the rule; and Jesus came and went uniformly after the manner of a Spirit, to accustom us to think on His Body as spiritualized, yea Deified and yet a Body, so should we regard the Old Testament, not as the dead body of our Lord, to be embalmed with honour, and laid with the dead, but as a living and true Body, which it hath pleased God to take, in order to be accessible to us; and wherein alone we can see Him ‘Full of grace and truth.’ (L24)

The Word, having taken on a human body, is forever united with that body. In the same way, the humble earthly words of the Old Testament are forever united with the Spirit of Christ and the Word which speaks in them. Before the light shining from the glorified body of Christ illuminated the literal or lettered body of the Old Testament, it appeared in the lowly form of Christ’s human nature, having ‘no form nor comeliness … no beauty that we should desire him’ (Isa. 53:2). However, in the same way that Christ’s human body was transformed and glorified by the resurrection, so too was the body of the Old Testament transfigured by the light which shines in it through the Spirit of the risen Christ. Rather than a lifeless casing which may be cast aside now that the revelation has come, the Old Testament shines ‘transparently, with a portion of that Majesty which was veiled within it’, it is shown to be ‘a ‘glorified Body’. As the Son was revealed in the body which also veiled his Godhead, so is the truth of the New Testament revealed in the types of the Old Testament which

20 Here Pusey challenges the view of his friend and colleague August Tholuck: ‘The substance of the Messianic prophecies is the Psyche of the New Testament, hidden under the chrysalis envelopement of the Old Testament … the prophecies wear an envelope, which they can be divested of only by him who perceives their historical fulfilment’. Diss., 189-190.
also veil a portion of His Majesty. In reading the Psalms, for example, one ought not to look only at the surface, but rather to contemplate ‘Him, the Sun of Righteousness, Who, before He rose on our worlds, tinged it with His own rich heaven-born hues, and since He has shone upon it, has filled all things with His life and light.’ (L134) Like the Risen body of Christ, the Old Testament joined with the New Testament and read according to the Spirit in the Church is ‘spiritualized, yea Deified and yet a Body’; the Old Testament is ‘the living and true Body’ of the Lord.

5.1.4 Reading Types as a Means of Communion

Reading the types of the Old Testament not only communicates knowledge, but it is also a means of communion or participation in the divine life. Discovering the express image of God in the images or types of Scripture is the way by which the image of God in humanity is deepened and we are returned to the Archetype. The most focussed exposition in the ‘Lectures’ of the doubly sacramental character of the Old Testament, both as revelation and as a means of communion, comes in Pusey’s discussion of the Psalms. On the basis of the doctrine of the Incarnation and the unity of the human and divine in Christ, Pusey emphasizes that the Psalms prophesy both Christ and his Church: ‘Since then He has taken our nature, and joined it to Himself, it is nothing strange but rather in harmony therewith, that the words wherein He speaks, should so include us, as at times to belong to us rather than to Himself.’ (L133) On the basis of the union of the head and the body, Christ and the Church, Pusey argues that ‘thus now may be read the Psalms as never without ourselves, never without our Lord’. (L133) One hears here again Pusey’s emphasis on the permanence of the union of the human and divine in both Christ and the Scriptures; this sacramental union cannot be undone. The Psalms describe both the life of Christ and the life of the Church:

[1] They speak of afflictions – in Him, those He bore for us; in us, the ‘due reward of our deeds;’ [2] of sinking in depths of mire – in Him of suffering; in us, of defilement; [3] of God’s ‘forsaking,’ – Him, in the mystery of the Cross; in us, for trial or humiliation; [4] of being saved from the pit – in Him, the Resurrection on the third day; in us, deliverance from Hell; [5] of Holiness and faithfulness to the will of God
– in Him, perfect obedience; in us, imperfect yet acceptable through Him in whom it is wrought. (L133)

Understanding typical prophecy requires seeing the way in which the type describes both Christ and the Church, and how the prophecy applies differently to Christ and the Church. According to the sacramental understanding, the type is both like and unlike that which it represents and communicates. The capacity of bread to nourish is part of its capacity to serve as a type of spiritual food, yet partaking of the sacrament implies both a different kind of eating and a different kind of nourishment. Both identity and distinction are part of the sacramental character of typical prophecy. In Coleridge’s terms which we considered in Chapter 4, types, like symbols, are ‘always tautological (i.e. expressing the same subject but with a difference)’.  

Pusey’s description of how the Psalms are both the prayers of Christ and the prayers of the Church is not an original one. At this point in the ‘Lectures’, he is practically paraphrasing Augustine’s *Expositions on the Psalms*, from which he quotes extensively:

‘Christ,’ says St Augustine, ‘many times speaks sometimes in His own Person, i.e. as our Head … sometimes in ours, i.e. His members; inasmuch as these also when He said, ‘I was hungry and ye gave Me to eat,’ He speaks in the Person of His members, not His own. And when He cried, ‘Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou Me?’ the Head cried for the members and yet He said not ‘Why persecutest thou my members’ but ‘why persecutest thou Me’.’ (L133)

Pusey quotes Augustine not only to establish that Christ speaks both for Himself and for the members of His body in the Psalms, but also that this possibility for such dual meanings in the Psalms comes from the fundamental union of the Church and Christ:

Why speak as one? Because He says, ‘They two shall be one flesh.’ ‘This’ saith the Apostle, ‘is a great mystery but I speak of Christ and the Church’ – If then Himself said, ‘they are no more two but one flesh’,
what marvel if there be one flesh, one tongue, the same words, as of one flesh, of the Head of the body?25

According to Pusey ‘our Lord’s incarnation, His mystical Body in the Eucharist, and the mystical Body the Church … are blended as parts of the same Mystery and bear the same name’. One could reasonably add as another element of this mystery, ‘His mystical Body in the Old Testament and in the Psalms’, i.e., the typical reading of the Old Testament and of Holy Scripture. (L125)

In a beautiful passage, Pusey links the principle of the Incarnation with the capacity of the Psalms to belong to Christ and the Christian. He emphasizes that through this union the Psalms have a sacramental force or a sanctifying power ‘lifting us up to Him our Head’. Such a typical reading of the Psalms both displays and effects this union, ‘He in us, or we in Him:’

Through this mysterious union of the members with the Head, it is nothing precarious or arbitrary that those words either on their surface may belong to us, which in their full and deep truth they speak of our Head, or that He, while speaking in them of Himself, in some places speaks rather of His members than of Himself. For so are they more adapted to our use, lifting us up to Him our Head, and yet not forgetting ourselves our infirmities and sins. Still it is one system, one history, one, through this gracious and mysterious union, whether the shadow be cast forward or backwards, foreshadowing or reflecting: He in us, or we in Him; one history of trust in God, whether in Him of Whom the taunt was spoken, ‘He trusted in God that he would deliver Him’, or in the Martyr’s sufferings or in daily trials; one, of purpose to do God’s will, of setting God always before Him, of being hated causelessly by the world and perfected through suffering. (L134)

Pusey encourages the reader not only to see how prophecy reveals the mystery of Christ, but how types and prophecies are means or instruments of that mystery. In a sacramental reading of the Psalms, the reader is invited to discern the Lord’s body in a way analogous to the worthy communicant of the Holy

25 Pusey quotes Psalm 38:6. See Augustine 1848, Psalm 40, §12, 144-145. ‘Whence then come the sins, but from the Body; which is the Church: Because both the Head, and the Body of Christ, are speaking. Why do they speak as if one person only? Because they twain, as Gen. 2, He hath said, shall be one flesh. This (says the Apostle) is a great mystery: but I speak concerning Christ’. 191
Eucharist who is exhorted both to ‘be in perfect charity with all men’ and to discern the Lord’s body in the sacramental types of bread and wine.\textsuperscript{26}

Christ is the goal of prophecy in a two-fold way. The prophecies of the Old Testament reveal Christ, and reading the Psalms as a prophecy of Christ also effects a deeper union with Christ:

And this gives a mysterious virtue to the Psalms, and may help to shew how, by the Divine wisdom, they suit the manifold worshippers, whom the Church contains within her bosom, and who pray in her courts. They suit the highest saints, and have even been the words, in which they poured forth their souls to God, in life or in death, for they being, by growth in holiness, fitted to receive the mind of the Spirit, understood them more as He did, whose voice they are; and we, the more imperfect members of Him and of the Church, can use them, as they speak more upon the surface; and to both they have a Sacramental force as being used in Him, and being His words in us, addressed to the Father as the words of the Son. And, thus we may use them, as we do the Prayer of our Lord, untiringly, rather one might say, gathering fresh strength from the frequency of its and their use, as never more hoping to be heard than when praying the Father in the Lord's own words. (L133)\textsuperscript{27}

The ‘mysterious virtue’ of the Psalms means that the grace they communicate is inward and spiritual, not that it is uncertain or based on a subjective emotional state. The mysterious virtue of the Psalms is the inward and spiritual grace communicated through earthly elements or words. The Psalms have a ‘sacramental’ force or power to make the readers partakers of the divine life. Pusey says that this ‘sacramental force’ comes from praying the words of the Psalms ‘in Him’, in Christ. As such, they are ‘His words in us, addressed to the Father as the words of the Son’. Sharing in the Son’s communication with the Father in the words of the Psalms is a sacramental way of reading by which the members of the body grow in holiness and are ‘fitted to receive the mind of the Spirit’. We have seen in Chapter 3 that Pusey describes the renewal of human nature in terms of having the mind of God shaped in us. In this light, it is

\textsuperscript{26} See 1 Cor. 11:27-30 and the third ‘Exhortation’ which the rubric directs to be read ‘At the time of the celebration of the Communion’, in ‘Holy Communion’, The Book of Common Prayer (1662).

\textsuperscript{27} my italics
significant to note that Pusey argues that reading the Psalms can give a special access to the mind of Christ and hence to the mind of God:

They, so to say, are the very thoughts of our Redeemer, as He was man; other prophecy delivers to us the fruits of His coming; the Gospels relate to us His acts for us, tell us of His Passion, and His doctrine, report to us His words and commands; the Psalms (to speak reverently) shadow forth to us a reality beyond all thought, the thoughts with which He communed with His Father. (L133)

Reading the Psalms typically enables us to share in the thoughts of Christ and so to have his thoughts shape our minds. This is one of the ways by which the image and likeness of God in us ‘may endlessly deepen, until it could be finally perfected’. (L145)

5.2 Typical Prophecy and Allegory

5.2.1 The Problem with the term ‘Allegory’

I have been arguing that Pusey advocates an approach to the Old Testament and the Scriptures which is fundamentally shaped by his understanding of the prevalence of type. Pusey’s investigation of types and typical prophecy is an investigation of the way in which a sacramental reading of the Old Testament both expresses and leads the reader, both the individual and the collective ecclesial reader, more deeply into the mystery of Christ. A typical reading is Christological, ecclesial, and sacramental. In order to understand what Pusey means by a ‘typical’ reading of the Old Testament, and as well, more basically, what he means by type and typology, it is important to distinguish his approach from contemporary discussions about typology and allegory. Many contemporary writers sharply distinguish typology from allegory, arguing that typology offers a more biblical, historical, or straightforward kind of interpretation, while allegory is more literary, creative, or obscure. Approaching the ‘Lectures’ through the lens of this modern-day discussion could lead one to misunderstand Pusey’s argument. On the basis of terminology, one might assume that Pusey’s investigation of type and typology is something distinct from allegory. However, Pusey’s investigation of types and prophecies of the Old Testament is an investigation of what many writers would call an allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament. In order to
understand the fundamental connection Pusey makes between a ‘typical’ reading and the mystery of Christ, it is necessary to look beyond terminology to consider his exploration of the different senses of the typical meaning of Old Testament passages, those ‘which most fully exhausts their meaning’. (L20) In order to do this, it is helpful to consider first why Pusey does not use the term allegory, and then to look at his arguments in the light of contemporary discussions about the distinction between allegory and typology.

Even a consideration of etymology shows the difficulty of excluding any notion of the allegorical from Pusey’s understanding of typology or typical prophecy. In his study of typology, A. C. Charity points out that the word ‘typology’ does not appear in Latin (typologia) until 1840, or in English until 1844. However, Pusey uses the word ‘typology’ seven times in the Lectures in the autumn of 1836, apparently earlier than any published use of ‘typology’ in English. (L9, 11, 12, 29) At the time when Pusey gave the ‘Lectures’, ‘typology’ was a new term, if not an innovation. This suggests the difficulty of approaching the ‘Lectures’ using a sharp distinction between allegory and typology. His description of typical interpretation describes what, up to that time, was usually characterized as allegory.

Pusey rarely uses the term ‘allegory’. Once he quotes Coleridge who uses ‘allegory’, in this instance at least, as a synonym for ‘myth’. (L46) Twice he describes how modern commentators characterize the interpretations of the Fathers as ‘fanciful allegorizing’ or ‘undue allegorizing’: ‘It is too notorious that persons in these days would condemn all of the fathers for undue allegorizing or an excessive typology’. (L11, 9) He refers on two occasions to the ‘allegorical’ interpretations offered by Jewish commentators. (L79, 169) In his most positive use of the term, he connects ‘the ἀλληγοροῦμεν of Hagar and Mount Sinai’ with the ‘Apostolic mode of interpretation’. (L11) The best clue we have as to why Pusey does not use the term allegory to describe the

28 Charity 1966, 171 n. 2. See also Martens 2008, 300 n. 66 and Louth 1989, 118. ‘Typology’ and ‘typological’ (which Pusey does not use) come into common usage with the Scottish theologian Patrick Fairbairn’s still-reprinted book, The Typology of Scripture (1845).
29 See also M19, describing the apologetic approach: ‘It endeavours to get rid of all typology and makes us suspicious of them’.

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interpretation of type and typical prophecy comes in Marshall’s ‘Notes’ for the eighth lecture. This is the same lecture in which Pusey referred to Coleridge’s analysis of the role of evidence in relation to the Champion at a Coronation. In this lecture Pusey appears to have drawn on material which did not become part of the manuscript. Marshall records that Pusey criticized the unhistorical and allegorical approach that Augustine followed in On Genesis against the Manichees. Pusey faulted Augustine for disregarding the literal or historical sense:

Compare the different tone of St. Augustine in his work De Genesi ad Manicheos written soon after his conversion from Manichaeism in De Genesi ad Litteram written some time after. He first had recourse to the Allegorical method of interpreting the account of the Fall, to the exclusion of the Literal; but he afterwards adopted the latter. He embraced the former to explain that which he did not at first understand. He knew it required a more diligent search to interpret God’s word as it stands, than to affix to it a meaning of our own. It has a Figurative, and a Literal because it stands written. He united both together. What Sacred Scripture relates, as a fact, is such. The typical meaning does not interfere with the literal. If Adam was a man, who lived and died as other men, why should not Paradise be a spot of ground, a certain definite place?30

Pusey argues that the account of the Fall in Genesis is a true history and that the literal or historical meaning of the text cannot be set aside. The reference to Paradise as ‘a definite space’, a ‘spot of ground’ is a criticism of the suggestion that one finds in De Genesi ad Manicheos that Paradise was a spiritual state signifying the happy life. Augustine writes of Eve, ‘For perhaps she was not in paradise according to place, but rather according to the disposition of happiness’.31 Pusey’s criticisms follow the description Augustine himself offers in his Retractiones where Augustine admitted that he did not consider himself capable of the ‘more diligent search to interpret God’s word as it stands’ at the time of writing De Genesi ad Manicheos.32 For Pusey, and the

30 M55-56. Pusey finds support for his approach in references to the history of Genesis 1-4 in Rev. 22:2-3 (the ‘tree of life’ and there being ‘no more curse’ in the new Jerusalem) and because ‘our Saviour’ alludes to the ‘first murder’ in John 8:44. M57.
32 M55. Pusey refers to Augustine, Retractions, I.17. See Augustine 1991, 42: ‘After I had compared the two books of On Genesis, against the Manichaeans, and had explained the
later Augustine, ‘The typical meaning does not interfere with the literal’, and cannot be set aside; God ‘united both together’. This is the same point that Pusey makes elsewhere in the ‘Lectures’, ‘we shall find that humbler and more obvious meaning also involved and wrapped up in the other’. (L10) When he considers Augustine’s reflections on the union of ‘the sacrifice of Christians … in the sacrament of the altar’ with the offering of Christ ‘in His Passion for us’, Pusey articulates a principle which he applies to the interpretation of types: ‘St Augustine does not mean so to identify these sacrifices, as to merge in the lower the mystery of the higher, but rather represents the lower as contained in the mystery of the higher’. (L108) It is a basic principle for Pusey that the typical or spiritual sense begins with the plain sense, and that this plain sense cannot be discarded or neglected. Pusey appears to associate allegorical interpretation with this kind of neglect.\(^{33}\)

The cultural milieu of the day also would have made the use of the term allegorical problematic for Pusey. In the nineteenth century ‘allegory’ was most commonly associated with fictional writing that used personifications or metaphors to teach a lesson or to make a point rather than with the patristic interpretation of Scripture.\(^{34}\) For Pusey’s contemporaries, allegory was not primarily a way, good or bad, of interpreting the Bible (or other writings), but a form of composition, allegoric writing.\(^{35}\) In Bunyan’s *Pilgrim’s Progress* the character ‘Christian’, and those whom he meets, like ‘Goodwill’ or ‘Sloth’ are allegorical personifications. However salutary the purpose of such writings, the literal or historical element, which for Pusey must be united with a legitimate typical interpretation of the Bible, is absent. Pusey would have been familiar with Coleridge’s view that whereas ‘the translucence of the Eternal through words of Scripture according to their allegorical meaning, not presuming to explain such great mysteries of natural things literally – that is, in what sense the statements there made can be interpreted according to their historical significance – I wanted to test my capabilities in this truly most taxing and difficult work also.’

\(^{33}\) For a consideration of the negotiation involved in the notion of the ‘plain sense’ in early Christian exegesis, see Ayres 2004, 39–40.

\(^{34}\) For examples and further discussion, see Kelley 1997, 70 and Lewis 1958, 45.

\(^{35}\) For the difference between ‘allegorical interpretation,’ which ‘claims to discover the truth hidden beneath a text,’ and ‘allegorical composition,’ which ‘personifies abstract concepts and fashions a narrative around them,’ see Whitman 1987, 3-5. For a description of the wide range of literary works that can be described as allegorical, see Fletcher, 1964, 1-23.
and in the Temporal’ characterizes the symbol, ‘an allegory is but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language which is itself nothing but an abstraction from the objects of the senses’.

A symbol or a type embodies and communicates what is real and universal, whereas allegory is a confection, an elaborate and somewhat frivolous creation. When commentators in Pusey’s day applied the term ‘allegorical’ to the interpretation of Scripture, it was usually to describe the interpretation of purely metaphorical sayings or as a derogatory term to criticize those who neglected the historical or literal meaning of the text.

5.2.2 The Apologetic Distinction between Allegory and Typology

In his article, ‘Revisiting the Allegory/Typology Distinction: The Case of Origen’, Peter W. Martens reviews the scholarly debate over the past sixty years about the usefulness and accuracy of sharply distinguishing allegorical and typological interpretation in the Fathers. He focuses on Origen scholarship, but he situates this in the context of a more general discussion about the way in which allegory and typology are understood. He shows how the terms and trajectory of this discussion were guided by the debate between the French writers Henri de Lubac and Jean Daniélou in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In a series of articles and books, Daniélou distinguished typology, a truly biblical, patristic, and catholic form of spiritual exegesis, from the allegorical approach which he saw as subjective and based on ephemeral or extraneous ideas or practices, especially ‘the rabbinical, Philo’s, and the gnostic’.

While de Lubac acknowledged the need to differentiate legitimate or catholic readings from literary creations, he argued that Daniélou’s distinction between allegory and typology was neither biblical nor an

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36 _SMan_. 30. See also Coleridge’s fuller description in an 1818 lecture in Barth 1977, 107.
37 For example, _Intro_. 401-2.
38 Martens 2008, 283-317. See also Burghardt 1950, 78-116. Burghardt provides a useful summary, contemporary with the beginning of the debate between de Lubac and Daniélou, of studies of the spiritual exegesis in the Fathers and the distinction between allegory and typology. For a consideration of patristic exegesis through the lens of the term ‘figura’, see Auerbach 1984, 28-60, esp. 47-9.
39 Daniélou 1955, 174 and 174-199 for a detailed description of these three extraneous influences. For Daniélou’s understanding of typology, see Daniélou 1946, 199-202. For its distinction from allegory, Daniélou 1951, 416, and Daniélou 1955, 174 and 174-199.
expression of the catechetical tradition of the Church. De Lubac maintains that
St Paul and the Fathers use allegory to describe what Daniélou means by
typology:

… on devra donc dire que l’interprétation allégorique, en son idée
traditionelle, consiste à discerner les types ou les figures qui, en Israël
annonçaient le Christ, – dans tout Israël, tout le Christ. Elle établit le
rapport de la figure à la vérité, de la lettre à l’esprit, de l’ancien au
nouveau.⁴⁰

According to this view, allegory is not distinct from typology, but it is the
search for the meaning of the type.

Martens summarizes how the debate between Daniélou and de Lubac set
the course for scholarly debate about the usefulness and legitimacy of allegory
and typology:

The ‘two things’ that had to be clearly distinguished, for Daniélou, were
the successful and the unsuccessful nonliteral interpretations of Scripture,
‘typology’ and ‘allegory’ respectively. This concern would prove
portentous. Over the course of the next half-century, a dominant
trajectory of the scholarship would insist, with him, that ‘typology’ and
‘allegory’ ought indeed to serve as markers for the better and worse
forms of nonliteral exegesis.⁴¹

The trouble with this distinction, Martens argues, is that what counts as a
successful or non-successful form of non-literal exegesis is defined in different
ways. For example, Daniélou treats the ecclesial or eschatological meaning of a
type as part of the typological sense while others describe such interpretations
as ‘allegorical’ in a negative sense, i.e. subjective, or ahistorical.⁴² Martens
states that the scholarly consensus these days supports distinguishing allegory
from typology, although there is a significant dissenting minority.⁴³ Martens
sides with the minority view because the terms have been understood

designated little more than the first of these contrasting terms [or, better, of two opposed terms]
for which “allegory” was the vital connection….allegorical interpretation, in the traditional
sense, consists of discerning the types and figures that, in Israel, announced Christ – in all of
Israel, all of Christ’.
⁴³ Martens offers an extensive list of those who take different views of this subject. Ibid. 285 n.
4. See also Ayres 2004, 31 n. 66.
differently in different ages as well as by the contemporary scholars, and because scholars do not agree on what constitutes a ‘successful nonliteral scriptural interpretation’. 44

This debate helps one to see the way in which Pusey’s understanding of typology includes what often goes by the name allegory. Interpreters who distinguish allegory from typology and put forward typology as the authentically Christian form of figurative exegesis generally argue that typology is more faithful to historical or narrative context. According to this view, a typological interpretation depends on historical or contextual similarities between the type and the anti-type, while allegory, on the other hand, treats the figure – whether a saying, person, or event – as floating more freely from both history and literary context. 45 This distinction is sometimes framed in terms of relative clarity. In Sanctified Vision, John J. O’Keefe and R. R. Reno, for example, argue that the connection between the elements that constitute a type and its fulfilment is fairly obvious: ‘If successful, the association of the two elements discloses the shared type, and that shared type becomes visible and persuasive to the reader or listener.’ 46 In the case of allegory, this connection is much less clear or definitive:

Unlike typologies, allegories require significantly more interpretive investment capital. The reader must outline the reality for which the text is a map, explaining the coding system of the text so that the message can be read. For this reason, an allegorical interpretation often seems a reading laid over the text rather than a reading in the text. 47

According to this view an allegorical interpretation requires knowledge of a reality external to the scriptures, which appears to be imposed on the text. The text appears to be a code rather than a veil. Types on the other hand are more

44 Ibid. 315 and 284. See also Burghardt 1950, 111-115.
47 O’Keefe 2005, 90. In the case of allegory, events, words, or characters ‘stand for something else.’ 89.
transparent to the reality which they figure, and so the connection is more obvious.

In the terms of Pusey’s argument, this kind of distinction between typology and allegory is a species of the apologetic approach which attempts to establish prophecy on the basis of clear evidence and criteria. While O’Keefe and Reno do not use the language of the apologists, their characterization of the obvious links between a type and its fulfilment recalls Horne’s insistence that it is necessary and possible to distinguish between a genuine analogy based on ‘the exercise of legitimate reasoning and deduction’ and ‘the crude notions urged by every person of warm devotional feelings or vivid imagination’. As we have seen already, Pusey cautions against any attempt to define prophecy or types according to such standards of clarity. Describing typology as a kind of interpretation which gives proper weight to history or context, or which is clearer, simply shifts the ground of the debate.

For Pusey, how one distinguishes between a likeness which is a confection versus one that is real and inherent, or in O’Keefe and Reno’s terms, between ‘a reading laid over the text rather than a reading in the text’, is not straightforward: ‘For nothing is more difficult, than to prove the correspondence of things which to a mind, that is formed to receive it, requires no proof, but are rather perceived by a sort of intuition.’ (L36) Here Pusey focuses on the very doubt or uncertainty which accompanies some interpretations as a kind of witness to an analogy or resemblance, even if that analogy cannot ‘abide the test of a severe reasoning’. Pusey recognizes that some types are clearer than others. However, as we say in Chapter 2, it is part of his basic argument that the judging of typical prophecy according to standards of clarity is based on empiricist and rationalist assumptions. For Pusey, those types which are clear invite the reader to search and to seek those which are more veiled. The distinction between clear types and unclear allegories is another form of the false distinction between simple or direct prophecy on the one hand, and veiled or typical prophecy on the other.

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48 Intro., 615.
Moreover, as we have seen already, this lack of clarity is inevitable, a result both of the distinction between the divine and the human, and of impairment which sin causes to human spiritual eyesight. Like O’Keefe and Reno, Pusey emphasizes the importance of knowing ‘the reality for which the text is a map’. However, if it appears that this reality is a map laid over the text, external and extraneous, rather than the fulfilment of the meaning inherent in the text, it may be because the powers of sight by which types are recognized has been weakened by poor habits of reading and false assumptions:

... who could undertake to demonstrate the likeness even of a corporeal image? One will pronounce it like and the other unlike; not as if there were no certainty to be obtained; but because one ... may have formed to himself a wrong ideal of what a likeness ought to be, or have been unable to enter into the full character of the original. One should not in each case go about to prove the beliefs, nor should we be disturbed, that we could not, or feel the likeness less strong, if we felt assured that we ourselves knew well the original. For on this at last the question mainly turns. (L37)

The sense of a lack of correspondence in the text may be the result of a more basic lack of correspondence between the reader and what the text reveals or symbolizes. If one does not know well enough ‘the original’ which the type reveals, even a genuine and illuminating typical interpretation will appear to be laid over the text. The fact of experience that some types have ‘more evidence to us’ is not conclusive. (L8) As was discussed in Chapter 3, the knowledge of types is a function of the formation or sanctification of the whole person. To know the reality, one must be able not just to see in a superficial way, but to ‘enter into the full character of the original’. (L37) The sense that a reading is laid over the text may reflect the character of the reader who is still too unlike the original, God, to recognize the likeness. As we saw in Chapter 3, O’Keefe and Reno are aware of what Pusey describes as the necessity of spiritual discernment: ‘Vision must be sanctified if one is to see rather than be blinded by the mystery of God.’49 However, in the terms of Pusey’s argument, they have not applied this understanding to the distinction they make between allegory and typology. Pusey accepts the genuineness of interpretations which

49 O’Keefe 2005, 139.
will not be obvious to all readers, and which some would describe as fanciful or allegorical in a pejorative sense. For Pusey this lack of clarity does not mean that the meanings which are discovered are strained or read into the text, but is an inevitable result of the character of human understanding.

Whatever the meaning or usefulness of the distinction between allegory and typology in current literature, and despite Pusey’s preference for the term ‘typical’ over ‘allegorical’, one will understand Pusey’s ‘Lectures’ better if one adopts the approach suggested by de Lubac and considers allegory and typology to be synonyms. Andrew Louth, like de Lubac, points out that when early and medieval Christian writers refer to allegory they mean what Daniélou calls ‘typology’, ‘and we are all set to misunderstand them if we restrict the reference of the term “allegory” to something opposed to typology’. In the same way, we are likely to misunderstand Pusey if, when he speaks of typical interpretation, we imagine that he means something opposed to allegorical interpretation, or that all that is called allegory is excluded from his study. Appreciating the mystery of Christ, and entering into that mystery through sacramental reading, requires the exploration of senses which are necessarily elusive and will appear to some as obscure.

5.2.3 Allegory and the Mystery of Christ

De Lubac offers both a vocabulary and an argument which helps one to see how Pusey’s investigation of type and typical prophecy was a response to the apologetic approach and the dangers of rationalism and empiricism. In Pusey’s argument, the symbolic form of typical prophecy mirrors the union and distinction of the divine and human natures in Christ. There is a human element, a history lived by a particular community and words written by human authors, and yet this same history reveals the character of God and manifests his over-ruling providence. History has an internal and spiritual component as well as an external and visible one. The text of the Bible and the history which it proclaims are on the one hand available to study and investigation by all people, the good and the bad, those with faith or without,

50 Louth 1989, 118.
and with the use of specialized historical, linguistic, or literary tools. On the other hand, biblical history is also typical prophecy which conveys a spiritual truth which must be spiritually discerned by faith and with the eye of the sanctified soul. The hidden treasure veiled and communicated in the history and the letter can only be seen by eyes illuminated by faith and comprehended by a mind conformed to the divine mind. The truth which types reveal is not accessible to analytic reason alone. In making this argument, Pusey understood himself to be moving contrary to a growing consensus – the idea that ‘a sense is to be sought and found in words and phrases, deeper than that which is required for the mere context … is clean contrary to the boasted discovery of modern times, the so-called historico-grammatical interpretation’. (L39)

Like Pusey, de Lubac also finds allegorical interpretation to be intrinsically connected to the Incarnation, and the hiddenness of the allegorical sense as corresponding to the way in which the divine is veiled by the human both in the Incarnation and in the literal body of Scripture: ‘The spiritual sense of Scripture is clothed by the letter as the divinity of Christ is clothed in flesh.’51 The metaphor of Scripture as the flesh of Christ requires attention to be paid both to the external form and to the reality which it contains or communicates: ‘just as the Word of God clothed with flesh in Mary came into the world … so here is He covered with the veil of the letter: as the letter is seen as flesh, whilst the hidden spiritual sense within is sensed as divinity’.52 De Lubac’s description complements Pusey’s understanding of the Old Testament as the living body of the Lord, having no form or comeliness, yet nonetheless the body in which his divinity is made manifest:

Now there is here something more than a comparison; ‘letter’ and ‘flesh’ are not only alike in that they are both likened to a ‘veil’; for, according to Scripture itself, one can say that ‘The Word of God has been incarnated in two ways,’ since at bottom it is one and the same unique Word of God who descends into the letter of Scripture and into the flesh of our humanity, into this ‘weak and unbeautiful’ flesh, to hide itself there and to manifest itself there all together.’53

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51 Lubac, 2000, 108.
53 Lubac 2000, 61.
Quoting F. J. A. Hort (1828-92), Andrew Louth offers a similar image of the Old Testament as a risen body animated by the life of Christ: ‘Out of Christ all that is behind is dead … But in Him the whole dead past becomes alive again: it is part of His body and His life flows through every part.’ Interacting also with de Lubac’s work, Louth describes the character of Scripture in relation to the Incarnation: ‘The Old Testament builds up a context, a matrix, in which the mystery of Christ can be incarnated.’

In Pusey’s words, in reading the Old Testament one ought not to look only at the surface, but rather to contemplate ‘Him, the Sun of Righteousness, Who, before He rose on our world, tinged it with His own rich heaven-born hues, and since He has shone upon it, has filled all things with His life and light’. (L134)

De Lubac’s argument complements Pusey’s emphasis that prophecy and type cannot be limited to what can serve as definite evidence. The humble or historical sense cannot fully exhaust the meaning of anything which points to Christ. To the extent which one finds Christ as the subject of prophecy, one will also emphasize the elusive character of that knowledge:

No more than life in Christ is the knowledge of Christ accessible to the natural man, the one who confines himself to mere appearances even in his deepest reflections. Interior and spiritual, the object of allegory is by that very fact a ‘hidden’ object: mysticus, occultus. It conceals itself from carnal eyes.

The Incarnation is real, ‘But precisely its reality is of an infinitely deeper nature than that of a simple historical fact, observable from the outside’, a description which recalls Pusey’s image of ‘dwelling’ in the house of divine truth. De Lubac, like Pusey, offers an explanation about why a sense which is elusive, a typical or mystical sense, is not subjective or uncertain:

Mystical is the doublet either of ‘allegorical’ or of ‘spiritual’ in the most general sense, but not of ‘spiritual’ in the individual or subjective sense. The mystical meaning is the meaning relative to the ‘mystery’, the one

54 Louth 1989, 120.
55 Ibid. Louth refers also to Lubac 2000, 105.
57 Lubac 2000, 97 and 3.1 of this thesis, L30-1.
that contains the fullness of the doctrine. ‘Typical’ and ‘mystical’ are directly correlative. 58

In Pusey’s terms, it is the meaning which is both ‘higher’ and ‘deeper’ that communicates this ‘fullness of doctrine’. As we saw in Chapter 4, Pusey also maintains that the fullest sense is also the objective sense. 59

Pusey’s emphasis on the seriousness of drawing the circle too narrowly, or of neglecting what can only be discerned in faith rather than proved, can sound dramatic or exaggerated. However, one finds in de Lubac the same insistence that it is precisely the element which is hidden or elusive which is the sense which promises salvation: ‘the object of allegory, that is, the New Testament, consists in facta mystica. These are “hidden” facts, which have an inside, and it is this inside which makes of them salvific, absolute, definitive facts’. 60 In de Lubac’s terminology, allegory is ‘the doctrinal sense par excellence’, or ‘the Christian sense of Scripture’. 61 De Lubac writes:

By means of the words of Moses God ‘instructs the holy Church allegorically.’ One can therefore define the Christian faith as ‘allegorica doctrina.’ In fact, ‘what is allegory but the mystic doctrine of the mysteries?’ Its content is exactly ‘the doctrine of the holy Church.’ The allegorical sense of Scripture is ‘the Catholic sense.’ 62

If one takes allegorical as a synonym for typical, this explains why Pusey suggested that those who failed to accept the typical interpretation of the Old Testament were in danger of undermining Christian faith, or, in Radner’s terms, of giving up ‘any pretence to holding orthodox theistic convictions’. 63

One finds the equation of typical reading with orthodoxy in Daniélou’s book on Origen, where he divides the senses of Scripture into a literal sense and a typological sense. He argues that the typological sense can also be called the Christological sense, and that it has ‘as many subdivisions as there are facets in the Christus totus’. 64 In relation to the argument being made here, the

58 Lubac 1989, 144 n. 83, translating Lubac 1947, 199 n. 77.
59 M29 quoted in 4.3.2.
60 Lubac 2000, 98.
61 Ibid.109, 123.
62 Ibid. 109
63 Radner 2004, 87, quoted at 5.1 above.
64 Daniélou, 1955, 191.
neglect of the typological sense would be a neglect of the Christian or Christological meaning of a passage:

It could be said that essentially there are only two meanings in Scripture, the literal and the Christological. But the Christological meaning can in turn be subdivided into as many sections as there are aspects in Christ himself. Christ may be considered either as a historical Person manifest in the events recorded in the Gospels, or as living a hidden life in the ‘sacraments’ of the Church which is his body, or as appearing at the parousia at the end of the world and reigning in glory. Further, these three advents themselves, to use a term of St Augustine’s, have more than one side to them. In the historical Christ we may consider either the external actions of his earthly life or the spiritual content of its mysteries. In the mystical Christ, again, we may consider either the collective aspect, which is the whole Church, or the separate members of that Church, each of whom has to ‘put on’ Christ (Rom. xiii. 14, Gal. iii. 27).

Daniélou and de Lubac help one to see that Pusey’s emphasis on the necessity of typical interpretation is not a narrow response to a nineteenth century debate, but an attempt to elucidate the exegetical consequences of the doctrine of the Incarnation. It is fascinating also to note the number of ways in which Pusey’s discussion of the errors of the apologists and his examination of the typical character of Scripture explores theological issues which writers like Daniélou and de Lubac treat as fundamental to the project of ressourcement, ‘a work of retrieval and renewal’ in which Pusey also engaged.

65 Daniélou, 1955, 161. For a description of the unity of the Christological and Ecclesial senses of allegory which fits well with Pusey’s argument, see Lubac 2000, 90-93, and Lubac 1947, 193.

66 For Robert Louis Wilken on the ressourcement, Lubac 1998, xii.
5.2.4 Moving through the Senses from Image to Likeness

As we have seen already, Pusey does not offer a systematic discussion of the different senses of Scripture. However, considering his investigation of typical prophecy alongside de Lubac’s study of the different senses of Scripture in the ancient Church enables one to see how for Pusey a typical reading of Scripture is inextricably connected with an appreciation of the mystery of Christ. Pusey describes two primary senses of Scripture – on the one hand, the typical, spiritual, higher, or mystical meaning and, on the other, the obvious, plain, historical, or superficial meaning. This division fits well with de Lubac’s account of the basic twofold of meaning of Scripture which he offers in his authoritative work on allegorical interpretation, *Medieval Exegesis*:

There are, then, basically only two senses of Scripture recognized everywhere in the ancient tradition: the one, which consists in the history or the letter; the other, which is more generally named spiritual, or allegorical, or mystical. *The letter signifies one thing, mystic discourse another.*

In the context of the basic two-fold division of meaning, allegory designates all the different levels of the spiritual or typical sense. De Lubac also considers in detail the different ways the tradition develops this basic division of sense into a four-fold division of meaning, where allegory is distinguished both from history or the letter, and also from tropology and anagogy.

At the beginning of *Medieval Exegesis*, de Lubac offers the oft-repeated distich to describe the four senses of Scripture and their proper relation to one another: ‘*Littera gesta docet, quid credas allegoria, | Moralis quid agas, quo tendas anagogia*’ or ‘The letter teaches events, allegory what you should believe, | Morality teaches what you should do, anagogy what mark you should be aiming for.’

The typical interpretation of the city of Jerusalem offers a classic

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69 Lubac 1998, 271, n. 1, and 1. Lubac 1947, 192. The distich is often attributed to Nicholas of Lyra, but de Lubac argues that it was written by the Dominican Augustine of Dacia around 1260. Lubac, 1998, 1. See Lubac, 1998, 115, for an explanation of this form as the classic four-fold division. For a detailed discussion, and for the problem with alternative forms, see pp. 96-115 and Lubac 2000.
example of this four-fold development of sense: ‘la cité sainte des Juifs, qui figure l’Église avant de figurer l’âme chrétienne et enfin la cité céleste’.70 Jerusalem is both an historical city and, in the allegorical or dogmatic sense, a type of the Church.71 The history of Jerusalem prophesies the life and character of the Church. The type has a moral or tropological sense also. Since Jerusalem figures the ideal Christian city, it represents the kind of life the Christian citizen is called to live; it describes not just the soul as one finds it, but the soul reordered by grace to become like God. Finally, Jerusalem is the eschatological city, the heavenly and eternal city which is the destination for which these same citizens look and strive. For de Lubac, this four-fold formula is the mature expression of a properly Christian exegesis. It unfolds the meaning of the text. What one believes, i.e. allegory, arises from what happened; the spiritual and the historical are closely linked. Allegory is not a subjective embellishment, but rather reveals the meaning of the history. Tropology, what one does, results in the proper order of things not just from what happened, but from a proper interpretation of what happened. Morality is applied or lived doctrine. In the anagogical sense, the promise is fulfilled and the allegorical and moral sense are united – what allegory reveals will finally become the reality in which one lives. In Pusey’s words: ‘There will “God” indeed be “the portion” (Ps. 142:6) of His saints, there will they indeed “walk before the Lord” (Ps. 116:9) … [in] the True land of the living, when this mortal shall put on immortality, and this corruption put on incorruption.’ (L130)

Pusey’s view of the higher or fullest sense is also multi-layered. Although he does not formally discuss a four-fold division of sense, we can see in Pusey’s exposition of the history of ‘the brazen serpent’ the senses which de Lubac describes. (L87-90) Pusey begins by describing the event itself, the obvious and historical meaning of Numbers 21:4–9:

Fiery serpents had been sent as the punishment of their last and worst rebellion, wherein they spake against God as well as Moses (Num. 21:5)

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70 Lubac 1947, 193. For a fuller discussion of Jerusalem as the classic type, see Lubac 2000, 199-207.
and much people died. Then God commanded Moses to make a fiery serpent and put it on an ensign, and it shall come to pass that ‘every one that is bitten when he looketh upon it, shall live’. In itself, it was a trial of faith, and so the direct cure of their former disease – faithlessness. Yet this accounted not for the use of a symbol, especially in Israel, to whom the use of all symbols was forbidden and least of all, of such as a symbol as this. (L87-88)

The fiery serpent is a symbol of the one who led the first parents of the children of Israel to sin and who continued to bruise their heel, ‘at first the seducer and afterward the tormentor of man’. (L88) The reason for which the fiery serpents were sent among the people was, Pusey says, ‘evidently of a character to be immediately understood’. (L87) Since the sin which occasioned the punishment was a lack of faith in the Lord who brought them up out of Egypt, the remedy is following Moses’ instructions. This is the superficial meaning of the history, what Pusey sometimes calls the ‘plain meaning of the prophecy’. (L81, 84). What can be ‘immediately understood’ is ‘the obvious historical sense’ or ‘that which is required for the mere context’. (L39) This is the sense which the young Augustine neglected in his commentary On Genesis against the Manichees. However, even in ‘the obvious historical sense’ of the account of the brazen serpent, there are clues to suggest that there is a veiled meaning to be sought out. Pusey points out that it was a strange thing that a people to whom symbols were forbidden were required to look upon a kind of graven image. It was even stranger that healing would come by looking on a symbol of the evil one. Even without St. John’s account of Christ’s application of this history to his own work, this strangeness would be enough of a clue to suggest that one ought not to rest in the superficial sense but seek a higher one also.

The history of the brazen serpent declares ‘the Mystery of Redemption’. (L89) The revelation is a mystery – the visible history both conceals and reveals a spiritual reality. (L89) This is the mystical or typical sense in Pusey’s terminology, or the allegorical or doctrinal sense for de Lubac. The details of

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72 ‘And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.’ Gen. 3:11.

73 See also Daniélon 1951, 202: ‘le serpent du désert figure le mystère de la rédemption’.

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the history prophesy and foreshadow ‘how sin might be pardoned and the source of sin destroyed’. (L88) The pole or standard on which the brazen serpent was placed is a type both of the cross and the victory which Christ wins on the cross: ‘The cross and standard combined spoke beforehand in great words εν τουτο νικα’, in this sign conquer. (L88) Pusey explores what he calls the ‘Catholic interpretation’ of this subject, citing Barnabas, Cyril of Alexandria, Chrysostom, and Gregory of Nyssa. (L89-90) With different emphases, they consider how the fiery serpent prophesies both Christ’s death and the defeat of Satan. Pusey quotes Cyril of Alexandria: ‘God the Word therefore came in the likeness of sinful flesh that he might condemn sin in the flesh.’ (L90)

However, this typical or allegorical sense is not a simple or univocal sense. What we are to believe may be diversified according to the different aspects of the person of Christ. Chrysostom, for example, emphasizes not ‘the likeness of sinful flesh’, but how the difference between the serpents which attacked the Israelites and the brazen serpent reveals Christ’s sinlessness: ‘the serpent which destroyed had venom, but that which saved was free from poison. For death which destroyed had sin as the serpent’s poison, but that of the Lord was free from all sin, as the brazen serpent was of venom’. (L90) The life-destroying venom of the fiery serpents is an emblem of sin. Christ was without sin, as the brazen serpent was without venom. This is all part of the typical or allegorical sense.

The history of the brazen serpent not only prophesies salvation in Christ, but teaches how our lives are to be conformed to the life of Christ. Pusey offers an exposition of what de Lubac would call the moral or tropological sense:

The sum of all which is believed in the mystery of our faith is a looking to the Passion of Him, who for us took on Him the Passion. But that Passion is the Cross. So that whoso looketh to Him, as the history sheweth, is not hurt by the venom of lust. But to look to the cross is this, to make one’s whole life as it were dead to the world, crucified, fixed in virtue, unmoveable to all sin, as saith the prophet, crucifying our own

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74 Pusey refers to Cyril’s commentary on the Gospel of St John, on John 3:14, 15.
75 Pusey refers to Chrysostom, ‘Homily 27’ of his Homilies on the Gospel of St. John, on verse 3:15.
flesh by the fear of God. But the nail which restraineth the flesh, is self-command. (L90)

Before Pusey offers a moral lesson, he begins with what the history teaches us to believe or, in de Lubac’s terms, the allegorical sense of the type: ‘The sum of all which is believed in the mystery of our faith is a looking to the Passion of Him, who for us took on Him the Passion.’ What we believe leads to what we do: ‘to make one’s whole life as it were dead to the world, crucified, fixed in virtue, unmoveable to all sin’. In his account, the details are essential to the capacity of the history to serve as a genuine type: the venom symbolizes sin and the nails which fix Christ to the cross are the nails of self-command which attach us to the life of virtue. Speaking about the passage through the Red Sea and the way that ‘the history of the Jewish church, in a derived and secondary way, shadow[s] out God’s dealings with the several human souls’ (L27), Pusey offers an evocative image to describe the capacity of historical types to offer a moral sense: ‘Whence a true philosopher has strongly said, “Every history in the Bible is a prophecy, which is fulfilled throughout all centuries and in the soul of each individual. Each history bears the image of man, a body, which is earth and ashes and worthless, the outer letter; but also a soul, the breath of God”.’

Pusey also offers an anagogical or eschatological interpretation of the history of the brazen serpent by unfolding the fullest sense of the expressions which have the idea of ‘life’ as their root:

‘Whoever looked upon the brazen serpent, with his heart fixed on the Name of the Word of the Lord, he lived’, says a Jewish paraphrase. And how inexpressibly great is the simplicity of the Hebrew expression ‘he lived’, ‘he who looketh thereon shall live’, not simply, ‘shall be made whole’, ‘shall be cured of his plague’, but ‘shall live’. The great, because absolute and unlimited promise, was the fitter organ to convey the idea of that life, which is absolutely opposed to all death.’ (L89)

76 Pusey quotes here Johann Georg Hamann (1730-88), from the motto prefixed to his ‘extensive lyrical commentary on Scripture’ (Betz 2012, 39), Biblische Betrachtungen eines Christen, Biblical Reflections of a Christian. Tholuck quotes the same passage, Diss., 190, but in a shorter from than one finds in the ‘Lectures’. For Hamman’s Biblical Reflections, See Smith 1960, 117-39. Pusey appears to draw extensively on Hamann’s ideas about the Bible, history, prophecy, and nature. For example, Pusey seems to adopt Hamann’s idea of prophecy springing out of the future in his idea of Israel existing ‘for the future’ (L26). Smith 1960, 91.
This passage is characteristic of a number of passages in the ‘Lectures’ where Pusey speaks of the promise of being given ‘life’ as a typical prophecy of the promise of eternal life, that life ‘which is absolutely opposed to all death’. For Pusey, the life opposed to all death describes first the life of Christ, and derivatively the life of the saints who share that life. In his comments on Psalm 143:8 and related passages Pusey develops this anagogical or eschatological sense:

... and so again words denoting our ‘life’, ‘the land of the living’, ‘our days’, relate to that life, which we hope to live in Him, the body of this death being laid aside. All life is typical and an efflux of real life, and so our shadowy life, as opposed to death, is an emblem of endless life. (L130)

The life which is promised to those who look on the serpent is, in a veiled form, a promise of endless life, our ‘real’ life. Although Pusey does not develop this sense in detail in his brief comments on the ‘life’ which is promised to those who look at the fiery serpent which will be ‘set on a pole’ (Num. 21:8), this is obviously the sense which he is evoking. In the promise that ‘he who looketh thereon shall live’, Pusey finds a prophecy of both Christ’s conquest over death and of the eternal life which that victory offers.

Although Pusey does not discuss a particular hierarchy or order of sense, the multiple senses that one finds in his expositions correspond to the different elements of the mystery of Christ which has been the subject of this chapter. If the types of the Old Testament prophesy the whole Christ, body as well as head, and if their fulfilment is both historical and eschatological, then one ought to expect to find something like de Lubac’s four senses in Old Testament prophecy. The movement from one sense to another, the unfolding of the fullest meaning inherent in the type, is a fundamental principle in Pusey’s conception of the sacramental character of the Old Testament. A typical reading both discovers the mystery of the whole Christ, Christ in his Incarnation, Christ in the Church, Christ in the sacraments, and is a means of participation in this mystery. Pusey emphasized that understanding prophecy is not a matter of intellect alone but a response of the whole person to God. The movement from the historical sense to the fullest sense is the movement of
sanctification from the image to the likeness of God. Andrew Louth describes the elaboration of the moral sense of Scripture in this way:

This movement from faith to understanding is not simply an intellectual process; it is not simply a matter of the development of doctrine. It is a matter of realizing our participation in the mystery of Christ. This has a dogmatic dimension, certainly, and this is the first to be developed. But these dogmas are not lifeless propositions: they disclose to us the lineaments of the mystery of Christ; and that mystery draws us to itself, that mystery invites our response. The allegorical sense leads into the moral sense. ‘Historia et parabolis nutrimur; allegoria crescimus; moralitate perficimur’ (by history and parables we are nourished; by allegory we grow; by morality we are perfected).

The unfolding of the different layers of the meaning of types and typical prophecy expresses the movement by which the soul and the Church are drawn deeper into the mystery of Christ. The plain sense of the history is not left behind. Rather, ‘we shall find that humbler and more obvious meaning also involved and wrapped up in the other’, the higher meaning. (L10) Pusey’s Tractarian colleague Isaac Williams argues that the interpretations of the ‘Ancient Church’ reveal how the words of Scripture have an inherent potential of signification which sweeps toward an eternal fulfilment:

… the words of Divine truth … contain greater meanings than we can fathom; and therefore amplify and extend their significations as if they were advancing onward, (like the interpretations and various fulfilsments of prophecy,) into deeper and higher meanings, till lost in ever increasing, and at length infinite light and greatness, beyond what the limited view of man is capable of pursuing.

According to Pusey’s argument the meaning of the history or the plain sense is perfected in an eternal and eschatological fulfilment which redeems and unites all the senses of the type.

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78 T87, 21-2.
Chapter 6 Procession and Return: Typology and Cosmology

6.1 ‘Every thing is a Type’

6.1.1 Creation as the Offspring of God (Hooker and Ambrose)

‘The world is full of types; and it were probably true to say, “every thing is a type”, if we could see it.’ (L14) In order to understand Pusey’s description of typology and prophecy, it is necessary to understand the theological foundation of this basic principle. Pusey’s argument extends beyond the reading and interpretation of the Old Testament. What Pusey says about the typological character of the Bible expresses a comprehensive vision of the creation and redemption of all that is made, earthly and heavenly, visible and invisible, material and spiritual: ‘What then appears to me of primary importance as a corrective of this narrow view of prophecy is to have well impressed on the mind the significant character of every thing, which came from God.’ (L14) .

The movement from unity to multiplicity and back to unity, a movement of love and sacrifice, which expresses the inner life of God the Holy Trinity, also establishes the inherent capacity of all things to serve as types or symbols of spiritual truth and invisible or eschatological realities. The principles of typology ‘lie in the very being of God Himself’. (L152)

Quoting at length from the section of Richard Hooker’s Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity where Hooker considers the Incarnation and the sacraments, Pusey explains how all created things are God’s offspring and bear the stamp of their creator:

For as Hooker says (Ecclesiastical Polity V.56.5), ‘All things being partakers of God’ in that ‘God hath his influence into the very essence of all things, without which influence of Deity supporting them, their utter annihilation could not choose but follow’, ‘they are his offspring’, and as being such they must (in so far as they have not been marred and deformed by sin) bear a certain impress and image of Himself and an analogy, or proportion, or relation to other existences derived from God. (L14)\(^1\)

\(^1\) Laws, V.56.5. The core of Hooker’s treatment of the Incarnation and Sacraments is found in V.50-60.
Even if the way ‘all things’ are God’s offspring is distinct from the relationship of the Son with the Father, ‘because their substance and his wholly differeth, their coherence and communion either with him or amongst themselves is in no sort like unto that’, nonetheless all created things have an organic and inherent relationship with God who created them. Pusey quotes Hooker at length:

All things which God in their times and seasons hath brought forth, were eternally and before all times in God, as a work unbegun is in the artificer, which afterward bringeth it into effect. Therefore whatsoever we do behold now in this present world, it was enwrapped within the bowels of Divine Mercy, written in the book of eternal Wisdom, and held in the hands of omnipotent Power, the first foundations of the world being yet unlaid. ‘So that all things which God hath made are in that respect the offspring of God’; (Acts 17:28-29) they are in Him, as effects in their highest cause, He likewise actually is in them, the assistance and influence of His Deity being their life. (L15)

The divine ‘artificer’ sustains his offspring by a kind of participation, ‘He likewise actually is in them’. Pusey’s account of creation fits with his account of knowledge and, in Charles Taylor’s conception, a ‘substantial’ view of the relationship of God and the natural world.

Hooker’s description of the things of ‘this present world’ as ‘written’ first in God’s timeless purposes, ‘in the book of eternal Wisdom’, and only then in time, is particularly important for Pusey’s theory of types. Hooker gives voice here to the Platonic conception that what we see in the sensible world mirrors an ideal order of things, the ‘thoughts of God’ or eternal and heavenly realities. This is the broader context of Pusey’s description, which we considered in Chapter 4, of the various degrees of type and their relation to the one Archetype: ‘the shadow is the law, the image in the Gospel, the reality in the heavenly places’. (L106) Pusey argues that while ‘man only’ is called ‘the image of God in this lower world’, still ‘The other visible creatures of God’s Word and the efflux of his Spirit, do, in fact, present a continual harmony with an order of things above them; they possess in themselves a relation to things

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2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 See Bradatan 2006, 20, 29 for a discussion of this Platonic theme.
unseen’. (L14) Keble describes this principle in his description of what Hooker finds in the Fathers:

Thus in a manner they seem to have realized, though in an infinitely higher sense, the system of Plato: every thing to them existed in two worlds: in the world of sense, according to its outward nature and relations; in the world intellectual, according to its spiritual associations. And thus did the whole scheme of material things, and especially those objects in it which are consecrated by scriptural allusion, assume in their eyes a sacramental or symbolical character.  

We will see the importance of this idea for Pusey’s theory of types below.

6.1.2 Creation and Redemption as Procession and Return

The idea that creation is an emanation or procession from the One, and that redemption is the return of all things to this Triune Unity is of fundamental importance for the ‘Lectures’ and Pusey’s treatment of types. While Pusey would have found this view of creation in many of the patristic and medieval authors to whom he looked, in the ‘Lectures’ he refers explicitly to Hooker and, as we shall see below, to Ambrose. Torrance Kirby argues that the idea of procession and return guides Hooker’s treatment of Eternal Law, Natural Law, and Divine Law: ‘Just as Neoplatonic cosmology accounts for the genesis of the world by means of a downward procession or emanation from the One, so also Hooker derives a diverse hierarchy of laws from the one Eternal Law.’

Hooker’s understanding of created things as the offspring of God which ‘are in Him, as effects in their highest cause’ follows this pattern: ‘for Hooker the creation of the world is an “outward procession” or exitus from the divine unity’. Likewise, the restoration and perfection of this order is a movement of return: ‘A complete restoration of the order is provided directly by God himself in the divine act of Redemption, “in himselfe prepared before all worldes.” The redemption is a reeditus or “return” to God of all creation by “a way mysticall and supernaturall” (Lawes, I.11.6 …).’ In Hooker’s account, no part of the created order falls outside the movement of creation and return: ‘In this process

5 Laws, i, xci.
6 Kirby 1998, 50.
7 Ibid. 51.
of going out from and returning to God who is “the Eternal himselfe,” nothing created can be said to fall outside the original order established in the one Eternal Law.¹⁸

Hooker emphasizes that the origin and end of creation is not simply the ‘One’, but the One in Three, God the Holy Trinity. In the same section from which Pusey quotes extensively, Hooker writes: ‘Whatsoever God doth work, the hands of all three Persons are jointly and equally in it according to the order of that connexion whereby they each depend upon other.’¹⁹ Kirby emphasizes the importance of understanding Hooker’s notion of procession and return in Trinitarian terms:

The works of both creation and redemption are linked to God’s own Trinitarian self-reflection. All things proceed from and return to God by the divine Word. The utterance of the Word brings the world into being. (Laws, I.3.2 … ) The divine work of redemption ‘God in himselfe prepared before all worldes.’ (Laws, 1.11.6 …) God is thus an end to himself in the process of both exitus and reitus. The seemingly endless and immeasurable diversity of life in its many forms is stabilised and contained by an order which is nothing less than the divine self-identity.¹⁰

The importance of this view, in terms of Pusey’s treatment of types, is that it holds together the diversity of natural and verbal signs, God’s works and words, with ‘the divine self-identity’ of the Archetype.

6.1.3 Principles which ‘lie in the very being of God Himself’

Pusey situates his treatment of types and prophecy in the context of this same all-embracing understanding of creation and redemption as procession from, and return to, the one God, the principle of unity. Pusey develops this idea especially in the later sections of the ‘Lectures’ (‘On Prophecy’ and ‘Numerology’) and in the supplemental material, i.e. in those sections where he expands on the ideas which he sketches more briefly in the pages where he quotes Hooker. Pusey emphasizes that creation has its origin in divine oneness. Commenting on the ‘divine character of numbers’, Pusey describes how the

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¹⁸ Ibid. 52.
¹⁹ Laws, V.56.5.
¹⁰ Kirby 1998, 52.
number ‘one’ represents or ‘shadows’ God: ‘One expresses the absolute Unity and perfection, and so has every where been accounted to represent God Himself. … Holy Scripture sets forth “the Lord our God as One Lord” and realizes His Unity in the Oneness which He causes, while it shadows Him.’

(L152) All creation is an emanation or an efflux from this ‘absolute Unity’: ‘Divine Creation must be the expression of something within God, because He is Infinite, the Only Original, embracing all things, and without Him there is nothing.’

As we will see below, what God gives of himself to created things is what enables those things, words and works, to figure God.

Pusey turns to Ambrose’s exposition of the six days of creation in his Hexameron for assistance in articulating the principle of unity as the origin of all created things. Pusey sees the ‘in the beginning’ of Genesis 1:1 as referring not to a starting point in time, but to the principle, or Archetype, of all creation, the divine Word, the Son of the Father:

… one meaning of these much-containing words ‘In the Beginning’ doubtless is that ‘God created heaven and earth’ in ‘Him’ Who is ‘The Beginning’ (as He calleth Himself, ‘The Beginning’ and again ‘I am the Beginning and the End, The First and The Last’) and we know that ‘by Him God made the worlds’.

In Ambrose’s account, the Creator is the Son who tells the Jews in John 8:25, ‘I am the beginning, I who speak with you’. Pusey goes on to speak of creation as a procession from this principle of unity, the beginning, to the many:

As St. Ambrose says, ‘There is One Word, Which worketh in each, and wherever He worketh in each, He “worketh all things in all”. This Word, with the Father, One, has diffused Himself into many, because of His fullness have all we received. Therefore if Thou viewest each several thing of all things, which were created in Himself, thou wilt see that in each is there what in all is One Word, of Whom according to our capacity we are partakers.’

‘From Him, in Him and to Him are all...

11 S-BN, 1.
13 Ibid. I.2.5, 5 (cf. I.8.29, 32).
things,’ by Him created, by Him preserved, and both for His glory; begun in Him, in Him continued; in Him the end.\(^{14}\)

We see in this quotation not only a description of creation as a diffusion to the many of what belongs to the One, but how this kind of description of creation is intrinsically connected to a movement of return into unity; ‘in Him continued, in Him the end’.

In the same way that Pusey describes creation as a movement from One to many, he represents redemption as a movement of return to God:

… we shall, in one way, all be one, in that ‘God will be all in all’, knitting ‘all things in Heaven and in Earth’ in one by His all-pervading Spirit, which maketh all one when he entereth, maketh all Christians one temple here, and shall make all one celestial City; yet not in the Pantheistic way, as though all were to be dissolved and absorbed into the essence of God, but after the likeness of the Mystery of His own Nature, there shall be unity of being, in that all shall live by His Life and inflowing Essence, with plurality and distinct personality. (L151)

Pusey describes this movement of return to unity by drawing on a quotation of Francis Bacon, which he repeats twice in the ‘Lectures’:

Thus One represents absolute Unity and perfection, and so God Himself. The tendency of all things toward God, is, as in an image set forth, in the tendency of all things to meet together in unity. ‘God,’ says Bacon, ‘is holy in the multitude of his works, holy in their order, holy in their unison. Wherefore the speculation of Plato and Parmenides (although in them it was a bare speculation) yet was excellent; ‘that all things as by a ladder rise up to unity’. (L18)\(^ {15}\)

When Pusey repeats this reference to Bacon in the section of the ‘Lectures’ where he gives a much longer, fuller treatment of numerology, he adds the comment that ‘The tendency to unity is a tendency toward God’. (L152)

Pusey appears to see Bacon at least in some measure as Coleridge did, as ‘the British Plato’, and as the advocate of a philosophy which ‘sees nature as the mirror of the spirit’.\(^ {16}\) In a similar way, in a letter to Pusey, his Tractarian colleague Benjamin Harrison\(^ *\) appealed to Bacon to argue for the necessity of returning to ‘the higher symbolical and typical interpretation’ of the Fathers:

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\(^{14}\) S-BGW, 1, and L15.

\(^{15}\) Bacon 1974, Book II.7.6, 93.

\(^{16}\) Hedley 2000, 206, 213.
‘there seems to be a sort of philosophia prima in the interpretations of Scripture not less than in that of Nature which seems to put one on the level of a higher science, and so to further the more “perfect discovery” of which Bacon speaks.’ 17 Bacon’s ‘ladder’ by which all things ‘rise up to unity’ pictures both the return of creation to God as a movement of ascent and also describes the movement from the literal to the higher sense. Pusey’s comprehensive view of types mirrors his comprehensive notion of procession and return. The common origin and destiny of all things is the fundamental reason that the ‘world is full of types’ and that prophecy, in ‘Scripture’ and in ‘Nature’, comes in the form of types or typical prophecy.

In Pusey’s account, like that of Hooker, the One from whom creation proceeds and to which it returns is the One in Three and Three in One. However much Pusey describes creation as the work of the Divine Word, the principle of unity and the creation is God the Holy Trinity. As we saw above, the Son who creates, the ‘One Word, Which worketh in each’ is not alone, but ‘with the Father’. In Ambrose’s treatment also, the ‘One’ is not the Father only, but both the Triune God and any One of the Persons in whom all the fulness of the Godhead dwells. Alongside the Scriptural witness to the creative speech of the Word who is ‘the Beginning’, Pusey writes that ‘the operation of the Holy Ghost also is declared expressly: “The Spirit of God brooded upon the form of the deep”, ordering and breathing His Life into the formless mass’. 18 Following Ambrose again, Pusey asserts: ‘The agency of the Son and Holy Ghost in the Creation is declared in the Psalms “By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made and all the host of them by the Spirit of His mouth”.’ 19 Of ‘the book of God’s works’, and ‘the book of His word’, Pusey writes, ‘Both

17 B. Harrison to Pusey, 26 Aug. 1835, LBV-47. See Bacon 1974, I.5.5, 34. Bacon argues that the loss of a ‘philosophia prima … cannot but cease and stop all progression. For no perfect discovery can be made upon a flat or a level’. See Betz 2012, 136, for Hamann’s view, following Bacon, that historical or literary tools can ‘never exhaust a text that prophetically encompasses all ages’.

*Harrison, Benjamin (1808–1887). Fellow at Christ Church from 1828-48 and domestic chaplain to Archbishop Howley from 1838-48, and the author of four of the Tracts (nos.16, 17, 24, 49). After moving to Lambeth, Harrison became less sympathetic to the Oxford Movement.

18 S-BGW, 1

19 Ibid. See Ambrose, Hexameron, I. 8.29
were spoken through His Word, by His Spirit. Both reveal the unseen God being spoken in Him, “Who is the bright Reflection of His Glory, and the Expressive Image of His Person” through the Spirit.”

Pusey describes the movement of creation and return, in Kirby’s expression, as a form of ‘Trinitarian self-reflexion’:

Thus, in the union of Three in One (in form tercary, in essence one) it has been observed this is the most frequent figure which we find in nature, and enters most into intricate harmony. And God has (one may venture perhaps to say) impressed this form upon nature, and given us an inclination to rest therein, as an impress of His own perfect Triune existence … For the thoughtful Ancients could not fail to see how deeply this same number was impressed on the human frame, man’s mind, the structure of the Universe. (L154)

In this passage from his discussion of the typical character of number he directs attention not so much to the common work of the persons of the Trinity as to the stamp or impress of ‘the union of Three in One’ which the created order manifests. The way in which Pusey connects his account of types so closely with the work of the Trinity in creation and ‘the deepest mystery of the Godhead’ (L151) suggests how the principle of types is not only knit into the order of things but expresses the life of God. What Pusey says about the ‘symbolical character of numbers’ applies more generally to his treatment of types: ‘The principles seem to lie in the very being of God Himself’. (L152)

6.1.4 Christian Platonism and the World of Types

The way Pusey draws on Ambrose to articulate an account of creation and redemption as procession and return is another example of the way in which elements of Christian Platonism shape his account of types and typical

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20 S-BGW, 1.
21 L.154: ‘But indeed for instruction alone, it is impressive, how God has made all things to reflect His own image to man. Heathenism knew and felt three worlds, Heaven, Earth and Hell; three divisions of our world, earth, sea, and sky; three times, past, present, and future; three parts of every action, beginning, middle, end; each examination of human thoughts is analysed into three elements; whereas ordinary habit would speak of man as two-fold only, soul and body, they saw more deeply that he was three fold in nature, although that third principle they could not see … yet they approached here to the truth, now declared that man is one, yet three-fold, body, mind and spirit.’
prophecy. Kirby points to the ‘Neoplatonic Logic’ in Hooker in the very passages which Pusey cites to explain how creation is an ‘efflux’ of God:

In the circular process of emanation and return, Hooker places his argument in a theological tradition which harks back to the early centuries of the Christian era. Even before this pattern of processio et reditus was taken up by Christian theologians, Plotinus argued that the One is the terminus of all striving in the world because it is the originative first principle.22

This idea of creation striving to return to ‘the One’ is also implicit in Pusey’s account of the soul which is made in the image of God and which seeks to return to the source from whence it came. Describing how Plotinus’ notion of emanation and return shapes Augustine’s presentation of the soul’s ascent to God, Andrew Louth writes that the image ‘longs for its archetype’, a characterization that fits precisely with Pusey’s account.23

We have seen in previous chapters how Pusey draws on Platonist ideas and the importance of Coleridge as a point of contact with this tradition. Hedley’s analysis of Coleridge emphasizes the way in which Coleridge draws on the Cambridge Platonists and George Berkeley (1685-1753) as bearers of a tradition of ‘Neoplatonism’ reaching back to Plotinus and to Plato.24 In particular, Hedley argues that ‘Coleridge belongs to an Idealistic tradition in Berkeley’s sense of “those who make all corporeal things to be dependent upon Soul or Mind”, i.e. in the broad meaning of anti-naturalistic’.25 In Hedley’s terms, Pusey is also an anti-naturalist, as one opposed to scientism or naturalism as discussed in Chapter 2, and an idealist, as one who argued that ‘we still live in the land of shadows’ as discussed in Chapter 5, shadows cast by more real and enduring spiritual realities. (L94)

Hedley’s reference to Berkeley’s importance for Coleridge points to another important source for Pusey. As we saw in Chapter 2, Pusey’s most explicit criticism of Locke is made in the form of a juxtaposition with

22 Kirby 1998, 51.
23 Louth 1981, 147. On the importance of these ideas in Plotinus see pp. 38, 36-51.
24 Hedley 2000, 6-7, 61, 106, 289-90. See also Newsome, 1974 for a consideration of the influence of Platonism on Coleridge and the Romantics, suggesting ways that this tradition shaped the ‘Lectures’.
Berkeley: ‘For one Plato one has many Diogenes; for one Berkeley many Lockes, for one Athanasius many Arius.’ (L61) This quotation implies an approval not only of Berkeley, but of Plato alongside of Athanasius. Pusey also made the connection between Berkeley and Plato when he criticized the dominance of the common-sense philosophy and empiricism in Oriel examinations for fellowships: ‘I should like gradually to introduce Metaphysics, i.e., Butler, Clarke, Berkeley, not the modern trash which in Messrs Stewart and Reid has assumed the name. But we must begin, I suppose, with Plato.’

The Berkeley to whom Pusey appealed is not the Berkeley conceived of as ‘nothing more than a convenient bridge between Locke and Hume, a natural logical step in the development of British empiricism’, but rather Berkeley the Platonist. Costica Bradatan argues that this ‘other Bishop Berkeley’ posits ‘a fundamental likeness and similarity of function between the human mind and the divine mind’; sees the works of creation as an expression of divine archetypes, the ‘thoughts of God’; and finds in ‘the whole system of Nature … a system of signs, a visual divine language, speaking to our minds of God’.

In a recent article, ‘Newman and Christian Platonism in Britain’, Mark McIntosh considers the influence of Berkeley on Newman’s understanding of ‘the visible world [as] the instrument, yet the veil, of the world invisible’. McIntosh’s analysis of Platonist influences on Newman suggests parallels with Pusey and areas of possible cross-fertilization where Berkeley, either directly or through Newman, may have influenced Pusey’s theory of types. McIntosh describes Berkeley as a critic of ‘the naturalizing tendency of the new science...

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27 Bradatan 2006, 22.


29 McIntosh 2011, 358.

30 Ibid. See especially 350, 356-7. McIntosh acknowledges that Newman is often read ‘against the background of Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, and Hume’, i.e., in relation to the empiricist tradition (p. 344). This aspect of Newman’s thought is considered in depth in Cameron 1962 and 1967. In light of McIntosh’s article and the sources to which he points, it is difficult to agree with Cameron’s conclusion that ‘we may be grateful that he [Newman] was never touched by idealist metaphysics’. Cameron 1967, 96.
and the new philosophy’, connecting his view with Pusey’s criticism of naturalism and rationalism in the ‘Lectures’ also.31

Pusey was aware of the Platonic associations of his ideas in the ‘Lectures’. However, he also wished to differentiate his approach from pagan philosophical models. Following Ambrose again, he distinguishes the Creator who is the beginning, the Archetype, from the Platonic demiurge: ‘What God hath created must, one may boldly say, express God; since God has no copy external to Himself as Plato imagined, which He could copy as an archetype’.32

Also, the pages in which Pusey refers to Ambrose are especially replete with biblical references. He seems to wish to emphasize that this understanding of creation and redemption is primarily Christian and biblical. Still, he maintains that Plato and the greatest pagan philosophers discern ‘shadows of Christian truth’.33 Pusey, like his Tractarian colleagues, viewed the ‘deepest philosophies’ of the Greeks as having been spoken ‘by an inspiration of God’, and as a preparation for the Gospel.34 As much as Plato or the Platonists articulated the relationship of the temporal and the eternal or the finite to the infinite, or bore witness to the unity of intellect and character, Pusey saw them as forerunners of Gospel truth, uncovering fragments of the order of things to which the Fathers gave a properly Christian expression. The importance of seeing Pusey in relation to the tradition of Christian Platonism extends beyond a consideration of the origin of his ideas. Rather, it shows again that Pusey’s argument involves recovering not only an exegetical approach but the theological vision within which the typology of the Fathers makes sense. It is

31 McIntosh 2011, 352-3. See Newsome 1974, 61-72 and 85 for the idea that Newman was ‘a man of Platonic temper and disposition who had acquired the training of an Aristotelian’, suggesting a possible cause of divergence with Pusey who fits perhaps more closely with Newsome’s description of Platonism. See also Nockles 1997, 210-1.
32 S-BGW, 1. See Ambrose 1961, Hexameron, I.2.5, 5. See also Kirby 1998, 55, 64 for Hooker’s consideration of Plato’s demiurge. Andrew Louth describes the importance of consigning the Word ‘to the realm of the (now strictly) divine’ for the development of Nicene Orthodoxy in the context of the Arian controversy. Louth 1981, 76.
33 S-FTL, 4. He also quotes Keble’s assessment of these ‘high spirits of old’ in Xn. Yr., ‘Fourth Sunday after Trinity’, 142.
34 S-BN, 1. For the Tractarians’ approach to the idea that Greek philosophy is a preparation for the Gospel, see Newman 1967, 34, and McGrath 1997, 45-50. For Keble, Laws, xci-ii (quoted above) and Keble 1912, ii, 475-477. See also Williams 1846, 225 and B. Harrison to Pusey, 26 Aug. 1835, LBV-47.
by seeing Pusey’s notion of type within this over-arching system that one can appreciate why reading the Old Testament in what he calls ‘the Apostolic mode’ is necessary for him, and also can see both the strength and weaknesses of his argument.

6.2 The Book of God’s Word and the Book of God’s Works

6.2.1 ‘Syllables of that Eternal Voice’

Pusey’s description of God’s words and works as the speech of the divine Word connects his presentation of creation and redemption as procession and return directly with his theory of type: ‘The world then is one word of God; by His speech was it made, “He spoke the word and it was” (Ps. 33:9).’ The ‘world’ which was spoken is also a ‘word’. With Ambrose’s words and allusions in his mind, Pusey continues:

All things then are His word, for His word was their being; in and by His Word were they made; by the utterance of His ‘word of power’ doth that Word still ‘uphold them’ in being [Heb. 1:3]; they then as uttered by God, speak of Him Who spoke them; they are syllables of that Eternal Voice which spake them. Each word was a work, and each work a word, as again when the Word was made flesh – words and works – with Him were one; ‘His word was with power’ (Luke 4:3) ‘The words that I speak unto you, I speak not of Myself, but the Father That dwelleth in Me, He doeth the works’ (John 14:11). And so, as ‘day unto day uttereth speech; and night unto night sheweth knowledge’ [Ps. 19:2]; they speak in that they are; their existence is their speech.\(^{36}\)

The ‘syllables of that Eternal Voice’ belong to a typical and figurative language whose grammar is the purposes of God or the order of the divine life. This speaking does not just pass on information, it is a form of divine self-communication: ‘All things then are His word, for His word was their being’. Therefore creation is not simply a past event, and the works of God are not a lifeless text. Rather, the works continue to speak and the Word by which they were made upholds them. This means also that God’s speaking constitutes the movement of return as well as the work of creation:

\(^{35}\) S-BGW, 1.

\(^{36}\) Ibid.
To speak was to create; and so creation was His speech, as re-creation shall be another word when He shall say, ‘Come again, ye children of men’ (Ps. 90:3) where the Holy Spirit shall be also present, as it is said, ‘Thou shalt send forth Thy Spirit, they shall be created; and Thou shalt renew the face of the earth’ (Ps. 104:30).  

The movement through the senses of typical prophecy which aids the soul in its journey from the image to the likeness of God mirrors the movement of return to God by which the whole creation is renewed.

Pusey describes creation and the natural world not only as speech, but a kind of book which offers a form of revelation analogous to that of the Bible:

The book of God’s works thus, and the book of His word correspond, because they both are emanations of His Word, ‘without Whom was not every thing made, which was made’. Both were spoken through His Word, by His Spirit. Both reveal the unseen God being spoken in Him, ‘Who is the bright Reflection of His Glory, and the Expressive Image of His Person’ through the Spirit.  

Pusey emphasizes that there is a correspondence between Scripture and the ‘Book of God’s work’. Since both have the same author, they communicate the same message. On the one hand, ‘the book of Nature’ offers a ‘commentary to revelation’ and harmonizes with it. (L17) On the other hand, Scripture also interprets the book of Nature: ‘He stamps in the book of His Word the meaning of the book of His works’. Before considering in more detail ‘the book of His works’, it is important to consider first the principles which Pusey offers and by which what is written therein may be interpreted.

6.2.2 Types as Partakers of Divine Qualities

On the basis of this understanding of the creation as the speech and offspring of God who ‘bear a certain impress and image of Himself’ Pusey establishes the principle of analogy. (L14) This principle is fundamental to Pusey’s understanding of typology. Pusey sets out the principle as follows:

But that, wherein God is, must in some first way express the character of God, Who is in them; and must bear some relation to those other

37 Ibid.
39 Pusey 1853, 30.
offspring of God; so that as an analogy in the physical structure of all
constructed things from the highest to the lowest is widely perceptible,
there should also be some analogy between their moral significancy, as
far as each is capable of expressing it. (L15)\(^{40}\)

In his description of analogy here, Pusey emphasizes two sorts of likeness or
relations. The first is the way in which a common source of creation, a
common creator, establishes a likeness between different created things, what
he calls ‘an analogy, or proportion, or relation to other existences derived from
God’. (L14) This principle explains how the connections and associations
between created things in Scripture serve as a system or web of meaning and
signification: ‘This relation between animate and inanimate, rational and
irrational creation, is expressed by the very word “imagery”, which implies that
one class, whereon these qualities are less forcibly impressed, furnishes as it
were “images” or representations of that higher class, which possesses these
qualities more fully.’ (L15) As will be discussed below, this also suggests the
different ways or degrees in which things may be related, and hence the
possibility of one object or type may have multiple meanings.

The second sort of analogy is between the physical and moral character
of a created thing. As we have seen in Chapter 3, Pusey’s understanding of
analogy is shaped by Bishop Joseph Butler. Butler states this idea succinctly:
‘There is a much more exact correspondence between the natural and moral
world than we are apt to take notice of … This is a particular instance of that
general observation of the Son of Sirach: “All things are double one against
another, and God hath made nothing imperfect.”’\(^{41}\) The works of God have a
‘moral significancy’ (L15, above) because something divine is given or
impacted to them: ‘Divine creation must be the expression of something within
God’.\(^{42}\) Pusey describes how ‘abstract words’ in Scripture such as wisdom,

\(^{40}\) See also S-FTL, 9, below, in relation to the ‘Great Chain of Being’. Pusey may be drawing
on Augustine’s description of Hilary, in *On the Trinity*, X.10.12, Augustine 1994, 103:
“Therefore, all these things which are made by divine skill, show in themselves a certain unity,
and form, and order”.

\(^{41}\) Butler 1897, Sermon 6, 92. Pusey quotes this passage from the Son of Sirach to illustrate the
‘harmony in the ordinances of God’. L3

\(^{42}\) S-BN, 1.
righteousness, peace, and strength are nonetheless typical, because wherever we find these qualities, they speak to us of that 'something within God':

There is, however, a very solemn way in which Holy Scripture teaches us to look on these also as typical, i.e. as far as they relate to qualities, which are attributes or effluences from God. For all virtue and power and might being from God, all which hath it, so far represents God ... Much more then, when the qualities are mentioned in the abstract in Holy Scripture do they relate to Him in Whom they intrinsically exist. To this Holy Scripture itself guides us; when it foretells that our Lord should be called, 'The Lord our righteousness', or declares that 'He is our peace', or that He is of God made unto us 'wisdom and righteousness and sanctification and redemption', or that He is 'the Power of God and the Wisdom of God'. (L136)

Pusey maintains that to say that qualities are an effluence of God means more than that they describe God or are metaphors. Rather, qualities, in their fullest sense, are of the essence of God: 'He is Himself what He gives, for His gifts are Himself, by His Spirit Who is the Gift, “We have,” says St Ambrose, “all things in Christ – Christ is all things to us.”'\(^43\) For Pusey, the unity of God and His gifts is a consequence of the unity of the Divine Nature:

… the attributes or qualities of God are not some thing distinct from God, but they are Himself, in those several relations; for to think otherwise were to derogate from the simply Unity of the Divine Nature, as though God were not One simple perfect Essence, but Essence and Qualities existing therein or added thereto.\(^44\)

We saw in Chapter 3 that the idea of the unity of the attributes of wisdom and holiness shaped Pusey’s account of knowledge as participation and of the moral character of knowledge. In an analogous way, since divine attributes, ‘all virtue and power and might’, are part of what Pusey calls ‘the imparted divinity of nature’, then all that is created by God bears a sort of moral stamp or character: ‘All nature is an image of good, or evil; good as far as it is an effluence of God, and retains His life, evil whenever it had pleased Him to

\(^43\) S-GC, 7.
\(^44\) S-GC, 7. See also Pusey 1853, 29-30. Pusey may be drawing on Augustine’s discussion, in *On the Trinity*, of divine attributes or qualities as being one with God: ‘Further, if we say, Eternal, immortal, incorruptible, unchangeable, living, wise, powerful, beautiful, righteous, good, blessed, spirit ... whatever seems to be predicated therein according to quality, is to be understood according to substance or essence.’ See *On the Trinity*, XV.5.8, Augustine 1994, 203. Also, V.10.11, 93.
Although he cannot claim an etymological basis for doing so, Pusey argues from a theological perspective that all good necessarily comes from God, and that what is good in one part of creation has the capacity to represent or serve as a type of good found elsewhere:

God and Godly is equivalent to good and goodly; every thing which is good is an efflux of God and represents Him in its way, and so also mutually reflects itself, (i.e. every thing which is good represents other things which are so, from their mutual relation to God). Whence again each several good serves as an image to the others. (L16)  

As much as something exists at all, it exists by the goodness of the God who created and sustains it. However, as we will consider more fully below, God’s works serve as an image of what is evil also. Ultimately, it is the presence or absence of God and divine attributes which determine the typical character of nature: ‘Thus, as in nature, things are significant whether by the presence of God or by His absence, so in the history of His grace.’

Pusey’s analysis of the way divine qualities are of the substance of God, and therefore reflect God wherever they are found, also explains his understanding of the ‘fullest’ sense of Old Testament sayings, and how Christ is prophesied in the whole of the Old Testament, in sayings as well as in events and people: ‘words, descriptive of a high degree of divine qualities, whatever their context be, have necessarily their fulfilment in Him’. Pusey writes:

Thus, to take a few instances in which the Fathers so read the Old Testament; whom Simeon saw [‘mine eyes have seen Thy Salvation’], they prayed for, so often as they prayed, ‘Shew us Thy Mercy, O Lord, and grant us Thy Salvation’; that ‘thy way (i.e. He who is The Way) may be known upon earth, and among all nations Thy Salvation’; for Him the Patriarch waited when he said ‘I have waited for Thy Salvation, O Lord’ for Him the Psalmist, ‘I have longed for Thy Salvation, O Lord’ (L136)

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45 S-BN, 1, 3.  
46 This passage is repeated in S-BN, 1.  
47 S-FTL, 7. See also S-EL, 7: ‘Such then being the ground of the moral significance of nature, the presence of God or His absence, His creative Hand, or corruption through sin, we come back to the same conviction, which the sight of nature itself and the way in which it is decyphered by poets impresses upon us, that, could we read it, every thing has a meaning and that this meaning is real, inherent in the things themselves.’  
48 S-GC, 9.
Pusey’s notion of the ‘fullest’ sense of a passage is based not on the subjective inclinations or notions of the interpreter, but on the principle that all good qualities both come from God and speak of God. Pusey does not simply copy Butler’s principle of analogy, but gives both that principle and his notion of the ‘fullest sense’ a more comprehensive theological foundation by drawing on Hooker and Ambrose, among others, and developing their consideration of creation as the offspring of God sharing in divine attributes.

According to Pusey’s understanding of the mystery of Christ, his principle that ‘words, descriptive of a high degree of divine qualities, whatever their context be, have necessarily their fulfilment in Him’, teaches us to expect that qualities typical of Christ will also be found in His body:

Since God only is Light and Love and Wisdom and Truth absolutely in Himself, since they are of God… so does it add intensely to our conceptions of the condescension of God, that they are to us Light, and Life, and Love, and Wisdom, not merely by qualities conferred upon us, but through Sacramental participation of Themelves, by virtue of the Incarnation. Not in a metaphor, but in reality is Christ our Life and Light and Wisdom and Righteousness and Sanctification; since all these are what He is, they are ours, from His Indwelling in us through the Spirit.

Pusey’s investigation of the typical character of divine attributes expresses his understanding of the Incarnation and of the sacramental principle, how the manifestation of God in the flesh describes both the Incarnation and the communion of the members of the body with their head. The way in which types share in the substance of the Archetype also describes the divine indwelling of Christ in the Church. Qualities fulfilled in Christ are fulfilled in a lesser extent in the disciples:

Here again as those of old foreshadowed Him, does He deign to be reflected in His saints, so that the same titles in different degrees belong to Him and His. ‘Great’ says St. Ambrose, ‘is the grace of Christ, Who hath given almost all His titles to His disciples. “I am” He saith “the Light of the world” and yet that name wherein He sheweth His own glory, He allowed to His disciples, saying, “Ye are the Light of the world”. “I am the Living Bread” and “We all are one Bread”. “I am the true vine” and to them He saith “I planted there a fruitful, wholly and

49 S-GC, 9.
true vine.” Christ is a Rock; “for they drank of that spiritual Rock which followed them and that rock was Christ.” To His disciples also He refused not the grace of this title, that he too be Petras, as having from the Rock, the solidity of constancy, the firmness of faith, strive thou too to be a rock’.\footnote{S-FTL, 6. Pusey quotes Ambrose, ‘in Luc. vi § 98’.
}

The exploration of typology is an exploration of the mystery of Christ. Pusey’s theory of types explains not only how the Old Testament prophesies Christ and the Church, but also that participation in Christ implies a participation in the qualities which are part of the divine unity. Seeing these divine attributes means seeing both how they are imparted in creation, and how the promise which they figure is fulfilled in a redemptive return to God.

6.3 The Moral Significance of Nature

6.3.1 Nature as a Biblical Commentary

Pusey’s analysis of the way in which all created things share divine attributes, to different degrees and in different ways, helps one to interpret ‘the book of God’s works’. (L16) Quoting ‘a philosophic German’, almost certainly J. G. Hamann (1730 - 1788), Pusey maintains that ‘the book of Nature’ offers a ‘Poetry of Metaphysics’ and a ‘commentary to revelation’. (L17)\footnote{On Hamann’s view of the revelation offered ‘in nature and in His Word’, see Betz 2012, 46, 87, 136-9.} To illustrate this, Pusey recalls how early Christian interpreters found types of Christ’s ‘birth of a Virgin, and of the Resurrection from the dead’ in the cycle of germination, by which the earth blossoms in return for the rain of heaven.\footnote{Pusey quotes Irenaeus, Against Heresies, III.5.1. This section is part of the portion of the ‘Lectures’ which Pusey quotes in his A Letter to the Right Hon. and Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of London, but which comes before the missing section which is found only in the Letter. Most of Pusey 1851, 195-6 is also found on L135. See Chapter 1.2 of this thesis for a discussion of the significance of the Letter.} He focuses in particular on Psalm 85:11, ‘a Psalm which the Church selects for the festival of our Lord's Nativity – “Truth” is it said, “shall spring … out of the earth and righteousness shall look down from Heaven.”’\footnote{Pusey 1851, 196-7.} Pusey comments on the ‘combination of Heaven and Earth to produce men’s salvation’ which he
finds in the images of Psalm 85, first in his own words, and then quoting Augustine’s commentary on this verse:

A Heavenly descent of Righteousness, the earth open to receive It; and through both these issues from the earth, Salvation; – who other than He, who is the Branch of the Lord, the Root of David (Rev. 5:5), the offshoot from the stem of Jesse (Isa. 11), the sucker out of a dry ground (Isa. 53)? A heavenly original, an earthly birth, that He might die for us. ‘What is Truth? The Son of God. What is earth? The flesh. Ask whence Christ is born, and thou seest that Truth sprung out of the earth. This Truth, which sprung of the earth, was before the earth, and by it was made Heaven and earth. But that Righteousness might look down from heaven, i.e. that men might be justified by the Divine grace, Truth was born of the Virgin Mary.’ (L135)54

According to Pusey’s account, ‘from things earthy is a real correspondence to things spiritual’, and by this correspondence earthy things assist our apprehension of the greatest spiritual mysteries.

The correspondence between the two books of the divine Word means that the created thing, the natural type, is an independent and objective voice. The meaning such types offer is more than metaphorical, it has a securer foundation than poetic or artistic convention. Referring to Job 21:18 which says of the wicked, ‘They are as stubble before the wind, and as chaff that the storm carrieth away’, Pusey writes:

His natural works also, in numerous instances convey the same truth which He afterwards expressly declares, only that man has not of himself wisdom to understand it. So that the relation between the image employed by revelation and the truth declared is an inherent correspondence, not a mere external likeness: to take but a slight and brief instance; the stubble before the wind, or the small dust before the whirlwind, exhibit in themselves the idea not simply of unresisting, powerless, and contemptible dispersion or destruction – powerless notwithstanding their multitude – before one all-powerful but invisible Agent, but wherein the moral character displays itself, – the intrinsic emptiness and worthlessness of the thing so tossed: so that the mind as soon as the thought is suggested to it, at once sees a number of real analogies between the ‘stubble before the wind’ and the destruction of the wicked and these the more forcible because real – because the

54Pusey quotes Augustine’s commentary on Ps. 85 § 13, in Augustine 1850, 180.
physical object does declare the same moral lesson, although we should not have perceived it. (L15-16)

The author of Job is not imposing moral categories on amoral nature, but he is discerning the moral significance of creation. What Scripture adds to nature is a revelation of the correspondences which are there, but which are nonetheless inherent in the natural works before this revelation. When he discusses the appropriateness of water to serve as the material element of spiritual cleansing in Holy Baptism, Pusey describes the purposefulness of this correspondence more fully:

There is in the Ancient Church what by moderns would be condemned as Realism, or Materialism, or Mysticism. Their view seems to have been of this sort; that, since GOD had appointed the use of water for Baptism, there must have been an appropriateness in it, which there was in no other element; that there was an analogy between His physical and moral Creation, and that not only imaginative but real; that in forming the Physical, He had respect also to the purposes which He designed in His Moral creation, and imparted to the physical agent properties corresponding to its moral uses; that in His earlier dispensations He had regard to the latter, and not only taught man beforehand what should be, but, in a manner, by employing His creature in the subordinate offices of the former, imparted to it a fitness to serve in the latter and greater. Pusey evokes here again the inherent correspondences by which the book of Nature complements the book of Scripture. More radically, he also argues that the way natural types serve in sacred history in different but analogous ways over time witnesses to the providential ordering of all things within which the meaning of types are discerned. These different appearances of the same type in different circumstances is part of the way they speak. Like any language, the language of type develops associations and nuances over time which the native speaker recognizes. Christopher Seitz sees Pusey’s notion of ‘figural interpretation’ and the idea that there is ‘a surplus of intended meaning in every divine revelation’ as having ‘a basic theological grounding, involving a

55 L.18: ‘A clear transparent stream impresses on the mind involuntarily the idea of guileless purity, the cloudless sky, of pure encompassing love; the bursting bubble, of vanity, what is physically crooked of what is so morally, what is rigidly straight’.

56 T67rev., 361.
doctrine of providence’.

Pusey describes this idea of providence also in terms of divine government: ‘There is then an analogy between the natural works of God among themselves, and again, since they come from the same Author, between His natural and revealed works, as between His natural and revealed Government.’ (L15) Once again, we see that Pusey’s theory of types arises out of an all encompassing, and providential, vision of creation and redemption.

Pusey emphasizes the way in which the revelation which nature offers is an independent witness to the same revelation which Scripture offers by illustrating it with an example from Arabic poetry. During his first seven years as Regius Professor of Hebrew he spent a considerable portion of his time finishing an Arabic catalogue for the Bodleian Library, a task left incomplete by his predecessor Alexander Nicoll. Pusey had studied Arabic intensively during his second trip to Germany in the hope that it would help him to understand Hebrew better, a view which he later considered misguided. This may be the only place in the ‘Lectures’ where Pusey brings his knowledge of Arabic to bear directly on the subject of types and prophecy: ‘And this analogy the more thoughtful of the Arabian poets have exultantly expressed by the phrase *lisan al-hal*, literally, “tongue of the condition”, i.e. “what each object expresses by being what it is”’. (L16) The contemporary Iranian scholar Nasrollah Pourjavady translates *lisan al-hal* as ‘the language of the state of being’. He describes it as a literary device ‘where nonhuman or inanimate objects’ speak through a silent language. *Lisan al-hal* is the kind of language where things *speak by being* what they are or whereby mystics speak through or from their mystical experience. When the created world glorifies the

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58 For the possible connection with Hooker, see Kirby 1998. See also Pusey 1853, 30, on the ‘orders and ranks of earthly polity’ which ‘proceed from Him and reflect Him’.
59 For a discussion of Pusey’s study of Arabic, and of the immense labour and scholarship required to complete the Arabic Catalogue, see Life, 96-7, 203-7, 323.
60 Pusey renders *lisan al-hal* in Arabic script.
61 For the importance of this literary device in Persian literature, see Pourjavady 2005.
Creator, for example, it does so in “lisan al-hal”, simply through being what it is.  

Pusey finds further testimony to the objective character of the moral meanings offered by the book of Nature in the agreement of different peoples and ages:

This reality is again attested by the universal agreement of all minds in all nations as to the meaning of certain appearances in nature. Thus a broken flower, as designating one untimely cut off; mown corn as manhood cut down; the course of a river as time; a bubble, as vanity; spring, as youth; winter as old age; and the like, will be found in every language, in every nation these analogies have been perceived and held to be true.  

Pusey argues also that ‘these religious meanings were not arbitrarily affixed by their own minds, but that they arose out of, and existed in, the things themselves.’ Pusey calls upon Isaac Williams and William Shakespeare to witness to the way in which natural objects speak. He says that ‘one great poet of nature exhibits a thoughtful character finding sermons in a stone’, a reference to As You Like It: ‘And this, our life, exempt from public haunt, finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, sermons in stones, and good in every thing.’ Pusey also refers to Isaac Williams describing how the whole of creation serves as a mirror which reflects eternal things, and how each object becomes ‘a speaking sign’:

As evening clouds oft shadow things of earth.
Obscure and transient, yet as by they sail,
There the full heart reads many a solemn tale;
Each object seen becomes a speaking sign.
Which with a finger points to things divine,
A mirror wherein things celestial pass.
Eternity discerned as in a glass.

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62 I am grateful for the description in these last two sentences to Dr Alexander Treiger, Assistant Professor, Religious Studies at Dalhousie University, Halifax.
63 S-FTL, 13. The beginning of this text follows the ‘Lectures’, then it diverges.
64 S-FTL, 13.
65 S-FTL, 17.
66 Williams 1846, 225 quoted in S-FTL, 14.
Williams evokes here the conception of the world or time as a ‘moving image of eternity’. Pusey maintains that not only particular works, but processes or change in the created world can serve as types of spiritual realities:

How strange, as bearing on the depth of the mystery of man’s Redemption, that law of vegetable nature inculcated by our Lord Himself, that life is through death! ‘Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it brings forth much fruit (John 12:24).’ (L135)

In all these ways, the ‘creatures of God’s Word and the efflux of his Spirit, do, in fact, present a continual harmony with an order of things above them’. (L14) This view reflects not only the way the best of the Greek philosophers, ‘high spirits of old’, discerned ‘Streaks of a brighter heaven’ behind the ‘murky blind’ of the book of Nature, but more importantly, in Pusey’s account, the teaching ‘inculcated by our Lord Himself’ about the relation of the lower and higher world: ‘It is our Lord’s own parable, the grain of mustard-seed which is again Himself’. (L135)

6.3.2 The Poet as a Moral Philosopher

Pusey’s comprehensive theory of type is also displayed in the way that he describes the interpretation of the book of nature by religious poets in the same terms as he describes the interpretation of Scripture. These poets discern the religious element in the typical prophecy of the natural world: ‘the province of the true poet has been not to invent likenesses, but to trace out the analogies, which are actually impressed upon the creation. He is, (so to speak) the moral philosopher, or again the historian of the moral character of nature.’ (L15)

Poets who discover the God-given language of nature are not simply creating works of fiction, they are moral philosophers who perceive what the Archetype teaches through analogies with the natural world: ‘when religious poets (as Wordsworth or the author of the Christian Year) have traced out such correspondence, the mind instantly recognises it as true, not as beautiful only and so not belonging to their minds subjectively, but as actually and really

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67 For a brief discussion of this idea in Plato’s Timaeus and in Hooker’s Laws, see Kirby 1998 55 and 64.
68 S-FTL, 4, quoting Xn.Yr., ‘Fourth Sunday after Trinity’.
existing (objective)’. (L16-17) Keble himself also describes the poet as a kind of divine in his *Lectures on Poetry* (1832-41):

> For, once let that magic wand, as the phrase goes, touch any region of Nature, forthwith all that before seemed secular and profane is illumined with a new and celestial light: men come to realize that the various images and similes of things, and all other poetic charms, are not merely the play of a keen and clever mind, nor to be put down as empty fancies: but rather they guide us by gentle hints and no uncertain signs, to the very utterances of Nature, or we may more truly say, of the Author of Nature. And thus it has come to pass, the great and pre-eminent poets have also been ranked as representatives of religion, and their sphere has been treated with religious reverence.

Not only do the book of God’s works and the book of God’s words reveal the same thing, they must also be read in the same way, not stopping at the plain or superficial sense, but looking for the deep things waiting to be uncovered: ‘in deciphering Nature’s outspread pages, just as a superficial meaning of any deeper passage will present itself at the first glance, it is on reflection, then in different degrees, that its further bearings are discovered’. When these further bearings are traced out, it will be found that they lead to Christ. Pusey refers to Williams again: ‘Wisdom’s self descending from the sky | Shall train thy heart to glad philosophy | And Christ Himself upon the way appears, | In things of Heaven to school thine eyes and ears’.

Furthermore, it is what is divine in the interpreter or poet which discerns the spiritual character of nature: ‘Hence too those whose office has been in any degree to read it, have even, which in any degree true to their office, been accounted to have something Divine, to speak by an inspiration of God, and have been the moral teachers of their people’. In the dedication of his *Lectures on Poetry*, Keble describes Wordsworth in these terms as a ‘true philosopher and inspired poet who by the special gift and calling of Almighty

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69 Pusey refers to *Xn.Yr.*, ‘First Sunday after Epiphany’: ‘Every leaf in every nook | Every wave in every brook | Chanting with a solemn voice | Minds us of our better choice | Shall I call ye sense or learning, | Instinct pure, or Heaven-taught art?’

70 Keble 1912, ii, 481. See also S-FTL, 13: ‘few can see them although when once pointed out, they are acknowledged by all’.

71 S-FTL, 13.

72 S-FTL, 14, referring to Williams 1846, 225.

73 S-BN, 1.
God whether he sang of man or of nature failed not to lift up men’s hearts to holy things. 74

Like reading the book of God’s Word, reading the book of nature comes with a kind of trial. The temper of mind which despises small things and ‘will not bend itself to the lowly portal … which in Naaman, despises slight visible means, or in Saul, slight shades of duty, or with Gallio ‘questions of words and names (Acts 18:12-15)’ will not be able to see ‘tokens of Him in every foot-track of His Providence, each work of His Hands’. 75 Once again, Pusey makes the failure to discern the meaning of types an example of the gravest forms of biblical disobedience or faithlessness. Careful attention to nature helps the soul to ‘bend itself to the lowly portal’; it is a means of sanctification. The knowledge which the book of nature imparts is also a moral knowledge: ‘Again, all of a right moral character can read something of nature’s meaning’. 76 The principle that ‘like knows like’, applies to reading the book of God’s works as well as the book of God’s words:

With this Divine character of nature it corresponds, that its book is best read by the purest and most divine. In it too ‘the pure in heart see God’. To the worldly or sensual it is a sealed book. What is Divine in it can be read only by what is Divine in man. To those of the earth, it is earthly; the Spirit in man deciphers to man what is spiritual in nature. 77

As we saw above, for Pusey, ‘the book of Nature’ offers a ‘Poetry of Metaphysics’. (L17) Geoffrey Rowell stresses the poetic character of the theology of the Oxford Movement: ‘It is no accident that Keble, Newman and Isaac Williams were all poets; or that Keble’s earliest and most famous work is The Christian Year (1827), the whole purpose of which is to set out in poetry some of the major themes of the Christian festivals and services.’ 78 While Pusey was not a poet, he also suggests that emphasizing the typical character of the Old Testament means emphasizing its ‘more poetical or imaginative and

74 Keble 1912.
75 S-EL, 7.
76 S-FTL 13.
77 S-BN, 1. See also L16: ‘nature convey[s] instruction to the soul … in stronger proportion to the purity of each’.
78 Rowell 1999, 112. See also Härdelin 1965, 63.
mystical character’. (L11) The poetry of type is God-given, part of the character of revelation in Scripture and in Nature.

6.3.3 Diversity of Meaning and Minuteness of Sense

Pusey’s account of creation as an efflux which is spoken by God in word and in work offers a theological grounding to elements of his theory of type which were discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The argument that divine attributes are manifest in different ways in the works of nature, in people, in animals, in objects, or in sayings, explains Pusey’s understanding of the multiple meanings or senses of typical prophecy. Having set out the principle of analogy by which all created things are related to one another due to their common origin, Pusey makes this principle the basis for the interpretation of Scripture:

Thus, further, in the interpretation of Holy Scripture itself, several important principles are involved in this reality and minuteness of the relation of things, words and persons to others, higher or lower than themselves. 1) Since this relation is inherent in the things themselves, it will be present, wherever that occurs in which it is embodied; i.e. the symbol is significant in itself, antecedent to the consideration of the context or circumstance in which it is found. 2) Since things possessing these relations are thus various, and different things or persons possess the same qualities in different degrees, each will have not one only but various relations and stand in different degrees of nearness to the rest, according as they possess more or less of this same quality. Hence, prophecy will have not only a double, but a manifold sense and fulfilment.79

These principles apply to typical words or sayings as well as to typical things or people: ‘One might even say that no deep saying was ever uttered which was not capable of many applications and a variety of meanings, which might very possibly float before our mind together or severally, of which one remains the highest and of that one the rest are fainter and inferior representations.’ (L19) Since different qualities are evident in different degrees in people or the words they speak, in the types of Scripture and nature, there are many possible connections or references:

79 S-FTL, 5.
So full are all things of manifold meaning; words or actions, things in nature or art; human characters or events; singly or together, with simple reference or of complex significance, all has a varied meaning; represent each other, or the lower the higher and the higher a higher still; yet all knit together and thereby attesting themselves of one great family.\textsuperscript{80}

We see here again the way in which Pusey connects his theory of types with a hierarchical view of nature (material and immaterial) joined ‘as by a ladder’ (L18, above) or knit together in a great chain of being. In a section of the supplemental material where he elaborates his understanding of the analogy between the ‘the physical structure of all constructed things’ and their ‘moral significancy’ (L15, above), he describes this chain or ladder in terms both of the connection of the highest and lowest, and in terms of time, the beginning and the end:

… so that while each in a degree reflects the highest, yet each is significant also of those immediately above it, and nature images man’s moral nature, and man retains some image of God (and thereby some traces of the truth and its wiser minds were illumined by it, to mitigate the darkness), and Heathenism preserves some echoes of Paradise and shadows out, in parts, the older dispensation, and the Jewish, both in outline and depth of shadow, though both indistinctly, portrays the Christian Church, and the Christian Church the Church triumphant, and earth Heaven, wherewith in Christ it is already knit together in one.\textsuperscript{81}

The replacement of this theological, organic, and substantial idea with a more mechanistic approach both to Scripture and to creation is part of Pusey’s criticism of rationalism and the Spirit of the Age.\textsuperscript{82}

As created things express divine attributes in different ways, the same type can express different meanings: ‘and if a different meaning is found in the same object, this will be, because in fact each thing contains several such relations, or has several such characters impressed upon it, whereof according to their peculiar character or susceptibility, different minds have perceived

\textsuperscript{80} S-FTL, 9. These reflections may have been prompted by Keble’s question as to whether Pusey was ‘against a double sense’. See Keble to Pusey, 14 Nov. 1836, LBV-97.

\textsuperscript{81} S-FTL, 9. The words that precede this quotation are identical with L15, quoted above, incorporating also the reference to the ‘ladder’ from L18, also quoted above.

\textsuperscript{82} See Kirby 1998, 62 n. 8, for Hooker as a witness to the idea of the ‘chain of being’. See Taylor 2007, 323-4, 353, for the loss of this idea and its sacramental view of nature in the modern period, the ‘Secular Age’.
different sides’. (L16) The way in which a lion can represent different kinds of greatness, great good or great evil, is an example of this principle: ‘Hence a lion in that it has uncontrollable passions is an emblem of the Enemy of souls; in that it has a royal might, the Lion of the tribe of Judah is our Lord’. (L136)83

With the help of Tertullian, Pusey also considers the different ways birds serve as types in the Bible:

Again, how the same object, in different relations, has altogether a different aspect. ‘The bird escaped out of the snare of the fowler’, is an image of the soul free from Satan’s enthralments; soaring aloft. And as Tertullian notices, borne on the form of the cross, of faith mounting heavenwards; the same birds bent downwards and gathering up the good seed sown, of evil spirits; in their untoiling ways, ‘they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns’, of unanxious reliance on God’s Providence; lodging and living among (Psalm 104:12) the branches of that which God had planted, of the thankful praising refrain of the nations from every side within the Church; the Eagle again of contemplating faith which gazes or the Sun of Righteousness.84

These examples show what Pusey means when he writes that the Fathers, ‘(unlike our dry, hard way of treating things) had the several bearings of the same subjects continually in their mind and passed rapidly from the one to the other’. (L117-118) His description of the mutual relations of all things to God and to one another through the divine qualities imparted to them offers the principle which gives a theological grounding to this observation.

Pusey describes the different fulfilments of prophecy in terms of perspective; types have ‘a nearer and a background’. The description evokes the stained glass of Abraham van Ligne (fl. 1623-42). Some of his windows present Old Testament stories in a single light or pane, where chronology is represented by perspective, with different parts of the story in the foreground or background. So, for example, in the typological east window (1631) at Lincoln College Chapel, Oxford, Elijah’s ascension in a flaming chariot (2 Kgs 2:11), his disciple Elisha’s parting the river Jordan (v. 13), and Elisha’s

83 See 1 Pet. 5:6, Rev. 5:5, Gen. 49:9.
84 S-FTL, 8. See Tertullian 1842, ‘Of Prayer’, § 29, 321: ‘Nay, even the birds, now as they soar, lift up themselves to Heaven, and stretch out the cross of their wings for hands, and utter somewhat, which may seem a prayer’. Pusey wrote the preface to this volume.
encounter with the youth who mocked him (vv. 23-4), are represented in the same pane or light like different frames of a film.\textsuperscript{85} The representation of events in time by their place in the background or foreground makes visual depth or perspective an analogy for chronology, adding a fourth dimension to the glass. Pusey uses such a visual image to explain the multiple fulfilsments of types in words:

This admission of degrees furnishes the very character of a type. It gives, as it were, a nearer and a background; a nearer to which the words might superficially appear to bear the closer resemblance, and a further and deeper to which, on account of their undefinedness they would correspond, and which in that it is deeper, does in fact more fully correspond with them. Thus, the same word nepeš-signifying ‘life’, ‘soul’, the words, ‘the waters are come in’ \textit{ʿad-nāpeš} [to neck/soul, Ps. 69:1] might be used of temporal danger, [but] their meaning is more fully expressed by one verse ‘even unto my soul’; thus ‘many say to my soul, there is no help for him in his God’ [Ps. 3:2], express that they ‘say it so as to reach the very soul’, say that as to his very life, temporal or spiritual, God has forsaken him … Again how varied the words napēšō \textit{bēṯōb tālīn} ‘his soul shall dwell in good’ [Ps. 25:13]; in their lowest sense, they may mean present rest of mind or estate, ‘his soul shall dwell at ease’; in their highest they mean, ‘that his soul shall dwell in Him that is “Good that is God”’ … amid the night of trouble should he rest and find refuge in God; and higher yet, yet describes Him “Who was with God and was God”, and “was in the bosom of His Father”.\textsuperscript{86}

The different fulfilsments of the types are like vignettes in Van Linge’s glass, manifesting different fulfilsments of the Archetype which belong together in the same story. Moreover, Pusey’s discussion of how divine attributes are communicated in different degrees and way pertains not only to typical things, but also to typical sayings and the attributes which words evoke. Types communicate by their place in foreground or background of the masterwork of God’s providence.

The view that ‘divine Creation must be the expression of something within God’ also provides theological explanation for Pusey’s emphasis on the

\textsuperscript{85} For Abraham van Ligne as connected with the Lincoln College Chapel glass, see Alexander Faludy, ‘Linge, Bernard van (b. 1598, d. in or after 1644)’, \textit{ODNB}. Other windows of this sort by Van Ligne can be found in the chapel of University College, Oxford.

\textsuperscript{86} S-EL, 1. See also L10.
significant character of the most minute details of a type.\textsuperscript{87} To authors like Thomas Horne, only ‘fanciful expositors’ find meaning in the number of the boards of the tabernacle.\textsuperscript{88} However, in his analysis of the typical character of numbers, Pusey connects these ‘10 boards and the length of each board 10 cubits’ (Exod. 26:18) with his consideration of the mystical meaning of ‘ten’: ‘the symbol of completion … “the perfect number, as comprising all numbers in itself” … an acknowledgement that all came from God and was due to Him’. (L160)\textsuperscript{89} For Pusey, the emphasis on the minuteness of meaning of Scriptural types is the working out of his understanding of creation as the offspring of God which is stamped by God and reflects God:

Only now we see the ground of what impresses itself on the simple mind as intuition. We seem to see that every thing, however minute, has a real meaning of its own; we know now that it must have it, because all is as it came from Him, or as it has been corrupted and has its meaning by virtue of one of those relations … For since the meaning is inherent, then it is present, wherever that occurs wherein it is embodied; and the minuteness of the significance of God’s works corresponds with and illustrates that of His word. There is an analogy between the minuteness of God’s Providence, which numbers the very hairs of our head and the cubits of our stature and counts our steps one by one, ordereth our goings, the allotment of our days, and the minuteness of significance in His ordinances, the fringes of the High Priest and the number of the boards of the tabernacle, in nature and in His word.\textsuperscript{90}

In the same way that all things have their being in the creative movement out of God, so are all things gathered together in the redemptive return to God. To deny the significance of even little details would be to suggest that they fall outside of God’s providential ordering.

It is worth noting that the arguments considered in this chapter draw especially on the material which Pusey wrote after he first gave the course of lectures on types and prophecy in 1836-7, i.e. in the later sections of the

\textsuperscript{87} S-BN, 1.
\textsuperscript{88} Intro., 615-616. For Horne, see 4.2.2.
\textsuperscript{89} The idea of the ‘perfect number’ may be a reference Hippolytus 1994, chapter 51, 45, where Hippolytus attributes this idea to Pythagoras of Samos (c. 570-495 BC).
\textsuperscript{90} S-EL, 7.
‘Lectures’ and in the supplemental material.\(^91\) He appears to have been probing for the principles which his observations or intuition, especially in the prolegomenon in the ‘Lectures’, had suggested. As he told Keble in the autumn of 1836, his ‘notions of types have been gradually expanding for a good many years’.\(^92\) His later work, in the supplemental material and later sections, brings to light these ideas. These principles connect Pusey’s theory of types with matters of cosmology, anthropology and epistemology.

6.4 The Longing of Creation

6.4.1 The Restoration of Defaced Types

Pusey’s account of the Fall fundamentally shapes how he describes types, and his account of redemption is always an account of how the meaning and promise of types are fulfilled. The work of redemption is the work of God directing what is marred or incomplete toward perfection. In the ‘Lectures’, Pusey does not explain how creation was affected by the Fall, the mechanism or the way by which human sin affected the whole created order. He assumes this, but his understanding of analogy suggests this connection. He emphasizes the inter-connectedness of things and suggests that nothing exists apart from moral categories or moral signification. Creation has moral signification built into it. A catastrophe in one part of the order or system of things reverberates to affect another. Pusey refers to Romans 8:20, ‘For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the same in hope’, to justify his view of both the corruption of nature and its inherent goodness:

Although then, the creation, being, against its will ‘been made subject to vanity’, that fuller likeness, which originally it bore, when ‘God saw every thing which He had made and behold it was very good’, is, in a measure, defaced, it is not effaced; as far as it has life and remains good, it retains the impress of God.\(^93\)

\(^91\) Supplemental material in ‘Types and Prophecies’ in ‘Pusey Papers: EBP Biblical MSS’.
\(^92\) Keble to Pusey, 14 Nov. 1836, in LBV 97. See also Life, 400.
\(^93\) S-BN, 1. See also L16. For a fuller consideration of Pusey’s understanding of both the subjection of creation to vanity and its restoration, see ‘Sermon XVII’, in Pusey 1883, 304-26.
For Pusey, understanding the significant character of all things means both recognizing the image of God in the book of his works and seeing how that image has been marred or corrupted:

This significance of the divine part of nature is forcefully illustrated by the contrasted meaning of that which is corrupt and debased. For thus is the significance of the whole contemplated. All nature is an image of good, or evil; good as far as it is an effluence of God, and retains His life, evil whencesoever it had pleased Him to withdraw Himself, or that curse extends, under which for men’s sin He laid the earth, and which implies the withholding of that influence, whereby all will be, as He made it, good. The same creation which, as far as it retains the moulding of His Hands represents Himself, does, as far as He has withdrawn Himself, represent that which is opposed to, or destitute of, Him. As far as it is destitute of Him, it is death; as far as it is a perversion, evil.94

Pusey offers the classic Augustinian account that evil does not have an independent existence but is rather a perversion or negation of the good.95

Insofar as a created thing continues to exist at all, continuing to bear some resemblance to its Creator, the image is effaced, not defaced. On the one hand, ‘the history of mankind, in general, is typical, far more than we even now understand’ (L25), while on the other, ‘being mostly the history of man’s sins, has in itself little of Divine meaning’.96 The image of God in humanity was most gravely marred by the Fall as having been both in the highest way ‘the image of God in this lower world’, and as the agents of the subjection of creation, human and non-human, to vanity. (L14) The Fall does not mean that creation became evil, but that the created world no longer offers images of its maker in so straightforward or transparent a way: ‘Nature although suffering through man’s fall, breathes more of Heaven than fallen man.’97 Pusey’s view of the Fall accounts, in part, for his view that types are necessarily veiled.

Pusey’s discussion of types includes a description not only of how the image of God has been defaced in his offspring, but of how that image will be restored. Even in what is debased or sinful one discerns the image of God, and

94 S-BN, 3.
95 See, for example, Augustine, On Free Will, 3.1.1.
96 S-FTL, 11.
97 S-FTL, 12.
the image in all created types, however marred, longs for the Archetype. Comparing the Christian sacrifice of the Eucharist with the sacrifices which the Jews offered, Pusey describes the hope for the perfect fulfilment of the sacrificial types of the Old and the New Covenants: ‘And ours have their longing expectation too; only, until they be fulfilled, i.e. filled up completely by the presence of Him whom they fore shadow; for ours also fill up a period of looking-onward, until a greater glory be revealed’. (L123) Even those types which are tainted by human sin display this expectation: ‘For, one may say, all things debased are not inventions, but spurious imitations of the truth. “Souls” says St Augustine, (de Trin. XI.5.8), “in their very sins seek but a sort of likeness of God, in a proud and perverted and so to say slavish freedom”. Pusey illustrates this idea from Augustine’s Confessions, arguing that the ‘tendernesses of the wanton’ do not only imitate love but seek genuine love. Pusey’s argument that there is no place to retire from God means that all things are caught up in this movement which is a movement toward the unity of God: ‘What is imperfect, in God’s world, in itself tends to and prophesies of what is perfect. Every thing is tending somewhither, and by its tendency, force, tells that whither it is tending. Imperfect good, by its very existence, speaks of its completion somewhere; growing evil of its consummation.

Pusey offers a typological account of redemption, arguing that the evidence of divine qualities even in human sins shows that nothing falls outside of the movement of creation and redemption. Again, he draws on Augustine:

And thus the Unity of God in attested even by this perversion of His gifts, ‘Even by thus imitating Thee, they imply Thee to be the Creator of all nature; whence there is no place whither altogether to retire from Thee.’ Amid apparent confusion there is a higher Unity, since things in their distortion preserve the trace of the original; in their abuse their use; in their counterfeit their first image.

98 S-BN, 3.
100 S-FTL, 10.
In Pusey’s account, the movement from the plain sense of a scriptural or natural type through the different kinds of meaning, typical or allegorical or moral, to the fulfilment or perfection of the type in an eschatological sense mirrors the longing of creation for its creator and the image of God, in humanity and in all created things, for the Archetype. Again, he calls on Keble as a witness to this longing:

In the words of a Christian poet:
It was not then a poet’s dream…
Which bids us see in heaven and earth,
In all fair things around,
Strong yearnings for a blest new birth.
With sinless glories crown’d;
Which bids us hear …
In the low chant of wakeful birds,
In the deep weltering flood,
In whispering leaves, these solemn words–
‘God made us all for good.’

According to Pusey, ‘Sacred history is the key to profane. The veil is there raised, which ordinarily covers the connexion of events with God, their First Cause, and the meaning and significance of those events in themselves and their relations with each other.’ (L25) With that assistance, one may discern signs of these ‘strong yearnings for a blest new birth’ in all people in all ages, but especially in Israel:

The kingdoms of the world shadowed out the world and its never-ceasing distinction of good and evil; the people of Israel shadowed out besides, the kingdom of Christ. It existed for the future; yea the better among them in the future. And as in their degree, the whole race of men since the fall, as many as lost not the traces of their first estate, were ‘viri desideriorum’ men of longing, men of the future, looking forward to the completion of the primaeval Gospel; and thus themselves calculated to be images of the future. (L26)

This desire of God’s people reflects the desire of the type to return to the Archetype.

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102 Xn. Yr., ‘Fourth Sunday after Trinity’.
103 Pusey appears to be developing Tholuck’s description of this longing in the people of Israel. See Diss., 190.
Pusey’s account unites the first stirrings of the hope for ‘the completion of the primaevul Gospel’ with its completion. He connects the promise that the seed of the woman will bruise the serpent’s head (Gen. 3:15) with all the partial fulfilsments of the hope in various deliverers of the Old Testament, with the Christ’s victory won for himself and for his body, with the perfect fulfilment of the type in eternity:

This first promise, then, contained in its compass the whole Gospel: the whole history of Redemption is involved in it, it reaches from the gates of Paradise, within which it was uttered, to the final consummation of all things at the coming of our Lord, when death and hell shall be cast into the lake of fire: all other subsequent more definite prophecies are but a supplementary of it, filling out the one or other part of its outline. (L45)

In Pusey’s account, the end is there in the beginning.

In a similar way, Pusey maintains that we not only look forward to ‘the sinless Paradis, our Zion of eternal and heavenly blessedness’, but we remember it: ‘yet is it Jerusalem and the Lord’s song, which we remember’. (L131) Evoking William Wordsworth’s ‘Intimations of Immortality’, Pusey associates this remembering with the knowledge of a child, ‘so lately come from its Maker’s hand’. (L14, M21) In Wordsworth’s words, ‘Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting … But trailing clouds of glory do we come | From God, who is our home’. What the child remembers is what was first written in the book of eternal wisdom before it was in some sense engraven in his mind.¹⁰⁴

The idea that what we know is a kind of remembering what God has imparted to the soul fits with the scheme by which the end toward which both creation and the meaning of all types tend is also a restoration. Discerning the meaning of typical prophecy involves seeing the origin of all things in God as well as their unity in Him. The future entrance into the land of the living is both a

¹⁰⁴ For a consideration of the Romantic adaption of the Platonic understanding of anamnesis, see Newsome 1974, 25-40 and for Wordsworth’s Ode, p. 26 (for this idea in Keble, see Xs.Yr., ‘Third Sunday in Lent’). Newsome considers the significance of this idea for Schleiermacher as well as for Wordsworth and Coleridge, and the child as a representative of an ideal of knowledge with many resemblances to Pusey’s account: ‘Its sense of wonder, its capacity to marvel, and – above all – its recognition of the wholeness of things, or its intuitive perception of the one behind the many’ (p. 32). For the wisdom of a child praised in the High Church tradition, see Nockles 1994, 203.
return and a progression toward a new creation which is the result of the work of Christ in time and from eternity.

The period of longing for this return is not something that is over and past. According to the mystery of Christ, the words which were shaped by the Spirit to speak of the Son’s first coming are given to the Church to enable her to pray and seek for His second coming: ‘Whom in His first Advent, they thus looked for, longed for, prayed for, fainted for, we, using their words confess what we look for in His second, when to those who look for Him, He, our Salvation shall appear without sin unto salvation.’ (L136) The longing of the saints of the Old Testament is a type of the longing of the saints of the New for the perfect fulfilment of the eternal Day. In one sense, the words of the Psalmist, ‘so shall I live and keep thy words’ can speak to us of life in the present, life in communion with the Risen Christ. In another sense, Pusey notes that the Psalmist speaks ‘not in the present but in the future’. (L130) Drawing on the image of ‘dwelling in a house’ that we considered in Chapter 3, Pusey says that the true Christian knows himself to be living as a pilgrim waiting to inhabit an eternal dwelling in the ‘Zion of eternal and heavenly blessedness’: ‘Then, since that is our house, here we are but strangers … words which speak of our “going forth” and “entering in” most fully relate to our “going forth” from the body (Ps. 121.8) and this world and entering into Paradise.’ (L131) In this restored and redeemed order, all types are fulfilled and become superfluous: ‘and then shall our images be swept away, when sight succeeds to the reflection in the mirror as were their shadows by the first coming of Him, the Substance’. (L123)

6.4.2 The Necessary Imperfection and Death of Types

The search for the meaning of the type is part of the way by which we live out this longing for union with God which is both a present reality and something to be fulfilled. For Pusey, the longing of creation, human and non-human, is intrinsically connected with the idea that the type seeks or longs for the Archetype. In Pusey’s account, the incompleteness or imperfection of the type both reveals the insufficiency of all that is not God to satisfy human hope and expectation, and also stirs up the longing which is both a search for salvation
and for the meaning which exhausts the sense of the type. Therefore, Pusey’s view of the necessity of type is also a theory of the necessary incompleteness of any one type. It is only in the combination of type that the imperfect can represent the perfect: ‘Thus things imperfect were blended together in order that they might represent that which was perfect; lest the shadow should have too much honour’. (L125) Different types figure different aspects or qualities of the Archetype; only God can contain the perfection of all qualities. Pusey illustrates this idea by considering how, for example, Moses and Joshua serve as types of Christ. Each of them is inadequate to prophesy Christ in his fullness – one prophesies the cross, the other Christ’s name and victory:

Justin Martyr says of Moses and Joshua, ‘one of them stretching out his hands remained on the hill until evening, his hands being borne up, which exhibits no other figure than that of the cross; but he who was made to bear the name of Jesus, began the battle and has prevailed, but it may be observed that this took place through both those holy men and prophets of God united because one of them was not equal to support both mysteries, the image of the Cross and the bearing of the Name. For this right is and was and shall be that of One alone, whose Name also all principalities and powers fear, dreading to be destroyed by them’. (L125)\(^{105}\)

However, even the cross alone is so great a mystery that Moses is not sufficient to represent it by himself, but only with the assistance of Aaron and Hur (Exod. 17:12). Pusey quotes Chrysostom, ‘And again on Mount Sinai when Amalech warred with the Hebrews the hands of Moses were steadied, being supported by Aaron and Hur standing on either side; but Christ when He had come, Himself by Himself stretching forth His hands held them out on the Cross.’ (L32)\(^{106}\) That different types represent different elements of the great mysteries of faith arises from the inadequacy of human language to render these great spiritual truths. While this introduces an element of uncertainty, the search for clarity here would lead to an apologetic or evidentialist foreclosure on the truth; in becoming clear, we would also become shallow.

\(^{105}\) See Justin Martyr 1861, *Dialogue with Trypho*, § 111, 208.

The other part of Pusey’s account of the necessary incompleteness of the type is the way this incompleteness serves to fix our attention on our destination, ‘the sinless Paradise’. Compared to this reality, ‘our best praises are but songs in the night, melody in heaviness’. (L131) In the course of his treatment on numerology, Pusey discusses the character of imagery more generally. Although he describes the imperfection of types partly by the Fall and sin, he dwells more on the distinction between God and anything created, and on the way in which the same qualities which renders types capable of mediating between the eternal and the temporal also make them inadequate to fully express or symbolize God and heavenly realities:

For in all imagery, however perfect, there must not only be a falling-short of expressing spiritual things, but, in part, an actual inappropriateness, as in all comparison … They ‘prophesy in part’ only. All things, which are like, are unlike also, else they would be not like only, but the same … nature, besides that, as being finite and material, it can but inadequately express the Infinite and Spiritual, partakes also of the effects of man’s fall, and hath on it the sentence and trace of decay and fleshyness, which unfits it for picturing the perfect and abiding. It images forth the Object of love, but because it too is lowly as reflecting Him, it bears on it the marks of imperfection and transitoriness, lest we transfer to it the love and reverence, due to our One Creator Alone. In St Augustine’s language, ‘hushed’ be ‘the images of earth, and waters and air, hushed also the poles of heaven, hushed – every tongue and every sign, and whatever exists in transition, since, if any could hear, all these say, “We made not ourselves but He made us that abideth for ever.”’ – Hushed be they having roused only our ears to Him who made them, and He Alone speak.”

Pusey argues that the imperfections which disqualify some types in the apologetic approach to prophecy have a teaching office, demonstrating that the object of faith and hope is beyond all earthly things. The images, the works of God, are a kind of speech, but in order to say what they mean, they must fall silent. Andrew Louth’s description of the importance of the principle of ‘reserve’ in the ‘Lectures’, of Scripture’s ‘tendency to conceal’ as well as

107 Pusey quotes Augustine’s Confessions, IX.10.25, where Augustine describes his vision at Ostia. Talking with his mother, they ‘did by degrees pass through all things bodily … [to] arrive at that region of never-failing plenty … where life is the Wisdom by whom all these things are made’ (Ibid. IX.24).
reveal, also points to this kind of apophatic moment: ‘What is expressed in Scripture is veiled by reserve, surrounded (to use a phrase of Vladimir Lossky’s) by a ‘margin of silence’.

The typological displacement of attention does not only address the mind by teaching us what to value most, it also has a sanctifying effect by transferring our desire from earthly to heavenly things. Rowan Williams describes this divine purpose in the necessary imperfection of type in his analysis of Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine:

The Word incarnate and crucified represents the absence and deferral that is basic to signum as such, and represents also, crucially, the fact that absence and deferral are the means whereby God engages our desire so that it is freed from its own pull towards finishing, towards presence and possession.

We saw above that Pusey describes the deferred fulfilment in terms of ‘possession’. (L123, above) Speaking of Christ, Williams’ idea also mirrors that of Lossky, ‘He is God’s speech because he is worldly “silence”’. In a similar manner as Pusey had described the Old Testament, as having ‘no form or comeliness’, yet still being the ‘living and true Body, which it hath pleased God to take’ (L24), Williams suggests that signs, like the Incarnate God, are present in the world ‘in death, in weakness, inactivity, negation, the infirma divinitas of Confessions VII.18’. In order to release their saving efficacy, the types of the Bible need to undergo a kind of death which parallels the death of Christ and which enacts the believer’s death to creaturely attachments: ‘Cross and resurrection, to which all scriptural signs lead us, free us once and for all from the threat of an idolatry of signs. They are both inescapable and provisional.’

Pusey makes the same point, arguing that types are only shadows of a ‘Heavenly rest and pure delight’ which warn us by fading away.

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108 Louth 1984, 37. For ‘reserve’ as the ‘tendency to conceal’, see T80, 3.
110 Ibid. 144.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid. 148.
‘that they and our earthly existence are alike shadows, that not they, but He whom they represent is our rest’. (L151)  

6.4.3 The Real Life to which Types Lead

While Pusey maintains that types only inadequately symbolize the substance which they figure, Pusey uses the language of typical prophecy in the Psalms to describe the eternal realities which are both their fullest sense and the destination of our redemptive return to God. As we have seen already, the spiritual or eternal world is a more real world, a world with more substance, than the world which is accessible to empirical or historical investigation:

All life is typical and an efflux of real life, and so our shadowy life, as opposed to death, is an emblem of endless life. Yet our days are not really here, but there: ‘the land of the living’ is not this land of darkness and gloominess. But where light and life are one is the Source of both. (L130)

Pusey expresses here a form of the fundamental Platonic idea that ‘this world we perceive through the senses and about which we hold a variety of opinions, is the not the real world’.  

At the same time, to appreciate Pusey’s account, it is helpful to have in mind what Hort said of Coleridge, that he did not look upon the world of sense, ‘trees and rocks, as so many empty phantoms’. Rather, ‘the visible world was most thoroughly substantial to him, because he believed it to be sustained by an unseen world’. In Pusey’s terms, ‘every thing which is good is an efflux of God’. (L16)

Considering expressions relating to ‘sleeping’ and ‘waking’ in the Psalms, Pusey finds typical prophecies of an ‘Awaking’ which is more real and permanent than what we know in the present:

‘Sleeping’ and ‘awakening’ being then the daily image of death and Resurrection, and ‘sleep’ having been in the New Testament consecrated as the very title of death, ‘awaking’ of the bursting of the sleep of the grave, then Psalms which speak of ‘awaking’ will, in their highest meaning, belong to The Awaking. (L129)

113 Pusey quotes Williams 1846, ‘Image the First’, 12 (‘Heavenly rest and pure delight’).
114 Louth 1994, 54.
115 Hort 1856, 334. See also Hedley 2000, 129.
‘The Awaking’ here refers in its first sense to the Resurrection of Christ, and secondarily to the resurrection of each Christian in Christ. While the Christian has already been raised with Christ, a full sharing in that resurrection is still future. Pusey describes ‘the Awaking’ as the time when the image of God in humanity will be perfected. Commenting on Psalm 17:15, ‘As for me, I will behold thy face in righteousness: I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with thy likeness’, Pusey writes: ‘according to the fullness of the Hebrew meaning, awakening as the image of God, he shall be filled with it; filled with it, he should be himself again that image’. (L129) Pusey finds the fullest sense of this verse expressed better in the translation of the Book of Common Prayer where, ‘it is happily rendered … “when I awake up, after Thy likeness”’. (L129) This translation emphasizes that the likeness cannot be external to the one who enjoys it. The true Awaking comes not from merely beholding God more openly, but by becoming like what we behold in the sense of 1 John 3:2, ‘we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is’, or ‘after thy likeness’. Pusey’s description also emphasizes that the promise of salvation is fulfilled in a perfect participation in the Godhead. This is what it means to be ‘filled with’ the image of God, to be filled with the substance which belongs to the Archetype. In like manner, Pusey describes the eternal separation of the saved and the lost in terms of the image not being filled up, and so remaining a shadow even after the day has dawned and the eternal morning has come. The Psalms prophesy of those ‘who shall awaken to shame and everlasting contempt; “as a dream, when one awaketh, shall Thou, O Lord, in The Awakening, despise their image”, their shadowy being, which, as devoid of God, was a vain unreal shew’. (L129)

By way of analogy with the full meaning of Awaking, Pusey argues that expressions in the Psalms about the ‘Morning’ prophesy the morning of the resurrection of Christ and of the Christian’s resurrection in Him.116 At the

116 L129: ‘Since sleep is an image and name of death, waking of the Resurrection, the words “I laid Me down and slept; I awaked, for the Lord sustained Me”, (Ps. 3:5) most fully speak of His Resurrection which alone is past, as those of the next Psalm, “I will both lay me down in peace, and sleep: for thou, Lord, only makest me dwell in safety” (Ps. 4:8) which say nearly the same in the future, express most fully our hope of ours in Him.’
Awaking, the promise which is enjoyed in some degree already will become a perfect possession: “The morning” is that which shall have no evening, when the sun shall no more go down, the Morning of the One Day of Eternity.’ (L129) Pusey describes how this Morning is distinct from all the partial fulfilments of the prophecy:

… when he says, ‘I shall sing of thy might, I shall sing joyously of Thy passion in The Morning, for Thou hast been a fortress for me, a place to flee unto, in the day of my trouble’, [Ps. 59:16] he speaks of one endless hymn of praise, when the troubles and temptations and assaults of this life [are] over … the Morning, when the night of this world shall have passed away, the Morning, when we fear no longer the besettings of sorrow, and of the devil and his angels; the Morning, when we wake no more by the light of prophecy, but contemplate the Word of God Himself our Sun. (L130)

Referring to Augustine’s commentary on Psalm 90:15, ‘We are satisfied with Thy mercy in the morning’, Pusey emphasizes that this satisfaction fulfils the longing of humankind for presence and possession which is also the longing for the full meaning of the type:

… when they who hunger and thirst after righteousness shall be satisfied, compared with which all fullness now is but emptiness, when ‘Thou shalt make me full of joy with thy Countenance’, when He shall show us the Father and it shall suffice us, Which until it be accomplished, no good sufficeth us, nor ought to suffice us, lest our longing stop short in the way, which must be stretched forth until it attain. (L130) 117

There is an important connection between the fulfilment of human longing in the eternal morning, and the principle of typology. The types which can only be read with a sanctified mind are fulfilled when righteousness is joined with the vision of God which is communion with God. Likewise, the prophecy of the eternal Morning and Endless Day is a prophecy of the restored unity of the redeemed created order which has returned to God. Reading the Old Testament typically means seeing the relationship of the events, people, words, and institutions of the Old Covenant not simply to the New, but to the end which gives them the fullest sense which completes and perfects all the meaning of

117 Pusey quotes Augustine 1850, on Ps. 90 § 15, 279, referring also to Acts 2:28 which quotes Ps. 16:11 in the LXX version.
types and typical prophecy: ‘that God would be all in all things, then all good
would find its end and perfection in Him, being complete and perfected in
Him’. One again we see that Pusey offers a typological account not only of
the reading of the Old Testament, but also of creation, sanctification, and of
redemption, according to principles which one can trace up to the Trinitarian
being of God.

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118 S-FTL10.
Chapter 7 The Triple-Cord and the High Church Tradition

7.1 The Soil from which the Oxford Movement Grew

7.1.1 The Triple Cord

It is not generally appreciated that in the early and most creative years of the Oxford Movement, the sort of typological and allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures that one finds in the Fathers occupied not only Pusey, but also Newman and Keble. Newman’s *Arians of the Fourth Century* (1833) and Keble’s Tract 89, ‘On the Mysticism attributed to the Early Fathers of the Church’ (1841) serve as book-ends to a period during which Pusey, Keble, and Newman, as well as those who worked with them, wrote and lectured on the importance of allegorical or typological interpretations of the Scriptures. This investigation involved not only a description of typology or allegory, but a consideration of the principles which were implied and embodied in this practice. Pusey wrote the ‘Lectures’ in the context of this common project, a project which served as the soil from which grew the fundamental ideas of the Oxford Movement. The extent to which this work was a shared endeavour serves as another kind of witness to the necessity of typical interpretation for Pusey and also reveals the importance of this idea in the Oxford Movement.

At the time the ‘Lectures’ were written and delivered, Pusey, Keble, and Newman were working so closely together that it is often hard to distinguish their ideas or to know who was influencing whom, particularly on the subject of typological, allegorical or mystical interpretation.¹ They all emphasized the necessary connection between holy living and interpreting the Bible, and criticised the evidential theology of the previous century: ‘The last century, a time when love was cold, is noted as being especially the Age of Evidences’.² At the same time, their approach to patristic interpretation displays different

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¹ Allchin 1967, 52. Seynaeve 1953, 221, quotes Newman’s correspondence showing that during the early to mid-1830s he was working out Keble’s convictions as much as his own.
emphases. In the ‘Lectures’, Pusey the Professor of Hebrew focuses more than do Newman and Keble on a close reading of the text as well as investigating Jewish interpretations of the passages which he examines. Also, the way his encounter with German rationalism guides both his criticisms of the apologetic school and his advocacy of patristic interpretation, distinguished his approach from that of his colleagues. Pusey avoids the adjective ‘allegorical’ to describe the Fathers’ approach, whereas Keble and Newman use the term more freely. In his book on the Arians, Newman considers in more detail than does Pusey the connections between different kinds of interpretation and orthodox or heretical forms of belief. Keble the Professor of Poetry addresses the poetical elements of mystical interpretation.

We can see the way in which the ‘Lectures’ were part of a shared project in correspondence between Keble and Pusey during the winter of 1837. A fortnight before Pusey resumed his course of lectures on types and prophecies at the beginning of the Lent Term that year, Keble writes to Pusey about the paper, ‘On the Mysticism imputed to Early Christian Writers’, which he was preparing to give to the Theological Society which met in Pusey’s lodgings at Christ Church. The eight papers which Keble presented on the typical interpretations of the Fathers over the next four years formed the basis of his Tract 89, ‘On the Mysticism attributed to the Early Fathers of the Church’ (1841). Keble writes: ‘I have had a little scruple, from the thought that whatever I might say well I should only be going over the ground which you have been and are handling more considerately and better’. His letter emphasizes his unity of purpose with Pusey – it is ‘good to have two or three independent witnesses to the same truth’. On Easter Tuesday, two months later, Keble tells Pusey that he is working on ‘the continuation of the Paper on the Fathers’: ‘The subject, I think, will be the Limitation of the Figurative Interpretation as received by them: as that it did not trench on [encroach upon]...

3 See, for example, Thomas 1991, 109-11, 165-170.
4 See for example Keble 1912, ii, 481, quoted below.
6 Keble to Pusey, 18 Jan. 1837, LBV-97.
the Letter – that it does not affect the Ethics of the Old Testament in such cases as, e.g., the history of Lot & c. [etc.]. Referring to another idea we have already considered, he tells Pusey that he will also address the origin of ‘Figurative interpretation’, and show ‘that it cannot be accounted for as an accommodation to the Rabbis, or the Platonists and c. [etc.]’ In the same letter, he also praises Newman’s ‘Lectures on the Rule of Faith’. He appears to refer to one or more of the latter lectures in Newman’s Lectures on the Prophetic Office of the Church (1837). While Newman’s Lectures do not have as their primary subject the mystical or typological reading of Scripture, Newman puts forward ideas common to both Keble’s papers on ‘Mysticism’ and Pusey’s ‘Lectures’. Newman speaks of the ‘emblematic actions’ and ‘typical miracles’ of ‘our Saviour’ and quotes Basil who advocates that we do not interpret these words and deeds ‘in a simple or carnal manner’, but rather ‘enter into the depths of His contemplation’ and ‘become a communicant in truths mystically delivered’. In his letter to Pusey, Keble comments that he wishes that he had seen Newman’s Lectures before writing a particular sermon. Keble’s letter indicates how much the three men were working together at the time. Keble writes to Pusey about the paper, ‘On the Mysticism imputed to Early Christian Writers’, that he was scheduled to give while Pusey was offering his course of lectures on typical interpretation. In the same letter, Keble expresses his keen interest in another series of lectures by Newman which touches on the same topic. These three works, Keble’s Tract 89, Pusey’s work on types, and Newman’s Lectures on the Prophetic Office, emerged from the shared study of the allegorical and typological interpretations of the early Church.

The way in which Pusey, Keble, and Newman worked together on the Library of the Fathers also shows how the ‘Lectures’ were part of a shared project and the importance of that project to the Oxford Movement. The idea of

7 Keble to Pusey, Easter Tuesday [28 March], 1837, LBV-97.
8 Newman 1839a. At the beginning of Lecture XI, ‘On Scripture as the Record of Faith’, Newman states that he will discuss in that lecture and the following two ‘what is sometimes called the Rule of Faith’. Newman dates the preface 24 Feb, 1837.
9 Lect. XII, ‘On Scripture as the Record of our Lord’s Teaching’, Newman 1839a, 358. See also his reference to the ‘hidden sense’. Lect. XIII, 398.
10 It is not clear to which sermon Keble refers here.
producing the Library of the Fathers seems to have taken ‘definite shape’ at a meeting between him and Newman on 24 August, 1836, i.e. the same period during which Pusey was preparing the ‘Lectures’. After that meeting Pusey’s letters to Newman ‘are full of the scheme’.11 A month later Pusey and Newman wrote to Keble to propose that he join them, a proposal to which Keble agreed.12 In his letter, Pusey draws on Ecclesiastes 4:12, ‘a threefold cord is not quickly broken’, to describe their common purpose:

I have actually sent your name as a joint editor, waiting only for your formal sanction of it. I hope that you will not think it very bold; but, you know, ‘a treble cord’ & c. [etc.]’; and last year you and Newman left me to write my tracts ‘On Holy Baptism’ by myself, and to bear all the brunt of the Record; so this year I have intertwined your and Newman’s names so fast that I hope they will not easily slip away.13

This is not the first time that Pusey referred to the three of them as a ‘treble’ or triple cord. The year before, he wrote to Newman: ‘Best of all I should like to see our triple cord restored, “Keble, Newman, Pusey on Baptism.”’14 As we have seen already, Pusey’s Tracts ‘Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism’ are a companion piece to the ‘Lectures’, rehearsing many of the same principles and examples of typology. Pusey’s description of the triple cord is, therefore, also a reference to the way in which the three men were grappling with theological questions by investigating early Christian interpretation of Scripture.

7.1.2 Newman on Allegory

Newman’s discussion of allegorical exegesis in Arians of the Fourth Century (1833) offers a witness from the early years of the Oxford Movement of the shared project of which the ‘Lectures’ are a part. In the section on ‘The Church of Alexandria’, Newman describes the allegorical reading of the Scriptures not as an issue of historical concern only, but as a matter of primary and abiding

11 Trench 1900, 104.
12 Life, 424-428.
13 Pusey to Keble, 22 Sept. 1836, LBV-101, and Life, 425. To this letter from Pusey, Newman added his own appeal: ‘You must not think we are hurrying you into a plan of our own. Of course nothing shall be done about your name till we hear from [you].’
14 Pusey to Newman, 21 Oct. 1835, LBV-117. See also Trench 1900, 88.
theological importance. Newman argues that the allegorical reading offered by
the Alexandrians arises necessarily when one understands the ‘inspired
writings’, the Scriptures: ‘Those writings themselves have certainly an
allegorical structure, and seem to countenance and invite an allegorical
interpretation.’ Moreover, for Newman, this allegorical structure is
inextricably related to what and how Scripture communicates, to its message
and form:

Thus there seemed every encouragement, from the structure of Scripture,
from the apparent causes which led to that structure, and from the
purposes to which it was actually applied by its Divine Author, to induce
the Alexandrians to consider its text as primarily and directly the
instrument of an allegorical teaching.

If it is God’s purpose to use allegory to teach the message of the Bible, then
this must concern the Church in every age. Years later, in An Essay on the
Development of Christian Doctrine, Newman stated succinctly the view that he
shared with Pusey, only substituting ‘mystical’ for Pusey’s ‘typical’: ‘it may
almost be laid down as a historical fact, that the mystical interpretation and
orthodoxy will stand or fall together’.

Newman’s sermons and some of his other writings during the decade
following the publication of the Arias in 1833 show that he shared with Pusey
the view that the Old Testament was one great system of mystical, allegorical,
or in Pusey’s terms, ‘typical’, prophecy of Christ and the Church. In ‘The
Gospel Feast’, a sermon given in May 1838, the year after Pusey delivered his
‘Lectures’, Newman writes: ‘Now the Old Testament, as we know, is full of
figures and types of the Gospel; types various, and, in their literal wording,
contrary to each other, but all meeting and harmoniously filled in Christ and
His Church.’ He continues, ‘All that our Saviour has done is again and again

15 Arias, 1 § 3, 63.
16 Ibid. 66. See King 2009, 38-42 for a consideration of the importance of allegory in Arias.
17 Newman quoted in Seynaeve 1953, 320. Seynaeve maintains that Newman, generally during
his whole life and especially during his ‘Anglican period’, preferred the kind of ‘mystical
interpretation’ practised by the Alexandrian school over a more ‘critico-historical and literal
method’ (p. 311-312).
shadowed out in the Old Testament.’\textsuperscript{19} In Tract 85, ‘Lectures on the Scripture Proof of the Doctrines of the Church’ (1840), Newman writes: ‘is not the whole of the Bible, Old and New Testament, engaged in a system of outward signs and hidden realities under them?’\textsuperscript{20} Describing Christ as the focus of the Scriptures and the life of the Church, Newman adds that ‘every part of the Dispensation tends to the manifestation of Him who is the centre’.\textsuperscript{21}

Like Pusey, Newman also describes a typical reading as a ‘Sacramental’ reading. The language of type is not ‘merely figurative’ even if we do not understand entirely how the type will be fulfilled:

And, since we do not know, we will studiously keep to the figure given us in Scripture: we will not attempt to interpret it, or change the wording of it, being wise above what is written. We will not neglect it, because we do not understand it. We will hold it as a Mystery, or (what was anciently called) a Truth Sacramental; that is, a high invisible grace lodged in an outward form, a precious possession to be piously and thankfully guarded for the sake of the heavenly reality contained in it.\textsuperscript{22}

The types of Scripture are sacraments which participate in the reality which they figure and which communicate an invisible grace to the Church. In his \textit{Lectures on the Prophetic Office}, Newman writes: ‘Every word of revelation has a deep meaning. It is the outward form of a heavenly truth, and in this sense a mystery or sacrament.’\textsuperscript{23} Like Pusey, Newman describes the grace which comes from the typical reading of Scriptures as analogous to that which comes from sharing in the ‘Heavenly Feast’ of Holy Communion:

And if they are blessed who shall eat and drink of that table in the kingdom, so too blessed are they who meditate upon it, and hope for it now, – who read Scripture with it in their thoughts, and endeavour to look beneath the veil of the literal text, and to catch a sight of the gleams of heavenly light which are behind it’.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{19} ‘The Gospel Feast,’ N-PPS-vii, 165.
\textsuperscript{20} Quoted in Seynaeve 1953, 316.
\textsuperscript{21} ‘Saving Knowledge’, Jan. or Feb. 1835, N-PPS-ii, 155. For the date, Seynaeve 1953, 208.
\textsuperscript{22} N-PPS-ii, 211, Sermon 18, ‘Mysteries in Religion,’ on the Ascension of Christ, from the end of 1834.
\textsuperscript{24} N-PPS-vii, ‘The Gospel Feast’, 162.
For Newman, this approach expresses his understanding of the ‘Sacramental system; that is, the doctrine that material phenomena are both the types and the instruments of real things unseen’, a system which he learned through his study of the Alexandrian Church, but first from Bishop Butler and John Keble, and which we find also in Pusey. Moreover, the language of type cannot be left behind even when the antitype is come or revealed. If we seek to probe the meaning of Christian doctrine, to know, for example, ‘why was it that Christ ascended on high, or with what object’, we cannot explain this in abstract language: ‘Instead of explaining, Scripture does but continue to answer us in the language of the type; even to the last it veils His deed under the ancient figure.’

7.1.3 Keble and a Mystical Reading

Keble’s primary work on the typical or mystical interpretation of Scripture was published as Tract 89 of the Tracts for the Times, ‘On the Mysticism attributed to the Early Fathers of the Church’. In it, Keble sets out to investigate ‘the universal adoption by the early Christian writers of the allegorical way of expounding the Old Testament’. For Keble, as for Pusey, the study of mystical interpretation must include the search for the first principles, the grammar or rules of allegorical interpretation, which the best interpreters knew by a kind of instinct. Keble cautions those who limit the principle of ‘Mysticism’, which is synonymous with Pusey’s use of type or typology:

Here, as in every part of our patristical studies, it may be well to bear in mind the dream of Jacob, that we may not to our fear and shame have to awake by and by, and say, ‘Surely the LORD was with us in so many places, betokened by so many of His creatures, and we knew it not, but treated the thought unworthily.’

Like Pusey in the ‘Lectures’ when he refers to Cain’s neglect of a typical reading of the coats of skins, Keble offers a mystical interpretation of Jacob’s

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26 N-PPS-ii, 211, Sermon 18, ‘Mysteries in Religion,’ on the Ascension of Christ, from the end of 1834. In a note, Newman refers to Rev. 8:3-4.
27 T89, II.1, 14.
28 T89, VI.21, 162.
vision to urge the importance of typical interpretation more generally.

For Keble, as for Pusey and Newman, the whole of the Old Testament is prophetic of Christ, both directly and indirectly: ‘In the Old Testament the leading idea is, that the Church, whether diffusive, or embodied in her anointed members, king, priest, or prophet, is every where the type of Christ’.²⁹ Keble’s Tract puts forward many of the ideas found in the ‘Lectures’. He criticizes the utilitarian tendencies of modern apologists, for whom ‘common sense and practical utility are the very idols of this age’.³⁰ He argues with Augustine and the Fathers that, ‘so far as they are figurative’, the histories of the Old Testament prophesy Christ and his Church: ‘to Christ only, and His Church, the City of God, are they to be referred in every instance’.³¹

Like Pusey, Keble connects the interpretation of the Book of God’s word with learning to read the Book of Nature: ‘the Fathers passed from one branch of mysticism into another, from allegorizing the word of God, to spiritualizing His works’.³² For Keble this means that ‘we have the sum of this visible world declared to be an index or token of the invisible’.³³ Moreover, as well as speaking in a way analogous to the words of Scripture, these signs have something of the character of sacraments:

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\ldots \text{the works of God in creation and providence, besides their immediate uses in this life, appeared to the old writers as so many intended tokens from the Almighty, to assure us of some spiritual fact or other, which it concerns us in some way to know. So far, therefore, they fulfilled half at least of the nature of sacraments, according to the strict definition of our Catechism: they were pledges to assure us of some spiritual thing, if they were not means to convey it to us. They were, in a very sufficient sense, Verba visibilia.}\]

Keble also follows Pusey in discussing Ambrose’s Hexameron and the idea that the ‘beginning’ of Genesis 1:1 is not a beginning in time, but an evocation of the Archetype, what Keble calls ‘the chief point, or head, as if one should

²⁹ T89, V.19, 129.
³⁰ T89, I.2, 4.
³² T89, II.23, 29. For an example from the ‘Epistle to Barnabas’, see II.19, 26.
³³ T89, VI.12, 152.
³⁴ T89, VI.8, 148.
say in Latin, *summa operis*.

What Keble says about natural signs also applies to Scripture – a mystical interpretation is also a sacramental reading. ‘Sacramentals’ was the original title for the papers on ‘Mysticism’ which he gave to the Theological Society.\(^\text{35}\) As a characteristic example of the mysticism of the Fathers, Keble points to Ambrose and Chrysostom, who encourage the reader of the Old Testament to apprehend the ‘sacramental nature’ of the histories of the patriarchs: ‘consider not simply what was done, but look to the purpose’.\(^\text{36}\) Keble refers also to Augustine who writes: ‘Such is the letter of the Old Testament, clothed with the wrappings of carnal sacraments, or tokens; but if you once come to its marrow, it nourishes and satisfies.’\(^\text{37}\) The importance of this sacramental principle is emphasized by W. J. A. M. Beek, who argues that for Keble the main criterion of a living faith is ‘belief in the reality of the supernatural and its sacramental representation in the natural’.\(^\text{38}\) For Keble, Beek writes, ‘man’s symbolical sense is sacramental, because it enables him to regard all nature as a mystical manifestation of God’s presence’.\(^\text{39}\) Keble describes the sacramental character of natural or literary signs and symbols in his lectures on poetry: ‘In short, Poetry lends Religion her wealth of symbols and similes: Religion restores these again to Poetry, clothed with so splendid a radiance that they appear to be no longer merely symbols, but to partake (I might almost say) of the nature of sacraments.’\(^\text{40}\)

### 7.1.4 The Theological Society

The Theological Society which Pusey founded in 1835 was an important forum for the Tractarians’ study of the typological and allegorical interpretations of

\(^{35}\) Keble to Pusey, 18 Jan. 1837, LBV-97.
\(^{36}\) T89, IV.18, 92. Keble quotes, first, Ambrose, *Jacob and the Happy Life*, Book II.2.6, describing how Rebecca offered her ‘righteous’ son to the Lord, and then Chrysostom’s reflections on the meaning of the account, Chrysostom, *Homilies on Genesis*, Homily 43.
\(^{37}\) T89, V.12, 121.
\(^{38}\) Beek 1959, 102.
\(^{39}\) Ibid. 115.
\(^{40}\) Keble 1912, ii, 481. See also *Laws*, xci-ii, where Keble discusses the Father’s interpretation of natural symbols: ‘the whole world, to them, was full of sacraments’.

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the Fathers. From 1836 to 1841, the society met three, four, or even six times per term in Pusey’s house in Christ Church. While the purpose was a general one – ‘To promote the study of Theology, according to the peculiar character of our Church, by combining the study of Christian Antiquity with that of Holy Scripture’ – many papers bore more or less directly on the patristic interpretation of the Bible. As we have seen already, Tract 89 is one example of those projects for which the Theological Society was the initial impetus.

Tracts 80 (1838) and 87 (1840) by Isaac Williams, ‘On Reserve in Communicating Religious Knowledge’, offer together another example of the way in which the ‘Lectures’ were part of a shared project. Pusey considered these Tracts, based on papers which Williams gave during the Lent Term of 1837 for the Theological Society, as ‘the most valuable in the whole collection’. In them, Williams discusses the purposeful obscurity of revelation which is given through types and figures: ‘there appears in God’s manifestations of Himself to mankind, in conjunction with an exceeding desire to communicate that knowledge, a tendency to conceal, and throw a veil over it, as if it were injurious to us, unless we were of a certain disposition to receive it’. The way Williams unites an account of the ‘reserved’ or veiled character of revelation with the idea that genuine knowledge of spiritual things is a function of sanctification makes this a helpful concept with which to approach Pusey’s argument in the ‘Lectures’ and the Tractarian investigation of patristic interpretation more generally. While Pusey does not use the term ‘reserve’, we have seen that the ideas which this principle draws together are important for the ‘Lectures’. Likewise, Keble, in many ways the embodiment of reserve, argues that an appreciation of this principle is necessary in order to interpret or understand the Fathers’ mode of expression:

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41 See ‘Theological Society, 1837-41’, ‘Pusey Papers: Various’. All references to the dates and titles of papers come from this source. See also Life, 334-5.
42 For the importance of the Tracts, see Pusey to Dr. Hook, 12 Aug. 1838, LBV 95. Williams gave his papers ‘On the Reserve of Holy Scripture and the Early Church in treating sacred subjects before persons unprepared to receive them’ on 3 and 17 Feb., 1837.
43 T80, 3. See also pp. 5-6, 12, 27.
44 See Louth 1984, 37-38 for a discussion of ‘the doctrine of reserve’ and the ‘Lectures’.
… a little ecclesiastical knowledge will suggest to us another consideration, very needful to be borne in mind, when we are estimating the value of their concurrence in any point within their sphere, I mean the reverential reserve, which undoubtedly they practised in every part of religion, in proportion to its sacredness.\footnote{45}

Newman also discusses this ‘reverential reserve’ extensively in *The Arians of the Fourth Century* in relation to the ‘*disciplini arcani*’ of the Fathers.\footnote{46} Harrison, whose involvement in the Theological Society will be considered below, tells Pusey that he finds in the Fathers’ expositions of Scripture ‘a kind of veiling which, on the principles of Williams’ Tract, seems almost necessary’.\footnote{47}

As has already been noted, Pusey corresponded with Williams on the subject and material of the ‘Lectures’ some years after they were given. On 28 February, 1840, Williams gave another paper which bore directly on the subject of the ‘Lectures’ at the Theological Society, ‘The Rule of Scriptural Interpretation furnished by our Lord’. While that paper does not appear to be preserved, his *Devotional Commentary on the Gospel Narrative*, published in eight volumes between 1841 and 1850, suggests that ‘the Rule’ was one that emphasized typological or figurative interpretation:

> Our Lord had been pleased to reveal Himself to the Jews of old in a dark and mysterious manner, speaking to them through the medium of type and figure … So also in the Gospels does our Lord frequently use dark sayings, and figures which were not understood at the time by those to whom He spoke.\footnote{48}

In the same commentary, Williams emphasizes that understanding the fulfilment of prophecy requires a searching out of the hidden meaning: ‘our Blessed Lord alludes to expressions or events in the Old Testament, which might be considered figurative or allegorical; of which He has shewn the fulfilment, not after a literal, but in a spiritual and high sense’.\footnote{49} With Pusey,
Williams was a key co-worker in the endeavour to recover a patristic reading of Scripture.

During the Lent term of 1837, at the same time that Pusey was delivering his ‘Lectures’, another of the Tractarians, Benjamin Harrison, gave the first two of three papers on ‘The Alexandrian School’.\(^{50}\) From 1835, the year before Pusey began to work on his ‘Lectures’, through to the beginning of 1838, Harrison corresponded with Pusey about the typological expositions of this school.\(^{51}\) As we saw in the last chapter, Harrison stressed the importance of recovering ‘the higher symbolical and typical interpretation’ of the post-Apostolical Fathers. He also reflected Pusey’s impatience with limiting the typological principle:

I have been following out a good deal the subject of the typical meaning of the Old Testament: and this has led me to rather a wide range, because in typical expositions I have always felt, if this be true as well as ingenious, it ought to extend much further – there should be an analogy – Vitringa’s interpretation of Samson and Joseph seems to leave one suddenly where he ought to go on.\(^{52}\)

He went on to urge the importance of ‘an entire return’ to the system of the Fathers. Like Pusey, he saw the typical interpretations of the Fathers as a general or catholic principle misunderstood or scorned in their day: ‘In studying Scripture typically, I thought one seemed to view it under a light which the early Church seemed systematically and uniformly to apply; and for the neglect of which made all their whole system of interpretation seem fanciful and absurd to modern readers.’\(^{53}\) The way in which the Theological Society provided a forum in which the Tractarians furthered the investigation of patristic exegesis and the theological principles which these practices expressed and developed show the importance of the argument of the

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50 10 Mar. and 26 May 1837. The third paper was given the next year on 30 Mar. 1838.
51 See Harrison to Pusey, 13 Sept. 1836, on the doctrine of the Logos and the necessity of going back to the ancients, 7 July 1837, on the relationship between the image and prototype in creation, and 4 Jan. 1838, commending I. Williams’ principle of reserve. LBV-47.
52 Harrison to Pusey, 26 Aug. 1835. Harrison refers to the Dutch theologian Campegius Vitringa (1693-1723) known especially for his Commentary on Isaiah.
53 Harrison to Pusey, 5 Jan. 1836, LBV-47.
‘Lectures’ for the Tractarians.\textsuperscript{54}

7.2 The ‘Lectures’ and the High Church Tradition

7.2.1 The Hackney Phalanx and the Hutchinsonians

Despite the critical attitude which Pusey and his colleagues had for some aspects of the High Church or orthodox tradition in the decades preceding the Oxford revival, it is nonetheless from this tradition which the Oxford Movement emerged, and whose distinctive theological emphases are evident in the ‘Lectures’. Liddon describes Pusey’s regard for High Churchmen who witnessed to the communion of faith between the Caroline divines and the early Church:

Side by side with Evangelicalism there were also convictions which had been handed down across the dreary interval of the eighteenth century, and which here and there found expression in the lives of holy men, who taught a generation of Latitudinarians and Methodists how the great men of the Caroline age in the Church of England had believed and lived and died. Such men as Jones of Nayland, and Dr. Sikes of Guilsborough, and, at a somewhat later period, Mr. Norris of Hackney, and Mr. Joshua Watson, were of this company. The first two were theologians, inheriting and contemplating truths on which the Non-jurors had laid stress, and living in communion of thought and sympathy with the ancient Church.\textsuperscript{55}

One of those who Liddon singles out is ‘Mr. Norris of Hackney’ (1771-1850), the most influential clerical member of ‘the Hackney School, to which Pusey used often to refer’.\textsuperscript{56} The ‘Hackney School’, or the ‘Hackney Phalanx’ was a group linked by common ideas, friendship, family, and patronage with the merchant Joshua Watson (1771-1855), another one of those to whom Liddon refers, and his brother Archdeacon John Watson (1767-1839), the rector of the village of Hackney in North East London.\textsuperscript{57} In a letter to Joshua Watson after a visit to him in Brighton in September, 1839, Pusey reveals his sense both of the importance of the connection with at least some elements of the High Church

\textsuperscript{54} Newman also presented at least two papers to the Society, on 3 Nov. 1837, ‘On the Heresy of Apollinaris’, and on 14 Feb. 1840, ‘On the Monophysite Heresy’.

\textsuperscript{55} Life, 256. For Pusey’s regard for Dr. Thomas Sikes, the rector of Guilsborough, see Life, 257.

\textsuperscript{56} Life, 258.

\textsuperscript{57} For the importance of the Hackney Phalanx, see Nockles 1994, 14-15 and Hylson-Smith 1993, 101-120.
tradition, and of the strains caused, in part, by what Watson saw as the Tractarians’ party spirit and innovations:

We seem to have been plying against wind and tide of late … One had become so much the object of suspicion, that I cannot say how cheering it was to be recognised by you as carrying on the same torch which we had received from yourself and from those of your generation, who had remained faithful to the old teaching. We seemed no longer separated by a chasm from the old times and old paths, to which we wished to lead people back; the links which united us to those of old seemed to be restored.58

Pusey’s view of the faithfulness of his group did not prevent him, however, from criticizing in the ‘Lectures’ the apologetic approach to prophecy which he found in William Van Mildert, one the members of the Hackney School.

Liddon’s reference to ‘Jones of Nayland’ (1726–1800) as one of those who lived ‘in communion of thought and sympathy with the ancient Church’ points to another current of thought which is important to the ‘Lectures’. William Jones, from 1777 perpetual curate of Nayland, in Suffolk, was associated with the Hutchinsonians, the name given to a group of mostly High Churchman who developed the ideas of the naturalist and theologian John Hutchinson. Hutchinson* combined ‘a mysterious veneration of the Hebrew language with a fundamentalist opposition to Newtonian science’ and he criticized both ‘the materialism of the philosophers of their time and the humanism of the Latitudinarian divines’.59 In this approach he foreshadowed Pusey who combined an esteem for Hebrew, the ‘picture-language of the East’ (L24), God’s own language, ‘formed through His Spirit by His prophets as the tables of His law were “written by His finger”’, with his criticism of the scientism of the evidence writers.60 In addition to promoting ‘High Church

58 Pusey to J. Watson in Churton 1863, 236-7. See also Life, 259: ‘As Pusey said shortly before his own death, these men “must have prepared the ground for the Tracts.”’
59 Mather 1992, 10. See also Mather’s description of Bp Samuel Horsley on pp. 205, and Nockles 1994, 204.
*Hutchinson, John (1674-1737). He wrote his best known work Moses Principia (1724, 1727) in response to Isaac Newton’s Principia. He furthered his investigations in natural philosophy by travelling extensively in England and Wales in the employ of the duke of Somerset.
60 S-EL, 3. Pusey writes that through ‘the ambition of Nebuchadnezzar and Alexander [the Great] … The Hebrew spirit was infused into the body of the Greek, and He “turned to the
ecclesiastical, political and sacramental principles’, Nockles argues that ‘Hutchinsonian High Church rhetoric against the contemporary cult of human reason strikingly prefigured that of the Tractarians’. For the Hutchinsonians, religious knowledge is not addressed primarily to the intellect but rather ‘requires a preparation of the heart, a welcome by the whole person’, another important theme in the ‘Lectures’.

In the works of William Jones, one finds important elements of Pusey’s argument. Jones emphasizes that spiritual understanding is confused by corrupt affections as much as imperfect argument: ‘our religious differences … proceed from the blindness and corruption of the human heart, increased and cherished by some false principle that suits with its appetites’. The solution is not better arguments, but the transformation of the whole person by the grace of humility and obedience: ‘Where that is suffered to enter, and the heart, instead of persisting in its own will, is surrendered to the will of God, the whole gospel is sufficiently clear, because no text of it is any longer offensive.’ This emphasis on faith as the capacity which perceives and approves spiritual things is an argument about epistemology as well as sanctification, a combination we have considered in relation to the ‘Lectures’.

Some of the Hutchinsonians encouraged the consideration of the kind of typical or allegorical interpretations which Pusey advocates in the ‘Lectures’. Of course, there are numerous and rich sources in English theology which may have shaped Pusey’s understanding of patristic interpretation. Keble discusses the way in which ‘Hooker’s sympathy with the fourth century rather than the sixteenth is perpetually breaking out’, and suggests that this shows itself in an appreciation of the Fathers’ sacramental approach to the types and figures of nations a pure language”, His own, which, as far as it was a written language, was formed through His Spirit …”.

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61 Nockles 1994, 13, 203, also 204-5. See also Hylson-Smith 1993, 89-94.
62 Tavard 1978, 255.
63 William Jones, The Catholic Doctrine of the Trinity, New York (1813), quoted in Tavard 1978, 255. Nockles also finds High Church precursors for the doctrine of reserve, although the examples he gives generally focus on temper or character rather than the connection of this principle with biblical obscurity. See Nockles 1994, 198-200.
64 Tavard argues that the Hutchinsonians ‘anticipated some of the major conceptions of John Henry Newman’s epistemology’. Tavard 1978, 257.
Scripture and of nature: ‘And thus did the whole scheme of material things, and especially those objects in it which are consecrated by scriptural allusion, assume in their eyes a sacramental or symbolical character.’

Nicolas Lossky finds a patristic approach to Scriptural allegory, according to which the scriptural or sacramental symbol participates in the reality which it figures, in the sermons of Lancelot Andrewes as well. We have also seen that Bishop Butler’s articulation of the correspondence between natural and revealed religion profoundly influenced Pusey and his fellow Tractarians’ sense of the sacramental or typical character of the two books of God.

In the decades prior to the Tractarians’ efforts to recover a patristic or ‘Apostolic’ way of reading the Bible, it was the Hutchinsonians who bore witness to ‘the old teaching’ to which Pusey ‘wished to lead people back’. For example, Bishop Samuel Horsley (1733-1806), using ‘poetical’ as a synonym for symbolic or allegorical, wrote that ‘the far greater part of the prophetical writings, and all the psalms without exception, are poetical’.

Edward Churton, who had studied at Christ Church with Pusey and been the curate of J. J. Watson in Hackney, likewise saw a connection between patristic interpretation and the Hutchinsonians. When Churton wrote to Newman about his hope ‘to analyse the principle of the Allegorical Interpretations of the Fathers’, he asked, ‘how far does their Allegorical System resemble the Hutchinsonian?’

Pointing to the Hutchinsonians, Nockles argues that ‘the

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65 Laws, xci.
66 Lossky 1986, 70: ‘Le significant, l’image par exemple, participe à la réalité signifiée.’
67 Churton 1863, 237. Quoted in full above.
68 Horsley quoted in Mather 1992, 206. If it is correct to see Horsley as a precursor to the ‘Lectures’, it appears that Pusey’s opinion of the Hutchinsonian approach changed in the early 1830s. In his letter about English theology to Tholuck in May 1830, Pusey described Bp Horsley as ‘too rash a critic, too much of the conjectural school, and a Hutchinsonian’. Life, 244.
69 Churton to Newman, 2 Feb. 1838. See ‘Newman Papers: “British Critic”, 1836 – 1841’. Speaking of Churton, Nockles writes, ‘It was he who first drew up a patristic theory of scriptural allegory with reference to earlier Hutchinsonian notions’, and adds that Churton dropped the subject in favour of Keble (Nockles 1994, 208). However, it would probably be better to say that Churton witnessed to the need for such a theory, apparently after the Tractarians had already undertaken the task, but did not formulate one himself. In his article, ‘Use of the Fathers’, Churton speaks in general terms about the character of the Fathers’ writings, their witness to the ‘depth and compass in the divine word, far different from the shifting interpretations learnt in the diluted theology of later days’, but he does not offer a detailed exposition of their interpretations (Churton 1838, 47). He tells Newman that he hopes
patristic theory of sacramental symbolism was implicit in the writings of numerous pre-Tractarian High Churchmen.\(^{70}\)

### 7.2.2 Jones of Nayland and the Figurative Language of Holy Scripture

One of the fullest treatments of the typological interpretation of the Bible in the fifty years before the ‘Lectures’ was offered by William Jones in *A Course of Lectures on the Figurative Language of Holy Scripture, and the Interpretation of it from Scripture Itself* (1786).\(^{71}\) To this Jones added *A Discourse on the Use and Intention of Some Remarkable Passages of the Scripture*, explaining some portions of his argument in the *Lectures*. Nockles argues that in Jones’ *Course of Lectures*, ‘the argument of Pusey’s *Lectures on Types* of half a century later was strikingly prefigured’.\(^ {72}\) Jones himself connects his work to the Hutchinsonian school, criticizing those, ‘who ought to know better’, for ‘ascribing things to *Hutchinson*, which were borrowed from *Origen*’. (J273)

Jones begins his *Lectures on the Figurative Language of Holy Scripture* by addressing the obscurity of Scripture, ‘how the language of the Scripture differs from that of other books; and whence its obscurity arises’. (J5) He traces this obscurity to an inability to interpret types and to perceive ‘that sense of the scripture which is hidden under the signs and symbols of it’. (J22) He also describes the types of Scriptures by analogy with the sacraments; they ‘reveal some sacred and heavenly doctrine under some outward and visible sign of it’. (J22) As Pusey will in the ‘Lectures’, Jones maintains ‘That there is both a plain and a figurative sense in the language of the scripture’, ‘a literal sense of the words, and a deeper sense of their general intention, called the spirit, which the letter cannot always reach’. (J25-6).

\(^{70}\) Nockles 1994, 208 n. 6.

\(^{71}\) Jones 1801. Page numbers to Jones’ sermons will be given in the text following an uppercase J, e.g. (J1) for page one of Jones’ lectures in the edition above.

In addition to describing the figurative language of the Bible, Jones explains how the book of God’s word is written in signs from the book of God’s works:

the Scripture is found to have a language of its own, which doth not consist of words, but of signs or figures taken from visible things. It could not otherwise treat of God, who is a spirit, and of the spirit of man, and of a spiritual world; which no words can describe. Words are the arbitrary signs of natural things; but the language of revelation goes a step farther, and uses some things as the signs of other things; in consequence of which, the world which we now see becomes a sort of commentary on the mind of God, and explains the world in which we believe. (J11)

In Jones’ description we hear Pusey’s view that ‘“every thing is a type,” if we could see it’. Whereas Pusey describes God’s works as syllables, Jones says that all created things are letters: ‘all the objects of sense in heaven and earth, and under the earth, are as the letters of a universal language, in which all nations have a common interest’. (J72) Jones also connects the capacity of the ‘world which we now see’ to serve as a ‘commentary on the mind of God’ with an inherent correspondence between the two: ‘the visible world throughout is a pattern of the invisible’. (J32) Also significant in terms of the relationship to Pusey’s argument, Jones refers to how Clement of Alexandria sees shadows of Christian truth in the ‘barbarous philosophy’ which describes the ‘intellectual’ world as ‘being the archetype or original’ of the sensible world, which is an ‘image or copy of it’. (J73)73

One also finds in Jones the idea of the need for spiritual faculties in order to perceive spiritual things: ‘For spiritual truth there must be a spiritual sense; and the scripture calls this sense by the name of faith’. (J17) Jones does not investigate further the ‘sense or capacity in the intellect, by which the invisible

73 Jones quotes Clement’s *Stromata or Miscellanies*, V.14 describing how the Greeks borrowed their philosophy both from the Hebrews and the Gentiles: ‘There is a barbarous philosophy, (i.e. a foreign philosophy) “which hath a knowledge of the sensible and the intellectual worlds; the one being the archetype or original, the other an image or copy of it” … This barbarous philosophy, so called by Plato, whose doctrine is here repeated by Clemens Alexandrinus, was no where to be found but in the bible’. (J73) This quotation comes from the paragraph before the passage which Pusey quotes on ‘the divine and royal Word … and the image of the image is the human mind’ (L145) which is discussed in Chapter 3. See Clement of Alexandria 1994, 466, also I.16, 317-318.
things of the spirit of God are admitted and approved’. (J18, 17) However, like Pusey, he insists that unbelief is a moral as much as an intellectual problem which the appeal to evidence cannot solve:

Some speculative writers have treated of credibility and probability, and the nature, and force, and degrees, of evidence, as if we had rules for weighing all truth to a single grain with mechanical certainty: whereas in fact, man, with all his boasted balancings of reason, can resist a proof that would confound a devil … Vicious inclinations and habits of sin, which render truth disagreeable, are sure to have the effect of weakening and perverting the judgment. (J19-20)

Like Pusey, and probably following Butler, Jones maintains that the difficulties the Bible poses are a form of trial: ‘The bible has farther difficulties arising from another principle. For it pleased God, for wise ends, to exercise the faith and devotion of his people with a system of forms and ceremonies, which had no value but from their signification’. (J15)

While Jones does not work out a theory of the spiritual faculties in detail, he does offer a brief sketch of a theological or epistemological basis for the necessity of typical or figurative language in a similar way to Pusey in the ‘Lectures’:

This method is necessary to assist the mind in its conceptions, and supply the natural defect in our understandings. Being men, invested with an earthly body, which hath a sense of nothing but material things, we cannot see truth and reason, in themselves, as spirits do: these things are of a different nature from our sight; and therefore we are obliged to conceive them as they are reflected to us in the glass of the visible forms, and sensible qualities of outward things. (J238-9)

Types and typical language are a necessary form of mediation which cannot be left behind even in the time of the Gospel dispensation: ‘For truth, as we have often observed, does not enter into men’s minds in its own abstracted nature, but under the vehicle of some analogy’. (J252-3) Jones calls this ‘the sacred style’ and urges all preachers to adopt the ‘symbolical language of the bible’. (J252, 255)

The extent of the similarities between Jones and Pusey could lead one to overlook important differences. Jones’ Lectures lack the polemical edge of those delivered by Pusey fifty years later. Although Jones’ approach is
different from those in which Pusey finds symptoms of rationalism, Jones does not seek to emphasize where his approach corrects or challenges what Pusey calls the apologetic use. Jones’ argument that ‘This hidden wisdom of the scripture is to be considered as treasure hid in the earth, for which men must search with that same zeal and labour with which they penetrate into a mine of gold’ (J24) reminds one of Pusey’s description of types as ‘hidden treasure, which lie below the surface of Holy Scripture’. (L85) However, having stated the principle, in the more than two hundred pages that follow, Jones discusses types which are authorized explicitly by the New Testament rather than the ‘hidden wisdom of the scripture’. For example, he devotes the longest section to considering the teaching of 1 Corinthians 10 which makes the crossing of the Red Sea and the journey through the wilderness types of baptism and the Christian life. (J134-143) He also reflects on the flood as a type of baptism, as taught in 1 Peter 3:20-21, (J126-7) and on Joseph as a type of Christ with the support of St Stephen in the Acts of the Apostles (Acts 7:9). (J52, 181-3). One exception to this pattern, in the Discourse which he wrote to supplement his Lectures, is his consideration of the account of the borrowed axe-head which one of the ‘sons of the prophets’ lost in the river Jordan (2 Kgs 6:1-6). Jones examines the significance of the minute details of this history: the way in which ‘the head of the axe, being the better part of it’ corresponds to ‘the soul or spirit of man, the better part of him’, and how the axe-head being borrowed figures the soul belonging to God. He goes on to describe the raising of the axe-head as a prophecy of the raising up of human nature which was accomplished when ‘the branch of the stem of Jesse was cut down, and cast with us into the waters of death’ (J287-8). This passage would not be out of place in the ‘Lectures’, and it is one of the very few places where Jones refers to a patristic interpretation, in this case suggesting that the reader consult Irenaeus, Against Heresies, Book V.17.4, but without exploring the reference.74 However, the rarity of this example shows the difference from the ‘Lectures’ and the Tracts on Holy Baptism which are replete with such examples.

74 See Irenaeus 1872, Against Heresies V.17.4, 491. Jones adds considerably here, in the fashion Pusey does, to what Irenaeus says was ‘shewn typically’ by ‘the Prophet Elisha’.

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In a similar way, Jones, like Pusey, suggests the importance of considering the meaning which the details reveal: ‘if we descend to an actual examination of particulars, we find it assisting and leading our faculties forward’ (J12). However, he does not generally show examples of this beyond what the New Testament offers. For example, having commented briefly on St Stephen’s words, ‘the patriarchs, moved with envy, sold Joseph into Egypt’ (Acts 7:9), he adds: ‘Much more might be said to shew how exact the parallel is between the history of Joseph and the history of Christ, if we were to pursue it’ (J183). He even repeats this possibility on the next page: ‘Some things which have passed before us in the present lecture would suggest many profitable reflections, if I had time to insist upon them’ (J184). Yet this is precisely the kind of investigation which Pusey pursues:

In the next generation, one is again singled out as the emblem of the Christ; well-beloved of His father; appointed by God, to honour and for that appointment envied of his brethren when he declared it unto them, so that they would have slain him, his brethren who gave him up, providing that their hands should not be upon him; rejected by them as a false prophet –‘behold this dreamer cometh’, ‘This is written of Joseph but fulfilled in Christ, when the Jews said of His Passion “If He be the king of Israel, let him now come down from the cross, and we will believe Him.” (St Ambrose, [On Joseph], 3.12); sold for the price of a slave (20 pieces of silver) by Judah without any fault of his own; accused as unfaithful to his earthly master (Luke 23, 2 John 19:12), yet raised to kingly power by the very means which they had taken to depress him; according to the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, raised from amidst malefactors to the right hand of power; feeding with the bread of life the people who were made subject unto him; he manifested himself to them who asked not after Him, and at last also to his brethren to whom on their repentance and in their anguish he gradually made himself known; not by messengers but by Himself, he forgave them, for they knew not what they did; yet not until they had ceased to make excuses for themselves and confessed their guilt, sorrowfully confessing ‘We are verily guilty concerning Him, who was not ashamed to call us brethren. Therefore is this distress come upon us’ (Gen. 42:21); then he admitted them also under his rule and sustained them; fed them freely,
gave them the best of the land and kept them by Him for ever. (L74, 75C)\textsuperscript{75}

In comparison with Pusey’s exegesis, Jones’ approach calls to mind Harrison’s description of Campegius Vitringa, as one who ‘seems to leave one suddenly where he ought to go on’.\textsuperscript{76}

Perhaps the most significant form of Jones’ restraint comes in his discussion of what Pusey would call the sacramental character of Scripture. Commenting on 2 Corinthians 3:18, ‘We all, with open (that is unveiled) face, beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord’ (J249), Jones argues that ‘the spirit of those figures under which the bible delivers to us the things of God, has a power of raising and glorifying, even in this life, the spirit of man’ (J247). This evokes Pusey’s description of the ‘Sacramental force’ (L133) of the types of the Old Testament. Likewise, for Jones, those who see the light of God ‘reflected as in a glass from the figures and ceremonies of his law, are changed (Gr. transfigured) into the same image, from glory to glory’ (J249). Jones’ description illustrates well what Pusey means by knowledge as participation, and by sanctification as a form of deification.\textsuperscript{77} However, because Jones does not make this connection explicitly and explain how his exegesis arises from the doctrine of participation, his interpretation can still be read as a merely metaphorical reflection, a homiletical illustration of the way reading the Bible can change us. Jones’ account is stirring, but because he does not unite the figurative character of Scripture with the doctrine of the Incarnation, the Church, the sacraments, and creation in the way Pusey does, it lacks the theological force of Pusey’s argument. Since Pusey does not address

\textsuperscript{75} Pusey also quotes Ambrose at length to argue that the explanation which Joseph’s brothers gave to Joseph’s steward about the money they found in their sacks is a prophecy of humankind’s rejection of ‘free grace’ or ‘free gifts’ in favour of human merit or justification: ‘He it is who seeketh not your money but giveth his own. He gave you money in your sacks – Christ is the joyous gift; He is your silver, He your price. The Lord requireth not of you the price of his corn, seeketh not your weight of silver. Your silver is reprobate, the silver of the sack is not good.’ L75A, quoting \textit{On Joseph}, 9.47-48 and 9.50, Ambrose 1972, 221.

\textsuperscript{76} Harrison to Pusey, 26 Aug. 1835, quoted above.

\textsuperscript{77} This is another of the few places where Jones quotes a patristic source. In this case, he finds the same doctrine of transfiguration through reading Old Testament types in Irenaeus’ reflections on Daniel 12:3, ‘That men of understanding shall shine as the brightness of the firmament’. See \textit{Irenaeus} 1872, Against Heresies IV.26.1, 384-5 and J250 note.
Jones in the ‘Lectures’, this description is somewhat speculative. However, Pusey’s approach to the evidence writers and to Hampden suggests that there are occasions when, for him, ‘reserve’ about principles is inappropriate and the exigencies or dangers of the times require an elucidation of problems.

Jones’ approach is not apologetic in the pejorative sense in which Pusey uses the term; he does not seek to limit the consideration of the figurative interpretation of Scripture according to strict categories and, particularly with regard to what he says about types in the natural world, he encourages the reader to see how types and figurative language are knit into the order of things. Pusey’s argument is a natural though significant development and exploration of the principles in Jones’ ideas. However, one could read Jones’ Lectures alongside Marsh’s work or that of Van Mildert on the interpretation of types without the clear sense that they were advocating a radically different kind of approach, whereas this is not possible with Pusey’s ‘Lectures’. Although one finds many elements of Pusey’s account in Jones’ Lectures, and Jones suggests the necessity of figurative interpretation, his argument does not put forward this necessity with the same clarity or force as Pusey. Pusey’s suggestion that Cain’s first sin was not murder, but the refusal to read the history of his parents typically, would seem out of place in Jones’ Lectures, whereas it is entirely in keeping with the sense of urgency and the polemical edge of the ‘Lectures’. Pusey develops the principles which Jones mentions in a way that Jones does not. Whether or not Jones would agree with this development, it is difficult to say, but, as we shall now see, even many supporters of the Movement did not.

7.2.3 The ‘Lectures’ in conflict with the High Church tradition

If recognizing the influence of High Church ideas on the ‘Lectures’ is illuminating, the way in which High Churchmen were disturbed by this part of the Tractarian project is also instructive. In addition to those who saw the Tractarians as unnecessarily polemical or out of step with their distinguished forebears, or others who saw them as dangerous Romanizers, even many of the allies of the Oxford Movement were critical of the way they looked to the Fathers and brought forward early Christian interpretation of the Bible. We
have already considered in Chapter 2 how H. J. Rose disagreed with the Tractarians’ assessment of evidence writing, an assessment which is a key part of the argument of the ‘Lectures’. In correspondence with Newman in May, 1836, Rose also emphasized that the Tractarian appeal to the Fathers must be guided by the formularies of the Church of England: ‘We are going on no voyage of discovery. We know exactly the extent of the shore.’\textsuperscript{78} Newman would express a contrary view in Tract 90 in his warning that if, in reading the Fathers, ‘a man begins by summoning them before him, instead of betaking himself to them, by seeking to make them evidence for modern dogmas, instead of throwing his mind upon the text … he will to a certainty miss their sense.’\textsuperscript{79} Bearing more directly on the ‘Lectures’, in 1899, Edward Marshall asked F. E. Brightman, one of the first librarians of Pusey House and a renowned liturgical scholar, if his notes on Pusey’s lectures on types, taken sixty years, before might be published.\textsuperscript{80} After consulting with the principal V. S. S. Coles, Brightman hoped that Marshall would let his ‘Notes’ ‘find a permanent home in this library’, but added that ‘the publication might not be very successful’. With the recent publication of ‘the five volumes of the Life and the Letters’, and with another biography forthcoming by Mrs. Trench, Brightman thought that ‘perhaps people could feel overwhelmed by more Pusey literature’.\textsuperscript{81} In a sentence which appears to be the key to the others he adds, ‘And besides the subject matter being what it is, their publication might revive discussions which have been more or less lulled of late.’ Brightman clearly implies that he does not think it would be a good thing to rekindle the sort of discussions which the ‘Lectures’ might encourage. In this context, Brightman’s comments earlier in the letter that ‘the notes seem to represent a

\textsuperscript{78} H. J. Rose quoted in Nockles 1994, 117. See Nockles 113-9 for the ‘contrast between an essentially conservative High Church theory of Tradition and a more dynamic Tractarian theory’ (p. 113).

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid. 114.

\textsuperscript{80} F. E. Brightman (1856–1932) to Marshall, 3 Feb. 1899, appended to ‘Notes’, Marshall’s notebook. Since ‘no other memoranda of the Lectures are available in print’ the notebook ‘may be of interest as well for their value as for the view which they give of the Lecturer’s method of Instruction at this early period of his career’. M-Obs, preface.

\textsuperscript{81} Brightman refers to Liddon’s Life and Pusey 1898, The Spiritual Letters of E. B. Pusey. Mrs. Trench, the daughter of Abp Trench of Dublin, wrote The Story of Dr. Pusey’s Life.
side of Pusey’s teaching which is not so fully represented’ and that ‘they belong to a period early in his career’, seem to be a kind of disavowal, a dissociation of the views which one finds in the ‘Lectures’ from Pusey’s mature position. One assumes that the Principal with whom he consulted shared this view, or at least acquiesced in it.

While Liddon sometimes adopts a reverential approach to his subject, he is more guarded about Pusey’s efforts to revive a patristic interpretation of the Old Testament types and prophecies. When compared to the attention which he devotes to Pusey’s Tracts on the subject of Holy Baptism, or even his books on German theology, Liddon barely mentions the ‘Lectures’, explaining that they were never published because their author ‘was never sufficiently well satisfied with them, and they only exist in a fragmentary and imperfect form among his papers’.  

This comment, standing alone as it does, does not adequately describe the serious labour which the ‘Lectures’ represent, or their place either in Pusey’s thought or in the work of the Oxford movement. Liddon’s description of Pusey’s lack of satisfaction with the ‘Lectures’ appears to represent his own view, not just of their form, but of their contents, suggesting Andrew Louth’s assessment that Liddon found the ‘Lectures’, ‘it would seem, much too strange and disturbing’. This suspicion partly explains why Marshall’s ‘Notes’ were never published and Pusey’s ‘Lectures’ were virtually unknown until Alf Härdelin discussed their importance in his book on The Tractarian Understanding of the Eucharist (1965) and Donald Allchin made them the focus of his essay ‘The Theological Vision of the Oxford Movement’ (1967).

One can assess the possible responses to the ‘Lectures’, had they been known more widely, by considering how other publications which were part of the Tractarians’ effort to revive patristic interpretation and a patristic mind were received. Richard Church*, one of the leaders of the younger generation of the Oxford Movement and a close friend of Newman, offers such an

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82 Life, 399.
83 Louth 1984, 31.
84 Härdelin 1965 and Allchin 1967.
example.\textsuperscript{85} In his sympathetic treatment of the Oxford Movement, Dean Church argues that Keble’s Tract ‘On the Mysticism attributed to the Early Fathers of the Church’ and Williams’ Tracts ‘On Reserve’ were ‘out of place’ and became ‘potent weapons against Tractarianism’. While Church calls these two Tracts ‘innocent in themselves’, his assessment does suggest serious criticism: ‘The cause of the movement needed clear explanations; definite statements of doctrines which were popularly misunderstood; plain, convincing reasoning on the issues where we raised by it’. While Keble met this need in ‘masterly exposition of the meaning of Tradition’, his Tract on mysticism was of an entirely different character.\textsuperscript{86} Church writes:

It was hardly what the practical needs of the time required, and it took away men’s thoughts from them; the prospect was hopeless that in that state of men’s minds it should be understood, except by a very few; it merely helped to add another charge, that vague but mischievous charge of mysticism, to the list of accusations against the Tracts.\textsuperscript{87}

Keble was well aware of the dangers of being associated with mysticism: ‘it touches the very string, which most certainly moves contemptuous thought, in those who have imbibed the peculiar spirit of our time’.\textsuperscript{88} However, Tract 89 endeavours to show precisely why it was necessary to address this accusation. Moreover, as we have seen already, Keble’s Tract was part of a project of rediscovery which was the forum in which the Tractarians developed ideas central to their thought. Without the kind of investigation in which they were engaged, the attempt to promote patristic biblical interpretation would simply be an unsubstantiated assertion of one part of the tradition over another. Moreover, Pusey argues in the ‘Lectures’, as does Keble in Tract 89 and Newman in sermons and Tracts, that there was a danger in doing what Dean Church advocated, offering ‘plain, convincing reasoning on the issues’. The Tractarians argued that one of the chief problems of the day was an over-

\textsuperscript{85} *Church, Richard William (1815-90). Charles Marriott introduced Church to Newman and Keble in 1835. He was elected to a fellowship at Oriel in 1838. After twenty years in the ‘obscure Somerset parish of Whatley’ he was appointed Dean of St Paul’s, London, from 1871, when H. P. Liddon was a member of the chapter. G. Martin Murphy, ‘Church, Richard William (1815–1890)’, \textit{ODNB}.

\textsuperscript{86} Church 1897, 263. He refers to Keble 1836.

\textsuperscript{87} Church 1897, 264.

\textsuperscript{88} T89, I.2, 3.
reliance on such plain-reason, and that an appreciation of this problem must inform both theological argument in general and the interpretation of the Bible in particular. Dean Church’s assessment rejects that connection.

The second Tract that Church criticizes was, as we have seen, another one directly connected to the argument of ‘Lectures’ and to the Tractarians’ efforts to recover and promote patristic exegesis more generally. Church describes Isaac Williams’ first Tract ‘On Reserve in Communicating Religious Knowledge’ as ‘written in the most devout and reverent spirit by one of the gentlest and most refined of scholars, and full of deep Scriptural knowledge’. 89 However, despite its commendable qualities, Church argues that ‘it could well have been spared at the moment, and it certainly offered itself to unfortunate use’. 90 Due to Williams’ Tracts on Reserve, critics of the Oxford Movement could accuse its adherents of trying to keep back the ‘whole counsel of God’ and of promoting ‘secret and crooked methods’. Church believed that such was the opposition to Williams’ ideas that he had come to be regarded ‘almost as the most wicked and dangerous of the Tractarians’. 91 The assessment of the evangelical journal The Record, the same journal which had criticised Pusey’s Tracts on baptism, shows the accuracy of Church’s description:

… the character of these tracts is mysticism rendered plausible by metaphysical and sophistical reasoning. The temper and spirit is Gnostic and superstitious. Everything mysterious is almost too sacred to be handled. The reverence expressed is morbid, quite alien from the healthful spirit of the Scriptures but in harmony with that of the ascetics and contemplative devotees. 92

H. J. Rose had predicted such an assessment. In the letter to Newman where he urged the usefulness of evidences, Rose also questioned the expediency of ‘adopting mystery in any shape we can get it as a counterpoise to

89 Church 1897, 264.
90 Ibid. 265.
91 Ibid. 76.
92 The Record (27 Aug. 1840) quoted in Boneham 2009, 58. For further examples of the condemnation which Williams’ Tracts aroused, see pp. 57-63. For similar criticisms of Newman’s principle of disciplini arcani, see King 2009, 132-5, 253-4.
utilitarianism’. Rose added his prescient caution ‘I doubt the expediency – for it obviously lays us open to very plausible misrepresentation’.

While Rose and Church were obviously correct about the ‘plausible misrepresentation’ of the Tracts written by Keble and Williams, their conclusion that they could be ‘kept back’ displays a gulf of understanding between Rose and Church on one side, and the Tractarians on the other, about the importance of typical or mystical interpretations of Scripture, as well as the theological framework to which such interpretations inevitably belong. As we saw above, Pusey saw Williams’ Tracts on the principle of reserve as the most important of the Tracts for the Times. The idea that the communication of religious knowledge in a veiled way is providentially ordered by God to address the necessary conditions of spiritual knowledge is fundamental to Pusey, Newman, and Keble’s description of typology and allegory. Moreover, Church’s view of Keble’s Tract 89 that ‘It was hardly what the practical needs of the time required’ is the opposite of the view which Pusey takes in the ‘Lectures’, that the dangers facing the age were best exposed and addressed through urging the necessity of recovering both the exegetical practices and the theological vision of the early Church.

Whereas Church’s assessment was in accord with that of Brightman about the merits of leaving the ‘Lectures’ unpublished, lest they ‘revive’ unwelcome discussions, Church’s mentor Newman saw the ‘Lectures’ as exactly what the needs of the age demanded. In September, 1839, Newman wrote Pusey about David Friedrich Strauss’s radical reconstruction of the New Testament accounts of the life of Christ in his Leben Jesu (1835). In it, Strauss attributes the supernatural elements of the Gospels to the myth that developed between the death of Jesus and the writing of the Gospels at a later second-century date. To address the challenge of Strauss’s book Newman

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93 H. J. Rose to J. H. Newman, 11 Oct. 1838, ‘Newman Papers: “British Critic”, 1836 – 1841’. Rose refers to an article in the British Critic: ‘It is as clearly the Church’s time to be mysterious now, as it was its part to be enlightened in the middle ages. Mystery fits in with this age exactly; it suits it; it is just what the age wants, if it only knew what its wants were.’ Anon. 1838b, 397.

94 David Friedrich Strauss (1808-74). Appointed Lecturer on Hegelian philosophy at Tubingen University in 1832. He was influenced by Schleiermacher and later Hegel.
proposes, not an apologetic demonstration of the weaknesses of Strauss’s argument, but rather Pusey’s account of typological interpretation in the ‘Lectures’: ‘Strauss’s book is said to be doing harm at Cambridge. The only way to meet it is by your work on Types. I think so.” The argument of this thesis is that, according to the terms of the ‘Lectures’ and the project of which they are a part, it is Newman’s assessment, not Church’s implied one, that is correct.

7.3 The Typological Integration of Theology and Spirituality

One clue to the issues which might be involved in the suspicion which the Tractarians’ study and use of patristic theology aroused, and which also connects the project of the ‘Lectures’ with issues of our day, may be found in the way very little attention is given to how Pusey or the other Tractarians interpreted the Bible. In his study of the Oxford Movement, Brad Faught emphasizes the importance of biblical scholarship for the Tractarians: ‘the Tractarians’ view of Scripture was of vital importance to the development of the Movement, and in the hands of John Henry Newman, Edward Pusey, and John Keble especially an identifiable position can be discerned’. In the light of both Keble’s Tract 89 and Pusey’s ‘Lectures’, Andrew Louth argues that with the ‘question of the interpretation of Scripture … we touch the very nerve of the Oxford Movement’. He writes: ‘to address ourselves to the subject of “the Oxford Movement, the Fathers, and the Bible” is far from being a curious and somewhat arbitrary inquiry, but one that goes right to the heart of the innermost concerns of the Oxford divines’. Nonetheless, not much is written specifically about how Pusey or the other Tractarians interpreted the Bible compared to the attention given to other matters. Brad Faught writes: ‘While very much has been written about its leading personalities and the intensity of the controversies they provoked, very little work has been done on the way in

96 Faught 2008, 135-146, 136.
97 Louth 1984, 31.
which the Oxford men … viewed and handled Scripture’.\textsuperscript{98} This echoes the assessment of Andrew Louth: ‘The Oxford Movement was not noted for Biblical scholarship’.\textsuperscript{99} Nockles discusses the way in which the Tractarians understood the rule of faith in relation to Scripture, but primarily in terms of an historical rather than theological assessment of how they drew on patristic antiquity.\textsuperscript{100} As we have seen, in the 1830s Pusey, Keble, and Newman worked out their understanding of the interpretation of the Bible through the study of the typological and allegorical interpretations of the ancient Church. It is precisely because of this approach to the Bible, what Pusey called a catholic principle, that theology students today are unlikely to encounter careful study of Augustine or Origen, Irenaeus or Chrysostom, as part of introductory courses to biblical studies. Mainstream trends in biblical scholarship since the days of the Tractarians suggest that modern historical, textual, literary, or linguistic analyses offer access to objective truth in a way the Fathers cannot.\textsuperscript{101}

Seeking further, a clue which may explain, at least in part, the scholarly neglect of the Tractarians as interpreters of the Bible is William Sanday’s separation of ‘science and adequate knowledge’ from ‘innate kinship of Spirit’ in his description of what is needed to write a modern life of Christ.\textsuperscript{102} As we saw above, this division suggests that ‘kinship of Spirit’ is a pietistic attitude distinct from knowledge rather than, according to the understanding of knowledge as participation, an epistemological necessity. The separation of theoretical knowledge from sensibility or a pattern of life is symptomatic of what Mark McIntosh in his book \textit{Mystical Theology: the Integrity of Spirituality and Theology}, describes as a kind of ‘divorce’ between theology and spirituality and between doctrine and prayer which he suggests has been

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{98} Faught 2008, 135.
\item \textsuperscript{99} Louth 1984, 30.
\item \textsuperscript{100} Nockles 1994, 20, 113-8.
\item \textsuperscript{101} See Ayres 2004, 31-2 for his comments on ‘negative judgements about fourth-century exegesis’ and the need to understand early Christian exegesis ‘outside explicit or implicit comparison with modern academic practices’.
\item \textsuperscript{102} Sanday 1906, 240, discussed at 3.3.1.
\end{itemize}
common since at least the second half of the twentieth century.\(^{103}\) McIntosh’s assessment is shared by many other scholars. Andrew Louth has written about this in terms of a ‘dissociation between thought and feeling, between the mind and the heart’ which characterizes ‘modern culture and society’.\(^{104}\) This dissociation of sensibility manifests itself, Louth argues, in terms of ‘the division between theology and spirituality, the division between thought about God and the movement of the heart towards God’.\(^{105}\) Rowan Williams suggests that this split has even earlier sources, arguing that the ideas of medieval nominalism made it more difficult to give voice to the view ‘that Christian speculation is properly inseparable from engagement with the paradoxes of the cross and resurrection’.\(^{106}\) In his examination of the apophatic tradition, Denys Turner finds the division between theology and spirituality evident in the modern search for ‘a “mystical” equivalent to sense experience’ which is distinct from and more ‘first-order’ than ‘second-order theoretical reflection upon the language of experience’, which Turner also calls the ‘the verbose element of theology’.\(^{107}\) Partly because of this artificial separation, the apophatic language of the mystical tradition is psychologised and reduced to the descriptions of inner states which belong to one side of the modern division of sensibility. Ironically, by this move the apophatic encounter with God is no longer conceived as a negation of experience which ‘decentres’ or ‘disintegrates the experiential structures of selfhood’, but rather as a foundational subjective experience.\(^{108}\) In Pusey’s terms, this form of spiritual empiricism is dangerously anthropocentric and needs to be decentred so that we may see ‘the order and correspondences and harmonies of things … from the centre, which is God Himself’.\(^{109}\)

\(^{103}\) McIntosh 1998, 4, 10.
\(^{104}\) Louth 1989, 1.
\(^{105}\) Ibid. 2.
\(^{106}\) R. Williams quoted in McIntosh 1998, 75.
\(^{108}\) Ibid. 251. Drawing on MacIntyre 1984, Lewis Ayres similarly describes the way “emotivism” hides itself under the the guise of a language from an older era’. Ayres 2004, 402.
\(^{109}\) Scr.HB., 5. See also L2 above.
One way of reading the ‘Lectures’ would be to consider Pusey as attempting to offer a form of marriage counselling in the early stages of the divorce between theology and spirituality and theological anthropology and cosmology. In this sense, Sanday’s description of the need for a union of ‘kinship of spirit’ and ‘science’ is a description of a modern tragedy. In the approach which Pusey advocates in the ‘Lectures’, wonder, reverence, and a feeling mind are together essential elements of spiritual vision and adequate knowledge. Scientific tools are helpful, especially in order to investigate the human and earthy elements of the medium of revelation. However, no adequate knowledge of God and His ways is possible without the transformation by which a person becomes like God. Pusey’s account of knowledge as participation assumes that a God-given and ongoing kinship of spirit is the beginning of any study of Scripture and the search for the religious element or substance of prophecy.

It may be that the integrated theological vision which the ‘Lectures’ offer contributed to the disquiet which Pusey and his colleagues’ efforts to revive the patristic interpretation of the Bible encountered among sympathizers, as much as the more obvious and easily accessible concerns about authority and tradition. We have seen that ‘this system of the Ancient Church … perceives a harmony in Holy Scripture that this system allows no word of God to “fall to the ground,” but gathers up all diligently that “nothing be lost”’. Pusey finds an analogy between the harmony in Scripture and God’s ‘scheme of Creation’ by which ‘the lowest things bear a certain relation to the highest, attesting the unity of their Author’.\textsuperscript{110} According to this view, Pusey argues: ‘it is agreeable to the connection of His Word with his word, that this should, even in what seems the most incidental and insignificant detail of it, speak of Him, Who spoke it, be penetrated with Him, Who is its and our Life’.\textsuperscript{111} The details of which Pusey speaks include not only the typical people, events, or words of the Bible, but also types in the natural world and in human history. Pusey’s theory of type and typical prophecy is all-encompassing, linking the types and

\textsuperscript{110} T67rev., 389-90.
\textsuperscript{111} T67rev., 390.
prophecies of the Old Testament with an account of the soul and all created things, which are also, in different ways and degrees, types and images. These types are providentially knit together and seek, by the work of the Spirit which completes and gives reality to the type, an eschatological fulfilment in the Archetype who is the express image of the Father. While this Christian, Platonic, and Romantic longing for union represents one important current of thought shaping both the modern sense of identity and theological study, it is also one that moves against the ‘Spirit of the Age’ represented in the separation, for example, of theology from biblical studies and spirituality, or of science from religion. In his study of Keble’s account of the mystical interpretation of the Fathers, Ephraim Radner asks a question which displays Pusey’s sense of the necessity of typical interpretation:

Can one hold to the breadth of Scripture’s revelatory reach, bow to the creative sovereignty of God within our temporal lives, embrace the coherent character of nature’s divinely transparent sheaths, and run after the transforming allure of the purified soul – can one inhabit this vision of the world without traversing Scripture’s figurated terrain? Radner’s response, that ‘An answer to this kind of question is not easily offered’ and comments also that such an approach can seem ‘intrinsically unnatural, foreign, and perhaps even dangerously ideological’, is revealing.

He brings out well the sense of disquiet or incomprehension which the project of the ‘Lectures’ aroused in the mid-nineteenth century and which the advocacy of allegory as a serious form of biblical study can still stir up now. Pusey’s account of type and the theological vision in which it makes sense is, no doubt, incomplete and displays many imperfections. However, the ‘Lectures’ offer a coherent argument for the importance of a typological or allegorical approach to reading both Scripture and the book of God’s works, as well as for approaching theological questions more generally. Pusey’s argument also suggests the elements which will be part of any endeavour to

112 See Ayres 2004, 392–404 for the development of ‘the common modern fourfold division of theology into four sub-fields of systematics, Church history or historical theology, biblical studies, and practical or pastoral theology’.
113 Radner 2004, 88.
114 Ibid. 88, 80.
rediscover the necessary unity of theology and spirituality, placing an account of the soul alongside the interpretation of the Bible, and suggesting the importance of seeing these elements in the context of an all-embracing view of creation and redemption which ‘allows no word of God to “fall to the ground,” but gathers up all diligently that “nothing be lost”’. 
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