Anselm of Canterbury and the Development of Theological Thought, c. 1070-1141

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Anselm of Canterbury and the Development of Theological Thought, c. 1070-1141
Judith R. Dunthorne

Abstract

This thesis explores the role of Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) in the development of theological thought in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. It aims to demonstrate that Anselm’s thought had a greater impact on the early development of scholastic theology than is often recognized, particularly in the areas of the doctrine of the incarnation and redemption, but also in his discussion of freedom and sin. Through his explanation of the economy of salvation in terms of making satisfaction for sin, and his rejection of modes of discussion that focussed on the rights and role of the devil, Anselm’s writing on the theology of the redemption provided a framework for the discussion of later authors such as Hugh of St Victor, Peter Abelard, Bernard of Clairvaux and authors associated with the School of Laon, among others. Such discussion often utilized Anselm as an explicator of difficult passages in patristic theology, notably Augustine, and his work was most controversial when he was thought to have contradicted earlier authority. Anselm was involved in contemporary polemics with both Jews and Christian theologians, as well as producing works that explored profound theological and metaphysical ideas. In his emphasis on the place and role of reason in divine questions, he crossed the boundaries between ‘monastic’ and ‘scholastic’ thought. Through an exploration of Anselmian elements in the thought of a variety of authors from the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, this thesis aims to contribute to a broadening understanding of the legacy of this great thinker.
Anselm of Canterbury and the Development of Theological Thought, c. 1070-1141.

Judith R. Dunthorne

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Table of Contents

Abbreviations 4

Acknowledgements 7

Preface 9

Chapter 1 – Cur Deus homo - The Necessity of Satisfaction 18

Chapter 2 – Cur Deus homo – The Rights of the Devil 57

Chapter 3 – Cur Deus homo – Jewish-Christian Disputation 82

Chapter 4 – Freedom and the Will 108

Chapter 5 – Original Sin and the Sinless Christ 144

Chapter 6 – God and the Trinity 181

Conclusions 201

Appendix – Manuscript Distribution Tables 203

Bibliography 211
# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHDLMA</td>
<td>Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCM</td>
<td>Corpus christianorum continuatio mediaevalis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCSL</td>
<td>Corpus christianorum series latina.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSEL</td>
<td>Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum.</td>
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</table>


PL – *Patrologia latina*.

RB – *Revue bénédictine*.

RTAM - *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*.


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Preface

This thesis sets out to explore in more detail than has hitherto been the case, the extent to which Anselm of Canterbury’s thought was influential upon the immediate generations following his death. Anselm (1033-1109) is regularly counted one of the most influential of medieval thinkers, the heir to the Fathers and the harbinger of new intellectual questions and explorations in the high medieval schools. While it makes no particular claim to being a completely comprehensive study, the present discussion is the first to explore the afterlife of Anselmian questions amongst the generations of scholars in north-western Christendom until the 1140s in a wide perspective. Anselm’s thought was influential in his immediate surroundings at his monasteries of Bec and at Canterbury, and within the ‘School’ of Laon responsible for the beginning of the Glossa Ordinaria and associated with early Sentence collections from Anselm of Laon and his brother Ralph. Anselm’s ideas can be traced in the thought of Peter Abelard and Hugh of St Victor in the Parisian schools, as well amongst early Cistercian writers, Bernard of Clairvaux and William of St Thierry prominent amongst them. A final group of authors considered are those connected with Christian-Jewish dialogue and polemical texts of the first half of the twelfth century. Later scholars did not always consider the questions by which Anselm was intrigued, and on which he spent his own intellectual and prayerful energies, with the same enthusiasm; his reputation and influence were not consistent. Nevertheless his questions play a more prominent role in the development of twelfth-century theological thinking, and amongst a wider range of contemporary figures, than has previously been allowed.

Sir Richard Southern declared in his first monograph treatment of Anselm that:

He touched the thought, the piety and the politics of the time at every point; and whatever he touched looked different afterwards. He founded no school, and in many ways the immediate future turned against his methods and ideas. Ironically, his influence was most conspicuous where it was least personal – in the sphere of politics. His own pupils, though stirred into activity by his large and perceptive spirit, went their various ways. They left no easily recognisable impress on the future. Yet they helped, by collecting his works, by recording his conversation, by
adding their own more commonplace, though not negligible appendices to the body of his writings, to keep his influence alive.¹

Southern was certainly not wrong to emphasize Anselm’s political influence, and it is equally true that he founded no school. Whether, and if so in what ways, the generations immediately after his death, did move away from his methods and ideas will be explored in more detail. Anselm’s influence was a large one, perhaps larger than those pupils closest to him, and it is by virtue of that fact to a great extent, that the question of his immediate legacy is complex and to be found in a wider range of locations.

Anselm’s influence on the later twelfth century schools, and certainly the thirteenth-century masters, is well established, and the subject of much recent scholarship.² His earlier influence has not been so well studied, nor his influence always given its due place. This is partly perhaps because of historiographical habit, and partly because of the habit of twelfth-century authors of not acknowledging their sources and debts, particularly amongst modern authorities. In a similar manner to the difficulties in identifying Anselm’s own sources of influence, ideas have to be traced in a number of forms, from direct borrowing or quotation, occasionally openly acknowledged, more often not, to whole areas where lines of thought have been absorbed, digested, and which re-emerge in a different context, expression and with different valance.

However, once undertaken the question of Anselmian influence becomes an area of fruitful investigations. As Constant Mews has demonstrated, Anselm’s influence upon the early figures within northern French scholastic writing, such as William of Champeaux and Abelard, can be established as formative.³ The present discussion is cast as a contribution to this on-going exercise. As will be shown below, Anselm’s thought was debated at the School of Laon, in so far as the Sententiae attributed to Master Anselm and his brother Ralph, can be securely dated. The form of reception in this context is important. Anselm’s ideas were not adopted tout court, but epitomized, and as a result somewhat distorted. Nevertheless, by breaking down Anselmian ideas into manageable formulae for teaching purposes, early twelfth-century masters helped to ensure that the basic principles of his thought, notably of

Cur Deus homo, were available in a form that could be used easily in the scholastic environment, and that his ideas could gain a central place in contemporary debate on the redemption.

Anselm’s theological vision was also discussed in detail at the school of St Victor in Paris, and was an important source for Hugh of St Victor’s account of the theological development in his major treatise De sacramentis christianae fidei (c. 1130-37). In De sacramentis, Hugh used Anselmian arguments concerning the necessity of the incarnation of the God-man in order to make satisfaction for sin, in a passage that was later used by Peter Lombard in his Sententiae and his commentary on Romans. Through his influence on Lombard, as well as the continued and widespread popularity of De sacramentis itself, Hugh was one of the major channels through which Anselm’s argument entered the mainstream of scholastic thought from the mid-twelfth century onwards, up to the resurgence of his thought in the later twelfth and early thirteenth century.

As Southern pointed out, Anselm’s posthumous memory was preserved in the two monastic communities in which he lived, and whose members he led. Anselm as saintly figure, as monastic guide, and as the figure whose resistance to William Rufus and Henry I of England remained the subject of political and historical narrative, was preserved particularly. It should be noted that the present thesis will not explore questions of the impact and influence of Anselm’s ethical or political thought; nor will it explore his legacy in terms of affective piety and prayer. Rather, the focus will be squarely laid upon his influence on doctrinal issues, and the development of theological thought within the first half of the twelfth century. The major figures on whom his influence can be identified in creative or in critical modes have been mentioned above. In what follows it is particular areas of doctrinal development that will form the structural basis for discussion. In this, pre-eminent place is given to the understanding of the redemption of mankind. In terms of the necessity of the incarnation and atonement, the rights of the devil, and the particular circumstances of Jewish-Christian writings, Anselm’s thought is readily identifiable as a major reference point for twelfth-century scholars. Other areas to be considered are the related subjects of free will, original sin, and the Trinity.

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5 Peter Lombard, Sententiarum libri quattuor, ed. J. Hamesse, Corpus christianorum. Thesaurus patrum latinorum (Turnhout, 1991), 3.20.2; Commentaria in epistolam ad Romanos, PL, 191, 1301-1534, 5.8-10.
Of Anselm’s theological treatises, *Cur Deus homo* had the greatest impact on thought in the early twelfth century. In it, Anselm explored the reasons why God became incarnate and died on the cross in order to redeem humanity. Earlier writing on the redemption typically presented it in terms of a contest between God and the devil for lordship over man. There was a long history in patristic texts of analogies for the redemption that relied on the idea that, in sin, man had voluntarily placed himself under the devil’s jurisdiction so that he could not justly be rescued by God without infringing on the devil’s rights. In order for man to be redeemed justly, the devil had to give up his claims over him. Patristic authors suggested numerous analogies to describe how God could justly achieve this, and their images remained popular throughout the medieval period. However, Anselm rejected them completely. He denied that the devil had any right to hold power over man, and that God had no need to take his claims into account in the redemption.

Instead of a battle between God and the devil, Anselm presented the redemption as being concerned solely with the relationship between God and man. His argument focused on man’s need to make satisfaction for sin in order to be reconciled with God and enter into the eternal beatitude for which he had been created. By dishonouring God through sin, man incurred a debt that he could never hope to pay; even the entire created universe would be insufficient payment. The immutability of divine justice meant that satisfaction needed to be made for sin before man could enter the heavenly kingdom. Otherwise, sin would go unpunished and God’s honour would not be restored. As it was impossible for such disorder and injustice to exist in God’s good universe, it was necessary for satisfaction to be made by man for his sin. Only man owed this debt, but only God could pay it; nothing less than God was of sufficient value. Therefore, God became man, so that the incarnate God-man Christ could offer his life as payment for the sins of humanity and make the atonement that would allow man’s full reconciliation with God and restoration to his place in the heavenly kingdom.

Anselm devoted the majority of *Cur Deus homo* to an extended discussion of his satisfaction theory of the redemption, the argument that only one who was both God and man could make just and sufficient atonement for sin. However, he also addressed an alternative explanation of the redemption, which was popular among patristic and early medieval writers. This explanation discussed man’s redemption in terms of a cosmic battle between

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7 For discussion of specific examples, see Chapter 2.
God and the devil for power over man, in which the devil was utterly defeated. It was widely held that, when man first sinned, he handed himself over to the devil’s power. Some authors believed that this gave the devil certain rights over mankind, so that God could not justly seize man back from the devil’s grip by force. This concept of the devil’s rights led to explanations of the redemption which aimed to demonstrate how Christ’s death could justly liberate man, by manoeuvring the devil into giving up his own rights. Patristic and medieval authors used a variety of analogies to describe how Christ’s incarnation and crucifixion allowed this to happen, and there was no single universal theory behind it. However, the prevalence of ideas which depended on the premise that the devil had some right to power over man was such that it is possible to identify a genre of *ius diaboli* argumentation. 8

Anselm’s discussion of the *ius diaboli* in *Cur Deus homo* was unusual for him in that he made use of a contemporary *sententia* from the school of Laon as a basis for the structure of his own writing, quoting a statement made by Ralph of Laon that he considered erroneous, and going on to refute it in some detail. This provides a clear example of Anselm’s interest in contemporary discussion in the schools, and his concern to correct what he saw as inconsistencies and false doctrine in their teaching. Anselm rejected the *ius diaboli*, and the various images associated with it, completely. Not only were there no grounds on which the devil could claim a just right to power over man, or the right to be treated ‘justly’ by God; discussions of Christ’s death in terms of a ransom or trap for the devil must also be rejected absolutely, on the grounds that the God of justice and truth could never be involved in an act of deception.

Later *sententiae* from Laon, and the writings of other early twelfth-century authors, reveal a mixed reception of Anselm’s argument concerning the devil. While authors such as

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8 Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob*. *Patrologia latina* (hereafter PL), 75, 505-76, 782, 33.7.14, and Rufinus of Aquileia, *Expositio symboli*, ed. M. Simonetti, *CCSL*, 20 (Turnhout, 1961), pp. 133-182, 14, both used the image of the devil being hooked like a fish using the bait of Christ’s human flesh. Augustine, *DT*, 13.15.19, Augustine, *Sermo* 130, *PL*, 38, 725-8, 2, and Leo the Great, *Sermo* 22, 3-4, used a similar analogy of the cross as a trap for the devil. These analogies work on the principle that when the devil abused his rights by attempting to exert power over Christ, who was not under his jurisdiction, he could justly be deprived of his rights to power over the rest of humanity. Closely linked to the ‘abuse of power’ model was the ‘ransom’ model, which has roots in the statement in St Matthew’s Gospel, that the Son of Man came ‘to give his life as a ransom for many’ (Matthew 20:28). In his *Commentarium in evangelium secundum Matthaeum*, ed. R. Girot, *Sources chrétiennes*, 162 (Paris, 1970), Origen explained that the life of Jesus was given to the devil as a ransom for humanity. Having paid the ransom, God could justly remove man from the devil’s power, while the devil was deceived into thinking he could exert power over Christ and utterly defeated by Christ’s superior strength. Augustine’s account in *DT* did demonstrate some ambiguity regarding the legitimacy of the devil’s claim that he had a just right to power over man, discussed below (p. 63). However, any account of the redemption that relied on the need for God to treat the devil’s claims with justice inevitably implied that the devil had some form of just right to those claims. Gustaf Aulén described this form of thinking as the ‘Classical model’ of the redemption, which was challenged by Anselm’s ‘Latin model’ of the Atonement. Aulén, *Christus Victor. An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement*, trans. A.G. Herbert (Eugene, Oregon, 1931).
Hugh of St Victor and Peter Abelard appreciated the logic of his argument, others were reluctant to jettison an image that had such a powerful emotive appeal. Southern claims that ‘it may be said at once that the verdict of Anselm’s immediate successors was against him’, and that ‘even those...who appreciated the rest of his argument, were unwilling to abandon the rights of the devil’.\(^9\) According to Southern, only Peter Abelard accepted Anselm’s rejection of the rights of the devil wholeheartedly.\(^10\) This is an exaggeration; as well as Abelard, Hugh of St Victor, Bernard of Clairvaux, Odo and Herman of Tournai and some of the later Laon authors followed Anselm in rejecting the notion that the devil had any just right to power over man, although Bernard in particular continued to make use of traditional imagery associated with the *ius diaboli* in his polemical writing. Anselm’s satisfaction theory was not necessarily seen as incompatible with earlier models of the redemption that concentrated on the battle between God and the devil, and a number of authors combined elements of both in their writing.\(^11\)

Anselm’s rejection of an idea that had been dominant in patristic and early medieval literature may have led to fears that he was contradicting authoritative teaching, abandoning what had been considered sufficient for the catholic faith for centuries in favour of his own novel ideas. As in his discussion of the concept of ‘necessity’ in the redemption, discussed in the previous chapter, Anselm sought to clarify the teaching of the Church and its authorities, notably Augustine, and to bring greater consistency to the mass of ideas and images contained within earlier works. Where traditional images, such as the ‘rights of the devil’ idea, were incompatible with the demands of logic, Anselm was willing to abandon them in favour of alternative approaches. The varied weighting given to the competing demands of traditional ideas and rational argumentation by Anselm’s contemporaries and successors played a significant role in their responses to his approach to the problem of the *ius diaboli*.

The reception of *Cur Deus homo* in the schools of Laon, St Victor and Peter Abelard, is an area in which Anselm’s arguments concerning the necessity and justice or fittingness of the incarnation and redemption had immediate relevance to contemporary debate. Anselm’s work could be read as a commentary on Augustine, drawing together ideas that appeared at various points in Augustine’s writings, and providing a detailed and coherent analysis of key concepts and terminology. Apart from scholastic discussion, the arguments of *Cur Deus homo* also proved a useful source for the rising genre of disputation literature in the early

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\(^11\) This can be seen particularly in a number of works of Jewish-Christian disputation, discussed in Chapter 3.
twelfth century. By offering a reasoned explanation for the necessity of Christ’s incarnation and death in order to save humanity, Anselm’s satisfaction theory established a useful framework for writers such as Gilbert Crispin, Guibert of Nogent, Odo of Tournai and the author of the anonymous *Dialogus inter christianum et iudeum de fide catholica*.

With the exception of Odo of Tournai, these authors were relatively uninterested in theological and linguistic subtleties such as the different forms of necessity described by Anselm, and their accounts of the redemption presented simplified versions of his argument, along with generous quantities of scriptural quotation. Like Honorius Augustodunensis, whose account of the redemption in *Elucidarium* will be discussed in Chapter One, the authors of Jewish-Christian polemics were primarily concerned with providing a simple, irrefutable demonstration of the reasonableness and validity of the redemption. Anselm’s satisfaction theory was repeatedly combined with traditional images associated with the *ius diaboli* argument. Like Bernard of Clairvaux, to be discussed in Chapter Two, they were eager to harness the rhetorical power of such images to engage and inspire their audience, without necessarily being aware of, or concerned about, the reasons why Anselm had rejected their use as an explanation for the redemption.

One of the major themes of discussion on the incarnation and redemption in the early twelfth century concerned the relationship between divine justice and power, freedom and necessity. Anselm’s discussion of the necessity of the redemption in *Cur Deus homo* constituted a significant contribution to this discussion. However, the redemption was not the only subject in which the concept of freedom played a crucial role, and for which Anselm’s work provided a stimulus for discussion. In his early treatises *De libertate arbitrii* and *De casu diaboli* (1080s), and later in *De concordia* (c. 1107), Anselm discussed the meaning of freedom of choice, whether human, angelic or divine, and the relationship between human freedom, sin and grace. Anselm’s arguments in these texts enjoyed a mixed reception in the schools of the early twelfth century. In particular, passages where he appeared to go beyond or even contradict earlier authorities such as Augustine proved controversial, and were firmly rejected in texts from the school of Laon. Anselm’s thought on freedom was to a considerable extent derived from Augustine, but he presented his arguments in a new way, expanding concepts and definitions to encompass a broader frame of reference than his predecessor had conceived. In the attempt to present and interpret Anselm’s thought in a manner that was

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more obviously compatible with the traditional Augustinian framework, writers such as Honorius Augustodunensis and Hugh of St Victor gradually adapted Anselmian ideas into forms that had more immediate relevance and utility for contemporary discussion in the schools and beyond.

Following *Cur Deus homo*, Anselm returned to Christological concerns in his next treatise, *De conceptu uirginali et de originali peccato* (1099-1100), which asked how the sinless God-man could have been conceived from the *massa peccatrix* of fallen humanity, through the Virgin Mary. Anselm conceived *De conceptu* as a supplementary appendix to *Cur Deus homo*, returning to the further investigation of a question raised in the earlier work. Anselm’s discussion of the Virgin, conceived from the mass of sinful humanity, but purified and raised to a level of sanctity beyond anything else in creation, in order to be worthy of bearing the Son of God in her womb, fed into the growth in Marian theology and devotion in the twelfth century, particularly the controversy surrounding the doctrine and feast of the immaculate conception in England.

*De conceptu* also provided a distinctive contribution to discussion of the nature and transmission of original sin. Anselm’s approach differed from that of the majority of his contemporaries in that he defined original sin as injustice, rather than concupiscence. Only Odo of Tournai followed Anselm’s definition in the twelfth century, and his treatise *De peccato originali* was heavily influenced by Anselm’s work. The debate on the transmission of original sin as it developed during the early decades of the twelfth century was largely preoccupied with the problem of the origin of the soul, which had been declared unsolvable by Augustine, but was now considered a suitable subject for definition in the atmosphere of heightened confidence produced by the increasing systematization of theology in the schools. In his own writing on original sin, Anselm did not directly address the origin of the soul, and his assumed position has been the subject of debate, both at the school of Laon in the early twelfth century and among modern historians. As with *Cur Deus homo*, Anselm’s decision to write was motivated in part by his awareness of the questions and concerns facing his friends and colleagues both in monastic communities and the secular schools. Nevertheless, his alternative definition of original sin, and failure to approach the subject along similar lines to the general course of debate, meant that his argument did not fit easily into the broader framework of discussion in the schools or provide answers to the particular questions that

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were being asked by the majority of his contemporaries. The impact of *De conceptu* on the development of the doctrine of original sin in the early twelfth century was therefore limited.

Equally limited in its apparent impact was Anselm’s discussion of the Trinity, and the influence of his earlier writings, in particular the *Monologion* and *Proslogion*. Here, to return briefly to Southern’s statement quoted at the beginning of this preface, the evidence of manuscript production should be taken into account. While direct discussion of Anselm’s ideas on the relational aspects within the Godhead was limited, copies of his works were made, and their circulation was assured within the twelfth century. The later twelfth century and thirteenth century interest in these Anselmian questions draws on a more consistent engagement with Anselm in the century following his death.

The following chapters will trace Anselm’s influence on the development of redemption theology in particular amongst a wide range of authors within the first half of the twelfth century. Some, such as Gilbert Crispin are known to have studied under Anselm, and emerged from his own monastic communities; Eadmer of Canterbury, and possibly Honorius fit into this mould. Others, Abelard, Hugh of St Victor and Bernard represent different directions in which twelfth century thought could and would travel. All of the figures discussed here, whether perceived as major or more minor, played their part in the development of twelfth century thought, and all, whether in agreement or not, drew considerable inspiration from the Archbishop of Canterbury, and Prior and Abbot of Bec.

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Chapter One

Cur Deus homo and the Necessity of Satisfaction

Anselm’s aim in Cur Deus homo was to offer a rational explanation for the doctrine of the redemption, which relied on logic and reason rather than earlier authority. Instead of citing scriptural passages and patristic texts, he attempted to explain the redemption remoto Christo, removing the person of Christ altogether from his argument until he had demonstrated, by logical reasoning, that no other course of action would have been possible. Although he did not discuss the work of earlier authors explicitly, Anselm’s thought was firmly grounded in patristic authority; throughout his career, he took care to emphasize his orthodoxy, and refused to contemplate ideas that contradicted the doctrine of the catholic faith as it had developed through the work of earlier authorities. Nevertheless, as he explained in his commendation of Cur Deus homo to Pope Urban II, ‘even [the Fathers]...were not able to say all that they could have said if they had lived longer; and the reasoning of truth is so copious and profound that it cannot be exhausted by mortals.’ This consideration justified Anselm in going beyond the statements of earlier authors in order to develop a new model for understanding the redemption.

Anselm’s discussion of the necessity and justice of the incarnation and redemption explored questions that had been raised by earlier authors such as Augustine, and were the subject of debate among Anselm’s contemporaries, notably at the school of Laon. Although Augustine had argued that the incarnation of the Christ was the most fitting way for God to redeem mankind, he did not believe that this was the only possible option, and stressed that God could have chosen a different method, had he wished. Anselm’s claim that it was necessary for the redemption to be brought about through the incarnation and death of the God-man Christ was controversial, as it appeared to impose limitations on divine freedom and omnipotence. This was not in fact the case, and Anselm was careful to stress the complete freedom of God’s grace throughout the redemptive process. He distinguished between two different kinds of necessity, one of which compels action, while the other compels nothing, but results from the inevitable consequences of free choices already made. In this way, Anselm was able to argue that the incarnation was necessary without impinging on divine power and freedom. However, not all of his early commentators understood the

\[15\] Nam et illi, quia...non omnia quae possent, si diutius uixissent, dicere potuerunt; et ueritatis ratio tam ampla tamque profunda est, ut a mortalibus nequeat exhauriri. Anselm, CDH, Commendatio operis ad Urbanum Papam II.
subtleties of his thought on necessity, and the idea remained controversial in the twelfth century.

*Cur Deus homo* enjoyed a wide circulation soon after its composition.\(^{16}\) The prevalence of manuscript copies in schools and monastic houses in the early twelfth century suggests that it was considered a useful and important contribution to writing on the redemption. Evidence of discussion of his argument in the schools of Laon, St Victor and Peter Abelard indicates that Anselm’s claims regarding the necessity of the incarnation were of particular interest, and provoked considerable debate. The relationship between necessity and freedom, and the meaning of divine omnipotence, was an important subject of discussion in the schools of the early twelfth century, and the redemption offered an important case study for these broader concerns.\(^{17}\) In addition, Anselm’s discussion on the subject could be read as a commentary on statements made by Augustine, developing ideas that Augustine had discussed only briefly, and locating particular statements within a broader conceptual framework. The process of reading and interpreting Anselm in an Augustinian context can be seen in discussion at the schools of Laon and St Victor in particular, and will be a recurring theme in later chapters concerning different aspects of Anselm’s thought.

Although Anselm’s statements concerning the necessity of the incarnation remained controversial in the early twelfth century, his satisfaction theory enjoyed wide popularity. As well as being employed in scholastic texts by authors such as Hugh of St Victor, it was also adopted, in a simplified form, by authors such as Honorius Augustodunensis, who found in it a valuable means of explaining the incarnation and redemption to a less educated audience in terms that could be easily understood and that did not allow for rational doubt. The logical force of Anselm’s argument also made it suitable for use as the basis for polemical writing on the redemption, particularly in the context of Jewish-Christian disputations. The use of *Cur Deus homo* in disputation literature is the subject of Chapter Three.

Anselm’s rejection of the ‘rights of the devil’ (*ius diaboli*) also stimulated discussion in the early twelfth century. Although texts associated with the school of Laon continued to argue in terms of the devil’s just power over man, other authors such as Hugh of St Victor and Peter Abelard followed Anselm’s argument, and employed his description of the devil as

\(^{16}\) Thomas Bestul has identified forty-three surviving manuscripts from the twelfth century, as well as numerous references in contemporary library catalogues to manuscripts that are no longer extant. T. Bestul, ‘The Manuscript Tradition of *Cur Deus homo*,’ *Studia Anselmiana*, 128 (1999), pp. 285-307.

\(^{17}\) Anselm’s place in twelfth-century discussion of the nature of freedom and divine power outside the redemption are explored in Chapter 4. The meaning of human freedom, and its compatibility with divine grace and predestination, was an important concern for moral and pastoral teaching emphasizing personal responsibility for sin, as well as more metaphysical interests.
a rebel slave of God in their own discussions on the subject. Nevertheless, numerous authors whose accounts of the redemption in terms of satisfaction indicate that they were familiar with Anselm’s arguments in *Cur Deus homo* continued to employ analogies associated with the *ius diaboli* idea that Anselm had rejected, and apparently saw no incompatibility between the two forms of argument. Anselm’s approach to the *ius diaboli* concept, and its reception in the schools of the early twelfth century, will be discussed in Chapter Two. The current chapter will focus on the impact of Anselm’s satisfaction theory, and his arguments for the necessity of the incarnation, in the schools.

**Necessity: Anselm, Augustine and the School of Laon**

In patristic and early medieval thought, it was often argued that God could have chosen some other means of redeeming the human race, had he wished.  

18 God was omnipotent and limitless in his freedom; to suggest that God could not have saved the human race without being made man would be to impose insupportable constraints on divine power and freedom. On the other hand, why should God have chosen such a difficult and demeaning method, sending his own Son to suffer the shame and pains of mortal existence, culminating in an agonizing death on the cross, if he could have saved humanity with a simple word of divine command? As an attempt to resolve this problem, Augustine had turned to the concept of fittingness. Although God, ‘to whose power all things are equally subject, did not lack any other possible way’, ‘no other way [than the incarnation] was more fitting for healing our wretchedness.’  

19 Augustine went on to argue that the incarnation of the Son of God was necessary (*necessarium fuit*) in a sense, in order to demonstrate the extent and cost of God’s love for man.

In *Cur Deus homo*, Anselm explored the concept of fittingness in the incarnation, developing the idea beyond what could be found in Augustine’s work. For Anselm, fittingness meant acting according to the demands of justice and *rectitudo*. He had already explored the meaning of justice and *rectitudo* in his earlier treatises *De ueritate* and *De libertate arbitrii*, where he defined freedom and power in terms of the ability to act with perfect justice. Arbitrary action, which was not perfectly in line with justice, was not true

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19 *Non alium modum possibilem Deo defuisse, cujus potestati cuncta aequaliter subjacent; sed sanandae nostrae miseriae convenientiorem modum alium non fuisse*. Augustine, *DT*, 13.10.13.
freedom but a weakness, a liability to fall into injustice and sin.\textsuperscript{20} In \textit{Cur Deus homo}, Anselm applied his understanding of the meaning of justice, power and freedom in general to God’s action in the redemption in particular. The incarnation was necessary because any other course of action was incompatible with the demands of justice, and therefore unfitting for a just God. God’s perfect power and freedom meant that nothing could prevent him from acting in accord with his own just nature, and so he could not act in any other way.

Anselm was careful to avoid implying that the necessity of the incarnation imposed a limitation on divine power and freedom by compelling God to act in a particular way. He qualified his use of the term \textit{necessitas} by differentiating between the necessity that imposes external constraints on an agent (\textit{necessitas praecedens}) and the necessity that arises from the consequences of the agent’s prior decisions (\textit{necessitas sequens}).

For there is a preceding necessity, which is the cause for a thing’s being, and there is a consequent necessity, which the thing brings about. It is preceding and efficient necessity when it is said that ‘the sky revolves because it is necessary that it should revolve’; but it is consequent necessity which effects nothing but is itself brought about when I say ‘you are speaking by necessity, because you are speaking’. For when I say this, I mean that nothing can bring it about that, while you are speaking, you are not speaking; not that something is compelling you to speak.\textsuperscript{21}

It was necessity in the second sense that Anselm had in mind when he spoke of the ‘necessity’ of the incarnation. It was necessary that while God was just, he could not be unjust, but had to act in a manner that was fitting and in accord with the demands of justice and \textit{rectitudo}. God was not constrained to act as he did through any external, effectual necessity, but because to do so was his own will, immutable and infallible. ‘All these things were through necessity, because he himself so willed it...if he had not so willed, they would not have been.’\textsuperscript{22} Anselm was thus able to explain how Christ’s death on the cross was both necessary and free simultaneously, without any limitation being imposed on divine freedom and omnipotence.

\textsuperscript{20} For discussion of Anselm’s thought on this subject, see Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Est namque necessitas praecedens, quae causa ut sit res; et est necessitas sequens, quam res facit. Praecedens et efficiens necessitas est, cum dicitur caelum uoluit, quia necesse est ut uoluatur; sequens uero et quae nihil efficit sed fit, est cum dico te ex necessitate loqui, quia loqueris. Cum enim hoc dico, significo nihil facere posse, ut dum loqueris non loquaris, non quod aliquid te cogat ad loquendam. Anselm, CDH, 2.17.}

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Omnia ex necessitate fuisse, quia ipse uoluit...si non uoluisse, non fuissent. Ibid.}
The concept of the necessity of the incarnation was the subject of discussion at the school of Laon in the late eleventh century. A sententia attributed to Ralph of Laon asked why it was necessary for God himself to have become incarnate. Why could he not have sent an angel or a sinless man to redeem humanity instead? The author argued that no man was capable of redeeming man, because no man was free from sin. ‘If man were redeemed through a pure man, the corrupt would be liberated through the corrupt; but the corrupt could not redeem the corrupt. For the whole human race was corrupted through the sin of the first parent.’ With regard to the possibility of an angelic redeemer, the author argued that ‘the angelic nature was in part corrupted and if an angel were made incarnate it could certainly sin, its nature having been corrupted already through the sin of pride.’ This argument was repeated in another sententia, also attributed to Ralph of Laon, and which formed part of the same collection, appearing immediately before the sententia quoted here in the manuscript.

The sententia concluded that ‘no one else could free the human race, except he who was God. For it could not be done faithfully by anyone else, since a man or a pure angel could sin, if changed into flesh.’ Although he did not use the term necesse in this sententia, the author implied that the redemption could not reasonably have happened in any other way. The term necesse was used in two other sententiae attributed to Ralph. The first, after rejecting the idea that man could be saved either by an angel or a man, concluded with the statement that ‘it was necessary for God to become man as, because God cannot sin, he could strengthen the man united with him, so that he could in no way be conquered by temptation and sin.’ A further sententia, possibly the source for this one, also concluded that ‘it was necessary for the son of God to become man as, because God cannot sin, he could strengthen the man united with him so that he could not sin.’

The question of whether the redemption of mankind could have been brought about through a sinless man or an angel was repeated by Anselm in Cur Deus homo. Anselm’s response differed from that of the Laon author in that he did not admit the inevitable

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23 Si per purum hominem homo redimeretur, per corruptum corruptus liberaretur; sed corruptum corruptum redivere non potuit. Totem enim genus humanum per peccatum primi parentis erat corruptum. Sententia 232, ed. O. Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles (Gembloux, 1954), vol. 5, pp. 185-6.
24 Angelica enim natura in parte corrupta erat et si incarnaretur angelus, posset utique peccare cuius natura per peccatum superbie prius corrupta fuerat. Ibid.
27 Necesse ergo fuit ut Deus homo fieret, ut quia Deus peccare non potest, hominem sibi cœuntum ita confirmaret ut tentatione et peccato uinci nullo modo posset. Sententia 231, pp. 184-5.
29 Anselm, CDH, 1.5.
corruption of human and angelic nature to be a precluding factor. Human nature was only sinful through descent from Adam; God could create a new man in the same way as he had created Adam, who would still be free from sin. Although he did not address the notion of a saviour angel separately in this context, Anselm would not have agreed with the claim that the angelic nature had already been partially corrupted and retained the capacity to sin, which contradicted his belief that the angels who persevered were confirmed in their goodness so that they could no longer sin.\(^{30}\) It also implied that angels shared a common genus, an idea which Anselm rejected.\(^{31}\) However, the concluding statement in the \textit{sententia} expressed an opinion that was in concurrence with Anselm. ‘If a creature were to redeem the creature, the creature would then be subject to that creature, and in some way the dignity of man, who had been made in the image and likeness of God, would be diminished.’\(^{32}\) This was the argument used by Anselm in \textit{Cur Deus homo}:

Surely you understand that, were any other person to rescue man from eternal death, man would rightly be judged his slave? If he were such, he would in no way have been restored to that dignity which he would have had, if he had not sinned. For man, who had the prospect of being the slave of no one except God and equal to the good angels in everything, would be the slave of one who was not God and to whom the angels were not enslaved.\(^{33}\)

This passage in \textit{Cur Deus homo} demonstrates the extent to which Anselm was aware of contemporary debate in the schools, and concerned to make his own writing relevant to the issues of his day. Anselm’s particular awareness of, and interest in, contemporary teaching at the school of Laon, has been primarily attributed to his student Boso.\(^{34}\) According to Eadmer, and the \textit{Vita Bosonis} of Milo Crispin, Boso was an intelligent and well-educated young man who had come to the school at Bec troubled by perplexing questions, which he discussed with


\(^{31}\) Anselm, \textit{CDH}, 2.21.

\(^{32}\) \textit{Si creatura creaturam redimeret, utique creature creatura obnoxia esset, et quodam modo dignitas hominis inferioraretur qui ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei factus erat. Sententia 232.}

\(^{33}\) \textit{An non intelligas quia, quaecunque alia persona hominem a morte aeterna redimeret, eius seruus idem homo recte iudicaretur? Quod si esset, nullatenus restauratus esset in illam dignitatem, quam habiturum erat, si non peccasset: cum ipse, qui non nisi dei seruus et aequalis angelis bonis per omnia futures erat, seruus esset eius, qui deus non esset et cius angeli serui non essent. Anselm, CDH, 1.5.}

Anselm at length. Anselm later summoned Boso to join him at Canterbury.\textsuperscript{35} We know very little about Boso’s education before his arrival at Bec, and there is no mention of where he studied in the \textit{Vita Bosonis}, although Laon is highly probable.\textsuperscript{36} Anselm later acknowledged Boso and his questions as a major motivation for the composition of \textit{Cur Deus homo}.\textsuperscript{37} In a separate passage in \textit{Cur Deus homo}, addressing the concept that the devil had rights over man which God could not justly ignore, Anselm cited almost verbatim the Laon \textit{sententia}, albeit without reference to his source, and completely denied the validity of its argument. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Early twelfth-century sentence collections from Laon show that \textit{Cur Deus homo} was read and discussed there soon after its composition, and that Anselm’s arguments concerning the need for a God-man to make satisfaction for sin were quickly absorbed into the school’s teaching on the redemption. This can be seen particularly in the \textit{Sententie diuine pagine}.\textsuperscript{38} As with other sentence collections associated with the school of Laon, it is impossible to establish the precise dating and authorship of the text. René Silvain argued that it can be seen as a collection of \textit{reportationes} of the oral teaching provided by Anselm of Laon himself.\textsuperscript{39} Silvain’s view has not been widely accepted. Odon Lottin pointed out that, while it is possible that the collections were based on \textit{reportationes} of Anselm’s teaching, there is no evidence to suggest that this was the case.\textsuperscript{40} Nevertheless, Lottin accepted that the \textit{Sententie diuine pagine} has a significant basis in Anselm’s teaching.\textsuperscript{41}

In its discussion of whether God could have used some method other than the incarnation and death of the God-man Christ for redeeming man, the \textit{Sententie diuine pagine} stated that ‘saints say that it could not have happened otherwise.’\textsuperscript{42} Anselm of Canterbury is not mentioned in this passage. However, it seems a reasonable conjecture that this is who the author had in mind; he was clearly familiar with the arguments of \textit{Cur Deus homo}, citing the text explicitly in several points elsewhere in the collection.\textsuperscript{43} The author rejected the idea on the grounds that God could have redeemed man merely by commanding that it be done (\textit{solo}


\textsuperscript{39} R. Silvain, ‘La tradition des Sentences d’Anselme de Laon’, \textit{Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age} (hereafter AHDLMA), 16 (1948), pp. 1-52.

\textsuperscript{40} Lottin, \textit{Psychologie}, p. 181.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p. 183.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Dicunt tamen sancti, quod alter non potuit fieri}. SDP, p. 40.

\textsuperscript{43} See below, p. 11.
uerbo); but he went on to argue that, while it was not the only way by which redemption could be achieved, the incarnation of the Christ was certainly the most fitting (conueniens). Had God acted through word alone, man would not have received the supreme example of love and humility presented by Christ, and the redemption would not have provoked so much awe and wonder.

The author pointed out that a true reconciliation between God and man required a great sacrifice. ‘For when man stole himself away from God, it was right that reconciliation should take place through that which was greater, or at least equal, to that which he had stolen.’ While not using the Anselmian terminology of satisfactio, the thrust of the argument here is the same as that of Cur Deus homo. After reviewing, and rejecting, other possibilities for the redemptive sacrifice, the author concluded that only the God-man would do.

Because it could not happen by any of these means, God became incarnate to humanity; for because man had sinned, it was fitting that redemption should happen through man; but because this could not happen through a man who was [both] pure and subject to sin, God was made man, because in this way one person was God and man, that is Christ, who is the mediator between God and man, which is the most fitting for both.

The Laon author’s association of the ideas of fittingness and necessity has parallels with Cur Deus homo, in which Anselm argued that it was necessary for God to become man because no other way would be fitting for divine justice and the good order of the universe. Anselm used the terminology of conuenientia throughout Cur Deus homo, as the Laon author did in this sententia. The author was unwilling to endorse the conclusion that, if the redemption could not fittingly take place in any other way, it was necessary for it to happen through the incarnation of the God-man. This could be due to the weight of patristic authority in favour of the view that man could have been set free by divine command alone, and the fear that to suggest otherwise might impinge upon divine omnipotence. The Laon author was willing to utilize aspects of Anselmian thought where they could be of use in elucidating traditional

44 Cum enim homo subtraxisset se deo, rectum erat, ut per maius uel saltem equale illi qui se subtraxerat, fieret reconciliatio. SDP, p. 41.
45 Et quia horum nullo modorum poterat conuenieter fieri, deus incarnatus est humanitati; quia enim homo peccauerat, per hominem erat conueniens fieri redemptionem; sed quia hoc per hominem purum et subditum peccato non poterat fieri, deus factus est homo, ita quod una persona fuit deus et homo, id est, Christus, qui est mediator dei et hominis, cum utroque extreme conueniens. Ibid.
problems, but was unwilling to follow his ideas to potentially controversial and unauthenticated conclusions.

A later *sententia* identified by Lottin as belonging to the school of Laon also cited Anselm of Canterbury’s arguments on the necessity and fittingness of the incarnation. Entitled *Cur Deus homo*, the *sententia* asked whether it was necessary for Christ to be made incarnate in order to redeem humanity.\(^46\) The author argued that, although other means of redeeming man were possible for God, ‘it could not be done more justly or more fittingly than through the God man.’\(^47\)

Another way was possible for God, but none would have been more fitting for healing our wretchedness; this possibility must refer to God alone, not to creatures. If it is found elsewhere, ‘it could not happen otherwise’, the possibility must be understood to have been removed not from God but only from creatures. For this could not happen worthily through an angel nor through a simple man, since both were corrupted in nature; for this to be done worthily and fittingly it was necessary for divine and human nature to be joined in a unity of person; the divine, which alone could, and the human, which alone should. From which archbishop Anselm: God could, man should.\(^48\)

This *sententia* demonstrates a better understanding of Anselm’s arguments for the necessity of the incarnation than the passage from the *Sententie diviue pagine* discussed above, although its overall conclusion was similar. No other method of redemption would be fitting, as the penalty for sin which man alone ought to pay, could not be paid by any except God. As God could never act in a way that was unfitting, so it could be said that it was necessary for him to act in this way. However, this in no way impinged on divine omnipotence, which was absolute. The author was thus able to reconcile the concept of a necessary incarnation with the absolute power and freedom of God, and to accept the conclusions that Anselm had drawn in *Cur Deus homo* with fewer reservations than the author of the *Sententie diviue pagine*.

\(^47\) Nec iustius nec conuenientius potuit fieri quam per hominem deum. *Ibid*.
\(^48\) Fuit est alius modus possibilis Deo, sed nullus nostrre miserie conuenientior sanande; que possibilitas ad Deum solum, non ad creaturas referenda est. Quod si alibi inueniatur: non potuit aliter fieri, possibilitas non a Deo sed a creaturis tantum intelligentia est remoueri. Non enim per angelum neque simpliciter per hominum hoc digne fieri poterat, cum utriusque natura corrupta esset, ad hoc digne et conuenienter faciendum fuit necessarium diuinam et humanam naturam in unitatem persone coniungi; diuinam, qui sola poterat, humanam, quod sola debeat. Unde Anselmus archiepiscopus: Deus potuit, homo debuit. *Ibid*. 

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The line attributed to Anselm in the *sententia* above, ‘God could, man should’, has the air of a catch-phrase. It provided a neat summary of the basic principle of Anselm’s satisfaction theory in an easily memorable formula for the benefit of students who lacked either opportunity or inclination to study the text of *Cur Deus homo* in detail. There is sufficient evidence from the surviving *sententiae* to indicate that *Cur Deus homo* was closely read and discussed by at least some of the scholars of Laon, but many students may have had little more understanding of Anselm’s argument than what could be summarized in a few simple slogans. Much of the complexity of Anselm’s thought was inevitably lost in the process, which could lead to misunderstandings. The controversy surrounding his arguments on necessity in the twelfth century was primarily due to critics whose grasp of *Cur Deus homo* did not extend to recognition of the very specific sense in which Anselm used the term *necessitas*.

Although the discussion of the necessity and fittingness of the incarnation in the *Sententie diuine pagine* was apparently written with Anselm’s work in mind, the author did not cite *Cur Deus homo* explicitly in this passage. The author did address Anselm directly in the context of a discussion of why the fallen angels had to be replaced with men rather than other angels. The author began his discussion with the simple statement that ‘the ultimate cause was the good pleasure of God.’\(^{49}\) However, he then went on to discuss two alternative answers suggested by Anselm of Canterbury.\(^{50}\)

In the book entitled *Cur Deus homo*, there are two conjectures, of which the first is this. If God restored the number of angels from angels, this would seem to be contrary to the first creation of things... The second conjecture is this. If he were to be restored to that place, he should be equally blessed as he would have become if he had stood fast. But if he had stood fast, he would be blessed without the example or fear from the preceding fall, and so he would not be equally blessed, and so that place ought not to be restocked from angels.\(^{51}\)

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\(^{49}\) *Est summa causa beneplacitum dei. SDP*, p. 18.

\(^{50}\) Anselm, *CDH*, 1.17.

\(^{51}\) *In libro tamen qui titulatur: Cur deus homo, habente inde due coniecture, quarum prima est talis. Si deus restauraret numerum angelorum ex angelis, hoc uideretur contrarium priori creationi rerum...Alia coniectura est talis, quod qui in locum illius restituereetur, deberet esse illius beatitudinis, ad quam ille, si stetisset, peruenisset; sed ille, si stetisset, esset beatus sine exemplo uel terrore precedentis casus; et ita non esset eiusdem beatitudinis, et ita non ex angelis debuit restituiri locus ille. SDP*, p. 18.
Both of these ideas appear in *Cur Deus homo*. As the Laon author had identified, Anselm argued that the restored angel, having experienced the horror of the fall, could never reach the same degree of merited blessedness as the angel who persisted in the good from the beginning for its own sake. Therefore, he could never enjoy equal beatitude to the good angel, and so could not take his place in the heavenly city.

Other angels cannot be restored in place of [those who fell] – to say nothing of how this seems repugnant to the perfection of the original creation – because they should not be restored unless they could be such as those others would have been if they had not sinned, and if they had persevered without seeing the punishment for sin. But this would be impossible for those others who were put in their places after their fall. For he who knows nothing of punishment for sin, and he who looks constantly upon eternal punishment, are not equally praiseworthy, if they stand in the truth.\(^{52}\)

In *Cur Deus homo*, Boso responded to Anselm’s exposition of these arguments with the statement that ‘you have proved that bad angels ought to be replaced from the human race,’ rather than being reinstated themselves or replaced by other angels.\(^{53}\) The author of the *Sententie* did not share Boso’s confidence. In response to the first point, that it would seem contrary to the original perfection of creation, the Laon author criticized Anselm for failing to explain clearly that ‘God created everything in perfection, including the angel who fell. But he who was restored to his place seems to be of greater dignity than he who fell, because he did not fall as the other had.’\(^{54}\) If God needed to create new angels to replace those who had fallen, it would imply a failure in his initial creation, a mistake which needs to be rectified. More significantly for his critique of Anselm, the author claimed that the entire argument was invalid, because the same objection could also be made to the replacement of the fallen angels with men.\(^{55}\) The author also discounted Anselm’s second argument, that the angels

\[^{52}\] Alii autem angeli pro illis restitui non possunt ideo – ut taceam quomodo hoc repugnare uideatur primae creationis perfectioni - , quia non debent, nisi tales esse possint, quales illi fuissent, si non peccassent, cum illi nulla uisa uindicta peccati perseeuerassent; quod post illorum casum casum alius, qui pro illis restituerentur, esset impossible. Non enim pariter laudabiles sunt, si stant in ueritate; et qui nullam nouit peccati poenam, et qui eam semper aspicit aeternam. Anselm, *CDH*, 1.17.


\[^{54}\] Quod nec ipse evidenter explanat, nec nos allud percipimus, nisi deus omnia in perfectione creavit, et ita angellum qui cecidit. Ille autem qui restauraret locum eius, maioris dignitatis uideretur esse quam qui cecidit, in hoc scilicet, quod nec caderet sicut et ille. *SDP*, p. 18.

\[^{55}\] Hec coniectura debilis est, cum idem de homine coniectari possit. *Ibid.*
who were created or restored in the wake of the fall could never have the same degree of merit as those who had persevered from the beginning, on the grounds that this, too, applied equally well to men.\textsuperscript{56}

In the following paragraph, the author of the \textit{Sententie} went on to ask, as Anselm had done, whether man was created for the sole purpose of replacing the angels who had fallen in the heavenly city, or whether he was created for his own sake. Like Anselm, he concluded that man was created for his own sake, and he used Anselmian arguments as part of his explanation for why this should be the case. The Laon author began, as Anselm had done, with the question of whether angels and men were created simultaneously, or whether man was created after the angels’ fall. This question had been debated for centuries, particularly in relation to the interpretation of the creation narrative in Genesis.\textsuperscript{57} Neither Anselm of Canterbury nor the Laon author felt able to draw any definite conclusions on the question, but both sought a solution to the purpose of man’s creation that could work under either temporal model of creation. The Laon author began by arguing that if angels and men were created simultaneously, then there was no reason why man should have been created solely to replace the fallen angels, although he did acknowledge the possibility that God created man because he had foreseen the fall. If man was created after the angels, it was still likely that men were not created solely to replace the fallen angels, although it could not be proven.

If angel and man were created at the same time...there is no reason why man should have been created for that restoration, since he was created before the fall of the angel...But if he was created afterwards, then it is probable, but not conclusive.\textsuperscript{58}

This point had been argued in greater detail by Anselm, in his discussion of whether the angels had been created in sufficient numbers to fill the heavenly city if there had been no fall, and consequently whether man was created solely in order to replace the fallen angels. Anselm concluded that

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Eadem oppositio fieri de homine potest. SDP}, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Si autem angelus et homo simul creati sunt...non est ratio quod homo pro restaurazione illa sit factus, cum ante casum angeli fuerit creatus...Si autem post formatus est, tunc est uerisimile, sed non cogens. SDP}, pp. 18-19.
that perfect number, by which the heavenly city was to be completed, was not in
the angels. For if mankind was not created at the same time as the angels, it is
possible that this is the case, and if they were both created simultaneously...it
seems to be a necessity.\textsuperscript{59}

The Laon author became more compelling on the idea that man was created for his own sake
later in the paragraph, where he made more use of Anselm’s arguments. The author claimed
that, if man were created solely to replace the fallen angels, and could not have attained
beatitude without the fall, he would rejoice in the sin and suffering of the fallen angels which
had led to such great happiness for himself.\textsuperscript{60} This mirrors Anselm’s argument that the
‘perverse joy’ that man would feel in his own happiness at the cost of another’s fall would be
a sin that should preclude him from enjoying a place in heaven.\textsuperscript{61}

In \textit{Cur Deus homo}, Anselm also discussed the relative numbers of established angels,
fallen angels, and elect men. The argument that man could not be created simply to replace
the fallen angels seemed to indicate that the number of men who would be taken into the
heavenly city must exceed the number of angels who fell; man must be there on his own
account. He then referred to a verse from Deuteronomy which stated that God ‘determined
the limits of the peoples according to the number of the children of Israel’.\textsuperscript{62} Anselm noted
that an alternative version of the text referred to ‘the angels of God’, and that this had led
earlier authorities to argue that this meant that the number of elect men would equal the
number of good angels.\textsuperscript{63} He argued that this did not contradict his earlier discussion,

assuming it is not certain that the same number of angels remained steadfast as
had fallen. For, if there are more elect angels than wicked ones, it is a necessity
that elect humans should replace the wicked angels and it is a possibility that they
will be equal to the number of the blessed ones; and thus there will be more
righteous humans than unrighteous angels.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{In angelis non fuit ille perfectus numerus, quo civitas illa superna perficeretur: quoniam si homo simul cum
angelis factus non est; sic possibile est esse, et si simul facti sunt...videtur necesse esse. Anselm, CDH, 1.18.}
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Si enim ideo tantum homo factus esset, homo sciens se non peruenisse ad beatitudinem, nisi ille cecidisset,
gauderet de casu angeli, et ita non maneret in dilectione proximi. SDP, p. 19.}
\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Peruersa gratulatio. Anselm, CDH, 1.18.}
\textsuperscript{62} Deuteronomy 32:8.
\textsuperscript{63} This argument is found in Gregory the Great, \textit{Homiliae in euangelia}, ed. R. Etaix, CCSL, 141 (Turnhout,
1999), 34.11.
\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Si certum non est quod totidem angeli cecidissent quot remanserunt. Nam si plures sunt electi angeli quam
reprobi; et necesse est ut reprobos electi homines restaurent, et potest fieri ut beatorum numero consequentur;
et sic plures erunt homines iusti quam angeli iniusti. Anselm, CDH, 1.18.}
Anselm stressed the uncertainty of his conclusions which, although they appeared logical, could not be held as definite, as they were unconfirmed by authority. He concluded a lengthy discussion of the two versions of the text by arguing that both translations implied that as many men would be taken into heaven as there were angels who had kept their place. However, there was nothing in the text to suggest that more angels kept their place than fell. The logical argument he had set out in favour of the idea that there should be more elect men than fallen angels might seem to lead to the conclusion that more angels therefore must have persevered than fell, but this was unsubstantiated by authority and so could not be absolutely affirmed.

The Laon author concluded his discussion of the purpose of man’s creation in a similar way to Anselm. He argued that ‘as more angels remained than fell, and as many men ascended as remained, it appears that man was not created only for restoration, because if he were created only for restoration, then more would not have ascended than fell.’ The author did not refer to any authorities in this passage, but it seems likely that his argument was primarily taken from Anselm’s work, albeit in a simplified form, and without any of Anselm’s analysis of the problematic nature of the texts. The Laon author treated the Gregorian interpretation of the Deuteronomy text as perfectly logical and incontrovertible, and did not see any need to question the idea, as Anselm had done.

Anselm’s discussion of the creation of angels and men in *Cur Deus homo* raised a number of questions that had been debated by patristic authors, such as whether or not they had been created simultaneously, and whether angels and men would dwell in the heavenly city in equal numbers. This chapter of *Cur Deus homo* can thus be seen in part as an elaboration on, and exegesis of, patristic texts, particularly Augustine’s various commentaries on Genesis. This was a primary activity of the school of Laon, and may go some way towards explaining the Laon author’s interest in Anselm’s interpretation. The chapters of *Cur Deus homo* relating to man’s creation to replace the fallen angels and enter the heavenly city appear as a digression from the main text, instigated by a question from Boso. In the dialogue, Anselm initially displayed reluctance to address the question, on the grounds that it was irrelevant to the subject of the incarnation, and had to be persuaded into it by a reminder

65 *Cum plures angeli remanserint quam ceciderint, et tot sint ascensuri de hominibus quod remanserunt, appareat quod non tantum pro restaurazione; quia si tantum pro restaurazione, tunc non plures ascenderunt, quam ceciderant.* SDP, p. 19.
from Boso that ‘God loves a cheerful giver!’ This is essentially a literary conceit, and justification for an uncharacteristic digression. However, the fact that Anselm felt it necessary to enter into lengthy discussion on the subject in spite of its perceived irrelevance to the task in hand demonstrates that he considered it an important topic for his readers to understand, perhaps because he was aware that the problem was exercising his contemporaries in the schools. It is perhaps no coincidence that it was Boso, the confused ex-schoolman, who raised the subject in the dialogue, just as it was Boso who was later to raise the even more controversial question of the devil’s rights over man.

**Hugh of St Victor: Satisfaction and Necessity**

In *De sacramentis*, Hugh presented his account of the redemption using the analogy of a law suit with three claimants, God, man and the devil. The devil was convicted of having done injury both to God and to man. At the same time, man was convicted of having done injury to God, by rebelling against him in sin. Man’s offence against God meant that, although he had a just case against the devil, who had no right to inflict punishment on him, the trial could not be brought to court. This is because the only advocate with the power to ensure the devil’s conviction was God himself. God was unwilling to act as man’s advocate against the devil because of his continued anger regarding man’s sin. Therefore, it was necessary for man to be reconciled with God in order to enter suit with the devil, with God as advocate, and to be liberated from the punishment of servitude to sin.

Hugh discussed the reconciliation between God and man in terms of man making reparation for his sin. He argued that man ‘could not placate God rationally, unless he restored the damage which he had caused and made satisfaction for his contempt.’ Hugh identified two separate elements that were both necessary in order for the reparation to be adequate. Not only did man have to return that which he had stolen from God, he had to render back to God more than he had taken, to compensate for his contempt. This accords with the definition of satisfaction given by Anselm in *Cur Deus homo*. However, Hugh distinguished between the two elements of satisfaction more strongly than Anselm, using them as the basis to describe the two principle stages of Christ’s incarnation and death.

66 *Hilarem datorem diligit deus*. 1 Corinthians 9:7; Anselm, *CDH*, 1.16.
67 Anselm, *CDH* 1.7; see Chapter 2.
68 Hugh, *DS*, 1.8.4.
69 *Rationabiliter placare non poterat, nisi ei damnnum quod intulerat restauraret, et de contemptu satisfaceret.* Hugh, *DS*, 1.8.4.
70 Anselm, *CDH*, 1.11.
Hugh followed Anselm in stressing man’s utter incapability of providing sufficient recompense to God for his sin. Man had nothing which could compensate God worthily for the loss incurred, since anything he could offer from irrational creation would be insufficient to cover the loss of rational humanity. Even the gift of a man himself would be inadequate, since man in his fallen state was inferior to Adam in his created state of justice and innocence. ‘Therefore, man found nothing with which he could placate God for himself, because whether he gave what was his or himself, it would not be worthy recompense.’

For this reason, God himself became incarnate in humanity, so that the sinless God-man would provide a worthy recompense. ‘For in the birth of Christ God was justly placated toward man, since such a man was found for man who was not only equal to but even greater than man.’

The birth of the God-man Christ provided the means for man to restore to God a being of sufficient value to pay the debt owed for the loss of the first man in the fall. However, ‘it still remained for man that, just as by restoring damage he had placated anger, so also by making satisfaction for contempt he should be made worthy to escape punishment.’ Even after the original debt had been paid, man still owed God additional compensation to atone for his guilt and cover the injury caused by his contempt. Only by providing such satisfaction could man justly be freed from the punishment of subjection to the tyranny of the devil.

Hugh argued that ‘this could not be done fittingly unless he assumed of his own accord and obediently the punishment which he did not owe, so that he might become worthy to be rescued from the punishment which he had deserved through disobedience.’ Man could not do this, as his punishment was the just consequence of his sin. Therefore, in order that man might justly escape the punishment due, ‘it was necessary that such a man who had owed no punishment assume punishment for man.’ Christ alone owed no punishment, so Christ alone could freely take man’s punishment upon himself and atone for man’s guilt. In this way, Christ’s incarnation and death enabled man to be justly forgiven his sin and reconciled to God, so that he was no longer to be punished at the hands of the devil. The case

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71 Nichil ergo homo inuenit unde deum placare sibi posset, quia siue ipse sua, siue ipsum se daret, digna recompensatio non esset. Hugh, DS, 1.8.4.

72 In natiitatete enim christi iuste placatus est deus homini; quia talis homo inuentus est pro homine qui non solum...par, sed etiam maior esset homine. Ibid.

73 Ad huc supererat homini, ut sicut restaurando dampnum placuerat iram, ita quoque pro contemptu satisfaciendo dignus fieret eaudere penam. Ibid.

74 Hoc conuenientius fieri non poterat, nisi ut penam quam non debebat sponte et obedierent susciperet, ut de pena quam per inobedientiam meruerat eripi dignus fieret. Ibid.

75 Necesse fuit ut talis homo pro homine penam susciperet qui nichil pene debuisset. Ibid.
between God and man had been settled; now, with God as advocate, the case between man and the devil could be brought to its rightful conclusion.

Hugh’s account of the redemption, with its focus on the weight of man’s offence and the need to make adequate satisfaction to God which was not only equal to, but exceeded that which had been lost, has a clear basis in Anselm’s work. In Cur Deus homo, Anselm defined sin as ‘not to give God his due.’ The debt owed by man to God was a totally obedient will and perfect honour. In sin, man failed to render to God the honour due. He would remain in a state of guilt until he had repaid he honour which he had stolen. However, the repayment of the debt to the value that had been taken away was in itself insufficient; further payment needed to be made in compensation for the injury caused through the offence. Man was incapable of making adequate satisfaction for sin, because he already owed his entire being to God as Creator and Lord. He therefore had nothing left to offer as extra compensation.

Adequate satisfaction for sin could only be made by one ‘who would pay God for man’s sin something greater than everything that exists apart from God.’ Only God himself was capable of this, and so Christ became incarnate. Anselm further explained the value of Christ’s death on the grounds that

no man except him ever gave to God, by dying, what he would not have lost some time by necessity, or pay what he did not owe. But he voluntarily gave to the Father what he would never lose by necessity, and he paid for sinners what he did not owe for himself.

In these passages, Anselm identified two factors that rendered Christ’s death an adequate payment for man’s sin. First, there was his intrinsic worth as a divine being, ‘greater than everything that exists apart from God.’ Second, there was the fact that, as a sinless and immortal being, it was not necessary for him to die, and death was not part of the debt he owed to God. For these reasons, the voluntary death of the God-man offered a payment to God that was greater than the debt owed to God, and thus not only restored the value of what man had taken from God in his sin, but also provided satisfaction for the insult committed against God in the process.

76 *Non reddere deo debitum.* Anselm, *CDH*, 1.11.
77 *Qui soluat deo pro peccato hominis aliquid maius quam omne quod praeter deum est.* Ibid., 2.6.
78 *Nullus quumquam homo moriendo praeterillum deo dedit quod aliquando necessitate perditurus non erat, aut soluit quod non debebat. Ille vero sponte patri obtulit quod nulla necessitate quumquam amissurus erat, et soluit pro peccatoribus quod pro se non debebat.* Anselm, *CDH*, 2.18.
Both these virtues of the God-man appear in Hugh’s account. However, there is a significant difference between the way they were used in *De sacramentis* and *Cur Deus homo*. Rather than using them as two explanations of the same thing, Hugh separated them. He described Christ’s birth, and superiority over fallen man, as restoring the debt (*debitum*) owed to God for his loss (*dampnum*). The voluntary nature of his sacrificial death atoned for the guilt (*reatus*) caused by man’s contempt (*contemptus*) for God. This led him to separate the two elements of the redemption, reparation for the damage done and satisfaction for sin, in a way which Anselm did not.

Hugh’s analogy of the law suit provided one of the principal means by which Anselm’s understanding of the redemption in terms of man’s need to make satisfaction for sin were transmitted from the mid-twelfth century to a wider audience than those who studied *Cur Deus homo* directly. The dramatic appeal and simplicity of the image of the law court helped to make the basic concepts easily accessible, and the analogy was adopted by Peter Lombard in his *Sententiae*. Although the form of Hugh’s discussion was very different from that of Anselm, the content of his argument was strikingly similar to *Cur Deus homo*.

Where Hugh’s argument has been seen as differing from that of Anselm is his approach to the question of the necessity of the incarnation. While Anselm argued that it was necessary for God to act in this way in order for man’s restoration to be justly achieved, Hugh seems to have argued the opposite. In *De sacramentis*, he stated that ‘God could have accomplished the redemption of mankind even in some other way, had he so willed.’ Hugh identified justice explicitly with the will of God. This meant that whatever course of action God had chosen to take in the redemption, whether to save sinners or to condemn them, would inevitably be just. ‘Whatever he willed was good and just, so that even if he had willed differently it would not have been unjust, because the power is in his will that without injustice he can do whatever he wills.’

In contrast, Anselm’s discussion of the ‘necessity’ of the redemption might seem to imply that God was constrained by the requirements of an external justice which demanded

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80 *Redemptionem generis humani alio etiam modo deus perficere potuisset si uoluisset*. Hugh, *DS*, 1.8.10.
81 *Si ergo quod uoluit utrique bonum iustum fuit, ut etiam si aliter uoluisset iustum non fuisse, quia potestas est in uoluntate eius, quia sine iustitia facere illi liceat quocumque uoluisset*. Ibid., 1.8.9. In an earlier chapter of *De sacramentis*, Hugh discussed the relation between justice and the divine will in more general terms, arguing that ‘[God] did not will justly, because what he willed would be just, but what he willed was just because he willed it...When, therefore, it is asked why that which is just is just, the most fitting response is, because it is according to the will of God, which is just [*Necque enim iiccirco iustue uoluit quia futurum iustum fuit quod uoluit, sed quod uoluit iiccirco iustum uoluit quia ipse uoluit...Cum ergo queritur quare iustum est quod iustum est, conuennentissime respondetur quoniam secundum uoluntatem dei est que iusta est]*.’ *DS*, 1.4.1.
that he act in a particular way in order to avoid charges of injustice. Stephan Ernst argues that Anselm excluded the possibility that God could remit man of his sins through mercy alone, and save him without complete satisfaction having been made, because otherwise God would have to be considered unjust. He contrasts Anselm’s position with that of Hugh, saying that Hugh believed that no conditions could be imposed under which God’s action would be unjust. A similar distinction was made by Poppenberg, who claimed that Anselm’s position on this question constituted an error (fehler), avoided by Hugh.

Neither Ernst nor Poppenberg give adequate acknowledgement of the fact that Anselm consistently argued that God was not constrained by the demands of any external justice; the only necessity involved was that arising from the inevitable unchangeability of his own free will. The fact that Anselm’s ‘necessity’ did not impose any external constraints on God is recognized by Luis Ladaria, who argues that Anselm’s understanding of the necessity of the redemption is inseparable from his understanding of God’s freedom as Creator and desire to save man. Nevertheless, Ladaria sees a difference in emphasis between Anselm’s teaching and that of Hugh, suggesting that Anselm was more inclined to admit the necessity of the incarnation and death of Christ, while Hugh limited himself to the convenience of the particular method chosen by God.

Although he argued that ‘God could have accomplished the redemption of mankind even in a different manner had he willed,’ Hugh stressed the need for God’s action to be ‘reasonable’ (rationabilis) and ‘fitting’ (conuenientius), arguing that this was done according to the needs of human infirmity. Divine reason transcended human reason and could never be fully understood in human terms, but ratio was a fundamental tool of divine revelation. In order for there to be any possibility of understanding God’s character and love as demonstrated through his redemptive action, it needed to be comprehensible in human terms. In addition, Hugh discussed the ‘fittingness’ of God’s chosen method of redeeming humanity in terms of the example provided to man:

84 ‘Además Anselmo parece inclinarse más que Hugo a admitir la necesidad de la encarnación y muerte de Cristo para la redención...Hugo se limita...a hacer ver la conveniencia del modo concreto que Dios eligió para la salvación.’ L. Ladaria, ‘Creación y salvación en la Cristología de Hugo de San Victor’, Miscellanea Comillas, 59 (1973), pp. 261-301, at p. 291.
It was more befitting our infirmity, that God should be made man and assuming the mortality of man for man should reform man to the sight of his immortality, so that man should not doubt that he could ascend to the goods of him whom he had seen descend to bear his evils. And so that humanity, glorified in God, might be an example of glorification to men; and in that he suffered they would see what they ought to return to him, but in that he was glorified they should consider what they ought to expect from him, so that he himself might be the way in example and the truth in promise and the life in reward.85

The importance of carrying out the redemption in a manner that accorded with human perceptions of justice and rationality was such that Hugh actually argued that ‘it was necessary’ for Christ to act as he did in voluntarily taking man’s punishment on himself.86

The form and content of Hugh’s argument here reflected Augustine’s discussion on the same subject. In response to those who asked whether God could not have freed man in some other way, Augustine argued that God, who had supreme power over all creation, could have done so, but that

there was no other way more fitting for healing our misery, nor need there have been. For what was so necessary for raising up our hope, and for freeing the minds of mortals, cast down by the condition of mortality itself, from despair of immortality, than that it should be demonstrated to us at how greatly God valued us, and how greatly he loved us?87

Hugh’s discussion of the necessity and fittingness of the incarnation can be interpreted in part as an attempt to reconcile Anselm’s ideas about freedom and necessity with those of Augustine. Hugh’s statement that God could have acted differently had he wished is entirely

85 Sed quia iste nostre infirmitati conuenientior fuit ut deus homo fieret, et pro homine mortalitatem hominis assumens ad speciem sue immortalitatis hominem reformaret ut non diffidat iam homo se ad bona illias posse ascendere quem ad sua mala toleranda uidet descendisset. Et ut in dei humanitas glorifica exemplum esset glorificationis hominibus et in eo quod passus est uiderant quid ei debeant retribuere, in eo autem quod glorificatus est considerent quid ab eo debeant expectare. Ut ipse uia sit in exemplo, et aeritas in promisso, et uita in premio. Hugh, DS, 1.8.10.

86 Necesse fuit. Ibid., 1.8.4.

87 Sanandae nostrae miseriae convenientiorem modum alium non fuisse, nec esse oportuisse. Quid enim tam necessarium fuit ad erigendum spem nostram, mentesque mortalium conditione ipsius mortalitatis abjectas, ab immortalitatis desperatione liberandas, quam ut demonstraretur nobis quanti nos penderet Deus, quantumque diligeret? Augustine, DT, 13.10.13.
in accord with the Augustinian tradition. Hugh thus emphasized his own orthodoxy, and avoided the controversial problems about divine freedom and omnipotence which discussion of necessity tended to provoke. Nevertheless, in following Anselm’s argument for the need for man to make satisfaction for sin, which could not be achieved except through the incarnation of the Christ, Hugh implicitly accepted the idea that there was scope for the language of necessity with regard to the incarnation within a carefully defined framework. He expressed this necessity in terms of what was reasonable and fitting, and combined ideas derived from both Anselm and Augustine, in a way that stressed the fundamental orthodoxy and patristic precedent for Anselm’s arguments. A useful parallel can be drawn with the Sententia diuine pagine from the school of Laon, which similarly discussed the incarnation in terms of divine freedom, fittingness and necessity, and sought to interpret Anselm along broadly Augustinian lines. The attempt to reconcile Anselm with Augustine, and resolve apparent contradictions between them, was a recurrent theme among twelfth-century commentators, and led to some of the most fruitful discussion of Anselm’s work in a variety of fields.

**Peter Abelard**

Peter Abelard did not write a treatise on the redemption *per se*, and he did not reproduce Anselm’s arguments in the same systematic manner as the authors discussed above, who largely tended to follow the basic structural model of argumentation that Anselm had used in *Cur Deus homo*. Abelard’s discussion of the redemption in his *Commentaria in epistolam Pauli ad Romanos* (c.1133-7), was very different from Anselm’s work, both in form and content. Other than his rejection of the ‘rights of the devil’ idea, which has long been recognised as derived from *Cur Deus homo*, Abelard has traditionally been interpreted as proposing a completely ‘subjective’ explanation for the redemption, emphasizing Christ’s death as the supreme example of God’s love for man, in stark contrast with Anselm’s concern with justice and the ‘objective’ efficacy of Christ’s death making satisfaction for sin. 88

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88 In his 1915 Bampton Lectures at Oxford, Hastings Rashdall praised Abelard for presenting a purely subjective account of the redemption that ‘ceased to be dependent upon our accepting any of those difficult and sometimes repulsive theories of substitutive or expiatory or objective efficacy which were once connected with it’. Rashdall contrasted Abelard’s account with that of Anselm, whose insistence on the intrinsic righteousness of God he saw as ‘marred by his tendency to treat sin simply as a personal insult to God, and the satisfaction of it as a tyrant’s delight in feeling that his honour has been vindicated and his rebellious subjects compelled to lick the dust beneath his feet.’ Rashdall, *The Idea of the Atonement in Christian Theology* (London, 1919), p. 362. Rashdall’s approach typifies many nineteenth- and twentieth-century commentators. Further examples include Gustaf Aulen, *Christus Victor* (1931) and Jean Rivière, *Le Dogme de la Rédemption au début du moyen âge* (Paris,
However, a wider study of Abelard’s works demonstrates that his debt to *Cur Deus homo*, particularly with regard to the necessity of the incarnation, was greater than is often acknowledged. Although Anselm and Abelard were writing in different contexts, with very different forms and structures, this did not mean that Anselm’s influence on Abelard’s thought was diminished. On the contrary, Abelard was able to take a more holistic approach to his study of Anselm, and to absorb and ponder the implications of his ideas more deeply. Abelard’s analysis of the meaning of divine necessity and freedom in his *Theologia christianana* revealed a more sophisticated understanding of Anselm’s teaching on the subject, in relation to the incarnation and more generally, than can be found in other authors whose discussion of the necessity of satisfaction was, superficially, much closer to that of *Cur Deus homo* than anything Abelard wrote.

Abelard did not expound his understanding of the redemption in a systematic manner. The nearest he came to doing so was a *quaestio* inserted into his *Commentaria in epistolam Pauli ad Romanos*, where he asked

> by what necessity did God assume humanity to redeem us from dying according to the flesh, or from whom did he redeem us, who held us captive, either by justice or by power, and by what justice did he free us from this power, or what price did he give that he wanted him to receive so that he would release us?[^89]  

Abelard rejected the idea that Christ’s death constituted a payment for sin in any way. The crime of murdering the Son of God was in itself a sin, apparently much greater than the mere eating of an illicit apple in Eden. If Adam’s sin was so grave that it could be expiated by nothing less than the death of the Son of God, how could man possibly offer satisfaction for

1934), both of whom depict Anselm and Abelard as holding opposing positions on the redemption. Southern described Abelard’s argument as asserting ‘that the Incarnation was efficacious, not in satisfying the just claims of God or Devil, but in teaching by example the law of love’ and argued that ‘nothing could have been more alien to the whole spirit of Anselm’s theology’ than Abelard’s conclusions. Southern, *Portrait*, pp. 210-211. Similarly, Michael Clanchy argues that ‘the point Abelard wanted to make...was that the Redemption was not about justice or law; it was about love.’ Clanchy, *Abelard. A Medieval Life* (Oxford, 1997), p. 285. Some more recent commentators recognize the objective elements to Abelard’s argument, pointing out that the exemplarist argument would make no sense unless Christ’s death had already achieved concrete results. John Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 322; Thomas Williams, ‘Sin, Grace and Redemption’, in J.E. Brower and K. Guilfoy, *The Cambridge Companion to Abelard* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 258-278. For Abelard’s rejection of the *ius diaboli* idea, see Chapter 2.

the sin of his crucifixion? Furthermore, Abelard argued that Christ’s death could not constitute payment for sin, as the only person to whom such a payment could be made was God himself. Therefore, if a payment were being made, God would have to have demanded the payment of himself, which was absurd. Besides this, the God of goodness and justice could never act so cruelly as to demand the blood of an innocent man, least of all his own Son, as payment for the sins of another.  

Richard Weingart suggests that in this passage Abelard may have been parodying Anselm’s teaching in *Cur Deus homo*, where he described Christ’s death as offering satisfaction to God for sin. Weingart argues that Abelard rejected Anselm’s ‘satisfaction’ theory on the grounds that it presented God as a harsh tyrant demanding justice and payment for sin at the expense of divine love and mercy. Particularly abhorrent to Abelard was the notion that Anselm’s satisfaction theory imposed an external necessity on God’s actions. Weingart argues that ‘the concept of satisfaction imposes an extraneous necessity, because it falsely concedes that God must be reconciled to man through a change in attitude toward men which is accomplished only when his honour is satisfied and his anger appeased...In so far as Abailard understands satisfaction as the fulfilment of a debt demanded by God, he is consistent in his rejection of this theory.’

If Abelard believed that Anselm’s ‘satisfaction theory’ imposed an external necessity on God by means of an inevitable demand for the payment of man’s debt, this would represent a serious misunderstanding of Anselm’s thought on necessity and the nature of divine justice, to an extent which Weingart himself admits would be highly surprising. However, closer examination of Abelard’s analysis of divine necessity, not only in the *Commentaria* but elsewhere, demonstrates that his understanding of the nature of divine omnipotence and the meaning of necessity was far closer to that of Anselm than is often appreciated.

Abelard’s fullest explanation of the meaning of necessity with regard to divine omnipotence is found in the fifth book of his *Theologia christiana*, composed during the 1120s. Here, Abelard appeared to reject use of the language of necessity in relation to God. It was not necessity that underlay divine actions, but fittingness or honour (*honestas*).
But we depend more on fitting than on necessary reasons, since it is always principally established among the good that more is commended from fittingness, and that reason is always better which inclines towards fittingness rather than necessity, especially when those things which are fitting give pleasure in themselves and immediately attract us to themselves through a certain power of their own.\(^{95}\)

Later in the book, Abelard related the question about necessity and divine omnipotence in general to the specific question of the incarnation. He began this section with the statement that ‘it is written that God could have redeemed the human race by a different means from that which he did,’\(^{96}\) followed by a number of statements from patristic texts that supported this view. However, he did not use these texts to prove the utter invalidity of all talk of necessity with relation to the divine action. Instead, he pointed out the difficulties inherent in such texts, and the bitterness of the controversy surrounding them.

And so with these reasons as much as authorities heavily entangled on both sides of the dilemma, I have not easily found an approach by which we can explain ourselves. For the more violent the controversies on these questions, the solutions of course are necessarily more difficult.\(^{97}\)

Abelard went on to explain that the fact that God was not constrained by any external necessity to act as he did, did not mean that there was no sense in which the language of necessity was valid in discussion of divine actions. God’s supreme goodness was such that he was unable to act in any way that contradicted this goodness. Thus, although whatever he willed, he willed freely, it was impossible to him to will in any other way, and so he willed it from necessity.

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\(^{95}\) *Mcavers autem honestis quam necessariis rationibus nitimur, quoniam apud bonos id semper praeccipuum statuitur quod ex honestate amplius commendatur, et ea semper potior est ratio quae ad honestateam amplius quam ad necessitudinem aergit, praeeritum cum quae honesta sunt, per se placeant atque nos statim ad se sua ui quadam aliiciant.* Abelard, *Theologia christiana* [hereafter *TC*], ed. E.M. Buytaert, *Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica, CCCM*, 12(Turnhout, 1969), 5.15.

\(^{96}\) *Scriptum quoque est quod potuerit Deus alio modo quam fecerit humanum gens redimere.* *Ibid.*, 5.38.

\(^{97}\) *His itaque tam rationibus quam auctoritatibus grauitur in utraque parte complexionis impliciti, quo nos explicare possimus non facile aditum inuenio. Quo enim ahegmentiores sunt quaestionum depugnations, difficilibores profecto necesse est esse solutiones.* *Ibid.*, 5.41.
And so it seems to us that God – who is supremely good and can neither grow nor diminish in his goodness, which he has naturally and substantially from himself, not in our way through accident, - for he always has from himself such ineffable goodness, that I may say in human terms, that whatever he wills, he wills from necessity, and whatever he does, he does from necessity. For he cannot be without the good will which he has, for it is natural to him and coeternal, not foreign as ours is to us. And everything that is in the nature of the divine, is in him necessarily and inevitably in every way, as justice, piety, mercy, and whatever works a good will creates.\(^98\)

In this passage, Abelard reveals an understanding of an intrinsic necessity arising from the supreme goodness of the divine nature, which effectively meant that no other course of action was possible. This is very similar to Anselm’s argument that necessity could only be applied to God in the sense that the immutability of divine grace meant that he was always obliged to act in the most honourable manner, and to fulfil his promise, freely made at the dawn of time, to complete man’s salvation and bring him into the heavenly city. Although Anselm admitted that ‘necessity’ must be something of a misnomer in this case, which was entirely governed by grace, it still had some utility in describing the inevitability of what must be.\(^99\)

Abelard’s overarching emphasis on the absolute freedom of divine love and grace in the Commentaria on Romans, more explicitly central to Abelard’s argument than to Anselm’s, led him to be more cautious than Anselm had been in using the concept as a central theme of his argument; but his discussion of divine necessity in the Theologia christiana seems to indicate a detailed understanding of, and agreement with Anselm’s position in Cur Deus homo. Even in the Commentaria, he occasionally used the language of necessity with regard to the incarnation, such as his statement that as it was impossible for man to be saved through the written law alone, ‘it was necessary that the Christ should come’ as the fulfilment and consummation of the law.\(^100\)

\(^{98}\) Visum autem itaque nobis est Deum, - qui summe bonus est nec in sua crescere uel minui bonitate potest, quam naturaliter ac substantialiter ex se ipso, non nostro modo per accidens habet, - ex ipsa sua et ineffabili bonitate adeo semper, ut humano more loquar, accessum, ut quae uult, necessario uelit, et quae facit, necessario faciat. Non enim carere sua potest bona uoluntate quam habet, cum sit ei naturalis et coaeterna, non aduentitia sicut nostra est nobis. Et omne quod in natura est diuin inatis, necessario ei atque omnibus modis ineuitabiliter inest, utpote iustitia, pietas, misericordia, et quaecumque erga creaturas bona uoluntas. Abelard, TC,5.42.

\(^{99}\) Anselm, CDH, 2.5.

\(^{100}\) Necesse erat ut ueniret Christus. Abelard, CR, 3.7.152-3.
Abelard’s acknowledgement of the controversy surrounding the concept of a necessary incarnation indicates the importance of the debate, to which Anselm was a major contributor, in the teaching of the schools of the early twelfth century. The opposition that Anselm’s apparent rejection of the weight of patristic authority had provoked among his critics is illustrated by a letter written to Abelard by his former master Roscelin of Compiègne. The letter mainly focused on Trinitarian disputes, and Roscelin’s deeply troubled personal relationship with his former protégé. However, it also raised the question of Anselm’s teaching on the necessity of the incarnation in tones which clearly demonstrated its controversial nature.

But of Master Anselm the archbishop, who is both honoured for the sanctity of his life and extolled for his exceptional learning beyond the common measure of men, what shall I say? For he says, in the book which he calls Cur Deus homo, that God could not save man by any other way than this, that is unless he became man and suffered all that he suffered. The words of the sacred doctors, by whose teaching the Church is illuminated, strongly oppose his opinion.

Roscelin then went on to list various quotations from patristic texts which opposed the idea that God acted by necessity in his means of redeeming mankind, including several which Abelard would go on to cite in his discussion of the subject in the Theologia christiana. The context of this passage was Roscelin’s defence of errors made and recanted earlier in his career, on the grounds that even the greatest men were vulnerable to error, without necessitating accusations of heresy. The combination of Roscelin’s specific criticism of Anselm’s position on the necessity of the incarnation with praise for Anselm’s great learning and sanctity in general reveals much about Anselm’s reputation, as a holy man and as a scholar, by the 1120s. It is particularly striking that Roscelin chose to praise Anselm in this way, as the two men had been involved in bitter controversy in the past; Anselm had been instrumental in the condemnation of Roscelin’s teaching on the Trinity at the Council of Soissons in 1093.


102 Leo the Great, Sermo 22.3; Augustine, DT, 13.16.21, 13.10.13, 13.18.23; De agone christianus, 11.12.

103 See below, Chapter 6.
In his letter to Abelard, Roscelin presented Anselm’s argument on necessity in a way that was simplified to the extent of severe distortion. He implied that Anselm’s God was limited by external necessity to a single course of action whose only alternative was the eternal damnation of mankind and ultimate failure of the divine purpose of creation. This imposed a serious limitation on divine omnipotence and freedom. Whether Roscelin was deliberately over-simplifying Anselm’s argument to make a rhetorical point about the seriousness and lack of precedent for his claim, or whether he was genuinely unaware of the caveats which Anselm made for his use of the term ‘necessity’, is unclear, but it seems likely that similar arguments against Anselm’s work were being raised by Roscelin’s contemporaries in the schools, some of whom undoubtedly had only an extremely limited knowledge of the content of Cur Deus homo.

Rolf Peppermüller suggests that it was Roscelin’s depiction of Anselm’s teaching on the necessity of the incarnation in his letter to Abelard, rather than Cur Deus homo itself, that provided the main source of Abelard’s knowledge of the argument. Peppermüller argues that there is no real evidence to suggest that Abelard had any direct knowledge of Cur Deus homo, but only knew the arguments at second hand. It is true that, in his discussion of the controversy in Theologia christiana, he cited several of the same patristic sources as Roscelin, although he did not use these texts, as Roscelin had done, to prove the utter invalidity of all talk of necessity with relation to the divine action, but to point out the difficulties inherent in such texts, and the keenness of the controversy surrounding them. Abelard’s discussion on the meaning of divine necessity in Theologia christiana was close enough to that of Cur Deus homo to suggest that he was familiar with the details of Anselm’s argument, and there is nothing to suggest a significant shift in his position by the time he wrote the Commentaria in Romanos.

Although Abelard understood the subtleties of Anselm’s discussion of the necessity of the incarnation, and its relation to divine power and freedom, he must also have been aware of the way in which Anselm’s arguments were liable to misinterpretation and the mistaken belief that he subjected God to the constraints of external necessity. Roscelin’s letter would have made the danger abundantly clear, even if he had not already recognized it from his own interactions with students and fellow masters in the schools. Abelard’s apparent rejection of the concept of necessity in the Commentaria may have been in part a response to the misconception that divine omnipotence could be limited by external necessity.

Honorius Augustodunensis

Debate concerning the subtleties of the definitions of necessity and divine freedom in relation to the incarnation and redemption formed the basis of discussion of Cur Deus homo in the schools of Laon, St Victor and Abelard, as the masters struggled to reconcile the notion that it was necessary for God to act as he did with his own illimitable freedom from all external constraints. The potentially conflicting demands of necessity, justice, fittingness and freedom, which Anselm attempted to reconcile, were already apparent from a reading of patristic texts, notably Augustine’s De trinitate. Cur Deus homo can, to some extent, be seen as a commentary on Augustine, providing a model for the interrogation and harmonization of various disparate passages within the earlier author’s work, and submitting them to systematic, reasoned analysis. In the schools discussed above, the discussion and definition of theological concepts such as necessity and freedom was a primary concern, as an early stage in the general trend towards the development of a fully comprehensive, and conceptually consistent, systematic theology in the twelfth century and beyond.

By contrast, outside the schools discussed above, other writers were less interested in the subtleties of metaphysical concepts and the definition of terms. Honorius Augustodunensis was primarily concerned with the need for a clearly argued and straightforward exposition of Christian doctrine which could be used as a guide for teachers and preachers, without unnecessary complication. In his account of the redemption in his Elucidarium, a compendium of questions and answers relating to all essential areas of the Catholic faith, Honorius made extensive use of Anselm’s arguments in Cur Deus homo concerning the need for one who was both God and man to make satisfaction for sin. Elucidarium enjoyed wide popularity in the twelfth century; there are forty-one extant manuscripts of the Latin text from the twelfth century alone, and it was translated into several vernacular languages. It was particularly popular in South Germany and Austria, and provided one of the major channels through which Anselmian ideas on the redemption became known in these areas. Elucidarium offered a simplified version of the arguments of Cur Deus homo, with much of the complexity and subtlety of Anselm’s thought removed. Nevertheless, it presented the basic principles in a way that was clear and easy to follow, and

enabled Anselmian thought to permeate the ideas and beliefs of those outside the relatively narrow confines of the scholarly and monastic communities who could access the text of *Cur Deus homo* itself.

Honorius’ use of Anselmian arguments in *Elucidarium* is also interesting, as the text is thought to have been completed before the publication of *Cur Deus homo* in 1098. Honorius’s early knowledge of Anselm’s thought must have come from his personal acquaintance with Anselm, and oral conversations during a period of study under Anselm at Canterbury. The precise nature of the connection between Anselm and Honorius is impossible to know, as very little is known in detail about his life. Even the identity of ‘Augustodunensis’ is uncertain, although various theories have been raised. However, it seems likely that Honorius was born around 1070, was at various points in his career both a canon and a Benedictine monk, and lived for at least the second half of his life in Regensburg. He died around 1140. Although the limited evidence available is insufficient to draw any definite conclusions, it does seem likely that Honorius was connected with Canterbury, and studied under Anselm there. The role of personal and oral communication in the transmission of ideas within monastic and scholarly communities is, by its nature, difficult to assess due to the lack of surviving written evidence. Nevertheless, it must have been an important channel through which Anselmian ideas were shared among his immediate circle, both at Bec and Canterbury; and informal discussion with friends and students is likely to have played an important role in the development of Anselm’s own thought, and the genesis of texts.

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106 The name ‘Augustodunensis’ comes from Honorius’ *De luminaribus ecclesiae*, a list of authors on Scripture and the Christian faith from the Apostles to his own day, in which he referred to himself as ‘Honorius Augustodunensis Ecclesiae presbyter et scholasticus’. PL. 172, 197-234, at 232B. ‘Augustodunensis’ literally translates as ‘of the imperial height’ or hill. It was traditionally thought to refer to Autun in Burgundy, although the association of Honorius with Autun is now almost universally rejected. Other suggestions for possible translations include Augst near Basle and Augsburg in Swabia, as well St Augustine’s in Canterbury, or Canterbury more generally. Joseph Endres proposed the hill of Zигетсберг, ‘hill of victory’, near Regensburg, the site of an imperial victory where Charlemagne founded a Benedictine community dedicated to St Peter. Endres, *Honorius Augustodunensis*. Beitrag zur Geschichte des Geistigen Lebens im 12. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1906), p. 12. Yves Lefèvres follows Endres’ suggestion. Lefèvre, *L’Elucidarium et les lucidaires. Contribution, par l’histoire d’un texte, à l’histoire des croyances religieuses en France au moyen âge* (Paris, 1954), p. 215. Flint also believes that the title refers to Regensburg, but suggests instead of Weih St Peter’s the the alte Kapelle of Regensburg ‘which, by reason of its antiquity, grandeur and exalted connections...was both “august” and well-known.’ Flint, *Honorius*, pp. 19-20. Southern focuses on Honorius’ probable insular origins, and suggests a possible reference to Cashel, the ‘hill of the kings.’ Southern, *Saint Anselm and his Biographer* (Cambridge, 1963), p. 216.

107 Flint, *Honorius*.

108 See discussion below, pp. 52-55.

109 Further examples of the influence of conversation with colleagues and students in the genesis of Anselm’s works include his discussions with Boso (see Chapter 2) and Gilbert Crispin (see Chapter 3).
Honorius’s account of the redemption in the *Elucidarium* shows significant parallels with Anselm’s argument in *Cur Deus homo*. Like Anselm, Honorius began his discussion of man’s need for redemption with a reminder of the weight of sin. He stressed the gravity of Adam’s sin in disobeying God, arguing that the will of God was greater than the whole world. A single glance contrary to the will of God, even if the continued existence of the entire created universe depended on it, was a sin for which nothing in the created universe could atone.

If therefore you were standing before God and someone were to say ‘Look back, or the whole world will perish’, but God said, ‘I do not want you to look back, but to look upon me’, ought you to despise God, who is the Creator of all things, and the joy of the angels, so that you might free the transitory world?\(^{110}\)

Anselm had used the same example in *Cur Deus homo*:

[Anselm] If you were to see yourself in the sight of God, and someone were to say to you, ‘look over there’; but God said, ‘it is totally against my will that you should look’: consider in your heart what there is in everything that exists, on account of which you should make that look contrary to the will of God...What if it were necessary either for the whole world and whatever is not God to perish and return to nothing, or for you to do such a small thing contrary to the will of God?... [Boso] I have to confess that I must do nothing contrary to the will of God, even to preserve the whole of creation.\(^{111}\)

In *Elucidarium*, Honorius went on to explain that looking away from God was exactly what Adam had done at the Fall: ‘He stood before God and, at the instigation of the devil, looked

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\(^{111}\) [A] *Si uideres te in conspectus dei, et aliquis tibi diceret: aspice illuc; et deus econtra: nullatenus uolo ut aspicias: quare tu ipse in cordo tuo quid sit in omnibus quae sunt, pro quo contra voluntatem dei deberes illum aspectum facere...quid si necesse est aut totum mundum et quidquid deus non est perire et in nihilum redigi, aut te facere tam paruam contra voluntatem dei?...*[B] *Fateri me necesse est quia pro conservanda tota creatura nihil deberem facere contra voluntatem dei.* Anselm, *CDH*, 1.21.
back and committed a sin that was greater than the world.\textsuperscript{112} In order for man to atone for this sin,

he should restore the honour which he had stolen from God and make satisfaction for the sin which he had committed. For it is most just that he who steals another’s property should both restore what had been stolen and make satisfaction for the injuries incurred.\textsuperscript{113}

The claim that it was necessary for man, not only to restore the honour that had been stolen, but also to provide additional compensation for injuries incurred, was argued by Anselm in \textit{Cur Deus homo}:

He who does not render to God this honour due, steals from God what is his own, and dishonours God; and this is to sin. As long as he does not repay what he has stolen, he remains guilty. And it is not sufficient merely to repay what he has stolen: rather, he ought to repay more than he stole, for the insult inflicted. For just as it is not sufficient for he who injures the health of another to restore that person’s health, if he does not make some recompense for the painful injuries inflicted; so it is not sufficient for he who violates someone else’s honour, to restore that honour, if he does not, in accordance with the harmful act of dishonour, give as restitution something which pleases the person whom he has dishonoured.\textsuperscript{114}

Honorius argued that, in order for man to restore the honour he had stolen from God, it was necessary for him to conquer the devil, and restore all those predestined to eternal life.\textsuperscript{115} However, merely restoring the damage was not enough, as man also needed to make satisfaction; but this was beyond man’s capability. ‘Because he committed a sin greater than

\textsuperscript{112} Coram Deo stetit et, diaboli in clamante, retro respexit et maius peccatum quam mundus esset commisit. Honorius, Elucidarium, 1.99.

\textsuperscript{113} Honorem quem Deo abstulit reddere debuit et pro peccato satisfacere quod fecit. Valde enim iustum est ut qui alii sua abstulerit et ablata restituat et pro inuria illata satisfaciat. Ibid., 1.104.

\textsuperscript{114} Hunc honorem debuit reddere quod ablatum est, sed pro contumelia illata plus debet reddere quam abstulit. Sicut enim qui laedit salutem alterius, non sufficit si salutem restituit, nisi pro illata doloris iniuria recompenset aliquid: ita qui honorem alicuius uiolat non sufficit honorem reddere, si non secundum exhonorationis factam molestiam aliquid, quod placeat illi quem exhonorauit, restituit. Anselm, CDH, 1.11.

\textsuperscript{115} Honorius, Elucidarium, 1.106.
the world, he was obliged to pay God with something greater than the world.'

God could not simply overlook man’s debt.

If God were to overlook his honour in this way, because he could not have it, he would be impotent. But if he were to take sinful man into glory unpunished, from which he had expelled angels for a single thought, it would be unjust. Furthermore, if sin were to remain unpunished, something in the kingdom of God would be disordered; but nothing is left disordered in his kingdom: therefore the sinner must be punished. For who would return a jewel that had been buried in the mud to his treasury uncleaned?

This point, along with the pearl analogy, was also derived from Cur Deus homo. Anselm argued that it would be unfitting for God to allow sinful man into heaven without satisfaction having been made, as a sinner could not be the equal of the angels whose ranks he was to complete in the heavenly city, or worthy in himself to enjoy perfect beatitude. He used the analogy of a man who owns a pearl, which gets knocked into the mud, but who picks it up and gives it pride of place in his treasury without first washing the mud from it.

Surely God would be doing the same thing, if he held in his hand in the garden man, who would be the companion of the angels without sin, and permitted the devil, burning with envy, to throw man down, albeit consenting, into the mud of sin...surely, I say, he would be doing the same thing, if he were to bring man, stained with the filth of sin and without any cleansing, that is without any satisfaction at all, back to paradise, from which he had been expelled?

116 Quia peccatum maius mundi commisit, aliquid maius mundo Deo soluere debuit. Honorius, Elucidarium, 1.107.

117 Si Deus ei ideo dimitteret suum honorem, quia habere non posset, impotens esset; si autem hominem peccatorem impunitum in gloriam assumeret, unde angelum pro una cogitatione extruisset, iniustus esset. Porro si peccatum impunitum remaneret, aliquid in regno Dei inordinatum esset; sed in regno eius nihil relinquitur inordinatum: peccator ergo puniri debuit. Quis enim gemmam de caeno sublatam in thesaurus suos recondat non purgatam? Ibid.

118 Nonne similiter faceret deus, qui hominem angelis sociandum sine peccato quasi in manu sua tenebat in paradiso et permiserit, ut accensus invidia diabolus eum in lutum peccati quamuis consentientem deiceret...nonne, inquam, similiter faceret, si hominem pecci sorde maculatum sine omni lauatione, id est absque omni satisfacione...in paradisum, de quo eiecutus fuerat, reducet? Anselm, CDH, 1.19.
Honorius’ argument that there could be nothing unfitting in God’s kingdom was also an important theme of Anselm’s argument in *Cur Deus homo.*

The student in the dialogue then suggests various ways in which it might have been possible for a created being to save mankind, each of which the master rejects. It would be inappropriate for an angel to redeem man, because then man would be subject to the angel, when he should be his equal. A newly-created man, not descended from Adam and therefore not corrupted by original sin, would not be of Adam’s race, and so would be unable to make satisfaction for Adam’s sin, ‘for he who makes satisfaction for man, ought to be of his own race.’ A member of Adam’s race, such as a patriarch or prophet, could not redeem man because all men, however virtuous, are corrupted by original sin from the moment of their conception.

The first two of these arguments can be found in *Cur Deus homo.* In response to Boso’s question about why man could not have been redeemed either by an angel or a new man, free from sin, Anselm argued that man would then be subject to his redeemer, when he should be equal to the angels and subject to none but God.

In a later passage, Anselm also argued that it was necessary for the God-man redeemer to be descended from Adam, as only a member of Adam’s race was under obligation to pay, and it would be unfitting for anyone else to do so. ‘If [God] creates a new man who is not from the race of Adam, this new man will not belong to the human race which is descended from Adam. He will not owe satisfaction for this race, because he will not be of this race.’ Here, again, Anselm returned to the idea that, if man were to be restored by one of a different race, he could not be restored to his original dignity, and God’s purpose would be seen to have failed. As this was unfitting, it was necessary for the man through whom Adam’s race was to be restored should be taken from Adam’s race.

Honorius concluded his discussion of why only the God-man Christ could redeem man by arguing that

since an angel ought not to redeem man, and man could not make satisfaction for himself, the Son of God, through whom all things were made, in order that they

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121 *De suo enim genere esse debuit, qui pro homine satisfaceret. Ibid.*, 1.116.
122 Ibid., 1.117.
123 Anselm, *CDH*, 1.5.
124 Si nouum hominem facit non ex Adae genere, non pertinebit ad genus humanum quod natum est de Adam. Quae non debetur satisfacere pro eo, quia non erit de illo. Ibid., 2.8.
might also be redeemed through him, assumed full humanity and was made one person with two natures. And in that nature which was God, he defeated the devil, as he himself had defeated man, and opened heaven who to all who were predestined, and equal to the angels; which God alone could do. And in that nature by which he was man he made payment for the injury that was greater than the world, when he submitted to death that he did not owe; which man alone ought to do.\textsuperscript{125}

The idea that it was necessary for the God-man to become incarnate and die for the sin for which God alone could, and man alone should, pay, epitomized Anselm’s argument in \textit{Cur Deus homo}.\textsuperscript{126}

Honorius’s explanation of why only mankind, and not the fallen angels, could be restored, also reflects Anselm’s discussion on the subject. Honorius argued that because the angels fell without the instigation of another, they ought to rise again without the help of another, which was impossible.\textsuperscript{127} This statement closely echoes that of Anselm in \textit{Cur Deus homo}.\textsuperscript{128} A further Anselmian argument against the redemption of angels, which Honorius reproduces, relates to the generation of angels, each of his own genus. Anselm wrote that just as it was not right that man should be restored by another man who was not of the same race, even if he were of the same nature, similarly it is not right that an angel should be saved by another angel, even if he were of the same nature, since angels are not of one race as human beings are.\textsuperscript{129}

Honorius also used this argument:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{125} \textit{Quia igitur angelus redimere non debuit et homo satisfacere non potuit, Dei Filius, per quem omnia, ut et redemption fiet per eum, assumpsit plenum hominem et in duabus naturis factus est una persona. Et in illa natura qua Deus erat uicit diabolum, ut et ipse uicit hominem, et omnibus praedestinatis caelum aperuit et angelis coaequavit, quod solus Deus potuit. In ea autem natura quo homo fuit pro iniuria maius mundo soluit, cum mortem indebitam subit, quod solus homo facere debuit.}\textsuperscript{ Honorius, \textit{Elucidarium}, 1.118.}
\item \textsuperscript{126} \textit{Anselm, \textit{CDH}, 2.6.}
\item \textsuperscript{127} \textit{Quia sicut nullo instigante ceciderunt, ita nullo adjuvante resurgere debuerunt, quod erat eis impossibile.}\textsuperscript{ Honorius, \textit{Elucidarium}, 1.43.}
\item \textsuperscript{128} \textit{quia sicut ceciderunt, nullo alio nocente ut caderent, illa nullo alio adjuvante resurgere debent, quod est illis impossibile.}\textsuperscript{ Anselm, \textit{CDH}, 2.21.}
\item \textsuperscript{129} \textit{Et sicut homo per alium hominem, qui non esset eiusdem generis, quamuis eiusdem esset naturae, non debut relevari: ita nullus angelus per alium angelum saluari debet, quamuis omnes sint unius naturae, quoniam non sunt eiusdem generis sicut homines.}\textsuperscript{\textit{Ibid.}, 2.21.}
\end{itemize}
the angels were all created at the same time, and not from one angel, as men are born from one man. Therefore if Christ had taken the nature of an angel from one angel, he would have redeemed that one alone, and the others would have remained outside redemption.130

It is widely accepted that the close parallels between Honorius’s arguments regarding the redemption in *Elucidarium*, and those expounded by Anselm in *Cur Deus homo*, are such that Honorius must have known Anselm’s work.131 This would seem to suggest that Honorius could not have been writing before 1098, when *Cur Deus homo* was completed. However, this assumption is challenged by a twelfth-century Italian manuscript of the text, which has been studied in some detail by Virginia Brown.132 The manuscript was compiled during the reign of Roger II of Sicily (d. 1154) for Stephen, abbot of the monastery of San Salvatore in Telese, and contains a copy of the earliest recension of *Elucidarium*, as well as Hugh of St Victor’s *De tribus diebus*, a medical remedy and a collection of penitential texts.133 Brown suggests that the explanation for the presence of *Elucidarium* in Telese ‘may lie in the link that had been established some fifty years previously between the monastery of San Salvatore and Anselm of Canterbury.’ John, abbot of San Salvatore in 1098, had been Anselm’s pupil at Bec, and accompanied him to Sciavi in the spring of 1098.134 Brown also suggests that ‘it is tempting to speculate that Anselm could have brought the *Elucidarium* with him to Southern Italy and that the text of the Rimini manuscript may be a copy of a very early witness.’135

If this speculation is correct, Honorius could not have had access to the full text of *Cur Deus homo* while he was writing *Elucidarium*. This makes the question of how Honorius could have known about Anselm’s thought on the subject even more crucial. *Cur Deus homo* grew out of discussions with other monks in Anselm’s circle. Anselm explained in the

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130 Angeli sunt omnes partier creati, non ab uno angelo, sicut homines ab uno homine, nati. Ideo, si Christus ab uno angelo angelicam naturam sumeret, illum solum redimeret; alii extra redemptionem remanerent. Honorius, *Elucidarium*, 1.44.
134 Eadmer, VA, 2.29.
135 Brown, ‘*Pastorale*’, p. 139.
preface to the completed text that it was written ‘in response to a request’, presumably from those who had heard his oral discourses on the subject and wanted to have a written version. If Honorius had been in Canterbury at the same time as Anselm, it is likely that he would have been a participant in these discussions. However, the similarities, not only in terms of the structure of the argument, but also of terminology and phrasing, that can be seen in multiple places between Elucidarium and Cur Deus homo, indicate that it is more likely that Honorius had access to Anselm’s written text itself, at least in part, at the time of writing.

Although we know that Anselm completed Cur Deus homo in the summer of 1098, during his stay in Capua, it is unclear when he began to write. He stated in the Preface that he began the work in England, so it must have been underway before he left for his first period of exile in October 1097. The dating of Cur Deus homo has been discussed at some length by René Roques in the introduction to his edition of the text. Roques discusses Gerberon’s claim that the work was begun in 1094, after the completion of De incarnatione Verbi, but suggests instead that it was more likely that Anselm did not begin to write until shortly before he left the country, in 1097.\(^{136}\) The lack of evidence means that it is impossible to know when Anselm began to write. However, we do know that parts of Cur Deus homo were in circulation before the work was completed. In the Preface to the finished text, Anselm complained about ‘some people who, before it was completed and fully worked out, copied out the first parts of the work without my knowledge.’\(^ {137}\) The precise content of the prima partes of the work that were being distributed in this way are unidentifiable, as is the date from which they began to circulate. However, it does seem possible that Honorius may have had access to parts of Anselm’s written text before its completion in 1098. This may help to explain textual similarities between Elucidarium and parts of Cur Deus homo, even if Honorius was writing before 1098.

The only positive evidence that we have for the latest possible date of completion for Elucidarium is an English translation, in a manuscript dated c. 1125, now held in the British Library.\(^ {138}\) The text must therefore have been composed before this date, and was likely to have been considerably earlier, for it to have been translated already. Beyond this, evidence for the dating of the text is inconclusive. Brown’s suggestion that the Telese manuscript was


\(^{137}\) Quodam qui, antequam perfectum et exquisitum esset, primus partes eius me nesciente sibi transcriebant. Anselm, CDH, Praefatio.

taken from an extremely early copy of *Elucidarium*, brought to Italy by Anselm himself, is only speculative. However, it is not the only evidence to suggest an early dating of the work. A library catalogue from Blaubeuren in Baden-Württemburg, dating from the abbacy of Aezelinus (1085-1101), includes a reference to a ‘*librum lucidarium*’. Although it is impossible to identify this text positively, Gottschall suggests that it may well refer to Honorius’s *Elucidarium*.\(^{139}\) If he is correct, this narrows the time span within which it could have been written to within a couple of years of the completion of *Cur Deus homo*.

Additional support for an early dating of *Elucidarium* is contained in the fact that Honorius did not use any of Anselm’s later works. His discussion of the beatitudes awaiting the blessed in the life to come was apparently derived from Anselm’s sermon *De beatitudine*.\(^ {140}\) There are minor differences between Honorius’s list of the beatitudes and that contained in the text of Anselm’s sermon as recorded by Eadmer. This may indicate that Honorius’s discussion was not based on Eadmer’s text, but his own recollections of Anselm’s oral teaching and preaching at Canterbury before his first period of exile.\(^ {141}\) Alternative versions of the same sermon are recorded by Alexander of Canterbury, and in *De moribus humanis* and the *Dicta Anselmi*.\(^ {142}\) Alexander did not accompany Anselm on exile and so could not have heard the sermon at Cluny, as Eadmer did. All the available evidence suggests that Anselm preached on the subject several times, so it is highly possible that Honorius may have based his account on a version heard at Canterbury. However, there is no evidence that Honorius knew any of Anselm’s later works at the time of writing.\(^ {143}\)

\(^{139}\) Gottschall, *Elucidarium*, p. 11.


\(^{142}\) Alexander of Canterbury, *PL*, 184.353-364 (wrongly attributed to Guido of Chartreuse); *De humanis moribus*, 48-71; *Dicta Anselmi*, 5. The latter texts are both edited in Southern and Schmitt (eds.), *Memorials*.

\(^{143}\) Lefèvre (L’*Elucidarium*, p. 194) believes that certain of Honorius’ comments on the relations of the Trinity were taken from *De processione spiritus sancti* (c. 1099-1102; ed. Schmitt, *Opera*, v. 2). He notes the parallel between Honorius’ statement that ‘all things exist from the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Spirit [*Ex patre omnia, per Filium omnia, in Spiritu Sancto omnia*]’ (*Elucidarium*, 1.6), and Anselm’s lengthier discussion on the same theme (*De processione*, 9); and the Trinitarian analogy of the sun with its flame, brightness and heat (*Elucidarium*, 1.3; *De processione*, 8). However, these common elements are not sufficient to indicate that Honorius used *De processione* when writing *Elucidarium*, as neither concept was original to Anselm. The former appears in Augustine, *De trinitate* 1.6.12; the latter in Cassiodorus, *Expositio in Ps.* 50, 13. In both cases, Honorius is arguably closer to the earlier authors than to Anselm, both in terms of context and verbal parallels. Lefèvre agrees with Flint that there is no reason to suppose that Honorius knew Anselm’s *De conceptu virginali* (c. 1099) or *De concordia* (c. 1106) at the time of composing *Elucidarium*. The majority of *Elucidarium* follows the Augustinian definition of original sin as concupiscence, which Anselm had rejected in *De conceptu virginali*. Although one passage does follow Anselm in defining original sin as injustice (2.33a-d), this appears to be a later addition (Lefèvre, *L’Elucidarium*, p. 222). It is unclear whether or not it was Honorius himself who was responsible for this addition, but if it were, this would provide additional evidence that Honorius was unfamiliar with *De conceptu* when he first wrote *Elucidarium*, as he would otherwise have had no reason to make the addition.
Apart from his early knowledge of *Cur Deus homo* and *De beatitudine*, demonstrated in *Elucidarium*, further evidence to support the idea that Honorius spent time at Canterbury may be found in his sermon collection *Speculum ecclesiae*. Honorius presented the collection as a response to a request from the ‘brothers’ (*fratres*). The letter containing this request was included as a preface to the text itself, and referred to a recent visit to their community made by Honorius. In the early manuscripts, the letter was attributed to the monks of Canterbury, apparently indicating that Honorius had spent time in Canterbury.

*Elucidarium* presented Anselmian arguments and ideas in a simplified form, described by Loris Sturlese as a *banalisierung* of Anselm’s work. Honorius’ aim was to provide monks and clergy with a practical handbook of theology, offering sound doctrinal teaching and clear answers to the sorts of questions they were likely to face in pastoral work. For this reason, he concentrated on the basic principles of the weight of sin, man’s inability to pay his debt, and his need for a God-man to make satisfaction on his behalf. Subtleties within Anselm’s argument, such as the distinction between preceding and subsequent necessity, would be unnecessary complications for Honorius’ intended audience, explaining his failure to discuss them.

*Elucidarium* was not the only text in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries to employ a simplified version of Anselm’s satisfaction theory, without any extensive discussion of the precise meaning of terms such as ‘necessity’. A similar simplification of the argument can also be found in a number of works of Jewish-Christian polemics. These will be discussed in Chapter Three. Although the majority of the argument of *Cur Deus homo* was devoted to Anselm’s exposition of his satisfaction theory, and discussion of the necessity of the incarnation, he also addressed an alternative model of the redemption, focusing on the means by which God was able to defeat the power of the devil. As with his arguments concerning necessity, the role of the devil in the redemption was another area in Anselm’s

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145 Flint, *Honorius*, p. 10. Flint argues that the letter must have been sent to Honorius at a time when he was away from Canterbury, visiting other monastic houses in England. Gottschall follows Flint in seeing the dedication as evidence for a stay in Canterbury, while admitting that ‘unequivocal evidence...remains lacking.’ Gottschall, *Das Elucidarium*, p. 19. The dedication has not received universal acceptance of evidence that Honorius had stayed in Canterbury. Lefèvre suggests that ‘the Church of Canterbury’ does not necessarily refer to Canterbury itself, but to the province as a whole (Lefèvre, *L’Elucidarium*, p. 219). Sturlese accepts the identification of ‘the brothers of the Church of Canterbury’ with the Canterbury monks themselves, but argues that it is not necessary to assume that Honorius had studied in Canterbury in order to explain his contacts with the community. L. Sturlese, ‘Zwischen Anselm und Johannes Scotus Eriugena. Der seltsame Fall des Honorius Augstrodonensis, des Mönchs von Regensburg’ in B. Mojsisch & O. Pluta (eds.), *Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi* (Amsterdam, 1991), pp. 927-951, at p. 933.
146 Sturlese, ‘Honorius’, p. 927.
thought that apparently contradicted earlier authority, and it enjoyed a mixed reception in the early twelfth century.
Chapter Two

*Cur Deus homo* and the Rights of the Devil

**Illud quod dicere solemus**

Anselm opened his discussion of the argument concerning the rights of the devil in *Cur Deus homo* with a reference to a contemporary opinion on the subject, summarizing the idea that the devil had a just claim to power over man, which God could not justly overlook in the redemption.

But that other thing which we are accustomed to say, that God was obliged to act against the devil through justice rather than force in order to free man, so that when the devil killed him in whom there was no cause for death and who was God, he justly lost the power which he had held over sinners; otherwise [God] would have acted with unjust violence towards him, since he had possessed man justly, for he did not abduct man with violence, but man went over to him voluntarily.\(^\text{147}\)

According to this argument, when man sinned voluntarily, he willingly placed himself under the lordship of the devil. The devil thus had the right to exercise lordship over man, and God could not justly steal man away from him by force. Instead, God concealed himself in human form. When the devil tried to exercise the power of death over Christ, who was not under his jurisdiction, he overstepped the bounds of his authority, and so forfeited the right to exert any further power over the rest of humanity. God could now justly free man from the power of the devil without violently destroying the devil’s rights.

This passage in *Cur Deus homo* is an almost verbatim reproduction of part of a *sententia* attributed to Ralph of Laon. The *sententia* asked ‘why God the Father willed to redeem the human race through the human incarnation of the Word.’\(^\text{148}\) The majority of the

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\(^{147}\) *Sed et illud quod dicere solemus, deum scilicet debuisse prius per iustitiam contra diabolum agere, ut liberaret hominem, quam per fortitudinem, ut cum diabolas eum, in quo nulla mortis erat causa et qui deus erat, occideret, iuste potestatem quam super peccatores habebat amitteret, alioquin inlustam violentiam fecisset illi, quoniam iuste possidebat hominem, quem non ipse uiolenter attraxerat, sed idem homo ad illum sponte contulerat.* Anselm, *CDH*, 1.7.

sententia comprised arguments and ideas to which Anselm would have no objection. However, it also included a discussion of the way in which, in killing the Christ, the devil justly lost power over man, which until then had been held justly.

The devil unjustly brought death to him over whom he had no just cause to exercise power. Therefore he justly lost his power over man, who unjustly exercised his tyranny over Christ; so that when the devil killed him in whom there was no just cause for death and who was God, he justly lost the power which he had held over sinners. Otherwise Christ would have acted with unjust violence towards the devil, who had justly possessed man whom he did not abduct with violence, but man went over to him voluntarily.  

Anselm did not acknowledge his source for this passage in Cur Deus homo, but the textual parallels are close enough to demonstrate that he must have taken it from the Laon sententia. He did not cite the argument because he agreed with it, but immediately followed his summary with the statement that ‘I do not see what force this argument has.’ Anselm argued that, as a created being, the devil was under God’s jurisdiction, just as man was, and owed obedience to God. The devil was nothing more than a rebellious slave who had encouraged man, his fellow slave, to join him in his rebellion. The devil thus had no right whatsoever to claim dominion over man, and so there was no need for God to respect his position in the act of redemption.

Since neither the devil nor man belong to anyone except God, and that neither stands outside the power of God, what ought God to do with, concerning or in the case of his own, except punish his slave, who had persuaded his fellow slave to desert his lord and come over to him and, a traitor, had received a fugitive and, a thief, received a thief with the stolen property of his lord?...If God, the judge of

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149 Cui iuste diabolus mortem intulit in quo nullum ius sue potestatis inuenit. Iuste ergo suam in hominibus perdidit potestatem qui in Christo suam iustae exercit tyrannidem ut cum diabolus eum in quo nulla mortis est causa et qui Deus erat, occideret, iuste potestatem quam super peccatores habebat amitteret. Alioquin iniuastam uiolentiam Christus diaboli fecisset qui iuste possidebat hominem quem non ipse uiolenter sibi attraxerat, sed idem homo ad illum se sponte contiderat. Diabolus dicitur iuste possidere hominem quia Deus iuste hoc permittebat et homo iuste patiebatur quod promouerat. Non sua iustitia homo pati iuste dicitur, sed quia iusto Dei iudicio patitur.

150 Non uideo quam uim habebat. Anselm, CDH, 1.7.
all, were to rescue man thus possessed, from the power of the one who was so unjustly holding him,...what would be the injustice in this?\footnote{Cum autem diabolus aut homo non sit nisi dei et neuter extra potestatem dei consistat: quam causam debuit agere deus cum suo, de suo, in suo, nisi ut seruam suam puniret, qui suo conservo communem dominum deserere et ad se transire persuasisset, ac traditor fugituum, far furem cum furto domini sui suscepisset?...Aut si iudex omnium deus hominem sic possessum, de potestate tam iniuste possidentis...eriperet: quae haec iniustitia esset. Anselm, CDH, 1.7. I have translated seruus as ‘slave’ throughout, for the sake of consistency and in order to preserve the associations with the biblical concept of slavery to sin which was central to Anselm’s thought. It also emphasizes the totality of man’s bond to God, to whom he owes his entire being. The term ‘slave’ has serious negative connotations in English that are not necessarily present in the Latin seruus, which can lead to distortion of Anselm’s intention, and the portrayal of his thought as overly legalistic and inhumane. An alternative translation is ‘servant’, but this loses the sense of total commitment implied by the term seruus. Janet Fairweather used ‘bond-servant’ in her translation for the Oxford World Classics volume of Anselm’s works. This avoids the idea of limited authority implied by ‘servant’, but also restricts Anselm’s analogy to feudal concepts of vassalage, so losing the sense of universality in the argument, and the association with scriptural language.}

Anselm returned to the Laon sententia for a further quotation, again unacknowledged, later in the chapter. The second passage, which followed immediately after the first in the sententia, stated that

the devil is said to possess man justly because God justly permitted this and man justly suffered what he had deserved. Man is not said to have suffered justly through his own justice, but because he suffered through the just judgement of God.\footnote{Diabolus dicitur iuste possidere hominem quia Deus iuste hoc permittebat et homo iuste patiebat quod promeruerat. Non sua iustitia homo pati iuste dicitur, sed quia iusto Dei iudicio patitur. Sententia 232.}

In this way, the devil is said to torment man justly because God justly permitted this, and man justly suffered it. But this which man is said to suffer justly, he is not said to suffer justly through his own justice, but because he is punished through the just judgement of God.\footnote{Hoc...modo diabolus dicitur iuste uexare hominem quia Deus hoc iuste permittit et homo iuste patitur. Sed et hoc quod homo iuste dicitur pati, non sua iustitia pati iuste dicitur, sed quia iusto iudicio Dei punitur. Anselm, CDH, 1.7.}

Anselm’s reproduction of this opinion in Cur Deus homo contained a change of terminology that significantly altered its meaning. Where the sententia stated that the devil possessed man justly, in Anselm’s version, he now only tortured him justly.

\footnote{I have translated seruus as ‘slave’ throughout, for the sake of consistency and in order to preserve the associations with the biblical concept of slavery to sin which was central to Anselm’s thought. It also emphasizes the totality of man’s bond to God, to whom he owes his entire being. The term ‘slave’ has serious negative connotations in English that are not necessarily present in the Latin seruus, which can lead to distortion of Anselm’s intention, and the portrayal of his thought as overly legalistic and inhumane. An alternative translation is ‘servant’, but this loses the sense of total commitment implied by the term seruus. Janet Fairweather used ‘bond-servant’ in her translation for the Oxford World Classics volume of Anselm’s works. This avoids the idea of limited authority implied by ‘servant’, but also restricts Anselm’s analogy to feudal concepts of vassalage, so losing the sense of universality in the argument, and the association with scriptural language.}
The claim that the devil possessed (possidere) man justly could be interpreted as implying that man was now subject to the devil as lord, in contrast to his original status as one subject only to the lordship of God. In the intervening paragraphs between the two passages from *Cur Deus homo* cited above, Anselm had already refuted this notion, arguing that the devil, like man, was created by God with obligations to serve God; as a fellow slave, the devil could not possibly claim just lordship over man. Having dealt with this point, the question remained as to whether the devil, acting with divine permission, could be said to torment (uexare) man justly. Anselm argued that he could, in the sense that it was just that man should be punished for his sin, and that this punishment could occur at the hands of the devil, but that the devil himself was not acting justly in usurping authority over man, and could not claim just possession of man. 'For although man was justly tormented by the devil, nevertheless the devil tormented him unjustly. For man deserved to be punished...but the devil in no way deserved to punish him.'\(^{154}\)

Anselm argued that the justice by which man was punished did not necessarily imply that the punisher himself was just, although some people had mistakenly assumed so.

Those people who are of the opinion that the devil has just cause for his possession of man are led to this conclusion by the fact that they see that man is justly subject to harassment by the devil and consequently reckon that the devil is acting justly in inflicting it. For it can happen that one and the same thing is, from different points of view, both just and unjust.\(^{155}\)

By altering the wording of the Laon *sententia* from *possidere* to *uexare*, Anselm confirmed the conclusions he had drawn in the preceding paragraph. The rest of the passage cited completed the examination of whose justice it was by which man was punished, by eliminating the possibility that man himself was in possession of any justice in the matter, leaving God as the sole source and arbiter of all justice. This statement in the Laon *sententia* was uncontroversial, and could therefore be reproduced without comment or qualification.

Anselm did not quote verbatim from the Laon *sententia*, or acknowledge that he was citing any particular source; his only indication that he had a contemporary opinion in mind

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\(^{154}\) *Quamuis enim homo iuste a diabolo torqueretur, ipse tamen illum iniuste torquebat. Homo namque meruerat ut puniretur...diabolo uero meritum nullum erat ut puniret*. Anselm, *CDH*, 1.7.

\(^{155}\) Et puto illos, qui diabolum aliquam opinantur habere in possidendo hominem iustitiam, ad hoc inde adduci, quia uident hominem diaboli uexatione iuste subiaceret et deum hoc iuste permettere, et idcirco putant diabolum illam iuste inferre. *Ibid.*
was the brief reference at the start of the chapter, to ‘that other thing which we are accustomed to say.’ Citations of contemporary sources, even when unacknowledged and made for the specific purpose of being disproven, are rare in Anselm’s work, and not all commentators agree that he was citing Laon here. The parallels between the Laon sententia and Chapter Seven of Cur Deus homo were first noticed by Jean Rivière, who believed that the sententia was the later text, and that Ralph was quoting Cur Deus homo. More recently, Jay Rubenstein has come to the same conclusion, viewing the Laon sententia as Ralph’s response, on behalf of the school of Laon, to Anselm’s critique of its teaching on the devil. The impossibility of dating the sententia means that we cannot be certain; it is not even clear whether the attribution of the text to Ralph is accurate. However, as Southern has demonstrated, it is more likely that the sententia was written first, and that Anselm cited Laon, rather than the other way around. Anselm used the first extract as a starting-point for his discussion of the ius diaboli idea, as it provided a neat summary of the argument that he wished to disprove. His reproduction of the argument did not need to be a literal quotation, but he accurately conveyed the sense of the extract under consideration. His reproduction of the second extract was much closer linguistically to the first, but the replacement of possidere with uexare drastically altered its meaning. Anselm here harnessed the positive content of the Laon sententia, correcting its error and explaining to the reader how and why the change needed to be made, even without explicitly acknowledging that this was what he was doing.

Southern emphasizes the role of Boso in promoting Anselm’s awareness of contemporary teaching at Laon concerning the rights of the devil. He points to the dominant role given to Boso in the dialogue, in contrast to those of the anonymous discipuli of Anselm’s earlier dialogues. Most notably, the whole of Book One, Chapter Seven, which contains the statement of the rights of the devil theory, as well as its refutation, was put into Boso’s mouth. Southern argued that ‘in giving his pupil the initial breakthrough...[Anselm]
wished to give Boso some credit for an important moment in his own theological development.160

The fact that Boso was given the initial identification and refutation of the problem is not necessarily significant in itself, as the dialogue was simply the literary form chosen by Anselm for the composition of his treatise, not the record of an actual discussion between the two men. Nevertheless, support for Southern’s argument is found in the fact that Anselm himself credited Boso with a significant role in inspiring the composition of Cur Deus homo. In the Prologue to his treatise De conceptu uirginali (c. 1099), Anselm addressed Boso, stating that 'you more than anyone else impelled me to write.'161

Frederick Van Fleteren also credits Boso with a role in drawing Anselm’s attention to the problems inherent in the ius diaboli idea, but without making any reference to contemporary teaching at Laon. Instead, Van Fleteren focuses on patristic precedent for the ius diaboli idea, particularly the complex Augustinian heritage.162 In answer to the question of why it was necessary for God to become man and die in order to save mankind, rather than simply defeating the devil through a supreme display of divine power, Augustine argued that, although God could have used force against the devil, he preferred to defeat him with justice, as a method more befitting his all-encompassing goodness. He described how


Augustine emphasized the voluntary nature of man’s sin, arguing that man had wilfully placed himself under the power of the devil. God allowed this to take place, so that man’s slavery would be the just punishment for his sin.164 Augustine stopped short of claiming that the justice by which man was enslaved to the devil implied that the devil had a just right to

160 Southern, Portrait, p. 205.
161 Quem ut ederem tu maxime inter alios me impulisti. Anselm, DCV, Prologus.
163 Placuit Deo, ut propter eruendum hominem de diaboli potestate, non potentia diabolus, sed iustitia uinceretur; atque ita et homines imitantes Christum, iustitia quarerent diabolum uincere, non potentia. Non quod potentia quasi mali aliquid fugienda sit; sed ordo servandum est, quo prior est iustitia. Augustine, DT, 13.13.17.
164 Ibid., 13.12.16.
exert this dominion over man, arguing instead that the devil’s power was entirely contingent on man’s sin.\footnote{Augustine, \textit{Sermo} 130, 2.} Christ’s death, the perfect sacrifice made once for all on account of sin, meant that man’s penalty had been paid, so that he could justly be freed from the punishment of servitude to the devil. In \textit{De trinitate}, he described how ‘by his death, one true sacrifice poured out for us, he purged, abolished and destroyed whatever faults there were by which principalities and powers justly held us so that we should pay the penalty.’\footnote{Morte sua quippe uno uerissimo sacrificio pro nobis oblato, quidquid culparum erat unde nos principatus et potestates ad luenda supplicia iure detinebant, purgauit, aboleuit, extinxit. Augustine, \textit{DT}, 4.13.17.}  

Interpreting passages such as this one as a complete account of Augustine’s understanding of the justice by which man was enslaved to the devil is problematic, as it does not explain his concern to demonstrate how God treated the devil with justice. The passage quoted above continued with a description of how Christ’s death meant that the devil ‘lost man whom he possessed as if with complete justice, as he had been seduced through his own consent.’\footnote{Diabolus hominem, quem per consensionem seductum, tamquam iure integro possidebat...amisit. Ibid.} Augustine’s use of the word \textit{tanquam} (as if) in relation to the devil’s claim to justice indicates the ambiguity inherent in his discussion of the \textit{ius diaboli}. Nevertheless, as C.W. Marx points out, ‘Augustine’s statements that God chose to treat the devil with justice imply that God chose to respect some element of right in the Devil’s possession of humanity which was over and above that power which depended on humanity’s state of sin. Augustine never articulates the issue in this way, but it is implicit in how he describes the defeat of the devil.’\footnote{C.W. Marx, \textit{The Devil’s Rights and the Redemption in the Literature of Medieval England} (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 14-15.} 

Van Fleteren argues that both the ‘accustomed answer’ cited by Boso at the beginning of the chapter, and its refutation, derive from passages in \textit{De trinitate} 13. ‘Boso, intentionally we may believe, uses Augustine to refute an objection taken out of context by others from Augustine’s own writings. Likely, a few of Anselm’s contemporaries had raised this objection from Augustine’s own words.’\footnote{Van Fleteren, ‘Traces’, p. 172.} By focusing solely on the ambiguities inherent in one book of one text by one author, Van Fleteren greatly understates the prevalence of arguments and analogies that relied on the \textit{ius diaboli} idea in patristic and early medieval texts, many of whose authors were much less cautious than Augustine had been in their approach. Leo the Great (d. 461), was unequivocal in his argument that the voluntary nature of man’s sin in putting himself in the power of the devil meant that the devil could justly claim lordship over him.
For the pride of the ancient enemy did not claim a just tyranny over all men undeservedly, nor did he crush with unowed despotism those whom he had lured away from the law of God to obey his will of their own accord. And so it would not be just for him to lose the original servitude of the human race unless he was conquered by that which had surrendered.\textsuperscript{170}

It was this argument that was being taught at Laon in the late eleventh century.

**The School of Laon and the Reception of *Cur Deus homo***

Later *sententiae* from the school of Laon demonstrate a mixed reaction to Anselm’s arguments concerning the rights of the devil. While some acknowledged the problems inherent in the *ius diaboli* idea, demonstrating preference for an explanation of the redemption that was much closer to Anselm’s satisfaction theory, others continued to express support for the *ius diaboli* as taught by Ralph. A *sententia* entitled *Cur Deus homo* cited with approval Anselm’s argument for the necessity of the God-man (‘Archbishop Anselm: God could, man should.’),\textsuperscript{171} but also cited Augustine’s argument that God conquered the devil with justice, rather than power, so that man should imitate him in preferring justice to power. The devil was defeated justly because, in killing the sinless Christ, he justly lost the rest of mankind.\textsuperscript{172} This statement seems to imply that the author allowed some degree of justice in the devil’s possession of man which was lost when he overstepped his rights by killing the Christ. The argument is thus closer to that of Ralph on the question of the *ius diaboli*, even though the author employed Anselmian arguments on the necessity and fittingness of the incarnation. This may be indicative of the author’s reluctance to follow Anselm into territory that seemed to contradict earlier authority. Similarly, another *sententia* describes how ‘the devil lost his right over the human race’\textsuperscript{173} by attacking Christ, who remained pure and

\textsuperscript{170} *Nam superbia hostis antiqui non immerito sibi in omnes homines ius tyrannicum uindicabat, nec indebito dominatu premebat, quos a mandato Dei spontaneos in obsequium suae voluntatis illexerat. Non itaque iuste amitteret originalem humani generis seruitutem, nisi de eo quod subegerat uinceretur*. Leo the Great, *Sermo* 22, 3.


incorrupt in spite of taking on human nature. In attacking what was not his own (Christ), he lost what was his own (man).  

The *Liber Pancresis*, attributed to Anselm of Laon, seems to follow a similar argument. The author described how

Adam truly consented, and it is known how he consented, indeed by his own will, with the devil bringing no force to bear on him. And because he sinned voluntarily, he was subjected to the power of the devil and in this way corrupted himself and his descendants and was justly sold into servitude to the devil.

This passage seems to follow the same argument as the Ralph *sententia*, which emphasized the voluntary nature of man’s sin. Because man freely surrendered himself to the power of the devil, the devil could claim a just right to dominion over him.

The author went on to argue that ‘unless it was a man who conquered the devil, man would not be taken from him justly but violently.’ The devil’s claim to the right of dominion over man was such that it would be unjust for God to snatch man away from him through a show of divine power. After a brief discussion of why man’s redeemer needed to be one who was both God and man, the author returned to the voluntary nature of man’s sin, and the devil’s resulting *imperium* over him. ‘We know that God is just, and therefore would not seize from the devil with violence what was his own.’

However, the author of the *sententia* apparently recognized the problem inherent in claiming that the devil had a just right to power over man, as he followed this last statement with a counter-argument: ‘but did not the devil attack what was not his own unjustly? – Yes indeed.’ The devil acted wrongly in tempting man to sin and deceiving him into giving up his obedience to God and the blessedness that came from it. Therefore, the author concluded, ‘God justly sought and redeemed what was his own. Behold, you have the justice of God against the injustice of the devil.’

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174 *Amisit quod suum erat quia inuasit quod suum non erat*. *Sententia* 354.

175 *Adam uero consensit; et nota quomodo consensit, propria quidem uoluntate, et diaboli nullam sibi uim inferente. Et quia voluntate peccauti, subjectus est imperio diaboli et ita seipsum et posteros corruptit et ita iuste manicaptus est servitio diaboli*. *Sententia* 47, ed. Lottin, *Pyschologie*, vol. 5, p. 44.

176 *Nisi enim homo esset qui diabolum uinceret non iuste sed uiolenter ei homo tolletur*. Ibid.

177 *Scimus etiam quod Deus iustus est, diabolo igiur uiolenter non auferret quod suum est diaboli*. Ibid.

178 *Cui dicimus: nonne diabolus quod suum non erat iniuste inuasit? – Sic equidem*. Ibid.

179 *Deus iuste quod suum erat inquirit ac redimit. Ecce habes iustitiam Dei contra inuistitiam diaboli*. Ibid.
seduced through a trick’, through the devil’s false promise that he could make man like God.\textsuperscript{180}

The next sententia in the Liber Pancrisis manuscripts also demonstrated the problematic nature of the argument that the devil had a just right to power over man. The sententia emphasized the devil’s ius over mankind which could not be removed by force without injury. It was only when the devil attempted to usurp power over the sinless God man Christ that he justly lost dominion over man.\textsuperscript{181} However, the sententia also included a description of the various claims that could be made in a law suit between God, man and the devil, which proved that God was supremely just, and the devil supremely unjust.\textsuperscript{182} The devil claimed just possession over man, although he had seduced man into sin through deception and false promises, ‘because without force, but by your own will alone, you were more obedient to me than to your creator, I possess you by right.’\textsuperscript{183} As far as man was concerned, it was entirely right that he should suffer servitude to the devil. However, God had a prior claim to lordship over man, and could order the devil to ‘return to me my slave for, if he wandered from me because of your lies, he must still be returned to me, for I am your Lord God and his.’\textsuperscript{184} In response, the devil had to acknowledge that, as both he and man belonged to God, God could take man back if he wished. As man deserved to be punished, he could claim some defence against man, but not against God.\textsuperscript{185} The author concluded that ‘by this judgement, it can be seen that if God had liberated his creature from his [the devil’s] power, he would not do him injury.’\textsuperscript{186} The devil had no right to power over man which meant that God could not liberate him without injustice. Nevertheless, in respect to the devil’s claim that man had voluntarily placed himself in his power, God preferred that the devil should lose man by his own hand (suo commisso), by attempting to assert power over one who was not under his jurisdiction. By this means, the devil ‘lost by right those whom he had once seemed to hold by right.’\textsuperscript{187} The sententia illustrates the complexity and ambiguity inherent in the ius diaboli idea, as the author struggled to reconcile the justice of man’s

\textsuperscript{180} Ipse etiam homo, si posset, iuste seipsum diabolo eriperet, quia per dolum seductus fuerat. Sententia 47.
\textsuperscript{182} Deum iustissimum, diabolum uero iniustissimum. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{183} quia sine ui, sed sola tua voluntate magis mihi obedisti, quam creatori tuo, te iure possideo. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{184} redde mihi seruum meum quia si a me falliciis tuis aberrauit, mihi tamen qui Dominus Deus tuus sum et illius, reddendus est. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{185} contra illum, non contra te, aliquid defensionis habeo. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{186} hac diiudicatione uideri potest quod si Deus creaturam ab eius potestate liberasset, non faceret illi iniuriam. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{187} iure illos quos quondam iure uidebatur tenere uictus amisit. Ibid.
possession and punishment by the devil, with the injustice of the devil himself, and the relative strength of the claims of God, man and the devil.

The Liber Pancrisis illustrates the debates on the position of the devil that were taking place in Laon in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. The sententiae on the redemption acknowledged the problems inherent in the idea that an unjust devil could possibly claim a just right to power over man, when this power was usurped through deception and trickery, and the theft of one of God’s creatures by another. The focus of the Liber Pancrisis on man’s sin and resulting servitude to the devil meant that it was liberation from the power of the devil, rather than the reconciliation of man to God, which provided the central focus of the argument. In this it presented the redemption along traditional lines, following the emphases established by Augustine and other patristic authors. The need to make sense of the ambiguities contained in Augustinian writing on the redemption may well have been the primary motivation for the Laon authors’ interest in the question in the late eleventh century, and the arrival of Anselm’s argument in Cur Deus homo must have made a significant contribution to the ongoing debates. Other, later, sententiae associated with the school of Laon are less ambiguous, and follow much more closely Anselm’s argument that the devil acted unjustly in deceiving man, so that although it was just for man to be punished for his sin, the devil had no just right to usurp power over him.188

The variation among the Laon sententiae concerning the ius diaboli means that it is impossible to identify a single Laon position on the subject. While some sententiae, such as those associated with Ralph discussed at the beginning of this chapter, support the idea that the devil had a just claim to power over fallen man, others denied that an unjust devil could have any just claim to power. The precise impact of Cur Deus homo on debates concerning the ius diaboli concept at Laon is difficult to assess. The Liber pancrisis raised questions and difficulties that could have been derived from a critical reading of the ambiguities inherent in Augustine without the need for direct Anselmian influence. Nevertheless, it seems significant that the sententiae which rejected the concept of the devil’s rights unequivocally are those which Lottin identifies as later in date. We know that Cur Deus homo was read and discussed at Laon soon after its composition, as Anselmian arguments on necessity, satisfaction and the position of the angels were cited in later sententiae. It therefore seems probable that his arguments on the ius diaboli had a similarly significant impact on debates at Laon in the early

twelfth century, contributing to the broad shift in opinion that can be seen in the later *sententiae*.

**Hugh of St Victor**

The distinction between the justice by which man was punished for his sin, and the injustice of the devil’s action in punishing him, as discussed in *Cur Deus homo* and the Laon *sententiae*, also played an important role in Hugh of St Victor’s account of the redemption in *De sacramentis*. Hugh’s analogy of the law suit began with the trial of the devil, who was convicted of having done injury to God, ‘for he abducted man, his slave, by deception, and held him by violence.’ At the same time, the devil was also convicted of having done injury to man, ‘for first he deceived him by promising goods, and afterwards he harmed him by inflicting evils.’ The devil’s actions of theft, deceit and harm meant that he ‘had no just cause whereby he should claim to have rights over man.’ Therefore, God had no need to take the devil’s claims over man into account. Hugh thus followed Anselm in rejecting the ‘rights of the devil’ argument for the redemption.

However, although the devil had no right to inflict punishment on man, the fact of man’s punishment was not in itself unjust. By willingly disobeying divine precepts and voluntarily placing himself in the power of the devil, man had offended against God and so deserved to be punished.

Therefore the devil holds man unjustly, but man is held justly, because the devil never deserved that he should oppress man as his subject, but man deserved through his sin that he should be permitted to be oppressed by him...Justly therefore was man subjected to the devil, as regards his sin, but unjustly, as regards the devil’s deception.

This statement echoes that of Anselm in *Cur Deus homo*, that man was justly tormented by the devil, although the devil was unjust in tormenting him.

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189 *Quia servum eius hominem et fraudulenter abduxit et uiolenter tenuit*. Hugh, *DS*, 1.8.4.
190 *quia illum et prius bona promittendo decepit, et post mala inferendo nocuit*. Ibid.
191 *nullam diabolum iustam causam habuit quare sibi ius in homine uendicare debuit*. Ibid.
192 *Iniuste ergo diabolus hominem tenet, sed homo iuste tenetur; quia diabolus numquam meruit ut hominem sibi subiectum premeret, sed homo meruit per culpam suam ut ab eo premimitteretur...Juste ergo subditus est homo diabolo quantum ad culpam suam: iniuste autem quantum pertinet ad fraudulentiam diaboli*. Ibid.
193 Anselm, *CDH*, 1.7.
Man’s offence against God meant that, although he had a just case against the devil, the trial could not be brought to court. This is because the only advocate with the power to ensure the devil’s conviction was God himself. God was unwilling to act as man’s advocate against the devil because of his continued anger regarding man’s sin. Therefore, it was necessary for man to be reconciled with God in order to enter suit with the devil, with God as advocate. Hugh’s explanation of how Christ’s incarnation and death effected this reconciliation between man and God, like that of Anselm, can be understood entirely separately from any discussion of the devil. The reconciliation between man and God provides the main focus of Hugh’s argument. Man’s liberation from the power of the devil, which was made possible as a result of this reconciliation, was a vital consequence, but ultimately distinct from the main action of the redemption.

The similarity of Hugh’s position on the role of the devil in the redemption to that of Anselm is not always recognized. Clanchy argues that Hugh ‘treats the devil as if he has rights’, and ‘blithely ignores’ Anselm’s rejection of the *ius diaboli* idea.\(^\text{194}\) This claim is based on a serious misunderstanding of Hugh’s argument. Clanchy claimed that Hugh’s devil had a legitimate power over man which could only be terminated by Christ paying the due price for man’s release with his own blood. This is not the case. Hugh argued, as Anselm did, that the devil had no right to power over man, and did not need to be bought off with a ransom. Before the case between man and God was even brought to court, the devil had already been convicted for his unlawful abduction of man, and excluded from further involvement in man’s case. It was not the devil who received Christ’s sacrificial death as compensation for man, but God. The structure of Hugh’s account of the redemption in *De sacramentis*, which was based on the analogy of a court room, gave the devil a more prominent position than he had held in *Cur Deus homo*. However, Hugh’s devil played no more of an active role in the drama of redemption than Anselm’s had done. Unlike the court case described in the *Liber Panchrisis*, Hugh did not allow the devil to claim any rights, either with regards to man or God.

Clanchy emphasizes the litigious nature of Hugh’s court room analogy, and claims that he ‘portrays God like an angry and capricious man. The arbitrary anger of a medieval lord might be placated only by money or blood, but God should have a higher sense of justice.’\(^\text{195}\) Clanchy uses Hugh primarily to provide a contrast with Peter Abelard’s focus on love, and to emphasize the radical nature of Abelard’s argument. His claim that ‘in Hugh’s

\(^{194}\) Clanchy, *Abelard*, p. 284.

\(^{195}\) Ibid., p. 285.
analogy of the lawsuit there is no mention either of God’s love for man, nor of man’s love for
God’ may be technically correct, but that is because, within the context of the particular
analogy that Hugh was drawing, it would not have been appropriate for him to do so. The
redemption as the supreme expression of God’s love for man, and the answering love which
it inspired, lay at the heart of Hugh’s theology, and was inseparable from his understanding
of justice and justification, as it had been for Anselm.

Neither Anselm nor Hugh saw the divine justice of the redemption as a justice based
on legalism and human concepts of the rights of lordship. Although they both used legalistic
terminology to describe aspects of the redemption, this was essentially an analogy, and their
arguments can be understood entirely apart from feudal law. Terms such as debitum and
honor had much broader biblical and liturgical connotations than is often apparent from their
usual English translations, and should not be interpreted in a purely legalistic light.196 The
necessity of making satisfaction for sin was emphasized in the Rule of St Benedict, as well as
early medieval penitential literature.197 Similarly, discussion of man’s servitude to the devil
and to sin were not primarily rooted in medieval notions of vassalage, but in scriptural
accounts of man’s slavery, particularly in the epistle to the Romans.

Peter Abelard and the Council of Sens

The impact of Anselm’s work on Hugh of St Victor’s rejection of the ius diaboli idea has
received relatively little attention from historians. By contrast, Peter Abelard’s approach to
the devil, and its basis in Anselmian thought, is widely recognized.198 In his Commentaria in
Romanos, Abelard described the devil, as Anselm had done, as a rebel slave of God who had
seduced man, his fellow slave into joining him in his rebellion. The devil therefore had no
just right to claim possession over man.

For what right could the devil have in possessing man, unless perhaps he had
received him, with God permitting or even handing him over, to be tortured by
him? For do you think that if any slave wills to desert his lord and put himself
under the power of another, it is lawful for him to do this, so that his lord could
not rightfully seek him out and bring him back, if he should wish? For who

doubts that if a slave of any lord seduces a fellow slave by his persuasion and makes him turn away from obedience to his own lord, how much more guilty the seducer is held by his lord than the seduced? And how unjust would it be if he who seduced another deserved to have something of privilege or power over him whom he had seduced, who, even if he had some right over him beforehand, deserved to lose that right from the very wickedness of his seduction?\footnote{Quod etiam ius in possidendo hominem diabolus habere poterat, nisi forte quia eum, Deum permittente aut etiam tradente, ad torquendum ipsum susceperat? Numquid enim, si aliquid seruus dominum suam deserere uellet et alterius potestate se subdere, et sic agere liceret, ut non iure, si uellet, eum dominus requireret atque reduceret? Quis etiam dubitet quod si seruus alicuius domini persuasionibus suis conservum suum seducat et ab obedientia proprii domini declinare faciat, quanto amplius apud dominum suam res constitutur seductor quam seducus? et quam intustum sit ut is qui aliam seduxerit, aliquo unde privilegium uel potestatem in eum quem seduxerit habere meruerit, qui etiamis quod prius in eum ius haberet, ex hac ipsa seductionis suae nequitia ius illud amittere meruerit? Abelard, CR, 2.3.151-164.}

Abelard’s explanation of why the devil, who himself owed obedience to God as Lord, could not justly have any right over his fellow slaves, bears strong similarities to the argument used by Anselm in \textit{Cur Deus homo}.\footnote{Anselm, \textit{CDH}, 1.7.}

Abelard did not deny that man was in the power of the devil. He argued that God had allowed man to be handed over to the devil in just punishment for sin, but that the devil did not have any just right to exercise this power on his own account. Abelard also rejected the idea of Christ’s death as a ransom for sin, on the grounds that the devil was not man’s rightful lord, but merely his torturer under God’s command. The devil could not receive payment, as ‘it is not the torturers but their masters who arrange or receive the price for their captives.’\footnote{Neque enim tortores sed domini eorum pretia captiuorum componunt aut suscipiunt. Abelard, \textit{CR}, 2.3.230-31.}

The only person who could legitimately receive a ransom payment was God, but God could not receive a ransom that he himself had demanded. The notion that a just God could demand the blood of an innocent man, let alone his own Son, as the price of anything, implied a cruelty and wickedness that was impossible to imagine in God. Therefore, Christ’s death could not be considered a ransom in any way.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 2.3.227-38.}

Southern presents both Anselm and Abelard as eliminating the devil entirely from the process of redemption. This emphasizes the way in which both authors rejected the idea that the devil had an active role in the drama of redemption, focussing instead purely on the relationship between God and man, but it does not draw sufficient attention to the fact that neither Anselm nor Abelard denied the presence of the devil, and the reality of his power.
over man. Although the devil himself had no just right to punish man, man’s punishment by him was nevertheless just from the perspective of man’s sin and the justice demanded by a divinely ordered universe. The strengths of the ‘rights of the devil’ argument outlined by Southern include the fact that ‘it conformed to recognizable norms of justice in human society, and...satisfied an underlying desire for justice in the universe’, and that ‘it recognized the cosmic scale of man’s fall.’

Neither of these advantages was lost in Anselm’s argument, which took the reality of man’s sin, the devil’s power and the need for justice in the redemption into full account.

Abelard also recognized the de facto reality of the devil’s power, and that the weight of sin was such that man could not possibly effect his own redemption, however great his love. However, these underlying principles in his thought were not readily apparent from his account of the redemption in the Romans quaeestio, which concentrated purely on the exemplarist power of Christ’s human life and death. His teaching on the redemption was thus open to the charge that his rejection of the devil’s rights implied a rejection of the devil’s power and, consequently, of the entire objective efficacy of the redemption. It was one of a number of ‘heretical’ doctrines that led to Abelard’s condemnation at the hands of William of St Thierry and Bernard of Clairvaux at the Council of Sens in 1141. The attacks made by William and Bernard on Abelard’s teaching on the devil are revealing, not only for their fundamental misinterpretation of Abelard’s position, but also for perceptions of the status of the ius diaboli argument more broadly, forty years after Anselm had condemned it in Cur Deus homo.

It was William who first provoked the attack on Abelard’s ‘heretical’ teaching. In a letter to Bernard, he described a number of heretical teachings that he had found within Abelard’s books, and urged Bernard to take action and use his influence to put a stop to them. The letter began with a list of the heresies involved briefly stated, followed by longer discussions of particular items. In the chapter concerning Abelard’s teaching on the redemption, William provided Bernard with a lengthy ‘quotation’ from Abelard’s argument. This was not in fact a direct quotation of Abelard’s words, but a paraphrase of what William saw as his main argument.

“It must be known”, he says, “that our doctors since the apostles agree on this, that the devil held dominion and power over man, and that he possessed him...

Southern, Portrait, p. 208.
justly, for this reason, that man consented voluntarily to the devil from the freedom of choice which he had. For they say that if someone conquers someone else, the conquered is agreed to be justly the slave of the conqueror. Therefore, as the doctors say, the Son of God became incarnate for this necessity, so that man, who could not otherwise be liberated, should be justly liberated from the yoke of the devil through the death of an innocent man. But, as it seems to us, the devil did not have any right over man, except perhaps with God’s permission, as a prisoner, and the Son of God did not assume flesh in order to liberate man.”

By beginning his ‘quotation’ with the statement that ‘our doctors since the apostles agree’ with the argument that the devil could claim a just lordship over man, due to the voluntary nature of man’s sin, William presented Abelard as deliberately flying in the face of a thousand years of authoritative doctrine. This was powerful rhetoric, but ignored the complex and varied history of the *ius diaboli* idea. Although authors such as Leo the Great did not hesitate to express the redemption in those terms, others, such as Augustine, were much more ambiguous in their interpretation of the devil’s position. William made no reference to Anselm’s rejection of the *ius diaboli*, or of the other writers who followed him, but presented Abelard as proclaiming something completely new and unprecedented. However, elsewhere in the letter, William himself argued that the devil had no just right to power over man, when he wrote that ‘power over man was not justly gained by the devil, but wickedly assumed, and justly permitted by God.’ It was just that man should be punished for sin, but the justice was that of God, who permitted man’s just punishment to be carried out by the devil. The devil himself had no justice whereby he could claim the punishment of mankind as a right.

William thus agreed with Abelard and, although he did not feature in the argument, with Anselm, that there was no danger of doing injustice to the devil in setting man free, as the justice of man’s captivity lay not with the devil, but with God. It is significant that, in his ‘quotation’ of Abelard’s work, William did not present him as altogether rejecting the concept of the justice by which man was held by the devil. His inclusion of the caveat ‘except

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205 Potestas a diabolo est in hominem non iure acquisita, sed nequiter praesumpta, et a Deo iuste permissa. *Ibid.*
perhaps with God’s permission’ implies acceptance of the fact that man was captive to the
devil as a prisoner, and that there was a sense in which this captivity could be seen as just.
Although the devil had unjustly usurped power to which he had no right, God permitted him
to continue to exert this power so that man might receive the just punishment for his sin. The
devil’s power over man could therefore be said to be just, as it existed by the will of God,
which is always just. The justice of the devil’s power was not that of the devil, but of God.

Taking his understanding of the content of Abelard’s teaching from William’s
account, Bernard expressed surprise that the point should have come up at all. In his letter to
Innocent II, he described Abelard as

labouring to teach and to persuade that the devil neither could nor ought to have
had any right to claim man for himself, except by the permission of God, and that
without injury to the right of the devil, God could seek out his fugitive again, if he
wished to have mercy on him, and could rescue him by his word alone, as if
anyone denies this.206

Bernard’s contemptuous tone in this passage implies that he considered the fact that God
could in no way injure any just claim of the devil in redeeming mankind to be immediately
obvious and without need of explanation. His professed incredulity that anyone could doubt
the point is undoubtedly exaggerated for rhetorical effect, and it ignores the long history of
texts which implied that the devil did have rights over man, from patristic authors such as
Leo the Great to the near contemporary teaching of Ralph of Laon. However, it does seem to
imply that Anselm’s rejection of the devil’s rights had gained considerable acceptance in the
years since the publication of Cur Deus homo.

Although, in this passage, Bernard claimed that it was obvious that the devil had no
rights over man, elsewhere in the letter he appeared to express support for the ius diaboli. As
a starting point for his discussion, Bernard quoted John’s Gospel.207

“You would not have any power over me, unless it had been given to you from
above.”...I do not think he will claim that that power from above was given

206 Laborans docere et persuadere diabolum nullum sibi ius in hominem vindicare potuisse aut debuisse, nisi
permissu Dei, et quod sine iniuria diaboli iure Deus profugam suum, si vellet misereri, repetere, et solo verbo
eripere posset, quasi hoc quis diffitetur. Bernard, Epistola 190, ed. Leclercq et al., Sancti Bernardi Opera
(hereafter SBO) vol. 8, pp. 17-40, 8.19 (my emphasis).
207 John 19.11.
unjustly. Therefore he will learn that the devil had not only power, but also rights over man, so that, consequently, he will see this, that the Son of God came in the flesh to set men free. But even if we say that the power of the devil was just, nevertheless his will was not. Therefore, it was not the devil who attacked, nor man who deserved it, but the Lord who demanded it, that was just. For one is said to be just or unjust not through power, but through will. Therefore the devil had a certain right over man, and even if it was not justly gained but wickedly usurped, nevertheless it was permitted justly. And so man was justly held captive, but the justice was neither in man nor in the devil, but in God.  

In this passage, Bernard claimed that the devil did have a certain right over man, but it is clear from the context that he did not understand this right as belonging to the devil himself, but to God. It was right for the devil to punish man for sin, but his power over man was not justly gained, but unjustly usurped. Man’s captivity was just because God justly permitted it as the just punishment for sin. Therefore, the devil’s power over man could be said to be right and just in one sense, although this justice was not that of man or the devil, but of God. The devil himself had no justice whereby he could claim just rights over man. Bernard’s position here was ultimately far closer to Anselm’s argument that man was enslaved justly, although his enslaver seized him unjustly, than might at first appear.

The close resemblance between the teaching of Anselm and Abelard regarding the position of the devil has led a number of commentators to raise the question of why, in his condemnation of Abelard’s argument, Bernard made no mention of its precedent in Cur Deus homo. Burcht Pranger emphasizes the ‘high esteem’ in which Anselm was held by Bernard’s contemporaries, arguing that in the years since his death ‘he had somehow managed to become “a doctor”, if not “another Augustine”...and thus to carry a kind of authority which could not be ignored.’ He suggests that Bernard’s silence with regard to Anselm’s teaching on the subject therefore ‘hints at some embarrassment on his part’.

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208 NON HABERES POTESTATEM IN ME ULLAM, NISI DATA TIBI FUISSET DESUPER...Nec iniustam puto iste causabitur potestatem datam desuper. Discat ergo diabolum non solum potestatem, sed et iustam habuisse in homines, ut consequenter et hoc uldeat, uenisse utique in carne Dei Filium propter liberandos homines. Ceterum etsi iustam dicimus diaboli potestatem, non tamen et voluntatem. Unde non diabolus qui inuasit, non homo qui meruit, sed iustus Dominus qui exposuit. Non enim a potestate, sed a voluntate iustus iniustusque quis dicitur. Hoc ergo quoddam diaboli in hominem ius, etsi non iure acquisitum, sed nequiter usurpatum, iusti tamen permission. Sic uiaque homo iusti captius tenebatur, ut tamen nec in homine, nec in diaboli illa esset iustitia, sed in Deo. Bernard, Epistola 190, 5.14.

Alternatively, Constant Mews suggests that ignorance of Anselm’s argument is the most likely explanation for the omission, arguing that ‘the abbot of Clairvaux was not sufficiently familiar with this part of Anselm’s teaching to realise that Abelard was here influenced by ideas first put forward by the archbishop of Canterbury.’ Apart from Bernard’s denial of the devil’s rights in his letter to Innocent, there is considerable evidence to suggest that Bernard was familiar with the argument of Cur Deus homo as a whole. The treatise was widely available in the twelfth century, and Bestul has identified three manuscript copies at Clairvaux. There are a number of elements within Bernard’s writings on the redemption that display parallels with Anselm’s work. Although he argued that God could, without any injustice, have rescued man from the devil with a single word, Bernard maintained that it was necessary for the Son of God to take flesh and suffer, and made repeated use of the language of fittingness (conuenientia, decentia, congruentia, commodia) to explain why. Gillian Evans also points to Bernard’s use of the image of a picture painted not on a solid base, but on a cloud, as one taken from Cur Deus homo, although he used it for a different purpose than Anselm. She argues that the parallels between Bernard’s writings on the redemption and those of Anselm are sufficient to justify the conclusion that Bernard ‘had certainly read Cur Deus homo.’

Bernard’s description of the Holy Sepulchre in his treatise In laude nouae militia (c. 1128) also contained a lengthy discussion of the redemption. Here, like Anselm, Bernard discussed the redemption purely in terms of man’s relationship with God, without reference to the devil. Physical death was the just penalty for man’s rebellion against God. By voluntarily accepting death, which he did not deserve, Christ paid the penalty on behalf of man, so that man could justly be freed from the power of sin and death.

Accepting the punishment, yet without participating in the fault, he underwent a voluntary but only physical death and won for us both life and justice. Otherwise, if he had not suffered physically, he would not have paid what was owed, and if he had not died willingly his death would have been without merit. Now then, if

in which Anselm was held in the 1130s, Pranger points to the drive towards his canonization, exemplified by John of Salisbury’s new Vita Anselmi.


212 Bernard, Epistola 190, 8.19.


214 Evans, Mind, p. 154.
death is what sin deserves and death is what sin owes, as we have seen, then Christ in remitting the sin and dying for sinners has removed both what is deserved and what is owed.\textsuperscript{215}

This account of Christ’s death paying the just penalty for sin so that man might justly be set free and reconciled with God has parallels with Anselm’s argument in \textit{Cur Deus homo}.

The fact that Bernard was apparently familiar with Anselm’s argument in \textit{Cur Deus homo} is not incompatible with Mews’ suggestion that Bernard may not have realised the extent to which Abelard’s argument was based on Anselm’s work. There is no evidence that Bernard read the \textit{Commentaria in Romanos} for himself; his critique of Abelard was based entirely on William’s report of his teaching, which gave the erroneous impression that Abelard rejected not only the devil’s right to power, but also the \textit{de facto} reality of that power. William mistakenly believed that Abelard was arguing that mankind was not under the yoke of the devil, and so did not need to be liberated. It was this second part of Abelard’s argument, ‘that the Son of God did not assume flesh to liberate man,’ that really provoked the wrath of William and, following him, of Bernard. If Bernard did not see the connection between the arguments of Anselm and Abelard, he would have no reason to mention the Anselmian precedent for the rejection of the \textit{ius diaboli} idea. Bernard’s claim that the invalidity of the \textit{ius diaboli} concept was universally recognised would make naming Anselmian authority unnecessary and irrelevant.

In contrast to Bernard, the question of William’s awareness of, and attitude towards, Anselm’s argument has received little scholarly attention. There is no mention of Anselm in any of William’s writings and, with the notable exception of his argument that the devil had no rights over man, but was only permitted to exert power over him in the role of a prisoner, his works offer little indication that he may have been familiar with the arguments of \textit{Cur Deus homo}. It would seem surprising if William was not aware of Anselm’s work, given the wide availability of the text in the twelfth century, and William’s continued interest in scholastic activity, even after entering the monastery.

Little is known about William’s early life and education. He was born in Liège, and it seems likely that he received his early training in the liberal arts at one of the schools there.

before moving on to Reims to continue his studies, either in the liberal arts or theology. It has been suggested that he may also have attended Anselm’s school at Laon. In his letter to Bernard, William stated that he had ‘loved’ Abelard. Jean Déchanet believed that this phrase implied a personal acquaintance between the two men, and argued that this was likely to have been formed at Laon. However, this claim has been disputed by more recent historians. If William had studied at Laon, the argument that he was directly influenced by Anselm of Laon’s teaching on the rights of the devil would be more convincing. As it now seems unlikely that William attended Laon, the differences between his position on the devil, and that witnessed by the Laon *sententiae*, are less surprising.

Although Bernard and William rejected the principle of the *ius diaboli*, they both continued to use associated analogies in their explanations of the redemption. In his letter to Innocent, Bernard used the ‘abuse of power’ theory to explain how Christ justly freed man from the power of the devil.

The prince of this world came, and did not find anything in the Saviour, and when he nevertheless laid hands on an innocent man, he most justly lost those whom he had held; when he who owed nothing to death, accepted the injury of death, he justly released from the dominion of the devil he who had been guilty, and deserving of death. Bernard used the idea of an abuse of power on the part of the devil to explain how the devil justly lost power over man. Being deceived by Christ’s humanity into thinking that he was not divine, but a fallen man like any other, the devil attempted to exert the power of death over him and, in so doing, overstepped the bounds of his authority. As a consequence, he could justly be deprived of his power of the rest of humanity.

A similar passage appears in William’s treatise *De natura et dignitate amoris*. Here, William argued that it was necessary for Christ to hide the power of his divinity behind the

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220 *Venit princeps huius mundi, et in Salvatore non inuenit quidquam, et cum nihilominus innocentis manus iniecit, iustissime quos tenebat amisit, quando is qui morti nihil debebat, accepta mortis iniuria, qui obnoxius erat, et mortis debito, et diaboli soluit dominio*. Bernard, Epistola 190, 6.15.
infirmity of his human flesh as, if the devil had realised who he was, he would never have killed the Son of God.

The old deceiver was deceived; he inflicted the punishment for sin, that is a most horrible death, on him who was guilty of no sin. The just man having been killed unjustly for the sake of justice obtained a new justice concerning the enemy, that is of death unjustly brought upon him. As this death was not necessary for him, because he was without sin, in joining himself to sinful man, he absolved the guilty through the punishment of his own innocence.\textsuperscript{221}

Bernard’s discussion of the devil’s abuse of power, with its implicit acceptance of the idea that the devil was deceived into killing the Christ, contradicted Anselm’s argument that the God of truth and justice could never practise any form of deception, even against the devil. It is possible that Bernard was not fully aware of Anselm’s position here. Although it was fundamental to his thought on the redemption, Anselm did not discuss the concept at length in \textit{Cur Deus homo}. It played a more obvious role in his \textit{Meditatio de redemptione humanae} (c. 1098), which functioned as a contemplative companion piece to \textit{Cur Deus homo}. Here, Anselm asked

\begin{quote}
Why did you conceal such power under such humility? Was it so that you might deceive the devil, who by deceiving man had thrown him out of paradise? But truth deceives no one...Or so that the devil might deceive himself? But just as truth deceives no one, so it does not intend that anyone should deceive himself...You did not do this to deceive anyone, or so that anyone might deceive himself, but only so that you might do what needed to be done, in all things established in the truth.\textsuperscript{222}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{221} \textit{Deceptus antiquus deceptor, poenam peccati, mortem scilicet atrocissimam, ei inflixit, qui nullo erat peccato obnoxius. Occisus iustus iniuste pro iustitia nouam de inimico obtinuit iustitiam, mortis scilicet iniuste sibi illatae. Quam quasi sibi non necessarium, quia absque peccato erat, ipse homini peccatoris communicans, reum absolutum per poenam innocentiae sae. William of St Thierry, \textit{De natura et dignitate amoris}, ed. P. Verdeyen, CCCM, 88 (Turnhout, 2003), pp. 177-212, 37.  

\textsuperscript{222} \textit{Cur tantam uirtutam operuisti tanta humilitate? An ut falleres diabolum, qui fallendo hominem eigcit de paradiso? Sed utique ueritas nullum fallit...An ideo, ut ipse diabolus se falleret? Sed utique sicut ueritas nullum fallit, ita non intendit ut aliquis se fallat...Nec ut falleres nec ut aliquis se falleret, sic fecisti; sed ut faceres quod et quomodo faciendum erat, in ueritate per omnia perstistiti. Anselm, \textit{Meditatio de redemptione humanae}, ed. Schmitt, \textit{Opera}, vol. 3, pp. 81-91, at p. 85.}
Bernard may not have read the *Meditatio*; no copies are listed in the library catalogue of Clairvaux from this period, and its general circulation was narrower than that of *Cur Deus homo*. This would not necessarily imply ignorance of Anselm’s argument concerning the rights of the devil. Alternatively, Bernard may have understood Anselm’s position, but felt that the image still had value as an explanation for the devil’s loss of power over mankind following the killing of the Christ. Bernard used a wide range of images and analogies in his preaching and elsewhere to illustrate particular aspects of the redemption in a way that would be easily comprehensible and powerful for his audience. Nevertheless, the essentials of his teaching on the redemption, notably his rejection of the rights of the devil and his understanding of the redemption in terms of the payment of a debt, do seem to indicate a significant degree of Anselmian influence on Bernard’s thought.

The fact that Bernard and William continued to use the image of the devil’s abuse of power in their accounts of the redemption, in spite of explicitly denying the devil’s right to power, illustrates the fact that the ‘rights of the devil theory’ was not a fully coherent and comprehensive ‘theory’ of the redemption at all, but a collection of images and analogies used by various authors in various combinations to describe particular aspects of the redemption. Bernard and William exemplify the way in which the dramatic and imaginative force of the ‘abuse of power’ argument could still be deemed valuable, even when its underlying premise was removed.

It was not Abelard’s rejection of the idea that the devil had a just right to power over man that concerned William and Bernard as much as the perceived implication that the devil had no power over man at all, and that man therefore had no need of liberation. In *Cur Deus homo*, Anselm had made it clear that a rejection of the devil’s rights did not constitute a rejection of the devil’s power, or of the liberating efficacy of Christ’s death. The lack of reference to Anselm’s work in both William and Bernard may be partly due to the fact that it had little relevance to the particular issue under debate, which ultimately had little to do with the devil or the justice of his power. It was about the power of sin and man’s inability to save himself without the liberating power of divine grace, given through Christ.223 Abelard’s rejection of the rights of the devil was relatively uncontroversial, and both Bernard and William appear to have held views on the subject that were closer to that of Abelard, and of Anselm of Canterbury, than is often recognized.

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223 Bernard was particularly concerned to counter what he saw as Pelagian tendencies in Abelard’s thought. *Epistola* 190, 9.23.
The search for theological arguments that were rationally consistent was a hallmark of Anselm’s work, and the logic of his thought was one of its main attractions for later authors at the schools of Laon, St Victor and Abelard. Nevertheless, the imaginative appeal of older analogies of the redemption, centring on the defeat of the devil, remained powerful. Outside the theological speculation of the schools, other authors were less concerned with the demands of logical consistency and the subtle distinctions between different forms and levels of justice. For them, the powerful rhetoric of the battle for men’s souls, played out between God and the devil, had an impact that was too important to lose, and had formed the basis of teaching and preaching on the redemption for a millennium. Anselm’s satisfaction theory was not necessarily seen as incompatible with the continued use of images and ideas associated with the *ius diaboli*, both of which accepted the justice by which man was under punishment for sin. The following chapter will explore the combination of both forms of argumentation in the genre of Jewish-Christian disputation.
Chapter Three

Cur Deus homo and Jewish-Christian Disputation

It has been suggested that Cur Deus homo itself may have been written in part as a polemical treatise, providing arguments for use in disputation either with Jews or Muslims. Felix Asiedu stresses the structure of the treatise, which took as its starting point the objections to Christian doctrine that were being raised by the Jews, and argues that Anselm’s focus on these questions ‘implies a missiological and apologetic intent.’\(^\text{224}\) The argument of the first book of Cur Deus homo began with the statement that

Unbelievers, deriding us for our simplicity, object that we are inflicting injury and insult on God when we assert that he descended into a woman’s womb, was born of a woman, grew up nurtured on milk and human food and – to say nothing of many other things which do not seem suitable for God – suffered weariness, hunger, thirst, scourging, crucifixion between two robbers and death.\(^\text{225}\)

The claim of the Jews that, by making God suffer the shame and pain of mortal life and death on a cross, Christians inflicted insult and injury on divine honour, was a common topos of disputation literature, and featured in numerous texts.\(^\text{226}\) Before writing Cur Deus homo, Anselm had apparently been involved in extensive discussion concerning the redemption and with his friend and student Gilbert Crispin, whose Disputatio iudei et christiani (1092-3) constitutes the earliest written account of the satisfaction theory.\(^\text{227}\) Gilbert’s treatise provided a model for later examples of disputation literature, highlighting the utility of Anselm’s argument in the genre.

Apart from the Jewish context, Anselm was also involved in discussion with Muslims at Capua in 1098, the year Cur Deus homo was completed.\(^\text{228}\) If Anselm had in mind


\(^{225}\) Obiciunt nobis deridentes simplicitatem nostram infideles quia deo facimus iniuriam et contumeliam, cum eum asserimus in uterum mulieris descendisse, natum esse de femina, lacte et alimentis humanis nutritum creuisse, et – ut multa alia taceam quae deo non uidentur conuenire – lassitudinem, famem, sitim, uerbera et inter latrones crucem mortemque sustinisse. Anselm, CDH, 1.3.


\(^{227}\) For discussion, see below, p. 3.

\(^{228}\) Eadmer, VA, 2.32.
disputation not only with Jews, but also Muslims, by the time the final chapters of Cur Deus homo were written, this might explain Boso’s concluding claim that Anselm had produced an argument which would satisfy ‘not only Jews, but also pagans.’

Anselm’s interest in the challenges raised by Jewish opponents of Christianity and the need to provide rational and compelling answers to them must have been an important factor in his decision to write Cur Deus homo, but the treatise should not be seen as a work of anti-Jewish disputation in itself. Anselm’s primary concern was for his own students and the monks in his community, and their need for a clear explanation of sound Christian doctrine to help them to understand the faith which they already believed. Throughout his career, Anselm had stressed the primacy of faith over understanding, arguing that without pre-existing faith, one could not hope to gain understanding. Rather than attempting to convert the Jews through his rational argumentation, Anselm hoped to increase the faith and understanding of those who already believed, and to resolve any difficulties they might be experiencing. His concern with contemporary teaching in the schools, and the questions it provoked among students such as Boso, was his central purpose. In the process, Anselm produced an argument that proved extremely valuable for later authors who sought to explain rationally the tenets of Christianity, not only to a Christian audience, but also to Jews. As Boso pointed out at the beginning of Cur Deus homo, ‘although [unbelievers] seek reasons because they do not believe, while we seek them because we believe, nevertheless that which we seek is one and the same.’ Cur Deus homo thus constituted a valuable resource for the writers of Jewish-Christian disputations throughout the twelfth century.

Gilbert Crispin

The earliest text to show signs of Anselmian inspiration in its account of the redemption was a work of Jewish-Christian disputation, Gilbert Crispin’s Disputatio iudei et christiani (1092-3). The text enjoyed widespread popularity, and survives in thirty-two manuscripts, twenty of which date from the twelfth century. By providing an early model for the developing genre

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229 Non solum iudaeis sed etiam paganis. Anselm, CDH, 2.22.
230 Anselm, CDH, 1.
232 Quamuis enim illi ideo rationem quaerant, quia non credunt, nos uero, quia credimus; unum idemque tamen est quod quaerimus. Anselm, CDH, 1.3.
233 The text was incorporated by Lambert of St Omer in his Liber floridus (1120), alongside Cur Deus homo. Later in the century large chunks of it were copied almost verbatim in the third book of Alan of Lille’s Contra haereticos. It was also translated into Hebrew by Jacob ben Reuben in his Milhamot HaShem (1170), possibly the first Latin treatise to have done so. Abulafia and Evans, Works, p. xxvii.
of Jewish-Christian writing, the *Disputatio* provided an important vehicle for the transmission of Anselmian arguments for the necessity of the incarnation, albeit in a simplified form. The popularity of Gilbert’s text, which relied heavily on arguments for the *ius diaboli* alongside Anselmian arguments, may also have strengthened the idea that the two forms of argument were not incompatible; numerous later disputations followed Gilbert in incorporating both into their argument. Gilbert completed his treatise several years before the composition of *Cur Deus homo*, so that his understanding of Anselmian thought can only have come through oral communication. Study of the *Disputatio* can provide interesting evidence for the development of Anselm’s own thought, and the genesis of *Cur Deus homo* in the context of discussion with students and friends. Even more than Honorius Augustodunensis’ *Elucidarium*, discussed in Chapter One, Gilbert’s *Disputatio* exemplifies the way in which Anselm’s inspiration on his immediate circle was as much oral as written.

Gilbert would have had plenty of opportunity for discussion with Anselm both before and during the composition of the *Disputatio*. He had been a student of Anselm at Bec, before being brought to Canterbury by Lanfranc in 1079. He was later appointed abbot of Westminster, a position he held until his death in 1117.234 Anselm came to England in the autumn of 1092.235 His movements between arriving in England and his consecration as archbishop the following March are unclear. However, a letter to Bec, sent around Christmas 1092, asking for some books to be sent on, suggests that he was then at Westminster.236 Although this is impossible to demonstrate, it seems likely that he spent most of the winter with Gilbert.237 A prolonged stay at Westminster would have allowed the two men plenty of opportunity for detailed discussion of a range of theological and pastoral questions. Gilbert’s arguments concerning the incarnation and redemption can thus be interpreted as reflecting, at least in part, the outcome of discussion with his former master Anselm. The text must have been completed before Anselm’s elevation to Canterbury in March 1093, as the dedicatory letters of the early manuscripts address him as *pater et dominus Anselmus* or *pater et dominus Anselmus abbas*; he is not described as *archiepiscopus* until a later recension of the text, containing a few minor alterations.238

In the *Disputatio*, Gilbert emphasized the weight of sin and impact of the fall for all of humanity. As a result of Adam’s sin, all his descendants were born subject to sin and condemned to misery and death.\(^{239}\) Gilbert argued that, as man had sinned voluntarily and deliberately in stealing himself from God, man should make satisfaction for that sin.\(^{240}\) However, because of the fall, not even a day-old infant was free from sin, and there was no man on earth with enough justice in himself to atone for his own sins, let alone those of the entire human race.\(^{241}\) Therefore, it was necessary for God to become man in Christ, in order to undertake man’s obligations and fulfil the debt. Gilbert argued that

lest man should perish for eternity, man ought to be restored. But he could not be restored, unless God assumed man, undertook our necessity, became himself our advocate against the enemy...and completed our case. And so man must be restored to God, and through man, who had stolen himself from God.\(^{242}\)

Gilbert argued that it was necessary for God himself to act as man’s redeemer, rather than working through the creation of a new man, not descended from Adam, or an angel, on the grounds that

if a new man, or one born from another [who was not tainted by original sin], or an angel became man, to liberate man, man could not be restored to his original status and his natural dignity. For through his creation man, like the angels, was obliged to serve only his creator God; he could not be restored to that same status of liberty either through a man or through an angel. For anyone who is redeemed from servitude by another, is judged to be under obligation to serve that other. Therefore, since the full restoration of man could not be achieved by another, it was necessary that the Creator should come to the aid of the creature, that the Creator should take the place of the creature, so that man, having been restored by the Creator himself, would remain obliged to serve the Creator alone.\(^{243}\)

\(^{239}\) Gilbert, *DIC*, 96.
\(^{240}\) Ibid., 100.
\(^{241}\) Ibid., 101.
\(^{242}\) *Ne ergo in eternum homo periret, restitui hominem oportebat. Restitui autem non poterat, nisi Deus hominem assumeret, necessitatem nostram subiret, noster contra aduersarium causidicus ipse fieret, et nostre actionis negotium agens, non suadendo, sed tuto rationis iudicio aduersarium excludens, causam nostrum finiret. Restituendus itaque Deo homo erat, ac per hominem, qui Deo semetipsum abstulerat.* Gilbert, *DIC*, 100.
\(^{243}\) *si nouus uel aliiunde natus homo, seu angelus factus homo, hominem liberaret, non sic ad pristinum ingenite dignitatis statum restitui posset. Cum enim angelis homo par creatus, soli Deo creatori ad seruiendum obnoxius*
Gilbert’s argument that it would be inappropriate for man to be saved by any creature other than God, on the grounds that man would then be beholden to his saviour and subject to him, when he should be subject to none but God, was later repeated by Anselm in Cur Deus homo.\footnote{Anselm, CDH, 1.5.}

Although Anselm’s discussion of questions such as why God did not redeem man through a pure man or an angel reflects ongoing debate among his contemporaries,\footnote{In particular, at the school of Laon; see Chapter 1.} his main argument concerning the need for man to make satisfaction for sin was new. In the Disputatio iudei et christiani, Gilbert incorporated elements of this argument, although his main theme in discussion of the redemption was Christ’s liberation of man from the just dominion of the devil, which Anselm would reject altogether in Cur Deus homo.\footnote{See below, p. 14.} He drew closer to Anselm’s argument in a second dialogue, the Disputatio christiani cum gentili. This treatise was supposedly the product of discussions with a pagan whom Gilbert had met at a secret philosophers’ meeting in London.\footnote{Gilbert, Disputatio christiani cum gentili (hereafter DCG), eds. Abulafia and Evans, Works, pp. 61-87, 1.} It is thought to be close in date to the Disputatio christiani et iudei, although it makes use of arguments from Anselm’s De incarnacione uerbi which indicate that it cannot be earlier than March 1093, and Gilbert may have intended it as a companion piece, or even a continuation of the earlier work.\footnote{Southern, ‘Anselm and Gilbert’, p. 98.}

In the Disputatio christiani cum gentili, Gilbert explained how Christ’s death was effective in paying the penalty for man’s sin, enabling atonement to be made to God, in terms that were closer to Anselm’s understanding of satisfaction than he had used in the earlier Disputatio.

The sin through which we earned the punishment of death ought to be atoned for. But who can atone for this sin, corrupted by the mass of sin, when not even a day-old infant is free of it? Therefore there ought to be born from the same corrupt mass but without sin one who will atone for the damage of that sin. Therefore Christ was born of a virgin...And so man sinned, and man made atonement. Man sinned in Adam; man atoned for that sin in Christ. God created man; God, in...
Christ and through Christ, recreated man. Therefore man is totally obligated to God alone, so that he should fear him, love him, and submit to him in all things, because he was both created and recreated by him alone.  

In the *Disputatio christiani et gentili*, Gilbert described the efficacy of Christ’s incarnation and death primarily in terms of atonement for sin. He described this process in terms of making expiation (*expiare*) rather than satisfaction (*satisfacere*), as Anselm would do in *Cur Deus homo*, but the essential principle was the same.

It has been suggested that the passages in the *Disputatio iudei et christiani* that refer to the necessity of a God-man to make atonement for sin may not only have found their initial inspiration in discussion between Gilbert and Anselm, but that Anselm’s involvement was much more direct. Southern sees a clear stylistic contrast between the majority of the treatise, which relies heavily upon arguments taken from Scripture, and the relatively brief passages which attempt to explain the necessity of the incarnation using rational argumentation. He points out that the Jew made no response to these sections in the dialogue, and suggests that they may have constituted later interpolations to an already almost finished text, which otherwise offered a fairly accurate representation of genuine debates between Gilbert and a Jew, based primarily upon arguments based on scriptural exegesis. Abulafia follows Southern in arguing that the statements relating to the necessity of the incarnation did not form part of the original dialogue, suggesting that they were added later as a result of Gilbert’s discussions with Anselm. Bernard Blumenkranz takes this idea further, and even suggests that Anselm himself added a number of sentences to Gilbert’s original text when Gilbert sent it to him for approval. This argument is difficult to support. Although in the dedicatory preface to the *Disputatio*, Gilbert wrote that he was sending the text to Anselm for comment, there is no evidence to suggest that the work was sent to Anselm unfinished, or that Anselm’s comments were incorporated into a revised second version. As R.J. Zwi

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249 Expiare oportebat peccatum per quod merueramus mortis dispiendum. Sed quis de massa corrupte conditionis hoc peccatum expiaret, cum de eadem massa nec infans unius diei a peccato illo immunis esset? De eadem igitur massa sine peccato corrupti oportuit nasci qui expiaret nosquam illius peccati. Natus ergo est Christus de virgine...Peccavit itaque homo, et expiavit homo. Homo in Adam peccavit, homo in Christum peccatum illud expiavit; Deus creavit hominem, Deus in Christo et per Christum recreavit hominem. Totus ergo soli Deo est obnoxius homo, ut eam timeat, diligat, et in omnibus et optemperet, quia et creatus atque recreatus ad eo solo est. Gilbert, DCG, 72-3.


Werblowsky argues, ‘there is no need at all to postulate a direct literary influence of Anselm’s writings on the Disputatio, or to assume that Anselm had seen a first draft of Crispin’s text.’ The significant change of emphasis in Gilbert’s argument between the Disputatio iudei et christiani and the later Disputatio christiani cum gentili can most easily be explained with the argument that Anselm did not see a copy of the Disputatio iudei et christiani until after the text had been completed, but later expressed his opinion on the relative value of arguments involving the necessity of satisfaction and the rights of the devil, causing Gilbert to change his approach in his later Disputatio christiani cum gentili.

The distinction between the ‘Gilbertine’ sections of scriptural exegesis and ‘Anselmian’ passages of philosophical reasoning should not be over-stated, as Gilbert frequently alternated between passages of exegesis and rational argumentation in his writings. This can be seen in his Sermo in ramis palmarum, which has been dated to Palm Sunday 1093, shortly after the completion of the first Disputatio. Gilbert began his sermon by declaring his intention to explore the question of why God willed to become man, and why it was absolutely necessary (omnino necesse) for him to do so, in order to bring about the salvation of mankind. He then went on to give an account of the Fall that contained a number of ideas also found in Anselm’s De casu diaboli and Cur Deus homo, to demonstrate man’s need of salvation, before going on to discuss the means of the redemption itself. He described how only God could restore to man his original status, on the grounds that

if an angel or another man, born of a virgin without sin, could redeem man through his suffering, he still could not restore him to his original liberty. For he who is redeemed by another rightly becomes a slave under his dominion.

In the sermon, Gilbert interwove passages of rational inquiry and the ‘philosophical’ necessity of the incarnation with numerous scriptural quotations and exegesis, just as his account of the fall combined Anselmian arguments taken from De casu diaboli with extensive quotations from Genesis about the tree of the knowledge of good and evil and the expulsion from the garden of Eden. The sermon illustrates the fact that it is not necessary to interpret the combination of different styles of argument within Gilbert’s Disputatio with the

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256 Gilbert, Sermo in ramis palmarum, eds. Abulafia and Evans, Works, pp. 171-175, 1.
257 Si uero angelus uel alter homo nasceretur de uirgine absque peccato, per passionem suam redimere posset hominem, sed eum redimere non posset ad pristinam libertatem. A quo enim aliquis redimitur, eius ditioni iure seruus addicitur. Gilbert, Sermo, 13.
Jew as indicative of later interpolation, as this was a common characteristic of Gilbert’s writings; it can also be seen in a large percentage of his works with which there is no suggestion that Anselm may have been directly or personally involved.

Gilbert made no attempt to qualify his use of the term *necessitas* in his discussion of the necessity of the incarnation. He did comment that the necessity was not of God, but of man, but this phrase only emphasized man’s need of redemption in order to fulfil the purpose of his creation, and he did not engage with the problem of how an omnipotent and radically free God could be said to act from necessity. Anselm’s extensive discussion of necessity in *Cur Deus homo* reflects his own interest in the meaning of concepts such as necessity, justice and freedom, which was shared by his contemporaries at Laon. The need to interpret and reconcile statements in Augustine and elsewhere regarding necessity, fittingness and freedom was a central concern in the schools, but was less of a priority for Gilbert.

The *Disputatio christiani cum gentili* had little impact, and survives in only one manuscript. In contrast, the *Disputatio iudei et christiani* enjoyed wide popularity in the early twelfth century, and provided a model for subsequent examples of Jewish-Christian disputation. Later treatises not only used ideas derived from Gilbert’s *Disputatio*, but also the text of *Cur Deus homo*, which had not been available to Gilbert. Anselm’s argument was particularly useful to the writers of Jewish-Christian literature, because it supplied a reasonable answer to the main challenge posed by Jewish opponents to the doctrine of the incarnation: why God should abandon his divine power and majesty and subject himself to the indignity of birth as a human baby, followed by torture and death at the hands of men. Anselm’s account of why it was necessary and fitting for this to happen provided a useful tool for later authors. In addition, his satisfaction theory allowed the writers of Jewish-Christian literature to engage with ideas of sacrifice and redemption in a way that provided some points of contact with Jewish practice and belief.

*Dialogus inter christianum et iudeum de fide catholica*

An example of a Jewish-Christian disputation that drew heavily on both *Cur Deus homo* and Gilbert Crispin’s *Disputatio iudei et christiani* is the anonymous *Dialogus inter christianum*
The precise dating of the treatise is unknown, but its dedication to Alexander, bishop of Lincoln, indicates that it was probably composed between 1123 and 1148, the years of Alexander’s episcopacy. The text purported to be based on real discussions between the author and a Jew, and to have been written at the behest of members of the audience of the original debate. The opening sections of the Dialogus were modelled closely on Gilbert Crispin’s Disputatio iudei et christiani, and Bernard Blumenkranz dismissed the entire treatise as little more than a rewriting of Gilbert’s work. However, there are significant differences between the two treatises, and the source material for the Dialogus was far more extensive than Gilbert’s Disputatio alone. In particular, the author made extensive use of several Anselmian texts, including De casu diaboli, De conceptu uirginali and Cur Deus homo. Amos Funkenstein argues that the parallels with Cur Deus homo were such that the entire treatise constitutes a superficial and inept version of Anselm’s work. This judgement also gives an unfairly narrow interpretation of the author’s source material and skill in composition, but it does emphasize the extent of the debt which his treatise owed to Cur Deus homo.

The Dialogus began with the Christian claim that Jewish law could not bring salvation, and that it should be abandoned as without virtue. As Anselm had done in Cur Deus homo, the author emphasized the weight of sin, for which no amount of earthly sacrifice could atone. Only God was capable of making sufficient sacrifice for sin, so the incarnation of the Son of God was necessary to expiate human guilt.

Because all man sinned in the first father, he fell into death; therefore the law, with its carnal sacrifices, was not sufficient to restore this damage, and could not open paradise, nor was it able to save its observers from hell, although they were just. Therefore it was necessary that the Son of God should come to earth who, having been made a sufficient sacrifice for us, would remove carnal sacrifices,

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261Dialogus, 1045.

262Ibid.


265In particular, Abulafia identifies a number of passages in the text which appear to show the influence of teaching of Anselm of Laon and William of Champeaux. ‘Jewish-Christian Disputations’, p. 122.
and perfect the imperfect law, and bearing our evils destroy our death by his death, and open the doors of the heavenly kingdom. Therefore he made expiation for our guilt...  

The doctrine of original sin was problematic for Christians attempting to engage in dialogue with the Jews on man’s need for redemption, because the concept had no place in Jewish theology. This fact is recognised in the *Dialogus*, when the Jew responds to a statement made by the Christian about original sin with the objection that

> When you say original sin, I think you are talking about the sin which Adam, the father of all, committed, but what has that to do with us? Hear what the prophet says, the soul which perishes dies itself, the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, etc. Our father Adam bore his own sin which does not relate to us at all, because, although we are his sons, we do not bear his iniquity, but you think it is ours who were not yet created and were not.

The Christian in the *Dialogus* responded to this challenge by arguing that, as the whole of humanity was contained in Adam at the time of his sin, not only the individual man, but human nature itself, was corrupted by the fall. Having dealt with this point, the rest of the treatise continued to use arguments which assumed the existence of original sin, and which were no longer challenged by the Jew. Abulafia sees the author’s recognition of Jewish rejection of the doctrine of original sin as evidence that he was personally acquainted with Jews and had engaged in theological discussion with them, even if the *Dialogus* does not provide a direct historical record of a debate, as the author claimed.  

In *Cur Deus homo*, Anselm treated the concept of original sin as a universally-accepted fundamental that had no need of justification, as did Gilbert Crispin in the *Disputatio iudei et christiani*.

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266 *quia omnis homo in primo patre originaliter peccans, morte ceciderat; ad reparandum igitur hocdamnnum carnalibus sacrificiis sufficiens lex non fuit, quae paradisum aperiire non potuit, nec se obseruantes quamuis iustos ab infernis eripere ualuit. Ergo necesse erat ut Dei Filius in terris ueniret, qui pro nobis sufficiens hostia factus carnalia sacrificia remoueret, et legem imperfectam perficeret, et nostra mala gerens nostram mortem sua morte destruueret, et regni coelestis ianuas aperiret. Expiauit igitur culpam nostram... Dialogus, 1047B.*

267 *Cum dics origine peccatum aestimo te eloqui de peccato quod Adam pater omnium fecit, sed quid inde ad nos? audi quid propheta dicit, anima quae perierit ipsa morietur, filius non portabit iniquitatem patris, etc. Itaque pater Adam proprium iniquitatem portet quae ad nos omnino non pertinet, quia, quamuis ejus filii sumus, tamen iniquitetem ipsius non ferimus, quid autem nobis illum reputas qui nondum creasti uel non eramus! Dialogus, 1052B.*

Having argued that man needed to be redeemed by a sinless being making expiation for sin, the author went on to demonstrate why this sinless being had to be the Son of God himself, and not an angel or a pure man.

If indeed an incarnate angel were sent to complete this redemption, it would be very unfitting; because then man would be subject to four persons, and while serving one God in the Trinity he would also have to worship the angel who redeemed him; and if some new man were made and came to redeem the old man, it would not be at all appropriate, because neither his nature nor that of the angel would relate to us, and so could in no way restore us. But rather it was right for God to be made man, taking flesh from that sinful nature but without guilt, and that the Creator of man, coming himself, should redeem his creature.  

The argument that, if man were redeemed by any creature other than God, he would be subject to that creature and obliged to worship him alongside the Trinity could have come either from Anselm or from Laon. However, the second argument, that only a being who shared man’s fallen nature could fittingly make expiation for man’s sin, is distinctively Anselmian, and demonstrates a good understanding of Anselm’s teaching on the essential unity of the genus humanum as descended from Adam.  

The Dialogus differed from Cur Deus homo in its discussion of the angelic and human population of the heavenly city. The author argued that man had been created after the fall, with the purpose of replacing the fallen angels. In contrast, Anselm had argued that man was created for his own sake, and would have been saved even if the angels had not fallen. The author of the Dialogus agreed with Anselm that the angels who fell must be replaced by man, and not other angels, arguing that the angels who had persevered from the beginning had attained a perfection of charity that could not be achieved by angels created after the fall, but went on to describe how it was right that God should replace the fallen devil with a man formed from the mud of the earth, so that man should remain truly humble and

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269 *si uero angelus incarnandus ad hanc redemptionem expelendam mitteretur, ualde incongruum esset; quia tunc homo quatuor personis foret obnoxius, dum uni Deo in Trinitate seruiens, etiam angelum qui se redimeret adorare deberet; et si quidam homo nouus factus ad redimendum ueterem hominem adueniret, nunguam congrueret; quia nobis eius seu angelis natura non pertinens nullatenus nos reparare ualeret, sed magis decuit ut de ipsa peccatrice carnem sine culpa sumens Deus homo fieret, ac ipse factor hominis per semetipsum ueniens suam facturam redimeret.* Dialogus, 1070D.

270 *Ibid.*, 1063C.

271 Anselm, *CDH*, 1.18.
the devil be driven mad with jealousy by the lowliness of his successor.\footnote{Dialogus, 1063C.} This argument was very different from anything used by Anselm.

The Dialogus contained numerous arguments for the incarnation and redemption that were apparently derived from the author’s reading of Cur Deus homo. However, there are also significant differences between the two texts, and the overall thrust of the argument was closer to that of Gilbert Crispin’s Disputatio iudei et christiani. Like Gilbert, the author of the Dialogus used the terminology of expiation rather than satisfaction to describe how Christ’s death made restitution for sin. More fundamentally, in both treatises, the theme of expiation was less dominant than a restatement of traditional arguments for the redemption as freeing man from the power of the devil by manoeuvring him into giving up his previously just possession, which Anselm rejected.\footnote{See below, pp. 94f.} This reflects a trend in accounts of the redemption in Jewish-Christian disputations, further exemplified by Guibert of Nogent’s Tractatus de incarnatione contra iudeos.

**Guibert of Nogent**

A further example of use of Anselmian arguments for the necessity of the incarnation in Jewish-Christian disputation can be found in Guibert of Nogent’s Tractatus de incarnatione contra iudeos (1111). As a young novice at St-Germer de Fly, Guibert had studied under Anselm, then prior of Bec, who was a regular visitor at St-Germer.\footnote{Guibert of Nogent, Monodiae, PL 156, 837-962, 1.17.} The teaching that Guibert recalled most strongly in his Monodiae concerned the nature of the will, appetite and reason.\footnote{See Chapter 4.} However, he was profoundly influenced by Anselm’s thought on a number of different subjects, including the doctrine of the incarnation. The Tractatus was composed at the request of Bernard, deacon of Soissons, for use against Count John of Soissons, who was apparently promoting Jewish critique of Christian beliefs, particularly concerning the doctrine of the incarnation.\footnote{Guibert, Tractatus de incarnatione contra iudeos, PL 156, 489-527, 1.1. The Tractatus does not name John; this information comes from Guibert’s Monodiae, 2.5.} As with the other examples of Jewish-Christian disputations discussed in this chapter, the treatise makes extensive use of arguments taken from scripture, but the basic structure of the argument concerning the necessity of the incarnation closely reflects that of Anselm in Cur Deus homo.
Guibert emphasized the need for satisfaction to be made for sin in order for man to be redeemed. However, the weight of sin was such that it could never be repaid by mere man.\(^{277}\) No man was capable of making satisfaction for sin, because no man was free of sin; even a day-old infant was guilty of original sin. Only God was capable of making a payment on this scale. However, satisfaction could only be paid by man, as ‘no other nature except that which had sinned, could make satisfaction for that sin.’\(^{278}\) Therefore, satisfaction could only be made by one who was both God and man. ‘And so it was just that he should act for man who, in that he was man, was capable of dying for man but, being free from sin, could bear man’s sin; and, in that he was God, could reconcile man to God.’\(^{279}\)

It is impossible to know whether Guibert gleaned his argument concerning the need for one who was both God and man to make satisfaction for sin from the text of *Cur Deus homo* itself, or from discussions with Anselm in person, either before he left Bec or during his exile.\(^{280}\) However, the linguistic parallels, such as his use of the terminology of satisfaction, may well imply access to the text itself. Guibert’s discussion of satisfaction was closer to that of *Cur Deus homo* than Gilbert’s *Disputatio iudei et christiani* or the *Dialogus de fide catholica*. Nevertheless, like the other disputationes, his treatise combined Anselmian arguments for satisfaction with the rights of the devil concept, which Anselm had rejected.

**The ius diaboli in Disputation Literature**

Although much of Gilbert’s argument in the *Disputatio iudei et christiani* concerning the necessity for God to become incarnate to redeem humanity presaged Anselm’s position in *Cur Deus homo*, he argued the exact opposite to his former master with regard to the question of the rights of the devil. Gilbert’s argument assumed that the devil did have a just right to exercise power over man following the fall. He described how

the enemy found nothing that was his own in Christ, who had neither been conceived in sin, nor participated in sin, nor contracted the stain of sin during his life in any way whatsoever. And so therefore he offended by presumptuously bringing to an unjust death the man in whom he had found nothing that was his

\(^{277}\) *Simplex homo pro peccatis satisfacere nequibat.* Guibert, *Tractatus*, 3.2.

\(^{278}\) *Natura namque nulla alia praeter eam, quae peccauerat, pro eadem satisfacere poterat.* Ibid., 3.3.

\(^{279}\) *Iustum itaque erat, ut is pro hominibus aegeret, qui, secundum quod homo, mori pro homine poterat; peccati tamen essors, hominem peccata portaret; et secundum quod Deus erat, Deo...eundem reconciliaret.* Guibert, *Tractatus*, 3.2.

own, and over whom he had no rights whatsoever. Therefore he justly lost his just dominion, which he had obtained over the first man and his descendants through the sin of the first man.281

In this passage, Gilbert described the redemption in terms of an abuse of power on the part of the devil. When man sinned, he handed himself over to the power of the devil, who then enjoyed the right of dominion over him as subject. The God-man Christ was completely free of sin, and therefore not under the devil’s jurisdiction. When the devil attempted to exert power over Christ through death, he exceeded the bounds of his authority and consequently forfeited his right to exert continued power over the rest of mankind. Man could then be rescued from the devil without God laying himself open to any suspicion that he had acted unjustly. By contrast, in Cur Deus homo, Anselm unequivocally rejected the notion that the devil had rights over man, and any discussion of the redemption that relied on this premise. The fact that Gilbert continued to express support for the ius diaboli idea in his Disputatio iudei et christiani is therefore of interest for the development and immediate reception of Anselm’s thought.

Precisely how and when Anselm became aware of the ius diaboli concept and its inherent difficulties is debatable. Partly on the grounds of Gilbert’s apparent ignorance of the problem, Southern believed that it was a late development in Anselm’s thought on the redemption.282 He finds evidence for this theory in the structure of the text of Cur Deus homo, and suggests that Book One, Chapter Seven, in which Anselm refuted the ius diaboli argument, was a late addition to the text, arguing that Anselm’s first speech in Chapter Eight provides an immediate reaction to the questions raised by Boso in Chapter Six without reference to the intervening discussion of Chapter Seven.283

Arguing that Anselm developed his argument concerning the ius diaboli late enough to necessitate an interpolation into an already almost-completed text raises the question of how and when this might have happened. He may have been inspired by access to new texts and ideas that he encountered during his travels on the continent while in exile.284 This raises

282 Southern, Biographer, p. 86.
283 Ibid.
284 A potential candidate is Irenaeus, whose Adversus haereses bears striking parallels to Cur Deus homo.
intriguing questions about Anselm’s source material and intellectual development. However, it seems unlikely that the problem had not occurred to him before 1097. Discussions of the redemption in terms of a ransom, and the abuse of power motif, were commonplace in patristic and medieval writing. Furthermore, the meaning of justice had been central to Anselm’s thought for many years, as can be seen from earlier treatises such as De ueritate. Anselm’s argument for how an action can be both just and unjust simultaneously from the perspective of different agents reflects earlier discussion on the same subject in De ueritate.  

Southern’s argument that Anselm suddenly became aware of the problem with the ius diaboli and decided to write about it at a late stage in the composition of Cur Deus homo seems inconsistent with his other suggestion that his awareness of the problem was primarily stimulated by Boso bringing news of Ralph’s teaching from Laon. The difficulty is one of chronology, as it would apparently place Anselm’s epiphany, not only several years after Boso had first come to him with his perplexae questiones from the schools, but even two or three years after the previous occasion on which they are known to have spent time together; there is no evidence that Boso joined Anselm on his exile, although he was on the continent at the time. However, as has already been demonstrated, it is likely that Anselm had already developed his refutation of the ius diaboli idea several years earlier. The closeness of the verbal parallels between the passages under discussion in the Laon sententia and Cur Deus homo seem to indicate that Anselm had access, not only to a student’s personal recollections of oral teaching, but to the text of the sententia itself. As the precise date of the sententia is unknown, it is difficult to speculate on whether Boso could possibly have brought it with him to Bec, but the question is ultimately of limited significance, as Anselm presumably considered the substance of his argument before he began setting it to paper. If Southern’s analysis of the order of composition of the various sections of Cur Deus homo is

A Latin translation of Adversus haereses was available at Cluny, where Anselm stayed while on exile, although it is impossible to determine whether Anselm read it. G. E. M. Gasper, Anselm of Canterbury and his Theological Inheritance (Aldershot, 2004), pp. 72-3.

285 ‘When the sinner is struck by one who has not the right to do so, then the one ought to be struck but the other ought not to strike, and the blow both ought to be and ought not to be; and so it cannot be denied that it is both right and not right. But if you consider the judgement of the highest wisdom and goodness... who would dare deny that what is permitted by such wisdom and goodness ought to be? [Cum uero peccans ab eo ad quem non pertinet percutitur: quoniam et iste debet percute et ille non debet percutere, debet et non debet esse percussio; et ideo recta et non recta negari non potest. Quod si ad supernae sapientiae bontatisque consideres iudicium... quis auderit negare debere esse quod tanta sapientia et bontate permittitur?]’ Anselm, De ueritate (hereafter DV), ed. Schmitt, Opera, vol. 1, pp. 169-89, 8.

286 Boso was sent by Anselm to the Council of Clermont in 1095, after which he remained on the continent, and later returned to Bec. He eventually returned to Canterbury with Anselm after his second exile in 1106. Vita Bosonis, PL 150, 725D.
correct, and the chapter dealing with the *ius diaboli* argument was among the last to be written, Anselm could easily have acquired the text of the *sententia* while in France on exile in 1097.

Southern’s analysis of Gilbert’s work in relation to the development of Anselm’s thought and teaching was primarily focussed on Gilbert’s argument in the *Disputatio iudei et christiani*. However, a comparison with his account of the redemption in the slightly later *Disputatio christiani cum gentili* reveals a significant shift in Gilbert’s thought which may well have been the result of discussion with Anselm on the *ius diaboli* as early as 1093. In this second *Disputatio*, Gilbert did not repeat his argument concerning the rights of the devil and the abuse of power which enabled his just deprivation of mankind. Instead, he described man’s redemption purely in terms of making expiation for sin, without reference to the devil. Gilbert’s apparent change of mind on this point from his earlier *Disputatio* is significant, and may well be indicative of Anselmian influence. It seems reasonable to assume that Anselm read the *Disputatio iudei et christiani*, which was dedicated to him. Assuming that he had already identified the problem with the *ius diaboli* argument, it would be perfectly feasible to suggest that, in his response to Gilbert, he would have raised the point. This would provide a logical explanation for the change in Gilbert’s argument in the *Disputatio christiani cum gentili*. It could be argued that Gilbert’s omission did not necessarily reflect a new awareness of Anselm’s refutation of the *ius diaboli* argument, but that he may simply have chosen not to incorporate it in his second *Disputatio*, preferring instead to focus solely on the need for expiation. However, it seems unlikely that Anselm would have neglected to mention the subject in his correspondence with Gilbert following his receipt of the *Disputatio iudei et christiani*.

A useful parallel can be drawn with Honorius Augustodunensis’ account of the redemption in *Elucidarium*, which was also composed before the completion of *Cur Deus homo*, and before Anselm left for exile on the continent in 1097. Honorius also avoided mention of the *ius diaboli* argument. Unless Anselm had been teaching against the idea in the early 1090s, it would be difficult to explain Honorius’s omission of such a popular analogy for the redemption, in a work that was intended to provide a complete compendium of essential Christian doctrine.

Gilbert’s use of the *ius diaboli* concept in his *Disputatio iudei et christiani* is generally assumed to imply ignorance of Anselm’s teaching on the subject. An alternative explanation might be that Gilbert *was* aware of Anselm’s position, but deliberately chose to ignore it. In Gilbert’s case, the evidence of a change in argument in the *Disputatio christiani cum gentili*
seems to support the former conjecture. However, there are numerous examples of later authors who apparently had access to the full text of *Cur Deus homo*, following Anselmian arguments regarding the necessity of the God-man to make satisfaction for sin, who nevertheless also continued to use the analogies for the redemption that relied on the *ius diaboli* concept that Anselm had refuted.

An example of the combination of elements of Anselm’s teaching on the redemption with the continued use of the ransom theory is the *Dialogus inter christianum et iudeum de fide catholica*. The author of the *Dialogus* did not follow Anselm’s rejection of the *ius diaboli* theory. Instead, he described how, as man had sinned voluntarily, putting himself under the devil’s power, the devil could justly claim jurisdiction over him. The God-man was able to redeem mankind justly by catching the devil like a fish with the bait of human flesh, so that he justly lost power over man.

Guibert of Nogent’s *Tractatus de incarnatione contra iudeos* also combined Anselmian ideas of satisfaction with continued support of the *ius diaboli* concept. Guibert used the abuse of power argument to explain how Christ was justly able to free man from the power of the devil. ‘For since he owed nothing, and was attacked by the devil and forced to pay for what he had not taken, [Christ] seized him who had attacked him unjustly and removed the human race from his possession.’

Guibert was more explicit in his support of the idea that the devil had a just claim to power over mankind in his treatise *De laude sanctae Mariae*, where he cited Leo the Great in support of his argument that the Son of God wished to come to man, but could not, ‘because he should not violently break in on the devil’s rights, to whom man had voluntarily given his hands.’

It has been suggested that the continued support for the *ius diaboli* argument demonstrated by both Guibert and the author of the *Dialogus* should be attributed primarily to links with the school of Laon. Abulafia argues that the author of the *Dialogus* was likely to have had connections with the Laon milieu. She points to the dedication to Alexander, bishop of Lincoln, who had been educated at Laon, and the close links between the school of Laon and the Anglo-Norman court and ecclesiastical circles. Similarly, Rubenstein argues that Guibert’s support of the *ius diaboli* concept can be attributed to his connections with Laon.

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287 *Dialogus*, 1069B.
288 *Ibid.*, 1072B.
289 *Nam quia nil debuit, et a diabo impetitus coactus est soluere quae non rapuit, eum qui se impetuerat, sed inuste, corripuit, et ab humani generis possessione submouit.* Guibert, *Tractatus*, 3.3.
290 *Quia nec debuit uiolenter irrumpere iura diaboli, cui sponte homo manus dederat.* Guibert, *De laude sanctae Mariae*, PL 156, 537-577, at 553D.
Nogent, where Guibert was appointed abbot in 1104, was within the diocese of Laon, and Guibert was a frequent visitor; Rubenstein describes the town and its cathedral school as ‘a sort of second home for him.’\textsuperscript{292} Guibert’s admiration for both Anselm and Ralph is clear from his description of them in his \textit{Moralia in Genesin} (c. 1115):

\begin{quote}
God has placed in such a head [Bartholomew, Bishop of Laon] two eyes brighter than stars. On the right you have Anselm, regarded as master of the entire Latin world, whose bearing in the presentation of Scripture and the faith is so sound that he has at this time made more true catholics by his writings than any false-thinking person has made heretics. On the other side you have Ralph, whose quickness of mind and grasp of doctrine is in no way discordant with his brother’s.\textsuperscript{293}
\end{quote}

Rubenstein suggests that Guibert’s argument concerning the rights of the devil is indicative of Laon influence, and a deliberate decision on his part ‘to side with his new intellectual peers rather than with his old teacher.’\textsuperscript{294} The influence of the teaching to which Guibert was exposed at Laon is certainly likely to have played a significant role in the formation of his ideas concerning the devil. However, it is by no means certain that the teaching Guibert would have heard at Laon in the 1100s was the unequivocal support of the \textit{ius diaboli} shown in the Ralph \textit{sententia} discussed at the beginning of Chapter Two. The surviving \textit{sententiae} from Laon offer a range of opinions on the subject which indicate that, although the concept was widely debated at the school, there was no single ‘Laon position’ for Guibert to follow.

Guibert’s admiration of Ralph may have been a significant factor in his continued support of the \textit{ius diaboli} concept, but it was not inevitable that his connections with Laon should draw him to this conclusion, given the range of opinions to which he would have been exposed in discussion. Furthermore, explanations of the redemption that relied on the idea that devil had a just right to claim power over mankind were not unique to Laon, but had a long history in the patristic tradition. Guibert’s citation of Leo of Great in his treatise \textit{De laude sanctae Mariae} illustrates the range of other sources, beyond Laon, that could have

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[292]{Rubenstein, \textit{Guibert}, p. 112. Guibert repeatedly referred to his Laon connections and visits to the city in the \textit{Monodiae}.}
\footnotetext[293]{\textit{Indidit tanto Deus capiti duos oculos sideribus clariores, dum a dextris habes Anselnum, totius Latini orbis magisterio praedicatum, culas tam sincera est in Scripturarum ac fidel assertione seueritas, ut plures ueros suis probetur documentis fecisse Catholicos, quam instituisse potuerit erroneus quispiam temporis huius haereticos: altrinsecus Radulphum, culius ingenii ac doctrinae sicut a praefato fratre non discrepauit alacritas, ita totius eum bonae habitudinis aemulatur honestas.} Guibert, \textit{Moralia in Genesin}, \textit{PL}, 156, 19-337, at 19C.}
\footnotetext[294]{Rubenstein, \textit{Guibert}, p. 114.}
\end{footnotes}
provided Guibert’s principal motivation. Similarly, the argument for the *ius diaboli* in the *Dialogus* is not necessarily indicative of the direct influence of Laon, but could have been taken from a number of patristic sources. The image of the devil being hooked like a fish using the bait of Christ’s human flesh could be found in Gregory the Great and Rufinus of Aquileia, while similar analogies of the cross as a trap for the devil appear in Augustine and Leo the Great.\(^{295}\)

**Odo and Herman of Tournai**

Of the examples of Jewish-Christian disputation that made use of Anselmian arguments for the necessity of satisfaction for sin, only that of Odo of Tournai omitted entirely any argument for the redemption that relied on the concept of the *ius diaboli*, either implicitly or explicitly. Instead, Odo’s account of the redemption in his *Disputatio contra iudaeum Leonem nomine de aduentu Christi filii dei* (c. 1106-13) focussed purely on the impact of the fall in terms of man’s damaged relationship with God and the need for atonement, in an argument closely based on that of Anselm. There is no evidence that Odo knew Anselm personally, although they may have met when Anselm passed through Flanders while in exile in 1097. Anselm’s steward Baldwin, who accompanied him on exile, came from Tournai, and was the brother of Ralph, provost of St Martin’s, where Odo had been abbot before becoming bishop of Cambrai in 1105. Odo was instrumental in the transmission of Anselmian thought in Flanders and beyond, both through his own writing and his role in promoting the dissemination of copies of Anselm’s works. David Hughes describes how, during Odo’s episcopacy, the diocese of Cambrai ‘acted as a bridge to the regions of the east’, particularly Liège and the Rhineland, with Odo in particular playing an active role in the transmission of manuscripts.\(^{296}\)

In his *Disputatio*, Odo explored the reasons which necessitated the incarnation of the Christ. In order to demonstrate that man was completely incapable of achieving remission of sins for himself, Odo stressed the gravity of sin.

> If God were to forbid you to turn away from him even with a momentary lapse of thought, and someone else were to tell you truly that unless you turned your thoughts quickly toward another you would immediately perish and return to

\(^{295}\) See Chapter 2.

nothingness, surely you do not think that you ought to turn your thoughts even briefly to another and against God for your own sake and in order not to perish, or that you should commit so small a sin for your redemption?²⁹⁷

This demonstration of the gravity of sin had been used by Anselm in *Cur Deus homo*, when he asked whether one should allow a single glance contrary to the will of God in order to secure one’s own redemption, or even the redemption of the entire created universe.²⁹⁸ As Boso had responded in *Cur Deus homo*, Odo concluded this section of the dialogue with the statement that ‘not for one person, nor for all people, nor for the whole of creation, should even the smallest thing be done against God.’²⁹⁹

Odo refuted the claim made by Leo, the Jew in the dialogue, that man could earn righteousness through good works accomplished under the law.

Man was not able to make amends for sin by doing good works. For every good which he had been able to do before sin he owed to God, from whom he had received them. Even if a man should repay every good which he has received, nevertheless [something more] is justly demanded of him for the evil he has done. Therefore man cannot redeem himself for sin by any act of holiness under the law.³⁰⁰

Odo argued that man already owed everything he had and was to God, by virtue of his creation. This meant that he had nothing left over with which to make satisfaction for the additional debt incurred by sin. This argument had been made by Anselm. In the dialogue of *Cur Deus homo*, Anselm asked Boso what he thought he could offer as recompense for sin. Boso suggested that it could be done by honouring God through perfect love and obedience, penitence and a contrite heart. Anselm responded that Boso already owed all this to God from the moment of his creation, and would have continued to do so even if he had not sinned.

²⁹⁷ *Si ergo tibi Deus prohibeat ne intentione tuae cogitationis a se quoquam deflectas, et alius tibi uere dicat quia, nisi cito alio te uertas, statim peribis et redibis in nihilum, putasne alio cogitationem tuam breuiter uertendum contra Deum pro te ipso, ne pereas, et tantillum peccatum fieri pro redemptione tui?* Odo, *Disputatio*, 1105C.
²⁹⁹ *Neque pro uno, neque pro omnibus, neque pro tota creatura faciendum est, uel minimum aliquod contra Deum*. Odo, *Disputatio*, 1105D.
³⁰⁰ *Homo ergo non poterat emendare peccatum exercitio bonorum operum; omne etenim bonum quod poterat ante peccatum Deo debeat, a quo et acceperat. Reddat ergo homo omne bonum quod accipient; iuste tamen exigitur ab eo malum quod fecit. Non ergo potest homo sub lege sanctitate uella redimere quod peccavit*. Odo, *Disputatio*, 1104C-D.
When you render to God something which you owe him, even if you have not sinned, you should not think of this as recompense for what you owe him for sin. For you owe all these things you name to God...Therefore, what will you pay God for your sin?\textsuperscript{301}

Boso was thus led to the conclusion that ‘If, that in order that I may not sin, I owe him myself and whatever I can do, even when I do not sin, I have nothing to give him in recompense for sin.’\textsuperscript{302}

In his \textit{Disputatio}, Odo concluded, as Anselm had done, that full forgiveness and acquittal for sin could not justly be granted unless adequate satisfaction was made, over and above the debt already owed by man to God by virtue of his creation. This was far beyond human capacity. Even the entire created universe would be inadequate satisfaction for sin. ‘For the smallest sin outweighs the whole of creation, because the smallest sin is against God; but God is greater than all creation. Therefore the whole of creation is insufficient recompense for the smallest sin.’\textsuperscript{303} Only God, who is greater than the whole of creation, was capable of making adequate recompense for man’s sin.\textsuperscript{304} However, it was not right that God, who was not guilty of sin, should make recompense for the sin of another. This argument led Odo to the necessary reasons for the incarnation of the Christ.

It is necessary for man to come to glory, which he cannot do without satisfaction. God can make satisfaction but ought not to; man ought to, but cannot. Therefore, it is necessary for the natures of both to come together; that God become man, and that the one Jesus Christ become both God and man...In that he is God omnipotent, he can make satisfaction for sin; in that he is man, he ought to. He can, as God; he ought to, as man.\textsuperscript{305}

\textsuperscript{301} \textit{Cum reddis aliquid quod debes deo, etsiam non peccasti, non debes hoc computare pro debito quod debes pro peccato. Omnia autem ista debes deo quae dicas...Quid ergo solues deo pro peccato tuo?} Anselm, \textit{CDH}, 1.20.

\textsuperscript{302} \textit{Si me ipsum et quidquid possum, etiam quando non pecco, illi debeo ne peccem, nihil habeo quod pro peccato reddam.} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{303} \textit{Omnem enim creaturam praeponderat minimum peccatum, quia minimum peccatum est contra Deum: Deus autem omni creaturae major est. Non ergo sufficit omnis creatura ad recompensationem minimi peccati.} Odo, \textit{Disputatio}, 1106A-B.

\textsuperscript{304} \textit{Ibid.}, 1108C-D.

\textsuperscript{305} \textit{Quia necesse est hominem ad gloriam uenire quod sine satisfactione non potest, satisfacere uero Deus potest, sed non debet; homo uero debet, sed non potest; ideo necesse est ut utraque naturae convenienti, et fiat
Unlike other authors of disputation literature, Odo addressed seriously the subtleties of Anselm’s discussion of the necessity of the incarnation. He recognised the potentially provocative nature of the claim that it was ‘necessary’ for God to act in a particular way, and sought to clarify his meaning by explaining how God’s free grace, demonstrated by his promise to save mankind, could result in an act that was both necessary and free, in a passage that is reminiscent of Anselm’s argument for consequent necessity.

It is necessary to pay what it was not necessary to promise. For one who freely promises something obligates himself to pay by necessity so that, although the subsequent payment is of necessity, nevertheless the preceding promise is of the will and of grace. But this necessity which proceeds from grace, must not be separated from grace itself, so that a thing is justly said to be done by grace which in the first place had been promised with abundant grace.\(^{306}\)

In the same way, Anselm had argued that someone who freely promises a gift to another is then necessarily obliged to fulfil the promise. Even though it becomes a matter of necessity to make the gift once promised, unless one was to become a liar, ‘this should not be called necessity but grace, because he undertakes it and carries it out, without anyone forcing him, but freely.’\(^{307}\) The ‘necessity’ by which God was said to act in order to redeem humanity was nothing more than a necessary obligation to avoid what was dishonourable, and uphold his unchangeable honour. For this reason, Anselm concluded, ‘it is necessary that the goodness of God, because of his unchangeability, should complete what he has begun concerning man, although all the good that he does is grace.’\(^{308}\) Odo’s argument for the consequent necessity of God’s action, as a result of his earlier free choice and the immutability of divine goodness, had a clear basis in this passage from \textit{Cur Deus homo}. 

\textit{Deus homo, et unus Jesus Christus Deus et homo...ex eo quod omnipotens Deus est, pro peccato satisfacere potest; ex eo quod homo est debet, potest ut Deus, debet ut homo. Odo, Disputatio, 1108A.} \(^{306}\) \textit{Necessarium quidem est reddere quod non fuit necessarium promittere. Nam qui sponte promittit, obligat se necessitate reddendi ut quamvis necessitatis sit sequens reddito, voluntatis tamen est et gratiae praecedens promissio. Haec autem necessitas quae procedit a gratia, separanda non est ab ipsa gratia, ut jure dicatur gratia factum quod primum fuerat magna gratia promissum. Ibid., 1109C-D.}
\(^{307}\) \textit{non haec est dicenda necessitas, sed gratia, quia nullo cogente illam suscepit aut servat, sed gratis. Anselm, CDH, 2.5.}
\(^{308}\) \textit{necesse est, ut bonitas dei propter immutabilitatem suam perficiat de homine quod incepit, quam uis totum sit gratia bonum quod fecit. Ibid.}
Odo also utilized *Cur Deus homo* in his discussion of man’s ultimate destiny in the heavenly city. He argued that, following the fall of the angels, the heavenly city was left incomplete. God created man in order to complete the work of populating the heavenly city, which he had begun with the angels. Although he seems here to have diverged from Anselm’s opinion that man was created for his own sake, and not just to replace the fallen angels, Odo went on to argue that the final, total population of heaven would be greater than the number of the angels before the fall,

for if the number of angels who were created would suffice, man would only be able to replace those who fell and would rejoice over the fall of those whose glory he would obtain. But since no one but the just may enter heavenly glory, how can he be just who will rejoice at another’s sin? Therefore we say that the final number of the city will be greater than the number of angels in their original state.  

The argument that there needed to be more men saved than angels fallen so that man would not be dependent on the fall of the angels for his salvation, and would have no reason to exult over their loss, echoes Anselm’s argument in *Cur Deus homo*. It demonstrates that Odo did not see the sole purpose of man’s creation as being to replace the fallen angels, although he appeared to suggest this in the passage mentioned above.

Odo’s interest in the sections of *Cur Deus homo* that relate to the replacement of the fallen angels, and to the precise meaning of the necessity of the incarnation and its implications for divine omnipotence, reflects to some extent the interests of the Laon authors, and provides further illustration of the way in which Anselm’s arguments were relevant to contemporary debates. Odo is thought to have studied at Orleans and Toul, prior to taking up the abbacy of St Martin’s, and was central to the revival of scholarship at Tournai from 1096. His continued interest in the definition of terminology and contemporary discussion in the schools reflects his own scholastic background. His greater concern with the subtleties of Anselm’s argument relating to concepts such as necessity set Odo apart from the other Disputation writers discussed in this chapter.

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310 Hughes, *Odo*, pp. 12, 55.
Odo’s *Disputatio* was a popular text. There are sixteen extant manuscripts, of which four date from the twelfth century, and at least ten further manuscripts, now lost, are also known to have existed. It appeared in at least three versions during Odo’s lifetime, and was included in Lambert’s *Liber floridus* (c. 1112-20), alongside *Cur Deus homo* and Gilbert Crispin’s *Disputatio iudei et christiani*. Of particular importance for the transmission of Anselm’s work in the early twelfth century is a manuscript from the Benedictine house of Maria-Laach on the Rhine, in which Odo’s *Disputatio* appeared alongside Anselm’s *Cur Deus homo*, *De conceptu uirginali*, *De incarnatione Verbi* and *De fermentate et azymi*, as well as Gilbert Crispin’s *Disputatio iudei et christiani* and another disputation, the *Dialogus inter gentilem et christianum*. The whole codex is written in the same twelfth-century hand, with a marginal note in a later medieval hand (fol. 56r), stating that the text was sent by Odo to Vulbodo of Affligem. David Hughes believes that the manuscript could well be a witness of the text as sent by Odo to Affligem, of which Maria-Laach was a daughter-house, and suggests that it may be illustrative of Odo’s instrumental role in the transmission of Anselm’s work in the region. Odo’s contribution to the dissemination of Anselmian thought in the early twelfth century was thus effective in two ways, in promoting the accessibility of the text of *Cur Deus homo* itself, and of absorbing Anselm’s ideas into his own writing, demonstrating their continued relevance and utility for theological discussion. Odo was deeply concerned with the consequences of original sin throughout his career, and it provided the main theme of his earlier treatise *De peccato originali* (c. 1100-1105). Anselm’s discussion of the impact and transmission of original sin in *Cur Deus homo* and *De conceptu uirginali* were highly relevant to this discussion, and Odo made significant use of both treatises in his analysis. The inclusion of *Cur Deus homo* in the Maria-Laach manuscript alongside several Jewish-Christian disputations also illustrates the association of Anselm’s work with Jewish polemics and its continued utility in this field.

Odo’s student, Herman of Tournai (c. 1091-1147), also took inspiration from *Cur Deus homo*. In the preface to his treatise *De incarnatione Iesu Christi domini nostri*, Herman emphasized his debt to Anselm. ‘I have put nothing in [this treatise] of my own, but I have collected together...what I have read in the sacred doctors of the Church, and especially in the books of Master Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, who composed a book on the same

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311 Hughes, *Odo*, pp. 147, 220.
312 Berlin, Staatsbibliothek MS 276 fol. theol.
313 Hughes, *Odo*, p. 220.
314 See Chapter 5.
subject called *Cur Deus homo*. As well as *Cur Deus homo*, Herman also cited Anselm’s *De casu diaboli* and his prayer to Mary, during the course of the treatise.

In the first half of his treatise, Herman outlined the reasons for the necessity of the incarnation along broadly similar lines to *Cur Deus homo*. When man sinned and went over to the devil, he acted as a runaway slave, depriving God of his rightful property. In order for man to be reconciled to God after sin, man ‘should first restore intact whatever he had stolen, or something of equal value. Then he should make satisfaction for the arrogance with which he had spurned the precept of his creator and joined his enemy.’ Herman’s distinction between restoration of stolen property and satisfaction for injury reflects Anselm’s definition of satisfaction for sin. Herman went on to argue that nothing in the created universe, neither a new man, nor an angel, nor the whole world, could make worthy satisfaction for the sin of the first man. God alone was capable of paying such a price, but it was inappropriate for God to die for the sin of man; man alone should pay the price. Therefore, ‘since none could do this except God, and none should do it except man, it was necessary that a God-man should do it.’ Christ, who was both man and God, both could and should pay the penalty for sin, and was thus justly able to achieve the redemption of mankind.

Herman did refer to the devil in his argument, but only to reject the idea that the devil had rights over man.

both man and the devil were created by God, and both were slaves of God. And if a wicked slave had seduced a simple slave with deceitful counsel, and having stolen him away from his master had subordinated him to himself, surely it would be just for that wicked slave to be punished for his own wickedness, and for the simple slave to be set free from his dominion.

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315 *Sciatis tamen me in eo nihil de meo posuisse, sed quod in sanctis doctoribus legeram, et maxime in libro domini Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi, quem de eadem materia compositum, Cur Deus homo nominavit, uelut in uno uasculo congregasse.* Herman of Tournai, *Tractatus de incarnatione Iesu Christi domini nostri*, PL, 180, 9-38, Prefatio.

316 Ibid., 2, 11.

317 Herman, *Tractatus*, 1.

318 *primum oportet ut ex integro reddat quidquid ei abstulit, aut quod tantumdem ualeat. Deinde pro superbia, qua creatoris sui praeceptum contemptit et eius hosti adhaesit, ei satisfaciat.* Ibid., 3.

319 *quoniam itaque non potest illum facere nisi Deus, nec debet illum facere nisi homo, necesse est ut eam faciat Deus homo.* Ibid., 3.

320 *Uterque enim a Deo creatus, uterque Dei fuerat seruus, homo scilicet et diabolus. Et si seruus nequam simplicem seruum fraudulento consilio seduxerat, et proprio domino subtraxit sibimet subiugauerat, nonne iustum fuit ut seruus nequam pro sua nequitia punitetur, et seruus simplex de eius dominio liberaretur?* Ibid., 1.
Herman argued that the devil had no independent rights of his own but was, like man, a slave of God by virtue of his status as a created being. In tempting man to sin, the devil was nothing more than a rebel slave inciting others to join his rebellion. Such a character could not possibly claim any just right to authority over his fellow rebels, but deserved to be severely punished for his crime. Herman’s argument here closely follows Anselm’s description of the rebel slave in *Cur Deus homo*.

Herman and Odo were unusual in their rejection of imagery associated with the *ius diaboli* idea, and other authors of polemic texts and disputations continued to employ images such as the cross as a trap and the defeat of the devil for their rhetorical power, whether or not they believed in the concept of the devil’s rights *per se*. Anselm’s teaching regarding the rights of the devil, and his rejection of associated imagery, had only a limited impact on twelfth century authors. However, his satisfaction theory achieved wide popularity, and was often combined with more traditional discussion of the role of the devil in explanations of the redemption. Anselm’s use of the language of necessity in relation to the incarnation caused some controversy, largely due to misunderstanding of the subtleties of his argument concerning the meaning of the term; but his concern with the consequences of original sin and man’s inability to effect his own salvation, which provided the foundation for his argument, fitted into broader contemporary discussion of the meaning of sin and the limitations of human free choice. These will be discussed in the following chapters.
Chapter Four – Freedom and the Will

*De libertate arbitrii, De casu diaboli and De concordia*

*Libertas arbitrii: Anselm, Augustine and the School of Laon*

Anselm’s *De libertate arbitrii* took the form of a dialogue between a master and student, and began with a question from the student:

> Since free choice seems to be repugnant to grace, predestination and God’s foreknowledge, I want to know what freedom of choice is, and whether we always have it. For if freedom of choice is ‘to be able to sin and not to sin’, as some are accustomed to say, and we always have it, why do we sometimes need grace? But if we do not always have it, why is sin imputed to us when we sin without free choice?\(^{321}\)

The definition of free choice as ‘the ability to sin or not to sin’ is characteristic of Augustinian theology. Augustine explained the existence of evil in a divinely created universe, and man’s responsibility for sin, by arguing that God created man with two desires, for things eternal or temporal. The choice of which to follow lay entirely within the will; therefore sin existed as a result of free choice of the will.\(^{322}\)

While this definition of the will functioned well as a description of the freedom given to man to choose, without constraint, the direction of his own will, it did not provide a complete description of freedom in all its forms, as Anselm pointed out. Freedom could not just mean freedom to sin or not to sin. ‘If this were its definition, neither God nor the angels, who cannot sin, would have free choice, which it is impious to say.’\(^{323}\) On the contrary, Anselm argued that God and the angels who were without sin enjoyed the ultimate freedom, far beyond that experienced by man. Clearly, the ability to sin could not in itself be a component of true freedom, but its antithesis.

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\(^{321}\) *Quoniam liberum arbitrium uidetur repugnare gratiae et praedestinationi et praescientiae dei: ipsa libertas arbitrii quid sit nosse desidero, et utram semper illam habeamus. Si enim libertas arbitrii est ‘posse peccare et non peccare’, sicut a quibusdam solet dici, et hoc semper habemus: quomodo alliquando gratia indigemus? Si autem hoc non semper habeamus: cur nobis imputatur peccatum, quando sine libero arbitrio peccamus?* Anselm, DLA, 1.

\(^{322}\) Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* (hereafter DLA), ed. W.M. Green, CCSL, 19 (Turnhout, 1970), 1.16; *De actis cum Felice Manicheo*, PL, 42.517-522, 2.3.

\(^{323}\) *Si haec esset definitio: nec deus nec angeli qui peccare nequeunt liberum haberent arbitrium; quod nefas est dicere.* Anselm, DLA, 1.
Instead, Anselm defined freedom of choice as ‘the power of preserving rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself.’\textsuperscript{324} God and the good angels were perfectly free because ‘he who has what is honourable and expedient for him, so that he cannot lose it, is more free than he who has it in such a way that he can lose it and be led into what is dishonourable and inexpedient.’\textsuperscript{325} Ability to sin was not a power enhancing freedom, but a weakness that prevented man from fulfilling his potential, condemning him to slavery.

The objection that the definition of freedom as ‘the ability to sin or not to sin’ denied freedom to God, who could not sin, had been raised by Augustine, in his \textit{Contra Iulianum}.\textsuperscript{326} However, Augustine did not use this objection as a starting point for a fresh examination of what freedom of choice actually was, as Anselm did, and some medieval commentators continued to see ‘the ability to sin and not to sin’ as the Augustinian definition of free choice. This can be seen in the \textit{Sententiae divinae pagine} from the school of Laon. In a passage discussing the meaning of free choice, the author presented three possible alternative definitions, those of Boethius, Augustine and Anselm.

Free choice is, as Boethius says, free judgement of the will; for the decision of judgement is not free unless it can freely fulfil whatever part it chooses. Augustine says this: free choice is the power of doing good and evil. The bishop of Canterbury in his book defines it thus: the faculty of preserving rectitude for its own sake; and he posits this in such a way because Augustine’s definition seems absurd to him, for, although there was free choice in Christ, it seems to him absurd that he had the capacity to do evil. And so it seems to him concerning the angels confirmed in the good.\textsuperscript{327}

The Laon author opposed Anselm’s definition on the grounds that

\textsuperscript{324} \textit{Potestas seruandi rectitudinem uoluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem.} Anselm, DLA, 13.
\textsuperscript{325} \textit{Qui sic habet quod decet et quod expedit, ut hoc amittere non quaeat, liberior est quam ille qui sic habet hoc ipsum, ut possit perdere et ad hoc quod dedeceat et non expedit ualeat adduci.} Ibid., 1.
\textsuperscript{326} Augustine, \textit{Contra Iulianum imperfectum opus}, PL, 45, 1049-1608, 1.100.
\textsuperscript{327} \textit{Liberum arbitrium est, ut dicit Boetius, liberum de uoluntate iudicium; nisi enim libere possit implore quamlibet partem, non est libera diuicatio. Augustinus sic: Liberum arbitrium est potencia bene et male operandi. Episcopus cantorbiensis in libro suo ita diffinit: Facultas seruandi rectitudinem propter se ipsam, et ideo ponit hanc, quia uidetur absurda diffinitio Augustini, quia, cum in Christo fuerit liberum arbitrium, uidetur ei absursum, quod ibi fuerit potestia male operandi. Idem ei uidetur de angelis confirmatis in bono.} SDP, pp. 27-8.
The capacity to do evil was in Christ according to his humanity, and is not evil, but it would be absurd if he had done evil. In the same way, since the angels confirmed in evil had the capacity to do good, it is not absurd concerning the good angels [that they had the capacity to do evil]. Therefore Augustine’s opinion must be upheld.\textsuperscript{328}

The Laon author argued that the potential power to do evil was present in both the incarnate Christ and the good angels. This \textit{potentia} could never be realised, as Christ in his divinity and the angels in their confirmed goodness would never sin; the very idea was absurd. However, the mere possession of the power of doing evil meant that, in the author’s understanding, Anselm must be wrong, and the Augustinian definition of \textit{liberum arbitrium} as the power to do good or evil must be upheld. The author did not address Anselm’s main concern, that God himself could not sin. Instead, he concentrated on the free choice possessed by the incarnate Christ, and the angels. Arguing that the potential to sin was inherent in all rational created beings, the author argued that it must therefore have been present in Christ, who took on the fullness of human nature. However, because Christ was also fully divine, it was absurd to imagine that the potential to do evil would ever be realised by him.

This paragraph in the \textit{Sententie diuine pagine} is paralleled in another text identified by Lottin as belonging to the school of Laon. Like the \textit{Sententie diuine pagine}, the author listed the three definitions of Boethius, Augustine and Anselm, and related the argument of the latter specifically to Christ. ‘The Archbishop of Canterbury defines it thus: the faculty of preserving rectitude for its own sake, because he does not concede that the power of doing evil was in Christ.’\textsuperscript{329} The author of this sentence did not go on to analyse the merits of the different positions, as the author of the \textit{Sententie diuine pagine} had done.

Of the sentences relating to the nature of free choice in texts associated with the Laon school, none express support for the Anselmian definition. Collections such as the \textit{Sententie Anselmi} and the \textit{Sententie Atrabatensis} make no reference to Anselm’s argument, but offer a simple restatement of the Augustinian view.\textsuperscript{330} However, even though the author of the \textit{Sententie diuine pagine} disagreed with Anselm on this point, the fact that he mentioned it at

\textsuperscript{328} \textit{Potentia male operandi fuisse in Christo secundum humanitatem, non est malum, sed si male operaretur, hoc est absurdum. Item, cum in angelis confirmatis in malo sit potentia bene operandi, non est absurdum de bonis. Tenenda est ergo sententia Augustini. Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{329} \textit{Archiepiscopus Cantuariensis ita definit: facultas seruandi rectitudinem propter seipsam, quia non concedebat potentiam male operandi esse in Christo. Sententia 322, ed. Lottin, Psychologie, vol. 5, p. 253.}

all, and engaged seriously with its claims, demonstrates the relevance of Anselm’s work to contemporary debate within the schools at Laon and elsewhere.

By focussing purely on the freedom possessed by created beings, the Laon authors missed the point. Anselm did not dispute that both angels and men were created with the original capacity to sin, but recognized that this was necessary in order for them to have freedom of choice. At its most basic level, free choice means the freedom possessed by that rational being to choose, without hindrance, the orientation of his own will. For created beings, this inevitably implied the initial existence of alternative possibilities. Anselm argued that angels and men were created for one purpose; to uphold justice and, so doing, to enjoy perfect happiness for eternity. However, in order for man to embrace justice freely, he also had to have the possibility of rejecting it. Anselm would explore this subject fully in his next treatise, *De casu diaboli*, which he intended to be read alongside *De libertate arbitrii*, and again at the end of his career in *De concordia*. His main focus in *De libertate arbitrii* was on the consequences of the fall, and how man could be said to be a slave to sin, completely unable to will justice without the assistance of divine grace, without losing his essential free choice; a question that was essential to understanding the meaning of the fall, and man’s ultimate responsibility for sin. Anselm did not discuss pre-lapsarian freedom of choice in detail in *De libertate arbitrii*, but he did raise the question of how, if the capacity to sin had no part in free choice, angels and men could be said to have sinned by free choice.³³¹

Anselm explained that man and the apostate angels fell through free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) because they did so willingly and without being coerced by any external necessity. Nevertheless, he argued that, although they sinned through their own free choice, ‘it was not through this that it was free, that is through the power by which it was able not to sin and not to serve sin, but through the power which it had of sinning, which is neither assisted by the freedom not to sin nor compelled to servitude to sin.’³³² The fundamental faculty of *liberum arbitrium* essentially meant nothing more than the capacity of the rational will to choose its own direction without compulsion. This included the capacity to sin, although the will was not truly free unless it was unable to be corrupted by sin. True *libertas arbitrii* meant the inability of the *arbitrium* to be diverted from what was right and fitting by sin. Nevertheless, the *arbitrium* could be said to be *liberum* to a certain extent without this ultimate freedom, as long as it could not be compelled into any particular desire or action by extraneous necessity.

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³³¹ Anselm, *DLA*, 2.
³³² *Non per hoc unde liberum erat, id est per potestatem qua poterat non peccare et peccato non servire, sed per potestatem quam habebat peccandi, qua nec ad non peccandi libertatem iuabatur nec ad peccandi seruitutem cogebatur*. *Ibid.*
Once the initial choice between accepting or rejecting justice had been made by the rational creature, the outcome was final. The angels who chose justice were confirmed in justice, so that they could no longer sin. Similarly, the angels who fell, fell for ever. Man also fell, and as a consequence became enslaved to sin, so that he could no longer will justice, except with the aid of divine grace. However, this did not mean that he lost the power of free choice. Anselm attempted to explain this apparent paradox of slavery and freedom by differentiating between the basic faculty of will, and its use. The free choice of the will is an essential aspect of human nature that can never be destroyed, even though it is prevented from functioning as it should. As an analogy, Anselm compared the faculty of the will to that of sight; one may be unable to see because of darkness, or an obstacle in one’s line of vision, but this does not mean that the faculty of sight is lost.\(^{333}\)

Anselm thus recognized the need for rational created beings to have the initial capacity to uphold justice, or to reject it; to sin, or not to sin. However, he did not believe that this definition constituted a full and adequate definition of freedom of choice under all circumstances. True freedom implied not just the freedom of self-determination, discussed above, but the freedom of self-perfection, the capacity to uphold justice for its own sake and thus to fulfil the purpose of one’s existence and to live in perfect happiness. This freedom was already possessed by God and the angels who had been confirmed in goodness, but had not yet been granted to man.

Discussion of both of these two forms of freedom can be seen in Augustine. Augustine typically used the phrase *liberum arbitrium* (free choice) to describe the freedom of self-determination, and *libertas* (freedom) to denote the freedom of self-perfection.\(^{334}\) Anselm sought to combine both into the single concept of *libertas arbitrii*, freedom of choice. This marked a new departure in the theology of freedom, and must account to a considerable degree for the confusion shown in the Laon sentences about what he was trying to achieve. The Laon author critiqued Anselm’s definition as if it applied only to the original *liberum arbitrium* of created beings, as Augustine’s had been. This interpretation set Anselm against Augustine, when in fact Anselm’s thinking was firmly rooted in Augustinian theology, and should instead be seen as a development of, and attempt to clarify, Augustine’s thought.

Anselm intended his definition of *libertas arbitrii* to be universally-applicable, and to provide an adequate description of the freedom possessed by all rational beings, whether created or uncreated. This is not reflected in the discussion of his definition in the Laon

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333 Anselm, *DLA*, 3.
sentences, which focus purely on created beings and the incarnate Christ, without actively engaging in the question of the freedom possessed by the Godhead as a whole, un-incarnate and therefore unrelated to created nature. This may have been one of the factors that led the Laon authors to reject Anselm’s definition of libertas arbitrii. They saw no need to abandon the Augustinian definition which offered a perfectly reasonable explanation of the status of man and the angels, both before and after the fall. The Laon authors were generally more interested in pastoral and moral teaching than metaphysics, and the Augustinian definition was quite sufficient for their purposes.

Honorius Augustodunensis

The masters of the school of Laon were not the only early twelfth-century authors to find themselves confronted by an apparent dichotomy between two alternative definitions of free choice. A similar situation can be seen in the various discussions of freedom in the writings of Honorius Augustodunensis. Honorius addressed the meaning of free choice several times in his career, and his interpretation altered dramatically, almost certainly as a result of exposure to Anselm’s arguments in De libertate arbitrii and elsewhere.

Honorius first discussed the meaning of free choice in Elucidarium. The text survives in more than one recension, and two variations are found in Honorius’ phrasing of his definition of free choice. In the earlier recension, in response to the question ‘what is free choice?’, the master defines it as ‘the freedom to choose good and evil.’

In the later, it is defined as ‘the power of man to be and to will and to accomplish good or evil.’

335 Libertas eligendi bonum et malum. Honorius, Elucidarium, 2.7.
336 In potestate hominis esse et uelle et posse bonum uel malum. Lefèvre (L’Elucidarium, pp. 349-351) believes that the latter version was the original, as it was the one contained in manuscripts containing the shortest version of the work, without either of the two additional series of passages which he believes must have been later editions to the text. Lefèvre’s interpretation is rejected by Flint (‘The Original Text of the Elucidarium of Honorius Augustodunensis from the Twelfth-Century English Manuscripts’, Scriptorium, 18 (1964), pp. 91-94). Flint believes that the first reading, which defines free choice simply as ‘the freedom to choose good and evil’, should be seen as the original. Unlike Lefèvre, whose work was based primarily on French manuscripts, she concentrates on English manuscripts which she argues cast doubt on Lefèvre’s conclusions. According to Flint’s analysis, the majority of the early English manuscripts correspond closely to each other, and can be seen as the ‘Family B’ group of manuscripts which Lefèvre interpreted as the latest version of the text. In contrast, there are no early English exemplars of the short version. Flint argues that ‘Family B’, and not the shortened version, should be seen as the earliest recension of the text. She also points out that the manuscripts used by Lefèvre for his short version of the text were all late, and that his best early manuscripts belonged to the same ‘Family B’ group as the early English examples. As well as the evidence provided by the English manuscripts of Elucidarium, Flint argues that it makes more sense to see ‘the freedom to choose good or evil’ as the original text, as it is the definition that Honorius went on to use in the first recension of Inevitabile (see below). She also argues that interpreting the second definition as a later revision ‘makes much more sense in the broader historical context’, citing attempts by later twelfth-century thinkers such as Robert of Melun and Alan of Lille to
definitions ultimately follow the ‘Augustinian’ model of free choice as one between the two possible directions of good and evil. However, in De libertate arbitrii, Anselm had explicitly rejected this interpretation of free choice. Loris Sturlese believes that this raises serious difficulties for the theory that Honorius studied under Anselm in Canterbury, as, if this were the case, surely he would have known Anselm’s argument. Yet there is no particular reason why Honorius should have read De libertate arbitrii, which had been completed long before Anselm came to Canterbury and whose subject matter was perhaps no longer of immediate interest to him by the time Honorius arrived as a student, and no longer a regular subject of discussion.

Surviving accounts of Anselm’s oral teaching contain little on the subject of freedom. The most interesting passage for our purposes survives in only one manuscript of De similitudinibus, compiled by Robert de Braci, prior of Llanthony from 1131 to 1137. In a section entitled ‘On the Three Modes of Liberty’, Anselm differentiated between freedom of action (libertas actionis), of understanding (libertas intelligentiae), and of an upright will (libertas rectae voluntatis). The first two are only good when allied with the third, which confers the ability to know and to will what is right. The paragraph ends with the statement that ‘below the freedom of the will is the freedom of choice.’

If this, admittedly very brief, paragraph does provide an accurate summary of the sort of teaching that Honorius might have received on the subject of the freedom of choice in Canterbury, it may go some way towards explaining his own approach in Elucidarium. Although freedom of choice or judgement is an essential feature of the highest ‘freedom of an upright will’, it is also treated as a separate faculty in its own right. The phrasing of the paragraph is somewhat ambiguous, but Anselm appears to have been equating libertas arbitrii to some degree with the intermediate libertas intelligentiae. This is the ability of the intelligent creature to base the decisions of the will on rational judgement, a greater freedom than that of the irrational creature which, while experiencing no external coercion to a particular action, and thus enjoying libertas actionis, is nevertheless dominated by the demands of sense appetite alone and does not have freedom to judge between different courses of action. Similarly, libertas arbitrii is lower than libertas recte voluntatis, as

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freedom of choice and judgement is the prerogative of all rational creatures, even those who have irrevocably lost the supreme freedom of the upright will, and are thus in slavery to sin.

Anselm discussed these ideas more fully in *De libertate arbitrii*, but this passage in *De similitudinibus* does seem to offer a more explicit distinction between *libertas arbitrii* as *libertas intelligentiae* and the ultimate *libertas recte uoluntatis*. If this is the case, the passage not only provides a bridge between the traditional Augustinian definition of free choice and that used by Anselm in *De libertate arbitrii*, but is also a very similar concept to that which Honorius had in mind in his discussion of free choice.

The definition of free choice in the second book of *Elucidarium* is found in the context of a series of questions on the nature of sin. Rather than discussing freedom as a universal concept, as Anselm had in *De libertate arbitrii*, Honorius’ discussion of free choice in this context was limited to the question of the freedom given to man to choose between good and evil. In a separate passage, earlier in the text, Honorius raised the question of the freedom of choice possessed by the angels both before and after the fall of the devil. Here, the student asked why God did not create the angels without the ability to sin. The master replied that this was done for the sake of justice. It was right for God to reward the good angels on account of their merits. Had they been created without the ability to sin, there would have been no merit in their not sinning, and so their reward would not have been justly earned. ‘Therefore God gave them free choice, so that they would be able to choose and will the good of their own accord, and if they chose it willingly, they would justly receive the reward of not being able to sin.’

Had the angels not originally been created with the ability to choose evil, they would not have been free to choose the good. Similarly, man was created with the ability to choose either good or evil, so that he might freely choose the good, and thus be worthy of his place in heaven. This reflects Anselm’s teaching on the need for created beings to have been created with the capacity to will in different possible directions in order for their wills to be self-initiated, the only thing that could make them truly free.

After the fall of the devil, the good angels were confirmed, ‘so that they could no longer fall nor sin.’ They were henceforward unable to sin because they would never will it. As the good angels were confirmed in their choice of the good, so that it was as a result of their own free choice that they could no longer choose evil, this inability was in no way a restriction of their freedom of choice. Had man not succumbed to the temptation of the devil,

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339 *Dedit ergo eis Deus liberum arbitrium, ut sua sponte et uellent et possent eligere bonum et, si hoc voluntarie eligerent, iuste in remuneratione acciperunt ne unquam peccare possent* Honorius, *Elucidarium*, 1.45.
340 *Ut numquam nec cadere nec peccare possint* *Ibid.* 1.50.
341 *Numquam uelint* *Ibid.*, 1.51.
he too would have received this blessing, but because of sin, freedom of choice was diminished so that he was no longer able to choose the good without the aid of divine grace.

Honorius returned to the problem of free choice in his later dialogue, *Ineuitabile siue de praedestinatione et libero arbitrio*. This work survives in two recensions, which contain very different accounts of the meaning of free choice. In the earlier recension, Honorius discussed *liberum arbitrium* in similar language to that already used in *Elucidarium*. He referred directly, if not explicitly, to *Elucidarium*; on being asked by the master to supply a definition of *liberum arbitrium*, the student replied ‘as you defined it, the freedom to choose good or evil.’ In the second recension of the text Honorius abandoned this definition of free choice in favour of that used by Anselm. He no longer referred to his own earlier writing on the subject; when asked for a definition of free choice on this occasion, the student only suggested that ‘It seems to me that free choice means the freedom to choose good or evil.’ However, the master now replied that this definition would not do,

for choice means nothing unless it is between two or more things, where there is the option of choosing from the multiple things proposed. But to angels and men, to whom alone free choice is given, nothing except justice alone is proposed, so that they might enjoy eternal beatitude through having kept it. Therefore this does not seem a fitting definition of free choice.

Freedom of choice was not the power to choose between good and evil, but the power to choose the good and uphold justice, just as Anselm had defined it.

Because free choice is given solely for the preservation of justice, in which lies the salvation of the soul, this definition is thought to be suitable: freedom of

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343 *Ut tu diffinisti, libertatem bonum uel malum eligendi*. Ibid., p. 6 (my emphasis).
345 *Electio namque non nisi de duabus uel pluribus rebus dicitur; ubi optio eligendi de multis proponitur. Angelo autem uel homini, quibus solis datum est liberum arbitrium, non nisi sola iustitia proponebatur, qua seruata, aeterna beatitudine fruerentur. Igitur definitio non uidetur conueniens libero arbitrio*. Honorius, *Ineuitabile, PL*, 172, 1197-1222, at 1199D.
choice is the power of preserving rectitude of the will, for the sake of rectitude itself.\textsuperscript{346}

Honorius repeated this definition in another short treatise \textit{De libero arbitrio}. Here, he began his discussion of free choice with a summary of \textit{liberum arbitrium} at its most basic level, the capacity of the rational will to judge for itself, without coercion, what to will and what to avoid.\textsuperscript{347} Honorius argued that this definition was in itself insufficient to describe true freedom of choice, as only those who were just could be truly free, and unfettered by servitude to sin. He therefore used Anselm’s definition of free choice as the power of preserving justice for the sake of justice itself. Honorius did not name Anselm in this passage, but he did cite the authority of Augustine to support his argument that the will could not be truly just unless it were motivated by a desire for justice alone, uninfluenced by either fear of punishment or hope of reward.

\begin{quote}
Freedom of choice is the power of preserving justice for the sake of justice itself. For as Augustine defined it, he who avoids evil for fear of punishment, or does good for hope of reward, is not free. For he preserves it, compelled by fear or enticed by hope; and when he is dominated by fear or hope, he is rightly found not to be free. Only he who does good for delight in justice alone is judged to be free.\textsuperscript{348}
\end{quote}

Free choice was given for the purpose of upholding justice alone, and only the just were free; the unjust were slaves of sin. Honorius argued that those who were enslaved to sin still possessed free choice, but abused it to their harm, just as a man who, having been given a sword to defend himself, used it instead to injure himself.\textsuperscript{349}

In the following paragraph, Honorius went on, as Anselm had done, to address the criticism raised by those who believed that, because God and the angels could not sin, they could not have \textit{liberum arbitrium}. Honorius argued that, on the contrary, God and the angels

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Footnotes:}

\item\textsuperscript{346} Quia liberum arbitrium pro sola iustitia seruanda (in qua salus animae consistit) datur, eius definitio sic congrua aestimetur: Libertas arbitrii est potestas seruandi rectitudinem uoluntatis, propter ipsam rectitudinem. Honorius, \textit{Ineuitabile}, 1200C.

\item\textsuperscript{347} Honorius, \textit{De libero arbitrio} (hereafter DLA), PL, 172, 1223-1230, 2.

\item\textsuperscript{348} Libertas arbitrii est potestas seruandi iustitiam propter ipsam iustitiam. Augustino namque definiente, hic non est liber, qui uel timore supplicii malum deuitat, uel spe praemii bonum facit. Seruit enim timore coactus uel spe illectus: et cum timor et spes ei dominentur, non liber esse iure convincitur. Hic solummodo liber iudicatur qui sola delectatione iustitiae bonum operatur. Honorius, DLA, 3.

\item\textsuperscript{349} Ibid., 3.
\end{itemize}
enjoyed supreme freedom, for the very reason that they could not sin but always and
unceasingly willed justice, the one thing that true freedom of choice demanded. In contrast,
human \textit{liberum arbitrium} was weak and prone to fall into sin. It needed the constant
assistance of divine grace in order to will justice at all.\textsuperscript{350}

Honorius devoted the final two paragraphs of \textit{De libero arbitrio} to a discussion of
how man, having been given freedom of choice in order to preserve justice, was able to use
his free choice to lose his capacity for justice and become enslaved to sin. In order to answer
this question, Honorius borrowed another argument from Anselm, first discussed in \textit{De casu
diaboli} and later expanded in \textit{De concordia}, about the two wills possessed by man.

\textbf{Two wills: \textit{De casu diaboli} and \textit{De concordia}}

In \textit{De casu diaboli}, Anselm addressed the question of how the devil fell. Why did God create
the angels with the capacity to sin? Why did he not give the devil the perseverance he needed
to stand in the good? If the devil received all that he had from God, did God give him an evil
will? Anselm argued that the angels were created with free choice of the will for the sole
purpose of upholding justice. Nevertheless, in order to choose justice freely, it was necessary
for them to have the initial possibility of rejecting it. For an agent to be just, his actions
needed to be self-initiated; if he was constrained to act in a particular way, his actions could
not be seen as either just or unjust, but necessary. This meant that the angels had to have the
initial possibility of sinning, in order for them freely to reject this possibility and choose
justice. In his explanation of the fact that the good angels had the ability to sin before the fall,
Anselm argued that

\begin{quote}
if they had not been able to sin, they would have served justice not through
to the power, but necessity. But then they would not have merited grace from God
because they stood while others fell, since they would have retained a rationality
which they could not lose. They could not rightly be called just.\textsuperscript{351}
\end{quote}

Only by freely choosing to preserve justice when they could have abandoned it could the
good angels be considered truly just and deserving of their place in heaven.

\textsuperscript{350} Honorius, DLA, 4.
\textsuperscript{351} Si non potuerunt peccare, non potestate sed necessitate servauerunt iustitiam. Quare non magis meruerant
gratiam a deo quia steterunt aliis cadentibus, quam quia servauerunt rationalitatem quam perdere nequiverunt. Sed nec iusti recte...dicerentur. Anselm, DCD, 5.
Anselm argued that the angels were created with the initial capacity to will two things, justice (*iustitia*) and advantage or happiness (*commodum, beatitudo*). Anselm argued that ‘not only every rational creature, but everything capable of sensation, wills the useful and avoids the harmful. This everything wills good for itself, and avoids bad.’ As a natural characteristic of all willing creatures, rational or otherwise, the will for happiness was morally neutral. Without it, no creature could ever be happy, or enjoy eternal beatitude in heaven. By contrast, the will for justice sought moral goods, whether or not they were of immediate advantage to the individual. In order for the rational being to have free choice of judgement, it was necessary for him to have been created with both wills. Had he been able to will only advantage, or only justice, he could never be truly just. Justice demanded that the will for happiness be subordinated to the will for justice. Sin came when the devil willed his own advantage beyond that which God had ordained, that is, beyond the measure of justice. His sin lay in willing *commodum* more than *iustitia*.

Anselm’s discussion of the two wills in *De casu diaboli* focused on the initial freedom of choice possessed by the angels, but the same arguments could be applied equally well to man. In his later treatise *De concordia*, the focus of his concern switched to man. Here, Anselm developed his arguments from *De casu diaboli* concerning the will for justice and the will for advantage. He described the will at its most basic level as a tool, which could be turned to many different specific desires or uses. Every potential object of willing could be categorized under one of two fundamental orientations of the will, which Anselm described as *affectiones*; for justice or uprightness, and for happiness or advantage.

The tool for willing has two abilities which I call *affectiones*, one of which is for willing advantage, the other for willing uprightness. For the will as a tool wills nothing except advantage or uprightness. For whatever else it wills, it wills either on account of advantage or of uprightness and - even if it is mistaken – it thinks itself to be willing in relation to these. Indeed through the disposition to will advantage, man always wills happiness and to be happy; but through the

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disposition to will uprightness, he wills uprightness and to be righteous, that is, just.\textsuperscript{355}

These \textit{affectiones} of the will correspond to the two ‘wills’ that Anselm had described in \textit{De casu diaboli}, although he had since refined his terminology to enable a more detailed and precise discussion of the nature and operation of the rational will. However, Anselm was not entirely consistent in his choice of terminology, and continued to refer to the \textit{affectiones} as two \textit{voluntates} intermittently throughout his argument.

In \textit{De concordia}, Anselm argued that the \textit{affectio ad commodum} was an inseparable feature of the will; all rational creatures naturally will their own benefit and happiness. By contrast, the \textit{affectio ad rectitudinem} was separable, because not all rational creatures will justice, as the fall amply demonstrated.\textsuperscript{356} A further difference between the two is that the \textit{affectio ad rectitudinem} could be identified as \textit{rectitudo} itself, but the \textit{affectio ad commodum} was not the same thing as \textit{commodum}. ‘The will for justice is justice itself, but the will for happiness is not happiness, because not everyone who wills happiness has it.’\textsuperscript{357}

When man sinned, he lost the will for justice which was justice itself. The loss of justice was permanent, and man was unable to restore himself to it. ‘Now he was also made unable to will the justice he had abandoned. For one cannot will justice through free choice if one does not have it, though one can preserve it when one has it.’\textsuperscript{358} Only the will for happiness remained. This will, which had been created good, ‘became something evil, that is unjust, because it was not subordinate to justice without which one ought to will nothing.’\textsuperscript{359} The will, which had freely abandoned justice, necessarily remained unjust; ‘for it is unable by itself to return to justice, without which it is never free, because without it natural freedom of choice is useless.’\textsuperscript{360} Without justice, man lost the happiness which he had enjoyed at creation, and was reduced to servitude to the base passions of the flesh. The continued desire

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{355} \textit{Instrumentum uolendi duas habet aptitudines, quas uoco ‘affectiones’. Quorum una est ad uolendum commoditatem, altera ad uolendum rectitudinem. Nempe nihil uult voluntas quae est instrumentum, nisi aut commoditatem aut rectitudinem. Quidquid enim aliud uult, aut propter commoditatem aut propter rectitudinem uult, et ad has – etiam si fallitur – putat se referre quod uult. Per affectionem quidem quae est ad uolendum commoditatem, semper uult homo beatitudinem et beatus esse. Per illam uero quae est ad uolendum rectitudinem, uult rectitudinem et rectus, id est iustus esse.} Anselm, \textit{DC}, 3.11.
\item \textsuperscript{356} \textit{Ibid.}, 3.12.
\item \textsuperscript{357} \textit{Voluntas quidem iustitiae est ipsa iustitia; voluntas uero beatitudinis non est beatitudo, quia non omnis habet beatitudinem, quia habet eiusmod voluntatem.} \textit{Ibid.}, 3.13.
\item \textsuperscript{358} \textit{Infirma quoque modo facta est ad uolendum iustitiam desertam. Non enim per liberum arbitrium ita potest eam uelle, cum illam non habet, quemadmodum ualeat eam seruare cum habet.} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{359} \textit{Aliquid mala, id est inuista facta est, quia non est subditia iustitiae, sine qua nihil uelle debet.} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{360} \textit{Quia per se redire neguit ad iustitiam, sine qua numquam libera est, quia naturalis libertas arbitrii sine illa otiosa est.} \textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}

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for happiness which could no longer be attained constituted the just punishment for the abandonment of justice.\textsuperscript{361}

Honorius repeated this argument in the second recension of \textit{Ineuitabile}, in which he had also used the Anselmian definition of \textit{libertas arbitrii} as ‘the ability to preserve rectitude of the will for the sake of rectitude itself’, In this ‘Anselmian’ version of the text, he also made use of Anselm’s distinction between the two wills possessed by man, for justice and for happiness.

God created man just and happy, lacking nothing, with sufficient of all good things, and he gave him free will of justice and of happiness, so that with the will for justice he might rule over his subjected body, and with the will for happiness, he should obey God. Therefore he had justice to the honour of God, and happiness for his own advantage. And if he had preserved justice he would have honoured God, and would have reached the supreme happiness of the angels. But because he deserted justice, he lost happiness. But he retained the will for happiness. Therefore, he burns with longing for advantage, but he cannot have the advantage befitting rational nature, which he lost, and he is converted to the false advantages and bestial appetites of brute beasts.\textsuperscript{362}

Honorius argued that man was created with the will for justice and for happiness. The will for happiness was natural, and gave man the possibility of enjoying the supreme advantages which God had prepared for him. It was not intended to be followed without restraint, but only in obedience to the limits set down by divine precepts. The will for justice ought to keep the will for advantage under control, and prevent the desire for temporal goods and corporeal pleasures exceeding due measure. As punishment for abandoning the desire for justice, man lost the happiness which he would otherwise have enjoyed. He retained the desire for happiness, but without the guiding restraint of justice, he fell into carnal desires that could never bring true happiness.\textsuperscript{363}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{361} Anselm, \textit{DC}, 3.13.

\textsuperscript{362} Deus condidit hominem iustum et beatum, sine omni indigentia, in bonorum omnium sufficientia, et dedit liberum voluntatem, iustitiae et beatitudinis, ut voluntate iustitiae, corpore subdito imperaret; voluntate beatitudinis, Deo obediret. Habuit ergo iustitiam, ad honorem Dei; beatitudinem, ad commodum suum. Et si seruata iustitia Deum honorasset, ad summam angelorum beatitudinem peruenisset. Sed quia iustitiam deseruit, beatitudinem amisit. Sed voluntatem beatitudinis retinuit. Quia ergo feruet desiderio commodorum; sed commoda rationalis naturae competentia, quae perdit, habere non ualeat, ad falsa et brutorum commoda et bestiales appetitus se conuerit. Honorius, \textit{Ineuitabile}, 1212D-1213A.

\textsuperscript{363} A similar passage appears in Honorius, \textit{DLA}, 6.
\end{footnotesize}
The idea that man’s will could be turned to either of two fundamental orientations was not a completely novel element in Anselm’s thought, but has origins in Augustine. In his treatise *De libero arbitrio*, Augustine differentiated between the desire for eternal goods and that for temporal, changeable goods. The just man desires eternal goods above temporal advantage, while the unjust man has an inordinate desire for temporal advantage. The desire for happiness is natural to all human beings, but not all men are happy, because many lack justice.364

As an addendum to *De libero arbitrio*, Honorius included a number of *sententiae* from different authors offering definitions of free choice. The last of these was Anselm’s definition of ‘the power of preserving rectitude of the will for the sake of rectitude itself.’ Honorius did not comment on any of these *sententiae*, and when he used Anselm’s definition in the text itself, it was unattributed. It is significant that Honorius preferred to highlight the compatibility of the definition with accepted Augustinian authority, rather than the relative novelty of the definition itself. In the dedication of the treatise, Honorius claimed that he was writing in response to recent discussions on the meaning of free choice.365 It seems reasonable to suggest that Anselm’s work may have played an important part in these discussions. By emphasising the essential compatibility of Anselm’s thought with that of Augustine, Honorius stressed the orthodoxy of the new definition, enabling it to be incorporated into existing frameworks of discussion, as a means of clarifying and elaborating upon Augustinian doctrine.

Honorius’ attempt to portray Anselm’s discussion on freedom of choice as an extension of traditional Augustinian teaching illustrates the importance of Augustine’s thought in the early twelfth century, and the dangers of writing that seemed to contradict his authority. It was Anselm’s apparent opposition to Augustine’s definition of free choice that led the Laon authors to reject his work so strongly. Honorius also tried to present Anselm’s definition in a way that highlighted its utility for pastoral work and the movement for reform of the Church in England. Honorius was greatly concerned by the acute shortage of pastoral care for the laity in post-Conquest England, and keen to encourage monks to undertake pastoral duties. *Elucidarium* was thus created as a teaching aid to prepare new recruits for questions they were likely to face in the course of their ministry.366

365 Honorius, *DLA*, Prologus.
It has been suggested that Honorius’ desire for anonymity may provide further evidence, not only of only theological and intellectual, but also political and ecclesiastical, connections with Anselm in his own attempts at reform. In the preface to *Elucidarium*, he wrote that ‘I desired to conceal my name, for fear that destructive envy might bid its devotees scorn and neglect a useful work.’\(^{367}\) While this comment may have been little more than a literary conceit, various suggestions have been offered as to the possible sources and reasons for this envy. Lefèvre suggests that the hostility which Honorius feared was not directed against him personally, but his master Anselm.\(^{368}\) Honorius was afraid lest Anselm’s enemies in the Church, who had opposed his attempts at reform and suffered from the disorder resulting from his repeated exiles, should attempt to stifle his work. Lefèvre argues that ‘the anonymity sought by Honorius could allow his work to be less quickly noticed by Anselm’s enemies and to spread good teaching more surely.’ Lefèvre also points to Honorius’ comments at the beginning of the second recension of *Ineuitabile*, where he complains about the ‘malicious words of the envious.’\(^{369}\) Lefèvre argues that the fact that these envious detractors are only referred to in the second, Anselmian, version of the text, and not in the earlier recension, lends support to the belief that the *inuidia* were primarily opposed to Anselm rather than to Honorius himself.\(^{370}\)

There is no reason to suppose that the *inuidia* referred to in *Elucidarium* and those in the second recension of *Ineuitabile* were the same group of people. The opening paragraphs of *Ineuitabile* appear to form an attack on those in the schools who treat important matters of doctrine as opportunities to show off their own skills in disputation, rather than seeking to clarify the divine truth, with detrimental effects on the faith of the simple. There is nothing in this passage to indicate the fear of malicious detractors which led him to seek anonymity for *Elucidarium*.

If Honorius’ desire for anonymity did have more to do with fear of hostility against Anselm than against himself, the precise nature of this hostility must be examined. There are two basic aspects of Anselm’s activity that might have provoked opposition during his lifetime. Firstly, his political actions as archbishop. Anselm’s policy of reform was not always popular. A notable example is the Council of Westminster (1102), in which Anselm ordered the deposition of numerous abbots and bishops who failed to live up to his standards

\(^{367}\) *Nomen autem meum ideo uolui silentio contegi, ne inuidia tabescens suis iuberet utile opus contemnendo negligi.* Honorius, *Elucidarium*, Praefatio.

\(^{368}\) Lefèvre, *L’Elucidarium*, p. 229.

\(^{369}\) *Liuidos dentes inuidorum.* Honorius, *Ineuitabile*, 1198B.

of clerical purity, in particular his prohibition of married clergy.\footnote{Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, ed. M. Swanson (London, 2000), p. 238.} Anselm was unable to push through all his reforms; William of Malmesbury, writing in the early 1120s, decided against discussing Anselm’s conciliar decrees in his \textit{Gesta pontificum Anglorum}, on the grounds that ‘they have all disappeared into oblivion by now.’\footnote{Omnia iam obsoleta scientur deperisse. William of Malmesbury, \textit{Gesta pontificum Anglorum}, ed. M. Winterbottom (Oxford, 2007), 1.63.3.} Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine that many of those whose deposition had been called for might well have felt less than sympathetic towards their detractor. As well as political opposition towards Anselm, there may also have been an element of hostility towards his theological activities.\footnote{Both Eadmer and William of Malmesbury record early opposition to Anselm’s \textit{Monologion} and \textit{Proslogion}; see Chapter 6.}

If Honorius was worried, not only about Anselm’s political opponents, but about those who criticised his theological approach, his own structure and format in \textit{Elucidarium} could be interpreted in part as an attempt to reassure his readers and present Anselmian ideas in a manner that could not be construed as remotely speculative or dangerous. Early manuscripts of \textit{Elucidarium} emphasized their orthodoxy by identifying the authorities used, either in the margins of the text itself, and the very earliest often referred to Anselm simply as \textit{magister}.\footnote{Flint, ‘Elucidarius’, p. 187.} Anselm’s arguments were simplified and presented as straightforward expressions of orthodox teaching, with the contemplative and speculative elements removed. Flint describes the effect this had in ‘firmly repressing any encouragement it may have offered its readers to think.’\footnote{Flint, \textit{Elucidarius}, p. 183.} Honorius’ primary purpose in arranging his material in this way was to provide his readers with an easily accessible summary of the salient points of a given topic in order to meet the needs of a monastic or secular clerical audience who needed clear responses to basic theological questions. In order for this to be effective, his readers needed to have total confidence in the absolute orthodoxy and sufficiency of the opinions offered. Whether or not it was done with a conscious view to potential detractors of Anselm’s theology, one of the effects of Honorius’ work was to present Anselmian ideas in a format that removed any suspicion of unorthodox methodology or originality of approach.

**Levels of freedom: Hugh of St Victor**

Like those of Honorius and the masters at Laon, Hugh of St Victor’s analysis of \textit{liberum arbitrium} focused primarily on the freedom possessed by rational created beings rather than
their creator. His first discussion of the meaning of free choice in *De sacramentis* was in relation to the creation and fall of the angels. Here, he defined *liberum arbitrium* as ‘the free power of inclining their will and choice either to good or to evil.’ 376 Similarly, Hugh argued that man’s original freedom of choice consisted in ‘that freedom by which he could incline the desire of his will either to good or to evil.’ 377

Although he did not refer to Augustine in these passages, Hugh appears to have been following the ‘Augustinian’ definition of free choice that Anselm had rejected. However, Hugh made it clear that he did not consider ‘the ability to sin or not to sin’ as the ultimate *sine qua non* of free choice. He differentiated between different levels of freedom possessed by man at various stages of history. At his creation, and before the fall, man had the ability either to sin or not to sin. 378 After the fall, man lost the ability to uphold the good, and so was unable not to sin. 379 After man’s restoration to God through Christ’s action on the cross, the capacity to avoid sin was restored through the assistance of divine grace, although the possibility of sin remained. At the final stage, after confirmation, man would no longer have the ability to sin. 380 Hugh was careful to explain that this was ‘not because even then freedom of choice or lowliness of nature may be destroyed, but because strengthening grace (with the presence of which sin can in no way enter in), may no longer be taken away.’ 381

Hugh did not consider the ability to sin or not to sin to be a necessary and integral aspect of freedom of choice in all circumstances. As long as the initial movement of the will was free and without compulsion, this was all that was required. Subsequent necessity imposed on the will as a result of its own free choice might make it unable either to sin, or to avoid sinning, but this ‘necessity’ did not constitute a limitation of the rational being’s inalienable freedom of choice. While the hierarchy of created beings possessed varying levels of wisdom, power and freedom, this did not mean that any necessity was imposed on the weaker, since ‘just as a different strength and subtlety of nature do not lead to infirmity, and less knowledge does not engender ignorance of wisdom, so an inferior freedom does not impose any necessity on the choice of the will.’ 382

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376 *Siue ad bonum siue ad malum liberam inclinandae voluntatis et electionis propriae potestatem.* Hugh, *DS*, 1.5.8.

377 *Ea libertate qua potuit siue ad bonum siue ad malum voluntatis suae appetitum inclinare.* Ibid., 1.6.16.

378 *Posse peccare et non peccare.* Ibid.

379 *Posse peccare, non posse non peccare.* Ibid.

380 *Non posse peccare.* Hugh, *DS*, 1.6.16.

381 *Non quia uel tunc aut arbitrii libertas aut naturae humilitas destruat, sed quod gratia confirmans (que praesente peccatum nequaquam inesse potest) amplius non auferatur.* Ibid.

382 *Sicut differens uigor et subtilitas naturae infirmitatem non adducit, minorque cognition sapientiae ignorantium non ingenti; sic libertas inferior nullam arbitrio voluntatis necessitate imponit.* Ibid., 1.5.11.
Like Honorius, Hugh also adopted Anselm’s discussion of the two basic orientations of the will from *De concordia*. In his discussion of the human will in *De sacramentis*, Hugh identified two fundamental desires implanted in man by God from the beginning. These were the desire for the just (*appetitus iusti*), and the desire for the beneficial (*appetitus commodi*).\(^{383}\) Hugh explained that the *appetitus iusti* was created to be voluntary, so that man might freely deserve either reward, through its retention, or punishment, through its abandonment. If it was not subject to the rational will and to free choice, there could be no true merit. Conversely, the *appetitus commodi* was not voluntary but necessary. It was impossible for man to lose the desire for the beneficial. Through the *appetitus commodi*, God was able either to reward man or to punish him according to his merits.

Consequent to each *appetitus* was its corresponding *effectus*, justice (*iusticia*) and benefit or advantage (*commodum*).\(^{384}\) *Iusticia* was inseparable from the *appetitus iusti*, since to seek justice was in itself to possess justice. By contrast, *commodum* was separable from the *appetitus commodi*, since the desire for benefit remained whether or not it was possessed. When man sinned, he voluntarily lost his *appetitus iusti*. As a result of this, he deservedly lost not only his *iustitia*, but also his *commodum*. All that he had left was the *appetitus commodi*, which remained as a longing that could never be satisfied. This constituted the punishment of man for sin.

Hugh’s discussion of the *appetitus iusti* and *commodi* bears striking parallels to Anselm’s discussion of the will in *De casu diaboli* and *De concordia*. Like Anselm, Hugh argued that the will for justice could be identified with justice itself, but that the will for happiness could not. The will for happiness was natural and inseparable to all willing creatures, and was necessary for the creature to enjoy eternal reward or punishment according to his merit. This depended on whether he held fast to the will for justice, which was separable. The parallels between the development of the argument in Hugh and Anselm seem to indicate that, in spite of the slight differences in terminology, Hugh’s discussion of the *appetitus iusti* and *commodi* in man was closely based on Anselm’s work.\(^{385}\) The library catalogue from St Victor lists an early twelfth-century manuscript of Anselm’s works, including both *De casu diaboli* and *De concordia*.\(^{386}\)

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\(^{383}\) Hugh, *DS*, 1.7.11.

\(^{384}\) Ibid., 1.7.11.


Hugh defined justice as measure in desiring. In ceasing to will justice, man continued to will his own advantage, but this desire was now without measure.\(^{387}\) ‘In this, therefore, was the injustice of man, that he extended his desire beyond measure...When therefore he sought the highest good, he sought the good but he did not seek well, because he desired to seize this both immoderately and unseasonably.’\(^{388}\)

As a result of his inability to keep measure in desiring, ‘that dire necessity is born to extend desire by necessity beyond the order of the first disposition.’\(^{389}\) Although Hugh emphasized the consequent necessity of sin, he argued that this inevitability could not be offered as an excuse. Man’s first sin was voluntary; the necessity that arose as a result of his first sin was therefore voluntarily contracted. ‘Since the will produced necessity, necessity cannot excuse the will itself.’\(^{390}\)

By contrast, had man not sinned, but pursued the will for justice in ordering his desires, he would eventually have been brought to a position where he was no longer able to abandon it by sinning. Hugh commented that ‘there would have been an increase of glory in persevering in justice not to be able to grow cool in love and desire for goods possessed.’\(^{391}\) This inability to depart from the way of justice would not constitute an impingement on man’s freedom of choice, even though his will was now ‘necessarily’ obliged to follow a particular course; the necessity was voluntarily contracted, and thus fully compatible with freedom.

Hugh’s discussion of the different levels of freedom possessed by man at various stages of salvation history reflects a comparable discussion by Anselm in the final chapter of *De libertate arbitrii*. Having presented his universal definition of *libertas arbitrii* as ‘the freedom to possess rectitude of the will for its own sake’, Anselm had spent the majority of the treatise attempting to explain how man still retained freedom of choice even after sin. In the concluding chapter, he acknowledged that ‘although this definition is common to every rational nature, that which belongs to God is very different from those of rational creatures, and these vary greatly from each other.’\(^{392}\) This statement led Anselm to a brief discussion of

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\(^{387}\) Hugh, DS, 1.7.12.

\(^{388}\) *In hoc igitur iniustitia hominis fuit, quod appetitum suum extra mensuram extendit...Cum igitur summum bonum appetit, bonum appetit, sed bene non appetit, quia illud et moderate et intempestiue apprehendere conceputit.* Ibid., 1.7.15.

\(^{389}\) *Illa dira necessitas gignitur, ut extra ordinem primae dispositionis necessario appetitum extendat.* Ibid., 1.7.19.

\(^{390}\) *Quia necessitate operata est voluntas, voluntatem ipsam excusare non potest necessitas.* Ibid., 1.7.23.

\(^{391}\) *Augmentum gloriae fuisse in justitia perseveranti non posse ab amore et desiderio habitu boni tepescere.* Hugh, DS, 1.7.11.

\(^{392}\) *Quamuis enim secundum hanc definitionem communis sit omni rationali naturae, multum tamen differt illa quae dei est ab illis quae rationalis creaturae sunt, et illae ab inuicem.* Anselm, DLA, 14.
the different kinds and levels of freedom possessed by God and rational created beings. The *libertas arbitrii* possessed by God was unique because it was of itself and was neither created nor received, unlike that of angels and men. In terms of creatures, Anselm differentiated between those who possessed *rectitudo*, whether separably or inseparably, and those who did not. Before the fall, angels were created with separable rectitude. This meant that they possessed the ability to preserve rectitude by not sinning, but were also able to sin, if they so willed. Anselm did not mention the status of man before the fall in this passage, but he argued that righteous men in this life share the separable rectitude of the angels at creation; it was possible for them either to sin or to avoid sin, even though this could now only be achieved with the assistance of divine grace, and not from man’s own natural capacity. Inseparable rectitude, the ability to avoid sin without the possibility of falling into sin, belonged to the angels who had been confirmed in goodness, and awaited righteous men after death. Sinful men who lack divine grace are unable to avoid sinning, but their lack of rectitude is not yet irrecoverable and they can still be saved as long as they remain in this life. After death, the damned among humanity no longer have the possibility of regaining rectitude, but are in the same position as the fallen angels who cannot avoid sin.³⁹³

Anselm’s discussion of freedom in terms of the possession or lack of rectitude reflects his definition of *libertas arbitrii* as ‘the freedom to possess rectitude.’ Although the terms in which he couched his discussion appear very different from Hugh’s discussion in terms of the ability to sin and not to sin, the essential principle of the argument was the same. Hugh’s basic definition of *liberum arbitrium* as ‘a spontaneous movement or voluntary desire’³⁹⁴ was in accordance with Anselm’s discussion of the inalienable freedom of self-orientation of the rational will in *De libertate arbitrii*. However, like Anselm, Hugh did not believe that this was all that could be said about *liberum arbitrium*. He followed Anselm in identifying different levels of freedom that the rational will could possess, the highest being the freedom to preserve justice without the possibility of the degradation of sin. The chapter in which Hugh set out his schema of the different levels of freedom was entitled ‘on the nature of free choice through the three states.’³⁹⁵ This implies that, like Anselm, he understood the higher freedoms as higher levels of freedom of choice.

Unlike Anselm, Hugh did not discuss the question of divine freedom as part of his analysis of freedom of choice. For Hugh, the problem of freedom and necessity in the divine

³⁹⁴ Hugh, *DS*, 1.5.24.
³⁹⁵ *De qualitate liberi arbitrii per tres status*. Ibid., 1.6.16.
will became important in the context of the relationship between the faculties of will and power in God. In his *Libellus de potestate et voluntate Dei*, he began with the premise that God’s *potestas* and *voluntas* must be equal, since there can be no inequality in God. Everything that God wills to do, he can do, and everything that God can do, he wills to do. This led to the apparent conclusion that ‘everything which God can and wills to do, he does; just as everything which he does, he can and wills to do.’ However, this conclusion was problematic, as it implied that God was constrained by necessity to act as he did, which it was impious to claim. Hugh imagined his opponents arguing that either God’s power had to be greater than his will, since he was capable of doing many things which he did not will to do; or his will had to be greater than his power, because his power was constrained by his will so that nothing should be done against his will.

Hugh attempted to resolve this problem by differentiating between power and will as internal characteristics of God, and in relation to external things. Within God himself, power and will are completely inseparable, as his power is always voluntary and his will always powerful, and everything he does is always done with both will and power. Only with regard to externals can there be any distinction between them, since he does not will to do everything that he could will. ‘Thus therefore divine power sometimes exists with regard to different things than the will, but in itself it does not exist apart from the will, because it has nothing contrary to the will.’

This led to the further problem of appearing to suggest that God could act against his will, and thus be limited in his omnipotence by the fact of being able to be forced to act unwillingly. Hugh countered this objection by making a distinction between having the ability to do something which he does not will and having the ability to act against his will. Since God’s power and will *in se* are inseparable, God cannot do anything which he does not will to do. God’s will is the epitome of justice; therefore, to say that God cannot act against his will is the same as to say that God cannot act unjustly.

Hugh argued that God’s inability to act against his own just will did not constitute a limitation to divine omnipotence, but its very essence. True power consisted in the freedom to uphold justice. The ability to act unjustly was not power, but impotence, as it weakened the

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396 *Omne quod potest et uult, facit; sicut omne quod facit, potest et uult.* Hugh, *Libellus de potestate et voluntate Dei*, PL, 176.839-842, at 839B.
397 *Nefas est confiteri.* Ibid.
399 *Sic igitur potestas divina respectu aliquando ad alia se habet quam voluntas, sed in se aliud non habet quam voluntas, quia contra voluntatem nihil habet.* Hugh, *Libellus*, 840B.
400 *Hugh, ibid.*, 840C.
401 *Hugh, DS*, 1.4.1.
individual’s power to fulfil his divine purpose of upholding justice and rectitudo. This had been a major theme in Anselm’s discussion of freedom; in *De libertate arbitrii*, Anselm argued that ‘the will which cannot turn away from rectitude by sinning is more free than that which can desert it.’

Anselm and Hugh shared a strongly teleological understanding of freedom which was inseparable from their understanding of justice. Divine freedom was perfect freedom because it was unwaveringly oriented towards justice. In relation to external acts such as the incarnation of the Christ, the need for God to act with justice and *conuenientia* meant that he could be said to act by ‘necessity’, yet this was not the necessity of external constraints or impotence, but an expression of God’s ‘inability’ to act against his own will, and was therefore the epitome of freedom. Angels and men were created with the ability to choose between *iustitia* and *commodum*, but this was given solely in order that they might freely choose *iustitia*. The rational creature could not truly be said to be just unless his adoption of justice was the result of the unforced self-determination of the will, which demanded the provision of an original alternative. The final purpose of man’s free choice was the attainment of the perfect freedom of God, the freedom to uphold justice without hindrance, already achieved by the good angels.

**Bernard of Clairvaux**

Hugh was not the only early twelfth-century author to present his ideas on the meaning of freedom of choice, and its relation to sin, necessity and grace, by means of a scale of different levels of freedom. A similar model had been employed several years earlier by Bernard of Clairvaux. In his treatise *De gratia et libero arbitrio* (1128), Bernard identified three forms of freedom: freedom from necessity, from sin and from sorrow, or, alternatively, freedom of nature, of grace and of glory. The first, freedom from necessity, is common to all rational beings, good and bad. The second, freedom of counsel that enables freedom from sin, may be possessed in part in this life, through the gift of God’s grace, but will not be possessed completely until the world to come. Freedom from sorrow cannot be possessed in this life, except fleetingly, in moments of contemplative bliss.

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402 Libertior est uoluntas quae a rectitudine non peccandi declinare nequirit, quam quae illiam potest deserere. Anselm, *DLA*, 1.


Bernard identified *liberum arbitrium* specifically with freedom from necessity, the basic capacity of the rational will to give voluntary consent to a chosen course of action without compulsion by an external agent. ‘Where there is consent, there is will. And where the will is, there is freedom. And this is what I think is meant by “free choice”’. This freedom was natural and inalienable to all rational beings, and was the sole means by which an individual could be deemed either just or unjust, deserving of either happiness or of sorrow.

This *liberum arbitrium* constituted the image of God in man that could never be destroyed. However, freedom from necessity alone did not make man truly free, as it still left him enslaved to sin. Bernard argued that freedom from sin constituted a higher level of freedom that was not a natural characteristic of rational creation, but could only be given by divine grace. He described freedom from sin as freedom of counsel, the grace that enabled man to choose what was right and freely do it. Man’s rational capacity of judgement enabled him to discern right and wrong, but only grace, described here in its manifestation of free counsel, could enable man to act according to that judgement and avoid sin.

The final and highest freedom, freedom from sorrow, would follow as a natural consequence of freedom from sin, as man would then be free from everything harmful to him, and able to hold fast to the good. Through God’s grace, freedom of counsel may be possessed in part in this life, but will not be possessed fully until the world to come. Similarly, freedom from sorrow cannot be possessed in this life, except fleetingly, in moments of contemplative bliss.

*De gratia et libero arbitrio* can be seen primarily as a commentary on Romans. Bernard attempted to demonstrate how man’s slavery to sin meant that he was no longer capable of achieving righteousness for himself, but was completely dependent on the assistance of divine grace given to man through Christ. However, the fact that fallen man could no longer avoid sin did not negate free choice. *Liberum arbitrium* did not imply wisdom to choose the right course of action, or the power to carry it out; it only conferred the means of willing. Bernard argued that the fact that fallen man could no longer avoid sin did not signify the destruction of *liberum arbitrium*, but the loss of the two higher freedoms.
For it does not belong to free choice, in itself, nor did it ever belong to it, to possess either power or wisdom, but only to will; it makes the creature neither powerful nor wise, but only willing. Therefore he should not be thought to have lost free choice, if he is neither powerful nor wise, but only if he has ceased to be willing. For where there is no will, neither is there freedom.\textsuperscript{409}

Bernard explicitly identified \textit{liberum arbitrium} with freedom from necessity alone, with the possession of a rational will by which the individual consented to a particular desire or action. The definition of \textit{liberum arbitrium} in its most basic sense as freedom from necessity alone was characteristic of patristic and medieval theology, and was central to the thought of both Augustine and Anselm. Bernard did not consider the higher levels of freedom, from sin and from sorrow, as aspects of \textit{liberum arbitrium}, but as separate entities. The parameters of his argument thus differed significantly from those of Anselm, who emphasised the freedom from sin as an essential feature of true \textit{libertas arbitrii}. However, beyond the obvious difference of categorization, Bernard’s discussion of freedom and of free choice had much in common with that of Anselm.

Like Anselm, Bernard argued that \textit{liberum arbitrium} did not necessarily imply the ability to choose good or evil. He illustrated this fact with the observation that God could not will evil, and the devil could not will good, but this did not mean that either God or the devil lacked \textit{liberum arbitrium}.

Neither God nor the devil lacks free choice, since it is not weak necessity that makes the former unable to be evil, but a steadfast will for good and willing steadfastness; the latter is unable to be good not because of any violent oppression from outside but his own obstinate will for evil and his willing obstinacy. Free choice, consequently, is so called because whether in good or in evil, it makes the will equally free, since no one ought or can be called either good or bad unless he is willing.\textsuperscript{410}

\textsuperscript{409} Neque enim ad liberum arbitrium, quantum in se est, pertinet, aut aliquando pertinuit, posse uel sapere, sed tantum uelle: nec potens facit creaturam, nec sapiens facit creaturam, sed tantum uolens. Non ergo si potens aut sapiens, sed tantum si uolens esse desierit, liberum arbitrium amissus putanda erit. Ubi enim non est uoluntas, nec libertas. Bernard, DGLA, 8.24.

\textsuperscript{410} Ceterum nec Deus caret libero arbitrio, nec diabolus, quoniam quod ille esse non potest malus, non infirma facit necessitas, sed firma in bono uoluntas, et uoluntaria firmitas; quodque non ualeat in bonum respirare, non aliena facit uiolenta oppressio, sed sua ipsius in malo obstinata uoluntas ac uoluntaria obstinatio. Nunc igitur ex eo potius liberum dictur arbitrium, quod siue in bono, siue in malo, aequi liberum faciat uoluntatem, cum nec bonus quispiam, nec item malus dici debeat aut esse ualeat, nisi wolens. Ibid., 10.35.
*Liberum arbitrium* did not in itself imply the ability either to will good or evil, but merely to will *something.* God had *liberum arbitrium* because he willed the good freely and without coercion, while the devil’s evil will was similarly the result of his own free choice. In the same way, Bernard argued that fallen man’s inability to will the good did not mean that he lacked *liberum arbitrium.* He was merely unable to use it effectively, since he had lost the freedom of counsel that enabled him to will the good, freeing him from sin.

Bernard argued that, before the fall, man possessed both freedom of counsel and freedom of pleasure, but to a lower degree than he would receive in heaven. This meant that he was able not to sin, but not yet unable to sin; and able not to be disturbed, but not yet unable to be disturbed. When man sinned, he completely lost both his freedoms of counsel and of pleasure, so that he was now unable not to sin, or not to be disturbed. His freedom of choice remained intact but, lacking the higher freedoms, he was no longer able to use it effectively. Bernard defined the ability to will what is good as an enhancement of the faculty of *liberum arbitrium;* conversely, the ability to will what is evil was a defect. God enjoyed supreme *liberum arbitrium* because he had perfect freedom to will the good without hindrance. Man was created in the image of God and in possession of *liberum arbitrium,* in order that he might freely choose the good and come to the perfect freedom enjoyed by God. Man could never lose this basic capacity of choice in willing, but he was unable to use it effectively without also possessing the higher freedom of counsel. Man’s choice could not be truly free unless it was free from sin; true freedom of choice thus necessarily meant inability to sin.

Although Bernard did not identify the higher freedoms with *liberum arbitrium* in the narrow sense in which he used the term, they were nevertheless integral to his understanding of freedom of choice, just as they had been to Anselm. Bernard’s emphasis on goodness and the inability of the upright will to fall into evil as the one true and inalienable freedom of the will appears to show Anselmian influence. Unlike Hugh, Bernard did not use Anselm’s discussion of the *affectiones ad justitiam* and *ad commodum,* and the form and structure of his work provided less scope for the discussion of characteristically Anselmian questions than *De sacramentis.* However, Bernard provides a further example of how Anselm’s ideas on

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freedom could be combined with a more traditional definition of *liberum arbitrium*, and functioned as a clarification and extension of disparate elements in Augustine’s work, contributing to a more coherent discussion of the nature of freedom in its various forms in the scholarly communities of the twelfth century.

**Voluntas and Affectus: Guibert of Nogent and Anselm’s oral teaching**

A very different application of Anselm’s teaching on the will is found in the work of Guibert of Nogent. Guibert stands apart from the mainstream discussions described above, and his scriptural commentaries had little influence on his contemporaries.\footnote{Rubenstein lists only three complete manuscripts of Guibert’s *Moralia in Genesim* from the twelfth century, with extracts from the first book contained in two further manuscripts, indicating that the text was not widely read. Rubenstein, *Guibert*, pp. 279-280.} Nevertheless, his work is of interest to modern scholars because it provides a rare glimpse into the possible content and style of Anselm’s oral teaching during his time at Bec. As Abbot of Bec, Anselm frequently visited other monasteries in the area, including St Fly, where Guibert was a novice. In his autobiographical *Monodiae*, Guibert described how, on Anselm’s visits to St Fly,

his teaching was to divide the mind in a threefold or fourfold way, to treat the operations of the whole interior mystery under *affectus*, will, reason, and intellect. By a resolution, based on clear analysis, of what I and many others thought to be one, he showed that the two former are not identical, although it is agreed by ready assertions that in the presence of the third or fourth they are practically the same. He discussed with me certain chapters of the Gospel on this understanding, and most clearly explained the difference between willing and desiring.\footnote{Is itaque tripartito aut quadripartito mentem modo distingue docens, sub affectu, sub voluntate, sub ratione, sub intellectu commercia totius interni mysterii tractare, et quae una a plerisque et a me ipso putabantur certis divisionibus resoluta, non idem duae similia inter se modo monstrabat, quae tamen accedentibus quarto ut tertio eadem modo esse promptis assertionibus constat. Super quo sensu cum quaedam euangelica capitula mihi dissersisset, cum primum quidem quid inter uelle et affici distaret, luculentissime aperuisset. Guibert, *Monodiae*, 1.17.}

Nowhere in Anselm’s own writings is this tri- or quadri-partite division of the mind or soul explicitly discussed. The nearest we have to a discussion of the relationship between *ratio*, *voluntas* and *affectus* appears in *De concordia*, where Anselm described how ‘the soul possesses certain powers which it uses like tools for appropriate functions,’ such as *ratio* and
In the same chapter, Anselm divided the will into the *instrumentum uolendi*, ‘that power of the soul which we use to will’; the *affectio instrumenti*, ‘by which that tool is moved to will something’; and the *usus instrumenti*, the particular things that are willed at different times.

Jay Rubenstein notes the verbal parallel between Anselm’s *affectio* and Guibert’s *affectus*, arguing that it was this aspect of Anselm’s thought that Guibert had in mind in his discussion tripartite division of the mind. However, in spite of the verbal similarity between the terms *affectus* and *affectio*, they do not mean the same thing, and what Anselm described as an *affectio* of the will was very different from Guibert’s *affectus*. *Affectio* referred not to the desire for a particular thing (which Anselm termed a *usus* of the will), but to the fundamental orientation of the will which leads it to each particular thing. This is not the same concept that Guibert was trying to convey in his use of the term *affectus* in this passage in the *Monodiae*. Rather than a faculty of the will, his *affectus* was a separate and independent entity within the soul. This was the seat, not of the deliberate and consensual will, but of the impulses and desires that move the soul, its affects. John F. Benton and Paul J. Archembault both translate *affectus* as ‘appetite’, and although Rubenstein prefers to render it more literally as ‘Affection’, he does stress the correlation between the two terms, arguing that ‘affectus’ is...the word Guibert most often uses in places where most other theologians would prefer “Appetite”.

If we interpret Guibert’s *affectus* in terms of desire or ‘appetite’, a clear parallel emerges with another first-hand account of Anselm’s teaching, Alexander of Canterbury’s *Dicta Anselmi* (c. 1109-1116). Alexander was a monk of Christ church, Canterbury, who appears to have joined Anselm’s household around 1100. He became a close companion of Anselm, accompanying him throughout his second exile, and may have taken over much of Eadmer’s work as Anselm’s personal secretary. The *Dicta* provide a record of Anselm’s teaching *in commune* at Canterbury. Chapter 17 described how

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417 *Anima habet in se quasdam uires, quibus utitur utelat instrumentis ad usus congruos.* Anselm, DC, 3.11.
418 *Vis illa animae qua uitmur ad uolendum.* Ibid.
419 *Qua sic afficitur ipsum instrumentum ad uolendum aliquid.* Ibid.
420 Rubenstein, *Guibert*, p. 42.
422 Rubenstein, *Guibert*, p. 38.
the soul contains within itself three natures: reason, will and appetite. By reason we are similar to angels, by appetite to brute animals, by will to both. For we are rational, which is of angels, and prone to appetites, which is of brute animals, and have will, which is common to angels and brute animals. For when we will rightly we will according to the will, and if we seek what is illicit, we do this through the will. Therefore the will is in the middle between reason and appetite. For sometimes it tends towards reason, and sometimes towards appetite. When he turns himself towards reason, which rational and spiritual beings know, man is said to be rational or spiritual. But when he tends towards appetites, which carnal and irrational animals know, he is said to be carnal or animal.425

Alexander particularly identified the *appetitus* with carnal appetites, which man has in common with brute animals. This is the same meaning that Anselm generally gave the term when he used it in his own writings, although he used the verb form *appetere* much more broadly, to describe all sorts of desires and longings, spiritual as well as carnal. In *De conceptu uirginali*, Anselm discussed *appetitus* in the context of original sin. As a result of Adam’s sin, man’s body was corrupted so that it became subject to carnal appetites like those of brute animals.426 These appetites constitute the punishment for sin. This idea was repeated in *De concordia*, where Anselm described ‘that corruption and appetite, which are the punishment for sin.’427 Nevertheless, he emphasized that these appetites were not in themselves sinful, and differentiated between the experience of, and willing consent to, these carnal desires.428 The morally neutral nature of carnal appetites *per se* is demonstrated by the fact that they are experienced not only by man, but by brute animals who are incapable of moral good or evil, since they lack the freedom of judgement to choose what to will, but can only obey the impulses of their carnal appetite.429


426 *Anselm, DCV, 2.*

427 *Ipsa corruptio et appetitus, quae sunt poena peccati. Anselm, DC, 3.8.*

428 *Anselm, DCV, 4.*

429 *Anselm, DLA, 5.*
The meaning of the noun affectus in Anselm’s thought is somewhat ambiguous. In De conceptu virginali, he explained how the corruption of the body with carnal appetites (carnalibus appetitibus), in the aftermath of the fall, infected the soul in its turn with carnal desires (carnalibus affectibus). Here, the parallel between the physical appetitus and its corresponding mental affectus is obvious. Although in this passage Anselm used the term affectus to describe particular passions and desires, elsewhere he appears to have had a more general definition in mind. In his Oratio ad sanctum Paulum, he lamented the extent of his wretchedness and sin, as even the revelation of divine truth could not bring about true compunction: ‘sic veritas ostendit, et affectus non sentit’. Klaus Guth interprets Anselm’s use of affectus in this passage as referring not to a particular passion or desire, but to the organ which produces and governs these desires.

In his division of the soul into affectus, voluntas, ratio and intellectus, Guibert seems to have been using affectus to describe an instrument of the soul, the locus of desire, rather than as a particular desire itself. This is not substantially different from Anselm’s use of the term in the Oratio ad sanctum Paulum. This prayer, which probably formed part of the collection sent to Adelaide in 1070, was composed around the same time as Guibert’s reported conversations with Anselm. The fact that Anselm does not appear to have used the term in this way in his later works may suggest an evolution in his terminology across his career, although there is insufficient evidence to prove this, given the relative scarcity of references to the term in Anselm’s writing.

In the Monodiae, Guibert claimed that Anselm not only explained the theoretical principles of his model of the soul, but also used it to ‘argue with me several chapters of the Gospel’. He went on to explain how, inspired by this teaching, ‘I, in turn, began to apply his reasonings to similar commentaries wherever I could and to examine all Scripture attentively to find anything agreeing, morally, with those interpretations.’ The precise relationship between Guibert’s model of the soul and his scriptural exegesis has been debated by commentators. Klaus Guth argues that the four-fold model of the soul is analogous to the four senses of Scripture. According to this model, the literal, historical sense which deals with particular events, can be associated with the affectus that governs the movement of the heart.

430 Anselm, DCV, 2.
434 Coepi postmodum et ego ejus sensa commentis, prout poteram, similibus aemulari, et ubique Scripturarum, si quid istis moraliter arrideret, sensibus multa animi acrimonia perscrutari. Guibert, Monodiae, 1.17.
The allegorical sense, which requires judgement in interpretation, is associated with the *voluntas*. *Historia* and *allegoria* work together to build up the faith of the believer. Beyond this, *tropologia*, with its emphasis on the moral meaning of the text, can be compared to the *ratio* that tests the impulses of the *affectus* and makes a reasoned moral judgement based on the understanding of the need for the whole of life to be directed towards the good. Finally, *anagogia*, which provides insight into the higher mysteries of faith, is related to the *intellectus*.

Guth’s model, with its emphasis on the need for reason and will to combine in order to penetrate the deeper mysteries of faith certainly reflect an important element in Anselm’s thought that was taken up by Guibert, but this does not in itself demonstrate Guth’s contention that the four elements of the soul are analogous with the four senses of Scripture. Some of his points of comparison seem rather forced, and without adequate justification. In addition, it is unclear to what extent Guibert saw his model of the soul as fourfold at all, given that he seemed unclear whether *ratio* and *intellectus* should be interpreted as distinct faculties.

If Anselm’s model of the soul as described by Guibert cannot be understood as an analogy of the four levels of interpretation, it is necessary to ask what Guibert meant when he wrote that Anselm ‘argued with me certain chapters of the Gospel on this understanding.’ The phrase can perhaps best be explained in the light of Anselm’s own Preface to the three treatises *De veritate*, *De libertate arbitrii* and *De casu diaboli*, in which he described the works as ‘pertaining to the study of Scripture.’ Although the form of the the dialogues bears little resemblance to scriptural commentary, they provide detailed analysis of key passages, supplying students with the conceptual tools needed for a full understanding of the ideas and implications arising from the text. *De libertate arbitrii*, for example, takes as its starting point a quotation from John’s Gospel, and using it as a basis for discussion of how to reconcile man’s freedom of choice with his fallen status as a ‘slave of sin’. It does not seem unreasonable to suppose that it was discussions on how to interpret passages such as this one that Guibert was remembering when he described how Anselm ‘explained to me several passages from the Gospel based on this understanding,’ especially as he immediately

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437 *Pertinentes ad studium sacrae scripturae*. Anselm, *DV*, *Prologus*.

438 John 8.34.
followed this comment with ‘and he most clearly explained the difference between willing and desiring’; the basis of Anselm’s explanation of free will and sin.

In his own exegetical writing, Guibert used Anselm’s model of the soul, not just to explain the meaning of particular passages in Scripture, but as a basic model for the overall structure of his interpretative narrative. This can be seen particularly in his *Moralia in Genesin*, a commentary on the book of Genesis in which he focussed primarily on the moral or tropological interpretation. In the *Monodiae*, Guibert claimed that this work was written ‘according to those aforementioned four movements of the inner man.’\(^{439}\) In the *Moralia*, the characters and events of the Genesis narrative were interpreted as an extended analogy, representing the inner life of the soul with its various moral choices and conflicts.

In his interpretation of the fall, Guibert identified the *affectus* with carnal appetites. *Carnalis affectus* was represented by the serpent who tempted Eve, or *voluntas*, away from the dictates of reason.\(^{440}\) Sin consists in the will’s consent to the tempting impulses of *affectus*. The will, which ought to be governed by reason, is instead obedient to nothing but its own desires, and the natural hierarchy within man’s soul is overturned.\(^{441}\) After sin, the whole of Christian life becomes a struggle between *affectus* and *voluntas*, between the serpent and the woman and her offspring. This continuing struggle is the main theme of Guibert’s exegesis.

The concept of desire was crucial in Guibert’s thought, but *affectus* was not the only term he used to describe it. He also used the variant form *affectio*, as well as *appetitus*. These terms appear to a certain extent to have been interchangeable; Guibert alternated between them, often within a single paragraph, without making any attempt at differentiation. However, although the contexts in which Guibert used the terminology of *affectus* and *affectio* in the *Moralia* were many and varied, they can, broadly speaking, be divided into two main senses: to describe the particular and ever-changing passions experienced by man, or to describe the general orientation of the will. The first sense is epitomized by the serpent in the first few chapters of the *Moralia*, and is virtually indistinguishable from *appetitus*. The second sense is more interesting from the perspective of an investigation of Anselmian ideas in Guibert’s thought, as it has parallels with Anselm’s understanding of the two *affectiones* of the will.


\(^{440}\) Guibert, *Moralia*, 2.3.1.

\(^{441}\) *Ibid.*, 2.3.6-7.
In Anselm’s tripartite model of the will, between the single instrumentum uolendi and its multiple usus was a double affectio. Guibert shared this concept of a double orientation of the will, arguing that ‘we know by experience that there are two wills in man, one carnal, the other spiritual.’\textsuperscript{442} He explored this idea most fully in his account of Abraham, Sarah and Hagar. According to Guibert’s model, Sarah represented the spiritual will, and Hagar the carnal, while Abraham himself was associated with reason. Rubenstein highlights this element in Guibert’s commentary as ‘another sign that Guibert was a disciple of Anselm’, adding that ‘he probably added this division to his psychological model during the course of writing the Moralia, after he had learnt it from Anselm.’\textsuperscript{443} Rubenstein goes on to claim that ‘our suspicion that Guibert is drawing upon the vocabulary of Anselm receives some confirmation in a later passage, where he defines Hagar as a worldly affectio. When Abraham chooses between Hagar and Sarah, Reason chooses between the two basic directions, two basic affectiones of the will.’\textsuperscript{444}

It is difficult to justify Rubenstein’s claim that Guibert was remembering Anselm’s teaching on the two affectiones of the will purely on the grounds of this definition of Hagar; not only is the term distanced by several chapters from Guibert’s explicit discussion of the two wills in man, but the spiritual will embodied by Sarah is not described as an affectio, which one might have expected if this were the case. Guibert’s use of terms such as affectio throughout his writing was inconsistent; he repeatedly used the term as a synonym for the carnal appetites, and this may have been his intention when using the term to describe Hagar. In addition, we have no record of Anselm using the term affectio in this way before De concordia, written twenty years after the time when he knew Guibert at St Fly. In his earlier works, he simply referred to two uoluntates.\textsuperscript{445} Although he may have begun using affectiones to describe the two basic dispositions of the will in oral discussion before he first used them in a written treatise, it is impossible to say with any confidence that Guibert would have had any reason to associate the term with this aspect of Anselm’s teaching. Nevertheless, leaving aside the terminological details, the parallels between the thrust of Guibert’s argument and that of Anselm do seem to suggest that Rubenstein is largely correct in his analysis of a probable Anselmian influence on Guibert’s thought in this respect.

\textsuperscript{442} Duas esse in homine uoluntates, unam carnalem, spiritualem alteram, experto nouimus. Guibert, Moralia, 5.16.1.
\textsuperscript{443} Rubenstein, Guibert, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{444} Ibid. (referring to Moralia 6.21.9).
\textsuperscript{445} Anselm, DCD, 13.
In his account of Anselm’s teaching on the mind in the Monodiae, Guibert emphasized the distinction between affectus and uoluntas. However, he also stated that Anselm taught that, when combined with ratio or intellectus, they were ‘practically the same’ (eadem mox esse). The relation between will and reason was important for Guibert, and he emphasized the need for the two to be united if the human soul was to fulfil its potential. The first time this concept was discussed in the Moralia in Genesim was the union between Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden. Guibert described how, before sin, ratio or intellectus and uoluntas were joined together in perfect harmony, just as Adam and Eve were joined together as one flesh. 446 This union between reason and will enabled man to hold fast to one single desire, and strive effectively for his one true goal and the purpose of his existence, that of drawing ever nearer to God. Throughout the Moralia, the repeated motif of the patriarchs as the embodiment of reason, and their wives as will, reinforces this idea of the union between the two faculties of the soul.

Guibert further developed his argument about the need for the will to be allied with reason in his discussion of Sarah. As has already been seen, Sarah not only represented the single faculty of will in man, but also, in relation to Hagar, as one possible orientation of the will, the ‘spiritual’ rather than the ‘carnal’. However, Guibert went further in describing Sarah, not only as uoluntas, but as libertas uoluntatis, the freedom of the will. 447 In order for the will to be truly free, it must be illuminated by and allied with ratio, the power of judgement that enables it to identify what is right and to realise its true destiny. This reflects Anselm’s teaching, in De libertate arbitrii, that true freedom is only found where the will is in full accord with the demands of justice and rectitudo.

The relation between ratio and intellectus in Guibert’s model of the soul is somewhat ambiguous. His account in the Monodiae was vague on the question of whether what he was describing contained three or four primary elements: ‘his teaching was to divide the mind in a threefold or fourfold way.’ 448 Although he then went on to list four components, affectus, uoluntas, ratio and intellectus, it is unclear to what extent he envisaged ratio and intellectus to be fully separable. In the Monodiae passage, Guibert did not treat the two concepts separately, only commenting briefly on the effect that ‘ratio or intellectus’ had on the relation between affectus and uoluntas. For much of the Moralia, his interpretation was essentially tripartite, based on the relationship between affectus, uoluntas and ratio. Although he made

446 Guibert, Moralia, 2.2.24.
447 Ibid., 5.16.19.
448 Tripartito aut quadripartito modo. Guibert, Monodiae, 1.17.
frequent references to *intellectus*, this was not as a fourth element, but as an alternative to *ratio*. In the very first verse of his commentary, Guibert commented that ‘*ratio* indeed is nothing other than *intellectus*, through which we are made to be like God and the angels.’\(^{449}\) The same characters were described as representing both *ratio* and *intellectus*, sometimes within the same sentence.\(^ {450}\)

Guibert’s interpretative model throughout most of the *Moralia* can thus be seen as essentially tripartite. The change comes about in Book 10, with the introduction of the character of Joseph as a personification of *intellectus* or *intellectualitas*. For the first time, *intellectus* is described as a separate faculty, ranking higher than *ratio* in Guibert’s scheme, ‘for *intellectus* pertains to the divine, while *ratio* properly pertains to the human.’\(^ {451}\) The emergence of *intellectus* as a separate faculty of the soul appears to bring Guibert’s commentary in line with the four-fold model described in the *Monodiae*. However, the fact that this development only occurred at the end of Guibert’s narrative, in the final book, suggests that Guibert did not have it in mind as an essential element of his interpretative model throughout, but conceived the idea at a late stage in the writing process. Rubenstein points this out, arguing that Guibert’s *intellectus* was unlikely to be based on an Anselmian model. Instead, he suggests that ‘the creation of Intellect as a wholly new psychological function was most probably his own inspiration, an outgrowth of the writing process, and the most satisfactory way to end the moral narrative that his commentary had become…the narrative of the spiritual progress of a single mind.’\(^ {452}\)

In contrast, the tripartite model of *appetitus*, *uoluntas* and *ratio* reported by Alexander in the *Dicta Anselmi*, which did not share this function of charting the development of the individual soul over time, had no need of introducing a fourth component to describe the spiritual insight and understanding that could be achieved beyond *ratio* and *uoluntas* in the mature and upright soul. Although Anselm often used *intellectus* as a comparable term with *ratio*, he also had a higher concept of it as a form of spiritual enlightenment that went beyond the capabilities of *ratio* alone, as in his famous formula *fides quaerens intellectum*.\(^ {453}\) Nevertheless, the inclusion of *intellectus* as a faculty of the soul in the same manner as *ratio*, *uoluntas* and *affectus* does not seem to have featured in Anselm’s model, as far as can be ascertained from his written texts. Although Guibert included it in his description of

\(^{450}\) E.g. Abraham in *ibid.*, 4.12.20.
\(^{451}\) *Intellectus etenim ad divina, ratio proprie attinet ad humana. Ibid.*, 10.43.31.
\(^{452}\) Rubenstein, *Guibert*, p. 59.
\(^{453}\) Anselm, *Proslogion, Prologus.*
Anselm’s teaching in the Monodiae, it did not have a clearly-defined function, but was loosely referred to alongside ratio. That it was present at all in this description must be largely attributable to the fact that Guibert’s account in the Monodiae was written towards the end of Guibert’s career, after the completion of the Moralia. As Guibert’s model by the end of the text included intellectus as a fourth element, it also had to be included in his account of Anselm’s teaching.

By presenting his thought on the relation between will, appetite and reason in a tropological commentary on the book of Genesis, Guibert set himself apart from the forms of discussion that were taking place elsewhere among his contemporaries. Scholastic authors in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries were beginning to take a more systematic approach to concepts such as freedom and the will, and to analyse the various aspects through a carefully structured sequence of questions and ideas. Anselm’s work was of fundamental importance in this process, as he was the first author to attempt to establish a single universal definition of freedom of choice that drew together the various elements that had already been described in a piecemeal fashion by earlier authorities such as Augustine, and enabled a comprehensive overview of the whole question. Anselm also provided an example of how systematic analysis of philosophical and theological constructs, such as the definition of freedom, could be applied to the exegesis of challenging passages from Scripture to enable a fuller understanding and elaboration of doctrine. Subsequent authors found his subject-matter relevant to wider twelfth-century debates on the relation between freedom and sin, will and grace; and his work provided a useful conceptual framework for future discussion.
Chapter Five – Original Sin and the Birth of the Sinless Christ

De conceptu uirginali

Mary and the Immaculate Conception

The papal bull of 1854 which set out the dogma of the immaculate conception of Mary included the statement that Mary possessed ‘that fullness of holy innocence and sanctity than which, under God, one cannot imagine anything greater, and which, outside of God, no mind can succeed in comprehending fully.’  

The passage follows Anselm’s statement regarding Mary in De conceptu uirginali, composed after Cur Deus homo, where he argued that ‘it was fitting for the Virgin to shine with that purity than which a greater cannot be understood below God.’

In spite of this reference to his writing in the encyclical Ineffabilis Deus, Anselm did not support the idea that Mary’s conception was immaculate and entirely free from the stain of original sin. In Cur Deus homo, Anselm argued that ‘after it is agreed that that man is God and the reconciler of sinners, there is no doubt that he is totally without sin. But this cannot be so unless he was conceived without sin, from the mass of sin.’ As God, Christ could not be afflicted with sin in any way. As man, he must have been created from the massa peccatrix that was fallen humanity. Otherwise, he would not be eligible to pay the penalty for sin on man’s behalf. Christ’s human mother must therefore have been conceived in sin and born with original sin. The Virgin was conceived in original sin, but was cleansed of her sin before Christ’s birth, so that he could be born sinless from her in the state of sinlessness which was now hers. Mary was purified through grace because of her faith in the future death and redemption of her Son.

In De conceptu uirginali, Anselm referred the reader back to his discussion in Cur Deus homo to explain how Mary’s faith enabled her to be purified from sin before the conception of Christ. He also developed an alternative argument, which focused on the mechanics of Christ’s conception from a virgin. Anselm argued that original sin is

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455 Decens erat ut ea puritate, qua maior sub deo nequit intelligi, urgo illa niteret. Anselm, DCV, 18.
456 Postquam constat hominem illum deum et peccatorum esse reconciliatorem, dubium non est eum omnino sine peccato esse. Hoc autem esse non uatus, nisi absque peccato de massa peccatrice sit assumptus. Anselm, CDH, 2.16.
457 Ibid.
458 Anselm, DCV, 18.
transmitted through the will in sexual reproduction. Christ did not inherit original sin because
he was not propagated through Adam’s will, even though he was propagated from Adam’s
nature as a human being.

He could not transmit the aforementioned evils to any other person, although
propagated from him, in whose generation neither the propagating nature given to
him nor his will worked anything or could work anything. Thus it is neither
reasonable nor right that these evils of Adam should descend to the man
conceived from the Virgin.\textsuperscript{459}

Since Christ was born from a virgin, without the involvement of a tainted will through sexual
intercourse, he did not contract original sin. The will of God alone was responsible for the
virginal conception. As Anselm explained, ‘neither created nature, nor the will of a creature,
nor a power given to any that produced or sowed the seed, but God’s own will alone set it
aside from the Virgin to procreate a man by a new power, clean of sin.’\textsuperscript{460} Christ’s sinlessness
was due to the asexual nature of his conception from the Virgin. Even if he had not been God
but a man procreated in this way, he would still have been free from sin and possessing the
original justice lost by Adam.\textsuperscript{461}

Anselm thus identified two separate arguments that could be used to explain the
sinless birth of the God-man out of the sinful mass of humanity. The argument described in
\textit{De conceptu} provided a rational explanation for how propagation outside the natural working
of the human will could only result in just offspring, while his argument of \textit{Cur Deus homo}
demonstrated that ‘even if sin pervaded the entire essence of the Virgin, she could still be
made clean by faith to purify her for this mode of conception.’\textsuperscript{462}

Anselm’s arguments throughout \textit{Cur Deus homo} and \textit{De conceptu} clearly demonstrate
his belief that Mary was conceived in original sin and afterwards purified by divine grace
because of her faith. Anselm’s veneration of the Virgin was in no way diminished by his
conviction that she was conceived in original sin. In the passage quoted above, he described

\textsuperscript{459} \textit{Nulli ergo personae quamuis de se propagatae transmittere mala praedicta potuit, in cuius generatione nec
natura illi data propagandi, nec voluntas eius quicquam operata est aut operari ualuit. Quare Adae mala praedicta nulla ratione aut rectitudine ad hominem conceptum de uirgine pertranseant.} Anselm, DCV, 12.

\textsuperscript{460} \textit{Non creat a natura, non voluntas creaturae, non uilli data potestas producit aut seminat, sed solius Dei
propria voluntas ad procreandum hominem noua uirtute, mundum a peccato, de uirgine segregat.} Ibid., 13.

\textsuperscript{461} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{462} \textit{Etiam si in tota uirginis essentia peccatum esset, tamen ad huiusmodi conceptionis munditiam per fidem
munda fieri posset.} Ibid., 19.
her as being of greater goodness, not only than anything else in creation, but than anything that could be conceived, with the sole exception of God himself.\footnote{Anselm, DCV, 19.}

Although Anselm did not support the doctrine of the immaculate conception, he was widely associated with the development of the idea until into the twentieth century. This is largely attributable to the work of his student Eadmer. Eadmer’s treatise \textit{De conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis}, the earliest example of a text in support of the doctrine of the immaculate conception, circulated in manuscript form under Anselm’s name throughout the Middle Ages, and it was included as part of the Anselmian corpus in later printed editions.\footnote{E.g. \textit{PL}. The perception of Anselm as a supporter of the doctrine may also have been enhanced by his reputation as a restorer of local cults and festivals that had been abolished by Lanfranc, such as that of St Elphege (Eadmer, VA, 1.30). Given this record, it is unsurprising that proponents of other Anglo-Saxon festivals such as the Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary should also have claimed him as a natural supporter.}

In \textit{De conceptione}, composed c. 1125, Eadmer expressed the belief that ‘if there was anything of original sin in her [Mary’s] procreation...it belonged to the parents and not to the progeny.’\footnote{\textit{Si quid originalis peccati in propagatione eius...illud propagantium et non propagatae prolos fuit.} Eadmer, \textit{Tractatus de Conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis}, PL, 159.301-318, at 305B.} He described how Mary could have been born free from original sin, even though she was not herself born of a virgin, using the analogy of a horse chestnut, which develops perfectly formed and free from scratches and blemishes beneath a thorny exterior.

If God makes the chestnut to be conceived, nourished and formed under thorns, but remote from pricks, could he not grant to the human body which he was preparing for himself to be a temple in which he would dwell bodily and from which he would become fully man in the unity of his person, that although she was conceived among the thorns of sin, she might be rendered completely immune from their sting? Clearly he could, and he willed it; if, therefore, he willed it, he did it.\footnote{\textit{Si Deus castaneae confert ut inter spinas remota punctione concipiatur, alatur, formetur, non potuit haec dare humano quod ipse sibi parabat templo in quo corporaliter habitaret, et de quo in unitate suae personae perfectus homo fiet, ut licet inter spinas peccatorum conciperetur, ab ipsis tamen spinarum aculeis omnimode exsors redderetur? Potuit plane, et uluit; si igitur uluit, fecit.} Ibid., 305C-D.}

Eadmer believed that God \textit{could} have produced an immaculate conception. It was more fitting to the dignity and honour of the Blessed Virgin that she should not be stained with sin in any way. It would be unreasonable to suppose that God would not will to act in the most fitting manner possible; therefore Mary’s conception must have been immaculate. Although Eadmer’s conclusion was very different from that of Anselm on the subject, his argument...
from fittingness was reminiscent of Anselm’s reasoning process throughout *Cur Deus homo* and elsewhere.

Eadmer recognised the novelty of his claim that Mary was not subject to original sin.

If anyone shall say that she was not altogether free from the sin of our first parent, since she was conceived through the union of a man and a woman under the law, that is the catholic opinion. I do not wish by any means to dissent from the truth of the catholic and universal Church; nevertheless when I consider, so far as I can with my clouded mind, the magnificence of the workings of the divine power, I seem to see that if there was anything of original sin in her procreation, it belonged to the parents and not to the progeny.\(^{467}\)

Eadmer did not attempt to provide a sophisticated theological discussion of the precise means through which the Virgin was conceived, and his treatise did not address questions such as the transmission of original sin or the meaning of purification for sin that were a feature of more ‘scholarly’ approaches to the problem. Instead, his treatise was based on the desire to justify to the highest degree possible the devotional practices of his community. He considered the analogy of the chestnut as perfectly sufficient for the needs of his monastic readers, providing them with a simple model on which to base their understanding of the conception, and an image that could be used as focus for devotion.

The devotional purpose of *De conceptione* is revealed in the opening paragraphs of the treatise, where Eadmer referred to the feast of the conception, the celebration of which he claimed to be widespread.\(^{468}\) He referred to the fact that the feast was celebrated by simple Christians (*simplices*), who were sincere in their devotion to the Virgin and desire to celebrate her conception, even if they were unable to produce philosophical arguments in support of the feast, in the face of its theological opponents.\(^{469}\) This passage reveals the controversy surrounding the feast of the conception in the early twelfth century, and the ecclesial and polemical context in which Eadmer was writing.

\(^{467}\) *Quod si quis eam primae originis peccato non omnimode expertem fuisse pronuntiat, cum illam ex legali coniugio maris et feminae conceptam uerissime constet, sententia catholica est. Ego a catholicae et uniuersalis ecclesiae uruitate nulla ratione uolo dissentire, magnificentium tamen operationum uirtutis diuinae quadamquasi mentis lippitudine pro posse considerans, uideor mihi uidere quia si quid originalis peccati in propagatione eius, et communis uilti exstitit, illud propagantium et non propagatae prolis fuit.* Eadmer, *Tractatus*, 305B.

\(^{468}\) *In multis locis.* *Ibid.*, 302B.

\(^{469}\) *Ibid.*, 303B.
The feast of the conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary had been widely celebrated in the late Anglo-Saxon Church. It had been introduced at Winchester around 1030, and soon spread to other centres such as Canterbury, Exeter and Ramsey. However, it faced opposition from post-Conquest bishops such as Lanfranc, who saw the feast as a local aberration without theological justification, along with the cults of a number of Anglo-Saxon saints. The feast was omitted from the liturgical calendar produced at Canterbury under Lanfranc.

The principal figure in the move to restore the feast of the conception in England was Anselm, Abbot of Bury St Edmunds and nephew of Anselm of Canterbury. From 1109 to 1115, this Anselm had been Abbot of St Sabas in Rome, a Greek-speaking community that had fled from their original foundation near Jerusalem following the Saracen invasion of Palestine. The feast of the conception of the Virgin was popular in the Eastern Church, and continued to be celebrated by the monks of St Sabas in Rome. In 1122 Anselm was elected Abbot of Bury St Edmunds, and arrived in England eager to reintroduce the feast there too. Having spent time in Canterbury between 1100 and 1109, under the aegis of his uncle Anselm, he would have had the opportunity to learn from the older monks at Canterbury about their memories of the feast before its abandonment under Lanfranc. Awareness of recent devotion in England must have been a major source of encouragement to Anselm in his efforts to revive the practice.

Eadmer’s treatise on the conception was written in the context of this move to restore the feast of the conception in England. Eadmer must have known Anselm in Canterbury, and it seems likely that he composed the treatise with the specific aim of supporting Anselm. The reintroduction of the feast in England was controversial. A letter to Anselm from Osbert of Clare (c. 1127-8) expresses his own support for the revival, naming as fellow supporters Gilbert, Bishop of London and Hugh, Abbot of Reading, as well as Henry I himself; but it also demonstrates the bitter opposition encountered from the likes of Roger, Bishop of Salisbury and Bernard, Bishop of St David’s, who argued that the festival lacked the authority of the Roman Church and should be abolished forthwith. Osbert’s support for the feast of the conception was founded on his firm belief in the doctrine of the immaculate conception, although he did not express this belief explicitly in his sermon for the feast.

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lamenting in a letter to Warin, Dean of Worcester, that ‘I dare not say what I believe in my heart about this holy generation,’ for fear of his theological opponents.  

Support for the doctrine of the immaculate conception spread rapidly in England in the early twelfth century, and was primarily associated with celebration of the feast of the conception, legitimised by the Council of London in 1129. The feast of the conception also came to be celebrated on the continent, although its introduction there was similarly controversial. A letter from Bernard of Clairvaux to the canons of Lyons castigated them for their celebration of the feast, ‘which the custom of the Church does not recognize, reason does not approve and ancient tradition does not commend. Are we more learned than the Fathers, or more devout?’

Bernard objected to the feast of the conception on the grounds, not only of its novelty in the Church calendar, but also of the implied belief in the doctrine of the immaculate conception, which he opposed. Bernard argued that it was temporally impossible for Mary to be sanctified before her conception; therefore she must have been sanctified after her conception. Her conception was not immaculate, but in sin, and her purification came later. Mary was born a virgin, but was not born from a virgin; she was conceived through the natural law of human propagation, not through the Holy Spirit. Like Jeremiah, Mary was sanctified in the womb before her birth, but was not conceived already sanctified. Only Jesus was conceived through the Holy Spirit, and only Jesus was sanctified before his conception.

In his letter to the canons of Lyons, Bernard admitted that the desire to afford maximum devotion to the Virgin might lead the simple into the erroneous celebration of the feast of her conception without understanding the immense doctrinal implications. For learned men like the canons, however, such an error was inexcusable.

Bernard was passionate in his devotion to Mary. His opposition to the immaculate conception was not indicative of a diminished veneration of her ultimate purity and grace, after sanctification, but was instead a doctrinal concern based on his understanding of original sin and its Christological implications. This concern was widespread among theologians; Peter Lombard rejected the doctrine of the immaculate conception in his *Sententiae*, as did

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474 *Williams, Letters of Osbert of Clare*, p. 13.
478 *Bernard, Epistola* 174, 9.
Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure in the thirteenth century. It was not until Duns Scotus’ reanalysis of Anselm’s discussion of original sin and the virginal conception in the late thirteenth century that the doctrine began to gain serious ground among theologians.\footnote{For discussion of the development of the doctrine of the immaculate conception in the medieval period, see H. Graef, \textit{Mary, A History of Doctrine and Devotion} (London, 1963).}

Popular veneration of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and the desire to celebrate the feasts of key events in her life, including her conception, developed largely independently of debates concerning the finer points of doctrine. Early supporters of the feast of the conception, such as Eadmer and Anselm of Bury, had little interest in the subtleties of systematic theology. Southern emphasizes Eadmer’s concern as a historian to chart the historical events in Mary’s life, rather than approaching Mariological questions from an essentially ‘timeless’ philosophical attitude, as Anselm had done.\footnote{Southern, \textit{Biographer}, p. 288.} Anselm of Bury was influenced by Eastern practices, as observed by the monks of his own community of St Sabas. Eastern theology was not dominated by Augustinian teaching on original sin, and so were unaffected by the difficulties of explaining her freedom from the \textit{massa peccatrix} that caused so much difficulty among Western theologians.

Through his recognition that Mary was conceived in original sin, and was afterwards purified in order to bear the Son of God, Anselm’s Mariology was in line with the dominant position among theologians for the rest of the twelfth century. The doctrine of the immaculate conception as propounded by Eadmer was, from the perspective of scholastic theology, no more than an irrelevant doctrinal aberration, of which his own master Anselm would have approved no more than Bernard or Peter Lombard. Nevertheless, it could be argued that Anselm’s teaching in \textit{Cur Deus homo} and \textit{De conceptu uirginali} did have a significant role to play in the development of the doctrine of the immaculate conception. Southern points out that Eadmer’s argument of \textit{potuit, uelit, ergo fecit} was ultimately derived from Anselmian thought.\footnote{Southern, \textit{Portrait}, p. 435.} Furthermore, it has been suggested that it was Anselm’s revised definition of original sin as original injustice which paved the way for subsequent thinkers. Hilda Graef argues that

whereas the general opinion of theologians at that time was that concupiscence plays a decisive part in the transmission of [original sin], tainting all persons in the normal way, Anselm saw in it nothing else but the absence of justice. If Mary was the purest of all creatures, and if original sin was but the absence of original
justice, then no more was needed than the anticipation of the effects of Christ’s passion to make the Immaculate Conception theologically possible.\textsuperscript{482}

According to Graef, Eadmer’s notion of a ‘passive conception’, illustrated by his chestnut analogy, was only made possible because ‘his teacher Anselm had paved the way by regarding original sin as no more than the absence of original justice.’\textsuperscript{483} This definition of original sin as a non-thing, being nothing more than the absence of original justice, rather than the positive stain of concupiscence, removed the major objection to the doctrine of the immaculate conception. If original sin were no more than an absence, that absence could be easily made up by a special injection of grace, restoring Mary to the original level of justice possessed by Adam and Eve before the Fall. All that remained to be resolved was the temporal question of precisely when this grace was given; before or at the very moment of conception, or later. However, this question was just as relevant to a hamartiology that focused on concupiscence as to one of injustice, as Bernard’s letter to the canons of Lyons illustrates; an extraordinary gift of divine grace could surely remove a stain as easily as it could restore the loss of original justice. Furthermore, Anselm’s discussion of original sin and its transmission was not restricted purely to the loss of the original justice possessed by Adam before the fall, but also incorporated aspects of Augustinian thought on concupiscence and corruption as taught by his contemporaries. These will be discussed below.

**Original sin, original injustice: Anselm and Odo of Tournai**

In the opening chapters of *De conceptu*, Anselm defined original sin as original injustice, transmitted to all human beings from their first parents. When Adam and Eve sinned, they abandoned the justice with which they had been created, becoming personally unjust. This personal injustice affected the whole of human nature, which was at that time contained within Adam and Eve, and no-one else. Future generations inherited Adam’s sinful injustice as part of their human nature. As the sinful nature is contracted from their origin in Adam, it is called original injustice or original sin.\textsuperscript{484}

\textsuperscript{482} Graef, *Mary*, p. 211.
\textsuperscript{483} Ibid., p. 219.
\textsuperscript{484} Anselm, *DCV*, 1.
Anselm explained that, had Adam and Eve maintained their original justice, their
descendants would have inherited original justice. However, by abandoning justice, they
became weakened and corrupted by sin.

Since they sinned personally when, originally strong and incorrupt, they had the
power to remain just always without difficulty, their whole being was weakened
and corrupted...And because the whole of human nature was in them and nothing
existed outside them, the whole was weakened and corrupted.\textsuperscript{485}

Although he no longer had original justice, fallen man retained ‘the obligation of possessing
the justice which it had received, whole and without any injustice, and the obligation to make
satisfaction because he abandoned it.’\textsuperscript{486} Here, Anselm returned to one of the central themes
of \textit{Cur Deus homo}: of man’s debt to God, and the need, not only to repay what he had stolen
by restoring himself to his original justice and obedience to God, but also to make satisfaction
for the dishonour of his disobedience. At the same time, Adam’s nature was weakened
and corrupted by his abandonment of justice, so that all of human nature, propagated through
him, was also weakened and corrupted. Because of this weakening corruption, man was no
longer able to restore himself to his original state of justice. Anselm argued that

if [human nature] had not sinned, just as it had been made by God, so it would
have been propagated; and so after sin, just as it had made itself by sinning, so is
it propagated. Since, therefore, through itself it can neither make satisfaction for
sin nor regain its lost justice...It seems to be necessary that [human nature] is born
in infants with the obligation of making satisfaction for the first sin, which it
could always have avoided, and with the obligation of possessing original justice,
which it has always had the power to keep.\textsuperscript{487}

\textsuperscript{485} \textit{Quoniam autem personaliter peccauerunt, cum originaliter fortes et incorrupti haberent potestatem semper
seruandi sine difficultate iustitiam: totum quod erant infirmatum et corruptum est...Et quia tota humana natura}
in illis erat et extra ipsos de illa nihil erat, tota infirmata et corrupta est. Anselm, DCV, 2.

\textsuperscript{486} \textit{Remansit igitur in ea debitum iustitiae integrae sine omni iniustitia quam accept, et debitum satisfaciendi,
quia eam deseruit. Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{487} \textit{Si non peccasset, qualis facta est a deo talis propagaretur: ita post peccatum qualem se peccando fecit talis
propagaretur. Quoniam igitur per se nec satisfacere pro peccato nec iustitiam derelictam recuperare uael...uidetur est nece
esse eam in infantibus nasci cum debito satisfaciendi pro primo peccato, quod semper
cauere potuit, et cum debito habendi originallem iustitiam, quam semper servare ualuit. Ibid.}
The obligation to possess original justice, and to make satisfaction for the first sin, belonged to human nature, which was entirely contained within Adam at the time of his sin.\(^{488}\) An infant born with original sin was not guilty of personal sin, as it was not yet capable of distinguishing between good and evil, of acting with either justice or injustice. The newborn infant is sinful in nature, not in person. Human nature, contained in Adam, had the potential to avoid sin and retain its original justice; when it failed to do so, human nature was guilty of its own willing disobedience. Thus, although original sin did not involve any actual wrongdoing on the part of the individual person, Anselm defined it as absolute sin.\(^{489}\)

Anselm’s definition of original sin as injustice was taken up by Odo of Tournai in his treatise *De peccato originali* (c. 1100-1105). This was the only treatise in the early twelfth century to be written specifically on the nature and implications of original sin, and it owes a considerable debt to Anselm’s work in *De conceptu uirginali* and elsewhere. In the first book, Odo attempted to define ‘sin’. He began with a discussion of the nature of evil, which he defined as injustice.\(^{490}\) This injustice was found in the rational spirit alone; no action of the body could be described as sinful. Reason, will and the spirit itself are not evil, for these are creations of God, and God is the creator of good, not of evil. Instead, ‘the injustice of the will is the evil we seek.’\(^{491}\) Odo argued that evil was nothing, and had no essence. Evil could not have real existence, because everything that exists is made by God, and God is the creator of good, not evil. ‘If it exists, God made it, for God made everything that exists. But it is wicked to say that God made evil. Therefore evil is nothing.’\(^{492}\) Evil should instead be defined as nothing more than a privation of good.\(^{493}\)

Focussing his discussion on sin, which he had already defined as injustice, Odo explained that ‘injustice is the privation of justice, since indeed the privatory particle only removes justice and does not posit another essence.’\(^{494}\) The privatory particle ‘in-’ denied the existence of justice without replacing it with a new essence. Privation differed from negation only because it did not apply in all cases where the thing concerned did not exist, but only in

\(^{488}\) In *DCV* 9, Anselm explained how original sin is attributed to Adam alone, although both he and Eve sinned. Adam was the original man, from whom came the whole human race, including Eve (formed from Adam’s rib); thus, his sin affected the whole human race, whereas if Eve alone had sinned, it would have had no effect on future generations.

\(^{489}\) *Absolute peccatum.* Anselm, *DCV*, 3.

\(^{490}\) Odo of Tournai, *De peccato originali libri tres* [hereafter *DPO*], *PL*, 160, 1071-1102, at 1071C.

\(^{491}\) *Iniustitia voluntatis, ipsa est malum quod quaerimus.* *Ibid.*, 1072C.

\(^{492}\) *Si est, Deus fecit, qui fecit omne quod est. Sed Deum fecisse malum dicere nefas est. Malum igitur nihil est.* *Ibid.*, 1073B.

\(^{493}\) *Malum priuatio boni est.* *Ibid.*, 1073B.

\(^{494}\) *Est igitur iniustitia priuatio iustitiae, si quidem priuatoria particula tantum priuat iustitiam, nec aliam reponit essentiam.* *Ibid.*, 1074D.
cases where it *should* exist, but did not. Thus, ‘an unjust person does not exist unless one who ought to be just, is not.’

Odo next raised the potential objection that ‘if evil is nothing, we are punished for nothing, when we are punished for evil.’ Odo responded by arguing that

when we are punished for injustice we are punished for having abandoned justice. But justice is something; therefore we are punished for something. So when injustice is said to be nothing, nevertheless something is understood by that, for which we are punished because we have deserted it. We are punished therefore for the justice which we have deserted. And so both a privation is nothing, and, when we are punished for it, we are punished for that which is something.

Man’s punishment for injustice could be more accurately described as his punishment for having abandoned the justice he ought to have preserved; therefore, he is not punished for nothing and his punishment is just.

Odo’s discussion in Book One of *De peccato originali* bears striking similarities with Anselm’s writing on the nature of sin and evil in *De casu diaboli* and *De conceptu*. In *De casu diaboli*, Anselm identified the devil’s sin as his failure to serve justice with perseverance. By willing something that at the time he ought not to have willed (that is, to be like God), he deserted justice and thus sinned.

Anselm argued that the injustice of the will has no real existence in itself, but is nothing. ‘We say that injustice is nothing in itself, because it is nothing other than the privation of the good, which makes them evil and their will evil, and so we say that this injustice is nothing other than the privation of justice.’ When the devil sinned, he ‘lost something great, and received nothing in its place, except its privation which has no essence, which we call injustice.’

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495 *Iniustus uero non est, nisi qui iustus debet esse, nec est.* Odo, DPO, 1074D.
496 *Si malum nihil est, pro nihilo punimur, cum punimur pro malo.* Ibid., 1075D.
497 *Cum ergo pro iniustitia punitur, pro iustitia punimur deserta; sed est aliquid iustitia, punimur ergo pro aliquo. Ut cum iniustitia nihil dictur, in ea tamen aliquid intelligitur, pro quo punimur qua deserta, punimur ergo pro iustitia quam deserimus. Itaque et priuatio nihil est, et, cum pro ea punimur, pro ea punimur quod aliquid est.* Odo, DPO, 1076A.
498 *Volendo igitur aliquid quod uelle tunc non debebat, deseruit iustitiam, et sic peccavit.* Anselm, DCD, 4.
499 *Iniustitiam uero ipsum malum esse, quod nihil aliud dicimus quam boni priuacionem, quod malos et malam voluntatem facit, et ideo eandem iniustitiam non aliud esse asserimus quam priuacionem iustitiae.* Ibid., 9.
500 *Quam cum deseruit magnum aliquid perdidi, et nihil pro ea nisi priuacionem eius quae nullam habet essentiam, quam iniustitiam nominamus, suscepit.* Ibid., 9.
Having established that evil is nothing, Anselm then entered into a discussion of the word ‘nothing’, and in what senses it could be said to signify something, just as the word ‘evil’ was not meaningless, but apparently signified something. He concluded that the words *malum* and *nihil* only signified something according to grammatical form, and not in reference to a real entity. ‘For “nothing” signifies nothing other than “not-something”, or the absence of those things which are something. And “evil” is nothing other than “not-good”, or the absence of good where it is proper or fitting to be good.’\(^{501}\)

Transferring the discussion from evil in general to injustice in particular, Anselm demonstrated that injustice has no existence in itself, but is defined simply as the privation of justice where justice ought to have been. He argued that ‘the absence of justice is called injustice not before justice has been given but after it has been abandoned...the absence of justice is not dishonourable except where it is meant to be.’\(^{502}\) Only rational creatures, who were capable of and obliged to uphold justice, could ever be described as unjust; the lack of justice in brute beasts, for example, was not unjust, as beasts have neither the capability nor the obligation to be just.

The idea that evil has no existence in itself, but is merely a privation of good, was not original to Anselm, but a commonplace in medieval thought. Augustine discussed the non-existence of evil in his *Confessiones*, where he argued that ‘whatever things exist are good, and the evil into whose origins I was inquiring is not a substance, for if it were a substance, it would be good...you made all things good, and there are absolutely no substances which you did not make.’\(^{503}\) Anselm expanded the idea of the essential non-existence of evil into an explicit discussion of the essential non-existence of injustice, and the definition of sin as the absence of justice where justice should have been. By focusing on the voluntary abandonment of a justice that had already been given for the purpose of being upheld, Anselm added a conscious moral element to the question, relating it specifically to man’s culpability for sin.

In *De conceptu*, Anselm recapitulated his definition of sin as injustice.\(^{504}\) Referring the reader back to his earlier work in *De casu diaboli* and *De ueritate*, he argued that evil and injustice have no real existence in themselves, being merely the absence of good and of due

\(^{501}\) *Nihil enim non aliud significat quam non-aliiquid, aut absentiam eorum quae sunt aliiquid. Et malum non est aliud quam non-bonum, aut absentia boni ubi debet aut expedit esse bonum*. Anselm, *DCD*, 12.

\(^{502}\) *Non ante datum sed post derelictam iustitiam eadem absentia iustitiae, uocetur iustitiae...non dedecet abesse iustitiam, nisi ubi debet esse*. *Ibid.*, 16.


\(^{504}\) Anselm, *DCV*, 3.
justice respectively.505 Odo’s definition of sin as the deprivation of original justice can be seen as largely drawn from Anselm’s thought. The structure and form of Odo’s argument in the first book of De peccato originali bear strong resemblance to De conceptu. Like Anselm, Odo began with the definition of sin as injustice, and the demonstration of the essential non-existence of evil and injustice, with an argument based mainly on grammar and the meaning of a negation. Like Anselm, he differentiated between a simple negation with no moral dimension, and the privation of something which ought to be there. The question of Odo’s imaginary objector, asking whether the fact that evil is nothing means that man is punished for nothing, also appears in Anselm’s work, where he described ‘certain people’ who were ‘accustomed to say: if sin is nothing, why does God punish man for sin, when no-one should be punished for nothing?’506

Odo also demonstrated apparent Anselmian influence later in De peccato originali, when he discussed the sinlessness of the Christ. Like Anselm, Odo believed that original sin is transmitted through the will in sexual reproduction. When Adam sinned, he lost the uprightness of will through which he could propagate his seed without sin.

The soul of Adam joined guilt to the gift of propagation, and to the good of propagation which God gave him, he added sin which he did himself. Indeed, those things which were joined in origin cannot be separated in posterity. Therefore, men who are born by human propagation carry sin by nature. You are born by human propagation, so guilt follows of necessity.507

Christ was not born from human propagation, and so did not contract guilt from human propagation.

Christ did not have guilt, because he did not have a human generation. Nor is human nature subject to sin except where there is human generation. For, where there is only a divine operation in propagation, unless you blame God, there is no

505 Sicut enim inustitia non est aliud quam absentia debitae iustitiae, ita malum non est aliud quam absentia debiti boni. Anselm, DCV, 5.
506 Quidam...solent dicere: Si peccatum nihil est, cur punit Deus hominem pro peccato, cum pro nihilo nemo puniri debeat. Ibid., 6.
507 Anima Adam propagationi datae iuxxit culpam, et propagationis bono quod Deus dedit apposuit peccatum quod ipse fecti. Quae vero coniuncta sunt in origine separari nequeunt in posteritiati. Ideo trahunt naturale peccatum homines qui nascentur propagatione hominum; nascetis humana propagatione, sequitur culpa necessitate. Odo, DPO, 1084C.
guilt. Therefore, Christ would have been born without sin, even if he were not God.\textsuperscript{508}

Like Anselm, Odo argued that Christ’s miraculous conception apart from the usual process of human generation meant that he was free from the inheritance of original sin. Even if Christ were merely a human man conceived in this way, he would still have been free from sin. Irven Resnick and David Hughes both stress the extent of Anselm’s influence on Odo’s argument in \textit{De peccato}.\textsuperscript{509} However, there was one aspect of the question which Odo treated in far greater depth than anything in Anselm’s writing: his discussion of the origin of the soul.

\textbf{An obscure and perplexing question: Odo, Anselm and the Origin of the Soul}

Having established, as Anselm had done, that sin belonged entirely to the soul, and not to the body, Odo then turned to the question of the origin of the soul, and how each individual contracts the guilt of original sin.

The origin of the soul was much debated in patristic and early medieval literature, and no definite conclusions had been drawn. Augustine described the problem as one of great obscurity and perplexity,\textsuperscript{510} on which he was unable to give a firm opinion. In \textit{De libero arbitrio}, he outlined four main arguments concerning the origin of the soul that were circulating in the late fourth century.

\begin{quote}
There are four views about souls: either they come into being through propagation, or they are newly made for each individual being born, or, already existing elsewhere, they are sent by God into the bodies of those who are born, or they sink into them voluntarily.\textsuperscript{511}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{508} \textit{Christus non habuit culpam, quia generationem non habuit humanam. Nec est humana natura obnoxia peccato, nisi ubi fit humana generatio; nam ubi in propagatione sola est operatio divina, nisi Deam culpes, nulla est culpa. Sic igitur nasceretur sine peccato Christus, etiamsi non esset Deus.} Odo, DPO, 1084C-D.
\textsuperscript{511} Harum autem quatuor de anima sententiarum, utrum de propagine ueniant, an in singulis quibusque nascentibus nouae fiant, an in corpora nascentium iam alicubi existentes uel mittantur duinitus, uel sua sponte labantur. \textit{Ibid.}
Augustine argued that ‘one ought not to affirm rashly any of these’, as catholic commentators had not yet been able to produce any firm evidence one way or the other. The third and fourth views listed, which suggest the pre-existence of human souls in a spiritual dimension before they come, or are brought, to earth to dwell within a human body, had been widely discredited before the twelfth century. The choice faced by later patristic and medieval scholars, was between the idea that soul was propagated from soul, as flesh from flesh, and passed down from parent to child, or that each new soul was created individually by God and implanted into the infant’s body in its mother’s womb.

Odo’s discussion of the origin of the soul, in the second book of *De peccato originali*, begins with the claim that the authority of the orthodox Fathers taught that soul was not created from soul, as flesh from flesh, even though many people wanted to believe that this was so. Odo’s insistence on the creationist model as the orthodox catholic doctrine is striking, as there is little evidence to suggest that any one argument had been definitively established as correct before the twelfth century. Although in the late fourth century Jerome had declared that ‘the Church’s doctrine is that God forms souls every day, and sends them into the bodies of those who are born’, he failed to convince doubters who remained concerned about the apparent injustice of convicting infants of original sin. The majority of early medieval commentators followed Augustine in the view that it was impossible to know for certain one way or the other.

In *De peccato originali*, Odo presented a number of scriptural citations which appeared to demonstrate that each new soul is created by God, so that men ‘have both human fathers of the flesh and God as the father of our spirits, so that the flesh alone comes from man, but a new spirit is given by God into new flesh.’ However, in the first book of *De peccato originali*, Odo had already demonstrated that sin is found only in the soul, and not the body, so that subsequent generations could not be said to have sinned in Adam, as their souls were not in him when he sinned. Odo described this as a ‘very difficult question.’

Odo’s attempt to solve the problem involved a detailed explanation of how the individual souls of subsequent generations could be said to have been present in Adam’s soul at the time of his first sin, so that they could have been corrupted by his sin. His argument

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512 *Nullam temere affirmare oportebit.* Augustine, DLA, 3.21.59.  
515 E.g. Cassiodorus, *De anima*, PL 70, 1279-1308, 7; Alcuin, *De anima ratione*, PL, 101, 639-647, 13; Rabanus Maurus, *De anima*, PL, 110, 1109-1120, 2.  
516 *Nos et homines habere patres carnis nostrae, et Deum nostrorum patrem spirituum, ut caro sola ueniat ab homine, spiritus uero nouus a Deo detur in noua carne.* Odo, *DPO*, 1078C.  
517 *Valde difficile quaeestio.* Ibid.
was based on the philosophical distinction between individual and species, person and substance. At the time of the fall, the individual souls of Adam and Eve comprised the sum existence of the human soul. ‘When the first man was made, the human soul was made first in one individual, and then divided into another, and the very nature of the human soul was all and wholly in two persons.’\(^{518}\) Odo distinguished between the individual souls that Adam and Eve each possessed personally, and the human soul understood as the nature or substance of human soul, common to each individual. Thus, Odo counted three: the human soul \(\text{(humana anima)}\), Adam’s soul \(\text{(anima Adae)}\) and Eve’s soul \(\text{(anima Evae)}\).\(^{519}\)

When Adam and Eve sinned, they sinned personally, and as individuals, so that their own individual souls were corrupted. However, at the time of their sin, the whole of human nature was contained within them, so that there was no part of the human soul that was not contaminated with sin. Odo argued that ‘in the soul of Adam and in the soul of Eve, who sinned personally, the whole nature of the human soul was infected with sin, which nature is both a common substance and specific to each. For it does not yet exist outside these.’\(^{520}\) Had there existed at the time another individual who had not sinned, the whole nature of the human soul would not be guilty of sin; but this was not the case.\(^{521}\)

The corruption of the whole substance of the human soul in Adam and Eve meant that every future individual soul would share in that corruption. Odo argued that because the whole human soul in Adam was guilty of sin, it could not be transferred to other individuals without sin, nor could there now be a human soul without the blemish of sin, and each draws with it everywhere the concrete blemish which it has from the beginning in itself. Therefore every soul which was created after Adam, from its beginning draws in nature what he had incurred in himself.\(^{522}\)

\(^{518}\) *Quando primum factus est homo, humana anima facta prius in uno individeo, et deinde diuisa in alio, ipsius humanae animae natura, in duabus personis erat omnis et tota.* Odo, DPO, 1079C-D.

\(^{519}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{520}\) *In anima Adam ergo et in anima Evae, quae personaliter peccauerunt, infecta est peccato tota natura humanae animae; quae communis substantia est, est specialis utrisque. Extra has enim nondum est eam esse.* *Ibid.*, 1081C-1082A.

\(^{521}\) *Ibid.*, 1082A.

\(^{522}\) *Et quia humana anima tota est in Adam obnoxia peccati, sine peccato non potest ad alias personas transferri, nec fieri jam potest anima humana sine vitio peccati, et secum ubique trahit utium quod a principio habet in se concretum. Omnis igitur anima, quae post Adam creatur, a principio naturali trahit quod in se culpetur.* *Ibid.*, 1084A.
Odo concluded that ‘no human soul is created without sin in this life.’

By arguing that the entire substance of the human soul was contained in Adam and Eve so that all future individual souls were participants in their corruption, Odo appeared to be promoting the traducianist idea that original sin is transmitted with the soul, from parent to child. He explained how the soul must be created from human nature, so that ‘when a new soul is created it comes to be from a human nature...Therefore God makes a new soul which does not have a new nature. In person it is new; in species it is not new.’ Odo argued that when God created new souls, he was actually creating a new person of the existing human soul. Each individual soul was human because it shared in the substance of the human soul created first in Adam, but was at the same time individual to each person and newly created by God.

To explain how new souls are created from pre-existing nature, Odo argued that the soul has a generative power that enables it to reproduce. He described how ‘as body is made from body, so also a living soul is made from a living soul through a nutritive soul.’ This ‘nutritive seed’ constituted an intermediary substance between soul and soul, issuing from the soul of the parent and growing into the soul of the offspring. Odo used the commonly observed phenomenon of inherited personality, as well as physical traits, as evidence for his argument that spiritual, as well as corporeal, nature was transmitted from parent to child.

Often we see a likeness of the parent in the offspring, both in the appearance of the body and in the habits of the soul. What is this, unless the seed draws both a little fluid from the body and the nutritive power from the soul? For unless the seed transmits to the offspring in both ways what it drew from the parent in both ways, the offspring would not show such great likeness to the parent in both ways.
Odo concluded that, as what comes both from the soul and from the body could be found in the seed, ‘it is clear that the soul of the offspring comes from a root-stock, and all our souls were in the soul of Adam.’

Odo’s discussion of the transmission of the soul through a root-stock (tradux) from parent to child is surprising, given that he consistently claimed that the traducianist argument for the origin of the soul was wrong. Odo attempted to circumvent potential accusations of error by differentiating between his own use of the term tradux, and that of his traducianist opponents. Odo believed that the traducianist model involved a purely physical or materialist view of the soul, the idea that ‘soul comes from soul from that which the nutritive power draws in the seed, saying that the seed itself is a part of the soul, and is separated from the whole in making the offspring.’ Thus, Odo’s traducianists believed that, in reproduction, a part of the soul was separated from the rest and passed into the offspring to produce a new soul.

The error of this argument was, in Odo’s view, the failure to recognize the non-corporeal nature of the soul, which could not be divided into parts in this way.

For the human soul is a simple and non-composite nature. It is not composed of several things, although it may consist of several. It is one, and has many efficacies, just as the sun is one, and has many rays. It is simple and nourishes the body with many things from itself. Externally indeed they are many, but they come from that which is intrinsically simple; they are parts of the soul, but [the soul] has no composition, because the whole itself does not admit quantity.

The simple and non-composite nature of the soul meant that it was impossible for a part of the parent soul to be detached and transmitted to the offspring. If, as Odo believed, the traducianist argument required soul to be passed directly from parent to child in this way, then traducianism must be wrong. Instead, Odo posited a ‘nutritive power’ which was ‘the seed of the soul, but not soul.’ By using the generative seed as an intermediary substance
between soul and soul, Odo claimed to be able to reconcile the apparently contradictory demands of the simple nature of the soul with the need to propagate soul from soul.

While Odo clearly did not consider himself to be a supporter of traducianism, his argument for the transmission of the soul certainly appears to fall within the parameters of what would today be considered at least a form of spiritual traducianism. Terms such as ‘physical traducianism’ and ‘spiritual traducianism’ did not yet exist in Odo’s day, and it is important not to judge his work according to modern definitions of the various theories. When Odo opposed traducianism, his opposition was to the idea that would today be termed ‘physical traducianism’, the theory that part of the parent’s soul is transferred to the child. Tertullian, the main proponent of this model in the patristic period, had described how, during intercourse,

the seed of the whole man is discharged, deriving its fluidity from the substance of the body, and its warmth from the soul...in that final heat of gratification, when the generative fluid is ejected, do we not feel that something of our soul has also gone out, and we feel greatly weakened and enfeebled, with dimness of vision? This will be the animating seed, coming at once from the dripping of the soul, just as the fluid corporeal seed from the expulsion of the flesh.

Tertullian’s suggestion that part of the soul left the parent during intercourse, and became the seed that would develop into the soul of the child, was clearly incompatible with Odo’s understanding of the soul as simple and indivisible, and he rejected it for this reason. The idea that his own argument concerning the generative power of the seed could also be interpreted as a form of traducianism did not occur to him.

The similarities between Odo’s account of original sin in De peccato originali and that of Anselm in De conceptu, particularly their shared definition of original sin as original injustice, and discussion in terms of the lack of real existence in sin, seem to indicate that Odo’s work was in part derived from a reading of Anselm. Hughes lists a number of specific points in Odo’s argument that he believes could only have come from reading De

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534 Despumatur semen totius hominis, habens ex corporali substantia humorem, ex animi calorem...in illo ipso uoluptatis ultimo aestu quo gentiale uirus expellitur, nonne aliquid de anima quoque sentimus exire, atque adeo marcescimus et deuigescimus cum lucis detrimento? Hoc erit semen animale protinus ex animae destillatione, sicut et uirus illud corporale semen ex carnis defaecatione. Tertullian, De anima, ed. A. Gerlo, CCSL, 2 (Turnhout, 1954), 27.
This implies that Odo must have written *De peccato originali* after 1100, when *De conceptu* was completed. Resnick does make the suggestion that Odo could have completed his treatise as early as 1095, raising the intriguing possibility that the similarities between the two texts could be attributable, not to Anselm’s influence on Odo, but to Odo’s influence on Anselm.

However, although the available evidence does not allow any definite conclusions to be made regarding the dating of *De peccato originali*, it seems far more likely that it was Odo who was influenced by reading *De conceptu* than that Anselm took his arguments from *De peccato originali*. Anselm had been developing his thought on justice since at least the 1080s, when he composed *De ueritate*, and it remained a major theme in his work throughout his career, most notably in *De casu diaboli* and *Cur Deus homo*. His discussion of original sin in terms of original injustice in *De conceptu* was thus a natural continuation of a theme which he had developed over the course of two decades of writing. There was no need for his arguments in *De conceptu* to rely on a late reading of Odo’s treatise. On the other hand, Odo was a keen student of Anselm’s work. His use of Anselm’s arguments concerning the redemption in *Cur Deus homo* in his own *Disputatio contra Iudaeum* have already been discussed. There seems to be no good reason why he should not have been similarly influenced by Anselm’s *De conceptu* in his earlier work on sin. Further, the manuscript tradition indicates that, while copies of *De conceptu* were widely available in northern France and Flanders very soon after its completion, it is less likely that Anselm had ready access to *De peccato originali*.

Although a number of Odo’s arguments, particularly in the first two books of *De peccato originali*, bear close resemblance to arguments found in Anselm, his treatise also contains much that is original, notably in his discussion of the origin of the soul in Book 3. Odo’s attempt to provide a detailed, coherent explanation for the origin of the soul went far

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535 Hughes, *Odo*, p. 73
538 See Chapter 3.
539 The date by which Odo had completed *De peccato originali* is also unclear. Resnick believes that it was almost certainly completed before 1105, before Odo was elected Bishop of Cambrai, and before the composition of the *Disputatio* (Resnick, ‘Two Treatises’, p. 26). Hughes also dates the treatise before 1105 (Hughes, *Odo*, p. 63). Julian Gross suggests that it could have been written as late as 1110, although he offers no compelling reasons for a late dating (J. Gross, *Geschichte des Erbsündendogmas*, vol. 3: *Entwicklungsgeschichte des Erbsündendogmas im Zeitalter der Scholastik (12. – 15. Jahrhundert)*, (Munich, 1971), p. 28.
540 *De peccato* enjoyed only a small circulation in the twelfth century. Six manuscripts are known to have existed in the twelfth century, all in the Flanders region, only one of which survives today. Hughes, *Odo*, p. 64.
beyond anything in Anselm’s writing. Whether or not Anselm would have approved of Odo’s argument is therefore open to debate.

Hughes claims that both Anselm and Odo shared the view that ‘the nature of the human soul was entirely within Adam and Eve, and was corrupted by their sins.\(^{541}\) In *De conceptu*, Anselm stated that the whole of human nature was contained within Adam and Eve at the time of their sin. When they first sinned, ‘all that they were was weakened and corrupted...And because the whole of human nature was in them and nothing of it existed outside them, the whole was weakened and corrupted.’\(^{542}\)

The fact that Adam was the sole representative of human nature at that time, containing the whole of human nature within himself, meant that his personal sin affected not only his personal nature but the whole of human nature, rendering all future persons guilty of sin according to their human nature. As Anselm explained in a later passage,

What the person did, it did not do without the nature. For he was a person, because he was called Adam; a nature, because he was man. Therefore the person made the nature sinful, because when Adam sinned, man sinned...For this reason since nature subsists in persons, and there are no persons without nature, nature makes the persons of infants sinful. Thus the person deprives the nature that it procreates of the good, lacking which it makes them sinful and unjust. In this way the sin of Adam is transmitted personally in all those who are by nature propagated from him, and is in them original, or natural.\(^{543}\)

These passages indicate that, like Odo, Anselm differentiated between the universal human nature, contained wholly in Adam and propagated from him to all future descendents; and the individual person. What is less clear is how he saw the soul fitting into this scheme. Nowhere does Anselm explicitly state that ‘the whole of human nature’ contained in Adam includes the soul. On the contrary, a number of passages in *De conceptu* seem to imply that

\(^{541}\) Hughes, *Odo*, p. 73.

\(^{542}\) Totum quod erat infirmatum et corruptum est...Et quia tota humana natura in illis erat et extra ipsos de illa nihil erat, tota infirma et corrupta est. Anselm, DCV, 2.

only the body is propagated through Adam’s seed, and that the foetus does not gain a soul until some time after conception.

Following a passage in which he demonstrated that sin and injustice can only be discussed in relation to the rational will, Anselm concluded that ‘from this it would seem to follow either that an infant has a rational soul from the very point of conception, without which it could not have a rational will, or that there is no original sin at the moment of conception.’ Anselm rejected as absurd the first of these possibilities, on the grounds that ‘no human sense accepts that he has a rational soul at the very moment of conception.’

This statement could be interpreted merely as a reference to the fact that infants lack the ability to distinguish between right and wrong, having not yet attained the age of reason. However, it seems more likely that Anselm was thinking in terms of the development of the foetus within the womb. This can be inferred from his repeated use of the phrase ‘at the moment of conception’, where otherwise it would surely have made more sense simply to say ‘from birth’.

The idea that the soul did not enter the body at the moment of conception, but at some later point between conception and birth, was widely discussed in the twelfth century, not least in the context of the exegesis of a passage of Mosaic law: ‘If anyone strikes a pregnant woman, and causes her to miscarry, if the child is not formed, let him be punished with a fine; but if the child is formed, let him render soul for soul.’ In De sacramentis, Hugh of St Victor argued that the culprit was only required to render soul for soul in cases where the aborted child was formed, implying that the unformed child did not yet have a soul to lose.

Since, therefore, only in the formed abortion is soul ordered to be rendered for soul, what is shown except that in that which is not yet formed, there is not yet a soul, so that in truth, just as in the first man we read that the body was formed first, then the soul was infused, so too in all subsequent men we may believe that the human body is formed first in the womb, then the soul is infused.

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544 Videtur itaque sequi quod aut infans statim ab ipsa conceptione animam habet rationalem, sine qua voluntatem rationem nequit habere, aut in eo non est peccatum originale mox cum conceptus est. Anselm, DCV, 7.

545 Quod autem mox ab ipsa conceptione rationalem animam habeat, nullus humanus suscipit sensus. Ibid., 7.

546 Si quis percusserit mulierem pregnantem, et illa abortuum fecerit, si non fuerit formatum multetur pecunia. Si autem formatum fuerit reddat animam pro anima. Exodus 21:22-23, according to the Vulgate.

547 Cum ergo in abortu quo tandem formatum, anima pro anima reddi iubetur, quod nisi in eo quod nec dum formatum est animam adhuc non esse ostenditur, ut uidelicet quemadmodum in primo homine prius corpus formatur, deinde animam infusa legimus, ita et in subsequentibus omnibus prius in uulua corpus humanum formari, deinde animam infundi credamus. Hugh, DS, 1.7.30.
The idea that the destroyer of the unformed child was not guilty of homicide because the unformed body lacked *sensus*, and therefore did not possess a soul, first appeared in Rabanus Maurus’s ninth-century commentary on Exodus, and was also reproduced in the *Glossa ordinaria*.\(^{548}\)

If the soul did not enter the body until after conception, it could not be propagated from the parents in the manner of the flesh, but was created separately by God and infused into the unborn child, animating and transforming the lifeless body into a living human being. In the passage from *De conceptu*, quoted above, Anselm acknowledged that denying that the infant had a rational soul from the very moment of its conception appeared to lead to the conclusion that the infant was conceived without original sin.\(^{549}\) However, this conclusion could not be true either, as it contradicted a number of passages in Scripture. Anselm cited as evidence for conception in sin Job 14:4 (‘who but you alone can make clean one conceived from unclean seed?’), and Psalm 51:5 (‘I was conceived in iniquity and my mother conceived me in sin’).\(^{550}\)

Anselm therefore had to explain ‘how, if sin is not in infants immediately at conception itself, they are nevertheless said to be conceived of impure seed in iniquity and in sin.’\(^{551}\) Anselm argued that statements such as this should not be taken literally from a temporal perspective. ‘Often divine Scripture asserts something when it is not actually so, because it is certain that it will be so in the future.’\(^{552}\) God’s warning to Adam that on the day he ate of the forbidden tree he would die, did not mean that he would die on that very day, but that on that day he incurred the necessity that one day he would die. All men sinned in Adam, not because men who did not yet exist sinned personally in him, but because at the moment of Adam’s sin the necessity was created that all future men born of Adam’s nature would be sinners.

Relating this argument to original sin, Anselm claimed that man is conceived in sin, not because the seed from which he was conceived was itself sinful, but because at the

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\(^{548}\) Rabanus Maurus, *Commentariorum in Exodum libri quattuor*, PL, 108.9-246, 4.3.1. In his treatise *De anima*, Rabanus claimed that natural philosophers dated the arrival of the soul to the fortieth day after conception, on the grounds that this was when the animated foetus began to move in the womb. PL, 110.1109-1120, at 112B. However, in the same paragraph he went on to cast doubt over this theory, describing how other authors argue that soul is generated from soul as body is generated from body, and citing Augustine for the impossibility of reaching any firm conclusions on questions relating to the origin of the soul.

\(^{549}\) Anselm, *DCV*, 7.

\(^{550}\) *Ibid*.

\(^{551}\) *Quomodo, quamuis non statim ab ipsa conceptione sit in infantibus peccatum, de immundo tamen semine in iniquitatibus et in peccatis concipi dicantur.* *Ibid*.

\(^{552}\) *Saepe utique scriptura divina asserit aliquid esse quando non est, idcirco quia certum est futurum esse.* *Ibid*.
moment of his conception he took on the necessity that when he later gained a rational soul he would become sinful.

Man can be understood to be conceived of impure seed in iniquity and in sin, not because in his seed there is the uncleanness of sin, or sin, or iniquity, but because from that seed and that conception from which he began to be a man he took on the necessity that when he had a rational soul he would have the uncleanness of sin, which is nothing other than sin and iniquity...There is no sin in these [infants], because they do not have the will, without which it is not in them; nevertheless, it is said to be in them, because in the seed they take on the necessity of sinning when they are men.\(^{553}\)

If the soul is not present at the moment of conception, but enters the body at a later date, the conclusion must be drawn that only the body, and not the soul, is reproduced by means of human propagation. Although he never stated his position explicitly, it seems that Anselm did not support traducianist models for the origin of the soul, whether ‘physical’ or ‘spiritual’. The ‘whole of human nature’ contained in Adam and propagated from him can only refer to man’s physical nature.

In order to explain how a new soul, created pure by God and infused into the body of the infant, immediately took on the guilt of original sin, Anselm argued that it was corrupted through contact with the flesh. When Adam and Eve first sinned,

their whole being was weakened and corrupted. For their bodies, because after such a sin they became like those of brute animals, were subjected to corruption and carnal appetites; and their souls, because of the corruption of the body and its

\(^{553}\) de immundo semine in iniquitatibus et in peccatis concipi potest homo intelligi, non quod in semine sit immunditia peccati aut peccatum sive iniquitas, sed quia ab ipso semine et ipsa conceptione ex qua incipit homo esse accipit necessitatem, ut cum habeit animam rationalem, habeat peccati immunditiam, quae non est altius quam peccatum et iniquitas...Quippe non est in illis peccatum, quia non habent sine qua non inest voluntatem; et tamen dicitur inesse, quoniam in semine trahunt peccandi, cum homines iam erunt, necessitatem. Anselmi, \textit{DIV}, 7. ‘Men’ is to be understood here in the broad sense of humanity, not as adult males. Camilla McNab renders \textit{homines} as ‘human beings’ in her translation for \textit{Oxford World Classics}. I have preferred to translate \textit{homo} and its variant forms as ‘man’ throughout, for the sake of consistency and to preserve the rich symbiosis between the concepts of the individual man and the universal nature of humanity which must be understood whenever \textit{homo} is used in patristic and medieval texts. This can be lost when alternative translations such as ‘human beings’ are intermittently substituted, whether with the aim of emphasizing a particular facet of the term in interpreting a given passage, or for the sake of political correctness.
appetites and the lack of goods which they had lost, were infected with carnal desires.\textsuperscript{554}

Anselm quoted a verse from the Wisdom of Solomon to illustrate his argument that ‘the body which is corrupted weighs down the soul.’\textsuperscript{555}

\textbf{Gilbert Crispin on the Soul}

Anselm’s apparent creationist stance regarding the origin of the soul was not shared by his student Gilbert Crispin. Gilbert favoured a form of traducianism, on the grounds that it provided the only reasonable explanation for original sin, which condemned innocent children who were too young to know right from wrong, on account of the sin of their first father. ‘For if the soul which is given to the infant is not given from the root of the first soul, and is not procreated from the first soul, by what justice is the innocent condemned for the sin of the first soul?’\textsuperscript{556}

Gilbert cited a text from Paul’s epistle to the Romans, claiming that ‘sin entered into the world through one man, and death through sin, and in this way death came to all men, because all sinned’, as the basis for his argument concerning original sin.\textsuperscript{557} If all men sinned in Adam’s sin, then all men’s souls must in some way have been present in Adam’s soul, for ‘how could they have sinned in him, in whom they in no way existed?’\textsuperscript{558} If only the body, and not the soul, were passed down from parent to child, what was the meaning of the psalmist’s statement that ‘I was conceived in iniquity, and in sin my mother conceived me’, when only the soul could justly be found guilty of sin?\textsuperscript{559} These arguments led Gilbert to the conclusion that ‘the soul of an infant is assumed from the root of the soul of the first man, and

\textsuperscript{554} \textit{Totum quod erant infirmatum et corruptum est. Corpus quidem, quia tale post peccatum fuit, qualia sunt brutorum animalium, corruptioni et carnalibus appetitibus subiacentia. Anima vero, quia ex corruptione corporis et eisdem appetitis atque ex indigentia bonorum quae perdidi, carnalibus affectibus est infecta.} Anselm, \textit{DCV}, 2.


\textsuperscript{557} Romans 5.12, in Gilbert, \textit{DA}, 10.

\textsuperscript{558} \textit{Quomodo in illo peccavit, in quo nullo modo erat.} Gilbert, \textit{DA}, 12.

\textsuperscript{559} \textit{Ibid.}, 14-15.
not newly inspired, because it seems that it cannot be liable to condemnation through the sins committed by another, or anything it had committed itself.’

Gilbert acknowledged that not everyone agreed with this interpretation of the origin of the soul: ‘There are many who do not believe these things to be the case, who do not see how they could be.’ For Gilbert, the failure to recognize the propagation of human souls from Adam’s first soul was attributable to a reluctance to accept concepts that transcended human understanding. In a passage reminiscent of Anselm’s condemnation of Roscelin of Compiegne’s failure to submit faithfully to teaching that he could not understand through his own limited powers of reason, Gilbert argued that opponents of the theory of propagation were over-reliant on the capacity of the human senses and unable to submit with faithful obedience to the possibilities presented by a higher power. ‘For they do not see how the existence of things could be thus, measuring the immensity of Almighty God according to the capacity of their own senses, and according to the estimation of human sense.’

Gilbert’s espousal of a traducianist explanation for the origin of the soul provided him with a clear and satisfactory explanation of how a just God could justly condemn the souls of innocent babies who were not yet capable of sin, unless they had been saved through the divine grace of baptism. The utility of the traducianist argument in explaining this problem was widely recognised. In his treatise De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo paruulorum, Augustine asked where, if the soul were not propagated, was the justice whereby the newly-created soul, which was free from the contagion of sin, should be compelled to suffer physical punishment and even condemnation to hell, should the child die before baptism.

In De anima, Gilbert addressed similar questions to Odo in De peccato originali, and the conclusions he reached, in support of a form of traducianism, were similar to those of Odo. Unlike Odo, Gilbert did not attempt to provide an explanation for precisely how soul is generated from soul, whether in terms of what would today be described as ‘physical’ or ‘spiritual’ traducianism, although given the extent of his dependence on Augustine the latter

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560 *Anima infantis ex traduce anime primis hominis assumatur, et minime noua inspiretur, quia nullo alterius peccato inquinata, nec aliquo suo in facta, damnationis obnoxia esse uidentur.* Gilbert, DA, 16.

561 *Sunt multi qui non credunt ea esse, qui ipsi non uident posse esse.* Ibid., 22.


563 Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo paruulorum*, ed. C. Urba, *CCSL*, 60 (Turnhout, 1913), 3.18. In a letter to Jerome, Augustine expressed again his difficulty with the idea that infants should suffer punishment if their souls were newly created and free from all sin. *Epistola* 166, ed. A. Goldbacher, *CSEL*, 44 (Turnhout, 1895), pp. 545-583.
appears most likely.\textsuperscript{564} He was not interested in complex philosophical analysis of the sort that Odo employed in the elaboration of his argument, not just because he recognized that such an investigation was beyond his personal powers, but because he thought it unnecessary, even irreverent, to attempt to penetrate too deeply into the mysteries of faith.

Evans praises Gilbert for the success with which he managed to reduce complex theological questions to understandable conclusions, arguing that he ‘achieves something modest but sound in its way, with no pretensions to do more than clarify a theological problem for his monks.’\textsuperscript{565} He achieved his aim of producing a coherent explanation of the transmission of original sin, which was acceptable to human reason and not in direct contradiction to Scripture, and which emphasized the immutability of divine justice.\textsuperscript{566}

Gilbert’s support for a form of traducianism, at a period in which popular opinion was increasingly coming down in favour of the creationist model, is interesting. Had he reached his conclusions independently, or was he guided to them through Anselm’s teaching? Resnick suggests that, given Gilbert’s dependence on Anselm as his student, it should be possible to accept Gilbert’s ‘apparent traducianism’ as ‘Anselm’s own.’\textsuperscript{567} A similar position is held by Hughes who, while acknowledging that Gilbert’s traducianism ‘could have been based upon a powerful conviction’ of his own, nevertheless believes that ‘more probably...it was based on a persuasive authority such as Anselm’s.’\textsuperscript{568}

Anselm was clearly thinking about the problem of the origin of the soul towards the end of his life, and presumably discussed the matter with his friends and fellow monks. In the \textit{Vita Anselmi}, Eadmer described how, on his deathbed, Anselm had expressed regret that he would not now be able to ‘settle a question concerning the origin of the soul, which I am turning over in my mind...for I do not know whether anyone will solve it when I am dead.’\textsuperscript{569}

Southern argues that Anselm’s concern about the problem, illustrated in this passage in Eadmer, may have provided the motivation for Gilbert Crispin to write his treatise \textit{De anima}, and that Gilbert may have seen himself as Anselm’s ‘theological executor’ in this

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{564} In another letter, Augustine presented an analogy of the soul as a flame which could light further flames without loss to itself. This view of the soul’s transmission accords with the concept that would today be described as spiritual traducianism. Augustine, \textit{Epistola} 190, ed. Goldbacher. CSEL, 57 (Turnhout, 1897), pp. 137-157.\textsuperscript{565} Evans, ‘Gilbert Crispin, Abbot of Westminster, on the Soul’, \textit{Studia Monastica} 22 (1980), pp. 251-272, at p. 264.\textsuperscript{566} Gilbert, \textit{DA}, 7-8.\textsuperscript{567} Resnick, \textit{Two Theological Treatises}, p. 26.\textsuperscript{568} Hughes, \textit{Odo}, p. 75.\textsuperscript{569} \textit{Quaestionum quam de origine animae mente revoluuo absoluere...eo quod nescio utrum aliquis eam me defuncto sit soluturas}, Eadmer, VA, 2.66.}
Evans also believes that Gilbert took his inspiration to write primarily from Anselm, although she argues that the uncertain dating of *De anima* precludes any confident assertion that the treatise was written after Anselm’s death, as an attempt to carry out Anselm’s own plan to write such a work.\(^5^{71}\)

Gilbert’s traducianist position in his *De anima* treatise cannot be explained as the result of Anselm’s teaching. This is not necessarily surprising. Gilbert was an independent author who may have been influenced by conversations with Anselm, but was quite capable of thinking for himself and developing his own arguments. The form and content of *De anima* owes more to Gilbert’s reading of Augustine than to anyone else. The whole question of the propagation of the soul in relation to the transmission of original sin was developed by Augustine in his attempts to demonstrate the reality and inevitability of humanity’s guilt in the face of his Pelagian opponents. In the context in which Augustine was writing, a traducianist explanation of the origin of the soul did far more to promote teaching on original sin than the creationist alternative. Gilbert’s use of the traducianist argument to explain the transmission of original sin follows Augustine’s example. His insistence on the uncertain nature of his conclusions, and the need for humility and faith regarding questions that surpassed the capacity of human knowledge, also reflects Augustine.

It is impossible to date *De anima* with any precision. Southern’s suggestion that Gilbert may have seen himself as Anselm’s theological executor, completing a task which Anselm, on his deathbed, had regretted being unable to finish himself, supposes a date after Anselm’s death in 1109. However, as Evans points out, his theory cannot be verified. An alternative possibility is that Gilbert completed his treatise before Anselm’s death. A decade earlier, when Anselm composed *De conceptu*, he did not discuss the origin of the soul explicitly, although it is apparent from his argument that he was a supporter of the creationist model. A treatise advocating traducianism, coming from the pen of his friend and student Gilbert, could have been the factor that instigated his concern, in the final months of his life, to clarify a problem that he had not previously considered in need of clarification. While this possibility remains little more than speculation, it does fit the pattern whereby Anselm’s interest in a question was stimulated by the desire to clarify and correct ideas that appeared in the writings of his contemporaries.

The suggestion that Gilbert’s traducianist beliefs came from his master Anselm is further weakened by the fact that Honorius Augustodunensis, another of Anselm’s students,

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\(^{571}\) Evans, ‘Soul’, p. 261.
supported creationism. In the dialogue of *Elucidarium*, Honorius had the student ask 'whether souls were created from the beginning or are created daily.'\(^{572}\) The master responds that, although the invisible material from which souls are made was created by God in the beginning, ‘they are formed daily...and sent into the body.'\(^{573}\) In the following question, Honorius explained how souls which are created good and holy become tainted when they enter the polluted body, so that no human soul is free from the corruption of sin.\(^{574}\) Nowhere in Honorius’ dialogue was the possibility that one soul is in some way generated from another mentioned.

Honorius’ purpose in *Elucidarium* was to provide clear and comprehensible explanation of doctrine that avoided difficulty and controversy. Even so, the fact that the student does not even mention traducianist theories as a possible explanation for the origin of the soul, to be rejected by the master, seems to suggest that Honorius did not consider traducianism to be a serious possibility, or was unaware of the idea’s currency among his contemporaries. If, as Hughes and others have suggested, Anselm’s thought on the origin of the soul involved elements of spiritual traducianism, one might expect that his student Honorius would have included at least a passing reference to the idea in his theological compendium.\(^{575}\)

By the 1130s, traducianist arguments for the origin of the soul, whether ‘physical’ or ‘spiritual’, had been widely rejected. In *De peccato originali*, Odo had declared with confidence that the creationist model of the origin of the soul was the orthodox catholic doctrine, although he had difficulty explaining how, if this were the case, original sin was transmitted from one soul to another. Hugh of St Victor encountered similar difficulties. In *De sacramentis*, he stated that

the catholic faith has chosen as more to be believed that souls are made daily from nothing to be joined to bodies to give them life, than that they are

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\(^{572}\) *Sunt animae ab initio creatae aut creuntur quotidie?* Honorius, *Elucidarium*, 2.34.

\(^{573}\) *Formantur autem quotidie...et mittuntur in corporum effigiem*. *Ibid*.

\(^{574}\) *Ibid*., 2.35.

\(^{575}\) A later recension of *Elucidarium* includes a greatly expanded discussion of original sin, which appears to have been inspired largely by *De conceptu*, a text which was not available when Honorius first composed *Elucidarium*. The additional text begins with Anselm’s definition of original sin as injustice (2.33a). God made man just, with the intention that he should preserve justice and pass it on to his descendants. Adam’s voluntary abandonment of the justice he had been given meant that the whole of human nature assumed his injustice from the origin of their life. This injustice is called original sin (2.33b). The text went on to explain how, although only the flesh is propagated from Adam, while the soul is a given by God, when the soul joins the body to form a man, that man instantly takes on the debt of original sin (2.33f). Man is conceived in sin because he is conceived through concupiscence in sexual intercourse (2.33g). All of these ideas can be found in Anselm’s work on original sin.
propagated from a root-stock according to the nature of the body and the character of human flesh.\textsuperscript{576}

As far as Hugh was concerned, there could be no doubt that the creationist model was correct, and that traducianism had been universally discredited by the Catholic Church. Hugh’s refutation of traducianist thought was based on the non-corporeality and indivisibility of the soul. The soul’s simple nature meant that it could not be divided into parts, one of which remained in the parent while the other passed into the offspring. ‘If, therefore, soul is born from soul as flesh from flesh, let them say how that simple substance either remains whole in the begetter, if it passes into the begotten, or passes whole into the begotten, if it remains in the begetter.’\textsuperscript{577}

Physical traducianism of the form taught by Tertullian clearly did not make sense, and was rejected by Hugh for much the same reason as it had been rejected by Odo. However, Hugh also rejected the idea of the consubstantiality of souls, with its suggestion that the human soul could be divided personally to create new individuals without affecting its essential simplicity.

Unless perhaps they should wish to say that all souls are consubstantial and that the simple matter is indeed multiplied personally in the propagation of children, but is not divided essentially; not realizing how greatly unfittingly they pursue this claim, if one and the same essence should be believed to be destined alike to blessedness and damnation, glory and punishment.\textsuperscript{578}

Here, Hugh rejected an argument that would today be described as ‘spiritual traducianism’, on the grounds that if all human souls were essentially the same nature, this single nature could not be simultaneously beatified and condemned in different individuals. If the human soul were one, it could only be either just or unjust, not both. There is no reason to suppose that Hugh was familiar with Odo’s arguments in favour of a form of spiritual traducianism, but this passage does indicate that he was aware of the existence of potential arguments.

\textsuperscript{576} Fides catholica magis credendum eligit, animas cotidie corporibus uiuifiandis sociandas de nichilo fieri quam secundum corporis naturam, et carnis humanae proprietatem de traduce propagari. Hugh, DS, 1.7.30.
\textsuperscript{577} Si igitur anima ex anima gignitur sicut caro ex carne, dicant quomodo illa simplex substantia aut tota in gignente remaneat, si in genitum transierit, aut tota in genitum transeat, si in gignente remanserit. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{578} Nisi fortes omnes animas consubstantiales dicere aelint et illam materiam simplicem in propagationem filiorum personaliter quidem multiplicari, sed essentialiter non diuidi, non attendentes quanta inconuenientia hanc assertionem sequantur, si una et eadem essentia similis beatitudini et damnationi, glorie et pene addicta credatur. Ibid.
attempting to reconcile the essential simplicity and indivisibility of the soul with elements of traducianist thought. Hugh denied that there was any way in which soul could be said to be propagated from soul, and cited a number of scriptural passages to support his belief that each individual soul is created by God. However, he did acknowledge that ‘never has any reason or authority been able to prevail to such an extent as to dispel questioning doubt, with this exception alone, that the catholic faith has chosen as to more to be believed’ that souls are created daily by God and infused into the body.

Odo and Gilbert had used a form of traducianism because they believed it provided the best explanation for the justice of condemnation for original sin, a belief which was apparently shared by Augustine. In *De sacramentis*, Hugh recognized the utility of traducianism for the doctrine of original sin. ‘If souls were thought to be from a root-stock, there would not be such a great question, because justice would be more apparent in this, that original sin is said to pass from parents to children...if souls are not from a root-stock, how are children made guilty of the sin of parents?’579 Hugh argued that where human reason alone was incapable of comprehension, there was no point in attempting to resolve doubtful problems through the imposition of equally doubtful assertions such as the generation of souls from a root-stock. Multiplying uncertain propositions could never lead to a certain truth. Instead, where one was unable to come up with a certain solution to a problem, one should accept with faith the teaching of authority. The Catholic Church taught that only the flesh, and not the soul, is transmitted from parent to child. Therefore, if original sin was transmitted from parent to child, it must be transmitted through the flesh, even if it was difficult to understand how this could be so.

**Anselm, Boso and the School of Laon**

In the preface to *De conceptu*, Anselm addressed his student Boso, his interlocutor in *Cur Deus homo*. He described how, during the course of the discussions that became the basis for *Cur Deus homo*, Boso had raised questions about how God was able to assume human nature without sin to become a sinless God-man, drawn from the mass of sinful humanity. The question as it appeared in the second book of *Cur Deus homo* asked

579 *Si autem anime ex traduce esse dicerentur, non tanta quaestio esset, quia manifestior iusticia esset in eo quod peccatum originale a patribus in filios transire dicitur...Si anime ex traduce non sunt, quomodo peccato parentum filii obnoxii efficiuntur.* Hugh, DS. 1.7.30.
how did God assume a man without sin out of the mass of sin, that is, the human race, which is totally infected with sin, as if unleavened bread from leavened? For, granted that the actual conception of this man was pure and free from the sin of carnal pleasure, the Virgin from whom he was taken...was born with original sin, since she herself sinned in Adam, ‘in whom all have sinned’.  

Anselm’s initial response to Boso’s question in *Cur Deus homo* had been to stress the miraculous nature of Christ’s conception, and the impossibility of penetrating fully the workings of divine Wisdom. When pressed by Boso, he went on to describe how the Virgin, although conceived in sin, was purified through faith so that Christ received his purity from hers.

Although he did not investigate the problem of original sin and the virginal conception in any detail, Boso’s question continued to resonate, and was a major factor in causing Anselm to return to the question in his next treatise.

I am certain that in the book, *Cur Deus homo*...you have gathered that another reason can be seen, besides that which I set out there, for how God assumed a man without sin from the sinful mass of humanity; and your eager mind is greatly stimulated to seek out what it is. Therefore, I am afraid of seeming unjust to you, if I conceal from your love what occurs to me on the subject. And so I shall say briefly what I think on the subject...

In the course of the treatise, Anselm explained how the virginal conception, which was effected without the will of man in the natural course of propagation, enabled a sinless child to be conceived in the womb of a mother who had herself been born under the power of original sin. This argument assumes acceptance of the Augustinian belief that original sin is transmitted through fleshly concupiscence, as it was the absence of concupiscence in Christ’s
conception in the Virgin that enabled his freedom from contamination with the stain of sin.\textsuperscript{583} The transmission of original sin, and the role of fleshly concupiscence within that process, was the subject of extensive discussion at the school of Laon in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries.

A passage in the \textit{Sententiae Anselmi} defined original sin as ‘the corruption of concupiscence or tendency to concupiscence’, which was transmitted in the father’s seed and which, when the child’s flesh became animated, led to personal sin.\textsuperscript{584} The body must have had original sin before the soul entered it; if not, the body, as well as the soul, would have been originally pure, leaving nowhere for original sin to be found.\textsuperscript{585}

A later passage in the \textit{Sententie} returned to the question of whether soul could be generated from soul as flesh from flesh. The author argued that reason denied this to be a possibility. The soul had no parts, so how could a part of the soul be separated from the rest for the purpose of propagation?\textsuperscript{586} Neither could the soul be transmitted in its entirety, as it was impossible for the same soul to be worthy of punishment and glory simultaneously in different individuals.\textsuperscript{587} The argument that soul could not be propagated from soul was then supported by numerous citations from scriptural and patristic authority: the apostle’s statement in the Epistle to the Hebrews that man is the father of the flesh, but God the father of the spirit; Augustine’s commentary on Psalms which taught that God creates new souls daily; and Jerome’s declaration that those who believed in the propagation of the soul were in serious error; as well as the passage from Exodus which argued that a man who provoked miscarriage in a woman should only render a life for a life if the foetus was formed.\textsuperscript{588}

The \textit{Sententie Anselmi} demonstrate that the teaching on the soul and its origin in the school at Laon was strongly in favour of the creationist position, a position that was apparently shared by Anselm of Canterbury. It is likely that Anselm was aware of the teaching of his Laon contemporaries. In Chapter Two, it was argued that Anselm’s knowledge of contemporary teaching at Laon regarding the position of the devil in the redemption may have come largely from his student Boso, who came to Anselm from the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{583} Augustine, \textit{DLA} 3.18.
\bibitem{585} \textit{Unde autem postea assumeret, quod prius non habuit, si et anima et ipsum corpus mundum fuit?} \textit{Ibid.}
\bibitem{586} \textit{Per partes autem propagari quomodo potest res carens partibus}. \textit{Sententie Anselmi} p. 76
\bibitem{587} \textit{eadem anima per unum in pena, per alium in gloria est}. \textit{Ibid.} The same argument against the propagation of the soul was used by Hugh of St Victor in \textit{De sacramentis}; see above, pp. 172-4.
\end{thebibliography}
schools with perplexing questions about what he had learnt there.\textsuperscript{589} It may well be the case that Anselm’s knowledge of the teaching on original sin available at Laon at this time may also have come, at least in part, from Boso. Through \textit{Cur Deus homo} and \textit{De conceptu}, Anselm attempted to offer a coherent explanation of original sin and the sinless conception of the Christ that resolved the sort of doctrinal problems facing his contemporaries in the schools. Masters such as Anselm of Laon were beginning the process of drawing together the various statements made by Augustine and other authorities in different contexts to try to create a comprehensive picture of the whole subject of original sin and its implications. Anselm’s treatises were intended to provide a cogent, rational analysis of a given problem, and a conceptual framework that could be used as a basis for further discussion.

Anselm’s contribution to thought on original sin and the origin of the soul in \textit{Cur Deus homo} and \textit{De conceptu} fed into ongoing discussion at Laon, although his position was not always fully understood. The author of the \textit{Sententiae divinae paginae} apparently believed Anselm to have held traducianist views on the soul’s origin. In a passage discussing the various theories of the transmission of original sin, the author claimed that

some people say that, just as the body is propagated from another, so one soul is also from another, because otherwise they do not know how to explain original sin in children, for which they are condemned. They do not know the means of transmission. And the bishop, in \textit{Cur Deus homo}, agrees with these men.\textsuperscript{590}

This statement is problematic on several levels. The reference to \textit{Cur Deus homo}, rather than \textit{De conceptu}, for Anselm’s discussion on original sin may be explicable in terms of the close association between the two texts in the twelfth century, where \textit{De conceptu} could be seen as a continuation and supplement to \textit{Cur Deus homo}, rather than a separate and independent treatise. More significant is the attribution to Anselm of traducianist views on the origin of the soul. This is probably a mistake; Bliemetzrieder suggests that Anselm’s authority should belong not to the group of individuals described in the preceding sentences, but to those that followed. The author went on to describe how ‘others say that souls are not propagated as the

\textsuperscript{589} Eadmer, VA, 1.34.
\textsuperscript{590} \textit{Quidam tamen dicunt, quod, sicut corpus traducitur ab alio, sic et una anima ex alia, quia aliter nesciunt assignare originale in pueris, qui pro ea damnatur; modum traductionis ignorant. Et his consentit episcopus in Cur Deus homo}. SDP, p. 32.
body is; and so sin is not transmitted in the soul; and so sin is not transmitted in the soul.\textsuperscript{591} This position is certainly much closer to Anselm’s belief as set out in \textit{De conceptu}. However, the author of the \textit{Sententie} remained unconvinced.

If it is propagated in the body, then the impurity, that is, sin, is either spiritual or corporeal. But if it is corporeal, then man ought no more to be condemned for it than if he had been polluted with mud. But it is not spiritual, because there cannot be spirit except in rational creatures. And so they say that original sin is something, but they do not know where to assign it.\textsuperscript{592}

The difficulty inherent in defining corporeal weakness as sin, and a source of guilt for which new-born infants could be condemned even before they were old enough to commit personal, willing sin for themselves, continued to exercise writers on original sin throughout the twelfth century. The author of the \textit{Sententie diuine pagine} argued that the soul ‘is not condemned for this corruption but because, when the soul is infused into the body, it finds that body apt and suitable for sin, and delights in that aptitude, and that delight is called original sin.’\textsuperscript{593} It was not the corrupt flesh itself, but the soul’s pleasure in its corruption, that was culpable.

In \textit{Elucidarium}, Honorius used a similar argument to explain how souls which are created good and holy become tainted with sin upon association with the polluted body.

God, from whom is all goodness and all holiness, creates none but good and holy souls, and these desire naturally to enter the body, as we naturally want to live. However, when they enter that impure and polluted vessel, they embrace it with such great avidity that they love it more than God. Therefore it is just that when they prefer that sordid vessel, indeed that prison in which they are enclosed, to the love of God, God excludes them from his company.\textsuperscript{594}

\textsuperscript{591} Alii dicunt, quod anime non traductuntur, immo corpora tantum. Et ita peccatum non est traductum in anima. \textit{SDP}, pp. 32-33.

\textsuperscript{592} Item si in corpore traducto est, tunc uel est ibi, spiritualis immunditia, id est, peccatum, uel corporalis. Sed si corporalis, tunc homo non debet damnari pro eo plus quam si luto coainquinaretur. Item ibi spiritualis no est, quia spiritualis non debet esse nisi in rationabili creatura. Ideo dicunt quidam quod est originale peccatum, sed nesciunt assignare ubi sit. \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{593} pro hac corruptione non damnetur, sed ideo, quando anima infunditur corpori, inuenit corpus aptum et idoneum ad peccandum, et delectatur in illa aptitudine, et illa delectatio appellatur peccatum originale \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{594} Deus, a quo omnis bonitas et omnis sanctitas, nonnisi bonas et sanctas creat animas et ipse naturaliter desiderant corpus intrare, ut nos naturaliter cupimus uiuere. Verumtamen, cum intrauerint illud immundum et pollutum uasculum, tanta auiditate illud amplexantur, ut plus diligant quam Deum. Iustum igitur est ut, cum
The argument that the soul was held guilty of original sin because of the delight and love that it felt for the corrupted flesh, was not universally accepted in the twelfth century. Hugh of St Victor objected on the grounds that ‘if we say that when the soul is mingled with the body it is inclined by some will to delight in guilt, we already show that it is guilty not only of original but also of actual sin.’ On the other hand, if the soul’s association with polluted flesh was not willing but forced through necessity, it should not be accounted as the guilt of sin, for ‘we show by that very necessity it is absolved from guilt. For what is entirely of necessity is not imputable.’ If the soul did willingly ally itself to the body in delighted anticipation of sin, this was an act of personal, willing guilt and should be identified as personal, not original sin. Hugh did not attempt to resolve this problem, arguing that the solution had not been revealed to human knowledge. Hugh was willing to accept that divine justice with respect to the guilt of original sin was unfathomable, but his contemporary Peter Abelard was not. Abelard denied that original sin should be discussed in terms of guilt at all, arguing that it was merely a punishment. Abelard’s views were vigorously opposed by Bernard of Clairvaux at the Council of Sens, and had little real impact in the twelfth century.

Anselm’s discussion of original sin and the origin of the soul in Cur Deus homo and De conceptu reflected the teaching of Laon insofar as he agreed that the soul is created pure by God, and infused into the body at some point after conception, whereupon it becomes contaminated with original sin transmitted through the flesh. He also insisted that original sin was real sin, stressing the magnitude of its impact on man’s relationship with God. In all this, his work was entirely in agreement with the most influential streams of thought in the schools of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries. However, he diverged from popular opinion in his definition of original sin, not as concupiscence, but as injustice. This inevitably meant that his arguments on the subject of original sin developed along different lines from those of his contemporaries and successors in the schools. By defining original sin as the lack of original

ipsae sordidum uas, immo carcerem, quo clauduntur, amori Dei praeponat, eas Deus a suo consortio excludat. Honorius, Elucidarium, 2.35.

si diximus animam quando corpori commiscetur uoluntate quedam ad delectionem culpa inclinari, iam non originali tantum, sed actuque quoque peccato obnoxiam esse demonstramus. Hugh, DS, 1.7.35.

Ex ipsa necessitate a reatu absolutam esse ostendimus. Quod enim omnino necessitatis est, imputabile non est. Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Item 8 on Bernard’s list of charges against Abelard was the claim ‘that we do not contract guilt from Adam, but only punishment [quod non contraximus culpam ex Adam, sed poenam tantum].’ Bernard, Epistola 190.
justice, rather than the positive vice of concupiscence, he avoided problems such as whether and how the soul became a willing participant in that vice, that so troubled other authors. This may go some way towards explaining why *De conceptu* was cited by relatively few authors in the early twelfth century. Aspects of Anselm’s thought such as his definition of sin as injustice did not fit easily into the discursive framework of other authors who sought answers to questions based primarily on the Augustinian model of sin as concupiscence. *De conceptu* remained a popular text in the twelfth century, as is shown by the large number of surviving manuscripts, but full appreciation of the significance of Anselm’s argument was not yet widespread.\(^{601}\)

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\(^{601}\) See Appendix for manuscript availability.
Chapter Six

Writing about God and the Trinity

Monologion, Proslogion, De incarnacione Verbi and De processione Spiritus Sancti

In the preceding chapter, it was argued that Anselm’s discussion of original sin in De conceptu virginali had relatively little impact on contemporary debate in the schools because his approach to the subject was not immediately relevant to the discursive framework employed elsewhere. In contrast with Anselm’s analysis of the meaning of necessity in the redemption in Cur Deus homo, or the nature of free choice in De libertate arbitrii, Anselm’s definition of original sin as original injustice, and consequent failure to address problems such as the origin of the soul, meant that De conceptu had less obvious utility in the context of the specific debates that dominated discussion in schools such as Laon and St Victor. Written evidence of discussion of Anselm’s work often only exists where an aspect of his teaching was controversial, or provided an obvious contribution to contemporary debate. Where his ideas were uncontroversial, or did not fit easily into the discursive framework of the schools, there was little reason for Anselm’s contemporaries and successors to write explicitly about his work, even if the texts themselves were widely copied, indicating that they were well known, and considered of value by those who produced them.

There is very little evidence of discussion of Anselm’s earliest major treatises, Monologion and Proslogion, in the schools of the early twelfth century. The ‘ontological argument’ of Proslogion, which described God as ‘that than which a greater cannot be conceived’, was to have an enormous influence from the thirteenth century onwards, and is still widely discussed today.\(^{602}\) However, with the exception of the correspondence of Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, shortly after the text’s completion in the late 1070s, it was almost universally ignored by Anselm’s contemporaries and twelfth-century successors. This may be because the majority of Anselm’s readers in the early twelfth century were primarily interested in his work as a meditation and reflection on non-controversial ideas that were already familiar from earlier authors such as Augustine. As with the texts discussed in previous chapters, Monologion and Proslogion can be read as extended commentaries on ideas derived from Augustine, drawing together images and statements contained in a variety of Augustine’s works and combining them with ideas taken from Scripture and other...
authorities to generate a more complete, systematic understanding of orthodox, ‘Augustinian’ thought.

As with the treatises discussed in previous chapters, Anselm’s writing provoked controversy when it was thought to contradict orthodox authority. In *Monologion*, this can be seen in particular with regard to his discussion of the terminology best suited to describing the unity and triplicity of the triune God. Although Anselm’s thought was firmly rooted in earlier authority, as he stressed repeatedly in the Prologue to the text and in subsequent correspondence, he made little explicit reference to the work of his predecessors in the main body of the text. His working methodology took the pioneering approach of actively avoiding all explicit appeal to authority, whether scriptural or patristic, with the intention instead of demonstrating through rational argumentation that the truth of the Christian faith must be so, and to provide a framework for intellectual understanding and contemplation of what was already believed. This approach to theological questions aroused suspicion from some members of the monastic community, who apparently mistrusted an over-reliance on reason at the expense of authoritative teaching. In the 1090s, Anselm himself was to oppose the Trinitarian teaching of Roscelin of Compiègne, whose lack of respect for the authoritative teaching of orthodox catholicism, and reluctance to accept any truth that he could not grasp through his intellectual capacity alone, Anselm blamed for leading him into severe doctrinal heresy. Roscelin cited Anselm’s teaching in support of his ‘heretical’ claims concerning the Trinity, and this potential association with the taint of heresy provoked Anselm to enter into confrontation with Roscelin more directly than at any other moment in his career. His response took the form of an open letter *De incarnatione Verbi*, through which Roscelin was condemned at the Council of Soissons and forced to recant his erroneous teaching.603 The incident illustrates Anselm’s role in the gradual elaboration of ‘orthodox’ doctrine in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, with its concurrent identification and condemnation of ‘heretical’ statements and beliefs.

Anselm’s response to Roscelin in *De incarnatione Verbi* was itself subject to criticism in the 1120s by Peter Abelard, who suggested that Anselm’s analogy of a river to describe the Trinity, with a piped channel representing the incarnate Christ, had potentially heretical implications. Abelard’s own teaching on the Trinity met with strong opposition, and was condemned at the second council of Soissons in 1122. The complex personal relationships connecting Anselm, Roscelin and Abelard, that may have had as great an impact on

Abelard’s attitude towards his predecessor as the theological content of the arguments under debate, illustrate the importance of personal networks within the scholarly communities of the early twelfth century, although these are inevitably much more difficult to define than the transmission of written texts. Abelard’s discussion was limited to his analysis of a single analogy from *De incarnatione*. With this exception, there is little evidence for any discussion and criticism of Anselm’s writing on the Trinity in the schools. This implies that his arguments were generally viewed as non-controversial, and not prime candidates for debate. Nevertheless, the large number of manuscript copies suggests that treatises such as *Monologion* and *Proslogion* were considered valuable, even if they were not discussed in the surviving theological texts of the period.

**Monologion: Reason and Authority**

In Anselm’s first major treatise, *Monologion* (c. 1076), he attempted to discuss what could be known and said about God and the Trinity. Although the text relied heavily on ideas and arguments derived from Scripture and the patristic authors, Anselm made little explicit reference to authority, concentrating instead on a rational exposition and logical analysis of terms. This approach apparently provoked opposition from Anselm’s former mentor Lanfranc, who had taught him when he first came to Bec, before transferring to Caen in 1063. Anselm sent a copy of the text to Lanfranc for his approval. Lanfranc’s response does not survive, but it seems that he did not approve of Anselm’s methodology and lack of appeal to earlier authorities. Anselm insisted that *Monologion* was fully in accord with the teaching of the patristic authors, particularly Augustine. In his Preface to the completed work, he wrote that

> in the course of frequent re-readings of this treatise I have been unable to find anything which is inconsistent with the writings of the Catholic Fathers, and in particular with those of the Blessed Augustine. If, then, someone thinks that I have said here anything which is either too modern, or which departs from the truth, I would ask them to denounce me not as an arrogant modernizer or a maintainer of falsehood. Rather I ask that they first make a careful and thorough

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604 Anselm’s disagreement with Lanfranc concerning his discussion of the Trinity has been discussed in detail by Gasper, *Anselm*, pp. 127-143.
reading of the books *On the Trinity* of the aforementioned learned Augustine and then judge my little treatise on the basis of them.\(^{605}\)

In particular, Anselm was apparently criticized for his discussion of the vocabulary of ‘person’ and ‘substance’ in the Trinity. In the penultimate chapter of *Monologion*, he addressed the difficulty of finding a suitable term to represent the sense in which the Trinity was three. Talk of three persons in one substance was inappropriate, as a person is an independently existing thing, and the number of persons was the same as the number of substances; ‘since there are not several substances in the supreme essence, there are not several persons.’\(^{606}\) Nevertheless, practical necessity demanded that some term be adopted, however inadequately, to convey the triplicity of the Trinity. Anselm argued that ‘person’ or ‘substance’ could be used in this context, as they were terms commonly used to indicate individuals that existed as the subject of accidents. ‘Substance’ could not properly be used to describe the supreme essence, as the supreme essence was not subject to accidents. Therefore, Anselm concluded, ‘on the grounds of linguistic necessity, it is possible to refer with a clear conscience to refer to the unitary Trinity and Trinitary unity as one essence and three persons or substances.’\(^{607}\)

In suggesting that the Trinity could be spoken of as three substances, Anselm diverged from the standard Latin usage, which preferred to speak of three persons in one substance. However, it was not without precedent. The concept of three substances in one person was characteristic of thought among Greek authors, and Augustine, in his treatise *De trinitate*, had discussed the problem of terminology along similar lines to Anselm.\(^{608}\) Not all of Anselm’s early readers recognized the authoritative precedents for Anselm’s statement, or appreciated the logic which drove him to his conclusions. In a letter to Rainald, abbot of Poitiers, Anselm admitted that he had been criticised for his discussion of person and substance in the Trinity in *Monologion*, by people who

\(^{605}\) Quam ego saepe retractans nihil potui inuenire me in ea dixisse, quod non catholicorum patrum et maxime beati Augustini scriptis cohaeret. Quapropter si cui uidebitur, quod in eodem opusculo aliquid protulerim, quod aut nimis novum sit aut a ueritate dissentiat: rogo, ne statim me aut praesumptorem novitatum aut falsitatis assertorem exclamet, sed prius libros praefati doctoris Augustini De trinitate diligenter perspiciat, deinde secundum eos opusculum meum diluidiet. Anselm, *Monologion*, Prologus.

\(^{606}\) Quare in summa essentia sicut non sunt plures substantiae, ita nec plures personae. *Ibid.*, 79.

\(^{607}\) Potest ergo hac necessitatis ratione irreprehensibiler illa summa et una trinitas siue trina unitas dici una essentia et tres personae siue tres substantiae. *Ibid.*

\(^{608}\) Augustine, *DT*, 7.4.4-7. In the prologue to *Monologion*, Anselm defended his use of terminology with reference to the Greek usage, explaining that the difference use of vocabulary did not imply any difference of belief in the unity and triplicity of the Godhead.
did not know that three *personas* cannot be said properly of God, just as three *substantias* cannot, although there is a certain reason by which inadequate words may be used to signify that plurality which is understood in the supreme Trinity. The Latins say three *personas*, believing in one *substantia*, but the Greeks, no less faithfully, confess three *substantias* in one *persona*.

It may well be the case that Lanfranc’s criticism of *Monologion* focused in particular on Anselm’s apparent unorthodoxy in suggesting that one might speak of three *substantiae* in the Trinity with no less legitimacy than of three *personae*. This is certainly the impression given by the fact that it was this point on which he was most eager to defend himself, both in the Prologue to the text itself and in the letters concerning it. The relation between person and substance in Anselm’s thought was to become significant again during the 1090s, in the controversy against Roscelin of Compiègne.

Anselm’s approach to linguistic problems and the relative roles of authority and reason in discussion of the nature of God and the Trinity divided the monastic community at Bec and beyond. While readers such as Lanfranc were apparently concerned that Anselm’s emphasis on logic and reasoning might lead him into unorthodox statements and erroneous belief, others were eager to read a work that would explain, clearly and rationally, the content of faith and the reasoning behind various doctrinal statements. In the Prologue to *Monologion*, Anselm emphasized the frequent and earnest requests of his fellow monks to produce a text in which ‘nothing whatsoever was to be argued on the basis of Scripture, but the constraints of reason concisely to prove, and the clarity of truth clearly to show, in the plain style, with everyday arguments and down-to-earth dialectic, the conclusions of distinct investigations.’

Although a description of the author’s reluctant and humble acquiescence to the demands of eager disciples was a standard literary feature in a prologue of this sort, there was clearly a demand for a text that provided a rational and coherent explanation of statements and ideas that could previously be found only through extensive searching in disparate passages from authors such as Augustine. The popularity of the text, and

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610 See below, p. 190.

611 *Quatenus auctoritate scripturae penitus nihil in ea persuaderetur, sed quidquid per singulas investigationes finis assereret, id ita esse plano silo et ulterioribus argumentis simplicique disputatione et rationis necessitas breuiter cogeret et veritatis claritas palenter ostenderet.* Anselm, *Monologion, Prologus*. Anselm made a similar statement in the prologue to *CDH* (see Chapter 1).
widespread manuscript transmission, clearly demonstrate the need which Anselm’s work supplied.

**Proslogion**

Anselm’s next treatise, *Proslogion*, also divided opinion among the monastic community at Bec. As with *Monologion*, Anselm wrote for the benefit of his fellow monks, but there is evidence that not everyone at Bec appreciated what he was doing. Eadmer described how the wax tablets containing an early draft of the work were twice taken and destroyed by an unknown member of the community.\(^{612}\) Giles Gasper discusses this incident in some detail, and sees it as evidence of intellectual opposition towards Anselm’s working methodology, as well as political hostility and tensions arising from Anselm’s early promotion to a position of authority at Bec.\(^{613}\)

Early criticism of Anselm’s argument in *Proslogion* was not confined to wholesale rejection of his philosophical approach, but also included critical engagement with the argument on its own terms. The latter is epitomized by the *Pro insipiente*, traditionally attributed to Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, which Anselm ordered to be appended to future copies of *Proslogion* along with his own response.\(^{614}\) The *Pro insipiente* argued that the description of God as ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’\(^{615}\) did not necessarily prove that God exists. Anselm had argued that the existence, at least in the mind, of ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’, was proven even by doubters and deniers, since they understood and had a conception of what was said. ‘Therefore even the Fool is forced to agree that something than which a greater cannot be thought exists in the mind, since he understands this when he hears it, and whatever is understood is in the mind.’\(^{616}\) If it existed in the mind, it must also exist in reality, since that which had existence in reality was always greater than that which existed only in the mind.

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\(^{612}\) Eadmer, *VA*, 1.19.


\(^{614}\) *Quid ad haec respondeat quidam pro insipiente*, ed. Schmitt, *Opera*, vol. 1, pp. 125-129. Nothing certain is known about the author of *Pro insipiente*, who was anonymous in the early manuscripts of the text and in Eadmer’s account in *VA*, but long tradition associates the work with Gaunilo, an otherwise-unknown monk of Marmoutiers. For discussion, see Logan, *Proslogion*.


And surely that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist in the mind alone. For if it exists in the mind alone, it can be thought to exist in reality also, which is greater. If then that than which a greater cannot be thought exists in the mind alone, this same thing than which a greater cannot be thought is that than which a greater can be thought. But this surely cannot be. Therefore there is no doubt that something than which a greater cannot be thought exists both in the mind and in reality.617

In response to Anselm’s claim that ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ must exist in the mind, since even unbelievers understood the phrase and were able to form a mental conception of it, the Fool responded that it was perfectly possible to form a mental conception of a thing without believing it existed. Further, God so far transcended human understanding as to make it impossible to form a true conception of him. The Fool argued that

He who says that which is greater than everything exists because otherwise it would not be that which is greater than everything does not pay enough attention to whom he is speaking. For I do not yet admit, indeed I even deny or doubt, that this greater thing is any truly existing thing; and I do not concede that it exists in a different way from that when the mind tries to imagine a completely unknown thing on the basis of spoken words alone, if one can speak of ‘existence’ here. How therefore can it be proved to me from this that that which is greater than everything truly exists in reality, because it is evident that it is greater than all others, if I still deny and doubt that this is evident and do not admit that this greater thing exists either in my mind or thought, even in the sense in which many doubtfully real and unreal things are?618

617 Et certe id quo maius cogitari nequit, non potest esse in solo intellectu. Si enim uel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re, quod maius est. Si ergo id quo maius cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu: id ipsum quo maius cogitari non potest, est quo maius cogitari potest. Sed certe hoc esse non potest. Exstitit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo maius cogitari non ualet, et in intellectu et in re. Anselmi, Proslogion, 2 (my emphasis).

618 Quod qui esse dicit hoc quod maius omnibus aliter non erit omnibus maius: non satis attendit cui loquatur. Ego enim nondum dico, immo etiam nego uel dubio utra re uera esse maius illud, nec allud et esse concedo quam illud, si dicendum est ‘esse’, cum secundum uocem tantum audiam rem proorus ignotam sibi conatur animus effigere. Quomodo igitur inde mihi probatur maius illud rei ueritate subsistere, quia constet illud maius omnibus esse, cum id ego eo usque negem adhuc dubitemue constare, ut ne in intellectu quidem uel cogitatione mea eo saltem modo maius ipsum esse dicam, quo dubia etiam multa sunt et incerta? Pro insipiente, 5.
To illustrate his argument, the Fool imagined a mythical ‘Lost Island’, which was in every way superior to all other lands on earth. Such an island could easily be conceived in the imagination, but it would be foolishness to claim that this island must necessarily exist in reality, on the grounds that if it did not exist in reality as well as in the imagination, it would not be greater than existing lands and therefore could not exist, even in the mind, in the terms attributed to it.\(^{619}\)

In his response to the *Pro insipiente*, Anselm argued that the Fool was wrong in assuming that ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ was equivalent to ‘that which is greater than everything.’ ‘That which is greater than everything’, such as the Lost Island, could be thought not to exist; but ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ could not.\(^{620}\)

Even if the supreme goodness was beyond the power of human comprehension, the formula ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ could be understood, so that ‘what is heard can be thought of and understood even if the thing itself, than which a greater cannot be thought, cannot be thought of and understood.’\(^{621}\) It was possible to conceive of a being which was unable not to exist, and this must be understood as greater than a being that was able not to exist.

When, therefore, one thinks of that than which a greater cannot be thought, if one thinks of what can not exist, one does not think of that than which a greater cannot be thought. But the same thing cannot be both thought of and not thought of simultaneously. Therefore, he who thinks of that than which a greater cannot be thought does not think of something that can not exist but something that cannot not exist. Therefore what he thinks of exists necessarily, since whatever can not exist is not what he thinks of.\(^{622}\)

Anselm engaged in detail with the content of the Fool’s argument, pointing out the inaccuracies in his logic and reiterating and clarifying his own statements. In the final chapter of his response, he explained that he had chosen to do this because ‘it is quite clear that you [the Fool] have criticized those parts that seemed to you to be weak, not from any malice but

\(^{619}\) *Pro insipiente*, 6.


\(^{621}\) *Quod auditur cogitari et intelligi potest, etiam si res illa cogitari non ualeat aut intelligi, quia maius cogitari nequit. Ibid.*

\(^{622}\) *Dum ergo cogitatur quo maius non possit cogitari: si cogitatur quod possit non esse, non cogitatur quo non possit cogitari maius. Sed nequit idem simul cogitari et non cogitari. Quare qui cogitatur quo maius non possit cogitari: non cogitat quod possit, sed quod non possit non esse. Quapropter necesse est esse quod cogitat, quia quidquid non esse potest, non est quod cogitavit. Ibid.*, 9.
The Fool apparently recognized and appreciated Anselm’s intention, to prove by necessary reasons what he already believed through faith, and his difficulties following the logic of Anselm’s argument deserved to be taken seriously. Although Anselm himself did not consider further clarification necessary, he acknowledged that some readers were swayed by the Fool’s argument, and needed to have his mistakes clearly corrected. By ordering both the Pro insipiente and his own response to be copied and transmitted alongside all future copies of Proslogion, Anselm sought to ensure that the difficulties of his argument that had led the Fool to reject it should not prove a stumbling block to future readers.

With the exception of the Pro insipiente, there is no surviving evidence of any further discussion of Anselm’s argument. The text of Proslogion was clearly popular, and was widely copied in the early twelfth century; but few, if any, readers were concerned with the content of the logical argument of the early chapters. This may be because Anselm’s argument was not seen as controversial. Rather than a difficult problem that needed to be analysed and resolved, it was interpreted as a detailed re-statement of a universally-accepted belief. Unlike the necessary reasons for the incarnation and redemption, that provided fertile ground for debate in the schools of the early twelfth century, the necessary reasons for the existence of God were not considered to be in need of elucidation.

Anselm’s description of God as ‘that than which a greater cannot be conceived’ had precedents in earlier literature. In his Philosophiae Consolationis, Boethius discussed how the indisputable existence of imperfect goods necessitated the existence of a perfect good, the fount of all goods from which all lesser goods are derived as diminutions. God was the supreme good, for ‘nothing better than God can be conceived of.’ In his Confessiones, Augustine described the absolute incorruptibility of God, saying that ‘there could not have been or be any soul capable of conceiving that which is better than you, who are the supreme and highest good.’ Elsewhere, Augustine also described God as ‘the absolute supreme good, than whom nothing is or can be thought better.’ Anselm’s description can thus be

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623 Ibid., 10. In Pro insipiente 9, the Fool had offered fulsome praise for the majority of Anselm’s text, but noted that the argument to which he objected, although ‘rightly intuited’, was ‘less surely worked out’ and needed to be demonstrated more firmly.
624 Anselm, Responsio, 5.
626 Neque enimulla anima unquam potuit, poteritque cogitari aliquid quod sit melius, qui summum et bonum optimum est. Augustine, Confessiones, 7.4.6.
627 Summum bonum omnino, et quo esse et cogitari melius nihil possit. Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum, PL, 32, 1309-78, 2.11.24.
seen as an elaboration of an earlier theme, providing a thorough logical analysis of the necessary reasons for an idea that was already widely known. In a rare utilization of the phrase in the early twelfth century, Gilbert Crispin incorporated it into his discussion of how and why God could take on human form in the incarnation: ‘if God is that than which nothing greater or more self-sufficient can be conceived, by what necessity was he compelled to become a participant in human calamity and be a fellow sufferer of such great evils?’ This casual reference to the idea, without any attempt to explain or contextualize its claims, demonstrates its uncontroversial nature in the early twelfth century.

**Roscelin of Compiègne**

Anselm’s response to the *Pro insipiente* opened with an acknowledgement that his opponent was ‘an orthodox Christian and no fool.’ His conviction of the author’s orthodox faith enabled Anselm to address the arguments raised on their own terms, demonstrating the inevitable logic by which ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ must be understood to have real existence. An unshakeable faith in the truth of catholic doctrine was a fundamental pre-requisite of theological inquiry of the sort that Anselm attempted in *Proslogion*; in the opening prayer of the treatise, he acknowledged the utter impossibility of perceiving the nature of God which so transcended human understanding. Nevertheless, he prayed,

I do desire to understand your truth a little, that truth that my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand so that I may believe, but I believe so that I may understand. For I believe this also, that ‘unless I believe, I shall not understand.’

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For Anselm, the purpose of theological inquiry was to meditate on and penetrate deeper into the mystery of a faith that was already believed, to heighten understanding of the reasons for particular points of doctrine and to eliminate false beliefs. The impeccable orthodoxy of the author of *Pro insipiente* enabled the discussion of the logic of aspects of Anselm’s argument without any doubt as to the ultimate truth of his conclusion.

Anselm’s response to the *Pro insipiente* stands in sharp contrast to his response to another early reader of his writing on the nature of God, Roscelin of Compiègne. Apparently basing his claims on his reading of *Monologion*, Roscelin taught an understanding of the Trinity that was not in full accord with the teaching of the Catholic Church, and cited Anselm in support of his heterodox beliefs. Anselm’s reaction, in his treatise *De incarnatione Verbi*, contains some of his most conservative rhetoric on the place of theological investigation. He criticized Roscelin for not adhering to the rule that ‘unless you have believed, you will not understand’, and condemned

the presumption of those who, since they are unable to understand intellectually things the Christian faith professes, and with foolish pride think that there cannot in any way be things that they cannot understand, with unspeakable rashness dare to argue against such things rather than with humble wisdom admit their possibility.631

Anselm went on to say that

No Christian ought to argue how things that the Catholic Church sincerely believes and verbally professes are not so, but by always adhering to the same faith without hesitation, by loving it, and by living humbly according to it, a Christian ought to argue how they are, inasmuch as one can look for reasons.632

Michael Clanchy interprets this passage as setting a precedent for the censorship of texts concerning the fundamental tenets of the Catholic faith. He claims that ‘St Anselm had

631 *Praesumptionem eorum, qui nefanda temeritate audent disputare contra aliquid eorum quae fides Christiana confitetur, quoniam id intellectu capere nequeunt, et potius insipienti superbia iudicant nullatenus posse esse quod nequeunt intelligere, quam humili sapientia futeantur esse multa posse, quae ipsi non ualeant comprehendere. Anselm, DIV. 1.

632 *Nullus quippe Christianus debet disputare, quomodo quod catholica ecclesias corde credit et ore confitetur non sit; sed semper eandem fidem indubitante tenendo, amando et secundum illam uiuendo humiliter quantum potest quaeerere rationem quomodo sit. Ibid.*
recommended to the pope [Urban II, to whom the final version of the treatise was dedicated] that “no Christian should dispute about something which the catholic Church believes with its heart and confesses with its mouth.” In other words, there was to be no discussion of articles of the creed.”\textsuperscript{633} Clanchy’s translation of Anselm’s statement here is misleading; Anselm did not oppose all discussion of the articles of faith, but only of things that were clearly contrary to them: ‘no Christian ought to argue how what the catholic Church believes...is not so, but...how it is.’

For Anselm, the articles of the creed constituted the parameters of valid theological inquiry. The attempt to identify and understand the reasons underlying the fundamental belief of the Church was a useful, faith-enhancing activity. On the contrary, stepping beyond the boundaries established by the creed and treating its articles as open to question and correction was an inexcusable form of intellectual arrogance. Anselm attributed Roscelin’s heterodox teaching on the Trinity to an inability to accept, humbly and faithfully, divine mysteries that he was unable to explain rationally. Such arrogance deserved censure as much as the faulty logic of his argument required correction. The authority of the Church, embodied in the Pope, must act to defend the faith against the incursions of scholastic innovators.

Anselm firmly believed in the utility of logical argumentation in interpreting the teaching of Scripture and the content of the faith. His \textit{sola ratione} technique, employed in treatises from \textit{Monologion} to \textit{Cur Deus homo}, was a pioneering attempt to understand and clarify catholic doctrine by exploiting all available tools of reason and scholarship. Nevertheless, all theological inquiry must remain subject to the authority of the Church as the guardian of the true faith, by not casting doubt on the beliefs expressed in the creed. Where there was a direct conflict between the conclusions of individual reason and authoritative belief, the individual must be prepared to accept the fallibility of his own intellect and submit to the authority of the Church. Anselm’s emphasis on the importance of obedience to the authority of the Church may in part reflect his monastic background, suggesting a possible difference between ‘monastic’ and ‘scholastic’ approaches to theological activity.

How much Anselm knew about the details of Roscelin’s teaching is unclear. In the first recension of \textit{De incarnatione Verbi} (c. 1090-92), Anselm commented that he had known Roscelin personally, as a friend.\textsuperscript{634} Where and when they had met is unknown, but it seems

\textsuperscript{634} \textit{Hunc autem noui, quia amicus meus est}. Anselm, \textit{DIV Prior recensio}, 2. An intriguing passage in a letter from Peter Abelard to Gilbert, Bishop of Paris (c. 1122), hints that Roscelin had been involved in a violent dispute with Anselm, that resulted in his expulsion from England: ‘he blazed up so much against that magnificent doctor of the Church, Anselm of Canterbury, through his insults, that on account of his shameless
unlikely that Anselm knew Roscelin well, as he was apparently unaware of the nature of his teaching until he was alerted to its heretical content by a letter from John, a former Bec monk at Beauvais.\(^{635}\) Anselm’s initial response to John indicates a degree of caution, as he was unsure what meaning to attach to Roscelin’s statement.\(^{636}\) However, by the time he came to write his fuller response, in *De incarnatione Verbi*, Anselm was no longer in any doubt as to the heretical nature of Roscelin’s claims, or the danger that they posed. The text took the form of an open letter to the Church council at Soissons, where Roscelin was tried for heresy. Anselm did not attend the council himself, but entrusted the letter to Fulco, Bishop of Beauvais, to be read aloud to the entire assembly if necessary.\(^{637}\) In this letter, Anselm wrote that

> the cleric Roscelin says that in God the three persons are three things existing in separation from one another like three angels, and yet in such a way that there is one will and power; or else the Father and the Holy Spirit were incarnate. And [he says that] one could truly speak of three gods, if custom allowed it. He claims that Archbishop Lanfranc of venerable memory was of this opinion and that I am of it.\(^{638}\)

With regard to Lanfranc, there is little in the available evidence of his teaching to support Roscelin’s claim, although Margaret Gibson suggests that he may have been exploring the theological implications of Lanfranc’s comments, based on the *De decem categoriis*, on the ineffable name of God, in which he identified the name of God with *ousia*, ‘the ultimate term that is beyond utterance or comprehension.’\(^{639}\) However, with regard to his own teaching, Anselm was aware that statements he had made regarding the meaning of terms such as *grammaticus* and *albus* could be interpreted as supporting Roscelin’s statement. In his


\(^{638}\) Roscelinus clericus dicit in deo tres personas esse tres res ab inuicem separatas, sicut sunt tres angeli, ita tamen ut una sit voluntas et potestas; aut patrem et spiritum sanctum esse incarnatum; et tres deos uere posse dici, si usus admitteret. In qua sententia asserit uenerabilis memoriae archiepiscopum Lanfrancum fuisse et me esse. Anselm, Epistola 136, p.279.

treatise *De grammatico*, Anselm had demonstrated that these terms denoted quality, in reference to the substance *homo*. Although the statement is not found in any of his surviving written works, Anselm apparently also discussed the meaning of such terms as an analogy for the Trinity, suggesting that the persons of the Trinity were to God what qualities such as *albus*, *iustus* and *grammaticus* were to an individual man. In the first, unfinished, draft of *De incarnatione Verbi*, Anselm described how Roscelin ‘claimed to have heard me say that God can be said to be Father and Son and Spirit proceeding from Father and Son just as *albus* and *iustus* and *grammaticus* and similar things are said regarding an individual man.’ Anselm did not deny the truth of this statement, but it is significant that, in the final published version of *De incarnatione*, he removed all mention of it, apparently in consideration of the potentially damaging conclusions that could be drawn from it.

Constant Mews identifies another passage in Anselm’s writing that could have provided a basis for Roscelin’s belief that Anselm taught that the three persons of the Trinity could be described as three *res*: his discussion, in *Monologion*, of the three *substantiae* in the Trinity. In the only surviving text known to have been written by Roscelin, a letter to Peter Abelard denying accusations that he was guilty of teaching tri-theism, Roscelin insisted that he believed in the unity of the divine nature. Nevertheless, he stressed the importance of differentiating adequately between the three persons of the Trinity. As Anselm had done in *Monologion*, Roscelin cited Augustine’s discussion of the differences in terminology employed by the Latins and Greeks in describing the nature of the Trinity.

We do not therefore signify through ‘person’ anything else than through ‘substance’, and although we are accustomed from a certain habit of speaking to triple ‘person’ and not ‘substance’, the Greeks are accustomed to triple ‘substance’. And indeed it must not be said that in the faith in the Trinity they err in tripling ‘substance’, because they legitimately speak differently from us, yet they believe that which we believe, because, just as we say, they signify

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642 Southern discusses Anselm’s ‘suppression’ of the statement in *Portrait*, p. 178.
643 See above.
absolutely the same thing in God, whether by ‘person’ or ‘substance’ or ‘essence’. For, as much as there is diversity in speech, there is unity in faith.644

Roscelin argued that, ‘in the substance of the Holy Trinity any names do not signify one thing and another, whether in terms of parts or qualities, but they signify only substance itself, neither divided into parts nor changed through qualities.’ His argument here was based on Priscian’s definition of a noun as a nomen signifying substance with quality. In God there could be no distinction of quality, as this would imply mutability and variation within the divine simplicity. Therefore, the nomina given to the three members of the Trinity had to refer to substance alone. Mews argues that the Greek definition of the Trinity appealed to Roscelin because ‘it fitted with what he had learnt from Priscian about the meaning of a noun...While a name signified a quality in this created world, there was no such potential for partiality or mutability in God.’645

For the majority of the letter, Roscelin was primarily concerned with the identification of nomina with substantiae; the definition of a person as a thing (res) only appeared towards the end of his discussion, where he argued that Augustine ‘did not completely deny that there were three eternals...for they [the divine persons] were severally eternal, just like several eternal things.’646 Nevertheless, he continued to stress the unity inherent in the single essence of the Trinity.647 The claim that Roscelin advocated a form of tri-theism in distinguishing between three substantiae or res is unfounded. Roscelin insisted on the absolute simplicity and unity of the divine essence, but was at the same time determined to make adequate distinction between the members of the Trinity. His primary concern in the letter to Abelard as well as in the other texts attributed to him was not so much with the nature of things as of words, in particular the ontological status of nouns. However, his teaching could easily be

644 Sciendum est uero, quod in substantia sanctae Trinitatis quarlibet nomina non aliud et aliud significant, siue quantum ad partes siue quantum ad qualitates, sed ipsam solam non in partes dixisam nec per qualitates mutatam significant substantiam. Non igitur per personam aliud aliquid significamus quam per substantiam, licet ex quandam loquendi consuetudine triplicare soleamus personam, non substantiam, sicut Graeci triplicare solent substantiam. Neque vero dicendum est quod in fide Trinitatis errent triplicando substantiam, quia licet aliter dicant quam nos, id tamen credunt quod nos, quia, sivut diximus, siue persona siue substantia siue essentia in Deo prorsus idem significant. In locutione enim tantum diversitas est, in fide unitas. Roscelin, Epistola, p. 72.


646 Non omnino tres aeternos negasse...aeterni enim erant pluraliter, sicut plures res aeternae. Roscelin, Epistola, p. 76.

647 In addition to this letter, Mews identifies two further texts that he believes to be Roscelin’s work, both of which employ similar arguments concerning substance and quality, and the different nuances in Greek and Latin terminology. Mews, ‘Nominalism and Theology before Abelard: New Light on Roscelin of Compiègne’, Vivarium 30 (1992), pp. 4-33; and ‘St Anselm and Roscelin II’. 195
interpreted as an assault on orthodox teaching on the nature of the Trinity. Given the parallels that could be drawn with aspects of Anselm’s own writing on the meaning of *substantia* and *persona* in the Trinity, Anselm was right to be worried.

**Abelard, Roscelin and Anselm on the Trinity**

In *De incarnatione Verbi*, Anselm attempted to explain the essential unity of the Trinity and how this could be reconciled with the incarnation of the Son alone, without the Father and the Holy Spirit. To illustrate his argument, he employed a traditional analogy comparing the three persons of the Trinity to the source, stream and lake of the river Nile. Source, stream and lake were all distinct entities that could not be confused with each other, and yet all three were equally called ‘the Nile’.

Therefore the source, the stream, the lake are three, but there is one Nile, one river, one nature, and one water, and we cannot say that anything is three. For there are not three Niles or rivers or waters or natures, and neither are there three sources or streams or lakes. Therefore, we say one thing of three things, and three things of one thing, and yet not the three things of one another. 648

The identification of the Father with the source, the Son with the stream and the Holy Spirit with the delta not only demonstrated how there could be three persons in one God, but also the generation of the Son from the Father, as the stream from the source; and the procession of the Holy Spirit from both the Father and the Son, as the lake from both the source and the stream. 649 The basic analogy was derived from Augustine, 650 but Anselm extended it to encompass the Incarnation of the Son, by the simple addition of a channel.

For if the stream should run through a channel from the source to the lake, is not the stream alone, although no other Nile than the source and the lake, in the

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648 *Tres igitur sunt fons, riuus, lacus, et unus Nilus, unus fluaius, una natura, una aqua; et dici non potest quid tres. Nam neque tres aut Nili aut fluaui aut aquae aut naturae sunt, neque tres aut fontes aut riui aut lacus. Unum igitur dicitur hic de tribus et tria de uno, nec tamen tria de inuicem. Anselm, DIV, 13.*
649 Ibid.
channel, as I would say, just as the Son alone became flesh, although no other God than the Father or the Holy Spirit?651

The channel enabled Anselm to counter Roscelin’s claim that, if the three persons of the Trinity were one in substance, then the Father and the Spirit must have become incarnate along with the Son, from whom they were substantially inseparable. However, the innovation became the subject of later criticism from Peter Abelard. In *Theologia christiana*, composed during the 1120s, Abelard listed a number of opinions posited by various masters to describe the unity and triplicity of the Trinity, each of which he dismissed as erroneous. At the end of the list, Abelard described how

there was also in our most recent times a certain man, that is Anselm, metropolitan of Canterbury, who, preserving the unity of substance, seems to have introduced a more valid analogy than those which we have discussed. Unless I am mistaken, he took the basis of his analogy from the blessed Augustine, writing *To Pope Lawrence*, introducing from this both the source and its stream, whose substance is the same, as an example of divine generation, where the substance of the generator and the generated is the same. And so the aforementioned archbishop posits that the three are of the same substance, as it were, that is, the source, the stream and the pool: the source indeed from which is the stream as if the Father from whom is the Son, and the pool indeed which comes forth from the source and the stream as if the Spirit who proceeds from the Father and the Son. He also puts the stream in a pipe as the Son in human flesh, as if we should say that the Word incarnate is an enpiped stream.652

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651 *Si enim riuus per fistulam currat a fonte usque ad lacum; nonne solus riuus, quamuis non alius Nilus quam fons et lacus, ut ita dicam infistulatus est, sicut solus filius incarnatus est, licet non alius deus quam pater et spiritus sanctus?* Anselm, DIV, 14.

Clanchy believes that this passage in Abelard’s *Theologia* constitutes a ‘mockery’ of Anselm’s analogy and, by extension, of Anselm himself. He argues that Abelard deliberately played upon the potential double meaning of the *fistula* which Anselm had used to describe the incarnation. Although the term *fistula* had a variety of meanings in the Middle Ages, both sacred and profane, Clanchy emphasizes its association with bodily orifices, and hence with running sores and urine. ‘Expressed in this crude form, the analogy was patently absurd and covertly obscene.’ Whether this interpretation would have been uppermost in the minds of Abelard’s audience is doubtful, as there is no reason why they should not have imagined the *fistula* as the perfectly innocent water course that Anselm intended. Similar imagery was used by other authors, including Bernard of Clairvaux, without any suggestion of crudity. Nevertheless, given Abelard’s penchant for word play and irreverent jokes, exhibited throughout his career, it is easy to imagine that the opportunity offered by Anselm’s potentially incongruous juxtaposition of plumbing and divinity may have proved too difficult to resist. Whether this constitutes deliberate and vindictive ‘mockery’ of Anselm is another matter.

Abelard’s most serious criticism of Anselm’s analogy was that it implied a temporal succession of modes of being, as the substance of water was first the source, then the stream, and finally the pool. The water of the source was not at the same time the water of the stream or of the pool, as the substance of the Father is at the same time the substance of the Son and the Holy Spirit. ‘On the contrary’, Abelard concluded, ‘perhaps this analogy very strongly supports that heresy which confuses the properties of the persons over time, so that it says the same person is the Father when he wills, the Son when he wills, or the Holy Spirit.’ The heresy referred to was Sabellianism, which understated the distinction of the three persons in the Trinity by defining them as no more than a succession of modes. Anselm’s analogy was vulnerable to this accusation, as the water of the Nile (the unity of the Godhead) became successively the source, the stream and the pool (the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit).

This defect in the analogy had been recognized by Anselm himself. In his original exposition in *De incarnatione*, he pointed out that the spatial and temporal procession of the Nile was an imperfect figure of the divine Trinity that was unrestricted by the constraints of

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653 Clanchy, ‘Mockery’.
656 *Immo fortassis haec similitudo illi maxime suffragatur haeresi quae ita per temporum proprietates personarum commiscet, ut eadem personam dicit quando uult esse Patrem, quando uult Filium uel Spiritum Sanctum.* Abelard, TC, 4.83.
space and time. He did not immediately elaborate on this point, apparently expecting his readers to recognize that analogies such as this one should not be taken too literally or stretched beyond their initial, and very specific, points of comparison. Nevertheless, he returned to the analogy and its limitations in greater detail in his later treatise *De processione Spiritus Sancti* (1102), which focussed on the procession of the Holy Spirit from both the Father and the Son. The Greeks claimed that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father alone, through the Son, just as the pool proceeds not from the stream but from the spring, through the stream. Anselm argued that this would be true if there were a temporal or spatial procession of the Father to the Son, so that the Spirit was from the Father before it was from the Son, as the water in the pool proceeds initially from the spring, passing afterwards through the stream but not proceeding from the stream. However,

since the Son born from the Father does not go outside the Father but, remaining in him, is not distinct from the Father in place or time or essence; and since that from which the Holy Spirit proceeds is one and the same for the Father and the Son, we neither can understand nor ought to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and not from the Son. Therefore, we it seems that we cannot say rationally that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, but from the Father through the Son, since even if he be through the Son, he cannot not be from the Son.

Although some masters of dialectic such as Roscelin and Abelard were notorious for highlighting the inadequacies of physical analogies for metaphysical concepts, pushing them beyond their capacity in order to draw potentially dangerous or absurd conclusions, the majority of twelfth-century authors continued to recognize their utility. The nature of the Trinity was so far beyond human understanding that no form of argument or illustrative

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658 *Verum cum filius nascens de patre non exeat extra patrem, sed in ipso manens nec loco nec tempore nec essentia diversus sit a patre; et cum unum idemque sit patri et filio id unde procedit spiritus sanctus: nec intelligi potest nec dici debet spiritum sanctum procedere de patre et non de filio. Non ergo uidetur que ratione dicatur spiritus sanctus non procedere de filio, sed de patre per filium, cum etiamsi per filium, nequeat non de filio.* Anselm, *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, ed. Schmitt, *Opera*, vol. 2, pp. 174-219, 9. Gillian Evans suggests that the fact that Anselm felt it necessary to explain these difficulties with the analogy in his later work ‘suggests that the Anselmian images of the Trinity were the subject of current debate in the schools,’ and that the rigorous analysis imposed on them in the scholastic environment had forced Anselm to consider the further implications of his model. She describes how, in the early twelfth century, Augustinian analogies such as this were becoming out-dated in scholastic circles, with a greater emphasis on syllogism and images derived from mathematics for explaining difficult metaphysical concepts such as the Trinity. Evans, ‘St Anselm’s Images of Trinity’, *Journal of Theological Studies*, 27 (1976), pp. 46-57, at p. 52.
model would ever suffice as a complete explanation of its mysteries. Traditional analogies such as those used by Augustine continued to be employed alongside other forms of argumentation, as Anselm had done in his treatises *De incarnatione* and *De processione*. As long as they were read in the spirit Anselm had intended, as illustrations of particular aspects of the Trinity, rather than exact scientific models, there was nothing controversial about them, and little reason to discuss his reworking of orthodox ideas and images in scholastic texts. Unlike his original contributions to contemporary debates on key subjects such as the necessity of the incarnation, in *Cur Deus homo*, there was little in Anselm’s writing on the Trinity to stimulate active debate in the schools of the early twelfth century.

659 E.g. Hugh of St Victor, *DS*, 1.3; Bernard of Clairvaux, *De consideratione*, 6-9; Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, 1.
Conclusions

Anselm’s thought was of considerable importance in the development of twelfth-century thought, and was certainly of more widespread and diverse impact than has previously been established. Far from being a minor figure within the formative years of scholasticism, Anselm remained, in key areas of doctrinal evolution, central. The resurgence of his thought in the later twelfth and early thirteenth centuries was part of a continuity of interest, different in shape and contour across the theological landscape but ever-present.

It is the major contention of this thesis that Anselm’s thinking on a number of theological subjects provided crucial material for the development of theology in north-western Europe during the twelfth century. At the Cathedral schools, the nascent University of Paris, and in monastic locations, Anselmian themes were openly debated, and Anselmian questions explored. Anselm’s thought, it has been suggested, lay at the heart of major doctrinal development on the theology of the redemption, and contributed significantly in other areas too, on the questions surrounding free will and sin. In a more limited, but no less important way, Anselm’s Trinitarian thought was engaged with, although not to the extent as would be the case in the thirteenth century, when his thought would underpin two seemingly contradictory approaches to the understanding of the Trinity. In the case of his Trinitarian thought, Anselm’s twelfth century legacy was less to challenge than to explain.

If one of the characteristic directions of twelfth century theological thinking was the work of redemption, as Hugh of St Victor expressed it, then this was in large part built upon Anselmian foundations. The question of how the economy of salvation operated, the place and role of reason in establishing the necessity and fittingness of atonement through Christ drew throughout the period on Anselmian vocabulary and intellectual practice. Similarly the challenge to older modes of thought in the question of the rights of the devil has within it something of the same critical spirit that would characterize early scholastic thought. Anselm was invoked in more polemical circumstances, both in theological engagement over the Trinity with Roscelin, but also in the Christian-Jewish polemical literature of the early twelfth century. Here once more, his thought can be seen to be inspirational; he was not always followed, his line of reasoning was not always accepted, but the notion of a question-centred approach to doctrinal inquiry was a large part of his theological method, and an important contribution to the later medieval intellectual landscape.

Within the ensuing discussion the different communities within which his thought moved has been striking. To that extent a study of his influence shows something of the
personal and community structures upon which twelfth century theology was grounded and in
which it was nurtured and developed. Communities of learning that were inter-connected
encouraged debate and meditation upon contemporary thought alongside the Bible, the
Fathers, classical authorities and early medieval writings. Twelfth-century authors might be
chary of acknowledging the role of the *moderni* in theological debate, but to trace the
influence of Anselm’s thought within these circles shows the extent to which these
communities were fluid, permeable and inventive. Finally, this discussion reveals something
more too of the multiplicity of currents of theological thought in a period of considerable
intellectual fecundity. Anselm himself wrote in a controlled and remarkably consistent
manner, which few after him were able to mimic. It is, however, the variety of theological
visions to which his thought contributed that might be emphasized. The development of
theology in the early twelfth century was a product of multiple influences and multiple
centres, from which its creative energy derived.
Appendix

Manuscripts of Anselm’s Works in England, Normandy and Flanders

An exhaustive survey of all known manuscripts of Anselm’s works in the early twelfth century lies far beyond the scope of this thesis. The following tables are by no means comprehensive, but aim to provide a general overview of the distribution of Anselm manuscripts in the key areas of England, Normandy and Flanders. Some of the manuscripts listed are still extant and identified in modern collections; these are indicated by underlining where they appear in the tables. Others are known only from references in medieval book lists and library catalogues. As we often have no way of dating manuscripts from later medieval catalogues which are no longer extant or have not been identified, I have included information from thirteenth- and fourteenth-century catalogues, as it is possible that some of these manuscripts may be of an early date.

The difficulties of establishing precise dates for individual manuscripts mean that it is often impossible to state with any certainty when a text became available at a given location, or when individual readers may have gained their first access. These difficulties were highlighted by Thomas Bestul in his examination of the manuscript tradition of *Cur Deus homo* in the twelfth century. Nevertheless, as Bestul’s work has shown, there is much to be gained from a study of the manuscript evidence for the transmission of texts, and a detailed analysis of the availability of the corpus as a whole, combining what can be deduced of exemplars and manuscript families with a prosopographical study of the relationships between monastic houses and individual scribes and scholars, would be an extremely worthwhile study for future research on the reception of Anselm’s thought.

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Key to Tables

Items which have been underlined represent extant manuscripts. Items which have not been underlined represent manuscripts that are only known through medieval booklists and library catalogues.

Abbreviations

M: Monologion
P: Proslogion
DG: De grammatico
DV: De ueritate
DLA: De libertate arbitrii
DCD: De casu diaboli
DIV: De incarnatione Verbi
CDH: Cur Deus homo
DCV: De conceptu uirginali
DPSS: De processione Spiritus Sancti
DC: De concordia
MRH: Meditatio redemptionis humanae
Med.: Meditationes
Or.: Orationes
Ep.: Epistolae
DSAF: Epistola de sacrificio azimi et fermentati
DSE: Epistola de sacramentis ecclesiae
DS: De similitudinibus
DB: De beatitudine
DA: Dicta Anselmi

Mtff. (Table 2 only): indicates a reference in Montfaucon’s 1739 Bibliotheca Bibliothecarum. Unless otherwise identified, these manuscripts are undated.
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